MindWideOpen
Also by Steven Johnson Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software Interface Cul...
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MindWideOpen
Also by Steven Johnson Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms the Way We Create and Communicate
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SCRIBNER
1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 Copyright © 2004 by Steven Johnson All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. SCRIBNER and design are trademarks of Macmillan Library Reference USA, Inc., used under license by Simon & Schuster, the publisher of this work.
Designed by Kyoko Watanabe Text set in Adobe Caslon Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Johnson, Steven. Mind wide open: your brain and the neuroscience of everyday life/ Steven Johnson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Neurosciences. 2. Neuropsychology. 3. Self-perception. I. Title. RC341.J648 2004 612.8′2—dc22 2003063308 ISBN 0-7432-5879-7 Portions of this book first appeared in Discover Magazine and The Nation. “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test and images used by permission of Simon Baron-Cohen. The test first appeared in the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1997. The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test is based on photographs from commercial sources. The test itself is used only for research and is not distributed for commercial profits. Copyright of each individual photograph cannot be traced from these photo fragments. Visit us on the World Wide Web: www.SimonSays.com
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For my boys
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MindWideOpen …let winged Fancy wander Through the thought still spread beyond her: Open wide the mind’s cage-door… —KEATS
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Contents
Preface: Kafka’s Room 1
Mind Sight
2
The Sum of My Fears
3
Your Attention, Please
4
Survival of the Ticklish
5
The Hormones Talking
6
Scan Thyself Conclusion: Mind Wide Open Notes Bibliography Acknowledgments Index
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The author’s brain, seen through a conventional MRI scan.
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Preface Kafka’s Room
How pathetically scanty my self-knowledge is compared with, say, my knowledge of my room…. There is no such thing as observation of the inner world, as there is of the outer world. —KAFKA
The idea for this book began with a nervous joke—a handful of nervous jokes, to be precise. A few years ago, thanks to a lucky convergence of events and a long-standing curiosity, I found myself in the office of a biofeedback practitioner, lying on a couch with sensors attached to my palms, fingertips, and forehead. As we talked, the two of us stared into a computer monitor, where a series of numbers flashed on the screen like some kind of low-budget version of the CNBC ticker tape. The numbers documented precisely how much I was sweating and updated several times a second. I’ve never taken a lie detector test, but something about having a stranger ask me questions while keeping a close eye on my sweat glands put me on edge. And so I started making jokes. Getting a little tense was partly the point of the exercise. The machine I was attached to was tracking changes in my adrenaline levels, the “fight-or-flight” hormone secreted by the adrenal glands in situations that require a sudden surge of energy. Increased adrenaline can be detected through a number of means: because the hormone diverts blood from the extremes of the body to the core, drops in temperature at the extremities often suggest a release of adrenaline (hence the sensors on my fingertips). Sweating is also a telltale sign of heightened adrenaline levels. Because damp skin conducts electricity more effectively than dry skin, the electrodes on my palms could track how much I was sweating by monitoring changes in conductivity over time. Biofeedback systems are designed to give you a new kind of control over your body and mind by making physiological changes visible in a new way. After a few sessions, biofeedback users learn to “drive” their adrenaline levels up or down almost as though they were deciding to lift a finger or bend a knee. The brain, of course, is constantly adjusting adrenaline levels anyway—it’s just that you’re not usually aware of the process other than as a background sense of increased energy or calm.
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For the first five minutes of the session, my adrenaline levels remained at the midpoint of the scrolling chart, bouncing around ever so slightly, but with no real pronounced variation. And then something in the situation—I can’t remember now what it was—caused me to make an offhand joke. We both chuckled at my remark and then noticed that a huge spike had appeared on the monitor. Making the joke had triggered a surge of adrenaline in me. Or was it the reverse? Perhaps the rise in adrenaline was me mentally revving the engines before launching my joke into the environment. Whatever the causal chain, my joke-telling and my adrenaline levels were locked in some kind of chemical embrace. The extent of that link became clear at the end of our session, when the therapist handed me a printout of my adrenaline levels plotted over our thirtyminute encounter. It was, simply put, a time-line of my attempts at humor: a flat line interrupted by five or six dramatic spikes. I looked at that paper and thought: I’ve caught a glimpse of me here, viewed from an angle that I’ve never experienced before. I’d known for many years that I had a tendency to crack jokes compulsively in certain social situations, particularly in situations where the formality of the setting made humor a riskier bet. But I’d never thought about those jokes as triggering a chemical reaction in my own head. Suddenly, they seemed less like casual attempts at humor and more like a drug addict’s hungering for a new fix. I knew those adrenaline surges were just the tip of the iceberg. The creation and appreciation of humor is a remarkably complex neurological event, involving many parts of the brain and a host of chemical messengers. Doctors at the University of California Medical School, for example, recently located a small region near the front of the left brain that appears to trigger the feeling of mirth; while treating a sixteen-year-old epileptic patient, they applied a tiny jolt of electric current to the area, which caused the patient to find humor in whatever she happened to be looking at. This wasn’t merely a physical reflex of laughter: things genuinely seemed funny to her when the region was stimulated. (“You guys are just so funny—standing around,” she told her startled doctors.) Laughter itself involves a complex array of muscle actions, and there is increasing evidence that it triggers the release of small amounts of endorphins, the brain’s natural painkillers. (The next time you visit a comedy club, think “opium den.”) But making jokes in conversation also requires a subtle sense of one’s audience, a feel for their sense of humor and state of mind. Such outerdirected imagination is itself governed by another part of the brain, a part believed to be damaged in autistics and that accounts for their strained social interactions. This is what came to my mind as I thought about my nervous jokes on the biofeedback practitioner’s couch: that with each of those jokes somewhere in my head there was an elaborate electrochemical ballet unfolding, one that had been evolving since my first smile, or before. And now I had glimpsed a subsection of that inner performance as it happened. I found myself wondering how many of these little chemical subroutines are running in my brain on any given day? At 13 of 216
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any given moment? And what would it tell me about myself if I could see them, the way I could see those adrenaline spikes on the printout? And so biofeedback started me on my quest. I set out to track down as many charts, real-time displays, and 3-D models of my mental life as I could find. I talked to some of the world’s leading neuroscientists, asking them the question I’d been asking myself: “How had understanding the brain changed the way they thought about themselves?” I also found technology startups and armchair enthusiasts who had embraced brain science as a tool for self-exploration. It was a propitious time to make this journey. Over the past three decades, science has given us extraordinary glimpses of the brain’s inner geography, illuminating the amazing extent to which different tasks activate clearly defined regions: recognizing the face of a loved one, or planning a grocery list, or stringing together a sentence. Thus far, these new scientific tools have been employed mostly to observe people who have suffered neurological damage and to assess the mental maps shared by all human brains. But brains are like fingerprints—each of us possesses a unique neurological topography. We now have the technology in place to picture that inner landscape, in itself as it really is. These are tools, in other words, for exploring our individual minds, with all their quirkiness and inimitability. These are tools for capturing who we are, on the level of synapses and neurotransmitters and brain waves. Every human brain is capable of generating different patterns of electrical and chemical activity. The promise of these new tools involves being able to figure out what your pattern looks like. And then figuring out what that pattern tells you about yourself. It’s likely that you’ve thought about the patterns of your own brain’s wiring before. The general movement of popular psychology over the past century has been one from deeply figurative descriptions of mental traits toward greater physiological specificity: the movement, in a sense, from Oedipus to the neuron. Adrenaline itself has entered our everyday lexicon, as has the notion of our body administering quick chemical fixes purely for pleasure: we do things, we say, for the adrenaline rush, or the endorphin high. Radio ads now tout various wonder drugs’ ability to alter our neurotransmitter profiles as though they were selling dandruff shampoo. If you’ve read Listening to Prozac, you’ve probably met a person who seemed depressed and thought: hmm, very low serotonin. But such responses are just hunches about our inner physiological states, and crude ones at that. There are dozens of so-called information molecules in your body—neurotransmitters, hormones, peptides—each playing a key role in your shifting emotional response to external events, triggering everything from the nurturing instinct in mothers to the agitated surge of a panic attack. Could tools that measure the minute-by-minute levels of those substances in your body and brain teach you something about your own emotional toolbox? Could they help you make sense of your dreams, or your phobias? We’ve learned to track our mood changes with a statistician’s exactitude, to explore our childhood memories, to keep our minds alert with exercise. But your moods and memories and perceptions are themselves derived from electrochemical activity in your brain. What could you learn about yourself if you could catch a glimpse of that
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activity directly? If you could see what your brain looked like when it was remembering a long-forgotten childhood experience, or listening to a favorite song, or conceiving a good idea? Brain-imaging tools are miracles of modern science, but they are not the only channels to your mind’s inner life. Simply possessing a more informed understanding of your brain’s internal architecture can change the way you think about yourself. Part of such a process involves separating out mental routines that you typically experience in unison. If you know nothing about what’s actually happening in your head, the neurological activity you experience is invisible: it’s just you being yourself. But the more you learn about the brain’s architecture, the more you recognize that what happens in your head is more like an orchestra than a soloist, with dozens of players contributing to the overall mix. You can hear the symphony as a unified wash of sound, but you can also distinguish the trombones from the timpani, the violins from the cellos. To come to a comparable understanding of your own head, you don’t need a milliondollar imaging machine. You just need to learn something about the brain’s components and their typical patterns of activation. Sometimes those components come in the form of specialized brain regions; sometimes they come in the form of chemicals, like serotonin. Invariably, a certain mood that strikes you will contain a mix of both, the result of both neurochemical release and predictable activity in specific regions of your brain. As you learn to detect these brain components, you start to recognize how much multitasking is really going on in your own head. You realize that the emotion you feel isn’t simply a reaction to the world at that moment, but rather something closer to a drug, with a strange life of its own. There’s what we used to call a “rational” you and an “emotional” you, and the two aren’t always in sync. Brain science has now given us more accurate descriptions of these two sides of a personality, mapped onto specific regions of the brain. Instead of “rational” and “emotional,” today we have the “neocortical” you and the “limbic” you. Consider this situation, which you’ve probably encountered many times before. You’re in a perfectly good mood, having a conversation with a friend or colleague. You’re not particularly aware of your emotional state, but it’s purring along behind the scenes, making your dialogue free and unencumbered. And then your friend makes a passing reference to something unsettling, maybe a little stressful. Not earth-shattering, not immediately life-jeopardizing, but stressful nonetheless. Maybe he’s alluded to some upcoming corporate retreat you haven’t been invited to, or a tax deadline you’d forgotten about. Whatever it is, the news triggers a falling sensation in your body; you feel deflated and on edge. And then your friend says something that surprises or distracts you, and the depressing news flies out of your working memory, replaced by some other thought. At this moment, something uncanny happens in your head, not unlike the feeling of déjà vu. You feel the stress in your body and your head, but you can’t remember what triggered it in the first place. The feeling has been 15 of 216
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separated from the thought. Or put another way, you’ve lost the thought, but the feeling keeps on churning. Normally in this type of a situation you end up rewinding the tape of the conversation in your head—What were we just talking about?—and you locate the original item after a few seconds, at which point your mental state seems to snap back into place, just like the feeling of déjà vu lifting and linear time reinstating itself. You’re still stressed, but at least you know the reason why. Discontinuities occur like this because your conscious, second-by-second processing of a verbal conversation happens in one part of your brain, while your emotional evaluations happen somewhere else. Most of your immediate focus on generating and comprehending spoken words takes place, broadly speaking, in the prefrontal lobes of the neocortex, the most evolutionarily modern part of the brain. (Two small regions are particularly crucial: Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, the former largely focused on creating speech, the latter on processing incoming words.) But the emotions largely issue forth from areas located below the cortex, the region often called the “limbic system,” while some of their bodily effects are triggered one layer below the limbic system, in the brain stem that lies at the top of your spinal column. The activity in the prefrontal lobes consists mostly of the flash of neurons talking to each other in a very small region of your head, while the limbic system starts a cascade of events that lead to the release of chemicals that travel throughout the body, including one called “cortisol” that is responsible for much of the physical damage caused by long-term stress. So when you hear that stress-inducing sentence, two reactions go off in your head: your language centers and working memory decode the meaning and put it front and center in your consciousness; and a subcortical system triggers the stress response, releasing cortisol and other chemicals throughout your brain and body. The two systems operate at fundamentally different speeds, the prefrontal activity unfolding on the level of microseconds and the stress system on the level of seconds or even minutes. That’s why the two can get out of sync with one another. You think of something stressful and just as quickly forget about it. The prefrontal lobes can move that fast. But your emotional systems lag behind—there’s still cortisol floating in your bloodstream thirty seconds after the news vanishes from your working memory. And so the feeling stays alive in you. The question is: for that moment of disconnect, what exactly is in charge here? Your frontal lobes or your limbic system? And which one should you trust?
Brain science books sometimes suffer from a recurrent problem, one with no small measure of irony. The subject matter of a book about the human brain is, by definition, as close to home as you get. (These books are being read by human brains, after all.) But the deeper you delve into the details of brain anatomy, the higher the ratio of Latinate to English words becomes, and before long the lay reader is struggling to keep track of names like the “cingulate cortex” and the “nucleus accumbens.” Some books try to scale this learning
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curve by starting off with a crash course in neuroanatomy. My approach is different: we’ll start instead with a brain in action—feeling fear, laughing at a joke, coming up with a good idea—and tease out the underlying mechanisms as we go. I’ve also tried to limit the terminology needed to read this book: a half dozen chemicals, a half dozen brain regions, and a rudimentary understanding of the way neurons communicate. It is one of my fundamental assumptions that you can get something useful out of neuroscience with this level of mastery. (For the aficionados and the extracurious, I’ve included more detailed explanations in the endnotes.) The brain contains multitudes, as Whitman said in another context, but you don’t need to memorize them all to be a better user of your brain. If you know the landmarks, you can get your bearings. And when you’re navigating a space as complicated as your own brain, getting your bearings can make all the difference. If you’ve read a little about the brain over the past decade, you’ve no doubt encountered two topics that have dominated the public discussion of brain science. The first has to do with explaining consciousness, what the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio calls “the feeling of what happens.” The second has to do with the field of evolutionary psychology, which argues that our brains contain a kind of mental toolbox selected over millions of years of evolution to help our ancestors survive and reproduce in challenging environments. Consciousness and evolution are each fascinating avenues for exploration, but this book will try to sidestep both, in slightly different ways. Let’s start with consciousness. Imagine you’re seeing the face of a loved one after a long time apart, and feeling the pleasurable emotions triggered by that sight. We know a great deal about the path of incoming visual stimuli, shuttling information about the light bouncing off the contours of the face from your optic nerve to the sensory cortex. We know that this information resonates with memory storage systems controlled by the hippocampus, helping you remember details about your loved one. We also know quite a bit about the chemicals released in your brain that conjure up the feeling of emotional warmth. Thanks both to modern imaging technologies and studies of patients with localized brain damage, we can describe with truly remarkable precision the neurological ballet performed in your head when you gaze at the face of a child or spouse. But our scientific vision grows foggier when we try to explain how those patterns of neurochemical activity somehow create your first-person experience of that gaze: the “faceness” of your loved one’s face, the “emotionness” of the emotional feeling. Consciousness theorists call these properties “qualia”: the brain’s representation of both the external world and the body’s internal state—the taste of red wine, the look of light shimmering on water, the feeling of sudden fear hijacking your body. It seems preposterous at first, but there is a real question as to why we need qualia at all. We could theoretically have evolved brains capable of the entire range of human mental responses—processing internal and external stimuli, 17 of 216
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evaluating situations as either emotionally positive or negative, executing long-term plans—without actually feeling any of these processes. We’d be like robots or zombies, indistinguishable from normal humans from the outside but empty on the inside. So the question becomes: how did this strange property of mind come about? The brain is ultimately just a big lump of atoms strung together in a particular configuration, no different in this sense from a teakettle or a crown of broccoli. Presumably the teakettle and the broccoli aren’t conscious of themselves or their environment, so why should we be? To simplify almost to the point of parody, there are four competing answers to that question on today’s consciousness stage. The first is that the broccoli and the teakettle are conscious in some unimaginably different way from how we are. In other words, qualia is a property of matter itself, and the human brain is simply the most advanced qualia recording apparatus yet evolved. The second answer is that something unique exists in the configuration of cells that makes consciousness happen in brains and not in broccoli, though the nature of that something is a matter of great debate. The third answer implicates a mystery substance not yet understood by science—quantum behavior, perhaps, or some kind of spiritual life force—that turns a bunch of interconnected cells into a feeling brain. The fourth is the trick answer, proposing that one of the properties of consciousness is that it can’t explain itself, and so we’ll never get to the bottom of qualia no matter how scientifically and technologically adept we become. These are all mesmerizing possibilities, even if they do tend to induce a kind of existential vertigo (or make you a little squeamish the next time you drop a piece of broccoli into a pot of boiling water). I wouldn’t be at all surprised if one of the many theories of consciousness proposed in the past decade turns out to be largely correct. But science is very far from a consensus on this question right now, and I suspect it will remain in that state for the foreseeable future. And so in this book, I’ve made it a matter of policy to avoid the question of consciousness as often as possible. Running away from the problem of qualia turns out to be a relatively healthy strategy, because there’s a huge number of interesting and productive things that you can say about the brain without tackling the question of why consciousness feels the way it does. Think about my biofeedback session and my joke-telling adrenaline fix. Getting even that brief glimpse of my brain’s chemical feedback system taught me something new about my personality and my conversational habits, and sharpened my awareness of the way making jokes changed my internal mood. (And explained why I sometimes had a tendency to make jokes inappropriately.) But despite these insights, I have no idea whatsoever why an adrenaline rush feels the way it does. I can describe its edgy uplift, compare it to the effects of exogenous drugs like caffeine, predict the ways it will change my subsequent behavior. But I can’t tell you where the qualia of adrenaline comes from. It would be nice to know, of course, but fortunately it’s not the only kind of knowledge that neuroscience can impart to us.
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Then there’s the evolutionary psychology debate, which runs parallel to—and is often indistinguishable from—the question of nature and nurture. Are our mental faculties simply the product of evolved genes, or are they shaped by the circumstances of our upbringing? Unlike the mysteries of consciousness, this question has a clear, and I believe convincing, answer: they’re both. We are a mix of nature and nurture through and through, and it’s precisely the interplay between evolved tools and cultural experience that creates the richness of the human condition. In this book, I discuss some of the properties of the brain in terms of evolution, because a Darwinian perspective can sometimes illuminate features that might otherwise be shrouded in darkness, or help us understand drives and habits of mind that are unduly powerful or hard to shake. In chapter four, for instance, we’ll look more closely at the brain science of laughter, and part of that analysis will touch on why laughter evolved in the first place, which in turn helps us understand something new about when and why we laugh in everyday life. (It has much less to do with humor than you might think.) So evolutionary explanations will not be entirely absent from the chapters ahead, but neither will they be front and center. You can be agnostic about—or downright hostile toward—the premise of the evolved brain and still gain something from modern brain science, because on a basic level, the languages of nature and nurture are written in the same ink. My brain, for instance, may be releasing adrenaline with each successful punch line because millions of years of evolution endowed me with DNA that wired it that way. Or it may be that some unique set of circumstances from my childhood influenced that circuit in my brain. Most likely, of course, it’s a bit of both: adrenaline release during laughter may be a common human trait, just a little exaggerated in my case. But whatever the original cause, the wiring is there in my head, releasing its adrenaline like some kind of neurochemical Old Faithful. It’s fascinating to speculate whether a specific trait came from your ancestors or your fifth-grade teacher, but you don’t need to have a convincing answer to learn about the inner life of your brain. When public conversation turns to the way our biology shapes our behavior, we often encounter a quick denunciation of the entire premise: someone will claim that talking about minds in biological or Darwinian terms is “biological determinism,” a highbrow, sanitized version of the old horrors of racism, eugenics, and social Darwinism. For the most part, these fears are unfounded. Evolutionary psychology addresses the shared characteristics of the human species, what unites us all irrespective of race or culture—exactly the opposite of what a race-based inquiry into our biological roots would attempt to discover. Of course, the one place in which the evolutionary psychologists have in fact emphasized differences over commonalities is the fraught world of the sexes. Because so much of natural selection is predicated on reproductive success or failure, and because men and women have such different biological stakes in the act of reproduction, and because the sexual divide has been evolving for hundreds of millions of years, and not hundreds of thousands—it is inevitable 19 of 216
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that natural selection would craft slightly different toolboxes for each sex. Viewed with modern imaging technologies, men’s and women’s brains are nearly as distinct from each other as their bodies are. They have reliably different amounts of neurons and gray matter; some areas linked with sexuality and aggression are larger in men than in women; the left and right hemispheres are more tightly integrated in women than in men. And of course, those brains—and the bodies they are attached to—are partially shaped by two totally different kinds of hormones, the androgens and estrogens, which play a key role both in development and adult life experiences. Men and women are most certainly not from Mars and Venus, but it is entirely fair to say that they are on different drugs. A world in which the sexes were mentally indistinguishable might be a less conflict-ridden world, though also a little duller. But the truth is it is not the world we inhabit. Writing a book about brain science without describing some of these differences would be an exercise in bad faith, emphasizing politics over science in a way that does injustice to both.
In the past few decades, a certain type of science story has become commonplace in the media. You’ve probably encountered dozens of renditions of it: scientists announce that they have uncovered the roots of a particular human psychological attribute. The two standard variations of this story are the brain scanning version and the evolutionary psychology version. In the former, scientists pick some trait or behavior—a craving for sugar, say—and use a brainimaging device to scan someone while they’re experiencing that craving. The part of the brain that lights up during the scan—the dorsal striatum, in this case—is identified as the “craving center” of the brain, and before long a press release is being drafted. The evolutionary psychology version of the same story follows a different path. Instead of locating neurological roots, the scientists discover historical roots: the evolutionary history of why one trait came to be selected. This is a more speculative science, but a powerful one nonetheless. It takes an explanatory approach, not just a descriptive one, trying to answer the ultimate question of why we are the way we are. So the evolutionary psychologists explain that we have sugar cravings because carbohydrates were rare on the savannahs of Africa where the modern human brain evolved. A rule of thumb that was adaptive in one environment (if you happen to find sugar, eat as much of it as you can) turns out to be maladaptive in an environment where Coca-Cola is practically in the water supply. These two stories are intriguing ones, and there’s much to be learned from both approaches. But neither story tells you something about your own present-tense experience that you don’t know already. You’re already familiar with your sugar cravings, and while it’s nice to learn about their origins, knowing the role of the dorsal striatum won’t help much the next time you’re salivating over that Mars bar. If science is going to tell you something useful about your brain, it has to go beyond simply explaining the roots of some familiar mental
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phenomenon. Your brain is filled with a lively cast of characters sharing space inside your cranium, and while it’s interesting to find out their exact addresses, that information is ultimately unsatisfying. Call it the “neuromap fallacy.” If neuroscience turns out to be mostly good at telling us the location of the “food craving center,” or the “jealousy center,” then it will be of limited relevance to ordinary people seeking a new kind of self-awareness—because learning where jealousy lives in your head doesn’t make you understand the emotion any more clearly. Those neuromaps will be of great interest to scientists, of course, and doctors. But to the layperson, they’ll be little more than trivia. The best that the brain sciences offer comes in the form of genuine insights, insights in both senses of the word: a looking within and a new way of understanding. To that end, I have applied a test of sorts to the stories I’ve assembled for this book. I call it the “long-decay” test—as with a sound wave that takes an extended time to trail off into silence (or a radioactive material with a long half-life). There are insights about the brain that prompt a quick burst of recognition—“So that’s where the food craving comes from!”—and then just as quickly fade in the mind. These insights fail the long-decay test—they don’t stick with you in any profound way. To pass the test, the insight has to reverberate for weeks or months after you’ve first encountered it; it has to pop up in conversation or in moments of self-reflection; it may even change your behavior based on what it teaches you about yourself. Long-decay ideas transform as much as they inform. For the most part, the long-decay ideas I’ve assembled here have direct relevance to ordinary minds, minds untroubled by the extreme conditions profiled in so much of the scientific literature: amnesia, Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, manic-depression, the many forms of aphasia. The most powerful theories of mind have always had something useful to contribute to generally healthy minds and not just troubled ones. Freud developed his theories partially by analyzing the debilitating disorders of hysterics and schizophrenics, but psychoanalysis ultimately attracted such a large audience because you didn’t need to be mentally ill to find something useful in it. You could explore your Oedipal complex and analyze your dreams even if you weren’t worried about your sanity. I believe modern neuroscience deserves to be seen the same way: as relevant to the healthy as it is to the ill, as relevant to those of us wrestling with the small triumphs and tragedies of everyday life as it is to those battling more forbidding demons.
