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Media Studies: A Reader Marris, Paul. 0748607781 9780748607785 9780585156507

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Media Studies A Reader Edited and Introduced by Paul Marris and Sue Thornham

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EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Selection and editorial material (c) 1996 Paul Marris and Sue Thornham The texts are reprinted by permission of other publishers. Reprinted 1997 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in Monotype Garamond by Bibliocraft, Dundee, and printed and bound in Great Britain A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 7486 0778 1

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INTRODUCTION ABOUT THIS READER As part of the process by which any book reaches print, the outline proposal for this one was sent to a number of academic readers for comment, Those of one American reader, Jane Feuer, included the following: 'it combines a wide spectrum of what might be labelled cultural studies, approaches to the media; it is very British and very lefty/Marxist/feminist' - though she did add, 'I think that's good. . . ' The comment seems a useful one on which to begin this introduction, not because of its accuracy as a summary, but because it draws attention to the fact that the study of the mass media has always been a politically, as well as a theoretically, engaged enterprise (though, in the case of some research traditions, not always explicitly so), and that the particular inflection of that study in Britain is a distinctive one. What this book seeks to do, then, is to map a field, its varied, and often conflicting, histories, and its current debates. However, like any other, it is a map. sketched from a particular perspective. That perspective is one which draws centrally on certain key political/theoretical assumptions to provide its academic coherence and its structural framework, assumptions which are, as our reader suggests, grounded in cultural studies approaches to the media. The opening section. 'Some Introductions' begins by outlining the different, and often theoretically and methodologically opposed, origins of the field as it is now constituted in Britain. From the arguments between the American mass communication tradition and the Europe-centred Frankfurt School in the 1940s, to the very different analyses of communication technologies by Marshall McLuhan and Raymond Williams in the 1960s, these differences have centred not only on the relative importance of the theoretical and the empirical in media research, but also - and always (even if only implicitly) underpinning these more overt arguments - on the political assumptions within the different traditions about the role and function of the mass media in society. Crudely summarised, the approaches of both the American mass communication tradition and McLuhan's work in the 1960s derive from a position broadly supportive of the directions in which Western society was moving, whereas those of the Frankfurt School and the English culturalist tradition are profoundly critical. Thus, in Tony Bennett's words, 'the sorts of assumptions made about the broader structure of society within different bodies of theory have determined both the sorts of questions that have been posed in relation to the media and the way in which those questions have been pursued'. 1 The work of Stuart Hall at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the 1970s (see Chapter 5). constitutes a crucial moment in the development of media studies in Britain, drawing as it does upon paradigms from both the American and the European strands of thought and adding to them an attention to the media text which has its origins partly

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CONTENTS Preface

viii

Introduction: About this Reader

ix

Part One: Studying the Media Some Introductions

5

1. Mass communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton

14

2. Culture Industry Reconsidered Theodor W. Adorno

24

3. The Medium is the Message Marshall McLuhan

30

4. 'Mass Communication' and 'Minority Culture' Raymond Williams

35

5. Encoding/Decoding Stuart Hall

41

6. The Power of the Image Annette Kuhn

50

7. The Public Sphere Jürgen Habermas

55

8. The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media Jean Baudrillard

60

Further Reading

69

Production

75

9. On the Cultural Industries Nicholas Garnham

78

10. The Media and the State Colin Sparks

84

11. Concentration and Ownership in the Era of Privatization Graham Murdock file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/loop/Desktop/0748607781/files/page_v.html[27/02/2011 21.40.57]

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12. Producers in British Television Jeremy Tunstall

102

13. The BBC and the 1956 Suez Crisis Asa Briggs

113

Further Reading

119

Text: Codes and Structures

123

14. Radio Signs Andrew Crisell

125

15. The Codes of Television John Fiske

133

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16. Programming as Sequence or Flow Raymond Williams

142

17. Broadcast TV Narration John Ellis

148

Further Reading

154

Ideology and Genre

157

18. Racist Ideologies and the Media Stuart Hall

160

19. Fictions and Ideologies: The Case of Situation Comedy Janet Woollacott

169

20. Progressive Television and Documentary Drama John Caughie

180

21. Televised Chat and the Synthetic Personality Andrew Tolson

189

Further Reading

198

Feminist Readings

203

22. Survival Skills and Daydreams Janice Winship

205

23. Cagney & Lacey Feminist Strategies of Detection Danae Clark

211

24. The Page Three Girl Speaks to Women, Too Patricia Holland

221

Further Reading

230

'Postmodern' Media

235

25. Whose Imaginary? The Televisual Apparatus, the Female Body and Textual Strategies in Select Rock Videos on MTV E. Ann Kaplan

237

26. Postmodernism and Popular Culture Angela McRobbie

246

Further Reading

253

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Reception: 'Effects' to 'Uses'

257

27. Desensitization, Violence and the Media Hans Eysenck and D. K. B. Nias

260

28. On the Social Effects of Television James D. Halloran

266

29. The Television, Audience: A Revised Perspective Denis McQuail, Jay G. Blumler and J. R. Brown

271

30. Uses and Gratifications Research: A Critique Phillip Elliott:

285

Further Reading

292

The Politics of Reading

295

31. Cultural Transformations: The Politics of Resistance David Morley

298

32. Housewives and the Mass Media Dorothy Hobson

307

33. Wanted: Audiences. On the Politics of Empirical Audience Studies Ien Ang

313

Further Reading

321

Beyond Hegemony?

325

34. Behind Closed Doors: Video Recorders in the Home Ann Gray

327

35. Moments of Television: Neither the Text nor the Audience John Fiske

337

Further Reading

346

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Part Two: Case Studies Soap Opera

353

36. EastEnders: Creating the Audience David Buckingham

355

37. The Continuous Serial: A Definition Christine Geraghty

362

38. The Search for Tomorrow in Today's Soap Operas Tania Modleski

371

39. Dallas and Feminism Ien Ang

381

40. Crossroads: Notes on Soap Opera Charlotte Brunsdon

386

41. Everything Stops for Crossroads: Watching with the Audience Dorothy Hobson

391

Further Reading

398

News

401

42. News Values and News Production + Bias, Objectivity and ideology Peter Golding and Philip Elliott

405

43. The Production of Radio and Television News Philip Schlesinger

416

44. The Social Production of News Stuart Hall, Chas. Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts

424

45. The Falklands conflict: The Home Front Glasgow University Media Group

430

46. When a Woman Reads the News Patricia Holland

438

47. News Content and Audience Belief Greg Philo

446

Further Reading

452

Advertising

457

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48. Advertising: The Magic System Raymond Williams

461

49. The Impact of Advertising on the British Mass Media James Curran

466

50. Understanding Advertisers Kathy Myers

480

51. Decoding Advertisements Judith Williamson

489

52. Handling Sex Janice Winship

492

53. Discriminating or Duped? Young People as Consumers of Advertising/Art Mica Nave and Orson Nave

503

54. Consumer Culture and the Aura of the Commodity Alan Tomlinson

510

Further Reading

515

Acknowledgements

517

Index of Names

521

Subject Index

524

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PREFACE We should like to take this opportunity to thank staff and students on the BA (Hons) Media Studies and BA (Hons) Communication Studies degrees at the University of Sunderland for their contributions to the planning of this reader. We should also like to thank the School of Arts, Design and Communications for granting us sabbatical leave to complete the book; and colleagues in Media and Cultural Studies for being willing to add further administrative burdens to already heavy loads in order to make that leave possible. Thanks also go to Jackie Jones of Edinburgh University Press for her support and encouragement, to Nicola Carr for the efficiency of her detective work and to Melanie Gibson. for her help in the final stages of preparation. Finally, we should like to thank our families for their support throughout the preparation of this reader.

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in a specifically English tradition of literary criticism and partly in 1970's British film theory. But Hall's work does not represent merely a synthesis of hitherto opposed traditions. Rather, through his use of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, 2 he provides a framework by which the operation of mass media in society can be understood as a series of 'articulated' (in the term's double sense of 'expressed' and 'joined together') moments, each of which is also the site of cultural struggle, or 'negotiation', over meaning. Within such a framework, earlier traditions of research are both drawn upon and critiqued, positioned within a field of study which is now reconstituted around a model which is at once a theoretical and a political analysis. It is Hall's model - with its three 'moments' of production ('encoding'), text ('meaningful discourse') and reception ('decoding'), each of which may be viewed (and studied) as 'relatively autonomous', but which are also part of a wider process - which provides the central organising principle of this book. This is not to say, however, either that Hall's model has been uncontested or that the division between production, text and reception is unproblematic. Three difficulties should be mentioned here. The first is that many of the writers included in this volume Would deny the equivalence of Hall's 'moments', seeing the primary determining element in the production of meaning as being, for example, the processes of production or the processes of reception/consumption. The second difficulty concerns the boundaries between the divisions. In the case of soap opera; for example, where the programme itself is a continuous serial, where its storylines and characters are mediated for us by magazines and the press, and where viewers 'remake' the text in their viewing processes and discussions, the boundary between 'text' and 'reception' becomes uncertain, and much research has focused on this issue. Finally, in more recent work, particularly that which centres on theories of the postmodern, the Gramscian paradigm which underpins Hall's model has been more fundamentally challenged. The two chapters which close the opening section of this book (Chapters 7 and 8) represent two very different forms of this challenge, Jürgen Habermas calls for a return to a focus on the media as the site of the 'public sphere' of information and debate - away, therefore; from an emphasis on the media as site of popular culture, where Hall's model has proved so fruitful and where many of the chapters in this volume would be placed. For Jean Baudrillard, however, the mass media cannot operate in this public sphere, since theirs is a structure not of meaning but of simulation. Moreover, this world of simulation and spectacle has now absorbed the realm of the social, so that a separate sphere of resistance no longer exists: In this vision, Hall's model of 'articulated moments' no longer applies, and with its disappearance go the possibilities of negotiation and resistance which are built in at each 'moment' of the operation of the mass media in society. There are other debates and divisions which are represented in this volume. One concerns the position of feminist theory and research within media studies. None of the approaches outlined so far employs gender as a central organising principle. Indeed, most are, at least in their original form, notably gender-blind, operating a model within which the crucial issues for feminist analysis - such as the gendered nature of access to public power and discourses or the centrality of women's bodies as a site of struggle over control and meaning - cannot be inserted without a radical questioning of the model itself. Yet, as Annette Kuhn argues (Chapter 6), issues of power and representation within the operation of mass media have been a central concern of feminist cultural analyses, and feminist theories have challenged, used and transformed approaches and models. produced elsewhere. Moreover, feminists have been active within med research and theory, shifting the focus of Hall's model, for example, away from its original class-based analysis and towards a model of social power and dominance which can account for a range of differences in the structuring of social and discursive power,

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and a range of negotiations at the level of production, text and audience. The result is an uneven picture, in which feminist analyses axe positioned as central in some areas of media research and theory - notably those which focus upon the text-reader relationship within forms of popular culture - and as notably. 'off-centre' within others. 3 The reader may trace the contours of this debate through the different sections of this book. One further debate should be highlighted here, and this concerns the directions which research has taken within the broad framework provided by Hall's model. Its elaboration into a paradigm in which the 'relative autonomy' of its different moments could facilitate the separate study of the text as a complex discursive structure, and of the processes of reception as ones in which resistant, or oppositional, meanings and pleasures could be produced; can be seen as leading to the disappearance from sight of the framework as a Whole. In particular, an increasing focus on theories of pleasure in studies both of the text and of processes of reception poses problems for a model which was founded on an analysis of the Operations of power. The result, it has been argued, is that a model which began from a perspective critical of the structure and operations of contemporary Western society has ended in an often uncritical celebration of that society's mass media output.4 This debate; too, is one which Can be traced within this book both implicitly - in the difference between arguments to be found within the different sections (notably between those outlined in the section on 'Production' and those to be found in the later parts of the sections on 'Text' and 'Reception' - and explicitly - within individual sections. Nevertheless, if one function of a reader of this nature is to draw attention to debates and differences, another is to situate these debates within a coherent contextualising framework, and it is Stuart Hall's modal which provides that structuring framework here. After the opening section - with its representation of the different theoretical traditions which contribute to contemporary media studies - Part One is organised into three further sections, dealing in turn with 'Production', 'Text' and 'Reception'. Within these, where appropriate, a further division into sub-sections maps the range and variety, the arguments and debates, within work in these areas. The ordering of the three case studies which comprise Part Two mirrors this central organising principle, so that within each one, work in the areas of production, text and reception has been included. Here again, however, debates and differences should be noted. Work on 'News', for example, has been largely concerned with issues of public knowledge and information and has focused chiefly on the study of news production and organisation; while the study of 'Soap Opera' has had as its focus the analysis of popular pleasures, and has centred fax more on the text-reader relationship. This difference is reflected in the balance of pieces within each case study. One final point to be made here concerns the range of media referred to in these chapters. Most of the readings collected in this book focus on broadcasting and the press, and this limitation is quite deliberate. Film studies has a well-established critical tradition which must be traced elsewhere; space does not allow us to do more than refer to it here. Popular music, comics and popular fiction might have been given more attention, but a number of readers now exist which have as their focus the analysis of popular media culture, and the reader may turn to those.5 Broadcasting and the press have been central to the study of the mass media within a range of theoretical traditions, and that centrality is echoed in this reader. The study of the mass media has expanded rapidly over the last thirty-five years, and during that period has seen its focus challenged and reshaped by a series of theoretical influences and paradigms. The mapping of such a process must always be partial, and in a reader such as this

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will be challenged from within as well as outside its covers. We hope, however, that both this particular mapping and the debates which are represented within its fifty-four readings will offer a useful tool in the reader's own understanding of the study and the operations of the mass media. Notes 1. Tony Bennett, 'Theories of the Media, Theories of Society', in Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (eds), Culture, Society and the Media (London Methuen, 1982) p. 31. 2. The process by which economically dominant groups in society are able, through their exertion of cultural leadership and authority, to win the consent of subordinate groups to the status quo. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971) pp. 181-2 3. The term is one which forms the title of the 1991 volume on the relationship between feminism and cultural studies edited by Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury and Jackie Stacey, OffCentre (London: HarperCollins, 1991). 4. See, for example, Jim McGuigan's arguments in Cultural Populism (London: Routledge, 1992), especially pp. 61-75. 4. See, for example, Jim McGuigan's arguments in Cultural Populism (London: Routledge, 1992), especially pp. 61-75. 5. See, for example, Simon During (ed.), The Cultural Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1993), and John Storey (ed.), Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994).

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PART ONE STUDYING THE MEDIA

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Some Introductions When attempts at sustained and systematic consideration of the media began to be undertaken in the British academic world in the 1960s, there were essentially two relevant streams of thought available: one within social science (sociology, social psychology, political communications), the other within the humanities (notably English literary Study). Social science could look to a substantial body of English-language research built tip within the United States around the concept of 'mass communication'. In the USA the arrival of radio broadcasting to set alongside the popular press and mass cinema-going had first generated serious discussion about the mass media in society in the 1920s. Initially this had been of a broad general character, 1 but by the late 1930s more detailed individual empirical studies were being carried out by sociologists and social psychologists.2 So Lazarsfeld and Merton's piece published in 1948, 'Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action' (Chapter 1), stands on the achievement of ten years or so of social scientific research into 'mass communication', and seeks to summarise the broad features of what they felt was then known. Robert K. Merton stands at the heart of American social science of the mid-twentieth century, and was to become acknowledged as amongst the most professionally eminent of American sociologists. His work was within the functionalist tradition of sociology, like that of his teacher at Harvard, Talcott Parsons. This approach is evident in the way the first part of the essay proposes a taxonomy of 'social functions of the mass media'. One of these is seen as a 'dysfunction' - the 'narcotizing dysfunction', which renders 'large masses of the population politically apathetic and inert'. Merton's Collaborator in this article, Paul Lazarsfeld, had worked in Vienna as a social psychologist specialising in the study of marketing, before he emigrated to the United States in 1933 to avoid the Nazis. In the 1940s he and Merton became colleagues at Columbia University, where Lazarsfeld founded the Bureau of Applied Social Research to carry out quantitative social survey research work. Lazarsfeld is a central figure in the development of 'communication studies' in America, defining issues and methods in ways that were to prove profoundly influential for a quarter of a century. His interests in marketing, political communication and audience measurement meant that attitude change, influence and persuasive power were major preoccupations in his work - and the 'effects' of communication were long seen as consisting in attitude change and behaviour modification of a measurable kind. This theme is taken up in the final part of the joint essay, with its discussion of the best conditions for effective propaganda, which are said to be 'monopolization',3 'canalization' and 'supplementation'.4 The middle passage in the piece, in which the pair 'consider the impact of the mass media upon popular taste', registers the post

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war development in the United States of a substantial public debate over the consequences of the rise of the media for culture in general. Were cultural and aesthetic standards being debased, or was a historically unprecedented mass popular culture being developed by the foremost capitalist democracy? Lazarsfeld and Merton do not come down on either side, but at this early stage conclude '[t]he answer can come only from disciplined research'. The debate was to be a significant one amongst American intellectuals during the Cold War until at least the late 1950s. 5 A sharply distinct position on the social role of the media was developed within America during the 1940s, though it did not become widely known in the United States or Britain before the 1960s. This was the position of the Frankfurt School. The Institute of Social Research had been founded in Frankfurt am Main (Germany) in 1923 as an independent scholarly research institute specialising in sociology, social psychology, philosophy and political economy, with a pronounced affiliation to Marxism. Many of its leading researchers left Germany in the mid1930s to avoid Fascism, and the Institute was transplanted to New York, under the leadership of Max Horkheimer. The commitment to developing a Marxist understanding of society adequate to the industrial capitalist economies of the mid-twentieth century led the Frankfurt School writers to a consideration of the media. As German speaking émigré intellectuals in America working within social science, Lazarsfeld and the major Frankfurt School figures were known to one another. In 1941 the Institute for Social Research collaborated with Columbia University's Office of Radio Research on a special issue of the Institute's journal, Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, devoted to issues in mass communication, which contained contributions by Horkheimer, Adorno and Lazarsfeld. In Lazarsfeld's piece he drew his celebrated distinction between 'administrative' and 'critical' communications research, the former ,being to serve the knowledge requirements of the paymasters in the mass communications industry, the latter to meet the broader needs of social progress which might not meet the approval of established interests.6 But the views of Lazarsfeld and the Frankfurt School did not converge. Lazarsfeld wrote to Adorno 'I have great objections against . . . your disregard of evidence and systematic empirical research'.7 The Frankfurt School remained essentially peripheral and unknown within the mainstream of American social science. In 1947 Horkheimer and Adorno published a major work, Dialectic of Enlightenment, whose chapter entitled 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception' set forth a general view of the media in contemporary society,8 The term which was proposed was. 'culture industry', not 'mass communication'. The dialectic expounded in the book is the play of positive and negative outcomes of the application of human reason in the modern era. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment had promised that the power of human reason could banish the forces of superstition and backwardness, end ignorance through the development of scientific knowledge, bring prosperity from a growing technical mastery of nature; and introduce justice and order to human affairs. But, argued Adorno and Horkheimer, the application of human reason within capitalism often stimulated opposing tendencies. The intellectual conquest of small areas of knowledge amounted merry to the development of technical expertises, the expression of 'instrumental' reason divorced from the wider goals of human emancipation. These contributed to the exploitation of people and nature, and, made systems of social domination more efficient and effective. A traditional mitigating element had been. works of art, the experience of which offered intimations of the human spirit free of domination by instrumental reason. But now, ran the argument, even this zone of human life was becoming subject to the forces of rationalisation and instrumentalisation

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through the industrialisation of culture. The 'culture industry' (Hollywood, the mass media, the record industry) is increasingly organised like any Other commercial sector of manufacture and consumption, and culture has become commoditised. In contrast to the authenticity of folk and popular art and the human insights of genuine high art, the culture industry supplies 'substitute gratification', and promotes the cult of personality. and other authoritarian attitudes. Leisure is rationalised like industrial production, and consciousness is integrated smoothly into the cycle of capitalist reproduction and accumulation. Chapter 2, Adorno's 'Culture Industry Reconsidered', usefully 'summarises many of the themes from Dialectic of the Enlightenment that bear on the consideration' of the media. 9 The emphasis on the media as part of a capitalist industrialisation of culture which serves to reconcile people to a dominating social order in a totalising way has. made the Frankfurt School's arguments a profound exposition of what are often encountered as unsystematised colloquial opinions. The 1960s witnessed the dramatic ascent to public celebrity of the Canadian scholar Marshall mulch. His book Understanding Media, from which the extracts that make up Chapter 3 are taken, was published in 1964. He considered that discussion of the media was too narrowly focused on their contents - the effect of an advertisement, the meaning of a film, the line of a newspaper editorial. These were thought to be the 'messages' the media conveyed. But for mulch media are technologies each of which extends a particular human sense or faculty, and the real ' ''message" of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs'. The true significance of any medium is to be found in the overall impact of the generalised employment of that technological system. Hence, his celebrated claim. that 'the medium is the message'. He Considered that the printing press, a mechanical medium, promoted linearity, individualism and sequential rationality, which he linked to the visual. He preferred the new era of electronic media: radio, the telephone, television, and the coming 'automation' or computerisation. He associated these with instantaneity, the abolition of spatial separation, the unified field and simultaneity, and he linked them to the auditory. The global communications network that he foresaw was to be the ultimate 'extension of man', the externalisation of the central nervous system. In a period when the spread of transistor radios, television, and pop records seemed to many to be linked to the emergence of new patterns of youth behaviour, and when early communications satellites and information-processing systems seemed to herald further profound changes, many looked to McLuhan as offering an account of the significance of these developments - and a celebratory one at that. But although he spent his whole career within the academic world, McLuhan's ideas did not take deep roof there. His views were rightly characterised as technological determinist, reductively attributing technological causes to social events. For instance, in what is a reference to the rise of mass movements in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, he asserts that 'the introduction of radio in Europe' 'restore[d] a tribal pattern of intensive involvement'. Many of his preoccupations, however, now seem remarkably prescient of the themes of postmodernism: the coming of postindustrialism, the dissolution of the high culture/popular culture, opposition, the eschewal of linear rationality, the information technology revolution, the contraction of time-space. The work of Jean Baudrillard owes much to McLuhan. The second current of thought available in Britain in the 1960s to be brought to bear on the media was a native one, Leavisism within English literature. F. R. Leavis was the leading figure in a group of intellectuals connected to the Faculty of English at the University of Cambridge, whose Central vehicle from 1932 was a quarterly periodical, Scrultiny. They were

