Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949: New Democracy (1939-1941)

Volume VII

New Democracy 1939-1941

MAo~s ROAD1DPOWER Revolutionartjl¥fitings

1912·1_949

Stuart R. Schram, Editor Nancy J. Hodes. Associate Editor

Volume VII

New Democracy 1939-1941

1\fAOS ROADlD POWER

Revolutionar1j ~tings

1912·1949

This volume was prepared under the auspices of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University

The project for the translation of Mao Zedong's pre-1949 writings has been supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency. A grant to aid in the completion of the project has also been received from The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc.

The Cover

''The sole task of the Chinese youth at present is to defeat Japanese imperialism." (Inscription to mark May 4th, Youth Day, 1940.)

Volume VII

New Democracy 1939-1941

1\fAO~S ROAD TO POWER Revolutionarl:JWfitings

1912·1949 Stuart R. Schram, Editor Nancy J. Hodes Associate Editor

AN

Lyman P. VanSlyke Guest Associate Editor

EAsT GATE

BooK

cJvf.E.Sharpe Armonk, New York London. England

An East Gate Book Copyright © 2005 by John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research Introductory materials copyright© 2005 by Stuart R. Schram and Lyman VanSlyke

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form

without written permission from the publisher, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. Library of Congress Catalogjng-io-Publicatioo Data (Revised for val. 7) Mao, Tse-tung, 1893-1976.

Mao's road to power. "East gate book."

Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. I. The pre-Marxist period, 1912-192()-v. 7. New Democracy, 1939-1941 1. Schram, Stuart R., 11. Title. DS778.M3A25 1992 951.04 92-26783 ISBN 1-56324-049-1 (v. !:acid-free); ISBN 1-56324-457-8 (pbk; acid-free} Volume 7: ISBN 0-7656-0794-8 (acid-free} C!P

Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Pennanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984.

BM (c)

10

Contents Acknowledgments General Introduction: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912-1949 Introduction Note on Sources and Conventions

xxvii xxix xxxvii lxxvii

Part I. Texts 1939 Foreword to Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army (January 2)

5

To He Ganzhi (January 17)

9

The Relationship Between the War of Resistance and Foreign Assistance (January 20)

II

To Zhou Yang (January 22)

13

On the Current War Conditions and the Political Situation (January 28)

14

Inscription for the Artillery Regiment (n.d.)

21

To Chen Boda (February I)

22

Unite, While at the Same Time Struggling (February 5)

26

Telegram from Political Councilors Mao and Chen Asking for Leave Because of Other Business (February 12)

29

The Chinese Army Should Learn from the Red Army of the Soviet Union (February 16)

30

The Principal Staff of Political Organs at All Levels Must Be Party Members (February 19)

32

To Zhang Wentian (February 20)

33

vi

CONTENTS

To Zhang Wentian (February 22)

38

Preface to Nie Rongzhen's An Anti-Japanese Model BaseThe Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region (March 2)

40

Views on Improving the Plan of Education at Branches of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (March 6)

42

Women, Unite (March 8)

44

Talk at the Evening Meeting Commemorating Marx and Sun Yatsen (March 12)

50

Views on the New Fourth Army Staff Work Conference (March 16)

52

ToNie Rongzhen (March 18)

54

Address at the Evening Meeting Commemorating "March 18th" (March 18)

55

Collecting Information About the Deeds of National Heroes in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and Disseminating Propaganda About Them (March 18)

56

The Emphasis in Consolidation Should Be Placed on North China; Development Should Stress Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei (March 19)

57

The Political Direction for the General Mobilization of the National Spirit (May I)

60

The May Fourth Movement (May)

66

Speech at the Meeting in Yan'an in Commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the May Fourth Movement (May 4)

69

To Pan Zinian (May II)

80

Speech at the Educational Mobilization Meeting for Cadres at Their Posts in Yan'an (May 20)

81

In Commemoration of the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (May 26)

90

CONTENTS

vii

Struggle Without Ceasing (May 30)

92

The Chinese and British Peoples Stand at the Same Front! (June 1)

98

Inscription for the First Issue of the Magazine Chinese Women Published in Yan'an (June 1)

100

Speech Given at the Meeting to Commemorate the Third Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (June 1)

101

Talk at the Award-Giving Ceremony for Model Youth (June 6)

103

Outline on Opposing Capitulation (June 10)

104

Views on the Eighth Route Army Staff Work Conference (June 12)

141

To Xiao San (June 17)

143

The Gravest Crisis in the Current Situation (June 30)

144

Persist in Long-Term Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Pany (July 9)

148

Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Chinese Women's University (July 20)

155

Letter to President Lin Biao on the Study of Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee (July 29)

157

Elegiac Couplet for Mr. Guo Gaoru (July)

158

Instructions of the Central Military Commission on the Problem of Consolidating the Anti-Japanese University (July)

159

The Reactionaries Must Be Punished in Accordance with the Law of the Land (August 1)

160

Epigraph Written in His Own Handwriting for the Martyr Xie Zizhang (August 13)

165

Speech at the First Representative Conference of the Students' National Salvation Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (August 13)

166

viii

CONTENTS

To Mao Anying and Mao Anqing (August 26)

168

Invitation to Mr. Nehru to Visit Yan' an (August 27)

169

Mao Zedong, Leader of the Chinese Communist Party, on the Present International Situation and China's War of Resistance (September I)

170

Our Views Concerning the Work of the Political Council in the Past and the Current Situation (September 8)

177

Speech at an Evening Welcome Party for the Northern Route Comfort Corps of the National Comfort Corps of China (September 9)

186

The Communist Political Councilors Contribute in Support of the Hong Kong Workers Who Are Opposing Wang (September 12)

189

Outline of a Speech on the Second Imperialist War (September 14)

190

Mr. Mao Zedong's Interview with Mr. Liu, Correspondent for the Central News Agency, Mr. Geng, Correspondent for Saodang Bao, and Mr. Zhang, Correspondent for Xinmin Bao (September 16)

201

Form a Firm United Front, Defeat Japanese Imperialism (September 18)

207

Interviews with Edgar Snow (September 24-26)

212

Letter Regarding Industrial Cooperatives (September 25)

230

The Identity of Interests Between the Soviet Union and All Mankind (September 28)

231

Speech at the Evening Welcome Party for the Army Commander He Zhuguo, Mr. Snow, and Comrades Blestov and Magov (September 29)

239

Telegram in Reply to Jiang Dingwen, Chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Government (September 29)

241

Study the Enemy-Occupied Areas (October I)

242

Introducing The Communist (October 4)

244

CONTENTS

ix

Inscription for the Second Anniversary of the Anwu Youth Training Class (October 5)

255

To Lu Chao (October 7)

256

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks (October 10)

257

To Lin Zhonghe (November 5)

260

Inscription for Liu Xian (November)

261

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting Intellectuals (December I)

262

The Clashes Between the New and Old Armies in Southwestern Shanxi, and Our Overall Policy (December 6)

265

Views on Military Work in Shandong (December 6)

267

The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement (December 9)

270

The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (December 15)

279

Stalin Is the Friend of the Chinese People (December 20)

307

Speech at a Meeting of All Circles in Yan' an to Commemorate Stalin's Sixtieth Birthday (December 21)

309

In Memory of Norman Bethune (December 21)

312

Speech at the Evening Welcome Party for General Ma Zhanshan, the National Hero (December 22)

314

In Refutation of the Rumor Spread by the Military Headquarters in a Certain War Zone (December 27)

315

The Present Situation in Western Shanxi and Our Military Deployment (December 31)

317

To Wu Yuzhang (n.d.)

319

x

CONTENTS

Inscription for the Production Campaign of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (n.d.)

320

Inscription on Women's Liberation (n.d.)

321

1940

Inscription in Commemoration of the Anniversary of Dazhong Ribao (January I)

325

Get Ready to Cope with Rapid Changes in Central China (January 5)

326

At Present It Is Impossible to Take New Recruits (January II)

327

The Current Situation and Our Policies (January II)

328

On New Democracy (January 15)

330

'

Congratulatory Speech at the Mass Meeting Sponsored by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to Celebrate the Sixtieth Birthday of Comrade Wu Yuzhang (January 15)

370

Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition of the Border Region (January 16)

372

On Small Guerrilla Groups-An Important Form of Struggle in Guerrilla Areas (January 22)

374

Concentrate All Our Efforts to Develop Armed Forces and Set Up Base Areas (January 28)

377

Overcome the Danger of Capitulation, and Strive for a Tum for the Better (January 28)

379

The Forces in Southern Anhui Must Cross to the North of the River (January 29)

382

Abiding by the Principle of Self-Defense, Deal a Thorough Blow to the Attackers (January 30)

383

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks (February I)

384

The Situation and Tasks in the Stage of Mutual Support (February I)

388

CONTENTS

xi

Telegram from the Mass Meeting of the Popular Masses in Yan'an Denouncing Wang [Jingwei] and Supporting Chiang [Kaishek] (February 1)

399

Telegram to the People's Political Council Sent by Mao Zedong and Other Councilors (February 3)

405

Speech at the Founding Meeting of the Natural Science Research Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (February 5)

408

Strengthen Unity and Progress (February 7)

410

Introducing The Chinese Worker (February 7)

412

Speech at the Founding Meeting of the Yan'an Young People's Association for Promoting Constitutional Government (February I9)

414

New-Democratic Constitutional Government (February 20)

415

Declaration of the Association of All Circles in Yan'an for the Promotion of Constitutional Government (February 20)

424

Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions and Consolidate the Positions Won (March 5)

429

On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (March 6)

432

Telegram of Condolence Mourning the Death of Cai Yuanpei (March 7)

435

Uphold Long-Term Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (March 9)

436

Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front (March 11)

438

Think About What Concessions Need to Be Made to Avoid a Split in the Unity of the Two Parties (March 15)

446

Print and Circulate Widely the Open Telegram in Condemnation of Wang and for National Salvation (March 15)

447

xii CONTENTS

Turning the Military Posture in North China into a Defensive One so as to Establish a Politically Reasonable and Advantageous Position (March 16)

449

Consolidate North China and Expand in the Five Provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei (March 19)

451

Solidify the Communications Between the Center and Southeast Shanxi, as Well as Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (March 19)

453

The Tasks of the New Fourth Army's Political Work (March 19)

454

Assist the New Fourth Army in Establishing Anti-Japanese Base Areas in Eastern Anhui, North of the Huai, and in Northern Jiangsu (March 21)

456

Our Tacti'l.' in Dealing with the Diehards (March 25)

459

The Present Military Tactics in Central China (March 29)

460

Our Current Policy in North and Central China (April I)

462

Is the New Fourth Army Able to Cope with the Attacks by the Guomindang? (April 3)

464

Deployments and Strategies for the Expansion and Consolidation of Base Areas in Central China (April 5)

465

The Policy That Should Be Adopted Toward the Intermediate Forces (April 12)

467

Congratulatory Telegram to Sheng Shicai, the Governor of Xinjiang (April 15)

469

Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces, and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Diehards (May 4)

470

The Main Direction of Expansion of the New Fourth Army Is the Broad Areas of Southern and Northern Jiangsu (May 5)

475

To Xiao Xiangrong (n.d.)

476

Strategic Deployments in North and Central China (June I)

478

CONTENTS

xiii

Talk at the First Annual Session of the Yan'an New Philosophy society (June 21)

480

Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Political Situation, on the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the War of Resistance (July 5)

481

Unity to the Very End (July 5)

486

Decision of the Central Committee Concerning the Present Situation and Party Policy (July 7)

489

At Present in Central China We Should Indeed Develop Our Efforts Toward North Jiangsu (July 12)

496

The Current Situation and Our Party's Policy (July 13)

498

Our Opinions About Political Work in the Field by the Eighth Route Army (August 13)

504

The Future Tasks of the Shandong Base Area (August 28)

507

To Fan Wenlan (September 5)

509

A Notice Regarding the Investigation of Landlords, the Bourgeoisie, and Guomindang Army Officers (September 6)

511

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai and Others Concerning the Military Troop Movements of the Chiang and Guangxi Forces in Central China and Our Countermeasures (September 19)

514

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others Concerning the Arrangements in Dealing with the Attacks by the Chiang and Guangxi Forces (September 22)

516

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others Regarding the Direction in Which the New Fourth Army Headquarters and the Forces in Southern Anhui Should Move (October 8)

517

No Matter Which Unit Attacks Us You Must Wipe It Out Resolutely (0ctober9)

519

xiv CONTENTS

Our Current Policy Orientation Is To Reduce Friction and Emphasize Unity (October II)

520

Operational Principles of the New Fourth Army (October 12)

521

Pay Attention to Recruiting National Capitalists and Their Representatives to Participate in the Construction of the Base Areas (October 14)

523

Methods for Handling Captured Anti-Communist Officers and Soldiers (October 18)

525

Be on Guard Against Making "Leftist" Mistakes While Carrying Out the Policies (October 18)

526

Estimate 1\egarding the Current International Situation, and Policy for Dealing with a Possible Guomindang Attack (October 25)

527

On How to Prepare for Any Dark Circumstances Given the Present International Situation (October 25)

529

Instructions on the Current Situation (November I)

530

Telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi and Others on Intensifying Preparations to Smash Chiang Kaishek's Serious Attack (November I)

533

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Analysis of the Situation of Chiang Kaishek Opposing the Communist Party and Our Arrangements (November 2)

534

To Zhou Enlai on the Internal Circumstances and the Need to Oppose Capitulation and Strive to Bring About a Turn for the Better in the Current Situation (November 3)

536

Military Dispositions for Dealing with the Joint Attack on the Communists by Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese (November 3)

539

Letter from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying Regarding the Northward Movement of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (November 3)

541

Mobilize All Forces to Carry Out the Work of Gaining the Support of Friendly Armies (November 4)

542

CONTENTS xv

To Li Kenong and Others on Mobilizing All Forces Inside and Outside the Party to Stop the Campaign to Suppress the Communists and Capitulate to Japan (November 6)

545

To Zhou Enlai, on Strengthening Domestic and Foreign Contacts 10 Stop Capitulation and Division (November 6)

546

To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Main Points of the Reply to the Telegram from He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi] (November 6)

547

Regulations of the Military and Political Committees (Draft) (November 7)

549

To Zhou Enlai, on the Arrangement of Various Tasks Following the Sending Out of the Telegram of the 9th (November 9)

551

Telegram from Zhu De and Others to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi (November 9)

553

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying on the Problem of Asking Gu Zhutong at the Negotiations to Stop the Two Armies of Tang and Tan from Advancing Eastward (November 10)

560

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai on Work Arrangements Following the Telegram of the 9th (November 13)

561

Directive on Launching a Large-Scale Antisurrender and Anti-Civil War Movement to Counter Chiang Kaishek's Anti-Communist High Tide (November 15)

562

It Is of the Greatest Importance to Conduct United Front Work Among the Huangpu Faction of Military Men (November 16)

565

The Tasks of the Troops in North China This Winter (November 16)

566

Deployment for the Campaign in Northern Jiangsu (November 19)

568

To Zhou Enlai and Others on Smashing Chiang Kaishek's Anti-Communist Conspiracies (November 21)

570

All Our Units in Southern Anhui Must Move Away by the End of December (November 24)

572

xvi

CONTENTS

The Essence of Chiang Kaishek's Current Anti-Communist Policies and Our Basic Orientation (November 30)

573

To Zhou Wen (November 30)

575

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong and Zhu De Concerning Agreement to the Actions and Deployment of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (November 30)

576

Speech at the Meeting Called by the Central Bureau of the Border Region Regarding Economic Self-Sufficiency (December 3)

577

To Xiang Ying Regarding Whether the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui Has Made Various Preparations to Cope with Sudden Emergencies (December 3)

578

' The Various Policies That Should Be Carried Out in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (December 13)

579

Propose to the Guomindang That It Should Stop Its Attack on the New Fourth Army (December 15)

581

The Southern Anhui Troops Must Cross the River with Utmost Speed (December 16)

582

The Situation in Chongqing Is Serious. Xiang Ying and Zeng Shan Should Not Leave the Army for the Moment (December 18)

583

To Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on Arrangements to Meet Ye Ting on the Other Side of the Yangzi (December 20)

584

Ye Ting Should Cross the River Quickly (December 20)

585

Do Not Declare That the Battle of the Hundred Regiments Has Been Concluded (December 22)

586

Work Hard to Strengthen the Bases in Northern Jiangsu (December 23)

587

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang About How the New Fourth Army Must Move Immediately in Groups (December 24)

589

CONTENTS xvii

A General Notice Concerning the Attitude of All the Guomindang Factions and the Circumstances of Our Deployment (December 25)

590

Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying Concerning the Negotiations with Chiang Kaishek on the New Fourth Army's Route for Moving Northward (December 25)

593

Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Policy in the Current Situation (December 25)

594

Organize Reserve Shock Units to Deal with the Critical Situation in Central China (December 25)

604

From Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Xiang Ying About the Necessity of Destroying All Secret Documents (December 26)

605

You Must Resolutely and Methodically Achieve the Goal of Moving Northward (December 26)

606

To Ye Ting and Others from Mao Zedong and Zhu De About How the New Fourth Army Should Still Be on the Alert When Crossing the River (December 27)

607

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Agreement That the New Fourth Army Should Cross the River from Eastern Anhui in Groups (December 29)

608

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Delayed Reply to Liu Weizhang's Telegram and Other Matters (December 30)

609

It Is Best That the Forces South of the River Move to Southern Jiangsu in Groups (December 30)

610

Smash the Guomindang's Offensive and Bring About a Change for the Better in the Situation (December 31)

611

1941

Ye Ting Should Cross to the North of the River Within Two Weeks (January 2)

617

Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying Concerning the Immediate Move of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui to Southern J iangsu (January 3)

618

:rviii CONTENTS

The New Fourth Army Should Not Stay too Long in Maolin (January 7)

619

Mao Zedong and Zhu De Inquire of Liu Shaoqi About the Situation of Xiang Ying and Others (January 9)

620

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi Concerning the Leadership of the New Fourth Army (January II)

621

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi, Ye Ting, and Others About How the Entire New Fourth Army Should Obey the Command of Ye Ting and Rao Shushi (January II)

622

A Dispatch to Zhou Enlai and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning the Departure of Xiang Ying and Others from the Army When the New Fourth Army Was Breaf
623

It Will Be Best If the Troops in Southern Anhui Break Out of the Encirclement and Advance to the East or to the North in Groups (January 12)

624

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others to the Effect That Ye Ting Is to Command the New Fourth Army (January 12)

625

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Inquire ofYe Ting and Others About the Circumstances of the Breakthrough (January 13)

626

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying About How Serious Representations Should Be Made to the Guomindang Authorities (January 13)

627

Dispatch to Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Countermeasures Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident (January 13)

628

Plan to Surround Han Deqin and Shen Honglie in Reprisal for Chiang Kaishek's Massacre of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (January 13)

629

CONTENTS xix

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Inquire ofYe Ting and Others Whether or Not Chiang's Forces Have Ceased Fire and Lifted the Siege, and About the Situation of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (January 14)

630

Circular to Ye Ting and Others Concerning the Circumstances of the Negotiations with Chiang (January 14)

631

Circular to Liu Shaoqi, Ye Ting, and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Regarding the Status ofZhou Enlai's and Ye Jianying's Negotiations with Chiang Kaishek (January 14)

632

Circular to Zhou Enlai and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang About the Circumstances in Which Guomindang Forces Killed More than 7,000 of Our Men (January 14)

633

To Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying About Negotiating with Chiang Kaishek an Immediate Ceasefire and Lifting of the Siege (January 14)

634

Make Political and Military Preparations for a Great, Comprehensive Counterattack to Rescue the New Fourth Army (January 14)

635

Circular from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Regarding the Contents of the Emergency Telegram from He Yingqin to All Guomindang Units (January 15)

636

To Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying Concerning Political and Military Preparations for an Overall Counterattack (January 15)

637

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Inquire ofLiu Shaoqi and Chen Yi About the Number of Men and Rifles of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (January 17)

638

Talk Given by the Spokesman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident (January 18)

639

Circular from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning the Circumstances of Chiang Kaishek 's Orders to Attack Us in All War Zones (January 18)

644

;a

CONTENTS

To Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Political, Military, and Organizational Measures That Should Be Adopted (January 19)

645

To Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Liu Shaoqi on the Change in the Relationship Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party After Chiang Kaishek Issued his "January 17" Order, and Our Countermeasures (January 20)

646

Order and Statement of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Cqttral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Southern Anhui Incident (January 20)

647

Dispatch to Liu Shaoqi Regarding the Estimate of the Situation After the "January 17'' Order (January 23)

654

To Zhou Enlai on the Need to Adopt an Antagonistic Attitude Toward Chiang Kaishek, and Not to Fear a Breakup (January 25)

655

To Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai on Tactics for Dealing with Chiang Kaishek (January 25)

656

To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Policy for Dealing with Chiang Kaishek (January 27)

658

Directive of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on Guidelines for the Action of the New Fourth Army After the Southern Anhui Incident (January 28)

660

Letter to Xiao San (January 29)

662

Dispatch to Zhou Enlai Regarding Circumstances in the Development of the Current Situation (January 30)

663

To Mao Anying and Mao Anqing (January 31)

665

Congratulatory Telegram to the British House of Commons (January)

667

At Present the Command Center in Central China Should Focus on Three Basic Strategic Areas (February I)

668

Only by Restoring Unity Within the Country Will It Be Possible to Overcome the Offensive of the Japanese Bandits (February 2)

672

CONTENTS xxi

The Offensive Posture of the Japanese Army and Our Policies Toward the Guomindang (February 2)

675

An Analysis of the Situation as Regards the Japanese Attack, and of the Political Tendency of Chiang Kaishek (February 7)

677

Tendencies of the Various Parties After the New Fourth Army Incident (February 7)

680

Set Up an Artillery Headquarters and Put It Under the Direct Command of the Military Commission (February 7)

685

Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party at Present, and Our Tactics (February 14)

686

Abridged Text of a Telegram from Mao Zedong and Six Other Councilors to the Secretariat of the Political Council (February 15)

689

The Policy of Military Defensive and Political Offensive in Dealing with Chiang (February 17)

690

Inquiry ofZhou Enlai and Dong Biwu as to Whether They Have Proposed the Twelve Articles to the Political Council (February 20)

692

Circular to Zhou Enlai Containing an Estimate of the Situation Regarding Chiang Kaishek's Anti-Communist Activities (February 26)

693

Order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Appointments (February 28)

694

To Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu (March I)

695

To Zhou Enlai on the Question of Definitely Not Attending the Political Council (March 2)

696

To Zhou Enlai on the Relationship Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (March 4)

698

Reply of the Seven Communist Members of the Political Council Restating the Reasons They Cannot Attend the Current Session (March 8)

699

xxii

CONTENTS

Telegram to Comrade Browder from Comrade Mao Zedong Protesting the Class-Based Verdict Against the American People by the Supreme Court of the United States (March)

702

A Dispatch to Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Estimates of the Present Political and Military Situation (March 12)

703

Telegram in Reply to Mr. Situ Meitang and Others (March 14)

705

To Zhou Enlai Expressing Agreement That Zhou Enlai's Office Should Write an Article in Reply to Chiang Kaishek's Speech o~he 6th (March 15)

707

Preface to Rural Surveys (March 17)

708

Circular to Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Estimate of International Relations and Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (March 17)

711

The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught (March 18)

712

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Problem of Nonparticipation in the Committee of Parties and Factions Before the Issue of the New Fourth Army Is Resolved (March 21)

714

Opinion Regarding the Strategic Arrangements in Shandong and Central China (April 5)

715

Views Expressed by the Chinese Communist Party on the Publication of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (Aprill6)

717

Postscript to Rural Surveys (April 19)

719

An Analysis of the Attitudes of the Various Political Forces in Britain, the United States, and China After the Japanese-Soviet Treaty (April 20)

722

Telegram of Birthday Congratulations to Comrade Foster (April)

724

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Problem of Continuing the Unity Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party to Resist Japan (April 26)

725

CONTENTS xxiii

Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Broad Area from Shanghai to Fuzhou (April 30)

726

The Administrative Program in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (May I)

727

Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught (May 8)

731

The Current Situation and Our Overall Orientation (May 9)

735

Unite to Wage War Against the Enemy in a Planned Way in Coordination with Friendly Armies (May 14)

737

Notice Regarding Publication of Jiefang Ribao and Improving the Work of the New China News Agency (May 15)

738

Both the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army Are Attacking the Enemy Fiercely in His Rear (May 15)

739

Introductory Editorial to the Yan'an Jiefang Ribao (May 16)

740

Please Take a Look and See Whose Realm Our Land Is Today (May 18)

742

Reform Our Study (May 19)

747

Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (May 25)

755

Policies in the Struggle Against "Nibbling" on the Plains of Hebei (June 9)

757

Cooperate with Friendly Armies in the Battle; Resolutely Smash the Enemy's Attack (June 9)

759

Our Present Policy Is to Drag Chiang Into the War of Resistance (June 12)

761

To Lin Boqu (June 13 and 15)

762

Decision Regarding the International United Front Against Fascism (June 23)

764

xxiv

CONTENTS

During the War of Resistance Our Tactics Toward the Big Landlords and Big Bourgeoisie Should Involve Drawing Them In While Attacking Them (June 28)

765

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party Spirit (July I)

766

t

Prepare for Strategic Cooperation with the Soviet Army (July 2)

769

Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the War of Resistance (July 7)

770

To Assist the Red Army of the Soviet Union, We Have Decided to Adopt the Orientation of a Long-Term Struggle in the Form of Widespread Guerrilla War (July 15)

776

The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army Should Adopt the Orientation of a Long-Term Struggle (July 18)

779

Be Prepared to Persist for a Long Time in the Orientation of Self-Defense (July 30)

781

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Investigation (August I)

783

To Xiao Jun (August 2)

786

The Defense Along the River Along the Jundu-Jikou Line Should Be Strengthened (August 3)

787

To Xie Juezai (August 6)

788

To Xie Juezai (August 9)

791

To Xie Juezai (August 12)

793

Talk with the Student Delegation from Sui[ de] and Mi[zhi] (August)

794

Send One Regiment with Cadres to Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Zhongtiao Mountains (August 17)

795

Our Policies Toward the Puppet Troops and Our Views About the Treatment of the Puppet Officers and Soldiers (August 17)

796

CONTENTS

xxv

Statement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning Recent International Events (August 19)

798

To Chen Zhengren (August 19)

801

Seeking Suggestions on the Construction of Military Districts from All Strategic Units in North China (August 21)

802

To Xie Juezai (August 22)

804

Note to "Lu Zhongcai's Account of the Long March" (August 26)

806

Cooperate with the Guomindang Army in the Conduct of Operations, and Strive to Improve the Current Situation (September 9)

807

Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism (September 10)

808

Concerning Investigations in the Countryside (September 13)

812

Telegram of Condolence from the Councilors in Yan'an on the Death of Zhang Jiluan (September)

818

Decision of the Central Committee Regarding High-Level Study Groups (September 26)

819

To the Central Research Group and the High-Level Research Groups (September 29)

820

Build as Many Bomb Factories as Possible (October 23)

822

At the Eastern Anti-Fascist Congress, Comrade Mao Zedong Calls Upon All the Nationalities to Strengthen Their Unity (October 30)

823

In Refutation of the Third "Left" Line (Selected Extracts) (October)

826

List of Reading Materials for Theoretical Study (November I)

833

.Study Tasks and Study Methods for the Current Year (November 4)

835

Comrade Mao Zedong Delivers a Broadcast Speech (November 7)

836

On Sending Out the List of Materials on Theory and Other Issues (November 17)

838

xxvi

CONTENTS

Speech ai"the Assembly of Representatives of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (November 21)

839

High-Level Study Groups Everywhere Should Operate According to the Organizational Regulations (November 26)

843

Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the War in the Pacific (December 9)

844

Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front (December 9)

846

Estimate of the Situation in the International War (December 12)

848

To Cai Chang (December 16)

850

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Yan' an Cadre School (December 17)

851

Central Tasks in Our Work for the Year 1942 (December 28)

855

Part II. Brief Sayings and Inscriptions

857

Bibliography Index About the Editors

875 879 899

Acknowledgments

Major funding for this project has been provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, from which we have received five substantial grants, for the periods 1989-1991, 1991-1993, 1993-1995, 1995-1997, and 2001-2002. A generous grant from The Henry Luce Foundation Inc. was received for the years 1996-1997. In addition, many extraordinarily generous individual and corporate donors have contributed substantially toward the cost-sharing element of our budget. These include, in alphabetical order: Mrs. H. Ahmanson; Ambassador K wang S. Choi; the Dillon Fund on behalf of Phyllis D. Collins; the Harvard-Yenching Institute, which has supported this project in all its stages; James R. Houghton, the CBS Foundation, the Coming, Inc. Foundation, J.P. Morgan & Co., and the Metropolitan Life Foundation; Dr. Alice Kandell and the Kandell Fund; Leigh Fibers Inc. on behalf of Mr. Philip Lehner; Daniel Pierce; the Tang Fund on behalf of Mr. Oscar Tang; James 0. Welch, Jr., RJR Nabisco, and the Vanguard Group; and The Woodcock Foundation on behalf of John H.J. Guth, who has displayed a consistent, keen, and generous interest in this project. Translations of the materials included in our edition have been drafted by many different hands. Those who have made a substantial contribution to this volume include, in alphabetical order, Hsuan Delorme, Gu Weiqun, Li Jin, Beth Ruggiero, Tian Dongdong, Wang Xisu, Wang Zhi, and Zhu Hong. Volume V of our edition included five interviews with Mao Zedong conducted by Edgar Snow, which Mrs. Lois Wheeler Snow kindly authorized us to reproduce. In September 1939, Snow conducted two more long interviews with Mao, which fall within the scope of the present volume, and Mrs. Snow has again authorized us to make use of these. Once more, we wish to express our gratitude for her cooperation.

The guest associate editor of this volume, Professor Emeritus Lyman van Slyke of Stanford University, is the leading expert on the period in the history of the Chinese Communist Party dealt with here. It is he who prepared the first draft of the introduction, and though Stuart Schram played an active role in revising it, many of the key ideas expressed there should be attributed to Professor van Slyke. The two editors had detailed discussions regarding many issues raised in the text of the volume, and the final version is their joint work. Nancy Hodes, Associate Editor ofthe series until her departure for Soka Gakkai University in 2000, was involved in all aspects ofthe work on the present volume. She played an active role in the revision and annotation of the translations, and in xxvii

xxviii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

checking the final versions against the Chinese originals. She also drafted some translations. The editor, Stuart Schram, wishes to acknowledge yet again his indebtedness to Benjamin Schwartz, a pioneer in the study of Mao Zedong's thought. Professor Schwartz carefully read the manuscripts of earlier volumes of this series, and made stimulating and thoughtful criticisms of the introductions. Subsequently, he continued, so long as his health allowed, to offer insightful comments on the themes raised by the materials translated. This project was launched by Roderick MacFarquhar, Director of the Fairbank Center until June 30, 1992. Without his organizing ability, forceful advocacy, and fund-raising, it would never have come into being, and his continuing active participation has been vital to its success. His successor, Professor James L. Watson, took a serious interest in our work, as did Professor Ezra Vogel, Director of the center from July 1995 to June 1999. Professor Elizabeth Perry, Director from July 1999 to June 2002, and the current Director, Professor Wilt ldema, have continued to provide moral and on occasion material support. Ultimate responsibility for the accuracy and literary quality of the work as a whole rests with Stuart Schram as editor. For any remaining errors and inadequacies, the fault lies with him.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Mao Zedang and the Chinese Revolution,

1912-1949 Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao's writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao's ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century. The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century, and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter. Mao's native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority, and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus on the one hand, the Hunan Anny of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenthcentury refonners, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the revolution of 1911 was arguably as great as that of Sun Yatsen. 1 In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy. Apart from Mao's strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as . I. Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao's writings, espeCially those of the early period contained in Volume I of this series. See, regarding Zeng, pp. 10, 72, and 131. On Tan, see ''Zhang Kundi's Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong," September 1917, p. 139. On Huang, see "Letter to Miyazaki Toten," March 1917, pp. 111-12. .xxix

xxx

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that these were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values, but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the "antiquated" and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, "Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it sh'luld be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought.''2 In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: How could China develop an advanced civilization, and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese? As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao's early exposure to "Westernizing" influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them. Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This "new thought tide," which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward, and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party's first leader, for the Western values incarnated by "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy," he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources. In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work, and that Russia's proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed. 3 Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship, and the other half to deciding what to do with it, and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From beginning to end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import. To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the 2. Letter of August 1917 to Li Jinxi, Volume I. p. 132. 3. See his letter of January 21. 1921, to Cai Hesen, Volume II, pp. 35-36.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

:wei

tent that, although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always "planted his on the body of China,''4 ideology alone did not exhaustively deterine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong's most remarkable attributes was the :tent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx's dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world, but to change it. It is reliably reported that Mao's close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan'an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. To such detailed historical analyses based on economic and social facts, he preferred The Communist Manifesto, of which he saw the message as "Jieji douzheng,jieji douzheng,jieji douzheng!" (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!) In other words, for Mao the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history. Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior, or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some precapitalist stage of development (whether "Asiatic" or "feudal"). And, by placing the polarity "oppressor/oppressed" at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression, and the oppression of China by the imperialists, were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle. Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a "united front" or alliance with Sun Yatsen's Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922-1923, and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923-1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kaishek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was to be found in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants. By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was

~:ckside

4. Mao Zedong, "Ruhe yanjiu Zhonggong dangshi." (How to study the history of the Chinese Communist Party), talk of March 30, 1942. to a Central Committee study group, in Mao Zedong wenji, vol. 2. pp. 399-408.

xxxii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

not enough. A red army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolution, and so he put forward the slogan: "Political power comes out ofthe barrel of a ~n." 5 In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party, and soon became known as the "commander-in-chief." This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The "Chinese Soviet Republic," established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kaishek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced to embark in 1934 on the Long March. There were periods during the years 1931-1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, dominated in substantial measure by the Moscowtrained members of the so-called "Internationalist" faction. At other times, he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army, and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks. 6 Such enquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party's tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating. The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of Mao's rivals for the leadership. In meetings of the Politburo held in December 1934, in the course of the Long March, Mao was supported for the first time in over two years by a majority ofthe participants.' At the conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, Mao began his comeback in earnest. Soon he once again played a dominant role in decisions regarding military operations, though his rise to unquestioned dominance in the Party was a long process which reached its culmination only in 1945. In the course of the northward march from Zunyi to Shaanxi, Mao was driven at times by the continuing threat from Chiang Kaishek's campaigns of"Encirclement and Suppression" to advocate that the Red Army should fight its way to the

5. See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Volume III, pp. 31 and 36. 6. See, in particular, in Volume Ill, the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations, pp. 296-418 and 594-655, and in Volume IV, the circular of April2, 1931, on invesligating the situation regarding land and population, pp. 54-55, and the texts of 1933 on the "Land Investigation Movement," pp. 408-526 passim. 7. See Volume IV, pp. xciii-xciv.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

xxxiii

borders of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet aid and protection. a Once the survivors of the Red Army had established themselves in Shaanxi Province in 1936, Mao's perspective began to change, and a vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victim of oppression came progressively into play. For a time, Mao's line called for overthrowing the traitorous running dog Chiang Kaishek in order to fight Japan, but soon the growing threat of Japanese aggression and strong Soviet pressure in favor of collaboration with the Guomindang led to a fundamental change in the Party's policy. The Xi'an Incident of December 1936, in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader, was the catalyst which finally produced a second "united front." Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China, or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937-1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China. During the years in Yan' an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party, and in particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published while he was struggling for survival a few years earlier. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926. While Mao attained a dominant and unchallengeable position in the Party only in the mid-1940s, the year 1938 was of crucial importance in his rise to power. In May and June, he produced two of his most important and influential military writings, "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" and "On Protracted War." Meanwhile, it had been decided in March 1938 to send an emissary to Moscow to seek instructions from the Com intern in the face of the acute rivalry between Mao and Wang Ming, who had recently returned to China. In September the reply came back that the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, "with Mao Zedong as their head," should strive for close unity. 9 Having been thus annointed by Georgi Dimitrov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, Mao

8. See below, the Introduction to Volume V, pp. xliv-xlv, and also, in Volume V, the "Resolution on Problems of Military Strategy"' of December 23, 1935. 9. See Volume VI, p. xlix

x:cxiv GENERAL INTRODUCTION

delivered fn October 1938 his report "On the New Stage;• in which he put forward the call for the "Sinification of Marxism," making it very plain that he was the one who best understood this imperative. By this term he meant the modification not only of the language, but of the substance of Marxism in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and to Chinese realities. In 1939 and 1940, while paying lip service to the role of the Guomindang in China's struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao began increasingly to suggest that a successful Chinese revolution would only be possible under Communist leadership. By 1941, he made plain that in his view, no one else was capable of carrying out this enterprise, and attacked those in the Party who, in his view, preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The "Rectification Campaign" of 1942-43 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such "Internationalists," or to eliminate them from positions of influence. When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could out-vote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong's thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China's history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine. In 1939-1940, when Mao put forward the slogan of"New Democracy," he felt it necessary to define it as a regime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Even as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a "People's Democratic Autocracy." In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people's interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a "powerful state apparatus." In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall's attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang, and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949. In March 1949, Mao declared that though the Chinese revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership

GENE.RAL INTRODUCTION

xuv

and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at the twenty-seven years under Mao's leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments-the chiliastic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for "military communism," which underlay the Cultural Revolution-both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao's road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also cultivated in Mao himself, and in the Party, attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems. Revolution in its Leninist guise has loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese revolution has been, with the Russian revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, the impact of Mao is still a living reality in China more than two decades after his death. Following the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao's political and ideological heritage was heavily stressed by the Chinese leadership, and elements of a new Mao cult even emerged. While that tendency has faded in recent years, the symbolic importance of Mao as the creator of the new China has thus far largely ruled out serious criticism of the Chairaman. Though the ultimate outcome of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modem world, while retaining China's own identity, still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China's first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao's ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations.

Introducticm By January 1939, following the recently concluded Sixth Plenum, Mao Zedong had emerged as the most important single leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the organizational structures it had called into being. The problem of Zhang Guotao, culminating in Zhang's abandonment of the Communist Party and defection to the Guomindang in April 1938, was well behind him now. The more formidable challenge posed by Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) and the "Returned Students" had also been in significant measure overcome. Mao had succeeded in detaching a number of these young, well-educated, and often Russian-trained Communists from Wang Ming's faction, either winning them over to his side or inducing them to remain neutral. He accomplished this task partly by persuasion, partly by judicious use of organizational means and personnel assignments, and partly through Moscow's recognition of his leadership. At least equally important, however, was the fact that his policies were proving more effective than alternatives earlier proposed by erstwhile or potential rivals: his program of self-reliant guerrilla warfare and the establishment of base areas behind Japanese lines, his insistence on a flexible united front (with the Guomindang, with regional leaders, and with various social elements such as rich peasants and "patriotic" landlords), and his approaches to Party and army building were paying off. Nevertheless, at this time, Mao had not yet reached the towering and unquestioned status, both ideological and organizational, that he would achieve in the years ahead. Mao had become somewhat more than primus inter pares, but he was surrounded by strong-willed and capable comrades, who did not feel dwarfed or intimidated by him. These were fellow revolutionaries who had fought alongside him-and sometimes contended with him---
xxxviii INTRODUCTION

was well advanced in building the coalition which, under his overall guidance, would lead the Communist Party and the Communist movement in China for more than two decades into the future. Despite the richness of the writings contained in this volume, we see Mao Zedong only in some dimensions of his being. Of his personal side we catch only a fugitive glimpse now and then. Of the texture of life in Yan'an we see virtually nothing. David E. Apter and Tony Saich have evoked very well this gap in our apprehension of Mao's Yan'an experience. Even after visiting Mao's cave dwellings, they write, it remains difficult to imagine the sounds and scenes as they must have been, the clink of weapons and gear, the soon of horses. Missing is the sense of constant movement, couriers, dispatch riders, delegations, clusters of militia, or the smell of cooking pots, manure. 1 Regarding the actual handling of day-to-day business, we are also partly in the dark. We know that conferences and meetings of all types took up a great deal of Mao's time; chronologies indicate that almost every day Mao attended one or more meetings, many of which must have lasted for hours. But from the materials in this volume, we can infer only a little about how information was collected, processed, and exchanged; whether the many documents cosigned by Mao were drafted primarily by him or were a collegial product; or the flow of communications into Yan'an, to which Mao was responding. Reading these documents thus somewhat resembles hearing only one side of a telephone conversation. Some information about these matters can be found in the detailed chronology of Mao's life published in Beijing on the occasion of his centenary,2 but many points remain obscure. Until late November 1938, Mao and other senior Party leaders lived in cave dwellings on Phoenix Hill, within the perimeter ofYan'an itself. Central Committee headquarters was also in this vicinity. But after Japanese aircraft bombed the town, Mao and the Central Committee moved to the greater safety ofYangjialing, about two miles northwest. Somewhat later, perhaps in 1942, he moved even farther out, to the Date Garden (Zaoyuan). Midway between Yan'an and Yangjialing was Wangjiaping, where the Military Affairs Commission and Eighth Route Army headquarters were located. Mao also had quarters there, which he probably occupied when military affairs were particularly pressing.

1. David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 188 (hereafter Apter and Saieh, Revolutionary Discourse). 2. See Mao Zedong nianpu (Chronological biography of Mao Zedong). ed. Pang Xianzhi

(Beijing: Zhongyang wcnxian chubanshe, 1993). 3 vols. Since Mao Zedong is the central figure in our edition. the shon title for this work is simply Nianpu; in the case of similar chronological biographies of other figures, such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, our short title includes the name of the subject. Material relevant to the present volume is to be found in Vol. 2 of the Nianpu. covering the period July 1937-August 1945.

INTRODUCTION

xxxix

Many observers report that Mao created a singular impression on those around him. He was never fully predictable. Sometimes he was aloof, guarded, and suspicious, seeking to draw out the views of others without revealing his own. But on other occasions, he appears charming--chatty, informal, and unpretentious. Some observers also noted his unusual work habits, especially his penchant for working late into the night, when meetings were over, it was finally quiet, and the "constant movement" had ceased. His comments on the philosophy of Confucius and Mozi sent to Chen Boda (February 1, 1939) and Zhang Wentian (February 20 and 22, 1939) are marked "at night." Yet, given the volume of business he attended to, both important and routine, he must have maintained some semblance of a regular schedule. At any hour, Mao seems clearly to have been the magnetic center of energy on every occasion where he was present. This was also a time of change in Mao's personal life, for in late 1938, he began living with Jiang Qing and was considered married to her by 1939. This relationship was apparently frowned upon by some of his colleagues, who thought unseemly and uncomradely his treatment of his former wife, He Zizhen, and his infatuation with this much younger actress of suspect background. 3 In early 1939, Mao sent his new wife to Nanni wan, an agricultural colony and model of selfsufficiency, some thiny miles southeast ofYan'an. There she reportedly spent about six months. By midyear, after her return, she was pregnant with the daughter she bore Mao. 4 Our only glimpses of Mao as a father during these three years are two letters to his sons, Mao Anying-later killed in the Korean War-and Mao Anqing (August 26, 1939, and January 31, 1941). Born to Mao's first wife, Yang Kaihui, the two boys were then teenagers who had been sent to the Soviet Union. These letters, though brief, seem to mix a degree of warmth with the sort of paternal advice Polonius gave to Laenes, urging them to work hard and preserve a modest attitude. In 1939, Mao continued to hold the positions he had already achieved: a leading member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, with consequent authority over the Central Committee's Secretariat, and head ofthe Military Affairs Depart3. Even today the details of Mao's marital and family life are not altogether clear. His marriage to He Zizhen, who had accompanied him on the Long March and had borne five of his children, broke down in mid-1937, when she violently confronted him (in the presence of Agnes Smedley) concerning his affair with the glamorous actress/interpreter, Lily Wu. Shonly thereafter she was sent to the Soviet Union, ostensibly for medical treatment See Janice and Stephen R. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times ofan American Radical (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 187-92; Roxane Witke, Com· ~de Chiang Ch'ing (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). pp. 152ff; Ross Terrill, Madame Mao. The White-Boned Demon (New York: Morrow. 1984), ch. 4.

4. In addition to her own daughter, Jiang Qing also raised the youngest of He Zizhen's daughters. To both of them, she gave her own natal surname, Li. He's daughter, born in l936 or 1937, was called Li Min; her own daughter (b. 1940), Li Na. To Roxane Witke, Jta~g Qing firmly denied rumors that she had other children by Mao. See Witke, Comrade Chtang Ch"ing, pp. 164-65.

xl

INTRODUCTION

ment. Although Mao did not become chairman of the Politburo and the Secretariat untill943, in the aftermath of the Rectification Campaign, he certainly had sufficient organizational strength at this time to undergird his growing prestige and to put his stamp on the Chinese Communist movement. At first glance, the years from 1939 through 1941 might appear to mark a lull in the developmentof"the thought of Mao Zedong," but such a view is misleading. It is true that Mao produced fewer lengthy and strikingly original works than he had between the end of the Long March and the Sixth Plenum. Nevertheless, his writings during this period exhibit significant developments in his political perspective and tactical line. These three years were by far the bleakest, harshest, and most perilous of the entire war. Beginning in 1939, conditions became increasingly difficult for the Chinese Communist Party and the base areas under its control, and these circumstances deeply affected Mao's literary output. Japanese pacification efforts were stepped up, relations with the Guomindang were deteriorating and conflict with its armed forces became more frequent and more ferocious, capitulation was a serious danger, and China's international isolation reached its deepest point. Thus Mao's theoretical positions and the policy directions derived from them were put under severe and sustained pressure. It is quite likely that, if his policies had proved unsuccessful, his ideological and organizational primacy would have been called in question and perhaps challenged. Since that was not the case, Raymond Wylie is justified in calling this period, "the emergence of the prophet."5 Beyond any question, the Mao Zedong we see in this volume is a figure of remarkable suppleness and versatility. As Apter and Saich put it: In virtually every major essay, Mao deals in some fashion with large themes in the context of specific events. He is good at making connections between abstract thought and empirical knowledge .... Mao had an extraordinary ability to think on several levels at once, and could grasp the central issues and the large concems.6 These traits-this ability to shift registers, this capacity to retain simultaneously a sense of the whole and a grasp of the disaggregated specific, this feeling for the dualistic and contradictory nature of social, political, and military realities-are nearly everywhere displayed in the writings of these years. This protean quality makes difficult any simple or straightforward classification of Mao's writings. From one perspective, these writings are rooted in and grow from earlier statements, for example, from the philosophical positions expressed in his "Lecture 5. Raymond F. Wylie. The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung. Ch 'en Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory,/935-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980). This is the title of chapter 5, covering 1939-1940. 6. Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, p. 109.

INTRODUCTION

xli

Notes on Dialectical Materialism" of 1937, from which "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" were later derived, or from the military and political positions delineated in "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," "On Protracted War," and "On the New Stage." Yet these three years contain several statements of enduring importance. "Introducing The Communist' (October 4, 1939), "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (December 15, 1939), and "On New Democracy" (January 15, 1940) laid out a new and firmer line regarding relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang. "On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas" (March 6, 1940), "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front" (March II, 1940), and "Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught" (May 8, 1941) were important contributions to Mao's military and strategic thought. Finally, "Reform Our Study" (May 1941) was a harbinger of the great Rectification Campaign of 1942-1943. Laid into the analyses and policies set forth in these writings like individual tiles set into the larger designs of a mosaic are the highly concrete and specific writings that constitute so much of the bulk of this volume, in the same way that these writings fit into the even larger design of Mao's thought as a whole. Apter and Saich speak of Mao's alchemical talent for transmuting experience, including

the most mundane concrete activities, into revolutionary narratives summing up the significance of events at various levels. These narratives, which uwere made to fit inside each other like nesting boxes," deal with the long story of the disasters caused by external imperialism and domestic reaction; the struggle between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kaishek for the inheritance of Sun Yatsen; the struggle against Japan and the building of territorial bases behind enemy lines under Communist leadership; and struggles within the Chinese Communist Party itself between Mao and his rivals, with their contending claims to higher truth. 7 These four stories taken together constitute what Franz Schurrnann has characterized as the ''thought (sixiang) of Mao Zedong;• which rendered operational, concrete, and sinified the abstract "theory (lilun)" of Marx and Lenin. 8 Thus, whether one speaks of "narratives" or of "thought," the result is to endow with location, meaning, linkage (upward toward greater generalization or downward toward greater specificity) any event, big or small, within this differentiated totality. Despite his narrative skills, during the 1939-1941 period Mao does not yet appear to claim the omniscience later attributed to him. He complains of his own shallow historical knowledge, and he asks other comrades for both information and opinions. Many of the writings included here are cosigned and were in some cases shaped by extensive discussion at Party meetings. Although by this stage Mao's theoretical for7. Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, pp. 14-15. 8. Franz Schunnann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd ed. (Berkel~y: University of California Press, 1968) (hereafter Schunnann. Ideology and OrganizatiOn). See especially the introduction and ch. I.

xlii INTRODUCTION

mulations were well developed, he had not yet elevated "thought" to the level where it defined and hence detennined reality. Reality could still exercise some influence, albeit a narrowing influence, over the content and structure of ''thought." Nevertheless, we should not expect that, despite his overall and cumulative cogency, Mao would be always at the top of his game. Indeed, many of his writings here convey the tentativeness of someone thinking aloud, of trying out ideas on paper to see them more clearly. There are arenas and occasions-his analysis of international affairs and his treatment of conflict with the Nationalists in central China in late 1940 and early 1941 are perhaps the most salient examples-when Mao appears mercurial, contradictory, less than prescient. Sometimes, as in several of his public addresses and in some writings, Mao simply rambles in a way that must have confused his audience and confounded a stenographer ("The Current Situation and Our Party's Policy," July 13, 1940, is a good example). For the sake of clarity, we will take up in turn the four narrative levels referred to above: international setting, including Japanese imperialism; relations between the Communists and the Guomindang; military struggle and the development of base areas; and Mao's progress toward primacy within the Chinese Communist Party. In each case, we will seek to tie our discussion of Mao's words as closely as possible to the specific events and the actual political, military. and social settings which gave rise to them. As we do so, however, we must realize that we are unraveling into separate and partial narratives a single historical fabric of events in which all the strands were both interwoven and interactive. Reading the documents straight through in chronological order will help to restore the confusions and complexities with which Mao and his colleagues had to deal.

A Dynamic International Setting, 1939-1941 In international affairs, Mao Zedong quite predictably keyed his analysis to China's War of Resistance against Japan and to the welfare of the Chinese Communist Party. At the beginning of 1939, tensions ran high in Europe, but war had not yet broken out. Nevertheless the Communist Party's views, which doubtless reflected Mao's own, closely followed Stalin's assessment: that the looming prospect of war was a contest among factions within the capitalist-imperialist camp, and a plague on both the fascist and bourgeois nations. Only the Soviet Union represented peace and international justice, and only China-supported by the Soviet Union-was actively engaged, against Japan, in the struggle for independence and justice. From time to time, Mao spoke with appreciation of the financial and military aid China was receiving from the Soviet Union, without noting that it was all flowing to the Chinese Nationalists (something which, we know from other sources, rankled him).9

9. See Raymond Garthoff (ed.), Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Praeger, 1966).

INTRODUCTION

xliii

Mao occasionally hinted, but did not explicitly assert in the writings here, that China was also assisting the Soviet Union by diverting Japan from what many in that country saw as her natural and eventual enemy. Throughout 1939 and most of 1940, Mao was both hostile toward and contemptuous of Great Britain, France, and the United States. First, Great Britain and France were themselves imperialistic and had no interest in, or a positive dislike for, struggles for national independence in the colonies and semi colonies. Second, Europe was the scene of their vital interests, not the remote reaches of Asia. As for the United States, it would refuse to become directly involved, preferring as Mao often said, "to sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight." On occasions too frequent to be enumerated (and therefore indicating a deep level of con=n), Mao and the Chinese Communist Party predicted, warned against, and sought to prevent what they called "a Far Eastern Munich," by analogy with the original Munich conference of late September 1938. Just as that conference appeased Hitler and left the fate of Czechoslovakia to his tender mercies without any Czech representation, Mao feared the same sort of appeasement in Asia by the Western powers, leading essentially to recognition of and acquiescence in Japan's position in East Asia, especially China. A "Far Eastern Munich" would also be likely, in Mao's view, to have profound implications within China. Isolated from outside support and facing an untrammeled Japan, confidence in ultimate victory and the will to continue resistance might be sapped and the tide of capitulation grow. The defection of Wang Jingwei to the Japanese side in December 1938 was but the most spectacular evidence of capitulationist sentiment. Even more worrisome was the possibility that Chiang Kaishek himself might seek peace or accept one of the many Japanese proffers. Mao understood that capitulation-a Sino-Japanese "accommodation"-was inseparable from anti-communism. Japan was, after all, an active member of the anti-Comintern pact (1936), and coming to terms with Japan would inevitably mean embracing that position. Should such a disastrous turn occur, the Chinese Communist Party, as the only remaining force within China which stood both for national independence and for internal reform, would face, alone, the combined power of both foreign and domestic enemies. Not only Wang Jingwei but others (identified by the Communists as "pro-Japanese elements"), such as He Yingqin, who were still close to Chiang Kaishek, had in one way or another expressed the view that the Communists were a more fundamental and serious threat than the Japanese. As the war in China moved toward stalemate, and particularly as strategic Japanese offensives against Nationalist forces wound down, Mao believed that the danger of such a "turn for the worse" was further aggravated. Mao's writings on international affairs and the worldwide strategic situation are notably dogmatic and rigid by comparison with his treatment of domestic affairs, where he was clearly more at home, more knowledgeable, and more supple. A large part of Mao's analysis, shaped as it was by ideological categories, was devoted to whether the international situation made capitulation-and especially

xliv

INTRODUCTION

Chiang's capitulation-to Japan more or less likely. On some oc_casions: Mao wrote as though Chiang's actions would be determmed largely by mternat10nal rather than domestic considerations. Therefore, the most fundamental domestic policy derived from this analysis was to do everything possible to keep Chiang Kaishek and the National Government actively engaged in the war. Although the tone of references to Chiang differs somewhat between public and confidential inner-Party statements, the message is entirely consistent: unless or until Chiang actively surrenders to the Japanese, treat him with respect, praise all indications of resistance on his part, and blame anti-Communist or peace-seeking measures on misguided subordinates or traitorous "pro-Japanese elements." Criticism of Chiang himself, if offered at all, should be circumspect and restrained. These approaches were stressed, especially, at times when Chiang's actions were most suspect: when it appeared most likely that he might abandon the war and come to terms with Japan. As those dangers receded, as Chiang seemed more unlikely to accommodate Japan and root out the Communists, Mao and the Communist Party could be correspondingly more forthright in word and deed. This analysis continued essentially unchanged through 1939 and most of 1940, even through the stunning news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939, immediately followed by the partition of Poland. Although Stalin's volte-face caught the Chinese-Chiang as well as Mao--by surprise, Mao put the best possible face on this radical realignment. While it must have been awkward to switch off the antifascist rhetoric previously aimed at Germany. from the standpoint of the Chinese Communist Party a reduction of the threat to the Soviet Union in Europe complicated Japan's position in Asia. Thus Mao declared on September I: The Soviet-Gennan nonaggression pact is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government. The signing ofthe pact is no accident and has great significance. The treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie ... sought to instigate a SovietGerman war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the GermanItalian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, exposed the lies ofthis reactionary clique against communism and the Communist International, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany.... In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance, and deals a blow to the capitulators. 10 This line was followed by the Chinese Communist Party during the balance of 1939 and throughout 1940. The outbreak of the European war in September 1939

10. ''Interview with a New China Daily Correspondent on the New International Situation" (September I. 1939). translated below. Passages deleted from the Selected Works are here italicized. as they are in all texts in this edition for which the original version is available to us. (See below. the "Note on Sources and Conventions.")

INTRODUCTION

xlv

simply reinforced it. Late that month, Mao told Edgar Snow that "the Soviet Union will not participate in this war, because both sides are imperialists, and it is simply a robber war with justice on neither side." 11 The following spring and summer, with the unstoppable German blitzkreig overrunning the Low Countries and France, and with British forces driven in disarray across the Channel, China could expect even Jess in the way of support and even more in the way of appeasement of Japan in Asia. Beleaguered, Great Britain capitulated in July to Japanese demands that the Burma Road and Hong Kong be closed to China, thus breaking the last tenuous links with the Western world. Needless to say, the Vichy French government accepted every Japanese demand concerning Indochina and the Yunnan rail line. The Soviet Union-fearful of both Germany and Japan, dreading the possibility of a two-front war, and needing to build up his own forces-was gradually phasing out military aid to China. During the summer of 1940, China was isolated as never before, outside assistance was more distant than ever, and Nationalist surrender was by no means out ofthe question. France had been defeated, and the Battle of Britain was very much in the balance. The United States, just awakening from isolationism, was looking more toward Europe than toward Asia; meanwhile, strong voices in the United States argued that no vital interests were at stake in Asia. One might suggest that these circumstances caused the gradual softening in Mao's outlook late in 1940, as U.S. involvement in the conflict appeared nearer. Similarly, references to a Far Eastern Munich became less frequent. Doubts, however, still remained; in October, a secret telegram to Zhou Enlai in Chongqing contained the following: America's preparations are not complete, so it might not enter the war right away. If Germany invades England, the United States navy will have to respond immediately in the Atlantic, and will not be able to concentrate its forces to deal with the Pacific, so when Japan attacks various places in Southeast Asia, a war between Japan and America will not necessarily result. 12

The year 1941 was a time of cataclysmic change in international affairs. Three great events affected the world, China, and the Chinese Communist movement. These were the five-year nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Japan (April 13); the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22), and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7). The first of these relieved Stalin of worry that he might face a two-front war; the second and the third merged the related but separate conflicts in Europe and Asia into one huge global war. From this year came the realignments and alliances that continued until the war ended in 1945.

II. Interview with Edgar Snow on September 26, 1939, reproduced below. 12. "Estimate Regarding the Current International Situation, and Policy for Dealing With a Possible Guomindang Attack," October 25, 1940, translated below.

xlvi

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet-Japanese pact was a blow both to Chiang Kaishek and to MaoZedong because it meant that, in return for Stalin's increased security in the Far East, Japan no longer had to worry about conflict with the Soviet Union and could devote more energy to the war in China, to the further domination and exploitation of Southeast Asian resources, and to the coming showdown with the United States. As recently as March 1941, Mao had written that if Japan succeeded in signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, war would break out soon, and that such an accord would cause the deterioration of relations both between the Nationalists and the Communists, and between China and the Soviet Union. 13 The Chinese Communist Party therefore had to swallow hard even to appear supportive of this arrangement between its mortal enemy and its fraternal socialist comrade. This it did in a statement drafted by Mao and published on April 16, 1941, calling the pact a victory for peace and an elevation of the Soviet Union's international standing. This statement also argues, in terrns that ring quite hollow, that the Soviet Union would still continue to aid China and that Stalin's promises not to invade Manchuria (Manchukuo) or Outer Mongolia were, whatever one might think, helpful to China's struggle. The statement ends with reiteration of the three fundamental wartime policies: unwavering resistance to Japan, continued cooperation between the Guomindang and the CCP, and ending "of all kinds of reactionary domestic policies." 14 The following day, in a telegram to Zhou Enlai, Mao asserted that the Soviet-Japanese pact was "a severe blow to Chiang,'' who had been counting on the Soviet Union for support against Japan, and that it would make both capitulation and anti-communism more difficult for Chiang. 15 Equally striking was the reaction to German invasion of the Soviet Union, beginning on June 22, 1941. In this case, also, the initial response was drafted by Mao, on behalf of the Central Committee. Hitler's attack was, Mao said,

a perfidious crime of aggression not only against the Soviet Union but against the freedom and independence of all nations . ... The task in the world now is to mobilize the people of all countries and organize an international united front to fight international fascism and defend the Soviet Union, defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations .... In foreign relations, unite against the common foe with everybody in Britain, the United States and other countries who is opposed to the fascist rulers of Gerrnany, Italy, and Japan. 16

13. See below. his dispatch to Zhou Enlai, March 17. 1941. 14. See below, the "Views expressed by the Chinese Communist Party on the Publication of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact,'' April 1941. At the Politburo meeting which adopted the statement he had drafted, Mao observed that, with the signature of this treaty. the Soviet Union and Japan both gained more freedom, but that the problem of China had not been resolved. Nianpu, Vol. 2. p. 288. 15. See Nianpu, VoL 2, p. 288. The text of this telegram is not available to us. 16. See the "Decision Regarding the International United Front Against Fascism," June 23, 1941, translated below.

INTRODUCTION

xlvii

In another telegram, drafted on June 26, Mao declared: England, America, and China stand on the side of the Soviet Union. At present there is a confrontation between the fascist and antifascist fronts, of which the prospects are advantageous for the Soviet Union and for China. The current situation in China may change for the better. Our orientation is to secure such a change, and to strike at the Japanese invaders." This completed the reorientation of Mao's international policy line: those who in 1939 and 1940 had been bourgeois imperialists, fully as complicit as the Axis powers in the initiation of global conflict, were now united front allies in the struggle against fascism and for independence. Given Mao's conviction that dualities lie at the heart of every phenomenon, this reorientation could be viewed as a working out of contradictions in the international arena, not simply as an abandonment of previously held positions. Here. as both earlier and later, Mao's capacity to argue either side of a position in accordance with dialectics and contradiction served him well. Finally, of course, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, made comrades-in-arms of the Allied Powers, the Soviet Union, and China. The Politburo was rapidly convened, and Mao proposed that a statement regarding these events be issued. After two days of discussion such a document, which had been revised by Mao, was put out in the name of the Central Committee on December 9. Its language was categorical: This Pacific War is an unjust war launched by the Japanese fascists for the sake of aggression against the United States, Britain, and other countries. On the part of the United States, Britain, and other countries who have risen to resist this aggression, it is a just war of liberation in defense of independence, freedom, and democracy.... China must establish a military alliance with Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries fighting Japan, ... and persevere in fighting the war against Japan until victory is complete. 18 In speaking to the Politburo on December 8, Mao had enumerated six points about the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, which, he said, were advantageous both to the Soviet Union and to China: (I) the Japanese armies in China would be weakened; (2) Guomindang attacks on the border region might be reduced; (3) pro-Japanese and pro-German factions would be hard hit, thus enhancing the prospects for persuading the Guomindang not to capitulate; (4) the future 17. This brief extract is given in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 309. The full text of the telegram is not available, nor is it known to whom it was addressed. 18. See below, the "Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the War in the Pacific," December 9, 1941. (Because of the international date line, the attack on Pearl Harbor took place on December 8 Chinese time, so the Politburo did not wait a day before meeting.)

xlviii

INTRODUCTION

prospects for democracy in China would be improved; (5) the Soviet Union could move troops from the East to the West; (6) there was the possibility of a second front in Europe. The war in Europe would be shortened, but the war in the Pacific might be lengthened, though in the end British and U.S. forces would defeat Japan. 19 Yet Mao still privately harbored serious doubts. In a confidential telegram to Zhou Enlai, he speculated accurately that during "the next half-year, neither Britain nor the United States can compete against Japan," and he predicted that most of their Asian possessions would be lost. Nevertheless, "if two or three strongholds such as Singapore, Manila, and Darwin can be saved, a situation of stalemate will occur in six months. Then we can wait until the Japanese army is exhausted before launching a counterattack." Vigorous efforts to open a second front in Europe could mean that "Germany can be finished off more quickly," thus freeing resources for the war against Japan. "But," Mao added, "do the indolent British and U.S. military and political personnel have the necessary stamina?" 20 The New Stage: Cooperation and Conflict with the Guomindang

In 1939 as before, Mao continued to insist that Japanese aggression and the War of Resistance constituted the principal and antagonistic contradiction, which forced all other contradictions-including relationships with Chiang Kaishek and class struggle within Chinese society-into secondary, nonantagonistic positions. During 1938, Mao had presented in detail his views on the current situation in China's struggle against Japan. In ''On Protracted War" (May 1938) and ''On the New Stage" (October 1938), Mao argued that the War of Resistance against Japan would be divided into three strategic phases: strategic retreat, stalemate, and strategic offensive.21 The second, or stalemate. stage, of indefinite but prolonged duration, was the pivotal stage during which first-stage imbalances of power would be gradually and cumulatively reversed, with China gaining strength and Japan becoming progressively weaker. Mao repeatedly stressed his confidence in ultimate victory and refuted with equal firmness those who believed in quick victory and those who felt that no victory was possible. By early 1939, after the fall of Wuhan to the Japanese, Mao believed that the first phase was winding down and was more or less at an end. In October 1938, when Wuhan, Chiang's temporary capital, was about to fall, Mao argued that Japan would gradually shift from strategic offense to a more defensive posture, though fairly large tactical operations were still likely. This was the "new stage" which China was now entering, a stage that would bring with it such difficulties as the growing dangers of puppet governments, capitulation, greater anti-Communist 19. Extracts in Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 343-44.

20. See below, "Estimate of the Situation in the International War," December 12, 1941. This telegram ends with the full text of the six points Mao had put forward at the Politburo

meeting of December 8, indicating that they should not be made public. 21. "On Protracted War," in Volume VI. pp. 319-89, especially pp. 360-89.

INTRODUCf/ON

xlix

pressures both from Japan and domestically, and pessimism within China. In late December 1938, Mao's foresight was confirmed by the defection of Chiang Kaishek's most formidable rival, Wang Jingwei, to the Japanese side. At the heart of the Chinese Communist Party's united front policy toward the Guomindang (which was only one aspect of the united front policy in general) was one of those Machiavellian contradictions so characteristic of Mao Zedong: how to champion unified and unconditional resistance to Japan while simultaneously expanding Communist influence at Nationalist expense, without pushing the Nationalists into Japanese arms. Mao therefore had to calibrate Communist Party actions so that Chiang Kaishek would not angrily conclude that peace with Japan was preferable to toleration of continued Communist expansion. The trick was to push to the very brink of rupture, but not into the abyss of Sino-Japanese peace and the danger of renewed civil war-perhaps with Japanese assistance. Most of Mao's writings during these three years are relevant to this issue in specific political, military, social, and ideological terms; many address it directly. Until 1939, relations between the two major parties were perhaps better than many observers had expected. The Chinese Communist Party had been granted at least semilegal status, with a sizable delegation in Wuhan (and later Chongqing), representation in the advisory People's Political Conference, liaison offices in a number of cities, and publication of a newspaper and a magazine in Guomindang-controlled areas. Furthermore, the national government had acknowledged the existence of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (Shaan-Gun-Ning) Border Region and approved the ShanxiChahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) base in North China; it had authorized roth the three divisions comprising the Eighth Route Army (designated by the nattonal government the Eighteenth Group Army) and, later, the New Fourth Army in Central China. Finally, the national government was supplying monthly subsidies of 600,000 yuan to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Eighteenth Group Army. For its part, the Chinese Communist Party had recognized the national government as the legitimate government of China and Chiang Kaishek as its leader. It agreed to place its territories and armed forces under the broad authority of the national government, though this was but a fig leaf, hardly disguising their Party's continued control of lands and armies. It pledged to terminate class struggle and the forcible confiscation of land, and to accept Sun Yatsen's "Three People's Principles"-which it redefined in its own terms-as the core of its program. 22 22. Mao and others in the leadership group often expressed the Party's own version of

the Three People's Principles (sanmin zhuyi) and then used those definitions, first, to affirm the Party's loyalty to Sun Yatsen's legacy and united front solidarity with the Guomindang

and, second, to criticize the Guomindang for its failure to live up to its own core beliefs. See, for example, Mao's "On the New Stage" (October I 938), section entitled 'The Three People's Principles and Communism.' In Mao's "On the New Democracy" (January 1940),

the sanmin z.huyi were explicitly linked to the Three Great Policies of the 1920's, i.e., alliance with the Soviet Union, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, and assistance to the workers and peasants.

INTRODUCTION

This brief era of relative good feeling petered out, however, after the fall of Wuhan and the withdrawal of the national government to Sichuan. In January and February 1939, the Guomindang Central Executive Committee adopted a series of measures designed to restrict Communist influence and reassert the superiority of the Guomindang. 23 These actions also reflected "the new stage," in that the reduction of Japanese pressure allowed the Guomindang breathing space and resources to devote to them. The measures were aimed both at Communist influence in Guomindang-controlled areas and at the base areas themselves. The first serious clashes between military forces of the two parties came in 1939; they became more widespread and more intense as the Communists sought to expand the territories and populations under their effective control, and the Nationalists sought to restrict or recover these territories, mostly behind Japanese lines. Nationalist propaganda organs charged bitterly that despite their big talk the Communists had not in fact done much fighting, that their vaunted guerrilla warfare (youji zhan, literally "moving and hitting") was all you ("moving") and no ji ("hitting").24 Indeed, the Guomindang charged that it was the policy of the Chinese Communist Party to devote 70 percent of its effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the Guomindang, and 10 percent to anti-Japanese operations. 25 Although no evidence supports the existence of such an explicit division of effort, the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party could be read in this way, and such propaganda was often effective; the Communists denied it with the vehemence and self-righteous outrage that shows a nerve has been struck. In 1939, the Nationalists began to impose a progressively tighter blockade around the headquarters in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia area and made military efforts to penetrate Communist-influenced areas of North China. This led to what the Communists euphemistically called "friction" (moca), but which was actually a dirty, ruthless little war-within-a-war. 26 Soon the most serious friction was taking place in central China. In response to these hostile measures on the part of the Guomindang and also, no

23. These were (a) "Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties," (b) "Measures for Dealing with the Communist Problem," and (c) "Measures for Guarding Against Communist Activities in the Japanese-Occupied Areas." 24. Referring to this taunt, Mao attributed it to Wang Jingwei, or to reactionary elements sympathetic to Wang (see below, his preface of March 2, 1939, to a book by Nie Rongzhen; his talk of July 9, 1939; and Section Vlll of"On New Democracy," January 1940, pp. 34749). This manifestly reflected the policy, mentioned above, of avoiding direct criticism of Chiang Kaishek and his supporters. 25. Lyman P. VanSlyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 197-98 (hereafter VanSlyke, En· emies and Friends).

26. U.S. War Department, The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the U.S. War Department, July 1945, ed. Lyman P. VanSlyke (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), ch. 4.

INTRODUCf/ON

li

doubt, because of the confidence inspired in the Communist leadership by the growing power of their guerrilla bases behind the Japanese lines, Mao began in late 1939 to take a much firmer political line in discussing the role of the two parties. In his report of October I938 to the Sixth Plenum, Mao had hailed the Guomindang as a party which, in the course of its "glorious history" and under the "two great leaders;• Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek, had achieved great things for China. The Guomindang, he declared, "occupies the position of leader and backbone" in the anti-Japanese united front, and he predicted "a brilliant future" for it. 27 Now, barely a year later, Mao put things very differently. As always, he adapted his message to the audience. In "On New Democracy," directed at non-Communist intellectuals, he even went so far as to declare that, if the Chinese bourgeoisie (in other words, the Guomindang) could fulfill the responsibility of leading the people to drive out Japanese imperialism and introduce democratic government, "no one will be able to refuse his admiration." But he made it abundantly clear that he did not believe Chiang Kaishek could play this role, and therefore the Chinese revolution, which was "a great part of the world revolution," would have to be led by the Communist Party.In "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," meant primarily for Party members, he stated bluntly, "Unless it is led by the proletariat, the Chinese revolution cannot ... succeed." And in his introductory editorial for The Communist, an internal publication which would be seen only by Party members, he did not even raise the question of leadership, but simply assumed that the Communists would exercise it and went on to discuss how they should go about it_28 Military Matters and Base Areas: Resistance and Expansion

Although this change in Mao's political assessment is worthy of note, the controlling reality of these years was war: kangzhan, or the War of Resistance against Japan. Ostensibly a struggle between Japanese invaders and Chinese defenders, the war was actually several overlapping conflicts, the many interactions among which created an extraordinarily complex picture. On the Chinese side, the two principal forces-the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party-fought quite different wars against Japan. The Nationalists employed mostly conventional military tactics, while at Mao's insistence the Communists adopted the unconventional guerrilla tactics learned during the prewar decade of internal war and brought them to higher levels of sophistication and effectiveness. Moreover, at times when Japanese military pressure was heaviest on the Nationalists (during the early and late war years), the Communists had a relatively free hand. Conversely, when the 27. These quotations are taken from the portion of Mao's report which is not included in the Selected Works. For a full translation, see in Volume VI of our edition, section 18, "The Guomindang Has a Brilliant Future," pp. 487-90. 28. See below, pp. 340, 300, and 244-54 passim.

Iii

INTRODUCTION

Nationalist front was stalemated-as was the case during the middle years of the war (including the three years under review here), Japanese efforts to suppress or eliminate Communist-led resistance intensified to ferocious levels. In idealized versions of the Chinese Communist movement during the SinoJapanese war, guerrilla warfare occupies a hallowed place, as a special kind of str4ggle waged by a vanguard arrny and an aroused populace against foreign invaders and their native collaborators. The people's inferiority in the hardware of modern warfare is offset by such crucial intangibles as patriotism, strength of purpose, a just cause, correct political stance, effective leadership, the unity of the fighters and the common people (laobaixing), and endless resourcefulness. Mao Zedong, it is often claimed, brought guerrilla warfare to uncanny levels of effectiveness, and his model of guerrilla war might be adapted to winning revolutions almost anywhere-in Vietnam, in Peru, Cuba, or elsewhere. In the process, "guerrilla warfare" has become reified, a shibboleth to be invoked, rather than a description of real people engaged in real conflict. During the Sino-Japanese War, Mao Zedong made no such extravagant claims for guerrilla war. In a major November 1938 statement, he wrote, In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war.... In the intermediate stage [i.e., strategic stalemate] guerrilla warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary, because the enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing forthe counteroffensive, but will not yet be ready to launch it. Though this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one ofthe three stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. Unless we understand this ... we shall be unable to defeat Japan.29 We know that a sharp debate over military strategy had finally been resolved by the time of the Sixth Plenum, with Mao's insistence on guerrilla warfare having prevailed over some professionally minded generals who preferred regular warfare. One might argue that Mao was here seeking to reassure the generals that he too believed in regular warfare-in principle, in the past, and in the indefinite future. Meanwhile, he was winning his point by affirming the centrality of guerrilla warfare-in practice and for a present of considerable duration. Even if this is true, as it may well be, Mao was not being hypocritical. No evidence suggests that Mao then believed guerrilla warfare by itself could defeat Japan. 30 The purposes of warfare, 29. "Problems of War and Strategy," Volume VI, pp. 556-58. 30. Later, in 1948 and 1949, as victory over the Guomindang became more cenain, Mao came closer to making such claims for guerrilla war. For example, he praised the victory of

"millet and rifles" over "aircraft and artillery." In fact, however, by 1948 the Chinese Communist Party was indeed shifting to regular warfare and strategic counteroffensive against the Guomindang, using massive amounts of former Japanese and U.S.-made weapons and other equipment captured from (or surrendered by) Nationalist forces.