Enough disclaimers. I’ve tried to write what follows not as a polemic or a broadside, but as a kind of appreciation. Think of the way an art historian or a musicologist can help you discern new qualities in a great painting or symphony; your perception widens when you look through their eyes or listen with their ears. Brain experts can help us do the same with our own mental life. Under their tutelage, we start noticing reflexes and patterns hitherto invisible to us. Knowing something about the brain’s mechanics—and particularly your brain’s mechanics
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—widens your own self-awareness as powerfully as any therapy or meditation or drug. Brain science has become an avenue for introspection, a way of bridging the physiological reality of your brain with the mental life you already inhabit. The science and technology today are no longer limited to telling us how the mind works. They also have something to say about how your mind works. Unlike so many technoscientific advances, the brain sciences and their imaging technologies are, almost by definition, a kind of mirror. They capture what our brains are doing and reflect that information back to us. You gaze into the glass, and the reflection says to you, “Here is your brain.” This book is the story of my journey into that mirror.
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1 Mind Sight
“He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.” —FREUD
I’m gazing into a pair of eyes, scanning the arch of the brow, the hooded lids, trying to gauge whether they’re signaling defiance or panic. Just a pair of eyes—no mouth or torso, no hand gestures or vocal inflections. All I have to go on is a rectangular photo of two eyes staring at me from a computer screen. When I’ve made my judgment—it’s defiance, after all—another set pops on the screen, and I start my examination all over again. This reverse eye exam is part of an ingenious psychological test devised by the British psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen. The test presents you with thirty-six different sets of eyes, some crinkled in mirth, others gazing off to the horizon deep in thought. Below each image are four adjectives, such as: despondent preoccupied cautious regretful
Or: skeptical anticipating accusing contemplative
It’s your job to choose the adjective that best fits the image. Is that raised 24 of 216
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eyebrow a sign of doubt? Or is it rebuke? The eyes themselves are a demographic mix: some weathered and ancient, others accented with mascara and eyeliner. The subtlety of the expressions is astonishing; as I scroll from image to image, I’m seeing the human eye with a fresh perspective, feeling a newfound amazement at its communicative range. This test, though, is not ultimately about the eye’s capacity to signal emotion. It’s about something just as impressive, and just as easily overlooked: the brain’s ability to read those signals, to peer into the inner landscape of another mind, while relying only on the most transient of cues. You won’t find exam questions like these on the IQ test, or the SATs, but the mental skills being measured here are as essential as any in our cognitive toolbox. It turns out that one of the human brain’s greatest evolutionary achievements is its ability to model the mental events occurring in other brains. Chances are you’ve had an experience roughly like this: you’re at a social gathering with colleagues or peers—say it’s an office holiday party—and you run into a coworker with whom you have an unspoken rivalry. It’s one of those relationships that is chummy on the surface, but right beneath there’s a competitive energy that neither side acknowledges. When you first encounter your colleague, there’s the usual pleasant banter, but before long he’s confessed to you that something has gone wrong with his career trajectory: either he’s lost a big account at work or the fellowship didn’t come through or the last batch of short stories got rejected. Whatever it is, it’s bad news. It’s the sort of news that a friend should perhaps greet with a concerned, doleful expression, which is exactly the expression that you deliberately contort your face into as he delivers the news. The trouble is, you’re only a friend on the surface. Below the surface, you’re a rival, and a rival wants to grin at this news, wants to relish the schadenfreude. And so for a split second, as you’re hearing the fateful syllables roll off his tongue, his tone foreshadowing his disappointment before the sentence is even complete, you let out the slightest hint of a grin. And then an intricate dance begins. As your face wraps itself up in dutiful concern, you detect a flash of something in his face, a momentary startle that says, “Were you just smiling right there?” Perhaps his eyes suddenly lock on to your pupils, or he pauses in midsentence as though something has distracted him. In your mind, an interior closed-captioning emerges: “Did he see that grin?” As you offer your condolences, you can’t help wondering if your words sound cruel rather than comforting. “Is he thinking that I’m faking all this sympathy? Maybe I should tone it down a notch just in case.” The silent duet of those two internal monologues should be familiar to you, even if you’re the sort of person who never, ever gloats at another’s downfall. (Henry James made a literary career out of documenting these subtle interactions.) It needn’t be a Cheshire cat grin that provokes the interior monologues: imagine a conversation between two potential lovers, in which one 25 of 216
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worries that a facial expression has betrayed his love before he has summoned the courage to make a formal declaration. Sometimes the closed-captioning can overshadow the main dialogue, which can make for stilted conversation, with each participant second-guessing the other’s thoughts. This silent conversation—a passing grin, a sudden look of recognition, a lurking question about another’s motivation—comes so naturally to us that most of the time we’re not even aware that we are locked into such a complex exchange. The internal duet comes naturally because it relies on parts of the brain that specialize in precisely this kind of social interaction. Neuroscientists refer to this phenomenon as “mindreading”—not in the ESP sense, but rather in the more prosaic, but no less impressive, sense of building an educated guess about what someone else is thinking. Mindreading is literally part of our nature. We do it more effortlessly, and with more nuance, than any other species on the planet. We construct working hypotheses about what’s going on in other people’s heads almost as readily as we convert oxygen into carbon dioxide. Because mindreading is part of our nature, we don’t bother to teach it in schools or test our aptitude for it in placement exams. But it is a skill like any other, a skill that is unevenly distributed throughout the general population. Some people are deft mindreaders, picking up subtle intonational shifts and adjusting their response with imperceptible ease. Others mindread with the subtlety of a Mack truck, constantly second-guessing themselves or interrogating their conversational partners. Some are simply “mindblind,” shut off entirely from other people’s internal monologues. Even though we don’t teach this particular skill in school, and we barely have a vocabulary to describe it, our mindreading abilities play a key role in our work and relationship successes, our sense of humor, our social ease. But to understand these consequences, you have to stop taking the internal duet for granted. You have to slow it down, explore its underlying processes, recognize the duet for the marvel that it is. Our growing appreciation for the art of mindreading was accelerated in the late 1990s by the discovery of “mirror neurons” in the brains of monkeys, neurons that fire both when a monkey does a particular task—grabbing a branch, for example—and when the monkey sees another monkey do that same task, suggesting that the brain is designed to draw analogies between our own mental and physical states and those of other individuals. At the same time, researchers explored the premise that autistic people suffer from a kind of mindblindness, preventing them from building hypotheses about others’ internal monologues. In related studies, evolutionary psychologists began to think about the Darwinian rewards of mindreading in a social species, examining chimp populations for signs of comparable internal duets. Yet other scientists speculated on the connection between mirror neurons and the origins of language, since all forms of communication presuppose a working model of the object you’re attempting to communicate with. For language to evolve, humans needed a viable theory about the minds of other people—otherwise, they’d just 26 of 216
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be talking to themselves.
Let’s now go back to that silent duet at the office party, to the moment that half-concealed grin leaks out of the side of your mouth before you can replace it with the look of sympathy. What’s happening here? Most of the time you walk around with the assumption that you’re the boss of you, that you have a unified self that controls your actions in a relatively straightforward way. But your telltale grin challenges most of our assumptions about this selfhood, because at that moment at the office party, you are trying your hardest to do the exact opposite of smiling; you’re trying to look concerned and upset, full of compassion. But your mouth wants to smile. Whose mouth is it anyway? The answer is that your mouth has several masters, and some of them are brain subsystems that regulate emotional states. Smiling at times of genuine pleasure is not a learned behavior; every recorded culture on the planet represents the internal mental state of happiness with a smile. Deaf-blind children start smiling on the exact same developmental timetable as children who can see and hear. Cultures certainly differ in their assumptions about what makes people happy, as the popularity of frog’s legs and Steven Seagal movies in France will attest. And cultures also differ in their production of fake smiles, as in the beaming “bye-bye nows” of American flight attendants. But genuine happiness—whatever the details of its origin—expresses itself as a smile in all normal homo sapiens. Ironically, the forced smile of the flight attendant demonstrates just how innate the smiling reflex really is. A century and a half ago, the French neurologist Duchenne de Boulogne began studying the muscular underpinnings of people’s facial expressions, using the then-state-of-the-art technologies of photography and electricity. Duchenne photographed his subjects in various emotional states, and tried to automatically simulate their expressions by activating specific muscles with a small jolt of electric current. (The images from Duchenne’s experiments look like something from a Nine Inch Nails video.) In 1862, he published his findings in a volume titled Mechanism of the Human Physiognomy, which Darwin drew upon extensively ten years later in his best-selling The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals. But Duchenne’s research soon fell into oblivion, only to be discovered more than a century later by the University of California at San Francisco psychologist Paul Ekman, now generally considered to be the world’s leading expert on facial expressions. The most widely cited discovery in Duchenne’s work involved smiling. Using his crude tools, Duchenne established that genuine smiles and fake smiles utilize completely distinct ensembles of facial muscles—most visible in the eyes, which crinkle in real smiles but remain unchanged in the faux ones. (As a tribute to his long-neglected forebear, Ekman began referring to the genuine article as a “Duchenne smile.”) The muscle that controls eye-smiling is called the orbicularis
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oculi, and its activation has proved to be a reliable indicator of internal happiness or mirth. Modern brain scans show that pleasure centers in the brain light up in sync with the orbicularis oculi, but show no activity during fake smiles created with the mouth alone. The next time you want to know if your beaming waiter truly wants you to have a nice day, check out the outer edges of his eyebrows; if they don’t dip slightly when he smiles, he’s faking it. Duchenne’s insights into the muscular underpinnings of the smile make it easier to detect counterfeit good cheer, but they also teach us a more important lesson about selfhood and the emotions. Duchenne smiles are not willed deliberately into existence. You can consciously paint a fake smile on your face, but a real one erupts through a process that your conscious mind controls only in part. This is demonstrated most vividly in studies of stroke victims who suffer from a disturbing condition known as central facial paralysis, which prevents them from voluntarily moving either the left or right side of their face, depending on the location of the neurological damage. When these individuals are asked to smile or laugh on command, they produce lopsided grins: one side of the mouth curls up, the other remains frozen. But when they’re told a joke or they’re tickled, full smiles animate their face. This is why the smile has more than one master: sometimes it is triggered by the emotional systems, other times by areas that control voluntary facial movement. (Of course, depending on the brain region, the smile will differ slightly in its expression.) So that inadvertent grin that slips out at the news of your rival’s misfortune? It’s the result of two brain systems vying for control of the same face. The part of the brain that controls voluntary muscle movement —called the motor cortex—sends a command instructing the face to appear sympathetic. But your emotional system is requesting a toothy grin. Your face can’t satisfy both requests at the same time, so what results is a little bit of both: a grin that swiftly morphs into an expression of worried sincerity. And herein lies lesson one of that office party encounter: your brain is not a general-purpose computer with one unified central processor. It is an assemblage of competing subsystems—sometimes called “modules”—specialized for particular tasks. Most of the time, we only notice these modules when their goals are out of sync. When they work together, they coalesce into a unified sense of self. The idea of multiple selfhood is not, strictly speaking, a discovery of the brain sciences. There’s a long tradition of artists and philosophers documenting how fragmented we are below the surface, most notably in the modernist writers that pried open the psyche a century ago. Here’s Virginia Woolf describing the struggle between the two models of self in Mrs. Dalloway: How many million times she had seen her face, and always with the same imperceptible contraction! She pursed her lips when she looked in the glass. It was to give her face point. That was her self—pointed; dartlike; definite. That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a meeting-point…
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Freud famously envisioned the psyche as a battleground among three competing forces: id, superego, and ego. The modern understanding of the brain shatters that earlier vision into dozens of component parts, some specializing in core survival tasks, such as heartbeat regulation and the fight-or-flight instinct, others focused on more prosaic skills, such as face recognition. Your personality is, in a real sense, the aggregate of the differing strengths of each of these modules—as they have been shaped both by nature and nurture, by your genes and by your lived experience. In other words: you are the sum of your modules. If the modular nature of the mind is often hidden to us, how can we see behind the curtain of the unified self and catch a glimpse of those interacting components? Several avenues are available to us. There are the studies of pathological cases popularized by books such as Oliver Sacks’s The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, in which we detect the existence of modules through patients who have suffered targeted brain damage that takes out one or two modules but leaves the rest of the brain functioning normally. Or we can experience the modularity of the brain more directly by taking drugs that throw a monkey wrench into its machinery, causing individual modules to take on a new autonomy (which is why people on drugs often feel as though they hear voices). Or you can gaze inside your brain directly, using today’s brain-imaging technologies. Another more entertaining way into the modular mind is through the back door of illusions and various tricks of the mind. Optical illusions help reveal modules by triggering conflicts between different submodules in the visual system: modules for distinguishing between background and foreground, recognizing borders between objects, or locating objects in 3-D space. Remember the childhood game of spinning in place and then stopping quickly to feel the spinning continue? In this game, as you turn, objects in the room pass by you in a counterclockwise direction. But when you stop, you feel a sense of vertigo, and the room seems to be spinning around you in the reverse direction, as though you were standing at the motionless center of a merry-go-round. Why does the room seem to spin after you’ve stopped moving? And why does it appear to spin in the other direction? This staple of early childhood play reveals the brain’s modular approach to detecting motion. The part of the brain that evaluates whether you’re moving relies on two primary sources: information from the visual field and information from the fluid sloshing around in your inner ear. Most of the time, those two lieutenants concur in their assessments to their commander, but when you stop suddenly after spinning clockwise, the liquid in your inner ear continues to move around for a few seconds more, while your vision responds instantly to the cessation of movement. So the haptic centers of the brain are taking in conflicting data: the inner ear reports you’re still moving, while the eyes report that you’re at rest. The only way the brain can resolve this conflict is to assume that both reports are correct: you are still spinning, but it doesn’t seem that way because the world around you is spinning right along with you. The illusion of the world rotating is actually a brilliant on-the-fly interpretation that your brain 29 of 216
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makes to reconcile the conflicting data it receives. It’s not the correct interpretation, of course, but it’s a revealing one. Module disagreement is not a bad way of describing the ultimate cause behind that inadvertent grin at the office party: part of your brain wants to smile, and part of it wants to show sympathy. The result is a kind of “slip of the face”: the mouth and eyes betraying an emotion that the social self wants suppressed. The lesson here is that the control structures between modules often matter as much as the strength or weakness of each module itself. The brain is a network, and the way that each node in that network communicates with other nodes is an essential part of its higher-level properties. Even among the macrostructures of the brain, the connections made are as important as the individual structures themselves. One notable difference between male and female neuroanatomy is the communication channel that connects the left and right hemispheres, called the corpus callosum, which is much larger in women than in men. We now believe that this increased connectivity enables women to do a better job than men at reconciling the sometimes conflicting interpretations offered up by each hemisphere. Some people are good at suppressing grins, while others are lousy at it. Some modules are better at overriding other modules; some are more submissive. Understood in the broadest sense, the process of growing up can be seen as the slow subjugation of emotional centers—such as the amygdala, which plays an essential role in fear responses—by the more recently evolved regions of the brain located in the prefrontal cortex that control voluntary actions, long-term planning, and other higher functions. Infants are born with relatively well-developed amygdalas, which is why they’re so good at being frightened right out of the gate. But their prefrontal regions take most of childhood to mature. So not only is the mind a network of distinct modules, but those modules sometimes compete with each other. The brain’s modular system cannot be imagined as a neurological report card, with a B+ for face recognition and a failing grade for mindreading. This is because the modules interact with each other, sometimes inhibiting, sometimes amplifying, sometimes translating or interpreting in novel ways. The brain is much more like an ecosystem than a list of stable personality traits, with modules simultaneously competing and relying on each other. Hence lesson two: It’s a jungle in there. So if we now understand something about that renegade grin, what can we say about its detection? The silent duet of mindreading begins in your colleague’s brain when he first thinks to himself, midsentence, that you might be quietly celebrating his bad news. It’s fitting that the telltale sign is the crinkling of your eyes, as your orbicularis oculi betrays your inner state. Mindreading is in many ways a kind of eye-reading—we learn a great deal about the content of other people’s thoughts by watching their eyes. Eyes are essential to building what brain scientists call a “theory of other minds.”
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The connection between mindreading and eye-reading begins early in child development—so early, in fact, that it is unlikely to be the product of learned behavior. In their first year, most children will become adept at something called “gaze monitoring”: they see you looking off toward the corner of the room; they turn and look in that direction; then they check back to make sure the two of you are looking at the same thing. Because we do it so well, gaze monitoring doesn’t seem like much of an accomplishment, but it requires an elaborate understanding of the human visual apparatus, too elaborate to be purely the product of cultural learning. Think about what’s implied in gaze monitoring. First, you have to understand that people have their own perceptions of the world, distinct from yours. Second, some of those perceptions flow into their mind through their eyes. Third, you can determine the objects people perceive by drawing a straight line from the black circles in the middle of their eyes outward. Fourth, when those black circles shift, that means the gaze has shifted to another object. Consequently, if you want to know what another person is perceiving, you follow the movement of those black circles, and then shift your own gaze toward the object they’re focused on. If the gaze-monitoring skill were purely a learned behavior, it would take a month of school and a four-year-old’s brain to master it. Infants can barely be taught how to use a spoon, much less how to track retinal movements and deduce inner mental states. They can’t learn gaze monitoring, but they do it nonetheless—because their brains contain a cheat sheet of sorts that prepares them for the underlying principles of gaze monitoring, a kind of psychological physics: people have minds; people’s minds perceive different things; part of that perception happens through the eyes; if you want to know what someone’s thinking, look at his eyes. These biological cues start early in life: one study found that two-month-old infants were more likely to stare at the eyes than at any other part of the face. As we grow older, we scrutinize people’s eyes for subtler cues: not just what they’re looking at, but what they’re thinking and feeling. Because our emotional systems are wired directly to our facial muscles, à la the Duchenne smile, we often get accurate portraits of other people’s moods just by scanning their eyes or the corners of their mouth. As our office party exchange shows, sometimes that portrait gives a more accurate testimony than people’s verbal descriptions of their moods. Who are you going to believe—me or my lying eyes? Gaze monitoring and emotional expression recognition are two of the fundamental mindreading systems, but we also use other tricks. We monitor speech intonation carefully for emotional nuance. We put ourselves into other people’s mental shoes—what the cognitive scientists call the “simulation theory” of mindreading, according to which your brain is effectively running a mini-simulation of someone else’s to anticipate how the other person might feel. Your brain runs all these routines any time you interact with other people. It 31 of 216
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takes careful training, or massive distraction, to stop your mind from inferring other people’s mental states as you talk to them. Mindreading is a background process that feeds into our foreground processes; we’re aware of the insights it gives us but usually not aware of how we’re actually getting that information, and how good we are at extracting it. The sophistication of our mindreading skills is part of our heritage as social primates; our biology contains cheat sheets for building theories about other minds because our brains evolved—and continue to evolve—in complex social environments where being able to outfox or cooperate with your fellow humans was essential to survival. So just as some animals evolved nervous systems that were adapted for sudden movement or sonar, our brains grew increasingly sophisticated at modeling the behavior of other brains. An entire host of neurological systems revolve around the expectation that you will spend much of your life managing social relationships of one sort or another. Your brain is wired to expect an environment with oxygen, gravity, and light. It’s also wired to expect an environment populated by other brains. Hence lesson three: Deep down, we’re all extroverts. We’re all extroverts, except those of us whose brains have developed without the normal mindreading systems. There are dozens of neurological disorders that compromise social skills, but few are more common than the family of conditions that we generally call “autism.” Autistic people possess many skills lacking in the normal population: they often have nearly photographic memories and astonishing mathematical abilities. Their ease with mechanical systems, including computers, can be extraordinary. But autism impairs social skills dramatically. While autistic people can usually learn and communicate using language, there is something missing in their exchanges with other people, some strange distance in their social demeanor. They seem emotionally remote, disconnected. Many experts now believe that this distance derives from a distinct neurological condition: autistics are mindreading-impaired. The social distance associated with autism is a vivid example of the brain’s modular nature: autistics generally have above-average IQs, and their general logic skills are impeccable. But they lack social intelligence, particularly the ability to make on-the-fly assessments of other people’s inner thoughts. Autistic people do have to go to school to read facial expressions—learning to intuit another person’s mood is at least as challenging for them as learning to read is for the rest of us. When you’re engaged in conversation, you don’t think to yourself, “Aha! His right eyebrow just crinkled up. He must be happy.” You just sense that there’s a happy expression on his face. But autistics have to perform precisely that kind of deliberate analysis, memorizing which expressions are associated with which emotions and then studying people’s faces actively as they talk, looking for signs. One of the early predictors of autism in toddlers is an inability to perform gaze monitoring. It’s as though autistics are born without the social physics that the rest of us possess innately, as though they were mindblind. 32 of 216
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Simon Baron-Cohen believes that the symptoms of autism exist on a continuum: while some people clearly suffer from extreme cases, millions suffer only from minor cases of mindblindness. (Because autism is ten times more likely to develop in boys than girls, Baron-Cohen has argued that the disorder should be considered simply an extreme version of the male brain’s tendencies, rather than a disconnected aberration.) The history of mathematics and physics is populated by borderline autistics: people with great number skills but limited social grace. We all know bright people who perform poorly in social situations, seem disengaged in conversation, or fail to pick up on our emotional cues. Even if you’re a particularly astute mindreader, you probably have your own “autistic moments” in passing, when you’re conducting a conversation on autopilot, lost in your own internal monologue. If you spend enough time with the literature, you can’t help dividing up your friends and colleagues into the talented mindreaders and the mind-dyslexics. You start evaluating your own prowess as you engage with other people. Mindreading becomes a part of your basic vocabulary for evaluating yourself and others: some people have a sharp sense of humor, some are quick learners, some are good mindreaders. If autism exists on a continuum, then it’s possible to locate yourself on that continuum. You can take a simple test called the Autism Spectrum Quotient that Baron-Cohen and his colleagues created—answer fifty questions about yourself on a Web page, and a simple program spits out a number between 1 and 32. The higher the number, the closer you are to autism. (The median result is 16.4.) It’s not exactly hard science because it relies on self-evaluation and the questions themselves are relatively broad. But if you trust your ability to assess the general areas of your personality, the test provides a rough sketch of your autism quotient (otherwise known as “AQ”). The questions are phrased as statements with which you can “definitely agree,” “slightly agree,” “slightly disagree,” or “definitely disagree.” I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is talking to me. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than on the small details. I am not very good at remembering phone numbers. I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation or a person’s appearance.
