May 1940
History of Warfare Editors
Kelly DeVries Loyola College in Maryland
John France
University of Wales Swans...
235 downloads
4358 Views
116MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
May 1940
History of Warfare Editors
Kelly DeVries Loyola College in Maryland
John France
University of Wales Swansea
Michael S. Neiberg
University of Southern Mississippi
Frederick Schneid High Point University
VOLUME 57
May 1940 The Battle for the Netherlands
Edited by
Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010
On the cover: Dutch infantry position behind the Valley Canal (photo: Spaarnestad Fotoarchief, Haarlem). No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Netherlands Minister of Defence. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data May 1940 : the battle for the Netherlands / edited by Piet Kamphuis and Herman Amersfoort. p. cm. -- (History of warfare, ISSN 1385-7827 ; v. 57) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18438-1 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939-1945--Campaigns-Netherlands. I. Kamphuis, P. H. II. Amersfoort, H. (Hermanus), 1951- III. Title. IV. Series. D763.N4M39 2010 940.54’2192--dc22
ISSN: ISBN:
2010001509
1385-7827 978-90-04-18438-1
Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints BRILL, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Typeset by chs:p [Leiden, Netherlands]
printed in the netherlands
CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................................................ ix Colour maps I.
Introduction . ........................................................................................ 1 H. Amersfoort The Netherlands and the war The shock The questions
II.
The Emergence of the German Threat ............................................ 13 H.W. van den Doel The consequences of the First World War Versailles The 1920s: seeking stability Fascism and National Socialism National Socialists in power The German Lebensraum ambitions Conclusion
III. Between Hope and Fear: The Netherlands armed forces in the interwar period ....................................................................... 35 C.M. Schulten and P.M.J. de Koster Introduction The legacy of neutrality After the First World War The cupboard is bare - from 1922 to 1933 Turning point Rising tensions The military geography of the Netherlands Strategic policy Winkelman’s operation plan
vi
contents
IV. The Gathering Storm: The German armed forces in the interwar period ....................................................................... 89 J.W.M. Schulten Introduction The German rearmament Baptism of fire The German operation plan for the Westfeldzug Plan of attack of the 18th Army The alert V.
The Generals’ Duel: Five days of war at the military strategic level . ................................................................................... 139 H. Amersfoort and J.W.M. Schulten Düsseldorf, Friday 10 May 1940 The Hague, Friday 10 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Saturday 11 May 1940 The Hague, Saturday 11 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Sunday 12 May 1940 The Hague, Sunday 12 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Monday 13 May 1940 The Hague, Monday 13 May 1940 Düsseldorf, Tuesday 14 May 1940 The Hague, Tuesday 14 May 1940 Rijsoord, Wednesday 15 May 1940
VI. ‘Fall Festung’: A surprise attack on The Hague . ........................... 179 C.M. Schulten Introduction Ypenburg, Valkenburg and Ockenburg captured by the Germans The continuing battle for the airfields on 10 May The recapture of Ypenburg The battle for Valkenburg Ockenburg back in Dutch hands Further actions against the airborne troops and the battle at Overschie Conclusion VII. Disputed Territory: The battle in the Dutch provinces of Limburg, Noord-Brabant and Zeeland ......................................... 205 H.W. van den Doel Introduction
contents
vii
Operations against the bridges over the river Maas The battle at Mill Passage through Noord-Brabant Zeeland struggles on The final pocket of resistance eradicated Conclusion VIII. The Field Army Defeated: The battle for the Grebbe Line . ........ 261 H.W. van den Doel Introduction The fall of the IJssel Line The attack on the outposts of the IVth Division General Harberts’ countermeasures The German attack on the main resistance sector Chaos among the military leadership The fall of the Grebbe Line The battle at Scherpenzeel The end Conclusion IX. “Vorwärts denken, vorwärts sehen, vorwärts reiten!”: The battle in the northern provinces ............................................. 321 P.H. Kamphuis The territorial defence of the northern Netherlands A morning of battle and a pursuit in vain The collapse of the Wons Position The offensive reconnaissance mission fails Conclusion X.
Not a bridge too far: The battle for the Moerdijk bridges, Dordrecht and Rotterdam . ............................................................. 343 H.W. van den Doel The German plans Dutch combat readiness The German airborne landings Consolidation of the German positions Actions by the border battalions and the Kil Group The Light Division takes action Die Panzer arrive on time The battle in Rotterdam
viii
contents The bombing of Rotterdam Conclusion
XI. Myth and reality ............................................................................... 395 H. Amersfoort Still coming to terms with the past? Analysing the military operations Pre-war defence policy: does it require re-evaluation? Annex: Table of land forces rank equivalents . ....................................... 419 Annotated bibliography ............................................................................ 421 Index ............................................................................................................ 449 Biographical notes . .................................................................................... 461 Photo acknowledgements ......................................................................... 463
PREFACE The original, Dutch-language edition of this book was published in 1990, fifty years after the Netherlands became involved in the Second World War. It was the work of a young generation of university-educated military historians who, unlike their predecessors, had no personal memories of the war. Their aim was to subject the five-day war of May 1940 to a critical analysis and thus provide an explanation for the crushing defeat which the Dutch armed forces suffered at the hands of the German Wehrmacht. The sometimes sobering conclusions led to fierce negative reactions among part of the readership, in particular in veterans’ circles. Others appreciated the book as a successful attempt to separate the subject matter from the feelings of anger and shame which had dominated previous historiography. The book achieved good print numbers, was soon sold out and in the following years continued to receive a great deal of attention on the second-hand market, so that in 2005 a revised edition was published, incorporating the most recent academic research in the Netherlands, France and Germany. At present, Mei 1940 is considered to be the authoritative work in the Dutch language on the war between Germany and the Netherlands in May 1940. This spawned the idea for an English-language edition, the result of which you now have before you. This edition again incorporates the latest international academic research on the subject. The text has also been adapted for an international readership. This edition would not have been possible without the contributions of many people. The editors would like to thank their colleagues at the Netherlands Institute of Military History, and in particular the cartographer and graphic designer, Louis Kaulartz. They also owe a debt of gratitude to Heleen Heckman, head of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence Translation Service, to the translator, Fiona Nauta, and to Stephanie Lewis and Kate Walsarie Wolff who worked on the translation under her responsibility. Fiona Nauta in particular spared no effort, and it was a privilege to work with her. We would like to thank Sdu Uitgevers in The Hague, who
x
preface
published the Dutch edition, for their prompt permission to publish the English translation. Last but not least, we thank Julian Deahl and his team at Brill Publishers for the pleasant cooperation during the production of this book. Herman Amersfoort Piet Kamphuis
COLOUR MAPS
illustrations
Key to symbols
1
Key to maps and diagrams Army chain of command
air-transportable unit
Dutch unit
XXXXX
Army group
air force unit
Belgian unit
XXXX
Army
French unit
MR
motorcyclist unit
XXX
Corps
navy unit
German unit
XX
Division
infantry unit
SSS
marines unit X
Brigade
tank unit
transport unit
artillery unit
mortar unit
Regiment
engineer unit
machine-gun unit
Battalion
signals unit
mounted unit
Company
III
II
I Squadron, Battery
reconnaissance unit / light unit
motorised unit
antitank unit
armoured train
anti-aircraft unit
cyclist unit
Section
Gr
grenadiers unit
staff unit
DivTr
division troops
medical unit
PERS
personnel
supply unit
paratroop unit
torpedomen unit
2
illustrations 10 May 1940
Initial positions 0
position and/or line (forward) position and/or line sector boundary German army sector boundary German corps division front line
A
Casemate line IJssel, Arnhem-Nijmegen, Maas-Waal Canal, Maas and Juliana Canal
B
Grebbe Line, Valley Position
C
Peel-Raam Position
D
Waal-Linge Position
E
New Dutch Waterline
F
Southern front of Fortress Holland
G
Defence Line of Amsterdam
N O R T H
BORKUM
S E A
SCHIERMONNIKOOG
TERSCHELLING
T
H
E
R
Steenwijk
Enkhuizen Hoorn
Alkmaar
M
Oranje Position (planned) Albert Canal
O
Dyle Line
G Marken Amsterdam B
Haarlem
D
ek
Rotterdam L
Bergse Maas
Moerdijk
Almelo
A
Ma as
Oss
Ghent
3
B
E
L
G
er nd De
Kortrijk
Doornik
Ath
C
re Dend
Seneffe
t au sc E
rpe Sca
Waterloo
Denain
Weert
Ca
na
l
6 Leverkusen
XXX
Genk
Maastricht
Geleen
Cologne
4
Gulpen Aachen 27 Vaals
XXX
Bad Godesberg
Liège
Nijvel Gembloux
Charleroi
XXXX
Dalheim
Visé
Waver
hr Ru
Solingen
XXX
A
M
Hasselt
XXXX
use
Me
Huy
Namur re mb Sa
Roermond
Maaseik
-
Jumet
Quevy
Krefeld
11 ert
Essen
Duisburg Wuppertal
Düsseldorf
l
Tienen
Mons
9
Horst
Cana
U
Leuven
Edingen
Geldern XXX
Budel
Alb
N
I
Brussels
G E R M A N Y
Venray XX
Mol
Heist
Aalst
Wezel Xanten
A
Tilburg
Gr. Nete
O
XXXX
18
Borken
XXX
26
Mill Gennep
XXX
chpens Kem
Antwerp
St.-Niklaas
Nijmegen
's-Hertogenbosch
Turnhout
t
Bruges
10
Zevenaar
Venlo
Brasschaat
held
VLAANDEREN
XXX
Winterswijk
e
Sc
ZEEUWS-
Bentheim
Ahaus
Tiel
Eindhoven Knokke
Zutphen
Rhin
L
Hengelo Enschede
Arnhem
M
Steenbergen Breda Bergen op Zoom
Middelburg
Nordhorn
Deventer
Wageningen Rhenen Lower Rhine
Waal
Zaltbommel
F Zierikzee
1
Aa
Dordrecht
Hardenberg Ommen
el IJss
2
E
Schoonhoven
Meppen
Harderwijk
XXX
Schiedam
Emmen
A
Amersfoort
Delft
an.
XX
Apeldoorn
4 Utrecht
Leiden
S
je C
Zwolle
XXX
1 The Hague
D
ran
Kampen
Purmerend
Zaandam
NO
Hoogeveen
Meppel
Urk
IJSSELMEER
XXX
A
Medemblik
Petten
N
L
Lemmer
Staveren
Ems
E
Monschau
4
Spa Adenau Hillesheim
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
N K
Stadskanaal
Ho ofd v.
Eendracht, Zanddijk and Bath Positions
Assen Heerenveen
Den Helder
he
L
Sneek
I
H
tsc
Den Helder Position
p
J
en
Wons Position
K
Win s choter- die
Drachten
Dr
J
WA
IJsselmeer Dam
Groningen
Leeuwarden
N E D Harlingen
s
I
TEXEL
D
Delfzijl
A
SE
VLIELAND
Em
Casemate line in eastern Groningen and eastern Drenthe
Flushing
Norden
ROTTUMEROOG
AMELAND
H
Kapelle
25 km
3
illustrations Airfields around The Hague and the advance of Gruppe Sponeck Valkenburg Airfield 10 May 1940
1
0
Katwijk aan Zee
2 km
2 3-4 Katwijk a. d. Rijn pp
ly
Can
3-4
Valkenburg
Rijnsburg
al
10/5
6
2-2 Valkenburg
11/5
Oegstgeest
11/5
Valkenburg Airfield
ine
De Pan
Rijnsburg
North Sea
Rh
Su
Warmond
Katwijk a.d. Rijn
dunes
10/5 Haagsche Schouw
10/5
Wassenaarse Slag
Rijksdorp Maaldrift
Wassenaar 3-4
Den Deijl Meij en Del
3-4
Kievit
Drinking water pumping station
Pier
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
3
Leiden
Bier Lap
1
Valkenburg Airfield
Voorschoten
Scheveningen
The Hague
Stompwijk
4
5
1
Leidschendam Ypenburg Airfield
2
3
Kijkduin
Voorburg
10/5
Drievliet
Rijswijk
Ockenburg Airfield 10/5
Rijswijk
Ockenburg
(bridge under constr.)
Hoornbrug
10/5
Loosduinen
Bloemendaal
temporary bridge
10/5
11/5
3 ta
velodrome
xi w
Poeldijk
ay
trambridge
Wateringen
12/5
Monster ’s-Gravenzande
Delft
Kwintsheul
Hoeve Ypenburg
3
3
tram depot
er
Ypenburg
1
3
2
’t Woudt
3 Airfield
Lierhand
10/5
n)
io
ct
tru
s on
Honselersdijk
Naaldwijk
nd
(u
c
Den Hoorn
Hoeve Loos
11/5
De Lier
Westerlee
Schipluiden Burgersdijk
uw ie
N
Maasdijk
Negenhuizen
1
2
Villa Bimini
Zwet brug
Hillegersberg
e
13/5 Zouteveen
10/5
Wa te
Schiebroek
Noord-Kethel
12/5
rw
eg
Poortershaven
Gruppe Sponeck S ch
Kijkduin
1-2 22 Blijrust
airfield
Zestienhoven
Overschie Abtspolder
1
47 47 Loosduinen Ockenburg
Dutch position
2
(a) M-36 armoured vehicle, (a) (b)(c) (b) machine gun, (c) heavy machine gun landings of the Fallschirmjägerregiment
12/5
Gruppe Sponeck’s displacement route to Overschie
Geest
PERS
Rotterdam
Overschie
ie
Meer en Bosch
Zegbroek polder
Ockenburg Airfield
Schans
Kethel
Ockenburg Airfield 10 May 1940
3
2
1 1
Johanna hoeve
Ypenburg Airfield
Ter Heijde
Staalduinen
10 May 1940
German position location of German units
Spangensche Polder
12/5
arrival date planned route to:
1
Queen’s palace
2
Parliament
3
Energy company
4
Coastal battery
5
Radio transmitter
German advance through Noord-Brabant and northern Limburg
4
illustrations
Alblasserdam 10 May morning
Barendrecht
5
0
10 km
ALBLASSER
WAARD
Ophemert
12 May evening Island of Dordrecht
KIL
's-Gravendeel
Tweede Tol
Strijen
BOMMELER WAARD
Rijswijk Nieuwendijk
L A N D A L T E N A
Dussen
Willemsdorp ER
Hedel
Genderen
HE BERGSC MAAS
AM
S
Kerkdriel
Aalburg V A N
Hank
DIEP
Zaltbommel
Werkendam
D RWE E
ME
E NI
Strijensas
Waardenburg
Brakel
B I E S B O S C H
E
UW
Rosmalen
Heusden
Lage-Zwaluwe Geertruidenberg OUDE E Elshout MAASJ LL Hoge-Zwaluwe HO Waspik Moerdijk Raamsdonksveer Raamsdonk Drunen Made Klundert Zevenbergschen- Hoek 's-Gravenmoer Wagenberg Zevenbergen Kaatsheuvel Terheijden D AN
L
NA
RK
Hazeldonk
TEL DIN
11 May morning
TIELER WAARD
GORINCHEM
DORDRECHT
Maasdam
Meteren
Spijk
Papendrecht Sliedrecht Giessendam Zwijndrecht Hardinxveld O U MAADE S
Heukelum
Bleskensgraaf
Oosterhout
CA
W IL
MA
HEL
Teteringen
M IN
’s-HERTOGENBOSCH Helvoirt
Dongen A
Vlijmen
CA
VUGHT
11 May evening
11 May morning
Loon op Zand
N.
+
12 May Schijndel evening
BREDA Rijen
Etten
TILBURG
Boxtel Oisterwijk
11 May morning
Ginneken Ulvenhout
St. Willebrord Heike
Gilze
Moergestel Goirle
Rijsbergen
Best
AA
Chaam 11 May evening
Hilvarenbeek Meerle
CA N.
Poppel
Baarle-Hertog
XX
25
474
Graspeel
6
Lagenberkt
Horst
481
XX
Postel
18
XX
Kasterlee
256
Dessel Lommel
XX MR
Katwijksche Peel
2
Neerpelt
12 May evening
456
2
Luijkgestel
Retie
Gierle
Kapelhof
Molenheide
2
Hof
Arendonk
Mill 3
Westerhoven
12 May evening
TURNHOUT
Bruggen
Vilheide
Eersel
Reusel
454
Langenboom Nieuwmill
Waa
Hapert Bladel
Ravels
XX
254 1
Veldhoven Hoogeloon
12 May evening
10 May 1940
Lagepeel
Meerveldhoven
18 X XXX 6
Lage Mierde
Hoogstraten
The breach at Mill
Middelbeers
SSVD
Baarle-Nassau
IX
Meer
1
12 May evening
XX
TR BE A
Zundert
W
Oirschot
Mol
1 Geel
Balen Kerkhoven
Exsel
10-12 May 1940
illustrations LAND
Lobith Tolkamer
Beumingen
VA N M A A S E N WA A L
NIJMEGEN
Bergharen
RHIN
E
St. Anna
Emmerik
1 XX 0 26 X
Megen
Oijen
Ravenstein
Lith
Wijchen
Kellen Grieth
Kleef
Malden Groesbeek
Oss
Grave
Schaijk Heesch
Geffen
Mook
Gassel
11 May morning
Till XX
Overasselt
254
Calcar XXX
Cuyk
26
Nistelrode
Pfalzdorf
Gennep
Oeffelt Mill
XXX
3
XX
St. Hubert
Uden
Heeswijk
Beugen
11 May morning
ID
Maas Line
Hees
Kevelaer
MS A VA
Overloon
RT
De Rips
Aarle
Blitterswijk Geldern
18 XXXX 6
HELMOND
Wanssum
P E E L Venraij
Beek
NAL WILHELMINA CA XX
Well
Gemert
Bakel
Walbeck
Oorloo Scheide
Peel-Raam Position
Nunen
Arcen
Deurne
Horst
L
NA
Mierlo
Grubbenvorst
Geldrop
Velden
Sevenum
Someren
Helenaveen Maasbree
XXX
Tegelen
Beringen
Someren Eind Meijel
Panningen
Roggelschedijk
Helden
Baarlo
9 Hinsbeck
Steijl
Kaldenkirchen Lobberich
Maarheeze
11 May evening
XX
Belfeld Spurk
Soerendonk Nederweert
Budel
Hushoven
Roggel
Hulsen
WEERT
Heijthuizen
Dorplein St. HuibrechtsLille
Baexem
Born
Buggenum
Brüggen Swalmen Boukoel
Horn Kaulille Kleine-Brogel
Beegden
Stramproij
Bracht
Reuver
Neer Haelen
11 May Swartbroek morning
30
Offenbeek
Budschop
XX X
56 VENLO
Blerick
Neerkant
Wankum
Herongen
Heusden 11 May morning
Leende
Straelen Schandelo
Liessel
Asten
Aalst
MAAS
Griendsveen
CA
EINDHOVEN
Valkenswaard
Wetten
Westerbeek
Lieshout
Hooggeldrop
Weeze
Vierlingbeek
LE IL W
St. Oedenrode
256
Oploo Erp
-
Kervenheim
XX
St. Anthonis
Veghel
ZU
Üdem
Boxmeer Afferden
11 May evening
9
Goch
(see inset)
Dinther
alre
5
Elten
Millingen
Gendt
L
Horssen
Altforst
Dreumel
W AA
ROERMOND
St. Georg
Elmpt Waldniel Nieder-Krüchten
Gebroek Neeritter
Bocholt Molenbeersel
Wessem Thorn
Heel Linne
Wegberg
St. Odiliënberg Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
6
illustrations
Walcheren, Noord-Beveland, Zuid-Beveland and Zeeuws-Vlaanderen
Kattendijke
3
5
0
Kapelle
Yerseke
Zuid-
38
Vlake
Biezelinge
1
NG
Goudswaard VL
IE
dijk
40 nd-
Bruinisse K R
DUIVELAND
Zierikzee ROOMPOT
O S TE R -
Middelburg
Arnemuiden
Zoutelande Koudekerke
Groede
Hoofdplaat
2
Nieuwvliet XX
Zanddijk position
Hansweert
Hoedekenskerke
Ellewoutsdijk Kloosterzande
St. Margriete
XX
Le
ld opo
Bergen op Zoom
Li js
Kaprijke
dra ina ge
Eeklo
Can al
Knesselare
Axel
38
14
tank ditch Hoogerheide Waarde Rilland Bath position SC Bath HE Kalmthout LD Ossendrecht E
Ertvelde
Waarschoot
17 May
Kapellen
Doel
Lilloo
Nieuwnamen
Koewacht
Ekeren
Kieldrecht
Sinaai
Merksem
De Klinge
ANTWERP
St. Gilles-Waas St. Pauwels
Moerbeke
17 May
Brasschaat
Verrebroek
Zelzate
Wachtebeke
XX
SSG
Berendrecht
Hulst
St. Jansteen Sas van Gent
Essen
Woensdrecht SSD Huijbergen
VLAANDEREN
Bassevelde
St. Laureins Maldegem
Philippine
Canal
Wouw
14 May 20.00 hrs.
Boschkapelle
Sluiskil
60
15
225
Zaamslag Watervliet
Fijnaart
Roosendaal
Zandvliet
IJzendijke
40
Dinteloord
Nispen
E
Kruiningen Krabbendijke
Terneuzen
Biervliet
2
AK
38
Schoondijke Z E E U W S -
Oostburg
ER
THOLEN
15 May 13.00 hrs.
Baarland
38
1
15 May 08.00 hrs.
BEVELAND
W E Borssele STE RBreskens
LK
VO
Steenbergen Oudgastel Nw. Vossemeer Kruisland
Wemeldinge Kloetinge Yerseke S C H ELD Kapelle
’s-Gravenpolder
Flushing
R
16 May 02.30 hrs. 16 May Poortvliet 10.30 hrs. Tholen
Goes
ZUID-
68
St. Annaland
St. Maartensdijk Wilhelminadorp
16 May evening
Oost Souburg
ME
Stampersgat
Kats
16 May Heinkenszand 16.00 hrs.
17 May
16 May afternoon
Stavenisse
Sloe Dam
XX 23.00 hrs.
Willemstad Ooltgensplaat
St. Philipsland
O Kortgene Oostkerke
17 May 12.00 hrs.
WALCHEREN
AM
Oosterland
BEVELAND
Westkapelle
Middelsluis
Oude Tonge
Westenschouwen
Kaasgat
Za Kruinigen
NOORD-
14
Zuid-Beijerland
OVERFLAKKEE
Serooskerke
Kamperland Serooskerke Veere
Aardenburg
T
Middelharnis
N
SCHOUWEN
Colijnsplaat
68
Nieuw-Beijerland
Brouwershaven
Hansweert
Domburg
RI
Dirksland
3
Molen dijk
Beveland
271
V ELI NG G R E E
Canal
Wemeldinge
Stellendam
10 km
40
HA
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
14-17 May 1940 Ouddorp
Deurne
Melsele Haasdonk
St. Niklaas Basel
Hoboken
Berchem
7
illustrations Grebbe Line
10 May 1940
Huizen
2
0
4 km
Bussum Blaricum
Ermelo
Leuvenum
I J s s e l m e e r
Nulde
Spakenburg
Speulde
Putten V
Laren 18
Bunschoten Garderen
E
Hilversum Baarn
G
L
Nijkerk E
W E
7
S
7
XX
Amersfoort
5
8
XX
A
Soesterberg
C
XXX
21
2
Woudenberg
S
E
2
De Klomp
H
XX
Doorn E
Rijsenburg
Renswoude
15
XXX
2 U
rda
Up
pe
L
Cothen
rR
Amerongen
hin
eC
Schalkwijk
an
.
Wijk bij Duurstede L
e ow
r
10
2
E
Leersum m-
XX
4
R hine
R Elst U
XXX
X
Bennekom XX
19G
A
(p
NEDER
lan
BETUWE
Buren
d)
Rumpt
46
Tiel
Leeuwen
Geldermalsen
Wamel Ophemert
M
Druten Afferden
Puiflijk
Winssen Horssen Bergharen
Kessel
as
Appeltern
29
Batenburg
Maasbommel
Ravenstein Lith
Hernen
Megen
Oijen
a
Gameren
3
Varik Zaltbommel
24
Dreumel
Neerijnen Opijnen
Ochten XXX
al
LAND VAN MAAS EN WAAL
TIELER WAARD
Waardenburg Tuil Nieuwaal
Zetten Dodewaard
44 Wa
B
L in g e
Meteren
Opheusden
Kesteren
X
Tricht
Randwijk
Lienden ne
Zoelen
Buurmalsen
Beesd
Wageningen
Maurik
Rijswijk Beusichem
Renkum
4
Rhenen 8
Eck en Wiel Culemborg
Ede
Veenendaal
22
V
Werkhoven ste
I
Maarn
Driebergen
Odijk
Lunteren
Scherpenzeel
E
Bunnik
Am
L
T
L
4
H
Zeist
Harskamp
Macharen
Haren
Niftrik
Wijchen
Cartografie: Louis Kaulartz / IMG / KL
E
16
8
XXXX
V
R
De Bilt
Barneveld
E
Bilthoven
T
U
R
XXX
4
U
Stroe
7
E
Soest
D
XX
’t Hart
Voorthuizen
L
Soestdijk
8
illustrations
Grebbeberg, outpost sector
11 May 1940
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
3
Dijkgraaf sche
19
I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N Landen Voon Hooge
Gr
Outpost line
ift
Veen kampen
burg tank
or Gr
eb
be
ditch
slag
Hooi
10.00 hrs.
12.30 hrs.
1
SSDF
Pomona
landen 12.30 hrs.
Kruiponder
2
2-8
13.30 hrs.
12.00 hrs.
Front line
10.30 hrs. 13.30 hrs.
3 1
3-8
Wageningen
13.30 hrs.
2-8
16.00 hrs.
Maria Hoeve a’s Anna’s Hoeve
12.00 hrs.
Heimerstein
2
1-8
12.30 hrs.
1
3
3-8 17.30 hrs.
Grebbeberg
SSDF Wolfswaard
15.00 hrs.
De Hoop
(former) Hornwork
1
Pumping station (former) Bastions
Klaver en Wolfswaard
1-8
Livonia
Den Dooven orchard
Brickworks
L O
ER
Brickworks
14.00 hrs.
Pothoek
W
Pumping station
Brickworks De Blauwe Kamer
R
H
I
N
sector boundary outpost line / front line
E (a) (b) (c)
Ferry
Brickworks
light machine gun, position protected from fragmentation in steel turret so-called ‘Porcupine’ type (S-type) (d) antitank gun in casemate (e) M18 machine gun (f) 6-Veld field gun (a)
Maneswaard
(d) (e)
(f)
(b) heavy machine gun (c) concrete casemate,
Section of a weapon system indicated in this area German attack 0
250
500 m
15.00 hrs.
time of position of German troops
9
illustrations
I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
Grebbeberg From the evening of 11 May until the very early morning of 13 May 1940
arrival 13 May
2
24
3
29
1
29
HOOILANDEN
3
19
ift
20
Gr
1
or Gr
eb
be
Achterberg Kruiponder
1
15
3
8
Windmill
Rear line Front line Landmines
4
2
Vreewijk
8
16 1
1
Stop line
1
19
Anna’s Hoeve
Rhenen
Zoo
19 (-)
2
19
2
LO
1
12 May afternoon
24 (-)
46 (-)
WE R
12 May evening
2 8 (-) 12 May 18.00 hrs. + 20.45 hrs.
Heimerstein
1 2
Rye field
12 May 4.00 hrs.
3
12 May 18.00 hrs.
322
SSDF Pothoek
Grebbeberg
11(-) 1
3
8 (-)
Brickworks
XX (former) Hornwork
207
SSDF
3
Pumping station (under construction)
R
H
IN
322
Livonia
(former) Bastions
E Brickworks De Blauwe Kamer
(a)
light machine gun, position
(b)
heavy machine gun in steel turret
(c)
concrete casemate, so-called
protected from fragmentation
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g)
‘Porcupine’ type (S-type) (d) antitank gun in concrete casemate (e)
M18 machine gun
(f)
7-Veld field gun mortar
(g)
front line / stop line / rear line forward line of German troops Ferry orchard German attack
afternoon time of position of German troops Dutch counterattack
0
250
500 m
10
illustrations
±12.30 hrs. 13 May 1940 Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
Grebbeberg
I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N
HOOILANDEN
19
Gr
3
ift or
15
1
2 Achterberg
3
Gr
24
eb
be
29
Kruiponder
8
3
Rear line
1
1st target line
Windmill
20
1
2 3
1
29
SSDF
46 (-)
1
Landmines
11 Vreewijk
Stop line
2
SSDF
24 1
16
1
8
1
2
Rhenen
11
2
LO
24 (-)
4
2
8 (-)
19 (-)
1
207
322
Rye field
WE
3
R
Pothoek
Grebbeberg
11(-) 1
8 (-)
SSDF (-) 3
3
Brickworks
(Former) Hornwork
322
Pumping station (under construction)
R
(b)
heavy machine gun in steel turret
(c)
concrete casemate, so-called
protected from fragmentation
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g)
‘Porcupine’ type (S-type) (d) antitank gun in concrete casemate (e)
M18 machine gun
(f)
7-Veld field gun mortar
(g)
E
light machine gun, position
H
46
Livonia
(former) Bastions
IN
2 (a)
Anna’s Hoeve
XX
Heimerstein
Zoo
322
Brickworks De Blauwe Kamer front line / stop line / rear line forward line of German troops orchard
Ferry
German attack
afternoon time of position of German troops Dutch counterattack
0
250
500 m
11
illustrations
The battle at Scherpenzeel
13.30-20.00 hrs 13 May 1940 Ba
Cana
l
German sector boundary 0
500 m.
227
1 km
to Am
Front line
Gli
erbeek n- d
Ca
Canal
be
sf
Ne
er
na
l
ek
-
oo
227
he
udsche
bee
-
(-)
k
nte
wo
366
Cana
ulu
697
l
Me
1
der
sc
8 XX 2
ren
Walderveen
Lunte r
5
sch
e
rt
1
XX
eld
beek
ev
der-
rn
Mod
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
to
outpost sector according to German data March 1940
21 ek
Scherpenzeel
Ca
na
bee
l
256
Lunte
rensc
1
eke
4
rs l o ot
De Groep (tank ditch)
Outpost line
Emmikhuizen
De Klomp
Emmikhuizerberg
2
207
he
Bro
3
12
k
Renswoude
Stop line
15
(-)
be
4 XXX 2 Woudenberg
412 Lunteren 328
15
de to E
(tank ditch)
Roode Haan
1
227 XX 207
19 Oml.-
2
8
2
4 Veenendaal
Geldersch Veenendaal Can. Bi
XX
ss
Benedeneind
id sgr
Leersum
2 X X4
av
10
D op
Hondsenelleboog
ch
22
207
4
ift
1
Middelbuurt
G rif t or
Front line Amerongen
Gr
eb
be
12
illustrations
The attack by the 1. Kavalleriedivision WONS POSITION
AMELAND
WONS SECTOR
Dokkum
Schraard
11/5
Kornwerderzand VLIELAND (Habour)
WONS POSITION
TEXEL
1
Makkum
C-Stg Hd DEN HELDER POSITION
1 Tjeuke Meer
12/5
Den Oever
22
Urk
C-Vg H E LIN WA TER
HOLLAND
TCH DU
Hilversum
Ca
Amersfoort
na
l UTRECHT
Hardenberg Ommen
Zwolle TBO
XXX
10
22
21 1
Nordhorn
O
Warning line Nunspeet
TBF
sector of Territorial Commander in Friesland
Q
Line of defence Epe Line of defence
TBO
sector of TerritorialAlmelo Commander Oldenzaal in Overijssel
F
C-Stg Hd
Commander of Den Helder Position Hengelo Holten Dutch sector boundary C-Vg H Commander ofn.Fortress Holland Deventer a Enschede Gronau German sector boundary tek Apeldoorn en AdvanceTwroute 11/5 Date of advance National border Provincial border HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau Zutphen Lochem
sel IJs
Leiden
Naarden
Rijn-
ZUID-
sterdam
Hoofddorp DEFENCE LINE OF AMSTERDAM
Elburg
GR LIN EBBE E
Am Muiden
NEW
AMSTERDAM
Kampen IJSSELMEER
1 Coevorden
t ch Ve
Marken
2 Emmen Sleen
Hoogeveen
l
Purmerend Zaandam
HOLLAND
F
OVERIJSSEL
se
Haarlem
Beilen GROEP ASSEN
Schokland
IJSSEL LINE
Q
DRENTHE
Echten
Zwartsluis 10/5
Hoorn
NOORD-
IJmuiden
Meppel
Enkhuizen
WEST FRIESLAND
Stadskanaal
10/5 Westerbork
Steenwijk 10/5
Medemblik
Schagen
O
Gieten
Assen
Lemmer
11/5 Petten
10/5
Heerenveen Appelscha
IJs
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
Staveren
Veendam Zuidlaren
TBF
Sneek Den Helder
l na Ca Winschoter- diep Winschoten
Eelde Drachten
11/5
1
Marum GROEP GRONINGEN
FRIESLAND
Bolsward
Dollard
al an sC Em Nieuwolda
Groningen
11/5
Leeuwarden
Franeker
10/5
Ho ofd va art
NORTH POSITION
12/5
12/5
Allingawier Idsegahuizen Harlingen
Emden
Delfzijl
Bedum Grijpskerk
Makkum BREEZAND
Zoutkamp
Lauwerszee
Kollum
2
MAKKUM SECTOR
IJ
OSTFRIESLAND
GRONINGEN
Ems
43
WADDEN SEA
Dr en tsc he
RW
r Dam ee
m
el
ss
Gooium
Hajum Wons Kornwerd
KORNWERDERZAND
BORKUM
SCHIERMONNIKOOG
ZURICH SECTOR
s Em
KORNWERDERZAND
10 km
0
NORTH SEA
Pingjum
Zurich
Inundation Line of resistance Company sector boundary
10-14 May 1940
13
illustrations
Kethel
Overschie
el ss Ouderkerk a/d IJssel IJ Bergambacht Capelle a/d IJssel
ROTTERDAM
Maasland
Maassluis
SCHIEDAM
Vlaardingen
Schoonhoven Ammerstol
Nieuwpoort
Groot-Ammers
Krimpen a/d IJssel
K Lekkerkerk LE Goudriaan Streefkerk IJsselmonde Krimpen a/d Lek Noordeloos Nieuwenhoorn Slikkerveer Nw.-Lekkerkerk AAS M Kinderdijk UDE Bleskensgraaf O Ridderkerk Heenvliet Alblasserdam Geervliet XX Neder-Slingeland 10 May Barendrecht Oostendam XX end of Rhoon Oud-Alblas Portugaal O afternoon Abbenbroek Spijkenisse Wijngaarden UDE Rijsoord H.I.Ambacht 7 Goidschalxoord Hekelingen Giessendam Papendrecht Heerjansdam Heerjansd Zwijndrecht drecht Gorinchem Heinenoord Oudenhoorn OudZuidland Hardinxveld Puttershoek Beijerland Sliedrecht MAA DORDRECHT SPU Blaak S I Nieuw-Beijerland 11 May 3 Werkendam Goudswaard D morning BEDIJKTE Krispijn Dubbeldam RWE E HA BINNEN MAAS MEvan 't Land Piershil Wieldrecht Kop RI I s l a n d NG Westmaas Maasdam
Rozenburg
SC
HE
UR
NIEUWE MAAS Pernis Waalhaven Airfield Hoogvliet
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH Carto
10-13 May 1940
The Moerdijk-Rotterdam axis
12 May
Zuid-Beijerland
O
E
K
S
E
Klaaswaal
Stad aan 't Haringvliet
2
Strijen TIENGEMETEN
Middelsluis
W
Numansdorp
VL
A
IE
Den Bommel
of evening Nieuwendijk Dordrecht Tweede Tol B I E S B O S C H E
's-Gravendeel
10-11 May night
KIL
H
Zwartsluisje
28
A
R
D
Strijensas
T
DS
Oude-Tonge
ER
Ooltgensplaat
R
6
Noordschans
RAK
Dinteloord
NT
EL
Fijnaart
Langeweg Hazeldonk
0
5 km
Stampersgat
Made
Den Hout
Wagenberg Zevenbergen
DI
Standdaarbuiten
Terheijden
MAASJE
's-Gravenmoer
Oosterhout
Horst
MARK
AL
N
CA
OUD E
Waspik Raamsdonksveer Raamsdonk
nbergschen- Hoek Zevenbergschen-
Klundert
E
K VOL
Dussen
HE BERGSC MAAS
Geertruidenberg 10 May afternoon Drimmelen
Hoge-Zwaluwe
KR
Hank
Willemsdorp DIEPLage-Zwaluwe AM
Moerdijk
ME
EU
NI
AN
LL
HO
Willemstad
AM
W
Mookhoek Schenkeldijkk
Teteringen
WILH ELM INA
XX
9
CA
N.
14
illustrations
Dordtsche Kil and surrounding area Reeweg-
Zuid
Wieldrecht
Amstelwijck
Wieldrechtsche Gravestein Krab-en Landzicht Kil
church
Kil dyke
Schenkeltje mill water tower
TrekBonaventura
et Vli de Ou
damsche
Polder Pumping station Wieldrecht
KIL
Nieuw-
weg
stkil We
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
's-Gravendeel Steam ferry
Wielhoven Church
Tweede Tol Killezigt Beerwijk
Langen Dam
Nieuwe
Catharinahoeve
Oude er Be de Ou
pumping station
Beer
Beer
Mookhoek k el M
Nieuwe
polder dij k
g we
om Bo
Polder Kooilandsche
Electric pumping station
Oude
Den Engel
Koperen polder Brabers polder
Ferry
Gorze
Polder
polder
OudBeversoord
jk di er Be
Beneden polder
DORDTSCHE
Strijensche
Wa ch t di jk
Meerkoot
Sass endij k
polder
De Wacht
Mookhoek
Polder
polder
eg ekw Vlo
Polder
Stoope
Willemsdorp Ferry
Polder
Maria Bouwlust polder
A HOLL
NDS
DIEP 0
500 m
15
illustrations
Rotterdam city centre
10 May 1940
German positions on the Noordereiland German position under slip road to Willems bridge (Willemsbrug)
AK
PL AN TA GE
DI JK
SLA
NIE UW E
GOUDS CHE SIN GEL
tram
railway
E HOOG
6
Hotel Weimar Maasstation Koningsbrug
WILLEMSSTR.
5
BOEZEM
4
HUGO
Maashotel Nat. Levensverz. Mij. Witte Huis
OOSTERSTR.