INTRODUCTION

liii

however defined, were to inflict casualties on the enemy, to clear territories which could then be organized into base areas, and to defend those base areas against attack from the Japanese, from puppets, or from Guomindang-controlled armies. Because the Japanese occupation of North China had been at first very superficial, limited as it was to the major cities and the communications lines connecting them (the so-called "point-and-line occupation"), vast regions of the countryside were opened up to the Communists. While the Nationalists were being driven westward out of their most economically developed and politically reliable strongholds in the lower and central Yangzi region, Communist forces expanded eastward behind Japanese lines. Thus, during the first year and a half of the war, through 1938, the Chinese Communist Party had succeeded in establishing its influence in much of North China behind Japanese lines. This was most evident in various regions of Shanxi and Hebei Provinces, where organized political structures were being set up, but it was also present in Chahar, Shandong, and Henan. In Central China, the New Fourth Army was still in its formative stage, but had created military and political nuclei both north and south of the Yangzi River. These early beginnings were already growing into the anti-Japanese base areas which would form the true foundation of Communist power as the war continued. Mao Zedong understood that expansion behind Japanese lines certified the patriotic credentials of the Chinese Communist Party while simultaneously vastly increasing the territory, population, and resources of the Party. In 1939, as noted above, things began to change. Determined to take countermeasures, the Guomindang took threefold action: first, to blockade the headquarters area of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (the Yan'an base), and to restore the Guomindang's own presence in areas behind Japanese lines in North China where base areas had already been established; second, to oppose vigorously the intrusion and expansion of Communist forces behind Japanese lines in Central China, where Nationalist forces still existed, but where the Communists' New Fourth Army, reinforced by Eighth Route Army detachments sent southward, were becoming increasingly aggressive; and, third, to restrict, as much as politically possible, Communist activities in Guomindang-controlled areas of unoccupied China. 31 Later in the year, about 400,000 Nationalist troops were stationed in a blockade around the western and southern sides of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and the monthly subsidy to the Communists was terminated. Armed clashes between Nationalist (or regional) and Communist forces were also beginning to 31. Actions aimed at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the North China bases. in mid- and late 1939, constituted what the Chinese Communists called ''the first anti-Communist upsurge" (or "high tide"). Conflicts in Central China, mainly in 1940 and culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, were "the second antic_ommunist upsurge." Suppression of Communist activity throughout Guomindang-occupled areas took place, with varying degrees of severity, throughout the rest of the war. Sec above. note 23.

/iv INTRODUCTION

occur. These escalated in the fall and winter of 1939-1940 into what the CCP called "the first anti-Communist upsurge." This was marked by Nationalist probing operations against exposed parts of the Shaan-Gan-Ning perimeter, by more determined Nationalist efforts to intrude its armies into Communist-controlled bases in Shanxi and Hebei provinces, and-most spectacularly-by Yan Xi shan 's split with the Chinese Communist Party. 32 By spring 1940, however, the immediate crisis had passed; the Communists considered that the "upsurge" had been beaten back. Throughout 1939 and into 1940, Mao addressed himself far more often to the problem of military relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang than he did to operations against the Japanese. This was not because he thought the latter less important than the former. Clearly, the war against the Japanese was utterly fundamental. But basic principles, strategies, and tactics had been enunciated earlier, during the first two years of the war--especially in "Problems of Strategy in the Guerrilla War Against Japan" (May 1938) and "On Protracted War" (also May 1938). By the Sixth Plenum, Mao's arguments had substantially carried the day, and his policies of base-building and independence within the united front framework had proved themselves in practice. Thus, while the anti-Japanese effort remained crucial and extremely difficult, it was no longer so problematic as in the past. Much more difficult to manage were relations with various non-Communist military forces. Mao insisted on following a selective policy which employed both struggle (which the Chinese Communist Party, as noted above, called "friction") and conciliation, which he summarized under the three headings "on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint" (you-li, you-li, you-jie). Mao explained what he meant: First, the principle of self-defense.... [W]e must never attack others without provocation, but once attacked we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of our struggle. Second, the principle of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without cenainty of success. We must know how to exploit the contradictions among the die-hards and must not take on too many

of them at a single time, but must direct our blows at the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle of a truce. After repulsing one diehard attack, we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close before anolher attack is made on us. A truce should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity with the diehards and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with them. 33 32. Yan Xi shan was the long-time governor of Shanxi Province. He was sometimes the rival and adversary but sometimes also the ally of Chiang Kaishek. Since late 1936, the CCP had formed a close united front with Yan, helping him (and itself) to extend and deepen its influence throughout the province-or what was left of it after the Japanese invasion. The split occurred when the differences between Yan and the Communists become irreconcilable. Sec VanSlyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 130-42. 33. See below "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front," March II. 1940.

INTRODUCTION

[,

This statement reflects in general form a more concrete directive sent to Peng Dehuai a few days earlier. Peng, then in general command of Eighth Route Army field forces in the North China bases, had recently split with Yan Xishan and had just successfully repulsed Chiang Kaishek's efforts to regain a foothold in Communist-controlled bases in Shanxi and Hebei. Ordering Peng to seek to restore contacts with Yan and to break off combat operations despite having the upper hand, Mao wrote:

The present task for our side is to strive for internal peace in the major regions so that we may be able to concentrate our forces to consolidate our positions within half a year.... If our military counteroffensive does not stop ... the intermediate factions may regard us as too extreme and too excessive. There will then be the possibility that we might lose the sympathy ofthe intermediate factions. Therefore, whether from the point of view of consolidating our forces, or from the point of view of striving to win over the sympathy ofthe intermediate factions, it is necessary to halt temporarily the military struggle between the two sides. 34 The other side of Mao's dialectical coin was his determination to continue the expansion of Communist influence and base areas. As to the regions in which base areas should be developed, during 1939 Mao spoke most often about consolidating the North China bases and expanding southward. For example, in March he argued: The emphasis in consolidation should be placed on North China. Development should stress Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei .... The three provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, and Henan, in particular, are the pivotal regions in the whole country's protracted War ofResistaoce.... Cadres from Yan' an should be used mainly in Central China for a certain period of time in the future. 35 Meanwhile, the first significant violence was beginning to take place between Communist-led military units in the base areas and various anti-Communist forces. But where this conflict involved local antagonists, without support at higher levels, it could be handled on the spot and posed no threat to larger united front concerns. Provincial or warlord forces, often called informally zapai jun ("miscellaneous [i.e., second-rate] armies") could be more formidable and were sometimes used as cat's-paws for broader Nationalist anti-Communist policy. Mao, who knew that these zapai jun were not strong enough to overcome Communist forces, ordained an orchestrated response under the three headings of 'Justification," "benefit," and "restraint" described above. 34. "Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions and Consolidate the Positions Won," March 5, 1940, translated below. 35. "The Emphasis in Consolidation Should Be Placed on North China; Development Should Stress on Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei," March 19, 1939.

/vi INTRODUCTION

These tactics were all the more effective because provincial and warlord forces were usually unenthusiastic about trying to overcome the Communist-led base areas in the first place. Their commanders also strongly suspected that Chiang Kaishek would shed few tears if both they and Chinese Communist forces happened to exhaust themselves in combat. Thus they were likely to accept some tolerable modus vivendi if it was offered to them. They might even be open to the patriotic blandishments of the united front, wishing to avoid being described, in effect, as betrayers of resistance to Japan. Mao publicly blamed conflict at this level on pro-Japanese or "diehard" (i.e., strongly anti-Communist but not necessarily pro-Japanese) elements, describing them as initiatives that Chiang Kaishek had not ordered and would have prevented, as harming the united front against Japan, had he known of them in advance. Mao almost certainly did not believe this explanation, but it justified striking back, and he knew that Chiang was in no position to dispute it. Thus, in January 1940, even while "friction" was at its height in North China, the Party Secretariat sent a directive, drafted by Mao, to the leadership of the Shandong and Central Plains bureaus of the Chinese Communist Party, observing that "the regions in which we can, at present, expand our armed forces are limited principally to Shandong and Central China.... We request that you pay serious attention to making the expansion of armed strength the core of your work."36 Shandong was to add 150,000 troops, and the Central Plains bureau 100,000; and each was to aim at ten times that number in self-defense (militia) forces. By 1940, Mao's concerns for base area expansion and development were increasingly focused on Central China, and upon a secure linkage between the North China bases of the Eighth Route Army and more southerly bases ofthe New Fourth Army. The thrust of his position was that the New Fourth Army should concentrate its efforts on those portions of Anhui and Jiangsu above the Yangzi River, on both sides of the Grand Canal. More specifically, the Military Affairs Commission, in which Mao was the dominant figure, and the Central Plains Bureau, now headed by Liu Shaoqi, had staked out those portions of Jiangsu north of the Yangzi River as the principal target for expansion, base construction, and linkage with the North China bases. While not ignoring Anhui, Hubei, and Henan, they now considered Jiangsu an altogether more promising area. The principal Nationalist military commander, Han Deqin, 37 was a Jiangsu native and protege ofGu Zhutong,38 but Han's armies were poorly trained, his subordinates were of uncertain loyalty, and he was disliked by many leading lights among the Jiangsu gentry; meanwhile Gu's forces

36. See ''Concentrate All Our Efforts to Develop Anned Forces and Set Up Base Areas," January 28, 1940, translated below, pp. 377-78. 37. Regarding Han Deqin (1892-1988), see below the relevant note to the document of

April 5, 1940, and the reference on p. lvii. 38. Regarding Gu Zhutong (1893-1987), see the note on p. 585 of Volume V and the

reference below on p. lix of this Introduction.

INTRODCJC710N

/vii

were at a distance, south of the Yangzi River. Adding to these other considerations, the Japanese occupation of northern and central Jiangsu in 1939 and 1940 was very light, with large expanses of the countryside completely devoid of Japanese or even puppet troops. Anhui was comparatively less attractive than Jiangsu as a target. Closer to reinforcement from unoccupied China, Anhui was under the jurisdiction ofLi Zongren39 and the Guangxi faction, with its better trained and more disciplined forces (the principal political and military commanders in the province were Liao Lei, until his death in late 1939, and then Li Pinxian) ..wThe Guangxi faction was less hostile to the Communists than many other forces, at least until Li Pinxian took over, and its relations with Han Deqin were not particularly friendly. Just how important this cluster of issues was to Mao is shown by the frequency with which he wrote about them. During the first three months of the year, statements concerning base area matters occur frequently. For the period from April to September, they comprise well over half the documents contained in this volume. And during the fall and winter, as Communist forces in Central China vanquished Han Deqin and moved ever closer to the disaster that befell them in the New Fourth Army Incident (January 1941), he spoke of almost nothing else. Mao was equally concerned about the security and expansion of base areas north of the river and the vulnerability of New Fourth Army units located south of the Yangzi River, including army headquarters under Xiang Ying. 41 Indeed, during the latter months of 1939 and the first half of 1940, substantial portions of the New Fourth Army were moved from south of the Yangzi to north of it, mainly across Yangzhong Island, where Guan Wen wei had established a strong presence. Chen Yi, a leading figure from the original nucleus of the New Fourth Army, moved northward with these units and did much to help establish them in central and northern Jiangsu. Other detachments of the New Fourth Army were also moving eastward, from Hubei and western Anhui. These northward and eastward deployments, of course, left the units still remaining south of the river in more vulnerable straits. Mao first expressed his concern about the exposure of the southern forces in early January 1940, and returned to the subject with increasing frequency throughout

39. Regarding the earlier career of Li Zongren (1893-1966), see Volume V, p. 365, note I. Since 1937, he had been commander of the Fifth War Area, a post he retained until 1945. 40. Regarding Li Pinxian (1892-1987), see below, the relevant note to the document of March 16, 1940. 41. Regarding the early career of Xiang Ying ( 1897-1941), see Volume IV, p. xxxii, note

8, and the numerous references to him in that volume. When the main Communist forces left Jiangxi for the Long March, Xiang Ying remained behind with the mission of creating a new base in the area, but by 1936 his forces had been badly mauled. Following the outbreak of war with Japan. Xiang Ying became deputy commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army. His forces won several engagements with the Japanese, but as chronicled in this volume. they were crushed in the "New Fourth Army Incident" of January 1941, in which Xiang Ying was killed.

/viii

INTRODUCTION

the year. In January, Mao and Wang Jiaxiang42 radioed Xiang Ying and Ye Ting,4 3 urging them to cross the Yangzi northward, or at least to prepare a number of crossing points.44 Later in the year, as the "friction" described below became more heated, Mao and the Military Affairs Commission became increasingly concerned about the situation in southern Anhui, where the headquarters detachments of the New Fourth Army were located under the leadership ofYe Ting and Xiang Ying, and messages became more frequent. Partly worried by their military insecurity, he was also distressed by the compromises with the Nationalists and with local society which Ye and Xiang thought necessary. In southern Anhui (i.e., south of the Yangzi River), geopolitical conditions were adverse to base building, powerful Japanese forces were nearby, and so were potent Nationalist units. Consequently, these elements of the New Fourth Army were more exposed and more vulnerable than those north of the Yangzi, particularly so after many of the combat units were transferred north. Probably for this reason, Ye Ting and Xiang Ying felt they had to be more circumspect and accommodating to the Guomindang-from whom they received a monthly subsidy and other badly needed supplies-than suited Mao. Mao may well have felt that their position violated the principle of independence and autonomy within the united front, and he may have questioned Xiang Ying's obedience to his orders. Meanwhile, north ofthe Yangzi, base area expansion in Central China was bringing the New Fourth Army into direct conflict with provincial armies both stronger and more closely affiliated with Chiang Kaishek than those in North China. The Nationalist political and military presence had long been strong there and had not been so seriously shattered as in the north. Furthermore, Communist forces had been unable to get into the region soon enough to take advantage of the temporary chaos of the first months.of the war. This area was thus strenuously contested among the Japanese (and their puppets), the Nationalists, and the Chinese Communist Party. As the New Fourth Army, reinforced by Eighth Route Army units sent south, expanded into the central and northern reaches of both Anhui and Jiangsu

42. Regarding the early career of Wang Jiaxiang (1907-), see Volume IV, p. xxxvii, note 3. He participated in the All-China Congress of Soviets in 1931 and became the commissar of foreign affairs in the new soviet government. He made the Long March and, after receiving medical treatment in the Soviet Union for an air raid wound, returned to China in 1937 and founded the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. At this time, he was responsible for training cadres of the People's Liberation Army. 43. Ye Ting (1897-1946) was one of the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising of 1927. After the defeat of the Communists, he broke with the Party and spent a number of years first in Berline and Vienna and then in Hong Kong. In 1937, he persuaded Chiang Kaishek to approve the establishment of the New Fourth Army, which was formally created in 1938. The process by which this force came to be seen by the Nationalists as a threat, and was ultimately destroyed in 1940-1941, is chronicled in this volume. 44. See ''The Forces in Southern Anhui Must Cross to the North of the River," January 29. 1940. translated below.

INTRODUCTION

fix

Provinces, they came into ever more serious conflict with the armies of Li Pinxian and Han Deqin, governors and military commanders of these two provinces. With events quickly building toward the climactic battles around the central Jiangsu town of Huangchiao in October 1940, Mao first took a hard and aggressive line. On October 9, he telegraphed Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi, "No matter which unit attacks us, you must be determined to wipe it out. Only by wiping out anti-Communist forces such as these is it possible to attack the Japanese invaders.''45 Just two days later, however, Mao and his colleagues were once again counseling moderation: "Our current policy orientation is to reduce friction and emphasize unity ... to reduce the tension in our relationship with Han [Deqin] and Li [Pinxian].''46 Having won the crucial battle and taken great strides in his plan to build consolidated and contiguous bases in north-central Jiangsu and Anhui, Mao now elected-as was his consistent practice-to pull back and offer an apparent olive branch to the defeated opponent. A similar policy, however, could not be adopted south of the Yangzi, from whence many units had already been sent north. There the remaining forces were no match for the armies of Gu Zhutong, at this time commander of the Third War Zone, and the presence of New Fourth Army headquarters represented a terrible vulnerability. The danger grew more acute as Nationalist forces were defeated and driven out of the regions immediately to the north, and retaliation against these exposed southern Communists became more and more likely. All through the autumn of 1940, Mao repeatedly expressed his anxiety about the southern detachments and about whether a conflict between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party was about to erupt into full civil war (including possible collaboration with Japan), and about what counteractive steps should be taken in the political and military realms. Time after time, Mao urged Xiang Ying and Ye Ting to move northward, recognizing the possibility of ambush along the way. He was also in frequent contact with Zhou Enlai in Chongqing. On October 19, 1940, two of Chiang Kaishek's most important military subordinates (He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi) raised the stakes by ordering all Communist forces to relocate to the north of the Yellow River by the end of the year. (This directive is often referred to as "the luJo order," luJo being the telegraphic code designation for that date.) This was clearly a response to long-term Communist expansion and to the startling defeats so recently suffered by the Guomindang.47 45. The references are to Han Deqin, governor of Jiangsu and commander of Nationalist forces in that province and to Li Pinxian. who held the same positions in Anhui. Their forces were concentrated north of the Yangzi River. See below, .. No Matter Which U.1it Attacks Us. You must Be Determined to Wipe It Out," October 9, 1940, p. 519. 46. See below, "Our Current Policy Orientation Is To Reduce Friction and Emphasize Unity," October II, 1940. p. 520. 47. Mao and his colleagues were convinced that the Guomindang wanted Communist forces concentrated in a relatively limited and topographically disadvantaged area, where they would be highly vulnerable to Japanese attack. Furthermore, the designated area lacked the resources to support such a large influx of troops.

1x INTRODUCTION

Mao consistently urged Xiang Ying and Ye Ting to move north-at one point (see the exasperated December 26 telegram) scolding Xiang Ying for timidity and hinting at deliberate disobedience. But in other documents, both earlier and later, Mao was more ambivalent. At various times, he counseled delay and negotiation and considered various routing options out of southern Anhui (even the possibility of moving southward into Zhejiang and beyond). Elsewhere he suggested that Chiang might be bluffing, or that by holding Han Deqin a kind of hostage in central and nonhern Jiangsu, an attack on Xiang Ying could be avoided. Thus Xiang Ying may well have felt that he was getting contradictory directions and that he would after all have to fend for himself and his detachments as best he could in the light of the actual circumstances facing him. Some of these ambivalences were doubtless born of Mao's need to consider various options or were the result of imperfect information in a complex and dynamically evolving situation. As regards our understanding of Mao's mind and behavior, however, his reaction to these events shows a human and fallible side, where his own uncenainties led to something less than clear and compelling leadership. The culmination came with the Guomindang's crushing attack upon and destruction of the headquaners detachment of the New Founh Army between January 4 and 15, 1941.48 On January 17, the Nationalists declared the New Founb Army dissolved for insubordination and rebellious acts. When the blow finally fell, Mao was not surprised, but he was downcast nevertheless. He deplored the lack of detailed knowledge about what, exactly, had happened: "How many men have broken through? How many rifles? Where are they now? How are things with them? How many men and rifles were besieged in Maolin? Who was the commander? Let us know as soon as possible for use in the negotiations.',.9 Only gradually did the leadership in Yan'an come to see the full picture. Zhou Enlai and others of the Communist group in Chongqing immediately lodged strong protests with the Nationalists, ponraying the New Fourth Army as a group of manyred patriots, with accompanying outrage and injured innocence. In Yan'an, Mao and his colleagues remained publicly silent until a few days after the

48. An estimated 9,000 New Fourth army men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Ye Ting, who had followed a more northerly route, was captured in mid-January. Xiang Ying tried to break out of the Maolin trap on his own with only a small detachment, then rejoined the remnants of his army. Finally-facing almost certain annihilation-he and Yuan Guoping, accompanied by only a few soliders and carrying the army's gold reseJVes, sought once again to escape. Regarding Yuan Guoping (1905-1941 ), see below, the note to the telegram of March 19, 1940. addressed to him. In all probability, Xiang and Yuan hoped to form the nucleus of a new guerrilla unit, as had been done before, during the harsh years of 1934-1937. But in mid-March, they were betrayed, robbed, and mutdered by one of their subordinates. 49. See below. p. 626, the telegram of January 13, 1941. to YeTing and others, signed by Mao and his colleagues on the Military Affairs Commission, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang, January 12, 1940. They did not know that Ye had been captured by the Nationalists. Only the brigade commander, Fu Qiutao, and a handful of his troops made a successful crossing to the north of the Yangzi River.

INTRODUCTION

/xi

January 17 order dissolving the New Fourth Army. Then the Communist propaganda apparatus swung into action, describing the Southern Anhui Incident as "a move planned by pro-Japanese conspirators and anti-Communist diehards." This lengthy statement went on to set forth twelve demands upon the Guomindang, as conditions for resumption of the united front. 5° Despite this bold position, Mao privately sounded deeply pessimistic, apparently fearing the outcome that he had so long sought to avoid: the full outbreak of civil war and its probable corollary of Nationalist capitulation to Japan. On January 19, 1941, just two days after the national government had declared the New Fourth Army dissolved for its rebellious actions, Mao wrote to Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi, instructing them to prepare for the worst: By declaring the New Fourth Army rebels and putting Ye Ting on trial, Chiang Kaishek seems to have made up his mind to break with our Party.... Politically, we shall fully expose Chiang's scheme (though making no mention of his name for the time being) .. .. Only a defensive posture will continue to be taken, so as to mobilize the masses of the people under the slogan of persisting in the war against Japan and opposing the civil war. Militarily, we shall first fight defensive warfare and fight our way, when necessary, to Gansu and Sichuan. 51 The next day he wrote to them (and Zhou Enlai) again: "The relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party such as it is now is of no use at all to us and to the revolution. But the split was caused by Chiang, so it is rather to our advantage.''52 He spoke to Liu Shaoqi in even more desperate terms: "Chiang Kaishek's order of January 17 marks the beginning of a sudden emergency on a national scale, the start of all-around capitulation and the breakup of the whole country. Our estimate made before December 17 is no longer applicable."53 Soon, however, Chiang Kaishek drew back from the brink of civil war. It had become clear that the Chinese Communist Party was better able to play the patriotic, innocent victim than was the Guomindang to portray itself as the object of disobedience and disloyalty. Within a month, the campaign to discredit the Nationalists was paying off, both at home and abroad. Mao's mood and estimate of the situation now both changed dramatically. In a telegram to Zhou Enlai in Chongqing, he presented an almost ebullient assessment, ending on a characteristically dialectic note: Chiang has never been so beseiged with reproach from within and without; we have never won such extensive support from the people (both at home and abroad) .... Our political offensive (the twelve demands) has prevailed over Chiang's po-

50. See below, "Order and Statement of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Southern Anhui Incident," January 20, 1941, pp. 647-53. 51. See the text of January 19, 1941, signed by Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang. translated below, p. 645. 52. See below, the communication of January 20, 1941, p. 646. 53. See below, the dispatch to Liu Shaoqi dated January 23, 1941, p. 654.

lxii

INTRODUCTION

Iitical offensive (the telegram of the 19th ... ). Our offensive has achieved results and more is yet to be gained. Our piiiJlOse is not to get Chiang to acknowledge our twelve demands, ... as he will never bring himself to do so, ... but to defeat their offensive with our offensive. The situation has changed. Before January 17, he was on the offensive while we were on the defensive. Things turned inside out after January 17, when he has landed in a defensive position. This has been our greatest victory. Only a military offensive, which is an enormous wrong policy, will obstruct Chiang from fighting Japan, while a political offensive, on the contrary, will push Chiang to fight Japan .... So the combination of ntilitary defensive and political offensive is absolutely correct, the two being both opposite and complementary to each other.54 By March 1941, Mao was able to declare that the "second anti-Communist onslaught was now over. 55 Mao could now conclude that, if Chiang had not fundamentally changed policy as a result of Communist victories in northern Jiangsu andAnhui and his retaliation against the New Fourth Army, he never would. With the easing of this crisis, Mao's fundamental vision of the united front with the Nationalists was vindicated: They would neither initiate full-scale civil war nor surrender to Japan. This was a sweepingjustification of Mao's policies toward the Nationalists, toward regional armies, and toward the strategic placement and defense of the base areas. From this time forward, the Nationalists could no longer seriously challenge the Communists in the well-established base areas of North and Central China. Communist activity south of the Yangzi had been forced underground in the bloody attack on the New Fourth Army headquarters detachment, leaving only a tenuous presence, but these events had in effect served Mao's strategic vision of moving north of the river and eastward into areas behind Japanese lines, from which Nationalist-affiliated or local contenders could be ejected, co-opted, isolated, or rendered harmless. Beginning at this time, too, the New Fourth Army came to look more and more like the Eighth Route Army in command structure, training, and social composition. In stark and quite surprising contrast to Mao's effusiveness during the Central China campaign and the New Fourth Army crisis was his almost total silence during the Battle of the Hundred Regiments (August 20 to mid-December 1940).56 The Hundred Regiments, the largest anti-Japanese campaign ofthe war, took place simultaneously with the conflicts between the Communists and the Guomindang in Central China just summarized, yet-so far as we now know-Mao had nothing to say about it. Standard accounts portray the Hundred Regiments as the largest and most nearly conventional military operation undertaken against the Japanese 54. "Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party at Present and Our

Tactics,'' February 14, t941, pp. 686-89. 55. See below, "The Situation Afler the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist On-

slaught,'' March 18, 1941, pp. 712-13, and the May 8 statement, "Conclusions on theRepulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught,'' pp. 731-34. 56. The fullest description and analysis of this campaign is Lyman P. Van Slyke, "The Battle of the Hundred Regiments: Problems of Coordination and Control During the Sino-

Japanese War,'" Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996). pp. 979-1005.

INTRODUC110N

lxiii

b C mmunist military forces during the Sino-Japanese War, but recently avail-

a~le :vidence shows that these were sprawling, decentralized engagements-large d small--occurring in a huge area dunng more than three months. an Initially planned by the field forces of the Eighth Route Army (principally by Peng Dehuai, but with assistance from Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, Zuo Quan, and others), the campaign was originally conceived as a counter balance to increasingly effective Japanese suppression tactics. Principal targets were the rail lines and strong points, which the Japanese were using as the "bars" of their "cage" strategy designed to isolate bases from one another and squeeze them ever tighter. Relying on the element of surprise, the Eighth Route Army at first achieved striking successes. By mid-September, however, Japanese reinforcements had arrived and fierce fighting ensued. From then on, Chinese forces were on the defensive, as the Japanese restored their precampaign positions. As a result of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the new Japanese commander in North China undertook savage mopping-up operations, the infamous "three-all" (kill all, burn all, loot all) campaigns. These campaigns, which recurred throughout 1941 and 1942, and extended into 1943, were the most difficult times of the entire war for the North China bases. Communist-controlled territory was cut in half, and communist armies shrunk by about a quarter. We now know that Mao and the Military Affairs Commission were informed in advance of plans for this campaign, but apparently did not respond. We are not aware of any contemporary statement unambiguously attributable to Mao concerning the Battle ofthe Hundred Regiments, and know of only one from the central authorities in Yan' an. Written during the heady early successes of the campaign, that one directive-which came from the Central Secretariat and not, as one would expect, from the Military Affairs Department---eontains the following passage: the full strength of our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army should concentrate its attention on attacking the enemy; they should emulate the example of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments in North China. In Shandong and Central China, one or several well-planned, large-scale offensive actions should be launched against the enemy. In North China, offensive operations of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments should be enlargect.57 57. Dated September 10, 1940. This unsigned directive of the Central Secretariat appears in Baituan dazhan lishi wenxian ziliao xuanbian (Selected Historical Materials Regarding the Great Battle of the Hundred Regiments) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), P· 13. There is reason to believe that Mao either wrote or approved this directive. Given his deep i~volvemcnt in and responsibility for military matters, it seems unlikely that such a sweepmg strategy would have been set forth without his knowledge. Furthermore, the language here resembles in tone that of some other statements known to have been made by Ma<~. such as "Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Broad Area from Shanghai to Fuzhou," ~pnl 30, 1941. translated below. p. 726. It also echoes the overconfidence exhibited by teld commanders, especially Pcng Dehuai, who imagined at this same time that the Japa?esc could be severely defeated and all the major North China bases could be amalgamated mto one. Nie Rongzhcn later described the mood as one of "brain fever."

lxiv

INTRODUCTION

Mao's only reference to the campaign while it was actually taking place was brief, indirect, and late in the day: "Do not declare openly that the Battle of the Hundred Regiments has been concluded. Chiang Kaishek is about to launch an anti-Communist upsurge, and we still need to use publicity about the Battle of the Hundred Regiments to oppose him. Signed Mao, Zhu, Wang.''58 There is, however, a brief but suggestive-and possibly critical-statement in a text of June 1941, addressed precisely to Peng Dehuai. "On the one hand," said Mao, "we have to fight (fighting is mandatory) but, on the other hand, we cannot light too fiercely (as in the Battle of the Hundred Regiments).''59 The rest of this statement, which suggests political and persuasive policies rather than direct military action to counterbalance Japanese operations against bases on the Hebei plains, is quite contrary in its thrust to that of the Hundred Regiments' approach. After these major combat operations against the Nationalists and the Japanese were concluded, from the spring of 1941 until the end of the year, Mao made only occasional statements concerning purely military affairs. As before, most of these had to do with relations between the Communists and the Guomindang. Although the War of Resistance and the ultimate defeat of Japan remain the underlying foundation for all these writings, one would not have guessed, from reading material authored by Mao, how serious were the Japanese mopping-up campaigns during 1941. Complementing Mao's external military concern for the location, expansion, and defense of the bases in their larger environments were his "internal" views of the social, economic, and political policies within the base areas. Once again, his silences may be as important as his statements. During most of 1939, while base area development and consolidation was still moving forward and "friction" had not yet become a serious threat, Mao directed only a few statements, couched in general language, at the base areas. These were contained mostly in public pronouncements or in policy papers intended for the Chinese Communist Party as a whole. We do not see specific orders issued to specific commanders in response to specific events, such as those described above in the military area. Under these relatively benign circumstances (compared to what was to come), earlier positions and policies seem to have sufficed. 58. See below the text of December 22, 1940, p. 586. Prefatory calligraphy by Mao also appeared in a Chinese Communist compilation of materials on the Hundred Regiments. This was Baituan dazhan teji (Special Collection on the Hundred Regiments Offensive) (Eighth Route Army Political Office, March 1941). Mao wrote. "Oppose Petainism. and also oppose de Gaullism. Finnly uphold the doctrine of the national revolution for independence and liberation." The negative reference to de Gaulle is not surprising at this time. since Mao viewed Petain (the running dog of Hitler) and de Gaulle (the running dog of British imperialism) as equally reprehensible. (See below the translations of the two documents dated October 25. 1940. pp. 527-29.) The fact that Mao allowed the use of his calligraphy obviously suggests that he approved of the book's contents. He did, however, refrain from an explicit endorsement of the Hundred Regiments offensive. 59. See below. the telegram to Peng dated June 9. 1941. pp. 759-60.

IN1RODUCT/ON

I>~

This tone continued into the early months of 1940, until the issuance of the important statement, "On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas" (March 6, 1940). The first paragraph established the rationale: "This is a time when the anti-Communist diehards of the Guomindang are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in North and Central China." The united front was the key, in Mao's view, to the social and political consolidation of the base areas under Communist Party leadership, to presenting a "democratic.. alternative more attractive than the Guomindang version elsewhere, and to the avoidance of errors of both left and right. Of the two, Mao asserted, "At the moment, the 'Left' tendency of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger.'' 60 Accordingly, Mao directed the adoption of what came to be called the "threethirds" policy. "In accordance with the united front principle concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for non-Party Left progressives, and one-third for the intermediate sections who are neither Left nor Right." This conciliatory political policy paralleled the economic policy of assuring landlords and money lenders that, after rent and interest had been reduced as required, they would in fact be paid. Mao meant these policies seriously in both the political and economic arenas, but directed that they be applied flexibly, to serve the party's ultimate objectives: increasing popular support, reducing or isolating possible adversaries, and enhancing the leadership, authority, and prestige of the Chinese Communist Party.61 This policy was most often applied to the various popular assemblies in the base areas (which were, however, sounding boards and rubber stamps rather than true decision-making bodies). Sometimes it was carried out in the less crucial agencies of the base area administration. It was never instituted in the governance of military or security affairs, and could obviously not be applied within the Party. Nevertheless, the "three-thirds" system was very successful, and reflected Mao's characteristically dialectical approach to politics. During the periods of the greatest difficulty, such as began in late 1939 and continued well past 1941, when in many ways more had to be asked of those living in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the base areas behind Japanese lines, Mao moderated the contradictions between various social classes rather than sharpening them. Contrari60. See below, the directive of March 6, 1940, pp. 432-34. 61. For a thorough description and analysis of the three-thirds system, see VanSlyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 142-53. We are here concerned with ..three-thirds" as part of the social and political consolidation of the base areas. But, coming as it did after the split with Yan Xi shan, toward the end of the "first anti-Communist upsurge," and just after publica~ lion of "On New Democracy," the policy was probably designed to counter Guomindang talk of constitutional rule. By seeming to make their own political structure more represen~ tativc and broad-based, the Communists could argue that the Guomindang should do likewise. If Chiang agreed, the Communists would benefit; if not, the Guomindang would compromise its image.

lxvi

INTRODUCTION

wise, when overall conditions improved, those contradictions could be heightened once again and a harder line could be taken.

Leadership and Party Building Leadership Almost all historians of the Chinese Communist movement, both inside and outside China, agree that at the Sixth Plenum Mao Zedong achieved a higher degree of leadership and authority than ever before, and that between the Rectification (Zhengfeng) Movement of 1942 and the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 he was elevated to virtual cultic status. 62 Although within this general consensus there are some disagreements over emphasis, timing, and detail, the years 1939-1941 are recognized as a crucially important link in the process by which Mao strengthened his own leadership and sought to build a Party based on his vision. This process involved, first, the elaboration and elevation of his own "thought"; second, the building of a powerful coalition committed to him, doctrinally and organizationally; third, the acquiescence in his leadership by former and potential rivals; and, fourth, the propagation and inculcation of his particular vision. Although Mao had moved to the fore by late 1938, he had not yet completely won over or neutralized his former rivals and he had not yet fully demonstrated in action the superiority of his policy lines to alternative possibilities. In part, Mao was constrained by his stress on Party unity (under his own leadership, of course). His efforts to pursue this goal would be undercut by excessive emphasis on the mistakes and the misguided leadership of the past. Since many of his supporters-Wang Jiaxiang and Zhou Enlai among them-had only been recruited to his side fairly recently, a partisan approach would alienate them, not draw them closer to him. But caution also grew out of Mao's ambivalence toward the Communist International. On the one hand, Stalin's (and the International's) recognition of Mao as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party was a major asset in the consolidation of his leadership. But that recognition and the Sixth Plenum "did not eliminate differences with the Soviet Union or alter the legal, and in some respects the still 62. Among the more significant English-language reconstructions of Mao's path to leadership are the following (in alphabetical order): Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse; Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse·tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Shum Kui-Kwong, The Chinese Communists' Rise to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United f"rvnt ( 19.15-1945) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Frederick C.

Teiwes, The Formation of the Maoist Leadership, From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1994) (hereafter Teiwes, Formation); and Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism. See also Commentaries F and Gin Tony Saich (ed.), The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996) (hereafter Saich, Rise to Power).

INTRODUCTION

lxvii

practical, subordinate relationship of Yan'an to Moscow." 63 Mao could not denounce Wang Ming's "second left line" (1932-1935) and other errors of the past without also criticizing, explicitly or by implication, the Comintern, which had designed and endorsed them. Mao recognized that the Soviet Union and the International still carried much prestige within the Chinese Communist Party, and he w~s unwilling to jeopardize the kiss on the cheek he had so recently obtained from the International. Nevertheless, Mao continued efforts characterized by Teiwes as "both prudent and relentless, developing a pattern of pushing forward his political programme at every opportunity but avoiding fracturing the carefully nurtured consensus which would mark his actions up to the Seventh Congress."64 Both Mao's prudence and his relentlessness are manifested in his editorial of October 4, 1939, for the first issue of The Communist, a new inner-Party periodical. Characterizing the united front, armed struggle, and Party building as "the three magic weapons" of the Communist Party in defeating the enemies of the revolution, Mao placed the main emphasis in this article on the third of these weapons, Party building. The construction of "a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally" was, he declared, imperative for the victory of the revolution. "We are now," he added, "in the process of building such a Party." Prudently, he dated the defeat of "Left" opportunism from the Fourth Plenum of 1928, at which a dominant role was played by the returned students from Moscow, as well as from the Zunyi conference of 1935, which saw a tactical alliance between Mao and members of the International faction. But he relentlessly hammered home the point that many of the Party's earlier defeats stemmed from "lack of understanding of integrating the theory of MarxismLeninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution"-in other words, because they had failed to carry out the "Sinification of Marxism" which Mao had been advocating since 1938. There must be, he said, a thorough review of the CCP's "eighteen years of experience."65 About a year later, in an important directive dated December 25, 1940, during the so-called "second anti-Communist upsurge;· when armed conflict between Communist and Guomindang troops had escalated seriously in Central China and the vulnerability of New Fourth Army detachments south of the Yangzi was well understood, Mao insisted that the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But some of our Party's cadres still do not realize that the Party's present policy must be fundamentally different from its policy during the Civil War. It must be understood that in no circumstances will the Party change its united front policy for the entire period of the

63. Teiwes, fOrmation, p. 31. 64. Tciwcs, Formation, p. 10. 65. Sec below, the translation of"lntroducing 1he Communist," October 4, 1939, pp. 244-54.

lxviii

INTRODUCTION

War of Resistance against Japan, and that many of the policies adopted during the Soviet period cannot be duplicated again. In particular, many ultra-Left policies of the latter Soviet period are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then ... 66

This may have been Mao's answer to Wang Ming's reissuance in July 1940 of The Two Lines, originally published in 1931, under the new and provocative title of Strive for the Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party. In the new preface, Wang had sought to exculpate himself: "No true dialectical and historical materialist can deal with a problem apart from the conditions of a certain time and place. He cannot regard what was correct yesterday as entirely wrong today, nor decide what is incorrect today could not have been right yesterday.'-67 This weakly defensive rationalization was clearly not acceptable to Mao, who had already made plain in his editorial of October 1939 that "Bolshevization" meant following his line. But by this time, Wang Ming had lost all power within the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party. He had already expressed in unmistakably ritualistic language his praise of Mao, he had been removed as director of the United Front Work Department, and he had been appointed principal of the Women's University in Yan'an. Mao could afford to take his time and to encapsulate his repudiation of Wang's version of the past in a statement of current policy. Later, of course, he would confront Wang Ming's history directly and crush it in the most powerful and dismissive language possible. The latter months of 1940 and the first months of 1941 were taken up substantially with the military and political crisis between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, which peaked with the New Fourth Army incident of January 1941. But, later in that year, Mao returned forcefully to his reconstruction of Party history, perhaps feeling he could do so as the twin crises of capitulation and civil war eased, then faded into the background. This reconstruction was inseparable, of course, from Mao's concern with the inculcation of his theory, standpoint, and methodology among Party members more generally. The fact that he felt ready, by the middle of 1941, to take on these tasks suggests that he had sufficient confidence in his own authority and prestige within the Party to carry them out. But it also implies that his "thought" was now sufficiently "unified"-embracing domains from Marxist theory through the history of China and of the Communist Party to military strategy, politics, and social policy, right down to fact-finding investigation at the local level-to form a coherent, comprehensive, and communicable ideology. So far as Party history and Mao's position within that history was concerned,

66. "Directive of the Central Committee on Policy in the Current Situation." December 25, 1940, pp. 594-{>()3. In Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 441-49, as "On Policy." 67. Wylie, Emergence, p. 133.

INTRODUCTION

lxix

the two most significant statements were "Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism" (September 10, 1941) and, above all, "In Refutation of the Third 'Left' Line" (precise date uncertain; probably October 1941 ). 68 The first of these texts represents Mao's opening remarks to an Enlarged Politburo Plenum held between September 10 and October 22, 1941, and the second was also laid before that gathering. This plenum, Mao himself recognized, was the most important formal meeting of Party leaders since the Sixth Plenum, exactly three years earlier. and it shows how much progress he had made in the consolidation and recognition of his leadership during this period. Teiwes notes that these meetings have been "a relatively neglected event in accounts of Mao's rise ... [but) the importance of the occasion can be seen in the developments which emerged from it." He goes on to detail them: the establishment of a senior cadres study group within the Centre led by Mao and Wang Jiaxiang, a measure normal1y regarded as the beginning of the rectification campaign; the reorganization of the Central Pany School with Mao, Ren Bishi and Peng Zhen now taking control; the setting up of a "coe1mittee to clean up past history," the start of a three and a half year process culminating in the Historical Resolution; the subsequent publication of"Since the Sixth Congress," the basic materials for high-level cadre study of Party history during rectification; the setting up of a "white area work review committee" under Mao to review historical experience in underground work; and (most likely) the creation of a "cadre screening committee" under Kang Sheng. 69 Party Building

Most accounts of Mao's rise to power within the Chinese Communist Party focus on factional and ideological struggle at or near the top. Certainly. these matters concerned Mao profoundly. But Party building at middle and lower levels and among the rank and file also mattered deeply to him. When the War of Resistance began in 1937, the Chinese Communist Parly claimed about 40,000 members, while its regular, full-time armies numbered perhaps 80,000. But during the first years of the war, both organizations experienced meteoric expansion, a "storm expansion" called for by the Party to meet the escalating demands of war. base-area construction, quasi-legalization throughout Guomindang-controlled areas, and so on. By early 1940, the Party had grown roughly twentyfold, to nearly 800,000; the regular armies (not counting local

68. Both texts arc translated below. pp. 808-911 and 826-32. 69. Teiwes. Formalion. p. II. Teiwes claims (p. 13), however. that "everything did not go completely Mao's way·• in this conference. Still at issue was when the "third left line" began. Mao wanted an earlier date that would make Wang Ming the principal culprit; other comrades-including Wang himsclr. or course-prcrcrrcd to date it rrom September 1931. after Wang's departure for Moscow.

lxx

INTRODUCflON

units and part-time militia) to approximately 500,000-'0 This growth was a striking success, but it entailed serious problems. Even if all those who had been Party members in 1937 survived these first years of the war, which was surely not the case, these numbers show that more than 95 percent of Party members in 1940 were newcomers to the Party, with less than three years'

experience. Moreover. these recent recruits came in every shape and size, from every sort of social background: writers and intellectuals from Shanghai, educated students exiled by the war from the eastern cities, schoolteachers from xian towns, influential villagers and their offspring, landlords, poor and middle peasants, layabouts and town toughs, members of local brotherhoods, secret societies, and bandit gangs. At least two-thirds were functionally or totally illiterate, even more at the village level. Although efforts were made to screen these new Party members, such pell-mell growth carried on under wartime pressures meant that not a few unsuitable, undesirable, or downright dangerous persons (for example, Guomindang agents or opportunists) found their way into the Party. But even the well-intentioned and committed had much to learn, from Marxist ideology to nationalism and war-time policy, from the history of the Party to the current situation, from organizational structure to the nuts and bolts of organizational life and obligation in the performance of daily tasks; many had to learn how to read and write. Above all, these heterogeneous recruits had to be socialized, to submerge or transcend their individual differences, and to internalize their new identity as creatively obedient elements within a cohesive and disciplined revolutionary organization. As late as December 1939, Mao Zedong (in the name of the Central Committee) was still calling for the Party to recruit large numbers of intellectuals, in a statement deemed important enough for inclusion in the Selected Works. Countering a pervasive tendency in the Party, the army, and training institutes to be suspicious of the social class background and commitment of intellectuals, Mao claims that "our Party and our army have already developed a hard core of well-tested cadres and are thus capable of leading the intellectuals. And such failures have given rise to erroneous tendencies on the question of intellectuals." He goes on to demand that All Party organizations in the war areas and all army units led by the Party should recruit large numbers of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals into our army, training institutes, and organs of government. We should use various ways and means to recruit all intellectuals and semi-imel/ectuals who are willing to fight Japan

70. Sec Lyman P. Van Slyke. "The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-

Japanese War. 1937-1945." in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (eds.). The Cambridge 1/istory of China. Vol. 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). pp. 61921. The figures ror Party and army should not be added together, since many army men were simultaneously Party members. Perhaps one-third of the armed forces had some sort of pany affiliation: regular, probationary. or prospective.

INTRODUCTION

lxxi

and who are fairly loyal, hard-working, and able to endure hardship; we should give them political education and help them to temper themselves in war and work and to serve the army, the government, and the masses; and taking each

case on its merits, we should admit into the Party those who measure up to the requirements of Party membership. As for those who do not qualify or do not wish to join the Party, we should have good working relations with them and give them guidance in their work with us.7 1 Nevertheless, available data show that Party membership leveled off in 1940 and remained at or near 800,000 until a second growth spurt in 1944 and 1945, during the last phase of the war-an expansive period for the CCP after the rigors of the middle war years-in preparation for the Seventh Party Congress and the postwar contest with the Guomindang. Throughout these three years, Mao Zedong often expresses his concerns about the training and socialization of new Party members and soliders. Sometimes he addresses these concerns directly, but they also appear in many of his statements on social, political, economic, and military affairs. In these statements and in other materials from these years, we can see at least three strands, overlapping and interrelated but distinguishable, that by mid-1941 are flowing together. These are (a) straightforward cadre education: MarxismLeninism, history of the Chinese revolution, organizational structure, organizational behavior, specific task-oriented military or political training, even basic literacy; (b) the construction and propagation of the Maoist vision of the Chinese revolution, so central to the establishment of Mao's own ideological and organizational primacy, and hence both to the final elimination of rivals and to the conversion of colleagues into disciples; and (c) the need for interiorization and psychological reconstruction at both individual and group levels, so that Party members would not only know, in formal and intellectual ways, what Mao and the leadership wanted them to know, but beyond that would internalize, embody, and use as guides to action what Mao repeatedly called the standpoint, viewpoint, and methods which combined the abstract truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution. Although no strict periodization is possible, Mao seems more concerned with the first two strands during 1939 and 1940. These first two strands are seen in the cadre education movement of 1939 and 1940, which Mao supported but came to feel did not go far enough or reach deeply enough. One of Mao's most important statements during this period, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (December 15, 1939), was specifically intended as "a textbook, written jointly by Comrade Mao Zedong and several other comrades in Yan'an." The first chapter, "Chinese Society," was drafted by others

71. "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting Intellectuals," December I, 1939, pp. 262-64.

lxxii

INTRODUCTION

and revised by Mao. Mao himself wrote the second chapter, ''The Chinese Revolution." A third chapter, "Party Building," was never finished, perhaps because it raised issues and controversies upon which Mao was not yet quite ready to place his distinctive stamp.12 Apter and Saich list forty-four cadre schools established in the Shaanxi-GansuNingxia Border Region between 1935 and 1945 (four of them set up before the outbreak of the war). Of these forty-four, half-twenty-two-were founded during the three years under review here. They range from the Workers' College to the Chinese Women's University (of which Wang Ming was appointed the first principal) to the Minorities Academy and the Military Affairs Academy. 73 This educational system, Wylie observes, "gave Mao the means to exercise a degree of ideological control that had never been possible before. It was this educational system that was to serve as the incubator for Mao's Rectification Movement of 1942-43."74 The third strand-holistic integration of empirical investigation, concrete policies, regional tactics, revolutionary strategy, and the general principles of Marxism-Leninism creatively applied to concrete Chinese realities, what Saich and Apter call the "single discourse"-appears more and more forcefully during 1941. A large number of writings address various interrelated aspects of this discourse. The "Preface and Postscript to Rural Surveys" (March 17 and April 19, 194 I. pp. 70S-IO and 719-21 below) stress the need for detailed, hands-on, on-the-spot investigation. "Without investigation, there is no right to speak." The implications were clear: Mao had carried out many investigations; his rivals, on the whole, had not. In a speech to high-level cadres in Yan'an on May 19, 1941, entitled "Reform Our Study:• Mao inveighed against both subjectivism (following one's own hunches) and dogmatism (following a mechanical and literal Marxism-Leninism). He deplored the fact that "many comrades seem to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the sake of study, not for the sake of the practice of the Chinese revolution." in an obvious attack on the returned students, he mocked "Seventeen- and eighteenyear-old babies who nibble on Das Kapital and the Anti-Diihring," but show no interest in China's problems. Not surprisingly. this text would be published only in early 1942, after the launching of the Rectification campaign. A "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party Spirit," dated July I, 1941, addresses a constellation of problems arising from the fact that our environment is one of the countryside, and one of guerrilla warfare where

separate and independent activities have been going on and will stay so for a long 72. See Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 153-54. and also the note to this essay in Selected Works. Vol. II, p. 305. 73. See the Appendix in Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, pp. 335-36. 74. Wylie, Emergence, p. 60.

INTRODUCTION

lxxiii

time, and the small producers and inte11ectuals make up a large proportion of the Party membership: factors that tend to give rise to ..egoism," "heroism," "state of non-organization," ..assertion of independence," and ..decentralism" among some Party members .... Should we allow these tendencies to develop, they would undermine the Party's unified intention, action, and discipline, might generate the organization of small groups and factional conflicts, and even go so far as to oppose the Party, bringing tremendous damage to the Party and the revolution. 75

Training, discipline, and, above all, "the weapon of self-criticism" and thorough study are prescribed. All cadres should adopt a style of work which is "selfless. faithful and honest, simple in way of life, hard-working, down-to-earth, practical and realistic, and watchful against arrogance and shallowness. The habit of completely separating theory from practice, and study from work, must be transformed." On August I, 1941, the Central Committee adopted a "Resolution on Investigation and Study" which had been drafted by Mao 76 This is a detailed statement of perspectives, procedures, and practices in the process of carrying out empirical investigations, which are prescribed for all Party members. Together with several communications with Xie Juezai during the ensuing two weeks, it forms the background of investigations carried out by Mao himself, published in December 1942 as Economic and Financial Problems. " 17 On September 10, 1941, as noted above, Mao Zedong made, in his opening address to a protracted and crucial meeting of the Politburo, his most explicit attack to date on the returned students. In this text, entitled "Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism," he denounced the "subjectivists" who claimed to represent the "international line" as "sham Marxists," and declared that their "leftist" tendency had been even more harmful than that of Li Lisan. "Hitherto," he asserted, "the line of the Party for the period of more than three years from 1932 to December 1935 has never been summed up. Now we must prepare to summarize it at the Seventh Congress." Because of the difficulties created by the war and by China's internal situation, the Seventh Congress would not meet until 1945, but Mao was

75. This resolution appears in several volumes of Mao's writings issued during the Cultural Revolution period and is reproduced in the Supplements to Mao l..edong ji. It is summarized at some length in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 310, although it is not explicitly attributed to Mao there. It is, however, highly consistent with the tone and thrust of his known writings of this period, and it seems unlikely that such a resolution, explicitly labeled as having been issued on the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, would have been adopted at this time without his participation and agreement. We have therefore included it among the materials translated in this volume. Sec below, pp. 766--68. 76. See below, pp. 783-85. For Mao's role, sec Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 315-16. 77. This text is available in Andrew Watson (trans. and ed.), Mao 7..edong and the Political Economy of the Border Region: A Translation of Mao's Economic and Financial Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. J980). Watson's translation will be reproduced in Volume VIII of our edition.

lxxiv INTRODUCTION

determined to move ahead in settling accounts with those who had dominated the Party during the Jiangxi period. To this end, he called for "creative Marxism;• meaning obviously Sinified Marxism, but also for the "Marxification of the rich reality of the Chinese revolution."78 On September 13, 1941, Mao addressed a group of women in Yan'an engaged in studying the lives of women regarding the techniques of investigations in the countryside. 79 This prescriptive set of instructions rather systematically reiterated much that he had previously said. But here in this more informal setting. Mao allowed himself to become quite nostalgic about his own experiences during the 1920s and, especially, the 1930s, when he carried out investigations in Xingguo, Xunwu, and elsewhere. These experiences obviously carried much personal meaning for him and were not simply exercises in applied ideology. Much more formal were the "Decision of the Central Committee Regarding High-Level Study Groups" (September 26, 1941), and ''To the Central Research Group and the High-Level Research Groups" (September 29, 1941; see below, pp. 819-21). The first of these two documents directs that high-level cadres (ranks specified) in the Party, army, and government establish small study groups: The method used shall be the unity of theory and practice. The first term will last half a year, which will be devoted to the study ofthe models ofthinking of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and the twenty-year history of our Party as the two topics. Subsequently, other questions with regard to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and China's revolution will be studied, for the purpose of overcoming erroneous thinking (subjectivist and formalist) and developing revolutionary theory.... This study shall proceed under the condition that the major tasks for which the respective comrades are responsible are not hindered. In addition to studying a collection of seventy Party documents covering the period since the Sixth Congress of I 928, compiled by Mao and Wang Jiaxiang, the letter of September 29 called for the study of theory, with an emphasis on methods ofthought. It listed four items under this heading, including translations ofLenin's Left- Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder and of two Soviet works on dialectical materialism, as well as the introduction to An Outline of Economics by the Japanese Marxist Kawakami Hajime.so The two documents dated September 26 and 29 were presented at the Enlarged Plenum (September IO-October 22, I94I) discussed in the previous section of this introduction. With good reason, an authoritative chronology of the war years 78. See below the text of Mao's speech of September 10, 1941, pp. 808-11. 79. Sec below, "Concerning Investigations in the Countryside," September 13, 1941, pp. 812-17. 80. For a concise account of the compilation of the volume entitled Liuda yilai (Since the Sixth Congress), under Mao's direction, and the significance of this work, see Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, p. 276.

INTRODUCTION

/""'

lists the major themes taken up on this occasion and states that "this was in fact a Rectification meeting."81 Thus, we can see the Rectification campaign of 1942-1943 just over the horizon, and we know it will interweave seamlessly the three strands described above. Of the twenty Chinese documents compiled in 1942 for inclusion in the official corpus of study materials for this campaign, eight were written during the three years covered by the present volume. 82 By contrast, only three documents come from any time prior to 1939. The remainder were written in 1942 or later, specifically for the purposes of the Rectification campaign. It is thus apparent that much of what we consider distinctive about the Maoist and Chinese Communist approach both to the content and to the style of political education took shape during the 1939-1941 period. Conclusion During the years from 1939 to 1941, Mao had thus achieved increasing acceptance for his line in all four of the domains discussed in this introduction: antiimperialism and the conduct of the war against Japan, relations with the Guomindang, the building of territorial and social bases, and the definition of orthodoxy within the Party. The title of our edition, Mao's Road to Power, is meant to evoke the conquest of power in China by the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Zedong. It could, however, also be understood as referring to Mao's own road to supremacy in the Party. At the end of 1941, he was poised to make decisive advances, during the next few years, toward both of these objectives.

81. Party History Training and Research Institute at the Central Party School in Beijing (comp.), Zhongguo gongchandang kang-Ri zhanzheng .shiqi dashiji (Chronicle of Major Events Concerning the Chinese Communist Party During the Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan), (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1988), p. 303. 82. An English translation of these materials is conveniently available in Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44 (Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 1952). (This edition is complete except for six articles translated from the Russian, by Stalin, Lenin. and Dimitrov, which Compton omiued because they were already available in English.) The eight documents dating from the 19391941 period include four by Mao, three by Liu Shaoqi, and one by Chen Yun.

Note on Sources and Conventions This edition of Mao Zedong's writings in English translation aims to serve a dual audience, comprising not only China specialists, but those interested in Mao from other perspectives. In terms of content and presentation, we have done our best to make it useful and accessible to both these groups. Scope. This is a complete edition, in the sense that it will include a translation of every item of which the Chinese text can be obtained. It cannot be absolutely complete, because some materials are still kept under tight control in the archives of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation has, however, changed dramatically since Mao's death, as a result of the publication in China, either openly or for restricted circulation (neibu), of a number of important texts. Although the Zhong yang wenxian yanjiushi (Department for Research on Party Literature), which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for the publication of Mao's writings, has always disclaimed any intention of producing his complete pre-1949 works, it appeared at one time that an edition containing a very full selection was in fact on the way, at least for a part of his early career. An advertising leaflet dated December 20, 1988, announced the appearance, in the spring of 1989, of two volumes, Mao Zedong zaoqi zhuzuo ji (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong from the Early Period), and Jiandang he da geming shiqi Mao Zedong zhuzuo ji (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong during the Period of Establishing the Party and of the Great Revolution [of 1924-1927]), and invited advance orders for both volumes. The events of June 4, 1989,led first to the postponement of publication, and then to the decision to issue only the first of these volumes, for internal circulation, under the new title of Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao, /912.6-/920./ I (Draft Writings by Mao Zedong for the Early Period, June 1912-November 1920). Prior to June 1989, further volumes in a similar format were in preparation. These plans have now been set aside, and no complete Chinese edition can be expected unless there is a radical change in the political situation. But, as forecast in Volume I, the corpus of available materials has now been substantially expanded by the publication in Beijing of two major series to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Mao's birth. These are the Mao Zedong wenji (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), of which the first two volumes, for the years 1921-1942, appeared in December 1993; three more, covering the period 1943September 1949 came out in August 1996; and three volumes, for the years 1949-1975, in 1999. A six-volume edition of Mao's military writings, Mao Zedong junshi wenji (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), published in December 1993, also contains an abundance of new materials, many of which are not of purely military interest. lxxvii

lxxviii

NOTE ON SOURCE:S AND CONVENTIONS

Sources. Despite the appearance of these two important collections, there is still no complete, or nearly complete, Chinese edition of Mao's writings from December 1920 onward. This and all subsequent volumes of our edition must therefore be drawn from a variety of materials. The twenty volumes of the Mao Zedong ji (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) and the Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong. Supplement), edited by Professor Takeuchi Minoru and published in Tokyo in the 1970s and 1980s still constitute the most important single collection of Mao's pre-1949 writings available outside China. (For details on this, and other sources cited below, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Apart from the Selected Works of the 1950s (discussed below), other official Chinese editions of Mao's works, especially the two centenary series described above, contain a large number of important new items. The various specialized volumes issued in the 1980s to commemorate Mao's ninetieth birthday also provide useful materials from the pre-1949 period. Those drawn on in this volume include Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong), and Mao Zedong xinwen zhuzuo wenxuan (Selected Materials Regarding Mao Zedong's Journalistic Work), both of which appeared in 1983. As already indicated, all of these recent publications of the Party center are selective. Fortunately, we have been able to supplement them with materials drawn from an extremely wide range of sources, including contemporary newspapers and periodicals, individual texts published in China for restricted circulation, and facsimiles of handwritten materials. Information regarding the source we have followed is given in an unnumbered footnote at the beginning of each text. We have also included in these source notes information about the first publication, or the earliest known version, of the writing in question, whenever available. To avoid ambiguity, all works referred to in these notes are designated by their Chinese titles, sometimes in a shortened version. (For indications regarding short titles, and for full bibliographical details regarding all works cited, including those mentioned above, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Other things being equal, we have very often referred the reader who wishes to consult the Chinese text to the Mao Zedong ji and the Bujuan whenever the item in question appears there, because this series offers the convenience of a large quantity of materials in compact form. There are, however, many instances in which the version contained in recent official Chinese publications is more accurate or more complete, and we have accordingly taken it as the basis for our translation. In such cases, the nature of the more significant differences is indicated in notes to the text in question, but we have not sought to show the variants systematically. That has been done only in dealing with changes made in the original text of Mao's writings when they were revised for inclusion in the official edition of his Selected Works. Variants. While there are some differences between the various versions of

NOTE ON SOURCES AND CONVENTIONS

lxxix

texts by Mao published in the 1930s and 1940s, these are on the whole minor. Systematic revision of his pre-1949 writings was undenaken only from 1950 onward, in preparing the four-volume edition of the Mao Zedong xuanji, translated into English as the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. This problem did not arise in our Volume I, because its coverage ended in 1920, and the earliest item in the Selected Works is the "Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society;• written in 1925. Apart from this text, Volume II contained the well-known "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" of February 1927. Volumes III and IV each included four texts of this kind, Volume V included six, and in Volume VI, there were a dozen. In the present volume there are thirteen, including "Introducing The Communist," and "On New Democracy." Much ink has been spilled regarding the question of which version of the texts included in the official canon is more authentic, or more authoritative. Despite the passions formerly aroused by this issue, the answer seems rather obvious. For purposes of the historical record, only the text as originally written (when it is available) can tell us what Mao actually said in the 1920s and thereafter. For the study of Mao Zedong's thought, both versions have their uses in documenting how his ideas evolved over time. For purposes of defining ideological onhodoxy under the People's Republic, the Selected Works version is, of course, the ultimate standard. In any case, the purpose of this edition is not to lay down which was the "real" Mao, but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life, and the revised texts which were produced in the 1950s under Mao's close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of this edition, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner: I. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version

of the text in question. 2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in the Xuanji are printed in italics. 3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao, or under his authority, in the 1950s, are shown in the footnotes. The Mao Zedong ji indicates meticulously all changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation or style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunctionyu by the more colloquial he, both meaning "and"). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgement is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repeti-

tion in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out of account variants we regarded as trivial. In footnotes of this kind, the words that appear before the arrow reproduce enough of the original text to identify what has been changed. The words that

lxxx NOTE ON SOURCES AND CONVENTIONS

appear after the arrow correspond to what has been added or revised in the Xuanji. Because, in the rewriting of the 1950s, sentences and whole passages have often been substantially recast, it would take up far too much space, and make our text unreadable, to show every variant in detail. In some instances, it has been possible to show the new version in the form of complete sentences, but frequently we include only enough of the new wording to make plain the main thrust of the changes. Because the official translation of the Selected Works has been available for nearly half a century, and has been widely quoted in the literature, we have taken this version as our starting-point, but have modified or corrected it as we judged appropriate, both to improve the accuracy of the translation and to bring it into conformity with the conventions adopted in this edition. In those few instances where other materials in this book had already been published in English, we have made our own translations, comparing them subsequently with existing versions. Annotation. So that any attentive reader will be able to follow the details of Mao's argument in each case, we have assumed no knowledge of anything relating to China. Persons, institutions, places, and events are briefly characterized at the point where Mao first refers to them. Some individuals of secondary importance, especially those who appear only as names in a long list, are not included in the notes. We have also kept to a minimum annotations regarding people or events in the West. Despite these limitations, the reader will soon discover that the personages who appear in these pages are as numerous as the characters in a traditional Chinese novel. To keep the notes within reasonable compass, we have generally restricted those regarding Mao's contemporaries to their lives down to the period covered by each volume. To make it easier to locate information, references have been inserted indicating where the first note about a given individual appears in the

volume. or in previous volumes. In most biographical notes dates of birth and death, separated by a hyphen, are given immediately after the name. A blank following the hyphen should, in principle, signify that the person in question is still living. In the case of individuals born at the beginning of the twentieth century, this is obviously unlikely, but in some instances even the editors working in Beijing have not been able to ascertain the facts. We have done our best to fill these gaps, but have not always succeeded. It should not be assumed that all those born ninety or more years ago for whom no second date is given are already dead; some of them are in fact very much alive as of today. As pointed out in Volumes III and IV, Mao's writings regarding military operations for the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet periods contain references to an extremely large number of places, many of them of no particular significance. To annotate all of the place names mentioned would have imposed an intolerable burden on the printer, and on the reader. We therefore provided notes regarding

NOTE ON SOURCES AND CONVENTIONS

lxxxi

geography. or the terrain, only in exceptional cases. At that time, however, the action took place primarily in a relatively limited area of Jiangxi, Fujian, and neighboring provinces, so it was possible to include in those volumes maps showing the principal localities mentioned by Mao, in order to facilitate the understanding of the text. Because of the extremely extensive area in which the Red Army operated both during and after the Long March, the succeeding volumes would have required a large number of maps to cover the terrain in sufficient detail, and we must therefore refer the reader to an atlas of China-preferably one showing the place-names in use before 1949. The introductions to the volumes in this series should be considered in a very real sense as an extension of the notes. These texts will, we hope, help readers unfamiliar with Mao Zedong, or with twentieth-century China, find their ow11 way through Mao's writings of the pre-1949 period. Any controversial or provocative statements which they may contain are intended to stimulate retlection, not to impose a particular interpretation on the reader. This is a collection of historical source material, not a volume of interpretation. Use of Chinese terms. On the whole, we have sought to render all Chinese expressions into accurate and readable English, but in some cases it has seemed simpler and less ambiguous to use the Chinese word. These instances include, to begin with, zi (courtesy name) and hao (literary name). Because both Mao, and the authors he cited, frequently employ these alternative appellations instead of the ming or given name of the individual to whom they are referring, information regarding them is essential to the intelligence ofthe text. The English word "style" is sometimes used here, but because it may stand either for zi or for hao, it does not offer a satisfactory solution. The Chinese terms have, in any case, long been used in Western-language biographical dictionaries of China, as well as in Chinese works.

Similarly, in the case of second or provincial-level, and third or metropolitan-level graduates of the old examination system, we have chosen to use the Chinese terms, respectively juren and jinshi. We have also preferred xian to "county" for the administrative subdivision which constituted the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy, and still exists in China today. Apart from the Western connotations of "county," there is the problem that xian is also often translated "district" (as in the expression "district magistrate"), and "district" itself is ambiguous in the Chinese context. We have also preferred to use the Chinese word li rather than to translate "Chinese league" (or simply "league"), or to give the equivalent in miles or kilometers. Presentation. In the first five volumes of this series. Mao's writings were arranged in a single chronological series, according to the date of composition. The only exception to this pattern occured in Volume IV, where the forty laws to which Mao had put his signature as the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic appeared in an appendix, and in a smaller type face, because it seemed unlikely that he had actually written these documents himself. In Volume VI, the diverse na-

L=ii NOTE ON SOURCES AND CONVENTIONS

ture of the materials included made it seem appropriate to arrange the texts by category. This is not the case to the same degree with the present volume, but we have once again placed very brief notes and inscriptions which are neither lengthy enough nor important enough to justify presenting them individually in a separate category at the end of the volume. As already indicated, we have tried to tum Mao's Chinese into good English. At the same time, since this is a work of reference, we have sometimes followed Mao in directions which do not accord with English usage. Mao frequently emphasized words or phrases by placing dots or circles next to each of the characters involved. In this edition, the corresponding text has been set in bold. Usually we have also added a note explicitly pointing this out, but it should be clearly stated that all such highlighting is Mao's, not ours. Also, some of the Chinese texts we have translated contain omissions, because the editors in Tokyo, or even those in Beijing, did not have access to a complete version of the document in question, or could not read a few characters. When the number of missing characters is small, each one is commonly represented in the printed Chinese text by a hollow square occupying the space which would normally be taken up by a single character. In our English version, each such square has been represented by the symbol [X], so the reader of the translation can see how much is missing. Where the gap is a long one, we have dispensed with this procedure, and conveyed the necessary information in a footnote. Finally, like many Chinese writers, Mao tended to produce very long paragraphs, sometimes extending to several pages. Although this may seem monotonous to the English reader, we have generally followed his paragraphing exactly, because it must be presumed to reflect Mao's own sense of where the crucial turning points in his argument are to be found. We have not followed this pattern rigidly; on occasion massive blocks of text containing figures and other data have been turned into tables which are easier to follow. For the most part, however, the translations in this volume seek to reproduce Mao's original in form as well as in

substance.

- - - - - - - - - P a r t I: T e x t s - - - - - - - - -

--------1939--------

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

In addition, a part of the Eighth Route Ann y-our rear detachments-has guarded the Yellow River and is now ready to counter the enemy attack on the Northwest in coordination with friendly forces from the Northwest. All these accomplishments of the Eighth Route Army are there for all to see; they are recognized by all except the reactionary Trotskyists, the pro-Japanese faction of Wang Jingwei, and certain diehards wedded to the past. On the side of the enemy, not only do they dare not look down upon the Eighth Route Army but there is abundant evidence to show that they are increasingly fearful of the Eighth Route Anny. The Eighth Route Army men are ready to fight to the end and sacrifice their lives for the defense of our motherland. Evidence of their dedication and their invincibility is visible to the entire nation and the entire world; no one will dispute this except the reactionaries, the pro-Japanese elements, and certain diehards. Reports in this regard, both detailed and sketchy, by Chinese and foreign journalists, observers, and travelers have been published one after another. It is certainly not accidental that all unprejudiced people are willing to study the experience of the Eighth Route Army. Is the existence and development of the Eighth Route Army, with the Communists as its mainstay, beneficial or harmful to the Chinese nation? If people do raise such a question, we have only one answer for them: All those who believe that it is "harmful" are necessarily those who, in fact, do not want to see the War of Resistance triumph and spread rumors which directly assist the enemy. What is the source of these achievements of the Eighth Route Army? It lies in the correct leadership of the upper levels, the valor of the officers and men, the support from the people, and the coordination with the friendly forces-these are the four reasons why the Eighth Route Army has been able to record such accomplishments. Among them, the coordination of the allied armies is plain to see. Without the courageous War of Resistance of the main forces against the enemy on the front, the successful unfolding of the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear would have been impossible; without the support from the friendly forces also stationed in the enemy's rear, such great achievements would also have been impossible. The officers and men of the Eighth Route Army should be grateful to the friendly forces for their direct and indirect cooperation in fighting, and especially to those officers and men of the allied armies who have offered us all kinds of well-intentioned assistance and sincere encouragement. In the face ofthe common enemy, the armies of China bear one another no old grudge and have become close friends who help and support each other. This is the foundation which guarantees that China absolutely cannot perish. In former times, people said, "He who reads Zhuge's memorial on his military expedition and fails to shed tears is certainly not loyal; he who reads Li Mi's appeal to the emperor and fails to shed tears is certainly not filial." 3 Today we should say, "He who sees or hears how China's annies, 3. Zhuge Liang (181-234), zi Kongming, was the prime minister of the Shu Handynasty during the period of the Three Kingdoms (early to mid-third century); the memorial mentioned here figures in the novel regarding this era, the Romance ofthe Three Kingdoms. Li Mi (222-?) declined appointment as equeny to the heir apparent in a memorial pleading his duty to his aged grandmother, who had cared for him in his youth.

JANUARY /939

7

forgetful of old enmities and mutually supporting one another, have intimately united and is not moved is certainly not a patriot." Should not those who are "making personal fortunes out of the national disaster, and living off the friction [between parties and factions]" engage in a bit of self-examination at this time? Does the Eighth Route Army have shortcomings? Yes, it does, and not a few. First, it is poor in equipment and technology in comparison with the enemy and also with some of the friendly forces. This is a fundamental defect of the Eighth Route Army and of China's armies in general. Consequently, how to improve its technology and equipment in order to defeat the enemy has become a serious task for the Eighth Route Army in the new phase of the War of Resistance. Second, the Eighth Route Army is well known for its guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, but some cadres do not know enough about the strategy and tactics for resisting Japan. Ordinary cadres, especially those recently promoted, have not yet made an initial study of the management and command of the new-style modern armies. Some cadres of worker and peasant origin have not yet solved the problem of raising their cultural level to the necessary extent. To solve these problems has become the number two task for the Eighth Route Army. Third, to consolidate and enlarge the national united front is the overall orientation for achieving victory in the War of Resistance and in building up the country, and the cadres of the Eighth Route Army have achieved great success in this, but some cadres, especially the new cadres, are lacking in an understanding of the united front, and, in some areas, they have done poorly in working together with the friendly parties and armies, and in adjusting the relationships between different social strata for the benefit of the War of Resistance. As a result, strengthening our education in the policy ofthe united front has become an important task. Fourth, the Eighth Route Army has long made it one of the three main tasks of its political work to win over the enemy and puppet soldiers and has achieved remarkable results in this. Nevertheless, a lot remains to be done in teaching spoken and written Japanese to soldiers and cadres in general, and in developing various methods to make them better able to do propaganda among the enemy rank and file and the lower-level officers about opposition to the war of aggression and about the united front. The successes in winning over the Mongolian puppet troops have been relatively great, but there is still room for improvement. Here, it is extremely important to collect and study all possible information about the enemy and puppet troops, but what has been achieved has not been as much as required. Fifth, one of the most difficult problems in a long-term War of Resistance will be the problem of finance and the economy. This is a difficult problem for the War of Resistance in the whole country, as well as for the Eighth Route Army, and we must raise our level of understanding of it. This problem has already attracted the attention of certain sectors of the Eighth Route Army, but not of the Eighth Route Army as a whole. In each and every antiJapanese base area, not only must we see that correct local financial and economic policies are carried out as we have done before, but we must put forth the task for the army to take part in actual production, on condition that it does not interfere with military operations. In more or less consolidated base areas, the combat forces

8 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

will take care of the fighting, while the personnel of rear units will be in charge of production. When combat circumstances permit, the fighting forces may also make use of the opportunity and get the soldiers to make their own shoes, socks, gloves, and so on. In consolidated base areas, noncombat forces can be mobilized to grow vegetables, raise pigs, chop firewood, and, in particular, run cooperatives. By so doing, on the one hand, the livelihood of the army will be improved and provisions supplemented; on the other hand, the morale of the army will be stimulated and combat capacity increased. The issues discussed above-namely, improvements in equipment and technology,thorough study of strategy and tactics, correctly applying the policy of the united front, extensive efforts to win over the enemy and puppet troops, and the movement for participation by the army itself in production-all represent important problems to which the Eighth Route Army must pay greater attention during the new stage. Defects in other work will also be overcome along with the improvement on these important issues. It is the task of all the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, and also of the Military and Political Magazine, to enhance our achievements and overcome our shortcomings. The War of Resistance will be long and cruel; it is urgently necessary to enhance the achievements of the Eighth Route Army and overcome its shortcomings, first for the sake of expanding the fighting capacity ofthe Eighth Route Army, and, second, in order to offer the experience of the Eighth Route Army to the people and allied troops who are also fighting Japan. The Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army should work hard toward this end.

To He Ganzhi1 (January 17. 1939)

Comrade Ganzhi: I read your letter with great pleasure. There are not many among our comrades as yet who are interested in Chinese history and resolved to study it. There is Comrade Chen Boda2 in Yan'an, who is doing research in this field, and now you are also planning to study our national history. This is very good; I hope you will work on it conscientiously. To do so has also been an unfulfilled ambition of mine. I wanted to collect materials on China's military history, but to this day I have never got started doing it. My tools are inadequate, and this year I have still been able to study only the tools, that is, to study philosophy, economics, and Leninism, mainly philosophy. In the future I plan to study modem history. Your advice in this respect would be most welcome. I think you are right in your three approaches to the study of our national history, especially the second one. it will be of great help in the present anti-Japanese war if you can demonstrate in your book which of the two lines of national resistance and national capitulation is correct and which is erroneous, bitterly denouncing the national capitulationists and praising those in favor of national resistance from the Northern and Southern dynasties [42(}.-581], the Southern Song dynasty [ 11271278], the last years of the Ming dynasty [1368-1644], and the last years of the Qing dynasty . There is, however, one thing that should have your attention, that is, the policy of aggression, aiming at "achievement and success" and the conquest of the nations of "the weak and the ignorant" (which has occurred in our history)

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 136-37, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. He Ganzhi (1906-1969), a historian, was born in Taishan, Guangdong Province. In 1929 he went to Japan to study, returning to China afterthe September 18 incident in 1931.

He joined the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1934 and went to Yan'an in 1937.

At this time, he was a professor at the North Shaanxi Public School and chairman of the Section for Teaching and Research on China. 2. Chen Boda (1904-1989) was a native ofFujian. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927, studied at Sun Yatsen University in Moscow, and returned to China in 1929. In 1937he went to Yan'an, where he became MaoZedong's political secretary. At this time, he was also working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

10 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

should not be approved, and should not be confused with the positive policy of resistance. Attacks in the context of resistance, such as the cause embraced by Ban Chao of the Eastern Han dynasty,3 do not fall into the category of aggression. I look forward to receiving a copy of each of your two books when they are published. I wish you success in your efforts! MaoZedong

3. Ban Chao (31-IOI),Ihe younger brolher oflhe historian Ban Gu, was a well-known general of lhe Eastern Han dynasty [25-220]. He fought for thirty-one years on China's

western frontiers, achieving victories against the Xiongnu and obtaining the submission of more than fifty Central Asian kingdoms to the Chinese yoke. (The Xiongnu were nomads of the Northern Steppes, who threatened lhe Chinese empire at lhe end of the first and the beginning of the second century. They have often been identified with the Huns.)

