Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos
This page intentionally left blank
Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos
EDITED BY Y. Mich...
44 downloads
2618 Views
956KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos
This page intentionally left blank
Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos
EDITED BY Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul
MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, ETHNOS
© Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul, 2006. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–7102–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bodemann, Y. Michal, 1944– Migration, citizenship, ethnos / Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7102–1 1. Emigration and immigration—Europe. 2. Citizenship—Europe. 3. Immigrants—Europe. 4. Europe—Ethnic relations. I. Yurdakul, Gökçe. II. Title. JV7590.B63 2006 325.4—dc22
2005053910
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: April 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
C on t e n t s
List of Figures
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
Notes on the Contributors
xi
Introduction Gökçe Yurdakul and Y. Michal Bodemann
1
Part I
Citizenship and Incorporation Regimes
1. The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics Saskia Sassen
13
2. Citizenship, Statelessness and Market Fundamentalism: Arendtian Right to Have Rights Margaret R. Somers
35
3. Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization Christian Joppke
Part II
63
The Changing Sociopolitical Context
4. Being German and Jewish in Kazakhstan and Germany Ruth Mandel
95
5. The Migration-Security Nexus: International Migration and Security Before and After 9/11 Thomas Faist
103
6. Changing the Rules While the Game Is On: From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands Han Entzinger
121
vi / contents
Part III Muslim Communities and the Politics of Incorporation 7. The Murder of Theo van Gogh: Gender, Religion, and the Struggle over Immigrant Integration in the Netherlands Anna C. Korteweg
147
8. Unveiling Distribution: Muslim Women with Headscarves in France and Germany Pascale Fournier and Gökçe Yurdakul
167
9. Turkish Brides: A Look at the Immigration Debate in Germany Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim
185
Part IV
Labor Migration and Irregular Migration
10. Illegal Migration: What Can We Know and What Can We Explain? Friedrich Heckmann
197
11. Managing Citizenship and Migration: Undocumented Labor Migrants’ Children and Policy Reforms in Israel Adriana Kemp
219
Index
239
List of Figures
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5
Basic forms of illegal immigration Apprehensions of foreigners attempting to cross national land and sea borders illegally, 1990–2001 Apprehensions of human smugglers and smuggled migrants at German national borders, 1990–2001 Asylum applications (“Erstanträge”), 1990–2002 Persons suspected of a criminal offence without a legal residence status in Germany, 1994–2001
199 201 202 202 203
This page intentionally left blank
Acknowledgments
Most of the contributions in this volume were selected from the conference of the same title, organized by Y. Michal Bodemann at the Joint Initiative of German and European Studies at the University of Toronto with the joint sponsorship by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Berlin, October 2–4, 2003. We would also like to acknowledge the contribution by the Goethe Institut in Toronto to make this conference possible. Independently from the conference presentations, this edited volume has developed in its own path with additional contributions by Thomas Faist, Anna Korteweg, Pascale Fournier, and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. We would like to thank Ralf Fücks, Rita Süssmuth, Marieluise Beck, Cem Özdemir, Mekonnen Mesghena, Anne Demmer, Edith Klein, and Doina Popescu who contributed to this conference in different ways. Our thanks also go to Nadine Blumer who helped us with the manuscript and the Palgrave editorial team who carefully prepared it for publication.
This page intentionally left blank
Notes on the Contributors
Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim is Professor of Sociology at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Her fellowships include Cardiff University (1996); Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (1997–1998) and Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (2002–2003). Her areas of research are work and employment, family and gender, reproductive technologies, migration, ethnic and race relations. Her most recent book in English is Reinventing the Family: In Search of New Lifestyles, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press (2002). Her most recent book in German is Wir und die Anderen. Vom Blick der Deutschen auf Migranten und Minderheiten, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp (2004). Michal Bodemann is Professor of Sociology and is affiliated with the Joint Initiative of German and European Studies at the University of Toronto. He wrote his dissertation in the Department of Sociology at Brandeis University on rural social structure in central Sardinia, a community study that attempted to reconstruct the politics, kinship, and economic patterns since 1800. In that context, he has written on theories of underdevelopment, patron–client relations, and issues in Marxist theory. Today, his areas of interest and teaching include race and ethnic relations, classical sociological theory, qualitative methods, Jewish studies, and especially GermanJewish relations and memory. He has published numerous articles and books on Jews in Germany. His book, GedáchTnistheater. Die jüdische Gemeinschaft und ihre deutsche Erfindung (Theatre of Memory: The Jewish Community and its German Invention) was listed as one of the ten best nonfiction books in Germany in June 1996. He has held visiting professorships in various universities including Freie Universität Berlin (1983–1984, 1987–1988), Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik (1990–1991), Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (1990–1992 and 2003), University of Potsdam (1997) and Tel Aviv University (1999). He has received numerous SSHRC and DAAD grants for his research and held Halbert (Jerusalem), Mendelssohn (Potsdam) and Rockefeller (Bellagio) fellowships. Currently, he is conducting further research on Jews in contemporary Germany with Connaught Research Grant from University of Toronto. His most recent
xii / notes on the contributors
book is A Jewish Family in Germany Today: An Intimate Portrait (Duke University Press, 2004). Han Entzinger studied sociology and economics in Leiden, Rotterdam, and Strasbourg. He was appointed Professor of Migration and Integration Studies at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands) in 2001. From 1986–2001 he held a similar chair at Utrecht University. Earlier he worked inter alia for the International Labour Organization and for the Scientific Council for Government Policy, a think tank close to the Dutch Prime Minister. He is cofounder and member of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (www.ercomer.org). His research interests include international migration, integration and multiculturalism, migration and the welfare state, Islam in Western societies as well as comparative policies on these matters. His latest book is Migration between States and Markets (Ashgate, 2004, with Marco Martiniello and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, eds.). At various occasions he has been a consultant to the Council of Europe and the European Commission. He is past president of the Research Committee on Migration of the International Sociological Association. Thomas Faist is Chair and Professor of Transnational Relations and Development Sociology at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld. He is director of the Center on the Study of Migration, Citizenship and Development (www.comcad-bielefeld.de). Formerly, he directed International Studies in Political Management (ISPM) at Hochschule Bremen. He received his PhD degree from the New School for Social Research in New York. His research focuses on international migration, ethnic relations, social policy, comparative politics, and transnationalization. Thomas Faist was Willy-Brandt-Guest Professor at the University of Malmö and DAAD Visiting Professor at the University of Toronto. Currently, he directs internationally comparative projects on “The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Europe,” funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and “Democracy and Migration,” supported by the German Science Foundation. Thomas Faist is member of the editorial boards of the journals Ethnic & Racial Studies and The Sociological Quarterly. Among his most recent book publications is Transnational Social Spaces: Agents, Networks and Organizations (Oxford University Press, 2004). Pascale Fournier is Boulton Fellow at the McGill Faculty of Law, an SJD Candidate at Harvard Law School, and a Trudeau scholar. She is currently writing a doctoral dissertation that focuses on the interaction between law, Muslim women, and constitutional liberal states. She clerked for the Honorable Claire L’Heureux-Dube at the Supreme Court of Canada, and has
notes on the contributors / xiii
taught at the Institute for Women’s Studies and Research in Tehran, Iran. Her teaching and scholarly interests include comparative constitutional law, identity formation and the law, law and social change, human rights and Islam, critical legal studies, and family law in the context of globalization. She is actively involved in numerous NGOs—she currently serves on the board of directors of Canada World Youth and Fondation Paul Gérin-Lajoie and works as a legal consultant for the Canadian Council of Muslim Women. Her recent articles include: “La femme musulmane au Canada, un être visible caché? Réflexions sur la traduction de l’Autre,” Revue Éthique Publique, “La réligion dans l’espace public,” vol. 8, no. 1 (2006), “The Reception of Muslim Family Laws in Western Liberal States,” Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Dossier 27 (2005), “The Ghettoization of Difference in Canada: ‘Rape by Culture’ or the Danger of a Cultural Defence in Criminal Law Trials,” Manitoba Law Journal, vol. 29, no. 81 (2002) and “The Erasure of Islamic Difference in Canadian and American Family Law Adjudication,” Journal of Law and Policy, vol. 10, no. 51 (2001). Friedrich Heckmann is Professor of Sociology and director of european forum for migration studies at the University of Bamberg. He studied sociology, history, and economics at the universities of Münster, Kiel, Lawrence (USA) and Erlangen-Nürnberg. He received an MA in sociology from the University of Kansas in Lawrence in 1967 and his PhD from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg in 1972, where he worked as an assistant and researcher. He was Professor of Sociology at the Hamburg School of Economics and Political Science between 1982 and 1992. In 1992 he became a professor at the University of Bamberg. His main research interests are in the areas of migration, interethnic relations, integration of migrants, social structure of Germany, and sociological theory. He has served as a policy adviser and expert consultant on migration and integration for the German parliament, the German federal government, Länder governments, cities, and nongovernmental organizations. For his publications see: http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/mithecpe.htm Christian Joppke is Professor of Sociology at International University Bremen. Born in 1959, he graduated from the University of Frankfurt (1984), and received his PhD from the University of California in Berkeley (1989). He previously taught at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles (1990–1994), the European University Institute in Florence (1995–2002), and the University of British Columbia in Vancouver (2003–2004). In 2002–2003 he was a Visiting Fellow at the Russell Sage Foundation in New York. His areas of research are political sociology, citizenship and immigration, ethnic and race relations, nations and nationalism, social movements, comparative methods, and theory. His most recent book is
xiv / notes on the contributors
Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2005). Adriana Kemp received her PhD in Sociology at the University of Tel-Aviv. Since 2001 she is a Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Her research areas are political sociology, migration, citizenship and national identity, nationalism, territories and boundaries, sociology of Israeli society. She is the coeditor of Israelis in Conflict: Identities, Hegemonies, Challenges, Sussex University Press (2004, with D. Newman, O. Yiftachel, and U. Ram). She is currently preparing a book on Strangers in a Jewish State: The Politics of Labor Migration in Israel (Kibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House with Rebecca Raijman). Her recent articles include “International Migration, Domestic Work and Care Work: Undocumented Latina Migrants in Israel,” Gender and Society 17, 5 (2003) (with R. Raijman, S. Schamma-Gesser); “Labor Migration and Racialisation: Labor Market Mechanisms and Labor Migration Control Policies in Israel,” Social Identities 10, 2 (2003); “Tel Aviv is Not Foreign to You: Urban Incorporation Policy on Labor Migrants in Israel,” International Migration Review XXXVIII 1, 2004 (with R. Raijman). Anna C. Korteweg received her PhD in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley and is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto. She is working on a project on the integration of Muslim immigrants in northern Europe, focusing on the way national identities are constructed as the integration of these immigrants in various nation-states is negotiated. She has published in Theory and Society, The Annual Review of Sociology, and in Qualitative Sociology. She is writing a book based on her comparative ethnographic research at welfare offices charged with transforming single mothers into working mothers in the United States and the Netherlands. She is also writing a series of articles based on her new project. Ruth Mandel received her PhD from the University of Chicago; her doctoral research focused on Turkish migration to Berlin. Over the past several years she has conducted research in Central Asia, and has carried out a longterm project on media and development in Kazakhstan. She has taught social anthropology at University College London since 1990, and has published many articles on her research. Mandel was a Berlin Prize Fellow at the American Academy during the fall semester 2000. During her time in Berlin, she worked on her project entitled “Changing Practices of Citizenship and Belonging among Recent Immigrants from the Soviet Union.” This project is a continuation of her research on two immigrant populations: the ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union and former Soviet Jews who have immigrated to Berlin. In particular, she was interested
notes on the contributors / xv
in the difficulty of defining citizenship and nationality, the practical and political problems this presents, and also the social problems these populations have encountered as they seek acceptance in a new land. Saskia Sassen is Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, and Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics. Her new book is Denationalization: Territory, Authority and Rights in a Global Digital Age (Princeton University Press, 2005). She has just completed for UNESCO a five-year project on sustainable human settlement for which she set up a network of researchers and activists in over fifty countries. Her most recent books are the edited Global Networks, Linked Cities (New York and London: Routledge, 2002) and the coedited Socio-Digital Formations: New Architectures for Global Order (Princeton University Press, 2005). The Global City is out in a new fully updated edition in 2001. Her books are translated into fifteen languages. She serves on several editorial boards and is an adviser to several international bodies. She is a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Cities, and Chair of the Information Technology and International Cooperation Committee of the Social Science Research Council (USA). Her comments have appeared in The Guardian, The New York Times, Le Monde Diplomatique, the International Herald Tribune, Vanguardia, Clarin, the Financial Times, among others. Margaret R. Somers is Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan. She is specializing in comparative historical sociology and citizenship formation and democratization. She is the recipient of distinguished awards and fellowships, most recent of which include Rutgers University Center for Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture. She is the chair of the American Sociological Association’s Historical Comparative Sociology. Her recent articles are “From Poverty to Perversity: Markets, Institutions, and the State over Two Centuries of Welfare Debate,” American Sociological Review (April 2005) and “Citizenship Troubles: Genealogies of Struggle for the Soul of the Social” in The Making and Unmaking of Modernity, edited by Julia Adams, Lis Clemens, and Ann Orloff, Duke University Press (2004). Her book Studies in Citizenship, Civil Society and the Public Sphere is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. Gökçe Yurdakul studied sociology at Bogazici University, Istanbul and gender and women’s studies at Middle East Technical University in Ankara. She is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Toronto, Department of Sociology. Her dissertation is on immigrant mobilization and political
xvi / notes on the contributors
representation in Germany. Her teaching and research interests include migration, citizenship, race and ethnicity, gender, and women. She is the author of “State, Political Parties, Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Berlin” (2006, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies); “Migrant Genealogies: German Turkish Identity in Public Display” (2002, Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien) and coauthor of “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey” (with Aysan Sev’er, 2001, Violence against Women).
Introduction Gökçe Yurdakul and Y. Michal Bodemann
This volume addresses the problem of how citizenship regimes and immigrant incorporation policies are being transformed in the aftermath of September 11. Our contributors, from Western Europe, Canada, and the United States have entered into a discussion in order to address this problem and further our understanding of the European situation and migration at large. We will raise three interrelated questions: First, how has migration evolved in Europe over the past decades? Here we will deal with basic issues in contemporary German and European migration at large, sketching the situation since 1945 and focusing on the new developments since the early 1980s. Second, how has the citizenship debate evolved and how has the problem of citizenship, in relation to immigration, been dealt with by the receiving states in Western Europe? Third, how have the migrants responded to their situation in various receiving countries? Most importantly, what sort of institutional structures have they elaborated and how do these structures relate to and interact with the host society? In the case of Germany, in a celebrated review of developments since 1945, Günter Grass has pointed out that, in the course of German unification, inequality has been increasing in German society. Germany, in fact, is not the only Western European country that is experiencing these economic changes. Many multinational companies in France and in the Netherlands, for example, started to cut back on the number of employees, and have taken their factories to the peripheries of the European Union, such as Poland, Romania, and Turkey. At the end of the nineties and the beginning of the new millennium, many financially stable companies, such as those in the automotive industry, began to cut back on the number of workers. Many firms undercut industry agreements, and at times even contravened collective bargaining agreements (Thelen and Wijnbergen, 2003).
2 / gökçe yurdakul and y. michal bodemann
The pressing effects of globalization and the onslaught of neoliberal policies dismantled the strong tradition of the German welfare state. The Social Democratic Party-led government made dramatic cuts to sickness benefits and pensions in its first term, between 1998 and 2002. When the SPD was elected for the second time, more dramatic changes were on the way: for example, the reform of employment policy in order to reduce the unemployment level which reached its highest level since World War II. It is quite apparent that the socioeconomic issues Günter Grass has pointed to, and German unification notwithstanding, have long ceased to be a part of a German Sonderweg: over the past two decades, neoliberalism and what is being described as globalization have had a similar impact in especially many other Western European societies, such as the Netherlands and France. Moreover, migration issues and the minority rights debate cannot be discussed without the overall sociopolitical transformation in Europe after World War II. Both of these debates, then, should be seen within both the larger context of economic and political transformation in Europe, and for the purpose of this volume, specifically in the context of Germany. The transformation in Europe from its heavily manufacturing based economy to its deindustrialization has brought about a strong emergence of neoliberal policies and as a result of which it has often ignored drastic changes in the lives of immigrants. Germany has a different history with immigrants as compared to the Netherlands and France. In the 1960s, Germany imported “guest workers” in order to realize the “economic miracle.” The Netherlands and France also had a considerable number of “guest workers,” however the majority of their immigrants are from their former colonies. Although many of the guest workers and the residents from former colonies were expected to stay only temporarily, it soon became apparent that they would stay permanently in the host countries. By the early 1990s, many Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Algerians had already been in their host countries for several decades, the second-generation immigrant children had started to enter the labor market, and the third-generation had become students in schools. The receiving countries introduced reforms which were to facilitate the integration of immigrants. For example, foreigners who reside in the Netherlands for five years can vote in the local elections and take part in referenda since the 1980s. However, in France only French nationals can vote and stand for elections and there are no other political rights for immigrants. The same procedure also goes for Germany (EU Parliamentary Assembly, 2000). France naturalizes its immigrant population according to the ius soli principle, therefore the children of immigrants who are born in France
introduction / 3
automatically become French citizens. On the other hand, the German state recently introduced reforms in line with the changes in European Union policies to facilitate immigrant integration granting them German citizenship. With the introduction of a new citizenship law (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) in 1999, the German state partially discarded the concept of ancestral origin, and started naturalizing the migrant population. According to the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, children born in Germany after the year 2000 can be granted dual citizenship: they may hold German citizenship and their parents’ native citizenship until the age of twentythree. Although this is a revolutionary change in German citizenship law, it will take a long time for the effects of this law on the immigrant society to be felt. In fact, the socioeconomic inequalities in Western European societies, specifically regarding immigrants, are disturbing: in Germany, the unemployment rate among immigrants was 20 percent in 1999. This is twice as high as the unemployment level among Germans (efms, 2000). In France, “Turks and Moroccans with a high school diploma are more affected by unemployment than the average with same qualifications” (Simon, 2003: 1112, cf. Fournier and Yurdakul in this volume). The Dutch state also has to deal with high unemployment levels and low education levels among its immigrant populations. As a result, many immigrants and second-generation immigrant children are forced to work in the secondary labor market and take over less desirable jobs especially in the service sector. However, since the labor unions have been weakened while the service sector that absorbs most of the immigrant labor is being strengthened, the collective bargaining power of immigrants has decreased dramatically. In order to survive in the context of new market regulations, a declining welfare system, and neoliberal policies, a segment of second and third-generation immigrants tend to withdraw to the closed milieus of their own ethnic and religious communities, ethnic businesses, and religious schools. This, more than anything else has encouraged what in Germany is described as Parallelgesellschaften (parallel societies), blamed on the immigrants—the marginalization and social withdrawal of immigrants in Germany, and in other Western European societies. Indeed, while the German, Dutch, or French media report almost daily about the headscarf issue, forced marriages, and honor killings among immigrants, the European editions of Turkish newspapers primarily address the rising unemployment level and the dismantling of welfare and unemployment assistance. Even these differences in the media reports show that the majority society is mainly concerned about immigrants who are threatening their social values and cultural norms; whereas the immigrants are
4 / gökçe yurdakul and y. michal bodemann
mostly concerned about socioeconomic problems that are threatening their survival in the host society. Since the end of the 1990s and the start of the new century, the state policies started to encourage immigrants to adapt to the cultural patterns of the host society. In other words, cultural and behavioral assimilation is now expected from immigrants, and in fact, is enforced by the state authorities through new regulations. This situation, more often than not, leads to greater defensive reactions among immigrants and pits immigrants against the host society and its political institutions; much of this, in turn, has greatly strengthened an array of ethnic organizations. Recently, other European states, such as the Netherlands and France, changed their immigration policies from cultural pluralism to a “new assimilation” (Brubaker, 2001; Entzinger, 2003). The retreat of multiculturalism in Europe is not a coincidence; rather, it is related to the high unemployment levels and economic instability in the countries that carry most of the financial burden of the European Union, such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands. By and large, as borders have become tighter, and immigration regulations have become harsher, the ideology of integration, that of “cultural pluralism” is yielding to another, that of the “new assimilation” in Europe. New assimilation is a term recently introduced by Rogers Brubaker. As he argues in his article “The Return of Assimilation?” (2001), multiculturalist social thought, public discourse, and public policies have exhausted themselves. Now we are observing a change from a multiculturalist era to a new assimilationist one, which is conceptually and in substance different from the assimilatonist policies of the 1960s. The new assimilation is open to difference, but not open to ghettoization, segregation, or marginalization. Christian Joppke (2003) for instance, has noted that recent changes in public policies in Britain and the Netherlands, as well as in Germany and France, indicate a retreat from multiculturalism toward the “civic integration” of immigrants. In other words, the dominant ideology is, as the Norwegian anthropologist Unni Wikkan also argues, if immigrants want to be a part of a country, then they have to “do their share” (2001). Their share is as diverse as removing headscarves in public places, attending integration courses, or taking compulsory language courses and tests. In Marshallian terms, migrants cannot merely demand rights; they also have duties, which are determined by the institutions of the receiving state. On the one hand, market-led immigration policies are determining the future of migration in the European countries (Engelen, 2003). On the other hand, the European states are tightening the border to avoid unwanted immigrants, specifically those who cannot be absorbed into the
introduction / 5
labor market in the short term. For example, the Netherlands is discussing whether it should regulate immigration through marriage. And the refugee acceptance level in Germany dropped by 29.7 percent in 2003. In other words, the Western European countries want to decrease the migration levels, specifically if these migrants cannot be employed in their respective labor markets. Moreover, countries in the European Union are drafting new laws in order to regulate the integration of incoming immigrants. Many politicians in Germany, for example, claim that immigrant employment fosters integration into the host society (Jenson, 2001). If these immigrants are not employable, then they should not enter Germany in the first place. If they do manage to enter Germany, as asylum seekers or through marriage, state authorities are attempting to generate “policies that seek to end welfare abuse and make workfare programs compulsory” (Jenson, 2001: 2). These integration policies today, then, are largely a fait accompli. Learning the language of the majority and the cultural and social idiom of the receiving country is turning into a legislated duty for the immigrants, not a natural result of their participation in society. The opposite, “disintegration,” appears as a threat to the European economies, societies, and cultures (Favell, 2001). For instance, in Germany, tax payers do not want to shoulder the living costs of foreigners from obscure lands in addition to the growing retirement costs of the German pensioners. In France, many French citizens do not want children to wear Islamic religious symbols in French public schools, nor do they want “the law of the Republic being challenged by the ‘law of the Koran’ ” (Kastoryano, 2004: 1239). In this sociopolitical context, we are asking here, how have citizenship regimes and immigrant incorporation policies been changed in the aftermath of September 11? We shall address four major themes: the citizenship regimes, the effects of the changing sociopolitical context on immigrant incorporation policies, the politics of incorporation on Muslim communities and irregular migration. In the first section on citizenship regimes, Saskia Sassen, Margaret Somers, and Christian Joppke will guide us through some theoretical perspectives on citizenship. All three contributions deal with the transformations of citizenship and bring different and interesting insights to the questions on state memberships, ethnicity, nationalism, and rights. Saskia Sassen asks where we see the changes toward postnational and/or denationalized features of citizenship. She says that the global cities appear partly as denationalized spaces that allow a partial reinvention of citizenship. In this context, the informal citizenship practices may formalize new types of rights in the global cities. She calls this “claiming rights to the city.” Margaret Somers is also concerned with rights, however in a different way: it is Margaret Somers’ thesis that in contrast to
6 / gökçe yurdakul and y. michal bodemann
