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OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS editors j. maddicott j. harris j. robertson
r. j. w. evans b. ward-perkins r. service p. a. slack
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Migration and Inequality in Germany 1870–1913
OLIVER GRANT
CLARENDON PRESS OXFORD
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With oYces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York ß Oliver Grant 2005 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd. King’s Lynn, Norfolk. ISBN 0-19-927656-0 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
PREFACE This study has its origins in a D.Phil. thesis, ‘Internal Migration in Germany 1870–1913’, which was motivated by the view that migration is the central problem of an industrializing society. The initial stimulus came from a visit to China in the spring of 1995, a visit which reawoke my interest in the process of economic growth and its associated problems and opportunities. This combined with an older fascination with the course of German history to produce the thesis which has now evolved into this book. Comparison is one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of a historian, and one of the themes of this book is that historians should not be timid or reticent about this. They should be prepared to make broad comparisons across time and across continents. They should insist that theirs is a discipline which can contribute to the study of major issues of current concern: the causes of war and peace, economic growth and the creation of modern industrial societies, the foundations of democracy and the establishment of individual rights. If historians turn their backs on these issues, then others will Wll this gap. But, while historians can bring to these subjects the additional perspective which is gained by historical analysis, they should also be aware of the researches on contemporary societies which social scientists are making, and consider the ways that these can bring new perspectives to bear on historical issues. This means confronting the methods that social scientists bring to bear on these issues, in particular modelbuilding and the use of statistical analysis. Both will be used in the chapters that follow. The way that the thesis has evolved into this book has been inXuenced by the experience of designing and teaching a postgraduate course on comparative industrialization at Oxford University, entitled ‘Industrialization in Europe, North America and East Asia since 1700’. I would like to thank Professor Avner OVer for having encouraged me to do this. I also thank those students who have taken the course for many interesting discussions on the problems of industrializing societies. When the problems of Imperial Germany are set in this wider context, it soon becomes apparent that, to a large extent, this was a successful and progressive society, which dealt with the problems of rapid
vi
Preface
industrialization unusually well. It was in many respects the Wrst ‘Modell Deutschland’. I owe thanks to many people who have helped directly and indirectly over the past three years. I have beneWted from exemplary supervision from Professors Charles Feinstein and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann. I have much enjoyed our conversations. I have learnt much from their observations and suggestions. I had the additional good fortune to have had two excellent examiners in Professors Niall Ferguson and Albrecht Ritschl. This work has been considerably improved as a result of their comments. Individual chapters have been read by Anthony Atkinson, Avner OVer, Hans-Joachim Voth, Liam Brunt, James Foreman-Peck, Tom Nicholas, and Eric Grimmer-Solem. I thank all these for their time and attention. I owe much to the library of the London School of Economics. This has a large collection of German statistical materials on open access. I am particularly grateful that the German statistical collection has remained on open access during the rebuilding of the main library. I would like to express my thanks to the staV of the Nuneham Courtenay depository of the Bodleian Library, to Chris Newbould and John Slater. The depository is not well suited to the arrival of visitors with access permits, who sit in corridors and cause obstructions. Their tolerance was much appreciated. I owe thanks to my wife and children, the arrival of the latter having coincided with the beginning of this study. They have provided much diversion and, at times, a necessary sense of proportion. But my Wnal thanks are owed to my farm staV, to Paul Burns, Russell Donovan, and Alan Roberts, who have taken on additional responsibilities while I have been working on this study. It is beyond question that, without their eVorts, this would not have been possible. O.W.G. 18 June 2004
CONTENTS 1. Imperial Germany as an Example of Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
1
2. Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
22
3. The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
56
4. Migration in Germany 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
97
5. Demography and Migration
124
6. Migration, Farm Size, and the Condition of the Agricultural Labourer
181
7. Agricultural Productivity, Labour Surplus, and Migration
215
8. Migration and Urban Labour Markets
253
9. Industrialization, Migration, and Inequality
293
10. Challenging the Kehrite View of Imperial Germany
330
References and Sources
361
Index
389
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1
Imperial Germany as an Example of Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n: ‘A h o use d iv ided’ —M i g r a t i o n a n d I nequa lity in I m p e r i a l G e r m a n y , 1870–1913 ‘A house divided cannot stand’ is Abraham Lincoln’s pre´cis of the issues facing the United States in the Civil War; it can also serve as a summary of the views of a school of German historians, the Kehrite school. The key concept of this school is the ‘primacy of internal politics’: the view that the internal weaknesses of pre-1914 Germany led to a series of expedients which made German foreign policy a disruptive force in pre-1914 European diplomacy, and which prevented the settlement of outstanding disputes by any means short of a general European conXict. The core of this policy was the building of a Xeet large enough to challenge British naval hegemony.1 What were the sources of the internal weakness of Imperial Germany? Historians have produced a list of suggested Xaws in the polity and social structure of Imperial Germany: a series of ‘skirted decisions’ which explain Germany’s failure to make political progress commensurate with its economic advances.2 In this analysis, the fundamental assumption is 1 Kehr’s own work, originally written in the 1930s, is available in English, Kehr (1975) and (1977). Other important works in the Kehrite tradition include Wehler (1969) and (1985), Berghahn (1971), Stegemann (1977), and the collection in Stu¨rmer (1976). The existence of a Kehrite school has been denied by Puhle (1978) and there is some disagreement over what the key Kehrite concept really is; for Eley (1986) it is either ‘the primacy of pre-industrial traditions’, p. 42, or the concept of Sammlungspolitik, p. 111. For the purposes of this study, the key Kehrite concept is the ‘primacy of internal politics’: meaning by this, that the Kaiserreich suVered from internal problems, which had an adverse eVect on foreign policy to an extent which is unusual compared to other states. This last point is rarely made explicitly, but it is important if the concept is to have any genuine force. For a simple statement of this view, see Ro¨hl (1969), 10. 2 The phrase ‘skirted decisions’ is taken from the title of an essay in Mommsen (1995). Mommsen’s work stresses the political crisis produced by the inability of the Bismarckian
2
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
that there were options which, if taken, would have alleviated the social strains and enabled Germany to become a normal, modern, democratic industrial state. And the implication of this is that such a state would have been a more stable and predictable element of the pre-1914 diplomatic order. These ‘skirted decisions’ were not just political and diplomatic: they were derived from a fundamental unwillingness of the ‘pre-industrial’ elites of Imperial Germany to modernize structures and institutions which had their roots in the traditions of an agrarian society.3 This produced a bureaucracy recruited from a narrow and unrepresentative social base, a political system which limited democratic control over the executive, and a social order in which large numbers felt themselves to be excluded or marginalized. In short, an outcome of ‘incomplete modernization’, derived in part from the Bismarckian origins of the Kaiserreich in a ‘revolution from above’. Historians outside the group normally identiWed as Kehrite, or Kehrinspired, have accepted parts of this argument, or put it forward in diVerent guises. The broader concept of a Sammlungspolitik, policies designed to rally ‘loyal’ forces in support of the Imperial government, has replaced Kehr’s narrower emphasis on the trade-oV of agricultural protection for battleship construction. Modern studies place greater stress on social and cultural divisions as the ultimate sources of the weakness of the political structure: the rise of extremist ideas, the isolation of important social strata, and the domination of political parties by economic interest groups. Instead of a conscious ‘Flucht nach Vorn’, an attempt to solve internal problems by foreign policy adventures, more recent studies have set German foreign policy in the context of a society where Social Darwinism had a ‘special resonance’, where ‘chauvinistic bile’ had a ‘broad appeal’, where paciWsm was ‘relatively weak’ and ‘its opposite was correspondingly powerful’. Under these circumstances, the ‘restless, querulous’ nature of German foreign policy, the ‘fatalistic brinkmanship’ of the civilian leadership in the constitution to adapt to changing economic and social conditions, and argues that ‘in July 1914 the ‘‘latent crisis’’ of the German political system spilled over onto the international stage, setting in train a world war’, Mommsen (1995), 204. This can be regarded as a variation on the basic Kehrite theme. 3 According to Wehler (1985), 236, Bismarck, and the ‘Wilhelmine polycracy’ that followed him, were determined to avoid the spread of democracy and moves towards equal rights. The militancy of the property-owning elites, and their determination to preserve their privileges at all costs, is stressed in, for example, Puhle (1976), 341.
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
3
crisis of July 1914, are seen, implicitly or explicitly, as expressions of deeper Xaws.4 This study puts forward an alternative hypothesis: that many of the internal stresses and strains of Imperial Germany were the inevitable consequences of industrialization, and that there was little that German political leaders could have done about this. Even if the political elites had been prepared to make concessions this would not have produced an immediate shift to a more harmonious society: the option of a ‘social market economy’ was not available in pre-1914 circumstances. Instead, the maturing of the industrial economy was a necessary precondition for the attainment of social stability and political maturity. The point that the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy inevitably creates social and political strains is not a new one. Other societies had also experienced these tensions. But the process of industrialization in Germany was diVerent from that in the pioneer industrializing countries because Germany had the advantages, and the disadvantages, of ‘relative backwardness’, as originally pointed out by Alexander Gerschenkron.5 Germany could make use of advanced industrial technology developed elsewhere. This meant that the pace of German industrialization was faster. It meant that the gap between productivity in the mechanized industrial sectors and the traditional sectors (agriculture and handcraft) was much greater. Transfers of labour between these sectors was a major contribution to overall growth. But the same transfers brought about social and institutional disruption. Pre-1914 Germany was the Wrst economy to experience the telescoped process of industrial development typical of those countries which make their way to the front rank of industrial powers having started from a position of relative backwardness. Many historians have noted the rapidity of the process of social and economic transformation in Imperial Germany. But the full implications of this have not been examined.6 One important consequence is that the analysis of German economy in the period needs to make use of concepts and tools taken 4 The quoted phrases are all from Blackbourn (1997), 426, 433, 446, 452, and 459. This is not a work in the Kehrite tradition as it is normally understood, but it is indicative of the way that Kehrite ideas have penetrated the historical mainstream. Works which discuss foreign policy issues in isolation from the domestic context are rare. 5 Gerschenkron (1962); the main pioneer industrializing country was, of course, Great Britain, but France also experienced a prolonged period of relatively slow industrial development, as emphasized by Keyder and O’Brien (1978). 6 One study which has made use of insights from development economics in the analysis of inequality trends in nineteenth-century Germany is Dumke (1991).
4
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from the Weld of development economics. The concept of development economics as a separate branch of economics rests on the idea that ‘relatively backward’ countries face diVerent problems and opportunities to those which arise in more mature economies, or in societies which have a more drawn out period of transition. Much of the analysis which will be presented in this study makes use of ideas whose origins lie in development economics: the ‘Kuznets Curve’ relating income inequality to industrialization; the ‘Lewis Model’ of development under labour surplus conditions. Many societies have found industrialization to be a disruptive process, and the path to maturity has often been a rocky one even for those societies which have successfully made the transition. The problems which Germany faced have reoccurred in other contexts. The historical debate over the pace of political progress relative to economic development in Imperial Germany has a modern counterpart in arguments over the role of authoritarian governments, or ‘Asian values’, in the success of the East Asian ‘newly industrializing countries’ (or NICs). Developmental dictatorships such as the Park regime in South Korea or the Kuomintang government in Taiwan have presided over the initial stages of rapid industrialization, and political liberalization has come later, when the most disruptive phase has been completed.7 It has been argued, by the World Bank amongst others, that an ‘insulated bureaucracy’ is an important component of a successful longterm growth strategy.8 If so, then the alleged backwardness of the German political system may have been advantageous in economic terms: the state was able to focus on long-term goals rather than being obliged, by the pressures of democratic politics, to resort to short-term expedients which had damaging long-term consequences.9 There are now a number of examples of societies which have had authoritarian governments during the early stages of industrialization, and which have successfully managed the transition to democracy once this phase is past. Besides the Korean and Taiwanese cases just cited, there are other examples: Chile post-Pinochet, Spain after Franco, the 7 The role of authoritarian states in economic development in East Asia has been examined in a number of works; see for example Amsden (1989), Amsden (2001), and Wade (1990). 8 World Bank (1994), 167. 9 Many Third World countries have a problem of ‘urban bias’ as a result of policies which were intended to improve urban conditions, but which then create privileged urban elites.
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
5
re-establishment of democracy in Brazil following military rule in the 1960s. Why were these societies able to make this transition when Germany could not? It cannot, surely, be argued that social and political tensions were any greater in Germany in the 1880s and 1890s than in Chile at the time of the coup against Allende, or Spain just before the outbreak of the civil war. There were, undeniably, particular factors in the case of each of these societies which helped to cause a reduction in the potential for social and political conXict as industrialization proceeded. This study does not propose a general theory of politics and industrial development. But one particular factor is that the process of transition was not derailed by any major external catastrophe. These countries did not face genuine strategic dilemmas which in turn impinged on domestic politics. They were not required to work out solutions to internal problems of transition at the same time as they dealt with foreign policy issues, which were themselves moving towards a crisis for independent reasons. This alternative view of pre-1914 Germany stresses the essential autonomy of the foreign policy problems which beset the German government. In this ‘anti-Kehrite’ formulation, ‘revolutions from above’ are commonplace; the processes of economic and political advance do not go hand in hand but follow diVerent trajectories, so that ‘incomplete modernization’ is the normal state for an industrializing society; Imperial Germany was not moving towards an internally generated catastrophe, but was a society with as good a chance of achieving full economic maturity, social modernization, and political democratization as any other. The decisive factor in the equation, which shifted German history onto a diVerent course, was the outbreak of war in 1914.10
2. Mi g r a t i o n a n d I n e q u a l i t y i n t h e D e v e l o p m en t P r o c e s s Migration has a key role in industrialization, and it is a principal cause of the social dislocation which accompanies the early stages of economic growth in modern industrial societies. This will inevitably be a period of high migration. It is the opportunity to shift labour out of low productivity sectors such as agriculture which makes it possible to 10 Arguments about the outbreak of war are summarized in Pogge von Strandmann (1988), see also the collection edited by Scho¨llgen (1990).
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
6
achieve high rates of growth in underdeveloped economies. Indeed, one of the deWning features which distinguishes ‘mature’ from ‘developing’ economies is that, typically, economic growth in the latter is accompanied by large-scale migration from the countryside into cities, while in the former it is not. One view which provides a simple analysis of the eVects of migration out of agriculture is the model of economic development Wrst set out by Arthur Lewis in 1955: ‘a model of development with unlimited supplies of labour’, generally known to development economists as the Lewis Model.11 In his article, Lewis analysed the eVects of industrial development in the context of a labour market where there is surplus labour, as commonly found in countries in the early stages of industrialization. The model predicts that, so long as capitalists can draw on these supplies of surplus labour, then the fruits of industrial progress will go largely to the holders of capital, in the form of rising proWts, and there will be little increase in the level of real wages. Given that the owners of capital are likely to be predominantly rich, and few in number, it can be seen that this prediction will lead to rising inequality in cities and other industrial areas, with a consequent increase in social divisions, and, also, to a feeling amongst industrial workers that they are not gaining a fair reward for their labours. For students of German history the attraction of the Lewis Model is that it provides a possible explanation both of the rapid growth of the German economy 1870–1914 and of the tensions that accompanied this. Moreover it also suggests a reason for one of these problems: the rise of the socialist vote. Lewis named the two phases he described ‘classical’ (when there is a labour surplus and wages are held down) and ‘neoclassical’ (when the labour surplus is exhausted and wages start to rise). But one might note the similarity between his model and that of Karl Marx and call the Wrst phase ‘Marxist’ or ‘quasi-Marxist’. According to the model, this is a period when the capitalist economy behaves in a way which seems to bear out some of Marx’s predictions: proWts rise as a percentage of the national income; wages lag behind productivity increases.12 11
Lewis (1954). For a modern discussion see Hayami (1997), 72–5 and 170–2. Lewis did not assume, as Marx did, that technology was always labour-saving. In a purely Marxist model capital accumulation leads to increased competition, a fall in the rate of proWt, and increasingly severe economic crises, so the ultimate level of the share of proWts in national income is not clearly determined. However, Kolakowski has pointed out that Marx’s views on whether capitalism led to the absolute or the relative impoverishment of the working class are also ‘by no means unequivocal’, Kolakowski (1978), i. 289. 12
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
7
If the economy behaved as Lewis predicted, then the experience of workers competing in urban labour markets with apparently unlimited supplies of migrants from rural areas would be a dispiriting one. The formation of trade unions could lead to an improvement in workers’ bargaining strength, but unions would have to be cautious about pressing claims for higher wages given the ability of employers to bring in large numbers of migrants with no previous experience of trade union activity. Trade unions would be more eVective where the workers they represented possessed skills which could not easily be taught to newly arrived migrants, as was the case for printers and other members of the so-called ‘labour aristocracy’. These would be easier to organize. In this context, the appeal of radical Marxist ideas would be understandable, together with a pessimistic view of the likely beneWts from non-revolutionary trade union activity. But the diVerence between Lewis’s model and Marx’s is that Lewis’s labour surplus phrase comes to an end eventually. When this happens, urban labour markets are no longer dominated by the Xow of surplus labour out of agriculture, and employers who need to attract labour to new industries are obliged to oVer superior wage levels to those obtained by fully employed workers elsewhere. Trade unions can bargain from a position of strength and union membership can oVer beneWts to unskilled as well as skilled workers. The economy enters a new phase in which wages rise in line with productivity and the proWt share stabilizes or may even decline. The operation of the Lewis Model is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The introduction of new technology causes a rise in productivity in the advanced or industrial sectors. But with unlimited labour supplies, the wage level is Wxed. Consequently, the gains from productivity increases go exclusively to the owners of capital, producing a rise in the proWts share. It is only when the labour surplus is exhausted—a moment sometimes called the ‘turning point’ in the development economics literature—that wages can rise above the Xoor set by the ready availability of surplus labour in the traditional or rural sectors.13 Once this has occurred the economy shifts to a new phase of development, represented by the neo-classical model of mainstream economics, where there are limitations on the supply of labour as well as capital. In this phase, both capital and labour share in the fruits of economic development. In mature capitalist economies real wages have tended to rise at least as fast as the growth of productivity, if not somewhat faster. This 13
The term ‘turning point’ was coined by Fei and Ranis (1964).
8
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
Productivity Profits Wages
Labour surplus model
Neo-classical model Turning point
Fig. 1.1. The pure Lewis Model: changing factor shares during industrialization
has meant that the share of wages in national output has been stable or tending to increase.14 The implication of the Lewis Model is that this historical moment, the ‘turning point’ as the economy moves out of the labour surplus phase, represents a new opportunity to achieve political and social stabilization. There are now reasons for workers to favour ‘normal’ trade union activity, aiming to secure steady improvements in wages and other working conditions, over more radical alternatives. ‘Revisionist’ views should gain ground. Provided that the political system oVers a reasonable chance of similar progress, leading to increased participation in political decisionmaking, and that the whole system is not destabilized by some major catastrophe, a society which has passed the ‘turning point’ of the Lewis Model has a much better prospect of achieving full political, social, and economic maturity—becoming a ‘normal’ modern, liberal, capitalist democracy—than one which is still in the labour surplus phase. The Lewis Model in this pure form has a clear and abrupt transition from the labour surplus to the neo-classical model. In practice, economic development does not divide quite so easily into phases. 14 The Wgure shows the eVect on factor shares if wages rise in line with productivity. This is not an automatic consequence of the transition to a ‘neo-classical’ economy, although it is broadly consistent with the experience of most OECD countries in the twentieth century.
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
9
Moreover, there is generally some rise in wages during the early stages of industrialization, even if the rise is not as fast as the increase in productivity. Initially, industry can rely on nearby sources of labour. But once this ‘local labour surplus’ is exhausted, wages have to be raised to attract migrants from regions which are more remote from the main industrial areas. This period of slow wage increases, which lag behind rising productivity, can last until all sources of surplus labour are used up. Then wages start to rise in line with productivity. Figure 1.2 illustrates this ‘modiWed Lewis Model’. In the early stages of industrialization the beneWts still go predominantly to the owners of capital, even though there is some increase in wages. The transition to the neo-classical model is a more gradual one. Instead of a sudden ‘turning point’ there is a slower transition to the neo-classical model. What evidence is there that wages lagged behind productivity? The actual record of German wage and productivity growth is set out in Figure 1.3. There are some caveats to note. The Wgures used for these calculations are taken from Walter HoVmann’s Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft. The wage series used is derived from a combination of diVerent sources, and this means that it must be treated with some caution.15
Productivity Profits Wages
Labour surplus model
Neo-classical model
Fig. 1.2. The modified Lewis Model: changing factor shares during industrialization 15 More reliable wage data becomes available from the 1870s and 1880s onwards, Bry (1960), Desai (1968), and Hohls (1995). However, the onset of German industrialization is
10
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
400
300
NVA/head
200
Real wages
100 90 80 1850
1856
1862
1868
1874
1880
1886
1892
1898
1904
1910
Fig. 1.3. Indices of productivity and real wages in the advanced sectors of the German economy (industry, mining, and transport), 1850–1913 Log scale; base is average for the years 1850–9 (¼100) Source: Calculated from Hoffmann (1965). The series are averages for the three sectors calculated from Hoffmann’s figures for employment, net value added, and wages. The real wage figures are produced using Hoffmann’s deflator for private consumption.
The second caveat is that wages may lag behind productivity for other reasons. If the terms of trade move against the industrial sector, then factor returns will not keep pace with productivity.16 In the period after 1895, the German export sector had to gain market share from Britain, and this led to downwards pressure on industrial prices at a time when world agricultural prices were recovering from the low point generally dated to the 1850s, and Figure 1.3 shows that the gap between the two series opened mainly in the 1860s and early 1870s. It would also be interesting to compare real wages and the return on capital in the industrial sector, but HoVmann’s proWt Wgures have come in for heavy criticism, Fremdling (1991). 16 The diVerence is that, with adverse movements of the terms of trade, factor returns in the industrial sector are depressed in general, so both proWts and wages are held down, but under the Lewis Model only wages are held back.
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
11
of the mid-1890s. This shift in the terms of trade meant that the impressive productivity performance of the German industrial sector in the years just before the First World War was not fully reXected in real wage gains. Figure 1.3 shows that, according to HoVmann’s Wgures, real wages did not keep pace with productivity in the modern sectors. Between 1850/9 and 1904/13 productivity rose by 202%; real wages rose by 119%. The rate of increase of productivity was 70% higher than the rate of increase of real wages. The Wgure shows that the gap opened substantially in the 1860s and early 1870s. It then closed in the 1880s before widening again in the 1890s and 1900s. The fact that so much of the widening of the gap occurred in the 1860s, which is a period for which there are few reliable wage statistics, means that these results need to be interpreted with caution. What can be said is that these are Wgures which are consistent with the modiWed version of the Lewis Model as shown in Figure 1.2. Wages did not keep up with productivity; most of the beneWts of industrialization went to the owners of capital.
3. T o w a r d s a M o r e G e n e r a l T h e o r y o f I n e q u a l i t y a n d I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n: T h e W e b e r –L e w i s –K u z n e t s H y p o t h e s i s The Lewis Model is not a complete model of inequality and industrialization: it lacks several important components. It does not explain how the labour surplus is created, and how this phase comes to an end. It provides a possible explanation of rising urban inequality, but to explain the general movement of inequality in an industrializing society it is necessary to widen the scope of the enquiry to include consideration of rural inequality and the relationship between the two sectors. Lewis’s view of the labour surplus is essentially a static one: lessdeveloped countries are overpopulated relative to economic opportunities; there is underemployment both in agriculture and in an informal urban sector.17 His views are, in some respects, very similar to those of Max Weber, writing about conditions in east-Elbian agriculture in the 17
In societies which do not have comprehensive unemployment insurance there is rarely much formal unemployment. Labour surplus conditions are more likely to Wnd expression in high levels of underemployment.
12
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
late nineteenth century. Lewis wrote: ‘in over populated countries the code of ethical behaviour so shapes itself that it becomes good form for each person to oVer as much employment as he can’.18 Weber held that ‘the old economic order asks: ‘‘how can I give, on this piece of land, work and sustenance to the greatest number’’ ’.19 Both these statements describe a system of values which gives rise to behaviour which departs from the proWt-maximizing norm. Lewis did not try to explain why this changed, but Weber did. The most important factor was the changing attitudes and values of the land-owners. These were obliged by their desire to maintain their position in society to match the consumption patterns of the rising urban bourgeoisie, and this in turn led to the adoption of entrepreneurial, proWt-maximizing behaviour. Under capitalism, entrepreneurial land-owners would employ the cheapest labour, use the best technology, and prefer market relationships to paternalistic systems of mutual obligation. Thus, while the ‘old economic order’ provided employment for surplus labour, this surplus was released when capitalist values came to predominate. In Weber’s view, therefore, it was the permeation of capitalist values throughout society which led to the creation and release of the rural labour surplus. This was an inevitable consequence of industrialization. While Weber’s views on the exact mechanism which brings about social change in rural societies during industrialization can be disputed, his basic point that there are institutional arrangements in traditional agriculture whose erosion during industrialization can create a period of heavy migration into urban labour markets is more in tune with modern analysis. This could arise for a number of reasons. Traditional marriage patterns may have held back demographic increase. There may be institutionalized underemployment in agriculture, supported by systems favouring revenue sharing or informal arrangements for mutual insurance in hard times. Institutions which were appropriate to an isolated agricultural sector with limited access to urban markets may hold back the use of new technology: improved transportation may bring modern inputs and a consequent increase in productivity, making it possible to 18
Lewis (1954), 142. The quotation is from a lecture Weber gave in the United States, Weber (1948), 367. Weber’s major work on east-Elbian agriculture formed part of a survey by the Verein fu¨r Sozialpolitik, Weber (1893). Other writings on this subject include an article which appeared in 1894, Weber (1894, trans. 1979) and various speeches and addresses, which can be found in Weber (1993). 19
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
13
shift large quantities of labour into the industrial sector while maintaining or increasing food production.20 A more general view of the relationship between industrialization and inequality in all sectors of society was provided by Simon Kuznets, writing, like Lewis, in the 1950s.21 He was inXuenced by the work of the Soviet economist Prokopovitch, who had used nineteenth-century Prussian tax data to show a rise in inequality during industrialization. As a result of Prokopovitch’s work, Kuznets was also aware of a gap between rural and urban inequality in nineteenth-century Prussia. He found a similar pattern in studies of inequality in the United States and India.22 This led him to a general statement of the relationship between inequality and economic development. His hypothesis was that the shifting balance between a relatively egalitarian, but poor, rural sector, and a relatively unequal, but richer, urban sector would produce a curve, an ‘inverted U’, as inequality Wrst rises with industrialization, and then declines (Figure 1.4). Migration has an important role in the mechanism which, according to Kuznets, produced his curve. It was migration between the two sectors which produced the shifting sectoral balance. Moreover, this eVect would be intensiWed if the initial eVect of industrialization was to raise the size of the rural–urban wage gap. Modern studies have shown that the movement of the rural–urban gap is an important factor in the overall income distribution: large gaps between rural and urban earnings are associated with high levels of overall inequality.23 Poorer rural workers and peasants account for a disproportionate number of the total numbers on low incomes even in advanced countries, so a worsening of the relative position of agriculture will tend to worsen the overall distribution of income. This factor in itself could explain part of the increase in inequality predicted by Kuznets. If modern industrial centres are to grow rapidly they will need to attract labour from rural areas. Initially this may come from nearby regions, where there may be surplus labour. But, when this surplus is exhausted, sources of labour must be found in further-oV 20
The view that many of the traditional institutions of agriculture in underdeveloped countries are eVective solutions to the problems of remoteness, uncertain yields, and limited access to markets is put forward in Dasgupta (1993). 21 Kuznets (1955). 22 Ibid. 7; the German Wgures came from Prokopovitch (1926). 23 Bourguignon and Morrison (1998), Bourgignon (1990); Basu (1997) discusses the theory behind this.
