Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe: Between Ethnic Diversity and Equality

Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe Between Ethnic Diversity and Equality

On the Boundary of Two Worlds: Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics 18

Editor Leonidas Donskis, Member of the European Parliament, and previously Professor and Dean of Vytautas Magnus University School of Political Science and Diplomacy in Kaunas, Lithuania. Editorial and Advisory Board Timo Airaksinen, University of Helsinki, Finland Egidijus Aleksandravicius, Lithuanian Emigration Institute, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania Stefano Bianchini, University of Bologna, Forlì Campus, Italy Endre Bojtar, Institute of Literary Studies, Budapest, Hungary Kristian Gerner, University of Lund, Sweden John Hiden, University of Glasgow, UK Mikko Lagerspetz, Åbo Academy, Finland Andreas Lawaty, Nordost-Institute, Lüneburg, Germany Olli Loukola, University of Helsinki, Finland Hannu Niemi, University of Helsinki, Finland Alvydas Nikzentaitis, Lithuanian History Institute, Lithuania Yves Plasseraud, Paris, France Rein Raud, Rector of Tallinn University, Estonia Alfred Erich Senn, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, and Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania David Smith, University of Glasgow, UK Saulius Suziedelis, Millersville University, USA Joachim Tauber, Nordost-Institut, Lüneburg, Germany Tomas Venclova, Yale University, USA

Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe Between Ethnic Diversity and Equality

Edited and introduced by

Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009

Cover photo: Lúnik 9, a Roma borough in the city of Košice, Slovakia. © Sylvia Allen The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2733-6 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2734-3 © Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009 Printed in the Netherlands

Table of Contents Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe: An Introduction Timofei Agarin and Malte Brosig

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Section I International Organizations and Minority Integration in Europe The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights? Manuela Riedel

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The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for Advancing the Rights of Minorities Alexander H. E. Morawa

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The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Equality Promotion Malte Brosig

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Beyond Conflict Prevention: HCNM and Minority Integration Natalie Sabanadze

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Section II Political Integration of Minority Communities Comparing European Institutional and Hungarian Approaches to Roma (Gypsy) Minorities Annabel Tremlett

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The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania: Legal Framework for Social Inclusion Michaela Salamun

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Political Community, Political Institutions and Minority Politics in Slovakia 1998–2006 Ada-Charlotte Regelmann

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Cooptation as Integration? National Programme “Integration of Society in Latvia” on Minority Participation Timofey Agarin

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Social Cohesion Estonian Style: Minority Integration Through Constitutionalized Hegemony and Fictive Pluralism Tove H. Malloy

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Section III The Interface of Minority and Majority Communities Round Pegs in Square Holes: Integrating the Romani Community in Hungary Aidan McGarry

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Empowerment as a two-way Process: The Role of Romani NGOs in Integration of Macedonian Society Sara Nikolić

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Romani Teaching Assistants in the Czech Education System: An Opportunity to Address Barriers to the Labour Market? Laura Cashman

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Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe? Concluding Observations Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig

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Contributors

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Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe: An Introduction Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) was anticipated with great expectations. The aspiring member states expected the EU to guarantee economic prosperity and political recognition, while Western countries saw political integration of the continent as a way to secure peace and stability throughout the region. Both sides viewed EU-accession as a tool providing an opportunity to overcome ethnic tensions and irredentism, as well as promoting social cohesion through the process of European integration. However, the optimistic predictions that ethnic conflicts would disappear following economic development and regional integration into the EU, NATO and other organizations did not materialize as had been hoped. Prior to and following EU accession, CEE countries had to develop their own strategies to accommodate large minority populations on their territories. Today these states provide models of their own to address minority protection and find local interpretations of what integration entails. In spite of the relatively short experience in devising policies relevant (and suitable) to minorities, most of the CEE countries precipitated the change in relations between the state institutions and the societies they govern, that result from development of an ever closer European Union. Interstate treaties, trans-border cooperation and regional initiatives considerably improved the status of minority groups across CEE. All new EU member states have found ways to address political, economic, and social inequalities between their majority and minority residents Still, many issues remain contested. It appears that every country in CEE provides a plethora of questions to debate inequalities between the majority and minority population. For the members of minority groups across the region there is much more at stake than the majority groups of their countries of residence are prepared to accept in the course of social integration. However, considerable local knowledge is required to develop minority integration in practice. None of the programmes developed by the state aiming at minority integration across the region show overlap in goals, practices or incentives. That is not to say that these approaches to integration are incomparable. Arguably, broad scale generalizations are insensitive to details of local implementation and case-studies provide too much detail at the expense of an overall elegance of narrative. In this volume we sought to strike a balance between the two extremes by providing a detailed narrative underlying

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Introduction

______________________________________________________________ policy-making, but also pointing to potential issues of contention between local, national and European policies. This volume provides the reader with a detailed account of current challenges in integrating ethnic minority groups in CEE countries. We thereby took great care not to slide into one-sided modes of analysis privileging either the international, national or societal dimension of integration but aim at covering the most important aspects of minority integration across disciplines as different as anthropology, political science, sociology and law. This multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary approach to minority integration, in our view, best covers the complex reality on the ground. We have deliberately decided not to promote a certain theory of integration or concept of multiculturalism which would only account for certain aspects of minority integration but hardly cover the existing complexity of the issue. The volume clearly privileges theoretical, analytical and disciplinary pluralism over deductive monism. Thus the contributions to this volume do not aim at further developing or testing theoretical models of integration in the first place but deliver analytically informed rich empirical examinations of current challenges in ethnic minority integration in CEE. Consequently, the volume follows an inherently inductive orientation uncovering those challenges that international organizations, nation-states, minority groups and mainstream society encounter in the 21st century demarcating a long path to effective equality and integration. In this volume we bring together the contributions discussing minority integration in countries as diverse as Albania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Estonia, and Hungary. Our contributors analyze the concepts and interpretations related to minority integration, more frequently than not questioning the outcome of integration efforts in countries under review. In order to provide a comprehensive overview on these issues and debates, we analyze different approaches, advocated by various actors in the field. Throughout the volume our contributors argue that particular ways of accommodating minority groups in CEEC have been developed. Minority integration, as we argue in the volume, reflects on particular histories of minority settlement, relations with external states, engagement of international actors, and decisively, the majorities’ perception of “their” nation-states. By and large, where “national citizenship” became more open and embraced, social differences, alongside cultural and linguistic diversity within political community prevailed in developing models more effective than those already in place across Western European EU states. 1. The European Dimension of Minority Integration Minority integration issues are currently gaining attention across Europe, particularly since the last two rounds in EU enlargement. Since 2004 the EU has become more diverse than ever: 23 official languages have been regis-

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______________________________________________________________ tered in Brussels, 60 indigenous languages are actively spoken in the EU comprising not less than 40 million people and 190 different ethnic minority groups (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 2). The diversity of ethnic belonging almost naturally raises the question of equal opportunity for all members of societies affected, especially when considering disparities between the dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups in most EU member states. The EU’s focus on non-discrimination dominates the current discourse on minority rights across the member and non-member states alike. The contributions of our volume suggest that growing attention to social inclusion across the European continent is the outcome of a general shift in the international perception of minority rights issues. Minority rights in the early 1990s had for a considerable time, been constructed through the prism of security. It was primarily the trepidation of Western European countries towards the potential of ethnic violence and war in the Balkan region which led the EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Council of Europe (COE) to (re)-discover the discourse on minority rights. The war in the former Yugoslavia was perceived to be a threat to security in South-Eastern Europe, potentially spreading beyond the Balkans. The demise of the Soviet Union could also have had unprecedented geopolitical consequences for CEE states. Lasting political and economic transition across CEE countries could destabilize societies, revealing ethnic tensions, previously suppressed by the socialist leadership. It was in this light that in 1992 the OSCE set up a special body responsible for monitoring and prevention of ethnic conflicts, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). In addition, in 1994 the COE drafted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) which became the first international legally binding agreement formulating specific minority rights norms. Finally, the so-called Copenhagen EU-accession criteria, elaborated in 1993, made EU-membership conditional on the respect for and protection of minorities. Twenty years on, there is no evidence of ethnic warfare occurring outside of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Across CEE countries it appears political, economic and social transition has been at least successful enough to prevent ethnic conflict, while continuously improving majority-minority relations. These achievements give evidence of the positive impact of international engagement in CEE states and societies. The COE’s legally binding instruments for minority rights protection, the HCNM’s quiet diplomacy, EU membership conditionality and financial support to the states, are essential for the successful promotion of minority integration standards throughout CEE. In this context international institutions establish benchmarks for equal treatment of minority groups throughout the region. Classical state monitoring on the implementation of human rights treaties - such as FCNM, jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights, new governance instru-

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______________________________________________________________ ments in the case of the EU and social inclusion initiatives advanced by the OSCE in the course of its conflict prevention approach – were all fundamental to securing the interethnic accord across the region. Indeed, one of the most important functions international organizations can fulfil is the setting of standards which has at least two advantages over individual national standard setting. First, it ensures comparability between cases and avoids bias to a certain group of people or the unique actor constellation in one country. Second, international institutions engage in norm setting as a non-partisan actor who does not pursue its own ethnic interests. Although international support for integrative measures is often essential for their lasting success, international institutions contribute far less towards enforcement and implementation of these standards on the ground. Generally, international institutions depend on their member states’ willingness to implement commonly agreed conventions, declarations, jurisdictions and policy targets. None of the international organizations has its local administrative bodies, which could facilitate, not even to mention, implement integration policies. Even the EU which is by far the world’s most active and successful international regulator does not implement any of its regulations and directives, spelt out in well beyond 100,000 pages of the acquis communautaire. However, the EU has certainly the most general influence on social inclusion policies in its member states, not least because of its legislative and financial capacities. The same also holds for the COE and OSCE, which in contrast with the EU, have very limited financial means to support nation-states’ integration programmes. These organizations’ role is limited to monitoring the implementation of legal standards, giving advice, and providing organizational support for the setting up of integration measures. Despite these limitations the COE and OSCE have much to contribute. Their most valuable role is in the distribution of knowledge on European best-practices and the development of benchmark legislation for sustainable and successful integration measures. This becomes particularly important because of the general lack of experience in setting up minority integration concepts and strategies in CEE. Taking the situation of different minority groups into account, international institutions collect data and provide information on a wide range of situations to its nation-states. They are then expected to devise specific policy-solutions to the problems on the ground that would correspond to European-wide action plans and comply with European legal standards. The promotion of equal rights and effective equality throughout CEE comprises social, economic, and political integration measures. In this respect, European institutions engage in a multi-level and multi-actor game. While no single international institution dominates the scene, horizontal cooperation provides the greatest potential for cooperation and converges into a

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______________________________________________________________ broader European approach to minority rights. The fact that the COE is developing legal standards for minority integration through the FCNM and the jurisprudence of its human rights court is complemented by the EU’s policy initiatives on social inclusion and non-discrimination. Cooperation between the EU, COE and OSCE has been intensifying over the past decade. Since 2001 the EU and COE have been institutionalizing their cooperation in a joint programme line, addressing issues of multiculturalism and social inclusion. At the same time significant differences remain in the activities of the EU and the COE. The EU has not developed a comprehensive set of minority rights but is very active in the field of nondiscrimination and social inclusion. The COE, on the other hand, additionally seeks to guarantee minorities’ linguistic, cultural and political rights. The relationship between the EU and the COE should thus be seen as that of complementary cooperation on the issues relevant to the legal status of a minority with an overlapping interest in minority integration. At the vertical axis international organizations seek interaction with both the states and a multitude of domestic actors. This spectrum reaches from multi-national non-governmental organizations to central, regional and local administrative bodies, from local civic initiatives to nearly all sorts of minority pressure groups. Here international institutions create conditions in support of minorities’ integration into society by benchmarking, monitoring, mediating, and funding of integration programmes. Admittedly the EU, OSCE, and COE only have limited experience and competence in the area of minority integration, which poses a number of new challenges to the expertise of international organizations in that area. This raises the question of whether the EU, or any other international organization, is capable of generating some base-line for inter-ethnic cooperation across the region? While our contributors do not underestimate the complexity of the question, they argue that only a concerted action at both the international and national levels can guarantee equal opportunity for participation of minorities across the CEE. 2. The National Dimension of Minority Integration International organizations involved with supporting social inclusion and promoting equality of minorities play an important role in reducing tensions between the ethnic communities on the domestic level across CEE. Especially noteworthy is the international organizations’ effort in setting parameters for good practice towards minority populations. Needless to say, fulfilling this task is not easy at all. The notion of equality can be stretched widely to encompass interpretations as diverse as entitlement for participation in decision-making to prohibition of unequal treatment in the public sphere, from individual-centred affirmative action to group-oriented support of selfgovernment in areas of compact settlement.

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______________________________________________________________ Not surprisingly, the lack of normative guidelines at the international level towards minority integration results in deficient practical application of integration at the state level. How divergent approaches to integration should, and how they should not be applied creates real problems in justifying the promotion of specific instruments for minority protection (Patten and Kymlicka, 2003, pp. 32-37). Most of the international organizations involved in minority integration projects have previously advised nation-states to apply pragmatic rules and support policies that have measurable positive impacts on integration. General indicators for minority integration, such as unemployment and literacy rates, proportional representation in private and public sectors of economy, as well as participation and visibility in political institutions were used for this purpose. Parekh summarizes the outcome of equal treatment policies, following which “All citizens should enjoy equal opportunities to acquire the capacities and skills needed to function in society and to pursue their self-chosen goals equally effectually” (2000, p. 211). In this sense, the role of the nation-state in fostering equitable treatment of minorities and majorities is not limited to the distribution of material resources and to provisions of fair access to public goods. Recognition of minority groups as equal partners in policy-making and implementation relies heavily on the equal treatment of individuals, irrespective of their group membership, and their linguistic, cultural or ethnic specificity. Clearly, the concept of equality is determined by the social environment and relational attitudes of groups engaged in establishing what “ equal treatment” means. Being an intersubjectively and relatively defined social good, equality is embedded in the general social and, crucially, political context. It is operationalized and endowed with meanings which make sense to individuals and groups, engaged in the effort of negotiating the terms of cooperation and finally, integration. Therefore the discussion on social justice is central for debating the processes of intergroup relations generally, and integration processes particularly. Minority opinions play an important part in these deliberations, because they allow a more elaborate definition of justice, and oppose perpetuation of institutional equilibria, maintaining the majority’s monopoly of power resources. The problem of equality between the minority and majority is not limited to countries we investigate in the volume. Like the majority of EU states, the polities across CEE are defined in terms of nation-states. From within this context, every state in the region “belongs” to one particular ethnic group, whose name it bears; to the group, whose special relation with “its” state is rarely questioned. At the same time, various European and international organizations sought to initiate institutional changes which would facilitate minority participation in decision-making processes. The EU, COE, HCNM all questioned the monopoly of states’ majorities over political resources in “their” countries, suggesting a potential security dilemma should minority

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______________________________________________________________ grievances be continuously neglected. On the flip side, even though political actors across CEE were reluctant to question the dominant status of majority groups over minorities in their societies, formal equality between the groups provides the starting point for deliberation on further concessions. The contributions of the book address this relationship head-on. Most of them conclude that no regulations prescribing equal access of minority groups to political resources are effective in their own right. Instead, financial support and affirmative action are among the resources that make some difference over time, resulting in – possibly, but not necessarily – a multicultural outlook of a given society. Along the lines suggested in the current multiculturalism debate, our authors observe that common civic identity of state citizens, where “constitutional patriotism” dominates over ethnic particularism are not devoid of ethnic criteria (Kymlicka, 2000; Soysal, 1994; Parekh, 2000). Most definitely, no state which nurtures the civic identity of its citizens over ethnically defined group-memberships is entirely free of bias in favour of its constituent culture. All multicultural societies establish some form of cultural hierarchies in the public sphere, leaving unquestioned the relation between the official state language and minority languages, the core state culture/s and non-core cultures, the state’s dominant group and nondominant communities. In this sense, our contributors observe that unless the states in CEE define their societies in cultural, linguistic, racial and any other exclusive terms, one can hardly speak of accomplished integration. This does not mean the end of appreciation for cultural differences in societies, but requires challenging the assumption that all individuals have equal resources, irrespective of their personal cultural endowments. As Malloy rightly points out, “the value of culture must be appreciated as a valuable contribution to the individual’s development and capability to function in society, especially the individual’s capability to act in the economic sphere without risking exclusion” (2005, p. 12). This point is of particular salience throughout the region we study in the book. Here, the cultural markers dominate the design of political institutions and thus require particular attention to minority opinions while addressing the issue of integration. The debate of unequal resource distribution between the majorities and minorities across CEE states would be incomplete without addressing the role of state-building in creating the basic provisions for the understanding of multiculturalism in the given societies. Where some scholars see institutional design to be of crucial importance for equal access to state resources from minority groups (Linz and Stepan, 1996), others tend to disagree. Political participation, they argue, is crucial to establish the rules of the game and is central for broad-scale democratization in societies (Rueschmeyer et al., 1998). In this context, structural mechanisms available to the members of a minority to improve their position within political settings across CEE is

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______________________________________________________________ always defined by the members of the majority, who are – most obviously – reluctant to render some of their structural advantage to other groups. Needless to say, this leaves plenty of room for improving mutual perceptions of majorities and minorities across the region. However, potential for improvement is most frequently mistaken for deficits of existing institutional design, a point that need not be reproduced here. Instead, additional attention should be granted to analyses of relations between the state- and nation-building, which went hand in hand since the inception of democratic movements against the socialist regimes in all countries across CEE (Brubaker, 1996; Brubaker, 2004; Jenne, 2006; Galbreath, 2005). If state- and nation-building are so closely interlinked, should one treat the challenge of minority integration as a by-product of (post-socialist) democratic transition? Possibly this is the case, but it is not necessarily so. The state approaches to minority integration in all CEE states address many issues which are relevant to minority. And in many cases, even the nationalizing states invite minority groups to cooperate with the existing institutions and majority publics. However, the issues are more likely than not to be defined by majority policy-makers, and the terms of cooperation are also dictated by the dominant group. What we observe throughout CEE is ethnic and cultural diversity that presents a challenge to the current debate of multi-culturalism. The contributions in this volume suggest, among others that the statebearing nations continue to perceive themselves to be locked in position, where active steps of protection of the national language, culture and ethnocentric education are necessary. On the other hand, however, our authors demonstrate that there is an anticipation of change in the relations between the core and non-core ethnic communities across CEE countries. The majority and minority are involved in shaping state policies, but the core ethnic community plays a role far more decisive than does a minority. In this context, the members of the minority are expected to adapt to the dominance of the state-bearing ethnic group, its language, and importantly, its visions of political community. The chapters addressing state-policies aimed at integration suggest that non-core groups are expected to accept the position assigned to them by the majority in their state of residence. The case-studies presented in the second section of our book make clear that issues on which minority communities are invited to deliberate are framed by majorities. In this, minority groups do not feature as equal partners engaged in the process of institutional change. It is in this section of the book that the limits of the state-led approach to societal integration become clearly visible. As our contributors argue, intergroup relations remain tense due to a tight connection between the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic interests of statebearing group, embedded in design of state institutions. Although the ethnocentric agenda of many CEE states is to a degree balanced by international leverage, state institutions tend to prefer homogeneous societies to be dealt

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______________________________________________________________ with, over multicultural ones. This is where, as our contributors suggest, one should look for multicultural solutions in the day-to-day interactions between the individuals of various cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Analyses of relations between the members of majority and minority groups provide some insight into expected outcomes of integration on both sides as well as strategies applicable on case to case basis. 3. The Role of Society in Minority Integration To be effective, social integration requires a bottom-line consensus on what individuals involved see as a desirable and necessary outcome. The terms and the expected effects of integration need to be negotiated among and across broad segments of both the majority and minority communities. However, as our contributors observe, majority and minority groups seem to pursue different goals and thus favour different, partially excluding means to achieve societal integration. While the members of the majority regard integration as a tool with which to increase social cohesion and improve institutional performance, the members of minority usually seek to augment group integrity and stability by securing the status of their group. Scholarly investigations of the claims advanced by the members of majority groups in the course of negotiating the terms of integrations are usually regarded as instruments of nation- and state-building under the conditions of uncertainty (Brubaker, 2004; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999). Particularly, earlier discussions of majority claims emphasize the importance of the legal framework of the state, historical experiences and international legal standards of state sovereignty if formulated for the international consumer (Vachudova, 2005). At the same time, others investigating the rhetoric of majorities’ political entrepreneurs produced for a home audience argue that the primary aim of this rhetoric rests with legitimizing majorities’ dominance over local minorities (Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Nic Craith, 2006). Irrespective of the interpretation sought, majority populations throughout CEE constitute the state-bearing nations and thus exhort significant pressures on members of other groups, who happen to reside on the territory of “their” state. Therefore most students of post-socialist ethnic relations argue that the emphasis on “special relation” of majority communities with “their” state requires interpretations from a rational choice perspective (Laitin 1998; Wimmer, 2002; Hale, 2008). The interpretations of the policies differ considerably, depending on the strategies majority and minority groups deploy to achieve the best possible outcomes from their interactions. Some claim that nationalizing policies are nothing less than a thinly veiled effort to secure the redistribution of available resources among the members of an in-group (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Hechter 2000). Others argue that the majorities opt for nationalizing policies to circumvent ethnic tensions during the

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Introduction

______________________________________________________________ period of institutional change (Connor, 1993; Pridham and Gallagher, 2000). Yet another camp of rational choice interpretations suggests that ethnonational mobilization of the majority is resulting from perceptions of immanent external threat to the state and its constituent group (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Laitin 2007; Saidemann, 2001). All these interpretations can be (and have been) applied to all of the cases studied in this volume. Our contributors, however, claim that it is impossible to understand political rationale behind integration approaches throughout the region without taking seriously the minority/majority relations outside of the formal institutional political arena. The extent of political, social and economic changes across the region had an immediate impact on the legal status of state-languages, opportunities for minority education, political participation and representation of minority populations. The policy-measures alone, however, fail to account for particular strategies of adaptation favoured by the members of non-dominant groups. Where the members of majority groups were taking the upper hand in determining political reforms and path development of state institutions, many members of minority populations were left estranged from political processes. However, day-to-day interactions, be it in public institutions, at workplace, or in educational facilities remain an integral part of minorities’ interaction with the members of majority and improvement of intergroup relations. In a way, the members of minority communities tacitly confirm to the structural limitations on their activities, when they interact with the members of the majority on “their” terms and in “their” language, in institutions designed to serve primarily the majorities’ interests. But how far do they accept the terms of interaction? How do minorities address their grievances with institutions in place, when they interact with one another? The contributions in the section three of the volume suggest that even despite being designed to the disadvantage of minorities, minority groups have considerable leverage to participate in political decision making. The section points out that throughout the region minorities have little say on policy development in their states of residence, despite the fact that some steps have been undertaken during the past decade across CEE to provide additional opportunities for minority participation in public life. Throughout the region states addressed some minority grievances, prompting minority’s adaptation to the changing social reality, but there is only a limited framework for non-dominant groups’ political participation. Mainly their activities are confined to social cooperation envisaged by the state integration programmes, majority political actors and local initiatives. This once again indicates that minority participation is not treasured for its intrinsic value, i.e. as positively affecting institutional performance and increasing diversity, but rather as symbolic engagement in affirming decisions, previously made by the members of the majority. Here, the contributions underline that social participation is essential to support minority inte-

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______________________________________________________________ gration effectively. However, the contributions also conclude that the majority population continues to see the democratic transition as largely “their” responsibility. So, what does minority integration entail? Is it integration for participation, or integration through participation? Effectively, the presence of minority groups requires the renegotiation of institutionalized mechanisms for providing social services and ensuring the base-line of economic equality through the lens of social justice. Across CEE majorities, while not directly discouraging minority participation, engage in dialogue with members of minority communities when they cannot address the issues tangent on minority interests because of inadequate institutional capacity. This aspect of majority/minority relations falls increasingly into the EU focus on effective equality, non-discrimination and social justice which represent the corner-stones of minority integration. Indeed, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU dedicates a whole chapter to equality, among other things banning racial discrimination and calling for respect to cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. In this document, the EU acknowledges that the project of European integration can only be successful if membership of an ethnic group does not legitimize social, economic and political marginalization. This suggests that the individual approach to minority integration, which has been developing throughout the CEE region for the two past decades, finds some correspondence in national policies. Being primarily devised as a positive response to the potential burdening of European external relations, especially security and stability on its Eastern borders, it revolutionized majority/minority relations throughout Europe considerably. The multinational nature of the EU, diversity of its resident population and increasing diversity resulting from incoming migration all require reconsideration of states’ relations with their minorities. While some citizens could blend in and accommodate more effectively under these conditions, those left behind and/or disenfranchised may gradually alienate from society and the democratic political organization of state affairs (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 151). Where some groups of citizens are deprived of effective political participation because of their ethnic belonging, the future of social relations would be particularly uncertain. In many cases involving the status of minorities without a “kin state” international organizations were particularly engaged in drawing the attention of national policymakers to issues of minority needs and living conditions. While the wellbeing and the status of minority was easily disconnected from security concerns of their states of residence as was the case with Roma, the improvement of status of minorities living of the “wrong side” of a nation-state border was more difficult to negotiate. In this sense, EU enlargement has been conducive for diminishing the fears of minority secession and irredentism, which could undermine state integrity. Persisting social, economic and political cleavages

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Introduction

______________________________________________________________ between ethnic minority communities and majority groups in CEE societies have raised questions related to social justice, economic exclusion and political marginalization. The contributions in the second section of our volume address the difficulties of ‘stranded’ minorities in their states of residence such as Magyars in Slovakia, as well as Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. However, the situation of Roma communities across CEE, as is particularly discussed in the section three, fits well into this framework. Both, international institutions and nation-states across CEE have undertaken measures to remedy the persistent exclusion of many Roma communities. It remains to be seen, however, which role each international organization and state agencies can assume in fostering integration of this particular ethnic group. The development of multiple applicable international standards and benchmarks for integration policies are already in place. Nonetheless, Roma exclusion persists across the region with the legal basis for equalizing measures not being fully exploited. The EU Racial Equality Directive and Article 4 of the FCNM enable states to apply affirmative action but it remains largely unclear under which conditions the implementation of such action is compelling. The notion of effective equality, however, requires interpretation and agreement on its minimal meaning. In some cases, equal treatment of all members of citizenry might adequately sustain differences in society; on other occasions the lack of affirmative action is likely to perpetuate inequality between ethnic groups, rather than induce their equal treatment. Because ethnic minorities across the region differ greatly in their status as well as in their access to political and social resources, only differentiated treatment of groups can ensure individual equality of minority individuals with the members of majority populations (Parekh, 2000, p. 240; Kymlicka, 2003, p. 153). Not only does this apply to day-to-day interaction between the members of the majority and minority populations, but also to state-led approaches to integration and engagement of international organizations with the issues tangent to minority equality. In this context, sensitivity to cultural differences is decisive in negotiating strategies of accommodation and integration of multicultural societies. Where institutional intervention seeks to provide guidelines and benchmarks for minority integration, international experience in devising instruments for culturally neutral approaches is essential. This holds for international as well as domestic approaches to treatment of minority groups. This requires international actors to justify attempts towards minority inclusion on a normative basis, opening inroads for the inclusion of minorities of various kinds: racial, national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic etc. In the absence of a ubiquitously applicable normative approach guiding international involvement with minority integration at the local or national levels, policies cannot prefer any model of integration once and for all. Instead, approaches to integration must be con-

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______________________________________________________________ stantly updated to changing expectations of groups involved and re-adjusted to preliminary results achieved. In this sense, while there is no European master-plan for minority integration in place, room should be made available for developing and implementing innovative approaches applicable outside of each nation-state context. 4. The Structure of the Book The volume is analyzing different levels of minority integration in three separate sections. International organizations, such as the EU, OSCE, and COE are playing an important role in the promotion of ideas and norms on ethnic diversity and will be examined in the first place. Nation-states doubtlessly play a crucial role in interpreting international norms and putting them into policies. States can impose preferred concepts of inter-ethnic relations, but they also provide fora for minority/majority conciliation to renegotiate the terms of relations. The contributions also address the role local societies play in accommodating ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity by engaging with the abstract concept of integration practically. The first part of the book reflects on the role international organizations and international law plays in promoting minority integration policies throughout the region. The involvement of the EU (Riedel), the COE (Morawa and Brosig) and the OSCE (Sabanadze) is scrutinized while discussing particular norms and standards set out by each of these organizations. Especially during EU enlargement international organizations had first to address protection of minorities and develop a legal framework for minority integration. While the three organizations are active in the promotion of liberal norms regulating minority integration standards, relations between the nation-states, the resident minority groups, they pursue different, although not incompatible goals. This section explores the concepts of minority integration, guiding their engagement with minority integration. Furthermore, this section also highlights the very different instruments organizations apply for the promotion of their concept of integration. While the OSCE relies on quiet diplomacy for conflict prevention, the COE uses socialization through monitoring. Finally the EU provides funding for integration projects and makes membership conditional upon the respect of minority protection norms. The second part of the book discusses steps undertaken in different countries across CEE to facilitate minority integration. The contributors of this part of the book address the political steps initiated by both minority political entrepreneurs, as well as those emanating from the majority dominated political establishment. Here we observe a difference in narratives from majority and minority political representatives in the process of negotiating the terms of minority integration in the framework of the nation-state. The contributions addressing the majority views on minority accommodation

20

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______________________________________________________________ suggest that the dominant groups endeavour to guarantee the central role of their cultures for the state-community. In doing so, the majorities in CEE countries appeal to the principles of multicultural social community emphasizing the importance of a common cultural core, to be accepted by all of the ethnic and linguistic communities resident in the country and willing to integrate. While the debates on multicultural citizenship are common place in CEE today, the contributors indicate that frequently these have been instrumentalized by the state-bearing community to legitimize and perpetuate the hierarchical relations between the resident ethnic groups. However, policy steps initiated by the minority groups suggest that their representatives act largely in pursuit of greater accountability by the state of their residence. The chapters discussing the involvement of minority political entrepreneurs in Hungary (Tremlett), Albania (Salamun), Estonia (Malloy), Latvia (Agarin) and Slovakia (Regelmann) suggest that the needs of social groups vary according to the history of their presence in the given state. Unfortunately, the contributors to this volume conclude, that cultural and linguistic needs of minorities are rarely met by their states of residence, if they are made with reference to cultural pluralism. As is demonstrated in the contributions, representatives of minority groups which highlight the persistence of social exclusion and segregation are more likely to be marginalized in the national politics, than achieve a notable concession for the group they represent. The third section of the volume examines social involvement in developing minority integration strategies. The authors in this section suggest that the successful implementation of integration policies and their constant development is highly dependent on the role taken by the majority population. These views are supported by the studies of the Czech Republic (Cashman), Hungary (McGarry) and Macedonia (Nikolic). Furthermore, contributors in this section find that the integration initiatives stall when the state majority is unprepared to take part in the process. Thereby inter-communal dialogue advanced by NGOs or community groups is essential for effective implementation of the national integration programmes and rapprochement between minority and majority groups. Despite the many challenges minority integration is facing at the analytical level we are investigating in this book, CEE states currently enjoy favourable conditions to achieve this ambitious goal. No doubt, ethnic minorities in today’s CEE have more opportunities to participate in political processes and engage in social interaction on terms more favourable to them as ever before. What our contributors see as decisive for guaranteeing equality between the majority and minority partners in the process, however, is the engagement of all actors from the field. The international community, nationstates, society, as well as the minority groups would need to further engage in negotiating the terms of equal treatment for all members of societies affected.

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______________________________________________________________ References Anderson, B. (1991), Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Brubaker, R. (2004), Ethnicity without Groups. London: Harvard University Press. —(1996), Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burawoy, M, and K. Verdery (eds.) (1999), Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Connor, W. (1993), “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16: 373–389. Fearon, J.D., and D.D. Laitin (2003), “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. Galbreath, D. J. (2005), Nation-Building and Minority Politics in PostSocialist States: Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Hale, H. E. (2008), The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hechter, M. (2000), Containing Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jenne, E. K. (2007), Ethnic Bargaining. The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. London: Cornell University Press. Kuzio, T. (1998), State and Nation Building in Ukraine. London: Routledge. Kymlicka, W. (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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______________________________________________________________ —(2000), Politics in the Vernacular : Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —(2003), “Multicultural states and intercultural citizens,” Theory and Research in Education, 1(2): 147–169. Kymlicka, W. and A. Patten (2003), Language Rights and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laitin, D. D. (1998), Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. —(2007), Nations, States, and Violence. New York: Oxford University Press. Linz, J. J., and A. Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Malloy, T. H. (2005), National Minority Rights in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nic Craith, M. (2006), Europe and the Politics of Language. Citizens, Migrant and Outsiders. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Patten, A. and W. Kymlicka (2003), “Introduction: Language Rights and Political Theory: Context, Issues, and Approaches” in: A. Patten and W. Kymlicka (eds.) Language Rights and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–51. Parekh, B. (2000), Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Basingstoke: Macmillian. Pridham, G. and T. Vanhanen (1994), Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives. London: Routledge. Pridham, G. and T. Gallagher (2000), Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans. London: Routledge. Rueschemeyer, D., M. Rueschemeyer, and B. Wittrock (1998), Participation and Democracy, East and West: Comparisons and Interpretations. Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharp.

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______________________________________________________________ Saideman, S. M. (2001), The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Soysal, Y. N (1994), Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Toggenburg, G. v. (2007), “Europe and the Integration of Integration,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Vachudova, M. A. (2005), Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wimmer, A. (2002), Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict. Shadows of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Section I International Organizations and Minority Integration in Europe

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights? Manuela Riedel The article presents various aspects of minority integration in the EU’s internal and external dimension, discussing the main legal texts and elements of equality and diversity as well as recent developments in the field. The text discusses three central questions: Did Brussels react to calls for common European standards on minority issues, developing a legal and political framework securing a uniform level of minority protection? In this regard, does the EU initiate measures that go beyond anti-discrimination? If so, are there any practical consequences of the EU’s approach? The author finds that to date, in the EU’s internal dimension, various programmes and initiative exist but that there seems to be a lack of coordination and interconnection. In this regard, the situation in the EU might reflect ad hoc mechanisms learned from enlargement preparations. Introduction In the early 1990s minority protection became an essential element of the EU’s democracy promotion in post-communist states. In the light of the breakdown of the Communist block and the war in former Yugoslavia, the EU discovered minority protection as a means of maintaining security and stability in the region and the EU, as a whole. As regards accession negotiations, the European Commission was the main driver of minority protection, using instruments such as conditionality. Generally speaking, the EU’s attempts to create a diverse, tolerant and multicultural society, and particularly the preparations for the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, have introduced minority rights into European political debate. To date, this has not been substantially reflected in legal texts and the focus remained on non-discrimination rather than on the promotion of special rights relevant for minorities. Nevertheless, several policy programmes, initiatives and statements by the European Commission hint at the fact that an EU system of minority integration going beyond formal equality is evolving. For example, over the last years the European Commission has developed several action plans in order to promote equal opportunities for various groups in danger of discrimination (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 7). Overall, in the internal dimension the European Parliament was a driving force on minority-related issues such as racism and xenophobia and adopted several resolutions on countering these phenomena in the mem-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 28 ______________________________________________________________ ber states and on promoting linguistic and cultural rights (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 11). The relationship between minority protection and non-discrimination is an ongoing debate, with a central question being whether anti-discrimination provisions are sufficient to ensure respect for minorities (see e.g. Tsilevich, 2001; Wiener and Schwellnus, 2004; Toggenburg, 2006). The debate has been heated in the context of the EU directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the so called Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)). In my paper I present various aspects of minority integration in the EU’s internal and external dimension, discussing the main legal texts and elements of equality and diversity as well as recent developments in the field. In order to outline the position of the EU on the matter, statements and initiatives of the European Commission will be taken as an example, due to the Commission’s central role in this regard in both the EU’s external and internal affairs. Throughout the EU accession processes, the EU asked candidate countries to comply with a number of more or less clearly defined conditions regarding the living standard of minorities. Due to a lack of EU member states’ obligation to fulfil the same criteria, discussion about so called “double standards” evolved, calling for common European standards, applicable to all members and candidates. The text discusses three central questions: Did Brussels react to such claims, developing a legal and political framework securing a uniform level of minority protection? In this regard, does the EU initiate measures that go beyond anti-discrimination? If so, are there any practical consequences of the EU’s approach? I find that to date, in the EU’s internal dimension, various programmes and initiative exist but that there seems to be a lack of coordination and interconnection. In this regard, the situation in the EU might reflect ad hoc mechanisms learned from enlargement preparations. 1. Minority Integration in the EU’s External Relations Only recently did minority protection become an issue in the EU’s external relations. Generally, for the promotion of democratic principles, including minority protection, the EU draws on definitions, instruments and experiences from other European institutions that ‘traditionally’ deal with these issues. This is due, among other reasons, to the fact that until the 1990s the EU was almost exclusively focused on economic questions, with single initiatives of the European Parliament or formal declarations by other EU institutions being exceptional. This is why since 1993, in the light of the new challenges Europe faced in the early 1990s, the Council of Europe (COE)1 and the European Commission have developed a wide-ranging cooperation on, amongst others, minority protection issues.

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______________________________________________________________ In the European Commission, the OSCE and COE Unit of the “Multilateral Relations and Human Rights Directorate” of DG External Relations (RELEX) is responsible for coordinating relations with the COE. Several Directorate Generals do have direct relations with the COE on specific subjects. One major event was the signing on 3 April 2001 of a Joint Declaration on Co-operation and Partnership by Secretary General Walter Schwimmer for the COE and Chris Patten for the European Commission, setting out the framework and principles guiding the co-operation. Following decisions taken at the COE Third Summit in May 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the EU and the COE in May 2007, providing a new framework for enhanced cooperation and political dialogue and strengthened relations in areas of common interest such as human rights, fundamental freedoms and social cohesion. Furthermore, the COE and the EU decided to co-finance joint programmes, including initiatives supporting national minorities. An example of a joint project is ‘Roma under the Stability Pact’, aimed at promoting the status of the Roma population. In the course of the past years, the European Commission frequently used documents of the COE to justify its democratic conditions towards applicant states. In the EU’s Agenda 2000, the COE’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) as well as Recommendation 1201 adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE in 1993 were described as terms of reference for an effective protection of minorities (European Commission, 1997b, p. 44). Since then, both texts can be found in many Commission documents (e.g. European Commission, 2002, p. 10). Additionally, at the judicial level there are some similarities between the two organizations concerning protection against discrimination. With respect to Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol n°12 to the ECHR, it is established case law of the European Court of Human Rights that a difference of treatment is discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 ECHR if it has no objective and reasonable justification, e.g. a legitimate aim (de Schutter, 2005, p. 14). As de Schutter notes, the adoption of the EU anti-discrimination Directives in 2000 have influenced the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of Article 14 ECHR; the court also referred to the EC Directives in Nachova (de Schutter, 2005, p. 38). Not least, it is interesting to see that when describing its cooperation with the EU, the COE outlines four areas of Brussels’ activities (see COE, 2008): firstly, measures of a mainly political character, developed by the European Parliament, in promotion of cultural diversity and preservation of the cultural heritage; secondly, measures taken by the European Commission, the Council of Ministers (and the Parliament), characterized by a functional approach; thirdly, measures taken in the framework of the EU foreign policy, without touching the internal sphere of the EU; and fourthly, policies not oriented toward minorities which are nonetheless rele-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 30 ______________________________________________________________ vant to minority issues. The COE further stated that although at least 30 million EU citizens speak a regional or “lesser used” language as their mother tongue, EU efforts regarding the protection of minorities are often observed as being “rather scarce and limited to controlling whether national law aimed to protect minorities is compatible with EU principles and laws” (see e.g. COE, 2008). When it comes to cooperation with the OSCE, the most relevant documents adopted within the framework of the OSCE2 concerning national minorities in Europe are the Copenhagen Document of 1990 and the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, signed on 21 November 1990, reiterating the determination of the participant states to promote the rights of minorities. In the follow-up-meeting in Helsinki in 1992 an OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was appointed with the main task to provide early warning and, if necessary, to activate mediation procedures when tensions involving national minorities seem likely to develop in such a way as to threaten peace and stability in the continent. Over the past years, the High Commissioner has developed close links with the European Commission concerning ethnic relations and minorities, in particular with the DirectorateGeneral for Enlargement. Generally, when evaluating the EU candidate countries’ performance with regard to minority protection, the European Commission has drawn on the expertise of the High Commissioner in the area of minority standards and minority rights. In this context, two observations might be of importance and do also hint to the reach of an EU minority rights policy: First of all, cooperation with other institutions dealing with various aspects of minority rights first and foremost concerns the EU’s relations with countries hopeful of joining the EU. Secondly, although minority protection is dealt with by various European organizations, there is no generally accepted legal definition of the term ‘minority,’ and the problem of whether minority protection should include group rights also remains unsolved, leaving a lot of space of manoeuvre for states to define their relations with minority groups. Problems relating to a missing definition of what constitutes a minority and which rights should be granted to minorities, importantly impacted on conditionality, the EU’s core instrument for promoting the protection of minorities in the context of the association and accession preparations of Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, despite the EU’s stronger power relating to its financial capacity and strong incentives for EU membership, the actual impact of EU conditionality on the situation of minorities living in Central and Eastern European countries has been controversially discussed throughout past and current association and accession processes. In broad terms, conditionality was about the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, requiring amongst other things the rule of law and stable democratic

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______________________________________________________________ institutions as well as human rights and respect for minorities. With the Maastricht Treaty, the protection of human rights was introduced into European primary law, with Art. 6 I TEU highlighting the importance of democracy and human rights for the EU, but not mentioning minority protection. Therefore, for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, criticism also related to discrepancies between the lack of commitment to minority protection in the internal affairs of existing EU member states and the prominent role the issue played in the EU’s external relations. Moreover, the EU’s requirements described in progress reports and other documents on minority protection were vague, creating uncertainty among the candidates – for example, priorities changed over time and different conditions were imposed on different countries. The effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality was hampered by confusing nature of the regulation. The so-called double standards on minority protection requirements - between member and candidate countries and among the candidates themselves - faced criticism within EU institutions, namely the European Parliament. For example, the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities of the European Parliament criticized the fact that minority standards that are to be fulfilled by EU candidates are not adhered to by the ‘old European states’, namely France and Greece, and that these double standards have further led to the new EU members threatening to move away from already achieved minority standards.3 Such concerns were already voiced at the very beginning of the EU accession processes of Central and Eastern European countries. For example, already in 1998, the Reflection Group on Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement under the chairmanship of Giuliano Amato found that “the EU will find it hard to maintain its agnostic stance on minority rights vis-à-vis its Member States”. The group identified three main challenges the EU had to face (Mirga, 2005): firstly, new member states would bring minority problems of direct concern to the EU; secondly, increased migration both from new and poorer member states and from third countries would accentuate the differentiation between these two groups and would necessitate regulation of the status of non-EU minority groups; and thirdly the special situation of Roma. Nevertheless, the prominent place of minority protection in the course of the pre–accession process leading to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements did not result in the elaboration of any rigorous minority protection standard that could be used by the EU both internally and externally, especially during the preparation of the enlargements to come (Kochenov, 2007, p. 10). Once postcommunist countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, an approach to minority protection in those countries based on conditionality had to be abandoned, and European attempts to stimulate ethno-cultural diversity in the new member states have instead emphasized the themes of social inclusion, anti-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 32 ______________________________________________________________ discrimination and equal opportunities (Vermeersch, 2007, p. 2). Not least, there were fears that due to the fact that there is no EU minority protection system, the reforms conducted during accession preparations that led to a certain degree of minority protection in the sense of promoting special linguistic or cultural rights could be threatened by the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination which is fundamental to the functioning of the EU internal market. The European Commission and other institutions might therefore face the question whether special rights for minorities that were demanded during accession processes can go together with fundamental market rules the EU is based on. Nonetheless, as regards the EU’s commitment to minority protection in third countries, the European Commission recently emphasized that it will continue to promote the values of non-discrimination and equal opportunities in its enlargement policy, with special attention to be paid to the rights of persons belonging to linguistic or cultural minorities (European Commission, 2008, p. 7). 2.

Minority Integration in the EU – Promoting Equality while Respecting Diversity The EU approach to protection of minorities does evolve around several critical issues. Non-discrimination is at the core of the EU’s strategy to combat inequalities and is one of the basic principles of the internal market. In this sense, the European Commission frequently highlights that the EU is founded on the shared principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that all kinds of discrimination undermine these shared values (see e.g. European Commission, 2008, p. 2). In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave new powers for European action against discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Discrimination in employment and occupational matters has been prohibited on all these grounds. These powers apply to all, irrespective of whether they belong to minorities or not. The framework on non-discrimination was significantly extended by Art. 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, which established a legal basis at EU level to adopt measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Resulting from the adoption of Art. 13 EC, two new Framework Directives were adopted in 2000, being the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5). As will be further outlined, both Directives recognize positive action with a view to ensuring full equality in practice. In the meantime, the term ‘shall not prevent’ implies that positive action provisions as such do not make positive action compulsory (European Commission, 2007a, p. 28).

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______________________________________________________________ In addition, the Racial Equality Directive was designed “to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into effect in the member states the principle of equal treatment” (Art. 1). The Directive itself does not contain a definition of what is meant by racial or ethnic origin. The preamble indicates that the Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. However, due to the term ‘ethnic origin’ the directive is relevant for ethnic groups, including ethnic minorities. The Directive defines direct and indirect discrimination (Art. 2) and determines the scope as applying to all persons of the public and private sector regarding amongst others access to employment, occupation, training, social protection, social advantages, education and housing (Art. 3). Positive action, meaning that the member states are allowed to take special measures for certain groups in order to achieve the groups’ access to equality, shall help the member states to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin (Art. 5).4 The agenda of positive duties is closely aligned with the mainstreaming approach. This seeks the integration of equality objectives across all areas and into all stages of policy formulation, implementation and evaluation (European Commission, 2004a, p. 32, see below the section on new governance). The Directive also urged member states to ensure equal opportunities for minorities’ access to judicial and administrative procedures (Art. 7). Importantly, the Directive asks member states to introduce into their national legal systems measures that are necessary to protect individuals from adverse treatment or adverse consequences as a reaction to a complaint or a proceeding aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment (Art. 9 on victimization). In the case of discriminatory dismissal, the remedy granted must include either reinstatement or compensation (Bell, Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 83). In Art. 13 of the Directive, the EU required all member states to establish ‘bodies’ that assist victims of racial and ethnic discrimination, to conduct surveys about the forms and prevalence of discrimination and to issue reports and recommendations (Art. 17). In 2006, the European Commission reported that most member states have implemented Art. 13 either by designating existing institutions or by setting up new institutions carrying out the competences mentioned in the Directive (European Commission, 2006, p. 20). The legal anti-discrimination framework is accompanied and supported by a set of other arrangements such as the EU Action programme against discrimination or Raxen. Criticism of the Racial Equality Directive relates amongst other areas to a missing definition of what constitutes a minority, with some authors claiming that this would play into the hands of member states denying the existence of minorities (Brennan, 2004, p. 321). In 2007, the European Commission itself stated that there might be a certain degree of tension be-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 34 ______________________________________________________________ tween the limited competence base of the Community (Art. 3 (1) Race Equality Directive) and some areas enumerated in the Directive, namely education, health care and housing and furthermore, the exact scope of other areas, like social advantages and access to and supply of goods and services, which are available to the public, including housing is “everything but clear” (European Commission, 2007, p. 24). It is important to note that in light of the EU’s limited competences, it is primarily the responsibility of the member states to take care of many areas crucial for the integration of minorities, including education, employment and social inclusion. In these fields, the EU is limited to coordinating member states’ policies, and supporting their implementation, e.g. through the Structural Funds. As regards the situation at national level, at the time when the antidiscrimination directives were set up, most EU member states already had in place some legal provisions addressing the issue of discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, but there were big differences regarding the scope and systematic application of legislation. However, for some of the member states and most of the countries then hoping to join the EU in 2004, anti-discrimination legislation was factually non-existent (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 17). In any case, a legal framework addressing discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin was described to be an important development across the EU (ibid.). Besides the EU’s non-discrimination legislation, EU member states are required to adopt National Action Plans (NAPs) addressing exclusion at all levels of society. The plans are funded via the European Social Fund, the EQUAL Programme and the European Structural and Cohesion Fund, with the main objective being the reduction of disparities in development among member states and regions in order to strengthen the economy and social cohesion. In order to be eligible for structural funds, member states must prepare National Development Plans (NDPs) (EC Council Regulation 1260/1999), detailing how they will pursue their development objectives and priorities (European Agency For Reconstruction, 2006, p. 56). The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 asked member states and the European Commission to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and in its 2005 revision, which finally resulted in the Integrated Guidelines for Employment (2005–2008), the European Council accentuated the need to focus on growth and employment and a better integration of “vulnerable groups” in the labour market (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 13). These legal and political developments of recent years have led to the EU having one of the worlds most advanced legal frameworks relating to nondiscrimination. Nonetheless, there are some areas in which the EU devotes special attention to minorities, therefore leading to the question to what extent the EU

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______________________________________________________________ is taking and willing to take measures which go beyond non-discrimination. An obvious example of this development is the mentioning of respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities in the text of the EU constitution draft and the to-be-into-force EU treaty (Art. 2).5 Another example is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights laying down the equality before law of all people (Art. 20) and prohibiting discrimination on any ground (Art. 21). In the meantime, it requests the Union to protect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (Art. 22). In so far as it explicitly addresses minorities in its internal policy, e.g. regarding the European Employment Strategy and the Process of Social Inclusion, the EU tends to focus on ‘ethnic minorities’ (European Commission, 2007, p. 6). Though the European Commission from time to time talks about minorities as being groups, it seems that the EU’s approach is rather focused on granting rights of relevance for individual people who are members of a minority group, with Roma and the EU’s position vis-à-vis candidate countries being an exception to this rule. The European Commission defines a minority group as having stable ethnic, linguistic or religious characteristics which are different from the rest of the population, as well as a numerical minority position and the wish to preserve its own, separate cultural identity (European Commission, 2007, p. 12). As concerns racial or ethnic origin, in the view of the European Commission, the prohibition of discrimination goes beyond employment, serving the diversity of European societies which in Brussels-speak is one of Europe’s strengths and needs to be protected (European Commission, 2008, p. 5). One year after the big enlargement of 2004 the European Commission emphasized that there was a need to go beyond anti-discrimination and that “the EU should reinforce its efforts to promote equal opportunities for all, in order to tackle the structural barriers faced by migrants, ethnic minorities, the disabled, older and younger workers and other vulnerable groups” (European Commission, 2005, point 2 and 10). The European Commission concluded that one of the major challenges the enlarged EU is facing was to “develop a coherent and effective approach to the social and labour market integration of ethnic minorities” (ibid.). Apart from social and labour market integration, the European Commission frequently outlines that issues of special relevance for minorities concern language rights in the field of education, media, and communications with authorities, and rights relating to culture as well as to political participation (European Commission, 2007, p. 12). Not least, preservation of linguistic diversity is one of the issues frequently addressed by the European Union (see European Commission, 2003a). The increasing emphasis on minority protection within the EU partly relates to the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which to date is one of the main promoters of human rights within the EU. As regards minori-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 36 ______________________________________________________________ ties, meaning both traditional minorities and migrants, residing in the EU member states, the ECJ in several cases dealt with the use of language before national courts (see e.g. Mutsch C-137/84, Bickel & Franz C-274/96) or in the field of labour (see e.g. Groener C-379/87). In its rulings, the ECJ emphasized that linguistic requirement generally must be applied in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner and that in certain circumstances policies promoting language protection can go together with internal market rules (Angonese C-281/98; for a detailed discussion of the ECJ’s rulings see van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). Nevertheless, due to a lack of competences defined in the EU’s primary law, the ECJ in these cases did not address the issue of minority protection but focused instead on the importance of the protection of linguistic rights in the context of the free movement of workers in the EU. In other cases, the ECJ dismissed regional language arrangements in the interest of community law (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). The above mentioned Groener case showed that a general application of language requirements (affecting the free movement of workers) can be a form of indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, should there not be a legitimate objective (European Commission, 2007, p. 28). In this regard, the European Commission refers to de Schutter who found that “a similar obligation to treat differently situations which are substantively different may be derived from the definition of indirect discrimination in article 2(2)(b) of the Racial Equality Directive” (ibid.). As regards positive action, the European Commission noted that while the case law of the ECJ is developing in relation to positive action, and increasingly seems to acknowledge the substantive equality goal, it remains rather restrictive towards forms of positive action aimed at equality of results (European Commission, 2007, p. 7). Some authors found that the ECJ has been very reluctant in accepting positive discrimination (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 3). However, judgments concerning language rights, for example, could favour ‘new minorities’ (such as Turkish immigrants in Germany) that have the nationality of a member state while exercising rights granted in the TEC (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). All in all, in the field of linguistic rights and internal market provisions, the EU’s initiatives and legal texts as well as the case law of the ECJ can be understood as favouring ‘new minorities’ while questions of traditional national minorities seem to remain an issue of EU enlargements processes and accession negotiations. Therefore, it is justifiable to argue that visà-vis its member states, the European Commission and the ECJ first of all eye compliance with internal market rules, allowing and advancing measures that go beyond anti-discrimination under these restrictions. In this regard, a 2005 resolution of the European Parliament illustrates that the EU institutions at some point diverged over the success and reach of Commission statements

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______________________________________________________________ and policies: The MEPs found that there was a difference between the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies, as equal treatment “is a basic right, not a privilege, of all citizens” and that being part of a minority can never justify or explain either exclusion or discrimination (European Parliament, 2005, p. 2). In its resolution, the European Parliament further pointed out that EU enlargements led and will lead to greater cultural and linguistic diversity and that the European Commission should therefore establish a policy standard for the protection of national minorities, also in light of the COE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (European Parliament, 2005, p. 3). Access to participation in all aspects of daily life and promotion of their values and interests in a pluralist society are said to be of special relevance for minorities. The following section describes instruments and measures applied by the EU that shall help in achieving minority integration in Europe. 3. Formal Equality versus Substantive Equality A much-discussed issue has been whether the protection and integration of persons belonging to minorities would require ‘equal’ rights or ‘special’ rights (European Commission, 2007, p. 5, for a summary of the debate, see European Commission, 2004). In 2007, the European Commission pointed to the fact that ‘special’ rights are not necessarily the opposite of ‘equal’ rights, depending on what conception of equality one embraces (ibid.). The European Commission highlighted that there is an important distinction between formal equality (which sets out to treat everybody in the same way) and substantive, or full equality: Full equality might necessitate differential treatment or special rights, which according to the European Commission are not meant to be privileges. In the view of the European Commission, it is widely accepted that an adequate system of minority protection is based on nondiscrimination in combination with individual human rights of special relevance for minorities and secondly on minority-specific standards aimed at protecting and promoting the right to identity of minorities (European Commission, 2007, p. 6). With regard to all forms of discrimination in the context of Art. 13 EC, the European Commission announced that in its 2008 legislative and work programme, it would propose new initiatives to complete the legal framework, building on the results of an extensive public consultation process. The European Commission emphasized that this commitment responded to the Council’s calls to the Commission to examine any gaps that may exist in the current Community anti-discrimination legislative framework, and the European Parliament’s repeated requests for the framework to be extended (European Commission, 2008, p. 4).

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 38 ______________________________________________________________ Against this background, this section asks which measures the EU takes to tackle its goal of promoting anti-discrimination and the granting of special rights to minorities at the same time. In the following, some instruments of new governance that help promoting the integration of minorities are outlined. New governance mechanisms are central to the European Commission’s strategy to address discrimination matters (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). The 2001 White Paper on European Governance defines governance as a measure of better combining different policy tools such as legislation and action programmes. This would contribute to strengthening the Community method, guaranteeing both the diversity and effectiveness of the Union (European Commission, 2001, p. 8). Central to the concept are openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These principles shall help to demonstrate how member states, by acting together within the Union, are able to tackle their concerns more effectively (ibid., p. 3). One intention of the European Commission in developing new governance mechanisms is to build on established practice in some member states, including providing for a single legal procedure for victims of discrimination to submit complaints and treating evidence that discrimination has occurred on more than one ground as an aggravating factor. Furthermore, the European Commission wants to raise awareness regarding multiple discriminations by financing activities and providing funding for smaller networks of NGOs representing intersectional groups (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). In its July 2008 communication on the EU’s renewed commitment to non-discrimination and equal opportunities, the European Commission highlighted that legislative protection against discrimination must be accompanied by an active strategy to promote non-discrimination and equal opportunities, adding that dialogue on non-discrimination policy must be fostered and more effective use must be made of the instruments available, both in general and with particular emphasis on promoting the social inclusion of Roma (European Commission, 2008, p. 2). The European Commission pointed to the fact that the national equality bodies played a particularly important role in combating discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origins in the member states and that the Commission supports the development of cooperation between, and capacity-building of, equality bodies via the Equinet network (European Commission, 2008, p. 3). A European network of Equality Bodies, Equinet, was set up to facilitate exchange of information between Equality Bodies across Europe, and to support the uniform implementation of EU anti-discrimination law and the levelling-up of legal protection for victims (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 12). In the meantime, Brussels highlighted that still there is no uniform minimum level of protection within the EU for people who suffered discrimination (European Commission, 2008, p. 4). As the European

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______________________________________________________________ Commission has pointed out, advancing non-discrimination and equal opportunities for rely both on a sound legislative basis and on a range of policy tools, including awareness-raising, mainstreaming, data collection and positive action (European Commission, 2008, p. 6). Positive action was acknowledged by the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam, with Art. 141 EC allowing the member states to take special measures in order to promote equal employment chances in terms of gender equality. Identical treatment may result in formal equality, but cannot suffice to bring about equality in practice. This is why the EU non-discrimination legislation does not prevent any member state from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent, or compensate for, disadvantages linked to discrimination on grounds where there is provision for protection (European Commission, 2008, p. 7). Positive action might be taken regarding (i) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupations, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; (ii) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience and (iii) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay (Art. 3 Racial Equality Directive). According to Art. 4 of the Race Equality Directive, differential treatment shall not constitute discrimination if pursuing a legitimate objective. As of January 2007, positive action was provided for in the national legislation of at least 20 EU member states including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2008, p. 7). Regarding another element of new governance discussed in this contribution, the European Commission is of the opinion that mainstreaming principles should apply across all grounds covered by Article 13 EC “if the inequality and discrimination suffered by all groups are to be reduced” (European Commission, 2008, p. 6). Non-discrimination mainstreaming is broadly about ensuring the integration of an equality perspective into all stages of the policy-making process – from design through to implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 1). The aim is to reduce levels of discrimination suffered by particular social groups and to improve equality outcomes for individuals (ibid.). Mainstreaming has an important function in reinforcing anti-discrimination and in achieving the Lisbon objectives, namely increasing labour market participation of disadvantaged groups. The third main tool, impact assessment, is potentially one of the most important instruments through which non-discrimination and equal opportunity principles can be taken into account in the formulation of EU policies,

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 40 ______________________________________________________________ legislation and programmes (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 7). In 2001, the European Commission introduced an obligation to scrutinize all new legislative proposals to ensure respect for fundamental rights (ibid.). In 2005, the revised Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC (2005) 791 of 15 June 2005) formulated a single instrument through which the economic, social and environmental impacts of proposed policies and legislation could be assessed. The guidelines include checklists of the types of impacts to be considered in carrying out impact assessment work, including some in relation to fundamental rights (ibid.). Furthermore, the Lisbon strategy introduced the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a means of governance using soft law mechanisms (guidelines, indicators, benchmarking and best practices) and including amongst others the development of National Action Plans (Schmidt, 2007, p. 2). Due to the fact that some member states included cultural policies in their National Action Plans without mentioning how these will enhance social inclusion of ethnic minorities, the European Commission identified culture as an area of interest leading to fostering of identity (see European Commission, 2005a). Already in a 2003 report, the European Commission emphasized cultural policies as a central part of any approach to addressing social exclusion, presenting access to culture, problems of culture in remote areas, creative activities and cultural activities to promote the social inclusion of ethnic minorities as main areas of interest (Schmidt, 2007, p. 3, see European Commission, 2003). All the measures discussed so far do not exhaust the situation and therefore there are other measures underlining the EU’s aim to combat discrimination: The Community Action Programme to combat discrimination (2001–2006), adopted by Council Decision of 27 November 2001, put forward a broader action programme aimed at combating all forms of discrimination referred to in the Amsterdam Treaty, other than discrimination based on gender (European Agency of Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 11). The programme was established to support the effective implementation of new EU anti-discrimination legislation and targeted various stakeholders to develop appropriate and effective anti-discrimination legislation and policies, across the EU, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and EU candidate countries (European Commission, 2004a, p. 32). It aimed at improving the understanding of issues related to discrimination, developing the capacity to tackle discrimination effectively and promoting the values underlying the fight against discrimination. Not least, the adoption of the Community Action Programme provided a financial framework through which measures to combat and prevent discrimination in support of the implementation of the two Directives could be undertaken by the member states (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5).

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______________________________________________________________ Furthermore, the European Year against Racism (1997) and the 2007 European Year of Equal Opportunities for all were designed to further encourage non-discrimination mainstreaming in policy-making (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5). The European Year of Equal Opportunities was set up to show that “all people are entitled to equal treatment, irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (European Parliament and European Council Decision No. 771/2006/EC). It served to explain to groups that are at risk of discrimination their rights and the European legislation in the field of nondiscrimination (Decision 771/2006/EC, Art. 2). Previously,, as a follow-up to the Green Paper on equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged Europe (2004), the European Commission in 2005 set out a framework strategy for the positive and active promotion of non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all in order to ensure effective legal protection against discrimination (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 12). At the community level, Inter-service Working Groups have been set up on equality-related issues, such as disability, gender, racism and xenophobia (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 8). Further, in the 2007-13 financial perspective, non-discrimination is playing a greater role (ibid.). As regards Roma, the European Commission recently highlighted that the problem of widespread persisting individual and institutional discrimination and unemployment as well as poverty is unacceptable from a human rights perspective but also from the perspective of social cohesion (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). Furthermore, while generally the EU’s legislative measures and policy proposals with respect to minority integration are addressed to the member states alone, the situation of Roma was described as being a joint responsibility of the EU and its member states (ibid.). In this regard, the European Commission plans to step up its work with national equality bodies and to promote the involvement of Roma in policy development and implementation (ibid.). For now, within the European Commission, an Inter-Service Group – chaired by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities – coordinates the EU’s programmes and policies with regard to Roma issues. (For further reading on the EU’s strategy towards Roma, see Tremlett in this volume.) Not least, in 2008 the European Parliament issued a resolution on a European strategy on Roma, pointing to the need to find a comprehensive approach at EU level whilst acknowledging that crucial competences and resources fall within the responsibilities of member states (European Parliament, 2008, point 5 and 6). Over the last years, besides programmes and initiatives, several institutions have been created or further developed in order to strengthen the EU’s aim to fight discrimination, including with regard to minorities. For example, in 2007 the EU High Level Group of Experts on the Social and Labour Mar-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 42 ______________________________________________________________ ket Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities was nominated (Commission Decision No. 2006/33/EC, p. 1). The group’s task is to draft reports and to provide recommendations on “how Europe can enhance the inclusion of minorities in the labour market” (Commission Decision No. 2006/33/EC, p. 1). Next to the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and RAXEN are central to Brussels’ strategy. The FRA6 is an independent body of the EU, established in 2007 and based in Vienna. The agency builds on the former European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). EUMC was tasked to support policy responses and supplementary measures to combat racism and xenophobia in the EU by providing the community and its member states with evidence-based analyses, conclusions and opinions on the situation of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the Union (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 10). FRA assists member states, candidate countries and EU institutions on human rights matters within in the meaning of Art. 6(2) of the Treaty of the EU, including the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. FRA works on racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and related intolerance, applying tools such as data collection mechanisms, analysis of information on the development of fundamental rights in the EU and cooperation with governments and international organizations. Each member state has a National Liaison Officer. A cooperation agreement with the COE (namely with the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the COE’s department for social cohesion) has been concluded in order to avoid duplication, ensure complementarities and mutually reinforce each other’s work. FRA also cooperates with the OSCE, namely the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Another important aspect of FRA’s work is cooperation with civil society. Art. 2 of the Council decision on the FRA’s multiannual framework for 2007–2012 identified discrimination against persons belonging to minorities as one of the agency’s thematic areas (Council Decision 2008). The agency’s budget will increase from 14 million Euros in 2008 to 22 million Euros in 2012, pointing to the importance the EU devotes to issues dealt with by the agency. Since 2000, FRA has collected data on issues regarding racism, xenophobia and related intolerances through its RAXEN National Focal Points (NFPs) covering all EU member states. The focal points provide reporting on legislation, racist violence and crime, employment, education, housing and health and are primarily used to develop comparative analyses as well as policies and initiatives promoting equality and diversity.

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______________________________________________________________ Data collection for improved monitoring in the development of minority protection within the EU has additionally provided for a lively debate over the last years (see e.g. Minority Rights Group International, 2006, Negrin, 2003). Despite the fact that member states are not obliged by the antidiscrimination directives to collect data on discrimination, data collection and use is relevant in respect of several key aspects of the directives (Bell, Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 74). The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) stressed that monitoring is required to combat forms of indirect discrimination as well as social exclusion of vulnerable groups on the employment market. (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 15). In the meantime, the network further pointed out difficulties related to monitoring with respect to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, namely fear of certain states that improved monitoring mechanisms could lead to a certain recognition of the existence of such groups by these states and open the way to vindication of ‘special rights’ of minorities (ibid.). In addition, the network hinted to the fact that members of the groups concerned, on the other hand, may fear that data relating to the ethnic, religious or linguistic membership will be misused, and may lead to discrimination (ibid.). Ethnic, religious or linguistic monitoring should not be equated with the recognition of certain rights to minorities, rather it should be seen as a tool in an anti-discrimination strategy, the network further argued (ibid.), adding that amongst others language proficiency requirements as well as access to citizenship and the prohibition on the grounds of ethnic origin continue to be major forms of discrimination against minorities in the region (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 19). In the meantime, the network emphasized that in the light of the European Employment Strategy it was not necessary for the EU member states to adopt positive action schemes, except for certain groups such as Roma who are facing a situation of structural disadvantage in all areas of social life (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 25). Apart from employment, the promotion of policies favouring the integration of certain underprivileged minorities requires the collection of information on access to health care, education or adequate housing, the network highlighted (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 26). The aspects discussed above relating to EU policies, programmes and institutions that might impact on the situation of minorities living in member states and in states with close relations to the EU illustrate that the EU’s main concern is social and labour market integration, based on non-discrimination and mainstreaming. The work of FRA, fostering amongst others the dialogue on non-discrimination, is an example for this. Therefore, single statements of the EU, like the 2007 announcement that next to non-discrimination minority-specific standards must be promoted (European Commission, 2007, p. 6) seem to be less effective and rarely advanced, hence being without substan-

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 44 ______________________________________________________________ tive effects in practice. An exception might be the elaboration of a Roma strategy, but still, it seems that programmes and initiatives do lack some coordination and interconnection. In this regard, there might be a case for arguing that indeed, there has been a spill-back from enlargement preparations towards EU member states, meaning that measures going beyond nondiscrimination and promoting e.g. cultural rights are ad hoc and somehow inconsistent. Conclusion and Summary of Academic Discussion Finally, as a round-up, what does the academic world say about successes and shortcomings of the EU’s instruments in the field of minority protection and the actual impact on the life of minorities? As regards the Racial Equality Directive, many authors criticize that the exception for difference of treatment is based on nationality, arguing that difference of treatment on grounds of racial or ethnic origin will often coincide with differences in nationality and that this exception may make it difficult in practice for third country nationals to enforce successfully the Directive and could amount to indirect discrimination (for a summary of academic discussion, see European Commission, 2004a, p. 16; in its conclusion about the main findings of academic literature the Commission points out that due to the fact that many authors focus on shortcomings of EU antidiscrimination legislation with regard to human rights, this dimension must be strengthened in the future, see p. 32). The scope for positive action under the directives based on Art. 13 EC and the question of whether this should be classified as an exception of the principle of equal treatment are discussed in the literature (ibid.). The European Commission further highlights that some authors note that the directives do build a bridge between non-discrimination and human rights (ibid., see e.g. Mahlmann, 2003; Dollat, 2002). This interpretation by the European Commission seems to reflect the academic debate on the issue. Many authors draw a distinction between ‘formal equal treatment’ and ‘substantive equality’. The first concept refers to situations where two categories of persons whose factual and legal circumstances disclose no essential difference are treated differently or where situations which are different they are treated in an identical manner. For the second concept, equal treatment may not be sufficient to achieve full equality in practice and positive action is needed to compensate for inequalities caused e.g. by different education or housing situations (European Commission, 2004a, p. 17). Therefore, some authors find that positive action is an exception to the principle of formal equal treatment or a vital component of achieving substantive equality, while some are critical of this approach as it may limit the subsequent scope for such initiatives (European Commission, 2004a,

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______________________________________________________________ p. 27). Others emphasize that positive action is not an exception to the principle of equal treatment rather, it is necessary to ensure full equality (Bell, Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 52). Apart from this non-discrimination literature, several authors devoted work to the question of double standards in enlargement processes and their impacts on the EU as a whole: Although the EU does not provide a ‘minority rights policy,’ some scholars have observed a stronger EU focus on minorities not least as a consequence of the latest enlargement preparations describing an “internalization of the protection of minorities in the EU system” (Toggenburg, 2000, p. 25). In the words of Toggenburg, in the context of European integration minority protection should not be regarded as a ‘hermetic’ legal competence matter but as an overall policy aim that is best fulfilled by a variety of legal and political instruments (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). He continues to describe several dimensions of the integration of minorities, including the integration of persons belonging to a minority group into the state while these persons’ group identities remain to be guaranteed to a certain degree. Secondly, minority protection has to be integrated as a policy aim in all public policies by means of legislative impact assessment and mainstreaming (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). Further, Wheatley identified nine factors that are responsible for the success of inclusion of minorities in EU member states (Wheatley, 2007, pp. 6 et seq.). The EU’s regional policy as well as the indirect influence of the EU on the institutional design of the member states, the educational system and the introduction of proportionality and ethnic quotas in employment are named as factors promoting minority inclusion that derive from the EU level (ibid.). With regard to general aspects of EU minority protection, Toggenburg pointed out that the EU level is, in the area of minority protection, (still) characterized by a “politics versus law” situation, with for instance the European Parliament claiming that while protection of minorities is a part of the Copenhagen criteria, there is no standard for minority rights in Community policy nor is there a Community understanding of who can be considered a member of a minority (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). Toggenburg however hints to the fact that the EU has to respect limits in the area of law (ibid.). This short insight in the academic discussion surrounding EU minority issues shows that substantive criticism was made concerning ‘hard facts’, meaning the relevant EU Directives, while for other issues such as cultural and linguistic rights statements are more general, which also points to the fact that in these areas, the EU still has limited power and member states play a greater role. However, the relevance of minority integration has been constantly growing over the last 15 years. Preparations to the enlargement process of 2004 had a special impact on discussions of minority-related issues and on

The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights 46 ______________________________________________________________ the further development of EU policies and institutional arrangements which were not in the first place designed to serve minority integration, but de facto attempt do so, e.g. by promoting equal opportunities when it comes to integration issues, there is a strong interaction between member states implementing EU legislation and acknowledgement at the EU level of best practices in areas such as employment, social inclusion or language policies. Generally speaking, there seems to be a situation of ‘old minorities’ vs. ‘new minorities’, with the former being covered by the EU’s enlargement processes and single initiatives of the European Parliament and the latter being central to Brussels’ employment and social cohesion strategy as they represent important migrant groups in the member states. Furthermore, due to the EU’s limited competences, for the time-being the outcome of Brussels’ attempts to promote the integration of minorities in Europe come to an end when there is a lack of political will and of resources at national level. In this light, if the European Commission wants to commit to its aim to protect both equality and diversity in its member states, it remains questionable whether the EU’s strategy to focus on national minorities during enlargement processes, while internally new minorities such as migrants are at stake (with the exception of Roma) will succeed in the long-term. This is particularly important when it comes to further enlargement rounds, as the issue of doublestandards seems to remain. Endnotes 1 All information is taken from website of the European Commission’s DG External relations, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ coe/index.htm (accessed 18 October 2008). 2 See the OSCE website, available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm /23618.html (accessed 20 September 2008). 3 See http://www.living-diversity.eu/News/Eintrage/2007/12/6_Eintrag_1. html (accessed 10 March 2008) During the accession processes the Parliament was also critical about the progresses in candidate states as regards minority protection that had been described by the Commission, see e.g. for the case of Romania Pridham, 2007, p. 354. 4 The Employment Equality Directive provides similar goals than the Racial Equality directive, e.g. as regards positive action (Art. 7). The employment directive will not be further discussed in this text. 5 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (emphasis

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______________________________________________________________ added). The provision was agreed upon not in the drafting stage for the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe but at the Intergovernmental Conference under the Italian Presidency at the end of 2003 and has been criticized for remaining ambiguous and rather modest, despite the actual success of being mentioned in the EU’s primary law, see von Toggenburg, 2006, p. 7, who amongst others criticises the fact that the provision is not followed by any policy provision or competence base in the text. 6 All information is taken from the agency’s website, available at http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat_content&cati d=45f1665036644 (accessed 5 October 2008).

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______________________________________________________________ Toggenburg, G. v. (2007), “Europe and the Integration of Integration,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. —(2006), “A remaining share or a new part? The Union’s role vis-à-vis minorities after the enlargement decade,” EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/15. —(2000) “A rough orientation Through a Delicate Relationship. The EU’s Endeavours for (its) Minorities,” European Integration Online Papers (EioP), Vol. 4 (2000) No. 16, Available http://www.eiop.or.at/ eiop/texte/2000-016a.htm (accessed 18 January 2008). Tsilevich, B. (2001), “EU Enlargement and the Protection of National Minorities: Opportunities, Myths, and Prospects,” EUMAP Online Journal, feature on European standards in minority protection, 1 October 2001, Available http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2001/oct/ euenlarge (accessed 10 December 2008). Vermeersch, P. (2007), “Ethnic Minority Protection and Anti-discrimination in Central Europe Before and After EU Accession: the Case of Poland,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Wheatley, J. (2007), “The Economic Status of National Minorities in Europe: a Four-Case Study,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, I/2007. Wiener, A. and G. Schwellnus (2004), “Contested Norms in the Process of EU Enlargement: Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights,” Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB No. 2/2004.