the stateless refugees of interwar Europe, depicted by Hannah Arendt, who were deprived of the “right to have rights,” today’s socially and politically excluded are being compensated with an “alternative identity of ethnos and nationalism,” and in this respect at least, all other considerable differences between the United States and Europe notwithstanding, her observations hold for both contemporary cases. Christian Joppke is interested in the changing meaning of citizenship through migration. Like state membership, citizenship as well is pushed into two different directions: on the one hand, the liberal states are forced to de-ethnicize state membership through immigration; on the other hand, immigrant sending states want to maintain relations with their citizens which forces them to re-ethnicize their state membership. In his article, he shows that some liberal states, such as the German state, are de-ethnicizing citizenship, whereas others, such as France, are re-ethnicizing it. Joppke, therefore, offers a comparative review of the transformation of citizenship between re- and de-ethnicization in Western Europe. The second section on the changing sociopolitical context discusses the transformation of integration regimes in Western Europe. These discussions include the specific situations of countries and case studies, focusing mostly on Germany and the Netherlands and drawing comparisons to North America in the aftermath of September 11. Here, Ruth Mandel focuses first on the changing socioeconomic context in Europe. Mandel deals with the shifting identities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. She compares practices, processes, and performances of Russian Jews, ethnic Germans, and Turks in Germany. Comparing the three, she interrogates the “genuineness” and “authenticity” of Germanness and Jewishness that determine the membership categories such as “quota refugees,” “resettlers” and “immigrants.” While Mandel looks at the shifting identities that gradually emerged after the end of the cold war, Thomas Faist deals with another key event: September 11. Faist points out to the increasing focus on the migration-security nexus after September 11. As he analyzes the consequences of September 11, he proposes three dimensions of the migration-security nexus: reinforcement of stereotypes, stricter internal and external controls, and questions of immigrant integration, specifically with regard to Muslim populations. Within this framework, he points to the fact that the security threats to Western societies have been present even before September 11 and the political uses of September 11 have only exacerbated the already existing discourses of migration and security. As Faist sets the scene of the changing socioeconomic context after September 11 in Western societies, Entzinger introduces us to the specific case of the Netherlands. In his article, he analyzes the background of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands over the past decades and
introduction / 7
looks for answers to his question whether the integration of immigrants in the Netherlands has failed. Anna Korteweg’s contribution complements Entzinger’s article. She analyzes the increasingly vociferous calls for assimilation in the context of the murder of film maker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan origin. Both authors highlight the decline of multiculturalism and the rise of assimilation policies in the Netherlands. Where Entzinger focuses on the policy trajectory within the Netherlands, Korteweg shows how gender becomes the arena of struggle in the national debate over immigrant integration. This debate quickly traveled across the border to Germany. Korteweg’s article takes us to the third section of this volume on politics of incorporation and Muslim communities. Interestingly, while it was not a deliberate choice, all three articles in the section on Muslim communities were compelled to address gender. This demonstrates the centrality of women and gender issues within the debates on immigrant integration. While analyzing the gender dimension in the rise of assimilation in the Netherlands, Korteweg in particular points to the centrality of gender issues in the recent immigration debates. Similarly Pascale Fournier and Gökçe Yurdakul argue that the headscarf debates in Germany and France conceal the importance of the socioeconomic status of Muslim women in these countries. According to Fournier and Yurdakul, legal and political debates on the hijab are dominated by the “identity politics” discourse which obscures relevant socioeconomic dimensions. In the last chapter on Muslim communities, Elisabeth BeckGernsheim, aptly complementing the earlier ones, focuses on the icon of the “bartered bride,” by means of a “folklore of superficial knowledge,” in the construction of otherness. Her particular case study in this regard is a highly popular book by the German Turkish writer Necla Kelek, The Alien Bride, and the ways in which this book has been used to feed a moral panic against Turkish/Muslim immigrants in Germany. A survey such as this volume, on the North American and Western European scene, would be amiss if it did not draw comparisons to the incorporation of immigrants elsewhere. The last section on irregular immigration, therefore, compares the cases of Israel and Germany. This section presents cases that move from Latin American immigrants in Israel to Moldovians within the European Union, and it teaches us that migration issues cannot be pinned onto the territories of one nation-state, but that they occur in complex intertwined networks in transnational spaces. While Friedrich Heckmann’s article deals with irregular migration in Germany, Adriana Kemp’s essay on Israel brings a fresh approach to the Western European debates. Heckmann asks whether it is empirically possible to trace illegal or undocumented migration. In his discussion of the social organization of human smuggling, he challenges the theory of organized
8 / gökçe yurdakul and y. michal bodemann
crime and offers new concepts from market and networks theory to understand different forms of human smuggling and illegal migration. By analyzing examples of Afghans who arrive in Hamburg to Chinese who came to Manhattan from China, Heckmann explores networks, concepts, and methods to understand human smuggling. The last article in this volume, the Israeli case of undocumented immigrants, puts the European and North American cases into perspective by revealing similarities between immigration to Israel and to Western Europe. Adriana Kemp deals with the administrative and policy initiatives to naturalize the undocumented labor migrants’ children in Israel who are neither Jewish nor Arab. She questions the extent to which “ ‘post-national’ norms and ideas that informed European and North American debates permeated also the public discourse in Israel.” Much like Western European countries, the Israeli state is also forced to recruit labor migrants and then deal with the question of membership within the neoliberal policies of the 1990s. Kemp’s article shows us that the Western Europe or North American experience is not unique; other countries experience the challenges of immigration as well. In fact, migration issues should be discussed in the context of sociopolitical changes that affect the global system, rather than the territorial boundaries of nation-states. Lastly, the volume amply demonstrates that Günter Grass’s observations on the overall collapse of social solidarity and the ridicule on the part of “slick young journalists” and other intellectuals heaped upon those who express warnings about the consequences of this new and seemingly unbridled neoliberal politics, must be taken seriously. References Brubaker, Rogers (2001), “Return to Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24, 4, pp. 531–548. efms-European Forum for Migration Studies (2000), “Beck presents report on the Situation of Foreigners in Germany,” Migration Report: Chronology of Relevant News and Occurrences in the Area of the Institute’s Work, February, http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dfeb00_e.htm Engelen, Ewald (2003), “How to Combine Openness and Protection? Citizenship, Migration, and Welfare Regimes,” Politics & Society, 31, 4, pp. 503–536. Entzinger, Han (2003), “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands,” in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (eds.) Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 59–86. EU Parliamentary Assembly (2000), Participation of Immigrants and Foreign Residents in Political Life in the Council of Europe Member States http:// assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc00/edoc8916.htm
introduction / 9 Favell, Adrian (2001), “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and a Critique,” in T. Alexander Aleinetioff and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds.) Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, Washington: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, pp. 349–399. Ganssmann, Heiner (2004), “Germany: Capital Flees,” Le Monde Diplomatique, http://mondediplo.com/2004/02/12economy Grass, Günter (2005), “The Gravest Generation,” New York Times, May 7, A27. Jenson, Jane (2001), “Social Cohesion and Inclusion: What is the Research Agenda?” Canadian Research Policy Networks, http://www.cprn.com/ en/doc.cfm?doc ⫽ 690 Joppke, Christian (2003), The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal States, Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper # 203. Kastoryano, Riva (2004), “Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany,” International Migration Review, 38, 3, pp. 1234–1256. Simon, Patrick (2003), “France and the Unknown Second Generation: Preliminary Results on Social Mobility,” International Migration Review, 37, 4, pp. 1091–1119. Thelen, Kathleen and Christa van Wijnbergen (2003), “The Paradox of Globalization: Labor Relations in Germany and beyond,” Comparative Political Studies, 36, 8, pp. 859–880. Wikan, Unni (2003), Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
This page intentionally left blank
Part I Citizenship and Incorporation Regimes
This page intentionally left blank
C h ap t e r 1 The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics Saskia Sassen
Most of the scholarship on citizenship has claimed a necessary connection to the national state. The transformations afoot today raise questions about this proposition insofar as they significantly alter those conditions which in the past fed that articulation between citizenship and the national state. The context for this possible alteration is defined by two major, partly interconnected conditions. One is the change in the position and institutional features of national states since the 1980s resulting from various forms of globalization. These range from economic privatization and deregulation to the increased prominence of the international human rights regime. The second is the emergence of multiple actors, groups, and communities partly strengthened by these transformations in the state and increasingly unwilling to automatically identify with a nation as represented by the state. Addressing the question of citizenship against these transformations entails a specific stance. It is quite possible to posit that at the most abstract or formal level not much has changed over the last century in the essential features of citizenship. The theoretical ground from which I address the issue is that of the historicity and the embeddedness of both categories, citizenship and the national state, rather than their purely formal features. Each of these has been constructed in elaborate and formal ways. And each has evolved historically as a tightly packaged bundle of what were in fact often rather diverse elements. The dynamics at work today are destabilizing these particular bundlings and bringing to the fore the fact of that bundling and its particularity. Through their destabilizing effects, these dynamics are producing operational and rhetorical openings for the emergence of new types of political subjects and new spatialities for politics.
14 / saskia sassen
More broadly, the destabilizing of national state-centered hierarchies of legitimate power and allegiance has enabled a multiplication of nonformalized or only partly formalized political dynamics and actors. These signal a deterritorializing of citizenship practices and identities, and of discourses about loyalty and allegiance. Finally, specific transformations inside the national state have directly and indirectly altered particular features of the institution of citizenship. These transformations are not predicated necessarily on deterritorialization or locations for the institution outside the national state as is key to conceptions of postnational citizenship, and hence are usefully distinguished from current notions of postnational citizenship. I will refer to these as denationalized forms of citizenship. Analytically, I seek to understand how various transformations entail continuities or discontinuities in the basic institutional form. That is to say, where do we see continuities in the formal bundle of rights at the heart of the institution and where do we see movement toward postnational and/or denationalized features of citizenship? And where might as yet informal citizenship practices engender formalizations of new types of rights? Particular attention goes to several specific issues that capture these features. One of these is the relationship between citizenship and nationality and the evolution of the latter toward something akin to “effective” nationality rather than as “allegiance” to one state or exclusive formal nationality. A later section examines the mix of distinct elements that actually make up the category of citizenship in today’s highly developed countries. Far from being a unitary category or a mere legal status, these diverse elements can be contradictory. One of my assumptions here is that the destabilizing impact of globalization contributes to accentuate the distinctiveness of each of these elements. A case in point is the growing tension between the legal form and the normative project toward enhanced inclusion as various minorities and disadvantaged sectors gain visibility for their claim-making. Critical here is the failure in most countries to achieve “equal” citizenship— that is, not just a formal status but an enabling condition. The remaining sections begin to theorize these issues with a view toward specifying incipient and typically not formalized developments in the institution of citizenship. Informal practices and political subjects not quite fully recognized as such can nonetheless function as part of the political landscape. Undocumented immigrants who are long-term residents engage in practices that are the same as those of formally defined citizens in the routines of daily life; this produces an informal social contract between these undocumented immigrants and the community. Subjects who are by definition categorized as nonpolitical, such as “housewives” may actually have considerable political agency and be emergent political subjects. Insofar as citizenship is at least partly shaped by the conditions within
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 15
which it is embedded, conditions that have today changed in certain very specific and also general ways, we may well be seeing a corresponding set of changes in the institution itself. These may not yet be formalized and some may never become fully formalized. Further, social constructions that mark individuals, such as race and ethnicity, may well become destabilized by these developments in both the institution of citizenship and the nationstate. Generally, the analysis in this paper suggests that we might see an unbounding of existing types of subjects, particularly dominant ones such as the citizen-subject, the alien, and the racialized subject. A concluding section argues that many of these transformations in the broader context and in the institution itself become legible in today’s large cities. Perhaps the most evolved type of site for these transformations is the global city.1 In this process, the global city is reconfigured as a partly denationalized space that enables a partial reinvention of citizenship. This reinvention takes the institution away from questions of nationality narrowly defined and toward the enactment of a large array of particular interests, from protests against police brutality and globalization to sexual preference politics and house-squatting by anarchists. I interpret this as a move toward citizenship practices that revolve around claiming rights to the city. These are not exclusively or necessarily urban practices. But it is especially in large cities that we see simultaneously some of the most extreme inequalities as well as conditions enabling these citizenship practices. In global cities, these practices also contain the possibility of directly engaging strategic forms of power, a fact which I interpret as significant in a context where power is increasingly privatized, globalized, and elusive. Citizenship and Nationality In its narrowest definition citizenship describes the legal relationship between the individual and the polity. This relation can in principle assume many forms, in good part depending on the definition of the polity. Thus, in Europe this definition of the polity was originally the city, both in ancient and in medieval times. But it is the evolution of polities along the lines of state formation that gave citizenship in the west its full institutionalized and formalized character and made nationality a key component of citizenship. Today the terms citizenship and nationality both refer to the national state. In a technical legal sense, while essentially the same concept, each term reflects a different legal framework. Both identify the legal status of an individual in terms of state membership. But citizenship is largely confined to the national dimension, while nationality refers to the international legal dimension in the context of an interstate system. The legal status entails the
16 / saskia sassen
specifics of whom the state recognizes as a citizen and the formal basis for the rights and responsibilities of the individual in relation to the state. International law affirms that each state may determine who will be considered a citizen of that state (see Hague Convention, 1954). Domestic laws about who is a citizen vary significantly across states and so do the definitions of what it entails to be a citizen. Even within Europe, let alone worldwide, there are marked differences in how citizenship is articulated and hence how noncitizens are defined. The aggressive nationalism and territorial competition among European states in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and well into the twentieth centuries made the concept of dual nationality generally undesirable, incompatible with individual loyalties and destabilizing of the international order. Absolute state authority over a territory and its nationals could not easily accommodate dual nationality. Indeed, we see the development of a series of mechanisms aimed at preventing or counteracting the common causes for dual nationality (Marrus, 1985). This negative perception of dual nationality continued into the first half of the twentieth century and well into the 1960s. There were no international accords on dual nationality. The main effort by the international system remained rooting out the causes of dual nationality by means of multilateral codification of the law on the subject (Rubenstein and Adler, 2000). It is probably the case that this particular form of the institution of citizenship, centered on exclusive allegiance, reached its highpoint in the twentieth century. The major transformations of the 1980s and 1990s have once again brought conditions for a change in the institution of citizenship and its relation to nationality. They have also brought about changes in the legal content of nationality. Mostly minor formal and nonformal changes are beginning to dilute the particular formalization coming out of European history. The long lasting resistance to dual or multiple nationality is shifting toward a selective acceptance. According to some legal scholars (Spiro, 1997; Rubenstein and Adler, 2000), in the future, dual and multiple nationality will become the norm. Today, more people than ever before have dual nationality (Spiro, 1997). Insofar as the importance of nationality is a function of the central role of states in the international system, it is quite possible that a decline in the importance of this role and a proliferation of other actors will affect the value of nationality. These transformations may give citizenship yet another set of features as it continues to respond to the conditions within which it is embedded (Sassen, 1996: chapter 2). The nationalizing of the institution, which took place over the last several centuries, may today give way to a partial denationalizing. A fundamental dynamic in this regard is the growing articulation of national economies with the global economy and the associated
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 17
pressures on states to be competitive. Crucial to current notions of competitive states is withdrawal from various spheres of citizenship entitlements, with the possibility of a corresponding dilution of loyalty to the state. Citizens’ loyalty may in turn be less crucial to the state today than it was at a time of people-intensive and frequent warfare, with its need for loyal citizen-soldiers (Turner, 2000). Masses of troops today can be replaced by technologically intensive methods of warfare. Most importantly, in the highly developed world, warfare has become less significant partly due to economic globalization. Global firms and global markets do not want the rich countries to fight wars among themselves. The “international” project of the most powerful actors on the world stage today is radically different from what it was in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Many of the dynamics that built economies, polities, and societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries contained an articulation between the national scale and the growth of entitlements for citizens. During industrialization, class formation, class struggles, and the advantages of both employers and workers tended to scale at the national level and became identified with state-produced legislation and regulations, entitlements, and obligations. The state came to be seen as a key to ensuring the wellbeing of significant portions of both the working class and the bourgeoisie. The development of welfare states in the twentieth century became a crucial institutional domain for granting entitlements to the poor and the disadvantaged. Today, the growing weight given to notions of the “competitiveness” of states puts pressure on states to cut down on these entitlements. This in turn weakens the reciprocal relationship between the poor and the state (e.g., Munger, 2001). Finally, the growth of unemployment and the fact that many of the young are developing weak ties to the labor market, once thought of as a crucial mechanism for the socialization of young adults, will further weaken the loyalty and sense of reciprocity between these future adults and the state (Roulleau-Berger, 2002). As these trends have come together toward the end of the twentieth century they contribute to destabilize the meaning of citizenship as it was forged in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. Economic policies and technical developments we associate with economic globalization have strengthened the importance of cross-border dynamics and reduced the significance of borders. The associated emphasis on markets has brought into question the foundations of the welfare state. T. H. Marshall (1977 [1950]) and many others saw and continue to see the welfare state as an important ingredient of social citizenship. Today the assumptions of the dominant model of Marshallian citizenship have been severely diluted under the impact of globalization and the ascendance of the market as the preferred mechanism for addressing these social issues. For many critics,
18 / saskia sassen
the reliance on markets to solve political and social problems is a savage attack on the principles of citizenship. Thus Peter Saunders (1993) argues that citizenship inscribed in the institutions of the welfare state is a buffer against the vagaries of the market and the inequalities of the class system. The nature of citizenship has also been challenged by a proliferation of old issues that have gained new attention. Among the latter are the question of state membership of aboriginal communities, stateless people, and refugees (Sassen, 1999; Knop, 2002). All of these have important implications for human rights in relation to citizenship. These social changes in the role of the state, the impact of globalization on states, and the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups also have major implications for questions of identity. “Is citizenship a useful concept for exploring the problems of belonging, identity and personality in the modern world?” (Shotter, 1993; Ong, 1999: chapters 1 and 4). Can such a radical change in the conditions for citizenship leave the institution itself unchanged? Deconstructing Citizenship Though often talked about as a single concept and experienced as a unitary institution, citizenship actually describes a number of discrete but related aspects in the relation between the individual and the polity. Current developments are bringing to light and accentuating the distinctiveness of these various aspects, from formal rights to practices and psychological dimensions (see Ong, 1996; Bosniak, 2000). They make legible the tension between citizenship as a formal legal status and as a normative project or an aspiration. The formal equality granted to all citizens rarely rests on the need for substantive equality in social and even political terms. In brief, current conditions have strengthened the emphasis on rights and aspirations that go beyond the formal legal definition of rights and obligations. This is mirrored most recently in the reinvigoration of theoretical distinctions: communitarian and deliberative, republican and liberal, feminist, postnational and cosmopolitan notions of citizenship. Insofar as citizenship is a status which articulates legal rights and responsibilities, the mechanisms through which this articulation is shaped and implemented can be analytically distinguished from the status itself and so can the content of the rights. In the medieval cities so admired by Max Weber (1958), the urban residents themselves set up the structures through which they could establish and thicken their rights in the space of the city. Today it is the national state that provides these mechanisms and it does so for national political space. But these mechanisms may well be changing once again given globalization, the associated changes in the national state, and the ascendance of human
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 19
rights. In each of these major phases, the actual content and shape of the legal rights and obligations also changed. Some of these issues can be illustrated through the evolution of equal citizenship over the last few decades. Equal citizenship is central to the modern institution of citizenship. The expansion of equality among citizens has shaped a good part of its evolution in the twentieth century. There is debate as to what brought about the expanded inclusions over this period, most notably the granting of the vote to women. For some (e.g. Karst, 2000) it is law itself—and national law—that has been crucial in promoting recognition of exclusions and measures for their elimination. For others (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1992) politics and identity have been essential because they provide the sense of solidarity necessary for the further development of modern citizenship in the nation-state. Either way, insofar as equality is based on membership, citizenship status forms the basis of an exclusive politics and identity (Walzer, 1985; Bosniak, 1996). In a country such as the United States, the principle of equal citizenship remains unfulfilled, even after the successful struggles and legal advances of the last five decades (Karst, 1997).2 Groups defined by race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation and other “identities,” still face various exclusions from full participation in public life notwithstanding formal equality as citizens. Second, because full participation as a citizen rests on a material base (Marshall, 1977; Handler, 1995) poverty excludes large sectors of the population and the gap is widening. Feminist and race-critical scholarship has highlighted the failure of gender- and race-neutral conceptions of citizenship, such as legal status, to account for the differences of individuals within communities (Benhabib et al., 1995; Crenshaw et al., 1996; Delgado and Stefancic, 1999; Benhabib, 2002). In brief, legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights. Citizenship is affected by the position of different groups within a nation-state. Yet it is precisely the position of these different groups that has engendered the practices and struggles that forced changes in the institution of citizenship itself. Thus Kenneth Karst (1997) observes that in the United States it was national law that “braided the strands of citizenship”—formal legal status, rights, belonging—into the principle of equal citizenship. This took place through a series of Supreme Court decisions and acts of Congress beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Karst emphasizes how important these constitutional and legislative instruments are, and that we cannot take citizenship for granted or be complacent about it. There are two aspects here that matter for my argument. This history of interactions between differential positionings and expanded inclusions signals the possibility that the new conditions of inequality and difference evident today and the new types of claim-making they produce may well
20 / saskia sassen
bring about further transformations in the institution. Citizenship is partly produced by the practices of the excluded. Second, by expanding the formal inclusionary aspect of citizenship, the national state contributed to create some of the conditions that eventually would facilitate key aspects of postnational citizenship. At the same time, insofar as the state itself has undergone significant transformation, notably the changes bundled under the notion of the competitive state, it may reduce the chances that state institutions will do the type of legislative and judiciary work that has led to expanded formal inclusions. The consequence of these two developments may well be the absence of a lineal progression in the evolution of the institution. The expanding inclusions that we have seen in the United States since the 1960s may have produced conditions which make possible forms of citizenship that follow a different trajectory. Furthermore, the pressures of globalization on national states may mean that claim-making will increasingly be directed at other institutions as well. This is already evident in a variety of instances. One example is the decision by first-nation people to go directly to the UN and claim direct representation in international fora, rather than going through the national state. It is also evident in the increasingly institutionalized framework of the international human rights regime and the emergent possibilities for bypassing unilateral state sovereignty. As the importance of equality in citizenship has grown and become more visible, and as the role of national law to giving presence and voice to hitherto silenced minorities has grown, the tension between the formal status and the normative project of citizenship has also grown. For many, citizenship is becoming a normative project whereby social membership becomes increasingly comprehensive and open ended. Globalization and human rights are further enabling this tension and therewith furthering the elements of a new discourse on rights. These developments signal that the analytic terrain within which we need to place the question of rights, authority, and obligations is shifting (Sassen, 1996: chapter 2; Sassen, 2003). Some of these issues can be illustrated by two contrasting cases described below. Toward effective nationality and informal citizenship Unauthorized yet recognized Perhaps one of the more extreme instances of a condition akin to effective as opposed to formal nationality is what has been called the informal social contract that binds undocumented immigrants to their communities of residence (Schuck and Smith, 1985). Thus, unauthorized immigrants who
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 21
demonstrate civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty can argue that they merit legal residency. To make this brief examination more specific, I will focus on one case, undocumented immigrants in the United States. Individuals, even when they are undocumented immigrants, can move between the multiple meanings of citizenship. The daily practices by undocumented immigrants as part of their daily life in the community where they reside—such as raising a family, schooling children, holding a job—earn them citizenship claims in the United States even as the formal status and, more narrowly, legalization may continue to evade them. There are dimensions of citizenship, such as strong community ties and participation in civic activities, which are being enacted informally through these practices. These practices produce at least a partial recognition of them as full social beings. In many countries around the world, including the United States, long-term undocumented residents often can gain legal residence if they can document the fact of this long-term residence and “good conduct.” U.S. immigration law recognizes such informal participation as grounds for granting legal residency. For instance, prior to the new immigration law passed in 1996, individuals who could prove seven years of continuous presence, good moral character, and that deportation would be an extreme hardship, were eligible for suspension of deportation, and thus, U.S. residency. NACARA3 extended the eligibility of this suspension of deportation to some 300,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were unauthorized residents in the United States. The case of undocumented immigrants is, in many ways, a very particular and special illustration of a condition akin to “effective” citizenship and nationality. One way of interpreting this dynamic in the light of the discussion in the preceding sections is to emphasize that it is the fact of the multiple dimensions of citizenship which engenders strategies for legitimizing informal or extra-statal forms of membership (Soysal, 1994; Coutin, 2000). The practices of these undocumented immigrants are a form of citizenship practices and their identities as members of a community of residence assume some of the features of citizenship identities. Supposedly this could hold even in the communitarian model where the community can decide on whom to admit and whom to exclude, but once admitted, proper civic practices earn full membership. Further, the practices of migrants, even if undocumented, can contribute to recognition of their rights in countries of origin. During the 1981–1992 civil war, Salvadoran migrants even though they were citizens of El Salvador, were directly and indirectly excluded from El Salvador through political violence, enormous economic hardship, and direct persecution (Mahler, 1996). They could not enjoy their rights as citizens. After