WAR AND E
important objects
3
BOEZEM
LAN GE
OU DE
GED EM PTE
Dutch patrols
SINGEL
Positions of Dutch troops
2
R. VEEMARKTST
T DE GROO
route of German troops
VLI ET LAA N
STRAAT
VEE MARKT
German floatplane
1
RIJWEG
GOUDSCHE
OOST PLEIN
ANSTR.
v.SPA
ER LO OST ER K ACHT
NT EE M
AAT STR ENS AUR ST.L
IGER STE REN BOE R E TEIG ENS MIDD
OTE GRO RKT MA
E UW NIE UWE NIE
4
Station Beurs OUDE HA
H AV EN
K W ER
AN M FF O IN .H E G L R P U K B RI ND E H
SNG I N KO
E AD UK A SS NA
ÔT REP ENT VEN HA
UW AD
OO
ES
PJ M O
OO
RW
EG
HA VE
N
AT
BI NN EN HA VE RS N TR AA T
ST
SP
AT
S IN PR
RA ST
W IL LE M S
N VE HA
RA ST
KA DE
AN LA
DE KA
pedestrian ferry
Cartography: Louis Kaulartz / NIMH
pedestrian ferry
OM BO JE AN OR
EILAND
pedestrian ferry
16
N O O R D E R -
SE O R
16
11
HAVEN
E W EU NI IK R D EN .H PR
11
pedestrian ferry
AS MA
L BO
MAASKADE
BO
EP HE SC
6
1
M AA SK AD E
LEUVEHAVEN
SC H JUFFERSTRAAT EE P
M AK ER S
HAVEN HAVEN
N VE HA S ER AK M
RKA
STE
NASSAU-
LEUVE
N
WIJVEN NHA WIJ
2
GAT
Maasstation
5
OO
G U R SB M LE IL W
LEUVE
N WIJ
H
3
DIJ K
DE
N VE
. STR ORN THO POS
IN PLE LAAK RDB URS NOO K BE A A BL AK AAT BLA STR ZUID N IJ W N EN HAV AVE
E
BOE REN ADM IRA LITE ITS KAD E
N VE HA VEN HA IET T VL IE NG GVL I R HA ARIN IET L V H ING R HA
G HOO
EIN KPL KER
TZE
AL NDA ENE GRO
RKT SMA KAA
OTE GRO
OOS
AAT STR
AT
TRA
KIPS
16
illustrations
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands and the war In the Netherlands, the 1940-45 period is referred to as ‘the war’. In all its simplicity, that designation illustrates the huge significance of the Second World War in the collective memory of the Dutch people. The choice of word itself is remarkable. The actual war experience was limited to five days in May 1940, when the Dutch armed forces fought and lost the battle against the Germans, and the period from mid-September 1944 to May 1945, when the Allies recaptured Dutch territory. In the latter operations, the Dutch armed forces played a modest and rather symbolic role. The 1940-45 years were more of a history of occupation than a war experience. Nevertheless, the Dutch people who lived through this period are not inclined to divide their lives into ‘before and after the occupation’. The common parlance is ‘before the war’ and ‘after the war’. In 1940, the Dutch people in general, and the Dutch armed forces in particular, were inexperienced when it came to war. The most recent war experience had been over a century ago. This was in 1830-32, when King William I endeavoured, in vain, to put a stop by force of arms to the secession of the southern Netherlands, present-day Belgium, from his kingdom. In attaching such exceptional significance to the 1940-45 period, the Netherlands stands out from many other European countries, where that place is occupied by the First World War. There, the ‘Great War’ marks a turning point in the history of European civilisation. In the Netherlands, it is impossible for the experience of 1914-18 to have the same intensity. The country was neutral during those years and the mobilised army saw no action at all. Although Dutch neutrality was threatened on several occasions, and the country suffered many adverse consequences of the war, the Netherlands underwent what were terrible years for the rest of Europe
May 1940: a cartoon by L.J. Jordaan expresses the indignation about the German attack on the Netherlands (left); entrances to Amsterdam Central Station are being closed (below).
introduction
3
as a relative outsider. It was not until the Second World War that the average Dutchman was confronted personally with modern warfare. Dutch neutrality in 1914-18 had been no coincidence. Since the midnineteenth century, the Netherlands had remained as detached as possible from the developments in the power politics between the neighbouring great powers, Germany, France and Britain. In the hundred years preceding 1940, the notions of aloofness and neutrality developed into permanent values in Dutch strategic culture and became all but articles of faith in the political and social set of values. The country was even able to derive a certain feeling of moral superiority from these ideas. Whereas the great powers determined their positions in international relations by means of power and force—reprehensible instruments in the eyes of many Dutch people—the Netherlands liked to think of itself as a shining example of the workings of international law. This self-image was undoubtedly misleading. It did not rhyme with the bloody wars through which the colonial administration subjected the Netherlands East Indies on the other side of the world. It also overlooked the fact that, as a “satisfied nation”, the Netherlands only stood to lose from participation in an armed conflict. If the Netherlands were to choose the path of rapprochement with Germany in peacetime, it would run the risk of Britain taking control of the Dutch colonies in Asia. If support from Britain were sought, Germany could be tempted to carry out a preventive strike on Dutch territory. That was the situation the Netherlands faced in 1940. A country and an army without recent war experience, a country which, strengthened by the favourable experiences of 1914-18, hoped to be able to remain neutral again, and a country with an introverted, mainly bourgeois culture. Values such as order and authority, peacefulness, patriotism, industry and self-restraint took precedence over martial values such as glory, valour or self-sacrifice.
The shock All these aspects will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters of this book, but it is useful to point them out briefly here as well. They can explain the enormity of the shock caused by the German invasion of the Netherlands on 10 May 1940. For any individual or society, war is one of the most devastating occurrences possible. It is an experience which disrupts normal life entirely. For the people of the Netherlands, however, inexperienced and mentally unprepared as they were, the shock was par-
4
chapter one
ticularly severe. And that was not all. Within five days the fight ended in a crushing defeat. The defeat was worse than had been anticipated and came sooner. The general assumption was that the armed forces would be able to put up resistance for several weeks and that allies would come to their assistance in the meantime in order to turn the tide. The capitulation on 14 May 1940 dealt a harsh blow to this perspective. It was a traumatic experience. The leading Dutch military journal De Militaire Spectator began its July 1940 issue with a brief review of recent events: “It has now been two months since we began our struggle against an attack by our all-powerful neighbour, equipped with the most up-to-date resources and inspired by an indomitable urge to attack, which was not our enemy up to the point of the attack, and still our thoughts and feelings are dominated by that one thing, the mere Five-Day War”. This sentiment was not limited to the military, but permeated society as a whole. It is therefore no wonder that, even during those five days of the war, explanations for the developing catastrophe were already circulating. Some were harsh in their judgements on the shortcomings of the Dutch armed forces. Others clung to deeds which gave encouragement and which could inspire them not to resign themselves to German occupation. From those five days of war, an image emerged that was very well suited to softening the pain of defeat. An important element of that image was the indignation at the, in Dutch eyes, unexpected and treacherous manner in which the German armed forces had assaulted the country. That indignation was motivated by the constant hope of remaining neutral in the impending Europe-wide war. It was in that spirit that Queen Wilhelmina addressed her people in a proclamation on 10 May 1940, saying: “After our country had, with scrupulous precision, observed absolute neutrality all these months and while it had no other intention but to maintain that attitude strictly and consistently, last night the German armed forces, without any warning whatsoever, carried out a sudden attack on our territory.” The first opinions were also soon expressed regarding the course of the battle. Both the army, including the air forces, and the navy had put up a brave fight. However, as the commander-in-chief, General H.G. Winkelman, put it in his radio broadcast in which he announced the capitulation, “the fight was too one-sided, our troops were up against technological assets for which even the greatest of human courage would be no match”.1 1 V.E. Nierstrasz, Inleiding en algemeen overzicht van de gevechtsdagen van 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957) 291.
Damage caused during an aerial attack on Schiphol airport on 10 May.
Bombs dropped by a German aircraft ruined twelve houses in Amsterdam, killing 44 civilians, on 12 May.
6
chapter one
Everyone knew what the general was referring to: tanks, modern aircraft, paratroops and air-transportable units. Furthermore, the swift defeat was generally attributed to the poor armament and equipment of the Dutch armed forces. In addition, according to general opinion, as if their technological superiority were not enough, the Germans also availed themselves of improper combat methods, violated the law of war and received assistance from a fifth column of German agents and Dutch traitors. In that respect, it was important to note that in one of the key theatres of war, the Grebbeberg, an SS regiment had been involved in the fighting. Official announcements also influenced public opinion during the fighting. For instance, the statements by the Dutch General Headquarters on 10 May 1940 spoke of German paratroops disguised in Dutch uniforms, reported a German officer who threatened to kill Dutch prisoners of war and cried shame over German soldiers using prisoners of war as human shields. In retrospect, the image of the battle thus created was an intriguing combination of truths and half-truths. During the war and shortly after, it provided an initial explanation for the rapid defeat. It may even be better not to speak of an explanation, but rather of justification of the defeat. What people needed was not so much knowledge of the full facts, but rather a representation of events that would make the humiliating defeat bearable. The German superiority combined with the treachery and deceit gave the defeat an element of inevitability, bitter though it was. That shifted some of the responsibility for the defeat. One of the key Dutch historians specialised in the Second World War, Lou de Jong, characterised public opinion as a “simultaneously dramatic and romantic simplification, the bottom line of which was that the Germans, had they only implemented normal combat methods, would not have been able to subdue the courageous and heroic Netherlands. It had required abnormal, indeed criminal combat methods”.2 Although, as was mentioned earlier, reproaches were heaped on the armed forces immediately after capitulation regarding the brevity of their resistance, the view soon took root that that same weak army had managed to halt, or at least delay, the German advance in several places. And the Wehrmacht, it seemed, had paid a high price. All in all, it had still taken the Germans five days to conquer the small country, much longer than they would have assumed beforehand. The losses had been substantial, particularly at the IJsselmeer Dam, at the Grebbeberg and in the 2 L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 3 Mei ’40 (The Hague, 1970) 520.
introduction
7
Hague area. This had caused the former two of those theatres of war to be dubbed ‘the Dam of Death’ and ‘the Devil’s Hill’, respectively. The greatest achievement of the Dutch army had been the elimination of the air-transportable troops in the Hague area. This German elite unit, as it was soon referred to, failed to capture the airfields around The Hague and was depleted as a result of casualties and capture. In addition, the Marine Corps, known as the ‘Black Devils’, had made it so difficult for the Germans in Rotterdam, that the latter had had to resort to a full-blown act of terror: an aerial bombardment which razed the entire historic city centre to the ground. Rotterdam thus suffered a fate similar to that of Warsaw, and later Coventry and London. Considering the circumstances in 1940 and the years of occupation which followed, the image portrayed above was unmistakably justified. It made the defeat bearable and, by emphasising the high German casualty figures, gave meaning and significance to the sacrifices made. Moreover, it also served the country beyond its borders, where the government in exile in London had to convince the allies that the previously neutral Netherlands was a valuable ally and deserved allied support on account of its resistance to the German aggression. The government propaganda based on this image had the desired effect. Partly on that basis, the Daily Telegraph was able to say of the Dutch soldiers on 10 July 1941: “It is safe to go tigershooting with them”.3
The questions In the bigger picture of the war between Germany and the allies, the conquest of the Netherlands in May 1940 was only of minor importance. The main objective of Fall Gelb was to defeat the French armed forces and the British expeditionary force which had come to their aid. The point of main effort of the German attack lay in the advance through northern France, via the Meuse crossing at Sedan to the Channel coast at Abbeville. By comparison, the attack on the Netherlands was a secondary mission on the far-right flank, covering the operations in Belgium. That does not detract from the fact, however, that the attack on the Netherlands contained a number of elements which gave it a more general significance, exceeding the Dutch theatre of war. Winkelman’s proclamation, as quoted above, attributes the German victory to the German superiority in modern weapons. At first glance 3 Cited in E.N. van Kleffens, Belevenissen II 1940-1958 (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1983) 27.
A poster of the Prins Bernhard Fonds and Spitfire Fonds to acquire funding for war materials depicts the air attack on Rotterdam (left); the destruction in Rotterdam after the aerial bombardment of the city on 14 May (below).
introduction
9
there is something to be said for that. An armoured division had operated in the southern half of the Netherlands and the attack on the airfields near The Hague and the bridges on the Dordrecht-Rotterdam axis was unique. It was the first time that an entire airborne corps went into action. In the opening phase of the conflict, it was supported by strong air forces. In addition, a great many motorised infantry units operated on Dutch territory. The armoured division mentioned earlier was followed by a motorised SS infantry division, and facing the Grebbe Line, north of the Rhine, were two motorised SS infantry regiments. During the 1940 campaign, tanks, motorised infantry and air forces were the instruments of the Blitzkrieg. That term is central in all discussions on and analyses of the war in 1940 and it is also true for the operations against the Netherlands, which in the Dutch view, after all, had led to Dutch capitulation much faster than the high command, the government and the people had expected. Recent research, however, in particular that by Karl-Heinz Frieser, has shown that the German success in 1940 was not so much underpinned by a well-developed and broadly supported Blitzkrieg doctrine, but rather was strongly dependent on improvisation and even insubordination on the part of a small group of generals.4 This raises the interesting question as to the significance of those modern combat assets for the German operations on Dutch territory. In this respect, it is also important to ask the question to what extent the German attack on the Netherlands was a strategic raid. Clarity should also be sought as to the significance of the losses in personnel and materiel inflicted on the corps. How substantial were those losses and to what extent did they affect later German operations such as the intended invasion of the English coast (Operation Seelöwe) and the attack on Crete (Operation Merkur)? The deployment of SS units on Dutch soil is also remarkable. Later, on the eastern front in the war against the Soviet Union, the SS played an active part in the Vernichtungskrieg against the Russian population in general and the Jews in particular. During those operations, the law of war was grossly and systematically violated. There are also records of German violations of the law of war in the Dutch theatre of war in 1940, and some of those instances involved SS soldiers. The question arises to what extent those violations were due to the National Socialist origins of the SS and whether other factors were involved. The law of war and the possibly criminal nature of the German actions are also important to the debate on the nature and significance of the bombing of Rotterdam on 14 May 1940, immediately prior to the Dutch 4 Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995).
10
chapter one
capitulation. What preceded the bombing, was it a tactical, strategic or even a terror bombing? And how did the bombing relate to the possible German fear that the operations in the Netherlands might take longer than had been assumed beforehand, thus jeopardising the operations in France? Considering these questions may lead to the conclusion that they resemble the questions that were being asked immediately after the German invasion. The fact that they are being dealt with again in this book stems from a different need, however, from that in 1940. Then, the motives were outrage over the injustice that had been suffered and the process of coping with a traumatic experience. This book focuses on factual research, critical analysis and scientific curiosity. A number of further questions are also significant. It is a commonplace to say that an army generally can fight no better than the quality of the preparations for an imminent conflict allows. The question is, therefore, whether a different defence policy in the years leading up to the war could have led to a different outcome in the battle. Were the policy of neutrality and the derived military strategy a wise choice? Would a higher defence budget and earlier rearmament have made any difference? Are the political and military leadership to blame in this respect? To what extent was the chosen system of force generation (army organisation and staffing) responsible for the defeat? The answers to these questions must, of course, take into account the strategy, the operation plan and the tactical operations of the opponent, the German Wehrmacht, as well as the latter’s equipment, level of training and structure. Underlying these questions is another, more important, fundamental question. Was there an alternative in the interwar period for the Dutch defence policy, and more generally the war preparations as a whole, which would have provided a better chance of a more favourable outcome to a future war? The Netherlands was a small country, surrounded by large powers which were highly likely to go to war with each other once again. In the eyes of the Dutch defence planners, the First World War, with its destruction and violence on a massive, industrial scale, served as the model for the impending war. But in such an orgy of violence, what would be an effective way to defend the country, given the limited Dutch resources, the small population number and the small territory? Was it even possible anymore to solve the problem of the Dutch territorial defence in a time of total war? Only if we include these fundamental questions in our considerations will we be able to form a balanced judgement on the old problem of the “mere Five-Day War”.
On 16 May, German troops marched into Amsterdam(right), including motor units of SS Regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’ (below).
12
chapter one
These questions have determined the structure of this book. This introduction is followed by an overview of international politics in the 1920s and 1930s, focusing in particular on the political developments in Germany. The next two chapters look at how the Netherlands and Germany made their military preparations for another war in Europe, with the focus on the strategies and the operation plans. Chapter 5 deals with the execution of the German and Dutch campaign plans, from the opening of hostilities to the Dutch capitulation. It shows how the Dutch commander-in-chief and the Commander of the Field Army on the one hand, and their opponents, Army Group B commander Fedor von Bock and 18th Army commander Georg von Küchler on the other hand, led their respective operations. The five subsequent chapters discuss, at the tactical level, the course of the battles in the various theatres of operations. The concluding chapter takes stock, analyses the battle and answers the questions which lie at the basis of this study.
CHAPTER TWO
THE EMERGENCE OF THE GERMAN THREAT
The consequences of the First World War On 11 November 1918, the guns fell silent in Western Europe; an armistice had brought an end to the First World War. In London, Big Ben’s chimes heralded an end to four years of war, and people danced in the streets of Britain and France. A bloody nightmare had come to an end and the people of Europe were preparing to resume their lives as they were before August 1914. The war, however, had changed their world drastically. To start with, the political map of Europe bore little resemblance to that of 1914. Three mighty empires, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, had fallen. In Germany, the defeat had cost Kaiser Wilhelm II his position. His downfall began with the actions of the Erster Generalquartiermeister of the German army, General Erich Ludendorff. The latter had reached the conclusion in September 1918 that the war was lost and had insisted that the Kaiser appoint a government that would have enough support among the population. That new government should then immediately begin negotiations with the allied powers. Ludendorff ’s intentions in this respect were twofold. He hoped to win time in order to regroup his armies, while at the same time the civilian government would carry all the blame for the defeat, should that defeat become inevitable. The army would thus be spared the anger of the disappointed German people. Wilhelm followed Ludendorff ’s advice and appointed the liberal prince Max von Baden as Reichskanzler. A number of reforms were carried out in October, and Germany became a constitutional monarchy. These reforms did not go far enough, however, for the American president, Woodrow Wilson, who occupied a prominent position in the allied camp. He wanted a more democratic German government and refused to negotiate a possible armistice. Many Germans, meanwhile, lost their faith in Wilhelm II. The idea that a republican government would be better able to come to an agreement with the allies was gaining ground. On 3 November, sailors in Kiel revolted, revolutionary councils were formed in various
14
chapter two
towns and the social democrats in the government threatened to resign unless the Kaiser abdicated. On 9 November, Wilhelm decided to give up, and fled to the Netherlands. The armistice was agreed two days later. The Weimar Republic, named after the town in which the constitution for the new state was drawn up, was therefore not the result of a conscious choice on the part of the German population. The empire collapsed because the allies demanded it, because the Germans longed for peace and because the German army leadership wanted to save face. The latter was accomplished; when the war came to an end, the army was still in France, its organisation was intact and not a single shot had been fired on German soil. It would later therefore be said that the army had never been defeated, but that it had been stabbed in the back by the home front. In the 1920s, Adolf Hitler was to describe the German defeat as “the greatest villainy of the century”, committed by “November criminals”. This was what prompted him to go into politics: “And I resolved to become a politician.”1 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Weimar Republic was born under an unlucky star. The First World War also ended the tsars’ rule in Russia. Two revolutions, one in March 1917 and one in November of the same year, had eventually established a Bolshevist regime, led by the professional revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The new government was to make peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, abandoning the allied cause. This contributed to the Bolshevist Soviet Union becoming a pariah in the international community, misunderstood, distrusted and abhorred by the entire world. Lastly, at the end of the war, the Habsburg Empire made way for several new nation states: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Politically, Central Europe became a patchwork, with plenty of material to serve as the basis for an international conflict. After all, every country had a significant number of ethnic minorities within its borders, such as the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. The First World War did not, however, only have direct political consequences. The financial situation in the world had also changed considerably. The war had drained the finances of the European powers. They had gone from being creditors to being debtors. For instance, the allied powers, Britain, France and Italy, owed the United States some seven billion dollars. Europe also lost export markets in Latin America and Asia. As a 1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf. The First Complete and Unexpurgated Edition Published in the English Language (New York, 1939) 204.
the emergence of the german threat
15
result, after the war, almost every single government in Europe was faced with budget problems, increased by the many welfare payments to war widows and war invalids. There was little money to rebuild the European societies after the massive destruction. None of the governments were able to live up to the high expectations in their countries. Lastly, the First World War decimated an entire generation from a demographic point of view. In total, some 8.5 million people in Europe had been killed and over 20 million had been wounded, many of whom were crippled for life. Germany counted around 6 million dead and wounded; France around 5.5 million. An entire generation had been left behind on the battlefield. In the years following 1918, therefore, Europe was to be led by statesmen and soldiers who already had been in control during the First World War. The European population continued to expect leadership from old men such as Paul von Hindenburg and Henri Pétain. What then, were the direct consequences of the First World War for the Netherlands? At first it seemed as if the government’s policy of neutrality had been successful: the country had remained outside the theatre of war. This was generally attributed to the modernisation of the army, which on the eve of the war had led to a significant increase in combat power, and to the cautious foreign policy, which was aimed at removing any reasons a possible enemy might have for attacking the country. Only later would it emerge that it was largely thanks to the own interests of the warring nations that the Netherlands had been able to remain neutral.2 Staying out of range during the war widely confirmed the idea that for the Netherlands, the traditional policy in the areas of foreign politics and defence, a policy in which aloofness and neutrality were key concepts, was also the right choice for the twentieth century. In addition, in Europe and certainly also in the Netherlands, the atrocities of the battlefields of the First World War had fuelled the optimistic expectation that in the future nobody would settle political disputes by armed conflict anymore. In this respect also, therefore, the experiences of the war meant an enhancement of the neutrality policy, or as Minister of Foreign Affairs jonkheer H.A. van Karnebeek preferred to call it after the Netherlands joined the League of Nations, the self-reliance policy. 2 L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 1, Voorspel (The Hague, 1969) 38-71. J.A. Fortuin, “Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog”, Militaire Spectator, CXLIX (1980) 21-35. F. Snapper, “De gevechtswaarde van de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 1914-1918 en in 1940”, Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, III (1980) 30-35. R. van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946 (Amsterdam, 1999) 32.
16
chapter two Versailles
Although it was true that, after 11 November 1918, the fighting ceased in Western Europe, what was lacking was a peace treaty between the allies and the defeated nations. To this end, the leaders of the world gathered in Paris. The key players were, on behalf of the United States, the dour puritan Wilson, who wanted to punish guilty Germany and reform the world through his League of Nations; on behalf of France, the staunch nationalist Georges Clemenceau, le père de la victoire, who wanted to curb the German danger for good; and on behalf of the United Kingdom, the fickle Welshman David Lloyd George, who was really more interested in his country’s domestic politics. The eventual results of the peace negotiations, as laid down in the Treaties of Paris, the best known of which is the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, were the products of a compromise between the three allied leaders. For instance, France gave Wilson the space to achieve his League of Nations ideal, although countries such as Germany and the Soviet Union were barred from membership. In return, the Treaty of Versailles included stipulations which were to make renewed action by Germany against France impossible. Initially, France wanted to make the German Rhineland into an independent state, which would be under the supervision of the allies. When this plan was rejected by the US and Britain, at Clemenceau’s insistence the allies signed a treaty of guarantee which promised France immediate support in the event of German attack. In addition, France was given control of the coal mines in the Saarland, which was to be governed by the League of Nations, Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France and France was to receive large sums in reparation from Germany. The German army was to withdraw from the Rhineland and was not to exceed 100,000 men. The latter stipulation, however, did not spell the end of this army. As the allies had banned conscription in Germany, it became a highly skilled and professional organisation. In addition, Germany lost all its colonies, was to relinquish large areas in the east to Poland, including the mining area of Silicia, lost Danzig and was officially given the blame for the First World War. In Germany, it was therefore referred to as der große Betrug von Versailles and the Germans felt they had been unduly humiliated. In the end, the Treaty of Versailles did not bring the lasting peace which it had been intended to bring. It played into the hands of the group surrounding Ludendorff, and discredited the parties which supported the Weimar Republic and signed the treaty. Versailles was both too harsh and
In 1925, with the signature of the Treaty of Locarno, the Weimar Republic accepted its western borders. German continued to harbour objections against the border with Poland, to which it had had to cede large areas of land in 1919 (right); 19 October 1930: the National Socialist Sturmabteilung demonstrating in Neu-Brandenburg against the uniform ban (below).
18
chapter two
too weak where Germany was concerned: too harsh because it punished the Germans disproportionately for the events between 1914 and 1918, and too weak because Germany’s core was allowed to remain intact. From an economic, political and military point of view, Germany remained a potential world power, which would be sure to seek possibilities to review the Treaty of Versailles. In the end, the treaty did not provide France with the security it wanted either. The US Senate refused to ratify the treaties, so that the Franco-British-American guarantee treaty came to nothing. Therefore, when the peace treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, the French maréchal Ferdinand Foch said: “This is not peace, it is a twentyyear truce.”3
The 1920s: seeking stability International politics in the early 1920s centred around Franco-German relations. As has been said earlier, France was very disappointed by the results of the peace talks in Paris. The Rhineland had remained part of the German Reich, and the Franco-British-American treaty of guarantee had not materialised. All France could therefore do was to strive for strict enforcement of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1923, it even occupied the Ruhr area, in order to force Germany to make the reparation payments it had been ordered to pay. This resulted in a huge increase in inflation, hitting the German middle class the hardest. France also entered into alliances with the new states in Eastern Europe: an alliance treaty with Poland in 1921, with Czechoslovakia in 1924, with Yugoslavia in 1926 and with Romania in 1927. In Rapallo in 1922, Germany in turn signed a treaty with the other pariah of the international community, the Soviet Union. Both states relinquished all reparation payments, established diplomatic ties and improved their economic relationship. Close military cooperation was established in secret. German soldiers provided instruction to the Red Army and in turn were provided with training facilities, and were thus able to maintain a high standard. The tension between France and Germany was reduced significantly when the Dawes Plan, named after the American banker Charles G. Dawes, was accepted in 1924. This plan entailed France’s withdrawal from the Ruhr area, arranged the German reparation payments and made it possible for 3 See: H.L. Wesseling, Vele ideeën over Frankrijk. Opstellen over geschiedenis en cultuur (Amsterdam, 1987) 238.
the emergence of the german threat
19
the Weimar Republic to borrow significant sums of money, in order to allow the economy to recover. International politics appeared to be entering calmer waters. There was a prospect of a stable international order. A clear sign in this respect was the signing of the Treaties of Locarno in 1925. In those treaties, Germany accepted its western border as established in the Treaty of Versailles. It was also determined that Germany or France would receive military support from Britain and Italy in the event of an act of aggression by the one against the other. Interesting to note is the fact that remilitarisation of the Rhineland, if it were to occur, would be considered to be an act of aggression. The Treaties of Locarno also enabled Germany to become a member of the League of Nations. Nonetheless, ‘Locarno’ did not mean a fundamental change in international relations. The stipulations of Versailles remained in force, which was a constant source of dissatisfaction for the Germans. Germany did not accept the borders in Eastern Europe, continued to circumvent the disarmament regulations and in 1926 strengthened its relationship with the Soviet Union. Still, in 1925, there was a collective sigh of relief over ‘the spirit of Locarno’. In 1928, 65 nations even signed the Kellogg-Briand pact, deciding to abolish war as a means of resolving international conflicts. In practice, however, this pact, too, had little significance. For instance, not a single agreement was made on sanctions in the event of military aggression. The Dutch historian A.F. Manning therefore wrote: “The real value? Well, it was an example of diplomacy of the street, adopted by statesmen. A demonstration of the ancient nostalgia for peace.”4 Nonetheless, the aversion to violence that had grown since the Great War and the apparent international détente fuelled the antimilitarism already present in the Netherlands. The expansion of the fleet, considered necessary by the government and proposed in the 1922 Fleet Act, was not carried out, under massive pressure from the population. Government policy itself was also adapted to the decreased military threat. Defence expenditure remained at a low level throughout the 1920s. As a result, in 1922, the duration of the initial term of service for conscripts was limited to five and a half months, the armament was weak and growing out of date, and the enthusiasm for a career as an officer was declining. For the sake of its security, the Netherlands was hoping that a stable balance of power would be restored in Europe and had expectations, be they rather reserved, of the symbol of the apparently organised and stable world order, the League of Nations. 4 A.F. Manning, “Bankroet der optimisten. De politieke constellatie van Europa: 1933” in: A.H. Paape e.a., eds, Bericht van de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 1970-1975) 59. See also: Van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede, 73-75.
20
chapter two Fascism and National Socialism
Despite the calm on the international stage, in several countries there were large population groups who were dissatisfied with the world in which they lived. Tradesmen, small businessmen, demobilised soldiers and certain intellectuals found that the modern, capitalist and industrialised society of the twentieth century did not give them enough room to develop. Criticism of the industrial society was not a new phenomenon. One only has to think of writers such as Maurice Barrès, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Julius Langbehn and Friedrich Nietzsche, who, each in their own way, had aired their grievances over the existing society even before the First World War. After the war, the dissatisfied were to unite mainly in two large and related political movements, fascism and National Socialism. In March 1919, Benito Mussolini founded an organisation which can be considered to be the precursor of the fascist movement, the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento, a “league of combat” consisting of veterans and former socialists. This group did not have its own ideology, but was centred around the will for power and reaction against the existing social order. It was against democracy as a form of government, against capitalism, against liberalism, against communism, against internationalism and against pacifism. In 1919, Mussolini declared emphatically that fascism was comprised of actions. The people no longer needed ideologies, they needed action. After fascism had gained power in Italy in 1922, however, in the person of Mussolini, and the movement became institutionalised, an ideology of sorts emerged nonetheless. That ideology consisted of a number of elements. First of all, fascism advocated philosophical irrationalism: it doubted reason, placed great trust in intuition and strongly believed in myths such as that of the greatness of the Italian nation. It was therefore not surprising that the book Psychologie des foules (1895), by the French philosopher Gustave Le Bon, was popular among fascists and National Socialists. Another characteristic of fascism was the idea that the individual derives his value from his existence within a state. The wishes of the citizens were clearly subordinate to the interests of the state: nationalism was of essential importance to the fascists. Fascism also assumed a fundamental inequality among humans, which meant for the purpose of government that a leader with superior insight had to lead the masses. Lastly, fascism was the philosophy of terror and violence. According to Mussolini, fascism believed neither in the use nor the possibility of lasting peace. Only war would ennoble the people and give the strongest their dues. An
the emergence of the german threat
21
almost automatic result of these concepts was an extremely aggressive foreign policy, aimed at building an empire. The German version of fascism, National Socialism, added another two elements. In the first place, National Socialism was explicitly not focused on the nation state, but on people and race. According to the National Socialists, the world was populated by different races, and within the white race various so-called Unterrassen could be distinguished. Reasoning from a social Darwinist perspective, in Mein Kampf, Hitler came to the conviction that the Germanic or Aryan race was to be considered as the most gifted and most creative. The Aryan race “created culture” and as such stood above races which “maintained culture” or “destroyed culture”. According to Hitler, the culture-creating race should be refined to become a racially pure Herrenvolk, while culture-destroying races such as that of the Jews should be wiped off the face of the earth. The result of all this was the concept of Lebensraum. The superiority of the German people would lead to the annexation of surrounding states and the establishment of a thousand-year Germanic empire. This was to be achieved by fighting, which to the National Socialists meant the same as living, because after all, man was a predator. Hitler once said: “We must shake off all sentimentality and be hard. Some day, when I order war, I shall not be in a position to hesitate because of the ten million young men I shall be sending to their deaths.”5
National Socialists in power When the world economy collapsed in 1929, Germany in particular was in serious trouble. Foreign loans, essential to the German economy, were revoked and factories had to close. Six million people lost their jobs, and the middle class, which had never really recovered from the inflation of 1923, was again hit hard. As a result, few had any faith left in the democratic Weimar Republic, and political groups on the left and right of the political spectrum gained in appeal. It was Adolf Hitler who managed to strike the right note by strongly condemning the Treaty of Versailles as the source of all the misery and criticising the democracy for its inability to solve the people’s problems. He called on the German people to back him. In 1930, Hitler’s party, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) won 107 seats in the Reichstag, partly thanks to mob vio5 Quoted in: F.G. van der Poll, “Totalitaire stromingen” in: Fasen en facetten (Amsterdam, 1962) 256.
A polling station in Berlin during the Reichstag elections on 5 March 1933, the last elections to be held under the Weimar Republic.
Adolf Hitler during the Reichsparteitag of the NSDAP in Nuremberg in 1933.
the emergence of the german threat
23
lence perpetrated by its strong arm, the Sturmabteilung (SA). In 1928, the NSDAP had only had 12 seats, and it had looked as though the phenomenon Hitler was of a passing nature. In July 1932, the Nazis won as many as 230 seats, making them the largest political group in the country. In the election in November of that year, however, the growth appeared to have halted. The party lost two million votes and 34 seats. Hitler was saved by the nationalist-conservative quarter. The traditional political leaders in those circles wanted Germany restored as a great power and in Hitler they saw a useful instrument with which to channel the general discontent in Germany. On 30 January 1933, at their instigation, ageing president von Hindenburg appointed Hitler Reichskanzler. Adolf Hitler had come to power entirely legally, without ever having had the backing of the majority of the German people.The new government’s first act was to call new elections. Again, the NSDAP did not achieve a majority, despite violence, unrest and the fire in the Reichstag building, which was blamed on the communists. The party did win 44% of the seats, however. The German parliament then put itself on the sidelines, however, by passing the Enabling Act, allowing the government to take all measures “to remedy the distress of the people and the nation”. Then all political parties, except the NSDAP, were disbanded. In a very short space of time, Germany had become a dictatorial one-party state. From the very beginning, Hitler’s foreign policy was characterised by numerous declarations emphasising Germany’s peaceful intentions. For instance, Germany announced it was willing to disarm as long as it obtained equal status in the international community. As early as 1933, however, Hitler decided to abandon the disarmament talks in Geneva and also to leave the League of Nations, the first step towards a completely new foreign policy. Hitler largely removed the threat which emanated from these measures by signing a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934. Until then, the German claims to Danzig and the Polish corridor had always been considered to be the greatest threats to world peace. Now it seemed as if Hitler, no matter how far-reaching his political aims, was considering violence to be a useless instrument in foreign politics. In Germany in the meantime, Hitler dealt with Ernst Röhm’s SA, as Röhm saw an important role for his organisation in the army and posed a threat to Hitler’s position. With this action on 30 June 1934, known as the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, in which the leading figures of the SA met their deaths, Hitler was able to win over the army leadership even further. This contributed to his being able to assume and combine the posts of Reichspräsident and Reichskanzler in August 1934.
24
chapter two
In the German state ruled by Hitler as Führer, the economy was made to serve the preparations for war. The key figure in this respect was Hjalmar Schacht, who as Minister of Economic Affairs and president of the Deutsche Bank was pumping considerable amounts of Deutschmarks into the economy by funding public works, such as the construction of the Autobahnen and an increase in arms production. The leadership of the Wehrmacht, meanwhile, was happy with the new political direction, which, after all, appeared to be facilitating German rearmament, even though many officers had their reservations about the parvenu Hitler and those close to him. Almost imperceptibly, however, the German army was falling into the grasp of the National Socialists. The Luftwaffe for instance, not established until the spring of 1935, was led by Hermann Göring, the second man behind Hitler in the Nazi hierarchy, and the rapid growth of the army allowed many young officers to make promotion quickly. Career opportunities and development possibilities led to Hitler’s bid for power being able to count on increasing support within the armed forces. The image of a peaceful Germany, established after the German-Polish non-aggression treaty, suffered serious damage from Hitler’s attempts to stage a National Socialist coup in Vienna. This failed attempt at Anschluß (1934) first of all led to France’s strengthening its ties with both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and also set Mussolini’s Italy against Germany. When Hitler officially announced German rearmament and the introduction of conscription in March 1935, Italy, France and Britain even united in the so-called Stresa Front. The three countries strongly condemned the German measures and announced their backing of Austrian independence. Hitler had manoeuvred himself into an isolated position. This situation soon came to an end, however. In June of the same year, Britain and Germany signed a fleet treaty. Britain hoped to safeguard its maritime superiority in Europe for the longer term, so that it could concentrate on the Far East. The fleet treaty meant the first crack in the Stresa Front. Not that the understanding between the three countries in the Stresa Front was to hold out for very long anyway. After all, as early as 1935, Mussolini decided that, now that Austria’s independence was safeguarded, he no longer needed France and Britain. Anticipating the anger of Britain in particular, he conquered Abyssinia, present-day Ethiopia. An outraged British public demanded sanctions against Italy, but in practice there were no more than diplomatic skirmishes.
the emergence of the german threat
25
Adolf Hitler takes the salute in Nuremberg in 1935.
The Stresa Front was no more and on 7 March 1936, Hitler made use of this fact by remilitarising the Rhineland. This not only defied the Treaty of Versailles, but also the Treaty of Locarno. The German Führer was playing for high stakes. Should France have responded with military force, then the German troops would immediately have retreated behind the Rhine. France did not respond at all, however. Hitler’s gamble, against the advice of his military advisers, paid off. A demilitarised Rhineland had left the Ruhr area undefended and protected France against a German attack. Now German troops were at the French border again and the Ruhr industrial area now lay in the rear area. ‘Versailles’ had been revised for good, Germany’s self-confidence had grown and Hitler had strengthened his position with regard to the military.
26
chapter two The German Lebensraum ambitions
After his success in the Rhineland, Hitler gradually obtained a better grip on German military strategy, at the expense of the military leadership. Hitler began to unfold plans for the deployment of the armed forces for foreign conquests. These plans were a mix of the opportunistic intention of taking advantage of international crises and a grand ideological panorama. On 5 November 1937, for instance, there was a secret meeting between Hitler, his ministers of Foreign Affairs and War, Constantin von Neurath and Werner von Blomberg, respectively, and the commandersin-chief of the army, air force and navy, Werner von Fritsch, Hermann Göring and Erich Raeder. During that meeting, Hitler spoke of the necessity of acquiring Lebensraum for the German people. The future of the Third Reich was at stake and from that point on, everything was to be focused on conquering Eastern Europe, or bringing it under German influence, no later than between 1943 and 1945. That would be when Germany’s military power was at its height. First of all, Hitler announced, in preparation for further expansion, Austria and Czechoslovakia would have to fall victim to the German hunger for territory, by force if necessary. According to the Führer, a military operation in Eastern Europe could also take place earlier than 1943, in the event that France were to be beset by serious domestic social tensions, or war were to break out in the Mediterranean between Britain and Italy. Von Neurath, von Blomberg and von Fritsch had mainly practical objections to these plans of Hitler’s. They did not yet dare risk a pan-European armed conflict. Power struggles, however, formed one of the key elements of the National Socialist ideology. The critics were therefore replaced within months. Hitler himself became commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, Wilhelm Keitel was appointed Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), von Neurath was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop and von Fritsch by Walther von Brauchitsch. They were not the only ones to be put on the sidelines. After November 1937, some sixty generals were sent into retirement and replaced by more docile figures, dedicated to National Socialism. Hitler had decided that Germany would go into battle, and he had no use for a critical military. The first victim of Hitler’s expansionist dynamism was to be Austria, the country where he was born on 20 April 1889 and which he had wanted to annex in 1934. In a meeting with the Austrian chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, on 4 February 1938, Hitler demanded that Nazis be included in the Austrian government. Von Schuschnigg, however, saw through the
The Saar area was governed by the League of Nations for 15 years from 1919. A referendum in 1935 showed that 90% of the population favoured a return to the German Reich, after which German troops entered the region.
“Peace for our time.” With this message, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich on 30 September 1938. His first declaration was made at Heston airfield.
28
chapter two
intentions of his aggressive neighbour and announced a referendum on 9 March, in which the Austrians would be asked whether they would favour an Anschluß. Two days later, Hitler demanded that the referendum be postponed and when von Schuschnigg refused, he ordered the invasion of Austria. The Western European powers only offered paper objections; Italy declared it had no objections to the Anschluß. Austria was “heim ins Reich”. After Austria, it was the turn of Czechoslovakia. Hitler wished to annex those areas where the so-called Sudeten Germans lived. As these areas were where the Czechoslovakian defences lay, such an operation would also give Germany considerable influence in that country. From the spring of 1938, an atmosphere of crisis continually surrounded the Sudeten question. Britain, too, feared that war might ensue, despite the fact that the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, referred to the Sudeten question as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”. The Franco-Czechoslovakian alliance treaty of 1924, however, rendered the situation potentially explosive. To what extent, then, were Britain and France willing and able to lend Czechoslovakia military support, and how would they react to a German attack in the west? British Prime Minister Chamberlain was an avowed opponent of military involvement in any conflict on the Continent. Priority was to be given to the defence of the motherland, as well as the protection of British interests in the Middle East and the preservation of the Empire. The Chiefs of Staff therefore urged Chamberlain to avoid conflict in Europe at any cost: “without overlooking the assistance which we would hope to obtain from France and possibly other allies, we cannot foresee the time when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our trade, territory and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time.”6 For the British government, there appeared to be only one policy worth pursuing, namely the appeasement of Hitler. France’s priority in the event of a European war was the defence of its territory, and by no means the interests of countries such as Czechoslovakia or Poland. In order to halt the Wehrmacht, France had constructed an extensive line of defences along its borders with Germany and Luxembourg and its eastern border with Belgium, the Maginot Line. The line stopped, however, at la Ferté-sur-Chiers, some 25 kilometres south-east of Sedan as the crow flies, because the French high command considered the Ardennes to be unsuitable for a surprise attack by heavy German mechanised units. Moreover, in the event of a German attack, the French army 6 Quoted in: Michael Howard, The continental commitment. The dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars (Harmondsworth, 1974) 120.
After the Munich conference, German troops entered Sudetenland unhindered.
The Germans’ entering Prague on 16 March 1939 convinced the British government that the appeasement policy with regard to Germany had failed. London provided Poland and Romania with a guarantee of security and began negotiations with the French government on the deployment of a British expeditionary force to the Continent.