The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for Advancing the Rights of Minorities Alexander H. E. Morawa The article discusses the “special consideration” standard in favour of ethnic minorities developed by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2001 judgment in Chapman v. the United Kingdom. It explores what has become of this standard in subsequent years and suggests that, subject to proper interpretation and application, it can become a workable tool for minority rights advocates and litigators. “[I]n certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable justification, give rise to a breach of [the right to equality].”1 “Discrimination on account of … a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination. Racial discrimination is a particularly invidious kind of discrimination and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment.”2 Introduction In 2003, I have examined the very beginnings of a line of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of minority rights that has become known as the “special consideration” standard (Morawa, 2003, p. 97). A concept of legal thought aiming at what one might call affirmative equality,3 it has been applauded as very promising initially. This essay seeks to explore what became of the standard in subsequent years, and whether the promise has been fulfilled. It then argues that special consideration can serve as a useful tool for advancing the rights of minorities today and suggests possible ways of revitalizing it in practice to accomplish that goal. After acknowledging in 1996 in Buckley4 that the “traditional lifestyle” of minorities falls within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court established in January 2001 in its Chapman judgment5 its special consideration standard in the field of minority protection under the Convention in the following terms:

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___________________________________________________________ “[A]lthough the fact of being a member of a minority with a traditional lifestyle different from that of the majority of a society does not confer an immunity from general laws intended to safeguard assets common to the whole society such as the environment, it may have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented. … [T]he vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving at the decisions in particular cases.[6] To this extent there is thus a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of life[7].”8 Human rights advocates had urged the court in this and several parallel cases to judicially recognize and enforce the “growing consensus amongst international organizations about the need to take specific measures to address the position of the Roma in relation to a number of issues, including their accommodation and general living conditions.”9 Indeed, the limited legal scholarship on the issue of vulnerability in human rights law (Morawa, 2003a, p. 139) suggests that minority rights are one sub-field of the discipline where the nexus between a vulnerable position in society and affirmative measures to improve that status are most obvious. It should be noted, however, that in the Chapman decision, the majority of the Court found that Article 8 had not been violated where a Gypsy family had been evicted from land it owned in a green belt area, referring to the general duty no to discriminate – here: against non-Roma – under Article 14 ECHR. A minority of seven judges voiced a strong dissent explaining, inter alia, the relationship of Articles 8 and 14: “[W]e cannot agree with the view expressed by the majority that to accord protection under Article 8 to a gypsy in unlawful residence in a caravan on her land would raise problems under Article 14 where planning laws continued to prevent individuals from setting up houses on their land in the same area. … This approach ignores the factor … that in this case the applicant’s lifestyle as a gypsy gives a wider scope to Article 8, which would not necessarily be the case for a person who lives in conventional housing, the supply of which is subject to fewer constraints. The situations would not be likely to be analogous. On the contrary, discrimination may arise where States, without objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.”10

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______________________________________________________________ The Concrete Meaning of the Chapman Standard 1. Does “special consideration” amount to affirmative action? Or is it merely one of the Court’s so frequent intra-right differentiations? Although the Court remains largely silent as to the concrete meaning of its standard – even if it speaks of a positive obligation to “facilitate” the Gypsy way of life, and the split amongst the judges when it came to applying it requires further analysis in light of subsequent practice – it may be assumed that what was intended was in fact to create a basis for granting somewhat different levels of the right at issue (i.e. higher levels of rights to privacy and home in cases of people belonging to minority groups). This is not as unique as it may seem. In fact, human rights jurisprudence is full of express differentiations of the level of protection – that is, non-interference, but also affirmative duties of the state – depending on a particular attribute or characteristic of the person or group affected. This can include findings that national law is lacking adequate remedies, thus requiring legislative action in order to comply with Convention requirements. Consider an earlier landmark case of the Court, X and Y v. the Netherlands (1985), where a mentally handicapped girl had been sexually assaulted but both she and her parents were barred, for formal reasons, from bringing a criminal complaint against the perpetrator. The Court ruled “that the protection afforded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing of the kind inflicted on Miss Y is insufficient. This is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions […].”11 The failure, here of both the legislature and law enforcement, to act with ‘due diligence’, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has said in Velasquez-Rodriguez,12 triggered state responsibility (see Hofstötter, 2004). Several Convention rights have thus been interpreted as requiring positive state action “in order to make them more operate effectively or meaningfully, hence implying a positive obligation into the primarily negative wording of the Convention” (de Than, 2003, p. 169). An example of the “levels” or “degrees” of protection warranting corresponding state duties is free speech under Article 10 ECHR in the political context: while everyone enjoys the right to voice his or her opinions, for instance by demonstrating,13 some people, such as journalists14 and elected representatives in democratic states,15 may go further in their criticism and any restrictions placed upon them by the authorities “call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.”16 Also, who is being verbally attacked makes a difference: politicians, while allowed broader free speech, must also tolerate more17 and may, in particular in times of transition, be liable not only for their actions, but also for their failures to dissociate themselves from the previous regime in time. The state here is under a positive duty to develop a system of media regulation (or: non-regulation, which is also not a merely

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___________________________________________________________ negative obligation) that takes these varying degrees of negative and positive duties into account and fosters media pluralism and an effective public discourse in political matters. The Chapman standard at first sight seems to fall into the same category: While everyone enjoys the rights under Article 8 ECHR, and Gypsies or other minorities must in principle also abide by a country’s laws in force, when it comes to appraising the conformity of a certain measure with the Convention, one must attach more significance to their particular status and must more closely scrutinize the justifications advanced for a particular restriction. In essence, that is the Chapman standard’s underlying methodology. Yet a process of “special consideration” entails an additional element: it may be described as a three-step approach to affirmative duties of states in favour or ethnic groups or, if you will, a test to be followed: First, such groups do not enjoy immunity from general laws as long these laws survive the general test of sufficient precision, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality18 the Court would apply in any given case. Second, the group’s traditional lifestyle may “have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented” or, in other words, the Court will scrutinize the concrete circumstances of such cases with some higher level of scrutiny. Third – and that is the true affirmative statement here – there is a “positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States […] to facilitate the […] way of life of minority groups.” The test questions for national authorities when adopting or judicially reviewing measures, and for the Court when reassessing them ex post facto, would then be: 1. 2.

3.

Is the law at issue pursuing a legitimate aim, necessary in a democratic society, and proportionate to the goal it seeks to achieve? What is the effect of the measure on the minority compared to the general public or any other appropriate ‘test group’ it can be compared to? Does the way the national authorities apply the law in concreto in a situation affecting or involving (members of) ethnic, religious, racial or comparable groups indicate that they intend to facilitate the group’s way of life?

The third question is of the essence. Impermissible under the special consideration standard would be all those concrete measures that either deny, neglect or ignore the needs of minority groups – that is still the test applied under general standards of European human rights law – or such measures that fail to show an intent and effort of the decision maker to actively facilitate, or promote the lifestyle of those concerned. In other words, a decision maker who does not discriminate, and can prove so, could still trigger state responsibility under Chapman of he or she cannot show convincingly that the

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______________________________________________________________ facilitation of a minority lifestyle was part of the consideration, and became part of the ultimate decision. Merely considering the minority’s interests, but then opting for the – usually simpler, cheaper, and more popular – measure that treats everyone alike, does not suffice. What is crucial for the further analysis of the special consideration standard is the duty to facilitate. Innocent sounding as it may be, the term “to facilitate” has a certain fairly clear meaning in international human rights law. By using the term, the Court – and we can be sure it did not do so by coincidence – incorporated terminology commonly uses in the discussion of economic, social, and cultural rights into its reasoning: the CESCR (Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) Committee has stipulated that “economic, social and cultural rights, like all human rights, impose […] three levels of obligations on States parties – the obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfill. The obligation to fulfill further contains duties to provide, promote and facilitate,”19 which the International Commission of Jurists has handily summarized as follows: “The obligation to fulfil-facilitate requires States parties to proactively engage in activities that strengthen access to and the utilisation of resources and the means to ensure the realisation of Covenant rights. The obligation to fulfil-provide requires States parties to take measures necessary to ensure that each person within its jurisdiction may obtain basic economic, social and cultural rights satisfaction whenever they, for reasons beyond their control, are unable to realise these rights through the means at their disposal. For example, with regard to the right to food, the obligation to fulfil-facilitate suggests State party assistance to provide informational and other opportunities for persons to obtain food whereas the obligation to fulfil-provide implies the direct provision of food or resources when no other alternatives exist due to unemployment, disadvantage, age, sudden crisis/disaster, marginalisation, etc.”20 Thus, also in the words of the CESCR Committee, the “obligation to fulfil (facilitate) requires States to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities”21 in the realization of their rights. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, for instance, has emphasized that “the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.”22 But do we need the element “provide” for our task at hand, namely interpreting the special consideration standard as a purposeful tool for (first generation) rights implementation? One should bear in mind that we are talking about core civil and political rights here (such as the right to privacy) that are interpreted to include elements of social and eco-

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___________________________________________________________ nomic rights but are, as the Court makes clear, Convention rights with all their might. For those, fulfill-facilitate with its positive measures will suffice to come up with a meaningful standard, as we shall see. Any facilitation of the way of life of a minority will many times clash with a majority’s views, attitudes, or prejudices. We can draw some inspiration for answering the question whether national authorities should give in to such prevailing popular emotions from what the Court has said in the context of free political speech in the majority-minority context: In Ouranio Toxo it emphasized that “mention of the consciousness of belonging to a minority and the preservation and development of a minority’s culture cannot be said to constitute a threat to “democratic society”, even though it may provoke tensions.”23 Of course, one might say, it is not in line with maintaining and strengthening a democratic Europe if states curtail the democratic right of non-majorities to be visible and outspoken, to live their identity, and to interact with others without having to shed their characteristics. But that encroaches upon certain comfort zones humans build for themselves amongst which, truth be told, a bit of racial intolerance and prejudice sometimes lurks. With its demand that states comply with their obligation to foster tolerance amongst ethnic groups,24 the Court has quite clearly reigned in permissible recourse to anti-minority sentiments flowing into official government decisions. In the special consideration context, that implies an elevated duty of decision makers to firmly advance the interests of minorities, if necessary against popular demands, when seeking to facilitate their way of life. 2. Chapman and Beyond It is noteworthy that governments have, it seems, not only opted for a selective reading of the Court’s rulings in Buckley and Chapman, but have at least occasionally picked their own kind of raisins from the cake. In the Moldovan et al. case (second judgment of 2005), for instance, the only reference to these two cases is by the Romanian government. The complainant claimed, and the Court ultimately agreed, that after a bar fight that had left a nonRoma dead, not only had the population of a village, joined by local law enforcement, opted for killing the three alleged murderers of Roma origin – two by beating them to death, one by setting his house on fire; rather, the mob had then proceeded to destroying a number of Romani dwellings. The investigations led nowhere, and the courts found it suitable to include insulting and racist language in their judgments. The houses that were constructed as reparation for the victims by the government subsequently were almost uninhabitable. Before the Court, the government denied that the State authorities “bore any responsibility for the destruction of the applicants’ houses [… and] had only positive obligations under Article 8, obligations which had been fulfilled in this case by granting aid to the applicants to rebuild their homes. In any event, the Government considered that there was no obligation

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______________________________________________________________ under the Convention to provide a home to persons who were in difficulties. They relied in this connection on the cases of Buckley […] and Chapman […].”25 Nothing in these cases suggests that a government is under no obligation to repair the damage done through either its agents’ actions (police officers inciting violence or cheering on a mob) or omissions (officers standing idly by) whilst a riot is in progress, be it in the context of racial and ethnic tensions, or not. The question may legitimately be asked whether and under what circumstances there is a duty of states to provide housing to persons within their jurisdiction in general. The Court’s jurisprudence has clarified that the meaning of any language indicating that no state obligation exists in Buckley and Chapman is narrow in that respect, for instance that “no right can be derived from Article 8 that they provide housing, or conditions for housing, that meet particular environmental standards or in any particular location.”26 In Collins v. the United Kingdom (2002), for instance, the Court had to assess the complaints of a severely handicapped woman who had been promised a “home for life” in a certain public care facility, but was subsequently transferred to a different social care facility. The domestic authorities had argued that “home for life” does not necessarily mean a “home for life” at a particular hospital or place of residence; rather a “home for life” by reference to the needs of those individuals being met appropriately.”27 The Court ultimately agreed, but only after a careful assessment of the entitlements involved and the effects of the move. In Volkova v. Russia (2003), the Court, after ominously stating that “neither Article 8 nor any other provision of the Convention guarantees housing of a particular standard or at all”,28 continued to assess the complaint similarly as in Collins, namely by assessing valid promises and entitlements to a residence in a particular type of ‘dorm’ and applying a proportionality test. In O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom (2001) the Court adopted different language, holding that the “scope of any positive obligation to house the homeless must be limited”,29 but is not non-existent. Referring to its earlier case of Mazari v. Italy (1999),30 it said that, for instance, a refusal to provide housing assistance to a person suffering from a serious disease might raise issues under Article 8 ECHR.31 It is impossible to conclude from this practice32 that aspects of a person’s residence, and a state’s obligation to safeguard or even provide for it under certain circumstances, if properly linked to for instance Article 8 of the Convention, fall outside the scope of review of the Court. Romania’s claim indicates that one can extract a meaning from the judgments establishing the special consideration standard that is not only contrary to said standard, but contrary to the very essence of European human rights law. The immediate post-Chapman jurisprudence followed the majority’s line of reasoning to the letter, rejecting a series of similar cases in late Janu-

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___________________________________________________________ ary 2001. In Eatson33 and Porter v. the United Kingdom,34 for instance, the Court began with the obscure statement that the Gypsy way of life was to be considered “traditional” and therefore falling within the special consideration standard proper only if the persons concerned were in fact itinerant travelers.35 The Court then followed the standard test weighing, in line with the national authorities, the “not very special circumstances” of the applicants against the “strong, environmental reasons for the refusal of the planning permission.”36 What is of concern, however, is that the Court added language that there might have been “humanitarian considerations which might have supported another outcome at the national level,”37 thus suggesting that the states enjoyed an overly wide margin of appreciation – a holding which has no basis in Chapman, irrespective of whether one reads the majority opinion alone or, as is suggested, together with the dissent. A reference to “humanitarian” considerations also suggests that states were free to take the situation of minorities into account or not, rather than facing a legal obligation not only to consider it, but to give it priority consideration. That, too, finds no support in Chapman. In the case of the Gypsy Council (2002)38 restrictions on a Gypsy event were at issue: The local police decided to prohibit any assemblies “within a 5 mile radius of Horsmonden Village Green”39 on the weekend that the traditional Horsmonden Horse Fair in Kent was scheduled to take place. According to the applicants, the planned assembly was to be a significant cultural and social event in the life of Romani Gypsy community in the United Kingdom, and was to be attended primarily by Gypsies. The prohibition was explained by various breaches of public order and anti-social behavior by participants in previous years, but also by “fear expressed by residents” of the village and by “the normal social interactions between villagers being suspended as a consequence of the sheer volume of visiting travelers.”40 The applicants challenged the decision, but the High Court affirmed it, “consider[ing] that the fact that the Romany Gypsy Community could go to an alternative site some 20 miles away […] which was approved by the local authority and the police, served to limit the impact upon the Romany Gypsy community.”41 The High Court’s original judgment contains the following more detailed or additional considerations: “The plain reality is that both the Borough Council and the Secretary of State considered, in the light of the policing concerns, that the disruption to the life of the local community was of paramount concern and the need to avoid such disruption should take priority over the interests of the Romany community. In any event […] it is not the case that the Romany community will not be able to gather at all this weekend anywhere in the area […] albeit [the alternative venue] does not provide a

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______________________________________________________________ complete answer to their concern or indeed any answer which is satisfactory to them.”42 The High Court finally “noted that Articles 8 and 11 of the Convention recognized that balance had to be struck between the interests of the individual, in this case, the interests of the gypsy community and the interests of society generally, but found no reason on that basis to interfere on public law grounds with the assessment reached” by the authorities.43 The Strasbourg Court was seized by the applicants with the principal complaint that the prohibition order violated their rights under Articles 8, 11, and 14 ECHR. They pointed out that it “had a disproportionate effect on the gypsy Romany community and that the authorities could have accommodated the fair by imposing reasonable conditions on its conduct, e.g. by regulating car parking, limiting the number of stall holders, ensuring sufficient policing, ensuring that there were sufficient stewards provided by the organizers and ensuring that the village was cleaned afterwards by liaising with the gypsy representatives.”44 The Court assessed the necessity of the interference in a democratic society and its proportionality as follows: “The Court notes that the Horsmonden fair was a traditional gathering of longstanding and as such of considerable cultural and social importance to the gypsy community. However, the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly is not absolute and where large gatherings are concerned the impact of the event on the community as a whole may legitimately be taken into consideration.[45] The horse fair had been growing in size over the years and in 2000 the police had identified concerns about the disruption to the local community caused inter alia by the ‘sheer volume’ of visitors, indiscriminate parking, littering, a background level of increased crime and road closures. The Court observes that the authorities made available a site some 20 miles from Horsmonden, where large numbers of persons could assemble without causing disruption. … While the applicants argue that it would have been possible to allow the fair to take place as usual subject to reasonable conditions regulating car parking, ensuring sufficient stewards, policing and litter collection, the Court is not persuaded that this would have necessarily prevented the disorder and disruption which was anticipated. In the circumstances, the response of the authorities was proportionate, striking a fair balance between the rights of the applicants and those of the community generally.”46 With respect to Article 14 of the Convention, the Court added:

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___________________________________________________________ “The Court has found above that the measure pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of other. It prevented any persons attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin. It is not persuaded that the prohibition order […] was imposed with any discriminatory intent or effect.”47 In order to illustrate whether the Court in Gypsy Council applied a standard that would qualify as special, within the meaning of the Chapman standard, reference may be made to two – possibly crucial – statements it made in the context of Article 8: holding that the gathering under a stricter regime would not “have necessarily prevented the disorder and disruption which was anticipate”, and Article 14: the measure “prevented any persons attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin.” The need to prevent anticipated disorder may justify the prohibition of assemblies under the general standard if other measures are judged to be ineffective by the authorities for reasons which the Court, exercising its review powers, finds convincing (see Morawa, 2003, 105 et seq.). That test extends to both the levels of “anticipation” and of “likelihood of failure” of alternative, less restrictive means to prevent such disorder. Nowhere even in the case law concerning non-special situations has a standard been applied that requires applicants to provide positive proof that other measures will “necessarily” prevent any trouble. As for the measure at issue having prevented “any persons attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin,” it suffices to say that the Horsmonden Horse Fair traditionally was a Gypsy event with mostly Gypsy attendance in order to foster their culture and tradition. Of course any non-Gypsy who would have wanted to attend was also deprived of an opportunity to partake in the event, but it is apparent that the measure not only indirectly, but quite openly targeted the Gypsies; everyone else may well have walked away saying: “Oh, well, there will be other events.” It was the Gypsy tradition and culture, however, that was at stake and would have required the Court to review the restrictive measures under the special consideration standard. It may not come as a surprise that Chapman is not mentioned in the decision. Connors v. the United Kingdom (2004)48 is interesting not only in that it held that the eviction of a Gypsy family from land they resided on lawfully, for a multitude of instances of breaches of the peace and disorderly conduct, violated Article 8 ECHR because of a lack of proper procedural safeguards (and, indeed, in light of a flawed regime of managing sites for Gypsies). The Court here explicitly referred to Buckley and Chapman,49 but then proceeded to distinguish these cases:

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______________________________________________________________ “The present case may also be distinguished from the Chapman case […], in which there was a wide margin of appreciation, as in that case, it was undisputed that the applicant had breached planning law in taking up occupation of land within the Green Belt in her caravans and claimed, in effect, special exemption from the rules applying to everyone else. In the present case, the applicant was lawfully on the site […].”50 By emphasizing that applicant Chapman, other that Connors, was seeking special treatment, while the latter was merely asking for equal treatment, the Court, despite referring to special consideration as a standard, renders that standard inapplicable, but instead resorts to the general three-prong test of permissibility of an interference with the right to family life. Connors, therefore, is in truth not a special consideration case, but a simple equal treatment case. The Chapman follow-up jurisprudence to date culminates in the case of Codona v. the United Kingdom (2006). There, a Gypsy applicant and her family were offered so-called brick and mortar accommodation, to which she had a “cultural aversion”, after she had been removed from an illegal caravan site. The Court here made the rather unusual choice of initially stating that it was “far from obvious that Article 8 is engaged” because Mrs. Codona was allegedly seeking to enforce a non-existent positive obligation of the state to provide her with housing of her choice, only to proceed to an in-depth evaluation of the case under its Article 8-jurisprudence. Recalling the Chapman standard of a duty to facilitate the Gypsy way of life, the Court acknowledged that an aversion against living in standard housing “can be identified as forming part of the applicant’s ’gypsy way of life‘.”51 It added that it “does not rule out that, in principle, Article 8 could impose a positive obligation on the authorities to provide accommodation for a homeless gypsy which is such that it facilitates their ’gypsy way of life.’”52 Then, comes the turning point in the Court’s reasoning: “However, it considers that this obligation could only arise when the authorities had such accommodation at their disposal and were making a choice between offering such accommodation or accommodation which was not ’suitable‘ for the cultural needs of a gypsy.”53

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___________________________________________________________ With that, the Court clings to the narrow majority’s reasoning in Chapman that the positive duties under the special consideration standard were subject to a general “as far as possible” reservation, which the dissenters vehemently opposed. The Court in Codona reiterates this conclusion, borrowing from a pre-Chapman decision by the European Commission of Human Rights54 and stating that, pursuant to the facts at hand … “the domestic authorities were alive to, and complied with, any positive obligation that they owed under Article 8 to facilitate the applicant’s ’gypsy way of life’, to the extent that such was possible given the constraints of available accommodation.”55 3.

Non-European Practice Informing Special Consideration Jurisprudence While a European case-law applying the special consideration standard consistently and convincingly has not, to date, been forthcoming, the practice of other human rights tribunals offers a few examples that are helpful in further refining the standard. Consider, for instance, the case of L. R. et al. v. the Slovak Republic (2005) before the CERD Committee: here, a municipal council had first adopted a resolution in favour of constructing low-cost housing for the local Roma community, which had been residing in slum-like quarters for many years. After public protests and, in particular, a petition warning against a possible “influx” of Roma from elsewhere once they would become aware of the availability of inexpensive living space, the municipality revoked the decision. The Committee held that … “the council resolutions in question, taking initially an important policy and practical step towards realization of the right to housing followed by its revocation and replacement with a weaker measure, taken together, do indeed amount to the impairment of the recognition or exercise on an equal basis of the human right to housing.”56 We may conclude from that, at the very least, that the revocation of an affirmative measure or, in other words, the deliberate undoing of special consideration, is suspect and thus may, in circumstance such as those present in the L. R. case and without other justification, trigger a breach of human rights. It seems thus that an act of a national authority that is, upon review, driven by a special consideration in favour of a minority group, will raise the level of justification if that measure is subsequently revoked. This is in line with the principle of subsidiarity, since under such circumstances the international tribunal will not substitute a state’s assessment with its own, but will merely reinforce, and reinstitute a decision already arrived at domestically.

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______________________________________________________________ A Special Consideration Standard for the Future 4. Letsas (2007, pp. 129–130) asserts that the European Court of Human Rights “is willing to promote interests that are normally served by social and economic human rights (as political goals) but that can textually be read into the civil rights of the ECHR.” Warbrick (2007, p. 247), in a rather cautious article, nevertheless asserts that the Convention protects “collateral aspects of economic and social interests, where these involve civil and political rights”, and gives the examples of procedural provisions and the protection against discrimination. Indeed, the promotion of human rights may well entail a “liberal” reading of norms that may have been intended to be primarily negative or defensive, in line with the Court’s general principle of a dynamic approach to human rights interpretation. As the present author has said elsewhere, “[t]he interpretation must be “dynamic” and “evolutive”, taking into account that the ECHR is “a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions.” Authors have pointed out and it appears settled today that the Convention has “law-making character” and should be seen as “a bill of rights that must be interpreted so as to permit its development with time” and with changing “social and political attitudes”” (Morawa, 2003b, para. 28).57 Clapham (1993, p. 345), for instance, concluded when discussing the reach of human rights into the private sphere – something that minority rights often entail – that the obligation to take “”positive measures” may mean actual expenditure and the deployment of resources to ensure that the right can be freely exercised ’without interference from private individuals.’” Special considerations in favour of minorities may be said to have something in common with the margin of appreciation: for them to truly govern in any given situation, the right(s) at issue should be of they highest order, and the circumstances in which the dispute arises should not lend themselves to be interpreted as falling within the realm of the “institutional order” of the state, such as elections58 or the maintenance of a legitimate constitutional principle, such as secularism in Turkey.59 A comparable approach is taken by the Court when it assigns a “level” to the margin of appreciation it is inclined to grant a respondent state (see van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 15). We can conclude for the purposes of the present analysis, first that the rights of ethnic minorities fall in the highest category, since there is not only the Court which in its jurisprudence is outspoken against anything that suggests state-sponsored racial bias, but also the Council of Europe in general that has committed itself to eradicating racial inequality. Second, it is clear from practice that race-based preferences in all their manifestations are no justifications that would ever be accepted as elements of a democratically legitimate constitutional order in contemporary Europe.

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___________________________________________________________ As regards the specific scope of positive duties that arise under the special consideration standard, the practice is, unfortunately, rather sparse. The Court, it seems, has backed away from its very promising special consideration standard, and has sought to resolve the cases before it by relying on general standards and assessment techniques. That approach, regrettably, has overshadowed the affirmative rights-based approach Chapman promised. Earlier, we discussed some issues pertaining to the right to housing and whether state obligations extend to providing accommodations to certain people under particular circumstances. We found, initially, that an entitlement to housing could emerge, for instance, if the government itself had destroyed or made uninhabitable the houses of people, be it through unlawful action or negligence. Here, the duty to provide is intrinsically linked to a material breach of human rights obligations, such as Articles 3 or 8 ECHR. In other cases, that duty may be liked to lawful entitlements people have under domestic law or practice, such as title to housing of a particular kind, e.g. a bed in a particular care facility for the handicapped,60 or rooms in a dorm.61 Thirdly, a right to housing may derive from a non-discrimination claim, be it freestanding (Article 26 CCPR) or accessory to a substantive right (Article 14 ECHR). It shall be noted at this point that that the equality-regime is growing stronger, with the adoption on Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR, but also a European jurisprudence that is expanding the reach of Article 14. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has taken the lead here by consistently holding when interpreting Article 26 CCPR, that “when … legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State’s sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with [A]rticle 26 of the Covenant”62 and has added that the application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 26 thus “is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.”63 The European Court of Human Rights, too, has evolved its jurisprudence in recent cases well beyond the purely accessory character of Article 14 as having “no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.”64 It has early on clarified that “the application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the provisions in question.”65 The contemporary interpretation is more open and resembles – within the limits of the text of the Convention – the universal standard: “The prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 … extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the Convention and Protocols require each State to guarantee. It

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______________________________________________________________ applies also to those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Article of the Convention, for which the State has voluntarily decided to provide.”66 Apart from these international legal developments, we must not overlook the significance of a comparative (constitutional) review of relevant state practice as this can inform the interpretation of international legal obligations. In the field of housing rights that was the topic of the majority of the Gypsy-related Strasbourg cases following Chapman, for instance, judicial practice indicates a gradual recognition of a right to adequate housing either explicitly, for instance in constitutions,67 or implicitly, by judicial practice interpreting more broad or vague national norms.68 The emerging practice suggests that the third, equality-based argument in favour of a right to housing outlined supra may, in be the most suitable to use jointly with the special consideration standard, while also borrowing from the second, substantive rights-based approach. If entitlements are granted by the state, these must be granted without unreasonable distinction. Never can members of a minority group be treated less favourably than the general population. However, they can or, as we can see, must under certain circumstances be treated more favourably if the prescribed – mandatory, not optional – goal of fostering their traditional lifestyle requires it. If the entitlements are substantive-rights based or -related, this argument is reinforced, but not substantially different. For Europe, it is crucial to note in this respect the European Court’s language emphasizing that “Article 14 does not prohibit a member State from treating groups differently in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them; indeed, in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable justification, give rise to a breach of that Article.”69 The Court has provided a roadmap of sorts for such corrective affirmative action by holding: “[T]he provisions of the Convention do not prevent Contracting States from introducing general policy schemes by way of legislative measures whereby a certain category or group of individuals is treated differently from others, provided that the interference with the rights of the statutory category or group as a whole can be justified under the Convention.”70 Interpreted this way, the special consideration standard imposes on states something similar to what the material equality standard does: it first prescribes a compulsory goal of fostering the lifestyle of minorities, which is to be incorporated in government policies. Secondly, it adds the additional dimension of an equally mandatory pro-minority consideration in any application of the policy (or law) by national decision makers which, in turn, is open to the scrutiny of international human rights tribunals. Whether the state does pursue the mandatory goal – fostering the lifestyle of minorities – by

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___________________________________________________________ appropriate means can be assessed by the Court using fairly common methodology, yet with a twist: fostering is never static, but is by definition progressive. For the review of whether measures aimed at the progressive realization of rights are satisfactory we can, once again, seek guidance in the realm of CESCR rights and obligations. The duties of states there include, in no uncertain terms stemming not from the Covenant’s implementation machinery but the wording of the treaty, to use “all appropriate means” to foster – facilitate – the progressive realization of the rights guaranteed. What means are appropriate? “While each State party must decide for itself which means are the most appropriate under the circumstances with respect to each of the rights, the ’appropriateness‘ of the means chosen will not always be self-evident. It is therefore desirable that States parties’ reports should indicate not only the measures that have been taken but also the basis on which they are considered to be the most “appropriate” under the circumstances. However, the ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one for the Committee to make.”71 While the states parties to the ECHR enjoy a margin of appreciation when adopting laws, policies, and implementation procedures for fostering minority rights, their appropriateness to progressively advance these rights can be tested by the Court under its own special consideration standard. We must recall that in Chapman, the Court took notice of the “emerging international consensus amongst the Contracting States of the Council of Europe recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle, not only for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the whole community.”72 The reiteration of that fact in D H et al. v. the Czech Republic – a case where the Grand Chamber found breaches of the Convention in an inflexible system of assessing the special educational needs of Romani children, while the trial Chamber less than two years earlier had not found this to amount to a violation of the Convention73 – is in itself an indication that the concept is by no means static. We have thus managed to merge the standards of civil and political rights with interpretative tools stemming from second generation rights into a flexible and adjustable tool for assessing states’ continuous compliance with an emerging minimum standard, just as the Court prompted us to do in Chapman.

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______________________________________________________________ 5.

The “Possibility” Exception and Evolving Human Rights Standards As we have seen in Codona, the newer jurisprudence of the Court has, on the one hand, begun embracing positive obligations a bit more wholeheartedly but, on the other hand, now emphasizes the factual “possibility” of corrective affirmative action, such as the provision of suitable housing, as a general threshold for state liability. This begs two questions: first, is such a broad “possibility” exception justifiable in human rights law and, second, if we allow it, does it open an avenue for creative lawyering aimed at strengthening the special consideration duties enunciated in Chapman? While certain human rights have been identified as inalienable – allowing no exception and derogation and not being susceptible to any implied limitations – per se and others have been interpreted so as to allow only very limited restrictions that states need to tailor narrowly and justify by what amounts to compelling reasons, the rights we are contemplating here fall in a category that in general lack that quality. Thus, although fulfilling these rights is not an obligation states can make entirely or predominantly dependent on the availability of resources, the scope of these rights is expanding, since the treaties and covenants were designed and are applied as living instruments. Therefore, a gradually increasing density and depth of human rights standards is foreseen and intended. The UN bodies, in particular the CESCR Committee, speak of a progressive realization of rights. The Strasbourg Court, for instance, applies the concept of evolving common European standards to assess the contents of rights at any given time. Both it and the European Court of Justice “draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions of the member states”74 and do not hesitate to apply what one would call internationalized constitutional comparison to find the laws or practices in one country to be at odds with an identified “common European standard” (Morawa, 2003b, para. 29 and Morawa, 2007, p. 73). What may have been acceptable at a point in time in history, may turn into a violation later. Thus, even in the field of civil and political rights, justifications for non-compliance based on contemporary circumstances, including the availability of resources, may be tolerated in certain limited circumstances by the supervisory bodies. We cannot, therefore, categorically reject the “possibility” exception. If we bear in mind that we are operating in an evolving system – and nothing illustrates that better than the area of positive obligations – it seems consequential to make creative use of the issue of resource availability by incorporating it into the special consideration standard. The progressive realization of rights has been interpreted as follows: “[T]he phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realiza-

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___________________________________________________________ tion of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.”75 The gradual realization of human rights, even in the social and economic field, requires adherence to standards of expedience and effectiveness. Both are reviewable by judicial and quasi-judicial international bodies. Both correspond to what the European Court of human rights has done, for example by requiring states to remain “in sync” with the common European approach to dealing with a particular matter. The Court here has applied a practice of what one can non-technically call ‘warnings’, that is rulings that find no breach of a Convention right, but indicate that there nevertheless is a deficiency that can, over time, develop into non-compliance. To ensure that no such step-by-step violation is established, the state concerned has a de-facto duty, which can be translated into a legal obligation at least ex post facto, to take positive measures to ensure compliance. That includes adjustments to their policies (at the law and implementation levels) and the making available of economic resources so that individual decisions can facilitate the minority way of life. What is needed for such facilitation is many times in limited supply – such as housing and land for Roma who live a traditional lifestyle in the United Kingdom – and, as the dissenters in Chapman made clear,76 there would be no issue of unjustified different treatment if the government would adopt a policy to either remedy the scarcity of such resources or allow deviations from planning and zoning regulations in favour of minority members, even if it would not adopt the same policies in the (housing) sector in general. In other words, the special consideration standard demands affirmative action, but then also protects the government from suits by non-minority members who are not treated favourably. Access to housing her is a highly relevant example, but the same principle applies to a variety of other sectors and public policies. From the recent case of Andrejeva v. Latvia we can extrapolate another quite compelling reason for a positive duty along the lines outlined supra: Minorities tend to reside on the territory of states not by choice, but because of factors beyond their control. Since forced population movements are fortunately outlawed by ius cogens, the existence of such minorities is a fact and the obligations of the ‘host’ or multiethnic state are continuing. External influences that seek to positively affect these minorities, such as measures adopted by kin states, notwithstanding, the multiethnic state is and will remain the only state “with which [group members have] any stable legal ties

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______________________________________________________________ and thus the only State which, objectively, can assume responsibility for [them] … .”77 The stability of the ties may well be the key word. Stable multiethnic societies will flourish only if there is a proper give and take between the majority and minorities of affirmative approval of the latter’s right to existence as a distinct group, which requires positive measures, and in turn affirmative acceptance of the duties of loyalty and common purpose that statehood rightfully demands. Conclusions It would seem that the special consideration standard pursuant to Chapman is a workable tool for minority rights advocates and litigators. It does need some renewal, and some thinking out of the box. The above considerations point in a direction which, if consequently followed, would lead to a practically relevant standard that is also compatible with its host, the European human rights system, and modest and flexible enough to find the support of those in governments who subscribe to inter-ethnic harmony and the progressive advancement of the European citizenry unblemished by the discontent of minorities. Endnotes 1 European Court of Human Rights [hereafter: Eur.Ct.H.R.], Appl. 55707/00, Andrejeva v. Latvia, judgment (GC) of February 18, 2009, para. 82. See also “Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium (Merits), judgment of July 23, 1968, Series A, No. 6, para. 10. 2 Eur.Ct.H.R., D H et al. v. the Czech Republic, judgment (GC) of November 13, 2007, para. 176. 3 For a comprehensive discussion of the various manifestations of equality in international human rights law, see Morawa 2001/2. 4 Eur.Ct.H.R., Buckley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports 1996–IV. 5 Eur.Ct.H.R., Chapman v. the United Kingdom, judgment (GC) of 18 January 2001, Reports 2001-I. For a discussion of this case see Mowbrey 2004, 176 et seq. 6 Reference is made to Buckley, paras. 76, 80, and 84. 7 With reference, mutatis mutandis, to the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A, No. 31, para. 31, the Keegan v. Ireland judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A, No. 290, para. 49, and the Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A. No. 297–C, para. 31. 8 Chapman, at para. 96.

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___________________________________________________________ 9 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), Written Comments in cases Chapman and others, undated, available at www.errc.org, accessed on 29 April 2009. 10 Chapman, joint dissenting opinion of judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Tulkens, Strážnická, Lorenzen, Fischbach and Casadevall, at para. 8, with reference to Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April 2000, Reports 2000– IV. 11 Eur.Ct.H.R., X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of March 26, 1985, Series A., No. 91, para. 27. The Court has subsequently held that “the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.” Eur.Ct.H.R., Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of October 28, 1998, Reports 1998-VIII. 12 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C, No. 4 (1988). 13 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Chorherr v. Austria, judgment of August 25, 1993, Series A, No. 266–B, for a case exploring the limits of that right. 14 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Lingens v. Austria, judgment of June 24, 1986, Series A, No. 103. 15 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Castells v. Spain, judgment of April 23, 1992, Series A, No. 236. 16 Ibid., at para. 42 (emphasis added). 17 See, for instance, Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 42409/98, Wolfgang Schüssel v. Austria, decision on the admissibility of February 21, 2002. 18 The Court has, in its more recent jurisprudence, adopted a “duty to promote tolerance” standard in matters involving ethnic and other tensions within a society: “Although the Court recognises that it is possible that tension is created in situations where a community becomes divided, it considers that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.” Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 74651/01, Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, judgment of January 15, 2009, at para. 65, with reference to Ouranio Toxo et al. v. Greece, judgment of October 20, 2005, Reports 2005-X, para. 40, and Serif v. Greece, judgment of December 14, 1999, Reports 1999-IX, para. 53. 19 For a recent statement see: CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16 (2005) Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 17 (emphasis added).

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______________________________________________________________ 20 ICJ, The State Obligation to Respect, Protect and Fulfill ICESCR Rights, undated, http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/7.pdf, accessed on 29 April 2009 21 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13 (1999) on the Right to Education, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 47. 22 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/education/rapporteur/index.htm, accessed on 29 April 2009. 23 Ouranio Toxo et al. v. Greece, at para. 40. 24 Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski, at para. 65, and others. 25 Eur.Ct.H.R., Moldovan et al. v. Romania, judgment no. 2 of July 12, 2005, Reports 2005-VII, at para. 91. 26 Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 31888/03, Martin Ward v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of November 9, 2004. para. 1 (emphasis added). 27 Appl. 11909/02, Collins v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of October 15, 2002, p. 3. 28 Appl. 48758/99, Volkova v. Russia, decision on the admissibility of November 18, 2003, at p. 7. 29 Appl. 39022/97, O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of June 26, 2001, at p. 7. 30 Appl. 36448/97, Mazari v. Italy, decision on the admissibility of May 4, 1999. 31 O’Rourke, at p. 7. 32 The cases described in more detail are not isolated incidences, but are mirrored in other decisions in comparable cases, such as Appl. 40328/98, Siebert v. Poland, decision on the admissibility of May 25, 2004 (alleged breach of Article 8 ECHR by the authorities’ refusal to register the complainant at the address of an apartment he had been granted a tenancy in under the Communist regime, but which had later on been revoked) and Appl. 69353/01, Bleyová v. Slovakia, decision on the admissibility of October 17, 2006 (concerning a dispute over an apartment where the applicant had resided for 40 years, despite her not being the owner, on the basis of a court decision granting her a right to reside there until an alternative residence would be allocated to her). 33 Appl. 39664/98, decision on the admissibility of January 30, 2001. 34 Appl. 47953/99, decision on the admissibility of January 30, 2001. 35 Eatson, at p. 9, Porter, at p. 8. 36 Eatson, at p. 10, Porter, at p. 9. 37 Eatson, at p. 11, Porter, at p. 9. 38 Appl. No. 66336/01, The Gypsy Council et al. v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of May 14, 2002. For a more detailed description of the facts see Morawa 2003, 97 et seq.

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___________________________________________________________ 39 Gypsy Council, at p. 3, referring to the Order of the Turnbridge Wells Borough Council of 4 September 2000. 40 Gypsy Council, at pp. 2–3. 41 Ibid., at p. 4. 42 High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, case CO/3213/2000, CO/3230/2000, Regina v. Turnbridge Wells Borough Council et al., ex parte Gypsy Council, judgment of September 7, 2000, at para. 29. 43 Gypsy Council, at p. 4. 44 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 45 Reference is made, mutatis mutandis, to the European Commission of Human Rights’ [hereafter: Eur.Comm.H.R.] decisions in Appl. 20490/92, Iskcon v. the United Kingdom, dated March 8, 1994, 76 Decisions and Reports 90 (1994), and 31416/96, Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, dated October 19, 1998. 46 Gypsy Council, at p. 7–8. 47 Ibid., at p. 8. 48 Appl. 66746/01, Connors v. the United Kingdom, judgment of May 27, 2004. 49 Ibid., at paras. 83–4. 50 Ibid., at para. 86 (emphasis added). 51 Appl. 485/05, Codona v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of February 7, 2006, at p. 10. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Eur.Comm.H.R., Appl. 31600/96, Burton v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility of September 10, 1996. 55 Codona, at p. 11. The same reasoning is repeated later in the context of the applicant’s non-discrimination complaint (Articles 8 and 14 read together), where the Court says that ‘it was, in fact, not possible to offer any accommodation other than bricks and mortar accommodation.’ Ibid., at p. 13. 56 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Communication No. 31/2003, L. R. et al. v. the Slovak Republic, opinion of March 7, 2005, CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, at para. 10.7. 57 Internal references omitted. 58 See the Court’s judgment in Ždanoka v. Latvia. 59 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) et al. v. Turkey, judgment of February 13, 2003, Reports 2003-II. 60 Collins v. the United Kingdom (2002). 61 Volkova v. Russia (2003). 62 This is a consequent line of jurisprudence beginning with the groundbreaking social security-related Communications Nos. 172/1984, S.W.M.

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______________________________________________________________ Broeks v. the Netherlands, views of April 9, 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, para. 12.4; and 182/1984, F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, views of April 9, 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984, para. 12.4. 63 CCPR General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination, para. 12. 64 Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 13378/05, Burden v. the United Kingdom, judgment [GC] of April 29, 2008, para. 58, and many others. 65 Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of September 16, 1996, Reports 1996-IV, para. 36, amongst others. 66 Stec et al. v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility (GC) of July 6, 2005, Reports 2005-X, para. 40 and Appl. 55707/00, Andrejeva v. Latvia, judgment (GC) of February 18, 2009, para. 74. 67 See. e.g. Section 26(2) of the South African Constitution which requires the state to “devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing.” This mandate was interpreted by the South African Constitutional Court in Government v. Irene Grootboom et al., judgement of October 4, 2000, 2001 (1) SA 46, para. 36, as follows: “A right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the state that is responsible for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide housing. The state must create the conditions for access to adequate housing for people at all economic levels … . State policy dealing with housing must therefore take account of different economic levels of our society.” 68 India, Supreme Court, Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, Civil Appeal No. 2598/1989, judgment of January 31, 1990, (1990) 1 S.C.C. 520, para. 9: “Basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to the three - food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society. That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in view. For the animal it is the bare protection of the body; for a human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would allow him to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and intellectual. The Constitution aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That would be possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is not necessary that every citizen must be ensured of living in a well built comfortable house but a reasonable home particularly for people in India can even be mud built thatched house or a mud-built fire proof accommodation.” 69 Andrejeva v. Latvia, at para. 82 (emphasis added), with reference to Thlimmenos, para. 44, and Stec et al. v. the United Kingdom , para. 51.

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___________________________________________________________ 70 Ždanoka v. Latvia, at para. 112. 71 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3 (1990) on the Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, para. 4 (emphasis added). 72 D H. et al. v. the Czech Republic, at para. 181. 73 While D. H. contains a reference to Chapman, the Grand Chamber resolved the case exclusively on the basis of a standard non-discrimination analysis. 74 European Court of Justice, Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, judgment of December 13, 1979, [1979] ECR 3727. 75 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3, para. 9 (emphasis added). 76 Chapman, dissenting opinion, para. 8. 77 Andrejeva v. Latvia, at para. 88.

References Clapham, A. (1993), Human Rights in the Private Sphere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Than, C. (2003), “Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: Towards the Human Rights of Victims and Vulnerable Witnesses,” The Journal of Criminal Law, 67(2): 165–182. Hofstötter, B. (2004), “European Court of Human Rights: Positive Obligations in E. and others v. United Kingdom,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2(3): 525–560. Letsas, G. (2007), A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morawa, A. H. E. (2001/2), “The Evolving Human Right to Equality,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues 1, 157–205. —(2003), “The European Court of Human Rights and Minority Rights: The ‘Special Consideration Standard’ in Light of Gypsy Council,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 10(2): 97–109. —(2003a), “‘Vulnerability’ as a Standard in International Human Rights Law,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 10: 139-155.

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______________________________________________________________ —(2003b), “The ‘Common European Approach’, ‘International Trends’, and the Evolution of Human Rights Law. A Comment on Goodwin and I v. the United Kingdom,” German Law Journal, 3(8), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/print.php?id=172. —(2007), “Substantive Due Process in Human Rights Law: International Tribunals and the Review of Domestic Decisions,” in: D. Girsberger and M. Luminati (eds.) ZGB gestern – heute – morgen. Festschrift zum Schweizerischen Juristentag, Zürich: Schulthess, 67–80. Mowbrey, A. R. (2004), The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Oxford and Oregon: Hart Publishing. van Bossuyt, A. (2007), “Fit for Purpose or Faulty Design? Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice on the Legal Protection of Minorities,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 1. Warbrick, C. (2007), “Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights,” in: M. A. Balerin and R. McCorquodale (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 241–257.

The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Equality Promotion Malte Brosig This article examines the promotion of standards for equal treatment by the Council of Europe’s (COE) Advisory Committee (AC) to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). It aims to explore the distinct character of the AC’s method of norm promotion on the basis of notoriously vague minority rights standards. The article focuses on the practice of implementing FCNM norms by analyzing the AC’s country-specific recommendations through which the AC seeks to enhance the wording of the Convention’s text. It is argued that the special quality of the AC’s norm promotion method lies not only in the interpretation of the FCNM articles in the context of particular countries but in the systematic and pervasive recognition of context-dependent variables of minority living conditions, thus enhancing the text of the FCNM. Introduction At the centre of this chapter’s analysis is Article 4 of the FCNM, which prohibits racial discrimination and allows measures of affirmative action and “effective equality”. This paper examines the substance of how the AC understands “effective equality”. While Article 4 provides a clear obligation for the promotion of equalizing integration programmes, this paper explores which concrete instruments for integration the AC endorses in its monitoring reports and which actors are envisioned for the implementation of integration measures. These questions are of pivotal importance for the European minority rights regime since the most severe violations against minority rights are racial discrimination and the persistence of social and economic marginalization resulting from it. Minority rights protection and minority integration are intrinsically linked to each other. As Rainer Hofmann, a former President of the AC, has pointed out: “The ultimate goal of minority rights protection consists of achieving the full integration of persons belonging to minorities into the society of the States in which they live, while at the same time, guaranteeing the preservation and promotion of their distinct identity” (Hofmann, 2006b, p. 13). Thus integration policies are directly contributing to the realization of minority rights and are a prerequisite for full compliance with minority rights standards.

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______________________________________________________________ The article is structured in three main sections. The first section discusses the legal quality of the FCNM. The vague and open wording of the FCNM poses a particular challenge for the implementation of minority rights norms including standards for minority integration and non-discrimination. This leaves considerable leeway for the AC to give meaning to FCNM standards. In the second section, this paper analyzes the AC’s country opinions on Article 4 clarifying the meaning of “effective equality” in everyday practice. The final section concludes with a short analysis of the AC’s concept of integration and its specific character of norm promotion. 1. The Legal Quality of Minority Rights Norms The FCNM entered into force in February 1998. It is the first and only legally binding human rights convention on minority rights. Its norms are legally binding for all contracting parties but, with the exception of Article 3, these norms are only “programme-type” provisions which are not directly applicable (Explanatory Report to the FCNM, para. 11). Consequently states are under a legal obligation to follow the principles and provisions of the FCNM through the application of domestic legislation and the implementation of policy programmes. In this process states enjoy a high degree of discretion because FCNM norms cannot be applied directly and their substance is not necessarily to be found in the Convention itself. The FCNM does not provide its contracting parties with ready-made solutions for the settling of minority issues or unique instruments for setting up minority integration programmes (Steketee, 2001, p. 4). However, it provides states with principles and objectives which include the application of integration measures. The implementation of the FCNM is monitored by an Advisory Committee (AC) comprised of 18 independent experts who are nominated by the contracting state parties of the FCNM. The AC monitors the implementation of FCNM norms on the basis of reports periodically submitted by each of the state parties. An initial report is due within one year after ratifying the FCNM and every fifth year thereafter. The recommendations of the AC need to be approved by the Committee of Ministers (CM), an intergovernmental body of COE member states. The fact that states can block unwelcome recommendations of the AC in the CM has given rise to strong criticism by some scholars (Alfredsson, 2000, pp. 291–304; Troebst, 1999, p. 20). However, day-to-day practice has developed a “constructive” and “trusting” relationship between the two bodies, as former members of the AC have noted (Phillips, 2004, p. 118; Hoffmann, 2004, pp. 3–16). Due to the soft wording of the FCNM, leaving a considerable degree of discretion for member states, the most important sources of reference are AC country opinions. The substance of FCNM norms very much lies in the practice of the AC’s recommendations. The reason for the lack of substance and the specific character of the FCNM programme-type provisions is not

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______________________________________________________________ only to be found in the inability of the COE member states to agree on stricter norms for minority protection. It also reflects on the very different living conditions of national minorities throughout Europe, which makes it difficult to develop single standards for the needs of all minority groups (Steketee, 2001, p. 4). Thus the often criticized soft and vague wording of the FCNM (Pentassuglia, 1999, p. 419) allows for the much needed flexibility of minority rights norms to account for the very diverse realities in which minorities are living. What distinguishes the FCNM from the European fundamental rights regime is the absence of directly litigable human rights norms and the existence of an independent court to which individuals might take their complaints under certain conditions. The AC is not a court nor can it coerce states and oblige them to revise domestic laws. Minorities cannot appeal to the AC nor is the AC a completely independent body. Its opinions still need to be approved by the CM which makes its decisions behind closed doors. The committee then seeks the cooperation of its contracting parties and issues opinions of legal quality. The language of its opinions is moderate and diplomatic. It tries to support and advise states in the process of norm implementation, but the AC does not exert judicial control which would result in clear decisions such as those of a jury or judge (Hofmann, 2006a, p. 6). Instead it partly abandons the judicial arena by commenting on policy developments. Thereby a certain norm is interpreted not only on the basis of legal provisions such as the FCNM but also flexible standards which are promoted on the basis of context-dependent conditions. As the empirical analysis will show, the choice of integration instruments promoted by the AC for accomplishing “effective equality” is highly dependent on the specific living environment of ethnic minorities as well as the capacity of states to carry out equalizing measures and the political history of inter-ethnic relations. The AC relies exclusively on soft mechanisms for norm enforcement. Unlike the case of EU enlargement, external incentives and conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) do not play a prominent role. Likewise the COE cannot provide extensive funding for minority integration programmes as the EU can afford them (see contribution by Riedel in this volume). In the concert of European organizations, the AC compliance mechanism distinguishes itself from the policy of preventive diplomacy exercised by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. It can hardly be compared with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, since its norms are not litigable and the AC is only a monitoring body and not a court. Thus the role the AC can play in order to bring states into compliance has narrow boundaries. The AC very much relies on its persuasive power and must try to socialize states into compliance. Socialization as a form of non-coercive norm enforcement relies on long-term communication as a vehicle for norm compliance. Deliberation,

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______________________________________________________________ rhetorical commitment and persuasion are key elements of the socialization mechanism (Risse, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Checkel, 2002). Its incremental impact on state compliance has been analyzed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink at length in their seminal volume, The Power of Human Rights International Norms and Domestic Change (1999). The AC uses socialization through its standard monitoring procedure within the framework of the FCNM. Pursuant to Article 25 the contracting parties to the FCNM have to submit regular reports on the progress of the implementation of FCNM norms. The AC replies to these state reports by compiling country-specific opinions to which the state parties usually send their statement responding to the AC’s opinion and criticism. A monitoring cycle is completed by a follow-up seminar. These follow-up seminars bring together members of the AC and state representatives in a joint conference evaluating the state of minority rights implementation in the respective country. Frequently minority representatives and members of civil society are invited too. A full monitoring cycle lasts two to three years before the whole machinery starts all over again. In this period state representatives are immersed in a communication process that is steered by the AC with the aim of explaining and teaching countries how to properly implement minority standards. Following the logic of socialization, the density and frequency of contacts exerts an incremental influence on countries. When countries are involved in this communication process, which does not terminate at any given point, they commit themselves to the goals of the FCNM. With every further contact the AC manifests its roles as a promoter of minority rights norms and reinforces these norms. However, the socialization process does not describe a gradual progress towards norm compliance. Patterns of non-compliance are frequently encountered. In the case of minority rights norms, the monitoring cycle is not only important because of its socializing effects on participating states, it is also a form of standard setting, benchmarking, and interpretation. A standard which on paper gives leeway for its application is given meaning primarily through its application. A monitoring cycle starts with the contracting parties, not the AC, interpreting the norms set forth in the FCNM. Each member state makes the initial decisions on how to implement and apply minority rights norms before the AC starts its review activities on state practice. Thus, at the beginning, the AC is reactive towards state practice. Norm adherence is not a simple reaction to prescriptive standards, rather vague norms acquire their meaning through application and supervision by monitoring bodies like the AC (Wiener, 2004). The AC monitors the application of FCNM norms by setting them in context to national and local conditions. This in the end may lead the AC to promote a certain measure like positive discrimination in one situation in order to reach substantive equality while it may reject this practice in another situation. This flexibility is seen as the most appropriate approach for

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______________________________________________________________ minority rights protection because it is able to consider the very different living conditions of ethnic minorities in Europe. Thus the opinions are tailormade for each country. Through the state reporting and monitoring process, the AC refines existing standards which need further refinement because they are vaguely formulated and often entail escape clauses. 2. The Legal Basis of Minority Integration and Equal Treatment Minority integration is not new to the COE. As early as 1969 the Parliamentary Assembly called for a better integration of Roma in Western Europe (PACE, Rec. 563, 1969). Six years later the CM, for the first time, considered the application of “special measures” for integration (CM Res. 75(13) para. 5). With the Eastern enlargement of the COE in the 1990s the question of integration, primarily of Roma, triggered the issuance of a number of official COE recommendations and resolutions. Between 1993 and 2006 the COE authored six recommendations on the integration of Roma people and many more on general minority issues. Nonetheless, the FCNM does not provide minorities with a right to integration nor even the right to enforce a certain method or practice. There are, however, a few provisions of the FCNM which, combined, cover the most important aspects of standard minority integration programmes in Europe. Article 15 calls upon countries to create those conditions necessary “for the effective participation of … national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs”. It raises the issue of the participation of minority groups in society in order to remedy their often marginalized position and underrepresentation in decision and policy making. Article 5 requires states to promote minority cultures and prohibits any form of assimilation in state integration programmes. The promotion of intercultural dialogue and tolerance is covered by Article 6. Finally, core integration goals are promoted primarily by Article 4 (see Table 1) demanding “effective equality” and prevention from discrimination. Racial discrimination is the most severe violation of minority rights and the issue of equal treatment and equal opportunities is pivotal to achieve equality and to ameliorate the existing marginalization and social and economic cleavages between ethnic minorities and the majority society, hence the empirical part of this paper will focus only on the AC’s promotion of Article 4. Article 4(1) first guarantees minorities equality before the law and the equal enjoyment of rights. Any discrimination based on belonging to an ethnic minority is prohibited. However, this protection against discrimination and the formal admission of equality before the law does not always lead to substantive equality and the equal enjoyment of rights in practice. Therefore paragraph 2 demands the adoption of “adequate measures” for the promotion of substantial equality (Alfredsson, 2006, p. 144). The explanatory report to the FCNM on Article 4(2) makes it clear that special equalizing measures

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______________________________________________________________ must adhere to the principle of proportionality: “This principle requires […] that such measures do not extend, in time or in scope, beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the aim of full and effective equality”. Thus affirmative action, which in some cases is needed in order to reach substantial equality, should be designed as a temporary instrument as long as the specific circumstances of marginalization or discrimination need to be overcome. Inevitably this requires a periodic and systematic assessment of minority living conditions and needs. Equalizing measures must be underpinned by statistical data and a socio-economic mapping clearly demonstrating the need for affirmative action. The final paragraph of Article 4 legitimizes temporary preferential treat of ethnic minorities if these measures aim at overcoming marginalization and discrimination based on belonging to a minority group. Affirmative action is not a discriminatory practice and does not contravene the principle of equality if it conforms to the principle of proportionality. Table 1. Article 4 of the FCNM Article 4 1 The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 2 The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, they shall take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities. 3. The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to be an act of discrimination.

The comments of the AC in response to state reports clearly show that there is an obligation to introduce equalizing measures under certain conditions, as the following section will show. However, despite the explanatory report and its additional explications on Article 4, many questions remain. It is not clear which specific measures are adequate for the accomplishment of substantial equality. Not every unequal treatment needs the application of positive discrimination. The term “effective equality” needs to be explained in greater detail which can only be done through the process of monitoring and application of these norms. The efficiency question is very much tied to the specific conditions in the social, cultural, economic and political environment that minorities encounter.

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______________________________________________________________ The Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Article 4 The following section analyzes the opinion of the AC on Article 4. In order to make the analysis comprehensive, I reviewed all the comments of the AC to the contracting parties since the FCNM entered into force in 1998. I examined AC country opinions in the first and second cycle of state reports, which have been concluded by most countries. The third cycle, which is just beginning at the time of writing, has not been examined. For most states parties, the first cycle comprises an initial report on which the AC issues its first opinion. This first opinion comments primarily on the state of transposition of FCNM norms into legislation and inquires into the degree of legal protection of minorities with reference to the FCNM. In the second cycle, the AC proceeds by shifting its main attention away from the formal legal adoption of norms to the proper application and effective implementation of minority rights norms. Thereby the AC clarifies the scope and range of application much more than the explanatory report or legal commentaries in the literature. In order to analyze the AC’s comments on Article 4, this section identifies those factors that are frequently mentioned by the AC. We have determined 16 such conditions (see Table 2). These conditions are the essence of Article 4, reflecting on the AC’s interpretation of equal treatment and nondiscrimination. The data sheet in Table 2 documents the frequency of appearance of each factor by each country. As mentioned above, the FCNM norms are formulated quite vaguely with the intention of covering a variety of cases and allowing for flexibility in application. Thus the AC does not recommend the same procedures to every state party, but distinguishes between cases. The data sheet visualizes how frequently the AC refers to a certain factor and how systematically this factor is introduced in the AC’s opinions, which gives us a first hint of when a certain factor is picked up by the AC. The table also shows which mixture of conditions the AC highlights for each of the 32 countries. However, only a qualitative analysis which also inquires into individual conditions can evaluate the importance of these 16 factors in greater detail. The AC’s opinions can be grouped into three major categories; formal requirements, policy organization, and policy instruments (Table 3). At the beginning is the legal formal transposition of FCNM norms into domestic legislation which, with regard to Article 4, requires the transposition of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. If this first hurdle has been achieved successfully the AC requests the setting up of effective structures which implement integration programmes systematically and coherently. Finally the AC issues a number of very specific recommendations advocating certain policy instruments which aim at remedying the worst cases of marginalization. The following empirical analysis examines the AC’s country

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______________________________________________________________ opinions according to these three categories. It seeks to clarify the actual meaning of equal treatment in practice and inquires into the context variables which guide the AC in its selection of minority integration instruments.

ALB ARM AUT AZE BH CHE CRO CYP CZE DEN ESP EST FIN GBR GER HUN IRE ITA KOS LIE LTU MKD MLD NOR POL ROM RUS SCG SLO SVK SWE UKR

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X X X X -

X X X X X -

legal aid and remedy

confidence building

traditional way of

Roma women

consultation

EC/2000/43

needs awareness

local administration

implementation gap

legal status

insufficient monitor-

adequate resources

positive measures

institutional set up

deficient legal pro-

poor data

Country

Table 2. Article 4 and AC country opinions

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X -

X = presence of a condition, - = absence of a condition Formal Legal Requirements Many of the AC opinions in the first monitoring cycle focus on formal and legal requirements for the full implementation of Article 4. The AC systematically addressed the need for countries to protect minorities against discrimination through comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation providing victims of discrimination with effective legal remedies. It also collected sta-

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______________________________________________________________ tistical data on the living conditions of ethnic minorities and commented on problems related to the legal status of minorities. Table 3. Advisory Committee: Groupings of Country Opinions Formal requirements

Policy organization

Policy instruments

Availability of adequate statistical data

Effective monitoring capabilities

Tailor-made country recommendations

Comprehensive legal protection against discrimination

Effectively working Ombudsman (institutional independence, regional availability)

Variety of preferential measures depending on living conditions

Availability of effective legal remedies against discrimination Clarification of legal status questions

Cross sector coordination at the horizontal and vertical axes

Affirmative integration measures especially in the employment and education sector

Special emphasis on local authorities

Special measures for Roma woman

Minority consultation

Respect for the traditional way of life

Incorporation of civil society when implementing integration programmes

Promotion of best practice solutions

Proper planning, execution, evaluation of all integration measures Availability of adequate resources and funding

According to the AC, only a comprehensive anti-discrimination law can guarantee full equality. Although most countries prohibit discrimination on various grounds in their constitutions, a general discrimination ban does not suffice to guarantee real equality when confronted with persisting forms of marginalization, stigmatization and social and economic deprivation. According to the AC country opinions, two-thirds of the analyzed counties did not provide minorities with sufficiently comprehensive legal protection against discrimination. Comprehensive legislation must protect minorities from any form of discrimination, protecting individuals from discrimination by public and private institutions (Serbia first cycle, para. 31, 17/11/04). Besides general bans on discrimination, many countries have introduced additional legislation to prohibit discrimination in employment, which the

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______________________________________________________________ AC actively supports (Croatia, first cycle, para. 23, 06/04/01). However, greater protection is needed in areas in which minorities and in particular Roma people frequently suffer discrimination, like housing (Sweden, first cycle, para. 31, 20/02/03), education (Russia, first cycle, para. 32, 13/09/02), health care (Lithuania, first cycle, para. 28, 21/02/03 and CM Rec. 2006(10)), and employment (Italy, first cycle, para. 22, 14/09/01). The transposition of the EU Racial Equality Directive is also supported, however, without making comments on whether a state has transposed the directive properly or not. In some cases the AC combines its call for comprehensive adoption of anti-discrimination legislation with the transposition of the EU Racial Equality Directive (Germany, second cycle, para. 28, 01/03/06). In the case of Ireland, the AC used the belated transposition of the EU directive as a tool to apply pressure to accelerate legislative reforms from which the AC hopes to bring Irish law into compliance with the FCNM (Ireland, first cycle, para. 21, 22/05/03). However, the promotion of this EU directive for some EU member states, but not for non-EU members, poses the potential threat of establishing differential treatment without having a solid legal justification for this practice. As part of a comprehensive legal protection against racial discrimination which reaches all areas of the life of minority groups, the introduction of effective remedies is required of all contracting parties. The existence of legal protection mechanisms against discrimination is a precondition that necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the promotion of “full and effective equality” in real life. The effective working of legal provisions depends on a number of conditions of which the AC is aware in its comments on state reports. Low numbers of legal trials concerning acts of racial discrimination being brought before courts, despite NGO reports on widespread discrimination in everyday life, is very often indicative of a malfunctioning of the national administration and judicial system which deprives many minority members of access to effective remedies (Russia, second cycle, para. 46, 11/05/06). Despite the fact that many Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have transposed the Racial Equality Directive punctually does not automatically give their minority populations the opportunity to seek a remedy before a court. Moreover, the AC attaches great importance to the possibility that victims of discrimination can seek compensation for damages suffered (Cyprus, first cycle, para 23, 06/04/01). The CM even pledges free legal aid for the very poor (CM Rec. (2005)4 para. 13). In addition to the proper transposition of comprehensive nondiscrimination legislation, great importance is attached to the availability of reliable statistical data. In 25 out of 32 cases the AC criticizes the insufficient availability of statistical data concerning national minorities. Any effective integration measure needs a careful evaluation of minority living conditions based on reliable statistical data before it can be implemented properly. In

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______________________________________________________________ many cases there appear to be significant discrepancies between the data made available to the COE and the actual ethnic minority populations in a certain country (Austria, first cycle, para. 22, 16/05/02 or Czech Republic first cycle para. 28, 06/04/01). This is particularly true for Roma people. National census data frequently do not provide reliable figures on the Roma population. In its comments, the AC requests not only exact data on the ethnic composition of states but also asks member states to provide details according to age, sex, and geographical location (Germany, second cycle para. 33, 01/03/06). It is only possible to judge the effectiveness and appropriateness of national integration measures if reliable data is provided. This data is also important for countries in order to allow them to develop what the AC calls “targeted measures” for integration (Slovenia, second cycle, para. 61, 26/05/05). Collecting statistical data is essential not only for the development of integration strategies but also for the implementation and evaluation of equalizing measures (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 41, 27/05/04). Guaranteeing “full and effective equality” requires states to constantly re-evaluate and up-date their data on ethnic minorities. Changes in the ethnic composition in certain territories or changes in the socio-economic conditions of minority groups have to be recognized within an appropriate time span. Collecting data based on ethnic characteristics does not always find support in state administrations and concerns about it can be justified. A potential danger is the misuse of this data to discriminate against a certain group. For instance, the gathering of crime-related data according to racial origin can be politically exploited for populist reasons and might even fuel resentment against minorities. In countries in which ethnic conflicts have recently been overcome or continue to exist, this form of data collection can lead to an unintended division of society into ethnic groups with far-reaching consequences. Therefore, this data was not explicitly demanded from Kosovo and Bosnia, which were reminded to comply with personal data protection provisions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, first cycle, para. 53, 27/05/05). A further formal requirement for the proper application of FCNM norms is the question of the legal status of ethnic minorities. This issue is particularly relevant in the Baltic countries and in the Balkans. In Estonia and Latvia, for example, around one-third of the population belong to the Russian-speaking minority, many of whom did not obtain an Estonian or Latvian passport automatically after the Soviet Union collapsed. The issue of citizenship and of what constitutes an ethnic minority is of the highest importance for the implementation of FCNM norms. In their explanatory declaration to the FCNM, both countries declared that only citizens fall under the category of national minorities and thus can enjoy rights set out in the FCNM. However, similar declarations have been issued by Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Switzerland (Thiele, 2006, p. 126).

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______________________________________________________________ In the Balkan region the uncertain legal status of Roma hinders the implementation of integration programmes in many cases. The unclear legal status of Roma settlements in Serbia led the authorities to forcefully evict Roma from their homes (Serbia, first cycle, para. 40, 17/11/04, see also CM Rec. (2005)4, para. 24). Roma living in non-legalized settlements often belong to the most disenfranchised and marginalized group of people. These settlements often lack basic infrastructure like water supply or waste collection. There have also been cases in which Roma have been removed from residence lists, leaving these people with an uncertain residence status (Slovenia, second cycle, para. 56, 26/05/05). Policy Organization A substantial proportion of the AC country opinions focus on the organization and administration of minority integration programmes. Indeed the AC spends more time and effort on commenting on the correct set-up of state implementing organs and administrative coordination of minority policy instruments than on the promotion of specific policy programmes. This section presents the AC’s opinion on state policy organization mentioning the effective working of Ombudsman institutions, the need for proper policy coordination between state institutions at the central and local level, models for adequate minority participation and problems of monitoring and implementation. According to the AC, the availability of effective remedies depends on the existence and proper working of a specialized monitoring institution. The introduction of the office of Ombudsman has become a standard recommendation. States without such a specialized body are advised to establish such an institution “in a timely manner” (Armenia, first cycle, para. 26, 16/05/02). The Ombudsman primarily serves the interest of the public including ethnic minorities but is not a representative for minority interests. In many cases the duties of this office are narrowly defined. An Ombudsman institution classically investigates complaints by individuals whose rights have been violated by state authorities (Cyprus, first cycle, para. 23, 06/04/01). Against this narrow understanding of the duties and functions of an Ombudsman the AC wants to expand its competences to the promotion of equal treatment (Czech Republic, second cycle, para. 20, 24/02/05). In its country opinions, the AC has expressed the view that the mere existence of an Ombudsman office may not suffice for guaranteeing effective remedies against discrimination. It attaches a number of conditions or expectations for this institution to work well. The offices should be accessible to people in regional areas and in areas in which minorities reside, to increase the accessibility of the Ombudsman office for ethnic minorities (Azerbaijan, first cycle, para. 26, 22/05/03). The building of popular confidence between

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______________________________________________________________ state institutions and minorities is a further issue of concern in the cases of Azerbaijan (ibid., para. 24), Bosnia (first cycle, para. 36, 27/05/05), Russia (second cycle, para. 46 11/05/06), Kosovo (first cycle, para. 37 25/11/05) and Slovenia (second cycle, para. 50, 26/05/05), which have shown signs of serious disruption of public trust in state institutions. The AC takes a keen interest in the effective working of Ombudsman institutions within the domestic state structure and considers it as “indispensable for the Ombudsman to be able to rely on cooperation from all authorities” (Slovenia, first cycle, para 27, 12/09/02). This is a particular challenge since often minority issues do not fall in the competence of only one ministerial office but cut cross many portfolios. The effective working of Ombudsman institutions also requires a well-informed minority which knows its rights and actively uses them. Furthermore, countries are reminded to provide adequate financial resources and institutional independence when setting up such an office (Armenia, first cycle, para. 27, 16/05/02). For guaranteeing effective equality, the AC investigates the domestic organization of state integration programmes. Questions of the proper implementation of integration instruments and the efficient organization of integration programmes, including the allocation of adequate funding, supervision, administration and evaluation, are important elements of its opinions. In 19 out of 32 cases, comments on the organizational set-up of integration programmes were made. Indeed the challenge when setting up national integration programmes is not only the often low public support for minority integration projects but also the need for proper planning and cooperation between national and regional authorities on the vertical level as well as between different ministries at the horizontal level. Based on comprehensive non-discrimination legislation, the AC demands that countries develop comprehensive integration strategies remedying “at all levels” social and economic discrimination and marginalization (Bosnia, first cycle, para. 49, 27/05/05). Such measures need to involve “close coordination” of all relevant ministries (ibid., para 51). The CM has supported this view in a number of recommendations on Roma integration issues (CM, Rec. (2001)17; CM Rec. (2005)4; CM Rec. (2006)10). Problems of coordination between different ministries are a frequent challenge for the implementation of integration projects. Repeatedly the AC expresses concern about the varying degrees of commitment of the state administration bodies involved. Concerns were issued on the full and consistent implementation of integration projects by all involved actors (Romania, first cycle, para. 25, 06/04/01). The success and sustainability of minority integration programmes depends to a large extent on an effectively working regional and local administration. It is the local authorities that run integration projects and thus local governments feature frequently in AC recommendations (see also CM Rec. (2005)4 para. 9, 35; Croatia, second cycle, para. 74, 01/10/04). Resis-

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______________________________________________________________ tance or ignorance against integration projects by local authorities can impact negatively on national integration programmes and at worst can undermine the ability of these programmes to promote effective equality (Czech Republic, second cycle, paras. 52, 59, 24/02/05; Hungary, second cycle, paras. 49, 52, 09/12/04). Coordination with local authorities is important because many services in which Roma, primarily, suffer discrimination, such as health care, housing etc. are administered by them (Italy, second cycle, para. 56, 24/02/05). Besides calling for proper coordination of central, regional, and local administrative institutions, the AC also calls for cooperation with civil society (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 33, 27/05/04). Contact with civil society organizations is an important information source for the AC. Occasionally it refers to NGO opinions or reports on the state of integration measures and revealed shortcomings in their implementation (Norway, second cycle, para. 39, 05/10/06). The incorporation of civil society organizations is particularly valuable in situations in which there is only a weak or no political representation of minority interests. In these situations, the AC tries to integrate civil society organizations to represent minority interests (Poland, first cycle, para. 39, 27/11/03). Following the country opinions of the AC, it is not fully clear if states should feel required to set up a special or separate administrative unit which administers integration projects. However, the AC supports their establishment and proper funding (Spain, first cycle, para. 31, 27/11/03). In many cases it reminds countries to provide sufficient funding for integration programmes. In 17 out of 32 cases, the AC finds that countries provide insufficient resources for the proper implementation of integration programmes, and 12 of these 17 are Eastern European countries. Additionally the CM has highlighted the need to “provide long-term budgetary support” especially for Roma integration projects (CM Rec. (2001)17, para. 28). Besides the proper coordination of state institutions involved in designing integration programmes, the AC frequently calls for the “active participation of Travellers and Traveller organizations in the implementation structures set up” (Ireland, first cycle, para. 42, 22/05/03). In half the countries which have ratified the FCNM, proper minority consultation when setting up minority integration programmes has been called for (see Table 2). Systematic minority consultation primarily seeks to guarantee that minority integration projects reflect the real needs of minorities and are not developed without minority input (Russia, second cycle, para. 70, 11/05/06). In some instances the AC recommends increasing the number of minority employees in state administrations (Kosovo, para. 37, 25/11/05; Macedonia, first cycle, para. 36, 27/05/04). Minority consultation has also been mentioned in a variety of COE recommendations by the CM stressing the importance of minority participation at the planning, implementation and evaluation of integration

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______________________________________________________________ projects (CM, Rec. R (2000)4; CM Rec (2001)17; CM Rec. (2005)4; CM Rec. (2006)10). As can be seen in Table 2, almost two-thirds of countries inadequately monitor their non-discrimination legislation or insufficiently supervise their integration programmes. Governments, according to the AC, need to have information available on the practical application of non-discrimination legislation in order to guarantee fully that equalizing measures and nondiscrimination legislation work properly (Ukraine first cycle, para. 28, 01/03/02). Only if countries have up-to-date information available are they able to adjust current programmes to the needs of minority members. Furthermore, the monitoring and evaluation of integration measures should be conducted by independent institutions (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 33, 27/05/04). Not only states need to monitor the implementation of nondiscrimination and integration programmes, however. This information is also crucial for the AC, which has to rely on statistical data and survey studies provided by the state parties, or other independent research institutes or NGOs, to fulfil its task, the monitoring of the FCNM (Slovakia, first cycle, para. 21, 22/09/00). The insufficient monitoring apparatus in many countries also complements the frequently observed problems of implementation. One-third of country opinions complain about insufficient implementation of nondiscrimination rules or integration, and the majority of such cases are Eastern European countries. The reasons for this implementation deficit are manifold. In the case of Bosnia (first cycle, para. 42, 27/05/05) it is a “deeply-rooted discrimination” in society. In other cases, the AC has attributed the implementation gap to; lack of statistical data to monitor the progress of implementation (Croatia, second cycle, para. 43, 01/10/04), lack of commitment of national governments towards integration goals (ibid., para. 51), insufficient budget (ibid., para. 72), lack of systematic evaluation of integration projects (Ireland, second cycle, para. 41, 06/10/06), lack of minority participation during the implementation of integration programmes (Ireland, first cycle, para. 42, 22/05/03), misconduct of police officers (Lithuania, first cycle, para. 32, 21/03/03), unclear guidelines for implementing agencies (Romania, first, cycle, para. 29, 06/04/01), unclear legal status of ethnic minorities (Russia, first cycle, para. 36, 13/09/02), lack of judicial independence (Serbia, first cycle, para. 36, 17/11/04), or the unawareness of existing non-discrimination laws among the broader public and within the judicial system (Romania, second cycle, para. 47, 24/11/05). In its comments on the organizational set up of integration programmes, the AC is primarily reacting to the situation on the ground. Confronted with implementation deficits, inadequate monitoring and widespread organizational shortcomings, the AC has to devote large parts of its commen-

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______________________________________________________________ taries to questions of administrative organization before recommending specific policy instruments. Policy Instruments The promotion of minority integration measures is primarily based on Article 4(2) and thus the AC’s comments on the implementation of this paragraph are central for our understanding of what equalizing measures are about. The AC actively encourages states to use minority integration tools for the promotion of effective equality. However, it has not developed objective criteria for when affirmative action is justified, it only refers to persisting and considerable inequalities between national minorities and mainstream society which justify the introduction of preferential treatment (Romania, first cycle, CM Conclusions, 06/04/01). In many cases the AC narrows down the area in which it recommends positive measures for securing full equality; employment (Serbia, first cycle, para. 38, 17/11/04), housing (Norway, first cycle, para. 76, 12/09/02), education (Sweden, first cycle, para. 26, 20/02/03), or Roma woman (Norway, first cycle, para. 76, 12/09/02). A number of terms are used to express the need for preferential treatment without calling directly for affirmative action. In the country recommendations one can find the terms; “positive measures”, “targeted measures”, “specific measures”, “decisive measures”, “remedial measures”, “suitable measures” and “additional measures”. They all, in a polite and diplomatic manner, point to persistent inequalities between ethnic minorities and mainstream society that require state intervention and some kind of positive discrimination. However, the AC avoids the naming of specific equalizing measures and it does not prescribe concrete instruments for any particular issue. The AC’s approach is to emphasize problems and to make countries aware of existing inequalities. The measure applied to remedy the situation is left to the discretion of each state party. There are differences in emphasis, however; while the term “suitable measure” leaves considerable scope for interpretation, the wording “positive” or “remedial” measures demands more direct state intervention. However, it is not clear according to which benchmarks the AC decides a situation requires “additional” or “targeted” measures. In some cases the AC’s comments appear as rather non-coercive recommendations. Phrases like, “The Advisory Committee considers that the Armenian authorities should step up their efforts in this regard (effective equality)” without going into the matter of the scope and extent of the government’s efforts can only formulate very vague obligations for Armenia (Armenia, first cycle para. 93, 16/05/02). Positive measures in the area of education are seen as vital for success in other fields such as employment and housing and therefore education forms a special focus for AC comments (Finland, first cycle, para. 20, 22/09/00). As stated earlier, no specific integra-

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______________________________________________________________ tion measures have been prescribed nor is it inquired why certain instruments have worked effectively or not. The decision as to which instruments best apply for the integration of minority people is left for the state parties. The AC not only criticizes shortcomings in its periodic country opinion, it also encourages states to continue and systematically apply projects that have a proven positive impact. One case in point is the introduction of Roma assistant teachers (see the contribution by Cashman in this volume), which lowered the school drop-out rates of Roma students significantly (Poland, first cycle, para. 37, 27/11/03). The Parliamentary Assembly of the COE, more directly than the AC, calls upon countries to recruit Roma staff in public services ranging from administrative work in local authorities to health-care assistants in hospitals (PACE, Rec. 1557 (2002) para. 15c). Examples of successful “best practice” are promoted which can be developed by regional authorities or organizations from which a whole country may profit if applied coherently (Serbia, first cycle, para. 38, 17/11/04). In its comments on Article 4 the AC, with the exception of Roma women, rarely singles out a sub-group of any particular ethnic minority. However, because Roma women frequently encounter double discrimination based on their ethnic origin and gender, the AC devotes special attention to the situation of Roma women. In more than 20 country opinions the AC has made a direct reference to the situation of Roma women, making states aware of their vulnerable situation. In many cases it uses the standard phrase, “the Advisory Committee underlines that, when implementing special measures, particular attention should be paid to the situation of Roma women” (Denmark, first cycle, para. 20, 22/09/00) to express the need for special integration measures. The AC also finds “that the gender dimension needs to be taken into account in the design and implementation of all minority initiatives” (Ireland, second cycle, para. 51, 06/10/06). On some occasions more specific advice has been found. For Ireland (first cycle, para. 38, 22/05/03) the AC recommends improving the access to childcare facilities from which it expects women to have better access to the labour market. Indeed unemployment among Roma women is one of the most worrying and persistent forms of lack of integration (Norway, second cycle, 05/10/06). In Romania the AC welcomes the training of Roma women as social workers to improve the health and living conditions in Roma settlements (Romania, second cycle, para. 53, 24/11/05). This measure combines efforts to raise health-care standards among Roma and provides Roma women with job training and employment. The 2003 Body and Soul Report, which revealed dozens of cases of forced sterilization of Roma women mostly in Slovakia, has triggered the AC to focus more intensively on Roma women and their needs in the healthcare system (Slovakia, second cycle, para. 57, 26/05/05). Lastly the AC makes reference to the traditional way of life of Roma Travellers, however, only in a small number of cases (5 of 32) does it indi-

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______________________________________________________________ cate that their lifestyle needs special consideration. For example, integration measures should take into account the special needs of Roma and their traditional way of life (Spain, first cycle, para. 37, 27/11/03). Hereby the AC highlights especially the needs of Travellers and their nomadic lifestyle to which integration measures need to be adapted (Norway, second cycle, para. 45, 05/10/06). Respect for the traditional way of life of Roma has also been acknowledged by the CM (CM Rec. (2005)4) and even by the European Court of Human Rights based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Morawa, 2004; Gilbert, 2002, pp. 778–780). The AC and Norm Promotion This contribution aims to clarify the meaning of “effective equality” of Article 4 of the FCNM, which is a central element of many minority integration programmes in Europe, and thereby analyzed the immanent character of the AC norm promotion mechanism. Two conditions have shaped the AC norm promotion process the most; first, the lack of legal power and robust enforcement mechanisms, and second, the vague meaning of FCNM norms giving considerable discretion for its interpretation. The AC has to rely almost exclusively on its socialization power. FCNM standards, although they are legally binding, are not directly litigable. Furthermore, the COE cannot offer any significant external incentives for norm compliance, like financial subsidies for what are often costly integration programmes. Thus the AC mechanism is primarily characterized by a lack of political and legal power and the absence of material support for the implementation of FCNM standards. Incrementally, the EU is filling this gap through its non-discrimination legislation and large-scale funding of minority integration programmes (see contribution by Riedel to this volume). However, the power of the AC is in its monitoring process, which immerses states in a communication process on the proper application of minority rights norms creating commitments states cannot easily evade. This rather soft norm enforcement mechanism is a logical reaction to the vague wording of minority rights norms. The open wording of many minority rights standards may, in some cases, be a burden, giving states the opportunity to circumvent strict norms. However, it also legitimizes the function of the AC as a guardian and interpreter of European minority rights. Indeed having strict norms but weak enforcement instruments may be worse than having vague norms but relying on the power of socialization. Without the open wording of the FCNM the work of the AC would be seen with much more scepticism. Its current approach, which combines socialization through monitoring and elements of norm-setting, also suits the COE because it assigns to the AC the role of interpreter and promoter of European minority rights norms.