22 / saskia sassen
fleeing, many continued to provide support to their families and communities. Further, migrants’ remittances became a key factor for El Salvador’s economy—as they are for several countries around the world. The government of El Salvador actually began to support the emigrants’ fight to get residency rights in the United States, even joining U.S. based activist organizations in this effort. The Salvadoran government was thus supporting Salvadorans who were the formerly excluded citizens—they needed those remittances to keep coming and they needed the emigrants to stay out of the Salvadoran workforce given the high unemployment in the country. Thus the participation of these undocumented migrants in cross-border community, family, and political networks has contributed to increasing recognition of their legal and political rights as Salvadoran citizens (Coutin, 2000; Mahler, 1996). According to Coutin (2000) and others, movements between membership and exclusion, and between different dimensions of citizenship, legitimacy and illegitimacy, may be as important as redefinitions of citizenship itself. Given scarce resources the possibility of negotiating the different dimensions of citizenship may well represent an important enabling condition. Undocumented immigrants develop informal, covert, often extra-statal strategies and networks connecting them with communities in sending countries. Hometowns rely on their remittances and their information about jobs in the United States. Sending remittances illegally by an unauthorized immigrant can be seen as an act of patriotism, and working as an undocumented immigrant can be seen as contributing to the host economy. Multiple interdependencies are thereby established and grounds for claims on the receiving and the originating country can be established even when the immigrants are undocumented and laws are broken (Basch et al., 1994; Cordero-Guzmán et al., 2001). Authorized yet unrecognized At perhaps the other extreme of the undocumented immigrant whose practices allow her to become accepted as a member of the political community, is the case of those who are full citizens yet not recognized as political subjects. In an enormously insightful study of Japanese housewives, Robin LeBlanc (1999) finds precisely this combination. Being a housewife is basically a full-time occupation in Japan and restricts Japanese women’s public life in many important ways, both practical and symbolical. A “housewife” in Japan is a person whose very identity is customarily that of a particularistic, nonpolitical actor. Yet, paradoxically, it is also a condition providing these women with a unique vehicle for other forms of public participation, ones where being a housewife is an advantage,
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 23
one denied to those who might have the qualifications of higher level political life. LeBlanc documents how the housewife has an advantage in the world of local politics or the political life of a local area: she can be trusted precisely because she is a housewife, she can build networks with other housewives, hers is the image of desirable public concern and of a powerful—because believable—critic of mainstream politics. There is something extremely important in this condition which is shared with women in other cultures and vis-à-vis different issues. For instance, and in a very different register, women emerged as a specific type of political actor during the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s in several countries of Latin America. It was precisely their condition as mothers and wives that gave them the clarity and the courage to demand justice and to demand bread and to do so confronting armed soldiers and policemen. Mothers in the barrios of Santiago during Pinochet’s dictatorship, the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, the mothers regularly demonstrating in front of the major prisons in El Salvador during the civil war—all were driven to political action by their despair at the loss of children and husbands and the struggle to provide food in their homes. Further, and in a very different type of situation, there is an interesting parallel between LeBlanc’s capturing of the political in the condition of the housewife and a set of findings in some of the research on immigrant women in the United States. There is growing evidence that immigrant women are more likely than immigrant men to emerge as actors in the public domain precisely because of their responsibilities in the household. Regular wage work and improved access to other public realms has an impact on their culturally specified subordinate role to men in the household. Immigrant women gain greater personal autonomy and independence while immigrant men lose ground compared to what was their condition in cultures of origin. Women gain more control over budgeting and other domestic decisions, and greater leverage in requesting help from men in domestic chores. Their responsibility for securing public services and other public resources for their families gives them a chance to become incorporated in the mainstream society—they are often the ones in the household who mediate in this process (e.g., Chinchilla and Hamilton, 2001). It is likely that some women benefit more than others from these circumstances; we need more research to establish the impact of class, education, and income on these gendered outcomes. Besides the relatively greater empowerment of immigrant women in the household associated with waged employment, what matters here is their greater participation in the public sphere and their possible emergence as public actors. There are two arenas where immigrant women are active: institutions for public and private assistance, and the immigrant or ethnic
24 / saskia sassen
community. The incorporation of women in the migration process strengthens the settlement likelihood and contributes to greater immigrant participation in their communities and vis-à-vis the state. For instance, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) found immigrant women come to assume more active public and social roles, which further reinforces their status in the household and the settlement process. These immigrant women are more active in community building and community activism and they are positioned differently from men regarding the broader economy and the state. They are the ones who are likely to have to handle the legal vulnerability of their families in the process of seeking public and social services for their families. This greater participation by women suggests the possibility that they may emerge as more forceful and visible actors and make their role in the labor market more visible as well.4 These are dimensions of citizenship and citizenship practices that do not fit the indicators and categories of mainstream frameworks for understanding citizenship and political life. Women in the condition of housewives and mothers do not fit the categories and indicators used to capture participation in political life. Feminist scholarship in all the social sciences has had to deal with a set of similar or equivalent difficulties and tensions in its effort to constitute its subject or to reconfigure a subject that has been flattened. The theoretical and empirical distance that has to be bridged between the recognized world of politics and the as yet unmapped experience of citizenship of the housewife—not of women as such, but of women as housewives—is a distance we encounter in many types of inquiry. Bridging this distance requires specific forms of empirical research and theorization. Postnational or denationalized? From the perspective of nation-based citizenship theory, some of these transformations might be interpreted as a decline or devaluation of citizenship or, more favorably, as a displacement of citizenship in the face of other forms of collective organization and affiliation, as yet unnamed (Bosniak, 2000). Insofar as citizenship is theorized as necessarily national (e.g., Himmelfarb, 2001), by definition these new developments cannot be captured in the language of citizenship.5 An alternative interpretation would be to suspend the national, as in postnational conceptions and to posit that the issue of where citizenship is enacted is one to be determined in light of developing social practice (e.g., Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996; Torres, 1998; Torres, Inda and Miron, 1999). From where I look at these issues, there is a third possibility, beyond these two. It is that citizenship—even if situated in institutional settings
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 25
that are “national”—is a possibly changed institution if the meaning of the national itself has changed. That is to say, insofar as globalization has changed certain features of the territorial and institutional organization of the political power and authority of the state, the institution of citizenship—its formal rights, its practices, its psychological dimension—has also been transformed even when it remains centered in the national state. I have argued, for instance, that this territorial and institutional transformation of state power and authority has produced operational, conceptual, and rhetorical openings for nation-based subjects other than the national state to emerge as legitimate actors in international and global arenas that used to be exclusive to the state (see Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 1996). I distinguish what I would narrowly define as denationalized from postnational citizenship, the latter the term most commonly used and the only one used in the broader debate.6 In my reading we are dealing with two distinct dynamics rather than only the emergence of locations for citizenship outside the frame of the national state. Their difference is a question of scope and institutional embeddedness. The understanding in the scholarship is that postnational citizenship is located partly outside the confines of the national. In considering denationalization, the focus moves on to the transformation of the national, including the national in its condition as foundational for citizenship. Thus it could be argued that postnationalism and denationalization represent two different trajectories. Both are viable, and they do not exclude each other. The national, then, remains a referent in my work (e.g., Sassen, 2003). But, clearly, it is a referent of a specific sort: it is, after all, its change that becomes the key theoretical feature through which it enters my specification of changes in the institution of citizenship. Whether or not this devalues citizenship (Jacobson, 1996) is not immediately evident to me at this point. Citizenship has undergone many transformations in its history precisely because it is to variable extents embedded in the specifics of each of its eras.7 Significant to my argument here is also the fact discussed earlier about the importance of national law in the process of expanding inclusions, inclusions which today are destabilizing older notions of citizenship. This pluralized meaning of citizenship partly produced by the formal expansions of the legal status of citizenship, is today contributing to explode the boundaries of that legal status even further. First, and most importantly in my reading is the strengthening, including the constitutionalizing, of civil rights which allow citizens to make claims against their states and allow them to invoke a measure of autonomy in the formal political arena that can be read as a lengthening distance between the formal apparatus of the state and the institution of citizenship. The implications, both political and theoretical of this dimension are complex and in
26 / saskia sassen
the making: we cannot tell what will be the practices and rhetorics that might be invented. Second, I add to this the granting, by national states, of a whole range of “rights” to foreign actors, largely and especially, economic actors— foreign firms, foreign investors, international markets, foreign business people (see Sassen, 1996: chapter 2). Admittedly, this is not a common way of framing the issue. It comes out of my particular perspective about the impact of globalization and denationalization on the national state, including the impact on the relation between the state and its own citizens, and the state and foreign economic actors. I see this as a significant, though not much recognized, development in the history of claim-making. For me the question as to how citizens should handle these new concentrations of power and “legitimacy” that attach to global firms and markets is a key to the future of democracy. My efforts to detect the extent to which the global is embedded and filtered through the national (e.g., the concept of the global city [Sassen, 2001]; see also Sassen, 2000) is one way of understanding whether therein lies a possibility for citizens, still largely confined to national institutions, to demand accountability of global economic actors through national institutional channels, rather than having to wait for a “global” state. Citizenship in the Global City The particular transformations in the understanding and theorization of citizenship discussed thus far bring us back to some of the earlier historical formations around questions of citizenship, most prominently the crucial role played by cities and civil society. The large city of today, most especially the global city, emerges as a strategic site for these new types of operations. It is one of the nexi where the formation of new claims materializes and assumes concrete forms. The loss of power at the national level produces the possibility for new forms of power and politics at the subnational level. The national as container of social process and power is cracked. This cracked casing opens up possibilities for a geography of politics that links subnational spaces. Cities are foremost in this new geography. One question this engenders is how and whether we are seeing the formation of new types of politics that localize in these cities. If we consider that large cities concentrate both the leading sectors of global capital and a growing share of disadvantaged populations— immigrants, many of the disadvantaged women, people of color generally, and, in the megacities of developing countries, masses of shanty dwellers— then we can see that cities have become a strategic terrain for a whole series of conflicts and contradictions. We can then think of cities also as one of the
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 27
sites for the contradictions of the globalization of capital, even though, heeding Ira Katznelson’s (1992) observation, the city cannot be reduced to this dynamic. Recovering cities along these lines means recovering the multiplicity of presences in this landscape. The large city of today has emerged as a strategic site for a whole range of new types of operations— political, economic, cultural, and subjective (Allen et al., 1999; Bridge and Watson, 2000; Isin, 2000). While citizenship originated in cities and cities played an important role in its evolution, I do not think we can simply read some of these current developments as a return to that older historical condition. The significance of the city today as a setting for engendering new types of citizenship practices and new types of incompletely formalized political subjects does not derive from that history. Nor does current local city government have much to do with earlier notions of citizenship and democracy described for ancient and medieval cities in Europe (Isin, 2000: 7). It is, rather, more connected to what Henri Lefebvre (1991; 1995) was capturing when describing the city as oeuvre and hence the importance of agency. Where Lefebvre found this agency in the working class in the Paris of the twentieth century, I find it in two strategic actors—global corporate capital and immigration—in today’s global cities. Here I would like to return to the fact of the embeddedness of the institution of citizenship. What is being engendered today in terms of citizenship practices in the global city is quite different from what it might have been in the medieval city of Weber. In the medieval city we see a set of practices that allowed the burghers to set up systems for owning and protecting property and to implement various immunities against despots of all sorts.8 Today’s citizenship practices have to do with the production of “presence” of those without power and a politics that claims rights to the city. What the two situations share is the notion that through these practices new forms of citizenship are being constituted and that the city is a key site for this type of political work and is, indeed, partly constituted through these dynamics. After the long historical phase that saw the ascendance of the national state and the scaling of key economic dynamics at the national level, the city is once again today a scale for strategic economic and political dynamics. In his effort to specify the ideal-typical features of what constitutes the city, Weber sought out a certain type of city—most prominently the cities of the late Middle Ages rather than the modern industrial cities of his time. Weber sought a kind of city that combined conditions and dynamics which forced its residents and leaders into creative, innovative responses and adaptations. Further, he posited that these changes produced in the context of the city signaled transformations that went beyond the city, that could have a far reach in instituting often fundamental transformations. In that regard
28 / saskia sassen
the city offered the possibility of understanding far reaching changes that could—under certain conditions—eventually encompass society at large. There are two aspects of Weber’s The City that are of particular importance here. Weber sought to understand under what conditions cities can be positive and creative influences on people’s lives. For Weber cities are a set of social structures that encourage social individuality and innovation and hence are an instrument of historical change. There is in this intellectual project a deep sense of the historicity of these conditions. For Weber, modern urban life did not correspond to this positive and creative power of cities; Weber saw modern cities as dominated by large factories and office bureaucracies. My own reading of the Fordist city corresponds in many ways to Weber’s in the sense that the strategic scale under Fordism is the national scale and cities lose significance. It is the large Fordist factory and the mines which emerge as key sites for the political work of the disadvantaged and those without power. For Weber, it is particularly the cities of the late Middle Ages that combine the conditions that pushed urban residents, merchants, artisans, and leaders to address them and deal with them. These transformations could make for epochal change beyond the city itself: Weber shows us how in many of these cities these struggles led to the creation of the elements of what we could call governance systems and citizenship. In this regard struggles around political, economic, legal, and cultural issues which are centered in the realities of cities can become the catalysts for new transurban developments in all these institutional domains: markets, participatory governance, rights for members of the urban community regardless of lineage, judicial recourse, cultures of engagement, and deliberation. The particular analytic element I want to extricate from this aspect of Weber’s understanding and theorization of the city is the historicity of those conditions that make cities strategic sites for the enactment of important transformations in multiple institutional domains. Elsewhere (2001) I have developed the argument that today a certain type of city—the global city— has emerged as a strategic site precisely for such innovations and transformations in multiple institutional domains. Several of the key components of economic globalization and digitization instantiate in this type of city and produce dislocations and destabilizations of existing institutional orders and legal, regulatory, and normative frames for handling urban conditions. It is the high level of concentration of these new dynamics in these cities that forces creative responses and innovations. There is, most probably, a threshold effect at work here. The historicity of this process rests in the fact that under Keynesian policies, particularly the Fordist contract, and the dominance of mass manufacturing as the organizing economic dynamic, cities had lost strategic
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 29
functions and were not the site for creative institutional innovations. The strategic sites were the large factory and the whole process of mass manufacturing and mass consumer markets, and, second, the national government where regulatory frameworks were developed and the Fordist contract instituted. The factory and the government were the strategic sites where the crucial dynamics producing the major institutional innovations of the epoch were located. With globalization and digitization—and all the specific elements they entail—global cities emerge as such strategic sites. While the strategic transformations are sharply concentrated in global cities, many of the transformations are also enacted, besides being diffused, in cities at lower orders of national urban hierarchies. Furthermore, in my reading, particular institutions of the state also are such strategic sites even as there is an overall shrinking of state authority through deregulation and privatization. A second analytic element I want to extricate from Weber’s The City is the particular type of embeddedness of the transformations he describes and renders as ideal/typical features. This is not an embeddedness in what we might think of as deep structures because the latter are precisely the ones that are being dislocated or changed and are creating openings for new fundamental arrangements to emerge. The embeddedness is, rather, in very specific conditions, opportunities, constraints, needs, interactions, contestations, and interests. The aspect that matters here is the complexity, detail and social thickness of the particular conditions and the dynamics he identifies as enabling change and innovation. This complexity and thickness also produces ambiguities in the meaning of the changes and innovations. It is not always clear whether they are positive—where we might interpret positive as meaning the creation or strengthening of some element, even if very partial or minor, of participatory democracy in the city—and in what time frame their positiveness would become evident. In those cities of the late Middle Ages he saw as being what the city is about, he finds contradictory and multivalent innovations. He dissects these innovations to understand what they can produce or launch. The argument I derive from this particular type of embeddedness of change and innovation is that current conditions in global cities are creating not only new structurations of power but also operational and rhetorical openings for new types of political actors which may have been submerged, invisible, or without voice. A key element of the argument here is that the localization of strategic components of globalization in these cities means that the disadvantaged can engage the new forms of globalized corporate power, and second, that the growing numbers and diversity of the disadvantaged in these cities under these conditions assumes a distinctive “presence.” This entails a distinction between powerlessness and invisibility or
30 / saskia sassen
impotence. The disadvantaged in global cities can gain “presence” in their engagement with power but also vis-à-vis each other. This is different from the 1950s–1970s period in the United States, for instance, when white flight and the significant departure of major corporate headquarters left cities hollowed out and the disadvantaged in a condition of abandonment. Today, the localization of the global creates a set of objective conditions of engagement. This can be seen, for example, in the struggles against gentrification—which encroaches on minority and disadvantaged neighborhoods and led to growing numbers of homeless beginning in the 1980s—and the struggles for the rights of the homeless, or also in demonstrations against police brutalizing minority people. These struggles are different from the ghetto uprisings of the 1960s, which were short, intense eruptions confined to the ghettos and causing most of the damage in the neighborhoods of the disadvantaged themselves. In these ghetto uprisings there was no engagement with power. The conditions that today mark the possibility of cities as strategic sites are basically two, and both capture major transformations that are destabilizing older systems organizing territory and politics. One of these is the rescaling of what are the strategic territories that articulate the new politicaleconomic system. The other is the partial unbundling or at least weakening of the national as container of social process due to the variety of dynamics encompassed by globalization and digitization. The consequences for cities of these two conditions are many: what matters here is that cities emerge as strategic sites for major economic processes and for new types of political actors. Insofar as citizenship is embedded and in turn marked by its embeddedness, these new conditions may well signal the possibility of new forms of citizenship practices and identities. There is something to be captured here—a distinction between powerlessness and the condition of being an actor even though lacking power. I use the term presence to name this condition. In the context of a strategic space such as the global city, the types of disadvantaged people described here are not simply marginal; they acquire presence in a broader political process that escapes the boundaries of the formal polity. This presence signals the possibility of a politics. What this politics will be will depend on the specific projects and practices of various communities. Insofar as the sense of membership of these communities is not subsumed under the national, it may well signal the possibility of a politics that, while transnational, is actually centered in concrete localities. Notes 1. For the fullest treatment of my concept of the global city, see the updated second edition of Sassen (2001), The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 31 2. In Kenneth Karst’s interpretation of U.S. law, aliens are “constitutionally entitled to most of the guarantees of equal citizenship, and the Supreme Court has accepted this idea to a modest degree” (Karst, 2000: 599; see also fn. 20 where he cites cases). Karst also notes that the Supreme Court has not carried this development nearly as far as he might wish. 3. NACARA is The 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act. It created an amnesty for 300,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans to apply for suspension of deportation. This is an immigration remedy that had been eliminated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996 (see Coutin, 2000). 4. For the limits of this process see, e.g., Parreñas (2001). 5. Thus for Karst “In the US today, citizenship is inextricable from a complex legal framework that includes a widely accepted body of substantive law, strong lawmaking institutions, and law-enforcing institutions capable of performing their task” (2000: 600). Not recognizing the centrality of the law is, for Karst, a big mistake. Postnational citizenship lacks an institutional framework that can protect the substantive values of citizenship. Karst does acknowledge the possibility of rabid nationalism and the exclusion of aliens when legal status is made central. 6. Bosniak (2000) uses the denationalized interchangeably with postnational. I do not. 7. In this regard, I have emphasized as significant (1996: chapter 2) the introduction in the new constitutions of South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and the Central European countries, of a provision that qualifies what had been an unqualified right—if democratically elected—of the sovereign to be the exclusive representative of its people in international fora. 8. Only in Russia—where the walled city did not evolve as a center of urban immunities and liberties—does the meaning of citizen diverge from concepts of civil society and cities, and belongs to the state, not the city (Weber, 1958).
References Allen, John, Doreen Massey and Michael Pryke (eds.) (1999), Unsettling Cities, London: Routledge. Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton (1994), Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States, Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach. Benhabib, Seyla (2002), Democractic Equality and Cultural Diversity: Political Identities in the Global Era, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Benhabib, Seyla, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser (1995), Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, New York: Routledge. Bosniak, Linda (1996), “ ‘Nativism’ The Concept: Some Reflections,” in Juan Perea (ed.) Immigrants Out!: The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States, New York: New York University Press. ———(2000), “Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage,” Northwestern University Law Review 94, 3, pp. 963–984. Bridge, Gary and Sophie Watson (eds.) (2000), A Companion to the City, Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell. Chinchilla, Norma and Nora Hamilton (2001), Seeking Community in the Global City: Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
32 / saskia sassen Cordero-Guzmán, Héctor R., Robert C. Smith, and Ramón Grosfoguel (eds.) (2001), Migration, Transnationalization, and Race in a Changing New York, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Coutin, Susan B. (2000), “Denationalization, Inclusion, and Exclusion: Negotiating the Boundaries of Belonging,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7, 2, pp. 585–594. Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas (eds.) (1996), Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement, New York: New Press. Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic (eds.) (2001), Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. “Feminism and Globalization: the Impact of the Global Economy on Women and Feminist Theory” (1996), Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Special Issue 4, 1. Hague Convention (1954), Available online at http://exchanges.state.gov/ education/culprop/hague.html Handler, Joel (1995), The Poverty of Welfare Reform, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Himmelfarb, Gertrude (2001), One Nation, Two Cultures: A Searching Examination of American Society in the Aftermath of Our Cultural Revolution, New York: Vintage Books. Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette (1994), Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Isin, Engin (2000), “Introduction: Democracy, Citizenship and the City,” in Engin Isin (ed.) Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City, New York: Routledge. Jacobson, David (1996), Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Karst, Kenneth (1997), “The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective,” Cornell Law Review 82, 3, pp. 523–571. ———(2000), “Citizenship, Law, and the American Nation,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7, 2, pp. 595–601. Katznelson, Ira (1992), Marxism and the City, Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon. Knop, Karen (2002), Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. LeBlanc, Robin (1999), Bicycle Citizens: The Political World of the Japanese Housewife, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lefebvre, Henri (1991), The Production of Space, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. ———(1995), Writing on Cities, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Mahler, Sarah (1995), American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Marrus, Michael R. (1985), The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, New York: Oxford University Press. Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1977 [1950]), “Citizenship and Social Class.” Class, Citizenship, and Social Development, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Munger, Frank (ed.) (2002), Laboring Under the Line, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Ong, Aihwa (1996), “Strategic Sisterhood or Sisters in Solidarity?: Questions of Communitarianism and Citizenship in Asia,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 4, 1, pp. 107–135.