14
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
Inequality
Gross Domestic Product per capita
Fig. 1.4. The Kuznets Curve: an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and economic growth during the early stages of industrialization
regions. This may require a substantial increase in the gap between rural and urban earnings to create the necessary incentives for would-be migrants. Although Lewis and Kuznets had diVerent mechanisms in mind, there are similarities between their views. The downward phase of the Kuznets Curve is brought about by two factors: the declining importance of the poorer rural sector in the overall distribution of income (which reduces the importance of the gap between rural and urban incomes as a contribution to general inequality) and a tendency for inequality within the urban sector to start high and fall over time. This last point can also be derived from the Lewis Model. Putting the views of these three authors together produces a general theory of the relationship between economic development and inequality: industrialization and the spread of modern values and relationships unleashes a process of social change in agriculture, which in turn leads to the transfer of surplus labour to the urban sector; labour surplus conditions produce an unequal distribution of income in the urban sector; the increased importance of the unequal urban sector leads to a general rise in inequality; the ending of the labour surplus period creates conditions which will eventually lead to a fall in inequality.
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
15
4. C r i t i c i s m o f t h e L e w i s Mo d e l a n d Al t e r n a t i v e V i e w s The Lewis Model has been widely used in development economics, and it is still one of the mainstays of this branch of economic analysis, but it has had its critics. 1. In the development economics literature the aspect of the Lewis Model which has attracted most criticism is the view that agriculture has only a passive role in economic development, and does not progress technologically in the same way as the urban or industrial sector.24 One of the most serious charges against the Lewis Model is that it has contributed to the tendency of modern developing countries to underinvest in agriculture. 2. Lewis makes a restrictive assumption about savings: ‘only capitalists save’. While this assumption may be justiWed for some developing countries where banks and other savings institutions are not well established, the experience of other industrializing countries shows that, given the right institutional framework, even people who are not particularly well oV will save, and that these savings can be an important component of total funds available for investment. A more realistic assumption might be that ‘only capitalists invest in industry’: meaning that, in the early stages of industrialization, only a minority have the specialized knowledge of the new technology to be able to take advantage of the opportunities it oVers. This, in turn, points to the importance of institutional development, in making it possible for the savings of those who lack technical knowledge to be channelled into industrial investments: the German banking system performed such a function. 3. Lewis has been accused of overemphasizing the importance of agriculture as a source of surplus labour. Surveys of modern developing economies show that the main area of underemployment is in fact the informal urban sector. Whether this also applies to nineteenth-century Germany is another matter. The phenomenon of high rates of urbanization, in countries which are still in the early stages of industrialization, is one which is found in post-1945 developing countries and not in nineteenth-century Europe. But an informal urban sector did exist: Tagelo¨hner, workers without permanent employment dependent on occasional day-labouring jobs, were a signiWcant part of the urban labour market. 24 Industrialization and urban growth produces change in agriculture in nearby regions, as was pointed out by Von Thu¨nen (1826).
16
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
4. In addition, there has been criticism of the concept of the labour surplus itself. When, in 1979, Lewis was awarded the Nobel prize for economics, it was shared with the Chicago agricultural economist Theodore Schultz. Both had made a range of important contributions to development economics, but on this subject they were in fundamental disagreement: Schultz denied the existence of a labour surplus in traditional agriculture, certainly in Lewis’s sense of a large body of labour with zero marginal productivity.25 The essence of Schultz’s critique was, Wrst, to deny that resource allocation was ineYcient in traditional agriculture, or that there was a preference for idleness or a bias against thrift. From this it followed that labour would be fully occupied to the point where marginal cost was equal to marginal product. Secondly, he made use of empirical studies to show that underemployment was not prevalent, and also demonstrated, using the eVects of the 1918–19 inXuenza epidemic in India, that an exogenous removal of agricultural labour did aVect food production.26 In Schultz’s view peasants were ‘poor but eYcient’.27 If investment was low it was because the return on capital was also low, or the discount rate was high. It was expensive for small subsistence farmers to search for innovations; this, rather than resistance to change, explained low technical progress. Peasant ineYciency was a myth imposed by Western agricultural experts who failed to understand the seasonal nature of much work in traditional agriculture. Although Lewis may well be the better known, or at least the more cited, author, Schultz’s critique has been highly inXuential. The view that peasants Wnd eYcient solutions to the problems they face is now a commonplace. Moreover, Schultz’s stress on the importance of the introduction of new factors—new productive knowledge, better education, human capital in the broadest sense—appears prescient in the light of subsequent developments in growth theory. Nineteenth-century German agriculture oVers an excellent example of the introduction of new, non-traditional factors exactly as described by Schultz: new scientiWc knowledge, heavy investments in education, and specialist training in agricultural sciences. But before setting up Lewis and Schultz as polar opposites it should be noted that in some respects they are not so far apart. Schultz thought 25
Possible deWnitions of the labour surplus are discussed in Reynolds (1975), 11. Major wars have also led to the sudden removal of large numbers from the labour market; Prest (1948) gives some interesting examples of cases where this led to a fall of production in less-developed economies, and some others where it did not. 27 Schultz (1964), 40. 26
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
17
that the introduction of new factors could produce a relatively ‘cheap’ rise in productivity: the transformation of traditional agriculture could be quite rapid. Now there is a clear distinction between Lewis’s view of a static rural labour surplus, which pre-dates industrialization, and Schultz’s more dynamic version, but the practical implications are similar: quite large amounts of labour can be released from agriculture while food production is maintained or increased.28 Moreover, it is worth considering what the source of these new inputs might be. Government investments in agricultural science and education in nineteenth-century Germany were not the whole story. Industrialization brought new agricultural inputs: basic slag from steelmaking; ammonium sulphate from gas production. Industrial progress stimulated scientiWc research as well as beneWting from it, and this created possibilities for agricultural advances in turn. Industrialization raised the demand for agricultural products, some of which, such as sugar beet, also required improved technical knowledge. Industrial growth led to improved communications, bringing to rural society better access to markets and to productive knowledge. Institutional developments, such as improved banking systems, also aVected agriculture. So, the transformation of traditional agriculture was, at least in part, a consequence of industrialization. Although Schultz and Weber came from diVerent traditions and were writing in diVerent centuries, there is a similarity in their views in that the creation of an agricultural labour surplus is a dynamic process, which comes about as a result of industrialization and the eVect that this has on agriculture. Weber’s primary stress was on the changes in social attitudes but he also considered the eVect of changing technology, in particular the introduction of sugar beet. This increased the seasonality of agricultural work, leading to the employment of seasonal migrant labour, which in turn brought about a weakening of social ties.
5. T h e L e w i s M o d e l a n d t h e H i s t o r i o g r a p h y of Imperial Germany Historical studies are mostly bounded in scope and in time, and this one is no exception: July 1914 makes a convenient date for the ending 28 Ibid. 24–5. This eVect is greatly strengthened if, as is often the case, industrialization is accompanied by increased population growth, an issue which will be examined in Chapter 5.
18
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
of a study of conditions inside Imperial Germany. The year 1913 is the last one for which a full set of data on peacetime conditions is available. But the temptation to see the events of 1914–18, not just the war but the revolutionary outbreaks which accompanied its ending, as the culmination of forces and developments already under way within the social structure of the Kaiserreich needs to be resisted. The sense that the narrative structure needs a natural full-stop, not an accidental one, pervades much that has been written about Imperial Germany. The massive disruption of German political and social development which followed is felt to need deep-seated explanations, not just the impact of chance events. Hence the appeal of Sonderweg arguments which trace the evolution of Xaws rooted in the character of the Bismarckian state and the social or cultural background to its political travails. The current consensus is not one to accept the Kehrite view of the absolute primacy of internal politics in foreign policy without reservation. Instead the view which prevails is one which stresses the interaction of external and internal politics: the way that interest group politics hemmed and hampered policy-making in both Welds; the constricting eVect of unresolved constitutional problems on government action; the eVect of a drift to radicalism and chauvinism on the tenor of debate and the ability of political actors to see issues as resolvable, given goodwill and a willingness to engage in rational analysis, rather than unbridgeable divisions, calling for recourse to apocalyptical solutions. The predominant view sees the intertwined problems of the Kaiserreich as a Gordian knot which, by implication, only a radical discontinuity could solve. Historians who take a positive and optimistic view, who stress the real prospects for peaceful evolution without violent confrontation, have had a poor reception from their colleagues.29 The value of economic models to historians lies in their ability to draw together diVerent pieces of evidence and present a coherent picture of social or economic evolution. The common features of the experience of many societies engaged in the process of industrialization has naturally excited the interest of theorists and led to the construction of theories which seek to explain these consistencies. While some historians may distrust these attempts to impose a common structure on historical events, the alternative approach, a history without theory, leads to the particularization of every historical event, and an undue
29
See, for example, the reaction to Rauh (1973) and (1977).
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
19
stress on the unique features of every society, ignoring many points of similarity. Migration is a particularly good example of this tendency to see events without considering the broader context. It is a subject which has rightly stimulated historical analysis. The movement of individuals or families from one social and economic context to a diVerent one is a dramatic historical event which brings about the disruption of traditional relations, and leads to the creation of new ones. But it also forms part of a larger picture, playing a role in the determination of wage levels and other factor returns in the economy as a whole. This in turn has an eVect on attitudes and motivations at the level of the individual. For a society in the upwards phase of the Kuznets Curve, a drift to radicalism is not inevitable, but the context is one which is, at the very least, conducive to alienation and a sense of social exclusion. The divergent paths of factor returns predicted by the Lewis Model, when translated into the actual experiences of workers exposed to the movements of urban labour markets under labour surplus conditions, meant that a generation of workers had poor living conditions, low life expectancy, and insecure jobs and saw only slow improvements in these circumstances, despite rapid economic growth. But these were not German peculiarities; they were the result of general forces unleashed by the introduction of modern technology. And as Germany began to climb out of the trap created by the labour surplus phase of economic development, conditions in German cities did improve, albeit slowly. This in turn created a more favourable background for social reconciliation and political progress. The Lewis Model suggests that the ending of the labour surplus phase may well represent an opportunity for a wider process of political and social modernization.
6. St a n d a r d s o f C o m p a r i s o n f o r t h e H i st or io g r a p h y o f t h e Kaiserreich A major concern of historians has been the extent to which Imperial Germany was an unusual state or society in the context of late nineteenth-century Europe. The view that there was something exceptional about Germany takes diVerent forms: Wolfgang Mommsen has placed the emphasis on Xaws in the political system; for Hans-Ulrich Wehler it is the Janusgesicht of incomplete modernization, which raises broader
20
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
questions of social and economic development. But one feature of these studies is that the standard of comparison is taken from the experience of the states of Western Europe: Wehler has written about choices between ‘Modernisierung und Tradition . . . okzidentalen Gemeinsamkeiten und deutschen Sonderkeiten’.30 The implication of the Weber–Lewis–Kuznets hypothesis is that this comparison may not be appropriate. In the pioneer industrial states the process of industrialization was more drawn out, the erosion of preindustrial, or pre-capitalist, values and institutions was slower.31 There may have been a labour surplus period, when labour supplies were abundant due to population growth or changes within agriculture, but this was less acute and spread over a longer period. The growth of cities was not so rapid. Patterns of inequality changed slowly, if at all. Political and social institutions could evolve in situations where there was less pressure for sudden change.32 In the British case, the existence of labour surplus conditions has been detected in the operation of the labour market in the period up to 1850.33 This was the result of a relatively drawn-out process: comparatively slow industrial growth combined with demographic pressure and the Wnal stages of the transition to large-scale agriculture which had started in the sixteenth century. But the German experience was a diVerent one. Although there had been pockets of proto-industrial activity in the eighteenth century, the onset of rapid economic growth was delayed until the ‘triple uniWcation’ of the mid-nineteenth century: economic uniWcation with the creation of the Zollverein in 1834; political and monetary uniWcation with the founding of the German Empire in 1871; and, crucially for a country with limited access to sea transport, the creation of a uniWed market as a result of the expansion of the railway network in the 1850s and 1860s. 30 Modernisation or Tradition . . . Convergence to Western Norms or German Exceptionalism, Wehler (1995), 1252; the use of the adjective okzidentalen obscures which Western state is being used as the standard of comparison. Since the strictures of Blackbourn and Eley (1984) appeared, German historians of the Sonderweg persuasion have been less speciWc on this point, although it is often Britain that is the implied model. 31 In the British case, the switch to large-scale capitalist agriculture came well before the onset of industrialization. 32 The main focus of comparison is obviously Britain, but Belgium and the Netherlands were also advanced industrial or commercial societies by 1830. Recent scholarship has also shown that the process of French industrial growth was a relatively drawn-out one. 33 As argued in Feinstein (1998), 651.
Industrialization under Labour Surplus Conditions
21
German economic development was, like that other of Continental countries, ‘jerked’ forwards by the application of British techology.34 In the German case, the jerk was made even more abrupt by the overcoming of barriers to internal market integration which had hitherto held back economic development. The result was that German industrialization from 1850 onwards was unusually fast. The process was telescoped in a way which was new in the experience of other European countries. This created problems of adjustment and adaptation which were unprecedented in their intensity. If so, then the standard of comparison for Imperial Germany should not be taken from Western Europe but, in the Wrst instance, from other late-industrializing European countries—Russia, Italy, and Spain, for example—and secondly, from other non-European countries which have gone through the process of industrialization. There is a large range of scholarship which has been devoted to the comparative study of developing economies, and the diVerent social, economic, and political problems associated with or resulting from the development process. It is the basic contention of this book that the tools developed within this Weld, the Weld of development studies, can be used to understand and elucidate the problems of Imperial Germany. This will, it is hoped, shed a new light on the diYculties, and the achievements, of the Kaiserreich. 34 Pollard (1981), 84. The transforming nature of the new British industrial technology is clear from the regional studies presented in chapter 3 of Pollard’s study.
2
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n The Kuznets Curve—the hypothesis that inequality will initially rise and then fall with industrialization—is predicated on the basis of a series of assumptions made by Kuznets in his original article. One of these is the assertion that, initially, inequality will be higher in the urban than the rural sector. However, consideration of the historical record, as well as the current position in developing countries, shows that there are a wide range of possible levels of inequality in the rural sector in underdeveloped or newly industrializing countries. Factors such as climate, crop specialization, the eYcacy of land reform, the legacy of colonialism or feudalism can produce very diVerent outcomes. The contemporary situation shows wide divergences. On the one hand there are the ‘plantation economies’ of central and southern America, which typically have large inequalities in land ownership and rural incomes; at the other extreme, the rural sectors of many newly industrializing East Asian countries are characterized by small-scale intensive rice production, with a consequent narrowing of disparities in income and wealth.1 Thus, a study of the evolution of inequality in an industrializing society needs to start with a consideration of the state of rural society: the allocation of property rights, the distribution of land holding and land ownership, the position of rural labourers. Even if the predictions of the Lewis Model concerning conditions in urban labour markets are correct, and this leads to high inequality in the urban sector, there are some societies in which the level of rural inequality is so high that industrialization produces little or no increase in the overall level of inequality.
1 Works which have stressed the importance of such geographical factors include Bray (1986) and Engerman and SokoloV (1997).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
23
2. T h e A g r a r i a n R e f o r m Mo v e m e n t i n N i n e t e e n t h - Ce n t u r y G e r m a n y : G e n e r a l Co n s i d e r a t i o n s Historical analysis of the nineteenth-century agrarian reforms has tended to look for statistical indicators to judge the impact of the reforms: Wgures for peasant (or smallholder) land losses, information on the numbers of landless labourers and their incomes, the extent of peasant indebtedness, the overall structure of land holding before and after the reforms, the balance between rented land and land in owneroccupation. These are important issues, and it is right that they should be the main focus of research, but the use of statistical indicators is meaningless without ‘benchmarks’, standards by which to judge the diVerence between success and failure. Much of the modern historical analysis of the agrarian reforms has been inXuenced by the ‘incomplete’ or ‘absent’ revolution thesis of the Sonderweg school of German historians: the view that the deWning characteristic of German history has been a succession of ‘revolutions from above’, which necessarily lacked the capacity to achieve thoroughgoing social transformations of the type supposedly achieved in other countries which experienced ‘revolutions from below’. Implicitly, therefore, the standards of comparison for the agrarian reforms are the revolutionary land settlements brought about by the French or Russian revolutions (referring in the latter case to the pre-collectivization period). These are possible points of comparison, but not the only ones. There is now a large number of studies in the Weld of development economics on land reform and its problems. This has a number of lessons for historians. Perhaps the most important of these is the sheer diYculty of land reform: it is quite rare to Wnd examples of land reform programmes which have been even moderately successful. Agrarian reforms have too often been either ineVective or else led to results which were inimical to the development process.2 Land reform is a social and political process which places an unusual strain on the capacity of the political system to deliver an unbiased outcome: one which is not inXuenced either by the social composition of the bureaucracy or by the ability of special interest groups to aVect political decisions. It is a test of the ‘encompassing’ nature of the political process: the extent to which decision-makers put the long-term 2
Modern works that make this point include Low (1996) and Ghimure (2001).
24
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
interests of society, considered as a whole, ahead of considerations of short-term expediency (which militate against oVending powerful social groups) or the favouring of sectional interests.3 Moreover, it is a process which involves balancing a number of diVerent objectives. The history of land reform shows that there are many pitfalls. These include the following. (i) The eVect of expropriation on property rights Radical land reform without compensation can achieve a dramatic alteration of rural property rights. However, expropriation on such a scale will have adverse eVects on investment in other sectors: investors will wonder if similar violations of property rights are possible in other areas. This is one consideration which has led most governments to pay compensation to landlords and others adversely aVected by land reforms. The record of recent years shows that some compensation has nearly always been paid: the main exceptions being land reforms following the establishment of Communist governments which have been coupled with more general restrictions on private property rights. In the German case, compensation was paid by the peasants themselves, either in the form of monetary compensation or land given up to landlords, in order to secure the elimination of labour services and other onerous duties or restrictions. Arguably, the various German states could have provided more of these payments themselves, but the limited size of state budgets in the early nineteenth century probably precluded this option. (ii) The eVect on production The objectives of land reform are Wrst to reduce rural inequality, and secondly to promote increased agricultural productivity, the use of new technology, and rising food production. Otherwise, inadequate agricultural production may act as a brake on industrial development, producing problems such as the ‘scissors crisis’ of the Soviet economy in the NEP period.4 Land reform should not create a rural sector which is an obstacle to general economic development. It should not consist entirely of subsistence farmers unable to produce a marketable surplus. 3 The concepts of ‘encompassing’ and ‘sectional’ interest groups are taken from Olson (1982). 4 Nove (1969), 93–6.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
25
The impressive productivity performance of the German agricultural sector in the second half of the nineteenth century showed that the reforms produced an eYcient market-orientated sector, which was well able to take advantage of the opportunities presented by expanding urban demand. (iii) The importance of rural credit A major theme which connects to this last point is the availability of rural credit. In cases where land reform has had an adverse eVect on production, the lack of credit has often been an important factor. Moreover, if peasants are obliged to pay compensation to former landlords, then some means of Wnance will be required for this. In cases where rural Wnance has been unobtainable or prohibitively expensive, there has often been a return to landlord control, as indebted peasants have been forced to sell land to local money-lenders or back to former landlords.5 This is probably the area where the Prussian reforms, in particular, were most deWcient. In the early nineteenth century, state-sponsored rural credit institutions, such as the Landschaften or rural mortgage banks, lent mainly to larger estates. Smaller farmers had limited access to credit, and this contributed to the extent of peasant land losses. By contrast, in areas such as the Kingdom of Saxony, where more eVort was made to give small and medium-sized farmers access to credit, the post-reform land distribution was more egalitarian. (iv) The importance of market access As the objective is to create an agricultural sector which is both egalitarian and also market-orientated, it follows that the costs of market access will be an important factor. For peasant farmers, with relatively small marketable surpluses, high transport costs and other obstacles can make the use of the market mechanism an unattractive proposition. The consequences are, Wrst, that peasant farmers revert to subsistence agriculture, which makes it diYcult to pay for modern inputs or maintain payments on debts, and secondly, that supplies of food and other materials from the rural sector are limited. 5
In the Philippines there have been 11 consecutive land reform programmes, but the lack of rural credit and other follow-up services has meant that land has tended to pass back into the hands of landlords and agricultural companies, Ghimure (2001), 13.
26
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
Inevitably, diVerent areas of Germany had very diVerent experiences. In the western regions the proximity of expanding urban markets made life easier for peasant farmers who could intensify livestock production or specialize in perishable high-value products for local markets. In the east transport costs were high, which meant that the main marketable crops would be cereals.6 This inevitably favoured the larger estates, which tended to be more orientated towards cereal production. But the elimination of internal tariVs and the creation of a single German market, together with the expansion of the railway network, did improve opportunities for farmers in some of the remoter areas.7 (v) The importance of contingency But even the best-designed land reform is still subject to a range of inXuences which are outside the control of the political authorities. Two of the most important are demographic pressure, and the movement of farm prices. Under circumstances where there is acute demographic pressure in rural areas, and the supply of fertile land is limited, it will be extremely diYcult to avoid a rise in the landless population, even with a highly egalitarian land distribution. The alternative is to permit the subdivision of holdings to an extent which would substantially reduce the marketable surplus, which would jeopardize other rural policy objectives. Another outside factor is the movement of farm prices. If land reform leaves the peasant sector with an increased level of indebtedness as a result both of compensation payments to landlords, and also investments consequent on the shift to a more market-orientated agricultural system, then the real burden of these debts will be raised if prices fall, and reduced if prices rise. Some notably successful land reform programmes, such as those of post-1945 Japan and eighteenth-century Denmark, have been considerably assisted by subsequent bursts of inXation which reduced the real value of peasant debts.
6 Which had a relatively high value-to-weight ratio; see Brinkmann (1935), 82–3 for the transport costs of various commodities; this uses German data collected by H. Settegast in the pre-1914 period. 7 East Prussia was an area which contained a large number of small or medium sized holdings, and which was able to expand livestock production substantially in the late nineteenth century, moving away from wool production into more intensive livestock systems.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
27
Figure 2.1 illustrates this point by comparing the movement of agricultural prices in Prussia after 1816, and in Japan after 1946. The lower line gives the movement of rye prices in Prussia (1815 boundaries); superimposed on this is a second line giving the movement of rice prices in Japan in the years following the land reform introduced by the American occupation authorities in the years immediately after the Second World War. The Japanese reforms were mainly carried out in 1946–7. In the years which followed there was a burst of inXation which carried rice prices to levels two or three times those of the reform period. A more gradual increase in subsequent years took prices up to an index of 500 by the late 1960s. By contrast, the years which followed the Prussian reforms saw a fall in prices to levels which were around a third of the 1816–18 average by 600 400
200
100 80 60
Prussia
40
Japan
1817
1820
1823
1826
1829
1832
1835
1838
Fig. 2.1. A comparison of agricultural price movements in Prussia (rye prices 1816–40) and Japan (rice prices 1946–69) Three-year moving averages as indices (base for Prussia is 1816–18, for Japan 1946–8). Japanese index is superimposed (1946 corresponds to 1816). Source: Japanese prices are from various issues of the Japanese statistical yearbook, 1950–70; the index is a chained index, using whatever was reported, so that the 1946–7 prices are wholesale prices (Tokyo), 1947–50 prices are black market prices (Tokyo), and the 1950–70 prices are producer prices (all Japan). The German index uses the average Prussian wholesale prices reported in ZdKPSB (1907), 84–92.
28
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
the mid-1820s. The reforms were carried out under circumstances which were considerably less favourable for peasant farmers than those in post-1945 Japan. The value to historians of the broader context provided by modern writings on land reform is that it emphasizes the point that agrarian policy needs to serve a range of objectives, and it must make a positive contribution to the general objective of social and economic development. Land reform cannot be judged according to a simple ‘black– white’ dichotomy, where a resulting egalitarian land distribution is ‘white’ and an inegalitarian one is ‘black’. These other objectives also need to be taken into account.
3. A C o m p a r i s o n o f A g r a r i a n R e f o r m s i n G e r m a n y and Denmark (i) The Danish experience The consideration of the Danish land reforms makes an interesting point of comparison for the later German reforms. Agrarian reform in Denmark was essentially an eighteenth-century phenomenon, which was largely completed by 1810. Most of the legislation was passed in the period 1768–81 (although the abolition of serfdom came earlier in 1701). There are a number of points of interest which can be compared and contrasted with the German experience.8 First, agrarian reform in Denmark was to a large extent a product of ‘enlightened’ state action. The state took the initiative and the reforms were designed to serve state interests. These included the improvement of state Wnances (which led the government to favour the peasantry who were not exempt from taxation over the nobility who were). There was also a conscious attempt to create a free independent peasantry; the abolition of serfdom in 1701, for example, was connected with a decision to move to a conscript army. Neither the French revolution nor industrialization had any part in the decision to introduce the reforms. Secondly, despite this the reforms did not operate against aristocratic interests in general. The nobility did give up their feudal rights but 8 The main sources used for this section are Baack (1977), Bjorn (1977), and Skrubbeltrang (1954); Tracey (1982) describes the evolution of Danish agriculture in the postreform period.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
29
they were well compensated. Many estates chose to sell land to their tenants, and it was this which increased the proportion of freehold land held by peasants from the pre-reform level of under 10% to 40% in 1810. Between 1786 and 1807 226 out of 800 estates sold a majority of their land. However, the nobility did achieve an increase in rents on the land that remained in their possession, and the price of land rose by 93% between 1781–5 and 1796–1800. As land-owners, both nobility and peasantry gained from this increase. The main impetus to the reform came from the realization that improved agricultural techniques, coupled with the enclosure and consolidation of holdings, could bring about a large increase in output. Experiments by progressive landlords in the 1760s showed that these measures, which included the abolition of labour service and the granting of copyhold tenancies, could lead to a doubling of production (as occurred on the pioneering BernstorV estate between 1764 and 1783). The ‘increase in the cake’ was large enough to give everyone a share (grain production rose 40% 1770–1803). What the government did was to make sure that a substantial slice of the beneWts went to the peasantry. In other states, notably Britain, the gains from agricultural improvement went largely to landlords and large-scale tenant farmers. Thirdly, and this emphasizes the voluntary, co-operative nature of the reforms, some aspects were not the result of legislation. Thus the abolition of labour service or Hoveri was not decreed. Yet by 1807 this only applied to a quarter of Danish farmland, having previously been fairly universal. The reason was that it had become an ineYcient system which obliged the peasantry to keep large numbers of horses instead of cattle. So the reforms made it possible to raise cattle numbers, from 280,000 in 1774, to 560,000 in 1804 and 834,000 in 1837. At the same time the number of horses fell (from 400,000 in 1804 to 325,000 in 1837). Equally, the process of enclosure and consolidation was not regarded by the peasantry with hostility. Indeed, where they were freeholders or copyholders they often initiated such schemes themselves, and in areas where peasant freehold was common, enclosure was earlier.9 This points to the importance of the prior evolution of tenant rights. Where these had become hereditary and Wrmly entrenched, with legal support, the peasantry could bargain successfully with land-owners to secure enclosure and the commutation of feudal duties even if the state stood aside. 9
Bjorn (1977).