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______________________________________________________________ The country-specific recommendations of the AC are indispensable for a deeper understanding of the principle of equality in Article 4. By reference to the AC’s opinions, we can more systematically comprehend the meaning and scope of “effective equality” for minorities in Europe. The AC’s recommendations give detailed information on the obligations states have accepted when ratifying the FCNM. For monitoring the implementation of Article 4 the AC has developed its own “choreography”. In a first step the AC demands the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, in a second step it comments on the organizational set-up of state integration efforts, and thirdly the AC recommends more concrete integration measures. Thus the special value of analyzing the AC’s comments also lies in the creation of meaning through the monitoring of Article 4. The AC is not only a monitoring body but also a norm constructor through monitoring. The above sections could reveal a number of characteristics of this monitoring process and thereby specify the special character of norm promotion of the AC. Each recommendation is a country-specific comment which takes into account the specific living environment of ethnic minorities in Europe. The tailoring of country opinions is guided by implicit context variables. These variables are rather pragmatic benchmarks reacting to the reallife situation of minorities. The AC cautiously avoids normative language that would give preference to any theory of multiculturalism or other ideology. The fact that a substantial proportion of the AC opinions deal with questions of administrative organization of integration measures instead of integration instruments itself is a reaction to implementation problems on the ground. The FCNM does not provide any guidelines for how states should organize their integration programmes, thus the AC’s opinions generally do not promote a certain type of coordination. The AC’s comments are outcomeoriented and rather advise than prescribe a certain method of coordination. However, the AC insists on commonsense elementary conditions, like adequate funding or proper coordination between different levels of state institutions. Thus the AC opinions help states to design their integration programmes properly, but the choice of instruments is left to the countries. Any specific instruments are welcome as long as they remedy substantial inequalities. The AC’s recommendations are very often general in nature, only occasionally recommending specific integration instruments or policies. This can largely be explained by the open wording of Article 4 which does not give preference for any specific measure. The AC only requires states to adopt a certain measure if there is an objective need for it (Hofmann 2006 b, p. 13). It calls for the adoption of specific, targeted or positive measures which are country, issue, and minority specific. Recommendations by the AC are individually tailored for each country and thus measures recommended for one country may not be adequate for all others. Integration measures in

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______________________________________________________________ the area of education and employment are the most frequent ones recommended by the AC, followed by the special protection of Roma woman and respect for the traditional way of life of Roma Travellers. However, the AC has not developed transparent criteria according to which it decides which situation deserves the application of additional or positive integration measures. The existence of persisting forms of inequality is made on pragmatic assumptions on the living conditions of minorities. Conclusion Of all European international organizations, the AC is the institution that has developed the most sophisticated and elaborated approach to minority rights in general and minority integration in particular. Through a process of longterm monitoring, commenting, and socialization, the AC has further developed the scope and meaning of full equality and its organizational prerequisites. It has developed flexible and individually tailored benchmarks for minority integration programmes, setting standards in accordance with and beyond the legal framework. Yet the AC has been reluctant to prescribe specific integration tools, its soft law approach leaves considerable space for multiple ways to reach equality. The choice of instruments for furthering social inclusion is largely left to the discretion of countries. Furthermore, the work of the AC aims to reinforce integration efforts by state and non-state actors. It gives minority activists external (international) legitimacy and political support for their work.

References Alfredsson, G. (2000), “A Frame for an incomplete painting: Comparison of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities with international standards and monitoring procedures,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 7(4): 291–304. —(2006), “Article 4,” in: M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 141–151. Body and Soul, Forced Sterilization and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom in Slovakia (2003), Centre for Reproductive Rights and Poradňa pre občianske a ludske prava, http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_bo_slovakia.html (accessed 20 January 2009).

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______________________________________________________________ Checkel, J. (2001), “Why comply? Social learning and European identity change,” International Organization, 55(3): 553–588. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 563 (1969), On the situation of Gypsies and other travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1203 (1993), On Gypsies in Europe. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1557 (2002), The legal situation of Roma in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution (75) 13 (1975), Containing Recommendations on the Social Situation of Nomads in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (2000) 4, On the Education of Roma/Gypsy Children in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2001)17, On improving the economic and employment situation of Roma/Gypsies and Travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2005)4, On improving the housing conditions of Roma and Travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2006)10, On better access to health care for Roma and Travellers in Europe. Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and Explanatory Report, Strasbourg, February 1995, H(1995)010. European Union, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 180/22-26, 19.07.2000. Gilbert, G. (2002), “The burgeoning minority rights jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, 24(3): 736– 780.

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______________________________________________________________ Hofmann, R. (2004), “Zur Überwachung der Umsetzung des Rahmenübereinkommens zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten – Eine Bilanz nach fünf Jahren, ” Europa Ethnica, 61: 3–16. —(2006a), “The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: An Introduction,” in: M. Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–24. —(2006b), The impact of international norms on the protection of national minorities in Europe: The added value and essential role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Report prepared for the Secretariat of the FCNM and for the Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 5 December 2006. Morawa, A. (2004), “The European Court of Human Rights and minority rights: The ‘special consideration’ standard in light of Gypsy Council,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 10: 97–109. Pentassuglia, G. (1999), “Monitoring minority rights in Europe: The implementation machinery of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities – With special reference to the role of the Advisory Committee,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 6(4): 417– 462. Phillips, A. (2004), “The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM),” in: Mechanisms for the implementation of minority rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 109–129. Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and K. Sikkink (1999), The Power of Human Rights, International norms and domestic change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse, T. (2000), “Let’s Argue! Communicative action in international relations,” International Organization, 54(1): 1–39. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001), “The Community trap, liberal norms, rhetorical action, and Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization, 55(1): 47–80. Schimmelfennig F. and U. Sedelmeier (eds.) (2005), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press: Ithaca NY and London.

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______________________________________________________________ Steketee, F. (2001), “The Framework Convention: A piece of art or a tool for action?,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 8: 1–15. Thiele, C. (2006), “Minority rights in Europe: An introduction into a fragmented regime,” in: M. Brosig (ed.) Human Rights in Europe. A Fragmented Regime? Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 121–136. Troebst, S. (1999), “From paper to practice: The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,” Helsinki Monitor 1999, 1: 19–26. Wiener, A. (2004), “Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world politics,” European Journal of International Relations, 10(2): 189–234. Documents of the Advisory Committee Advisory Committee, Opinion on Armenia, first cycle, 16/05/02. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Austria, first cycle 16/05/02. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Azerbaijan, first cycle, 22/05/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina, first cycle, 27/05/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Croatia, first and second cycle, 06/04/01 and 01/10/04. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Cyprus, first cycle, 06/04/01. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Czech Republic, first and second cycle, 06/04/01 and 24/02/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Denmark, first cycle, 22/09/00. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Germany, second cycle, 01/03/06. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Finland, first cycle, 22/09/00. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Hungary, second cycle, 09/12/04.

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______________________________________________________________ Advisory Committee, Opinion on Ireland, first cycle, 22/05/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Italy, first and second cycle, 14/09/01 and 24/02/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Kosovo, first cycle, 25/11/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Lithuania, first cycle, 21/02/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Macedonia, first cycle, 27/05/04. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Norway, first and second cycle, 12/09/02 and 05/10/06. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Poland, first cycle, 27/11/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Romania, first and second cycle, 06/04/01 and 24/11/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Russia, first and second cycle, 13/09/02 and 11/05/06. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Serbia, first cycle, 17/11/01. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Slovakia, first and second cycle, 22/09/00 and 26/05/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Slovenia, first and second cycle, 12/09/02 and 26/05/05. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Spain, first cycle, 27/11/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Sweden, first cycle, 20/02/03. Advisory Committee, Opinion on Ukraine, first cycle, 01/03/02.

Beyond Conflict Prevention: HCNM and Minority Integration Natalie Sabanadze Integration of persons belonging to national minorities is an essential precondition for peaceful and democratic development of any multiethnic state. It is, however, a challenging task particularly for those societies that are undergoing processes of State and nation-building and have in the past experienced upsurge of radical nationalism and ethnic conflict. Prevention of conflicts through the integration of national minorities is the task of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). This article describes how the HCNM, over the course of 15 years, has combined considerations of justice and security and balanced between seemingly opposite tendencies of integration on the one hand and protection and promotion of ethno-cultural diversity on the other. Introduction The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was established by the participating States of the then Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the 1992 Helsinki meeting. It was an institution created specifically in response to the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and proliferation of ethno-national conflicts throughout the post-communist space. The international community at a time appeared to be caught by surprise with the seeming resurgence of nationalism and the challenges it posed to the stability and integrity of multinational states. In the Helsinki Document, the participating States acknowledged that aggressive nationalism and intolerance, coupled with economic decline, social tensions and gross violations of human, including minority rights, represented a clear threat to the peaceful development of society, particularly in new democracies. For this reason, the participating States identified the need for an international instrument which would “mediate between the parties concerned in order to reduce the tension before it led to open, armed conflict between them” (Zaagman and Zaal, 1994, pp. 95–113). Integration with respect for diversity is the basis upon which HCNM’s conflict prevention strategy is founded. At a more general, philosophical level this means finding a working balance between minority rights on the one hand and sovereign rights of states on the other; between ethno-cultural self-assertion and self-determination of groups and territorial integrity of

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______________________________________________________________ states; between social cohesion and growing ethno-cultural diversity. At a more practical policy level this means finding the right balance between teaching of the state language to persons belonging to national minorities and providing education in mother tongue; between encouraging minority participation through regional or ethnic parties as well as through their inclusion into mainstream party lists; allowing cross border exchanges with so-called kin-states and accepting their support in the spheres of culture and education while making sure that this does not lead to the outsourcing of minority protection from states of residence to kin-states. The experience of the HCNM shows that balancing between those trends that seem to be pulling in different directions is not only possible but is also an essential precondition for achieving sustainable peace and security both within and between states. The HCNM from 2001–2007 Rolf Ekeus once noted that “a society at peace with itself will more likely to be at peace with its neighbours” (Ekeus, 2003). The emphasis on peace is important to note as it underscores that the HCNM is first and foremost a conflict prevention instrument designed to contribute to the preservation of peace and security in the OSCE area. Over the course of fifteen years, the HCNM has actively pursued conflict prevention at both operational and structural levels and has come to be regarded as one of the main successes of the OSCE. Nevertheless, today the HCNM faces a difficult question. The institution was created when wars were waging in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union and today, fifteen years later, the war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia has returned the violence back in the part of the world that the HCNM has devoted particular time and attention. The question, therefore, is whether instruments and the overall approach developed by the HCNM can still be regarded as valid and relevant or whether they require a significant rethinking. This paper addresses the above question by first describing and analyzing the integrationist approach of the HCNM to the question of national minorities and then by identifying conditions under which such an approach can be and has been successful. The mandate and the background against which the HCNM was established are important in understanding both practical and normative foundations of the HCNM activities. The paper, therefore, begins by summarizing the mandate of the HCNM and highlighting its specific characteristics. It then moves on to the discussion of nationalist challenges to the democratic development of states and normative frameworks on the basis of which the HCNM has been dealing with these challenges. Integrating diversity is an approach that the HCNM has pursued through the course of his work. The second part of the paper devotes special attention to explaining the main rationale behind such an approach and uses examples to illustrate how the approach has been translated from theory into practice. The conclusion returns to the question of

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______________________________________________________________ whether the HCNM has been a success as a conflict prevention institution or a failure. 1. The HCNM Mandate: Its Origins and Content Since the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts often linked to ethnicity and nationalism came to be seen as major threats to international peace and security. Antagonistic nationalisms of majority and minority groups not only brought the dissolution of multinational states such as former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union but were also threatening newly independent successor states with further disintegration. The threat of secession was particularly acute in those countries were national minorities were territorially concentrated, often bordering the so-called kin-states. This has raised fears of irredentism and secession across Easter Europe as well as fears of mass migration from the region in Western Europe. It also became clear that existing international instruments, conceived after the World War II and further developed during the Cold War, were incapable of dealing with the challenge of identity based, intra-state conflict. Standards for the protection of minority rights that would ensure that minorities were respected and accommodated in states of their residence were largely lacking. Similarly, international organizations in Europe had very limited operational capacity to deal with the growing need of conflict prevention (Friberg and Nasic, 2008, p. 13). Since the problem of national minorities came to the fore in the European politics at precisely the moment when the CSCE was itself undergoing rapid and far-reaching institutional changes, being transformed from a conference to a fully fledged international organization, it was one of the first to develop mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of rights of national minorities (Jackson-Preece, 1998, p. 3). The High Commissioner on National Minorities was one such mechanism, created specifically to tackle conflicts between minority and majority groups through providing assistance to the OSCE participating States in implementing national minority standards (Helsinki Follow-up Meeting 1992)1. As one observer has noted, an instrument had to be designed to facilitate the role of the OSCE in managing change resulting from post-Communist transition – essentially to address the relationship between minorities and majorities as part of the political process in the broadest sense (Packer, 1996, pp. 279–291). The HCNM, as described by the Helsinki Document, is an “instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage” and will, according to the mandate, provide: “’early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but in the judgement of the High Commissioner,

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______________________________________________________________ have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States, requiring the attention of and action by the Council or the CSO” (The Helsinki Decisions, II.3). The preventive mandate tasks the HCNM to get involved in situations of potential conflict at the earliest possible stage. In doing so, the HCNM is authorized to assess the nature of tensions and the parties involved, making a direct contact not only with State authorities but also with non-State actors. The HCNM is to make on-site visits in order to receive first-hand information from all parties concerned and from a variety of sources “including the media and non-governmental organisations” and thus make a well-informed judgement “on the potential consequences for peace and stability within the OSCE area” (11b) of a specific conflict. He is to engage with and promote dialogue between various actors, in order to facilitate resolution of disputes before they flare up into violent confrontation. In case the HCNM concludes that the situation is escalating beyond control and that his preventive efforts have been exhausted, the mandate specifies that he can issue an early warning to the Permanent Council via the Chairman in Office (CiO). Negotiating about such an institution was far from easy. Many states feared that they had to formally recognize national minorities living in their territories; invite unwelcome interventions from the so-called ‘kin-states’ and even go as far as to accept collective rights for ethnic groups. The mandate, therefore, was finally adopted with some restrictions. It does not allow the HCNM to “consider national minority issues in situations involving organised acts of terrorism” (5b) or to establish any contact with organization linked to or condoning terrorism. It also precludes the HCNM to engage in any individual cases (5c), which rules out the possibility for individual persons to address the HCNM. Finally, the mandate established that even though HCNM is by and large an independent institution, it is accountable to the Chairman in Office (CiO) of the OSCE and is obliged to report to the CiO on a regular basis and after each country visit. The mandate also stated that the HCNM should be an eminent person with long-standing international experience “from whom an impartial performance of the function may be expected” (8). Max van der Stoel, former Dutch foreign minister, was appointed the first High Commissioner in 1992 and served in that capacity until 2001. He was succeeded by the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus, who was the HCNM until July 2007. Current HCNM, former Norwegian foreign minister Knut Vollebaek, took up his post in August, 2007. The HCNM is to serve for a threeyear term with a possibility of extension for another three years. The Mandate of the HCNM was very much a child of its times. First it reflected the growing unease about the spread of ethno-national violence and what appeared as growing tensions between majority and minority communi-

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______________________________________________________________ ties within states. There was a real fear, as described above, that the experience of the Balkans and the Caucasus would spread all over Eastern Europe and usher a new era of instability and warfare. Second, the mandate reflected the growing acceptance among states that human rights are a matter of international concern and not simply a domestic affair of an individual state. The OSCE participating States made a forceful declaration to this effect in what is known as Moscow Document, which states that commitments undertaken in the human dimension “are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned” (Moscow Document, p.29). This was an important political statement, recognizing the international dimension of human rights and opposing the principle of absolute non-intervention (Bloed and Letschert, 2008, p. 92). Against this background, the OSCE created an institution of the HCNM which can be described as an ‘intrusive’ instrument, allowing the involvement in internal affairs of states. Apart for the formal restrictions mentioned above, the HCNM is eligible to visit and engage in any state he deems necessary and expect a degree of cooperation from the host authorities. The mandate of the HCNM, therefore, is based on the understanding that the violation of human rights, including minority rights is one of the direct causes of intra-state strife and that these violations need to be addressed as part of the overall conflict prevention strategy. This explains the fact that even though the HCNM was conceived as a purely security instrument, the emphasis on human dimension has been clearly pronounced in the work of the HCNM from the very start.2 The mandate established the High Commissioner on National Minorities and not for National Minorities, underscoring that the HCNM is neither an ombudsman for minorities not a human rights defender. Nevertheless, it has been accepted that the objective of preventing conflicts has a direct linkage with the protection of and respect for the rights of national minorities, which is a clear human dimension issue. The HCNM makes regular contributions to the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings and in majority of cases acts for the advancement and recognition of minority rights. This means that in practice HCNM is a cross-dimensional institution even though his primary responsibilities lie within the security basket of the OSCE. The mandate, however, does not define a national minority and neither does it offer any criteria for the HCNM to follow when selecting the cases and areas of engagement. Moreover, the mandate explicitly allows the HCNM to exercise his “judgement” in this matter, leaving much flexibility to the person occupying the post. All three High Commissioners have followed a pragmatic approach to the existence of a national minority, treating it as a matter of fact rather than that of a contested concept. Max van der Stoel, the first High Commissioner, is often cited as saying “I know a minority when I

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______________________________________________________________ see one”. Later he qualified his statement and offered a more objective interpretation of a minority. In his intervention during the 1993 Human Dimension meeting in Warsaw, van der Stoel stated: “first of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity” (HDIM Meeting 1993). Avoiding a strict definition of a national minority has served the HCNM well, allowing his engagement in cases where minorities were not formally recognized as such by States of their residence. Finally, given the emphasis in the HCNM’s preventive work on the field-work, on-site visits and local contacts, HCNM’s solutions and recommendations have been mainly context specific rather than universal. A great deal of the HCNM’s work depends on a sound knowledge and understanding of the political context in which his interlocutors are operating and in which decisions are being made. The HCNM, therefore, has been facing a difficult task of appearing consistent without practicing uniformity and using universal standards in extremely diverse places and situations (Kemp, 2001, p. 26). Balancing between universal norms and their context specific application without undermining the credibility of the institution is one challenge among many that the HCNM has been facing. From the very start he had to navigate between upholding rights of minority communities and showing due respect and understanding for the national security concerns of sovereign states. In so doing, the HCNM has been promoting a more inclusive and pluralistic approach to nation-building in countries with a difficult legacy of communism and ethnic nationalism. 2

The Nature of Conflict: Nationalist Challenge to Democratic Transition One of the defining features of the HCNM’s mandate is that it clearly identifies the nature of conflict that is to prevent. It does not speak about conflict prevention in general, which would make the institution far less effective. It speaks of a specific kind of conflict which stems from tensions between ethno-national communities and majority-minority relations within States that often spills over across State borders. Majority of such conflicts have a pronounced international dimension with a potential of disrupting regional stability and undermining friendly inter-State relations. When the HCNM was established the probability that such conflicts would proliferate across the entire post-Communist space was very high. Today the danger is much less, however, some of the challenges that the HCNM faced then are still relevant. These include the rise of antagonistic nationalisms within States; a tendency to ethnicize every-day politics and securitize minority demands to the extent that their resolution through normal democratic politics becomes very difficult. This section explores some of these challenges that the HCNM has been

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______________________________________________________________ facing both in the past and present and against this background discusses the normative frameworks within which the institution operates. The conflicts that came to the fore after the collapse of the Soviet Union were a result of a complex mix of factors. Among them I would single out two: one is the communist legacy with its institutionalization of ethnicity and another is rapid transition from authoritarianism to market democracy. One of the characteristic features of the Soviet system was a complex hierarchy of ethnically based territorial units with a varying degree of formal autonomy. The result was the institutionalization of ethnicity and concomitant establishment of what can be described ethno-communist elites. As Rogers Brubaker argued, Soviet republics were expressly defined by and for the nations for whom they were named (Brubaker, 1996, p. 46). However, expression of their national identity was to be limited to culture while politically Moscow required complete subordination. In other words, nations at the level of republics as well as ethnic groups at the level of autonomous units were institutionalized as ethno-national entities and were given a sense of ownership of their territory without the right to rule it (ibid., p. 46). This had a number of important consequences for the nation-building processes that followed the fall of communism. These included the development of nonpolitical, quasi-nationalism in parallel to the official communist ideology; the presence of ethnically defined elites that were ready to step in after the collapse, exchanging communist ideals for the nationalist ones; the spread of the predominantly primordialist conception of nation; and devaluation of the concept of autonomy.3 In some post-communist countries depending on their prior historic development, nationalist mobilisation occurred faster than in others. However, in all cases conditions conducive to the rise of ethno-centric nationalism were already put in place by the Soviet system. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Soviet historiography favoured a specifically ethno-centric conception of nation with primordialism being an unchallenged paradigm. Postcommunist successor states followed the same approach, treating nationhood as the most natural social association, a kind of extended family. As Magda Opalski points out, “primordialism which has been in decline in the West for some time, continues to dominate post-Soviet social and political sciences, and is deeply ingrained in the political culture” (Opalski, 2001, p. 312). It was, therefore, not surprising that the nation was largely defined as an organic community closed for outsiders and nationality came to be divorced from citizenship. Such an exclusive conception of nationhood significantly complicated majority-minority relations in the post-Communist newly independent states, creating a sense of alienation among minority communities and a sense of mistrust of minorities among titular majorities. It should also be noted that concepts such as autonomy and powersharing that have been regarded and implemented as part of the solution to

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______________________________________________________________ ethno-territorial disputes in the West came to be seen as part of the problem in the post-Communist context (Kymlicka, 2008, pp. 11–42). Under the Soviet system, ethnic groups were given a chance to develop national selfawareness and identity without exercising effective control over their destiny. For majorities in newly independent states this meant that autonomies created structures around which ethnic mobilization could occur and which subsequently could challenge territorial integrity of a state (Cornell, 1999, p. 192).4 For minorities, autonomy came to mean very little in practice and those who experienced Soviet style autonomy tend to favour secession. Especially since many autonomous minority communities saw their status revoked after independence of their states of residence, as in the case of Kosovo or South Ossetia, letting credence to their worst fears. The concept of autonomy in other words has become devalued to the extent that it is very difficult to be accepted as part of the negotiated solution. Coupled with the Communist legacy a rapid pace of democratization was one of the factors contributing to bringing the tensions to the fore. After the long years of political repression and accumulation of grievances, democratization created space for these grievances to be voiced openly. It also gave a possibility for nationalist political leaders from both majority and minority communities to articulate their programmes, leading to open confrontation between competing nationalist projects. It has been noted, therefore, that there exists a correlation between the rise of ethno-national disputes and democratization (MacFarlane, 1997, pp. 399–420). This is particularly true for the early stages of democratic transition when space is open for making competing claims but institutions are still under-developed for accommodating these claims. In the long run, however, effective democratization remains the only solution for settling internal disputes and restoring faith in negotiated agreements and mechanisms of power-sharing. An example of Spain and accommodation of Basque and Catalan demands after the transition to democracy is instructive in this respect. Democratization, it should be noted, was one factor triggering rising tensions. The collapse of centrally planned economies and a rising sense of fear and insecurity further exacerbated divisions along ethnic lines, resulting in the growing ethnicization of every-day politics in many post-Communist states. It was common for persons belonging to national minorities to perceive economic hardship, lack of employment opportunities or regional under-developments as targeted specifically at them and resulting from deliberate discrimination on ethnic grounds. Even the most benign, daily issues such as access to water or electricity can be seen as contingent on ethnic identity and belonging, making even simple issues extremely difficult to resolve. Under the circumstances of hardship and state failure, it is common for people to rely on family and kin for the basic survival (Kupchan, 1995). For many minorities in Eastern Europe, kin happened to reside and form a major-

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______________________________________________________________ ity in a neighbouring States. This rose fears of irredentism and fragmentation, leading to the widespread perception of minorities as a disloyal, fifth column. The question of minorities, therefore, became an essential national security issue for many newly independent States and as Kymlicka has argued, resulted in the widespread securitization of the minority problematique (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 13–107). Under these challenging circumstances that characterised the early 1990s, the HCNM was to develop its conflict prevention strategy. The mandate provided a very general framework. However, the actual policy, approach and normative frameworks under which to operate had to be developed by the first High Commissioner himself and later his successors. In general terms, the key challenge was and still remains the need to reconcile tensions between justice and security; between the need to create an integrated, socially cohesive society and the ability to practice the politics of difference. In fulfilling his task, the HCNM has followed a human rights informed approach, based on the belief that the road to sustainable security lies through the respect for and protection of human, including minority rights. At the same time, he has relied on principles of good governance and on inclusive, pluralistic approaches to nation-building as part of his overall conflict prevention strategy. In practice this meant devoting special attention to the spheres of education and political participation. It is only through a rigorous yet pluralistic system of education, which is open to different ideas, cultures, languages and approaches, both in terms of its content and process, which societies learn to question long-established stereotypes, challenge national myths and create responsible, tolerant citizenry. The HCNM took this view from the very beginning, identifying education as area that can make the most difference in preventing inter-group conflict in the long run. All three High Commissioners have promoted teaching in different languages, including providing teaching in the mother tongue for minorities and teaching of the state language for persons belonging to national minorities. Often bilingual and multilingual models have been favoured as the best way to create conditions under which children of different ethno-cultural background would not only share the classrooms but also share each other’s languages and cultures. For the adult minority population, the HCNM has supported training courses in the state language in order to enhance their opportunities to integrate and participate in public life of their respective states. The question of language has been particularly acute in the context of the former Soviet Union. Many minority communities of different ethnic origin spoke Russian as their mother-tongue. Under the Soviet system, this was certainly the language of official communication and the most useful one for personal advancement. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Russian speaking minorities found themselves at a disadvantaged position

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______________________________________________________________ when newly independent states began actively promoting their respective state languages often accompanied by the official discourse of “undoing previous injustice”. While strengthening of the state language is a legitimate aim for any newly independent state, it takes great political maturity and caution to do it in a way that does not strain inter-ethnic relations. Too often, as a result of clumsy and confrontational approach taken by national elites, the language has become a source of inter-ethnic conflict. In many instances, the HCNM has worked hard with individual governments to show how states can organize themselves around, and protect, an official state language while at the same time respecting the linguistic rights of minorities. The question of language has been at the heart of the post-communist nation-building and the HCNM has contributed to making it a more open and inclusive process that would create foundations for the future peace and prosperity. For example, in 2004 the HCNM visited Latvia to assess the situation following the adoption of the Latvian Education Law, which allowed up to 40 per cent of subjects being taught in languages other than Latvian and required that the remaining 60 per cent of the curriculum being taught in the state language, i.e. Latvian. The reform was met with opposition from some members of the Russian minority who saw their right to receive education in mother tongue curtained by the new legislation. The HCNM’s assessment of the situation, however, reflected his emphasis on the need to promote integration of persons belonging to national minorities, making it clear that a state has the right, and indeed duty, to promote national integration, in particular by supporting the acquisition of proficiency in the state language. On the whole, he did not object to the bilingual model adopted by the Latvian authorities. However, the HCNM did recommend that Latvian authorities make greater effort in promoting dialogue between the authorities and minority communities in order to better explain the aims of the reform and engage minority representatives in its successful implementation. The underlying assumption of the HCNM’s approach is that establishing an inter-communal dialogue between majority and minority communities is an essential precondition for effective implementation of the national integration programmes and policies. Political participation is another area which holds key to building a pluralist nation, described by one commentator as “an imagined community of the twenty-first century” (Inder Singh, 2002). The HCNM has been promoting effective participation of minorities as the basis for good and democratic governance in multiethnic societies. It means that governments should not only consider the opinions of the peoples affected by its decisions but also allow them to influence and shape these decisions. According to the 1999 Lund Recommendations on Minority Participation in Public Life, which has been commissioned and endorsed by the HCNM, effective participations has two main dimensions.5 One is to create political space and opportunities

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______________________________________________________________ for persons belonging to national minorities to have a say on matters that affect them directly and another is to have a degree of control over these matters (Packer, 2007, pp. 69–85). In addition, participation is to take place at both the local and national levels. While it is crucial that minorities have both a say and a degree of control over decisions at the local level where they reside in great numbers, it is equally and perhaps symbolically even more important that they take part and influence decisions at the national level and on matters of general interest. Participation within the democratic framework of decision-making is what gives minorities a sense of belonging to and a stake in their respective societies. This in turn is the best way to ensure that inter-group disagreements are dealt with through normal democratic political processes and do not flare up into open confrontation let alone violence. The Lund Recommendations specifically and most of the HCNM’s country specific recommendations more generally, aim at addressing one fundamental question: “How can one create the politico-legal space in which differing groups of people with differing interests, needs and aspirations can live together?” (ibid., p. 81). With the risk of being criticized for inconsistency, the approach adopted by the HCNM to address this question has been varied, context-specific and ranged from territorial to non-territorial solutions. For example, in Crimea the HCNM was of the opinion that territorial autonomy was essential for maintaining peace and stability both within peninsula and between Crimea and central authorities in Kyiv. However, in other cases such as Slovakia he has opposed the choice for territorial autonomy given its potential to generate dangerous tensions. He believed that in Slovakia, under a democratic leadership a system of minority rights could be established which would provide all the necessary safeguards for the protection of national minorities, particularly for the Hungarian minority.6 Human rights, good governance and pluralistic nation-building are, therefore, the main normative frameworks within which the HCNM operates. All three are important and mutually complementary, allowing the HCNM to better address both the causes and symptoms of ethno-national conflict under a variety of different circumstances. Some scholars such as Will Kymlicka have criticized the HCNM for being less concerned with rights of minorities, either as groups or individuals and being more preoccupied with greater geopolitical and security implications of minority-majority relations. In this view, such an approach reinforces the securitization of the minority question, which has negative consequences for the cause of minority protection. According to Kymlicka, the security approach to the minority question erodes the democratic space for voicing minority demands and reduces the likelihood that those demands will be accepted and treated as a matter of normal democratic politics (Kymlicka, 2008, pp. 11–42). Violation of minority rights becomes easy to justify in terms of protecting vital national security interests and such justifications tend to be largely acceptable by the broader public.

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______________________________________________________________ Most importantly, securitization of minority issues may generate the wrong kind of responses, often heavy handed, on the part of the state authorities that in the long run may end up undermining the very security they are trying to uphold. All these concerns with regard to the securitization of the minority issues, which is particularly characteristic of post-Communist States, are valid. However, the work of the HCNM reveals a more complex interconnection between security and human rights. His approach demonstrates that the relationship between the two is neither that of opposition nor of a choice. The two are connected in a way that complement and reinforce each other. Sustainable peace and security can only be achieved through the respect of human, including minority rights. Peaceful and secure societies in turn are much less prone to securitizing rights and are more open to the recognition and acceptance of legitimate concerns of both groups and individuals. In countries that are undergoing a difficult transition, securitization can first of all, serve a useful purpose of attracting attention to and prioritizing minority issues and concerns. It so happens that attaching a ‘security’ label to something often leads to that ‘something’ receiving more attention, more resources and a greater commitment from relevant authorities (MacFarlane and Foong Khong, 2006). This is particularly important in countries that are either developing or going through the stage of transition, when resources are scarce and problems numerous. Under such circumstances there should be good reasons for the governments to commit money and resources to minority schools, for example, than to all other, equally burning issues. Secondly, it follows that the security approach gives a valuable leverage to the HCNM in his dealings with governments. He can appeal to the selfinterest of states, defined in national security terms, and by doing so persuade them to tackle minority issues. What would be the effectiveness of the HCNM, which has neither enforcement power nor material incentives to generate compliance, if he was only to speak about the promotion of rights especially in countries that are openly indifferent to the rights discourse? The effectiveness and consequently the value of the HCNM’s involvement are significantly enhanced when he manages to speak directly to the national security concerns of states. The HCNM, therefore, uses the security approach for instrumental purposes but the main objective of his engagement is normalization of interethnic relations within a given state, which ultimately leads to the desecuritization of the minority question. A good example, in this context is the HCNM’s Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in InterState Relations issued in October of 2008. The key factor contributing to the securitization of the minority question, particularly in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, is the so-called kin-state factor. The presence of kinstates is associated with threats of irredentism, justified or not, and with fears

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______________________________________________________________ of potential political and even military intervention from often neighbouring states claiming protection of ‘their people’ abroad. Historic legacies also exacerbate the problem, particularly when a kin-state in question is a former imperial power. Through the Bolzano Recommendations, the HCNM tackled this very sensitive issue and tried to show states how they can support minorities abroad in a way that benefits minorities and at the same time respects friendly, good neighbourly relations. Benign, friendly kin-states on the border are crucial for reassuring states of residence and consequently, allowing for the normalization and de-securitization of majority-minorities relations in their territories. The main and consistent message of all HCNM’s recommendations in assisting States to tackle minority problems is that this can only be done through the respect and protection of human, including minority rights and good governance. In other words, his fundamental approach is security through justice not security vs. justice. Despite his sensitivity to the contexts and appreciation of case specific differences, he has consistently argued that the way to reduce tensions and avoid conflict along the lines of identity is through the creation of a just society for everybody. This means a society in which the national minority culture can not only be expressed but also safeguarded and promoted; in which any disadvantage stemming from being a person belonging to national or ethnic minority has been removed; and in which minorities have a say in all spheres of public life, especially but not exclusively in matters that directly affect them (Skovgaard, 2007). 3. Integrating Minorities The HCNM does not favour one particular model of the organization of a multiethnic state over others. Partly because there are no ideal models that can be universally applicable. There are simply ways of negotiating acceptable solutions and such solutions as a rule are context specific. Moreover, the HCNM’s goal is not to advocate one specific end-result, be it federation, consociational power-sharing or simply unitary state with the minimum standards of minority protection. His efforts aim at promoting an inclusive and democratic process which could eventually lead states and minorities to finding arrangements that suit them best. In other words, his efforts are about establishing channels of effective communication between various groups and more importantly, about keeping these channels open. This is how I would interpret the HCNM’s favoured approach, which is integration with respect for diversity. It is not so much a model to be prescribed but rather a process which is dynamic, flexible and which could lead to sustainable, negotiated solutions. Rolf Ekeus, High Commissioner from 2003–2007, identified several elements that define this approach of integrating diversity in his 2006 address to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. First, he noted that integration is about

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______________________________________________________________ interaction and not simply about tolerating a plurality of cultures. It requires special efforts both from governments and minority communities to find shared values and develop an over-arching common identity, no matter how “thin”, to ensure that respect for and recognition of difference does not lead to the separation or to the establishment of parallel societies. Of course the right of minorities to maintain their identity including their culture and religion must be respected. However, in the words of Ekeus, “this should not, if possible, be achieved in a way which prevents the deepening of participation in the wider society. Policies which lead to increasingly separate communities risk making society vulnerable to tensions and strife” (Ekeus, 2006). Second, respect for diversity is not only about celebration of cultural differences. It requires governments to develop specialized approaches aimed at helping people to accommodate and negotiate their differences in ways that allow for genuine equality and help to minimize the risk of conflict (ibid.). It also requires a political space to practice the politics of difference, while ensuring that policies that sustain diversity do not result in entrenching differences as insurmountable and solidify inequalities (ibid.). Thirdly, there are some fundamentals such as respect for human dignity, the rule of law and human rights that can and should form the basis for shared values and even common identity. For the rest, according to Ekeus, we need to respect differences and to learn to see the diversification of our societies as enrichment (ibid.). It should also be noted that integration is a two way process, which is contingent upon minorities exercising not only their rights but also responsibilities. Minorities, therefore, should also try and avoid isolationism and join in with a majority in a common effort to build a better future. It may take time before minorities feel reassured enough that their rights, their culture and identity are adequately respected and promoted especially if past taught them a different lesson. However, drive towards building ethnically pure communities is dangerous both from the side of majority and from that of a minority. In today’s world ethno-cultural and state boundaries rarely coincide, which means that people are bound to learn how to live together in peace and understanding. After the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, there has been a growing scepticism about chances for survival of multi-ethnic states. Integration with respect for diversity, however, is the HCNM’s answer to such scepticism. It aims at creating the kind of foundations that would not allow the repetition of previous mistakes and would create the solid basis for peace and prosperity. Such an approach is much easier to preach than to implement. The HCNM has consistently offered advice to governments in this respect both through policy recommendations and through tension-reducing projects. His country-specific recommendations are confidential and thus cannot be reproduced here for an analysis and assessment. However, from the limited infor-

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______________________________________________________________ mation that is publically available some examples can be invoked. They demonstrate that the HCNM has been using a combination of operational and structural prevention depending on circumstances and for better ensuring sustainable, long-lasting conflict prevention.7 On the operational side, the HCNM has relied on quiet diplomacy to address sides involved in the dispute. He has paid frequent visits to countries of his engagement, offering impartial advice to the parties concerned and facilitating dialogue and mediation. He has worked with governments to refine legislation affecting persons belonging to national minorities and supported projects that showed how his policy advice can be implemented in practice. Through developing projects in areas of education, language teaching, media, participation, management of inter-ethnic relations and policing, the HCNM has assisted states to address the root causes of conflict and put in place necessary structures that would sustain peace in the long run. For example, Van der Stoel and Ekeus have contributed to the normalization of relations between Hungary and neighbouring states over the treatment of sizable Hungarian minorities, particularly in Romania and Slovakia and to a lesser extent in Serbia. Both High Commissioners stressed the importance of creating a legal framework for the protection of minority rights and the inclusion of minority communities into the governing structures of the state, as an essential part of the overall process of democratization. At the same time, they have worked closely with Hungary, urging the Hungarian government to modify its controversial legislation, known as the Status Law, with regard to the protection of ethnic kin abroad. The HCNM has acknowledged that the so-called kin-states may have an interest in the well-being of a minority community abroad. However, this interest does not translate into the right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over people residing on the territory of another state (Ekeus, 2001). Moreover, states may pursue this interest in a way that does not undermine the integration of minorities in states where they reside and does not fuel separatist tendencies (Vollebaek, 2007). The triadic relationship between minorities, kin-states and states of residence has been at the heart of the HCNM activities in many regions, including the Baltic States, South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. Beginning from the 1992, successive High Commissioners have been involved in promoting integration of Russian minorities in the three Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The tensions between Russian minorities and newly independent Baltic States have flared up in numerous occasions in the early 1990s, displaying a high probability of open conflict with the potential involvement of the Russian Federation. The main concern with regard to the Russian minority in the Baltic States centred upon various citizenship criteria and stringent language and residency requirements that threatened to leave large segments of Russian minorities without citizenship.

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______________________________________________________________ This would have not only limited their rights to political participation but would have also had denied them access to pensions and other social security benefits. A significant complicating factor in this situation was Russia’s declared interest in the fate of Russian minorities all over former Soviet Union and in the Baltic States in particular. In September 1992, Russia wished to activate the Moscow Mechanism8 with regard to Estonia’s proposed citizenship law, which required a degree of proficiency in the Estonian language which few Russian were capable of satisfying. The fear that Russia would instrumentalize the issue of its kinminorities and use it as a pretext for interference gave the three Baltic States reasons to fear that granting citizenship to their substantial Russian minorities would compromise their independence. As summarized by Jennifer-Jackson Preece, “granting citizenship to an ethnic Russian community that was relocated to the Baltic states by Stalin in order to ensure Soviet political control and who received privileges during the Soviet era would be a threat to national identities and independence of these states.” (Jackson-Preece, 1998, p. 6). The first High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel, dedicated much attention and efforts at improving majority-minority relations in the Baltic states. Upon his advice, all three states made significant amendments to their legislation on citizenship and language. The HCNM has been paying particular attention to those members of the Russian community that were born in Baltic states and who were married to citizens of those states. At the same time, however, both van der Stoel and Ekeus advocated a gradual approach to reducing the problem of non-citizens in these states, showing understanding to concerns of national minorities as well as to those of continued independence and stability of newly independent Baltic States. The HCNM, therefore, accepted the necessity of reasonable requirements for the knowledge of official language and urged the governments to create adequate opportunities for learning the state language. The Baltic States have made a significant progress in this respect and have become exporters of expertise in teaching official language to both adults and school children. Rolf Ekeus has often used Latvian and Estonian experts to promote state language education for minorities in other countries, including Moldova. The main concern of the HCNM in Moldova has been the lack of integration of minority communities into Moldovan society due to, inter alia, lack of proficiency in the state language. In order to encourage the government take a proactive role in promoting linguistic integration, the HCNM has been supporting the language teaching project for civil servants in Southern Moldova. The project benefited several hundred civil servants of Gagauz, Russian and Bulgarian origin. The project activities have been concentrating in the autonomous region of Gagauzia, where the level of state language proficiency is particularly poor among the population. This has become a matter of concern to the HCNM since Moldova adopted legislation

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______________________________________________________________ requiring all public sector employees to have a working knowledge of the state language, which would effectively curtail minority participation in public life unless special efforts are made to improve teaching of the state language. The most extensive conflict prevention and integration programme of the HCNM has been carried out in Georgia since 2003. The programme targets Armenian and Azeri minorities who are the largest national minorities in Georgia residing in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli respectively. It includes activities aimed at teaching the state language to civil servants from minority communities; retraining minority language teachers as well as teachers of Georgian as a second language in latest language teaching methodologies; building capacity of local media and rebroadcasting of Georgian news in minority languages; training civil servants in management of interethnic relations and providing free legal advice to the population of the region through the established legal centres. All these activities aimed at redressing effective isolation of the two minority-populated regions from the rest of the country, which was exacerbated by poor road infrastructure, information vacuum, insufficient knowledge of the state language and persistence of ethnic stereotypes among Georgia’s civil servants. With the help of the HCNM, the question of minority integration has become one of the top priorities for the Georgian authorities. Most of the projects supported by the HCNM under conflict prevention and integration programme have been taken over by the Georgian government and should be continued in the future with the local funding. Despite these efforts there are many more challenges facing Georgia today. It should be noted that the HCNM has not been active in the breakaway region of South Ossetia, which became the main scene of hostilities in August 2008. The main reason behind the HCNM’s non-involvement was the presence of the OSCE mission in Georgia which was tasked specifically with the prevention and settlement of the South Ossetia conflict. The current HCNM, Knut Vollebaek, however, issued a statement on August 25, 2008 regarding the situation in Georgia, pointing out that history has shown how dangerous and destabilizing it is for states to take unilateral action to defend, protect or support their citizens or “ethnic kin” abroad, and warned against using this as a justification for undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. Whether the HCNM would have been able to prevent the eruption of violence in South Ossetia had he been more involved is a hypothetical question to which I am inclined to give a negative answer. Success and effectiveness of the HCNM’s initiatives ultimately depend on two main factors: compliance to his recommendations by governments and leaders of the groups involved and existence of the right kind of conditions as part of the overall international environment that encourage and value such compliance.

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______________________________________________________________ Conclusion: Success or Failure? How can one measure or even identify success of an institution such as the HCNM? As a rule, conflicts that do not erupt are less known and causes of their non-eruption are rarely investigated. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of diplomatic and other measures that are taking place behind closed doors. It is also difficult to attribute a successful prevention of conflict to one single factor. There is always a combination of factors and an alignment of forces that reduce tensions and lead to the eventual avoidance of conflict. When describing the HCNM’s success, therefore, it is worth keeping in mind that as a rule this success is shared; it is shared with states and other international actors. Nevertheless, there is evidence of certain success defined in terms of armed conflict prevention for the HCNM due to his efforts to diffuse tensions between national minority and majority communities in places such as the Baltic States, Central Europe, Ukraine’s Crimea, and Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti. Most importantly, however, it should be noted that despite initial fears that ethno-national conflicts would escalate beyond any reasonable control, cases of violent ethno-national disputes remained confined only to certain areas and fortunately, became an exception rather than a norm. In addition, since the mid-1990s no new cases of ethnic warfare have been recorded in wider Europe. According to the study conducted by Ted Robert Gurr, by the mid-1990s, the most common strategy among ethnic groups was not armed conflict but prosaic politics. Therefore, based on counterfactual reasoning it is possible to conclude that most potential conflicts have been successfully prevented. Another element of success is the growing acceptance of and compliance with international norms and standards of human, including minority rights protection. It is worth remembering that East European states of today that have undertaken significant commitments to protect persons belonging to national minorities and to ensure effective integration of their societies, were highly nationalistic, divided and exclusive polities merely fifteen years ago. Most of these states experienced not only successful democratisation but also a successful de-radicalization and devaluation of extreme ethno-nationalism as a political force. In many parts of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, the political power of nationalism expressed in support of radical nationalist parties and leaders diminished significantly over time. In general, the appeal of ethno-nationalism by the late 1990s was much weaker than that in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. In those cases where armed conflicts did take place, resolution and prevention efforts have been far less successful as in the case of South Ossetia. However, as Adam Roberts pointed out, “the historical record suggests that the management of communal conflicts is inherently difficult, whether it

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______________________________________________________________ is attempted by states, empires, regional or global institutions. The UN (and by extension also the OSCE and COE) should not be judged too harshly merely for running into difficulties similar to those encountered by other bodies” (Roberts, 1995, pp. 389–410). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify conditions when international institutions such as the HCNM tend to be more successful and when less so. The effectiveness of the HCNM is limited when states and groups have no incentives to comply and when his efforts confront alternative interests of the major powers. The case of South Ossetia represented a combination of the above two factors, which leads to the conclusion that chances of success for the HCNM’s involvement would have been at best limited. When states, however, sought out international legitimacy, striving for eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the leverage of the HCNM had been much greater. In this context, states and groups operate in an environment that values compliance and rewards it with the benefit of ‘membership’, which creates significant incentive to seek compromise and develop good human and minority rights record. It should be noted, however, that the EU membership alone does not have a magical effect. Inter-ethnic tensions will persist, as it is happening in the case of Slovakia and Hungary, also after accession unless states continue their efforts aimed at national integration based on the protection of minority rights and respect for diversity. Ultimately, it is local actors that determine the success of international institutions. As Jennifer Jackson-Preece points out, nobody can ‘force’ a nation to be democratic or to respect human rights. “Final responsibility for success or failure in the protection of national minorities rests with domestic rather than international actors” (Jackson-Preece, 1998). Endnotes 1 The HCNM's mandate is contained in the part entitled “The Helsinki Decisions”. For a detailed exposition of how the post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities was established, see Zaagman, R. and Zaal. H. (1994), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: prehistory and negotiations”: in A. Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath, Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 95–111. 2 In OSCE terminology, the term “human dimension” is used to describe the set of norms and activities related to human rights and democracy, which are regarded within the OSCE as one of three dimensions of security, together with the politico-military and the economic and environmental dimensions. These three dimensions add up to the comprehensive approach to security

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______________________________________________________________ adopted by the OSCE (See OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide (Warsaw, 2001). 3 It can be added that authoritarianism of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union also contributed to the rise of nationalism, creating a political culture that favours communities over individuals and fosters suspicion for difference and dissent. See Michnik. A. (1991), “Nationalism”, Social Research, 58(4), 757–764. For a broader discussion of causes and consequences of post-communist nationalism, see MungiuPippidi, A. and Krastev. I. (ed.), (2004) Nationalism After Communism: Lessons Learned, Budapest: CEU Press. 4 Svante Cornell noted on the example of Caucasus and Central Asia that even though both regions harbour numerous minorities, only those with autonomous status had revolted. These include Chechens in Russia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and South Ossetians in Georgia and also Transnistrians in Moldova. Central Asia, by contrast, where there were fewer autonomous regions, has had a lower propensity to conflict than the Caucasus (Cornell 1999:192). 5 See Drzewicki, K. (2005), “The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – Five Years After and More Years Ahead,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 12, 123–131. 6 See the interview with Max van der Stoel, in: Zellner. W. and Lange, F. (eds.) (2001), Peace and Stability Through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, BadenBaden: Nomos. 7 For the discussion of different approaches to conflict prevention, see Michael Lund (1996), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace Press. 8 The Moscow Mechanism provides for a variety of OSCE mission to look into human dimension issues such as human rights.

References Bloed, A and R. Letschert (2008), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” in: K. Henrad and R. Dunbar (eds.), Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 88–119. Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Cornell, S. (1999), “The devaluation of the concept of autonomy: national minorities in the former Soviet Union,” Central Asian Survey, 18(2): 185– 196. Drzewicki, K. (2005), “The Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – Five year after and more years ahead,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 12: 123– 131. Friberg, E. and H. Nasic (2008), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” in: M. Weller and S. Wolf (eds.), Institutions for the Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Eastern and Central Europe. Council of Europe Publishing, 13–49. Inder Singh, A. (2002), “Minorities, justice and security in post-Communist Europe: Continuing the debate with W. Kymlicka,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 4. Jackson-Preece, J. (1998), “National minority rights enforcement in Europe: A difficult balancing act,” The International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(2) at http://www,gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_2/Preece.htm. Kemp, W. (2001), Quiet Diplomacy in Action: the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Kupchan, C. (1995), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2001), “Western political theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe,” in: W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski (eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13–106. — (2008), “The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights: Rights to culture, participation and autonomy,” in: M. Weller, D. Blacklock and K. Nobbs (eds.), The Protection of Minorities in Wider Europe. London: Palgrave, 11–42. Lund, M. (1996), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.

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MacFarlane, N. (1997), “Democratization, nationalism and regional security in Southern Caucasus,” Government and Opposition, 32(3): 399–420. MacFarlane, N. and K. Yuen Foong (2006), Human Security and UN: A Critical History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Michnik, A. (1991), “Nationalism,” Social Research, 58(4): 757–764. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and I. Krastev (eds.) (2004), Nationalism After Communism. Budapest: CEU Press. Opalski, M. (2001) “Can Will Kymlicka be exported to Russia?” in: W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski (eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 298–320. Packer, J. (1996). “Conflict prevention by the OAU: the relevance of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” African Yearbook on International Law, 4: 279–291 — (2007), “Reflections on implementation mechanisms on selected autonomy, self-rule and similar arrangements,” in: M Boltjes (ed.), Implementing Negotiated Agreements: The Real Challenge to Intrastate Peace. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 69–85. Roberts, A. (1995), “Communal conflicts as a challenge to international organization: the case of former Yugoslavia,” Review of International Studies, 21(4): 389–410. Skovgaard, J. (2007), “Towards a European Norm?: The framing of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia by the Council of Europe, the EU and the OSCE,” EUI Working Papers, 7. Zaagman R. and H. Zaal (1994), “The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: prehistory and negotiations,” in: A. Bloed (ed.), The Challenge of Change: the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath. Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 95–111.

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______________________________________________________________ Zellner, W. and F. Lang (eds.) (1999), Peace and Stability through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Baden-Baden: Nomos. OSCE Documents and Publications Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, 1991. CSCE Helsinki Document: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 1992. OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Reference Guide, Warsaw, 2001. Selected Speeches, Statements and Publications by the OSCE HCNM Ekeus, R. (2001), OSCE HCNM Statement on Sovereignty, Responsibility and National Minorities, The Hague. Ekeus, R. (2003), “Towards Europe for All”. Address to the Roundtable “New Minorities: Inclusion and Equality,” organized by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee, The Hague. Ekeus, R. (2003), “Building Understanding and Tolerance in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Promoting Integration and the Role of the International Community,” Address by the OSCE HCNM, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Ekeus, R. (2005), “Demographic Trends, Migration and Integrating Persons Belonging to National Minorities: Ensuring Security and Sustainable Development in the OSCE Area,” Address by the OSCE HCNM, Thirteenth Meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum, Prague. Vollebaek, K. (2007), “OSCE HCNM Statement on Protection of Minorities and Citizens Abroad,” The Hague. Vollebaek, K. (2007), “Opening Remarks at the Launch of Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations,” Bolzano.

Section II Political Integration of Minority Communities

Comparing European Institutional and Hungarian Approaches to Roma (Gypsy) Minorities Annabel Tremlett The chapter analyses how Roma (Gypsy) minorities are discursively represented in documents from European institutions which are currently forming the most influential ‘public level’ arena for Roma politics. A comparison is made between the way social inclusion of Roma minorities is conceptualized in key European institutional documents, and the discourses from accession countries, such as Hungary, in the monitoring process. The ‘intercultural’ or ‘recognition’ approach taken by European institutions is criticized as failing to take into account and engage with the complex interface of differing discourses on ethnicity prevalent in post-socialist countries. Introduction The expansion of the European Union (EU) to include post-socialist states can be seen as a turning point in the history of the EU. The process of EU expansion has highlighted Roma as the largest and poorest minority group in Central and Eastern Europe.1 Despite the potential of the EU to form a “truly historic role” as an influential arena for Roma politics (Kovats, 2001, p. 111), European institutions have been accused of not going far enough to make any real changes.2 Whilst European institutions have drawn up seemingly progressive documents for minorities, there has not been an obvious result for the majority of Roma living in poverty. Criticisms were particularly generated after the first European Roma Forum in Brussels in 2008. The outcomes did not match the high hopes placed on the Forum as an event that would shake up the apparent inertia of European institutional activity. European institutions were accused of having a “passive” stance towards Roma (EU Roma coalition), a lack of creative ideas (Lívia Járóka, Hungarian Roma MEP), along with missing the opportunity to create a pan-European strategy (Minority Rights Group). This chapter focuses on the apparent impasse through examining a part of the process of implementing European institutional recommendations at a state level, using Hungary as an example. Some key differences are revealed in the way Roma minorities are discussed in the European institutional documents compared to the Hungarian state monitoring reports. These key differences may help explain why seemingly progressive European-level documents do not affect the lives of many Roma people. Two such docu-

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______________________________________________________________ ments are the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992 (henceforth the ECRML), and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995 (henceforth the FCNM). Both documents are considered to be the most influential moves to securing Roma minority rights at a pan-European level to date. I examine the approach to Roma minorities in these documents before comparing the reaction at Hungarian level through state monitoring reports. The monitoring reports form the feedback process, showing how states have adapted these documents into their legislation and promoted the ideas to the public. The approach to analysis is informed by Nancy Fraser’s writing on “recognition” and “redistributive” paradigms that she says have formed the basis of the dilemma of the “postsocialist” age (1997). These paradigms were found to be useful in examining the different approaches to the Roma. It is through this analysis that a tension between the European institutional and the Hungarian state approach to Roma is revealed. The chapter argues that the European institutional commitment to a multicultural or recognition approach is markedly different to the Hungarian state’s approach to Roma minorities. The Hungarian approach is ambivalent in its commitment to multiculturalism, and can be said to be more inclined towards the “redistribution” paradigm, yet with some use of deficit discourse about Roma minorities. The tension between the two approaches is highlighted as a reason behind the apparent stalemate of European institutional action. Considering the situation of Roma in Hungary as firmly rooted in problems related to poverty, this chapter suggests that the imbalance of the importance placed on recognition politics may impede European institutional efforts in helping Roma minorities. 1.

Approach to Analysis: Fraser’s Recognition and Redistribution Paradigms In her work on the “postsocialist” condition, Fraser describes two broad approaches to notions of injustice: a “redistribution” paradigm and a “recognition” paradigm. The paradigm of “redistribution” is described as based on the understanding of injustice as socio-economic: for example exploitation in the workplace or denial or access to a decent job and wage (Fraser, 1997, p.13). On the other hand, the “recognition” paradigm includes an understanding of injustice as “rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication” – for example cultural domination, non-recognition and disrespect (ibid., p.14). Despite both types of injustice being intertwined in practice (“far from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce each other dialectically” ibid., p.15), Fraser maintains that discursively, the redistributive/recognition paradigms still appear distinct from each other, producing

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______________________________________________________________ different and often contradictory claims for the people they want social justice for. These claims are summarised in Table 1 below: Table 1. Summary of “Redistribution” and “Recognition” Paradigms “Redistribution” paradigm

“Recognition” paradigm

Injustice seen in terms of...

Exploitation in/marginalisation from labour force

Cultural misrecognition

Justice seen in terms of...

Socio-economic equality

Representational equality

Mode of collectivity (how people are seen)

People’s existence is rooted in the political economy, therefore any injustices suffered by members will be traceable to the political economy (Fraser, 1997, p. 14)

People are “differentiated as a collectivity by virtue of the reigning social patterns of interpretations and evaluation, not by virtue of the division of labor” (ibid., p.18)

Remedy

“Redistribution”: restructuring the political economy so as to alter the class distribution of social burdens and social benefits (ibid., p.17)

“Recognition”: recognise the value of all cultures and change the cultural variations that privilege a certain group (ibid., p.19)

Whilst recognition claims “tend to promote group differentiation”, redistribution claims “often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity […] they tend to promote group dedifferentiation” (ibid., p.16). This leads to tensions, “whereas the first tends to promote group differentiation, the second tends to undermine it. Thus, the two kinds of claim stand in tension with each other; they can interfere with, or even work against, each other” (ibid., p.16). Fraser describes a constitutive feature of the “postsocialist” condition as a shift away from political claims of redistributing wealth to an emphasis on the recognition of different groups and their value in society (Fraser, 1997, p. 2). However, rather than signifying a positive shift towards a multicultural, tolerant society, Fraser sees the so-called “identity politics” favoured by the “recognition” paradigm as decentring class, leading to a “decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former” (ibid.). As we will go on to see, these two types of claims can be related to discourses about Roma from European institutional and recently acceded “postsocialist” states. We now turn to how European institutions increasingly use the “recognition” paradigm.

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______________________________________________________________ 2. European Institutions: Use of the “Recognition” Paradigm Here I will first outline the general approach of European institutions to Roma minorities, both from the Council of Europe and the European Union. I then go onto look specifically at two documents: the ECRML (European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages) and the FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities). I will show how the “recognition” paradigm is used in these documents to produce a certain way of looking at Roma which leads to a specific view on how to raise their social status. The Council of Europe (COE), describes Roma people as a distinct minority with a unique and rich language and culture. In a 1993 recommendation that was said to have “paved the way towards a new phase in the activity of the Council of Europe” (Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe 2002: paras I/1, II/1), this approach was clearly set out: “A special place among the minorities is reserved for Gypsies. Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call their own, they are a true European minority, but one that does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities. As a non-territorial minority, Gypsies greatly contribute to the cultural diversity of Europe. In different parts of Europe they contribute in different ways, be it by language and music or by their trades and crafts.” (Gypsies in Europe 1993, Recommendation 1203: paras. 2 and 3). The above paragraphs clearly show the tendency of the COE’s cultural approach to Roma minorities (also observed by Kovats, 2001, p. 102). In rather romantic terms, the COE describes Roma as a “scattered” minority who contribute to European culture through their specific language, music and trade. A similar approach can be seen in EU documents. The resolution Discrimination against the Roma from the European Council (an EU institution), called for an “international level” approach to Roma, describing Roma minorities themselves as a “transnational people”, which appears to fit into the COE’s “cultural” approach: “The European Parliament, A. recognizing that the Roma as a transnational people face special social problems, B. recognizing that there is widespread discrimination against the Roma in practically every country where they are settled, but that their numbers in central and eastern Europe make the problem particularly acute,

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______________________________________________________________ C. recognizing that, potentially, the conditions of life of the Roma people are a problem which can only be tackled at the international level, D. understanding that the Roma have a special culture that should be respected; recognizing, however, that their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment, E. recognizing that the education of future generations is a key element in the integration of Roma into the societies where they are living and that particular attention should be paid to this.” (From Discrimination against the Roma Resolution 1995). In the above extract, “the Roma” are said to face “special social problems” (point A) as well as having “a special culture” (point D). The word “special” indicates the Roma are a unique minority, and it seems that their “special-ness” may contribute to their problems, “their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D). Roma are thus not portrayed as a part of the societies in which they live, as the following examples from the above extract show: • “a transnational people” (point A) - therefore not “of” a nation state; • “[…] in practically every country where they are settled” (point B) – “settled” in a country, therefore not “of” the country; • “their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D) - therefore different or opposing a “way of life” that other people have. “The Roma” are thus represented as a particular minority living across Europe, yet in each place where they live they are set apart from the main society and their disadvantaged position can be attributed, at least in part, to their distinctive way of living. This is an important point, as we will see later that the notion of Roma as “different” from their social environment forms the basis of approaches designed to solve their marginalized position in society. Both the COE and the EU document describe Roma in terms of “difference”. The similarities between the two documents’ descriptions can be seen in direct comparison below:

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______________________________________________________________

(i) (ii)

(iii)

Gypsies in Europe 1993 (CoE)

Discrimination against the Roma 1995 (EU)

“a non-territorial minority” (para. 2). “Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call their own” (para. 2).

“a transnational people” (point A).

“they are a true European minority, but one that does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities” (para. 3).

“their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D).

“[…] in practically every country where they are settled” (point B).

The outcome of both descriptions is an emphasis on the Roma minority as a unique minority. “Transnational” or “non-territorial” refers to them as living across Europe, but not “of” the countries where they reside (points i and ii). Their difference from the societies where they live is further established as their culture is seen as separate: a different “way of life”, and a minority that “does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities” (point iii). Roma culture and language is seen as unique, and key to their integration. The COE and EU’s converging approach can be termed an “intercultural” approach in what Fraser terms a “recognition paradigm” that “is celebratory and positive; it sees all identities as deserving of recognition and all differences as meriting affirmation” (Fraser, 1997, pp. 181–182). The two European institutional legal documents focused on in this article also fit into this paradigm – indeed, can be seen as a product of it. The ECRML (European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) entered into force in 1998 (as of 2009, signed and ratified by 24 states) has been referred to as a key instrument in the European institutional emerging approach to Roma minorities3 and is also noted as a key instrument for the implementation of minority rights (see Morawa and Weller, 2005). The ECRML is concerned with the protection and promotion of minority languages, seeing their revival and institutionalisation as paramount to the successful integration of minority groups into mainstream society, “[the Charter is] a system of positive protection for minority languages and the communities using them[…] in order to safeguard the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture, to

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______________________________________________________________ use their own language, to establish their schools and so on.” (Explanatory Report to the Charter, paras.1,2 p.1) [my addition] The message is that discrimination debilitates the chances of minorities to fully partake in society, and discrimination can be tackled through official recognition and support of minority culture and language. The prohibition of discrimination and the support of the expression of minority language and culture are said to impact on the social and economic position of minority groups. Following the ECRML, the FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities) was adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1998 (as of 2008 had been signed and ratified by 39 states). Like the Charter, the FCNM is seen as breaking new ground, the “first comprehensive treaty addressing minority rights anywhere” (Weller, 2005, p. 7). The FCNM consists of a Preamble and 32 articles that are grouped into five sections. In terms of Fraser’s redistributive/recognition paradigms, the FCNM can be said to follow the recognition paradigm as its articles focus on minorities as a collectivity whose coherence is based on cultural differentiation rather than division in type of labour or socio-economic class: “The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage” (Section I, Article 5 para. 1). The stress is on “intercultural dialogue” (Article 6, para. 1; Article 12 para. 71) that aims to promote and protect the culture of minorities in order to raise their status in societies and therefore advance their integration. So, for examples: •

•

•

In education: better achievements in education are envisaged through fostering “knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority” (Section II Article 12 para. 1). In anti-discrimination: the development of text books for schools, media outlets and separate religious and education institutions (Section II Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13). In freedom of speech: seen as the right to “hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas in the minority language” (Section II Article 9, para. 1, see also Article 10, 14).

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______________________________________________________________ All the above refer to what Fraser terms as the “recognition” paradigm, “changing the cultural variations that privilege a certain group” (1997, p. 19). The idea is that by allowing and encouraging minority culture in institutional life, the minorities will have greater access to these institutions and thereby become more integrated. There is no mention of what Fraser calls the “redistribution” paradigm: political involvement, labour division, poverty, unemployment are not mentioned, apart from in the phrase that Parties should adopt measures to promote equality in “all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life” (Section I, Article 4 para. 2, similar phrase used in Article 15). Thus both documents take the approach that the preservation and promotion of minority culture has the potential to help these groups out of a disadvantaged social and economic position. This closely follows the COE/EU approach to Roma outlined earlier, in which Roma culture was emphasised as a means through which Roma people can alleviate their marginalised and deprived circumstances. As we have seen, the overall approach to Roma minorities falls into what Fraser terms the “recognition” paradigm. Through recognising the individual qualities of the minority groups, and making sure they are present in all types of institutional life (social, economic, cultural), the members of minority groups will feel they have a presence in (and thus easier access to) these institutions, which will improve their living standards. People are seen in cultural groups that need to understand, respect and interact with each other’s differences in order to get along and have equal status in society, the “building blocks for a liberal approach to minority rights” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 2). This approach is not unique to European institutions, and has been elsewhere referred to as “multiculturalism” and “cultural diversity”, an approach that is said to be an “effective intervention on a social and local level”, yet which attracts many critics (Verkuyten, 2004, p.53).4 Whilst aware of general criticisms of the multicultural approach, this chapter does not advocate a “for or against” argument for multicultural philosophy per se, but instead turns to look at how this approach progresses when put into practice. I now turn to see how these documents have been dealt with in the monitoring reports produced by Hungary. The aim is to determine how the recognition approach taken by European institutions in these two legal documents is dealt with in terms of the Roma minority in Hungary. Hungary and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) The Republic of Hungary was among the first states to sign the ECRML in 1992, which then came into force in 1998.5 The application of the ECRML in

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______________________________________________________________ Hungary undergoes various monitoring procedures that take place in 3-yearly cycles, and up to 2008 there have been three monitoring procedures: in 1999, 2002, and 2005. The procedures include the production of three reports: a submission of a periodical report by the State Party; a monitoring exercise carried out by a Committee of Experts; and the Committee of Ministers’ (from the COE) recommendations to the States Parties6. The latter two reports are published within two years of the first periodical report by the State Party. This section focuses on the monitoring reports carried out by a Committee of Experts in Hungary (published in 2001, 2004 and 2007). These reports, through their descriptions of the implementation of the ECRML, show how the ECRML is perceived as relevant (or not) to the Roma minority in Hungary. In this analysis we see not only how the Hungarian reports differ in their approach to the ECRML’s descriptions of Roma, but also, over the years, differ from each other in an apparently uneasy attempt to become better aligned with the ECRML’s approach. Table 2 below summarizes the three reports: Table 2. Summary of the Hungarian monitoring reports for the ECRML 2001 Little evidence of Roma culture: onus on Roma minorities losing their language and their culture.

2004 Little evidence of Roma culture: onus on historical situation - state-forced integration of Roma minorities caused subsequent loss of language and culture.

Approach to social exclusion

Social exclusion caused by poor socioeconomic situation of Roma, rather than lack of linguistic or cultural recognition.

Social exclusion should be seen as socio-economic along with linguistic and cultural recognition.

Recognition or redistribution paradigm

Redistribution, but with disadvantage seen as a deficit of Roma.

Redistribution alongside some recognition, with disadvantage seen as a deficit of state action.

Approach to Roma culture in Hungarian society

2007 Evidence of Roma culture: onus on “authorities” as not recognising Roma culture in their legislation, and society as not galvanised enough to raise the profile of Roma language and culture. Social exclusion can be tackled mainly through educational desegregation via identity politics.

Recognition, with the state and general society blamed as failing to recognise Roma language and culture.

Table 2 above shows how the stance of the monitoring reports modulates over the years from a focus on redistribution measures to recognition politics, and with that a shift in blame from the minorities themselves to state defi-

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______________________________________________________________ ciencies. The recognition of the existence of Roma culture increases with each report. The 2001 report was mostly concerned with the problems it found in applying the ECRML to Hungary’s Roma minority.7 Roma were the only minority group that was said to be problematic for the implementation of the ECRML. The main problem cited was the fact that most Roma in Hungary do not speak a Romany language and rather than focusing on language, social exclusion and discrimination should be tackled: “The majority of Roma/Gypsies have lost their native language, speaking only Hungarian as mother tongue (although often with severe deficiencies in linguistic skills). […] For the purpose of the Charter, only these some 30% of minoritylanguage-speaking Roma/Gypsies are relevant, not the large majority of Hungarian-speaking Roma/Gypsies whose main problems are social exclusion and discrimination” (2001 report, section 1.2, para. 13, p.9). The above extract reveals a number of differences from the European institutional “recognition” approach. Most striking is the difference in the way Roma are viewed as a minority group: whereas the “recognition” approach in the ECRML sees minority language as fundamental to a minority community such as the Roma, the 2001 report from Hungary says that only 30 percent of Roma in Hungary actually speak a Romany language. This would therefore make the ECRML irrelevant to the majority of Roma in Hungary, and so a strategy in which Romany language is focused on would not improve their poor economic and social situation. Furthermore, the above extract refutes the “recognition” approach by saying that in fact, the main problems faced by Roma minorities are “social exclusion and discrimination” (see also section 2.1, para. 30 pp.15–16). This suggests the Hungarian viewpoint is more in a “redistributive” paradigm, which Fraser says is about injustice in the political economy rather than cultural misrecognition (Fraser, 1997, p.14). It then follows that the approaches to anti-discrimination differ – whereas the ECRML, following the general European institutional approach of seeing Romany language and culture as the “essential common denominator” to Roma identity8 and therefore fundamental to anti-discriminatory approaches, the 2001 report from Hungary does not, saying in its conclusions, “it is not always easy to reconcile classical goals of anti-discrimination policy and modern approaches directed towards the preservation of linguistic identity” (Findings, para. D, p.35). The report states that in Hungary, Romany languages have not been regarded in a celebratory cultural way (i.e. the languages have not been held in high regard and have been discriminated

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______________________________________________________________ against), and therefore encouraging their revival in this climate may actually exacerbate prejudice, “the Republic of Hungary should pay primary attention to the problem and should take measures to preserve the languages of the Roma/Gypsy population, without endangering the important goal of putting an end to the marginalisation and social discrimination that have traditionally plagued members of this community” (2001 report, section 2.1 para. 34). Whilst the ECRML conceptualizes the promotion and protection of minority languages as helping to combat discrimination, the above extract shows how the 2001 report says the exact opposite. The 2001 report sees any moves to integrate Romani languages into public life as something that needs to be carried out carefully and strategically, so as not to endanger the path to social integration. Moreover, if we go back to the previous extract, we can see a use of deficit language when describing the Roma minority: the Roma have “lost” their native language, and even when talking Hungarian have “severe deficiencies” in linguistic skills. The image produced is of a minority who are lacking the cultural tools of the majority population, and it is this lack that causes their exclusion from society. We will see later how this tendency towards deficit language can also be seen in the monitoring reports for the FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities). The subsequent monitoring reports for the ECRML in 2004 and 2007 reveal a moderation of ideas to better suit the ECRML’s multicultural recognition approach. In the 2004 report there seems to be an acceptance that the 2001 report was at odds with the Charter’s approach and the report aims to address this: “The Committee of Experts considers it necessary to take the assessment it started in its first evaluation report a step forward and start including elements of a social and cultural nature in its evaluation” (2004 report, section 3.2.4, para. 45, p.11). Note here that the way of aligning the 2004 report more to the ECRML’s aim is to “start including elements of a social and cultural nature” [my emphasis]. This is further established as the 2004 report still posits redistribution as the important goal with recognition as an additional factor: “The Committee of Experts underlines that integration in line with the principles set out in the Charter, is one which allows for a full participation in economic, social and political life,

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______________________________________________________________ combined with the preservation of one’s linguistic and cultural identity” (2004 report, section 3.2.4, para. 43, p.11). The “recognition” paradigm of the ECRML that sees socio-economic participation through linguistic and cultural recognition is not fully endorsed – it is not seen as the means, but rather an addition, “combined with”. The aim is to increase the presence of Romany languages in institutional life which even mono-Hungarian speaking Roma can access, “recovering their language if they so wish” (section 3.2.4, para. 49). On an ideological level, the 2004 report from Hungary appears to view culture in terms of blocks that can be accessed and fitted in when required, rather than the ECRML’s approach which presents cultural and language in a much more holistic manner. Nevertheless the cultural element of the ECRML is endorsed here, much more than in earlier documents. However it is seen as supplementary rather than fundamental, something that can be accessed as and when needed. The 2007 report from Hungary then goes one step further to align itself fully with the ECRML’s approach, and criticism becomes more directed at the Hungarian government itself. The 2007 report admonishes the Hungarian government for not including Romany language and culture into its strategy for raising the status of Roma minorities, “the authorities have introduced a wide-ranging government programme aiming at the further economic, social and political integration of the Roma. However, this programme has no specific component aimed at the preservation or promotion of Romany and Beás” (2007 report, section 3.1, conclusion rec. no.1, p.35). Here the report distances itself the Hungarian government, thus aligning itself more to the “recognition” paradigm of the ECRML in which Romany and Beás languages would be specifically referred to. The recommendations in the report all focus on the recognition of these languages in education, media and other public spaces. Education is particularly focused on, with the term “desegregation” used. This is the first time the term is used in the reports, and links to a wider movement in Hungary and beyond to stop the ongoing discriminatory practice of wrongly placing Roma children into special needs schools.9 Whilst other discourses on the desegregation of Roma children regularly talk of problems of socio-economic disparity in the “redistribution” sense of injustice, the 2007 report focuses on language, criticising the Hungarian authorities of not recognising Romany and Beás languages in their strategies. The monitoring feedback, over the years, changes from questioning the ECRML’s stance on Roma language and culture to fully endorsing the view that recognition is the route to promoting anti-discriminatory measures.