the repositioning of citizenship and alienage / 33 ———(1999), Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar (2001), Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Portes, Alejandro (1996), “Global Villagers: the Rise of Transnational Communities,” American Prospect 7, 25, pp. 74–78. Roulleau-Berger, Laurence (ed.) (2002), Youth and Work in the Postindustrial Cities of North America and Europe, Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. Rubenstein, Kim and Daniel Adler (2000), “International Citizenship: the Future of Nationality in a Globalized World,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7, 2, pp. 519–548. Sassen, Saskia (1996), Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, New York: Columbia University Press. ———(1999), Guests and Aliens, New York: New Press. ———(2000), “Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization,” Public Culture 12, 1, pp. 215–232. ———(2001), The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, Second Edition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———(2006), Territory, Authority and Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Under Contract). Saunders, Peter (1993), “Citizenship in a Liberal Society,” in Bryan Turner (ed.) Citizenship and Social Theory, London: Sage. Schuck, Peter and Rogers Smith (1985), Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shotter, John (1993), “Psychology and Citizenship: Identity and Belonging,” in Bryan Turner (ed.) Citizenship and Social Theory, London: Sage. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhogˇlu (1994), Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Spiro, Peter (1997), “Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship,” Emory Law Review, 46, 4, pp. 1412–1485. Taylor, Charles (1992), “The Politics of Recognition,” in Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann (eds.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Torres, Maria de los Ángeles (1998), “Transnational Political and Cultural Identities: Crossing Theoretical Borders,” in Frank Bonilla, Edwin Mélendez, Rebecca Morales, and Maria de los Ángeles Torres (eds.) Borderless Borders, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Torres, Rodolfo D., Jonathan Xavier Inda, and Louis F. Miron (1999), Race, Identity, and Citizenship, Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell. Turner, Bryan (2000), “Cosmopolitan Virtue: Loyalty and the City,” in Engin Isin (ed.) Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City, New York: Routledge. Walzer, Michael (1985), Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books. Weber, Max (1958), The City, New York, NY: Free Press. Young, Iris Marion (1990), Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
This page intentionally left blank
C h ap t e r 2 Citizenship, Statelessness and Market Fundamentalism: Arendtian Right to Have Rights Margaret R. Somers
The revival of attention to Hannah Arendt’s discussion of stateless people in her magisterial The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) has added enormously to our current understandings of migration, citizenship, and ethnos in the context of globalization (see especially Benhabib, 2004, 2001; Power, 2004). In this chapter,1 I bring Arendt’s analysis to bear on a very different kind of statelessness (to date not yet recognized) one that characterizes, those who hold de jure American citizenship but who are being expelled from the rights-bearing terrain of the rule of the law, from protection by the social state, and from access to the public sphere. My argument is that increasing numbers of market victims are being expelled from meaningful membership in an organized political community—that which confers and recognizes human identity—via a process of the contractualization and commodification of citizenship. Systematically degrading the public sphere and making the institutions of the social state increasingly irrelevant, these market regimes are transforming the foundations of citizenship from social and political to contractual and civil. As both Arendt and Karl Polanyi understood, governing through contractualism returns the social to the tyranny of naturalism and the stateless “freedom” of natural rights. In short, it steals the “right to have rights,” the very precondition for personhood. Arendt’s story is about how the stateless refugees of interwar Europe became little more than the “scum of the earth”—her shocking words for the dehumanization inflicted upon those whose loss of membership in a political community made them into an utterly expendable surplus population. Her association of “scum” and “statelessness” derived from her basic
36 / margaret r. somers
political and moral conviction that the only source of human personhood is membership in an organized political body and full citizenship in a nationstate, which she dubs with the remarkable phrase “the right to have rights.” Three quarters of a century after Arendt’s tale of statelessness, the tyranny of nation over state, and the hypocrisy of the “Rights of Man,” today a similar dynamic is being accomplished through a not altogether unrelated historical decoupling of the two entities that have historically made up the tenuous unity of the nation-state—that unstable marriage of ethnos and demos that has, at least since the early modern era, served as the foundational mechanism for the distribution of peoples into one or another juridical-legal political entity. But what the robustness of de jure national membership promised in Arendt’s mid-century era of burgeoning social states is being denied today by the increasingly expansive regimes of neoliberal market fundamentalism. The status of formal citizenship no longer in itself can endow the personhood (denied by statelessness) necessary to claim the bundle of rights that are due to all citizens. The thesis of this chapter is that while today’s socially and politically excluded are also losing the right to have rights, in contrast to Arendt’s midcentury Europeans they are not landing in a political vacuum. Instead, they are being compensated for their loss of meaningful citizenship via demos with an alternative identity of ethnos and nationalism which has propelled them full force into the political culture of the nation. They have become stateless nationals. The last 30 years of neoliberalism and market fundamentalism in tandem with the new post-9/11 security state has produced this new regime, one that is remaking the political identities of the middle and working classes by increasingly turning them into stateless nationals who take comfort in the compensatory identity of being true patriots. Those familiar with Arendt’s work may question my applying to the internal conditions of a nation-state a conceptual vocabulary she developed in the context of the transformation of the interwar European configuration of geopolitical state formation, and which she used to explain genocide on a massive scale. But as has become increasingly clear over the years, Origins is a great deal more than a brilliant historical analysis; it is equally a political theory of the conditions necessary for enabling full human agency and personhood. Stripped down to its most basic theoretical infrastructure, the story of statelessness and the futility of the rights of man is a robust theory about the constitutive preconditions for the destruction of a people—and by the logic of inversion, for human personhood. As Arendt herself wrote in the 1953 second edition, it was a work of politics more than of history (Kohn, 2002). In what follows I reprise Arendt’s story of Europe in the years from the end of the World War I and the treaty of Versailles through the full-scale
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 37
preconditions for genocide. From this narrative I distill concepts, relationships, and causal mechanisms and use them to construct what can be characterized as an Arendtian matrix made up of two binary, and normative, oppositions— between nation and state on the one hand, and between the Rights of Man and the right of law on the other. Both I believe fall under a single more all encompassing “great dichotomy,” one that Arendt shares with other great thinkers of her generation such as Karl Polanyi, namely the opposition between social naturalism and human artifice. For Arendt, just as for many other philosophical veterans of the great horrors of the first half of the twentieth century, the more committed one is to the side of artifice, the safer for humanity as a whole. With these intellectual tools, I return to contemporary American society to construct a social and political hypothesis about a populace that is once again losing its right to have rights while gaining an ever thicker fictive ethnicity of nationalism. Narrating Arendt on the Triumph of the Nation over the State Chapter Nine of Origins, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” divides into two sections. The first, “The ‘Nation of Minorities’ and the Stateless People,” begins with the signing of the peace treaties at the end of World War I where the victorious Western allies engaged in a project to reconfigure the political, social, and ethnic geography of Eastern and Central Europe in the wake of the breakup of the Austrian-Hungarian and the Czarist empires and the emergence of the successor states that followed, such as Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The question they confronted was: what should be done with over 100 million people who under the different empires had been contained as relatively autonomous ethnic and religious clusters and who now found themselves residing in countries of national identities other than their own. The story Arendt tells is of the so-called Minority Treaties—a stupefyingly arrogant (my words, not hers) set of treaties imposed on the successor states by the League of Nations. The treaties specified that these states were to be governed by the majority ethnic group—“state peoples” they were to be called. But what to do with the large numbers of national ethnic minorities, such as the Croats in Yugoslavia, the Ukrainians in Poland, the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the Jews who resided as minorities in every one of the new ethnically defined nation-states? The solution was that all these ethnic minorities would be designated as official “minorities” and for whom an explicit series of protective measures were created (although, one might add, governing was not among them). Intended to guarantee civil rights to the minority ethnicities in the context
38 / margaret r. somers
of their political subordination to majority ethnic rule, these included religious toleration, for example the right to practice one’s own religion and to learn and teach Hebrew for Jews, as well as cultural and economic freedoms, and what was deemed “political equality.” The successor states signed under protest, pointing to the double standard in which the Western signers did not put themselves under the same set of requirements, and their compliance was reluctant. At first the minority groups were merely “second class citizens,” but citizens nonetheless. It was a condition that Arendt called “half stateless” because while de jure citizens, their minority status meant that while they were excluded entirely from the powers of governance they still held national passports, which actually guaranteed far greater political identity to them abroad than in their own “home” countries (Arendt 1979: 276). At home, however, they were completely vulnerable to whatever political decisions were made by the “state peoples,” including that of being denaturalized and expelled by majority rule. In 1934 Germany instituted the Nuremberg Laws stating that only those of Aryan descent could be German citizens. Long before the Nazis thought up the idea of the final solution and the gas chambers, they understood that the first step in the destruction of the Jews would be to systematically strip them of their citizenship and turn them into stateless peoples, left only to beg for entry into the very countries that had created this disastrous state of affairs. And as Germany had not been subject to the Minority Treaties, Hitler took the neglect of according national rights to German minorities as implicit permission. Inspired by the success of the German Reich, in short order the dominant ethnic groups of the successor states began a domino process of expatriation—the instrument of choice for solving the problem of difference. Thus began the first burst of widespread statelessness in the interwar period. Millions who had been promised guaranteed rights were now thrust outside the pale of law and made into refugees as the states insisted on their sovereign right of expulsion and withdrew the political and legal protections due to all citizens. With the state abrogating all formal national documents, the minorities were now apatrides sans papiers. One might have thought they would have found refuge in the West. But instead, they found themselves unwanted everywhere, including the Western states in which they sought refuge, and reviled as nothing less than the “scum of the earth.” This was the genius of Fascism’s denaturalization policies, which was mimicked by the states that followed the German example. They understood that people outside of any human community were close to losing their very humanity, and thus would provoke repulsion in even the most liberal of Western states. In Arendt’s words, those whom “the persecutor
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 39
had singled out as scum of the earth—Jews, Trotskyites, etc.—actually were received as scum of the earth everywhere; those whom persecution had called undesirable became the indesirables of Europe.” The official SS newspaper stated explicitly in 1938 that “If the world was not yet convinced that the Jews were the scum of the earth, it soon would be when unidentifiable beggars, without nationality, without money, and without passports crossed their frontiers.” This kind of “factual propaganda,” Arendt continues, “worked better than Goebbels’ rhetoric” (p. 269). Nation versus State/Law Nation-state creation, according to Arendt, is a deeply historical enterprise, one requiring a whole list of historical prerequisites including homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil. Without these conditions, the Allies’ attempt to “regulate” the “nationality problem” by means of the Minority Treaties and project of nation-state building was “simply preposterous” (Arendt 1979: 270). That minority rights’ guarantees were recognized as even necessary in the first place was in itself an acknowledgment that the dominant ethnic nationalities—the “state peoples”—were the only ones who could expect real protection by the political and legal institutions of what were in effect merely ethnic polities no longer ruled by law but by nationality. It was unlikely that they would ever accept as full citizens those “minority peoples” who “insisted” on maintaining their own separate “nationality” (i.e. ethnicity). Turning over political rule to the resident ethnic power meant only one thing: the conflation of demos into ethnos. Arendt declares that as soon as the treaties were signed, and before the mass expulsions began, the “transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation had been completed; the nation had conquered the state, national interest had priority over law long before Hitler could pronounce ‘right is what is good for the German people’ ” (p. 275, my italics). This is the first of Arendt’s normative oppositions—nation versus law, ethnos versus demos, an instrument of nation versus an instrument of state, pre-political identity versus political agency, who you “are” versus what you do, nationalism versus citizenship. These are theoretical principles abstracted from the specificity of the particular story Arendt tells of interwar Europe, principles that serve as the foundation of a more general theory of politics and humanity. For the nation-state cannot exist once its principle of equality before the law has broken down. Without this legal equality, which originally was destined to replace the older laws and orders of the feudal society, the nation dissolves
40 / margaret r. somers into an anarchic mass of over- and underprivileged individuals. Laws that are not equal for all revert to rights and privileges, something contradictory to the very nature of nation-states. The clearer the proof of their inability to treat stateless people as legal persons and the greater the extension of arbitrary rule by police decree, the more difficult it is for states to resist the temptation to deprive all citizens of legal status and rule them with an omnipotent police. (p. 290)
The Failure of the Rights of Man But what about the rights guaranteed by the Minority Treaties? Did they not include the promise of civil and political rights that were intended to protect the “non-state people” from the tyranny of the ethnic majority? Indeed they did promise to do so. When the League of Nations signed the treaties they assumed that as long as the minorities were guaranteed the basic juridicalcivil rights they had solved the problem of safeguarding the minorities against majority domination. There was only one problem. The rights specified in the treaties did not provide minorities with the most important right of all—the right without which no other rights would have any meaning, the right without which there would in effect be no legal self to which the other rights could be attached. This primary or foundational right was what Arendt calls “the right to have rights.” She describes it this way: We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation. (pp. 296–297)
The right to have rights, in other words, is nothing less than the right to citizenship in an organized political entity. And without this one right that had not been included—the right to citizenship—there would be no way to guarantee that there even would be a political agent capable of claiming and acting upon the bundle of rights that were included. How was it that the signers of the treaties could have forgotten this when they calculated how to protect the minorities in the new successor states? As Arendt makes clear (without framing it in quite this terminology), as products of Western liberalism the members of the League of Nations would have found the question itself to be outside the boundaries of liberalism’s political and normative lexicon. In the liberal worldview the need for citizenship is precluded by a different set of rights, the Rights of Man. In Arendt’s words, “the secondary category of rights springs immediately from the nature of Man—Man in nature, not God, not history, is the source of Law,
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 41
independent of the privileges granted by Sovereign or Estates.” Thus “[citizenship] was never even mentioned among the human rights [because it] cannot be expressed in the categories of the eighteenth century because they presume that rights spring immediately from the ‘nature’ of man” (p. 297). The Lockean fiction imported into the Treaties by the League of Nations, then, was that civil and political rights need no institutional foundations as they simply inhere in the value of persons who bear rights simply because they are human beings: “no special law . . . [had been] deemed necessary to protect them because all laws were supposed to rest upon them” (emphasis added, p. 291). Most relevant to the suddenly rightless European minorities who found themselves outside the pale of the very governments the Treaties’ had assigned to be their protectors, that natural rights are pre-political meant that no written, that is, positive political law acknowledged them, no constitution or international agreement recognized them, and the Covenant of the League of Nations had never even so much as mentioned them. They led, in short, a “somewhat shadowy existence as an appeal in individual exceptional cases for which normal legal institutions did not suffice,” (Arendt 1979: 280–281). For liberalism, then, the only guarantee for the civil rights promised by the treaties was the normative unspoken presupposition that human freedom is rooted in the pre-social, pre-political autonomous natural rightsbearing individual. Because natural rights were in themselves the final arbiters of human freedom, no other authority was invoked to support them: The decisive factor is that these rights and the human dignity they bestow should remain valid and real even if only a single human being existed on earth; they are independent of human plurality and should remain valid even if a human being is expelled from the human community. (pp. 297–298)
Thus the fiction of natural rights, or the Rights of Man, is more complex than the putatively self-evident nature of the rights-bearing individual. It also requires an explicit absence of political authority and the traditional power of positive law issued by the state, as well as a robust and selfsustaining alternative site of social organization to that of the state. If we have Hobbes to acknowledge for the first explicit claim for the existence of natural rights, it is Locke whose thought experiment created the revolution in conceptual space that gave liberalism its permanent foundations. Motivated by the need to find the roots of human freedom in an enduring refuge from the coercion of the absolutist state, Locke posited the heuristic question of what would be the condition of human beings when imagined prior to all the social and political appurtenances with which they were burdened under the tyranny of the state.
42 / margaret r. somers
The answer produced by his thought experiment was that people would be discovered to be completely autonomous individuals living in a presocial, pre-political “state of nature” solely by virtue of being human—and not by reason of any act of government or national sovereign. To be sure, on the grounds of these originating natural rights, Lockean persons emerged from the state of nature to contractually agree to a civil society and a fiduciary government. But it cannot be gainsaid that it is precisely because human freedoms had been given an actual foundational location in the state of nature that they cancelled out any justification or need for institutional foundations and political intervention into the lives of free persons. The foreboding results were such that once these rights were defined as natural inalienable alternatives to the coercive positive laws issued by governments and administrative states, for two and a half centuries liberal discourse invoked human rights “whenever individuals needed protection against the new sovereignty of the state and the new arbitrariness of society” (p. 291). And yet, when put to the test, it was precisely against arbitrary state power that these “inalienable” and “indefeasible” rights were utterly unenforceable, hence meaningless: “the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them” (p. 292). And not only in the expelling successor states where nationalism had conquered the rule of law. As became clear in short order, whenever refugees, who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state, actually appeared on their doorsteps asking for admittance, all those countries whose normative foundations were based upon the so-called indefeasibility of human rights displayed equal distain for them as did the ethnic tyrannies. France, the United Kingdom and the United States were no more interested in protecting the putative human rights of the now stateless minorities than were the original expelling states. That the rightless and stateless were perceived and treated as the “scum of the earth” was a matter of ontology even before it was a political decision. Outside of political community, humans lose their very humanity. It is here that the awful hypocrisy of natural rights achieves its most tragic consequences: “[S]tateless people could see . . . that the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger. Because of it they were regarded as savages . . . It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man” (p. 300). The Nazis understood this better than anyone: long before they herded Jews and other unwanteds into the gas chambers, they had found “to their satisfaction” that by first depriving them of their citizenship, and thus of all legal and political status, “no country would claim these people” (p. 296). Ontological dehumanization brought forth by
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 43
statelessness and the loss of citizenship was the precondition to extermination on a mass scale. Arendt calls this section of her chapter “The perplexities of the rights of man”—perplexing and tragically ironic perhaps because this status of statelessness, the very condition of being outside all human social organization, is the ideal typical liberal utopia, the very state of nature where people should find themselves at the very apex of their freedom and sovereign rights. Precisely because of being absolutely cut loose from government and political community, the stateless had achieved the very telos of natural rights—the perfect liberal model of freedom from the political, existing only in the pure state of nature where right is endowed simply by virtue of being human, prior to governments and institutions, indeed prior to any other human relationships. And indeed, as Arendt points out with irony, the stateless and rightless actually had no shortage of freedom. Those “outside the pale of law” have more freedom of movement than an imprisoned criminal or “more freedom of opinion in the internment camps of democratic countries than they would in any ordinary despotism” (p. 296). In short, “if a human being loses his political status, he should, according to the implications of the inborn and inalienable rights of man, come under exactly the situation for which the declarations of such general rights provided. Actually exactly the opposite is the case” (p. 300). But history has shown us, Arendt points out, that “neither physical safety . . . nor freedom of opinion changes in the least their fundamental situation of rightlessness. The prolongation of their lives is due to charity not to right, for no law exists which could force the nations to feed them; their freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys . . .; and freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom for nothing they think matters anyhow.” Here Arendt truly points to the empty abstractness of rights rooted in a “place” called the state of nature: The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective. Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community . . . is no longer a matter of course and not belonging not a matter of choice . . . This extremity and nothing else is the situation of people deprived of human rights. (p. 296)
Thus Arendt is insisting that human rights are only viable within an organized political community; that there is no such thing as human rights outside of citizenship since it is only through citizenship that the right to live can only be guaranteed. All the freedom in the world could not change the fact that the stateless found themselves betrayed by liberalism’s very
44 / margaret r. somers
promise as its anti-statist utopianism turned out to be a dystopia: The rightless and stateless didn’t just suffer the loss of their legal and political identities from their own governments, but from all governments in all countries. The calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed, but that nobody even wants to oppress them” (Arendt, 1979: 296). Absolute freedom incites repulsion, not protection, toward the stateless: “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human” (299). Nature versus Political Artifice Beneath the thick brush of Arendt’s chapter on statelessness, there’s a very elegant and stark conceptual infrastructure made up of two sets of oppositions: 1. Nation versus juridical state, ethnos versus demos, naturalized identity versus political identity, community versus civil society. 2. The Rights of Man versus the public sphere, natural law versus Rule of Law, freedom versus citizenship, autonomy versus membership. Arendt’s theory, framed here in its starkest form, is that whether the future bodes more genocide or the actual realization of a culture of human rights requires locating ourselves consistently on the far side of both dichotomies—that is, on the side of political artifice, the rule of law, and a pluralistic political community. The mutual exclusivity between citizenship rights and natural rights is at the heart of Arendt’s second normative opposition—that between the state of nature and the nature of the state, between natural rights and legal citizenship rights, between naturalism and institutionalism, between nature and political artifice. Whereas the first dichotomy contrasts the rule of law and state with the dense quicksand of national and ethnic identity, the second contrasts law with the pure vacuum of abstraction born of a 300-year-old thought experiment appropriated to become the foundation of real political theory. Although these are two separate oppositions, historically they worked in sequence with each other—the first moral failure preparing the way for phase two of the genocide that was inadvertently allowed to happen by liberalism’s failure to understand either nationalism or the institutional foundations of right. In the first phase, only those who belonged to the fictive nation were worthy of inclusion. Those excluded from the imagined nation were made stateless due to their outsider identity. Once thrust outside the only nation-state to which they could make even formal claim to belonging, they were now outside the framework of any organized polity. With this loss of the right to have rights, they ultimately lost the right to live.