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opposed to both the Edwardian belle-lettrisme that had formerly dominated the study of modern English at Cambridge, and the pseudo-aristocratic dilettantism they perceived in the Bloomsbury clique and other metropolitan literary coteries. In contrast they developed a view of the role of literary intellectuals that called for them to undertake serious tasks: above all, to uphold the continuity of culture and train discriminatory sensibilities in the face of modern mass civilisation. The felt need for such a role to be played had its precursors in Coleridge and Arnold in their views on the tasks of the 'clerisy' and the educators respectively, Because of language's important role in expressing the deepest values of a society and preserving the lines of continuity of a culture, the literary critic - and by extension, the literature teacher - comprises the key social grouping most appropriate to fulfil these functions. And a professionalisation of literary criticism is necessary: in contrast to amateurism, dilettantism and impressionism, the development of specialist professional skills in the close 'scrutiny' of literary texts and detailed analysis of how they are organised is called for - 'practical criticism'. On the other hand, the overarching concern with the state of English culture calls for consideration of how these texts are connected with the broader society and history of which they form a part, In his diagnosis of the state of English culture, made around the time of the founding of Scrutiny, Leavis saw the media and popular culture as integral to the 'breach in continuity' that now threatened society as a result of the strains between contemporary civilisation and the cultural tradition. In Mass Civilization and Minority Culture (1930) and Culture and Environment (1933; co-written with Denys Thompson), Leavis castigated the media of the day. Cinema trades in the 'cheapest emotional appeals', rendering it merely 'a means of passive diversion'. The levellingdown and 'standardizing influence of broadcasting hardly admits of doubt'. Advertising's copywriters abuse the language, and advertising's commercial pressures shape the press. The subtitle of Culture and Environment is The Training of Critical Awareness, and the book is an educational primer to foster the discriminatory awareness amongst pupils and students that 'films, newspapers, publicity in all its forms, commercially catered fiction - all offer satisfaction at the lowest level'. Three elements in the Leavisite position - close attention to the (literary) text ('practical criticism'), an interest in its connections with the wider social processes, and the notion that the nature of the media's output is indicative of the general state of civilisation - were available for a reconfiguration that would treat the media with seriousness and without automatic hostility. And this reconfiguration occurred in the early 1960s amongst some literary intellectuals partly formed by Leavisism, though. with a more explicit affiliation to the left, notably Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall. Raymond Williams'. Communications (1962) was a topical book that suggested ways both for analysing press and broadcasting output and for reforming arts and media policy to remove some of the commercial pressures. The extract published here as Chapter 4 indicates how Williams is addressing issues rooted in the Leavisite problematic, but not acquiescing in its terms. In the first part he uses the term 'communications' to reconfigure effectively the ideas of 'culture' and 'civilization' and, refuse the maintenance of a distinction that assigns the media solely to the latter. In the second part he discusses 'minority culture' and 'mass communications' in a way that throws doubt on the claims of minority culture - 'I see no real evidence that it is a permanent and reliable means of maintaining a living excellence' - and partially optimistic about the possibilities of mass communication - 'we often forget how many facts, how many new opinions, how many new kinds of work and new ways of seeing the world nevertheless get through'. The policy reforms proposed were designed to strengthen the institutional bases in British society for the positive development of communications. In 1964, Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel published The Popular Arts. This

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book was an educational primer in the tradition of Culture and Environment, but with the Crucial difference that the authors argued 'the struggle between what is good and worthwhile and what is shoddy and debased is not a struggle against the modern forms of communication, but a conflict within these media'. 10 The objective was to develop the skills of critical discrimination in young people amongst works drawn from cinema, broadcasting, popular music and other modern media, which allowed for some detailed discussion and analysis of particular examples. Stuart Hall, however, was to go on to make a much more far-reaching break with Leavisism, as can be Seen from his 'Encoding/Decoding' (Chapter 5). The version reprinted here was first published in 1980, but it is the finalised form of a piece that had started life much earlier, as an address to a 1973 conference on 'understanding television', which then appeared as an occasional paper from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, Hall's academic home in that period. So it is fundamentally a piece from the early seventies, and can be seen as marking the inauguration of the 'cultural studies' stream in media studies, which has since become the most significant current in the academic study of the media in Britain. The paper represents the simultaneous confluence of, and rupture with, the two available relevant bodies of thinking about the media before that time, the 'mass communication' tradition rooted in American social science, and the 'culture and civilisation' tradition of Leavisism in English literary studies, even in the 'left Leavisite' version that Hall himself had inhabited previously. The residual traces of a Leavisstyle concern with the particularity of the text are apparent in his denunciation of the impoverished social scientific conception of the media 'message' or 'content'. But these are no longer rich popular artworks about which a discriminatory sensibility must be cultivated.-Instead the new-found influence of structural linguistics and semiology can be detected. 'Messages' should be seen as 'sign vehicles of a specific kind organized, like any form of communication or language, through the operation of codes within the syntagmatic Chain of a discourse'; they are 'discursive forms' (see Chapters 14 and 15). Since the 1940s, American mass communication research had worked with a broad underlying model of the elements of (mass) communication that can be summarised as: source - message - receiver. In this piece, Hall took the model and fundamentally recast its terms to propose these 'elements' as a set of articulated moments in the circulation of social meaning. He had in mind an analogy with the value cycle set forth in Marx's account of Capital, in which value flows through the economy, changing its form from labour power to finished goods to realised capital and so on. The usefulness of this analogy is to illuminate that 'each [moment] has its specific modality and conditions of existence' and 'while each of the moments, in articulation, is necessary to the circuit as a whole, no one moment can fully guarantee the next moment with which it is articulated'. This point was in order to refuse the strong determinism Of the Frankfurt School view of the media, in which the modern culture industry efficiently integrated the consciousness of viewers, listeners and readers to fit the reproduction needs of the capitalist social order (see Chapter 2): In its place Hall was proposing the possibility that viewers might not simply accept wholesale the media's messages just because they were exposed to them. They might make a reading according to a 'negotiated' code, or even a wholly 'oppositional' one. Hall has pointed out since that in the paper these 'are decoding positions; they are not sociological groups'.11 That's because in a celebrated research project, his colleague David Morley did go on to test the idea of readings made according to 'hegemonic', 'negotiated' and 'oppositional' codes against' actual readings made by particular groups of people (see Chapter 31).

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Hall has since acknowledged a shortcoming in the paper's presentation of his position: I want[ed] to get rid of the notion of any originating moment . . . [W]e are in history already; therefore we are in discourse already. So what the media pick up on is already a discursive universe; The encoding moment doesn't come from nowhere. I made a mistake by drawing that bloody diagram with only the top half. You see, if you're doing a circuit, you must draw a circuit; so I must show how decoding enters practice and discourses which a reporter is picking up on. 12 There is, however, a reason why the 'mistake' might have been made. That's because although encoding is not intended to be seen as an 'originating moment', it's not intended either to be seen as having an equivalence or symmetry with the moment of decoding. There is a 'preferred meaning' encoded in media discourses. I don't want a modal of a circuit which has no power in it. I don't want a model which is determinist, but I don't want a model without determination. And therefore I don't think audiences are in the same positions of power with those who signify the world to them. And preferred reading is simply a way of saying if you have control of the apparatus of signifying the world, if you're in control of the media, you own it, you write the texts - to some extent it has a determining shape.13 'Encoding/Decoding' is the text that marks the opening-up in Britain of study of the media to a Marxism informed by the concepts developed in structuralism and semiology. Over the same period, however, another political current was to begin addressing questions related to the media: the twentieth century's Second wave of Western feminism. Like Marxism, feminism is in the first instance a politics, its aim not simply to understand but also to change, in Jane Miller's words, 'the unquestioning male possession of the structures of economic and cultural power.14 Such change, however, presumes understanding, and like cultural studies, feminism made use of emergent theoretical. approaches - from structuralism and semiology, psychoanalysis and Althusserian Marxism, for example - in order to understand not only how and why particular images and representations of women circulate in Western culture, but also how such representations are fled to the patriarchal structure of society and to our individual sense of a gendered identity' within that society. But this focus on gender as a structuring principle of our social and symbolic worlds could not simply be added on to the class-based model of the emerging field of cultural studies. In challenging dominant 'knowledges' of, or 'truths' about women and the feminine, feminist theory also questioned the bases of such knowledge, asking how and where knowledge is produced and by whom, what counts as knowledge and whose interests it serves; Stuart' Hall has, described the painful, exercise through which the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies attempted in the late 1970s to come to terms with feminism's challenge to 'the male-oriented' models: and assumptions' and the heavily masculine subject matter and topics' which had until then characterised its work.15 But this effort has not always been matched by similar adjustments within other media research traditions, and feminist theory' and criticism continue to occupy an uneasy, position within media studies. It is this complex. relationship which Annette Kuhn's piece (Chapter 6) outlines, in a chapter which originally formed the Introduction to her 1985 book. The power of the Image: Essays on Representation and Sexually. Beginning from the insistence that 'politics and knowledge are interdependent', and in the case of feminism mutually regenerative, she describes the way in which feminism has 'both used and transformed' existing knowledge and theoretical frameworks, 'drawing strategically on . . . strands of non-feminist or prefeminist thinking', but also exposing their weaknesses,

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and ultimately 'generating qualitatively new knowledge, . . . constructing a new field'. Within this field, the questions addressed have concerned the relationship between representation, sexuality, spectatorship, knowledge and power. In asking how representations of women both 'speak to' and help to construct our gendered identities, feminist research has also explored the social and cultural contexts within which such representations circulate; and the pleasures, both complicit and resistant, which they generate. Such analysis may itself, argues Kuhn, be regarded as 'strategic practice', 'an act of resistance in itself', but it also represents that straggle over meaning which is a prerequisite for political change. The final two chapters in 'Some Introductions' can be seen as representing two antagonistic poles in debates over the media in the late 1980s and 1990s. Jürgen Habermas is a German philosopher and social scientist who stands in the intellectual tradition of the Frankfurt School. Like Adorno and Horkheimer before him, he is concerned with the legacy of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment and all that it promised for human progress and emancipation. He identifies as a key feature of that period the formation Of a 'public sphere', the (immaterial)place - not within the state or the market or private households - where public opinion can be formed. This zone is characterised by the commitment to the values of open rational debate, the public good, and the formal equality of participants. Irrationality and arbitrary or hieratic authority are in principle alien to it; argument based upon evidence is the appropriate discursive mode. One of the major institutional sites of the public sphere in the late eighteenth century was the newspaper press (along with museums and galleries, learned and debating societies, etc.), while '[t]oday, newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere'. But in the meantime, argues Habermas, the public Sphere has been 'refeudalized', returned to the state of a mere display of public authority, characteristic of 'publicness' in the pre-Enlightenment 'feudal' era. Broadcasting and the press are adulterated by consumer advertising and the public relations industry: the public sphere is thus corrupted and decaying. Habermas wishes to see the fulfilment of the Enlightenment idea of the public sphere, though nowadays the participation of a 'public of private persons acting as individuals would be replaced by a public of organized private persons' in democratically based political parties, campaign groups and other civil associations. There is sometimes said to be an element of retrospective idealisation in Habermas' portrait of the public sphere. His critics point out that the eighteenth-century public sphere was for gentlemen only; artisans; waged workers and most women were excluded. 16 But this Criticism overlooks Habermas' intention to register that the development of the idea itself represented a historical progress, like the ideas of 'liberty, equality, solidarity,, even though the emergence of these philosophical tenets marked the inauguration of an enormous unfinished struggle to realise them. To many nowadays the concept of the public sphere is another manifestation of the false universalism of the European Enlightenment. However, Habermas' ideas have proved a rallying point for those concerned with democracy and the media, the extension of freedom of information and the Curbing of commercial interests in the press and broadcasting. For instance, in the late 1980S a defence of British public-service broadcasting was mounted around the concept of the public Sphere.17 In Chapter 8, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard discusses a similar area of concern - the contemporary media and political and social representation - and he too acknowledges that Enlightenment ideals have not been realised, either in society at large or in the role played by the media. His is a position often called 'postmodernist' (though he is rather coy about accepting the term). In contrast to the modern era commencing with the Enlightenment - when scientific reason sought to construct an accurate account of nature, society and history, and thus produce a truthful representation of the world - the postmodern period of today is characterised by the

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end of representation. For contemporary culture is a culture of 'simulation', 'the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal'. 18 No longer is it a case of an external real reflected or represented by scholarship or the arts; culture is dominated by the media, which exercise a fascination for the masses through the ceaseless play of hyperreal spectacle. 'Reality' becomes inseparably bound up with the media and is increasingly constituted by them. 'The situation no longer permits us to isolate reality . . . as a fundamental variable. . .. [B]ecause we will never in future be able to separate reality from its statistical, simulative projection in the media, [the result is] a state of suspense and of definitive uncertainty about reality.' The media, far from furnishing a public sphere in which to make social and political representations (in both senses), increasingly fill the space of that politics and society, indeed constitute the hyperreal spectacle that is society and politics today. This is 'the implosion of the social in the media'. Baudrillard does not mourn this development or depict it as manipulation by the media causing 'alienation' of the masses from true. democratic politics. Instead he suggests it leads to a 'secret strategy' of resistance by the masses to refuse to adopt the part assigned to them by Enlightenment philosophers or power politicians, and derisively allow the rulers to assume the burdens of political responsibility while themselves remaining unknowable behind the spectacle, These eight chapters are written from a variety of standpoints: classic American social science; Frankfurt critical theory; technological determinism; British 'culturalism' and 'cultural studies; feminism; Habermasian 'public sphere' theory; and postmodernism. Together they form a representative and rich selection of the most significant traditions of thought since the mid-twentieth century on the overall place of the media in society. Notes 1. See, for example, Waiter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922); John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1927); Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in the World War (New York: Knopf, 1927); Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928). 2. See, for example, Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet, Herta Herzog, The Invasion from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1940); Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton (eds), Radio Research: 1942-3 (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944); Carl I. Hovland, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Fred D. Sheffield, Experiments in Mass Communication (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949). 3. The mention of the radio artiste Kate Smith in this section draws on the study Robert Merton and colleagues had made of the reasons for the success of the performer's marathon radio campaign to sell US war bonds: Robert K. Merton, Marjorie Fiske, Alberta Curtis, Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive (New York: Harper, 1946). 4. The idea of 'supplementation' - 'the enhanced effectiveness of th[e] joining of mass media and direct personal contact' - anticipates to some degree one of Lazarsfeld's most famous concepts, the 'two-step flow' of communication influence. This was developed through reflection on the findings of a study of mass media influence on voting in the 1940 us Presidential Election campaign (Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University: Press, 1944), and set forth in Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications (Glencoe, Ill. The Free Press, 1955). 5. For a sense of the range of the American post-war 'mass culture' debate, a useful anthology from the period is: Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White (eds), Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America (New York: Macmillan, 1957). 6. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 'Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research', Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9:1 (1941) pp. 2-16. 7. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, unpublished letter to Theodor Adorno, n.d. [1938]. Cited in Hanno Hardt, Critical Communication Studies: Communication, History and Theory in America (London: Routledge, 1992). 8. 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception' is available in abridged form in James Curran, Michael file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/loop/Desktop/0748607781/files/page_12.html[27/02/2011 21.41.04]

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Gurevitch, Janet Woollacott (eds), Mass Communication and Society (London: Edward Arnold, 1977). 9. In his introduction to a published translation of this essay, Andreas Huyssen detects a 'shift of emphasis' in Adorno's position towards a slightly less totalised conception of the culture industry's perpetration of mass deception, but it is for its synoptic reprise of Adorno and Horkheimer's major themes that the

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piece is reprinted here. (Andreas Huyssen, 'Introduction to Adorno', New German Critique 6 (Fall 1975) pp. 311). 10. Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel, The Popular Arts (London: Hutchinson, 1964) p. 15. 11. 'Reflections upon the Encoding/Decoding Model: An Interview with Stuart Hall', in Jon Cruz and Justin Lewis (eds), Viewing Reading, Listening: Audiences and Cultural Reception (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1994) p. 256. 12. Ibid., p. 260, editors' italics. 13. Ibid., p. 261. 14. Jane Miller, Seductions: Studies in Reading and Culture (London: Virago, 1990) p. 10. 15. Stuart Hall, 'Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems', in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, Paul Willis (eds), Culture, Media, Language (London: Hutchinson, 1980) pp. 35-6. 16. Nancy Fraser, 'What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender', in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds), Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender (Minneapois: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, 'The Proletarian Public Sphere', in Armand Mattelart and Seth Sieglaub (eds), Communication and Class Struggle, vol. 1, (New York: International General, 1979). 17. See especially Nicholas Garnham, 'The Media and the Public Sphere', in Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, Philip Schlesinger (eds), Communicating Politics: Mass Communications and the Political Process (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986); and Paddy Scannell, 'Public Service Broadcasting and Modern Public Life', Media, Culture and Society 11:2, (1989). 18. Jean Baudrillard Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983) p. 2.

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1 Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton A review of the current state of actual knowledge concerning the social role of the mass media of communication and their effects upon the contemporary American community is an ungrateful task, for certified knowledge of this kind is impressively slight. Little more can be clone than to explore the nature of the problems by methods which, in the course of many decades, will ultimately provide the knowledge we seek. Although this is anything but an encouraging preamble, it provides a necessary context for assessing the research and tentative contusions of those of us professionally concerned with the study of mass media. A reconnaissance will suggest what we know, what we need to know, and will locate the strategic points requiring further inquiry. [. . .] The Social Role of the Machinery of Mass Media What role can be assigned to the mass media by virtue of the fact that they exist? What are the implications of a Hollywood, a Radio City, and a Time-Life-Fortune enterprise for our society? These questions can of course be discussed only in grossly speculative terms, since no experimentation or rigorous comparative study is possible. Comparisons with other societies lacking these mass media would be too crude to yield decisive results, and comparisons with an earlier day in American society would still involve gross assertions rather than precise demonstrations. In such an instance, brevity is clearly indicated. And opinions should be leavened with caution. It is our tentative judgment that the social role played by the very existence of the mass media has been commonly overestimated. What are the grounds for this judgment?

From Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, 'Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action', in Lyman Bryson (ed.), The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948). Also available in Wilbur Schramm (ed.), Mass Communications (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960).

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It is dear that the mass media reach enormous audiences. Approximately forty-five million Americans attend the movies every week; our daily newspaper circulation is about fifty-four million, and some forty-six million American homes are equipped with television, and in these homes the average American watches television for about three hours a day, These are formidable figures. But they are merely supply and consumption figures, not figures registering the effect of mass media. They bear only upon what people do, not upon the social and psychological impact of the media. To know the number of hours people keep the radio turned on gives no indication of the effect upon them of what they hear. Knowledge of consumption data in the field of mass media remains far from a demonstration of their net effect upon behavior and attitude and outlook. As was indicated a moment ago, we cannot resort to experiment by comparing contemporary American society with and without mass media, But, however tentatively, we can compare their social effect with, say, that of the automobile. It is not unlikely that the invention of the automobile and its development into a mass-owned commodity has had a significantly greater effect upon society than the invention of the radio and its development into a medium of mass communication. Consider the social complexes into which the automobile has entered. Its sheer existence has exerted pressure for vastly improved roads and with these, mobility has increased enormously, The shape of metropolitan agglomerations has been significantly affected by the automobile. And, it may be submitted, the inventions which enlarge the radius of movement and action exert a greater influence upon social outlook and daily routines than inventions which provide avenues for ideas - ideas which can be avoided by withdrawal, deflected by resistance and transformed by assimilation. Granted, for a moment, that the mass media play a comparatively minor role in shaping our society, why are they the object of so much popular concern and criticism? Why do so many become exercised by the 'problems' of the radio and film and press and, so few by the problems of, say, the automobile and the airplane? In addition to the sources of this concern which we have noted previously, there is an unwitting psychological basis for concern which derives from a socio-historical context. Many make the mass media targets for hostile criticism because they feel themselves duped by the turn of events. The social changes ascribable to 'reform movements' may be slow and slight, but they do cumulate. The surface facts are familiar enough. The sixty-hour week has given way to the forty-hour week. Child labor has been progressively curtailed. With all its deficiencies, free universal education has become progressively institutionalized. These and other gains register a series of reform victories. And now, people have more leisure time. They have, ostensibly, greater access to the cultural heritage. And what use do they make of this unmortgaged time so painfully acquired for them? They listen to the radio and go to the movies. These mass media seem somehow to have cheated reformers of the fruits of their victories, The struggle for freedom for leisure and popular education and social security was carried on in the hope that, once freed of cramping shackles, people would d avail themselves of major cultural products of our society, Shakespeare or Beethoven or perhaps Kant. Instead, they turn to Faith Baldwin or Johnny Mercer or Edgar Guest. [. . .] However little this sense of betrayal may account for prevailing attitudes toward the mass media, it may again be noted that the Sheer presence of these media may not affect our society so profoundly as it is widely supposed.