30
chapter two
leadership intended to establish a defensive front on Belgian territory, west of the Ardennes. Meanwhile, Hitler had demanded that Czechoslovakia cede Sudetenland to Germany, under threat of military intervention. Precisely at that critical moment, Chamberlain decided to travel to Berchtesgaden in southern Germany, where he had a meeting with Hitler on 15 September 1938. During these talks, the British Prime Minster said he did not object to annexation of Sudetenland by Hitler, as long as the latter gave the undertaking that there would be no military intervention by Germany. Initially, the German Führer appeared to agree with the British proposal, but on 22 September he announced that Czechoslovakia was to hand over Sudetenland to Germany no later than 1 October. If it did not comply, war would be the result. Europe appeared to be heading unavoidably towards armed conflict when Mussolini proposed holding a conference on the issues in Munich on 29 September. The Munich conference was attended by the leaders of Germany, Italy, France and Britain. The subject of the conference, Czechoslovakia, was not invited. At the conference, the two leaders from democratic Western Europe, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, agreed to Hitler’s demands. The despondent Czechoslovakians could do nothing except feel betrayed and accept the ‘Munich’ decisions. Back in London, however, Chamberlain received a hero’s welcome. He said he had achieved “peace with honour”. “I believe it is peace for our time”, he added. Almost everyone agreed. General Edmund Ironside, then Inspector-General of the Forces, wrote in his diary: Chamberlain is of course right. We have not the means of defending ourselves and he knows it... We cannot expose ourselves now to a German attack. We simply commit suicide if we do.7
Chamberlain was later severely criticised for his appeasement policy, but in view of the many difficulties he faced, his actions were understandable. Britain faced a great number of problems. At home there was an economic crisis, severe unrest had erupted in Palestine and in British India a strong nationalist movement had emerged, making reform there unavoidable. In addition, Japan was threatening British possessions in South East Asia and Italy posed a threat to the sea route through the Suez Canal. 7 R. Macleod and D. Kelly, eds, The Ironside diaries (London, 1962) 62. On the position of the British army during the interwar period and directly prior to the fight in 1940, see: B. Bond, The army between the two world wars 1918-1939 and C. d’Este, The army and the challenge of war 1939-1945 in: D. Chandler and I. Beckett, eds, The Oxford illustrated history of the British army (Oxford and New York, 1994) 263-278 and 279-306.
Hitler enters Danzig triumphant on 19 September 1939.
After its ultimatum had remained unanswered, the British government declared war on the German Reich on 3 September 1939. The photograph shows the proclamation being read on the steps of the Royal Exchange.
32
chapter two
The British army would simply not be able to endure a large-scale European conflict on top of all that, and appeasement therefore seemed the only way forward. Win time and strengthen the defence was the motto. Time played an important role in Hitler’s considerations as well, however. He realised that his policy of conquest might provoke France and Britain into rearming. In addition, the risk of a general European conflict was increasing. Despite Germany’s advantage, like France and Britain it was not prepared for such a conflict. It was therefore a matter of quickly achieving a series of successes against smaller powers, but at the same time not jeopardising peace in Europe as a whole. This scheme failed. Britain’s compliant attitude changed when, on 16 March 1939, despite the Munich agreement, Hitler invaded unoccupied Czechoslovakia and divided it into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and an independent Slovakia. The Führer had definitely lifted his mask and the failure of the appeasement policy had become manifest. Chamberlain now guaranteed the two Eastern European states directly under German threat, Poland and Romania, that Britain would provide military assistance if their sovereignty were threatened. After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, the French and British military leadership also held extensive talks to discuss strategic policy and London decided to send a British expeditionary force to the Continent. They were convinced that no German attack on the strong Maginot Line was to be expected and that a German advance through the Ardennes would take so long that there would be enough time for countermeasures. The Wehrmacht would therefore, as had been done in 1914, try to invade via the relatively weakly defended northern border of France. It was along this front, therefore, that the best French troops and the entire British expeditionary force would be stationed. In response to a German attack, the French and British troops would enter Belgium, which would have become an ally as a result of the German invasion. The German assault was to be halted by positions on Belgian territory and from there a counteroffensive would be launched towards the Rhineland and the Ruhr area. Without its arms industry, based in those areas, Germany would be unable to continue the war.8 As yet, however, the allied troops would not see action. Hitler was still looking eastwards. 8 For the main outline of the allied operational plans up to the commencement of hostilities, see: K.H. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (München, 1995) 100110; R.A. Doughty, The breaking point. Sedan and the fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, 1990) 8-18; P. Taghon, Mei 1940. De achttiendaagse veldtocht in België (Tielt, 1989). ����������� For a highly detailed description, see B. Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il entrer en Belgique? Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France (Paris, 2000).
the emergence of the german threat
33
The east was, after all, where the main areas lay which Germany had lost after the Treaty of Versailles: Danzig, the Polish Corridor and Silicia. Hitler assumed that invading Poland would not provoke a military response from the Western powers; after all, they had done nothing to save strategically important Czechoslovakia either. When Germany subsequently signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939, including a secret protocol dividing Poland between the two countries, Hitler appeared to have a free rein. He therefore decided to go on the warpath. After a staged ‘Polish’ attack on a German radio station in Gleiwitz, the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein in the port of Danzig opened fire on the Polish positions at a quarter to five on 1 September. At around the same time, heavy German units crossed the Polish-German border in various places. “This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our own territory”, roared Hitler in the Reichstag that very same day. “Since 5: 45 a.m. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met with bombs!”9 The German Führer had plunged his people, and with them the rest of Europe, into war. For six long years the world was to remain in the grasp of the many horrors that ensued. The Netherlands, too, was not to be spared the ravages of war.
Conclusion What, then, went wrong during the interwar period? First of all, the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles had not provided a definitive solution for the problems which had landed Europe in a large-scale military conflict in 1914. The European balance of power, which had been upset by the demographic, economic and military growth of Germany, had only been restored artificially; Germany’s potential remained intact. With its very strict conditions, the Treaty of Versailles had laid the basis for future frustrations and rendered the democratic government of the Weimar Republic suspicious in the eyes of conservative Germans. In the second place, the negative economic developments after 1914 had hit the social groups in Europe which should have formed the basis for stable social development the hardest. In both Italy and Germany, but in other countries as well, the middle classes became the victims of the high 9 “Speech by Herr Hitler to the Reichstag on September 1, 1939” in: The British War Blue Book. Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939). Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. Published online by The Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk106.asp
34
chapter two
inflation which came with the economic crises. Opportunistic politicians would use the discontent among these groups in order to gain power. Lastly, various developments in the interwar period, as well as the outcome of the First World War and the bad economic situation, allowed a number of radical right-wing movements to emerge. Once they came to power, they would pose the greatest threat to peace. The fascist and National Socialist ideologies were aggressive, aimed at conflict with a view to seizing power and to expansion. This was to cause international politics to lose all form of reason. It was up to the democracies of Europe to find an adequate response. This set them an enormous task. Not only had the international climate become grimmer, internally the governments of the European democracies were also experiencing problems. The self-confidence displayed by Germany and Italy and the way in which they tackled the economic crisis raised the question as to whether democracy was still the best and most effective form of government, and whether the future did not lie with more authoritarian political systems. This crisis in democracy was evident in the emergence of radical right-wing political parties, even outside Germany and Italy, and in the emergence of democratic reform movements. It was in the midst of all these uncertainties that the Netherlands had to find its way in the 1920s and 1930s. The Netherlands, which had managed to stay well away from European power politics for so long, was also to be confronted with the consequences of aggressive German expansion.
CHAPTER THREE
BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: THE NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Introduction The defence policy pursued by the Netherlands in the 1920s and 1930s is still considered by many Dutch people to be one of the main reasons for the defeat in May 1940. After all, it is said, not only the poor level of training and the inadequate armament of the Netherlands armed forces were the cause of the defeat, but also, and especially, the policy of neutrality. The political and military leadership had not properly interpreted the signs of the times and therefore had failed to change course when there was still time. As a consequence, the country was unnecessarily poorly prepared when it began its trial of strength with the Third Reich. It is questionable, however, whether such reproaches do justice to the options that were open to the political and military leaders in the Netherlands. A correct assessment of the defence policy therefore first requires an outline of its backgrounds and of the circumstances which faced the leaders in question. This will particularly concern the connections, or lack thereof, between three elements: the policy of neutrality, the military-strategic policy and the availability of assets with which the armed forces were to perform their tasks.
The legacy of neutrality The policy of neutrality, which was brought to an end by the German invasion in 1940, had a history which went back an entire century. The basis was laid in the 1840s, when, after the secession of Belgium, the Netherlands resigned itself to its role as a smaller power. The general opinion was that the country’s security would be best served if the Netherlands involved itself as little as possible in the differences between and aspirations of the surrounding powers. In times of tension or outright conflict,
36
chapter three
Image from a staff exercise in the northern provinces, 15 June 1932.
this policy of non-involvement took the form of neutrality. As long as the Netherlands was not attacked, it would not side with any of the warring parties and would take great care not to give offence to any power whatsoever.������������������������������������������������������������������ Should ����������������������������������������������������������������� the Netherlands be attacked nonetheless, then it would defend its sovereignty by force of arms, with the aggressor’s opponents automatically becoming allies. National defence was to have such a deterrent effect that foreign powers would think better of attacking. This was not the only basis for that deterrence, however. Political and military leaders assumed that the great European powers would not allow one another to conquer the Netherlands, as this would upset the balance of power.������������������������������������������������������������� This ������������������������������������������������������������ meant that the Netherlands could always count on assistance from allies.����������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������� Aggression against the Netherlands would almost certainly plunge a foreign power into an armed conflict with the entire alliance. This prospect, it was assumed, would act as a significant deterrent.
between hope and fear
37
Dutch security policy, therefore, was based on two main concepts: it would benefit strongly from a stable balance of power in Europe, and the neutrality was an armed neutrality.��������������������������������������� �������������������������������������� These concepts together formed the political basis for the military strategy in 1940. The Dutch historian H.W. von der Dunk referred to this basis as ‘pseudoneutralism’, as there was a considerable paradox between the non-involvement and neutrality on the one hand, and on the other hand the firm conviction that military defeat would eventually be prevented by one of the great powers.1 The political and military debates on the precise nature and size of the armed forces that would suit this strategy have therefore always been faced with the problem that it was not possible to determine unequivocally what degree of defence effort was required and sufficient. All that was certain was that, as a small power surrounded by three great ones, Germany, France and Britain, the Netherlands would never be able to maintain a defence strong enough to defend itself alone against an invasion by one of those three countries.2 That, 1 For the Dutch strategic policy in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the early decades of the twentieth century, see: W. Bevaart, De Nederlandse defensie (18391874) (The Hague, 1993); W. Klinkert, Het vaderland verdedigd. Plannen en opvattingen omtrent de verdediging van Nederland 1874-1914 (The Hague, 1992); R.P.F. Bijkerk, “Nederlands defensiebeleid in de jaren ’20. Het bestaande beeld nader bezien”, Militaire Spectator, CLXIV (1995) 90-96; R.P.F. Bijkerk, “Actueel militair verleden?”, Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht, XVII (1995-december) 19-24; R.P.F. Bijkerk, “W.F. Pop (1858-1931)” in: G. Teitler and W. Klinkert, eds, Kopstukken uit de krijgsmacht. Nederlandse vlag- en opperofficieren 1815-1955 (Amsterdam, 1997) 282-299 and R. van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946 (Amsterdam, 1999), passim. For the designation of Dutch security policy as ‘pseudoneutralism’, see: H.W. von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie: het dilemma in de jaren dertig” in: G. Teitler, ed., Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30 (Dieren, 1984) 21. For the altered strategic situation of the Netherlands in the First World War and the contacts with the surrounding powers, see: T. van Gent, Het falen van de Nederlandse gewapende neutraliteit, september 1939-mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 2009). For the strategic planning within the General Staff, also see: H. Amersfoort, Een harmonisch leger voor Nederland.���������������������������������� Oorlogsbeeld, ��������������������������������� strategie en operationele planning van het Nederlandse leger in het Interbellum (Breda, 2007). 2 The Netherlands was in a similar position to that of neighbouring Belgium, as was noted by other countries. Even before the First World War, the great French teacher and military thinker Ferdinand Foch wrote in his authoritative Des principes de la guerre (which was first published in 1903): “The situation of Belgium is known to you: a neutrality guaranteed by Europe, which is perhaps nothing more than a word, but has, in any case, hitherto guaranteed the existence of that little State; further, the immediate neighbourhood of two great Powers, Germany and France, from neither of which does any serious military obstacle separate that State, by either of which it might be easily conquered if the other neighbour, or Europe as a whole, did not intervene in the struggle. [For the Belgian Army, it would be a matter of developing a specific theory of war which] would have a welldetermined object, namely that of delaying as much as possible the advance of the invading neighbour. The study would then consist in finding out how the Belgian Army can perform such a part, by avoiding the decision by arms and adjourning the judgment of battle.” See: Marshal Foch, The Principles of War (London, 1921) 22-23.
38
chapter three
however, was a negative point of departure. There was no positive point of departure on which military planning could have been based. On the one hand, the armed forces had to be strong enough to form a deterrent. On the other hand, in view of the expected allied support, they were not required to be able to defend the country entirely by themselves. Should the deterrence fail, then the Dutch armed forces only had to be able to safeguard national sovereignty and part of Dutch territory long enough to give the allies time to come to their assistance. The objective of the military strategy was derived from the same principle. It was realistic, but hardly ambitious: gaining time. To achieve that objective, the Netherlands relied heavily on fortifications and defence lines.������������������������������������������������� The ������������������������������������������������ 1874 Fortifications Act concentrated the defence, even more so than before, on the area bordered by the coast, the Amsterdam area, the New Dutch Waterline and a southern front along the major rivers.������������������������������������������������������� This ������������������������������������������������������ area, which was soon to be known as Fortress Holland, provided good opportunities for a sustained defence and made an enemy invasion an unattractive prospect. As early as the 1840s, however, there were also those who said that part of the army should be kept mobile, rather than being tied to prepared positions and lines. King William II (1840-49) in particular was an advocate of this point of view. These troops, of which some were preferably to be activated in peacetime, would be able to operate as a forward defence in the free space outside the lines, particularly in the Achterhoek and Noord-Brabant.����������������������� In ���������������������� the nineteenth century, these plans were never implemented, but troops were earmarked to delay the enemy advance in the area between the border and the major defence lines, by means of demolition and harassment operations, allowing the mobilisation in the rear area to continue undisturbed. If they were to get into difficulties, they could then retreat behind friendly lines. Military developments abroad and a changing threat perception opened new prospects for the mobile troops. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the great powers began to attach greater importance to mobile warfare in their doctrines.������������������������������������� ������������������������������������ Future armed conflicts would no longer be centred on fortresses, but move into the open field. From now on, warfare meant manoeuvring with armies and forcing quick conclusions by means of large-scale battles.������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������� In this doctrine, which was embraced particularly in Germany and France, the offensive operation developed into the ideal of the art of warfare. For the Dutch strategists, this military trend represented both a threat and a challenge. The threat lay in what was generally referred to as the ‘strategic raid’. This would mean that a neighbouring power, without the
between hope and fear
39
slightest warning or a declaration of war, would, as it were, overrun the country directly from the barracks, and occupy it, before the Dutch army had had the chance to mobilise. As has already been mentioned, it was one of the tasks of the mobile troops to avert this danger.��������������� The �������������� opportunities lay in following the example of the great powers. From the turn of the century, the General Staff had ceased to regard one of the surrounding powers attempting to conquer the entire country as a possibility. Instead, there was the fear that Germany, France or Britain would make use of Dutch territory for their operations in the event of a large-scale conflict. This could be in Limburg, Noord-Brabant or possibly Zeeland. The staunch defence of Fortress Holland would no longer suffice against this threat. If the Netherlands was to be able to act in response to such gross violations of its territory, far from Fortress Holland, it would need to have powerful, mobile troops at its disposal. At the end of the nineteenth century, the term ‘field army’ began to appear increasingly in the debates on the tasks of the Dutch army. Supporters of the idea were of the opinion that the army organisation should have a permanent place for a strong force which was suitable for mounting a mobile defence outside Fortress Holland. This field army would have to be so well trained and equipped that it would be able to strike across long distances from a centrally located concentration area, and be able to switch from one theatre of operations to another, depending on the movements of the enemy. In this view, conscription legislation would have to be reviewed so that the conscripts were on active service long enough to be trained in the difficult mobile warfare.�������������������������������������������������������� All ������������������������������������������������������� these measures were to harmonise the army organisation, the conscription system and the contributions of the fortifications system and the field army to the national defence. The advocates of the field army partly had their way at the beginning of the twentieth century.����������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� This was possible because in the 1898-1913 period, the lengthy stalemate in the modernisation of the army organisation and the army formation system, which was still based on the 1861 Militia Act, was broken. Various ministers of war contributed, but it was Hendrikus Colijn who eventually gave shape to the system in 1911-1913. Personal conscription was introduced in 1898, and the annual contingent was increased from 17,500 men to 23,000. The duration of the conscription was five years, but in the infantry, which was the main arm, the initial term of service was shortened from twelve months to eight-and-ahalf. The schutterijen, municipal militias, were no longer of any value to modern combat and were therefore disbanded and replaced by the home guard. Every year, the senior draft of the militia was transferred to the
40
chapter three
home guard (landweer) and after another five years to the home reserve (landstorm). The home reserve comprised all ex-militiamen and ex-home guard conscripts, as well as all those who were exempted from the militia. There were more conscripts available each year than the 23,000 who were called up on active service. Due to these measures, the Netherlands now had a trained and mobilisable army (the activated, most recent draft of the militia plus the militia and home guard drafts which could be called up) of around 207,000 men. In the shape of the home reserve, there was a 160,000-strong, albeit only partially trained, army reserve, to replace combat losses and for rotation purposes. The home reserve also meant that the Netherlands now not only had personal conscription, but general conscription as well. There were sufficient numbers of trained soldiers to be able to make a distinction, even in peacetime, between fortification troops and units for the field army, so that the peacetime and war establishments were better aligned. In 1905, a fourth division was added to the field army. Almost half of the mobilisable strength was now earmarked for the field army. The command structure was improved with the introduction of the brigade level: three brigades per division, each with three regiments. The same was achieved with the establishment of a permanent field army headquarters in 1907, which also operated in peacetime. All staffs from brigade level upwards were now already in place in peacetime, so that this aspect of the transition from peace to war would run more smoothly as well. The operational possibilities of the field army were assessed from 1910, during strategic map exercises at the General Staff. The following year, the first of a series of field exercises took place, with entire divisions taking part simultaneously and simulating mobile warfare to the best possible degree. Many people were of the opinion that the favourable course of the First World War for the Netherlands was proof that the decisions made in the preceding years had been correct. It was said that the expansion of the armed forces, the improvements in the organisation and especially the manoeuvre capability of the field army, which had been concentrated south of the major rivers in 1914-1918, together had formed a deterrent which had saved the Netherlands from the carnage.3 These opinions were based on the pre-war improvements in the army and testified to a welldeveloped national self-confidence. On the other hand, they obscured the fact that the great powers, particularly the German Empire, had respected Dutch neutrality for reasons of self-interest. 3 Cf. H.P. van Tuyll van Serooskerken, The Netherlands and World War I. Espionage, diplomacy and survival (Leiden, 2001).
between hope and fear
41
After the First World War The Netherlands had not been involved in the First World War, but the sense of relief in that respect soon gave way to discord and a feeling of disorientation. The reason for this was the fact that the end of the Great War had shaken Dutch security policy to its very foundations: the balance of power in Europe had been upset drastically and the options for a credible policy of armed neutrality had decreased considerably. The Treaty of Versailles ruled out Germany as a great power, while the British cabinet, so soon after the bloody battle in northern France, was extremely hesitant towards subsequent continental commitment. In this situation, France had a free rein to subdue Germany with power politics and to dominate the continent. Minister of Foreign Affairs Herman van Karnebeek, and with him the mainstream of Dutch politics, understood that the Netherlands had lost its role as baron de balance for the time being. In the 1920s, therefore, they considered it necessary and inevitable that Germany would eventually resume it natural place as a great power. The means to that end was a peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles. As a small, non-involved power, however, the Netherlands had little opportunity to effect this independently, and would have to wait and see whether London, which had the same goal in mind, was successful. When from 1933 onwards, Germany began, less and less peacefully, to rid itself of the restrictions of Versailles, the successive Colijn governments hoped that Germany, after it had settled its grievances, would decide not to go to war and return to being a normal power in a restored balance of power. Meanwhile, the armed forces could be reinforced, to support the policy of armed neutrality. Colijn personally was worried in particular about the Japanese aspirations in the Far East. In the 1920s and 1930s, he was one of the key politicians in the Netherlands.������������������������������� ������������������������������ A member of one of the Protestant political parties, he led five governments and held various ministerial posts. Prior to his political career, from 1892 to 1909 he fought in Aceh as an officer in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, receiving the highest honour for bravery, the Military Order of William. From 1914 to 1922 he was a member of the board of directors of the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, the oil company developing the large oilfields in Sumatra. This background explains why, as a politician, Colijn continued to have a specific interest in the Netherlands East Indies. The sometimes open but usually tacit orientation towards the British continental policy of a balance of power in the 1920s and appeasement in the 1930s was the contin-
42
chapter three
uation of a nineteenth-century trend, and tied in well with the common interests in the Far East.4 The League of Nations could offer no alternative. The cabinet did not believe that the establishment of the League had changed the principle that international relations were all about power struggles.��������������� �������������� Collective security, arbitration and international law would only have any significance after a stable balance of power had been restored.������������������������� Moreover, ������������������������ collective security, which meant that all members of the League of Nations would act as one against any country which disturbed world peace, was at odds with the policy of neutrality. The Hague therefore had great doubts regarding Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which governed the composition of an armed force that would bring any aggressor into line on behalf of the League of Nations, as well as the right of League of Nations troops to passage through other members’ territory, and the imposing of economic and financial sanctions.5 From 1934, the Netherlands stated several times, with increasing emphasis, that it would decide on a case-by-case basis whether it would participate in certain sanctions.������ A ����� final argument against the League of Nations was that the countries which had emerged victorious from the First World War, and France especially, dominated the organisation. The fact that the Netherlands nonetheless joined the League of Nations in 1920 stemmed from the fear that it would otherwise end up being isolated in the international community.������������������������������������ In ����������������������������������� addition, people had not yet recovered from the shock of the First World War. Any means which could contribute to the prevention of a repeat of such an orgy of military violence and international anarchy was welcome. In that respect, the League of Nations appealed to the imaginations of many and represented hope for a better future, a future of “a peaceful world order, based on principles such as respect for international law, the scaling down of armaments, peaceful resolution of disputes and economic cooperation.”6 The task facing the cabinets of the 1920s and 1930s was not an easy one. The government’s financial position had deteriorated as a result of the war.���������������������������������������������������������������� The ��������������������������������������������������������������� underlying factor was the high defence expenditure as a result of mobilisation and the various crisis measures that had been necessary to save the country from major disruption. The anticipated post-war recovery failed to materialise. From 1920 to 1927, the Dutch economy was 4 H. Langeveld, Schipper naast God. Hendrikus Colijn 1869-1944. Deel Twee 1933-1944 (Amsterdam, 2004) 339-381, 479-487. 5 G. van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd. Van Oslostaten tot Benelux, 1930-1940 (Amsterdam and Brussels, 1985) 58. 6 Van Diepen, Voor Volkenbond en vrede, 287.
In February 1936, more money was made available for defence, when Parliament approved the establishment of the Defence Fund. Cartoon by L.J. Jordaan in the Groene Amsterdammer of 22 February 1936.
Consultations in Hotel Wientjes in Zwolle during manoeuvres which took place in Gelderland and Overijssel from 20 to 24 September 1937. Second from the left is the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General baron van Voorst tot Voorst. Opposite him, leaning forward, is Captain V.E. Nierstrasz and on the far right is Lieutenant A.H.J.L. Fiévez.
44
chapter three
in recession, not least as a result of the collapse of the German market, which was so important to the Netherlands. This was precisely at a time when the equal treatment of private and state schools and the expansion of social legislation were leading to extra expenditure.�������������� ������������� These circumstances forced the centre-right coalition parties to cut back on other parts of the state budget.������������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������������������� These cutbacks particularly hit national defence.���� ��� After all, the favourable international situation appeared to allow room for these cutbacks. In the 1920s there was no threat of war. After Hitler gained power in 1933, and thunderclouds gathered over the international skies, however, the Netherlands began to grow concerned. In her speech at the official opening of Parliament in 1934, Queen Wilhelmina said: It must be concluded, with grave concern for the future of mankind, that almost everywhere the tendency towards strong armament has been revived. The Government will do whatever lies in its power to contribute to putting a curb on that tendency.�������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������� It is, however, also obliged to take this phenomenon into account in the implementation of its plans with regard to national defence.7
It was to be some years, however, before this concern manifested itself in defence policy. The worldwide economic crisis which began in 1929, and the financial and economic policy pursued by Colijn, stood in the way of an increase in defence expenditure for some years. By now, a change began to occur among the supporters of unilateral disarmament as well. After 1918, the Liberal Democratic Union (VDB) and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP), two parties which did not bear the responsibility of government, had proved staunch supporters of increasingly drastic cutbacks on defence and these parties had adopted the emblem of the ‘broken rifle’.���������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� In 1936, under pressure from the developments in Europe, the VDB officially abandoned its pro-disarmament position. The SDAP followed suit a year later, with leaders such as Koos Vorrink, who was a captain in the Amsterdam civic guard in 1940, and H.B. Wiardi Beckman, who was a reserve lieutenant at General Headquarters, giving voice to the changing opinions.
The cupboard is bare—from 1922 to 1933 The other foundation of security policy, that of armed neutrality, also became considerably less firm in the 1920s and 1930s. After the First World 7 E. van Raalte, ed., Troonredes, openingsredes, inhuldigingsredes 1814-1963 (The Hague, 1964) 249-250.
between hope and fear
45
War, the Netherlands was faced with the task of ensuring that its army kept abreast of the military developments of the great powers. Warfare had undergone a great many changes during the Great War, as well as a huge increase in scale.�������������������������������������������������� These ������������������������������������������������� new developments, such as the tactical consequences of the use of machine guns, infantry field guns, heavy field artillery, poison gases, aircraft and the tank, had largely passed the Netherlands by. It was not immediately evident how these developments would fit into the limited Dutch framework. Nor was it easy to make decisions in this respect with regard to army strength and organisation.The challenge was to design an army system which was less expensive in peacetime than that of before 1914, and as a result of which the burden of conscription on the population was as light as possible. Nonetheless, in wartime the system would have to produce an army which followed the trend of scale increase in warfare. It was with this basis that the Ruys de Beerenbrouck government, which took office on 9 September 1918, went to work. The army plan drawn up by the Minister of War, G.A.A. Alting von Geusau, changed hardly a single aspect of Colijn’s pre-war system.�������������� ������������� His only concession was to shorten the duration of the initial term of service for conscripts. Alting von Geusau considered this to be justifiable because as yet there was no significant war threat. In addition, due to the fact that the home reserve had been called up during the mobilisation of 1914-1918, the Netherlands now had 450,000 trained soldiers. Parliament, however, was not satisfied and demanded more cutbacks. Alting von Geusau chose the honourable option and resigned in early January 1920. His successor, W.F. Pop, knew how difficult his task was going to be. He had been acting Commander-in-Chief since 11 November 1918 and Chief of the General Staff since 15 November 1919, and in those capacities he had participated in the civil-service consultations on army reform and had been involved in the extensive discussions with senior civil servants, the rest of the army leadership and the government parliamentary parties after Alting von Geusau’s resignation. These consultations had begun with an internal memorandum, which Member of Parliament and former Minister of War H. Colijn had written at the request of C.J.M. Ruys de Beerenbrouck, the Prime Minister. In the spring of 1921, Pop presented his Bill for a new Militia Act. He maintained the contingent of 23,000 men. Of that number, 15,000 were intended for the main arm, the infantry, and they could be considered fully trained after six months. They were to form the core of the army. The remaining 8,000 would only be partially trained and those who had done voluntary training prior to callup would spend even less time in the barracks, if any at all. Pop wanted
46
chapter three
to form a field army from the most recent draft of fully trained soldiers, to comprise 36 infantry battalions, half of the pre-war field army number. This reduction was compensated by doubling the strength of the artillery: two regiments of field artillery instead of one for each of the four divisions of the field army. Pop’s opting for a small, and therefore affordable, yet well-equipped army was partly in accordance with the conclusions which the French army had drawn from the First World War. In the French opinion, in the next war the artillery would be the second main arm, cooperating with the infantry.��������������������������������������������������������� Overwhelming �������������������������������������������������������� firepower would decide the battle “by wearing down the opponent”. The French 1921 combat manual referred to firepower, rather than manoeuvre, as “the main element of combat” and defined the attack as “the fire that advances” and the defence as “the fire that stops”. Only behind walls of fire would the infantry be able to move across the battlefield.�������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������� Pop was unable, however, to follow another generally accepted conclusion from 1914-1918, namely that the next war would be all about massiveness and stamina. Parliament’s desire to cut back on defence and to have the burden of conscription be as light as possible prevented it. Pop’s solution of a small moderately trained field army, with a large reserve still to be trained, did not tie in with the view that a small power should have considerable military capability in the early stages of a conflict in order to have any chance of success against the armed forces of a great power. Large reserves would be of no significance if the armed forces were destroyed in the first battle. When he realised in July 1921 that his proposal stood no chance in Parliament, and it became clear that the cabinet did not want to resign over the matter, Pop resigned. His successor, J.J.C. van Dijk, had to find another way out of the same paradox of requirements as his predecessors had been faced with.���������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� Unlike his predecessors, Van Dijk was to succeed in designing an army system which was politically acceptable and also met the minimum requirements on the military side. Van Dijk let go of Pop’s distinction between the core army and the largely untrained reserve. He reverted to the pre-war large ‘single army’, but that meant he could not avoid making greater concessions with regard to the size of the contingent, the duration of the initial term of service and a more limited strengthening of the artillery. It was with this army system, based on Van Dijk’s law of 4 February 1922 “comprising a new regulation of conscription”, that the Netherlands would enter into the confrontation with the German Wehrmacht in 1940.
between hope and fear
47
The 1922 law allowed a mobilisable army of around 250,000 men to be formed. This would bring the field army back to its pre-war strength of 72 infantry battalions. Due to a later amendment to the law, the total army strength was increased, comprising at least 280,000 men in May 1940.8 This strength was built up out of a large number of relatively small annual drafts, namely fifteen drafts to fill the war establishment, with another five drafts from the oldest trained drafts to form a reserve. Van Dijk achieved this by disbanding the home guard and the home reserve and merging them with the militia. A maximum of 19,500 conscripts would be called up for active service each year.������������������������������������������ The ����������������������������������������� advantage was that the burden of conscription on the population was kept to a minimum, because many young men did not need to be called up and therefore were declared extraordinary conscripts. Moreover, a relatively small draft was less expensive than a large one, as it required fewer instructors and a smaller infrastructure. There were, nonetheless, a number of objections to this system. Many men were not called up for national service, resulting in a certain social inequality. In addition, it would become apparent that in 1939 a great many husbands and fathers were mobilised, but many unmarried young men escaped mobilisation. Purely from a military point of view, it would have been better to opt for a smaller number of larger annual drafts. The advantages would have been the fact that the army which was mobilised would have been “younger” and therefore more flexible, and that a larger part of the population would have been familiar with the military organisation.������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������ In the circumstances of the 1920s, however, the possibility to reduce “the personal and financial burden of military service” was decisive.9 Attempts were made, however, to remove the objections by, if possible, concentrating the older drafts of conscripts in certain corps which were not intended for the front line, the so-called high-numbered regiments. The law also prescribed the duration of the initial term of service. Since 1901, it had been twelve months for some conscripts and eight-and-a-half for others. The Covenant of the League of Nations determined that if two countries wished to settle a dispute by force of arms, they would have to wait for a period of three months after an arbitral decision before opening hostilities. Van Dijk saw this as an argument in favour of shortening the initial term of service by three months.10 For a number of arms and 8 A.J. Groustra and P.W. Oesterhoff, De dienstplichtwet voorzien van aanteekeningen (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1922) 31 and F. Snapper, “Enige sterktecijfers betreffende de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 1840-1940”, Mededelingen Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf, IV (1981) 91. 9 Queen’s Speech of 21 September 1920, in: Van Raalte, Troonredes, 227. 10 ��������������� J.J. �������������� de Wolf, Mars in Cathedra 1865-1965 (The Hague, 1965) 67.
48
chapter three
branches, including the infantry, it was reduced to just five-and-a-half months. The conscripted officers and NCOs, the mounted artillery and cavalry, and certain categories of soldiers with specialist jobs served longer, up to a maximum of eighteen months. Incidentally, it was possible to shorten the initial term of service by four months by means of the ‘preliminary exercise’, that is for the soldiers who were assigned to an arm or corps to which this rule applied. This preliminary exercise took place on a voluntary basis, in the soldiers’ own free time, in order to alleviate the burden of conscription and to save money. The preliminary exercise proved not to work well as part of the training system, however, and the costs turned out to be higher than expected as well.���������������������� ��������������������� It was therefore discontinued in 1936. The short duration of the initial term of service was a concession to the wishes of society. Military experts thought it was too short, but as long as the time was put to good use, in their opinion it would still be possible to teach the conscripts elementary military skills. To that end, they were to spend the first and last six weeks of their initial term of service at camps in Ede and Nieuw-Milligen for intensive training in the field. In practice, however, this did not materialise. As regards the refresher training exercises, the law stated that their maximum duration was to be 40 days, generally divided over two periods, and that they were to take place within six years of the year of the initial term of service.���������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������������� That meant that there were no more refresher training exercises after the sixth year. The level of training of the older drafts dropped considerably. When various refresher training exercises were shortened, or even cancelled completely, as a result of cutbacks, it meant yet another weakening of the level of training. The 1922 Conscription Act separated the peacetime establishment from the wartime establishment. Unlike the situation before 1914, when mobilisation meant bringing the standing units up to war strength, those units would now be formed from scratch in the event of mobilisation. A major disadvantage was that they would be lacking in cohesion, which had an adverse effect on the combat power. As the army consisted entirely of training units in peacetime, there were no combat-ready troops present. The system also made it very difficult to exercise with large units. The result of all this was a shortage of experienced commanders in the wartime army, which was to become clearly apparent in 1940. From 1922 onwards, another reorganisation was undertaken. Various measures were taken to improve the flexibility of the army and its command and control.����������������������������������������������� For ���������������������������������������������� instance, Fortress Holland Command was es-
Prince Bernhard inspecting the First Armoured Vehicle Squadron in 1936. The squadron was equipped with the Landsverk M-36 armoured vehicle.
The car workshop of the engineers, 1939.
50
chapter three
tablished in 1922. In addition, the Field Army now comprised four division groups (called corps from 1 July 1939) of two divisions each, while the manoeuvre element of the Field Army was increased in 1924 with the establishment of the Light Brigade. Attempts were also made to improve the armament. For instance, in 1922, Van Dijk launched a proposal for an Armament Fund. The fund, which was to contain some 105 million guilders, eventually did not materialise, however.������������������������ ����������������������� Subsequently, the decision was made to spend 60 million guilders in the 1925-1931 period on improvements to the army, but this did not happen either. In those years, there was only one-and-a-half million guilders available every year for armament. Nonetheless, the Ministry managed to order 10-Veld field guns in 1927. The M20 light machine-gun and the Stokes-Brandt mortar were also introduced. The limited financial resources exacted a great deal of the army’s ability to improvise. For instance, the 8-Staal guns, which had been deemed outdated and allocated to the gun reserve, were upgraded in 1927. A year earlier, the 7-Veld field guns had been modified. Further proposals by the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General P.J.H. van der Palm, for additions to the armament and equipment were rejected in 1927. In 1928, the 1922 Conscription Act was amended, separating the conscription from the draft year. That meant that the conscripted officers and NCOs could be called up before the rank and file. This did not change the number of men available for conscription, however. The 1922 law had made its mark on the developments, because it had established the numerical strength and the peacetime and wartime establishments. In this context, Lieutenant General H.A. Seyffardt, who had succeeded Van der Palm as Chief of the General Staff in May 1929, remarked: In 1922, the wartime organisations were established on the basis of the most recently quoted strength. At the time, however, it was not possible to take into account all factors to which modern wartime organisations must conform. In addition, in later years new organisations were established, the personnel requirements of which could not have been taken into account in 1922. Various staffs had to be expanded, the anti-aircraft artillery, the searchlight battalions for the air defence and the motorcycle service in particular set higher personnel requirements than had initially been expected; new machine-gun organisations were established and existing ones were expanded; the organisation for the division group artillery, the infantry guns, the pioneer and pontoon battalion of the Light Brigade, and the company of the transportation corps etc. were established.11 11 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Report ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� of the Chief of the General Staff, 14 May 1930, in: Archief van het Kabinet der Koningin, The Hague, Litt. Z.G., no. 42.
between hope and fear
51
In the 1920s the Netherlands endeavoured, with the measures referred to by Seyffardt, to maintain an army which would remain a modest reflection of the armies of the great powers, on a scale befitting a small power. The problem was that this had to be done within the confines of the available budget, more specifically within the scope of the 1922 Conscription Act, which fixed the strength of the army at a maximum of 250,000 men. The result was that the continuing modernisation of the army systematically came at the cost of the traditional combat power, namely that of the infantry. The army that resulted from the 1922 army system was supposed to carry out the operation plans of the General Staff. In view of the policy of neutrality, that staff had to take a various number of war scenarios into account. A detailed defence plan was prepared for each of those scenarios. The Field Army would take up a certain position, referred to as a concentration, depending on the situation. In 1925, five such concentrations had been prepared:12 a. a concentration near the Wilhelmina Canal, in the event of a conflict with a power to the south; b. a concentration in eastern Noord-Brabant, in order to take action against a passage through southern Limburg; c. a concentration at the river IJssel, in the event of a conflict with an eastern neighbour; d. a concentration behind the New Dutch Waterline; e. a concentration on the coast and in Zeeland. From 1928, the staff gave these various concentration plans for the Field Army colours, with Concentration Blue applying to an attack by Germany, scenario c. Despite the disarmament of Germany, in the 1920s the General Staff continued to bear in mind the possibility that the Netherlands could be defeated quickly, if its eastern neighbour were to acquire a strong army again. After all, the Netherlands had no combat-ready troops at its disposal. In order to solve this problem (referred to as a ‘strategic raid’), the Conscription Act included a stipulation that in the event of heightened tension, certain categories of conscripts would be called up, to safeguard the general mobilisation. From 1926, this was referred to as ‘strategic precautions’. 12 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� C.M. Schulten, “Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap; de mobilisaties in 1870, 1914 en 1939” in: C.A. Kuyt, ed., Nederland mobiliseert (The Hague, 1985).
52
chapter three
In 1931, the Welter Commission was established, which was tasked with making proposals for decreases in government expenditure, in view of the poor economic situation. Contrary to what was assumed later, the sole purpose of the commission was not to cut back on defence expenditure. Its establishment was, in fact, a turning point in the long series of cutbacks in the defence budget. The commission’s report showed that, with the existing organisation, there were scarcely any possibilities left to reduce the national defence. The only significant cutback for defence was on the salaries, which applied to all government employees.������������� Other ������������ ministries, such as Education, Water Management, and Labour, Trade & Industry had to endure further reductions. It is often thought that the state of the army during a large part of the interwar period was the result of the position held by the left-wing parties, whose watchword was “Not a single man and not a single cent for militarism”. This was only partly true. The social-democrats (SDAP) and the progressive liberals (VDB) did not govern for the greater part of those years. The Christian-democrats, who held a key position in politics and formed the successive cabinets, always supported the cutbacks on defence. The cabinet held the view that expenditure for the army could be limited to the bare necessities, as long as the Netherlands’ neutrality and sovereignty were not compromised.13 It must be noted, however, that there were no signs of increased tension in international relations at the time.