30
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
A fourth point is the importance of Wnance. Here the state did establish a Royal Credit Bank which made loans to peasant farmers for the purchase of freehold land or copyhold tenures. But the impact of this bank was not large compared to other sources of Wnance. It lent 442,000 Rigsdalers for this purpose in 1786–98 (compared to 1,058,000 for landlord improvements). In the overall Wnancing of peasant land purchase this was only a small share. In the 1790s it is thought that around 11⁄2 million Rigsdalers were lent by banks for this purpose and another 1 million by private investors. In 1797–1807 the Eukkase (or widow’s pension fund) lent 2,245,000 million for the purchase of freeholds or copyholds.10 As far as the Wnancing of the cost of enclosure and other improvements is concerned, this seems to have been mainly done by the landlords themselves. Tenants were required to repay the cost of enclosure at an interest rate of 4%, which would have been a very reasonable rate for agrarian credit in a pre-industrial society. However, landlords also beneWted from the increase in rents, which may explain why they were prepared to fund the costs of enclosure on favourable terms. A Wfth point is that although the Danish reforms had an egalitarian aspect, this did not mean that all beneWted equally. There were large numbers of cottagers who did not gain freehold or copyhold land, either through purchase or the enclosure of the common Welds. These bore the burden of such labour service as remained. It is probably wrong to blame the reforms for the creation of a ‘rural proletariat’ (which had probably always existed in some form or another), but the fact that some groups beneWted substantially while others did not was bound to increase social divisions (at least between these groups). This was probably inevitable. No eighteenth- or nineteenth-century government (and few since) had the power to push through a completely egalitarian land redistribution. The reforms had to take account of existing interests and work with these. What the state could (and did) do was to alter the terms on which the peasants bargained with the landlords. It forced the granting of longer leases, regulated the conditions under which landlords could evict, and obliged them to compensate tenants for improvements. The acquisition of peasant holdings by large estates was prevented (as was the splitting of holdings once consolidated).11 As one of the Danish ministers involved, Count von Eggers, wrote in an open letter to Stein in 1807: ‘it is not enough . . . just to dissolve personal bondage . . . One must secure them (the peasants) sustenance even as one gives them back their 10
Baack (1977), 37.
11
Tracey (1982).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
31
freedom; one must ensure that they remain proprietors and do not become day-labourers.’12 Finally, the special conditions of Danish agriculture in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century should be mentioned. In the Wrst place, even before the reforms Danish agriculture had not been dominated by ‘demesne’ farming (large estates typically using labour services provided in lieu of rent rather than wage labour). Large, directly farmed estates had occupied only 13% of the agricultural area before the reforms; this was reduced to 9% in 1835. Secondly, the reforms took place at a time of rising agricultural prosperity. Between the 1730s and the 1790s land prices rose sevenfold. Between 1771–80 and 1791–1800 rye prices rose 26%, oats prices rose 32%, and barley 45%. This made it easier to provide adequate landlord compensation without overburdening the peasantry. Thirdly, Denmark was well-situated for agricultural exports. By 1803, 12% of grain production was exported. With good access to foreign markets, in particular the expanding British market, there were favourable conditions for the establishment of a market-orientated peasantry. Danish geography was also well suited to an era when water transport was the only practical means of moving bulk cargoes such as grain. Finally, the debts that the peasants incurred as a result of the reforms were wiped out in a burst of inXation in 1807–10. This gave the reforms a redistributional aspect which was certainly unintended.13 (ii) Agrarian reform in central and north-west Germany Comparison with the Danish example shows that the German reforms, in particular those introduced in Prussia in 1807–11, diVered in several respects. One of the principal objectives of the centrepiece of the German reforms, the edict of 1811, was the abolition of labour services, an issue which was not addressed by legislation in Denmark. Peasant emancipation in the German case was, as Clapham put it, ‘twoedged’:14 the peasant was freed from restrictions and gained much in the way of rights, but at the same time the previous policy of the Prussian government—Bauernschutz, the deliberate protection of the peasantry against landlord demands—was also given up.15 12
Baack (1977), 39. A similar burst of inXation contributed to the success of the land reform imposed on Japan by the US occupation authorities in 1945. 14 Clapham (1921, repr. 1966), 43. 15 Knapp (1891), 35–6. 13
32
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
Labour services were not transformed into monetary obligations, but rather redeemed by the cession of land to the landlord by the peasant (a third of the total holding for tenants with hereditary rights, a half for the others). Thus, the reforms had a built-in tendency to expand the proportion of the total area farmed by large estates. Peasant land losses to landlords were, however, balanced by gains as a result of enclosure. The process still left many peasant holdings below the minimum needed to maintain a self-suYcient rural enterprise (Spannfa¨hige— capable of maintaining a team of horses or oxen—is the term used in the oYcial statistics).16 The enclosure movement in Germany started before the reforms and continued long after. The result was that enclosure and emancipation tended to be separate movements, with the consequence that the surge in production which followed enclosure could not be used to provide compensation for emancipation. However, despite these diVerences, the fact is that in a large slice of Germany, to the west of the Elbe and the north of the Main (and including the Kingdom of Saxony), the reforms worked very much as they had in Denmark: that is they produced a class of medium-sized peasant holdings, mostly owner-occupied although the majority did rent some land, free of labour service and other ‘feudal’ obligations, with the common Welds largely enclosed and some consolidation of holdings.17 There were a number of reasons for this. In many areas there was, as in Denmark, a deliberate policy bias in favour of the peasantry. The Kingdom of Saxony is perhaps the best example of this.18 In the Rhineland and other western regions, French inXuence in 1806–13 may have had some eVect, but was probably too brief to have made a major impact.19 The availability of credit was an important factor. In Saxony the Sa¨chsische Landesrentenbank lent 86 million Thalers to peasants for the purchase of labour service duties and other obligations in 1834–59.20 16 According to a Prussian survey of 1859, there were 344,701 Spannfa¨hige holdings and 604,501 Nichtspa¨nnfa¨hige (holdings below the minimum size needed to maintain a team of draught animals). The number of Spannfa¨hige had fallen from 351,607 in 1816. However, the same survey also showed that in many areas the Spannfa¨hige holdings had made net gains during the reform period; gains from the enclosure of common Welds outweighing losses through compensation for landlords, Meitzen (1868), 500. 17 In 1895 86% of agricultural land was owner-occupied, Rauchberg (1900), 580. 18 Conze (1969). 19 Dovring (1956), 144 emphasizes the impact of the French Revolution, but German historians have tended not to support this point. 20 Wehler (1995).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
33
In general the western peasant farmer was more likely to get access to credit from Landeskreditkassen and Rentenbanken than his counterpart east of the Elbe, where the dominant credit institutions, the Landschaften, lent mainly to the large estates.21 The legal framework in the large parts of north-western and central Germany that came under Prussian administration was similar to that in the east, where the reforms led to the transfer of substantial amounts of land to the landlords, due to the fact that peasants were obliged to oVer land in return for the abolition of labour services. The fact that this did not happen suggests that labour services were either already rare, or naturally declining, or that the peasants were able to oVer monetary compensation instead.22 Local conditions could play a part. Thus in the Magdeburg region the prosperity brought about by the cultivation of sugar beet created a class of medium-sized peasant farmers who often had shares in the sugar reWneries. Labour services and payments in kind were ended by 1845, which was relatively early for central Germany, and the resulting debts seem to have been paid oV quite easily.23 In general the circumstances under which the reforms were introduced seem to have been at least as important as the actual legislation (and possibly more so). What these areas had in common with Denmark was a low level of demesne farming before the reforms, well-entrenched peasant rights which were often hereditary, and favourable economic opportunities thanks to the proximity of growing urban markets which also provided employment opportunities for surplus rural labour. It also should be remembered that the reforms of 1807–11 applied only to Prussia and to Spannfa¨hige peasants (who could provide a team of draught animals); only in the 1850s were the reforms extended to peasants who were Nichtspannfa¨hige and to important non-Prussian territories (the main reforms in Saxony date from this period). This coincided with the period of economic growth brought about by the railway boom. Almost certainly this was a favourable conjuncture. It meant that labourers who did not receive land as a result of the reforms could Wnd employment outside agriculture.24 21 Tcherkinsky (1921), 78. There were other sources of Wnance, but the Landschaften were the main sources of mortgage lending, ibid. 82. 22 This is the view of Conze (1969). 23 Plaul (1986). 24 Hempel (1957) describes how the Heuerlingen (the hired labourers of north-western Germany) became increasingly divided between agricultural and non-agricultural employment (having previously combined agricultural work and cottage industry).
34
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
(iii) The reforms in Prussia east of the Elbe This is the area which has received most attention from historians. There is a widely accepted view that something went wrong with the reforms in east-Elbian agriculture: ‘the beneWts of the agrarian reforms went largely to the feudal aristocracy’, as one historian has written.25 The aristocracy gained substantially from the surrender of peasant land as compensation for the loss of labour services, and also obtained 86% of the land made available by the enclosure of the common Welds. This view has been fairly well established since the writings of Theodor von der Goltz and Adolph Meitzen in the nineteenth century. In 1868 Meitzen analysed the movement of the land distribution in the original Prussian provinces over the 1816–59 period, and showed the impact on peasant land-holdings of the loss of land given up to landlords. However, his analysis also showed that the peasantry had had some compensation from gains made as a result of the overall increase in the land under cultivation. Writing slightly later, in 1875, von der Goltz examined the position of landless agricultural labourers, which appeared to have worsened as a result of the reforms (although this might also have been caused by demographic pressure).26 Subsequent writers, such as Max Weber and Gustav Knapp, endorsed the views put forward by Meitzen and von der Goltz, and the supposed failure of the land reforms in the Prussian east became a generally accepted part of ‘received opinion’ on the broader question of LandXucht: the depopulation of the rural east as a result of migration to cities in central and western Germany. There were Wve main reasons why the impact of the land reforms in the east diVered from the eVect in the rest of Germany. The Wrst was the remoteness of many eastern regions. In the period before the establishment of a railway network, marketing costs were extremely high for any farm which did not have easy access to water transport. While the east had its share of navigable rivers, such as the Oder and the Vistula, there were large areas between these rivers which had poor communications, and little access to the expanding urban markets of western Germany. In these circumstances, the establishment of a marketorientated peasant agriculture faced almost insuperable obstacles. 25 Koselleck (1967), 498. The aristocratic estates made substantial gains from enclosure, adding over 100 hectares on average according to one calculation, Berthold et al. (1990), i. 234. 26 Meitzen (1868), von der Goltz (1875).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
35
Table 2.1. Communications in Prussian provinces east and west of the Elbe, 1867 Miles of improved Miles of Miles of canals and road (Chausee) railway line navigable rivers East and West Prussia Pomerania Posen Brandenburg Silesia Average east of the Elbe
53.4 63.0 67.2 62.8 82.9 64.6
9.0 10.8 10.7 18.1 24.3 14.4
14.2 13.4 13.0 28.4 9.0 15.7
Prussian Saxony Westphalia Rhineland Average rest of Prussia
105.9 159.6 178.9 148.0
26.4 30.1 37.0 31.3
20.7 14.0 24.2 20.1
Note: All figures are relative to the total land area (excluding water) in square miles (unit is pre-1870 Prussian mile). Source: Calculated from figures in Meitzen (1863), i. 65–6, iii. 291.
The poor state of communications east of the Elbe is demonstrated by the Wgures in Table 2.1, taken from a survey in 1867. The Wgures are expressed in relation to land area. An average square mile of territory east of the Elbe had only 44% of the total length of improved roads in a typical square mile in the provinces west of the Elbe. It had 46% of the railway mileage, and 78% of the total mileage of canals and navigable waterways, for an area of comparable size in the rest of Prussia. The chances of having reasonable access to improved roads or a railway were correspondingly low.27 Secondly, access to credit was limited. Only about a tenth of the rural population was able to obtain credit, and interest rates were in the range 12–30%,28 much higher than the rate of 4% charged to Danish peasants, and the similar rate which aristocratic borrowers paid on loans from the Landschaften.29 27 The importance of having good communications is well demonstrated in contemporary Argentina, where the lack of good roads in rural areas is an obstacle to the development of small farms. Only large estates can aVord the high cost of getting produce to markets. 28 Koselleck (1967), 507. 29 Tcherkinsky (1921), 43. Lu¨tge also stresses the role of credit, Lu¨tge (1963), 236.
36
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
Thirdly, the main areas of industrial expansion were not in eastern Germany but in the centre and the west. In the vicinity of these western cities, small-scale agricultural enterprises could prosper, supplying perishable goods, such as fruit and vegetables, and also livestock produce. The economics of livestock production were much better suited to peasant holdings than the extensive arable systems which characterized eastern Germany.30 Fourthly, the east was an area where the Prussian monarchy’s policy of Bauernschutz—the protection and entrenchment of peasant rights— had had less eVect. The position of the peasants before emancipation was less favourable, and their bargaining position was consequently weaker. This was an especially important factor in the parts of the east which were not part of Prussia (such as Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz) or where Prussian rule was more recently established (such as Pomerania).31 Finally, the Gutsherrschaft administrative system, common in the east, gave the aristocracy an important role in local government and the administration of justice. It is probable that this had some eVect on the agrarian reform process, either because the land-owners gained control over the operation of the reforms, or because the government was unwilling or unable to confront powerful local interests (a factor which would have applied a fortiori in areas where a German aristocracy ruled over a Polish peasantry). In assessing the reforms, historians have tended to divide between those who see this Wfth factor as the most important inXuence, and those who recognize that the other factors meant that, even if the government had been prepared to overrule aristocratic objections, the conditions in eastern Germany in the early nineteenth century were not favourable for small-scale, market-orientated, peasant farming.32 In which case, a more radical reallocation of rural property rights would have been damaging, holding back productivity gains, and producing a subsistence sector unable to produce a marketable surplus. For, considering the broader context of the contribution of the agrarian reforms to German economic development, it is clear that there are 30 Von Thu¨nen (1826) was the Wrst to analyse the eVect of urban proximity on agricultural systems; Levy (1911) explains the advantages that smallholdings specializing in livestock produce had over larger units. 31 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of the pre-reform legacy see, inter alia, Conze (1969), Lu¨tge (1963), Harnish (1986), and Perkins (1986). 32 Schissler (1986) stresses the way the aristocracy controlled the reform process east of the Elbe.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
37
strong reasons to regard the eastern reforms as successful, despite the failure to match the egalitarian outcome in western Germany. Free labour, paid in cash or in kind, was, on some estimates, three times more productive than labour contributed under the pre-reform system.33 There was a large increase in investment: the new demesne farms required three times as much capital as the pre-reform holdings.34 And uncultivated land was reduced from 40.3% of the total agricultural area in 1816 to 19.0% in 1864. This, combined with increased yields (there was a 43% increase in the yields of the major crops 1805–63), meant that in the Wrst half of the nineteenth century the Prussian arable sector was sustaining growth rates of 1.0–1.3% per annum.35 In the context of an economy which, in this period, was largely pre-industrial (there were pockets of industrialization in Saxony and the Ruhr but no general upwards shift in the rate of growth before the 1850s), it appears that arable farming has a good claim to be regarded as a ‘leading sector’ in this period.36 The new, post-reform, ‘demesne-farming’ of east-Elbian agriculture was, in many respects, a highly Xexible contractual system. The landlord provided land to the peasant in return for labour services which were employed in the production of marketable produce on the demesne farm. In the pure form, the peasant received recompense only in the form of land. But in practice the system showed more variation. The Inste of eastern agriculture received some land and a share in the harvest. The Deputate or Kossa¨ten received a smallholding plus Wxed payment (in kind or later in money).37 This Xexibility allowed the system to adjust for the requirements of the production system. Thus peasants were often given responsibility for the care of animals and the upkeep of buildings, becoming in eVect small contractors, which 33
34 Tipton (1976), 24. Koselleck (1967), 507. Finck von Finckenstein (1960), 99–100 provides Wgures for yields and the cultivated area. The implied growth rate of production is easily calculated from these. The range of 1.0 to 1.3% per annum reXects the eVect of choosing diVerent base years. 36 HoVmann (1963), 100–4, produced much higher Wgures for the growth of agricultural production in Germany as a whole (1.9% per annum in 1800–1860/5) and derived from these an estimate of the increase in agricultural productivity of 1.3% per annum over this period. These Wgures were, however, based on estimates of livestock production which were much less well founded than those provided for the Prussian arable sector by Finck von Finckenstein. HoVmann also assumed that non-Prussian areas matched the Prussian increase in arable production, which is unlikely, given that the Prussian increase was made possible by the incorporation of previously uncultivated areas in the east, an under-utilized resource not available to other German states. 37 Finck von Finckenstein (1960), 197 gives payments to a Deputat around 1800. 35
38
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
reduced monitoring costs for the landlord. Granting harvest shares gave peasants an interest in the yield from the demesne Welds.38 The economics of the system shows that it was particularly well suited to the settlement of areas where land was relatively abundant, labour comparatively scarce, and markets either a long way away or inherently risky. The peasant household had no need to market any of its production beyond a small amount for local trade and barter. Marketing costs were borne entirely by the landlord. (iv) The extent of peasant land losses in Prussia The extent of peasant land losses has remained one of the most serious charges against the Prussian land reforms. Knapp claimed that the peasants ‘lost’ a million hectares as a result of the reforms. This Wgure is almost certainly an exaggeration. The situation was confused by the point that ‘peasant’ holdings, which in the literature of the period are generally deWned as holdings of at least 2 hectares, made both gains and losses as a result of the reforms (losing land given up as compensation for relief from labour services and gaining from the enclosure of the previously uncultivated areas). The most careful examination of the net gains and losses is probably that by Saalfeld, which is given in Table 2.2. So, in total, peasant losses were not so large when it is considered that labour services were removed from 16.95 million Morgen (the net loss of 5.5% of the aVected land is far less than the half to one third provided for in the legislation), but this has to be set alongside a substantial expansion of the total area under cultivation (the total arable area east of the Elbe rose by 61% 1800–61).39 Thus, of the land made available by the division of the commons only 14% went to the peasants; most of the rest went to the large estates. It is estimated that there was an overall increase in demesne land of 18%: 13.5% was due to the reforms and 4.5% due to purchases by the estates. Moreover, peasant losses were not evenly distributed. In Westphalia peasant land-holdings rose by 9.9% in area, and by 1.8% in Prussian Saxony, but falls of 13.2% and 12.8% were recorded for Pomerania and Silesia (respectively).40 38 It has been suggested that labour service was highly ineYcient compared to ‘free labour’ by a factor of 1 : 2 or 1 : 3 but this would have created a massive incentive to move to wage labour; the long survival of demesne farming suggests that any ineYciencies were not on this scale. 39 Dickler (1975), 273. 40 All Wgures are from Saalfeld (1963).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
39
Table 2.2. Peasant gains and losses, Prussia 1816–59, in million Morgen
Losses:
Gains: Net losses
to smallholdings to large estates total through enclosure
in Morgen (m.)
as % of all peasant land 1816
1.29 0.47 1.76 0.83 0.93
3.8 1.4 5.2 2.5 2.7
Note: ‘Peasant’ holdings are defined as between 2 and 100 hectares; a ‘Morgen’ is, according to the dictionary (Langenscheidt) ‘a variable unit of between 0.6 and 0.9 acres’ , but most commentators seem to assume that 4 Morgen ¼ 1 hectare. Source: Saalfeld (1963).
The losses have to be set against the removal of labour services. Of the spannfa¨higen Bauern 84% had had their service obligations removed (a total of 6 million days) by 1848 and of the 23.5 million Handdiensttage (days of labour service without animals) owed in 1816, 17 million had also been relieved. To get some perspective on this, it implies (assuming that the Wgure of 17 million Morgen for the aVected area is correct) that a holding of 20 hectare (or 80 Morgen) might have owed on average 80 days labour service without draught animals, and 28 with draught animals: a total of 108 days.41 It would have been a substantial gain to be free of this. The process by which the larger estates gained at the expense of peasant holdings was a complex one, in which free purchase played an important role. There was a high rate of turnover in the land market in the early part of the century, both for estates and peasant holdings. Thus 24% of Prussian peasant land changed hands in 1816–59, but most of these transfers (which totalled 8.2 million Morgen) were from one peasant to another.42 Transfers to smaller or larger holdings were only 21% of the total. Equally, the larger estates changed ownership 41 In practice it would have been more likely to be one or the other; so perhaps 50–60 days with animals and no Handsdienst, or 120–50 days’ Handsdienst on its own; calculations use Wgures from Koselleck (1967), 498; note, the estimates are much lower than the 5–6 days per week quoted by Harnisch (1986), but these levels could have been reached in some regions. 42 Saalfeld (1963).
40
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
quite frequently. Out of 888 estates in East Prussia in 1806 only 378 were in the same family in 1829.43 There were two main reasons for this. The Wrst was the cost of the reforms and associated investments which led to build-up of debt. The second was the fall in agricultural prices in the 1820s. The reforms led to a considerable expansion of the area under cultivation, but this was expensive. New houses had to be built for the labour needed to replace that previously provided by the tenants. The cost of enclosing (and where necessary draining) the common Welds had to be met. The peasants had to pay compensation where this had been agreed, meet their share of the enclosure costs, and replace livestock which were the landlord’s property. Rather more is known about the debts owed by the large estates which tended to be recorded (and periodically surveyed by the Prussian government) but the position of the peasantry was also serious.44 Whereas the estates could borrow from the Landschaften at 4% the peasantry had to pay considerably more, if they were oVered credit at all. Certainly the nobility had problems: a third of estates in Pomerania went into receivership during the period 1817–29.45 But the fact that they, and those investors who subsequently bought up the bankrupt estates, could borrow may have contributed to the gains made by the large estates during this period. If this is right then it was the economic success of the reforms which contributed to their ‘social’ failure. For it was the increase in the area under cultivation, and the consequent reduction in the uncultivated area from 40% of the Prussian land area in 1816 to 19% in 1864, that was the reform’s greatest achievement: ‘this increase of cultivated area and total production was only made possible by the new energies released by the reform process’.46 (v) The regional pattern of land losses and transfers in Prussia The impact of the reforms varied considerably in the diVerent Prussian regions. In a sense this was an intriguing ‘natural experiment’: a similar set of legal changes had diVerent eVects according to circumstances. 43
Koselleck (1967), 512. Meitzen (1885) is a rare attempt to survey debt on peasant holdings, which showed that debts could be as high relative to property values as on larger estates. 45 Koselleck (1967), 508. 46 Lu¨tge (1963), 228. 44
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
41
Government surveys showed that previously existing diVerences in agricultural structure, and in systems of agricultural tenure, aVected the way the reforms operated in the diVerent regions. Table 2.3 gives some Wgures for the most important reforms. The Wrst column gives the total number of holdings which were completely released from all services. The largest numbers of these were in Silesia and Prussian Saxony. The next two columns give Wgures for the two of the most important categories of labour service: Spanndienst (work on the demesne farm with a team of draught animals provided by the peasant household) and Handdienst (work on the demesne farm without the obligation to provide draught animals). The province where the amount of relief from Spanndienst was highest was Posen; the province with the highest amount of relief from Handdienst was Silesia. The Wnal column gives the area of the holdings whose land was ‘reformed’ (neu reguliert) through the enclosure of common Welds or the consolidation of strips. These areas were largest in the four eastern provinces: East and West Prussia, Posen, Pomerania, and Brandenburg. The other provinces had little land in this category. In general, the reforms are shown to have had little eVect in the western provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia. In these areas feudal obligations were already in decline, as a result of developments in the pre-reform era (including the period of Napoleonic reform). Enclosure and the consolidation of holdings either took place in the Table 2.3. The impact of the agrarian reforms in Prussia, 1816–48
East and West Prussia Pomerania Posen Brandenburg Silesia Prussian Saxony Westphalia Rhineland
Number of holdings released from services
Given up days of Spanndienst (000s)
Given up days of Handdienst (000s)
Area of reformed holdings (000 Morgen)
8490 13,015 15,002 39,830 95,014 93,185 18,326 6789
375.1 818.0 1985.9 1145.1 195.1 33.4 0.0 0.0
568.2 1465.1 4344.4 2632.2 7547.5 252.8 59.5 0.0
1125.7 1208.3 1388.0 1231.3 205.3 0.2 0.0 0.0
Source: Figures from Meitzen (1868), iv. 302–3.
42
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
pre-reform era or else were carried out without direct involvement by the state or its agencies, which would exclude the reformed holdings from these statistics. Another province where there was little eVect from the reforms was Prussia (the province of Prussia was later divided into East and West Prussia), apart from the area recorded in the fourth column. Turning to the other side of the reform process, the provision of compensation to landlords for the loss of labour services and other feudal duties, this shows a similar variation between diVerent regions (Table 2.4). Large lump sum compensation payments were made in three regions: Brandenburg, Saxony, and Silesia. In Posen, compensation was more likely to take the form of an annual monetary payment. The heaviest payments in kind were made in Brandenburg. The Wnal column gives the amount of land given up as compensation, and this reXects both the extent of the reforms, and the amount of compensation paid in other ways. Thus, the low level of land losses in Saxony and Silesia can be connected to the relatively high level of capital sum payments in these provinces. In Posen, land losses were not so high, but there were substantial annual payments. The provinces
Table 2.4. The costs of agrarian reforms in Prussia, 1816–48: compensation payments by peasants to landlords Total compensation paid, in the form of:
East and West Prussia Pomerania Posen Brandenburg Silesia Prussian Saxony Westphalia Rhineland Source: As for Table 2.3.
Capital sums (000 Thaler)
Annual payments in money (0000 Thaler)
Annual payments in kind (Scheffel of rye)
Land given up (000 Morgen)
423.9 1403.4 104.7 4172.2 4192.5 5932.1 1965.6 350.3
153.2 140.2 492.6 266.4 338.9 134.0 68.7 5.9
15,300 36,900 10,400 108,500 51,900 23,700 2100 600
196.9 590.6 206.9 405.9 118.4 14.0 0.3 0.1
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
43
with the largest losses were Pomerania and Brandenburg. In the former, payments under the other categories were relatively low, and so it seems that giving up land was the preferred method of compensation in this province. In Brandenburg, the overall level of compensation appears to have been relatively high, with high payments in all categories. What this comparison shows is the variation in the reform process: a typical reform in Posen might involve relief from an obligation to provide Spanndienst, labour service with draught animals, and the compensation would be in the form of increased monetary payments; in Silesia, it was more likely to be relief from Handdienst, with compensation in the form of a lump sum payment. Concentrating on the extent of land losses and gains by peasant households obscures these other dimensions of the reform process. Although the reforms did involve some loss of land by peasant farmers, this has to be set against the gains that were made. The loss of grazing land may have been outweighed by the ability to devote more time to the holding (due to relief from labour services). The new holding was likely to be enclosed, which made it easier to introduce improved husbandry techniques. Cattle could be kept instead of horses or oxen to work the landlord’s Welds. For the landless labourers, however, the loss of common grazing was probably not outweighed by other gains. The main social cost of the reforms was the rise in the number of landless labourers, and the increase in the numbers of peasant holdings which were not large enough to be self-suYcient.47
Table 2.5. Consolidation of holdings in Prussian Saxony
Number of farms Total area Number of plots before consolidation Average size Number of plots after consolidation Average size
Altengotten
Großengotten
848 6101 Morgen 18920 0.32 Morgen 913 6.68 Morgen
1241 6803 Morgen 16100 0.42 Morgen 1584 4.29 Morgen
Source: Conrad (1891), 666. 47
Berthold (1978).