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Some Social Functions of the Mass Media In continuing our examination of the social role which can be ascribed to the mass media by virtue of their 'sheer existence,' we temporarily abstract from the social structure in which the media find their place. We do not, for example, consider the diverse effects of the mass media under varying systems of ownership and Control, an important structural factor which will be discussed subsequently. The mass media undoubtedly serve many social functions which might well become the object of sustained research. Of these functions, we have occasion to notice only three. The Status Conferral Function The mass media confer status on public issues, persons, organizations, and social movements. Common experience as Well as research testifies that the social standing of persons or social policies is raised when these command favorable attention in the mass media. In many quarters, for example, the support of a political candidate or a public policy by The Times is taken as significant, and this support is regarded as a distinct asset for the candidate or the policy. Why? For some, the editorial views of The Times represent the considered judgment of a group of experts, thus calling for the respect of laymen. But this is only one element in the status conferral function of the mass media, for enhanced status accrues to those who merely receive attention in the media, quite apart from any editorial support. The mass media bestow prestige and enhance the authority of individuals and groups by legitimizing their status. Recognition by the press or radio or magazines or newsreels testifies that one has arrived, that one is important enough to have been singled out from the large anonymous masses, that one's behavior and opinions are significant enough to require public notice. The operation of this status conferral function may be witnessed most vividly in the advertising pattern of testimonials to a product by 'prominent people.' Within wide circles of the population (though not within certain selected social strata), such testimonials not only enhance the prestige of the product but also reflect prestige on the person who provides the testimonials. They give public notice that the large and powerful world of commerce regards him as possessing sufficiently high status for his opinion to count with many people. In a word, his testimonial is a testimonial to his own status. [. . .] This status conferral function thus enters into organized social action by legitimizing selected policies; persons, and groups which receive the support of mass media. We shall have occasion to note the detailed operation of this function in connection with the conditions making for the maximal utilization of mass media for designated social ends. At the moment, having considered the 'status conferral' function, we shall consider a second: the enforced application of social norms through the mass media. The Enforcement of Social Norms Such catch phrases as 'the power of the press' (and other mass media) or 'the bright glare of publicity' presumably refer to this function. The mass media may initiate organized social action by 'exposing' conditions which are at variance with public moralities. But it need not be prematurely assumed that this pattern consists simply in making these deviations widely known. We have something to learn in this connection from Malinowski's observations among his beloved Trobriand Islanders. There, he reports, no organized social action is taken with respect

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to behavior deviant from a social norm unless there is public announcement of the deviation. This is not merely a matter of acquainting the individuals in the group with the facts of the case. Many may have known privately of these deviations - e.g., incest among the Trobrianders, as with political or business corruption, prostitution, gambling among ourselves but they will not have pressed for public action. But once the behavioral deviations are made simultaneously public for all, this sets in train tensions between the 'privately tolerable' and the 'publicly acknowledgeable.' The mechanism of public exposure would seem to operate somewhat as follows. Many social norms prove inconvenient for individuals in the society. They militate against the gratification of wants and impulses. Since many find the norms burdensome, there is some measure of leniency in applying them, both to oneself and to others. Hence the emergence of deviant behavior and private toleration in these deviations. But this can continue only so long as one is not in a situation where one must take a public stand for or against the norms. Publicity, the enforced acknowledgment by members of the group that these deviations have occurred, requires each individual to take such a stand. He must either range himself with the non-conformists, thus proclaiming his repudiation of the group norms, and thus asserting that he, too, is outside the moral framework or, regardless of his private predilections, he must fall into line by supporting the norm. Publicity closes the gap between 'private attitudes' and 'public morality.' Publicity exerts pressure for a single rather than a dual morality by preventing continued evasion of the issue. It calls forth public reaffirmation and (however sporadic) application of the social norm. In a mass society, this function of public exposure is institutionalized in the mass media of communication. Press, radio, and journals expose fairly well-known deviations to public view, and as a rule, this exposure forces some degree of public action against what has been privately tolerated. The mass media may, for example, introduce severe strains upon 'polite ethnic discrimination' by calling public attention to these practices which are at odds with the norms of non-discrimination. At times, the media may organize exposure activities into a 'crusade.' [. . .] [M]ass media dearly serve to reaffirm social norms by exposing deviations from these norms to public view. Study of the particular range of norms thus reaffirmed would provide a dear index of the extent to Which these media deal with peripheral or central problems of the structure of our society. The Narcotizing Dysfunction A third social consequence of the mass media has gone largely unnoticed. At least, it has received little explicit comment and, apparently, has not been systematically put to use for furthering planned objectives. This may be called the narcotizing dysfunction of the mass media. It is termed dysfunctional rather than functional on the assumption that it is not in the interest of modern complex society to have large masses of the population politically apathetic and inert. How does this unplanned mechanism operate? Scattered studies have shown that an increasing proportion of the time of Americans is devoted to the products of the mass media. With distinct variations in different regions and among different social strata, the outpourings of the media presumably enable the twentieth century American to 'keep abreast of the world.' Yet, it is suggested, this Vast supply Of communications may elicit only a superficial concern with the problems of society, and this superficiality often cloaks mass apathy.

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Exposure to this flood of information may serve to narcotize rather than to energize the average reader or listener. As an increasing meed of time is devoted to reading and listening, a decreasing share is available for organized action. The individual reads accounts Of issues and problems and may even discuss alternative lines of action. But this rather intellectualized, rather remote connection with organized social action is not activated. The interested and informed citizen can congratulate himself on his lofty state of interest and information and neglect to see that he has abstained from decision and action. In short, he takes his secondary contact with the world of political reality, his reading and listening and thinking, as a vicarious performance. He comes to mistake knowing about problems of the day for doing something about them. His social conscience remains spotlessly dean. He is concerned. He is informed. And he has all sorts of ideas as to what should be done. But, after he has gotten through his dinner and after he has listened to his favored radio programs and after he has read his second newspaper of the day, it is really time for bed. In this peculiar respect, mass communications may be included among the most respectable and efficient of social narcotics. They may be so fully effective as to keep the addict from recognizing his own malady. That the mass media have lifted the level of information of large populations is evident. Yet, quite apart from intent, increasing dosages of mass communications may be inadvertently transforming the energies of men from active participation into passive knowledge. The occurrence of this narcotizing dysfunction can scarcely be doubted, but the extent to which it operates has yet to be determined. Research on this problem remains one of the many tasks still confronting the student of mass communications. The Structure of Ownership and Operation To this point we have considered the mass media quite apart from their incorporation within a particular social and economic structure. But clearly, the social effects of the media will vary as the system of ownership and control varies. Thus to consider the social effects of American mass media is to deal only with the effects of these media as privately owned enterprises under profit-oriented management. It is general knowledge that this circumstance is not inherent in the technological nature of the mass media. In England, for example, to say nothing of Russia, the radio is to all intents and purposes owned, controlled, and operated by government. The structure of control is altogether different in this country. Its salient characteristic stems from the fact that except for movies and books, it is not the magazine reader nor the radio listener nor, in large part, the reader of newspapers who supports the enterprise, but the advertiser. Big business finances the production and distribution of mass media. And, all intent aside, he who pays the piper generally calls the tune. Social Conformism Since the mass media are supported by great business concerns geared into the current social and economic system, the media contribute to the maintenance of that system. This contribution is not found merely in the effective advertisement of the sponsor's product. It arises, rather, from the typical presence in magazine stories, radio programs, and newspaper columns of some element of confirmation, some element of approval of the present structure of society. And this continuing reaffirmation underscores the duty to accept. To the extent that the media of mass communication have had an influence upon their audiences, it has stemmed not only from what is said, but more significantly from what is not

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said. For these media not only continue to affirm the status quo but, in the same measure, they fail to raise essential questions about the structure of society. Hence by leading toward conformism and by providing little basis for a critical appraisal of society, the commercially sponsored mass media indirectly but effectively restrain the cogent development of a genuinely critical outlook. This is not to ignore the occasionally critical journal article or radio program. But these exceptions are so few that they are lost in the overwhelming flood of conformist materials. . . Since our commercially sponsored mass media promote a largely unthinking allegiance to our social structure, they cannot be relied upon to work for changes, even minor changes, in that structure. It is possible to list some developments to the contrary, but upon close inspection they prove illusory. A community group, such as the PTA, may request the producer of a radio serial to inject the theme of tolerant race attitudes into the program. Should the producer feel that this theme is safe, that it will not antagonize any substantial part of his audience, he may agree, but at the first indication that it is a dangerous theme which may alienate potential consumers, he will refuse, or will soon abandon the experiment. Social objectives are consistently surrendered by commercialized media when they dash with economic gains. Minor tokens of 'progressive' views are of slight importance since they are included only by the grace of the sponsors and only on the condition that they be sufficiently acceptable as not to alienate any appreciable part of the audience. Economic pressure makes for conformism by omission of sensitive issues. Impact Upon Popular Taste Since the largest part of our radio, movies, magazines, and a considerable part of our books and newspapers are devoted to 'entertainment,' this dearly requires us to consider the impact of the mass media upon popular taste. Were we to ask the average American with some pretension to literary or esthetic cultivation if mass communications have had any effect upon popular taste, he would doubtlessly answer with a resounding affirmative. And more, citing abundant instances, he would insist that esthetic and intellectual tastes have been depraved by the flow of trivial formula products from printing presses, radio stations, and movie studios. The columns of criticism abound with these complaints. In one sense, this requires no further discussion. There can be no doubt that the women who are daily entranced for three or four hours by some twelve consecutive 'soap operas,' all cut to the same dismal pattern, exhibit an appalling lack of esthetic judgment. Nor is this impression altered by the contents of pulp and slick magazines, or by the depressing abundance of formula motion pictures replete with hero, heroine, and villain moving through a contrived atmosphere of sex, sin, and success. Yet unless we locate these patterns in historical and sociological terms, we may find ourselves confusedly engaged in condemning without understanding, in criticism which is sound but largely irrelevant. What is the historical status of this notoriously low level Of popular taste? Is it the poor remains of standards which were once significantly higher, a relatively new birth in the world of values, largely unrelated to the higher standards from which it has allegedly fallen, or a poor substitute blocking the way to the development of superior standards and the expression of high esthetic purpose? If esthetic tastes are to be considered in their social setting, we must recognize that the effective audience for the arts has become historically transformed. Some centuries back, this

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audience was largely confined to a selected aristocratic elite. Relatively few were literate. And very few possessed the means to buy books, attend theaters, and travel to the urban centers of the arts. Not more than a slight fraction, possibly not more than one or two per cent, of the population composed the effective audience for the arts. These happy few cultivated their esthetic tastes, and their selective demand left its mark in the form of relatively high artistic standards. With the widesweeping spread of popular education and with the emergence of the new technologies of mass communication, there developed an enormously enlarged market for the arts. Some forms of music, drama, and literature now reach virtually everyone in our society. This is why, of course, we speak of mass media and of mass art. And the great audiences for the mass media, though in the main literate, are not highly cultivated. About half the population, in fact, have halted their formal education upon leaving grammar school. [. . .] Our formulation of the problem should now be plain. It is misleading to speak simply of the decline of esthetic tastes. Mass audiences probably include a larger number of persons with cultivated esthetic standards, but these are swallowed up by the large masses who constitute the new and untutored audience for the arts. Whereas yesterday the elite constituted virtually the whole of the audience, they are today a minute fraction of the whole. In consequence, the average level of esthetic standards and tastes of audiences has been depressed, although the tastes of some sectors of the population have undoubtedly been raised and the total number of people exposed to communication contents has been vastly increased. But this analysis does not directly answer the question of the effects of the mass media upon public taste, a question which is as complex as it is unexplored. The answer can come only from disciplined research. One would want to know, for example, whether mass media have robbed the intellectual and artistic elite of the art forms which might otherwise have been accessible to them. And this involves inquiry into the pressure exerted by the mass audience upon creative individuals to cater to mass tastes. Literary hacks have existed in every age. But it would be important to learn if the electrification of the arts supplies power for a significantly greater proportion of dim literary lights. And, above all, it would be essential to determine if mass media and mass tastes are necessarily linked in a vicious circle of deteriorating standards or if appropriate action on the part of the directors of mass media could initiate a virtuous circle of cumulatively improving tastes among their audiences. More concretely, are the operators of commercialized mass media caught up in a situation in which they cannot, whatever their private preferences, radically raise the esthetic standards of their products? In passing, it should be noted that much remains to be learned concerning standards appropriate for mass art. It is possible that standards for art forms produced by a small band of creative talents for a small and selective audience are not applicable to art forms produced by a gigantic industry for the population at large. The beginnings of investigation on this problem are sufficiently suggestive to warrant further study. Sporadic and consequently inconclusive experiments in the raising of standards have met with profound resistance from mass audiences. On occasion, radio stations and networks have attempted to supplant a soap opera with a program of classical music, or formula comedy skits with discussions of public issues. In general, the people supposed to benefit by this reformation of program have simply refused to be benefited. They cease listening. The audience dwindles. Researches have shown, for example, that radio programs of classical music tend to preserve rather than to create interest in classical music and that newly emerging interests are typically superficial. Most listeners to these programs have previously acquired an interest in

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classical music; the few whose interest is initiated by the programs are caught up by melodic compositions and come to think of classical music exclusively in terms of Tschaikowsky or Rimsky, Korsakow or Dvorak. [. . .] We turn now to the third and last aspect of the social role of the mass media: the possibilities of utilizing them for moving toward designated types of social objectives. Propaganda for Social Objectives This final question is perhaps of more direct interest to you than the other questions we have discussed. It represents something of a challenge to us since it provides the means of resolving the apparent paradox to which we referred previously: the seeming paradox arising from the assertion that the significance of the sheet existence of the mats media has been exaggerated and the multiple indications that the media do exert influences upon their audiences. What arc the conditions for the effective use of mass media for what might be called 'propaganda for social objectives' - the promotion, let us say, of non-discriminatory race relations, or of educational reforms, or of positive attitudes toward organized labor? Research indicates that, at least, one or more of three conditions must be satisfied if this propaganda is to prove effective. These Conditions may be briefly designated as (l) monopolization, (2) canalization rather than change of basic values, and (3) supplementary face-to-face contact. Each of these conditions merits some discussion. Monopolization This situation obtains when there is little or no opposition in the mass media to the diffusion of values, policies, or public images. That is to say, monopolization of the mass media occurs in the absence of counterpropaganda. In this restricted sense, monopolization of the mass media is found in diverse circumstances. It is, of course, indigenous to the political structure of authoritarian society, where access to the media of communication is wholly closed to those who oppose the official ideology. The evidence suggests that this monopoly played some part in enabling the Nazis to maintain their' control of the German people. But this same situation is approximated in other social systems. During the war, for example, our government utilized the radio, with some success, to promote and to maintain identification with the war effort. The effectiveness of these morale building efforts was in large measure due to the virtually complete absence of counterpropaganda. Similar situations arise in the world of commercialized propaganda, The mass media create popular idols. The public images of the radio performer; Katie Smith; for example, picture her as: a woman with unparalleled understanding of other American women, deeply sympathetic with ordinary men and women, a spiritual guide and mentor, a patriot whose views on public affairs should be taken seriously. Linked with the cardinal American virtues, the public images of Kate Smith are at no point subject to a counterpropaganda Not that she has no competitors in the market of radio advertising. But there are none who set themselves systematically to question what she has said. In consequence, an unmarried radio entertainer with an annual income in six figures may be visualized by millions of American women as a hard-working mother who knows the recipe for managing life on fifteen hundred a year. This image of a popular idol would have far less currency Were it subjected to counter propaganda. Such neutralization occurs, for example, as a result of preelection campaigns by

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Republicans and Democrats. By and large; as a recent study has shown, the propaganda issued by each of these parties neutralizes. the effect of the other's propaganda. Were both parties to forgo their campaigning through the mass media entirely, it is altogether likely that the net effect would be to reproduce the present distribution of votes. [. . .] To the extent that opposing political propaganda in the mass media are balanced, the net effect is negligible. The virtual monopolization of the media for given social objectives, however, will produce discernible effects upon audiences. Canalization Prevailing beliefs in the enormous power of mass communications appear to stem from successful cases of monopolistic propaganda or from advertising. But the leap from the efficacy of advertising to the assumed efficacy of propaganda aimed at deep-rooted attitudes and ego involved behavior is as unwarranted as it is dangerous. Advertising is typically directed toward the canalizing of preexisting behavior patterns or attitudes. It seldom seeks to instil new attitudes or to create significantly new behavior patterns, 'Advertising pays' because it generally deals with a simple psychological situation, For Americans who have been socialized in the use of a toothbrush, it makes relatively little difference which brand of toothbrush they use. Once the gross pattern of behavior or the generic attitude has been established, it can be canalized in one direction or another. Resistance is slight, But mass propaganda typically meets a more complex situation. It may seek objectives which are at odds with deep-lying attitudes. It may seek to reshape rather than to canalize current systems of values. And the successes of advertising may only highlight the failures of propaganda. Much of the current propaganda which is aimed at abolishing deepseated and racial prejudices, for example, seems to have had little effectiveness. Media of mass communication, then, have been effectively used to canalize basic attitudes but there is little evidence of their having served to change these attitudes. Supplementation Mass propaganda which is neither monopolistic nor canalizing in character may, nonetheless, prove effective if it meets a third condition: supplementation. through face-to-face contacts. [. . .] Students of mass movements have come to repudiate the view that mass propaganda in and of itself creates or maintains the movement. Naziism did not attain its brief moment of hegemony by capturing the mass media of communication, The media-played an ancillary role, supplementing the use of organized violence, organized distribution of rewards for conformity, and organized centers of local indoctrination. The Soviet Union has also made large and impressive use of mass media, for indoctrinating enormous, populations with appropriate ideologies. But the organizers of indoctrination saw to it that the mass media did not operate alone. 'Red corners,' 'reading huts,' and 'listening stations' composed meeting places in which groups of citizens were exposed to the mass media in common, The 55,000 reading rooms and clubs which had come into being by 1933 enabled the local ideological elite to talk over with rank-and-file readers the content of what they read, The relative scarcity of radios in private homes again made for group listening, and group discussions of what had been, heard. In these instances, the machinery of mass persuasion included face-to-face contact in local organizations as an adjunct to the mass media, The privatized individual response to the

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materials presented through the channels of mass communication was considered inadequate for transforming exposure to propaganda into effectiveness of propaganda. In a society such as our own, where the pattern of bureaucratization has not yet become so pervasive or, at least, not so dearly crystallized, it has likewise been found that mass media prove most effective in conjunction with local centers of organized face-to-face contact. Several factors contribute to the enhanced effectiveness of this joining of mass media and direct personal contact. Most clearly, the local discussions serve to reinforce the content of mass propaganda. Such mutual confirmation produces a 'clinching effect.' Secondly, the central media lessen the task of the local organizer, and the personnel requirements for such subalterns need not be as rigorous in a popular movement. The subalterns need not set forth the propaganda content for themselves, but need only pilot potential converts to the radio where the doctrine is being expounded. Thirdly, the appearance of a representative of the movement on a nation-wide network, or his mention in the national press, serves to symbolize the legitimacy and significance of the movement. It is no powerless, inconsequential enterprise. The mass media, as we have seen, confer status. And the status of the national movement reflects back on the status of the local cells, thus consolidating the tentative decisions of its members. In this interlocking arrangement, the local organizer ensures an audience for the national speaker and the national speaker validates the status of the local organizer. This brief summary of the situations in which the mass media achieve their maximum propaganda effect may resolve the seeming contradiction which arose at the outset of our discussion. The mass media prove most effective when they opiate in a situation of virtual 'psychological monopoly,' or when the objective is one of canalizing rather than modifying basic attitudes or when they operate in conjunction with face-to-face contacts. But these three conditions are rarely satisfied conjointly in propaganda for social objectives To the degree that of attention is rare, opposing propagandas have free play in a democracy. And, by and large, basic-social issues involve more than a mere canalizing of preexistent basic attitudes; they call, rather, for substantial changes in attitude and behavior. Finally, for the most obvious. of reasons, the close collaboration of mass media and locally organized centers for face-to-face contact has seldom been, achieved in groups striving for planned social change. Such programs are expensive And it is precisely these groups which Seldom have the large resources needed for these expensive programs. The forward looking groups at the edges of the power structure do not ordinarily have the large financial means of the contented groups at the center. As a result of this threefold situation, the present role of media is largely confined to peripheral social concerns and the media do not exhibit the degree of social power commonly attributed to them. By the same token, find in view of the present organization of business ownership and control of the mass media, they have served to cement the structure of our society. Organized business does approach a virtual 'psychological monopoly' of the mass media. Radio commercials and newspaper advertisements are, of course, premised on a system which has been termed free enterprise. Moreover, the world of commerce is primarily concerned with canalizing rather than radically changing basic attitudes; it seeks only to create preferences for one rather than another brand of product. Face-to-face contacts with those who have been socialized in our culture serve primarily to reinforce the prevailing culture patterns Thus, the very conditions which make for the maximum effectiveness of the mass media of communication operate toward the maintenance of the going social and cultural structure rather than toward its change.

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2 Culture Industry Reconsidered Theodor W. Adorno The term culture industry was perhaps used for the first time in the book Dialectic of Enlightenment, Which Horkheimer and I published in Amsterdam in 1947. In our drafts We spoke of 'mass culture'. We replaced that expression with 'culture industry' in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. From the latter the culture industry must be distinguished in the extreme. The culture industry fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less according to plan. The individual branches are similar in structure or at least fit into each other, ordering themselves into a system almost without a gap. This is made possible by contemporary technical capabilities as well as by economic and administrative concentration. The culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above: To the detriment of both it forces together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years. The seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy; the seriousness of the lower perishes with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total. Thus, although the culture industry undeniably speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions towards which it is directed, the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation; an appendage of the machinery. The customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us believe. not its subject but its object. The very word mass-media, specially honed for the culture industry, already shifts the accents onto harmless terrain. Neither is it a question of primary concern for the masses, nor of the techniques of communication as such; but of the spirit which sufflates them, their master's voice. The culture industry misuses its concern for the masses in order to duplicate, reinforce and strengthen their mentality, which it presumes

Originally a broadcast talk given on the Hessian Broadcasting System, Federal Republic of Germany in spring 1963, this piece was published in this translation by Anson G. Rabinbach, New German Critique no. 6 (Fall 1975) pp. 12-19; rept. as ch. 3 of Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. with an introduction by J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 85 - 92.