Turning point In 1933, the Netherlands was still in a depression.������������������������ ����������������������� The country was suffering under the poor economic climate and a high unemployment rate. In military circles, the realisation grew that the formation and organisation of the army, developed in 1922, had not led to the desired result due to the cutbacks. In September 1933, the cabinet established a commission which was to design an organisation for the army both in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands East Indies, which would save 20 to 30 million guilders in defence expenditure. This commission, chaired by A.W.F. Idenburg, considered reductions in the wartime establishment to be unjustifiable, however, and only saw possibilities for saving money on the peacetime establishment. Not until the autumn of 1935 were these proposals for the 13 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For the viewpoints of the political parties, see: J.A.M.M. Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum” in: G. Teitler, ed., Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30 (Dieren, 1984) 42-62.
Exercise with searchlights at the Kromhout Barracks in Utrecht, 16 April 1939.
Queen Wilhelmina visiting units of the First Corps in Haarlem on 4 April 1940.
54
chapter three
peacetime organisation adopted.����������������������������������������� They ���������������������������������������� included the introduction of a system in which NCOs became civil servants after a number of years,14 and the discontinuation of the preliminary exercise. In the meantime, a number of events had taken place which had increased international tensions considerably. They were the failure of the disarmament conferences in 1932 and 1933, and the rise of Hitler’s Germany. Major General I.H. Reijnders, who had succeeded Seyffardt as Chief of the General Staff in 1934, was therefore tasked by the Minister of Defence in early 1935 with making proposals for the improvement of the defence. In February 1935, Reijnders submitted a memorandum which packed quite a punch.������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������������� It was based on a long-term study by the General Staff of the latest developments in strategy and demonstrated an acute insight into the consequences of modern warfare for the Netherlands.15 Reijnders began with the assertion that Germany’s military power had grown exceptionally since the country had left the League of Nations, reintroduced conscription and freed itself from the other stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. He drew the conclusion that a European war would in time “have to be considered as a very realistic possibility”. Reijnders also remarked that, in the event of a German offensive against France, Dutch territory, unlike in 1914, would probably be violated, as a result of the increase in scale which warfare had since undergone.16 In order to increase combat power, Reijnders advocated an increase in the annual contingent of conscripts, an increase in the level of training and an improvement of the materiel and equipment. In November 1935, the cabinet, led by Prime Minister H. Colijn, decided to introduce a bill for the establishment of “the fund to improve the materiel and equipment of the army and of the navy insofar as it concerned the coastal defence of the Netherlands”.17 The bill was passed on 18 February 1936. In total, this Defence Fund amounted to 53.4 million guilders, 31 million of which was 14 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� This ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ system was the regulation by law of the transfer of (career) NCOs to civil service jobs.�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Conscript NCOs in the rank of sergeant, who had served six years on actual service, were entitled to an appointment as a career NCO or a civil servant in a certain number of jobs. Other categories were marines, corporals of the police troops, marechaussees and soldiers of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. See: J. Vennik, Het capitulantenreglement 1935. Toegelicht en van aanteekeningen voorzien (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1935). 15 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� claim by L. de Jong that the pre-war military leadership should be blamed for a lack of vision can therefore be refuted. See: L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Deel 1. Voorspel (The Hague, 1969) 636-637; and: G. Teitler, “De krijgsmacht als Cassandra” in: Teitler, Tussen crisis en oorlog, 70-87. 16 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ I.H. ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Reijnders, “Paraatheid Ned.��������������������������������������������� Weermacht”, �������������������������������������������� February 1935, in: Documentatie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie Den Haag (DC-NIHM), Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II, Nederland 1922-1938, box 405, file 1. 17 �Keesings Historisch Archief 1935, 2060.
between hope and fear
55
for the army.�������������������������������������������������������������� The ������������������������������������������������������������� main points that required urgent attention were anti-aircraft assets, aircraft, infantry guns and munitions. Effecting the planned materiel investments would take a considerable amount of time.�������� ������� Immediately significant were the improved measures against a strategic raid from the east.�������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������� In 1935 and 1936, at Reijnders’ proposal, casemates with permanent surveillance were built near the main bridges over the IJssel, the Maas-Waal Canal and the Maas, vastly increasing the defensive capability of these water obstacles. Personnel of the Corps of Police Troops manned the casemates. The Defence Fund in fact formed a beginning for the improvements to the Dutch army. These plans, which also received support from the VDB and the SDAP, which until then had been strongly opposed to armament, included the establishment of permanently active territorial commanders, the expansion of the refresher exercises and an amendment to the Conscription Act in 1938. The annual contingent of 19,500 men was increased to 32,000 and the initial term of service was increased from five-and-half to eleven months. The latter measure meant that the armed forces had combat-ready troops at their disposal, as the infantry conscripts received their training with the first battalion of the regiment and then served for six months with the second battalion, which was given combat-ready status from then on.��������������������������������������������������������� In �������������������������������������������������������� addition, the size of the army increased with the arrival of larger drafts. The downside was that the problems with the initial term of service and the command in wartime were growing, as the professional officers and NCOs, small as their numbers were, had to be divided over a greater number of troops. The army leadership compensated for this somewhat by allowing reserve officers to become professional servicemen. As early as 1937, General Reijnders set out in an urgency programme what needed to be procured: artillery, anti-aircraft guns, antitank guns, aircraft, tanks and armoured vehicles.18 The procurement of the materiel met with obstacles, which led to delays in the introduction. The arms race had now taken on a more general nature, and the demand for arms was therefore great.�������������������������������������������������������� As ������������������������������������������������������� the Netherlands was a trend follower and did not begin rearming until a later stage, and had no major weapons industry of its own, the shortage on the international arms market formed a major obstacle. The problems increased when Germany later prohibited arms exports. The air defence, which was part of the army, was vastly improved in 1938 with the establishment of the Air Defence Command, commanded 18 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������������� I.H. Reijnders, “Urgentieprogramma”, 4 February 1937, in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II. Nederland 1922-1938, box 405, file 15.
56
chapter three
by the competent Major General P.W. Best. The aviation brigade, the antiaircraft artillery and the searchlights, the aircraft warning service and the commands of the air-defence sectors were brought together in a single organisation.���������������������������������������������������������������� It ��������������������������������������������������������������� was well organised, but its combat power left much to be desired.�������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������� Despite the fact that the importance of good air defence was recognised, the air fleet was not very large in 1940: 125 aircraft, 60 of which were obsolete. There were also insufficient numbers of anti-aircraft guns. The Royal Netherlands Navy played a modest role in the defence of the Netherlands. After all, its main task was in the Netherlands East Indies. During the interwar period, the main issues were the 1923 Fleet Act and the 1938 Battle Cruiser Plan. These, however, were fleet plans which were mainly of interest to the overseas empire. In the Netherlands, the navy’s tasks included securing minefields and reconnaissance with regard to enemy landing fleets. Maintaining neutrality in the Dutch coastal waters was also part of its task. The actual defence of the motherland was in the hands of the army, where the following command structure existed before the mobilisation: the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the Field Army both came directly under the authority of the Minister of Defence, as did the Chief of the Navy Staff. The army was therefore led by two authorities, on an equal level.������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������ This meant that there was a risk of disputes over competency and disagreement on the manner in which the country should be defended. The latter problem would become more acute in the second half of the 1930s, as a result of the German threat. In the second half of the 1930s, willingness was growing among the Dutch population and the politicians to establish a more powerful defence. Improvement measures were therefore taken, but they generally did not have sufficient effect. The main problem was the fact that in the design of the 1922 system, and particularly in the hollowing out that occurred later, there was insufficient room to quickly turn the peacetime army into a powerful wartime force if the international situation demanded it. This would have required a larger number of professional officers and NCOs, a considerable pool of well-trained reserve personnel and a substantial materiel reserve.
Rising tensions In early September 1938, tensions in Europe were rising so fast that in the Netherlands, too, military preparatory measures were unavoidable, but the cabinet and Parliament had already taken the necessary steps much ear-
Prince Bernhard receiving a briefing during manoeuvres in the Peel area on 9 October 1939. Opposite him, wearing a flat cap, is Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, Inspector of the Cavalry and Commander of the Light Division.
Exercise with a smoke screen in front of a Carden Loyd tracked armoured vehicle. Five of these vehicles were purchased in the early 1930s, to counter ‘serious disturbances’. They were assigned to the Mobile Artillery Corps.
58
chapter three
lier. This need not come as a surprise. As has been discussed earlier, Dutch security policy was based on maintaining strict neutrality and non-involvement, whilst at the same time assuming that in the event of an enemy attack, the country would be able to count on allied support. On the one hand, this policy was self-contradictory, on the other hand clever use was being made of the European balance of power for the Netherlands’ own security. During the 1914-1918 mobilisation, it had proved to be a useful point of departure for military-political policy. Thanks to skilful political and diplomatic play, always supported by military measures, and always making good use of the assumed German and British reluctance to open up a new front in the Netherlands, the Dutch government had managed to maintain neutrality until the end of the war, albeit with difficulty at times. In the second half of the 1930s, it became increasingly clear that Europe was heading for a new war between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other hand. The Dutch government was to maintain formal neutrality until 10 May 1940. The difference compared with the period before and during the First World War was that this time it would also actively seek certain guarantees from France and Britain before the outbreak of war regarding military support in the event of a German attack. These attempts, obviously, took place in secret so as not to jeopardise the official policy of neutrality. In this period, the Dutch army leadership considered a German attack to be the most likely. In addition, they assumed that, unlike the situation in the 1914-1918 period, it was now no longer likely that the Netherlands would be able to stay out of the impending war. This new situation called for a more active policy of neutrality than before. From a military point of view, the problem lay in the fact that the strategic position of the Netherlands had changed during the interwar period. The importance of the Netherlands in the event of a new war between Germany on the one hand and a coalition consisting of France, Britain and Belgium on the other hand increased for all parties during those years. In the first place, France and Belgium strengthened their border defences in the 1930s. From 1930 onwards, France worked on the construction of the Maginot Line and Belgium built defence works in the Ardennes, along the Meuse and the newly dug Albert Canal between Liège and Antwerp. Consequently, it was likely that a German offensive against France would attempt to circumvent those obstacles in the north by means of an offensive across Dutch territory, through Noord-Brabant and on to Flanders. Another possibility was that, prior to such an offensive against France, Germany would first seize control of the Netherlands in
between hope and fear
59
a separate operation. In either case, the Netherlands would become more vulnerable to a German attack and, consequently, the question as to what place the Netherlands should have in their operation plans became a more one pressing for the coalition members. That twofold effect was also a factor in another issue. The importance of the Netherlands for the warfare of the great powers increased as a result of the rapid development of strategic air power in and after the First World War. It would be much easier for the RAF to strike the German war industry in the Ruhr area from Dutch airfields than from the other side of the North Sea. Conversely, the Luftwaffe would be able to establish an air warning system in the Netherlands to defend the Ruhr area, while the conquest of the Netherlands would allow Germany to deny the RAF the use of Dutch airfields. As a result of these two developments, in the run-up to the Westfeldzug, France, Britain and Germany would therefore be putting a great deal of thought into deciding which approach to adopt towards the Netherlands. This also forced Belgium, in a similar position to the Netherlands, to determine its position. The Dutch political and military leadership were only too well aware of these developments. This explains why, in the second half of the 1930s, the Netherlands increasingly maintained diplomatic contacts behind the scenes with all the surrounding powers in order to sound out their possible courses of action towards the Netherlands in the impending war. Regarding France and Britain, the question was to what extent they would be willing to give the Netherlands guarantees prior to the commencement of hostilities. For their part, these countries were trying to find out whether the Netherlands would maintain its neutrality or choose sides in the event of a war. All this activity did not, however, result in the Netherlands maintaining its neutrality, as had been the case in 1914-1918, nor did it lead to an alliance between the Netherlands and one of the warring parties prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The reason for this was different for each of the countries involved. The British were greatly interested in using the Dutch airfields, but as long as the Netherlands did not give up its neutrality, they were reluctant to make any commitments regarding support for the Netherlands, both due to a lack of resources and on the grounds that military support would probably not be able to prevent a Dutch defeat against Germany. Any materiel and British units that had been supplied would then possibly fall into German hands. France shared the Dutch analysis that Noord-Brabant was likely to be the first theatre in the German offensive, but was initially more concerned with what to do about Belgium after the latter had terminated
60
chapter three
its military cooperation with Paris in 1936. The French military planners would eventually conclude that the allied front had to be extended into Dutch territory. This decision, which was preceded by arduous discussions and disagreement, was not reached until shortly before May 1940. France’s own interests were decisive in this respect because, like London, Paris expected the Dutch contribution to the allied war effort to be limited. Over time, the way in which the Netherlands figured in the German military plans was to vary from merely making use of the Maas crossing at Maastricht, without any further breach of neutrality, to conquering the entire country. In the end, however, the interests of the Luftwaffe were to tip the balance in favour of the latter option. In this case, too, the strength of the Dutch defence against a German attack hardly carried any weight. In the end, Belgium and the Netherlands had too little to offer one another from a military point of view to persuade each other to make cooperation commitments, either openly or in secret, prior to the commencement of hostilities. Under the given circumstances, there was little that the secret diplomatic dealings with the allies could yield for the Netherlands and, for its part, the Netherlands did not have much to offer the other parties either. The countries thus kept in contact, each waiting for the other to make a move to break the deadlock. This continued until, in the early morning of 10 May 1940, Germany drove the Netherlands and the allies into each other’s arms. A policy of neutrality does not only consist of secret diplomatic talks and sounding out each other’s intentions, however. Visible signs of determination and the will to defend that neutrality by force of arms are equally crucial factors. For instance, in October 1937, a number of units had already carried out a trial mobilisation. Austria’s Anschluß with Germany in March 1938 had led to amendments to legislation being fast-tracked, with the 38/I draft serving as second battalion with the regiments and the conscripts from the 38/II draft (March 1938) forming the first battalions. As a result, for the first time in years, the Netherlands had combat-ready units at its disposal. On 27 September 1938, in response to the continuing Sudeten crisis, telegram O was issued, containing the order to “take positions”.��������� This �������� ordered the border battalions, formed by the combat-ready second battalions, to take up their positions in the border regions. Together with the other peacetime units involved in this strategic defence, the border battalions now came under the command of the territorial commanders, the Commander of Fortress Holland, the Commander of the Den Helder Posi-
between hope and fear
61
tion and the Commander in Zeeland. The commanders took the necessary measures to complete the strategic defence. As a consequence, a number of exercises, such as that of the Light Brigade, were interrupted or even cancelled. Between 15 and 19 September, before telegram O was issued, a number of units had already taken part in an exercise in ‘strategic defence’. On 12 September, live ammunition had even been issued to the combatready battalions, and there were trains ready for mobilisation transport. In addition to telegram O, telegram P was also issued on 27 September 1938, which in fact was a prior warning of the proclamation of the Extraordinary Call-up for External Security (BOUV).��������������������� This �������������������� BOUV was initiated by telegram Q, which was issued on 28 September at 04.20 hrs. This mobilised not only seventeen battalions, but also all coastal artillery and the entire air fleet.������������������������������������������������������� Under ������������������������������������������������������ cover of the border battalions, it placed a protective sphere, as it were, over the country, under which the general mobilisation and concentration could take place.19 This system provided the cabinet with a flexible instrument with which to maintain neutrality.������� It ������ allowed border troops to be positioned in all directions and the country to be brought into a state of defence, without having to decide upon general mobilisation immediately. Mobilisation would result in the disruption of daily life, could not be sustained indefinitely and might create an impression abroad of hostile intent, provoking a preventive strike. Telegram A, the warning telegram for mobilisation, was also issued on 28 September, but in view of the result of the Munich Conference, it was decided not to issue telegram B, which was to order preliminary mobilisation. Telegram A was retracted on 3 October. The next day, those who had been called up by telegram Q returned to their mobilisation centres. On 6 October, the units which had reported for duty after telegram O were directed back to their peacetime locations. Tensions mounted considerably again after Italy invaded Albania on 7 April 1939, and telegram O was issued again. Experience had shown, however, that the telegrams should be issued at longer intervals.������������ After ����������� telegram P had been issued the same day, telegram Q was issued on 10 April and the second BOUV was in place. As in 1938, telegram A was issued, but retracted after considerable time, on 27 May. The BOUV remained in force, however. Although the numerical strength was decreasing due to all kinds of leave regulations, the state of alert regarding a possible strategic raid was maintained. 19 ������������������ ����������������� J.J.C.P. Wilson, Vijf oorlogsdagen en hun twintigjarige voorgeschiedenis (Assen and Baarn, 1960) 42.
62
chapter three
The Polish crisis again increased the risk of war. After the soldiers from the units under the BOUV who were on leave had been called back, telegram A was issued on 23 August. That was soon followed, on 24 August, by telegram B, which ordered preliminary mobilisation on 25 August. On that day, a number of categories of officers and NCOs, administrative personnel and quartermasters were mobilised. This was done with a view to the proclamation of the general mobilisation, which was done on 28 August by means of telegram C. The first day troops reported for duty was 29 August. The general mobilisation did not take into account the declaration by the German envoy J. Graf von Zech on 26 August to Queen Wilhelmina and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eelco van Kleffens, that Germany would respect Dutch neutrality.20 Meanwhile, also on 28 August, the Chief of the General Staff, General Reijnders, had been appointed Commander-inChief of Land and Sea Forces (OLZ).�������������������������������� This ������������������������������� changed the command structure. In the wartime establishment, that is to say after the proclamation of the general mobilisation, the OLZ stood above the other commanders in the chain of command. The OLZ did, however, report to the Minister of Defence.������������������������������������������������������������� The ������������������������������������������������������������ mobilisation, which was well prepared, went entirely according to plan. The soldiers reported to a number of mobilisation centres, where they received a medical examination and were issued with weapons and equipment. The next phase was to establish Concentration Blue. Transport to the positions did not pose too many problems either, so that on 3 September, the 280,000 troops had reached their war locations.
The military geography of the Netherlands As does any operation plan, the Dutch plan had to take into account a great many factors of influence. One of those factors was the geography of the country. The German plan of attack also had to allow for the specific characteristics of the Dutch landscape.������������������������������� In ������������������������������ order to understand the debate on the Dutch operation plan in the late 1930s, it is important to look briefly at the military geography of the Netherlands and its impact on the defence of the country. The Netherlands lies at the edge of the European continent and is bordered by the North Sea to the north and west. It borders Belgium to the south and Germany to the east. The territory does not cover a very large area. The longest distance from east to west as the crow flies is around 20 ���������������������������������� The ��������������������������������� scene has been described in, inter alia, C. Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Krijgshaftig in een vormeloze jas (Amsterdam, 2001) 263.
between hope and fear
63
160 kilometres, and from north to south it is around 250 kilometres. The shape of the country is very irregular. A former sea arm, the Zuiderzee, penetrates deeply into the territory. The construction of the IJsselmeer Dam between 1927 and 1932 closed it off from the sea, and since then it has been known as the IJsselmeer.������������������������������������ ����������������������������������� In the far south-west, in the provinces of Zeeland and Zuid-Holland, several islands lie in the delta of the major rivers, and in the far south-east, along the river Maas, lies the long and narrow province of Limburg, connecting the ancient Maas fortress of Maastricht with the rest of the country. In that area, the Netherlands separates Belgium from Germany. The country is divided into two by the basin of the major rivers Rhine, Waal and Maas and their estuaries in the Hollands Diep and the Haringvliet. Part of the country lies below sea level, namely large sections of the delta islands and the land west of a north-south line through Utrecht, from the IJsselmeer to the major rivers. Large parts of the north of the country are also below sea level.������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ Also, large sections of the land surrounding the rivers lie below the average water level of the rivers. The rest of the country, south of the rivers and east of Utrecht, is above sea level. These are mainly elevated, dry areas consisting of sandy soil. An exception is the Peel area, an elongated marshland in the east of the province of NoordBrabant. The heart of the country lies in the west, encircled by the imaginary line through Amsterdam-Utrecht-Rotterdam-The Hague. In the interwar period, some 40% of the population lived in this area. It contained the key centres of trade and industry, and the two main ports, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.������������������������������������������������������������������� The ������������������������������������������������������������������ latter was, and is, also the capital city.�������������������� The ������������������� seat of government was, as it is today, in The Hague.����������������������������������� ���������������������������������� Utrecht was an important intersection of roads, railways and waterways. The Netherlands had maintained a concentrated defence since the middle of the nineteenth century. That meant that only the heart of the country would be defended to the last. From the 1880s on, this area was referred to as Fortress Holland. The coast formed its western front, and its southern front comprised the river Waal and the Hollands Diep and Haringvliet waterways. The north was covered by the IJsselmeer and, after the construction of the IJsselmeer Dam, by the fortifications at Kornwerderzand at the eastern end of the dam. The eastern front of Fortress Holland consisted of a line of forts and inundations running through Utrecht: the New Dutch Waterline. Within Fortress Holland lay the Defence Line of Amsterdam, a circular position around the capital providing the Dutch army a final refuge from any superior enemy.
64
chapter three
The area around the major rivers formed a strong, defensible barrier against any attack on Fortress Holland from the south, from Belgium or France for instance. For an attacker from the east, i.e. Germany, the river area formed a strategic boundary. Any attack on Fortress Holland would have to take place to the north or south of it. The river area itself was not suitable for an advance from the east involving a sizeable force, as there was too little room to manoeuvre. Both south and north of the major rivers, the elevated sandy ground was much better suited for an attack. There, the Dutch defence made use of natural obstacles.������������������ ����������������� North of the rivers, those obstacles were the river IJssel, the Gelderse Vallei, which contained the Grebbe Line, and the eastern edge of the polder area of Holland, where the New Dutch Waterline had been constructed. South of the rivers, the first defence line was formed by the river Maas. Behind it lay the Peel marshland, also easily defensible. The most direct and most logical path of attack from the east was north of the major rivers. It was this axis of advance on which the Dutch defence concentrated, which explains the positions of the IJssel Line, the Grebbe Line and the Waterline.���������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� By comparison, the Netherlands was poorly defended south of the major rivers. If an attack from the east were to take place by that route, it would therefore initially be successful. In order to advance into Fortress Holland, however, the attacker would eventually have to cross through the river area and the further west he advanced, the more difficult that would be.
Strategic policy On 3 September, the day when Britain and France declared war on Germany, the entire Dutch army had been mobilised, but the question was whether they were also prepared for war. The period following September 1939 was characterised by the construction of positions and the conducting of exercises. The new Minister of Defence in the new cabinet of jonkheer D.J. de Geer, which had taken office in August, was Lieutenant Colonel A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn of the General Staff. From 1934, he had worked alternately for the Field Army and the General Staff Division of the Ministry of Defence, and therefore knew the army well. In his new position, he would soon come into conflict with the newly appointed commander-in-chief. This was not surprising.������������������������������������������������� The ������������������������������������������������ scope of their authority was not very clearly defined, so that as a result of a number of specific issues, the minister and the commander-in-chief had to work out where the military respon-
A 6-Veld field gun being hooked up. A battery of four guns was assigned to each infantry regiment. In 1940, the army had 224 of these guns.
A 10-Veld field gun being transported across the Rhine at Rhenen by pontoniers. This type of field gun was introduced in 1927, and was the most up-to-date gun in the artillery in 1940. The army had 56 of these guns.
66
chapter three
sibility ended and political responsibility began. The problems between the minister and the commander-in-chief began as soon as the mobilisation had been proclaimed. General Reijnders, who reported directly to the minister and not to the Council of Ministers, insisted on a state of martial law being declared. The Council of Ministers refused to do so, however, because the OLZ would then be able to take direct action in numerous areas without consultation. A state of war would be less drastic, as it would continue to require consultation with the civil authorities. The cabinet therefore declared a state of war on 1 September 1939, but with the proviso that only those powers could be exercised which were related to establishing combat positions and obstacles. To meet Reijnders’ wishes to some extent, in early November martial law was declared in the areas where the various positions were located. Reijnders was disappointed but accepted this restriction of his authority. In the same period, Reijnders also clashed with Dijxhoorn over the acceptability of social-democratic clubs for conscripts, the mobilisation clubs. This issue was not going to be the last problem for the commander-in-chief, however. There were some tough nuts to be cracked where war policy was concerned. It should not be forgotten that Dijxhoorn and Reijnders’ personalities clashed, and that it must have been difficult for the commander-in-chief to have a minister above him who until recently had worked for his own staff. The general expectation was that the Netherlands, if it were attacked, would have to fend for itself for some time—estimates ran from a few weeks to several months—in a war which could last for a considerable length of time, as had the First World War. A letter from Minister of War J.J.C. van Dijk dated 12 July 1924, for instance, showed that the army would have to be able to fight for three months before it could count on assistance from allies or intervention by the League of Nations.21 That expectation of three months of war was also voiced a number of times in the 1930s.������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������ In a meeting of the Economic Defence Preparations Committee in 1938 regarding stockpiling of food, the military representative, Captain J.C. Roelofsen, also mentioned the anticipated three-month war.22 In 1937, the goal set for the air forces in wartime was that in two months’ time, 50% of the wartime strength on paper would be delivered by the industry, anticipating the loss of half of the aircraft during that period.23 21 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� M.L. ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� van Ham, “De verzorging van de Koninklijke Landmacht in 1939 en 1940” (unpublished manuscript, Netherlands Institute of Military History, The Hague, s.a.). 22 ���������������� ��������������� G. Trienekens, Ons volk en de honger. De voedselvoorziening 1940-1945 (Utrecht, 1985) 36-37. 23 ��������������������� �������������������� R. de Bruin et al., Illusies en incidenten. De militaire luchtvaart en de neutraliteitshandhaving tot 10 mei 1940 (The Hague, s.a.) 270.
68
chapter three
As has been mentioned, in the 1920s, various concentrations had been prepared for the defence of the country.������������������������������ Under ����������������������������� pressure due to the international situation, in 1934 and 1935 the General Staff elaborated on Concentration Blue. This was approved by the Minister of Defence, H. Colijn, in 1936. The plans entailed a defence of the ‘heart of the country’ by the IInd and IVth Corps in the Gelderse Vallei area, by Brigade A at the Betuwe Position and by Brigade B at the Maas-Waal Position. The idea of a concentration in a line along the IJssel, which was the plan in 1925, was abandoned. There were insufficient troops available to mount a proper defence of the long IJssel Line. The shorter line in the Gelderse Vallei (Grebbe Line) was more favourable in that respect.�������������� From ������������� that position, the Field Army would be able to fall back on the time-honoured New Dutch Waterline (Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie), where the defence was to be sustained to the very end. In Reijnders’ plan, the Ist Corps was garrisoned as a reserve, between the Hook of Holland and Haarlem, and was under the direct command of the commander-in-chief.�������������� ������������� The Light Division would be partly concentrated in the south-east of Noord-Brabant and partly in Apeldoorn. The surveillance troops were positioned along the eastern, southern and western borders. South of the major rivers, the Peel-Raam Position was to be occupied by the IIIrd Corps and the Peel Division.������������������������������������������������������������������ The ����������������������������������������������������������������� concentration directives therefore entailed a defence of Fortress Holland, while the IIIrd Corps was to firmly prevent the enemy from passing through Noord-Brabant and Limburg. The army leadership was now counting on speedy assistance from France and Britain in the event of a German invasion. Of chief importance to allied cooperation were the province of Zeeland, where the British could land, and the province of Noord-Brabant, where the French could deploy. The way in which Reijnders, Chief of Staff since 1934, had had Concentration Blue elaborated brought him into conflict with the Commander of the Field Army, at that time Lieutenant General W. Röell. The latter was of the opinion that by not letting the Field Army engage in a decisive battle in the Gelderse Vallei, Reijnders was underestimating its significance. After all, the Field Army’s tasks had always included mobile and offensive operations. Röell was succeeded in April 1937 by Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, who was also dissatisfied with the role Reijnders had assigned the Field Army. In July 1937, he complained to the Chief of the General Staff that the latter’s description of the Field Army’s first task, namely to mount a “staunch defence” in the Gelderse Vallei, forced it to take up a prepared position. He preferred to have the task changed to “opposing a breakthrough into Dutch territory in the stron-
between hope and fear
69
gest possible manner”. Such an assignment would give the Field Army the freedom to mount a mobile and offensive defence, by engaging the enemy at an early stage, with flanking manoeuvres in unexpected places in the Veluwe area, along the IJssel, or across the major rivers in Noord-Brabant. In addition, it would be easier to adapt the operations to the actual progress of the German attack. In an internal memo of the same period, Van Voorst tot Voorst followed the examples of great generals from the past, such as Frederick the Great, Helmuth von Moltke and Stadholder William III, and then concluded that it was not possible to derive sound operational plans from the concentration chosen by Reijnders: It is not a matter of destroying the enemy. Every forward movement will lead to divergent action. One then fulfils the enemy’s every expectation. He can opt either to block off the chosen position or to carry out a carefully planned systematic attack on the weakest point.24
In February 1939, Van Voorst tot Voorst yielded to Reijnders inasmuch as he accepted the establishment of a prepared position in the Gelderse Vallei. Opinions continued to differ as to the use of this line. In Van Voorst tot Voorst’s view, Reijnders’ defensive approach was doomed to failure. Defensive operations alone would leave the initiative to the attacker and could, if successful, only win time, but never force an outcome. The Field Army would be beginning a hopeless fight, which could only end in defeat. A forward defence was therefore what was needed to defend the Grebbe Line, by offensive manoeuvres in the Veluwe area. If this were to deter the enemy, and he were to bear southwards to continue the attack through Noord-Brabant, the Field Army would be able to threaten his flank, again by means of an offensive operation. The requirement that the permanent position had to be suitable for offensive operations meant that Van Voorst tot Voorst also rejected the New Dutch Waterline as the location for the last line of resistance. Due to its extensive inundation areas and narrow access routes, it was simply not suitable as a base for an offensive operation. That was why the main line of resistance had to be at the Grebbe Line.25 In addition, Van Voorst tot Voorst had serious doubts about the success of a retreat to the New Dutch Waterline, faced with an enemy which had tried and tested airpower, 24 �������� J.J.G. ������� baron van Voorst tot Voorst, “Memorie op grond van de ontworpen Concentratie Blauw”, 11 July 1937, in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II, Mobilisatie 19381940, box 440, bundel I, no. 1; See also: J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst to I.H. Reijnders, 16 July 1937, in: Ibidem. 25 �������� J.J.G. ������� baron van Voorst tot Voorst, “Memorandum I betreffende de ‘Stelling van de Geldersche Vallei’”, 19 February 1939, in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II, Mobilisatie 1938-1940, box 440b, bundel IV, no. 12.
The poster proclaiming the general mobilisation on 28 August 1939 (left); the first day of the mobilisation: a banner shows reservists where to report (below).
between hope and fear
71
motorised troops and tanks. The distance between the two lines was too short for the Field Army to be able to shake off the enemy properly. Van Voorst tot Voorst also held the view that establishing two major positions one behind the other would be unnecessarily costly. Moreover, the Gelderse Vallei provided better cover on account of the vegetation in the terrain, and was more suitable for the construction of fortifications due to the nature of the soil and the groundwater level. The line there would therefore be better able to withstand air attacks and artillery fire than the Waterline. Lastly, the Grebbe Line, extended to the Maas by means of the Betuwe Position and the Maas-Waal Position, protected a larger part of the country. Reijnders’ appointment as commander-in-chief on 28 August 1939 and the general mobilisation in the days that followed created a new situation. In his new role, Reijnders was now the superior of the Commander of the Field Army.�������������������������������������������������������������� As ������������������������������������������������������������� early as 9 September, he succeeded in persuading the cabinet to order him, in the event of an attack from the east, to pull back the Field Army to the New Dutch Waterline, without allowing it to engage in a decisive battle at the Grebbe Line. That was the only place where at least some preparation had been made for the country’s defence. Reijnders did not, however, have any troops with which to further bring the Waterline into a state of defence. The Ist Corps, which was supposed to receive the retreating Field Army at the Waterline, was for the time being positioned along the coast, in view of the all-round neutrality. Van Voorst tot Voorst’s approach was better in that respect, even though it did not seem so at first glance.���������������������������� ��������������������������� Work had been done on a defence line in the Gelderse Vallei on several occasions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Later, there had been plans for work, but they were never implemented. The concentration plans of the 1920s were based either on the Waterline or the IJssel Line. The main objection to the Grebbe Line, the fact that the southern part lay too high for it to be inundated naturally, had never been addressed. A water obstacle could only be established here by building a bombproof pumping station in a stream called the Grift. The only reinforcement of the Grebbe Line in the 1930s had been the construction of a number of casemates at strategic traffic intersections. This had hardly produced a defensible position, however. The main advantage for Van Voorst tot Voorst was that he had sufficient troops to establish a satisfactory position in the Gelderse Vallei. After all, two corps with a total of four divisions were concentrated there. The Commander of the Field Army therefore immediately set his troops to digging, and had them continue unabatedly, even after he had heard in
72
chapter three
Rising inundation near Woudenberg in the Valley Position.
mid-October that the government had ordered Reijnders to retreat to the Waterline if necessary. There was another strategically significant matter on which the Commander of the Field Army and the commander-in-chief differed, namely the defence of Noord-Brabant.���������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� Together with the north of Belgian Brabant, the area formed the link between Fortress Holland and the Belgian forward defence line, which lay between Antwerp and Liège, along the Albert Canal.����������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������� Together with Zeeland and the north of Limburg, Noord-Brabant was of vital importance to allied cooperation in the event of a German attack. The area therefore had to be defended long enough to give the allies the opportunity to deploy there. The question was, however, exactly where, with how many troops and at what price that defence was to be maintained. The matter was complicated by the policy of neutrality, which precluded any consultations on the matter with Brussels, Paris or London.
between hope and fear
73
The Peel-Raam Position was chosen as the line of resistance, in accordance with Concentration Blue. Work on this position had begun as early as 1934. It was manned by the Peel Division. The IIIrd Corps and part of, later all of, the Light Division were concentrated further back. Reijnders wanted the defence of the position to be maintained for a number of days. In doing so, however, the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division were not to be exposed to the risk of destruction. Due to a shortage of troops, Reijnders’ wish was, in the event of an imminent breach of the Peel-Raam Position, for the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division to retreat to within Fortress Holland, where they would be assigned new tasks. Van Voorst tot Voorst had serious doubts about the feasibility of the retreat plan, and feared that the position would be outflanked on the right, across Belgian territory, as the Belgian army only had weak units positioned there. He therefore proposed to defend Noord-Brabant further to the west, along a line between ’s-Hertogenbosch, Tilburg and Goirle, which he dubbed the Orange Position. The route back for the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division would then be shorter and the enemy would face a difficult advance from the border through an area full of obstacles and demolitions, before he reached the position.������������������������������ ����������������������������� In addition, the Orange Position was much shorter than the Peel-Raam Position, allowing a stronger defence with the same number of troops. Details of the French operation plans, which became available in late November 1939, reinforced the arguments of the Commander of the Field Army. The Dutch military attaché in Paris and Brussels, Lieutenant Colonel D. van Voorst Evekink, had heard from French contacts, as well as from Belgian sources, that the French commander-in-chief, général d’armée Maurice Gamelin, was planning to establish a forward defensive front in Belgium. This front would stretch all the way to Antwerp. Since 1936, France had been looking into the possibility of military intervention in Belgium. The plans elaborated on earlier Franco-Belgian military cooperation based on their military alliance of 1920, cooperation which had had come to something of a dead end since 1927. In 1936, German troops had again occupied the demilitarised Rhineland, and Belgium had again declared its neutrality. The French high command considered several operational possibilities without coming to a decision. This failure to commit could not continue when the French government declared war on Germany in September 1939. The plan of choice was now the “plan Escaut”. This entailed the French troops and the British Expeditionary Force establishing a defensive front behind the upper course of the Scheldt: from Valenciennes, via Tournai and Oudenaarde, to Ghent.������������� In ������������ early No-
74
chapter three
vember 1939, the French commander-in-chief, Gamelin, was also bearing in mind the possibility that Germany would mount a limited operation with the sole purpose of conquering the Netherlands, or invade Belgium through Dutch Noord-Brabant and Limburg. Both options were equally dangerous, and France would have to respond. In the “hypothèse Hollande”, the Franco-British front would have to lie much further north and east. It would follow the Meuse from the border town of Givet, via Namur to Liège and then turn along the back of the Albert Canal to Antwerp. Paratroops would be dropped on Walcheren and at the isthmus of ZuidBeveland, to enable French ground troops to deploy in Zeeland.����� ���� During the rest of the month of November, this hypothèse developed into a firm, albeit it more limited, plan in the French planning process, the “plan Dyle”. In this plan, Gamelin opted for a front behind the Meuse, from Givet to Namur.������������������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������������������������� From there, it would not continue to Liège, but turn northwards to Wavre and from there it would follow the river Dyle to Louvain and then link up with the Belgian positions at Antwerp. Contrary to the “plan Escaut”, Brussels would then also lie behind the allied defence. The airborne landings in Zeeland disappeared from the plans on 23 December 1939. Motorised and mechanised units would engage in mobile defensive and delaying combat operations in the space between the front from Antwerp to Namur and the Albert Canal, in cooperation with the Belgian units positioned there. It was a daring plan, and therefore controversial in the eyes of Gamelin’s subordinate commanders, but he was determined. This plan had not yet set his mind entirely at ease, however. There was a gaping hole in the defence between the Belgian defence behind the Albert Canal and the Dutch Peel-Raam Position. This would allow the Germans to move in behind the Peel-Raam Position and then take Noord-Brabant and Zeeland.���������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������������� The physical cohesion with the Dutch main defence at Fortress Holland would then be broken and the Scheldt estuary, and access to the port of Antwerp, would be in enemy hands.���������������������� ��������������������� He was therefore toying with the idea of sending French divisions even further north, as far as Fortress Holland. The link-up point would be in western Brabant, so that the Moerdijk bridges across the Hollands Diep would form the physical connection. This manoeuvre was known as the “hypothèse Breda”. Van Voorst Evekink was able to brief Reijnders in general terms on the latest state of affairs with regard to the French plans.�������������������� ������������������� No matter how positive these reports were, however, they also made it clear that the French were not planning to advance further eastwards than the Breda area, or Tilburg at a push. In any case, it was not to be expected that a combined defence would be mounted at the Peel-Raam Position with strong French
Members of Parliament visiting the positions of the Field Army in autumn 1939, during the mobilisation. They are being led by the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst.
Hussars-Motorcyclists crossing a water obstacle during an exercise in 1939, using a float.
76
chapter three
units. This argued in favour of the Commander of the Field Army and his Orange Position. Reijnders, however, and following his advice, the cabinet, which had been informed of the French plans in early December, insisted on the Peel-Raam Position, despite all the operational objections. His arguments were of a political rather than a military nature. A position at Breda or Tilburg would leave large parts of Noord-Brabant undefended, with the exception of the border defence and the line along the Maas, and give the Germans the opportunity to invade Belgium almost unchallenged. Such a position would therefore damage the allied interests and that might be held against the Netherlands during peace negotiations after a German defeat. Secondly, in this position it would be a long while before large Dutch units engaged in battle with the German army. This would mean a dangerous delay in the moment when France and Britain would recognise the Netherlands as an ally. The Peel-Raam Position, on the other hand, would bring that moment forward to the first hours of the war and would obstruct the German advance route to the Albert Canal. So even after Reijnders had been appointed commander-in-chief, his differences of opinion with Van Voorst tot Voorst did not come to an end. Even intervention by Minister Dijxhoorn, who had serious doubts about the feasibility of Reijnders’ plans, did not change that, nor did cabinet meetings or consultations with the Queen. The government’s assignment to the commander-in-chief of 9 September 1939 was changed on 7 January 1940, however, although the new assignment contained no firm decisions either. In the meantime, the difficult relationship between Reijnders on the one hand and Dijxhoorn and the other members of the cabinet on the other hand deteriorated noticeably. After the conflict on the state of war, the argument about the mobilisation clubs and the incompatibilité d’humeur between the commander-in-chief and the minister, doubts now also arose about the commander-in-chief ’s understanding of strategy, whilst Reijnders for his part suspected that the Commander of the Field Army and the cabinet were trying to take his place.26 26 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Particularly ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� instructive regarding the difference of opinions are annexes 15 through 18 in part Ib of: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek (The Hague, 1949) from the correspondence between the Commander of the Field Army, the commander-in-chief and the Minister of Defence in the period November 1939-January 1940. See also: De Jong, Koninkrijk. Deel 2. Neutraal, 66-67, 203-221, 235 ff. For an analysis of the problems surrounding the position of the commander-in-chief in Dutch political and military relations in general, and those in 1939-1940 in particular, see: H. Amersfoort, ed., ‘Een kwestie van vertrouwen’. De geschiedenis van het opperbevel in Nederland en Nederlands-Indië. Annex to Van wankel evenwicht naar versterkte defensieorganisatie. Advies van de Adviescommissie Opperbevelhebberschap. The Hague, 19 April 2002.
between hope and fear
77
During January 1940, tensions surrounding Reijnders mounted even further. The Council of Ministers grew increasingly convinced that the commander-in-chief ’s position was untenable. On 31 January 1940, Reijnders handed in his resignation, after Prime Minister De Geer had informed him personally that Dijxhoorn had threatened to resign.��������� His �������� resignation was accepted on 6 February. One of the candidates for the vacant position of commander-in-chief was Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst.���������������� He ��������������� was not eligible, however, as having a Catholic commander-in-chief alongside a Catholic Commander of the Field Army, who was also his brother, was considered inadvisable. It was the former Minister of Defence, J.J.C. van Dijk who suggested Lieutenant General H.G. Winkelman. Winkelman himself had expected to become Chief of the General Staff in 1934. He had retired instead, and the position was filled by Reijnders. Winkelman’s career included such positions as Assistant Chief of the General Staff and Chief of Staff of the Field Army. In the latter position, he had also been the superior of then Captain A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn. From 1938, Winkelman held a position with the Philips lighting company in Eindhoven as adviser on evacuation measures in the event of a war. When the mobilisation was announced, he was called up on active service again, and appointed Commander of the Utrecht-Soesterberg Air Defence Sector.������������ ����������� On 6 February 1940, Winkelman was appointed commander-in-chief. Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst became his Chief of the Army Staff.
