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Migration, Globalisation and Human Security In recent years international migration has become a growing political issue in many countries and a major topic of international debate. In the 1960s, only a handful of countries, mainly the traditional immigration nations in North America and Oceania, were significantly affected by international migration, but by the 1990s virtually every nation was influenced in some way by immigration or emigration of various kinds. As more and more migrants cross inter-state boundary lines, governments are realising that immigration and asylum problems cannot be separated from broader socioeconomic and political issues. Attempts to develop multilateral strategies to ease international tensions arising from uncontrolled migration are complicated by economic disparities, regional political tensions and mounting population and ecological pressures. International migration, particularly in terms of forced resettlement and urbanisation, also gives rise to a myriad of problems relating to aspects of security. Until recently, the question ‘what is security?’ was rarely asked in the context of these developments. Migration, Globalisation and Human Security looks at a range of security and human security issues related to the displacement of civilian populations and shows how the tenuous existence of migrants can lead to a myriad of human security threats. Providing major theoretical analyses of recent migration trends and in depth case-studies, this book shows that a redefinition of the notion of human security is now needed. David T.Graham is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Studies, Nottingham Trent University and Nana K.Poku is a Senior UN Researcher, based in the Department of Politics, Southampton University.
Routledge Research in Population and Migration Series Editors Paul Boyle and Mike Parnwell 1 Migration and Gender in the Developed World Edited by Paul Boyle and Keith Halfacree 2 Migration, Globalisation and Human Security Edited by David T.Graham and Nana K.Poku
Migration, Globalisation and Human Security Edited by David T.Graham and Nana K.Poku
London and New York
First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2000 Edited by David T.Graham and Nana K.Poku All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Migration, globalisation, and human security/edited by David T.Graham and Nana K.Poku. p. cm.—(Routledge research in population & migration) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Emigration and immigration—Political aspects. 2. National security. I. Graham, David T., 1953–. II. Poku, Nana, 1971– III. Series. JV6255.M54 2000 99–33643 325′.09′049–dc21 CIP ISBN 0-203-98067-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-415-18436-3 (Print Edition)
Contents
List of contributors
viii
1
Introduction NANA K.POKU AN D DAVID T.GRAHAM
1
2
Human security in a globalising world NANA K.POKU , NEIL RENWICK AN D JOHN GLENN
9
3
‘Neither here nor there?’ The implications of global diasporas for (inter)national security RICHARD DAVIES
23
4
Mapping territoriality: the geopolitics of sovereignty, governance and the citizen PETER MARDEN
47
5
Migration and security from a North-South perspective: Sweden and Malawi ELISABETH ABIRI
70
6
A durable international migration and security nexus: the problem of the Islamic periphery in transatlantic ties MARK J.MILLER
92
7
Meta-societies, remittance economies and Internet addresses: dimensions of contemporary human security in Polynesia RICHARD BEDFORD
109
8
Tourism, globalisation and critical security in Burma and Thailand MICHAEL J.G.PARNWELL
137
9
Emigration and immigration: the case of Russia IGOR USHKALOV
162
vi
10
The brain drain in Russia: scale, direction and structure IRINA MALAKHA
172
11
The people paradox: human movements and human security in a globalising world DAVID T.GRAHAM
185
Index
215
This book is dedicated to F.H.Hinsley for his enormous contribution to international studies and Peter Vale for his tireless pursuit of justice.
Contributors
Elisabeth Abiri is Lecturer at the Department of Peace and Development Research, University of Göteborg, Sweden. She is currently researching on a project entitled International Migration, Europe and the Quest for Security. Her interests include international migration and refugee flows in relation to human rights and globalisation and security. Her publications include Säkerhetsaspekter på internationell migration (Security Dimensions of International Migration), Report to Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap ÖCB (1995). Richard Bedford is Professor of Geography and Head of the Division of Cultural and Environmental Studies, University of Waikato, New Zealand. He has been undertaking research on migration, population change and socioeconomic transformation in the Pacific Islands since the mid-1960s. His recent research has focused on international migration between island countries in the Pacific and countries on the Pacific rim, especially New Zealand. Richard Davies is a former Lecturer and Researcher in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University, England. His primary research interest concerns the formation of national and political identities in Poland. He is now employed as an Emergency Planning Officer at Leeds City Council, working on its Year 2000 programme. John Glenn is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Southampton University, England. His latest works include The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia and several publications on the problems of nation-building and state legitimacy in the successor states since the collapse of the Soviet Union. David T.Graham is Senior Lecturer in Geography and Information Technology at Nottingham Trent University, England. His research interests cover medical geography, population issues, and political geography. He has written on these and other topics for a variety of academic journals. He is currently working on a book entitled A Twentieth Century History of the Scottish Cities for publication in 1999.
ix
Irina Malakha is a Researcher at the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences and has published extensively in the fields of security, migration and the effects of skilled emigration. Peter Marden is Lecturer in the Department of Geography and Environmental Science, Monash University, Australia. He is also Director of the Development Studies Centre at Monash. He teaches political geography and development theory. His main research interests are globalisation, community studies, social and political theory. He has also published articles on finance capital and is currently completing a book on globalisation and community. Mark J.Miller is Professor of Political Science at the University of Delaware. He co-authored The Age of Migration, with S.Castles (1993), now in its second edition, The Unavoidable Issue: US Immigration Policy in the 1980s (1982), and Administering Foreign Worker Programs: Lessons from Europe (1992). Michael J.G.Parnwell is a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for South-East Asian Studies at the University of Hull, England. He has researched and written widely on aspects of Third World development. His publications include Population Movements and the Third World (1993) and Environmental Change in South-East Asia: People, Politics and Sustainable Development, with M.Bryant (1996). Nana K.Poku is a Senior United Nations Researcher and Lecturer at Southampton University, England. He has written extensively for UN publications. Among his recent books are Marginalisation and the Scope of Marginality (1999) and Regionalisation and Integration in Southern Africa (1999). Neil Renwick is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Studies at Nottingham Trent University, England. He is the author of five books and one co-edited book on security and identity in International Relations. His most recent work is America’s World Identity (forthcoming). Igor Ushkalov is Professor of Demography at the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He has written on migration and demographics in Russia, including Regional Processes and the Migration Situation in Russia and the Former SU (with I.Malakha) (1995), Vneshniaia migratzia naselenia kak kolichestevennyi i kachestvennyi factor demographicheskoi dinamiki, (External migration as a factor of qualitative and quantitative demographic dynamics) (1996), Territoalnye obtznosty, reghionalnye krizisy i migratzia neselenia v sovremennoi Rossii (Territorial communities, regional crisis and migration of population in modern Russia) (1997).
1 Introduction
Nana K.Poku and David T.Graham
Thomas Hobbes once described the nature of the state as a form of institution— as he put it, an ‘Artificial Man’, defined by prominence and sovereignty, the authorised representative giving life and motion to society and the body politic. There is a form of social contract between the state and citizenry. In this contract citizens confer on the state the right to control a definable territorial space and, in the process, the right to make and enforce such rules or laws as is deemed necessary in exchange for political, economic and military security. Raymond Aron (1962:750) pursues the theme further by describing the nation-state as a ‘collective personality’ which, like the individual personality, ‘is born and dies in time…asserts itself only by consciousness, being capable of [rational] thought and action’. The orderly polity resulting from the Hobbesian contract between individuals and the state cannot, however, be replicated internationally by a similar contract between states. This is so because the ‘ahistoric moment of utilitarian calculation informed by reason and fear that gave rise to social contract has no counterpart in international relations’ (Walker 1989:174). In essence, domestic order becomes the mirror image and necessary condition of international disorder, thus making anarchy the axiomatic and unalterable principle of global life. However mythical this proposition of a mass opting into a social contract to create the state might sound, either for the imposition of minimal order or cooperative communal benefits, people have granted a central organ a monopoly of political authority and power. Reinforced by nineteenth- and twentieth-century concepts of ideology and nationalism, the state system has now become the most prominent unit of political organisation in the world; organisations to which millions of people owe allegiance and for which many are prepared to die. Indeed, the psychological high of belonging has made it particularly satisfying to belong to a particular state and to be stateless is to enter a world of unimaginable misery and insecurity. The disintegration of states like Afghanistan, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and many countries on the African continent, have demonstrated in the most dramatic way the exposure of vast numbers of people not only to the dangers of violence from contending bands of warriors and bandits, in a manner reminiscent of medieval times, but to hunger and disease on a cataclysmic scale.
2 NANA K.POKU AND DAVID T.GRAHAM
Population movements and human (in)security Since the 1960s, a number of major developments in global migration patterns have placed the phenomenon at the heart of international politics. First, the scale of movements has increased exponentially. In the 1960s, only a handful of countries, mainly the traditional immigration nations in North America and Oceania, were significantly affected by international migration, but by the 1990s more than 2 per cent of the world’s population was living outside of their country of birth (Martin and Widgren 1996), and virtually every nation was influenced in some way by immigration or emigration of various kinds. Second, there has been an enormous increase in the diversity of international population movement. Whereas in the past, the bulk of such movement involved permanent, or at least long-term, settlement at the destination, world migration is now characterised by not only increased levels of permanent settlement in foreign countries but also by a myriad of temporary, circular migrations of varying duration with a range of purposes. Third, and perhaps inevitably, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of global institutions shaping the level and pattern of international migration. Further, government involvement is increasing, not only in destination countries where attempts to limit the number and characteristics of immigrants have escalated, but also in origin countries where nations have realised the benefits of remittances to national development and actively encouraged emigration of various kinds. However, it is often overlooked that there are other institutions that have become important gatekeepers and facilitators in international migration (Goss and Lindquist 1995; Hugo 1995). These factors have reinforced each other to change the racial mix of many countries and cities beyond all recognition. Simultaneously, the increase in international migration has also given rise to paranoia and xenophobia. Migrants everywhere live a tenuous existence—rarely gaining the same rights as nonmigrants, their hosts always aloof. Blamed for a range of ills— from unemployment to crime, strained social services to lack of national unity— migrants are aware of just how easily their rights can be swept away. The plight of refugees is even worse. We are all still haunted by the terrible images of children and elderly people shivering in the snows of the Kurd Mountains of northern Iraq. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraqi offensive against the Kurdish populations in the north of the country had pushed one million people towards the Turkish border, which was hermetically closed to them. Rather than admitting the refugees, as Turkey had previously done, they were prevented from crossing the border. Human rights abuses by Turkish border guards and the life-threatening winter conditions of the mountainous border regions led to an increasing death rate—between 400 and 1,000 per day— largely due to hypothermia, exposure, exhaustion, and bacteria-ridden drinking water, which led to pneumonia, diarrhoea and cholera. At the peak of the crisis, 22 per cent of the refugees were malnourished (4 per cent severely), and 70 per cent of all the hospital cases had diarrhoea. An estimated 4,500 to 6,700 Kurds
INTRODUCTION 3
died during the initial crisis. These figures do not account for those refugees who fled to the Iranian border, who at the peak were triple the numbers at the Turkish border. For these people, matters were complicated by the estimated 10 million landmines that had been planted by the government after 1975, predominantly during the Iran-Iraq War. In the end, only a spectacular and unprecedented effort in aid coordination made it possible to avoid total disaster. At the time, the effort seemed to indicate that even the overnight appearance of some two million refugees was not an impossible task to be countered by military-civilian interaction. Then, in April 1994, the world stood by and watched a televised genocide in Rwanda. The scale and brutality of this genocide must rank as one of the most horrific periods of intense killing anywhere in the world. At the end of one hundred days of intense killing, over one million Tutsis were murdered in cold blood and some two million people were displaced. The mass exodus of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo serves as a reminder of the relationship between state security, international security, territoriality, globalisation, ethnicity, itself a function of past migration, and current migration which in turn threatens further instability in the region. Added to this complex scenario is the myriad human security threats—social, economic, environmental, familial, health, welfare, life, among others—to the ethnic Albanian refugees and displaced persons, the Kosovo Serbs and others in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the time of writing, it is estimated that half of Kosovo’s 1.6 million ethnic Albanians have been forced from their homes. Of these, over 450, 000 have crossed Kosovo’s borders since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing began on 24 March 1999, 60,000 fled before the allied intervention and around 260,000 are displaced within the province. This represents Europe’s largest refugee crisis since World War II. The situation inside the everexpanding refugee camps deteriorated so rapidly that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for the first time during this conflict, urged countries not in the immediate areas to offer a ‘safe haven’ to fleeing civilians. In the words of Sadako Ogata (1999), the UNHCR, ‘Kosovo’s neighbours are swamped and they are no longer in a position to cope with the influx of people. All nations must help now to save lives.’ Certainly, the situation in Qafe Prushit, an isolated mountain area in Albania would seem to confirm the desperate nature of the problem. A confidential UNHCR field report indicates that dehydration and hypothermia have already begun to claim victims in this area. Increasingly, the displacement of civilian populations—under the guise of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or some other pretext—is no longer the by-product of war, but a goal in its own right. The human suffering which underlies it, as well as its impact on regional peace and security, has brought into sharp focus the ways in which different categories of people are marginal to the states in which they live and the various forms of insecurity confronting them. Human rights abuses in Burma or Turkey, genocide in Rwanda or Indonesia, and a whole range of
4 NANA K.POKU AND DAVID T.GRAHAM
outrages against civilians on all sides in the wars of Liberia, Algeria, Angola, Sierra Leone and parts of the former Soviet Union are all cases in point. The ongoing conflicts over the remains of what was once Yugoslavia highlight the plight of a population without protection from any state—some falling prey to the remnants of the very state that was once supposed to be their protector. Like the Kurds in Iraq and the Tutsis in Rwanda, the plight of the Kosovo Albanians demonstrates in a dramatic way the catastrophic insecurity of ordinary people in circumstances where states— and the international system of states—are either unable to provide protection or are themselves the principal sources of violence. The structure of the book Chapter 2 explores in some detail the central issues and identifies some of the conceptual problems of a state-centred notion of international security which is bound to overlook the interests and needs of large categories of people, particularly those already external in other ways within states or the system of states. In a significant way, this chapter provides the theoretical framework for the book as a whole. Following on from this theoretical debate, Chapter 3 looks at one of the more obvious links between migration and security—the diaspora. The chapter examines the significance of diasporas and the types of threats they pose to the security of a range of actors, primarily their host states, homelands and certain third parties. Davies argues that the definition of diaspora should be opened out to encompass a broad range of groups from a variety of origins. He further argues that diasporas have an increasing relevance and impact on actors as a result of processes transforming global systems. Several ongoing processes, including advances in transportation and communications technology, increasing migratory flows, and increasing levels of pluralism and tolerance in host countries, have provided diasporas with greater autonomy, power and opportunities for the assertion of their identities and interests. He concludes by looking at the impact of diasporic activities on the security of others. Throughout, he argues that traditional conceptions of security need to be revised to incorporate threats and perceptions of threats arising from fears for the survival of collective identities and values, in addition to those relating to military threats. He applies a revised conception of security in order to discuss the enhanced potential of diasporas to threaten the political, economic and cultural security of their homelands, host countries and third parties enmeshed in diasporic networks. In Chapter 4, Peter Marden explores the relationship between territoriality, citizenship and sovereignty. These are traditionally aligned with nationstates and their seeming autonomy in the international system of states. He argues that forces of fragmentation are closely associated with globalisation in the 1990s. The shifting boundaries of authority are diminishing the administrative capacity of states to deal with forces that seem to defy containment. Hence, as borders become more porous and less meaningful the very basis of democratic
INTRODUCTION 5
governance may erode. Increased human migration is seen as another threat to the nation-state. It is reasonable to argue that in a world of shifting boundaries and mobile populations, the institutions of liberal democracy have revealed a peculiar fragility. Rather than close borders and become more exclusionary, states should open up their borders to immigrants. Whatever the case, the moral obligations of states within the current phase of globalisation are no longer based on an uncomplicated relation between state and citizen, as this relation is now bound up with contested sovereignties. Elisabeth Abiri explores the securitisation of cross-border migration from the perspective of refugees in Chapter 5. She uses two contrasting cases to explore some of the issues involved—Sweden and Malawi. She shows how these seemingly dissimilar countries increasingly came to view migration as a security issue. These two countries which, up until relatively recently, had a generous disposition towards refugees began to change perspectives and policies. The chapter focuses on the inflow and stay of Mozambican refugees in Malawi and the inflow and stay of Bosnian refugees in Sweden. She suggests that since the securitisation of migration appears to be part of globalisation, taking place in the South as well as in the North, it is reasonable to assume that some of the dynamics behind the securitisation of migration may be common for a number of cases. She concludes that migration discourse and policy have been securitised in Malawi and Sweden at approximately the same time but for different reasons. In both cases, the securitisation of cross-border migration is used as the channel for the frustration of both the ruling elite and the citizens. In Malawi, the securitisation is carried out as a way to consolidate democratic rule, while in Sweden it is used as a way to recapture faith in politics. In Chapter 6, Mark J.Miller argues that international migration is increasingly viewed as an important regional and geostrategic dynamic with potentially crucial effects upon states, societies and their security. International migration weaves together states, societies and entire regions in complex, frequently inextricable and often strategically important ways. In order to understand international security at the twilight of the twentieth century, one must first understand international migration. Of particular significance is the nature of the relationship between liberal democracies and, what he terms, the Islamic periphery. This refers to the predominantly Islamic states and societies stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. But he focuses on two cases—the Algerian insurgency and its spillover to Western Europe and the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey and its extension to neighbouring Kurdish areas and to Western Europe. They are illustrative of broader processes affecting international security worldwide. The ‘recent’ Polynesian diaspora from the smaller islands of Oceania to New Zealand, Australia and the United States forms the basis of Chapter 7. Here, Richard Bedford uses literature and more conventional academic sources to explore a number of issues, including social, identity and economic security. No matter where Polynesian peoples live, there is always an acknowledgement of a
6 NANA K.POKU AND DAVID T.GRAHAM
homeland in the islands. Unlike most diasporas of recent times, that from Oceania is largely voluntary and has resulted in an unusual, if not unique, creation of transnational social and economic relationships at family level which in some respects transcend the state as the primary socioeconomic grouping for whole peoples. The chapter reviews two aspects of the transnational linkages that are so critical for contemporary human security in Polynesia. The first is the meaning of the process of ‘world enlargement’ which some commentators have recognised as being the basis for new meta-societies in Oceania. The second concerns the remittance transfers which ‘lubricate’ the linkages in these metasocieties, and give meaning to the notion of transnational economies and societies of Polynesians. Michael Parnwell explores the impact of tourism within the context of political, societal and environmental security in Chapter 8. The chapter identifies the victims of certain forms of tourism development, and why they are such. Burma and Thailand form the basis of analysis which links globalisation in the form of the largest mass migration of all time—tourism—with human security and development issues. The forces that might serve to protect citizens’ interests in the face of tourist globalisation appear relatively powerless in the face of the prevailing political economy. However, Parnwell presents evidence that the situation is beginning to change with the emergence of advocacy groups, nongovernmental organisations and, in Thailand at least, a gradual tendency towards greater democratisation. These have increased awareness of the negative externalities of tourism development. But the industry has sought to extend its realms of activity and influence to include countries on Thailand’s periphery, where awareness of, and the means to control, the harmful effects of tourism are much less advanced and where, by contrast, the incentive to facilitate the relatively soft form of development that tourism represents is substantial. The issues of emigration and immigration in post-Soviet Russia provide the basis for Igor Ushkalov’s contribution in Chapter 9. The economic and democratic forces that helped cause the downfall of the Soviet Union and the communist state have helped unleash a demand for freedom of movement both internally and externally. Ushkalov shows how migration is an important component in Russia’s demography. He explores some of the population movements consequent on democratisation. He demonstrates how major and complex internal movements pose threats to regional security, including ecological security. International migration is also a threat to security. Most of the emigrants are those with skills and qualifications. Many of the immigrants are from the Far East, particularly China, and this poses a threat to human and conventional security. Throughout the chapter the ethnic dimension to the security-migration nexus is never far from the surface. Irina Malakha takes one aspect of Ushkaolov’s chapter—the brain drain— further in Chapter 10 where she discusses the emigration of highly skilled and highly qualified personnel from Russia. The last few years have seen a large increase in both internal and external movements in what had been, for security
INTRODUCTION 7
reasons, a very immobile society. The lifting of strict restrictions on emigration and the opening of its borders has presented Russia with a number of problems not least of which is the exodus of some of its best people. This has serious economic and social security implications for Russia. With the educational level of these emigrants ten times higher than the average for Russia as a whole this flight of talent has already had an effect on the ‘quality’ of the Russian populace. It also has a deleterious impact on all aspects of research and development in the country, as Malakha amply demonstrates. There are associated problems related to a range of human security issues for modern Russia, particularly during a period of transition. Economic instability and political unrest are least likely to be solved when the most intellectually able are emigrating in large numbers. This is a loss of human capital and a loss of the investment in the education and training of the emigrants. David T.Graham’s chapter explores the population movements in the context of globalisation. Globalising forces have weakened the nation-state and national boundaries have become increasingly porous. While nation-states have little control over the movement of goods, capital and information they have sought to exert their influence on the movement of people. Country after country has erected barriers to immigration. Ever stringent criteria control the entry of labour, refugees, settlers and asylum seekers. National governments, aware of the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment and the popularity of nativist political parties, cut quotas, impose harsher regulations, engage in multilateral agreements and like to be seen to be taking a ‘tough stance’ on immigration. Yet these same countries spend large sums of money encouraging people to visit for tourism, culture, sport, business, study and temporary work, which the host population is unable or unwilling to do. Graham explores this people paradox. The willingness to encourage mass tourism and other short-term movements on the one hand, while curtailing more traditional movements on the other. The many potential human security threats associated with diasporas, settlement migration, refugees, foreign labour and asylum seekers are viewed as serious by policy-makers. At the same time, mass tourism and other short-term movements are seen as unproblematic in terms of human security and accepted as part of the globalising process (but as Parnwell shows this is far from the case). References Aron, R. (1962) Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Goss, J. and Linquist, B. (1995) ‘Conceptualizing international labour migration: a structural perspective’, International Migration Review 29(2):317–51. Hugo, G.J. (1995) ‘Illegal international migration in Asia’, in R.Cohen (ed.) Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 397–402. Martin, P. and Widgren, J. (1996) ‘International migration: a global challenge’, Population Studies 51, 1:1–18.
8 NANA K.POKU AND DAVID T.GRAHAM
Ogata, S. (1999) Quoted from a press conference, Geneva, 4 April. Walker, R.B.J. (1989) ‘History and structure in the theory of international studies’, Millennium 18(2):163–83.