44
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
(vi) Consolidation and the reforms in southern Germany In southern Germany the reforms started late and in one important respect were unsuccessful: there was relatively little consolidation of holdings. Fragmentation of holdings had been a fairly general consequence of the open Welds system practised over much of Germany in the eighteenth century. It was greatly increased by the system of partible inheritance or Realteilung practised in the south (and other areas). In those areas of central Germany where the reforms were fully implemented there was considerable consolidation. Thus in two districts of Prussian Saxony, Altengotten and großengotten, the average numbers of separate plots were reduced as follows: In the article from which these Wgures are drawn Conrad gives seven examples of districts where consolidation had not taken place by the time the article was written (it was published in 1891). In these the number of separate plots per holding ranges from 21 to 59. Most are in the south, though some are in central Germany (the Koblenz area, for example). In general consolidation made slow progress in the Wrst half of the century, and eVective legislation was not passed until the 1850s in Prussia, Baden, and Hesse, and the 1860s in Bavaria and Wu¨rttemberg (further laws were passed in these states in 1886).48 Despite this there had already been some consolidation in the north-west. Even after laws had been passed there was much less consolidation in the south. In the south-west in particular, where peasant rights were strongly protected, there was opposition to the division of the common Welds. The system which evolved in the south was characterized by a relatively high population density, quite high reliance on non-agricultural earnings to supplement the income from the holding, few large estates but many smallholdings, and continuous division of holdings (not necessarily on inheritance—children could be given a share on reaching their majority). It was probably not very eYcient in economic terms. Germany came to import livestock products from Denmark and Holland which, arguably, could have been produced on southern farms. But it provided a reserve of labour which was available for industrial use when needed.49 And in downturns the rural economy could reabsorb surplus labour, at least for a time. Whether this system produced more or less discontent is hard to say. Contemporary observers thought it gave the peasants a higher social 48
Haushofer (1957), 58.
49
Catt (1986).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
45
status.50 But, on the other hand, it was a vulnerable system, with a tendency to overpopulation, and not one which was conducive to agricultural progress. The dependence on non-agricultural earnings worked well when there were local sources of employment, but less well when craft earnings came under pressure due to competition from large-scale industry. In practice only relatively few of those with smallholdings found industrial employment: 27.5% of those with possession of holdings of less than 2 hectares in Baden in 1907, and 23.4% in Wu¨rttemberg, against 55.8% in Westphalia and 40.6% in Anhalt.51 (vii) Concluding comments The comparison with Denmark, and the consideration of the reform process in the diVerent parts of Germany, makes it plain that local circumstances and the timing of the reforms could have important eVects on the outcome. Past policies also had an eVect. The Wrm establishment of peasant rights before the reforms certainly aVected the subsequent distribution of land. Thus in Mecklenburg and the former Swedish Pomerania there had been little protection of peasant rights and these areas became dominated by large estates: 75% of agricultural land in the Stralsund region was in holdings of over 100 hectares in 1882. In Prussia east of the Elbe the proportion was 43%.52 So the Prussian policy of peasant protection did have some eVect. But in view of the cost of the reforms, the paucity of rural credit institutions, and the fact that labour was becoming less scarce, it was probably inevitable that the large estates were going to make gains, especially in the remote areas east of the Elbe.
4. G er man A g r i c u l t u r e i n C o m p a r i s o n with Other European Countries As already noted, the implicit assumption behind the ‘failed revolution’ hypothesis is that there was the possibility of a genuinely revolutionary outcome, which would have resulted in a more complete modernization of nineteenth-century German politics and society. For political 50
51 For example, Knapp (1887), 309. Dillwitz (1975), 110–11. Perkin (1986); Dillwitz (1973); Conze (1969) refers to the annihilation of the peasantry in Mecklenburg and Pomerania in the eighteenth century. 52
46
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
developments the implied point of comparison is usually Britain, whose path of gradual progress to a widened franchise and a fully democratic system of constitutional government contrasts with Germany’s halting and uncertain moves in the same direction. For agriculture, the most relevant comparison is the land settlement brought about by the French revolution. But it should not be assumed from this that all was well with rural France in the nineteenth century. While the revolutionary settlement had created a large number of small and medium-sized holdings, the level of owner-occupation was lower than in Germany. In 1882, only 60% of French agricultural land was in owner-occupation, 27% was rented, and 13% was in metayage, or share-cropping. By contrast, in Germany in 1895, over 86% of land was owner-occupied, just 12% was rented, and only 1% was in share-cropping (this adds in Deputatland, which was a form of share farming although applied to animal husbandry).53 A second problem was the failure of yields and productivity in France to rise as much as in Germany. According to Bairoch, around 1800 French wheat yields were 85% of the German level; by 1910 they were only 71% of the German Wgure. His estimates of agricultural productivity show a rise for Germany of 371% 1800–1910, for France the increase is 172%.54 There are various measures which can be used to compare the structure of German agriculture after the reforms with other countries. One is the division of the agricultural labour force between employed and self-employed workers. Labourers who were either landless, or who had insuYcient land to provide full-time employment on their own holding, would be obliged to take work on other farms or outside agriculture. These would then be classiWed as employed, in contrast to those whose own holding was large enough to support themselves and their family without working oV the holding. The proportion of the agricultural labour force classiWed as employed is thus an approximate measure of 53 German Wgures from Rauchberg (1900), 579; French from Auge´-Laribe´ (1950), 93. The German Wgure was just below that of South Korea in 1980, 92% owner-occupied, which had increased from 35% in 1950, Wgures from Asian Productivity Organisation (1994), 37. The South Korean example is generally considered the best-managed land reform in recent years. By contrast, despite various eVorts at land reform, Pakistan still has 36% of land in tenancy and 18% in share-cropping, ibid. 70. 54 Figures from Bairoch (1989); Bairoch’s measure of agricultural productivity is calories produced per male agricultural worker, which is not ideal but probably the only measure which can be constructed for this period given the deWciencies of the data sources.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
47
the proportion that had access to holdings of a viable size. Table 2.6 provides a comparison drawn from national censuses carried out around 1900. Limitations in the data sources mean that the analysis has to be limited to the breakdown of the male labour force. This table shows that the German reforms produced an agrarian sector which predominantly consisted of self-employed owneroccupiers: the classic land reform objective. The percentage of the agricultural labour force which was classiWed as being employed was low by comparison with other European countries. The French level was notably higher. The high level of employment in England and Wales is not so surprising, given a historical process which had resulted in an unusually inegalitarian allocation of rural property rights. However, a number of other countries, not usually considered to be particularly unequal, had lower levels of self-employment than Germany. Quite evidently, the Danish land reforms did not produce a position in which all had equal access to land.55 Table 2.6. Percentages of the male agricultural labour force classified as being employed (including servants), excluding family members, various censuses circa 1900
Austria-Hungary Norway Finland Germany Belgium Italy France Sweden Switzerland Denmark Netherlands England and Wales
Date of census
% classified as employed
1900 1900 1910 1907 1901 1910 1901 1900 1900 1900 1899 1901
28.3 29.3 30.7 36.7 36.8 46.8 47.2 47.6 51.5 60.1 67.6 73.0
Source: Figures from Flora et al. (1983), adjusted to exclude family members and unclassified workers. 55 The extent of ‘landlessness’ is more diYcult to compare. Many employed workers in Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, had the use of a smallholding to grow potatoes and other vegetables. The Wgures given in Table 2.5 are not comparable with modern surveys of landlessness: see Jazairy et al. (1992), 406–7 for a summary of these.
48
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
Comparable Wgures on the distribution of agricultural land by size of holding are only available for a few countries. Table 2.7 provides some Wgures for England and Wales, Germany, and France. The Wgures have been adjusted to allow for diVerences in the classiWcations by size class. The British and German classiWcations use broadly comparable methodology: German holdings were classiWed by total agricultural area, the British by area under crops and grass. The French agricultural censuses classiWed holdings by total area, which tended to increase the importance of larger holdings, which would often include a disproportionate amount of woodland, moor, or other uncultivated areas. Comparison of the English and German Wgures shows that the distribution of land by size of holding was much more unequal in England: there was a smaller smallholding sector and the area in large holdings was proportionately greater. Typically, English agricultural land was concentrated in medium- or large-scale tenanted holdings of 100 acres or more. Comparison with France is more diYcult, due to the diVerent classiWcation methods used. An English statistician who examined this issue in 1887, P. G. Craigie, thought that, whereas three-quarters of the English agricultural area was in holdings of over 100 acres (roughly Table 2.7. A comparison of the percentage distribution of land by size of holding
Area in holdings of less than 20 hectares Area in holdings of between 20 and 40 hectares Area in holdings of over 40 hectares Area in holdings of between 40 and 100 hectares Area in holdings of over 100 hectares
England and Wales 1885
Germany 1882
France 1882
14.4
45.0
38.2
13.0
13.1
12.9
72.6
41.9
48.9
34.0
17.5
n.a.
38.6
24.4
n.a.
Note: England and Wales: classified by area under crops and grass; Germany: classified by total agricultural area; France: classified by total area. Source: British figures from Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968), 20; French and German figures from Tracey (1982). To produce comparable figures, the density functions were interpolated using a log-log interpolation method.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
49
equivalent to 40 hectares), only a third of the equivalent French area was in this class.56 This is a considerably lower proportion than the 48.9% share given in Table 2.7. If this is right, then the distribution of agricultural area in France may have been rather more egalitarian than in Germany, contrary to the impression given by the French distribution by total land area, shown in Table 2.2. Either way, the diVerence was probably not that great. However, the objective of agrarian reform is not just to produce a relatively equal distribution of land-holding: it is also to produce a more egalitarian pattern of land ownership. Comparison of the distribution of land according to the size of the owned farm or estate is even more diYcult, as there are no oYcial Wgures available for this period. In England in the early 1870s there was a Local Government survey of land ownership, sometimes referred to as the ‘New Doomsday Book’.57 This survey showed that land ownership in England and Wales was highly concentrated: 74% of privately owned land was in estates of 300 acres or more. This is a distribution by size of total land ownership, not ownership of agricultural land. Making some allowance for this suggests that between 60% and 65% of agricultural land was in estates of 300 acres or more (the lower Wgure assumes that all nonagricultural land was in larger estates), and between 65% and 70% in estates of 100 hectares or more. This contrasts with the farm census Wgures which show that 28% of agricultural land was in holdings of 300 acres or more in 1875 (or 38% in holdings of over 100 hectares). Thus, the distribution of land by ownership was much more inegalitarian than the distribution by holding. The high level of owner-occupation in Germany meant that the gap between the distribution by ownership and by holding was nothing like as large as in Britain. The distribution by ownership may well have been more egalitarian than the distribution by holding size. This could arise if larger holdings rented from more than one landlord, or if they included some rented land as well as some which was owneroccupied. The best source of information on the structure of ownership in German agriculture is a survey carried out by the Reich statistical oYce in 1938. This produced a careful cross-tabulation of the distribution of 56 Craigie (1887), 110; Levy (1911) is also a useful source on the structure of English agriculture in comparison with other countries. 57 The original returns were summarized in Bateman (1879), but this study makes use of the adjusted results published in Brodrick (1881).
50
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
land by size of estate and by size of holding (something which is not available for British agriculture). The results are summarized in Table 2.8. This table shows a fairly close correspondence between the size distribution by holding size and the pattern of ownership. There are some regions where the ownership distribution was signiWcantly more equal than the holding distribution: Brunswick, Silesia, Westphalia, and Hanover are the most notable. There are two regions where the ownership distribution was signiWcantly less egalitarian: Mecklenburg and Anhalt. But in general the two series do not diVer by much.
Table 2.8. The distribution of land by size of holding and by size of estate, by province, 1938 % of land in individual ownership
% of agricultural land in holdings of over 100 hectares
% of all privately owned land in estates of over 100 hectares
East Prussia Brandenburg Pomerania Silesia Prussian Saxony Schleswig-Holstein Hanover Westphalia Hesse-Nassau Rhineland Bavaria Saxony Wu¨rttemberg Baden Thuringia Hesse Mecklenburg Oldenburg Brunswick Anhalt
72.0 71.1 71.8 71.7 72.1 83.8 77.1 81.1 48.2 59.9 72.1 72.4 63.9 61.5 62.3 62.7 82.8 84.4 56.2 55.5
32.2 35.7 46.5 38.1 25.9 16.8 19.7 19.1 6.4 10.5 5.7 17.4 1.1 10.9 9.8 9.9 35.0 11.8 13.2 26.1
32.0 31.1 40.0 26.7 25.7 14.4 10.1 5.7 6.7 4.7 4.5 13.8 3.9 5.9 11.3 5.1 48.2 19.3 2.9 35.2
All Germany
70.0
22.3
18.7
Source: SDR (1938).
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
51
The drawing of conclusions for the pre-1914 era from a survey undertaken in 1938 is obviously something which needs to be done with some care. The crisis which aVected German agriculture in the 1920s would have altered the relationship between the two series to some extent. One consequence could have been an increase in the ownership of land by institutions, both public sector and private (as a result of the repossession of mortgaged estates, for example). The Wrst column of Table 2.8 shows that, in some regions, the percentage of land in private ownership had fallen to under 60% (though this does not appear to have much eVect on the relationship between the two distributions). With these caveats in mind, a hedged statement is advisable: on the evidence currently available, there is no reason to anticipate that the ownership distribution in the German regions before 1914 would have been markedly less egalitarian than the holding distribution, with the exception of regions such as Mecklenburg where the 1938 survey showed this to be the case. In other words the holding distribution is a good guide to inequality in land ownership in pre-1914 Germany (which follows from the high level of owner-occupation in German agriculture). Looking at the map of German agriculture in 1895 (Figure 2.2), the only areas with a level of inequality in land-holding which came up to the English level (38.6% of land in holdings of over 100 hectares) were those east of the Elbe. Even in this area there were several regions where larger holdings were relatively rare: in the East Prussian region of Gumbinnen holdings with over 100 hectares accounted for 33.1% of the total agricultural area, in the Silesian Regierungsbezirke of Oppeln and Liegnitz they occupied 31.2 and 28.4% respectively. But when allowance is made for the substantial gap in Britain between inequality in land ownership and in land-holding, the diVerence between the two countries becomes a massive one. The English level of 65–70% of land in the ownership of estates with at least 100 hectares was way above the most probable level in most regions east of the Elbe. It was equalled only in parts of Pomerania (the Stralsund Regierungsbezirk and possibly Ko¨slin as well) and, most probably, in Mecklenburg. In Posen and Bromberg, the English level could have been reached if the ownership distribution had been substantially less equal than the holding distribution. The image of east-Elbian agriculture as one dominated by large estates, on the English pattern, is to a large degree a false one. The
52
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
25−30% 30−35% 35−40% 40−45% <5%
45−50%
5−10%
50−55%
10−15%
55−60%
15−20%
60−65%
20−25%
>65%
Fig. 2.2. Percentage of land in holdings of over 100 hectares, 1895
typical farm in Brandenburg, Silesia, East Prussia, and the Danzig region of West Prussia was more likely to be an owner-occupied holding of around 30–50 hectares. Even where larger estates predominated, they were very diVerent from the English model: an average Junker estate might consist of around 250 hectares farmed ‘in hand’; the equivalent English aristocratic estate in the 1890s would be almost entirely let out to tenants, and considerably larger. In Germany 14% of land was in some form of tenancy in 1895; the Wgure for England and Wales in 1891 was 85%.58 Tenanted percentages in German regions came nowhere near the English Wgures. Figure 2.3 gives the percentage of the total agricultural area which was rented, by region. The map shows that the highest percentages were in AlsaceLorraine and in Mecklenburg. The lowest was in Bavaria. In general, the rented percentage was not particularly high east of the Elbe, apart 58
Rauchberg (1900), 579; Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968), 25.
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
53
from Mecklenburg. Levels in the other eastern provinces were below those in central and western regions such as Hanover, Prussian Saxony, and the Rhineland. In most of Germany, especially in the west and the south, large estates were a rarity. The typical farm was small, 10–20 hectares, and owner-occupied. There was little employed labour. The rural sector was therefore, by the standards of contemporary European countries, a relatively egalitarian one. The low proportion of landless labourers in the rural population as a whole, and the high level of owner-occupation, mean that the structure of nineteenth-century German agriculture compared well with the situation in many less-developed economies today.59
5. T h e Ku z n e t s C u r v e a nd G e r m a n A g r i c u l t u r e The Kuznets Curve is a hypothesis about the development of inequality in industrializing economies based on a series of assumptions about inequality in diVerent sectors. However, the analysis of particular countries shows that historical circumstances and geographical conditions matter a lot and can lead to large diVerences: Do these favour large estates or plantations? Has there been an attempt at land reform? Was this successful or unsuccessful? In the German case, the agrarian reforms produced a relatively egalitarian rural sector, which meant that the starting point for the Kuznets Curve was a low one.60 If inequality in the industrial sector turned out to be high, then a shift into this sector from the more egalitarian rural sector would tend to push up overall inequality. The structure of German agriculture also meant that the experience of rural–urban migration produced a much more dramatic change in social circumstances than in Britain. In Britain the tripartite division of industrial society—owner or shareholder at the top, salaried manager or foreman in the middle, wage-earning worker at the bottom—was not dissimilar to the tripartite division of rural society—large land-owner who rented
59 Prosterman and Riedinger (1987), 41 gives the current position in developing economies. 60 The Prussian rural distribution was an egalitarian one by modern standards. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 9, which includes estimates of income inequality derived from tax statistics.
54
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
15−20% >5%
20−25%
5−10%
25−30%
10−15%
30−35%
Fig. 2.3. Rented land as a percentage of the total agricultural area, 1882
out land at the top, tenant farmer in the middle, landless rural labourer at the bottom. The position in rural Germany was a very diVerent one. Migrants from the rural areas in the south and the west came from areas where peasant proprietorship was the dominant system. If they were the sons and daughters of peasant farmers they would have had little experience of wage labour. If they came from the families of the relatively small number of landless labourers, the social context would still have been a dissimilar one (working alongside neighbours who did own some land) to that provided by an urban factory. Even in the east, the position of the agricultural labourer was not that of a wage-earning labourer paid by the hour. There were a variety of contractual arrangements, most of which gave a degree of autonomy to the labourer and his family, at least as far as the organization of the day’s work was concerned.61
61 The system was one which required the worker to supply speciWed hours of labour at harvest time and other peak periods, but which left the organization of duties such as cow-keeping up to the labourer. Outside peak periods, the worker and his family were
Sources of Inequality in Rural Germany
55
For these reasons, the structure of German agriculture had an eVect on the impact of industrialization and migration: the relative change was a greater one. Industrialization brought about a transformation of society which was more rapid than in early-industrializing economies such as Britain. It was also a more profound change than in Britain. expected to occupy themselves on a smallholding provided by the land-owner. See Weber (1893) and Chapter 6 below for further details.
3
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n The discussion in the Wrst two chapters has made it clear that there are particular reasons to be concerned with the process of migration during the early stages of industrialization. First, migration is the conduit whereby a rural labour surplus holds down wages in urban labour markets during the labour surplus phase of the Lewis Model. Secondly, the transfer of population from a relatively egalitarian rural sector to a more unequal urban sector is an integral part of the Kuznets process, pushing up overall inequality. Both these factors make it important to consider the factors which aVected the pace of migration, and which eventually led to a change in the pattern of migration as the labour surplus phase came to an end.1 The important feature of the labour surplus phase is the movement of population from predominantly agricultural regions to the expanding urban centres, resulting in a high level of net losses in the former areas, and large gains in the latter. But this feature was not the only type of migration in industrializing societies. It was superimposed on a pattern which already existed in pre-industrial societies: of seasonal migration connected with the harvest demands and other types of work inXuenced by weather conditions. It also merged into a more modern pattern, characteristic of mature industrial societies, of migration between urban centres, responding to shifts in labour demand by industry. But neither of these other streams has the implications predicted by the Lewis Model. Other migration streams which have diVerent implications are those which cross international boundaries. Where there is a large outward 1 Internal migration is not the only source of downward pressure on labour markets. Kindleberger (1967), 20 argues that in late nineteenth-century America there were labour surplus conditions created by heavy immigration. In post-1945 West Germany there was a similar eVect as a result of the inXux of refugees, ibid. 34.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
57
Xow of emigrants this will transfer a portion of the rural labour surplus to foreign labour markets, thus acting as a ‘safety valve’, relieving pressure on over-supplied urban markets in the country of origin. But where there is large-scale immigration, then surplus conditions elsewhere can intensify the ‘labour surplus’ phase in the host country. EVectively, the labour market in the receiving country is integrated with that of the country of origin. Those parts of the migration process which have tended to attract most attention are moves which result in a permanent gain or loss of population. In the aggregate this is net migration: a surplus or deWcit is created when moves in are deducted from moves out. But in most societies net internal migration is relatively small compared to gross internal migration. There are many moves which are temporary or reversible. There are life-cycle moves: young men (less often women) who move to cities intending to return, perhaps hoping to have accumulated enough savings to buy a smallholding or some other business in their region of birth. There are seasonal moves: farmers who take winter jobs in cities but return for the harvest; other agricultural workers who move with the harvest, starting in the warmer southern regions, and moving north and east as the harvest season progresses. There are certain skilled occupations which have always been associated with high mobility: stonemasons and other skilled building workers moved with major construction projects in medieval Europe, such as bridges or cathedrals. Railway construction had a similar eVect in the nineteenth century, attracting large numbers of workers, skilled and unskilled.2 Most of the available statistical sources tend to measure net migration better than gross migration. Census returns generally record place of residence at the time of the census and place of birth: it is rare to Wnd any evidence on places of residence between these two points. This means that many temporary moves between these dates are unrecorded. Germany is relatively unusual in that, thanks to the system of MeldepXicht, compulsory registration after a change of residence, there is some evidence on gross migration.3 This makes it possible to examine the relationship between the labour surplus transfers and the general pattern of mobility. 2 Von der Goltz (1875) includes the results of a survey of rural migration in the early 1870s, which shows both the traditional pattern of seasonal migration, and the impact of railway construction. 3 The MeldepXicht system and its value as a migration source is described in Meyer (1938).
58
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913 2. G e r m a n M i g r a t i o n a n d U r b a n i z a t i o n in International Comparison
Most of this study is concerned with the eVect of internal migration in Germany. But it is worth considering whether the German experience diVered from that of other European countries, and if so, in what way? It is not easy to achieve comparability of migration statistics between countries. The drawing of the regional boundaries aVects migration records. A country with a large number of regional units will tend to have more recorded migration than one with a relatively small number of larger units. An accurate comparison needs to be based on a similar set of regional units for all countries. In the late nineteenth century, the American statistician, Adna Weber, attempted such a comparison. His results are given in Table 3.1. These show that, compared to all other European countries, the German states of Prussia and Saxony had the highest rates of internal migration. In many other countries there were relatively few internal moves. This is particularly striking for the Scandinavian countries, which had high rates of external migration, but much less internal migration.4 Table 3.1. Percentage of the population born outside the country where enumerated
Saxony Prussia England and Wales Denmark Austria France Switzerland Netherlands Norway Sweden Hungary
Date of census
% born elsewhere
1885 1890 1891 1890 1890 1891 1888 1889 1875 1880 1890
30.9 30.3 28.4 22.1 19.8 18.7 17.9 13.0 12.8 11.5 10.8
Source: Weber (1899), 249. 4 Norway and Sweden had the highest rates of emigration after Ireland, Hatton and Williamson (1998), 33.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
59
Another approach is to compare rates of urbanization. If cities are growing fast, so that the proportion of the population living in cities is rising, then this can come about either through higher rates of natural increase or through migration. In practice, in most European countries, the Wrst factor was not important: the rate of natural increase in cities was generally below that in rural areas. So, rising urbanization was a consequence of migration. Table 3.2 presents some Wgures for the proportion of the population living in cities in various European countries. These are countries for which results are available both for the period around 1870 and again for the period just before the First World War. The results for the Netherlands in 1909 are given in brackets as there are no comparable Wgures for the earlier period. The table is in two parts: Part A gives the percentage of the population living in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants; Part B gives the proportion living in towns and cities with over 20,000 inhabitants. The table shows that by 1910 Germany was the third most urbanized country in Europe after Britain and the Netherlands. There is a signiWcant gap between Germany and the fourth-placed country on both measures. In 1870, by contrast, Germany was behind France and Belgium on both measures, and around the same level as Italy, Denmark, and Ireland (the relative position depending on the measure used). The increase in urbanization between the two dates (measured as the annual gain in percentage points) is larger in Germany than in any other country. The German gain during the period 1871–1910 was 16.5 percentage points using the ‘over 100,000’ measure and 22.2 using the ‘over 20,000’ measure. The next-placed country was England and Wales with gains of 12.1 and 18.6 respectively (1871–1911). The gain for France was just 5.7 percentage points on the ‘over 100,000’ measure, and 9.3 percentage points for the ‘over 20,000’ measure. Urbanization in nineteenth-century Germany proceeded at a much faster pace than in other European countries. The pressure on urban services and amenities was correspondingly high, as was the pressure on urban labour markets in the Lewis Model framework. Where high urban growth resulted from high inward migration, this also meant that a higher portion of the population was exposed to the experience of social dislocation resulting from moves from a rural society still dominated by traditional attitudes and values to a very diVerent urban environment. Table 3.3 provides Wgures for a more detailed comparison of Germany with England and Wales over the whole of the nineteenth
60
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
Table 3.2. Urbanization in various European countries, c. 1870 and c. 1910 A: Living in cities >100,000 Date of % census England and Wales Scotland Denmark France Belgium Ireland Italy Germany Austria Sweden Norway Switzerland Finland Netherlands not available
1871 1871 1870 1872 1866 1871 1861 1871 1869 1870 1875 1870 1870
25.8 22.7 10.2 9.1 8.1 7.8 5.4 4.8 3.7 3.3 0 0 0
Date of % census England and Wales Scotland (Netherlands) Germany Denmark Ireland France Belgium Italy Austria Norway Sweden Switzerland Finland
1911 1911 (1909) 1910 1911 1911 1910 1910 1911 1910 1910 1910 1910 1910
37.9 30.1 (29.7) 21.3 16.8 15.8 14.8 11.0 10.9 10.6 10.3 9.2 8.6 4.7
B: Living in towns and cities >20,000 Date of % census England and Wales Scotland Belgium France Germany Ireland Italy Denmark Norway Austria Switzerland Sweden Finland
1871 1871 1866 1872 1871 1871 1861 1870 1875 1869 1870 1870 1870
42.0 31.8 15.4 14.8 12.5 11.6 11.1 10.2 8.5 6.5 6.4 5.8 1.6
Date of census England and Wales Scotland Germany Belgium Italy Denmark France Ireland Switzerland Norway Austria Sweden Finland (Netherlands)
1911 1911 1910 1910 1911 1911 1910 1911 1910 1910 1910 1910 1910 (1909)
%
60.6 49.5 34.7 28.8 28.2 27.0 24.1 21.5 21.1 18.1 16.9 16.1 9.3 (40.4)
Source: Data from Flora et al. (1996), 249–80; the French and Belgian results used diVerent-size classes and were adjusted to make them comparable by extrapolating the density function.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
61
century. This shows that in 1801 England was much more urbanized than Germany in 1871. Interpolating between the census years, it appears that Germany reached the English 1801 Wgure of 23.0% in 1893. Germany then moved to 34.7% in 1910. Using the same approach on the results for England and Wales shows that this Wgure was attained around 1853. So, while it took Germany 17 years to get from 23.0% to 34.7%, it took England and Wales 52 years to make the same move. Urbanization was three times as fast in Germany than in England during the equivalent period.5 Table 3.3. Percentage of the population living in towns and cities >20,000 Germany Date of census
1871 1880 1890 1900 1910
England and Wales %
Date of census
%
12.5 16.1 21.0 28.8 34.7
1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911
23.0 24.4 25.9 28.5 30.7 33.6 38.2 42.0 47.9 53.7 58.2 60.6
Note: A comparison with France shows that the move from 4.8% of the population living in cities of over 100,000 to 14.8% took 59 years in France (1852–1911) but 26 years in Germany (1871–97). Source: Data from Flora et al. (1996), 262, 278.