Winkelman’s operation plan The lack of unity between the two main commanders had had its effects on the preparations for a possible war in the late 1930s, as far as the operation plan was concerned. Time was slowly running out. On 10 January 1940, a small German military communications aircraft had made an emergency landing at Maasmechelen in Belgium. On that occasion, documents were seized regarding operations on a front between the North Sea and the Moselle, and in particular an airborne operation west of Dinant. The opinions were divided as to how significant these documents should be considered to be. There were other reports as well, however, such as warnings from the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major G.J. Sas, which indicated that there was a growing risk of war with Germany. Food for thought in that respect was also provided by the fact that the German air force, as well as the British, incidentally, conducted regular reconnaissance flights over Dutch ter-
78
chapter three
ritory and that the German intelligence services were showing an interest in the Netherlands. The kidnapping, near Venlo, of two British secret agents to Germany on 9 November 1939, known as the Venlo incident, was still fresh in people’s memories. Winkelman realised that it was time to put an end to the uncertainty regarding the appropriate strategic policy. Winkelman was also aware, even more so than Reijnders, that the army was not large enough to defend the entire country. Further concentration of the combat power within Fortress Holland therefore appeared inevitable in his view. Another point of departure for Winkelman’s operation plan was to rely as little as possible on the successful outcome of a mobile and offensive operation by the army, because it was insufficiently armed, equipped and trained.������������������������������������������������������������������ All ����������������������������������������������������������������� in all, Winkelman shifted the focus of the Dutch strategy towards a straightforward operation plan, with a strong static-defensive element. The Field Army was bound to prepared lines and positions even more so than before. Winkelman’s measures demonstrate another point. There had never been a sound basis of trust between Reijnders and the cabinet.���������� The ��������� cabinet had therefore constantly kept the commander-in-chief in close check, with carefully formulated instructions. Winkelman, by contrast, did have their trust. He was given much more leeway, and was able to make his own decisions on various occasions, decisions which included political aspects and which could have required consultation with the cabinet. North of the major rivers, Winkelman chose the Grebbe Line as the main defence line. In accordance with the views of the Commander of the Field Army and of the cabinet, he decided that the operational risks involved in a deliberate retreat, as Reijnders had wanted, were too great. He also removed any illusions the Commander of the Field Army might have had of an offensive break-out from the position. The IInd and IVth Corps were to fight the battle in the position only. His opting for the Grebbe Line should therefore not be seen as support for the operational ideas of the Commander of the Field Army, but as a sign of his having a sense of reality.���������������������������������������������������������������������� The ��������������������������������������������������������������������� course of events had made the Gelderse Vallei into a strong position under construction, whereas much less work had been done on the Waterline. After all the talking that had been done about the Grebbe Line since 1934, initiatives by J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst to improve this line had resulted in a fait accompli, that under the circumstances of imminent war could not be ignored.������������������������������������ A ����������������������������������� disadvantage of the gradual decision-making process was that nothing had been done yet about the weak point of the position, namely the lack of inundation areas in the southern
A 6-Veld field gun in position in the New Dutch Waterline near Naarden, winter 1939-1940.
The Light Division on field exercise during the 1939-1940 mobilisation.
80
chapter three
part. Construction of a bombproof pumping station did not begin until late 1939. It would not yet be operational by May 1940. The line was also reinforced with troops which were removed from the Waterline and the border defence. The Waterline was now almost entirely devoid of troops. This was not problematic in Winkelman’s view, as the Ist Corps, stationed at the coast, was available as a strategic reserve. It was more difficult for Winkelman to come to a decision regarding Noord-Brabant. The Peel-Raam Position was under construction, but in order for it to be defended successfully, it would have to connect with the Belgian positions and have the certainty of French troops arriving in time. The policy of neutrality officially precluded any consultations with future allies and even the assignment which Winkelman received from the government in early April 1940 regarding war policy did not give him room to conduct any such consultations, no matter how liberally it was formulated. Winkelman, however, considered the issue to be of such importance that he decided, regardless of the risk of serious political damage, to have Van Voorst Evekink seek renewed contact with the Belgian and French army leaderships.27 Winkelman’s expectations regarding the allies, meanwhile, were not inconsiderable, and in fact not realistic.28 As Reijnders had done, he had memoranda deposited with the diplomatic missions in Brussels, Paris and London, which were to be presented to the respective governments after a German attack. In those memoranda, the commanderin-chief set out his operation plans and asked France for an entire corps of four divisions. The French air force was to disrupt German bridge-laying activities across the Maas and IJssel.���������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������� Britain was asked for a division to defend Zeeland, and the transfer of air defence artillery and ten squadrons of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to Fortress Holland. As has been mentioned, the Dutch were familiar with part of the French and Belgian operation plans. Just before his resignation, Reijnders had asked General R. van Overstraeten, Head of the Military Office of the King of Belgium, whether the Belgians would be prepared to extend the Peel-Raam Position into Belgium.����������������������������������� The ���������������������������������� answer was negative.���������� Van ��������� Overstraeten proposed a combined line between the Bergsche Maas and the Albert Canal, along the Waalwijk–Tilburg–Turnhout line, partly overlapping the Orange Position which Van Voorst tot Voorst had envisaged. An identical request in mid-February from Winkelman to the Belgian 27 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ The contacts with London were more limited than those with Brussels and Paris and mainly concerned navy matters and the possible transport to Britain of the gold of the Central Bank of the Netherlands. These contacts will mostly not be considered here. 28 ����������� B. ���������� Chaix, En Mai 1940, Fallait-il entrer en Belgique? Décisions stratégiques et plans opérationnels de la campagne de France (Paris, 2000) 107-113.
between hope and fear
81
military attaché in The Hague, Colonel P.J. Diepenrijckx, was also turned down. Winkelman’s threat–made with the knowledge of Van Kleffens and Dijxhoorn–that the Belgian stance would force him to practically evacuate Noord-Brabant in the event of war, was equally unsuccessful in changing Van Overstraeten’s mind.����������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������� The latter was left to conclude that the Netherlands, in its evacuation plans, had opted for a “stratégie d’isolement”.29 Subsequently, on 5 April 1940, Winkelman had Van Voorst Evekink consult with French commander-in-chief Gamelin. It became apparent that in Belgium, the French and British troops would respond to a German offensive by forming a defensive front along the Givet–Namur–Louvain–Antwerp line: the “plan Dyle”. Meanwhile, despite persistent doubts among his subordinate commanders, on 20 March 1940 Gamelin had also developed the “hypothèse Breda” into a firm plan, the “plan Breda”. This became part of the assignment of the French 7th Army, which Gamelin had already earmarked for the operations on the French left flank in the “hypothèse Hollande” and the “plan Dyle”. Earlier on, i.e. in the “plan Escaut”, this army had been positioned at Rheims, as a central strategic reserve for the northern front. His decision not to maintain a large strategic reserve, but to deploy it on the left flank instead demonstrates the extent to which Gamelin was convinced that the point of main effort of the German attack would be in Flanders, as it had been in 1914. This expectation had led him to believe that the front in Belgium would be progressively stronger the further north it was extended. It would then be impossible to outflank the troops there and it would lend cohesion to the Dutch, Belgian, British and French operations. On the other hand, the success of Gamelin’s strategy was entirely dependent on the enemy’s actions. If the German main effort were to be elsewhere and if the Germans were able to conduct their operations swiftly, he would be powerless to do anything about it. He lacked strong reserves with which to immediately counter the danger. It would take complex and lengthy manoeuvres by units which were already engaged in combat before he would be able to respond to the actual events of the campaign. Gamelin was of the opinion, however, that he had sufficient time. For the purpose of the implementation of the decisions made on 20 March 1940, the French and British armies were positioned as follows. The French force involved the units of the 1st Army Group, commanded by général d’armée Gaston Henri Bilotte. On the left flank, between the coast at Dunkirk and Lille, stood, as has been mentioned, the mobile 7th Army of général d’armée Henri-Honoré Giraud. Its orders were to advance 29 ��������������������� Quoted �������������������� in: De Jong, Koninkrijk. Deel 2. Neutraal, 256.
On 2 December 1939, the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, had a series of photographs sent to the Dutch daily newspapers, to demonstrate the impassability of the inundated areas. In a covering letter, the commander said that he considered the publication of the photographs to be “particularly desirable, also in view of the impression abroad”. This photograph shows a 7-Veld field gun, with a team of horses and a limber. The 7-Veld field gun was introduced in 1904. In May 1940, the army had 310 of these guns.
Machine-gun nest at the entrance to the port of Scheveningen during the mobilisation period.
between hope and fear
83
through Flanders to a front on either side of Antwerp. North of that front it was to occupy the Antwerp–Turnhout–Tilburg line, so that the connection with Fortress Holland, via Breda, the Moerdijk bridges and Dordrecht, was covered. South of the front it would defend the Antwerp–Louvain line. To the right of the 7th Army, in a staging area south-east of Lille, stood the British Expeditionary Force, commanded by General Lord John Gort. It was to advance to a line due east of Brussels, between Louvain and Wavre. Next to the British, between Valenciennes and Maubeuge, stood the strong 1st Army, commanded by général d’armée Georges Blanchard. It was destined for the front between Wavre and Namur.��������������� �������������� Facing the Ardennes stood the weakest French armies, the 9th Army of général d’armée André Georges Corap, which consisted almost entirely of reservists, and the 2nd Army of général d’armée Charles Huntziger.�������������������� By ������������������� Gamelin’s calculations, the Germans would need nine days to advance through this inaccessible, hilly and wooded terrain by the Meuse. They would then take seven days to prepare to force a river crossing. The Meuse crossing was therefore to be expected no earlier than the seventeenth day of the offensive. That provided enough time to tackle the problems in this sector. Halfway into the sector of the 2nd Army, at the fortification at La Ferté, some 25 kilometres south-east of Sedan as the crow flies, was where the Maginot Line began. From here to the border with neutral Switzerland, France considered itself to be safe. The Netherlands was naturally interested in the advance of the 7th Army in particular.�������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������� On the first day of the war, two of its motorised divisions and one light tank division were to advance to Zeeland and NoordBrabant. Three more divisions were to follow later. In the French view, the Netherlands and Belgium should preferably establish their defence on the Tilburg–Turnhout line as well, so that Giraud’s army would be able to reinforce them.���������������������������������������������������� That ��������������������������������������������������� same evening, Van Voorst Evekink informed Winkelman of the general tenor of the French plans. It was now clear to the Dutch commander-in-chief what needed to be done in Noord-Brabant. The attaché noted Winkelman’s response as follows: In those circumstances, Peel Position will be evacuated by main forces (approx. 15 battalions remain, without artillery). Main defence will now be: Grebbe Line–Waal Maas–Merwede Group–Fortress Holland.30
Although hardly flattering, Van Overstraeten’s conclusion mentioned earlier was an apt description of Winkelman’s policy regarding Noord-Bra30 ����������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������� Questioning of D. van Voorst Evekink, 12 August 1948, in: Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid. Deel Ic, 616.
84
chapter three
bant. On 6 April, the commander-in-chief made the definite decision that the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division would for the time being remain concentrated behind the Peel-Raam Position, in order for their presence to create the illusion of a staunch defence; they were not allowed to engage in combat. In the night following the first day of the war, they would be pulled back from Noord-Brabant. The Light Division would move to Fortress Holland, to form the strategic reserve together with the Ist Corps. The IIIrd Corps would move to the southern front of Fortress Holland and the Waal-Linge Position. In respect of the retreat, Brigade B, positioned in the Land van Maas en Waal area, would move back to behind the southern Grebbe Line, in order to serve as an operational reserve there for the Field Army. After capturing the Maas Line, in Noord-Brabant the Germans would only be faced with the Peel Division, positioned along an extended front. This meant that the defence of Noord-Brabant, and with it, the link-up between Fortress Holland and the allied front, came to depend upon the French deployment in this area. Both military and politically, Winkelman was banking heavily on future events, especially considering the fact that the distance which the German units would have to cover to reach Breda was around half the distance the French would have to go.31 If they succeeded in swiftly breaching the Peel-Raam Position, the Germans had the best chance of winning the race for Breda. A few days later, on 11 April, Van Voorst Evekink informed Gamelin in writing of Winkelman’s decisions. This did not change the plans for the French advance. Gamelin held on to his own reasoning that the defence would be strongest if it were extended as far north as possible. The subordinate commanders in the 7th Army, which was earmarked for the Belgian-Dutch border area, were not informed either. This was to lead to some unpleasant surprises for them in May. In April 1940, tensions in Europe were rising considerably. On 9 April, there came the shocking news that German airborne troops had taken the airports at Copenhagen and Oslo, in surprise attacks.�������������������� In ������������������� addition, it became clear that these troops had received assistance from fifth columns among the Danish and Norwegian populations.������������������������� An ������������������������ attack on the Netherlands loomed. As a result of the events in Norway and Denmark, General Winkelman ordered extra security at the main airfields.����������������� An ���������������� infantry battalion each was assigned to Schiphol, Waalhaven, Ypenburg and Valkenburg. The 1st Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment, which was part of the Light 31 ��������������� K.H. �������������� Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995) 108. For the French plans for the operations in the Netherlands, see: Chaix, En Mai 1940, 107-113, 149150, 168-172, 179-183.
between hope and fear
85
Division, was moved from Noord-Brabant to Wassenaar, a village near The Hague. Armoured vehicles were made available for the defence of Ypenburg and Waalhaven. Roads and certain parts of the terrain near The Hague were blocked to prevent enemy landings.���������������������� ��������������������� On 22 April, the Commander of the Air Defence, Lieutenant General P.W. Best, emphasised to his airfield commanders: After all, the outward defence of the airfield may not be neglected entirely, as there is the possibility that a forced landing of foreign troops may be accompanied by attacks along the ground by paratroops dropped outside the airfield previously, or by malicious elements living here.32
Winkelman saw reason to further strengthen the defence of the heart of the country. The IIIrd Corps was now stationed further west, near ’s-Hertogenbosch, which would facilitate a retreat to Fortress Holland. Six extra infantry battalions were positioned to strengthen the Betuwe front. Two came from Groningen and Drenthe, and the other four were from the eastern front of Fortress Holland. Six battalions, and three battalions of 7-Veld field guns, were sent from the southern front to the eastern front of Fortress Holland. Orders had also been given for the expansion of the inundation areas. On 10 April, all leave was cancelled, but this order was revoked on the 27th. Nonetheless, the situation remained explosive. An intelligence report of 26 April 1940 summarised it as follows: Although the tension appears to have eased somewhat, peace of mind is out of the question. The position of the German troops is such, that at any given moment an attack could be mounted towards the west, whereby the right wing north of the rivers, covered by German troops, could choose its advance through Noord-Brabant.������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ The operation against Norway has not weakened the German air force significantly. Presumably, the German airpower is relatively more occupied due to this operation. This can, of course, have a delaying effect on an operation in westerly direction.33
Tensions rose further during the first few days of May 1940. The combatreadiness of certain units was increased, and further preparations for inundations were made. On 6 May, Major Sas warned of a possible attack on 8 May.��������������������������������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������� When it did not materialise, leave was granted again in certain cases. On 8 May, reports reached General Headquarters of troop movements on the German side of the border, reports which increased in number over the course of the following day. In two telephone calls in the evening of 9 May, Major Sas was more adamant than ever in warning of a German 32 ��������������������������� Quoted �������������������������� in: F.J. Molenaar, De luchtverdediging mei 1940 (The Hague, 1970) 103-104. 33 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ C.-Brigade B., “Mededeeling van gegevens no.��������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27”, �������������������������������� in: DC-NIMH, Voorgeschiedenis W.O. II. Nederland 1938-1940, box 415, file 19.
86
chapter three
attack the next morning. The stream of reports which Winkelman had faced that day, increased the credibility of Sas’ reports. At headquarters, the feeling was growing that war was imminent. At around nine o’clock that evening, therefore, a telex was sent out with the following message: “Very alarming reports are coming in from the border. Remain very much on your guard”. The message was sent to the territorial commanders in Friesland, Overijssel and southern Limburg, the Commander of the Field Army, the Commander of the Air Defence and the commanders of the Den Helder Position, Fortress Holland and the Commander in Zeeland, as well as the commanders of the IInd, IIIrd and IVth Corps.������������� ������������ All commanders were to decide for themselves what measures to take. After 22.00 hrs, Winkelman and Dijxhoorn held a meeting, in which they discussed placing obstacles east of the Maas and the IJssel.������� An ������ order to that effect was issued via the Commander of the Field Army to the Commander of the IIIrd Corps.������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������ At 23.15 hrs, the troops tasked with strategic security were ordered to effect full readiness by 03.00 hrs on 10 May. Never before since the proclamation of the mobilisation had such drastic measures been taken. At around midnight, a confident Winkelman left his headquarters at Lange Voorhout 7 in The Hague. In passing, he said to Lieutenant Colonel J.G.M. van der Plassche, Head of the Foreign Intelligence Division: “The gentlemen can come now, we have done everything we can. I’m going home now to grab a few hours’ sleep”.34 Less than four hours later, the first German troops set foot on Dutch territory.
34 ������������������������������������������������������������� Quoted ������������������������������������������������������������ in: M. van Blankenstein, “De raadselachtige dienst”, De stem van Nederland, (19 July 1946) 21.
between hope and fear
87
Broad outline of the organisation of the Royal Netherlands Army in May 1940 The composition of the Royal Netherlands Army in May 1940 was based on the wartime organisation as laid down in 1933 in the manual entitled Samenstelling van de Koninklijke Landmacht op voet van oorlog [Composition of the Royal Netherlands Army on a war footing] (The Hague, 1933). On that basis, the strength of the army fell roughly into two groups, namely the troops which belonged to the Field Army and those which did not. Organically, the Field Army consisted of the Ist Corps, IInd Corps, IIIrd Corps, IVth Corps, the Light Division and the Army Troops and field trains; the 2nd Aviation Regiment was also assigned for the purposes of air reconnaissance. The troops outside the Field Army were intended for the territorial defence and for the lines and positions which were not to be occupied by the Field Army. Following the announcement of the general mobilisation of the armed forces on 28 August 1939, the army took up its war positions in accordance with ‘Concentration Blue’. For this, it was necessary to deviate from the organic composition of various large units. The way in which the command relationships were consequently arranged on 9 May 1940 and, following the developments on the first day of war, in the evening of 10 May can be found in the organisational diagrams elsewhere in this book. A corps (approximately 25,000 men) consisted of two divisions (approximately 10,000 men each) and corps troops. A division comprised a staff, a pioneer company, two machine-gun companies, an antitank company, an anti-aircraft machine-gun company, an anti-aircraft artillery battery, three infantry regiments and an artillery regiment.���������� ��������� An infantry regiment was made up of a staff, a mortar company (six mortars), a 6-Veld field-gun battery (four pieces), an anti-tank company (six pieces) and three infantry battalions. It numbered approximately 2,500 men. The infantry battalion was composed as follows: a battalion staff, three companies of riflemen and a machine-gun company. The strength amounted to some 750 men on average and a riflemen company usually numbered approximately 160. Each artillery regiment in principle consisted of three battalions of three batteries, and each battery had four guns. In the spring of 1940, the light troops in the Corps and in the Light Division were involved in a large-scale reorganisation, which had not yet been fully completed on 10 May 1940. As a consequence, when the fighting started, the Light Division consisted of a staff, a signals squadron, two armoured-vehicle squadrons, a machine-gun squadron, two hussars-
88
chapter three
motorcyclist regiments, two cyclist regiments, the Mobile Artillery Corps and a division train.���������������������������������������������� Because ��������������������������������������������� of various command arrangements, however, in terms of combat units the commander only had the 2nd HussarsMotorcyclist Regiment, the two cyclist regiments and the Mobile Artillery Corps. Broadly speaking, the following figures apply with regard to unit strength: • corps – approximately 25,000 men • division – approximately 10,000 men • infantry regiment – approximately 2,500 men • infantry battalion – approximately 750 men • riflemen company – approximately 160 men • infantry section – approximately 30 men On 10 May 1940, the total strength of the Royal Netherlands Army amounted to approximately 280,000 men. Of these, after the various changes in the command relationships, some 120,000 men were under the command of the Commander of the Field Army in the evening of 10 May.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE GATHERING STORM: THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Introduction When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, its army numbered 2,758,000 men and was organised into 103 divisions, 53 of which, including 6 armoured divisions, had already belonged to the active peacetime army.1 This strong army bore hardly any resemblance to the army of the Weimar Republic, which in 1933, according to the Chef des Truppenamtes, General Wilhelm Adam, would only have been able to withstand two weeks at most of any military conflict. Had it been invaded by France, all it would have been able to do was “inflict a few pinpricks here and there”.2 The weakness of the Reichswehr, as the army of the Weimar Republic was known, was due to the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. Article 231, for example, stated that Germany and its allies were wholly responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. One of the consequences of this Kriegsschuldartikel was that a number of restrictions were imposed on the Weimar Republic in terms of the structure and size of its armed forces, with a view to preventing any more German military operations. Germany was, for instance, not permitted to have tanks or heavy guns, could not have an air force and the size of the German navy was severely restricted: large warships and submarines were forbidden and the personnel complement was not allowed to exceed 15,000. There were also stringent restrictions on the number of personnel in the Reichswehr. It was not to exceed 100,000: 4,000 officers and 96,000 NCOs and other ranks, and Germany had to abolish its conscription legislation. The organisation of the Reichswehr was thus simple: under the 1 B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945. Entwicklung des organisatorischen Aufbaues. Band I. Das Heer bis zum Kriegsbeginn (Darmstadt, 1954) 65 ff. 2 Wilhelm Deist, “Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht” in: Wilhelm Deist e.a., Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg. Band I. Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Stuttgart, 1979) 400-401.
90
chapter four
Between the autumn of 1934 and September 1939, the German army increased in number from some 250,000 to 2,758,000. Presentations of colours by Hitler himself served to enhance the bond between the Führer and the army. Photograph taken in autumn 1936.
Reichswehrminister and the Chef der Heeresleitung were two Reichswehrgruppenkommandos, one in Berlin and one in Kassel. These Kommandos contained the army’s seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. The task of these divisions was, according to Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles, to “be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers”. The Reichswehr had no general staff, nor a Kriegsakademie for training general staff officers. The allies would not allow Germany to have such an organisation, given the part that those particular officers had played in the First World War. The advanced training for officers was, therefore, decentralised and was provided by the Führergehilfelehrgänge in the Wehrkreise, into which the Reichswehrgruppenkommandos were divided. The idea was thus to prevent a situation in which training was given to an exclusive and homogenous corps of staff officers. Because of the high levels of unemployment in Germany after 1918, a great many Germans aspired to a position of officer or lower rank in the
the gathering storm
91
Reichswehr. Selection criteria were thus stringent, one of them being the way in which the candidates had performed during the First World War. For the officers’ positions in particular, veterans from the former German army were selected. Their political views were mainly right-wing. Recruitment of the rank and file occurred, as had generally been the case in the past, mainly in the countryside, where the population was nationalistic and conservative. This meant that the Reichswehr could certainly not be said to reflect German society. The first Chef der Heeresleitung was Generalmajor Walther Reinhardt. The Chef des Truppenamtes, Generalmajor Hans von Seeckt, should, however, be regarded as the founder of the Reichswehr. The Truppenamt was in effect the continuation of the forbidden general staff. It was made up of sixty officers and its activities were virtually the same as those of the former general staff. In 1920, Hans von Seeckt was appointed Chef der Heeresleitung, a post which he was to hold until 1926. As early as January 1921, Von Seeckt made it clear that he saw it as his duty to make the Reichswehr the basis for the future expansion of the German army, with the aim of regaining Germany’s status as a great power. He therefore called his creation the Führerheer and was willing to circumvent the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.3 German engineers from Krupp, for example, went to Bofors in Sweden, where they developed what was to become the Second World War’s famous 88mm Flak (Fliegerabwehrkanone). Also, with the aid of all kinds of umbrella organisations, such as Aerosport GmbH and the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt, pilots were trained and preparations were made to allow a German air force to be established quickly when the time came. It was for this purpose that a secret treaty concerning mutual support was signed with the Soviet Union in Rapallo in 1922. Germany would provide the Soviet Union with technicians to help to build up the Russian industry and train Russian officers. In return, the Soviet Union was to supply ammunition and other armaments to Germany. The Soviet Union also allowed Germany to use its territory to conduct tank exercises and experiments with war gases. During the ten years that this cooperation lasted, three hundred German pilots were trained in the Soviet Union. In 1925, amid the deepest secrecy, the Truppenamt drew up the initial plans for an expansion of the Reichswehr. Inextricably linked to this was 3 Rainer Wohlfeil, “Heer und Republik” in: Edgar Graf von Matuschka and Rainer Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und Republik (1918-1933) (Frankfurt am Main, 1970) 207. For the build-up of the German army after the First World War, see also: K.-V. Neugebauer, ed., Grundzüge der deutschen Militärgeschichte (2 vol; Freiburg, 1993) Band I, Historischer Überblick, 272-294 and 300-309.
92
chapter four
the reinforcement of the Reichswehr’s materiel. The driving force behind the plans was Von Seeckt’s successor as Chef der Heeresleitung, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Heye, who took up the appointment in October 1926. In February 1927, Heye informed Reichskanzler Wilhelm Marx’s cabinet about the secret build-up of the Reichswehr. The Marx government proved willing to support the covert build-up of arms and developed a system which enabled funds to be made available to the Reichswehrministerium without involving Parliament.4 Heye found himself facing major problems, however, when it came to the supply of ammunition. The German industry indeed did its utmost to meet the demand, but the result of the rearmament was limited nonetheless. As well as the rearmament, the Reichswehr also devoted a great deal of attention to the development of military doctrine. The operations of the First World War were studied and analysed, with the focus more on the future than on the past. The First World War, with its futile trench warfare, had demonstrated the need to end any subsequent war by means of a brief, decisive campaign. One of the first results of these analyses was the issue of the manual entitled Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, which was published in 1921. This manual not only looked at the command process and the decision-making, but also organised the cooperation between the infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers and the support services. Elaborating on the German military doctrines of the nineteenth century, the central tenets were the assault and the victory blow. It is the attack alone which dictates to the enemy.������������������������ The ����������������������� superiority of commander and unit is shown to the best advantage in that.�������������������� ������������������� Particularly effective is the envelopment of one or both wings and an attack on the enemy’s rear. The enemy can thus be eliminated. All orders pertaining to the attack must bear the hallmark of the greatest possible resolve.��������������������� The �������������������� will of the commander to achieve victory must be clear down to the last man.5
This view was reflected in the tactical commands. The orders in these commands were always highly specific. For example, attacks had to be “ruthless, without delay and under total concentration of strength”. This aggressive language became the norm for the spoken and written language of the German armed forces. If an attack were to be successful, it had to have a clear point of main effort. That main effort was formed by a concentration of troops, which also meant a concentration of fire power. A major difficulty in this respect 4 Deist, “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 378. 5 Heinz-Ludger Borgert, Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939. Band IX. Grundzüge der militärischen Kriegsführung (Munich, 1979) 543.
the gathering storm
93
was that, in war, nothing was ever certain. The weather conditions or the state of the terrain could, for instance, be unpredictable, and the enemy could react in a way that was not expected. It was, therefore, considered necessary to be able to shift the point of main effort during a military operation. To make this possible, considerable freedom of action at all command levels was essential. The proviso was, however, that the commanders involved had clear sight of the end objective and all acted in accordance with the same procedures, which were laid down in the regulations. The manual was to remain a means at all times and was never to become an aim in itself. Blind obedience or rigid discipline thus had no place in the Reichswehr. Seen schematically, all levels of the Reichswehr’s command system were in theory as follows: upon receiving a command or order, an assessment of the situation was made. This assessment took into account all sorts of factors, such as the weather, the terrain and the strength of friendly and enemy troops. This assessment led to a decision which would form the basis for new orders. If no new orders were forthcoming, units would formulate their own mission within the framework of the general objective and get to work. The manual on Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen was also elaborated in 1923 with a second part, which was intended for a future army that was no longer subject to the restrictive stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.
The German rearmament At the end of the 1920s, there was a prevailing opinion in German military circles that the complete helplessness should be brought to an end as soon as possible. Not that the country had aggressive intentions, but the presence of a German military force was needed to deter neighbouring countries from attacking Germany. Around 1930, the Weimar Republic would still have been utterly helpless in military terms against any attack by a foreign power. This was illustrated particularly in the many Kriegsspiele which were conducted at the end of the 1920s under the leadership of the Chef des Truppenamtes, Generalmajor Werner von Blomberg. It turned out that a war with Poland, for example, could be fought “only for a short time and with the loss of more German territory”.6 This helplessness was again referred to by the new Chef des Truppenamtes, General Adam, in 1933 in no uncertain terms: “We cannot fight a war at the moment. We must do all we 6 Deist, “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 385-387.
Part of the German rearmament was the build-up of the tank arm. This photograph shows the production of the Panzerkampfwagen III, a model that was introduced into the units from 1936.
A heavy 15cm field howitzer is put in position. This modern weapon was introduced after Germany had decided that it would no longer respect the restrictive stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.
the gathering storm
95
can to avoid it, even at the cost of a diplomatic defeat.”7 It seemed to be a proposal for some sort of German appeasement policy. In April 1930, Reichswehrminister Wilhelm Groener issued the Weisung entitled “Die Aufgaben der Wehrmacht”. In order to prevent neighbouring countries from invading Germany, the Reichswehr, according to Groener, would have to be three times its current size. Twenty-one infantry divisions had to be formed and armed with heavy artillery and other modern weapons. This reinforcement of the Reichswehr, however, had to take place “within the parameters of the possibilities in terms of equipment and supplies”. Expectations were, therefore, that it would not be until 1938 that these divisions would be supplied with weapons, ammunition and other equipment. In 1933, the new Reichskanzler, Adolf Hitler, made it clear in various speeches that his aim was to put an end to Germany’s military impotence. A definitive step towards the rearmament was the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in October 1933. In December 1933, Hitler then decided to set up a 300,000-strong Friedensheer. This army was to form the basis for a Kriegsheer which would be capable of conducting “a defensive war on several fronts with some prospect of success”. This would, of course, only be achieved with the reintroduction of conscription. As a basis for setting up the wartime army, consideration is being given to a peacetime army consisting of 21 divisions (300,000 men), whereby an active conscription period of one year will apply for most of the military personnel. General conscription should be introduced with effect from 1 October 1934.8
The Chef des Truppenamtes, Generalleutnant Ludwig Beck, urged caution. Too rapid an expansion of the Reichswehr would have an adverse effect on the quality of the troops. In May 1934, he wrote: In terms of national politics, it is not right that an army that has been formed so rapidly as an instrument of power for the state should have more value than an army that is two-thirds or half the size, but was built up by solid labour.����������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������� The core of the existing professional army that will be incorporated in this will lose its striking power for good. I would rather rely on 10 people who are secure than on 50 people who are not.9 7 Walter Bernhardt, Die deutsche Aufrüstung 1934-1939. Militärische und politische Konzeptionen und ihre Einschätzung durch die Alliierten (Frankfurt am Main, 1969) 35. 8 “Denkschrift des Truppenamtes in der Heeresleitung vom 14.12.1933 über den Aufbau des künftigen Friedensheeres” in: Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, “Drei Dokumente zur Planung eines 300.000 Mann-Friedensheeres aus dem Dezember 1933”, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, XXII (1977) 115. 9 Bernhardt, Die deutsche Aufrüstung, 70.
96
chapter four
The required 21,000 officers, 7% of the total strength of the Friedensheer, could be recruited from the officer corps of the Bereitschaftspolizei and from the circle of former officers who had served in the First World War. A particular problem was caused by the low birth rate during the war years, which meant that the intakes were too small to meet the demand. In the autumn of 1934, the strength of the Reichswehr had nonetheless risen to over 250,000. Another problem was posed by the “attempts by the SA to form its own army”.10 In the spring of 1934, those within the Reichswehrministerium foresaw that it would be impossible to deactivate the SA by peaceful means, and so from March onwards they worked with Heinrich Himmler’s Schutzstaffel (SS), which was supplied with weapons, ammunition and accommodation. The killing of the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, on 30 June 1934, along with a number of his colleagues, indeed signified the end of the SA, but that did not give the Reichswehr a monopoly in terms of defence and security. It was, after all, Himmler’s SS which had proved indispensable for Hitler. After 1933, the SS developed into a complex organisation. Firstly, there was the Allgemeine SS, a basic organisation comprising members who only served in the SS in their free time; by the end of 1938, they numbered 215,000. They saw themselves as the ideologically pure vanguard of National Socialism. The Allgemeine SS did not, however, have any great political significance. More important was the fact that Himmler had already managed to give the SS virtually total control of the police force in 1934. A major part of the SS was the Ic-Dienst, later to become the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), a multi-faceted intelligence service, which supplied the information that formed the basis for the work of the dreaded Gestapo. In 1933, Joseph (‘Sepp’) Dietrich had formed a military sub-organisation within the SS to serve as Hitler’s personal bodyguard. This regiment was aptly named Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’. More of these SS groups were soon set up, most of which were equipped with weapons and put into barracks. A number of these produced the SS Totenkopfverbände, which were responsible for guarding the concentration camps. The SS regiments ‘Adolf Hitler’, ‘Germania’ and ‘Deutschland’ together formed the SS Verfügungstruppe, a small army which was at Hitler’s personal disposal. After the Anschluβ, a fourth regiment was formed in Vienna: the SS regiment ‘Der Führer’. From the end of 1939 onwards, all armed SS units–Totenkopfverbände and Verfügungstruppe–were known by the name 10 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Niederschrift ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� über die Besprechungen im Reichswehr-ministerium am 20. und 21.12.1933 zum Aufbau des 300.000-Mann-Heeres” in: Rautenberg, “Drei Dokumente”, 119.
the gathering storm
97
Waffen SS. The SS Totenkopfverbände were relieved of their surveillance task in 1939 and were fully incorporated in the Waffen SS two years later. The military value of these armed SS units was initially extremely limited. They had a flawless command of the goose-step, but apart from that they had barely progressed beyond a mentality of mob violence. It was for that reason that the SS leaders decided in 1934 to recruit ex-career officers, who would turn these fanatic street fighters into reliable, professional soldiers. The SS Verfügungstruppe would, however, never become an ‘ordinary’ military unit, mainly because some of these ex-career officers used it to experiment with modern ideas, such as (…) the commander of the second SS regiment, ‘Deutschland’, former captain Felix Steiner, who had a considerable influence on the training of the entire Verfügungstruppe. Based on his experiences in the First World War, Steiner (...) believed in an elite army of small, rapid shock forces, made up of extremely well-trained, all-round soldiers.11
So what did the future hold for the Waffen SS? Should they remain a police force first and foremost, perhaps to be deployed against the Wehrmacht in the event that the army should prove politically unreliable, or should they be expanded to form a second large force, independent of the Wehrmacht? The question remained unclear for a long time. Hitler had indeed ordered improvements to the personnel and equipment of the SS Verfügungstruppe on 25 May 1939, thus securing the place of the SS troops as the second Waffenträger der Nation, but he still resisted Himmler’s fervent desire to expand the Waffen SS. It was not until 1942 that he gave in and even started to encourage the expansion. How should the combat value of the SS units which were deployed in the Netherlands in May 1940 be assessed? They coupled aspirations to an elite status and a strong desire to prove themselves on the battlefield with poor military training and minimal combat experience. They were angriffsfreudige, physically strong and well-armed volunteers who were not hindered by too much knowledge of battle. The Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe B, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, remarked in April 1940: “The combat training for NCOs and men of the SS is inadequate; that’s going to cost a lot of blood! What a waste of fine human material!”12 11 ���������������������� N.K.C.A. ��������������������� in ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland. Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945. Deel 1. Inleiding/documenten 1935-1942 (The Hague, 1976) 48. 12 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Bernhard R. Kroener, “Die personellen Ressourcen des dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1942” in: Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller en Hans Umbreit, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg. Band 5. Erster Halbband. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1939-1941 (Stuttgart, 1988) 832.
98
chapter four
The German troops who invaded the Netherlands and Belgium used a phrase book. It was clear from many of the phrases that the Germans were counting on the presence of French troops.
Back to the German rearmament. Until the referendum on the future of Saarland that was held on 1 March 1935, much restraint was exercised in public on this matter. After that, however, Hitler, who had become the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces after the death of President Paul von Hindenburg in 1934, announced far-reaching measures. He declared, for instance, during a speech on 16 March 1935, that he no longer felt bound by the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and would reintroduce general conscription that same day. The German army leadership were now able to speed up the expansion of the army. True to form, soon after the announcement of the introduction of conscription, the Truppenamt was renamed the Generalstab des Heeres and in Berlin the Kriegsakademie opened its doors once again. Generalleutnant Beck had drawn up new armament plans in the meantime. The idea was to create a Friedensheer strong enough to allow the mobilisation of a Kriegsheer that would actually be able to implement a multifront strat-
the gathering storm
99
egy. Such a Kriegsheer would need to have 63 infantry, 3 cavalry and 3 armoured divisions. The previously planned Friedensheer made up of 21 infantry divisions would no longer suffice. It was for this reason that in the “Act pertaining to the build-up of the Wehrmacht” in March 1935, Hitler presented a future Friedensheer of 36 divisions. Hitler’s wishes presented the leaders of the Reichswehr with major problems. In March 1935, the Reichswehrführung did indeed have 21 divisions, but they had not yet reached full strength. Some 280,000 men were under arms, but no more than 109 of the 189 infantry battalions were combat-ready, while the two armoured battalions only had twelve Panzerkampfwagen.13 The Chef der Heeresleitung, General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, nonetheless decided on 2 April that 24 entire divisions had to be combat-ready by the autumn of 1935. To this end, the 56,000 personnel who made up the barracked Landespolizei were incorporated in the army. This improved the quality of the army, as the Landespolizei consisted mainly of NCOs and lower ranks who already had long careers behind them. In the autumn of 1935, the German army reached a strength of approximately 400,000, which meant that the personnel complement had quadrupled in two and a half years. On 7 March 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland, the first offensive action by the newly-formed Wehrmacht. The political success of this action led to Hitler’s decision in August 1936 to involve the entire German economy in the rearmament. The aim was now to create a 2,421,000-strong army by 1 September 1939, although the German army leaders did not expect the expansion to be complete until 1942 or 1943. Things did not proceed without dispute, of course. In particular, the plans of the Inspektor der Kraftfahrtruppen, Generalmajor Oswald Lutz, and his chief of staff, Oberst Heinz Guderian, to make the armoured divisions the main operational unit of the German army met with a great deal of resistance, certainly from the side of the traditional cavalry, which felt that its very existence was under threat. Hitler was, however, receptive to unconventional ideas and he thus made sure that the mass production of Panzer I began in the winter of 1934-1935. Beck, too, allowed himself to be swayed. Without the deployment of armoured units, any attack against an enemy of equal numbers had no chance of success. He decided, therefore, that each corps should have a Panzer brigade. For the armoured units, Beck also foresaw “an independent operational deployment in conjunction with other motorised arms (currently armoured division).”14 13 ���������������������������������������� Deist, ��������������������������������������� “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 418. 14 �Ibidem, 429.