2 Human security in a globalising world Nana K.Poku, Neil Renwick and John Glenn
Introduction For almost half a century, Cold War ideology served to eclipse the distinction between the state, popular interests and the multiplicity of values, claims and identities of a state’s citizenry. When it came to considering security, state and society were considered as one, thereby occluding what was in reality a problematic relation. Issues like internal conflicts, intrastate and interstate migratory flows and environmental problems were more or less subsumed under the security policies and interests of nation-states. In general, state policies always appeared both well defined and comprehensive enough to include everything that mattered to the ‘national interest’. Fundamentally, the ‘national interest’ was a term used by policy-makers to describe the long-term, core collective objectives of the state. Generally, in descending order of priority, the collective objectives were deemed to comprise the security and survival of the state, economic prosperity and the sustenance of the social and political values of the security of the state. Normally, governments would claim that these objectives constitute the fundamental and immutable interest of all the citizens of the state, regardless of social rank, party political affiliation, wealth or ethnicity. These nationwide collective interests were presented as being representative of the vital interests of the whole of the state. In this construction of the ‘national interest’, the state became the censorious referent of security and the concept became synonymous with the defence of the ‘national interest’. Security in this context was conceived internally as the repression of dissidence while externally it involved espionage and massive arms proliferation, in particular the development of ever more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. This conception of security and its implications for the construction of the ‘national interest’ was indebted to the methodological and ontological insights of the dominant paradigm of the day—realism. In what follows, this chapter examines the challenges to the realist conception of security that have arisen from the increasing globalisation of the world. Although the last two decades have witnessed the extension of the security debate into ever wider issue areas, it is argued that much of this writing has remained within the general framework of
10 NANA K.POKU, NEIL RENWICK AND JOHN GLENN
realism. Thus, by adopting such a framework these writings have, either implicitly or explicitly, accepted the state-centric assumptions of realism and its younger cousin neorealism. In other fields of inquiry it may be considered passé to refer to the increasing interconnectedness of the world and the final realisation of the ‘global village’ that McLuhan and Carpenter (1966) spoke of in the sixties. However, in international relations the globalisation literature has helped highlight the weakness of an approach that takes the state as the primary actor and presents the international environment as essentially static and immutable. The increasing importance of a multitude of actors, the almost instantaneous transmission of information across the world that has led to the ‘annihilation of space’, and the increasing sensitivity of national economies to events elsewhere underline the unreality of realism’s state-centred model (Leyson 1995). At the same time, the growing awareness that the increasing interconnectedness of the world has meant that activities performed at the local level may have consequences, intended or unintended, for distant ‘others’, has raised another series of questions at the ethical level. Transnationalism and interdependence have always had a double-edged quality to them in the sense that they have brought with them both positive and negative impacts, but the dramatic increase in both the speed and number of these interactions has brought into sharper focus their ethical implications. Globalisation has thus brought into stark relief the potential for propagating transnational harm to absent ‘others’ on a daily basis. Although realism has always claimed to eschew any normative stance, its outlook and description of the world has always carried with it normative implications (Brown 1992). At the very heart of its approach is the fundamental assumption that the state is the main referent object of security, thus reifying an abstract social construct. The objective of this chapter is thus twofold. First, to make such normative assumptions explicit and to argue that an approach such as realism is wholly inadequate for dealing with the issue of migration in any meaningful way. Second, to offer in place of realism’s preoccupation with state security, a conception of security that adopts the welfare of humanity as its main concern. Realism, the state and security Although what follows assumes a unitary school, realism must be understood less as a coherent theoretical position in its own right than as the site of a great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes. Whether situated against the early twentieth-century crisis of historicism or analysed as yet another benighted footnote to dualism inherited from classical Greek philosophy, claims to political realism in the theory of international relations carry meanings and implications from a much broader discourse about politics and philosophy. Contrary to the assertion of some critics, however, modern realists share, rather than reject, the core premises of their classical predecessors (Ashley 1984). Indeed, the modern form of realism reiterates the traditional argument that any serious extension of
HUMAN SECURITY IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 11
moral and political community beyond the boundaries of the sovereign state is inconceivable in the context of anarchy. It is from these shared values that we can begin to draw some general conclusions about the core assumptions of realist thought. These are: the state, anarchy of the international system, power and security (Doyle 1990; Rosenberg 1990). Drawing heavily on the classical writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes, realism is grounded in a pessimistic conception of human nature. In general, human beings are perceived to have a problematic nature: they are uninformed, passionate, undisciplined, and even violent. Moreover, they lack the intelligence to perform rational cost-benefit calculations and are incapable of discerning their own best interest, and even if they do, they lack the willpower to act in accordance with those interests. This view of man is tied to a specific image of the state. Because man cannot find fulfilment and salvation within himself he must find it outside himself—in the collectivity, in the state (see Hegel 1953; Hobbes 1964). In this construction, the state compensates for the deficiencies of man; where man is passionate, the state is rational; where man is weak, the state is strong—it possesses reason and will, there is a raison d’ètat and a volonte d’ètat. States have intelligence and will to survive; they are rational actors, entailing a state-centred perception of world politics (Waltz 1979). Yet states are not entirely rational. They have a dualistic nature—there is a certain potential to unreason in each state. They may at times lose their will to exist or they may endanger the existence of other states by pursuing ‘revisionist’ policies. According to this realist view, the state needs an elite because it must survive in a hostile environment, at home and abroad. At home it confronts the irrational masses of citizens—abroad, a host of hostile powers. The supreme goal is to survive in this two-sided state of war, and, to succeed, the state needs to be highly centralised and hierarchical (Bernhardi 1914). It is a tight collectivity in which individuals are treated as a means serving a higher end, subordinate parts of a whole with well-defined functions and roles. Their values are not individualistic, they do not emphasise independence, self-determination, selfdiscipline, voluntariness, or equality. Within this kind of state the emphasis is on dependence, subordination, compulsion and inequality in order that the ‘national interest’ can be pursued. Externally, the state has to be strong because it confronts others of a similar kind—hence the anarchical nature of the international system. The result is a decentralised system where conflict is endemic and security is managed by selfhelp. Each state has to provide for its own security. Each state is forced to arm. Economic considerations are subordinate to military considerations because, although states engage in international trade, this engagement is fragile because states worry about the relative gains accruing from international exchange, gains that directly affect their relative position of strength. In this context, cooperation is temporary because states only cooperate for purely egotistical reasons— concerned with counterbalancing a potential hegemon. As a result, international trade and interdependence must not be valued too highly. The impact of the
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‘forces of modernity,’ of science, technology, communication and commerce, is ambivalent: they can strengthen or weaken a country. This is a world of no permanent friendship or enmities but of constantly changing alliances dictated by no other sentiment (such as religion, ideology, or dynastic bonds) than the ‘reason of state’. Such cooperation is natural and rational because it is assumed that each state has the will and the power to aim for its own survival. State representatives are not expected actively to seek conflict but they must regard war as a rational instrument and have to be willing to use it when necessary. At times, war can be avoided because the mere threat of war (deterrence) will suffice, but it is important to prepare for the worst case scenario. To that end, it is vital to be in possession of a broad range of military instruments to handle any situation and to control any crisis. Insufficient armament, and particularly disarmament, leads to a power vacuum and to unstable situations inviting aggression and causing war (Gray 1988). Stability in the international system is more likely when all states are sufficiently secure and armed. Perpetual peace is impossible—at best there can be stability through the adroit management of alliances that counter-balance potential hegemons. The paranoid world of the Cold War proved fertile grounds for these ideas. Accordingly, security came to focus on war, the ability to fight wars and the external threats to the state that might give rise to them (Wolfers 1962). For the analyst, the referent object of security became the state. In this world, security came from being a citizen, and insecurity from citizens of other states. The state was thus depicted as the protector of its citizens from the hostile intentions of other states. According to Krause and Williams (1997:43), these threats from other states were seen as being ‘directed toward individuals qua citizens (that is, toward their states), and the study of security accordingly strives to mitigate these threats through concerted action by the representatives of the citizenry— the state leaders’. Societal security in this context was underplayed, or examined specifically in the context of the legitimacy of the governing structure of any particular state. Thus, such issues as interstate and intrastate migration, environmental protection, food and water security, job security, to name but a few, were either not dealt with or dismissed as domestic political matters. The odious nature of realism in the context of the Cold War, it appears, was sufficient to discourage scholars and commentators from investigating the critical nature of human security. The state and insecurity Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has generated an extraordinarily complex debate. In the literature, the concept has found itself redefined (Baldwin 1997; Mathews 1989; Poku and Graham 1998; Thomas 1987), reconceptualised (Håkan 1992), reshaped (Krause and Williams 1997), retheorised (Booth 1991; Wyn Jones 1989), re-examined (Buzan 1993) and revisioned (Lipschutz 1992). The resulting conceptual muddle has allowed some
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to claim not so much a redefinition as a de-definition of security (Waever 1993). However, despite the considerable attention, it is still rare to find the security interests of states separated, even conceptually, from those of the people under them; less still, the international security of persons and groups of people, rather than states, made the focus of attention. Some authors, like Waever (1993), are critical of much of the literature that has endeavoured to move the security debate forward. For Waever, any extension of the content and context of security beyond the state and the international system faces three interrelated problems: First, the concept of security becomes all-inclusive and is thereby emptied of content; second, the lack of explicit attention to the connotative core of classical security make the new approaches an innocent contributor to the reproduction— and even expansion—of securitisation; and, third, there is a lack of political effort on ‘security,’ as traditionally defined. The critical approach argued below challenges this view on the grounds that any normative claims for privileging the state—as was witnessed during the Cold War—are untenable because it is quite fallacious to view threats to human security simply in terms of protection from military violence. Such an approach places common humanity rather than raison d’état at the core of the normative concerns, implying that security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with the security of everybody living within that state. As Wyn Jones (1989) rightly noted, in places where security of the state is synonymous with the security of the citizens in that state, it usually comes at a price. In other words, ‘their citizens’ security is bought at the price of insecurity for the vast majority of the inhabitants of [the other] chronically insecure states’ (Wyn Jones 1989:311). Indeed, international politics is littered with instances of how one country or group’s national security can be another country or group’s insecurity. The apartheid system, which dominated South African politics for nearly fifty years, provides an illuminating example of this. Here, we find that, in formal-legal terms, the state was constructed as the state of ‘the people’, of a ‘nation’ of people; but of course that nationhood was racially qualified; it was a white ‘nation’, a nation which took racial similarities and hence European origins as the criteria for membership. The state legally validated the white inhabitants of South Africa as sovereign right-bearing subjects who experienced their liberty through their membership of a ‘nation’ (a nation underpinned by twin ethics of community and brotherhood) and the protection of their rights by the public agency of the state. By so doing, the state formally suggested itself to its white subjects as the architectonic political expression of a rational— liberal ethic. Critical to the crafting of this apartheid state was the principle of the reconstruction of ‘the native’ as a non-national, who stood outside the civilised society of the white nation and who could not therefore find comfort in the public legal paternalism of the modern liberal state. Many of the apartheid laws sought to reinforce, institutionally as well as ideologically, this reconstructive attitude towards the African majority. Above all, the laws passed by Vorster’s government in the 1970s, which set out to make legally viable the reconstitution
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of the Homelands as a separate ‘independent’ sovereign state, should be read as an attempt to deny the African majority citizenship of the white nation and hence of the white state. As Connie Mulder, whom Botha narrowly beat in the 1978 leadership election put it: If our [National Party] policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the black people are concerned, there will not be one black [meaning African] man with South African citizenship. Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honorable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this parliament to accommodate those people politically. (House of Assembly 1978) However, in reference to the white constituency, it was a projection of itself as a formally liberal ideal, which the apartheid state depended on as the rational justification for its continued dominance. In other words, the state tried to argue that, in terms of its rational-ethical relations to the white constituency, it represented the ideal security regime. It was on this kind of argument that the state sought to base its claim to the monopoly both of the means of physical violence, and the means of generating an all-encompassing legal-normative order within the borders of the territory of the South African state. Hence, the state presented itself to the white constituents as a state which was just and deserving of obedience because it was a state which, at root, embraced the modern democratic principle of political organisation (parliamentary practice, electoral politics, party and caucus dynamics), modern bureaucratic principles of civil administration and modern methods of judicial arbitration. Moreover, the state justified its continued dominance by presenting itself as a form of political order which, in the international realm, would always act reasonably in the interests of the sovereign people, in the spheres of economic and military engagement. These were the modern legitimations that the state offered up to the people as arguments which justified its continued dominance. These were also the very arguments that underlined the insecurities of the rest of the black majority. More recently, a number of crises have demonstrated in an equally dramatic way the catastrophic insecurity of ordinary people in circumstances where states— and the international system of states—are either unwilling and/or unable to provide protection or are themselves the principal sources of violence. Human rights abuses in Burma, Turkey, or Indonesia, and a whole range of outrages against civilians on all sides in the wars of Liberia, Algeria or parts of the former Soviet Union are all cases in point. For many people in these societies, their chief security threat is the very government under whose sovereignty they live, either through its power and oppressive policies, or as a result of its incapacity to sustain the infrastructure of life for the vast majority. The conflicts over the remains of what was once Yugoslavia highlight the plight of a population without protection from any state—some fall prey to the remnants of the very state that
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was once supposed to be their protector. The disintegration of the state in Yugoslavia has demonstrated in the most dramatic way the exposure of a vast numbers of people not only to the dangers of violence from contending bands of warriors and bandits, in a manner reminiscent of medieval Europe, but hunger and disease on a cataclysmic scale. This is particularly the case in parts of the former colonial world where the very existence of national sovereignty has been threatened by the failure of the nation-building processes (Thomas 1987). Nowhere are there more examples than in contemporary Africa. Far more than in other parts of the post-colonial world, the African state system, as we know it today, is the direct and obvious descendent of European colonialism. Its boundaries are the lines drawn on maps by colonial governments, generally with startling lack of concern for the people whom they casually allocated to one territory or another. Every boundary cuts through at least one cultural area; the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary divides fourteen, while the boundaries of Burkina Faso cross twenty-one cultural areas. At the micro level such boundaries sometimes divided town from hinterland, village from traditional fields and even families from their communities. This artificiality has made it particularly difficult to generate a moral basis for government, which in turn has endowed rulers with legitimacy or authority, rather than with the mere control of the state machinery. Though the notion of government is accepted, the political institutions through which it is exercised are treated with remarkable indifference. Multi-party systems have been replaced by single-party states, and in turn by military regimes, without raising much more than a flicker of interest from any but those who were immediately affected by the change. For the great majority, life simply continued. And, while passive acceptance certainly (from the government’s point of view) has much to be said for it, it provides no assurance of stability. Unlike the colonial state which managed to supervise the disparate elements over which it ruled (with unrivalled military coercion and frequently, brute force), post-colonial states have, in general, failed to resolve intraethnic disputes and the result has been the proliferation of violence we have come to associate with the African continent. This explains why the continent has the highest number of migrants of any region in the world. Indeed, Africa’s present condition draws attention not only to the absence of protection for many people by states, but to the possibility of states that, in their present condition, can barely provide an acceptable degree of security in any sense to anyone. At issue is not whether imperial systems were more secure, or security-giving, or more stable than the post-colonial states, which, quite evidently, they were not, but two issues are worth considering. The first is that the process of transformation through which new states are consolidated by responding to new doctrines of legitimacy and security is, like the reordering of power relations to which it is a response, turbulent and protracted with no guarantee of a happy ending. The second is that in the light of its failure in so many ways to deliver security, we have to question whether the postcolonial state, specifically, is in a
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general sense any more satisfactory as a basis of world order than what preceded it. This point is particularly important, because it calls into question the nature of states themselves. The human security approach As we move towards the twenty-first century, questions about the relevance and role of the modern state have become ever more pressing. Although the possibility that international relations may don the mantle of a previous historical epoch is often underestimated, there does seem to be a widespread recognition of the need to reconceptualise the foundations of the emergent global order (Rosenau 1997). Specifically, there is a need to re-examine the impacts of modernity—defined as the latest stage of capitalism—on the objectified notion of the Hobbesian state. It has long been perceived by historical sociologists, like Mann, Hall, Chase-Dunn and Sklair, that the state has been in crisis. It can also be seen in the work of geographers (Corbridge, Martin and Thrift 1994; Dicken 1992). Interest in the decline of the state has been evident among lawyers for some time, particularly those who argue that states are not the only sources of legal authority either today or in the past. It can also be seen in much recent work by scholars concerned with the management and organisation of business, who see the strong development of networks of economic enterprises transcending state frontiers, confusing state agencies and replacing the hierarchical firm as the dominant model for the production of goods and services. This insight is significant for the state since it has hitherto been the state that conferred ‘corporate personality’ on the firm, even though this has always been little more than a convenient fiction. Much of the recent literature on globalisation has focused on the huge array of interdependent relations that have sprung up between a multitude of actors, state and non-state, and the distanciated nature of these interactions. It is argued that the globalised nature of the world has meant that, increasingly, relationships that involve close encounters of a direct kind in which we meet others face to face are being replaced by indirect contact with remote persons. Today, economic activities are no longer focused at the local level and the objective is no longer to serve a limited population with immediate needs. Modern production is spread over large intervals of time due to long-term industrialised planning and does not involve one local site but many spatially distant sites. Generally, production is no longer geared to the satisfaction of a community’s immediate needs. Instead, it is designed to fulfil consumption at a distant site by an unknown user (Saurin 1994). At the same time, the global nature of the financial system has resulted in capital created in one area being reinvested in a multitude of facilities and enterprises situated in other, often very distant, sites. Social activities are geared towards producing items not for immediate local needs but towards producing commodities that satisfy the desires of absent others who in all likelihood one will never meet. Globalisation has therefore radically altered the manner in
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which we conduct our lives in the sense that ‘locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them. What structures the locale is not simply that which is present on the scene; the “visible form” of the locale conceals the distanciated relations which determine its nature’ (Giddens 1990:19). Instead of seeing the world as made up of states which limit their cooperative endeavours because of the conditions inherent within the international system, it is argued that we are dealing with a world system in which virtually all areas of the earth are affected, one way or another, by activities in another part of the world. This conclusion has ethical implications for the way in which we regard others, regardless of how remote their habitat may be from ours. Rather than viewing security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua citizens (that is, toward their states)’, our approach views security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua persons’ (Krause and Williams 1997). Implicit, then, in this conjunction of issues with ideas of human security and liberation is the notion of the ethical and moral. As an approach that focuses upon the importance of the insecurities facing people rather than governments or institutional agencies, human security is concerned with transcending the dominant paradigmatic orthodoxy that views critical concerns of migration—recognition (i.e. citizenship), basic needs (i.e. sustenance), protection (i.e. refugee status), or human rights (i.e. legal standing) —as problems of interstate politics and consequently beyond the realm of the ethical or moral. The veteran American diplomat George Kennan offers the clearest exposition of the orthodox perspective: First of all, the conduct of diplomacy is the responsibility of governments. …; What we are talking about, therefore, when we attempt to relate moral considerations to foreign policy, is the behaviour of governments, not of individuals or entire peoples. Second,…the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience…. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the wellbeing of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’…. Finally,…there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the US government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles. (Kennan 1985:205–7)
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This classic exposition of the realist position is deeply embedded in the assumptions about the basic character of humanity itself, the struggle for power that inheres in such character and is thus universal and reified in a propensity for violence in the conduct of sovereign states towards each other. As an assumed, and asserted, ‘undeniable fact of experience’ (Morgenthau 1993:36) in the realist outlook, the contest for power leaves the ethical and moral to be determined almost exclusively by specific political circumstances and ‘prudence’ (‘the political consequences of seemingly moral action’) (Morgenthau 1993:12). Thus moral claims to the ‘just war’ (for example in the war against Iraq), to ideological superiority (as in the Cold War confrontation), or to ethnic and racial superiority (such as in the Bosnia– Herzegovinan, Rwandan or Kosovo Albanian examples of ‘ethnic cleansing’) are couched in ‘zero-sum’ terms. Thus it is and thus it has always been (Morgenthau 1993). Migration in the form of forced expulsions or refugees fleeing war is thus, for realists, less a problem of morality and more a problem of realpolitik (Does this destabilise our country’s political order? What do we do with these people? What does this mean for our available national economic, social and welfare resources? Will our receiving of refugees be seen as a hostile act by the other state’s government?). Clearly, such notions of morality in international affairs have been challenged over centuries by those who have envisaged a world of states the standards of which are guaranteed by international legal prescription. The Grotian tradition assumes the harnessing of states’ egocentric behaviour by voluntarily agreed limitations on sovereign action. International organisations such as the League of Nations, the United Nations or the International Court of Justice at The Hague are therefore contributory to the construction of internationally agreed standards of right conduct. Migration is thus regulated according to both national and international laws. These are supplemented by non-binding declarations on rights and obligations of states designed to establish practical governance. Alternatively, challenges have been mounted from a cosmopolitan tradition claiming universal moral values embedded in a human singularity. All humans thus seek freedom from want and oppression and, as part of a single human species, should seek amelioration as a basic right of existence. It is thus an incumbent obligation upon the rest of humanity to ensure that these rights are heard, respected and met. Arguments for the universality of human rights or for ‘basic needs’ approaches to world suffering clearly assume such ethical precepts. Yet, these approaches are all fraught with problems. Emancipation in the realist perspective rests within the gift of government officials acting upon selfdefinitions of necessarily selfish national interests. Thus, the imperatives of governmental political ‘prudence’ represent an uncertain, ad hoc basis for moral considerations of human security. Claims that the international system displays a significant degree of societal commitment despite its fundamentally anarchical condition are beside the main point that such a definitional self-allocation of responsibility necessarily excludes and subordinates the moral needs of people
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themselves. Similarly, cosmopolitan universalism and the arguments of ‘ethical relativists’ devalue the human dimension. A further consideration here is the assumption of the state as an effective and affective agency. Without resorting to the full armoury of postmodernist arguments, the validity of this assumption is clearly open to question. The intensification of complex forms of manufacturing, distribution and marketing interdependency and the heightened sensitivities of the world’s financial interconnections have served to restrict the practical sovereignty exercised by governments in their attempts to conduct day-to-day economic management. The increased scale and velocity of transactional transfers across the boundaries of states are ever more difficult for governments to police and influence. Such processes are further strengthened by a trend towards largescale corporate mergers designed to create enterprises with the genuinely global scale and reach foreshadowed a little prematurely in the 1970s and 1980s (Dicken 1992). If to this is added a sense of a more ‘disorganised’ form of post-Fordist capitalism flowing from these deeper economic processes, then governments appear more as the camp followers rather than the generals of the international system (Lash and Urry 1987, 1994). Here, Anthony Giddens’ arguments offer insight. He argues that such changes are reconstructing social relationships across reorganised time and space. This is ‘a single world, having a unitary framework of experience…yet at the same time one which creates new forms of fragmentation and dispersal’ (Giddens 1992:17) This condition, Giddens (1992: 21) argues, is giving rise to a ‘sequestration of experience’ separating daily life from familiar poles of moral understanding. Thus, ‘for many people, direct contact with events and situations which link the individual lifespan to broad issues of morality and finitude are rare and fleeting’ (Giddens 1992:21). For migrants to a new country even more than for the wider social experience, such sequestration is felt intensively. For refugees or even for some gypsy communities, the sense of displacement is potentially even more acute. The human security approach is particularly concerned with addressing the insecurities of this experience by placing the human subject at the very heart of its analytical focus. The 1994 United Nations Development Report gave this approach its empirical content. In this report, the component of human security fell under two broad headings; freedom from fear and freedom from want (the key principles underlying the UN Charter itself). Of particular importance to us is that this proposal defined human security as ‘people-centred. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society’ and argued that ‘to address the growing challenge of human security, a new development paradigm is needed that puts people at the centre of development…and respects the natural systems on which all life depends’ (United Nations 1994:4, 23). The main focus throughout this report was the security of the individuals that constitute humanity. Similarly, the 1995 Commission on Global Governance which emphasises human security, sets out a list of security objectives that should be of global concern. From its
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perspective the principal aims of global security ‘should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet’s life-support systems by eliminating the economic, social, environmental, political, and military conditions that generate threats to the security of people and the planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate into armed conflicts’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995:84). It is both difficult and possibly self-defeating to think of these issues as isolated and disconnected with other security issues. Migration, for example, more often than not goes hand in hand with environmental degradation, economic deprivation and conflict or vice versa. But, also, such events are not regarded as caused solely by events within a particular state’s borders. Rather, interactions with distant others more often than not play a part in the original pressures for populations to move from one place to another. An obvious example of this would be the speculative activities that resulted in the economic meltdown in Southeast Asia which led to the mass expulsion of ‘guest’ workers from these states. A less obvious example is the sale of armaments to oppressive regimes, the use of which in government clampdowns leads to mass exodus. This acknowledgement of causal interdependence lies at the heart of sustainable common security and a holistic perspective of migratory movements. For example, it is said that ‘poverty, injustice, environmental degradation, and conflict interact in complex and potent ways…. The immediate cause of any mass movement of refugees may appear to be political upheaval and military violence. But the underlying causes often include the deterioration of the natural resource base and its capacity to support the population’; similarly, ‘environmental stress is both a cause and an effect of political tension and military conflict’ (Commission on Environment and Development 1997:290–1). Such a global perspective expands our notion of ethical responsibility beyond state borders by recognising that in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world there is a concomitant increase in the likelihood of propagating transnational harm to remote others (Linklater 1998). This has a deep significance for the way in which we regard the issue of migration because such global interactions imply that we have an obligation to those affected. As one author has suggested, we not only have to overcome the dominant discourse of realism/neorealism but also liberal economic thought that separates economics from politics (Mittelman 1994). Human security must strive to relink what liberal economic theory has de-linked. Economic investment, the penetration of distant locales and the trade in weaponry and other forms of technology bring with them political consequences and responsibilities for all involved. Conclusion This redefinition of the content and purpose of security studies does not entail any attempt to deny or ignore the continuing importance of military security. It does mean, however, that by placing the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless,
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the under-represented, the powerless at the core of their agenda, that for the majority of the people in the world, apparent ‘marginal’ or ‘esoteric’ concerns— such as environmental security, food and economic security—are far more real and immediate threats to their security than interstate wars. This broader conception of security focuses variously, or indeed interchangeably, on the individual, on society, on civil society, on community, on the continuing integrity of ethnic or cultural groups and on global society. In line with the sentiments of Ken Booth (1991), the discourse and practice of security in this context, is primarily concerned with the struggle for human emancipation. It is within this emancipatory discourse that this book is located. References Ashley, R.K. (1984) ‘The poverty of neorealism’, International Organization 38: 255–86. Baldwin, D.A. (1997) ‘The concept of security’, Review of International Studies 23(1): 5– 26. Bernhardi, F.von (1914) Germany and the Next War, New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Booth, K. (1991) ‘Strategy and emancipation’, Review of International Studies 17(4): 313– 26. Brown, C. (1992) International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Buzan, B. (1993) ‘Societal security’, in O.Waever, B.Buzan, M.Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (eds) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter, pp. 41–58. Commission on Environment and Development (1997) Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Corbridge, S., Martin, R. and Thrift, N. (eds) (1994) Money, Power and Space, Oxford: Blackwell. Dicken, P. (1992) Global Shift: The Internationalisation of Economic Activity, London: Paul Chapman Publishing. Doyle, M. (1990) ‘Thucydidean realism’, Review of International Studies 16(3): 223–37. Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1992) ‘Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age’, in F.Frascina and J.Harris (eds) Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology of Critical Texts, London: Phaidon, pp. 210–22. Gray, C.S. (1988) The Geopolitics of Super Power, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Håkan, W. (1992) ‘(Re)conceptualising security’, Arms Control 13 (3): 487–92. Hegel, G.W.F. (1953) Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Hobbes, T. (1964) Leviathan, New York: Washington Square Press. House of Assembly (1978) Debates, 7 February, Column 579. Kennan, G. (1985) ‘Morality and foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs 64(2): 205–7.