If you’ve read something about autism, or the theory of other minds, these questions will seem predictable enough. When I took the test—if you must know, I scored a 15, just slightly less autistic than average—I flipped through the questions with a kind of jaded awareness: here’s the facial expression question, here’s the number memory question. It was only when I went back and reviewed the exam that I realized my familiarity with the topic had blinded me to something fascinating about the test itself.
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Think about those last two statements: “I am not very good at remembering phone numbers” and “I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation or a person’s appearance.” Now, if you come to the test knowing something about autism, you’ll instantly deposit those two statements on opposite ends of the AQ spectrum. An autistic person, you’ll think, will be good at remembering phone numbers and bad at noticing small changes in someone’s appearance. But if you don’t know anything about autism, if you’re just coming to the test with a commonsense understanding of human psychology, then those two attributes will hardly seem like opposites. You’d probably think someone with a good memory for phone numbers would be more likely to notice small changes in appearance: she’d be detail-oriented, good at keeping track of small things. Certainly these don’t seem like traits that would naturally be opposed to one another. But if you know something about the brain science behind autism, the fact that the two traits are inversely related makes perfect sense, because number skills and mindreading skills aren’t simply the result of general intelligence; they’re specialized modules, modules that for some as of yet unknown reason have been yoked together in the brain’s wiring. This is one of the key insights that neuroscience brings to our sense of self: strengths or weaknesses in one area are often predictive of strengths or weaknesses in seemingly unrelated areas. It makes intuitive sense to us that people who are better at processing language might be worse at processing visual data, or that blind people might have sharper hearing than people with eyesight. But you’re less likely to get a nod of agreement when you propose that people who are good at factoring pi in their heads are usually bad at tracking eye movements. Yet that is the brain’s reality. The more you understand the mind in the light of modern brain science, the more you recognize that isolated traits you possess aren’t necessarily isolated—the brain is full of zero-sum games, where one talent prospers at the expense of another. Sometimes those balancing acts involve related skills; sometimes the connection is more obscure. Thus our final principle: Your brain contains some strange bedfellows.
Is mindreading one of our long-decay ideas, an idea that transforms your own sense of self? I believe it is, but to grasp that importance you can’t think of mindreading simply as another word for “empathy.” We all know people who are more empathic than others, who are more sensitive to others’ feelings. Empathy is a powerful human trait, and it would be wrong to underestimate its centrality in our social interactions. By the same token, empathy is nothing new. What is new, I think, is the notion of the second-by-second, instinctive dance of mindreading: the mental sparring at the office party. Empathy is something you’re consciously aware of feeling; you think to yourself, “It breaks my heart to see her so sad.” Mindreading is faster than that, more invisible. The data it relies on flies by at lightning speed: a momentary tonal shift, a pause that suggests hesitation, a brief, inquisitive twist of the head. You may consciously evaluate the data once it has been interpreted—“Why did she seem startled by that news?”—but the act of interpretation itself is closer to a reflex than to a 34 of 216
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deliberate act of contemplation or analysis. One way of describing mindreading is via an idiom that we often use for performers: having a feel for your audience. Having a feel for your audience is different from being sensitive to the feelings of your audience, which is what empathy is all about. For weeks after I first started reading about the neuroscience of mindreading, I found myself in conversations with friends or new acquaintances with a second-level, meta-interior monologue running through my head. Instead of watching their facial expressions for subtle clues about their internal state, I was watching their reactions to my expressions and speculating on their mindreading skills. At a dinner party, I’d be listening to a friend follow a dozen irrelevant detours in telling what should have been a thirty-second story and suddenly recognize something I’d felt intuitively about him for years but never really put into words: he’s mind-dyslexic. With other friends (many of them women) I finally understood part of why I had enjoyed our conversations so much over the years—our internal duets were as rich as the external ones. I put myself under the same microscope, noticing that in certain social situations I would be more “locked in” to my conversational partner, whereas in others my mindreading antenna appeared to get lousy reception. This resonance is the sign of a long-decay idea—it’s like a tune that gets stuck in your head, and you can’t help humming it wherever you go. The more I thought about mindreading, the more I wanted to quantify my skills at it. The autism quotient test had whetted my appetite, but it was too subjective, and the skills it assessed were as much about that broader category of empathy as they were about the local reflex of analyzing facial expressions. I wanted my mindreading skills analyzed the way you’d have your vision tested, and I figured if there was anyone who could help me in this quest, it was Simon Baron-Cohen. That’s how I eventually found myself scrolling through those computer images of eyes, scanning for drooping eyelids and furrowed brows. I’d read a little about the eye-reading test before I actually sat down to take it and had imagined it to be much simpler than it turned out to be. Emotion scholars tend to divide up the spectrum of human emotion into two camps: the “primary” emotions of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust; and the “secondary” social emotions of embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, and pride. I figured the test would involve mapping one or the other of those ten sentiments to a pair of eyes, which seemed easy enough. But when I actually started to read through the instructions, I was shocked to find that the glossary of emotional states went on for several pages— ninety-three emotions in all, everything from “aghast” to “tentative.” I’d anticipated choosing between “happy” and “sad,” but instead the test wanted me to distinguish between “flirtatious,” “playful,” and “friendly,” or “upset,” “worried,” and “unfriendly.” As I read through the list, one disturbing thought came abruptly into my head: I am going to flunk this test. There was no way I could detect emotions this subtle in static images of two eyes. Perhaps my autism quotient score wasn’t accurate, after all. If nonautistic people could read 35 of 216
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eye expressions at this level of sophistication, then maybe I was closer to Rain Man than I thought. The test began with a grainy black-and-white image of an elderly man’s eyes that looked like a close-up from a Jean Cocteau film. The left eye was wide open, the right more hooded. The emotion options were “hateful,” “panicked,” “arrogant,” and “jealous.” My first impulse was to choose “panicked,” but as I studied that right eye, I began to have second thoughts. Was there something angry there? Or something wounded, as of a jealous husband who has just stumbled across his wife in the arms of another man? The more I scrutinized the image, the harder it got to discern a clear emotion. I decided to go with my initial hunch. I turned to the next image, and a set of younger eyes of indeterminate gender stared back at me: perfectly symmetrical, with the slightest suggestion of a squint. I thought to myself, This is what they mean when someone has a “gleam” in their eyes. The first emotion option was “playful” and I immediately said, That’s the one. But then I read on: “comforting,” “irritated,” and “bored” were the other options. Definitely not bored, but maybe what I saw as playfulness was really being comforting, being sympathetic. What was a gleam anyway? When I tried to locate the specific gleaming quality, the effect seemed to dissipate. As I searched for that original playfulness, I thought I detected a hint of irritation in the eyes. This is madness, I thought: I’m overanalyzing these images. Better to go with the gut, since this is supposed to measure gut responses anyway. I marked down “playful” and moved on.
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Three expressions from the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test.
As the test progressed, I got a little better at sticking with my original hunches, but with each image, the clarity of the initial emotion grew less intense the longer I analyzed it. All but a few had an emotion that struck me at first glance, and while second thoughts caused me to doubt most of my first decisions, I went with my initial instincts throughout the test. By the end, I felt as though I would probably come out with half of the answers correct, which seemed like a pretty good ratio given the subtlety of emotions being presented. But as it turned out, I was way off in my self-assessment. Instead of missing 18 of 36 questions, I had missed only 5. On the first seventeen images, the source of so much second-guessing, I’d been 100 percent right. It’s an interesting test when you think you’re failing, and you end up getting an A (or at least a solid B+). Particularly if you base all your answers on your gut reactions, and ignore all your attempts to outthink the exam. When I tried to interpret the images consciously, surveying each lid and crease for the semiotics of affect, the data became meaningless: folds of tissue, signifying nothing. But when I just let myself look—look without thinking—the underlying emotions came through with startling clarity. I couldn’t explain what made a gleam gleam, but I knew one when I saw it. If there was a connection to Rain Man’s autism, it was here, in that
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instinctive “gut feeling,” in the mental computation so fast and so transparent that it doesn’t feel like thinking. Afterward, I was reminded of the classic stories of autistic people emptying a box of matchsticks and somehow just “seeing” exactly how many are scattered across the floor. The number just pops into their head, as vivid and unavoidable as a face. They have a gut feeling for numbers, the way most of us have a gut feeling for “playful” and “panicked.” Only neither feeling comes from the gut. After I finished the test, I asked Baron-Cohen what had been going on in my brain as I analyzed the images. “We’ve done fMRI scans of people taking the ‘reading the eyes’ test, and what we’ve found is that the amygdala lights up in trying to figure out people’s thoughts and feelings. In people with autism, they show highly reduced amygdala activity,” he explained. In many ways, the amygdala is the “gut feeling” center of the brain, implicated in all sorts of emotional processing. Recently, it has been shown to play a central role in our understanding of fear (which we will return to in the next chapter); when people have a “sinking feeling in their gut,” or feel “gripped” by fear, the reaction has most likely been triggered by the amygdala. People with amygdala damage caused by strokes or head injuries often report that they are unable to detect fearful expressions in other people’s faces. But as Baron-Cohen’s test suggests, fear is only part of the amygdala story. “My hunch is that the amygdala is actually used to detect a much more varied range of emotions,” he told me. Inspired by the subtle emotional discrimination he found among his test subjects, Baron-Cohen has set out on a more ambitious quest: “We decided to figure out just how many emotions there are.” He began with a survey of emotional descriptors taken from a collection of thesauri, which produced a list thousands of words long. Baron-Cohen and his team, aided by a lexicographer, then winnowed out the synonyms, creating a smaller collection of “discrete emotional concepts.” “We came up with a number,” he said with a laugh. “Four hundred and twelve.” Four hundred and twelve unique emotions. The fact that our vocabularies include adjectives for so many emotional states, coupled with how well nonautistics score on the eye-reading exam, drives the point home: we are equipped biologically with an incredibly sensitive antennae for emotional variation. Baron-Cohen’s latest mission is to build a tool that will help people whose antennae are broken. “What we’ve done is asked actors and actresses to create facial expressions for each of the four hundred and twelve emotions, and then included them all on a DVD. It’s like an encyclopedia for emotion,” he said. “It was designed for people who score poorly on the autism tests, who want to learn emotional recognition in a slightly artificial way.” Because autistics often possess higher-than-average skills at what Baron-Cohen calls “systematizing” —learning the rules of a given system, breaking it down into its component parts—one option for them is to improve their emotional recognition skills by 38 of 216
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systematizing the human face. Baron-Cohen continued: “It’s not the intuitive way of approaching people, but you could do it. You could try to figure out the rules that allow you to read another’s emotional expression. It’s like trying to learn a second language, sitting there with a grammar book and rules of syntax trying to figure it out in a different way than you would if you were a native speaker.” The two approaches originate in different regions of the brain: the intuitive recognition centered in the amygdala and the systematizing ability residing in the neocortex, the seat of higher logic and language. The clash between the amygdala and the neocortex explains my indecision while taking the eye-reading test. My gut reactions would flash up instantly from the amygdala, after which the neocortex would start analyzing the image in a more systematic way. But I haven’t trained my neocortex to recognize emotions; I haven’t spent time with Baron-Cohen’s encyclopedia—precisely because my amygdala does such a good job on its own. And so the more I analyzed a given image logically, the less clear the answer became. The next time you’re advised to trust your gut when you’re meeting someone new, ignore the advice. Your gut has nothing to do with it. But by all means trust your amygdala.
There’s a crucial scene near the beginning of Henry James’s The Golden Bowl in which the recently married Maggie Verver walks in to find her beloved father, the long-widowed billionaire Adam Verver, engaged in what appears to be flirtatious conversation with a young woman. In a glance, Maggie suddenly grasps that her own marriage has created a new possibility: that her father might remarry after years of living as a bachelor with his only daughter. The rest of the book plays out, in a sense, the aftershock of this moment of recognition: the father does eventually marry another woman, with more or less disastrous consequences. But the originating scene itself unfolds without words spoken between father and daughter; it is as exacting, and as lyrical, an account of mindreading as you are likely to find in literature: [Maggie’s appearance] determined for Adam Verver, in the oddest way in the world, a new and sharp perception. It was really remarkable: this perception expanded, on the spot, as a flower, one of the strangest, might, at a breath, have suddenly opened. The breath, for that matter, was more than anything else, the look in his daughter’s eyes—the look with which he saw her take in exactly what had occurred in her absence.
The visual communication flows in both directions; as Mr. Verver contemplates the look in his daughter’s eyes, she in turn recognizes his recognition: He became aware himself, for that matter, during the minute Maggie stood there before speaking; and with the sense, moreover, of what he saw her see, he the sense of what she saw him.…Her face couldn’t keep it from him; she had seen, on top of everything, in her
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James spends ten pages plumbing the depths of what he calls this “mute communication”—slowing the tape down to analyze its every twitch and unspoken innuendo. The passage gives us a wonderful instance of the human mind’s powers of perception, on two levels. First, there is the silent duet between father and daughter, each of whom reads volumes into a simple pair of expressions glimpsed across a room. And then we have the observatory power of James himself, recognizing the depth of the exchange and drawing it out long enough for us to dissect its subtlety. I bring up this scene because I think what James does here runs parallel to what the brain sciences can do for our own self-awareness. They can help us see our interactions with a new clarity, to detect long-term patterns or split-second instincts that might otherwise go unnoticed, sometimes because they operate below conscious awareness and sometimes because we’re so familiar with them that they’ve become invisible to us. There are differences in approach between the discerning eyes of scientists and novelists: James doesn’t offer a working theory to explain how Adam Verver manages to gather so much information out of a passing glance; and brain scientists don’t usually weave their insights into gripping narratives. But both approaches can illuminate the life of the mind. To use a Jamesian term, they give us powers of discrimination. In recent years, any time the brain sciences and the arts have intersected, the debate has generally been framed in terms of evolutionary psychology: does the Darwinian approach have something useful to teach us about the cultural achievements of art? The clashes that usually characterize these debates occur because on some level evolutionary explanations operate against the grain of art. Purely Darwinian models of the mind are about human universals, about what unites us as a species. Great novels or paintings or films are about the conflict between human universals and the local events of our personal and public histories. The narrative form that evolutionary psychology most closely resembles is myth: the enduring struggles and drives that define the human condition. The creative arts are about seeing what happens when individual lives intersect with these human drives, and often with the broader currents of history. This is why, more often than not, you get fire-works when the Darwinians and the art critics appear on the same panel. But when you widen the lens to see beyond evolutionary psychology, the conflict disappears. Brain science is as much about those chance events and individual personalities as it is about enduring truths and human universals. The last few decades of research have revealed, again and again, the way specific memories transform us as we grow and develop, the way life experience wires our brains as meticulously as our genes do. When we participate in mindreading’s silent duet, we’re drawing upon cognitive tools that are a part of our evolved human nature, but every mindreading exchange is also colored by the memories and associations unique to an individual life. We’re wired to see smiles as a sign of internal happiness, but a smile can also remind us of a parent’s grin from our childhood or a movie 40 of 216
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star’s smile beaming down from the silver screen or a joke we told over breakfast this morning. Brain science has much to teach us about the way those individual memories are formed, and how they come to weigh on our subsequent behavior. The impact of past events on the present is so crucial to the modern understanding of the brain that this book doesn’t include a single chapter on memory. This is because in many respects all the chapters are about memory. Virginia Woolf described the compensation for growing old as gaining “the power of taking hold of experience, of turning it round, slowly, in the light.” Memories transform our perception of the present, but the process is even more nuanced and layered than that: reactivating memories in a new context changes the trace of memory itself. For a long time, neuroscientists assumed that memories were like volumes stored in a library; when your brain remembered something, it was simply searching through the stacks and then reading aloud from whatever passage it discovered. But some scientists now believe that memories effectively get rewritten every time they’re activated, thanks to a process called reconsolidation. (Freud sensed this process as well, though he gave it a different name: Nachtraglichkeit, or “retroactivity.”) To create a synaptic connection between two neurons—the associative link at the heart of all neuronal learning—you need protein synthesis. Studies on rats suggest that if you block protein synthesis during the execution of learned behavior—the brain’s memory of a reward cycle, for instance—the learned behavior disappears. Instead of just recalling a memory that had been forged days or months before, the brain forges the memory all over again, in a new associative context. In a sense, when we remember something, we create a new memory, one shaped by the changes that have happened to our brain since the memory last occurred to us. So the science is telling us two things: our brains are designed to capture the idiosyncrasies of our lives, and those lives—our memories of them—are being rewritten with each passing day. You need only read a few pages of Proust to know that artists have been exploring these properties for centuries, if not millennia, just as James grasped the transformative power of mindreading. Indeed, the world of culture —particularly the poets and novelists and philosophers—has historically led the way in widening our understanding of the brain’s faculties, much as that flower opened under Adam Verver’s gaze. This they continue to do. The only difference now is that they have some competition.
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2 The Sum of My Fears
A few years ago, my wife and I moved into an apartment in a renovated old warehouse on the far west edge of downtown Manhattan. The apartment was nice enough by New York standards, but it had one irresistible attraction: a massive eight-foot-high window looking out over the Hudson River. For the first few months in the space, any time interesting weather happened—a snowstorm, a particularly nice sunset—we’d gather together at the window and enjoy the view. When summer arrived that year, we discovered a new feature of our view: thunderstorm watching. Most weather patterns blow in from the west where we live, and so as the temperature would start to climb, we’d see the thunderheads collect out over New Jersey, and we’d settle in for a good show. One mid-June afternoon, an especially severe storm started brewing—severe enough, we later found out, to cause the local news stations to run emergency bulletins forecasting heavy winds. As the skies darkened, and the whitecaps appeared on the river, we stood together at the window, faces practically pressed against the glass. And then we heard a sound. It was a subtle noise, like a twig snapping, and under the wind’s whistling and the rumble of thunder it was hard to locate spatially. My wife shouted out: “What the hell was that?” She immediately jumped back from the glass, while I remained just to the side of the window. In a typical display of composure and perceptiveness, I said I thought it might have been the door closing in the study, and my wife walked toward the back of the apartment to see if I was right. But that snapping sound wasn’t, in fact, the study door; it was the bolt that anchored the bottom steel frame of the window. As I turned back to inspect the window, a sudden blast of air blew the frame right out of the wall, shattering a pane of glass the size of a kitchen table and sending shards through the entire length of the apartment. Because I was standing to the side of the window, the glass and frame blew right past me. If my
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wife had not ventured off to inspect the study door, she would have taken the full force of a steel frame and glass panel being blown in by sixty-mile-an-hour winds. It’s entirely possible that the impact would have killed her. You may know what those few seconds felt like. First, there is the extraordinary sense of time slowing down. The window itself probably took less than a tenth of a second to blow out, but I have a distinct memory of thinking—all before the glass hit the floor—that physically we were going to be all right, that my wife was too far away to be injured. A split second later, I was wondering if perhaps the storm had kicked up a tornado, which meant that standing next to an open window a hundred feet aboveground wasn’t exactly the safest place to be. Within a few seconds, we’d barricaded ourselves in a bathroom, and only then did I notice that my heart rate had increased and my palms were sweating. Below my direct awareness, blood had rushed to my extremities, preparing me for sudden movement and creating the “nervous stomach” feeling in my gut. My adrenal glands had secreted a sudden rush of adrenaline, which helps prepare the body for sudden movement by converting glycogen into energy-rich glucose. My reflexes had been primed, making me much more likely to startle in response to another unexpected sound; pain sensations were dampened. But what I noticed most at the time was an otherworldly sense of alert clarity. I remember thinking: If Starbucks ever figures out a way to produce this feeling via a cup of espresso, they’ll really take over the world. This is the body’s fear response, an orchestral mix of physiological instruments launching with masterful speed and precision. We talk about it colloquially as the fight-or-flight response. Feeling it kick in is one of the best ways to experience your brain and body as an autonomous system, operating independently of your conscious will. A second after the window blew in, I made a deliberate decision to hide in the bathroom for protection, but my brain was making comparable decisions as well—decisions executed in a purely unconscious, instinctive fashion but nonetheless designed to protect me from harm. The effects of those decisions are as powerful as those of many recreational drugs, though they are concocted entirely by the brain’s internal chemistry. The fight-or-flight response is amazing, but it is also old news. Even before we started monitoring our fluctuating serotonin levels or training the right side of our brain, the phrase “adrenaline rush” was part of the popular vocabulary. The immediate physiological reaction of fear is familiar enough. Fight-or-flight launches in a matter of seconds, and its effects can dissolve in minutes. But the trace memory of that fear can last a lifetime.