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 45
Viewed from this angle, the pair of distinctions actually amount to a single more encompassing one between nature versus artifice. Both a nationalism depleted of law and a liberalism depleted of an organized political community amount to the same thing: two kinds of naturalisms set in opposition to the rule of law, to institutional rules, and to the artificial construct of citizenship itself. At first glance, this is may seem puzzling. While liberalism’s natural rights and The Rights of Man are of course immediately recognizable as derived from the fictive state of nature, we are more accustomed to thinking of nationalism and ethnicity not as products of nature but of culture, and which apply to collectivities rather than to autonomous individuals. Indeed the fictive ethnicity of the nation seems to be constitutively based on “groupness,” a very long distance from the individualism of man in the state of nature. Yet identity based in the nation, ethnicity, and “culture” is ultimately no less driven by the seduction of naturalism’s epistemic privilege than is liberalism’s naturalistic ontology. Ethnic and national identities are derived from stories about the essential nature of persons. To be sure, it is in the context of families of origin that individuals usually come to awareness of this identity. But while families, even communities, come and go, identities do not; instead they are ascribed to the self as natural and primordial and rooted in the very “blood and soil” of the nation. Identity myths are thus based on the vertical association of individuals with an essential segment of primordial nature; in the case of the nation they originate from deeply ascribed vertical relationships with a particular territoriality, not from horizontal relations with others. Nor are they the result of actions or politics; instead they are part of the “mere existence that is mysteriously given to us by birth” (p. 301). As such they are rooted in the “whole sphere of the merely given” (ibid.). The group identities of nationalism or ethnicity result from the aggregation of these multiple primordial identities. The illusion of nationalism as a collective construct, rather than a naturalistic and biological one, derives from this secondary moment in which individually defined naturalized identities are aggregated in imagined communities. But ultimately, the communities are held together by the primary function of individual vertical identities defined by “blood and soil,” rather than by the horizontal ties of relationships constructed in communities. Tragic evidence of the naturalization of ethnic and national identity formation comes from the case of Sarajevo in the early 1990s, one of Europe’s most cosmopolitan cities before the Bosnian war in the former Yugoslavia, despite decades of intermarriage and a culture of deep pluralism among Serbs, Bosnians (Muslims), even Croats. Yet once the Serbs declared a nationalist war of ethnic cleansing, these culturally constructed horizontal
46 / margaret r. somers
ties among decades-old friends, neighbors, civic groups, and political cultures dissolved in an instant. Instead, the Serbs responded to the cries of hate and violence against their fellow citizens of Sarajevo that were being issued from their “blood” relatives of Serbia—a land of complete strangers which the vast majority of Bosnian Serbs had never so much as visited. In the last instance, the vertically defined naturalized identities of nation and ethnicity proved to be the foundational mechanisms that incited the Bosnian Serbs to genocidal action against their fellow citizens of Sarajevo, a city that in its prewar condition Arendt would have recognized as a result of conscious political action and human artifice–exactly the opposite of the fictive idea of the nation and its “natural” communities. Since the naturalization of identities is equally imposed against the will of the ethnic group as they are embraced, German Jews under the Nazis is the other obvious example of the passive biologization of national identity over the constructed political actions of citizens. Generations of German citizenship convinced Jewish families that they did not need to flee the country under Hitler; as Germans “first and foremost” they were surely not at risk of anti-Semitism. State-sponsored genocide (prefigurative of Bosnia fifty years later) followed when the tragic optimism of the Jewish citizens was felled handily by the tyranny of biology over citizenship. As Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated, little has changed in the domination of Germany’s naturalized “blood” ties over those of citizenship. The naturalism of natural rights theory is of course more obvious. As the central mechanism of liberalism’s great thought experiment, social naturalism underlies all of its philosophical tenets. At the root of all of liberalism’s social naturalism is the stipulation that the inexorable powers of nature and its laws—made conceptually available for the first time by the scientific revolution—are the only conceivable source of countervailing power to that of the coercive state. This allowed for an alliance between freedom and nature— or, put more to the point, between freedom and anti-statism. The mapping of social naturalism’s binary category of the natural and the artificial onto liberalism’s binary of freedom and tyranny sealed the alliance for the next three centuries and continues stronger than ever in the present (Block, 1997; Somers, 1999). It follows readily that “natural” rights became the necessary mechanisms to preserve human freedom against the ever-present threat of state coercion. That meant that as the bearers of these natural rights, humans themselves had to be ontologically pre-social and pre-political in that they are born free in the site of nature, and are ontologically defined by their solitary vertical relationships to nature itself—the site of freedom—and not by relations with others. The concept of natural rights is thus militantly anti-relational, and only grudgingly do these natural rights-bearing persons enter into
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 47
contractual relations with others to create civil society, itself intended to be a mirror image of the state of nature. Even then civil society continues to be a pre-political refuge from the presumptively chronic tyranny of the state (Block, 1997; Somers, 1999). Arendt’s view of liberalism, then, is that it as biologically driven as is of nationalism: “Man,” ontologically a product of nature, can preserve his freedom only to the extent that he can preserve his foundational ties to the site of nature or its proxies: “From the beginning the paradox involved in the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an “abstract” human being who seemed to exist nowhere, for even savages lived in some kind of social order” (p. 291). It is not by accident that Arendt uses the potentially disturbing allusion to “savages” to argue her case for the universality of constructed political arrangements. By treading on the naturalistic terrain of her conceptual opponents, she is saying that social and political rules among “citizens” is always present, even among those who may appear most “primitive” to us in that they live as “natural” an existence conceivable while still being human. And just as it is their humanity, however distant from our “advanced” civilization, that inevitably embeds these “savages” within some kind of political membership and social organization; it is the absence of those products of human endeavor that marks the divide between the recognizably human and those who others refuse to recognize as such: “The loss of “home and political status became identical with expulsion from humanity altogether” (p. 297). Arendt’s two pairs of binary oppositions, between nation and state, between natural rights and law, are thus both instances of a single umbrellalike opposition between nature and artifice that encompasses the first two. Liberalism’s social naturalism with its collapse of law into the tyranny of the unreal idea of an abstract human is simply the other side of nationalism’s collapse of law into the tyranny of nation. Arendt’s metaphor of the stateless as the “scum of the earth” is thus hardly accidental. Whether made stateless on the basis of being the wrong national “blood” or rightless on the basis of being “protected” by natural rights, the results were the same for the Jews and other redundant peoples of interwar Europe. They were biologized, reduced to their animal needs that, as we know from Marx, expelled them from our human species-being, leaving them to be seen by others as outside the spectrum of humanity itself and thus being impossible subjects for human empathy. For Arendt the “abject freedom” of statelessness reduces humans to little more than beasts, a situation in which “rightless people are indeed thrown back into a peculiar state of nature” (p. 300). The mark of what she calls the “dark background of mere givenness,” naturalism, means that “they have lost all those parts of the world and all those aspects of human existence
48 / margaret r. somers
which are the result of our common labor, the outcome of the human artifice” (pp. 300–301). Here we arrive at the clearest statements of Arendt’s alternative to naturalism, whether that of nationalism or that of liberalism. More is required than merely the institutions of law and states, and even more than the fact of citizenship itself, it requires collective political action in the drive for human justice: “Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. Our political life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals” (p. 301). By contrast, the inability to act or make any impact on the world, resulted invariably from the conquest by the “background of mere givenness, the background formed by our unchangeable and unique nature.” Thus the stateless and rightless refugees were “persecuted not because of what they had done or thought, but because of what they unchangeably were—born into the wrong kind of race or the wrong kind of class” (p. 294). Whether by expulsion or denial, losing citizenship means finding ourselves in a world of social naturalism in which we cannot act and change at will. It is this inability to matter through our own agency that pushes us to the edge of our very humanity: the stateless “are deprived not of the right to freedom, but the right to action; not of the right to think, but of the right to opinion. . . . blessings and doom are meted out to them according to accident and without any relation whatsoever to what they do, did, or may do” (p. 296). Nature, in short, “the merely given . . . is a permanent threat to the public sphere” (p. 301). In the end, people’s right to have rights are most threatened by their being forced outside the public “common” and being thrown back, “in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness or their mere differentiation”—by ethnicity, that is. No longer citizens of any polity, “they are no longer allowed to partake in the human artifice, they begin to belong to the human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal species.” The real “paradox” entailed in the loss of human rights, and that means the right to have rights, is that “such a loss coincides with the instant a person becomes a human being in general—without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself— and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality”—that is to say, natural identity (p. 302, my italics). Arendt’s republicanism and her focus on the importance of political membership has led some to worry about her having too great a trust in the
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 49
state, with too little recognition of civil society’s necessity in the preservation of freedom (Cohen 1996). As I read her, however, Arendt had no love for the state in and of itself, nor absolute trust in the law and certainly not in political entities as such. As I read it, hers is a dualistic vision: only states can commit genocide, but only states have the potential to prevent it. It is also a tragic vision: cosmopolitan citizenship and human rights are the ideal, but they are as yet unrealizable in an international global universe still driven by nation-states. Despite much hand wringing over the demise of the nationstate, little has changed in the interceding half century to give us any greater optimism for a truly democratic international human rights regime (Power 2004). Statelessness Today Arendt forced our attention to the macro processes of interwar Europe by the striking name she gave the chapter that’s been the subject of this article— “The End of the Nation-State and the Decline of the Rights of Man.” Was she justified in making such definitive declarations of demise about two of Liberalism’s most foundational phenomena of the last three centuries? Certainly hers was a brilliant insight that the nation-state as we knew it had begun a precipitous fall as soon as the post-World War I League of Nations condoned the ethnos of nations supplanting the rule of law in all the successor states of Central and Eastern Europe. And given that Germany’s Nazi era represented the virtual perfection of the subordination of law by nation, at the time of her writing she was surely right about both the end of the nation-state as well as the demise of the hypocritical charade of the Rights of Man. But in the post-World War II period of prosperity and social democracy, nations and states appeared to have seamlessly conjoined once again into a universe of nation-states. Arguably, however, it was a unity that lasted only a few decades. With the beginnings of neoliberalism in the 1970s and the phoenixlike revival of market fundamentalism in the 1980s, the nation-state’s ambiguous unity once again began wresting apart into its two component parts. Over the last decades and radically intensified in the post-9/11 era, from this disarticulation of the culture of nation from the institutional entity of the political we are once again seeing the same dynamics: on the one side the naturalized “imagined community” of the nation; on the other the institutional and legal foundations of the state. From these have emerged two competing spheres of belonging and participation, one associated with a militant security-driven nationalism inflected by conservative moral social control and a radical free market ideology; the other with the rule of law, democratic commitments, and citizenship rights—civil, political, and social, thus
50 / margaret r. somers
embracing individual liberties, democratic participation, and a socially embedded market. Across this binary divide (often characterized as “red” and “blue” states in the case of the United States), the populations of societies increasingly under the sway of market fundamentalism are distributed in an increasingly polarized and rigidified opposition. This renewed disarticulation of nation from state frames the context of similarity between Arendt’s Europe and the early twenty-first century; we still live in a world in which refugees, apatrides, victims of human rights’ violations, superfluous people, and genocides are the norm, rather than the state of exception. But it is the interior world of what can be characterized as a new neoliberal statelessness to which I now want to draw attention—not in a search for empirical or historical commonalities, but to bring attention to the analytic similarities that emerge by mapping the implications of Arendt’s theoretical work onto the empirical patterns of nation-state uncoupling today. From the four-fold matrix that I developed above from the interior bulwark of Arendt’s thesis, I argued that the minority peoples of Europe became surplus people subject to genocide at the point at which they found themselves on the wrong side of the two-dimensional opposition between nature and human artifice, between social naturalism and the rule of law. In the first instance, they were victimized by the tyranny of ethnic naturalism and the domination of the rule of ethnos over the rule of law; in the second, they were persecuted by a 300-year-old thought experiment about the natural “rights of man” over the putatively coercive institutions of citizenship and political membership. Today, the double binary of nature versus artifice, naturalism versus citizenship, is forging similar analytic dynamics along different historical and empirical axes. The domination of rights’ naturalism today is taking place not in the interstices of nation states, but in the rise of market fundamentalism and its foundational commitment to the fiction of inexorable natural market laws. The result is increasing numbers of socially excluded stateless nationals—people who hold formal de jure citizenship, but from whom the state has withdrawn its institutions of social citizenship (via the privatization of public services, the decline of the social welfare state, etc.), even while expelling the bulk of the population from any meaningful participation in the political realm, and providing only the thinnest of connections to civil and legal rights. In their place, the proportionately tiny slice of the population that comprises the governing elites (governing in the fullest sense of not just politics and law, but equally the economy, the global markets, the media, and popular culture industry) have appropriated for their private site of profit and political control the institutions of power and the state, including those of the rule of law. Being expelled from the zone of the public sphere and cut loose from the state, however, has not propelled these stateless nationals into a vacuum of
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 51
identity. Instead, with the degradation of the public sphere and the social state, these increasing numbers of the working poor and degraded middleclasses are being “relocated” into the zone of the nation and its thick identityendowing patriotic and religious culture of belonging and participation. In today’s post-9/11 nation the domination of the naturalism of ethnos over the rule of law and demos (civil and political citizenship) provides the stateless and excluded with an alternative identity from that of rights-bearing citizen, namely that of nationalist patriots—a political garb that works to compensate the excluded for their loss of rights by allying them with the dominant political and social order. This is a curious inversion from the precise pattern of events in the Arendtian story, yet the logic at work is the same. In the case of the European Jews, nationalism and natural rights worked in tandem to expel them from the human community. Today, by contrast, it is the domination of the natural rights claimed by market regimes that are responsible for the dramatic rise of social exclusion, while the rise of nationalism is not amplifying but compensating, mitigating, and transforming this exclusion into an alternative source of human identity—one that allows them to be at the very heart of the included, this time not as rights-bearing citizens but as free market patriots. Losing the Right to Have Rights Through the Contractualization and Naturalization of Citizenship The new stateless peoples are being expelled from meaningful membership in an organized political community—that which confers and recognizes human identity—via a process of the contractualization and commodification of citizenship. In market society, more than mere political membership is required to sustain the right to have rights: market embeddedness is necessary, along with an autonomous public sphere and a non-commodified sphere of civil society—the spaces of citizenship. What the robustness of de jure political membership promised in Arendt’s mid-century era of burgeoning social states is being denied today by the increasingly expansive regimes of neoliberal market fundamentalism. Systematically degrading the public sphere and making the institutions of the social state increasingly irrelevant, these market regimes are transforming the foundations of citizenship from social and political to contractual and civil. As Arendt and Karl Polanyi both understood, governing through contractualism returns the social to the tyranny of naturalism, the stateless “freedom” of natural rights. In short, it steals the “right to have rights,” the very precondition for personhood. The journey from the public to the private, from the social to the “natural,” entails moving from an at least partially rights-driven life with some degree
52 / margaret r. somers
of market embeddedness to one with full exposure to the discipline of the market. Market fundamentalism, a term popularized by George Soros to capture the religious-like certitude of those who believe in organizing all dimensions of social life according to market principles, is the contemporary form of what Polanyi (2001 [1944]) identified six decades ago as economic liberalism’s “stark utopia”—the idea that society as a whole could be subordinated to a system of self-regulating markets. Today, just as in Polanyi’s early nineteenth century, for most people the years of ever-increasing market fundamentalism have led to a modern dystopia. People in, virtually all corners of social life, civil society, and the public sphere alike are all being subject to renewed commodification, leading to levels of inequality not seen since the gilded age. This commodification of citizenship tout court is a process driven by the withdrawal of the state from its sixty years of social and market embeddedness, accompanied by the systematic dismantling of civil, political, and above all, social citizenship rights. In this process, statelessness is both ends and means of exclusion. “Starving the beast” (as per the Heritage Foundation) is the mechanism by which political expulsion is accomplished while it is also the outcome of that accomplishment. There is no need to reprise the ongoing dynamics of thirty years of market fundamentalism and neoliberalism. What is important here is to simply highlight the state’s increasing abandonment of its institutions of inclusion, protections, and rights (market interferences, employment regulations, and so on) all driven by mechanisms that are forcing people and social life into unmediated and unprotected exposure to market demands, forcing them into commodification and turning them into stateless peoples. “Freed” from the tyranny of the state, excluded from the institutional fetters of law, justice, and public goods, a large segment of society has been catapulted into the liberal dystopia of social naturalism. The end of interference with the autonomous freedom of contract, the end of the minimum wage, the end of restriction on hours of labor—these are only some of the achievements and the desiderata, some accomplished already, some still in planning, that mark the fulfillment of market fundamentalism’s political culture. In market societies, as we know from T. H. Marshall (1950), the measure of social and political inequality and exclusion is directly proportionate to the degree of market embeddedness by the egalitarian institutions of citizenship. And from Polanyi, we know it is proportionate to the degree to which the commodification of citizenship and human communities into factors of labor can be resisted. In today’s culture of market fundamentalism, these struggles over the proportionate balance between the drive to subject all dimensions of social life to market principles and the attempt to restrict marketization to its appropriate sites, are increasingly being defeated as public good after public good, from education to health care to citizenship
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 53
itself, are subjected to privatization and, in the case of the public sphere, degradation and stigmatization. Social Exclusion and Losing the Right to Have Rights In Arendt’s schemata, statelessness invoked not only rightlessness but more profoundly an indistinguishable identity with “the scum of the earth.” She uses these shockingly naturalistic words to provoke alarm at the association of humans with “scum”—worms, slugs, and other filthy creatures of the biological world. Arendt’s association of “scum” with “statelessness” derived from her basic political and moral belief that the only source of human personhood—mutual recognition—is membership in an organized political body. To explain how people could be so dehumanized and merely biologized, in world opinion she introduces the concept of the “right to have rights.” Creating a lexical ordering of rights in a single phrase allows Arendt to explain the apparent historical paradox that the minorities of interwar Europe could have been guaranteed their civil and civic rights by the Minority Treaties, but still have found themselves utterly rightless because the promised juridical-political rights were meaningless without a full human being to which they could be attached. Yet the existence of such a human was fully conditional on the first right in the right to have rights—“the right to belong to some kind of organized community” and “to live in “a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions” (p. 297), that is the right to citizenship. In the context of massive European denaturalizations, losing that primary right meant losing de jure and de facto citizenship from the expelling nation-states. Arendt, of course, was making a more general existential and ontological point about human personhood: just as humans became least recognized as such when they were stripped of everything but their “naked lives” as nothing-but-human, conversely, the precondition for rights-bearing is the prior right of inclusion, membership, and mutual recognition. To understand how losing the right to have rights bears on contemporary market regimes and to reorient our thinking from Arendt’s ethnic and nationalist processes of exclusion to the market-driven mechanisms of exclusion prevailing today, it is helpful to introduce the term “social exclusion,” which Europeans today use to refer to poverty. Replacing the term poverty with that of social exclusion is bracingly clarifying. It gives the lie to the current trend of attributing poverty to individual behavioral character traits and substitutes a framework of social relationships that embed and account for market outcomes. Whereas “poverty levels,” moreover, are usually constructed from malleable statistical measurements of governmentdefined income levels, social exclusion begins with the blunt consequences of
54 / margaret r. somers
poverty—exclusion from the heart of society. Only then does the concept induce us to seek an explanation in patterns of social relationships, exposure to markets, and institutional arrangements. The great achievement of the concept of social exclusion is thus to turn a narrow economic term regarding income into a political category signifying relations of power and conscious choices that are codified in social policies—rather than as the outcome of individual choices or behaviors. T. H. Marshall (1950), an Arendtian contemporary, clearly anticipated the difference in the meaning of poverty between “income” levels on the one hand, and questions of social inclusion and exclusion on the other. In his well-known triptych of citizenship rights—civil, political, and social— Marshall dismisses the oft-thought association of social rights with welfare schemes or income distribution policies. Instead, he defines social citizenship (such as the right to quality health care and public education) in a way that powerfully invokes Arendt’s human ontology of that primary right of membership and citizenship on which all the civic-juridical rights depend: by social citizenship “I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society . . . which in turn means a claim to be accepted as full members of the society, that is, as citizens” (Marshall 1950: 6, 8, italics added). Then, as if to anticipate and/or echo Arendt directly, Marshall goes on to describe social rights as “necessary requisites of civil freedom” (p. 16). Freedom, in other words, is itself already dependent on prior full inclusion in the standards of the community. Marshall then makes the same point from another angle. Civil rights, the first of his three types of citizenship, is usually associated with the economic and civil freedoms characterized by freedom from the state—the right to property, to liberty of the person, freedom from habeas corpus, freedom of speech and assembly, and so on. But it is the last clause in Marshall’s definition of civil citizenship that is often overlooked, namely what he calls the “right to justice.” This he defines as a “different order” from the other civil rights “because it is the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law” (p. 8, my italics). All the rights in the world, Marshall is saying here, mean nothing without full access to the rule of law; but that formal right to access will be completely meaningless without the inclusionary resources necessary to create the kind of person capable of acting on those rights of access. This is what he means by terms of equality—it is another way of once again invoking full social inclusion as the prerequisite to equal access to the system of justice. Today both equality and due process are threatened by market-driven exclusions. The subsequent loss of rights that these entail parallel Arendt’s
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 55
nationalist and naturalist-driven interwar exclusions. Marshall’s priority of partaking in the social heritage and Arendt’s ontological postulate of political belonging both make membership as citizens the foundational necessity, and right, of human personhood and identity. The implications of Marshall’s argument that both social citizenship and access to the courts are foundational rights, the latter “because it is the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law” (p. 8), the former because it is “a necessary prerequisite of civil freedom” (p. 16), are now very clear: when market-driven inequalities and social exclusions deny adequate ontological foundations for access to the rights-based institutions of the state—the courts of justice, quality public education, adequate health care, in short, all the aspects of life necessary to live the life of a civilized being—the consequences are people without that primary foundational right of personhood. The inexorable links between social exclusion, statelessness, and losing the right to have rights demonstrate that the formal legal passports carried by today’s socially excluded have no more de facto meaning than did the civic rights guaranteed by the Minority Treaties. By formal law they may be citizens, but today’s socially excluded are no longer rights-bearing citizens; by default they have become mere denizens who reside in the country but are for all effects and purposes stateless and superfluous people (Hammar, 1990). Lack of access to the rights-based institutions of the state thus lead to rightless and stateless people who are nonetheless legal residents of their own countries. The borders demarcating citizen exclusion and inclusion that form the periphery of states, have in the twenty-first century migrated to the center of our social world (Balibar, 2004). From Market Externalities to Storm Troops of Nationalism “Market externalities” is the term used by economists to capture the “imperfections” that result from “interferences” with what under ideal circumstances would be a balanced equilibrium of market forces. Included among such “externalities” are environmental decay, air pollution, shortages of flu vaccines, “sticky” levels of unemployment and underemployment, lack of public health, and wage levels below a living wage. When Karl Polanyi, who had no patience for euphemisms, addressed the similar consequences of the early nineteenth century commodification of land and labor, he saw them as threats to the fabric of the social body. As he unturned earlier episodes of unsustainable levels of inequality and poverty that were ripping apart communities, Polanyi introduced the idea of a “double movement” to characterize the various social groups and movements that
56 / margaret r. somers
coalesced to counteract the dissolution being foisted upon communities by the marketization of society. These included trade unions and working class mutual societies, as well as cross-class alliances that fought for factory legislation, resistance to poor relief repeal, extension of the franchise, and even revolutionary uprisings. Because market fundamentalism soldiered on in response to these movements by at once subjecting ever greater dimensions of society to market principles while in time intensifying its protectionism toward other countries, by the early twentieth century such massive failures to recognize what Polanyi called the “reality of society” led to fascism and totalitarianism. Only the embedded markets of the American New Deal and English social democracy managed to avoid these latter fates. Given the extent and kinds of market “externalities” being inflicted by today’s neoliberal processes of recommodification, one might expect a similar upsurge in Polanyi’s double movements of resistance. Indeed if we lived in a different political universe, it would not be unreasonable to expect real social unrest, massive working class protest, or at the least widespread union actions and strikes. There are, of course, no such double movements in sight, at least in the Anglo-American world. Instead, the very people most victimized by the vanishing state—the stateless, the rightless, the socially excluded, the working poor and blue collar classes, the déclassé middle-classes—have embraced something that apparently fills a much deeper need than social revolution, namely the identity of the nation and the ethnos of America, namely market fundamentalist nationalism. Nationalism is usually treated as an international phenomenon in which the objects of inclusion and exclusion are marked by the boundaries of nation: “we” are Americans; “they” are foreigners. And to be sure, there is no shortage of xenophobia and American chauvinism passing under the banner of American patriotism (one need only remember how French fries morphed into “freedom fries” after France refused to join in the invasion of Iraq). Moreover, 9/11 so galvanized the patriotic impulse of Americans that for a while nationalist identification seemed to embrace the nation as a whole. “But accusations of questionable patriotism and nationalism are always more directed against fellow citizens, for it is by “othering” internal dissenters that the included are able to distinguish themselves as true patriots ready to defend the nation against the threat from within.” Thus in Arendt’s story of interwar Europe, the processes of genocide began not with Jews being attacked from outside nation-states but with their denaturalizations driven from the dominant ethnic forces within their own states of residence. The excluded were those who by choice or coercion were deemed to be in essence, by nature that is, alien from the dominant “national peoples.” As the polluted within the national body, these minority presences posed a constant threat. Whether it was the Germans toward
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 57
the Poles, or the Poles and just about every other state toward the Jews, denaturalizations driven by nationalist purifications were undertaken in the name of national survival. National identity depended on the ability of the included to distinguish themselves from the cancerous growth within the body of the nation making survival itself dependent upon ruthless expulsions of the non-belongers.2 While the weapons of purification may be of a different order today, the foundations of national identity are much the same. Despite the temporary lull of patriotic unification following 9/11, the real enemies to the nation are defined as those within the social body who are either naturalized others—immigrants, nonwhites, non-heterosexuals—or insufficiently part of the dominant ethnos of America by virtue of their cultural “elitism,” their war against “people of faith,” and their inherent “America-hating.” Much more significant, then, than chauvinism toward other countries in shaping the future of democratic citizenship are the kinds of national identities founded in the internal differentiation of “we” versus “them.” Rather than the relatively weak identification with the politically defined nation-state as a whole, it is this attachment to a naturalized pre-political internally differentiated national community that is filling the vacuum left by the social exclusion and statelessness of class. Patriotism, as now asserted, is characterized by identification only with those who are believed to embody the true characteristics of the nation—in this case, “real Americans.” Essential to this identity is the dualistic presupposition that while the real Americans are by far the majority of the population, they are nonetheless the victims of arrogant cultural elites who not only do not share the same love and identification with country, but who by their political dissent are providing comfort to the terrorists. Thus the social exclusion of class resentiment is quelled by the oldest salve known to political rulers—the balm of fictive belonging by virtue of one’s authentic and natural roots in the national cultural soil in tandem with a fervent exclusionary treatment of the internal Others whose questionable degree of patriotism threatens the survival of the true nation.3 Thus without so much as a peep from the media, one of the Right’s most visible public intellectuals had no trouble finding a publisher for her best-selling book on the “treason” of American liberals (Coulter, 2003). Some may object that evangelical right wing Christianity more than nationalism has become the driving force of internal exclusionary identity politics. But this assumption misallocates the distribution of their respective powers. Religious litmus tests, conflating political differences to wars against “people of faith,” and the use of Biblical injunctions as political wedge issues are proxies for the inclusion and exclusions of the nation. Difference from evangelical Christianity, indeed the separation of church
58 / margaret r. somers
and state itself, today have been made one and the same as hatred of authentic America. Small wonder such differences become threats that need to be purged. And while for the socially excluded blurring the line between church and state provides a mechanism of national belonging and identity simply in the day to day practices of everyday religious commitments, for the governing classes blurring that line provides a mechanism for politically mobilizing support for their continued governance. While national identity is rooted in a naturalistic story of American ethnos it thus always contains within it a set of cultural commitments and practices. Among these, religious orthodoxies are more often than not the first among equals. But the conflation by the socially excluded of nationalist loyalty with a zealous commitment to the idea of the free market (and unfettered commodification) is surely one of the great peculiarities of American nationalism. In light of the long tradition of populist anticapitalism not only on American but also much of European fascist soil, one could almost call it a variety of American exceptionalism. The secret is in the concept of freedom which, more than any other, is the dominant trope of American nationalism. That a passionate anti-statist conception of freedom from government tyranny is the flip side of freedom of property from state interference and regulation, taxes and redistribution, is of course not an American peculiarity but one of liberalism tout court (Block, 1997; Somers, 1999). But that the long tradition of American nativism’s anti-statist righteousness and the demand to “get government off people’s backs” maps perfectly onto a three decades’ long movement by the privileged to restructure the tax system by eliminating all tax on wealth and income from wealth, and shifting it onto income from labor, seems to be a unique cultural indicator of American patriotism only in recent decades. The truly breathtaking achievement of American nationalism is that the current regime of market fundamentalism is well on the way to consolidating an uncontested government of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich that is being voted in by people who are not. Indeed one of the most remarkable findings in Thomas Frank’s best-selling What’s the Matter with Kansas? is just this passionate willingness on the part of the socially excluded to take whatever actions necessary to ensure that the largest possible tax cuts go to the wealthiest and most privileged Americans (Frank, 2004, 2005). Today’s peculiar form of nationalist identity formation is one that reproduces the very economic policies that caused those most victimized by them to be expelled into the “freedom” of statelessness in the first place. The socially excluded’s zealous but oft puzzling ardor toward the kind of free market capitalism that does most harm to their material interests can perhaps be explained by the association between the façade of cowboy capitalism and commitment to a nationalist ethnos in general and the peculiar
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 59
American obsession with absolute freedom. Inversely, it also explains the vitriol directed by “hardworking patriots who love their country and are persecuted for it” toward liberals, intellectuals, and rich “Hollywood types” who are “either high-born weaklings or eggheads hypnotized by some fancy idea [and] are always ready to sell their nation out at a moment’s notice” (Frank, 2005: 47).4 The social exclusion produced by losing the labor market protections attached to citizenship thus leads to a powerful class ressentiment among today’s stateless nationals; attachment to the nation endows a compensatory identity that gives direction and energy to the rage. It isn’t always possible for the socially excluded “scum” of society to be compensated for their loss of status and rights by being “allowed” into the portals of the nation. Jews and all the millions of other dehumanized apatrides had no such options. Whether national inclusion is available to the rightless detritus of society is entirely dependent on the prevailing distribution of power. Because today power flows in exactly the opposite direction from that of interwar Europe, as they move from the exclusions of citizenship to the inclusions of nationalism, today’s stateless find themselves in a very different position than did the European Jews and others stateless peoples. Today, those who dominate political governance have every reason to encourage those excluded from the rights of citizenship to identify themselves more strongly than ever as included in the nation. Alliances between the politically powerful and the powerless are hardly new in the history of politics, much less so in the history of fascism. Yet the kind of alliance held together between the socially excluded white working classes and the kind of class power represented by the currently hegemonic Republican ruling party is unprecedented in American history.5 And the kind of nationalist fervor whipped up by the governing regime in the hearts of those most victimized by their economic policies, is of a nature guaranteed to at once obscure the source of their exclusion and rightlessness while turning their nationalist pride and anger toward the political rivals. The result is a coalition driven by a rubric of the nation on the part of the socially excluded, by political expediency on the part of their elite allies. After all, whereas the state defines, concedes, enforces, or endows citizenship rights; the nation demands and receives duties. Of all the dimensions of nationalist identity, none of them include the rights attached to the legal institutions of citizenship. Instead, as a pre-political naturalistic identity, nationalism invokes only duties—foremost amongst which is the willingness to die for—and vote for—the regime that has taken on the mantle of true patriotism. The usefulness to the privileged of their alliance with the working poor under the banner of national identity makes these socially excluded patriots unlikely to become victims of the Patriot Act or other forms of political
60 / margaret r. somers
policing. But it is more than likely, in fact inevitable, that they will become economic victims, as all the righteousness of national inclusion and identity cannot erase the fact that they have lost the right to have rights. Identity tied to ethnos—without the accompanying right to have rights of citizenship institutions—is an identity reduced to biology, to the state of being an animal. Left without the right to have rights, one is “the scum of the earth.” The site of the nation is the space of rightlessness. From status to contract, from public to private, from participation to consumption, from social rights to commodification, from civil and political rights to the civic religion of patriotism and the nation—these signal not the end of citizenship but its remaking and commodification. And the commodification of citizenship is a deeper and even more insidious process than Polanyi’s famous commodification of individual labor. For while the latter throws one to the mercy of the welfare state and the stigma of public assistance, the former destroys the social state altogether. Whereas nation-states have always distinguished themselves from others by means of a thick exterior border based on a territorial “container” of its nation, they have always been simultaneously characterized by an interior seemingly without borders, an open space kept open by the political public sphere where differences are not supposed to discriminate against but to give meaning and historicity to people’s private lives. With this new commodification of citizenship, an interior border has emerged in duplication of that of the exterior. On one side, the people with the power of rule, on the other the people with the privilege of American nationality. The outcome is the dissolution of internal citizenship inclusion to the exclusion brought about by “internal borders” (Balibar, 2004). Just as the stateless peoples of interwar Europe were betrayed by the empty promises and hypocrisy of the rights of man when thrown into the dystopia of having nothing but their natural rights, of being nothing but a human, so too today’s socially excluded, having lost the right to have rights, find themselves victims in a contemporary morality tale that once again touts natural rights—of property, of the market, of free contract—as the foundations of human freedom. The Jews and other nothing-buthumans who lost their rights to have rights became scum of the earth in their naturalized condition, and thus served up the world with a legitimate reason for their annihilation. The Nazis found ways to exterminate the stateless and rightless of Europe in record time. Whether in the long run there will be a similar outcome by natural means (starvation, disease, reduced life expectancy, permanent jail time, etc.) is still an open question. What is clear is that today’s story has a very different twist to it, one that has converted nature into nation and has changed the face of politics in the United States. If they are not extinguished by serving as cannon fodder in
citizenship, statelessness and market fundamentalism / 61
the wars launched by the nation’s governing regime, it is likely that today’s stateless American patriots will die slowly, from the exclusions that Arendt, Polanyi, and Marshall all explained were the very foundations of modern personhood—the rights of membership with which only full citizens are endowed. These rights of citizenship are, of course, civil rights, political rights, and perhaps the set of rights without which no true citizenship is possible, namely the social rights that underlie that primary right of the right to have rights without which there cannot exist the robust mutual recognition between equals that full human identity requires. History discloses that losing the right to have rights entails losing the membership necessary to be recognized as part of humanity itself. Notes 1. This chapter was originally presented as “Social Exclusion, Stateless Citizens, and Losing the ‘Right to Have Rights’ ” at a Presidential Plenary Session on Culture and Political Identities, organized by Craig Calhoun, American Sociological Association Meetings, August 18, 2003, and at “Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America,” a Conference sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the DAAD, and the Joint Initiative in German and European Studies, University of Toronto, Canada, October 2–5, 2003. 2. Often subjected to the metaphor of cancer in the body politic, the case is made that if another person has cancer one feels pity but not fear; but when the cancer is inside your own body, then any means necessary are taken to destroy the disease. 3. It is well-known that “those who are not with us, are against us,” just as anyone who raised any criticisms of the current Bush government “aided and abetted the terrorists.” 4. It also explains the fierce loyalty of African Americans to the Democratic Party. As the victims not only of social exclusion but of the association between national identity and whiteness, they have no trouble understanding the true consequences of being stateless in a market fundamentalist regime. 5. In the 2004 U.S. elections, 27% of the white working classes voted Republican.