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______________________________________________________________ As Table 2 shows, the monitoring reports thus move to distance themselves from the Hungarian authorities. The initial disquiet surrounding the potential effectiveness of the ECRML for Roma in Hungary is lost in the reports, along with mention of redistribution-type measures and, indeed, deficit type of discourses about Roma language and culture. However, this does not mean these approaches have disappeared – as the reports tell us, the Hungarian authorities are still involved in these types of measures, and are thus still prevalent. The monitoring process, I argue, could have held an important position in discussing the differences between European and Hungarian state level approaches to Roma. Instead, the monitoring reports move to reject the state’s approach in favour of the European institutional approach. Perhaps this succeeds in reducing some deficit discourses around Roma culture and language, but at the same time, issues of effectiveness for the majority of Roma in Hungary, and socio-economic redistributive measures that might be useful alongside cultural recognition are not addressed. Hungary and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) Moving onto the FCNM, we can see similar problems in the way the monitoring reports attempt to discuss different cultural elements in the framework. Since Hungary has ratified the FCNM there have been two monitoring reports, one in 1999 and the second in 2004. Similar to the ECRML, the earlier report focuses much more on redistribution than then latter which is more concerned with recognition. In the 1999 report, unfair housing treatment suffered by Roma minorities is mentioned twice (with regards to Articles 1 and 6), whilst problems in the labour market particularly around lack of job opportunities are emphasised (Articles 1 and 4). Poverty and educational segregation are also referred to. However, there is no direct solution given to these problem – all recommendations refer to cultural phenomena such as: the setting up of museums (Article 4); Gypsy cultural centres (Article 5); separate places of worship (Article 8) and minority broadcasting (Article 9). Therefore whilst flagging up injustice in the redistribution terms of the labour market and socioeconomic inequality, the measures are all based on recognition-type solutions. The 2004 report continues in a similar vein, but now with even less mention of any redistribution phenomena: only school scholarships and measures to reduce segregation in schools are mentioned in Articles 5 and 6. Recognition phenomena are far more emphasized, with minority media programmes on the agenda (Articles 9 and 10), and more Romany language development in schools and institutions (Articles 12, 14). We might conclude that the “recognition” paradigm has eclipsed any particularly redistributive-

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______________________________________________________________ focused recommendations, and the monitoring reports have fully endorsed the European institutional pathway of celebratory recognition-type solutions. However, an interesting aspect of the 2004 report is in Part III of the report which deals with “Further evolvements affecting the situation of the Roma minority” (para.6, pp.102–113). In this section, economic and social integration and employment problems of Roma minorities are emphasized beyond any recognition measures. The Roma are referred to here as a “disadvantaged” minority, a phrase that up until this point has barely been used in the FCNM or monitoring process. Whilst measures in a “recognition” paradigm might be flagged up in the main body of the report, disadvantage and poverty in “redistribution” terms are still an area the report wants to acknowledge. Furthermore, in Annex XII (pp.159–161) two “case studies” are described which are said to have “created a stir and were hotly discussed recently in the media” (p.159). In both case studies, despite their written appearance as official reports (both are said to be from the Minister of the Interior, and are in keeping with the layout of a factual report e.g. the first begins “On 1 November 2002 at 13.16...”), both use deficit discourses in describing the Roma people in the incident, drawing on recognizable negative representations of Gypsies. This suggests the “recognition” paradigm is not one that is fully embraced. The two cases describe tensions between police and Roma people in which the Roma are presented as an unruly, uncontrollable mob. The first ‘case’ reports on an incident at a hospital where the family of a deceased woman has gathered and subsequently cause a disturbance. We first learn that the security service at the hospital were alerted to an incident, “the security service of the Bugát Pál Hospital in Gyöngyös received a notification that at the surgery class of the hospital, on the third floor, a mass of some 40 to 50 people had gathered and annoyed the calm of patients with their loudness.” (FCNM state report 2004, p.159). From the above extract we can see the types of bias against Roma. First of all, instead of presenting us with a simple number of people involved in the incident, (which could have been presented as a “fact” in a similar way to the date, time, location at the opening), we get the phrase “mass of some 40 to 50 people”. The words “mass...” and “have gathered” suggests something aligned to a demonstration, a large quantity of people brought together for a specific purpose (thereby suggesting it could be premeditated), with connotations to being anti-establishment and of lower class (the word “tömeg” is used in the Hungarian version that has similar connotations to “mass” in English). The next phrase describes what this “mass” of people did: they “annoyed the calm of patients with their loudness”. So the hint at

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______________________________________________________________ the meaning of “mass” as something anti-establishment is confirmed – the crowd are differentiated from the “calm of patients”, the ordinary people who are justified as being there because they are members of the hospital, “calm patients” - unlike this “mass” who are “annoying” and “loud”. We then learn that these “some 40 to 50 people” had come to the hospital because of a death of a relative: “They came together because one of the members of their family, the mother of the family of 82 years of age had died.” The deceased relative is described as “the mother of the family”. Thus the sentence groups the crowd together as one huge unit, drawing on the strong – often pejoratively used – representation of Roma people as overly fertile with large and unruly families (see Durst 2002). The next few sentences confirms this unruliness of the Roma: “The relatives, a lot of them in a drunken condition, rushed into the room and stroked and pulled the deceased. The patients and nurses took fright and there was a just operated patient who left the room with fear, even in a reduced condition, barefoot […]. The policemen arriving called upon the blustering relatives to leave the building. Some of the company tried to comply with this notice, though reluctantly, but the lift could not start due to its overload. The policemen tried to direct the mass through the staircase when temper got out of hand […]. One of the fighters took a jack out of his pocket while the mass was scanning that they would beat the policemen to death” (ibid., p. 159). The Roma are described as a dangerous, unruly mob who are somewhat uncivilized in their behaviour: they “stroke” and “pull” the dead woman, they “try” to comply with the policemen’s orders but their “temper” gets the better of them, even leading to the suggestion of intent to kill. The reporting of this incident shows that even in what is presented as a factual report, deficit stereotypical descriptions of Roma minorities as a rowdy, uncontrollable family mob prevail. In a similar style, the second incident also reports Roma as a tempestuous, hostile mob against the state order. In brief, the report describes a traffic incident that turned into a more serious confrontation. We learn that whilst police were carrying out road traffic control in a town not far from Budapest (“Valkó”), one van did not respond to their “stop” arm signal and carried on driving. After a car chase and attempted arrest in which the driver threatens the police with a crowbar and a policeman drew his gun, “30–40 people” are reported to come out onto the streets “shouting and aggressively threatening” the policemen. The policemen ended up fleeing without arresting anyone:

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______________________________________________________________ “Due to the aggressive action of the ever increasing group equipped with various devices (hoes, scythes, forks) and the lynch feeling evolved, the policemen gave up their further action in order to protect their own safety, left the site with the service car, and then notified the duty of the Police Headquarters of Gödöllı” (ibid., p.160). Here the Roma are an “ever increasing group” equipped with weapons, again the image of a growing mob, and in a comparable vein to the last story, the police flee the scene – the Roma are lawless, even the police cannot deal with them. Neither stories are elaborated on, nor shown as to where they might fit in to the FCNM framework. Without any further contextualization, these incidents work to show the Roma in a stereotypical, deficit light as an uncontrollable mass. This way of talking about Roma clearly does not fit into the ‘anti-discriminatory’ approach of the FCNM that is cultural and celebratory, and does not fit into the increasingly cultural view of Roma taken by the main body of the FCNM monitoring reports themselves. Here, I suggest that the negative representations of Roma both here and in other documents relates to a culture in Hungary in which deficit discourse about Roma is widespread and regularly circulated. Discriminatory discourses towards Roma in Hungary are well-recognized as a problem and commented on in both academic literature and different media sources (see Kende, 2000, p. 200; Csepeli and Simon, 2004, p. 129; Stewart, 1997, p. 4) and as we have seen in this article, can even surface in reports that purport to be pro- celebrating Roma culture. Conclusions The European instruments for minorities rely on the existence of a specific identity for a specific minority, and the idea that people (should) want to celebrate distinct identities. European institutional approaches to Roma strongly emphasize cultural recognition that sees Roma culture as celebratory, and sees this celebration as a means to encourage and facilitate their social and economic inclusion into mainstream society. This approach has been taken to newly acceded post-socialist countries who have high numbers of Roma, such as Hungary. The Hungarian response (at least as shown in the monitoring processes) is ambivalent in endorsing the celebratory stance as the central answer to Roma exclusion. In Hungary’s monitoring reports, there appears a struggle to fully embrace the recognition paradigm. In the monitoring process for the ECRML, for example, early reports emphasise redistribution first and foremost, with only the later reports moving to endorse recognition politics. The later reports stand rather uneasily vis-à-vis the “Hungarian authorities” onto whom the

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______________________________________________________________ blame is laid for not taking up the recognition baton, whilst the earlier alignment to this stance is left unquestioned. In the same process for the FCNM, recognition solutions are flagged up, which could appear to suggest the reports fully embrace the European institutional approach. However, redistribution-type discourses on poverty and disadvantage do appear, but are pushed into the latter sections or annexes of the reports. It appears that in the attempt to integrate Hungarian discourses into European discourses on Roma, an uneasy position is struck in which “antidiscrimination” is separated from the redistributive measures of dealing with poverty and disadvantage. Redistributive measures could possibly be much more effective then attempting to celebrate a certain culture and language that is not necessarily practiced by most members of the minority. The European institutional response thus appears inadequate to deal with the severe inequalities suffered by Roma communities. However, this is not to say that the Hungarian response would therefore be wholly effective in solving problems faced by Roma minorities. Both monitoring processes have shown moments of the use of deficit discourses about Roma – the most striking example is in the FCNM monitoring process, in which descriptions of incidents involving Roma are highly discriminatory. These, however, are limited to the end of the report, and therefore are not properly aired or dealt with. Here we come to the main tension between the two approaches to the Roma minority. This chapter has shown how the ‘Hungarian voice’ has been modified through the monitoring processes to distance itself from statemeasures towards Roma, whilst still including elements of these measures in various guises, mixed with occasions of deficit discourse that tap into wider negative representations of Roma “without culture”; “unruly, dangerous, violent” and “opposing mainstream norms”. These deficit discourses run the risk of seriously impeding any redistribution or recognition integratory measures, yet the monitoring process does not help debate these issues, but rather forces them into the corners of reports, closing down any possibilities for discussions. If the European institutions do want to play a role in helping Roma minorities, then they will have to deal with redistributive issues alongside identity politics, and open up dialogues with “postsocialist” countries in order to help identify and engage with discriminatory discourses about Roma as not only a potentially cultural minority in need of recognition, but also as a minority that suffers from extreme poverty. Setting up a binary division between celebrating positive cultural aspects, and the hard struggle of enduring poverty, only reduces the opportunity for effective intervention. A multiculturalist or “recognition” approach needs to progress along two lines: firstly, it needs to take into account the idea that ‘a’ minority might not always neatly link to ‘a’ culture and ‘a’ language. This might mean measures to promote and encourage cultural difference may need to take

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______________________________________________________________ plurality, hybridity and even aspects of nationality into account - for example whilst Romany languages are of the utmost importance for Romany speakers, in Hungary the majority of Roma do not speak a Romany language and therefore documents such as the ECRML will not be directly useful in improving their access to services (e.g. the schooling system). Secondly, a “recognition” approach also needs to integrate redistribution measures to deal with certain aspects of inequality in order to really tackle disadvantage at a structural level. As Fraser puts it, “in other words, to reconnect the problematic of cultural difference with the problematic of social equality” (Fraser, 1997, p. 187). Finally, any recognition approach also needs to be careful in its pursuance of the need to identify and celebrate “difference”. Whilst acknowledging the advantages of diverse cultures in a society, this chapter has shown how a commitment to “difference as best” can limit the potential for dynamic debates with other standpoints, and prevent the progress of anti-discriminatory developments that can tackle inequality. Endnotes 1 The EU accepted ten new countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania then joined in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey began membership negotiations in 2005. Numbers of Roma in the recent post-socialist accession countries range from approximately 8,000 in Latvia, to 600,000 in Hungary and about 2 million in Romania (Source: European Union support for Roma communities in Central and Eastern Europe, 2003 (Brussels: European Commission) p. 4). 2 The term “European institutions” here refers both to institutions affiliated to the Council of Europe and those affiliated to the European Union. 3 See Gypsies in Europe 1992 (COE/Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1203, para. 11.iv), Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe 2002 (COE/Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights report, paras. I/2, 6, 15.a.v; IIB/54). 4 Verkuyten neatly sums up the critics of multiculturalism by saying, it has been suggested that multiculturalism can lead to reified group distinctions that become fault lines for conflict and separatism. Similarly, others have argued that multiculturalism endangers social unity and cohesion, and is also contradictory to the notion of equality and the ideal of meritocracy. (Verkuyten, 2004, p. 54; See also contribution of Malloy, this volume). 5 The significance of the ECRML for the Central and Eastern European region is shown in the increase of interest in the charter since the fall of communism 1989/90: “The CLRAE [Congress of Local and Regional Authori-

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______________________________________________________________ ties] conceived and presented its draft charter before the dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and in the light of the needs of the countries which at that time were already members of the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, the relevance of the charter and its approach to the situation of the countries of central and eastern Europe has since been confirmed by the considerable interest expressed by the representatives of a number of these countries in the establishment of European standards on this topic” (Explanatory Report: para. 12 p.3) [my insertion]. Although the Explanatory Report does not expand on exactly who the “representatives” were who displayed interest in the charter, we can speculate that this does, in part, point to parties interested in languages spoken by Roma people. Subsequent calls for standardising Romani languages have referred to the ECRML as the legal background for this process. For example, a version of the Romani alphabet was devised and written by Marcel Courtiade, with EU funding, and was adopted by the International Romani Union at its Fourth World Congress, held in Warsaw 1990 (Acton and Klimová, 2001, p. 162). 6 For the full monitoring process plus all the reports, a useful website is from the Budapest-based Public Foundation for European Comparative Minority Research (“EÖKIK”), see webpage http://languagecharter.eokik.hu (accessed 20 December 2008). 7 Minority languages pertinent to the ECRML’s application in Hungary are listed as follows: Croatian (17,577 speakers), German (37,511 speakers), Romanian (8,730 speakers), Serbian (2,953 speakers), Slovak (12,745 speakers), Roma/Gypsies (48,072 speakers), (figures according to the Population Census 1990, probably conservative). 8 “The Roma culture being an essentially oral culture, the language is not highly codified; and incessant travels and exchanges with the populations of the places they passed through have transformed Romani into a multitude of languages: a Rom from Romania, for example, will not be understood by a Spanish or Portuguese Kalo. But even if it is not used by all groups, the language remains an essential common denominator of this people scattered all over the continent” (The Situation of Gypsies (Roma and Sinti) in Europe 1995: Introduction, p. 8). 9 Hungary was the first country in the region to adopt and implement a government initiated and supported school integration programme. It was launched in 2003, and provides financial incentives to schools that commit to integrating Roma students into the mainstream classrooms. In an outline of the government initiated and support school integration programme (Mohácsi 2005). Implementing integration and desegregation has become one of the priorities to be dealt with in the pan-European programme Decade for Roma

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______________________________________________________________ Inclusion 2005-2015, see webpage www.romadecade.org (accessed 2. March 2009).

References Acton, T.A. & I. Klimová (2001), “The International Romani Union: An East European answer to West European questions? Shifts in the focus of World Romani Congresses 1971-2000,” in: Guy, W. (ed.) (2001), Between past and future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 157–219. Csepeli, G. and D. Simon (2004), “Construction of Roma Identity in Eastern and Central Europe: Perception and Self-identification,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1): 129–150. Discrimination against the Roma Resolution 1995 B4-0974/95, 13th July 1995, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 249/156, 25th September 1995. Durst, J. (2002), “Fertility and childbearing practices among poor Gypsy women in Hungary: the intersections of class, race and gender,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 35: 457–474. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992. (entered into force 1.March 1998) Strasbourg, Council of Europe. European Union Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, Brussels, European Commission, 2003. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995 Fraser, N. (1997), Justice Interruptus. Critical reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ condition London: Routledge. Kende, Á. (2000), “The Hungary of Otherness: The Roma (Gypsies) of Hungary,” Journal of European Area Studies, 8(2): 187–201. Kovats, M. (2001), “The emergence of European Roma policy,” in: W. Guy (ed.), Between past and future, the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 93–116.

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Kymlicka, W. (2005), Multicultural Citizenship. Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press. Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe. (2002), Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe. Morawa, A. and M. Weller (2005), Mechanisms for the implementation of minority rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Mohácsi, V. and L. Járóka (2005), “The only hope for the European Roma is the European Union”, Equal voices: Targeting and mainstreaming the integration of Roma at the EU and European level, Issue 16, June 2005. Stewart, M. (1997), The Time of the Gypsies. Oxford: Westview Press. Verkuyten, M. (2004), “Everyday ways of thinking about multiculturalism,” Ethnicities, 4(1): 53–74. Weller, M. (ed.) (2005), The Rights of Minorities in Europe. A commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania: Legal Framework for Social Inclusion Michaela Salamun The Strategy Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority of 2003 as well as other sublegal acts have complemented the existing legal framework for minority protection in Albania. They are set in the context of (international) soft law, such as Opinions of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe and the annual reports of the European Commission relating to Albania. The sublegal acts have effected changes in the definition of the Roma and Egyptian minorities and in their position in the areas of education, employment and social affairs. Despite such changes, however, implementation needs to be improved, mainly in terms of providing sufficient funding and increasing local government activities. Introduction This chapter discusses in what ways the legal framework in Albania accounts for the social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities.1 This is important, as legal frameworks in different countries tend to provide different measures of social inclusion. Moreover, – inter alia due to more recent processes of identity formation (Marushiakova, Popov, 2001; Trubeta, 2005) – the Egyptian community may not be treated as a distinct minority by the state, but regarded as a subgroup within the Roma minority that generally have seen a more longstanding process of identity building in Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) (Vermeersch, 2006, pp. 13; Friedman, 2007). Social inclusion has been defined mainly via its antonym, social exclusion, which consists in “deprivation and barriers, which […] prevent the full participation in areas such as employment, education, health, environment, housing, culture, access to rights or family support, as well as training and job opportunities” (European Commission, 2000, p. 6). Social inclusion therefore can be defined as the overcoming, minimizing or non-existence of such deprivation and barriers. Consequently, a legal framework which creates the prerequisites for social inclusion needs to provide for measures of positive discrimination or affirmative action that try to level out existing inequalities in cases where barriers affect only a certain group of the population and so

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______________________________________________________________ indirectly discriminate against it. In addition, the framework needs to be effectively implemented. In a first step I discuss the definition of the Roma and Egyptian minorities or communities in Albania and what constitutional provisions and sublegal acts on minority protection apply to them (e.g. the Strategy Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority of 2003; hereinafter National Strategy). In a second step, my paper examines legal instruments that account for the inclusion of the Roma minority in the fields of education, employment and social affairs. It shows how these instruments either explicitly or implicitly refer to the minority, explicit reference showing a higher degree of political priority by the legislator. In addition, the higher the legal act in the hierarchy of normative acts, starting from sublegal acts (instructions, decisions, orders) through laws up to constitutional laws, the higher is its political priority. In a third step, institutions monitoring the implementation of the National Strategy are described. 1. Definition of the Roma and Egyptian Minorities In contrast to the Slovenian Constitution, which – in a unique way refers to the status and special rights of the Romani community in Art. 65, the Albanian Constitution (Law No. 8417, dated 21/10/1998, as amended) does not refer explicitly to the Roma or Egyptian minorities or communities. Rather, it relates to “minorities” in general; “coexistence with, and understanding of Albanians for, minorities” is regarded as “one of the bases of the state, which has to respect and protect them” (Art. 3). In addition, the Constitution mentions “national minorities”, which are granted special rights mainly in the cultural and linguistic area, such as mother-tongue education2 (Art. 20, para. 2). The Constitution also contains a principle of equality (Art. 18, para.s 1 and 2), which allows for the execution of positive discrimination, when there is reasonable and objective legitimacy (Art. 18, para. 3 of the Constitution; Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 28). Considering that – though subject to certain restrictions – legally it is in principle upon the States to define the concept of minority, the question arises which of these constitutional provisions apply to the Roma and Egyptian communities. Firstly, the Roma community has been recognized in official documents, like state reports, as an ethno-linguistic minority,3 as opposed to a national minority (e.g. the Greek or Macedonian minority) that has a motherland (UN, ICCPR, HRC, 2004, para. 9). Because the special rights provided in Art. 20, para. 2 of the Constitution are granted exclusively to national minorities, only the principle of equality set out in Art. 18 of the Constitution applies to members of the Roma and Egyptian community, just like to any other Albanian citizens. However, this is limited by the standard-setting function of the Opinions issued by the Advisory Committee of the Council of

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______________________________________________________________ Europe Framework Convention for National Minorities (AC) (Lantschner, 2008), which made clear that: “[i]t understands that, according to the Albanian government, the Framework Convention is also to be applied without distinction or discriminating effect to the linguistic minorities. Nevertheless, it encourages the government, in consultation with those concerned, to re-examine the question of the possible designation of the Roma and Aromanians/Vlachs as national minorities” (AC, 2002, para.s 20, 84; similar AC, 2008, para. 9).4 Thus the AC argues for a recognition of the Roma minority as a “national” minority (which then might potentially come also within the wider constitutional protection, including mother-tongue education), whereas the government programme refers to it merely as “ethnic minorities” and “communities”.5 Secondly, the Egyptian community was not officially recognized as a minority until 2005. The government gave as a reason in a state report of 2003 that unlike the nomadic Roma, who have their own language and ethnic characteristics, Egyptians were settled, did not have their own language, culture or religion and were fully integrated into Albanian society (UN, CERD, 2003b, para. 8; similar Government of Albania, 2008, para. 23). However, according to the Advisory Committee such non-recognition a priori excluded the minority from the protection of the Framework Convention and, therefore, was not compatible with it (AC, 2002, para. 22). Following the national elections of July 2005, the Egyptian community was mentioned in the government programme 2005–2009 of 8 September 2005. In my opinion such explicit reference could be seen as a first official acknowledgment of the minority. The government programme states: “The Government commits itself to abide by and achieve the highest standards in respecting the rights of all the ethnic minorities: Greek, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma, Egyptian and Aromanian ... Priority treatment will be offered to the Roma and Egyptian communities through a special education and housing program, in order to overcome the consequences of their long-term discrimination.” (Government of Albania, 2005) While the first state report to the Advisory Committee in 2001 had not mentioned the Egyptian community,6 the second state report in 2007 referred

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______________________________________________________________ explicitly to this community (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 34). The first sublegal act mentioning the Egyptian minority is Council of Ministers’ (CoM) Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007 “For the adoption of the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action plan for its implementation.” It states that awareness of the employees of the employment offices will be raised relating to “women of the Roma and Egyptian community,” so as to implement existing employment promotion programmes (CoM Decision No. 632, see below) as well as measures of the National Strategy. However, unlike the Roma minority, the Egyptian minority does not have a representative in the State Committee for Minorities (AHC, 2007, point 3). Therefore, one can speak about a partial recognition of the Egyptian community so far. The Advisory Committee recognizes that further dialogue is needed between the authorities and the Egyptian community in order to decide on measures aimed at preserving and developing their identity and culture (AC, 2008, para.s 10, 46). There is no current official data on the number of minority members, as the 2001 census did not include a question on nationality or language used at home.7 A study of the World Bank indicates that the Roma minority comprises 79,000 members, i.e. 2.4 per cent of the population (de Soto et al., 2002, p. 90).8 The Roma assess their number as twice as many (120– 150,000), the Egyptian minority gives its number as high as 200–250,000 persons (Center for Ethnic Studies, 2002; de Soto et al., 2004, pp. 67). Districts with large Roma populations can be found in Korça, Elbasan, Tirana, Fier, Berat and Durrës, where Roma live mainly in separate quarters, in outskirts or in villages close to towns. Rural communities can e.g. be found in the villages of Bilisht, Maliq, Pojan and Zvezde around the southeastern town of Korça (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. xxiv). 2. Legal Instruments for Social Inclusion Legal instruments that account for social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities exist mainly as sublegal acts, such as decisions of the CoM and orders or instructions of individual ministries in the fields of education, employment and social affairs. The perhaps most prominent one is the Strategy for Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority, adopted by CoM Decision No. 633, dated 18/09/2003. It provides for measures of positive discrimination or affirmative action in the areas of education, cultural heritage and family, economics, employment, poverty reduction and social welfare, health and infrastructure as well as public order, justice and public administration and has been concretised through the issuance of further sublegal acts relating to the Roma and Egyptian minorities. I address these separately in the following.

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______________________________________________________________ Instruments Relating to Education Roma children in Albania face a low enrolment rate (48 cer cent primary, 12 per cent secondary, 2 per cent tertiary education), low attendance (Roma 4.02 and Egyptians 5.06 years of school in average) and a high drop-out rate with as much as 94 per cent of Roma pupils starting grade 1 not reaching grade 5 as a share of all pupils aged 12 (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, pp. 54).9 Thus the members of the Roma and Egyptian minorities generally face high figures of illiteracy (64 per cent of Roma and 24 per cent of Egyptians, ages 7–20, 40 per cent of Roma and 11.3per cent of Egyptians, ages 20–40) (ibid., p. xxviii).10 Access to education may be obstructed by factors, such as high cost of school supplies (ibid., pp. 61), or internal and international migration of Roma parents during the school year (ibid., pp. 57), who frequently take their children with them.11 Other prohibitive factors may include large distance to education facilities, lack of child care facilities for younger children, security risks (parents fear especially that girls are trafficked into prostitution, ODIHR, 2003), perceived teacher discrimination, traditional gender roles, lack of Albanian language skills, hunger, malnourishment and poor diet (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. 57). A disproportionate number of Roma children are not registered in the Civil Registry which restricts their access to education and public services in general. Recent amendments of the Law on civil status reward the mother by payment of lek 5,000 (approx. € 38) for registering the child within a certain time period, i.e. 60 days from birth within Albania and 90 days from birth abroad or 60 days from the entry into force of the law for all births that are not declared until present (Art 34/1, para.s 4 and 5 of No. 8950, dated 10/10/2002, most recently amended by Law No. 9929, dated 09/06/2008). There is a fine of lek 50,000 (approx. € 384) for units of local government that do not implement the law or pay the reward sum (Art 69.1b). The amendments were advertised on informational programmes in national television, publicity spots, posters, and leaflets with sufficient information on the manner of declaration for children’s registration and a meeting has been held at the national level with registry offices and responsible personnel in hospital centers (Government of Albania, 2008, para. 15). In the field of education Chapter I of the National Strategy aims to strengthen preschool education for Roma children.12 This is done through measures to overcome language difficulties, to ensure that all Roma children complete mandatory education and many continue with secondary and even higher education, and to establish quotas at the universities for Roma students to study programmes, such as public administration, social sciences, law, economics, engineering, etc. Several instructions of the Ministry of Education and Science concretize and implement the National Strategy.13 Instruc-

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______________________________________________________________ tion No. 34, dated 08/12/2004, “For the implementation of the project “Second Chance” for the schooling of pupils who abandoned school and those who are immobilized because of the blood feud phenomena,” Instruction No. 18, dated 30/08/2005, which requires the regional Education Directorates to report in writing twice a year on the implementation of the National Strategy (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 59), and Instruction No. 6, dated 29/03/2006, “For the registration in schools of the Roma pupils who are not provided with a birth certificate” (ibid., p. 97). The AC notes that this instruction has alerted teachers to the problem and improved the situation to some extent; moreover, 50 per cent of the 469 pupils involved in the project “Second Chance” belong to the Roma community (AC, 2008, para.s 169 f). Moreover, the Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with the Institute for Pedagogical Research, AEDP (Albanian Educational Development Programme) of the Soros Foundation and the Roma Union of Albania conducted a pilot programme in the nine-year school “Bajram Curri” in Tirana, in which the teaching of Romani language, history and culture is included in the school curriculum and in which several Roma assistant teachers were employed (Save the Children, 2001, p. 41; ETF, 2000, p. 39). Other activities have been the collection of data about the situation of Roma in education, such as a study on attendance of Roma children in preschool and pre-university education institutions (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, p. 12), the reconstruction of schools in areas with a high concentration of Roma children, such as in Tirana, Shkodra, Korça, Elbasan, Fier, Gjirokastra, Lushnja and Berat (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, para. 5.1), awareness raising and support of parents in cooperation with NGOs providing economic assistance to Roma families to enable regular school education of their children (IHF Report, 2003, p. 10), projects for teaching Romanes in schools, organization of additional classes to fight illiteracy (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, para. 5.1) and the distribution of free textbooks to the poorest segments of society, including the Roma (ECRI, 2004, para. 59).14 In particular, based on the National Strategy for the Development of the Pre-university Education 2004–2005 (approved by CoM Decision No. 538, dated 12/08/2004), new syllabuses containing optional subjects chosen by parent boards allow pupils who belong to minorities to study in their schools their history, customs and the culture of their nation as well as subjects in their mother tongue (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 60). The adoption of concrete measures to this respect has been requested (AHC, 2007). While activities promoting the education of Roma children already took place before the adoption of the National Strategy, after its adoption such activities through the issuing of instructions, some of which explicitly mention the Roma minority, were accorded higher priority and a more solid or “permanent” basis. In other words, the formal recognition of the minority

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______________________________________________________________ has been increased through the adoption of sublegal acts for the promotion of their education, which have paved the ground for further integration of the minority. Instruments Relating to Employment Roma and Egyptian household incomes in Albania are less than half of the majority urban household incomes at the national level (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. xxv). The unemployment rate is estimated at 90per cent in some communities and close to 100 per cent in the towns of Gjirokastra and Delvina, many lacking a full-time job since the state-owned enterprises were closed down in 1990/1 (ibid., p. 66). Only 2 per cent of the Roma and 3.3 per cent of Egyptians receive unemployment benefits and 95 per cent of Roma and 91 per cent of Egyptians who are unemployed or work informally do not contribute to social security plans (ibid., p. 67). Those with work face an ethnic hierarchy of jobs, as members of the Roma minority tend to work as street sweepers and to trade with used clothes on the streets (ibid., p. 68). They also do casual work, mainly in basic construction and public works projects, agriculture or work as porters or dockers (ibid., p. 70). Moreover, some Roma still work in more traditional jobs, such as basket makers, horse breeders, blacksmiths, cart-drivers, peddlers, animal tamers, musicians and dancers (UN, CERD, 2003a, para. 106). Romani children frequently work with their parents in agriculture, collect metal and used clothes and beg in the streets of big cities (de Soto, Gëdeshi, 2002, pp. 22). However, in Korça there are several Roma doctors and some minority members have completed university education (Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania, 2000, p. 18). Egyptians may work as blacksmiths, ironworkers, coppersmiths, tinsmiths, shoemakers and butchers (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. 71). In contrast to the Roma, they may have reached a higher education level and be more integrated in society; some are engineers, doctors, teachers, economists, military officers and state employees. In addition, Egyptian musicians have contributed to musical development in Albania and many are part of bands and orchestras (ibid., p. 65). As regards the fields of economy and employment, Chapter III of the National Strategy provides for measures regarding business development, such as provision of consulting services, market surveys and access to credit for Roma communities. In addition, it foresees implementation of special programmes to increase employment opportunities for Roma, enactment of advantageous policies for companies employing Roma, integration in the mainstream educational and vocational training system, as well as assistance to communes and municipalities to attract Roma to the labour market. To improve labour conditions, the National Strategy provides for enactment of

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______________________________________________________________ measures to eliminate violation of labour code provisions by employers and to strengthen controls by the State Labour Inspectorate in businesses employing Roma. There are several government programmes for employment promotion,15 some of which promote employment of certain groups: CoM Decision No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers gave priority, inter alia, to Roma women distinguishing them among their major focus group of women aged over 35 and young mothers. An employer who provides a job for a female jobseeker from the lists of the Employment Office, on a regular contract and at least for one year, receives financial support: a) in the first year of contract 70 per cent of obligatory social insurance and 4 minimum-wage salaries based on the country scale; b) in the second year of contract 85 per cent of obligatory social insurance and 6 minimum-wage salaries; c) in the third year of the contract’s execution 100 per cent of obligatory insurance and 8 minimum-wage salaries. Under this programme 86 Roma were employed in 2004 (Ministria e Punës dhe Cështjeve Sociale, 2005, p. 27). To implement the decision, Instruction No. 76, dated 14/01/2004, provides that the Employment Offices should cooperate with Roma associations registered by court decision regarding Roma women who are registered as unemployed (Point 15). Instruction No. 647, dated 20/03/2006, as amended by Instruction No. 647/1, dated 15/05/2006, sets out the conditions the employer must fulfil, documents he or she must submit as well as the procedure to be followed.16 Since 2007 employment offices are to include disaggregated statistics on unemployed Roma jobseekers in periodical statistical reports (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, p. 44). Moreover, Order No. 645, dated 20/03/2006, “For the priorities of the employment promotion programme for the year 2006” stresses that the participation of special groups, which tend to include Roma, in the employment promotion programmes is to consist of at least 20 per cent of all employees in these programmes and that 50 per cent of their funds will be used only for the implementation of Decision No. 632 of 2003 (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 90). However, the Court of Auditors concluded that in 2006 funds were not distributed according to this order (Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit, 2007, p. 7). In the field of vocational training, CoM Decision No. 616, dated 04/12/2002, determined additional special groups, such as trafficked women and girls, however, without mentioning explicitly the Roma minority, who benefit from Law No. 8872, dated 29/03/2002, “On education and vocational training in the Republic of Albania”17. By contrast, Order No. 394, dated 23/02/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs “For the fees in the vocational training system” explicitly mentions the Roma community: Vocational training was to be given free of charge in the vocational public training

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______________________________________________________________ centres to unemployed jobseekers registered with the Employment Offices, including the Roma community (Point 6). This is repeated in Order No. 782, dated 04/04/2006, “For the fees in the vocational training systems” (Point 4). In 2004 about 50, in 2005 67 and in 2006 98 persons benefitted from these courses (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, pp. 45). Furthermore, CoM Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007, on the adoption of the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action plan for its implementation, which includes the Sectoral Employment Strategy 2007–2013, inter alia states that public works can be used to employ unemployed jobseekers of the Roma community, as foreseen in the National Strategy (Objective 8).18 However, the Sectoral Employment Strategy merely repeats many of the goals and activities already mentioned in the National Strategy. While certainly constituting an important step in reinforcing the government priorities regarding the Roma community, such repetition may show at the same time that the programmes and measures provided for in the National Strategy have been implemented only in part. The State Inspectorate of Labour inspected and identified all natural and legal subjects that employ Roma, but so far no cases of violations of their rights regarding working conditions, wage and working hours have been identified. Also, the Social Security Institute in cooperation with the Inspectorate and the Directorate of Taxes inspected private subjects that employed Roma to include them in the social security scheme (Ministry of Work and Social Services, 2004). Following the adoption of the National Strategy several sublegal acts regarding employment promotion of the Roma community have been adopted, which shows the political priority accorded by the government to this issue. The measures, some of which provide for positive discrimination inter alia for Roma women, improve the legal bases for minority protection; however, they appear to have reached only a small number of minority members and therefore seem to be of limited practical effect. Instruments Relating to Social Affairs Regarding social affairs, the National Strategy envisages integrating Roma street children, providing economic aid for poor families, as well as support for Roma civil society organizations to improve interaction with and service to their constituents. Moreover, it foresees putting the Roma workforce on the mandatory social security scheme as the greatest part of Roma is engaged in informal activities as well as registration of the Roma population in the Civil Registrar’s Office.

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______________________________________________________________ The integration of the Roma minority is also related to the Strategy of Social Services (adopted by Decision No. 265, dated 28/04/2005). In support of this strategy the project “Distribution of Social Services in Albania” financed by the World Bank has been implemented, which created 43 new community social services, out of which a considerable number address problems of Roma women and children (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, pp. 93). Social service officials in municipalities/ communes were requested to give information and assistance to help Roma families to take advantage of economic assistance and to identify their needs for social services (based on Law No. 9355, dated 10/03/2005, “On assistance and social services” as amended by Law No. 9602, dated 28/07/2006). As a result, Roma minority families have been included in the economic assistance programme, disability payment and public social services (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, pp. 93).19 In addition, CoM Decision No. 913, dated 19/12/2007, “On the adoption of the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 and the action plan for its implementation” lists Roma girls and women among those who are at the greatest risk to be the victims of domestic violence.20 This strategy mentions that in the field of social protection the state is to take care inter alia of Roma and Egyptian families (Point 3.5) mainly through cash transfers in the form of economic assistance, or public or private services for persons in need. In addition, in the elaboration of the criteria of families below the absolute poverty line, inter alia, Roma and Egyptian families are to be treated with priority (Point 5.1.1). The network of community services is extended through pilot projects in three zones for women and girls in need.. This comprises female heads of family, victims of domestic violence, trafficked women, Roma and Egyptian women, handicapped women, women with many children etc (Point 5.2.1). In the field of social affairs the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 mentions explicitly the Roma and Egyptian community, for which it foresees measures of positive discrimination, while at the same time according these measures also to other groups in need. This should be seen in the context of the fact that in many regions of Albania there is poverty in general and the majority population could hardly understand a favourable treatment of minority members in terms of economic assistance. 3. Monitoring Institutions A Sector for the Monitoring of the Implementation of the National Strategy was created in 2004 near the Institute for State Social Services of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.21 However, it was staffed only with three officials, though its capacities are to be reinforced over the following years (CoM, 2004, p. 130; Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 62). Never-

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______________________________________________________________ theless, the monitoring sector has played a very active role in the implementation of the National Strategy (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 59). There is also an interministerial working group dealing with issues related to the Roma minority, which is headed by the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and supported by the Office for Minorities within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN, CERD, 2003a, para. 128; Commission Report, 2003, p. 10). Moreover, the State Committee of Minorities includes a representative of the Roma minority (established in CoM Decision No. 127, dated 11/03/2004, as amended). In 2004 it was announced that the total budget to be made available for the implementation of the National Strategy was € 7 million over a period of 15 years (Equal. Të barabarta, 2004, pp. 4).22 However, discrepancies have been found in the allocation of the funds, with some activities, such as data collection, not funded at all, while others appeared oversubscribed. In addition, it has been argued, since many sources of funding refer to “donors”, a commitment to ensure the long-term financial sustainability is questionable (Abdikeeva, 2005, p. 5). Government funding comes from the budgets of ministries which have an allocation either for vulnerable groups in general or for Roma in particular. In practice the funding provided by authorities remains minimal, since most projects to implement the National Strategy have been initiated by civil society with assistance from international organisations as one-off projects confined to certain municipalities (AC, 2008, para. 77). Similarly, it has been noted that information on the existence and the content of the National Strategy is weak in the regions, where the Roma community suffers from a lack of acknowledgement by local authorities and a lack of civil society organizations to represent their interests (Commission Report, 2006, p. 15). The annual reports of the European Commission in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association process continue to note the adverse socioeconomic situation of the Roma minority.23 The report of 2006 suggested that Albania further develop practical measures under the National Strategy and plan financial resources for its full implementation (Commission Report, 2006, pp. 14). Reporting on implementation of the National Strategy in 2007, the Commission acknowledges steps taken to improve housing, employment and business opportunities for Roma and to organize vaccination campaigns. However, the implementation is described as slow and fragmented with little progress made in improving the situation of the Roma. The group continues to face very difficult living conditions and discrimination, especially in the areas of education, social protection, health care, housing and employment (Commission Report, 2007, pp. 17). This is repeated in the Commission report of 2008, which, however, also recognises some limited progress in terms of measures taken by the government. Upon joining the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 in April 2008 Albania’s monitoring sector has

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______________________________________________________________ been up-graded to a technical secretariat. Employing a member of the Roma community among its staff will improve its capacity to monitor and coordinate measures with other institutions (Commission Report, 2008, p. 17). The AC notes that the full implementation of this Strategy is still lagging behind as the authorities have not yet secured adequate funding and resources and have not adequately involved the local authorities. Action should be taken to assess more precisely the extent of the problem and develop performance indicators to measure the progress achieved by the National Strategy (AC, 2008, para. 25). Recently, a Commission of Assessment of projects proposals in the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunication approved projects by local units allocating funding to the municipalities/communes of Tirana, Kuçova, Korça, Pojan, Bilisht, for reconstruction of buildings, improvement of services, of infrastructure and construction of new objects for the Roma community in the value of lek 30 million (approx. € 230,769, Government of Albania, 2008, para. 27). Conclusion The adoption of the National Strategy for the Roma in 2003 and the official acknowledgement of the Egyptian community by the government since 2005 have been among the main developments in Albania. Since the first regular Commission Report of 2002 and the entry into force of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities for Albania in 2000 steps were undertaken towards achieving a higher degree of social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities. The National Strategy is an impressive document, which refers to a wide range of goals to be achieved, and consequently creates a heavy workload for the administrative authorities. However, the National Strategy is short of funding. Additionally, the National Strategy has been criticized for lacking a human rights-based approach, anti-discrimination focus and community empowerment measures as well as for a weak design of the monitoring and evaluation components (UNDP Albania, 2006, p. 7). In addition to the National Strategy, sublegal acts have been issued by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to further the integration of the Roma and Egyptian communities, some of which allow measures of positive discrimination or affirmative action regarding inter alia members of the Roma and Egyptian minorities. In the field of education many initiatives have been taken by the Ministry of Education and Science. However, it has been noted that Roma communities have not always been adequately involved and for many families the costs of school materials other than textbooks, which are given for free, remain prohibitive (ECRI, 2004, para. 57). Furthermore, as the number of Roma children in schools has not substantially increased and the

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______________________________________________________________ literacy rate of the Roma population remains low, barriers, such as poverty, language difficulties, temporary migration and discrimination, prevail (Commission, 2007, p. 16). Similarly, in the area of employment and social affairs many sublegal acts have been adopted, which, however, seem to have been implemented only in part. It is certainly an important sign that the recently adopted Sectoral Employment Strategy 2007–2013 and the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 refer explicitly to the Roma and Egyptian communities, even though they largely seem to repeat provisions of existing sublegal acts. Nevertheless, in my view such reference shows the political priority accorded to this issue by the government and is essential in terms of further increasing awareness and fostering implementation of the National Strategy. The initiatives taken by the ministries and the government certainly represent an important step and show that the government is active in implementing the National Strategy. At the same time, there is a need of a more comprehensive and systematic approach, which would cover larger sections of the Roma and Egyptian communities. Moreover, women certainly represent the weakest segment of society and therefore must be protected and promoted most. Nevertheless, employment promotion should be further extended to cover sizable groups of unemployed male Roma jobseekers, so as to broaden the concept of positive discrimination or affirmative action to (ethnic) minority protection in general. To this end, the legislator may even consider providing explicit reference to the Roma and also the Egyptian community in the Constitution, like this is done e.g. in the Constitutions of Slovenia (Art. 65), Kosovo (e.g. Art. 64) and Macedonia (Art. 78, para. 2) and a minority protection law. In the context of European integration, the National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 2007–2012 considers as a priority the full implementation of the National Strategy, aiming to improve living conditions, education and employment of the Roma community through programmes of economic assistance as well as public and private services of social care. It provides as a short and medium-term priority for the period 2007–2009 the implementation of the National Strategy as part of the government strategy to fight poverty and social exclusion. To this respect, in the short-term the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities is to conduct a large number of implementing activities.24 The State Committee for Minorities is likewise to organize a roundtable about the implementation of the measures foreseen in the National Strategy (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 60). Moreover, in the medium-term the adoption of a draft law on the rights and freedoms of the national minorities and the teaching of the mother tongue of the national minorities entirely is in conformity with the Framework Convention for Na-

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______________________________________________________________ tional Minorities is foreseen (ibid.). However, it seems questionable, if this draft law will include the Roma and Egyptian communities, considering that the government does not list linguistic minorities among national minorities so far. In the long-term 2011–2012, a draft law on census including an ethnic and linguistic self-declaration of the citizens is to be adopted and a roundtable on the results of the monitoring of the National Strategy to be organized (ibid.). If the many implementing activities foreseen in the National Plan as short-term priorities are really carried out, the living conditions of the Roma minority will certainly be improved. Unless sufficient funding is provided, social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities will remain a long-term issue. Rather than leading to visible results in the near future implementation might still be a matter of future developments/policymakers. In addition to an increase in funds, much work still needs to be done at the level of local government. If the National Strategy is to reach a larger number of the Roma and Egyptian population in Albania implementation needs to take place closer to these communities. Endnotes 1 It builds on and expands research conducted for Access to Education, Training and Employment of Ethnic Minorities in the Western Balkans. Country Report Albania, Eurac/European Training Foundation, January 2006, 52 pp, unpublished report. Developments were considered up to March 2008 and updated in April 2009. 2 However, implementing legislation exists only with regard to tuition of the Greek and Macedonian minorities, but not for the Montenegrin minority (AHC, 2000, p. 61). 3 Reportedly, the recognition followed a consultation with experts and researchers on minority issues from state authorities and the Academy of Sciencies in 2003 (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 81). 4 The FCNM entered into force for Albania on 1. January 2000. Cf. http://www.coe.int. It has constitutional rank in the Albanian legal system (see Art. 116, Art. 122, para.s 1 and 2 of the Constitution). 5 As of April 2009 Albania has not ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which includes also non-territorial languages – though in a limited application of the Charter articles - and explicitly mentions Romani in its Explanatory Report (para. 36) (Bakker, Rooker, 2001, p. 14). 6 It dealt only with the Roma, who were distinguished into four main tribes: Kallbuxhinj (residing predominantly in the townships of Tirana, Elbasani, Pogradeci, Korça, Bilishti, Gjirokastra, Saranda); Meçkare (with the domicile

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______________________________________________________________ in Lushnja, Fieri, Vlora); scattered Kurtofet; and nomadic Cergaret (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, p. 15). 7 A study by INSTAT of 2003 did not include the Roma minority, because it was based on the 1989 census, in which the minority had been included in the category of ‘others’ that numbered 479 members (INSTAT, 2005, ERRC, 1997, p. 89). Censuses from 1961 and 1970 had counted 10,000 and 50,000 Roma (cited in Z. Bárány, 2002, p. 126). Reportedly, the Roma had been first registered in a census of 1522-23, when about 1270 people were estimated to live in 374 camp-fires (CEDIME-SE, 2000, p. 7). 8 However, for several reasons, such as a small household survey, the data is not representative (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2002, p. xi). 9 Cf. http://vulnerability.undp.sk (accessed 26 July 2008). 10 Data by UNDP suggests a higher literacy rate for Roma, i.e. 65 per cent for ages 15–24 and 75-79 per cent for ages 25–44, with rates for females about 10 per cent lower than those for males (ibid). 11 Meçkars are an exception: Even though they travel more often, their children complete more years of school and have lower illiteracy rates (ibid., p. 59). 12 The National Strategy for Children adopted by CoM Decision No. 368, dated 31/05/2005, also deals with Roma Children. 13 In contrast to orders, instructions only have explanatory character and explain in detail all provisions of laws or decisions of the Council of Ministers (Art. 128 (ç) and (d) of Law No. 9000, dated 30.1.2003 on the organisation and functioning of the Council of Ministers). 14 Besides initiatives of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, pp. 27), NGOs (Ministry of Work and Social Services, Directorate of Social Services, 2004), the community maintains the private schools ‘Vakthi Sheme’ (Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania, 2000, p. 13). 15 They are based on the Strategy for Employment and Vocational Training, adopted by CoM Decision No. 67, dated 10/01/2003, which builds on the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development (Government of Albania, 2001). 16 Overall, while aiming to prevent illegal employment practices, the requirements seem to demand quite a lot of effort and time from employers. 17 Art. 5 (c) of this law defines inter alia special groups that wish professional reintegration as persons with disabilities, mothers with many children, persons under 18 years, long-term unemployed persons, persons from families who live below the poverty line and any other category defined in a decision of the Council of Ministers. In addition, Instruction No. 2222, dated 31/10/2002, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs “On counselling

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______________________________________________________________ and orientation in the vocational training” provides that special attention should be paid to the vocational training of special groups as defined by law or sublegal acts (Point 6). 18 The use of promotion policies for companies that employ Roma is foreseen, which aims at i) the possibility of financing companies with employers and employees from the Roma community, ii) fiscal facilitation policies for those companies that create jobs for Roma, iii) material support, support relating to work environment, financial support and support regarding human resources for those businesses that deal with traditional products of the Roma community. 19 The situation of the Roma and Egyptian population is also dealt with in the Regional Development Strategies of 2005. See for the strategies at http://www.undp.org.al (accessed 26 July 2008). 20 Especially women and girls with disabilities, of migrant background or from rural areas and Roma in the age groups of 18–23 and 37-45 are noted to be subjected to violence more frequently (National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007-2010, 2007). 21 See Order No. 213/2, dated 22.6.2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. 22 Another sum reported is 27 million USD; http://www.info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35479/ Prez1%20Albania.ppt (accessed 26 July 2008). 23 The EC report states that the socio-economic situation of the Roma remained clearly below acceptable standards and requested that concrete plans to support this community be implemented (Commission Report, 2001, p. 11). The 2005 report notes that, despite some measures under the National Strategy, both, the Roma and the Egyptian communities continue to suffer prejudice and discrimination in a number of societal settings; especially in education, professional training and employment (Commission Report, 2005, p. 21). The report of the following year indicates that 78 per cent of the Roma population live in poverty and 39 per cent in extreme poverty; only 12 per cent were enrolled in secondary school, compared to the national average of 81 per cent (Commission Report, 2006, pp. 14). 24 A second cycle of meetings related to implementation in the regions, an interministerial working group to organize, coordinate, monitor and implement the National Strategy, a roundtable about its implementation, a project in 2007 with UNICEF, the Ministry of Education and Science and Save the Children in three zones with Roma population about registration in school, pre-school access, parents’ advising, increase of teachers’ capacity to deal with marginalized children, data collection about Roma children within and outside the education system, strengthening the capacities of the monitoring

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______________________________________________________________ sector, a project to develop monitoring indicators and training of the sector and the interministerial working group, improvement of the living conditions of the Roma community and a project in 2007-2009 about the implementation of the National Strategy with UNDP and many other organisations (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 60).

References Abdikeeva, A., and MRG partners (2005), Roma Poverty and the Roma National Strategies: The Cases of Albania, Greece and Serbia, Minority Rights Group International, http://www.minorityrights.org (accessed 26 July 2007). Bakker, P. and M. Rooker (2001), “The political status of the Romani language in Europe,” Mercator Working Paper 3. Bárány, Z. (2002), The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Soto, H., Beddies, S. and I. Gëdeshi (2005), “Roma and Egyptians in Albania. From Social Exclusion to Social Inclusion,” World Bank Working Paper No. 53. De Soto, H., and I. Gëdeshi (2002), “Dimensions of Romani Poverty in Albania,” Roma Rights, 1, http://lists.errc.org/rr_nr1_2002/noteb3.shtml (accessed 26 July 2008). De Soto, H., Gëdeshi, I., Beddies, S. and D. Perez (2004), “Nga përjashtimi, te përfshirja shoqërore (studim mbi romët dhe evgjitët në shqipëri),” Politika & Shoqëria, 2(14): 67–82. De Soto, H., Gordon, P., Gëdeshi, I. and Z. Sinoimeri (2002), Poverty in Albania. A Qualitative Assessment, World Bank, Washington DC. Friedman, E. (2007), “A Dual Challenge for the Year of Equal Opportunities for All: Roms in the Western Balkans,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, 2/2007. Lantschner, E. (2008), “Emerging European Standards of Minority Protection through Soft Jurisprudence?,” in: J. Marko (ed.), European Integration and

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______________________________________________________________ its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 53–82. Marushiakova, E., and V. Popov (2001), “New ethnic identities in the Balkans: The case of the Egyptians,” Philosophy and Sociology, 2(8): 465– 477. Trubeta, S. (2005), “Balkan Egyptians and Gypsy/Roma Discourse,” Nationalities Papers, 1(33): 71–95. Vermeersch, P. (2006), The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.

Reports AC (2002), Opinion on Albania, Strasbourg, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)004. AC (2008), Second Opinion on Albania, Strasbourg, ACFC/OP/II (2008)003. AHC (2000), Report on the Completion of the Project: “On the Status of the Minorities in the Republic of Albania”. AHC (2007), Respektimi dhe mbrojtja e të drejtave të minoriteteve dhe grupeve të cënueshme për diskriminim, http://www.ahc.org.al/kshh/ ARKIV/2007/0812minoritetet.htm (accessed 26 July 2008). CEDIME-SE (2000), Minorities in Southeast Europe. Roma of Albania. Center for Ethnic Studies (2002), Ethnic communities in Albania and their problems, Tirana, http://www.macedoniansinalbania.org (accessed 26 July 2008). Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania (2000), The forgotten Children. A report on the Roma Children’s Rights Situation in Albania. Council of Ministers (2004), Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnership Priorities, Tirana.

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______________________________________________________________ ECRI (2001), Second Report on Albania adopted on 16 June 2000, CRI (2001) 2, Strasbourg. ECRI (2004), Third Report on Albania, CRI (2005) 23, Strasbourg. Equal. Të barabarta. Social-Kulturore-Multietnike, Nr. 8, Tirana, April 2004. ERRC (1997), No Record of the Case. Roma in Albania, Country Reports Series, No. 5. ETF (2000), Country Report. Vocational education and training against social exclusion. Albania, Torino. European Commission (2000), Communication from the Commission: Building an Inclusive Europe, COM (2000)79 final. European Commission (2001), Report on preparation for the negotiation of a SAA. European Commission (2003), Second Annual Report on Albania. European Commission (2005), Progress Report on Albania. European Commission (2006), Progress Report on Albania. European Commission (2007), Progress Report on Albania. European Commission (2008), Progress Report on Albania. Government of Albania (2001), National Strategy for Economic and Social Development - Medium Term Programme of the Albanian Government “Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy”. Government of Albania (2005), Government programme 2005-2009, http://www.keshilliministrave.al/english/programi/Anglisht%20programi.htm (accessed 26 July 2008). Government of Albania (2008), Comments of the Government of Albania on the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Albania, GVT/COM/II(2008)005.

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INSTAT (2005), “Minorities in Albania,” Thirteenth Meeting of the OSCE Economic Forum Demographic Trends, Migration and Integrating Persons belonging to National Minorities: Ensuring Security and Sustainable Development in the OSCE area, 23-27 May 2005, Prague, distributed at the request of Albania, EF.DEL/42/05. Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit (2007), Buletini i kontrolleve të vitit 2007, V. Departamenti i Kontrollit te Institucioneve Financiare, Ndermarrjeve dhe të Shoqërive Publike Ministria e Punës dhe Cështjeve Sociale (2005) Të dhëna të hollësishme mbi tregun aktual të punës në Shqipëri. Ministry of European Integration (2007), National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 2007-2012, Tirana Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2007) Progress Report on the National Strategy “On Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Community”. Ministry of Work and Social Services, Directorate of Social Services (2004), Information for the implementation of the Strategy for the improvement of the living conditions of the Roma minority, Tirana. ODIHR (2003), CPRSI Assessment Trip to Albania on Trafficking in Children from Roma and Egyptian Communities, Report, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/09/680_en.pdf (accessed 26 July 2008) Report submitted by Albania pursuant to Art. 25, Para. 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, received on 26 July 2001, ACFC/SR(2001)005. Save the Children (2001), Denied a future? The right to education of Roma/Gypsy & Traveller children in Europe. Second Report submitted by Albania pursuant to Art. 25, Para. 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 18 May 2007, ACFC/SR/II(2007)004. UN, CERD (2003a), Reports submitted by State Parties under Art. 9 of the Convention. Fourth Periodic Reports of State Parties due in 2001. Addendum. Albania, CERD/C/397/Add.1.

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UN, CERD (2003b), Sixty-third session, Summary record of the 1585th meeting, CERD/C/SR.1585. UN, ICCPR, HRC (2004), Eighty-second session: Summary record of the 2230th meeting, CCPR/C/SR.2230. UNDP Albania (2006), At Risk: The Social Vulnerability of Roma in Albania, Tirana. Laws and Sublegal Acts Decision No. 127, dated 11/03/2004, of the Council of Ministers on establishing the State Committee of Minorities, as amended by Decision No. 822, dated 28/12/2005, of the Council of Ministers. Decision No. 265, dated 28/04/2005, of the Council of Ministers adopting the Strategy of Social Services. Decision No. 538, dated 12/08/2004, of the Council of Ministers adopting the National Strategy for the Development of the Pre-university Education 2004– 2005. Decision No. 616, dated 04/12/2002, of the Council of Ministers on determining additional special groups, who benefit from Law No. 8872, dated 29/03/2002 on education and vocational training in the Republic of Albania. Decision No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, of the Council of Ministers on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers. Decision No. 633, dated 18/09/2003, of the Council of Ministers adopting the Strategy for Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority. Decision No. 67, dated 10/01/2003, of the Council of Ministers adopting the Strategy for Employment and Vocational Training. Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007, of the Council of Ministers adopting the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action plan for its implementation.

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______________________________________________________________ Decision No. 913, dated 19/12/2007, of the Council of Ministers adopting the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence 2007-2010. Instruction No. 18, dated 30/08/2005, of the Minister of Education on the implementation of the National Strategy. Instruction No. 2222, dated 31/10/2002, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on counselling and orientation in the vocational training. Instruction No. 34, dated 08/12/2004, of the Minister of Education on the implementation of the project “Second Chance” for the schooling of pupils who abandoned school and those who are immobilized because of the blood feud phenomena. Instruction No. 6, dated 29/03/2006, of the Minister of Education on the registration in schools of the Roma pupils who are not provided with a birth certificate. Instruction No. 647, dated 20/03/2006, of the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities implementing Decision No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, of the Council of Ministers on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers, as amended by Instruction No. 647/1, dated 15/05/2006. Instruction No. 76, dated 14/01/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs for implementing Decision Nr. 632, dated 18/09/2003 of the Council of Ministers on a programme to promote the employment of female jobseekers. Law No. 8417, dated 21/10/1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, as amended most recently by Law No. 9904, dated 21/04/2008. Law No. 8950, dated 10/10/2002, on civil status, as amended most recently by Law No. No. 9929, dated 09/06/2008. Law No. 9000, dated 30/01/2003, on the organisation and functioning of the Council of Ministers. Law No. 9355, dated 10/03/2005, on assistance and social services, as amended by Law No. 9602, dated 28/07/2006.

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______________________________________________________________ Order No. 213/2, dated 22/06/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on the creation of the monitoring sector. Order No. 394, dated 23/02/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on the fees in the vocational training system. Order No. 645, dated 20/03/2006, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs on the priorities of the employment promotion programme for the year 2006. Order No. 782, dated 04/04/2006 on the fees in the vocational training systems.

Political Community, Political Institutions and Minority Politics in Slovakia 1998–2006 Ada-Charlotte Regelmann The chapter analyses change and continuity in the concept and practices of the Slovak political community regarding the country’s largest ethnic minority, the Magyars. Focusing on the two subsequent legislative periods between 1998 and 2006 with Magyar participation in government, minority inclusion into the identity of the political community, minority representation in the institutional framework and their consideration in the political decision-making are examined. As is argued, selective responsiveness to minority demands has not led to a broadened understanding of community. Instead, different level political institutions have helped stabilise the established unequal majority-minority relations regarding minority participation in politics and society. Introduction Ethnic division of the political community has been identified as an important factor for conflict and instability in ethnically or culturally heterogeneous societies (Horowitz, 1993). Integrating their political community is therefore a major challenge for these countries. While formal citizenship and formal participation in decision-making processes (e.g. via parliamentary representation) have been identified necessary premises, they are not sufficient for the inclusion of non-dominant ethnic groups into the political community (ibid.). For example, full exertion of citizenship rights and obligations is constrained when it is linked to primordial belonging to a particular group. Participation can be limited when it is conditioned on criteria set by one group alone. Such constraints constitute fundamental aspects of ethnically divided societies and are reflected in their institutional settings. A change of membership criteria or related political institutions that have been derived from a restrictive concept of political community thereby provides a possible opportunity to overcome ethnic division. As I argue in this paper, such change in fundamental institutions is embedded in the shift in conflict or power constellations (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Changes in power relations, themselves potentially reflecting transformation of the underlying conflict, constitute an interesting starting point to inquire developments in the political community. Slovakia represents a case in point in this respect. Although ethnicity does not constitute the only dividing line, the country features aspects of an ethnically divided society: Politics have been shaped and dominated by the Slovak majority, largely

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______________________________________________________________ disregarding the approximately 14 per cent of the citizenry belonging to an ethnic minority, with the Magyars constituting 9.7 per cent of the population alone.1 The linkage of citizenship to Slovak language and culture as well as exclusive political practices constrains minority participation in political processes (Csergı, 2007).2 In the 1998 elections, the political scenery changed, when a nationalist government lost its majority in parliament and was replaced by a politically broad coalition that, besides ethnic Slovak parties also comprised of the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP). This article investigates to what extent the inclusion of the MKP into government helped form a new, more inclusive consensus on political community in Slovakia. Drawing on theoretical frameworks that examine the structure and role of institutions, I analyze the regulation and organization of minority politics in Slovakia 1998–2006. Central to the analysis is the question of reinforcement or reinterpretation of institutions that underlie and constitute the political community. Did minority participation in government foster their participation in the community in general? Has political interaction between majority and minority political actors led to a new understanding of membership in the political community, integrating both minority and majority demands? To answer these questions, I will take the following steps: the theoretical section elaborates on the relation of political community and institutions at three conceptual levels, including identity, rules and policies. Whereas at the level of identity the fundamental “we” of a political community is defined, the level of rules provides for the institutional framework of governance. The level of policies relates to the responsiveness to minority demands as well as processes of agenda-setting and decision-making (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). In the second part I examine the institutionalization of political community at these analytical levels in the case study. In the final section I return to the initial question, relating the trajectories of the political community institutions to their origins, and to the political actors’ preferences as expressed in their interaction with the institutions. 1. Institutionalizing the Political Community Central to political integration is the concept of political community that shapes and reflects the institutions of a political system. In this paper I draw upon the reformulation of political community by Peter Juviler and Sherill Stroschein (1999), who claim to integrate into a coherent comparative frame “aspects of political development, stability, democratic state-building, public participation, and their relation to the inclusion and exclusion of various groups regarding the equality of rights and obligations” (p. 436). I briefly present their argument which aims at analyzing group conflicts within states. Political community denotes the broad range of people eligible for taking part in decision-making processes over community issues. This includes all persons in a given territory “in and out of government who recognize the

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______________________________________________________________ government as the legitimate decision maker […], generally comply with its decisions, and cooperate toward shared purposes” (ibid., p. 438). Accordingly, government, political rules and mechanisms of resource distribution form only a part of the political community. Political community members outside government sustain the community through compliance and loyalty, or act as corrective and supportive elements through engagement in lobbying or civil society activism (ibid.). At the core of Juviler and Stroschein’s concept is the link of political community to its “consensus” on institutions of decision-making and conflict resolution, rights, obligations and objectives, and to the commitment to these purposes and rules on the part of its members. Essentially, political community exists if there is a consensus among persons or groups on such a community (ibid.). Moreover, as formal criteria for membership relates to the consensus of those who are already members, criteria are likely to favour them over non-members or establish exclusive membership requirements. By the same token, legitimate participation in (re)formulating the consensus depends on fulfilling membership criteria (ibid.). Three preliminary conclusions can be derived from this definition. First, those who do not share the consensus are not part of the community and thus do not share an identity with other parts of the community. Second, exclusion from essential rights or resources determines the position of their group in relation to the core of the political community. And third, participation of the excluded and their representation in the institutions of a political system is limited. Political community defined according to these principles is based on shared identity, recurrence to regulatory institutions and access to procedures of democratic governance, and corresponds directly with the dimensions of Claus Offe’s “triple transition”: identity, institutions and rights (Offe, 2004). Following his delineation, Juviler and Stroschein deploy three levels of political institutions in which consensus becomes tangible: the political community’s fundamental identificational “we”; its institutional framework; and the procedures of negotiating power and resource distribution. At the first level, the most fundamental consensus of a community simultaneously constitutes its boundaries. This is formulated most clearly in the state constitution. Furthermore, requirements for citizenship (based on political/territorial criteria, primordial, identity/cultural prerequisites or a mixture of any of these) define who belongs to the nation or political community (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). These institutions constitute the normative basis for further debates on membership and consensus of the community. In multicultural societies they are exclusive when they correspond with the identity framework of one particular cultural group only, precluding identity consensus with other groups. As the identity of the political community represents the framework of reference for community building, exclusion

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______________________________________________________________ from this consensus hence impacts on the chances for full inclusion into the system of rules and rights, though it does not completely impede it. The second level comprises the regulatory institutional framework of rules, rights and obligations, as well as the organizational structure of the political system. Though fundamental for membership, inclusion into the identity framework of the community (first level) does not guarantee equal inclusion into consensus formation on rules and rights. This is the case, for example, when rules violate a first level multicultural identity agreement by founding rights on culturally exclusive criteria. Governance, then, does not represent a consensus of the members anymore, thus lacks legitimacy for those who do or can not agree. On the other hand, exclusion at the first level can be partially compensated by introducing institutions that allow for consent of those formally excluded, thus providing for their inclusion into the consensus-forming community. As rules and rights are important assets for the future position of political actors in negotiating processes (Giddens, 1984), potentially, inclusion into the regulatory frame allows for redefining the normative membership criteria over time. At the third level, in day-to-day policies the distribution of political power and economic resources is negotiated (Offe, 2004). Representing a consensus of its members, political community is constituted by responding to demands. Therefore, responsiveness to claims and criticism of those excluded constitutes one option for changing political community. In this process, non-members can call upon the institutions to redistribute available resources and recast consensus on the community’s identity. In this paper, however, I do not focus on the institutional patterns of interaction between political actors, but rather analyze how, if at all, they have used the given institutionalized structures of Slovak political community for engaging in majority-minority consensus formation. Clearly, political community includes all three levels of identity, regulation and procedures. Juviler and Stroschein, however, have not further developed their concept to explain how the three levels interrelate. For preliminary usage in this paper I suggest understanding them as different, though closely related institutions. While membership in the political community requires inclusion at all levels by definition, exclusion from one or two does not preclude participation in political processes completely. Interrelation and interaction of institutions, I argue, make the change of one institution possible through change in another related institution. This argument will be further elaborated in the following section. Juviler and Stroschein provide for a coherent concept of political community and give some clues to its prerequisites as well as its relationship to the development of political entities. However, they do not explain how political community is established in the first place and how it develops. Understanding political community as multi-layered set of institutions, I draw

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______________________________________________________________ upon frameworks that analyze origins and dynamics of institutions. In a nutshell, institutions are conceptualised as constituting power constellations and interests of political actors, as well as shaping the dynamics of political and social developments (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). In turn, institutions represent structural features of conflicts and negotiation between social groups. While these features emphasize the structuring aspects of institutions, this is not to say that agents only fulfil requirements or purposes of institutions. Rather, it is in the agents’ institutionalized practices that social conflicts become tangible. These practices, essentially, are based on repeated or modified interpretations of societal structures through the agents (Emirbayer and Mische, 1996). I now briefly revisit the relation of institutions, agency, and change. In general, social and political institutions structure group relations as well as political agency (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). They denote sets of formalized “rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘ruling out’ behavior deemed to be undesirable” (Streek and Thelen, 2005, pp. 12–13). They are distinguished from informal rules, such as social conventions, by their legitimate and obligatory character. This is to say that their enforcement can be claimed by third party actors or society as a whole and non-compliance with institutions can be sanctioned morally, socially or juridically (ibid.). Likewise, the political institutions that are in focus here pose expectations of obedience, contribution or assimilation to the ruled regarding their behaviour in interaction with or within the political community. However, institutions do not reflect one-way relations. Instead, they are understood as ruling organizations in which rule makers and rule takers interact (ibid.). This notion of interagency between institutions and social actors is crucial. Origins, dynamics and, decisively, change of institutions are embedded in such processes of interaction. Emphasizing the origins of institutions as set in particular historical conflicts, Thelen and Steinmo (1992) stress that institutions are constituted by agents negotiating their relations. In this respect, social conflicts as well as power constellations are inherent to institutions. In institutionalizing processes agents put into practice their social roles and identities. By compliance with expectations and following rules, they perpetuate the social systems, which also includes politics (Giddens, 1984). That is to say, social roles and identities are by no means determining agency, but do so in interplay with the institutions. Essentially, institutions are embedded in the conflicting experiences, assumptions and interests of agents who are in turn shaped by institutions and power configurations. They are not direct tools for particular individuals’ uni-dimensional interests or direct functions of structural relations. On this note, March and Olsen (1996) describe the multiplicity of institutions and social structures as co-evolving. In this reciprocal development, at any point in time there is an array of potential directions, involving main-

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______________________________________________________________ tenance or shift of the institutional setting. However, alternatives of development are not arbitrary, nor do they necessarily reflect environmental demands for change or quick adaptations to functional outcomes. Rather, institutional analysis requires particular attention to the origins and trajectories of these “enduring legacies of political struggles” (Thelen, 1999, p. 388). These struggles are transformed into lasting institutions and path dependent patterns through what Thelen calls “feedback effects”. Shaped by institutions, actors adopt strategies that both reflect and solidify the logic of the system, and thereby confirm the power constellation on the basis of which the institutions had been established (Thelen, 1999). The feedback effects provide for the stability of institutions. Change, then, is possible, when the foundations of a particular institution are shaken, resulting in shifts of institutional logics that in turn impact on social actors’ choices. Correspondingly, agency is understood as constant interpretation of their environments by social actors, in order to adjust to institutional expectations. Agents engage with the institutions in a triadic way, employing habits, evaluations of present situations and alternatives, as well as aspirations and projections of future developments. Thus they reflect, reproduce or reshape the institutions (Emirbayer and Mische, 1996). Decisively, these “historical” agents have the ability to criticize, reinterpret, or justify and perpetuate patterns of relations as well as the frameworks of interpretation. Streek and Thelen argue that as rules are never self-evident in their meaning, they have to be reinterpreted constantly (2005). This facilitates shifts in emphasis or interpretations, while vagueness can evoke creative interpretations. New challenges can redirect actors’ preferences towards new purposes, such as when institutional environments or power relations change. Feedback effects generate adaptation processes and change within institutions in the very process of securing institutional stability. For the purpose of this paper, therefore, the identification of potential shifts in the concept of political community requires the examination of trajectories in the community’s political institutions, their interpretations and re-formulations. Change in ethnic relations within a section of social system can shake those institutions that structure society according to ethnic belonging (Thelen, 1999). In what follows, I interpret the inclusion into government of the Hungarian Coalition Party as contradicting the ethnically exclusive consensus of the political community. This, I suggest, caused the need for reformulating the criteria for political membership and the members’ consensus. 2. Institutionalizing the Nationalist Principle In the aftermath of the “Velvet Revolution”, Slovakia faced the challenge of building a new political community. As will be argued in this section, in the early 1990s a nationalist principle was established and henceforth shaped the developing institutional frame. By the end of the 1990s the dominant institu-

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______________________________________________________________ tionalized logic of Slovak privilege in a multicultural setting and semiauthoritarian rule, however, came into conflict with latent institutions of civic governance and aspirations of democratic state-hood. The opportunity window of parliamentary elections in 1998 opened to change power relations to the benefit of forces drawing from non-nationalist institutional resources. This change, I conclude, held the chance for reinterpretation of the political community under new auspices. The Slovak political elite had emphasized its perception of relative exclusion from the Czech-Slovak political community during common statehood for decades. In the early 1990s, it strived for more autonomy and sovereignty, initially within a common framework with the Czech lands, later as a separate nation-state (Ramet, 1994). Simultaneously, the democratization of the late 1980s – early 1990s had led to the creation of an array of cultural organizations by the different ethnic groups inhabiting Slovakia, including the Slovaks. The newly formulated demands and identities posed the challenge of integrating these diverse groups into one community. In the struggle for a new consensus three strands emerged that since then have shaped Slovakia’s institutional development. They consist of a nationalist, a moderate and a pluralist concept of political community. However, these are not easily assigned to political parties but rather represent tendencies in politics (Csergı, 2007). The nationalist principle has dominated political thought far beyond parties that usually count as nationalist. Simultaneously, parts of the moderate camp support liberal concepts of Slovakia as a civic nation. Pluralist concepts, almost exclusively represented by the Magyar camp, encompass a broad range of ideas, from loose demands for recognition of minorities as legitimate political actors to concepts of co-nation and equal status of majority and minority groups (ibid.). Despite initial common activity in the Public Against Violence movement that aimed at overcoming Czech-Slovak Communism, main lines of disagreement arose between representatives of the Slovak and Czech (until the split), and the Slovak and Magyar groups. While the conflicts were by no means ethnic in principle, with occurrence and spreading of the Slovak selfdetermination myth politics were ethnicized (Nedelsky, 2003). First signs of institutionalizing the ethnic principle as guiding Slovak state politics appeared in 1990 and 1992 with the adoption of the Official Language Law and the Slovak Constitution. Both documents were read by observers and politicians as aimed not only against Czech domination, but also against the other ethnic groups living in Slovakia, particularly the Magyars (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Over the 1990s this perspective was corroborated by the development of multiple nationalisms against external and internal forces. These nationalisms merged into a coherent view that stressed the privilege of “Slovakness” in the design of Slovakia’s society and its institutions (Deegan-Krause, 2004). Ex-post justification of the split of the federation and a problematic

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______________________________________________________________ historical legacy of conflict fed into this nationalism. This development simultaneously fostered the exclusion of “non-Slovaks” from political community (Harris, 2002). The process of institutionalizing the nationalist principle continued in many fields of politics over the course of the 1990s. Measures implemented to protect and develop the state language were to the disadvantage of minority languages and cultural rights of non-dominant groups, causing protests both on the ground and in parliament by members of the Magyar minority (Langman, 2002). However, some of the means aimed at securing Slovakness had an impact not only on ethnic minorities, but also on political opponents of the Mečiar government. The Protection of the Republic Law in 1996 helped the government label most forms of disagreement with its politics as anti-Slovak (Nedelsky, 2003). Under the harshening anti-opposition politics of the Mečiar government the influence of non-governmental organizations and think tanks promoting liberal ideas on the opposition parties as well as on society grew (Pridham, 2002). It was these very developments that strengthened ties between the opposition parties, and eventually enabled them to reinforce the latent institutional resources of non-nationalist discourse. Needless to say, Slovak opposition parties cannot all be labelled liberal regarding their views on ethnic majority-minority-relations. Still, they had shown inclination to improving these relations and even demonstrated that (silent) cooperation between Slovak moderates and Magyar pluralists was possible (Csergı, 2007).3 By revoking a number of minority discriminating measures of the Mečiar government, during their interim government in 1994 moderate parties supported minority cultural rights in the private sphere. Despite this, they have not worked actively towards the abrogation of the emphasis on Slovakness. Instead, they supported it – for example in the adoption of the 1995 State Language Law, although this was under strong nationalist pressure (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Political activists who are assigned to the moderate camp have in many instances confirmed majorityminority-relations through their decisions or statements (ibid.). That is to say, the broad moderate camp was dominated by the idea of Slovak privilege and favoured the design of political community as civic, though under Slovak leadership (Nedelsky, 2003). Apart from the civic principle, opposition forces were able to reinforce another resource present in Slovak political discourse. Over the 1990s, in Slovakia the desire grew to join the European Union (EU). This was shared by the Mečiar government (Csergı, 2007). However, EU accession requirements were in conflict with the nationalist and semi-authoritarian logics of the government. Consequently, the strong opposition parties seemed to be more apt to fulfil EU criteria and benefited from the rise of formerly subordinate institutions (Pridham, 2008). Moreover, the start of EU negotiations on Slovakia’s accession was conditioned on significantly improved minority

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______________________________________________________________ politics. This was the main reason for the MKP’s inclusion into government and represented an important step for Slovakia’s integration with Europe (Pridham, 2002). The incoherence of political institutions and the need to adjust to challenges from the environment facilitated the strategic opening of the institutional setting (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). The momentum of the 1998 parliamentary elections allowed activating latent institutional resources of political liberalism. During coalition talks, moderate and pluralist forces mobilized civic-liberal institutions for establishing a multicultural government. This opened the setting for debating, redefining or reinforcing the concept of political community. 3. Normative Consensus? Identity Institutions of the Slovak State The identity of a political community is put into record in its fundamental artefacts, such as a state constitution (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). It determines the relationship between citizenry and the state; furthermore it shapes subsequent institution-building and reflects the results of decision-making processes. Therefore, the consensus of the political community is the agreement of those who participate in the negotiations that lead to its (re)formulation. As suggested in the theoretical section, inclusion into the community is provided, when the citizen is accepted to participate in the decision-making following her agreement on the rules, regulations, and purposes of the community. As this paper focuses on citizens as belonging to different ethnic groups, the consensus in question is about group inclusion. A consensus most inclusive, then, would not privilege one group over the others, while a most exclusive consensus would represent the agreement within one group alone for its single benefit.4 The Slovak constitution is both the identificational foundation of the Slovak political community and already the outcome of a decision-making process which is being reinterpreted and potentially reinforced over time. It defines the relation between state and citizen. The Slovak constitution distinguishes between ethnic groups, ascribing different roles to them and accepting an exclusive understanding of political community. Simultaneously, it guarantees same rights and non-discrimination against any citizen on the basis of ethnic (or other) affiliation. Furthermore, the constitution recognizes ethnic minorities as groups with particular status and provides certain constitutional laws to secure their specific rights. These constitutional rights, all to be determined by law, in general guarantee mother-tongue education, use of minority language in dealings with authorities, and the “right to participate in the solution of affairs concerning national minorities and ethnic groups” (Ùstava, 1992). The partly contradictory and vaguely defined articles referred to here leave ample space for interpretation. While during the 1990s the nationalist interpretation prevailed, the new government has embarked on forming a new consensus on state-society relations.