I have a phobia of bees. At an earlier point in my life, it was a genuine social impediment. (Picnics were off-limits, and during yellow jacket season I was 44 of 216
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usually huddled indoors while my peers enjoyed the brilliant New England fall weather.) I also have a mild fear of heights and a fear of flying that cycles on and off every few years, usually in sync with world events. Chances are, you have an equivalent cabinet of horrors yourself. Some might have been triggered by events in your personal history, while others may be traced to genetic origins. I suspect my fear of heights is more biology than personal history, but I know that my fear of bees dates back to a series of traumatic stings that I experienced as a child. With the airplanes—Well, if you read the papers or watch the news, you can’t help being a little afraid of strapping yourself into a flying tube loaded with explosive fuel. But ever since that June storm, a new fear has entered the mix for me: the sound of wind whistling through a window. I know now that our window blew in because it had been installed improperly, with a single joint to bear a load that was supposed to be distributed between two—that snapping sound we heard was the one joint giving way. I am entirely convinced that the window we have now is installed correctly, and I trust our superintendent when he says that it is designed to withstand hurricane-force winds. In the five years since that June, we have weathered dozens of storms that produced gusts comparable to the one that blew it in, and the window has performed flawlessly. I know all these facts—and yet when the wind kicks up, and I hear that whistling sound, I can feel my adrenaline levels rise. If I’m sitting beneath the window, I have to move to the other side of the room before I can concentrate on anything other than the whistling. And even positioned safely out of harm’s way, I have an edgy, background sense of dread until the wind dies down again. Part of my brain—the part that feels most me-like, the part that has opinions about the world and decides to act on those opinions in a rational way—knows that the windows are safe, and short of a Level 3 hurricane, I should be able to look out at the Hudson with perfect ease. But another part of my brain wants to barricade myself in the bathroom all over again. Fear memories like this one are another way of apprehending the brain’s modular nature directly. Even mild trace memories of traumatic events can leave you feeling a little like a split personality, while serious cases of post-traumatic stress disorder can be horribly debilitating, particularly in the face of stimuli that somehow resemble the original trauma. The flight-or-flight response may offer a vivid example of the body’s physiological instincts, but in the classic examples—as the mugger chases you down the alleyway or the bombs scream across the sky—your instinctive responses are in sync with your rational ones. Part of your brain says, “I’m afraid,” and the other part says, “For good reason.” But years later, when your heart starts racing at the sound of whistling wind, a gap opens up between your conscious assessment of the present danger and some other assessment elsewhere in your mind. Part of you knows that you’re safe, and part of you can’t help being afraid. Which you is you? Answering that question takes us back nearly a hundred years to a French psychologist named Edouard Claparede, who was treating a woman suffering 45 of 216
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from a rare form of amnesia that left her incapable of forming new memories. Claparede’s patient had suffered localized brain damage that preserved her basic mechanical and reasoning skills, along with most of her older memories. But beyond the duration of a few minutes, the recent past was lost to her—a condition captured brilliantly in the recent thriller Memento, in which a man suffering from a similar ailment attempts to solve a mystery by furiously scrawling new information on the backs of Polaroids before his memories fade to black. Claparede’s patient seemed herself straight out of some kind of slapstick farce, if only her condition weren’t so tragic. Each day the doctor would greet her and run through a series of introductions. If he then left for fifteen minutes, he would return entirely unrecognized. Doctor and patient would do the introductions again, and the patient would find herself conversing with a brand-new doctor. One day, Claparede decided to vary the routine. He introduced himself as usual, but concealed a thumbtack in his palm the first time he reached to shake her hand. It doesn’t sound like your ideal initial consultation with a physician, but Claparede was onto something. When he arrived the next day, his amnesiac patient greeted him with the usual blank welcome—no memory of yesterday’s pinprick, no memory of yesterday at all. Until Claparede extended his hand. Without being able to explain why, Claparede’s patient refused to shake hands with her doctor. The woman incapable of forming new memories had nevertheless remembered something from the recent past—a borderlineconscious sense of danger, the trace memory of past trauma. She failed utterly to recognize the face and the voice she’d encountered every day for months. But she remembered the fear. Why would an amnesiac suddenly develop a flair for memory over a thumbtack? Until recently, Claparede’s patient seemed to scientists like a complete anomaly, one of those rogue data points that made no sense under reigning scientific orthodoxy. For most of the last fifty years the story was the same: the brain relied on a general intelligence, increasingly imagined as a computer, that drew upon past experience to make rational assessments of new situations. This process was the basis of learning and emotion. You had inputs from the outside world; you had memories of past inputs; and you had some kind of glorified calculator that would measure these inputs against each other and come up with a behavioral strategy. If you experienced fear in the face of a given stimulus, it was because your memory bank had pulled up some past experience of danger that resembled the present stimulus. The emotion of fear itself was a secondary effect, like a command issued from the rational brain: “The data suggest that there’s cause for fear here, so we should start feeling afraid now.” Claparede’s patient threw a giant monkey wrench into this model. How could someone learn fear when her memory system couldn’t learn at all? It would be like me developing a phobia of wind without remembering our window crashing 46 of 216
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in. You can’t build a rational assessment of potential danger if your memory banks aren’t supplying any information about past encounters. If fear resulted from a rational assessment of risk, how could Claparede’s patient both know to avoid her doctor’s handshake and yet not know why? Clearly, her brain had captured some trace of the pinprick in some alternative storage system unavailable to consciousness. But where was the memory stored?
Learning to be afraid turns out to have been one of the most studied behavioral patterns of the twentieth century. In fact, Claparede’s thumbtack is itself a somewhat fiendish twist on a classic behaviorist experiment, one almost as famous as Pavlov’s canine dinner bell: fear conditioning. Put a rat in a cage, play a tone, and simultaneously deliver a shock to the animal. After even a single pairing of tone and shock, the rat starts to fear the tone itself, even if it’s not always accompanied by the shock. The fear reaction is known as a conditioned response: the rat has an unconditioned, innate fear of shocks, and it can be conditioned to be afraid of tones if the two are associated with each other. Claparede’s thumbtack is the shock. His outstretched hand is the tone. After only one exposure, the amnesiac patient acquired a conditioned fear response to shaking hands with her doctor. As their name implied, the behaviorists were interested in the hard data of external appearance: whether the rat acted afraid or not after a few sessions of tone-and-shock. At heart, they believed that you could judge a book by its cover. How the rat’s brain actually processed that fear response and how that fear response felt subjectively to the rat—these questions were off-limits to the behaviorists, sequestered away in the “black box” of the unknowable brain. But over the past few decades, science has opened up that black box, and charted the actual pathways of conditioned fear in the brain. The leading figure in the field is a soft-spoken, if controversial, NYU professor named Joseph LeDoux. When I visited him at his office near Washington Square, he told me the story of his intellectual quest. It has the classic rogue-science beginning. “My first grant request on this topic in the early 1980s,” he explained with a smile, “was turned down because emotions can’t be studied scientifically.” In its initial phase, LeDoux’s research was cartographic in nature, a literal mapping of the mind. But because advanced brain-imaging technologies weren’t yet available, LeDoux’s mapmaking was more Lewis and Clark than GPS satellite. The tone-and-shock fear-conditioning experiment gave him a simple causal chain to explore, because the pathways of sound-processing in the rodent brain had already been delineated. He knew where the sound entered the brain and where it was integrated into conscious perception, and he knew several key relay points along the way, including three primary stops: the initial data processing performed in the brain stem, followed by one of the brain’s primary hubs, the thalamus; only after passing through those initial two stopovers did the sound enter conscious awareness, in the auditory areas of the cortex.
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LeDoux’s approach was a kind of surgical subtraction. Take a healthy rat and begin extracting specific parts of its brain; if you remove a region and it can still learn to associate the tone with the shock, then the region you’ve removed isn’t necessary for fear conditioning. But if the rat stops learning, you know you’ve got something relevant. LeDoux began at the end of the chain: the auditory cortex, where the sound, having traveled through various way stations starting with the eardrum, is finally integrated into our sensory experience of the world. When he removed that region, the rats could still learn to fear the tone. With the auditory cortex removed, they were an even more extreme version of Claperede’s patient: afraid of a noise without even hearing it. So the learning didn’t reside at the conscious end of the chain; it was somewhere in the middle. “So I went down one station to the auditory thalamus,” LeDoux said. “I took that out, and they couldn’t learn at all. So that meant that the sound had to go through the system to the level of the thalamus, but didn’t go through the cortex. So where was it going?” The question was a puzzling one, because the auditory thalamus was supposed to be just a relay station from the ear to the primary destination, the auditory cortex. That implied something strangely inverted about LeDoux’s result: you could eliminate the primary destination altogether without affecting the learning, but if you took out the relay station, the learning stopped. LeDoux’s assumption was that the auditory thalamus harbored a link to another part of the brain, in addition to its link to the cortex. Using a tracer dye to follow pathways out from the auditory thalamus, LeDoux discovered a connection to the amygdala, the almond-shaped region in the forebrain that we encountered in the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test. When he removed the amygdala from the brains of the rats, they failed to learn. Subsequent experiments also demonstrated that a crucial part of the amygdala known as the “central nucleus” contained links to key brain stem areas that controlled the autonomic functions involved in fight-or-flight, like heart rate acceleration. “I didn’t start out looking for the amygdala,” LeDoux said. “The research led me to it.” The principal insight that emerged out of LeDoux’s research is that the experience of danger follows two pathways in the brain, one conscious and rational, the other unconscious and innate. These were quickly dubbed the “high road” and the “low road.” Say you’re walking through a forest and out of the corner of your eye you detect a slithering shape to your left, accompanied by a rattling sound. Before you even have time to formulate the word “snake,” your body has frozen in its tracks; your heart rate has accelerated; the sweat glands on your palms have dilated. In your brain, the information flow looks something like this: your eyes and ears transmit basic sensory information to the auditory and visual thalamus, where the information is then transmitted along two paths. The first path heads toward the cortex, where it will be integrated with other real-time sensory data, along with more elaborate associations: the word “rattlesnake” itself, or your childhood memories of a pet python, or the snake scene from Raiders of the Lost Ark. Around the same time, the slithering rustle 48 of 216
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would also be transmitted—in less rich detail—to the amygdala itself, which would blast out an alarm to the brain stem, alerting the body that a potential threat is nearby. The key difference between the two paths is time: via the high road, it might take a few seconds to establish the presence of the snake and formulate a response, while the low road kicks the body into a freezing response within a fraction of a second. Of course, none of the elaborate bodily choreography involved in this response has to be learned, the way you might learn a complicated yoga position; your body knows how to execute the freezing response without any training at all. In fact, it knows the response so well that it is nearly impossible to keep it from happening in the face of a sudden threat. The memories captured by the amygdala during traumatic events have two intriguing properties. The first is that they contain less information than traditional memories—what memory researchers call “declarative memories.” The visual cortex perceives the snake in all its slithering glory; your declarative memory of the forest snake might include a distinct pattern on its skin or the exact series of movements it made before you turned and ran. But your amygdala retains a much cruder portrait, as though the event were being shot by a Polaroid instead of an IMAX camera. The amygdala might store only the general slithering movement and the long, thin black outline of the snake’s body against the grass. A higher-resolution image would exceed the capacity of the channel that connects the thalamus to the amygdala, so what you get is a quick but dirty image rather than the slower, but more realistic, portrait created by the visual cortex. (The same goes for information transmitted by the other senses as well.) This “quick sketch” approach helps the body respond to threats with extraordinary speed, but it has a troubling side effect. Because fear memory is fuzzier than declarative memory, the pool of objects that potentially resembles the specific fear memory is much larger: a dark stick or a garden hose in the grass can easily fool your amygdala into thinking that you’ve stumbled across another rattlesnake, even if your visual cortex can easily tell the difference. The quick sketch approach explains partly why post-traumatic stress disorder is such a difficult condition to treat. The amygdala of a Vietnam vet may hear an AK-47 every time a truck backfires, and every thunderstorm sounds like carpet bombing. If the amygdala could somehow be trained to discriminate better, these flashbacks wouldn’t happen as frequently. Yet a virtue lurks in that lack of discrimination. If your trauma memories were too specific, your brain would be incapable of learning from experience—or, more precisely, incapable of learning general principles from experience. If a more discriminating amygdala encountered a rattlesnake with brown spots on its skin, it might not know to be afraid of one without spots. Snakes that approached you from the left side might leave you unafraid of snakes approaching from the right. The quick sketch approach to fear memory lets you move beyond the details into general rules of thumb: if you see something slithering in the grass—spots or no spots—then run away. In Borges’s classic story “Funes the Memorious,” the protagonist is gifted (and cursed) with an uncanny, beyond-photographic memory capable of conjuring up the slightest 49 of 216
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details from the most incidental occurrence two decades before. Near the end of the story, the narrator says, “I suspect, nevertheless, that [Funes] was not very capable of thought. To think is to forget a difference, to generalize, to abstract. In the overly replete world of Funes there were nothing but details…” In reducing the resolution of the fear memory, the amygdala performs a kind of thinking, searching out underlying commonalities in a world of unique threats. The other intriguing property of fear-learning is what some brain scientists call “flashbulb memory.” During traumatic events, your brain stores not only a trace of the specific threat—the snake, or the oncoming car, or the rattle of AK-47 fire—but also the contextual details surrounding that threat. This is a classic expression of the brain’s associative architecture, captured by the famous slogan “cells that fire together, wire together.” Different incoming stimuli trigger activity in specific constellations of neurons; when those neurons fire in sync with one another, they are more likely to form new connections. As the connections grow stronger, a given neuron has an easier time triggering another connected neuron. This process—the root of all synaptic learning—goes by the name “Hebbian learning,” after the Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb, who first proposed the model in 1949. Think of a traumatic event from your own past, one that involves a sudden danger, like a car accident. You no doubt remember the immediate threat —headlights bearing down on you or a screeching tire—but most likely you also possess a number of extraneous memories: the song playing on the car stereo at the moment of impact, the color of the early-evening sky, the confused expression on the face of an onlooking pedestrian. None of those details actually seems related functionally to the threat posed by two cars colliding with each other, and yet when you hear the song five months later, you can feel the fear response welling up inside you. The neurons associated with the screeching tires had fired at the same time as those associated with the song on the radio. The fear response helped wire them together. Once again, a lack of discrimination has a potentially adaptive value. In life-or-death situations, you never know where relevant information might lie. Say that your rattlesnake encounter takes place next to a forest stream. The sound of a brook babbling isn’t relevant to the rattlesnake threat, but a rattling sound is emphatically so. Our brains are designed to take note during traumatic events of all sensory inputs—albeit in a low-resolution form—on the off chance that some stray element will turn out to be a good predictor of future threats. If that means we develop irrational fear of babbling brooks, and an entirely rational fear of rattling, so be it. The irrational fear won’t kill us, but not acquiring the rational fear very well might. This, too, is a kind of thinking. In the months after 9/11, I started noticing a subtle but predictable shift in my general levels of Manhattan-dwelling anxiety. Crisp, clear weather made me more nervous than overcast days. For a long time, I thought this was purely extraneous associative learning: September 11 itself had been a spectacularly clear day, which is one reason my memories of 50 of 216
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standing on Greenwich Street and watching the towers burn was so vivid—there was no moisture or smog in the air to block the view. So when similar weather elevated my anxiety levels, I thought of it as being like that song on the radio during the car accident: a stray detail, unrelated to the real threat, that nevertheless becomes associated with the fear memory. But then one day, while walking along the same path I had followed on the morning of the attacks, I had a small epiphany. I realized that my amygdala had stumbled across a clue that hadn’t occurred to my rational brain. Forget about all the other threats that arose in the public imagination after 9/11—anthrax and dirty bombs and smallpox—and think exclusively of the specific assaults that took place on that horrible day. If the threat that your brain is trying to protect you from is hijacked airplanes flying into skyscrapers by visual flight rules, then cloudy days are probably less dangerous than clear ones. If it’s hard enough to hit a building without a flight plan in perfect weather, then it’s almost impossible to do it when half the building is concealed by fog. If the imminent danger was an exact replay of the 9/11 attacks, there was nothing irrational about being more anxious on sunny days. I made a number of conscious evaluations of potential threats after 9/11—I avoided densely populated parts of the city and tall buildings whenever possible. I drove or took the train when traveling along the Eastern Seaboard, forswearing the shuttle flights that had been such a staple of my life over the previous decade. These were deliberate strategies for dealing with a possible attack, developed by analyzing the patterns of a past one. But my amygdala was also evaluating the danger, and creating its own strategies. And one of those strategies was: be on the lookout during nice weather. Of course, the amygdala wasn’t actually working through the logic on its own; it simply stored a flashbulb memory of that day, and one of the elements illuminated was the brilliant blue sky. When subsequently my amygdala encountered similar skies, it set off an alarm. I had missed the connection between the weather and the attacks in my subjective appraisal of that nightmare day. But my amygdala hadn’t.
Where are these quick-and-dirty flashbulb memories stored? Some scientists believe the amygdala doesn’t have its own discrete storage system for emotionally charged memories but rather somehow marks memories created by other parts of the brain as being emotionally significant. In 2001 James McGaugh of the University of California at Irvine conducted a telling variation on the classic fear-conditioning experiment by delivering a shock to a rat if the animal took a step. After administering the shock, McGaugh injected cyclic AMP—a cellular messenger that strengthens neuronal synapses, leading to stronger memory—into the animal’s cortex. Two days later, the rats were tested to see how well they had been conditioned; those that received the cortex injections turned out to have enhanced memories of the shock. “So we know the cortex is involved in the memory that’s based on fear in that situation,” McGaugh tells me
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after I call him up to discuss the experiment and its implications. “Now, if we make a lesion of the amygdala, the stimulation of the cortex doesn’t do anything. In other words, you have to have a working amygdala for the cortex to do its job.” I ask him about the implications of these results. “That experiment tells me that fear is not learned in the amygdala,” he explains. “Amygdala projections are coming up to brain regions where information is being stored, and they’re saying: ‘You know this memory you’re storing? Well, it turns out to be a very important one, so make it a little stronger, please.’ It provides selectivity in our lives. You don’t need to know where you parked the car three weeks ago, unless it was broken into that day.” You can think of this selectivity as the brain’s way of underlining. At first glance, this might seem like another instance of the neuromap fallacy. Why should it matter to you whether the memory is stored in the amygdala or not? Two reasons. First, if the memory is stored in some secure, undisclosed location of the mind, inaccessible to conscious awareness, then all sorts of possibilities for psychological dysfunction open up, because the memory has a dual life in your brain. The cortex can forget, but the amygdala can keep the fear alive, albeit somewhere below the radar of awareness. Before long, you’re finding yourself afraid of all sunny days everywhere, and you have no idea where the phobia originated. More important, though, if the amygdala is merely underlining important memories stored elsewhere, then the brain science is potentially telling us something new about the way we handle traumatic memories, particularly after an episode itself has passed. It’s the amygdala activation that underscores the memories, and from the memory’s point of view, it doesn’t really matter whether the underlining is being triggered by the actual event or its recollection. If your body loads up with the fight-or-flight response, the memory grows more pronounced—even if you’re simply recalling events that took place in the past. “Say you have a traumatic experience,” McGaugh says. “The memory of that experience will pop into your brain the next day, whether you want it to or not. And when that memory pops into your brain, you’re going to have that whole autonomic response that you had originally. It’s going to come back again. So it’s not only that you remember that you were mugged, but you also get very emotionally excited about it when the memory happens.” That emotional excitement triggers the memory-enhancing cycle all over again, making the traumatic memory even stronger, like a spinning tire deepening the muck hole it’s stuck in with each jab to the accelerator. As McGaugh is telling me about this, I think back to the days and weeks that followed our window blowing in, during which time I found myself replaying the event again and again in my head, with one horrifying alteration: my wife doesn’t
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jump back from the window at the sound of the joint snapping. Instead she stays at the glass for five seconds longer, and the window crashes in with her standing beneath it. Just contemplating the thought for a split second would fill me with gut-tightening dread, but I couldn’t help returning to it. The chain of events seemed far too fragile: take away that one brief, instinctive decision to move away from the glass, and our lives are potentially altered forever. There was too thin a line separating what happened from what might have happened, and each time I contemplated that line, I could feel my body’s stress response relive the event all over again. This gets to the heart of why McGaugh’s research is not just another case of gratuitous neuromapping. Knowing about the way fear memories are stored suggested something genuinely new to me about the way my wind phobia came into being. The fear began, of course, with the initial event, but the phobia itself may well have been cemented by my subsequent ruminations on the disaster that might have happened. If I had managed to avoid replaying those bleak scenarios in my head—or at least kept my amygdala from triggering the fear response when I replayed them—the phobia might not have developed at all. I would still remember the event, of course, but the sound of air whistling through a window wouldn’t start my heart racing all over again. If after the fact you can keep your amygdala from underlining the memory, you can potentially ward off a phobic reaction. One way of preventing the underlining is through drugs. Beta-blockers prevent the body’s autonomic system from kicking in during stressful events. (People who suffer from a fear of public speaking sometimes take these drugs before giving a speech to keep their heart rate down.) In a few recent studies inspired by McGaugh’s findings, recent trauma sufferers have been given beta-blockers. By preventing the autonomic reaction, beta-blockers keep the memory from forming deeper grooves in the brain, making post-traumatic stress symptoms less severe. All of which raises the question of whether a little old-fashioned repression might be a healthy response for people in the weeks after experiencing a traumatic event. It’s a popular cliché that we need to “work through” frightening experiences, through therapy or extended conversation with loved ones. But if replaying the event, and consequently triggering the body’s autonomic response, can lead to later stress disorders, then maybe the worst thing you can do in the immediate aftermath of fear is talk through the incident. Maybe you’re better putting it out of your mind altogether, at least until the fear response subsides.