The Relationship Between the War of Resistance and Foreign Assistance Preface to the English Edition of On Protracted War

(January 20, 1939)

Friends in Shanghai are translating my On Protracted War into English. I am naturally very happy to hear this, for China's great War of Resistance concerns not merely China and the East but the whole world. In democratic countries such as England, America, and France, the broad popular masses, including all the progressive people of various social strata, sympathize with China's War of Resistance and oppose the Japanese imperialist invasion of China. The only exception is a portion of the diehard faction, which oppose China's War of Resistance. As regards the diehard faction, some are obstinate by nature and have all along been sympathetic to the Japanese warlords. Others-because they do not understand the ineluctable law that governs China's War of Resistance, according to which Japan is doomed to failure and China is bound to win after traveling a difficult road-have become pessimistic, have lost hope, and refuse to assist China. I think there must be such people. It is, of course, my hope that my book will give them the opportunity to understand the truth of the matter. Perhaps there are still some even among those who are sympathetic to China's War of Resistance and who make up the majority of the people who likewise do not understand the truth about China's War of Resistance. They are sympathetic, but at the same time they feel depressed. We are even more obligated to free these people of their sympathetic depression. This little booklet of mine was written in May 1938. Because it covers all the phases of the Sino-Japanese war, its significance is of a lasting nature. As to whether the arguments put forth in the book are correct or erroneous, the entire experience of our War of Resistance in the past has verified them, and our experience in the future will continue to verify them. After the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, the War of Resistance is just now progressing to a new phase-one that is favorable to us and disadvantageous to Japan. This is a stage of stalemate

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 19-20, which reproduces it from Balujunjunzheng zazhi, no. 2, February 15, 1939. We have not been able to locate a copy of a British or American edition of On Protracted War, in order to compare our translation with that previously published. II

12

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

between the enemy and us. This time will come soon, because the enemy will be forced to terminate his strategic offensive and go over to the strategic defensive, while we, thanks to our resolute resistance and growth in strength, will put an end to our strategic retreat (of the main force, not of the guerrillas) and enter into strategic contention. In the new stage, our entire task consists in preparing for the counterattack. The preparation may take a long time, but we will devote all our courage and energy to carrying out these preparations, and we certainly will and definitely can drive Japanese imperialism out of China. In the great War of Resistance, it depends mainly on China's own strength to defeat the enemy; China's forces are being mobilized right now, and they will not only become an invincible force but will prevail over the enemy and expel him from our country. There is no doubt about that. At the same time, however, we need assistance and support from without. Our enemy is an international enemy, and our War of Resistance is also an international war of resistance. History has already shown that the idea of a separate war is erroneous. There are people in democratic countries, like England and America, who still harbor the idea of standing alone; they do not understand that, if China is defeated, England, America, and other such countries will no longer be able to rest in peace. This idea is completely wrong and out of date. To support China is to support themselves: this is the concrete reality at the present time. That is why I hope that this book will arouse some sympathy in the English-speaking countries, for the benefit of China and also of the world. China is fighting a war in the midst of difficulties, but the flames of a war among the great powers of the world are drawing closer day by day. No country can remain aloof from it, however much it may wish to. We are in favor of President Roosevelt's declaration in defense of democracy; we resolutely oppose Chamberlain's policy of making concessions to the fascist countries. To this day, Chamberlain is still timid and overcautious about Japan. I hope the popular masses of England and America will arise forcefully and demand that their governments adopt a new policy of opposition to wars of aggression, for the sake of China, and also for the sake of England and America themselves.

To Zhou Yang1 (January 22, 1939, 10:00 P.M.)

Comrade Zhou Yang: I have not read the whole of the manuscript,2 half of which was written by Li Liuru and the other half by He Peiyuan. 3 It Is of great importance in our propaganda directed to those outside the border region, 4 so it should not be sent to press lightly before everything, from the form to the content, has been made right. I now request you to take full responsibility for the revision of the book; if you think it should be entirely rewritten, go ahead and do so. Although this will demand extra effort on your part, its significance is very great. It would be best if you could finish the work before February 15, so the book could be published at the end of the month. It has been arranged that the author's remuneration (1.5 yuan per thousand characters) will be divided up among you, Comrade Li, and Comrade He, to show my appreciation for your efforts. Salutations! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, which reproduces it from the manuscript. l. Zhou Yang (1908-1989) was a native of Hunan Province. After a period of study in Japan, he spent the years 1930-1937 in Shanghai, where he served as secretary-general of the League of Left-Wing Writers. When the war with Japan broke out in 1937, he went to Yan' an, where he became head of the Education Department of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government. 2. The reference is to the first draft of A True Record of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The book was published by Jiefang chubanshe in Yan'an in December

1939. 3. Li Liuru ( 1887-1973), a native of Hunan, had received military training and participated in the Wuhan Uprising of 1911. After a period of study in Japan, he returned to Hunan in 1919, and joined the Chinese Communist Party there in 1921. He participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927 and in 1930 went to the Central Soviet Area, where he occupied a number of posts. In August 1937 he went to Yan'an. At this time, he was chief secretary in Mao Zedong's office. He Peiyuan was a secretary of that office. 4. Mao himself emphasized the words set in boldface by the use of dots under the characters. 13

On the Current War Conditions and the Political Situation (January 28, 1939)

I am going to discuss the current situation. Since you comrades are scattered all over, and are not completely clear about the situation as a whole, I would like to take this opportunity to talk about it with you comrades. We shall look at the problem according to the report and resolution of the Sixth Plenum. The Sixth Plenum said: ''The resistance war can be sustained." This was said in the first half of October last year, and three months have gone by since then. How are things going? On October 30 oflast year, Chairman Chiang published his open letter to the people of the whole country. On December 26, he published his article refuting Konoe. 1 It was very well done. He also deprived Wang Jingwei of his party membership. All these actions indicated that he wants to carry out resolutely the policy of the Resistance War and prove that the strength of the proJapanese faction is unable to shake the Resistance War. In the past, the first question was whether to fight or not, and there used to be a tendency toward compromise within the party of our friends, and they were talking about peace. This made things very difficult. Although our Communist Party is determined to fight no matter what happens, and we are not going to compromise, everyone knows that the Communist Party is still the minority in the country as a whole, it is still a small shareholder in the united front. If we were to fight Japan all alone, it would be still more difficult. Now that the Guomindang has taken these measures, and has resolved to support resolutely the orientation of the Resistance War, under this condition of "fighting," it is easy to make an issue of things. This is a good thing, it is a progressive element in the united front. Let us now discuss the war situation. Last October we predicted that, after the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, we would suffer more difficulties but would, at the same time, make more progress. As far as the difficulties are concerned, you comrades are all aware that, because

This is an extract from Mao's talk summing up the results of a conference of the Eighteenth Army Group in Yan'an. Our source is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 148-55, where it is reproduced from the stenographic record in the Central Archives. l. The reference is to Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945), who was prime minister of Japan from June 1937 until January 1939. 14

JANUARY 1939

15

of the fall of major cities and communication lines, the political power of the state as well as the battle terrain are territorially divided by the enemy, and financial and economic difficulties have increased. As regards progress, it is manifested above all in persistence in the Resistance War, and in the defeat of the peace party in the two meetings of the People's Political Council. Well then, can progress overcome the difficulties? Our answer is in the affirmative. Moreover, only if we are more progressive. and work harder to overcome difficulties, can we make the war change into the New Stage. The central task put forward at the Sixth Plenum is also the task of the people of all China; it is to increase our strength, overcome difficulties, stop the enemy's offensive, and prepare for our counteroffensive. Its correctness has been proved already and will continue to be proved in the future. We say that the enemy's attack has not yet stopped. During the past three months since the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, the enemy has not undertaken any major actions at the front, but it is fighting fiercely on the flanks and in the rear. There are people who say that our estimate was wrong, because the enemy has already stopped his attacks. We do not say this, or think this, because the enemy may still attack places such as Xi'an, Lanzhou, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuzhou, and Hengzhou, and we must be prepared. Although until this moment, when I am speaking, my words have still not been borne out, it is nevertheless better to be prepared, for if we are not prepared our losses will be even greater. Why will the enemy continue to attack? To begin with, if he does not attack, the fascist warlords will collapse immediately, and the enemy has very great ambitions. Not only does he want to attack all of China, he also wants to attack Southeast Asia, Burma, Vietnam, and India. In China, his plan is to oppose Chairman Chiang, oppose the Communist Party, and sabotage the Anti-Japanese National United Front. He wants to believe he can achieve his goal, but whether or not he can will depend upon the level of our efforts. We say that the enemy's attack will stop, but can it stop or not? We say, it must stop. Japan wants to destroy us, and we want it to stop, but how this can be achieved can be explained only on the basis of the situations on the enemy's side and on our own. Because of the small size of the enemy's country, its small population, and small number of troops, and because, on the other hand, the front is now so long, stretching to Guangzhou in the south and Baotou in the north, the enemy has suffered from the very beginning from the weakness of lack of troops. When you add to this the dispersal of forces, its strong army has become weaker. This lack of troops and dispersal of troops is an incurable disease. Its strength does not allow it to send more troops to China, because in addition it must be on guard against the powerful Soviet Union. Besides, Britain, America, and France are also its enemies. Finally, it has to be on guard against its own people and the people in its colonies. Therefore, it can send to China at most one-third of its forces. Now it is said that its troops there already number one million; in the future, it may be able to send at most another million and no more. This being the case, we will attack it every day from the front and from its rear; we will fight it with our regular forces and guerrillas to kill and injure its soldiers and exhaust them, so that its troops will be even

/6

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

fewer in number and even more dispersed, so that it will consume more ammunition and supplies, its strength will be weakened, and it will have to stop the attack. On the other hand, our country of China will be stronger; we will be able to fight not only guerrilla war but mobile war, and there will be progress in various other respects. Though we are still unable to halt the Japanese attack now, we are absolutely sure that we will be able to make them stop it. We must make every possible effon to bring it to a halt. As for our prediction that guerrilla warfare can be greatly developed in the enemy's rear, and that base areas can be established, this has already been proved, and will be proved even more in the future. At the same time, we also pointed out that the guerrilla war would not all be smooth sailing. We must see that the enemy is sure to turn around and attack, and at that time guerrilla war will be even more difficult. We must be prepared for the arrival of this difficulty and strike back at it from a fighting posture. We must be prepared for this, for only thus can we avoid

the misfortune of uunpreparedness." We say that the Anti-Japanese National United Front will develop, but there will be some difficulties. The Guomindang is making progress, but in this progressive stream there is a countercurrent. What has been proved in the past three months? The diehard element Wang Jingwei has become the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei, and naturally he may still make trouble in the future. The Guomindang has deprived Wang Jingwei of his pany membership forever, and this is good. All the generals at the front in different places, Chen Cheng, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, and our Commander-in-chief and Vice Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] have all telegraphed the National Government to issue a wanted circular, but an open circular has not yet been issued. We think that this wanted circular is necessary, for he has already become a Chinese traitor and mingled with the enemy. Even though it is not cenain that we will be able to catch him now, when the time comes that the Japanese imperialists are defeated, where on eanh can he escape to? Some people say that he will go to Germany or Italy, but at the time when the doom of all these world fascists is at hand, where else can he flee? In sum, so long as he is still on earth, we are sure to catch him in the end. We say that in the overall forward movement of progress there will be some panial setbacks, and because of these setbacks, there will be friction. Not only will there be friction, but it will be somewhat worse than in the past. The force behind these setbacks can be funher divided into two factions. One faction is pro-Japanese, anti-Chiang, and anti-Communist, and Wang Jingwei is its head. Now some of them have gone, but there are still some adherents left. The other group is the diehard elements, who advocate so-called resistance against Japan, suppon of Chiang, and opposition to the Communists. There are many people of this kind around the border region. They say: At present, we should first oppose the Communists, and then resist the Japanese; when the enemy comes, we will resist the Japanese first and then oppose the Communists. At the front, it is said that there are some people who advocate the so-called parallel progress of resistance against Japan and oppo-

JANUARY 1939

17

sition against the Communists. As regards the group which is pro-Japanese and opposed to Chiang and the Communists, the following concrete examples illustrate the "carrying out" of their "views." At the second meeting of the People's Political Council, some draft resolutions with anti-Chiang contents were proposed. They claimed that the big fire in Changsha had something to do with Chainnan Chiang, using this to criticize Chainnan Chiang. They denounced guerrilla war as [the action of] roving bandits, criticizing both Chainnan Chiang and the Communist Party, since Chainnan Chiang as well as the Communist Party has suggested that in the protracted War of Resistance, it is necessary to develop guerrilla warfare. There are also those, such as Zhang Junmai, 2 who have re .ponded to Wang Jingwei by writing articles saying how bad the Communist Party is! Why the Eighth Route Anny and the New Fourth Anny should be done away with! The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is thus and so! In sum, they are applying their most vicious insults to the Communist Party as well as to the annies, administration, and people under its leadership. As for [Wang Jingwei's] being pro-Japanese, before he fled, though he did not say things clearly, in his articles and speeches there was always a hidden message of unwillingness to resist Japan and the idea of seeking a compromise with the Japanese. The other group, in Xi'an as well as in places near the border region, is carrying on its work, which is welcomed by the enemy, even more assiduously than before. They are a bunch of hooligans who make a living out of creating friction without paying attention to the overall situation. This countercurrent is retrogressive. Within the camp ofthe united front there is progress as well as retrogression, but if a fight takes place betwee 1 two persons, one progressive and the other backward, who will win? Our answer is that the progressive tendency can overcome the retrogressive tendency. We must understand that within the united front there is sure to be friction. The name of the united front itself contains the idea of friction, for when talking about unification, it is possible only if there are two or more. If there is only one, "one hand does not clap," and there can be no friction, but if there are two, two hands will clap and make a loud noise, and friction will be unavoidable. If the united front lasts for ten thousand years, friction will also last for ten thousand years. So long as there is the united front, friction will exist, because when there are differences, there will be friction. But we are doing our best to reduce friction. Some people are detennined to create friction. If so, what should we do then? At the Sixth Plenum we said that we would never tolerate unreasonable friction. We must adhere to the principle: "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we

2. Zhang Jiasen (1887-1969), zi Junmai, commonly known in the West as Carson Chang, a native of Jiangsu, studied in Tokyo and subsequently in Gennany and England. For many years he was closely associated with Liang Qichao, and not on good terms with the Guomindang. In 1937, however, after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he accepted a post in Nanjing, while advocating his own brand of state socialism. In 1939 he followed the government to Chongqing.

18 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

are attacked, we will cenainly retaliate." This last principle is very imponant. For instance, I am standing in this room, and he pushes me. If I yield to him and back off one step, then he will push me back one step after the other until I have no place to stand in this room. Therefore, if he pushes, we will push back, until we have pushed him back to where he came from. If they want to create friction, we will oppose friction. They say that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government is a puppet regime, they want to abolish the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region and the Communist Pany as well, they want the Eighth Route Army and the New Founh Army to go to the desen area, and so on and so on. They have a great many variants like this, and we oppose all of them. They are creating a lot of friction around the periphery of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Take the occupation of villages, for example. If they take one village, we should take two of theirs. If they return one of ours, we should return the same number. If they take captives, and take two of our men, we will take four of theirs. If they lock ours up for three days, we will lock theirs up for six days before releasing them. Why should we treat them more severely than they treat us? This is because they attacked us first, justice is not on their side, and they must be punished. This is what is called opposing friction. We must love each other and unite, but we should stand up; otherwise, we will suffer the "pain of losing our Pany." At present, with the increase in friction, what is the future of the united front? We will definitely persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It can also be maintained during the anti-Japanese war, as has already been made clear in the repon at the Sixth Plenum. Love and unity are the principles of the united front. Nonetheless, we must also insist on the principle of opposing friction; it is impossible without this point. Only by maintaining this principle can we strengthen and expand the AntiJapanese National United Front. Now the Guomindang is holding its Fifth Plenum. We do not anticipate that the result will be bad, but at the same time we should not ignore the fact that friction is still possible. Above I have talked about the situation on the Chinese side. I will now discuss the situation on the Japanese side. Japan has changed its prime minister, because it now wants to use a new method, namely, the general mobilization of the whole country. This proves that at the present time its old methods are inadequate, and its difficulties have become more apparent. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that in the future it will attack China even more frenziedly, and that it is preparing to attack the entire world. It is in the situation [characterized by the saying] "when riding a tiger the hard pan is getting off' and has no alternative to launching a general mobilization of the whole country. As for Japan's difficulties, in military terms they manifest themselves in the lack of troops and dispersion of troops. The economy is even more exhausted. Fewer commodities are now exponed, because military industry has expanded. Conversely, impons are greater than in the past, because ofthe need to make large

JANUARY 1939

19

quantities of military supplies. In the past Japanese products were the cheapest (because it exploited most severely the great mass of workers and peasants), and they could be used to exchange for some foreign products. Now that this condition no longer exists, it has to use cash if it wants to buy raw materials from foreign countries, but Japan does not have large cash reserves. Moreover, in the more than one year's war of invasion against China, it has spent nearly 9 billion yen in military expenses. Diplomatically, it is becoming more and more isolated. Britain, the United States, and France have already sent protests to Japan, asking why it violated the Nine-Power Treaty. 3 This happened after the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou. Now Britain and the United States are discussing the use of economic sanctions to punish Japan. In the past America had a neutrality law, which was disadvantageous to China but advantageous to Japan. Now the relationship between Japan and the United States is not good, because Japan wants everything for itself, and the interests of Britain and the United States in China are weakened. At the same time, because Britain and the United States are separated from China by large oceans, additional shipping fees are added to their products, the prices of their products are higher than those from Japan, and they are unable to compete against the Japanese. Furthermore, using as its excuse the military implications, Japan does not allow British and American merchant ships to navigate the Yangzi and other rivers, and the commercial interests of Britain and the United States in China have been almost completely taken over. Now Japan is talking in fine words about returning the leased territories,• but in reality it wants to change the leased territories of Britain and France into its own occupied territories. In addition, it is attempting to attack Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Australia, and other such places. Japanese imperialism has become "a rat running across the street, with everyone shouting 'kill it'." Its only friends are Hitler and Mussolini. All the democratic countries, such as Britain, the United States, and France, dislike it, let alone the Soviet Union. Last October we said that Japan had not stopped its attack, but it undoubtedly would. Moreover, we pointed out the three conditions that would make it stop, of which the aforementioned difficulties of Japan constitute one.

3. The Nine-Power Treaty, adopted at the Washington Conference of t922, contained stipulations regarding the Open Door and equal opportunity in China. 4. Beginning in 1898, in the aftermath of the Boxer Uprising, foreign powers demanded and obtained from China so-called "leased territories," which were excluded from Chinese sovereignty for tenns often as long as ninety-nine years. The territory in Northeast China thus granted to Russia was for the most part handed over to Japan following the RussoJapanese War of 1905, and Gennany's territory in Shandong was likewise taken over by Japan, though it was returned to China in t922. In 1939, there thus remained only three such territories: a large area con.trolled by Japan in Manchuria; the "New Territories" opposite Hong Kong under British rule; and the post of Guangzhouwan, opposite Hainan Island, under French control.

20

MAO'S ROAD 7V POWER

What, then, is the international attitude toward us? In the past we pointed out that the problem in Europe differs somewhat from the problem in Asia. In the past Britain and France made one concession after another to Hitler in Europe, but adopted in some respects a different attitude toward China. This has already been demonstrated. It is good that Britain and France lend money to us; this opens one door, and in the future we will have more ways out. Nevertheless, will they help us greatly? That can't happen. There are limitations in the imperialist countries. Naturally we are not relying on the international environment to eat; we must put the

main emphasis on China. There are two kinds of countries in the world. One is the fascist countries, the other is the democratic countries. The contradictions between these two kinds of countries are daily becoming more acute. Now that the Spanish government army has become more dangerous, Germany wants to take back its old colonies, and Italy is scheming to take Tunisia and other places belonging to France. A war crisis among the big powers has drawn closer. Now a world war has already begun. The wars that have taken place in the past, and are taking place today, are wars in which the fascist countries are attacking the weak and small countries. In the future they will fight against big countries, but when that will happen we do not yet know. Do we, however, wish that it would take place as soon as possible, or what? If it were to begin now, that would certainly be a good thing in some respects. For example, a blow against the fascists in the West would weaken the power of Japan. But this is indirect, and thus it would be better if the attack came later, for in that case, Britain, the United States, and the other democratic countries would be able to help us more directly. The Soviet Union is not willing to fight now either. In a few years, when it has completed its third five-year plan and has become stronger, so that the mere mention of its name will scare the fascists to death, this will be more beneficial to China as well as to the world. The world is sure to fight a larger-scale war, but there is no way to predict when that war will break out. Such is the present aspect of the war and the political situation.

Inscription for the Artillery Regiment (1939)

To all the comrades of the Artillery Regiment, officers and men: It is already the first anniversary of the formation of the Artillery Regiment of the Eighth Route Army. I hope you will make great efforts in the study of political and military science and technical subjects, create a regiment which will be a powerful force in the anti-Japanese war, and achieve your goal of becoming ever-victorious and all-conquering, so as to win glory for the nation and become a model for the Eighth Route Army!

Our source for this document is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 17, which reproduces it from a text published in China in 1982. 2/

ToChenBoda (February 1, 1939)

Comrade Boda: I have read your article "The Philosophical Thought of Mozi.'' 1 It is a great contribution of yours to have identified a Chinese Heraclitus. 2 I have a few specific comments, which you will find on another sheet, for your reference. They are mere reflections in the course of a casual reading, and not results of serious study. Salutations, Mao Zedong, on the night of February I

I. The title It might be better if it were changed to ''The Philosophical Ideas of Mozi-An Ancient Materialist Philosopher" or ''The Materialist Philosophy of Mozi.''3 2. The existence of things does not depend solely on their properties; there is also their basic nature. Nature and properties are inseparable, but there is a distinction. An object can lose some of its properties and yet remain the same, because the object still retains its nature. In [the expression] zhiqi, 4 zhi seems to referto the nature of the thing, something that will never change (within the compass of the thing itself), while qi seems to indicate quantity as well as properties, things that do change. 3. The meaning of the sentence ''The superior man Uunzi] cannot distinguish between what is benevolent and what is not on the basis of his behavior" might be

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 140-43, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Chen Boda's article was published in Jiefang, nos. 82, 102, and 104, in 1939 and 1940.

2. Heraclitus had been called by Lenin "one of the founders of dialectics." 3. Chen Boda did not follow Mao in this, and the title of the published article remained

as indicated above. 4. In modem Chinese, this two-character compound has the meaning of "will" or "aspiration." Mao is discussing it here as used in the writings of Mencius, and also of Confucius. Chen Boda's explanation of the meaning of the term (in part I of his article, Jiefang, no. 82, p. 22) is in harmony with Mao's brief comment here. 22

FEBRUARY 1939

23

expressed somewhat more clearly by saying that when the superior man acts, he ends up doing only what is not benevolent, rather than doing what is benevolent.' 4. The paragraph discussing cause and effect seems to be dealing with the question of necessity and contingency at the same time. "The matter being what it is" indicates necessity, yet the form in which this necessity manifests itself is accidental. All the forms in which necessity manifests itself are, as a rule, contingent. It always manifests itself in the form of contingency. Therefore it is correct to say "there could have been no Wuchang Uprising of October 10 without this partial cause." However, the necessity of the 1911 Revolution (major cause) must have necessarily been provoked by another contingency (minor cause), and completed by way of numerous contingent causes. It might well have been the Hanyang Uprising of October 10 or an uprising in some other place on some other date. It is also right to say that "had it not been for the fact that it broke out at that most appropriate moment, it might not have spread like a prairie fire." But it would have necessarily broken out at some other appropriate moment and become a prairie fire. 5. The question of the Doctrine of the Mean Such doctrines of the Moist school as "in desiring it, one weighs the benefit; in aversion to it, one weighs the loss,"6 "maintaining a balance between the two without veering to one side,"7 and "establish a position that is unshakable"8 mean the same thing as Confucian concepts such as "hold the two extremes and employ the Mean,''9 "choose the Mean, grasp it firmly, and do not lose it," 10 "stand erect in the middle and do not incline to either side," and "maintain this course to death with-

5. Chen Boda's article does not contain the exact words quoted by Mao, but the reference is clearly to Chen's statement (Jiefang, no. 82, p. 22) that "the so-called 'superior

man' ... can tell you that this is benevolent and that is not, but when it comes to his behavior, his actions end up being only those lacking in benevolence rather than benevolent ones, which means that he has no idea what benevolence actually is." 6. This is from Mozi, book 10, chapter 40, "The Canon" (Jing), part I. The context is a

definition of the system of merit, in which officials are rewarded or punished according to their deeds. 7. This is from Mozi, book 10, chapter 42, "Exposition of the Canon" (Jingshuo), part I. A standard commentary to the text states that this is a gloss on the previous expression, and it is likely that Mao had this in mind in devising his interpretation. 8. From Mozi, book 10, chapter 41, "The Canon" (Jing), part II.

9. The Doctrine ofthe Mean, VI, reads: "The Master said, 'There was Shun-He indeed was greatly wise! Shun loved to question others, and to study their words, though they might be shallow. He concealed what was bad in them, and displayed what was good. He

took hold of their two extremes, determined the Mean, and employed it in his government of the people. It was by this that he was Shun!'" (Legge. Vol. I, p. 388). Mao is referring to the penultimate sentence of this paragraph. 10. The reference is to the Doctrine of the Mean, VIII, which reads: ''The Master said, 'This was the manner of Hui-he made choice of the Mean, and whenever he got hold of what was good, he clasped it firmly, as if wearing it on his breast, and did not lose it"' (Legge, Vol. I. p. 389).

24

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

out changing."" They all confirm the stability of substantive disposition and make an argument for the stability of such substantive disposition along two lines: opposition to excess and to falling shon. 12 Here are a few of my objections: (a) That a two-line struggle is being waged or that the method of a two-line battle is being used to determine the relativity of substantive disposition; (b) The two schools, Confucian and Moist, mean the same thing although they use different words. The Moists made no special advance; (c) "Correctness" is a concept concerned with substantive disposition, which is the same as the Confucian's "mean" (not veering to one side is called the mean). "To weigh" is not a concept concerned with substantive disposition but is, rather, a method for defining the distinction between one panicular substantive disposition and another, which is the same as the Confucian school's "hold," as in "hold the two extremes and employ the Mean."The "correctness" of "desire" is "benefit," differentiating it from loss. The "correctness" of "aversion" is "loss," differentiating it from benefit and avoiding any confusion between the two. "In weighing, maintaining a balance between the two without veering to one side" 13 should be explained as defining the panicular substantive disposition of a thing and not letting it deviate to the left or to the right (that is, not having it veer toward a different substantive disposition), but this phrase is not as clear and appropriate as "excess is the same as falling shon," so you should not say that it "is a further development over 'excess is the same as falling shon'"; (d) To say that "maintaining a balance between the two without veering to one side shows precisely that Mozi saw that one particular substantive disposition contains two different sides and not veering to either one side or the other is the only correct way, the only way that truly conforms to that substantive disposition" is rather inappropriate, as it makes the Moist school out to be eclectic. A substantive disposition does have two sides, but in the course of a single process only one is the

II. The reference is to the Doctrine of the Mean, X, 5 (Legge, Vol. I, p. 390), which reads: ''The superior man cultivates a friendly hannony, without being weak. How finn is he in his energy! He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side. How finn is he in his energy! When good principles prevail in the government of his country, he does not change from what he was in retirement. How firm is his energy! When bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to death without changing. How finn is he in his energy!" 12. Mao's analysis in all this hinges upon his interpretation of Mozi's use of the word zheng, commonly translated as "appropriateness," "uprightness," "the Middle Way," and so on. This word appears in the first and last of Mao's references to Mozi, and Mao clearly takes it in the "traditional Confucian" sense as just described, whereas we have rendered it in a more "neutral" way, as "it" in the first instance, and as "establish a position" in the second. For a fuller and clearer exposition of Mao's ideas regarding the relation between excess [guo] and falling short [buji], which he equaled respectively with leftism and righlism, see below, his leller of February 20, 1939, 10 Zhang Wentian. 13. The original Mozi text reads, "The wise man maintains a balance between the two without veering to one side," but the standard commentary takes "wise man" as "one who weighs things," and Mao is clearly following him here.

FEBRUARY 1939 25

principal side, and it is relatively stable, so there must necessarily be some inclination, a veering toward this side. What is meant by a particular substantive disposition, or one substantive disposition, is this particular side, which is the substance; otherwise the substantive disposition will have been negated. Therefore, what Mozi means by "without veering to either side" is to avoid deviation to the right or the left, or veering toward a different substantive disposition, and not to avoid deviation toward one of the two sides of a particular substantive disposition (actually this would not be deviation but, rather, precisely, correctness). This is the explanation that should be made if the Moist school is, indeed, dialectical materialist. 6. The question of "halves" and "extremes" This section in Mozi, and Hu Shi's 14 interpretation of it in particular, cannot provide proof regarding the issue of transformation of substantive disposition; it seems to be a discussion of the question of limitation and limitlessness.

14. Regarding Hu Shi, see below the note to the text of February 22, 1939.

Unite, While at the Same Time Struggling (February 5, 1939)

How do we consolidate the united front to achieve our goal: ''the War of Resistance must be victorious, and building the country must be successful"? We must make use of the struggle on two fronts. One is to oppose closed-doorism. We must talk about love for our former enemies, and unite with the landlords, capitalists, and petty bourgeoisie, provided only that they are willing. There are some here among us who are mortally afraid that they will be soiled by bourgeois garbage, and who say these people are no good, that we should not talk with them about love and should not talk with them about unity. They believe that we can win the War of Resistance all by ourselves if we just study Marxism behind closed doors. The thought of these people really is no good, and we should oppose it, for closed-doorism hinders unity and hinders the united front. There are also some other people whose thinking is very confused; these are the villains who "make money out of the misfortunes of the country" and who ''make a living by creating friction." Such people we must also oppose. The enemies of unity are those who sabotage unity and pay no attention to unity. The struggle is like a combat at the front. We have attacked those closed-doorists who do not care about unity, and also those diehard elements who make a living by creating friction, and this constitutes a front. There is another front, and another thing we must attack. This thing we must attack is seeking to abolish the Communist Party and to incorporate it into the Guomindang, under the pretext of talking about "unity." Such people often talk about "aligning the Communist Party with the Guomindang." But to eliminate the Communist Party is harmful and not advantageous for carrying out [Sun Yatsen' s] Three People's Principles. We are the most resolute in carrying out nationalism (the anti-Japanese war). We are also the most thoroughgoing in carrying out people's rights. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is an example of this. Recently an American reporter attended the meetings of the border region assembly for several days, and he said that the democracy is on a much higher level here than in America. In the entire country, it is we here who are carrying out the principles of people's rights and people's livelihood. Elsewhere, though they boast that they

This is an rx.tract from a speech by Mao at the Central Party School. Our source for this text is Dangde wenxian, no. 4, 1995, pp. 15-16. 26

FEBRUARY 1939 27

want to carry out the Three People's Principles, in reality, they apply only one people •5 principle (resistance against Japan), and moreover they do not carry it out very well. We are the loyal followers of the Three People's Principles; we are indomitable in carrying the Three People's Principles through to the end. If some people say that people's rights and people's livelihood should not be carried out, and you say "Well, all right," this is wrong, it is capitulationism; if people say that they do not want communism and you reply, "Yes, yes," this is also capitulationism. At present it is we who are resolutely carrying out the Three People's Principles; in the future, we will carry out communism unconditionally. on the one hand, the united front is about love and unity; on the other hand, it also requires struggle. Isn't this self-contradictory? At the school, each one of you has both unity and struggle. If you make a mistake and you want to correct it, don't you have to struggle? Confucius said, ''The gentleman agrees with others, without being an echo. The small man echoes without being in agreement."' This is also the same as saying that there is struggle in unity. There are also both unification and struggle in the relationship between a father and a son, or between a ruler and his minister. On the one hand, the father loves his son, and his son is filial; the ruler is enlightened and his minister is worthy-this is loving and uniting, which is also unity. On the other hand, the son exhorts his father regarding his mistakes and the minister remonstrates with the king regarding his errors. This is struggle, or what today is called education by persuasion. All of this shows that there is struggle in unification, and this applies to everything under heaven. If someone believes that there is only unity but no struggle, he has not yet studied Marxism properly. Unity and struggle are the two basic principles of the united front. Well then, are these two things of equal importance? Should we say that struggle is more important than unity? The answer to both of these questions is in the negative! The first fundamental principle of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is unity, which means we must talk with our friends about love, unity, mutual aid, and so on. But another principle is struggle, which means mediation, persuasion, education, and so on. This is an indispensable principle. Well then, why don't we add the word "struggle" to the name of the "Anti-Japanese National United Front," so that it will become the "Anti-Japanese National United Struggle Front"? I believe all of you comrades know the reason. Some people may not understand the word "struggle" in our sense, and may be frightened away as soon as they see the word "struggle." At the same time, when we speak of struggle this does not mean that we have to struggle all the time. It is absolutely not the case that, as soon as we see a frien
28 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

during the War of Resistance, but will it be true also after the War of Resistance? That depends on how the other people behave. If the other people aim their machine guns at us and put their swords against our necks, do we still have to say "I want to unite with you," "I love you"? Comrades, if that happens in the future, we will have no alternative but to pick up the machine gun and sword to struggle, and that struggle can certainly not be carried on by persuasion and education. At that time, struggle will become the first priority. Marxism holds that there is nothing that does not contain struggle, and that there is not simply one form of struggle, but many and varied forrns.

Telegram from Political Councilors Mao and Chen Asking for Leave Because of Other Business (February 12, 1939)

Comrades Mao Zedong and Chen Shaoyu are unable to attend the Third Session of the People's Political Council because of other business. and have sent a telegram to Chongqing asking for leave. The full text of the telegraro, which we ha"e obtained, reads as follows: To the Secretariat of the People's Political Council in Chongqing, and for transmission to Chairman Chiang of the Council for his perusal: Because of other business, we are unable to attend the present session of the Political Council. We are sending this telegram to ask for leave. Mao Zedong

Chen Shaoyu 1

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 23, where it is reproduced from the text published in Xin Zhonghua bao on February 13, 1939. I. Although he had been criticized for his ''rightist line" at the Sixth Plenum in September 1938, Chen Shaoyu (better known as Wang Ming) was nonetheless at this time a member of the Secretariat, and the head of the Party's United Front Department. 29

The Chinese Army Should Learn from the Red Army ofthe Soviet Union In Commemoration of the 21st Anniversary of the Red Army of the Soviet Union on February 23 (Written in Response to an Invitation from the Soviet Newspaper Pravda to Contribute Articles) (February 16, 1939)

When we hear of the celebration of the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet Red Army, we feel there is a great force standing before the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, a force that has stretched out its friendly hand, offering to provide backing for our war of national liberation against Japan. This great force is the Red Army of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Red Army has been tempered and toughened over the past twenty-one years, and its army, its air force, and also its navy have become an invincible force. Under the leadership of the wise leader, Comrade Stalin, and the supreme commander, Comrade Voroshilov, because it is a people's army of the workers and peasants, and because it possesses powerful technology and equipment, thorough military training, and correct political work, not only did it become the mainstay in the defense of the socialist Soviet Union a long time ago, but it has also long been the main force in maintaining world peace and in opposing fascist aggression, a model for all the armed forces in the world that are truly willing to fight against fascist aggression. In this latter sense, I believe that every officer and man of the Soviet Red Army, every Soviet citizen, understands the nature of the war that the Chinese nation and the Chinese people are fighting, and the circumstances of difficulty and hardship in which the war is taking place. But they also know what a bright future the war portends, and how the war is closely related to the Soviet Union and to the whole world. Conversely, in our country of China, not only in the Eighth Route Army, but among all the soldiers who are fighting Japan, there is no one who does not know that the Soviet Red Army is a good friend of the Chinese people and the Soviet Union is the one

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 6, pp. 311-12, where it is reproduced from the Chongqing edition of the periodical Qunzhong, Vol. 2, no. 17/18, March II, 1939. 30

FEBRUARY 1939 31

that is assisting China in the most substantial way in the War of Resistance. In particular, they understand that the experience and lessons ofthe Soviet Red Army are the right thing for the Chmese arm1es and the Chmese sold1ers to emulate. It 1s now clear to us that, to defeat the Japanese imperialists, the Chinese armies must also become armies with a correct political direction, gradually armed with new technology and equipment, with modernized military training, and political work for the national revolution. The Chinese armies are strong in many respects. In the past nineteen months, these strong points have gradually aroused astonishment from the enemy and admiration in the world. The Chinese armies will definitely be able to temper themselves in the long War of Resistance Against Japan, and thereby become a powerful contingent in the war against fascism in the world, in order to drive out the Japanese invaders and achieve the liberation of the Chinese nation, and also to assist in the worldwide antifascist war. But for historical reasons, the Chinese armies still to this day have many shortcomings, the major ones being inadequacy in political training, new technology, and modernized military training, and above all deficiencies in political work and the absence of correct policies. In these regards, we should learn from the Soviet Red Army. It is known to all that the two nations, the Soviet Union and China, have formed intimate relations over the past ten years or more, on the basis of opposing imperialist aggression. From 1924 to 1927, the Soviet Union and its Red Army assisted China's Northern Expedition; now it is fighting side by side with China in opposition to the aggression by the Japanese fascists. At the present time, when the War of Resistance is entering a new and difficult phase, the friendly relationship between China and the Soviet Union should be strengthened and the spiritual connection between the Chinese army and the Soviet Red Army should become even closer. Both countries are faced with a formidable foe, and it is the right time for the two nations and the two armies to fight alongside each other. It is true that the fascist countries are stepping up their aggression against China, making preparations to attack the Soviet Union, devastating Spain, and planning another wretched war among the major powers of the world. Even so, the outcome is predictable; the final victory will absolutely not belong to the aggressors. The people of China, the Soviet Union, and Spain, as well as all the other nations of the world that are being invaded, will seize the final victory. At present, when the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet Red Army is being celebrated, I, in my capacity as a member of the Chinese nation and the Chinese armies, hereby express my friendly antifascist salute to the Soviet people and the Soviet Red Army!

The Principal Staff of Political Organs at All Levels Must Be Party Members (February 19, 1939)

Our forces are constantly being enlarged. New units of all descriptions are being reorganized into our forces. Many of the political cadres may not be Party members. If that is the case, it will be difficult to maintain the Eighth Route Army's fine tradition of a good political system. There will be even less assurance of Party leadership or of the application of its policies. In the future, no matter what kind of force it is, once it has been reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, it is imperative that a Party organization be established within it. Its political instructors, instructors, and the principal staff of the political organs at various levels must be Party members and accept the leadership of the Party. Otherwise, it is better to have fewer forces organized in this way rather than many which are not. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang] 1

Tan [Zhengj2

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 454, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. The reference is to Wang Jiaxiang, than deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission and director of the General Political Department. 2. Tan Zheng (1907-1988), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927, panicipated in the Long March, and was at Ibis time deputy head or lhe General Political Department. 32

To Zhang Wentian 1 (February 20, 1939, at night)

I once had a look at Comrade Boda's2 ''The Philosophy of Confucius"3 (though not carefully), and thought it was good. This time I have read it again at your request, and still think it is good on the whole, but there are a few debatable points which I am listing below. Please think them over and discuss them with Comrade Boda. I really have not studied all these things of Confucius.• The suggestions which appear below came to my mind as I was reading Soda's article, and I am not confident that they are correct. I. "If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success ... " 5 If this is taken as the sole guiding principle of philosophy, it amounts to idealism, as Boda correctly points out. But if it constitutes only a part of philosophy, that is, if it is placed in an empiricist perspective, it is correct. The meaning is then similar to that of "without correct theory, there can be no correct practice." If Confucius had prefixed the phrase "If names be not correct" with "If the facts are unclear, then the name will not be correct,'' and if Confucius had truly recognized that reality is the basis, then he would not have been an idealist. This is not, however, the case, so Confucius's system is idealist; but, as partial Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 144-49, where it is printed from the manuscript. I. Zhang Wentian (1900-1976), pseudonym Luo Fu, was a native ofNanhui, Shanghai. He had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and thereafter spent four years studying in the Soviet Union. Returning to China at the end of 1930, he became one of the leading members of the "International Faction" in the Party. In 1934, he supplanted Mao as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In January 1935 at Zunyi, he threw his support behind Mao, and beearne secretary general of the Party. At this time he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party. On the original manuscript of this letter from Mao Zedong to Zhang Wentian, the opening greeting is missing. 2. Chen Boda. 3. The article here called ..The Philosophy of Confucius" was published in Jiefang, no. 69, April15, 1939, pp. 20-24, as 'The Philosophical Thought of Confucius." 4. This is a somewhat disingenuous statement. Mao had devoted a great deal of time in his youth to studying "these things of Confucius," as evidenced by the fact that there are over a hundred references to Confucius or to the Confucian classics in Volume I of our edition, covering the years 1912-1920. 5. The quotation is from the Analects, XIII, III, 5 (Legge, Vol. I, pp. 263-64). 33

34

MAO'SROADTOPOWER

truth, it is correct. All idealism contains some partial truth, and such was the case also with Confucius. This point should be mentioned in the article, lest the readers think that even if "names are not correct, and language is not in accordance with the truth of things," yet "affairs" can nevertheless be carried to "success." Not only Confucius, but we too, are engaged in "rectifying names." Confucius was rectifying the names of the feudal order; we are rectifying the names of the revolutionary order. Confucius gave primacy to the names, while we give primacy to reality. The difference lies here. Idealist philosophy has another strong point, which is its emphasis on conscious activity. Confucius was like this, too, so he could arouse people's attention and suppon. One of the imponant reasons why mechanistic materialism cannot overcome idealism is that it underestimates conscious activity. We should mention Confucius's strong point in this respect. 6 2. "The relationship between father and son in a family reflects that of a ruler and his minister in a society" should preferably be stated in reverse: ''The relationship between ruler and minister in a society (it would probably be more appropriate to say in a state) reflects that of father and son in a family." 7 ln fact, before the state appeared in slave society and feudal society, families already existed. The patriarchal system in the clan society of the later period of primitive communist society was the precursor of the formation of the state. Therefore, "filial piety became loyalty," and not the other way around. All states (polities) manifest economic centralization. Whereas in a feudal state, the family is the basic unit of the small-producers' economy of the time, or, as Boda says, "the basic cell," the feudal state emerged in conformity with the centralization (the feudal centralization) of these units. 3. The Problem of the Doctrine of the Mean Boda 's explanation is correct, but inadequate. "Excess is just like falling shon" is a method of struggling on two fronts; it is one of the imponant methods of thought. All philosophies, all thought, and all everyday life must have a struggle on two fronts, in order to confirm the relative stability [of the relationship] between things and concepts. "A given quality contains a given quantity" (it would be better to say, "A given quality is inherent in a given quantity") is correct,8 but the important thing is to find out and ascenain that given quality from the quantity of a thing, and set boundaries for it so that it can be distinguished from other

6. The published text of Chen Boda's anicle contains (p. 21) a brief paragraph referring to positive elements in Confucius's thought, especially his emphasis on ''conscious activity," but the point is not stressed. 7. Chen Boda did not follow Mao completely on this point; he treats the filial piety of the son toward the father, and the loyalty of the minister to the ruler, as two closely linked concepts, both equally oppressive of the irulividual. "Filial piety," he writes, "is the epitome of loyalty; loyalty is filial piety writ large" (p. 21). 8. In this case, Chen Boda added Mao's formulation after his own as an alternative. See the published anicle, p. 22.

FEBRUARY 1939

35

different qualities. This is the purpose of fighting on two fronts. In the article it is best to quote from the Doctrine of the Mean, "There was Shun-He indeed was greatly wise! Shun loved to question others, and to study their words ..... He took hold of their two extremes, determmed the Mean, and employed 11 m hts government of the people,"9 as well as "This was the manner of Hui-he made choice of the Mean, and whenever he got hold of what was good, he clasped it firmly, as if wearing it on his breast, and did not lose it," 10 which further illustrates the meaning of the doctrine of the mean. Zhu Xi commented on the phrase "There was Shun-he was indeed greatly wise," saying, ''The two extremes refer to the extremes of public opinion. For all things have two extremes, such as big and small, and thick and thin. Within the realm of good, one again examines the two extremes and chooses the mean and uses it. Then the choice is very carefully made, and the use optimal. But if it does not depend on whether my capacity for discernment is not inadequate, how can I achieve this? This is through knowing what is neither excessive nor falling short, and thus practicing the Way." 11 This annotation is basically correct, but "the two extremes" should not be explained simply as "the extremes of public opinion" but, rather, should be explained clearly to refer to "excess" and "falling short." "Excess" is a "leftist" thing, and "falling short" is a "rightist" thing. According to our present point of view, excess and falling short refer to the movements of a certain object in time and space. When it develops to a certain state, quantitative relationships should determine a certain quality. This is "mean" or "the invariable mean," or "the right time." If we say that this thing is not in that state, but has entered into another state, then it has a different quality, and has become "excessive" or gone "to the left." If we say that this thing still lingers in the same state without new development, then it is an old thing, a stagnant concept, conservative and stubborn; it is rightist and "has fallen short." Confucius's concept of the doctrine of the mean has no such idea of development. For the most part, it rejected ideas which differed from those it had already established. There is no doubt, however, that it did look for and ascertain quality from quantity, and oppose "left" and right deviations. This thought was indeed, as Boda says, a great discovery and a great achievement of Confucius. It is an important field of philosophy, and merits an explanation. 4. When we talk about Confucius being "anxious about personal gains and losses," we need not give the example of his "expressing joy" when he was serving as prime minister of the state of Lu, because you cannot point out what other more

9. Doctrine of the Mean, VI (Legge, Vol. I, p. 388). 10. The reference is to the Doctrine of the Mean, VIII (Legge, Vol. I, p. 389). This and the previous quotation correspond to the same passages Mao cited in his letter of February I, 1939, regarding Chen Boda's article on Mozi. 11. The quotation is from Zhu Xi, Sishujizhu (Annotations on the Four Books).

36 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

proper attitudes there are besides "expressing joy" when one becomes an official.12 The problem lies, rather, in whether he should be in that office, but not whether he should have expressed joy. 5. As far as Confucius's ethical theories are concerned, they should be examined on the basis of materialism and be subjected to more criticism, so as to make it easier to bring out the differences of principle with the ethical views of the Guomindang (the Guomindang takes the greatest pleasure in quoting Confucius in this respect). For example, take "wisdom, benevolence, and courage." Since Confucius's wisdom (in theory) was not based on objective facts, it was arbitrary and idealist. Consequently, benevolence and courage, as seen by them (in practice), were benevolent only toward the ruling class but not toward the masses. The courage was the courage to oppress people and to defend feudalism, but not to serve the people. Wisdom, benevolence, and courage, called "the three virtues," have always been muddled concepts. Wisdom is a theory, a thought, a plan, a program, a policy. Benevolence and courage are attitudes which should be adopted when theories, policies, and so on are being carried out. Benevolence is like what we now call "to love and unite with," and courage is like what we now call "overcoming hardships." (At present, when we say love and unite with, and overcome hardships, these are all materialist, while Confucius's wisdom, benevolence, and courage were all subjective.) And yet there are even more important attitudes, such as "loyalty." If you are not loyal, then "wisdom" is merely empty talk without credibility, benevolence is only hypocritical, and courage is an empty shell. Moreover, benevolence and righteousness must be considered together. "Righteousness is that which is appropriate to the circumstances."" It can be said that righteousness is in the realm of "wisdom," while benevolence is only one of the attitudes adopted in practice. And yet it was put above righteousness, giving rise to the confused thought of idealism. This thing called "benevolence" has been taken advantage of by idealist thinkers for thousands of years since Confucius, and they have made a great mess out of it. Indeed, it has done great harm to people. I think such ethical categories of Confucius should be criticized on the basis of historical materialism and put in their proper place. Comrade Boda has made some criticisms, but I still feel they are not severe enough. 6. Apart from the failure to point out clearly the fundamentally metaphysical character of Confucius's epistemological and sociological theories, there are ex-

12. This example does not appear in the published version of Chen's article. Apparently he responded to Mao's criticism by deleting the whole passage. 13. This is a truncated version of a quotation from Zhu Xi's Sishu jizhu, the section commenting on book I, chapter I of the Mencius, which is devoted to the relation between benevolence and righteousness. Zhu Xi wrote: "Benevolence is the virtue of the heart, and the principle of love. Righteousness is the structure of the heart, and what is appropriate to the circumstances."

FEBRUARY /939

37

planations of many aspects of his dialectics, such as the relationship between name and reality. writing and substance, and words and action. 7. In addition, this article does not have an overall theme, so when a beginner reads it, he will feel it is not very systematic. If a brief explanation summing up the philosophy of Confucius could be placed at the beginning or the end of the article, pointing out its basic nature, that would be better. All ofBoda's articles that I have read so far seem to have the same defect. I have just casually jotted down the points above, without thinking deeply about them. MaoZedong

To Zhang Wentian (February 22, 1939, at night)

I have read Comrade [Chen] Bod a's article again. The corrections are all fine. Yet there are still the following suggestions. Please pass them on to Comrade Boda for his consideration. I. As regards Confucius's achievement in popularizing education, he quoted Guo Moruo's words, to the effect that Confucius's only achievement was the popularization of education, and he had no other achievements at all. This is not in accord with the facts and is also in contradiction with this article, so I feel that this quotation can be omitted. 2. I added a sentence before the last paragraph, making it even more emphatic.' 3. This article and Boda's articles on Laozi and Mozi 2 have quoted many passages from the writings of Zhang [Binglin], Liang [Qichao], Hu [Shi], and Feng [Youlan]. 3 I have no objection to quoting their writings, but in the appropriate place there should be a critical statement, explaining that they have made contributions to the Chinese academic realm, but that there are basic differences be-

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 150-52, where it is printed from the manuscript. I. The first sentence of the last paragraph of Chen Boda' s article (p. 24) reads as follows: "Confucius is the first fully developed orthodox representative in the intellectual domain of the ruling class in our country's feudal society, and at the same time he is truly the founder of China's idealist philosophy." We have no way of knowing whether or not this is the sentence Mao had written, and to which he refers here. 2. The article on Mozi is that commented on in Mao's letter, translated above, dated February I, 1939. The article on Laozi, entitled "Laozi's Philosophical Thought," appeared in Jiefang, no. 63/64, 1939. 3. Liang Qichao (1873-1929), hao Rengong, a native of Guangdong, was one of the two leading figures in the Reform movement of 1898, and Mao held him in high esteem during his student days. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a native of Anhui, took his Ph.D. at Colum· bia under John Dewey. He was the first to advocate writing in the spoken language, and played an active role in the May Fourth movement. At that time, Mao was influenced by him to some degree, but Hu was a Western-style liberal, and Mao's attitude toward him soon changed as he evolved toward Communism. As for the two whose writings Mao says here he "has not studied," Zhang Binglin (1869-1936), a native of Zhejiang, was an eminent scholar and historian, who played a central role in the introduction of the concept of nationalism into China at the tum of the century. Feng Youlan (1895-1990), a native of Henan, who had obtained a doctorate from Columbia University, was a leading nee-traditionalist scholar. 38

FEBRUARY 1939 39

tween their thought and ours. Basically, Liang's thought was idealism and metaphysics, and Hu's was vulgar materialism and relativism, as well as metaphysics. As for Zhang and Feng ... (I have not studied Zhang and Feng). Without such a simple statement, there is the danger that the reader might believe them. Since those two articles on Laozi, and so on, have already been published, a statement may be added at the end of the article on Confucius (with an indentation of two characters), explaining that all the quotations from these people that appear in that article, the two previous articles, and all the articles to be published in the future are quoted only for what was correctly said on a given subject or what was correctly said in general, and that as for criticism of the errors of their entire thought systems, that is another matter, and needs to be addressed at another time.4 Am I right or wrong? Please deliberate with Comrade Chen. Salutations! MaoZedong

4. A note along these lines was indeed added at the end of Chen Boda's article (p. 24).

Preface to Nie Rongzhen 's An Anti-Japanese Model Base-The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region (March 2, 1939)

The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Border Region is a fortress of the War of Resistance in North China. There they have put nationalism into practice by firmly maintaining resistance against Japan; there they have put into practice people's rights through democracy and freedom; and there they have also begun to put into practice the principle of the people's livelihood by improving the livelihood of the people. In a word, there they are putting into practice the Three People's Principles, which are interconnected and inseparable one from the other. It will not do merely to talk about the Three People's Principles, nor will it do to carry out only one of the Three People's Principles. Empty talk has no effect on the actual situation. The enemy has already occupied more than half of China, and who with even a modicum of conscience could still today be offering only empty talk? The military War of Resistance in itself counts as putting into practice the principle of nationalism, but without resolutely putting into practice the principles of people's rights and people's livelihood in coordination with the War of Resistance, it would be impossible to defeat the Japanese bandits. In his last will and testament, Mr. Sun Yatsen said that through his forty years of experience he was profoundly aware that to reach the goal of freedom and equality, it was necessary to carry out two great revolutionary principles, namely (I) to arouse the popular masses, and (2) to join together in a common struggle with all those nations in the world that have treated us as equals. How could we possibly fail to carry out Mr. Sun's final instructions now that our nation's peril is as grave as it is today? To arouse the masses is to put into practice the principles of people's rights and people's livelihood; there is no other way to do so. The principle of people's rights in particular is like yearning for clouds in the face of drought and cannot be put off a moment longer. The program of a War of Resistance and nation building passed at the Guomindang's Provisional National Assembly has been promoted by Chairman

Our source for this text isMaoZedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 25-26. where it is reproduced from Nie Rongzhen's book, as published in December 1939 by the publishing house of Balujun junzheng zazhi. 40

MARCH 1939 41

Chiang and the National Government at the top and supported by the popular masses all over the country from below, yet many people remain deeply silent about this program. Not only do they keep silent on the matter, they actually interfere with it. With regard to the parts of the program having to do with putting into practice the people's rights, such as guaranteeing the people's freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association, instead of being rewarded, those who carry it out are rather penalized. This is indeed an extremely bizarre situation and absolutely must undergo a change. The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region's spirit of resolutely carrying out the Three People's Principles is worthy of admiration and merits reward. In the past Wang Jingwei and his ilk went about claiming all the time that the Eighth Route Army and the guerrilla forces were "roving around [you] but not hitting Ui],"t or "were neither moving nor hitting," and certain yesmen rose up to echo them. But Wang Jingwei himself"moved" right into the bosom of Japan, and the yesmen are engaging in "guerrilla warfare" within the world of their four and eight rounds of mahjong. They don't even know enough to be ashamed of themselves! In the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region there are no Wang Jingwei followers, nor are there four and eight rounds of mahjong. There instead they are resolutely carrying out the Three People's Principles and have founded the fortress of the War of Resistance in North China through the arduous struggle of guerrilla warfare. It is not without reason that Chairman Chiang has emphatically praised the war in North China. This small book by Comrade Nie Rongzhen paints a vivid picture describing the actual experience of this area over a year and a half and how they put into practice the Three People's Principles and persisted in waging guerrilla warfare. It not only suffices to defeat the nonsense spread by the Chinese traitors and their yesmen, but also can serve as a model for other places in showing how to put into practice the Three People's Principles and how to arouse the popular masses to coordinate efforts closely in the resistance against Japan. Anyone calling himself a nonbeliever should surely read this book. On the eve of its publication, I am delighted to write the preface for it. MaoZedong

I. This is a play on the Chinese tenn for guerrilla warfare, youji zhan, frequently used in Guomindang propaganda at this time to suggest that the Communist armies were not really fighting the Japanese. Mao returned to this issue in his talk of July 9, 1939, translated below. For the context, see above, the Introduction.

Views on Improving the Plan of Education at Branches of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (March 6, 1939)

To Zhu, Peng, Zuo, and Fu, 1 and for the information of He and Zhou2 at the First Branch: With regard to the education plan for branches of the Anti-Japanese University, there is a need to strengthen military education and intensify military life for the purpose of training junior military officers, and a need to readjust educational methods and to train instructors so as to make them more able to teach the new types of students who are receiving the education. We agree in principle with all of these proposals for change, but on several specific questions we would like to offer the following suggestions: I. Even though the purpose is to train military cadres, political education should still occupy an important place, at least on a par with that of military education. For this reason, Leninism must be taught as part of the subject matter of political courses. This is a very basic question in arming their minds politically. In addition, movements of the popular masses, the question of the Communist Party, and the question of the Eighth Route Army should be taught as special courses. The united front, on the other hand, may be taught as part of the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Party building is to be part of education only within the Party, and ordinary students are to be taught only about the question of the Communist Party. The present international situation need not be taught either, so as to put the emphasis on education regarding current affairs.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 455-57, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Zhu and Peng refer to Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. Zuo and Fu refer to Zuo Quan and Fu Zhong, who were, respectively, deputy chief-of-staff and deputy head of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army. 2. He and Zhou refer to He Changgong and Zhou Chunquan, respectively, president and vice-president of the First Branch of the Anti-Japanese University. 42

MARCH 1939 43

2. In order to deepen education, it is imperative to maintain the tradition of fewer but better with regard to educational methods in school, so that under no circumstance should students attend more than six classes a week. 3. Therefore, it seems that there is too much military education. If the length of the educational course remains eight months, then, aside from giving priority to infantry tactics below the company level and guerrilla tactics, only a little strategic theory may be taught (using On Protracted War as the textbook), as well as the knowledge that junior officers must have, on building fortifications, weaponry, and topography. Although transportation, the military system, horsemanship, hygiene, and rules and regulations are also important, it may still be better not to teach these subjects because of time constraints. 4. The students will work mainly in the Eighth Route Army in the future, so, in order that Party education may be strengthened, Party branches should be brought into the open, and the Party's system of scheduling the day should be put into effect. 5. During the eight months of study, it would be best for the students to have the opportunity to go into the armed forces for practical training for approximately one month. It is hoped that you will give consideration to the above views. Also please convey this to Nie and Peng,3 and to the Second Branch School. Mao [Zedong] Teng [Daiyuan]4

Wang [Jiaxiang] Luo [Ruiqing]s

3. The reference is to Nie Rongzhen, who was then the commander and concurrently political commissar of the Eighth Route Anny for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area, and Peng Zhen, who was secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 4. In addition to Mao and Wang, who had signed the previous telegram, this one bears the names of Teng Daiyuan (1904-1974), a native of Hunan, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and was at this time chief of staff of the Military Affairs Commission, and Tan Zheng (1907-1988), a native of Hunan, who had joined the Chinese Commu· nist Party in 1927, participated in the Long March, and was at this time deputy head of the General Political Department. 5. Luo Ruiqing (1906-1978), a native of Sichuan, was at this time vice-president and political commissar of the Anti-Japanese University.

Women, Unite (March 8, 1939)

Comrades: Today we are holding a meeting for women. A great many people are participating; there are female comrades and male comrades, old grannies, and even small children. Everyone has come to commemorate "March eighth," to mark this international women's day. As regards the commemoration of "March eighth," all the women in the entire world, except those extremely dissolute female vampires, are panicipating and holding meetings wherever it is possible. Our female compatriots here in China, in every part of the country, except for those female Chinese traitors, are also panicipating in commemorative activities and holding meetings wherever possible. Why are we commemorating "March the eighth" and holding meetings? Because we want to form organizations. Why do women want to form organizations? For the purpose of winning freedom and equality for women. At present, our Chinese nation is neither free nor equal; it is being tied up and oppressed by imperialism. The Chinese people are neither free nor equal; they are being tied up and oppressed by feudal forces. Therefore, our Chinese nation and our Chinese people must shatter the oppression of imperialism and the feudal forces, and struggle hard to obtain freedom and equality for the nation and the people. In every country in the world except the Soviet Union, none of the ordinary people are free and equal. Now they are struggling courageously for this very objectivefreedom and equality. The oppressed people throughout the world, men and women, total more than a billion. They are all carrying on a fierce struggle against the oppressors. In this China of ours there are 450 million compatriots, men and women, all of whom are locked in a cruel struggle against Japanese imperialism. In these struggles, whether in China or in the world as a whole, the men assuredly have a great deal of force, but what about the women? Do the women have strength or not? Some people say that women have no strength. Others say that women do have a bit of strength, but Our source for this text is MaoZedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 166-72, where it is reproduced from the stenographic record of Mao's speech celebrating Women's Day on March 8, 1939, as preserved in the Central Archives. 44

MARCH 1939 45

very little. Even among female compatriots themselves, there are those who express the view that their strength is not at all great. Such ways of speaking and thinking are wrong. In every struggle, if we say that the strength of men is very great, so is the strength of women. Without the participation of women, nothing in this world can be accomplished. If women do not participate in our fight against Japan, we will not succeed; if women do not participate in the production campaign, it will not succeed either. Whatever the matter in hand, without women, nothing can succeed. In order for women to be strong, there must be one more condition-they must form organizations. Without an organization, their strength is scattered and dissipated. Each person is thinking only of herself. This is what is meant by [the saying] "If hearts are not united, strength cannot be combined." When there is an organization, hearts will be united, strength will be combined, and, then, with hearts and strength united, we can accomplish great things. [The saying] "When hearts are united, mountains can be moved" conveys the truth that in organization there is strength. If we take a look right now, do the female comrades throughout the country have women's organizations or not? Yes, some do, but very few. There are somewhat more in our Border Region, but in other places all over the country, there are very few. There are many places where there are simply none at all. As a result, the 225 million female compatriots in the entire country are not showing the strength which they should have in this great national war of self-defense. We should now hold big meetings, make speeches, write articles, and conduct propaganda to call on all the female compatriots throughout the country to join the common societies organized by men and women together, and to organize societies for the women themselves. They should join the self-defense army and so on. In addition, we should call on those women who are willing and determined to struggle for the realization of communism to join the Communist Party. In this way an enormous force will be created. For example, the one million women out of the population of two million in the border regions are all organized into societies. If the 225 million women in the whole country organized into groups, this strength would be greater. If the one billion women in the entire world were organized into groups, and if everyone understood the affairs of the world, as well as the truth about the world, so that their hearts were united, the result would be an even more tremendous force. Whoever dared to bully them would be exterminated by these women. In sum, they should organize into groups, organize all kinds of groups, from small groups to big groups, organize big groups out of small groups, unite hearts and minds, gather together the strength to carry on great struggles. This kind of struggle is sure to be victorious. There are two kinds of people in the world at present. One kind is the good people; the other kind is the bad people. Those who help us and show us sympathy, such as the Soviet Union, the oppressed people in all the colonies and semicolonies, and the workers, the peasants, and the oppressed in all the capitalist countries are the good people. Those who bully and invade us, such as Japanese imperialists and

46

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

other imperialists, are the bad people. In China there are also good people and bad people. The workers, the peasants, and all the progressive anti-Japanese elements are good people; they want to resist Japan and progress. The Chinese traitors are bad people; instead of resisting Japan, they want to capitulate to Japan. There are also some diehard elements who are likewise bad people. They do not want to progress; they want to suppress the progressive forces. At present the Chinese people, men and women alike, are being bullied by the bad people in the world as well as in China. They suffer under layers and layers of oppression. First comes the oppression of foreign imperialism, particularly the oppression of Japanese imperialism; then comes the oppression of the Chinese traitors, the diehard elements, and the corrupt officials, local bullies, and bad gentry. What is more, our female comrades suffer under an additional layer of oppression, which is oppression by men. For example, men beat their wives; they look down upon women; they say that women are capable of nothing and do not allow them to participate in national affairs; they hire female workers to do the same kind of work as men, but pay them less. Naturally, such prejudice is social prejudice, and not an issue between the two sexes. Such oppression is social oppression, and not an issue between the two sexes either. Thus, we Chinese people, men or women, must all rise up and oppose the oppression of foreign imperialism, the Chinese traitors, the diehard elements, the local bullies, and bad gentry. Our female compatriots, however, must also rise up and smash those social prejudices and that social oppression. Women, like men, must have freedom and equality. These words have been repeated for hundreds of years in the world, but how many places have turned them into reality? Which country in the world has truly applied them, apart from the Soviet Union? In China, words such as "equal treatment of men and women" have also been repeated for many years, but where have they been carried out in the entire country except in the border region? It is evident that women's liberation and social liberation are closely connected. The women's liberation movement should exist as an integral part of the movement for social liberation. The liberation of women cannot be achieved in isolation from a movement of social liberation; at the same time, without a women's movement, social liberation is impossible. Consequently, if we truly seek social liberation, we must mobilize the broad masses of women to participate in it; by the same token, in order for women to seek their own true liberation, they must take part in the struggle for social liberation. From the very beginning of the national-democratic revolution in modem China, guns have been used, and the struggle has now been going on for a hundred years. But <;luring these hundred years, every revolutionary struggle, after repeated ups and downs, ended in failure. Well then, will we fail again this time? Fighting against Japan, will we be defeated again? Will the whole of China suffer once again? Are we going to continue to suffer from the oppression of imperialism, the Chinese traitors, the diehard elements, local bullies, and bad gentry? In my opinion, this time the revolution will not fail, we will not be defeated in our fight against Japan.

MARCil 1939

47

The struggle this time is different from those struggles in the past hundred years. We suffered failure every time in the past, but this time we will definitely win. Why? Because this time, the Japanese imperialists have invaded us and occupied so much of our territory that if this China of ours is going to survive, we must definitely drive them out, we must persist in the War of Resistance and carry it to the end. The majority of the people in all China agree to carry it to the end. In the past, a few wavering elements did not let the broad masses of the people join the anti-Japanese united front. Now these elements have gradually taken themselves off. As a result, more people have joined the anti-Japanese united front. There are united fronts established by men and women together, there are united fronts for women alone, and there are united fronts for children. In sum, the number of united fronts is increasing day by day, the groups are becoming bigger day by day, the minds of the people are becoming more united day by day, and, consequently, our strength is becoming greater day by day. If we continue to carry on the struggle in this way, there can be no doubt that final victory will be ours. Besides, because the

world is now in a new era of war and revolution. an era in which the forces for socialist revolution are rising and the reactionary forces of capitalism are declining, this constitutes an excellent condition for the victory of the Chinese revolution. Consequently, this revolutionary struggle can never be like that of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the 1911 Revolution, and the May Fourth movement, nor will it be like the great revolution of 1925-1927, all of which suffered defeat. On the contrary, it can definitely be victorious. In our border region, it is not only men who can hold big meetings; women can hold their own big meetings independently. Our Communist Party calls on all Chinese compatriots, male or female, to hold meetings and organize groups. Now we especially call on women to stand up. Today, at this gathering to commemorate "March Eighth;' we are putting forward a call, launching a mobilization, to connect the big women's societies all over the country, to connect the big societies of both men and women all over the country. Let everyone come and contribute to the solving of China's problems. Down with Japanese imperialism, down with the Chinese traitors, down with the diehard elements, corrupt officials, local bullies, and bad gentry. Let the Chinese nation and the Chinese people have freedom and equality. Solve the women's problem, smash the social prejudice and oppression of looking down upon and insulting women, so that women can achieve freedom and equality. We must see to it that men do not suffer and woman do not suffer; we must ensure that no one suffers. We must ensure that everyone has enough food to eat, enough clothing to wear, and work to do, and carry forward the Chinese revolution to complete victory. Such is the appeal and the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and all our Communist Party members throughout the country, whether men or women, agree to it and support it, and are striving to put these views into practice. We hope that all the male and female compatriots throughout the country will strive hard to carry out these views. We Communists always stand together with those who fight for freedom and equality.

48 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

All the ordinary people in the country say that our border region is a good place and that there is freedom and equality here. Does this then mean that we have no shortcomings? Of course we may have shortcomings, but, compared with the country as a whole, we are much better. If you compare us with foreign countries, except for the Soviet Union, there is not a single one of the foreign countries that can compare with us. Nevertheless, we still do not feel self-satisfied about this. We must continue to progress; we want to establish a model for the whole world and the whole country, for North China and Central China, and for Xi' an. Over there in Xi'an, ordinary people are not allowed to hold meetings; they do not have freedom, nor do they have equality. We Communists totally disapprove of such things. Today we are having a meeting, and we will send a telegram to the whole country, to let the ordinary people out there see how the ordinary people here in our place are involved in management, how the women here are handling affairs, and how the ordinary people are living their lives. We also want the bad people out there to see how great is the strength which results when ordinary people have organized groups, and when women have organized societies. The bad people should awake, they should no longer hold blindly to superstitions such as "one man takes everything for himself' and "no one dares to harm me"; they should never again treat the ordinary people as "Adou." 1 The people are capable, theirs is the greatest strength, and once they have organized into groups, they will be a forever victorious and unrivaled army, which nothing under heaven can stop. Comrades, just what is meant by freedom and equality for women? It is when women have the freedom to conduct their own affairs, the freedom to hold meetings, and the freedom of speech. Without these rights, it is impossible to talk about freedom and equality. We Communists promote these rights, we hope that all of you comrades will unite together and form a single bloc. Let the women in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region first unite, before going on to organize in the country as a whole. The students of the Women's University2 should copy this method of Yan'an when they go to different areas in the future, apply the good methods of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. If they continue in this way for eight to ten years, by then, the people of all China will have achieved liberation. The 225 million men will have been liberated, and so will the 225 million women. 3 It is impossible to achieve this goal in a short period of time-it will I. Adou was the son and heir of the founder of the Shu Han dynasty. The novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, one of Mao's favorite books, treats his stupidity and incompetence as a primary cause of the collapse of the kingdom founded by his father, Liu Bei.

2. The Women's University had just been founded in Yan'an. 3. A brief summary of this lecture was published at the time in Xin Zhonghua bao, March 13, 1939, and has been reproduced in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 27. After a

few sentences evoking Mao's main theme, that China's liberation can be achieved only by the joint efforts of its 225 million women and 225 million men, this text continues: We should learn from Krupskaia; we should learn from the model female leader martyred in the era of the Great Revolution, the Communist Party member Xiang

MARCH 1939 49

take eight to ten years. Nor will it be possible with only a few people; it can only be achieved by the people of the whole country working together. It will not be easy to accomplish; we must redouble our efforts. With the redoubled efforts of the people in the border region, and the efforts of the people in the whole country, and with the necessary time, we can certainly achieve our goal. Freedom and equality lie ahead of us, comrades. Let everyone make great efforts!

Jingyu, who had struggled for the liberation of women, the liberation of the laboring masses, and the cause of Communism all her life. We need to cultivate thousands and hundreds of heroines, hundreds and thousands of professionals and "Ph.D.s" [boshi] for the women's movement.

It is not clear why the official transcript makes no reference to Lenin's wife, Krupskaia, or to the revolutionary martyr Xiang Jingyu, who had been a close friend of Mao's in his youth. (See Volume I of our edition, especially his letter to her, pp. 595-96.)

Talk at the Evening Meeting Commemorating Marx and Sun Yatsen (March 12, 1939)

(Special to our paper) ... The majestic "Intemationale" and the national anthem provided an ensemble combining the spirit of internationalism and the spirit of nationalism. After Comrade Mo Wenhua, on behalf of the presidium, proclaimed the significance of this meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong strode onto the platfonn amidst enthusiastic applause. He explained the significance of commemorating these two great revolutionary teachers, and on the basis of the Director General's testament, he explained the important thought of Mr. Sun Yatsen 1 about arousing the popular masses to struggle together. The Director General said in his testament that he had devoted himself to the revolution for forty years and that these forty years had led to the following two conclusions: (I) arouse the popular masses, and (2) unite with all those nations in the world that treat us on an equal basis. Mr. Yatsen had a deep understanding of the importance of arousing the popular masses and of the fact that without them we cannot defeat imperialism.... Now Marxism and the Three People's Principles have been linked together, and, as regards arousing the popular masses and uniting with all the nations in the world which treat us on an equal basis to reach the goal of attaining freedom and equality for China, they are basically identical.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 29, where it is reproduced from Xin ZhonghUJJ bao, March 16, 1939. I. Two points should be clarified here. First, Sun Yatsen's title, as leader of the Guomindang, was zongli, nonnally translated "director general." When he died and was replaced by Chiang Kaishek, Chiang was given a slightly different title because it was felt that Sun was unique and no one could succeed him as the founder of the party. Consequently, throughout this edition, "the Director General" is capitalized wherever it occurs and always refers to Sun even if his name is not mentioned. Second, Sun is, with Chiang, one of the two persons who are known in this edition by the Cantonese fonn of their names. In Sun's case, the matter is further complicated by the fact that he is rarely designated in Chinese sources by his hao Yatsen (Yixian in standard pronunciation) but, rather, by an alternative hao, Zhongshan, or by his original given name (ming), Wen. In the introduction to this text he is referred to as Sun Zhongshan and in the following paragraph Mao calls him "Mr. Zhongshan." For the sake of consistency we have rendered this as "Mr. Yatsen," even though that would sound odd in Chinese. 50

MARCH /939

51

The Guomindang and the Communist Party should unite very well, and cooperate for a long time to come! The silence of the meeting hall was broken by thunderous applause, while the brilliant

lights shone on a sea of excited faces.

Views on the New Fourth Army Staff Work Conference 1 (March 16, 1939)

Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], Zhou [Zikun), and Lai [Chuanzhu): 2 Our views on the staff conference follow; please take them into consideration. The general orientation for the conference should be to review and summarize experiences and lessons learned from past staff work, to expand on its achievements, to correct its mistakes, to establish various systems for staff work, and to define the main content of staff work. We must insist that the political caliber of staff personnel be raised, and that the level of some forrner technical staff workers be raised to the level of tactical staff personnel and strategic staff personnel, in order to improve the work of the commanding organs and to prepare them to exercise leadership in battle under new circumstances. For this purpose: I. In addition to summarizing past work, the conference should decide on future work. deterrnine the tasks of staff departments at various levels and the division of labor among the various sections, establish various systems, forrnulate

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 458-59, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. This was the New Fourth Army's second conference on staff work, held at Army Headquarters in Yunling, Jingxian, in Anhui Province, from March l8to 24, 1939. 2. Ye Ting (1896-1946), zi Xiyi, was a native of Guangdong. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924, while studying in the Soviet Union, participated in the Nanchang and Guangzhou uprisings of 1927, and then spent a decade in Europe, returning to China in

1937 on the outbreak of the war against Japan to become commanderpin·chief of the New Fourth Army. Xiang Ying (1898-1941), a native of Hubei, joined the Chinese Communist Party in

1922 and was active in the labor movement from then until 1927. In 1928, he went to Moscow to attend the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, at which he was elected a member of the Central Committee and of the Standing Committee of the Polit-

buro. During the Jiangxi Soviet period, he occupied various responsible posts in the Party and the government. When the main Red Anny forces embarked on the Long March, he was left behind to engage in guerrilla warfare. After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he became deputy commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army. Zhou Zikun was deputy chief of staff, and Lai Chuanzhu was chief of staff. 52

MARCH 1939 53

various rules and procedures, and stipulate the priorities in our work during a certain period of time. 2. In addition to discussing future work, the training of staff officers and the enhancement of their education should be discussed. This should be done on the basis of the priorities specified above. 3. The level of political position and conviction of staff personnel is to be raised. 4. Sufficient preparatory work should be done beforehand, such as holding smaller meetings in advance, and discussing separately the work of the various departments· and various systems and regulations. It is expected that you will inform us by telegram of the results of the conference. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Teng [Daiyuan]

ToNie Rongzhen (March 18, 1939)

Comrade Rongzhen: I have received the [manuscript of the] book you wrote, 1 the album of photographs you sent me, and your letter. These are all very precious things. We plan to publish the book in both Yan 'an and Chongqing (Director Wang [Jiaxiang] and I will each write a preface to it). The photographs are being passed around for all the comrades to see. I hope that you continue to struggle hard, deepen your studies, and write more new works. MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 153, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. This refers to Nie's book about the anti-Japanese struggles in the Shanxi-Chahar-

Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Base Area, which was published in Yan'an by the publishing house of

the Balujunjunzheng zazhi in December 1939. Its title, personally inscribed by Mao, was An Anti-Japanese Model Base Area-The Shanxi-Chtlhar-Hebei Border Region. Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang each wrote a preface to it (see above, the text dated March 2, 1939, for Mao's preface). 54

Address at the Evening Meeting Commemorating "March 18th" (March 18, 1939)

.. "March 18th"-a magnificent and heroic day dyed in blood! Shortly after six o'clock, the Shaangong Auditorium was packed with people as usual, both inside and outside . . The program of the meeting began in a solemn atmosphere . ... Waving his hand as if to sweep away all the traitors to the nation, Comrade Mao Zedong said:

If we want to eliminate the enemy we must wage two kinds of war: One is an overt war, and the other is a covert war. The covert war consists of both strategic offensives, striking deep within the enemy's heart, and strategic defense to protect ourselves. To defeat the enemy it is necessary to attack from both within and without, so both are of equally great significance.... [We] demand that every security staff member recognize the importance and honor of this task, and we hope that each and every security staff member has stamina and perseveres until the victory of the War of Resistance and until the final victory of Communism. The audience responded with prolonged applause.