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Krause, K. and Williams, M. (1997) ‘From strategy to security: foundations of critical security studies’, in K.Krause and M.Williams (eds) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, London: UCL Press, pp. 33–61. Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. ——(1994) Economies of Signs and Space, London: Sage. Leyson, A. (1995) ‘Annihilating space?: the speed-up of communications’, in J. Allen (ed.) A Shrinking World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 8–25. Linklater, A. (1998) The Transformation of Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press. Lipschutz, R. (1992) ‘Reconstructing world politics: the emergence of global civil society’, Millennium 21(3): 389–421. Mathews, J.T. (1989) ‘Redefining security’, Foreign Affairs 68(2): 171–7. McLuhan, M. and Carpenter, E. (1966) Explorations in Communication, Boston: Beacon Press. Mittelman, J. (1994) ‘Production and migration’, in Y.Sakamoto (ed.) Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System, Tokyo: United Nations University, pp. 34–62. Morgenthau, H. ([1948] 1993) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: McGraw-Hill. Poku, N. and Graham, D.T. (eds) (1998) Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security, Westport, CT: Praeger. Rosenau, J.N. (1997) ‘Imposing global orders: a synthesised ontology for a turbulent era’, in S.Gill and J.H.Mittelman (eds) Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 220–36. Rosenberg, J. (1990) ‘What’s the matter with realism?’, Review of International Studies 16 (4): 285–303. Saurin, J. (1994) ‘Global environmental degradation’, in C.Thomas (ed.) Rio: Unravelling the Consequences, Oregon: Frank Cass, pp. 20–43. Thomas, C. (1987) In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. United Nations (1994) Human Development Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waever, O. (1993) ‘Societal security: the concept’, in O.Waever, B.Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P.Lemaitre (eds) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter, pp. 17–40. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House. Wolfers, A. (1962) Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wyn Jones, R. (1989) “‘Message in a bottle”? Theory and praxis in critical security studies’, Contemporary Security Policy 16(3): 299–319.
3 ‘Neither here nor there?’
The implications of global diasporas for (inter)national security Richard Davies
Introduction In a world commonly depicted as constituted by a system of nation-states, diasporas stand out as one of the ‘awkward’ collective identities which are ‘neither here nor there’. To ‘outsiders’, diasporas are often perceived as groups who resist full assimilation into their host society and who desire to maintain strong ties with their homelands. While these transnational linkages may give rise to suspicions or fears about their loyalties to the host, for diaspora ‘insiders’ such fears merely serve to further engender group cohesion and a sense of difference within the host society. Diasporas have long been neglected by international relations theorists so that these ‘quintessentially transnational’ (Rosenau 1993:xvi) actors rank amongst the least understood in global politics. There have been notable exceptions to this oversight (Constas and Platias 1993; Seton-Watson 1977; Sheffer 1986), but in spite of growing international relations research focused on non-state identities, the analysis of diasporas and their role in global politics continues to be dominated by social anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. In many ways, it is surprising that this absence has persisted for so long; diasporas are widespread phenomena and certain notable diasporas—Jewish, Armenian, and Chinese—have played central roles in international politics and trade. Moreover, it would appear that in recent times several processes have enhanced their ability to play an influential role in global politics and as a consequence heightened their potential for threatening the security of other actors and their interests. Thus, this chapter aims to redress this absence of diasporas in the international relations literature and examine their ability to pose threats to the security of other actors. It will begin by addressing the problem of definition in order to demarcate the scope of the subject matter. Second, it will examine the claim that diasporas are increasingly relevant actors in the realm of global politics worthy of greater consideration by scholars of international relations. Finally, it will consider the potential threats posed by diasporas to aspects of national security. This necessitates formulating a revised definition of security which is appropriate to the study of diasporas and which is not restricted to threats from state or
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military sources. From this basis, the analysis will examine how the activities of diasporas have implications for the ‘national’ security of their homelands and host countries, as well as third parties who become enmeshed in transnational diasporic networks. What is a diaspora? Most scholars researching the concept of diaspora stress its derivation from the dispersion of Jews from their homeland, their subsequent migrations, and the maintenance of their culture and identity in settlements around the world. The Jewish diaspora of ‘victims’ (Cohen 1996) is therefore seen as the ‘archetypal’ diaspora. However, the term ‘diaspora’ slowly came to be applied to other dispersed groups, so that it ‘now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community’ (Tölölyan 1991:4–5). Although the term risks becoming a ‘promiscuously capacious category’ (Tölölyan 1991:8), this wider expropriation reflects a perceived need by scholars to understand a number of increasingly important global political and cultural dynamics which will be discussed in the next section. In many ways diasporas are similar to other ethnic groups in that they maintain and police symbolic and behavioural boundaries which preserve a collective identity different to the host’s hegemonic one (Tölöyan 1991). However, diasporas are unusual in that they place greater emphasis on their social, cultural and economic links at the expense of their political and territorial integrity (Rosenau 1993). In order to tease out these differences further, we will now turn to a definition formulated by Sheffer: Ethnic diasporas are created either by voluntary migration…or as a result of expulsion from their homeland…and settlement in one or more host countries. In these host countries the diasporas remain minority groups…. In their host countries diasporas preserve their ethnic, or ethnic-religious identity and communal solidarity. This serves as the basis for maintaining and promoting constant contacts among the diasporas’ activist elements. (Sheffer 1986:9) In contrast with other ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups which claim an historical association with the particular territory they inhabit, diasporas result from the migration of their members from their homeland and their subsequent settlement in host societies. The mere fact of migration is not sufficient of itself as a diaspora ‘is a type of community whose essential feature is that it is scattered over a wide part of the earth’s surface’ (Seton-Watson 1977:383). Yet while this may overstate matters, other scholars emphasise that the dispersal of members of the community must be to at least two or more ‘foreign regions’, so that the
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diaspora constitutes a transnational network as opposed to a mere ethnic minority in a territory discontinuous with the homeland (Cohen 1996; Safran 1991). The causes of enforced or coerced migrations of diasporas-in-waiting are more diverse than the archetypal Jewish experience would suggest—to achieve cultural homogeneity (Armenians); as a punishment for rebellion or to deal with political and religious dissidents (Jews, Cubans, Poles); for the purpose of slave or indentured labour (Africans, Indians, Chinese); as a consequence of conflict and malign neglect, leading to famine, epidemic, poverty and hunger (Palestinians, Chinese, Indians, Irish); or to put pressure on other states in order to stop their interference (Cubans), destabilise them, or force recognition (Chaliand and Rageau 1995; Tölölyan 1991; Weiner 1993a). The dispersion of diaspora communities from voluntary population movements may also take a number of forms—unskilled workers seeking employment and better economic opportunities abroad; ‘trading diasporas’ or ‘middlemen minorities’ who fulfil important economic roles through their trading networks and possession of valuable occupational and commercial skills absent from host societies; the diasporas of groups of colonists established as part of the imperialist designs of European nation-states. This broadening of the conception of diaspora to admit those arising from voluntary as well as enforced migration demonstrates that these communities are composed of like members. In fact diasporas often result from different migrations so that members seldom exhibit homogeneous attitudes to the homeland or its government (Shain 1993). Consequently, diasporas encompass a range of members from political exiles and highly mobilised activists to those almost assimilated into the host culture, a composition which is subject to transformation by new migrations and changes in the perceptions of its members. A diaspora is not a self-evident notion and such a community may cease to function for several reasons. First, group members assimilate into their host society to the degree that they lose interest in their land of origin and the group itself loses its cohesion (Esman 1986; Marienstras 1989). This is most likely where the diaspora community is small, where there are close cultural similarities with the host society, or where the host is highly democratic (Chaliand and Rageau 1995). Second, the group may slowly break the sentimental and economic ties binding them to the homeland or may become alienated from it (Esman 1986). Third, group members may ‘return’ to their putative homeland, although the creation of Israel constitutes a rare example of this (Marienstras 1989). This discussion provides useful insights into the maintenance and reproduction of diasporas which Sheffer (1993:263) sheds further light on: ‘There are three interconnected, quintessential elements that determine whether ethnic groups can be regarded as diasporas: identity, organization and meaningful contacts with the homeland.’ We will now examine these three aspects together and attempt to draw out their individual pertinence within the discussion.
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Successful diaspora communities display a variety of levels of consciousness, but they have in common their success in perpetuating their ethnoreligious identities and solidarity over extended periods in host societies (Esman 1986). The significance of the time factor is vital for it is the lapse of time which tests whether a diaspora has been able to survive and adapt against the corrosive impact of assimilation, cultural commonalities with the host society which hinder differentiation, internal tensions posed by the physical distance and temporal absence from the homeland. Moreover, the diaspora’s minority identity undergoes constant transformation and is subject to a constant interaction of history, culture and power (Hall 1990). Hence, the maintenance of diasporic consciousness necessitates a high degree of boundary-marking which is ‘a matter of will, of conscious decision and… determination’ (Marienstras 1989:125). In practical terms, this implies several things. First, within the diaspora, members must perceive themselves as belonging to a collectivity whose specific identity is clearly differentiated from the host’s identity and constructed through its communal institutions (Tölölyan 1991). The degree to which the diasporic community organises as embodied by its network of institutions is a powerful indicator of its ‘desire to endure’ (Chaliand and Rageau 1995:xviii). Usually, the community establishes specialised organisations to conduct, promote and defend their political, cultural, religious and economic interests in host countries (Sheffer 1986, 1993). Diasporic consciousness and mobilisation are easier to maintain within groups which have already developed clearly defined identities over several centuries, although this may also be facilitated where members feel a heightened sense of alienation within the host society (Safran 1991). Second, with regard to the ‘external’ dimension, group members must continue to relate to their co-nationals in the homeland and elsewhere in the diaspora, such that their collective consciousness is significantly defined by this relationship (Safran 1991). The notion of ‘homeland’ may not always be unproblematic. First, there may no longer be an existing homeland or national state. Second, the boundaries of the homeland may not be fixed, because the group is nomadic, straddles the boundaries of several states, or because the group has been ‘ethnically cleansed’ from key parts of the historical homeland. From within a host country, the diaspora maintains this relatedness sentimentally through the collective memory and myths, which communicate its cultural heritage, the reasons for dispersion, and any commitments to maintain, or return to, the homeland (Chaliand and Rageau 1995; Safran 1991). However, a diaspora community’s links to the homeland also have an equally significant ongoing material dimension. Individuals and diasporic communal organisations engage in a variety of meaningful practices linking them to their co-nationals in the form of communications, visits by public figures, financial remittances, lobbying national and international institutions and a variety of cultural, economic and political exchanges (Esman 1986). These contacts have the effect of preserving the diaspora’s links with the homeland, providing a form of solidarity which enables it to confirm its identity and its difference from the host. The manner in
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which the diaspora is viewed by the homeland also contributes to the maintenance of diaspora identity. However, co-nationals in the homeland itself may no longer similarly recognise them as members of the wider national community or display ambivalence towards them (Tölölyan 1991). A diaspora’s situation within its host and its ties beyond the host’s boundaries to the homeland constitute its relevance to global politics and furnish the diaspora with one central and common characteristic—‘a continuous involvement in a triadic relationship between the diaspora, the host country and the homeland. Consequently, all these diasporas are active in the trans-state arena and have a certain influence in international politics’ (Sheffer 1986:8). Each actor in the triad has its own interests which may lead to conflict between the parties, but which may also coincide to facilitate cooperation. The outcome will depend on the configuration and relations within the specific network. Although this notion of a triad was a significant development in comprehending the significance of diasporas in global politics, in reality it constitutes a simplification of configurations that often encompass more than three actors. In this regard, Constas and Platias (1993:4) described the so-called ‘triad’ containing Greece, the United States and the Greek-American diaspora as a pentagonal relationship which included Turkey and Cyprus because American Greeks regularly act against Turkey and also on behalf of Greek Cyprus. New relevance for old phenomena? Although a number of older diasporas have continued to thrive and have successfully reproduced themselves, there is a growing consensus amongst scholars that, due to recent dramatic changes in the global system, the number of ethnic groups who may be ‘sensibly described’ as diasporas is increasing and that diasporas in general are assuming a growing influence in global politics. This section will consider the underlying factors and events which have been put forward to explain the increased salience of diasporas in the global domain and consider the consequences of these changes. To this end, we shall refer to the work of five key scholars—Clifford (1993), Cohen (1996), Constas and Platias (1993), Sheffer (1993), and Tölölyan (1991), amongst whom there is a high degree of consensus on four main factors responsible for the transformation. First, trends associated with processes of globalisation enable ties with homelands and other ‘locales’ to be preserved. Second, there has been a qualitative increase in the levels of mass migration creating new diasporic communities or increasing the size of older ones. Third, cultural and political pluralism has become more widespread following the end of the Cold War, reducing the pressures to assimilate. Fourth, increasing ethnonationalism has led to a greater assertiveness of, and struggles over, identity and reawakening dormant diasporas. We will now turn to examine these factors on an individual basis.
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Globalisation The most comprehensive discussion of the impact of globalisation on diasporas is provided by Cohen (1995). Cohen (1995:12) contends that three aspects of globalisation ‘have opened up the spaces for diasporas to survive and thrive’ in the period of late modernity—a world economy characterised by enhanced transactions between its constituent parts; forms of international migration of a shorter duration; a cosmopolitan and hybridised culture produced and maintained by global players. For the purposes of this discussion we will restrict ourselves to the first two points, while immigration will be addressed in the following section. Cohen (1995:12) describes this late modern world economy as being characterised by ‘quicker and denser transactions between its sub-sectors and regions due to better communications, cheaper transport and the effects of liberal trade and capital-flow policies.’ Over the course of this century, and particularly in the post-World War II era, technological advances have demolished the natural and spatial impediments to contacts between disconnected segments of communities. Advances in transportation technology, particularly in relation to air travel, have facilitated easier and more affordable maintenance of a variety of exchanges and ties (familial, religious, political, business), which have the positive effect of reducing a sense of physical estrangement. It also makes it easier to transport arms to homelands in conflicts and as well as inflammatory or seditious materials. Nevertheless, whilst states are able to exercise some control over physical movements, this is more difficult in relation to communications technology, such as telephones, fax, satellite television and electronic mail. Diasporas now have the possibility of maintaining cheap and speedy permanent contacts with homelands through verbal communication, the transfer of information or money by computer, live coverage of dramatic events, largely unhindered by any political and legal barriers posed by the host government. Thus, these technologies offer diasporas an increased viability, a renewed interest in the homeland for ‘dormant diasporas’ (Shain 1993) and the creation of sophisticated networks of participation and communication with diasporic homelands (Sheffer 1993). Increased migratory flows Although Cohen lists international migration as one of his aspects of late modernity, this phenomenon is too old and important to be reduced to a mere process of globalisation. In fact, migration has increased steadily from the midnineteenth century as a result of improving transportation and uneven economic development (Esman 1986). However, new processes and technologies have resulted in unprecedented migratory flows (Constas and Platias 1993), enhancing the opportunities for maintaining old and new diasporas alike. Moreover, although the formation of new diasporas has been attributed to accelerated
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immigration to the industrialised world (Sheffer 1986; Tölölyan 1991), the bulk of population movements continue to be between developing countries (Weiner 1993b). Cohen (1995) contends that much of present international migration is short-term, noting that industrialised countries now offer only limited immigration opportunities, but Sheffer (1993) argues that sooner or later most migrants will settle down in their host countries and become members of an organised diaspora because they are disinclined both to return home or to assimilate fully. The major underlying causes for the migration continue to be the ongoing inequalities in the global political economy, the persistence of violent conflicts and political disorder across the world and the effects of natural disasters. For the people affected, the improvements which have occurred in terms of global transport and communications networks have served only to make the escape from poor conditions more of a possibility (Weiner 1993a). Continuing high levels of poverty in the developing world, allied with growing populations and surplus labour, provide an impetus for major population movements from ‘South to North’, supplemented by others now travelling ‘East to West’ following the political and economic transformation of the former Soviet bloc (Constas and Platias 1993). Furthermore, current global economic forces and attitudes (lowwage flexible labour regimes) have also created a demand which necessitates such migrations (Clifford 1993). However, unlike Armstrong’s (1976) proletarian diaspora, these diasporas are more likely to be educated, affluent and politically mobilised, more able to influence their host’s foreign policy (Constas and Platias 1993). Changes such as these herald a changing attitude towards diasporas and an acknowledgement of the power and influence they are able to wield. As Weiner stated, migration issues are ‘now matters of high international politics involving heads of states, ministries of defence, security and external relations’ (1993a:1). Increased levels of pluralism and tolerance Sheffer (1993), Constas and Platias (1993), and Cohen (1996) each claimed that there were global trends towards cultural and political pluralism which had begun in the liberal democracies and which had spread following the end of the Cold War. Until recently, the majority of European states perceived themselves as relatively homogeneous nation-states in which it was implicitly assumed that immigrants should be assimilated into each state’s hegemonic identity (Waever 1993). However, this aspiration to normative cultural and ethnic homogeneity was challenged in the post-World War II period in a number of ways—first, by the growth of immigrant populations of a greater cultural distance than previously; second, certain groups vigorously defended their right to maintain their cultural difference; third, by a degree of popular resistance to the acceptance of immigrants of such cultural difference; finally, a number of ‘multiculturalists’ viewed processes of assimilation as illiberal and advocated
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acceptance of some of immigrants’ values and culture by the host society (Waever 1993). In recent times circumstances have changed dramatically with major receiving countries in the industrialised world becoming increasingly culturally and ethnically heterogeneous entities which have abandoned assimilation as a policy (Tölölyan 1991; Waever 1993). Consequently, the increasing tolerance of cultural diversity by states has been matched by a growth in the assertion of diaspora identities and the desire to maintain external links. Increased ethnonationalism For many Western countries the end of Cold War meant not only the disappearance of a powerful external threat to their security, but also the loss of an important source of cohesion between the diverse groups which constitute them. In these states this transformation opened a space for allowing marginalised identities to be freely reasserted. Following the collapse of many authoritarian regimes across the world, this pluralism has also begun to develop across other parts of the global system. On a broader level, this has allowed a reawakening and expression of many ethnic and national identities after years of authoritarian rule. For diasporas in the Soviet bloc, the changes ended the enforced estrangement of their communities from their contacts with the homeland. Moreover, it also provided an impetus for the reawakening of a sense of ethnic identity amongst former members of diasporas in the West whose homelands had been subject to authoritarian regimes and who had ceased to participate in diasporic networks (Constas and Platias 1993). These diaspora communities had achieved a high degree of assimilation in their host countries, but had reactivated their moribund organisations and networks in response to dramatic events or misfortunes in their homelands. The collapse of communism has encouraged these groups to provide financial and technical assistance to help the process of reconstruction and transition to market economies and liberaldemocratic political systems, to become involved as interest groups in homeland politics and, on a more negative note, as participants in some of the ensuing conflicts. Although diasporas and the networks through which they operate have long played a significant but neglected role in global politics, this discussion has clearly shown that in marked ways the world has changed and that several processes—increasing migration, advances in communications and transportation technology, and growing political pluralism—have demonstrably enhanced the relevance of these old phenomena and the number of diasporas. Diasporas have become more important transnational actors on the global political, cultural and economic stage and now form an integral part of the global political structure. As Constas and Platias (1993) contend, the status of diasporas as international actors is confirmed by their fulfilment of three key criteria. First, they have an impact on international politics by influencing the behaviour of host countries, homelands and third parties. Second, diasporas are perceived as significant by
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state leaders and thus are regarded in their strategies. Third, they have a degree of autonomy from external influences, although they may be used as an instrument by other parties. If one accepts the view that global politics remains largely predicated on the existence of sovereign states, albeit as entities under challenge, then we may conclude that these enhanced diasporic groups pose a greater level of potential threat to the ‘national’ security of host countries, homelands and third parties than heretofore, particularly in terms of their loyalty, accountability and disproportionate ability to influence policy and wield power: the growing number as well as the more elaborate and efficient organizations of both migrants and diasporas, tend to increase the potential and the actual incidence of tension and conflict in host countries and in international politics…. Like most other social conflicts…they should be regarded as givens of present domestic and international politics. (Sheffer 1993:284) These issues will now be considered in detail in the final section. Diasporas and threats to security This analysis does not presume that diasporas are inherently inimical to the security of states or the global system. In fact, diasporas offer many opportunities for enhanced security by providing bridges between cultures and polities which facilitate cultural, political and economic exchanges and understanding. Today, many diaspora groups play an important role in the democratisation and development of their homelands, processes which have tangible consequences in terms of national, regional and global security. Nevertheless, the expanding power and numbers of diaspora communities pose an increasing potential for threats to the ‘national’ security of their host countries, homelands as well as to third parties enmeshed voluntarily or involuntarily in transnational diasporic networks and it is with this detail which we are concerned with here. Redefining security In order to formulate a definition of security applicable to threats posed by invigorated diasporic groups, we will use an article by Baldwin (1997) as a departure point. In this article, Baldwin contended that, in spite of its wide use in international relations, the conceptual analysis of security has been much neglected and that recent attempts to reorientate security away from military threats towards new issues had failed to receive appropriate attention. In Baldwin’s framework, security is a social construct rather than fixed, possessing different meanings in different societies (Huysmans 1995; Weiner 1993a). Thus, it is necessary to understand the context in which the notion of security is formed
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and from whose perspective this is being viewed. Baldwin (1997:13) defines security as ‘a low probability of damage to acquired values’. This broader and more relative view of security emphasises the preservation of acquired values rather than the existence or absence of threats, acknowledging that no actor can ever be wholly secure (Waever 1993). From this basis, the definition of security may be established through the specification of two factors. The first factor to be specified is a referent object, the actor(s) whose security is under discussion. In orthodox international relations, this has traditionally been the nation-state (Huysmans 1995), even though there is ‘nothing inevitable or permanent about defining security in state-centred terms’ (Waever 1993:20–1). However, Baldwin’s (1997) framework is equally applicable to the security of other levels of analysis whether the individual, ethnic or religious group, society, state, or international system. Second, it is necessary to specify the values to be protected, such as political autonomy, territorial integrity, or continuity of state identity. Although ‘state security’ continues to be relevant and states still face challenges to their values of sovereignty and territorial integrity (Waever 1993), the changing global landscape has allowed new agendas to emerge and given a greater prominence to other values which relate to other sectors, such as economic, environmental, and social security. Waever (1993) distinguished between state security (military, political, economic, environmental) and its concern with threats to its sovereignty, and societal security which relates to existential threats to a cultural identity, particularly in the areas of language, ethnicity and religion. This emphasis on the maintenance of the referent object’s identity was also highlighted by Huysmans (1995: 58), who remarked that ‘the security involved in the security construct is ontological security; it is a security which involves the continuity of self-identity…a struggle for survival.’ Clearly this is not another value, but one which reflects the survival of the referent object. Nevertheless, the formulation of a security policy necessitates the specification of further variables. These are: the source of specific threats; the degree of security given competing objectives; the means and policies for the pursuit of security; the opportunity cost of security for specific values; the time period for a given security policy (Baldwin 1997). It is also important to distinguish between the objective and subjective dimensions of security. While there are often clear differences between what can objectively be assessed as a ‘real’ threat and what is ‘perceived’ as such (Waever 1993), states and societies may feel insecure without the threat of armed attack— and the perception of threat may be regarded as significant as the threat itself. Moreover, fears ‘often do have a basis in reality, and whether they do or do not, fears shape the way peoples and their governments behave’ (Weiner 1993b:ix). As Waever (1993) suggested, there are a number of ways in which groups may perceive their identities as threatened: suppression of their expression (language, names or dress); impeding their ability to reproduce through the closure of key cultural institutions or exile of members; competition with other incompatible identities or the immigration of ‘others’.