The more I learned about the amygdala, the more it seemed to me that this small region of the brain deserved to be a household term, recognized as widely as the “natural high” endorphins or serotonin. If the opposition between left and right brain had become the subject matter for self-help books on management strategies or learning how to paint, then the amygdala deserved an even more
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prominent place in the spotlight. When you’re intuiting a spouse’s bad mood from a subtle look in her eye, or you’re recovering from a terrifying skiing accident, or you’re battling your phobia of snakes—in all these cases, your amygdala directs your appraisal of the world, whether you’re aware of it or not. The more I learned, the more it seemed to me that a fundamental tension in the human brain lay in the battle between amygdala and neocortex—the emotional center wrestling for control of the organism with the seat of reason. The trouble with emotional memories is that they can be fiendishly difficult to eradicate. The brain seems to be wired to prevent the deliberate overriding of fear responses. Although extensive neural pathways link the amygdala to the neocortex, the paths running in the reverse direction are sparse. Our brains seem to have been designed to allow the fear system to take control in threatening situations while preventing the reign of our conscious, deliberative selves. This design may have been optimal for predator-rich environments in which survival was a minute-by-minute question, but it is not always a useful adaptation for modern environments in which the stressors can be job-performance reviews. The amygdala may be looking out for your best interests by preserving a memory of a window blowing in, but if the end result is an inability to sit still in your apartment during 20-mile-per-hour gusts, the fear circuitry has gone too far. It’s tempting to see the battles between these different regions as a reenactment of Freud’s proposed clash between man’s civilized superego and his primal id. Certainly knee-jerk antipathy to the Freudian unconscious—an unwillingness to accept the premise that we are shaped by drives outside of our conscious awareness, drives that often run counter to our perceived interests—is dead wrong. Our brains teem with crucial processes that run below the radar of our surface perception—and it’s a good thing, too! If we had to deliberately parse out other people’s emotional nuances, or evaluate new situations for potential threats, we’d never get anything done. We’re better off letting the amygdala do that work for us, even if we’re usually not aware that it’s working at all. So in our modern understanding of the amygdala, there is some vindication for the Freudian model. But in other crucial respects, the connection seems less fitting. Think about the watered-down Freudian language that we now use to discuss trauma and memory. We’re all aware that traumatic events play tricks on our normal memory, and that certain elements of those memories hang around below our awareness for long periods of time, surging up at bizarre moments. We also recognize that our minds can sometimes return insistently to traumatic events, usually against our will. But our explanations for these phenomena can be peculiar. When some stray detail from a long-forgotten trauma pops into our head, we assume that somehow the original memory in all its clarity has been repressed by the psyche, beaten down into submission. The phobic details that reappear years later enact the return of that repressed memory. You don’t remember the snakebite from childhood because it left too strong an impression for your brain to handle, but when you flinch at the sight of the garden hose, 54 of 216
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that repressed memory is clawing its way back into consciousness. But in the modern portrait of amygdala activation, there is no clear mechanism for the repression or censoring of traumatic events; there are unconscious memories recorded, but those memories are not unconscious from having been repressed by some kind of internal censor. They’re unconscious because the amygdala operates largely below conscious awareness, and regulates autonomic behavior that we can’t directly control. The traumatic memories are captured by the amygdala not because the executive brain (the ego, in Freud’s formulation) can’t tolerate them in some fashion; they’re captured because they contain information that might be useful to the future safety of the organism. It’s good for the organism’s future prospects to have a quick-and-dirty fear response to the sound of a rattlesnake, a fear response that doesn’t need the slower pathways of conscious processing. The cause of memory storage by the amygdala is not some kind of internal censorship; it’s efficiency. Some normal declarative memories, however traumatic they might be, just fade away over time, but the amygdala is more tenacious. It keeps score. If a snake bit you in your early teens, the amygdala may well retain a crude trace memory of that event for decades after the traditional memory has faded. In a sense, we are all a little bit like Claparede’s amnesiac patient: remembering the fear more vividly than the original trauma. There is some evidence, largely derived from the study of rats, that severe stress may impede the formation of declarative memories. Extended release of the stress hormone glucocortocoid causes atrophy in the neurons of the hippocampus, though the effect is reversible if the stress comes to an end. Long-term stress may cause permanent damage to the hippocampus. So there may well be a neurological explanation for why traumatic memories have a tendency to disappear from consciousness while persisting in our “gut” reactions and phobias. The stress response weakens your hippocampus so much that the declarative memory never forms, while the amygdala manages to capture the traumatic event via the “low road.” You have an emotional memory, but not a declarative one. But while the trauma registers only in your unconscious perception of the world, the declarative memory is not the victim of repression, in the strict Freudian sense. It is closer to the temporary amnesia you experience after you’ve taken a blow to the head. Activation of the body’s stress system—like a blow to the head—has all sorts of debilitating physiological effects: elevated blood pressure, higher rates of heart disease and even cancer. One of those effects is impaired memory. When a baseball player is hit in the temple by a fastball and wakes up without a memory of the pitch, we don’t say that the memory was too traumatic to be processed by the mind’s bureau of standards and thus had to be repressed. We accept that a projectile traveling at 90 miles per hour will damage the neurons dedicated to recording memories. Where lost memories are concerned, severe stress is more like that fastball than an internal censor. What about traumatic memories that we find ourselves revisiting compulsively? Here our pop psychological assumptions follow a slightly different 55 of 216
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path, one that dates back to the model Freud developed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle after treating a number of patients struggling with traumatic memories of carnage on the battlefields of WWI. In the book, he famously amended his theory of the human mind’s underlying drive for pleasure with an additional, sometimes contradictory “death drive,” in which the organism seeks out, above all else, the cessation of stimuli. Freud had been forced into this reformulation by the seemingly illogical mental behavior he kept witnessing among the veterans: an often debilitating insistence on revisiting the traumatic memories of war in flashbacks, dreams, panic attacks set off by loud noises, and so on. (The term “post-traumatic stress disorder” didn’t exist at the time, but that’s exactly what Freud was documenting.) This repetition-compulsion made no sense in a psyche driven by the pleasure principle alone, particularly in dreams, which were supposed to be nonstop pageants of wish fulfillment. And yet the trauma sufferers’ dreams returned endlessly to the frontlines, replaying in horrifying detail the brutality of war. If the mind simply wanted to feel pleasure all the time, why would it bother reliving these terrible memories? Part of Freud’s solution was to suggest that reliving these memories was the psyche’s way of subduing them; by recalling such horror at will, the mind somehow brought the events under conscious control, thus making them less threatening. “These dreams are endeavoring to master the stimulus retrospectively,” he wrote. Predictably enough, Freud saw a similar pattern at work in a young child’s anxiety about being separated from his mother. He tells the story of watching his grandson playing a game of “fort-da” incessantly: hiding a toy, and then uncovering it, then hiding it again, then recovering. By repeating the trauma of loss and subsequent recovery, the boy was mastering the experience and diminishing the psychic trauma it inflicted on him. But Freud also went beyond the idea of simple mastery. The veterans weren’t just revisiting wartime events to gain control of the memories, to subdue them; they were also venturing back to those days because they possessed a crucial drive as part of what Freud called the “psychic economy,” an underlying desire to restore the self to that original state of total quiescence. Absence of all stimuli was the goal, Freud argued, not of positive or negative stimuli. This was the death drive operating alongside the pleasure principle. Freud’s “death drive” solution to the repetition-compulsion problem had an enormous impact on both scientific and popular perceptions of how the mind works at times of extreme stress. But his theoretical gymnastics seem superfluous in the light of modern brain science. The brain is not trying to release what would otherwise be overwhelming energies—mastering the trauma by letting off steam—when it revisits traumatic events against the conscious will of the individual. The brain is revisiting these memories because, over the millions of years that our central nervous system has been evolving, a mental circuit was created that (1) recorded details from traumatic encounters and (2) set off a systemwide alarm when it was reminded of those details. That circuitry helped our ancestors survive and pass on their genes more often than not, which is why we find the amygdala and its fear responses in so many species. Freud 56 of 216
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was exactly right to insist that certain regions of the brain operated outside of our conscious control. But there is nothing in the brain’s architecture, as we now understand it, that compels the organism toward death. (There may be a death drive in our genetic architecture, in the form of body clocks that tell our organs when to stop doing regular maintenance work. But that’s another story.) The fear response—however incapacitating it can be—is fundamentally about staying alive. It’s about staying alive when there isn’t time to think. The brain evolved a strategy to cut conscious thinking and decision-making out of the picture and to let the amygdala do the work. When the brain revisits traumatic memories, it isn’t trying to beat them into submission; it’s trying to keep them relevant. You’re not reminded of frightening events because the brain is somehow drawn to death imagery or because it wants to eliminate the memory by replaying it ad nauseam. The memories come back to you because, on some basic level, they’re good for you. It seems unnecessary to be afraid of things that end up being harmless 99.99 percent of the time. But the 99.99 percent of unwarranted fear is merely a passing annoyance compared to the threat posed by the remaining .01 percent. I don’t like being afraid of wind, but being afraid is not going to kill me. Flying windows, on the other hand, just might.
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3 Your Attention, Please
I am pedaling a bicycle with my brain. Or, more accurately, I am failing miserably at pedaling a bicycle with my brain. I’m high above Central Park on a sultry August afternoon, sitting in a suite at the Mayflower Hotel, where a team of executives with a company called the Attention Builders have been holding an all-day training session for use of their new product, which happens to be strapped to my head. The product—part of an integrated system called the Attention Trainer—looks like your standard Day-Glo bike helmet, but it harbors state-of-the-art neurofeedback technology that measures changes in the electrical activity of certain sections of your brain and reports them back via a wireless connection to an ordinary PC. The Attention Builders, as the name suggests, have built this system to help children combat that chronic end-of-millennium complaint, attention deficit disorder. The helmet tracks specific types of electrical activity associated with ADD (and the related disorder ADHD, short for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder). The data generated by the helmet is presented graphically in real time to the person wearing the helmet. Because the company is, literally, trying to capture the attention of kids with this product, the Builders have concocted a series of video games that respond to the data generated by your brain, games that reward high-attention states and discourage more distracted ones. Start zoning out while connected to the Attention Trainer software, and you’ll see it reflected on the screen within a split second. Start paying attention, and you’ll find yourself winning the game. And that’s my problem. I’m losing the game.
Neurofeedback dates to the late 1960s and early ’70s, during which time it experienced an initial blip of Aquarian hype, alongside primal scream therapy, TM, and EST. Early advocates found that the technology enabled users to reach meditative states more easily by encouraging the alpha brain waves associated with deep relaxation. The trouble with the first neurofeedback machines revolved
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around the weakness of the feedback: lacking modern graphical displays and high-speed processors, the early units represented brain activity with squiggly lines and R2D2-like computer bleeps. While the evangelists talked about using neurofeedback to fine-tune the instrument of your mind—the seminal history of the movement is a book called A Symphony in the Brain—the technological limitations of the age made that instrument sound about as sophisticated as a cell phone ringer. But it took more than an increase in computational power to usher in a neurofeedback revival. It’s one of many small ironies in the history of neurofeedback that a technology originally associated with the alternative mind-expansion movements of the ’60s should find new life thanks to today’s culture of grade-school overachievement. While neurofeedback machines are being used in a variety of contexts, the most common use today is therapeutic, for treating ADD and ADHD as a nonchemical alternative to Ritalin and other prescription stimulants. “I had gotten interested in neurofeedback in the late nineties,” Attention Builder CEO Tom Blue tells me at the Mayflower before I put on his device. “I learned that there was this technology out there that could train a person how to achieve a certain state of mind through observed brain waves—which was technologically intriguing—and the potential seemed to be humongous. And the thing that seemed so out of whack was that I’d never heard of it.” Blue is an appealing salesman for his product—he’s neither clinicalsounding nor New Agey. When I meet him, he’s dressed in tan pants and a green short-sleeved shirt; he looks as though he might be an amiable local golf pro. “If you think of the world of neurofeedback as one that has been fermenting for many years, accumulating a lot of data that’s really quite powerful,” he explains, rolling out a gentle sales pitch, “we were looking to more or less uncork it.” I’m here to investigate something beyond the purely therapeutic application of the technology; I’m wondering whether a subculture of recreational neurofeedback users is on the rise. To date, neurofeedback machines have been largely clunky devices that look like they belong on the set of the ’70s TV drama Emergency. The Attention Trainer system, on the other hand, looks like something you’d strap on to interact with your PlayStation. Make the technology sexy enough, and attach it to a Pentium IV, and people might start using it to expand their minds and not just to treat a specific disorder. Most recreational drugs began as medicines, after all—why couldn’t neurofeedback follow the same course? Blue is so impassioned in his description of therapeutic benefits that I worry I’ll offend him by bringing up the recreational possibilities. “I’ll talk to the kids after they’re done,” he says, staring me down intently, “and consistently what they say—it’s like what one child said to me: ‘Now I know how it needs to feel when I read.’ They literally are learning what it feels like to pay attention. If you think about it—you’re a little kid, and all you’ve been told is that you’re not 60 of 216
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paying attention, you don’t really know what the heck attention is.” I’m feeling a little sheepish now about even bringing up the idea of less clinical applications, but I plunge ahead, and immediately Blue’s face brightens: “We think about those other directions all the time. This technology is not just for people who are battling disorders. It should be like going to the gym!” Before long, I’m seated before a projection screen, while Kamran Fallahpour, a New York–based therapist who consults for the Attention Builders, adjusts the helmet to fit the contours of my skull. It feels vaguely viselike, but Blue is quick to remind me that it’s designed to fit a child’s head. After a few minutes of jostling, the computer reports a clean signal from my brain, and Fallahpour retreats six feet to the desk where the machine resides and clicks quickly through a few initial screens. I’m listening to him speak, and as I’m listening, millions of neurons in my brain are building up tiny electric charges and then releasing neurotransmitters that indirectly send the voltage to other neurons via axons. These neurons communicate in unison, with a fantastically large number creating a collective rhythm with their discharges. That synchrony generates waves of electrical activity that can be measured by an electrode placed on the outside of the skull. About seventy-five years ago, a German scientist named Hans Berger discovered that the human brain generated a half dozen or so distinct wave states, each associated with a certain mode of consciousness: 1 to 4 hertz (or delta) appearing in non-REM sleep, for example, or alpha, which lies between 8 and 12 hertz, and usually suggests a state of relaxation. The sensors that are attached to my skull as Fallahpour speaks to me are capturing my theta levels, which fall between 4 and 7 hertz. Unusually high theta levels often accompany an easily distracted state of mind, so the software that Blue and his team have created is designed to reduce theta, pushing the brain into a more attentive state. “Normally what we would do here is that we would have you play this memory game,” Fallahpour explains, “and get a reading on your theta levels so that we could establish a baseline for the session. But I’ll just play the game for you, since we’re just doing a trial run here.” I nod approvingly, not realizing the implications of what he’s just said, and a few beats later, Blue jumps in to explain the need for a calibration session in the first place. He’s building on his gym analogy from before, and so immediately he has my complete attention. “If you think of this as being like exercise,” he says while Fallahpour obligingly plays out the memory game on the screen, “the one thing that’s different from, say, lifting weights…when you go to the gym, you’re about as strong today as you were yesterday. But with attention training, depending on what you’ve been doing all day, you might be scattered or you might be quite focused. So you really need to establish that baseline at the beginning of each session; that way the rest of the session is tailored to your present state of
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mind.” The companion software application—one of the simplest in the Attention Trainer suite—involves an on-screen bicyclist who pedals faster as your theta levels decrease. The cyclist’s exertion is relative to your theta levels during the calibration period. Think of your theta on a scale of 1 to 5—if you calibrate at 4 and then drive your theta down to 3 during the game, the bicyclist will pedal more rapidly. If you get it down to 1, you’ll feel like Lance Armstrong. My bicycle-pedaling skills, on the other hand, turn out to be more like Jabba the Hut’s. After a few minutes of calibration, Fallahpour announces that the system is ready, and launches the bike game. A long stretch of intense humiliation begins. From the very outset, my bike refuses to budge. I try focusing on my breathing. I try staring intently at the screen. I try staring intently at the wall. I try mentally reciting the first paragraph of a magazine article I’ve just written. The bicycle remains frozen. After about thirty seconds, the computer begins taunting me with pre-recorded encouraging words: “I know you can make it,” it says in a voice that sounds uncannily like HAL refusing to open the pod bay doors in 2001: A Space Odyssey. “Focus on the game.” I’m trying to focus on the game, but very quickly, I find myself focusing on the possibility that I have been suffering from ADD for years without realizing it. And then I find myself focusing on Blue and Fallahpour, who have settled into an awkward silence as I set what must be a new world record for theta levels. After about a minute, Blue says, “You might try counting by sevens.” I make my way up to 140, with no movement from the bike. Fallahpour says, “Stare at the cogs on the bicycle wheel, and concentrate on what they’re doing.” I fix my gaze on the cogs, which are spinning steadily despite the bike’s overall intransigence. The staring does no good. Five minutes pass, and the game ends. All told, the bike has made only a handful of brief nudges forward. I’m ready to swallow an entire bottle of Ritalin. As I take the helmet off, Blue tries to sound upbeat: “You have to remember that this usually requires forty to fifty sessions for people to achieve their goals. It’s hard to get results in one session.” But I can tell he’s a little puzzled by how poorly I’ve done. I ask weakly if it’s possible that the system wasn’t receiving a clean signal from the helmet. Everyone shakes their head—“You get an alert notice immediately if there’s a problem with that,” Blue explains. And then Fallahpour pipes up, from behind the PC: “You know, there might have been something unusual about the calibration process. Normally, we would be capturing your theta levels as you play the memory game, but in this case we were capturing your theta levels as you were listening to Tom, and I was playing the memory game. Let’s try it again, and do the calibration properly.”
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I strap the helmet on again, play the memory game dutifully, and we launch a new video game, this one with more advanced 3-D graphics. I’m using the computer keyboard now to drive a little go-cart through a cartoon cemetery—and the lower my theta levels get, the faster the cart moves on the screen. From the very first seconds of the game, I notice a dramatic difference: the cart charges ahead when I focus intently on the activity on the screen; when I move my eyes around the room, or flip mentally through a scattered series of thoughts, it lurches to a halt. I try counting by sevens, and sure enough, the cart picks up speed steadily. After a few minutes, I ask to switch back to the bicycle game, just to verify the difference. After Fallahpour changes screens, the low-resolution cyclist reappears—only this time, I feel as though I can move him across the screen at will. He jumps forward when I concentrate, drops back when I lose focus. It’s an absolutely uncanny feeling. I think a certain type of thought, and on the screen, something changes that reflects the nature of that thought. I find myself recalling the old Arthur C. Clarke line about the best technology being indistinguishable from magic, but this is better than magic. It feels like telepathy. When I’ve finished with the demo, the company’s head of product development, Ken Feldt, pulls up the behind-the-scenes data on my wave states during the session. The second, accurate calibration charted my theta levels at 3.6; during the subsequent games, I had reduced my levels to 2.7, thus enabling me to pedal the bicycle with much success. It turned out that during the initial calibration, when I had been listening to Tom Blue speak, my theta levels had dipped down as low as 1.6, twice as good as they had been during my most attentive moments pedaling—or failing to pedal—the bicycle. “That’s why you were so bad at the game originally,” Feldt says as he shows me the data. Without even trying, I had jumped into an extremely focused state in my conversation with Blue, more focused, in fact, than any of the focused states that I had deliberately attempted to reach. That state had set the benchmark for my first attempts to pedal the bicycle, and so when my theta levels during that initial session came in higher than my listening-to-Tom-Blue levels, the software responded by slowing the wheels to a standstill. It was my own version of “the zone.” “We’ve found from our tests that some people can focus intently while they listen whereas others can’t,” Feldt says. “One of our clinicians was testing adults, and was working with a man who tested off the charts when he was reading but couldn’t listen worth a damn. What this might imply about you is that you can focus very well when you’re listening.” I found myself mulling over Feldt’s words for days. After the immediate, breathtaking magic of the hardware itself—controlling a machine with my mind—it was this strange revelation at the very end of our session that stuck with me. Had I learned something new about myself? Maybe. I was more focused listening to someone talk than I was while actively trying to focus. I was more focused listening to someone talk than I was while locked into playing a video game. Of course, when I’m listening, I’m not thinking about my focus, which is 63 of 216
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probably one of the reasons I can focus in the first place. But it took the Attention Trainer’s technology to prompt this glimmer of insight. I had caught a glimpse of what my brain was doing physically when it did something well. And all this was after just twenty minutes, and a slightly mangled calibration session.
A few weeks after my time with the Attention Builders, I met Leslie Seiden and Hal Rosenblum, a married Upper East Side couple in their late fifties and early sixties, who formed a company called Braincare, Inc., a few years ago. They make for an unlikely pair of neurofeedback evangelists—he’s a retired pharmacologist and amateur photographer with a dry sense of humor; she’s a lively practicing psychotherapist who has integrated neurofeedback into her practice. When I visit them at their townhouse, she’s wearing a bright pink suit with a gold brooch on her lapel. She’s eager to tell her story. “I had been suffering from migraines since I was fifteen years old. I’d get them every few weeks, and that was just the story of my life. The medicines got better, but nothing really changed. And then one day I had dinner with a colleague of mine, and I was telling him about my migraines, and he said, ‘Oh, I can help you with those.’ And he told me about neurofeedback. “So my husband and I went out and took a course,” she continues. “I bought a used machine from a colleague and began doing sessions myself at night. I did about sixty sessions, and I really felt that it made some significant difference in my migraine history—they were shorter, less intense, less frequent. Also, I’d been a person who had to nap every day—after the neurofeedback, I stopped having to take naps. “So I started to think: this is pretty big. I even got my kids to try it.” Before long, they had converted the front room of their ground-floor office to headquarters of Braincare and put up a website advertising their services. When Rosenblum hooks me up to Braincare’s neurofeedback machine, the overall environment feels more medical than the Attention Trainer setup— Rosenblum has to attach electrodes to my skull with conducting paste—but once the software starts up, the experience feels familiar. It begins with a simple real-time portrait of my brain wave activity: four line graphs scrolling across the screen. Rosenblum points to one and says, “That’s theta—that’s what we’ll be trying to reduce in this session.” I stare at the data for a few minutes, as it rushes by, and I begin to experiment with different mental states. It’s easier to throw the theta levels into overdrive by swooping from thought to thought than it is to focus intently, mainly because the data on-screen bustles with so much activity, and I find my eyes darting around the screen with each change. But even my attempts at artificial ADD don’t last very long. There’s a strangely hall-ofmirrors quality to my interaction with this machine: I try to act distracted, and within a few seconds, the wave form on the screen changes to reflect my distraction, which causes me to pay attention to it, thus ending my distracted 64 of 216
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state. After a few minutes, I ask, “Do you have any good games?” And within thirty seconds, I’m piloting a spaceship hurtling toward a distant star, and once again I find that I can control the objects on the screen with ease. In the four years they’ve been in business, Seiden and Rosenblum have treated nearly two hundred patients, mostly children battling ADD. But increasingly, the practice has attracted a more eclectic mix. Seiden tells stories of day traders trying to stay focused in front of a screenful of churning numbers, lawyers trying to reach “optimal mental functioning.” “We had a Buddhist monk come in. He was in his sixties, and he’d lost his capacity for deep meditation,” Seiden tells me. “We gave him ten sessions of alpha-theta, and he was able to find it again.” But even in the domain where it has had the most dramatic, if still anecdotal, success, neurofeedback has yet to become a mainstream approach. The sense of neurofeedback residing on the margins of popular acceptance is readily apparent to anyone exploring the field. In early 2002, I traveled down to a neurofeedback convention being held in a hotel just north of Miami. It was something of a surreal experience. If you didn’t count the crowd gathered for the conference itself, the hotel clientele seemed entirely to comprise eighty-something retirees on vacation packages who boarded shuttle buses every morning for group expeditions to the Miami Boat Show or the Fairchild Gardens. While the shuffleboard set tottered over to buffet breakfast, a band of neurofeedback aficionados would be arguing over coffee and doughnuts about the merits of parietal lobe scans and phase portraits. The group itself was a fascinating demographic: mostly boomers who seemed as though they had thoroughly enjoyed the ’60s. There were a few Ph.D.s and a number of emissaries from institutes with exotic-sounding names. There were also at least two practicing parapsychologists. The mix of New Age sloganeering and neurotech jargon had, to my ears at least, a fresh, if not altogether persuasive, sound. “The problem with hearing both sides of the story,” one speaker explained to robust applause, “is that you don’t get to hear about all the other sides.” The New Age component had me eyeing the exits on a number of occasions, but there was also an infectious enthusiasm to the group, in both their belief in the technology itself and their belief that they could use it to enhance their brains. It was a strange breed of the American ethos of self-improvement. I couldn’t help being reminded of the personal computer hobbyists circa 1975: a high ratio of evangelists to ordinary users, united by a conviction that their technology could change the world. But there was a sense lingering in the air in Miami that the world had already taken a look at the technology, and turned up its nose. Some of these folks, after all, had been renegades in their particular disciplines for twenty years. “It’s going to get worse,” one of them announced when asked about mainstream acceptance of neurofeedback, “before it gets even worse.”