Our source for this text is MaoZedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 31, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 22, 1939. 55

Collecting Information About the Deeds of National Heroes in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and Disseminating Propaganda About Them 1 (March 18, 1939)

Many national heroes have emerged during the War of Resistance from among the officers and soldiers of our Eighth Route Army and our New Fourth Army. Praising these heroes and their heroic deeds has important significance with regard to both outside propaganda and internal education. The various political organs should pay attention to collecting the deeds of such heroes, and, in addition to publishing them in various army newspapers, to selecting the most important ones to inform us by telegram and broadcast them. From now on, all military and political publications will include a special column on War of Resistance heroes of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, so it is hoped that political departments at all levels will supply these materials.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, p. 43, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. This telegram was addressed by Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zheng, and Xiao Jingguang to the political organs of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Xiao Jingguang ( 1903-1989), a native of Hunan, was at this time commander of the rear echelon of the Eighth Route Army. 56

The Emphasis in Consolidation Should Be Placed on North China; Development Should Stress Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei (March 19, 1939)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai, and for the information ofZhu [De] and Yang [Shangkun]: I have taken note of your telegram, and my reply is as follows: I. It is quite correct to expand the army to the fullest extent possible. As for laying the emphasis in consolidation upon North China, I have read all your plans, and they are all correct. Development, on the other hand, should stress the five provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, and for the moment please pay special attention to the province of Shandong. In this province we already have a foundation, but we lack a leadership backbone, so when the enemy's new offensive begins, please think about solving this problem of a leadership backbone. Northern Jiangsu should also be developed by southern Shandong. As for the development of the three provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, Henan in particular is the pivotal region in the whole country's protracted War of Resistance, and although it is not possible at present to achieve large-scale development, the greatest efforts should be made to prepare for it. 2. In the future for a certain period of time, cadres from Yan'an should be used mainly in Central China, and preparations should be made to use some in the northwest, some in the south, and some in the northeast. As for North China, the main thing is to provide teachers and teaching materials. 3. It may be possible to ask our friends for help in finding personnel for the munitions factory, but it is necessary to wait and see how the negotiations go. I am afraid this may not be dependable, and we should mainly rely upon searching within the country. 4. A production campaign is now being developed in the Border Region so that it will be possible to be self-reliant and self-sufficient when times are most difficult.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 173-75, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 57

58 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

CaoJurut is now in charge of the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Department and cannot be moved. Li Liuru2 can be spared and sent to where you are, but he is in poor health, and would not be able to go until he has had some treatment and rest. Meanwhile I am also considering other candidates and will let you know the results later. 5. It is quite right for the front to pay attention to banks and the collection of taxes, but the fundamental solution lies in production. Please consider mobilizing, within certain relatively stable areas, not only the popular masses but also the organizations, schools, troops (as long as it does not interfere with work, study, and combat), and that you yourselves should engage directly in production. The rear area already has considerable experience and can serve as a reference for you. 6. For cadres in posts, study is very important, and it should become a movement (as long as it does not interfere with work and combat). There should be organizations and methods to manage studying, and in relatively stable institutions a two-hour study regimen should be carried out. The Central Committee has established a Cadre Education Department, and the rear area's experience can serve as a reference for the front. 7. It is quite correct to avoid meeting Lu Zhonglin. 3 The only effective way to deal with such people is to stand one's ground and respond with a firm and uncompromising counterattack. The same method should be used to deal with Shen Honglie4 in Shandong. Shen is now launching a fierce attack on us, so please be sure to give him a firm counterattack. 8. The meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, at which many important issues will be discussed, has been fixed for the end of April. 5 General

I. Cao Juro (1901-1981), a native of Longyan, Fujian, was then deputy head of the Department of Finance and Economy of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee. 2. Li Liuru was then chief secretary in Mao's office. 3. Lu Zhonglin (1884-1966), zi Ruibo, a native ofDingxian (now the city ofDingzhou) in Hehei, had been an important military subordinate of Feng Yuxiang. In 1930 he broke with Feng and went over to Chiang Kaishek. (Regarding Feng and his relations with Chiang Kaishek, see the biographical note on p. 241 of Volume II of this edition, and Mao's leller to him on pp. 460-461 of Volume V.) At this time he was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army's Hebei-Chahar bailie area, and governor of Hebei (then occupied by the Japanese). 4. Shen Hong lie ( 1882-1969), anative ofTianmen, Hubei, was then deputy commanderin-chief of the Guomindang Anny's Shandong-Jiangsu battle area, commander-in-chief of the Shandong guerrilla forces, and governor of Shandong. Shen had succeeded Han Fuju as governor in 1938 when Han was executed for dereliction of duty. 5. The Politburo did not, in fact, meet until July 3, 1939. On this occasion, a dec1aration on the first two years of the War of Resistance. revised by Mao, was adopted and published on July 7. A longer and more important Politburo meeting took place from August 2 to 25. For a brief account of these sessions, see the Introduction.

MARCH 1939 59

Headquarters and the Northern Bureau have decided to send Zhu Rui 6 to attend. There is more than a month before the meeting; please consider the possibility of making a trip to Yan'an on that occasion. MaoZedong

6. Zhu Rui (1905-1948), a native of Jiangsu, had joined the Chinese Communist Pany in 1924. He studied first at Sun Yatsen University and then at an artillery school in Moscow from 1925to 1929, and while there joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Returning to China, he went to the Jiangxi Soviet Republic and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Shandong branch office and political commissar of the Eighth Route Army's First Column.

The Political Direction for the General Mobilization of the National Spirit An Address Given at the Meeting for General Mobilization of the National Spirit and Celebration of the "May First" Labor Day Held by All Circles in Yan 'an

(May 1, 1939)

Comrades: Today all circles in Yan'an are attending this grand meeting in order to carry out a general mobilization of the national spirit. Today is also the "May First" Labor Day, and the fact that we are holding this grand meeting to commemorate it is of great significance. Today is May First. Today, all the proletarians of the whole world, and all the laboring people, are staging demonstrations wherever possible. Comrades! Against whom are they demonstrating? Against fascism! Against the aggressors! Today, all the oppressed peoples of the world, all the oppressed nations of the world, are staging marches and demonstrations everywhere, and are holding meetings against fascism and against the aggressor-bandits! Here in China on this day, the whole of the working class and of the laboring people, wherever possible, are all without exception holding "May First" commemoration meetings protesting against the aggression of Japanese imperialism. At the same time, everywhere throughout China, the people of the whole country-workers, peasants, merchants, students, soldiers, parties, politicians, military, civilians, all parties and factions-are responding to Chairman Chiang's call for the general mobilization of the national spirit. They all vow to oppose the traitors, support the War of Resistance, and concentrate their strength and their wills! To what end? To overthrow Japanese imperialism (applause from the entire audience), to save our China from peril, and to transform her into a new China. (Applause from the entire audience, followed by shouts of: Down with Japanese imperial-

This speech was first published inJiefang. no. 71. May 15, 1939. Our source is MaoZedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 313-19, where it is reproduced from that version. 60

MAY /939

61

ism! Create a new China! ... ) This is the first point I want to make regarding the significance oftoday's meeting. Second, why is it necessary to mobilize the national spirit? Why did Chairman Chiang propose the general mobilization of the national spirit? Because our enemies, in order to achieve their goals and carry out their ideas, want to destroy all of China. The Japanese fascist warlords are engaged in mobilizing all of Japan's national strength to continue the fascist war of aggression, to continue this bandit war, which slaughters the Chinese people. Moreover, right now the bad elements consisting of the Chinese scoundrel Wang Jingwei and his disciples and followers are conducting activities which aid Japanese imperialism, and are favorable neither to the War of Resistance, nor to the country and the nation. They are conducting activities to "overthrow Chiang and oppose Communism." In Hong Kong and Shanghai, they have organized the so-called "Anti-Communist Alliance to Save the Country," headed by Wang Jingwei, and aim to set up a puppet government which will capitulate to Japanese imperialism. Because Japan and these Chinese traitors are running wild in this way, we need to mobilize the national spirit in the whole country and call on all of the 450 million people to unite in a spirit of resisting to the end. We must oppose Japanese imperialism, oppose the Chinese traitors, oppose Wang Jingwei, oppose the Trotskyites, and all the gangs of scoundrels. We must support Chairman Chiang, support the National Government, support Guomindang-Communist cooperation, fight to the end, mobilize all forces, and achieve final victory! How far shall we carry our struggle? We must fight until we have reached the banks ofthe Yalu River! (Applause from the whole hall.) We must recover all our lost territories! (Applause from the whole hall.) We will never stop without achieving our goals. This is why Chairman Chiang has initiated the general mobilization of the national spirit and the Chinese Communist Party has supported Chairman Chiang's call and the general mobilization of the national spirit. Today, all circles in Yan'an, all the Party, political, military, and popular organs, and all schools are meeting here to swear that they will carry out the platform for the general mobilization ofthe national spirit, and that, in order to achieve these same goals, they will assuredly defeat our enemies and build a new China! (Applause from the whole audience, followed by shouts of: Let the people of the whole country unite! Support Chairman Chiang! Carry out the general mobilization ofthe national spirit! Support the Guomindang! Support the Communist Party! Support the long-term cooperation of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party! Down with the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei! Down with the Trotskyites! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!) Third, I will talk about the problem of the state and the nation. Our state is the state of the people of the whole country, the state of the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants. It belongs to all the patriotic people, and does not belong to the Japanese bandits, nor to the Chinese traitors, the followers of Wang Jingwei, or the Trotskyites. Our country wants to expel Chinese traitors like Wang Jingwei. There are still some individuals who do not understand our righteous

62

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

cause; either they are preparing to become Chinese traitors or spiritually they have been captured by the traitors. If they definitely want to follow Wang Jingwei, we will also expel them. For several thousand years, our nation has been an independent and self-respecting nation. It is a nation which cannot coexist with Japanese imperialism. Within our state and nation, we allow only an anti-Japanese government to exist; we will absolutely not tolerate any puppet government. We want to defend our native land; we want to liberate the Chinese nation completely. Japanese imperialism has violated the independence of our state and jeopardized the existence of our nation; we must overthrow it. We must also overthrow all those traitors and collaborators who have sold out the interests of the state and the nation. This is [what is meant by]"Thestate is supreme, the nation is supreme." (The whole audience shouted: Defend our native land, shed our last drop of blood in order to defend our native land! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation! Down with the Chinese traitors and collaborators!) Fourth, in order to succeed in defending our native land, and in liberating the Chinese nation, we must achieve victory in the War of Resistance. The Chinese Communist Party has consistently advocated: "Resisting Japan comes first; everything else should be subordinated to resisting Japan; mobilize all forces so as to win final victory!" What does this mean? It means "Military actions come first, victory comes first." To win victory is our only criterion. Whatever it takes to help us win the war, whatever is conducive to the War of Resistance, we will do and we will support; whatever hinders victory, and whatever obstructs the War of Resistance, we will not do and we will oppose. We will oppose all the actions ofWang's faction, the Trotskyites, the troublemakers, the diehards, and the conspirators. We will destroy all those who are wrecking the War of Resistance! (The entire audience applauded and shouted: Resisting Japan comes first! Everything else is subordinated to resisting Japan! Mobilize all forces! Fight to achieve final victory! Military action comes first! Victory comes first! Oppose compromise and surrender! Oppose the traitors and collaborators!) Fifth, if we aim to reach the goal of final victory, to fight all the way to the banks of the Yalu River, and to recover all the lost territory, we must unite and concentrate the thoughts, will, and strength of the people of the whole nation. This requires in turn that we carry out, strengthen, and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front or, in the words of Chairman Chiang's appeal, "Concentrate our will and our strength." All our wills should focus on the final victory. Could we focus on any other point? Could we reach a peaceful compromise with Japan? Absolutely not! We must fight for the final victory-we must reach this point. All of our forces must be concentrated on the single aspect of the anti-Japanese front. Can we concentrate on some other aspect? Absolutely not! Wang Jingwei wants to concentrate all our force on his front of Chinese traitors and on the front of capitulation to Japan. Would this do? Absolutely not! There are some troublemakers and creators of friction who do not bring the forces together but, on the contrary, disperse them. Is this right? Absolutely not. Therefore, all our wills should be focused

MAY 1939

63

on final victory, and all our forces should be entirely concentrated on the single point of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. We should absolutely not violate these orientations. Those who do violate them we will oppose, overthrow, and regard as Chinese traitors. (Everyone shouted: Concentrate all our wills on the final victory! Concentrate all our forces on the anti-Japanese front!) Sixth, in order to win final victory, in order to strengthen and expand the AntiJapanese National United Front, we must transform the spirit of the citizens of the whole country, and get rid of all the bad and wrong things. Selfishness, cravenly clinging to life instead of braving death, corruption and degeneration, dejection, apathy, ... Are these good? (The audience shouted: No!) These have to be done away with. This is precisely what we mean by our repeated calls for a workstyle of arduous struggle. Our nation has always had a workstyle of arduous struggle, and we must continue to develop it. We must make a fundamental change in the practices of cravenly clinging to life instead of braving death, corruption and degeneration, dejection and apathy, which are currently so widespread among many people. The Communist Party has always advocated a firm and correct political direction. During theW ar of Resistance, we need to correct all the erroneous thinking that is harmful to the War of Resistance. First, there is the treacherous thinking of the Wang Jingwei faction and the Trotskyites. Such thinking, hostile to the state and to the nation, must be corrected. All other kinds of thought harmful to the War of Resistance must also be corrected. For example, some people say, "Marxism is not a good friend of the Three People's Principles." Is this saying correct? Absolutely not! Mr. Sun Yatsen very clearly pointed out, "Marxism is a good friend of the Three People's Principles." Now these people have turned their backs on Mr. Sun's instructions, saying that these two ideologies are not good friends. Such thinking goes against the united front; it goes against the thought of more than 90 percent of the laboring people and against the thought of the nation. All this wrong thinking must be completely corrected and liquidated, for only thus can we have a firm and correct political orientation. This firm and correct political orientation is inseparable from the workstyle of arduous struggle. Without a firm and correct political orientation, we cannot promote a workstyle of arduous struggle; and without a workstyle of arduous struggle, a firm and correct political orientation cannot be put into practice. (Applause from the whole audience is followed by shouts of: Fight against selfishness! Fight against clinging to life and fearing death! Fight against corruption and degeneration! Fight against wrong thinking! Adhere to the firm and correct political orientation! Vigorously enforce the workstyle of hard struggle and plain living!) Seventh and last, let us talk about our current overall policy orientation-the overall policy orientation of the War of Resistance and of building the countrythe Three People's Principles. The Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and they should be completely carried out in the course of the struggle to resist Japan and build the country. Nationalism means that we must overthrow Japanese imperialism; People's Rights

64 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

means that the people of the whole country will enjoy freedom; and People's Livelihood requires that the people of the whole country have clothes to wear, food to eat, and work to do. These are all very good and indispensable, and we must resolutely carry them out. From this day forward, the people of the whole country must truly carry out the Three People's Principles! We must not simply talk about them, but also get to work to apply them. There are many people who profess to believe in the Three People's Principles, but as I see it, they do not really believe in them. Because ifthey believed in Nationalism, they would have to fight to the end against Japan; but in fact they are prepared to compromise and capitulate. Wang Jingwei is one of those who have already capitulated. To believe in People's Rights means that you cannot oppress the common people, but they are unwilling to grant the common people democratic rights. To believe in the People's Livelihood means to pay attention to the problem of clothing and feeding the ordinary people, and yet they have absolutely no intention of improving the lives of the people. Can such people be called believers in the Three People's Principles? (The whole audience shouted: No, they cannot!) Can such people be called faithful disciples of Mr. Sun Yatsen? (Again the whole audience shouted: No, they cannot!) Only those who wage the War of Resistance to the end, until we reach the Yalu River and recover all our lost territories, never surrendering, and never betraying the country, can be called true believers in Nationalism and faithful disciples of Mr. Sun Yatsen's Nationalism. Only those who offer the common people democratic rights, and freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association, do not oppress the common people, and "arouse the popular masses" in accordance with Mr. Sun Yatsen's testament, can be called true believers in People's Rights, and faithful disciples of Mr. Sun Yatsen's People's Rights. Only those who strive to alleviate the suffering in the lives of the majority of the people, for example, by carrying out Mr. Sun Yatsen' s "Land to the tiller," and by carrying out the production movement, so that everyone has clothes to wear, food to eat, and a job to do, can be called true believers in People's Livelihood and faithful followers of Mr. Sun Yatsen's principle of People's Livelihood. Comrades! Let us all be faithful followers of the Three People's Principles and good pupils of Mr. Sun Yatsen. We must absolutely not be sham followers or bad pupils. We must not simply pay lip service to the Three People's Principles but, rather, carry them out completely in practice. What do we call those who talk about it but do not do it? We call them sham adherents of the Three People's Principles. We now call on all the people of the whole country to set their hands to carrying out the Three People's Principles. Let us all be true adherents of the Three People's Principles. I hope that all the people of the whole country will carry out the Nationalism that consists in overthrowing Japanese imperialism and liberating the Chinese nation; I hope that everyone will carry out the People's Rights, which consist in helping the common people, rousing the common people, and giving them democratic rights; I hope that everyone will carry out the principle of People's Livelihood, which consists in giving the common people clothes to wear, food to eat, and a job to do. What needs to be carried out at present in our

MAY 1939 65

whole country is this kind of Three People'sPrinciples, the genuine Three People's Principles. We must struggle to the end for the realization ofthe true Three People's Principles! (Everyone applauds and shouts: Let the whole country carry out the Three People's Principles! Fight against the sham adherents of the Three People's Principles, who talk about them, but do not actually hold them in their hearts!) These are the matters about which we are meeting here today. They are also the objectives of the general mobilization of the national spirit. In sum, we want to carry out the Three People's Principles thoroughly and genuinely! We must mobilize all forces to win the final victory, fight until we reach the banks of the Yalu River, and recover all our lost territories. We must absolutely drive Japanese imperialism out of China and establish a brand new Republic of China! (Enthusiastic and prolonged applause.)

The May Fourth Movement (May 1939)

The May Fourth movement twenty years ago marked a new stage in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. The cultural reform movement which grew out of the May Fourth movement was only one of the manifestations of this revolution. With the growth and development of new social forces in that period, the bourgeois-democratic revolution gained a vital new force,' a force consisting of the working class, the student masses, and the new national bourgeoisie. Around the time of the May Fourth movement, hundreds of thousands of students courageously took their place in the van. In these respects the May Fourth movement went a step beyond the Revolution of 1911. If we trace China's bourgeois-democratic revolution back to the Opium War2 we see that it has passed through a number of stages in its development: the Opium War, the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,3 the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the coup of 18984 the Boxer movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May Fourth movement, the Northern Expedition, and the war of the Red Army. 5 The present War of Resistance Against Japan is yet another stage and is the greatest, most vigorous, and most dynamic stage of all. The process of the democratic revolution can be considered completed and the bourgeois-democratic revolution can be considered accomplished only when the forces of foreign oppression• and domestic feudalism have been basically overthrown, and an independent democratic state has been established. From the Opium War onward each stage in the development of the revolution has had certain different characteristics and manifestations,that is to say, its own distinguishing features. 7 But taken as a whole, all the

This article was first published in Jiefang, no. 70, May I. 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 321-23, where it is reproduced from that source. I. The bourgeois-democratic revolution gained a vital new force -+ A powerful camp made its appearance in the bourgeois-democratic revolution 2. The Opium War-+ Its formative period 3. The movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom -+ The revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom

4. The coup of 1898 ~ The Reform Movement of 1898 5. The war of the Red Anny -+ The war of the Agrarian Revolution 6. Forces of foreign oppression -+ Forces of foreign imperialism 7. Here the Selected Works version inserts a sentence reading, "Of these, the most important distinction is whether they came before or after the emergence of the Communist Party." 66

MAY 1939 67

stages bear the character of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. This last characteristic is the basic characteristic that is common in varying degrees to all the stages. The aim of this democratic revolution is to complete' a social system hitherto unknown in Chinese history. namely, a democratic social system having a feudal society (during the last hundred years a semicolonial and semifeudal society) as its precursor and a socialist society as its successor. But this system itself is a democratic society. It is coming from a feudal society and will move toward a socialist society, but, during a certain historical period, it struggles to establish a democratic society. If anyone asks why a Communist should strive to bring into being, first, a bourgeois-democratic society and, then, a socialist society, our answer is: We are following the inevitable course of history. China's democratic revolution depends on certain ~ocial forces for its accomplishment. These social forces are the working class, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the progressive bourgeoisie, that is, the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and businessmen, with the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary force.• It is impossible to accomplish the anti-imperialist and antifeudal democratic revolution without these basic revolutionary forces. 10 Today, the principal enemies of the revolution are the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors, and the fundamental policy of the revolution is the Anti-Japanese United Front. The components of this front are all the anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and businessmen. Final victory in the War of Resistance will cenainly be won when this united front is greatly consolidated and developed. In the Chinese democratic revolutionary movement, it was the intellectuals who were the first to awaken. This was clearly demonstrated both in the Revolution of 1911 and in the May Fourth movement." But the intellectuals will accomplish nothing ifthey fail to integrate themselves with the popular masses of the workers and peasants. This is the cause of failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the May Founh movement. In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary intellectuals and nonrevolutionary or counterrevolutionary intellectuals is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the popular masses of the workers and peasants, and actually do so. Ultimately it is this alone. and not professions of faith (professions offaith only) in things like the Three People's Principles and Marxism that distinguishes one from the other. A true believer in the

8. Complete ~ Establish 9. With the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary force..,. With the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary force and with the workers as the class which leads the revolution 10. Without these basic revolutionary forces..,. Without these basic revolutionary forces and without the leadership of the working class 11. The May Fourth movement. ..,. The May Fourth movement, and in the period of the May Fourth movement the incellectuals were more numerous and more politically conscious than in the period of the Revolution of 1911.

68

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Three People's Principles and a true Marxist 12 must be one who is willing to integrate himself with the worker and peasant popular masses, and actually does so. It is now twenty years since the May Fourth movement and almost two years since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The young people and the cultural workers of the whole country bear a heavy responsibility." I hope they will understand the character and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution, make their work serve the worker and peasant popular masses, go into their midst, and become propagandists and organizers among them. Victory will be ours when the popular masses of the entire country rise up against Japan. Young people of the whole country, exert yourselves!

12. A true believer in the Three People's Principles and a true Marxist ... A true revolutionary 13. A heavy responsibility ...... A heavy responsibility for the democratic revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan.

Speech at the Meeting in Yan'an in Commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the May Fourth Movement (May 4, 1939)

Comrades, today is the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement, and the youth ofYan'an are all gathered here for this commemoration meeting. I shall therefore take the occasion to speak on the orientation' of the youth movement in China. First, May 4 has now been designated as China's Youth Day, and rightly so. Twenty years have elapsed since "May Fourth," yet it is only this year that the day has been designated as the national Youth Day, and this is a most significant fact. For it indicates that the Chinese people's democratic revolution against imperialism and against the feudal forces 2 will soon reach a turning point. The anti-imperialist, antifeudal people's democratic revolution encountered repeated failures over several decades, but now there must be a change, a change toward victory and not another failure. The Chinese revolution is now going forward-forward, that is to say, to victory. The repeated failures of the past cannot and must not be allowed to recur, and they must be turned into victory. But has the change already taken place? No. It has not, nor have we yet won victory. But victory can be won by uniting all the forces of the country. It is precisely in the present War of Resistance Against Japan that we are striving to reach the turning point from failure to victory. Just consider. For the past twenty years, "May Fourth" was not designated as Youth Day. Since March this year, it has been designated as Youth Day upon the proposal of youth organizations in Yan'an, and youth organizations outside Yan'an have also made it the Youth Day. Our hearts are like theirs. "We are of the same mind and follow the same reasoning." We all want to fight against Japanese imperialism, and we all want to establish a new China. lsn 'tthis good news? Many people in the past were not in favor of designating "May Fourth" as the Youth Day, and refused to recognize the revolutionary significance of the May Fourth movement,

This speech was first published in Zhongguo qingnian, no. 6, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 325-37. I. The orientation .... Some questions concerning the orientation 2. The feudal forces -+ Feudalism 69

70

MAO'S ROAD TO POWE.R

saying that the May Founh movement was antigovernment. Now those who opposed it are also supportive. They have probably understood this point: The May Fourth movement was directed against a government of national betrayal, a government which colluded with imperialism and sold out the interests of the nation, a government which oppressed the people. Was it not necessary to oppose such a government? If it was not, then the May Fourth movement was simply a mistake. But it is very clear that such a government must be opposed; a government of national betrayal must be overthrown. Just consider, long before the May Fourth movement Mr. Sun Yatsen was already a rebel against the government of his day; he opposed and overthrew the Manchus. 3 Was he right in doing so? In my opinion he was quite right because the government he opposed did not resist imperialism but colluded with it, and was not a revolutionary government but one that suppressed the revolution. The May Fourth movement was a revolutionary movement precisely because it opposed a government of national betrayal. The youth of all China should see the May Fourth movement in this light. Today, when the whole nation has militantly risen to resist Japan, we are determined to defeat Japanese imperialism, and we shall not tolerate any traitors selling out the country, or allow the revolution to fail again, for we have taken warning from its failures in the past. The whole of China's youth 4 has awakened and is imbued with this determination to triumph, and this is reflected in the designation of"May 4" as Youth Day. We are now advancing along the road to victory and, provided only that the whole people makes an effort5 (it is impossible without this condition), the Chinese revolution will definitely triumph through the War of Resistance. This is the first point I want to address todlly. Second, what is the Chinese revolution directed against? What are the targets of the revolution? As everybody knows, imperialism is one target, and the feudal forces6 are the other. What are the targets of the revolution at this moment? One is Japanese imperialism, and the other the Chinese traitors. To make our revolution we must overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors. Who are the makers of the revolution? What is its main force? The common people of China. The motive forces of the revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry, the masses ofyoung people, and all those members of other classes who are willing to oppose imperialism and feudalism. All these are the revolutionary forces opposing imperialism and feudalism. But who, among so many, constitutes the basic force, the backbone of the revolution? The workers and the peasants, forming 90 percent of the country's population. What is the nature of the Chinese revolution? What kind ofrevolution are we making today? Today we are making a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and we are not going beyond the scope ofthe bourgeois-democratic revolution. We

3. Manchus ....,. Qing government 4. The whole of China's youth ....,. The whole of China's youth, with some exceptions, 5. Makes an effort ....,. Makes a concerted effort 6. The feudal forces ....,. Feudalism

MAY 1939

71

should not destroy7 the bourgeois system of private property for the present; what we want to destroy is imperialism and the feudal forces. 8 This is what we mean by the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But the bourgeoisie is already incapable of carrying through this revolution, which can be carried through only by the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people. What is the goal of this revolution? To overthrow imperialism and the feudal forces and establish a people's democratic republic, such is its goal. This kind of people's democratic republic is a republic of the Three People's Principles. 9 It will be different both from the semicolonial and semi feudal state of the present and from the socialist system of the future. Capitalists have no place in the social structure of a socialist society, but they are 10 allowed to exist in this people's democracy. Will there always be a place for capitalists in China? No, there will not be, there will certainly not be. This is true not only of China but of the whole world. In the future no country, whether it be Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Germany, or Italy, will have any place for capitalists, and China will be no exception. The Soviet Union is a country which has already established socialism, and, beyond all doubt, just as "The turtles in front make the way and the ones behind follow," the whole world will follow in the future. China will certainly develop into socialism in the future; that is an irresistible law. But our present stage is not socialism" but, rather, the destruction of imperialism and the feudal forces, 12 changing the present semicolonial and semifeudal status, 13 and establishing a people's democratic system. This is what the young people of the whole country must strive for. This is the second point I want to address today. Third, what are the lessons of the past experience of the Chinese revolution? This is also an important question for our young people to understand. Strictly speaking, the Chinese people's democratic revolution 14 against imperialism and feudalism was begun by Mr. Sun Yatsen and has been going on for more than fifty years. Foreign capitalist aggression against China has, on the other hand, been going on for almost a hundred years. For the past hundred years, China's struggles, beginning with the Opium War against British imperialism," have included the war of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, theReform Movement of 1898, the Boxer movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May

7. We should not destroy- By and large, we should not destroy 8. The feudal forces.- Feudalism. 9. The Three People's Principles- The revolutionary Three People's Principles 10. Are - Will still be II. But our present stage is not socialism -+ But at the present stage we are not putting socialism into practice 12. Feudal forces -+ Feudalism I3. Status -+ Status of China at present 14. The Chinese people's democratic revolution

revolution IS. British imperialism

-+

British aggression

-+

China's bourgeois-democratic

72

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Fourth movement, the Northern Expedition, and the war waged by the Red Army. Although each situation was different, their common purpose was to repel foreign enemies or change existing conditions. It was, however, only beginning with Mr. Sun Yatsen that a bourgeois-democratic revolution with relatively clear objectives began. In the past fifty years the revolution started by Mr. Sun has had both its successes and its failures. Just consider, the Revolution of 1911 sent the emperor packing. Was that not a success? Yet it was a failure in the sense that, while it got rid of one emperor, it left China under imperialist and feudal oppression, so that the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolutionary task remained entirely unaccomplished. What did the May Fourth movement do? It was also an antiimperialist, anti feudal democratic revolution, but it, too, failed, and China remained under the rule of imperialism and the feudal forces. The same is true of the great revolution known as the Northern Expedition; it scored successes, but it too failed. From the time [the Guomindang] purged the party and turned against the Communists, China again fell under the domination of imperialism and the feudal forces. The inevitable result was the ten years' war waged by the Red Army. But these ten years of glorious and arduous struggle did not fulfill the task in the whole country. If we are to sum up the revolution during the past several decades, we may say that it has won only temporary and partial victories and not permanent nationwide victory. As Mr. Sun Yatsen said, ''The revolution is not yet completed; you comrades must continue to struggle." The question now is: Why, after several decades of struggle, has the Chinese revolution still not attained its goal? What are the reasons? I think there are two: first, the enemy forces have been too strong; second, our own forces have been too weak. Because one side was strong and the other side weak, the revolution did not succeed. The enemy forces that were too strong comprised those of imperialism and the feudal forces, but the main thing was that the forces of imperialism have been too strong. In saying that our own forces have been too weak, we mean weak militarily, politically, economically, and culturally; but our weaknesses and our consequent failure to fulfill the antiimperialist and anti feudal task are chiefly due to the fact that the toiling masses of workers and peasants, constituting 90 percent of the population, have not 16 been mobilized. If we are to sum up the experience ofthe revolution of the past decades, we may say that the basic lesson is that the people throughout the country have not been fully mobilized and that those in power 17 have invariably opposed and sabotaged such mobilization. This is the fundamental lesson. You should study it carefully, and so should the young people of the whole country. Only by mobilizing and organizing the workers and peasants, who comprise 90 percent of the population, is it possible to defeat imperialism and overthrow the feudal forces. Mr. Sun Yatsen said in his Testament:

16. Have not -+ Have not yet 17 · Those in power .... The reactionaries

MAY 1939

73

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have finnly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals. It is now more than ten years since this venerable gentleman died, and if we add these ten years to the forty years of which he spoke, the total is more than fifty years. What is the lesson ofthe revolution during these fifty years? Fundamentally, it is the principle of"arousing the masses ofthe people." Young people must know that only by mobilizing the great masses of workers and peasants, who form 90 percent of the population, can we defeat imperialism and the feudal forces. Today, unless we mobilize the workers and peasants of the whole country, it will be impossible for us to defeat Japan and build a new China. Fourth, I will speak again of the youth movement. On this very day twenty years ago there occurred in China a great event known to history as the May Fourth movement, in which the students participated; it was a movement of tremendous historical significance. What role have China's young people played since "May Fourth"? They have played the role of the vanguard, 18 and this fact is recognized by everyone in the country except the diehards. What is a vanguard role? It means taking the lead and standing in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks. In the antiimperialist and anti feudal ranks of the Chinese people, there is a contingent composed ofthe country's young intellectuals and young students. This is a contingent of considerable size and, even if those who have died are not included, it now numbers several million. This contingent of several million is one of the front armies against imperialism and feudalism, and an important army too. But it is not enough to rely on this front army alone. We cannot defeat the enemy by relying on it alone, for it is not the main force. What then is the main force? It is none other than the broad masses of the workers and peasants. The young intellectuals and students must definitely go among the workers and peasants, who make up 90 percent of the population, and mobilize and organize them. Without this main force of workers and peasants, relying only on the contingent of young intellectuals and young students, we cannot achieve victory over imperialism and feudalism. Therefore, the young intellectuals and young students throughout the country must definitely unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants and become one with them. Only thus can a mighty force be successfully created, a force of hundreds of millions of people! Only with this huge force can the enemy's strongholds be taken and his last fortresses smashed. The whole of China's revolutionary movement found its origin in the initiative ofyoung students and young intellectuals who had awakened. But every beginning must have a fulfillment. Thus, for

18. They have played the role of the vanguard-+ They have played in a certain sense the role of a vanguard

74

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

example, when the students in Yan' an reclaim land and plant grain, reclaiming the land is the beginning, but the fulfillment comes only with the harvest. The young students and intellectuals must unite with the broad masses of young workers and peasants. Only when the millions of students have become one with the tens of millions of worker and peasant youth can they form a powerful youth movement. Otherwise, they cannot become a powerful movement. If the young people wish to achieve results, they must also make friends with adults and unite with the majority of people who are above the age of twenty-five. Do we also need old people? Of course we need them too. Old people have experience; one cannot neglect them because they are old. Consequently, the young people must join forces with the old, even with those who are a hundred, and unite with them to fight against Japan. Aren't there people who want to organize an "old folks' army"? What can an "old folks' army" do? They can work as propaganda teams. Old folks are very good at doing propaganda work; the common people love to listen to them. Children are also important. Comrades, organizing children is also an important task of the youth movement. Children can form "children's armies," which are the Children's Corps. Japanese imperialism is busy out there training our children to make of them little Chinese traitors, so how could we refrain from allying ourselves with the children? "People cannot be judged by appearances, and water in the sea cannot be measured by the dou.'' 19 There was not only the case of "the eighty-year-old Taigong meeting King Wen," but also that of "a twelve-year-old Gan Luo becoming prime minister"w as well! Once organized, children have great advantages. They can identify Chinese traitors, keep track of opium smokers, and confiscate mahjong sets and are especially good for standing sentry and checking road passes. In North China there are children's armies that are very fierce and very capable of keeping watch and checking road passes. Thus we see that young people must unite with adults, the elderly, and children. Only if they do so can they be effective in resisting Japan and saving the country, and only this will benefit the youth movement itself Let the young people go among the 450 million of our people and organize them to make of them a great anti-Japanese revolutionary army. Only if we have such a revolutionary army can we defeat Japanese imperi-

19. The dou is a unit of dry measure equal to one decaliter. 20. Jiang Ziya (original name LU Shang, also known as Jiang Taigong) was discovered at the age of eighty by Wen Wang, the founder of the Zhou dynasty, reputedly with the guidance of the divining-grass. For twenty years he served Wen Wang, and his son and successor Wu Wang, making use, it is said, of his ability to "marshall the spirits." (For a brief account, see Herbert A. Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary [Taipei: Literature House, 1962], pp. 135-36.) Gan Luo was a native of the kingdom of Chu during the Warring States period. He was the grandson ofGan Long, the prime ministerofQin. At the age of twelve, he was appointed a minister by the Qin prime minister LU Buwei, and was subsequently raised in rank because of his services during the conflict between Qin and Zhao. but he did not himself become prime minister.

MAY 1939

75

a/ism. In assessing the youth movement of the past from this viewpoint, we should call attention to an erroneous tendency. In the youth movement of the past few decades, a section ofthe young people have been unwilling to unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants and have opposed the movements of the workers and peasants; this is an adverse current in the youth movement. In fact, these people are not at all enlightened in their refusal to unite with the masses who make up 90 percent of the population and in going so far as to oppose them outright. Is this a good tendency? I think not, because in opposing the workers and peasants they are in fact opposing the revolution. That is why I say that this is an adverse current in the youth movement. A youth movement of that kind is a narrow youth movement and cannot bring about good results. This is like planting trees that do not bear fruit and growing crops that do not yield grain. How can one call such a movement a real revolutionary movement against imperialism and feudalism? A few days ago I wrote a short article in which I made this remark: "In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary youth 21 and nonrevolutionary or counterrevolutionary youth is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the popular masses of workers and peasants, and actually do so."22 Here I advanced a criterion which I regard as the only criterion. How should we judge whether or not a young person is a revolutionary? How can we tell? There can only be one criterion, namely, whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice. If he is willing to do so and actually does so, he is a revolutionary; otherwise he is a nonrevolutionary or a counterrevolutionary. If today he integrates himself with the masses of workers and peasants, then today he is a revolutionary; if tomorrow he ceases to do so or turns around to oppress the common people, then he becomes a nonrevolutionary or a counterrevolutionary. Some young people only talk glibly about their belief in the Three People's Principles or in Marxism, but this does not prove anything. Doesn't Hitler profess his "belief in socialism"? Twenty years ago even Mussolini was actually a "socialist"! And what did his "socialism" amount to in the final analysis? Fascism that killed people without bloodshed. Didn't Chen Duxiu once "believe" in Marxism? What did he do later?23 As a matter offact, he went over to

21. Youth ~ Intellectuals 22. The quotation is from the preceding text. 23. Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) was, wilh Li Dazhao, one oflhe two founding falhers of the Chinese Communist Party. His influence on Mao Zedong during lhe May Fourth period had been very considerable (see Volume I, passim), and in 1924 Chen and Mao had worked together as chainnan and secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (see the three documents signed by lhe two of them in these capacities in Volume II, pp. 215-2l).ln 1929, Chen had broken with the Party and rallied to Trotskyism. Arrested by the Guomindang in 1932 and held in custody until the outbreak of !he anti-Japanese war in 1937, he spent his last years in Chongqing, where he moved back toward an appreciation of the Western-style democracy he had supported during the May Fourth movement.

76

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the counterrevolution. Didn'tZhang Guotao once "believe" in Marxism too? Where has he gone to now?24 As a matter offact, he has run away and landed in the mire. Some people style themselves "followers of the Three People's Principles," or even old stalwarts of these principles, but what have they done? It turns out that their Principle of Nationalism means conspiring with imperialism and their Principle of Democracy means oppressing the common people. What about their Principle of the People's Livelihood? It means sucking the people's blood, the more the better. These are phony advocates of the Three People's Principles who pay lip service only but are not sincere. Wang Jingwei is the chief representative of these people. So when we assess a person and judge whether he is a true or false adherent of the Three People's Principles, whether he is a true or false Marxist, we need only find out how he stands in relation to the broad masses of workers and peasants, and then we shall know him for what he is. This is the only criterion; there is no other. I hope that the youth of our country will never allow themselves to be carried away by this sinister adverse current but will clearly recognize the workers and peasants as their friends and march forward to a bright future. I hope that all young comrades will think this point over and judge whether there is truth in it.

Fifth, the present War of Resistance Against Japan marks a new stage-the greatest, most dynamic, and most vigorous stage--in the Chinese revolution. In this stage, youth shoulders tremendous responsibilities. Our Chinese revolution of the past several decades has gone through many stages of struggle, but at no stage has it been so vigorous and dynamic" as in the present War of Resistance. When we say that the Chinese revolution now has features distinguishing it from the revolution in the past, that will tum it from failure into victory, we are referring to the fact that the broad masses of the Chinese people have made progress, of which the progress of youth is clear proof. Hence, the present anti-Japanese war will certainly be victorious and cannot fail to be victorious. As everyone knows, the basic policy in this war is the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and its aim is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors, transform old China into a new China, and liberate the whole nation from its semicolonial and semifeudal status. In other words,to carry out the Three People's Principles ofMr. Sun Yatsen, and build a new China ofthe Three People's Principles. Recently, Chairman Chiang said, "The state is supreme, the nation is supreme." This is a call to overthrow

24. Although Zhang Guotao (1897-1979) and Mao Zedong were both founding members of the Chinese Communist Party, they had never enjoyed good relations. During the period of the Long March especially, they had often come into sharp conflict and taken different paths. (See Volume V,passim.) When Zhang and the remnants of his army finally sought refuge in Yan' an in 1936, Zhang was appointed to major offices in the Party and in the border region government, but enjoyed no real power. In April 1938, he was sent to participate in a ceremony in Xi' an honoring the Yellow Emperor, and took advantage of the occasion to travel directly to Hankow and place himself under the protection of the Guomindang.

25. Vigorous and dynamic -+ Broad

MAY 1939

77

Japanese imperialism completely, and not to allow Japanese imperialism to trample on our state and our nation; it is a call to overthrow completely the Chinese traitor who is selling out his country, Wang Jingwei, and all his followers and adherents, and not to allow any overt or covert Chinese traitors, large or small, now or in the future, to sell out our national interests. What we demand is complete indepen· dencefor our state, and complete national liberation, and that is what is meant by "The state is supreme, the nation is supreme." What does Chairman Chiang mean when he says, "Military affairs take first place, victory takes first place"? This means that the War of Resistance must be carried through to the end, that resistance to Japan should take precedence over everything, and that all else should be subordinated to it. We must definitely mobilize all available forces, strive for final victory, fight to the banks of the Yalu River, and recover all our lost territory. So long as there is one inch of unrecovered Chinese territory, our war will never cease. If anyone dares to try to stop the War of Resistance Against Japan halfway, and to carry out a peaceful compromise, we shall declare ourselves irreconcilably opposed to him. Chairman Chiang has also put forward the slogan "Concentrate our will, concentrate our strength." What is the meaning of this? It means that, if we want to secure final victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, all of the country's strength must be concentrated on the united front and definitely must not be dispersed to opposing sides, thus increasing the importance of our task of consolidating and enlarging the united front. All the minds and wills in our country must definitely be concentrated on the single point ofwinning final victory, and we must definitely permit no one to entertain irresponsible thoughts of compromise and capitulation. Because of this, the masses of the youth ofYan'an and of the whole country must continue to urge the Three People's Principles Youth Corpsu, to join hands with us and to set up a united youth movement. You have already made several proposals to them regarding this point, but they have not yet written you in reply. That is a pity, but you should keep on putting forward proposals,for the present lack of unity of the Chinese youth movement is a great defect. You should continue to put forward proposals demanding unity, because only in unity is there strength. You must help the youth of the whole country to understand the present situation. Japanese imperialism is still fighting ferociously; militarily, they are going to attack the Southwest and the Northwest. Politically they are trying to destroy our united front, to destroy the Guomindang and the Communist Party. They are trying to overthrow Chairman Chiang; they call this "toppling Chiang." They are trying to annihilate the Communist Party; this is called "opposing Communism." The youth of the whole country must absolutely not be deceived by the enemy's attempts to sow dissension and must never promote friction within their

own ranks. They must expose the heresy of "toppling Chiang and opposing Communism," to achieve unity and resist Japan to the end.

26. As the name suggests, this was the Guomindang youth organization.

78 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Sixth and last, I want to speak about the youth movement in Yan'an. It is the model for the youth movement throughout the country. The direction it is taking is in fact the orientation for the youth movement of the entire country. Why? Because the orientation of the Yan' an youth movement is correct. You see, in the matter of unity they have acquitted themselves well, indeed very well. The Yan 'an youth movement in itself has achieved solidarity and unity. The young intellectuals, young students, young workers, and young peasants in Yan'an at all levels are united. Large numbers of revolutionary youth from all over the country, and even from abroad beyond the South China Sea,27 are studying in Yan'an. Most of you attending this meeting today have come from thousands of miles away; whether your surname is Zhang or Li, whether you are a man or a woman, a worker or a peasant, you are all united as of one mind. Should this not be regarded as a model for the whole country? The youth in Yan'an, besides being united among themselves, have integrated themselves with the masses of workers and peasants, and in this more than anything else are a model for the whole country. What have the youth of Yan 'an been doing? They have been learning the theory of revolution and studying the principles and methods for resisting Japan and saving the nation. They have been carrying out the campaign for production and have reclaimed thousands of mu of wasteland. Even Confucius never did any such thing as reclaiming land or tilling the soil. When he ran his school, he had quite a number of students, "seventy worthies and three thousand disciples"--quite a flourishing school! But he had farfewer students than there are in Yan'an, and they did not go in for any such thing as a production campaign. When his student asked him for instruction on how to plow the fields, Confucius answered, "I don't know, I am not as good at that as a farmer." Confucius was next asked how to grow vegetables, and he answered, "I don't know, I am not as good at that as a vegetable gardener." In ancient times the youth of China who studied under a sage neither learned revolutionary theory nor took part in labor. Today, there is little revolutionary theory taught and there are no such things as production movements in the schools in other parts ofChina. 28 It is only here in Yan'an29 that the young people are fundamentally different; the young people in Yan'an are truly the vanguard in resisting Japan and saving the nation because their political orientation is correct, as are their methods of work. That is why I say the youth movement in Yan'an should be the model for the youth movement throughout the country. The meeting today is highly significant. I have said all I wanted to say. I hope you will all study the experiences of the Chinese revolution in the past fifty years, develop its good points and discard its mistakes, so that youth will be integrated with the people of the whole country, and the revolution will make the turn from

27. From abroad beyond the South China Sea ...., From Chinese communities abroad 28. In other parts of China ...,. Over vast regions of our country 29. In Yan'an ..... In Yan'an and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines

MAY 19.19

79

failure to victory. When the young people of the whole country and the people of the whole country are mobilized, organized, and united, that is the day when Japanese imperialism will be overthrown. Every young person must shoulder this responsibility. Each young person must be different from before and strongly resolve to unite all the youth of China, to organize the people of the whole country, to overthrow Japanese imperialism, and to transform the old China into a new China. This is what I expect of you. 1Prolonged applause followed by the shouting ofslogans: Youth of the country, unite! People ofthe country, unite! Promote the glorious tradition ofthe May Founh movement! Oppose Chinese traitors selling out their country! Down with Wang Jingwei! Down with all Chinese traitors! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!)

To Pan Zinian 1 (May II, 1939)

Comrade Zinian: I have received your letter of April2 and passed it on to Comrade Jiang Qixian, the minister of health, asking him to investigate and reply to you. For medical questions in the future, you, or Mr. Tao's nephew 2 and others, may write directly to Comrade Jiang at the Yan'an Health Department, and they will answer you. Last year, after I received your letter, I sent you a letter in reply. I wonder whether or not you received it? Wishing you improvement in your health! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 154, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Pan Zinian ( 1893-1972) was a native of Yixing, Jiangsu. At this time, he was chairman of the Xinhua ribao in Chongqing.

2. We have been unable to identify Mr. Tao or his nephew. 80

Speech at the Educational Mobilization Meeting for Cadres at Their Posts in Yan'an (May 20, 1939)

Comrades: We have been preparing for this meeting for quite a long time.' It was meant to be held earlier, but because of the production movement, it was postponed until today. Now, responding to the Central Committee's call concerning the study movement, the comrades in the various organs have organized study groups, and some have already begun to study and have achieved considerable results. This is very good. We have called today's meeting to discuss a few questions related to the study movement.

1. The Study Movement Is Nec:essary On the basis of past experience as well as of the current situation, our Pany has recently launched two movements. One is the production movement, and the other is the study movement. Both these movements have universal and permanent significance. As everyone knows, the purpose of the production movement is to get food to eat and clothes to wear. Clothes to wear and food to eat are things we very much need, so our current production movement is extremely imponant. The whole country needs to eat food and wear clothing, so it is imponant for the whole country as well. This is likewise the case not only in the whole country but in the whole world. Therefore, the production movement has a universal nature. It is not only we ourselves who need food to eat and clothes to wear; our sons, grandsons, and their descendants need them too. Thus the production movement was not only needed in

Our source for this speech is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 176-85, where it is reproduced from the stenographic record in the Central Archives.

I. This meeting was convened by the Cadre Education Department of the Central Committee, and was attended by more than a thousand people drawn from the administration, schools, and mass organizations. See Zhongguo gongchandang KangRi zhanzheng shiqi dashiji, 1937-1945, ed. Xiao Yiping eta!. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988) (hereafter, Dashiji). 8/

82

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the past, and is not only needed in the present, but will still be needed in the future. This is the basis for the permanent character of the production movement. Now, as regards the study movement. The ancients have said: "If a man cannot span past and present, he's just a horse or ox wearing clothes.''2 That is to say, if human beings are not familiar with both past and present they are just like cattle and horses wearing the clothes of humans. What is meant by "the past"? "The past" means "history." Everything that happened in the past is called "the past." From the time Pan Gu separated the heavens and the earth until today, the whole process in between is called "the past." "The present" means now. It is not enough for us to know only the present; we must also know the past. The people of Yan' an have to know the past and the present, the people of the whole nation have to know the past and the present, and the people of the whole world, too, need to know the past and the present. We Communist Party members, especially. need to know even more of the past and the present. To know the past and the present requires study. Not only must we study, but the people who come after us must also study. Therefore, the study movement also has a universal character as well as a permanent character. Both our production movement and our study movement have universal and permanent significance. This is true in a general sense. Now I shall talk about the direct reasons for initiating the production movement and the study movement. The immediate reason we started the production movement is that we had no food to eat and no clothes to wear. Although we do have a little now, in future when things become difficult we will not have enough to eat or enough to wear, so we must now make advance preparations. In this way the problems of clothes to wear and food to eat have become the direct reasons for our launching the production movement.

What, then, is the immediate reason for initiating the study movement? It is that our Communist Party wants to lead the revolution. In the past there were several tens of thousands of Communist Party members in the whole nation, now there are several hundreds of thousands, and in the future there will be several million. If these hundreds of thousands and millions of Communist Party members are to lead the revolution of tens of millions and hundreds of millions of people, it cannot be done if they have no learning. So Communists should understand all kinds of things. Consequently, to lead the revolution it is necessary to study, and this is one of the reasons we started the study movement. In addition, it is urgently necessary to overcome the defects in our work. At present, the following contradiction has arisen in our ranks: if our cadres do not study, they will be unable to lead the work. Some of the veteran cadres have spent

2. This line is from a poem by Han YU (768-824), Fu dushu chengnan (Fu Studies South of the City), translated by Stephen Owen in The Poetry of Meng Chiao and Han Yii (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 273.

MAY 1939 83

time in the past in other armies, where all the work depends on orders from above. But in our Red Army, relying solely on issuing orders will not work. If people do not listen to you and you resort to beating them, the result is that you cannot effectively lead the work, and many soldiers run away. Issuing orders in the army confers a certain power and prestige, but power and prestige by themselves without ability are useless. In addition to power and prestige, all cadres in our Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and guerrilla units must also have abilities, which means they have to study. At present some of our soldiers know more characters than do their battalion commanders. They used to be completely illiterate, but now they can recognize five hundred, a thousand, two thousand, or three thousand characters, and are able to write short essays and put them up on wall newspapers. Our battalion and company commanders refuse to attend classes given by the political instructors because they think the classes are meant for the soldiers and that to join in would really be a "loss of status"! Because they want to maintain their "status," the result is that they not only cannot write articles, but are ignorant of many things, while the soldiers are wiser than they are. For this reason there is a kind of panic in our ranks, which is not an economic panic or a political panic but, rather, a panic with regard to abilities. The skills learned in the past were very few, so if some are used up today and some are used up tomorrow, eventually they will run out. Just as in a store where there are few goods to begin with, they are sold out right away and the place is totally empty so that they cannot go on doing business. In order to keep going, goods will have to be brought in. For our cadres, "bringing in goods" means learning new skills, which is what many of our cadres urgently need. To do a good job, our cadres must know more. It is not enough just to get by on what little one learned in the past. That is only half-baked knowledge, and even though one can still get the work done in this way, it is insufficient for doing a decent job. If we want the work to be done really well, their knowledge must definitely be increased. Whether it is a question of Party cadres, state cadres, military cadres, cadres in people's organizations, or educational cadres, they can do a better job only if they increase their level of knowledge. I see now that some of our teachers are still using the text on basic politics that was published at the time of the Central Soviet Area. They are quite familiar with the material in this book because they are likely to have taught it seventy or eighty times already, but they know nothing else. This is really a case of "focusing on nothing outside the book itself, devoting oneself to nothing but basic politics." They do not know how to develop further the material in the book by relating it to the new situation. Such conditions can also be seen in organizations of the popular masses, in the army, and in [Party] branches. To break out of this situation now and improve our work, we must intensify our study. The third point that makes study an urgent necessity is a peculiarity of our Party. In the past the ranks of our Party were small, with only very few Party members. Even now the number of Party members is by no means large, but we have now shouldered the task of defeating Japanese imperialism and establishing

84

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

a new China, and this demands that we build a large Party. It was small in the past and now it needs to be large, so what is to be done? We are now in the process of going from small to big, and we need to recruit Party members throughout the country. But some people ask, "Why do you have to be larger' They do not want us to get large. But we feel that it is better to be somewhat bigger. And according to the view of the common people, they also want us to be larger, because they cannot find the Communists no matter how hard they look, and only if our Party grows in size will it be easier to find. On this we should be somewhat more stubborn. Unlike certain people, we want to build a large Party which is not an "undisciplined mob" of a party but, rather, one that is independent and endowed with fighting capacity. Forthis a large number of knowledgeable cadres is necessary to serve as a backbone. This task lies before us, and we must pay attention to it at all times. If we want to lead a revolution of several hundred million people, our present strength is clearly inadequate. If we want to build a big Party, we cannot do so if our cadres do not study. Study is work to which we attach much importance, and it is of particularly urgent necessity that our comrades who are cadres study. If they do not study they will be unable to lead the work, to improve the work, and to build a large Party. Leading the work, improving the work, and building a large Party are the direct reasons for our study movement, and the resolution on the study movement at our Sixth Plenum is extremely important. Our Party has always called upon all comrades in the Party to study. There was study in the past, but it was poorly organized, not as well as it is now. Now we have moved one step further in that there is organization instead of the anarchistic state of the past. The Central Committee has now set up a Cadre Education Department, which is in charge of leading study in the whole Party. Our comrades cannot just read some books and leave it at that, but must study in an organized fashion. This sort of organ and this type of system must be established in Party offices at every level all over the country, and in the border region at all levels of government, in all organizations of the popular masses, and in schools at every level, to lead and carry out study. It is the same in the army, where an education department and a study system must be set up. The Central Committee is going to promote such a study system throughout the country, doing everything within the Communist Party's power to move it forward so as to create a great tide of enthusiasm for study. Comrades, everyone must study hard and must not fall behind or be lazy and fall asleep. In the past Confucius's student Zai Yu slept during the day, and Confucius berated him, saying: "Rotten wood cannot be carved."3 Something like this could be said to the lazy people within our ranks, but those who have achieved something in their studies should be rewarded. There should be both rewards and pun-

3. See the Analects, V, IX, I (Legge, Vol. I, p. 176).

MAY /939

85

ishment, and they should be clearly delineated. But we are mostly concerned with rewards, and it doesn't matter if there is an occasional Zai Yu.

z. The Study Movement Is Possible The study movement is necessary, all right, but is it possible? Our answer is that it is entirely possible. But then other problems arise-not many, only two of them. One is that everyone is extremely busy, and the other is being unable to understand what is read. These two problems are absolutely real. People are so busy with work, and if yo11 then add to that the production movement, plus the fact that those at the front have to do battle, they are unable to study. Not only the ordinary people say so, but even senior cadres say this as well. "No time" has become the rationale for not wanting to study and the excuse for being lazy. It is wrong for Communist Party members not to study theory, and when there is a problem a solution should be sought; this is the true spirit of a Communist Party member. There is a way to solve the problem of being busy, and it is called "squeezing." "Squeezing" may be used to deal with being busy. This is like when there are a great many people at a meeting, and people have to squeeze in to get a seat. Or it is like a carpenter driving a nail into a piece of wood so that clothes may be hung on it. In this case the carpenter "squeezes" it into the wood; only when the wood yields has he been successful. Ever since wood has been yielding in this way, so many pieces of wood have had nails driven into them, and tiny invisible threadlike holes have been "squeezed" to make such large openings. This shows that "squeezing" is an effective method. We are presently very busy with our work, so we could have it make some concessions by using the "squeezing" method to eke out two hours for study from our daily schedule of work, meals, and rest, and squeeze the work onto both ends, one at the top and one toward the bottom. This way two hours could certainly be squeezed out for study. Comrade Chen Yun4 has experience in "squeezing." He has ways to "squeeze out" time for reading and attending meetings. The other problem is being unable to understand what is read. This situation does actually exist. There are comrades who would ''rather carry night soil than study theory."lf one is busy one can "squeeze," which is one way out; there is also a way out if one cannot understand something one reads, which is called "digging into it." This is "drilling" into something as a carpenter drills into a piece of wood.

4. Chen Yun (1905-1993), original name Liao Chenyun, a native of Jiangsu,joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. He went to the Jiangxi Central Soviet Area in 1933, participated in the early part of the Long March, and played an imponant role at the Zunyi Conference of January 1935. Thereafter he was sent to the Soviet Union as a delegate to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. Returning to China in 1937, he became head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, a post which he still held at this time. It was thus natural that Mao should cite him as an expert in organizing and scheduling the Party's work.

86 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

We need not be afraid of what we cannot understand, but should rather deal with it by "digging into it." In China, reading and studying were originally called attacking the books. To study Marxism means to attack Marx's theories. If you wish to read and understand Marx's theories, you cannot do so without attacking them. What cannot be understood in one's reading should be attacked as one would an enemy. Some people at present do not adopt an offensive posture, only a defensive one. This is wrong. Marxism absolutely cannot make concessions, so without attacking it there can be no result. In the past people used to say "checking against a foe" for "proofreading." Proofreading is indeed quite difficult, and it cannot be done successfully without treating it as a foe. As far as difficulty is concerned, we should attack it as if it were an enemy, and with the enemy we do not deal sentimentally. Therefore, while it is true that Marxist and Leninist theory is indeed very difficult, if we attack it unsentimentally with the attitude we adopt toward an "enemy," we are sure to win every single battle and can cenainly capture its stronghold. In "Sacrificing a Crocodile," by Han Wengong5 of ancient times, there is a passage about giving the crocodile three days to leave, and if it did not leave in three days, giving it five, and if it did not leave within seven days then killing it without ceremony in one stroke of the sword. We should do as Han Wengong did in sacrificing the crocodile, allowing ten days to understand it, then twenty, thiny, ninety days ... , not stopping until it is finally understood. In this way, what cannot be understood can cenainly be transformed into something that can be understood. If one is unable to understand something directly, one may approach it from a different angle. It is like in war, if a tough enemy cannot be defeated from the front, he may be harassed and attacked from the side, or surrounded on all four sides and isolated, and thus easily defeated. It is the same with studying. If something cannot be understood directly at first, one can stan by reading other things around it and laying a foundation, so as to be able to understand directly little by little. If busy with work, one has to "squeeze," and if unable to understand, one has to "drill." Using these two methods to deal with it, one can cenainly be victorious in one's studies.

3. There Will Be Achievements in the Study Movement Some results have already been achieved in the study movement in that many study groups have been organized. in Yan'an, among those that have been organized already are a philosophy group, a reading group, and so on, and they have already achieved results. Those who did not understand philosophy before now understand it a little, and those who did not understand Marxism now also under-

5. Han Wengong is Han Yu. We have been unable to locate this poem; Mao·s memory of the title may have been approximate.

MAY 1939 87

stand a little of it. Such organizations exist in the military as well, and they too have accomplished at least something. In many places outside [the border areas] there are such organizations as reading societies, which provide education similar to that of our education for cadres at their posts, and they may serve us as reference points. We Communist Party members are full of enthusiasm for study. I have been told that since the study movement began, many comrades have been very enthusiastic and happy. and that those who had asked to be transferred to other posts no longer wish to be transferred. This is another achievement of the study movement. The foundation of the study movement is the conscious enthusiasm of our comrades. Our method is to coordinate individual activity with organized activity. In the beginning some schools ignored individual activity and did not allow free time for reading. The daily schedule was very full, and although things were good as far

as organized activities are concerned, this is a rather serious shortcoming, since individual initiative cannot be brought into full play. We are trying to find a way to correct matters with regard to this point. We advocate the coordination of individual activity and organized activity, fostering both conscious enthusiasm and sound leadership with regard to study, so our study movement is bound to achieve results. Here I want to discuss one point in passing, which is that among our cadres there are some who are a little older, and who think that it is hopeless for people to study when they are older. I believe it is wrong to think this way. Who says that older people cannot do it? There is an old saying, "Only when a person reaches fifty-five is he a tiger coming out of retirement." Well, then, if you are fifty-four you are still a youth, so how on earth could you be incapable of studying?! This is the point I wanted to make in passing. Our present educational system for cadres is very good. It is a new invention, a newly invented university system. Speaking of universities, we have here the Marxist-Leninist Academy, the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University, the Women's University, and so on, which are all very good. Outside there are Beijing University, Fudan University, and others, and in foreign countries there are Oxford University, the University of Paris, and so on. In all of them one graduates after five or six years of study, so they are called fixed-term universities. But this university of ours may be considered the first of its kind in the world. We call it a lifetime university, because it does not matter if you are a little older; as long as you are still alive you may enter our university. This university of ours is an original creation ofYan'an, but anyone can enter it no matter where he is, be it some place in North China, Central China, or South China, and no matter who he is, whether a Communist Party member or not. He can always enter this long-term university. I can even mention some examples of people who became successful after studying in a lifetime university. From the very earliest times, the truly learned did not acquire their knowledge in school. Confucius did not learn his Confucian doctrine in school all at once. His teacher was called Xiang Tuo; this is confirmed in

88

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

books. It is recorded in the Three-Character Classic that "Of old, Zhongni took Xiang Tuo for his teacher."' But he did not learn all of his doctrine from Xiang Tuo. It was not until he became a teacher and an official in the state of Lu that his Confucian doctrine came into being. The same is true for Mr. Sun Yatsen. There was no such thing as the Three People's Principles while he was in school. As everyone knows, his field of study was medicine, and his Three People's Principles did not come into existence until after he was out of school. Furthermore, Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles did not appear all at once. At first there was only one People's Principle, and later there were two People's Principles. Finally he made a trip to Europe, observed various conditions such as that social problems had arisen in Europe, and that the workers wanted to overthrow the capitalists, and so on, and he came up with the additional principle of the People's Livelihood. This is how the Three People's Principles were finally put together. As for foreign countries, there was the case of Marx, who did not study Marxism in school at all but, rather, idealism. The Marxism he later learned outside school was different from what his teachers taught. As for those with little formal schooling, I can give Gorky as an example. He is the world's most famous "doctor" of literature, but he never attended primary school, nor did he ever go to middle school, and he cenainly never went to college. But his writings are foremost in the world. Therefore, going to school is all very well, but this is only a matter of entering a door, and if one wants to obtain funher knowledge, one must certainly study outside school and study for a long period of time. It does not matter if you still do not know how to read now, because there is hope as long as you study hard.

4- Study Should Be Followed Through to the End Study must be carried through until the very end. The biggest enemy in studying is not to carry it through to the very "end." If one is satisfied with oneself after learning a little something and thinks that he need not continue to study, this sort of satisfaction is the biggest and most tenacious enemy of our study movement. After ·today's meeting it should be overcome. As Comrade Luo Mai 7 has said, what we are learning includes things such as pany-building and the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and 6. Mao here quotes the lines numbered 267 and 268 from the Three-Character Classic. Zhongni was the hao of Confucius. See Herbert A. Giles, Elementary Chinese. Sanzijing (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh. t900), pp. t ls--19. 7. Luo Mai was the pseudonym of Li Wei han (1896-1984), a native ofChangsha, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. After studying in Moscow from 1931 to 1933, he returned to China, went to the Jiangxi Soviet Area, and thereafter participated in the Long March. At this time he was deputy head of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Cadre Education Department and president of the Central Party School.

MAY 1939

89

these are things that we shall continue to study over the long run. We can certainly learn all these things very well as long as we overcome all difficulties in our studies, but the main thing is not to give up halfway. Otherwise, nothing will be achieved. Apart from all this knowledge, there is the question of the current situation and the Party's policy. These two items were not included in past plans, but they are absolutely necessary, because this is real knowledge, and it is "today's" knowledge. As for the question ofthe current situation, the Central Committee is already selecting materials on the current situation in preparation for the compilation of a comprehensive anthology that may be supplied to the comrades for study and reference. As for the Party's policy, everyone has probably read through the resolutions of the Sixth Plenum once, but it is wrong to discard them as soon as one has finished reading them; the Party's policies should be studied frequently. All conference reports between the Sixth Plenum and the Seventh Plenum should be studied, including meetings ofthe Politburo. To study the theory alone without studying the Party's policy is inadequate and leads to separation from reality. The present study movement for the education of cadres at their posts encompasses the Party, the government, the army, the people, and educational institutions, and includes all working cadres in organizations of the popular masses and schools. After this meeting of ours is over, everyone should work hard, help one another, and correct the old way of doing things, in which one kept any books to himself and refused to share his studies with others. From now on, we must help

one another in our studies, serving as one another's teachers and one another's students, really becoming fellow students. The same applies to the comrades in the Central Committee; comrades should study together. Comrade Luo Mai told me that those at the lower levels are already asking for materials, that the comrades are studying already. This is very good and amply shows the comrades' enthusiasm. All right! Everyone present today and all Party comrades, study and learn, everyone should study through to the end, should enter this lifetime university. The whole Party should be transformed into one big university. The leader of this university is the Central Committee. Each local Party office, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the guerrilla units are the subdivisions of this big university. Every Party comrade and all non-Party soldiers must enter this university. We believe that if we adopt the orientation of studying through to the end we will surely be able to overcome the evil phenomenon of complacency. Our study movement is necessary. We can study. Results have already been achieved in our studies, and there will be more achievements in the future. We have adopted the policy of studying through to the very end. Under the leadership ofthe Depanment for Cadre Education, I am confident that the results of the study movement for cadres will be very good. This method we are trying out now should be spread throughout the Parry, and panicularly in the Party in North China.

In Commemoration ofthe Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (May 26, 1939)

The reason the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has become famous all over the country and all over the world is that, of all military institutions, it is the most revolutionary, the most progressive, and the best fighter for national liberation and social emancipation. This, I think, is the reason why visitors to Yan' an are so keen on seeing it. The university is revolutionary and progressive because both its staff members and teachers and its courses are revolutionary and progressive, and also because its students are revolutionary and progressive. Without this revolutionary and progressive character, it could never have become the object of praise at home and abroad. Some people attack the university; they are the capitulationists and diehards. This only goes to show that the university is a most revolutionary and progressive one, or otherwise they would not attack it. The vigorous attacks by the capitulationists and diehards testify to its revolutionary and progressive nature and add to its luster. It is a glorious military institute not only because the majority of people support and praise it, but also because the capitulationists and diehards strenuously attack and slander it. 1 In the past three years, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has made a great contribution to the country, to the nation, and to society by training

Our source for this speech is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 35-37, which reproduces the text as it originally appeared on May 30, 1939, in Xin Zhonghua bao and indicates the variants compared to the version published in Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu (Beijing, 1964), pp. 150-52, under the title "To Be Attacked by the Enemy Is Not a Bad Thing But a Good Thing." The Xin Zhonghua bao text has recently been reprinted without any changes in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 187-88. For this reason, we do not show the variants systematically here, but have indicated one or two of the most imponant in the notes. I. In keeping with the new title of the 1964 version, a paragraph was added here stressing that it is bad if a person, a political party, an army, or a school is not attacked by the enemy, for that would mean "that we have sunk to the level of the enemy"; it is good to be attacked by the enemy, since this proves "that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves." 90

MAY 1939 91

tens of thousands of promising, progressive, and revolutionary young students. It will certainly go on making its contribution to the country, the nation, and society, because it will continue to train such young students in large numbers. 2 The Huangpu Military Academy of the past and today's Anti-Japanese University reflect luster upon each other and emulate each other's virtues. The educational guidelines of the Anti-Japanese University are as follows: a firm and correct political orienta~ion, a style of work involving industrious effort and a fighting spirit, and flexible strategy and tactics. These are three essentials in the making of an anti-Japanese revolutionary soldier. It is in accordance with these essentials that the staff, teachers, and students of the university engage in teaching and learning. The improvement and progress of the Anti-Japanese University over the past few years have been accompanied by certain shortcomings. It has developed, but difficulties have arisen too. The main difficulty is the shortage of funds, teachers, and teaching materials. But, led by the Communist Party, the Anti-Japanese University does not fear any difficulties and will certainly overcome them. There are no such things as difficulties for Communists, for they can surmount them. It is my hope, and the hope of the people of the whole country and the entire world, that the Anti-Japanese University will correct its shortcomings and become still more progressive after its third anniversary. Teachers, staff members, and students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University,let us redouble our efforts!

2. The 1964 Xuandu edition adds here: "In speaking of the university, people often compare it to the Huangpu Military Academy before the Nonhem Expedition. In fact, there are points of both similarity and difference between the two institutes. The similarity is the presence of Communists among the teachers and students in both. The difference is that,

while the chief leaders and the majority of the students at the Huangpu Military Academy were members of the Guomindang, the entire leadership of the Anti-Japanese Military and

Political University is in the hands of the Communist Pany and the vast majority of the students are Communist or Communist-inclined. For this reason, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University of today cannot but be more revolutionary and more progres-

sive than was the Huangpu Military Academy of the past, and it will cenainly make a greater contribution to national liberation and social emancipation." The sentence which follows does not, of course, appear in the 1964 text.

Struggle Without Ceasing (May 30, 1939)

Comrades: I was delighted when I heard that a meeting was being held today to congratulate model youths, so I came to participate. Just now Comrade Feng Wenbin 1 spoke at some length, and what he said was very good. One sentence in his speech was, "We must struggle without ceasing." This is the point I want to talk about today. In the past, when I was a student, the conditions were not so good as those you enjoy today. First we read the works of Confucius, that is, the old stuff which goes, "Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application?"2 Later, I went to a foreign-style school and received some bourgeois education. Although in school I did hear something about what Sun Yatsen and Marx had said, I did not learn the true doctrine of Sun Yatsenism and Marxism until after I had left school. Now you can hear about everything, except that there is a bit less about Confucius. You can read many books, such as Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles, the Director General's Testament, and so on, as well as books on Marxism and on the strategy and tactics of the War of Resistance Against Japan. In former times, I did not have access to any of these books. Nineteen years ago, very few copies of the Communist Manifesto were printed in the entire country, so where would we have been able to find such a good theory? How could we be as happy as you are today? The age in which you are growing up now is a fortunate age, it is completely different from the era when I was a student. You model youths were elected during commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement, and this has tremendous significance. Twenty years ago the youths who participated in the May Fourth movement in Beijing

Our source for this speech is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 189-95, where it is reproduced from the stenographic record in the Central Archives. I. Feng Wenbin (1911-1997), a native of Zhejiang, joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1928 and the Communist Party in 1929 and participated in the Long March. In April 1937 he became head of the Northwest Young People's National Salvation League, and the following year he became deputy secretary of the Committee for Youth Work of the Central Committee.

2. 1b.is is the opening sentence of the Atuzlects; we follow here the translation of Legge, Vol. I, p. 137. 92

MAY /939

93

were true model youths, for they opposed the government, which was selling out the country, they shed blood in the May Fourth movement and participated in such a struggle. These youths constituted the vanguard of the revolution, and they were extremely valiant in carrying out such a struggle for the liberation, independence, freedom, and happiness of the Chinese nation. Quite a number of them have survived until today; many of the best elements in the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard 3 and the Northwest Youth Association for National Salvation4 are those who remained since that time. A considerable number of the revolutionary youths from those days later became Communist Party members. China's youth movement has a very good revolutionary tradition, which is to "struggle without ceasing." We in the Communist Party have inherited this tradition. We are carrying it on now, and we shall certainly continue it into the future. There are some people, on the other hand, who fought very valiantly in the May Fourth movement in Beiping but who later changed. One of these is Zhang Guotao, and there are others such as Kang Baiqing,' Luo Jialun, 6 and so on. They were all part ofthe vanguard during the May Fourth movement, but where are they now? They have now become part of the deserters. Before "May Fourth," Wang Jingwei went in a fit of passion to assassinate the Xuantong emperor's guardian, the prince regent. At that time he was extremely valiant. The news these days, however, is not very good, and he has stolen into Shanghai from Hanoi, then from Shanghai to the capital of Japan to visit the Japanese emperor, talked matters over with Japanese prime minister Hiranuma, and discussed the "[Wang] Jingwei-Hiranuma [Kiichiro] Agreement." Leaving aside how many words and articles there are in this agreement of his, it can be summarized in four big characters, which amount to "the destruction of China."

3. The Chinese National Liberation Vanguard was a youth group organized by the Chinese Communist Party and established in February 1936 as an outgrowth of the December Ninth movement. See below, Mao's talk of December 9, 1939, ''The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement." In areas under Guomindang control it was forced to disband in 1938, and in the anti-Japanese base areas it was later incorporated into the broaderbased youth organization, the Youth Association for National Salvation. 4. The Northwest Youth Association (or Alliance) for National Salvation was a mass youth group for resistance to Japan organized by the Chinese Communist Party and established in April 1937. 5. Kang Baiqing (1896-1958), a native of Anyue, Sichuan, was involved.in the literary revolution movement in the early 1920s. Along with Fu Sinian, Luo Jialun, and others, he helped organize the New Tide Society (Xinchao she) in 1918 and joined the Young China Association the same year. He went to study in the United States in 1920, and on his return held office in various warlord armies and organizations. 6. Luo Jia1un (1897-1969), a native of Shaoxing, was active in the New Culture movement, the New Tide Society, and the May Fourth movement. He studied abroad from 1920 to 1926 and on his return held various offices in Guomindang military, educational, and governmental departments.