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is given and unchangeable. How this mentality might be changed is excluded throughout. The masses are not the measure but the ideology of the culture industry; even though the culture industry itself could scarcely exist without adapting to the masses. The cultural commodities of the industry are governed, as Brecht and Suhrkamp expressed it thirty years ago, by the principle of their realization as value, and not by their own specific content and harmonious formation. The entire practice of the culture industry transfers the profit. motive naked onto cultural forms. Ever since these cultural forms first began to earn a living for their creators as commodities in the market-place they had already possessed something of this quality. But then they sought after profit only indirectly, over and above their autonomous essence. New on the part of the culture industry is the direct and undisguised primacy of a precisely and thoroughly calculated efficacy in its most typical products. The autonomy of works of art; which of course rarely ever predominated in an entirely pure form, and was always permeated by a constellation of effects, is tendentially eliminated by the culture industry, with or without the conscious will of those in control. The latter include both those who carry out directives as well as those who hold the power. In economic terms they are or were in search of new opportunities for the realization of capital in the most economically developed countries. The old opportunities became increasingly more precarious as a result of the same concentration process which alone makes the culture industry possible as an omnipresent phenomenon. Culture, in the true sense, did not simply accommodate itself to human beings; but it always simultaneously raised a protest against the petrified relations under which they lived; thereby honouring them. In so far as culture becomes wholly assimilated to and integrated in those petrified relations, human beings are once more debased; cultural entities typical of the culture industry are no longer also commodities, they are commodities through. and through. This quantitative shift is so great that it calls forth entirely new phenomena. Ultimately, the culture industry no longer even needs to directly pursue everywhere the profit interests from Which it originated. These interests have become objectified in its ideology and have even made themselves independent of the compulsion to sell the cultural commodities which must be swallowed anyway. The culture industry turns into public relations, the manufacturing of goodwill'' per se, without regard for particular firms or saleable objects, Brought to bear is a general uncritical consensus, advertisements produced for the world, so that each product of the culture industry becomes its own advertisement. Nevertheless, those characteristics which originally stamped the transformation of literature into a commodity are maintained in this process. More than anything in the world, the culture industry has its ontology, a scaffolding of rigidly conservative basic categories which can be gleaned, for example, from the commercial English novels of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. What parades as progress in the culture industry, as the incessantly new which it offers up, remains the disguise for an eternal sameness; everywhere the changes mask a skeleton which has Changed just as little as the profit motive itself since the time it first gained its predominance over culture. Thus, the expression 'industry' is not to be taken too literally. It refers to the standardization of the thing itself such as that of the Western, familiar to every movie-goer - and to the rationalization of distribution techniques, but not strictly to the production process. Although in film, the central sector of the culture industry, the production process resembles technical modes of operation in the extensive division of labour, the employment of machines arid the separation of the labourers from the means of production - expressed in the perennial conflict between artists active in the culture industry and those who control it - individual forms of production are nevertheless maintained. Each product affects an individual air;

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individuality itself serves in reinforce ideology, in so far as the illusion is conjured up that the completely reified and mediated is a sanctuary from immediacy and life. Now, as ever, the culture industry exists in the 'service' of third persons, maintaining its affinity to the declining circulation process of capital, to the commerce from which it came into being. Its ideology above all makes use of the star system, borrowed from individualistic art and its commercial exploitation. The more dehumanized its methods of operation and content, the more diligently and successfully the culture industry propagates supposedly great personalities and operates with heart-throbs. It is industrial more in a sociological sense, in the incorporation of industrial forms of organization even when nothing is manufactured - as in the rationalization of office work - rather than in the sense of anything really and actually produced by technological rationality, Accordingly, the misinvestments of the culture industry are considerable, throwing those branches rendered obsolete by new techniques into crises, which seldom lead to changes for the better. The concept of technique in the culture industry is only in name identical with technique in works of art. In the latter, technique, is concerned with the internal organization of the object itself, with its inner logic. In contrast, the technique of the culture industry is, from the beginning, one of distribution and mechanical reproduction, and therefore always remains external to its object. The culture industry finds ideological support precisely in so far as it carefully shields itself from the full potential of the techniques contained in its products. It lives parasitically from the extra-artistic technique of the material production of goods, without regard. for the obligation to the internal artistic whole implied by its functionality (Sachlichlkeit), but also without concern for the laws of form demanded by aesthetic autonomy. The result for the physiognomy of the culture industry is. essentially a mixture of streamlining, photographic hardness and precision on the one hand, and individualistic residues, sentimentality and an already rationally disposed and adapted romanticism on the other. Adopting Benjamin's designation of the traditional work of art by the concept of aura, the presence of that which is not present, the culture industry is defined by the fact that it does not strictly counterpose another principle to that of aura, but rather by the fact that it conserves the decaying aura as a foggy mist. By this means the culture industry betrays its own ideological abuses. It has recently become customary among cultural officials as well as sociologists to warn against underestimating the culture industry while pointing to its great importance for the development of the consciouness of its consumers, It is to be taken seriously, without cultured snobbism. In actuality the culture industry is important as a moment of the spirit which dominates today. Whoever ignores its influence out of scepticism for what it stuffs into people would be naive. Yet there is a deceptive glitter about the admonition to take it seriously. Because of its social role, disturbing questions about its quality, about truth or untruth, and about the aesthetic niveau of the culture industry's emissions are repressed, or at least excluded from the so-called sociology of communications. The critic is accused of taking refuge in arrogant esoterica. It would be advisable first to indicate the double meaning of importance that slowly worms its way in unnoticed, Even if it touches the lives of innumerable people, the function of something is no guarantee of its particular quality. The blending: of aesthetics with its residual communicative aspects leads art, as a social phenomenon, not to its rightful position in opposition to alleged artistic snobbism, but rather in a variety of ways to the defence of its baneful social consequences. The importance of the culture industry in the spiritual constitution of the masses is no dispensation for reflection on its objective legitimation, its essential being, least of all by a science which thinks itself pragmatic. On the contrary: such reflection becomes necessary precisely for this reason. To take the culture industry as seriously

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as its unquestioned role demands; means to take it seriously critically, and not to cower in the face of its monopolistic character. Among those intellectuals anxious to reconcile themselves with the phenomenon and eager to find a common formula to express both their reservations against it and their respect for its power a tone of ironic toleration prevails unless they have already created a new mythos of the twentieth century from the imposed regression, After all, those intellectuals maintain, everyone knows what pocket novels; films off the rack, family television shows rolled out into serials and hit parades, advice to the lovelorn and horoscope columns are all about. All of this, however, is harmless and, according to them, even democratic since it responds to a demand, albeit a stimulated one. It also bestows all kinds of blessings, they point out, for example, through the dissemination of information, advice and stress Seducing patterns of behaviour. Of course, as every sociological study measuring something as elementary as how politically informed the public is has proven, the information is meagre or indifferent. Moreover, the advice to be gained from manifestations of the culture industry is vacuous, banal or worse, and the behaviour patterns are shamelessly conformist. The two-faced irony in the relationship of servile intellectuals to the culture industry is not restricted to them alone. It may also be supposed that the consciousness of the consumers themselves is split between the prescribed fun which is supplied to them by the culture industry and a not particularly well-hidden doubt about its blessings. The phrase, the world wants to be deceived, has become truer than had ever been intended. People are not only, as the Saying goes; falling for the swindle; if it guarantees them even the most fleeting gratification they desire a deception which is nonetheless transparent to them. They force their eyes shut and voice approval, in a kind of self-loathing, for what is meted out to them, knowing fully the purpose for which it is manufactured. Without admitting it they sense that their lives Would be completely intolerable as soon as they no longer clung to satisfactions which are none at all. The most ambitious defence of the culture industry today celebrates its spirit, which might be safely called ideology, as an ordering factor. In a supposedly chaotic world it provides human beings with something like standards for orientation, and that alone seems worthy of approval. However, what its defenders imagine is preserved by the culture industry is in fact all the more thoroughly destroyed by it. The colour film demolishes the genial old tavern to a greater extent than bombs ever could: the film exterminates its imago. No homeland can survive being processed by the films which celebrate it, and which thereby turn the unique character on which it thrives into an interchangeable sameness. That which legitimately could be called culture attempted, as an expression of suffering and contradiction, to maintain a grasp on the idea of the good life. Culture cannot represent either that which merely exists or the conventional and no longer binding categories of order which the culture industry drapes over the idea of the good life as if existing reality were the good life, and as if those categories were its true measure. If the response of the culture industry's representatives is that it does not deliver art at all, this is itself the ideology with which theft evade responsibility for that from which the business lives. No misdeed is ever righted by explaining it as such. The appeal to order alone, without concrete specificity, is futile; the appeal to the dissemination of norms, without these ever proving themselves in reality or before consciousness, is equally futile. The idea of an objectively binding order, huckstered to people because it is so lacking for them, has no claims if it does not prove itself internally and in confrontation with human beings. But this is precisely what no product of the culture industry would engage in. The concepts of order which it hammers into human beings are always those of the status

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quo. They remain unquestioned, unanalysed and undialectically presupposed, even if they no longer have any substance for those who accept them. In contrast to the Kantian, the. categorical imperative of the. culture industry no longer has anything in common with freedom. It proclaims: you shall conform, without instruction as to what; conform to that which exists anyway, and to that which everyone thinks anyway as a reflex of this power and Omnipresence, The power of the culture industry's ideology is such that conformity has replaced consciousness. The order that springs from it is never confronted with what it claims to be or with the real interests of human beings. Order, however, is not good in itself. It would be so only. as a good order. The fact that the culture industry is oblivious to this and extols order in abstracto, bears. witness to the impotence and untruth of the messages it conveys. While it claims to lead the perplexed, it deludes them with false conflicts which they are, to exchange for their own. It solves conflicts for them only in appearance, in a way that they can hardly be solved in their real lives. In the products of the culture industry human beings get into trouble only so that they can be rescued unharmed, usually by representatives of a benevolent collective; and then in empty harmony, they are reconciled with the general, whose demands. they had experienced at the outset as irreconcileable with their interests, For this purpose the culture industry has developed formulas which even reach into such non-conceptual areas as light musical entertainment. Here too one gets into a 'jam', into rhythmic problems, which can be instantly disentangled by the triumph of the basic beat. Even its defenders, however, would hardly contradict Plato openly who maintained that what is objectively and intrinsically untrue cannot also be subjectively good and true for human beings. The concoctions of the culture industry are neither guides for a blissful life, nor a new art of moral responsibility, but rather exhortations to toe the line, behind which stand the most powerful interests. The consensus which it propagates strengthens blind, opaque authority. If the culture industry is measured. not by its own substance and logic, but by its efficacy, by its position in reality and its explicit pretensions; if the focus of serious concern is With the efficacy to which it always appeals, the potential of its effect becomes twice as weigthy. This potential, however, lies in the promotion and exploitation of the ego-weakness to which the powerless members of contemporary society, with its concentration of power, are condemned. Their consciousness is further developed retrogressively; It is no coincidence that cynical American film producers are heard to say that their pictures must take into consideration the level of eleven-year-olds. In doing so they would very much like to make adults into eleven-year-olds. It is true that thorough research has not, for the time being, produced an airtight case proving the regressive effects of particular products of the culture industry. No doubt an imaginatively designed experiment could achieve this more successfully than the powerful financial interests concerned would find comfortable, In any case, it can be assumed without hesitation that steady drops hollow the stone, especially since the system of the culture industry that surrounds the masses tolerates hardly any deviation and incessantly drills the same formulas on behaviour. Only their deep unconscious mistrust, the last residue of the difference between art and empirical reality in the spiritual make-up of the masses explains why they have not, to a person long since perceived and accepted the world as it is constructed for them by the culture industry. Even if its messages were as harmless as they are made out to be - on countless occasions they are obviously not harmless, like the movies which chime in with currently popular hate campaigns against intellectuals by portraying them with the usual stereotypes - the attitudes: which the culture industry calls forth are anything. but harmless. If an astrologer urges his readers to drive carefully on a particular day, that certainly hurts no one; they will, however,

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be harmed indeed by the stupefication which lies in the claim that advice which is valid every day and which is therefore idiotic, needs the approval of the stars. Human dependence and servitude, the vanishing point of the culture industry, could scarcely be more faithfully described than by the American interviewee who was of the opinion that the dilemmas of the contemporary epoch would end if people would simply follow the lead of prominent personalities. In so far as the culture industry arouses a feeling of well-being that the world is precisely in that order suggested by the culture industry, the substitute gratification which it prepares for human beings cheats them out of the same happiness which it deceitfully projects. The total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in which, as Horkheimer and I have noted, enlightenment, that is the progressive technical domination of nature, becomes mass deception and is turned into a means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and deride consciously for themselves. These, however, would be the precondition for a democratic society which needs adults who have come of age in order to sustain itself and develop. If the masses have been unjustly reviled from above as masses, the culture industry is not among the least responsible for making them into masses and then despising them, while obstructing the emancipation for which human beings are as ripe as the productive forces of the epoch permit.

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3 The Medium is the Message Marshall McLuhan In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational practical fact, the medium is the message. This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium - that is, of any extension of ourselves - result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology. Thus, with automation.* for example, the new patterns of human association tend to eliminate jobs, it is true. That is the negative result. Positively, automation creates roles for people, which is to say depth of involvement in their work and human association that our preceding mechanical technology had destroyed. Many people would be disposed to say that it was not the machine, but what one did with the machine, that was its meaning or message. In terms of the ways in which the machine altered our relations to one another and to ourselves, it mattered not in the least whether it turned out cornflakes or Cadillacs. The restructuring of human work and association was shaped by the technique of fragmentation that is the essence of machine technology. The essence of automation technology is the opposite. It is integral and decentralist in depth, just as the machine was fragmentary, centralist, and superficial in its patterning of human relationships. The instance of the electric light may prove illuminating in this connection. The electric light is pure information. It is a medium without a message, as it were, unless it is used to spell out some verbal ad or name. This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the 'content' of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is asked, 'What is the content of speech?' it is necessary to say, 'It is an actual process of thought, which is in itself nonverbal.' An abstract painting represents direct manifestation of creative thought processes as they might appear in computer designs. What we are considering here, however,

From Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: the Exdensions of Man (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964) pp. 11, 15-21,31-3, 68-9.

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are the psychic and social consequences of the designs or patterns as they amplify or accelerate existing processes. For the 'message' of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. The railway did not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road into human society, but it accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, creating totally new kinds of dries and new kinds of work and leisure. This happened whether the railway functioned in a tropical or a northern environment, and is quite independent of the freight or content of the railway medium. The airplane, on the other hand, by accelerating the rate of transportation, tends to dissolve the railway form of city, politics, and association, quite independently of what the airplane is fused for. Let us return to the electric light. Whether the light is being used for brain surgery or night baseball is a matter of indifference. It could be argued that these activities are in some way the 'content' of the electric light, since they could not exist without the electric light. This fact merely underlines the point that 'the medium is the message' because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action. The content or uses of such media are as diverse as they are ineffectual in shaping the form of human association. Indeed, it is only too typical that the 'content' of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium. It is only today that industries have become aware of the various kinds of business in which they are engaged. When IBM discovered that it was not in the business of making office equipment or business machines, but that it was in the business of processing information, then it began to navigate with dear vision. The General Electric Company makes a considerable portion of its profits from electric light bulbs and lighting Systems. It has not yet discovered that, quite as much as A.T. & T, it is in the business of moving information. The electric light escapes attention as a communication medium just because it has no 'content.' And this makes it an invaluable instance of how people fail to study media at all. For it is not till the electric tight is used to spell out some brand name that it is noticed as a medium. Then it is not the light but the 'content' (or what is really another medium) that is noticed. The message of the electric light is like the message of electric power in industry, totally radical, pervasive, and decentralized. For electric fight and power are separate from their uses, yet they eliminate time and space factors in human association exactly as do radio, telegraph, telephone, and TV, creating involvement in depth. [. . .] In accepting an honorary degree from the University of Notre Dame a few years ago. General David Sarnoff** made this statement: 'We are too prone to make technological instruments the scapegoats for the sins of those who wield them. The products of modern science are not in themselves good or bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value.' That is the voice of the current somnambulism, Suppose we were to say, 'Apple pie is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the Way it is used that determines its value.' Or, 'The smallpox virus is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the way it is used that determines its value.' Again 'Firearms are in themselves neither good nor bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value.' That is, if the slugs reach the right people firearms are good. If the TV tube fires the right ammunition at the right people it is good. I am not being perverse. There is simply nothing in the Sarnoff statement that will bear scrutiny, for it ignores the nature of the medium, of any and all media, in the true Narcissus style of one hypnotized by the amputation and extension of his own being in a new technical form. General Sarnoff went on to explain his attitude to the technology

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of print, saying that it was true that print caused much trash to circulate, but it had also disseminated the Bible and the thoughts of seers and philosophers. It has never occurred to General Sarnoff that any technology could do anything but add itself on to what we already are. [. . .] [M]echanization is achieved by fragmentation of any process and by putting the fragmented parts in a series. Yet, as David Hume showed in the eighteenth century, there is no principle of causality in a mere sequence. That one thing follows mother accounts for nothing. Nothing follows from following, except change. So the greatest of all reversals occurred with electricity, that ended sequence by making things instant. With instant speed the causes of things began to emerge to awareness again, as they had not done with things in sequence and in concatenation accordingly. Instead of asking which came first, the chicken or the egg, it suddenly seemed that a chicken was an egg's idea for getting more eggs. Just before an airplane breaks the sound barrier, sound waves become visible on the wings of the plane. The sudden visibility of sound just as sound ends is an apt instance of that great pattern of being that reveals new and opposite forms just as the earlier forms reach their peak performance. Mechanization was never so vividly fragmented or sequential as in the birth of the movies, the moment that translated us beyond mechanism into the world of growth and organic interrelation. The movie, by sheer speeding up the mechanical, carried us from the world of sequence and connections into the world of creative configuration and structure. The message of the movie medium is that of transition from lineal connections to configurations. It is the transition that produced the now quite correct observation: 'If it works, it's obsolete.' When electric speed further takes over from mechanical movie sequences, then the lines of force in structures and in media become loud and clear, We return to the inclusive form of the icon. To a highly literate and mechanized culture the movie appeared as a world of triumphant illusions and dreams that money could buy. It was at this moment of the movie that cubism occurred, and it has been described by E. H. Gombrich (Art and Illusion) as 'the most radical attempt to stamp out ambiguity and to enforce one reading of the picture - that of a man-made construction, a colored canvas.' For cubism substitutes all facets of an object simultaneously for the 'point of view' or facet of perspective illusion. Instead of the specialized illusion of the third dimension on canvas, cubism sets up an interplay of planes and contradiction or dramatic conflict of patterns, lights, textures that 'drives home the message' by involvement. This is held by many to be an exercise in painting, not in illusion. In other words, cubism, by giving the inside and outside, the top, bottom, back, and front and the rest, in two dimensions, drops the illusion of perspective in favor of instant sensory awareness of the whole. Cubism, by seizing on instant total awareness, suddenly announced that the medium is the message. Is it not evident that the moment that sequence yields to the simultaneous, one is in the world of the structure and of configuration? Is that not what has happened in physics as in painting, poetry, and in communication? Specialized segments of attention have shifted to total field, and we can now say, 'The medium is the message' quite naturally, Before the electric speed and total field, it was not obvious that the medium is the message. The message, it seemed, was the 'content,' as people used to ask what a painting was about. Yet they never thought to ask what a melody was about, nor what a house or a dress was about. In such matters, people retained some sense of the whole pattern, of form and

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function as a unity. But in the electric age this integral idea of structure and configuration has become [. . .] prevalent [. . .]. [. . .] Hot and Cold [. . .] There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a cool one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool one like TV. A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in 'high definition.' High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A photograph is, visually, 'high definition.' A cartoon is 'low definition,' simply because very little visual information is provided. Telephone is a cool medium, or one of low definition, because the ear is given a meager amount of information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition, because so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener. On the other hand, hot media do not leave so much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion by the audience. Naturally, therefore, a hot medium like radio has very different effects on the user from a cool medium like the telephone. A cool medium like hieroglyphic or ideogrammic written characters has very different effects from the hot and explosive medium of the phonetic alphabet. The alphabet, when pushed to a high degree of abstract visual intensity, became typography. The printed word with its specialist intensity burst the bonds of medieval corporate guilds and monasteries, creating extreme. individualist patterns of enterprise and monopoly. But the typical reversal occurred when extremes of monopoly brought back the corporation, with its impersonal empire over many lives. The hotting-up of the medium of writing to repeatable print intensity led to nationalism and the religious wars of the sixteenth century. The heavy and unwieldy media, such as stone, are time binders. Used for writing, they are very cool indeed, and serve to unify the ages; whereas paper is a hot medium that serves to unify spaces horizontally, both in political and entertainment empires. Any hot medium allows of less participation than a cool one, as a lecture makes for less participation than a seminar, and a book for less than dialogue. With print many earlier forms were excluded from life and an, and many were given strange new intensity. [. . .] A tribal and feudal hierarchy of traditional kind collapses quickly when it meets any hot medium of the mechanical, uniform, and repetitive kind. The medium of money or wheel or writing, or any other form of specialist speed-up of exchange and information, will serve to fragment a tribal structure. Similarly, a very much greater speed-up, such as occurs with electricity, may serve to restore a tribal pattern of intense involvement such as took place with the introduction of radio in Europe, and is now tending to happen as a result of TV in America. Specialist technologies detribalize. The non-specialist electric technology retribalizes. [. . .] By putting our physical bodies inside our extended nervous systems, by means of electric media, we set up a dynamic by which all previous technologies that are mere extensions of hands and feet and teeth and bodily heatcontrols - all such extensions of our bodies, including cities - will be translated into information systems. Electromagnetic technology requires utter human docility and quiescence of meditation such as benefits an organism that now wears its brain outside its skull and its nerves outside its hide. Man must serve his electric technology with

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the same servomechanistic fidelity with which he served his coracle, his canoe, his typography, and all other extensions of his physical organs. But there is this difference, that previous technologies were partial and fragmentary, and the electric is total and inclusive. An external consensus or conscience is now as necessary as private consciousness. With the new media, however, it is also possible to store and to translate everything; and, as for speed, that is no problem. No further acceleration is possible this side of the light barrier. Just as when information levels rise in physics and chemistry, it is possible to use anything for fuel or fabric or building material, so with electric technology all solid goods can be summoned to appear as solid commodities by means of information circuits set up in the organic patterns that we call 'automation' and information retrieval. Under electric technology the entire business of man becomes learning and knowing [. . .] After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the Western world is imploding. During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of man - the technological simulation of consciousness, when 'the' creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the Whole of human society, much as We have already extended our senses and our nerves by the various media. Editors' Notes

* Automation: the 1960s term for the introduction of new information technologies; computerisation. ** David Sarnoff (1891-1971). As a young employee of the Marconi radio company, Sarnoff is often credited with having 'invented' broadcasting as an application of the new wireless technology. He founded the first American broadcasting network, NBC, in 1926, and was head of the Radio Corporation of America from 1930 to 1966.

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4 'Mass Communication and 'Minority Culture' Raymond Williams In our own generation, there has been a dramatic tightening of interest in this world of communications. The development of powerful new means of communication has coincided, historically, with the extension of democracy and with the attempts, by many kinds of ruling group, to control and manage democracy. The development has also coincided with important changes in the nature of work and in education, which have given many people new kinds of social opportunity. There has been a great expansion in the scale of ordinary society, both through the new communications Systems and through the growth of many kinds of large scale organization. Acting together, these developments have created social problems which seem to be of a quite new kind. The growth of interest in communications is an important response to this new situation. It came, really, as a break-through in experience, cutting across our usual categories. Already some of our basic ideas of society are being changed by this new emphasis. From one familiar approach, through traditional politics, we have seen the central facts of society as power and government. From another familiar approach, through traditional economics, we have seen the central concerns of society as property, production, and trade. These approaches remain important, but they are now joined by a new emphasis: that society is a form of communication, through which experience is described, shared, modified, and preserved. We are used to descriptions of our whole common life in political and economic terms. The emphasis on communications asserts, as a matter of experience, that men and societies are not confined to relationships of power, property, and production. Their relationships in describing, learning, persuading, and exchanging experiences are seen as equally fundamental. This emphasis is exceptionally important in the long crisis of twentieth-century society. Many people, starting from older versions of society, have seen the growth of modern communications not as an expansion of men's powers to learn and to exchange ideas and experiences, but as a new

From R. Williams, Communications (Harmondsworth: Penguin Special, 1962) pp, 9-12, 68-75.