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Wes Sime stood out for me at the brain convention because in the midst of all the psi researchers and aging hippies, he got up on the stage and talked about golf. It was not out of character for Sime. The first time I talked with him, he was on a cell phone from a PGA Senior Tour event in Des Moines, Iowa, where he had been introducing professional golfers to the wonders of neurofeedback. A professor of health and human performance at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Sime may be the ultimate evangelist for neurofeedback’s recreational potential. For one, his career has revolved increasingly around training athletes to use the technology, primarily using a Peak Achievement Trainer device made by a company called EEG Spectrum. And then there’s his personal attachment to the technology, which seems almost obsessive. When I asked him over the phone to describe the gadget he’s been using with the golfers, his voice perked up: “I’m wearing it right now—I’ve been wearing it throughout this conversation.” A few days later, he sent me an email responding to a handful of questions I’d asked him, and his message ended: “Ironically, as I write this message to you I am using the neurofeedback software to shape my own attentiveness to the task. It is an interactive process that will soon become commonplace, almost like having a cruise control on my car.” Sime’s first professional epiphany came from his work with a college diver who was recovering from a devastating back injury. After a series of neurofeedback sessions to work on his ability to focus—to imagine a successful dive before physically executing it—the young man made a spectacular recovery and was soon performing at a higher level than he had before his injury. “After he won his first meet, his coach came to me and said, ‘I don’t know what you were doing with Eric and all that head stuff, but Eric used to be able to dive, which meant that eight or nine times out of ten he’d do pretty well, but he’d always have one dive that would hurt him. But now—Now Eric is a diver. He makes something out of every single dive. I don’t know how that happens—this is nearly unheard of because diving is such a precision sport.’ Normally it takes a month to come back after an injury like that, but here this kid came back after only a week or two of training and won the first meet he was in.” Sime has also participated in a number of studies attempting to quantify these seemingly anecdotal accounts. In one remarkable project, dozens of golfers were hooked up to neurofeedback devices, and their brain wave activity was analyzed as they putted. Sime and his colleagues found a clear correlation between certain wave states and successful or unsuccessful putts. Armed with this data, the potential for “peak performance” training is obvious: once you know what wave states produce the most accurate shots, you simply need to configure your neurofeedback software to encourage that particular state. Interestingly, Sime says that the most effective setting for golfers tends to be an across-the-board, inhibit-all setting that discourages activity at all the major frequencies. It’s the EEG equivalent of what athletes call “the zone”: getting your mind out of the game and letting your muscle memory do its work unimpeded. For decades the zone has served as a kind of athlete’s mysticism, but like Seiden’s Buddhist monk, that mystical language is being translated into the hard
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data of science. “I can literally go back with a golfer after a shot,” Sime explains, “and say: ‘Look at this, were you as focused as you wanted to be on the first half of this particular attempt at putting?’ And he’ll say yes or no, and I’ll go down and look at the graph and say, ‘Aha, you see here.’ Or I can do it the other way around and say, ‘You know what, on that last swing it looks like you started to bail out a little bit and started doubting your swing a little bit.’ And the guy will go, ‘You’re absolutely right. I started to get anxious on the downswing.’ It is the most exciting confirmation of quality of imagery and mental rehearsal that we’ve ever seen.” As Sime tells me this, I find myself thinking of the one time I saw Tiger Woods in person. It was the fourth round of the 1999 PGA Championship at Medinah, a tournament that he went on to win after a dramatic closing duel with Sergio Garcia. I was standing among the throngs lining the path between the sixth green and the seventh tee, reveling in the noise and the rhythmic chanting (“Tiger! Tiger!”), when the man himself walked down the narrow aisle carved through the crowd. For a second or two I saw him up close as he made his way to the seventh tee. I have never in my life seen a wider chasm between the look in someone’s eyes and the surrounding environment. He had five hundred boisterous fans chanting his name from two feet away, and he looked as though he were halfway through a transcendental meditation session. If two people were cheering for me with such vigor, my heart would be beating like Secretariat’s. Of course, Tiger Woods is used to crowd noise, but what I saw in his eyes that day was more than just the look of someone anesthetized to cheering. He had shut something off in his brain, and his eyes were reflecting it. Shutting off instead of building up—Tiger’s stare points to one area in which Tom Blue’s mental gym analogy breaks down. There aren’t many exercise machines out there designed to weaken muscles, or shut them down altogether. Sometimes training the brain is about learning how to turn off muscles that the brain naturally wants to flex. It’s understandable that your brain wants to flush your body with adrenaline when five hundred people scream your name while swarming around you, but uncontrolled adrenaline may not be useful if you’re trying to win your second major. So you learn how to shut it down. Athletes sometimes talk about “getting their brain out of the way,” but, of course, you don’t want your entire brain out of the way. An athlete wants to preserve the parts that take muscle memories and turn them into actual movements; he wants the high-speed corridors of instinctual movement to be active, while the more sluggish regions of introspection and self-doubt to be dampened. In a sense, great athletes are trying to reproduce the strategy that evolution stumbled across when it created the quick-and-dirty route that the fear response follows in the brain. If you don’t have time to think, better to get rid of thinking altogether.
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It’s impossible to spend time in the world of neurofeedback enthusiasts and not feel intrigued by the vision of a personal neurotrainer who watches the computer screen as you practice your dives or your public speaking, rewarding you when you set your own personal best for theta inhibition. The idea might sound ludicrous, but it’s not really all that far from what we’re accustomed to today: every coach or teacher you’ve ever had—from Little League to college physics—was trying to condition your brain to behave in new ways. When you learned how to hold off on your natural impulse to swing at a changeup, or how to visualize travel at the speed of light, you were altering the neurochemistry of your brain: strengthening the connections between some synapses and weakening others; encouraging some broader regions to become more active while subduing others. The difference is that, unlike the neurotrainer, the Little League coach can’t see the changes in brain activity directly. Still, there are limits to the neurotrainer’s vision. After the initial amazement had worn off while I was playing the space game at Seiden’s office, I couldn’t help noticing that I couldn’t control the ship with nearly as much accuracy as I could have with a joystick or a keyboard. There’s a fuzziness to the interaction that would be unpleasant were I actually interested in having an efficient conversation with the computer. Manipulating a computer with your brain is a bit like the old Dr. Johnson quote about the walking dog: it is not done well, but you are amazed to see that it is done at all. That limitation has to do with the fact that the EEG sensors aren’t terribly accurate. I ask John Donoghue, executive director of Brown University’s brain science program, what he thinks about these limitations. “There have been people who have been trying to get control of devices by picking up brain signals, but they’ve had little success,” he explains. “Most of the experiments have been with paralyzed individuals: you hook up EEG equipment to them and put them in front of a computer. And then the EEG signal is fed into the computer in a way that might, say, make the cursor move up, choosing items from a selection. “That’s called one-dimensional selection, but the rate is pretty slow: like three words a minute. There are a few who can do two-dimensional control but it takes an immense amount of concentration. That’s why, from the outside, using a noninvasive approach, it’s pretty tough,” he says. This is probably disappointing news for gamers who fantasize about mind-control versions of video games like Quake, but it also is a cautionary tale for those of us interested in the technology’s capacity for enhancing introspection. The almost unthinkable complexity of the brain’s information network is necessarily compressed down to a crude language when a machine listens to the collective rhythms of brain waves through the skull: hence my elemental interaction with the on-screen cyclist, consisting of two verbs—“faster” and “slow down.” “The information is there, but the problem is that getting access to it right now requires implanting something inside your brain,” Donoghue says. “The only things you pick up with the EEG are big changes—that’s why it’s great for detecting epileptic seizures. You can track more global rhythms.” In other words, 68 of 216
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at its best using neurofeedback to listen to your brain’s activity is like hiring someone to attend a symphony for you who only reports back with word of each key change. It was clear to me from these experiments that neurofeedback technology can accurately represent different mental states, albeit crudely. But it’s still up for grabs how easily it can encourage brains to grow more comfortable in less familiar states. Systems like the Attention Trainers’ or Braincare’s had translated activity in my head into a new kind of language—that much was certain. But could these machines actually push my head in new directions? Given the climate of the last decade, the most compelling data on this question to date involves ADD. But the story is still incomplete. “I may have lost some credibility with some of my colleagues when I started offering this to patients,” Seiden says to me. “But the data has been coming in.” Of course, if the technology does prove to be as effective as its evangelists believe it will, another fear quickly arises: are we going to create a generation of superattentive robots? A generation of kids trained on neurofeedback is probably preferable to a generation of superattentive stimulant addicts, which is where we seem to be headed now. And the Attention Builder software is open-ended. Already people are training themselves to reach alpha states, like Seiden’s monk, or inhibit all, like Sime’s golfers. Who knows—there might well be a high-theta subculture that emerges in the coming years. Some people read “Howl,” some people read The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. Some people inhibit theta, some encourage it. Neurofeedback is mostly just a mirror. How we choose to change ourselves based on what we see in the reflection is up to us. But take the therapeutic question off the table, and you’re left with the more provocative premise—that this is a technology that could lead to a more nuanced kind of self-awareness. The recreational use of neurofeedback could become an avenue for introspection, a way of bridging the physiological reality of your brain with your conscious mental life. We already accept the first two legs of Leslie Seiden’s journey—from analyst to psychopharmacologist. If the “talking cure” and Prozac are now seen as legitimate avenues of self-exploration and improvement, why not a machine that listens to the sounds of our brains? In the weeks following each of my neurofeedback sessions, I would catch myself stumbling into a certain mental state—early morning stupor, midtown Manhattan sidewalk anxiety, postcoffee email-writing fury—and wonder where my theta levels were, or if my beta waves were on the rise. I would think of Wes Sime, wearing his Peak Performance Trainer as he types out his email, and the question seems inescapable: could this become a kind of Walkman for the early twenty-first century? A Walkman that actually makes you faster, sharper, more in control. Assuming, of course, that faster, sharper, more in control is what you’re looking for.
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My journey into the world of neurofeedback made me more curious about what “attention” really meant. The more I thought about it, the more attention seemed like a colloquial illusion: it appeared to be a unified category only until you spent some time analyzing your own attentiveness. With enough scrutiny, the category began to fragment into component parts: there was me paying attention while playing the Attention Trainer video game; and there was me paying attention while listening to Tom Blue. They were both ways of paying attention, but when I thought about what the experiences actually felt like, they seemed to be two distinct activities, drawing upon different resources. Playing video games tends to have a narrowing effect on my mind: there’s nothing going on in my head other than a second-by-second appraisal of the activity on the screen. (It’s a strangely trancelike state, despite the usual graphical pyrotechnics.) Paying attention to someone speaking, on the other hand, feels like a widening of my consciousness—or at least the part that grapples with meaning and semantic depth. The games are all about reflexes and reaction time; listening to speech is about interpretation—both the literal interpretation of the words and the mindreading assessment of the speaker’s facial expressions, gestures, and intonation. The more I thought about it, grouping these two skills under the same umbrella seemed as artificial as saying that my juggling skills could reasonably predict my talents as a cook. But if a single, all-encompassing category called “attention” was illusory, then what was a more accurate taxonomy? To say that one specific category is too broad is not to do away with categories altogether. Because of its importance in education, and because of the hype around ADD, attention turns out to be a much-analyzed faculty of the human mind. Even if the proverbial man on the street continues to think of attention as a unified thing, the neuroscientists and psychologists now know it to be a collection of different skills, sometimes overlapping and sometimes not. The concept of attention is a prisoner of our language: we think of these different skills as qualitatively alike because we have one word that embraces them all. Ultimately I realized I wanted to understand attention in the actual language of the brain, to learn about its core mechanisms. And then I wanted to test those mechanisms to find out more about my own attentiveness. That’s how I found my way to John Rodenbough, a North Carolina–based psychologist who has developed the Comprehensive Attention Battery (CAB), a software program that relies on more than a dozen separate tests to evaluate a person’s repertoire of attention skills. The very first time we talked, it was clear to me that Rodenbough thought the idea of a unified attention category was misleading at best. “People are often locked in to this idea that they have either good attention or poor attention,” he explained in a quiet drawl. “You’ll often see these children who are labeled as having attention problems, but when you sit down and test them, you’ll find that there are some areas that they excel in. I wonder whether there is such a thing as attention.” 70 of 216
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The most elemental distinction in the brain’s attention circuitry is a relatively intuitive division among the different senses. You might have stellar visual focus, but you get easily distracted when listening to something or someone. Because they are easiest to test, seeing and hearing are the most widely studied of the attention faculties, but we also have olfactory and tactile attention circuits as well as “kinesthetic” ones that track our body’s position in space. Beyond sensory data, the component parts of attention revolve around how the information itself is processed in the brain. “Sustain” is your ability to remain focused on a single object or task for extended periods without becoming distracted. You might be great at sustaining olfactory attention, but your visual system might be easily diverted by new stimuli. At any given moment, so much data about the external world enters your brain through your sensory channels that the key proficiency of consciousness is not the ability to perceive the external world but rather the ability to shut so much of it out. If you paid constant attention to everything that your sensory organs were perceiving, you’d be overwhelmed with stimulus. Instead, the “mind’s eye” focuses selectively on a tiny fraction of that incoming stream. The Danish writer Tor Norretranders calls this the “user illusion”: you think being conscious means perceiving everything around you, but in fact it means perceiving small slices of reality and still being able to switch back and forth between them with extraordinary ease. That switching is essential to the illusion of consciousness, but it can lead to sustain problems as well. Suffering from poor sustain is like having a wandering mind’s eye. If sustain is all about remaining focused on an incoming data stream, “encoding” is the brain’s ability to take that data and put it into working memory. The archetypal example is the encoding of phone numbers. To memorize a phone number, you first have to sustain your auditory focus long enough to actually hear the digits spoken to you; then you have to store those digits somewhere or else they’ll be replaced by the next signal to come in through your ears. For short strings of data like phone numbers, the brain usually stores the information in what attention specialists call a “phonological loop”—like an audio recording of the numbers being uttered. This is often the case even if the original number was conveyed to you via sight. Watch yourself the next time you read a phone number off a piece of paper, and then walk upstairs to make the call. Most likely, as you read the numbers you’ll repeat them to yourself—either out loud or internally—and then keep repeating the string as you walk up the stairs. You could theoretically memorize the shapes and arrangement of the digits on the page, and recall the number by recalling the image—but you don’t. (We have innate skills as listeners, but our reading skills are all learned.) We do have powerful spatial memory systems, however, which is why we’ll sometimes recall a number by capturing the spatial sequence of the numbers dialed on the keypad. But most of the time, you’ll capture the number as a phonological loop. That process is what attention experts call “encoding.” Encoding is the attention subsystem that has received the most mainstream 71 of 216
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recognition over the past few years, largely because of the storage limits built into the human system. With very few exceptions, humans are capable of remembering about seven distinct items in working memory. (Technically, the figure is seven plus or minus two.) You can recall millions of separate things —everything from phone numbers to faces to the lyrics of “London Calling”—as long as they’re stored in your long-term memory bank. But when new information comes along and you need to encode it quickly and retain it for a short while, you’ll start overloading your working memory buffer if you go beyond seven items. It’s no accident that phone numbers are seven digits long—when the phone companies set out to design the modern dial system, they consulted psychologists on the maximum number of digits that could be readily memorized by an average person. After sustain and encoding, the toolbox of attention grows more complicated, because attention isn’t just about focusing on a single task or object—it’s often about switching among different tasks and different sensory inputs. One measure of this is what specialists call “focus/execute” skills. Assuming you don’t live in a monastery or a prison cell, every day of your life probably involves running through thousands of separate routines that follow a regulated script, with each stage requiring a specific attentional mode. You check the kids’ seat belts, put the key in the ignition, listen to the engine, glance over your shoulder to make sure the driveway’s clear, look both ways before you turn onto the street. If this is a familiar sequence for you, odds are you perform these actions almost unconsciously by now—but not entirely unconsciously. If something goes wrong at any of the stages—if you see an oncoming car or Junior’s unbuckled his seat belt—you’ll notice, because on some fundamental level you’re paying attention. Attending to all those details would be overwhelming if each wasn’t finite in duration and objective. You can run through the routines like clockwork because at each step your brain knows to stop the previous task and start the next one. If your brain weren’t capable of making these shifts, the incoming data would quickly add up to information overload. You might not notice that skate-board in the driveway because you were still thinking about the ignition key. “Focus/execute” describes the sequence when it’s done right: you focus on a specific task, execute it, move on to the next task, and focus all over again. Rinse, repeat. Focus/execute implies a predetermined script, but of course real life doesn’t always supply a script. Our most sophisticated feats of attention usually come when we have to extract on-the-fly assessments of relevance out of a flurry of competing signals. This is attention’s executive branch, which usually goes by the name “supervisory attention control.” Supervisory attention is the quarterback who sees the open receiver thirty yards away despite the linebackers hurtling toward him; it’s the music aficionado who can pick out a single ill-tuned violin lurking in an orchestra’s vast sound field. (Or it’s the parent noticing the toy wagon left in the driveway as she’s backing out of the garage with three kids cackling in the rear seat.) People with supervisory attention skills are often good 72 of 216
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at shutting out stimuli that we should naturally be attentive to—Tiger Woods blocking out the five hundred cheering fans as he walks to the seventh tee. In this sense, supervisory attention often involves overriding our impulses, voting down the obvious attraction in favor of a more understated object of study. The attention system works as a kind of assembly line: higher-level functions are built on top of the lower-level functions. So if you have problems encoding, you’ll almost certainly have problems with supervisory attention. When people notice attention impairments, they’re usually detecting problems with the focus/execute or the supervisory levels, but the original source of the problem may well be farther down the chain, or it might be localized to a particular sensory channel. For a psychologist like Rodenbough, the first step in treating an attention disorder is to isolate the weak link in the chain. That’s why he developed his CAB software—a suite of distinct tests tailored to measure the components of the attention system. The CAB tests don’t peer inside your brain directly, of course, but they are ingeniously designed to detect both the strengths and weaknesses of each tool in the attention toolbox.
It’s fair to say that taking the Comprehensive Attention Battery is like playing the worst video game you’ve ever played in your life. When I first sat down to explore the CAB tests, I tried to pump myself up: you get a score at the end of this test, after all, and I wanted a high one. This would be my own private attention decathlon—all I had to do was stay focused for an hour or so, and my extraordinary gifts would be recorded for posterity. Then I started up the software, and before long, my brain was hurting. Taking the CAB was a kind of karmic payback for all the times that I found it amusing to recite random integers within earshot of someone trying to memorize a phone number. Because each test is contoured to probe the brain’s attention system, it forces you to confront the limits of your specific attention faculties. As the tests unfold, they tend to get more difficult; invariably there’s an inflection point at which you can feel your hardware shorting out. But it’s not a general lack of focus that you experience; it’s an extremely precise sensation—the difference between your car feeling a little slushy while making turns and a light popping up on the dashboard alerting you that the pressure is low in the front left tire. If you’ve ever doubted the “law of seven,” you should try taking the audio encoding test. It’s the most elemental of the tests: the computer begins by listing three numbers, which you have to enter back in the correct sequence after a momentary pause. The process is effortless for the first few rounds, as you need to encode four then five then six numbers. Encoding six numbers is just as easy as encoding three—you can play back the phonological loop as though it were an audio sample reliably triggered by a keyboard. The information doesn’t degrade. But once you cross over into encoding eight or nine numbers, your brain starts to scramble. You can feel the last few digits pushing the first few out of the buffer.
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As your encoding system approaches its limits, it instinctively reaches for shortcuts, reducing a collection of digits to a single data point, thereby freeing up room in your working memory. As I neared the end of the encoding test, one ten-digit number I was asked to memorize began with 3–0–1, my parents’ area code. Instantly, I was able to translate those three numbers into a single unit, leaving more room for the rest of the sequence. Instead of encoding ten random numbers, I had to encode seven numbers plus my parents’ area code. Eight items, instead of ten—just few enough to keep the whole sequence clear in my head. Memory specialists call this technique “chunking”—turning a series of discrete objects into a larger chunk, freeing up working memory for additional data. (Four-digit numbers that begin with 19 are particularly vulnerable to being chunked, since they can be memorized as years—instead of encoding ten numbers, you encode six plus the year JFK was shot.) The CAB illuminates a few quirks of the brain’s attention architecture. The encoding tests include both forward and backward versions. For the latter, you have to memorize a series of digits and then enter them in reverse order. This part of the test had me reaching for the Advil even before I passed the seven-digit threshold. Having to punch the numbers back in reverse order meant that the phonological loop wasn’t nearly as helpful as it had been in the forward version. You could play the mental tape of the sequence, but there wasn’t a ready-made internal mechanism for playing it backward. I got only three out of twenty wrong in the forward version, but twice as many foiled me going in reverse. That disparity made intuitive sense to me: having to reverse the sequence felt like something my brain wasn’t designed to do. But when I moved on to the visual encoding test, I stumbled across a startling result. The test shows you a grid of nine boxes, arranged tic-tac-toe style. Instead of listing a series of numbers, the test illuminates a sequence of boxes. After the sequence is over, you repeat the sequence by clicking on the boxes: first in the original order, and then in reverse. Unlike in the audio test, visual encoding going backward was easier than going forward. The sequence came naturally to me in reverse order, while re-creating the original series took more effort. After the test, I ask Rodenbough if my results with visual encoding are unusual. “Not at all,” he explains. “Our brains are designed to track backwards visually. When you see some kind of movement—our brains are designed to follow that movement backwards.” When you track a projectile flying through the air, your brain intuitively calculates its point of origin by imagining its trajectory in reverse. It’s one of those little talents you’ve relied on your entire life without ever really noticing it. But taking the CAB made that particular faculty as vivid as those hardwired for stereo vision or face recognition. Reverse visual encoding is a general human aptitude. Some of us are better at it than others, thanks to our genes or our cultural training—but on average, we’re all better going backward than forward while capturing visual data. It’s a species trait. Taking the CAB helped me recognize that I possessed the trait, and that itself was a kind of insight. But I was searching for individual variation as well—not just the universal attention toolbox, but also my own distinct talents 74 of 216
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with the tools themselves. I ask Rodenbough if the tests have caused him to think about his own attention faculties any differently. At first, he demurs. “I have to remind myself that my scores on the tests themselves are meaningless. I’ve spent so many hours debugging the software that I must have taken each of them hundreds of times. Over time, though,” he concedes, “I’ve learned that I don’t do very well sustaining attention auditorily. I tend to get a bunch of thoughts in my head, and I lose track of what someone’s saying.” I ask him if knowing about this deficit has changed his attention strategies in noticeable ways. “Well, my wife complains that I don’t listen to her,” he says after a pause. “So I try to think about this in terms of the components of attention. Am I listening to her, or am I thinking about too many things at the same time, and she’s just running over my buffer for my encoding ability? That’s how I’ve been able to rationalize it—when she says something, I’m thinking over all the permutations of what she’s said, and it uses up all my encoding space.” “So it’s as though you’re listening too intently?” I ask, a smile forming. “That’s right.” “And does she buy that?” “Well, no, I haven’t given her that one yet.” Rodenbough laughs. “I just keep it to myself.”