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______________________________________________________________ The preamble of the constitution defines the state-founding community as the Slovak nation based on the idea of self-determination. The nation is distinguished from other national minorities and ethnic groups. While the latter are included into the citizenry that is denoted the constitution’s sovereign, they are not part of the state-bearing nation. This important difference is emphasized by Nedelsky (2003). In analyzing Slovak political elite positions on the terms of nation and nationality she elucidates the relation of the stateforming nation and the state. The state, in the Slovak interpretation, is the means of a nation to realise its “right to self-determination”. Nationalities lack this right, as in this perspective they already “own” a state elsewhere, where they can realize their sovereignty as a nation (ibid.). This interpretation of the Slovak constitution defines the citizenry as divided into two classes of citizens. While the nation as state-owner features strong relations with the state, nationalities hold weaker ties to it, missing the right to realize national ambitions through it. Distinguishing the state-founder and the citizenry, the preamble establishes a power relation between the nation and the citizenry: The former is in the position to grant rights to the latter which, however, are never secure. As students of minority rights in Slovakia have observed, the unequal distinction between nation and nationalities has shaped legislation and policies in the country up until today (e.g. Csergı, 2007). In order to evaluate the inclusiveness of the Slovak interpretation of political community the understanding of “nation” needs clarification. The constitution delineates minority group rights in the fields of language, culture, and education. Slovak dominance is secured by emphasizing the role of Slovak as state language. Moreover, the constitution is formulated in the “spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the Great Moravian Empire” (Ùstava, 1992). Constituting salient elements of the nation’s sovereignty, language and culture are key distinguishing features of the nation from other nationalities. Slovak language, seen as most important cultural asset of the nation, is closely linked to Slovak national sovereignty over the state territory (Csergı, 2007). This reasoning is reinforced in the body of the constitution which states that minority rights are not to “jeopardise the sovereignty of the Slovak state, the integrity of its territory or of other inhabitants of Slovakia” (Ùstava, 1992). Purporting to protect the Slovak nation from its potential “renegade” co-citizens, this passage implies a threat emendating from ethnic minorities. Considering the linkage between state, nation and language, in this sense speaking the state language downright became a citizen’s duty in the rhetoric of nationalist politicians. While this logic was applied in Slovak politics over the 1990s, it was not without alternatives. After it had been challenged by the pluralists and liberals or moderates already in the early and mid-1990s, the new government of 1998 re-launched a debate on the sovereign (Csergı, 2007). Two

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______________________________________________________________ versions of pluralist argument were put forward in the debate. Parts of the Magyar representatives favoured the cooperation along political rather than ethnic lines according to a liberal principle, an argument backed up by Slovak liberals. Others argued for the unification of Magyar political community and the recognition of the Magyar minority as a partner-nation (ibid.). Both arguments, however, involved the demand for inclusion into the state-founding entity. During constitutional debate 2000/2001, the MKP supported a new interpretation of the constitution, following up the liberal pluralist interpretation. The party suggested to replace the wording “we, the Slovak nation” by the more inclusive, and according to its promoters more adequate regarding Slovakia’s ethnic heterogeneity “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”. The implications of the proposal, however, go beyond mere symbolic recognition. The salience of cultural (including language) self-expression for the ethnic minorities in the country would solidify demands for a new, multicultural consensus rather than solely express acceptance of multicultural reality. Recognition of the minorities as co-founding elements of the state, and thus as its “owners”, requires significant changes in the institutional setting, which threatens the Slovak’s upper hand in the political community. It is therefore not surprising that the MKP proposal was not accepted in parliament by other than MKP and Democratic Party parliamentarians in 2001 (Dostál, 2002). To conclude, the relation between state and society is defined by strong cultural components. The constitution clearly distinguishes the stateforming cultural nation from other cultural groups, establishing a strong tie between the state and its “nation”, while rejecting this status for national minorities on basis of the self-determination argument. This nationalist concept of political community continued to prevail under moderate-pluralist regime. Despite the preparedness of the Slovak moderates to cooperate with the MKP in government, their willingness did not include the acceptance of Magyars and other minorities as equally constituting part of a Slovak civic nation. The fundamental identity consensus in Slovakia, hence, neither relies on the approval of minority fellow citizens, nor does it incorporate minority demands in order to represent an inclusive consensus that can claim legitimacy for minorities. However, inclusion into the state-founding nation and thus political community is basically possible. Depending on the respective principle shaping the consensus (ethnic nationalist or civic-nationalist), this requires a stricter or weaker form of cultural and language assimilation among the minority groups. 4. Rules of the Game: Regulatory Institutions Whereas the political community’s boundaries are defined in the identity consensus, the community is effectuated in the regulatory framework, or

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______________________________________________________________ rules of the system. Rules are conceptualized here as the publicly fixed codifications that define how power and economic resources are to be activated. They include laws and other sets of codification, as well as formal organizations of the political system and its artefacts. Rules regulate the relations between state and society, establish, maintain and modify social order. Though shaped by the normative identity frame, rules are not fixed by it. They constitute institutions in their own right, representing “imperfect” interpretations of the identity framework through social and political actors. Each rule, then, reflects a unique development of the environment’s and other institutions’ influence on actors’ preferences. Consequently, exclusion from membership at the identity level not necessarily precludes agents from participation in constituting the rules of state-society relations (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). That is to say that political integration could be established through the regulatory system, while exclusion from membership remained merely symbolic. Three aspects of minority inclusion into the regulatory framework of the political community will be analyzed in this section. Institutionalized regulations that support minority participation represent a means to facilitate their active inclusion into consensus formation. Hence, first, provisions for minority involvement into decision-making are examined. Second, formal inclusion constitutes only one necessary aspect of participation, as citizenship is cultural-linguistically defined. Therefore, provisions for including minority cultures and languages into the public framework are analyzed. Third, as regulations may vary at different levels of political organization the regulatory setting is examined with regard to specific minority provisions at the regional and municipality levels. Participation through Governmental Representation? The framework regulating the relations between national minorities and the state as well as the majority society in Slovakia is ambivalent, as no general or coherent minority legislation exists. The Slovak constitution guarantees fundamental human rights in line with international agreements. Additionally, national minorities and ethnic groups have the right for cultural group development, including association, establishing educational and cultural institutions, education in their mother tongue, use of minority languages in dealings with the authorities, and distributing and receiving information in minority languages. Furthermore, minorities have the constitutional right to “participate in the solution of affairs concerning national minorities and ethnic groups” (Ùstava, 1992). However, most of these rights are not further defined by law, leaving the situation for minorities vague and open to interpretation by the respective governments. Moreover, as no general minority law is in place that would define the relation between state and minority

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______________________________________________________________ groups more clearly, the situation of minorities in Slovakia is determined by a number of single laws, institutional and organizational structures. These form the opportunities for linguistic and cultural group development as well as for minority participation at the national, regional and local levels. Minority group advocacy in political processes at the national level primarily depends on political representation due to high regional concentration and strong group identity of the Magyars. Due to this strength, the MKP gained 15 out of 150 parliamentary seats in 1998, and could raise their share to 20 seats in 2002. As part of government, the MKP received three ministries, including one of the two positions of Deputy Prime Minister. While no measures of affirmative action have been introduced, the Dzurinda government launched several posts with clear responsibility for questions of minority rights: in 1999 the Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities and Regional Development, the government committee and cabinet’s section for Human Rights and Minorities, and in 2002 also the Ombudsman for the Protection of Human and Civil rights. Furthermore, in the ministries of education and culture operate sections for minority culture and minority education respectively. Though not provided with portfolio, these institutions were intended to fulfil advisory and coordinating functions, and they are also assigned the right to initiate legislation proposals. However, while the Deputy Prime Minister initiated several draft bills, his success was limited. The Committee for minority rights, as governmental institution, has not much space for autonomous activity; furthermore it was not very active under the Dzurinda government.5 While these institutions provide for some openness to minority demands, autonomous influence on decision-making processes is limited by the governmental dominance in them. Overall, ethnic minorities in Slovakia do not have a secured place for participating in community building. Political power sharing on basis of ethnic belonging not only contradicts the nationalist principle, but is also not in line with the liberal concept of community. Inclusion by Cultural Integration? The inclusion into decision-making is an important aspect of minority group representation. However, it is neither necessarily sufficient, nor the only means to provide for responsiveness towards minority claims. Consensus can, in principle, also be established through an institutional structure that is open to include and represent the different cultural groups’ demands. Taking into account the nationalist interpretation of political community in Slovakia, preconditions for a multicultural consensus in relation to the rules of political community primarily refer to the regulation of the very elements that secure one group’s privilege. As argued in the previous section, Slovak dominance is expressed through the privilege of Slovak language, culture and historical

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______________________________________________________________ myths. Comprehensive minority legislation in these fields would therefore enhance the potential to form a practical consensus of minority and majority groups. In Slovakia minority cultural group rights are still largely determined by the 1995 State Language Law (SLL), although parts of it were revoked by the 1999 Minority Language Law (MLL) (Daftary and Gál, 2003). The SLL is indebted to the principle of one state – one language, supporting and guaranteeing, according to its promoters, Slovak national culture, sovereignty, societal functionability and social integration.6 The Law, while introduced as a means to “establish the conditions for every citizen to be able to master the [Slovak] language”, significantly restricts the use of minority languages in Slovakia in both the public and the private spheres (Harlig, 1997). Whilst it could be seen as integrative means to improve minority members’ chances in the economic and social spheres, it is in conflict with the claims of minority groups, who regard their language as important factor to maintain cultural group identity (Langman, 2002). Before the introduction of the MLL, the law prohibited minority language use in contacts with public officials also in predominantly Hungarian-inhabited areas and extended even into the relations between doctor and patient. Being in line with the general language legislation of the 1990s the law reflects the nationalist attempt to form Slovakia as a nation-state, by ousting most expressions of Slovakia’s multicultural reality from public life and visibility (Nedelsky, 2003).7 The Slovak-only policy has been evaluated both as in-line with, and contradicting the constitution, given the provision for Slovak as the state language and for minority language rights (Harlig, 1997). While many of the measures which had constrained the socio-cultural development of minority groups for years were revoked by the Dzurinda government following the deposition of Mečiar, the SLL remained largely intact (Dostál, 2000–2007). However, the MLL filled the legal vacuum that had been established by the SLL in the field of minority language usage in official contacts (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Decisively, with the MLL limited provisions for multi-language acceptance re-entered the institutional framework. It provides for the right to use minority languages in official contacts in municipalities with significant minority population. However, the law is problematic from the perspective of effective minority legislation in several ways. First, the regulations for minority language usage do not apply to the whole country, but are limited to municipalities where a respective minority constitutes at least 20 per cent of the population. Second, the Law exhibits a number of gaps, loop holes, contradictions and vague formulations which make it hard to implement the law and are not apt to provide for greater responsiveness to minority demands (ibid.). Third, the scope of the MLL application is limited to the field of communication with public authorities. It does

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______________________________________________________________ not regulate the use of minority languages in the fields of education, culture, broadcasting etc. (Dostál, 2001).8 Overall, the MLL does not provide a coherent strategy for minority language use. Neither does it distinguish the role minorities can play in relation with the state and its founding nation. The law did not help define a consensus between majority and minorities regarding the diverse linguistic identities of the citizenry (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Also, it does not represent an attempt to include the minorities’ perspectives into the formulation of the rules of governance. As such, the MLL was criticized by the MKP, whose proposals for amending the draft bill have, however, not been taken into account (ibid.). Instead, the law confirms the position of Slovak as the sole state language. It thereby represents four arguments that have served to back up the dominance of Slovakness citizenry (Nedelsky, 2003). First, in this reasoning, Slovak dominance secures national sovereignty. Second, provisions for other national groups’ rights enhance disintegration of society by fostering these groups’ strive for national self-determination. Third, the Slovak language is seen as tool for the smooth functioning of society. Fourth, Slovak language and culture represent the civic tool for integrating the citizenry. By claiming both, Slovak language and culture as national asset of the Slovak group as well as Slovak language as “neutral” tool for integrating majority and minority groups, these rules reinforce the ambiguity of the identity consensus. Consequently, they resemble a coalition of liberal and nationalist concepts of political community, leaving no space for minority participation in society on their own terms. Despite these limitations the mere introduction of a Minority Language Law should be interpreted in line with steps revoking the repressive nationalist policies of the previous decade, allowing for more responsiveness to minority cultural claims in governmental policies. Provisory acceptance of such claims is underlined with the institutional frame for minority language education. Mother tongue education is provided to a large share of minority children in Slovakia (Langman, 2002). Furthermore, the Dzurinda government founded a University that functions predominantly in Hungarian. It offers education at three faculties, the pedagogical, theological and economic, thus representing means for increasing social competitiveness of the Magyar group in Slovakia. The establishment of a “Hungarian University” in the less economically developed region of Southern Slovakia can be seen as the major success of the MKP in government. Though some critics doubt the University’s competitiveness, and others fear the isolation of the Magyar students from the country’s Slovak-speaking academia, the MKP politicians could not see sufficient means for guaranteeing Hungarian higher education in the already existing, Slovak-dominated academic institutions (Dostál, 2003; 2005).

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______________________________________________________________ However, decision-making authority in the field of education remains with the national government, epitomised by conflicts over contents of the textbooks, historical narratives etc. taught at the Hungarian language schools (Deets and Stroschein, 2005). Nonetheless, the “Hungarian University” allows the continuous education in Hungarian language from nursery schools to the highest possible level for Slovak Magyars. Decisively, this suggests the liberalization of minority politics. Likewise, other initiatives of the government in the fields of minority culture do not cause as much unease among Slovaks today as in the 1990s. Yet, general provisions for responsiveness to minority demands as well as regarding their participation in society remain limited (Dostál, 2003) and hence appear to be ambivalent. The change in power relations in the political system was not reflected in significant amendments to the regulatory framework at the national level. Instead, existing institutions were adapted to new requirements through superficial shifts not questioning the overall community consensus. It represents a nationalist-liberal compromise that allows for some minority selfexpression in spheres where non-members of the political community do not challenge the overall privilege of Slovakness. This arrangement reflects a liberal concept of political community to the extent that most expressions of cultural belonging are limited to the private sphere. However, the liberal concept accepts minority rights only on the premise of the Slovak national principle as means of integrating the community. While no institution supporting minority representation guarantees minority group inclusion into decision-making processes, the framework provides for cultural rights on basis of high concentration of minority population. However, organizationally these rights are still linked to the national level. The regional concentration of minorities does not form a basis of any territorial or cultural decision-making authority. Quite the contrary, the territorial-administrative structure in Slovakia is established in a way to undermine the political strength that the Magyars gained from their settlement patterns (Dostál 2002). Power-sharing through Devolution? The new government initiated the reform of public administration aiming at general democratization and devolution (Bryson, 2008). It touched two major issues with regard to political community structuring at the regional and municipality levels and involved aspects of ethno-politics consequently. First, territorial-administrative reform bore the chance of redrawing the borders of territorial units and increasing the minorities’ share of the respective regional population. This could foster their role in regional politics due to numerical strength. Second, with the introduction of self-government at the regional

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______________________________________________________________ level, the competences of institutions at the national, regional and local levels had to be redefined. Students of devolution argue that regional self-governments potentially enhance democratic community building, if they are enabled to exercise policies more accessible to the regional population. This could include ethnopolitical democracy (Buček, 2002). At the local level people can engage, even if they are not part of the overall political community. The limits of the political community as represented in the institutional setting, therefore do not fully constrain political agency on side of those excluded from political community on the whole. In a sense, they can cooperate with the national political community despite being “outside” of it. Opening the limits of community then depends on possible alliances or cooperation with those members of citizenry that favour a more open community. Following the fall of Mečiar, political power relations at the national level have changed in 1998. The regulation of control mechanisms and economic resource distribution at sub-national levels, however, has not changed, nor has the majority-minority group relations within the established social order. Likewise, devolution of competencies to the regional governments in the course of the reform has not altered the majority-minority consensus over the institutions of political community locally. Although large parts of the government coalition attempted to reorganize the administration according to historical regions in order to increase cooperation between municipalities, the existing structure of regional administration is being maintained. The aspired form of organization would have provided for more decision-making autonomy of minority groups at the local levels, a scenario that made part of the coalition government vote against it, together with the opposition parties (Brusis, 2002). Likewise, the limited transfer of competences to the regional and local self-governments does not warrant decision-making authority for minority groups on questions of their particular interest. As responsibilities lie more in the managerial, implementing and control functions and in concrete organization of public services, this does not allow the shaping and designing of policies (Bryson, 2008). Admittedly, the reluctance of the national political community to give up competences in these fields to subnational communities reserves the opportunity for redistributing resources between regions and coherent organization of society as a whole. This enables the national government to balance regional differences and potentially enhance social integration at the sub-national level. From the vantage point of minority participation, however, the problem lies with the ethnic dimension of central state institutions. What does this mean for minority engagement with the regulatory institutions of the Slovak state? Despite a number of legislative changes, the Dzurinda government did not initiate significant change in the institutional setting of minority-related ‘rules’. More so, the government missed the

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______________________________________________________________ chance to introduce a coherent and unambiguous frame for changing majority-minority relations. Opening the political sphere for minority participation on the basis of group belonging would have implied a reorganization of political power and resources. However, Slovak politicians were disinclined towards initiating the redistribution of power resources. That is to say, the administrative reform aimed at undermining regional dynamics, and in this respect reinforced the ethnic cleavage in the country. Just as the territorial order had been established with the strong presence of the Magyars in mind, the reform debate was shaped by the very same cleavage. Despite the intention to democratize state-society relations by means of devolution, the implications for simultaneously democratizing state-minority relations became an obstacle to this aspect of the reform. 5. Policies and Practices of the Multicultural Community While the regulatory and identity structures of the political community define how resources are allocated, rules and self-conception of the community are determined in the interaction of political agents with these structures. In their practices these agents interpret the given framework in order to adjust their decision-making and coalition formation. For this reason, frameworks are open to interpretations that circumvent, modify or confirm the old understanding. Actions thus represent currently valid interpretations of the consensus on who is legitimate to act on community issues. In Slovakia, I suggest, though accepted as member of government, the MKP was not accepted as legitimate actor when it came to issues that regarded the position of minorities, and therefore the general political community. Based on their electoral successes and due to the Slovak moderates’ desire for a good standing in the EU accession negotiations, Magyar representatives were included into the powerful decision-making body of the Slovak government (Pridham, 2002). However, disagreement on the desired concept of community frequently led to an unfortunate overlap of political and ethnic voting and the subsequent exclusion of the MKP from decisionmaking. The MKP’s pluralist concept of political community could not mobilize political and normative institutions in its support. Putative aspects of pluralism in the community consensus turned out as expressions of a liberalnationalist idea, granting selected minority rights in the private sphere, where they would not challenge the dominant group’s privilege. Moreover, as the Dzurinda government would have had an absolute majority already without the MKP, the latter’s role in government was weakened; the MKP provided, however, for the constitutional majority (ibid.). The dealing with a number of proposals submitted by the MKP illustrates the weak position of the Hungarian government actors. These promoted the inclusion of minorities into the political community by aiming at the identity consensus, organizational structure of political community at differ-

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______________________________________________________________ ent levels, and regulations for minority inclusion in various fields. The MKP demanded acknowledgement of the whole citizenry as part of the statefounding nation, supporting a liberal rather than pluralist concept of political community. In order to compensate for the attributed role of “second-classcitizens”, the representatives of the Magyar community emphasized their view that a coherent minority law was needed to clarify the ambiguous wording of the constitution. Likewise, a Law on the Financing of Minority Culture was drafted by the MKP to make planning in this field possible and grant more security to the minority groups. In addition, the MKP supported the recognition of minority rights beyond administrative units with a certain percentage of minority population. All these demands implied the recognition of minorities as a substantial part of the citizenry of Slovakia and their limited inclusion into the political community, at least at the levels of regulation and resource distribution. Unsurprisingly, the MKP’s influence on political agenda-setting was limited. Despite liberal or moderate orientation among the Slovak government parties, only one party supported the inclusion into the state founding community (Dostál, 2002). The process of drafting and debating a Minority Law was repeatedly postponed, responsibilities shifted among institutions, before it was finally dropped (Dostál, 2002–2006). Other initiatives were overthrown by “Slovak coalitions” of government and opposition parties, which repeatedly mobilized the narrative of periled sovereignty against the MKP’s proposals. Although the government showed preparedness to fill the gaps left by the vague wording of the constitution, it did not put much effort into the question of how to actually ensure minority participation in Slovak politics. No government strategy revealed signs of a coherent concept of integrating the political community normatively or regulatory, at any level of the political system. The rejection (or disregard?) of the MKP’s proposals does not show a clear pattern. However, all rebuffed initiatives would have significantly changed the structural and institutional settings towards a pluralist conception. Lacking guarantees for participation in decision-making, the Magyars in government depended on the preparedness of Slovak forces to cooperate with them by mobilizing liberal or multicultural resources. Instead, however, both Slovak camps have continuously activated the narratives on national selfdetermination and sovereignty, and impeded tendencies of any form of minority autonomy. They were backed up by the reference to identity and regulatory framework of the political community. A pluralist conception of the nation, if established, would have contradicted this accepted system of norms and rules of Slovakia’s core-nation.

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______________________________________________________________ Change or Continuity in Slovakia’s majority-minority Relations? Political community denotes the group of people in a political unit or territory who are perceived as legitimate to make decisions on community issues. Inclusion into the political community is no necessary prerequisite of membership in a political unit or territory. Rather, the community is defined through a consensus, which represents the results of bargaining processes among its members. It includes the community’s purposes, rules, organization and procedures. The agreement on membership in the community is bound to be exclusive if it is formulated by its members, embedded in particular power relations and bearing their perceptions of potentially conflicting interests with the members of other groups. However, the degree of its inclusiveness is alterable. Eventually, the consensus of the community members is the expression of ongoing interaction of political actors with their structural environment. As such, it is open to reinterpretation, redefinitions and, potentially, to change. Simultaneously, institutions at different levels contribute to the community’s instantiation and maintenance. These institutions not only help reinforce the consensus on the whole, but also serve to strengthen each other, thus stabilising the established group relations when they face challenges at various levels. In the multiethnic setting of Slovakia, over the 1990s a system of normative and legal rules had been established that institutionalised the dominance of the largest ethnic group. In this process, the political community mobilized strong discourses on perceived group disadvantage, historical cleavages and the problems of current radical social change. With the inclusion of a minority party into government in 1998, the consensus on Slovak dominance was challenged by a change in power relations between the main concepts of political community. While this transformation was reflected in a minor shift in the regulatory framework and practices of resource distribution, power sharing did not lead to fundamental change of the political community. In this process, the different levels of political community served as inter-institutional feedbacks and adjusting factors for the community’s institutional setting to remain stable. While the MKP was re-elected into government in 2002, thus being confirmed as legitimate actor on community issues, this did not help integrate the Magyars and Slovaks into one consensus on the boundaries of the nation. The old normative consensus on political community as the agreement of the Slovak group only was stabilized through the other institutional levels. The rules structuring group relations confirm the privilege of the linguistically and culturally Slovak nation as single legitimate actor. The practices in everyday politics simultaneously reflected the old interpretation of the community consensus and in this sense corrected deviant 6.

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______________________________________________________________ developments, such as those challenging the Slovak “ownership” of the state. Likewise, when at the regulatory level the frame was opened to grant and broaden cultural rights for minorities, the political actors were able to reinforce the community consensus to the advantage of Slovak privilege. In the decision-making on appropriate rights for minorities more pluralist ideas came into conflict with the identity framework provided by the constitution and concept of citizenship that supported nationalist and liberal interpretations. Finally, while the MKP met formal requirements for participating in agenda-setting and decision-making processes, neither the identity nor the regulatory framework supply legitimacy or any means of proportionate say in politics. The ambiguous community consensus on the relations between Slovaks and Magyars provides resources for nationalist and liberal, but not pluralist conceptions of society. As argued in this paper, the implementation of the Slovak version of community consensus at various levels of the political (and social) sphere helped stabilize the accord through inter-institutional feedback effects somewhat. The inclusion of minority political actors into the political system, therefore, can be a first step for community integration. However, significant change in the institutional setting is necessary to make the inclusion lasting, and ultimately, to guarantee the establishment of a new consensus. Endnotes 1. In this article, the group of Slovak citizens who are ascribed Hungarian nationality or identify themselves with it will be referred to as Magyars in order to distinguish them from the citizens of Hungary (Hungarians). 2. References to Ondrej Dostál’s annual reports on the situation of ethnic minorities in Slovakia are listed as one single entry in the list of references for reasons of space (cf. Dostál, 2000–2003; 2005–2007). 3. Slovak and Magyar parties cooperated during the brief “moderate” interim government (March – December 1994) between Mečiar’s second and third terms in office. This cooperation could be revived over the years before the 1998 election, when Slovak and Magyar opposition parties worked together more closely on selected issues (Csergı, 2007). 4. Various schools of thought have identified pros and cons of different concepts of community for minority participation, such as ethnic or civic nationalism, liberal pluralism or illiberal nationalism. For a debate on these concepts in relation to the Slovak case cf. Csergı, 2007; Deets and Stroschein, 2005; Nedelsky, 2003. 5. The Council’s chair and vice-chair are appointed by cabinet; governmental practice allocated the chair to the Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities, and

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______________________________________________________________ the vice-chair to the Minister of Culture. Between 2002 and 2006 the Council met only once per year (Dostál, 2006). 6. These aspects are mentioned in the justification of the State Language Law: “[T]he Slovak language is the most important distinctive feature of the uniqueness of the Slovak nation, the most valuable piece of the cultural heritage and expression of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the general means of communication for its citizens, which guarantees them freedom and equality in dignity and rights in the territory of the Slovak Republic” (Translation adopted from Daftary and Gál, 2003, my emphases). 7. Further laws enacted under the Mečiar government restricted among others the use of names and prohibited geographical designations in minority languages. 8. Moreover, initiatives of the MKP to extend minority language rights to municipalities with less than 20 per cent minority population or to the national parliament have repeatedly been rejected by “Slovak coalitions”. Not only does this confirm Slovak as the only language of the political community; it also constitutes two groups of minority citizens: those residing in significantly minority-inhabited areas (who can exercise their minority language rights), and those who reside elsewhere.

References Brusis, M. (2002), “Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 15: 531–559. Bryson, P. J. (2008), “‘State administration’ vs. self-government in the Slovak and Czech Republics,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 41: 339–358. Buček, J. (2002), “Responding to Diversity: Solutions at the Local Level in Slovakia,” in: A. M. Bíró and P. Kovács (eds.), Diversity in Action: Local Public Management of Multi-Ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 273–306. Csergı, Z. (2007), Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Daftary, F. and K. Gál (2003), “The 1999 Slovak Minority Language Law: Internal or External Politics?,” in: F. Daftary and F. Grin (eds.), Nation-

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______________________________________________________________ Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries. Budapest: Open Society Institute, 33–71. Deegan-Krause, K. (2004), “Uniting the Enemy: Politics and the Convergence of Nationalisms in Slovakia,” East European Politics and Societies, 18: 651–696. Deets, S. and S. Stroschein (2005), “Dilemmas of autonomy and liberal pluralism: examples involving Hungarians in Central Europe.” Nations and Nationalism, 11: 285–305. Dostál, O. (2000-2003 and 2005-2007), “Národnostné menšiny,” in: M. Kollár and G. Mesežnikov (eds.), Slovensko 2000 (2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006). Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky. Emirbayer, M. and A. Mische (1996), “What Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology, 103: 962–1023. Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity. Harlig, J. (1997), “National Consolidation vs. European Integration: The Language Issue in Slovakia,” Security Dialogue, 28: 479–491. Harris, E. (2002), Nationalism and Democratisation: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia. Aldershot: Ashgate. Horowitz, D. L. (1993), “Democracy in Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy, 4: 18–38. Juviler, P. and S. Stroschein (1999), “Missing Boundaries of Comparison: The Political Community,” Political Science Quarterly, 114: 435–453. Langman, J. (2002), “Mother-tongue education versus bilingual education: shifting ideologies and policies in the Republic of Slovakia,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 154: 47–64. March, J. G., and J. P. Olsen (1996), “Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 9: 247–264.

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______________________________________________________________ Nedelsky, N. (2003), “Constitutional nationalism’s implications for minority rights and democratization: the case of Slovakia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26: 102–128. Offe, C. (2004), “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences, 71: 501–528. Pridham, G. (2008), “Status Quo Bias or Institutionalisation for Reversibility? The EU’s Political Conditionality, Post-Accession Tendencies and Democratic Consolidation in Slovakia,” Europe-Asia Studies, 60: 423– 454. —(2002). “The European Union’s Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: The Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared,” Europe-Asia Studies, 54: 203–227. Ramet, S. P. (1994), “The Reemergence of Slovakia,” Nationalities Papers, 22: 99–117. Streek, W. and K. Thelen (2005), “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,” in: W. Streek and K. Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–39. Thelen, K. (1999), “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 369–404. Thelen, K. and S. Steinmo (1992), “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics,” in: S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–32. Ùstava Slovenskej Republiky [Constitution of the Slovak Republic] (1992), http://www-8.vlada.gov.sk/index.php?ID=1013, accessed 20 March 2009.

Cooptation as Integration? National Programme “Integration of Society in Latvia” on Minority Participation

Timofey Agarin Increasing accountability of political institutions to the people these structures serve is essential for democratising regimes. However, how can institutions designed to attend to the interests of the dominant ethnic community account to the expectations of non-dominant groups? In my paper I investigate the National Programme “Integration of Society in Latvia” to assess whether its declared goals – increase political participation and achieve social integration – were aimed at accommodating differences between state-bearing Latvians and minority Russian speakers. In relying on Erin Jenne’s “Theory of Ethnic Bargaining”, I argue that social integration in Latvia stood little chance to achieve its declared goals. Introduction The accountability of political entrepreneurs to all people affected by their decisions is essential for democratising regimes. Over the past decades, multicultural political communities in particular have witnessed difficulties to stand up to the demands of minority groups affected by the majoritarian decision-making. While the multiculturalism debate underlines the formal equality of all affected to participate in political decision-making, tacit acknowledgement that all nation-states formally belong to their majority populations constrains genuine equality of majority and minority groups engaging in political processes. Unequal distribution of decision-making powers between the dominant and non-dominant groups seems to be embedded in the very understanding of democratic political process, and is at the core of the liberal democratic project. The difference between the aspiration to accommodate and the difficulty to address the expectations of non-dominant groups can be seen largely as a result of differential access to political, economic, cultural and social resources of the given society. However, the political institutions designed to serve the interests of a state-bearing group constrain political participation and social integration of non-dominant groups into one single community, regulated by state institutions. Upon the demise of the Soviet Union (USSR) as many as 15 states faced the task of regulating the relations between their societies and political institutions. In most cases, ethnic communities whose name these new states

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______________________________________________________________ bore were defined as proprietors of the polity and empowered to design political institutions and procedures in a way that catered best for their needs. While in some regions of the former USSR affirmative action had resulted in violent conflict, Baltic states were spared of ethnic strife between the increasingly marginalised non-dominant groups and growingly powerful titular populations. Unlike in the neighbouring Lithuania, Latvian political leadership decided not to grant automatic citizenship of the post-Soviet state to its residents, who arrived in the republic during the Soviet occupation and had no connection to pre-Soviet Latvian state. Instead, Latvian authorities, somewhat similarly to those in Estonia, distributed the so-called “passports of non-citizens” to around 40% of the country’s resident population, who could not testify of ancestral connection to pre-Soviet polity. Predictably, following the passing of naturalisation legislation in 1995, the numbers of non-citizens have been on steady, although far from rapid decline. Although the Latvian authorities emphasise the continuous decline in the number of non-citizens, the research on Latvia’s policies underlines multiple means employed to discourage resident non-Latvian non-citizen populations from political participation (Galbreath, 2005). Additionally, the state authorities were pressured by international organizations and the local advocacy groups to acknowledge Latvia’s mainly Russian speaking resident population as a legitimate part of political community. Somewhat similarly to Estonia, Priit Järve argues, Latvian authorities had gone through the full cycle of effectively denying responsibility for its resident non-citizens (1990– 1998), to accepting these as minorities in the Latvian state (1998–2001 ), and later to providing them with the means to integrate into the Latvian dominated society (after 2001) (Järve, 2002; Jurado, 2003). However, no significant changes were undertaken to allow automatic citizenship for Soviet-time migrants in Latvia. Instead, the relations between on the one hand state institutions and political community dominated by ethnic Latvians, and the Russian speaking resident non-citizens of the country on the other were addressed in the National Programme “The Integration of Society in Latvia.” In fact, it was only in 2001 that Latvian authorities encouraged broader participation of non-titular residents in the dialogue on political and social issues. As I will argue in this paper, the essence of this policy document demonstrated to non-titular residents of Latvian state what is expected from them by the state, as well as by the majority population in order to become accepted partners in the social and political dialogue. Essentially, this paper asks whether the expectations of the minority community have been addressed by the Latvian political leadership. Throughout the paper, I refer to political leadership from both groups as “political entrepreneurs.” As I discuss, it appears that in the debate on society integration, political actors capitalised on agenda for change, and sought to secure the benefits for their own group at the expense of improving the inter-

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______________________________________________________________ group relations. In order to do this, I take Erin Jenne’s theory of ethnic bargaining (hereafter TEB) as the starting point for my analyses and conclude that institutional accommodation alone is likely to fail solutions for minority integration. As I will argue, while the National Programme (hereafter NP) signposted the expected ways of cooperation between the minority and majority in Latvia, it did not make up for the limited resources available to nontitulars to participate in any decision-making. While demonstrating to the members of minority community an expectation of their contribution to statebuilding, the NP “The Integration of Society in Latvia” failed to address problems relevant for minority participation. My analyses point out that minority integration can succeed if adjustments are made in political frameworks, but they are unlikely to be lasting or effective if the dynamics of the intergroup relations are neglected. 1.

Standing up to Minority Claims: Learning from the “Triadic Nexus” Political change in the post-communist Central Eastern Europe (further, CEE) is in the focus of many scholarly analyses over the past decade. However, the contribution of Rogers Brubaker drew particular interest in the field. In his analyses of the CEE states and their relations with minority communities, Brubaker famously coined the triadic nexus model, inspiring a range of investigations. In his “Nationalism reframed”, Brubaker observes in particular, the tensions between the states, national minorities and the minorities’ external homeland define the potential for ethnopolitical conflict during the period of transition (Brubaker, 1996). Brubaker claims that the relations between the minorities and the states depend not only on internal actors, but are closely interwoven with the external forces, such as home-land states and international organizations. This approach draws attention to the importance of subjective perceptions of the situation in which policies are pursued and has enormous epistemic implications. Brubaker indicates that the dual linkages in the triadic nexus exemplify “(1) the close interdependence of relations within and between field; (2) the responsive and interactive character of the triadic relational interplay between the fields; and (3) the mediated character of this responsive interplay” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 69). However, the complexity of links between different actors opens the stage for unexpected impacts of various forces. Still, at the same time, the model establishes that intents behind actions are unpredictable, even under the assumption of the rational preference formation. More recent conceptual developments of Brubaker’s model try to improve the predicting capacity of the “triadic nexus” model and provide suggestions on the identity of actors involved in the process. Unsurprisingly, political scientists place an emphasis on institutional change and focus on

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______________________________________________________________ relations between the states and international organizations in an effort to determine the outcomes of policy-making (Kelley, 2004b; Smith, 2002; Tesser, 2003). David Smith, for example, argued that, from the perspective of analysing Baltic and other CEE states, Brubaker underestimates the importance of one actor regulating a huge chunk of nation-state policies towards its minorities, namely, the international organizations (Smith, 2002). Comparing the “quadruple nexus” in Estonian and Latvian (alongside Slovak and Romanian) cases, Judith Kelley comes to the similar conclusion. She argues that international conditionality prompts states to reduce nationalising logic in favour of greater accommodation of local minority communities (Kelley, 2004a). Interestingly, Kelley concludes that the normative pressure as exercised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities (further, OSCE HCNM) was far less effective than causal conditions set out prior to accession of CEE states to international organizations (see also, Galbreath, 2005). Kelley argues that the OSCE in general, and the HCNM in particular, prompted institutional change in Latvia and thus facilitated this country’s integration into European security architecture. Among other things, international organizations provided nation-states (however, nationalising) decisive leverage against the claims of external states, which claimed special relations with national minorities, as was the case with the Russian Federation’s stand towards Latvia (Budryte, 2005). These approaches underline the importance of the inter-state relations for social accord within these states, and draw a link between the international, nation-state and intra-state proliferation. Expanding Brubaker’s model in his “Nation-Building and Minority Rights,” David Galbreath argues that international organizations such as the OSCE, COE and EU played a pivotal role in helping Estonia and Latvia to jointly formulate minority legislation (Galbreath, 2005). Galbreath not only pays attention to the international conditionality of local policies, but also pays attention to the rationale behind the national decision-making in the process of Baltic EU accession. He argues that because Baltic politicians viewed European membership as the ultimate security guarantee, they were prepared to adopt suggested practices in exchange for various strategic benefits. In doing so, Galbreath considers conditionality to be effective not because it improved the position of Estonia and Latvia to face Russian Federation’s claims, but because it changed political institutions of states and thus also modified the path development of state-policies making them less nationalising (Galbreath, 2005 and 2006a). These discussions, however, only marginally address the perspective of local political actors in shaping the relation between the states and its minority populations. However, the accommodation of demands by the international organizations would be unlikely if membership therein was not considered a national priority. Indeed, these approaches would need to favour the

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______________________________________________________________ interpretation of Baltic political elites and Baltic institutional design as single actors within the institutional learning process. In reality, however, the discrepancy between the critical responses of Latvia’s political elites to criticisms from OSCE HCNM and the institutional changes shambolically implemented indicate that the two should not be collated. By the same token, the friction between ethnic communities would not have been reduced were there no willingness to shelve tense relations between the groups, whatever the reason. There remains no doubt that the institutional arrangements supporting minority participation in political processes were largely a result of international conditionality. However, institutional change has only marginally impacted preferences of political actors who sought to keep state institutions accountable mainly, even if not any more exclusively to majority groups of their state. Today political actors in Latvia continue to reiterate long-term international security benefits when considering additional support to minorities in domestic debates. This clearly indicates that international conditionality did not change attitudes and views, while changing political institutions (Jubulis, 2001; Zepa and Supule, 2006). The emphasis on international conditionality and policy-learning, however, misses one crucial part in the puzzle of politics. Nationalising policies are implemented to improve performance of the members of one group versus the members of other groups, in the situation when available resources are scarce. If political institutions are designed to serve one (ethnic) group only, the exclusion of potential competitors is most effective and would require the non-dominant group to demand equality first, before claiming any further rights. While the members of a minority group can extend very different claims, what is particularly telling about them is that they can be completely ignored by the political majority, i.e. those who profit from the status quo. Even if minority claims cause great commotion within the political community and can even call for external political leverage, there is little reason for majority politicians to change the terms of access to resources. Minority demands are therefore more important from the perspective of what they represent than what they really aim at achieving, as Brubaker rightly suggests. In her book, Erin Jenne undertakes to advance our understanding of contributing role of intent in the process of formulating minority claims and their accommodation by the majority. The framework of ethnic bargaining, following Jenne, explains claims of non-dominant group on a spectrum from radicalisation to moderation, as an element of regular politicking in multiethnic societies. Jenne addresses the factors that determine minority groups’ decisions to opt for various bargaining strategies, from affirmative action to secession/irredentism, discussing the position of minority elites, parties, and party leaders representing rank and file minority populations and enjoying their great support (Jenne, 2007, pp. 40–41). Given that claims of political

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______________________________________________________________ leaders are constantly reformulated and reapplied in the situation, which is itself determined by structural factors such as the support of external actors and response of opponents, these demands need not be taken at face value. Jenne’s framework, which addresses the triangular relation between the majority, the minority and external actor, bears some resemblance to Brubaker’s nexus model. By placing greater emphasis on the importance of activities of the minority in the process of formulating demands, as well as with its focus on the efforts of majority politicians to respond to minority claims, the TEB provides an intent-related rational choice explanation of the ethnic conflicts (Jenne, 2007, p. 49). In contrast to Brubaker’s nexus, Jenne’s ethnic bargaining allows assessment of the reasons for minority mobilisation in the first instance. These “[o]n the most basic level, beliefs about minority leverage are a function of structural characteristics, including group size and territorial compactness” (Jenne, 2007, p. 41). However, Jenne indicates that structural traits are unlikely to predict when and even whether minorities will mobilise, leading to consideration of ethnocentric rhetoric and its mobilising impact on minority behaviour. Jenne frames ethnic mobilisation within the context of external support, treating it not as a goal in itself, but as an instrumental action, serving geopolitical interests or pragmatism (Jenne, 2007, p. 43). The model suggests that the external players would only have two options to react in the situation, to either be supportive, or not supportive, of minorities’ claims. Similarly to the external players, majorities also do not have the right for the first draw in the bargaining process with minorities, as these are usually not concerned with minorities in the first instance. The majority actors involved in bargaining process with minorities usually “make decisions based on a variety of goals and inputs – which may or may not involve minority. […] Rarely do these powerful players consider the likely minority response to their actions when making their choice” (Jenne, 2007, p. 42). What results from this conceptualisation of conflict is that the decision to commence the new round of bargaining lies fully with the minority, based on the expected response from the two other players, the majorities and the external supporter (Jenne, 2007, p. 43). Going on from here, Jenne suggests that, by estimating the response of the majority, as well as that of external actors, political entrepreneurs of the minority reach a conclusion about the “state of the world” in which the minority group finds itself. In the face of a repressive majority, minority leaders moderate their demands in order to avoid repression, or, under a nonrepressive majority, prefer interethnic cooperation. This leads Jenne to conclude that “external actors have a greater impact on minority behaviour than host governments” (Jenne, 2007, pp. 46–47). The framework of ethnic bargaining also assumes that it depends on the elites whether the interethnic

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______________________________________________________________ relations would normalise as a result of a firm commitment to, and policy steps in favour of the de-ethnicization of conflict. This model indicates on the one hand that the majority ethnic-group is either not concerned with the minority demands in the first place, or does not take these as an invitation to start bargaining. Therefore, it is always the minority who is initiating the process of bargaining and hence the minority chooses respective strategies in the face of expected costs/pay-offs from the majority and/or external actor. On the other hand, however, the model shows that the claims of the minority group have to stay relatively stable, in order for it to remain focused on the implementation of its goals. Importantly, there is always a chance for betterment. “Because [the minority group] is continually updating its beliefs concerning the state of the world, the group can be expected to mobilize sporadically so that a society once driven by ethnic violence becomes a model of ethnic cohabitation, and vice versa” (Jenne, 2007, p. 45). All the more important is the fact that majority can misrepresent their genuine interests and mislead the minority in its estimation of the opportunity structure. Nonetheless, minority groups are the ones who constantly weigh the costs of accommodation against the perspective of ethnic separation from the majority, opting for the least costly outcome possible. This is an important qualification of the TEB. It indicates that, while a non-dominant group might appear radical and call for re-distribution of political resources, its political entrepreneurs do not expect a full response from the dominant majority. The ethnic bargaining theory employs various policyrelated documents to assess the perceptions of majority/minority relations, suggesting that public statements are frequently the least credible expressions of intent, “they may be little more than empty rhetoric or bluffing devices” (Jenne, 2007, p. 49). At the same time, policies and actions – while also being non-binding instruments – are more reliable signs of commitment by a state, or of organization to a future set of actions. No doubt the elites of the dominant group influence the intensity of minority claims, with the consequence that “minority radicalization is driven by signals of behavioural intent from the host government and/or lobby actor” (Jenne, 2007, p. 53). However, from a policy standpoint, “this means that minority protections on the domestic level may be insufficient for resolving an internal conflict if external sources of minority leverage are not first neutralized” (Jenne, 2007, p. 47). Clearly, this indicates that, while the increase in minority claims is regularly seen as a result of the centre’s inability to commit to minority protection, the TEB suggests that, despite the best will of majority, minorities will radicalise if they perceive outside support to be in place. Rhetoric support from another state, financial backing for implementation of particular policies by the international organisations, or both significantly facilitate minorities’ radicalisation.

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______________________________________________________________ Although the TEB is useful, it does have its limitations in its ability to critically analyse the multi-layered meanings of policy-documents aimed at society integration. On the one hand, the TEB does not allow one to address the content of the policies separately from their declared intent. On the other hand, even the perfunctory efforts by political actors involved in bargaining negotiations produce effects that TEB needs to take as a serious attempt to improve the intergroup relations. However, the TEB allows an assessment of the process of bi-communal negotiations in Latvia as is reflected in the NP “Integration of Society in Latvia.” In the following I discuss how accommodation of various interests featured in the Latvian debate on social integration in order to revisit the expected outcomes of the integration process. The TEB indicates how the groups involved in the process of bargaining were accommodating to each other’s claims and would allow me to envisage the role of intent in the process of bargaining. Crucially, applying TEB to the Latvian case study suggests a wholly different interpretation of perceived group-status by Latvian and Russian speaking communities, providing for additional insights to understand the resource distributive logic of Latvia’s nationalising policies. 2. What Does TEB tell us about the Framing of Minority? Far from suggesting that Latvian politics are still following the nationalising logic which dominated politics in the early years of re-established Independence – as would result from applying Brubaker’s model strictu sensu –, my contention here is that Latvia’s policies have become less and less nationalising since the late 1990s. Needless to say, limited political rights, marginalisation on the political stage, as well as the social exclusion of Latvia’s Soviet migrant communities have initially limited the minorities’ opportunities to be engaged in policy-making. It is generally accepted that local political elites and the public perceive non-titular, Soviet-time migrants as lacking sufficient loyalty to Latvian state. Many argue that this perception has pressured local leadership to fortify the status of the Latvian language and choose a “defensive approach” to ensure the cultural dominance of the majority community (see Galbreath, 2005; Jubulis, 2001). Some analyses even suggest that certain rights were provided to non-titulars in the course of the late-1990s as a result of the “conditioned” accommodation of minority rights by the international actors (Muižnieks and Brands-Kehris, 2003), while others indicate that the “conditioned” response undermined the non-titular acceptance of decisions made by political entrepreneurs (Dorodnova, 2002). Overall, the deficiency of design in political community was brought up in numerous communications between the international organizations monitoring the situation on the ground, NGOs, the Latvian officials, and has been the focus of the local academic studies (see e.g. Rozenvalds, 2005).

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______________________________________________________________ This does not mean to say that the non-titulars viewed the state as something alien to them. Quite the opposite, the members of minority communities were actively claiming various rights from state institutions, from citizenship to use of their native tongue when communicating with state officials. Exemplarily, the electoral success of the party representing mainly the interests of Latvia’s non-titular populations, For Human Rights in United Latvia, in the late-90s – early 2000s had put titular population on alert with regard to the claims of the resident Russian speakers. Also, the galvanization of the non-titular community, as a result of the reform of minority language schools and introduction of bilingual education in 2004 made Latvian majority increasingly sensitive to ethnopolitical claims emerging from the local Russian speaking community (Galbreath, 2006a). Over time, the recurrent claims by non-titular ethnic groups led Latvians to perceive local non-titulars as demanding and, hence, lacking in loyalty to the state of residence. However, the TEB does not distinguish between the real and imagined consequences of bargaining action and, hence takes social constructivist stand seriously: if these parties consider the results of an action to be real, in the given circumstances they are (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The overall perception of the titular community that it is under increasing pressure from the non-titular residents, as well as from the international organizations, could lead policy-makers to grant additional concessions to the members of the Russian-speaking community. Latvian political entrepreneurs were making all efforts to profit from the opportunity structure of the moment, taking advantage of the unanimous support of their constituency for re-negotiating the ethnic relations with Latvia’s minority ethnic community. Particularly, the perceived moral support of international organizations such as EU, COE and OSCE - all seen as protectors of Latvia against Russia’s verbal attacks – among the titular political elites indicates that they were acting from an insecure position in the bargaining process. The TEB assumes that political entrepreneurs reflect the interests of their constituency. Therefore, support granted by Latvia’s majority to political leadership could also be taken as an indication of specific self-perception within the Latvian community. Thus Latvia’s titular majority was renegotiating the status quo using the opportunity window created by the link between internal policy-decisions and international support. The same goes for the development of the national integration programme. The drafting processes began before the EU accession talks started with Latvia and the programme was accepted for implementation before Latvia joined the EU. In 2008, however, it was shelved when the EU was still providing rhetoric and financial help in support of integration on majorities’ terms, but was unable to exhort any pressure as to the continuation of the NP. Does this mean that Latvia’s efforts to proceed with the integration programme were resulting merely from the European conditionality pressures?

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______________________________________________________________ Most of scholars agree that it is extremely difficult to decouple social integration policies from international support for political elites’ own agenda in the countries, aspiring the EU membership. However, the TEB predicts that the dominant group is not interested in minority’s grievances, neither does it require external support to initiate changes in its relations with nondominant community. Were there any reasons besides EU conditionality for majority political entrepreneurs to launch NP “The Integration of Society in Latvia”? Although this is an interesting connection to explore, my paper follows a much narrower approach of the TEB and explores national level decision-making on the issue of society integration. Firstly, I look at the declared intentions of the policy-makers to address the opportunity structure available for actors to engage with the programme for society integration. Secondly, I investigate the set of goals outlined in the programme, addressing the content of integration as was institutionalised in the programme. I conclude by discussing the initial goals envisaged and why these could not be upheld after the programme’s lifetime expired, leading to its termination in 2008. Declared Intent of Integration The Latvian government initiated the programme’s development during the period of accession talks with the EU, adapting the “Integration of Society in Latvia: Framework Document” in April 1998 (further, FD).1 At this time, Latvia was continuously criticised by international organisations for failing to address the problem of statelessness by officials of various European states. Their criticisms revolved around the lack of provisions for minority protection, and most prominently, the Russian Federation criticised the abuse of human rights of its own “compatriots”. It is in this climate that decision was made to devise a consolidated policy to address society integration, something that primarily (if not exclusively) was understood as the reduction of statelessness, or on other occasions as guaranteeing the fluency in Latvian of all Russian speakers.2 Public debates were initiated on the content and scope of the programme in March 1999 to inform the public of the programme’s goals and to collect feedback on the implementation strategies. Unsurprisingly, it attracted great interest from the public, but the government effectively considered feedback from the civic initiatives only on the issues which were outlined in the initial document. Albeit the FD was backed up by public opinions expressed, only the propositions made to draw the Latvian language and culture into the foreground of policy were granted detailed attention. The issues of regional and sectoral differences in the Latvian society, as well as approaches to the role of language and education in the process were specifically considered. Additionally, the chapter on reintegration of economically disadvantaged groups, such as residents of rural

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______________________________________________________________ areas, homeless and unemployed, was incorporated into the NP, making additional reference to the hazards of social marginalisation. Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, the Naturalization Board, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, and the National Programme for Latvian Language Training all participated in identifying different causes of societal concern.3 Further progress in developing efficient steps towards the integration of Latvia’s society was made with the meeting of Cabinet of Ministers on December 7, 1999, with an approval of a short version of the programme at the meeting of the secretaries of state just a month later, on January 13, 2000. Devised in 1999, the FD reiterated the principles which emphasised the means of preserving the national language, and therefore appealed very strongly to the titular group. Emphasis was placed on a certain view of history and the preservation of the state language. The FD therefore made it clear that “The current predicament of the Latvian language reflects the complicated political, economic, ethno-demographic and psychological processes, which have taken place during the course of history in Latvia” (FD, p. 34). It appears that social integration was perceived as a tool for excluding possibilities of an alternative development, rather than a means to investigate intrinsic reasons for addressing the issue. As is clear, the FD was devised by the members of the titular group and passed in the government dominated by the ethnic Latvians. At the same time, the concept of integration was understood by members of non-Latvian communities as based upon the values of the (ethnic) Latvian nation and enforcing the integrity of Latvians’ cultural domain in public. How did the programme formulate the cultural claims of the titular Latvians? Were they embedded in the broader social context? The elaboration on the basis of the FD took place in two steps, which (as we will go on to see) might suggest that reactions from public discussion were originally meant to be considered by the policy-makers. At the first stage, the framework document of the programme underwent revision, incorporating the feedback from social debates and discussions. While the public discussion on the draft was initiated to “introduce the social integration document to the society, to foster an exchange of views about the main ideas of social integration, to listen to opinions, to provide a possibility for everybody to express themselves who wished to participate in the discussion” (FD, p. 57), the result was far more ambivalent as it related to the programme’s core questions. In the second stage, the NP was officially drafted from June 1- August 1, 1999, significantly amending the original draft, doubling its length. Substantial revisions of parts were made, supplementing the second document with two new chapters “Civic Participation and Political Integration” and “Social and Regional Integration of Society.” The programme distinguished four thematic fields relevant for ethnic policies and social integration of society, while declaring that:

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______________________________________________________________ “The integration of society in Latvia is oriented to mutual understanding and co-operation among individuals and different groups in the framework of Latvia’s legal system; it is based on the Latvian language as the state language and on loyalty to the state of Latvia.” (NP, p. 4) Essentially, the four areas where integration has to be implemented and monitored include: civic participation and political integration (including NGOs and cooperation with Latvian compatriots abroad); social and regional integration (including support for the unemployed and for non-Latvians with poor Latvian-language knowledge); education, language and culture (including preparation of the bilingual education programmes for minorities, courses for teachers of the Latvian language and bilingual education); and information policies, which also includes accessibility of information in the minority languages. Needless to say, these areas, while not explicitly defining the cultural and linguistic preservation of the Latvian nation and its accommodation with the cultures of minorities resident in the country, place significant emphasis on the cultural aspects of the integration of Latvia’s society. While the first chapter of the programme addresses the issues of individual integration strategies for members of communities, its second chapter puts greater emphasis on collective integration by initiating a debate on specific approaches to the issue of regional integration (NP, p. 47–48 ). It also addresses the measures necessary for creating a society of individuals with equal opportunities. However, it presumes that the leading role will be assumed by the titular people, the Latvians, emphasising the importance of social cohesion on the basis of the state language. The issues of poverty and differences in income, unemployment and the impact of limited education as a factor undermining social integration are also addressed, along with the shortcomings of the social security system (NP, pp.41–42). The third chapter of the programme, “Education, Language, and Culture” underlines the importance of a long-term stability of the interethnic relations in the country, with a clear commitment to the education system as a central pillar that ensures the stability of a multicultural society (NP, pp. 56– 59). The chapter begins with cultural development, stating that “Understanding of all groups of society about cultural values of the Latvian nation as well as the cultures of minority groups is an important part of the integration process of society. In order to promote the development of Latvian culture and minority cultures, a unified cultural environment must be created and the cultural dialogue ought to be expanded during the process of integration” (NP, p. 56).

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______________________________________________________________ Clearly, the Latvian language is to play an essential role and hence is conceived as an effective tool for the integration of non-Latvians and Latvians of all generations. “In implementation of the integration process of society, children and young people make up the most important target group. The educational system must ensure the learning and inheritance of human and specifically Latvian values, and the opportunities to preserve inter-cultural education and the cultural identity of minorities” (NP, p. 56). The ambitious and, hence, more controversial approach of the programme to integration aims to safeguard public space, where it is prescribed that communication should take place in the common language. The FD stresses that “prejudices and mutual distrust persist in Latvian society,” a fact that is mentioned in the context of the lack of appropriate language training for non-Latvians, with “many objective and subjective factors hinder[ing] learning of Latvian language” (FD, p. 36). But the phrasing of the programme document states more firmly that the “Legislation on language should help to establish a balance and to stabilise the relationship between the state and minority languages” (NP, p. 69). All this indicates that the FD had outlined the policy steps to be developed and elaborated upon in the NP with an aim of continuously stressing the role of the titular culture in the independent state of Latvia. In the NP the cultural and linguistic dominance of ethnic Latvians in the public space was reinforced even further by failing to question the “one-culture, one-nation, one-state” approach already embedded in the legal documents of the Latvian state. The NP additionally sought to fortify the privileged position of ethnic Latvians in “their” state in the advantageous situation, when international support for policy-steps was perceived as available. While pointing out the importance of cultural and linguistic issues for Latvia’s policy-makers during the period of writing the NP, this section has shown that the dominant group was using the external institutional backing to create further privileges in accessing state institutions for those who are proficient in the language and values of the Latvian majority. Institutionalised Content of Integration The previous discussion of the aspects of NP “Integration of Society in Latvia” indicates that titular political entrepreneurs in Latvia outlined the measures to address the potential threat from the non-titular community, which was perceived in terms of lacking linguistic accommodation. Although meas-

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______________________________________________________________ ures were undertaken to facilitate intercommunal dialogue and interethnic communication, there is a lack of clarity with respect to the role ascribed to the Latvian majority in the process. In fact, NP remains largely undecided on how the dominant community in Latvia should relate to and engage with the non-dominant groups. While various aspects of the programme reiterate statements already framed in the constitution and other documents of the independent Latvian State, it appears to mainly address the non-titular actors, prescribing, more than advising them to integrate. The NP states that “[t]he integration of society will not succeed if it is directed only from ‘the top down’ without active civic participation from the grass roots level” (NP, p.13). At the same time, the key points of the programme reflect a strong patronising logic, particularly when it comes to reflections on the relation between the state and society, and the role of the individual in deliberating and taking part in political decision making. Chapter One, “Civic Participation and Political Integration” introduces the discussion of the role individuals play in the political decision-making process, consistently presenting conformity with the interests of majority as a penultimate goal: “Active civic participation in social and political life fosters the irreversibility of integration and conformity with the interests of the majority” (NP, p. 13). The role of individuals in the political decision-making process was initially introduced in the context of the long-term experience of the Latvian state as a home to many minorities, and non-titulars are now welcome to contribute to the discussion on future strategies for cooperation in society (FD, pp. 14–15). Interestingly enough, the FD indicated that “the integration of society in education is inconceivable as a one-sided process [… ]. Integration of society in education is a process with two aspects, the Latvian and the non-Latvian, and both sides should be prepared to engage in intercultural dialogue and show the other side understanding, tolerance and cooperation” (FD, pp. 29). However, this statement was dropped from the final text of NP which focused instead on the benefits of rapprochement between the Latvian state and its residents. Two of the three subchapters, “Civic Participation” and “Participation in the Non-governmental Organizations” repeat the strong emphasis on developing a unified society in Latvia, where individuals of different ethnic backgrounds mutually accept their differences, as well as the right of the Latvian people to political self-determination. A general undertone of the document, however, indicates that the fragmentation of society into segregated ethnic communities is counterproductive for social and political developments, and has to be dealt with by means of increasing the trust of all inhabitants in the Latvian state (FD, p. 14). This is clearly indicative of the state’s intention to extend support for all those members of non-titular communities to integrate into the Latvian society, supporting “a positive orientation toward naturalization and the integration of society” (FD, p. 15).

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______________________________________________________________ A particular role in this process was ascribed to the development of the networks of civil society through the active political participation of Latvia’s residents. “Active civic participation in social and political life fosters the irreversibility of integration and conformity with the interests of the majority; […]” (NP, p. 13). The role of civil society organizations in this process is highly ambivalent as portrayed in the programme, as these are expected to expand their activities to create a more peaceful society. At the same time, civil society activity is supposed to support the national and cultural identities of national minorities, a fact that probably would not diminish the tensions between the official position on the core ethnic ideals of the state and the views of minority groups (NP, pp. 34–35). Nonetheless, major areas of concern relating to civic participation are outlined in order to address and “overcome alienation of people from governmental and local authorities by maintaining a dialogue between the individual, the society and the state” (NP, p. 14). The role of the NGOs is also outlined and made responsible for “individual participation in the life of society.” Repatriation, migration and cooperation with Latvians abroad are outlined as important; the goal being the establishment of “a unified system which would ease the return to his/her homeland for any Latvian or citizen of Latvia who wishes to do so and would assist in his/her integration in the society of Latvia” (NP, p. 14). In this sense, this section particularly underlines the centrality of Latvianness for the narrative of statehood, as well as for the bottom-line of the social integration process. In a similar vein, the reference to the Soviet past of the country is made in the Introduction, emphasising the dramatic situation of the Latvian language and the challenge to Latvians’ survival represented by non-titular residents: “Latvia has inherited more than half a million Soviet era immigrants and their descendants, many of whom have not yet become integrated into the Latvian cultural and linguistic environment, and thus do not feel connected to the Latvian state” (NP, p. 7). In the normative wording, which suggests that the Soviet-migrants and foreign observes are not acquainted with the history of Latvia, it states that “the Latvian people did not voluntarily choose the Soviet regime and life in totalitarian system; this must be understood” (NP, p. 10). The reference to the Soviet past within the NP suggests that the integration would need to take place not only on the basis of common linguistic environment, but also requires consent with the “special relations” between the state and the ethnic Latvians prior, as well as following Latvia’s regained independence. In the sense of the TEB, this aspect of the NP needs to be interpreted as a signal of preparedness to engage in the bi-communal dialogue in order to secure the status quo of the interethnic relations achieved at that given point. However, while the NP makes a considerable concession to non-dominant groups by inviting them to participate in decision-making, it gravely overes-

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______________________________________________________________ timates the readiness of members of both titular and non-titular communities to engage in collaboration. The policy decision makes sense not only in the light of the TEB, but also from the rational choice perspective of the policymakers, who need to secure their privileged access to resources available before negotiating additional issues. While the reasons to redress the importance of Latvianness as central for political community could include proficiency in the Latvian language as a precondition to accessing citizenship, the implementation of the minority school reform scheduled for 2002 required additional affirmative steps to precipitate non-dominant groups’ negative reactions. However, the TEB suggests that the policy-documents preserving the ethnic and cultural specificity of one group, while not addressing the expectations of the other groups, can only be expected to come only from the minority group. TEB states that the propositions for policy-amendments made by the entrepreneurs of the minority community hold a significant bias in favour of their ethnic group, but it is up to the majority to start negotiations and reconsider the power distribution arrangements. But, how to deal with the fact that Latvian NP was drafted by political entrepreneurs of the dominant ethnic community, and largely without engagement of the non-Latvian populations? Let us now look, how this agenda was envisaged in the NP. Envisaged Outcomes of Integration The TEB does not distinguish between the real and perceived effects of group strategies, when addressing policy decisions and steps undertaken by the political entrepreneurs. While the non-dominant group constantly produces the signs of intent for consumption of external actors and the dominant majority, the TEP does not discriminate between the “real” and “faked” signs. In doing so, it allows the assessment of the opportunities for change in the relations between the groups involved in bargaining. As I had indicated in the preceding section, the Latvian NP invited the members of the non-dominant ethnic groups to engage in the policy-making by contributing to civic activities, through engagement in the NGOs and the like. Now I would like to attend to more obvious signs included in the programme that suggest the desirability of change to the contemporary resource allocation by calling for greater cooperation of non-dominant groups with the Latvian state. The introduction to the programme states that there is considerable alienation between the members of society and the state tracing back to the Soviet period of Latvian statehood. In addition, the alienation between ethnic communities of Latvia can be surmounted when different parts of society undertake common action, for example in the civil society organizations. The programme calls for the formation of a democratic civil society in Latvia to be united by two common beliefs: a commitment to the independence of

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______________________________________________________________ Latvia and dedication to the statehood based on the Latvian language. The NP suggests the reasons why this was not possible to date: its roots lie in the limited social cohesion of Latvian state. Specifically, the programme addresses the segregation of information space into one functioning in the state language, while the other provides information in Russian. The divisions in the information space and different interpretations of political events in media operating in two different languages is, as the NP suggests, determined by continuing existence of parallel schooling in state and in minority languages. Once again, claiming that the different schooling streams cater to different socio-cultural groups and reinforce divisions between ethnic communities, the NP claims that unless this Soviet inheritance is abolished can there be no effective social cohesion. The sections of the NP addressing issues of education state that education in general, and schooling in particular, are responsible for raising the value of the Latvia’s statehood with its citizens. Additionally, the NP also underlines the importance of creating a common information space in Latvia, emphasising that a “segment of Latvia’s population is still influenced by the Russian information space, and Russian sources of information play a significant role in shaping their opinions” (FD, p.46). However, the final version of the programme drops the statements on the separateness of the information spaces in favour of underlining the prospects and possibilities of all Latvia’s residents. It places greater emphasis on the common issues: “[Common information space] will foster considerably achievements in the Latvian language learning. Good command of the Latvian language will help to overcome a barrier in receiving information, which exists due to the lack of knowledge of Latvian and an inability to read the Latvian press, or to listen to the radio and watch TV programmes” (NP, p. 96). At the same time, not only the mass media, but also the academic community is called upon to assist in the process of integration. The final part of the programme outlines the possible areas where contributions of various social scientists are expected and are welcome, and how these should assist social accord in the new situation. The programme reads “[T]he integration of society requires a large spiritual and moral capacity […]. The process of integration also requires concentration on self-actualisation so as to better develop and preserve conviction and mental strength, individual judgement and independent behaviour, when in the presence of people who have different beliefs and values, and with people having another ethnic identity” (NP, p. 104).

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______________________________________________________________ However, it is hard to see who is supposed to coordinate the implementation of the goals and how The document emphasises the importance of state policies for drawing the linguistic communities closer together, underlining the top-down logic of cohesion. While the programme remains largely declarative and is ridden with repetition, it demonstrates a discernable difficulty in determining both the role of majority in facilitating social integration processes and the steps - besides learning the Latvian language of course expected from minority populations to create an integrated society. Overall, the drafting committee has not succeeded in striking a balance between the insecurities of the titular community regarding its privileged access to state institutions via the linguistic proficiency on the one hand, and the nondominant groups’ growing proficiency in the state language and thus increased pressure to compete with the dominant group “on their terms.” Overall, the NP “Integration of Society in Latvia” was developed in accordance with the FD approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and remained a compromise between hard-line nationalising forces and those convinced of the importance of symbolic steps to facilitate ethnic cooperation. In the course of the two years after the initial version was passed by the Cabinet of Ministers, the development of the final version of the document was continuing and was completed on February 6, 2001, when the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia approved the full version of the NP. Preceded by decisions from different governmental bodies, the Department of Integration of Society was set up in November 2000 within the Ministry of Justice to coordinate the implementation of the NP. Additionally, the Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Society Integration was established and made responsible for the coordination of the programme. Likewise, the Society Integration Foundation was established in the 2001 to facilitate the implementation process. Until 2007 all these institutions were engaged in distribution of governmental funds to organizations facilitating state-language acquisition and supporting minority communities. However, weak institutional links between the governmental and regional bodies undermined implementation and limited cooperation on the ground (Zepa et al., 2006a, p. 21). In addition, there was no clear commitment from the policy-makers to engage with and improve the bi-communal dialogue between the dominant and non-dominant communities in Latvia. Significantly, there was a lack of criteria for evaluating the implementation of the NP’s agenda. As a result thereof some “façade” minority organizations received financial support, while many “working” projects were declined governmental funds.4 Ultimately, when discussions of continuation of the integration initiatives ensued in 2007, no agreement could be reached on the set of indicators to evaluate the impact of the NP during the period of 2001–2008. Thus, it was argued, there was no reason to continue

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______________________________________________________________ with the integration initiatives altogether, and no need to devise a follow-up national programme for society integration. In 2008 the responsibility for the tasks of integration was moved to the Ministry of Children, Family and Integration Affairs prompting further cuts in funding and support of activities facilitating ethnic accord. Considered from the point of view of TEB, the impact of the NP on the integration processes on the ground allows interesting conclusions about the state of interethnic relations in Latvia. The NP opened up opportunities for engagement of non-dominant communities in political decision-making, but failed to determine the role of the dominant group in coordinating the direction of cooperation. My overview of the background from which the dominant group envisaged cooperation with another group makes clear that Latvian political entrepreneurs made presumptions about the outcomes of integration from a position, ascribed by the TEB to minority groups. Was this really the case? 3. Discussion The Latvian integration programme reflects a peculiar logic of its drafters. In effect, the documents testify of a dissonance in their rhetoric and their application, demonstrating a stunning difference between what the FD and NP envisage to do, i.e. integration of multicultural in Latvia, and what these documents actually end up doing. As I have discussed in the previous section of the paper, both the FD and NP seek to co-opt the members of nondominant communities and to engage them in policy-implementation. However, the very engagement of non-dominant groups has to take place on the terms proposed by the majority, discouraging non-dominant minorities’ activities that would change the existing intergroup relations in the country. The discrepancy between the envisaged intent and institutionalised content of the integration programmes are likely to suggest interpretation of these policydocuments as merely symbolic steps. The approach to integration, outlined in the FD and NP was therefore to deflect criticism by complying with affirmative action rules, and thus was highly tokenistic. On the one hand, the document suggests that the state-bearing dominant group of Latvians perceives itself to be locked in the status of minority. The role of the titular community is underlined throughout, indicating that non-titular residents of the state need to accept to the dominance of Latvians’ language and values in “their” state This is particularly expressed in the parts of the programme indicating the importance of Latvian cultural values and views of history, the value of linguistic proficiency and the social accommodation on the basis of Latvians’ aspirations. On the other hand, however, the programme points out the expected change in the roles of non-titular and titular communities with both the dominant and the non-dominant groups expected to engage in the shaping of the

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______________________________________________________________ state policies. Does this suggest that non-dominant groups should come to terms with their position as a national minority? Or, is the incentive to be understood as calling on Latvians to assume a more consistent position as the “masters of their land”? Either way, it appears that integration, as is conceived of in the NP, is defined from the view point of a dominant group, seeking perpetuation of its privileged access to political institutions and discarding any claims from non-dominant groups to renegotiate the institutional design in “their” state. In the context of the Latvian situation, this is no mean feat. From the point of view of my theoretical discussion, the policy-makers provide a strong indication of intent to support the development of minority cultures and the retention of non-core groups’ linguistic identities within the framework of the Latvian state. Decisively, the TEB indicates that, when laying out the terms of cooperation between communities, one of the groups needs to define itself as a perceived majority, capable of dealing with the minority irrespective of claims it extends. In Latvia, this indicates a crucial incentive for non-titular populations to abandon the discourse of ethnic conflict, which by the early 2000s had grown to become largely self-referential. As I have demonstrated, the steps envisaged in the FD were feeding-off the nontitulars’ rhetoric. In the 2001 version of NP, however, the rhetoric of democratic state-building, national consolidation and civic cooperation prevailed, thus guaranteeing the common reference for both the titular as well as nontitular groups. The TEB would suggest a reading of this “invitation to cooperate” as a call to non-titulars to assume the role of minority player and collectively engage in bi-communal learning processes. In this case, one group needs to assume the role of majority, while the other that of its partner. Indeed, it seems that while NP outlines the steps to be undertaken by non-Latvians to integrate, it fails to address the dominant group and calls for Latvians’ active engagement in the integration process. The NP spells out that the lack of Latvian citizenship is the reason for Russian speakers’ unwillingness to engage in political processes in Latvia. Negative perceptions of Latvian citizenship with Russian speakers are also addressed, as are the negative views of non-citizens about the procedures of naturalisation. However, the differences in perception of political institutions between the dominant and non-dominant group are seen as a result of individual differences between the Latvians and non-Latvians. Throughout the NP there is not a mention of the fact that political institutions of the Latvian state favour Latvian speaking residents over all other residents of the state. Neither is there any acknowledgement of structural constraints placed on non-Latvians in the Latvians’ state: a range of individual-level difficulties is mentioned in the programme, among them the limited motivation to acquire the state language and the set of negative collective images about the Latvian state and its citizenship. However, while the ties of resident minorities with the Latvian state

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______________________________________________________________ are underemphasised, there appears to be neither an awareness of structural disadvantages placed on minority communities, nor of the fact that these deter future efforts of bi-communal dialogue. The impact of institutional design and political structures has been in the focus of debates on European involvement in the process of minority integration in Latvia. As I have argued, structural limitations resulting from the ethnic bias of Latvia’s state institutions significantly limit the opportunities for engagement of non-dominant groups in negotiations on resource redistribution. My outline of the Latvia’s NP pays particular attention to the motives of political entrepreneurs aimed at the accommodation of nontitulars’ grievances under the conditions of the existing status quo. Decisively, Latvian political entrepreneurs took their structural resourcefulness for granted, disregarding the limits for political participation of minorities resulting from disadvantages they are exposed to in the nation-state of Latvians. In the advent of the EU eastward enlargement, scholars and practitioners engaged with Latvia’s integration processes were very positive about the impact of international “epistemic communities” on Latvia’s policies towards its minorities (Galbreath, 2006a; Galbreath, 2006b). Indeed, European engagement allows predicting the timing of nationalising policies’ relaxation during the period of external pressure and advocacy for measures alleviating social exclusion of Latvia’s non-titular communities. Exemplarily, crucial corrections to Citizenship Law preceded the start of EU-admission talks in 1998 only by few days. Perceived EU backing also explains the drafting of the national FD for social integration and its development into a full-fledged programme after Latvia was invited to join the EU. The growing security of political entrepreneurs from the dominant community after the EU accession ultimately resulted in the programme’s discontinuation in 2008. However, it was not the representatives of the Russian speaking community, but of the Latvian dominant group who have initiated the bargaining for greater control of resources. Crucially, this points to the evaluation of the view held by both the dominant and the non-dominant groups of resources already available during the bargaining for more. It is from this point that the bargaining initiated by the Latvian political elites from a perspective of the TEB should be interpreted as re-negotiating the terms of access to additional political resources. TEB suggests that the representatives of a group in a position of perceived disadvantage initiate the redistribution of resources. This strategy, as we have seen has been deployed by the political entrepreneurs of Latvian majority. As TEB predicts, they heavily rely on the support of external actors, in this case of the European institutions, in order to maximise their outcomes versus the group they perceive to be in a position of greater resourcefulness, in this case Russian speaking residents of Latvia. How valid is this interpretation of the roles, assumed by the ethnic groups in Latvia during the process of NP implementation? Were non-

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______________________________________________________________ Latvians really invited to engage with political institutions and advance their goals within the framework provided by the Latvians’ state? Unfortunately, the scope of the paper does not allow me to address the long-term effects of the NP on the integration processes in Latvia. One important observation to be made considers the institutional opportunity structure after the implementation of the programme. This needs to investigate whether the representation of minorities among the political entrepreneurs increased, or whether the perception of ethnic tensions was reduced, and interethnic cooperation intensified at the institutional level. All this was not the case following the adoption and termination of the programme. Conclusion My overview suggests that the Latvian programme was an ambivalent effort to co-opt non-Latvians willing to improve their access to resources by participating in community life on the terms imposed by the dominant group. Indeed, the analyses of the integration outcomes suggest that this was partially achieved, while large segments of the Russian speaking community in Latvia were only further alienated from political processes (Zepa and Supule, 2006; Zepa et al. 2006b). Following the inception of the programme the members of minority communities have even less incentive to engage in political processes in their country of residence. Particularly those with no citizenship and no voting rights continue to perceive the set of integration related measures as Latvians’ tool to establish policies favouring the dominant group at the expense of minority (Karklins and Zepa, 2001). But, how did Latvia’s Russian speakers profit from the NP Society Integration in Latvia? As discussed in the first part of the paper, the approaches (building upon Brubaker’s triadic nexus model) discuss group options from perspective of resource distribution. In doing so, as I argue, they tend to conflate the institutional proclivity towards stability and equilibrium with the preferences of dominant group, seeking the preservation of its privileged access to institutions in place. This was sought for by the titular group in Latvian society, irrespective of changes in the status of all other groups. In a sense, this is what happened in Latvia. The paper provides for a better understanding of the dominant group’s motivation to develop more intensive ties with the state and its institutions, while continuing to co-opt the members of non-dominant groups. From the point of view of the TEB, the NP sets a clear framework in which the bicommunal cooperation should be pursued. However, it does so out of a position of perceived minority that requires cooperation with another group, but is not prepared to give up any of the structural advantages it had accumulated. The programme also indicates what is does not support: “confrontation between elements of society, segregation, marginalisation and forced assimilation; tendencies to ethno-federalism that would undermine the formation of

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______________________________________________________________ a unified Latvian state; extremism, intolerance and national hatred” (NP, p. 9) Remarkably, “the formation of a two-community state; the model of ‘two societies in one nation’” (NP, p. 9) is precisely what can result from the emphasis on linguistic and cultural markers of individual identity. The NP “Integration of Society in Latvia” makes clear that the Latvian political entrepreneurs have set important agenda for local minority populations. The members of Latvia’s non-dominant communities are called upon to take advantage of integration opportunities by accepting the relations between the ethnic groups in the public space. In doing this, non-dominant groups are not only to accept the privileged status of the titular ethnic group, but are also to perpetuate inequalities existing in these groups’ access to political, social and cultural resources provided by the state institutions. The question remains however, whether this is what can be termed “integration,” or whether the programme invites the members of non-dominant group to undergo a voluntary assimilation to achieve equal treatment by the state. Endnotes 1. Latvian Government (1999). The Integration of Society in Latvia: A Framework Document. Riga. Full text of the Framework document http://www.np.gov.lv/en/faili_en/integracija.zip Accessed 14 February 2008. 2. Boris Tsilevich. Personal communication, November 2007. 3. For an overview of debates taking place, see http://www.np.gov.lv/ index.php?en=fjas_en&saite=integracija.htm Accessed 14 February 2008. 4. Nils Muižnieks. Personal communication, November 2007.