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The high degree of specificity present in Baldwin’s (1997) analysis suitably illustrates the multifaceted nature of security and enables it to be redefined so that it is appropriate to the study of diasporas. However, it is necessary to amend his definition for our purposes and security will be defined as the relative absence of real or perceived threats and low vulnerability of damage to the identity and acquired values of specified collectivities in important sectors of its collective life. These changes allow the definition to address a number of points outlined above. First, the existence or absence of perceived and real threats are so central to our understanding of security that it was felt necessary to reinclude this in a modified form. Second, it was felt that ‘vulnerability’ conveyed the openness of referent objects to risk more accurately than ‘probability’. Third, the inclusion of ‘specified collectivities’ makes clear that security is not the exclusive concern of the state. Fourth, the need for existential survival is such a central motivation for all collectivities that it necessitated specification as a separate value. Diasporas and threats to national and global security This section explores a number of important threats, real or perceptible, which the heightened significance of diasporas poses to the identity and acquired values of actors implicated in diasporic networks. In particular we will examine their impact on the ‘national’ security of their host countries and homelands, before turning to consider their effects on third parties who are enmeshed voluntarily or involuntarily in these networks. To facilitate this discussion we will utilise a taxonomy developed by Weiner (1993a), which suggests five broad types of situation in which ‘migrants’ may be perceived as a threat to their homelands, hosts or between the two sides. For our purposes, we will adapt and supplement this in order to deal with: first, the specific sources of tension and conflict which arise from the ‘rather unique and precarious existence of diasporas, as well as the main patterns of loyalty they develop’ (Sheffer 1993:283); and second, the impact on the much neglected third parties who are often implicated in diasporic networks, but who do not figure in the rather narrow ‘triadic’ configuration. The revised taxonomy of situations where diasporas may be perceived as threats to acquired values and identities is as follows: 1 Diaspora communities are hostile to homeland regimes and attempt to destabilise them. 2 Diaspora communities are used by host states as an instrument against their homelands either as agents and resources, or for blackmail. 3 Diasporas as a political threat to the host society by acting as an instrument of homelands, through excessive influence on host foreign policy, or involvement in sponsoring illegal or other activities which problematise the host’s relations with homelands or third parties.
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4 Diasporas constitute threats to the host’s cultural identity and values through their desire to maintain their own distinct identity and institutions, implying a disinclination to assimilate into the host identity. 5 Diasporas as an economic or social problem in terms of crime and a drain on social welfare budgets due to their housing and education needs. 6 Diasporas as a political threat to the identity and values of third parties, and to regional and global security, through their support of homeland aggression and irredentism, the use of political and economic resources to block assistance to parties affected by their activities and their lack of accountability for their actions. Factors influencing the likelihood of these threat scenarios arising include the following variables—the size, history and location(s) of the diaspora’s sectors, its levels of mobilisation and organisation, the relative distribution of power and wealth, the self-perception (values and objectives) and mutual perception of the parties concerned, inter alia. As Esman (1986:344) notes, both host and home governments have ‘varying capacities, opportunities and inclinations to become involved in activities that affect diaspora communities.’ It is not possible to draw generalised conclusions which are appropriate to all diasporas, and each case requires separate consideration. Diasporas and threats to homelands Apart from their sentimental ties with their homeland, diasporic communities usually maintain cordial material links to their homeland and are generally welldisposed to provide assistance and to act in home government’s interest in interstate relations (Esman 1986). However, such cordial ties may not always exist. A diasporic community can be highly heterogeneous and, while many of its members may have emigrated voluntarily, others—often political exiles, religious dissidents or refugees—may have been expelled from the homeland. Thus, some groups and individuals may display a high degree of hostility towards the homeland regime, as distinct to the homeland, a situation made more probable where the host’s democracy contrasts with the homeland’s authoritarianism (Weiner 1993a). Where the homeland fails to sustain friendly relations with its diaspora, or becomes engaged in active confrontation with it, this may portend serious implications for its own security. The consequences are largely dependent upon the intensity of mutual antipathy, diaspora solidarity and organisation, and the incentives for mobilisation (Shain 1989). This might imply relatively passive opposition in the form of a suspension of cultural contacts and financial assistance, and muted criticism of the regime. On a more serious level, influential sectors of the diaspora, who have taken umbrage at the behaviour or policies of the regime, may seek to exert a moral or material influence on events in the homeland in order to actively oppose or destabilise its regime (Esman
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1986; Shain 1989; 1993). This influence may take the form of the promotion and transmission of propaganda to the homeland denouncing its lack of legitimacy or democracy (such as Cuban exiles’ use of Radio and TV Marti), financing opposition groups and armed insurgencies (as in the support provided by the Irish-American organisation NORAID for republican causes in Northern Ireland), lobbying host and other governments and international institutions to withhold support or break off relations with the homeland and recognise governments-in-exile. While these activities may often be laudable from a pluralist perspective, they can have awkward reverberations on other relationships within a diasporic network. The diaspora’s success at damaging the stability or credibility of the homeland regime may be such that this leads to requests for the host government to restrain the diaspora’s activities. As Esman (1986) observed, this has led to the Irish government asking the US government to prevent arms shipments to the IRA and Beijing to request Southeast Asian states to stop funds being channelled to Taiwan. A failure to prevent the escalation of these activities by host countries may also lead to them being held responsible by homeland regimes, leading to direct conflicts between them or diplomatic action to counter their perceived involvement (Weiner 1993a). For opportunistic hosts, breakdowns in relations between diasporas and their homelands provide an opening for them to use the diaspora as agents or instruments to pursue its own political and economic interests. Such arrangements can be beneficial to both sides as ‘the diaspora may be a convenient and low-cost for the host government, while by supporting its government, the diaspora enhances its status and security’ (Esman 1986: 342). In circumstances where homelands do not have repressive or authoritarian regimes, the diaspora is not seen to represent a legitimate alternative to the nation in exile and its powerful, even overweening, influence on the affairs and culture of the homeland becomes more problematic. It should be noted that members of the diaspora are not domiciled in the homeland, may not possess formal citizenship and largely do not formally participate in its democratic political process or perform the obligations implied by such systems through the payment of taxes, performing military service and so on. The ability to profoundly influence events in another state or society, possibly as the instrument of another state, which one may never have visited, suggests a potential for threats to the security of the homeland through a frightening lack of accountability, if not a perversion of its democracy. For example, diasporas may pressurise homelands to adopt inappropriate policies based on outmoded premises rather than the current geopolitical context. They may engage in activities which endanger a rapprochement between former adversaries and exacerbate conflicts, which many have contended is the case with Irish-Americans and certain Jewish groups in the United States. It is apparent that the interests of diasporas and homelands cannot be identical by virtue of their different circumstances and conditions. There is a potential for differences in other dimensions and it may be argued that diasporas can also pose
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a threat to the homeland’s cultural identity. All identities are subject to transformation and evolve in the light of historical processes and events. Even amongst relatively recently founded diasporas, the diaspora identity can be distinguished from that of the homeland by virtue of its defining experience of dispersion, and this difference will be heightened when this event is particularly traumatic. In spite of the continuing links connecting the two groups, each community will undergo distinct experiences in their individual contexts and the passage of time compounds the potential for greater differentiation. Thus, no matter how appreciative homelands are for assistance from the diaspora, its members may also be viewed negatively—for vulgarising the ethnic culture, being tainted by other cultures, being too ambitious or politically demanding— and returnees may not be welcomed back (Safran 1991). Returnees from more advanced countries may pose threats to the given order by unsettling the political, social or economic balance, creating a sense of inferiority, and ironically given their persistence in host countries, creating problems of integration and assimilation, as in the case of Soviet Jews settling in Israel (Safran 1991). Diasporas and threats to host countries Our taxonomy highlighted three primary contexts in which diasporas may be perceived as threats to their host society—first, as a political threat or security risk as a consequence of their external links to homelands and diasporic networks; second, as a cultural threat to its identity and values through the preservation of their own distinct identity and institutions; and third, as an economic or social problem posing disproportionate costs and burdens. Given the constraints of space, the third area of threat will be briefly discussed together with threats arising from cultural factors. Diasporas and the political security of the host While differences in identity underpin the perception that diasporas constitute a political threat to their hosts in a variety of manifestations, it is the defining aspect of diasporic identity—the maintenance of sentimental and material links with ‘their’ homeland through transnational networks—which gives rise to a perception of threats to the security to a host state or society. In many ways the links to diasporic homelands, which are often other states, may be deemed as ‘loyalties and solidarities inconsistent with and sometimes even contradicting the traditional allegiances to territorial states’ (Sheffer 1986:1). Hence, diasporas find themselves simultaneously in both an existential dilemma and a security dilemma. In order to allay perceptions of disloyalty or dual loyalties among other members of a host society, they must assimilate or cut their links to their homeland. However, if they assimilate or sever their ties, they cease to be a diaspora. Put another way, in a global political system predicated on nation-
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states, diasporas seem to be expected to reconcile the irreconcilable. This dilemma is compounded as there is ‘explicit and implicit continuous competition between homelands and host countries about moral and practical authority over the members of the diaspora’ (Sheffer 1993:279). However, whether or not the perception of threat arises depends on the activities in which the diaspora and its organisations are engaged, on whose behalf they are acting, and the quality of relations between the host and homeland. The specialised organisations established by diasporic communities facilitate communication with the homeland, but also enable the diaspora to conduct certain forms of political activity. In particular, they provide the basis for performing a significant role in the foreign policies of both host countries and homelands by constraining their behaviour, by having an autonomous influence on events and policies in both countries, and finally by influencing events and policies and outcomes in home and host countries acting as an instrument (Constas and Platias 1993). The ability of diasporas to exert this influence depends on two factors. First, on their possession of the requisite organisation and motivation (leadership, coordination, collective will) necessary to mobilise members and maintain a solidarity and commitment to achieve their objectives. Crises are particularly effective in this regard, but the intensity of such feelings may wax and wane over time. Second, on the existence of an appropriate political opportunity structure in the host country which embodies the degree to which the host is sensitive to, or prepared to tolerate, the political activism of diasporas. This particular factor determines not only the extent to which they may organise and act, but also the levels of access to its policy-makers to which they are permitted (Constas and Platias 1993). In more closed and authoritarian host countries, it is more difficult for diaspora organisations to operate openly, especially in terms of maintaining relations with the homeland. In these contexts, the mere existence of organisations representing the interests of the diaspora may be sufficient to cause confrontations, although this is likely to be more acute where these form part of a transnational network (Sheffer 1993). In some circumstances, as in the Cold War, the host regime may fear that the actions of these organisations pose threats to its sovereignty or vital interests, and give rise to problems of dual loyalties. Such confrontations have often arisen as a direct result of changes in the host’s or homeland’s foreign policies and may lead to further restrictions on diaspora activities, particularly in their transnational networks. In the past, perceptions of threat or paranoia have developed or been manipulated to such levels of hysteria that other sectors of society have visited extreme violence—mass expulsions, massacres, and genocide—to devastating effect upon whole diaspora communities as exemplified by the cases of Jews in Europe, Asians in East Africa, and Palestinians in Kuwait (Sheffer 1993). In relatively tolerant pluralist societies the external links of diasporas are accepted on the implicit understanding that these organisations do not engage in activities which may endanger the host’s political security by compromising its
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sovereignty or interests, which breach its laws or which engage in overtly treasonable or disloyal behaviour. Many host states take the attitude that diaspora organisations also offers a means for them to exercise a certain amount of control over these activities, although this opportunity is now threatened by the use of less easily regulated new technologies. Nevertheless, such scenarios facilitate a wide scope of possible activities for diaspora organisations to pursue formally their own interests and exert influence relatively unimpeded. In countries which have fragmented or decentralised power structures and are relatively sensitive to societal demands, powerful interest groups like diasporas are more able to influence or manipulate policy-making towards their own ends. In the paradigmatic case of the United States, various diasporic lobbies—notably the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian—have profoundly affected the US foreign policy on behalf of the homelands (providing military and economic assistance, arms sales, diplomatic recognition, boycotts and embargoes of third parties) through publicity and media pressure, demonstrations, petitions, campaign contributions, and intervention in electoral campaigns threats, directed at both Congress and the US Presidency (Constas and Platias 1993). The ability to exert this degree of influence may, however, pose threats to the host’s security. It is extremely questionable as to whether such small unrepresentative but vocal minority interest groups should be able to exert such a disproportionate influence, or constrain the host’s freedom on policies which ought to be more objectively defined and represent the interests of a greater segment of society. As Esman (1986) poignantly observed, it is a widely-held belief in the United States that the Jewish lobby has distorted American Middle Eastern foreign policy. As a consequence, diasporas may have a negative impact on the host’s economic, cultural and political relations with other parties who do not subscribe to the same policies. Furthermore, diasporic activities may affect the security of host states in less benign ways beyond exerting an excessive influence on the host’s foreign policy or acting as an instrument of the homeland. For example, in recent years certain diasporas—Algerians in France and Kurds in Germany—have allowed homeland conflicts to spill over into the host state through their involvement in terrorist acts against opposing groups (see Chapter 6). A further recent example has been seen in the growing use of diasporic networks by members of the Turkish diaspora in London to transport heroin into the United Kingdom. Other examples may be found in the use of often elaborate transnational networks for money-laundering and other criminal activity, links with other terrorist or armed groups, and so forth, which may create internal security problems as well as drawing host states into conflicts with third parties. In the light of this, it is not surprising that Sheffer (1993) concluded that tensions and conflicts between host countries and diaspora are more frequently caused by the activities and attitudes of the diaspora than vice-versa. A clear tension and potential for conflict exists between the attitudes and interests of the different parties, but as far as possible diasporas will attempt to
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avoid a perception of partiality. On the one hand, homelands may exploit diaspora sentiments to pursue their national interests and have traditionally been keen on using them as foreign policy and financial assets (Esman 1986; Safran 1991). Simultaneously, on the other hand, host countries will adopt a mixture of incentives and implied coercion through an emphasis on the need for activities to be legal (Sheffer 1993). As we noted earlier, diasporas are normally inclined to act in the homeland’s interest in interstate relations, particularly where these coincide with their own objectives. This may not always be possible though, particularly when relations between the host and homeland are at a low ebb or where the two sides are engaged in conflict. Of course, the loyalty of some diaspora members to their homelands will always take precedence over that to their host countries. However, some diaspora groups may be sensitive or vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty, and are loath to be portrayed as an extension or lobby for foreign interests, because their own security and status may be at risk. Thus, where there is a clash of interests between the host and homeland, the less able the diaspora is to reconcile its own interests with those of the homeland, the more likely the diaspora is to give precedence to its own domestic security needs by accepting certain rules of behaviour rather than risking its victimisation for the sake of the homeland. Nevertheless, this vulnerability may be exploited by both sides to stimulate or inhibit political activity (Shain 1993). This erring towards self-preservation may be prudent given homelands’ often ambivalent attitude towards their diasporas. According to Sheffer (1993), the majority of homeland states develop a relatively cynical attitude towards their diasporas, which they expect to exhibit complete loyalty, and exploit them for their own narrow national interests, including their use in espionage and other activities which may affect the host’s security. When diasporas are consequently discriminated against, threatened with mistreatment or have already become victims of a confrontation (as refugees, expellees, internees), they may seek protection from the homeland government and this may lead to some form of intervention on their behalf (military action, negotiations, or lobbying). However, when relations between a host and the diaspora or homeland sour, homelands are generally either reluctant or cautious of becoming involved in confrontations to defend the interests of their diasporas, as seen in China’s behaviour in relation to its diasporas in Southeast Asia. There are, of course, limits to what a disconnected and possibly distant homeland is able to do, but the diplomatic costs and dangers of intervention as well as the principle of noninterference in other sovereign states also play a part (Esman 1986). In the final analysis, homelands will rarely jeopardise their own security or other important interests for those of their diasporas.