The most intriguing tests in the CAB are those that engage the mind’s executive branch. Taking the encoding and sustain tests makes you feel as though you’re pushing the limits of a cognitive muscle that you don’t really have much control over: you hit eight digits on the encoding, and no matter how hard you concentrate, you can’t keep the entire string in your head. But as the tests start to explore your supervisory attention skills—the ones atop the focus food chain—the part of your head that feels like “you” starts to come into play. I found these executive branch tests revealing because they came closest to capturing the real-world experience of trying to “pay attention,” particularly in an age of mixed media and sensory overload. Supervisory attention is ultimately all about choice: your executive brain receives all sorts of data at once, pouring in through the various sensory channels, and somehow you have to decide what’s important and what’s not. The CAB tests present incoming stimuli as fairly elemental components, but then they go to maddening extremes to cross the signals between the different channels. The most famous example of this is the Stroop Interference Test, in which three words—“blue,” “red,” and “green”—repeat randomly in any of the sixteen squares of a grid. The words themselves are colored blue, red, and green, but not consistently: sometimes the word “red” is colored red, but
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sometimes it’s blue. In the initial stage of the test, your job is to select all the words that match the ink they’re printed in, all the red reds and blue blues and green greens. This is much harder than it sounds, precisely because your brain has to resolve conflicting information coming in from different senses. As your attention settles on each word in the grid, a strange duet develops in your head: I know the letters spell out “blue,” but is the color blue? As you stare at the word, the letters insistently bark out blueness to the part of your brain that processes language, but your visual system is making a very different report: “What do you mean, blue? Those letters are red!” Part of your brain sees blue, and part of it sees red, and your executive brain has to make the call. When I took the Stroop test, I found myself dealing with the conflict between these two modules by shutting down my language processor as best I could. I tried to see each word as a pure shape and not a series of recognizable letters. It helped that each of three words was built out of a different number of letters, giving each a distinctive width. And so—without even truly realizing what I was doing—I found myself scanning the grids looking for small blocks of text colored red, medium-sized text colored blue, and lengthier blocks colored green. I was feeling pretty proud of myself until I got to the second stage, at which point a recorded voice began chanting “red, red, blue, green, green” as I tried to pick out the correct squares. It was about then that I started crying. My tour through the CAB may not have been the most fun I’ve ever had at a computer, but it left me with an oddly precise awareness of my different tools as I utilized them in real life. In the days that followed, I’d memorize a phone number and think, Right, this is auditory encoding. Or I’d switch back and forth between watching CNN and reading my email and think, This is supervisory multiprocessing. Before I would simply have said that in each case I was trying to pay attention. Now the two acts seemed as different as push-ups and running on a treadmill. They exercised their own cognitive muscles, and taking the CAB had allowed me to perceive those muscles as distinct entities for the first time. Unlike Rodenbough, I found that my visual encoding—for faces and environmental details—was the weakest link in my attention chain. Having isolated this property by taking the test, I started to confirm it in ordinary life. Around the time I was investigating the CAB, my wife and I were in the middle of a complicated renovation of a new house we’d bought. We’d take trips out to inspect the progress, and on return, my wife’s brain would be filled with dozens of seemingly photo-realistic details from the house, while mine would have a few meager scraps of images and general impressions. We had looked at the same objects, but I had failed to encode them. I started to think about it in the language of computer software: my default settings include visual encoding turned off. For my wife, I suspect, it’s the opposite: just walking around a room fills her head with details that she can recall days later. This doesn’t mean that I’m not capable of remembering visual information. In fact, now that I’ve located the problem, I’ve improved a little by consciously switching on the encoding routine when I’m in an environment I want to remember. Instead of scanning a room passively, I break it down into component parts: “Okay, notice the molding 76 of 216
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over the doorway—there’s a crack there. Now look at the electrical panel here….” It still doesn’t compete with my wife’s skills, but at least I’m in the game now. After my sojourn with the CAB, I experienced a strange, no doubt illusory side effect. Because I had learned a little about brain anatomy, I started to feel as though the different modes of attention were emanating from different physical locations in my head: the supervisory tasks were localized around my frontal lobes while the more primitive tasks—like sustain—seemed be happening in the back of my skull, closer to where incoming visual data is processed. All the brain scientists with whom I have discussed this claim that this kind of intracranial spatializing is impossible: you can’t literally feel where the computation is being performed in your head. But in a way, my having concocted the sensation was even more telling: as a species, we’re great mapmakers; our intelligence naturally gravitates to spatial organization. (One theory holds that the seat of long-term memory in the brain, the hippocampus, originally evolved as a cognitive mapmaking tool, helping our ancestors get their bearings in complex natural environments.) I had mapped in my head the brain’s attention system, and I had a newfound sensitivity to the specific components of that system, so it was almost inevitable that my brain would layer that map over itself, like a trick of the mind’s eye.
Jettisoning the idea of attention as a Single Unified Thing leaves you with two primary implications. The first we’ve already seen: if the art of paying attention is actually divided among several different modes, it’s helpful to learn which of those modes works well for you and which ones don’t pull their weight. The second insight operates one level up: if your attention is a system of interacting modes, then one of the most essential high-level functions that your brain performs is switching those modes. You can be the most brilliant auditory encoder in the world, but if you can’t switch into auditory encoding mode when it’s appropriate, your talents will be wasted. Part of having an effective brain is possessing good tools, but an equally important part is being able to pull the right tool out at the right time. Shortly after I’d spent my time with the CAB, I traveled west for my last expedition into the world of neurofeedback—to the offices of the Othmer Institute, located on the other side of the Hollywood hills, not ten minutes from that icon of Valley girl culture, the Sherman Oaks Mall. The institute is run by a husband-and-wife team, Susan and Sigfried Othmer, both practicing psychologists and longtime neurofeedback advocates. Sue had agreed to talk a little about their practice, and do some training with me. Driving out to their offices, I had been thinking again about the importance of mode switching, and so when Sue and I finally sit down in her office, I bring up the idea early in our conversation. Before I even finish my sentence, Othmer nods emphatically. “We look at everything we do as improving brain self-regulation,” she explains in a quiet,
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confident voice, refreshingly free of the evangelical overtones I’d encountered among other neurofeedback practitioners. “Our states vary enormously over the course of twenty-four hours, but we don’t perceive it that way because usually the state is appropriate for the moment.” Tools like the Attention Trainer were designed to push your brain toward a single target, but Othmer was more interested in exploring different states: focused but calm, or high-energy, or meditative trance. Because the software is artificially propelling your brain into these modes without altering your surrounding environment, you perceive the states themselves with a newfound clarity. “With neurofeedback, it can be very odd to suddenly feel yourself in a different state, for no apparent reason,” Othmer says with a chuckle. You don’t notice what the daydreaming state feels like normally, because you’re too busy daydreaming. But when you drop suddenly into daydreaming mode with a set of electrodes pasted onto your skull and a total stranger sitting two feet away from you, the shift in focus pops out immediately. “If I train you too low, you’ll feel a little stoned, a little drowsy—you might not want to drive,” Othmer says as she starts up the computer for a demonstration. “If I train you too high, you’ll be bouncing around the room.” Othmer begins the training by showing me a recording of someone else’s brain waves. On the screen, there are three scrolling lines, each representing a different part of the frequency spectrum. Sharp spikes appear at regular intervals in the top line. Othmer points to them: “You’d normally see those in a drowsy state. But this guy, he’s actually wide awake while we’re recording this. So you can see he has a severe attentional problem.” As she’s talking, she’s placing the electrodes against my skull. After a few minutes of fiddling, she hits a button on the screen, where a single scrolling line appears. “This is you,” she says. And there I am, or at least some small part of me, whittled down to a jagged—though thankfully not spiky—line on a computer monitor. “I’m going to take the brain waves, and then break out different frequencies,” she continues. With one click, the single line becomes three. “Then I’m going to set thresholds on some of those frequencies. I’m going to reward you every time you increase the amplitude within those thresholds.” The visual feedback on the monitor makes Othmer’s description immediately clear to me. As the wave form shuttles across the screen, bouncing up and down, Othmer creates two boundary lines, above and below the wave. Making those boundary lines closer to each other decreases the room available for the wave form, while pushing them farther apart opens up more room. The goal of the exercise for me is to fill the space between the lines as much as possible, without going over the boundaries. By changing those thresholds, she can indirectly change my internal states. “So we have a hook, and we can grab the state and move it up or down. Lower the rhythm, and the state becomes deeper; make the rhythm higher and it 78 of 216
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becomes more active,” she says. Of course, all this depends on my ability to change my internal state to match the changing thresholds. That’s where the reward comes in. I ask her how I’m to be motivated—I’m thinking candy, perhaps, or gold stars—and she switches on a second monitor. A streamlined version of Pac-Man appears on the screen: a maze of white dots with a circular creature poised in the upper left-hand corner, ready to explore. “This is your reward: when you increase the amplitude, the Pac-Man will start moving through the maze, and you’ll hear a beeping. The process is pretty much ‘let it beep, and be pleased that it’s beeping.’ ” I tell her that this sounds right up my alley, and she laughs. “It’s usually really easy for kids and almost impossible for adults the first time around.” Othmer suggests that we start with a more active, alert state. She hits a few buttons, and the session begins. I stare at the Pac-Man and wait a few seconds. Nothing happens. I try altering my mental state, but mostly I feel as though I’m altering my facial expression to convey a sense of active alertness, as though I’m sitting in the front row of a college lecture preening for the professor. After a few seconds, the Pac-Man moves a few inches forward, and the machine emits a couple of beeps. I don’t really feel any different, but I remember Othmer’s mantra—“be pleased that it’s beeping”—and so I try to shut down the part of my brain that’s focused on its own activity, and sure enough the beeping starts up again. The Pac-Man embarks on an extended stroll through the maze. I am pleased. After I’ve made it all the way through the maze, Othmer asks me how I feel. I do a quick internal check, and report that I indeed feel a little more alert. Not quite caffeinated, exactly—more like that upbeat anticipatory state as I’m watching the coffee being poured. Othmer offers to take me down a few notches, and I begin my mental dance with the Pac-Man once again. This time, I find the best way to get the little sprite to move is by mimicking the zoned-out state I often experience over a bowl of cereal first thing in the morning—in other words, your classic “spacing out.” It takes me a few minutes to drive the Pac-Man through the maze, and when I’m done, the “down” state lingers, not unpleasantly. Entering that zoned-out state so readily makes more of an impression on me than the alert one, partially because it brings into sharp relief that state I’ve been in since I walked in the door. Having a conversation with a new person —particularly in an interview setting, where there’s a rapid segue from the usual chitchat about the weather to more important ideas—invariably puts me a little on edge. I find myself talking faster, in both my exterior and interior monologues. On the outside, I make a lot of jokes, while on the inside, my mindreading usually kicks into overdrive. (“Does she think I’m an idiot? Why do I keep making these jokes?”) So when Othmer tried to amp me up with the neurofeedback, the change wasn’t all that noticeable. But finding myself in that slower, deeper state after the second training came as a shock. I’d only met this 79 of 216
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person twenty minutes before, and yet there was no trace left of my initialmeeting buzz. I thought to myself: I wouldn’t mind learning how to downshift into this state on command, if the setting warranted it. This seemed to me the antidote to the fears of a neurofeedback-enhanced generation of superattentive people: you could use the technology to take the edges off or you could use it to make the edges sharper. You could attempt to improve focus, or you could learn how to make things a little blurrier. And maybe more important, you could use the technology to help you select the appropriate state on command. Until I met with Othmer, I had thought of neurofeedback as a tool-sharpening device rather than a technique for improving your ability to shift between different tools. But Susan and her beeping Pac-Man helped me see that changing modes was a skill in itself, and one that you could be trained to perform better. There are modes, and then there’s mode switching. Both areas are essential to learning how to use your brain. “Mode switching isn’t something you’re taught at school,” Othmer tells me after the session. “But that’s what we’re trying to teach here.”
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4 Survival of the Ticklish
Like many first-time parents, within minutes of learning that my wife was carrying our child, I started calculating ways that the pregnancy could go wrong. As the months went by, I was haunted by the usual worries: the risk for miscarriage, a first-trimester bout of food poisoning, bizarre appendages in the ultrasound. Then in the sixth month, the baby dropped unexpectedly, and our obstetrician suggested that my wife go on bed rest to prevent a premature birth, where she remained until the final few weeks. As we grappled with that confinement, my mind piled on additional anxieties, ones that probably would have been better suited for a sitcom. Our doctor’s hospital was located on the Upper East Side—a twenty-minute cab ride from our apartment with no traffic, but counting on no traffic in midtown Manhattan is like counting on a New York subway rider giving up a seat for a pregnant lady. I had visions of delivering the baby myself in the back of a cab, somewhere on the shoulder of the FDR Drive, with a squeegee guy as the midwife. But somehow our son managed to remain in utero until the due date, and even waited out the cab ride to the hospital. He was born with no complications, and after two days at the hospital, mother and child were released with a clean bill of health. When we made it back downtown to our apartment, I started to notice the profound lifting of anxiety that had begun forty-eight hours before, when our cab pulled up in front of the hospital and it became clear that my fifteen minutes as an amateur ob-gyn would have to wait. As I went to sleep that night, the three of us together in the same room for the first time, I realized how much background anxiety I had been carrying around for the past nine months—and how little I now felt, with my wife and child sleeping contentedly beside me. I thought to myself: I can’t wait to get up tomorrow and experience what it’s like to walk around so free of fear. But of course things didn’t work out quite as I had imagined. Because tomorrow turned out to be September 11, 2001. My memories of that horrific day are mostly the now-familiar ones: seeing the towers burn from twenty blocks away, watching them fall on TV, feeling that
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sense of dread as the networks reported that another plane was missing. But a particular memory stands out, and in the days and weeks that followed I found myself puzzling over what it meant. That memory is of standing next to my wife, as she nursed our three-day-old son in a rocking chair, telling her that the second tower had fallen, and seeing the strangely distant, becalmed look in her eyes. I was filled with a new father’s protective fretfulness: were we safe in our apartment? Should we leave the city? Would the air be dangerous for our son? But my wife looked almost as though I were describing a fender bender I’d witnessed on the way home from the supermarket. Later, she confessed that she had found the whole experience otherworldly —while she felt guilty about not being adequately affected, she couldn’t bring herself to experience the shock and terror that everyone else seemed to be going through. Logically, she understood that something terrible had happened, but she couldn’t feel it. It wasn’t as if she were indifferent to the potential threats: she advised the rest of us in the house to do all the right things—stock up on bottled water, call the pediatrician for advice about the air-quality issues. But you could see in her eyes, in her whole carriage, that the crisis wasn’t having the same effect on her as it was on others. Something in this seemed odd to me: I would have expected a new mother to feel an exaggerated sense of alarm, given the tiny life she was cradling in her arms. Wouldn’t the instinct to protect her child trigger a stronger fear response? I could feel the adrenaline coursing through my body that day as we contemplated our options, but my wife seemed like she’d just taken a Valium. What was going on? The answer, I learned later, was that we were each on very different drugs. While I was under the influence of the cocktail of hormones that creates the fight-or-flight response, my wife was being lulled by a very different chemical—a fascinating molecule called oxytocin that plays an essential role in some of life’s most profound emotional events: falling in love, forming strong social attachments, having a baby. As I paced furiously around our apartment glued to the latest CNN update, oxytocin was keeping my wife calm and nurturing. And though I had my son’s best interests in mind, I have a pretty good idea which of our responses was the more helpful at the time. A year later, I found myself on UCLA’s Westwood campus, meeting with Shelley Taylor, a psychology professor who has done extensive investigation of the relationship between oxytocin and stress. Taylor is one of a growing cadre of brain researchers who have placed a newfound emphasis on the “positive” emotional circuits in the brain. For a number of reasons, the brain sciences historically have spent far more time exploring the neural pathways of negative emotional responses: on today’s map of the mind, the regions of fear and stress are clearly delineated, with mostly minor border disputes remaining. Until recently, the kingdom of love and affiliation was a vast terra incognita, so thinly sketched that you almost didn’t notice its absence. But Taylor and her allies have started to change all of that. 83 of 216
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When we meet in her office, a vista of downtown L.A. hovering behind the pine branches outside her window, I begin by asking how she got interested in oxytocin (not to be confused with the oft-abused painkiller oxycontin). Taylor tells the story of attending a lecture in the late ’90s given by a visiting scholar on the subject of stress and the fight-or-flight instinct. At one point in the lecture, the speaker discussed the levels of aggression displayed by his lab rats when they were exposed to stress. After exposure to regular stressors such as electric shocks, the animals would literally bite and claw each other to death if they weren’t separated. “That went off like a lightbulb in my head, because it’s not at all descriptive of what we typically see in our human studies,” Taylor tells me. “So I went back to my lab group and I said, ‘What do you make of these disjunctions between the animal studies and what we see in humans?’ And one of them said, ‘You know, the animal studies are all based on males. They don’t include females at all, because females cycle so rapidly.’ And then someone else said, ‘You know, I think that’s true for the human literature as well.’ So we started looking through the literature to see how well female responses to stress were represented, and the answer was very poorly. Prior to 1995, they constituted seventeen percent of the participants. There were virtually no studies where you had enough female participation to do a comparative study.” This lack of gender parity was not just a political issue. For decades, the scientific literature on stress response revolved around a fundamental causal chain: introduce a stressor—a lunging predator, say, or a rival stealing your food supply—and the body initiates the now famous fight-or-flight response. Taylor suspected that the fight-or-flight instinct was only half the story: “I said to my group, ‘Okay, let’s start from scratch. What are women doing? Is fight-orflight a reasonable description of women’s response to stress?’ And within seconds, all of us had an immediate response: ‘No.’ Because what differentiated female responses to stress from males’ is that female responses have to incorporate the protection of offspring, at least for the period of time that there are offspring. Our idea was that fight behavior works fine if you’re an individual; but if you’re trying to protect [your] young, fighting just isn’t going to work. The same goes for flight—only ungulates like deer have offspring that are capable of fleeing shortly after birth.” Two years after attending the original stress lecture, Taylor had formulated her response, in the form of an essay published in Science called “The Tending Instinct.” Fight-or-flight was one way of dealing with stress, she argued, but there was another option: tend-and-befriend. You can combat stress by literally going into combat with it, or you can reach out to your support group. Both stories are integral to the human experience, although Taylor believes that the tending instinct is more commonly expressed in women. She says, “There was recently a metareview of twenty-eight different studies, and twenty-six of them found that women sought social support in stressful situations more than men. Short of childbirth, there is no sex difference in humans that looks like that. With most sex differences—men have a slight spatial advantage, women have a 84 of 216
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linguistic advantage—when you actually look at the curves, there’s an enormous amount of overlap.” But when it came to seeking out social bonds in the face of stress, the data was emphatic. Taylor and her team even had a solid hunch about the brain chemistry behind the tending instinct, and oxytocin was a central player. Researchers had long known that oxytocin was released during life experiences that involve intense emotional attachment: childbirth, breast-feeding, and sexual climax. Higher oxytocin levels had been linked to sheerly stressful experiences as well. While oxytocin is present in both male and female brains, evidence suggested that estrogen enhanced the hormone’s effects, making it less powerful in testosterone-heavy male bodies. If there was a biologically grounded tending instinct, oxytocin probably played a role in it. You can’t dig very far into the literature on oxytocin without encountering a memorable little creature that to date has shed more light on the neurochemistry of attachment than any other animal. The prairie vole, a small rodent indigenous to the midwestern plains of the United States, is one of the natural world’s great romantics. After mating, most voles remain monogamously attached to their partner for life, raising children together in a rodent version of domestic bliss. This is, to say the least, an unusual practice in nature: among mammals, only 5 percent show this sort of monogamous, biparental behavior. Around twenty years ago, a neuroendocrinologist named Sue Carter began examining the brain of the prairie vole in an attempt to understand what caused its unusual fidelity. “I became interested in oxytocin then because I knew that oxytocin was released during sexual behavior,” Carter tells me over the phone from her office at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. “There was already research coming out showing that oxytocin facilitated parent-child bonding in sheep.” When Carter injected oxytocin into the brains of the voles, the animals formed even more tenacious bonds than usual. Carter also explored the effects of oxytocin from the reverse angle by injecting chemicals that shut off oxytocin receptors, blocking the hormone’s effects. Instantly, the prairie voles’ lifestyle became less Leave It to Beaver and more Woodstock: indiscriminate mating without any lasting attachment. “The most compelling evidence for oxytocin’s role in bonding is simply that when you block the oxytocin receptors, the animals don’t form pair bonds,” Carter explains. Several years later, an Emory University professor named Tom Insel, now president of NIMH, began a comparative study analyzing the brains of prairie voles and their less monogamous cousins, the montane voles. Insel discovered a remarkable difference between the two species: in the faithful voles, the oxytocin receptors overlapped with dopamine receptors in an area of the brain called the “nucleus accumbens”; in the nonmonogamous voles, the oxytocin receptors were located elsewhere. The nucleus accumbens is generally regarded as one of the brain’s essential pleasure centers, while dopamine coordinates many seeking and appetitive behaviors. In the monogamous voles, in other words, oxytocin receptors were planted firmly in the reward circuitry of the brain. The 85 of 216
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architecture suggested that behaviors associated with oxytocin release would feel good in the brains of the prairie voles, but have a different effect on the montane voles. If oxytocin encouraged the animals to stay attached to a partner, it was no wonder the prairie voles turned out to be so committed. Their brains were wired to make forming attachments pleasurable. The temptation to translate the vole studies into the brain chemistry of humans was irresistible. Like those of the monogamous prairie vole, human oxytocin receptors are located in several dopamine-rich regions of the brain, suggesting that oxytocin is also embedded in the human brain’s appetite and reward circuitry. One study compared the brain activity of subjects looking at pictures of loved ones versus pictures of nonromantic friends. The pattern of activity in the cortex was markedly different depending on which type of face the subject was exposed to. Interestingly, fMRI scans of the brain processing a romantic gaze bear a striking resemblance to the brain activity of new mothers listening to infant cries. They also resemble brain images of subjects under the influence of cocaine. (We’ll return to this last similarity later.) The face recognition studies are of particular interest because a number of animal studies have convincingly linked oxytocin to the formation of social memory. One hypothesis is that oxytocin release during key pair-bonding events like sexual climax or childbirth helps cement the image of a partner or a newborn in the mind’s eye. Mothers who breast-fed their children often describe powerful memories of their infant gazing up at them during nursing. The vividness of that memory, and its association with warm, maternal feelings, may well be the imprint of oxytocin.
There is something about the idea of a dedicated love circuitry in the brain that rubs certain people the wrong way. We accept readily enough the idea that our fear response should have its own chemical and neuronal architecture, but somehow it seems demeaning to suggest that a comparable physiological substrate exists for feelings as rich as love. Once over dinner, I told a friend of mine a few tid-bits about oxytocin and the neuroscience of attachment. He’d sat through a number of other brain-related riffs with enthusiasm, but when I moved on to love, he gave me a suspicious look: “I have a hard time believing that there’s that much commonality in the way that people experience love. I bet if you did scans of people’s brain in the throes of romantic love, it would look different every time.” To a certain extent, my friend was right: our brains are like fingerprints, each one a little different. When you think of a loved one, a unique constellation of neurons fire, triggering the image of their face, memories of past times together—a subtle cocktail of different subemotions. Some people no doubt experience love more vividly; some find it linked inextricably to sexual attraction, while others have more platonic inclinations. In theory, all these differences could be detected by advanced brain scans.