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method of government or a new opportunity for trade. All the new means of communication have been abused, for political control (as in propaganda) or for commercial profit (as in advertising). We can protest against such uses, but unless we have a dear alternative version of human society we are not likely to make our protests effective. My own view is that we have been wrong in taking communication as secondary. Many people seem to assume as a matter of course that there is, first, reality, and then, second, communication about it. We degrade art and learning by supposing that they are always secondhand activities: that there is life, and then afterwards there are these accounts of it. Our commonest political error is the assumption that power - the capacity to govern other men - is the reality of the whole social process, and so the only context of politics. Our commonest economic error is the assumption that production and trade are our only practical activities, and that they require no other human justification or scrutiny. We need to say what many of us know in experience: that the life of man, and the business of society, cannot be confined to these ends; that the struggle to learn, to describe, to understand, to educate, is a central and necessary part of our humanity. This struggle is not begun, at second hand, after reality has occurred. It is, in itself, a major way in which reality is continually formed and changed. What we call society is not only a network of political and economic arrangements, but also a process of learning and communication. Communication begins in the struggle to learn and to describe. To start this process in our minds, and to pass on its results to others, we depend on certain communication models, certain rules or conventions through which we can make contact. We can change these models, when they become inadequate, or we can modify and extend them. Our efforts to do so, and to use the existing models successfully, take up a large part of our living energy. The history of a language is a record of efforts of this kind, and is as central a part of the history of a people as its changing political and economic institutions. Moreover, many of our communication models become, in themselves, social institutions. Certain attitudes to others, certain forms of address, certain tones and styles, become embodied in institutions which are then very powerful in social effect. The crisis in modern communications has been caused by the speed of invention and by the difficulty of finding the right institutions in which these technical means are to be used. In modern Britain, we have a whole range of uses of printing, of photography, of television, which do not necessarily follow from the technical means themselves. Many have been shaped by changing political and economic forces. Many, also, have been shaped by what are really particular communication models: the idea that speaking or writing to many people at once is speaking or writing to 'the masses'; the idea that there are clear types of people and interest - 'Third Programme', 'Home Service' and 'Light'*; 'quality' and 'popular' - that we can separate and label. These arguable assumptions are often embodied in solid practical institutions, which then teach the models from which they start. We cannot examine the process of general communication in modern society Without examining the shapes of these institutions. Further, if we understand the importance of communication, in all our social activities, we find that in examining the process and the institutions we are also looking at out society - at some of our characteristic relationships - in new ways. [. . .] High and Low Men differ in their capacities for excellence. Yet democracy insists that everyone has an equal right to judge. Aren't we seeing, in our own time, the results of this contradiction? Isn't

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there great danger of the tradition of high culture being overwhelmed by mass culture, which expresses the tastes and standards of the ordinary man? Isn't it really our first duty to defend minority culture, which in its actual works is the highest achievement of humanity? The difficulty here is that 'minority culture' can mean two things. It can mean the work of the great artists and thinkers, and of the many lesser but still important figures who sustain them. It can mean also the work of these men as received and used by a particular social minority, which will indeed, often add to it certain works and habits of its own. The great tradition is in many Ways a common inheritance, and it has been the purpose of modern education to make it as Widely assailable as possible. Certainly this extension is never as easy as some people expect. Certainly it often happens that in the attempt to make difficult work more widely available, part of the value of the work is lost. Perhaps the whole attempt is wrongly conceived, and we should concentrate instead on maintaining the high tradition in its own terms. The question is, however, can this in any case be done? The work of the great artists and thinkers has never been confined to their own company; it has always beer made available to some others. And doesn't it often happen that those to whom it has been made available identify the tradition with themselves, grafting it into their own way of life? [. . .] Again and again, particular minorities confuse the superiority of the tradition which has been made available to them with their own superiority, an association which the passing of time or of frontiers can make suddenly ludicrous. We must always be careful to distinguish the great works of the past from the social minority which at a particular place and time identifies itself with them. The great tradition very often continues itself in quite unexpected ways. Much new work, in the past, has been called 'low', in terms of the 'high' standards of the day. This happened to much of our Elizabethan drama, and to the novel in the eighteenth century. Looking back, we can understand this, because the society was changing in fundamental ways. The minorities which assumed that they alone had the inheritance and guardianship of the great tradition in fact turned out to be wrong. This mistake can happen at any time. In our own century, there are such new forms as the film, the musical, and jazz. Each of these has been seen as 'low', a threat to 'our' standards. Yet during the period in which films have been made, there have been as many major contributions, in film, to the world's dramatic tradition, as there have been major plays. Of course most films are nowhere near this level. But from the past we have only the best work, and we can properly compare with this only our own best work. Some forms may well be better than others, in that they contain much greater possibilities for the artist, but this cannot be settled until there has been time for development. The great period of the novel came more than a century after the form had become popular and had been dismised as 'low'. It realized possibilities which nobody could then have foreseen. The prestige of an old form is never decisive. There is no reason, today, why a science-fiction story should be thought less serious than a historical novel, or a new musical than a naturalist play. 'Low' equals 'unfamiliar' is one of the perennial cultural traps, and it is fallen into most easily by those who assume that in their own persons, in their own learned tastes and habits, theft are the high tradition. This might be agreed, but does. it go to the real issue? These mistakes are made, but new minorities set them fight. Still, however, they are minorities. Most people are not interested in the great tradition, old or new. Most people are hot interested in art, but merely in entertainment. Actual popular taste is for such things as variety, the circus, sport, and processions. Why force art on such people, especially since you Will be in danger Of reducing art to that level,

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mixing it up with the popular and commercial worlds? Wouldn't your effort be better spent on maintaining real art for those who value it? This distinction between art and entertainment may be much more difficult to maintain than it looks. At its extremes, of course, it is obvious. But over the whole range, is there any easy and absolute distinction? Great art can give us deep and lasting experiences, but the experience we get from many things that we rightly call art is quite often light and temporary. The excitement of the circus, the procession, the variety sketch, can be quite easily forgotten, but at the time it is often intense. Sport, in our century, has become a popular spectacle: its excitements again are intense and often temporary. There may be a difference between such things and the minor decorative arts, the passing comedies, the fashionable artistic performers, but can it really be seen as a difference between 'high' and 'low'? And even where the difference seems absolute, what follows from this? What has to be shown, to sustain the argument that 'high culture' is in danger of being overwhelmed by 'mass culture', is that there is not only difference but conflict. Most of us can test this in our own experience. For, in fact, we do not live in these neatly separated worlds. Many of us go one day to a circus, one day to a theatre; one day to the football, one day to a concert. The experiences are different, and vary widely in quality both between and within themselves. Do we in fact feel that our capacity for any one of these things is affected by our use of the others? But perhaps this is not the main point. Isn't the real, threat of 'mass culture' - of things like television rather than things like football or the circus - that it reduces us to an endlessly mixed, undiscriminating, fundamentally bored, reaction? The spirit of everything, art and entertainment, can become so standardized that we have no absorbed interest in anything, but simply an indifferent acceptance, bringing together what Coleridge called 'indulgence of sloth and hatred of vacancy'. You're not exactly enjoying it, or paying any particular attention, but it's passing the time. And in so deadly an atmosphere the great tradition simply cannot live. Most of us, I think, have experienced this atmosphere. At times, even, we take it as a kind of drag: in periods of tiredness or convalescence, or during tension and anxiety when we have to wait and when almost anything can help us to wait. Certainly as a normal habit of mind this would be enervating and dangerous; there is a good deal of reality that we cannot afford to be cut off from, however much we may want some temporary relief. The challenge of work that is really in the great tradition is that in many different ways it can get through with an intensity, a closeness, a concentration that in fact moves us to respond, It can be the reporter breaking through our prejudice to the facts; the dramatist reaching so deeply into our experience that we find it difficult, in the first shock, even to breathe; the painter suddenly showing us the shape of a street so clearly that we ask how we could ever have walked down it indifferently. It is sometimes a disturbing challenge to what we have always believed and done, and sometimes a way to new experience, new ways of seeing and feeling. Or again, in unexpected ways, it can confirm and strengthen us, giving new energy. to what we already know is important, or what we knew but couldn't express. Is this living word threatened by the routines of 'mass culture'? The threat is real, but it. does not come only from 'mass culture'; it comes also from many kinds of routine art and routine thinking. There are many sources for the formula or routine which insulates us from reality. There is the weakness in ourselves, or at best the insufficient strength. There is also the intention of others, that we should be kept out of touch. Many interests are served by this kind of insulation: old forms of society, old and discredited beliefs, a wish to keep people quiet and uncritical. Such interests, based on power, habit, or privilege, are often served by, often, actively seek, formulas and routines that insulate men from reality.

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If we look at what we call 'mass culture' and 'minority culture', I am not sure that we invariably find one on the side of reality and one against it. Certainly the great works always challenge us with their own reality, and can stimulate us to active attention. But when these works are embedded in a particular minority culture, which adds to them not only its own local habits but also the facts and feelings which spring from its minority position, the effect can be very different. At best, a minority culture, in keeping the works available, offers the best that has been done and said in the world. At worst, it translates the best into its own accents, and confuses it with many other inferior things. I see no real evidence that it is a permanent and reliable means of maintaining a living excellence. But even if it isn't permanent and reliable, isn't it bound to be better than the ordinary world of mass communications? There the construction of formulas seems almost built in. It is perhaps the only easy way of getting through quickly to a very large number of people, and the system seems to depend on this. Certainly we can only understand large-scale communications if we acknowledge the importance of formulas which can be fairly quickly and widely learned and used. Yet, in fact, formulas are necessary for all communication. What is at worst a formula for processing an experience is at best a convention for transmitting it in a widely available form. We have seen so much falsification, glamorization, and real vulgarization that we often forget how many facts, how many new opinions, how many new kinds of work and new ways of seeing the world nevertheless get through. By comparison with times when there was no highly organized communications system these are dramatic gains. We have then to adjust the balance much more carefully than a simple contrast of 'minority' and 'mass', 'high' and 'low' would suggest. There is one further argument, that can very easily be overlooked. The great tradition is itself always in danger of being vulgarized when it is confined to a minority culture. Just because it is a mixed inheritance, from many societies and many times as well as from many kinds of men, it cannot easily be contained within one limited social form. Further, if it is so contained, there can be deep and unnecessary hostility to it from those outside the social minority. If the great tradition is not made generally available, there is often this frightening combination of hostility and a vacuum. What then usually happens is that this is penetrated and exploited from outside. In the worst cultural products of our time, we find little that is genuinely popular, developed from the life of actual communities. We find instead a synthetic culture, or anti-culture, which is alien to almost everybody, persistently hostile to art and intellectual activity, which it spends much of its time in misrepresenting, and given over to exploiting indifference, lack of feeling, frustration, and hatred. It finds such common human interests as sex, and turns them into crude caricatures or glossy facsimiles. It plays repeatedly around hatred and aggression, which it never discharges but continually feeds. This is not the culture of 'the ordinary man'; it is the culture of the disinherited. It seems to me that those who have contrived the disinheritance, by artificially isolating the great tradition, bear as heavy a responsibility for these destructive elements as their actual providers. In Britain, we have to notice that much of this bad work is American in origin. At certain levels, we are culturally an American colony. But of course it is not the best American culture that we are getting, and the import and imitation of the worst has been done, again and again, by some of our own people, significantly often driven by hatred or envy of the English minority which has associated the great tradition with itself. To go pseudo-American is a way out of the English complex of class and culture, but of course it solves nothing; it merely ritualizes the emptiness and despair. Most bad culture is the result of this kind of social collapse. The genuinely popular tradition is despised, the great tradition is kept exclusive, and into the gap

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pour the speculators who know how to exploit disinheritance because they themselves are rooted in nothing. The general situation is very difficult to understand. In part, now, the great tradition is being responsibly extended, and is finding an excellent response, both in the real increase of audiences, and in the answering vitality of new contributions to it from new kinds of experience. The purely destructive exploitation of the vacuum is also very powerful, in part because the control of our cultural organization has passed very largely into the hands of men who know no other definitions. At the same time, against all the apparent odds, elements of the really popular tradition persist, especially in variety, sport, some kinds of spectacle, and the impulse to make our own entertainment, especially in music. It seems impossible to understand this many-sided and constantly. changing situation through the old formulas of 'minority' and 'mass', which are the symptoms of the collapse rather than keys to understanding it. We have to look at a new situation in new ways. Editors' Note

*The 'Third Programme', 'Home Service' and 'Light' were the names of the BBC's domestic wireless networks from 1945/6 to 1967, providing distinct services that in contemporary terms broadly correspond to Radio 3, Radio 4 and Radio 2 respectively.

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5 Encoding/Decoding Stuart Hall Traditionally, mass-communications research has conceptualized the process of communication in terms of a circulation circuit or loop. This model has been criticized for its linearity - sender/message/receiver - for its concentration on the level of message exchange and for the absence of a structured conception of the different moments as a complex structure of relations. But it is also possible (and useful) to think of this process in terms of a structure produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive moments - production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction. This would be to think of the process as a 'complex structure in dominance', sustained through the articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and conditions of existence. This second approach, homologous to that which forms the skeleton of Commodity production offered in Marx's Grundisse and in Capital, has the added advantage of bringing out more sharply how a continuous circuit - production-distributionproduction - can be sustained through a 'passage of forms'. 1 It also highlights the specificity of the forms in which the product of the process 'appears' in each moment, and thus what distinguishes discursive 'production' from other types of production in our society and in modern media systems. The 'object' of these practices is meanings and messages in the form of sign-vehicles of a specific kind organized, like any form of communication or language, through the operation of codes within the syntagmatic chain of a discourse. The apparatuses, relations and practices of production thus issue, at a certain moment (the moment of 'production/circulation') in the form of symbolic vehicles constituted within the rules of 'language'. It is in this discursive form that the circulation of the 'product' takes place. The process thus requires, at the production end, its material instruments - its 'means' - as well as its own sets of social (production)

Froth S. Hall, 'Encoding/Decoding', ch. 10 in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (eds), Culture, Media, Language (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 128-38; an edited extract from S. Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse', CCCS stencilled paper no. 7 (Birminngham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1973).

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relations - the organization and combination of practices within media apparatuses. But it is in the discursive form that the circulation of the product takes place, as well as its distribution to different audiences. Once accomplished, the discourse must then be translated - transformed, again - into social practices if the circuit is to be both completed and effective. If no 'meaning' is taken, there can be no 'consumption'. If the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no effect. The value of this approach is that while each of the moments, in articulation, is necessary to the circuit as a whole, no one moment can fully guarantee the next moment with which it is articulated. Since each has its specific modality and conditions of existence, each can constitute its own break or interruption of the 'passage of forms' on whose continuity the flow of effective production (that is, 'reproduction') depends. Thus while in no way wanting to limit research to 'following only those leads which emerge from content analysis' 2 we must recognize that the discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the communicative exchange (from the viewpoint of circulation), and that the moments of 'encoding' and 'decoding', though only 'relatively autonomous' in relation to the communicative process as a whole, are determinate moments. A 'raw' historical event cannot, in that form, be transmitted by, say, a television newscast. Events can only be signified within the aural-visual forms of the televisual discourse. In the moment when a historical event passes under the sign of discourse, it is subject to all the complex formal 'rules' by which language signifies. To put it paradoxically, the event must become a 'story' before it can become a communicative event. In that moment the formal sub-rules of discourse are 'in dominance', without, of course, subordinating out of existence the historical event so signified, the social relations in which the rules are set to work or the social and political consequences of the event having been signified in this way. The 'message form' is the necessary 'form of appearance' of the event in its passage from source to receiver. Thus the transposition into and out of the 'message form' (or the mode of symbolic exchange) is not a random 'moment', which we can take up or ignore at our convenience, The 'message form' is a determinate moment; though, at another level, it comprises the surface movements of the communications system only and requires, at another stage, to be integrated into the social relations of the communication process as a whole, of which it forms only a part. From this general perspective, we may crudely characterize the television communicative process as follows. The institutional structures of broadcasting, with their practices and networks of production, their organized relations and technical infrastructures, are required to produce programme. Using the analogy of Capital, this is the 'labour process' in the discursive mode. Production, here, constructs the message. In one sense, then, the circuit begins here. Of course, the production process is not without its 'discursive' aspect: it, too; is framed throughout by meanings and ideas: knowledge-in-use concerning the routines of production, historically defined technical skills, professional ideologies, institutional knowledge, definitions and assumptions, assumptions about the audience and so on frame the constitution of the programme through this production structure. Further, though the production structures of television originate the television discourse, they do not constitute a closed, system. They draw topics, treatments, agendas, events, personnel, images of the audience, 'definitions of the situation' from other sources and other discursive formations within the wider socio-cultural and political, structure of which they are a differentiated part. Philip Elliott has expressed this point succinctly, within a more traditional framework, in his discussion of the way in which the audience is both the 'source' and the 'receiver' of the television message. Thus - to borrow Marx's terms - circulation and reception are, indeed, 'moments' of the production process in television and are reincorporated, via a number of skewed and structured 'feedbacks', into the

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production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television message is thus also itself a 'moment' of the production process in its larger sense, though the latter is 'predominant' because it is the 'point of departure for the realization' of the message. Production and reception of the television message are not, therefore, identical, but they are related: they are differentiated moments within the totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a whole. At a certain point, however, the broadcasting structures must yield encoded messages in the form of a meaningful discourse. The institution-societal relations of production must pass under the discursive rules of language for its product to be 'realized'. This initiates a further differentiated moment, in which the formal rules of discourse and language are in dominance. Before this message can have an 'effect' (however defined), satisfy a 'need' or be put to a 'use', it must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It is this set of decoded meanings which 'have an effect', influence, entertain, instruct or persuade, with very complex perceptual, cognitive, emotional, ideological or behavioural consequences. In a 'determinate' moment the structure employs a code and yields a 'message': at another determinate moment the 'message', via its decodings, issues into the structure of social practices. We are now fully aware that this re-entry into the practices of audience reception and 'use' cannot be understood in simple behavioural terms. The typical processes identified in positivistic research on isolated elements - effects, uses, 'gratifications' - are themselves framed by structures of understanding, as well as being produced by social and economic relations, which shape their 'realization' at the reception end of the chain and which permit the meanings signified in the discourse to be transposed into practice or consciousness (to acquire social use value or political effectivity). Clearly, what we have labelled in the diagram 'meaning structures 1' and 'meaning structures 2' may not be the same. They do not constitute an 'immediate identity'. The codes of encoding and decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical. The degrees of symmetry - that is, the degrees of 'understanding' and 'misunderstanding' in the communicative exchange - depend on the degrees of symmetry/asymmetry (relations of equivalence) established between the positions of the 'personifications', encoder-producer and decoder-receiver. But this in turn depends on

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the degrees of identity/non-identity between the codes which perfectly or imperfectly transmit, interrupt or systematically distort what has been transmitted. The lack of fit between the codes has a great deal to do with the structural differences of relation and position between broadcasters and audiences, but it also has something to do with the asymmetry between the codes of 'source' and 'receiver' at the moment of transformation into and out of the discursive form. What are called 'distortions' or 'misunderstandings' arise precisely from the lack of equivalence between the two sides in the communicative exchange. Once again, this defines the 'relative autonomy, but 'determinateness', of the entry and exit of the message in its discursive moments The application of this rudimentary paradigm has already begun to transform our understanding of the older term, television 'content'. We are just beginning to see how it might also transform our understanding of audience reception, 'reading' and response as well. Beginnings and endings have been announced in communications research before, so we must be cautious. But there seems some ground for thinking that a new and exciting phase in so-called audience research, of a quite new kind, may be opening up. At either end of the communicative chain the use of the semiotic paradigm promises to dispel the lingering behaviourism which has dogged mass-media research for so long, especially in its approach to content. Though we know the television programme is not a behavioural input, like a tap on the knee cap, it seems to have been almost impossible for traditional researchers to conceptualize the communicative process without lapsing into one or other variant of low-flying behaviourism. We know, as Gerbner has remarked, that representations of violence on the TV screen 'are not violence but messages about violence': 3 but we have continued to research the question of violence, for example, as if we were unable to comprehend this epistemological distinction. The television sign is a complex one, It is itself constituted by the combination of two types of discourse, visual and aural. Moreover, it is an iconic sign, in Peirce's terminology, because 'it posseses some of the properties of the thing represented'.4 This is a point which has led to a great deal of confusion and has provided the site of intense controversy in the study of visual language. Since the visual discourse translates a three-dimensional world into two-dimensional planes, it cannot, of course, be the referent or concept it signifies. The dog in the film can bark but it cannot bite! Reality exists outside language, but it is constantly mediated by and through language: and what we can know and say has to be produced in and through discourse. Discursive 'knowledge' is the product not of the transparent representation of the 'real' in language but of the articulation of language on real relations and conditions. Thus there is no intelligible discourse without the operation of a code. Iconic signs are therefore coded signs too - even if the codes here work differently from those of other signs. There is no degree zero in language. Naturalism and 'realism' - the apparent fidelity of the representation to the thing or concept represented - is the result, the effect, of a certain specific articulation of language on the 'real'. It is the result of a discursive practice. Certain codes may, of course, be so widely distributed in a specific language community or culture, and be learned at so early an age, that they appear not to be constructed - the effect of an articulation between sign and referent but to be 'naturally' given. Simple visual Signs appear to have achieved a 'near-universality' in this sense: though evidence remains that even apparently 'natural' visual codes are culture-specific. However, this does not mean that no codes have intervened; rather, that the codes have been profoundly naturalized. The operation of naturalized codes reveals not the transparency and 'naturalness' of language but the depth, the habituation and the nearuniversality of the codes in use. They produce apparently 'natural'; recognitions. This has the (ideological) effect of concealing the practices of coding which