References Berger, P. L. and T. Luckmann (1967), The Social Construction of Reality. London: Allen Lane. Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Budryte, D. (2005), Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the post-Soviet Baltic States. Aldershot: Ashgate. Dorodnova, J. (2002), “Challenging “Ethnic Democracy”: Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Latvia, 1993–2001.” Core Working Paper, Hamburg.

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______________________________________________________________ Galbreath, D.J. (2005), Nation-Building and Minority Politics in PostSocialist States: Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag. —(2006a), “European Integration through Democratic Conditionality: Latvia in the Context of Minority Rights,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 14:69–87. —(2006b), “From nationalism to nation-building: Latvian politics and minority policy,” Nationalities Papers 34: 383–406. Järve, P. (2002), “Two Waves of Language Law in the Baltic States: Changes of Rationale?,” Journal of Baltic Studies 23: 78–110. Jenne, E.K. (2007), Ethnic Bargaining. The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. London: Cornell University Press. Jubulis, M.A. (2001), Nationalism and Democratic Transition: The Politics of Citizenship and Language in Post-Soviet Latvia. Lanham: University Press of America. Jurado, E. (2003). “Complying with European Standards of Minority Education: Estonia’s Relations with the European Union, OSCE and Council of Europe,” Journal of Baltic Studies 34: 399–431. Karklins, R. and B.Zepa (2001), “Political Participation in Latvia 1987– 2001,” Journal of Baltic Studies 32: 334–346. Kelley, J. (2004a), “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions,” International Organization 58: 425–457. —(2004b), Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Latvian Government. (1999). The Integration of Society in Latvia: A Framework Document. Riga. —(2001), The Integration of Society in Latvia. National Programme. Riga. Muižnieks, N. and I. Brands-Kehris. (2003), “The European Union, Democratization, and Minorities in Latvia,” P. J. Kubicek (ed.) The European Union and Democratization. London: Routledge, 30–55.

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______________________________________________________________ Rozenvalds, J. (2005), How democratic is Latvia: audit of democracy. Riga: LU Akademiskas apgads. Smith, D.J. (2002), “Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2: 3–16. Tarrow, S. (1998), Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tesser, L.M. (2003), “The Geopolitics of Tolerance: Minority Rights under EU Expansion in East-Central Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 17: 483–532. Zepa, B., Lace,I., Klave, E. and I. Supule. (2006a), “The Aspect of Culture in the Social Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities. Final Report: Latvia.” European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg. Zepa, B. and I. Supule. (2006), “Ethnopolitical Tension in Latvia: Factors Facilitating and Impeding Ethnic Accord,” in: N. Muiznieks (ed.) LatvianRussian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions, Riga: LU Akademiskais apgads, 33–40. Zepa, B., I. Supule, L. Krastina, I. Kesane, M. Grivins, I. Bebrisa and I. Ievina (2006b), “Integration practice and perspectives.” Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, Riga.

Social Cohesion Estonian Style: Minority Integration Through Constitutionalized Hegemony and Fictive Pluralism Tove H. Malloy In 1998 Estonia’s government began designing its social integration programmes. While theoretically the early integration programme was based on the Estonian nation building policy of one Estonia speaking one language, the Estonian language, subsequent programmes have increasingly espoused multiculturalist views allowing citizens of minority origin to practice and pursue minority culture in the private sphere. This chapter will interrogate the theoretical and conceptual ideas informing the Estonian Integration Programme from the early political statements in 1998 through to the 2008–2013 Programme. This will be done through a critical examination of its main tenets, such as identity, democracy and ethics as well as sovereignty and territoriality. Subjecting these to arguments of pluralization, agonistic ethics and critical responsiveness, it will be argued that in order to render the Estonian Integration Programme fit for the 21st century, it will have to be de-essentialized, de-antagonized and de-territorialized. Introduction The ideal of social cohesion often becomes obscured in ethnically divided societies after historical upheavals or major socio-economic changes. We have seen this happen in several of the new democracies that emerged after the end of Communism in Europe. Power changes hands, ideologies are discarded and new ones adopted or old ones recycled. Societal groupings change situation; majorities become minorities or vice versa. Pressures mount to stabilize the state, unite the people and protect the nation. Umpteen models exist as how to institutionalize the state and mediate the nation. Much less is known about how to unite the people. The focus of this chapter is the efforts to unite the people of Estonia after it gained independence from the Soviet Union. The moral vocabulary of social cohesion includes loyalty, solidarity, virtue, common values, patriotism and unity. The normative vocabulary prescribes equality, participation, inclusion, sovereignty and self-determination, while the ethical vocabulary comprises tolerance, respect, recognition, dialogue and co-operation. However, the interpretation of universal concepts is

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______________________________________________________________ often taken for granted, while the social vocabulary of culture, community, diversity, added value, identity and difference is often neglected. And when deemed relevant, social situations are often over-interpreted to fit certain instrumental and ideological ends. As a result social cohesion ideals after seismic changes may not reflect the actual situation on the ground. The aim of this chapter is to expose the underlying ideological assumptions informing Estonian social cohesion through a critical reading of Estonia’s political strategy towards integration of minorities. This will be attempted by examining its main theoretical tenets, such as culture, toleration and identity and relating these to ideologies of multiculturalism. Social cohesion is of course a contested concept. It has been suggested that belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy are key concepts to take into consideration as well as “ties that bind,” such as values, identity, culture, differences and divisions, inequalities and inequities, cultural diversity and geographical divisions (Jenson, 1998).1 Social glue in terms of associations, networks and infrastructure must also be in focus. In fact, social glue is more than institutions; it is communication and the moral regulation that people create as a result of their inter-dependence (see Scott and Marshall 2005, p. 173).2 This is why it has been suggested that social cohesion defines the role that social connectedness plays in people’s ability to communicate across social, economic, cultural and ethnic groups (Ministry of Culture 2006).3 But countries are unique, and countries require different models of social cohesion. Social cohesion need not mean beautiful harmony and common values only. It may also mean divergence and disagreements, or what Charles Taylor has termed “constitutive tensions” (Taylor, 2001). Indeed, the struggle for recognition may be seen as a permanent state of social cohesion and indeed of democracy (Honneth, 1995). In fact, it is common knowledge that social policies which do not account for difference and diversification will not secure social cohesion (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002). The interpretation of the notion of social cohesion is thus a powerful tool, in particular in the hands of ethnic elites. Myths are created or discarded (Canovan, 2005). This is why scholars of ethnic elites have argued that “[…] a great deal of ethnopolitical outcomes are in fact often determined by the effective reframing of otherwise objective situations by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, and […] rigorous conceptual schemes are only half the recipe for explaining real ethnopolitical dynamics” (Pettai, 2001, p. 266). The “effective reframing” of peoplehood and nationhood may result in the overt and covert manipulation of public discourses and policies to fit a desired outcome, and may be cognitive as well as non-cognitive. What is important, therefore, is that such strategies are identified and analyzed so that ethno-political dynamics may be evaluated normatively. To put Estonia’s efforts at social integration to such a test is one objective of this chapter.

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______________________________________________________________ Estonia’s government began designing its first post-independence social integration policy in 1998. While initially a blueprint for a language strategy promoting Estonian nation building on the basis of one language, the Estonian language, subsequent integration programmes have increasingly espoused more inclusive views. Much has already been written about Estonian integration programmes (Pettai, 2003; Kirch et al., 2006; Brosig, 2008), and ideas have been on offer to describe the strategies of the new democratic governments in Estonia (Laitin, 1998; Pettai and Hallik, 2002; Järve, 2005). While Vello Pettai and Klara Hallik speak of control system and co-optation (2002), Priit Järve refers to ethnic containment policies (2005).4 However, little has been argued about the theoretical and conceptual ideas informing the Estonian integration strategy as espoused in the social integration programmes. Close readings of social integration documents usually offer theoretical insights into the model of social cohesion pursued. The specific purpose of this chapter is, therefore, a theoretical interrogation of the overall Estonian integration strategy (hereafter the Strategy) beginning from the early political statement in 1998 through to the 2008–2013 full-fledged policy. The overall aim of this chapter is to inform the normative discourse on minority rights with a critical theory analysis of the model of social cohesion being implemented in Estonia. Critical theory is seen as a good approach because it can excavate the ideological assumptions motivating ethnopolitical dynamics. Thus, identifying and analyzing ideological assumptions as well as psychological processes helps us understand the ethnomobilization resulting in dominant and oppressive actions. Subjecting ideological assumptions to arguments of post-structural pluralization, this chapter will question whether the Estonian Strategy is robust enough to meet the pluralization of the twenty first century. Post-structural pluralization is the view that pluralism needs to be pluralized, or as William E. Connolly puts it, the “refashioning of pluralist imagination” meaning contesting our conventional views of pluralism (1995, p.xiii). The chapter begins the critical reading of the Estonian Strategy by first putting social cohesion in the perspective of integration in order to show the link between these. This is followed by a rough overview of critical theory tools offered by Connolly’s theory of pluralization. The main part of the chapter, the analysis of the Estonian Strategy will focus on three major documents adopted by the Estonian governments since 1998. In concluding, I assess the degree to which pluralism informs the Estonian Strategy and thus the ideal of social cohesion. 1. Social Integration and Antagonism Usually social integration strategies are a response to change. In Estonia the Strategy was a belated response to the change resulting from independence and the adoption of ideologies informing the subsequent nation and state building. The (re-)establishment of the independent state of Estonia resulted

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______________________________________________________________ not only in a change in public ideology from socialism to liberalism but also in a change in power structures and management of public spaces from predominantly Russian dominated and Soviet oriented to predominantly Estonian and Europe oriented.5 Such change touches all members of society. Programmes to enhance social integration are thus both functional tools for fostering social cohesion and ideological ideals for social unity. Moreover, they involve both people and institutions, and they must involve both the public and the private spheres. Most importantly, they must include law and morality because their overall aim is to create social order as well as social unity. Change happens furthermore not only within societies but also in the wider context of the global society. Global phenomena influence the way in which states adapt both internally and externally. Social integration strategies must adapt to change both within and without. In several ways, social integration is a two-way process. Social integration strategies are furthermore political tools of democratization. Democratization through integration requires that integration institutions have legitimacy. These must be designed in such a way that they foster a sense of collective reasoning, meaning some involvement of all groups in society and where feasible joint decision-making on major issues. Numerous models have been designed espousing varied degrees of collective reasoning in divided societies (Rawls, 1971; Lijphart, 1977; Dryzek, 1990; Connolly, 1991; Habermas, 1992; Tully, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Keating, 2001; Goodin, 2003; Bader, 2007; Norval, 2007). It is beyond the scope here to discuss these models of political integration. It suffices to emphasize that without legitimate institutions of political integration it is difficult to foster social integration. This is particular relevant in deeply divided societies, such as Estonia where the social is divided into two major groups living to a great extent divided by ethnicity and language. The current ratio between Estonians and Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia is three to one.6 When politics go bad in societies divided along ethnic lines it is therefore likely that there is a negative self-identification in play. Negative self-identification can manifest itself as antagonism. Antagonism usually emanates from the impossibility to deal with alterity.7 Connolly explains alterity as the otherness which is related to the process of linking identity to difference (2002[1991]). Difference is intrinsically linked to personal identity in that identity is established in relation to a series of differences. Identity stands in a complex, political relation to the differences it seeks to fix. It is an endless play of definition, counter-definition, and countering of counter-definitions. Contingency of identity is thus a stable part of identity itself. However, identity formation contingent on the self’s definition of the Other makes for a troubled relationship with ethics. To act ethically may mean to call some comforts of identity into question (Connolly, 2002[1991], p. xix). To be ethical is thus to put identity at risk because one

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______________________________________________________________ would have to interrogate one’s essential self and go beyond toleration and show respect. The implication would be that a reassessment of one’s true identity might be required. For this reason many equate the demands of morality with the identity they already confess. To ensure ethical behaviour in social integration processes, identity has therefore to be de-essentialized through the incorporation of contingency rather than the negation of difference. Identity formation has furthermore a collective dimension. Connolly explains that personal identity and collective identity are connected through the channel of freedom (2002[1991], pp. 65–68). People must be able to believe that state institutions carry with them sufficient efficacy to promote the collective ends we prize. Thus one’s self-identification as a free individual is bound up with a common belief in the capacity of the state to promote publicly defined purposes. Similarly, if one knows that one’s choices and judgements matter in the public realm this also informs the orientation one takes to a variety of other social roles. Thus, when circumstances are favourable, the personal-collective identity relation is one of loyalty. When they are unfavourable, they degenerate into either disaffection with the state or a nationalism in which the tribulations of history are attributed to an evil otherness which must be neutralized. Serious threats to freedom can grow out of these ideological links between personal and collective identity (Connolly, 2002[1991], pp. 198–200). Firstly, the politics of collective identity may organize the idealisms and egoisms of its legitimate members into a collective egoism. And the politics of collective egoism becomes more intense whenever it is faced with internal or external affronts to its self-assurance. Secondly, in believing that one’s identity or the collective identity of one’s group is the best and only true identity, the function of converting difference into otherness sets in. Collective dogmatization thus happens when it is confronted by disruptive contingencies. Next it constructs minorities as objects of resentment to protect its own collective identity. Such resentment often turns into a generalized, existential resentment formed by people or groups unwilling to explore necessary injustices in their own political ideals (Connolly, 2002[1991], pp. 25–26). Injustices suffered due to majority resentment are usually undeserved and can be systemic. Often these injustices cannot be eliminated. But what is alarming is that if these injustices are not recognized by the individual or the group unknowingly afflicting them on others, they conceal the fact that they foster a feeling of existential resentment in the person unwilling to take the steps to self-scrutinize. In other words, from the base of a political ideal which is not fully analyzed and scrutinized can emanate, without wilfully wanting to do so, a “politics of resentment” that legitimizes these injustices (Connolly, 2002[1991], p. 26). It is rewarded by those of the in-group who harbour the same resentment. In effect, electoral politics contain powerful pressures to

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______________________________________________________________ become a closed circuit for the dogmatism of collective identity into threat through the negation of difference. As threats are perceived as real, they become the energy for the dogmatization of identity. This is why it has been argued that a robust social integration strategy neither evades nor confirms difference (Phillips, 1996, p. 143). Multicultural policy making derived from a view of multiculturalismas-ideology is indeed a difficult issue in many countries in Europe (see Malloy, 2008). States face great difficulties when seeking to conceptualize multicultural policies based on liberal democratic theory. From the core principles of liberal democracy has sprung a number of different views of multiculturalism with different approaches to freedom and equality. In fact it is the clash between a class versus a status approach that divides these. Most democratic theories of multiculturalism prioritise equality over freedom (Walzer, 1983; Phillips, 1999). This is because they see diversity of cultures as an asset to society rather than a burden, and thus all cultures deserve equal moral standing and protection. The emphasis is on “multi” first, and where needed differentiation in rights and entitlements will be made in order to secure equality. Liberal theories of multiculturalism also see diversity of cultures as an asset to society but are less clear on equality versus freedom (Kymlicka, 1989 and 1995). The moral value worthy of protection and standing is assigned to the individual person rather than to the cultural group and in most theories of liberal multiculturalism differentiation is not acceptable (Sandel, 1982). One might say that these emphasize neither “multi” nor “culture” by remaining neutral (Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1977). Finally, communitarian theories of multiculturalism value the cultural survival of the group above all and thus appear willing to forego both equality and freedom (Taylor, 1989). This emphasis on “culture” becomes problematic not only if a culture promotes illiberal practices which might oppress individual members but also if it is unable to be inclusive in terms of extending membership to new members except through assimilation. This muddled state of affairs of theories of multiculturalism is not just an academic debate about ideals of freedom, equality and culture, or which multiculturalism-as-ideology do we value. It is about how to conceptualize social integration strategies based on status. 2. The Estonian Social Integration Strategy Social integration strategies in a deeply divided society, such as Estonia include numerous policy areas all of which it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address. Here the focus is alone on the official Strategy laid out by consecutive Estonian governments in key documents. Of importance when assessing ideological assumptions behind any social integration strategy aimed at integration of opposed groups is to bring to bear any relevant foundational doctrines through a full reading of the chain-of-texts that constitute

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______________________________________________________________ these foundations. Such a chain-of-texts may include any type of identityinforming narrative, including constitutional frameworks and special rights provisions that stipulate legally the democratic sharing of sovereignty, territory and collective goods. This chapter must confine itself to highlighting a few tenets of the foundational ideology enshrined in the 1992 Estonian Constitution. These include the notion in the Preamble that the Constitution “guarantees the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages” as well as Article 6 which stipulates that “the official language of Estonia is Estonian.”8 In addition, Article 50 and 52 are of importance as these regulate the right of minorities to establish “institutions of selfgovernment in accordance with conditions and procedures determined by the Law on Cultural Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities” (1993) as well as the possibility of using their own language when in contact with the authorities in areas where more than half of the population speak another language. Here it should be noted that the Law on Cultural Autonomy provisions the right of national minorities to establish self-administrative cultural institutions which can promote the cultural rights enshrined in the Constitution. The word self-government is nowhere to be found in text of the Act. In general the Law is considered a re-adoption of the policies that existed during the inter-war period when there was no major large minority threatening the unity of Estonia and thus useless for the present day situation where one third of the population belongs to another language group and culture (Smith 2001). It has also been seen as a “smoke screen” erected to ward off international criticism about lack of rights for the minorities.9 This section begins by a reading of the 1998 document, The bases of the Estonian state integration policy for the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian Society (hereafter NIP) which set off the social integration process in Estonia. Next, follows a reading of the 2000 Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007 (hereafter SIP) which was the first full-fledged programme to be implemented and which was rigorously monitored and evaluated by the Estonian authorities. Finally, the section will finished with a reading of the Estonian Integration Strategy 2008–2013 (hereafter EIS) which was designed on the basis of lessons learned from the previous programme as well as numerous other policies related to social integration.10 The Beginning The first political statement on Estonia’s new national integration policy, the NIP adopted in 1998, was a brief document that explained the background to the new policy, including the reasons for taking the step in Estonia as well as the principles and goals of integration over the next ten years. It argued that based on “current national and social interests,” policies should ensure rapid modernisation by remaining united in the pursuit of one Estonian culture

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______________________________________________________________ rather than risk “two societies in one state”. This agenda was considered feasible as the attitude among Estonians had become “more tolerant and open”. The principles underpinning NIP were the value of the young, of development, of inclusive participation, of confidence through tolerance and the values of a united Europe. The goal of one integrated, tolerant and secure Estonian culture would be achieved through improved attitudes toward the Other as well as improved access to citizenship. A better Estonian education system as the basis for integration was also a goal, as was improved language skills among non-Estonian speakers, adaptation of minorities to Estonian culture, elimination of regional disparity and political participation of minorities in Estonian society. Finally, it would also require improved understanding among Estonians of minorities as legitimate members of society. The NIP was a clear political statement that Estonia needed to improve its integration ratio. There was a legitimate concern that the Estonian state could break into two, if attitudes and co-existence did not improve. Moreover, the statement about a future policy came after much international pressure on Estonia to perform better with regard to its minorities not only normatively but also in the perspective of a future membership of the European Union (EU).11 The need to move towards integration policy had been stalled by rising state nationalism in the 1990s. This did not appear to have waned when the NIP was drafted. The NIP espoused a strong mono-ethnic attitude. Not only the title, but also phrases such as “policy on nonEstonians” and “integration requires a serious effort on the part of nonEstonians” evince a certain degree of superiority. To an outsider, the NIP appeared rather more as a dictum of “my way, or no way.” Certainly, the dilemma of how to reconcile state building with nation building was visible from the start. The main theoretical concern in the NIP is the use of the concept tolerance. The juxtaposition of tolerance and openness noted above raises concerns about the understanding of tolerance and the effect that toleration has on societies that are deeply divided. Tolerance is the habit of permitting disagreement and not disapproving of opinions that you do not share or lifestyles that are different than yours. In deeply divided societies this means that tolerance must foster patient forbearance towards that which is not approved. There is toleration only where there are things that are disapproved. This is why Connolly warns us that toleration can create problems in the social sphere (2002[1991], p. 43). Toleration of non-approved cultural practices can result in contempt and resentment. The people who decide to tolerate a foreign culture within their social realm may feel themselves absolved from further moves towards better understanding of that culture. Such groups rarely conceive of themselves as requiring equal doses of toleration from the others and thus may come to wear their toleration as an additional badge of superiority. Toleration on this notion clearly does not celebrate difference as

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______________________________________________________________ an asset in society. Once the feeling of superiority is prevalent in a society, resentment is likely to produce an environment of antagonism. Connolly has suggested that in those political systems which are all too often antagonistic, and which create environments where no positive social vision is enunciated, a form of agonistic respect should be fostered (2002[1991]). Agonistic respect is a reciprocal virtue appropriate to a world in which partisans find themselves in intensive relations of political interdependence but maintaining a “pathos of distance” (Connolly, 2002[1991], p. 179). Agonistic respect furthermore carries the expectation that one may contest one another on the source of respect especially when one party insists that eligibility for respect itself requires acceptance of the universal it affirms.12 Agonistic respect is thus compatible with a model of pluralism. It does not allow for the consolidation of a majority identity around which a set of minorities is tolerated as satellites.13 Instead it provides minorities with the possibility to surge into being from below the threshold of tolerance. Another theoretical concern in the NIP is the reference to one Estonian culture. Referring to one Estonian culture is of course feasible as long as it is seen as embracing several ethnic groups and traditions. This is the general idea of culture in many multicultural societies of today. But several cultures within one society also means that cultural groups strive for cultural hegemony (see Figure 1). Cultural hegemonic struggles are part of an ongoing process where boundaries change constantly according to influences from a variety of sources, including ethnic mobilization. When the lines are drawn in the sand in the cultural market place, social exclusion based on ethnic mobilization, ethnic boundaries, and ethnic closure happens (Ballard 2002: 34). And if a group achieves a hegemonic position in society by seeking ethnic closure, ethnic exclusionism may happen (Coenders et al., 2007). Cultural hegemony based on ethnic exclusionism is thus part of the every day ethnic struggles in society. However, such struggles should be open to all groups in society through inclusion and participation in political life. It does not appear that the NIP promoted participation of several cultures. This was evidenced in its normative or lack of normative approach. It was a statement that included no linguistic rights of minorities and indeed lacked entirely a human rights approach.14 Moreover, it decreed mobility of Estonians into the regions where minorities are in the majority in order to render these regions “multicultural and open” (NIP, 1998) while at the same time, minorities were expected to integrate into the Estonian majority culture. In short, the way in which to avoid the feared two-society scenario appeared rather more like colonization by members of the majority into minority regions and through assimilation of minorities into the majority culture. It is not surprising that the NIP espoused ethno-cultural existentialism and that ethno-nationalism15 and ethnic conservatism were the prevailing ideologies informing the state nationalism.16 At the time, the

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Culture

Dominant ethnicity

Ethnicity

Ethnicity

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Figure 1. Dynamics of cultural hegemony and ethnic exclusionism Source: Malloy and Gazzola Estonian elite was clearly still in a post-imperial mode of thinking (Laitin, 1998, p.106). The perceived threat to state security of the large Russian minority with the power of its kin-state behind it prevented the elite from acting as true liberals.17 Moreover, the fear that the Estonian language might die out in the competition with a large imperial language was another conceived threat albeit unfounded. The political elite essentially acted as if it were still a weak and victimized minority fearing for its existence.18 However, the Estonian language has survived for centuries the onslaught of German, Swedish and Russian speakers. While the instrumental aim of the need to make all members of society fluent in Estonian is plausible, the fact that it is presented in the policy as one-language, one nation indicates a fear of multiculturalism. The methodology of integration was clearly cultural assimilation, or state building through a culturalist programme rather than a civic programme (Laitin, 1998, pp. 346–359). As David Laitin has noted, culturalist programmes that seek integration through assimilation will result in elite rationalization about cultural hegemony, whereas assimilation through a civic programme is more likely to result in pluralism.19 Certainly, the NIP was not a policy seeking integration through dialogue. In fact, words such as dialogue, inter-ethnic co-operation etc. did not occur in the NIP. It is quite clear from reading the document that the Estonian elite was facing a dilemma in terms of having to meet international normative and modernization standards while also seeking to build a mono-ethnic based state. The NIP was followed up by an Action Plan 1998–99, The integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society which again mirrors the one-way process that was the prevailing attitude at the NIP. The Action Plan did take

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______________________________________________________________ two important steps further towards a redefinition of the notion of Estonian culture. Firstly, it introduced the notion of multiculturalism into the Strategy. While the Action Plan thus assumed multiculturalism as an underlying notion of integration, it nevertheless defined multiculturalism from the perspective of a mono-ethnic Estonian culture (see Pettai, 2003, pp. 70–71). It is clear that the difference between multiculturalism-as-a-fact and multiculturalismas-ideology was not appreciated. Indeed, multiculturalism-as-ideology is nowhere visible in the document. Secondly, even though the Strategy appeared to be adopting a republican notion by referring to a “common core,” the document explicitly underlines that this common core must derive from the ethnic Estonian culture. This would have been just fine if the notion of Estonian culture was an unfixed and non-static phenomenon that is constantly “rejigged, reinterpreted and reinvented” (Ballard, 2002, p.13). However, there is little evidence of this in the Action Plan. Instead it seems more like a nationalism providing a foil for dominance (Kaufmann paraphrasing Juteau in Kaufmann, 2004).20 It does mention behavioural patterns developed in Estonia as part of the common core and refers to minorities as contributing to these patterns. Indeed, it declared that the preservation of the culture of ethnic minorities was a major task. This was to be achieved by giving minorities the opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue. These facts could be interpreted as if the common core of Estonian culture would be comprised of several cultures. Instead the Action Plan created a hierarchy of cultures whereby the Estonian culture holds a privileged position in relations with the state. It was obviously not meant to be a notion of a common core of several cultures. This is confirmed in the document which states that “whereas society may become multicultural, the state is and shall remain Estoniancentered” (quoted in Pettai, 2003, p. 71). It is difficult to see a multicultural strategy spring from such discourse. From Statement to Implementation Estonia’s first full-fledged attempt at social inclusion policy making was the SIP. The SIP incorporated some of the criticisms lodged against the NIP, including making references to human rights enshrined both in the Estonian Constitution and international law instruments ratified by Estonia. Moreover, the text refers comfortably to the idea of creating “a balanced and democratic multicultural society” (SIP, 2000, p. 13) “characterised by the principles of cultural pluralism, a strong common core and the preservation and development of the Estonian cultural domain” (SIP, 2000, p. 5). Indeed, integration was to be seen as a bilateral and harmonising process based on a process enabling the maintenance of ethnic differences on the basis of the recognition of the cultural rights of ethnic minorities (SIP, 2000, p.13). Thus, integration was to happen through three processes, linguistic-communicative, legal-

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______________________________________________________________ political and socio-economic. The linguistic-communicative process would focus on integration in education, including language knowledge of Estonian among minorities and attitudinal changes among Estonians. The legalpolitical process would focus on improving the naturalisation process, minority participation in the political sphere as well as the loyalty and responsibility on the part of minorities toward the welfare of the Estonian state. The socio-economic process would focus on breaking down barriers excluding minorities from both public and work life as well as on regional development through migration to and from the Ida-Virumaa County.21 But most importantly, the SIP now enumerated two target groups, ethnic minorities and Estonians. On the one hand, ethnic minorities would see the barriers against their integration disappear, whereas on the other hand, Estonians would act less repellent against ethnic minorities while also recognizing that there was no reason to fear the non-survival of their culture. In short, in reading the SIP one was lead to believe that Estonia was ready to abandon the post-imperial fear of ethnic minorities and move towards a multicultural and pluralist view of society. Indeed, nationhood is an ongoing mobilization and mediation process and nationalism is a social force that may vary in strength from period to period but which never disappears (Canovan, 1996). On such a reading one might be led to believe that the Estonian integration Strategy was reflecting a change in state nationalism which allowed a greater degree of pluralism. However, the SIP maintained the mono-ethnic approach and an overt ideology of ethno-nationalism as state nationalism. The idea that the theoretical tenets of the SIP evidenced a transformation from post-imperialism to multiculturalism is questionable to say the least. Granted, it has been argued that the way in which the Russian-speaking minorities were perceived has changed. While the legacy of many years of Soviet domination resulted in Estonians seeing the Russian-speaking community as guest workers, a redefinition happened in the public discourse whereby they came to be seen as immigrants once Estonians began to realize that Russian-speakers were not leaving (Pettai, 2001). In contrast to being a method of transformation, this was a strategy of avoidance. What was to be avoided was the acceptance of the Estonian state as a dual-society state which would have had to give recognition to the Russian-speaking minorities as a national minority and perhaps even an autonomous self-administrating minority. The redefinition of the status of the Russian-speaking minorities was therefore a political manoeuvre rather than an ideological shift. A closer look at the notion of the common core in the SIP thus reveals a contradiction. First of all, the SIP established that “the common core operates on the basis of the Estonian language, common social institutions and democratic values” (2000, p. 16). Mono-lingualism was thus maintained. Secondly, democratic values enumerated in the document included normative

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______________________________________________________________ standards as well as individual choice and cultural pluralism, in particular the objective of integration as the “cultural acclimatisation of different ethnic groups in Estonia” (SIP, 2000, p. 16, emphasis mine). One must wonder what was meant by acclimatisation? Allowing for translation nuances, it is not convincing language since the reference to different ethnic groups implies exclusion of ethnic Estonians. This seems to be confirmed by the definition of cultural pluralism offered in the SIP as “the recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of minorities in Estonian society” (SIP, 2000, p. 16). While this might sound promising for minorities, it is not clear how inclusive this pluralism is? Does it include ethnic Estonians? Thirdly, the common core would be based on the knowledge of Estonian history, pride of being Estonian citizens and awareness of the multicultural nature of the country. This means that the common core would create an environment that formed “a basis for mutually enriching interaction and the recognition of common interests” as well as make minorities feel secure in Estonia (SIP, 2000, p. 16). The concern for the security of minorities is of course noble but one must question whether a knowledge of Estonian history and pride of being an Estonian citizen really guarantee common interests? Although this enumeration of democratic values could have been taken right out of the textbook on multiculturalism-as-ideology, it prioritises unfortunately the communitarian view of multiculturalism-as-ideology that presupposes moral membership of the in-group and which extends its membership only through assimilation. Thus, the way in which minorities would be invited to hold moral membership of the in-group would be in a rather cruel manner akin to what Charles Taylor has termed “mis-recognition” (Taylor, 1994).22 Moral membership for minorities in the common core of Estonian society would require members of minorities to split their personal identity. This is described quite clearly in the SIP in that “the languages of ethnic minorities, ethnic traditions, religious beliefs, family traditions and personal lifestyles are not treated as part of the strong common core of Estonian society” because they are not considered common to all members of society (SIP, 2000, p. 17). Indeed, these phenomena are considered the private interests of each individual, and any opportunity for their advancement must be found in the private sphere. The definition thus excludes ethnocultural minority identity characteristics from the public spheres and hence from the common core. Separating the public and the private sphere in terms of culture is a serious matter because it not only may promote dislodged identities; it may also result in lack of social cohesion. The idea that what happens in the private sphere of people’s lives is not a matter of state concern is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, a horizontal approach to integration both the social and the political are vital. One cannot argue for a horizontal approach to integration at the political level without also having some horizontal approach in social affairs. Some models main-

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______________________________________________________________ tain the separation of the spheres with mixed results and only long-term prospects for social integration.23 A vertical view of the social whereby ethnic and cultural groups live separated will not create social integration even if the political sphere is horizontal (see Figure 2). Moreover, the political environment confirms the laws of the state, and the state and its laws are the guardian of an entire social order and of all the values which the social order requires. One cannot argue that law is public whereas morality is private into which the law can intrude only by violating individual rights or freedoms and so undermining its won legitimacy. Women are mothers in both public and private. Moreover, morality becomes public once it involves harm to one of the involved. By the same token, the languages of ethnic minorities in Estonia must be a public concern precisely because the SIP holds that while learning Estonian is important for the integration process, the state at the same time “also supports ethnic minorities’ activities in the promotion of education and culture in their native tongue and the preparation of a pedagogical cadre” (SIP, 2000, p. 14). Since when did a pedagogical cadre not belong to the public sphere? Separating the public and private spheres functionally is simply not feasible. Should the state support mother tongue learning only with the view that it would be spoken in private behind closed doors? Why bother, if this were the case?

Social sphere

Political sphere Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

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Figure 2.Vertical social (non)-integration Secondly, the functional separation between the private and the public spheres is simply not feasible in terms of individual self-identification. The fact that it is to be reality for minorities but not for the core ethnic Estonian group does not promote pluralism. Rather, is seems like a full invitation to create the much feared two-society state. The two-society fear is indeed a legitimate fear if social integration is the goal.24 The SIP does recognize that contradictions and conflicts cannot be ruled out in integration processes since “the social harmonisation of society and the preservation of differences are often conflicting processes” (SIP, 2000, p. 15). Openness and tolerance towards differences are thus considered one of the principal challenges for Estonian society, according to the SIP (2000, p. 15). All parties must exert

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______________________________________________________________ themselves in achieving a more open society. Moreover, minorities must learn Estonian, and Estonians must realize that the future of Estonia is not ethnic based but political (SIP, 2000, p.15). However, while the SIP argues correctly that social cohesion must be fostered through political institutions, it is not ready to give up the ethno-cultural traditions of mother Estonia. This is because the definition of the common core as noted above requires one language, the Estonian language and one caretaker of the state, the Estonian culture. This means that political institutions must follow the ethno-cultural traditions of the Estonian culture, rather than succeeding in convincing minorities to become part of this. The separation of the public and the private spheres therefore results in excluding minority ethno-cultures from the political institutions (see Figure 3).

Political sphere Group 3

Group 4

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Figure 3. Vertical cultural non-integration As much as the framers of the SIP have tried to make it look like a Strategy for fostering multiculturalism-as-ideology, they essentially gave minorities only one choice, namely assimilation. The separation of the public and the private spheres which is necessary for some but not for others will not be overcome through tolerance. Group 1 which masters the requirements for operating in the public sphere will hold hegemony over the political discourse whereas Group 2 will be forced to accept assimilation in order to participate in that discourse. As a result, it would appear that the SIP will eventually defeat its own purpose of integration. Estonia is thus indeed what the Constitution stipulates, a state with the dominant ethnic group exerting cultural hegemony over the state institutions through constitutional exclusiveness. Had the SIP promoted sincere dialogue, however, the outlook might be different. But even this hope is futile. Dialogue is indeed mentioned in the SIP in that “in social dialogue all cultures functioning in Estonia are equal” but in relation to the state, “the status of Estonian culture is different to that

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______________________________________________________________ of minority cultures” (2000, p. 17). Notwithstanding that this means that social dialogue does not include state affairs, it reiterates the hierarchy established in the earlier statement that only Estonian cultural characteristics are accepted in the public sphere and state affairs. By relegating minorities to a secondary rank in society, it contradicts the democratic view of multiculturalism-as-ideology offered above which prioritises equality over freedom, and where cultural diversity is seen as an asset to society rather than a burden, and thus all cultures deserve equal moral standing and protection. At best the multicultural view espoused in the SIP is communitarian; but a muddled and exclusionary communitarian outlook which promotes normative standards while risking damages to the self-identification processes of minorities. Not surprisingly, the SIP was unsuccessful in achieving its goals and targets. When the time came around for the Estonian government to draw up a new five-year programme for integration, there seemed ample opportunity to seek to design a coherent, non-contradictory programme which would take into account lessons learned. As with the SIP, the government opened up for consultation with civil society, including international experts.25 For this purpose a working document, Strategy for the integration of Estonian society 2008–2013 (SIES) was drawn up and circulated in 2007. The SIES document credited the lack of progress to the fact that “volume and speed of implementation were less than required” (SIES, 2007, p. 3). The SEIS document concedes to international assessments of the situation which held that the SIP 2000–2007 programme did not pay strong enough attention to socioeconomic integration. Thus, combating unemployment and taking measures to prevent HIV/AIDS should receive stronger attention in the next programme. It also noted that the feeling of distance between Estonians and minorities remained a concern, in part because there is in practice no public communicative space. The media is virtually separated according to languages. This furthermore hampers the inter-cultural dialogue. However, the SEIS document did not consider the multicultural goals and objectives of the previous programme as flawed and in need of redefinition, nor did it find the conceptual framework and implementation approach wanting (SEIS, 2007, p. 3). It did redefine the contextual situation of integration a bit by emphasizing the increasing mixture of cultures at the global level and the influence that this would have on Estonian society. The scope was thus broadened to include newly arrived immigrants who constitute around two per cent of the population. Following that, it acknowledged the need to incorporate the EU’s “Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the integration of ThirdCountry Nationals in the European Union.” The EU’s definition of integration was reproduced in full in the SEIS document, and the principles adopted by the Estonian government were declared in accordance with the EU definition.26

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______________________________________________________________ In Search of Pluralism Following the public consultation the EIS was drafted and adopted by the Estonian parliament in April 2008. This document follows the SIP’s theoretical outlook but is greatly improved in terms of use of ethical language and references to international normative standards. It evidences the cognition that social integration is a delicate, emotional process which requires great sensitivity to issues and wording. Thus, gone are the references to nonEstonians, the unfortunate and misconstrued denomination of Russianspeaking people living in Estonia without Estonian citizenship. Instead there is reference throughout the document to permanent residents. While this is not ideal either as it still implies immigration and thus out-group status (see Laitin, 1998, p. 267), it takes the sting out of the reference. Moreover, reference to the common core is gone, and the notion that integration involves all members of society is stated clearly several times. The principles of the EIS are thus rephrased to fit better the international discourse on human rights and freedoms and indeed prefaced loud and clearly by an adherence to EU values, norms and standards. In that sense, the EIS may actually have acquired its own power in the process. However, the EIS remains mono-ethnic and mono-lingual as dictated by the Constitution. The division between the public and the private spheres is also maintained although it is not described as concisely as in previous documents. It furthermore maintains the idea of a common Estonian identity although this is rephrased as a “common state identity” (EIS, 2008, p. 4). Similarly, the fear of the dual-society is reiterated although in terms of isolation and withdrawal rather than sovereign and political division. Finally, and most disturbingly, it maintains the notion of tolerance as the agent destined to foster integration. New language in the EIS includes a principle on civil society and the need for more activity at the social level. This is seen not only as relevant in terms of social integration but also as a tool to empower people through selfrealisation and make them more loyal to the state. This should be seen in relation to the SEIS working document which discussed participatory democracy and confidence in the process among all members of society. Participatory democracy was seen in the SEIS as the “intensification of … mutual contacts between people from different cultures based on toleration and cooperation” (SEIS, 2007, pp. 7–8). While the ambitious notion of participatory democracy did not make it into the EIS, a direct call for NGOs to help foster more individual participation was included. Notwithstanding that participatory democracy would have been ambitious in a democracy where a large portion of the population is expected to shed itself of its cultural identity when participating in public affairs, its absence from the final document may be indicative of the fact that it would have required concessions in terms of political minority rights.

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______________________________________________________________ Interesting is the new notion of a common state identity. According to the EIS it is to be based on a common understanding of Estonia as built on the constitutional values of the Republic and the contribution of all in society to this. Notwithstanding the fact that the idea of a state identity is odd, but precisely therefore, it seems that this term must cover for something that is too sensitive to be mentioned. Two issues make this concept problematic. Firstly, the idea that the state identity must be based on the constitutional values of Estonia. By now it is well known that the Estonian Constitution is founded on a logic of ethnic ascendancy meaning the ascendancy of the ethnic group of Estonians (Järve, 2005). This logic is found in the Preamble to the Constitution which holds that “Unwavering in their faith and with an unswerving will to safeguard and develop a state which is established on the inextinguishable right of the Estonian people to national selfdetermination and which … shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages.” Multiculturalism in Estonia is thus if not a fiction certainly unconstitutional.27 Secondly, the idea that all members of society can contribute to the work towards an ideal of a state identity is problematic. Although the EIS explains Estonian state identity as the “sense of us” and “the sense of security of the people in that they are part of the Estonian social and political life and share the positive emotional sense of belonging with the people and the territory” (2008, p. 11), such language seems insincere. For minorities to accept the invitation, they would have to assimilate precisely because according to the Constitution the aim of statehood is ethnic Estonian nationhood. The goal of a common state identity is not, therefore, a case of a blurring between the distinction between state building and nation building but rather, I would argue, a case of a rational choice between two equally problematic notions of collective identity. If the term of national identity had been used, the integration Strategy would have been seen as ambiguous as to which national identity was in question. This is because the public discourse has delineated “the national” in Estonia as Estonian and not Russian. Thus, the framers of the EIS were cornered by the public discourse and of course by the Constitution. The term state identity was perhaps chosen because it was considered safer not only from a constitutional perspective but also from a psychological point of view. By using the term state identity the reference to Estonia is saved because the Strategy holds that the culture and language of the state is Estonian. Moreover, the term avoids implying the politically incorrect language of us-them because it implies a civic republican notion, a notion which does not appear sincere in the case of Estonia. However, ambiguity is not as alarming as often

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______________________________________________________________ thought, as long as the self-identification process fosters solidarity. Jeff Spinner-Halev has warned that democratizing states which are also nationalizing need to develop a sense of solidarity through national identity formation (2008). Solidarity, he argues provides the state with the power to establish legitimate institutions. Solidarity is fostered through an appeal to a collective identity, often a national identity, rather than a republican citizens-based identity which only promises good governance. Since sacrifice is needed from all members of society especially when the democracy is new, the appeal to a national identity is more likely to foster this. Thus, Spinner-Halev argues that “a national identity gives people a strong sense of purpose as they build up state institutions; it encourages them to make sacrifices” (2008, p. 608). The problem is that sacrifice is not easily fostered in new democracies where the “nation” is divided. A feeling of threat thus takes over, and unless the democracy has reached a certain maturity whereby the ruling elite and the majority will assume the burden of providing protection and minority rights to vulnerable groups, solidarity will not emerge. The method by which to achieve this, according to Spinner-Halev, is through developing a nationhood that contends with memories of past injustices, not a separation of identity from politics, or what he calls privatisation of identity (2008, p. 619). In short a complication and expansion of the collective identity even to the point of sustaining ambivalence rather than a simplification (Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 621). Had the framers settled for a reference to national identity it might have been, therefore, an opportunity to invite members of the Russian-speaking community to join an Estonian nation that was willing to be flexible and redefine itself. Here it is interesting to note that the term “Estonianness” had been introduced in the SEIS without further clarification except that it would be a common element of society. This term was not maintained in the EIS. Whether this was due to the Bronze Soldier crisis of April 2007 that saw violence break out during the protests of the Russian-speaking youth against removal of the statue of the Soviet soldier from downtown Tallinn is difficult to know. Certainly, it might have given the drafters second thoughts. This is unfortunate because Estonianness is precisely what is needed but what remains an illusion as long as the ideal of the Estonian language and the Estonian culture remains the hegemonic goal for the public sphere. The Bronze Soldier crisis shows that the process from dogmatization to a “politics of resentment” can trigger events in the social environment. No matter who blinked first, the crisis reignited old fears and feelings. Throughout the world the events were interpreted as the beginning of the break-up of Estonia and the fact that Russian-speakers remain suppressed in the Estonian society. However, polls taken immediately after the event seem to negate these suppositions (Minister for Population 2007).28 Attitudes among both ethnic Es-

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______________________________________________________________ tonians and Russian-speaking Estonians were in fact improved and sympathy on the rise. In that sense the Bronze Soldier crisis may have been the good news. This is because events can promote “nationness” (Brubaker, 1996, pp. 18–19), and nationness is what is lacking in Estonia. Rogers Brubaker explains that nationness is a cognitive frame and a socio-political category that may crystallize as a result of sudden and unexpected events collectively involving all members of society. Of course, nationness after the Bronze Soldier could easily be seen to only mobilize ethnic Estonians. It therefore remains to be seen if the polls hold up in the long term.29 A major concern raised by the EIS is labour market integration and elimination of regional inequality. Integration in these sectors has suffered due to the lack of mastering of the Estonian language among Russianspeaking minorities. The SIP did not include activities in the field of economic integration as this was promoted through other government programmes. Results now show that labour market exclusion is not due to ethnic exclusion but due to structural deficiencies among minorities. However, the idea that structural deficiencies in labour market performance can be seen separately from the cultural identity of minorities is flawed. This argument has been pointed out by economists who argue that in the economy “culture counts” (see Malloy, 2005b). Culture in the economy supports the view that individual economic action is based on culturally engendered capabilities. The idea that capabilities are fostered through culture relies on the view that certain functions are particularly central in human life, and these functions render the human being a dignified free being capable of shaping her life in co-operation and reciprocity with others (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999). Moreover, a human life is shaped by these human powers of practical reason and sociability, and each human being is thus a bearer of cultural value (Raz, 2005). In other words, the value of culture must be appreciated as a valuable contribution to the individual’s development and capability to function in society, especially the individual’s capability to act in the economic sphere. Culture is therefore seen as one of the components of the multidimensionality of social and economic inclusion. Finally, encouraging about the EIS was the principle of adhering to fundamental European values, including the normative values of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Not that this would yield minorities greater protection; the EU acquis communautaire does not include any specific minority rights. But the cognition that Estonia is squarely embedded in the European cultural area and the values that this brings is ground for optimism. The notion that a social integration strategy is an isolated internal state affair has been challenged by the increased inter-dependency of states, and the idea that state politics is subject to a de-territorializing globalizing politics. Globalizing politics to Connolly means that individual loyalties are bestowed not necessarily on a territorial polity but on late modernity

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______________________________________________________________ (2002[1991], p. 216). Late modernity is a systemic time without a corresponding political place. Globalising politics thus call the sufficiency of sovereignty into doubt. “The reach and effects of global processes exceed the reach of sovereign states, and state-centred definitions of these matters may exclude exactly those issues and possible responses that would significantly compromise the claims of sovereignty” (Connolly 2002[1991], p. 216). Unfortunately, the strategic objectives of the EIS do not take into account this global perspective. The relations between social integration, social cohesion, democracy and globalization do not appear to have informed the EIS. Granted it is early days for the Estonian state both in terms of statehood and in terms of membership of the EU. But globalization does not wait. The need to put social integration strategies in the perspective of the globalized democracy and new notions of sovereignty and territory is pressing. Conclusion Although social cohesion is a notion that is up for grabs in any society, the intellectual manipulation by political elites to suit certain ideological and instrumental goals can have devastating effects in societies divided along ethnic lines. Universal vocabulary proves useful signifiers in such a discourse. It represents ideals that are difficult to repudiate, especially as ideals for deeply divided societies. Usually these are promoted as norms that are natural and true standards that anyone would endorse once they have experienced them. However, rather than creating a true horizontal sphere of universal (common) values, such an agenda can in fact result in alienation and exclusion. The problem is that if there is not consensus about universal definitions, political power structures are free to take over and set the agenda for nation and state building according to the prevailing view among the people who populate these structures. This is one of the reasons that nations are “zones of conflict” where the power to regulate populations is fluctuating (Hutchinson, 2005, p.4). Particularistic values may be promoted as universalistic ideals. The Estonian social integration Strategy in focus in this chapter is an epitome of such hegemonic strategies. The problem is when states do not want a plural ethos upon which to build its polity. Such states are forced to find a social cohesion myth that conceals the real aim while purporting to promote pluralism. This type of inclusive fiction, or what I would term “fictive pluralism” thus renders the basis for social cohesion dubious. If social integration strategies are to be seen as indicators of a country’s ideal of social cohesion, and ultimately of the country’s ability to foster social cohesion, Estonia’s Strategy is an example of contradictions. This is because, on the one hand, the Estonian integration Strategy is promoting pluralism in terms of multiculturalism whereas, on the other hand, the founding document of the state, the Constitution is decreeing ethnic dominance. Granted it is feasible to promote pluralism in states

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______________________________________________________________ dominated by one ethnie but if the dominant ethnicity is legally enshrined in the constitution, pluralism will not stand up in a court of law let alone play a role in collective identity formation. This type of “constitutional hegemony” thus negates any feasibility of rendering the polity plural. This is the dilemma that the framers of the Estonian social integration Strategy were facing all along. The result we have seen is a vertical society detached from a fictive horizontal polity. The contradiction between ideology and instrumental goals, i.e. ethno-nationalism and dominant Estonian ethnicity, on the one hand, and public policies of integration setting fictive targets for pluralism for some but not for others, on the other, therefore puts the authenticity of the Strategy in question. As the transformation from a thick to a thin ethno-nationalism is thus questionable, it is likely that the Estonian integration Strategy based on the underlying assumptions of ethno-national ideology and ethnic dominance will not reach its ultimate goal of social integration. Certainly, social cohesion seems a long-term perspective if not a dream. Moreover, as global pluralization begins to pluralize the Estonian ideal of non-plural social cohesion, the ramifications may be dire. This chapter has shown that some of the theoretical ideals informing the Estonian Strategy are flawed either because they are not pluralizing, such as the view of split-identity for members of society who are not ethnic Estonians, or because they are not ethical, such as toleration. Split-identity may result in radicalization, and toleration fosters antagonism. Moreover, it has been argued that the notion of culture, one Estonian culture for the public sphere is fabrication. Fabrication may be necessary to create the myths of nation, the people and the polity. But fabrication which separates the people according to spheres is basically social engineering. These ideals and ethics, I believe cover for a resentment within the dominant Estonian ethnicity which is manifested in antagonism and dogmatism thus informing the Estonian integration Strategy negatively. If the Strategy is to be successful in enhancing social cohesion in a globalizing world, it will have to be further de-essentialized, de-antagonized and de-territorialized. Endnotes 1 The Canadian Cultural Observatory study from 1998 about social cohesion in Canada focused on mapping culture and cultural diversity in the areas mentioned. See Jenson 1998. Will Kymlicka in a chapter named “The Ties that Bind” discusses a similar 1991 study of the Canadian Citizen’s Forum which analyzed shared values in the Canadian society. See Kymlicka 1995, Chapter 9. 2 Emile Durkheim called this the organic solidarity and argued that it is fostered through increased intensity in communication between segments of

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______________________________________________________________ society. This constant social contact between groups and individuals creates the moral and social consensus which is a pre-condition for social integration. 3 Piloting indicators in the area of social cohesion is still in an embryo stage in the social sciences but the Government of New Zealand has taken a lead though with its 2006 study which is in fact a compendium of cultural indicators. 4 Indeed, Järve (2005) confirms all the analytical tools of Sammy Smooha’s model of ethnic democracy (2005). Smooha’s model of ethnic democracy is an analytical model for a regime that combines a structured ethnic dominance with democratic rights for all. 5 During the Soviet era, the USSR had followed an integrationist politics toward the Baltic states thus allowing for the local or titular elites to be in governing positions as well as for the local or titular languages to be used along side the Russian language. See further Laitin, 1998, p.67. 6 It should be noted that the denomination Russian-speaking in Estonia covers a number of national minorities, such as people from Belarus, the Ukraine, as well as Russians from Russia proper. 7 For a good analysis of alterity in national identity construction see Campbell 1998. 8 The full text of the Estonian Constitution can be found on the web-pages of the Estonian President at http://www.president.ee/en/estonia/constitution.php (8 January 2009). 9 For more on the Law on Cultural Autonomy, see Smith 2001. To read the full text of the Law, see the Estonian Institute’s website at http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/cult_auton/ (9 January 2009). 10 All three documents have been read in the English language as provided to me by officials in the Estonian public administration. I would like to thank Eva-Maria Asari for assistance. Any misjudgement on my part due to working from translated documents are indeed unfortunate, and I would be grateful for any comments to that effect. The documents in are available in Estonian at the website of the Office of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs http://www.rahvastikuminister.ee/?lang=en (9 January 2009). 11 Most notably the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities had sent letters to the Estonian Government indicating that the country was violating international standards on national minority protection. For a list of his letters and recommendations go to http://www.ecmi.de/emap/download/ Est_OSCE_1_List_of_documents.pdf (9 January 2009). The list also includes references to Council of Europe and EU reports as well as those of the United Nations’ Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 12 The scholarship of Bhikhu Parekh is another good example of this argument. Particularism is to be respected not because of it being particular but because it is universal to the personal identity of the particular person. The fullest account of this thesis is found in his latest book (2008).

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______________________________________________________________ 13 To be successful Connolly argues that agonistic respect must furthermore be accompanied by a sense of critical responsiveness (1995). Critical responsiveness requires individuals to be willing to redefine their own identity in the ongoing interaction with others. It does not mean that the individual responds paternalistic or humbly and warmly to the other to prepare the other to convert to a universal identity. Critical responsiveness instead offers a view that opens up cultural space and allows the Other to consolidate itself into something that is un-afflicted by negative cultural markings. It thus does away with the ‘us-them’ syndrome so often afflicting democracy in divided societies. 14 For a good discussion of the various defects of the NIP, see Järve and Wellmann 1998. 15 Ethno-nationalism is seen here as an ideological creed rather than a politics of separatism. 16 The term ‘radical ethnic nationalism’ has been used about this type of post-communist nationalism that emerged in a number of post-Soviet states (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002, pp. 149-50). Characteristic for this type of nationalism is a lack of coherent ideology and historic amnesia and little in common with earlier nationalisms. 17 For a good description of the manoeuvres that members of the Estonian parliament, the Riigikogu went through to prevent Russian-speakers from standing for office in the 1993 election, see Laitin, 1999, pp. 182–183. 18 Will Kymlicka calls this phenomenon a ‘minoritized majority’ because it describes a mode of thinking that new rulers in post-Communist countries followed at least initially towards the representatives of the former imperial rulers who had become minorities (2007, pp. 185-86). Usually this mode of thinking is based on a fear that the former imperial rulers would rise again, or that through the global market the former imperial rulers would be strong enough to outdo the nation building of the new-found independent state. 19 Laitin explains further that elites that follow a culturalist programme of integration will create a French-type republic, whereas elites that follow a civic programme are more likely to create pluralists states , such as the USA (1998: 351–352) 20 For a full theory of dominant ethnie see Smith 1986. For an excellent discussion of dominant ethnicity see Kaufmann 2004. 21 Ida-Virumaa County is the county bordering to Russia in the North East of Estonia. It is home to about 70 per cent Russian-speaking people 22 Taylor argues that lack of recognition of identity sub-groups in society is likely to lead to serious psychological problems as well as political tensions. See Taylor 1994. 23 Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy is the most well-known and was theorized on the basis of the democratic model that emerged in the Netherlands in the early part of the twentieth century. However, the model devel-

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______________________________________________________________ oped into a virtual representative democracy and eventually rendered itself obsolete. See Lijphart 1977 24 Theories of dual-society are not discussed here even though there are several well-developed theories. This is because such theories do not explicitly pursue social integration between the two groups. Dual-society states need not, however, be as divisive as often portrayed. Of course, finding ways of living together ethically in dual-society states requires what Michael Keating has called “a philosophy that binds them together and gives them a democratic rationale” (2001, p. 171). But Keating’s own theory of plurinational democracy offers just that. He suggests allocation of power to all nationalities within the state often based on territorial claims but not requiring statehood. As such, sovereignty will have to be seen as non-absolute not vested only in states. Rather, sovereignty can have multiple attachment points above and below the state. The normative view of nationhood is that dualsociety states are perfectly capable of being democratic and liberal. 25 The author was involved in this consultation process. 26 The definition offered by the European Commission consists of 11 principles emphasizing that integration of third-country nationals is a bilateral process following European values involving the labour market, social competence, education and youth work, equal access, inter-cultural dialogue, culture and religion, participation, mainstreaming and assessment of effectiveness of policies. See SEIS, pp.11–12. 27 I am thankful to Priit Järve for clarifying this to me. 28 English summary of survey commissioned by the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, titled Ethnic relations and challenges of integration policy after the bronze soldier crisis. The survey was prepared by scientists at the University of Tartu. A copy is on hand by the author. 29 The 2008 Estonian Human Development Report shows a negative trend from 2007 to 2008 in terms of self-assessed membership of the Estonian nation among Russian speakers, citizens as well as non-citizens. See Estonian Human Development Report 2008, Chapter 4, Table 4.4.1 at p. 91 available online at http://www.kogu.ee/public/EIA2008_eng.pdf.

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______________________________________________________________ Smooha, S. (2005), “The Model of Ethnic Democracy” in: S. Smooha and P. Järve (eds.), The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe. Budapest: LGI Books, 5–60. Spinner-Halev, J. (2008), “Democracy, Solidarity and Post-nationalism”, Political Studies, 56 (3): 604–628. Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. —(1994), “The Politics of Recognition” in: A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. —(2001), “Foreword” in: A.-G. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Section III The Interface of Minority and Majority Communities

Round Pegs in Square Holes: Integrating the Romani Community in Hungary Aidan McGarry This chapter assess the impact of three integration components on Roma in Hungary: cultural; socio-economic; and political. It argues that Hungary has initiated policies in all three integration components but each has fallen short of the mark in terms of addressing the specific needs and interests of Roma. State integration efforts are focused on the protection of national minorities whose interests are overwhelmingly cultural in nature such as linguistic and educational provisions, and the interests of Roma, which are primarily socio-economic and political in nature, are sidelined. However, through ethnic mobilization Roma have attempted to redress this unsatisfactory situation. Introduction Amongst Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which have attempted to accommodate and protect minorities, Hungary is often cited as possessing the most progressive minority policy (Ringold et al., 2004, p. xxi). Hungary’s minority policy has been interpreted as serving as a good example to neighbouring states in the field of minority protection to look after the wider Magyar diaspora. Thus, minority policy at the state level is informed by a desire to protect so-called national minorities within state boundaries with the purpose of encouraging reciprocal treatment for the Hungarian communities residing in neighbouring states. However, the institutions which have been created as part of this policy are not appropriate for the Romani community. Hungary officially recognizes thirteen “national and ethnic minorities” with twelve being defined as national and only Roma are recognized as an ethnic minority. This chapter argues that such a distinction, and particularly the resulting policy provisions, impact negatively on attempts to integrate the Romani community in Hungary. This has, in turn, necessitated the creation of effective representation structures for the Romani community. All minority communities require the capacity to articulate their interests and to influence policy and decision making, and this is more pronounced for Roma who are more disadvantaged and marginalized than any other minority in Central and Eastern Europe. Roma are recognized as an ethnic minority, rather than a national minority, because they have no kin state. Kin states are crucial actors in the successful integration of national minorities as they are able to lobby and

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______________________________________________________________ advocate on behalf of minority communities outside national borders. Roma are the largest minority community in Hungary although determining exact figures for the Romani population is fraught with difficulties. In the 2001 census, 190,000 individuals declared Romani ethnicity although reports from domestic non-governmental organizations and international organizations estimate this figure to be between 400,000–600,000 (Riba, 1999, p. 1). This figure is sustained by the European Commission which estimates the Hungarian Romani population to be between 550,000–600,000 (European Commission Regular Report on Hungary, 2002, p. 31). The divergence between the declared and estimated figures can be explained by historical, social and psychological reasons related to the history of Roma in CEECs (Marushiakova and Popov, 2001). Furthermore, Roma are geographically dispersed, whilst national minorities tend to be geographically concentrated. As elsewhere across Central and Eastern Europe, Roma are a heterogeneous minority and can be divided into the Hungarian-speaking Romungro (70 per cent), the Romani-speaking Olah (22 per cent), and the Romanian-speaking Béas (8 per cent) (Kaltenbach, 1998, p. 62).1 Such heterogeneity and territorial diffusion impacts negatively on the capacity of Roma to mobilize politically and ensure that their voice is heard. This chapter assesses three integration components: cultural integration; socio-economic integration and political integration. Hungary has initiated policies in all three integration components but each has fallen short of the mark in terms of integrating Roma. Though the numerous structural problems impeding the integration of Roma may account for the dire socioeconomic situation many Roma endure, there has been a dramatic increase in the number institutions and organizations which have been established to formally articulate the interests of the Romani community. Some of these institutions have been created by the state such as the Minority SelfGovernment (MSG) system as well as specific policies targeting Roma however this chapter maintains that although Roma are affected by such legislative interventions and policy provisions, they do not profit from their creation for a number of reasons. That is to say, state minority integration efforts (section I) are focused on the protection of national minorities whose interests are overwhelmingly cultural in nature such as linguistic and educational provisions, and the interests of Roma, which are primarily socio-economic and political in nature, are sidelined. Roma are thus squeezed into a state minority policy which emphasizes cultural interests and do not fit their specific circumstances (section II) or when policy is tailored to their specific needs such as socio-economic interests (section III), significant improvements in the situation of Roma have not been felt because targeted programmes have not been implemented effectively. In light of these factors, the importance of representation structures which articulate the interests of Roma and advocate for meaningful integration efforts is inflated. These representation structures

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______________________________________________________________ have resulted from ethnic mobilization processes from the Romani community and include political parties and civil society organizations (see section IV). Table 1. State integration in Hungary Integration Component

State Response

Impact on Roma Integration

Cultural Integration

Local and National Minority Self-Government

Socio-Economic Integration

Medium and Long-Term Programmes targeting Roma.

Political Integration

Local and National Minority Self-Government

Cultural interests are not as relevant for Roma as socio-economic and political interests. Lack of coordinated approach to implement the Medium-Term Programme. Impact of discrimination is under-appreciated. Roma are under-represented in public life which has resulted in processes of ethnic mobilization.

The issues facing the Romani community in Hungary are complex and inter-related. It is not enough to address poverty without addressing societal exclusion because the two are inextricably linked. Likewise improving access to social services cannot be addressed without also tackling discrimination. Of course, any policy that aims at promoting effective integration ought to incorporate all three components and should be aware of the complex relationship between each component. Most models which attempt to understand integration processes often over-emphasize one of the three components. This is particularly true for Roma which require integration processes to focus on all three components simultaneously and should ensure that policy in one component is reflexively responsive to policies in other components. Thus, each integration component “may require different policy objectives and different policy instruments” (Entzinger, 2000, p. 115) but these need to be attuned to the real needs and interests of all minorities in Hungary. This chapter maintains that Roma cannot simply be the object of policy which is formulated and imposed from above. Effective integration policy in the cultural, socio-economic and political components should be formulated with input from Roma in order to be responsive to their interests. This means that channels of communication and consultation must be build into any integration efforts so that the voice of Roma can be heard and policy and legislation tailored accordingly. 1. State Integration Policy CEECs have shown a willingness to take measures to protect different ethnic, linguistic cultural and religious groups in their countries (Pataki, 2002, p. 247) in line with the process of democratization. Integration here is under-

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______________________________________________________________ stood as “a situation in which groups of different cultural backgrounds and different beliefs can participate in society on an equal footing” (Cashmore and Troyna, 1982, p. 61). There exists a variety of institutional mechanisms for ethnic accommodation which can be utilized including self-governance, cultural and territorial autonomy, assimilation and integration. Moreover, several services, benefits and valued resources are allocated by state agencies to people on the basis of their ethnicity (Drury, 1997, p. 20), and are deployed to foster integration. Therefore the state must first officially recognize an ethnic minority and its constituent members on the basis of ethnic categorization. Article 68 of the Constitution provides the basis for Act LXXVII of 1993 “On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities” (hereafter “Minorities Act”) which recognizes thirteen national and ethnic minorities in Hungary.2 Roma face barriers to effective integration which follows from a position that differs from other minorities for two key reasons. Firstly, Roma “occupy the lowest social and economic strata in large part as a result of their ethnic identity” (Jenne, 2000, p. 190–191). This means that the majority ascribes negative associations onto the Romani identity which in turn means Roma are marginalized and discriminated because they are ethnically Romani. Secondly, unlike Bulgarians, German, and Croatians, amongst others, Roma have no kin state to lobby and advocate on their behalf. Kin states are often effective representatives on behalf of diasporas which possess some leverage in bilateral relations. Jenne points out that the international community, in the form of intergovernmental organizations, mitigate this phenomenon to some extent for Roma (Jenne, 2000, p. 191) however it has been convincingly argued that this interest in the Roma issue is primarily motivated by the desire to curb East-West migration in Europe (Simhandl, 2006). In the past Roma have been assimilated through state policies which sought to eradicate the Romani identity. From the mid-eighteenth century both Maria Theresa and Joseph II attempted to deal with the Gypsy question through a policy of forced assimilation. Such measures included banning the name “Gypsy” and prohibiting the use of the Gypsy language (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, p. 2). The policy of assimilation proved successful with many Roma no longer speaking Romani indeed, 70 per cent of Roma in Hungary speak Hungarian. Whilst the relative socio-economic position of Roma improved under communism, expressions of cultural identity was suppressed and the Hungarian state restricted the nomadic way of life for Roma through forced sedentarization. Hungary’s current integration policy is primarily informed by its concern with the Magyar diaspora in neighbouring states. The Treaty of Trianon (1920) resulted in 2.8 million (about 22 per cent of all Hungarians) living in neighbouring states and Hungary has endured strained relations with many of its neighbours. Hungary’s seemingly progressive minority protection policy

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______________________________________________________________ is influenced by its desire to serve as a good example to neighbouring states which house Hungary’s diaspora (Bessenyey Williams, 2002, p 234). Such a policy may be motivated by a number of factors including “the level of ethnic solidarity, the electoral interests of office-seeking elites, and the presence or absence of effective external incentives to comply with the preferences of international actors” (Stein, 2000, p. 14). Furthermore, “it is a constitutional obligation (chap.1, art 6, para. 3) of the Hungarian government to take responsibility for the Hungarians living beyond the country’s border” (Bessenyey Williams, 2002, p. 229). Therefore, kin state behaviour may include material support for home state minorities such as donating school textbooks, lobbying in the international political context, or bilateral agreements with home state governments. The latter is of particular relevance for Hungary which concluded a series of bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries in the 1990s. After the first free elections in 1990, Prime Minister Antall stated: “It is time that the national minorities truly formed the most important bridge of friendship between countries, but this can only be done by communities who have gained their rights and sense of dignity”. Prior to 1994 with the elaboration of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection for National Minorities (FCNM) there existed no legally binding international standard covering national minorities however Hungary managed to safeguard some rights for the Magyar diaspora through bilateral agreements. By the end of 1992 Hungary had concluded bilateral treaties and conventions with Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Croatia and Slovenia, amongst others. The treaties contained a commitment to co-operate in various fields including language and culture and the central purpose of these treaties was to safeguard the future existence of the Magyar diaspora. Whilst the treaties concluded prior to 1993 were relatively uncontroversial as they had strong support by the host state the same cannot be said of the protracted treaties negotiated with Slovakia (1995) and Romania (1996). The main problems with these treaties being the respective fear on the part of Slovak and Romanian authorities in terms of group rights and any form of autonomy, particularly territorial autonomy. These bilateral treaties paved the way for the Law on the Hungarian Minorities Living in Neighbouring Countries which entered into force in 2002 and gives Hungarian minorities living abroad, upon registration, certain rights and privileges in the area of education and culture. Such developments did not affect Roma because they possess no kin state. There exists no Romanistan to lobby and advocate for the rights of Roma. The bilateral agreements concluded by Hungary placed an emphasis on national minorities, that is, those minorities which had a kin state. The rights and duties of national minorities are overwhelmingly cultural in nature as they relate to protection of language and ownership over media, and can secure material resources from their kin state to help preserve their cultural

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______________________________________________________________ identity. Therefore when Hungary elaborated its considered integration policy through the “Minorities Act”, it was no surprise that the interests and rights concerned culture. Roma were not given any particular concessions or credence even though they are the largest minority in Hungary. Thus integration efforts directed towards national minorities have been relatively successful whilst such efforts have largely by-passed the Romani community. In its first Opinion on Hungary in 2000, the Advisory Committee on the FCNM notes the difference in terms of interests between Roma and the twelve national minorities: “The situation of the Roma gives rise to deep concern, notably regarding numerous acts of discrimination in a wide range of societal settings, widespread negative perceptions and significant differences in socioeconomic and living conditions between Roma and the remaining population (…) In respect of other national minorities, issues to be addressed lie notably in the fields of media, education, and the participation in public life” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 2). The issue of integration of Roma is one of the most pertinent and pressing in Hungary today. In 2007, a new Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minorities Rights (Minorities Ombudsman) was appointed. Erno Kallai, a Rom, prioritizes the integration of the Romani minority into Hungarian society and describes this objective as a “crucial question” (ERRC, 2007a) facing Hungary. Whilst important measures have been taken to promote the integration of Roma into society, they continue to face particular difficulties which other minorities do not. Roma find themselves in a triple exclusion: cultural, socio-economic and political (Barša, 2002, p. 252), therefore their situation is unique. Their cultural exclusion is manifest in the disproportionate number of children attending “special” schools and the inadequate support for Romani educational and media initiatives. Their socioeconomic exclusion can be found in extremely high rates of unemployment and low standards in health and housing provisions. Finally, their political exclusion is reflected by their almost complete absence from the political and administrative architecture of the state. Hungary has attempted to address this exclusion both indirectly and directly through a series of legislative and policy interventions. Each component of integration policy is assessed in terms of stated objectives and formal implementation, and the impact on Romani integration. 2.

Cultural Integration: Minority Self-Government (MSG) in Hungary The Hungarian minority protection system is based on the concept of cultural autonomy (Eiler and Kovács, 2002, p. 176) which means a community living anywhere in the country can be joined together in an autonomous organization on the basis of their common ethnic belonging and is recognized as a constitutional entity, namely nations with cultural sovereignty. Gál notes that

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______________________________________________________________ cultural autonomy (sometimes referred to as personal autonomy) accord rights which are usually limited “to matters of culture, language, religion and education” (Gál, 2002, p. 8), and the cultural autonomy system in Hungary provides the platform for the articulation of cultural interests related to language, preservation of tradition and heritage, and education. Each national and ethnic minority has its own local and national self-government or “cultural parliament” (Krizsán, 2000, p. 251) which has exclusive legislative authority in cultural matters, and also has a separate cultural ministry and a national Secretary of State. The national self-government is a “body of representatives supposedly representing the interests of the whole community throughout the country” (Krizsán, 2000, p. 253) and is elected by delegates of the local minority selfgovernments. The national minority self-government is made up of 53 members, led by a President, which form the general assembly which is required meet four times annually. Local and national minority self-governments can participate in legislative and administrative activities from the lowest to the highest levels of governance, express their views on draft legal regulations and request information from public administrative bodies and local government on issues affecting the minority they represent, and propose measures to address. They have a right of veto on matters relating to education, culture, local media, efforts to sustain traditions, and the use of minorities’ languages, however in other areas their function is purely consultative. Before discussing the role and competencies of the MSG system and how these fit with general integration efforts towards national minorities as well as their appropriateness vis-à-vis the Romani community, it is first necessary to highlight some key recent changes in the MSG system. The MSG system was widely criticized for allowing non-national and other ethnic minorities to vote in the MSG elections however amendments in 2005 have improved this unsatisfactory situation. To explain, since the explicit purpose of the MSG system is to represent the cultural interests of national and ethnic minorities, it would seem appropriate to ensure that only individuals consciously identifying with one of the thirteen national or ethnic minorities could vote or stand in MSG elections. However, Article 70 of the Constitution states that everyone can vote and stand for election in the MSG elections irrespective of their group identity or affiliation. This meant that prior to 2006, representatives of minorities were not elected by the groups themselves and, more worryingly, some deliberately abused the electoral system so nonminorities sat on local self governments. The latter phenomenon tended to disproportionately affect the Romani community. This unsustainable situation led to a revision of the “Minorities Act” including how candidates are elected which will go some way to reducing the abuse of the MSG system. Since 2006, candidates and voters must register their ethnicity prior to elections at the local election office and only those who consciously identity as a

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______________________________________________________________ national or ethnic minority will be able to vote in the corresponding MSG election. However minorities in CEECs, and particularly Roma, have a distrust of ethnic registration therefore there is a concern that fewer individuals from minority communities will register which could make the MSG less representative and democratic. The status of these bodies as the most prominent representatives of a minority is not appropriate to its structure and competencies therefore there is a mismatch. In its present form it is not equipped to cope with the competitive and heterogeneous nature of Romani interests because “the very design of the system prevents it from having a significant impact on issues of greatest concern to most Roma and hinders political integration” (NDI, 2006, p. 6). The MSG system was never intended to promote one factional interest over another rather it was created to enhance the status and authority of a minority through formal representation of cultural interests. Indeed, Article 5(2) of the “Minorities Act” states: “The basic function of minority governments is to protect and represent the interests of minorities by performing their duties and exercising their statutory authority.” Kovats points out that there is an inherent tension between the “fundamental purpose of Roma politics to achieve equality for Roma with regards to the rights and opportunities enjoyed by other citizens and the primary role of the self-government system to promote the differences of minority identities through facilitating cultural autonomy” (Kovats, 2001, p. 21). The minority self-government system provides minorities with a platform to address cultural interests and promote their cultural identity and since minority groups such as Roma are often defined by their collective ethnic identity, the minority self-government system offers opportunities to reaffirm and embrace this ethnic identity in a public institution. Whilst other minority communities are principally concerned with cultural interests such as education and language, the Romani community face more pressing challenges such as poverty, discrimination, and unemployment, amongst others. This does not mean that cultural interests are irrelevant for Roma because the unique cultural heritage of Roma must be preserved, and the local and national Roma self-governments strive to ensure that the Romani identity is promoted. As noted previously, 70 per cent of Hungarian Roma speak Hungarian (Stewart, 1997, p. 10) as their first and preferred language due to previous assimilation policies. Certainly the linguistic aspect is more relevant to the twelve national minorities who have kin states and in many cases rely on the linguistic component of their identity to mark their specificity as a national minority, and the purpose of the MSG system is to protect the cultural identity of minorities. In multicultural societies, the cultural component is often favoured over socio-economic and political components of integration - because it is less demanding on resources - and therefore it tends to privilege some groups more than others. This is the case in

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______________________________________________________________ Hungary which has privileged national minorities by creating appropriate institutions which are tailored to their cultural interests. I do not dispute that the MSG system is a useful resource for national minorities however it is inappropriate for Roma and actually impedes integration efforts of the Romani community in other areas (section IV). Additionally, confusion exists over the role and competencies of local minority self-government and in particular their relationship to municipal governments. Local and national self-governments are intended to be partners to municipal governments at the local level, and to co-operate with the executive and the legislature at the national level however the relationship between the local minority self-government and the municipal governments is unclear meaning that “Roma often approach their minority self-government expecting assistance related to a broad number of issues including housing, employment, discrimination and utility services” (NDI, 2006, p. 22). To compound matters, municipal governments consistently refer Roma to their selfgovernments to address issues which fall well beyond their remit and result in Roma finding no solutions to their (invariably socio-economic and political) problems from either municipal government or from their local selfgovernment. In light of these shortcomings, it is imperative that the government pursues policies that reflect the real needs and circumstances of the Romani population, thus ensuring that socio-economic and political interests are addressed effectively. As Eiler and Kovács (2002, p. 183) accurately surmise: “While the principal objective of the 12 national minorities today is to stop the processes of assimilation and to fill the framework of cultural autonomy with actual content, the greatest challenge for Roma minority selfgovernments is the social and economic integration of the Roma minority.” The MSG system has won praise from international actors in terms of integrating minorities in Hungary and the twelve national minorities have certainly benefited greatly from the cultural provisions and institutions established by the “Minorities Act” in terms of protecting and preserving language and culture. The same cannot be said of Roma however. If the purpose of integration is to promote and protect ethnic identities then the MSG system is a success despite some shortcomings. However, if the purpose of integration is to ensure equality then the MSG system in its present form does not fit the Romani community because the issues facing Roma in Hungary are too multi-faceted and complex. They require a concerted effort on the part of state institutions as well as the Romani community and in some cases this means treating Roma differently in order to encourage integration.