References Agamben, Giorgio (2000), Means Without End: Notes on Politics, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Arendt, Hannah (1979 [1951]), The Origins of Totalitarianism, San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace & Co. Balibar, Etienne (2004), We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Benhabib, Seyla (2001), Transformations of Citizenship: Dilemmas of the Nation State in the Era of Globalization, Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum.
62 / margaret r. somers Benhabib, Seyla (2004), The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Block, Fred (1997), The Vampire State, New York: The New Press. Brubaker, Rogers (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harrard University Press. Cohen, Jean L. (1996) “Rights, Citizenship, and the Modern Form of the social: Dilemmas of Arendation Republicanism,” Constellations, 3(2):164–189. Coulter, Anne (2003), Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War of Terrorism, New York: Crown Forum. Frank, Thomas (2004), What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America, New York: Metropolitan Books. ——— (2005), “What’s the Matter with Liberals?” The New York Review of Books, LII, 8, May 12, pp. 46–51. Habermas, Jurgen (2001), The Postnational Constellation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hammar, Tomas (1990), Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens, and Citizens in a World of International Migration, Brookfield, VT: Gower. Kohn, Jerome (2002), “Arendt’s Concept and Description of Totalitarianism,” Social Research, 69, 2, Summer, pp. 621–656. Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1992 [1950]), Citizenship and Social Class, Concord, MA: Pluto Press. Polanyi, Karl (2001 [1944]), The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press. Power, Samantha (2004), “The Lesson of Hannah Arendt,” The New York Review of Books, 51, April 29, p. 7. Somers, Margaret (1999), “The Privatization of Citizenship: How to Unthink a Knowledge Culture,” in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds.) Beyond the Cultural Turn, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 121–161. ——— (2005), “Beware Trojan Horses Bearing Social Capital: How Privatization Turned Solidarity into a Bowling Team,” in George Steinmetz (ed.) The Politics of Method, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 346–411. ——— (2005), “Citizenship Troubles: Genealogies of Struggle for the Soul of the Social,” in Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff (eds.) Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 438–469. ——— (2005), “Let them Eat Social Capital: Sociologizing the Market or Marketizing the Social?” Thesis Eleven: Critical Theory and Historical Sociology, 81, May, pp. 5–19. Somers, Margaret and Fred Block (2005), “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over Two Centuries of Welfare Debate,” American Sociological Review, 70, April, pp. 260–287. Soros, George (1998), The Crisis of Global Capitalism, New York: Public Affaires. ——— (2000), Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism, New York: Public Affaires.
C h ap t e r 3 Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization Christian Joppke
Citizenship is one of the most ambivalent though busily utilized and expanded entries in the contemporary social science lexicon. Its ambivalence consists of its dual, and most often overlapping, function as analyticalnormative concept to order multiple realities and empirical object of study itself, with a certain tendency of the first to eclipse the second. If a recent Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Isin and Turner, 2002) identified a good number of hyphenated citizenships, from “cultural,” “sexual,” and “ecological” to “cosmopolitan,” such “citizenship” is less a distinct and clearly demarcated object of study than a conceptual metaphor for a bewildering variety of rights-based claims in contemporary societies, particularly if raised by marginal groups. This chapter1 turns the attention back to what citizenship, underneath its hyphenated forms, essentially is: membership in a state. Contemporary globalizing processes, most notably increased international migration in the context of a world-spanning human rights culture and the transnational linking of segments or subsystems of previously “national” societies with their counterparts abroad, are fundamentally transforming the meaning and regulation of citizenship as state membership. A prominent formula to capture this transformation is “postnational membership” (Soysal, 1994). It depicts a decreasing relevance of state membership, because fundamental (civil, social, sometimes even political) rights are now invested outside a person’s formal citizen status, and are instead tied to her abstract personhood or residence status. Two elements of this scenario stand out. First, its subject is not so much changes of the meaning and regulation of state membership, as of the “rights” that are contingently attached to (or decoupled from) this status. However, there have been important recent changes in how the status of state membership is determined and distributed, irrespective
64 / christian joppke
of the rights attached to it. These changes of the status dimension of state membership are the subject of this article. Second, the trajectory of the postnational membership scenario is linear: “from” citizenship “to” its postnational alternative. Its plausibility rests on the assumption of a golden age of citizenship, which is empirically questionable—not all rights, not even some of the most important (civil and social) rights, had ever been dependent on formal state membership (see Ferrajoli, 1994). There has been great historical and cross-national variation with respect to tying or separating rights from formal citizenship status, which is not captured in the linear “from-to” scenario. In addition, linear reasoning brackets the ambivalences, contradictions, and multiple valences that are the mark of most social phenomena and change processes, the transformation of citizenship included.2 In this article, I argue that international migration in the contemporary context of human rights and transnationalism is impinging on citizenship as state membership in two opposite directions. On the side of immigration, it forces the state to de-ethnicize citizenship, in the sense of grounding access to citizenship more on residence and birth on territory than on filiation. Failing to do so would violate fundamental liberal-democratic precepts that most contemporary states are notionally committed to. On the side of emigration, international migration tips the balance in the opposite direction, toward re-ethnicized citizenship, in the sense of providing incentives for states to retain links with their members abroad, particularly across generations. Failing to do so would not just violate the national vocation of the state, according to which the state is an intergenerational community with “a common ancestry and a common destiny” (Zolberg, 1999: 84); there are also material interests in terms of remittances and influence abroad that move the state in this direction. The opposition between “de-” and “re-ethnicizing” trends and forces is transverse to the “civic” versus “ethnic” distinction known in the nations and nationalism literature. I thus take issue with a second comprehensive account of citizenship in an age of globalization and migration, which appositely redirects the attention from the Marshallian “rights” to the Weberian “status” (or “closure”) dimension of citizenship, but sees the relative openness or closure of citizenship to newcomers determined by inert cultural understandings of nationhood, “civic” or “ethnic” (Brubaker, 1992). This scenario shares with the postnational membership alternative its linearity and de-politicized nature, though diagnosing a resilience rather than transformation of citizenship in light of contemporary challenges. Against this account, this article will show that a traditional “civic” nation-state like France has been subject to significant re-ethnicizing pressures, whereas the traditionally “ethnic” nation-state of Germany has recently moved toward de-ethnicized citizenship in a big way.
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 65
In fact, the tension between de- and re-ethnicization is inherent in what a state essentially is: a territorial unit, whose integrative measures in an age of universal human rights have to become increasingly abstract and procedural; and a membership unit, which one usually enters at birth and exits only at death, and the ties to which continue to exist irrespective of a member’s contingent location and movements in space. The novelty is that the de- and re-ethnicization imperatives impinge on an increasing number of (especially European) states simultaneously, rather than being neatly distributed across predominantly migrant receiving or— sending states, respectively, as it used to be in the past. In the face of global mobility, “emigration” is no longer the prerogative of traditionally poor or underdeveloped states. Two Council of Europe reports in the 1990s addressed the fact that tens of millions of Europeans were living abroad, while there was no “law of expatriates” in most European states to deal with the complications surrounding this phenomenon (from restrictions on the right to vote to the loss of citizenship) in a consistent way, not to mention the absence of a law of expatriates at international and European levels (Council of Europe, 1994; 1999). This is not bound to last, because with increased emigration across all categories of states the latter (and not just migrants) become drawn into the maelstrom of the “deterritorialization of politics” (Council of Europe, 1999: 20) that is a mark of contemporary globalization. The burgeoning literature on transnationalism has largely focused on migrant ties and networks across borders, and ignored the fact that states as membership units are actively (and not just passively) involved in this process (an exception is Glick Schiller, 1999). As this article shall document, it is an increasingly topical question, differently answered by different states, at what point the ties of membership abroad are severed and whether (and by what means) they are recoverable. While the de- versus re-ethnicization imperatives are structurally grounded in the immigration and emigration sides of contemporary international migration, there is a simple mechanism to bring them into the open. The political left, true to its universalist vocation, generally supports de-ethnicized citizenship rules, which lower the threshold of citizenship acquisition for immigrants. By contrast, the political right, more on the side of “being” than of “becoming” (see Bartolini, 2000: 9), generally supports re-ethnicized citizenship rules, strengthening the ties with members abroad even across foreign-born generations. Whether de- or re-ethnicized citizenship wins out is then a question of who has the political majority in a given moment and place. Theoretically, a citizenship law is possible that is both generous to newcomers and to long-settled members abroad (up to a certain limit explored below). In practice, however, recent episodes of citizenship reform have unfailingly been moments in which the forces of de- and
66 / christian joppke
re-ethnicization have split across party lines and thus come to a head. While after the demise of the communist alternative the distinction between “left” and “right” may have become meaningless in many other respects (see Giddens, 1994), with respect to the conflict between the de- and re-ethnicization of citizenship, and thus of the state as such, it still works rather neatly. Citizenship without Rights and Identity Before mapping out the countervailing trends and forces of de- and reethnicization, it is important to clarify what citizenship as state membership in essence is: a status, not a set of rights or an identity (as it is commonly understood in contemporary citizenship studies). In German language this is expressed in the notion of Staatsangehörigkeit (state membership), which is separate from that of Staatsbürgerschaft (denoting “citizenship” as a set of rights and duties). A classic study defined citizenship as state membership, as a “status”, that is, “a condition to which certain rights and duties are connected” (Makarov, 1947: 23). By implication, it is irrelevant which rights and duties are connected to that status. Makarov speaks of the “abstract character” of Staatsangehörigkeit, the concrete content of which may be variably and contingently defined by the lawmaker. Another way of explicating this “abstract character” of citizenship as state membership is by delimiting it externally from the “foreigner” or “alien,” and internally from the holder of full citizenship rights, especially political rights. While the foreigner-citizen duality still stands, only recently has the holding of state membership come to coalesce with the enjoyment of full citizenship rights. Colonial, Third-Republican France (as most colonial, pre-universal-suffrage states), for instance, distinguished between “nationalité” (in the sense of formal state membership) and “citoyenneté” (denoting full citizenship rights), the former including colonial subjects and women in the metropole, and the latter being reserved to male metropolitan French.3 Building on Makarov (1947), de Groot (1989: 5) characterized citizenship as state membership as “legal-technical coupling notion (Kopplungsbegriff ) without an essential content.” The formerly communist states went further than this, equating the mere membership in a state with a certain mindset and behavior. This turned state membership into a concept of virtue; note that communist state membership could be lost “for gross violation of (someone’s) citizenship (Staatsbürgerliche) duties” (Article 13 of the GDR Nationality Law, quoted in de Groot, 1989: 14). The impossibility of expelling citizens in today’s nontotalitarian states proves the “abstract character” of state membership, which is notionally decoupled from rights and identity. As de Groot (ibid.) correctly points out, it is therefore odd to
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 67
conceive of formal state membership as a “human right,” as does Article 15 of the UN Universal Human Rights Declaration of 1948. State membership is conceptually at a different level from the right to life or liberty, because the rights that are contingently tied to state membership (e.g., the right to diplomatic protection) could also be granted in some other way, for instance, through someone’s state of birth or residence. Strictly speaking, the right to a state membership is “the guarantee of a surprise package” (ibid.), as this membership can take on many a content. If state membership isn’t a right, neither is it an identity. Building on Brubaker’s seminal comparison of Germany and France (1992), the two principal mechanisms of ascribing state membership through filiation (jus sanguinis) or birth in the territory (jus soli) are sometimes construed as implying an “ethnic” or “civic” understanding of membership, as informed by different understandings of nationhood. While this association is empirically possible (and arguably has been made in crucial moments of citizenship reform in Germany and France alike), there is nothing necessary about it. Nationality law, as Patrick Weil has shown along the German and French examples in the early to mid-nineteenth centuries, is carried out by jurists, who are more amenable to copy each other’s inventions across states than to be under the sway of a particular “nationhood” tradition: “Nationality law is not the reflection of a concept of nation” (Weil, 2002: 13). For instance, Prussia’s adoption of jus sanguinis in 1842 and the parallel introduction of a “naturalization” procedure were both borrowed from France, whose switch from jus soli to jus sanguinis in the 1803 Civil Code was emulated in the first half of the nineteenth century across continental Europe, Germany included (see ibid.: chapter 7). Half a century later, the rejection of modifying strict jus sanguinis by jus soli elements in the Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 1913 was certainly in the explicit intention of keeping ethnically undesired eastern Jews and Poles out of the citizenry. In a pattern that shall be corroborated below, the Socialist opposition to the Conservative majority in the Reichstag held against the conservatives’ notion of the state as a “family” united by common “descent” the contractual notion of a “work community” (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) that commanded to bring all of its participants into the citizenry through eased naturalization and elements of jus soli. However, as Dieter Gosewinkel (2001: 326) argued concisely, the “ ‘blood’ in the principle of ‘jus sanguinis’ was formal and instrumental, not substantial”— it did not prejudge a development toward an ethnic, or even a biological race identity, as some have argued. Jus sanguinis is at heart a formal-legal concept, which is indifferent to the nature and quality of the “blood” that is transmitted by it. Note that through naturalization the German citizenry always remained open to the
68 / christian joppke
outside, until the loss of the African colonies after World War I, even to colonial natives (Gosewinkel, 2001: 303–309). And, in an often overlooked rebuttal of völkisch forces on the extreme right, the 1913 law defined “German” strictly formally through membership in a Bundesstaat or—this was a novelty—immediate Reichsangehörigkeit, thus excluding coethnic German-Austrians but potentially including Slavs through naturalization. Moreover, an interpretation of the 1913 citizenship law in terms of a prestatal “ethnonational” identity (Brubaker, 1992: chapter 6) overlooks some state-national principles that are equally centrally built into it. While removing the automatic loss of citizenship after residing ten years abroad (which had been a uniquely harsh provision in Europe at the time and a major reason of the entire law project), the new law prescribed the general loss of German citizenship when naturalizing abroad, and even prescribed expatriation for Auslandsdeutsche in the case of draft dodging. “No Volksgemeinschaft without Wehrbereitschaft (willingness to be drafted)” was the plainly nationalist slogan that accompanied the making of the Wilhelminian citizenship law, pointing to an important limitation of the ethnonational principle. In short, the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the 1913 German citizenship law did not per se express or prejudge the turn to an ethnic or even racial identity; on the contrary, the law left ample “spaces for a liberal citizenship policy” (Gosewinkel, 2001: 327). A state qua membership unit is fundamentally an ethnic institution, because membership is usually ascribed at birth. Contrary to the contractual fashioning of the modern state in the European enlightenment, the element of consent and choice touches the institution of citizenship only at the margins; at heart, one belongs to the state into which one is born, which makes it a relationship of origins and thus of ethnicity. The decisive moment in the development of state membership was the turn from “domicile” to “birth” as the main attributive mechanism. As the first modern law that exclusively dealt with state membership, the Prussian Subject Law (Untertanengesetz) of 1842, put it clearly, “domicile within our states shall no longer be sufficient alone to ground the status of ‘Prussian’ ” (Groot, 1989: 312). The distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis is secondary to this fundamental transition from domicile to birth, because jus soli also makes “birth” the decisive element of citizenship attribution. Interestingly, however, only jus sanguinis was originally the quintessentially modern membership principle, because it made nationality law a “right of the person,” according to which nationality was transmitted like the name of the family, through filiation, and could not be lost by an individual’s contingent movements in space ( Weil, 2000: 12). By contrast, jus soli was then tainted by its feudal origins, because it derived from the ownership of the land by the Lord, its human elements included, who owed the
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 69
Lord their “allegiance.” The reinterpretation of jus soli from feudal “allegiance” to democratic “socialization” in late nineteenth-century France prepared the ground for the contemporary view of jus soli as the more modern citizenship principle, simply because it allows to better accommodate the consequences of massive cross-border mobility. Note, however, that jus soli alone, unmodified by jus sanguinis elements, may be equally seen at odds with cross-border mobility, because on its basis even short-term stays (like tourism or merely transiting) could yield the life-long good of membership. Accordingly, Britain and Portugal moved from unconditional jus soli (which had been exceptional in Europe) toward strengthening jus sanguinis elements in the early 1980s with the same justification of better accommodating international migration that also motivated some jus sanguinis states to move in the exact opposite direction in the same period. Rather than reflecting particular visions of “nationhood,” jus soli and jus sanguinis are flexible legal-technical mechanisms that allow multiple interpretations and combinations, and states (or rather the dominant political forces in them) have generally not hesitated to modify these rules if they saw a concrete need or interest for it. De-Ethnicization . . . If citizenship as state membership is inherently ethnic, because it is a nonchosen origin construct that is generally acquired with a person’s birth, the notion of “de-ethnicization” may appear paradoxical, if not nonsensical. I define “de-ethnicization” as the process of facilitating the access to citizenship, either through opening it at the margins in terms of liberalized naturalization procedures, or through adding jus soli elements to the modern main road of birth attributed citizenship jure sanguinis. Through both measures the state opens up its membership to newcomers, and breaks through the closed circuit of exclusively filiation-based membership that constitutes “ethnic” citizenship in the narrow sense. Whereas jus soli elements, as remnants of feudalism, had practically disappeared in continental Europe by 1900, they were successively reintroduced in the course of the twentieth century, mostly driven by the democratic imperative of integrating long-settled migrant populations (see Groot, 1989: 312–316).With a few exceptions, all European Union states today grant as-of-right citizenship to second-generation immigrants, either at birth or—in a kind of delayed jus soli—optionally at a later stage (see Weil, 2001). What has caused this transition toward conditional jus soli citizenship across Europe? Not immigration per se, because at an earlier stage the latter had provoked the exact opposite response, as in the explicit discarding of jus soli elements in the 1913 German Reichs—und
70 / christian joppke
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz. Rather, it is immigration in a particular historical context that triggers an integrative (rather than exclusionary) response: the context of a global human rights culture. Discussing strong international opposition to disturbingly “ethnocultural” citizenship laws in some post-communist states in eastern Europe, Diane Orentlicher (1998: 312) has argued that “increasingly . . . international law has subtly reinforced territorial/civic conceptions of nationality.” For an earlier period, one author had provocatively stated that international law had boiled down to enshrining the principle of state sovereignty and “deducing some of the consequences” (Herz, 1957). Now human rights constraints have messed up the sovereign order of things. As Orentlicher describes the simple cause of the revaluation of territorial over ethnic citizenship (in the narrow, filiation-based sense), “states owe human rights obligations to individuals who are vulnerable to their exercise of sovereign power” (Orentlicher, 1998: 322, fn. 117). Because the influence of international law on the domain of citizenship and immigration is negligible to non-existing,4 two additional conditions at domestic level must be met for de-ethnicization to take place: first, the decoupling of the state from nation-building; second, the existence of a political force, usually on the left, to wage a reform that promises few if any votes. With respect to the first, de-ethnicization rests on a “self-limiting” understanding of nation-building in a liberal state (see Kymlicka, 2002). What nation-building originally meant has been explicated in detail by James Scott (1998: 82): the creation of “a perfectly legible population with registered, unique names and addresses keyed to grid settlements; who pursue single, identifiable occupations; and all of whose transactions are documented according to the designated formula and in the official language.” Ethnically selective immigration policies and ethnically closed citizenship laws, which predominated throughout Western states from the late nineteenth century into the early second half of the twentieth century, were prime instruments of the “high modernist” state (Scott, 1998: 87–102) that sought to recruit and produce identical units in its serial nation-building exercise. The postwar era of universal human rights withdrew the high modernist state’s basis, which Scott characterized as a “prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist (the state’s) plans” (89). Nation-building became self-limiting and liberal norms constrained what states could do in the domain of immigration and citizenship policy. However, the state must become decoupled from nation-building in yet another sense for de-ethnicized citizenship rules to be possible: the borders of the state must coincide with the boundaries of the nation. Only then can a profoundly illiberal sense that the state is “owned” by a particular nation recede into the background, and the liberal-democratic imperative of integrating foreign migrant populations becomes more urgently felt.