Looking at results for individual cities, it is clear that one reason why urbanization was so fast in Germany was that all the main cities grew fast. The annual rates of growth of the Wve largest cities in 1871–1900 were: 5
There is no simple relationship between urbanization and economic growth, but this comparison provides another piece of evidence (if more were needed) indicating that the rate of growth in Britain during the industrial revolution was relatively slow.
62
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
Berlin 3.70% Hamburg 2.85% Munich 3.52% Leipzig 3.66% Dresden 3.22%6 In Britain there were cities which matched these rates of growth: Liverpool grew at 3.30% per annum in 1801–31; Glasgow at 3.03% in 1801–41. But there were other cities which grew less fast: Birmingham at 2.4% in 1801–31, and London at 1.95% in 1801–41. The slow growth of London, which was already a large city in the eighteenth century, is particularly important in holding back the overall rate of increase.7 Comparison with cities outside Western Europe shows that there were American cities which matched or surpassed German rates of growth: New York grew at 3.9% per annum in 1825–71 and Chicago went from a population of 80,000 in 1855 to one of 420,000 in 1876, an annual growth rate of 8.2%. Massive immigration made these rates of growth possible. But the German rate of urbanization was unusually fast by the standards of nineteenth-century Europe: faster than any other European country had experienced. This meant that internal migration was also relatively high. The natural rate of population increase for Berlin was only 0.95% per annum in 1841–1900; it required high rates of inward migration to raise the annual growth rate to 3.7%.
3. M e a s u r i n g G ross a nd N e t Mi g r a t i o n As mentioned in the Introduction, there was an obligation on the German population to register a change of residence. This created a source of data on migration which is particularly valuable in that it gives information about total moves. The obligation did not apply to temporary changes and there may also have been some evasion. In 1902 the Berlin statistical oYce published adjusted Wgures which took account of under-recording, the extent of this being estimated from a comparison with the census results. No adjustment to the amount of 6 Figures from Schrott (1903), who provides a valuable adjustment to the population Wgures which takes account of boundary changes. 7 British Wgures taken from the 1879 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, articles on various cities.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
63
inward migration was considered necessary, but the numbers of outward moves were adjusted upwards by 17%. However, it is possible that the Berlin police were unusually vigilant. Others may have been more lax. It is noticeable, for example, that recorded gross migration is signiWcantly lower for Bavarian cities than in other parts of Germany.8 Keeping these reservations in mind, these Wgures still show a society which had high levels of mobility. From 1898 onwards the available city statistics were collected and published in the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Sta¨dte. By 1907 this included Wgures for 48 cities, with a total population of 11.3 million. These cities recorded a total number of moves in of 2.06 million and moves out of 1.81 million. Total moves amounted to 346 per 1,000 head of population.9 There will, however, be some double counting in this (moves from one city to another will be counted twice). Moreover, some individuals will have left and come back in the same year, thus counting as two moves. The adjusted series produced by the Berlin statistical oYce runs from 1841 to 1902. For this study the series has been extended to 1912 using the same adjustment procedure, and the results of the 1905 and 1910 censuses. Figure 3.1 shows the results. There are four periods which can be distinguished. The Wrst runs from 1841 to the late 1850s. In this period overall mobility is relatively low. On average total moves are 141 per 1,000 head of population in 1841–59. Net gains are 1.2% per annum on average, but these Xuctuate considerably. In the second period, from 1860 to the early 1870s, overall mobility is much higher and rises to a peak of over 270 moves per 1,000 in 1871–3. Net gains are also high, averaging 3.4% in 1860–73, although these do still Xuctuate.10 It is worth taking note of the timing of this phase: it coincides with the onset of faster industrial growth brought about by the boom in railway construction. It is a period in which agricultural prices were tending to rise. The increase in mobility was not connected to any agricultural crisis. 8 Berlin Wgures from SJB (1903), 158; Wgures for all cities were published annually in SJDS. 9 SJDS (1908), 39; all the main cities are included with the exception of Munich. Total moves includes all moves to and from each city; moves within the city boundaries are not included. 10 This is partly due to the inXuence of the war years 1866 and 1870; in both these years net migration is low, presumably as a result of the conscription of many potential migrants.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
64 400
300
200
100 Net moves 0 Total moves
−100 1841
1849
1857
1865
1873
1881
1889
1897
1905
Fig. 3.1. Net and gross migration, Berlin 1841–1912: net moves and total moves per 1,000 head of population Source: The original series was in SJB (1903), 158; the extension uses annual data from SJDS, adjusted for the census results for 1905 and 1910.
In the third period, from 1874 to 1890, mobility is below the 1871–3 peak although there is an upward trend. Net gains are substantial, although, at 2.2% per annum, these are lower than in the previous period. From 1890 onwards net migration falls, while gross migration rises, eventually rising above the level of the 1871–3 peak. By 1910–12 Berlin was no longer gaining population through migration.11 So the Wnal period is one of high mobility, a Xexible pre-1914 labour market, but not one of high net migration. Whether this is typical of Germany as a whole is a question which will be considered later. What was the reason for this high mobility? There was a seasonal element, which leads one to conclude that some migrants did return home to help with farmwork in the summer. Figure 3.2 gives a monthly breakdown of migration in and out of Berlin in 1901–2.12 There was a 11 The chart shows a net loss; however, this is partly due to a shift in population to areas which were not included within the pre-1914 city boundaries: Charlottenburg, Neuko¨lln, Scho¨neberg, Spandau, Lichtenberg, and Wilmersdorf. Including these in a ‘Greater Berlin’ unit (and allowing for some under-recording of moves out) alters the overall result to one of balance: moves out equalled moves in. 12 Data from SJB (1903), 159; the moves out have been adjusted upwards by the statistical oYce.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
65
3
2
1
0
Net moves −1 Moves in −2
Moves out Jan.
Mar.
May
July
Sept.
Nov.
Fig. 3.2. Net moves, moves out and moves in, as percentages of the total population, Berlin 1901–2 (averages of the two years) Source: Data from SJB (1903), 159.
substantial move out in March, at the start of the sowing season, and a smaller outwards movement in the summer months. In all Berlin lost 0.76% of the total population in the period February–July and gained 0.70% in the remaining months. However, this is probably a serious underestimate of the true movement; many of those who returned for just a few weeks in the summer may not have needed to register a change of address. In general, however, this is not a major contribution to overall mobility. As the chart shows, there were a large number of moves in both directions in most months. Monthly net migration is small relative to gross migration, as is annual net migration. Results from other cities also show a seasonal pattern. Figure 3.3 provides a similar analysis of moves to and from Cologne in 1912–13.13 Here the seasonal pattern is a rather diVerent one: there is net outwards migration in the June–August period, equivalent to 0.5% of the total population, and gains in the remaining months amounting to 2.9% of the total population. Again, monthly net migration is small relative to gross migration. 13
SJK (1914), 30; the moves out are not adjusted, so these may be underestimated.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
66
2
1
0
Net moves
−1
Moves in −2
Moves out Jan.
Mar.
May
July
Sept.
Nov.
Fig. 3.3. Net moves, moves out and moves in, as percentages of the total population, Cologne 1911–12 (averages of the two years)
It is also worth considering what aspects of migration are obscured or downgraded by the tendency to concentrate on net migration. Two studies are of interest. The Wrst is an analysis by the Berlin statistical oYce of the occupations of migrants in 1910. In this year there were 263,991 registered moves into Berlin and 206,552 moves out, an apparent gain of 56,839. Table 3.4a compares the breakdown by occupation of this Wgure with the distribution of total moves (in and out). In this year Berlin took in numbers of industrial workers, and these accounted for a third of net moves, but only a quarter of all moves. By contrast, the professional categories, oYcials, students, and workers in trade and commerce (a highly mobile group according to census returns) all occupy a larger share of total moves than net moves. The Cologne statistical oYce classiWed migrants in 1913 according to their last place of residence or intended destination. This again can be used to compare net and gross migration. The results (in Table 3.4b) show that net migration Wgures tend to be biased towards moves over longer distances, while the importance of moves within the locality, in this case the Regierungsbezirk Ko¨ln, is underestimated.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
67
Table 3.4a. A comparison of the distribution by occupation of net moves and total moves, Berlin 1910
Occupied in agriculture and Wshery Occupied in industry Occupied in trade and commerce Domestic servants General labourers Professional, state oVicials, and military personnel Pensioners and rentiers Students UnclassiWed
% share in net moves
% share in total moves
1.15 33.62 15.74 25.60 16.63 1.67 1.14 0.65 3.80
0.78 26.54 20.01 23.09 11.98 7.40 1.31 4.20 4.71
Note: Unoccupied family members are included, classiWed according to the occupation of the head of the household. Source: Calculated from SJB (1908–11), 215, which classiWed migrants into 43 occupational categories. These have been amalgamated for use in Table 3.4a.
Table 3.4b. A comparison of the distribution of net moves and total moves, by last place of residence or intended destination, Cologne 1913
Rest of Regierungsbezirk Ko¨ln Rest of Rhineland province Hesse-Nassau and Westphalia Rest of Germany
% share in net moves
% share in total moves
18.4 43.5 12.7 25.5
29.4 38.8 12.1 19.7
Source: Calculated from SJK (1913), 27.
To summarize, using Wgures for net migration concentrates attention on the movement of migrants over substantial distances into urban industrial jobs, but there are other short-distance moves which are also an important part of internal migration in the period: a student going to a large city to study; a doctor or oYcial moving to a diVerent post; a small trader trying his or her luck in a series of diVerent localities. Most of the rest of this study will be concerned with net migration, or moves revealed by the census comparison of place of residence with place of
68
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
birth. But it should be borne in mind that these moves represent just the visible part of a much larger iceberg.
4. So u r c e s o f Mi g r a n t s Where did migrants come from? Did this change over time? The analysis of census data provides one way to answer these questions. By looking at cohorts, census returns sorted by the date of arrival in the city, it is possible to compare the origins of migrants in diVerent periods. Two points should be noted in advance. The Wrst, following from the discussion in the previous section, is that this will only capture permanent moves, or at least moves which had not been reversed by the time of the census. The second is that the analysis will be aVected if there are variations in death rates according to migrant origins. If migrants from the rural east, for example, live in poorer quality housing, and have lower life expectancy in consequence, then there will be a tendency for these to be under-represented in earlier cohorts. It is possible to make such an analysis by cohort of the 1910 Berlin census. This is shown in Table 3.5. In 1910 the Berlin census asked for the last place of residence prior to migration. This makes it possible to compare those migrants who moved directly from their place of birth to those who made an intermediate move. The Wrst point to note is the decline in the numbers of moves from the areas nearest to Berlin, especially the provinces of Brandenburg, Prussian Saxony, and Anhalt. These provided over half the migrants in the pre-1870 period, but only a third after 1900. There is a shift in favour of the eastern provinces in the period to 1890, but thereafter the east’s share declines. By 1906–10 migrants were drawn much more evenly. There were rises in the share contributed by the west and north-west, and by the other central provinces, and there was also a rise in the foreign contingent. There is a problem here: return migration could have the eVect of boosting the east’s share over time, as eastern migrants were less likely to return or make further moves. Thus, the eastern share will tend to rise for cohorts furthest from the census date. Fortunately, there are other ways to establish the trend of net migration and these will be used in a later section. Looking at the balance between migrants who moved from their place of birth, and those who had already made at least one move, it is
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
69
Table 3.5. Analysis of the 1910 Berlin population by arrival cohort: percentage distribution of those born outside the city by last place of residence prior to migration (both sexes) Date of arrival in the city 1906– 1901– 1896– 1891– 1886– 1881– 1876– 1871– pre10 5 1900 5 90 5 80 5 1870 All moves: Regbez. Potsdam 16.5 16.0 16.4 Other Brandenburg/ 16.7 17.9 19.5 Pr. Saxony/Anhalt Other Centre 8.3 7.0 6.2 total centre 41.5 40.8 42.0 East 37.5 45.5 46.7 West and 10.6 6.9 5.8 north-west South and 3.1 2.1 1.7 south-west Foreign 7.3 4.8 3.7 Moved from place of birth: total 40.6 44.4 48.2 From towns and 29.2 34.4 39.4 rural areas From cities 8.7 8.1 7.3 Moved from somewhere other than place of total 59.4 55.6 51.8 From towns and 36.9 35.0 33.8 rural areas From cities 18.0 17.7 15.8
15.2 19.3
14.2 19.5
16.4 22.3
17.3 23.5
15.8 23.4
22.4 28.1
5.4 39.9 49.2 5.9
4.8 38.5 53.1 4.4
5.1 43.8 48.4 4.5
4.6 45.5 47.5 4.0
3.7 42.9 51.3 3.0
3.4 53.8 41.4 2.9
1.8
1.4
1.2
1.2
0.9
0.5
3.2
2.6
2.1
1.8
1.9
1.4
49.7 41.1
53.0 44.8
55.8 47.7
60.7 52.8
63.7 56.5
71.1 61.9
7.3 birth: 50.3 32.3
7.2
7.3
7.1
6.4
8.6
47.0 30.5
44.2 28.8
39.3 25.7
36.3 24.2
28.9 19.3
16.1
15.0
14.1
12.6
10.9
8.9
Source: These calculations were made using material from microWlm tapes kindly made available by Professor Dudley Baines, which are now in the library of the London School of Economics. These contain the full published record of the Berlin censuses 1861–1910. The results were summarized using the regional classiWcation set out in Appendix 2C. The data is drawn from table V.3 of the 1910 census, Berlin Statistisches Amt (1913–16), i. 32–9.
clear that there is a considerable change. Over 70% of the pre-1870 cohort were on their Wrst move. By 1906–10 this had dropped to below 30%. There is also a shift in the source of migrants, from smaller towns and rural areas to cities (the census data makes it possible to group migrants from 87 major towns and cities, the Berlin suburbs not
70
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
incorporated in the city, and the industrial regions of Zabrze and Borbeck). But it should be noted that these urban areas only contributed 27% of migrants in 1906–10; the majority still came from rural areas and small towns. Comparison with the results of earlier censuses is made diYcult by the fact that these only recorded place of birth, not last place of residence. It is possible to take encouragement from the Wnding that most of those who arrived in the earlier years had come from their place of birth, but this is still an obvious source of discrepancy between the two data sources. Table 3.6 provides an analysis of the population resident in 1890, by place of birth and date of arrival. This shows a steady rise in the proportion coming from the eastern provinces. In the 1870s and 1880s about half of all migrants came from this area. At the same time there was decline in the proportion coming from the area around Berlin, which is particularly marked in the case of the nearby Kreise: Teltow, Niederbarmin, and Osthavelland. At this stage it would be premature to attempt to draw Wrm conclusions, but the pattern which is emerging suggests that the German Table 3.6. Cohort analysis of the Berlin population 1890: percentage distribution of those born outside the city by place of birth (both sexes) Date of arrival in the city 1881– 1871– 1861– 1851– 1841– 1831– 1821– pre90 80 70 60 50 40 30 1820 Nearby Kreise 6.3 Rest of Regbez. 9.4 Potsdam Other Brandenburg/ 20.7 Pr. Saxony/Anhalt Other Centre 3.5 TOTAL CENTRE 39.9 East 49.3 West and north-west 6.2 South and south-west 1.6 Foreign 3.1
6.4 11.2
7.4 13.5
10.2 16.1
12.3 17.8
16.4 20.7
20.0 21.5
22.6 20.9
23.1
26.6
30.8
32.0
30.3
28.1
24.8
2.6 43.3 50.3 3.9 0.8 1.7
2.3 49.8 45.0 3.5 0.5 1.2
2.5 59.6 34.9 4.1 0.5 0.9
3.2 65.3 28.6 4.3 0.8 1.0
3.0 70.4 24.2 3.8 0.7 0.9
4.2 73.8 20.4 3.3 0.9 1.3
5.7 74.0 15.2 5.1 2.4 4.9
Source: Calculated from data in Berliner Statistisches Amt (1893), table V.2; the regional classiWcation is set out in Appendix 2C.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
71
experience of migration during the period of industrialization can be divided into three periods: 1. Early (up to the 1860s): low mobility, most migrants drawn from the regions nearest to the cities. 2. Middle (from the 1860s to the 1890s): higher mobility, and a major shift of population out of the rural east. 3. Late (after the mid-1890s): a highly mobile, Xexible labour market, but one less dominated by the absorption of a labour surplus from the rural east. The cohort analysis made by the Berlin statistical oYce was also used to examine the extent to which migrants from diVerent regions made further moves after arrival. The basic requirement was an assessment of the probable death rate of a given cohort. After this had been deducted, a comparison of cohort numbers at diVerent census dates gave the percentages of those who remained and those who moved again. This was not an estimate of return migration as such, but return migration formed a part of the total of those moving. Ideally it would have been desirable to adjust for diVerences in likely death rates, but this information was not available, and the statistical oYce applied the same death rate to all groups (though diVerent rates were applied to each sex). Some error would have resulted from this. If migrants from the east, having lower wages and poorer living conditions than others, had higher death rates then there will be a tendency to overestimate the numbers moving: some of those assumed to have moved having, in fact, died.14 Table 3.7 provides a summary of this analysis, using the 1875, 1880, and 1890 censuses. The table shows that those who moved over short distances, coming from the adjacent areas of Brandenburg and Prussian Saxony, were less likely to make further moves. Of those who moved from more distant areas, those coming from the eastern provinces have much lower rates of further migration when compared to the rest of Germany. Two other points which emerge are the high rates of further migration for foreigners and the lower rates for women compared to men. 14 The view that the poor had higher death rates is well supported: see Spree (1988) for example. There is no evidence that eastern migrants had lower wages; nevertheless, given lower wage levels in the region of origin it can be assumed that reservation wage levels would be lower for eastern migrants facing similar costs of migration, and it is therefore probable that wages would have tended to be lower.
72
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
Table 3.7. Estimates of the numbers making further moves after arrival, Berlin 1875–80 and 1880–90 % of each migrant cohort who move away from Berlin
Arrived from: Brandenburg/ Pr. Saxony East Rest of Germany Foreigners
Arrived pre-1875, moved in 1875–80
Arrived pre-1880, moved in 1880–90
men
women
men
women
25.3
15.4
26.0
21.8
27.6 43.6 51.0
16.8 23.4 35.6
25.4 46.4 53.3
19.0 32.1 44.7
Source: Calculated from data in Berlin Statistisches Amt (1893), 44.
This may appear a surprising result. The likelihood of a temporary move could be expected to be inversely related to distance: individuals might make short moves intending to return, to take advantage of unusual short-term employment opportunities, but over long distances the cost of the move would mean that most would be intended to be permanent. Instead the reverse seems to be the case. It might be that short-distance migrants are better informed, and therefore less likely to make mistakes, but examination of Figure 3.4, which gives the rate of further moves in 1880–90 by region, shows that there is no simple relationship with distance: the more distant provinces such as East Prussia, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Rhineland show very diVerent results. Figure 3.4 suggests that there are two factors which aVect the likelihood of further moves. The Wrst is what might be termed ‘cultural aYnity’: migrants from Alsace-Lorraine and from the Catholic areas of southern Germany were less likely to make permanent moves to Berlin. The same point applies to foreigners. The second is the income level of the region of origin. Migrants from the richer western and north-western provinces (Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Rhineland, and Westphalia) were more likely to make further moves. So this analysis shows that there was a fundamental diVerence between migration from the east and
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
73
Berlin
>700
400−450
600−700
350−400
550−600
300−350
500−550
250−300
450−500
200−250
Fig. 3.4. Estimated numbers making further moves in 1880–90 by region: numbers moving again per 1,000 of those arrived in Berlin pre-1880 from each region (men only) Source: As for Table 3.7.
migration from other areas: the Wrst was a permanent shift of a population surplus in the sense that it represents the rectiWcation of an imbalance between the available labour force and perceived relative opportunities in the region of origin; the second was part of a general pattern of rising mobility. The east was the principal source of surplus labour for the Berlin labour market in the period. But there were other streams of longdistance migration, seasonal as well as permanent. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate this by making use of a survey of local authorities in the 1860s (at the Kreis level or equivalent). The administrators were asked about migration to or from their district. Many replied in general terms (‘much movement at harvest time’ or such like), but some identiWed particular destinations or sources, and sometimes gave reasons as well.
74
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913 Sweden - Harvest Peatcutting
Holland - Harvest
Peatcutting Sugar beet
Eisenach
Bohemia - Harvest
Italy - Harvest and brick-making
Fig. 3.5. Examples of long-distance migration connected with agricultural activities Source: Examples taken from survey replies given in von der Goltz (1875). There was substantial harvest-related migration within Germany over shorter distances; Bertold et al. (1990), 268 has a map of these movements.
The survey was not a comprehensive one, but it does provide a useful picture of movements in Germany at the time.15 Figure 3.5 gives some examples of long-distance migration connected with agricultural activities. It shows that, even in the 1860s, Germany was attracting foreign seasonal labour at harvest time, although in this period the main sources were Bohemia, Sweden, and Italy. There were also harvest-related movements inside Germany though these were mainly over relatively short distances. Mostly the movements were from 15 The authorities were not asked about the means of transportation used by these migrants. Some of these movements were suYciently short to have been possible on foot or using horse-drawn transport. Others were so long as to imply the use of the railway network.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
75
Areas reporting migration to railway construction
Fig. 3.6. Examples of long-distance migration connected with industrial or urban activities: areas reporting moves to Berlin or the Ruhr; areas reporting migration to take part in railway construction Source: As for Figure 3.5.
east to west, though there were some exceptions, such as the seasonal migration from the Eisenach region to eastern Silesia at harvest time. The sugar beet areas of central Germany were attracting seasonal migrants, although the authorities indicated that peat-cutting in these regions was also an important reason for migration to these areas. Figure 3.6 gives some examples of migration connected with industrial or urban activities. It shows, Wrst, those regions which speciWcally mentioned outward migration to Berlin or the Ruhr. The latter area was mainly drawing migrants from western or central Germany in this period (large-scale migration from the east came later). Berlin was attracting migrants from eastern Brandenburg, and parts of Silesia and Posen. These were, it appears, relatively concentrated streams, from a limited number of areas, compared to the more widespread eVect of railway construction. The Wgure shows the districts reporting major movements
76
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
to railway construction. These were in predominantly rural areas in the south, the centre, and in the east. Comparison with the previous Wgure suggests that railway construction may well have Wtted in with the preindustrial pattern of seasonal migration at harvest time: young people from regions accustomed to provide harvest labour to other areas went to the railways instead. By contrast, moves to cities represented a more fundamental change in lifestyle and social surroundings. The transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial pattern of migration was not a sudden change for the supplying regions: there were several stages. Regions might start with a tradition of harvest-time outmigration, then move on to temporary migration connected with railway building or other major construction projects. It was then a possibility that a portion of those who made temporary moves for these reasons might decide to make permanent moves. This in turn would establish migrant cores, which could then expand as those making the initial moves were joined by friends or other family members. 5. D i f f e r e n c e s i n M i g r a t i o n b y S e x Many of the statistics on migration are available for both sexes. In this study these are amalgamated unless there is some evident diVerence which might be of interest, such as that shown in Table 3.6. Otherwise every table would be twice as long. There are indeed diVerences in the migration record between the sexes. In general men moved more. In 1901–11 in Berlin there were annually, on average, 301 moves per 1,000 for the male population, but only 222 moves per 1,000 for the female population (total moves to and from Berlin, Wgures adjusted by the statistical oYce). But this higher rate of gross migration did not mean that net migration was necessarily less for women. In fact in 1891–1912 the female population of Berlin gained proportionately more through migration: an average annual gain of 0.46% against one of 0.39% for the male population. Looking at the country as a whole, and dividing it into 17 fairly large regional groupings, the 1907 census found that 14.7% of men were living outside their region of birth, and 12.4% of women. This is a signiWcant diVerence, but one which shows that women were by no means immobile, even if they moved less often than men.16 16 Calculations from the analysis of the 1907 Occupational Census published in SJDS (1909).
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
77
30 20 10 0 −10 −20 Men −30
Women 1891
1895
1899
1903
1907
1911
Fig. 3.7. Net migration of men and women, Berlin 1891–1912, per 1,000 head of population of each sex (moves out adjusted by the statistical office) Source: Calculated from data in SJB (1913), 158.