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Diasporas and the cultural security of hosts The salience of threats posed by diaspora communities to the political security of states, primarily through subversion, fits more neatly within traditional conceptions of international relations than the idea that the security of host states and societies may be threatened by the culture and values of a resident minority diaspora community. However, following the loss of more traditional military threats implied by the end of the Cold War, academic and popular attention has refocused on perceived and real threats to acquired values emanating from other quarters, namely to economic, environmental and particularly ontological or identity security. The latter is concerned with the survival or sustainability of the identities of particular collectivities in the face of real or perceived existential threats and under changing conditions. The importance of this area was emphasised by Sheffer (1993) who opined that differences in identity of diasporas and host societies are the cause of all their conflicts and that all other reasons which may be apparent follow from this. In terms of identity construction, the perpetuation of separate groups demonstrates that both entities are engaged in processes of boundary formation and maintenance, or inclusion and exclusion, which are mutually constitutive. Nevertheless, for our purposes we are concerned only with the issue of how and why host societies perceive threats to their ontological security. According to Waever (1993), the authority and legitimacy of state institutions has come to depend increasingly on its claim to offer social and economic security as opposed to protection from real or imaginary external military threats, which had long been the principal justification for their monopoly of power. This contention is a powerful one, but it is also clear that the state has long provided a high degree of ontological security inherent in societal security as can be witnessed by its use and abuse of nationalist ideology. However, a number of changes outlined earlier have in many ways led to an increasing perception of threat to the security of identities within host societies, namely increasing levels of immigration, growing acceptance of cultural pluralism, the abandonment of assimilation by receiving states, and advances in technology which facilitate the maintenance of meaningful links by migrants with their sending countries. At a broader level, the degree to which a host perceives diaspora communities as an existential threat will depend in large part upon the form of its society and its political institutions and their historical attitude to such immigrant groups— for example, tolerance, indifference, assimilation, exclusion or discrimination. Historically, some skilled ‘middlemen’ diasporas were welcomed by their hosts and their talents exploited in order to serve the host’s interests, while others were mistreated as inimical aliens and put into ghettos where they could not contaminate the host culture. Until recently, most industrialised receiving states aimed to create culturally homogeneous nation-states with a uniform national identity and to that end undertook policies of assimilation. The virtually
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complete abandonment of such policies is symptomatic of the problems which even tolerant host countries face in relation to diasporas. As Clifford (1993) asserted, states like the United States which subscribe to an assimilationist ideology are unable to assimilate groups which preserve significant loyalties and material links to a homeland or other sectors of the community, in contrast to other immigrants who wish to be assimilated. This may pose no problems for those who might be termed as ‘multiculturalists’, but for many others in host countries the failure to assimilate may be perceived as a rejection of the dominant culture’s identity and values. By preserving their own distinct identity and institutions, they are perceived as signifying that ‘they’ are not one of ‘us’. This then poses the dilemma for host countries, namely to what degree is it legitimate or necessary to insist that newcomers accept current political and social norms (Cohen 1995). The complete absence of any degree of assimilation implies a potential inability for the diaspora to play any meaningful part in the cultural, economic and political life of the host country and an obvious inability for diasporas to pursue their own and the homeland’s interests within this context. On the other hand, by succumbing to assimilation pressures, diasporas face the risk that the community will lose its cohesion and become alienated from its links with the homeland. There are, needless to say, additional factors aside from the degree of assimilation of the community’s members which will determine whether ‘they’ are perceived as threatening to the hegemonic identity. First, such perceptions will take account of the extent to which the community has overtly organised its own distinct or parallel institutions. Furthermore, the increasing quantity, scope and efficiency of such organisations is likely to raise the potential and the actual incidence of tension and conflict with the host (Sheffer 1993). Second, the location and size of the diasporic community, both in absolute terms and in relation to the indigenous population, may have an impact on the perceptions regarding the capacity of the host society’s various institutions to absorb and adapt to the diaspora (Waever 1993). Although attitudes to what is acceptable will vary, many governments and individuals alike fear that large numbers of immigrants, particularly those belonging to groups resistant to assimilation, may destabilise the state and society by weakening its cultural identity, disturb a delicate ethnic balance, and impose strains on their welfare and economy (Waever 1993; Weiner 1993b). Weiner emphatically states that such perceptions should not be summarily dismissed as xenophobic, paranoid or inhumane responses, as these insecurities relate to important aspects of human life in areas such as employment, welfare, and housing. The perception of cultural threat is likely to be particularly acute where diasporas become concentrated in specific areas or occupations, whether this is caused through discrimination or selfimposed (Tölölyan 1991; Waever 1993). Finally, the perception of threat outlined in the last point is further compounded where the degree of difference between the host society and diaspora is such that they may be unassimilable. The host’s boundary may be solidified and its perception of threat reinforced
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where diasporas are viewed as physically or culturally distinctive or where their values and behavioural norms—especially in terms of politics and religion—are mutually incompatible (Tölölyan 1991; Waever 1993). From this discussion it can be concluded that diasporas are not constructed as threats to the cultural values and identity in isolation, for both communities engage in processes of boundary-marking characterised by ‘a dialectic of trust and fear’ (Huysmans 1995:60). This leads to the creation of an ‘us’ whom we include and trust, and a ‘them’ whom we exclude and fear. Where diasporic communities pose real threats in objective terms, or are perceived to be threatening, the survival of the host’s cultural identity and way of life is placed at the centre of the security agenda. The diaspora identity is invested with danger, distance and worthlessness and collective action may occur to eliminate the threat via exclusion, assimilation or destruction (Huysmans 1995). Diasporas and threats to third parties It has already been demonstrated that the often politically-charged activities of diasporas have the potential to jeopardise the acquired values and identities of their hosts and homelands. However, the impact of diasporic activities often reverberate beyond the triad of the diaspora and its host and homeland; indeed, such actions may have been intended to have an effect upon the political, economic and cultural security of third parties, whether states, other collectivities or international institutions. By virtue of the existence of a system of sovereign states and the maintenance of links between diasporas and their homelands, other actors—host states, other parts of the diaspora, third parties which interact with the motherland—may become enmeshed voluntarily or involuntarily in complex transnational diasporic networks. Thus, this characterisation of diasporic networks as a triadic configuration must then be discounted as a simplification of reality. Earlier we cited Constas and Platias’ (1993) contention that the triad consisting of Greece, the United States and the Greek diaspora in the United States usually incorporated Turkey and Greece in a pentagonal relationship as the diasporic group regularly acts against Turkey as well on behalf of the Greek sector of Cyprus. Once again, this constitutes a slight simplification as a number of other important actors are directly and indirectly involved in this quagmire —United States (host), Greece (homeland), Greek-Americans, Greek Cyprus and other Greek diasporas, plus third parties such as Turkish Cyprus, Turkey, together with international organisations in the shape of NATO (Greece and Turkey as members), the UN (peacekeeping force), and the EU (Greek Cypriot application for membership and the influence of Greece and diaspora lobbies in member states). Moreover, while not necessarily the norm, such complex situations are also far from unusual. In another particularly high profile case, namely the situation of Jews in the USSR seeking emigration, the various processes concerned the Soviet Jews themselves, the Soviet government, Israel, Jewish diaspora groups in the United
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States and elsewhere, the US government, and lest we forget, Palestinians whose lives have been profoundly affected by the immigration and housing needs of large numbers of Jews from the USSR. The degree to which diaspora activities affect the security of third parties depends on their inclination to become involved in activities which have implications beyond the homeland. However, when the diaspora perceives the existence of a crisis situation in which the survival or existential security of the homeland is at stake—as exemplified by Israel’s Six Day War, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, or the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia—;there is a powerful impetus for diaspora mobilisation. The outcome of this can be seen in fundraising to provide financial or logistical support to the homeland, a redoubling of pressures on foreign policy-makers in host states, lobbying of international organisations to act against third parties by freezing aid or military assistance, by forcing a change in policy or an end to aggression and through the use of various forms of diplomatic action. These activities will have ramifications for the behaviour of all actors directly or indirectly involved in these conflicts (Constas and Platias 1993). Although these activities have clear implications for the security of other states, if this is to ensure the survival of the homeland against the aggression of belligerent neighbour states then this would seem to be motivated by good intentions. The recent role of Irish-Americans in securing a new IRA cessation of violence should be seen in this light and this will enhance the security of those third parties—for example Germany and the Netherlands— who have been directly affected by the IRA’s activities on their sovereign territory. However, the roles and motives of diaspora groups have in many other instances been questionable or insensitive, facilitating or perpetuating aggressive conflicts by the motherland, supporting irredentism, and using their often considerable political and economic clout to block developmental assistance to third parties in pursuit of ancient interethnic feuds, all of which have had the effect increasing conflict and exacerbating regional or global tension. It will suffice here to cite two recent examples. In the first, a Jewish-American bingo tycoon obtained planning permission to build a large Jewish settlement in Arab East Jerusalem which led to further major crises in the foundered peace process (Borger 1997). In the second instance, Armenian-Americans lobbied the US Congress to continue the 1992 restrictions on aid to Azerbaijan imposed in response to its energy blockade of Armenia in spite of its military defeat by Armenia and massive refugee problems. Simultaneously, the Armenian diaspora was funding the reconstruction of a road linking Armenia and NagornoKarabakh across annexed Azerbaijani territory (Meek 1997; Ottaway and Morgan 1997). Reducing the security of the third party will not help resolve the differences between these groups, but will rather inflame already difficult relations. Consequently, it would appear that there is a growing risk that diaspora groups, with their enhanced ability to influence events in global politics, will
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undertake activities which jeopardise the security of third parties while not being accountable for their actions. Conclusion This chapter has examined the significance of diasporas and the types of threats they pose to the security of a range of actors, primarily their host states, homelands and certain third parties. In the light of earlier neglect of this theme in international relations, it began with a detailed discussion of the widely appropriated notion of diaspora. It was demonstrated that the definition of diaspora should be opened out to encompass a broad range of groups from a variety of origins, but which desire to endure as separate entities and most importantly to maintain their links with a homeland. From this foundation, we concluded that the pertinence of diasporas to global politics stemmed from its participation in complex transnational networks providing connections between different segments of the diaspora, their host countries, and the homeland, a configuration which often engages a number of third parties who may be directly or indirectly affected by, or involved in, these relations. The second section explored the contention that diasporas have an increasing relevance and impact as actors as a result of processes transforming the global political system. It was concluded that several ongoing processes, including advances in transportation and communications technology, increasing migratory flows, and increasing levels of pluralism and tolerance in host countries, have provided diasporas with greater autonomy, power and opportunities for the assertion of their identities and interests. These changes have qualitatively enhanced the ability of diasporas to play an influential role in global politics and as a consequence pose a greater potential to threaten the security of other actors and their interests. The final section of this chapter then contemplated the ramifications of diasporic activities for the security of others. It was noted that the concept of security has a history of conceptual neglect which mirrors that of diaspora. Similarly, it was made clear that traditional conceptions of security needed to be revised to incorporate threats and perceptions of threat arising from fears for the survival of collective identities and values, in addition to those relating to military threats. A revised conception of security was applied in order to discuss enhanced potential of diasporas for posing threats to the political, economic and cultural security of their homelands, host countries and third parties enmeshed in diasporic networks. It was concluded that it has become more difficult to control diasporas and to hold them to account for their activities. Moreover, they have a greater capacity to threaten various sectors of the security of an increasing range of actors, shown by their potential to constitute threats to the national security of host, homeland and third-party countries alike, all of which may have a wider impact upon regional and global stability. However, at the same time, the many responsible diasporic communities offer the possibility to bridge cultures, to limit conflicts, facilitate interaction and commerce between
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peoples, and play a powerful role in the democratisation and development of societies in which they have meaningful connections and interests. Finally, the growing potential of diasporas for threatening the security of other significant actors appears to be symptomatic of the declining ability of the nationstate to assert itself as the primary focus of allegiance and ‘call the shots’ in global politics. We should not forget that diasporas ‘pre-dated the nation-state, lived within it and now may, in significant respects, transcend and succeed it’ (Cohen 1995:16). The growth in the number and influence of diasporas, and expanding implications for national and global security are likely to continue. Further, as Rosenau (1993:xvi) made clear: ‘Given the ever greater salience of diasporas, it seems unimaginable that international relations theorists will not have to make a place for them in their analytical frameworks.’ References Armstrong, J. (1976) ‘Mobilized and proletarian diasporas’, American Political Science Review 70:393–408. ——(1996) ‘Archetypal diaspora’, in J.Hutchinson and A.D.Smith, (eds) Ethnicity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 120–7. Baldwin, D.A. (1997) ‘The concept of security’, Review of International Studies, 23(1): 5– 26. Borger, J. (1997) ‘Bingo tycoon threatens Jerusalem’s future’, The Guardian, 26 July, p. 15. Chaliand, G. and Rageau, J-P. (1995) Penguin Atlas of Diasporas, New York: Viking. Clifford, J. (1993) ‘Diasporas’, Cultural Anthropology 9(3):302–38. Cohen, R. (1995) ‘Rethinking “Babylon”: iconoclastic conceptions of the diasporic experience’, New Community 21(1):5–18. ——(1996) ‘Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims to challengers’, International Affairs 72(3):507–20. Constas, D.C. and Platias, A.G. (1993) ‘Diasporas in world politics: an introduction’, in D.C.Constas and A.G.Platias (eds) The Greeks in Comparative Perspective, London: Macmillan, pp. 3–28. Esman, M.J. (1986) ‘Diasporas and international relations’, in G.Sheffer (ed.) Modern Diasporas and International Politics, London: Croom Helm, pp. 333–49. Hall, S. (1990) ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, in J.Rutherford (ed.) Identity: Community, Culture and Difference, London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 222–37. Huysmans, J. (1995) ‘Migrants as security problem: dangers of “securitizing” societal issues’, in R.Miles and D.Thränhardt (eds), Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, London: Pinter, pp. 53–72. Marienstras, R. (1989) ‘On the notion of diaspora’, in G.Chaliand (ed.) Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States, London: Pluto, pp. 119–25. Meek, J. (1997) ‘To the victor the spoils’, The Guardian, 9 June, p. 11. Ottaway, D. and Morgan, D. (1997) ‘US aides seek the Caspian’s black gold’, The Guardian, 8 July, p. 17.
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Rosenau, J.N. (1993) ‘Foreword’, in D.C.Constas and A.G.Platias (eds) Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective, London: Macmillan, xv– xxi. Safran, W. (1991) ‘Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return’, Diaspora 1(1): 83–99. Seton-Watson, H. (1977) ‘Diaspora nations’, in Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, London: Methuen, pp. 383–415. Shain, Y. (1989) The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. ——(1993) ‘Democrats and secessionists: US diasporas as regime destabilizers’, in M.Weiner (ed.) International Migration and Security, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 287–322. Sheffer, G. (1986) ‘A new field of study: modern diasporas in international politics’, in G.Sheffer (ed.) Modern Diasporas and International Politics, London: Croom Helm, pp. 1–15. ——(1993) ‘Ethnic diasporas: a threat to their hosts’, in M.Weiner (ed.) International Migration and Security, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 263–85. Tölölyan, K. (1991) ‘Rethinking diaspora(s): stateless power in the transnational moment’, Diaspora 5(1): 3–36. Waever, O. (1993) Securitization and Desecuritization, Working Paper no. 5, Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research. Weiner, M. (1993a) ‘Introduction: security, stability and international migration’, in M.Weiner (ed.) International Migration and Security, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 1–35. ——(1993b) ‘Preface’, in M.Weiner (ed.) International Migration and Security, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. ix–xix.
4 Mapping territoriality
The geopolitics of sovereignty, governance and the citizen Peter Marden
In the present era of international politics, whether one refers to it as belonging to the vagaries of globalisation or some postmodern domain, there seems to be an intellectual obligation to revisit critically some long-held cherished assumptions about politics and society. Indeed, to suggest that the territorial boundaries of states are no longer commensurate with political authority and absolute control is hardly innovative. Nor is it necessarily startling to recognise the growing network of non-state organisations exercising levels of influence over states and national policy-making agendas. If anything, the literature on globalisation has at least brought this to our attention. But to what extent has some of the language and conceptual iconography usually associated with a state-centred polity come under serious scrutiny? Notions of difference, ethnicity and the cultural realm of identity politics have all surfaced as essential features of the contemporary international political landscape. This is not surprising when one considers the diverse and powerful responses to the dimensions of international migration. Indeed, the accommodation of cultural differences is becoming a real test of tolerance for some communities. But what impact are these events and recognitions having on hitherto unproblematised conceptualisations of territoriality and sovereignty? This chapter will examine how broader understandings of territoriality and sovereignty will help us come to grips with what many have called postmodern world politics. Rather than rallying around the call for the ‘end of geography’ this analysis will affirm the imperative of geography, but only through a redefinition of these foundational terms. By adopting a broader perspective on these terms, the issues surrounding the nature of governance and the challenges to the state also become clear. Hence, the need to break away from previous deterministic geopolitical theoretical frameworks concerning territoriality and world politics. This chapter is primarily theoretical and it is hoped that new areas for research and discussion concerning international political space can be opened. Geopolitics and the nation-state So much of our theoretical literature in the humanities and social sciences is based on traditional conceptualisations about the nation-state as a defining
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geographical and historical entity. Indeed, there are some concepts that appear to only have meaning when applied within the nation-state framework, and much of our Western legal reasoning is grounded on these assumptions. It is now widely recognised, however, that some of the problems facing nations are forcing us to rethink the specificities of the past. For example, environmentalists for quite some time have been pointing to the inability of states to manage and control environmental problems. The recent fires in Southeast Asia are an unfortunate reminder that this inability, matched with a lack of political will, can have disastrous ramifications beyond that of loss of life, such as the chronic impact on the agricultural productivity of an entire region. The very idea of ‘security’ within the nation-state is also being redefined due to changes in the relations between states and the global nature of problems which are interlinked. There is, of course, good reason not to exaggerate this shift in our understanding as the Gulf War and its ongoing legacy demonstrate. The nature of conflict between states may be changing but the potential of real aggression is still present. The point though, is that the risks associated with long-term environmental degradation, of hunger, of shortages of oil or electricity, of unemployment and penury and perhaps of preventable disease, are adding new dimensions to the problems of national security. Rosenau (1994:255) sums it up well with the observation that security is more elusive than ever because ‘it is embedded in the interaction of localizing and globalizing forces.’ How can we say there is a decline in the authority of the state within its territorial borders? It has been argued that: we must look to the quality of that authority. It rests on the failure of most governments to discharge those very basic functions for which the state as an institution was created—the maintenance of civil law and order, the defence of the territory from the depredation of foreign invaders, the guarantee of sound money to the economy, and the assurance of clear, judicially interpreted rules regarding the basic exchanges of property between buyers and sellers, lenders and borrowers, landlords and tenants…;the very idea of a social contract could not have been conceived without the economic necessity of civic cooperation between state and society. (Strange 1996:xii) In many respects this cooperation is breaking down as the state attempts to deal with numerous social and economic agendas being shaped by exogenous factors. We will see evidence of this later when I look closely at the nature of governance and how this political task has become both delicate and complex for states to perform. On one hand, civil society is vibrant and offering new opportunities for political expression and community development, yet on the other hand, it is being squeezed by the state intervening not on the basis to fulfil social obligations but for purposes of attracting international capital interests quite often at odds
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with grassroots alternatives. Indeed, perhaps the most crucial question of all about the state is: government for whom and in whose interest? This era of globalisation is bringing with it a new set of responsibilities and obligations that lie well outside the parameters of the traditional domestic constituency. A recognisable part of this constituency, however, is placing increasing demands on the state to meet international obligations over specific global problems. The language of human rights, environment and markets is transnational in both meaning and context. However, international law has clearly been developed faster than individual nationstates can fulfil their regulatory responsibilities, or develop an institutional capacity to deal with the complexities involved. It is also predicated on a number of inconsistencies and contradictions. On one hand, nation-states are expected to engage in global dialogue and meaningful strategies to offset environmental disaster, yet on the other hand, they are also expected to control and manage market forces along nationalistic lines, sometimes by the same constituency. So the question, ‘government for whom’, is a vexed one. Constituencies need to be identified and located and the democratic implications considered seriously. Essentially, to be a good global citizen, or in Hegelian terms ‘a good state’, may involve rearranging the priorities that were once considered inviolable to political elites. Yet this may be achieved by stealth or subterfuge. The whole free-market trade arguments that have dominated international forums since GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) are essentially about governing for a specific constituency under the banner of national reform. This is not to suggest some crude form of ‘capture theory’ or conspiracy theory but attests to a reality of global finance and the increasing influence capital interests are having on states and national policymaking outcomes. This aspect of globalisation has been well documented and there is no need to go over these debates (see Corbridge, Martin and Thrift 1994). But there is one aspect worth noting. In many respects the dichotomy between global capital and the state is a false one. McMichael and Myhre (1991) for example, claim that the current process of capital transnationalisation also involves a reorganisation of the state into a ‘transnational state’ commensurate with a shift in the regulatory regime from one that was ostensibly national in character to one firmly grounded in the global. Such thinking lies at the heart of the ‘end of geography’ thesis (see O’Brien 1992) concerning the loss of economic sovereignty and impinges directly upon our concerns about sovereignty in general. It is though, above all else, quintessentially about territory, but this too is becoming complicated. There is a prevailing set of spatial referents that resonate through our understanding such as space, place, milieu, region, environment, locality that are all used interchangeably with ‘territory’. Yet, despite the multiplicity of its usage, the meaning of territoriality has remained disturbingly vague. It has become a trendy word which can mean anything from geopolitics of sovereign states to the idea that something is fixed by location. In a more exaggerated form, cultural
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critics like Baudrillard argue that territory is being remapped before our eyes and that we are rapidly becoming floating identities in a world characterised by hyperreality and ephemeral images. It is a world dominated by interconnecting media and multifaceted technology that is taking on a whole new vocabulary. Against such a backdrop where are our ideas about territory and its fundamental importance to our sense of attachment, to belonging, to sharing a collective identity that has a past, a culture—a set of images that stay etched in our subconscious? What becomes of our relationship to place as we have known it, to spatial communities, whether neighbourhood or small town, to the bonds of social capital and to those primordial social networks? Is the spatial/temporal phenomenon of postmodern capitalism actually destroying communities as we have experienced them? Has the technological juggernaut redefined space and our sense of relationship by creating a spatial anomaly whereby the actual sharing of space is a highly individualised process—a lonely vigil? These questions may resemble a script of a Star Trek episode but they are important questions to ponder because of their social implications and to their association with the notion of territoriality. However, I have no hesitation is suggesting that such language belongs more to playful imaginations than to reality. The fact is, place does matter and we are not floating identities on landscapes of hyperreality, but rooted in places of reality. Globalisation is producing strange juxtapositions between image and text and allowing us to connect to other spaces in a micro-second. But does this enabling technology yield much insight into who we are as people, as citizens of nations, as members of a local community, as simply interacting human beings taking solace and comfort from these relations? One does not have to evoke a romantic image of community to provide a counterpoint to some of the exaggerated claims of globalisation theorists. Virtual geographies stand side by side with real geographies as part of the lived experience for many today. Hence, where exactly to locate culture is no longer an easy task, or a set of meanings that can be read off from the nationstate as the defining variable. On this point Bhabha (1994) makes a valuable argument for considering those ‘interstices’, the overlapping and displacement of domains of difference, where the intersubjective and collective experience of ‘nationness’, community interest and cultural value are negotiated. The relationship between territory and identity is a powerful historical association imbued with a plethora of cultural and literary images. But to what extent has globalisation altered this? To answer this we first need to recognise that territoriality is complex and not simply defined, it comprises a variety of social arrangements. Constructing territorialities According to Forsberg (1996:359–62) we can distinguish between six forms of territoriality. I want to examine each in turn with a view to building on these categories for the purpose of establishing the discursive precursors to a successive discussion on sovereignty and governance. These six forms are by no means
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definitive. They are, however, an appropriate starting point for further discussion on the operational boundaries of the term and its application in modern politics. There is much that is intangible about postmodern discussion on territory and the subject. However, the tangibilities of the term ‘territoriality’ are quite apparent when considering the changeability of possession with reference to sovereignty and ownership. Subsequently, territoriality as it is commonly held can be either given or taken away due to nefarious political processes, outward aggression or judicial outcomes. Hence, what impact does the process of ‘de-territorialisation’ have on identity and traditional notions of sovereignty? We are getting ahead of ourselves, however, because we first need to understand the various dimensions of territoriality. The first feature to examine is that of the existential aspect of territoriality. This, of course, is the most basic and fundamental as it involves that which is most intimate—personal space. Without trivialising the obvious requirements of physical existence, this notion of territory is tenuous indeed. Nevertheless, a heightened sense of overcrowding in a world that is shrinking is a commonly expressed anxiety today. The various ecological disasters that await an overpopulated world are also well and truly embedded in daily consciousness, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. Another important, yet ignored, factor to consider with this existential component is that of privacy and its continuing relevance to the human condition (see Squires 1994). The fear of invasion of personal space can be just as traumatic as the foreboding presence of isolation. It can be argued with some confidence that the perceived need to rejuvenate public spaces and to rethink the idea of the public sphere are recurring motifs in contemporary social and political theory. Yet, this same literature is remarkably silent on the issue of privacy and its importance to social and political life. I will have more to say on this later. Suffice to say, one should distinguish between privacy as that pertaining to isolation and solitude and to that which involves power over space: hence, the question of autonomy needs to be raised. For now though let us return to our forms. Operational territoriality lies at the heart of the classical geopolitical tradition in global politics by supporting the simple dictum that geography provides the conditions and opportunities for human behaviour. At the crudest level of analysis it represents an expression of geographical determinism belonging to early schools of geography and geographers. It still remains somewhat surprising to find such deterministic thinking within the bounds of international politics scholars who still seem to regard the ‘first law of geography’ as the operational basis of territoriality. Nonetheless, this form of territoriality is widely recognised and described in association with the ‘tyranny of distance’ whereby location influences decision-making and distances limit interaction by setting physical constraints. It is also a fundamental axiom of economic thought; namely, the idea of comparative advantage and the fact that resources are bounded in space and such occupation will largely determine the nature of trade and commerce. Despite its many problems as a workable concept in today’s complex world, this
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form of territoriality still remains the most basic and commonplace point of reference. A similar form to the above is ecological territoriality concerning the bounded distribution of resources with territory. Hence, ownership and access to these resources is also tied up with political power, as well as determining climatic factors that provide the physical conditions of habitation and action. This form is the primordial link with ‘mother earth’, it is our daily reminder of the ecology of human action on all spatial scales, from the local to global. It is also the form of territoriality that is most contested by contrasting claims of ownership, particularly at the subnational level where resources and politics and issues of eroding sovereignty are pronounced. The language of ‘ethnodevelopment’ and the new cultural politics of difference is bringing to the fore concerns that go to the very centre of Western political thought about sovereignty and its direct link with territoriality and resources. The emphasis is on state’s rights and the rights of indigenous communities that are strategically located within the bounds of ecologically sensitive, yet highly marketable, natural resources (see Howitt et al. 1996 for excellent examples). Concern about the eroding sovereignty of indigenous peoples is not solely based around ‘colonial practices’ whereby national governments are entering into equity partnerships with transnational companies in resource ventures, but also with the rights afforded national claims of sovereignty over those communities with alternative epistemologies. Hence, forms of territoriality attached to resources and sensitive ecologies could very well be the battlegrounds of the next millennium where the concept of ‘nation’ itself may come under increasing scrutiny. Biological territoriality is probably the most popular image of territoriality which simply regards the human species as a territorial animal. This image mainly comes from sociobiologists attesting that certain territorial aspects of human behaviour are grounded in genes. Hence, the ‘marking of one’s territory’ is regarded as part of our evolutionary psyche and that every other interpretation must be subsumed under the universal laws of genetic determinants. In many respects, the ‘territorial imperative’ is emerging again, not that it ever really disappeared, with a new fascination with genetics and its association with philosophy, politics and matters theological (witness Jones 1996). Irrespective of the criticisms of social scientists concerning simplistic biological models pertaining to human behaviour, the images evoked by sociobiologists and geneticists still hold a powerful sway over notions of territoriality. Psychological territoriality is closely associated with some interpretations of nationalism and our link with community, history and nation. This form concerns the cognitive and emotional connections between people and their environment. It is central to cultural theory and social theory concerning mental mapping, or imaginary constructions of place which exhibit powerful expressions of sentiment. Hence, folklore and myth are often a part of this form of territoriality, particularly various manifestations of nationalism which are embedded in cultural and literary contexts that conjure up images of place, heritage and political