100
chapter four
German infantryman with the MG-34 light machine gun.
Despite this technological modernisation, Generalleutnant Beck still considered the most important factor in the war organisation to be the human element. The Truppenführung manual, most of which he himself had written, stated: Despite technology, the value of the man is the crucial factor; his importance has grown because of dispersed battles. ���������������������������� The emptiness of the battlefield demands fighters who can think and act independently, who exploit each situation with forethought, resolve and courage, filled with the conviction that it is up to each and every man to ensure success.15
The build-up of the Luftwaffe was the most spectacular part of the German rearmament in the 1930s. From three Reklamestaffeln in 1933, the German air force grew to a strength of 4,093 deployable aircraft in 1939.
15 �Truppenführung. I. Teil (Abschnitt I-XIII) (Berlin, 1936) 3.
the gathering storm
101
During the same period, the air force also developed more and more as an independent Service.16 In 1933, the German air force was still only regarded as a supporting unit for the army and the navy. But this started to change immediately after Hitler’s appointment as Reichskanzler in 1933. This became particularly apparent with the appointment of the influential National Socialist Hermann Göring as Reichskommissar für die Luftfahrt. Erhard Milch, who as state secretary took on the day-to-day management of Göring’s office, thus declared on 30 January 1933 that it was his intention to incorporate the entire air force, both military and civilian, in a Reichsluftfahrtministerium. As early as 10 May of that same year, the founding of this ministry became a fact. State Secretary Milch immediately set to work on the build-up of the Luftwaffe. The director of Lufthansa, Robert Knauss, was the first to come up with proposals. Just as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had wanted for the navy at the end of the nineteenth century, Knauss wanted to see a RisikoLuftwaffe, which would be such a powerful deterrent that not a single country would entertain the thought of attacking Germany. Milch realised, however, that Germany’s small aviation industry was not capable of implementing a programme such as this. Nonetheless, the construction of heavy bombers was the key element of the first armament plans for the Luftwaffe. This would enable Germany to carry out heavy aerial bombardments to strike an aggressor deep in his own territory. On 1 July 1934, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium presented an extensive construction programme, which envisaged for 1938 a total Luftwaffe complement of 6,671 deployable aircraft: 2,225 fighter planes, 2,188 bombers, 699 dive bombers and 1,559 reconnaissance planes. Göring made sure that the necessary funds were available. This, of course, meant a huge stimulus for the German aviation industry, which still only employed 4,000 personnel in 1933. The aircraft factories Junkers in Dessau, Heinkel in Warnemünde, Dornier in Friedrichshafen and the Bayerischen Flugzeugwerke in Augsburg expanded enormously. In October 1938, there were thus 204,100 people employed in the aviation industry. The programme ultimately proved too ambitious, despite the personal intervention of the Chef des Luftkommandoamtes, Oberst Walter Wever, who as early as May 1934 instructed Junkers and Dornier to design a four-engined bomber. The aims of the 1934 programme could not be 16 ������������������������ On ����������������������� the build-up of the Luftwaffe, see in particular: Karl Köhler and Karl-Heinz Hummel, “Die Organisation der Luftwaffe 1933-1939” in: Wehrmacht und Nationalsozialismus 1933-1939 (Munich, 1978) 501-579.
Fabric with a camouflage pattern is displayed in the government clothing store in Berlin.
German infantry cross a water obstacle with the aid of a float containing their clothing and equipment. The pack, referred to in the regulations as Zeltbahnbündel, was made by using half of a tent.
the gathering storm
103
realised and immediately after the death of Wever in 1936, Göring intervened. He appointed Generalleutnant Albert Kesselring as the new Chef des Luftkommandoamtes and Ernst Udet, until then the Oberst Inspektor der Jagd- und Sturzkampfflieger, as the Chef des Technischen Amtes. What was startling was that the Kriegsspiel “Wehrmachtstudie 1935/36”, a general staff exercise on paper, revealed that the Luftwaffe would not be capable of taking out the French air force. The conclusion was that “the German air arsenal (...) was wholly inadequate”.17 The leadership of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium concentrated, therefore, on developing a Luftwaffe which would be able to provide sufficient support for the army. This meant that the German air force became a primarily tactical air force, in which fighter planes, medium bombers and dive bombers were extremely important. In May 1940, for example, compared to 1,120 bombers of the types Dornier Do-17, Heinkel He-111 and Junkers Ju-88, there were 342 Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers and 1,264 Messerschmitt Me-109 and Me-110 fighter planes. These German aircraft had too limited a radius of action to provide effective support for naval warfare.18 A major problem in the build-up of the Luftwaffe was the recruitment of personnel. In 1933, von Blomberg decided that the officer corps should consist of an “elite corps with the most unbridled desire to fight”.19 For this, the army was obliged to relinquish some of its best people. But the civil aviation industry also lost many personnel to the burgeoning air force. In August 1939, the Luftwaffe was ultimately to comprise 15,000 officers and 370,000 NCOs and other ranks.20 The rearmament of the German navy initially proceeded at a slower and more controlled pace than that of the Luftwaffe and the army. On 18 June 1935, a naval treaty was signed with Britain, which stipulated that the German war fleet must not exceed 35% of the tonnage of British naval forces. This did not, however, apply to submarines, of which Germany was allowed to have as many as Britain. Because of this, the major expansion of the German navy did not get under way until 1938. The German navy commanders expected that in 1944 the establishment of a war fleet would be so advanced that they would have nothing to fear from Britain or any other naval power. 17 ���������������������������������������� Deist, ��������������������������������������� “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 494. 18 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Karl-Heinz Völker, “Die deutsche Luftwaffe September 1939 bis Juni 1940”, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, XXVII (1978) 196. J. Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (London, 1999) 82-86. 19 ���������������������������������������� Deist, ��������������������������������������� “Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht”, 478. 20 �������������������� ������������������� Karl-Heinz Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939. Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie (Stuttgart, 1967) 183.
The signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on 23 August 1939 sealed the fate of Poland. May 1940
German command structure Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht
The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht under the command of Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel is the staff of the Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler.
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe XXXX
Marinegruppe West
Marinegruppe Ost
1 2
U - Boote
The Oberkommando des Heeres, under the command of General Franz Halder, is the staff of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch. Keitel and Halder command only these two staffs and have no authority over the units that come under the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht or Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres. C
3
4
Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Oberkommando des Heeres
XXXXX
XXXXX
A
XXXXX
B
5
the gathering storm
105
The more the German rearmament began to take shape, the more attention was devoted to a possible future war and the necessary operation plans. For the German army leadership, there were two key considerations. Firstly, because of the lack of raw materials, Germany would only be able to wage a short war. Then there was the problem of a potential dualfront war. Since the Franco-German war (1870-1871), the German general staff had been taking account of this in the formulation of their operation plans. The main principle that they adopted was that the opponents attacking from two sides had to be defeated one after the other. While one front acted defensively, the other had to attack. In the 1930s, the army trod very carefully in the footsteps of its predecessors in the preparation of its operation plans. That meant that any opponents in mobile warfare had to be defeated quickly. Tanks and aircraft were regarded as important tools in this respect. Because of the use of these new assets, the German warfighting method later became known as Blitzkrieg. These were, however, such traditional operation plans that they once again sought to find an answer to Germany’s classic problem of the dual-front war. By 1937, the German army had progressed to such an extent that it was able to hold its first major exercise. Because of the German territorial expansion in 1938, the rearmament was stepped up another gear and Hitler started to get involved in the military affairs. During the Sudeten crisis in 1938, the German army had 48 divisions. For the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, the Sudeten issue was actually the last straw. He felt that Hitler’s foreign policy was not in keeping with the available military means and he resigned. Beck, who was later to emerge as one of the key figures of the German resistance against Hitler, was succeeded by General der Artillerie Franz Halder. Other senior officers, such as von Blomberg and von Fritsch, also had to step down. In September 1939, the thus purged German army stood virtually as one behind Hitler and his war politics. This army, which had a modern vanguard in the form of motorised and mechanised divisions, was set up at breakneck speed after 1933, which meant that the rearmament targets were constantly raised. All this was only possible, however, because of the efforts of the Reichswehr leaders, who had been doing their utmost since the mid-1920s to recreate a strong German army. Hitler’s accession to power merely served to provide the German army leadership with greater opportunities to achieve this goal.
106
chapter four Baptism of fire
Up until the military occupation of the whole of Czechoslovakia, Hitler had managed to avoid a situation in which the territorial expansions of the Third Reich would lead led to a general European military conflict. France and Britain had had enough, however, and on 31 March 1939 they signed a guarantee of military support for Poland, which looked as if it might become the next victim. When Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to invade Poland on 1 September 1939, France and Britain therefore responded two days later by declaring war on the Third Reich. The Second World War had begun. The German people were largely aware that difficult times lay ahead and they were resigned and none too enthusiastic in their response to this latest move by the Führer. Weisung Nr. 1 für die Kriegführung, which Hitler published at the beginning of the Poland campaign, stated explicitly: Now that all the political possibilities of resolving what has for Germany become an untenable situation on its eastern border have been exhausted, I have decided to opt for a solution involving the use of force.21
The way in which the war in Poland had to be conducted had been set out by Hitler in Weisung “Fall Weiss” on 3 April 1939. The aim was to invade Poland by surprise and to destroy the Polish armed forces in a brief campaign. For the German army leadership, the outbreak of war came too soon, certainly now that it looked as if war would also have to be waged on France and Britain very soon. The strategic situation bore a dangerously close resemblance to that of the unsuccessful First World War. Germany ran the risk of once again having to fight a prolonged dual-front war in Europe, while being cut off from the raw materials on the world market by a naval blockade. Although Germany had signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939, the Von Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, it was unclear how long that would hold good, given Hitler’s expansion plans in the east. The military side, too, left much to be desired. The build-up of the army was not complete, neither in terms of materiel nor personnel, and the level of proficiency of the troops—the length of service for conscripts was by then two years on average—was inadequate. Compared to the Polish forces, however, the Wehrmacht was vastly superior in terms of personnel and materiel. Including all the reserve units, 21 � Weisung Nr. 1 für die Kriegführung in: Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. (2nd ed.; Koblenz, 1983) 19.
German soldiers meet in the north of the Polish Corridor, south-west of Danzig, on 11 September 1939 (right); Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, on 9 September 1939, during the Polish campaign (below).
108
chapter four
the German offensive army consisted of 15 Panzer and motorised infantry divisions. In addition, 37 ordinary infantry divisions were deployed. The German forces also had 3,600 armoured vehicles and 1,929 aircraft. In the west, the German army remained safely behind the Westwall, the German defence line along the western bank of the Rhine. It was here that Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb used 12 well-equipped and well-trained divisions and 32 more poorly equipped and trained ones to conduct the strategic defensive. It was not made very difficult for him, however, as the vast majority of the French stayed safely behind their Maginot Line. The German army leadership were able to concentrate all their attention on the fighting in Poland. Poland had lost this war before it even began. It was surrounded by German forces on three sides: to the west by those in Germany itself, to the south by those in German-occupied Slovakia and to the north by those in German East Prussia. Lastly, the eastern border was threatened by the Red Army of the Soviet Union. Faced with this threat, the Polish high command positioned the forces in an all-round defence along the borders. They were thus widely dispersed and would for that reason alone be outnumbered wherever the Germans concentrated their point of main effort. But the Polish army was even smaller than the German attack force. The Poles deployed 37 infantry divisions and 750 armoured vehicles, supported by 900 aircraft. They did have 11 mounted brigades, while the Germans only had one such brigade. However, this advantage had no significance whatsoever, as these units were in effect no longer suitable for modern warfare. The German attack on Poland was carried out by two army groups. Army Group South attacked from the south, under the command of Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt. The other army group, Army Group North, was under the command of Generaloberst Fedor von Bock. They attacked from the north. Together, the two army groups were to execute a pincer movement in the direction of Warsaw, as a result of which the Polish army would be surrounded and destroyed. The point of main effort of the German attack lay with Army Group South. This army group consisted of three armies, of which the 10th Army had orders to carry out the decisive thrust to Warsaw and seize the capital. The commander of this army was Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau and the chief of staff was General Friedrich Paulus. One of the smaller units in this Heeresgruppe was SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. It soon became clear that it performed badly on the front. The main reason for this was the lack of military proficiency. After 10 September 1939, this SS regiment was, therefore, assigned
the gathering storm
109
a simpler task on the front. The face of Hitler’s elite group was thus saved and the army group was not hindered too much by Sepp Dietrich and his enthusiastic but incompetent SS personnel. The task of Army Group North was first to link up Pomerania and East Prussia by capturing the Polish corridor at Danzig. They would then sheer off to the south in order to support von Rundstedt’s attack northwards. Even during the preparations for the Polish campaign, von Bock had pointed out that it was wrong to give his army group such a subordinate role. He foresaw that large sections of the Polish army would avoid the encirclement at Warsaw by retreating towards the east over the river Vistula. So, after the capture of the Polish corridor, von Bock wanted his army group to execute an encirclement from East Prussia to BrestLitovsk (some 200 kilometres east of Warsaw) in order to head off the Polish army. However, the Oberkommando des Heeres, in other words the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, General Walther von Brauchitsch, and his chief of staff, General Franz Halder, objected to von Bock’s ideas and stuck to the original course, obviously much to the satisfaction of von Rundstedt. Relations between von Brauchitsch and von Bock remained good, despite these professional differences of opinion, but in the case of von Bock and Halder, the disagreement about the campaign in Poland was to lead to personal irritation. This did not detract from the fact that von Bock was by and large considered a stubborn but highly competent, intelligent and ambitious officer. He was one of the few German commanders who had had first-hand combat experience on the front line during the First World War. He had been decorated for that with one of the highest honours, the Pour le Mérite. During the Polish campaign, his Army Group North comprised the 4th Army and the 3rd Army. The commander-in-chief of the latter was General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler. The air support for the army group was provided by Air Fleet 2, which was under the command of General der Flieger Albert Kesselring. The cooperation between von Bock, Kesselring and von Küchler was to run smoothly throughout the operations. Another of von Bock’s prominent subordinate commanders was General der Panzertruppen Heinz Guderian. He commanded the XIXth Panzer Corps and was seeking an opportunity to test his theories on the use of armour in practice. Once the German attack had started, it soon became clear that von Bock had been right. Parts of the Polish army indeed tried to escape the grip of von Rundstedt’s Army Group South by retreating across the Vistula. The Oberkommando des Heeres, however, held fast to the original operation plan until 9 September 1939 and only then did they
Massive show of support for the Führer in the Reichstag after the campaign against Poland, 6 October 1939.
In 1940, the German army had about twice the number of horses that they had in 1914. This picture shows a column including a mobile kitchen near Wittenberg, on the Elbe, on the way to the western front on 2 April 1940.
the gathering storm
111
give von Bock leave to use Guderian’s Panzer Corps to strike out far to the east. Brest-Litovsk was captured on 15 September, thus sealing the fate of the Polish army. France and Britain were unable to help Poland and the Soviet Union invaded the beleaguered country on 17 September 1939 in order to occupy the territory it had been allocated in the pact of 23 August 1939. Germany and the Soviet Union subsequently signed a Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag on 28 September 1939. After the fall of Warsaw the day before, the battle continued east of the Vistula for another few days. Poland eventually capitulated on 7 October 1939, by which time Hitler had turned his attention to France. German losses during the fighting in Poland amounted to 10,572 dead, 30,322 wounded and 3,404 missing. In terms of materiel, 300 tanks and 560 aircraft were lost. The battles were analysed immediately by the German army leadership. Although the losses were not deemed to be abnormally high, the battles showed that the army had numerous shortcomings. The senior staffs had functioned well on the whole. The problems lay mainly in the command at the level of the lowest commanders and their NCOs. There were also failings in the combat training and combat discipline of the ordinary soldiers. It was, for instance, much too often the case that small units had been distracted from their military objectives by undisciplined conduct towards the civilian population. Extensive training programmes were immediately imposed on the troops in order to address these shortcomings.
The German operation plan for the Westfeldzug On 3 October 1939, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group B, was ordered by the Oberkommando des Heeres to go in great haste from Allenstein in East Prussia to Berlin to receive information about new operations. Much to his annoyance, he had to wait until 9 October before he was able to speak to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch. During that conversation, von Bock learned that the Oberkommando des Heeres did not see much point in a western offensive. The risks for Germany which had been identified by Halder since the Franco-British declaration of war on 3 September still existed: a repeat of 1914-1918 was likely and Germany was nowhere near ready for a test of strength with the French army, which was considered to be the strongest in Europe. That same day, however, saw the issue of Adolf Hitler’s Weisung Nr. 6 für die Kriegführung, in which he ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare for an offensive in the west. The Führer had decided “to act decisively and of-
112
chapter four
fensively without allowing much time to elapse”.22 While the staff of Army Group B were moving from Allenstein to Bad Godesberg, von Bock went to Frankfurt am Main to meet Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, the commander of Army Group C, which had already been posted to Germany’s western border, and to take over the part of the front intended for Army Group B. During that meeting, von Leeb pointed out that, because of the political consequences and the Wehrmacht’s military options, he was very much against a German offensive in the west. Von Bock was broadly of the same opinion, although for him the military-technical considerations weighed heavier than the political ones. Army Group B, comprising the 4th Army and the 6th Army, took over the sector of the front to the north of the Sankt Goar–Mittlach–Bisschof line from Army Group C. On 11 October 1939, the commanders-in-chief of the 4th Army, Generaloberst Günther von Kluge, and the 6th Army, Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau, were summoned to Bad Godesberg. Von Bock posed the question of whether a German military operation against France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was possible and, if so, how any such offensive should be conducted. Both von Reichenau and von Kluge rejected an attack on military-operational grounds because there was a serious risk that it would run aground in northern France, just as it had in 1914. Von Bock incorporated the opinions of both his subordinate commanders in a memorandum for the Oberkommando des Heeres, which he submitted on 12 October 1939. In it, he recommended that the initiative should for the time being be left to France and Britain. As a result of Hitler’s orders of 9 October to prepare for a war of aggression in the west, the chief of the general staff, General Halder, drew up an operation plan despite the objections of the commanders of the two army groups. The planning of the Westfeldzug had thus begun. This proceeded concurrently with the preparations for the conquest of Denmark and Norway, an operation which was referred to as Unternehmen “Weserübung”. The task of planning this operation fell to the Seekriegsleitung. Their domain was the naval war with Britain and the economic preparations for war, in particular ensuring the supply of iron ore from Sweden. The Westfeldzug was part of the land war and focused primarily on defeating France. On 19 October 1939, the Oberkommando des Heeres issued Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’. Fall Gelb was the German codename for the offensive in the west. The Oberkommando wanted to deploy 75 divisions in order to defeat large sections of the French army and to occupy the Netherlands, Belgium and northern France. This would, in accordance 22 ����������� Hubatsch, ����������Hitlers Weisungen, 32-33.
the gathering storm
113
with Hitler’s wishes of 9 October, create favourable conditions for the continuation of the war against Britain. The French army would be weakened, the Channel ports would become available and an “extended forward area” to protect the Ruhr area would be under German control. Halder believed that the point of main effort of the offensive should lie to the north of Liège, so that strong German units could reach Dutch soil by crossing the river Maas at and to the north of Maastricht and could use parts of the Netherlands to the south of the major rivers as an advance area. He did not expect much resistance from the Dutch army. Army Group B, now comprising the 2nd, 4th and 6th Armies, was to be active in the operation’s main effort. This army group, the first to come back from Poland and thus automatically tasked for the time being with the main part of the offensive, had to defeat the Belgian forces, eradicate any French support and advance to the coast. Army Group A, which was positioned between Army Group B and Army Group C, was to protect these operations by advancing south through Luxembourg and the Ardennes. On the northern flank of Army Group B’s operations, a new Armee-Abteilung N(ord), which would fall under the direct command of the Oberkommando des Heeres, was to breach the Grebbe Line to the north of the major Dutch rivers and take possession of Fortress Holland. And finally, Army Group C simply had to sit out the course of the battle in its positions opposite the Maginot Line and then fix the French forces in this line.23 Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’ was only a provisional operation plan, not much more than the “expression of an imposed unimaginative improvisation”, possibly even also intended to show Hitler that he would be well advised to avoid an offensive against France.24 There was thus widespread criticism of the plan. Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, objected to the operation against the Grebbe Line and against the chosen point of main effort, just as Hitler had done, while he was of the general opinion that the German offensive would be too weak. On 22 October, there was a meeting about this between the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberkommando des Heeres, during which the possibility of abandoning the idea of an offensive against Fortress Holland was discussed. In the days that followed, there were frantic discussions between the German army chiefs about the operational alternatives. On 25 October, 23 ��������������������������� �������������������������� Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 19391940 (Göttingen, Berlin and Frankfurt, 1956) 42-51. 24 ���������������������� ��������������������� Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957) 32. K.H. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich, 1995) 74-75.
114
chapter four
Hitler listened first to von Brauchitsch and Halder, then to von Bock, von Reichenau and von Kluge. The Führer put forward the idea of placing the point of main effort of the offensive to the south of Liège, then to cross the Meuse at Namur and, once the allies had entered Flanders, advance from there to the north-west, thereby isolating and destroying the troops that had assembled in Belgium. This idea took the army leadership completely by surprise. Hitler instructed the Oberkommando des Heeres “to investigate the new idea”. 25 During the subsequent discussions, Hitler backtracked to his earlier ideas, as he so often did. Now the idea was that points of main effort would be formed both to the north and to the south of Liège. The main objective, after a frontal attack, was to destroy enemy troops and to reach the Channel coast. Both points of main effort were to be reinforced with a Panzergruppe, while the deployment of larger armoured units in the 6th Army had to wait until safe crossing over the Meuse could be ensured. The Oberkommando des Heeres took these ideas into account when drawing up the second Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’ of 29 October 1939. The plan to occupy the Netherlands was abandoned completely. Army Group B would now breach the Belgian defence lines with two points of main effort, one on either side of Liège. If this was successful, the operation should achieve the same result that had been envisaged in the draft of 19 October. Whether that would be achieved by veering to the north-west or the south-west after reaching the Antwerp–Brussels–Charleroi line would depend on where the main allied force was situated at the time; in other words, on whether the main allied force would remain in France or move on into Belgium. Army Group A, comprising the 12th Army and the 16th Army, still had to provide protection for the flank.26 On the basis of this plan, Hitler wanted to see an attack as early as 5 November, despite resistance by the German army leadership. The date for the attack was changed because of bad weather. This was to happen on many more occasions in the time that followed, but not only as a result of the weather. Another reason was the inconsistency on the part of Hitler who, by continuing to put forward new ideas, confused the military planning process time and time again. On 11 November 1939, for example, he ordered the staff of Guderian’s XIXth Corps to be transferred from Army Group B to Army Group A and to take command of mechanised 25 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Hans Umbreit, “Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa” in: Klaus A. Maier e.a., Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg.����������������������������������� Band ���������������������������������� 2. Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979) 246-247. 26 ������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������ “Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’”, 29 oktober 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 46-51. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 75.
the gathering storm
115
German paratroops training in a Junkers Ju-52, February 1940.
Heeresgruppe A
May 1940 XXXXX
A XXXX
4
XXXX
12
XXXX
16
XXX
XXXX
15
XXII XXX
Schnelle Truppen
41
PzGrp
XXX
19
XXX
14
and motorised divisions. This corps was to advance on the south wing via Arlon to the Meuse at Sedan. Hitler was not sure whether the bridges over the Meuse at Liège would indeed fall undamaged into German hands. If they did not—a possibility which was reminiscent of the fatal delay that the Germans had experienced at Liège in 1914—then the armoured units of Army Group B would have to stand idly by and watch the offensive run
116
chapter four
aground. Army Group A would thus provide an alternative. For the time being, however, Hitler’s order meant the creation of a third point of main effort, in addition to those on either side of Liège. Hitler was of the opinion that it would only be possible to decide on the actual point of main effort once the operation was under way and more was known about the allied operation. All in all, more and more emphasis was thus placed on the frontal nature of the offensive and the actual objective became even less clear. The change of date for the attack also gave the German army leadership an opportunity to consider the operations against the Netherlands once again. The Luftwaffe in particular objected to the plan to leave the Netherlands alone. After all, British air forces could, in the event of a German attack, come to the Netherlands and from there bomb the Ruhr area. Hitler was persuaded and on 15 November, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht issued what was known as a Holland-Weisung. Army Group B now had to occupy the Netherlands up to the Grebbe Line and also, in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine, prepare an attack on the West Frisian Islands, the islands along the northern coast of the Netherlands.27 The Luftwaffe could then set up observation posts on Dutch soil which would be able to alert the air defences in the event of a British air attack. Von Bock, the commander of Army Group B, was not at all happy about this Holland-Weisung, given that the partial occupation of the Netherlands would mean that the right flank of the 6th Army, which was to advance through Noord-Brabant, would be left unprotected. He had not been able to stand Halder since Poland anyway. Von Bock scoffed that Halder was making him perform a “water pantomime”, which had nothing to do with the main effort in Belgium and which did nothing to affect the threat from the Netherlands itself. The army group felt, therefore, that the whole of the Netherlands should be occupied, so that neither the British army nor the air force would have the chance to entrench in Fortress Holland. Once the Netherlands had been taken, troops would become available for the subsequent advance on Belgium and France. The Luftwaffe was also unhappy with the half-hearted solution offered by the Holland-Weisung. This bungling of the operational planning, added to the fundamental doubt that still existed on the military side as to the capability of defeating France, was crippling for the mutual trust between Hitler, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberkommando des Heeres. On 23 November 1939, therefore, Hitler summoned the commanders-in-chief of 27 ������������� Letter ������������ from Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Walther von Brauchitsch to Heeresgruppenkommando B, 15 November 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 55-56.
the gathering storm
117
the three Services, the commanders of the army groups and armies, the chiefs of staff of the corps and other high-ranking military personnel to Berlin to convince them of the need for and feasibility of a war against France and Britain. The time, Hitler told them, was ripe to attack the allies. For the first time in German history, the risk of a dual-front war could be avoided, thanks to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The aim of a German offensive was to eliminate France and to secure the European mainland against any British attacks, preferably by signing a compromise peace agreement with London, in order to have their hands free to acquire Lebensraum in the east. The crisis of confidence continued after this meeting, however. The incident at Maasmechelen on 10 January 1940, in which important operational documents fell into Belgian hands, led to more confusion. What had the Belgians discovered, what had they told Paris and London, how much importance would the allies attach to the documents and, above all, what did this mean for the German operation plans? The third Aufmarschanweisung, which Hitler issued on 30 January 1940, was thus virtually the same and equally as unsatisfying as the previous two. The idea was to advance over a wide front to the Channel coast, conquer Belgium and defeat as many French and British troops as possible in order to continue the war against the allies from a stronger position. In accordance with Hitler’s orders of 11 November 1939, Halder foresaw a third point of main effort, in the Ardennes with Army Group A. As a result of the discussions about the Holland-Weisung, the whole of the Netherlands would now be occupied. The impasse which the operational planning had thus reached would not be broken until the middle of February 1940. That was largely due to the chief of staff of Army Group A, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein. Faced with the first Aufmarschanweisung in October 1939, he had already reached the conclusion that the greatest objection to Halder’s operation plans was that they would not lead to the destruction of the enemy and could not, therefore, produce a decisive result. The planned operation cannot have a decisive effect on the war. In terms of numbers, the combat power ratio does not form the basis for a destructive victory against the allied armies.28
This was because the German main effort, in Army Group B, would meet the allied main effort head on, namely the French and British units that 28 ��������������������������������������� Letter �������������������������������������� from the commander-in-chief of Heeresgruppe A to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, 31 October 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 119-122. Rundstedt expressed here what von Manstein had presented to him in a memorandum. See also: E. von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn, 1955) 91-124, 625 ff. and Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 78-94.
118
chapter four
were on the way to the forward front in Belgium. That would probably end in a stalemate. Von Manstein was also worried that his own Army Group A was too weak to protect Army Group B’s long left flank against the expected French counterattacks from the south during the advance to the coast. Army Group B would thus not only have to expect heavy fighting in front, but would also be liable to dangerous counterattacks on the left flank. Over the period from October 1939 to January 1940, von Manstein was to write seven memoranda in which he gradually spelled out his thoughts about an entirely different operation plan, first to the commander of Army Group A, von Rundstedt, and through him to Halder. Von Manstein wanted to place the German point of main effort further south, with Army Group A. With strong mechanised and motorised units, Army Group A would have to advance quickly through Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes via Arlon to the Meuse and cross the river at Sedan. Then, without worrying about their open flanks, the ‘mobile troops’ had to push through northern France at the same tempo to the Channel coast at Abbeville, the Somme estuary. They would thus slip through behind the allied troops heading to the north and north-east. Army Group B’s task was not to defeat the allies in their point of main effort in Flanders but indeed to lure the enemy towards them. The further the allies advanced into Belgium, the better: that would mean that they were leaving northern France, the place where the Germans wanted to force a decision. Ultimately, the entire allied force in Flanders would be surrounded and would end up between a rock (Army Group A, in the south) and a hard place (Army Group B, in the east and the north). The allies would have the sea behind them. Sealed in this “Kessel”, the French, British and Belgian armies would eventually have to surrender or otherwise risk destruction. Von Manstein thus proposed that the attack be directed not at the place where the allies were strong but indeed at the place where they were weak. Sedan lay to the west of the last ouvrage on the Maginot Line and the Meuse front was relatively sparsely occupied here because the French had positioned their best units on their left flank, along the Flanders border. An important question was whether it would be possible for large motorised and mechanised units to advance quickly, in other words in three days, through Luxembourg and the Ardennes to the Meuse and cross the river immediately, on the fourth day. The French had good reason to believe that they could manage with a weak defence here. Von Manstein was lucky in this respect in that in November 1939 the staff of Guderian’s XIXth Corps had been placed under the command of Army Group A
the gathering storm
119
and sent to Koblenz, which was already home to the army group’s staff. Von Manstein and Guderian were also quartered in neighbouring hotels. As the chief of staff of the Inspekteur der Kraftfahrtruppe, Guderian had been the driving force behind the development of the German tank arm and was convinced as no other of the possibilities of this new weapon. Guderian also knew the Ardennes and the terrain at Sedan from his own experience. He had moved through the Ardennes during the advance in 1914 and had spent a month in Sedan for a general staff course at the beginning of 1918. He confirmed to von Manstein that it would be possible for strong tank units to advance through the Ardennes to the Meuse in three days. Conversely, von Manstein’s operation plan also confirmed Guderian’s own idea that tank units should be concentrated in the point of main effort, thereby ensuring that the whole campaign could be decided quickly and that a futile war of attrition, such as that of 1914-1918, could be avoided. Von Manstein’s subsequent memoranda were thus the result of intensive and stimulating discussions with Guderian. Von Manstein had quickly dealt with the problem of the point of main effort, but he also had a solution for the danger of French flank attacks, which threatened Halder’s plan. He suggested that when the main force of tank units moved from the bridgehead at Sedan to the Somme Valley, the units following immediately behind should break out of the bridgehead in a southerly direction, towards Rheims, Châlons sur Marne and from there to the southernmost point of the Maginot Line at Belfort. They would be able to defeat the sizeable reserves that the French were keeping behind the Maginot Line in Lorraine, long before they could threaten the bridgehead. This offensive form of defence also made it unnecessary to secure Army Group A’s four-hundred-kilometre-long left flank (from the German-Luxembourg border to the Channel coast) with a defensive front, because the French would simply not have the assets with which to attack it. The tank divisions would thus be able to concentrate fully on their race to the west. To make all this possible, however, Army Group A would have to be reinforced. On 30 November, prompted by von Manstein’s first memorandum, von Rundstedt wrote to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres: If this new operational concept, whether it serves as the basic idea for the entire operation or merely as an addition to the attack through northern Belgium, is to be implemented effectively, it is absolutely vital that the army group is brought into line with it in terms of command structure and order of battle.
120
chapter four
As many motorised and mechanised divisions as possible were to be assembled at the point of main effort, according to Guderian himself “preferably all of them!”.29 Up until the beginning of February 1940, the ideas of the von Manstein-Guderian duo had no influence on the discussions about the operation plan between the Oberkommando des Heeres, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, Hitler. Halder’s third Aufmarschanweisung, on 30 January, simply expanded on the previous two. That was because Halder refused to submit von Manstein’s memoranda to Keitel and Hitler. Halder was enough of a military professional to see the creativity, even brilliance, in von Manstein’s proposals. But that was precisely his objection: they paved the way for something he was dead set against, namely a premature invasion of France. Also, Halder could not bear to suddenly introduce an as yet undeveloped idea into the planning process at levels above him. Halder was a methodical man, who would only accept an idea once all its aspects had been logically and mathematically calculated and once all staff sections had been consulted in detail. He did not want to run the risk that Hitler would be off and running with von Manstein’s idea before the plan had been worked out. It would only serve to confirm the Führer’s already preconceived notion that the professional staff process was an obstacle in the decision-making process and that it was better to trust purely in intuition and willpower. If that idea went ahead, Halder, and with him the entire military leadership, would no longer have a leg to stand on in his struggle with Hitler. Nothing less than one of the main characteristics of the German military system, namely the independence of the professional military planning, was at stake here. On 27 January 1940, Halder even managed to have von Manstein promoted away. On 9 February, the latter travelled, deeply disappointed, to Stettin to take command of the XXXVIIIth Corps, which was still being formed. Von Manstein was replaced by Generalleutnant Georg von Sodenstern, a man who was known to have no expectations regarding the use of the tank arm. The arrival of winter, which made any offensive unfeasible for the time being, gave Halder the opportunity in the second half of December to study the different operational possibilities in a Kriegsspiel. The setting of a new date for the attack, on 17 January 1940, however, made it impossible to put this intention into practice. After the attack date had been changed 29 ������������������������������ ����������������������������� Letter from Rundstedt to the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Brauchitsch, 30 November 1939, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 129-131. H. Guderian, Errinerungen eines Soldaten (Neckargemünd, 1960) 79.
the gathering storm
121
again, the Kriegsspiel took place after all on 7 February, two days before von Manstein’s departure. His assumptions turned out to be correct. A breakthrough at Sedan by three tank divisions of General Guderian’s XIXth Corps and General Gustav von Wietersheim’s motorised XIVth Corps was to prove highly successful. By this stage, nobody any longer expected major allied resistance in northern France. Since the middle of January 1940, the Germans had been certain that large sections of the British and French forces would enter Belgium. This was a result of the shock reaction in Gamelin’s headquarters that followed the announcement of the German operation plans after the incident at Maasmechelen on 10 January. In response, the French had alerted all their front-line units and mobilised their reserves. The German military intelligence service managed, after cracking the codes, to monitor the huge volume of accompanying radio traffic and build up an accurate picture of the French order of battle and planned operations. Halder gradually became convinced by the outcome of the Kriegsspiel on 7 February and a follow-up on 14 February. So he started work on a fourth Aufmarschanweisung, in which he incorporated the results of the Kriegsspiele. That did not mean that he adopted von Manstein’s ideas in full. In the advance through the Ardennes, Halder wanted infantry divisions to go in front, secure the Meuse crossing and then form a strong, unassailable bridgehead. Only once that had been achieved would the tank divisions of Guderian’s XIXth Corps be able to perform a forward passage of lines through the infantry and break out of the bridgehead towards the coast. That would not be possible until the tenth day of battle. This prospect filled Guderian with horror, and it would have horrified von Manstein too, had he known, because it gave the French all the time they needed to take countermeasures once they had realised that the German point of main effort was not in Flanders but at Sedan. In the opinions of von Manstein and Guderian, the tank divisions should be in the spearhead from the start, on the fourth day, with their own infantry regiments, fight their way across the Meuse and break out to the west immediately. In this campaign, speed and surprise along the main axis of advance had to be more important than combat power ratios. Halder would eventually agree to a vanguard comprising Guderian’s XIXth Corps, but would stick to his opinion that the bridgehead they had formed should first be extended by the infantry divisions from the next echelon before the tank divisions were allowed to break out. In the meantime, Hitler remained uneasy about the operation plans of the Oberkommando des Heeres. In December 1939 and January 1940, his
122
chapter four
thoughts regularly returned to Sedan. Unlike von Manstein and Guderian, who saw Sedan as a prerequisite for destroying the allies, Hitler regarded Sedan as a local, tactical issue: a more suitable place to cross the river than Maastricht, Liège or Namur. Just as in his orders of 11 November 1939, again he dared not commit himself and announced to his generals that he wanted to leave the point of main effort of the operation open for the time being. He wanted the decision to depend on the actual course of the operation. It would not be their own initiative, therefore, but their response to the actions of the allies which would determine the location of the main effort, if it were up to the Führer. On 2 February 1940, Hitler heard for the first time that, as well as the three Aufmarschanweisungen from the Oberkommando des Heeres, there were other plans in circulation. It was his aide-de-camp, Oberstleutnant Rudolf Schmundt, who alerted him to that fact after a visit to the Army Group A headquarters in Koblenz. Although Hitler did not realise the strategic scope of von Manstein’s operation plan, it did provide him with the arguments he needed to impose his will on the Oberkommando des Heeres and thus strengthen his position of power over the reluctant military leaders. On 13 February, he discussed various matters with Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, the Chef des Wehrmachtführungsamtes, and he showed himself to be in favour of deploying the largest part of the motorised units in the direction of Sedan. On 17 February, the Führer then met with von Manstein, who explained his ideas to him in person. Hitler was extremely impressed by them and the next day the Oberkommando des Heeres received orders via Jodl to make new plans which took account of the Führer’s ideas. Halder and those around him had by then abandoned all hope of dissuading Hitler from an attack on France. Halder now felt that, if the campaign against France was inevitable, he should opt for a flight forward and that the best thing for him to do would be to try to achieve a crushing defeat of the allies. Von Manstein’s operation plan offered the best chance for this, as he himself had concluded from the Kriegsspiele. When Jodl’s orders reached him on 18 February, his formulation of the fourth and last Aufmarschanweisung was already well advanced. By that time, Halder had lost another weapon with which to continue his resistance to the campaign in France. During the winter months, Hitler had ordered the attack on several occasions, but had cancelled it each time in the period between the warning order and the implementation order. In February 1940, this time lapse no longer existed. This was the result of the development of what was known as the So-Fortfall, an operation plan for use in the event of an allied attack on Germany. A rapid
The workhorse of the Luftwaffe, the Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft.
Heeresgruppe B
May 1940 XXXX
XXXXX
2
B
XXX
XXXX
4 8
XXXX
18 10 26
XXX
6
XXX
2
XXX XX
1
4 9 11 27
XXX
XXX
16
XX
7
XXX
39
from 13 May XX
22
124
chapter four
response by the Wehrmacht was of course of paramount importance in such a case. In the months preceding the Westfeldzug, the operation plan for the So-Fortfall was constantly improved and refined, whereby the time needed between the warning order and the implementation order became shorter and shorter. The ultimate result was that the response time for Fall Gelb was reduced from more than six days to a few hours. The opportunity for opposing an attack order had thus disappeared. On 24 February 1940, Halder had finished the Neufassung der Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’. Its key sentence read as follows: The troops deployed to the south of the Liège–Charleroi line will force the crossing over the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan (including both places) and open the way to the northern French border defence towards the lower reaches of the Somme.