Male migration was more volatile. Figure 3.7 compares annual net migration for each sex for Berlin during the period 1891–1912. The magnitude of the swings in male migration is clearly greater, and evidently related to economic conditions. For example, the so-called Elektroboom of 1898–1900, which was particularly marked in Berlin, produced a larger male inXow, and the collapse of this boom in 1901–2 led to a net outXow of men, but not to a net outXow of women. Looking at the historical record, there is evidence to show that female mobility rose more slowly than male. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 make use of the cohort analysis of the Berlin population in 1890 and 1910 given in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. In the Wrst of these, the proportion of migrants who came from the central provinces is compared for both sexes; in the second the analysis is repeated for the east. Two sets of lines are shown. As mentioned in the discussion in section 4 above, the census results are not comparable: the 1910 census classiWes by last place of residence prior to migration; the 1890 census classiWes by place of birth. So there are separate lines (A and B) for each census. The Wgures show that in the Wrst half of the nineteenth century there was a marked diVerence between the two sexes: female migrants were much more likely to be drawn from the central provinces, and less likely to come from the east. Female migration was predominantly
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
78 80 Women (A)
70 Men (A)
60
50 Men (B) 40 Women (B)
30 1815
1825
1835
1845
1855
1865
1875
1885
1895
1905
Fig. 3.8. Percentage of migrants drawn from the centre, by arrival cohort, Berlin 1815–1910 A 1890 census results classified by place of birth B 1910 census results classified by last place of residence Source: Figures given in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
short-distance. As migration from the east rose, female migration lagged behind male migration, reaching the 30% mark about 20 years later, for example. But by the 1860s the gap had narrowed considerably. And from 1870 onwards there is no tendency for more female migrants to come from the central regions, and the eastern proportion is rather higher for female migration than for male. In general, the diVerences between male and female migration are not so large after 1870, at least when net migration is the main focus of interest. The main diVerences are in the pre-1870 period, and in the fact that men moved more often, and thus contributed a higher proportion of total moves. Young men made more frequent moves than young women, but women were nearly as likely to make permanent changes of residence.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
79
60 Women (B) 50
Men (B)
40
30 Men (A)
20 Women (A)
10 1815
1825
1835
1845
1855
1865
1875
1885
1895
1905
Fig. 3.9. Percentage of migrants drawn from the east, by arrival cohort, Berlin 1815–1910 A 1890 census results classified by place of birth B 1910 census results classified by last place of residence Source: Figures given in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
6. G e r m a n Em i g r a t i o n The Lewis Model deals with the operation of an economy seen in isolation, without considering the geographical context: How easy is migration across international frontiers? What are the conditions in neighbouring countries? Are wages in these countries lower or higher? In the model, the urban wage is determined by conditions in domestic agriculture: by the existence, or non-existence, of a labour surplus in this sector. But if there is migration from neighbouring countries with lower wages, then the whole wage structure will be inXuenced by conditions in these countries. And if there is substantial out-migration then
80
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
the internal labour market will be aVected by developments in the recipient countries. German external migration underwent a major structural change around 1895. Comparison of census results with recorded births and deaths for the territories included in the post-1871 German empire show a total net loss of 2.34 million in 1841–71 (an annual average of 78,100) and 2.46 million in 1871–95 (an average of 102,500). But after 1895 this Xow came to an end. Between 1895 and 1910 the net loss was just 14,000, an annual average of less than a thousand. Calculations based on census returns may underestimate the extent of the change. By 1910 Germany was admitting large numbers of foreigners on temporary permits. Holders of these permits were required to leave the country by December, and then re-apply if they wished to continue to reside in Germany. As German censuses were carried out in December, those who complied with this regulation would have been omitted from the census total.17 A census taken in some other month would have shown a larger population, and the calculated rate of migration into Germany would have been greater. Germany may well have already been a net gainer through migration.18 If so then this was an unusual development. Of the other European countries, only Belgium was a net gainer before 1914. Britain did not start to gain population through migration until the 1970s. This change had the eVect of reinforcing the links between Germany and the other labour markets of central and eastern Europe, and decoupling Germany from the converging labour markets of the ‘Atlantic economy’. Discussion of German emigration in the nineteenth century is dominated by German emigration to the United States. Partly this is due to the nature of the statistical sources. There are records of German overseas migration, both from the ports of departure and from the recipient countries, but there is very little on movements across land frontiers. In 1912 the German statistical oYce made a survey of foreign censuses, to establish the numbers of Germans living outside the Reich. The Wgures are given in Table 3.8. The statistics are not fully comparable: some countries recorded all those born in Germany; others only included those who still retained German citizenship. Some countries which lack suitable census data are excluded: Brazil is the most important of these. 17 Those who chose not to comply with the regulation would have had a good reason to evade the census. 18 Return migration was also important: see Schniedewind (1994) for a study of this. Other studies of German migration include Bade (1980 and 1991) and Marschalck (1973).
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
81
Table 3.8. Germans living in foreign countries 1910–11 United Statesy Switzerland Austria-Hungary France Belgium
2,501,000 220,000 126,000 90,000 57,000
Britain and Ireland y Netherlands Denmark Australiay
56,000
Argentina
27,000
38,000 35,000 33,000
Luxembourg Chile Italy
22,000 11,000 11,000
y
Countries who recorded all those born in Germany, all others recorded only German citizens. Source: Kaiserlich Statistisches Amt (1916), 3*.
The pre-eminence of the United States as an emigrant destination is evident. But quite large numbers went to neighbouring states, although these in return provided migrants to Germany, reducing net migration. The most substantial Xow of net migration out of Germany to a European destination was to Switzerland (there were 68,000 Swiss living in Germany in 1910). The United States accounted for 91% of recorded overseas migration in 1871–1913. Figure 3.10 shows that there were years when this fell to 80% or below. Typically these were years when migration to the United States was low, but there is no evidence that migrants chose other destinations when conditions were unfavourable for migration to the United States (migration to the United States was not negatively correlated with Xows to other destinations). Towards the end of the period there is some evidence that German migrants were looking for alternative destinations. There was a rise in migration to Canada and Argentina. However, the Xows were not large compared to the movements to the United States in the period up to 1895. By contrast, after 1900 British emigration switched to the Empire, which took 65% of those leaving in 1911–13 (up from 28% in 1891–1900).19 Comparison of migrant destinations with the regional origins of migrants is possible from German Wgures from 1899 onwards. Figure 3.11 gives migration to the United States as a percentage of all recorded migration to non-European destinations, 1900–9. The main areas from which there was migration to alternative destinations were a group of central regions—Saxony, Prussian Saxony, and Berlin-Brandenburg. 19 British Wgures from Thomas (1973), 57; the German Wgures are calculations using Wgures for migrant destinations from SJDR.
82
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
100
80
60 Asia 40
Africa Australia
20
Other North and South America Brazil
0 1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911
United States
Fig. 3.10. Percentage distribution of recorded migration to non-European destinations (from German sources) 1871–1913 Note: The German figures initially covered only migration from German ports and Antwerp. Later this was expanded to include migration from French ports. Migration from British ports was not included, which affected the figures for migration to Australia. Source: Data from SJDR (1885), table 5, p. 23 and subsequent issues.
This group includes some important industrial centres. At the other end of the scale, in the agricultural regions of eastern and southern Germany there was little migration to destinations other than the United States. The result is that there is a positive correlation between the percentage occupied in agriculture in each region, and the percentage going to the United States (a coeYcient of 0.56), indicating that the Xow to the United States was more ‘agricultural’ than the Xow to other destinations.20 20 The negative correlation between the percentage going to Brazil (the next most important destination) and the percentage occupied in agriculture is even stronger (a coeYcient of 0.72). This Wnding that the ‘more advanced’ regions sent migrants to the ‘less advanced’ destination is intriguing although perhaps not of any great signiWcance. It has a parallel in the better-known division between northern and southern Italy (the south was more likely to send migrants to the United States), Hatton and Williamson (1998), ch. 6.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
<86%
92−94%
86−88%
94−96%
88−90%
96−98%
90−92%
>98%
83
Fig. 3.11. Migration to the United States as a percentage of all migration to non-European destinations 1900–9, by region Source: Calculated from data in SJDR (1901–10).
However, the basic conclusion has to be that the story of German emigration is, in aggregate, the story of German migration to the United States. There was no other Xow which was large enough to have a signiWcant eVect on labour market conditions inside Germany. The record of migration to the United States is presented in Figure 3.12. Only moves from Germany to the United States are given; there are no Wgures for return migration before 1909. The chart includes two series for German migration to the United States, one from German sources and the other from US immigration records. The two sources agree relatively well. Between 1890 and 1900 there is little diVerence. Before 1890 the discrepancy is probably due to gaps in the German records. After 1900, the diVerence is less easy to explain. The US authorities may have classiWed a number of Germanspeaking immigrants from Russia as Germans. This could explain why
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
84 300
Emigration: US data US−German wage ratio 200
Emigration: German data
100
0 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Fig. 3.12. Annual German emigration to the United States (in 1,000s) and the US-German wage ratio Source: Migration figures from US Department of Commerce (1975), and SJDR, annual issues; wage ratio calculated from Williamson (1995), 164–7. The source for the German wage data is a series for unskilled building wages in Rostock, Nuremburg, and Berlin, originally collected by Robert Kuczynski, also published in Kuczynski (1945) and Bry (1960).
the discrepancy rose after 1900. Some travellers, intending to stay for a limited period, may also be classiWed as immigrants in the US Wgures.21 The migration Wgures show three main peaks: in the early 1850s, in the late 1860s and early 1870s, and in the period 1881–93. After this German emigration to the United States remained at a low level. These changes can be linked to the relative movement of the German and US economies: emigration was high when conditions were favourable in the United States or unfavourable in Germany. But after 1895 this relationship becomes much weaker: the collapse of the Elektroboom in 1900–1 produced only a modest rise in emigration, for example.22 21 There are large discrepancies in statistics of German migration 1900–13 for all the major non-European destinations. These are discussed in Burgdo¨rfer (1926). One problem was German emigration through British ports, but there is no obvious reason why this should only have caused diYculty after 1900. 22 Grant (2002d ) contains a detailed analysis of the decline of German emigration to the United States.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
85
Figure 3.12 also gives the US–German wage ratio, calculated from Williamson’s series in purchasing power parities. There was a major disturbance to this series in the 1860s, as a result of the American Civil War. Once allowance is made for this, it is clear that there is no evident tendency for wages in the two countries to converge. Germany was an exception to the general tendency for wages in the Atlantic economies to move closer. One reason for this was that declining emigration to the United States, combined with increasing immigration from eastern and central Europe, had the eVect of strengthening links with other oversupplied labour markets in these regions, and weakening those with the converging Atlantic economies.23 German emigration to the United States declined for a number of reasons, due to changes within Germany and within the United States. One factor was increased competition within the United States from sources of ‘new immigration’: countries in southern and eastern Europe which supplied an increased proportion of US immigrants from the 1890s onwards.24 Another was a reduction in the availability of land in the United States which suited German farming skills as the frontier of settlement moved into more arid western regions. But a further possible reason is that Germany was moving out of the labour surplus phase when migration, internal and external, was dominated by the release of surplus agricultural labour. German emigration had a strong agricultural character. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the variation in the intensity of migration by region, for two periods: 1871–9 and 1890–9. The regional rates of emigration (per head of resident population) are expressed as percentages of the national average. The variation between regions is striking: in 1871–9 the average annual rate of emigration was 0.44 per 1,000 in East Prussia, and 4.53 in West Prussia, ten times as large. In the 1870s the highest rates of migration were in the rural east, in West Prussia, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania. There were also high rates in the north-west, and in the south-west, which had been an area of high emigration earlier in the 23 Important studies on convergence in the international economy of the late nineteenth century include O’Rourke et al. (1994 and 1996) and Taylor and Williamson (1997). Although Germany contributed large absolute numbers of migrants in the years before 1895, the numbers were not as high relative to the size of the German population as for Ireland and some Scandinavian countries. This meant that the convergence process was not a strong one even in the years when emigration was high. 24 In the literature on US immigration these are the ‘new immigration’ sources, to distinguish them from the traditional sources: Britain, Ireland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries.
86
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
>300 250−300 200−250 150−200 125−150 100−125 80−100 60−80 40−60 20−40 <20
Fig. 3.13. Regional emigration rates as percentages of the national average, 1871–9 Source: Calculated from data in SJDR (1881), table 5, pp. 14–15 and subsequent issues. These include all recorded migration to non-European destinations. The earlier figures omit migration through French ports, which may affect the rates from some western provinces.
century. The pattern was not greatly altered by the 1890s: the highest rates were then in Posen, West Prussia, and Pomerania, the Mecklenburg rate having dropped. There is a relationship between migration intensity and the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture. Rates of migration tended to be below average in the more industrial regions, as can be seen from the maps: Westphalia, Saxony, Silesia, the Rhineland, and BerlinBrandenburg all had low rates of emigration. Table 3.9 gives correlation coeYcients for various periods, which show that this association between high emigration and high rates of agricultural employment was at its highest in 1885–94, and thereafter tended to fall. Although German migrants came largely from agricultural regions the statistical sources show that they were not predominantly occupied as farmers or farmworkers immediately prior to departure. Table 3.10
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
87
>300 250−300 200−250 150−200 125−150 100−125 80−100 60−80 40−60 20−40 <20
Fig. 3.14. Regional emigration rates as percentages of the national average, 1890–9 Source: Calculated from annual data in SJDR.
Table 3.9. Correlation between rates of emigration by region and the percentage occupied in agriculture in each region, for diVerent periods, 1871–1913 1871–4 1875–9 1880–4
0.54 0.47 0.51
1885–9 1890–4 1895–9
0.59 0.61 0.48
1900–4 1905–9 1910–13
0.53 0.45 0.32
Source: Annual data from SJDR for recorded immigration by province.
compares the previous occupations of German immigrants with those of other groups. This shows that relatively few German immigrants had previously been occupied in agriculture.25 The proportions were, however, rather higher than for the other ‘old migrant’ groups. 25 Marschalck (1973), 79–80 gives the Wgures from German sources; see also Marschalck and Ko¨llmann (1973), 537.
88
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
Table 3.10. Occupations of immigrants to the United States prior to departure (as percentages of migrants 1899–1910 excluding those without an occupation)
Professional Farmers Skilled workers Unskilled: farm workers Unskilled: non-agricultural
Irish
Scandinavian
German
English
1.5 0.3 13.4 4.8 80.1
1.3 2.5 21.5 7.6 67.0
3.9 3.0 35.0 18.0 40.2
11.3 2.4 53.9 2.5 29.8
Note: The table gives results for the four largest ‘old migrant’ groups. Amongst the ‘new migrant’ groups the Poles, Slovaks, and Croats had higher proportions previously occupied in agriculture than the Germans (‘nationalities’ are as classiWed by the US immigration authorities, which means that Polish-speaking migrants are treated as a separate group). Source: Calculated from US Immigration Commission (1910–11), 100–76; the distinction between skilled and unskilled is largely that used by the immigration authorities; the subsequent division into categories (industrial, handicrafts, etc.) follows the author’s classiWcation.
However, this may be misleading. If there is surplus labour in agriculture, then the Wrst to move will be the younger sons of farmers, and the children of landless labourers. These will be unable to Wnd work in agriculture, and may well start by taking non-agricultural jobs in their region of birth. But if they are determined to work in agriculture somewhere, then the realization that only emigration to a country where land is readily available oVers this possibility will eventually make them decide to move. However, the records will show that these are people whose occupations prior to migration were outside agriculture, in a rural handcraft sector or as unskilled non-agricultural labourers. The recorded occupations of migrants after arrival in the United States also show that relatively few found work in agriculture immediately. But it does appear from the US census returns that German migrants had a stronger preference for farming than some other groups, notably the British. Table 3.11 gives Wgures for the percentage of the male labour force who were classiWed as farmers by the United States. As this shows, by 1910 German migrants were twice as likely as British migrants to be farmers, having started from a position of equality in 1870. The table also shows that only a relatively small proportion of the German-born population were farmers, a rather lower Wgure than the
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
89
Table 3.11. Farmers as a percentage of the US male labour force 1870–1910
As a % of the total US labour force As a % of those born in Germany As a % of those born in Britain German–British ratio
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
27.8 21.5 20.2 1.06
28.3 24.3 19.8 1.23
27.1 21.2 14.7 1.44
22.1 20.6 13.1 1.57
19.5 18.4 9.0 2.04
Source: Census results from US Department of Commerce (1975) and Hutchinson (1956); the 1870 Wgures are estimates using the movement of the total German-born population engaged in agriculture. (Changing census deWnitions may account for some of the jumps in the Wgures, but the relative movements should be unaVected.)
one for the whole US labour force. Even if the 4.9% of the 1910 German-born workforce who were farm-workers is added to the numbers for farmers, the total is only 22.3%, which is well below the equivalent Wgure for the United States as a whole (35.1%). Most German migrants were in non-agricultural jobs. However, once again, this comparison may well lead to an underestimate of the importance of agricultural opportunities to German migrants. A higher proportion of immigrants may have become farmers eventually. A typical immigrant life-cycle might include an initial period of non-agricultural work to pay oV debts incurred during the passage and to accumulate capital before applying for a Homestead land grant. Some were obliged, by the terms under which they had travelled, to take non-agricultural jobs to pay oV debts to steamship companies and their agents. The sudden decline in German emigration around 1895 Wts with the picture given earlier, of a ‘labour surplus’ phase of migration out of the rural east which came to an end in the late 1890s. Migrants who wanted to remain in Germany went to the major cities. Those who were more adventurous, or determined to go to a country where land was available, or had contacts with Germans already in the United States, went across the Atlantic. This trans-Atlantic ‘safety valve’ reduced the pressure on urban labour markets quite considerably in 1880–5. In 1880 around 55% of those leaving the eastern provinces of Germany went abroad. By the early 1900s this had changed: in 1900–5 less than 10% of those leaving these regions left the country.26 26 Calculated indirectly from a comparison of natural population movements, recorded population, and registered emigration by region using Wgures published annually in the
90
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913 7. I m m i g r a t i o n i n t o G e r ma ny 1870–1913
At the same time as German emigration was declining there was an increase in immigration into Germany. The German population census showed a substantial increase in the numbers of foreigners living in Germany, from 433,000 in 1890, to 779,000 in 1900 and 1,260,000 in 1910. This indicates that the net annual rate of immigration was around 41,000–46,000 in the 1890s and 57,000–64,000 in the 1900s.27 But the census was taken in the month of December, and this would tend to aVect the numbers since migrants on short-term permits were expected to return home in this month. The occupational census of 1907, taken in June, gave the numbers of foreigners living in Germany as 1,342,000, which was greater than the Wgures from the December censuses for 1905 (1,030,000) and 1910 (1,260,000). But even this may have been below the peak, which is likely to have come in the harvest months of August and September. The total numbers who came to Germany on temporary permits were considerable. Russian Wgures show that, on average, 755,000 temporary eight-month passports were issued each year between 1910 and 1913 to those wishing to work in Germany and their families. Over the same period, the German Wgures show that 484,000 work permits were issued, on average, each year to Russians (including Poles and Germans of Russian nationality), and 267,000 to other nationalities. Italian emigration Wgures show that, on average, 69,000 Italians went to Germany each year between 1910 and 1913, and the Germans issued 54,000 work permits to Italians.28 So the numbers of workers, and their dependants, coming to Germany on a temporary basis each year could have exceeded one million.29 How long they stayed is a more diYcult question. Some could have come for a few weeks, for a harvest job just over Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reichs. The resulting Wgures are approximate. There was some tendency to under-record external migration, but this has to be set against the fact that return migration was not recorded at all. 27 To get this estimate a mortality rate had to be applied, which should be lower than the German average to allow for the diVerent age structure of the migrant population. The range was produced by using, Wrst, a mortality rate half the overall German rate, and then one 85% the overall rate. Data from SJDR (1913). 28 These were mostly seasonal workers; comparison of the Italian emigration Wgures with the German census Wgures indicates that 90–95% of Italian migrants in 1900–10 went back each year. Ferenczi and Willcox (1929), 810 and 828–31; see also Del Fabbro (1996). 29 There might well have been a signiWcant amount of unrecorded migration from other areas, from Bohemia for example.
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
91
the frontier; others may have stayed for the full eight months allowed by the Russian passport.30 What is also uncertain is the extent to which this was a new development, rather than the imposition of a system of passports and permits on a Xow which was already in existence. Russian Wgures show a steep increase in the numbers of passports, from an annual Wgure of around 100,000 in 1900. German Wgures show a more moderate rise in the number of permits: 733,000 of these were issued in Prussia alone in 1907 (all nationalities); 768,000 in the whole of Germany in 1913.31 Surveys in the 1890s suggested that the use of seasonal migrant labour in German agriculture was already substantial.32 It may well be that it was the extension of this to German industry which was the novelty. Table 3.12 gives the numbers of foreigners living in Germany according to the December censuses. The Wgures show that the largest contribution came from Austria-Hungary. The numbers of Russians was relatively small (more came in the summer on temporary permits). The Xow of migrants from Austria-Hungary has attracted less attention, but it was also an important inXuence on the German labour market. Table 3.12. Numbers of foreigners, by country of birth, resident in Germany 1900, 1905, and 1910
Russia Austria-Hungary Switzerland Italy France Spain and Portugal Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg Scandinavia Britain and Ireland Balkans including Greece and Turkey Others totals
1900
1905
1910
47.0 391.0 55.5 69.7 20.5 0.9 113.5 38.9 16.1 4.1 21.8 779.0
106.6 525.8 62.9 98.2 20.6 1.3 127.6 41.1 17.3 5.8 23.2 1030.4
137.7 667.2 68.3 104.2 19.1 2.0 172.0 39.2 18.3 8.1 24.0 1260.0
Source: Kaiserlich Statistisches Amt (1916). 30 31 32
For a description of the work permit system, see Bade (1984), also Nichtweiss (1959). Burgdo¨rfer (1929), 379; there are no Wgures for before 1905. Weber (1893).
92
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
Attention has also tended to focus on the Xow of labour into agriculture. The 1907 occupational census showed that there were 288,300 foreign-born agricultural workers, 3.3% of the labour force. There were rather more foreign industrial workers (501,000) and these were 4.6% of the industrial labour force. The industries most dependent on foreign labour were mining and metals (7.5% foreign), quarrying (8.8%), and construction (7.4%).33 Looking at the regional distribution of workers in these three industries, it is also noticeable that the highest concentrations of foreign workers were not in the east but more in the south-west (Figure 3.15). The Wgure for Alsace-Lorraine (27%) is perhaps something of an anomaly, but there are also high Wgures for Baden (14.3%) and Wu¨rttemberg (12.0%). By contrast the distribution of foreign agricultural
>1
8−10
1−2
10−12
2−4
12−14
4−6
14−16
6−8
>20
Fig. 3.15. Foreign-born workers as a percentage of all those occupied in mining and metals, quarrying, and construction, 1907 Source: 1907 occupational census, SDR (1908), n.f. 210.
33
SDR n.f. 210 (1908).
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
93
<1
8−10
1−2
10−12
2−4
12−14
4−6
14−16
6−8
>20
Fig. 3.16. Foreign-born workers as a percentage of all those occupied in agriculture, June 1907 Source: 1907 occupational census, SDR (1908), n.f. 210.
workers is more or less as expected (Figure 3.16). The highest Wgure was the 11.3% of the Mecklenburg agricultural labour force which was foreign-born. Next came Prussian Saxony-Anhalt with 8.1%. Although the conventional view may be that the typical pre-1914 migrant was a Russian Pole working in eastern agriculture, this shows that a typical migrant was just as likely to be someone from Austria-Hungary working in a quarry or on a building site in south-western Germany.
8. M i g r a t i o n a n d L a b o u r Su r p l u s The previous section has stressed the growing links between Germany and the labour markets of eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Austria-Hungary. In combination with the decline in emigration to the United States, which weakened the connection between Germany and
94
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
the converging Atlantic labour markets, this development reinforced the ‘Continental’ nature of the German labour market, insulating it from the forces driving the process of convergence in the Atlantic economies. It also meant that one source of elastic labour supplies—the labour surplus in German agriculture—was supplemented by another—migration from neighbours to the east. This in turn held back the increase in German wages. This was an inevitable consequence of the eastern movement of the process of industrialization in Europe. Both inside Germany and outside Germany industrialization led to increased mobility, traditional institutions which promoted immobility were eroded, and improved communications made migration attractive and aVordable. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century these same forces were unleashed in the countries to the east and the south of Germany. This in turn set oV a new wave of migration to the United States, displacing potential German emigrants, and also increased migration across Germany’s land frontiers to the south and the east. A theme which runs through the chapter is the identiWcation of periods within the 1870–1913 timespan covered by this study, and the characterization of these periods. Evidence presented points to the importance of the years around 1895 as a dividing point. After this external migration is greatly reduced, and the rate of migration out of the east falls. There is also a shift in the characteristics of the typical migrant, from being someone with no previous experience of urban life, to a person who had already moved at least once, and who was more likely to have come from another city. The importance of the 1895 caesura is demonstrated by Wgures which will be presented in Chapter 9. These show that the Kuznets Curve, the relationship between income inequality and economic development, peaks around these years. The years up to 1895 are characterized by rising inequality and high net migration: the labour surplus phase of the Lewis Model. After 1895 there was a highly mobile labour market, but static or falling inequality; Germany was moving out of the labour surplus phase.
A p p e n d i x 3A. A N o t e o n R e g i o n a l U n i t s The regions used in pre-1914 German statistics are a source of some diYculty in that they vary considerably in size, and the boundaries
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
95
Table 3A.1. Regions and regional groupings Regional grouping
Regional unit used in this study
Includes the following regional units used in German statistical publications
East
East Prussia West Prussia Pomerania Posen Silesia Mecklenburg
East Prussia West Prussia Pomerania Posen Silesia Mecklenburg-Schwerin and -Strelitz
Centre
Berlin/Brandenburg Pr. Saxony/Anhalt Thuringia
Berlin and Brandenburg Provinz Saxony and Anhalt Saxony-Weimar, -Altenburg, -Meiningen, and -Coburg-Gotha, both Reub and both Schwarzburgs Saxony (Kingdom of)
Saxony West and north-west
Schleswig-Holstein
Hesse-Nassau Rhineland Hesse
Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and Lu¨beck Hanover, Oldenburg, Brunswick, and Bremen Westphalia, Waldeck, and both Lippes Hesse-Nassau Rhineland Hesse
Bavaria excl. Pfalz Pfalz Baden Wu¨rttemberg/ Hohenzollern Alsace-Lorraine
Bavaria excl. Pfalz Pfalz Baden Wu¨rttemberg and Hohenzollern Alsace-Lorraine
Hanover/Oldenburg/ Brunswick Westphalia
South and south-west
96
The Pattern of Migration, 1870–1913
reXect a historical process: Prussian expansion leading to eventual German uniWcation, not any Napoleonic striving for geographical logic. Therefore, all the statistics in this study are presented in tables or Wgures which use regional units designed to eliminate the smaller regions. On occasions, these are then grouped into four main regional categories: east, centre, west and north-west, and south and south-west. The basic system is shown in Table 3A.1. In addition, wherever possible, Oldenburg is split: the separate enclaves of Lu¨beck and Birkenfeld being included in Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland respectively. For some purposes, chieXy agricultural, the term ‘east-Elbian’ is used: here Berlin/Brandenburg is added to the other eastern provinces. For the tables and maps presented in this study a certain amount of additional work was required to produce results which conformed to these boundaries. The Wgures could not be taken directly from oYcial publications.
4
Migration in Germany 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n: A N o t e o n Me t h o d o l o g y a n d So u r c e Ma t e r i a l s The study of migration has been one of the most active areas of German historical research in recent years. This has produced a number of excellent local studies, making use of regional archives. These have described the eVects of large-scale migration: the process of assimilation, the problems faced by rapidly expanding cities, the process whereby an industrial workforce was created from a stream of rural migrants.1 The response of the German state and the upper echelons of German society to these problems has been examined, and, at times, found wanting. Studies have repeatedly shown pre-1914 Germany to be a society of high inequality, and limited social mobility.2 The aim of this book is not to produce another local study. It is instead to try to grasp the process in its entirety: to put migration in a theoretical context which explains the origins of the problems described by the regional studies, and to answer the question ‘Why is migration in this period so important?’ The Lewis Model, the concept of a ‘labour surplus’ phase in economic development, provides such a context, and the application of this model is therefore a central theme. The remit of the study is therefore a wide one. The aim is to test certain hypotheses about the causes and consequences of migration. The level is the national one: not what was happening in certain cities or regions, but the eVect on Germany as a whole. And, wherever possible, hypotheses have been expressed in quantiWable terms. 1
Examples include Barfuss (1985), Bo¨lsker-Schlicht (1997), Del Fabbro (1996), Jackson (1997), Ko¨llmann (1960), Kosters-Kraft (1998), Lourens and Lucassen (1999), Oberpennig (1998), Reich (1998), Wenneman (1997), Crew (1979), Catt (1986), and the various studies in Hoerder and Nagler (1995), Ro¨bler (1995), and Bade (1987). Studies of migration with a wider remit include Matzerath (1985), Caumanns (1994), Ko¨llmann (1959), Tipton (1976), and Hochstadt (1999). 2 Kaelble (1986).