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______________________________________________________________ 3.

Socio-Economic Integration: Medium and Long-Term Plans for the Integration of Roma The MSG system ensures that the socio-economic interests of Roma are articulated and that decisions affecting Roma are reached with their agreement and input. When discussing the merits of the MSG system, the President of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Toso Doncsev, argued that “the operation of Roma minority self-governments promotes social integration, resulting in better communications between Roma and non-Roma inhabitants of the same settlement” (IRB, 2001, p. 3). Whilst most MSGs are involved in the preservation of culture, language and traditions (for which support from the kin state is usually available), Roma self-governments are additionally involved in social issues, health care, employment and combating discrimination. However, the role of socio-economic integration primarily falls under the jurisdiction of municipal governments, backed up by material resources, whose relationship with Roma self-governments is often contentious. Indeed, “many municipalities tolerate, support or even implement segregation practices at the expense of Roma in several areas” (Council of Europe 2004, p. 5), including housing, health and education. Suffice to say that integration efforts will always be undermined when manifestations of segregation persist. Although Hungary has supported initiatives to integrate Roma, to some extent it was only since 1997 that there have been comprehensive measures to integrate Roma with the responsibility for the related measures being allocated to individual ministries. The “Medium-Term Roma Action Programme”3 provided for the establishment of targeted programmes in education and employment with each ministry submitting annual reports detailing how targets were being met. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is one of the key actors in ensuring the integration of Roma and allocated funding to support the Programme which focused on re-training and labour projects, as well as subsidies to support the long-term unemployed. One of the key problems facing Roma is the inability to access socio-economic provisions which is impeded by widespread direct and indirect discrimination. Although successive governments regard the social integration of Roma as both a minority policy and a social policy, which are informed respectively by group and individual approaches, this has meant that the Medium-Term Action Programme focuses on social issues, but does not address racial discrimination. This means that the socio-economic problems which Roma face are because of discrimination on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Put simply, Roma are discriminated against because they are Roma therefore integration efforts cannot ignore such underlying structural factors when attempting to improve their situation. Law CXXV on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities (2003) contains a general ban on all forms of direct and indi-

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______________________________________________________________ rect discrimination including discrimination based on affiliation to a minority. Equality of opportunity means “the prevention of racial and ethnic discrimination in the allocation of rights in such spheres as housing, employment and education” (Rex, 1997, p. 7). In this respect, it utilizes a (individual) human rights approach which would suggest that targeting the Romani communities collectively through state policies such as the Medium-Term Roma Action Plan is not enough in order to promote meaningful integration. Another key actor which facilitated the Medium-Term Roma Action Programme for the integration of Roma was the Ministry of Education. A large number of Roma were (and continue to be) over-represented in socalled “special schools” or specially-designated “catch-up classes” within schools which is the result of societal prejudice and institutional racism rather than weak cognitive and learning capabilities. The issue of segregated schooling for Romani children has become a visible and potent motivator of collective action, particularly at the transnational level. In 2002, the Budapestbased European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) submitted written comments to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) which argues that discrimination pervades all aspects of life for Roma in Hungary, notably in the fields of education, housing, and access to public services and the subsequent report from UNCERD maintains that in spite of the Medium-Term Roma Action Programme “[abuse and discrimination] practices have not ceased” (ERRC, 2002a, p. 1). In 2007, one Romani Member of the European Parliament Viktória Mohácsi initiated a lawsuit, together with the Romani Civil Rights Foundation and Amalipe, against schools which continue this practice and has called for the number of Romani children classified as mentally disabled to be reduced. It is estimated that 20 per cent of Romani children are classified as such which is ten times more than the proportion of non-Roma children (ERRC, 2007b, p. 1). This phenomenon, which is discussed by Cashman in this volume, excludes socially disadvantaged children from mainstream public education. Whilst equality cannot be achieved by treating everyone the same, persistent segregation in the education system reinforces negative associations with Romani identity and is antithetical to integration efforts. The true test of any integration policy is how it is implemented. In 2000, one Romani politician, Aladar Katai, argued that the Medium-Term Action Programme was too slow and was not producing the expected results4 and another commentator, Gabor Czene, maintained that the Programme had not improved the situation of Roma in 2000 “significantly enough to be felt” (cited in IRB, 2001, p. 4). This led to a series of major institutional changes following the elections in 2002. Roma affairs became the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister’s Office and a Political State Secretary for Roma Affairs was nominated. Additionally, the Council for Roma Affairs, a coordinating body without decision-making powers, was set up. The work of

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______________________________________________________________ the State Secretary is supported by the Office for Roma Affairs, which was created to deal with issues concerning the social integration of Roma. In 2002, the new state policy placed particular emphasis on equality of opportunity in accessing socio-economic rights. The role of international actors has been a key influence in minority policy in CEECs. Accession to the European Union was a motivating factor for most CEECs in 2000 and this led to the creation of two Roma Social Integration PHARE programmes in 2000 and 2002. The 2000 Programme supported projects aiming at combating discrimination in accessing socioeconomic provisions whilst the 2002 sought to enhance the efficiency, implementation and impact of the Medium-Term Roma Action Programme (Prime Minister’s Office, 2003, p. 3) however the socio-economic situation did not improve as was hoped. The Advisory Committee to the FCNM notes that important measures have been taken to promote the integration of Roma into society however, “they continue to face particular difficulties and various forms of discrimination in a range of fields such as education, employment, housing and health care” (Council of Europe, 2004, p. 1). In 2007, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) submitted Concluding Observations on Hungary’s compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee expressed concern at the inadequate access of Roma to social and economic rights including housing, employment, health, and education. The Committee noted that: that the housing conditions of Roma were inadequate and that Roma were subject to forced evictions and there exist barriers to accessing social housing; Roma faced discrimination in the labour market; Roma are frequently denied access to health services and experience segregation in hospitals; and a high number of Roma children are segregated in separate schools and classes (CESCR, 2007). This would suggest that the socioeconomic situation of Roma has not substantially changed in postenlargement Hungary. Turning to more recent developments it is possible to gauge whether lessons have been learned from past failures. Despite previous shortcomings, current state integration efforts reflect minor adjustments rather than a radical departure from the past. However, the medium-term vision, so prevalent in previous government policy, has been abandoned in favour of a long-term approach thus Hungarian authorities have recognized that the integration of Roma should not attempt any quick fix solutions. In 2007, Hungary adopted the Roma Integration Decade Programme Strategy Plan for the period 2007– 2015 which sets out tasks in two-year action plans. As before these include concrete measures and monitoring tasks primarily in the field of employment, housing, education and health, although the government also recognizes that legal measures and incentives are not enough; it is essential to change attitudes and values system too which can only be achieved in the long term. The

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______________________________________________________________ first two year action plan (2008–2009) adopted by Governmental Decree 1105/2007 contains projects with deadlines and allocated resources (of ten billion HUF) in the priority areas of: education; employment and development of enterprises; housing; health; anti-discrimination; culture, media and sport; and gender equality as a horizontal issue (Ürmös, 2008, p. 3). The new state policy will target Roma in areas where Roma are over-represented including long-term unemployment, low educational attainment, early school leaving, etc. It remains to be seen whether the long-term approach will succeed where the medium-term approach has failed although there does appear to be a concerted effort on the part of government to address the socioeconomic interests of Roma. It has been argued that state Roma integration policy is distributive, rather than developmental (ERRC, 2002b, p. 44), and this distinction is important. Allocating funding is important up to a point but it also requires supporting legislation and policy which addresses the specific interests of Roma, however such interests can only be known through the active participation and representation of Roma in public life. 4. Political Integration: Participation and Representation of Roma Romani mobilization and participation in public life are necessary for the interests of Roma to be heard. Through self-organization, the collective experiences and interests of Roma in Hungarian society can be articulated, and this ought to inform state integration policy. Too often the interests of Roma are assumed by state agencies and these are often tacked onto institutions designed for national minorities. Taking the MSG system as an example, the emphasis on cultural interests has had the unintended consequence of highlighting its political shortcomings, and begs the question: How is it possible to manage and articulate shared socio-economic and political interests through an institution primarily designed for establishing the cultural autonomy of minority populations? It can be argued that by providing representation through the MSG system the state suffocates calls for representation in parliament. Paragraph 68 of the Constitution states that national and ethnic minorities are constituent factors in the State and that “the laws of the Republic of Hungary ensure representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the territory of the country.” In the Constitution there is no explicit statement relating to a level of political integration for national and ethnic minorities therefore Krizsán (2000, p. 258) points out: “a literal reading of the Constitution suggests that even minority self-governments could be an acceptable means of representation.” But parliament has proven a difficult institution for Roma to access. There is currently no Romani parliamentarian who has been elected on an ethnic ticket, either independently or with a Romani political party. There are Romani candidates on mainstream political party lists but the descriptive representation of Roma in parliament does not match their demo-

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______________________________________________________________ graphic weight. There are only three Romani parliamentarians at present, out of a potential 386, (on the side of the opposition Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union) yet the population of Roma in Hungary is approximately 6 per cent. This has led to calls for a guaranteed seat in parliament for national and ethnic minorities but there is a danger that such an innovation would be merely decorative and tokenistic and may not improve integration efforts of Roma, as is the case in Romania (McGarry, 2008). Thus a valid concern of opponents to guaranteed representation in parliament is that it creates an “illusion of power” (Cole, 1976, p. 221; cited in Adolino, 1998, p. 19) which would not produce tangible benefits for Roma. Political integration of the Romani community refers to the participation and representation of Roma in public life, so that they are included in the main institutions of society. Phillips (1993, p. 174) argues that “some of the disadvantages that oppressed groups suffer can be remedied only in policy by an affirmative acknowledgement of the group’s specificity.” But the political integration of any group is different from cultural or socio-economic integration in that it requires mobilization of the community in question to articulate interests and demands. The state can provide resources to stimulate political integration but the onus is on the community in question. There is a danger that vertical political integration efforts can create dependency on state resources and by extension calls into question the autonomy of an organization if it is sponsored by the state (ERRC, 2002b, p. 4). Given the emphasis on cultural integration by the state, efforts to integrate Roma politically have not been adequately pursued. Adolino (1998, p. 1) argues that “participation in parties, elections and representative institutions are important means for promoting political integration.” In this respect political integration refers to the incorporation of Roma into mainstream political institutions such as political parties and parliament. Whilst such pursuits are certainly important, they have only attained a modicum of success. To examine the instances of political integration of Roma this section will focus on how Roma in Hungary have attempted to create their own representation structures to articulate their interests and focuses on Romani political parties and civil society organizations. Needless to say, the creation of such representation structures requires appropriate policy and legislative responses from the state, which will further encourage political integration efforts. Roma need to be able to influence decision and policies which affects them directly though this does not necessarily mean having control over decision-making. Political parties and civil society organizations are key actors which stimulate political integration. The two largest Romani political parties in Hungary are Lungro Drom and MCF Roma Union, the former being the largest political association. In the 2006 parliamentary elections, Lungro Drom, in coalition with the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union grouping secured three seats, whilst MCF Roma Union, allied with the MSzP attained

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______________________________________________________________ only 0.08 per cent of the national vote. In assessing the role of political parties based on ethnic affiliation, it has been argued “membership and constituencies are coeval with the minority’s population, electoral mobilization is unproblematic, and turnout is akin to a census” (Stein, 2000, p. 19). But such confidence in electoral support is misplaced as this is clearly not the case with Roma who do not tend to vote for Romani political parties because if they did their parliamentary representation would be much higher. Indeed Roma, more generally, do not engage in democratic procedures due to lack of identification papers and an antipathy towards mainstream political institutions, which continue to marginalize Romani communities. The Roma vote is split between these two political parties which impede attempts to build an effective political platform. Furthermore, the practical implications of the MSG system means that Roma direct their efforts towards the local and national minority self-governments, at the expense of creating and nurturing other representation structures to foster political integration. Representation for marginalized groups requires institutional mechanisms and material resources, and representation is important as it ensures that all interests in the public are recognized in democratic deliberations. Civil society organizations have been much more useful than political parties in facilitating political integration. The proliferation of Romani civil society organizations and associations after 1989 testifies to the culture of civic advocacy and activism in Hungary today. And MSGs have very few advantages over non-governmental organizations “other than very limited government funding and the right to consent on issues of education, language, and cultural preservation” (NDI, 2006, p. 22). Civil society organizations ensure that citizens, including minorities, organize themselves and take part in the monitoring and implementing of policy measures beyond the control of the state. These representation structures are on the fringes of bureaucratic and administrative institutions which have carved out a new social space by filling a niche: they articulate interests which have been sidelined by state-controlled structures. In this respect, civil society organizations provide a mechanism for political integration which supplements the electoral process. The real quality of Roma civil society organizations lies not just in their ability to effect social change or successfully impact on the distribution of state funding, but in their capacity to ensure the Romani community have a political voice. Civil society organizations also articulate the socio-economic interests of Roma. The state budget provides statutory funding to help integrate Roma into the labour market. The key partners in this policy are locally-based Roma NGOs who, as representatives of the Romani minority, gather information about who is employed and what qualifications they have (Babusik, 2004, p. 15). Locally-based Romani NGOs are viewed as trusted partners by both the state and the Romani community so are privy to data on those indi-

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______________________________________________________________ viduals who are registered with them in order to find a job. One prominent example is the Autonómia Foundation which was established in 1990 with the aim of helping the merging civil society through implementing programmes and developing projects including “Employment Without Prejudice” in Tolna County in 2004/2005 which contributed to the fight against labour market discrimination in a localized context.5 Guided by its long-term vision of self-reliance of Roma, Autonómia mobilizes the support of local communities by training leaders and assisting employment initiatives. Political integration clearly requires the political will of Roma as well as supporting institutions (in the form of policy and legislation) where necessary. Political integration, like cultural and socio-economic integration, is an ongoing process and is not unproblematic. The Romani community may be unwilling to engage in mainstream political structures but signs of political integration are slowly emerging. Conclusion Hungary’s policy towards national and ethnic minorities has been characterized by an emphasis on cultural integration first and foremost. For Roma, this has resulted in efforts to preserve identity, language and traditions through MSGs. Whilst cultural integration efforts ought to be encouraged and sustained, this needs to be complimented by a more concerted and considered approach to socio-economic and political integration which are more relevant to Roma. Minorities often seek differential treatment with regards to cultural interests, that is, that their respective otherness should be celebrated. However, usually they seek integration in the socio-economic and political components so that they are afforded the same opportunities as other citizens. All three components are relevant to Roma and policy and legislation ought to be attuned to the relationships between and across the different integration components. In this respect it is more appropriate to conceive of integration as a process, not a tangible product. The principal mechanism for promoting integration of minorities has been the establishment of the MSG system. This system has benefited the twelve national minorities and is certainly an important tool for Roma although the cultural remit of the MSGs do not match up to the interests of Roma. For this reason state policy towards Roma can be described as putting round pegs in square holes; Roma have been tacked onto a system which is not designed for them. Attempts to target Roma through budgetary allocation and Programmes have thus far failed to produce notable changes for many Romani communities due to their short-term focus and inability to adequately appreciate the impact of racial discrimination on Romani access to socioeconomic goods and services. The one component where state integration efforts have been subdued has been in the sphere of politics. It is not the sole responsibility of the state to guarantee formal representation for minorities

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______________________________________________________________ and evidence in other states suggests that these are often tokenistic. Political integration for Roma has the most distance to travel because Roma are building on unstable foundations, therefore it will take time. Recent mobilization efforts by Roma have secured democratic representation in the national assembly but this is does not reflect the demographic weight of Roma in Hungary. Additionally, projects and efforts in civil society indicate an increasing dynamism to advance political integration of Roma on a local level. Meaningful integration will require that Roma are able to participate in public institutions at the local and national level for it is only through representation structures that Roma are able to articulate their interests. It has been argued that policies on Roma are designed and shaped by administrators with “little knowledge of the needs and insights of the Roma people” (Puxon, 1973, p. 13). The importance of political representation is exacerbated due to the lack of an effective ally or advocate in the shape of a kin state. The history of the Romani community across Europe demonstrates the necessity of possessing a political voice- it means that ignoring, excluding or presuming needs and interests are assuaged. Endnotes 1 For a historical overview of the Romani sub-groups in Hungary see: Marushiakova and Popov, 2001: 38–39. 2 These are: Roma, Germans, Slovakians, Croatian, Serbian, Armenian, Romanian, Polish, Greek, Bulgarian, Slovenians, Ukrainian, Ruthenian. 3 After a 1999 revision the Programme was officially titled, “Government resolution No. 1047/1999 (V.5) about Medium-Term Measures to Improve the Living Standards and Social Position of the Roma Population” (Kadét 2001, p. 4). 4 RFE/RL, 8th August 2000. 5 Autonómia Foundation Annual Report 2004: 21.

References Adolino, J.R. (1998), Ethnic Minorities, Electoral Politics and Political Integration in Britain. London: Pinter. Autonómia Foundation (2004), Annual Report. Budapest: Oliton. Babusik, F. (2004), “Legitimacy, Statistics and Research Methodology- Who is Romani in Hungary today and what are we (not) allowed to know about Roma?,” Ethnic Statistics, Roma Rights Quarterly, 2. ERRC, Budapest, 14– 18.

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______________________________________________________________ Barša, P. (2002), “Ethnocultural Justice in East European States and the Case of the Czech Roma,” in: W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski (eds.), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 243–257. Bessenyey-Williams, M. (2002), “European Integration and Minority Rights: The Case of Hungary and its Neighbours,” in: R. Linden (ed.), Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 227–258. Cashmore, E. and B. Troyna (eds.) (1982), Black Youths in Crisis. London: Allen & Unwin. Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2000), Opinion on Hungary. Strasbourg. ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)004, 1–17. Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2004), Second Opinion on Hungary. Strasbourg. ACFC/INF/OP/II(2004)003, 1–32. Drury, B. (1997), “Ethnic mobilisation: Some theoretical considerations,” in: J. Rex. and B. Drury (eds.), Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-cultural Europe. Aldershot: Avebury, 13–29. Eiler, F. and N. Kovács (2002), “Minority Self-Governments in Hungary”, in: K. Gál (ed.), Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Reform Institute. Entzinger, H. (2000), “The Dynamics of Integration Policies: A Multidimensional Model,” in: R. Koopmans and P. Statham (eds.), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–117. European Commission’s Regular Report on Hungary, 2002. Brussels. European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) (2002a), “ERRC Submits Written Comments Concerning Roma Rights Issues in Hungary to the UN Human Rights Committee,” Roma Rights, Budapest. European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), (2002b), “Grassroots Strategies to Combat Extreme Poverty”. Extreme Poverty. Roma Rights, 1, Budapest.

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______________________________________________________________ European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), (2007a), “ERRC Welcomes Hungary’s New Minority Ombudsman,” Roma Rights, (4/2007). Budapest. European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), (2007b), “Segregated Schooling Updates in Hungary,” Roma Rights, Budapest. Gál, K. (2002), “Minority Governance on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century,” in: K. Gál (ed.), Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: Open Society Institute. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) (2001), Hungary Government Actions to Improve the Situation of Roma in 2000–2001. Issue Paper, May 2001. Jenne, E. (2000), “The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe: Constructing a Stateless Nation,” in: J. P. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post Communist Europe: State-Building, Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization. New York: East West Institute, 189–212. Kadét, E. (2001), “Creative Accounting: State Spending on Programmes for Roma in Hungary,” Roma Rights 2–3/2001. Budapest. Kaltenbach, J. (1998), “Hungarian Report,” in: J. Kranz and H. Küpper (eds.), Law and Practice in Central European Countries in the Field of National Minorities Protection After 1989, Warsaw: Centre for International Relations. Kovats, M. (2001), “The Political Significance of the first National Gypsy Minority Self-Government (Országos Cigány Kisebbségi önkormányzat),” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 1: 1–24. Krizsán, A. (2000), “The Hungarian Minority Protection System: a flexible approach to the adjudication of ethnic claims,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 26(2): 247–262. Marushiakova, E. and Popov, V. (2001), “Historical and ethnographic background: Gypsies, Roma, Sinti,” in: W. Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future. The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, Hatfield: Hertfordshire University Press.

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______________________________________________________________ McGarry, A. (2008), “Political Participation and Interest Representation of Roma in Romania,” Journal on Ethnopolitical and Minority Issues in Europe. Issue 1: 1–25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), Gypsies/Roma in Hungary. Fact Sheets on Hungary. Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1–12. National Democratic Institute (NDI), (2006), “The Hungarian Minority SelfGovernment System as a Means of Increasing Romani Political Participation,” Assessment Report, September/October. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Pataki, Z. G. (2002), “Overview of Proposals for Minority Self-Governments of Hungarian Minorities in Central Europe,” in: K. Gál (ed.) Minority Governance in Europe. Budapest: Open Society Institute. Phillips, A. (1993), Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity Press. Prime Minister’s Office (The Political Secretary Responsible for Roma Affairs) (2003), The Hungarian Government’s Roma Policy. June, 1–6. Puxon, G. (1973), Rom: Europe’s Gypsies. London: Minority Rights Group. Rex, J. (1997), “Ethnic mobilisation in multi-cultural societies”, in: J. Rex and B. Drury (eds.) Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-cultural Europe. Aldershot: Avebury, 3–12. Riba, I. (1999), “Minority Self-Government in Hungary,” The Hungarian Quarterly, 40(155), 1–3. Ringold, D. Orenstein, M. and E. Wilkens (2004), Roma in an Expanding Europe: Breaking the Poverty Cycle. London: World Bank. Simhandl, K. (2006), “’Western Gypsies and Travellers’–‘Eastern Roma’: the creation of political objects by the institutions of the European Union,” Nations and Nationalism, 12(1): 97–115. Stein, J.P. (2000), “National Minorities and Political Development in PostCommunist Europe,” in: J. P. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post Communist Europe: State-Building, Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization. New York: East West Institute, 1–30.

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______________________________________________________________ Stewart, M. (1997), The Time of the Gypsies. Oxford: Westview. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (2007), Concluding Observations: Hungary. E/C.12/HUN/3, 1–8. Ürmös, A. (2008), Recent Developments and Upcoming Plans of Hungary. Decade of Roma Inclusion, International Steering Committee Meeting. June 24–25.

Empowerment as a two-way Process: The Role of Romani NGOs in the Integration of Macedonian Society Sara Nikolić This paper analyzes the paths to integration of the Romani community in the Republic of Macedonia. Taking Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to human development, it argues that both individual capacities and the capacity of society to create a framework for cooperation are essential for integrating traditionally marginalized groups. The Macedonian case study indicates that one path to integration along the designated lines leads Romani communities to engage in NGO activity. The role of this sector as both an initiator of work on Romani integration, and as a promoter of participatory capabilities by the Romani public, provides leverage in addressing public policy issues specifically relevant for both individual and community well-being. Introduction Recent data on the well-being of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe clearly points to their marginal social and economic position in their respective societies.1 “The particular predicament of the Roma […] is well documented. Problems of pervasive discrimination in several areas of life, especially regarding access to employment, education, health care and housing, go hand in hand with numerous instances of racial violence, and mistreatment by the police” (Henrard, 2003, p. 183). The issues of Romani marginalisation and exclusion in states of Central and East Europe and beyond are broadly covered in numerous recent publications, in the contributions of this volume among others. Instead of addressing these problems, my paper seeks to identify avenues that could enable members of the Romani community to alter their present state. By discussing the Romani community in Macedonia I explore different approaches to the empowerment of the group in more general terms.2 For this purpose, the discussion is grounded on Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’ approach to human development (Sen, 1999). It suggests that empowerment should be seen as an enhancement of one’s capabilities, dependent on both individual,

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______________________________________________________________ as well as on societal capacity to create a framework for human development and capability realization. Sen further defines capability enhancement as achievable via the development of favourable public policy. As the latter is dependent on the use of participatory capabilities by the public itself, it will be the objective of my contribution to focus on this two-way approach to empowerment. I therefore investigate developments in public policy and public advocacy, and consider the relationship between the two in order to depict the process of empowerment of Roma in Macedonia in terms of Sen’s approach. The main argument suggests that empowerment can be achieved through policies promoting the favourable integration of Roma in Macedonia, partly developed by Roma themselves, via Romani non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as viable participatory mechanisms. This argument is necessarily composed of two parts. Firstly, I argue that the process of integrating Romani communities in Eastern Europe has better chances for success if it is accomplished under terms favourable to the group. Enhancing Romani capabilities can, as such, be a means for this group’s empowerment and hence integration. The perspective on integration I chose in this context fits within the liberal-pluralist framework, giving importance to both individual and community rights.3 It is generally accepted that this perspective is the most favourable in contemporary settings and is highly conducive to minority empowerment in a society dominated by another group. To illustrate this, I assess empowerment strategies using the process of Romani integration in Macedonia as a case study, and evaluate the development of public policy, which enables integration on positive terms. The second part of my argument focuses on the role of the Romani non-governmental sector as a promoter of improved participatory capabilities for the Romani public. By discussing the role of Romani NGOs in public policy-making on the issue of integration, I argue that the empowerment of a minority is stimulated by inter-communal dialogue and cooperation. I further demonstrate that Romani NGOs are a means to facilitate the political and social participation of the Romani community in Macedonia’s policy-making process. Overall, while Romani empowerment presumes integration under favourable terms, successful integration can only be accomplished through the participation of the Romani community itself in the development and implementation of policies relating to them. NGOs play a crucial role in this process, being one of the sensible tools enabling this participation4 and enhancing the collaboration between the minority and majority communities. My study is based on field research conducted in Macedonia in the summer of 2006. 14 interviews were conducted with civil society and government sector representatives working on Romani integration issues. The field-work data is supplemented by reviews and analysis of the relevant analytical digests and policy documents of the Macedonian state.

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______________________________________________________________ 1. Theoretical Framework of Empowerment and Integration As the aim of this work is to consider a plausible path for the empowerment of a disadvantaged community, it requires a focus on equality of opportunity not solely from the point of view of the individual but also of the community as a whole. Therefore, this discussion very much reflects the ideas of a multifaceted, or human, approach to development. A leading name when considering human development and taking a dual perspective of examining the circumstances from the point of view of the disadvantaged group, as well as of the wider society it is based within, is Amartya Sen. Adopting a ‘capabilities’ approach to human development, Sen argues that the ‘expansion of the “capabilities” of persons to lead the kind of lives that they value – and have reason to value’, is relational, rather than solely individual (Sen, 1999, p. 18). Its realization depends both on individual agency, as well as on the capacity of society to create a framework for the realization of these capabilities. Using this approach, Sen explains poverty as being characterised by deeper factors than simply low income, as rather being the result of deprivation of a number of basic capabilities. These include limited educational opportunities, insufficient access to proper health care and nonexistent public participation mechanisms, leading to a general state of disempowerment within which it is difficult to prosper. Low income can have adverse effects such as illiteracy and ill health, but it is only by tackling these issues through focused policy measures that human well-being can be achieved and sustained (Sen, 1999, p. 19). Low income is, therefore, only the end-result of a general incapacity to access basic capabilities. Consequently, the realization of these capabilities is important for human development and empowerment, while income remains only instrumentally significant in the process (Sen, 1999, p. 87). Human development is, therefore, expressed through the capacity to act (Kavan, 2006). Thus, sources of poverty do not lie solely in individual capacity but are rooted in social structures which prevent individuals from making the most of their opportunities. This framework makes clear that the difficulties with integration experienced by Roma need to be addressed in terms of empowerment and expressed through the enhancement of capabilities (Kavan, 2006). Sen states how “[…] capabilities can be enhanced by public policy, but also, on the other side, the direction of public policy can be influenced by the effective use of participatory capabilities by the public” (Sen, 1999, p. 18, italics are my own). Therefore, empowerment can be defined as a set of mechanisms that enable communities to access and participate in decisionmaking on policy issues. This type of participation requires both capacitydevelopment within the given community and a society open to the participation of previously excluded groups.

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______________________________________________________________ Looking at the idea of empowerment from another angle, it becomes important to define a context that is conducive to the empowerment of a minority group. Kymlicka’s discussion of minority rights in the context of nation-building provides additional insights into how the model can be deployed. His argument is that the members of majority groups have an invariable advantage over minority ethnocultural communities in devising political institutions to suit their interests (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 19–22). Minority groups, according to Kymlicka, either have the option to ‘integrate into the majority society or seek the self-government needed to create and sustain their own modern institutions’ (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 23). This model has, however, only marginal applicability for stateless and dispersed communities, such as Roma. Instead, integration into the structures of the nation-states where they reside appears to be the best approach to empowerment available for Romani communities (Djordjević and Filipović, 2005, pp. 57–58). Therefore, keeping this in mind, my discussion evaluates mechanisms that enhance capabilities and thus achieve empowerment. To do so, I turn to the notion of integration. Integration can be understood in different ways. For the purposes of this paper, I use the concept to determine conditions required for and resulting in empowerment. To do so, I move away from basic liberal theory and its exclusive focus on the rights and empowerment of the individual to also take into account the concepts of empowerment of ethnocultural groups explored in communitarian theory. Therefore, I prefer to define integration in liberalpluralist terms, as this approach presents a synthesis of both the liberal and the communitarian models. Such a definition advocates a combination of both civic and communitarian values in order to obtain the most favourable model of inclusion for ethnocultural groups. Kymlicka recognizes that “controversies and conflicts over the management of ethnocultural diversity won’t go away, or spontaneously resolve themselves [but rather] they are a permanent and enduring feature of liberal democracies that must be tackled headon” (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 82). He argues that the standard liberal model separating state and ethnic identity in an attempt at ‘cultural neutrality’ is inappropriate, because ethnicity is not a marginal phenomenon and will not disappear as states modernize (ibid., pp. 14–15). Instead, Kymlicka argues for ethnic relations based upon ‘ethnocultural justice’ (ibid., pp. 21). Striking a middle ground between liberal and communitarian perspectives, his suggestion seeks to address the challenges to equal treatment experienced by members of contemporary multi-ethnic and multicultural societies. Kymlicka places ethnocultural justice within the framework of a liberal democratic model of ‘nation-building’, urging a greater focus on minority rights. Essentially, he argues that it is through access to minority rights that a member of a minority community can come to exercise their individual rights on an equal basis. In this sense, minority rights both “[…] protect the

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______________________________________________________________ freedom of individuals within the group; and they promote relations of equality (non-dominance) between groups” (ibid., pp. 28). This approach, therefore, excludes the possibility of internal restrictions – of groups legitimately limiting “the basic civil or political rights of their own members in the name of preserving the purity or authenticity of the group’s culture, traditions, or bloodlines” (ibid., pp. 27–28). As such, Kymlicka considers the communitarian perspective but adjusts it to the liberal expectations of preserving individual rights and liberties, bringing forth ideas that correspond to functional improvements in the position of minorities. To establish the key elements of integration under favourable terms, Kymlicka looks at integration from the perspective of different types of ethnocultural communities. He identifies the integration of recognised national minorities to be particularly complicated,5 because it represents an “imposed choice” rather than the outcome of deliberation between the group members (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 63). National minorities require the “same tools of nation-building available to […] the majority nation, subject to the same liberal limitations” (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 27). In addition, they need a set of ‘external protections’ - minority rights, which reduce their vulnerability to the majority’s economic or political dominance, without in turn enabling them to dominate over other groups (ibid., pp. 28). In this way, minority groups are able to assume a position of “positive equality”, not being disadvantaged by the possession of cultural traits different to those of the majority. For Kymlicka, Roma, as a group, could either be defined as “national minority”, or as “transnational” minority. In the first instance their countries of residence would be required to provide them with additional guarantees, in the latter case, being a “European” minority would result in a civil-rightsoriented approach, taking ethnocultural issues beyond the responsibility of a nation-state (ibid., pp. 74–75). Currently the two approaches are combined, putting “increased emphasis on cultural differences alongside issues of eliminating discrimination” (ibid., pp.74). Kymlicka concludes that with the majority of Roma adjusted to their host-cultures, and highly fragmented in terms of their native language and customs, negotiating their status in their countries of residence becomes of primary importance (ibid., pp.76). Additionally, integration processes will vary across the CEE region, which explains the need for a country-focused approach for discussing the issue. Integration, according to the liberal-pluralist perspective, needs to address some elements of individual choice, but also include an emphasis on minority rights and the recognition of separate ethnic identities, the fight against prejudice and discrimination and the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Furthermore, political institutions need to be modified to make them more accommodating to cultural differences and to reduce the bias in favour of the dominant group.6 Kymlicka points to the right to repre-

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______________________________________________________________ sentation as an important element of inclusion, whether in the form of geographic constituencies or of non-territorial representation in the public sphere (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 176). Integration simultaneously involves the recognition of one’s duties and obligations, and, furthermore, can only function as a “two-way process”– if both the mainstream society is ready to adapt to the minority groups, and vice versa (ibid., p. 96). In this section of my paper, I have argued that integration is most successful if it follows the path of empowerment and leads to the enhancement of one’s capabilities. I have also argued that participation of the disempowered in policy-making can be achieved by providing the non-dominant group with both individual and collective rights. Now I turn to discuss the process of empowering Roma in the Republic of Macedonia. My argument will be illustrated by examining their participation in policy-making relevant to Romani integration and looking, in particular, at the participation of Romani NGOs in the policy-making process. 2. The Macedonian Integration Framework Before examining the process of Romani integration in Macedonia in particular, I will outline the background to the regional context of Romani integration. When it comes to policy developments regarding Roma in Eastern Europe,7 as well as the integration of minorities in general, an important shift in frameworks can be observed since the end of the communist period. It is a move towards more liberal-pluralist understandings and practices of integration. As Jean Pierre Liegeois argues, although the communist policy towards the Roma in Eastern Europe was one of inclusion, it was in fact an inclusion that was technocratic and controlling, with an underlying intention to assimilate rather than to integrate (Liégeois, 1994, pp. 143–144). This approach fits within the overall goal of minimizing ethnic differences within society (Ringold, 2000, p. 5) through “[melting] individual and ethnic distinctiveness into a homogenous working class” (UNDP, 2002, p. 21). This goal was to be achieved throught the application of restrictive policies, such as the prohibition of nomadism and the adoption of legislation on sedenterization. Additionally, extensive industrialization absorbed the Romani population into the ranks of unskilled labourers in the state-controlled economy, to the detriment of the traditional independent occupations they held in the informal sector (Liégeois, 1994, pp. 143–144 ; Thelen, 2005, p. 29; Friedman, 2002, pp. 23–47). All of these practices show how “[i]nclusion of Roma in socialist societies was done in an assimilative and non-participatory way” (UNDP, 2002, p. 19). Several relevant shifts in practices can be observed in the period following the fall of communism. The negative economic trends and the loss of

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______________________________________________________________ certainty, security, full employment, and welfare that ensued in the postcommunist period affected most of the citizens of Eastern Europe unfavourably (Vejvoda, 1997, pp. 40–42) but Roma have been particularly hard hit. In material terms, they were greatly affected by the crisis in the heavy industry sector, where a great majority made a living (Huber, 1993, p. 47; Thelen, 2005, p. 30). Furthermore, the climate of rising tensions due to feelings of popular frustration has found release in growing ethno-nationalism, xenophobia and scapegoating. Roma often bore the brunt of the rising discrimination, further aggravating their overall well-being (Henrard, 2003, p. 183; Huber, 1993, p. 46; Petrova, 2004, pp. 24–25). From the desired socialist homogeneity of the communist period, there was a switch to particularization according to ethnic belonging, shifting the framework from assimilation to segregation. However, with the opening of the public sphere created by the breakdown of totalitarian state control, as well as global and regional advancements in the field of human rights protection, positive shifts in the treatment and status of minorities also began to emerge (Petrova, 2004, p. 8). The strong pressure and incentives, to implement measures to protect both human and minority rights in the newly emerging, transitional democracies of the East, is to a great extent related to the push for membership in an enlarging European Union. The special emphasis on favourable minority policies, as well as a closer focus on the situation of Roma in particular, was part of a pre-emptive enlargement agenda of Western governments, the EU and supranational organizations (Kovats, 2002, p. 1). In the context of the growing mobility which accompanies the process of EU integration, “[s]upporting vulnerable groups’ desires for social integration in the CEE countries is the only sustainable way to prevent the emergence of impoverished, alienated, underclass strata when the countries join the EU” (UNDP, 2002, p. 83).8 Therefore, national policy developments concerning Roma in Eastern Europe can at least in part be identified as a direct outcome of wider European interests. As a result, in recent years, especially since the late 1990s, significant efforts undertaken by Eastern European states on behalf of their Romani populations can be recognized: “They have established new institutional structures to deal with minority affairs, designed and introduced a number of programs and policies, and generally devoted increasing attention to the Roma’s predicament. The status and rights of the Gypsies […] have become more or less strongly safeguarded by new laws in all of the region even though in practice these rights are not always protected effectively” (Barany, 2002, p. 322).

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______________________________________________________________ These new measures also include the passing of anti-racist and antidiscrimination bills (Barany, 2002, pp. 311–316), as well as the development of specialized national strategies for Roma in many South-East European states (Abdikeeva, 2005, p. 1). Finally, emerging from the 2003 regional conference in Budapest “Roma in an Expanding Europe: Challenges for the Future”, the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005–2015) presents the political commitment of ten Central and South-East European states to actively engage in resolving the issues of Romani poverty, exclusion and discrimination.9 The initiative was founded by a group of regional and international actors, which again points to the growing global, and most notably European, concern for the situation of Roma in the region. Of course, reaching positive results requires the active involvement of the majority populations in the process, as well as of Roma themselves. Taking all of this into consideration, it can be argued that important steps are being taken with regard to including and recognizing the Romani population in state affairs. In addition, the opening of the public sphere as a result of the fall of communism creates a space for action and for the mobilization of the citizens themselves. This is now possible outside of the sphere controlled by the state, giving the “[…] opportunity for ethnic minorities to express their ethnic identity and participate in society” (Ringold, 2000, p. 6). The opportunities available for civic participation will be examined below. Minority Integration in Macedonia I now turn to look at country-specific developments in the context of the post-1989 framework in the case of the Republic of Macedonia. In the previous period, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stood somewhat apart from other socialist states in the region with regard to the treatment of its Romani population. It was the only state not to resort to assimilationist policies. It provided local Romani communities with recognition as a unique ‘ethnic group’, permitting Romani traditional occupations and supporting Romani cultural development (Friedman, 2002, pp. 41–68). However, more than anything, Roma were treated with ‘benign neglect’ (European Centre for Minority Issues, 2004, p. 7), a legacy the Republic of Macedonia seems to have inherited to some extent. The conditions of the Romani population in Macedonia are recognized as ‘considerably better than those of the Roma in other East European states’ in relative terms (Barany, 1995, p. 527), but the overall standing of the Roma population in the state remains poor (Demirovski, 2000, p. 154). It should be pointed out that the Macedonians have shown a level of tolerance towards Roma, which distinguishes them from other Eastern European majorities. This can be explained by the fact that Macedonians do not perceive Roma as intimidating or threatening, when put in the context of the persistent tensions

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______________________________________________________________ with the much larger and politically stronger Albanian minority (Barany, 1995, p. 527). This fact has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, there is a relatively high social acceptance of Roma and a fairly positive relationship between the majority population and the Romani minority.10 On the other, this societal indifference also implies that, in terms of advocating for further improvements in status, Roma need to take a lot more initiative to achieve recognition. Within the new post-communist framework, national, regional and international factors, as well as the additional context of Yugoslav dissolution, interplay in the minority integration framework in place in present-day Macedonia. Among the measures and policies implemented in Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) certainly ‘constitutes the most important overall political context for improving interethnic relations and overcoming stereotyping’ (European Agency for Reconstruction, 2003, p. 8). Following its signing on 13 August 2001, the agreement was codified through 15 Constitutional Amendments in November 2001. The main goal of the agreement, besides putting an immediate stop to the Macedonian-Albanian conflict, was to ensure the survival of the Macedonian state, by focusing on greater respect for the ethnic identities of its citizens.11 The development of civil society was highlighted as one of its aims for the future. Furthermore, a larger space for ensuring minority rights was opened up in this context, although this particularly focused on the rights of the large Albanian minority, who constitute 25 per cent of the total population.12 One of the most important aspects of the OFA with regard to Macedonia’s minority communities is its focus on their equitable representation in both central and local public bodies as well as at all levels of employment within these bodies. This allows for a greater strengthening of the ethnic identity of communities, as this identity acquires significance in terms of participation in state authorities and public life in Macedonia. (Skaric, 2004, pp. 182–189). It creates a space favourable for the successful integration of minority communities, by encouraging their greater participation in public life and greater interaction with the majority group. However, these provisions have taken time to implement. In the specific case of the Romani minority, as of 2006 there were only three representatives working at the level of state institutions. There were also two Romani representatives in the Parliament (Kamberi, 2006). Overall, “[t]he imbalance between the total number of the Roma and the number of them employed in state agencies and public institutions is [very] high” (Skaric, 2004, p. 200). Feat Kamberovski, the President of the Romani Rights Forum ARKA, from the city of Kumanovo, suggests that the biggest problem for the Romani community is the lack of educated persons to fill the Ohrid quotas, further exacerbated by the fact that those qualified are often drawn into better positions elsewhere (Plaut, 2006, p. 11). However, in an interview with the author

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______________________________________________________________ Kamberovski admitted that the situation is slowly improving, with younger Roma graduating from university and entering employment in public institutions (Kamberovski, 2006). For the time being however, the Romani community would also benefit from more participation in alternative initiatives, such as the civil society sector emphasized in the agreement itself, an option that will be further explored below. The OFA supports the favourable integration of ethnic communities in many ways. It promotes greater respect for ethnic identity with emphasis on minority rights and equal representation in public life. Integration is also supported by the greater decentralization of power and local selfadministration than was set out in Macedonia’s initial Constitution in 1991, offering minorities more space to organize in their own communities (Skaric, 2004, p. 185).13 These provisions provide ethnic communities with more structured opportunities for participation in public life (European Agency for Reconstruction, 2003, p. 8). This is a very positive step towards making these communities feel more a part of the Macedonian state, as well as making the state itself come to acknowledge their presence and involvement. The interviews conducted with Romani representatives in Macedonia revealed both their receptiveness to the new form of integration and their willingness to take responsibility for the process of its realization. This implies that the space and readiness exist to transfer these empowerment trends onto the community as a whole. My respondents also recognized that the state as a whole needed to engage more actively in order for integration to occur, indicating how important it is that the majority society is willing to actively participate in this process (Kamberovska, 2006). Akin to other countries in the region, the Macedonian state has recently shown a greater interest in supporting this initiative. In the context of aspiration towards EU membership, a Strategy for the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia was developed. Its focus is on key areas requiring improvements in order to achieve a better quality of life for the Romani community,14 justifying demands for action when it comes to the implementation of favourable policies (Redzepi, 2006; Kamberovski, 2006; Friedman, 2006). The strategy document also testifies to the state’s awareness of the existing problems of the Romani population. The Decade of Roma Inclusion initiative, which was initiated in the same period, also contributed to raising public awareness about issues related to Romani inclusion, marking the start of specialized policies and programs for Roma in Macedonia (Zekirova, 2006). The resulting National Action Plan, which focuses on education, employment, health and housing, suggests a more active state position on the issue of Romani integration. Both documents played an important role in opening up communication between the government and the Romani community (Kamberi, 2006).

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______________________________________________________________ Therefore, with the developments related to the OFA, the national strategy and the Decade, a structure conducive to Romani integration on favourable terms has been established in Macedonia. It is also evident that the willingness to participate in the advancement of work on integration exists in the Romani community. Given the present low levels of participation within the public sector – such as through the proportional representation quotas set by the OFA – exploring alternative participatory mechanisms for the Roma in Macedonia would be worthwhile. The final part of my contribution to this volume looks at whether the mechanisms which have been devised in this regard actually function by assessing Romani participation in civil society initiatives. 3.

The Role of Romani NGOs in the Process of Romani Integration In order for Roma to fight discrimination and attain empowerment in the societies in which they live, they must participate actively in the processes of identity building and decision-making. In addition, the active engagement of the society as a whole in the process, most notably of the state-bearing ethnic groups, is necessary. This is where civil society becomes significant. When discussing the contribution made by civil society to social integration, many authors present it as the ““middle ground” between the individual and the state, a space that can limit state’s excesses and allow individual’s capacities to be expressed and developed unimpeded” (Belloni, 2000, p. 10). This characteristic of civil society makes it conducive to citizen empowerment in decision-making on governance matters and a ‘source of considerable popular leverage’ (Howard, 2002, p. 165). It can result in political processes which better serve citizens, protecting them from unfair policies and laws, but also in the promotion of legislation, favoured by the populations affected. As such, civil society is “a venue for the aggregation and communication of societal interests” (Green, 2002, p. 455), capable of bringing more public control to the governance sphere (Scholte, 2004, p. 212). By virtue of presenting citizens with the means to voice their concerns and exercise influence over policy-making, civil society has the potential to be an extremely valuable element in giving a voice to minority groups, and establishing the conditions necessary for a more balanced inter-communal (minoritymajority) dialogue. NGOs are an important component of civil society when it comes to participation in public life. As pointed out by the 2006 Open Society Institute report on Roma Inclusion: “Over the past decade, the NGO sector, within the broader sphere of civil society, has proven to be the entry point for

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______________________________________________________________ Romani participation in public life. It is largely due to Romani civic activism that there is any public awareness or recognition of Romani issues. In addition to their role as advocates for Romani rights, NGOs with strong ties to local communities are key to the success of any initiative or intervention targeting Roma” (Rorke and Wilkens, 2006, pp. 22–23). The Macedonian transition towards democracy formally enshrined freedom of association and autonomous action as constitutional liberties (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2005a, p. 73). Furthermore, the overall development of the civil society sector is also connected to the main events of the past decades: the increase in the activities of international aid organizations in Macedonia as a result of the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the influx of refugees into the country, the development of legislation encouraging the expansion of the NGO sector, followed by the advent of an even larger number of international NGOs and donors in the context of the 2000–2002 Kosovo crisis (European Agency for Reconstruction, 2003, pp. 10–11). In the case of Romani NGOs in particular, the growth of their numbers started in the mid-1990s, with 120 registered organizations appearing by 2003, 30 of which are considered truly active, covering practically the entire territory of the state (Plaut 2003, p. 20). Their activities focus mainly on human rights issues, provision of legal advice, formal and informal education, monitoring of the judicial system, activism and advocacy, women’s issues and cultural development (Plaut, 2003, pp. 6–7). According to Eben Friedman, Regional Representative of the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), civic consciousness among Roma is more common than among other minorities in Macedonia (Friedman, 2006). This view is confirmed in the Government Strategy document, testifying to “[…] the fact that Roma more and more frequently associate and form citizens’ organizations with the aim of helping each other and protecting their interests as a group. This trend is more frequent among Roma than among the other ethnic groups in Macedonia” (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia, 2004, p. 20). Having received donor support since 1995, the Romani NGO sector is recognized as having perhaps the most experience and capacity in this field in Macedonia to date (Daftari and Verma, 2002, p. 9). This elaboration favours understanding of NGOs as mechanisms conducive to community empowerment: they are well spreadout, focus on issues relevant to local communities, and capitalize on organizational know-how (in terms of fundraising, project implementation, etc.). Finally, as pointed out by Nadir Redzepi of the Roma Humanitarian Association of Macedonia “Sonce”, in the past decade, it is the NGO sector particularly that has seen the emergence of a ‘beginning elite’ in the Romani com-

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______________________________________________________________ munity, gathering a critical mass of skilled individuals capable of lobbying for the advancement of community needs.15 Both Romani and non-Romani experts working in the field point out that Romani NGOs have demonstrated their importance both as initiators of activities relevant to their community, and through connecting the Romani community with the state institutions (Zekirova, 2006). As such, Romani NGOs play a key role in facilitating inter-communal dialogue and in the overall integration process. The Romani NGO sector has had an input into the process of Romani integration and empowerment through participation in both local-level initiatives and in the shaping of public policy, which will be addressed in the following sections. Local Initiatives In several of the field interviews conducted for this study, Romani NGOs were identified as the principal actors of Romani integration, investing the greatest amount of human resources and activities in relevant issues, more so than the other actors in the Romani community (Memeti, 2006; Redzepi, 2006). All of the representatives of organizations interviewed for the purpose of this research have contributed to the integration process through locallevel initiatives, in several relevant fields. For example, in the domain of civil rights, the Roma Rights Forum ARKA based in the city of Kumanovo, has been providing free legal assistance to people without citizenship since 2001.16 They managed to provide help to 399 individual cases by 2006, a significant percentage of the total number of cases in the area. They helped 400 Romani individuals to obtain registration and basic personal documents, an essential step to ensure these individuals’ equal participation within the Macedonian society, in terms of access to services, resources and opportunities and the protection of the Macedonian state (Kamberovski, 2006). Romani NGOs also demonstrated their capabilities through the elaboration and implementation of projects which focus on education, such as an initiative to enhance the participation of young Roma in primary education.17 With the support of Romani NGOs, awareness-raising and support activities linking local schools and Romani communities have been established. The NGOs succeeded in improving the understanding and knowledge of the school staff about the living conditions of Roma, as well as facilitating discussions between Romani parents and school personnel. This resulted in a more positive attitude among teachers towards the Romani children, as well as increased interest in inter-cultural educational training. This improvement in attitude and inter-community communication also contributed to increased pupil motivation for school attendance (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2005b, pp. 3–14). The president of the Romani Women’s Association of Macedonia “Daja”, Dilbera Kamberovska, notes that schools were

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______________________________________________________________ not very open to collaboration with NGOs, and particularly Romani NGOs, in the past. This has now changed in an important way, with schools realizing the usefulness of both this collaboration and of the additional training and awareness-raising that can be organized thanks to this extra support (Kamberovska, 2006).18 As a final example of local level initiatives, the Roma Humanitarian Association of Macedonia “Sonce – Tetovo” started off as an informal group of citizens in 1996, through a collection of charitable donations from the community itself to cover the expenses of its poorer members (Redzepi, 2006). As a sign of the Romani community’s personal engagement in its own development, this kind of support also validates the NGO as a rightful promoter of community interest. Policy Advising Mechanisms Another key aspect of empowerment is minority participation in shaping public policy. Here I consider the contribution of Romani NGOs to policymaking on issues of direct relevance to their own community, both at the national and at the local level. As will become clear, these processes are also paralleled by the contribution made by NGOs to the advancement of intercommunal dialogue and cooperation. In 2002, inspired in part by the developments of the Council of Europe proceedings on Romani issues,19 some of the most active Romani NGOs in Macedonia recognized the need to develop a national strategy for Romani inclusion, and joined together within an NGO network, Roma 2002 (or RNGO 2002), in order to do so. The network’s strategy20 focused on building capacities within the Romani NGO sector, with the goal of “more efficient action at the national level” (RNGO – Roma, 2002, p. 3). It also set out the main areas in which strategic action was needed in order to improve the overall quality of life of the Romani population. The strategy reviewed the problems faced by the Romani community, and proposed paths for solutions in the spheres identified21 which are similar to what is later set out in the official Government Strategy for the Roma, developed in 2004. Parallels can be drawn between the two strategies, in regard to both concerns elaborated and solutions proposed.22 An overview of both strategies points to the initial RNGO 2002 document serving as the basis for the later governmental document. The RNGO 2002 strategy, actively employed and listed as a source of reference in the latter document, thus signals the network’s input into public policy shaping. The fact that the document was used in the elaboration of the official strategy also indicates the ever greater level of legitimacy granted to the work of civil actors. It also exemplifies the fact that the state is increasingly willing to cooperate with minority organizations on the policy-making level.

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______________________________________________________________ Apart from demonstrating the input into policy making of NGOs, the RNGO 2002 strategy, conceived two years prior to the government strategy, also highlights the future-oriented thinking of the Romani NGO sector. It testifies to their insight into areas of relevance for the Romani community. An important factor to note is that the network formation and strategy development were enacted on a voluntary basis, with the participant organizations providing the logistical support and hosting the meetings which led to the NGO strategy. The network continued to operate in this way until 2005 when the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) provided it with financial support to establish an office in Skopje in order to continue lobbying and awareness-raising efforts in close proximity to the government offices (Kamberovska, 2006).23 This case demonstrates the dedication of individuals working within the NGO sector and presents a counterpoint to the often-cited critique of this sector being primarily guided by a quest for funding. Romani NGOs have also had input into the development of public policy at the local level, where cases of successful NGO cooperation with the local government can be identified. As a requirement of the Decade of Roma Inclusion, a National Action Plan for improvements in the spheres of education, employment, health and housing was developed in 2005. In Macedonia, as a further expansion of this initiative (within the context of the law on local self-government segment of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, whose final component came into force in 2005)24 the creation of focused action plans for the Decade was also undertaken at the local level. At the time of research, this was being implemented in several Macedonian cities (Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar, Stip, Delcevo), with local NGOs playing a leading role in the process, in collaboration with local government representatives (Jasarevski, 2006). In Tetovo, a local team for the Decade of Roma Inclusion was formed, and a local action plan was created and adopted by the Tetovo Municipal Council, entering the official gazette of the city, guaranteeing 10 years of municipal support for Roma inclusion activities (Redzepi, 2006). The local action plan places strong emphasis on collaboration between the local government and local NGOs.25 This shows that joint responsibility for the implementation of the initiative has been accepted, suggesting a long-term commitment to cooperation between these two sides.26 It also indicates that positive steps were made in terms of NGO input into policy developments relevant to Roma integration. At both the local and the national levels the NGO sector emerged as a functional tool for Romani community participation. Future progress will have to be determined by the capacity to implement the concrete actions specified in the plans and strategy. Finally, as stated in the MCIC “Civil Society Index” report, more favourable cases of dialogue and cooperation between the government and the

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______________________________________________________________ civil society sector have been noticeable in recent years. This has particularly been the case in the sphere of humanitarian activities, as well as in the context of drafting laws and strategies, one example being the 2004 National Strategy for the Roma Population (Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2005a, p. 74). Mabera Kamberi, Administrator of the Decade of Roma Inclusion, also points to the preparation of the National Action Plan related to this strategy and to the Roma Decade itself as significant factors in the establishment of linkages between the government, NGOs and the wider Romani community (Kamberi, 2006). This is a significant improvement, as the government essentially moved away from perceiving NGOs as the “enemy” or “opposition” to government.27 Instead, they realized that there are quite a few benefits to cooperation, such as better insights into specific issues and opportunities to delegate certain tasks.28 This shift in attitudes and practices established the basis for a successful process of integration of Roma, as both the community and the state now have a say in developments and have shown willingness to cooperate in this process. Conclusion This contribution has discussed possible paths to minority empowerment based on the example of the Romani community in the Republic of Macedonia. Taking Amartya Sen’s “capabilities” approach to human development, empowerment was depicted as the enhancement of one’s capabilities. As such, it was shown that empowerment is dependent on both individual capacities and on the capacity of the society to create a framework for human development and capability realization. As demonstrated, the latter can be accomplished by establishing favourable public policies, which can in turn be achieved through the effective use of participatory capabilities by the public itself. For Roma in Eastern Europe, favourable public policy was shown to be one factor enabling their successful integration into society. Integration was defined as the recognition of both individual and minority rights, and the fight against prejudice and discrimination leading to a positive form of equality - or inclusion. In line with a pluralist conceptualisation of national identity, this conceptualisation of integration calls for the acceptance of differences and is above all a two-way process, requiring the willingness and input of both the majority and the minority. Under these provisions, integration is seen as means of empowerment of a minority group. It enables the group’s members to enhance their capabilities and to participate on equal terms with other members of society. Therefore, it can be concluded that the creation of public policy favourable to Romani integration can lead to empowerment, provided it involves the participation of both the broader society and especially the Romani community itself in its development.

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______________________________________________________________ This type of participatory approach was not possible during the communist period, as the state dominated the public sphere and employed policies of an assimilationist nature. However, integration became more viable after 1989, with the development of some favourable state, as well as international and regional (and particularly EU accession-related) policies. In addition, it was supported by the opening of a space for the development of Romani civil society. Looking at the specific case of the Republic of Macedonia, a policy structure more conducive to Romani integration on favourable terms was identified in the developments relating to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Strategy for the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia and the Decade of Roma Inclusion and its related National Action Plan. Additionally, the Romani NGO sector has become a viable mechanism for Romani participation in policy creation. I demonstrated the input of this sector as both an initiator of work on Romani integration and a promoter of participatory capabilities by the Romani public, allowing the community to influence the creation of policy on both the state and local levels. This highlighted the sector as a plausible means of empowerment for the Romani community. As another positive trend, one of the significant outcomes of the process of policy-making related to Romani integration to date was shown to be the growing cooperation between the Romani NGOs and the government. This cooperation needs to develop further in the future, as the dedication of both sides is necessary to advance integration efforts and strengthen the capabilities of the Roma community. Further developments and improvements are of course required. I advocated no fully fledged solutions but merely identified certain positive developments, outlining a plausible path towards future progress. It is possible to recognize some recent empowerment trends in Macedonia, thanks to more responsible actors emerging in the Romani community in the past decade, greater government engagement in the process of Romani integration and the overall enhancement of cooperation between the two sets of actors. In order for empowerment trends to develop further, concrete action, guided by concentrated joint effort is needed. Endnotes 1 “[O]ver 40 percent of Roma in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia are unemployed […], compared with one-digit unemployment figures for the general population. Only 10 percent of Romani schoolchildren in Croatia eventually finish elementary school […]. In Serbia and Montenegro, the Roma are the ethnic group with the highest illiteracy rate, 34.8 percent, and the largest percentage of people who have not finished

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______________________________________________________________ elementary school, 78.7 percent. […] According to a survey on health conditions of the Romani in Borsod County in northeast Hungary, […], the life expectancy of the Romani population is approximately 10 years lower than that of other groups” (Petrova, 2004, p. 25). The list unfortunately goes on. 2 The overall conditions of Roma in Macedonia have been recognized as considerably better than in other Eastern European states by a number of authors (for example, see Poulton (1993), Barany (1995), Friedman (2002)). Macedonia was chosen as a case study for this contribution, as the comparatively better situation makes it easier to identify the elements of empowerment. 3 For discussion, see the contribution of Tove Malloy in this volume. 4 While recognizing there are other important elements of empowerment of a community, such as political parties, the media, and the business sector, this analysis will limit itself to looking at the particular role of the NGO sector in the process in order to ensure greater focus. Due to the stated focus on empowerment within and via the NGO sphere (and also due to space limitations), rather than presenting a comprehensive analysis of this sector, stress will be placed on its positive accomplishments, in order to identify elements of empowerment of the Romani community. This being the objective, it is recognized that the analysis does not adopt a neutral perspective but rather seeks to reveal positive traits in the process of Romani integration and participation in order to discern paths for future improvements. 5 Although there is no single institutionalised definition of national minorities, the one most commonly cited is that of Francesco Capotorti, which states that a national minority is: “[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language” (Capotorti, 1979, para. 568). 6 “Integration into common institutions operating in a common language should still leave maximal room for the expression of individual and collective differences, both in public and private, and public institutions should be adapted to accommodate the identity and practices of ethnocultural minorities. Put another way, the conception of national identity, and national integration, should be a pluralist and tolerant one” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 48). 7 This overview excludes the countries of the former Soviet Union, which have a different situational background when it comes to the Roma. 8 For more insight, see also Vermeersch 2004. 9 The countries taking part are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and as of recently Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of them hosts to quite large and disadvantaged Romani minorities. The program priorities include concentrated action in the

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______________________________________________________________ core areas related to improving the quality of life: education, employment, health and housing. The Decade also puts an important emphasis on the involvement of the Roma themselves in the process, specifically by means of the Romani civil society (The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015; Abdikeeva 2005, p. 2). 10 As stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Roma: “This minority is characterized by a high degree of integrity and a clearly expressed feeling of belonging to the Republic of Macedonia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia 1997, p. 3). 11 Contrary to the Constitution of the Former Yugoslavia, where they were categorized as an “other minority”, the Roma are recognized in the Macedonian Constitution as a group equal in status to other major ethnic communities living in the country, and were mentioned for the first time in the Constitutional preamble of a country (UNDP, 2005, p. 43; Skaric, 2004, p. 192). Furthermore, the Constitutional Amendments introduce the notion of “community”, giving members of the listed communities (Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies) the right to express their identity and community attributes, and guaranteeing the protection of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (2001) Amendment VIII replacing Article 48). 12 In this also lies the biggest critique of Ohrid from the perspective of Macedonia’s smaller minorities, that due to the overwhelming focus on the Macedonian-Albanian relationship, their concerns are being neglected and they not adequately taken account of in the measures serving to implement OFA provisions (Skaric, 2004, pp. 183–184; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2005, p. 29). 13 At the local level, the Suto Orizari Municipality of Skopje, the first municipality in the world with a Romani majority (64.14 per cent), is the only municipality in Macedonia where the members of the Romani community have the right to the official use of their language. The only Romani mayor and Romani members of a Municipality Council are in Shutka too. Finally, at the time of research, the only Macedonian school with optional teaching in the Romani language was located there. (Working Group on Minority Issues 204, p. 31; Skaric, 2004, pp. 199–200). 14 It was recognised that membership “entails elaboration of a comprehensive Roma development policy in accordance with the Copenhaguen criteria for EU accession, as well as many other EU documents concerning the Roma directly.” Among the documents discussed in the EU Agenda 2000 (1997), stipulating “it is necessary to achieve ongoing development of social, economic and political sphere, and to provide protection against discrimination and racism, including decent housing, adequate education and health services.” The Draft Recommendations of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe also determine measures, which states should implement with

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______________________________________________________________ regard to the Romani population in particular (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia, 2004, pp. 4–5). 15 These are ‘people who have certain power and knowledge – connected to education, economic power, political power – people who are leaders and want to change the life of the community for the better’. From 1995, when the work of the sector started, Redzepi witnessed the slow but gradual growth of this mass of people. In our interview he pointed out that the NGO sector had a particularly positive effect in this respect, coupled with the increasing numbers of university-educated young Roma joining the efforts (Redzepi, 2006). 16 Access to citizenship remains a big problem for the Roma community in Macedonia, hindering ‘their integration as full-empowered members of society’ (European Roma Rights Centre, 1998, p. 17). 17 15 NGOs were the implementing organizations of the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation’s (MCIC) 2Applied Education for Young Roma” programme. 18 The same obstacle was witnessed by Drom in their early work with primary schools, around 2001. The present change of pace, with greater confidence placed in NGO input, and greater collaboration overall, has resulted in lower dropout rates (Jasarevski, 2006). 19 Such as the Draft Recommendations of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Policies Towards the Roma/Gypsies in Europe (2002). 20 Initially developed in a document entitled “Strategy for Development of Roma NGOs in Republic of Macedonia” (2002), and later in the “Strategy of RNGO – Roma 2002 for Development of the Roma Community in Republic of Macedonia 2005–2015” (2004). 21 These are: education; socio-economic development; civil society, human rights and women’s issues; culture, science and media; NGO development; health care; and sport, youth and ecology (RNGO – Roma 2002 2002, p. 15; RNGO – Roma 2002 2004, p. 12). 22 For example, both strategies recognize the need to encourage the attendance of Roma children in preschool education as well as the lack of communication between parents, schools and students as some of the important problems, and emphasize the involvement of Romani citizens’ organizations in motivating the community, as well as collaborating with the educational institutions and the state (RNGO – Roma 2002 2002, pp. 16–18; Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia 2004, pp. 43–46). 23 Dilbera Kamberovska is also the Vice-President of RNGO2002. 24 Following the Law on Local Self-Government and the Law on Financing of Local Self-Government, the Law on Territorial Organization of Local SelfGovernment was adopted in 2005. 25 For example, in the action plan for education, the realization of almost all the core activities has both a government and an NGO component, with 31

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______________________________________________________________ sub-activities attributed either to a joint effort (11), or to realization by NGOs (8), the municipality (6) and the educational institutions (6) (Lokalen Akcionen Plan za Dekada na Vklucuvanje na Romite - Tetovo. 2006). 26 Development of the NGO/local government cooperation has been noted in the Kumanovo municipality as well. Drafting and implementing the local action plan involved a lobby group of local experts from different spheres: the President of the Municipal Council, the Director of the Health Centre, elementary school representatives, as well as representatives of four local NGOs (Jasarevski, 2006). 27 As pointed out by many NGO leaders interviewed. 28 The following statement about Romani organizations, featured in the Government Strategy depicts this realization well: “[…] activists of these organizations acquired skills and training through formal and informal forms of education, creating a mass of people ready and able to work and deal with the challenges in their community. Since the success of […] the Strategy directly depends on the level of direct engagement of people from the Roma community, especially from these citizens organizations […] it is necessary […] to use the potentials of these organization […] meaning to make them partners of the state” (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia, 2004, pp. 20–21).

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______________________________________________________________ Lokalen Akcionen Plan za Dekada na Vklucuvanje na Romite - Tetovo (2006), Tetovo. Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (2005a), CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Macedonia: 15 Years of Transition – A Country Moving Towards Citizen Participation, Skopje: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation. Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (2005b), Applied Education for Young Roma: Annual Progress Report (January-December 2005), Skopje: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation. Memeti, E. (Ministry of Local Self-Government, specialized working group for Romani integration). (2006). Interview. [Interview with Sara Nikolic, 2 September 2006]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia (1997), Situation of the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje. Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia (2004), Strategy for Roma in the Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, http://www.ecmirom.org/ (accessed 7 July 2006). Petrova, Dimitrina (2004), “The Roma: Between a Myth and the Future,” Roma Rights: Quarterly Journal of the European Roma Rights Center, 1: 7– 33. Plaut, S. (2003), Information Impasse: Mapping Communication Patterns between Romani Media and Romani Civil Society in the Republic of Macedonia. Skopje: NGO Infocenter. —(2006), “Absent Roma, Imported Interest: Roma as Subject and Agent in the Republic of Macedonia”, paper presented at ISA Conference, San Diego. Poulton, H. (1993), “The Roma in Macedonia: A Balkan Success Story?,” RFE/RL Research Report, 2(19): 42–45. Redzepi, N. (Roma Humanitarian Association of Macedonia “Sonce”, National Working Group for the Decade of Roma Inclusion in Macedonia). (2006). Interview. [Interview with Sara Nikolic, 4 August 2006].

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______________________________________________________________ Ringold, D. (2000), Roma and the Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Trends and Challenges. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. RNGO – Roma 2002 2002, Strategy for Development of Roma NGOs in Republic of Macedonia, RNGO-Roma 2002, Macedonia. —2004, Strategy of RNGO – Roma 2002 for Development of the Roma Community in Republic of Macedonia 2005–2015, http://www.rnvoroma2002.org.mk/Strategy.pdf (accessed 2 October 2006). Rorke, B. & A. Wilkens (eds) (2006), Roma Inclusion: Lessons Learned from OSI’s Roma Programming, Open Society Institute, New York, http://www.soros.org/ (accessed 11 September 2006). Scholte, J. A. (2004), “Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance,” Government and Opposition, 39(2): 211–233. Sen, A. (1999), Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skaric, S. (2004), “Ohrid Agreement and Minority Communities in Macedonia”, in: G. Bašić (ed.), Prospects of Multiculturality in Western Balkan States, Belgrade: Ethnicity Research Center Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 94–110. Thelen, P. (2005), “Roma Policy: The Long Walk Towards Political Participation,” in: P. Thelen (ed.), Roma in Europe: From Social Exclusion to Active Participation. Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. UNDP (2002), Avoiding the Dependency Trap: The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, A Regional Human Development Report. Bratislava: UNDP. UNDP (2005), Faces of Poverty, Faces of Hope: Vulnerability Profiles for Decade of Roma Inclusion Countries. Bratislava: UNDP. Vejvoda, I. (1997), “The Exit from totalitarianism in East and Central European Countries,” International Affairs, 73(1): 37–52. Vermeersch, P. (2004), “Minority Policy in Central Europe: Exploring the Impact of the EU’s Enlargement Strategy,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 3(2): 3–19.

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______________________________________________________________ Working Group on Minority Issues (2004), Shadow Report on the Situation of National Minorities in the Republic of Macedonia, http://www.ecmimacedonia.org/MaNGO/documents/ (accessed 10 August 2006). Zekirova, N. (Applied Education for Young Roma - Macedonian Center for International Cooperation) (2006). Interview. [Interview with Sara Nikolic, 7 August 2006].