In all its simplicity, this sentence placed the attack’s point of main effort clearly with Army Group A: the 4th Army was incorporated in this army group and half of the German armoured units, later organised in Panzergruppe Kleist, were assigned to the 12th Army, which was to bring about the breach at Sedan. The 16th Army was to protect the southern flank of the operation.30 Halder thus abandoned the second attack proposed by von Manstein, from the bridgehead to the south, against the French reserves in Lorraine. The new operation plan was later dubbed the Sichelschnittplan, an analogy which likened the advance to Abbeville to the motion of a reaper who puts his sickle to a sheaf of corn and then chops it down. The impasse in the operational decision-making had finally been broken. The plan of 24 February 1940 combined the genius of von Manstein, the methodical testing of his operational concept by Halder, its execution by Guderian, the will and the authority of Hitler and, finally, the certainty regarding the Franco-British operations in Belgium. That did not mean, however, that everyone was now in agreement on the German side. After the months of unresolved discussions about the operation plan, the breakthrough in the fourth Aufmarschanweisung came as a shock to many. Among the army commanders within Army Group A, and also more broadly within the ranks of the German generals, there was considerable doubt as to the chances of Halder’s operation plan leading to victory. They had not been convinced by the Kriegsspiele of 7 and 14 February 1940. The most outspoken of the critics were the chief of staff of Army Group A, Generalleutnant von Sodenstern, and the commander of Army 30 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Neufassung ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� der Aufmarschanweisung ‘Gelb’”, 24 February 1940, in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 64-68.
the gathering storm
125
Group B, Generaloberst von Bock. Their arguments were highly reminiscent of the French theories about the obstacle value of the Ardennes and the Meuse. The dense concentration of tank units in Army Group A, the advance though the Ardennes, the Meuse crossing and the open flanks during the advance to the coast were all far too great a risk and actually heralded the failure of the plan. Why should the passage through the arduous terrain of the Ardennes succeed where the crossing of the flat terrain of Flanders had ended in a fiasco in 1914? In both cases, the objective was, after all, to envelop and take out the enemy’s main force. Did Halder actually realise how vulnerable the tank columns were to air strikes on the narrow roads in the Ardennes, certainly if the offensive ran aground on the French Meuse defences? Did Halder really think that the French units in the Maginot Line to the east of Sedan would let Guderian proceed unchallenged? But even if the river crossing at Sedan and the breakout from the bridgehead succeeded, what was the point if Guderian’s corps was then destroyed by the French operational reserves on the southern flank? In these circles, Halder was referred to as the “gravedigger of the tank arm” and his plan was described as “foolish and reckless”.31 This dissension about the chances of success in the point of main effort of Fall Gelb was never to disappear and would even play a role in the execution of the operation. The decision had been made, however, and Halder, ironically the man who had at first opposed von Manstein’s plan the most vehemently, stuck to his decision. The task of Army Group C remained unchanged—to fix the French in the Maginot Line. The task of Army Group B was to capture the Netherlands and thus prevent the country being used as an operating base for the allies. It was also supposed to draw the allied forces present in Belgium and fix them. The operation plan now contained a number of elements which were ideal for directing the attention of the allied high command to the northern part of the theatre of operations and to confirm their expectations that the German main effort lay in Flanders. These elements related to the deployment of air forces. During the first three days of the offensive, the bombers and Stukas (Sturzkampfflugzeuge) would mainly appear near Army Group B, above Belgium and the Netherlands. Over the Ardennes, the Luftwaffe would concentrate on fighter plane actions to engage French and British reconnaissance units. Only when Guderian had to cross the Meuse and form a bridgehead on the left bank of the river would the tactical air support capacity, namely the Stukas, be as31 ���������� Frieser, ���������Blitzkrieg-Legende, 78-94, 102-103, 110-114.
chapter four
126
signed urgently to the point of main effort. There, the bombers would perform interdiction tasks and the fighter planes would gain air supremacy. But more importantly, from the first minutes of battle, Gamelin’s attention would be drawn to the north by the spectacular deployment of a new weapon, the airborne troops. On the morning of the first day of battle, the showpiece of the Belgian fortifications, Fort Eben Emael, which defended the bridges over the Albert Canal to the north of Liège, would have to be taken out by a special air-landing unit, which was to use gliders to land on top of the fort. At the same time, paratroops in the Netherlands would take the bridges at Moerdijk, Dordrecht and Rotterdam by surprise and airborne troops would capture three airfields near The Hague. For all these units themselves, the tactical assignments were of course the most important, but the real importance of their actions lay at a higher operational level: to deceive the allied high command with regard to the point of main effort of the offensive.32 Given that the capture of the Netherlands had become a significant part of Army Group B’s operations, a decision had already been made earlier, in January 1940, to form a new army. It became the 18th Army, the staff of which was already in the army group under the command of General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler. This was the staff which had led the 3rd Army during the Polish campaign. The 18th Army was allocated the front section to the north of the 6th Army, which was under the command of Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau and was also the location of the point of main effort of Army Group B’s attack. It was supported in its operations by Air Fleet 2 under the command of General der Flieger Albert Kesselring. The decision-making regarding the operations against the Netherlands and the implementation thereof thus fell to the three commanders, von Bock, von Küchler and Kesselring, who had already shown that they could work well together in the Polish campaign. For the development of the plan of attack on the Netherlands, they were able to fall back on earlier ideas on the subject. Similar plans of attack had already been made in 1939 as a result of the Holland-Weisung.
Plan of attack of the 18th Army On 19 November 1939, the Xth Corps, which was part of Army Group B, revealed its own plan of attack. In this plan, one of the infantry divisions of the corps, the 227th, had the task of crossing the IJssel at Deventer and 32 �Ibidem, XXI, 103-105, 301.
When the German army invaded the Netherlands, it used a number of armoured trains in order to be able to push through quickly into the depth.
Delivering indirect fire with German 88mm guns at Maastricht, 10 May 1940.
128
chapter four
Zutphen and then pushing through to Amersfoort by way of Apeldoorn. The 207th Infantry Division was to march on Utrecht via Arnhem and Ede. Both divisions would be provided with a motorised vanguard with extra artillery and engineer support. The unit reporting for this task that same day was SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, which had, however, guarded part of Germany’s western border during the attack on Poland and had therefore had no combat experience. The 227th Infantry Division did not receive its motorised vanguard until later, in the form of SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. Unlike SS regiment ‘Der Führer’, this regiment had indeed gained experience in Poland, but had, according to many Wehrmacht officers, failed. At 12.00 hrs on 29 January 1940, the staff of the 18th Army took over the command in its front sector and the plans of attack could be developed further. The 18th Army was to attack the Netherlands with the 1st Cavalry Division, the Xth Corps and the XXVIth Corps. The general assignment was to occupy the Netherlands as quickly as possible and thus release units for the fighting against the French and British armies elsewhere in the army group’s sector. In support of this task, the airborne corps, under the command of Generalleutnant Kurt Student, would conduct an airborne operation within Fortress Holland. In the 18th Army’s plan of attack, the 1st Cavalry Division played a subordinate role. The division’s task was to occupy the northern provinces and then cross the IJsselmeer to breach Fortress Holland near Enkhuizen. The Xth Corps, on the other hand, attracted considerably more of von Küchler’s attention. This corps, reinforced by the two SS regiments, was to breach the IJssel Line north of the major rivers and attack the New Dutch Waterline. No account was taken of strong defences on the Grebbe Line. The point of main effort of the 18th Army’s attack lay, however, with the XXVIth Corps. This corps had the task of breaching the Peel-Raam Position and establishing communications with the German paratroops who had landed by the Moerdijk bridges. A front also had to be formed to the south in order to ward off an allied counterattack from the direction of Antwerp and Zeeland. On 10 May 1940, the corps had the 254th Infantry Division, the 256th Infantry Division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and the 9th Panzer Division to perform these tasks. Both the infantry divisions had the task of breaking through the Peel-Raam Position in order to clear the way to the west for the other two divisions. In order to check the feasibility of this corps’ plan of attack, Armeeoberkommando 18 held a Kriegsspiel on 28 February 1940 based on the existing plans and order of battle. Another aim of this Kriegsspiel was to train the commanders and staff of the corps and the divisions in making
the gathering storm
129
decisions and issuing orders to their units. The Kriegsspiel was based on the assumption that, with the exception of the railway bridge at Gennep, all the bridges over the Maas had been destroyed, including those at Mook and Grave. Other assumptions were that Dutch troops would quickly have vacated the Peel-Raam Position and that the Luftwaffe would have eliminated the Dutch air force in a surprise attack and gained control of the airspace. A major problem was the limited road network in NoordBrabant, which meant that there was a considerable risk of traffic jams during the German advance. It was also assumed that British, French and Belgian troops in Noord-Brabant, at ’s-Hertogenbosch for example, would attempt to halt the German advance. During the two-day Kriegsspiel, the participants discussed and analysed all the possibilities of the attack by the XXVIth Corps. In the concluding meeting, von Küchler once again pointed out what the aim of this exercise had been: It was partly to focus your thinking and point out that, in the event of an attack, it is important to deny the enemy the initiative by acting as quickly as possible, that this command post exercise was held. More specifically, the aim of the exercise was to reflect on and calculate, on the basis of the situation likely to arise in the course of the battle, how the battle of the XXVIth Corps in the army’s point of main effort would proceed in terms of time.33
Von Bock, who had himself been present at the Kriegsspiel on 28 February, felt that things had been extremely favourably presented: The commander-in-chief of the 18th Army is acting very favourably for the German side. He has brought down the Maas and Peel positions in two days, wiped out the first wave of British motorised divisions when they were still on the other side of Antwerp and only let two Belgian infantry divisions get as far as Breda. The assessment of the situation regarding the bridges over the Maas is also extremely favourable. Nonetheless, day 3 of the attack is the major battle, but after linkup has been successfully established with the paratroops at the Moerdijk bridge.34
Von Bock’s conclusion was that the 18th Army should be reinforced with two divisions on the third day of the attack, when the advance had reached the area around Breda in Noord-Brabant. This request was submitted to Halder by telephone that same day. Halder rejected it, however, whereupon von Bock, in consultation with Armeeoberkommando 18, came up with another solution. If it became clear that the advance of the Xth Corps 33 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Armeeoberkommando ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18 Nr.��������������������������������������������������� 310/40 �������������������������������������������������� g.Kdos, in: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BAMA), Freiburg im Breisgau, 8117/5. 34 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Kriegstagebuch ���������������������������������������������������������������� Nr.���������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������� 2 der Heeresgruppe B, in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/19.
130
chapter four
was going to stagnate, the two SS regiments would be removed and placed under the command of the XXVIth Corps. Von Bock now faced the attack on the Netherlands with confidence. In a situation assessment of Army Group B on 8 March 1940, he again assumed that the fate of the Netherlands could be decided on the third day of fighting. By then, the XXVIth Corps would have reached the Moerdijk bridges, thus denying French and British troops any chance of entering Fortress Holland from Flanders or Zeeland. It was impossible to say beforehand how long the Dutch army would be able to hold Fortress Holland, but victory would in any event be the 18th Army’s. Von Bock was still more concerned about the complex situation in Breda after the third day of fighting, given that there would be three different directions of attack from here: against Fortress Holland, against Zeeland and against Antwerp. He still believed, therefore, that the troops in Noord-Brabant would have to be reinforced on the third day and that when the 6th Army and the 18th Army linked up, a new corps would have to be established in order to ensure effective command.35 There was a special role for the airborne troops. On 4 November 1939, the Oberkommando des Heeres had already told Army Group B about the possibility of conducting airborne operations with the aim of taking out the Belgian Fort Eben Emael and capturing the nearby bridges over the Albert Canal. They also wondered whether airborne operations would also be useful at Namur and Ghent. Von Bock was not very keen on this idea, however. Any airborne operations, which were the province of the Luftwaffe, had to be fitted in with the planned operations of the army group. It was the wrong way round to change or even adapt these operations according to the availability of the airborne units. Furthermore, there had been little experience of using these troops, so their deployment was risky. However, von Bock had no say in the airborne operations at Fort Eben Emael and at the bridges over the Albert Canal. These operations remained under the direct supervision of Hitler himself. After Army Group B had studied the various possibilities for an airborne operation, only the Netherlands remained. On 22 January 1940, the Oberkommando des Heeres gave orders for the preparation of airborne operations at the Moerdijk bridges and at Rotterdam. The motive for this was that it would thus be impossible for the British, who would undoubtedly rush to the Netherlands’ aid, to get into Fortress Holland and entrench behind the New Dutch Waterline. This operation was assigned to the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Air Transportable Division. There were as 35 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Beurteilung der Lage der HGr.B nach dem Stande vom 8.3.1940” in: Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte, 113-118.
the gathering storm
131
yet few specific details about the operation, given that Göring was keeping the preparation to himself for the time being. It was not until 6 February that things became clearer for Army Group B, when Kesselring and several staff officers went to see von Bock again in his headquarters in Bad Godesberg. The 7th Air Division was to be deployed at the Moerdijk bridges, Dordrecht and Rotterdam, while the 22nd Air Transportable Division had the task of landing around The Hague in order to capture the Queen, the government and the army chiefs. This last plan was related to an idea that had surfaced recently, namely to send an envoy, Werner Kiewitz, to the Dutch government at the start of the hostilities to offer a halt to the German attack if the Netherlands accepted German military protection immediately. The air-transportable division had been an ordinary infantry division, which had taken part in the attack on Poland. On 10 November 1939, the division had been given the status of air-transportable division, which meant that it would be flown in transport aircraft to the deployment area. The air-transportable division therefore trained in the rapid embarkation and debarkation of transport aircraft. There was thus no question of it being a special elite unit. The 7th Air Division, which was established in 1938, was, on the other hand, a paratrooper unit and belonged to the Luftwaffe. A German paratrooper had to meet stringent requirements, so this could indeed be described as an elite unit. It was, however, the first that Army Group B had heard of the proposed airborne operation at The Hague. Von Bock was not really interested in the operation at The Hague, because it was not in keeping with his operation plans. If the airborne corps succeeded in its task of capturing the Dutch government, that would, in von Bock’s view, be a bonus. For him, it was more important to capture the Moerdijk bridges undamaged, as this would open the way to Fortress Holland. The airborne operation would commence at the time the German troops crossed the Dutch border. To support the airborne operations and the capture of the Netherlands, Army Group B was allocated General der Luftwaffe Richard Putzier with three squadrons. After some discussion, von Bock and Kesselring agreed that Army Group B’s forward units should be at the Moerdijk bridges on the third day of the attack. For his part, Kesselring promised that Air Fleet 2 would do all it could to prevent the British and the French advancing northwards from Antwerp. The entire plan for the airborne operation, conceived by Student and finalised on 23 February 1940, was not discussed until 14 March during a meeting between von Bock, Kesselring, Student, H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck
132
chapter four
A Kampffliegertruppe’s radio post, Netherlands, 12 May 1940.
and Putzier. As well as being the commander of the 7th Air Division, Student had also been appointed commander of the airborne corps, into which his division had been merged with von Sponeck’s 22nd Air Transportable Division. Because the two divisions would be landing some distance from each other and had different missions, and because Student did not have a corps staff, the 22nd Air Transportable Division would be left entirely to its own devices throughout the operation. On 16 March 1940, von Bock, von Reichenau and von Küchler went to see Hitler in Berlin to report on progress by Army Group B. At this meeting, von Küchler told the Führer in detail about the 18th Army’s plan of attack. In his closing words at this meeting, Hitler assessed the combat power of the Dutch army as follows: “The defence capabilities of the Netherlands should be regarded as extremely limited.”36 The last Kriegsspiel that the staff of the German 18th Army held prior to the campaign against the Netherlands, on 25 and 26 April 1940, pointed in the same direction. Even if six to eight British or French divisions came to the assistance of the Netherlands, the 18th Army would have penetrated Fortress Holland and defeated the Netherlands by the morning of the fifth day of war.37 36 ����������������������������������������������������������������� Kriegstagebuch ���������������������������������������������������������������� Nr.���������������������������������������������� 2��������������������������������������������� des Heeresgruppe B, in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/19. 37 �������������� T. v��������� an Gent, Het falen van de Nederlandse gewapende neutraliteit, september 1939mei 1940 (Amsterdam, 2009) 106-107.
the gathering storm
133
In March and April, the German army leadership focused much attention on troop discipline. This was because they were far from happy about the conduct of German soldiers during the Polish campaign. Military discipline had, in their view, left much to be desired. Plundering and the killing of defenceless civilians had not been unusual. The objections of the German army leadership were not only of an ethical nature; any uncontrolled actions of troops not only damaged the image of the army, but also led, and that was perhaps the most important consideration, to a reduction of combat power. When the German troops took up their positions in the Westwall, discipline was stepped up. Measures were taken to stop the excessive consumption of alcohol, the courts martial dealt out stiffer punishments for absence without leave and, above all, the officers were made aware of their role in maintaining military discipline and order. The Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres wrote to his subordinates, for example: “Once again I must warn emphatically against drunkenness and alcohol abuse. Violations will weigh twice as heavily in these times.”38 Particular attention was paid to the treatment of prisoners of war. The soldiers were also given instructions on how they should conduct themselves towards civilians in occupied territory, a few of them being: 1. Decent military conduct is the primary duty. Any damage to the image of the German Wehrmacht will be severely punished. 2. The occupied country and its population may not be exploited. They are under the special protection of each individual German soldier. 3. Looting and acts of violence towards peaceful civilians will be punished with the most severe penalties under military criminal law. The sentence may be the death penalty.39
The Netherlands’ neutrality was another problem. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht realised that, before the attack on the neutral countries of Belgium and the Netherlands, it would be advisable to convince the German troops of the legitimacy of such an attack by claiming that the allies had violated the territory of these countries first. In the Wehrmachtsbericht of 10 May 1940, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht therefore declared: In view of the imminent extension of enemy operations to Belgian and Dutch territory and the accompanying threat to the Ruhr area, the German
38 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Armeeoberkommando ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18, Ia, nr.������������������������������������������������ 1330/40, ����������������������������������������������� “Geselligkeit im Kriege”, 27 February 1940, in: BA-MA, W 3879. 39 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Befehl ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� für das Verhalten des deutschen Soldaten im besetzten Gebiet, 22. Februar 1940 in: BA-MA, RH 19 II/164. In more depth: H. Amersfoort, ‘Ik had mijn roode-kruis band afgedaan’. Oorlogsrecht en gedragingen van Nederlandse en Duitse militairen in gevecht, mei 1940 (The Hague, 2005) 81-92.
134
chapter four Westheer will be ready at daybreak on 10 May to cross Germany’s western border in an attack across the widest possible front.40
The alert For the German troops in the Westwall, 9 May 1940 started like any other day. It was warm and sunny. Generaloberst von Bock performed an inspection of an artillery battery. At 11.25 hrs, Army Group B received a telex message from Berlin. The telex had come from the Oberkommando des Heeres and read as follows: “To Army Group B. ‘Yellow 10 May 1940, 05.35 hrs.’”41 This message was transmitted by telephone to Armeeoberkommando 6 at 11.30 hrs. Armeeoberkommando 18 was alerted in the same way two minutes later and they both passed the alert on to their own units. Heeresgruppenkommando B had stressed that the enemy was to know nothing of the imminent attack. This meant that only the key officials would be informed initially and that the troop movements to the assault line would not take place until after dark. Von Bock left his headquarters in the afternoon to check personally on the 4th Panzer Division’s preparations for the attack; this was the unit that was to be deployed at his army group’s point of main effort at Maastricht. At 20.10 hrs, the army group received a telephone message from the Oberkommando des Heeres with the codeword “Danzig”. That meant that the attack was now irreversible. The Heeresgruppenkommando passed the message to its own units in the same way as the first alert. Hitler travelled that night by train from Berlin to a bunker complex at Euskirchen in the northern Eifel. He and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and the Oberkommando des Heeres were to stay there throughout the Westfeldzug. On 10 May 1940, all units received special orders from Hitler. The Führer ended these orders with the following call: What we have seen as a growing threat for many months has now happened. Under cover of a gigantic diversionary manoeuvre in south-eastern Europe, England and France are trying to get into the Ruhr area through Holland and Belgium. Soldiers of the Western Front! 40 ���������������������������������������������������������� “OKW-Bericht ��������������������������������������������������������� vom 10.5.40.” in: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940 (Göttingen, Berlin and Frankfurt, 1960) 4. 41 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ In May 1940, there was a time difference of 1 hour and 40 minutes between the Netherlands and Germany.��������������������������������������������������������������������� For �������������������������������������������������������������������� the sake of clarity, all references in the text, with the exception of the German quotations, are based on Dutch time.
the gathering storm
135
That means your time has come! The battle starting today will decide the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years. Do your duty! The German people are with you with their wishes for victory.42
Several hours before the attack was to start, the units tasked with capturing the various bridges in the Dutch border area undamaged started on their way. The unrest on the German border had not gone unnoticed by the Dutch, who started setting up obstacles. The atmosphere on both sides of the border was highly charged as troops awaited the break of day.
42 ���������������������������������������� “Tagesbefehl ��������������������������������������� Hitlers vom 10.50.40” in: Ibidem, 3-4.
136
chapter four Broad outline of the organisation of Army Group B and Air Fleet 2 on 10 May 1940
On 10 May 1940, Army Group B was made up of the 6th Army and the 18th Army, both of which consisted of a number of corps. The 18th Army comprised the Xth Corps and the XXVIth Corps, while the 6th Army consisted of four corps, namely the IVth, the IXth, the XIth and the XXVIIth. The staff of the XVIth Panzer Corps also belonged to the 6th Army. On 10 May 1940, only the 3rd Panzer Division, which had not been placed in the first line, was still under the command of this staff. The idea was, after forcing the crossing of the Albert Canal, to reassign the 4th Panzer Division from the IVth Corps to the XVIth Panzer Corps as well and to make this corps the spearhead of the 6th Army. The corps were made up of two or three infantry divisions, if necessary reinforced with a Panzer division. Army Group B numbered 26 infantry divisions in total. It also had three Panzer divisions, the two mentioned above in the 6th Army as well as the 9th Panzer Division in the 18th Army. If we discount southern Limburg, which was merely a transit area for the Germans, there were six infantry divisions, one Panzer division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and a cavalry division involved in the attack on the Netherlands as far as the army was concerned. For the land war, one should also add the Luftwaffe’s 7th Air Division and 22nd Air Transportable Division. The German army thus had one more command level (Land Forces, Army Group, Army, Corps, Division) than the Dutch army (Army, Field Army, Corps, Division), but in the German system not all levels had the same tasks. The staffs of the army groups and of the corps were only responsible for the operational command. The staffs of the armies and the divisions, on the other hand, were also responsible for the personnel and equipment in the units under their command. Army and division thus enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and had relatively large staffs. The organically assigned staff of an army numbered 498 officers, NCOs and other ranks, as well as 1,864 men to look after communications and 280 men for all sorts of other tasks. The basic unit of the German organisation was the infantry division. This usually numbered over 17,000 men. The staff of a division, including the signals personnel, consisted of 38 officers, 6 civil servants, 125 NCOs and 315 other ranks. The infantry divisions usually comprised three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an antitank battalion and a number of smaller medical, support and engineer units.
the gathering storm
137
An armoured division was made up of more than 13,000 men. The 18th Army had, as mentioned above, just one armoured division under its command, namely the 9th Panzer Division. This Austrian unit had been formed on 3 January 1940 from the 4th Light Division and consisted of two infantry regiments and one armoured regiment. The organic strength of tanks and armoured vehicles was made up of: 37 Panzerkampfwagen I, 59 Panzerkampfwagen II, 40 Panzerkampfwagen III and 24 Panzerkampfwagen IV. The weaponry of Panzerkampfwagen I consisted of two machine guns. Types II, III and IV had, besides a machine gun, a gun with a calibre of 2 cm, 3.7 cm and 7.5 cm, respectively. Compared to the other operational areas of Army Groups A and B, the deployment of German tanks for the attack on Fortress Holland was modest. Moreover, the 9th Panzer Division was, in view of its equipment, one of the weakest of the ten Panzer divisions that the German army had in 1940. The tactical air support for Army Group B was provided by Air Fleet 2, whose commander, General der Flieger Albert Kesselring, was on an adjacent command level with the commander of Army Group B, Generaloberst Fedor von Bock. Air Fleet 2 consisted of: the IVth Air Corps, the VIIIth Air Corps, the 11th Flak Corps, the 7th Air Division, the 22nd Air Transportable Division and Long-range Reconnaissance Group 122. The air fleet was the largest operational unit in the Luftwaffe. The number and type of the units assigned were not set organically. For each operation, the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe made a number of flight units available to the Oberbefehlshaber of the air fleet and these remained under his command until his assigned mission had been accomplished. The air corps was itself made up of wings. The wing was the largest mobile and homogenous formation in the Luftwaffe and normally consisted of a staff squadron of six aircraft and three groups. The group was the smallest operational and administrative flight unit and consisted of a staff flight made up of three aircraft and three squadrons. Each squadron had three flights, consisting of three aircraft each, as well as three planes in reserve. In principle, the air fleet had the same command and organisational structure as the army group. That allowed a flexible response to changing situations and ensured good cooperation between army and air force.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE GENERALS’ DUEL: FIVE DAYS OF WAR AT THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL
Düsseldorf, Friday 10 May 1940 The night before 10 May 1940 was a quiet one for the staff of Army Group B. The orders had been given and the troops were taking their positions according to plan. For the time being, there was nothing left for Generaloberst Fedor von Bock and his staff officers to do except wait for the break of day. That night, the operations division of Armeeoberkommando 18 moved from Wuppertal to Wesel, where a command post was set up. Von Bock received word from the divisions on the front line that explosions had been heard in Dutch territory. That led the army group to conclude that, despite the strict secrecy measures, the Dutch were expecting the German attack. At 03.55 hrs that night, the commander of the 18th Army, General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler, was present at the 256th Infantry Division to witness the start of the offensive in person. Von Küchler returned to his own command post at 05.00 hrs. At 04.00 hrs, the Luftwaffe reported to Army Group B that all aircraft that were to be involved in the attack on the Netherlands had started and that the airborne divisions of Generalleutnant K. Student and Generalleutnant H.E.O. Graf von Sponeck had entered Dutch airspace without having come under fire. The mist had lifted and the weather was excellent. The good news that the railway bridge at Gennep had fallen into German hands undamaged reached Army Group B as early as 04.50 hrs. A setback, however, was the report that all the other bridges across the Maas which the 18th Army had intended to use had been destroyed in time by the Dutch. This was not considered to have catastrophic consequences for the execution of the attack, because Army Group B had taken this eventuality into account and provided extra bridge-laying equipment. Five of the bridges over the Juliana Canal in the path of the 6th Army’s advance had been taken without damage. By around 06.20 hrs, Army Group B had been informed that the air-landing operation at the Belgian Fort Eben
140
chapter five
General Headquarters regularly issued “army announcements” to keep the population informed about the progress of the fighting.
Emael near Liège was proceeding according to plan and that the Belgians had only destroyed the bridge over the Albert Canal at Kanne in that sector. At the same time, it was reported that troops had broken into the Peel-Raam Position near Mill. Von Bock then went to the IVth Corps, where the focus of Army Group B’s operations lay, to see for himself the progress being made at Maastricht. He informed his staff of his findings by telephone at 10.10 hrs. The 4th Panzer Division, which was part of the IVth Corps, was at the time in the process of crossing the Maas at Maastricht and von Bock pointed out that it was imperative that the operation be completed in the night of 10 May. Von Küchler’s 18th Army had been informed by 10.20 hrs that the para operations at the Moerdijk bridges and at Rotterdam had been successful. Although the 18th Army did not have any detailed information, it was assumed that Von Sponeck’s operation near The Hague, conversely, had not succeeded.
the generals’ duel
141
At 11.20 hrs, Army Group B had sufficient insight into the overall situation in its front sector in order to inform the Oberkommando des Heeres, where General der Artillerie Franz Halder was in charge as Chief of Staff. According to von Bock’s report, the developments at Maastricht and Gennep looked promising for the 6th Army and the 18th Army, respectively, whilst no British landings had been observed in the Netherlands yet. In addition, aerial reconnaissance had shown that the British and French armies had still not crossed the Belgian border. For the time being, Army Group B need not expect any threat from that direction. Nonetheless, von Bock urged his subordinate commanders, Generaloberst Walther von Reichenau of the 6th Army and General Georg von Küchler of the 18th Army, to make haste. This was not really necessary, or as von Bock put it in his journal: “This light pressure will not be necessary for either of them, because they know what really matters—I must not, however, neglect any opportunity to push things forward.”1 From the reports that came in later that afternoon, Army Group B concluded that the Dutch Light Division was being pulled back from the Peel-Raam Position in order to be redeployed at Fortress Holland. Although the Peel-Raam position had not yet been breached, Armeeoberkommando 18 expected that the Dutch would soon evacuate that line in view of the situation at Mill. At the end of the first day of war, von Bock was confident about the campaign to come. In his opinion, the resistance put up by the Dutch and Belgian armies had not been very strong. For both the 6th Army and the 18th Army, the situation on the whole had developed according to plan. The orders for 11 May therefore did not divert from the operation plan. The 6th Army was crossing the Maas and now had to hold the bridgehead at Maastricht and cross the Albert Canal at Eben Emael. As far as the Netherlands was concerned, the possibility had been taken into account that the country might capitulate on the first day. In that case, the crossing of the border according to the operation orders issued would have taken the form of a “peaceful occupation”. Von Bock had not taken that possibility very seriously nor, for that matter, the related airborne operation—a Luftwaffe operation. Von Bock was therefore not particularly worried by the fact that this operation had turned out to be a fiasco. In this theatre of operations, his main objective on the first day was the Moerdijk bridges and, fortunately, the paratroops’ attack there had been successful. The operations of the 1st Cavalry Division and the Xth Corps also proceeded according to plan. That corps was already becoming the focus of 1 Kriegstagebuch Fedor von Bock, 10 May 1940, in: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (BA-MA), N 22/5.
142
chapter five
operations. Upon reaching the IJssel, the 227th Infantry Division had found that all the bridges over that river had been blown up. It took them until the afternoon to cross the river, and then, due to a lack of bridge-laying equipment, the forward troops were halted in front of the Apeldoorn Canal. The 207th Infantry Division, however, advancing further to the south, had practically reached the Grebbe Line by the end of the day. This was therefore presumably where the main attack would take place. With a view to that attack, this division was reinforced in the evening of 10 May by a battalion of the SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. Given that everything else was going practically according to expectations, the 18th Army saw no reason to deviate from the planned operations. Von Küchler pointed out to the commander of the XXVIth Corps, General der Artillerie Albert Wodrig, that he should advance to Breda as quickly as possible, according to plan. The 9th Panzer Division, which was to establish communications with the German paratroops who had landed at the Moerdijk bridges, was therefore ordered to prepare to cross the Maas as soon as the Peel-Raam Position had actually been breached. The only change to the plans for the advance concerned the bridges over the Maas which the 9th Panzer Division was to use. As the bridges at Grave and Ravenstein had been blown up, the division would cross at Gennep and Mook, as soon as the pontoon bridges there were ready. The SS Verfügungsdivision was also ordered to prepare to cross the Maas at Gennep.
The Hague, Friday 10 May 1940 After a steady stream of communications in the evening of Thursday 9 May, after midnight a certain calm had descended over General Headquarters.2 From 01.30 hrs, however, the headquarters was phoned several times by Lieutenant General P.W. Best’s Air Defence Command, reporting large foreign aircraft formations over the Netherlands. Two hours later it became clear that German raiding parties were attacking the Maas bridges and other locations in the border regions. From 04.00 hrs, by which time day was beginning to dawn, there were reports of bombing raids on various airfields. These raids destroyed many aircraft on the ground. After 05.00 hrs, reports followed of German paratroops landing at and around the airfields of Waalhaven (near Rotterdam) and Ypenburg, Ockenburg and Valkenburg (near The Hague). Paratroops also landed near Dordrecht 2 The outline of the Dutch command at General Headquarters level is mainly derived from V.E Nierstrasz, Inleiding en Algemeen Overzicht van de gevechtsdagen 10-19 mei 1940 (The Hague, 1957).
the generals’ duel
143
Meeting at General Headquarters at Lange Voorhout 7 in The Hague: the navy Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral J.Th. Furstner (centre), the army Chief of Staff, Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst (left) and the Commander-in-Chief, General H.G. Winkelman.
and south of the Moerdijk bridges. Near the Maas bridges in Rotterdam, the Germans landed using floatplanes. The Belgians were reporting similar events. There, the target was the bridges over the Albert Canal. In the meantime, at around 03.30 hrs, General Winkelman and his chief adviser, army Chief of Staff Major General H.F.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, had arrived at General Headquarters. They established that the Netherlands was effectively at war with the German Reich. The main thing now for Winkelman was to form a general picture of the situation. Then the commander-in-chief would have to establish what countermeasures were required. Winkelman could leave the execution of his orders to his main subordinate commanders, the Commander of the Field Army, Lieutenant General J.J.G. baron van Voorst tot Voorst, in Zeist, and the Commander of Fortress Holland, Lieutenant General J. van Andel, in The Hague. The strategic plan was based on a long and staunch defence of Fortress Holland. This battle would be fought in allied cooperation with France, Britain and Belgium. For this plan to succeed, the area within Fortress Holland would have to be, and remain, entirely in Dutch hands. In addition, the lines of communication with the allies would have to be kept open. For the latter part, Winkelman’s attention was mainly focused on the southern province of Noord-Brabant.
144
chapter five
It was not until around midday that Winkelman had a reliable picture of the situation. For the first eight or nine hours after his arrival at headquarters he could do little other than respond as soon as possible to the worst reports. Close to home, he was able to take action immediately. Just after five, Winkelman placed Major General N.T. Carstens’ Ist Corps under Van Andel’s command and ordered him to eliminate all paratroops and air-transportable units within Fortress Holland immediately. For this purpose, on the basis of measures taken at the time of the mobilisation, Van Andel was also given the depot troops based in Fortress Holland. After the elimination of the German invaders, the Ist Corps would then be available again as a strategic reserve. In the hours that followed, it became clear that the enemy had settled at various locations throughout Fortress Holland. There were Germans at and around the three airfields at The Hague. The bridges in Rotterdam and Dordrecht and those near Moerdijk were in German hands, as was Waalhaven airfield. The enemy landings at that airfield continued all day. According to Winkelman and Van Andel, this could indicate that airborne operations were to be expected elsewhere as well. They thought it would be most likely that there would be actions against Schiphol airport, which had already been bombed, as a prelude to attacks on Amsterdam and Haarlem. Van Andel was therefore also given all remaining aircraft. For that purpose, at around 10.20 hrs, Winkelman placed Lieutenant General P.W. Best directly under Van Andel’s command. This measure also put the 2nd Aviation Regiment, which was to support the Field Army’s operations with reconnaissance and air strikes and therefore took its orders from the Commander of the Field Army, under Van Andel’s command. This way, all remaining aircraft could be deployed wherever the commander-inchief decided the threat was the most serious. At the same time, the situation in Noord-Brabant required attention. At 05.00 hrs, the headquarters was phoned by the commander of the IIIrd Corps, Major General A.A. van Nijnatten, in ’s-Hertogenbosch. He reported that the railway bridge over the Maas at Gennep had fallen into German hands undamaged, that an armoured train had crossed this bridge and penetrated the Peel-Raam Position at Mill and that fighting was in progress within the position. Van Nijnatten was given permission to direct the 2nd Hussars-Motorcyclist Regiment of the nearby Light Division to the scene. For the next hour and a half, Winkelman reviewed the situation in Noord-Brabant. If the German breach at Mill were successful, after the Peel Division, the IIIrd Corps and possibly even the Light Division would
the generals’ duel
145 until 10 May 1940
Dutch command structure Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces
Commander of Fortress Holland
Commander of the Air Defence
Commander of the eastern front of Fortress Holland
Director of the Staging and Traffic Service Commander of the Field Army
Territorial Commander in Friesland (TBF) Territorial Commander in southern Limburg (TBZL) Commander of the Ist Corps Chief of the Navy Staff
Commander of the II nd Corps Commander of the III rd Corps
Commander of the IV th Corps
Commander of the Peel Division
Territorial Commander in Overijssel (TBO)
Commander of the Light Division
Commander of Brigade A
Commander of the Den Helder Position
Commander of the Utrecht-Soesterberg Air Defence Sector
Commander in Zeeland (CZ)
Commander of the 2 nd Aviation Regiment
A
B
G
become involved in the fighting. The retreat planned for the following night would then come to nothing. The Waal-Linge Position, which Van Nijnatten was to occupy, would then remain empty and as a result the Valley Position could be attacked from the rear, from the area of the major rivers. The Commander of the Field Army had already expressed his concern over this danger by telephone. Colonel H.C. van der Bijl’s Light Division must also not be pinned down in combat. That division was to move to Fortress Holland, to form the strategic reserve there. The German airborne landings within the Fortress made this manoeuvre even more
146
chapter five
urgent. Reviewing the situation, Winkelman decided at around 06.45 hrs to order the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division to execute the planned retreat immediately, regardless of the risk of air strikes. Apart from two border battalions in the west of the province, that left only the Peel Division in Noord-Brabant, under the command of Colonel L.J. Schmidt. South of the major rivers, the Germans would only encounter any substantial resistance if the French managed to establish their planned closed front in Belgium in time and if they were able to extend it to Fortress Holland. At 06.45 hrs, Winkelman sent a telex to the troops announcing that France, Britain and Belgium were allies. Prior to that moment, the military attachés of those countries had already visited headquarters and Winkelman had had a telephone conversation with the allied commanderin-chief, général M. Gamelin. At around eleven, the military attaché in Paris, Lieutenant Colonel D. van Voorst Evekink, made a report by telephone of a conversation with Gamelin. These conversations revealed that the four French armies and the British Expeditionary Force, which were positioned along the Belgian border, would advance to the Dinant–Namur–Louvain– Antwerp line, so roughly along the rivers Meuse, Dyle and Scheldt. The furthest to the left of those armies, général d’armée H.H. Giraud’s 7th Army, had been intended for Noord-Brabant, but for the time being would remain with the main force and not advance any further than Antwerp. Only the advance guards would immediately advance into Noord-Brabant and Zeeland, over land and sea. The first combined action would be aimed at recapturing the Moerdijk bridges. The Dutch already had the 6th Border Battalion on its way there. With a view to future use of the Moerdijk bridges by French troops on their way to Fortress Holland, Winkelman ordered the Dutch artillery in the Hoekse Waard not to destroy the bridges with shell fire. In order to coordinate the operations in the longer term, Gamelin and Winkelman announced the sending of military missions. One of the results of the Franco-Dutch consultations was that the Commander of the Peel Division was informed of the imminent French arrival at the end of the morning. Schmidt’s relief on receiving this message was tempered considerably by the announcement by the headquarters’ Chief of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson, that nothing at all had been arranged with regard to the cooperation with the French, so he would have to do that himself. While Winkelman set his hopes on Colonel Schmidt for the PeelRaam Position, the recapture of the Moerdijk bridges and the cooperation with Giraud, it was time to return to the problems within Fortress Holland. The greatest threat came from the Moerdijk–Dordrecht–Rotterdam
Series of telex messages of 9 and 10 May 1940 (right); The destroyed rail and road bridges at Zutphen (below).