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
98
This is not because this is regarded as the only way to approach the subject, or as necessarily superior to other techniques of historical enquiry; it is because this is a type of study not currently available. The idea is to produce a work which is complementary to the regional and local studies: for example the collection published as People in Transit.3 Moreover, the main emphasis has been on the use of statistical sources available in nineteenth-century government publications. This period was one in which statistical enquiry was developing, both in scope, in the areas covered by published statistical series, and in the use that was made of the results. There was a belief that the proper use of statistics could lead to a better understanding of social problems and, at times, produce solutions. The classic case was the use of mortality tables to prove the connection between breast-feeding and low infant mortality.4 The new German empire had an Imperial Statistical OYce, which oversaw the collection of national statistics and the administration of censuses. There were also state statistical oYces, which collected a lot of the data and conducted enquiries of their own. The most important was the Prussian Statistical Bureau, headed by Ernst Engel in the 1860s and 1870s, but others also made interesting contributions: the Saxon Statistical OYce made a series of studies of income distribution in the 1900s which were unusually comprehensive for the time. In addition, all the major cities had statistical oYces, and typically published a statistical yearbook. The most important of these was the Berlin Statistical Bureau, whose director in the years before the First World War was Robert Kuczynski. The analysis of these materials used the techniques available at the time: where causation was suspected a series was ranked by one variable, and results given for a second variable. This could show a rough correlation: if the eye running down the page could pick up a tendency for the second variable to rise or fall. But regression analysis was not used, and any relationship involving more than one explanatory variable could not be studied. The result is a vast amount of statistical material presented in a form which is not easy to understand or digest. Taking one example: the 1907 Zeitschrift of the Prussian Statistical Bureau contained an article by Dr M. Broesike on internal migration in Prussia which included sixteen of these ‘visual correlation’ tables, some of which extended over two or more pages, and contained as many as 489 observations (an 3
Hoerder and Nagler (1995).
4
Berlin, Statistisches Amt (1893), 82.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
99
example is shown as Figure 4.1).5 There were also a number of other tables containing basic statistical material. This was a barrier to comprehension greater, in most respects, than the obstacle presented by the terminology of modern econometrics. So the approach used in this study has been to seek, in the Wrst place, to achieve a thorough knowledge of the materials collected and made available by the various statistical oYces, and secondly to subject these to examination using modern econometric analysis. For the general reader the statistical results have been summarized in a series of tables which are included in the main text of this chapter,
Fig. 4.1. Part of a ‘visual correlation’ table from Broesike (1907) Note: This is part of a table covering 489 Prussian Kreise. Broesike has classified them by the dominant farm size; the first column gives the percentage of the total agricultural area in holdings of this size. He is looking for a relationship between this and rates of migration for 1895–1900 and 1900–5 (the two columns at the right). He also includes a classification (Kb or Gb) according to the next most important farm size class, and follows this with the percentage of the total agricultural area in holdings of this size. So, the reader is asked to look down the two right-hand columns, and consider if migration tends to rise or fall with the dominant farm size, keeping in mind the possible effect that might flow from the farm size sector ranked second. 5
Broesike (1907).
100
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
and in subsequent chapters which also make use of econometric analysis. These provide a ‘verbal exposition’ of the econometric results. A more detailed analysis is then presented in appendices, which may be of interest to those readers who are well versed in statistical matters. They can, however, be skipped without losing any essential part of the argument presented in each chapter.
2. T he C h a n g in g N a t u r e o f M i g r a t i o n , 1871–1913 The basic hypothesis considered in this study is that Germany went through a ‘labour surplus’ phase of economic development, and that this phase was coming to an end by the late 1890s. The shift to a more modern pattern of migration post-1900 created conditions which were favourable to political stabilization and the transition to a mature democratic society. The Lewis Model provides the theoretical basis for these claims. One of the best sources of Wgures for migration is the indirect calculation of net migration by region based on the comparison of census returns. For each census year from 1871 to 1910, the Imperial Statistical OYce compared the actual increase in population by region with the recorded numbers of births and deaths since the last census (generally Wve years before). Deducting the recorded natural increase from the actual increase produced a Wgure for net migration. This was done for eighty-one regions and eight periods, thus producing a panel data set of 648 observations. The reliability of these calculations will depend on the accurate recording of births and deaths. By and large, this was not unsatisfactory in Germany in the period. The main question raised by demographers concerns the recording of stillbirths in the Wrst half of the century, but this is not a problem as it does not aVect the overall rate of natural increase (the issue is whether these were recorded as a birth followed by a death or left unrecorded).6 One obvious problem is that the destination of migrants is not recorded by this procedure. Other data sources will be examined in the next section which do provide this information. It is, however, possible to make the same calculation for Germany as a whole, which provides a
6
See the discussion of this in Knodel (1974).
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
101
Wgure for net external migration. This gives an idea of the balance between external and internal migration. In 1900 the Imperial Statistical OYce extended the analysis back to 1841. In this pre-uniWcation period censuses were organized by the diVerent states, and did not always take place in the same year. In addition, boundary changes imply that a calculation of net external migration, for the territories included in the post-1871 state, will include a certain amount of internal migration within French and Danish territories (pre-1871 and pre-1864 respectively). For these reasons the pre-1871 Wgures should be treated with some care, although they are probably reliable for Prussian territories. The overall record 1841–1910 is given in Table 4.1. The table uses four regional groupings. Of these two are consistent sources of net outwards migration: east, and south and south-west. But the trajectories are very diVerent. The east was not a major source of net outwards migration prior to 1861. Indeed, parts of the east were gaining through migration: East Prussia and West Prussia both made gains in 1851–61. Thereafter, outwards migration rises until, in the decade 1880–90, the region is losing 1% of its total population annually
Table 4.1. Net migration 1841–1910, in average annual rates per 100,000 of the resident population
1841–51 1851–61 1861–71 1871–5 1875–80 1880–5 1885–90 1890–5 1895–1900 1900–5 1905–10
East
Centre
West and north-west
South and south-west
All Germany
55 65 342 738 431 959 1038 661 815 662 663
þ37 98 þ22 þ323 þ48 þ35 þ490 þ99 þ351 þ316 þ225
273 331 260 þ119 99 252 þ167 þ50 þ449 þ285 þ217
301 433 284 365 203 559 268 259 60 113 192
167 243 229 192 174 427 137 177 þ35 þ18 51
Source: Pre-1871 data from SDR n.f.150, pp. 190*–193*; post-1871 data from SDR a.f. ¨ bersicht 1B, pp. 50–2 (1871–5 Wgures) and subsequent census publications, 25(2) U combined in the regional units given in Appendix Table 3A.1.
102
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
through migration. This rate of out-migration then falls back in the decade after 1900. In the south and south-west, by contrast, outmigration was already substantial in the pre-1871 period. There is a continuous outXow, with Xuctuations, until 1895, although the rates are well below those in the east. After 1895, the rate of out-migration is much reduced. The experience of the two gaining regions is also diVerent. In the pre-1871 period the west and north-west was also a major source of out-migration. This was a period in which this region contributed heavily to German migration to the United States. But after 1871 this changed. There are periods of in-migration as well as out-migration. After 1885 the region consistently absorbs migrants, post-1895 this is on a larger scale. By contrast there is consistent migration into the central region; the only period in which outwards net migration is recorded is 1851–61. The rate of absorption Xuctuates, with peaks in 1871–5 and 1885–90, but it is more consistent after 1895. The story in summary is that, in the early part of the century, there was a substantial labour surplus in western Germany, north and south. This was chieXy exported, although some was transferred to the centre and east. In the rural east the amount of land under cultivation was still rising so any local surpluses could be mainly absorbed within the region. From the 1860s onwards industrial growth in the west and the centre meant that more migrants could be found employment within these regions, but at the same time the east emerged as a major source of out-migration. Before 1895 the rate of progress of the industrial regions was not suYcient to take in all the migrants out of the east and the south, resulting in a continuing high rate of emigration for Germany as a whole (Wnal column of Table 4.1). Statistical analysis of the migration Wgures can be used to extract additional information from the census results.7 Although the published census returns do not distinguish between agricultural and nonagricultural areas, the use of modern econometric techniques can produce estimated rates of net gain and loss for each period. These are given in Table 4.2. The table shows that there were four periods in which the net rate of out-migration from agricultural areas exceeded 2.0% per annum, and 7 Results of the regressions used to make these calculations are given in Appendix 4B, which also contains a discussion of the statistical issues involved, and further comments on the pattern of migration revealed by this analysis.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
103
Table 4.2. Results of statistical analysis of net migration by region, 1871–1910: rates of net gain or loss through migration for agricultural and non-agricultural areas (annual rates of gain or loss as percentages of the total population)
1871–5 1875–80 1880–5 1885–90 1890–5 1895–1900 1900–5 1905–10
Estimated rate of net loss for an entirely agricultural region
Estimated rate of net gain for an entirely non-agricultural region
2.33 1.25 2.50 2.89 1.64 2.48 1.58 1.55
þ1.60 þ0.73 þ1.01 þ1.65 þ0.68 þ1.34 þ0.77 þ0.61
these also produced annual rates of gain for the non-agricultural areas of at least 1.0%.8 After 1900, the rate of migration drops to one which produces a signiWcantly lower rate of gain for the non-agricultural regions: the rate of gain for 1905–10 is the lowest of all. This does not mean that the overall level of migration had necessarily dropped; rather it had changed its character from one dominated by the transfer of surplus labour out of agriculture, to a pattern where this was one stream amongst others, although still important. One way of demonstrating this change is to consider what percentage of the pattern of net gains and losses can be explained purely by the extent to which the region specializes in agriculture. In a ‘labour surplus’ period a large proportion of migrant moves are from agricultural to non-agricultural areas, and most of the variation in net gains and losses by region is due to this factor. In other periods transfers between industrial regions due to the relative performance of diVerent industries will be an important inXuence and the role of rural–urban migration will be reduced. Table 4.3 gives Wgures produced by the statistical analysis of the census results, which show how German internal migration changed over the period covered by this study. 8 The rate of gain is lower relative to the size of the non-agricultural population for two reasons. First, the total non-agricultural population was larger. Secondly, some of those leaving agriculture emigrated and so did not transfer to non-agricultural regions inside Germany.
104
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis Table 4.3. ‘Rural labour surplus’ migration as a percentage of all migration (the percentage of the variation in net gains and losses which can be explained by the proportion occupied in agriculture) 1871–5 1875–80 1880–5 1885–90 1890–5 1895–1900 1900–5 1905–10
44.2 43.5 57.1 63.9 39.8 48.9 33.1 26.9
Note: These are the R2 statistics from the regressions given in Appendix Table 4B1.
The table shows that, before 1900, labour surplus migration was the most important factor in internal German migration. Even in periods when the rates of net gain and loss were reduced, such as 1875–80, the importance of the ‘labour surplus’ component remained high. The peak for labour surplus migration came in the 1880s: in this period over 50% of the variation can be explained by this one factor: was the region agricultural or not? The 1890s are a transitional period, with a less pronounced agricultural character. By 1900–5 only a third of the pattern of net gains and losses can be explained by the proportion occupied in agriculture, and by 1905–10 this has dropped to just over a quarter. The labour surplus period was over. So, what happened in the 1890s that brought about this change? Was there a static lump of surplus labour in agriculture which had simply moved out by then? Or were there other changes which improved the prospects of the agricultural sector? Some Wgures on these issues are brought together in Figure 4.2. All are taken from HoVmann. The two indices of arable producer prices and imported cereal prices show the eVect that world market conditions had on German producer prices. World market prices fell from the 1870s onwards and this brought down German producer prices despite tariV protection. But from the mid-1890s onwards world market prices began to recover, and this in turn brought about a recovery of German arable producer prices. The consequences of this can be seen from the movement of the index of land prices. The index fell slowly from the late
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
105
200 Wage ratio
180 160 140 120 Import prices 100 80
Arable prices Land prices
60 40 1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
Fig. 4.2. Indicators of agricultural conditions, 1870–1913 (all indices have 1913 ¼100) ‘Wage ratio’ is the ratio of industrial to agricultural wages; ‘arable prices’ is an index of arable producer prices; ‘import prices’ is an index of the price of imported cereals. Source: Calculated from data in Hoffmann (1965), 492–5, 561–2, 569–70, and 610–11. Hoffman’s index of agricultural workers’ earnings is based on figures for cash payments, but figures given in Pohl (1908) also show gains for workers paid in kind or by harvest shares. Earnings of Insteleute with threshing shares in Oletzko (East Prussia) rose 73% between 1880 and 1903 for example.
1870s, when it was over 67, to a low point of 59.6 in 1895. From then onwards it was rising, the level reached in 1913 representing a rise of 68% in eighteen years. The uppermost line in Figure 4.2 gives industrial wages as a percentage of agricultural. In the early 1870s industrial wages were 40–50% above agricultural wages, and dipped below this in the late 1870s. Thereafter the ratio rose and remained in the range 170–180% from the late 1880s onwards. The improved agricultural conditions post1895 did not lead to a fall in this ratio, but agricultural wages did keep pace with industrial wages during this period.
106
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
The movement of this ratio can also be interpreted in the light of the migration patterns considered in the previous chapter. In the midcentury, the industrial regions were drawing migrants predominantly from nearby rural areas. Consequently, the premium required to persuade migrants to come from these areas needed to be only a moderate one. But by the late nineteenth century the premium had to be suYcient to persuade migrants to move over much longer distances. It is noticeable that the premium did not fall back after 1900, even though agriculture was then doing better. Industry still had need of longdistance migrants.
3. A n a l y s i n g N e t M i g r a t i o n b y R e g i o n, 1871–1910 Scrutiny of the pattern of net migration shown in Table 4.1 in the light of the evidence on changing agricultural conditions given in Figure 4.2 shows that there is a possible connection between migration and agricultural conditions: the improvement in land prices after 1895 appears to have had some eVect, reducing the rate of migration out of the east for example. This raises the possibility that a more precise modelling of the eVect of changing agricultural conditions on migration might produce an equation which can be estimated econometrically. The value of this does not lie only in giving precise values to relationships which can be guessed at from visual inspection—it also makes it possible to compare diVerent causes of migration. There are two issues which are of particular interest. The Wrst is the eVect of agricultural structure, the extent to which the prevalence of large estates had an eVect on migration. The second is the relationship between migration and demographic variables: how far was the regional pattern of migration caused by diVerences in rates of population increase? Both these issues will be examined in greater depth in subsequent chapters; the aim here is to show the part they played in the overall pattern of migration. The full set of econometric results is given in Table 4B.2 in the Appendix; Table 4.4 provides a summary of the results. The analysis shows that demographic factors had an important inXuence on the pattern of migration: regions with high birth rates tended to have high rates of out-migration; regions with high death rates took in migrants to replace these losses. The birth rate which matters most is the one which aVects current levels of entry onto the regional labour
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
107
Table 4.4. Summary of results of statistical analysis of net migration for 81 regions, Wve-year time periods, 1871–1910 I. Secure statistical results Factors which increase net outwards migration: High birth rates in the past Presence of large farms and estates Increases in the rural–urban wage gap Factors which decrease net outwards migration or lead to net gains from migration: High death rates in the current period High rates of non-agricultural employment II. Less secure statistical results Factors which increase net outwards migration: Low land prices Note: The classiWcation of results as ‘secure’ or ‘less secure’ is based on the analysis and discussion given in the Appendix. The assessment is based on the usual statistical tests of signiWcance, plus the ‘robustness’ of the results—the extent to which a coeYcient is aVected by changes in the form of the estimated equation or the inclusion of additional variables.
market. It is the lagged birth rate—the birth rate for 20 years before— which is used in the estimated equations. The estimates conWrm that the level of agricultural occupation was an important inXuence on migration: agricultural regions tended to shed population and non-agricultural regions made gains. But they also show that agricultural structure mattered: the presence of large farms and estates tended to increase out-migration. This question will be one of the main themes of Chapter 6, but the result appears to conWrm a point made by a number of contemporary authors, including Max Weber.9 The eVect of changing agricultural conditions on migration can be estimated as part of the overall procedure: eVectively this asks whether migration out of agricultural areas was higher in bad periods for the agricultural sector—when land prices were low or the rural–urban wage gap was high. The analysis shows that times of low land prices were indeed periods in which migration out of rural areas tended to be 9 It was one of the major themes of Weber’s study of the conditions of the agricultural workers east of the Elbe, Weber (1893).
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
108
higher, but this result is not a particularly secure one in statistical terms. A stronger result is obtained when the eVect of changes in the rural– urban wage gap is included in the estimated equations: upwards movements in this gap led to increased out-migration; falls held back the Xow out of rural areas. How important are these variables in the explanation of the overall pattern of migration? One way to approach this is to try to explain migration between the four main regional groupings. An important caveat should be noted: there is a lot of migration within these units which is not covered by this analysis. Table 4.5 compares the eVect of predicted migration using the coeYcients calculated for the two demographic variables with the actual Wgures for net migration previously given in Table 4.1.10 The results show that demographic factors contributed to out-migration from the east, though the eVect is not large in relation to the total Xow. But the
Table 4.5. Demography and migration: the estimated eVect of demographic variables on net migration by regional grouping (columns headed a) compared with actual net migration, annual rates per 100,000 (columns headed b) East
1871–5 1875–80 1880–5 1885–90 1890–5 1895–1900 1900–5 1905–10
Centre
West and north-west
South and south-west
a
b
a
b
a
b
a
b
24 27 29 34 41 46 48 58
738 431 959 1038 661 815 662 663
15 17 21 28 40 52 58 66
þ323 þ48 þ35 þ490 þ99 þ351 þ316 þ225
14 19 27 33 43 52 55 60
þ119 99 252 þ167 þ50 þ449 þ285 þ217
0 1 16 26 36 44 43 44
365 203 559 268 259 60 113 192
Note: The equation used in these calculations was NETMIGjt ¼ 0:45NETMIGjt1 þ 0:26 DEATHRTjt 0:23 BIRTHRTjt4 (the j subscripts denoting the use of regional groupings); these coeYcients are from column a of Appendix Table 4B.2. 10
term.
The calculation is a simulation which allows for the eVect through the NETMIGkt1
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
109
same eVect should have led to a similar level of out-migration from the centre and the west, which in fact gained through migration. In the case of the south and south-west, there was a very small eVect from the demographic variables in the period of highest out-migration (1871–85) and a larger eVect in the period of lower out-migration after 1895. Some of the reasons for this can be seen from the comparison of the various regional groupings given in Table 4.6. The east did have a high birth rate, but it also had a high death rate (and more of the variation in the death rate fed into migration); the overall rate of natural population increase was not unusually high. The south had the lowest rates of natural population increase, yet initially a high rate of out-migration. The other factors show quite large variations which contribute rather more to the pattern of migration. Table 4.7 provides standardized estimates of the eVect of each factor on net migration over the whole period 1871–1910 (the standardization adjusts the calculated eVect so that the national average is zero). The impact of the demographic variables is small compared to the others. The most important eVect is the percentage of the population occupied in agriculture: the south and the east lost population through migration because they were more agricultural and because they had less industry. The south and the east diVered in the importance of larger farms and large estates, and this apparently caused a further rise in out-migration from the east. For the south, it caused a small reduction. This also had diVerent eVects on the two regions which gained through migration. The eVect of demographic factors on migration will be considered further in the next section and in the next chapter. In aggregate, it does Table 4.6. Average values by regional grouping, 1871–1910 East
Death rate, current period (annual %) Birth rate, 20 years previous (annual %) Percentage of land in holdings of over 100 hectares (1895) Percentage of the population occupied in agriculture (1895)
Centre
West and north-west
South and south-west
2.63
2.45
2.22
2.62
4.17
3.95
3.69
3.87
45.6
26.4
7.9
3.1
49.3
25.4
31.3
46.6
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
110
Table 4.7. Estimates of the eVect of diVerent factors on the pattern of net migration by regional grouping (annual average net migration per 100,000), 1871–1910 East
Centre West and South and north-west south-west
Both demographic variables 3 2 Percentage of land in holdings of 135 31 over 100 hectares Percentage of the population occupied 290 þ331 in agriculture
3 þ70
þ9 þ96
þ178
220
Note: A similar equation to that given in the previous footnote is used for each variable; the coeYcients used are 0:32 for LAND > 100j and 0:168 for % AGOCCPjt .
not appear that out-migration from the eastern provinces to the rest of Germany was driven to any signiWcant extent by higher rates of population growth than those in other regions. But population growth was high relative to the limited employment opportunities available in eastern agriculture. This drove the demographic surplus to seek employment in cities both inside the east and in other regions. It was the combination of demographic increase with the relative decline of agriculture which made the east a major source of migrants in the ‘labour surplus’ period. But this uses a broad classiWcation. Results in subsequent chapters show a diVerent picture for individual Kreise and regions. High rates of population growth at this level were an important factor in migration.
4. R u r a l – U r b a n Mi g r a t i o n f r o m t h e 1890 Ce n s u s The analysis in the previous section used net migration Wgures calculated from census returns. This data gives no indication of the destination of the migrant Xows. But a comparison of place of residence with place of birth from census returns can provide information of this type.11 An individual census is a snapshot, describing a moment in time, which tells us quite a lot about migration but which will leave out many 11
This type of data has been used by Ko¨llmann (1959) amongst others.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
111
moves. Those recorded as living away from their place of birth will include many who made other moves before reaching their current place of residence. Some of those living in the region of their birth may have left and then returned. In addition, there is no way of knowing which moves are temporary and which are intended to be permanent. Migration calculated from census records in this way is more than just net migration (since a calculation of the Xow from one region to another is possible in both directions) but it will also tend to understate the overall level of mobility. One advantage of this type of data is that it is possible to separate diVerent types of migration. The 1890 census is particularly useful. The published results provided an analysis of the population resident in major cities according to place of birth. This can be used to examine moves to the twenty-seven largest cities from areas outside these cities, thus excluding moves between major cities, and moves between rural areas. The analysis can consider whether the likelihood of a move was aVected by conditions in the region of origin or the recipient city, identifying factors which promoted or retarded migration between urban and rural areas. The full set of econometric results is given in Appendix 4B, Section (iii); Table 4.8 provides a summary of the Wndings. There are a number of general Wndings which provide an overview of the migration process in the period up to 1890. Migration was strongly aVected by the distance between the recipient cities and the regions of origin. If the recipient city lay within the region of origin this increased the likelihood of a move. This indicates a strong preference for short moves over long-distance ones. It also means that the proximity of major cities would have an eVect on overall rates of migration out of rural areas. In remote regions, the large distances needed to be travelled to reach the various major cities would have a depressing eVect on migration in general. High wages in the recipient cities, and low levels of unemployment or casual employment as revealed by the 1895 occupational census, tended to increase migration: moves were more likely to cities with stable or buoyant labour markets. There were certain industries which attracted migrants: clothing and construction oVered easy entry into the labour market for migrants who lacked previous experience of industrial work. By contrast, cities with high levels of employment in textiles did not attract migrants: the main period of rapid expansion of these cities had been in the 1860s and 1870s, and they had less need of migrants once this period had passed.
112
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
Table 4.8. Summary of results of statistical analysis of rural–urban moves from 1890 census I. Secure statistical results Characteristics of the regions of origin which increase outwards migration: Proximity to the recipient cities Presence of large farms and estates Poor economic prospects High rates of productivity growth in agriculture Characteristics of the recipient cities which increase inwards migration: High wages Low rates of natural population increase Low numbers of unemployed workers or workers without permanent jobs Presence of the construction and clothing industries Absence of the textile industry II. Less secure statistical results Characteristics of the regions of origin which increase migration: High rates of natural population increase High levels of agricultural employment
In the regions of origin, poor economic prospects, as indicated by a low rate of formation of Aktiengesellschaften (joint stock companies), had a positive eVect on outwards migration. This is interesting as it indicates a ‘forward-looking’ element to migration: migrants responded to the direction of economic change as well as current conditions. When these Wndings are combined with the result of those given in Table 4.4, they show how important economic factors could be in aVecting the course of migration: migrants were more likely to move if the urban–rural wage gap increased; they chose destinations with high wages and good chances of employment; they left regions which were lagging in terms of economic development. Demography was also important, although the strongest and most secure results are obtained for the recipient cities: high rates of natural population increase in these had a negative eVect on inwards migration, since such cities could Wll a greater proportion of available vacancies from their own natural increase. By contrast, while it appears that high rates of population increase in the regions of origin may have promoted out-migration from these regions, this Wnding is much less secure.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
113
Agricultural conditions are shown to have had an important eVect on out-migration. The presence of large farms and estates increased the likelihood of outwards migration in the regions of origin. In addition, agricultural change, as measured by the rate of productivity increase between 1880/4 and 1893/7, is associated with high rates of out-migration. This could be an indication that labour was shed as a direct consequence of changes in agricultural technology—the use of mechanized threshing, for example—or it could show that there was a general process of agricultural transformation, involving the replacement of traditional social and economic relations with modern capitalist ones, which had the eVect of both raising productivity and increasing the likelihood of migration. Alternatively, improvements in transportation may have brought new inputs to remote areas, raising productivity, as well as making it easier for potential migrants to leave.
5. C o n c l u s i o n s In general the statistical results presented in this chapter and the appendices conWrm the analysis presented in the previous chapter. There was a period of intense rural–urban migration in the 1870s and 1880s, and this was aVected by conditions within agriculture relative to those in industry, and by changes within agriculture. Agricultural transformation brought about the release of surplus labour onto urban labour markets. After a period of transition in the 1890s, the pattern of migration changed to one which was no longer dominated by the movement of surplus rural labour. The ending of this ‘labour surplus’ phase created conditions which were favourable to the creation of a modern mature industrial society, and to a process of social and economic reconciliation which could have led to the emergence of democratic institutions and a reduction in social conXict.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
114
Ap p e n d i x 4A. De s c r i p t i o n o f Re g r e s s i o n Va r i a b l e s a n d So u r c e s (i) Appendix Tables 4B.1 and 4B.2; Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 in text NETMIGkt BIRTHRTkt DEATHRTkt %AGOCCPkt
LAND > 100k
LANDPRICEt DAGINDWGAPt
Net migration, births, and deaths per 10,000 head of population from census results, from SDR a.f. 20 and 52, n.f. 32, 68 and 150–1, VSDR 1897 iv, 1906 iv, and 1911 iv. The population occupied in agriculture as a percentage of the total occupied population, from the occupational censuses, from SDR a.f. 4, n.f. 104–6 and 204–6: 1895 and 1907 results are also in Kaelble and Hohls (1995). The percentage of the total agricultural area in holdings of over 100 hectares, from 1895 Agricultural Census, SDR n.f. 212, pp. 489–500. HoVmann’s index of land prices, HoVmann (1965), 569–70. Change in the ratio of industrial and agricultural wages, using HoVmann’s Wgures, and comparing Wve-year averages, HoVmann (1965), 492–5.