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are present. But we must not be fooled by 'appearances. Actually, what naturalized codes demonstrate is the, degree of habituation produced when there is a fundamental alignment and reciprocity - an achieved equivalence between the encoding and decoding sides of an exchange of meanings. The functioning of the codes on the decoding side will frequently assume the status of naturalized perceptions. This leads us to think that the visual sign for 'cow' actually is (rather than represents) the animal, cow. But if we think of the visual representation of a cow in a manual on animal husbandry - and, even more, of the linguistic sign 'cow' - we can see that both, in different degrees, are arbitrary with respect to the concept of the animal they represent. The articulation of an arbitrary sign - whether visual or verbal - with the concept of a referent is the product not of nature but of convention, and the conventionalism of discourses requires the intervention, the support, of codes. Thus Eco has argued that iconic signs 'look like objects in the real world because they reproduce the conditions (that is, the codes) of perception in the viewer'. 5 These 'conditions of perception' are, however, the result of a highly coded, even if virtually unconscious, set of operations - decodings. This is as true of the photographic or televisual image as it is of any other sign. Iconic signs are, however, particularly vulnerable to being 'read' as natural because visual codes of perception are very widely distributed and because this type of sign is less arbitrary than a linguistic sign: the linguistic sign, 'cow' possesses none of the properties of the thing represented, whereas the visual sign appears to possess some of those properties. [. . .] The level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual reference and positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and association, is the point where already coded signs intersect with the deep semantic codes of a culture and take on additional, more active ideological dimensions. We might take an example from advertising discourse. Here, too, there is no 'purely denotative', and certainly no 'natural', representation. Every visual sign in advertising connotes a quality, situation, value or inference, which is present as an implication or implied meaning, depending on the connotational positioning. In Barthes's example, the sweater always signifies a 'warm garment' (denotation) and thus the activity/value of 'keeping warm'. But it is also possible, at its more connotative levels, to signify 'the coming of winter' or 'a cold day'. And, in the specialized sub-codes of fashion, sweater may also connote a fashionable style of baute couture or, alternatively, and informal style of dress. But set against the fight visual background and positioned by the romantic sub-code, it may connote 'long autumn walk in the woods'.6 Codes of this order dearly contract relations for the sign with the wider universe of ideologies in a society. These codes are the means by which power and ideology are made to signify in particular discourses. They refer signs to the 'maps of meaning' into which any culture is classified; and those 'maps of social reality' have the whole range of social meanings, practices, and usages, power and interest 'written in' to them. The connotative levels of signifiers, Barthes remarked, 'have a close communication with culture, knowledge, history, and it is through them, so to speak, that the environment world invades the linguistic and semantic system. They are, if you like, the fragments of ideology'.7 The so-called denotative level of the televisual sign is fixed by certain, very complex (but limited or 'closed') codes. But its connotative level,. though also bounded, is more open, subject to more active trasformations, which exploit its polysemic values. Any such already Constituted sign is potentially transformable into more than one connotative configuration. Polysemy must not, however, be confused with pluralism. Connotative codes are not equal among themselves. Any society/culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its classifications of the social and cultural and political world. These constitute a dominant cultural order, though it is neither

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univocal nor uncontested. This question of the 'structure of discourses in dominance' is a crucial point. The different areas of social life appear to be mapped out into discursive domains, hierarchically organized into dominant or preferred meanings. New, problematic or troubling events, which breach our expectancies and run counter to our 'common-sense constructs', to our 'taken-for-granted' knowledge of social Structures, must be assigned to their discursive domains before they can be said to 'make sense'. The most common way of 'mapping' them is to assign the new to some domain or other of the existing 'maps of problematic social reality'. We say dominant, not 'determined', because it is always possible to order, classify, assign and decode an event within more than one 'mapping'. But we say 'dominant' because there exists a pattern of 'preferred readings'; and these both have the institutional/political/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalized. 8 The domains of 'preferred meanings' have the whole social order embedded in them as a set of meanings, practices and beliefs: the everyday knowledge of social structures, of 'how things work for all practical purposes in this culture', the rank order of power and interest and the structure of legitimations, limits and sanctions. Thus to clarify a 'misunderstanding' at the connotative level, we must refer, through the codes, to the orders of social life, of economic and political power and of ideology. Further, since these mappings are 'structured in dominance' but not closed, the communicative process consists not in the unproblematic assignment of every visual item to its given position within a set of prearranged codes, but of performative rules - rules of competence and use, of logics-inuse - which seek actively to enforce or pre-fer one semantic domain over another and rule items into and out of their appropriate meaning-sets. Formal semiology has too often neglected this practice of interpretative work, though this constitutes, in fact, the real relations of broadcast practices in television. In speaking of dominant meanings, then, we are not talking about a one-sided process which governs how all events will be signified. It consists of the 'work' required to enforce, win plausibility for and command as legitimate a decoding of the event within the limit of dominant definitions in which it has been connotatively signified. Terni has remarked: By the word reading we mean not only the capacity to identify and decode a certain number of signs, but also the subjective capacity to put them into a creative relation between themselves and with other signs: a capacity which is, by itself, the condition for a complete awareness of one's total environment.9 Our quarrel here is with the notion of 'subjective capacity', as if the referent of a televisional discourse were an objective fact but the interpretative level were an individualized and private matter. Quite the opposite seems to be the case. The televisual practice takes 'objective' (that is, systemic) responsibility. precisely for the relations which disparate signs contract with one another in any discursive instance, and thus continually rearranges, delimits and prescribes into what 'awareness of one's total environment' these items are arranged. This brings us to the question of misunderstandings, Television producers Who find their message 'failing to get across' are frequently concerned to straighten out the kinks in the communication chain, thus facilitating the 'effectiveness' of their communication. Much research which claims the objectivity of 'policy-oriented analysis' reproduces this administrative goal by attempting to discover how much of a message the audience recalls and to improve the extent of understanding. No doubt misunderstandings of a literal kind do exist. The viewer does not know the terms employed, cannot follow the complex logic of argument or exposition, is unfamiliar with the language, finds the concepts too alien or difficult or is foxed by the expository narrative. But more often broadcasters are concerned that the audience has failed.

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to take the meaning as they - the broadcasters - intended. What they really mean to say is that viewers are not operating within the 'dominant' or 'preferred' code. Their ideal is 'perfectly transparent communication'. Instead, what they have to confront is 'systematically distorted communication'. 10 In recent years discrepancies of this kind have usually been explained by reference to 'selective perception'. This is the door via which a residual pluralism evades the compulsions of a highly structured, asymmetrical and nonequivalent process. Of course, there will always be private, individual, variant readings, But 'selective perception' is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the concept suggests. The patterns exhibit, aortas individual variants, significant clusterings. Any new approach to audience studies will therefore have to begin with a critique or 'selective perception' theory. It was argued earlier that since there is no necessary correspondence between encoding and decoding, the former can attempt to 'pre-fer' but cannot prescribe or guarantee the latter, which has its own conditions of existence. Unless they are wildly aberrant, encoding will have the effect of constructing some of the limits and parameters within which decodings will operate. If there were no limits, audiences could simply read whatever they liked into any message. No doubt some total misunderstandings of this kind do exist. But the vast range must contain some degree of reciprocity between encoding and decoding moments, otherwise we could not speak of an effective communicative exchange at all, Nevertheless, this 'correspondence' is not given but constructed. It is not 'natural' but the product of an articulation between two distinct moments. And the former cannot determine or guarantee, in a simple sense, which decoding codes will be employed. Otherwise communication would be a perfectly equivalent circuit, and every message would be an instance of 'perfectly transparent communication'. We must think, then, of the variant articulations in which encoding/decoding can be combined. To elaborate on this, we offer a hypothetical analysis of some possible decoding positions, in order to reinforce the point of 'no necessary correspondence'.11 We identify three hypothetical positions from which decodings of a televisual discourse may be constructed. These need to be empirically tested and refined. But the argument that decodings do not follow inevitably from encodings, that they are not identical, reinforces the argument of 'no necessary correspondence'. It also helps to reconstruct the common sense meaning of 'misunderstanding' in terms of a theory of 'systematically distorted communication'. The first hypothetical position is that of the dominant-hegemonic position. When the Viewer takes the connoted meaning from, say, a television newscast or current affairs programme full and straight, and decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded, we might say that the viewer is operating inside the dominant code. This is the ideal-typical case of 'perfectly transparent communication' - or is close as we are likely to come to it 'for all practical purposes'. Within this we can distinguish the positions produced by the professional code. This is the position (produced by What we perhaps ought to identify as the operation of a 'metacode') which the professional broadcasters assume when encoding a message which has already been signified in a hegemonic manner. The professional code is 'relatively independent' of the dominant code, in that it applies criteria and transformational operations of its own, especially those of a technico-practical nature. The professional code, however, operates within the ''hegemony' of the dominant code. Indeed, it serves to reproduce the dominant definitions precisely by bracketing their hegemonic quality and operating instead with displaced professional codings which foreground such apparently neutral-technical questions as visual quality, news arid presentational values, televisual quality, 'professionalism' and so on. The hegemonic interpretations

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of, say, the politics of Northern Ireland, or the Chilean coup or the Industrial Relations Bill are principally generated by political and military elites: the particular choice of presentational occasions and formats, the selection of personnel, the choice of images, the staging of debates are selected and combined through the operation of the professional code. How the broadcasting professionals are able both to operate with 'relatively autonomous' codes of their own and to act in such a way as to reproduce (not without contradiction) the hegemonic signification of events is a complex matter which cannot be further spelled out here. It must suffice to say -that the professionals axe linked with the defining elites not only by the institutional position of broadcasting itself as an 'ideological apparatus', 12 but also by the structure of access (that is, the systematic 'over-accessing' of selective elite personnel and their 'definition of the situation' in television). It may even be said that the professional codes serve to reproduce hegemonic definitions specifically by not overtly biasing their operations in a dominant direction: ideological reproduction therefore takes place here inadvertently, unconsciously, 'behind men's backs'.13 Of course, conflicts, contradictions and even misunderstandings regularly arise. between the dominant and the professional significations and their signifying agencies. The second position we would identify is that of the negotiated code or position. Majority audiences probably understand quite adequately what has been dominantly defined and professionally signified. The dominant definitions, however, are hegemonic precisely because they represent definitions of situations and events which are 'in dominance', (global). Dominant definitions connect events, implicitly or explicitly, to grand totalizations, to the great syntagmatic views-of-the-world: they take 'large views' of issues: they relate events to the 'national interest' or to the level of geo-politics, even if they make these connections in truncated, inverted or mystified ways. The definition of a hegemonic viewpoint is (a) that it defines within its terms the mental horizon, the universe, of possible meanings, of a whole sector of relations in a society or culture; and (b) that it carries with it the stamp of legitimacy - it appears coterminous with what is 'natural', 'inevitable', 'taken for granted' about the social order. Decoding within the negotiated version contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements: it acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, situational (situated) level, it makes its own ground rules - it operates with exceptions to the rule. It accords the privileged position to the dominant definitions of events while reserving the right to make a more negotiated application to 'local conditions', to its own more corporate positions. This negotiated version of the dominant ideology is thus shot through with contradictions, though these axe only on certain occasions brought to full visibility. Negotiated codes operate through what we might call particular or situated logics: and these logics axe sustained by their differential and unequal relation to the discourses and logics of power. The simplest example of a negotiated code is that which governs the response of a worker to the notion of an Industrial Relations Bill limiting the right to strike or to arguments for a wages freeze. At the level of the 'national interest' economic debate the decoder may adopt the hegemonic definition, agreeing that 'we must all pay ourselves less in order to combat inflation'. This, however, may have little or no relation to his/her willingness to go on Strike for better pay and conditions or to oppose the Industrial Relations Bill at the level of shop floor or union organization. We suspect that the great majority of so-called 'misunderstandings' arise from the contradictions and disjunctures between hegemonic-dominant encodings and negotiated-corporate decodings. It is just these mismatches in the levels Which most provoke defining elites and professionals to identify a 'failure in communications'. Finally, it is possible for a viewer perfectly to understand both the literal and the connotative inflection given by a discourse but to decode the message in a globally contrary way. He/she

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detotalizes the message in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message within some alternative framework of reference. This is the case of the viewer who listens to a debate on the need to limit wages but 'reads' every mention of the 'national interest' as 'class interest'. He/she is operating with what we must call an oppositional code. One of the most significant political moments (they also coincide with Crisis points Within the broadcasting organizations themselves, for obvious reasons) is the Point when events which are normally signified and decoded in a negotiated way begin to be given an oppositional reading. Here the 'politics of signification' - the struggle in discourse - is joined. Notes 1. For an explication and commentary on the methodological implications of Marx's argument, see S. Hall, 'A reading of Marx's 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse', in WPCS 6 (1974). 2. J. D. Halloran, 'Understanding television', Paper for the Council of Europe Colloquy on 'Understanding Television' (University of Leicester 1973). 3. G. Gerbner et al., Violence in TV Drama: A Study of Trends and Symbolic Functions (The Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania 1970). 4. Charles Peirce, Speculative Grammar, in Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 193158). 5. Umberto Eco, 'Articulations of the cinematic code', in Cinemantics, no. 1. 6. Roland Barthes, 'Rhetoric of the image', in WPCS 1 (1971). 7. Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology (Cape 1967). 8. For an extended critique of 'preferred reading', see Alan O'Shea, 'Preferred reading' (unpublished paper, CCCS, University of Birmingham). 9. P. Terni, 'Memorandum', Council of Europe Colloquy on 'Understanding Television' (University of Leicester 1973). 10. The phrase is Habermas's, in 'Systematically distorted communications', in P. Dretzel (ed.), Recent Sociology 2 (Collier-Macmillan 1970). It is used here, however, in a different way. 11. For a sociological formulation which is close, in some ways, to the positions outlined here but Which does not parallel the argument about the theory of discourse, see Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (Macgibbon and Kee 1971). 12. See Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and ideological state apparatuses', in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New Left Books 1971). 13. For an expansion of this argument, see Stuart Hall, 'The external/internal dialectic in broadcasting', 4th Symposium on Broadcasting (University of Manchester 1972), and 'Broadcasting and the state: the independence/impartiality couplet', AMCR Symposium, University of Leicester 1976 (CCCS unpublished paper).

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6 The Power of the Image Annette Kuhn The twentieth century's second wave of Western feminism has distinguished itself from other social and political movements in several important respects. Its espousal of non-hierarchical approaches to organisation and action have lent themselves particularly well to issue-oriented politics - campaigns around abortion legislation and direct action on peace and disarmament, for example. The movement's insistence on bringing to centre stage areas of life hitherto considered secondary, even irrelevant, to 'serious' politics - the division of labour in the household, relations between men and women at home and in the workplace, emotions, sexuality, even the Unconscious - also sets it apart, giving ground to a conviction that the women's movement is opening up and beginning to explore a whole new country. In this process, new maps have had to be drawn, concepts constructed, systems of thought developed, in the effort to order the apparent chaos of a neglected other side of patriarchal culture. To take just one example of the effects of all this: trade union campaigns to combat sexual harassment at work would have been inconceivable before the middle or late 1970s, if only because the phenomenon simply did not have a name before that time. One can scarcely organise around a non-existent concept. In other words, politics and knowledge are interdependent. In the ordinary way, the link between them will often go unnoticed or be taken for granted: where feminism is concerned, however, this is impossible, precisely because knowledge has had to be self-consciously produced alongside political activity. Each has regenerated the other. This is not to imply that the relationship is always a harmonious and uncontradictory one: mutual dependency always involves difficulty and struggle. Feminists may disagree, for example, on the extent to which producing knowledge is in itself a political activity. Are theory and practice in the final instance separate categories? Or is it acceptable to posit (to use a currently rather unfashionable term) a 'theoretical practice' of feminism? Knowledge of the kind likely to be useful to the women's movement - knowledge, that is, which increases our understanding of women's lives and the institutions and structures of

From A. Kuhn, The Power of the Image (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) pp. 1-8.

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power which impinge on those lives in varying degrees and in different ways, structures which construct woman as 'other' in a patriarchal society - much of this knowledge is being produced under the banner of women's studies. The fact that women's studies has come to assume an existence in the Academy, apparently independent of the women's movement, may present some problems for the relationship between a body of knowledge and the movement which was its initial raison d'être. However, precisely because it so evidently eschews the 'neutrality' demanded by the Academy, the status of women's studies as a subject, researched and taught in universities, polytechnics and colleges, is marginal and precarious and its future uncertain: women's studies, therefore, needs the women's movement as much as vice versa. Women's studies also needs an institutional space to develop, and it needs, as well, the opportunity to draw on other areas of intellectual endeavour where these promise to be useful and relevant to its project. The saying that knowledge does not come from nowhere has more than one meaning. [. . .] From its beginnings, feminism has regarded ideas, language and images as crucial in shaping women's (and men's) lives. In the USA in 1968, feminists staged a demonstration against the Miss America contest, protesting the event on grounds that it promoted an impossible image of ideal womanhood, and was complicit in the widespread idea that all women - not only participants in beauty contests - are reducible to a set of bodily attributes. From this beginning there followed critiques of stereotypical representations of women in advertisements and in films, and studies of the ways in which language - both vocabulary and linguistic usage - defines and confines women, From the point of view of its politics, then, the women's movement has always been interested in images, meanings, representations - and especially in challenging representations which, while questionable or offensive from a feminist standpoint, are from other points of view - if they are noticed at - perfectly acceptable. This interest is in part responsible for the chapters in the present book [The Power of the Image]. I say responsible, because without the women's movement a desire to question representation in this way could not be articulated, nor would, the public or even the private space to do so exist. I say in part, however, because since the early days feminist interest in images and representations has taken a variety of forms and directions. These have been determined largely by different ways in which representation has been thought about and analysed - that is, by the theories and methods brought to bear on the question. The question, I would argue, is a feminist one: be theories and methods not exclusively so. These come, at least to begin with, from elsewhere, and are appropriated and adapted to the feminist project. Knowledge does not come from nowhere, then: just as in this instance new knowledge is generated through the desire of feminist politics, so existing knowledge is both used and transformed in the service of this desire. The use and transformation of existing knowledge also partly motivates this book, then. It does not pretend to offer a comprehensive account of feminist thought on representation, however, but rather limits itself to an in-depth exploration of certain theoretical and methodological paths, hopefully opening up one or two new byways in the process. Which, paths, though, and why? The emergence of a new feminist movement in the late 1960s coincided with a renewed interest in marxist thought on 'the superstructure' - ideas, culture, ideology - and the place and effectivity of the superstructure within the social formation. 1 The different terms used here to describe the contents of the superstructure reflect a range of tendencies within marxist theory. Certain developments around the concept of ideology, for instance, were embodied in the work of the French philosopher Louis Althusser, work which - alongside that of other intellectuals,

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Roland Barthes and Claude Lévi-Strauss, for instance - was associated with structuralism. Barthes had written an introduction to semiotics - the study of signification, or meaning production, in society - and his book Mythologies comprised a series of short semiotically informed essays on specific images and representations, and on signification in general: which elements in images produce meaning, how the process operates, and so on. 2 In the early 1970s, an historian John Berger made a series of programmes for BBC Television Called Ways of Seeing. In these, Berger also considered how images make meaning, though in this instance without explicit recourse to semiotic concepts. Into this effectively semiotic project Berger injected a more orthodoxly marxist concern with the status of images as commodities - artifacts which are bought and sold, which have exchange value. One particularly influential programme dealt with the female nude, both in the European high, an tradition and in mass-produced pinup photographs. Analysis dealt not only with the formal qualities of these images per se, but also with the relationship between images and their consumers - who as well as being spectators are often buyers/owners of images too. Althusserian thought had a certain relevance to feminism because it contained a notion that human beings are constructed by ideology, that our ways of thinking about the world, of representing it to ourselves, becomes so 'naturalised' that we take our conception of that world for granted. If ideology effaces itself, the process by which this takes place could, for instance, explain (though Althusser did not in fact attempt to do so) the taken-for-granted nature of social constructs of femininity. Barthes's work on images suggested, moreover, that meanings are produced through the codes at work in representations, and that while meanings might appear to be natural, obvious, immanent, they are in fact produced: they are constructed through identifiable processes of signification at work in all representations. Finally, Ways of Seeing showed that meaning production takes place within social and historical contexts, and that in a capitalist society representations are no more exempt than any other products from considerations of the marketplace. It is not difficult to see a potential for crossfertilisation between these ideas and feminist concerns with representation: indeed, the work I have described forms a backcloth to the chapters in this book [The Power of the Image]. Iris really no more than a backcloth, though. Since the early 1970s, the study of images, particularly of cinematic images, as signifying systems has taken up. and. developed these 'prefeminist' concerns, bringing to the fore the issue of the spectator as subject addressed, positioned, even formed, by representations. To semiotic and structuralist approaches to representation has been added psychoanalysis, whose object is precisely the processes by which human subjectivity is formed.3 In work on the image, the cinematic image particularly, an emphasis on subjectivity has foregrounded the question of spectatorship in new ways. This, too, informs the writing in this book. But again, that is by no means the whole story: for feminist thought has long since entered the field of representation in its own right. These chapters may be read as inhabiting a tradition of feminist work on representation which draws strategically on the strands of non-feminist or prefeminist thinking I have described, if only because their objects (images, meanings, ideologies) and their objectives (analysis, deconstruction) have something in common with feminist concerns. At the same time, though, the very process of appropriation has exposed crucial weaknesses in these systems of thought - notably gender-blindness, formalism, and certain methodological shortcomings.4 Not only, though, has the appropriation of pre-existing theory necessarily.fruitfully - produced criticisms of it: the particular concerns of feminism, when mapped onto that theory, have been instrumental in generating qualitatively new knowledge, in constructing a new field.