148
chapter five
axis, the latter city in particular. After all, from Rotterdam the Germans would be able to push through to The Hague. Rotterdam comprised two threats, Waalhaven airfield and the Maas bridges. At Waalhaven, the continuing supply of German reinforcements had to be stopped. Air strikes were carried out to that end and Van Andel also had the artillery launch an attack from Hillegersberg. Recapture of the airfield would, however, be preferable. The nearest force was the Light Division, which by now was entering Fortress Holland. In anticipation of further assignments, Winkelman had already put the division under Van Andel’s command, again expanding his authority. At the end of the afternoon, Van Andel ordered Colonel Van der Bijl to have his division cross the bridge over the Noord at Alblasserdam. He was then to make his way via IJsselmonde to Waalhaven and recapture the airfield. The attack was to be supported by the 3rd Border Battalion, which was to advance from Beijerland across the bridge at Barendrecht. In the meantime, the British and French air forces would hopefully respond to Winkelman’s request to bomb Waalhaven airfield. An attack was as yet not an option for the Maas bridges, as the Light Division had not arrived yet. On the north bank of the Maas, near the bridges, the defence had to be organised, which at the time was being improvised by only depot troops and a few units of marines. As he no longer had any own reserves left, the next day Winkelman had the Field Army provide Van Andel with two regiments of infantry and an artillery battery. One of those regiments went to Rotterdam. Thus at around midday, Winkelman had made the first decisions regarding the three main strategic issues, security within Fortress Holland, the defence of Noord-Brabant and allied cooperation. All these issues boiled down to the same thing, stopping the German advance and creating the conditions for a sustained and staunch defence of Fortress Holland. The coming hours and days would show whether the actions ordered had had the desired effects. The developments in the afternoon and evening of 10 May gave cause for cautious optimism. There had been few reports from the northern provinces, but it had been established that the Wons Position was still intact. At Zutphen, the German advance guards were crossing the IJssel, but on 10 May they came to a standstill at the Apeldoorn Canal. The Grebbe Line was therefore completely untouched. Only at Wageningen did the first Germans appear in front of the position, late in the afternoon, but they did not attack it. The Commander in Zeeland, Rear Admiral H.J. van der Stad, reported from Middelburg that a French motorised division was on its way to Noord-Brabant, via Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, Walcheren and Zuid-Beve-
the generals’ duel
149
land. Royal Navy ships were arriving at Flushing, the Hook of Holland and IJmuiden. Although they were only setting demolition parties ashore, the important thing was that the British were getting involved. They also promised bombing raids on Waalhaven airfield. In some places at Ypenburg, Ockenburg, and Valkenburg, the Germans were pulling back into defensive positions, blocked off by Dutch units. The IIIrd Corps took up a safe position behind the Maas in the early evening, without having suffered any major losses. In the course of the night, it would cross the Waal. That meant that the Waal-Linge Position would be occupied on 11 May. The Light Division had similar news to report. It arrived in the Alblasserwaard in the afternoon. Colonel Van der Bijl considered the situation at the bridge over the Noord too uncertain to have his troops cross the bridge immediately. He would therefore not be able to participate in the attack on Waalhaven airfield until the next morning. This was not good news, because on that vital Rotterdam–Moerdijk axis, Winkelman suffered another blow. At the end of the afternoon, the 6th Border Battalion reported that it had failed to eliminate the German bridgehead on the south bank of the Hollands Diep at Moerdijk. A second attack would have to wait for reinforcements to arrive, French reinforcements. Those reinforcements were on their way, however. Winkelman received a message from Paris at 21.00 hrs that Gamelin had ordered Giraud’s army to press on to the area between Breda and Tilburg, if possible. Gamelin insisted that if the Dutch troops at the Peel-Raam Position were to retreat, that they also retreat to a line at Tilburg or Breda. An hour later, Winkelman was faced with that retreat. Colonel Schmidt phoned General Headquarters to announce that a German division at Mill had opened the attack and that a breach of the Peel-Raam Position was imminent. He also thought that the southern end of the position was being outflanked over Belgian territory. For that reason, and because the IIIrd Corps and the Light Division had reached safety, he wanted to abandon the position and continue the fight behind the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal. Headquarters reconciled itself to Schmidt’s proposal and Schmidt immediately ordered the retreat. For General Headquarters, 10 May was a tense day. By the evening, it could be established that the first blow had generally been dealt with well. The planned strategy was still feasible. Winkelman realised that the Germans had so far made more progress than he and his staff had assumed beforehand. He did not, however, consider it impossible to halt the German advance.
chapter five
150
Düsseldorf, Saturday 11 May 1940 For Army Group B, the night of 10 May 1940 passed without incident. The excellent communications system meant that all major units were well aware of the favourable situation. The 9th Panzer Division was preparing to press on to the Moerdijk bridges, in accordance with its orders. As the bridges over the Maas at Grave and Ravenstein, which the division was counting on, had been blown up, however, they had to use two Kriegsbrücken, a 16-tonne pontoon bridge at Gennep and an 8-tonne pontoon bridge at Mook. This meant that the Panzer division had to advance through two infantry divisions of the XXVIth Corps, which were also to make use of the bridges, before it reached the Maas. This resulted in huge traffic jams at the bridges, worsened by clumsy, improvised traffic control. The first units of the 9th Panzer Division did not cross the Maas at Gennep until 04.50 hrs. By the time they arrived at Mill, the Peel-Raam Position had been abandoned. During the further advance that day, again it was not Dutch resistance that proved the greatest problem, but the limited capacity of the road network in this thinly populated area. The advance guard did not reach Volkel until 08.20 hrs and it was three quarters of an hour later before it reported in neighbouring Uden. The advance from the Maas, just over twenty kilometres by road, had taken four hours and fifteen minutes. In the meantime, the SS Verfügungsdivision had also been ordered to commence its advance. As this division also had to cross the bridge at Gennep, the traffic chaos there became worse and worse. This unstructured course of events annoyed Generaloberst von Bock and that morning he went to Gennep and Mill in the Peel-Raam Position, to see the situation for himself. He then had a meeting with the Kommandierende General of the XXVIth Corps, Wodrig, whom he ordered to do everything necessary to enable the 9th Panzer Division to cross the bridges at Mook and Gennep as quickly as possible. Von Bock then left for the command post of von Küchler’s 18th Army, which was still in Wesel, also to discuss the traffic situation at the XXVIth Corps. On the way there, von Bock was told that enemy columns had been sighted on the roads from Antwerp to Breda. He wrote in his journal: “So here come the scoundrels already!”3 In Wesel, von Bock was received by the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Generalmajor Erich Marcks. They soon agreed that the 9th Panzer Division should cross the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal as soon as possible. The approaching French troops posed a risk to the paratroops at the Moerdijk 3 Ibidem, 11 May 1940.
the generals’ duel
151
Lange Voorhout 7. In May 1940, the building housed the General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces, General H.G. Winkelman.
bridges. Von Bock therefore had a request sent to General der Flieger Albert Kesselring’s Air Fleet 2 to delay the French advance by attacking, and if possible destroying, the columns from the air. Von Bock and Marcks had sufficient faith in the Luftwaffe to hold on to their expectation that the 9th Panzer Division would reach the Moerdijk bridges on time, that is the next day. Then von Bock spoke with Generaloberst von Reichenau, to hear about the 6th Army’s progress. In the night of 10 May, pontoon bridges had been laid at Maastricht for the 4th Panzer Division. By the end of the morning, the capitulation of Fort Eben Emael was reported. A passage had been forced across the Albert Canal. Von Bock therefore ordered von Reichenau to have the 4th Panzer Division advance as far as possible into Belgium that same day, via Tongeren. Von Bock then informed the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, by telephone of the latest developments. During that conversation, he indicated that he expected that, contrary to what had been assumed so far, the Dutch army would mount a staunch defence of the Grebbe Line. He no longer expected any quick successes from the 227th Infantry Division, because the main force of this division was slow to cross the IJssel, across a pontoon bridge at Zutphen, and its advance guards had only just begun crossing the Apeldoorn Canal. The SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’, the only completely motorised part of the divi-
152
chapter five
sion, was therefore removed from the division, and attached to the reserve of Army Group B, in anticipation of a new assignment. Von Bock then decided that the majority of the reserve should be positioned behind the 6th Army’s southern flank. A number of other reserve units, including the SS regiment which had just been made available, were positioned behind the XXVIth Corps. These decisions meant that von Bock was strengthening the main efforts of the 6th Army (advance via Maastricht–Tongeren) and the 18th Army (advance through Noord-Brabant). The prepared plans could easily be executed. Possible countermeasures from the Dutch and Belgian armies, which were considered to be weak, played no role in these decisions. Only the French threat to the bridgehead at Moerdijk had led to some extra measures. In the afternoon of 11 May, the Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando des Heeres, General Halder, decided that, in view of the troops’ progress, the command post of Armeekommando 18 was too far behind the front line and put pressure on von Küchler to move to a new location, further west. At 14.20 hrs, the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generaloberst von Brauchitsch, conveyed to von Bock, through his Chief of Staff Halder, the decision that Generalkommando XXXIX, under the command of General der Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt, would be put at the disposal of the 18th Army. As had been anticipated during the preparations for the campaign, this staff would be able to become operational when the XXVIth Corps had arrived in the area of Breda and decisions had to be made regarding the continuation of the battle against Fortress Holland, the Belgian positions at Antwerp and a possible British threat from Zeeland. That same afternoon, Hitler visited the Oberkommando des Heeres at Euskirchen and was very pleased with the overall progress.
The Hague, Saturday 11 May 1940 On the morning of 11 May, Winkelman first turned his attention to Rotterdam. After all, that was where the Light Division was to attempt to recapture Waalhaven airfield. It had to be possible on this day to regain the initiative at at least one of the points on the road from Noord-Brabant to Rotterdam. If the whole road could then be cleared, the link-up with the allied front in Belgium and Brabant would be established. Initially, Colonel Van der Bijl’s reports were not unfavourable. Despite fairly strong German resistance, small groups from his division had reached the other side of the Noord in two places. That was as far as Van der Bijl could go, however. By mid-morning he reported having had to
the generals’ duel
153
from the evening of 10 May 1940
Dutch command structure Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces
Commander of Fortress Holland
Director of the Staging and Traffic Service Commander of the Field Army
Territorial Commander in Noord-Brabant and Commander of the Peel Division Chief of the Navy Staff Commander of the Den Helder Position
Commander of the I st Corps
Commander of the eastern front of Fortress Holland
Commander of the Light Division
Territorial Commander in Overijssel (TBO)
Commander of the Air Defence
Commander of the IInd Corps Commander of the III rd Corps Commander of the IV th Corps Commander of Brigade A
A
B
G
Territorial Commander in Friesland (TBF) Commander in Zeeland (CZ)
pull his troops back onto the east bank again, under German pressure. At around the same time, General Headquarters was informed that the attack on the bridges at Dordrecht by a battalion of the Kil Group had also failed. In addition, the 3rd Border Battalion had not succeeded in reaching Waalhaven either. In order to deal with all these setbacks at once, Van Andel set a new assignment for Colonel Van der Bijl. The Light Division was now to have its main force cross from the Alblasserwaard to the Island of Dordrecht, clear up the German positions there, then advance by means of the ferry at Wieldrecht to the bridge at Barendrecht in order to mount an attack on Waalhaven airfield from there.
Column of Dutch soldiers resting. Rotterdam, May 1940.
General H.G. Winkelman at his desk at Lange Voorhout 7, The Hague.
the generals’ duel
155
There was little news from the Field Army in the morning. Aerial reconnaissance over the Veluwe and skirmishes on the ground indicated that only German advance guards had crossed the Apeldoorn Canal. There was more going on, however, between Wageningen and the Grebbeberg. There, the line’s outpost sector was being attacked. For Brigade A in the Betuwe, the situation was relatively calm. Brigade B, from the Land van Maas en Waal area, positioned itself at Wijk bij Duurstede on both sides of the Lek, as a reserve for the Grebbe Line. According to plan, the IIIrd Corps took up positions along the Waal and the Linge and was reinforced with troops from Brigade G, which was present in the area. The Field Army had thus completed the planned manoeuvres without any major problems. At 11.00 hrs, Winkelman visited Van Andel at his staff quarters to hear at first hand how the battle within Fortress Holland was progressing. The situation on the whole was stable, albeit that Van Andel was as yet unable to provide detailed information on the strength of the Germans within the Fortress. Counterattacks on the German positions were being prepared or had already been carried out, albeit without success so far. Only Rotterdam was a cause for concern. At Overschie, to the north of the city, there was a gradually increasing concentration of airborne units, occupying the road between Rotterdam and The Hague. They were preventing a rapid response to developments in Rotterdam, particularly if the German troops were to try to breach the Dutch defence at the bridges. Given the number of aircraft that had landed at Waalhaven, Van Andel concluded that by now there should be some 6,000 men on the ground there. There was a nervous atmosphere in Rotterdam, as well as elsewhere in Fortress Holland, particularly in the large cities. There were constant reports of new paratroop landings, shootings and fifth-column activities. All these reports had to be checked. Usually they were false alarms, but the many patrols were nevertheless exhausting the troops. Upon his arrival back at General Headquarters, at around midday Winkelman was phoned by the commander of the Peel Division, Colonel Schmidt. Schmidt and the French commanders on site at various locations in Noord-Brabant and the Belgian-Dutch border region had held discussions during the night and had come up with a plan for the combined defence. The front was to run from the Maas at ’s-Hertogenbosch to Tilburg, and from there via Goirle and Hilvarenbeek to the Belgian positions to the east of Turnhout. After leaving the position along the ZuidWillemsvaart Canal, the Peel Division would occupy the northern sector of this line and take up position between Tilburg and ’s-Hertogenbosch. Winkelman would, however, have to take into account that the French
156
chapter five
main force would still need another three to four days to move from Flanders to Brabant. For General Headquarters this was important, and on the whole good, news. The build-up of the French front was reassuring in any case. Whether the Peel Division would be able to successfully carry out another change of position so soon after arriving at the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal remained to be seen. Schmidt could give few guarantees in that respect, as he had to admit to not having much control over his troops anymore. By now, it was very important for Winkelman that the Peel Division build up a well-organised front in the agreed area. If they did not succeed, there would be a gap to the north of the French part of the front, through which the German troops would be able to push on to western Brabant and Moerdijk. In the afternoon of 11 May, therefore, Winkelman asked the British government in London to send at least two divisions to Zeeland or Brabant and also to carry out air strikes on Waalhaven airfield. He asked the French high command to have the troops operating in Brabant push through decisively to Moerdijk. The latter request he also conveyed through the Commander in Zeeland, Van der Stad, to the French units in his area of command. Headquarters was unable, however, to obtain a clear picture of the allied cooperation, let alone direct that cooperation. At 14.15 hrs, the Commander of the Field Army, J.J.G. baron Van Voorst tot Voorst, reported that he could no longer establish contact with Schmidt. The only report on the situation in Belgium was that the position along the Albert Canal was in danger of collapsing. All Winkelman heard about Noord-Brabant, via Van Andel, was that a French detachment had been sighted in Willemstad and Klundert. Its commander, however, was not willing to take on the German bridgehead at Moerdijk. Winkelman and his staff were of the opinion that they had a better grip on events during the second day of war than on the first. In and around Fortress Holland, the situation was stabilising. The airborne units near The Hague no longer posed a direct threat and the Germans were making no progress on the Rotterdam–Moerdijk axis. Although it was also true that the Dutch troops were not gaining in the latter area of operations either, that might change the next day if the Light Division carried out its new assignments successfully. That success was closely connected with the fighting in Noord-Brabant, where the build-up of a Franco-Dutch front appeared to be only a matter of time. On the basis of the information available to Winkelman, strategically speaking the situation was more fa-
the generals’ duel
157
vourable at the end of the second day than it had been in the evening of 10 May. On 10 May and much of 11 May, the Grebbe Line did not play a large part in the decision-making at General Headquarters. The line was not yet in any danger. That changed somewhat in the evening of 11 May, when Van Voorst tot Voorst reported that the Grebbeberg was being attacked by weak German units and that nevertheless the outposts had been lost. The Grebbeberg itself came under artillery fire. In the coming night, a counterattack would be carried out to recapture the outposts. In the meantime, the Commander of the Field Army warned that if the resistance in the main line of defence were not stronger than had been the case with the outposts, the enemy would breach the position.
Düsseldorf, Sunday 12 May 1940 On 12 May, it became clear to the German army leadership that there was no actual threat from Antwerp towards the direction of Breda. In the first place, German aerial reconnaissance had shown that no large-scale landings of British troops were taking place or were to be expected on the Dutch coast, as had been feared. In the second place, the reconnaissance showed that the presence of the French troops in the Breda area was as yet negligible. The Luftwaffe apparently had done a good job. The planned operations could therefore be carried out. At 09.05 hrs von Bock sent a telex to von Küchler, again urging him to make contact that day with the units of the airborne corps at the bridgehead at Moerdijk. The units of the XXVIth Corps that were not involved in the further attack on Fortress Holland were to build up a defensive front against Antwerp. Meanwhile, the 9th Panzer Division was making better progress than the previous day. One of its columns had reached Loon op Zand as early as 07.50 hrs, and was advancing towards Geertruidenberg. On the basis of the reports coming in, the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Generalmajor Marcks, concluded that the expected crisis situation at Breda would not develop after all. Even if a British landing were still to take place, it would be too late, and the French deployment in western Brabant was also too slow to be able to stop the XXVIth Corps. It was still necessary, however, to issue orders to this corps for the continuation of operations after reaching Breda. In the meantime, the staff of the 18th Army, succumbing to pressure from Halder, was preparing to move the command post from Wesel to Uden. In the early evening, a report reached
158
chapter five
von Küchler’s staff that the 9th Panzer Division had made contact with the German paratroops at the Moerdijk bridges at around 15.20 hrs. It was noted with satisfaction in the journal of the 18th Army: “On the evening of the third day of war, the army has completed the most important part of its assignment.”4 The developments at the Xth Corps at the Veluwe were followed passively by the staff of the 18th Army, while the combat actions of the 1st Cavalry Division in the north of the Netherlands received no attention at all from the army. Von Bock was not very pleased with the situation at the 6th Army that day. Although the crossings over the Maas and the Albert Canal, at Maastricht and Eben Emael respectively, had now been forced, the forts at Liège were still putting up resistance. Although the plan was to have the main force of the 6th Army advance further, with units separating from that force to conquer the forts, it was undesirable to have an enemy pocket of resistance in the army’s own rear area. As there was no information coming in about the exact situation, von Bock went to Tongeren to be informed by von Reichenau and to discuss the further course of the operations. At 19.50 hrs, the Chief of Staff of Army Group B, Generalleutnant Hans von Salmuth, reported to the Chief of Staff of the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, General Halder, on the progress made by the 6th Army and the 8th Army. They also discussed the continuation of the battle in Noord-Brabant. They could not make any decisions yet, however, about the further actions to be taken by the 9th Panzer Division, because they did not have the authority to do so. The decision was made later during personal consultations between their superiors, von Brauchitsch and von Bock. They agreed that, now that a wedge had been driven between Fortress Holland and the Belgian defence line along the Albert Canal, the campaign would be split up into two separate operations. One would involve advancing over the Moerdijk bridge to Rotterdam and the other would entail the capture of Zeeland and Antwerp followed by crossing the Scheldt. These two assignments were to be carried out by different army corps, to avoid the execution of the one task detracting from the other. Therefore von Brauchitsch and von Bock decided to make use of General der Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt’s Generalkommando XXXIX, which, after all, had been put at the disposal of the 18th Army the previous day. This corps staff would carry out the attack on Fortress Holland, and to that end was given under its command Student’s Airborne Corps, including the 22nd Air Transportable Division, 4 Kriegstagebuch 18. Armee, 12 May 1940, in: BA-MA, N 126/19.
the generals’ duel
159
or however much of it remained, the 9th Panzer Division, the 254th Infantry Division and the SS regiment ‘Adolf Hitler’. General Wodrig’s XXVIth Corps would form a front against Antwerp, with the remaining 256th Infantry Division, the SS Verfügungsdivision and infantry divisions from the reserves of Army Group B. With the attack on Antwerp coming ever closer, the coordination between the right flank of the 6th Army and the left flank of the XXVIth Corps was requiring more and more effort from von Bock and the staff of Army Group B. This pushed the developments at Generalleutnant Kurt Student’s Airborne Corps inside Fortress Holland and at the Xth Corps at the Grebbe Line to the background somewhat for Army Group B.
The Hague, Sunday 12 May 1940 The third day of the war was to belong to Winkelman’s subordinate commanders. General Headquarters felt it had gained a hold on events over the last two days. The main thing now was to gain decisive advantages in the various theatres of operations. Winkelman and his men would have to wait for that outcome before they could make any decisions on the further course of operations. There was an important part to play for the Light Division. In the course of the day, however, Van der Bijl had little progress to report. The Island of Dordrecht had not yet been cleared out, and by no means had an advance to Waalhaven airfield been effected. It took a long time for Van Andel to realise that this was not so much owing to a weak performance by the troops, but to the unclear command structure at Dordrecht. In what was only a small area, three different officers were in command. The three officers were working at cross purposes and meddling in each other’s business. In the early evening, Van Andel clarified the command structure and decided that the Light Division should be ready no later than the early morning of 13 May at the Wieldrecht ferry to carry out the push to Waalhaven airfield. Van Andel had had reports from both the Kil Group and the Light Division of armoured units on the road between Moerdijk and Dordrecht. On the basis of statements from General Headquarters, he assumed they were French tanks. In Fortress Holland, the situation on the whole remained unchanged. Winkelman’s only measures here concerned Rotterdam. Since the morning of 10 May, around six battalions had been sent to Rotterdam and the staff of the local commander, Colonel P.W. Scharroo, was not prepared for the work that that entailed. The Chief of the Operations Section of Gen-
Princess Juliana and her daughter Princess Beatrix arrive in London, 13 May 1940 (left); en route to England, Princess Irene travelled in a gas-proof carry-cot, carried here by Prince Bernhard on arrival in London (below).
the generals’ duel
161
The Commander-in-Chief leaving the Ministry of Defence at Plein 4 in The Hague, after consultations with the Minister of Defence, A.Q.H. Dijxhoorn, on 12 May 1940.
eral Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel J.J.C.P. Wilson, was subsequently sent to Scharroo, together with a number of other officers. Having arrived in Rotterdam, Wilson judged the situation to be more favourable than he had expected. He therefore asked Winkelman for a fresh battalion with which to mount an attack and at least recapture the Maas bridges. In the course of the day, things began to get serious along the Grebbe Line. In the IVth Corps’ sector the activity was limited to some minor fighting. The IInd Corps, however, and particularly its IVth Division had more to report. The attempt to recapture the outpost sector at the Grebbeberg had been abandoned prematurely. On the other hand, a small German unit had penetrated the main resistance sector that afternoon. Immediate counterattacks were to no avail. Preparations were already under way, however, for a better organised and larger-scale counterattack on 13 May. Lastly, 12 May brought news from the northern provinces. The Germans had breached the Wons Position, after which the Dutch troops
162
chapter five
prepared themselves for a possible German attack at the head of the IJsselmeer Dam. The navy Chief of Staff formed an IJsselmeer flotilla to counter attempts by the Germans to cross over from the Frisian IJsselmeer coast. To be on the safe side, vigilance was stepped up in NoordHolland as well. Of much greater importance, however, was the fact that there was one theatre of operations from which no reports were coming in whatsoever on 12 May, namely Noord-Brabant. Since the telephone conversation with Schmidt at around midday on 11 May, nothing further had been heard from the area. In order to gain insight into the situation, Winkelman ordered a three-man military mission to go to Noord-Brabant in the early afternoon and re-establish communications with the commanders there. This was not much help as yet, because it would be the next day before the three officers reported back and by then their assignment had been overtaken by events. General Headquarters continued to assume on 12 May that the Franco-Dutch front was in the process of being built up and that the recapture of the German bridgehead at Moerdijk could be expected soon. Not that there were no signs to the contrary, but they were difficult to interpret correctly. For instance, Van der Stad reported from Middelburg that parts of the Peel Division were in disarray and seeking safety in his sector. Van Andel heard from headquarters about armoured units in the Langstraat. It was unclear whether these were German or French tanks. A broadcast by Radio Bremen put an end to that uncertainty at eleven in the evening. In that broadcast, the German army leadership announced that its tank units had reached the Moerdijk bridges and were penetrating Fortress Holland. On the third day of battle, the Dutch prospects had therefore worsened considerably. It had not proved possible to retake the initiative anywhere. The allied cooperation threatened to become a fiasco. The French in Noord-Brabant had German tank units on their northern flank, cutting off their route to Fortress Holland. From now on, with the exception of isolated Zeeland, the battle would centre on holding Fortress Holland. The prospects, however, were not favourable. The Light Division’s failure had laid the road to Rotterdam open for the Germans. If they managed to cross the Maas in or near Rotterdam, The Hague would be under immediate threat. The danger could also come from other directions. The situation at the Grebbeberg was uncertain. The outcome of the planned counterattack there the next day would be decisive. The new situation required new measures to be taken. Now that there was no chance of the French entering Fortress Holland, Winkelman or-
the generals’ duel
163
dered the Kil Group to open artillery fire on the Moerdijk bridges. Colonel Scharroo was ordered to advance onto the Maas bridges and set demolition charges under them. That night, code word Irene was also issued, the signal to destroy the oil reserves at Pernis. In view of the deteriorating situation, Winkelman had to consider whether the safety of the Royal Family could be guaranteed any longer. Prince Bernhard, Princess Juliana and their two children had left for England via IJmuiden that evening. Evacuating the Queen had also been discussed on 12 May by Winkelman and the cabinet, but not yet considered necessary. It was perhaps time to reconsider that decision.
Düsseldorf, Monday 13 May 1940 As the operations being carried out by the XXVIth Corps at Rotterdam and the Xth Corps at the Grebbe Line were going according to plan, the staff of Army Group B was not very interested in the battle for Fortress Holland this day. At 08.50 hrs von Bock had informed Halder and von Brauchitsch again in detail about the progress of the battle. Apart from that, however, von Bock still focused most of his attention on the developments at the 6th Army. The ongoing battle at Liège was worrying him greatly. The thought of the delay which these forts had caused the German army in 1914 did not reassure von Bock, given that the 6th Army was making little progress in eliminating them. He therefore asked Air Fleet 2 for increased tactical air support for the 6th Army. To facilitate the build-up of the front against Antwerp by the XXVIth Corps and in preparation for the attack on Zeeland, he asked Kesselring to have Stuka attacks carried out on enemy columns at Breda and Roosendaal. The main effort of the air support was with the XVIth Panzer Corps, which had been formed at the 6th Army on 11 May from the 4th Panzer Division, the 3rd Panzer Division, which had been brought forward, and the 20th Infantry Division (motorised). The unit as a whole was under the command of Generaloberst Erich Hoepner. In the afternoon, the Luftwaffe reported that the threat at Liège had been dealt with and this was confirmed by the 6th Army. For the 18th Army, this day showed signs of the end of the battle for Fortress Holland approaching. At 05.20 hrs, the first vehicles of the main force of the 9th Panzer Division crossed the Moerdijk bridge. At around 06.50 hrs, commander Schmidt of Generalkommando XXXIX arrived in Wesel, where part of the staff of the 18th Army was still present. Schmidt’s appearance prompted von Bock to note in his journal that finally the
164
chapter five
corps was on its way, “which I have been asking for for months”.5 Schmidt was given the assignment, which had been drawn up for him some days earlier, to take the XXXIXth Corps and penetrate Fortress Holland. Before Schmidt could get started, however, there was still a great deal to be done. He and a number of staff officers had travelled in a staff car from his base in Jena, south-west of Leipzig. The rest of this corps staff and the corps troops would not arrive in the theatre of war from Jena until much later. For the time being, he would therefore have to manage with what Student could offer him. Another problem was that he did not know the precise locations of the units that were to be placed under his command, or their command posts. His only option was to go looking for them. It was not until the early morning of 14 May, when he moved into his command post in Rijsoord near Rotterdam, that he gained some hold on his corps. There, however, he was faced with a new problem. Communications with the command post of the 18th Army were not functioning properly. This obstacle would not be removed before the Dutch capitulation. This was of immediate consequence for Schmidt’s command of the air force units in his corps, the Airborne Corps, given that the liaison with General der Flieger Kesselring ran through a liaison officer at the headquarters of the 18th Army. This problem would become even more acute if tactical air support were needed for the battle at Rotterdam. Rotterdam was not the only option for penetrating Fortress Holland, however. An opportunity seemed to be opening up at the Grebbe Line as well. The Xth Corps, which the army group had moved to the background of the picture somewhat over the past days, would, with support from the Stukas of Squadron 4, attempt at 13.20 hrs to breach the Grebbe Line at Rhenen and advance to Fortress Holland via Utrecht. The Fortress would then only be protected by the New Dutch Waterline. The question was therefore raised at the headquarters of 18th Army that afternoon as to what General Winkelman’s plans could be. According to the 18. Armeeoberkommando, there were two possibilities. Either the Dutch troops would retreat behind the New Dutch Waterline and continue defending Fortress Holland from there, or they would block the German break-in at the Grebbe Line. In either case, the Dutch army would staunchly defend Rotterdam. The second option, a continuation of the defence at the Grebbe Line, seemed the most likely to von Küchler’s staff and that therefore formed the basis for the next day’s orders for the attack. In the afternoon of 13 May, Army Group B and the 18th Army were conducting a similar analysis of the situation, based on the question as to 5 Kriegstagebuch Fedor von Bock, 13 May 1940, in: BA-MA, N 22/5.
The blocked entrance to the harbour of IJmuiden.
Panzerkampfwagens III link up with paratroops at Tweede Tol in the early hours of 13 May.
166
chapter five
how the XXXIXth Corps was to continue the battle on 14 May. Von Küchler and von Bock soon agreed that the resistance at the Grebbe Line would soon be overcome and that the Dutch Field Army would then pull back to the New Dutch Waterline. According to von Küchler, that movement would mean Winkelman concentrating his troops at Utrecht in order to block the advance routes to The Hague. He therefore wanted to have the XXXIXth Corps advance from Rotterdam via Gouda to Utrecht in order to catch the majority of the Dutch Field Army in a pincer movement. Von Bock, on the other hand, expected Winkelman to have the Dutch army retreat along the Amersfoort–Amsterdam axis, in order to defend the capital as a last bulwark. After the breach at Rotterdam, the battle would then also have to be continued along the Gouda–Leiden axis towards Amsterdam. If the attack were to concentrate on Utrecht, there was a danger of part of the Dutch army escaping to Amsterdam. Von Küchler, however, would not give in and von Bock sent von Salmuth to his stubborn subordinate commander to convince him that he was wrong. He continued to resist, however, after which von Bock decided that the boundaries of the subordinate commander’s own responsibility had been reached and at 23.35 hrs he personally ordered von Küchler to change his plans. No matter how the 18th Army decided to complete the conquest of the Netherlands, it was beyond any doubt that the Dutch capitulation was imminent. It was therefore time to make preparations to that effect. In the evening of 13 May, therefore, the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Generalmajor Erich Marcks, asked the Head of the Operations Division of Army Group B, Oberst Wilhelm Hasse, what should be done when the Netherlands capitulated. Who should conduct the negotiations with Winkelman and what would the position of the Dutch soldiers be? Should they be considered prisoners of war? That would become clear the next day.
The Hague, Monday 13 May 1940 The fourth day began early for the commander-in-chief. That night, Winkelman had visited both the Queen at Noordeinde Palace and the members of the cabinet who were at Bezuidenhoutseweg 30, where the Council of Ministers had been meeting since 10 May. Winkelman set out the state of the country. It was, although not yet hopeless, nonetheless very serious. The ministers concluded that the Queen should leave the country immediately. At first, Winkelman resisted, fearing the effect such a step would have on the morale of the troops, but in the end he concurred with the cabinet’s point of view. The Queen also came to the conclusion that her
the generals’ duel
167
German vehicles in the streets of war-torn Rhenen.
departure was unavoidable. At around nine, she left The Hague to board a British destroyer at the Hook of Holland.6 Later that morning, Winkelman and all the members of the cabinet discussed the situation again. The main question now was whether to give up the fight or not. There was a difference of opinion, but after a heated debate the ministers followed the commander-in-chief ’s advice to keep going. They urged Winkelman, however, not to make needless sacrifices. On the basis of this rather vague guideline, therefore, the commander-inchief had to decide when the weapons would be laid down. For the time being, Winkelman took this as a mandate to continue fighting. At the same time, however, he bore in mind the possibility that communications between headquarters and the subordinate commanders could be cut off as a result of the fighting. With this in mind, the latter were given secret instructions, which entailed, inter alia, that commanders who became cut off had to assume that the government would not cease the resistance under any condition. The word was ‘hold fast to the last man’. 6 For a polemic review of the departure of Queen Wilhelmina, see N. van der Zee, Om erger te voorkomen.������������������������������������������������������������������������� De ������������������������������������������������������������������������ voorgeschiedenis en uitvoering van de vernietiging van het Nederlandse jodendom tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 1997) 141-153. C. Fasseur, Queen Wilhelmina’s biographer, uses persuasive arguments to counter Van der Zee’s conclusion that the Queen’s departure contributed indirectly to the destruction of the Dutch Jews. See C. Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Krijgshaftig in een vormeloze jas (Amsterdam, 2001) 20-24.
168
chapter five
Along the same lines, Winkelman had already taken measures earlier that morning. Major General Carstens was summoned to headquarters at 05.00 hrs, where he was ordered to establish an antitank front around The Hague to stop any tanks advancing from Rotterdam. Closely connected still to the threat at Rotterdam were the actions of the Light Division. It had been in action almost constantly since 10 May, without having been able to turn the tide on the southern front of Fortress Holland. By now, on 13 May, that was looking less likely than ever. Van der Bijl’s division was worn out and, with German tanks now on their way, was faced with a rapidly strengthening enemy. With permission from General Headquarters, all Dutch troops evacuated the Island of Dordrecht in the course of the day. The situation on his front, which was rapidly becoming critical, raised questions for Colonel Scharroo, the cantonment commander of Rotterdam. So far the exchanges of fire across the Maas had had little effect on the city and its population. Now, however, tanks and artillery were approaching and the risk of a German breach was increasing. If it were to come to street battles and artillery shelling, parts of the city ran the risk of being destroyed. Could that risk be taken and what was his troops’ task, Scharroo wondered. Winkelman himself spoke to Scharroo about this. The commander-in-chief let his decision be guided by the conclusions he had drawn earlier that day from his consultations with the Queen and the cabinet. As long as all means of defence had not yet been exhausted, he considered fighting on to be worthwhile. Winkelman therefore ordered Scharroo to defend Rotterdam staunchly and to hold the city to the last man. Evacuation of the city’s population was not discussed. The will to stand firm was also decisive in Winkelman’s stance regarding the navy. Vice Admiral J.Th. Furstner was under the command of the commander-in-chief insofar as the fleet’s contribution to the battle on land was concerned. Winkelman had nothing to do with the ships that were not involved. They were under the direct command of Furstner in his capacity as commander of the naval forces. As early as 10 May, the navy leadership had taken measures in case the motherland was occupied and the battle had to be continued elsewhere. From that day, various warships which were not significant for the land war crossed the North Sea to Britain. When Furstner realised on 13 May that things were going wrong on several fronts, he went to see Winkelman. Furstner announced that he would go to Britain as soon as it was established that the fight should be given up. Winkelman disagreed. His focus was inland. Talking now about what would happen after a capitulation was not appropriate, neither for the army nor for the
the generals’ duel
169
navy. It did not go any further, however, than this exchange of thoughts. Winkelman made no attempt to change Furstner’s mind. What happened at Kornwerderzand, the eastern head of the IJsselmeer Dam, that day was something that Winkelman had not seen so far in the other theatres of operations. The troops stood firm. The news that a German attack there had been unsuccessful was cold comfort for headquarters, however, given that since 10 May the northern theatre of operations had been the least important of all. Much more serious were the Field Army’s problems at the Grebbeberg. In the night of 12 May, the blocking off of the German troops who had penetrated the position appeared to have been successful. At the same time, the command post of the IVth Division was preparing a counterattack which was to drive back the Germans in the morning of 13 May. The reports that arrived at headquarters that afternoon, however, told a different story. The counterattack had failed and at Rhenen the Germans had reached the railway, the last defence. The Dutch troops left their positions at the Grebbeberg in what was increasingly beginning to resemble a rout. Eventually the line along the railway fell as well. Elsewhere in the Valley Position, events concluded more favourably. At Scherpenzeel, in the IInd Division’s sector, the German attacked that day as well, but this time to no avail. This was no consolation to the Commander of the Field Army, however. The breach at Rhenen jeopardised the defence of the entire line. Van Voorst tot Voorst therefore decided that the entire Field Army was to retreat to the New Dutch Waterline. Most ministers had concluded from Winkelman’s outline later that day that not only the Queen, but also the cabinet should leave the country.7 Shortly after midday, the group left for the Hook of Holland where they would be able to find a British warship. They phoned Winkelman from the Hook of Holland. Besides announcing that the seat of government was being moved abroad, they also had instructions for him regarding the war policy to be followed. The instructions, drawn up by Minister Dijxhoorn, repeated the earlier guideline: the commander-in-chief was to continue fighting. Surrender was to be offered if further resistance proved pointless and useless. All in all, the country’s military position in the night of 13 May was not to be envied. Only an incorrigible optimist could count on the tables being turned. Winkelman was no such optimist. Several decisions he made on 12 and 13 May show that he expected an early capitulation to be 7 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, E.N. van Kleffens, and the Minister of Colonies, Ch.J.I.M. Welter, had already left for London in the morning of 10 May 1940.
170
chapter five
the most likely end to the fighting, even though no such doubts could be heard in his orders to the troops. Those orders focused on the determination to fight on. Winkelman’s plan to postpone the capitulation as long as possible in the end focused on the question of what higher purpose was served by continuing to fight. Closely connected was the question of what sacrifices were proportional to that purpose. We can only guess at Winkelman’s ideas in this respect. Most in line with the strategic thought at headquarters before and during those days in May is the assumption that the objective of the battle still lay in allied warfare. Even though the defence of Fortress Holland was at an end, France, Britain and Belgium were holding on. By fixing as many German troops as possible for as long as possible, the Dutch armed forces would at least be able to prevent the German army leadership from moving those units to the front in Belgium or northern France. Closer to home there were common interests as well. Giraud’s advance guards were still fighting in Noord-Brabant, while two of his divisions were reinforcing the defence on the Zeeland islands and in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. The Dutch troops there had even been placed under French supreme command. The records do not show what sacrifices, military or otherwise, Winkelman did or did not consider acceptable for the continuation of operations. Nor is it known whether the issue was discussed in these terms at headquarters in the days before 14 May. It is possible that the issue was simply avoided so long as the actual situation did not give cause to make statements on the matter. If this was the case, the decision on when to capitulate not only depended on the resilience of the Dutch army and population, but also on the decisiveness and the means with which the Germans would continue their attack.
Düsseldorf, Tuesday 14 May 1940 For Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, 14 May 1940 was to be a busy day. His command post was still in Düsseldorf, but the front line was moving west, so to visit the forward troops he was having to travel increasingly long distances. This day again, his attention was mainly on the 6th Army. He visited the headquarters of the XVIth Corps in Tongeren and also appeared there in the command post of the 4th Panzer Division. Armeekommando 18 had by then moved to Uden. As the communications with Rijsoord remained flawed, however, the Head of the Operations Division went to the command post of the XXXIXth Corps to be informed of the situation at Rotterdam. At 12.20 hrs he was back in Uden
the generals’ duel
171
and announced that, at 13.20 hrs that same afternoon, after initial artillery shelling and an air strike, the XXXIXth Corps would continue the attack in Rotterdam and then penetrate deep into Fortress Holland. Prior to the attack, a parlementaire would be sent to the commander of Rotterdam to claim the city. It would be clear by now to the Dutch commanders as well that they were fighting a lost cause. Von Küchler was at the Xth Corps that afternoon and concluded from his own observations that the Dutch army was on the verge of collapse. The faulty communications meant that von Küchler’s staff in Uden had not been informed that afternoon of the actual situation in Rotterdam. At 16.20 hrs, when the staff was still counting on a continuation of the fighting, the report came that Rotterdam had capitulated, soon to be followed by the surrender of Utrecht. In a proclamation broadcast at 20.30 hrs on Dutch radio, Winkelman announced that the Dutch armed forces, with the exception of the troops in Zeeland, would lay down their weapons. It was through this broadcast that Army Group B and Armeekommando 18 found out about the Dutch capitulation. When von Bock reported this good news to von Brauchitsch, the latter responded rather coolly. Von Bock’s annoyance was reflected in his journal entry: “I told Brauchitsch, whose response to this not entirely unimportant event was ‘yes’.”8 Von Brauchitsch may have been preoccupied. The most significant development on 14 May for the Oberkommando des Heeres was not the Dutch capitulation, but the situation at Army Group A, in particular the battle at the bridgehead on the left bank of the Meuse at Sedan, which was to be followed by a breakout. The entire success of Fall Gelb could come to depend on it. Von Bock then ordered von Küchler to begin negotiations with Winkelman. As long as Hitler had not issued any further orders, the Dutch soldiers were to be considered prisoners of war, which for the time being sufficiently answered Generalmajor Marcks’ questions of the previous evening.
The Hague, Tuesday 14 May 1940 At General Headquarters, the fifth day of war began in relative calm. The Germans appeared to be leaving Kornwerderzand in peace. The Field Army reported an uninterrupted retreat to the New Dutch Waterline. The troops were tired, but nonetheless they were in the process of taking up their new positions. At the IVth Division and Brigade B, it was to be some 8 Ibidem, 14 May 1940.
After the capitulation: German columns enter Amsterdam …
... and arrive at the town hall.
the generals’ duel
173
time before the defence was properly organised, as much of the equipment and weapons had been lost and some units had been completely dispersed. The question was whether the Field Army would have that much time. The Light Division and the Kil Group also proved to have completed the retreat they had begun the previous day. In Rotterdam, the situation was still dangerous, but stable. Scharroo was making preparations to regroup his troops where the Germans would try to breach the front along the Maas. The threat behind him from the German bridgehead at Overschie was reduced that morning, as parts of the Ist Corps attacked it at 05.00 hrs from several directions. The relative calm at headquarters gave Winkelman and Van Voorst tot Voorst the opportunity to review the overall situation at the various fronts. After careful consideration, they concluded that the situation was as serious as ever, but still