Romani Teaching Assistants in the Czech Education System: An Opportunity to Address Barriers to the Labour Market? Laura Cashman This chapter examines the factors which explain the disproportionately high rates of unemployment among Roma in the Czech Republic. The teaching assistant programme is presented as a case study, with an emphasis on how the programme can contribute to the reduction of Romani unemployment rates in the long term. The chapter concludes that the employment of Romani teaching assistants alone will not end the marginalization and exclusion which Roma in the Czech Republic endure, but this programme is certainly a step in the right direction and one that deserves more support from the state. Introduction The Czech Republic is a very homogenous state, with approximately 95 per cent of the population claiming Czech nationality. However, it is also home to a number of national and ethnic minorities. While relations with most minority groups are generally harmonious, relations with Roma remain problematic. Opinion polls consistently show that most Czechs would prefer not to have Romani neighbours (CVVM 2003; 2006; Eurobarometer 2008) and the international reputation of the state has been damaged by scandals such as the infamous wall built in Ústí nad Labem in 1999 (European Commission, 1999:16; Roček, 1999), the sterilization of Romani women without their informed consent (Czech Ombudsman, 2005) and the disproportionate placement of Romani children in remedial special schools (European Court of Human Rights 2007). Before the Czech Republic joined the EU, the European Commission exerted significant pressure on the state to take steps to improve the integration of Romani communities (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005; Guy, 2001; Ram, 2003; Vermeersch, 2004). The most pressing concerns were tackling anti-Romani discrimination and resolving the problems of social exclusion which have progressively worsened since the fall of communism. While the challenges facing Roma in the education systems of Central and Eastern Europe are well documented (Čanek, D, 1998; ERRC, 1999; Liégeois, 1994; Polechová, 2003; Smith, 1997) this chapter looks at another major barrier to successful integration – unemployment. Using the Czech Republic as a case study, it discusses the factors contributing to the high

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______________________________________________________________ unemployment rates in Romani communities and considers how the employment of Romani teaching assistants – a policy which primarily targets the education system – could also have a positive effect in terms of reducing rates of unemployment among Roma. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the aims of the Czech national integration strategy. The chapter then examines the factors which explain the disproportionately high rates of unemployment among Roma. The role of the teaching assistant and the background to the implementation of the teaching assistant programme is presented in detail. The impact of the scheme is then analysed, with an emphasis on how the programme can contribute to the reduction of Romani unemployment rates in the long term. It is my conclusion that the employment of Romani teaching assistants in schools will not solve all the problems of marginalization and exclusion which Roma in the Czech Republic have to endure, but this programme is certainly a step in the right direction and one that deserves more support from the state authorities to ensure as many schools as possible get involved. It was anticipated that employing Roma as teaching assistants would provide Romani pupils with additional support and encouragement and offer a possible career to interested and suitably qualified Roma. However, this chapter will argue that a further positive consequence is the way in which the presence of Romani teaching assistants in schools transforms the attitudes of nonRomani teachers and pupils too. Given that social integration can only be achieved with the support of the majority society, this may in fact prove to be the most important consequence of the scheme. 1. Methodology This chapter is based on the findings of research examining the development and implementation of a range of policies to support the social inclusion of Romani communities in the Czech Republic conducted in two cities, Česke Budějovice and Ostrava, over a period of four months between October 2004 and May 2005.1 Both cities were visited again in October/November 2007. In total, approximately 100 people – local Romani Advisors, municipal and regional officials in the departments of education, social welfare and employment, representatives of NGOs supporting Romani communities, school principals, teaching assistants, social workers and field social assistants – were interviewed. The discussion presented here is based mainly on interviews conducted with principals, teachers and teaching assistants in 14 mainstream and remedial special primary schools with high numbers of Romani pupils.2 A further 67 teachers completed survey questionnaires. Ostrava, capital of the Moravia – Silesia Region, is the third largest city in the Czech Republic with a population of 320,000, of which between 20,000–30,000 are estimated to be Roma.3 The city’s economy was hugely dependent on coal and steel enterprises but unemployment levels rose dra-

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______________________________________________________________ matically when state subsidies for these industries were withdrawn in the 1990s, peaking at 18.4 per cent in 2004 (Czech Statistics Office 2008a). In 2007 the unemployment rate had fallen to 9.4 per cent but it is still among the highest rates in the country (Czech Statistics Office 2008b). Given the size of the Romani population, Ostrava, has a high international profile in terms of how the city has attempted (and sometimes failed) to manage the integration of Romani communities living there. NGOs in the city have been at the forefront of developing innovative ways to improve Romani integration – preparatory classes, teaching assistants and field social assistants were all first piloted in Ostrava. However, there have also been serious scandals including the failure of the city authorities to re-house Romani families after floods in 1998 destroyed many homes (ERRC 2002), the offer of sub-municipal mayor Liana Janáčková to subsidize one-way tickets to Canada for any Roma who wished to emigrate (Fawn, 2001, p. 1203) and the 2007 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), that the placement of disproportionate numbers of Romani children in remedial special schools for children with special educational needs constituted discrimination (ECHR 2007). Česke Budějovice, capital of the South Bohemia Region is an average sized Czech city with a population of approximately 90,000 and a proportionally smaller Romani population of approximately 2,500. The diverse industrial base of the city and surrounding region has also allowed it to become one of the success stories of the transition period, with consistently low unemployment. The unemployment rate was 3.9 per cent in 2005 (MLSA 2006a) and 3.8 per cent in 2007 (Czech Statistics Office, 2008b). In spite of the generally favourable economic conditions in the city, unemployment in Romani communities is as much a problem as it is in other cities. Ghettos are developing as non-Roma with the means to do so move away from suburbs where Roma live. Schools still struggle with high rates of absenteeism among Romani pupils and are trying to find ways to ensure that Romani pupils complete their education and get meaningful qualifications. The schools in Ostrava tended to have higher proportions of Romani pupils, with some principals estimating that sixty percent or more of their pupils were from Romani families.4 In České Budějovice the principal of the school with the highest proportion of Romani pupils thought that about ten per cent of the pupils were Romani. It was not possible to visit the only remedial special school in České Budějovice but it was reported that more than half of the pupils in that school were Romani. All of the schools visited in Ostrava employed Romani teaching assistants whereas in České Budějovice four schools employed teaching assistants and two did not. Only one teaching assistant employed in České Budějovice was Romani. Overall, the authorities in Ostrava were more engaged with implementing policies to improve Romani integration than their counterparts in České Budějovice. This was ex-

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______________________________________________________________ plained by the ideological positions of local officials and their views on the need for affirmative action policies to improve Romani integration and also the urgency of the situation; in Ostrava it was simply no longer possible to do nothing. 2. Background to the Czech National Integration Strategy Following significant international criticism, a comprehensive integration strategy – the Concept of Government Policy Towards Members of the Romani Community Designed to Facilitate their Social Integration (hereafter the 2000 Concept) – was passed in 2000. It introduced policies and programmes to improve the integration of Roma in all spheres of life (Government Resolution, 2000). The 2000 Concept acknowledged that the full integration of Roma as equal members of Czech society would only be achieved by tackling the low levels of educational attainment and high rates of unemployment among Roma and the widespread anti-Romani prejudices held by the majority society. Dealing with unemployment in Romani communities is arguably the cornerstone of the entire integration project because it is the perceived unwillingness of Roma to find employment which fuels much of the anti-Romani sentiment so prevalent among non-Roma. The comment “I’m not racist but why should I have to work and pay taxes while those Roma live off the state?” was heard many times in interviews for this research. The Czech state is attempting to tackle the high rates of unemployment in Romani communities in a number of ways. The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion stresses the links between social exclusion and unemployment (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004a). The National Action Plan on Employment for 2004 to 2006 includes policies to combat discrimination and to promote the inclusion of older workers and individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds into the labour force. It also contains the additional priorities of addressing regional employment disparities, enhancing work attractiveness and transforming undeclared work into regular employment (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004b). Antidiscrimination clauses, which have been incorporated into existing employment legislation, are intended to benefit Roma (Act on Employment Amendment, 1999). In addition to general policies to support jobseekers of all ethnicities, the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs and of Education also support some programmes specifically aimed at Romani communities. The development of the teaching assistant posts (the focus of this chapter), Romani Advisors and field social assistants who work for municipal authorities and the opportunities for Roma to train as police officers are intended to offer Roma alternative paths to employment. In terms of policy to date, more emphasis has been placed on addressing the socio-economic problems in Romani communities than on challenging the deep seated anti-

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______________________________________________________________ Romani prejudices which exist in Czech society (Cashman, 2008). However, as this contribution will show, some of the more successful policies, such as the employment of teaching assistants, are effective precisely because they address both kinds of barriers to integration. Teaching assistants improve the employment prospects of the pupils they support by making their experiences of the education system more bearable and their presence in schools also challenges the prejudices of non-Romani pupils and teachers, helping, albeit in a small way, to improve social relations between both groups. 3. Unemployment in Czech Romani Communities Since 1990, the Czech workforce has had to come to terms with the threat of unemployment. Restructuring of inefficient enterprises led to redundancies but the overall rate of unemployment increased very slowly because industries were privatized and rationalized at a gradual pace. This was often referred to as the Czech ‘unemployment miracle’ because it was thought that Czech labour policies had solved the problem of restructuring without causing mass unemployment (Flek and Večerník, 2004, p. 7). In fact, there was no miracle. The slow pace of privatization and restructuring simply delayed the inevitable and the unemployment rate peaked at 10.9 per cent in February 2004 (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2006a). This rate still compares favorably to other states in the region but it disguises significant regional and social inequalities among those who are unemployed. In the labour market, some social groups are more disadvantaged than others, especially women with small children, older workers and people with few qualifications. However, according to a report published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 2003, Roma are one of the most significant groups identified among the unemployed (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2003, para. 1.2). It is estimated that in many Romani communities, unemployment ranges from 70 to 100 per cent (Government of the Czech Republic, 1997, p. 7.2; Gabal, 2006, p. 42). The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs does not keep precise statistics on how many Roma are unemployed (this is considered to be a breach of the regulations with regard to collecting data about citizens based on their ethnicity) but estimates that Roma make up almost a third of all those registered as unemployed. This is despite the fact that Roma account for only about 3 per cent of the population (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2003, para. 1.2). There is some debate about how best to measure the rates of unemployment among Roma. For example, O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006, p. 7) argue that because official statistics do not take employment in the informal sector into account, they do not reflect the true situation of income and work activity in Romani households. This point was also made by an NGO representative interviewed in May 2005:

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______________________________________________________________ “They go collecting iron, things like that and this earns them more than if they were working somewhere for the minimum wage, which I can of course understand. If this kind of work were counted then maybe 50 percent would be unemployed but as we only count legal work then it really is 99 percent” (NGO Representative 2005). However, O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006, p. 10) accept that even if employment is defined in the broadest possible sense, rates of unemployment in Romani communities are very high and consistently higher than for nonRoma. Long-term unemployment is a particular problem. A significant proportion of Roma have been unemployed since the mid-1990s and there are many Roma living in the Czech Republic who have never had permanent legal employment and have been dependent on social welfare for all of their adult lives. While the majority of Roma worked during the communist period (by 1981, 75 per cent of working age Romani men and women were employed) (Kostelancik, 1989, p. 315), twenty years later, the problems of longterm unemployment are increasingly apparent. Research conducted in Western countries reveals that long-term unemployment can contribute to the social exclusion of individuals and families regardless of ethnicity. The experience of long-term unemployment can cause psychological problems, particularly stress and anxiety related disorders and “a sense of powerlessness and resignation that colours people’s broader attitudes to politics and society” (Gallie and Marsh, 1994, p. 14). The reasons behind the high rates of unemployment among Roma are, despite what many members of the majority society might think, complex and interconnected. Many non-Roma complain that Roma take advantage of the generosity of the state but under the current social welfare policy, families with four or more children are better off receiving social welfare benefits, than if one parent works and earns the minimum wage (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2003, para. 2.4). The attractiveness social welfare benefits increases further when the opportunities for undeclared casual work are taken into account. As reported by the NGO representative cited above, many Roma find short-term work labouring on construction sites or gathering scrap which provides them with an additional source of income for their family. They would not have time for such activities if they were working full time. This problem was acknowledged in the 2004 National Action Plan for Employment (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2004b, pp. 38–39) but a suitable solution has yet to be identified.5 The two most important factors which contribute to the high rates of unemployment in Romani communities are discrimination and low levels of educational attainment. The discrimination Romani jobseekers face in the

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______________________________________________________________ labour market is widely recognized, and even senior state officials concede that when given the option, employers usually choose a non-Romani applicant (Jařab, 2003; Government of the Czech Republic 1997, para. 7.4). Since anti-discrimination clauses were included in the Labour Code in October 1999 (Act on Employment Amendment, 1999) two landmark cases, those of Marcela Zupková in 2003 and Renata Kotlárová in 2004, have been successfully prosecuted in the civil courts and received a great deal of media attention (Mladá fronta Dnes, 2003a; Mladá fronta Dnes, 2003b; Právo, 2004). However, despite the introduction of this legislation, problems persist (Romani Advisor, 2005; ERRC, 2007). Jakub, a Romani teaching assistant interviewed as part of this research had personally experienced the most common form of discrimination which Roma suffer. He made a telephone enquiry about a vacancy and was invited to an interview. However, when he met the interviewer he was told that the position had already been filled: “I know it’s hard to prove but it happened to me personally. On the phone I speak correctly and I read a lot and Czech doesn’t cause me any problems. I was born here in Ostrava. On the phone they said ‘yes come along’ [for an interview] but when he saw with his own eyes that I was a Romani, the prejudices were terrible” (Jakub, Teaching Assistant 11, 2005). Along with discrimination and structural problems, arguably the most important barrier to employment is the low level of educational attainment among the majority of Roma. An educated, middle class of Roma is growing slowly but many Roma were educated in zvlaštní školy, remedial special schools for children with learning difficulties, and very few have secondary school or university qualifications. As a result the majority of Roma are not qualified for anything other than unskilled, menial work which will only pay the minimum wage. Young people who leave school with few qualifications have greatest difficulty finding employment. This is equally true for nonRoma. According to the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion, those most at risk of unemployment belong to more than one ‘at risk’ category “for example unskilled Roma or low-skilled young people” (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004a, p. 9). This has been backed up by other research which has identified education as a key determinant in explaining the incidence of unemployment (Mareš and Sirovátka, 2004, p. 57). Worryingly, the message that qualifications and skills can determine whether a jobseeker will find employment has not yet entered Romani discourses on employment and employment prospects. O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006) report that only a small proportion of Roma surveyed for their study identified their low levels of knowledge and skills as the reason why they had trouble finding employment. This suggests that “many Roma do not connect

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______________________________________________________________ their employment difficulties to their lack of formal knowledge and skills” (O’Higgins and Ivanov, 2006, p. 11). Young Romani street sweepers interviewed in České Budějovice in 2004 revealed similar attitudes. The suggestion that they remain at school and get qualifications which would help them find better work was dismissed as naive and impractical. One pointed out that even if she finished her education there was no guarantee of finding better work than street sweeping so she would be wasting her time and only putting off the inevitable. The entire group agreed that education was not a guarantee of a better life and therefore, not worth investing more time in than was absolutely necessary. 4.

Employing Romani Teaching Assistants in Czech Primary Schools Discussions of the integration of Romani communities often focus on what Roma have to do to integrate. While it is true that Roma will have to recognize the importance of qualifications in order to find legal employment, as this is the only way they can escape the poverty trap, for an integration policy to succeed the majority society also has to adapt (Říčan, 1998). Employers have to treat all applicants fairly regardless of their ethnicity and schools have to find ways to engage with Romani pupils and encourage them to complete their education. The benefits of employing more members of ethnic minority communities in schools are well established (Basit and McNamara, 2004; Jones and Maguire, 1998; Pole 1999; Siraj-Blatchford, 1993; Tomlinson, 1990) and the employment of teaching assistants who either belong to Romani communities or who can gain the trust of the community is a policy which may go some way towards improving the employment prospects of the next generation of Roma. The aims of the policy of employing Romani teaching assistants are threefold: The presence of Roma in positions of responsibility in schools allows them to act as role models for Romani pupils. Teaching assistants also act as a link between the school and the local Romani community promoting educational values and encouraging their parents to get involved with school activities, thus creating more inclusive institutions. Thirdly, by employing Roma in these roles wherever possible, new career opportunities are opened up to Roma. The first Romani teaching assistants were employed in a primary school in Ostrava in 1993. The aim was to improve the quality of education offered to pupils by allowing teachers to work with Romani teaching assistants in the classroom. The 1997 Bratinka Report6 On the Situation of Romani communities in the Czech Republic noted that the employment of teaching assistants had been very effective (Government of the Czech Republic, 1997, para. 4.3.1) but its authors were not yet ready to completely endorse the employment of teaching assistants because of reservations about the quality of their training. Taking these concerns into account, the government resolution

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______________________________________________________________ which accepted the Bratinka Report, instructed the Ministry of Education to “determine the qualifications required for the position of Romani pedagogical assistant” and to “earmark funds totalling Kč 2,268,000 (€70,000) for the wages of at least 20 pedagogical assistants” (Government of the Czech Republic, 1997: III, 1a). Between 1 September 1997 and 30 June 2000 the Ministry employed teaching assistants on a trial basis. The trial was considered a success (Council for Romani Affairs, 2005, para. 6.6) and in 2006 the Ministry of Education funded 328 assistants in 127 primary schools (Council for Romani Affairs, 2007, p. 9, Gabal, 2006, p. 63). According to the requirements established by the Ministry of Education, applicants for the position of teaching assistant must be over 18 years of age, have completed primary school, have a clean criminal record and meet the general recruitment requirements which apply to all school employees (Nová Škola, 2005a). Training programmes for teaching assistants were offered by NGOs until the Ministry of Education adopted the scheme. Originally, the training consisted of 72 training hours focusing on the basics of education theory, child psychology, mathematics and the Czech language (Nová Škola, 2005b). However, the training course has become more intensive and now applicants have to complete 180 hours of training before they can qualify (Nová Škola, 2005c). In addition to this training, teaching assistants are encouraged to further their education in other ways. The 2005 Update to the Concept noted that an increasing number of teaching assistants are completing their secondary and higher education or have expressed an interest in doing so (Council for Romani Affairs 2005, para. 6.8). Of the 11 teaching assistants interviewed as part of this research, seven had the Maturita, i.e. they had completed secondary school; the others had completed primary school and subsequently educated themselves in other ways. Jana was planning to go to university the following year to train as a lawyer and Daniel was training to be a teacher via a university correspondence course. In total 14 schools in Ostrava employed Romani teaching assistants in the school year 2004/05. Eight of these schools were studied for this research project. Most schools employed one or two assistants but one school had three and one school had ten, seven of whom were Romani. In these cases, the school paid the wages of the extra assistants through private fundraising initiatives. In the school year 2004/05 only one school in České Budějovice employed a Romani teaching assistant; of the six schools visited in the city, a further three employed non-Romani teaching assistants. In 2006/07 there were no Romani teaching assistants working in the city – the Romani teaching assistant previously employed was on maternity leave. Integration policies can only be successful if they are embraced by both the minority and majority communities and this is especially true for the employment of teaching assistants in schools. Given the increasing pressures on schools to stretch their budgets, if teachers and principals do not think the

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______________________________________________________________ programme is worthwhile and do not fully support it then it cannot succeed. There are two aspects to this programme which need support from teachers. First, some teachers may not like the idea of sharing their classroom with another adult and secondly, there are the issues around the ethnicity of the teaching assistants. Some teachers might accept a non-Romani teaching assistant but would find it more challenging to have a Romani person as their colleague. A survey of teachers in ten schools in Ostrava and České Budějovice revealed that the employment of Romani teaching assistants was viewed positively by the majority of teachers. 67 teachers responded to the survey and of those 38 (57 per cent) had worked with a Romani teaching assistant. Six of the respondents who had worked with a Romani teaching assistant reported negative experiences. Two did not like sharing their classroom with a teaching assistant and four claimed that they did not see that the presence of an assistant in their school had any positive effects. The overwhelming majority (32 respondents or 84 per cent of respondents who had worked with a Romani teaching assistant) reported positive experiences and felt it was an advantage to employ Romani teaching assistants in the school. They praised the way the teaching assistants acted as mediators between the school and the community and welcomed them in their classrooms to allow children to receive more individual attention. Comments included: “The assistant ensures a calmer environment for teaching.” “Without the assistant the situation would be far worse.” Altogether 29 of the teachers surveyed (43 per cent) stated that they had no experience working with Romani teaching assistants, either because there were none employed in their school or because they worked in schools where the work of the teaching assistant was directed at junior classes. Nonetheless, a majority of these respondents (17 or 59 per cent) stated that they would be interested in working with a teaching assistant should the opportunity arise. Nine respondents (31 per cent of respondents who had no experience working with a Romani teaching assistant) did not wish to engage with the programme. Some respondents stated that they preferred to work alone in the classroom while others were sceptical that the teaching assistants would make much difference. Two respondents commented that the problem lay with the pupils and their families and that if they changed their attitude towards education then these assistants would not be required. One teacher wrote: “I would love that [to work with a teaching assistant] but I know that not even a Romani assistant has the stamina, patience, constant love of their work and endurance.”

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______________________________________________________________ These survey responses indicate that the employment of teaching assistants has been largely successful. While teachers with no experience of working with teaching assistants are more sceptical about the concept, this research revealed that where the scheme has been introduced, most teachers recognized the valuable contribution made by teaching assistants to their schools. 5. Role Models One of the main reasons why schools wish to employ teachers and teaching assistants from ethnic minorities is so that they can act as positive role models for pupils to encourage them to participate in education and improve their chances of finding employment when they leave school. Research in the UK has revealed that the opportunity to act as a positive role model is also a motivation for people from minority communities to work in schools (Basit and McNamara, 2004, p.118; Carrington and Tomlin 2000, p.149; Pole, 1999). Teaching assistants interviewed as part of this research also indicated that this was an important consideration for them. Jakub claimed to be very aware of his responsibility to be a role model to show pupils that they could make something of their lives if they wanted to. The high rates of long-term unemployment in Romani communities meant that many of the pupils they taught had no experience of anyone in their family ever having worked and so were growing up with an expectation that all they could do was live on social welfare benefits. The teaching assistants hoped that they could challenge this position in a positive way. When asked why they had been motivated to finish their education and get qualifications, the teaching assistants attributed this to encouragement from their parents. A common theme was that their parents had instilled a strong work ethic in them, again challenging the assumption that all Roma are work-shy. In some ways, however, these families, who put such emphasis on education, were distanced from traditional Romani communities. Lukaš’ family spoke Czech at home to help him cope better at school. Two more admitted that they could not speak the Romani language at all. Anna was from a mixed family; only her mother was Romani. Jana’s father grew up in a children’s home so her family did not have a strong bond with other Roma and had never lived in a predominantly Romani neighbourhood. She was also married to a non-Romani man. Only the eldest interviewee, a man who had many years of experience as a Romani activist, but no secondary school education, claimed to speak fluent Romani. He was very keen to promote the culture as much as possible. All but one of the teaching assistants interviewed began their education before the fall of the communist regime. Therefore, this can be seen as evidence of the legacy of the communist assimilation policy:

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______________________________________________________________ individuals who had weaker ties to Romani communities were more successful in the education system (Gheorghe and Mirga, 1997). A question worth considering is the extent to which teaching assistants are acting as a tool for genuine inclusion or whether their presence is intended to ‘socialise’ Romani children into the norms and values of the majority Czech society. This is a phenomenon also encountered in the West, with black teachers sometimes being accused of being ‘coconuts’ – brown on the outside and white on the inside (Carrington and Tomlin, 2000, p. 150; Pole, 1999, p. 302). The teaching assistants interviewed for this project admitted that they felt different to many of the children they were teaching, and as argued above, their success in the education system was attributed to the willingness of their parents to submit to the assimilatory pressures of the time. However, the assistants also stressed that they were proud of their Romani heritage and they made it clear that they wanted to offer positive representations of Roma rather than deny their ethnic identity. They regretted not speaking better Romani but did not think they were in any way ‘less’ Romani as a result. They pointed out that the vast majority of Roma no longer speak Romani and unlike for other ethnic minorities in the region, language is not considered the primary marker of difference. Edita and Gabriela noted that there were cultural differences between how wealthier and poorer Roma lived and that the problems Romani children had at school were more pronounced in children from socially deprived backgrounds. It has been argued elsewhere that a major problem in terms of building a positive Romani identity is the conflation of the Romani ethnic identity with the social exclusion they have endured for so many generations (Pogany, 2006; Gheorghe and Mirga, 1997). Indeed for some, there can be no such thing as middle-class Roma (Stewart’s, 1997 account of life in a Romani community in Hungary offers a thoughtful analysis of this dilemma). However, this was not a view held by the teaching assistants and other young Romani activists encountered during fieldwork. Jana in particular was very clear that she wanted to show the world that there was more to Roma than just the very poor people who formed much of the stereotype. The teaching assistants also spoke about having a responsibility to present non-Romani children with positive representations of Roma. Eva, a teaching assistant working in a town near České Budějovice claimed that one of the most important things she does is challenge the prejudices the nonRomani pupils in the class have learned at home: “Parents tell them how dreadful Roma are and when I say I am a Romani woman they don’t believe me. They say: ‘but you can’t be you’re really nice’” (TA 3, Eva 2004).

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______________________________________________________________ However, while it is certainly important to challenge racist views held by school children, it is even more important that the teaching assistants challenge the prejudices held by their teaching colleagues. Research in the UK and the US has also revealed that the employment of teachers or teaching assistants from minority communities can be challenging for both teachers and pupils from the majority community because as they do not fit the “white, middle class stereotype” (Troyna, 1994) they are not always recognized as ‘legitimate’ teaching staff (Subedi, 2008). Furthermore, Subedi (2008, p. 60) argues that members of mainstream society struggle to accept that there can be a great deal of differentiation within minority communities, preferring instead to see them all as ‘exotic’ ‘others’. Interviews with teachers and principals indicated that the introduction of teaching assistants had not always run entirely smoothly, with teachers needing time to get used to the idea of working alongside Romani teaching assistants. One teacher interviewed in March 2005 reported a great deal of resistance to the idea when the teaching staff at her school first heard of the plan. They thought it was an unnecessary waste of money which was needed for other projects. She felt that there was also opposition because the teachers – and she included herself – had their own prejudices about Roma and could not imagine having Romani colleagues. However, after working with a teaching assistant she changed her mind. She claimed to now prefer working as a part of a team in the classroom. She was very honest in her appraisal of how her own attitudes had been transformed by the experience. Such reluctance was also experienced in other schools. The principal of another school spoke of how in the beginning some teachers had questioned whether the teaching assistant would share their staff room: “At first the teachers asked ‘and is she [the Romani teaching assistant] going to sit with us in the staff room?’ But today … nobody thinks about the fact that she is Roma, not at all. She is simply a member of the team; it’s excellent” (Principal 11, 2005). Thus, employing Roma in schools allows members of the majority society to come into contact with Roma who do not conform to the traditional stereotype and as in the cases cited above, individuals are forced to reassess their own prejudices. 6. Promoting More Inclusive Educational Institutions A significant problem facing Romani pupils in mainstream education is their sense of alienation from an institution where they encounter no adult members of their own community and learn little about their own culture. The widespread low levels of educational attainment in Romani families and

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______________________________________________________________ communities also leave children without anyone to whom they can look for support when they find life at school challenging. Schools have found it difficult to communicate with Romani parents and to convince them of the importance of education. Teachers have experienced problems trying to communicate with children because they are not familiar with Romani traditions and ways of thinking about problems (Balabánová, 2002; Šotolová, 2001; Smith, 1997). As stated above, it was envisaged that the employment of Romani teaching assistants should address some of these problems. The teaching assistants themselves reported having similar problems when they were at school and thus were conscious that they had a duty to help other Romani children. Three teaching assistants spoke of how they had been very unhappy at school because all their friends were in the local remedial special school and they were the only Roma there, but their parents insisted that they remain at school and not let the bullies or loneliness upset them. In schools where teaching assistants were employed, interviews with principals and surveys of teachers revealed that the presence of teaching assistants had significantly improved relations with parents and that more trust had built up on both sides. Five teaching assistants said that they felt closer to the children because they belonged to the same community. They understood the children better and the children trusted them more. Daniel and Milena commented that parents felt more comfortable when they knew a Romani teaching assistant was in the school. They also both believed that parents accepted criticism better from them than from non-Romani teachers, for example when dealing with truancy or disciplinary matters. Basit and McNamara (2004, p. 98) claim that the employment of ethnic minority teachers transforms schools in a number of ways. Although their work focused on schools in the UK, their findings can also usefully be applied in the case of Romani teaching assistants. Teachers can learn more about Roma and the discrimination they face through discussions with colleagues. This can prompt them to give more consideration to how they design lessons or manage their classes. Another important outcome of employing an ethnically diverse staff is that pupils see the staff working together and showing respect for one another. They can learn from these positive examples of cooperation and as they grow up they will be more open to working and living in a diverse society. One principal also raised this as an important reason to employ Romani teaching assistants: “I believe that a Romani teaching assistant for Romani pupils is the best there can be… That’s why I’m pleased that there is a Romani woman here, who has qualifications and can be a kind of role model. [She’s] not just an enemy who does things differently, has a different skin colour, a different mentality.

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______________________________________________________________ Therefore, it’s good that she’s a Romani woman” (Principal 5, 2004). Thus, employing Roma in schools is a measure which not only transforms schools but could gradually lead to a more inclusive society. Improving relations between schools and communities and children’s experiences at school should help to improve the levels of educational attainment of Romany pupils, however, as a means to improve their employment chances, the presence of teaching assistants in primary schools can bring only limited success. Many principals reported that thanks to intensive support and mentoring, almost all of their Romani pupils finished the primary stage of their education and enrolled in secondary schools, yet very few managed to complete more than a year or two of secondary education. While this was sometimes due to peer pressure, or demands from their families to contribute to the family income, it is also the case that the criticisms of mainstream primary schools as alienating institutions apply just as much to secondary schools. In Ostrava, the Romani Advisors had tried to convince the principals of secondary schools to get involved with the teaching assistant programme but the response was less than encouraging (Romani Advisor, 2005). At present, the main policy to encourage Roma to complete their secondary education is the offer of grants to subsidize their studies. While this financial support is important, the presence of Romani mentors in secondary schools could offer the emotional support which is lacking at the moment. 7. A Path to Employment for Roma The employment of teaching assistants is first and foremost a means to support Romani pupils in mainstream schools but by training and hiring Roma for these positions it is also possible to directly assist Romani jobseekers. Obviously, it would be impossible for all unemployed Roma to be employed as teaching assistants, even if they were all qualified for the job, but the question remains whether such a form of positive discrimination is an acceptable policy. Officially, the policy does not only target Roma for the positions, just as the assistants provide support to any children from ‘socio-culturally disadvantaged’ homes and not only Romani children. Any person who has the correct qualifications and can demonstrate that they have enough empathy to work with the children and communicate with their families must be considered for a post. All the principals interviewed for this research were asked for their views on hiring Roma to work as teaching assistants. Generally the principals of schools where Roma were employed believed that it was important to employ Roma wherever possible. They listed many of the advantages already discussed in the preceding sections – the children and parents trusted them, they gave teachers much needed additional support, they provided pupils with

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______________________________________________________________ positive role models and they helped to improve the school’s relationship with the local Romani community. However, the principals felt it was not enough to simply hire any Romani person for the job. Not every candidate was a success and the principal of one school in Ostrava reported that a teaching assistant was dismissed the previous year because he was not doing his job properly. Two of the principals said they preferred to employ Roma who had completed their secondary education even though the actual requirement for the job is to have completed the primary stage of education: “The assistant can be a person with primary education but I prefer when they have the Maturita because that shows Roma all that a person can achieve, that if they do something for it themselves then they have a chance” (Principal 11, 2005). However, some principals were unconvinced. Principal 3 reported negative experiences with Romani teaching assistants in the past and now preferred to employ non-Romani teaching assistants: “I have experience with Romani assistants from the last place where I worked. They often supported the claims of Roma that we were treating them badly. They wanted excessive advantages, which we could not give them. We cannot give them everything for free. There are some things that everyone must pay for themselves. And the assistants were always defending them even when they were in the wrong” (Principal 3, 2004). The principals of schools which had non-Romani teaching assistants insisted that although a member of a Romani community might have some additional advantages over a non-Romani assistant, they were happy with the work being done by the non-Romani teaching assistants. When asked how she viewed the situation, the only non-Romani teaching assistant interviewed argued that the ethnicity of the teaching assistant made little difference as long as the children received the support they needed. The employment of teaching assistants has been successful in the sense that some mainstream schools are now more inclusive environments for Romani children and communication has improved between families and schools. However, in spite of the positive results of their work the assistants were aware that there are still many problems to be overcome. Sometimes they felt that some of the expectations of what they could achieve as a link between Romani parents and the school were unrealistic. If parents had a negative attitude about education then sometimes even a teaching assistant from their community could not do very much to change their minds. Barbora spoke of the frustration she sometimes experienced:

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______________________________________________________________ “The only thing about my work which bothers me at present is that the cooperation with some parents is not as good as I, or the other teachers, would hope it to be. They don’t accept the recommendations from the school or from me. I can’t convince them of the importance or the benefits of learning” (TA 2, 2004). In the schools where teaching assistants were employed, it was apparent that they had a positive impact. However, more schools could get involved in the programme but their principals choose not to. One reason for this is the fear that by engaging in programmes to support Romani pupils, the school might get a reputation locally as a ‘Roma’ school – a label which principals were desperate to avoid. The other main reason offered was that the financial arrangements to pay the wages of teaching assistants were too complicated and busy principals did not have time to deal with all the red tape. Indeed, while the principals of schools involved with the scheme reported positive experiences with the teaching assistants, they also cited problems with how the wages of assistants were funded. Schools have to reapply to the Ministry of Education every year for the funding to pay assistants’ wages. This means an increased bureaucratic burden and the uncertainty of not knowing whether the application will be approved. As a result teaching assistants can only be employed on fixed contracts and this lack of job security can be a problem when trying to recruit the best candidates. The principal of one school in České Budějovice had attempted to hire a Romani person for the position of teaching assistant but the local Employment Office and the Regional Coordinator for Romani Affairs could not find any suitably qualified Roma interested in doing the work. Given the strength of the local economy in České Budějovice, a Romani person with some educational qualifications had other options for employment and so a temporary contract was not as appealing as it might be in cities like Ostrava where there was high unemployment. Given the state’s professed commitment to tackling unemployment among Roma and the overwhelmingly positive feedback from schools about the contribution teaching assistants make, the Ministry of Education has a responsibility to ensure more stability for both schools and jobseekers by offering permanent posts to teaching assistants. Conclusion This chapter has discussed the problems of unemployment among Roma. There is a vicious circle in many communities where long-term unemployment has robbed people of hope and educational aspiration. Despite all the evidence that educational qualifications are of crucial importance to jobseekers, some Roma do not believe that they would find employment even if

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______________________________________________________________ they invested time and energy in education. Without role models who can prove otherwise it is difficult to see how this circle can be broken. Employing teaching assistants in schools is one small way to tackle these problems. Jobseekers have a new avenue to gain work experience and schools become more inclusive. Romani children see members of their community in positions of authority being treated with respect and non-Romani children (and teachers) also benefit from the experience of having their prejudices about Roma challenged. Problems remain with how the scheme is funded and managed but as part of a wider policy to deal with the root causes of social exclusion in Romani communities, this is an important programme. The scheme as described here is not perfect. Thus far only 127 out of more than 4,000 Czech primary schools employ teaching assistants. As demonstrated in the above discussion, not even all schools with Romani pupils employ Romani teaching assistants. In fact, it is clear that all schools would benefit from the presence of Romani members of teaching staff as this is the best way to teach children about life in an ethnically diverse and mutually respectful society. Equally, the impact of the positive changes occurring in primary schools is lessened by the failure to continue the scheme in secondary schools. Principals interviewed for this research reported that their pupils were now completing their primary education but dropping out of secondary schools because they needed more support than could be made available to them. A further problem is the lack of certainty about the security of the jobs of teaching assistants, given that contracts are always offered on an annual basis. Principals waste valuable time reapplying to the Ministry of Education for funding every year and teaching assistants may become demoralised as they go through the same uncertainty annually. Given all the indications of how effective this programme can be, if the Czech state is really serious about building a fully integrated society then more support should be offered to schemes such as this. In the introduction to this volume the rationale behind integration policies in Central and Eastern Europe was questioned and it is worth reflecting on the underlying aims of the teaching assistant programme – is this genuinely a positive way to integrate Roma or is it actually a means to homogenize Roma by using teaching assistants to socialize Romani children into the dominant modes of behaviour? The latter argument could be sustained as many of the teaching assistants interviewed for this study, although Romani, did not belong to the communities they were supporting. However, based on the findings of this research I would argue that this is not the case. These teaching assistants aspired to belong to the middle class but they were not willing to deny their Romani heritage to achieve this goal. As one teaching assistant explicitly stated, it was their wish to broaden understandings of what it means to be Roma to allow educated, middle class individuals to also be seen as belonging to Romani communities. By gaining the respect of their

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______________________________________________________________ non-Romani colleagues and pupils, Romani teaching assistants can improve understanding between both communities and – given the importance of convincing the majority to embrace a multicultural vision of Czech society – they can help make their schools more inclusive institutions by promoting integration in the staff room as well as in the classroom. Endnotes 1 Research conducted in the period 2004–2005 was funded by the ESRC (PTA-030-2002-011) and a Europe-Asia Studies scholarship. 2 Primary school (Základní škola) is first stage of education which takes nine (compulsory) years, usually from the age of six to fifteen. 3 Statistical information about Roma is notoriously unreliable. The population figures for both cities were provided by municipal officials with responsibility for local Romani integration strategies. 4 Very few pupils registered their nationality as Romani, as Roma tend not to identity themselves on official documents, but the principals had a good idea of the ethnic profiles of their schools. 5 It should be noted that there is no cultural reason to explain high levels of unemployment among Roma. It is sometimes argued that Roma have no work ethic and prefer to steal or beg than to work for their living. However, this is not borne out by historical accounts, which refer to Roma as specialists in particular trades, especially metal work or horse-dealing (Fonseca, 1996; Fraser, 1995; Stewart, 1997), and as noted above Roma still look for casual work opportunities wherever possible. This work may not be legal but it remains a challenge to the stereotype of the ‘layabout’ Rom. 6 Named after Pavel Bratinka, President of the Council for National Minorities, who commissioned the report.

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Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe? Concluding Observations Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig In this chapter we revisit the topics of the volume and discuss whether multiculturalist take on ethnic diversity in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) has much to offer for the minorities affected. We argue that the group-based approach to minority integration is likely to miss its envisaged goals, because it essentializes cultural communities as homogeneous. While we view the cultural bias embedded in the integration policies as the major impediment for securing equality between the groups, we claim that safeguarding diversity is possible only by addressing individual preferences of members of different communities. If political structures really seek minority integration, they need to address individuals and not exclusively groups as the bearers of rights and duties. For this to happen, further consolidation of liberal democratic regimes across CEE seems to be a minimal requirement. Introduction Since Canada devised a comprehensive policy to manage its multiethnic society in the late 1960s “multiculturalism” has become a much debated concept across the globe. CEE countries could only join the deliberation after the Iron Curtain fell in the late 1980s. However, today they remain very much at the centre of the European debate on social equality and nondiscrimination, not least because international organizations increasingly sponsor and promote minority integration programmes based on multiculturalism. Across the post-socialist world, multiculturalism usually defines a public policy approach to the management of cultural diversity in society. Advocates of multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe additionally stress respect and tolerance for differences among ethnic and linguistic groups through emphasis on the uniqueness of cultures, especially in how they relate to one another and to national institutions. In so doing, scholars of multiculturalism effectively address collective rights inherent to members of minority groups, while at the same time dispensing with questions of individual autonomy. Although, multiculturalism has grown out of the original idea of defending and promoting the ethnic cultures of national communities, local minorities, or migratory communities, its area of application is most suitable under situations in which one culture dominates others. Current debates on

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______________________________________________________________ multiculturalism observe that its distinguishing feature lies in implicit or explicit attempts to honour liberal and democratic egalitarianism simultaneously, an endeavour which is difficult to reconcile with the growing acceptance of the cultural heterogeneity of citizenry (Modood, 2007). Hence, while having evolved from the liberal democratic values of liberty and equality, multiculturalism remains undecided as to the nature of these two fundamental concepts and thus far has been slow to produce a universally applicable collective understanding of the issues. All Western and Eastern European states largely acknowledge that present-day societies are culturally diverse. However, the policy-focus on guaranteeing group rights to minority groups is particularly difficult to reconcile with the liberal connotations of personal identity, which presumes freedom of choice to belong to any group. Studies of ethnopolitics, whether of Western or Eastern European societies tend to apply rational choice theoretical approaches to explain when, why and how primordial identities are mobilised and tend to cause conflicts (Brubaker, 2004; Hale, 2008; Hechter, 2000; Laitin, 2007). Taking an extreme position on the salience of group identities - cultural, ethnic or linguistic - rational choice approaches essentially deny the reality of individual commitment to a group agenda. Although our authors have avoided sliding into the debates on the nature of identities involved in the process of social integration, on many occasions the salience of these identities for the development of policies to facilitate minority integration is implicit. We claim that this view does not result from the “area studies fallacy” of the volume. Instead, we believe that our authors highlight the fundamental challenge of bringing about multiculturalist solutions to minority integration: essentializing groups on the one hand, and seeking their convergence on the other are difficult outcomes to reconcile. 1. What kind of Multiculturalism? Multiculturalism has many faces and many more conceptual formulations. Two currents can be discerned from the multitude of approaches, with “communitarian multiculturalism” dominating the scene and “pluralist multiculturalism” established as a secondary issue within the debates surrounding the design of democratic processes. The communitarian version of multiculturalism, naturally, distinguishes groups as objects of rights, estimates a policy’s effectiveness with respect to cultural communities and treats these communities as homogeneous entities (Benhabib, 2002; Taylor, 1992, 2004). The pluralist version also sees groups to be the bearers of specific rights and obligations, defends non-dominant cultural groups and suggests different forms of political representation of group interests, by various means. However, pluralist multiculturalism advocates self-government, cultural autonomy and similar rights for the members of groups, because it treats them as indi-

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______________________________________________________________ viduals in their own right (Kymlicka, 1995, 2000; Kymlicka and Patten, 2003; Phillips, 2007; Sen, 1999). Neither approach to multiculturalism however, addresses the policybias in favour of the dominant group which naturally has a greater influence over policy-making than ethnic minorities do. Frequently the state-bearing majority treats members of various groups as objects of group processes, but not as subjects choosing identities and thus forming groups as such. And because multiculturalisms distinguish the groups, not the individuals, as the bearers of distinct rights and freedoms, societal integration can only be understood as a process through which individuals move closer together into a common, culturally blind space (Philips, 2007; Tamir, 1992). Conversely, the group approach to societal integration and its emphasis on the centrality of collective rights points to a blind spot in the debates on multiculturalism. However defined, groups rarely engage in any integration measures. It is the individual member of the group who is affected by incentives and policies and who has very limited opportunities to determine either the direction or the pace of these processes. Multiculturalism, following the founding principles of democratic liberalism treats groups as nothing more than a sum of individuals, endowed with a set of inalienable rights. In so doing, multiculturalist solutions to integration are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, they seek to accommodate the interests of groups, while on the other, they emphasise that rights and freedoms are always individually allocated. Ultimately, multiculturalism is biased towards groups in general and towards any kind of community in a disadvantaged position in particular. Groups are either conceived of as being internally homogeneous, or exhibiting such intragroup variation that it is impossible to reach internal agreement of criteria for group membership. Although our contributors have focussed on what is at stake during the process of integration in CEE states, they are less explicit about the kind of multiculturalism that is being developed throughout the region. First and foremost, all the contributions address the shortcomings of the group-based approach of policies on societal integration applied across CEE states. Contributions to the Section One recognize the deficits implicit in the group approach to societal integration and emphasize the growing focus on individual rights, as advocated by international organizations. The contributions in Section One make clear, international organizations frequently address nondominant groups as if they were homogeneous, while at the same time viewing disadvantaged individuals as if they were not members of any group. Furthermore, in addressing the structural framework of integration processes in CEE countries, the contributions in Section Two suggest that internal group differences, particularly among the members of non-dominant communities are often overlooked by state approaches to integration. The base-line for successful integration of minority communities is de jure culture

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______________________________________________________________ blind political institutions, as all of the contributions to Section Two argue. However, in none of the cases examined in this volume are political structures de facto culture blind because they are all too frequently used by dominant groups to support their own nation-building projects. Finally, the conflicting logics of nation- and state-building are addressed from the perspective of non-dominant groups. Contributions to Section Three focus on conditions of access to political institutions and call for a redefinition of these from a functional perspective: Why do established institutions fail to address the structural conditions, which determine the marginal position of non-dominant groups? One of the central preconditions for integration in the multicultural societies in question lies in addressing the differences within the non-dominant groups. The contributions to Section Three illustrate the lack of sensitivity state-policies demonstrate when approaching different segments of the non-dominant Romani communities. However, throughout the volume we see that while policies remain blind towards differences within non-dominant or excluded groups, reducing inequalities among some members of these groups immediately leads to the further marginalization of the least competitive members of these communities. Women, children and individuals with less formal education are always jeopardized when attention is granted to larger entities, such as ethnic or linguistic groups. In sum, the contributions to this volume do not articulate, but always suggest that a group approach is a necessary base-line for equality between non-dominant and dominant groups. However, because there are critical differences within dominant and non-dominant groups in terms of resources, preferences and beliefs, a focus on intergroup differences should not overshadow intragroup variations. Effective implementation of the group-based approach to integration is more than likely to reproduce inequalities between the sub-groups, unless it is combined with the differentiated treatment of individual differences within the groups affected by the process of minority integration. All the contributors address the incentives for dominant groups in their approaches to minority integration. CEE approaches to integration promote individual involvement with the group that has better access to scarce (and, at times, highly contested) resources, central positions and benefits controlled by the dominant group. At the very least, this resembles a state sponsored process ensuring social cohesion at the expense of cultural diversity. At most, it is reminiscent of incentives for the members of non-dominant groups to assimilate into the dominant group. In both cases, however, a oneway integration process is at work with non-dominant groups adapting to the rules, set out by the dominant community, which is state-bearing, liberal democratic and held to be inherently good.

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______________________________________________________________ This false opposition between the choice of assimilation and marginalization, as our volume demonstrates, ultimately results in a new form of post-socialist multiculturalism. Across the region, we observe the development of policies protecting (if not promoting) the culture of the majority, as well as the evolution of a social consensus that the public space can dispense with visible presence of minority cultures, which are largely pushed into private sphere. In part, the retreat of non-dominant cultures into the private sphere is the result of the concerted action of international, national and local actors, working through policies of social cohesion. International legal instruments, local political leaderships, and the communities they target all see multiculturalism as a means for groups to interact, as if they were homogeneous, selfsustained and largely independent units within nation-state borders. However, while policy-making focuses on collectivities with hard boundaries, policyimplementation depends on flexible understandings of group memberships and the freedoms of their individual members, who can appeal for affirmative action and special standards of consideration. The chapters on Roma in this volume suggest that a group approach is at least one of the reasons – if not the central reason – to explain why Roma failed to achieve success in their integration endeavours across CEE. Multiculturalism affirms group rights but does so by essentializing cultures, homogenizing them for policy purposes, and tending to neglect differences within and similarities between cultures. The dilemma we see with approaches to societal integration across CEE is not that groups do not interact with each other to the degree necessary for a multicultural public sphere to emerge in any one country but that interactions take place between individuals, who classify each other exclusively in terms of belonging to different cultural communities. In spite of this, there is no debate on the fact that multiculturalism is a reality across CEE states and societies. Contrary to the commonly held view, multiculturalism does not emerge as the result of intellectual construction, nor is it an attempt to address potential conflict in multiethnic societies. Instead it has its source in the problems of real world politics and is driven by a growing awareness of inequality between different segments of society. The increasing heterogeneity of political communities across the globe links various questions of concern for the multiculturalist debate: from international relations between states to intergroup relations within state borders, from the choices made by individual members of non-dominant groups to the approaches of states to integrating their citizenry. Disregarding these differences between the groups at the cost of preserving societal and political integrity would be wrong-headed at best, counterproductive at worst. In this light, social integration is a means and an end in the multiculturalism debate. Offering solutions to agents on the ground, the

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______________________________________________________________ makers of policy-frameworks and monitoring the debates of the international community on social integration are always about the real-world society and the limits of political and social theories. At all times, however, understanding what is the base-line for integration and what is the drive behind the respective policies is central to estimating the envisaged outcomes. 2. The Role of European Organizations in Minority Integration Contributions in Section One analyze international norms and the instruments employed to promote equality and non-discrimination. While nondiscrimination norms form the desired minimum consensus which will affect all further policy measures to foster minority integration, the promotion of effective equality has only recently been emphasised by European institutions. European organizations have now taken a leading role in the promotion of minority non-discrimination and equality norms and programmes. In CEE practically no country has remained untouched by international efforts to integrate politically, socially or economically disenfranchised minority groups. Despite the large number of excellent studies investigating minority rights in CEE (Brubaker et al., 2006; Galbreath, 2005; Csergı, 2007; Harris, 2002; Kelley, 2004; Rechel, 2008; Smith, 2005; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006) much of this literature primarily analyzes the formal adoption of minority rights before EU enlargement and the impact of EU membership conditionality. However, this volume focuses primarily on the period after EU enlargement and on the much narrower issue of minority integration programmes in a variety of CEE countries. The prohibition of racial discrimination in particular, aims to create a public sphere which accommodates a range of diverging opinions and individual expressions of difference. In this manner, international organizations create a base-line for European values, where any kind of primordial loyalties and identities can be expressed freely within the context of societal debate. Equality promotion attempts to define this new public space in terms that ensure parity between all cultural groups, irrespective of their cultural background. Here, international regulations fortify individual liberties against group cohesion and potentially undermine individual expressions of cultural differences. For European organizations the principles of equality between majority and minority groups and non-discrimination of non-dominant communities constitute two fundamental principles of minority protection. This understanding was barely recognized in national legislation affecting minority treatment in the CEE countries after the end of Communism. Only nondiscrimination norms have been formally adopted in a comprehensive manner in the wake of EU enlargement and membership conditionality. The challenge for international organizations in promoting non-discrimination norms and standards of equality appears to lie in the promotion of general standards

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______________________________________________________________ for the very divers living conditions minorities face in Europe. Sponsorship of political practices, accountability of social interactions and recognition of individual freedoms are the focus of European organizations’ activities. Efforts by international organizations to positively steer minority/majority relations come with a multitude of instruments and approaches covering very different features of minority life. Our authors provide an analytical synopsis of at least two aspects in which international organizations are involved in minority integration. Firstly, international institutions engage in a norm-setting process. They develop standards for appropriate behaviour, either at the legal or policy level, promote them and monitor their application. Secondly, international organizations are norm promoters applying different methods and instruments to foster compliance for international standards. However, the promotion of integration measures by international organizations lacks a systematic and comprehensive approach grounded in normative theory. Standard-setting During the last two decades international organizations in Europe have established a widely accepted set of minority rights of which non-discrimination and equal treatment are at the core for ethnic minorities. The relative success of this process of standard-setting becomes apparent when we observe the reactions of CEE countries to these minority rights claims. Even in those countries where substantial cleavages exist between majority and minority groups, the basic rights of minorities are officially acknowledged although often inadequately implemented. Admittedly, this is why a general acceptance of non-discrimination and equality standards across CEE is insufficient to guarantee effective equality on the ground. International organizations have not developed a uniform or standard approach to integration based on any particular theoretical or normative approach to multiculturalism. However, European institutions increasingly promote the social integration of ethnic minorities and thereby, willingly or not, borrow from basic assumptions linked to the ‘multiculturalilst approach’. On the one hand, we observe that international standard-setting aims to transcend tight cultural bonds between individuals by guaranteeing everyone a life free from discrimination. However, as all social acts and practices are culturally determined culture-blind values and practices cannot exist. Thus international institutions engage in the promotion of standards on equality and non-discrimination. The multiculturalist solutions provided by international organizations implicitly ensure the recognition of cultural differences. However, the absence of strict international norms on the application of “effective equality” means that nation-states enjoy a fairly high degree of discre-

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______________________________________________________________ tion in setting up integration programmes which suit their own particular preferences. But how do international norms on minority integration take shape in the EU, COE and OSCE? As Riedel observes in her contribution, minority rights are not codified in any of the EU treaties. With the drafting of the Racial Equality Directive in 2000, the EU took an important step forward in guaranteeing equal treatment for ethnic minorities without clearly formulating a set of exclusive minority rights. The Racial Equality Directive obliges EU member states to transpose all of its provisions into national legislation. Measures of positive discrimination are explicitly accepted in Article 5 which draws a connection between non-discrimination as “full equality in practice” and the adoption of “specific measures” to ensure minority equality. Although, as Riedel makes clear, strictly speaking, EU law does not spell out a legal right to positive discrimination, such actions are permissible in practice under the Racial Equality Directive. In his contribution Brosig discusses the more progressive attitude towards equality rights found in the comments by the Advisory Committee (AC) of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) which monitors the application of the FCNM. Correspondingly, Morawa’s chapter on the jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights on Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) supports this view. In his contribution, Brosig argues that the AC delivers the most proactive approach of all European organizations. However, while the AC did not develop criteria for the application of affirmative action policies, it refers to cases where persisting inequalities between dominant and non-dominant groups of societies require monitoring. Affirmative action is most frequently requested regarding the status of Roma and their access to employment, housing, and education. In the AC country reports, states are called upon to undertake measures to remedy severe and durable forms of marginalization, in order to reverse previous discriminatory treatment of socio-economic and ethnic groups. In sum, Brosig concludes, the AC bases its decision to recommend certain integration measures on pragmatic assumptions of minority living conditions and avoids the normative language of multiculturalism. In his chapter, Morawa follows up the areas where special consideration of minority rights is often warranted. He argues that it corresponds to current trends in the approaches of all three organizations to minority integration measures. There is an increasingly strong emphasis on positive action that would guarantee effective equality and enhance protection against discrimination. In its Chapman judgement the European Court for Human Rights has already confirmed that for states a positive obligation exists to provide effective equality. However, as Morawa indicates, it is relatively silent on the concrete application of its “special consideration standard”. The

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______________________________________________________________ Court has also not systematically advanced the concept of affirmative action in its recent judgments. Norm Promotion The institution of the HCNM does not aim to develop formal minority rights and thus we cannot analyze legal provisions for minority integration at the HCNM. However, the HCNM plays such an important role in minority issues in Central and Eastern Europe that it can hardly be ignored in the concert of international institutions. Nevertheless, the HCNM can be said to engage in soft law standard-setting or at least in the promotion of a certain concept of minority rights in those areas in which ethnic conflicts are likely to arise or currently persist. As Sabanadze notes in her contribution, the HCNM bases its conflict prevention strategy on the idea that security and social justice are not opposing but rather mutually reinforcing concepts. To achieve political stability the HCNM promotes the concept of ethnic diversity with the overall aim of preventing potential ethnic conflict and violence. These soft standards do not entail hard positive obligations with specific guidelines outlining what should be done. Instead, Sabanadze concludes, these soft standards reflect the built-in expectations which would be expressed by the HCNM to governments in the event of a potential ethnic conflict. An examination of how international organizations in Europe protect norms relating to minority integration indicates the emergence of increasing demands on states to remedy cases of discrimination and marginalization more effectively. As all four contributions to Section One make clear, affirmative action has become a progressively more legitimate tool through the promotion of equality standards by international organizations. However, the application of preferential measures is not warranted under all circumstances and every case requires careful analysis in the context of ‘real life’ conditions. All institutions analyzed in the first section of this volume are very cautious in their promotion of affirmative measures which must not lead to unjustified privileges of a minority in comparison with the majority. All of the organizations analyzed in Section One of the volume advance minority rights by promoting equal treatment and non-discrimination. However, they differ according to the instruments used to promote and enforce these standards. In fact the EU applies hard and soft law instruments, ranging from new modes of governance like the open method of coordination to legally biniding standards such as the Racial Equality Directive. An exclusively legal approach is taken by the European Court for Human Rights, the AC oversees the correct implementation of the FCNM which requires both legal expertise but also policy advise and lastly the HCNM engages in conventional diplomacy as emergency mediator in situations of ethnic conflicts. Together these organizations make up a European minority rights regime,

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______________________________________________________________ although still fragmented (Thiele, 2006), which emphasises different aspects of minority protection of which equality promotion and non-discrimination are the cornerstones. International orghanizations played a pivotal role in establishing minority rights norms in Europe and bringing states to acknowledge minority claims on equal treatment, non-discrimination, and cultural rights. However, neither the EU, nor Council of Europe, nor the OSCE have developed or promoted a single model of multiculturalism which they want their member states to adopt. This can be referred to the practical impossibility to promote a comprehensive model of multiculturalism as living conditions of people vary significantly throughout Europe as well as to political disagreement among states which direction a multiculturalist society should take. With promoting norms and principles such as effective equality, nondiscrimination and cultural diversity these organizations made it clear that national programmes developing multicultulturalist goals on minority integration must not fall back behind these basic international standards. However, the design and implementation of integration programmes and projects is seen by international organizations as a task of domestic politics, societal debate and minority participation. 3. The Role of Nation-States in Minority Integration It is striking that international actors are largely silent on the use of specific instruments for minority integration. The normative grounds on which they promote standards of equality leave ample space for the discretion of nationstates. This is particularly the case with European non-discrimination legislation which is framed as negative obligations not to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, linguistic identity etc. Although these norms are strict and increasingly comprehensive, European institutions are prepared only to a limited extent to formulate positive obligations which would bind nationstates to certain measures ensuring effective equality. The lack of positive obligations on nation-states towards their minority communities also hampers the ability of international organizations to advocate integration programmes, leaving it to national governments to devise their own approaches to societal integration. As contributors to Section Two of our book indicate, efforts are being made across the CEE region to remedy cases of discrimination and to promote equality between dominant and non-dominant groups. Our authors observe that CEE societies are working on specific multiculturalist solutions to accommodate ethnic diversity. Some might notice some similarities between the societies in the Centre and Eastern and those in the Western Europe. Non-dominant groups are treated as homogeneous collectivities; noncore ethnics and migrants are perceived as a challenge to majority-serving

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______________________________________________________________ state institutions; the lack of transparency and accountability in parts of public, social, and cultural life to aspirations of minority groups. However, the CEE versions of multiculturalism diverge significantly from those of Western European states simply because they are engaged with state-building processes while struggling to complete nation-building projects. One big difference is that the Western European minorities were entrapped with existing political institutions serving local majorities, while the CEE minorities found themselves excluded from participating in institution-building in their states of residence. Naturally, this vision has little to do with any version of multiculturalism and provides only two viable ways out. On the one hand, political institutions across CEE are too inadequately prepared to address the real grievances of the non-dominant members of these societies. The fact that the state is perceived to be a bulwark of national identity is not always unproblematic, as is reflected in the Western European debate on integration (see, Bowen, 2007; Phillips, 2007; Wallach Scott, 2007). Case studies presented in Section Two suggest that understanding whose interests state institutions should serve, and how differences – cultural, ethnic, linguistic and others – should be addressed is highly problematic. State institutions became deeply ethnicized in the process of political competition, perpetuating inequalities between the majority and the minority communities by making the state home to only one, ethnocultural community (Berg-Schlosser and Vetik, 2001; Harlig, 1997; Kuzio, 1998). As a reaction to international organization’s promotion of minority rights and as a consequence of the genuinely disadvantaged position of many members of minority groups in CEE, states have adopted national legislation on non-discrimination and equal treatment (see Faist, 2009; Rechel, 2009; Preece, 1998). However, neither the integration programmes for Roma in Hungary, nor for Egyptians in Albania, neither for Hungarians in Slovakia, nor for Russian speakers in the Baltic states sought to increase the multicultural accountability of state institutions. Instead, they provided minority groups with limited possibilities to act within the existing (majority dominated) institutions to accommodate their interests. It appears that a similar conundrum of integration is embedded in all efforts of social cohesion, regardless of whether the states are in Eastern or Western Europe (see also, (Kymlicka, 2007; Vitikainen, 2009; Soutphommasane, 2005). Limits of the Group-Based Approach to Integration This is where the approach of international organizations’ and the state-led view of societal integration converge: they focus too much on groups in order to ensure equality and guarantee non-discrimination. Moreover, nondominant groups are presumed to possess clearly distinguishable identities

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______________________________________________________________ that differ from those of the mainstream society, thus opening the gates for the special protection of non-dominant groups. While international organizations attempt to support the preservation and development of minority cultures and protect the individual against discrimination, states across CEE are far less sophisticated in their approach to creating and sustaining group bonds. Contributors to this section argue that non-dominant groups have little leeway for action in the public sphere across CEE unless they cooperate on terms envisaged by the majorities. Common identities are constantly reinforced and created by recurring expressions of allegiance and mass attachment on the side of the majority, prompting minority groups to engage in the same processes to define their group borders (Sainsbury, 2006; Kurthen and Heisler, 2009; Vucetic, 2007). Framed and reframed in the national political rhetoric, common parlance and self-understanding, these ethnic/cultural/linguistic identities can be vague and ill-defined and yet provide a set of more or less clear behavioural patterns which come to be expected from the members of the group. Minority groups throughout the region have learnt far too well that in order to access resources in the grasp of the dominant group, they need to align themselves with the most powerful actors in the field, preferably policy-makers. In this context, studies of minority integration continuously address a subversive trend towards assimilation into the majority culture among labour-migrants and substantially disadvantaged communities (Laitin, 2007; Oudenhoven and Eisses, 1998; Soysal, 1994). In their individual contributions, the authors in the Section Two make explicit that since the collapse of communism the political elites in their casestudies have instilled societies with the idea that statehood belongs largely, if not entirely, to the dominant group in society. This also allows CEE states to extend specific expectations towards minority groups. While it is the majority that “feels it has been the victim of oppression, often at the hands of minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies. […] The sort of historic injustice that is central to postcommunist debates, unlike that in the West, is the historical oppression of the majority group by its minorities in collaboration with a kin-state or foreign power” (Kymlicka, 2008). Prominently, this context provides the dominant groups with arguments to deploy against the claims of non-dominant groups, and hence constrains the development of institutions supporting integration processes. If anything, political institutions, playing the role of “service station” on the terms of the majority, further undermine the options for equal access of various cultural groups, even for those who enjoy full citizenship (Budryte, 2005). However, if political institutions are presented as guarantors of the cultural identity of the dominant group, non-dominant groups can do nothing but see cooperation with political institutions as a way towards their cooptation and ultimately, assimilation. In addition, if policies implemented aim to

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______________________________________________________________ undo previous injustices inflicted upon the dominant groups by “imperial minorities”, political institutions will do nothing less than undermine the cultural diversity of a society affected by these political structures (Badescu et al., 2004; Csergı, 2007; Harris, 2002). Independent of the limitations imposed on the non-dominant groups, the cultural favouritism of political institutions across CEE prevents European non-discrimination and equality norms from becoming fully effective. On the one hand, culture-biased institutions allow considerable space for the claims of non-dominant groups to guarantee effective equality in individual relations with state organs. At the same time, political institutions seem to focus on the prevention of discrimination against non-dominant groups. In this sense, the previous focus of state institutions on guarantees of individual equality was undertaken to account for the autonomy of group cultural orientations without addressing differences within the groups themselves. In order to bring the presumption of group autonomy into equilibrium with that of individual liberty, individual decision making and the structure of personal intentions should be taken into greater account. Institutions ensuring integration are usually considered successful, when they do not impose any obligation on the dominant community to participate in the process. As a result, as the cases in Section Two make clear, members of the majority envisage that the state, political institutions and political processes could be run solely by the majority community with little or no consultation with non-dominant groups. Specifically, collective identity is perceived as a marker of a group’s distinctness, legitimizing the group’s self-determination and the institutionalization of a common identity. On the one hand, all five contributions in Section Two find that state institutions across the region are in dire need of consolidation. In all five states discussed in the section, the majority of democratic voters do not question the institutional design of new state structures, which primarily serve the interests of state- bearing majority. The consent of the majority of the citizenry, however, should not distract the attention from the discrimination perceived by members of non-dominant groups with regard to the institutional design of these states. Doubtless, this leaves little lee-way to renegotiate state/society relations writ large, and majority/minority relations in particular. On the other hand, minority integration constitutes an integral part of a state-building project, which is still far from accomplished. While these authors do not find any evidence that minority communities, their leadership or their external advocates are inherently in opposition to the emerging unitary state structures, all contributions in Section Two argue that the members of minority communities would have been much better off if they had been treated as partners during the process of state-building. For example, the discussions on the policy-making aimed at the integration of societies in

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______________________________________________________________ Slovakia, Latvia and Estonia underline that many policy goals were deemed ineffective, as they did not reflect the capacities and opinions, not to mention the preferences, of the minority communities they were intended to target. All of the contributions in the Section Two of the book independently determine that relations between the minority and majority groups can only be considered adequately against the backdrop of converging processes of nation- and state-building under way across the region. Where Tremlett and Salamun argue that group identities are essential to effective policy-making and implementation, Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy suggest that the policies advanced are too concerned with the status of the dominant group to be sufficiently sensitive to the grievances of minorities. Some previous studies claim that such policies are indicative of the majority’s self-perception (Alexius, 2008; Walsh and McLeod, 2007) and the contributions in Section Two point out that integration policies are indeed made by “minoritized majorities” (Bessenyey-Williams, 2002) Policy-makers across CEE accept that states are inherently, not only contingently, owned by one group, standing in permanent and inevitable all-out conflict over scarce resources with the subordinated groups. The Importance of Individual Autonomy To address the multicultural nature of societies in CEE, the limits of individual equality and autonomy embedded in majority-led state- and institutionbuilding need to be assessed consistently. The recognition of different ethnic groups as integral parts of a multicultural society would remain largely ineffective without guarantees of equality in intergroup interaction. Provisions for non-discrimination should ensure the rights of members of non-dominant groups to contest the leading role of the members of the dominant group in the process of institution- and state-building. In addition, collective rights for minority groups would allow different cultures to be accommodated in the public sphere. Embedding group rights to express cultural distinctiveness in the public sphere, for example, would allow for more flexible multicultural solutions and thus be fundamentally different from the right to nondiscrimination, pursued to date. To understand how CEE nation-states develop relations with their minority populations the potential for social integration across the region must be investigated. Remarkably, all of the contributors in Section Two address political institutions across CEE as reflecting the choices of majorities in the respective societies. The stance of these states towards their non-dominant communities is, therefore, largely determined by the majority’s own view of post-socialist statehood. Membership in the international democratic community is largely informed by the dominant elites’ definition of their national interest. Throughout the region we observe that policies are designed to draw

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______________________________________________________________ non-dominant minorities into broader social processes, while at the same time prescribing the criteria for an integration model, based on the culture of the majorities. Acceptance of a particular version of national history, proficiency in the state language and enthusiasm for the culture of the majority emerge as the criteria indicating social inclusion. The way ahead, as presented in the contributions to Section Two, is to address what is at stake for all members of society, irrespective of their minority or majority status. Blocking perceptions of national identity as the fulcrum of national sovereignty and the basis for political participation is one option proposed. Tremlett, Salamun, Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy argue that national identity needs to be emptied of cultural content, while at the same time filling the interpersonal space with culture-blind social relations. This is obviously a utopian endeavour, because no institutional arrangement or policy can ever be totally culture free but it is precisely the institutionalised cultural bias in favour of the majority population that our contributors are highlighting. Contributions to Section Two argue that as long as national identity can be understood only from one particular, usually majority, cultural background, the tension between members of dominant and non-dominant groups is likely to prevent functional interaction. Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy further suggest that if national identity is defined by a particular cultural background, it is likely to create two kinds of political communities, those with privileged access to political institutions, and those with limited access to participation through membership. Tremlett and Salamun, on the other hand, suggest that national identity can embrace non-dominant groups if substantial elements of individual choice are incorporated into the design of minority integration instruments . By recognizing individual choices within equality measures, the recipients of integration can be addressed without essentializing group membership. Ultimately, this creates the basis for a consolidated multicultural society. Avoiding an ethnic understanding of nationhood would automatically allow individual choice of civic or constitutional community identity over cohesive ties of ethnic or linguistic kinship. Tremlett and Salamun emphasise that as long as “national identity” means political identity, as envisaged by the dominant ethnic community, there is little chance to address the grievances of nondominant groups, such as Roma or Egyptians. Needless to say, how multicultural solutions will be embedded into policy-making largely depends on the guarantee of liberal democratic governance throughout CEE. Not all states across the region have an equal starting point for discussions about the liberal distribution of rights and obligations to individuals affected by state institutions and policies. In many cases members of non-dominant groups lack formal rights to participate in political decision making. In other cases, social and economic constraints prevent the equal engagement of minority groups. The case studies of “imperial minori-

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______________________________________________________________ ties” by Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy might suggest that recognition of difference between the groups would allow all individuals’ interests to be embedded within the existing political structures. Moreover, the case studies of Roma in chapters by Tremlett and Salamun indicate that shared interests and concerns for liberty and equality, so central to democratizing CEE societies, still need to be established in the public sphere and embodied in political structures. In this, further democratization is the prerequisite for broader institutional accountability to the demands of cultural communities and individual dissenters. Guarantees of political and social pluralism will open up ways to address inherently cultural interests, while at the same time updating the understandings of equality embedded in existing political institutions and allowing the elaboration of the novel forms of multicultural integration. 4. The Interface of Minority and Majority Communities The problems of multiculturalist solutions are particularly clear when state institutions attempt to deal with the integration of Romani communities. The inability of multiculturalism to address marginal groups without a discernable cultural core, but discriminated against nonetheless, becomes particularly striking. Here, the question of individual autonomy returns with great force. Equality between the individuals of different cultural backgrounds can hardly be guaranteed as long as it is the group that is the focus of non-discrimination and equality protections. The fundamental problem of effective equality arises when policy-making regarding national minority integration programmes is exclusively based on essentialized group features. Because group features may significantly deviate from individual perceptions of equality, any policy that only recognizes group values as the exclusive point of reference potentially or de facto infringes on individual choices for equal treatment. However, the importance of group rights for realizing individual equality should not be dismissed too quickly. Although integration measures must not essentialize group features, the autonomy for making choices depends on the individual’s membership of a certain group. Individual freedom to choose cultural loyalties opens the way for an intercultural dialogue, limits group-exclusion and makes group-based discrimination more difficult. Along the lines advocated by communitarian multiculturalists, differential treatment of groups would undermine exclusion based on group membership, as in cases of intergroup competition on the same political stage, such as in South Tyrol - Alto Adige. Guaranteeing individuals the freedom to choose cultural identity on the basis of which they would prefer to be treated would allow greater formal equality between the members of the same political community, as is envisaged by the liberal multiculturalists. This principle is at work in the cases of state interaction

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______________________________________________________________ with endogenous, non-dominant residents, such as Sami in Nordic states and First Nations in Canada. In all cases however, both schools of multiculturalism agree that when members of a non-dominant community present themselves as members of the dominant community, they are likely to gain greater acceptance. For multiculturalists, this adds up to greater equality of individuals from different cultural backgrounds when they interact in the public space. At times, however, this individual choice might result in creeping assimilation (see Laitin, 1998). The case studies in this volume confirm that either way, the more salient the perception of group identity is with both dominant and non-dominant communities, the more supportive institutions would need to be to alleviate the grievances of disadvantaged members of non-dominant groups. Thus, it seems logical that the greater focus on individual autonomy would allow one to address individual preferences and choices of integration strategies. Additionally, the focus on individual autonomy would allow a definition of individual preference formation in terms of individual choices rather than as a result of group cohesion. The most obvious outcome of a focus on individual autonomy would be deeper societal integration. Cultural Bias as an Embedded Limitation for Integration The contributions to Section Two suggest that all states in question have erected political institutions serving primarily the needs of the dominant cultural community. In Section Three McGarry, Cashman and Nikolić discuss the integration of Roma into different societies. All individually the authors conclude that the successful integration of Roma would result in this group’s embracing the set of claims for equality previously embraced by the dominant groups in their societies. What we see in the contributions to Section Three is that the approaches of nation-states to Romani integration in particular, see collective features to reinforce group identification apparently not as means for social stability, but as an end in itself. If there is no space left for dissenting individuals to opt out of, voice their concerns with, or reform cultural traditions from within, cultural communities are likely to perpetuate themselves, as will the borders and inequalities between different cultural groups – something that minority integration supposedly seeks to circumvent! As such, the contributions about Romani integration in Sections Two and Three highlight that resource redistribution between the groups is a tricky process. While our authors do not address the issue explicitly, from a multiculturalist point of view there is a potential danger in according resources to cultural groups, as there is a risk that more vocal members could subordinate the interests of other group members. In Hungary, as McGarry writes, Romani representatives call for the accommodation of cultural differences in the

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______________________________________________________________ political sphere on terms that would suit other minority groups, with distinct ethno-cultural features, possibly with the support of external homelands, but always with prior experience of fully fledged participation in political processes. If this process would take place in a multicultural setting, the members of Roma community with expertise and capability to engage in political bargaining could capitalize on their privileged access to whatever resources are made available, at the expense of less vocal members of their community. A similar process is observed by Nikolić in Macedonia, where the civil society activism of Romani groups aims to bring about equal access for this group to social and political resources, already available to the local dominant group and other communities of non-dominant citizens of Albania. Although Nikolić is highly positive about the Romani NGO activities in Macedonia, we see that in this situation, however, more active members of Romani communities are able to cut off the bigger part of the pie for use in their communities and neighbourhoods. Finally, guaranteeing Roma access to education is also complicated in the Czech Republic, as Cashman discussed in her paper. It appears that only those members of community resident in the areas with special projects for Roma have a chance to successfully integrate into the dominant society. What we see as a potential challenge for the dominant societies’ dealings with Roma from these contributions is that engagement in political parties, non-governmental organizational activity and grass-root pressure groups are fine as long as they increase the political representation of minority group. However, when these groups are granted a chunk of decision-making power over regular members of non-dominant communities, they might become manipulators of those who have little say. The case of Roma is particularly telling here. Cooperation between the dominant elites with Romani representatives essentially entails the cooptation of the Romani leadership, as McGarry observes. Nikolić suggests further that cooptation is geared towards the entrapment of minorities into a presumably enlightened and liberal mainstream society. In addition, Cashman discerns agency paths as being subordinated to institutional prescriptions and determined by the pervasiveness of liberal democratic values in the terms of majorities’ own national-cultural customs. In the Czech case, the presence of Roma in the classroom was clearly perceived as a threat to integrity of the dominant ethno-cultural group. Although intergroup competition was not observed by Cashman, the visibility of Roma in the public sphere presents a clear challenge to the homogeneity of the dominant society and exemplifies the importance of ethnocultural particularism for the members of the dominant group. Romani children seeking equality and non-discrimination in educational institutions were presumed to have little autonomy to decide for themselves and practise their own choices on par with Czech pupils.

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______________________________________________________________ Somewhat more optimistically, Nikolić presents the activities of Romani NGOs where rigorous observance of a common agenda in the public sphere make up for hollowing out the group agenda. Clearly, also in the example of Macedonia, Roma are denied a public space if they overemphasize differences. Furthermore, albeit, motivated by the best of intentions, Nikolić seems to speak about the creeping outsourcing of responsibilities for integration onto the shoulders of NGO activists and pressure groups by the Macedonian state. Finally, while McGarry does not necessarily want to cast doubt on Hungary’s commitment to Romani integration in theory, or in practice, his presentation of the politicking of the Romani leadership demonstrates that the choices they make are largely predicated by the options made available by the dominant community. Although, Hungarian Roma do not lack avenues to formulate strategies and interests framed as expressions of individualism, autonomous agency and group equality, Hungary’s political structures still hamper their agenda. In spite of these concerns, all three contributions make clear that non-dominant Roma are agents in their own right and are capable of formulating their cultural claims themselves. In short, what we desperately need when addressing the grievances of marginal and non-vocal minority groups is a clear-cut distinction between the claims of individuals to sustain their distinct identity and to acknowledge the right of individuals to determine her/himself whether or not s/he would like to belong to a group. McGarry, Nikolić and Cashman address this conundrum and try to sort out which claims warrant equality, which non-discrimination, and which do not warrant any special treatment. Certainly, where policymakers seek to address the concerns of non-dominant groups they need to begin with the notion that individual rights to equal treatment and nondiscrimination can only be effective when decoupled from cultural backgrounds and membership in any kind of community. The focus on individual differences, albeit rooted in a common cultural background would prevent stereotypical and simplistic assumptions about culture-based forms of political participation (McGarry), civic engagement (Nikolić) and preference for education (Cashman). After all, say our three contributors to the final section, the members of minority cultures do not have culturally determined action patterns that cannot also be found among members of dominant groups. If multiculturalism is to be successful, it needs to demonstrate new options to address the individual preferences of members of different communities – and demonstrate that the claims of individuals from the different groups can be indistinguishably similar –, rather than overemphasize differences.

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______________________________________________________________ 5. The Potential for Multicultural Solutions in CEE Multicultural solutions to societal integration mainly address the options for non-dominant groups to engage in political process previously determined by majority groups. In so doing, multiculturalism not only overemphasizes the importance of groups, and their influence on the preference formation of an individual’s cultural identity, but, furthermore,, multiculturalism treats all individual expressions of choice as being subordinate to the group’s action patterns. Thus, multiculturalist solutions to societal integration tend to see cultural communities as homogeneous, irrespective of variance among their members. For multicultural approaches to societal integration to be viable, the cultural groups targeted cannot have contingent borders and must project cultural identities onto all their members to the same degree. However, it goes without saying that not all individual choices result from culturally or otherwise group-determined action patterns. Although, autonomous preference formation can be determined by individual cultural baggage, preferences for interaction strategies are more often made from the contextual background. At the same time, from a multiculturalist perspective any judgement on culturally determined action patterns should be dismissed as immoral and discriminatory. This puts off the evaluation of cross-cultural similarities in values, expectations and preferences of individuals belonging to different cultural groups. Additionally, the failure to communicate across the cultural divide discourages the negotiation of possible ideas of convergence and leads to dissimilar attitudes not only on collaboration, but also on issues of mutual enrichment. Matters such as the value of human life, ethics and perceptions of individual freedoms all need to disappear from multicultural discourse. Particularly our contributors discussing state approaches to Romani communities underline that policy-making treats all Roma as if there were no internal subgroups among their representatives. What you see, is what you get: Institutions need to assume that cultures are fully internally homogeneous, and that the subjects belonging to cultural communities mutually share not only a language and values, but also interests and resources. However, as no multicultural society can be built from a blank canvas, all versions of multicultural institutions will necessarily accommodate dominant perceptions of politics, society and culture. The vicious circle is often thus reinforced by political institutions and social structures designed and driven by the concerns of the majority for the preservation of the status quo. As the contributions to our volume demonstrate, however, it is multiculturalist rhetoric married with institutional determinism which embodies the approaches to minority integration in CEE states. What is worse - political institutions, actors and policies further embed cultural bias into all kinds of social relations.

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______________________________________________________________ The purpose of political institutions is to improve the relationship between members of non-dominant communities and the privileged majority group, both of whom have different perceptions of public space. Political institutions also seek to make the members of non-dominant groups autonomous agents in their relationships with minority culture, but without providing them with any motivation to relate positively to the dominant culture. And although the two claims are central to multiculturalism, they stand in constant strain with one other. Hence, the adherents to multicultural communitarism are able to claim the primordial nature of cultural features, while at the same time favouring the assimilation of minorities of less sophisticated cultures into the dominant one. At the same time, multicultural pluralists are vocal defenders of cultural equality, while at the same time underlining the impossibility of communication across cultural divides. Our contributions make particularly clear that both the advocacy for and opposition to multiculturalism emerged on exactly the same grounds. Multiculturalism assumes that cultural memberships are primordial and involuntary, and hence constrain their members’ options for interaction with representatives of other cultural groups. This allows multiculturalists to call for accommodation of individuals who (allegedly) lack autonomy within political institutions that are (allegedly) culture blind. At the same time, these institutions are predicated on the majority culture, and allow its members a degree of freedom and equality, which the members of non-dominant groups cannot enjoy (see Bowen, 2007; Modood, 2007). This is where our discussions on minority integration in CEE countries have a clear fit with the debate on multiculturalism: Cultural claims of minority individuals are more often than not agent-driven and thus provide sufficient incentives for political institutions to respond accordingly. However, the claims of minority groups for their greater integration are misunderstood by dominant groups and seen as being agenda-driven, in the sense of reflecting their own experiences with political institutions. In all cases, the agenda-driven claims of the non-dominant groups seek to further redistribute resources and gain greater structural advantages from the dominant groups. If political institutions were to consider the stakes of minority integration carefully, they would need to address the disparities embedded in the treatment of groups as the bearers of rights and duties. In the process however, individuals with dissenting opinions and those with marginal opinions are bound to be the losers of integration, undermining the very project of institutional consolidation in the long run. Debating the content and extent of values distinguishing minority and majority groups, an integrated society from a non-integrated one, multicultural from cultural communication is needed to ensure the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes in the CEE states.

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Contributors Timofey Agarin is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Aberdeen. His academic work focuses on Central Eastern European states and their relations with local minority populations. His interests include cooperation between civil society groups and governments across the postsocialist states, multilingualism and multiculturalism, as well as social integration processes across Europe. Malte Brosig is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. He holds a PhD form the University of Portsmouth and is a co-speaker of the working group on human rights of the German Political Science Association. Laura Cashman is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. She has previously published articles on the integration of Romani communities in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism and Journal of Contemporary European Research. Tove H. Malloy is a Director European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in Flensburg, Germany. She specializes in the political aspects of minority rights in international law and IR with a specific focus on the European context. She is the author of National Minority Rights in Europe (OUP 2005). Aidan McGarry is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Brighton. His book ‘Who Speaks for Roma? Political Representation of a Transnational Minority Community’ will be published in 2009 by Continuum. Alexander H. E. Morawa is Professor of Comparative and Anglo-American Law, Associate Dean for Internationalization, and Director of the Transnational Legal Studies Program and the Lucerne Academy for Human Rights Interpretation at the University of Lucerne School of Law, Switzerland. Sara Nikolić currently works as Senior Policy Researcher at the Association Alumni of the Centre for Postgraduate Studies in Sarajevo. In the last years, she has conducted research on Romani Issues in both the Republic of Macedonia and in Croatia.

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______________________________________________________________ Ada-Charlotte Regelmann is a PhD student at the Department of Central and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow. Her PhD research focuses on the relationship between minority politics/minority rights and agency options of non-dominant ethnic groups in Estonia and Slovakia. Manuela Riedel is a PhD student at the Jean Monnet Chair for European Affairs at the University of Cologne. Her PhD project specialises on minority protection in EU enlargement processes. Natalie Sabanadze is Senior Adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. She holds PhD from Oxford University in Politics and International Relations. Her academic work has focussed on questions of political nationalism, ethnic conflict, globalisation, and post-communist transition. Michaela Salamun is Researcher and Lecturer at the Department of Austrian, European and Comparative Public Law, Political and Administrative Sciences and the Competence Center Southeast Europe at Karl-Franzens University Graz. Annabel Tremlett currently works as a Senior Lecturer at the University of Portsmouth UK. She works on conceptualisations and representations of inclusion and marginalised groups in Europe, along with looking at innovative ways to approach research in these areas using a critical application of approaches from sociology and social anthropology. She is also interested in the interface of language, ethnicity, popular culture, research claims and ethics.