94

MAO'SROADTOPOWER

The Wang Jingwei of thirty years ago and the Kang Baiqing, Luo Jialun, and Zhang Guotao of twenty years ago were all very brave, but they all have one shortcoming, which is that they are not good at struggling and lack the spirit to "struggle without ceasing." What is a model youth? There must be this element of struggle without ceasing. Other qualities must, of course, exist as well, including those mentioned just now by Comrade Feng Wenbin, such as intellect, virtue, sportsmanship, aesthetic sensibility, a sense of the masses, and so on, but in my opinion, "struggle without ceasing" is the most important one. Without this element, everything else is empty. To what extent should one struggle? One should struggle for five years, ten years, forty years, fifty years, even sixty or seventy years. In a word, struggle hard to the death. Until one has died, he has not yet achieved the aim of struggle without ceasing. There is a poem from the past with the following lines: ''Zhou Gong was filled with dread when rumors raged; Wang Mang was humble when he took a lower position 7 Had they died at the time, who would have known the truth or falsity of their lives?''8 1n the parlance of historians, this is called "making a judgment upon closing the coffin lid." In other words, the judgment of whether a person is good or evil cannot be made until the time of death. lfZhou Gong had died when rumors were raging, people would certainly have labeled him a ''traitorous minister." Or if Wang Mang had died when he had humbly declined a high position, then future generations would surely have praised him. But right now we are not discussing history, so we will not bother to argue about whether those two

7. Zhou Gong (d. 1105 s.c.) was the fourth son of King Wen of Zhou and younger brother to King Wu. He was adviser to his brother at the beginning of his brother's reign, and at the time there were rumors that he intended to usurp the throne, although he was later known as a man utterly devoted to the state. Wang Mang (33 s.c.-23 c.E. by contrast, was commonly known as "the Usurper" because of all his intrigues to gain power during the Han dynasty. Before he actually proclaimed himself emperor, however, he placed an infant on the throne and assumed the post of regent to the child. 8. These lines are quoted (not quite accurately) from the third of Bai Juyi's five poems entitled as a group "Unfettered Words" (Fang yan), written in 815. See Quan Tang shi (Zhonghua shuju paperback edition), ce 13, juan 438, pp. 4874-75. The full text of this poem is as follows: I hereby present a way to resolve all doubt; no need to use tortoise shell cracks or mil foil stalks. Jade is burned for three full days to test its authenticity, a tree takes seven years to show its timber. Zhou Gong was filled with dread when rumors abounded, Wang Mang acted humbly before he usurped the throne. Had they died in those early days, who would have known the truth or falsity of their lives? The author's own notes to lines 3 and 4 of the poem read: "Real jade does not get hot if burned for three days," and ''A tree in Jiangxi grows for seven years before [its quality] can be known."

MAY 1939

95

were good or evil. Instead, it goes to show that only upon a person's death can the truth about his merits and faults be properly assessed. When we say struggle without ceasing we mean struggle to the death. This struggle without ceasing is extremely important, and if we talk about moral values this is the one we should talk about. Model youths should be models with regard to this value. There are numerous other aspects in which to become a model. For example, there must be a correct direction in politics, yet it is far from enough just to have a correct political direction. If it is abandoned after three or four or five years, is it not all in vain? Therefore, after a correct political direction is attained, it must be firmly maintained, which is to say that there must be a "resolute and correct political direction." This orientation must be kept to without wavering, and this direction must be firmly maintained with the moral integrity to "resist wantonness in the face of prosperity, resist wavering in the face of poverty, and resist submission in the face of force and power." Youths such as this are the true model youths. Such morality is true political morality. This is our understanding of morality. Some people spout off all the time about morality and integrity, but they are politically irresolute and are likely to recant in midstream. This is a total lack of morality and virtue. I have said that there have been two currents in China's youth movement since its beginning: one is the revolutionary current, the other is the reactionary current.9 During the time of the May Fourth movement, one current demanded national independence, the realization of democratic politics, improvement of people's lives, standing together with the workers and peasants, standing together with the common people. Their position was a glorious one. The other current went in for compromising with imperialism. They too talked about toppling imperialism, but they would battle imperialism for only three days; on the fourth day they would stop fighting imperialism and become friends with imperialism. They said they wanted revolution and democratic politics, but again it was only for three days, and on the fourth day they began to oppress the common people. "Awaken the popular masses" were the words spoken by Mr. Sun Yatsenjust before his death. The ancients said that "a person about to die speaks words of great merit." Yet some people shouted [all this] for only three days and stopped on the fourth day. As for improving the people's livelihood, that was certainly nowhere in evidence. This is the reactionary current, which we call the "countercurrent." During the period of the Great Revolution, there were two youth groups in Guangdong: one was the Young Soldiers Association, and the other was the Sun Yatsenism Study Society . 10 These two groups represented those two currents. The 9. The reference is probably to the fourth section of Mao's article, "The May Fourth Movement," published on May I, 1939, and translated above. 10. The Young Soldiers Association was an organization established by Zhou Enlai at the Huangpu Military Academy in February 1925, led by members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League. It was dissolved after the Zhongshan gunboat incident of March 1926. The Sun Yatscnism Study Society was an organization led by the right wing of the Guomindang, headed by Dai Jitao.

96

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

former was revolutionary; they stood together with the majority of youths throughout the country, together with the workers and peasants and laboring masses. The latter was anti popular and anti-Communist. They opposed the Communists for ten years, and some of them made big fortunes and became officials through their anticommunism. Now they continue to hold up both hands, one for fighting Japan, the other for fighting the Communist Party. They want to resist Japan and at the same time to oppose communism, but is this feasible? Some people investigate very little history and therefore do not know much about such matters. Viewed historically, Wang Jingwei struggled hard this way and that, but he ended up struggling his way to the Japanese emperor's table for his supper, pitting himself in opposition to his whole nation. Now there are quite a few anti-Communists. On the one hand, they say that Japanese imperialism is despicable and must be toppled; on the other hand, they say that the Communist Party must be toppled as well. Some people forbade you to come to Yan'an and put you under arrest, so you had a difficult time getting here and made it to Yan'an through an ordeal of"numerous trials and tribulations." They said you are no good, but I see that you are fine, that you are outstanding model youths. They forbade you to come to Yan'an, saying that Yan'an is no good. Yan'an is indeed no good in that there is little vegetation and not enough funds, but Yan 'an has democratic politics and political freedom. In their eyes these things are certainly no good. Right now they are resisting Japan with one hand and fighting the Communists with the other, but in the future they may put both hands together and use them both to fight the Communist Party. The result can only be to become bedfellows with Japanese imperialism, surrender to the enemy, and turn into nonresisters to Japan. "Anticommunism means the destruction of China." These are the words of Chairman Chiang. These words must be publicly declared everywhere so that all the nation's youths and common people throughout the country know that the Communist Party must not be opposed. At present, we Communists are eating millet, plus we have to fend for ourselves when it comes to getting food and carrying out a production campaign, but the anti-Communist experts manage to eat a lot and eat well, and they do all sorts of bad things. There is a good example right here. Yan'an xian has two xian magistrates, one with a monthly salary of2 yuan, the other with a monthly salary of 180 yuan. The one who gets 2 yuan is a Communist Party member, and the one who gets 180 yuan is an anti-Communist expert. Yet the area under the anti-Communist expert's control consists of only one cave, and what he does is just to fight the Communists, engage in sabotage, and do espionage work. If they keep up this anticommunism, they are sure to become running dogs of imperialism. There are no dogs in this world but running dogs, nor are there any anti-Communist experts but those who surrender to Japanese imperialism. All you model youth comrades should know that persisting in anticommunism leads to becoming a running dog of imperialism. The purpose of their anticommunism is to destroy the Communist Party. The Communist Party is said to be bad because the Communist Party advocates fierce

MAY 1939

97

struggle. The Communist Pany has a tradition of struggling hard and is able to endure hunger and starvation to fight Japanese imperialism. In the past, when the Red Army was crossing the grasslands on the Long March, it had no food for fifty days and lived on tree bark. Only the Communist Pany could do something like this; no one else could. We Communist Party members "live on tree bark," while the local bullies, bad gentry, and corrupt officials "live off the fat of the land." Therefore, ifthe Communist Pany were to be wiped out, China would be in trouble. Everyone should suppon the Communist Party, and the common people throughout the country should also suppon the Communist Pany. On the other hand, those evil types who are anti-Communist, who make their fonunes off the nation's peril, and who make a living by creating conflict, should be eliminated one and all. Model youths present here today must battle these anti-Communist elements, oppose compromise and surrender, and oppose anticommunism. Your future is bright, and you must represent the majority of the common people throughout the country, represent all patriotic people, all people who resist Japan, as well as all people striving for China's independence, liberty, and well-being, and you must represent them forever. In the future when you grow older, teach your children to represent them too, have your children tell their children, have your grandchildren tell their grandchildren, and this way it will be passed on from one generation to another and from one to ten, ten to a hundred, a hundred to a thousand, passed on all over China, never ceasing until the goal is reached. We must cenainly make every effon to carry this out, and for the long run. We must cenainly achieve success in the revolution, fighting to the finish. Model youths, you must always keep in mind this point: "struggle without ceasing."

The Chinese and British Peoples Stand at the Same Front! (June l, 1939)

Just as the Chinese people's resolute and unwavering War of Resistance Against Japanese aggression reaches its second full year, the British Support-China Committee is sponsoring "China Week" all over the country to express support for our War of Resistance. On behalfofComradeZhu De and the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, the soldiers in hospitals at the front and in the rear, and also on my own behalf, I want to express how deeply moved and encouraged we are by such gestures of sympathy and concern! We wish to express our thanks and offer a heartfelt salute to the British people who have been standing with us on the international front against aggression. In the past two years, China's War of Resistance has proved the power of democratic force in fighting against aggression. The War of Resistance over these past two years has demonstrated that even a country that is backward in industry and subject to all kinds of oppression and insults in its national life can, full of confidence in victory, resist attacks by the most barbarous and violent fascists. It has proved, in addition, that not only is it impossible to separate the Chinese War of Resistance from the worldwide antiaggression forces, but that the blows we dealt the aggressors have moved our country to the very frontlines in the international struggle to protect worldwide democracy and civilization, and to the main antifascist front. As soon as the war started, we saw the British people aiding our War of Resistance with material goods, donating medical supplies, and sending medical teams to serve in China and expressing much actual sympathy with us. This shows that although there is a great distance between us and Britain, our War of Resistance is not something of no import to the British people. But because of the status of our War of Resistance in the worldwide struggle against aggression, we have the right to ask for more-more than the aid we have been given previously. First, we ask that you pay strict attention to your government's attitude. You must pressure it into taking resolute action to cease exporting weapons to Japan. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 339-41, where it is reproduced from Qunzhong (Chongqing), Vol. 3, no. 10, July 23, 1939. According to a note at the end of that version, the article was written by Mao Zedong for China Week, a periodical sponsored by the British Support-China Committee, and had been translated back from the English. We have not had access to the English text. 98

JUNE 1939

99

Just a few weeks ago, the British embassy and consulate general in Chongqing suffered damage under Japan's indiscriminate bombing of the capital. To this insult the British government has shown only the meekest diplomatic response in the form of a single written protest. This is precisely the sort of attitude that encouraged Japan to wipe out British interests at every possible opportunity. The most effective way for the British people to hold in check the Far Eastern robbers and to aid China at the same time is to exert forceful pressure on their government, demanding that it impose immediate sanctions upon Japan. In the past two years Japan's accomplices, fascist Germany and Italy, have been destroying peace in collusion with Japan, violating international treaties, and waging bloody and inhumane wars. Their activities have posed a direct threat to Britain's security. Here is another reason why the British people must force their government to support China's resistance war and take measures to complement the contributions China has made to the antiaggression front. Antifascism does not mean that we need to engage ourselves in individual wars. The threat is general, and so it is now necessary to struggle against it all over the world. To give an example, recently Japan has stepped up its anti-British propaganda in the occupied regions. Therefore, it is also necessary to the British people's selfdefense to help China and help those countries fighting against the enemies in the Far East. Given the various conditions described above, we make a proposal to you, requesting that you adopt concrete and effective measures to strengthen British policies so that the British government and people may stand together in their hopes and actions to check the Japanese aggressors. We have already been struggling resolutely for two years for the sake of our country's independence and freedom and the peace and freedom of the whole human race. During these two years the Japanese warlords have used shameless defeatists such as Wang Jingwei and his ilk in an attempt to destroy our War of Resistance by destroying the Anti-Japanese National United Front. But our friends may set their minds at rest. In the past two years the unity of the Chinese people has matured, and our determination to fight the War of Resistance to the final victory has been greatly strengthened. Both the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang are all the more resolutely carrying out our common resolutions, and supporting Chairman Chiang's leadership in the War of Resistance. In the past, defeatists such as Wang Jingwei and his ilk could still hide themselves in the rear conspiring to surrender, but now they can no longer conceal their true colors; they have been exposed and put to flight. Britain and China are geographically far apart, but the common desire to defeat fascist aggression has united us together. Let us join hands to defeat the common enemy of the human race. Let the peoples of China and Britain unite! June I, 1939, in Yan'an

Inscription for the First Issue of the Magazine Chinese Women Published in Yan'an (June I, 1939)

Women have been liberated and are emerging suddenly as a new force; Two hundred million in number, they have valiantly roused themselves. When men and women keep abreast of one another, it is like the sun rising from the east; Thus they subdue their enemies; will the latter not fall? The way to reach our goal is through arduous struggle; Nothing in this world is difficult; where there is a will, it can eventually be achieved. The publication of a women's magazine is like clouds in the midst of a drought; I expect to see this magazine be popular indeed.

This inscription was first published in Renmin ribao, September 20, 1977. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 39, which reproduces the text from this

source. 100

Speech Given at the Meeting to Commemorate the Third Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (June I, 1939)

(Special to our paper) ... First there was the grand review of the guards of honor. Majestic martial music was played in the splendor of the sunset, as several thousand valiant fighters. in high spirits and in good order, lined up around the meeting place, saluting the officials who walked past them to review them-Comrade Mao Zedong, all the responsible comrades of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the vice-president of the Anti-Japanese University, Luo Ruiqing, and others. After the review was over. because of filming. the order of the proceedings was temporarily changed. First of all, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Mao Zcdong. was asked to give his speech. Then. his strong and loud and clear voice struck the hearts of this group of young people:

Today is your third anniversary. The Anti-Japanese University has been in operation for three years, and our War of Resistance has been going on for nearly two years. The Anti-Japanese University is for resistance against Japan. The purpose of the Anti-Japanese University is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and thoroughly liberate the Chinese nation. For the past three years the Anti-Japanese University has created many strong anti-Japanese cadres to go to the front, to the enemy's rear, to attack the enemy, and to destroy the enemy .... In our country today there are still many people of the Wang [Jingwei] faction-capitulationists, those in the capitulation faction. They are not in favor of carrying through the War of Resistance to the end. They advocate making peace with Japanese imperialism, and they advocate compromise and surrender. What are we to do? We shall oppose surrender. "Carry on the War of Resistance until the very end" is still Chairman Chiang's rallying call and is supported by the people throughout the country. We of the Anti-Japanese University are all in favor of"Opposing surrender and carrying out the War of Resistance to the end." Among those of us of the Anti-Japanese University, there can be no one who will not fight to the very end, there can be no one who will not oppose surrender, and there cannot be

This summary of Mao's remarks was first published in the Van 'an Xin Zhonghua bao, June 6, 1939. We have translated it from Mao 7..edong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 41-42, which reproduces the tex.t from this source. /OJ

/02

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

a single person who would support peaceful compromise. If there is such a one, he is not an Anti-Japanese University student; he is, rather, the scum of the AntiJapanese University, the scum of the nation. (All present applauded and shouted: Oppose surrender, carry on the War of Resistance to the end!) The same goes for all parties and factions in the country; no one may be allowed to make peace, and all must act in unison to carry out the War of Resistance to the end! This is the basic principle of the Anti-Japanese University. It has been this way for the past three years, and it will remain this way for the next three years and for many more years to come. "Oppose capitulation and wage the War of Resistance to the end," this is the general guiding principle of the Anti-Japanese University. All present loudly shouted the slogans, "Resist to the end!" "Long live the Anti-Japanese University!"

Talk at the Award-Giving Ceremony for Mode/Youth (June 6, 1939)

(Special to our newspaper) ... Amid prolonged applause and enthusiastic cheers, Comrade Mao Zedong walked up to the platfonn. He was especially happy, often wearing a smile.

"Young people should consider a resolute and correct political orientation as their top priority. The model youth represent the common people of China and should represent them all their lives." "It is not enough to represent them yourselves; you should teach your sons to do so. China's revolution has not yet succeeded, and we must struggle for a long time-we must struggle forever." His words were so wann and powerful. 1

Our source for this extract from a repon in the Yan'an XinZhonghua bao for June 6, 1939, is Mao 'h!dong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 43. I. According to the contemporary report, Mao Zedong and Wang Ming proceeded to hand the awards personally to more than a thousand young people. 103

Outline on Opposing Capitulation Outline of the Report and Conclusions at the Yan 'an Conference of Senior Cadres REPORT (June 10, 1939)

The Characteristics of the Present Situation The characteristics of the present situation are as follows: the possibility of surrender by the Guomindang has become the greatest danger, and the Guomindang's anti-Communist activities are steps in the preparation of that surrender. The possibility of the Guomindang's surrender existed from the very beginning of the War of Resistance; it is not something that came up suddenly today. Its becoming the greatest danger in the overall picture at present is, however, a phenomenon of the current political situation. The Guomindang's anticommunism has also existed since the establishment of the United Front and is not something that suddenly happened today, but turning anticommunism into a direct step in preparing to surrender is a reality of the present. The current situation results from the following three factors: (I) the Japanese policy of inducing capitulation; (2) international pressure; and (3) the vacillation of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie. I will now discuss them one after the other below.

I. The Historical Development of Japan's Policy of Inducing Capitulation I. Japan's basic policy toward China is to destroy China and establish a socalled "New Order in East Asia." This is firm and unchanging, and is also unalterable in the eyes of the Japanese aggressors. The January 2, 1939, editorial of Tokyo's National News (the official organ of the military) stated: "The problem immediately at hand does not allow for the slightest retreat, nor for a moment's hesitation. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 196-237, where it is reproduced from documents in the Central Archives. The outline of the report is based on a handwritten

copy; the outline of the conclusion is taken from a printed text bearing Mao's own corrections. The outline can also be found in Volume 2 of the 1948 edition of the Selected Works; there are slight textual variations between that version and the one translated here. 104

JUNE /939

105

The incident has reached its concluding phase. Any misstep in ruling the state would not only result in losing the fruits of the war, but would also affect the country's destiny. History teaches us that the latter phase of a war is many times more difficult than the initial phase. The unfortunate examples of Germany and Russia during the Great War in Europe must be thoroughly understood by politicians and citizens alike." (Shijie zhishi, Vol. 9, no. I, February 1.) To sum up in a single sentence, this means that the basic principle of aggression must be thoroughly carried out; otherwise, dangers such as the German and Russian revolutions will arise. From this it is plain to see that to believe that Japan could make fundamental concessions and that the status quo before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident could be restored without a protracted war, by the application of pressure from Britain and the United States (as Chiang Kaishek and many people in the Guomindang believe), is nothing but a fantasy. 2. Japan's basic policy (general line) of "destroying China and establishing a New Order in East Asia" is firm and will not waver voluntarily. The methods (or tactics) for carrying out this basic policy, however, are a combination of soft and hard measures that have a certain flexibility, and certain temporary, partial, and superficial concessions may even be made in order to realize the fundamental goal. In general, political enticement to surrender was the primary method before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident; military attack was the main method from Marco Polo Bridge to [the fall of] Wuhan; and political enticement to surrender has been primary once again from Wuhan to the present. 3. To understand that the enemy's basic policy is firm and unchanging and that their tactics for applying it alternate between soft and hard methods, one need only look at the following materials: a. Before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a hard policy was adopted, the Three Northeastern Provinces were actually occupied,' and the method of diplomatic enticement to surrender was applied to China as a whole. i. Tanaka's memorial to the throne before the Manchurian incident (the letter of July 25, 1927, the second year of Showa, from Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi 2 to the emperor delivered through Minister of Court Affairs Ichiki Kitokuro) 3 stated that "to conquer the world, China must be conquered first," and laid down the policy of destroying China.

I. The Three Northeastern Provinces, as they are commonly called in English (the Ct-inesc, dong sansheng, means literally "three Eastern provinces") were Heilongjiang. Jilir.. and Fengtian. Together they constituted Manchuria. 2. Tanaka Giichi (1863-1929) became prime minister in April1927. He had served as minister of war, and was a forceful advocate of military values. Some doubts have been expressed about the authenticity of the memorial to the throne here attributed to him, but he consistently took a strong line in dealing with China. 3. 1chiki KitokurO (1867-1944) became minister of court affairs in 1925. (The Chinese text has wrong characters ror lchiki's given name or ming.)

106

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

ii. The occupation of Manchuria on September 18, 1931.4 iii. Amau's statement of April 17, 1934 (the statement made by Amau5 on behalf of the Foreign Ministry) declared: "Peace in the East is Japan's responsibility, so it opposes China's actions contrary to peace in the East and the actions of any other country that hinder peace in the East." This is an open declaration of their policy to destroy China. iv. Hirota's Three Principles ofJanuary 21, 19366 (Hirota formally announced the three principles in the Diet), namely: first, friendly relations with Japan; second, recognition of Manchuria [i.e., Manchukuo]; and third, joint

resistance to Communism. v. The six conditions in the secret report in the spring of 1937 by Matsumuro Kiiryo, 7 chief of the Japanese North China Intelligence Organization, all expressed a combination of soft and hard methods to be carried out simultaneously. b. From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident8 to [the fall of] Wuhan, to carry out their hard policy, firm military attacks were adopted as the primary method, and political enticement to surrender was secondary. i. A few days after the July 7 incident9 of 1937, Foreign Minister Hirota made a declaration of nonexpansionism. Our Party's August Resolution pointed out that this was a "smokescreen to cover up offensives" but, at the same time, implied that "by surrendering you will avoid attacks.'' 10 4. On September 18, 1931. the Manchurian Incident (also called the Mukden Incident took place. Officers of the Japanese Guandong Army blew up a small segment of railway tracks some five miles north of the Mukden station, and taking this as a pretext, the Guandong Army seized control of most of southern Manchuria. The response of the United States, Britain, and the League of Nations was indecisive, and on September 15, 1932, Japan recognized Manchukuo. 5. The reference is toAmau Eiji (1887-1968). who was atthis time chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This statement has often been referred to as an "Asian Monroe Doctrine." 6. Hirota Koki (1878--1948) was foreign minister in January 1936; he became prime minister in february. Regarding his "three principles" and the Chinese reaction to them, sec Volume V, p. 175. note I, and numerous other references throughout that volume. He was the only civilian sentenced to death by the Tokyo Tribunal. 7. Matsumuro Koryo (1886--1969), also known as MatsumuroTakeyoshi. 8. Shortly before midnight on July 7, 1937, Japanese troops conducting maneuvers near the Marco Polo Bridge, a strategic rail junction located some ten miles from Beiping, were fired upon, or claimed to have been fired upon, by Chinese forces. The next day, in telegrams to Chiang Kaishek and other Guomindang commanders, Mao called for a War of Resistance to recover the lost territories, and for shedding every last drop of blood to drive out the Japanese bandits. (See Volume V, pp. 695-96). On August 7, Chiang Kaishek formally decided to wage an all-out War of Resistance. 9. I.e., the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. I0. The reference is to the "Resolution of the Central Committee on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks" of August 25, 1937, translated in Saich, Rise to Power, pp. 791--92.

JUNE 1939

107

ii. On July 27, 1937, Army Minister Sugiyama 11 made a war statement at a special session of the Diet: "Absolutely determined to take punitive action, the Army authorities have already made important preparations." This indicates that the method would be the hard one of fighting to obtain surrender. iii. The conditions for peace put forward by Japan since the outbreak of fighting. According to the British Evening Standard, responsible persons ofthe Japanese government have presented the following conditions to Chiang Kaishek. There are six points altogether: (1) independence of Inner Mongolia; (2) autonomy of North China; (3) occupied Shanghai as a Japanese concession; (4) fishing rights along the coast from Shanhaiguan to Annan; 12 (5) China's withdrawal from the League of Nations; (6) no building of an air force (Jiefang bao, November 13, 1937). This shows the things it demanded, and to this day their demands are, generally speaking, still within this range. iv. After Nanjing was occupied on December 13, 1937, the commander of the Japanese Third Fleet, Tanikawa Ryo, 13 said on the 27th, ''The Japanese empire will never be satisfied with its success up until now, as it is still far from the outcome of the overall plan. Imperial soldiers act according to the general intent ofthe empire, serve the eternal peace of the Orient, and hope to reach the goal of thorough progress." This indicates that their intention is to continue military attacks. v. Hirota's New Year's Eve ( 1937) speech: "If friendly ally China can understand the important point that Japan is striving for peace in East Asia, it can avoid today's misery and pain. The Japanese government deeply hopes to begin a new peace in 1938 and resolve all problems." This shows that soft methods could be used if there were surrender. vi. The famous declaration of January 16. On December 11 (two days before the occupation of Nanjing) the Cabinet made the decision, the Imperial Court Conference adopted it on the 12th, Nanjing was occupied on the 13th, China's Chairman Chiang issued an open letter to the people of the whole country on the 17th, and on January 16 the [Japanese] government put out this declaration. The essential idea is as follows: In the future, the National Government will not be regarded as an opponent, and a new government is expected to be set up. Chinese territorial and political sovereignty and the rights and interests of the various other powers in China shall be respected. This shows a policy that is hard, and methods that are hard as well.

11. Sugiyama Gen (1880-1945) was an enthusiastic partisan of a hard line against China. He committed suicide in 1945 afteF arranging for the surrender of the Japanese anny. 12. Annan (Annam) was the current Chinese term for Vietnam. 13. We have been unable to find information about this person.

108 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

vii. On January 20, 1938, the Japanese ambassador to China, Kawagoe Shigeru, 14 said in an interview with journalists: "I am being recalled to Japan, while Councilor Hitaka 15 remains in Shanghai. The purpose of his remaining in Shanghai, however, is not at all because we still wish to make representations to the Chinese government, but, rather, to make arrangements with foreign diplomatic personnel with regard to incidents that might occur. The door is already closed on reestablishing negotiations with the National Government. Even if the National Government were to reconsider its attitude in the future, it could only enter into negotiation with the new Chinese institutions, and could not deal with Japan." Since the declaration of January 16, this statement was the most undisguised in pointing to war as primary and accommodation as secondary and in talking about overthrowing Chiang Kaishek and establishing a new government. viii. There remained, however, [an element of] peace within the war[like stance]. On January 20 Reuters reported that Hirota announced in the 73rd Diet four conditions of peace through German mediation: (I) abandon the alliance with the Communist Party to resist Japan and recognize "Manchuria"; (2) establish demilitarized zones in certain areas and set up administrative organs in these areas; (3) economic cooperation between China, Japan, and Manchuria; (4) reparations from China. These were the minimum conditions for negotiating peace, the conditions presented to Chiang by Trautmann. 16 Chiang at one point considered accepting them, and WangJingwei's "take one example" referred to this (Chiang, the two Chens, 17 and He, 18 as well as Sun, 19 Yu,20 and Bai 21 all took part in discussing the question of accepting). In the end Chiang rejected them, but Hirota announced them in the Diet. 14. Kawagoe Shigeru (1881-1969) was Japanese ambassador to China between 1936 and the beginning of 1938. IS. Hitaka Shinrokuro (1893-1976) became Japanese consul general in Shanghai in 1938. 16. Oskar Trautmann (1877-1950); then German ambassador to China. 17. The two Chens are Chen Guofu (1892-1951) and Chen Lifu (1900-2001), at the time members of the Guomindang's Central Standing Committee. For details regarding Chen Lifu, see below the relevant note to Edgar Snow's interviews of September 24--26, 1939 with Mao Zedong. 18. He Yingqin (189().-1987) a native of Guizhou Province, was at this time chief of staff of the Guomindang government's Military Affairs Commission and commander of the Fourth War Zone. 19. Sun Ke (1891-1973), the son of Sun Yatsen, was at the time president of the Legislative Yuan of the Guomindang government. 20. Yu Youren (1879-1964), a native of Shaanxi Province, was a member of the Guomindang central government's Standing Committee and president of the Judicial Yuan. 21. Bai Chongxi (1893-1966) was deputy chief of staff of the Guomindang government's Military Commission.

JUNE 1939

109

ix. During the 73rd session of the Diet in late January: Konoe's 22 opening speech: "The solution to the war requires a long period of time." "The present government has adopted firm policies and will no longer have any relations with China's Guomindang government in the future." Hirota's statement, announcing the four conditions put forward by Trautmann (see above). Minseito23 Diet members demanded that the government guarantee never to discuss conditions for peace with the Guomindang government. Diet member Shimada Toshio24 asked straight out, why not declare war on China? The Japanese government announced four key points in its policy toward China:(!) There would be absolutely no negotiations with the Guomindang government; (2) To stop arms shipments to China, it was still possible to declare war against China; (3) They would assume a position of guardianship toward the new regime in North China; (4) Third-party mediation would absolutely not be tolerated. But as late as January 29, Konoe indicated again in the same session of the Diet: "The act of declaring war is still under consideration. The decision depends upon China's attitude in the future." So the door to peace remained open. This reflected the struggle within the Japanese government between those advocating peace and those advocating war. At the time, Sugiyama issued a statement on this question about ''the need to prepare for a protracted war," in opposition to the faction advocating peace. 25 x. The Japanese ambassador in Shanghai (to the Reform Government),26 Tani Masayuki, 27 issued a statement on March 9, saying, ''The Chiang

22. Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945), who had become prime minister in June 1937.

23. The MinseitO ("Progressive Party" or "Democratic Party") was one of the two main political groupings in the Diet at this time. 24. Shimada Toshio (1877-1947), a long-time member of the Diet, was active in Japanese politics throughout his life. 25. The reference is to the army minister, Sugiyama Hajime. Mao's statement that he had foreseen a protracted war is puzzling, for Sugiyama had, in fact, prophesied in 1937 that the "China Incident" would be over in a month. 26. The so-called "Refonn Government of the Republic of China" (Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu) was a Japanese puppet government which had been established in Nanjing in March 1938 and theoretically had authority over Nanjing, Shanghai, and the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui. 27. Tani Masayuki ( 1889-1962), a career diplomat, had been made director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau in 1930. In 1942, he was to become foreign minister in the government of General TOjO.

110 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Kaishek regime is about to collapse, but it is imperative to continue to intensify the war so as to accelerate the downfall of Chiang's regime and cause third countries to give up their attempts to assist Chiang. Means other than war may be more effective and cost less if they cause Chiang to negotiate for peace." Here is one person advocating both war and peace in the course of a single speech. xi. Konoe's May 2nd speech on preparation for protracted war: "In order to overthrow Chiang's regime and eradicate the source of disaster in East Asia, we should not hesitate to devote even several years' time. At the same time, the whole country's citizens should do their utmost to assist the two pro-Japanese and anti-Communist regimes of North China and Central China." xii. Hirota's May 9th speech at the conference of local senior officials, advocating the prudent handling of the [China] Incident: ''The China Incident has entered a second stage, in which Chiang Kaishek' s regime is propagating the idea of a protracted War of Resistance and going in for domestic unity, but has not been able to reach the goal of unity. On the other hand, the provision of military supplies by various countries and aid to China from "the Soviet Union are actual facts. Therefore, the imperial government must take these facts into consideration and handle the present incident with care. When the Tianjin-Pukou line is occupied, the Provisional Government28 and the Reform Government should carry out a merger at once. 29 The imperial government supports this to the utmost, for the purpose of merger and unification and for successful and positive development." The enemy uses the Military and the Foreign Office, one to represent the hard line and one the soft, but there is either soft within the hard (espionage agencies in the military) or hard within the soft (the Foreign Office), alternately playing the hero and the villain. xiii. After Xuzhou fell, the enemy vowed to fight on to Kunming. Xuzhou fell on May 19th, and on the 22nd the enemy's frontline commander made a speech saying, "After the capture of Xuzhou, the war has by no means stopped. There are three steps in the war: The first step is the major battle of Xuzhou; the second step is the assault on Hankou; the third step is the attack on Chongqing or Kunming." How firm a statement this is!

28. The "Provisional Government of the Republic of China" (Zhonghua minguo linshi zhengfu) was a Japanese puppet government established in Beiping in December 1937, with authority over Beiping, Tianjin, and provinces in North China controlled by Japan. 29. In March 1940, both of these puppet governments were merged with that of Wang Jingwei.

JUNE /939

Ill

xiv. Minister Nagai 30 issued a statement on June 17th that Chiang's regime must be overthrown: "The government's current policy toward China is aimed at toppling Chiang's regime, assisting the new government, building a new China, and laying the foundation for a permanent peace in East Asia. Other policies must proceed along this line." xv. At the time of the Zhanggufeng lncident, 31 it was reported that Japan put forward five conditions for peace: "As the border dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union intensifies day by day and may turn into a large-scale war, today (August 5) a breath of peaceful air between China and Japan has wafted over Hong Kong. The morning edition of the Zici xibao 32 carried initial reports on the five conditions of peace put forward by Japan to China, and by afternoon all the evening papers carried the news. The five conditions are: ( 1) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from occupied areas, but Chinese troops are not to move in; (2) Recognition of"Manchukuo"; (3) Leasing ofHongkou, Zhabei, and Jiangwan to Japan for a period of ninety-nine years; (4) Reparations for losses suffered during this war; (5) Joint defense against the Communists." (Xingdao ribao report from Hong Kong on August 5, 1938.) xvi. The hard-line doctrine of ltagaki. 33 ltagaki issued a statement on July 1: "As long as Chiang's regime remains in existence, there is absolutely no possibility of peace between China and Japan. Today, Japan can no longer join hands with Chiang Kaishek in peace negotiations." On the first anniversary of the Incident, on July 7, ltagaki issued this statement: "From now on, no matter how many years the war is prolonged, there is only one road for the empire to take (note: this refers

30. The reference is to Nagai Ryiitaro ( 1881-1945), minister of communications in the Konoe government, who was an enthusiastic partisan of "Asia for Asiatics" and the New Order in East Asia. 31. The reference is to an armed conflict lasting two weeks along the border between Korea (then a Japanese colony) and the Soviet Union near Zhanggufcng, a peak on the seacoast just inside Soviet territory, in late July and early August 1938. The Tokyo Tribunal concluded that Japanese troops had provoked the Soviet forces. In any case, they were roundly defeated, and a ceasefire agreement was concluded in Moscow. (The text in the Mao 7..edong wenji is taken from a handwritten copy in the Central Archives. As pointed out by the editors in a note, the name of the mountain in this version contains an error: the middle character in Zhanggufeng has been replaced by an entirely different character pronounced "gao" instead of "gu." We have not felt obliged to follow them by incorporating the wrong spe1ling in the text.) 32. We have not been able to identify this newspaper, which was apparently published in Hong Kong. 33. Itagaki Seishiro (1885-1948) had been, in 1931, chief of staff of the Guandong Army and one of the prime movers in the ..Mukden Incident," which marked the beginning of Japan's invasion of China. At this time. he was the Japanese minister of the anny.

112 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

to the military conquest of China). Aside from this there is no way to achieve a hundred years of peace in the Orient." xvii. Establishment of a China Affairs Board to oversee the exercise of authority in China-a president, a vice-president, and five ministers. Not only the occupied areas, but the unoccupied areas as well would come within its jurisdiction. xviii. The driving out of Ugaki by the Japanese Army Ministry on September 29th. Ugaki resigned in anger over differences with the Army Ministry regarding policy toward China. 34 c. From [the fall of] Wuhan to the present-a change in tactics from hard to soft. i. Having occupied Guangzhou on October 12th and Wuhan on October 25th, and having seen Chiang Kaishek's open letter to the people, issued on the 30th, advocating a protracted War of Resistance, the Japanese government chose November 3, Meiji Commemoration Day, or what is called Emperor's Day, on which to issue an important declaration, clearly indicating a change in tactics. Its main points are as follows: (I) "The National Government has become a local government, and if it continues to resist Japan, then military actions will definitely not cease until this government is destroyed"; (2) "Japan's objective is to build a new order of perpetual security in East Asia. This means Japan, China, and Manchukuo joining together andestablishing relations of mutual assistance and interdependence in political, economic, cultural, and other spheres"; (3) "As for the National Government, if it is able to abandon its previous mistaken policies, and if it can be regenerated by other personnel and built up and maintained, then the Empire will not reject it." The policy has changed, with the declaration that the policy of not regarding the National Government as an interlocutor and insisting on establishing a puppet government is to be abandoned, and according to the declaration the National Government may be accepted as an interlocutor, but only on condition that Chiang leave office. ii. The Konoe statement of December 22, which was supported by Wang Jingwei in a circular telegram and bitterly repudiated by Chiang Kaishek in a speech. Its main points are as follows: (I) "The three countries of China, Japan, and Manchukuo should regard the establishment of a new order in East Asia as the common goal, unite and have close and friendly relations, engage in a common defense against Communism, and offer one another economic support"; (2) "Therefore, China must establish full state-to-state relations with 'Manchukuo"'; (3) "Conclude a Sino-Japa-

nese agreement for defense against Communism, station anti-Communist troops in specified areas, and make Inner Mongolia a special region for 34. Ugaki Kazushige (1868-1956) became foreign minister in May 1938, and resigned,

as Mao indicates, in September.

JUNE 1939

113

defense against Communism"; (4) "Sino-Japanese economic mutual assistance: subjects of the empire have the freedom to reside and do business in China, and Japan is to be granted facilities to develop and make use of natural resources in North China and Inner Mongolia"; (5) "Japan is willing to consider returning the concessions and relinquishing extraterritorial rights." This is a reiteration of the basic policies of the November 3 declaration, with added concrete content. The National Government and Chiang Kaishek (Chiang's existence is permitted beginning at this point) are both allowed to exist provided they submit to Japan. Japan may withdraw from Central and South China, but Nonh China is to be kept, though nominal sovereignty may not be required. iii. The Hiranuma Cabinet35 has maintained these policy guidelines unaltered up unti I the present. iv. Japan's instigating a broad "peace movement" in China, establishing a so-called "Association for Peace and the Cessation of War," holding public meetings and distributing handbills everywhere. For a long time no mention has been made of establishing a unified central government. It has been touched on occasionally, but only to frighten Chiang. Unless Chiang fights a War of Resistance to the end, they may yet change their minds about him. v. The huge plot to drive a wedge in the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Pany and make use of the Three People's Principles. The Japanese Matsumoto Shin'ichi wrote an anicle entitled "On the Question of Winning Overthe Masses ofthe Chinese Nation," in which he says: "The purpose of the empire's use of force is, first, to defeat thoroughly the anti-Japanese regime and armed forces and, second, to bring about mutual assistance and harmony between the two nations of China and Japan, and the establishment of peace in the Orient. The former is the means to achieve the latter. But these two things prove that the reality in China is in fact one of mutually opposing contradictions. If we consider the developments since the Incident, although the guiding principles of the anti-Japanese regime were erroneous, Chiang's regime in fact has the character of a national regime and enjoys the suppon of a majority of the Chinese nation. This is why the present regime has been able to win the enthusiastic support of the Chinese Communist Pany, the Chinese Youth Pany, the various anti-Japanese fronts, and the old soldiers. At present, we wish, on the one hand, to destroy Chiang's regime and, on the other hand, to cooperate with the Chinese nation. In fact, this amounts to the fruitless exercise of climbing a tree to catch a fish. The more we seek to 35. Hiranuma KiichirO (1867-1952) was prime minister at this time. A partisan of the alliance with Gennany, he resigned the prime ministership in August 1939, following the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact, which he saw as a betrayal.

114

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

overthrow Chiang, the more the Chinese nation will support him. If we try to overthrow Chiang, we will lose our hold on the popular masses, and if we wish to hold onto the popular masses, we cannot overthrow Chiang. Thus our country's basic difficulty lies here. "Both the Provisional Government and the Reform Government are still without a base among the popular masses. Those with a popular mass base are the northern and southern governments, which would not be difficult to merge. But the program of the new government should be under the banner of the Guomindang's Three People's Principles, and the task of the new government should be the realization of Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood. In other words, the enemy's banner is similar to ours, and it is hard to avoid getting them muddled and confused. But we can tell them to use 'Fight the War of Resistance while realizing the Three People's Principles' as a rallying call, while we respond with the call to 'Cooperate with Japan as we establish the Three People's Principles."' "Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists constitutes the backbone of the anti-Japanese united front, so it is truly necessary to smash it." "The objective of the battle at Wuhan was to shatter the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists, so the occupation of Wuhan is like a wedge driven between the Guomindang and the Communists, and both military and political tactics are aimed at dispersing the forces of the Guomindang and the Communists." (For the above text see Dagongbao, January 23 of this year.) vi. The Shanghai Daobao pointed out as early as February 17 the danger of a Far Eastern Munich: "On the one hand, it seeks truth from facts and tries to strengthen local governments and organize so-called Jiang-Han type governments. 36 On the other hand, it is carrying out an even larger conspiracy of an international nature. The main design of this conspiracy is to compel and entice the two countries of Britain and France to use the form of international conferences (open or secret) to force China and Japan into compromise with each other, even though Japan has declared in the past that it does not want the involvement of third countries in resolving the conflicts between China and Japan." It also said, "It is wrong to believe that Wang Jingwei is finished and everything will be fine. He may play a very evil role in the future." The twenty-nine items I have listed above illustrate the historical development of Japan's policy of luring China into capitulation, and fully illustrate the following three points: 36. "Jiang-Han" is the title of an ode in the Book of Poetry Ill, 3, 8 (Legge, Vol. IV, pp. 551-55). Atone level, it can be taken here simply as a reference to Wuhan, which is located at the confluence of the Great River (the Yangzi) and the Han River. Some allusion may also be intended to the content of the ode in question, which is about putting down rebellion and establishing peace throughout the empire.

JUNE 1939

115

First, Japan's overall policy of destroying China is extremely firm and will certainly never change. it is resolved to turn China into its colony and establish a so-called "New Order in East Asia." Second, however, its methods for carrying out this policy are a combination of soft and hard, with a shift in emphasis according to the times. Before Wuhan, force was primary, but there was peacemaking in the midst of war. After Wuhan, peacemaking has been primary, but there is still some fighting to press for surrender. Third, it is still trying to manipulate Britain, the United States, and France into calling a peace conference in the Far East, so that the danger of a Far Eastern Munich hangs over the heads of the Chinese people. 4. In the above three sections, the first points out that [Japan's] basic orientation is firm and unchanging. The second shows that it uses both soft and hard methods. The third indicates, by citing twenty-nine pieces of evidence, the historical development of its switch from the use of hard methods of application to soft ones and demonstrates that the greatest danger at present is surrender. Now this fourth section explains the reasons for its peace offer from the financial, economic, and military standpoints. Japan finds itself in tremendous difficulties in terms of finance (altogether 12 billion yen in three years; 2.55 billion the first year, 4.85 billion the second year, 4.65 billion the third year), the economy (huge increases in imports and a drastic decline in exports, military industries overshadowing peace industries, high inflation, deterioration in people's standard of living, exhaustion of cash reserves, and unstable foreign currency reserves), and the military situation (insufficient forces and dispersion of forces). It still has to prepare to cope with an international war, so it tries hard to induce China to surrender, divide the anti-Japanese front, make use of Wang Jingwei to persuade and entice Chiang Kaishek, and is preparing to make use of the Three People's Principles and the Guomindang. This conspiracy is extremely vicious. The enemy's war is nothing to fear, but its peace offer is very dangerous. The Dagongbao has called it a "peace of the hanged-man's ghost," in that it would bring China to its death. 5. To demonstrate its sincerity for peace to the Guomindang, Britain, and the United States, Japan has been using major force to carry out a "mopping-up" operation against the Eighth Route Army (fifteen divisions and regiments in North China) and now is further plotting to attack northern Shaanxi as a step to induce the Guomindang to surrender to Japan and oppose the Communists. The above is Japan's policy of inducing surrender. II. Pressures from Britain, the United States, and France The second factor making China's surrender the greatest danger at present is the pressure exerted on the Chinese government by the British, American, and French capitu]ationists. The laissez-faire policy of nonaggressor countries such as Britain, the United States, and France toward the war of aggression perpetrated by aggressor countries

1/6 MAO'S ROAD 7V POWER

is, as pointed out by Stalin, due neither to their lack of strength nor simply to their fear of revolution but, rather, stems from their conspiratorial scheme of "sitting atop a mountain to watch the tigers fight." In the beginning they encouraged Japan to go to war, saying that "China can be defeated within three months." Subsequently they gave up Shanghai, causing the fighting to take place deeper in the interior. They were willing to let Hong Kong be encircled, allowing Japan to occupy Guangzhou and Hainan Island. They provided Japan with great quantities of military supplies, enabling Japan to carry out a war of attrition. On the other hand, they also proclaimed their support for China and have already provided some assistance by lending small sums of money and donating a small quantity of military supplies, enabling China to engage in the war of attrition with Japan. They often talk up the "inevitability of China's victory" to boost China's morale in the war of attrition. The central purpose of all this is to wear out the two sides in a war of attrition, so that they can wait until both sides are exhausted, and then come out with their "healthy bodies" and order both sides to cease fire and have both sides listen to them. Their connivance at the aggressive acts of Germany and Italy in the West has this same purpose. They hope that Germany and the Soviet Union will fight each other, so that they can stand on the sidelines and watch the war, and then plunder them when they are exhausted. This is why they have never agreed to the general security plan proposed by the Soviet Union. This is why they have not been willing to guarantee the security of the three Baltic states (making an opening to facilitate a German attack on the Soviet Union). Herein lies the reason for the one-sided character of the war (the war of aggression is harmful to the interests of Britain, the United States, and France, yet Britain, the United States, and France have adopted the stance of onlookers). When the snipe and the clam grapple with each other, the fisherman profitsthis is the present policy of the British, American, and French imperialists. There are deep contradictions between these nonaggressor countries and the aggressor countries, but unless things reach a certain point they will not abandon their "fisherman's" policy. Molotov's statement "Britain and France have made some progress, but this so-called progress is superficial and without substance" and Stalin's statement "Don't be used by others" mean that Britain and France have not given up their fisherman's policy and that one should not be taken in by them. The possibility exists that Britain, France, and the Soviet Union may reach an agreement, but it is still difficult to be optimistic about it at present, and even after such an agreement were reached it could still be broken. The danger of a new Munich has by no means gone away. The Sixth Plenum pointed out that the British, American, and French governments are not reliable, and that only their peoples can be relied upon. The antiwar

JUNE 1939

117

and antifascist forces among the British, American, and French peoples are gradually on the rise, and only such forces are ultimately reliable. The Soviet Union has proclaimed its continuing support for China, but it absolutely does not approve of China's surrender. The Far Eastern Munich designed and promoted by Britain, the United States, and France is now approaching a critical moment. They seem to be thinking this way: hoping that China continues to fight for another half year, so that both sides are worn down somewhat, at which point the time will have come for the curtain to rise on a Far Eastern Munich. The second factor in the danger of China's surrender lies in this sort of interna-

tional situation. III. The Vacillation of the Chinese Landlord and Bourgeois Classes I. The Inevitability of Betrayal by the Bourgeoisie. a. The following was pointed out at the conference of soviet area representatives in May 1937: 37 "The Chinese bourgeoisie, which may be able to participate in opposing imperialism and feudalism under certain historical conditions, will, because of its political and economic weakness, waver and turn traitor given different historical conditions. This law has already been proved in Chinese history. Therefore, history has already rendered the verdict that the task ofthe anti-imperialist, antifeudal, bourgeois-democratic revolution in China cannot be carried out under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, but can achieve its objective only under the leadership of the proletariat." b. The Central Committee's decision of August 25, 38 1937, states: "Because serious weaknesses, as described above, still exist in the present War of Resistance, many unfavorable circumstances such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and so on may arise in the future course of the War of Resistance. The loss ofBeiping and Tianjin is the gravest Jesson since the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces. 39 Therefore, it should be recognized that this War of Resistance is an arduous and protracted war." c. The Sixth Plenum pointed out the serious existence of a crisis of compromise and placed opposition to capitulation and compromise in the first position. It pointed out that the Guomindang has a bright future, but that at the same time there are obstacles in its path, and that if they are not overcome there will be no bright future: "It is very obvious that the statement that all parties and groups have a bright future under the overall precondition of persevering in

37. The version of this document in the 1948 edition of Mao's Selected Works gives the incorrect date of April 1936 for this conference. 38. The 1948 edition of the Selected Works wrongly dates this citation August 15 in-

stead of August 25. 39. When, as was increasingly the case, Mao referred to the Four rather than the Three Northeastern Provinces. the fourth was Jchol (Rehe), now incorporated into Hebei.

1/8 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the War of Resistance and in the united front includes the idea of efforts to

overcome conservative tendencies within the various parties. If conservative tendencies that are detrimental to the War of Resistance and the united front are allowed to exist and to develop further, the bright future will be put at great risk. This applies equally to all parties and groups, including the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and other parties and groups." The Guomindang is a party whose backbone is made up of the bourgeoisie, and which is under the guidance and leadership of the bourgeoisie. 2. The Guomindang After the Fifth Plenum a. The main direction ofthe Fifth Plenum was still alliance with the Communist Party and resistance against Japan, but at the same time it already contained some elements of anticommunism and capitulation to Japan: (i) it decided on the orientation of relying on international pressure to achieve the peaceful resolution of the problems between China and Japan; (ii) it decided on the orientation of guarding against and opposing the Communists (but not by war) and establishing a "Committee for Preventing Communism." b. An atmosphere in favor of peace prevailed for a time: Opposition to a Far Eastern Munich was prohibited. An article entitled "Will Britain Create Another Munich in the Far East?'' was cut from the latest issue of Wenzhai, published in Chongqing. Many publications have carried articles advocating reliance on sanctions against Japan imposed by Britain and the United States, their intention being to hold an international mediation conference to solve the problem. Many people in government and party organizations advocate peace, and there are such people in the military as well. The "possibility of capitulation by the Guomindang" has always existed, but it has now become the greatest danger. If it is not overcome, China's War of Resistance will suffer great setbacks. c. The Guomindang is already in the process of making essential preparations for its surrender; that is to say, it is engaging in anticommunism. Anticommunism is the most important component of the preparations for surrender. Over the past six months, anticommunist activities have been especially intense in North China, Central China, the south, and the northwest. In North China: the Eighth Route Army has recovered lost territory from the hands of the Japanese, and the Guomindang has "recovered lost territory" from the hands of the Communist Party. In the Northwest: The Communist Party has not overstepped the boundaries of the border areas even by an inch, whereas the Guomindang has launched armed invasions against many border areas (Zhenning, Ningxian, Xunyi, Jingbian, and Wayaobao). The reason is that the Communist Party is the biggest obstacle to capitulation, and capitulation

cannot be realized without anticommunism. Everything is a pretext; preparing for surrender is the reality. Countless false documents have been fabricated.

JUNE /939

1/9

The three factors or three causes described above have caused the current situation to become a grave struggle between the capitulationists and the partisans of the War of Resistance, in which capitulation could become the greatest threat at present, and anticommunism is an inevitable step in preparing for surrender. Of the three reasons, the vacillation of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie is the primary one. If one does not waver oneself, the enemy's policy of inducement to surrender will be ineffectual, and international persuasion and pressure to surrender will be of no use. This situation is different from that at the time of the Sixth Plenum. Then the resistance war was still at its peak. Chiang's declaration of October 30 and his December 26 refutation of Konoe's statement are evidence of this. Now is a time when the enemy relies upon inducing capitulation as the primary method, and it has already produced some results. It is a time when Britain and the United States are stepping up their incitement to surrender, and it is after the Guomindang's Fifth Plenum decided to rely on Britain and the United States and to carry out anticommunist policies. Therefore, even though at that time opposition to capitulation was primary, the reality of the situation was not as grave as it is now. Over the past eight months the situation has evolved to the most critical stage of anticommunism and capitulation. Therefore, a new and concrete task has been added, which is to fight capitulation with all our might. Various pretexts for preparing to capitulate: The first pretext-the Communist Party is making trouble. This is false. Fabricated documents. Attacks on the border areas. Failure to pay the Eighth Route Army. The whole country carries out a good united front policy and supports Chiang and the government. There is no agrarian revolution in the whole country. The heroic fighting of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. The second pretext-plots by the Soviet Union. This is false. [The Soviet Union] aided the Chinese revolution in 1927. It provided the greatest help to China in its War of Resistance over the past two years. It has never conspired to invade any other country. Most countries are friendly and allied with it. The third pretext-financial and economic difficulties. This is false. As long as the new policies of the Sixth Plenum are adopted, any difficulties can be overcome. The experience of the Red Army in the past, or the Eighth Route Army at present, in surmounting difficulties is clear proof. The fourth pretext-that the people are weary of war. This is false. Japan is now making such propaganda, and to make such statements amounts to echoing Japanese propaganda. The people are dissatisfied with the conscription law, and they hate the erroneous methods used, not the War of Resistance itself. In addition, extreme suppression of the people's movement. The fifth pretext-that the military is weary of war. This is false. It slanders the anti-Japanese armies. Most of the officers and soldiers are fighting for national liberation. Most of the officers and soldiers are fed up with the civil war. The sixth pretext-there is no international assistance. This is false. A resistance war depends mainly on ourselves and not on others. The powerful assistance

/20

MAO'S RIMD TO POWER

of the Soviet Union and the sympathy of the people of all countries. The governments of Britain, the United States, and France are inherently unreliable. The seventh pretext-the enemy is too strong. This is false. The enemy is already greatly exhausted, will have expended in three years 12 billion yen, and its troops are insufficient and spread thin. Our terrain is better and our morale is higher. There are many other pretexts.

The Future of the War of Resistance (a rough estimate, not to be viewed rigidly) The War of Resistance must, however, absolutely be pursued. The Anti-Japanese National United Front and the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must be consolidated and developed, and the banner of the Three People's Principles and the slogan of a republic based on the Three People's Principles must certainly be maintained. This is the Party's basic mission. The possibility of a Guomindang surrender and the possibility of a continuation of the War of Resistance are two different possibilities. There are capitulationists, and there are resistance fighters, which are two phenomena. "Many setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises may occur"-this is one aspect. "But we believe that the War of Resistance that has already been launched, because of the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country, will definitely break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." "As long as the masses in their millions can truly be organized to enter the Anti-Japanese National United Front, victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is not in doubt"-this is yet another aspect. (All citations from the "August decision.") There are two possible futures for the War of Resistance: the first is that the majority resists and the minority surrenders; the second is that the majority surrenders and the minority resists. As regards the protracted and tortuous nature of the Chinese revolution, in the first case the outcome will be prolonged and tortuous; in the second case, the outcome will be even more prolonged and tortuous. We have never imagined that the War of Resistance should be won quickly or that it should be a linear progression (in the form of a straight line) but have, instead, always put forward the idea that it would be prolonged and subject to many twists and turns (a zigzag line). Nor have we ever suggested that capitulation could be overcome and victory won without mobilizing the people of the whole country and carrying out democratization of the state. Overcoming capitulation and winning victory must be accomplished by the majority of the people and by all patriotic and progressive elements from all parties and groups. It is impossible to imagine that everyone in the entire Guomindang would surrender, without a solitary exception.

JUNE 1939

121

In the failure of the Great Revolution of 1927, the entire Guomindang surrendered to imperialism and launched an anticommunist war. But at that time the situation was that: (a) no imperialist [power] had fought its way into China; (b) all the imperialists aided Chiang Kaishek in fighting communism, and all countries were in a stable situation for the time being; (c) the Guomindang had not suffered the bitterness of anticommunist war and was able to mobilize troops; (d) the people of the whole country had not had a taste of anticommunist wars or learned any painful lessons, nor had they any experience of being deceived; (e) the Communist Party did not have the experience of the period of the failure of the united front, nor did it have any armed forces (all had been defeated), and most of all it lacked experience in fighting a war; (f) the world was not in a period of revolution and war but, rather, in a period of reaction; and (g) the Soviet Union was not as strong as it is today. But there were still people such as Song [Qingling], He [Xiangning], and Deng Yanda40 who persisted in the revolution and did not turn traitor. After "September 18" there were Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, Zhao Bosheng, Dong Zhentang, and Ji Zhentong, as well as Ji Hongchang and Ren Yinqi, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, and Chen Jitang and Sun Ke 41 Moreover, there is today a history of two years of the War of Resistance. Even if there were a Miaga or a Hacha, China is not, after all, Spain or Czecho-

slovakia.42 I. If there are capitulationists (and this is inevitable; there is already a Wang Jingwei, and a Zhang Jingwei and aLi Jingwei are sure to emerge), there will also be those opposed to surrender. 2. If there are those who are resolved to surrender and never turn back, there may also be those who surrender for a time and prepare to fight again. 3. If there are those who capitulate first and join the fight later (some people have to be traitors to their country once before they can become good), there will also be those who capitulate first, then join the fight, and then surrender once again. 4. The people and officers may be deceived at the beginning, but wake up and resist later. For example, falsehoods such as "the Communist Party causes trouble," 40. On these three. see regarding Song Qingling. Volume V passim, especially Mao's letter to her on pp. 356-57. and regarding He Xiangning, Mao's letter to her in Volume V, pp. 682-83. Deng Yanda (1895-1931), who had been director of the general political department of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition, opposed Chiang Kaishek beginning in 1930 and became the leader of the Third Party. As a result, he was executed for treason in 1931.

41. As is obvious from the context, all of those cited here had shown themselves willing to cooperate with the Communists to a greater or lesser degree in the previous few years. On Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the two protagonists of the Xi'an Incident, see Volume V, p. 61, notes 4 and 7. On Dong Zhentang. see Volume V, p. 89n.5. On Feng Yuxiang, see Volume V, p. 460n.l. On Cai Tingkai, see Volume V, passim. On Sun Ke (also known as Sun Fo ). the son of Sun Yatsen, see above note 19 on p. I08. 42. The reference is to Jose Miaga, commander of the Republican armies in Madrid, who rebelled and surrendered the city to Franco in March 1939; and Emil Hacha, president of Czechoslovakia, who accepted Hitler's occupation of his country in the same month.

122

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

"the Eighth Route Army has turned traitor," "the international situation is bad;' "finances are extremely ditlicult," "the Soviet Union wants to turn China Red," ..temporary submission enables us to plan resistance," and so on are certain to appear. 5. The enemy will definitely not permit the existence of a nationwide, unified capitulation clique that is not subject to outside interference and will surely adopt a policy of causing splits and division. At that time many puppet regimes may exist simultaneously to facilitate their rule. Various armed capitulationists may engage in internecine wars among themselves-China is a country most likely to have civil wars (with large territory and a dispersed economy) and most experienced in

civil war. 6. The enemy may first make a concession and then intervene. When he concedes-there may be surrender; when he intervenes-there may be internal division. 7. Franco did not, after all, take in Miaga, nor did Hitler shelter Hacha. In the end, Japan will only collect people such as Wang Jingwei. 8. The experiences of the people and the military in Manchuria have become known to everyone. It is certain that the Chinese armies cannot be eliminated; it is also certain that captured guns will be used to fight. In general, the situation at that time will surely be one of confusion and not one of unification. At that time, the Communist Party will become the savior of the people of the whole country and the people of the whole country will yearn for the Communist Party as they do for the beginning of a new year. At that time, the Chinese people's confidence in the Soviet Union will surely be increased. At that time, the international situation will be one of war and revolution. At that time, Japan will possibly clash with Britain, the United States, and France. If such a situation occurs, it will be precisely a reflection of the protracted and tortuous reality of the Chinese revolution. It is inconceivable that such an undemocratic government as the present one could resist to the very end. It is unthinkable that such a government could win final victory. We have never had any such hope or made any such statement. The only government able to lead the resistance against Japan to victory is a government that is willing to mobilize the people of the whole country, including the Communist Party. In transforming anything old, there is a process of defection and overcoming it. At that time, an anti-Japanese national united front government (which includes the Communist Party) may emerge. At that time, China may have three different types of government-Japanese puppet government, semi puppet government, and anti-Japanese government. The struggle between these several types of government may produce a situation of what is called a stalemate. The so-called stalemate may be a stage with a situation just like this. It is also because of this sort of situation that to win quick victory is impossible. It is also because of this sort of situation that the country will not be destroyed.

JUNE /939

123

In future, there are only two possible outcomes to the War of Resistance, as mentioned above: (I) the majority fights a war of resistance and the minority surrenders; (2) the majority surrenders and the minority fights a war of resistance. If it is the second possible outcome that occurs, the circumstances may be as described above. But the first outcome is not completely hopeless at this point. Here are the reasons.

Domestically: (a) many soldiers support the War of Resistance; (b) the resistance faction within the Guomindang; (c) the Communist Party's opposition to capitulation; (d) the people's opposition to capitulation. Internationally: (a) the Soviet Union's assistance; (b) the lessons of Spain and Czechoslovakia; (c) public opinion among the peoples of Europe and America. In Japan: financial, economic, and military difficulties. It can be brought about, however, only through consolidation and expansion of the united front. If the second outcome occurs, it means the breakup, not only of the government, but also of the Three People's Principles and of the Guomindang: The Three People's Principles and Guomindang of the Japanese-now being created through Wang Jingwei. These are a fake Three People's Principles and a fake Guomindang. The intermediate Three People's Principles and Guomindang-already in the bud, now in the process of racing ahead. These are a half-true and half-fake Three People's Principles and Guomindang. The Three People's Principles and Guomindang of the Chinese people-now emerging, in the process of developing. These are the true Three People's Principles and Guomindang. Whether the Three People's Principles and the Guomindang can avoid the kind of breakup described above (a breakup [of some sort] is inevitable) depends upon what kind of efforts are made by the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country. Therefore, there are several kinds of possible scenarios for the stalemate phase: I. A stalemate in which the majority resists and the minority capitulates-which means overcoming the possibility of capitulation and having the majority resist and continue fighting. Aside from sabotaging Japan's political schemes, its military attacks are halted as well. This is the first possible scenario for the stalemate, the ideal one and the one most to be hoped for. 2. A stalemate in which the majority surrenders and the minority resists (the Communist Party and all those who refuse to surrender will continue the War of Resistance, despite being a minority)-<:ven though the majority of forces have capitulated and only a small force is left to resist. But as long as the small forces and the bases of resistance can be consolidated, a stalemate with the enemy may still be maintained, the way a small contingent of the Red Army in the base areas maintained a stalemate with the enemy in the past. The difference is that it was a civil war in the past, but from now on it is against Japan and the Chinese traitors, not a civil war.

124

MAO'S ROW TO POWER

Given that this is holding a position rather than retreating further, and that this is the only anti-Japanese army in the whole country, it is also a kind of stalemate

situation. This is the second type of stalemate situation. 3. A stalemate that starts with the minority forces and ends up with the majority forces-this is the third type of stalemate. By persisting in the War of Resistance, persisting in the united front, persisting in protracted warfare, persisting in cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and persisting in the Three People's Principles, the minority forces will divide and win over the strongholds of the capitulationists and then strive to get the majority forces to fight in the War of Resistance. At that time, if a counteroffensive against the enemy cannot be mounted yet, it is still a stalemate. We are striving for the first type of stalemate. There is also the second if we have no alternative, and in the future there may also be the third type. Dangers do e•ist, but the overall future is bright. People who e•press desperation in perilous situations and those who cannot see brightness when they are in darkness are simply cowards and opportunists. As early as the 1937 congress of soviet areas, the inevitability of betrayal by the bourgeoisie was pointed out. As early as August 1937 the Central Committee again pointed out that the "War of Resistance will be arduous and protracted" and that "many setbacks, retreats, internal divisions, and betrayals may occur." In November the dangers of national capitulationism, class capitulationism, and so on were pointed out. We predicted all of this; its occurrence is no accident. The future of the War of Resistance can be only good or bad. We are striving for a good outcome and are prepared at the same time to deal with even the worst possible situation if it should occur. The overall future is bright, but a prolonged and tortuous process of struggle is required. There is no victory to be won in a short period or through a straight path. We have always opposed theories of quick victory and of the loss of our country, and we still do so today. To equate betrayal by landlords and the bourgeoisie with the loss ofthe country means failure to see: (a) the e•istence of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army; (b) the anti-Japanese sentiments among the allied anti-Japanese forces; (c) the resistance faction in the Guomindang; (d) those among the bourgeoisie who are unwilling to capitulate at the moment; (e) the bourgeoisie who are still subject to oppression in the enemy-occupied areas; (f) the large numbers of petty bourgeoisie and peasants; and (g) aid from the Soviet Union. It is absolutely wrong to be blind to these growing forces, to see only the surrender of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and then conclude that the whole world is dark, and to panic, waver, and run away. The Si•th Plenum said that the stalemate phase is bound to be a stage "even more difficult but, at the same time, more progressive." More difficult because

JUNE 1939 125

aside from the enemy, capitulation and betrayal have occurred. More progressive because the Guomindang could make more progress through various forms of struggle (including war), and because a Guomindang that persists in resisting Japan continues to cooperate with the Communist Party. Some turn traitor and the majority resist Japan-this is the situation we hope for. We hoped for this in the past and continue to do so now, and we must strive for it. The majority turns traitor (or even everyone seems to do so for a time) and some resist Japan-this situation is not what we hope for, but it is possible. !fit occurs, we mustturn it around; this is also possible, and we should strive to realize it.

The Present Tasks Taking into account the two possible situations, favorable and unfavorable, described above, and particularly the possible unfavorable situation, what are the Party's tasks? First, the whole Party should strive to prepare itself ideologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so as to be able to cope with any incident at any time-all sorts of unexpected attacks and all sorts of big and small incidents. Second, the whole Party should strive to ally itself very closely with all patriotic progressive elements, all patriotic progressive members of the Guomindang (at the upper levels, the middle levels, and the masses in the lower levels), and also to mobilize the masses together with them (in areas ruled by the Guomindang we must work together with them, not by ourselves alone). We must also wage anticapitulation struggles and openly expose the true nature of anticommunism as preparation for surrender, so that the capitulationist faction and the anticommunist elements may be isolated, and resistance against Japan may be continued. Here it is necessary to strengthen the work on, and the personnel of, the united front. Third, no matter what the circumstances, the Party's basic task is to consolidate and enlarge the Anti-Japanese National United Front and persevere in cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and in the Three People's Principles. This orientation must be adhered to, without allowing the slightest

wavering. These are the Party's general tasks. Based on the tasks described above, the Party should pay attention to understanding, explaining, and carrying out the necessary work on the following questions: I. The question of whether or not the orientation of the Sixth Plenum is consistent with the current orientation.

The orientation of the Sixth Plenum is correct, and the Sixth Plenum has had a great impact throughout the country. Our orientation of actively uniting the whole country to strive for victory in the War of Resistance has penetrated the hearts of the people even more deeply thanks to the dissemination of the documents of the Sixth Plenum. Our united front work and the Party's organizational work have

/26

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

developed further throughout the country because of the directives of the Sixth Plenum. At present the danger of capitulation and anticommunist conspiracies has become the primary danger. Therefore, it is necessary to point out this new situation (in the past, it had not yet become a reality, so it could only be pointed out in general terms; now it has already become a real possibility, and hence it needs to be pointed out specifically). Only thus can we overcome the danger of capitulation and also prepare to carry out the necessary policies for dealing with capitulation in timely fashion, when from being a possibility it becomes a reality. The basic orientation, however, remains that of the Sixth Plenum, and, provided only that we give proper guidance, the actual content of the War of Resistance may be developed to a higher stage. 2. The question of why we should now prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally, and prepare public opinion and the masses as well. Here one must understand the experience of the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927. At that time there was no mental preparation, and this was the main reason for failure. Now preparations must be made. At that time, there could not be another national front, but we were also too absolute in some respects. Now it is necessary to persist in a long-term national front. At that time, there was a complete failure of the revolution as a whole, and the Party's line was to first retreat and then attack. Now there is no question of retreat with respect to the line. At present, it is a question of partial and temporary tactical conservatism during continued attacks, or of taking cover to prepare for attacks right away (if capitulation becomes a reality). At that time, because of the arrival of the reactionary period and the Party's lack of preparation and experience, the ranks were in confusion and the measures taken were erroneous (adventurism, for example). Now there should be an orderly retreat and defense (some temporary and some long-term) or counterattacks in the areas that have already fallen and in areas occupied by those planning to surrender; in other areas, the offensive orientation is to be maintained. At that time, large numbers of new Party members left the Party or betrayed it. Now such things may still happen under certain circumstances, so it is necessary to prepare beforehand. Historical experience shows that garbage inevitably falls off at revolutionary turning points (even if it is a temporary, partial turning point), and this is not a bad thing. But attention must be paid to guiding new Party members properly, especially the large numbers of young students; they will be useful in the future. At that time, the domestic and international situation was dark; now it is basically bright. At that time, the Central Committee was dominated by opportunism, and the Central Committee after reorganization still lacked experience. Such a situation no longer exists.

JUNE /939

127

At that time, a large backbone of cadres had not yet been created; now it has been. I have made eight points of comparison above. In spite of all this, it is still necessary to prepare ourselves psychologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so that we can triumphantly surmount difficulties, develop the war against Japan and the Chinese revolution to a higher stage, and avoid possible defeat. 3. The question of why the national front, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and the Three People's Principles should be pursued even if capitulation should become a reality. The main reasons have already been addressed in explaining the future of the War of Resistance. Here I shall say only this: a. The national united front must be preserved throughout the process of resisting Japan. Although many landlords and bourgeois elements leave it through betrayal and become its enemies, betrayal by the landlords and the bourgeoisie takes place gradually and not all at once. There must be cooperation with those who remain. To neglect this point will surely cause big mistakes. Hence, the united front should still remain, throughout the whole process of fighting

Japan. a united front of various parties and factions, various classes. various nationalities, various groups, and various armies. b. It is the same with cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Some members of the Guomindang have left and become enemies, but with those who remain there should still be cooperation. We should use the authentic Guomindang to oppose the false Guomindang, and win over the neutral Guomindang. The possibility of a future alliance between the Guomindang and the Communist Party on an equal footing still exists. Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is the organizational basis of the united front, and neglect of this point will also give rise to big mistakes. c. It is the same with the Three People's Principles, which are the political basis of the united front, and are principles and guidelines applicable to the process of resistance against Japan. We should use the true Three People's Principles to counter the false Three People's Principles and win over the neutral Three People's Principles. This is the policy that should be adopted in conditions where there are several types of Three People's Principles. There are differences between the Three People's Principles and Communism even in the process of resisting Japan, but in the process of resisting Japan they have one common point, which is that ifthe Three People's Principles are understood as they were interpreted at the Guomindang's First National Congress, the two do not fundamentally conflict with each other as regards the political program during the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is therefore wrong for many people, both within and outside the Party, to look down on the Three People's Principles, considering them a fundamentally reactionary, deceitful,

128

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

and empty ideology or dogma. This way of thinking stems from a failure to distinguish between the true Three People's Principles and the false Three People's Principles. d. As regards the question of ideological struggle, over the past two years, and particularly over the past six months. those who write articles on behalf of the Guomindang, including Trotskyites such as Ye Qing43 and others, have issued many "divisive and erroneous thoughts" that are not only against Communism but also against the true Three People's Principles. These amount to the thinking of the fake or intermediate Three People's Principles and should also be severely denounced and repudiated. Of these, the most blatant are the arbitrary noises about the so-called theories of"national conditions" and "unitication." In fact, they claim that only the Three People's Principles and the Guomindang are suited to the national conditions of China, but their false Three People's Principles and false Guomindang are most unsuited to the national conditions of China, while Communism and the Communist Party are entirely suited to Chinese conditions. The claim that the border areas and the Eighth Route Army are not unified, and should be eliminated to complete their so-called unification, actually corresponds to a false unification that goes against nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood and runs completely contrary to the interests of the War of Resistance. It is arbitrary, empty talk that totally contradicts the differences and struggles in the course of unification which are a fact of social history. Before the old semifeudal regime changes into a truly revolutionary democratic regime, the border areas and the Eighth Route Army must exist. Only when the revolutionary democratic regime has been established, and the danger of anticommunism has disappeared, can the two abandon their present special characteristics. Otherwise this is nothing but a counterrevolutionary demand.

4. The question of supporting Chiang. The slogan of supporting Chairman Chiang was correct in the past and is correct now. As long as Chiang leads the War of Resistance for a single day we shall continue to support him (of course the condition is fighting the War of Resistance), and he should be shown no disrespect.

43. Ren Zhuoxuan. alternate name Ye Qing ( 1896-1987), spent the years 1920-1925 in Fnmcc. where he joined the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, as well as the Guomindang. He soon became one of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Pany in France, but was expelled from the country as one of the organizers of a demonstration against the Chinese legation. Returning to China in 1927 after a year in the Soviet Union, he led underground

activities in Hunan. was sentenced to death. but somehow escaped with his life. In 1928. after being arrested again. he renounced his membership in the Communist Party, but retained his Marxist and socialist views. Following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war in 1937. he concluded that Sun Yatscn's Three People's Principles were the answer to China's problems. and in 1939 he rejoined the Guomindang.