(ii) Appendix Table 4B.3, Table 4.8 in text P(MIG)kj (dependent variable) NATPOPINCk
AGVALUEk
%AGRICk
Numbers born in rural part of region k who are recorded as living in city j, divided by total numbers born in rural part of k, calculated from SDR n.f. 68, pp. 136–53. Natural rate of population increase in the region of origin, 1880–90, from 1885 and 1895 census results, per 1,000 head of population, SDR n.f. 52 and VSDR 1897 iv. The value of Aktiengesellschaften founded 1871–90 from VSDR 1907 iv, p. 373; the Wgures are then divided by the regional population 1895 (1895 census). The population occupied in agriculture as a percentage of the total occupied population, from the
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
DAGPRODk
NATPOPINCj
AVEWAGESj %CONSTRCTj %CLOTHj %TEXTILESj %UNEMPj
115
1895 occupational census, Kaelble and Hohls (1995), 167–88. Percentage increase in agricultural value added per full-time labour unit, 1880/4 to 1893/7, from regional accounts prepared for this study (see Chapter 7). Natural rate of population increase for the recipient city, 1890–5, from SJDS (1892), table viii, p. 39, and subsequent issues. Average of Ortsu¨bliche Tagelo¨hne for men and women, 1892, from SJDS (1913), 827–8. Calculated from the results of the 1895 occupational census, given in SJDS (1898), 350–1; also in SDR n.f. 107–8.
Ap p e n d i x 4B. Ec o n o m e t r i c An a l y s i s (i) Analysis of net migration 1871–1910, using census data The post-1871 census results can be used to look at the rates of transfer between the eighty-one regions (the pre-1871 Wgures use diVerent regional units and so are not comparable). Analysing each time period separately can show if the course of migration changed—if there were some periods which were dominated by the transfer of surplus labour out of agriculture and others which show a diVerent pattern. Table 4B.1 presents the results of a series of regressions run for each time period in succession, with a single explanatory variable: the percentage of the total occupied population which is occupied in agriculture (%AGOCCP). What this table shows is the extent to which the pattern of net migration by region can be interpreted solely as a transfer of labour out of the more agricultural regions, either to the industrial regions or to foreign countries. The t-ratios are all signiWcant at the 95% conWdence level, which shows that the extent to which a region specializes in agriculture is always a factor in migration, but it is the R2 statistics in the Wnal column that are the most eloquent. These show the extent to which the incidence of this form of migration, the transfer of surplus labour out of agriculture, can explain all the observed variance in net
116
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
Table 4B.1. Regressions of net migration by period on % occupied in agriculture: dependent variable is net migration per 100,000 (annual rate) for 81 regions Period
constant
coeYcient on %AGOCCP
t-ratio
R2
1871–5 1875–80 1880–5 1885–90 1890–5 1895–1900 1900–5 1905–10
1595 734 1006 1653 677 1335 769 610
39.22 19.87 35.06 45.44 23.12 38.15 23.49 21.63
7.91 7.80 10.36 11.84 7.23 8.70 6.25 5.39
0.442 0.435 0.571 0.639 0.398 0.489 0.331 0.269
Note: Regression variables and sources given in Appendix 4A.
migration by region. At the peak in 1885–90, with an R2 of 0.639, this is evidently the dominant form of migration: 64% of the migration pattern can be explained by this factor alone. But by 1905–10 it only accounts for around a quarter of observed variance. By this time migration was more heavily inXuenced by other considerations.12 The slope coeYcients give an indication of the pace of the transfer. A high coeYcient indicates that a large proportion of the agricultural population migrated in that period. This peaks in 1885–90, although it is also high in 1871–5 and 1895–1900. By 1900–10 it is considerably lower. This table provides clear statistical support for the view that the pattern of migration shifted from a ‘labour surplus’ one in the 1870s and 1880s, to a more ‘normal’ one post-1900, where the movement of population out of agriculture (which still continues even in advanced industrial economies) is just one stream amongst other migrant movements, not a dominant inXuence on the labour market as a whole. (ii) Panel data analysis of migration 1871–1910 The separate analysis of each time period can produce interesting contrasts in the slope coeYcients, and in the Wt of the estimated equations, 12
The question of non-linearity in the functional form, which might aVect the R2 calculations, was considered. F-tests generally led to the rejection of additional X2 variables. No signiWcant improvement in the R2 s was found to be possible.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
117
but combining the data in a single panel makes it possible to test hypotheses about the reasons for the changes in the slope coeYcients. The analysis in this section uses the same sources as the previous section but analyses the data as a single panel. There are some restrictions on the analysis which follow from the nature of the data. Only eight time periods are available for the 1871– 1910 period, and the pre-1871 data is not comparable either in terms of the regional units used or the lengths of the time periods. This means that any lag structure has to be a simple one: eVectively the only possibility is the inclusion of a NETMIGkt1 term (net migration for the kth region lagged one period) amongst the explanatory variables, implying, by way of the Koyck transformation, a lag structure of the form E(Xt ) ¼ aXt þ a2 Xt1 þ a3 Xt2 þ a4 Xt3 . . . : for the expected values of the explanatory variables. An additional problem is that the sum total of regional net migration is the external balance, which Xuctuates considerably, as shown in Table 4.2. Ideally, this would be modelled separately, and in a way which took into account the eVect of alterations in economic conditions in the main destination for German emigrants, the United States.13 But, given the limited number of time periods, it is not possible to estimate a complex model of this type for the regional data set. So, the data set was analysed as a Wxed eVects panel data set, including dummies for all time periods, which means that the external balance is treated as an exogenous factor. The estimated model only deals with the internal transfer of population between the diVerent regions. Results are given in Table 4B.2. The Wrst column gives the basic model: net migration as a function of two demographic variables (the current death rate and the birth rate lagged 20 years), the percentage occupied in agriculture and the amount of land in holdings of over 100 hectares. As shown in the previous section, the percentage occupied in agriculture has an important eVect on migration, but this table shows that there is a further eVect from the prevalence of larger farms and large estates: there is a signiWcant negative coeYcient on the LAND > 100k term, suggesting that this causes additional out-migration. This point merited further investigation, and it is one of the themes examined in the next two chapters. In brief, these results show that, 13
A model of this type, using annual data, was included in chapter 6 of the original D.Phil. thesis, Grant (2000). It is intended to publish a separate article based on this chapter.
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Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
once the issue is examined at a lower level of aggregation, using a Kreislevel data set (with data for around 400 Prussian Kreise), then it is discovered that what mattered was the geographical position of these estates, the fact that they were mainly located in remote eastern areas, not the fact that they were large as such. The demographic terms are both signiWcant. Their importance is somewhat obscured by the lag structure adopted; part of the eVect comes through the NETMIGkt1 term. The estimated coeYcients imply that, after Wve periods (or twenty-Wve years), 41% of an increase in the birth rate lagged four periods would be exported through increased net migration, and 47% of a decrease in the current death rate.14 The next two columns in Table 4B.2 introduce variables which are inter-acted with the %AGOCCPkt variable. These are variables which might aVect the rate of labour transfer between agriculture and industry, and thus explain the variation in the coeYcients on %AGOCCP shown in Table 4B.1. A negative coeYcient therefore shows that a rise in this variable increases the rate of transfer from agriculture to industry; a positive coeYcient shows that it holds it back. The second column uses the change in the ratio between agricultural and industrial wages to explain the shifts in the pace of migration. This model produces an improved Wt. Part of the increase in migration between the 1870s and the 1890s can therefore be attributed to the eVect of the rise in this ratio. Given the lag structure used, this would still be aVecting migration for some time after this, even though the ratio ceased to rise. The third column uses a diVerent variable: the level of land prices as an indicator of agricultural prosperity. The estimated coeYcient is positive, indicating that higher land prices did reduce the rate of migration, but it is not signiWcant at the 5% level (the hypothesis that there is in fact no eVect on migration from this variable cannot be rejected with 95% conWdence). So, migration is best explained by the equation used for column b, which uses the change in the agriculture–industry wage gap. It was the widening of this gap which was responsible for the high rate of rural urban migration in the 1880s. What is also notable about the results in Table 4B.2 is the stability of the coeYcients on the demographic variables, and on the structural 14 The reason for lagging the birth rate 20 years is that the Berlin census results show that most migrants arrived in their early twenties.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
119
Table 4B.2. Fixed eVect regressions (OLS with time period dummies) of net migration, annual rates per 1,000 population, Wve-year time periods 1871–1910 a NETMIGkt1 DEATHRTkt BIRTHRTkt4 %AGOCCPkt LAND > 100k
b
þ0.454 (5.86) þ0.260 (3.43) 0.230 (4.26) 0.168 (6.60) 0.0320 (2.78)
%AGOCCPkt * DAGINDWGAPt %AGOCCPkt * LANDPRICEt N F-test of regression R-sqd adj R-sqd RSS
þ0.469 (5.98) þ0.231 (3.11) 0.214 (4.13) 0.163 (6.42) 0.0320 (2.84) 0.0119 (5.50)
c þ0.450 (5.73) þ0.247 (3.27) 0.223 (4.16) 0.170 (6.65) 0.0328 (2.85)
þ0.00380 (1.81) 648 89.10 [12,635] 0.627 0.620 112213990
648 89.02 [13,634] 0.646 0.639 106588139
648 83.18 [13,634] 0.630 0.623 111304403
Note: t-statistics (in brackets) calculated using White’s heterocedasticity-corrected standard errors. Appendix 4A gives a full description of variables and sources; alternative random eVects estimates of the equations are given in Appendix 2B of Grant (2000). These do not alter the basic results although some of the coeYcients did change.
variables LAND > 100k and %AGOCCPkt . The importance of these variables in the overall pattern of migration is conWrmed. The labour surplus was created by a combination of demographic factors and the relative decline of agriculture. (iii) Analysis of rural–urban moves from the 1890 census The 1890 census provides Wgures for moves to the twenty-seven largest cities from those living outside these cities, divided between twentynine provinces. This excludes city–city moves and rural–rural moves. This data has been used to create a variable Pkj , which is the proportion
120
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
of the total numbers born in province K, excluding those born in major cities, who move to city J. The model is a simple linear log-odds ratio model: log (Pkj =(1 Pkj ) ¼ f (Xk1 . . . :Xkn , Xj1 . . . :Xjm ), where f(.) is a linear function, and Xk1 . . . :Xkn , Xj1 . . . :Xjm are characteristics of the region of origin K and the recipient city J used as explanatory variables. The only nonlinear variable is the distance travelled which is entered in a log form. The functional form produces a logistic curve, thus preventing predicted values from falling below zero. The LOGDISTANCEkj term gives the log of the distance in kilometres between the recipient city and the nearest border of the region of origin. Where the recipient city was within the boundaries of the region a notional distance of 2 kilometres was used (this could not be zero as the term was to be in log form). To avoid distorting the results by this procedure a dummy variable DUM1CONTkj was introduced for moves to cities within the regional boundaries. Table 4B.3 gives the results of four diVerent regressions run using this data. In the Wrst three columns the only variables included for the
Table 4B.3. Regression results for linear log-odds migration model, 1890 census a Constant LOGDISTANCEkj DUM1CONTkj
5.982 1.331 (26.3) 0.655 (2.45)
Characteristics of the region of origin: NATPOPINCk þ0.01088 (1.26) %AGRICk þ0.01108 (2.64) LAND > 100k þ0.0154 (6.90) AGVALUEk DAGPRODk
b 5.620 1.334 (26.4) 0.676 (2.53) þ0.01118 (1.30) þ0.06684 (1.43) þ0.0141 (6.13) 0.00196 (2.13)
c
d
5.367 1.328 (27.2) 0.668 (2.55)
5.082 1.281 (30.4) 0.499 (2.21)
þ0.0156 (7.54) 0.00392 (4.63) 0.0140 (5.49)
þ0.0155 (8.73) 0.00381 (5.24) 0.0140 (6.37)
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis Characteristics of the recipient city: NATPOPINCj 0.0120 (8.95) AVEWAGESj þ0.0195 (11.55) %CONSTRCTj
0.0120 (8.98) þ0.0195 (11.57)
0.0120 (9.13) þ0.0195 (11.79)
783 1.028 818.5 177.8 [8,774] 0.647 0.644
783 1.010 790.8 214.5 [7,775] 0.659 0.656
%CLOTHj %TEXTILESj %UNEMPj N S RSS F-Test R-sqd adj.R-sqd
783 1.031 823.3 201.6 [8,774] 0.645 0.642
121 0.0101 (5.13) þ0.0123 (7.896) þ0.162 (6.156) þ0.105 (5.283) 0.040 (9.74) 0.140 (7.29) 783 0.869 582.5 209.4 [11,771] 0.749 0.746
Note: RONATINC and RCNATINC are natural rates of population growth for the region of origin and the recipient city; %AGRIC is the % of the population occupied in agriculture; %LAND > 100HA and %LAND20/100 refer to the distribution of the usable agricultural area by size of holding; AVEWAGES is the average wages of daylabourers in 1892 for each city; AGPROD82 and DAGPROD82=95 are Wgures for the levels of agricultural productivity 1880/5 and the increase in 1880/5–1893/7. These make use of regional agricultural accounts prepared by the author. Further details on the sources are in Appendix 4A.
recipient city are the level of wages (AVEWAGESj) and the rate of natural population increase (NATPOPINCj ). A number of explanatory variables which were found to inXuence migration were introduced for the region of origin. The results in the Wrst column show that the prevalence of larger farms and estates (LAND > 100k ) has a signiWcant positive eVect on the likelihood of a move from the region of origin. This conWrms the Wnding reported in the previous section. The rate of natural population increase has a signiWcant negative eVect on the likelihood of migration into the recipient city (a high rate of population increase reduces migration into the city) but the coeYcient on the NATPOPINCk term (population growth in the region of origin) was not signiWcant. This is an intriguing result: variations in population growth between cities matter; those in rural areas are less
122
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
important. This theme will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. The percentage of the population occupied in agriculture in the region of origin (%AGRICk ) is a variable whose importance is considerably reduced when compared to the results given in the previous section. But this is not so surprising. The eVect of using rural–urban moves as the dependent variable is to eliminate much of the previous eVect of this variable. More urban regions had lower overall net migration for two main reasons: Wrst, there were proportionately less farmers and farm-workers, and secondly, there were more moves to cities within the region. Moves to cities within the region are now recorded; and by using moves relative to the rural population as the dependent variable the importance of the Wrst point is also reduced.15 The second column shows the eVect of including the term AGVALUEk . This gives the value per head of population of Aktiengesellschaften (joint stock companies) founded 1871–1910 by region. This was included in an attempt to examine the extent to which migration was aVected by the prospects of a region as well as its current position. The %AGOCCPkt term is a backward-looking measure: it reXects what has happened in the past, not what is likely to happen in the future. The formation of Aktiengesellschaften is a forward-looking decision by investors and should be related to the dynamism of the region, to the extent to which it has specialized in fast-growing industries for example. The introduction of the AGVALUEk variable reduces the signiWcance of the %AGRICk term (column b). For the last two columns this term and the NATPOPINCk term are both dropped. The coeYcient on AGVALUEk is raised as a result. Some of the eVect of the %AGRICk variable is captured by AGVALUEk (Aktiengesellschaften were more likely to be formed in areas which were already industrial). But the greater signiWcance of AGVALUEk is due to its ‘forward-looking’ or dynamic quality. What exactly were these dynamic factors which caused AGVALUEk to have this inXuence? There were three forces at work. The Wrst was an increase in the importance of large Wrms, which were more likely to be Aktiengesellschaften. The second was the impact of foreign trade on the German economy, which led to greater specialization in those areas 15 The fact that some eVect is still exerted by %AGRICk is explained by the fact that there are some regions which were industrial but which did not have large cities.
Migration 1870–1913: A Statistical Analysis
123
where Germany had a comparative advantage, and in turn led to faster growth in regions specializing in these Welds. The third was a tendency for regional specialization to rise, due to economies of scale internal and external to the Wrm. Increased vertical integration, leading to the combining of processing and primary production in a single region, was one aspect of this. In the third column the increase in agricultural productivity by region between the years 1880–4 and 1893–7 is introduced (DAG PRODk ).16 This variable is found to have a signiWcant positive eVect on the likelihood of migration: migration is higher from regions with high productivity increases. This result can be interpreted as supporting the view that there was a substantial agricultural labour surplus, and the release of this surplus both increased productivity and led to out-migration. But an alternative view is that these are both consequences of a change in institutions and social relations. The impact of industrialization led to a transformation of agrarian society which both raised productivity and led to increased out-migration. In the last column (d) the breakdown of the employed population in the recipient city by occupation is used to produce a series of additional explanatory variables. The results show that certain industries attracted migrants, leading to an increase in the likelihood of inward migration from rural areas. Two which had this eVect were construction and clothing (%CONSTRCTj and %CLOTHj ). Other industries had a negative eVect. One of these was textiles (%TEXTILESj ). The main period of rapid expansion for this industry had passed by 1890, and the main textile areas had less need of migrants. The results also show that there is a negative eVect from the percentage of workers who were without regular employment according to the census (the variable is called %UNEMPj although it is not the same as registered unemployment). 16
These Wgures are derived from regional accounts. The methods used are described in chapter 5 of Grant (2000), and also in Grant (2002a).
5
Demography and Migration 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n The last chapter presented some evidence on the inXuence of demographic variables on migration. The results were equivocal. Regressions showed an eVect from demographic variables on net migration for eighty-one regions 1871–1910, but, when migration between four major regional groupings was considered, the net eVect of demographic factors was shown to be small when compared with other explanatory variables. The analysis of the 1890 census showed that variations in the natural rate of population increase in the recipient cities had an important eVect on migration, but that the eVect from population growth in the regions of origin was less certain. This chapter will attempt to elucidate these issues, in the context of a general discussion of the relationship between migration and demography in Germany 1870–1913. In this period Germany was going through the ‘demographic transition’, usually deWned as a movement from a state in which both fertility and mortality are high to one in which both are considerably lower. This transition has been much studied by demographers: one conclusion which has emerged is that there is no single model of the demographic transition—much will depend on the circumstances of individual countries or regions. The German experience conWrms this: there were important diVerences between the regions and these have implications for migration. SpeciWcally, the demographic experiences of two regions which were major sources of potential migrants in the period, the south and the east, were very diVerent. This had a considerable eVect. It is one reason why there was heavy out-migration from certain heavily agricultural regions in the east, while migration from similar southern regions was lower. So, diVerences between the south and the east will be one theme of the chapter. A second theme will be a comparison of the demographic background to two periods of heavy out-migration: that which aVected southern and western Germany in the earlier part of the nineteenth century and the movement out of eastern Germany in the period after
Demography and Migration
125
1870. The intention here is to look for signs of demographic stress, direct evidence of severe population pressure. To what extent was migration caused by overpopulation? Are there diVerences between the two periods? Comparison between the south and the east leads to an examination of the role played by agricultural factors. The agricultural systems of the two regions were very distinct: diVerent sized-farms, diVerent types of labour contract, diVerent inheritance systems. Did these have demographic eVects? As regards the demographic experience of the recipient towns and cities, this has already been studied in some depth. The high fertility of the coal-mining regions in the west is a well-known fact.1 This has clear implications for migration. It is a fairly simple calculation to show that high fertility reduced the need for migration into the coal-mining areas. A higher proportion of the required increase in the total labour force was supplied through the natural increase of the resident population than was the case for Berlin, for example. This was an important factor in migration.2 A more general theme is the contribution of demographic movements to the ‘labour surplus’ phase of the Lewis Model. The period of the ‘demographic transition’, when mortality rates fall ahead of a reduction in fertility, is potentially one of high population growth, contributing to the overall labour surplus.
2. T h e G e r m a n D e m o g r a p h i c E x p e r i e n c e i n t h e N i n et e en t h Ce n t u r y An overview of German population movements in the nineteenth century is provided in Figure 5.1. This uses calculations made by the Prussian statistical oYce for all the territories included in Prussia after the incorporation of Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein in 1866. This series extends back to 1816. A second series is superimposed, which is for all the post-1871 German territories, and makes use of a series 1
Wrigley (1961); see also Haines (1977) and (1979). Valuable studies of demographic change in Germany in the period include Ballod (1914), Hohorst (1977), Ko¨llmann (1974), Knodel (1988), Marschalck (1987), Lee (1979a), and Pollard (1980). This chapter also draws on the theoretical analysis of Birdsell (1988) and Habbakuk (1958). The regional classiWcation follows the deWnitions set out in Appendix Table 3A.1. 2
Demography and Migration
126 500 Prussian births 400
German births 300 Prussian deaths
German deaths
200 Prussian natural increase 100
German natural increase
0 1816
1826
1836
1846
1856
1866
1876
1886
1896
1906
Fig. 5.1. Births, deaths, and the natural rate of population increase, per 10,000 head of population, Prussia and Germany 1816–1913 (post-1871 territorial units) Note: Figures are three-year rolling averages. Source: The source used is SJPS (1915), 55; these estimates were endorsed by Ko¨llmann (1980), who also gives figures for the individual provinces.
produced by the Imperial Statistical OYce. This only goes back to 1862.3 There is a fairly close correspondence between the two series, which is as expected, given that Prussia accounted for around 61% of the total German population. The reliability of the earlier Wgures is open to question. The main area of concern is the Wgures for stillbirths prior to 1841. These had to be estimated as they were not then recorded. If these are underestimated then the birth rate and the death rate are aVected, but not the overall rate of population growth. The natural rate of population increase peaked in the 1816–22 period, possibly as a reaction to the ending of the disruptions caused by 3
Calculated from SJDR (1915), 22, SJPS (1910), 14.
Demography and Migration
127
the Napoleonic wars, but then fell back sharply in the agricultural crisis which followed, from 1.9% in 1822 to just 0.2% in 1831. This was brought about by a combination of a rise in the death rate and a fall in the birth rate. Thereafter there was an irregular recovery, which peaked in the mid-1870s, when the natural rate of increase reached 1.5% per annum. This period saw considerable Xuctuations in both fertility and mortality, which are apparent even when a three-year moving average is used. After the 1870s both series are much more stable, and tend to decline, with the decline in the death rate being more pronounced and starting much earlier. The birth rate does not show a substantial decline until after 1900, so that the rate of natural increase remained high, peaking at 1.56% per annum (reached in both 1898 and 1902).4 The decline of fertility after 1900 was too late to aVect the pre-1913 labour market. The combined eVects of high fertility in previous periods and declining mortality meant that the rate of increase of the potential labour force remained high right up to 1913. Comparison of the employment censuses of 1895 and 1907 shows the male labour force increasing at a rate of 1.5% per annum and an even faster rate for female employment.5 The pattern is a classic demographic transition curve. But the peak was reached at diVerent times in diVerent regions. Figure 5.2 illustrates this point, classifying each region by the timing of the peak rate of natural increase between census years (normally at Wve-year intervals). Most regions peaked in either 1895–1900 or 1900–5, as did the national average. But there was a group which peaked much earlier, in the 1870s. This included Berlin, Pomerania, and some other central regions. There is another group in which population growth was still rising by 1905–10, which had not, therefore, clearly peaked before the First World War. These are the regions shaded black. This is quite a scattered group of regions, with all areas represented apart from the centre. There is no clear pattern; it includes agricultural as well as industrial regions. Figure 5.2 helps to explain why there was relatively little eVect from demographic factors when the pattern of migration between the major regional groupings was considered in the last chapter. There were 4
German Wgures, SJDR (1912), 22. Data from Kaelble and Hohls (1989). There are some changes in the relative positions of the various regions as a result of diVerent rates of industrial growth between census dates, but the overall ranking remains remarkably constant. The classiWcation would be essentially the same if the 1882 or 1907 censuses were used in place of the 1895 census. 5
128
Demography and Migration
1871−5
1890−5
1875−80
1895−1900
1880−5
1900−5
1885−90
1905−10
Fig. 5.2. The demographic transition in Germany 1871–1910: German regions classified by the period of highest natural population increase Source: Data for this figure, and the next two, taken from census publications, SDR (1876), a.f. 20, SDR (1881), a.f. 57, SDR (1886), n.f. 32, SDR (1891), n.f. 68, SDR (1901), n.f. 150–1; VSDR 1897 iv, 1906 iv, and 1911 iv.
diVerences within these groupings which had a tendency to cancel each other out. Population growth falling in Pomerania was balanced by rising population growth in other eastern regions, for example. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate the eVect of these movements on the overall rate of population growth by region, comparing the 1870s with the 1900–10 period. The Wrst map has a ‘mottled’ appearance: most parts of the country contained regions both of high and of low growth. Again, this helps to explain why demography had a limited eVect on the major groupings. By 1900–10 there is a clearer pattern: the areas of high growth are predominantly in the west and in the east; the centre and the south contain the low-growth regions. In most areas the rate of increase was faster in the 1900–10 period. The main exceptions are in the centre, conWrming that this was the region which Wrst went into the downward phase of the demographic transition.
Demography and Migration
<0.8 0.8−1.0 1.0−1.2
129
1.4−1.6 1.6−1.8 >1.8
1.2−1.4
Fig. 5.3. The natural rate of population increase 1871–80 (annual averages) Source: As for Table 5.2.
From the viewpoint of a study of migration, the most important map is Figure 5.3. This is because diVerences in population growth in 1900–10, in so far as these reXect diVerences in birth rates, are not particularly relevant to migration Xows before 1914. A rise in the number of children will not increase migration immediately; in fact it could reduce migration if families with children are less likely to migrate. It is only when these children enter the labour market, and take decisions based on an assessment of their own prospects, that there is likely to be an increase in out-migration from a region of high population growth. Analysis of the Berlin Wgures from the 1885 census supports these points. The median age of migrants arrived in the previous year was 22.8; 52.2% of migrants were aged between 17 and 26.6 These Wgures also show that those aged between 20 and 21 had the highest probability of migration. 6
Calculated from Berlin, Statistisches Amt (1887), table Vb.
Demography and Migration
130
<0.8 0.8−1.0 1.0−1.2
1.4−1.6 1.6−1.8 >1.8
1.2−1.4
Fig. 5.4. The natural rate of population increase 1900–10 (annual averages) Source: As for Table 5.2.
So, it is the earlier, ‘mottled’ map of 1871–80 which has more signiWcance. The more pronounced regional pattern of 1900–10 was of little consequence for migration before 1914.
3. A C o m p a r i s o n o f D e m o g r a p h i c Mo v e m e n t s in th e Ea st a nd t he S o u t h The discussion in the previous section implicitly treated demographic factors as exogenous: as a pattern of behaviour which was unaVected by economic circumstances and prospects. But there are ways in which economic conditions can have eVects on population growth, and, once this is accepted, the main point about the interaction between demographic factors and migration becomes a rather diVerent one. It is the extent to which the natural rate of increase responds, or fails to respond, to diVerences in relative economic opportunities between regions that will aVect migration.
Demography and Migration
131
Contemporary observers were well aware of mechanisms whereby economic conditions could aVect both mortality and fertility. In 1879 von Fircks pointed to the coincidence of periods of rising mortality and high cereal prices.7 German demographers also recognized the importance of delayed marriage—the ‘Western European marriage pattern’— for the control of fertility. Indeed, they were particularly conscious of this, as Germany was very much on the frontier of this division: the area of delayed marriage in central and eastern Europe followed the line of German inXuence.8 In the German view, delayed marriage was a consequence of cultural progress, and this was the reason why Germany, and other parts of Western Europe, diVered in this respect from lands further east: ‘In primitive tribes or in countries with a low level of cultural development, such as Russia, Serbia or Bulgaria, the average age at marriage is very low; marriage takes place shortly after puberty for both sexes.’9 The same study argued that in Germany marriage was linked to economic conditions. The custom which delayed marriage until the couple were able to