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identity (see Anderson 1991). Because of the social and cultural milieux and the highly emotive language quite often used in association with attached meanings to place and homeland, this form of territoriality is most prone to political and ideological manipulation (see Zizek 1990 as an example of this point). An emphasis on the psychological brings together some interesting literatures on modernity and identity, especially with relations between self and society. Particularly important is how an analysis of this form enables a crucial intersection between psychoanalysis and social theory to bring to bear a distinctive viewpoint on matters of territoriality. Indeed, recent interpretations of the phenomenon of nationalism amidst growing globalisation stresses the importance of cognitive factors such as collective memory and cultural symbolism to conceptions of territoriality (see Smith 1991). The final form, political territoriality, is in many respects the most basic, yet also the most complex because it underlies the other forms to various degrees. In other words, the previous forms all have the potential to be politicised but sometimes the process is not clearly defined. What is not political when it comes to territoriality? Clearly in the modern era the idea of territory and political power are contiguous, which further renders any notion of politics without its accompanying spatial referent redundant. Thus, the very idea of sovereignty and territoriality residing within clearly defined borders, as with the nation-state, remains an enduring image. Clearly, these forms of territoriality are not all recognised and afforded equal status by various disciplinary practitioners. However, whether it is regarded as predominantly a political concept, or one belonging to our genetic primordial matrix, the predisposition to ‘mark territory’ appears as a natural feature of the human condition. Territoriality represents a political concept rooted in geography, as is much of our political taxonomy. For example, democracy and sovereignty have a distinctive geographical tone to their application in thought and practice. Can we envisage a form of democracy in non-spatial contexts whereby the action of participation in the political process is not bounded by distinct territories? To what extent are our conceptions of territoriality and governance being challenged by the growth in civil society, for example? It is to these questions I now turn. Shifting boundaries and autonomy The burgeoning literature on globalisation is highlighting the shifting boundaries of identity and the final annihilation of space. The growth of global civil society is supposedly creating new forms of association that transcend spatial boundaries, with a particular challenge to nationally defined territories of identity (see Lipschutz 1992). I commented on this phenomenon elsewhere and offered a cautionary warning against those proclaiming that the decline of the nation-state is nigh (see Marden 1997). We do, nevertheless, need to give due acknowledgement to the reality that historical boundaries of attachment that were
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once regarded as ‘natural’ are undergoing change. Subsequently, the close links between territoriality and the state are breaking down and the boundaries of communities are being reconstituted. In the political domain, authority is simultaneously relocating upwards towards supranational institutions, sidewards towards transnational organisations and social movements and downwards towards subnational communities (Rosenau 1994). Hence, the nation-state is being pulled and pushed from various directions to an extent that control and management of space within its jurisdiction is becoming more and more difficult. Meeting domestic demands for reform and justice may impinge upon international expectations of the ‘good state’, as is clearly evident with matters global such as human rights and environmental responsibility. In some instances, being the dutiful state in the eyes of the international community may involve making domestic sacrifices such as jobs in order to maintain a commitment towards a free trading system. The constituency of national-based governments has broadened significantly; therefore, decision-making and policy formation, once firmly aligned within national borders, are increasingly being influenced by agents that take no active part in democratic processes which are still nationally constituted. Another unprecedented phenomenon belonging to the late twentieth century is migration. In the late 1980s the United Nations’ estimate was that around 1 per cent of the world’s population (50 million people) were living in a country other than their place of birth. Within three years, the World Bank concluded that this figure had already increased to 100 million (UN 1993). Undoubtedly, that number is now much greater and already the contemporary period has been labelled the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller 1993). As has been noted, the world’s population doubled to five thousand million between 1950 and 1995, and is projected to increase yet again to eight thousand million by 2025, and this: demographic explosion lies at the very heart of many of the world’s problems and is also a source of the complexity and dynamism that has overwhelmed the parameters of the global system…ever greater numbers of people have meant larger, more articulate, and increasingly unwieldy publics. (Rosenau 1995:196) Rosenau then proceeds to outline and discuss the ‘dizzying increase in the density of actors’ that now sustain world politics and the global networking between this myriad of organisations, interest groups and social movements. Grant (1995) is not alone in bemoaning the fact that we have neither a clear understanding of the causes and outcomes of this massive contemporary movement across the juridical boundaries of nation-states. However, she does present the argument that voluntary migration, at least, appears to be largely implemented by kin networks as a mechanism for surviving continual redefinitions of modern political and economic life. Whatever the reason, there is
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no doubting the complexity and dynamism of current patterns of international migration. As I have discussed elsewhere (see Marden and Mercer 1997), there is also the growing problem of ‘undocumented immigration’ which, in the late 1990s, has been described as a ‘hot issue’, not only in Europe, Japan and the United States (Burgers and Engbersen 1996), but also in countries like Malaysia where, in January 1997, the government ‘purged’ an estimated one million illegal immigrant workers. As mentioned earlier, consideration must also be given to those internal forces that are contesting nation-state sovereignty, such as indigenous groups pursuing goals relating to autonomy and land rights. For some, the phenomenon of indigenous movements is a strong indication of the emergence of civil society and a new postmodern politics, one centred around claims of ‘authenticity’, culture and identity. Whatever conceptual or theoretical importance we wish to accord this movement, there is no uncertainty about the serious implications for those groups who find themselves in opposition to the state over matters of national development. A useful example, and one that this author is most familiar with, is the Australian experience where there is currently an expanding indigenous land rights’ movement and renewed calls for Aboriginal self-determination (Reynolds 1996; Sullivan 1996). Presently growing at twice the rate of the population as a whole, Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population will rise to around 360,000 by the turn of the century. Increasingly, since the election of the conservative coalition government in March 1996, Australia’s indigenous peoples are looking for international support in their fight against a strong community and state backlash. This situation highlights for me one the most important problems facing modern states, namely, the challenge posed by marginalised groups to issues of sovereignty and nationhood. As Howitt et al. (1996) point out, this should not be surprising considering that it is often indigenous peoples whose sovereignty is most decidedly challenged by the colonial and post-colonial practices of state formation. For indigenous groups, the idea of the territorially defined nation is more of a ‘dangerous fiction’ than an ‘imagined community’ because it is frequently established on the denial and subjugation of their rights, aspirations and culture. Indeed, the experience in many Third World countries, suggests that the project of national development will not tolerate even their presence, let alone any realistic chance of an alternative development model being considered. The tensions between the state and indigenous peoples are of course intensified when the sovereignty of resources is called into question. National governments have claimed indigenous lands, seas and resources as representing fundamental components of their own territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The extension or reinterpretation of ‘sovereignty’, however, remains conservatively opposed. As many indigenous activists have pointed out, while there is powerful resistance to the yielding of national sovereignty, the true meaning of selfdetermination will remain obscured. For example, Dodson (1994) admonishes those national representatives who support decolonisation of former colonial
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spaces on the principle of justice at the United Nations, while simultaneously refusing to accept an extension of the principle of self-determination from states to peoples. On this front, perhaps Yeatman (1995) is right to argue for a reconstitution of ‘sovereign selfhood’, but one that is distinctly divisible as opposed to an indivisible sovereign subject, and one that is reconcilable with justice. The main point to draw from this for our discussion is that the geopolitics of indigenous claims for self-determination and recognition of resource rights, pose a real challenge to long-held cherished assumptions about ‘territoriality’ and ‘sovereignty’. There are, indeed, shifting boundaries that are problematising historically situated institutional structures such as the nation-state, along with the accepted discourse and a foundational epistemology that has legally sanctioned, institutionalised and canonised these twin pillars of international politics. The shifting boundaries are not simply about language and theory as some realist attacks on post-colonialism would lay claim to, but rather belong to new ways people are organising themselves for social and political action. It may well be that one of the paradoxes of globalisation is the advent of highly localised sites of resistance that have the potential for global change (see Marden 1997). Whether we refer to these sites as evidence of new social movements or simply an expression of a growing global civil society, Escobar (1992) is right when he points to a multidimensionality which is indicative of a new mode of doing politics. In this sense, the term ‘environmental’ as a description of various grassroots movements is somewhat misleading because of the commonly held principles of justice and human rights that seem to augment and overlap with an environmental ethic. It is the ‘politics’ of everyday experience where cultural struggles over meaning are coexistent with concerns over material conditions: where an ethnography of popular resistance is evident, or to use de Certeau’s (1984) phrase a ‘marginal multitude’; or to what Williams (1980) claims as the continuation of residual practices that provides the basis for collective resistance and action (see Peet and Watts 1996). Contested sovereignties and the citizen Let us now establish a couple of propositions that are more argumentative than definitive. First, we should recognise that there are complexities surrounding the idea of sovereignty as belonging exclusively to the nation-state, albeit not reflected in international law or institutional practice. Second, the complexities are not just to do with reinterpretations from various new theoretical approaches, but derive out of a politics of dissent and resistance that are offering real challenges to state autonomy. These forces, however, should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence that the nation is withering away in the face of a newly emerging global civil ethic. The long process of state formation will not dissolve easily. The question now, though, lies within the context of the normative and the ethical: to what extent can we say that this is a desirable outcome? What of
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democracy and citizenship should a world of free-floating identities emerge? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt to answer such questions with the space it deserves. Let us, though, probe some of these issues in the hope that further research can be forthcoming. What are the virtues of citizenship? And how is the relationship between citizenship and democracy changing with the potential ‘leaking away’ of sovereignty from states? Before proceeding with these questions we should first ask—why is citizenship important in the modern political setting? Barrington (1995:731) offers two reasons: first, citizenship ‘is one of the few official identities that a state can bestow on its residents’; and second, it carries with it a privilege of specific economic and political rights that are denied ‘noncitizens’(e.g. ethnic Russians currently residing in Latvia and Estonia). In this context, citizenship can be interpreted as ‘a powerful instrument of social closure’ (Brubaker 1992:x). Rubenstein (1995) argues that debates surrounding citizenship are often confused because at least three different criteria are frequently invoked. At the simplest level there is the criterion of strict legal status (i.e. someone is recognised as a citizen by the state). But there is also a much broader interpretation based around what Alejandro (1993) refers to as ‘citizenship as communality and participation’. Relatedly, there is the ‘civic virtues’ construction of citizenship which focuses on the desirable activities involved in being a ‘good citizen’. This is simply citizenship by action, whereby the extent and level of one’s citizenship is directly attributable to one’s participation in that community (see Kymlicka and Norman 1994). The latter is especially favoured by those on the right who argue that ‘rights’ too often are privileged over ‘obligations’. Unlike Marshall’s (1965) earlier call that the full expression of citizenship can only derive from a liberal-democratic welfare state, usually referred to as ‘passive citizenship’, the ‘new right’ emphasise the virtue of responsibility and a heightened sense of social obligation. Predictably, their attacks on the welfare state are premised on a redefinition of citizenship, one that rejects passive citizenship and embraces the notion that failure to fulfil common obligations should exclude those individuals from the benefits of full membership. The idea being reinforced here is that citizens should be selfsupporting. To this end, conservatives have rejected the idea that citizenship can confer a status independent of economic standing (Mead 1986; Plant 1991). It is not my purpose to discuss the many theoretical variants now emerging about citizenship and its relationship to the state and democracy (see Beiner 1995). Suffice to say, we quickly come to a realisation that a precise definition is elusive for the simple reason that the concept has an unfortunate, yet predictable, habit of changing form depending upon political context and ideology. The interdependency between sovereignty and citizenship cannot go unnoticed as it directly placates the power of the state. Put simply, the sovereignty of states enshrines their right to delineate the boundaries of citizenship; of who belongs and who does not; of who can participate in the democratic process and who is excluded. Thus, there is not the same universal language surrounding the concept
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of citizenship as there is with ‘human rights’, nor the same expectant measure of reform. And, despite the challenges, there is still considerable domestic resistance to fundamentally altering or in any way diminishing the rights of states to define the operational parameters of citizenship (see Lahav 1993). It should also be recognised that whatever progress is made at the international scale, domestic reforms can be somewhat slower, and even purposefully undermined. As Rees (1995:316) has noted ‘given an adequate Parliamentary majority, rights may be enacted, added to, abridged or abrogated with relative ease…it makes little difference whether they are classed as civil, political or social’; Notwithstanding this, a world increasingly characterised by population movements and expanding diasporas will make it less tolerable for nations to evoke highly restrictive policies of citizenship. However, such a speculation should be positioned against the rising parochialism that appears to be invigorating particular nationalisms (see Marden 1997). Minogue (1995:11) argues that citizenship is best visualised as a spectrum ‘such if we go too far in either direction [it] disappears altogether’. At one extreme, the ‘pure’ Marxian vision has no real place for the concept of citizenship, nor for the nation if it comes to that—indeed, for Marx, citizens are ‘imaginary members of an illusory sovereignty’ (James 1996:81)—while at the other extreme, despotism does not either. Between these two we can distinguish variants loosely clustered around the foundational philosophies of such people as Hobbes, on the one hand, and Rousseau, on the other. These offer different emphases on the roles of participation and obedience. Even with a minimalist interpretation, citizenship certainly involves membership status in a legitimate entity, as well as legally recognisable rights. But in practice the latter are significantly mediated such that ethnicity, class, race and gender have a major impact upon the extent of active and meaningful participation in society. In short, formal citizenship rights are contingent upon the application of informal power. Liberalism is largely silent on this issue. Where to governance? In appraising the various risks and opportunities brought about by globalisation none seem to be as critical as the problems posed by the changing nature of government in democratic societies. What is the actual role of government in these days of global markets and financial networks uncompromising in their ability to render national economic policy problematic? The recent crisis in Asia should be a salutary lesson for those development strategists pushing the socalled Asian model on the rest of the developing world. This is particularly the case for the economic rationalists who regarded the trade-led expansion in Asia as the panacea for all social and economic ills facing Western developed nations. The role of the state was accorded minimalist consideration, and the whole issue of human rights and environmental responsibility treated as part of the sacrifice required for growing economies. Throughout the 1980s the left and the right,
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albeit somewhat blurred around the edges, were engaged in a development debate centred around the role of the state in Asian development. This debate became predictable, convoluted and theoretically tiresome, with very little constructive understanding forthcoming. In this regard, even the critics of the dominant economic models concerning the newly industrialised countries provided scant attention to the changing nature of government in terms of social obligations. I believe the problems facing many of these successful Asian nations stem not only from fiscal mismanagement, but also from an ever-growing incapacity to deliver on social and political reforms commensurate with the relatively high levels of economic growth. There may, indeed, be a fiscal crisis of the Asian state, but there is also a crisis of obligation which is threatening to further destabilise many of these societies. It is no stretch of the imagination to suggest that such crises may bring about new opportunities for a more inclusive politics; a politics more in tune with notions of community. It may also, however, bring about an even more austere form of governance in keeping with major international development institutions’ idea of what constitutes ‘good governance’. It is therefore no surprise to find that part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package to countries like South Korea will emphasise the need for significant reductions in government spending, especially those areas of social reform. The A$88 million IMF loan is also based on labour market reforms that may involve up to a million layoffs in 1998/9 and a wage freeze (The Age 1997:13). A financial crisis of this dimension is unlikely to foster an interventionist agenda embracing social democratic ideals, despite the ongoing unrest of students. Whether or not this current crisis is directly, or partly, attributable to globalisation is somewhat of a vexed issue, albeit an interesting one. What is less problematic is that there appears to be a crisis of development, at least in the type of social and economic modelling that has dominated institutional culture for the last two decades. Are we seeing a fragility to the dominant development paradigm of ‘perpetual growth’ and export-led development that have up until now been paraded as ‘absolutes’? If so, what are the political implications for the citizen and communities? Such questions as they apply to Asia’s current crisis cannot be answered here. Nevertheless, in the light of the current problems Fukuyama’s (1995) central argument requires reexamining, particularly some of the juxtapositions he posited between the West and the Asian experience. A task for another time, however. What is more immediate for our concerns, though, is the nature of politics itself and how the local and the global are becoming even more inextricably linked in terms of process and outcome. What are the ethics of obligation for the state? To what extent does ‘good governance’ mean different things to contested constituencies such as the tension deriving from being a global ‘good state’ to that of domestic expectations of the national citizenry? In short: what is good governance and how is the nature of politics changing with the onset of globalisation? Such questions go to the very heart of concerns about sovereignty, citizenship and security
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because, put simply, governance resonates through all of these dimensions of social and political life. In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair was recently elected on a platform of ‘social inclusion’ of bringing politics to the community, of reinvigorating the practice of democracy. This is the language of contemporary concerns about the diminishing of civil society under Thatcher’s ideologically inspired ‘there is no such thing as society’. It is argued that a restoration of civil society will inspire new dimensions of ‘good governance’, particularly as this process involves building up networks of ‘social capital’; communities of trust rather than of fear and risk. There is considerable rethinking being done at the moment concerning the politics of state and citizen. Elsewhere I have commented on the disempowering as well as the empowering dimensions of globalisation, especially the links between telecommunications technology and community development (see Marden 1997). But some of these issues need closer scrutiny because of their sheer importance to the whole debate on sovereignty. Part of this rethinking is coming from Demos, an independent think-tank primarily devoted to reconstructing political thinking involving theoretical analyses and studies of ethics and values (see Mulgan 1996). The core of Demos thinking is a belief that on a global scale, public confidence in politics and politicians to find solutions to major social and economic ills is at an all-time low. National governments seem to be unable, or indeed unwilling, to respond to growing national problems of unemployment, health, education and crime other than initiating policies that are both reactionary and short-sighted. Of course, Demos is not the first to lament the loss of imagination in political thought and action, but it is does represent a genuine effort to reinvigorate political thinking for the next century by addressing those structural changes that are taking place in many democratic societies that largely go unnoticed by political elites and the popular media. Another critic of contemporary British society is Hutton (1996) who argues that the political system is malfunctioning to the point where the idea of the public realm is discredited due to the inept nature of party politics itself to deal with the real issues. This former workshop of the world is now Europe’s fourth economic power after Germany, France and Italy. One in three children grow up in poverty, and a 1991 survey also showed that one 21-year-old in five was innumerate and one in seven was illiterate. Another disturbing fact is that the prison population is the highest in Europe. All this leads Hutton (1996:2) to conclude that ‘the British are failing’. Hutton’s work is largely a critique of New Right policy, particularly the legacy of Thatcherism on the nation’s social institutions. It is also, however, an affirmation of the need for rethinking politics in Britain such as that represented by Demos. However, it is interesting to note that even the early shine of New Labour in Britain under Blair is starting to dull as the financial realities concerning welfare begin to bite. Social security spending is a contentious issue in the Blair government as senior ministers are beginning to speak of too much money being spent on welfare and the need for reform, mainly through a superannuation system similar to that which exists in
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Australia. The concern over cradle-to-grave welfare and the increasing demands placed on a shrinking economy has initiated such intense discussion that the British Prime Minister faced the threat of a cabinet revolt recently over a range of reform measures that included a cut to disability benefits (Weekend Australian 1997:17). What this highlights is that the language of ‘New Labour’ including references to ‘civil society’, ‘community’ and ‘social capital’ is now juxtaposed with a financial constituency placing demands on the new government for the urgent need of ‘good governance’ to avoid falling behind the rest of Europe, even if this means abandoning some of the pre-election rhetoric about ‘social inclusion’. The importance of these matters of governance go well beyond simple ideological predispositions of parties to lie deep within the relation between state and citizen. For where is the sovereignty of the citizen when measured against these marked shifts in the obligations of state responsibility? As pointed out by Rose (1996), in almost all advanced industrial countries, from Sweden to Australia, the shibboleth of the ‘welfare state’ is under attack with many welfare systems undergoing transformation. Like some economic blueprint, the similarities of government strategies are quite remarkable: the privatisation of public utilities and welfare functions, the marketisation of health services, social insurance and pension schemes, educational reforms to introduce competition between schools and colleges, the emergence of new forms of management into the public service modelled upon an image of methods in the private sector, new contractual relations between agencies and service providers and between professionals and clients, a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own future well-being. In many cases these changes are accompanied by concerted attacks on organised labour, particularly any form of centralised wage-fixing and/ or government/ union relation deemed to be improper and inflexible for the current needs of efficient and competitive labour markets. Hence, while membership of trade unions is on the decline, at least in Australia, the switch to individual contractual arrangements is gaining ground as the preferred option by employers and government. But more pervasive are the selective attacks on society itself, especially on those perceived vested interest groups that have benefited from previous social policy initiatives. The politics of postmodernism, it would seem, reflect the theoretical and philosophical attacks on logocentrism and modernity. The politics of the grand, of the ideological, of the ‘mega’ is coming under serious threat by conservative elements who have, ironically, found sustenance with fashionable postmodern critiques of totality. It is hardly unreasonable to suggest that the politics of deconstruction rather than opening space for difference and a new ethic of responsibility has in fact led to closure, anxiety and the creation of an underclass in many advanced capitalist nations. It has, perhaps even more importantly, provided the means through which government can minimise social obligation and establish a new set of codes and regulatory devices that ensure the prosperity of a minimal state under the persuasive morality of ‘belt tightening’ and the
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beguiling simplicity of deficit avoidance. The idea of the social itself is caught up in the new politics. As Rose (1996) has observed, the political rationalities that have so dominated this century: socialism, social democracy, social liberalism, and their corresponding domains such as social protection, social justice, social rights and social stability—despite their considerable political differences—have all shared the notion that the nation must be governed. However, it seems today that notions of governance can involve a range of rationalities and techniques without an accompanying commitment to society as a whole. Governance, in this sense, is taken out of the imperative context of the social and is made the province of regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous agents within their familial and communal setting. Hence, whether we accept Thatcher’s bold claim that ‘there is no such thing as society’ or Baudrillard’s (1983) provocative call for ‘the end of the social’ we are faced with an inevitable realisation that this vast abstraction we have labelled ‘society’ is undergoing transformation. In a rather diachronistic way we have embraced the notion of society as the standard horizon for our thought, and of our moral evaluations. In the process, we have regarded identity, at least in a collective sense, commensurate with bounded territories governed by their own laws. But as alluded to elsewhere (see Marden 1997), processes of globalisation are redefining to some extent these archetypes by making them appear ephemeral and transitory in the face of new technologies, and are giving rise to new forms of allegiance to community values, beliefs and commitments. Rose (1996) points to a profound shift taking place within advanced liberal societies from ‘the social’ to ‘the community’ as representing a new territory for the administration of the individual and collective. New political languages are being formed around different versions of communitarianism involving representations of complex micro-moral relations among individuals and strategies of governance. One example is the emergence of ‘risk communities’ such as drug abusers and gay men, where individuals are seen to be subjects of allegiance to the dynamics of communities rather than to society as a whole. Hence, within these communities we find norms, beliefs and various codes of behaviour that are intricately linked with notions of selfgovernance and responsibility. But how far do we draw the distinction between community and society? In a somewhat neglected work, Etzioni (1968:2) argues that ‘the self which is to be activated is neither the centre nor the appendage of the individual self, but rather the self of a social collectivity’. He goes on to argue that ‘a social collectivity has a self, not as a reified or metaphysical category but as the carrier of an active orientation’. Collectivities can set goals, commit themselves to their realisation, and pursue them. Etzioni’s observations about the social self are, of course, reminiscent of the sociology of the 1960s, whereby ideas of community were invoked as an appropriate response to the alienation of modern mass society, as typified by Reisman’s The Lonely Crowd (1961) and Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1973). A very important addition to these works is the intuitive analysis
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of Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class (1967), now regarded as a sociological classic, albeit largely ignored by modern social theorists (see Mestrovic 1993 on this point). Together, these early intelligent forays into the problems and dilemmas facing advanced societies like North America, exhibit a certain resonance in contemporary discourses on communities and governance. Early sociological interpretations of community, at least those emanating from the 1960s, were based around invocations of community as lost authenticity as a counter to the dehumanising influence of a bureaucracy that was both remote and paternalistic (Rose 1996). Community in this sense was predicated on a language of empowerment, but as Rose (1996:332) comments, ‘what began as a language of resistance and critique was transformed…into an expert discourse and a professional vocation’. This professionalisation corresponded to a shift in vocabulary that rendered communities knowable and capable of social engineering, as witnessed by the plethora of community studies throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is interesting to note the use of the term ‘authentic’ with reference to community, considering today’s usage of the term by postcolonialist writers and the like. Once again, turning to these earlier texts brings forth an array of terms that are responsive and applicable to contemporary social theory. For example, examining Etzioni’s usage of the term reveals an insight into the dynamics of social alienation that is particularly applicable for the 1990s: Authenticity exists where responsiveness exists and is experienced as such. The world responds to the actor’s efforts, and its dynamics are comprehensible…authenticity requires not only that the actor be conscious, committed, and hold a share of the societal power, but also that the three components of the active orientation be balanced and connected. It is the fate of the inauthentic man that what he knows does not fit what he feels, and what he affects is not what he knows or is committed to do. His world has come apart…authenticity is not possible under alienating conditions. While the actively alienated man may play a significant role in transforming his condition and in creating the opportunity for authenticity, so long as this transformation is not advanced, he is not free from the effects of his alienating condition. (Etzioni 1968:620–1) In this respect, an authentic community is one where there are clearly defined reciprocal bonds of responsiveness. However, this can only be attained under non-alienating conditions in wider society. Thus, it is the wider societal conditions that largely determine the communal parameters of authenticity. Just how the individual within such a communal setting is empowered beyond the bonds of shared experience and solidarity is not really addressed by Etzioni to any satisfactory degree. It is here that contemporary concerns over the role of the
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state in the process of community construction as a method of governing are representative of a definite shift in the politics of modernity. The idea of government through community is probably best defined by the Commission on Social Justice (1994) which argues that if society is to be regenerated and social justice maximised, then the building of responsible communities that are prepared to invest in themselves is the only sure way. The idea is to minimise statism and redemocratise society by developing strong social bonds through local autonomous networks that facilitate the development of social capital. The core values can be identified as fairness, cooperation and responsibility. However, what constitutes government in this context? The refiguring of government through community has a number of features (see Rose 1996). The first is a spatial configuration and processes of detotalisation. This aspect has already been partly covered when we discussed globalisation and the rise of cosmopolitan social space. The context is one of fractured political-ethical forms of citizenship beyond that which the nation-state designates as belonging to a national community. The detotalisation is readily seen in the emergence of a plethora of communities covering a diverse range of social and cultural interests. These moral communities (ecological, feminist, religious…), lifestyle communities (fashion, taste, mode of life…) and communities of commitment (health, disability, local activism…) and the like, are thought to command our allegiance. These communities are construed as overlapping, multiple and heterogeneous, and characterised geographically as occupying the micro-locale. They also exhibit a non-spatial character such as those designated ‘virtual communities’ involving networks of communications, symbols, images and various associations such as non-governmental organisations. There are, as Wark (1994:x) has observed, ‘moments which reveal in everyday life something of the abstract form of the emergent virtual geography lacing the world together via the various technologies.’ There is no denying the power, actually or potentially, of the Internet and its spreading usage as a form of global communications, although there are still many problems associated with this medium as a channel of dissent or discourse of resistance (see Marden 1997). The implications of disrupted political space, however, is enough to concern some Asian countries such as Singapore to look into ways of regulating this explosive technology. The second feature of government through community is that of its changed ethical character. The social constituted an order of collective being, responsibility and obligations. And although policies of the social accorded individuals personal responsibility for their actions, there always existed a tacit understanding that external determinants also played their part, such as those of social class, family background and numerous other related contexts that may impinge on behaviour and determine life chances. However, these ‘ethical vectors’ as Rose (1996) refers to them, have been reorganised under the guise of community. Here, the subject is still regarded as a moral individual with bonds of obligation and responsibilities, but reconfigured differently. The individual in
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his community is both self-responsible and subordinate to particular emotional bonds of affinity to a specific network of other individuals, and also unified by other ties such as family, locality or moral commitment. Rose (1996:334) argues that ‘conduct is retrieved from a social order of determination into a new ethical perception of the individualized and autonomized actor, each of whom has unique, localized and specific ties to their particular family and to a particular moral community’ (my emphasis). The third aspect is that of the role of identification, and a distinction is made between those processes of identity formation that bind the individual to the social, as a unified single national society, and those that operate at the community level. Once again, emphasis is placed on how these lines of identity are reconfigured towards community as a locus of allegiance, which is not that difficult considering that community is less remote and more directly involved in the matrices of everyday life than that of this vast abstraction we call ‘the social’. The image of community, and of a sense of belonging, is deemed to be preexistent of modernity’s turn towards national unified space. It is, in other words, a more primary source of individual and collective belonging outside of the fundamental unit of the family. However, just like other sources of collective identity, particularly the narratives constructed around the nation, there is also a Janus-faced logic that is employed by proponents of community based on the fact that an assertion of community refers itself to something already existing and, therefore, has a claim on us; yet at the same time, our knowledge of particular communities is something we have to made aware of. There are two prominent images associated with the promotion of community (see Rose 1996). Each, to some degree, admonish the principles of neo-liberal social thought and politics such as the ethos of individualism of choice, control over one’s fate, personal responsibility, self-promotion and self-government. The other image concerns the virtues of community activ ation as a response to remote central governments, insensitive bureaucracies and incompetent local authorities. To actively participate in community is said to foster self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-reliance as opposed to a paternalistic centralising social government. Relations of identification are developed so that individuals can speak of ‘their community’ in terms that place emphasis on the emotional interdependency established between the self and the wider community. Community, in this sense, is not just the territory of government, but a means of government, ‘its ties, bonds, forces and affiliations are to be celebrated, encouraged, nurtured…and instrumentalized in the hope of producing consequences that are desirable for all and for each’ (Rose 1996:335). The image of community, therefore, starts to take on very complex characteristics, that are by no means confined to the definitional, as to notions of governance.