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Inevitably, the[se] questions [. . .] traverse both feminist concerns and knowledge-in-process. What relation, for instance, does spectatorship have to representations of women? What sort of activity is looking? What does looking have to do with Sexuality? With masculinity and femininity? With power? With knowledge? How do images, of women in particular, 'speak to' the spectator? Is the spectator addressed as male/female, masculine/feminine? Is femininity constructed in specific ways through representation? Why are images of women's bodies so prevalent in our society? Such questions may sometimes be answered by looking at and analysing actual images. But although such analysis must be regarded as necessary to an understanding of the relationship between representation and sexuality, it is not always sufficient. For, in practice, images are always seen in context: they always have a specific use value in the particular time and place of their consumption This together with their formal characteristics, conditions and limits the meanings available from them at any one moment But if representations always have use value, then more often than not they also have exchange value: they circulate as commodities in a social/economic system. This further conditions, or overdetermines, the meanings available from representations. Meanings do not reside in images, then: they are circulated between representation, spectator and social formation. All of the chapters in this book [The Power of the Image] are concerned in one way or another with images - with films as well as still photographs of various kinds. Each chapter places a slightly different emphasis on each of the terms defining the representation - spectator-social formation triangle: though, given the central place accorded the instance of looking, the spectator undoubtedly sits at the apex. Nevertheless, each chapter marks a move further away from the model of the image/text as an isolated object of analysis, and closer to a conception of the image as inhabiting various contexts: cultural. contexts of spectatorship, institutional and social/historical contexts of production and Consumption. At the same time, conceptualising texts as embedded within a series of contextual layers, and trying to do this without losing sight of texts as productive of meaning in their own right, does produce certain theoretical and methodological difficulties. [. . .] All of the texts/images discussed [. . .] may, in a broad sense, be regarded as 'culturally dominant'. Most of them Hollywood films and softcore pornography, for example - are produced commercially for mass audiences. Where this is not the case they strive to slot into hegemonic 'high art' institutions. Hegemony is never without contradiction, however, which is one reason why analysing culturally dominant representations can be very productive. Contextual overdetermination notwithstanding, meaning can never be finally guaranteed. In practice, the operations of texts and various levels of context are rarely in harmony, and there is always some space for 'aberrant' reception of dominant representations. [. . .] More generally, the very existence of a book like this one is testimony to the fact that readings 'against the grain' are not only available, but often compelling. The activity of deconstruction sets loose an array of 'unintended' meanings, by their nature subversive of the apparently transparent meanings which. texts offer us. But why spend time and effort analysing images of a kind often considered questionable, even objectionable, by feminists? Why not try instead to create alternatives to culturally dominant representations? As I have argued, politics and knowledge are interdependent: the women's movement is not, I believe, faced here with a choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives, though individual feminists - if only because one person's life is too short to

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encompass everything - often experience their own politics in such a way. Theory and practice inform one another. At one level, analysing and deconstructing dominant representations may be regarded as a strategic practice. It produces understanding, and understanding is necessary to action. It may also. be considered an act of resistance in itself. Politics is often thought of as one of life's more serious undertakings, allowing little room for pleasure. At the same time, feminists may feel secretly guilty about, their enjoyment. of images they are convinced ought to be rejected as politically unsound. In analysing such images, though, it is possible, indeed necessary, to acknowledge their pleasurable qualifies, precisely because pleasure is an area of analysis in its own right. 'Naive' pleasure, then, becomes admissible. And the acts of analysis, of deconstruction and of reading 'against the grain, offer an additional pleasure - the pleasure of resistance, of saying 'no': not to 'unsophisticated' enjoyment, by ourselves and others, of culturally dominant images, but to the. structures of power which ask us to consume them uncritically and in highly circumscribed ways. Notes 1. See, for example, Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Social Science, London, Fontana, 1972; Raymond Williams, 'Base and superstructure in marxist cultural theory', New Left Review, no. 32, 1973, pp. 3-16; Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and ideological state apparatuses', Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, London, New Left Books, 1971, pp. 121-73. 2. Elements of Semiology, London, Jonathan Cape, 1967; Mythologies, London, Paladin, 1973. 3. These developments are traced in Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, Language and Materialism, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. 4. See, for example, Mary Ann Doane et al., 'Feminist film criticism: an introduction', Re-Vision: Essays in Feminist Film Criticism, Los Angeles, American Film Institute, 1984, pp. 1-17; Annette Kuhn, 'Women's genres', Screen, vol. 25, no. 1, 1984, pp. 18-28.

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7 The Public Sphere Jürgen Habermas Concept By 'public sphere' we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons come together to form a public: They are then acting neither as business or professional people. conducting their private affairs, nor as legal consociates subject to the legal regulations of a state bureaucracy and obligated to obedience. Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and unite freely and express and publicize their opinions freely. When the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence; today, newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere. We speak of a political public sphere (as distinguished from a literary one, for instance) when the public discussions concern objects connected with the practice of the state. The coercive power of the state is the counterpart, as it were, of the political public sphere, but it is not a part of it. State power is, to be sure, considered 'public' power, but it owes the attribute of publicness to its task of caring for the public, that is, providing for the common good of all legal consociates. Only when the exercise of public authority has actually been subordinated to the requirement of democratic publicness does the political, public sphere acquire an institutionalized influence on the government, by the way of the legislative body. The term 'public opinion' refers to the functions of criticism and control of organized state authority that the public exercises informally, as well as formally during periodic elections. Regulations concerning the publicness (or publicity [Publizität] in its original meaning) of state-related activities, as, for instance, the public accessibility required of legal proceedings, are also connected with this function of public

From S. Seidman (ed.), Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader, trans. S. W. Nicholson (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989); originally published as 'Öffentlichkeit', in J. Habermas, Kultur and Kritik (Frankfurt ain Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973).

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opinion. To the public sphere as a sphere mediating between state and surety, a sphere in which the public as the vehicle of public opinion is formed, there corresponds the principle of publicness - the publicness that once had to win out against the secret politics of monarchs and that since then has permitted democratic control of state activity. It is no accident that these concepts of the public sphere and public opinion were not formed until the eighteenth century. They derive their specific meaning from a concrete historical situation. It was then that one learned to distinguish between opinion and public opinion, or opinion publique. Whereas mere opinions (things taken for granted as part of a culture, normative convictions, collective prejudices and judgments) seem to persist unchanged in their quasi-natural structure as a kind of sediment of history, public opinion, in terms of its very idea, can be formed only if a public that engages in rational discussion exists. Public discussions that are institutionally protected and that take, with critical intent, the exercise of political authority as their theme have not existed since time immemorial - they developed only in a specific phase of bourgeois society, and only by virtue of a specific constellation of interests could they be incorporated into the order of the bourgeois constitutional state. History It is not possible to demonstrate the existence of a public sphere in its own right, separate from the private sphere, in the European society of the High Middle Ages. At the same time, however, it is not a coincidence that the attributes of authority at that time were called 'public'. For a public representation of authority existed at that time. At all levels of the pyramid established by feudal law, the status of the feudal lord is neutral with respect to the categories 'public' and 'private'; but the person possessing that status represents it publicly; he displays himself, represents himself as the embodiment of a 'higher' power, in whatever degree. 'This concept of representation has survived into recent constitutional history. Even today the power of political authority on its highest level, however much it has become detached from its former basis, requires representation through the head of state. But such elements derive from a prebourgeois social structure. Representation in the sense of the bourgeois public sphere, as in representing' the nation or specific clients, has nothing to do with representative publicness, which inheres in the concrete existence of a lord. As long as the prince and the estates of his realm 'are, the land, rather than merely 'representing' it, they are capable of this kind of representation; they represent their authority 'before' the people rather that for the people. The feudal powers (the church, the prince, and the nobility) to which this representative publicness adheres disintegrated in the come of a long process of polarization; by the end of the eighteenth century they had decomposed into private elements on the one side and public on the other. The position of the church Changed in connection with tile Reformation; the tie to divine authority that the church represented, that is, religion, became a private matter. Historically, what is called the freedom of religion safeguarded the first domain of private autonomy; the church itself continued its; existence as one corporate body under public law among others. The corresponding polarization of princely power acquired visible form the separation of the public budget from the private household property of the feudal lord. In the bureaucracy and the military (and in part also in the administration of justice), institutions of public power became autonomous vis-à-vis the privatized sphere of the princely court. In terms of the estates. finally, elements from the ruling groups developed into organs of public power, into parliament (and in part also into judicial organs); elements from the occupational status groups, insofar as they had become established in urban corporations and in certain

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differentiations within the estates of the land, developed into the sphere of bourgeois society, which would confront the. state as a genuine domain of private autonomy. Representative publicness gave way to the new sphere of 'public power' that came into being with the national and territorial states. Ongoing state activity (permanent administration, a standing army) had its counterpart in the permanence of relationships that had developed in the meantime with the stock market and the press; through traffic in goods and news. Public power became consolidated as something tangible confronting those who were subject to it and who at first found themselves only negatively defined by it, These are the 'private persons' who are excluded from public power because they hold no office. 'Public' no longer refers to the representative court, of a person vested with authority; instead, it now refers to the competence-regulated activity of an apparatus furnished with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. As those to whom this public power is addressed, private persons subsumed under the state form the public. As a private domain, society, which has come to confront the state, as it were, is on the one hand clearly differentiated from public power; on the other hand, society becomes a matter of public interest insofar as with the rise of a market economy the reproduction of life extends beyond the confines of private domestic power. The bourgeois public sphere can be understood as the sphere of private persons assembled to form a public. They soon began to make use of the public sphere of informational newspapers, which was officially regulated; against the public power itself, using those papers, along with the morally and critically oriented weeklies, to engage in debate about the general rules governing relations in their own essentially privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and labor. The Liberal Model of the Public Sphere The medium in which this debate rakes place - public discussion - is unique and without historical prototype. Previously the estates' had negotiated contracts with their princes in which claims to power were defined on a caseby-case basis. As we know, this development followed a different course in England, where princely power was relativized through parliament, than on the Continent, where the estates were mediatized by the monarch. The 'third estate' then broke with this mode of equalizing power, for it could no longer establish itself as a ruling estate. Given a commercial economy, a division of authority accomplished through differentiation Of the fights of those possessing feudal authority (liberties belonging to the estates) was no longer possible - the power under private law of disposition of capitalist property is nonpolitical. The bourgeois are private persons; as such, they do not 'rule.' Thus their claims to power in opposition to public power are directed not against a concentration of authority that should be 'divided' but rather against the principle of established authority. The principle of control, namely publicness, that the bourgeois public opposes to the principle of established authority aims at a transformation of authority as such, not merry the exchange of one basis of legitimation for another. In the first modern constitutions the sections lilting basic rights provide an image of the liberal model of the public sphere: they guarantee society as a sphere of private autonomy; opposite it stands a public power limited to a few, functions; between the two spheres, as it were, stands the domain of private persons who have come together to form a public and who, as citizens of the state, mediate the state with the needs of bourgeois society, in order; as the idea goes, to thus convert political authority to 'rational' authority in the medium of this public sphere. Under the presuppositions of a society based on the free exchange of commodities, it

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seemed that the general interest, which served as the criterion by which this kind of rationality was to be evaluated, would be assured if the dealings of private persons in the marketplace were. emancipated from social forces and their dealings in the public sphere were emancipated from political coercion. The political daily press came to have an important role during this same period. In the second half of the eighteenth century, serious competition to the older form of news writing as the compiling of items of information arose in the form of literary journalism. Karl Bücher describes the main outlines of this development: 'From mere institutions for the publication of news, newspapers became the vehicles and guides of public opinion as well, weapons of party politics. The consequence of this for the internal organization of the newspaper enterprise was the insertion of a new function between the gathering of news and its publication: the editorial function. For the newspaper publisher, however, the significance of this development was that from a seller of new information he became a dealer in public opinion.' Publishers provided the commercial basis for the newspaper without, however, commercializing it as such. The press remained an institution of the public itself, operating to provide and intensify public discussion, no longer a mere organ for the conveyance of information, but not yet a medium of consumer. culture. This type of press can be observed especially in revolutionary periods, when papers associated with the tiniest political coalitions and groups spring up, as in Paris in 1789. In the Paris of 1848 every halfway prominent: politician still formed his own club, and every other one founded his own journal: over 450 clubs and more than 200 papers came into being there between February and May alone. Until the permanent legalization of a public sphere that functioned politically, the appearance of a political newspaper was equivalent to engagement in the struggle for a zone of freedom for public opinion, for publicness as a principle. Not until the establishment of the bourgeois Constitutional state was a press engaged in the public use of reason relieved of the pressure of ideological viewpoints. Since then it has been able to abandon its polemical stance and take advantage of the earning potential of commercial activity. The ground was cleared for this development from a press of viewpoints to a commercial press at about the same time in England, France, and the United States, during the 1830s. In the course of this transformation from the journalism of writers who were private persons to the consumer services of the mass media, the sphere of publicness was changed by an influx of private interests that achieved privileged representation within it. The Public Sphere in Mass Welfare-State-State Democracies The liberal model of the public sphere remains instructive in regard to the normative claim embodied in institutionalized requirements of publicness; but it is not applicable to actual relationships within a mass democracy that is industrially advanced and constituted as a social-welfare state. In part, the liberal modal had always contained ideological aspects; in part, the social presuppositions to which those aspects were linked have undergone fundamental changes. Even the forms in which the public sphere was manifested, forms Which made its idea seem to a certain extent obvious, began to change with the Chartist movement in England and the February Revolution in France. With the spread of the press and propaganda, the public expanded beyond the confines of the bourgeoisie. Along with its social exclusivity the public lost the cohesion given it by institutions of convivial social intercourse and by a relatively high standard of education. Accordingly, conflicts which in the past were pushed off into the private sphere now enter the public sphere. Group needs, which cannot expect satisfaction

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from a self-regulating market, tend toward state regulation. The public sphere, which must now mediate these demands, becomes a field for competition among interests in the cinder form of forcible confrontation. Laws that have obviously originated under the 'pressure of the streets' can scarcely continue to be understood in terms of a consensus achieved by private persons in public discussion; they correspond, in more or less undisguised form, to compromises between conflicting private interests. 'Today it is social organizations that act in relation to the state in the political public sphere, whether through the mediation of political parties or directly, in interplay with public administration. With the interlocking of the public and private domains, not only do political agencies take over certain functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social labor; Societal powers also take over political functions. This leads to a kind of 'refeudalization' of the public sphere. Large-scale organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with one another, behind closed doors if possible; but at the same time they have to secure at least plebiscitarian approval from the mass of the population through the deployment of a staged form of publicity. The political public sphere in the welfare state is characterized by a singular weakening of its critical functions. Whereas at one time publicness was intended to subject persons or things to the public use of reason and to make political decisions susceptible to revision before the tribunal of public opinion, today it has often enough already been enlisted in the aid of the secret policies of interest groups; in the form of 'publicity' it now acquires public prestige for persons or things and renders them capable of acclamation in a climate of nonpublic opinion. The term 'public relations' itself indicates how a public sphere that formerly emerged from the structure of society must now be produced circumstantially on a case-by-case basis. The Central relationship of the public, political parties, and parliament is also affected by this change in function. This existing trend toward the weakening of the public sphere, as a principle, is opposed, however, by a welfare state transformation of the functioning of basic rights: the requirement of publicness is extended by state organs to all organizations acting in relation to the state. To the extent to which this becomes a reality, a no longer intact public of private persons acting as individuals would be replaced by a public of organized private persons. Under current circumstances, only the latter could participate effectively in a process of public communication using the channels of intra-party and intra-organizational public spheres, on the basis of a publicness enforced for the dealings of organizations with the state. it is in this process of public communication that the formation of political compromises would have to achieve legitimation, The idea of the public sphere itself, which signified a rationalization of authority in the medium of public discussions among private persons, and which has been preserved in mass welfare-state democracy, threatens to disintegrate with the structural transformation of the public sphere. Today it could be realized only on a different basis, as a rationalization of the exercise of social and political power under the mutual control rival organizations committed to publicness in their internal structure as well as in their dealings with the state find with one another.

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8 The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media Jean Baudrillard Up to now there have been two great versions of the analysis of the media (as indeed that of the masses), one optimistic and one pessimistic. The optimistic one has assumed two major tonalities, very different from one another. There is the technological optimism of Marshall McLuhan: for him the electronic media inaugurate a generalized planetary communication and should conduct us, by the mental effect alone of new, technologies, beyond the atomizing rationality of the Gutenberg galaxy to the global village, to the new electronic tribalism - an achieved transparency of information and communication, The other version, more traditional, is that of dialectical optimism inspired by progressivist and Marxist thought: the media constitute a new, gigantic productive force and obey the dialectic of productive forces, Momentarily alienated and submitted to the law of capitalism, their intensive development can only eventually explode this monopoly. 'For the first time, in history,' writes Hans Enzensberger, 'the media make possible a mass participation in a productive process at once social and socialized, a participation whose practical means are in the hands of the masses themselves,' 1 These two positions more or less, the one technological, the other ideological, inspire the whole analysis and the present practice of the media.2 It is more particularly to the optimism of Enzensberger that I formerly opposed a resolutely pessimist vision in 'Requiem for the Media.' In that I described the mass. media as a 'speech without response.' What characterizes the mass media is that they are opposed to mediation, intransitive, that they fabricate noncommunication - if one accepts the definition of communication as an exchange, as the reciprocal space of speech and response, and thus of resonsibility. In other words, if one defines it as anything other than the simple emission/reception of information. Now the whole present architecture of the media is founded on this last definition: they are what finally forbids response, what renders impossible any process of exchange

A lecture delivered at the University of Melbourne; trans. Made MacLean, New Literary History, 16:3 (Spring 1985) pp. 577-89; reprinted as ch. 9 in Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) pp. 207-19.

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(except in the shape of a simulation of a response which integrated into the process of emission, and this changes nothing in the unilaterality of communication). That is their true abstraction. And it is in this abstraction that is founded the system of social control and power. To understand properly the term response, one must appreciate it in a meaning at once strong, symbolic, and primitive: power belongs to him who gives and to whom no return can be made. To give, and to do it in such a way that no return can be made, is to break exchange to one's own profit and to institute a monopoly: the social process is out of balance. To make a return, on the contrary, is to break this power relationship and to restore on the basis of an antagonistic reciprocity the circuit of symbolic exchange. The same applies in the sphere of the media: there speech Occurs in such a way that there is no possibility of a return. The restitution of this possibility of response entails upsetting the whole present structure; even better (as started to occur in 1968 and the 70s), it entails an 'antimedia' struggle. In reality, even if I did not share the technological optimism of McLuhan, I always recognized and considered as a gain the true revolution which he brought about in media analysis (this has been mostly ignored in France). On the other hand, though I also did not share the dialectical hopes of Enzensberger, I was not truly pessimistic, since I believed in a possible subversion of the code of the media and in the possibility of an alternate speech and a radical reciprocity of symbolic exchange. Today all that has changed. I would no longer interpret in the same way the forced silence of the masses in the mass media. I would no longer see in it a sign of passivity and of alienation, but to the contrary an original strategy, an original response in the form of a challenge; and on the basis of this reversal I suggest to you a vision of things which is no longer optimistic or pessimistic, but ironic and antagonistic. I will take the example of opinion polls, which are themselves a mass medium. It is said that opinion polls constitute a manipulation of democracy. This is certainly no more the case than that publicity is a manipulation of need and of consumption. It too produces demand (or so it claims) and invokes needs just as opinion polls produce answers and induce future behavior. All this would be serious if there were an objective truth of needs, an objective truth of public opinion. It is obvious that here we need to exercise extreme care. The influence of publicity, of opinion polls, of all the media, and of information in general would be dramatic if we were certain that there exists in opposition to it an authentic human nature, an authentic essence of the social, with its needs, its own will, its own values, its finalities. For this would set up the problem of its radical alienation. And indeed it is in this form that traditional critiques are expressed. Now the matter is at once less serious and more serious than this. The uncertainty which Surrounds the social and political effect of opinion polls (do they or do they not manipulate opinion?), like that which surrounds the real economic efficacy of publicity, will never be completely relieved - and it is just as well This results from the fact that there is a compound, a mixture of two heterogeneous systems whose data cannot be transferred from one to the other. An operational System which is statistical, information-based, and simulational is projected onto a traditional values system, onto a System of representation, will, and opinion. This collage, this collusion between the two, gives rise to an indefinite and useless polemic. We should agree neither with those who praise the beneficial use of the media, nor with those who scream about manipulation, for the simple reason that there is no relationship between a system of meaning and a system of simulation. Publicity and opinion polls would be incapable, even if they wished and claimed to do so, of alienating the will or the opinion of anybody at all, for the reason that they do not act in the time - space of will and of representation where judgement is formed.

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For the same reason, though reversed, it is quite impossible for them to throw any light at all on public opinion or individual will, since they do not act in a public space, on the stage of a public space. They are strangers to it, and indeed they Wish to dismantle it. Publicity and opinion polls and the media in general can only be imagined; they only exist On the basis of a disappearance, the disappearance from the public space, from the scene of politics, of public opinion in a form at once theatrical and representative as it was enacted in earlier epochs. Thus we can be reassured: they cannot destroy it. But we should not have any illusions: they cannot restore either. It is this lack of relationship between the two systems which today plunges us into a state of stupor. That is what I said: stupor. To be more objective one wood have to say: a radical uncertainty as to our own desire, our own choice, our own opinion, our own will. This is the dearest result of the whole media environment, of the information which makes demands on us from all sides and which is as good as blackmail. We will never know if an advertisement or opinion poll has had a real influence on individual or collective wills, but we will never know either What would have happened if there had been no opinion poll or advertisement. The situation no longer permits us to isolate reality or human nature as a fundamental variable. The result is therefore not to provide any additional information or to shed any light on reality, but on the contrary, because we will never in future be able to separate reality from its statistical, simulative projection in the media, a state of suspense and of definitive uncertainty about reality. Arid I repeat: it is a question here of a completely new species of uncertainty, which results not from the lack of information but from information itself and even from an excess of information. It is information itself which produces uncertainty, and so this uncertainty, unlike the traditional uncertainty which could always be resolved, is irreparable. This is our destiny: subject to opinion polls, information, publicity, statistics; constantly confronted with the anticipated statistical verification of our behavior, and absorbed by this permanent refraction of our least movements, we are no longer confronted with our own will. We are no longer even alienated, because for that it is necessary for the subject to be divided in itself, confronted with the other, to be contradictory. Now, where there is no other, the - scene of the other, like that of politics and of society, has disappeared. Each individual is forced despite himself or herself into the undivided coherency of statistics. There is in this a positive absorption into the transparency of computers, which is something Worse than alienation. There is an obscenity in the functioning and the omnipresence of opinion polls as in that of publicity. Not because they might betray the secret of an opinion, the intimacy of a will, or because they might violate some Unwritten law of the private being, but because they exhibit this redundancy of the social, this sort of continual voyeurism of the group in relation to itself: it must at all times know what it wants, know what it thinks, be told about its least needs, its least quivers, see itself continually on the videoscreen of statistics, constantly watch its own temperature chart, in a sort of hypochondriacal madness. The social becomes obsessed with itself; through this autoinformation, this permanent autointoxication, it becomes its own vice, its own perversion. This is the real obscenity. Through this feedback, this incessant anticipated accounting, the social loses its own scene. It no longer enacts itself; it his no more time to enact itself; it no longer occupies a particular space, public or political; it becomes confused with its own control screen. Overinformed, it develops ingrowing obesity. For everything which loses its scent (like the obese body) becomes for that very reason ob-scene.