JUNE 1939

129

The possibility exists, however, that under certain circumstances Chiang may not persist in the War of Resistance. How we react at such a time merits careful consideration. Of course, there has to be some reaction at such a time, but it must be an appropriate reaction based on the principle of helping to unite the majority to fight the War of Resistance and continue the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. "Anti-Chiang" slogans may not be revived lightly or casually. Chiang harbors enmity toward the Communist Party; this is a fact that he himself has demonstrated. We must strictly guard against sabotage of our Party by him and his subordinates; of that there is no doubt. Actively helping Chiang and urging him to move in a positive direction temains our overall policy. To those outside [the Party], we should talk not about "capitulation by the Guomindang" but, rather, about the "capitulationist faction among the landlords and the bourgeoisie." 5. The question of opposing Wang [Jingwei]. "It is wrong to think that Wang is already finished; Wang can still play a big role." This is absolutely correct. There is no doubt that the Chinese traitors in Wang's network are more harmful to China than other Chinese traitors. Wang has followers and sympathizers in the government, in Party organizations, and in parts of the army. Opposition to capitulation must be linked with opposition to Wang; this is more

convenient and realistic. 6. The question of fighting Japan and eliminating spies. If a serious instance of betrayal should occur, the Party should pay utmost attention to appropriate countermeasures, in accordance with the principle of not divorcing itself from the majority of the Guomindang. At such a time the slogan of resisting Japan and eliminating spies is necessary, and a war to resist Japan and eliminate spies (simultaneously resisting Japan and eliminating spies) is also unavoidable. But we must absolutely not detach ourselves from the majority of the Guomindang and lightly undertake rash actions. The war to eliminate spies can (and must) be launched only when it is understood and demanded by the majority of people. The current opposition to Wang, for example, is in line with this principle. 7. The question of democracy and the people's livelihood. It is impossible to lead the war against Japan to victory without a revolutionary democratic government. The masses of people throughout the country have long yearned for a democratic-centralist and clean government that would fight Japan and give freedom to the people. Hence, in the future, "striving for democracy" should be linked to the movement for "opposing capitulation and continuing the War of Resistance." "Improving the people's livelihood" should also be linked to it in the same way. Only resisting Japan, however, makes it possible to practice democracy, and only resisting Japan and democracy make it possible to improve the people's

130 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

lihood. This is the reality of the present political situation and should be clearly understood. 8. The question of friction. The friction and armed struggles, having the character of sabotage and of preparation to capitulate, that have been carried out since the Fifth Plenum of the Guomindang in Hebei and Shandong, and especially in the border areas, must be resolutely resisted. Such resistance is useful, but it must be limited strictly to a position of self-defense and absolutely not allowed to overstep that boundary so as to provide the provocateurs with a pretext to break up the united front. The objective of such defensive battles against friction is to consolidate the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. For this purpose, accommo-

dation and concession are also necessary under certain circumstances. Struggle is not to be forgotten in unity, and unity is not to be forgotten in struggle. Neither of the two may be neglected or abandoned, but unity is primary, and [there may be] "friction but no splits." Strictly guard against provocations, and do not be taken in. 9. The question of not developing our Party organizations within friendly armed forces and withdrawing our Party organizations from within certain armed forces. Based upon the experience of the past six months, the decision of the Sixth Plenum not to develop Party organizations among troops that are fighting Japan and cooperating is basically correct. Development of Communist Party organizations within Chinese armed forces should generally be restricted to Chinese traitor forces or forces that are preparing to turn traitor, the objective being to sabotage them. Such development should not be undertaken in other cases. A firm policy of sabotage should be adopted toward any armed forces that have become Chinese traitor forces or are directly preparing to become such. Where problems hindering cooperation have already arisen in certain anti-Japanese forces because of the matter of Party organizations, their withdrawal should be publicly announced so as to

ensure the continuation of cooperation. 10. The question of assisting friendly parties. a. Do our best to help all progressive elements, but the extent of assistance should also depend on the degree of progress. b. Refuse to help all backward elements and hopeless elements so as to prevent them from turning around to attack us after building up their strength. There have been many lessons in this regard in the past. In a word, unconditional assistance will not be offered. c. Make the utmost efforts to intensify work on all patriotic and progressive elements, urging them to oppose capitulation. Many capable cadres must be assigned to this work, and they must not slacken for a moment. Work on intermediate elements should also be intensified. II. The work of the various departments of the Center after the Sixth Plenum. Over the past three years, and particularly since the Sixth Plenum, various work departments of the [Party] Center have been gradually restored and established. In

JUNE /939

/3/

addition to such long-established departments as the Military Affairs Commission, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the Department for Work in Enemy-Occupied Areas, and the Youth Commission, newly established organs are the United Front Department, the Women's Commission, the Labor Commission, the Department of Finance and Economy, the Department for the Education of Cadres, the General Political Department, the Commission for Party Newspapers, the Commission for North and Central China, the Commission for the Northwest, and the Commission for the South. The organization of the Secretariat has also been improved, making sixteen organs in all. The restoration and establishment of these central work departments is a great achievement after the severe losses suffered during the Long March, a great event that gladdens the heart. 12. The question of the organization of the Center. a. The Politburo will meet once a week in the future. b. The Secretariat handles day-to-day matters. c. Notification on major matters is to be carried out in the name of the Center, and on minor issues in the name of the Secretariat. d. Distribution of personnel is based on the principle of ensuring the soundness of leadership by the Center, while strengthening local leadership at the same time. e. The various departments of the Center are to be streamlined and, at the same time, strengthened. 13. Education of cadres. During the past two years, seventeen schools have been established under the Center's direct guidance: the Anti-Japanese University, the Shaanxi Public School, the Party School, the Marxist-Leninist Institute, the Lu Xun Academy of Art, the Youth Training Class, the Women's University, the Workers' School, the Medical School, the Communications School, the training class of the Organization Department, the training class for administrators, the Border Region Party School, the Lu Xun Normal School, the Border Region Middle School, the Lu Xun Primary School, and the Kindergarten. The larger ones have more than 10,000 students, and the smaller ones have several hundred or several dozen students. Several thousand cadres are engaged in educational work, and more than 30,000 students have either graduated or are still in training. This is a tremendous achievement, a phenomenon unprecedented in the past eighteen years. The significant results of the work done by these students are not evident yet, but in a few years they will be. This orientation should be continued in the future. For material reasons and because of enemy dispositions, [the schools] are to be set up in the border areas and in North China. Those that go to the north remain under the direction and management of the Center, but their supervision has been delegated to the Northern Bureau. 14. The study movement. a. The study movement launched by the Center after the Sixth Plenum for cadres throughout the Party has been of primary importance in raising the theoretical and cultural levels of all Party cadres.

132

MAO'S ROAD "IV POWER

b. All cadres currently working in all the various Party, government, military, popular, and educational organs should work and study at the same time. c. Depending on the level, culture and theory may be stressed equally, or one may receive more emphasis. d. This is a kind of long-term higher education. e. The system of two hours of study every day. f. Work, engage in production, and study at the same time. g. Stress both spontaneity and compulsion, and the unity between theory and practice. h. Diligent students are to be rewarded, and lazy ones punished. i. Leading bodies and personnel in charge of cadre education are to be set up in all organs, schools, and military units at all levels. 15. The production movement. Wherever, whenever, and however possible, the agricultural, industrial, and cooperative movement must be developed among the people, and within organs, military units, and schools, using the method of self-reliance to solve all or a part of the problems of food, clothing, housing, and daily necessities, and to overcome difficulties so as to contribute to the War of Resistance Against Japan. The production movement in the border areas this year has been carried out in earnest. We must continue to sum up experiences to reach the goal of resolving difficulties. 16. The youth movement. There have been achievements since the Sixth Plenum. It is correct for the Youth Commission and the Joint Office for Youth to concentrate on leading the youth movement. The orientation for the youth movement: hold firmly to the united front among youth, maintain the attitude of the May Fourth letter to the Three People's Youth League so as to win over the majority of the youth under the banner of continuing the War of Resistance and of a democratic republic. 17. The women's movement. The Center has promulgated guidelines for the women's movement and begun the work of building a women's commission. Local leading bodies for women's work are also in the process of being set up gradually. The greatest deficiency among our cadres has always been that in female cadres. Moreover, the experience of the women's movement has not yet been summed up. This shortcoming must be corrected. Without a group of capable and specialized female cadres, it will be impossible to develop the women's movement. 18. The labor movement. Guidelines for work in the labor movement have been issued, a labor commission is beginning to be set up, and a workers' school has been opened. Among the mass movements, the labor movement is relatively weak. There are also too few workers among Party members. Improvements should be made in these two respects in the future.

JUNE /939

133

)9. The work of eliminating spies. Under the new circumstances, the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage our Party, army. and border area governments is gradually showing itself to be increasingly serious and is bound to become more serious in the future. This greatly increases the importance of our struggle to eliminate spies. For this reason the entire Party must pay more attention to this aspect and must allocate and train the necessary numbers of capable cadres to work in this field. All members of the Guomindang arrested or captured because of espionage or armed attacks against us are generally handled according to the principle of no executions and no capitulation (no capitulation means they should not be coerced into writing a confession or forced to declare the abandonment of their beliefs), so as to win over the majority of the Guomindang. 20. The question of Party organization. a. Small in number but highly capable. Now is not the time for widespread expansion. In general, recruitment should cease, and the principle should be small in number but highly capable. b. Tightly [organized]. c. Eliminate saboteurs, protect the Party. d. Class education, Marxism. e. Strictly carry out secret directives. 2 I. Self-reliance. The Party, the army, everything. Be ready to cope with the worst conditions. 22. The question of North China. The situation in North China could become extremely grave, and there is the possibility that the enemy's main forces will attack North China. Consequently, the Eighth Route Army and the Party in North China must pay serious attention to the possibility that this sort of situation may arise and make preparations on all fronts, including the military, politics, finance, Party organization, the united front, and so on, based on the principle of meeting the needs of persisting in a guerrilla war and coping with the greatest difficulties. The Party in North China is responsible for providing the Center with the necessary funds. The political significance of such funds is enormous. 23. The question of Central China. The work ofthe Party, the guerrilla war, and the movement ofthe popular masses in Central China must be greatly expanded, and our own bases built in a complex environment to serve as a pivotal area in the whole country's prolonged War of Resistance. United front work must be improved, and it should also be linked with expansion and progress in the work of the New Fourth Army. The basic principle is to send most of the cadres of the border areas to Central China. 24. Defend the border region. a. The border region is our fundamental base, the place where the Center is located, the seat of authority for the whole country; it must be resolutely defended;

/34

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

b. The enemy's attack against the border region is a step aimed at making China capitulate; c. It is possible that the enemy may attack Yan'an; d. Even ifYan'an should fall, the border region must still be maintained. Everyone should prepare to live the life of guerrilla warfare, a most difficult but most exciting life; e. The number one problem is food. Overcome difficulties through self-reliance~

f. Large numbers of students and staff workers are to go to the front; g. Do a good job of protecting and educating young students, new cadres, and new Party members; h. Preserve a leadership group, an education group, and a military affairs group. Relying on excellent terrain and the excellent masses, a way will certainly be found. 25. Mobilize large numbers of students and staff workers to go to the front. a. Strengthen education, strengthen work at the front; b. Return to the front after graduation, the sooner the better; c. Because of the enemy situation; d. Because of expenses; e. It is decided that I 0,000 people are to go. f. Political and organizational mobilization should be carried out very well; g. The rear area is suitable for leadership in education and for guerrilla warfare, but there are still quite a few people there; h. Cadres must be given appropriate assignments; i. More students must be kept in the rear area depending on circumstances; j. Names of the schools must be preserved, both at the front and in the rear. 26. The Seventh [Party J Congress.44 a. Complete elections before August I; b. Meet in October; c. Struggle to unite the whole Party and oppose capitulation; d. Those who can come and those who can participate in the congress. 27. Struggle on two fronts. a. Against the Right: Blind to the dangers of capitulation and anticommunism; Yielding to the pressure of the Guomindang; Seeing no way out of the current situation (losing sight of the future); Lacking a class stand; Fearful of and cowed by hard struggle. b. Against the Left:

44. It had been decided in 1938, at the Sixth Plenum, that the Seventh Congress should be held in 1939, as indicated in the text which follows but, because of the difficulties caused by the war, it took place only in the spring of 1945.

JUNE /939

/35

A dark China, a dark world, a dark border region, and a dark self; Preparing to sabotage the united front, negate the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, abandon the Three People's Principles, isolate oneself, and take blind actions. c. Veteran cadres should form the backbone and lead the large numbers of new Party members and new cadres to advance toward a higher stage of the resistance war, and attack the difficult positions. 28. Unite and overcome everything. a. There must be further unity: As long as the Center and the senior cadres are united, the whole Party can certainly unite. As long as the Communist Party is united, it will certainly be invincible. The savior of the people of the whole country is the Communist Party. b. There must be further centralization: The individual obeys the organization, the minority obeys the majority, the lower levels obey the higher levels, and the whole Party obeys the Central [Committee]. c. The whole country45 is united as one, its command is centralized, and it will conquer all.

Conclusion (June 13) I. The Question of the Current Situation !.It is absolutely correct to say that the main factor in capitulation is the wavering of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie. 2. Two possible types of capitulation must be overcome-( I) partial surrender, and (2) surrender of the majority. The first is a possibility at present, in a situation where the majority is fighting the War of Resistance; the other is a possibility in the future, in a situation where the majority may have surrendered. But doing the present work facilitates future work; the two are inextricably linked. 3. According to the definition of the Sixth Plenum, only a balance between enemy forces and our forces under certain circumstances constitutes a stalemate. In that case, not only is it impossible to call the present phase one of stalemate but, if aLi Jingwei appears, that will mean that the enemy has already organized (he is trying hard to organize) his strategic reserves and is deploying them in combatencircling our positions from the rear (beyond a doubt, national counterrevolution is a strategic ally of imperialism). At such a point, there would be even less of a

45. The version in the 1948 Selected Works has here "the whole Party," which makes

more sense in the context.

/36

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, but we would rather have suffered a major defeat. Such a time would be characterized by the fact that we were being attacked by Japanese imperialism plus Li Jingwei (China's Franco). Hence it would be much more serious than the past strategic withdrawal and would by no means constitute any sort of stalemate. 4. Right now, Japanese imperialism is organizing two strategic allied armies. One is that of international capitulationists, and the other is of Chinese capitulationists. The former is used to encircle China from without, and the latter is used to outflank China from within. The direction of our efforts is to mobilize the anticapitulationist forces both internationally and within the country, to defeat these two allied armies ofthe enemy. So long as they have not been defeated, there is no stalemate phase. 5. The frontal enemy (the main forces of Japanese imperialism) may yet launch more military attacks. It is wrong to say that such a possibility does not exist. Although he faces economic and financial difficulties and problems of manpower and military capability, there still exists the possibility of enemy offensives in terms of real strength and timing. Therefore, not only is it necessary, on the one hand, to defeat the flank attacks of the new enemy; it is also necessary, on the other hand, to prepare to continue to defeat the frontal attacks of the old enemy. This is the only way to achieve a balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves and to bring about a stalemate. 6. This is not to say, however, that a stalemate will emerge only when the real strength of the frontal and flank enemies has been reduced to such an extent that it is equivalent to that of our anti-Japanese armies in all respects. It is not a question of equalizing real strength but, rather, that our real strength plus the enemy's weaknesses plus international constraints equals a stalemate. 7. Therefore, a stalemate may emerge under three conditions: a. A large geographical area, a large population, and a consolidated position can create a balance between the enemy and ourselves. For example, the midpoint of the Russian civil war and the midpoint of the war in Europe. China, since the beginning of the War of Resistance, has had large territory and a large population, but not a solid position (political corruption and troublemaking by the capitulationists), so there is no stalemate yet. If efforts can be made to overcome the danger of surrender, and in the process of overcoming it politics are reformed and positions consolidated, then a stalemate will occur. This is the first condition. b. A balance may also occur in areas that are small (meaning that directly controlled base areas are small, though the country is large) and have fewer people but have a consolidated position. For example, the Red Army's ten years of fighting and, to a certain extent, the Northeast Volunteer Army, during a certain period. If betrayal by the majority became a reality in the future, the remaining minority could still create a balance, as long as the "Encirclement and Suppression" were continuously smashed, and in this way

JUNE 1939 137

a condition of stalemate would be present. The current situation in North China can be described as a temporary small-scale stalemate. Prolonging the situation in North China will turn it into a protracted small-scale stalemate. c. The transformation of a small-scale stalemate, as described above, into a large-scale stalemate is achieved through expansion of the united front and victories in the anti-encirclement-and-suppression struggle. If at the time it is still impossible to launch strategic counterattacks (and it is still during a period of counteroffensive campaigns), then it remains a phase of stalemate. 8. If betrayal by the majority is inevitable in the course of the War of Resistance, then there will have to be an entire phase of stalemate according to the following formula: a temporary large-scale stalemate after Wuhan (the current situation can be called a stalemate in a certain sense, but it can only be called temporary because the positions are not solid}-a small-scale stalemate some time later-another large-scale stalemate some time later still. The main characteristic of such a change is that from an insecure to a consolidated position. A long-term stalemate demands consolidated positions. With this condition satisfied, a balance may be maintained even with small numbers, and, without it, even large numbers may not be able to achieve it. Therefore, it is necessary to strive for large quantities (many people and large areas). But the key element remains strong quality. What is meant by consolidated positions is consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas and consolidation of the united front. 9. There is a real stalemate situation in North China, but it is still temporary. By proposing to "persist in the guerrilla war in North China," we aim to transform the temporary stalemate into a long-term one. If all other places except North China have become dark (as happened to the New Fourth Army and the Shaanxi-GansuNingxia Border Region), then even though it is a partial situation in terms of geographical area and the number of people, North China will be the only region where anti-Japanese forces exist, and this will still signify strategic stalemate. This is a hard situation, but we should be prepared for it. We will continue to work to the end, and we can continue to work to the end, even if the major half of the sky becomes dark and there is only the Communist Party left to resist the Japanese. Continuing the work in this way for three to five years, arousing the masses, attracting friendly allied forces, and gradually forming a grand new anti-Japanese front, we will become the core and leading force in the War of Resistance against Japan and the salvation of the country. So, no matter how you describe it, our future is bright, but the road is a very difficult one. 10. At present, it is precisely the time for readjustment of the relationship between the enemy and ourselves (the forces of the enemy and our forces), to see which side can win over the majority and which side has the best quality, for this will decide which side wins and which side loses. The issue of who will win and who will lose is still undecided, and both sides are renewing their efforts to create favorable conditions.

138 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The front will inevitably be reorganized and it must be reorganized. A portion of our allied forces (that consisting of the landlords and the bourgeoisie) may become a force allied with the enemy. But we should never allow all of them to go. We must seek support from another part ofthem, and it is entirely possible to do so. We still have broad allied forces which have not yet been mobilized. If the Chinese peasants, the Japanese workers, peasants, and soldiers, the international proletariat, and the power of the Soviet Union are mobilized, the enemies are doomed. The enemies are counterrevolutionary and we are revolutionary. This difference in nature determines who wins the final victory. But the tactics used in directing the war play an even greater role in deciding which side wins. Without the latter factor, and relying only on one's superior quality, victory can still not be obtained. II. The Question of Transformation I. We have said that we should prepare ourselves to cope with new possible situations and a possible Miaga. This should be done in accordance with the general line of the Sixth Plenum. Under the general line of the Sixth Plenum, prepare to counter a possible Miaga (or a Hacha) and to adopt a policy of temporary retreat in the area occupied by a Miaga. So far, one cannot imagine a 180 degree change as compared to the Sixth Plenum. That is to say that if there are changes, they will not be changes in the line. They will be partial and temporary changes of strategy and tactics for the purpose of preventing unexpected attacks. This point must first be made very clear. We must adhere resolutely to the past general line. 2. At present, what we should strive for with the utmost efforts, with the whole strength of our Party, is to avert the possibility of capitulation; to win over the majority to resist Japan; and to support, help, supervise, and criticize the Guomindang and Chiang in order to enable them to overcome the tendency of capitulation in the struggle against Wang and in their future development. This is the central task at present. 3. Therefore, it is imperative to stress unity, unified actions, and long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but not to stress other matters. These emphases are the only means to overcome the crisis of capitulation and are the only ways to prepare ourselves better to cope with possible turns of events. All of this is to isolate the capitalists and not oneself. III. On Several Questions of Tactics I. The question of consolidating the Party (the policy of organizational streamlining). Since the decision of the meeting held in March last year, the Party has grown greatly in numbers throughout the country. The present task is to consolidate it. So generally speaking, further recruitment should stop for the time being. Of course, this does not mean that not even one person should be admitted. There are some places where the membership should still be expanded. The suspension

JUNE /939

139

of recruitment is intended to facilitate consolidation, elimination of spies, and education. There will be further expansion in the future. 2. The Party should protect new Party members and cadres very well. The main responsibility rests on the shoulders of old Party members and old cadres. The relationship between new Party members and old Party members, and between new cadres and old cadres, should be dealt with well. If this is not done well, the old Party members and old cadres must bear the main responsibility. It is entirely reasonable to forgive new Party members and cadres, but there is no reason to treat old Party members and cadres in the same way. There were some erroneous viewpoints regarding this question in the past. The matter is broadly similar to the relationship between the main forces and the local and guerrilla forces. Large numbers of cadres should be promoted from among the new Party members. 3. Intensify inner-Party education. Combine class education with national education. But at present, class education should be emphasized, while not neglecting education in the united front. Textbooks of an intermediate level should be compiled, and, on philosophical questions, the emphasis should be on historical materialism. 4. Local cadres should be promoted. Without local cadres, including middlelevel and senior ones, it is impossible to establish and consolidate the bases. Oppose the tendency toward "imperial envoys," and oppose the attitude that despises "country bumpkins." Do away with the appellation "country bumpkins." 5. We must protect revolutionary intellectuals, and not repeat past mistakes. Without revolutionary intellectuals, the revolution cannot be victorious. The Guomindang is competing with us for young people, and the army should definitely take in large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals. Worker and peasant cadres should be persuaded to swallow them and not to be afraid ofthem. Without the help of revolutionary intellectuals, workers and peasants cannot improve themselves. Without intellectuals, the work of managing the country, the Party, and the army cannot be done. The government, the Party bureaus, and the mass movements should also attract revolutionary intellectuals. 6. The question of suspending the expansion of the Party and withdrawing the Party from friendly allied parties and troops. From the perspective of the overall situation, suspension and withdrawal are beneficial. Otherwise, the overall situation may be affected by this matter alone and the united front may be disrupted. The revolution cannot triumph without seeking the support of the Chinese armies, and, at present, this support can best be obtained in political terms. Setting up Party organizations there will hinder gaining political support. Rely on mouths rather than on organizations (under the temporary conditions), and depend on higher levels rather than on lower levels. On the one hand, withdraw the Party, and, on the other, strengthen liaison, accepting a certain independence of united front work. In general, the policy of sabotage is to be carried out only in the armies, governments, and political parties of real capitulationists. In principle, only the policy

140 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of winning political support is adopted in all other cases. Some special departments may not follow the approach of withdrawal. 7. Not killing Guomindang members is of great significance. This does not mean not killing traitors and spies, and a few defectors, or those who endanger the

revolution at critical moments. 8. It is inappropriate to put excessive emphasis on democracy and people's livelihood. Now it is essential to stress the opposition to capitulation (emphasize the War of Resistance). There should not be several priorities at the same time. They are linkages and not priorities. In the Guomindang-ruled areas, democracy and people's livelihood are propaganda slogans, and not calls for action. On troop recruitment, taxation, and production issues, an attitude of support as well as criticism should be adopted. The attitude of fundamental opposition cannot be adopted. 9. Local policies. There should be local policies that are clear and suitable to the local conditions and various situations. Later, the Center should give attention to providing guidance. 10. Mass movements should be strengthened. This is the meaning of what is called preparing the masses. It does not imply downgrading class struggle in order to overcome capitulationism. Only by correctly promoting class struggle, and linking it to the united front, can capitulation be overcome. It is dangerous to have only unity and no struggle. The masses are our ultimate support, and the ultimate support of the War of Resistance. II. The problem of the Muslims. 12. The publication of internal Party periodicals should be started immediately. Localities should also run publications. 13. Other matters. The overall conclusion is the following: Unite to surmount all difficulties.

Views on the Eighth Route Army Staff Work Conference (June 12, 1939)

Zuo: 1

It is almost two years since the beginning ofthe War of Resistance. The convening of a conference on staff work by the Army Group2 General Headquarters is an event of great significance. Our views on this folJow, and we hope that they wilJ be taken into account: I. The general orientation for the conference should be to summarize the experiences and lessons learned from staff work in our army over the past two years of the War of Resistance, to determine the general direction of staff work and the specific tasks that need to be carried out as a matter of urgency at present, and to raise the political caliber and improve the level of competence of staff personnel. It is hoped that technical staff wilJ attain the level of tactical and strategic staff. [We must) improve the commanding organs so that they are not only particularly skilJed in staff work for carrying out guerrilJa warfare, but are also capable of preparing for the transition to staff work in modem, regular warfare. 2. In reviewing merits and shortcomings in past work and searching for causes so as to correct mistakes and develop strong points, the conference should make the connection with carrying on the fine traditions of the Red Army era in the past, especialJy in examining and establishing various rules and regulations (the classified regulations and top-secret combat department regulations sent to you recently may be used as a basis for discussion. Please Jet us know whether or not you have received them).

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junsh; wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 463-64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. l. This telegram is addressed toZuo Quan (190&-1942), a native of Hunan and a graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy. Zuo had been an army commander in the Red Army during the Jiangxi period and was a veteran of the Long March. At this time, he was deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army. 2. The Communist forces commonly known as the Eighth Route Army had been offi-

cially designated the Eighteenth Army Group by the Guomindang in January 1938. This reference to an Army Group reflects that terminology. 141

142

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

3. To meet the needs of the present phase of army consolidation, the education section of the staff offices at various levels should be improved. When necessary, the chief of staff may serve concurrently as the chief of the [education] section, and there should also be a deputy section chief whose main task would be to provide teaching materials and to guide and monitor the implementation of educational programs. 4. To the extent possible, a way should be found to select personnel to run staff training courses under the direct leadership ofthe Army Group General Headquarters staff office so as to meet the demands of staff offices at various levels. 5. The military and political education of in-post staff should be regarded as a necessary precondition for army consolidation training. 6. Raising the political level, work skills, political standing, and beliefs of staff workers is a condition that cannot be separated from raising the efficiency of staff work. 7. Thorough preparations should be made so as to ensure that the conference can be carried out smoothly and that satisfactory results can be achieved. Each question should be discussed beforehand in small groups. Empty talk and trivial disputation should be avoided, and clear direction and practical, concrete methods are to be demanded. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Teng [Daiyuan]

ToXiao San 1 (June 17, 1939)

Comrade Zizhang, 1. I have read your work, 2 and it gave me the feeling of a battle being waged. Such fighting works are needed now, for life at present is all about combat. I hope you will write more.

2. If no obstacles arise, I should be able to attend the Gorky Evening Party; it's just that I have been rather busy lately. 3. I shall have to look into the question of a horse. This is actually not an easy matter. If you travel within the border region, I could let you use my horse once; if you go outside, we shall have to find another solution. With respect and admiration, MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 155-56, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. 1. Xiao San ( 1896-1983), original name Xiao Zizhang, also known by his pen name of Emi Xiao (which reflected his admiration for Rousseau's Emile), was a native of Xiangxiang,

Hunan. He was closely associated with Mao in the New People's Study Society and in other activities during the May Fourth period. (See the numerous references to him in Volume I of our edition.) Xiao studied in France in 1920 under the work-study program and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. He attended the Moscow University of the Toilers of the Far East in 1923-1924, was active in the Chinese Communist Party during the First United Front, and returned to the Soviet Union in 1927. In 1939, he had just come back to China and gone to Yan'an, where he became head of the editorial department of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts. 2. Refers to the manuscript of a collection of Xiao's poetry, some of which later appeared in his collections fleping ziti lu (The Road to Peace) and Xiao San shixuan (Selected Poems of Xiao San). 143

The Gravest Crisis in the Current Situation 1 (June 30, 1939)

On the second anniversary of the War of Resistance, the newspapers Liberation, Xinhua Daily, and New China, and the periodical Military and Political Review of the Eighth Route Army have as/red me to write a commemorative anicle. I have collected many materials to hand, and planned to write an essay commemorating the second anniversary of the War of Resistance entitled "Once Again on Protracted War" to answer the criticisms, challenges, and queries regarding On Protracted War and On the New Stage that have come from certain quaners since their publication. Here I can only briefly address the issue of the crisis in the

current situation. Ever since the Chinese nation was confronted with the aggressor, Japanese imperialism, the first and foremost question has been whether or not to fight. This question aroused extreme controversy in the period from the September Eighteenth Incident to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The conclusion reached by all patriotic parties and all patriotic fellow-countrymen was: ''To fight is to survive; not to fight is to perish." The conclusion reached by all capitulationists was: ''To fight is to perish; not to fight is to survive." For a time, the roaring guns of the resistance at Marco Polo Bridge decided the issue. They proclaimed the first conclusion right and the second completely wrong. But why was this question settled only temporarily and not once and for all? Because of Japanese imperialism's policy of inducing China to capitulate, because of the international capitulationists' attempts to bring about a compromise, and because of the wavering of certain people within our anti-Japanese front, the issue has been worded 2 in a slightly different way as a question of "peace or war," and a controversy has arisen inside China between those who favor continuing the war and those who favor making peace. Their respective positions remain the same. "To fight is to survive; to make peace is to perish" is the conclusion of the pro-war group, and "to make peace is to survive; to fight is to perish" is the conclusion of the pro-peace group. But the prowar group consists of all patriotic parties and all patriotic fellow countrymen, and

This text was first published in Jiefang, no. 75n6, July 7, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 343-48. I. The Gravest Crisis in the Current Situation ..... Opposing Capitulationist Activity 2. The issue has been worded ..... The issue has been raised again, worded /44

JUNE 1939

145

they make up the great majority of the entire nation, while the pro-peace group, or the capitulationists, in terms of its numbers, consists of only a small wavering minority within the anti-Japanese front. Consequently, the so-called pro-peace group is compelled to resort to deceitful propaganda, which means, primarily, anticommunism. And so it has fabricated and released a spate of false news items, false reports, false documents, and false resolutions, such as that the Communist Party engages in disruptive activities, that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are merely moving about without fighting and refuse to obey orders, that a separatist regime has been formed in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and is expanding beyond its confines, t~at the Communist Party is expanding widely and is plotting to overthrow the government, and even that the Soviet Union is plotting to invade China. Its purpose is to hoodwink the masses and cover up the real facts in an attempt at gradually manipulating public opinion so as to realize its goal of making peace, or capitulating. The reason those in the pro-peace group, or the capitulationist group, are doing all this is that the Communist Party is the initiator and champion of national unity and resistance, or the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and unless they oppose it, they cannot sabotage the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, split the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and surrender. In addition, they pin their hopes on concessions from Japanese imperialism, believing that Japan is already at the end of its rope and will change its basic policy and voluntarily withdraw from central, southern, and even northern China, and that China can thus achieve victory without doing any more fighting. They further pin their hopes on int< mational pressure. Many elements in the so-called pro-peace faction are hoping not only that the various international great powers will come out and put pressure on Japan so that she will make concessions and thereby facilitate a peace settlement, but that they will also put pressure on the Chinese government, so as to say to the pro-war faction: "Look! In the present international climate, is there any justification for continuing to fight? There can only be peace! A Pacific international conference would be to China's advantage. It would not be another Munich but, rather, a step toward China's renaissance!" This forms the sum total of the views, tactics, and schemes of China's pro-peace groups, or capitulationist faction! All of this does not pertain only to Wang Jingwei himself; what is more serious is that there are many other Zhang Jingweis and Li Jingweis and the like concealed within the anti-Japanese front who collaborate with Wang Jingwei from within and without, some of them doing a two-man comic act, some of them wearing the red face [of the hero] or the white face [of the villain]. We Communists openly proclaim: At all times we stand with those who favor continuing the war, we support all the national policies of the War of Resistance openly proclaimed by Chairman Chiang and the National Government in the past, and resolutely oppose those so-called pro-peace elements. We have but one desire, which is, together with all other patriotic parties and all other patriotic fellow countrymen, to strengthen unity and strengthen the national united front and

/46

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Guomindang-Communist cooperation, put the Three People's Principles into effect, support Chairman Chiang and the National Government to carry the War of Resistance through to the end, fight all the way to the Yalu River and recover all our lost territories. We firmly denounce the likes of Wang Jingwei, both overt and covert, who are creating an anti-Communist climate, engineering friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and even trying to provoke another split and civil war between the two parties. We say to them: In essence, all your divisive schemes are nothing but preparations for capitulation, and all your divisive and capitulationist policy simply reveals your general plan of selling out the interests of the nation for the selfish interests of a few individuals. All the people have eyes, and they will see through your scheming. We categorically repudiate the absurd view that a Pacific conference would not be an Eastern Munich, a preparation for turning China into another Czechoslovakia. We firmly denounce the groundless assertion that Japanese imperialism may come to its senses and make fundamental concessions. Japanese imperialism will never change its basic policy ofsubjugating China. Japan's honeyed words after the fall of Wuhan, for instance, abandoning the policy of "not accepting the National Government as the opposite party in negotiations" and turning around and recognizing the National Government as such, or, as another example, the alleged conditions for withdrawal of troops from central and southern China, are nothing but cunning schemes to bait the fish and hook them for cooking, so that whoever gets hooked can expect to be cooked. The international capitulationists, in inducing China to surrender, are likewise pursuing a scheming policy. They have countenanced Japan's invasion of China, sitting atop the mountain, watching the tigers fight, waiting for the opportune moment to engineer a so-called Pacific conference for negotiation in order to profit at others' expense. Anyone who pins his hopes on such schemers will likewise find that he has been badly duped. What was once a question of whether or not to fight has now become a question of whether to continue the war or to make peace, but essentially it is the same question, the most important and fundamental of all questions. In the past six months, with Japan pressing on with its policy of inducing China to capitulate, the international capitulationists intensifying their activities, and, above all, with some people in our anti-Japanese front wavering more than ever, a great clamor has arisen around the so-called pro-peace question. 3 In this way, the possibility of capitulation has become the main danger in the present political situation, and anticommunism, which means breaking up the Guomindang-Communist cooperation and the unity against Japan, has become the most important, foremost move that group of capitulationists is making to prepare for surrender. Under these circumstances, all patriotic parties and all patriotic fellow countrymen must keep a close watch on the capitulationists' activities and must understand the true reality

3. Pro-peace question

-+

Question of peace and war

JUNE 1939

/47

and main characteristics of the present situation, namely, that "capitulation is the chief danger and anticommunism is in preparation for capitulation," and they must do their utmost to oppose capitulation and a split. No group of people must ever he allowed to undermine or betray the war against Japanese imperialism, a sacred war of Resistance that has cost the whole nation two full years of bloodshed. No group of people must ever he allowed to disrupt or split the Guomindang-Communist cooperation and the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which has been forged and accepted by the common effort of the whole nation. Fight on, continue to unite, and China will survive. Continue to make peace, persist in splitting, and China will perish. Which to reject and which to accept? Our countrymen must swiftly decide. We Communists will definitely fight on and persist in unity. All patriotic parties and all patriots throughout the country will also fight on and persist in unity. Even if the capitulationists' plots to surrender and to cause splits should get the upper hand for a while, they will eventually he unmasked and punished by the people. The historic task of the Chinese nation is to achieve liberation through a united War of Resistance. What the capitulationists desire is the exact opposite, but however much they may have the upper hand, however jubilant they may be, fancying that "nobody [under heaven] dares harm them," under heaven, they cannot escape their fate of punishment by the whole people. To oppose capitulation and a split-this is the urgent task now confronting all patriotic political parties and groups and all patriotic fellow countrymen. People of the whole country, unite! Persist in the War of Resistance and in unity, and suppress all plots for capitulation and a split!

Persist in Long-Term Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (July 9, 1939)

I think you comrades must have talked a lot, heard a lot, read a lot, and also done a lot about the problem of the united front. Why do I want to talk about it again today when you comrades are leaving for the front? You comrades must realize that if, today, we want to drive Japanese imperialism out of our country, overthrow the Chinese traitors, overcome difficulties, seize victory in the War of Resistance, achieve national liberation and social liberation, and all the rest, everything must depend on this magic weapon, the united front. What is the united front? It is unity in the War of Resistance; it is the great unity of every class, every army, and every nationality in the War of Resistance. This great unity is called the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This anti-Japanese united front must comprise not only China but the whole world. It is not enough for it to consist only of China. We should organize all those in the world who are able to fight against Japanese aggression, whatever the degree of their opposition to it, into an anti-Japanese united front. This united front of ours includes Chinese forces as well as world forces; it is a great organization. In sum, the united front in China has already been organized and has become a nationwide anti-Japanese united front. Nevertheless, in the course of the War of Resistance, in the process of development of the united front, and within this great organization, many people have taken the road of fighting Japan, and some of them will change. Already there are some who have changed, and others may change in the future. Taking the road of fighting Japan is like your going to North China. The color of your faces will certainly change a bit after exposure to the sun and rain on your journey. You may also fall and lose some skin from your feet, or you may suffer a bellyache, and so on. All of these are small changes. There are also greater changes, as when some people become deserters while on the road, and give up, simply decamping and slinking off. Comrades, it is only a short journey you are going to undertake from here to North China, but what I am talking about today is not a short journey but,

This text consists of extracts from Mao's talk to a group from the North Shaanxi Public School (Shaanbei gongxue), which was about to leave for the front. Our source is Dangde wenxian, no. 4, 1995, pp. 17-20. /48

JULY /939

149

rather, a long journey-the long journey during which we will have to fight all the way to the Yalu River. During this long journey, in the Anti-Japanese National United Front as a whole, it is certain that there will be deserters. Now there is already a Wang Jingwei. He !led first to Vietnam, then to Hong Kong, and finally to Shanghai. He says that our Eighth Route Army is "roving around [you] but not hitting Ui]," 1 but, in my opinion, he is the one who is roving without hitting. He first roved to Japan to see the Japanese emperor,then roved to Beiping, and finally roved to Nanjing. But he has never yet struck a blow at the Japanese invaders, so Wang· Jingwei is really the only one who roves without striking. At present, according to those who come from outside [the Border Region], in the interior there are many Zhang Jingweis, Li Jingweis, Zhao Jingweis, Qian Jingweis, and so on. In sum, there are many people of Wang Jingwei's ilk. Who are they? They are the hidden Wang Jingweis. They want to perform a ''Zhang Song presents the map." In the era of the Three Kingdoms, there was a man named Zhang Song, who presented a map of western Sichuan to Liu Bei. As a result, Liu Bei entered Sichuan and founded the kingdom of Shu. 2 Today, when the Japanese imperialists are invading China, Wang Jingwei is the first to present them with the map, but there are Zhang Jingweis, Li Jingweis, Zhao Jingweis, Qian Jingweis, and so on, who are also preparing to present maps. Their plan is to present the map of the entire Republic of China to Japanese imperialism and to establish a ''China" under Japanese rule. That is why we say that at present there is great danger, the danger of surrender and of compromising halfway. In seeking to achieve this goal, they first spread rumors, with the aim of creating a split, so as to cause the breakup of this great organization, the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and to bring about a split in the Guomindang. Wang Jingwei has also organized a "Guomindang" in Shanghai, and his doctrine is also called the "Three People's Principles," so now there are two Guomindangs and two Three People's Principles. One is Wang Jingwei's, and the other is Chiang Kaishek's. Actually there are three kinds of Three People's Principles. One is fake, and WangJingwei's fall into this category; one is half-real and half-fake; and one is real. Above all, we oppose the fake Three People's Principles, oppose the fake Three People's Principles and the fake Guomindang of the open Wang Jingwei as well as of the hidden Wang Jingweis. People such as Wang Jingwei and his ilk split the Guomindang, split the Three People's Principles, split the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, split the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and split the entire

1. Mao had rejected this criticism of the role played by the Red Army in the anti-Japanese war in very similar terms in his preface of March 2, 1939, to a volume by Nie Rongzhen, translated above. 2. This refers to an episode in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, one of Mao's favorite traditional novels. Shu, where Liu Dei ultimately founded the so-called Shu Han dynasty, was one of the three kingdoms into which China was divided during part of the third century c.E.

/50

MAO'SROADTOPOWER

front of the War of Resistance. In a word, their conspiratorial scheme seeks to promote splitting in order to achieve their goal of bringing about capitulation. This is the greatest danger, a possible tendency, and an important characteristic of the present situation. It requires that all the people of the whole country arise, beginning with revolutionary youth, all the progressive classes, and you comrades in panicular, to oppose splits and oppose surrender. Splits, surrender, and compromise mean retreating and falling back; unity and the War of Resistance mean advancing and moving forward. The capitulationists are opposed to progress and are moving backward. At present, there are this son of people throughout the country who do backward things, anti-Communist things, unscientific things. We say that Marxism is the most scientific thing; they say that it does not fit Chinese national conditions. Those who say this are Wang Jingwei, Zhang Jingwei, Li Jingwei, and so on. We ask, "What are China's national conditions?'' They are unable to give an answer. What are China's national conditions? China's national conditions are that it is a semicolonial and semifeudal society. Therefore, whenever we are asked the question "What are China's national conditions?" we answer with the words "semicolonial and semi feudal." This is the conclusion obtained by many Chinese and foreign social scientists after several decades of study. Semicolonial and semifeudal are diseases. That is to say that China has two diseases: one is imperialist oppression and the other is the oppression of the feudal forces. Marxism is the most effective medicine for curing these diseases; it is truly absurd to say that it does not fit Chinese national conditions! They want to use this set of antiprogressive, backward, antiscientific fallacies to confuse China's youth, but the revolutionary and progressive young people can never be taken in by them. In the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and on the long road of fighting to the Yalu River which we wish to follow, many people will become deseners. Wang Jingwei was the first to desen, and there are quite a few who are preparing to desen as well. In the future, there will be some landlords and members of the bourgeoisie who, halfway through the journey, will be unable to stand the hardship and will also desen and go over to the side of Japanese imperialism. Nevertheless, so long as they have not run off, they are still our friends, we should still maintain affection and unity with them, and we should all resist Japan together. If they run away, then they become our enemies, and we should not speak politely to them any more. It is the same as regards the international camp. Whether a government is bourgeois or some other kind, so long as it helps us resist Japan, we are willing to be its friend. Such is our united front. The landlords and bourgeoisie are part of the united front, and, provided only that they fight the Japanese, we will unite with them all. But if some of them do not want to continue and want to leave, we can only let them go! "If the King of Hell decides to take a person's life on the third watch [3:00 to 5:00A.M.], he will definitely never let him live until the fifth [7:00 to 9:00 A.M.]." At present, the King of Hell is Japanese imperialism. He wants to invite these people to go; Wang Jingwei has already gone, and there are also Zhang Jingwei, Li Jingwei, and so on who are preparing to accept the invita-

JULY 1939

/51

tion. This kind of thing has already happened in the process of resisting Japan and will continue to happen in the future. All of us must understand this. There are those who ask themselves whether, if this happens, the ranks of our anti-Japanese front will not be diminished. What can be done about this? We should look at the problem this way: When Wang Jingwei was still in the anti-Japanese front, he tried by every possible means to obstruct the development of the anti-Japanese mass movement, to obstruct the expansion of the anti-Japanese armed forces and the anti-Japanese mass organizations. Since he fled, our North Shaanxi Public School and Anti-Japanese University have been able to recruit more students, and we have been able to organize more workers' national salvation unions and peasants' national salvation unions and so on. The War of Resistance is a long-term thing, and the more such people leave, the smaller their numbers become in the united front, and the more good people come to join us. There is yet another problem about which I would like to say a word. Now that Wang Jingwei has gone, and Zhang Jingwei and Li Jingwei are also preparing to leave, if this continues, will not the whole ofthe landlords and the bourgeoisie eventually leave? That will not happen. We know that there are still many people among the landlords and the bourgeoisie who want to resist Japan. Hence we must definitely maintain the Anti-Japanese National United Front. We should not think that since Wang Jingwei has deserted, and Zhang Jingwei and Li Jingwei are preparing to desert, it is no longer a national united front but has become, rather, a popular front, an alliance of the workers, peasants, and peuy bourgeoisie exclusively, not including the landlords and the bourgeoisie, so that we would perhaps be obliged to return to our policies of the past, auacking the local bullies and dividing up the land. Some people feel unhappy now because they are not able to overthrow the local bullies and divide up the land. Such thinking is wrong. We must bear in mind that revolution is not a mauer of seeking gratification but, rather, something that requires hard struggle. We must definitely try our best to do the following: anyone who can be kept a day longer should be kept a day longer; keeping someone for half a day, or a single night is also good, or even having people eat breakfast before leaving. Everyone should understand one point, that we want to uphold the united front. The present situation has the following characteristic: The compromising and capitulationist elements want to cause splits, and we shall deal with them through the progress of the War of Resistance, the unity of the whole country, and our persistence in the united front. We will certainly not let fall the banner of the united front. This is an extremely important point. Now I shall discuss the question of long-term cooperation once again. At present there are considerable numbers of deserters and people who are preparing to desert, so is it still possible for the two panies, Communist and Guomindang, to cooperate in the long run? Our answer is: "Yes!" The Wang Jingweis, Zhang Jingweis, Li Jingweis, and others are, after all, in the minority, and those remaining in the antiJapanese camp still constitute the majority. If we organize this majority into the united front, then this united front wiH, as before, include various parties, various

/52

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

factions, all classes, nationalities, and armed forces and will remain a great union of resistance against Japan. Long-term cooperation will continue to exist, because we will continue to the end to stand together with the anti-Japanese elements. We must definitely persist in long-term cooperation, for otherwise China's War of Resistance will surely meet with a great disaster. Today, as you comrades are about to depart, I give you this magic weapon of the "united front." I believe it to be like Jiang Ziya's "spirit-beating whip," used exclusively for beating evil spirits and monsters of all sorts. Armed with this "demon-beating whip," we need fear nothing, as we can then beat rash and blundering Japanese imperialism, and also the cowardly devils, the Chinese traitors' Comrades! Experience gained from undergoing all manner of hardships must certainly be prized very highly. Mr. Sun Y atsen accumulated forty years of revolutionary experience and said in his testament that "the people must be roused to action and we must unite with all those peoples ofthe world who treat us as equals." This corresponds to the idea of establishing a united front. The Chinese Communist Party has accumulated eighteen years of revolutionary experience and has profound experience with regard to the question of a united front. The relationship between the two parties, the Communist Party and the Guomindang, has already gone through three stages of cooperation, split, and cooperation again. Everyone gained experience in the ten years of civil war, our friends and ourselves. If everyone would consider it calmly for a moment, the problem of whether or not the two parties will keep fighting each other after the War of Resistance is won is not hard to resolve. Many Guomindang comrades have discussed with me this matter of whether, in the last analysis, the fighting will continue after the War of Resistance. I say: In the past you went in for "suppressing the Communists," and in the so-called "suppression of bandits" I was the

3. Cheng Fangwu, who became president of North China United University, founded at this time by the union of North Shaanxi Public School and three other schools, and led the group bound for the front to set up this institution, indicates in a brief summary of Mao's address on this occasion (which he wrongly dates July 7 instead of July 9, 1939) that Mao referred to the tluee "magic weapons" which he was later to discuss in the important editorial of October 4, 1939, translated below, "Introducing The Communist." Cheng also states that Mao explicitly linked his presentation of the "three magic weapons" [fa bao] to the traditional novel Fengshen yanyi (The Investiture of the Gods) and quotes Mao as follows: In that year when liang Ziya (liang Taigong) came down Mount Kunlun, Yuanshi Tiancun gave him three magic weapons: an almond-yellow flag, a monstrosity [sibuxiang], and a spirit-beating whip. Now you are going to the front, and I also give you three magic weapons, which are the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. Thus, he states, this talk constituted a preview of the editorial which would be published three months later. See Cheng Fangwu, Zhanhuozhong de daxue (A University in the Midst of the Fires of War) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), pp. 75-76. Only the first of the three "magic weapons" is discussed in the text translated here.

JULY /939

153

bandit chief. You insisted on "suppressing" us, but what is most curious is that the more we were "suppressed" the more numerous we became. Our party used to be only as big as a little finger, but thanks to the "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns it grew enormously and became as big as a thumb. Where do our guns come from? They were all gifts from you. The entire Red Army was forged by fighting you, and all the Red Army's guns were given by you, so I invite my friends to consider it: To fight or not to fight? We, too, have thought about it; let's everyone make peace! There are presently some diehard elements, however, who always want to oppose the Communists and wish to keep fighting a civil war. We say: We do not wish to fight. I used to live in Hankou, and you insisted on fighting, so I had no choice but to go up the Jinggangshan. If you go in for fighting the Communists again at this point and start to attack us once more, we will go up the mountains immediately. Yet I think it's better that everyone live in the cities. In the past Li Yuanhong said, "When there's food, everyone should eat it." We propose to add another point, "When there's an enemy, everyone should fight him." Everyone has a share in eating as well as in fighting the enemy. It would be utterly unfair if only the bourgeoisie and the landlords had food to eat, and the workers and peasants had nothing to eat. Where do the food people eat, the houses they live in, and the clothes they wear come from? When drinking water, think ofthe source. All of this was produced by the workers and peasants, but if the workers and peasants had nothing to eat and nothing to wear, wouldn't that be excessively unfair? We advocate that everyone have food and clothing, which means that the united front should not be ruptured. We can maintain long-term cooperation. Although there are deserters, long-term cooperation still exists. When you go to the front, you must keep this point firmly in mind: maintain long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. There is another question, one that has been raised in a letter from the comrades at the Shaanxi Public School and has also been raised indirectly with me by the school. This is the question "In the final analysis, is our Anti-Japanese National United Front a matter of strategy or a matter of tacticsr' They held a meeting to discuss this, and there was a very fierce argument about it. Nobody was clear on this. I thought about it for a few days, and there's no need for you comrades to argue about it anymore. Combine the opinions of both sides and you still end up with a "united front," in that the Anti-Japanese National United Front is both strategic and tactical. From the point of view of determining the proletariat's primary direction of attack in a given stage of the revolution and the point of view of establishing a plan for the corresponding deployment of revolutionary forces, the Anti-Japanese National United Front is a matter of strategy. It determines strategic tasks, determines and deploys allied forces, and that constitutes an overall strategic plan. In today's Anti-Japanese National United Front, its backbone, the proletariat, has as its domestic allies the peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, the landlords, and all other anti-Japanese elements, and all of them

154 MAO'SROADTOPOWER

together have organized a joint War of Resistance. Abroad, our allies are the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and other countries, and all of them have united to fight Japan. Thus an anti-Japanese united front has been formed inside and outside the country. Consequently, the Anti-Japanese National United Front is strategic. As for how to carry out resistance against Japan, specific forms of warfare, and forms of organization, these are tactical matters. There are all sorts of organizational forms; for example, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, United University, the trade unions, the peasant associations, the Youth Association for National Salvation, and so on. Organizing the worker and peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie, landlords, and the bourgeoisie all together to establish a political council is another form of organization and another form of struggle. Originally we were not in favor ofthe present political council,4 but it is all right to hold such a meeting now, because it is, after all, better than nothing. In the future it will no longer be sufficient to call political council meetings, and the rank and file will elect their own representatives and hold their own representative meetings. As far as organizing the Central Army, the Eighth Route Army, and so on to fight at the front is concerned, this is another form of organization and struggle. Though the forms vary a great deal, they are all carrying out strategic tasks. Therefore we say that the Anti-Japanese National United Front is strategic as well as tactical. We must hold firmly to the united front. With this magic weapon, all difficulties may be overcome. This spirit-beating whip-the united front-is the first magic weapon I give you today. I hope that you comrades will use it to eliminate all the demons, ghosts, and monsters.

4. The reference is to the People's Political Council (Guomin cam;henghui), established by the Ci•·,,mindang in 1938, of which Mao and several of his comrades were members. See above. 1!, • ··ote to the text of January 28, 1939.

Letter to President Lin Biao 1 on the Study of Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee (July 29, l9[X][X), 2 10 P.M.)

This group of graduates should be given no. 57 of Jiefang and the documents of the Sixth Plenum, 3 and they should discuss them before they leave. The copies needed may be quickly obtained from the [X][X] Section. It may be also better to obtain a few copies first and distribute two or three copies to each team. The Central Secretariat will meet on the afternoon of the 30th. I will attend the meeting of the Military Commission on the afternoon of the 1st, and can come to talk about the conclusions of the Sixth Plenum on the 2nd. Salutations! MaoZedong

Our source for this text is Mao l..edongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6. p. 91, where it is reproduced from Red Guard publications of 1967. I. This letter is addressed to Lin in his capacity as president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. 2. The year is missing in the source cited, but clearly this text should be dated 1939. 3. Issue no. 57 of Jiefang, dated November 25, 1938, contained Mao's report to the Sixth Plenum, entitled "On the New Stage," which is translated in Volume VI of this edition. The volume of documents of the Sixth Plenum to be studied was probably Zhong guo gongchandang de liuzhong quanhui wenxian (Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party) (Chongqing: Xinhua ribao, 1939). !57

/56

MAO'SROADTOPOWER

I hope that the comrades making up the teachers and staff of the Women's University will set their minds to their work, and be resolved to work for a long time. Our Party should have many professional educational workers .... Finally, he concluded with a few highly significant words, ''The day when the women of the whole country rise up is the time of victory of the Chinese revolution." The whole audience responded with wann applause and shouted, "Long Live the Women's University!" "Long Live Comrade Mao Zedong !"

Letter to President Lin Biao 1 on the Study of Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee (July 29, 19[X][X],Z 10 P.M.)

This group of graduates should be given no. 57 of Jiefang and the documents of the Sixth Plenum, 3 and they should discuss them before they leave. The copies needed may be quickly obtained from the [XI[ X] Section. It may be also better to obtain a few copies first and distribute two or three copies to each team. The Central Secretariat will meet on the afternoon of the 30th. I will attend the meeting of the Military Commission on the afternoon of the I st, and can come to talk about the conclusions of the Sixth Plenum on the 2nd. Salutations! Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 91, where it is reproduced from Red Guard publications of 1967. I. This Jetter is addressed to Lin in his capacity as president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. 2. The year is missing in the source cited, but clearly this text should be dated 1939. 3. Issue no. 57 of Jiefang. dated November 25. 1938, contained Mao's report to the Sixth Plenum, entitled ..On the New Stage," which is translated in Volume VI of this edition. The volume of documents of the Sixth Plenum to be studied was probably Zhongguo gongchandang de liuzhong quanhui wen.xian (Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party) (Chongqing: Xinhua ribao, 1939). 157

Elegiac Couplet for Mr. Guo Gaoru 1 (July 1939)

You, Sir, followed after the virtuous one, 2 living in reclusion behind a humble gate; able to enjoy a ripe old age, in illustrious virtue and understanding of mysteries you far surpassed the ancients; Your son is a distinguished master in the world of letters, exerting himself in military work to help drive out the Japanese bandits; his signal contributions engraved in stone inspire those to come.

We have translated this couplet from Shici duilian, pp. 171-72. where it is taken from no. 14 of Chongqing wenshi ziliao. I. Guo Zhaofei (1853-1939), zi Gaoru. had died in his native village in Sichuan on July 3, 1939. He was the father of Guo Moruo, who at this time headed the Literary Propaganda Section of the Political Department of the Military Commission of the Na· tiona! Government.

2. Here Mao is refening to Guo Gaoru as a reincarnation of the Eastern Han recluse Guo Tai, who was known for his virtues and refusal to serve as an official. /58

Instructions of the Central Military Commission on the Problem of Consolidating the Anti-Japanese University (July 1939)

The overall policy for running the Anti-Japanese University and all other military and political schools and training groups organized by intellectuals should be as follows: I. Training educated youth into proletarian soldiers or sympathizers and training them to become cadres of the Eighth Route Army are indeed hard work. We should endeavor to transform their thinking, pay attention to the process of their ideological transformation, and organize ideological contests and debates in appropriate ways. In reality, there must be struggles between bourgeois ideas and proletarian ideas in these schools. 2. All the work of schools should be aimed at transforming the thinking of students. Political education is the central link. There should not be too many courses, but the work of class education and Pany education must be greatly strengthened. The Anti-Japanese University is not a school of the united front, but a school for Eighth Route Army cadres under the leadership of the Pany. 3. The principles for educating intellectual youth are the following: a. Educate them to master Marxism-Leninism, and to overcome bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thinking and ideas. b. Educate them to be disciplined and organized and to oppose anarchism and liberalism. c. Educate them to go resolutely down to work at the grass roots and to oppose looking down on practical experience. d. Educate them to be close to the workers and peasants and to oppose the attitude of looking down on the workers and peasants.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 93-94, where it is reproduced from the guide to an exhibition at the Military Museum in Beijing. /59

The Reactionaries Must Be Punished in Accordance with the law of the land Speech at the Memorial Meeting for Victims of the Pingjiang Massacre'

(August 1, 1939)

Comrades, Today, August I, we are gathered here for a memorial meeting. Why are we holding this great memorial meeting? Because our revolutionary comrades and fighters against Japan have been killed, 2 and this is a grave matter. Who should be killed in these times? The Chinese traitors and the Japanese imperialists. China has been fighting Japanese traitors and the Japanese imperialists. We3 have been fighting Japanese imperialism for two years, but the outcome is not yet decided. Very few traitors have been killed.4 Yet our revolutionary comrades, all warriors against Japan, have been killed. Killed by whom? Killed by the troops. Why did the troops kill fighters against Japan? They were carrying out orders; certain people gave them the order to kill. Who gave them the order to kill? Part of the reactionaries. Comrades! Logically, who would want to kill fighters against Japan? First, the Japanese imperialists and, next, the Chinese collaborators and traitors such as Wang Jingwei. But the scene of the killing was not Shanghai, Beiping, Tianjin, Nanjing, or any other place occupied by the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators; This speech was first published in Jiefang, no. 81, August 20, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 6, pp. 349-55, where the text is reproduced from the 1944edition of Mao's works. 1. The attack by Guomindang forces on the Communist liaison office in Pingjiang,

Hunan, took place on June 12, 1939. Jt was one of the earliest overt acts stemming from Chiang Kaishek's January 1939 decision to restrict and suppress the Communists, discussed above in the Introduction. This public statement was ostensibly delayed to see whether the perpetrators would be punished, but it also coincides with the founding date of the Chinese Red Anny. Here, as elsewhere, Mao was careful at the time not to implicate Chiang, but to blame the massacres on sympathizers with Wang Jingwei and reactionary diehards.

2. Killed ~ Killed by the reactionaries 3. we~China 4. Very few traitors have been killed . ....., The traitors are still very active, and very few of

them have been killed. 160

AUGUST 1939 161

it took place in Pingjiang, in the rear of our War of Resistance, and among the victims were Comrades Tu Zhengkun and Luo Ziming, responsible comrades of the Pingjiang Liaison Office of the New Fourth Army. Obviously, the killing was perpetrated by a gang of reactionary butchers5 acting on the orders of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Jingwei. These reactionaries obsequiously carried out the orders of their masters, the Japanese and Wang Jingwei, and killed the anti-Japanese comrades.6 This is a grave matter and not a trivial matter; if it were a trivial

matter, we would not be holding this memorial meeting today. Comrades Tu, Luo, and others who were killed this time were anti-Japanese cadres, members of the New Fourth Army and the Communist Party. These loyal and courageous fighters were murdered by those who hod been sent by the reactionaries and anti-Communist elements. Preparing to capitulate, these reactionaries killed the most resolute fighters against Japan in a premeditated way. This is no trivial matter. We must raise our voices against it, we must denounce it! At present the whole country of China is resisting Japan and has forged a great union of the people for the purpose of resistance. But within this great union there are bad elements, reactionaries and capitulationists. What are they doing? They are doing such things as killing fighters against Japan, holding back progress, and working in collusion with the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators to pave the way for capitulation. Has anyone taken action on this serious case of the murder of anti-Japanese comrades? The murder was committed at 3 P.M. on June 12. Today is August I, but in all this time have we seen anyone step forward and take action?7 Who should have done so? First, action should have been taken under the law of the land by the administrators ofthe law. For instance, what is the responsibility of the high court

of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region? It is none other than dealing with the collaborators and the people who violate laws. If such a thing had happened in the Border Region, our high court would have acted long ago. But although nearly two months have elapsed since the Pingjiang massacre, the law and its administrators have done nothing. 8 Only the Communist Party has stoad out and done some-

thing about this matter. Our country has laws which are not perfect, but it still has laws. What is the function ofthese laws? The laws should protect the fighters against Japan and combat traitors and reactionaries. But up to now, the laws have not

been applied to the case of the Pingjiang massacre. This is absurd. Are the laws

5. Reactionary butchers ..... Chinese reactionaries 6. These reactionaries obsequiously carried out the orders of their masters, the Japanese and Wang Jingwei, and killed the anti-Japanese comrades .... Preparing to capitulate, these reactionaries obsequiously carried out the orders of the Japanese and Wang Jingwei, and the first people they killed were the most resolute fighters against Japan. 7. Take action?-+ Take action? No. 8. Have done nothing. -+ Have done nothing. What is the reason? The reason is that China is not unified.

162 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

dead? Are the laws meant to encourage criminals? Now we have to come out and do something about this matter in the name of the people. We demand that the people of the whole country rise up and everyone pay attention to protecting the anti-Japanese fighters, combat the collaborators and reactionaries, and respect the laws. So, the purpose of holding this meeting today is not only to commemorate the persons who died but also to ensure the right to the protection of life ofall comrades and compatriots against Japan. China must be unified; there can be no victory without unification. But what does unification mean? It means that everybody should resist Japan, that all should unite and strive for progress and that there should be due rewards and punishments. Who ought to be rewarded? Those who resist Japan, those who uphold unity, those who are progressive. And who ought to be punished? The collaborators, reactionaries, and those who retrogress.• Is our country now unified? It is not. The Pingjiang massacre proves it. It shows that there is no unification where there should be. We have long advocated 10 the unification of the whole country. First, unification on the basis of the War of Resistance. But now, instead of being rewarded, Tu Zhengkun, Luo Ziming, and the other comrades who were resisting the Japanese have been brutally murdered, whereas scoundrels and capitulators who oppose resistance, prepare to capitulate, and commit murder go unpunished. This is not unification. We must oppose these scoundrels and capitulators, and arrest the murderers. Second, unification on the basis of unity. Those who stand for unity ought to be rewarded and those who oppose 11 it ought to be punished. But now, Comrades Tu Zhengkun, Luo Ziming, and the others who upheld unity have been punished, have been shot dead, 12 whereas the scoundrels who undermine unity are allowed to go scot-free. That is not unification, and we must oppose it. Third, unification on the basis of progress. The whole country must go forward; the backward must try to keep pace with the progressive, and the progressive must not be held back.' 3 The Central Committee of the Communist Party put forward the following slogans:

Persist in the War of Resistance to the end and oppose compromise halfway; Consolidate national unity and oppose internal splits; Seek progress in the whole country and oppose retrogression;

The butchers at Pingjiang killed progressive people. They have practiced retrogression, which we must oppose. We want laws and unity. We want laws that protect

9. The collaborators, reactionaries, and those who retrogress ...... The collaborators and reactionaries who undermine resistance, unity, and progress. 10. Advocated -+ Demanded II. Oppose -+ Undermine 12. Shot dead -+ Brutally murdered 13. Held back -+ Held back to the pace of the backward

AUGUST 1939 /63

anti-Japanese officers and soldiers, and anti-Japanese people, and laws that punish the capitulators, saboteurs, and reactionaries. We want a unity of the whole country that is based on persistence in the War of Resistance and forbids retrogression. All capitulationist, splittist, and reactionary scoundrels ought to be punished in accordance with the law of the land. The Pingjiang massacre is extremely grave. Although only a few people were killed this time, and it happened only in one place, Pingjiang xian in Hunan Province, it is a matter that concerns the whole country, a national incident. Comrades, just consider that if this continues, one Communist killed today and ten Communists killed tomorrow, then hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands, may be killed. If the same thing happens to patriotic people who are being killed by the tens, hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands, China will be destroyed and the Japanese and Wang Jingwei will be jubilant. More than dozens and hundreds of Communists and patriotic personages have been assassinated since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, and the Pingjiang massacre is just a recent incident. Should this continue, it will be a disaster for China, in which all those opposed to Japan will be killed. What is the purpose of killing anti-Japanese people?Carrying out the order of Japanese imperialism and Wang Jingwei, these scoundrels are prepared to capitulate, so they begin by killing anti-Japanese soldiers, Communists, and patriotic people. If they are not stopped, China will perish at their hands. That is why this incident is a national matter of the gravest importance, and we should talk about it everywhere in the whole country. How can we do it? We can send letters and telegrams all over the country, demanding that the National Government prosecute the case and mete out harsh punishments to those reactionaries, murders, and saboteurs. Comrades, we will not cease our action after the meetings today. Comrades in Yan'an should all realize that Japanese imperialism has recently intensified its disruptive activities, that international imperialism has become more active in helping Japan, and that the traitors in China, both the overt and the covert Wang Jingweis, are more active than ever in sabotaging the War of Resistance, wrecking unity, and turning the clock back. They want to surrender the whole 14 of our country, cause an internal split, and engineer a civil war. Comrades, you should call upon the people of the whole country to arise and oppose this conspiracy. A telegram from today 's meeting in Yan 'an should be sent out to all parts of the country, opposing recurrence of this incident or events similar to it, firmly demanding the enforcement ofthe laws, the realization of unity, and the protection of revolutionary comrades and anti-Japanese comrades, cadres and people. This is the only way to defeat Japanese imperialism and win victory. (Unanimous applause.) Otherwise, China will be in grave danger. Today, we are unanimous in opposing such incidents, in requesting that Chairman Chiang and Chairman Un

14. The whole of~ The greater part of

/64

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

of the National Government 15 execute the laws that protect revolutionary comrades and anti-Japanese comrades and in demanding that the whole nation unite on the basis of the War of Resistance, unity, and progress. If the laws are still ineffective and there is still no unity, the people of the whole country will go on making demands for the effectiveness of the laws, the realization of unity, the suppression of saboteurs, reactionaries, capitulators, and other such scoundrels, and the prohibition ofsimilar incidents in the future. (Warm and unanimous applause.)

At the present time certain secret measures known as "Measures for Preventing and Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" are being extensively enforced. They are reactionary to the core, helpful to the Japanese Fascist Party, 16 and detrimental to resistance, unity, and progress. Which are the "alien parties"? The Japa· nese Fascist Party, WangJingwei, and the traitors. How can the Communist Party, the Guomindang, and all the other anti-Japanese political parties, which are united in resistance to Japan, be called "alien parties"? Yet the capitulators, reactionaries, and diehards are deliberately creating friction and splits in the anti-Japanese unity. 17 Is this kind of activity right or wrong? It is absolutely wrong! (Unanimous applause.) When it comes to prevention and restriction, what sort of people should be prevented and restricted? Japanese imperialism, Wang Jingwei, the reactionaries, and capitulators. (Unanimous applause.) Why prevent and restrict the Communist Party, which is the most resolute in resisting Japan, the most revolutionary, and the most progressive? It is absolutely wrong. We the people of all walks oflife in Yan' an voice our firm opposition and strong protest. (Unanimous applause.) We must oppose the "Measures for Preventing and Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties," for such measures are at the very root of all kinds of criminal actions that destroy everything, ignore the laws, and wreck unity. This is the purpose of holding this mass meeting today, and it is not merely to commemorate the death of a few comrades. It is for the sake of continued resistance, unity, and progress. To this end, the "Measures for Preventing and Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" must be abolished, the capitulators and reactionaries must be punished, and all revolutionary comrades and all the comrades and people resisting Japan must be protected. (Warm applause and shouting of slogans.)

15. The

reference is to Lin Sen (1868-1943), a native of Fujian, and an active partici-

pant in the Revolution of 191 I. Beginning in 1923, he served under Sun Yatsen in

Guangzhou, and played a leading role in the First Congress of the Guomindang in 1924. After a period of eclipse resulting from his participation in the Western Hills faction in 1925,

and conflict with Chiang Kaishek when in early 1931 he supported Hu Hanmin

against Chiang, he returned to Nanjing in October 1931, and assumed the largely ceremo· nial post of chainnan of the National Government, which he held until his death in 1943. 16. The Japanese Fascist Party--. Japanese imperialism 17. Splits in the anti-Japanese unity ..... Disunity within the anti-Japanese ranks

Epigraph Written in His Own Handwriting for the Martyr Xie Zizhang (August 13, 1939)

Xie Zizhang, ming Deyuan, was from Anding xian. He joined the Communist Party in Beiping in 1925. 1 From that time forward, he regarded Communism as the road to liberation for the Chinese people. He established training programs for the peasant movement, organized peasant associations, and led the people to participate in the movement against imperialists and warlords. As a result, the people called him Xie, the upright official. 2 When the Great Revolution was defeated in 1927, Zizhang led a revolt in Qingjian and later participated in the Weinan Insurrection. His will unweakened by defeat, he rushed about to various places in the Northwest and North China. After the September IS Incident, he raised an AntiImperialist United Army in areas bordering Shaanxi and Gansu, later renamed as the Shaanxi-Gansu Guerrillas of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army, which was the predecessor of the Twenty-sixth Army of the Red Army. He went to Chahar in 1933 to join the Anti-Japanese United Army and, when it failed, returned to northern Shaanxi. There he organized the Twenty-seventh Army and built the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region together with Liu Zhidan and other comrades. 3 He was wounded in the battle of Hekou in 1934 and died from his wounds in the spring of 1935. The Party, the government, the army, and the people, as well as all other circles were impressed by his merits and virtues, so they renamed Anding xian Zizhang xian in his memory. The above is written as a record when the government and the people are building a tomb for him. Inscribed by Mao Zedong The 9th day of the seventh month according to the lunar calendar The 28th year of the Chinese Republic Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 97. I. Xie Deyuan (1897-1935), whom Mao refers to here by his zi, Zizhang, was a native

of Anding xi an in Shaanxi Province. According to recent Chinese biographical dictionaries, he joined the Pany in 1924.

2. The Chinese tenn here is qingtian. literally "clear sky." a respectful sobriquet for a clean and upright official. 3. According to Mao's appeal of July 15, 1936, to the Gelaohui (see Volume V, pp.lxiv and 245-47), both Xie Zizhang and Liu Zhidan were "not only leaders of the Red Army" but also "exemplary members" of that secret society. 165

Speech at the First Representative Conference of the Students' National Salvation Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (August 13, 1939)

(Special report to this newspaper): ... Comrades Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, Kang Sheng, Deng Fa, and Zhang Dingcheng quietly entered the conference room from a door on the left side immediately after the Conference approved the circular telegram. The whole audience stood up and welcomed them with enthusiastic and prolonged applause. After a short interval, Comrade Mao Zedong strode up to the platform with joyful countenance. The applause broke out once again like spring thunder. Comrade Mao Zedong tried several times to begin speaking, but each time he was stopped by this overwhelming sound.

We are very happy because comrades are meeting here with great enthusiasm. We did not ask you comrades about the purpose of your conference, but we already know it. In this China of ours, there are two types of meetings. One type aims to thwart China's freedom and independence; such meetings are held by Chinese traitors and diehards. Another type demands China's freedom and independence. The meetings of the Communist Party and anti-Japanese elements all demand freedom and independence for China .... It is impossible to overthrow Japanese imperialism and win final victory without democracy. Which is better for the country-to perish or not to perish? We say that it is better for the country not to perish. But there should be democracy. Without democracy, the country will definitely perish. What is democracy? Democracy is the right freely to take any road. This condition in itself is sufficient. With this right, we can go anywhere we like. We may go to fight the fascists, the Chinese traitors, and the Troskyites. So we must definitely have these two characters.' Sun Yatsen has an ism called people's rights. 2 But now there are some people who have forgotten it, but nevertheless insist that they are faithful disciples of Sun

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, August 18, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 95-96, where it is reproduced from that source. I. I.e., the two characters minzhu, forming the Chinese term for democracy. 2. Minquan, Sun's term for democracy, often used by Mao in this sense in the 1920s, and during the war against Japan. 166

AUGUST 1939

/67

Yatsen. It is not enough for them merely to be disciples, they must be faithful ones

too ... · Each sentence and each word moved the heart of every comrade. His voice is as firm as an iron hammer, striking powerful blows against those diehards who oppose democracy, oppose people's rights, and oppose young people. Another round of enthusiastic applause breaks out. Comrade Mao Zedong, surrounded by several thousand pairs of eyes, concludes his speech concisely and to the point.

To Mao Anying and Mao Anqing (August 26, 1939)

Anying and Anqing, my sons: 1 I have received your last letter, which makes me feel very happy! How have you been doing lately? Have you made any progress? I am all right. I have also read some books, but not many; in my heart, I feel far from satisfied, unlike you, who spend most of your time studying. I asked our old comrade, Lin Boqu, 2 to buy some books for you and all the young comrades and to send them to you. I wonder if you have received them? Write and tell me. I will write again. Wishing you growth, progress, and happiness! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 157, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Mao's eldest son, Mao Anying (1922-1950), and his second son, Mao Anqing ( 1923- ), had heen looked after by the Party in Shanghai following the execution of their mother. Yang Kaihui, in 1930. In 1936, they were sent to Moscow. out of concern for their safety and also so that they could receive an education. Mao Anying was killed during an American bombing raid in November 1950 while serving in Korea. 2. Lin Zuhan (1885-1960), hao Boqu, had long been Mao's comrade both in the Chinese Communist Party, which he joined in 1921. and in the Guomindang during the First United Front (see Mao's letter to him in Volume II, pp. 192-94). He had been commissar for finance in the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, and had participated in the Long March. At this time he was the representative of the Eighth Route Army in Xi'an and was thus in a position to obtain books for Mao's sons. /68

Invitation to Mr. Nehru to Visit Yan'an (August 27, 1939)

To the New China Daily in Chongqing, for transmittal to Mr. Nehru, the leader of the Indian National Congress: 1 have heard, sir, of your arrival in Chongqing. From this time forward, the two great nations of China and India will unite even more closely in the struggle for their freedom and liberation. I, your humble servant, would like to extend to you our best regards and sincere welcome on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. I would also like to welcome you to visit Yan'an, so that we may hear your great instructions in person. The medical team your honorable organization has sent to aid China in her resistance to Japan is now serving in the Eighth Route Army. This has moved and encouraged the entire army, and we wish to express our gratitude. MaoZedong

!his letter was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, September I, 1939. We have translated ll from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 99, which reproduces it from that source. /69

Mao Zedong, Leader of the Chinese Communist Party, on the Present International Situation and China's War of Resistance1 (September 1, 1939)

(Special report from our correspondent, September 4.) On September I, our correspondent called on Comrade Mao Zedong and asked him for his opinions on questions concerning the present international situation and China's War of Resistance. Comrade Mao's replies were as follows: Correspondent: What is the significance of the nonaggression pact suddenly reached between the Soviet Union and Germany? Mao Zedong: The Soviet-German nonaggression pact is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government. The signing ofthe pact is no accident and has great political significance. This treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie, represented by Chamberlain and Daladier, sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, exposed the lies of this reactionary clique against communism and the Communist International, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and safeguarded the progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance to Japan and deals a blow to the capitulators. Thus it provides a basis for helping the people of the whole world to win freedom and liberation. Such is the full political significance of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. Question: People do not yet realize that the Soviet-German nonaggression pact is the result of the breakdown of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, but think that the

This interview was first published in Xinhua ribao, September 6, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 9-16, which reproduces that text. I. Mao Zedong, Leader of the Chinese Communist Party, on the Present International Situation and China's War of Resistance ..... Interview with a New China Daily correspon~ dent on the New IntcmationaJ Situation 170

SEPTEMBER 1939

171

soviet-German pact caused the breakdown. Please explain why the Anglo-Francosoviet talks failed. Answer: Purely because of a lack of good faith on the part of Britain and France. 2 For the past several years, the reactionary international bourgeoisie, above all that of Britain and France, has consistently pursued a reactionary policy, the so-called policy of"nonintervention," toward the fascist aggression of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The purpose of this policy is to connive at wars of aggression and to profit from them. Consequently, Britain and France flatly rejected the Soviet Union's repeated proposals. for a genuine front against aggression. Instead, they adopted a "noninterventionist" position and connived at German, Italian, and Japanese aggression, while they themselves stood on the sidelines. Their aim was to step forward and intervene when the belligerents had worn each other out. In pursuit of this reactionary policy, they sacrificed half of China to Japan and the whole of Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to Italy and Germany. In line with this policy, they also intended to sacrifice the Soviet Union. This 3 has already been clearly revealed in the course of the recent Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks. These talks lasted for more than four months, from April 15 to August 23, during which the Soviet Union exercised the utmost patience. But, from start to finish, Britain and France rejected the principle of equality and reciprocity; all they wanted was for the Soviet Union to guarantee their security, while they refused to do likewise for the Soviet Union and the Baltic states,4 so as to leave a gap through which Germany could attack. They also refused to allow the passage of Soviet troops through Poland to fight the aggressor. That is the fundamental reason why the talks broke down. Meanwhile, Germany gave up its anti-Soviet position,5 indicated its willingness to abandon in reality the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, and recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers. Hence the conclusion of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. The policy of nonintervention pursued by the international reactionaries, and primarily by the British and French reactionaries, is a policy of sitting on top of the mountain and watching the tigers fight, a downright imperialist policy of profiting at others' expense. This policy was initiated when Chamberlain took office and reached its climax in the Munich agreement of September last year. Thus it finally collapsed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. From now on, the situation will inevitably develop into one of direct confrontation between the two big imperialist blocs, the Anglo-French bloc and the German-Italian bloc. As I said last year at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, ''The inevitable consequence of Chamberlain's policy will be like

2. Britain and France

-+

The British and French governments

3. This ~ This plot

4. The Baltic states -+ The little Baltic states 5. Gave up its anti-Soviet position .... Showed willingness to stop opposing the Soviet Union

172

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

'lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own toes'." Chamberlain started out with the aim of injuring others and benefiting himself, only to end up by harming himself. This is the law of development which governs all reactionary policies. Question: In your opinion, how will the present international situation develop? Answer: At present, the international situation has already taken on a new aspect. During the previous stage, the second imperialist war, which began some time ago, had only a partial character, in the sense that, as a result of the policy of "nonintervention," one group of imperialist states attacked while another simply looked on; as far as Europe is concerned, this will inevitably be replaced in the future by a situation of all-embracing war. The second imperialist war has already entered the second stage. In the East, although the situation is different, there will also be a new stage. In Europe, a large-scale imperialist war is imminent between the German-Italian imperialist bloc and the Anglo-French imperialist bloc, which are contending for domination over the colonies. In this war, in order to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, both sides in the conflict will shamelessly declare their own cause to be just and that of their opponents unjust. In fact, this is nothing but a swindle, because the aims of both sides are imperialist aims; both are fighting for domination over the colonies and semicolonies and over spheres of influence, and both are waging a predatory war. At present, they are fighting over Poland, the Balkan peninsula, and the Mediterranean littoral. 6 The only just wars are nonpredatory wars, wars of liberation. Communists most strongly oppose any predatory war. They will, however, bravely step forward to support every just and nonpredatory war for liberation, and they will stand in the forefront of the struggle. With Chamberlain and Daladier practicing intimidation and bribery, the socialdemocratic parties affiliated with the Second International are splitting up. One section, the reactionary upper stratum, is following the same old disastrous road as in the First World War and is ready to support the new imperialist war. But another section will join with the Communists in forming a popular front against war and fascism. At present, Chamberlain and Daladier are following in the footsteps of Germany and Italy and are becoming more and more reactionary. Right now, they are taking advantage of the war mobilization to fascistize the state organization of their countries and to militarize the economy.ln short, the two big imperialist blocs are feverishly preparing for war, and millions of people are facing the danger of mass slaughter. But such a situation cannot fail to arouse antiwar movements7 among the masses. Whether in Germany or in Italy, Britain or France, or anywhere else in Europe or the world at large, if the people do not want to be used as imperialist cannon-fodder, they will have to rise up and oppose the imperialist war in every

6. Here the Selected Works text adds: ''This war is not at all a just war." 7. Antiwar movements ... Resistance movements

SEPTt::MBER 1939

173

possible way. Apart from the two big blocs discussed above, there is a third bloc in the capitaliSt world, headed by the Umted States and mcludmg a number of Central and South American countries. In its own interests, this bloc will not be drawn into the war, at least for the time being. As regards world peace, it can still work in concert with the Soviet Union and play a somewhat positive role. In the name of neutrality, American imperialism is refraining8 from joining either of the belligerents, so as to be able to come on the scene later and contend for the leadership of the capitalist world. The fact that the American bourgeoisie is not yet prepared to discard democracy and a peacetime economy at home is favorable to the world peace movement. As for Japanese imperialism, which has been badly hit by the SovietGerman pact, it is facing a future beset with still greater difficulties. Two factions within Japan are fighting over foreign policy. The fascist warlords are still contemplating an alliance with Germany and Italy for the purpose of gaining e•clusive control of China, invading Southeast Asia, and e
8. Is refraining .... Is refraining temporarily 9. The liberal bourgeoisie .... One section of the bourgeoisie I 0. Reactionary bourgeoisie ... Reactionaries

II. Military offensives in some parts of China-+ A frontal military offensive in China 12. Here Mao uses the expression yi Hua :zhi Hua, a deliberate paraphrase of the policy yiyi :zhiyi, "using barbarians to control barbarians,'' i.e., playing off one Western nation against another, advocated by some Chinese statesmen in the nineteenth century.