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Conclusion Whatever the vocabulary, we are facing challenges to the usage and application of central concepts of political association. Citizenship, sovereignty and territoriality are traditionally aligned with nation-states and their seeming autonomy in the international system of states. The sense of ‘belonging to’ similarly has always found a home with this primary unit of association, albeit an imagined one to some degree. So are postmodernists right when they point to the forces of fragmentation that are supposedly shifting the boundaries of these longheld assumptions? One is immediately drawn into an apology on behalf of those critics, however, who may hold such views but do not associate with postmodernism in any shape or form. Nevertheless, the importance of this question cannot be overstated in the light of the many problems facing nations, governance and democracy itself. I believe Rosenau (1994) is correct in his focus on ‘forces of fragmentation’ as representing the reality of globalisation in the 1990s. This fragmentation, however, does not necessarily translate into the language of disempowerment because there are many indications that new political space is being opened up at the margins for communities and social movements aspiring and working towards a different future other than that ascribed to them by global capital. For example, it is interesting to ponder the notion that if sovereignty adheres in the ‘people’ and not the state per se, then a delegation of authority can be reinterpreted or perhaps even reclaimed by popular action (see Falk 1992). It is difficult to see how this reinterpretation can satisfactorily counter the prevailing orthodoxy of statist interpretations of sovereignty. The issue is a vexed one because on one hand it is reasonably accepted that sovereignty rests on an overall congruence between, territoriality, authority, capability and loyalty (Falk 1992). On the other hand, though, new loyalties and capabilities are forming that are essentially transcending statist claims of natural legitimacy and authority. The potential for political transformation with the onset of global civil society has been debated elsewhere (see Lipschutz 1992; Marden 1997) and all that needs reiterating at this point is that the leaking away of sovereignty from states is no longer as fanciful as first thought. Fragmentation has certainly weakened states and ‘pitted them against their societies and citizens’ while congruently weakening the interstate system and ‘pitted international organisations against a multitude of actors who seek to realize their goals through either transnational or subnational relationships’ (Rosenau 1994:257). This turbulence in world politics, as Rosenau calls it, should awaken us to the realisation that such fundamentals as territoriality, community, productivity and loyalty are subject to quite dramatic transformation. The shifting boundaries of authority are diminishing the administrative capacity of states to deal with forces that seem to defy containment. Hence, as borders become more porous and less meaningful the very basis of democratic governance may erode. In other words: is this weakening of state sovereignty
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necessarily leading to a more inclusive politics where participation in the political process is actually enhanced; empowering those groups hitherto considered subversives or aliens? How is democracy assured with the leaking away of sovereignty? For example, pluralist and particularistic interpretations of citizenship are producing distinctive claims about the rights and obligations of communities and the state. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that in this world of shifting boundaries and mobile populations, the institutions of liberal democracy have revealed a peculiar fragility. The problem is not the recognition of diversity, but the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of cultural determinants and the seeming incapacity of liberal states to cope with a politics based on diffuse threads of commonality. What is revealed is that the difficulties for liberal democratic states in a postmodern political world do not derive so much from the demands for recognition by numerous groups, but rather from the transition from recognition to reconciliation. It is here where correction for past injustices has to be juxtaposed with demands for tolerance and equality within the framework of liberal democracy (see Marden and Mercer 1998). On the other hand, some commentators argue that rather than close borders and become more exclusionary, states should open up their borders to immigrants, especially those from the Third World. This is indeed the case argued by Carens (1995) who claims that citizenship in Western liberal democracies is simply the modern equivalent of ‘feudal privilege’, an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Whatever the case, the moral obligations of states within the current phase of globalisation are no longer based on an uncomplicated relation between state and citizen, as this relation is now bound up with contested sovereignties. References Alejandro, R. (1993) Hermeneutics, Citizenship and the Public Sphere, Albany: State University of New York Press. Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities, London: Verso. Barrington, L. (1995) ‘The domestic and international consequences of citizenship in the Soviet successor states’, Europe-Asia Studies 47(5):731–63. Baudrillard, J. (1983) Simulations, New York: Semiotext. Beiner, R. (ed.) (1995) Theorizing Citizenship, Albany: State University of New York Press. Bhabha, H. (1994) The Location of Culture, London: Routledge. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Burgers, J. and Engbersen, G. (1996) ‘Globalisation, migration, and undocumented immigrants’, New Community 22(4):619–35. Carens, J. (1995) ‘Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders’, in R.Beiner (ed.) Theorizing Citizenship, New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 229–54. Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (1993) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, New York: Guilford Press.
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Commission on Social Justice (1994) Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal, London: Vintage. Corbridge, S., Martin, R. and Thrift, N. (eds) (1994) Money, Power and Space, Oxford: Blackwell. de Certeau, M. (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley: University of California Press. Dodson, M. (1994) ‘Towards the exercise of indigenous rights: policy, power and selfdetermination’, Race and Class 35(4), 65–76. Escobar, P. (1992) ‘Imagining a post-development era? Critical thought, development and social movements’, Social Text 31/32:20–56. Etzioni, A. (1968) The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes, New York: The Free Press. Falk, R. (1992) Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Forsberg, T. (1996) ‘Beyond sovereignty, within territoriality: mapping the space of latemodern (geo)politics’, Cooperation and Conflict 31(4):355–86. Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: The Free Press. Galbraith, K. (1973) The Affluent Society, London: Penguin. Grant, G. (1995) ‘International migration, “middle classness” and the state’, Urban Anthropology, 24(3/4):281–312. Howitt, R., Connell, J. and Hirsch, P. (eds) (1996) Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Hutton, W. (1996) The State We’re In, London: Vintage. James, P. (1996) Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, London: Sage. Jones, S. (1996) In the Blood: God, Genes and Destiny, London: HarperCollins. Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (1994) ‘Return of the citizen: a survey of recent work on citizenship theory’, Ethics 104:34–48. Lahav, G. (1993) ‘Immigration, hypernationalism, and European security’, in J.P. Rogers (ed.) The Future of European Security. The Pursuit of Peace in an Era of Revolutionary Change, London: Macmillan, pp. 74–81. Lipschutz, R. (1992) ‘Reconstructing world politics: the emergence of global civil society’, Millennium 21(3):389–421. McMichael, P. and Myhre, D. (1991) ‘Global regulation versus the nation-state’, Capital and Class 43:83–106. Marden, P. (1997) ‘Geographies of dissent: globalization, identity and the nation’, Political Geography 16(1):37–64. Marden, P. and Mercer, D. (1997) The Tyranny of Difference: Multiculturalism, Citizenship and National Identity in Australia, Working paper no. 38, Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Department of Geography and Environmental Science, Monash University. ——(1998) ‘Locating strangers: multiculturalism, citizenship and nationhood in Australia’, Political Geography 17(8):939–58. Marshall, T. (1965) Class, Citizenship and Social Development, New York: Anchor. Mead, L. (1986) Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship, New York: The Free Press.
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Mestrovic, S. (1993) The Barbarian Temperament: Towards a Postmodern Critical Theory, London: Routledge. Minogue, K. (1995) ‘Two concepts of citizenship’, in A.Liebich, D.Warner and J. Dragovic (eds) Citizenship East and West, London: Kegan Paul International, pp. 9–22. Mulgan, R. (1996) ‘A race relations lesson from across the Tasman’, Australian Quarterly 68(2):77–87. O’Brien, R. (1992) Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography, London: Pinter/ RIIA. Peet, R. and Watts, M. (eds) (1996) Liberation Ecologies, London: Routledge. Plant, R. (1991) ‘Social rights and the reconstruction of welfare’, in G.Andrews (ed.) Citizenship, London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 50–64. Rees, A. (1995) ‘The promise of social citizenship’, Policy and Politics 23(4):313–25. Reisman, D. (1961) The Lonely Crowd, New Haven: Yale University Press. Reynolds, H. (1996) Aboriginal Sovereignty, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Rose, N. (1996) The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government, Economy and Society 25(3):327–56. Rosenau, J. (1994) ‘New dimensions of security: the interaction of globalizing and localizing dynamics’, Security Dialogue 25(3):255–81. ——(1995) ‘Security in a turbulent world’, Current History 94, 592:193–200. Rubenstein, K. (1995) ‘Citizenship in Australia: unscrambling its meaning’, Melbourne University Law Review 20, 503–27. Smith, A. (1991) National Identity, London: Penguin. Squires, J. (1994) ‘Private lives, secluded places: privacy as political possibility’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12:387–401. Strange, S. (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sullivan, P. (ed.) (1996) Shooting the Banker, Essays on ATSIC and Self-determination, Darwin: North Australia Research Unit, The Australia National University. The Age (1997) ‘Asia’s woes!’, The Age, 25 November, p. 17. UN (1993) State of the World’s Population, Toronto: Penguin. Veblen, T. ([1899]1967) The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York: Penguin Books. Wark, M. (1994) Virtual Geography, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Weekend Australian (1997) ‘Social insecurity’, Weekend Australian, 27 December, p. 17. Williams, R. (1980) Problems in Materialism and Culture, London: New Left Books. Yeatman, A. (1995) ‘Justice and the sovereign self, in M.Wilson and A.Yeatman (eds) Justice and Identity: Antipodean Practices, New Zealand: Allen and Unwin, pp. 195– 211. Zizek, S. (1990) ‘Eastern Europe’s republics of Gilead’, New Left Review 183:50–62.
5 Migration and security from a North-South perspective Sweden and Malawi Elisabeth Abiri
Since World War II, refugees and asylum seekers have been connected to the international human rights regime in four different ways. First, Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declares that every human being has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries. Second, the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 (or the Geneva convention) defines a ‘refugee’ as a person who crosses internationally recognised borders to escape state organised persecution for having exercised her or his political and civil rights. Third, the Convention firmly states that a refugee, once given asylum, shall be granted the same rights and freedoms as ordinary citizens. And finally, the protection of refugees by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organisations has generally been perceived as safeguarding human rights. These four connections between refugees and asylum seekers on the one hand, and the human rights regime on the other, have consequently positioned the discourse of involuntary migration within the human rights domain for almost forty years. This is not the case anymore. In the 1990s, changes have taken place that have led to the discourse on involuntary migration becoming situated inside the security domain. New Dimensions of Security The end of the Cold War opened up both political and academic space for a redefinition of the concept of security (Buzan 1991; Campbell 1992; Tickner 1993; Waever et al. 1993; Krause and Williams 1997). Today, talking or acting security is not limited to the military sphere of the state. The redefinition of security has brought in a broad range of new issues and an equally broad range of referring objects into the field of security. Most of these redefinitions have taken place both in the political and the academic arenas. In the political sphere, alternative referent objects besides the state, such as the individual or the social group, are, however, seldom taken seriously. For state officials, security is first and foremost a business for the state system, even though it is frequently acknowledged that the only acceptable goal for a national security policy (statecentred security policy) is the safeguarding of all inhabitants of the state
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territory. When it comes to the broadening of the national security agenda, states have been more willing to include economic, environmental, societal aspects of security into their overall national security policy. In some cases, states have not only been willing but indeed eager to add new aspects of security, sometimes without stating the need for adding these aspects in the first place. The adding of new issues to the security agenda, while the object of security still remains the same—the individual state—has led to the occurrence of a new phenomenon. To include new issues into the sphere of security is a way to raise the attention on the issue in question, or to sound the alarm on developments within a specific field. If this prioritising technique is to work, a strong connection between the national security of the state and the issue in question has to be presented. Involuntary migration is often mentioned as this connection, implying that the issue in question, be it of a environmental, social or economic kind, is a security concern since it has the potential for triggering refugee flows. In a way, involuntary migration has thus been positioned within the security domain, as a by-product of the securitisation of environmental, economic and societal concerns, rather than as an issue in its own right (Myers 1995). However, politicians and academics are increasingly focusing on cross-border migration as a security concern per se (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993; Huysmans 1995; Loescher 1992; Papademitriou 1994; Poku and Graham 1998; Weiner 1993). Of course, not all types of migration are brought to the forefront as security problems. On the contrary, all kinds of organised migration tend to be understood as being under state control, a fact that seems to substantially reduce the notion of threat. Thus, the ‘migration threat’ almost always refers to involuntary migration, that is of a more irregular and unorganised nature. Involuntary migration definitely raises questions of security. Human beings who involuntarily move across internationally recognised borders to escape persecution, war, violence or starvation are indeed experiencing threats to their security both as individuals and as a group. The paradox is that when the linkage between security and migration is highlighted, it is rarely with reference to the refugees. Quite the opposite—it is the refugees themselves who are presented as threats to presumptive receiving states and their citizens. Thus, the change from human rights to security does not only indicate a switch in perspectives and wordings, it also changes the focus from the refugees to the receiving state. The process by which a public migration discourse changes towards an emphasis on security issues is often referred to as a securitisation of migration (Hettne and Abiri 1998; Huysman 1995; Waever 1993a). In the case of refugees, securitisation of migration manifests itself in three main areas both in policymaking and in research. It is used as a way to acknowledge the role the so-called national interest plays in refugee policy-making. This has previously been highlighted by several authors; however, not so much in security terms as in terms of foreign policy (Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Mitchell 1992). As these authors point out, the ‘national interest’ has always been present in refugee policymaking, even though it has not surfaced in the public migration discourse until
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after the Cold War. The securitisation of migration can also be used as a way to frame the challenges cross-border migration pose to the receiving societies, when it comes to economic, social and cultural integration of the immigrants (Waever 1993b). The individual state’s power over the asylum determination process is indeed used to regulate refugee immigration so it benefits what is seen at the time as ‘the national interest’. To understand the state’s interest in shaping migration policies that match both domestic needs and foreign policy priorities is important in order to grasp developments in the field of global migration at large. However, framing this state-biased focus in words of security may not be the best way to visualise a range of appropriate actions, since insecurity is a state that is generally understood to be best dealt with through the elimination of the threat in question. A securitisation of migration may also manifest itself in a third way. Organisations and states dealing with refugee protection are changing their earlier emphasis on human rights for an emphasis on the term ‘human security’. This new interest for ‘human security’ is often understood as an improvement since it proves that the notion of security has assumed a more human and ‘peoplecentred’ aspect (UNHCR 1997). It can, however, also be argued that by using the term ‘human security’ instead of human rights, one accepts a renegotiation of the importance that have been attached to human rights. UNHCR’s 1997 report The State of the World’s Refugees defines ‘human security’ as having two principal aspects—safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life (UNHCR 1997:14). When human beings are fleeing war zones a first priority is, of course, to find them a place where they can be safe from these threats. However, there is a risk that a narrow focus on ‘human security’ will lead to a lowering of the goals of international humanitarian assistance, and consequently also to a lowering of the expectations refugees and other cross-border migrants can have on their life in exile. This chapter explores some of the issues of involuntary migration and its relationship with ‘human security’ from the perspectives of one of the world’s most developed countries—Sweden—and one of the least developed— Malawi. The securitisation of migration: the case of Sweden Since the end of the Cold War, the public migration discourse in Sweden can be said to have made a U-turn. The Swedish defence resolution which came into effect on 1 January 1997, reflected the degree to which involuntary migration and refugee flows had moved away from the exclusive realm of relief agencies and human rights bodies, by including the phenomenon among the non-military threats that now were officially declared to be of concern for Swedish security (Totalförsvar i förnyelse 1997). A news item from the Swedish news bureau TT, illustrates the changes perfectly. The headline reads ‘European preparedness for
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a refugee flow out of Albania’, and it is obvious that the word preparedness does not reflect humanitarian concerns: As a first step, the border control of the outside borders of Schengen will be strengthened…. The Schengen member countries are also encouraging the buffer states of East and Central Europe to heighten their efforts to limit the transiting of illegal refugees. (TT/AP 1998) The quotation above shows how the connection between cross-border migration and security is presented as natural and self-evident. The view of refugee flows as by definition constituting a threat to Swedish security has thus been accepted as a part of a new form of conventional wisdom (Bosniak 1991). In what ways refugee migration, or any kind of cross-border migration constitutes a threat to the Swedish state and society are seldom elaborated on. An attempt to map the different ways that refugee migration is perceived to be connected to Swedish national security has, however, been made by Hettne and Abiri (1998). In the Swedish case, security is perceived to be linked to crossborder migration in four distinct ways. First, immigration of possible terrorists, spies and the like. has always been understood as deeply connected to national security. Second, the organising capacity of the military is seen as a prerequisite to manage potential refugee emergencies. The transnational character of crossborder migration is perceived as a third security concern since it weakens the state’s room for independent actions. Finally, cross-border migration is seen as a security concern in the sense that it is perceived as a subnational challenge to civil society, connected to the risk of a possible disintegration of civil society. Comparing the incomparable: Sweden and Malawi In order to understand the character of the securitisation of migration it is necessary to situate the phenomenon in different case studies. However, a chronological study that focuses on one case over a longer period of time makes it harder to separate between characteristics that are unique to that case and others that might be of more general interest. A way to overcome this problem and generate new insights is to choose a specific event in the overall securitisation of Sweden and contrast this to another case. This chapter outlines such an exercise and attempts to show how the understanding both of the specific case of Sweden and the overall process of securitisation of migration can be improved. The two cases of cross-border migration that will be contrasted are the inflow and stay of Mozambican refugees in Malawi (from 1986 until the end of the United Nations’ organised repatriation programme in 1994), and the inflow and stay of Bosnian refugees in Sweden (from 1992 until the end of 1997).