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The silence of the masses is also in a sense obscene. For the masses are also made of this useless hyperinformation which claims to enlighten them, when all it does is clutter up the space of the representable and annul itself in a silent equivalence. And we cannot do much against this obscene circularity of the masses and of information. The two phenomena fit one another: the masses have no opinion and information does not inform them. Both of them, lacking a scene where the meaning of the social can be enacted, continue to feed one another monstrously - as the speed with which information revolves increases continually the weight of the masses as such, and not their selfawareness. So if one takes opinion polls, and the uncertainty which they induce about the principle of Social reality, and the type of obscenity, of statistical pornography to which they attract us - if we take all that seriously, if we confront all that with the claimed finalities of information and of the social itself, then it all seems very dramatic. But there is another way of taking things. It does not shed much more credit on opinion polls, but it restores a sort of status to them, in terms of derision and of play. In effect we can consider the indecisiveness of their results, the uncertainty of their effects, and their unconscious humor, which is rather similar to that of meteorology (for example, the possibility of verifying at the same time contradictory facts or tendencies); or again the casual way in which everybody uses them, disagreeing with them privately and especially if they verify exactly one's own behavior (no one accepts a perfect statistical evaluation of his chances). That is the real problem of the credibility accorded to them. Statistics, as an objective computation of probabilities, obviously eliminate any elective chance and any personal destiny. That is why, deep down, none of us believes in them, any more than the gambler believes in chance, but only in Luck (with a capital, the equivalent of Grace, not with lower case, which is the equivalent of probability). An amusing example of this obstinate denial of statistical chance is given by this news item: 'If this will reassure you, we have calculated that, of every 50 people who catch the metro twice a day for 60 years, only one is in danger of being attacked. Now there is no reason why it should be you! The beauty of statistics is never in their objectivity but in their involuntary humor. So if one takes opinion polls in this way, one can conceive that they could work for the masses themselves as a game, as a spectacle, as a means of deriding both the social and the political. The fact that opinion polls do their best to destroy the political as will and representation, the political as meaning, precisely through the effect of simulation and uncertainty - this fact can only give pleasure to the ironic unconscious of the masses (and to our individual political unconscious, if I may use this expression), whose deepest drive remains the symbolic murder of the political class, the symbolic murder of political reality, and this murder is produced by Opinion polls in their own way. That is why I wrote in Silent Majorities that the masses, which have always provided an alibi for political representation, take their revenge by allowing themselves the theatrical representation of the political scene. 3 The people have become public. They even allow themselves the luxury of enjoying day by day, as in a home cinema, the fluctuations of their own opinion in the daily reading of the opinion polls. It is only to this extent that they believe in them, that we all believe in them, as we believe in a game of malicious foretelling, a double or quits on the green baize of the political scene. It is, paradoxically, as a game that the opinion polls recover a sort of legitimacy. A game of the undecidable; a game of chance; a game of the undecidability of the political scene, of the equifinality of all tendencies; a game of truth effects in the circularity of questions and answers. Perhaps we can see here the apparition of one of these collective forms of game which Caillois called aléga4- an irruption into the polls themselves of a ludic, aleatory process, an ironic mirror

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for the use of the masses (and we all belong to the masses) of a political Scene which is Caught · in its own trap (for the politicians are the Only ones to believe in the polls, along with the pollsters obviously, as the only ones to believe in publicity are the publicity agents). In this regard, one may restore to them a sort of positive meaning: they would be part of a contemporary cultural mutation, part of the era of simulation. In view of this type of consequence, we are forced to congratulate ourselves on the very failure of polls, and on the distortions which make them undecidable and chancy. Far from regretting this, we must consider that there is a sort of fate or evil genius (the evil genius of the social itself?) which throws this too beautiful machine out of gear and prevents it from achieving the objectives which it claims. We must also ask if these distortions, far from being the consequence of a bad angle of refraction of information onto an inert and opaque matter, are not rather the consequence of an offensive resistance of the social itself to its investigation, the shape taken by an occult duel between the pollsters and the object polled, between information and the people who receive it? This is fundamental: people are always supposed to be willing partners in the game of truth, in the game of information. It is agreed that the object can always be persuaded of its truth; it is inconceivable that the object of the investigation, the object of the poll, should not adopt, generally speaking, the strategy of the subject of the analysis, of the pollster. There may certainly be some difficulties (for instance, the object does not understand the question; it's not its business; it's undecided; it replies in terms of the interviewer and not of the question, and so on), but it is admitted that the poll analyst is Capable Of rectifying What is basically only a lack of adaptation to the analytic apparatus. The hypothesis is never suggested that all this, far from being a marginal, archaic residue, is the effect of an offensive (not defensive) counterstrategy by the object; that, all in all, there exists somewhere an original, positive, possibly victorious strategy of the object opposed to the strategy of the subject (in this case, the pollster or any other producer of messages). This is what one could call the evil genius of the object, the evil genius of the masses, the evil genius of the social itself, constantly producing failure in the truth of the social and in its analysis, and for that reason unacceptable, and even unimaginable, to the tenants of this analysis To reflect the other's desire, to reflect its demand like a mirror, even to anticipate it: it is hard to imagine what powers of deception, of absorption, of deviation - in a word, of subtle revenge - there is in this type of response. This is the way the masses escape as reality, in this very mirror, in those simulative devices which are designed to capture them. Or again, the way in which events themselves disappear behind the television screen, or the more general screen of information (for it is true that events have no probable existence except on this deflective screen, which is no longer a mirror). While the mirror and screen of alienation Was a mode of production (the imaginary subject), this new screen is simply its mode of disappearance. But disappearance is a very complex mode: the object, the individual, is not only condemned to disappearance, but disappearance is also its Strategy; it is its way of response to this device for capture, for networking, and for forced identification. To this cathodic surface of recording, the individual or the mass reply by a parodic behavior of disappearance. What are they; what do they do; what do they become behind this screen? They turn themselves into an impenetrable and meaningless surface, which is a method of disappearing. They eclipse themselves; they melt into the superficial screen in such a way that their reality and that of their movement, just like that of particles of matter, may be radically questioned without making any fundamental Change to the probabilistic analysis of their behavior. In fact, behind this 'objective' fortification of

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networks and models which believe they can capture them, and where the whole population of analysts and expert observers believe that they capture them, there passes a wave of derision, of reversal, and of parody which is the active exploitation, the parodic enactment by the object itself of its mode of disappearance. There is and there always will be major difficulties in analyzing the media and the whole sphere of information through the traditional categories of the philosophy of the subject: will, representation, choice, liberty, deliberation, knowledge, and desire. For it is quite obvious that they are absolutely contradicted by the media; that the subject is absolutely alienated in its sovereignty. There is a distortion of principle between the sphere of information, and the moral law which still dominates us and whose decree is: you shall know yourself, you shall know what is your will and your desire. In this respect the media and even technics and science teach us nothing at all; they have rather restricted the limits of will and representation; they have muddled the cards and deprived any subject of the disposal of his other own body, desire, choice, and liberty. But this idea of alienation has probably never been anything but a philosopher's ideal perspective for the use of hypothetical masses. It has probably never expressed anything but the alienation of the philosopher himself; in other words, the one who thinks himself or herself other. On this subject Hegel is very clear in his judgement of the Aufklärer, of the philosophe of the Enlightenment, the one who denounces the 'empire of error' and despises it. Reason wants to enlighten the superstitious mass by revealing trickery. It seeks to make it understand that it is itself, the mass, which enables the despot to live and not the despot which makes it live, as it believes when it obeys him. For the demystifier, credulous consciousness is mistaken about itself. The Enlightenment speaks as if juggling priests had, by sleight of hand, spirited away the being of consciousness for which they substituted something absolutely foreign and other, and, at the same time, the Enlightenment says that this foreign thing is a being of consciousness, which believes in consciousness, which trusts it, which seeks to please it. 5 There is obviously a contradiction, says Hegel: one cannot confide oneself to an other than oneself and be mistaken about oneself, since when one confides in another, one demonstrates the certainty that one is safe with the other; in consequence, consciousness, which is said to be mystified, knows very well where it is safe and where it is not. Thus there is no need to correct a mistake which only exists in the Aufklärer himself. It is not consciousness, concludes Hegel, which takes itself for another, but it is the Aufklärer who takes himself for another, another than this common man whom he endeavors to make aware of his own stupidity. ,When the question is asked if it is allowable to deceive a people, one must reply that the question is worthless, because it is impossible to deceive a people about itself.'6 So it is enough to reverse the idea of a mass alienated by the media to evaluate how much the whole universe of the media, and perhaps the whole technical universe, is the result of a secret strategy of this mass which is claimed to be alienated, of a secret form of the refusal of will, of an in-voluntary challenge to everything which was demanded of the subject by philosophy - that is to say, to all rationality of choice and to all exercise of will, of knowledge, and of liberty. In one way it would be no longer a question of revolution but of massive devolution, of a massive delegation of the power of desire, of choice, of responsibility, a delegation to apparatuses either political or intellectual, either technical or operational, to whom has devolved the duty of taking care of all of these things. A massive de-volition, a massive desisting from will, but not through alienation or voluntary servitude (whose mystery, which is the modern enigma

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of politics, is unchanged since La Boétie because the problem is put in terms of the Consent of the subject to his own slavery, which fact no philosophy will ever be able to explain). We might argue that there exists another philosophy of lack of will, a sort of radical antimetaphysics whose secret is that the masses are deeply aware that they do not have to make a decision about themselves and the world; that they do not have to wish; that they do not have to know; that they do not have to desire. The deepest desire is perhaps to give the responsibility for one's desire to someone else. A strategy of ironic investment in the other, in the others; a strategy toward others not of appropriation but, on the contrary, of expulsion, of philosophers and people in power, an expulsion of the obligation of being responsible, of enduring philosophical, moral, and political categories. Clerks are there for that, so are professionals, the representative holders of concept and desire. Publicity, information, technics, the whole intellectual and political class are there to tell us what we want, to tell the masses what they want - and basically we thoroughly enjoy this massive transfer of responsibility because perhaps, very simply, it is not easy to want what we want; because perhaps, very simply, it is not very interesting to know what we want to deride, to desire. Who has imposed all this on us, even the need to desire, unless it be the philosophers? Choice is a strange imperative. Any philosophy which assigns man to the exercise of his will can only plunge him in despair. For if nothing more flattering to consciousness that to know what it wants, on the contrary nothing is more seductive to the other consciousness (the unconscious?) - the obscure and vital one which mikes happiness depend on the despair of will - than not to know what it wants, to be relieved of choice and diverted from its own objective will. It is much better to rely on some insignificant or powerful instance than to be dependent on one's own will or the necessity of choice. Beau Brummel had a servant for that purpose. Before a splendid landscape dotted with beautiful lakes, he turns toward his valet to ask him: 'Which lake do I prefer?' Even publicity would find an advantage in discarding the weak hypothesis of personal will and desire. Not only do people certainly not want to be told what they wish, but they certainly do not want to know it, and it is not even sure that they want to wish at all. Faced with such inducements, it is their evil genius who tells them not to want anything and to rely finally on the apparatus of publicity or of information to 'persuade' them, to construct a choice for them (or to rely on the political class to order things) - just as Brummel did with his servant. Whom does this trap close on? The mass knows that it knows nothing, and it does not Want to know. The mass knows that it can do nothing, and it does not want to achieve anything. It is violently reproached with this mark of stupidity and passivity. But not at all: the mass is very snobbish; it acts as Brummel did and delegates in a sovereign manner the faculty of choice to someone else by a sort of game of irresponsibility, of ironic challenge, of sovereign lack of will, of secret ruse. All the mediators (people of the media, politicians, intellectuals, all the heirs of the philosophes of the Enlightenment in contempt for the masses) are really only adapted to this purpose: to manage by delegation, by procuration, this tedious matter of power and of will, to unburden the misses of this transcendence for their greater pleasure and to turn it into a show for their benefit. Vicarious: this would be, to repeat Thorstein Veblen's concept, the status of these so-called privileged classes, whose will would be, in a way, diverted against themselves, toward the secret ends of the very masses whom they despise. We live all that, subjectively, in the most paradoxical mode, since in us, in everyone, this mass coexists with the intelligent and voluntary being who condemns it and despises it. Nobody knows what is truly opposed to consciousness, unless it may be the repressive

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unconscious which psychoanalysis has imposed on us. But our true unconscious is perhaps in this ironic power of nonparticipation of nondesire, of nonknowledge, of silence, of absorption of all powers, of expulsion of all powers of all wills, of all knowledge, of all meaning onto representatives surrounded by a halo of derision. Our unconscious would not then consist of drives, of pulsions, whose destiny is sad repression; it would not be repressed at all; it would be made of this joyful expulsion of all the encumbering superstructures of being and of will. We have always had a sad vision of the masses (alienated), a sad vision of the unconscious (repressed). On all our philosophy weighs this sad correlation. Even if only for a change, it would be interesting to conceive the mass, the object-mass, as the repository of a finally delusive, illusive, and allusive strategy, the correlative, of an ironic, joyful, and seductive unconscious. About the media you can sustain two opposing hypotheses: they are the strategy of power, which finds in them the means of mystifying the masses and of imposing its own truth. Or else they are the strategic territory of the ruse of the masses, who exercise in them their concrete power of the refusal of truth, of the denial of reality. Now the media are nothing else than a marvellous instrument for destabilizing the real and the true, all historical or political truth (there is thus no possible political strategy of the media: it is a contradiction in terms). And the addiction that we have for the media, the impossibility of doing without them, is a deep result of this phenomenon: it is not a result of a desire for culture, communication, and information, but of this perversion of truth and falsehood, of this destruction of meaning in the operation of the medium. The desire for a show, the desire for simulation, which is at the same time a desire for dissimulation. This is a vital reaction. It is a spontaneous, total resistance to the ultimatum of historical and political reason. It is essential today to evaluate this double challenge: the challenge to meaning by the masses and their silence (which is not at all a passive resistance), and the challenge to meaning which comes from the media and their fascination. All the marginal alternative endeavors to resuscitate meaning are secondary to this. Obviously there is a paradox in the inextricable entanglement of the masses and the media: is it the media that neutralize meaning and that produce the 'formless' (or informed) mass; or is it the mass which victoriously resists the media by diverting or by absorbing without reply all the messages which they produce? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence done to meaning? Is it the media that fascinate the masses, or is it the masses who divert the media into showmanship? The media toss around sense and nonsense; they manipulate in every sense at once. No one can control this process: the media are the vehicle for the simulation which belongs to the system and for the simulation which destroys the system, according to a circular logic, exactly like a Möbius strip - and it is just as well. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. That is to say, this process has no return. In conclusion, however, I must make one reservation. Our relationship to this system is an insoluble 'double bind' exactly that of children in their relationship to the demands of the adult world. They are at the same time told to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free, and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive objects, inert, obedient, and conformist. The child resists on all levels, and to these contradictory demands he or she replies by a double strategy. When we ask the child to be object, he or she opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, the strategy of a subject. When we ask the child to be subject, he or she opposes just as obstinately and successfully

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resistance as object; that is to say, exactly the opposite: infantilism, hyperconformity, total dependance, passivity, idiocy. Neither of the two strategies has more objective value than the other. Subject resistance is today given a unilateral value and considered to be positive - in the same way as in the political sphere only the practices of liberation, of emancipation, of expression, of self-constitution as a political subject are considered worthwhile and subversive. This is take no account of the equal and probably superior impact of all the practices of the object, the renunciation of the position of Subject and of meaning - exactly the practices of the mass - which we bury with the disdainful terms alienation and passivity. The liberating practices correspond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects; but they do not correspond at all to the other demand to constitute ourselves as subjects, to liberate, to express ourselves at any price, to vote, to produce, to decide, to speak, to participate, to play the game: blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, probably more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is to demand the liberating fights of the Subject. But this seems rather to reflect an earlier phase of the system; and even if we are still confronted With it, it is no longer a strategic territory: the present argument of the system is to maximize speech, to maximize the production of meaning, of participation. And so the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and the refusal of speech; or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is another form of refusal by overacceptance. It is the actual strategy of the masses. This strategy does not exclude the other, but it is the winning one today, because it is the most adapted to the present phase of the system. Notes 1. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'Constituents of a Theory of the Media,' New Left Review 64 (1970) 13-36. 2. Armand Mattelart, De l'usage des média en temps de crise (Paris, 1979). 3. Jean Baudrillard, A l'ombre des majorités silencieuses (Paris, 1978). 4. Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games, trans. Meyer Barash (London, 1962), ch. 8. 5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Pbänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, trans. M. M. (Hamburg, 1952) pp. 391-2. 6. Hegel, Ibid., p. 392.

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Further Reading American Mass Communication Theory Berelson, B. and Janowitz, M., Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1953). Bryson, L. (ed.). The Communication of Ideas. (New York: Harper, 1948). De Fleur, M., Theories of Mass Communication (New York: David McKay Co. Inc., 1966); 5th edn, with BallRokeach, S. (New York: Longman, 1989). Dexter, L. and White, D. M. (eds), People, Society and Mass Communications. (New York: Free Pros, 1964). Gitlin, T., 'Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm', Theory and Society 6:2 (1978) pp. 205-53. Hardt, H., Critical Communication Studies: Communication, History and Theory is America. (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H., The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944). Merton, R., Social Theory and Social Structure, Part III (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957). Morrison, D., 'The Beginnings of Modern Mass Communication Research', European Journal of Sociology 19:2 (1978)pp. 347-59. Rosenberg, D. and White, D. M., Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America (New York: Free Press, 1957). Schramm, W. (ed.), Communications in Modern Society (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948). Schramm, W. (ed.) Mass Communications (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960; 2nd edn, 1975). Wright, C. R., Mass Communications: A Sociological Perspective (New York: Random House Inc., 1959). Frankfurt School Adorno, T., The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, Ed. with an introduction by J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991). Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M., 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception', in Curran, J., Gurevitch, M. and Woollacott, J. (eds), Mass Communication and Society (London: Open University/Edward Arnold, 1977). Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. (eds), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978). Jay, M., The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 19231950 (London: Heinemann, 1973). Rose, G., The Melancboly Science: An Introduction to the Thought of T. W. Adorno (London: Macmillan, 1978). Slater, P., Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School: A Marxist Perspective (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). Tar, Z., The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (New York:

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Wiley, 1977). Marshall Mcluhan and Technological Determinism Ferguson, M., 'Marshall McLuhan Revisited: 1960s Zeitgeist Victim or Pioneer Postmodernist?' Media, Culture and Society 13:1 (1991) pp. 71-90. Kroker, A., Technology and the Canadian Mind: Innis, McLuhan, Grant (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984). McLuhan, M., Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964). McLuhan, M. and Fiore, Q. The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects. (New York: Bantam Books, 1967). Marched, P., Marsball McLuhan: The Medium and the Messenger (New York: Tichnenor & Fields, 1989. Miller, J., McLuhan (London: Fontana/William Collins, 1971). Stearn, G. (ed.), McLuban Hot and Cool (London: Penguin Books, 1967). Williams, R. Television: Technology and Cultural Form (London: Fontana/William Collins, 1974). Winston, B., Misunderstanding Media (London: Routledge, 1986). Leavisism to Culturalism Hall, S. and Whannel, P., The Popular Arts (London: Hutchinson, 1964). Hunter, W. Scrutiny of Cinema (London: Wishart, 1932); Reprinted (New York: Arno Press, 1972).

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Leavis, F. R., Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (Cambridge: Minority Press, 1930). Leavis, F. R. and Thompson, D., Culture and Environment: The Training of Critical Awareness (London: Chatto & Windus, 1933); reprinted (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977). O'Connor, A., Raymond Williams: Writing, Culture, Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Storey, J., An Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, chaps 2 and 3 (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). Thompson, D. (ed.), Discrimination and Popular Culture (Hardmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964); 2nd edn, 1973. Williams, R., The Long Revolution (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961). Williams, R, Communications (Harmondsworth: Penguin Special, 1962). Cultural Studies Fiske, J., 'British Cultural Studies and Television', in Alien, R. C. (ed.), Channels of Discourse: Television and Contemporary Criticism (London: Methuen, 1987); also Channels of Discourse, Reassembled (London: Routledge, 1992). Hall, S., 'Introduction' to Smith, A. C. H. et al., Paper Voices: The Popular Press and Social Change 1935-1965 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975). Hall, S., 'Culture, the Media and the ''Ideological Effect" ', in Curran, J., Gurevitch, M. and Woollacott, J. (eds), Mass Communication and Society (London: Open University/Edward Arnold, 1977). Hall, S., 'The Rediscovery of "Ideology": Return of the Repressed in Media Studies', in Gurevitch, M., Bennett, T., Curran, J. and Woollacott, J. (eds), Culture, Society and the Media (London: Methuen, 1982). Hall, S., Hobson, D., Lowe, A. and Willis, P. (eds), Culture, Media, Language, pt three, chaps 8-13, 'Media Studies' (London: Hutchinson, 1980). Turner, G., Britisb Cultural Studies: An Introduction (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Feminism Butcher, H., Coward, R. et al., 'Images of Women in the Media', CCC stencilled paper no. 31 (University of Birmingham, 1974). Coward, R., Female Desire (London: Paladin, 1984). Doane, M. A., Mellencamp, P., Williams, L. (eds), Re-Visions: Essays in Feminist Film Criticism (Los Angeles: American Film Institute, 1984). Friedan, B., The Feminine Mystique (New York: Norton & Co. Inc., 1963). Kaplan, E. A., 'Feminist Criticism and Television' in Allen, R. C. (ed.), Cbannels of Discourse (London: Methuen, 1987); also Channels of Discourse, Reassembled (London: Routledge, 1992) Kuhn, A., Women's Pictures (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). Kuhn, A., 'Women's Genres', Screen 25:1 (1984) pp. 18-28. Mulvey, L., 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', Screen 16:3 (1975) pp. 6-18. Tuchman G. et al. (eds), Hearth and Home: Images of Women in the Media (New York: Oxford University Press, file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/loop/Desktop/0748607781/files/page_70.html[27/02/2011 21.41.27]

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1978). Women's Studies Group, Women Take Issue (London: CCCS/Hutchinson, 1978). Zoonen, L. van, 'Feminist Perspectives on the Media', in Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (eds), Mass Media and. Society (London: Edward Arnold, 1991). Zoonen, L. van, Feminist Media Studies (London: Sage, 1994). See also 'Further Reading' for 'Feminist Readings' below. The Public Sphere Claxon, C., Harems and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). Curran, J., 'Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere', in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (eds), Communication and Citizenship (London: Routledge, 1991). Garnham, N., 'The Media and the Public Sphere', in Golding, P., Murdock, G. and Schlesinger, P. (eds). Communicating Politics: Mass Communications and the Political Process (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986); also available in Garnham, N., Capitalism and Communications: Global Culture and the Economies of Information, ed F. Inglis (London: Sage, 1990). Habermas, J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, transl. T. Burger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); originally publ. as Strukturwandel der Offentlichke