174

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Soviet Union to aid the world peace movement, to aid China in its War of Resistance, and to aid the liberation movements ofall nations and peoples of the world. Such is my appraisal of the international situation. Question: In these circumstances, what are the future prospects for China? Answer: There are two futures for China. One is a future of perseverance in the War of Resistance, unity, and progress, which would he a future of national rejuvenation. The other is a future of compromise, splits, and retrogression, which would be a future of national subjugation. In the new international situation, as the Japanese bandits 13 come up against increased difficulties and China resolutely refuses to compromise, the stage of strategic retreat will end for us and that of strategic stalemate will begin. This latter stage is that of preparation for the counteroffensive. But stalemate along the front means the reverse of stalemate in the enemy's rear. As the possibility of a stalemate along the frontlines increases, the possibility of a stalemate behind the enemy's lines will diminish. 14 Consequently, from now on the large-scale "mopping-up" campaigns the enemy has been conducting in the occupied areas-mainly in North China-since the fall of Wuhan will not only continue, but will be intensified. Furthermore, since the enemy's main policy 15 consists in his political offensive to "use Chinese to control Chinese" and in his economic aggression to "sustain the war by means of war," and since a Far Eastern Munich is the objective of British policy in the East, this will further increase enormously the very great danger that China 16 may be lured into surrender, and that a split may be created. As for the relationship between China's internal [strength] and that of the enemy, the difference is still very great, and unless the whole country unites in an arduous struggle, it will he impossible to build up strength for the counteroffensive. Therefore, China's task in the War of Resistance is still an extremely important task and must never be neglected in the slightest degree. Consequently, without any doubt whatsoever, China must on no account miss the present opportunity or make a wrong decision, but must adopt a firm and correct political standpoint. This means, first, taking a resolute stand in favor of the War of Resistance and opposing any movement in favor of compromise. Resolute blows must be struck at all the Wang Jingweis, whether overt or covert. China must firmly reject any blandishments, whether from the enemy 17 or from Britain, and must absolutely not participate in an Eastern Munich. Second, this means

13. The Japanese bandits~ Japan 14. As the possibility of a stalemate along the frontlines increases, the possibility of a stalemate behind the enemy's lines wiH diminish ...... As a situation of stalemate along the frontlines emerges. the struggle behind the enemy's lines will become intense. 15. Main policy-+ Main policy at present 16. China ~ A great pan of China 17. The enemy ..... Japan

SEPTEMBER /939

175

adhering firmly to the standpoint of unity and opposing any moves toward a split. Strict vigilance must be maintained against such moves whether they stem from the enemy.' 8 from other foreign countries, or from the capitulators at home. All friction 19 harmful to the War of Resistance must be sternly checked. Third, this means firm adherence to the stand of progress and opposition to any retrogression. Whether in the military, political, financial, or economic sphere, in Party affairs, or in the field of culture and education or the movements of the popular masses, every theory, every institution, and every measure harmful to the war must be reexamined and effectively changed to serve the War of Resistance and to respond to the aspirations of the entire country. If all this can be done, China will be able to build up its strength very well for the counteroffensive. From now on, the whole country must make ''preparation for the counteroffensive" its overall task in the War of Resistance. At present, it is necessary, on the one hand, earnestly to sustain our defense along the frontlines and vigorously to assist the fighting behind the enemy lines and, on the other, to institute political, military, and other reforms, and build up tremendous strength, so that when the moment comes, our whole might can be thrown into a large-scale counteroffensive for the recovery of our lost territories. In the diplomatic field, the unswerving principle should be to treat those who support us as friends and those who support our enemy as enemies. For example, in the past, when Wang Jingwei and others proposed following the course of Germany and Italy, while Germany and Italy were assisting the enemy, this was a completely erroneous theory of Chinese traitors. But if in the future Germany and Italy abandon their policy of supporting the enemy, there is no obstacle to approaching them, in order to weaken the enemy's strength. Again, if Britain supports the enemy and builds him up, we absolutely cannot rely on it, and must at all times be vigilant against its attempts to coerce and cajole us, in order to avoid being pulled into a vortex and harming the War of Resistance. As regards the Soviet Union, we should strengthen our friendship with it, and form a united front between the great Chinese and Soviet nations, in order to obtain more assistance from it, and consolidate the front ofthe War of Resistance. Our attitude toward the United States should be more or less the same. But it should be clearly understood that in all capitalist countries the most reliable friends supporting our War of Resistance are the broad masses of the people, and not the governments of these countries. In sum, the guiding principle for everything is whether it is advantageous for the War of Resistance. In the new international situation, as long as China is able to adopt a firm stand and carry out correct policies, it can reach the goal offinal victory. Under the slogans of supporting Chairman Chiang and the National Government, opposing surrender and persevering in unity, opposing splits and persevering in progress, and opposing retrogression, the people of the whole

18. The enemy .... The Japanese imperialists 19. Friction ..... Internal friction

176

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

country should mobilize all their forces and struggle to prepare for the counteroffensive! Whether or not China 'sfuture counteroffensive will be successful depends on our standpoint and our work now. I hope that every patriotic party and faction, every patriotic person will give serious consideration to these great issues affecting the country, shoulder their responsibilities, and stride forward toward a great and brilliant future for the Chinese nation. The greatest struggle for liberation in the history of mankind is unfolding today. As long as we make every effort, there can be no doubt that the Chinese nation will win independence and liberation!

Our Views Concerning the Work of the Political Council in the Past and the Current Situation (September 8, 1939)

It has been over a year now since the formation of the People's Political Council, on the first anniversary of the War of Resistance. When we accepted the invitation to join the Council, we issued a statement, "Our Views on the People's Political Council."' We pointed out, "Under the present circumstance of the intensified War of Resistance, the convening of the People's Political Council is a clear demonstration of progress toward a democratic system in our country's political life, and a clear demonstration of advances in unity and

unification among our various panies, factions, nationalities, social strata, and geographical regions. Although in terms of the way it was established and the definition of its functions and powers the People's Political Council is not an altogether satisfactory plenipotentiary representative organ of the people, this by no means deprives it of its role and significance today-the role of further uniting all kinds of forces throughout the country in a concerted effort to continue the War of Resistance and strive for national salvation, and the significance of leading national political life toward the initial phase of genuine democracy. Therefore, we Communists will not only continue to work for the establishment in the future of a popularly elected plenipotentiary people's representative organ, but will also participate in the work of the People's Political Council with the most active, enthusiastic, and sincere attitude." During the past year, the People's Political Council has met three times. From an overall perspective on the Council's work in the past, its greatest achievement lies with today's most pressing and central political question for China-persisting in fighting the War of Resistance of national self-defense to final victory and suppressing all kinds of tendencies and criminal activities of making halfhearted compromises along the way. All of this reflects the genuine demand of vast numbers of people throughout China. The Council's first meeting solemnly declared,

The text of these proposals was first published in the Chongqing edition of Xinhua ribao on September 9, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 17-26, which reproduces the text from this version.

I. For the full text of this document, dated July 5, 1938, see the translation in Volume VI of this edition. 177

178 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

''This Council hereby solemnly proclaims on behalf of the people of the whole country that the Chinese nation must persist in its unbending will to mobilize all its material resources and human power, for the sake of self-defense and humanity, to fight a protracted war against this most savage aggressor until the very end when final victory is won." The second meeting, too, passed a unanimous resolution to "support the government's established policy, as proclaimed by Chairman Chiang, of fighting a total and protracted War of Resistance and contending for the initiative," and called upon the people of the whole country to "fight the War of Resistance resolutely, never capitulate, defend the country together, and accomplish the task of fighting the war and building the country." The third meeting also resolved that "the established national policy of fighting the War of Resistance must be carried out to the end," and called upon the people to "strengthen their confidence, keep in step with one another, and be of one heart and mind from beginning to end, in order to recover our territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity, and carry through to the end the great enterprise of fighting the War of Resistance and building the country." In addition, participants in the three meetings put forward more than three hundred proposals on a wide range of concrete questions about fighting the War of Resistance and building the country. Although some of the matters raised were more urgent and some less so, and some of the proposals better thought out than others, it cannot be denied that all were products of careful consideration, and were designed to benefit the War of Resistance and the building ofthe country. What is regrettable is that the government has not been able to carry out truly and effectively the vast majority of the Political Council's resolutions, thus reducing the effectiveness which the Council's work should have had, and at the same time failing to satisfy the ardent hopes placed in the Council by our compatriots throughout the country. In taking part in the work of the Political Council during the past year, we Communist Party members of the Council, in line with positions announced in our statement of July 5 last year, abiding by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's instruction for "a clear political stand and a sincere spirit of unity," and urged on and encouraged by progressive people throughout the country, have been fighting together with other members of the Council to carry out the Chinese people's will and demands. We firmly believe that today the people's highest aspiration, resolve, and demand is to win victory in the War of Resistance, and to consolidate and expand the unity and progress of the whole nation, which are necessary for achieving and securing that victory. This is the reason that during the past three sessions ofthe Political Council we successively put forward the "Resolution on Supporting the Government in Carrying Out the Policy of Fighting the War of Resistance and Building the Country," the "Resolution on Supporting Chairman Chiang and the National Government in Strengthening National Unity and Persisting in a Protracted War of Resistance to the Final Victory," and the "Resolution on Supporting Chairman Chiang's Strong Denunciation of [Japanese prime minister] Konoe, and Taking It as the Sole Criterion for the National Policy of Fighting the War of Resistance in the Future." Thanks to the support of all fellow

SEPTEMBER 1939

179

members of the Council, these resolutions were all adopted. In addition, we proosed special resolutions embodying our views on a variety of other basic issues fn fighting the War of Resistance, such as building up the army, conscription, developing guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, practicing democratic politics, protecting people's rights, and so on. During the course of the past year's work we have firmly adhered to our position: "We represent the Chinese Communist Pany in our participation in the People's Political Council, and we are sincerely willing to join hands and work very closely in the Council with comrades from the Guomindang and other political panies and factions, as well those without pany affiliation, so that in a friendly and cordial manner we may discuss and decide on all the concrete measures and methods for applying them that are conducive to victory in the War of Resistance and success in building the country." At the same time we have been firm in exposing and relentless in denouncing all erroneous statements that are detrimental to the War of Resistance or that advocate reconciliation and capitulation. During the first and second meetings, the mad treasonable views of Rebel Wang [Jingwei] and members of his clique such as Li Shengwu, 2 though in disguised form, were denounced and refuted by us and by the great majority of our fellow Council members. During the past year of our work within the People's Political Council, although we regret that we have not produced more results, we venture to say with confidence that we have maintained our clear-cut, principled position of unity for the War of Resistance and have not deviated in the slightest from compliance with the will and aspirations of the people. Now that the government has decreed the extension of the term of office of Council members for another year, we, as Council members, wish to state our views to our fellow Council members and to the people of the whole country on the current situation and on the orientation for achieving future victories in the War of Resistance. It is a characteristic ofthe present situation in the War of Resistance that, on the one hand, the enemy is beset with increasing difficulties after two years of its war of aggression, and our prospect of a future victory in the War of Resistance is opening up daily. On the other hand, however, far from changing their course of conquering and destroying China, the Japanese bandits have become ever more treacherous, ruthless, and vicious in carrying out their established plan of destroying our country and are also even more insidiously carrying out their policy of using Chinese to control Chinese.' and using war to sustain war. Militarily, they have suspended their large-scale frontal offensives but are, instead, concentrating

2. Li Shengwu (1899-?), a native of Shandong Province, had pursued graduate study in Japan and England, obtaining a degree in law from Oxford University. After a period as editor of the official Zhong yang ribao in Nanjing, he served in the Foreign Ministry of the National Government from 1933 to 1937. From March 1940 until the summer of 1945, he occupied various important posts in Wang Jingwei's puppet government. 3. On this term, see above the relevant note to Mao's interview of September I, 1939. in Which he also employed it.

/80

MAO'S ROAD TO POW£R

all their forces to mop up the area of guerrilla warfare in their rear. Their purpose in this, on one hand, is to sap our will to fight the War of Resistance and, on the other, to consolidate their foothold in the occupied areas. Politically, they are making every effort to support and make use of Rebel Wang, touting his absurd antiChiang, anti-Communist, and pro-capitulation views. They are stepping up their activities in creating a puppet government, a puppet political party, and a puppet army; and at the same time instigating the likes of Rebel Wang and his clique, and other elements who harbor disloyal designs to sow seeds of discord and carry out anti-Chiang, anti-Communist activities within the camp of the War of Resistance, in an attempt to bring about a situation that forces China to capitulate. Economically, they carry out plunder, extortion, dumping goods, and exploiting our re-

sources, in the execution of their vicious plan of using war to sustain war and using Chinese resources to slaughter the Chinese people. At the same time, within the camp of the War of Resistance there are indeed a group of people who fail to make a correct assessment of the current situation. Either they believe that the enemy bandits have modified their policy of destroying China, or they think that it is possible to solve the Sino-Japanese problem by means of some sort of international conference. As a result they abandon the correct view, that of self-reliance, and make no concrete preparations for counterattacks. There are even those who go so far as to ignore the danger that the country may be destroyed and believe that our main energies should be directed toward domestic affairs, toward schemes for opposing Communism and disrupting the unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. They spare no effort to crack down on progressive forces and unremittingly to oppress the many promising young people. The impact of such self-inflicted wounds and fratricidal strife4 not only shakes the confidence of our compatriots in winning victory in the War of Resistance but also dampens the sympathy of international public opinion for the Chinese nation. Added difficulties in recruiting conscripts and devaluation of the government's currency have led some people to feel that there is the will to fight the War of Resistance but not the skill to defeat the enemy. All these things have deepened and intensified China's national crisis. Moreover, the development of the current international situation has brought about enormous changes in the environment of our country's War of Resistance. As a result of the signing of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, the anti-Communist axis has disintegrated, thus further isolating diplomatically the Japanese bandits and causing a shock in their domestic politics. This should have a beneficial effect on the situation in our country's War of Resistance. At the same time, because of the great European war brought about by the German fascists' invasion of Poland, the Japanese bandits will take advantage of the tension in Europe to step up the execution of its policy of concentrating 4. What we have rendered here as "self-inflicted wounds and fratricidal strife" is in the original text an expression meaning "inflicting pain by burning beanstalks to cook beans." that is, '"fighting within the family instead of fending off attacks from without."

SEPTEMBER 1939

181

its might on destroying China, and the British pro-compromise faction will try even harder to seek a possible compromise between Britain, Japan, and some other countries on the condition of sacrificing China. All this will create many new difficulties for our country's War of Resistance. For this reason, at present both the internal and external environment in our War of Resistance are undergoing new and radical changes. Under the new circumstances both at home and abroad, the important task now facing people all over China is to understand clearly all the features and possible trends of the new domestic and international situation, to persist in the national policy of fighting the War of Resistance to the end, to oppose the danger of compromise halfway, to make every effort to strengthen the unity of the whole country, to oppose all sorts of divisive plots, to strive for the country's continued progress, and to oppose all reactionary and retrogressive phenomena. At the same time, great efforts should be made to seize upon every incident and factor in the dramatically changing world situation that is favorable to us, so as to win more foreign assistance and support, overcome all dangers, surmount all difficulties, increase our strength, and prepare for the counteroffensive. To overcome the present difficulties and dangers, and to prepare our country's strength seriously for the counteroffensive, we believe that efforts should be made at present in the following respects: I. As regards the political aspect a. Mobilize the forces of the whole country to oppose compromise and capitulation, broaden the anti-Wang campaign, and eliminate all the hidden followers of the Wang faction and all capitulation is! elements in the resistance camp; b. Strengthen the wartime government, unify the military and political leadership, draw in people of talent from all parties and factions, and improve the efficiency of the wartime administrative offices; c. Practice wartime democracy, severely punish illegal acts of oppression directed against the popular masses and against young people, and effectively guarantee the freedom of speech, of the press, of association, and of assembly of the people, as well as their right to armed resistance against invasion; d. Punish severely and dismiss corrupt officials, and practice local autonomy; e. Set up arbitration organs to settle disputes between labor and capital, and between tenants and landlords, so as to improve the livelihood of the impoverished workers and peasants. This will increase the enthusiasm of the popular masses for the War of Resistance and will aid in the conscription and mobilization of soldiers. 2. As regards the military aspect a. Develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy rear, to the point of turning the enemy's rear into a battlefield and achieving a major victory by the accumulation of numerous minor victories. To do this requires the following: i. To prescribe and carry out the administrative program for guerrilla base areas, in compliance with the principles of the Program for the Resistance

/82

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

War and for Building Up the Country and conditions in the locality in question; ii. To combine political and military authority in the guerrilla base areas under the command of the major armed force in the area in question, which is experienced in fighting and has performed remarkable feats in the War of Resistance; iii. For the Central Government to provide the forces in the guerrilla base areas engaged in the War of Resistance with the necessary supplement

of arms and ammunition, as well as the necessary economic assistance, on a regular basis; iv. To dispatch to the enemy rear to expand the guerrilla war there those units that have the resolution and the capacity to carry out guerrilla war behind enemy lines and are endowed with firm political work and strict discipline; v. All individuals and units sent to the enemy rear must be capable of giving priority to unity in overcoming the enemy and of faithfully executing the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They must not harm ourselves and help the enemy by creating friction within our own ranks; vi. Those individuals and units that are sent to the enemy rear should be able to carry out democratic policies and set up a political power ofthe War of Resistance genuinely elected by the people themselves and approved by the government at a higher level. At the same time, they should pursue a policy of improving the people's livelihood, so as to unite the broad masses of the people for the destruction of the puppet regimes and disintegration of the puppet armies. Thus our manpower and resources will serve not the enemy, but ourselves. b. Develop a new army of national defense. In order to persist in the War of Resistance, and especially for the purpose of making preparations for a real

counteroffensive when circumstances become favorable and driving the invaders out of the country, we must build up a new army of national defense to serve as the backbone in the future counteroffensive. To do this requires the following: i. To select xx 5 divisions that have performed meritorious military service in the past as the foundation of the new army, without regard to political parties and factions or geographical boundaries; ii. To specify a unified establishment for all national defense divisions; iii. The cadres of these divisions of national defense should be selected from the leadership systems of the original army units, provided with modern

5. These two xs appear in the Chinese text. There is no way of knowing with certainty whether the reference is to the number or to the identity of the divisions, but the repetition

of this device in paragraph vi suggests Mao is talking about numbers.

SEPTEMBER /939

183

military training and solid political education, and expected to maintain the good traditions of each unit; iv. All national defense divisions should enjoy equal treatment in terms of equipment, pay, and provisions, which should be superior to those of ordinary units; v. The national defense divisions should be trained regularly and in a planned way, by responsible officers who are capable and have performed meritorious military service. The training is to be done in their respective areas and to the whole anny unit. vi. To build up an industry of national defense and step up military purchases from foreign countries, so as to obtain sufficient modern equipment for the xx national defense divisions within two years. 3. As regards the economic aspect We must disrupt the enemy's construction and development, while carrying out our production and economizing. To do this requires the following: a. Disrupt the enemy's construction in the occupied areas and his exploitation of our resources. Arouse the popular masses to boycou Japanese goods completely and to prevent the selling to the enemy of local products that could be of use to him. If some special military supplies have to be imponed from Japan, their purchase is to be controlled by the state; b. The state is to provide financial support and rewards to private investment so as to expand the cooperative movement in industry and agriculture, promote extensively various useful industries, and increase agricultural production as much as possible; c. Vigorously promote a movement for economy by military and political organs and by individuals. 4. As regards the financial aspect Resolutely transfonn the old workstyle, and carry out thoroughly a wartime financial policy. To do this requires the following: a. The issue of government currency must be appropriately coordinated with the circulation of capital, so as to eliminate the phenomenon of a price differential between coastal and interior areas; b. Foreign currencies must be strictly and completely controlled, and a foreign currency commiuee should be set up by the Political Council, with the mission of checking periodically whether the approval and use of foreign currencies by the Finance Ministry is justifiable, so as to put an end to all fraudulent practices for private gain; c. Private control of finance and disruption of the currency are to be strictly investigated and forbidden, especially financial malpractice and speculation by people in official positions, and the offenders must be severely punished; d. Portions of provinces in the war zones, those in enemy-occupied areas in particular, are allowed to issue a cenain amount of local currency or paper money for local circulation;

/84

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

e. Overseas Chinese and banking circles at home should be persuaded to buy more government bonds; they should be assured ofthe government's possession of actual funds and compensated with advantages in investment at home; f. As our national tax policy, progressive rates should be adopted in sales tax, income tax, and inheritance tax, land rent should be gradually reduced, and miscellaneous taxes and levies should be abolished; g. Confiscation of the property of the Chinese traitors must be strictly carried out, and in the case of those landlords who have escaped to enemy-occupied areas, the government should collect in their stead the land rent, which should be less than originally demanded and treated for the time being as the direct revenue of the state. h. The state budget, from the central level down to the local level, should be determined anew. The expenses that are related to the War of Resistance should be increased as required, and those that are not related to the war should be cut as much as possible, while those that can be dispensed with should be eliminated; i. The salaries of government administrative personnel, and especially of highranking officials, should be uniformly reduced and reduced to a level lower than that of military officers of the same rank. Extra pay and double salary should be abolished, and commissions prohibited in government borrowing or purchases. 5. As regards the diplomatic aspect If we wish to isolate the Japanese bandits as much as possible and strive to increase international support, it is necessary: a. Truly to unite all the peoples and governments that support and sympathize with our War of Resistance and make every effort to win from them more material aid and moral support; b. Resolutely to oppose all the plots of any state to make concessions to the Japanese bandits at the expense of China; resolutely support the orientation of independence and self-reliance in foreign policy; c. In support of the People's Political Council, all parties and factions, and all the various mass organizations should send delegations abroad to visit the various countries for extensive people's diplomatic activities, in order to increase the aid to us from the forces of democracy and peace. 6. As regards cooperation among the various parties and factions Strengthening the sincere unity among the various parties and factions participating in the War of Resistance, especially the friendly cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is in fact a fundamental guarantee in carrying out all the measures mentioned above, surviving the present perils, and defeating the Japanese bandits and Traitor Wang. To do this requires the following: a. To issue an explicit order guaranteeing the lawful rights of all parties and factions that are fighting Japan and to abolish in practice the many so-called measures to restrict the activity of alien parties;

SEPTEMBER 1939

185

b. To issue orders strictly forbidding discrimination and oppression directed against the Communist Party and against other parties and factions that are fighting Japan, and effectively prohibit threats to the occupation and the person of young people and others in industry, agriculture, the military, schools, and commerce on account of their party membership or their ideology, in order to create a situation of harmonious unity of the whole nation; c. Talented people should be widely absorbed in every kind of work related to the War of Resistance from various parties and factions; they must not be discriminated against or rejected as people useful to the state on account of their party membership or their personal opinions. At this time, when the bandits are penetrating deeply and disaster is threatening our nation, and when the world situation is stormy and changeable, it is the demand and aspiration of the people of the whole country to carry on the War of Resistance resolutely to the end, consolidate unity within the country, and strive for the progress of the whole country, in order truly to augment our strength in the War of Resistance and prepare for the counteroffensive against the enemy. It is as the representatives and emissaries of the people in the People's Political Council that we have sincerely made this joint statement before the convening of its fourth session. We hope that the people of the whole country and all our fellow councilors will offer us their instruction, encouragement, supervision, and criticism. We also offer it as the orientation for the joint struggle of all our fellow countrymen both inside and outside the Political Council. MaoZedong Qin Bangxian [Bo Gu]6 Wu Yuzhang7 Deng Yingchao9

Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming] Lin Zuhan Dong Biwu8

6. Regarding Qin Bangxian, better known undet his pseudonym Bo Gu, who was at one time the dominant figure in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, see Volume V, passim.

7. Regarding Wu Yuzhang, see the note to Mao's letter to him dated simply 1939, translated below. 8. Dong Biwu (1886-1975) was a member of the Central Committee. 9. Deng Yingchao (1904-1992) was Zhou Enlai's wife.

Speech at an Evening Welcome Party for the Northern Route Comfort Corps of the National Comfort Corps of China (September 9, 1939)

(Written specially for this newspaper) ... The humming of the vehicles was heard coming from outside the windows. All of a sudden, the singing was interrupted, and a solemn silence prevailed in the whole hall. First, Mr. Zhang Ji' and Mr. He Zhonghan,' guided by Comrade Mao Zedong, entered the hall. All those present stood up at once, and thunderous applause arose. After the other guests had come in one after another and taken their seats, formal opening of the party was proclaimed. Comrade Mao Zedong went up to the rostrum amid an enthusiastic ovation and delivered an address of welcome. Comrades: Today we are very happy and very sincere in holding this evening party and in welcoming the many comrades who have come to visit Yan' an. First of all, on behalf of all the comrades present, I salute Chairman Lin of the National Government' (the audience stands and applauds) and Chairman Chiang, the leader of the nation (the audience stands and applauds) .... It has been two years now since we united to resist Japan, and this circumstance has done away with the stagnation of two years ago. At that time, there was no This report was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, September 15, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 101-3, where this version isreproduced. 1. Zhang Ji (1882-1947), zi Puquan, a native of Zhili, was a charter member of Sun Yatsen's Tongmenghui, and in the early 1920s he was active in the affairs of the Guomindang. After a brief eclipse because he had supported the anti-Communist Western Hills group in 1925, he soon returned to a leading role in the affairs of the Nanjing government. In 1939, he was head of the Central Comfort Corps and frequently visited military units in the field. 2. He Zhonghan (1899-1972), a native of Hunan, had studied in the Soviet Union in 1921 and attended the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East. Atier graduating from the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924, he went once again to the Soviet Union in 1925 and entered the Frunze Military Academy. In 1928, he went to Japan for further military and politicaJ studies. Returning to China in 1931, he became a member of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and occupied various important posts in the field of political training in the army. At this time, he was head of the Comfort Corps in the Northwest. 3. The reference is to Lin Sen; see above, the relevant note to "The Reactionaries Must Be Punished," August I, 1939. /86

SEPTEMBER 1939

187

war of Resistance, and no unity. Now unity and the War of Resistance have come into existence, and this is a new phenomenon, a new scene. We are very much gratified that this new scene has already entered its third year. During the past two years of the War of Resistance, there have, however, been some minor clashes and some minor friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. As a result, the comrades of these two parties are anxious and solicitous about the problem of relations between the parties. This is truly a problem that has attracted everybody's attention. Not only the comrades within the two parties, but also ordinary people in society, are very concerned, and are awaiting a satisfactory answer to this problem. In fact, this matter is not all that difficult to comprehend. Everyone should be aware that the Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are its organizational foundation. The united front is a large union, which embraces all parties and factions, all circles and armies, all individualseveryone, with the exception of Chinese traitors. Naturally, the Communist Party recognizes that, of the two parties, the Guomindang is the primary great party. Although, in addition to these two parties, there are various other parties and factions, various circles and armies, the fact remains that the Guomindang and the Communist Party constitute the foundation. If these parties were not united, the united front would be out of the question. That is why we say that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are the organizational foundation of the united front. During the past two years of the War of Resistance, the unity ofthe two parties has been the central issue. The problem today is a problem which arises after two years of the War of Resistance, but there has been, and should be, no change in our basic orientation, which is summed up in the word "unity." Unity is the basic orientation. Unity should be achieved on the basis of progress. Recently, there has been some friction between the two parties in some places and among certain members. Such a phenomenon is not a good thing; but, as everyone knows, looking at the overall situation, the entire country is under the leadership of Chairman Chiang, and the people of all walks of life are concerned about one another, and urge one another on, so our unity in the War of Resistance can be relied on. We must definitely unite, no matter what happens; we have no orientation other than unity .... Because the enemy is "opposing Chiang," we, the people of the whole nation, must rise in support of Chairman Chiang (all those present applaud). Because the enemy wants to overthrow the National Government, we, the people of the whole country, must support the National Government (all those present applaud); because the enemy and Chinese traitors such as Wang Jingwei are trying to wreck the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we, the people of the whole country, should support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (all those present applaud); because the enemy wants to smash the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we, the people of the whole country, should support the Anti-Japanese National United Front (all those present applaud);

/88 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

because the enemy wishes to see internal conflict among us, we must not fight a civil war (all those present applaud). We should do things that will gladden those close to us and sadden the enemy, and do nothing that might hurt those close to us and please the enemy. We must stick to our own stand and never confuse it with the enemy's slogans. Our slogan is opposition to the enemy on all points, absolutely without the slightest confusion with the enemy. Any slogan that is identical with a slogan of the enemy is a pretext for fawning on and capitulating to the enemy; any statement like those of the enemy is a hackneyed tune that helps the enemy and boosts the enemy's arrogance. Anyone who wants to take over the enemy's slogans and, at the same time, talks about fighting the enemy is uttering nothing but deceitful words, which will be cruelly exposed by an implacable history. Today, only by uniting the whole country, supporting Chairman Chiang, supporting the National Government, supporting the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and supporting the Anti-Japanese National United Front, resolutely persisting in the War of Resistance and opposing capitulation, persisting in unity and opposing dissension, persisting in progress and opposing retrogression, can we defeat Japanese imperialism and drive it out of the country. Only thus can an independent and free new China emerge. Today we welcome our revolutionary elder, Mr. Zhang Puquan. He belongs to the older generation of the revolution and has made tremendous contributions to the cause of unity in the War of Resistance. So today we invite this venerable gentleman to give us instruction. We also welcome all the comrades in the Comfort Corps and ask for their instruction. (All those present applauded and shouted: "Welcome to the Central Comfort Corps!" "Welcome to the Central Political Work Delegation!" "Support the National Government!" "Support Chairman Chiang and persist to the end in the War of Resistance!" "Support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party!" "Support the Anti-Japanese National United Front!" "Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!"

The Communist Political Councilors Contribute in Support of the Hong Kong Workers Who Are Opposing Wang (September 12, 1939)

To Xinhua ribao, for transmission to Worker friends ofthe three newspapers Nanhoo, Tianyan, and Ziyou in Hong Kong who are on strike against Wang [Jingwei]: In declaring a strike and refusing to work in the course of the struggle against the Wang clique of Chinese traitors, you have manifestly set a good example for people all over China; this also funher illustrates the vanguard role of the working class in the War of Resistance, and their resolute and unyielding spirit of active struggle. The continuous development and expansion of this campaign is an extremely heavy blow at the Japanese bandits and the Chinese traitors. We are writing especially to send to you our warmest regards and highest respects with utmost sincerity. In addition, each of us has contributed 50 yuan (350 in total), to be passed on to you through Xinhua ribao, as a slight token of our concern. With national liberation salutations, MaoZedong Wu Yuzhang

Chen Shaoyu Dong Biwu

Qin Bangxian Deng Yingchao

Lin Zuhan

This document was first published in Xinhua ribao (Chongqing), September 13, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, p. 27, which reproduces this text. /89

Outline of a Speech on the Second Imperialist War Speech at a Cadres' Meeting in Yan 'an

(September 14, 1939)

I. A New Stage in the War The second imperialist war began a long while ago, and the fighting has been going on for many years. The aggression against China by the Japanese imperialists started in 1931. They first occupied China's Three Northeastern Provinces and then in 1937 staged a large-scale invasion of China proper. The Italian imperialists invaded Abyssinia in 1935. Germany and Italy jointly invaded Spain in 1936. In 1938, Germany occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia. In this period, more than 500 million people in the East and the West were drawn into the war, but imperialist countries such as Britain, the United States, and France were still not participating. Consequently, we call this period the first stage ofthe second imperialist war. Starting now, however, from the time when Britain and France have joined in the war, we call it the second stage, because the circumstances have already become completely different. If, in the past, it could still not be called a world war, because it was not taking place on a world scale, things are now different. Now the war has already become an imperialist world war, and this constitutes a new stage in the imperialist war.

II. The Cause of the War According to historical facts and Lenin's doctrine, capitalist development in the age of imperialism is extremely unbalanced, so war between the various imperialist countries is unavoidable. Less than twenty years after the end ofthe first imperialist war, which aimed at dividing up the world anew, a second imperialist war has broken out, and the imperialist countries are trying once again to divide up the world. The initial phase of this new war, that is, its first phase, was founded on the last worldwide economic crisis. When the unprecedented worldwide economic This text was first published in Balujun junz.heng zat.hi, no. 9, September 25, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 29-43, which reproduces this version. 190

SEPTEMBER 1939

191

crisis between 1929 and 1933 was over, it was followed not by prosperity, but by a peculiar kind of depression. Some imperialist countries, such as Japan and Italy, considered that they had received too •mall a share of the spoils of the First World War. while others, such as Germany, deemed that they had lost out in the distribution of booty in the previous war. So they rushed into the arena of war fully armed, in an attempt to evade the economic crisis and escape the collapse of capitalism. It was these circumstances that brought about the outbreak of the second imperialist war and shaped its first stage. In the second stage of the second imperialist war, Germany, Britain, France, and Poland have launched a large-scale war; the various capitalist countries in the world will get involved, directly or indirectly, on the basis of the new economic crisis. The new world economic crisis, which began in 1937, has in recent years penetrated the so-called "peaceful" states such as Britain, France, and the United States, and is also developing in Germany, Japan, and Italy. On the foundation of this economic crisis, a grave political crisis has also been created. The people are dissatisfied with capitalism and with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Whether in the states that became fascist a long time ago or in the states where they are just now taking advantage of the war to carry out fascization, this political crisis, this popular discontent, are daily becoming more acute. On the other hand, the socialist Soviet Union has been strengthened to the point where it can no longer be invaded. Under these conditions, the bourgeoisie of all the imperialist states realizes that, without a vast war, without transforming the limited war into a total war, without demolishing its imperialist friends, it cannot escape economic and politi-

cal crisis, nor can it escape its own doom. Such, in every particular, are the calculations of the bourgeoisie of all the countries of the world on the eve of its death. The authors of these calculations cannot imagine that in this way-by making use of a war to divide up the world anew, in order to escape from the economic and political crisis and avoid their own deaththey cannot fail to create an even greater economic and political crisis and hasten their own doom. They are like mad dogs, they are already mad, the capitalist system has made them altogether mad. They cannot do otherwise than hurl themselves pell-mell against their enemies and against the walls of the world. Such is the reality of life today in all the capitalist countries of the world. A fight between mad dogs-such is the present imperialist war.

Ill. The Goal of the War "War is the continuation of politics." The nature of imperialism is predatory, and even in periods of "peace" there is no instance when the policy of the imperialist states is not predatory. But when the predatory policy of certain imperialist states encounters the obstacle of certain other imperialist states and cannot break through this obstacle by peaceful means, then these states use warlike means to break through it, so that they may pursue their predatory policies. Therefore, plunder is the one

/92

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

and only political goal of imperialist wars. The aim of the second imperialist war is the same as that of the first imperialist war. It consists in dividing up the world anew, that is, in dividing up anew the colonies, semicolonies, and spheres of influence, in pillaging the peoples of the world, and in establishing their rule over the peoples of the world. This goal of the second imperialist war remains exactly the same, whether in the previous stage or in the present stage. Apart from aims of this kind, are there any other aims? Are there any good aims? There are none whatsoever. Whether it be Germany, Italy, or Japan, whether it be Britain, the United States, or France, all the imperialist states participating directly or indirectly in the war have only a counterrevolutionary goal, a goal of plundering the people, an imperialist goal. The "lasting peace" of Japanese imperialism, Hitler's "national self-determination," Chamberlain's "opposition to National Socialism," Daladier's "support for Poland," all come down in reality to a single word: "plunder." Only because it sounds good, and to fool the people, do they order their secretaries to invent a few fancy synonyms, that is all. IV. The Nature of the War The nature of the war is in line with the political aims of the war. All wars can be divided into two categories. According to Comrade Stalin's formulation, there are: (I) just wars, the aim of which is not pillage but liberation, and (2) unjust wars of pillage. By its nature, the second imperialist war,like the first imperialist war, falls into the second category, because neither of these wars has any purpose whatsoever other than the plunder of the people of the world, doing absolutely no good for the people of their own countries or of other countries. Therein lies the plundering, unjust, and imperialist nature of the war. Now both sides in the war, to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, are shamelessly declaring that they are just, while accusing the other side of being unjust. In reality, this is nothing but a farce, a kind of deception. Only wars of national liberation and wars for people's liberation, as well as the wars waged by the socialist countries in support of these two kinds of liberation movements, are just wars. This time, many people have once again become confused. In their view, Germany is, of course, unjust, but Britain and France are democratic countries opposing fascist countries, and Poland is fighting a war of national self-defense, so Britain, France, and Poland have a somewhat progressive character. This is an extremely muddled view. The confusion arises from lack of clarity about the purpose of the war and about the differing characteristics of the first and the second phases of the war. V. The Peculiarities of the First Stage of the War The peculiarities of the first stage of the second imperialist war are as follows: (I) As regards the relations among the various imperialist countries, a portion of

the imperialist states, the three fascist states of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were

SEPTEMBER /939

193

waging frenzied wars of aggression, violating the interests of all small and weak nations, violating the interests of all democratic countries, and unleashing a threat offascism within each democratic country. Consequently, the people of the whole world demanded that aggression be resisted and democracy defended. They all demanded that another part of the imperialist states, the so-called democratic states of Britain. the United States, and France, intervene against these wars of aggression and that they allow the people to retain a small residue of democracy. The soviet Union made known many times its willingness to establish a united front against aggression with all the so-called democratic states. If these so-called democratic states had intervened at the time against the aggressors; if a war had broken out to check the aggressors; if, for example, they had been able, together with the Soviet Union. to assist the armies of the Spanish government in halting the aggression by Germany and Italy and to assist China in halting the aggression by Japan, such actions. such wars, would have been just, and would have had a progressive character. But these so-called democratic states did not intervene at all; they adopted a policy of "nonintervention." Their aim was to bring about a situation in which the two sides-the side of the aggressors and the side of the victims of aggressionwould be exhausted by war, after which they could come out to intervene and rake in the spoils. The sacrifice of Austria and Czechoslovakia to Germany by Britain and France was in fact made on a basis of give-and-take. That is, the sacrifice was made on condition that Germany attack the Soviet Union. Britain, France, and the United States wanted to provoke a clash between the Soviet Union and Germany, a strategy of murdering people with someone else's hand and of making both sides suffer and neither side gain, which would allow them subsequently to achieve exclusive domination over the whole world. As a result of this "nonintervention" policy of theirs, only one group of imperialist countries was involved in the war, while another group was "sitting on top of the mountain and watching the tigers fight," so the war remained lopsided, partial, and unchecked. The counterrevolutionary policy of "nonintervention" adopted by the bourgeois governments in the democratic countries, which the popular forces were unable to abolish, gave rise to this partial character, which was the first peculiarity of the first stage of the war. (2) Nevertheless, during this period, apart from the circumstance that German, Italian, and Japanese imperialism were waging unjust wars of pillage, and that the socalled democratic states were allowing them to continue, there was a circumstance of another kind, there were also wars of national liberation. These were Abyssinia's war of resistance against Italy, the Spanish Republic's war of resistance against Germany and Italy, and China's great War of Resistance against Japan. Furthermore, the people of the whole world and the socialist Soviet Union have been sincerely supporting these wars. These latter wars are just wars, wars not of plunder but of liberation. Such are the two characteristics of the first stage of the war. The one-sided character of imperialist wars and the existence of anti-imperialist wars have been the two peculiarities of the first stage of the second imperialist war.

/94

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

VI. Our Revolutionary Policy During the First Stage of the War On the basis ofthe peculiarities ofthe first stage of the war, there is not the slightest doubt that the revolutionary policy in this stage has been to set up a united front of the states which have been invaded, in order to resist the onslaughts of the aggressors; to organize increasingly intense antifascist struggles by the popular masses in various democratic countries so as to safeguard democracy; and, at the same time, not to abandon the struggle to organize and develop the joint effort of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries to halt aggression. As regards this last point, namely, the formation of a united front against aggression between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries, even after Munich, because of the anger aroused among the broad masses of the English and French people and even among the left wing of the bourgeoisie by the defeat of Spain and the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, there was a possibility of compelling the Chamberlain and Daladier governments to abandon their policy of nonintervention and to organize, with the Soviet Union, a united front against aggression. This possibility has not yet completely disappeared at the present time. In a word, the overall task ofthe revolution in that period was to draw all possible forces throughout the world into a united front against fascism and aggression in order to check the frenzied invasion by the three fascist countries and to frustrate the fascist attacks from within in various other countries. Consequently, at that time the united front could be formed with the following four possible components: (I) in thecapitalistcountries, the united popular front, the united front of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie; (2) in the colonies and semicolonies, the united national front, the united front of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; (3) the socialist Soviet Union; and (4) the bourgeoisie and its government in the various democratic countries. The last component was still possible at that time because, in the face of the frenzied aggression by the fascist countries, the threat from the internal fascist forces, and the danger that was arising from the opposition to the Soviet Union, the bourgeois classes and their so-called democratic governments in these democratic countries had interests in common to some extent with the people of their own countries, with the people of their colonies and semicolonies, and with the Soviet Union. Of the four components, the Soviet Union was the main force. If the Soviet Union had been successful in forming a genuinely effective united front with all the so-called democratic countries to cooperate with the united fronts of the peoples of various countries and the national united fronts of the colonial and semicolonial countries, it would have been possible to stop further aggression by the fascist countries and put offto a later date the outbreak of the world war. Furthermore, if war had broken out, it would have been possible to defeat all the fascist countries. Had this been done, it would have been truly advantageous to the people of the world, and to all the countries of the world except the aggressors, and it would have been supported by the world proletariat. So the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, concluded two treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, respectively, and finally entered

SEPTEMBER 1939

195

into talks with Britain and France. Such a revolutionary policy was adapted to the world situation of the time and was necessary and correct. That was the only thing to do, and there was no other choice. VII. The Breakdown of the Talks Between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, and the Beginning of the Second Stage The bourgeoisie of the so-called democratic states fears on the one hand that fascist states may violate their interests; but they fear the development of the revolutionary forces even more. They fear the Soviet Union, they fear the liberation movements of the people o(their own countries, they fear the national liberation movements in the colonies and semicolonies. Consequently, they rejected a genuine united front against aggression and a genuine war against aggression involving the participation of the Soviet Union, and instead organized by themselves on their own a counterrevolutionary united front and launched on their own a bandit war of plunder. The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations lasted more than four months, from April 15 to August 23. The Soviet Union, for its pan, had already exercised the utmost patience. Britain and France, on the other hand, refused from beginning to end to recognize the principles of equality and mutual benefit. They simply demanded that the Soviet Union guarantee their security, and yet they refused to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union or of the small countries of the Baltic, thus leaving a breach through which Germany could send its forces. In addition, they would not allow the Soviet army to cross Poland to fight the aggressor. Naturally the Soviet Union was not willing to conclude a treaty like that proposed by Britain and France, which was not at all suited to revolutionary aims, but served only counterrevolutionary aims. What the Soviet Union was prepared to sign was a treaty based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, truly advantageous in halting the expansion of the aggressors and beneficial to the cause of world peace. That was the kind of treaty that Britain and France would never bring themselves to sign. This is the basic reason for the rupture of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. During this period, Germany abandoned its anti-Soviet position and was ready to abandon in practice the so-called "Anti-Comintem Pact"; it recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontier, and so the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was concluded. The absolute lack of sincerity of Britain and France in their negotiations with the Soviet Union, their absolute refusal genuinely to oppose aggression, and their determination to break offthe Three-Power Negotiations, proves nothing less than that Chamberlain had already decided on war. Consequently, if the great war broke out, it was not only Hitler but Chamberlain who wanted to fight, for if he had really wanted to avoid the war, he could certainly have done so only with Soviet panicipation. Even Lloyd George of England, a representative of the bourgeoisie, understood this point. And yet there are some fools who still do not grasp it even today and still believe that Chamberlain's entry into the war was not fully prepared beforehand. They also fail to see that Chamberlain entered into the three-power talks

196 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

solely in order to mobilize public opinion, so that he could declare to the popular masses: We, the British and French governments, have done everything humanly possible but are unable to form an alliance of the three countries, so the only alternative left for us is to declare war on Germany. Under these circumstances, the war between Germany and the three countries of Britain, France, and Poland broke out in the first ten days of September, thus opening a new stage in the second imperialist war-its second stage. VIII. The Peculiarities of the Second Stage of the War At present, now that a great war has broken out, the circumstances have undergone a fundamental change. The distinction that existed in the past between the fascist states and the democratic states has lost all meaning. At the present time, if one wishes to distinguish between things of different natures, there are only the following two categories: (I) all the countries that are waging an imperialist war of pillage, as well as all the countries that are in reality supporting this war, which constitute the first category; and (2) those countries that are waging not wars of pillage but just wars of national liberation and people's liberation, as well as the countries that support these wars, which constitute the second category. Now we must make new distinctions based on the new circumstances and abandon the old way of making distinctions, because things have already changed. The bourgeoisie in democratic countries has finally refused to compromise with the people and the Soviet Union, and has started a war of plunder. Today Britain has already become the most reactionary country in the world, and Chamberlain is already the number one anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, antidemocratic, and antipopular chieftain, the enemy of all small and weak peoples. In these circumstances, all the Communists should understand that the period for winning over the bourgeoisie and its governments in the so-called democratic countries, so as to form a united front with the Soviet Union, the people of various countries, and various colonial and semicolonial states, is already over. Such a possibility no longer exists. The only thing possible today is a united front against war and aggression formed by the Soviet Union with the people of all capitalist countries and all the oppressed nations in colonial and semicolonial countries. At present, the category that is missing is the bourgeoisie of the so-called democratic countries. The fact that this component, after wavering, has finally joined the enemy camp, becoming one of the two parties locked in an imperialist war, constitutes a great change. As a result, the number of components that could possibly make up a united front has been reduced from four to three. This change has led, first, to the transformation of the second imperialist war from a partial to an allembracing conflict (because the reaction has changed from partial to all-embracing). Second, it has caused the components that make up the new united front against war and aggression to be pure, unlike the old ones which were mixed. These are the two peculiarities of the second stage of the war.

SEPTEMBER 1939

197

Many comrades, paying no attention to the changing circumstances and the eculiarities of the new situation, think that things remain what they were. They let fheir thinking remain in the past stage, and they look on the changing situation from the old point of view. They have overlooked the qualitative changes in the new situation, thus falling unconsciously into a wholly erroneous position, into the position of the social democratic parties. I hope that the comrades who have made such mistakes will quickly correct themselves, and I am also persuaded that, having been once reminded, they can correct themselves. IX. Our Revolutionary Policy in the Second Stage of the War What should be the revolutionary policy of the proletariat, and especially of the Communist Party, in the light of the peculiarities of the second stage of the war? In my opinion, it should be as follows: 1. In all the imperialist countries participating in the war, it consists in calling on the people to oppose the imperialist war, unmasking the imperialist nature of the war, treating both sides in the war as bandits of the same ilk. In particular, it means opposing British imperialism, this bandit chieftain, awakening the people so that they will not be deceived by the imperialist bandits, carrying out propaganda among the people in favor of turning the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war, and forming a popular front against the imperialist war. In all belligerent countries, ifthere are places where there are Communist members of the parliament, they should all vote against the war budget, as Comrade [Karl] Liebknecht, leader of the German proletariat, did in his valiant and resolute struggle in the German parliament during the first imperialist war. They must absolutely not vote in support of the war, thus confusing their image with that of the social democrats. For the social democratic parties in these countries, following in the track of the first imperialist war, are shamelessly supporting the war under the slogan of "defending the fatherland" (the fatherland of capitalist bandit gangs). The social democratic party in Japan, that is, the so-called socialist party of the broad masses, has long betrayed the proletariat and given its support to the war of aggression of the Japanese warlords. At present, the social democratic parties in Britain and France, in response to the coercion and inducements of Chamberlain and Daladier, are betraying the proletariat of their own countries and supporting the bandit war of British and French imperialism. The Polish Social Democratic Party is supporting the reactionary bourgeois government of Poland, a running dog in the pay of Chamberlain, and has betrayed the interests of the Polish nation. In Poland they should, without the slightest doubt, mobilize the whole people, and unite with the Soviet Union to resist the aggression of German imperialism, and fight for the defense of Poland and the liberation of the Polish nation. But the fascist government of Poland has, on the contrary, suppressed the national liberation movement in its country, rejected the assistance offered by the Soviet Union, and willingly led the Polish people to become the cannon fodder of British and

198

MAO'S ROAD TO POWF.R

French financial capital, thus willingly turning Poland into a pan of the reactionary battlefront of world financial capital. Though there is no doubt that we have sympathy for the Polish people, we have absolutely no sympathy for the reactionary government of Poland, nor can we tolerate the Polish Social Democratic Pany, which is supporting such a government. Consequently, it is only by exposing the betrayal of the social democratic parties that the Communist parties in all belligerent countries, whether in Germany, Japan, and Italy, or in Britain, France, and Poland, can win over the masses of the people, organize a revolutionary united front, and prepare to use revolutionary war in order to put an end to the counter-

revolutionary war. 2. In all neutral countries, such as the United States, Communist Party members should expose to the people the imperialist policy of the bourgeois government, that is, a policy which calls itself neutral, but in reality aids the war and seeks to enrich itself greatly in the war. The American imperialists, behind the mask of neutrality, have already made a great deal of money at one stroke in the SinoJapanese war of the past two years, and are now again hoping to make money in the new war. Two weeks ago, in my talk on September I, I said that the U.S. bourgeoisie would not go so far for the time being as to abandon democratic politics and normal economic practices at home. I did not expect that, within a very short span of only a few days, it would declare a "partial emergency." In so doing, it is following in the footsteps of Britain and France, and heading step by step toward becoming more reactionary and putting itself on a war footing. The Communist Party must oppose such sham neutrality, which in reality supports the imperialist war. It must oppose the political fascization of these countries, the betrayal by the social democratic parties of these countries, and the involvement ofthese countries in the war, which would lead to unlimited expansion of the war zone. 3. In all the colonial and semicolonial countries, the policy to follow is that of the national united front, either to resist the invader (as in the case of China) or to oppose the metropolitan country (as in the case of India), in order to attain the goal of national independence. It is necessary to oppose the actions by the national traitors at home in betrayal of the national interests before a united front can be created, and the enemy can be defeated. In all the colonies of belligerent countries, we must oppose the actions of the traitors to the nation in selling out and supporting the war waged by the metropolitan country, oppose the mobilization of the people of the colony to participate in the war on the front of the metropolitan country, and remind the people of the colony of their bitter experience during the first imperialist war. In the colonial and semicolonial countries, there can be no hope for the national liberation movement without opposing the traitors to the nation.

X. The Outcome of the War The ongoing war will be a protracted war. I fully agree with Comrade Voroshilov when he said in his speech at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of

SEPTEMBER 1939

199

the Soviet Union, "In the contemporary era, the wars of the future will be protracted and continuous wars of attrition." He also said, "Without a doubt, in the inevitable and unavoidable general military conflict, there will eventually come an unprecedented juncture of life and death importance." His assessment is very correct. This protracted character is determined by the existence of both imperialist wars and anti-imperialist wars, both counterrevolutionary wars and revolutionary wars, by the fact that the war is both continuous and subject to local and temporary cessations, by reorganization and changes in the belligerents, by the destruction and reconstruction of the belligerents. All of these extremely complicated, changing circumstances have determined the protracted nature of the war. The second imperialist world war is an unprecedented disaster for the human race. All over the world. tragic instances of death, sickness, starvation, unemployment, deprivation of education, and broken families with their members separated or dead are rife. There can be no doubt that these circumstances will arouse the oppressed people in all the capitalist countries and the oppressed nations in all the colonial and semicolonial countries, who will awaken, unite, oppose imperialist wars, and organize revolutionary wars, the magnitude of which will far 'exceed that [of such wars] at the time of the First World War. During the First World War, no Communist parties existed except in Russia. Now things are different. Communist parties are to be found in dozens of countries, and have grown strong both politically and organizationally. There was no socialist country at the time of the First World War. Now things are different. The Soviet Union not only exists but has become one of the most powerful countries in the world.lt firmly opposes the imperialist war and resolutely supports people's liberation wars and national liberation wars. In the present war, it will play the great role of safeguarding the interests of mankind and intervening against imperialism. Now the division in the world has become extremely clear. All those elements of the bourgeoisie that are directly or indirectly participating in the imperialist war are reactionaries and make up the reactionary camp. The present imperialist war is a war between two imperialist cliques within this big reactionary camp. The conflict between the two reactionary cliques within this reactionary camp will in no way hinder them from uniting in the future to oppose the Soviet Union, oppose the people's liberation movement in various countries, oppose the national liberation movement in colonial and semicolonial countries, and oppose the world revolution. It would be naive to believe that they will go on fighting each other endlessly and can therefore be easily overthrown by the revolutionary people. That is one side of the matter-the side of the world reactionary front. On the other side are to be found the Soviet Union, the people's

liberation movements in capitalist countries, and the national liberation movements in colonial and semicolonial countries. All of these make up the revolutionary front, the revolutionary camp. Their objective is to overthrow the world reactionary camp, overcome the imperialist war with revolutionary war, topple the chief culprits of the war, overthrow the bourgeoisie, and liberate the oppressed peoples and nations of the world from the oppression of capitalism and from the

200

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

imperialist war. This is a great process of struggle, a process of arduous and protracted combat, and a process in which to educate, awaken, and organize the people and lead them in the struggle against the bourgeoisie. The capitalist economy has already come to its end, and the era of great change and great revolution has already arrived. The present era is a new era of war and revolution, an era in which the entire world of darkness will be transformed into a world of light. We are right in the midst of this era. The Chinese nation, which has been carrying on a War of Resistance Against Japan for two years, is a component part of the camp of world revolution, and an important and powerful part of that camp. The war by 450 million people for national liberation will definitely play a great role in the transformation of the world. The imperialist war is detrimental both to the world and to China, whereas theexistenceand growth of the Soviet Union, ofthe people's liberation movement in various capitalist countries throughout the world, and of the national liberation movement in colonial and semicolonial countries, are all good friends to China and provide dependable assistance to China's War of Resistance. China, the Soviet Union, the people's liberation movements in various countries, and the national liberation movements in various countries should form a firm united front, a revolutionary united front which serves to resist the counterrevolutionary united front. In this respect it can be said that wars between imperialisms, and the mutual weak· ening of imperialisms, constitute a favorable condition for movements of popular

liberation in various countries, for movements of national liberation in various countries, for China's War of Resistance, and for the building of communism in the Soviet Union. Thus we can say that the darkness in the world is only tempo· rary, and the future of the world is bright. Imperialism will surely perish, and the liberation of the oppressed peoples and of the oppressed nations is beyond any doubt. China's future is also bright. Provided only that China's anti-Japanese united front is further consolidated, and as long as we struggle with all our might, under the slogans of persistence in the War of Resistance and opposition to capitulation, persistence in unity and opposition to splits, and persistence in progress and oppo· sition to retrogression, our enemy will also certainly perish, and a new, free, and independent China will emerge!

Mr. Mao Zedong's Interview with Mr. Liu, Correspondent for the Central News Agency, Mr. Geng, Correspondent for Saodang Bao, and Mr. Zhang, Correspondent for Xinmin Bao (September 16, 1939, at 6:00P.M., in Yan'an)

Correspondent: We wish to consult you on a few questions. We have read your statement of September I in today's X in Zhonghua bao; it deals with some of our questions, but there are others on which we would like you to elaborate. Our written questions are divided into three groups, and we would be glad if you would give us your view on each of them. Mao Zedong: I shall deal with them according to your list. First, let us discuss the issue of the War of Resistance. You gentlemen ask if the War of Resistance has reached the stage of stalemate. I think it has in a sense-in the sense that there is a new international situation and that Japan is facing greater difficulties, while China has stood firm against compromise. This does not rule out the possibility that the enemy may still launch fairly big offensive campaigns; for instance, he may attack Beihai, Changsha, or even Xi'an. When we say that the enemy's large-scale strategic offensive and our strategic retreat have in a sense largely come to an end, we do not altogether exclude the possibility of further offensives and retreats. As for the concrete substance of the new stage, it is to prepare for the counteroffensive, and this concept covers everything. That is to say, during the stage of stalemate China must build up all the strength required for the future counteroffensive. To prepare for the counteroffensive does not mean launching it immediately, since it cannot be done unless the conditions are ripe. What we are talking about is the strategic, and not the tactical, counteroffensive. Tactical and partial counteroffensives, such as our repulse of the enemy's "mopping-up" campaigns in southeastern Shanxi, are not only possible but absolutely necessary. But the time has not yet arrived for a large-scale strategic counteroffensive, and we are now in the period of actively preparing for it. In this

This interview was first published in Jiefang, no. 86, October 10, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 49-55, which reproduces this version. 201

202 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

period we shall still have to repulse a certain number of offensive campaigns the enemy may launch at the front. To list the tasks of the new stage, in the enemy's rear we must keep up guerrilla warfare, smash his "mopping-up" campaigns, and defeat his economic aggression; at the front we must strengthen our military defenses and repulse any offensive campaign the enemy may launch; in the great rear area the main thing is to work actively for political reform. All these things constitute the specific content of our preparations for the counteroffensive. Internal political reform is extremely important because at this stage 1 the enemy is mainly carrying on a political offensive, so it is particularly necessary for us to strengthen our political resistance. In other words, the problem of democratic politics must be solved as soon as possible, for only thus can we increase our capacity for political resistance and build up our military strength. China has to rely mainly on our own efforts (ziligengsheng) in the War of Resistance. Although we have spoken of relying on our own efforts in the past, this has become even more important in the new international situation. The essential content of relying on our own efforts is democratic politics. Correspondent: You have just said that democratic politics is essential to winning victory in the War of Resistance by relying on our own efforts. How can such a system be brought into being in the present circumstances? Mao Zedong: The division into the three periods of military rule, political tutelage, and constitutional government was originally proposed by Mr. Sun Yatsen. But in his "Statement on My Departure for the North" issued in the last year of his life,2 he no longer spoke of the three periods, but said instead that a national assembly must be convened in China immediately. This shows that Mr. Sun himself modified his doctrine3 many years ago in the light of changing circumstances. In the grave situation prevailing today, with the War of Resistance going on, both the early convening of a national assembly and the introduction of democratic politics are imperative for truly averting the calamity of national subjugation, and for driving out the enemy. Opinions differ widely on this question. Some say that the common people are ignorant, and democratic politics cannot be introduced. This is wrong. The common people have made very rapid progress in the war and, given leadership and direction, democratic politics can certainly be introduced. For example, it has already been put into practice in North China, even though this has still not been done thoroughly. There most of the heads of districts, townships, and the bao and jia are chosen by popular vote. Even some xian magistrates have been

I. At this stage ..... At present 2. In the las! year of his life ~ Shortly before his death 3. Doctrine...,. Views

SEPTEMBER /939

203

chosen in this way, and progressive gentry' and promising young people have been elected. Questions of this kind should be thrown open to public discussion. In the second group on your list, you raise the question of "guarding against and restricting alien parties," that is, the question of the friction in various localities. You gentlemen are quite right to be concerned about this matter. There has been some improvement recently, but fundamentally the situation remains unchanged. correspondent: Has the Communist Party made its position on this question clear to the Central Goyernment? Mao Zedong: We have already protested. Correspondent: In what form did you raise the question? Mao Zedong: Our Party representative, Comrade Zhou Enlai, wrote a letter to Chairman Chiang as early as July. Then again on August I, people from all walks of life in Yan'an sent a telegram to Chairman Chiang and the National Government, demanding the withdrawal of the "Measures for Guarding Against and Restricting Alien Parties,''5 which had been secretly circulated and which are at the very root of the ufriction" in various places. Correspondent: Has there been any reply from the Central Government? Mao Zedong: There has been no formal reply. But it is said that these things have not actually been given final approval by Chairman Chiang, and there are also many people6 in the Guomindang who disapprove of such "measures." As you know, an army that participates in the common fight against Japan is called a friendly army, not an "alien army," so a political party that participates in the common fight against Japan is a friendly party, not an "alien party." There are many parties and groups taking part in the War of Resistance and, while they vary in strength, they are all fighting in the same cause; they must absolutely unite and must in no circumstances "guard against and restrict" one another. What is an alien party? The party of traitors headed by Wang Jingwei, the running dog of Japan, is an alien party, because it has nothing in common politically with the antiJapanese parties. That is the kind of party which should be guarded against and restricted. Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party there is common

4. Gentry ..... Elements 5. "Measures for Guarding Against and Restricting Alien Parties·· ..... "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" 6. Many people ~ Some people

204

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

political ground, namely resistance to Japanese aggression and establishment of a democratic republic. Therefore, the problem at present is how we can concentrate all our strength to oppose and guard against Japan, and oppose and guard against WangJingwei; it is not a problem of opposing and checking the Communist Party. Slogans can be put forward only on this basis. At present, Wang Jingwei has three slogans: "Oppose Chiang," "Oppose the Communists," and "Be pro-Japanese." He is the common enemy ofthe Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the entire people. But the Communist Party is not the enemy of the Guomindang, nor is the Guomindang the enemy of the Communist Party; they should unite and help each other rather than oppose or "guard against and restrict" each other. The slogans on our side must definitely be different from Wang Jingwei's; they must be the opposite of his and must absolutely never be confused with them. If he wants to oppose Chiang, we must support Chiang; if he wants to oppose the Communists, we must unite with the Communists; and if he wants to be pro-Japanese, we must resist Japan. This was the way the people ofChina acted in the past, and it is the way they should act now and in the foture. Whatever the enemy opposes we should support; whatever the enemy supports we should oppose. In articles nowadays people often quote an old saying from the Eastern Han dynasty. At that time, Zhu Fu, a highranking officer of the Han emperor Guangwu, wrote a letter to Peng Chong, the prefect of Yuyang. The letter contains the words, "Whatever you do, you must be sure that you do not sadden your friends and gladden your enemies."' This statement express a clear-cut political principle which we must never forget. In your list of questions, you gentlemen also ask about the Communist Party's attitude to what has come to be known as "friction." I can tell you frankly that we are fundamentally opposed to such friction between the anti-Japanese parties, which cancels out their strength. But if any party persists in treating us outrageously, tries to bully us, and resorts to repression, the Communist Party will have to take a firm stand in dealing with it. Our attitude is: "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack." As the saying of an ancient Chinese sage goes, "Whot the rules ofpropriety value is .. . reciprocity. If I give a gift, and nothing comes in return, that is contrary to propriety; if the thing comes to me, and I give nothing in return, thor is also contrary to propriety. "8 Our attitude is that we treat people in accordance with propriety. But our stand is strictly one of

7. In the Selected Works version, the substance of the previous three sentences remains the same, but the text has been rewritten in slightly more modem and colloquial form. Zhu Fu' s statement is summarized instead of quoted in the original text, and Emperor Guangwu is referred to by his name, Liu Xiu, instead of by his reign title. 8. The "ancient Chinese sage" referred to is Confucius or, in any case, the Confucian canon, which was frequently cited by Mao at this time. The passage in quotation marks is taken word for word from Volume I, part I of the Liji. We follow here the English version of James Legge, in The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Confucianism. Part III, the Li Ki (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), p. 65. This translation was published as Volume 27 of the series The Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max MUller.

SEPTEMBER /939

205

self-defense; no Communist is permitted to go beyond the principle of self-defense. This is a fact that everyone can see for himself; I need not talk more about it. correspondent: How about the friction in North China? Mao Zedong: Zhang Yinwu and Qin Qirong are the two expert friction-mongers there. Zhang Yinwu in Hebei and Qin Qirong in Shandong are utterly lawless, and their actions are scarcely distinguishable from those of the Chinese traitors.9 They seldom tight the enemy, but frequently attack the Eighth Route Army. There is a mass of indisputable evidence, such as Zhang Yinwu 's orders to his subordinates to attack the Eighth Route Army. We have already sent these materials to Chairman Chiang. Correspondent: Is there any friction with the New Fourth Army? Mao Zedong: Yes, there is. The Pingjiang massacre is a major incident that has shocked the whole country. 10 Correspondent: Some people say that the united front is important, but that the border region government should be abolished for the sake of unification. What do you think of this? Mao Zedong: Nonsense of all sorts is being talked everywhere, and the so-called abolition of the border region is one example of this. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is a democratic anti-Japanese base area and is politically the most progressive region in the whole country. What grounds are there for abolishing it? Moreover, Chairman Chiang long ago recognized the border region, and the Executive Yuan of the National Government officially recognized it as long ago as the winter of the 26th year of the Republic. China does indeed need to be unified, but it must be unified on the basis of the War of Resistance, cohesion,'' and progress. If unification is sought on the opposite basis, China could well perish.

9. Zhang Yinwu ( 1891-1940), a native of Hebei, was a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy. At this time, he held the rank of major general and was chairman of the Hcbei provincial government. Qin Qiyong (1903-1943), a native of Gansu Province, was a graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy. At this time, he was a commissioner in the Shandong provincial government and a leading figure in the Guomindang party apparatus in that province. 10. See above, the text of August I, 1939, on this topic. 11. Here there is a typographical error in the Mao Zedong ji (kunjie instead of tuanjie), which we have corrected on the basis of the text as reproduced in l..un muqian guoji xingshi yu Zhongguo kangzhan (On the Present International Situation and China's War of Resistance) (Chongqing: Xinhua ribao, December 1939), pp. 23-29.

206 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Correspondent: Since there are different interpretations of unification, is there any possibility of a split between the Guomintang and the Communist Party? Mao Zedong: If we are merely talking of possibilities, both unity and a split are possible, and the issue will be determined by the attitudes of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and especially of the people throughout the country. For our part, we Communists have long made it clear that our policy is cooperation and that we not only hope for long-term cooperation but are working hard for it. It is said that at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, Chairman Chiang also declared that domestic problems should not be solved by force. Confronted with a formidable enemy and bearing in mind the experience which both the Guomindang and the Communist Party have had in the past, everyone assuredly wishes to avoid a split. But in order to eliminate completely all possibility of a split, political guarantees must be provided for longterm cooperation, in the form of perseverance in the War of Resistance and the introduction of democratic government. If this can be done, unity can be maintained and a split avoided; it depends on the common effort of the two parties and the whole nation, and the effort must be made. "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation," "Persist in unity and oppose a split," and "Persist in progress and oppose retrogression"-these are the three great political slogans our Party put forward in its Manifesto of July 7 this year. In our opinion, this is the only way China can avoid subjugation and drive out the enemy. There is no other way. (Editor's note: Mr. Mao's talk includes a section concerning the imperialist world war,

which is omitted here since it is more or less the same as his talk on September 1.)

Form a Firm United Front, Defeat Japanese Imperialism (September 18, 1939)

Comrades: Today we are holding a meeting to commemorate the "September 18 Incident." It is already eight years since this incident took place. September 18 is a painful day for us to observe; "September 18" is the day on which the loss of the Three Northeastern Provinces began; "September 18" is the day on which the risk oflosing our entire state began. Formerly, we spoke like this, but many people did not believe us. They thought that the September 18 Incident would lead only to the loss of the Three Northeastern Provinces, not to that of the whole country. They said that the reason why the Japanese imperialists took over the Three Northeastern Provinces on "September 18" was to launch a war against the Soviet Union rather than to fight against China. The occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces was only temporary, and once the two countries had fought, there would be no problem. The Three Northeastern Provinces would be easily regained, or Japan might simply return them to us. There are some people who still think this way. Yesterday the Soviet Union and Japan signed a cease-fire agreement, relating to the border clash between Outer Mongolia and the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Japanese imperialists did not dare to continue to fight and yielded to the Soviet Union, so there could be such a cease-fire agreement. And yet many people simply refuse to consider the matter seriously; instead, they blame the Soviet Union for signing this agreement with Japan and earnestly wish that these other people will fight a big war. This is Chamberlain's view, an idea of watching two tigers fight while they sit on the top of the mountain with folded arms, waiting to reap the benefit, it is an idea of harming others and benefiting oneself. Nevertheless, as far as this is concerned our idea is different from theirs. As soon as the September 18 Incident occurred, we said that the occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces by the Japanese imperialists was their first step to destroy China. Their second step will be to destroy the entire Chinese nation. Now the iron facts have already been placed in front of our eyes, and it has been proved which prediction is correct.

Our source for this text is Dangde wenxian, no. 4, 1995, pp. 20-22. 207

208 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

It is already eight years since the September 18 Incident, and it is two years since the War of Resistance of the whole country began after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, yet China is still wandering along two roads. One is the road of compromise, surrender, split, and retreat. This is the road to the destruction of our state. The other is the road of persistence in the War of Resistance and opposition to surrender, persistence in unity and opposition to splits, persistence in progress and opposition to retreat. This is the road to national revival. Only by taking the second road will we be able to regain all the lost territory, regain the Three Northeastern Provinces, and realize our slogan, "Fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all lost territory." If we take an opposite road, preferring surrender to persistence in the War of Resistance, preferring splits to persistence in unity, preferring backwardness to persistence in progress, we will not be able to fight all the way through to the Yalu River, nor will we be able to regain our lost territory. We will not even be able to fight to the Marco Polo Bridge and Shanhaiguan. We have only one slogan, and that is, "Fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all our lost territory." The Three Northeastern Provinces must be regained. Now there are some people who are opposed to regaining the Three Northeastern Provinces. They will be satisfied merely with regaining Shanhaiguan or the Marco Polo Bridge. What is more, the people who say this are not at all prepared to use their own strength to regain these territories but intend to rely, rather, on foreign countries. They hope that the signers of the Nine-Power Treaty will call a meeting to force Japan to return our lost territory. It will be all right just to return the territory as far as the Marco Polo Bridge; Japan does not have to return the territory north of the Marco Polo Bridge. Is this view correct? No, it is completely wrong. We want to fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all our lost territory! To achieve this goal, we must rely first of all on ourselves. We should absolutely never rely entirely on others. Comrades! Rather than helping China, some countries are helping our enemy, Japanese imperialism. It has already become apparent that Britain is such a country. Britain and Japan are plotting to create a "Far Eastern Munich," they are bargaining with each other in order to carve up China. At present, confronted with the German invasion launched by Hitler in Europe, Britain and France have declared war on Germany. The United States is still looking on. But in the future, the war between the imperialists may stop, and they may unite to attack the Soviet Union, attack the national revolution in China, and attack the people's liberation movement and the national liberation movement in the whole world. Great changes have already taken place in today's world, especially in the past two weeks. That is, the capitalist countries in the whole world under the rule of the reactionary bourgeoisie are already standing on the same front to deal with the world revolution. Although there are problems and contradictions among them, the present war in Europe is the result of the conflict between the German bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie in Britain, the United States, and France. Yet we must know that no matter where these bourgeoisies come from, all blackbirds under the sky are black, they are all reactionary. Therefore, although there are many

SEPTEMBER 1939 209

contradictions among them, as far as dealing with the revolution, they can often achieve counterrevolutionary unanimity. If we want to regain our lost territory and the Three Northeastern Provinces, the comrades from the Northeast should first unite. The comrades from the Northeast should not distinguish among provinces and xian, should not distinguish between those who made revolution first and those who made revolution later. Everyone should unite and form a big group. The comrades from the Northeast, whether they are Communist Party members or comrades from other parties and groups, should all unite together to establish a firm united front. The same applies to the people in all the enemy-occupied areas. Nobo-ly should create disputes; the big enemy is in front of us, we are in danger of lo>ing our state, so how can we still clash about differences of opinion? We have only one enemy-the Japanese imperialists. We have only one objective-to regain all our lost territory. The comrades from the Northeast should first unite closely with the common people in the Northeast, form a united front with their 30 million fellow countrymen in the Northeast, and then unite with the people of all China and form a national united front. The slogan the Communist Party has raised is to persist in the War of Resistance and oppose surrender; persist in unity and oppose splits; persist in progress and oppose retrogression. These three slogans are the three medicines against disease, for some people in China are suffering from very dangerous diseases. They are infected with three serious diseases, namely the disease of surrender, the disease of splits, and the disease of retrogression. We have prepared three kinds of medicines for them. The first is "persist in the War of Resistance and oppose •urrender"; the second is "persist in unity and oppose splits"; the third is "persist m progress and oppose backwardness." This is giving out the prescription according to the disease; once the medicine is taken, the diseases will be gone. It is very good that you comrades support these three slogans. You should go everywhere throughout the country and tell the common people, tell your fathers and mothers, your brothers, and your friends, whether close or distant, about these three slogans. In this way, one tells ten, ten tell a hundred, a hundred tell a thousand, and a thousand tell ten thousand. In this way the message will continue to be propagated, so that the 30 million compatriots in the Northeast and the 450 million compatriots in the whole country will all understand and support these three slogans, and everyone will unite to form a solid united front. All the common people, and all the patriotic elements who participate in the War of Resistance, should be organized into this solid united front. This is the basic force. Consequently, without the united front, there will be no hope of regaining all our lost territory. If we want to regain all our lost territory, we must definitely form a united front. Comrades! When you go out, you should all organize small united fronts. For instance, if you become a teacher you should organize your students and their families into a united front; if you become a company commander, you should organize a united front in your company; if you become a journalist, you should organize all the people around you, including your relatives and friends, into a

210

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

united front. However many people there are, we should organize that number into a united front. These are all called small united fronts. The more such small united fronts we have the better, for with these numerous small united fronts as the basis we can form a big united front. The small united fronts are like the cells in a human body or the bricks in building a house. Just as there can be no human beings without cells, and no houses without bricks, there can be no large united fronts without smaller ones. It is precisely from these numerous small united fronts that the great national united front of 450 million people is formed. This large united front of ours will in turn join the united front of the entire world, to form the biggest united front on a worldwide scale. At present, it is the era of the great world revolution. There are altogether 2 billion people in the world, but there are only about 200 to 300 million reactionaries. The remaining 1.7 to 1.8 billion will form a united front to struggle against those 200 or 300 million. The 200 to 300 million reactionaries have in their hands the army, political power, newspapers, and political parties; their weapons for destroying us are numerous, while our weapons are very few. Nevertheless, we have one thing that we can use to defeat them, which is that we all work as one. At present, however, our hearts are still not united. Consequently, we should form a great united front to oppose those reactionary governments and oppose the bandit war they are fighting. At present, the worldwide united front is in the process of formation. The common people of the whole world are arising to oppose imperialists, to oppose capitalist and bourgeois dictatorship. The outbreak of the present great war has further accelerated the formation of the worldwide united front. The common people of the whole world, the weak and small nations, and the Soviet Union are joining hands to fight against counterrevolution, and this is the worldwide revolutionary united front. If we want to regain all our lost territory, it will be impossible to do so without the help of the worldwide united front. China is a piece of the world and will assuredly never be able to survive if isolated from the rest of the world. Naturally, we do not rely absolutely on foreign countries and on other people, abandoning self-reliance. We continue to depend mainly upon ourselves, and we must still work hard ourselves. We must certainly never be like some people whose eyes are fixed only on the foreigners and are unaware of China's own great strength. Every day they read from the testament ofthe Director General, "We must arouse the popular masses," but they never arouse the popular masses. On the contrary, they oppress the popular masses. They just mouth the words, but do not put them into practice. Is it true that diplomacy is unnecessary once the people in the entire nation have stood up and the united front has been formed? This is also entirely untrue. Of course, it is unnecessary if the diplomacy is to communicate with the imperialists, and participate in an imperialist war, for this kind of diplomacy is harmful to China, and we reject it. In sum, we will oppose anything that hurts China and support everything that benefits China. That is to say, we will adopt a friendly attitude toward whoever helps us and a hostile attitude toward those who aid the enemy.