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And yet beneath all that buzzing diversity, a few core patterns remain. By definition, emotions this fundamental need an underlying circuitry to do their work. If love lacked a physiological basis—if it were just something we decided to pick up, like learning how to type or play the cello—the emotion wouldn’t have the transformative, and sometimes destructive, power that it wields over our lives. Part of understanding love is celebrating the differences, but another part is sharing in the common experience. That’s why romantic poetry works, after all. In a way, it gets down to the question of what you mean when you talk about a “unique” profile. Every fingerprint is unique from one angle, in that its telltale markings differentiate it from every other fingerprint on the planet. But from another angle, all fingerprints are the same: grooves in our front skin arranged in semiconcentric circles, with a reliable series of components: center points, detch points, delta points. Love is like those fingerprints: the component parts are invariably arranged in novel ways, but the components themselves are universal. The complexity of the human brain—and the ethical problems of experimenting with love research—may mean that the scientific understanding of human attachment may not proceed as quickly as some would hope, which will probably come as a relief to the romantic poets among us. But while our knowledge of human neurochemistry is finite, the extent to which the chemistry repeats itself in other mammals suggests that love is as much a part of our evolutionary heritage as heartbeat regulation or stereo vision. If we had evolved as a species with different mating and child-rearing habits—abandoning our children at birth and moving indiscriminately from partner to partner, as most reptiles do—it’s likely that our brains would be incapable of feeling love. Reptiles lack both our neocortex, the seat of language and higher learning, and most of the human brain’s limbic system, which, as we’ve seen, plays a key role in regulating emotional response. Reptile brains do not produce the oxytocin molecule at all. If some accident of evolution had led reptiles to develop advanced forebrains capable of language and higher-level consciousness, while maintaining their nonexistent child-rearing habits, they might have ended up writing powerful verse about some other deep-seated biochemical urge—temperature regulation, say—but there would be no love sonnets in the reptile canon. The biological capacity for love is one way the brain prepares us for offspring who are born young and helpless, and who need tending to have even the slightest hope of survival. That tending comes in the form of social bonds: between parent and child, between the parents themselves, between the extended social family that helps raise the child. The glue that keeps those bonds strong is the feelings of pleasure and reward and satisfaction that our brains concoct for us when we enter into loving relationships. When you think about love and attachment from this perspective, love starts to look like a kind of solution to an exceptionally difficult problem: getting organisms to take care of other organisms even if it’s not in their direct best 87 of 216
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interest to do so. New parents will recognize this insight immediately; there are days (or more likely nights) when you look down at the screaming, defecating life-form on the changing table and you think, Why am I doing this? The neurocircuitry of love is evolution’s way of persuading you to stick it out. Changes in your brain chemistry prod you to search out food when your belly is empty or safety when you’re under attack. They also impel you to console your children and continue changing their diapers, despite the sleep deprivation and the temper tantrums. The evolutionary biologist Donald Symons has an elegant explanation for how our emotions evolved: we have powerful feelings precisely because the goals our emotions are propelling us toward are difficult ones to achieve. The more difficult the objective, the more powerful the feeling. In the environments where our brains evolved, finding food and tending to children were extremely challenging tasks, yet vital to reproductive success. So evolution hit upon a way to encourage us, by creating reward circuits in the brain that made us relish both our offspring and our meals. Consuming oxygen is just as important to our reproductive success, of course, but oxygen is plentiful in our environment, so we don’t have great feelings of warmth and contentment when we breathe. We need oxygen to live, but because it’s not hard to get, we don’t have an elaborate reward circuitry that propels us to search it out in the face of adversity. Perhaps the best example of the evolutionary pressures of love on parent-child attachment connects back to our initial discussion of mindreading: the smiling instinct. All neurologically healthy children begin smiling sometime in their first few months of life, and most parents will testify that the appearance of those beaming faces marked a turning point in their relationship to their child. After weeks of oscillating between sleeping and crying, their child’s eye and mouth muscles start to signal happiness, often when encountering a parent’s face. Suddenly the child is capable of positive feedback—and it doesn’t come a minute too soon. If you embarked on some monstrous genetic experiment and pushed back the onset of infant smiling six months, I suspect you’d see a proportionate rise in the number of children given up for adoption, or abandoned altogether. Those first smiling exchanges are some of evolution’s most beautiful duets: a brain wired to produce a specific expression interacting with another brain wired to feel intense pleasure at the sight of that expression. They are the first unspoken phonemes in the language of love.
Smiles are only the beginning, of course. Many of the words in this book were typed with a constant sound track echoing through our home: our toddler son’s laughter. On most days, it seems as though laughing is his primary activity. And the laughing effect is usually infectious—it’s hard not to hear his delighted guffaws and not chuckle along with him. My wife and I do all sorts of rewarding things with our son, but few are as uniformly happy, as emotionally warming, as laughing together with him. Not surprisingly, our laughing is often triggered by
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tickling and rough-and-tumble play. There’s nothing new here—but something strange nonetheless. We take it for granted both that tickling causes laughter and that one person’s laughter will easily “infect” other people within earshot. Even a child knows these things. But when you think about them from a distance, they seem like strange conventions. We can understand readily enough why natural selection would have implanted the fight-or-flight response in us, or endowed us with a sex drive. But the tendency to laugh when others laugh in our presence, or to laugh when someone strokes our belly with a feather—what’s the evolutionary advantage of that? And yet a quick glance at the Nielsen ratings or the personal ads will tell you that laughter is one of the most satisfying and sought-after states available to us. Understanding the roots of laughter requires that you undo your habitual assumptions about how “natural” it is. We’re accustomed to thinking of laughter as a logical response to humor, but this connection is a misleading one. The closer we get to understanding what makes us laugh, the farther we get from humor. To appreciate the roots of laughter, you have to stop thinking about jokes. There is a long, semi-illustrious history of scholarly investigation into the nature of humor, from Freud’s Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious, which may well be the least funny book about humor ever written, to a British research group that announced recently that it had determined the World’s Funniest Joke. Despite the researchers’ claim to have sampled a massive international audience in making this discovery, the winning joke revolved around none other than residents of New Jersey: A couple of New Jersey hunters are out in the woods when one of them falls to the ground. He doesn’t seem to be breathing; his eyes are rolled back in his head. The other guy whips out his cell phone and calls the emergency services. He gasps to the operator: “My friend is dead! What can I do?”
The operator, in a calm, soothing voice, says: “Just take it easy. I can help. First, let’s make sure he’s dead.” There is silence, then a shot is heard. The guy’s voice comes back on the line. He says: “OK, now what?” As this joke illustrates, most assessments of humor’s underlying structure gravitate to the notion of controlled incongruity: you’re expecting x and you get y. For the hunting joke to work, it has to be readable on two levels, with two plausible ways to interpret the 911 operator’s instructions—either the hunter checks his friend’s pulse or he shoots him. The context sets you up to expect that he’ll check his friend’s pulse, so the—admittedly dark—humor arrives when he takes the wildly unlikely path. That incongruity has limits, of course: if the hunter chooses to do something utterly nonsensical—untie his shoelaces or climb a tree—the joke wouldn’t be funny. As we’ll see in the next chapter, it’s no surprise that surprise plays a role here: the brain contains a number of
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subsystems that respond strongly to unexpected or novel developments. A handful of studies in recent years have looked at brain activity while subjects were chuckling over a good joke—attempting, in a sense, to locate the neurological funny bone. Early evidence suggests that the frontal lobes are implicated in “getting” the joke, while the brain regions associated with motor control execute the physical response of laughter. One study analyzed patients with damage to the right frontal lobes, an integrative region of the brain where emotional, logical, and perceptual data converge. The brain-damaged patients had far more difficulty than control subjects in choosing the proper punch line to a series of jokes, usually opting for absurdist, slapstick-style endings rather than traditional ones. Humor may often come in coarse, lowest-commondenominator packages, but actually getting the joke draws upon our higher brain functions. This is the kind of research that Robert Provine thought he’d be doing when he set out to study laughter: having people listen to jokes and other witticisms, and watching what happened. A professor of psychology and neuroscience at the University of Maryland, Provine is the author of the book Laughter: A Scientific Investigation—the culmination of a decade-long quest to determine why we laugh. Provine began by simply observing casual conversations and counting the times that people laughed while listening to another person speaking. But he quickly noticed a fundamental flaw in his assumptions about how laughter worked. “I started recording all these conversations,” Provine says, “and the numbers I was getting—I didn’t believe them when I saw them. The speakers were laughing more than the listeners. Every time that would happen, I would think, Okay, I have to go back and start over again, because that can’t be right.” Speakers, in turned out, were 46 percent more likely to laugh than listeners—and what they were laughing at, more often than not, wasn’t exactly funny. Neither listeners nor speakers seemed to be laughing at traditional jokes. Provine and his team of grad students recorded the ostensible “punch lines” that triggered laughter in ordinary conversation. They found that only around 15 percent of the sentences that triggered laughter were humorous in any reasonable sense of the word. The big laugh lines included: I’ll see you guys later. Put those cigarettes away. I hope we all do well. It was nice meeting you, too. We can handle this. I see your point. I should do that, but I’m too lazy.
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The few studies of laughter that preceded this one had assumed that laughing and humor were linked inextricably, but Provine’s early research suggested that the connection was only an occasional one. People certainly laughed at jokes, but that was only a small part of the story. “There’s a dark side to laughter that we sometimes are too quick to overlook,” he says. “The kids at Columbine were laughing as they walked through the school shooting their peers.” As his research progressed, Provine began to suspect that laughter was in fact about something else—not humor or gags or incongruity, but social interaction. He found support for this assumption in a study that had already been conducted, analyzing people’s laughter patterns in social and solitary contexts. “You’re thirty times more likely to laugh when you’re with other people than you are when you’re alone—if you don’t count simulated social environments like laugh tracks on television,” Provine says. “In fact, when you’re alone, you’re more likely to talk out loud to yourself than you are to laugh out loud. Much more.” Think how rarely you’ll laugh out loud at a funny passage in a book but how quick you’ll be to make a friendly laugh when greeting an old acquaintance. Laughing is not an instinctive physical response to humor, the way a flinch responds to pain or a shiver to cold. It’s an instinctive form of social bonding that humor is crafted to exploit. Provine’s lab at the Baltimore campus of the University of Maryland looks like the back room at a stereo-repair store—long tables cluttered with old equipment, tubes and wires everywhere. The walls are decorated with brightly colored posters of tangled neurons. (Add some Day-Glo typography and they might pass for signs promoting a Grateful Dead concert at the Fillmore.) A Tickle Me Elmo doll lies draped over a chair. Provine’s old mentor, the late neuroembryologist Victor Hamburger, glowers down from a picture hung above a battered Silicon Graphics workstation. Hamburger’s expression suggests a sense of concerned bafflement: “I trained you as a scientist, and here you are playing with dolls!” While much of Provine’s work draws on his training under Hamburger, exploring the neuromuscular control of laughter and its relationship to the human and chimp respiratory systems, the most immediate way to grasp his insights is to watch video footage of some of his more informal fieldwork, which basically consists of Provine and a cameraman prowling Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, asking groups of people to laugh for the camera. The overall effect is more like that of a color story for the local news than serious research, but as Provine and I watch the tapes together in his lab, I find myself looking at the laughers with fresh eyes. Again and again, the same pattern repeats on the
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screen: Provine asks someone to laugh, and they demur, look puzzled for a second, say something like, “I can’t just laugh.” Then they turn to their friends or family, and the laughter rolls out of them as though it were as natural as breathing. The pattern stays the same even as the subjects change: a group of high school students on a field trip, a married couple, a pair of college freshmen. At one point Provine—dressed in a plaid shirt and khakis, looking something like the comedian Robert Klein—stops two waste-disposal workers driving a golf cart loaded up with trash bags. When they fail to guffaw on cue, Provine asks them why they can’t muster one up. “Because you’re not funny,” one of them says. They turn to each other and share a hearty laugh. “See, you two just made each other laugh,” Provine says. “Yeah, well, we’re coworkers,” one of them replies. The insistent focus on laughter patterns has a strange effect on me as Provine runs through the footage. By the time we get to the cluster of high school kids, I’ve stopped hearing their spoken words at all and hear just the rhythmic peals of laughter breaking out every ten seconds or so. Sonically, the laughter dominates the speech; you can barely hear the dialogue underneath the hysterics. If you were an alien encountering humans for the first time, you’d have to assume that the laughing served as the primary communication method, with the spoken words interspersed as an afterthought. After one particularly loud outbreak, Provine turns to me and says, “Now, do you think they’re all individually making a conscious decision to laugh?” He shakes his head dismissively. “Of course not. They’re not aware of making a decision at all. In fact, we’re often not aware that we’re even laughing in the first place. We’ve vastly overrated our conscious control of laughter.” There is evidence that the physical mechanism of laughter itself is generated in the brain stem, the most ancient region of the nervous system, which is also responsible for fundamental life-or-death functions like breathing. Sufferers of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis—Lou Gehrig’s disease—which targets the brain stem, often experience spontaneous bursts of uncontrollable laughter without feeling happiness or mirth. (They often undergo a comparable experience with crying as well.) Sometimes called the “reptilian brain” because its basic structure dates back to our reptile ancestors, the brain stem is devoted largely to our most primal, life-sustaining instincts, far removed from our complex, higher-brain skills at understanding humor. And yet somehow, in this primitive region of the brain, we apparently find the urge to laugh. We’re accustomed to thinking of common-but-unconscious instincts as being essential adaptations, like the startle reflex or the suckling of newborns. Why would we have a reflex for something as frivolous-seeming as laughter? Watching Provine’s teenage laughers on-screen reminds me of an old Carl Sagan riff in which he describes “a species of primate” that likes to gather in packs of
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fifty or sixty, crammed together in a darkened cave, and hyperventilate in unison, to the point of almost passing out. The behavior is described in such a way as to make it sound exotic and somewhat foolish, like salmon swimming furiously upstream to their deaths or butterflies traveling thousands of miles to rendezvous once a year. The joke, of course, is that the primate is homo sapiens, and the group hyperventilation is our fondness for laughing together at comedy clubs or theaters, or with the virtual crowds of television laugh tracks. I’m thinking about the Sagan riff when another burst of laughter arrives through the television’s speakers, and without even realizing what I’m doing, I find myself laughing along with the kids on the screen. I can’t help it—their laughter is contagious.
We may be the only species on the planet that laughs together in such large groups, but we are not alone in our appetite for laughter. Not surprisingly, our near relatives, the chimpanzees, are also avid laughers, although differences in their vocal apparatus cause the laughter to sound somewhat more like panting than it does the human variety. “The actual production seems a bit different between the two species because the chimpanzee’s laughter is rapid and breathy, whereas ours is punctuated with glottal stops,” says legendary chimp researcher Roger Fouts. “Also, the chimpanzee laughter occurs on the inhale and exhale, but ours is primarily done on our exhales. But other than these small differences in production, it seems to me to be just like ours in most respects.” Chimps don’t do stand-up routines, of course, but they do share with humans a laughter-related obsession with humans, one that Provine believes is central to the roots of laughter itself: chimps love tickling. Back in his lab, Provine shows me video footage of a pair of young chimps named Josh and Lizzie playing with a human caretaker. It’s a full-on ticklefest, with the chimps panting away hysterically each time their bellies are scratched. “That’s chimpanzee laughter you’re hearing,” Provine says. It’s close enough to human laughter that I find myself chuckling along with it as well. Parents will testify that ticklefests are often the first elaborate play routine that they engage in with their children, and one of the most reliable laugh inducers. According to Fouts, who helped teach sign language to Washoe, perhaps the world’s most famous chimpanzee, the practice is just as common, and perhaps more long-lived, among the chimps. “Tickling seems to be very important to chimpanzees because it continues throughout their lives,” he says. “Even Washoe at the age of thirty-seven still enjoys tickling and being tickled by her adult family members.” Among young chimpanzees that have been taught sign language, tickling is a frequent topic of conversation. Like laughter, tickling is almost by definition a social activity. Like in the incongruity theory of humor, tickling relies on a certain element of surprise, which is why it’s impossible to tickle yourself. Predictable touch doesn’t elicit the
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laughter and squirming of tickling—it’s unpredictable touch that does the trick. A number of tickle-related studies have shown convincingly that tickling exploits the sensorimotor system’s awareness of the difference between self and other: if the system orders your hand to move toward your belly, it doesn’t register surprise when the nerve endings on your belly report being stroked. But if the touch is being generated by another sensorimotor system, the belly-stroking will come as a surprise. The pleasant laughter as a result of tickling is the way the brain responds to that touch. In both human and chimpanzee societies, tickling usually first appears in parent-child interactions and has an essential role in creating those initial bonds. “The reason [tickling and laughter] are so important,” Roger Fouts says, “is because they play a role in maintaining the affinitive bonds of friendship within the family and community.” A few years ago, the Pulitzer Prize–winning scientist Jared Diamond wrote a short book with the provocative title Why Sex Is Fun. Some of the research into laughter suggests an evolutionary answer to the question of why tickling is fun: it encourages us to play well with others. Young children are so receptive to the rough-and-tumble play of tickle that even pretend tickling will often send them into wails of laughter. (Fouts reports that the threat of tickle has a similar effect on his chimps.) In his book, Provine suggests that “feigned tickle” can be thought of as the Original Joke, the first deliberate behavior in a child’s life designed to exploit the tickling/laughter circuit. Our comedy clubs and sitcoms are culturally enhanced versions of those original playful childhood exchanges. Where we once laughed at the surprise touch of a parent or sibling, we now laugh at the surprise twist of a punch line. Along with the suckling and smiling instincts, the laughter of tickle evolved as a way of cementing the bond between parents and children, creating an impulse that eventually carried over into the social lives of adults. Bowling Green University professor Jaak Panksepp, one of my mentors on the neuroscience of emotions, has gone so far as to suggest a dedicated “play” circuitry in the brain, equivalent to the more extensively studied fear or love circuits. Panksepp has studied the role of rough-and-tumble play in cementing social connections between juvenile rats. The play instinct, he has discovered, is not easily suppressed: rats that have been denied the opportunity to engage in rough-and-tumble play—which has a distinct choreography among young rats, along with a chirping vocalization that may be the rat equivalent of laughter—will nonetheless immediately engage in play behavior given the chance. Panksepp compares this inclination to a bird’s instinct for flying. “Probably the most powerful positive emotion of all—once your tummy is full and you don’t have bodily needs—is vigorous social engagement among the young,” Panksepp says. “The largest amount of human laughter seems to occur in the midst of early childhood—rough-and-tumble play, chasing, all the stuff they love.” Playing is what young mammals do, and in humans and chimpanzees, laughter is the way the brain expresses the pleasure of that play. “Since laughter seems to be ritualized panting, basically what you do in laughing is replicate the sound of rough-and-tumble play,” Robert Provine says. “And you know, that’s 94 of 216
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where I think it came from. Tickle is an important part of our primate heritage. Touching and being touched is an important part of what it means to be a mammal. I mean, this is why we’re not lizards!” There is much that we don’t yet know about the neurological underpinnings of laughter. We do not yet know precisely why laughing feels so good, though one recent study detected evidence that laughing triggered activity in the nucleus accumbens, the same region implicated in love circuitry. Panksepp has performed studies that suggest drugs that block the effects of opiates suppress the play instinct in rats, which implies that the brain’s endorphin system may be involved in the pleasure of laughter. Anecdotal evidence along with some clinical studies do suggest that laughing makes you healthier by suppressing stress hormones and elevating S-IgA immune system antibodies. If you think of laughter as a form of human behavior that is basically synonymous with the detection of humor, the laughing-makes-you-healthier premise seems bizarre. Why would natural selection make our immune system respond to jokes? Provine’s approach helps resolve the mystery: our bodies aren’t responding to wisecracks and punch lines, they’re responding to social connection. This approach to laughter provides a fascinating bridge between evolutionary and Freudian psychologies. In both models the past weighs heavily on the present-tense brain. In the psychoanalytic model, it’s the anxieties and trace memories of childhood haunting the adult psyche. In the Darwinian model, it’s the ancestral environment where our brains evolved that does the haunting: we live in cities and suburbs now, but our brains are filled with tools optimized for the savannahs of Africa. In both models, our past complicates our present reality, because the drives and appetites of the past aren’t always in sync with those of the present. In both we are haunted by our origins: the childhood of the species in the Darwinian framework and the childhood of the individual in the Freudian. Understanding the roots of laughter requires a kind of hybrid of the Darwinian and Freudian models. We laugh primarily because laughter is a crucial component of the emotional glue that connects parent and child during the most vulnerable years of development. Children who laugh and roughhouse and tickle with their guardians create powerful bonds of affection with those grown-ups, and the bonds help them survive. But natural selection is notoriously conservative with its designs: when you build a mechanism for bonding into the child’s brain, the accompanying impulses don’t necessarily disappear in adulthood or when children aren’t around. So the difficulties of child-rearing created the capacity for—and the deep pleasure of—laughing, and once that capacity was installed, we came upon other applications for it. So when we laugh at the Chaplin film, we have childhood to thank for it. Not our individual childhood in the Freudian sense, but childhood itself and its unique challenges.
The idea that laughter evolved first to cement social connections and was only
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later hijacked by the stand-up comics is a particularly crucial insight in a world of ever-proliferating communication channels. Not long ago, I attended a small retreat on the design of communications software that put twenty-odd people in a room together to discuss various ideas face-to-face, while simultaneously letting them converse in a special electronic chat room restricted solely to the people attending the retreat. The chat was projected onto a flat screen visible to everyone in the room, and people typed their comments via their laptops. The chat turned out to be a mix of follow-up observations and references to related reading on the Web, as well as the usual snarkiness that you’d expect. From one angle, it was a pretty intoxicating mix—the carrying on of two simultaneous group conversations with the same group. I felt like we were pulling down a lot of data: the real-world conversations grounded things, and the chat let the room riff. It was also a little intoxicating in the dizzying sense. Cognitive scientists have long known that our attention buffers max out when following two “verbal” conversations at once, and this experiment made me wonder if the carrying capacity is any different if one conversation is spoken and one is text. But the most interesting side effect of this discussion was that the arrangement sucked all the jokes out of the room and into the chat. If someone had a funny throwaway remark to make, they’d simply toss it into the chat log. You’d see people smile to themselves as the joke scrolled across the screen, but they wouldn’t laugh out loud. I mentioned this point near the end, as we were discussing the format, and someone said that having the jokes in the virtual world improved matters: the jokes were there for all to see, but they didn’t interrupt the flow of the conversation. That observation was true enough, but only if you think the point of jokes is humor rather than laughter. If laughter is primarily a form of social bonding, then depriving the room of laughter will have a dramatic effect on its general tone. At the end of the session, when the moderator asked us to close our laptops and reflect on the day a bit, the space quickly reverberated with group laughter, which completely transformed the social climate. The number of jokes per minute probably declined, but the room felt far more collegial and cohesive. And that is because in the initial arrangement, with the humor stashed away on the digital screens, our brains had been deprived of the reward chemicals triggered by laughter. Jokes on their own simply weren’t enough. The lesson here is twofold. First, certain social settings—particularly those that involve virtual communication—may artificially dampen laughter that would otherwise be generated in a face-to-face encounter. Second, social interaction without laughter produces modified brain chemistry, which affects both your background impression of the exchange—its emotional color—and the resulting trace memories the exchange leaves in your head. Putting smiley faces into email to supplement the lack of verbal intonation helps convey when you’re trying to be funny, but because the recipient of your message is still alone when reading it, she won’t be likely to laugh out loud, and that suppressed laughter will make a difference. The memory will be happier—and consequently stronger—if she 96 of 216
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laughs. As the brain science of social connection becomes more widely appreciated, our communications tools will be judged increasingly with this yardstick. Attention deficit disorder is conventionally described as the classic ailment of our multitasking age, but when you look at most electronic communication through the lens of neuroscience, it’s hard not to think that autism might be a more appropriate “poster condition” for the digital society. (The cultural critic Harvey Blume made this argument nearly a decade ago.) When we interact with other humans via communication channels that are stripped of facial expressions and gestures and laughter, we are unwittingly simulating the blank emotional radar of the mindblind. But for most people, I suspect, the neuroscience of personal connection will have more intimate revelations as we come to understand and recognize the chemicals that trigger these powerful feelings. Not just because it’s intellectually interesting to know that your feelings of attachment are partially instigated by oxytocin, but also because the chemistry’s effects go beyond the primary emotion itself—altering your memory, your immediate attention, your evaluation of people and environments. You can think of these areas as being like the side effects associated with pharmaceutical drugs, though this shouldn’t imply that the effects result from poor design. (We’ll turn to the whole idea of decoding the brain’s chemical side effects in the next chapter.) When you begin to explore these peripheral effects on the mind, you’re not just memorizing drug names; you’re learning to recognize symptoms. Odds are, you’ve detected these symptoms before without knowing a thing about brain science, but you may have attributed some of the subtler symptoms to other causes, or found them hard to explain. This was the story of our little family on 9/11. About a year after our son was born, I was talking with Sue Carter about her investigations into oxytocin, and I told her about my wife’s strange sense of calm in the midst of all tha