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 71
The combination of structural and agency factors in the de-ethnicization of citizenship may be well illustrated by the German case. Though one of the world’s major immigrant-receiving states after World War II, by the early 1900s Germany was one of the few states in Europe that had resisted the trend toward accompanying jus sanguinis citizenship with jus soli elements to incorporate her huge migrant population. The structural reason for this was the non-congruence of state borders and national boundaries: an ethnically closed, exclusively filiation-based citizenship was seen as the bridge to national unity and expression of (West) Germany’s homeland obligations toward the ethnic German diasporas in communist eastern Europe. Even under these structural conditions that favored ethnic citizenship the democracy principle put pressure on this citizenship. In 1984, the conservative-liberal (CDU/FDP) government declared that “no state can lastingly tolerate that a numerically significant part of the population remains outside the political community for generations” (quoted in Hailbronner and Renner, 2001: 140). And in its rejection of granting local voting rights to foreigners in 1990, the Federal Constitutional Court encouraged the lawmaker to “facilitate the acquisition of German citizenship” for the sake of the “democratic idea” (quoted in ibid.: 141). This was precisely the moment where the post-unification congruence of state and nation removed the structural barrier to a de-ethnicization of citizenship law. In 1990, the year of unification, the CDU/FDP government promptly ventured a first cautious liberalization of the naturalization procedure for long-settled foreigners and their offspring. However, all further going changes remained dependent on the political left. A crucial turning point was the so-called Asylum Compromise of December 1992. This was the moment when the German state made a huge stride from defining itself as the ethnic homeland of all Germans in the world, Israeli-style, to the civic-territorial composite of those who resided in it, French-style. More concretely, the oppositional SPD, in a concession for agreeing on a restriction of the constitutional asylum right, achieved a phasing-out in principle of ethnic German immigration and the introduction of as-of-right citizenship for long-settled foreigners and their offspring. By the same token, the conservative party in power (especially its Bavarian sister party, the Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU) blocked all further going changes, most notably jus soli citizenship for second-generation immigrants. The latter was achieved only after a new Left-Green (SPD/Greens) government arrived in the fall of 1998, which had made the creation of a “modern citizenship law” one of its earliest priorities (see Joppke, 2000). The German case not only shows us the structural and agency-based conditions for the arrival of de-ethnicized citizenship, but also some of its
72 / christian joppke
typical features. One element is straightforward: the birth attribution of citizenship jure soli. Note that this is not an unconditional jus soli rule (as in the classic immigration countries) but always in combination with certain residence requirements of the parents. Interestingly, in tying jus soli citizenship to an eight-year legal residence of a parent, Germany’s jus soli rule is more expansive than that currently in place in most West European states, which— like the Netherlands since 1953, Spain since 1954, or Belgium since 1985— require that one parent also be born in the country (the so-called double jus soli, which was pioneered by France in 1889). However, the German jus soli citizenship is in another respect more restrictive than parallel provisions in Western Europe, because—in response to a massive conservative campaign against dual citizenship—at majority age a choice is required between one’s German jus soli and one’s additional jus sanguinis citizenship. A second element of de-ethnicized citizenship, less visible but of no less importance, consists of a liberalization of naturalization, most notably the refusal to make cultural assimilation an individually tested prerequisite of citizenship acquisition. The latter had been a central element of the old German naturalization procedures, according to which the entry into the citizenry of newcomers was always the “exception” and could only occur if there was a “public interest” in this, and which required the “voluntary and permanent orientation to Germany” (which in effect was stating that one had to be ethnoculturally German before being granted German citizenship). With the introduction of as-of-right citizenship for second-generation and long-settled foreigners in 1992, a less demanding, liberal logic has been instituted: the lawmaker explicitly abstained from asking for the cultural “assimilation” of the citizenship applicant; all that was asked for was her “integration,” which was generally presumed to have happened once a threshold of residence time and schooling occurred (Hailbronner and Renner, 2001: 659). Interestingly, the throwing out of the cultural assimilation requirement was initially so radical that even applicants without any knowledge of the German language could in principle be naturalized. This led to the inconsistency that the conditions for being granted a permanent resident permit were more exacting than for the acquisition of citizenship, because the former (but not the latter) required sufficient German language competence. Accordingly, the grand reform of nationality law in 1999 retightened the integration requirements for as-of-right naturalization, in asking for “sufficient knowledge of German language,” as well as for a written “commitment to the liberal democratic order” of the Federal Republic. This, however, was not a return to cultural assimilation. It incorporated the two basic integration requirements that all liberal states today impose on its newcomers: language acquisition and a procedural commitment to liberal-democratic rules (see Joppke and Morawska, 2003: 3–8).
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 73
Abstaining from a cultural assimilation requirement in citizenship acquisition epitomizes a more general abstention of the contemporary liberal state from “high modernist” nation-building (à la Scott, 1998). How typical is the German case? The post-birth acquisition differs from the birthattribution of citizenship in being mostly at the discretion of the administrative state.5 In addition to imposing certain residence, economic, and civic status requirements, the naturalization rules of most states make “societal integration” or an equivalent to it a precondition for being admitted into the citizenry. This criterion is mostly vague and indeterminate, leaving a maximum of discretion to the examining state officer. However, there is a certain trend toward curtailing this requirement. Since UNESCO recommended the replacement of the tainted notion of “assimilation” with that of “integration” in 1959, all Western states have notionally desisted from asking for the cultural assimilation of their immigrants. It would therefore be inconsistent to leave such a request in their citizenship laws. Germany, even in its retightened naturalization rules of 2000, has dropped the notion that a citizenship applicant had to show a “voluntary and permanent orientation to Germany,” asking only for a nationally anonymous, procedural commitment to the “liberal-democratic order” (see Hailbronner and Renner, 2001: 439). Belgium, in its 1985 citizenship reform, reduced the societal integration requirement from being “suited” (idoine) to “volonté d’intégration” (Groot, 1989: 251), that is, from integration as a result (which meant cultural assimilation) to integration as an intention. This weaker, processual notion of integration seems to be gaining ground. Only French nationality law still officially asks for the “assimilation” of her citizenship applicants. Article 31 of the implementing rules explicates this as “le degré de leur assimilation aux moeurs et aux usages de la France et leur connaissance de la langue française”. In this respect, French nationality law lags behind official integration policy, which abandoned the notion of assimilation in favor of integration in 1993 (Haut Conseil, 1993: 8). However, the Conseil d’État, France’s highest administrative court, has narrowly interpreted assimilation in terms of “sufficient knowledge” of the French language (whose definition further depends on the education and social station of the applicant), and it has repeatedly reined in on overshooting magistrates who refused citizenship requests by Muslim immigrants on capricious grounds, such as wearing a veil (see Lagarde, 1997: 131). Even if reduced to certain procedural commitments and proved language competence, the entire criterion of vaguely defined “societal integration” as a precondition of naturalization contradicts the “abstract character” of state membership (Makarov, 1947: 32). Instead, it pushes the latter toward the virtuous citizenship that had been the mark of the former communist states. It is therefore apposite to argue with Gerard de Groot
74 / christian joppke
(1989: 258): “From the point of view of a modern citizenship conception it is not justified to ask new citizens to be better and more virtuous than many persons who have acquired their citizenship through birth.” Finally, a third element of de-ethnicized citizenship is an increasing toleration of dual citizenship. This development is intrinsically linked to the liberalization of access to citizenship, because many states no longer ask citizenship applicants to first divest themselves of their previous citizenship. Dual citizenship breaks with the segmentary logic of the classic nation-state, according to which one could belong to only one state at a time. Witness that the earlier repudiation of dual citizenship likened the latter to “bigamy.” In U.S. Ambassador George Bancroft’s nineteenth-century words, one should “as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries” (quoted in Koslowski, 2000: 206). This has been enshrined in the 1930 Hague Convention’s prescription that “every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only.” Conversely, the toleration of dual citizenship reflects an invasion into the segmentary nation-state domain of the logic of functional differentiation, which endorses and even requires multiple memberships and allegiances.6 This invasion of a functional logic is very visible in the Carnegie Endowment’s case for tolerating dual citizenship: “Empirically, modern nations in overwhelming proportions tolerate or encourage a wide range of competing loyalties and affiliations in civil society—to family, business, local community, religious denominations, sports teams, nongovernmental organizations promoting both political and nonpolitical causes—and do not treat such allegiances . . . as bigamous or as incompatible with . . . loyalty to the nation-state” (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002: 29). From the point of view of receiving states, the toleration of dual citizenship is part of the trend from ethnic toward territorial citizenship, which is driven by these states’ need to integrate their growing immigrant populations. This linkage is explicit in the Council of Europe’s new Nationality Convention of 1997, which justifies the departure from its 1963 predecessor’s strict prohibition of dual nationality in reference to “labor migrations between European States leading to substantial immigrant populations (and) the need for the integration of permanent residents . . .”(Council of Europe, 1997: 23). However, not just immigrant integration but the demand for equality between the sexes has driven liberal states into this direction. To the degree that all postwar Western states have abolished patrilinear descent rules in response to feminist concerns, dual citizenship has become a sociological reality in them, even before this became linked to the immigration problem. . . . and Re-Ethnicization of Citizenship While it signifies a “de-ethnicization” from the point of view of receiving states, dual citizenship entails a “re-ethnicization” from the point of view of
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 75
sending states. For instance, major migrant-sending states such as Turkey or Mexico have recently allowed their emigrants to keep their citizenship (or at least a reduced “nationality” status) when they naturalize elsewhere, in the interest of retaining materially and politically valuable ties with their expatriates. Dual citizenship is thus a prime example of the same global process— increased personal mobility across borders—spurring the “de-” and “re-ethnicization” of involved states. This dynamic is particularly intricate in some European states that are simultaneously migrant-sending and migrantreceiving. Only a few of them have responded asymmetrically, either showing more lenience toward emigrant than immigrant dual citizenship (as in Germany) or—rather curiously—vice versa (as in Belgium). Instead, most European states have taken a symmetric stance, tolerating both emigrant and immigrant dual citizenship, which makes them subject to a simultaneous “de-” and “re-ethnicization” in this respect.7 As Groot (1989: 285) noted the intrinsic connection between both, “(if ) states tolerate dual citizenship for immigrants, it is unreasonable to make their own citizens lose their citizenship of origin when they voluntarily acquire another one.” The potential of re-ethnicization is grounded in the fact that states are not just territorial but membership units. If borders become more permeable and mobility across them increases, this cuts both ways: nonmembers enter; members leave. While the entering of nonmembers, in the contemporary context of universal human rights, triggers the de-ethnicization of the liberal state, the leaving of members unleashes an opposite dynamic of re-ethnicization. Much as the de-ethnicization trend, which revolves around the territorial nature of the state, re-ethnicization cuts across the “ethnic” versus “civic” distinction known from the nations and nationalism literature, as it is grounded in the ascriptive membership component of the state. All states are “ethnic” in the sense that birth is the usual way of becoming a member of a state: “states are primarily communities of descent,” concede two advocates of liberal citizenship policies for an “age of migration” (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002: 14). There are two moments in which the descent-based, ethnic quality of the state becomes visible: when nonmembers enter, and when members leave. With regard to the first, nonmembers can never join the citizenry at their discretion, but have to undergo a “naturalization”; its Latin root word nasci (to be born) indicates the quasi-genealogical quality of all postbirth entries into the citizenry too. In turn, members who leave the territory of the state, even for extended periods, do not thereby lose their membership. The state moves with its members, and even beyond its territory it continues to exert a “personal sovereignty” over its citizens.8 Moreover, the ethnic quality of the state qua membership unit is revealed in the fact that all states, even those that are most deeply committed to civic-territorial principles, allow their members to transmit the good of membership to their offspring born abroad, jure sanguinis.9
76 / christian joppke
There is nothing new about the re-ethnicizing thrust of retaining links with members abroad. To retain ties with the Auslandsdeutsche, which had previously lost their German citizenship after only ten years of living abroad, had been the impetus behind the archetype of an ethnic citizenship law, the Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 1913. What is distinct about the current situation is that there are simultaneously severe new constraints on how far states can go in this direction, while certain old constraints—most notably a rejection of dual citizenship—are crumbling, so that the revaluation of states as space transcending membership units can take on a surprisingly contemporary note. With respect to contemporary constraints on re-ethnicization, the state’s parallel inclination to be inclusive to nonmembers on their territory and the liberal norms that frame this inclusion set limits on any desire to be ethnically inclusive with respect to members abroad. A little noticed but highly significant side effect of the recent introduction of jus soli elements in German citizenship was to put limits on the possibility to transmit German citizenship outside the country, jure sanguinis. Previously, there was no generational stopping point whatsoever to this transmission abroad.10 The demand to “reduce the automatic inheritability of German citizenship in cases of a lacking relationship to the state territory” (quoted in Hailbronner and Renner, 2001: 357) was first raised by the SPD within the Asylum Compromise of 1992, underscoring the significance of the latter for reducing the ethnic while strengthening the civic-territorial contours of the German state. However, only the citizenship law of 1999 introduced such a stopping point for extra-territorial citizenship transmission in terms of the second (“grandchild”) generation born abroad. Their German citizenship is no longer automatic, but conditional upon their parents’ declaration of the fact of birth to a German consulate or embassy within a tight time limit. With this reform Germany adjusted to international standard practice, according to which citizenship should express a “genuine connection” between an individual and her state.11 And, the state being fixed to a territory, a “genuine connection” is obviously more likely to be established within than beyond the state’s borders. If one surveys the regulations of the loss of membership across contemporary states, one is struck by their huge variation, even among states that have taken similarly harsh lines on limiting the transmission of citizenship abroad. In the United States, according to the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, a foreign-born child can be American only when both parents are U.S. citizens and at least one of them had habitually resided in the United States since his or her birth. In the United Kingdom, according to the 1981 Nationality Act, a child born abroad can be British only when at least one parent derived her citizenship not by filiation alone (see Lagarde,
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 77
1984: 483). In the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and France, the first foreign-born emigrant generation can lose its filiation-based citizenship when continuing to stay abroad for a certain period (Groot, 1989: 290–295). No such rules for losing one’s citizenship when residing abroad over long periods exist in other European states, Britain included. When acquiring another citizenship, Dutch law always requires the loss of one’s Dutch citizenship; in Germany and Italy, the loss of one’s citizenship of origin is contingent upon giving up one’s domestic residence status, that is, domestic residents can acquire a second citizenship; in Spain, three years of residence abroad must lapse before one’s citizenship of origin is withdrawn for naturalizing elsewhere. And so on. The cross-national variety of rules on the loss of citizenship abroad is astounding, and it defies easy categorization. However, underneath a highly diverse treatment of the cutting, retaining, or recovering of ties with expatriates, there seems to be an informal consensus among contemporary states that beyond the second foreign-born generation of expatriates the ties of membership should either cease to exist or, where they have been cut already, they should not be recoverable in a preferential way. Having said this, the above cited examples suggest that the informal second-generation cap12 on ties with members abroad is not fully exhausted in many contemporary states, not even in those with longstanding emigrant traditions. The reasons for this are manifold and often idiosyncratic. One generic break though has been the traditional hostility toward dual citizenship in the international state system, which has only recently given away to its pragmatic toleration. One also has to see that the “emigrant” has always been a twisted figure in the nation-state imagination, and her image of carrying the national torch abroad has competed with that of traitor to the national cause—in major emigrant-sending, young nationstates such as Turkey or Mexico the negative view prevailed until most recently.13 To the degree that the withering of nationalist interstate rivalry has removed a lingering source of ambiguity surrounding the emigrant, one can observe a growing assertiveness with respect to the sustenance or recovery of ties with emigrant communities abroad. In this respect, the current situation has provided a new opening for re-ethnicization that did not exist in the past. As we shall see, the justification of re-ethnicized citizenship thus takes on a surprisingly contemporary note, invoking themes of the lesser importance of space, distance, and state borders in a global age of timespace compression and increased cross-border mobility. This has set the scene for increasing clashes between the forces of de- and re-ethnicization, particularly in states that are marked by simultaneous immigration and emigration experiences and legacies. The following examples from France, Italy, and Spain shall show14 that in a number of European states recent episodes of citizenship reform have been moments in which the forces of
78 / christian joppke
de- and re-ethnicization have come to a head. While the affinity between de-ethnicization and the political left has already been demonstrated in the German case, the three cases discussed in the following show that re-ethnicization has unfailingly been the project of the political right. The French reform of citizenship in 1993, passed under a Gaullist government, has come to be known for taking away automatic citizenship at majority age from the France-born children of foreign immigrants, making the award of citizenship contingent upon their expressed “volonté” to become French. This focus on volonté was a brilliant rhetorical move by the political right because it allowed an ethnic suspicion (i.e., that North African migrants were not assimilating in the same way as the European immigrants of the past) to be dressed in unmistakably nonethnic Republican cloth, in invoking Renan’s famous definition of citizenship as a “plebiscite of everyday.”15 A little-noticed but important side plot in this drama was the strengthening of jus sanguinis citizenship for French expatriates, which occurred entirely outside of any “Republican” discourse. The bashing of the immigrant and the embracing of the emigrant bears the signature of the political right. On the part of French expatriates, who are formally represented by “Senators for the French Abroad” in the upper house of Parliament (Sénat), a long-standing bone of contention had been provisions in the nationality law that either took away (Article 95) or withheld (Article 144) descentbased citizenship from certain foreign-born children of French emigrants— the condition for this abrogation or denial of citizenship being that their parents had not resided in France for fifty years and that neither parents nor the offspring in question had a “possession d’état de français.”16 Though consistent with the statist-territorial conception of French citizenship, these were undeniably “odious” provisions, which had caused a good deal of individual hardship.17 On their basis, even someone born and raised in France could be stripped of her citizenship, if after emigrating she did not bother to make contact with a French consulate (no legal duty this) over a fifty-year stretch—not to mention that her offspring would thus forfeit her filiationbased citizenship too. The 1993 reform allowed these (first- or secondgeneration) offspring of French emigrants to reclaim French citizenship through simple declaration, yet with the proviso that they could demonstrate “manifest ties of a cultural, professional, economic, or familial order (with France)” (according to the new Article 21–14 of the Code Civil). This was a smallish measure, of which less than 100 French expatriates made use between 1995 and 1997 (Baudet-Caille, 2000: 58). Yet the combination of strengthening jus sanguinis citizenship for expatriates with restricting jus soli citizenship for domestic immigrants made it a symbolically charged affair.18 In a Socialist critic’s eye, this combination revealed the
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 79
existence on the Gaullist side of “a certain conception of the ethnic nation, a conception that we condemn absolutely.”19 This was even admitted on the Gaullist side, in their loud and clear rejection of an amendment that would have treated immigrants and emigrants in a symmetric way. This amendment, proposed by a maverick Gaullist, Pierre Mazeaud, in the National Assembly (the lower house of Parliament), would have made citizenship for the second-generation descendants of French emigrants (more precisely, for the offspring of one French parent abroad who was him-or herself born abroad)20 contingent upon their expressed “volonté” around majority age.21 Next to the different foreign(er)-born generations to which this measure was to apply (“first” in the case of immigrants; “second” in the case of emigrants), there was of course one decisive difference in the proposed treatment of both groups: the immigrant did not possess French citizenship before expressing her “volonté,” whereas the emigrant was French at birth jure sanguinis yet risked losing her citizenship if she did not express her “volonté” between the age of sixteen to twenty-one. No wonder that this caused the united wrath of the “Senators for the French Abroad,” and under their pressure the amendment had to be withdrawn. Yet what was more interesting matter was that the Senate commission that recommended the suppression of the amendment denied that both groups should be treated symmetrically: in its view, it was not “acceptable to submit young French born abroad to an obligatory formality . . . like the one that is asked of young foreigners who are born in France of foreign parents.”22 As a communist senator remarked critically, this view established a “net difference” between both groups: a French by descent was “more French” than a young foreigner born in France and residing in France since her birth. To which the Gaullist side emphatically responded: “Mais oui!,” “Par definition!”23 In this small but noteworthy moment the rightist forces of re-ethnicization prevailed over the leftist forces of de-ethnicization.24 In 1998, when under a Socialist prime minister the automaticity of jus soli for second-generation immigrants at majority age was reinstated (though in weakened form), in an equally little known backstage drama the ethnic emigrant lobby on the right tried to further strengthen the ties with later-generation expatriates abroad. According to their proposal, the “manifest ties” proviso as a condition for recovering French citizenship was to be dropped, while this recovery was to be based on filiation alone, even into the second foreign-born generation, the only constraint being a “sufficient knowledge of the French language.” Under the new left majority, catcalls drowned this amendment: “Ça, c’est vraiment archaïque!” exclaimed a Socialist member of the National Assembly in the moment of the suppression of the amendment.25 The 1992 reform of Italian citizenship law, passed under ChristianDemocratic Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, had a similar gist of embracing
80 / christian joppke
emigrants and bashing immigrants. In a striking difference, however, there was not even any verbal opposition by the left. Surely, in a country that had seen some 26 million of its inhabitants emigrating between 1876 and 1976, and whose ethnic-origin community abroad is estimated at 50 million, emigrant concerns had always been an important matter. Tellingly, the career of the 1992 Citizenship Law (Law Number 91) began with a December 1998 draft bill by then minister of foreign affairs, Giulio Andreotti, who a few weeks earlier had chaired a national meeting of the Italian emigrant community in Rome (see Pastore, 2001: 113, fn. 26). As in all recent European attempts to bolster ties with emigrants abroad, the range of the respective provisions in the 1992 Italian citizenship law was inconspicuous, and taken alone they would have hardly raised an eyebrow. The law merely extended some emigrant-friendly measures that had already characterized its 1912 predecessor: the second-generation descendants of Italian expatriates were given the option of Italian citizenship “by choice,”26 if certain conditions applied—such as service in the Italian army, employment by the state (even abroad), or a two-year residence in Italy at majority age. A probably wider circle of potential re-migrants was addressed in a parallel reduction of the minimum residence for discretionary naturalization from five to three years. At the same time, the de facto permission of dual citizenship under the 1912 law was upgraded into an explicit permission. This was not exactly a revolution: the recognition of dual citizenship corresponded to the international trend; the second-generation threshold of citizenship for the foreign-born was not transcended; and the potential of ethnic migration was further reduced by a prior residence requirement in most categories, which made would-be ethnic migrants subject to the normal immigration controls. As in France, the particular venom of this measure consisted of a parallel tightening of immigrants’ access to citizenship, which was a simple result of the conservative parties holding the political majority at the time. First, the minimum residence time for naturalization was doubled, from five to a hefty ten years. Second, Italian-born children of immigrants were given the option of Italian citizenship only if they resided in Italy until the age of majority “without interruption.”27 Without bothering to justify why the immigrants had to suffer when the emigrants were handed out a benefit, a Christian-Democratic senator flatly stated: “Then there is the problem of the immigrants. We have adopted a rather generous regime with respect to the extracomunitari . . . (B)ut it is clear that . . . we have to bestow on our co-citizens (i nostril concittadini) a favorable treatment. The ties with Italy by emigrants on all continents . . . are so strong that they maintain themselves across several generations.”28 When the bill was adopted in the Camera dei Deputati (the lower house of Parliament), the leader of the