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The reasons behind the choice of Malawi are twofold. The first reason can be found in my own curiosity of the Malawian case. Malawi—for a decade the host country of over one million Mozambican refugees—was not perceived to be just any host country. In very much the same way as Sweden has been referred to as the ‘good guy’ among the richer states, Malawi has been presented as the symbol for all generous poor host countries. [Sweden] did have a strong political commitment to create an equitable society and a national dedication over the last 30 years to meeting the needs of people in the developing world. It has been more generous than other European nations to refugees… (Hoge 1998) News reports of unwanted immigrants overrunning Canada or the United States can be placed in context by looking at Malawi, where, according to the 1993 World Refugee Survey, refugees outnumbered local residents more than two to one in some districts (Papademitriou 1997). Today, Malawi has ceased to be a symbol. A news item in 1996 reported that Malawi had deported ten illegal immigrants in three weeks. The report continues: ‘deportees include a Mozambican and a South African, five Asians of Indian origin and a Pakistani national’ (Malawi News Roundup 1996). In a country which only five years earlier had been counting refugees in hundreds of thousands, it is definitely noteworthy that ten immigrants, no matter how illegal, are considered news material at all. It seems obvious that the Malawian attitude towards migration is changing as well. The other reason behind the choice of Malawi can be found on the theoretical level. Since the securitisation of migration appears to be part of globalisation, taking place in the South as well as in the North, it is reasonable to assume that some of the dynamics behind the securitisation of migration may be common for a number of cases. The rift between the North and South, here represented by Sweden and Malawi, does, however, influence not only the living conditions of people, but also the level of theoretical generalisation possible. This is often acknowledged through the act of avoidance, that is by not doing any comparison at all. This is unfortunate, since it is important to consider the seemingly separate together, in an informed way, and not be discouraged by manifest differences. Although the members of receiving societies and the refugees inside these societies experience quite different realities, these realities are all the time contemporary and interlinked. Consequently, comparative analyses are often made between what is commonly referred to as ‘comparable’ countries (often rich industrial or poor developing ones). These comparisons, however, often understate the underlying differences that nevertheless exist between these countries. In the same manner, the resemblances that do exist between ‘incomparable’ countries are downplayed. Malawi and Sweden are both small countries with populations of
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less than ten million that have found themselves as receiving countries for large numbers of refugees that have crossed internationally recognised borders in order to escape brutal civil wars in their countries of origin. As such, both countries were forced to develop a political response to the refugee migration in question. Furthermore, they both represent cases where states have not talked or written about cross-border migration in security terms, although they may have reacted in such terms. The era of globalisation: two forms of modernity Since the focus of the study is on the securitisation of migration discourses and policies of states, the differences between the Swedish and Malawian states are, of course, important to keep in mind. As can be seen by the brief description of the two countries below, Sweden and Malawi differ on a number of points. Sweden, on the one hand, can be described as a developed country, while Malawi, on the other hand, must be classified as being among the least developed countries and, consequently, in urgent need of development. However, these opposites connect over the notion of industrial modernity. The industrial modern state with predictability, order and progress as its main features is often understood as the goal of development. Sweden, or the Swedish model, has earlier been seen as the prototype for industrial modernity, with a state that was able to deliver all three of the main features to its population (Hettne et al. 1998). Since a number of processes, commonly labelled globalisation, are increasingly calling the sovereignty of individual states into question, it has become necessary to distinguish between ‘simple’ modernity, or industrial modernity, with its view on modernity as a linear development towards more of the same—more modernity—and a more complex modernity— reflexive modernity—with its focus on doubts, questioning, and the risks modernity has brought upon itself. The differences between these two kinds of modernity has been masterly elaborated upon by Beck (1997). It appears to be fruitful to frame the differences between Malawi and Sweden in terms of modernity. The analysis will therefore use Beck’s three coordinates of politics and conflicts which according to him can be approached conceptually in three dichotomies. The first dichotomy ‘safe-unsafe’ deals with attitudes towards uncertainty, the second one, ‘inside-outside’ focuses on attitudes towards strangers and the third dichotomy, ‘political-apolitical’ highlights attitudes towards the possibilities. These dichotomies are also useful for framing the conflict of the two modernities mentioned above (Beck 1997). Malawi: country profile When the Mozambican refugees started to arrive in Malawi, the country was one of the handful of poorest countries in the world with a population of around ten
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million, a per capita gross national product of US$160, infant mortality rate 153 per 1000 live births, life expectancy 46 years and an adult literacy rate about 25 per cent. It had an annual population growth rate of 2.6 per cent and a population density of 1,061 inhabitants per 1,000 hectares (or 106.1 inhabitants per square kilometre). The country is divided into three administrative regions: Northern, Central and Southern. Economic development has tended to be channelled to the Central region where the largest ethnolinguistic group, the Chewa, who constitute rather less than half the population, live. Other important groups are Tumbuka-speakers in the north and Yao, Lomwe and Nyanja-speakers in the south. In 1968, Chewa was made the sole national language and the use of other African languages in the press or on the radio was declared illegal. Chewa thus became the sole medium of instruction and information, although it is the mother tongue of less than half of Malawians. Between independence in 1964 and the emergence of a democratic opposition movement in 1992—the major part of the period in focus—Malawi was ruled by a single-party government which was unusually restrictive of any form of dissent. According to Human Rights Watch (1990), all independent associations and free expression were effectively forbidden. Although many states in subSaharan Africa at the time suffered from greater political violence than Malawi, there were few African countries that had such a combination of totalitarianism and personal despotism. An extensive system of censorship operated, which put tight limits on academic and press freedom. Life in Malawi At the time of the arrival of the Mozambicans, life in Malawi appears to have been unsafe for the people since they were generally living in poverty, under harsh political control and with drought as an ever-pending threat to subsistence farming. If the normal state of life is one of vulnerability due to events beyond individual control, then uncertainty will be the only thing one can be certain of. Paradoxically, ‘unsafety’ might be accompanied with a more relaxed attitude towards unpredictability. Simultaneously, expectations of possibilities to change the situation might be very low. In the first place, it is important to point out that to lead a life of poverty is in itself time-consuming and leaves little room for manoeuvre to contemplate change. Second, a long period of dictatorship with the resultant disregard for the life conditions of the ordinary person encourages an apolitical attitude to public affairs. Strategies for change are difficult to visualise and if they are, the cost of change appears to be too high. On the other hand, Malawi’s political elite lived the life of industrial modernity. The Cold War with its ideological divide seemed to be a constant in international relations, a fact that ensured the regime of unconditional US support for years to come. Furthermore, the elite did not experience the
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‘unsafety’ of the people, since their lives were not touched by poverty or drought, and the control of politics lay in its hands. Sweden: country profile When the Bosnian refugees started to arrive in Sweden, the country was one of the wealthiest countries in the world, with a population of a little less than nine million, a per capita gross national product of US$26.500, an infant mortality rate so low it is not even mentioned in the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Reports, a life expectancy of 77 years and an adult literacy rate of almost 100 per cent. It had a population growth rate of 0.5 per cent and a population density of 209 inhabitants per 1,000 hectares (or 20.9 inhabitants per square kilometre). Economic development has tended to be channelled to the southern parts of Sweden where the majority of the population lives. The country’s largest ethnolinguistic group is the Swedes, who constitute close to 90 per cent of the population. Small ethnolinguistic minorities had existed for centuries (the indigenous population of Laps in northern Sweden and Finnish-speaking groups) but these groups had been neglected or suppressed in national policymaking. Swedish has been the sole national, as well as official, language. Since World War II, immigration has created a number of new ethnic minorities. Today, 900, 000 of Sweden’s inhabitants are foreign citizens, of which citizens from the Nordic countries constitute around 40 per cent (the bulk of them, 200,000, being Finnish). Other European Union citizens make up another 40,000 (or around 5 per cent). These minority groups originate from the labour immigrants of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Yet other minorities originate from the refugee immigration from the 1970s and onwards, among them around 50,000 Iranians and 30,000 Chileans. Sweden, although still a constitutional monarchy, has been a parliamentary democracy for the last century. It has neither been colonised nor has it been a major colonial power. For most of the twentieth century, the country has been governed by the Social Democrats. During the 1960s and 1970s, Sweden developed a high internationalist profile with its engagement in various UN multilateral institutions and in other issues of international solidarity. However, the developments in the Swedish economy and labour market, and consequent reductions in the former comprehensive welfare system, have in many ways changed the Swedish attitude towards international commitments. Life in Sweden Until the 1980s, because of the extensive welfare state, life in Sweden had been safe and planable both for the people and the political elite. For most of the twentieth century, life had continuously been improving, as economic conditions improved and democracy deepened. A long period of democracy, economic
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prosperity and the important role of the welfare state had, however, instilled a strong sense of entitlement in the Swedish citizens. Consequently, every frustration could be understood as a failure of politics. Strategies for change and improvement were supposed to be inherent in the political system. When the Bosnian refugees arrived in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War had consolidated the feeling that the country had reached the end of a predictable era and was now entering an era of risk. Sweden had been considered a safe haven for its people. The rest of the world was, on the contrary, considered unsafe and in need of change. It is possible that Swedish internationalism was conditioned by the upholding of a sharp distinction between outside and inside. As long as the inside remained safe and ‘unsafety’ was an outside phenomenon, the Swedish government and civil society was easily mobilised to assist people living under unsafe conditions through the UN, international aid and a generous refugee reception. That the border between inside and outside, safe and unsafe, was not as impermeable as once imagined, was brought to Sweden’s attention by two dramatic events in 1986. The murder of Prime Minister Palme proved that the inside was not so safe after all. That a political leader could be murdered on the streets of Stockholm was not only unexpected, it was entirely inconceivable, and the murder thus signalled the end of the trusting attitude that had characterised Swedish society. Only two months later, the serious accident in the nuclear plant of Chernobyl left large areas of northern Sweden contaminated with nuclear radiation for several years to come. The ‘unsafety’ of the outside could overnight become the ‘unsafety’ of the inside. Malawi and the Mozambican refugees During 1985–91, the number of refugees in Africa increased by 8.5 per cent per year, rising from 2.9 million to 5.4 million. The reasons behind this dramatic increase was the increased incidence of internal conflict, civil unrest and instability, often exacerbated by the persistence of drought and famine. The number of African countries that hosted over 100,000 refugees doubled during the period (from seven to fourteen). Three of these countries— Ethiopia, Somalia and Malawi—were each hosting more than a million refugees (Oucho 1996). Although many of the world’s poorer countries have shown remarkable hospitality towards refugees, Malawi stands out as an exemplar. For almost a decade, Malawi was the major receiving country for all Mozambicans whose flight from civil war and drought had brought them across state borders. In fact, large parts of the refugee flows were forced across the border by RENAMO—the violent opponent to the governing party, FRELIMO—that wanted to use the refugee camps as a basis for recruitment (Nilsson 1999). During that period, very few incidents were recorded in which displaced Mozambicans were refused admission to the country, or were forced to leave Malawi against their will (UNHCR 1997). In 1993, Malawi was the top country
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on two of the lists of UNHCR; the one ranking countries according to the ratio of the refugee population to the total population, and the list ranking countries according to the ratio of refugee population to the gross national product per capita. The country was also the receiver of the UNHCR’s fifth largest assistance programme in 1991, and the sixth in 1992. A massive influx of refugees from the devastating civil war in neighbouring Mozambique began in 1986, and by 1993 Malawi was host to over a million Mozambican refugees—the equivalent to 10 per cent of its own total population. Refugees lived in thirteen of Malawi’s twenty-four administrative districts and in some cases, they outnumbered the local inhabitants. Transnational politics A number of aspects of Malawi’s policy towards Mozambique in the 1980s can be directly linked to the civil war in Mozambique, and the creation of the one million refugees. Senior members of the Malawian government were closely associated with the rebel RENAMO. Malawi became a staging post for South African logistic support for RENAMO. Furthermore, the movement was provided with rear bases and recruitment bases inside Malawi. In 1986, this support provoked a major crisis between Mozambique and Malawi, with the former threatening military action. The crisis was only defused by the death in a plane crash of the Mozambican president, Samora Machel, the same year. Later, the entanglement in Mozambique became an important factor in alienating the army from the government and the party. Malawian troops were deployed within Mozambique to guard Malawi’s main route to the sea (the transport corridor to the port of Nacala) against attack from RENAMO. When the Malawian soldiers suffered casualties at the hands of enemies backed by their own government this created a frustration that built up over the years, to show itself in the violent attacks on headquarters of the party and the Malawian ‘Young Pioneers’ in December 1993 (Human Rights Watch 1990). The country that the refugees left behind was a country in chaos. According to Wilson and Nunes (1994) most of the fifteen million rural Mozambicans were not living in their home areas, and many had been displaced several times during the course of the war. The series of displacements mirrored the turns in the civil war that swept over the country, leaving some parts calm for periods of time when the fighting was concentrated in other regions. During quieter times, refugees returned, only to be forced to leave again. A chronology of the population movement to and from the Milange district in Northern Mozambique, presented by Wilson and Nunes (1994), gives an excellent illustration of how the migration of refugees across the Malawi-Mozambican border was in a state of constant change. As one group tried to repatriate, another was forced to leave.
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Transnational life The moving back and forth over the border had taken place as long as the border had existed. Like so many other African borders, the border between Malawi and Mozambique has never been understood as a border in the nation-state sense of the word. In fact, it is more appropriate to see the border as central to the community than as a boundary dividing the people. The existence of two different economic and political systems within walking distance formed a livelihood that took advantage of the differences in prices and/or rules (Wilson and Nunes 1994). The border people were in fact so closely integrated that they did not really feel that they were refugees until they were targeted for separate assistance by the international aid organisations (Wilson 1994). It was not until 1986 that Malawi started to classify Mozambican immigrants as refugees that should be held separate from the local people even against their will. This policy of non-separation had been quite natural in a situation where most southern Malawians had Mozambican origins. Consequently, Malawians welcomed and assisted the refugees and the Malawian state accepted their presence. However, the sheer number of refugees arriving, together with the arrival of international aid in 1986, resulted in a separation of refugees from the local people. Growing concerns about the impact of the refugee influx and the administrative control needed for the humanitarian assistance, meant that refugees were increasingly placed in camps. Family networks were, however, used to find better places to stay, since many of the refugees preferred to stay with local people and meet their own needs (Wilson and Nunes 1994). The Mozambicans wanted to stay as close to the border as possible. This closeness enabled them to keep in touch with people at home and, in some cases, also to keep cultivating their land through nightly visits back to their fields. In late 1989, the Malawi government decided to transfer new arrivals to another site across the country due to overcrowding of the camps close to the border. This move constituted a major problem for the Mozambican refugees. According to Wilson and Nunes (1994), they were concerned over the fact that this transfer would separate them from their compatriots and their land, and make self-repatriation more difficult in terms of both information and logistics. Changes connected to the refugee presence The impact of the arrival of an additional million human beings to a poor country with a shortage of arable land puts an intolerable strain on already meagre resources and administrative structures. The ecological effects caused by the refugee settlements and camps have been especially noteworthy. Refugees felled large number of trees in order to acquire wood for fuel and building material. This is not something that is specific to the Malawian case. However, the location of the refugee settlements in some of the most ecologically vulnerable
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areas of the country exacerbated deforestation and has led to subsequent land degradation. The shortage of arable land prevented the refugees’ involvement in agriculture, and consequently also their possibility of becoming self-sufficient. The majority of the refugees were almost entirely dependent on outside relief for food, water, health care and other support. Nevertheless, the Malawi government had to divert a significant proportion of its own revenues to the refugee programme, despite the provision of large-scale foreign aid to support the refugees. The presence of international relief aid of such magnitude had a detrimental effect on the country’s road system. As a result it became more difficult for Malawian farmers to transport their agricultural products, something which in its turn affected the food distribution throughout the country (UNHCR 1993). At the end of the 1980s, the Malawian economy was badly hit by a fall in tobacco prices on the world market, since tobacco, along with sugar and tea, constituted its major export. Remittances from migrant workers in South Africa, that once had been the mainstay of Malawi’s foreign exchange earnings, had also been reduced to an illegal trickle. As the years went by and the UNHCR’s relief programme diminished from fifty to twenty-six US dollars per refugee annually, refugees came into direct competition with Malawians for access to health facilities, schools, water supplies and informal employment opportunities. Notions of inside and outside in Malawi It is quite clear that the definition of outside and inside did not correspond to the Malawian-Mozambican border, neither when it came to social or economic networks, or to the political impact Malawi’s ‘foreign policy’ had on its ‘domestic policy’. Inside and outside had always been blurred and continued to be so during the civil war. As far as the people were concerned, the movement across the border between the two countries was not a movement from an ‘inside’ to an ‘outside’. The most important divide between inside and outside appears to have been the one between areas controlled by RENAMO and the ones controlled by FRELIMO. Being on the inside or outside of these areas mattered more to the refugees than on which side of the international border they were. Internationally, the refugee movement was, however, described as an interstate affair, where citizens from one country enter the territory of another country. Furthermore, it is interesting that it was by the actions of the international community that the notion of difference between Malawians and Mozambicans first entered the minds of the border people, since it made a stronger point of separating citizens and refugees than the two countries and the people did themselves.
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Changes in the 1990s The beginning of the 1990s was the era of two major changes in Malawi. The Mozambican refugees started to return home, some of them as a part of the United Nations repatriation plan, the rest of them through their own initiative. The changing situation inside Mozambique, together with the Malawian government’s increasingly explicit focus on repatriation, led to the repatriation of the majority of the refugees over a period of two years. The repatriation was no more a one-time event than the flight had been. It can rather be characterised by a moving back and forth until a final decision to resettle was taken. During this period, a revival of Malawian civil society was initiated by a pastoral letter written by the country’s eight Catholic bishops in May 1992. The letter, containing severe criticism of the government, was the first open act of opposition to the Banda regime in twenty-eight years. As such, it paved the way for an increasingly bold public agitation for political reform, that led to Malawi’s first ever multi-party election in May 1994, two years after the pastoral letter (Posner 1995). It is interesting that it was not until this contemporary democratic post-refugee period that ten illegal immigrants became an news issue. Sweden and the Bosnian refugees Between 1988 and 1992, the number of people seeking asylum in the whole of Europe increased by an average of 31 per cent per year, only to decrease again by an average of 18 per cent per year in the time period between 1992 and 1997. During the peak year of 1992, close to 700,000 persons sought asylum in a European country, three times as many as four years earlier. The main reason behind this dramatic increase was the internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to the arrival of around 70,000 Bosnians to Sweden. Sweden now hosts around 5 per cent of all Bosnians who crossed state borders during their flight. Transnational politics A number of aspects of Sweden’s policy towards Yugoslavia in the 1980s can be directly linked to the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and the creation of the one million refugees. First, Sweden was an arms exporter to Yugoslavia, indirectly arming the executors of the infamous ‘ethnic cleansing’ that created millions of refugees. Second, the post-World War II economic boom in Sweden led to a labour shortage which was met by recruitment tours to Yugoslavia. The previous role of labour importer proved to be an important factor for the refugees’ choice of destination in the 1990s. Sweden was the place of friends and relatives, and consequently a place to turn to. When the Bosnian refugees arrived
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in Sweden, around 40,000 persons of Yugoslavian origin were already living in the country on a permanent basis (SOPEMI 1992). The country that the refugees left behind was a country in chaos. According to UNHCR (1995), over one million Bosnians left the country, while another million were displaced inside Bosnian borders. The people fled the so-called ethnic cleansing that was one of the main purposes of the civil war. Due to the intensity of fighting, the Bosnians left their homes, or what remained of them, in concentrated groups in a relatively short period of time, as compared to the Mozambicans in Malawi who arrived over a much longer period of time. Twelve European countries became host countries for over 20,000 Bosnian refugees. Three of these countries—Germany, Yugoslavia (FR) and Croatia—were each hosting more than 250,000 refugees, together more than 69 per cent of all displaced Bosnians who had crossed any internationally recognised borders. In 1993, the ratio of the refugee population to the total population was one refugee for every 26.7 inhabitants, a ratio that placed Sweden at number twelve on the list ranking countries according to the ratio of refugee population to total population (UNHCR 1993). Unlike Malawi, the country was not one of the fifty top countries on the list ranking countries according to the ratio of refugee population to the gross national product per capita. Sweden was, however, one of the largest contributors to UNHCR both in absolute terms and according to per capita income. In 1992, Sweden’s contribution to the UNHCR was close to US $92,000 (UNHCR 1993). Changes connected with the refugee presence The period in focus can generally be described as one of hardening of immigration and refugee policies. By December 1989, the Swedish government considered the refugee situation had become so serious that an emergency decision had to be made that narrowed the granting of asylum to only refugees under the Geneva convention. The most noteworthy policy change during the period must, however, be the introduction of a visa obligation for refugees from Bosnia. This visa obligation was decided upon in June 1993, the same month as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had earlier described the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as follows: The intensification of the war, the absence of decisive political breakthrough, the restrictions on asylum and the virtual depletion of resources for humanitarian efforts constitute an explosive mixture which may cause a massive humanitarian disaster with even greater consequences for Europe. (UNHCR 1993:184) One of the arguments behind the visa policy change was that the acceptance of refugees was not the best way to deal with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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The act of giving asylum to people fleeing Bosnia could indeed be of indirect assistance to the persecutors for whom the creation of refugees was a goal in itself, and a part of a strategy of ethnic cleansing. The people who fled the civil war had, however, made their choice—the personal cost of maintaining an ethnically mixed society were much too high. To introduce a visa obligation against people fleeing ethnic cleansing ended the last claim Sweden could have to a ‘good-guy’ status in refugee affairs, as is also reflected in the way Sweden’s refugee policies are treated in the international media. The Swedish minister, responsible for immigration at the time, Birgit Friggebo, tried to soften the humanitarian significance of the policy changes by declaring that most of the 40, 000 Bosnians awaiting decisions on their asylum applications in Sweden would be granted a permanent residence permit. Furthermore, the government was considering seeking parliament’s approval to raise the number of so-called ‘quota-refugees’ to 1,000 persons per month for refugees from former Yugoslavia. The introduction of the visa obligation was formulated in a way that underlined the Swedish government’s feeling that the country had admitted more than its share of refugees compared to some other states outside the former Yugoslavia, with the obvious exception of Germany. The official statement announced that Sweden was not able to cope with the influx, at the time reaching 1,200 to 1,700 Bosnians per week. Most of them arrived by bus via Poland, Hungary and Slovakia—countries that, according to Friggebo, did not take their responsibility seriously since they were merely transiting asylum seekers to Sweden. The introduction of the visa obligation should be seen as a direct signal to these countries to change their policies (Dagens Nyheter 1993). Even with the introduction of the visa obligation, the accumulated number of Bosnian refugees makes them the largest refugee group received in Sweden to date. The majority of them are young, well-educated Bosnian Muslims, originating from all over Bosnia (Eastmond 1998). It is not self-evident that the arrival of an additional 70,000 human beings to a country with Sweden’s administrative capacity and economic resources should have any significant impact on the country. The Bosnians did, however, arrive at a time when the number of foreigners had become a sensitive and problematic issue. The number of crimes with racial motives, among them attacks on refugees and refugee camps, has increased all through the 1990s. The location of refugee camps in vulnerable areas with a high degree of unemployment has in some cases exacerbated the tensions between local youths and the asylum seekers in the camps. Even if asylum seekers have a legal right take up employment, the shortage of jobs has prevented their involvement in society, and consequently also their possibility of becoming self-sufficient. The majority of asylum seekers were dependent on the camps for their daily subsistence. When given asylum, the refugees were settled in communities all over Sweden in accordance with the refugee settlement policy aiming at dispersal of the refugees throughout the country. This dispersal policy had the consequence that
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refugees settled in one community were very different. They not only came from different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were also from different social strata and would probably not have associated with each other or felt that they had much in common before the war (Eastmond 1998). This method of locating the refugees made it hard to use any social support groups and networks that might exist both within the refugee community at large, and between the established labour immigrants and the refugees. This approach stands in contrast to the Malawian case where these social ties appear to have been the basis for the organisation of the settlements and camps. Once resettled with their permanent residence permit, the Bosnians continued to encounter poor prospects in the Swedish labour market. After the first years of an introductory programme (including Swedish lessons and complementary professional training) almost 50 per cent of them are still unemployed. However, this is not a specific trait for the Bosnian group. Immigrants have much higher unemployment figures than the Swedish population. Even though official explanations of the different employment rates focus on the features of the individual immigrant, like lack of Swedish language skills, and the ‘right’ education, the degree of generalisation seems to suggest that it is more of a structural dilemma than it is usually presented as. An explanation more in line with this interpretation is given by Eastmond (1998), who states that acceptance on the labour market does increasingly depend on being Swedish not only in the cultural but also in the ethnic sense (i.e. of Swedish descent, rejecting visible marks of foreignness, such as appearance, accents, names). Stories about the difficulties a ‘foreign’ name may give its job-hunting owner are abundant. At the end of the 1980s, the dismantling of the extensive Swedish welfare state began and unemployment rates rose. As a result of economic decline, a general feeling that refugees were in direct competition with the Swedes for employment opportunities surfaced. The so-called popular discontent in Sweden has, during the 1990s, to a large extent focused on immigration and the occurrence of the comparatively new ethnic minorities. Immigration has thus become an urgent issue. The recent tightening of asylum law and policy in Sweden, and across all Western states, can in part be understood as an attempt to regain voters from rightwing extremist and/or anti-immigration parties (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993; Papademetriou 1994). Notions of inside and outside in Sweden That the notion of the indivisibility of outside and inside had entered the Swedish public conscience did not indicate that there was an acceptance of the fact. Even though the case of the Bosnian refugees pointed out how the outside-inside dichotomy did not correspond to the Swedish internationally recognised borders, neither when it came to social or economic networks, or to the political impact Sweden’s ‘foreign policy’ had on its ‘domestic policy’, this blurring of inside and outside tended to be seen as an anomaly. The existing of social networks
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between the labour immigrants on the inside of Swedish borders and the refugees-to-be on the outside were never mentioned as a possible explanation as to the choice of Sweden as a country of asylum. In the Swedish case, the definition of outside and inside is still generally seen as corresponding to the borders of the country, or at least it is still understood as the preferable order of things. It is interesting to note that even when strangers are physically inside the territorial borders, they still remain on the outside of the invisible borders of Swedish society. As noted by Eastmond (1998), the official inclusion into Swedish society has not been followed by an inclusion in practice. Malawi and Sweden: differences and similarities It has become a truism to say that all states’ actions are increasingly influenced by ongoing globalising processes. In a way, the term globalisation has been coined to capture the realisation that state borders do not separate the outside from the inside to the degree that the industrial modernity presupposes. Today, it is obvious that a number of cross-border phenomena have eroded a state’s abilities to obtain the ‘non-interference in its internal affairs’ that was the precondition for the creation of a safe predictable domestic sphere. Among these phenomena, finance, trade, production are often mentioned as the most influential, but changes within technology, international law, transportation, mass media, together with environmental changes and refugee flows also have a substantial impact on the life inside state borders, since developments within all these fields increasingly shape the room for manoeuvre for individual states. The industrial modern state had been seen as a goal for development strategies on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the only difference in opinion being concerned with the appropriate form of government. After the end of the Cold War the model remained, but the political differences petered out. The multi-party democratic version of the industrial modern state was becoming a model with global spread. A number of states embarked on a rocky road towards democratic rule, following the countries of Eastern Europe. Malawi: on the road to industrial modernity? These changes on the international scene contributed to the pressure for reform in Malawi. The examples of political change in Zambia and South Africa had the important effect of convincing Malawians that change was indeed possible. Furthermore, the Malawian government felt the growing pressure from the international community that increasingly stressed the importance of democracy and human rights once the strategic imperative of maintaining unconditional support for Banda had disappeared (Posner 1995). With the change in form of government came the expectations about what the introduction of democracy