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 81
Socialist faction meekly gave in: “Surely, there are open questions (for example, the ten year residence requirement for the extracomunitari), but we are altogether convinced that now is not the moment to start this type of discussion.”29 In fact, the bill passed its last hurdle in the lower house without a single “no” vote, with even the Socialists and Communists voting in its favor. If one peruses the justifications given for privileging i nostri concittadini abroad in the 1992 Citizenship Law, one is struck by their contemporarysounding note, invoking themes of globalism and transnationalism, plus a quite ferocious antistatism. According to Senator Mazzola (the ChristianDemocratic rapporteur of the bill), this measure responded to a desire of “our foreign communities . . . to increase and strengthen their ties with the mother country within an international community of increasingly rapid, continuous, and dense communications, dialogue, and relationships.”30 The bill’s Christian-Democratic supporters were anxious to stress that this was not a “politico-nationalist” projection of the Italian state abroad but instead a measure of purely “cultural recognition,” driven by a “vision of the world that transcends the identity of nation-states.”31 In Italy, this was really an old theme because “in catholic political thinking the nation is prior to the State,” as another Christian-Democratic Senator put it.32 Along more contemporary lines, the affirmation of dual citizenship in this law was celebrated as “burying the idea of the State as the only God to whom one owes total and unconditional loyalty.”33 Indeed, the entire debate was permeated by an astonishing (though very Italian) amount of state-bashing by the legislative branch of this very state. Interestingly, the motif of an “ethical obligation” to those who had suffered hardship for helping to “keep up the name of Italy in the world,” while not absent, was clearly secondary to the “interest of our national community . . . to retain the tie of citizenship that has an important sentimental and cultural value, beyond its juridical aspects.”34 In short, this was a measure to strengthen the sense of Italian nationness, separate from and beyond the state, in a world of increased mobility and movement across borders. Epitomizing the left-right divide behind the de- versus re-ethnicization contest, leftist governments under Prodi and Amato in the late 1990s sought to undo the hard line on citizenship for foreigners. Prodi established a Commission for Integration Policy that recommended conditional jus soli citizenship for the children of immigrants and other measures to facilitate ordinary foreigners’ access to citizenship (Pastore, 2001: 108–109). However, a first concrete reform proposal by the minister for social solidarity in the Amato government, which was presented in December 2000,35 was never carried any further, and it became irrelevant after the centerright’s election victory in May 2001. Instead, under Berlusconi the concerns
82 / christian joppke
of i nostri connazionali gained new prominence. This is expressed in the addition to the plethora of Italian state ministries of a “Ministry for Italians Around the World,” which is headed by a member of the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale and ancient veteran of Mussolini’s “Salo” government, Mirko Tremaglia. In addition to soliciting a law that allows Italian citizens abroad to vote in national elections, Tremaglia’s major success so far lies in extending ethnic privileges from citizenship to immigration policy. Note that the ethnic privileges in the 1992 citizenship law were granted in a context of “reduced migratory flows” and the “stabilization of our communities abroad”;36 they were not meant to stir immigration. After the recent economic collapse of Argentina, which saw scores of ethnic Italians line-up for Italian citizenship, this has changed.37 At the behest of Tremaglia, the new immigration law of 2002, which is harsh on extracomunitari in any other respect, promptly includes a quota for “workers of Italian origin.”38 Spain is a third case in which recent citizenship reforms have been moments of contestation between the forces of de- and re-ethnicization on the left and right, respectively, though with an interesting twist. For a country of emigration Spain has always been hostile to dual citizenship, as a result of which Spanish emigrants faced severe difficulties in retaining or transmitting their citizenship abroad.39 Only for a brief moment in the 1980s, and characteristically at the behest of a conservative government, Spanish emigrants were allowed to acquire a foreign citizenship without losing the Spanish one.40 This was rescinded by a Socialist government in 1990, whose less protective attitude toward Spaniards abroad was tellingly accompanied by a stronger emphasis on integrating immigrants at home. Throughout the 1990s the Socialists tightly policed the dual citizenship frontier for emigrants, and in turn they were attacked by the conservative Popular Party (PP) for “making the return of Spanish emigrants intentionally more difficult.”41 While the respective regulations have greatly fluctuated over two nationality reforms in 1990 and 1995, the Socialist government’s line on the descendants of emigrants who had lost their citizenship was generally less than generous: the emigrants’ hijos (children) were subject to a one-year residence requirement before they could recover Spanish citizenship, while their nietos (grandchildren) were even relegated to the same naturalization procedures as ordinary immigrants. The newest reform of nationality law, passed by a conservative PP government in 2002, is all about remedying the emigrants’ plight, which became a burning issue with the recent economic crisis in Latin America. The law waives the residence requirement for the hijos, reduces the residence period for the nietos to one year, and generally allows emigrants to hold two nationalities. Consonant with the typical left-right divide in the reform of citizenship law, the Socialist opposition entered the fray with a
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 83
counterproposal that would have eased domestic immigrants’ access to citizenship, most notably through granting jus soli citizenship to the children of legal immigrants.42 This was easily rebuffed by the PP government, because a conditional form of jus soli for second-generation immigrants already existed in Spain.43 More interesting than the predictable wrangle between emigrant and immigrant causes was the fact that the Socialists were in a double-bind: most second—and third-generation—emigrants who would profit from the new law were the descendants of civil war exiles, whose citizenship had been taken away from them under General Franco. More than reaffirming the ethnic bonds of the nation in a global era, Italian-style, the 2002 reform of Spanish nationality law could thus be seen as a matter of correcting a historical injustice. This dimension of the law, which was entirely absent in the first PP proposal presented in March 2001,44 was pushed to the fore by the Mexican exile movement “Morados,” which lobbied the Spanish king in a signature campaign. Given the age profile of the descendants of civil war exiles, the Morados brought the nietos (grandchildren) into the debate, who had been absent from the original bill.45 The Socialists and the extreme Left (Izquierda Unida), political descendants of the losers of the civil war, naturally joined the Morados’ (though unsuccessful in the end) quest for exempting the nietos also from any residence requirement.46 Curiously, if the left eventually rejected the 2002 law,47 they did so not only because of the law’s blind eye on immigrants, but also because it was not deemed generous enough to emigrants. Of all recent moves on European states’ emigration frontier the Spanish one has the biggest migration potential: the Spanish Foreign Ministry estimates that the 2002 reform of nationality law has put about one million descendants of Spanish emigrants on a fast track to Spanish citizenship.48 This, however, reflects a unique political history and a prior overshooting zeal in cutting the citizenship ties of emigrants. Spain is no exemption from the informal consensus across contemporary states that the ties of membership should not stretch beyond the second generation of emigrants born abroad. In this one sees the workings of the international norm of citizenship as a territorial construct that should express a “genuine connection” between individual and state (see Orentlicher, 1998). Only where the formal citizenship tie was prematurely cut do we see past emigration as a source of contemporary ethnic migration. This does not diminish the re-ethnicizing thrust of emigration: to the degree that dual citizenship restrictions are weakening around the world, and emigration is unambiguously valued as a political and economic asset by sending states, global mobility is bound to revalorize these states’ non-territorial, ethnic dimension as membership units.
84 / christian joppke
Conclusion Tied to a territory and based on a personal infrastructure that reproduces itself intergenerationally, the modern state is a fundamentally dualistic institution, being territorial and ethnic at the same time. Contemporary globalizing processes impinge on both dimensions simultaneously and in different directions, creating possibilities for the de- and re-ethnicization of the state and its underlying notion of membership. It is this ambivalence and bidirectional possibility, as well as the different articulations according to who is in charge in a given time and place (the left or the right), which is missed by the linear and depoliticized accounts of the coming of postnational membership or of the resilience of national traditions of citizenship. As a territorial unit, contemporary globalizing processes move the state to be more inclusive of the migrant populations residing on its territory, launching a trend toward de-ethnicized citizenship. As a membership unit, the same globalizing processes provide the state with a counter-narrative for being more inclusive of its members abroad, because space and territory are now considered less relevant for retaining a sense of belonging and for building community. This is the one insight of the “transnationalism” literature that has apparently been heeded by the institution that is often believed to be circumvented and weakened by this phenomenon, the state. If migrant transnationalism is indeed a leftist “globalization from below” (A. Portes), the state’s incorporation of transnational rhetoric amounts to a piracy by the right, considering that the emigrant cause is overwhelmingly carried by conservative parties and governments. Which trend prevails, the emigrant cause of the right or the immigrant cause of the left, is most often a simple function of who has the political majority. However, there are severe limitations in how far a state can go in reethnicizing its membership, and these limitations are constituted by the irremediably territorial nature of the state. Since the famous Nottebohm case, the international system prescribes a citizenship that expresses a “genuine connection” between a person and a state, and short of actual residence such a connection is difficult to establish, especially across generations. And, this is the message of the German experience, the very incorporation of elements of territorial citizenship, which is commanded by the democracy principle and human rights considerations, has set limits to the possibility of transmitting citizenship abroad across the generations. All contemporary moves toward re-ethnicizing citizenship have thus remained within a second generation born abroad maximum, as a result of which ethnic citizenship shades into a recognition of family ties that are the incontrovertible building block of all human societies. The “de-” versus “re-ethnicization” contrast lacks the neat simplicity of the “national traditions of citizenship” or “postnational membership”
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 85
formulas. Instead it demarcates the range of variation within which contemporary citizenship debates and transitions occur. This is not to say that all states are equally affected by the dynamic depicted here. The very notion of de-ethnicization presupposes an ethnic closure of the citizenry at an earlier point, which in terms of predominantly jus sanguinis citizenship never existed in the unconditional jus soli regimes of Canada or the United States.49 Conversely, the lack of an emigration legacy in settler states makes the latter immune to the temptations of re-ethnicization, and the very concept of a co-national without citizenship (a “patrial” in British parlance), which is central to all re-ethnicizing campaigns, is nonexistent in them. In the strict sense the de- versus re-ethnicization notion works best for European states, in which ethnic citizenship jure sanguinis had once been the norm, epitomizing modern nation-stateness, and in which the territorializing move away from it is counteracted by long-standing emigration legacies that are surprisingly compatible with the contemporary rhetoric of globalism and transnationalism. And even within Europe it is obvious that the de-ethnicization trend has been stronger in its northwestern corner, reflecting the stronger presence of long-established migrant populations there, while the re-ethnicization trend has been more marked in the southwest, due to its predominantly emigrant past and a much more recent transformation into an immigrant-receiving region (with the exception of France). Important as they are, these cross-national variations cannot detract from the more general point about the transformation of citizenship as state membership that has been suggested here. Rather than prejudging national identities or reflecting traditions of nationhood, jus sanguinis and jus soli are flexible legal mechanisms that are grounded in the dual nature of the state as ethnic and territorial units, and political elites have not hesitated to manipulate these mechanisms if they saw a need or interest in doing so. Grosso modo, the political left has pushed toward de-ethnicization, whereas the right has pushed toward the re-ethnicization of citizenship. The fact that both projects are compatible with, and even reinforced by, contemporary globalizing and transnational processes and rhetoric guarantees that the deversus re-ethnicizing dynamic will shape citizenship in the years to come, in Europe and beyond. While they are opposite in terms of constituent groups and political thrust, de- and re-ethnicization have the joint effect of enlarging the circle of those who have access to citizenship. Contrary to Makarov’s (1947) classic diction of the “abstract character” of state membership, we saw that the latter has increasingly been couched as a “right” itself, be it for immigrants or for (the descendants of ) emigrants. Turning the access to citizenship into a “right,” which is part and parcel of a rights revolution for aliens (see Soysal, 1994; Joppke, 2001), is intrinsically connected to the hollowing-out
86 / christian joppke
of the content of citizenship, particularly of its redistributive side, and of what “rights” in general are deemed to legitimately consist of (see Abraham, 2002). The rights of citizens once were “positive” rights, conceded through the blood of war, the sweat of work, and the tears of reproduction.50 If everybody has rights, the content of rights is bound to become “negative” only. The nexus between inclusive citizenship and procedurally thinned rights for everyone is unsurpassedly expressed in the 14th Amendment of the American Constitution, which manages to pair a maximally inclusive jus soli definition of citizenship with a list of negative “due process” and “equal protection” rights for all “persons,” independently of their citizenship status. This was a glimpse of the neoliberal fut ure, marked by the decay of substantive citizen rights and the rise of constitutional rights for everyone. The noise of the de- versus re-ethnicizing contest masks the secular decline of the entire citizenship construct. But this is the subject of another, more important story. Notes 1. This article was written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation in New York (2002–2003). I would like to thank the Foundation for superb working conditions. This is the reprint of the article that is published in the Archives Européennes de Sociologie (2003), 44 (3): 429–458. 2. For a general assessment of the role of “ambivalence” in the social sciences, see Smelser (1998). 3. There are multiple contemporary examples of a noncongruence of formal state membership and full citizenship rights. For instance, Puerto Ricans are U.S. “nationals,” but not “citizens”; Mexico recently introduced a distinction between “nationality” and “citizenship” to retain ties with its emigrants abroad, and so on. 4. In the case of postcommunist Eastern Europe, it is not international law but their interest in joining the European Union that has moved the states in the region to cut the roughest edges of their ethnically exclusive citizenship laws. 5. With respect to citizenship law, one must distinguish between two types of state discretion: legislative and administrative discretion. Because at the international level citizenship law falls under the domaine reservé of the sovereign state (see Makarov, 1947: 70), the lawmaker is generally free to regulate citizenship as it sees fit. However, within citizenship law the naturalization procedure is “discretionary” in yet a more extreme sense, as even when certain minimal conditions are met on the part of the applicant the state may still refuse a request. By the same token, Brubaker’s (1989: 108–112) distinction between “as of right” naturalization (in the United States and Canada) and “discretionary” naturalization (in Europe) is overdrawn, because even on the “as of right” end there is still a considerable amount of state discretion (e.g., through the inherently vague “good character” clause in the United States). 6. For the distinction between segmentary and functional differentiation, see Luhmann, 1982. 7. This last group of states includes France, Britain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 87 8. “Personal sovereignty” in international law means that the state may unilaterally grant rights to and impose obligations on its members, even outside its territory (Hailbronner and Renner, 2001: 83). 9. But see Lagarde (1984) for important variations of the length and modalities of transmitting citizenship abroad. 10. Except the prohibition of dual citizenship according to Article 25.1 of the old (and new) citizenship law, whose exceptions in Article 25.2 were tightly policed. 11. “Genuine connection” is the notion coined in the International Court of Justice’s famous Nottebohm decision of 1955, according to which the absence of a “genuine connection” forfeited a state’s right of diplomatic protection. The notion has since been redeployed within a human rights context, referring to a state’s duty to confer citizenship on people in their territory who have a “genuine connection” to that state (see Orentlicher, 1998: 320). 12. If one counts the actual emigrants as “first” generation, the informal cap in question is a “third”-generation cap. Here and in the following, the notion of “second” generation will refer to the second foreign-born generation. 13. In pre-1989 Eurasia, a variant of this was to consider emigrants (as “exiles”), traitors to the communist cause. 14. All of these countries are admittedly classified in a Council of Europe report on “Europeans Living Abroad” (1999: 8) as “proactively” courting their emigrant communities abroad, in contrast to the “laissez-faire” approach prevailing in northern Europe. However, the report also states that to the degree that there is movement across these categories, it moves from “laissez-faire” toward a more “proactive” approach. 15. On the reverse, the left was now forced to define Republican citizenship in rather un-Renanian terms as “appartenance,” sociological rather than will-based belonging that shared its objectivistic thrust with the abhorred ethnic citizenship on the other side of the Rhine (see Weil, 1997 as the central document of grounding Republican citizenship in “appartenance” rather than “volonté ”). 16. The “possession d’état de français” is a sociological concept with juridicial consequences: someone is considered French by public authorities on the basis of a valid passport, electoral registration, inscription in a French consulate, or any other contact with French authorities. Conversely, a person living abroad who fails to renew his passport or make contact with French authorities in any other way over a period exceeding ten years loses his or her “possession d’état de français” (see Lagarde, 1997: 116). 17. See the statement by Jacques Habert, Senator for the French Abroad, Senat, Séance du June 16, 1993: 1376. 18. See Lagarde’s (1993: 558) critique of the “totally exorbitant” preferencing of jus sanguinis over traditional jus soli in the 1993 reform of nationality law. 19. Statement by Jean-Luc Melenchon, Senat, Seance du June 15, 1993: 1304. 20. Limiting this measure to children of one French parent betrays the intention to treat emigrants and immigrants symmetrically with respect to volonté— immigrant children with one French parent, after all, were French jure sanguinis. 21. Assemblée Nationale, Second Session of May 12, 1993: 419. The Mazeaud amendment resembled closely a recommendation of the Long Commission (1998: 178–180).
88 / christian joppke 22. Quoted ibid., p. 103. 23. Ibid. 24. Note that the Socialists and Communists also voted against the Mazeaud amendment, but with the broader intent of rejecting “elective” nationality for all groups, the immigrants included. 25. M. Gérard Gouzes, in: Assemblée Nationale, third session of February 10, 1998: 1438. 26. Citizenship “by choice” means as-of-right citizenship, without the need to naturalize, established by mere declaration of the entitled individual. 27. Previously no such continuous residence was required for second-generation immigrants born in Italy. 28. Senator Toth, in: Senato della Repubblica, 10th Legislature, 524th Session, May 23, 1991: 524. 29. Silvia Barbieri, Camera dei Deputati, 10th Legislature, First Commission, Meeting of January 9, 1992: 79. 30. Senator Mazzola, Senato della Repubblica, 10th Legislature, Disegni di legge e relazioni, documenti 1460 e 1850-A: 41. 31. Senator Mazzola, Senato della Repubblica, 10th Legislature, 524th Session, May 23, 1991: 15. 32. Senator Toth, Senato della Repubblicca, 10th Legistature, 524th Session, May 23, 1991: p. 43. 33. Senator Strik Lievers, Senato della Repubblicca, 10th Legislature, 524th Session, May 23, 1991: p. 10. 34. Senator Mazzola, Senato della Repubblica, 10th Legislature, Documents 1460 and 1850-A., July 31, 1989. 35. “Piu facile diventare italiani,” la Repubblica, December 22, 2000: 1. 36. Senator Mazzola, Senato della Repubblica, 10th Legislature, desegni di legge e relazioni, documenti 1460 e 1850-A: 4. 37. “Argentina, la fuga degli italiani,” la Repubblica, January 11, 2002: 19. 38. “Italian origin” is defined in Article 17 of the new immigration law as having at least a “third-degree (Italian) ancestor in the direct line” (Senato della Repubblica, 14th Legislature, Disegno di legge no. 795-B). 39. The only exceptions to this are the dual nationality regimes with LatinAmerican states. 40. This was also an answer to the post-Francoist constitutional principles that Spaniards of origin could not be deprived of Spanish citizenship (Article 11.2) and that the state had to safeguard the rights of emigrants abroad and further their return (Article 42.3). 41. Statement by Fraga Egusquiaguirre (PP) during the parliamentary debate surrounding the 1990 reform of nationality law (Diario de Sesiones del Senado, no. 38, October 17, 1990: 1949–1981). 42. “La reforma del Codigo Civil sobre nacionalidad se hara por consenso,” El Pais, February 2002. 43. “El PP rechaza que hijos de inmigrantes regulares sean espanoles al nacer,” El Pais, May 24, 2002. 44. Boletin Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, VII Legislatura, Proposicion de Ley: Modification del Codigo Civil en materia de
citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization / 89
45. 46.
47. 48. 49. 50.
nacionalidad. No. 122–1, Presentada por el Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Congreso, March 16, 2001. “Hijos y nietos de emigrantes y exiliados podran pedir la nacionalidad sin ningun limite de edad,” El Pais, May 18, 2002. A further unsuccessful request was to grant to the descendants of emigrants the equivalent of an originally attributed (rather than later acquired) citizenship. This is an important distinction because Spaniards by birth enjoy certain immunities that naturalized Spaniards do not enjoy (such as the impossibility of being stripped of their citizenship). The PSOE abstained during the final vote; the IU voted against the law. Around 850,000 of those live in Latin America (400,000 in Argentina, 200,000 in Venezuela, 100,000 in Mexico, and 80,000 in Cuba). “Mehr Nachwuchs für Spanien,” Neue fürcher Zeitung, January 28, 2003. However, all settler states had racially exclusive naturalization rules in the first half of the twentieth century. For the distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights, see Berlin, 1969.
References Abraham, David (2002), Citizenship Solidarity and Rights Individualism, The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California-San Diego, Working Paper no. 53. Aleinikoff, Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer (2002), Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Bartolini, Stefano (2000), The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Baudet-Caille, Véronique (2000), La nationalité française, Paris: Editions ASH. Berlin, Isaiah (1969), “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Isaiah Berlin (ed.) Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brubaker, Rogers (1989), “Citizenship and Naturalization,” in Rogers Brubaker (ed.) Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, Lanham: University Press of America. –––––– (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Council of Europe (1997), European Convention on Nationality and Explanatory Report, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, European Treaty Series No. 166. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly) (1994), Europeans Living Abroad, Strabourg, Council of Europe, Doc. 7078. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly) (1999), Links Between European, Living Abroad and Their Countries of Origin, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Doc. 8339. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly) (2004), Europeans Living Abroad, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Doc. 7078. Ferrajoli, Luigi (1994), “Dai diritti del cittadino ai diritti della persona,” in Danilo Zolo, (ed.) La Cittadinanza, Rome and Bari: Laterza. Giddens, Anthony (1994), Beyond Left and Right, Cambridge: Polity Press.
90 / christian joppke Glick Schiller, Nina (1999), “Transmigrants and Nation-States,” in Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz and Josh DeWind (eds.) Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Gosewinkel, Dieter (2001), Einbürgern und Ausschliessen, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Groot, Gérard-René de (1989), Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht im Wandel, Cologne: Carl HeymannsVerlag. Hailbronner, Kay and Günter Renner (2001), Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, Munich: C.H. Beck. Haut Conseil À L’Integration (1993), L’intégration à la française, Paris: La Documentation française. Herz, John (1957), “The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” World Politics, 9, pp. 473–493. Isin, Engin and Bryan Turner (eds.) (2002), Handbook of Citizenship Studies, London: Sage. Joppke, Christian (2000), “Mobilization of Culture and the Reform of Citizenship Law,” in Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds.) Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——— (2001), “The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights,” Comparative Political Studies, 34, 4, pp. 339–366. Joppke, Christian and Ewa Morawska (2003), “Integrating Immigrants in Liberal States: Policies and Practices,” in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (eds.) Toward Assimilation and Citizenship, London: Palgrave. Koslowski, Rey (2000), “Demographic Boundary Maintenance in World Politics,” in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (eds.) Identities, Borders, Orders, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kymlicka, Will (2002), Territorial Boundaries, Typescript. Lagarde, Paul (1984), “Nationalité et filiation,” in Michel Verwilghen (ed.) Nationalité etstatut personnel, Bruxelles: Bruylant. ——— (1993), “La nationalité française rétrécie,” Revue critique de droit international privé, 82, 4, pp. 535–563. ——— (1997), La nationalité française, Paris: Dalloz. Long, Marceau (1988), Être français aujourd’hui, Paris: Olivier Orban. Luhmann, Niklas (1982), The Differentiation of Society, New York: Columbia University Press. Makarov, Alexander (1947), Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Orentlicher, Diane (1998), “Citizenship and National Identity,” in David Wippman (ed.) International Law and Ethnic Conflict, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pastore, Ferruccio (2001), “Nationality Law and International Migration: The Italian Case,” in Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (eds.) Towards a European Nationality, London: Palgrave. Scott, James (1998), Seeing Like a State, New Haven: Yale University Press. Smelser, Neil (1998), “The Rational and the Ambivalent in the Social Sciences,” American Sociological Review, 63, 1, pp. 1–15. Soysal, Yasemin (1994), Limits to Citizenship, Chicago