SEPTEMBER 1939 211

Comrades from the Northeast, you have already been working hard for eight years in the process of organizing this great united front, and you should continue 10 work hard in the future. You should act like Yu the Great. For the sake of the public welfare, "he was eight years away from his home, and though he thrice passed the door of it, he did not enter."' Now you have already been away for eight years and have not once returned home. Comrades, you should still be prepared not to be able to go home for several years. You should be prepared to swear never to go home if the enemy bandits are not wiped out! You should have the spirit of sacri flee, of sacrificing yourselves for the sake of the public good. In what year will you finally be able to go home? We cannot say definitely at present. It is now 1939: we must wage a protracted war, we must continue to fight. Everyone must be resolute, and we must absolutely drive the Japanese bandits out of China! The focus of our work is to organize united fronts-the united front in the Northeast, in all the enemy-occupied territories, in all of China, and in the whole world. Comrades, provided only that we are resolute and act in this way, we are sure to succeed. The Northeast can definitely be regained, and we can definitely fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all our lost territory. By then our forces will be ready, and we will fight all the way back to the Northeast. Comrade Stalin has already prepared a hammer, and he is going to hit the Japanese imperialists on the head. When Japanese imperialism has been defeated, instead of a memorial meeting we will have a celebration meeting. By then, if China is liberated, we will have a meeting to celebrate the liberation of the whole country. At present, every comrade must make great efforts; everyone should study hard and try his best to participate in the national liberation movement. We will not rest a single day until China is victorious!

I. The reference is to the Mencius,lll,l,IV, 7 (Legge, Vol. 2, p. 251). Mao had already used this allusion in his essay of 1917 on physical culture; see Volume I of this edition, p.I20.

Interviews with Edgar Snow (September 24-26, 1939) 1

I. The United Front and Problems of Policy1

Snow: There seems to exist some discrepancy between the Guomindang's description of the political basis ofthe War of Resistance, and the Communist Party's. These interviews were first published by Edgar Snow in the China Weekly Review, January 13 and 20, 1940, under the title "The Chinese Communists and Wars on Two Continents." As Mao states in the second interview, his own secretary took down the proceedings directly in Chinese. It is presumably this record which provided the basis for the text of the first interview, printed from a manuscript in the Central Archives bearing Mao's own corrections, that appears in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 238-46. lbis version is considerably fuller than the published English text. The additional material may have been deleted either by Snow or by

the editors of the China Weekly Review, in order to save space or because it was considered of lesser interest to the Western reader. In any case, we have taken this Chinese version as authoritative and have amended the translation of Mao's remarks accordingly. Words and sentences thus added to the published version are set in italics. Generally speaking, Snow's questions have been left as they appear in the published text, on the assumption that he himself knew best what he had asked, but in a few instances points have been added from the Chinese transcript in order to show what Mao thought he was supposed to be answering. Changes, not specifically noted here, have been made in the orthography of Chinese names and in other minor details to bring the usage into conformity with that in this series, and variants of little substantive interest between the English and Chinese texts have been ignored. In borderline cases, we have avoided tampering with Snow's English version. For example, in order to retain the atmosphere of the period, "Chiang weiyuanzhang" has been left as "Generalissimo Chiang," or simply ''the Generalissimo," rather than replacing this by "Chairman Chiang." Unfortunately, the second interview, dealing with international affairs, is not inc1uded in Mao Zedong wenji. The Chinese text in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 105-23, comprises both interviews, but it is taken from a volume published in China in 1982 which simply translates the 1940 English version back into Chinese. In the case of the second interview, therefore, we have reproduced the text from the China Weekly Review, while correcting a few typographical errors and making minor changes in usage as indicated above. 1. In the China Weekly Review, the two interviews are dated September 25 and September 26, respectively. Mao Zedong wenji dates the first September 24. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 138, gives the same date for the first interview, but, although it alludes briefly to the content of the second interview, it docs not indicate precisely when it took place. Assuming that the first interview, for which an official record is cited, was held on the 24th, the second might have been either on the 25th or on the 26th. The subtitles for the two interviews are taken from the version published in 1940. 2. The main titles of the two interviews are taken from the printed text of these interviews in the China Weekly Review. 212

SEPTEMBER 1939

213

The latter repeatedly emphasizes that the united front is the political basis of the war (see Mao Zedong's "On Protracted War," ''On the New Stage," etc.), while this phrase nowhere plays a role in the Guomindang literature and statements. The Guomindang sees the political basis of the war as the submission of the Communists and all other political groups to the dictatorship of the Guomindang. Thus, in Chongqing I had an interview with General Zhang Qun 3 and asked him his opinion on this point. He said there was no question of a united front at present, that there was only one legal party in China, the Guomindang, and but one legal government, the National Government. The "border region governments" were completely illegal and eventually would be abolished. General Jiang Dingwen4 told me the same thing in Xi'an. He said there was no other legal party in China except the Guomindang. The Communist Party "ceased to exist" after its agreement with the Generalissimo. Therefore there is at present no question of a united front. [The Communist Party had no legal position whatsoever in China].' although the former Communists, as part of the Guomindang army, had a right to maintain offices and depots. Chen Lifu6 last year said practically the same. Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek himself recently told a German correspondent that "there is not a single Communist left in China," which obviously denies the legal existence of the Communist Party, hence the conception of the united front. What is your answer to such statements? Wherein lies the legal foundation of the united front? The legal foundation of the Communist Party? Is it possible to have a nominal united front between two parties when one party denies the existence of the other? Mao: The united front has actually already existed in China for some time. In the minds of the majority of the people, and in their utterances, writings, and actions 3. Zhang Qun (1888-1991) was a native of Sichuan Province. In 1908 he wentto Tokyo to study at the Japanese Military Academy; while there, he joined the Tongmenghui. He returned to China at the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, and, beginning in the 1920s he occupied various posts, first in the Beijing warlord government, and then in the Guomindang. In 1938, he was appointed deputy head of the National Government's Executive Yuan. At this time, he was also head of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of National Defense. 4. Jiang Dingwen (1895-1974), zi Mingsan, was a native ofZhejiang Province. A graduate of the Zhejiang Military Academy, he played an important role at the Huangpu Military Academy from its first session, and there established close links with Chiang Kaishek. In the 1930s, Chiang appointed him to various commands in the war against the Communists. During the Xi'an Incident, he served as intermediary between Xi' an and Nanjing. At this time, he was commander of the Tenth War Zone. 5. This and other passages in square brackets are missing from the Chinese text. 6. Chen Lifu (1900-2001), a native ofZhejiang, obtained a master's degree in mining engineering from the University of Pittsburgh. On returning to China, he became confidential secretary to Chiang Kaishek and. thereafter, thanks to his close links to Chiang, occupied various important posts in the Guomindang party and government. As noted in Volume V, he played a conciliatory role between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party during the Xi'an Incident of 1936.1n 1939, he was head of the Organization Department of the Guomindang and minister of education in the National Government.

214 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

as well, the united front is recognized as something real as well as nominal. But a small minority, though in reality it must perhaps acknowledge the united front, verbally tries to deny it, so that in their utterances and writings there is no such thing as a united front. We used to call these people's attitude Ah Q-ism, because the character Ah Q portrayed in Lu Xun's story always said he was right, was triumphant, whereas others were always wrong, always defeated. From an Ah Qist's viewpoint, there seems to be no united front. If you do not believe that, just refer to Lu Xun's "True Story of Ah Q." There is a small group of people in China who have always very much wanted to be like Hitler, ignoring facts. Everyone knows that Hitler said some time ago that the Soviet Union is only a name, and there is really no such country in the world. But after a while Hitler became more educated and made some progress. On August23, 1939, he suddenly discovered not only the nominal existence ofthe USSR, but the reality of it. (He signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union.E.S.)" Among China's Ah Q-ists I think there are many who may make similar progress. If today they still deny the existence of the united front, and even the existence of the Communist Party, it is quite possible that some day in the future they may recognize the existence in name and in reality of the Communist Party and of the united front. There was a sage long ago in China called Mencius, who once said: "My eyesight is sharp enough to examine a point of autumn hair, but I do not see a wagonload offaggots." 8 These words would very aptly describe today's Ah Q-ists. As for the question of our submission to the dictatorship of the Guomindang, perhaps there are some Guomindang members who believe that and say that, but I consider that they are free to think as they like. Since they eat, sleep, their tongues are in their own mouths, and they have so-called brains, which are unique to higher animals-since they meet all these conditions, they therefore have such a freedom, the freedom to talk nonsense. Personally, I support the democratic principle of Mr. Sun Yatsen, and I will not interfere with this freedom of theirs. In fact, just now I am too busy to bother about it. As for submission, I don't know what the other political groups say, but I know that since the first day of its existence the Communist Party has been entirely independent and has never sacrificed its independence for one day, haifa day, one hour, or one minute. It has never submitted to any party or any group or any person. It is the most difficult thing conceivable to secure such submission/rom the Communist Party.

7. Snow's parenthetical comments, generally signed with his initials. are reproduced here as they appear in the 1940 version. 8. Legge, Vol. 2, pp. 141-42. This is from Book I, part I, "King Hui of Liang." Mencius

is telling the king about the difference between not doing something and not being able to do it. Obviously Mao is implying that the "Ah Q-ists" refuse to see something they have the power to see.

SEPTEMBER 1939

215

ltrustthatthe great majority ofGuomindang members who have a conscience and are sincere would not say all the things you mentioned, because they all understand that the War of Resistance and unity are primary. As for Mr. Chiang Kaishek's having denied the existence of Communists in China, I don't think that can be true. This is because, first, Mr. Chiang is a statesman and possesses not only political common sense, but something more. Second, since Mr. Chiang is the leader of the War of Resistance, he should not have said such a thing. Third, if he really did say that, is it not in contradiction to a former speech? On September9 23, 1937, Mr Chiang made a statement in which he fully recognized the legal status of the Communist Party. Hence I do not believe that it is possible for Mr. Chiang to have made such a statement, since it is lacking in political sense, detrimental to unity and the War of Resistance, and is contradictory to his previous statements. Yet if he did in fact say this,then we have a right to have him correct it. The ancients said: "The faults of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and the moon. He has his faults, and all men see them; he changes again, and all men look up to him.'' 10 If Mr. Chiang really did say such a thing,then he is truly mistaken, and it is a mistake that the entire membership of the Communist Party cannot abide, so we must have him correct it. And yet it is true that the legal position of the Communist Party is nonexistent.11 The Chinese government has never carried out what Mr. Chiang stated on September 23, 1937, which was to give the Communist Party full legality. There is likewise no legal basis given to other parties outside the Communist Party. This simply proves that China is not yet a country with a constitutional government and is not yet a country with a legal system. 12 No wonder all the people 13 in the country want to conclude the "period of tutelage" (under the Guomindang) 14 and institute constitutional government. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region 1' has been recognized personally by Mr. Chiang several times in front of the Communist Party's representative, Comrade Zhou Enlai, at the time of the 1936 Xi'an Incident and in the spring and summer of 1937. In the winter of 1937 the Executive Yuan of the National

9. Snow's text has "December" here; this is an obvious error. 10. Analects, Book XIX, Chapter 21. translated in Legge, Vol. I, p. 346. Mao cited this same passage in 1959, after the Lushan Conference, in urging his comrades to recognize their mistakes and correct them. See his speech of September I l, 1959, inS. Schram (ed.). Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1974), pp. 153-54. I I. Instead of "nonexistent," the 1940 text has "really very incompletely realized." 12. Snow's text in the Review here includes the words "democratic" and "united" to describe what China is not. 13. Snow's text adds "and parties" here. 14. According to Sun Yatsen's theory, a period of tutelage (under the Guomindang, as indicated by Snow's parenthetical note) would be required to prepare the people of China for democracy and constitutional government. 15. The 1940 version has "Border Government" instead of "border region."

216

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Government formally ratified [legislation giving it a legal position). The fact that it has not yet been promulgated and that the appointment of officials for the border regions has not yet been approved mere! y proves that the Executive Yuan's standard of efficiency must be far too low and that bureaucratism in the Chinese government is truly very serious. No wonder the people of the whole country are demanding the thorough reform of administrative organs. 16 The situation should be improved. Snow: China's foreign policy emphasizes that China's struggle is on the side of democracy, and against fascism, and that China belongs in the ranks of the democratic powers. Is there, then, any basis for such a claim that China is a democratic country? Has China made any progress toward democracy since the war began? Have the people gained any political power? Here I don't refer to conditions in the border regions or in the guerrilla areas, but to that part of Free China 17 under the direct control of the Central Government. Mao: There is one basis for such a claim, which is the official name of our state. Do not the people of various countries call us Zhonghua minguo-the Chinese Republic? I think that this is the only basis for the claim. But if we refer the claim to reality it is obviously not true. China today is an undemocratic country. Mr. Sun Yatsen's principle of democracy has existed for decades now, but so far it has not been realized. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the country want to see it realized, and some day it probably will be realized. When that happens there will be another basis for the claim. I hope this claim will be added, because not only would it be advantageous for diplomatic discussion, but, most important, it would facilitate the War of Resistance. Snow: If China has not made any progress toward democracy during the war, 18 what change has actually taken place in the character of the Central Government? Is it not still an exclusively Guomindang dictatorship? Mao: There have been some changes in [the government's] policies, [if not in the government itself]. They have stopped fighting a civil war and have begun to fight

16. With regard to the previous two sentences, there are major discrepancies between the Chinese version and Snow's published interview. The second sentence does not appear in Snow's text. The beginning of the first one, in Snow's version, becomes the following two sentences: "Why was such a bill ever promulgated and why did the Central Government approve the appointment of officials for the Border Government, if both are illegal? Such confusion on the part of high officials merely suggests that their standard of efficiency is really too low."

17. The Chinese text refers here to "territories not under enemy occupation," rather than to "Free China." 18. The Chinese text omits the preceding clause.

SEPTEMBER 1939

217

Japan. This is a change in policy. But as regards other policies, such as those referring to democracy and people's livelihood, there have been no changes. Therefore people throughout the country are now fervently demanding the realization of the principles of democracy and people's livelihood. We cannot say that there has been any organic change in the government. It is still a one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang. This dictatorship has aroused discontent in the whole nation, and it is a condition which must be changed. During the recent session of the People's Political Council in Chongqing, Mr. Chiang said in his opening speech that all talented people should be mobilized, 19 and the Political Council passed a resolution proposing that the "period of tutelage" be brought to an end and that constitutional government be established. This is good news. The people all over China are now very anxious about all this, because if China's domestic politics are not reformed and democracy is not realized, then not only will it be impossible to defeat Japan but China will surely be dismembered. Snow: (During another conversation I asked Mao whether the Communists would actually participate in a coalition government if they were offered any cabinet posts. I said I had been told that in 1938, when the government was at Hankou, one or two minor cabinet posts had been offered to the Communists, but that they had declined. It was said that the Communists did not want to take part in a coalition government because they were afraid the foreign powers might not approve of such a development, it would frighten wavering Chinese elements into the camp of compromise and defeatism, and the Communists did not want to assume any responsibility in a government in which they could not control policy. Mao Zedong denied that any cabinet posts had ever been offered the Communists. He said that if any such proposal were made, the Communist Party would be glad to participate.) Have any changes occurred in the class basis of the Chinese government as a result of the war? Mao: In my view there have been some partial changes. The richest people along the seacoast and [in the cities) along the Yangzi River have mostly become Chinese traitors and semitraitors. This group finds representation in Wang Jingwei. People of this class can no longer be relied upon to support the government. The basis of a government for the War of Resistance should mainly rest upon, and will eventually have to rest upon, the middle class and the vast peasantry, because only these classes are the great force maintaining the War of Resistance. Snow: Do you mean that the government actually represents the middle class and the peasantry more than it did forrnerly?20

19. Snow's text adds here, ''regardless of party affiliations, to work for the country." 20. The Chinese version adds here: "and that there are fewer capitalists represented."

218 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Mao: I am saying that reliance should be placed upon these two classes, not thqt it already has been placed upon them. I am talking about the future of the gove,.,._ ment and not its present condition. Snow: Has there been a change in the classes represented by the government? Mao: No, there has not been such a change. Snow: Does the present government represent the landlords and the bourgeoisie? Mao: Yes. The present government is still on the whole representative of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, but many representatives of these classes have already fled. Snow: Then what do they represent? Mao: In the sense of its anti-Japanese war policy, the foundation has mainly been placed upon the middle class and the vast peasantry, and these classes are already represented, but with regard to policies concerning democracy and livelihood, this

has not yet been the case. 21 Snow: Because the Communist Party has abandoned propaganda emphasizing class conflict, abolished its soviets, submitted to the leadership of the Guomindang and the Guomindang government, adopted the Three People's Principles, ceased confiscating the property of landlords and capitalists,22 and stopped organizational work and propaganda in the Guomindang areas, many people now assert that Chinese Communists are in fact no longer social revolutionaries but mere reformists-bourgeois in methods and in aims. How do you answer such claims? Do you not still maintain that the Chinese revolution is anti-imperialist and antifeudal, with the possibility of transformation, at a certain stage, into socialist revolution and that the responsibility ofthe Communist Party is to lead the nation toward that

revolution? Mao: We are always social revolutionaries; we are never reformists. There are two main objectives in the thesis of the Chinese revolution. The first consists of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie together bringing about a national democratic revolution. We are now in the midst ofachieving this pan, and we are determined to do a thorough job of it. But the thesis has a second part, which consists of the proletariat leading the peasantry in carrying out socialist revolution. This, too, 21. The last four pairs of comments are greatly condensed and presented as a single question and answer in Snow's version. 22. Here the Chinese version has: "ceased confiscating the land of landlords,"

SEPTEMBER 1939 219

ust be achieved, and completely achieved. For the present the revolution is namonal democratic in character, but after it has developed to a certain stage it will ~e transformed into socialist revolution. The present "becoming" of the social revolutionary part in the thesis of the Chinese revolution will turn into its "being"-unless our work in the present phase is a failure, in which case there is no early possibility of social revolution. Snow: Has China also the possibility of developing, before or after the completion of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution, toward fascist dictatorship? Are fascist groups in China increasing or decreasing in strength? Mao: There is no possibility of a fascist dictatorship developing in China. Half the country is already colonized, and the other half is menaced by the same fate. The Chinese economy is still mostly semifeudal in character. These are the reasons that our fascist dreamers have no future. If, in the past, we inaptly and misleadingly described a certain Chinese political organization as "fascist," and if we now refer to that force, we can see that it is weakening, not strengthening. It is very obvious that in such a country as China, anyone who tries to create fascism is destined to break his own neck. 23 Snow: The Communist Party claims to hold hegemony over the workers and peasants of China. Aside from the leadership of the peasants in the border regions, and the leadership of the Red Army, which has some proletarian elements, how does the Communist Party in actual practice assert its leadership over the industrial proletariat of China-SO to 90 percent of which is now dwelling in places held by Japanese imperialists? In what way is the Communist Party educating both peasants and proletariat to be conscious of the present anti-Japanese and antifeudal aims of the revolution? Mao: The Communist Party's claim to leadership over the workers and peasants is of two kinds, political and organizational. For example, in places such as the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and in the guerrilla districts in North China under the Eighth Route Army, we possess not only political leadership, but organizational hegemony over the workers and peasants. Elsewhere, wherever there is a Communist Party organization, all peasants and workers who subscribe to the Communist Party main principles are following the Communist Party's political leadership. Where they have already been organized there is organizational lead· ership as well.

1 2.3. Instead of this last sentence, Snow's version has the following two: "But it is miseadmg to apply the tenn 'fascist' to such a force, for China is fundamentally too weak (in economic development) to support a fascist movement Those who imagine otherwise, and try to create 'fascism' in China, are destined finaily to break their necks."

220 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

(Under this logic it is evident that the Communists consider all the armed forces participating in the anti-Japanese war as under their influence, since resistance is the central demand of the Communist Party in the present stage of the revolution. Other people would quickly deny this and call it wishful thinking; but it is the logic which enables the Communists to endure other restrictions on their activity. As long as resistance continues, they believe, revolutionary struggle continues, and consequently the period of "transformation" draws nearer.-E.S.)24 Education of workers and peasants to understand the need to fight Japan and oppose the forces of the Chinese traitors is being done by Communist Parry members orally, in writing, and mainly through the Parry's actions in resisting Japan. 2S Snow: Do you think the War of Resistance thus far has strengthened or weakened the feudal elements in China? Just where, in the present Communist program, are the antifeudal aims of the revolution expressed? Are they being realized anywhere outside the border regions? Is it possible to win the war unless the antifeudal program of the revolution is simultaneously carried out on a national scale?26 Mao: Here what I must say first is that in the present stage of the Chinese revolution the problem of primary importance is resistance to Japanese imperialism. Antifeudal tasks may [for a while] have to be subordinated to the major antiJapanese issue. Our antifeudal program [in this period] consists of demands for nationwide democracy and the improvement of people's livelihood by such measures as the elimination ofexorbitant taxes and levies and the reduction of rent and loan interest. There is a nationwide democratic movement growingly widespread among not only workers and peasants but also among the petty bourgeoisie such as large numbers of intellectuals, students and other youths, cultural workers, progressive thinkers, statesmen, scientists, military men, and so on. The obstacle that confronts this movement is an archaic political system that has impeded its development. Therefore, changing that political system (without endangering resistance) is an important task. Without a doubt, unless it is changed, and unless democ·

24. This note by Snow does not, of course, appear in the Chinese version. 25. In Snow's text, the preceding paragraph reads as follows: "You ask how the Com-

munists are educating the workers and peasants (in non-Communist areas) to tight against Japan and against feudalism. Something can be done, and is being done, by propaganda.

Much is done through the organization of anti-Japanese activities, through which aJso the people can come to understand the necessity for the overthrow of feudalism." 26. Here the Chinese version adds the following sentence to Snow's question: "Since it is not even possible for the peasants to organize themselves to resist Japan-to say nothing of meeting the demands of refonning the countryside--could the antifeuda1 task of the revolution be realized in the midst of the war?"

racy is realized, there can be no victory in tbe anti-Japanese war (italics mineE.S.). 27Resistance and democracy are the two edges of a single sword. Some people pretend to support resistance but to reject the principle of democracy. In reality they do not want the anti-Japanese struggle to succeed but, rather, wan/to drag it toward failure. 28 Snow: In China some of the capitalists have fled to Wang Jingwei's side. This means that China's national bourgeoisie and compradore class no longer makes

up the government's main component. Under such circumstances, the government has already lost the force upon which to rely, so why has it continued to represent these classes for such a relatively long period of time, and why has it not raised the organizational position of the workers and peasants? Mao: This is being stubborn. The class basis has changed, bur the government's organizational structure still has not changed. Because these people will try to hold out in their positions, draw their salaries, and not let others in. Therefore changing the organizational structure ofthe government requires a process, and it cannot be achieved overnight. II. International Questions (September 26, 1939) Snow: After the signature of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact there were fears in Chongqing that it might be followed by a Russo-Japanese nonaggression pact. The USSR did at one time urge Japan to sign such a pact. Do you consider it a possibility at present? If no, why is it impossible? Mao: If such a pact would hinder the support of the USSR for China, then it would not be signed. Under the condition that it would not interfere with that support, however, it could be signed without harmful effects. The Soviet Union has interests in common with the world liberation movement and also with the national semicolonial and colonial revolution. The Soviet Union will not sign a pact which is disadvantageous to those movements.

27. In the Weekly Review version, this sentence is italicized for emphasis. To avoid confusion with the use of italics for variants, we have set it in boldface here. 28. In Snow's version, these two sentences read: "In reality they do not want to use either edge of the sword. They are dragging the anti-imperialist struggle toward failure." The text of this interview as published in the China Weekly Review ends here; the next question and answer do not appear in it.

222

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Snow: I read your comment on the signature of the Soviet-German pact. You seem to think it unlikely that the Soviet Union can be drawn into the European War .... Do you think the USSR would remain neutral, as long as it is not attacked, even if Nazi Germany appears to be near victory? Mao: The Soviet Union will not participate in this war, because both sides are imperialists, and it is simply a robber war with justice on neither side. Both sides are struggling for the balance of power and rule over the peoples of the world. Both are wrong, and the Soviet Union will not become involved in this kind of war, but will remain neutral. But the Soviet Union will not adopt a neutral policy in all wars. In the case of righteous wars of liberation it will not remain neutral. This has consistently been the Soviet policy for twenty years. For example, the Soviet Union supported the Republican Army of Spain. From 1937 till now it helped China in the anti-Japanese war. The movement of Russian troops into Poland on September 17 was also for the purpose of liberating the Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples. The Soviet Union will support national liberation movements in colonial and semicolonial countries and it will support people's (social revolutionary) movements in capitalist countries whenever they rise. It will support revolutionary warfare but remain neutral in purely counterrevolutionary wars. As for the outcome of the present European war, the Soviet Union cannot be frightened by the threat of the victorious power to herself, whether it is England or Germany. Whenever the Soviet Union is attacked, it will have the support of the people of various countries and of the national minorities in colonial and semicolonial countries. The center of the anti-Soviet movement today is no longer Nazi Germany. It is among the so-called democratic countries, with Great Britain in the lead. Under Chamberlain's leadership the governments of the so-called democratic countries are organizing a vast front which aspires to involve Italy and Japan. With this they expect first to defeat Germany, and then to attack the Soviet Union. The present international situation has undergone profound changes. Snow: I understand you to mean that you see no difference between fascism and the cause of the democracies of England and France? Mao: No, there is no difference in their positions in this war. Chamberlain is organizing a world front with which to surround the Soviet Union, anti-Japanese China, and Germany. His purpose is to stop the war in China, overthrow Hitler, and isolate the Soviet Union, so that it will be convenient to organize an antiSoviet drive later on. Chamberlain, as the leader of reactionary international capitalism, understands that if he does not act in that way the anti-Japanese war can achieve victory. Germany can recover her colonies, India can win her independence, and his own rule and that of his colleagues will collapse.

SEPTEMBER 1939 223

Snow: That seems a rather large order for Mr. Chamberlain. I wonder if you mean that, while fighting Germany, Chamberlain's real attention is centered upon the destruction of Russia? It appears to me that Chamberlain has got his hands full with Hitler for the present, without planning an even larger war against Russia. Would it not be logical for him to try to win Russia's friendship, if possible, in order to beat Hitler, even if he does have some designs on Stalin in the future? Do you mean that he formerly dreamed of diverting Hitler's attack toward the East, or that he is actively planning it now, or that he hopes to consummate such a front out of the present war? Mao: He formerly dreamed of it, he actually plans it now, and he hopes to realize it later. Why? Because in front of Chamberlain there is not only the problem of Hitler, but also the problem of revolt in India, and among people in his own country, while the Soviet Union is the supporter of the colonial revolutions and the people's (revolutionary) movement in capitalist countries themselves. Hence Roosevelt also sympathizes with Chamberlain. Snow: What effect will the European war have upon Japan's strategy in Eastern Asia and Japan's foreign policy? Mao: Japan will utilize the European war for two purposes. The first is to intensify her invasion of China, and the second is to extend her aggression to the South Sea Islands. First of all, however, she must destroy China, and she will concentrate her main attention on that task, for the present. She will not take part in the European war. By remaining a nonparticipant she can continue to trade with France and Britain and America, and perhaps also borrow money from them. Without foreign trade and loans it will be difficult for Japan to overcome China. Germany is quite busy with her own affair in Europe at present, and can no longer look after Japan. The Soviet Union has little trade with Japan; furthermore she will not loan one copperto Japan. The question is whether Britain, France, and America will help Japan to destroy China, and it is a very grave question. The second Japanese objective during the European war involves ambitious hopes indeed. But whether or not Britain, France, and America are defeated in Europe, Japan will concentrate her fleet in the south. At that time a Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies will become a possibility, because they are an intermediate point between frontal Anglo-Japanese conflict, being a sphere of important British influence but not a British colony. Japanese militarists find the Dutch Indies very attractive, with abundant natural resources and a large population. If Great Britain, France, and the U.S.A. adopt a policy which helps Japan and makes it possible for her to achieve victory over China, they will simply be arming Japan for a future attack in which they themselves will be the target. Japan hopes to get rich in this world war. Roosevelt is also hoping to get rich. Roosevelt wants to win leadership in the capitalist world. He wants Chamberlain

224

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

for a secretary and Japan for part of his guard, his rearguard-with Hitler and Mussolini in the vanguard. But he shakes his head sadly at Stalin and says that Stalin is not useful to him. Snow: Would you say that the war in Europe is likely to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the Sino-Japanese struggle, then? Mao: If Britain, France, and the U.S.A. carry out a policy which gives material help to Japan it may have a decisive effect. ... Otherwise, by relying mainly upon herself, and the principle of self-sufficiency, China can and should defeat Japan during this period of world war and chaos. Snow: Obviously the European war must greatly weaken the position of Britain and France in China. That means, perhaps, the weakening of both Anglo-French resistance to Japan, and Anglo-French assistance to China. Where China's dependence on foreign powers is concerned, therefore, the role of Soviet help is enormously increased, and in particular the Northwest route of supplies becomes more important. Likewise Soviet policy toward Japan in Siberia and Outer Mongolia. Is Soviet help to China likely to be enlarged to a degree sufficient to compensate for the weakening of Anglo-French assistance? Mao: If China continues determinedly to resist, and cooperates closely with the Soviet Union, the latter's help will not only compensate for diminishing AngloFrench assistance, but will far surpass it in importance. Fundamentally, Britain and France have not been "helping" China. Their policy is simply one of noninterference with the war, thus far, but not one of positive assistance to China. Snow: In this connection, is it possible that this greater Soviet help to China's liberation movement may take a form somewhat similar to what you called Soviet aid to the Belorussian and Ukrainian liberation movements? There is, for example, a powerful anti-Japanese national liberation movement in Manchuria, and there are similar liberation movements in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Is it possible that the Soviet Union may give these liberation movements help by sending in armed anti-Japanese expeditions? Mao: According to Leninism such a possibility exists.... But the fundamental question is whether the Chinese fight for themselves. Snow: With the Soviet occupation of Poland, by agreement with Nazi Germany, Russia appears to be cooperating with the totalitarian Axis in the partitioning of weaker states. That will certainly be a widely expressed view. In any case, the new Soviet policy means the collapse of the so-called United Front of the democratic countries (including the USSR) against Fascism. How will this affect the political

SEPTEMBER 1939

225

slogans of China's war against Japan? Until now China has appealed for the support of the capitalist democracies against totalitarian Japan. Do the past slogans of Chinese diplomacy now lose their validity? Mao: With the outbreak of the European war, world political relations underwent profound changes. Germany gave up her anti-Soviet and anti-Comintern (sic!j29 policy. On the other hand, the so-called democratic countries began to utilize war to bring an end to democracy. These so-called democratic countries became the center of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, antidemocratic, and anti popular movements and the enemy of the colonial and semicolonial people's movements. Germany and England are both imperialist countries. Both the fascist countries and the so-called democracy England are robber imperialists. The war between them is an imperialist war, waged against the will oftheir own peoples, and against the will of the people of the USSR. The center of world reaction now lies in England. Chamberlain is the world's Public Enemy No. I. Formerly the Soviet Union, and the Communist parties of all nations, made great efforts to win over Chamberlain, and induce him to resist fascism, in cooperation with the USSR. But the reactionary governments of the capitalist class in the so-called democracies, with Chamberlain in the foreground, finally rejected these offers, refused to cooperate with the USSR, and as a result the second imperialist war was enlarged. Chamberlain was never sincere in opening Anglo-Russian negotiations. He was determined that the talks should lead nowhere. In this way he chose war, rather than peace, for it was obvious that, if the Soviet Union were excluded from cooperation, there could be no guarantee of peace. Even Lloyd George, a great spokesman for the capitalist class, recognized that. Meanwhile Germany took advantage of Chamberlain's policy, abandoned its anti-Comintern stand, and made a nonaggression pact with the USSR. That changed the face of the whole situation. With the liquidation of the Nazi anti-Soviet, antiComintern policy, the distinction formerly drawn between fascist and democratic capitalist countries lost its validity, and no longer serves as a political measurement. The period of attempting to win over the capitalist class and its governments to form a United Front with the USSR becomes a thing of the past. A new standard is necessary to distinguish between various countries, based upon a new situation. How shall we classify them? In one category belong those countries which carry on, or help to carry on, or really openly and positively support, unjust and robber imperialist wars. In a second category belong those countries which support popular liberation wars. The

29. The parenthetical remark sic! appears in the text as published, and also in Snow's manuscript. Its appearance here is puzzling. The Anti-Comintem Treaty of November 1936 between Germany and Japan was, after all, a fact of international life prior to 1939.

226

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

policy of Communist parties in different countries must be changed accordingly, for the policy followed until now has become inadequate. Under the new situation, the possible participants in a worldwide revolutionary United Front can no longer include the capitalist class in the so-called democracies. This class has already become the enemy of the oppressed nations. Such a revolutionary united front must now consist of the following elements: (I) the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries; (2) anti-imperialist elements in the semicolonial and colonial countries, including the proletariat and sections of capitalists; (3) the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. In a speech on September 14, I said that the imperialist war had already entered a new stage, distinguished by two characteristics. First, it had changed from onesided war into universal war. (A reference to Stalin's description of the second imperialist war, contained in his speech before the Communist Party Plenum last March.-E.S.) Second, the organizational makeup of the world revolutionary front has changed from the complex to the simple. The present slogans of world revolution become these: oppose imperialist war; destroy counterrevolutionary war; support the people's revolutionary war by means of revolutionary war; support the people's revolutionary wars in colonial and semicolonial countries. These can be similarly applied in all countries, including both fascist and so-called democratic countries which utilize war as a means of achieving fascism. China's anti-Japanese war is part of the world revolutionary front. The anti-Japanese United Front in China helps the people's front in capitalist countries, and the national revolutionary united front in colonial and semicolonial countries everywhere helps the people's front in capitalist countries, and such help is reciprocal. (Here I interrupted to ask Mao why, if Germany was imperialist and no different from Britain and France, the Soviet Union should participate in Germany's imperialist adventure to the extent of making available to Germany Russia's great reserves of wheat, oil, and other war materials. Why, incidentally, did Russia continue to lease oil lands to Japan in Sakhalin, or to give Japan fishing rights. The latter were of great value in enabling Japan to export large quantities of fish, and thus establish foreign credits with which to buy munitions and carry on a "robber imperialist" war against the "national liberation movement" of"semicolonial China." (Mao replied that it was an extremely complicated question, and could not be answered until one saw the end of the policy. The conditions under which the Soviet Union sells oil to Japan were not clear to him. In any case, the Soviet Union was supplying neither Germany nor Japan with any war instruments, and to maintain ordinary trade did not make her a participant in the war. (I asked whether there was much difference, in modem war, between supplying a belligerent with tanks or airplanes, and supplying the tanks and planes themselves. Why was the United States a participant in Japan's imperialist invasion of China, because she sold Japan the raw materials of war, but the Soviet Union not a

participant in Germany's imperialist war in Europe. nor Japan's war in Asia, when she supplied the same kind of materials to the two combatants?

SEPTEMBER /939

227

(Mao chuckled and admitted that the distinction between trade in war materials and trade in war instruments was not great. What mattered, he said, was whether the country in question was really supporting imperialist war as a matter of policy, or whether it was supporting revolutionary wars of liberation. In that judgment there was no question where the USSR stood. She had given positive support to revolutionary wars in China, in 1925-27, in Spain, and in China at present. The Soviet Union would always be on the side of just revolutionary wars but would not take sides in imperialist war, though she might maintain ordinary trade with all belligerents. (I suggested that, since it was a question "off the record," I would not publish his comment. He replied that he had no objection; it had all been taken down by his own secretary, and was "on the record" as far as he was concerned. So I have included a summary of it here.-E.S.) Concerning the question of Poland, it is necessary to look at it from several different angles, from the standpoint of the German, British, French, and Polish governments; and from the standpoint of the Polish people, and finally from the Soviet Union's viewpoint. German aggression in Poland is purely imperialistic, a war waged for the purpose of robbing and plundering the Polish people. Strategically Poland represents the Anglo-French front, and in striking it Hitler destroys one wing of that front. Naturally we are opposed to such a war. For Britain and France, Poland was an object of plunder for finance capital. It was for the purpose of utilizing Poland to resist Hitler's attempt to redivide the spoils of imperialism that Britain and France encouraged Poland to act as part of their imperialist front. Since that was the objective condition of Anglo-French participation in the war involving Poland, it is an imperialist position and should not be supported. Poland itself had a semi fascist government, ruled by the reactionary Polish capitalist class. It mercilessly exploited the workers and peasants among the Polish population. It mercilessly suppressed the Polish democrats and progressives. At the same time, its Pan-Polish policy resulted in the oppression of large national minorities within Poland's boundaries, including 8,000,000 Belorussians, 3,000,000 Ukrainians, and 500,000 Germans. Its policy toward these minorities was imperialistic. The Polish government, acting under instructions of British finance capital, willingly mobilized its population for gun fodder. It willingly acted as an organic part of the reactionary front of international finance capital, which does not represent the interests of the Polish people. For twenty years the Polish government remained consistently hostile to the Soviet Union. During the Anglo-Russian talks it rejected the aid of the Soviet Union. It revealed its incompetence when, after but two weeks, it buried itself under the iron heel of Hitler. A million and a half Polish troops could not survive a single blow, and exposed Poland's population to Nazi persecution. At Madrid the poorly equipped Spanish militia was able to hold a front for two years, but the Polish government's forces were destroyed in two weeks! In China the Eighth

228 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Route Army has defended its Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar war area for two years against Japan, but Poland had no "Wutai" (Wutai shan, the mountainous base of the Communist troops in northern Shanxi) and no Eighth Route Army. All this weakness clearly indicates the incompetence and wickedness of the Polish government. We should waste no tears over imperialistic Poland. Finally, concerning the Soviet Union. The Nazi invasion of Poland presented the Soviet Union with the problem: whether to permit the whole Polish population to fall victim to Nazi persecution, or whether to liberate national minorities of Eastern Poland. The Soviet Union chose to follow the second course of action. In Eastern Poland there is a vast stretch of territory inhabited by 8 million Belorussians and 3 million Ukrainians. This territory was forcibly seized from the young socialist soviet republics as the price of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and fell under the domination ofthe reactionary Polish government. Today the Soviet Union, no longer weak and young, takes back its own and liberates them. News dispatches from the front describe the welcome which the minorities of Poland are giving to the Red Army. The people carry food and beverages to the Red troops, hail and embrace them, and cheer them as saviors. There is no such news from places occupied by German and French troops. This shows that the war of the Soviet Union in this case is a just war, and in the interest of liberating national minorities and oppressed peoples.

Snow: But Domei reports much the same sort of hearty welcome wherever its Army takes the New Order to East Asia. I dare say the German press is telling the German public about the enthusiasm with which its bombs were received in Poland also. It is customary in these days for a conquered people not only to submit, but to congratulate their conquerors.

Mao: (laughing) Nobody believes Domei reports, and though I have not seen any German claims of a welcome in Poland I am sure nobody would believe them, if made. In the case of reports about the welcome given Soviet troops, there are independent observers there who can see for themselves whether or not they are true ....

In conclusion, it should be noted that the main problem now facing the Soviet Union is the attempt made by Chamberlain to realize his old policy. On the one hand, he is blockading Germany and putting immense pressure on Germany's western front. On the other hand, he is attempting to buy off Italy and Japan, and to appease Germany. By presenting Hitler with Hungary and Rumania, in exchange for the abrogation of the Soviet-German Pact, he hopes to turn German rifles toward the East. Those aims of Chamberlainism not only exist at present but will continue to exist in the future. Soviet occupation of Poland is for the purpose of liberating the Belorussians and Ukrainians, and recovering the territory of the Union, but it is also a concrete method of consolidating the German-Soviet Pact, and frustrating

SEPTEMBER /939

229

the schemes of Chamberlain. Recent news indicates that the policy has achieved very great success. 30 On another occasion I asked Mao whether, in his opinion, Russia's occupation of Poland was primarily justified by strategic-military necessity or political necessity. Mao seemed to think that the governing factor was strategic necessity, but that the move was partly military and partly political. The political side was not related directly to the world condition of the revolutionary movement but to the Soviet Union's historic relations with Eastern Poland. The Soviet-German Pact, on the other hand, was not political but a strategic-military necessity. Stalin wanted it in order to block Chamberlain's effort to build a coalition against Russia. Mao claimed that Chamberlain had clearly indicated to Hitler that he had to make a choice between fighting Russia or fighting England. If Hitler attacked Russia, Chamberlain was prepared to tolerate his occupation of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states. If not, he would use Poland to oppose Hitler. Stalin was then compelled to seek his own agreement with Hitler. I suggested to Mao that the Soviet policy was bound to produce its own dialectical reaction, and quite possibly would strengthen Hitler to a degree which might represent a real menace to the USSR. The immediate effect of Soviet policy would be greatly to weaken Communist parties in England, France, and America, driving away from them especially the liberal petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and throwing great confusion into the ranks of the working class itself. If the C.P. opposed the war it would be suppressed-as it had already been in France. All peripheral leftwing groups who actively opposed the war would also be suppressed. Such a development would strengthen reactionary and conservative elements. Fascist dictatorial methods, under the guise of war mobilization necessities, would quickly spread. The paralyzing of this vanguard element would greatly weaken the opposition to appeasement efforts on the part of Chamberlain and Daladier in seeking a bargain with Hitler, and the chances for a future anti-Soviet combination might considerably improve. The transformation of the imperialist war into a united imperialist attack on the USSR was thus conceivably rendered possible by the present Soviet-German Pact. Mao disagreed. He believed the Pact guaranteed Soviet Russia the security it needs against German attack. "Hitler is in Stalin's pocket," he said. So all is well-unless it turns out that there is a hole in Stalin's pocket.

30. This is the end of the September 26 interview. Snow's concluding remarks follow. Nothing is known about the "other occasion" when Snow discussed these matters with Mao.

Letter Regarding Industrial Cooperatives (Yan'an, September 25, 1939)

Bishop Hall, Chairman Chen Han-seng, Secretary, International Committee, The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Hong Kong Gentlemen: I am in favor of the establishment of many small industries in China by means of cooperatives. Your great devotion to such a cause, and the splendid effort you have made to help our War of Resistance, are deeply appreciated. If it is possible to build this kind of (cooperative) industries in the guerrilla districts of North China, and in the adjacent war regions in the northwest, the help would be greatly appreciated and warmly welcomed by the Eighth Route Army and my humble self. I understand that such a plan is in fact already contemplated. It is very much hoped that it can be realized, for its contribution to our struggle would be incalculably great. I would be most grateful if you would convey this thought to your committees abroad, and to our countrymen overseas. Here I wish especially to thank our fellowcountrymen in the Philippines, and the (Industrial Cooperatives) Promotion Committee there, for they have made great efforts to support our fatherland and the

industrial cooperative movement. In one word, if we struggle hard, and if China and her foreign friends cooperate together, there can be no doubt of our final victory over the Japanese! With national anti-Japanese greetings. MaoZedong Mao wrote this letter at the request of Edgar Snow, Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow), and others involved in the movement to create cooperative industrial enterprises. For Snow's account of his dea1ings with Mao on this matter see Random Notes on Red China, pp. 7172. Our source is a carbon copy of the typewritten English text, contained in the Edgar Snow Papers. A note at the top of the page reads: "Translation of an original letter in Chi· nese written by Mao Tse-tung." The Chinese text does not appear to be available, but according to other documents in the Snow Papers, this version was reviewed by Mao's representative and can therefore be regarded as accurate. 230

The Identity of Interests Between the Soviet Union and All Mankind (September 28, 1939)

At the time of the twenty-second anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, 1 the SinoSoviet Cultural Association has asked me for an article. On the basis of my own observations, I should like to clarify a few problems concerning the Soviet Union and China. These problems are being discussed widely by people in China, 2 especially among various anti-Japanese parties and factions, anti-Japanese military men, students and youth, journalists, and people in cultural circles, and apparently no definite conclusions have yet been reached. It may not be a waste of time if I take this opponunity to set fonh my views for the consideration of those who are concerned about the war in Europe and about Sino-Soviet relations.

The First Question, Concerning the Soviet Union and the Prevention of the Second Imperialist World War Some people say the Soviet Union does not want the world to remain at peace because the outbreak of a world war is to its advantage, and that the present war was precipitated by the Soviet Union's conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Germany instead of a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France. I consider this view incorrect. In the past, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union over a very long period of time has consistently been one of peace, a policy based on the close links between its own interests and those of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Not only has the Soviet Union always needed peace for its own socialist construction, but it has also needed to strengthen the peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and all the countries of the world, so as to avoid the outbreak of anti-Soviet wars. It has also needed to check the aggression of the various fascist countries, curb the war-mongering actions of the so-called democratic countries, and delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war for as long as possible, in order to achieve peace on a world scale. Just look, for many years the Soviet Union has

This article was first published in Jiefang. no. 86, October 10, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 53--64, where it is reproduced from this source. 1. Soviet Revolution -+ Great Soviet Revolution 2. China-+ China at present 231

232

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

devoted great efforts to the cause of world peace. The proof of this is that, for example, it has joined the League of Nations, signed treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, and tried hard to conclude security pacts with Britain and all other countries that might be willing to have peace. When Germany and Italy jointly invaded Spain, and Britain, the United States, and France adopted a policy of nominal "nonintervention" but actually of not hindering3 their aggression, the Soviet Union gave active support to the Spanish Republican forces in their resistance to Germany and Italy, and actively opposed the "nonintervention" policy of Britain, the United States, and France. When Japan invaded China, and the same three powers adopted the same kind of "nonintervention" policy, the Soviet Union not only concluded a nonaggression treaty with China, but gave China active help in its War of Resistance. 4 When Britain and France connived at Hitler's aggression and sacrificed Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union spared no effort in exposing the sinister aims behind the Munich policy and made proposals to Britain and France for further efforts to check aggression. When Poland became the burning question in the spring and summer of this year, and it was touch and go whether world war would break out, the Soviet Union negotiated with Britain and France for over four months, despite Chamberlain and Daladier's lack of sincerity, in an endeavor to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance to prevent the outbreak of war. But all these efforts were blocked by the imperialist policy of the British and French bourgeois governments, a policy of conniving at, instigating, and spreading war, so eventually the cause of world peace was thwarted and the imperialist world war broke out. The bourgeois governments of Britain, the United States, and France had no genuine desire to prevent the outbreak of a great war; on the contrary, they helped to bring it about. Their refusal and their refusal alone to come to terms with the Soviet Union and conclude a really effective treaty of mutual assistance based on the principle of equality and reciprocity proved that they wanted not peace but war. Everyone knows that in the contemporary world rejection of the Soviet Union means rejection of peace. Even Lloyd George, that typical representative of the British bourgeoisie, knows this. It was in these circumstances, and at this time, when Germany agreed to discard its anti-Soviet stance,' abandon the anti-Comintern pact, and recognize the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers, that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was concluded. The plan of Britain, the United States, and France was to egg Germany on to attack the Soviet Union, so that they themselves, "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight," could get ready to come down and deal with both of them, 6 after the two great peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany had worn

3. Not hindering ~ Laissez-faire toward 4. War of Resistance ~ Resistance to Japan 5. Discard its anti-Soviet stance -+ Stop anti-Soviet activities 6. Deal with both of them ..... Take over

SEPTEMBER /939

233

each other out. The German-Soviet nonaggression pact smashed this vast international plot for putting the Soviet Union and Germany under their control. Those fellow-countrymen who ignored this international plot, and ignored the schemes of the British 7 imperialists, who connived at and instigated war and promoted the plot to cause the outbreak of a great world war, have actually been taken in by the sugary propaganda of these conspirators. In dealing with the problem of Spain, the problem of China, or the problem of Austria and Czechoslovakia, these schemers were not the slightest degree interested in checking aggression; on the contrary, they connived at aggression and instigated war, playing the proverbial role of the tisherman who set the snipe and clam at each other and then took advantage of both. They euphemistically described their actions as a policy of "nonintervention," but what they actually did constituted a policy of"sitting on top ofthe mountain to watch the tigers fight." Quite a few people throughout the world have been fooled by the honeyed words of Chamberlain and his partners, failing to see the murderous intent behind their smiles, or to understand that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was concluded only after Chamberlain and Daladier had made up their minds to reject the Soviet Union and bring about the imperialist war. It is time for these people to wake up. The Soviet Union offers a complete contrast. The Soviet Union wants not only peace for itself, but also peace for the world; it wants not only to prevent aggression by the fascist states against its own country and small and weak nations, but also to prevent the outbreak ofthe world war and stop the war mongering activities of the so-called democratic states or at least delay the outbreak of a great war. The unfortunate outbreak of the world war is entirely the result of the imperialist countries' rejection and sabotage of the common ef forts of the Soviet Union and the people of the world to maintain peace. The fact that the Soviet Union worked so hard to preserve world peace to the very last minute proves that the interests of the Soviet Union are identical to those of the overwhelming majority of mankind. This is the first question I wanted to talk about. The Second Question, Concerning the Attitude Adopted by the Soviet Union Toward the Second Imperialist World War Some people say that, since the second imperialist world war has now broken out, the Soviet Union may perhaps take sides-in other words, the Soviet Red Army seems to be on the point ofjoining the front of German imperialism. I consider this view incorrect. On whichever side, the Anglo-French or the German, the war h at has just broken out is an unjust, predatory, and imperialist war. The Communist parties and the people of all countries should rise up against it and expose the imperialist character of both belligerents, for this imperialist war brings only harm

7. British_,. British and French

234

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

and no benefit whatever to the people of the world; they should also expose the criminal acts of the social-democratic parties in supporting the imperialist war and betraying the interests of the proletariat. The Soviet Union is a socialist country, a country in which the Communist Party is in power, and it necessarily maintains a clear-cut twofold attitude toward wars: (I) It firmly refuses to take part in any unjust, predatory, and imperialist war and maintains neutrality toward the belligerents. Consequently, the Soviet Red Army can never disregard principle and join an imperialist front. (2) It actively supports just and nonpredatory wars of liberation. For instance, it helped China8 in its war of the Northern Expedition thirteen years ago and Spain9 in its war against Germany and Italy last year. It has been helping China 10 in its War of Resistance AgainstJapan for the last two years, and Outer Mongolia 11 in resisting Japan for the last few months. It will certainly give help to any war of people's liberation or national liberation which may break out in other countries in the future and will certainly give help to any wars that contribute to the defense ofthe Soviet Union. 12 The history of the Soviet Union in the last twenty-two years has already proved this, and history will prove it again in the future. Some people regard the Soviet Union's trade with Germany, which is based on the German-Soviet commercial agreement, as an act of participation in

the war on the German side. This view, too, is wrong, because it confuses commercial relations with participation in war. For example, the Soviet Union traded with Germany and Italy during the Spanish war, yet nobody in the world said that the Soviet Union was helping Germany and Italy in their aggression against Spain. On the contrary, people said that it was helping Spain in resisting this aggression, since the Soviet Union actually did help Spain. Again, during the present SinoJapanese war, the Soviet Union is trading with Japan, but nobody in the world is saying that the Soviet Union is helping Japan in its aggression against China; on the contrary, people say that it is helping China to resist aggression, since it actually is helping China. At present, both sides in the world war have trading relations with the Soviet Union, but this cannot be regarded as assistance to either, still less as taking part in the war. Only if the nature of the war changes, and the war waged by one country or several countries undergoes certain necessary changes, so that it becomes advantageous to the Soviet Union and to the peoples of the world, will it be possible for the Soviet Union to help or participate; otherwise it will not. As for the fact that the Soviet Union is obliged to trade to a greater or lesser extent on more or less preferential terms with one or another ofthe belligerents according to how friendly or hostile it happens to be, that depends not on the Soviet Union but on the attitude of the belligerents themselves. But even if one or several countries

8. China-+ The Chinese people 9. Spain -+ The Spanish people I0. China ..... The Chinese people t I. Outer Mongolia -+ The Mongolian people 12. The Soviet Union ..... Peace

SEPTEMBER /939

235

adopts an anti-Soviet attitude, the Soviet Union will not break off trade relations with them so long as they, like Germany before August 23, are willing to maintain diplomatic relations and conclude trade treaties with it and do not declare war on it. It should be clearly understood that such commercial relations do not mean assistance, much less panicipation in war. Of course, every clear-minded person should be able to predict a situation that is likely to appear. In the changing international situation, Chamberlain is trying to organize a world reactionary united front aimed at defeating Germany first and attacking the Soviet Union later, or attacking them both simultaneously. If this reactionary front is in fact successfully organized and makes the Soviet Union its enemy, the Soviet Union and Germany will have commoa interests and the nature of Germany's war will become a war beneficial to the socialist countries. At that time, it is possible that the Soviet Union and Germany may form a united front, and the question ofassistance or panicipation in war may arise. But until then such a question should not be posed. This is a manifestation ofthe identity ofthe interests ofthe Soviet Union and the majority of the people of the world. This is the second question I want to talk about.

The Third Question, Concerning the Sending of Troops to Poland by the Soviet Union Many people in China are bewildered by this complicated question." The complexity of the issue causes people's thinking to become confused. The Polish question should be viewed from various angles, from that of Germany, of Britain and France, of the Polish government, of the Polish people, and of the Soviet Union. Germany staned the war in order to plunder the Polish people and in order to smash one flank of the Anglo-French imperialist front. Such a war is imperialist in nature; we can have no sympathy for it and should oppose it. This is the first point. As for Britain and France, they have regarded Poland as one of the objects of plunder for their finance capital; they have exploited it to thwart the German imperialist attempt at a world redivision of the spoils and made it a flank of their own imperialist front. Therefore their war is an imperialist war, their so-called aid to Poland being merely for the purpose of contending with Germany for domination over Poland, so this war, too, cannot be regarded with sympathy and should be opposed. This is the second point. As for the Polish government, it was a fascist government, a reactionary government of the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie. It ruthlessly exploited the workers and peasants the population of over 10 million people of Polish nationality and oppressed the Polish democrats. Moreover, it was a government of great Polish chauvinists, which carried out ruthless nationalist oppression against the non-Polish minority nationalities-the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, Germans, Lithuanians, and others, who number more than 10

13. This complicated question....., The fact that Soviet troops have entered Poland

236 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

million; it was itself an imperialist state. 14 In the war, this reactionary Polish government willingly led the Polish people to serve as cannon fodder for British and French finance capital, and it willingly served as a sector of the reactionary front of international finance capital. For twenty years the Polish government consistently opposed the Soviet Union and, during the talks between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, it firmly rejected the Soviet offer to help it with troops. Moreover, it was an utterly incompetent government, which in just two weeks put Poland under the iron heel of German imperialism. Its huge army of over 1.5 million collapsed at the first blow, and it broughtdestructionfrom the German imperialists to the Polish people in just two weeks, leaving the Polish people to suffer the outrages of German imperialism. Such were the towering crimes of the Polish government, and it would be wrong for us to waste any sympathy on it. This is the third point. As for the Polish people, they are victims; they should rise up against the oppression of the German fascists, and against their own reactionary bourgeoisie,15 and establish an independent, free, and democratic Polish state. Without the slightest doubt, our sympathy must go out to the Polish people. This is the fourth point. As for the Soviet Union, its war has 16 been perfectly just. It was confronted by two problems. The first problem was whether to let the whole of Poland fall under the rule of German imperialism or to help the minority nationalities of eastern Poland win their liberation. It chose the second course. A vast stretch of territory inhabited by Belorussians and Ukrainians had been snatched from the new-born Soviet state by the German imperialists as far back as 1918, when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, and it was later arbitrarily put under the rule of the reactionary Polish government by the Treaty of Versailles. What the Soviet Union has now done is merely to recover its lost territory, liberate the oppressed Belorussians and Ukrainians, and save them from German oppression. The news dispatches of the last few days show how warmly these minority nationalities are welcoming the Red Army as their liberator, offering it food and drink while not a single report of this kind has come in from western Poland, which has been occupied by German troops or from the places in western Germany, which have been occupied by French troops. This shows clearly that the Soviet Union's war is a just and nonpredatory war of liberation, a war helping to liberate weak and small nations and free the people. On the other hand, the war being waged by Germany and by Britain and France is an unjust, predatory, and imperialist war for the oppression of the nations and peoples of other countries. The second problem confronting the Soviet Union was Chamberlain's endeavor to continue his old policy. His policy was, first, to impose a large-scale blockade on Germany and bring pressure on it from the west; second, to try to form an alliance with the United States and to

14. State

-+

Government

15. Reactionary bourgeoisie .... Reactionary landlords and bourgeoisie 16. Its war has .... Its actions have

SEPTEMBER 1939

237

buy over Italy, Japan, and the countries of northern Europe so as to isolate Germany; and third, to bribe Germany with the offer of Poland, and even of Hungary and Romania. In short, Chamberlain resorted to all kinds of intimidation and bribery to get Germany to renounce the German-Soviet nonaggression pact and turn its guns on the Soviet Union. This intrigue is not only going on at present, but will continue. The powerful Soviet army's entry into eastern Poland, with the aim of recovering the Soviet Union's own territory and liberating the weak and small

nationalities there, was at the same time a praCtical move to consolidate the GennanSoviet nonaggression pact 17 and to frustrate Chamberlain's intrigue. Judging by the news reports of the last few days, this Soviet policy has been a very great success. It is a concrete manifestation of the identity of the interests of the Soviet Union with those of the overwhelming majority of mankind, including those of the oppressed people under reactionary Polish rule. This is the third question I wanted to talk about. The Fourth Question, Concerning Soviet Assistance to China Since the conclusion of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact, a great blow has been struck against Japan, China has been helped, the position of those in favor of the War of Resistance has been strengthened, and a blow has been struck against the capitulationists. The Chinese people have welcomed this treaty, and that is very correct. However, since the signing of the Nomonhan truce agreement, 18 British and U.S. news agencies have been busy spreading the story that a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression treaty is about to be signed, and this has caused a certain concern among the Chinese people. There are some who even think that the Soviet Union might no longer help China. I believe that this observation is incorrect. The nature of the Nomonhan truce agreement is the same as that of the previous Zhanggufeng truce agreement.' 9 that is to say, the Japanese militarists, being compelled to admit defeat, have had to recognize the inviolability of the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. These truce agreements will enable the Soviet Union to increase rather than decrease its aid to China. As for the talk about a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression

17. Consolidate the Gennan-Soviet nonaggression pact -+ Prevent the forces of German aggression from expanding eastward

18. The Nomonhan truce agreement was concluded in Moscow in September 1939. In May 1939, Japanese troops and lroops from the puppet state of Manchukuo had attacked troops of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic of Mongolia at Nomonhan, on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, and had been repulsed. The truce agreement pi'ovided for the formation of a commission with representatives from each side to demarcate the frontier in the disputed places. 19. This agreement had been concluded in Moscow on August 11, 1938, in the aftermath of a clash between Japanese and Soviet troops in the Zhanggufeng District on the border of China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. In this case, a bilateral commission had also been established to demarcate the border.

238

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

treaty, the Soviet Union has been proposing it for many years, but Japan has invariably rejected it. Now there is a section of the Japanese ruling class that wants such a treaty with the Soviet Union, but whether the Soviet Union will be willing to conclude it depends on the basic principle of whether the treaty will be in accord with the interests of the Soviet Union and of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Specifically, it depends on whether the treaty will conflict with the interests of China's war of national liberation. Judging from Stalin's report to the Eighteenth Congress ofthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10 this year and Molotov's speech on foreign policy at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 30, I think the Soviet Union will not alter this basic principle. Even if such a treaty were to be concluded, the Soviet Union would certainly not agree to anything that would restrict its freedom of action in helping China. The interests of the Soviet Union and of China's national liberation will always be in complete conformity and will never conflict. I regard this as absolutely beyond doubt. Those people who are prejudiced against the Soviet Union are capitalizing on the Nomonhan truce agreement and on the talk about a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression treaty in order to make trouble and stir up ill feeling between the two great nations of China and the Soviet Union. Such behavior is to be found among the British, American, and French schemers and the Chinese capitulationists; it is highly dangerous, and we must thoroughly expose their dirty tricks. It is obvious that China's foreign policy must be a policy ofthe War of Resistance. This policy means relying primarily on our own efforts, while not ignoring any possibility of securing help from abroad. Now that the imperialist world war has broken out, foreign help is coming chiefly from three sources; (I) the socialist Soviet Union, (2) the people of all the capitalist countries in the world, and (3) the oppressed nations in the colonies and semicolonies. These are our only reliable sources of help. Apart from this, any other so-called foreign assistance, even if it should become available, can only be regarded as supplementary and temporary. Of course, China should try to obtain such supplementary and temporary foreign help, but must never depend too much on it or consider it reliable. China should maintain strict neutrality toward the belligerents in the imperialist war and not join either side. To maintain that China should join the Anglo-French imperialist war front is a capitulationist view, which is harmful to the War of Resistance as well as to the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and should be utterly rejected. This is the fourth question I wanted to talk about. The above four questions are being widely discussed by our fellow countrymen. It is a very good thing that they are giving attention to the study of international problems, to the relations between the imperialist world war and China's War of Resistance and between the Soviet Union and China, with the aim of victory over Japanese aggression. Here I have given some of my basic views on these questions, and I hope that readers will not spare their comments as to whether or not they are correct. The War of Resistance and the cause of the liberation ofthe Chinese nation have great prospects.

Speech at the Evening Welcome Party for the Army Commander He Zhuguo, Mr. Snow, and Comrades Blestov and Magov (September 29, 1939)

(Written specially for this newspaper) Arter a dinner of welcome given by Comrade Mao Zedong in their honor and accompanied personally by him, the group of guests-"fricnds from China and from abroad." to quote Comrade Mao Zedong-entcrcd the Central Auditorium crowded with people and, amid warm applause, attended the evening welcome party ~ponsored by various circles ofYan'an . ... In the midst of boisterous applause. Comrade Mao Zcdong began his address of welcome:

We are here holding this grand evening party to welcome many friends and guests trom this country and from abroad. First of all, we welcome General He Zhuguo, 1 who has been valiantly fighting in the forefront of the War of Resistance for more than two years, where he has worked hard and done valuable service. At present General He Zhuguo is leading his forces to [X][XJ[X] from [X][X] via our border region. So we are holding this gathering to welcome him very warmly, as well as many other comrades of the [X] Cavalry Army. 2 In addition, we welcome Mr. Wei 3 and Mr. Cai, both senior advisers from the headquarters of the Second Military District. The Eighth Route Army operates in the Second Military District, under the orders of Commander Yan.4 We welcome the visit of the comrades from the Second Military District.

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao. September 29, 1939. We have trdnSIated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 125-26, where it is reproduced from that source. I. He Zhuguo (1897-1985), a native of Guangxi Province, was a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy, who had also studied cavalry tactics in Japan. In the aftermath of the 1936 Xi'an Incident. he had supported Zhang Xueliang. In August 1938, he had been appointed commander of the Second Cavalry Army, and in this capacity he had participated in the War of Resistance in the northeast. 2. Presumably the reference is to He's Second Cavalry Army. 3. The reference may be to Wei Wei, a native of Henan and a graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy, who in 1938 had been appointed deputy commander of the Ninety-third Army in the Second Military District. 4. The reference is to Yan Xishan (1883-1960), who had played a major role in his native province of Shanxi since the late 1920s. In 1937 he had been appointed commanderin-chief of the Second War area by Chiang Kaishek. 239

240 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

We also welcome guests from foreign countries. They fall into three categories. One is the American correspondent Mr. Snow, whose name is well known to us all. He was the very first one to visit the soviet area in northern Shaanxi in 1936. This is his second visit, and we warmly welcome him. America is a great nation. The masses of its people are opposed to imperialism and sympathetic to the liberation of the oppressed nations. Mr. Snow stands on the side of the broad masses of the people. He is a good friend of the Communist Party. It is hoped that, with the efforts of Mr. Snow, the two great nations of China and the United States will join hands, so as to help the Chinese people to overthrow Japanese imperialism. Also at today's evening party are the comrades of the Indian Medical Team. India is a great nation with a population of 320 million. Britain tried to force India into the war, but the Indian National Congress delivered a declaration, on behalf of the whole people, of their refusal to fight and their opposition to the imperialist war. The leader ofthe Indian National Congress is none other than Mr. Nehru, who visited Chongqing not long ago. Mr. Nehru has sent the Indian Medical Team to assist China. The two great nations of China and India have united to defeat Japanese imperialism. At this evening party, we would like to give an even greater welcome to the friends from the Soviet Union. The help from the Soviet Union in our War of Resistance will enable China to defeat the Japanese imperialists and win the final victory. The fact that this evening we are welcoming the comrades who have been doing hard and valuable work in the War of Resistance is a manifestation of the unity of all China. We welcome our international friends, and we want all the great nations that are helping us-the American people, the oppressed people of India, and the Soviet Union-to unite. With our internal unity, plus international unity, Japanese imperialism will definitely be overthrown.

Telegram in Reply to Jiang Dingwen, Chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Government (September 29, 1939)

Mr. Jiang Mingsan, 1 chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Government: Your telegram has been respectfully received and read. When northern Shaanxi is suffering a drought, the Central Government has appropriated funds and southern Shaanxi has helped with grain. The whole area is covered with benevolence, and all the people are filled with jubilation. The border region has also suffered from the drought, though not so seriously as the Suiyuan and Yulin areas. So we also made a small contribution, just as an expression of good will from a neighbor. You put us to shame when you expressed your gratitude, and we really do not deserve it. This telegram is specially sent in reply, and to wish you good health. Your admiring younger brother, MaoZedong

This telegram was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, October 6, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 127, which reproduces that text. I. Regarding Jiang Dingwen, see note 4 to Mao's interview of September 24, 1939, with Edgar Snow. 241

Study the Enemy-Occupied Areas (October 1, 1939)

The problem of the enemy-occupied areas in China is a matter of life or death for Japanese imperialism. In the present stage, to concentrate all its strength for the invasion of China is the set policy of Japanese imperialism. As for the pattern of the enemy invasion of China during the present stage, a frontal military attack or a large-scale strategic offensive (as distinguished from offensive campaigns of a certain magnitude), such as the attack in force on Wuhan, is no longer very probable. Basically, the enemy's mode of aggression has already come to take the two forms of political and economic attacks. By political attack, I mean splitting China's united front for resisting Japan, causing friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and enticing China to surrender. By economic attack, I mean managing the occupied areas of China and developing the industry and commerce there, and using it to undermine our economy geared to the War of Resistance. To achieve its goal of an economic attack, the enemy must necessarily launch "mopping-up campaigns" against our guerrilla warfare, set up a unified puppet regime, and eliminate the national spirit of our people in the occupied areas. Therefore, the question of the occupied areas has become an extremely grave problem in the second stage of our War of Resistance-the stage of a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. The stage of a stalemate is, for the enemy, a stage in which to secure the territory it has occupied and prepare for the final conquest of the whole of China; for China, it is the stage for securing the territory which has not yet fallen and getting ready to recover the lost territory. The enemy is managing the occupied areas in such a way as to create the conditions for securing these areas and conquering the whole of China. In order to secure the territory which has not yet fallen, and recover the territory which has been lost, we have no choice but to make preparations in every domain. To support most actively the guerrilla war and to reform domestic politics are the two main political orientations for disrupting the enemy's plans and carrying out our own plans.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 44-46, where it is reproduced from Shishi wenti congsu, no. 2, in which it was originally published in 1939. 242

OCTOBER I 939 243

In conditions like these, the study of the problems of the enemy-occupied areas brooks no delay. The question involves two sides, our side and the enemy side. On our side, it is a question of how to sustain the guerrilla war, and, needless to say, it is extremely important to study this question. On the enemy side, it is a question of what the enemy has done, and will do in the future, in the occupied areas. This is in fact the starting point for the study of the previous question, for, without sufficient knowledge ofthe enemy's circumstances, there can be no discussion of methods for coping with him. And yet nine cadres out of ten who are fighting the War of Resistance have made no study, or have made no systematic study, of the problem of what the enemy has done apd will do in the future in the occupied areas. This shows clearly that it is important and necessary to call attention to this problem. "The Association for the Study of Current Affairs" has been organized in Yan'an for the purpose of studying all important problems of current affairs. Apart from study and discussion, the comrades there have also set about editing a Current Affairs Series. For purposes of research, they have divided up the work into four topics: problems of Japan, problems of the enemy-occupied areas, problems of world affairs, and problems of China in the War of Resistance. They are gathering information for this reference collection, which will be published in the form of digests for reference purposes. Japanese Imperialism at War, published last July, can be considered the first study of conditions in the homeland of Japanese imperialism and was also the first volume of the Current Affairs Series. Japanese Imperialism in the Occupied Areas of China (Japan in the Occupied Areas for short) is the first study of conditions in the enemy-occupied areas and the second volume of the Current Affairs Series. The studies of the other two problems will soon be published one after the other. It is truly necessary and important to carry out such systematic research on current problems, and to provide materials for all the cadres engaged in the War of Resistance. The work-style of closing one's eyes and talking groundlessly, like those "blind men groping for fish," must be abandoned. "Without investigation, there is no right to speak," 1 or, to put it another way, "in order to study current affairs, one must first possess detailed infonnation" is a minimum requirement for scientific

methodology. and in no sense constitutes what is called ''narrow empiricism." Last, it must be pointed out that such a current affairs series is nothing but a collection of materials. They are important materials, but they are only materials, and incomplete materials at that. They do not solve the problems. To solve the problems, research is necessary, and conclusions must be drawn from the materials. This is a different kind of work, which is not dealt with in the present series.

1. Mao had first put forward this maxim in May 1930. Sec "Oppose Book ism," in Volume III. pp. 419-26.

Introducing The Communist (October 4, 1939)

The Central Committee has long planned to publish an internal Party journal, and now, at last, we can say that the plan has become a reality. Such a journal is necessary to build a Bolshevik' Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. This necessity is all the more obvious given the present situation. Special features of the present situation are, on the one hand, that the danger of capitulation, of fragmentation, and of retrogression within the AntiJapanese National United Front is increasing daily and, on the other hand, that our Party has stepped out of its narrow confines and become a major national party. The Party's task is to mobilize the masses to overcome the dangers of capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression and to prepare against all possible eventualities, so that, should such things suddenly occur, the Party and the revolution would not suffer unexpected losses. At a time like this, the publication of an internal Party journal of this sort is necessary indeed. This internal Party journal is called The Communist. What is its mission? What topics will it deal with? How will it differ from other Party publications? Its mission is to help build a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. The construction of such a party is urgently needed for the victory of the Chinese revolution, and we are just now in the process of building such a party. On the whole, moreover, the subjective and objective conditions for building such a party are already present; indeed this great undertaking is now in the making. No ordinary Party publication is equal to the task of carrying out this great undertaking. A special Party periodical is necessary, and that is why The Communist is being published. To a certain extent, our Party is already national in scale and already has a mass character. Moreover, so far as its leadership core, some of its membership, its general line, and its revolutionary work are concerned, it is already a Bolshevik party that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 65-79, which reproduces the text as it appears in the supplementary volume to the 1947 Chinese edition of Mao's Se/ecled Works. I. Bolshevik .... Bolshevized (This change occurs repeatedly throughout the present document; subsequent occurrences are not footnoted.) 244

OCTOBER 1939 245

That being the case, whnt new tasks are there, and why set a new task at this

time? The reason is that we now have large numbers of new Party members and many new branches, 2 and they cannot yet be considered to have a broad mass character, 10 be ideologically, politically, and organizationally consolidated, or to be bolshevized. At the same time, the problem of raising the level also arises with respect to the older Party members and the older branches, as does the problem of making further progress in ideological, political, and organizational consolidation and in bolshevization. The circumstances in which the Party now finds itself and the responsibilities it is shouldering are quite unlike those in the civil war3 period of the past; the circumstances are much more complex and the responsibilities much heavier. This is the period of a national united front, and we have formed a united front with the bourgeoisie; this is the period of a War of Resistance Against Japan, and the armed forces of our Party are at the front fighting a ruthless war against the enemy in coordination with friendly armies; this is the period when our Party has developed into a national party4 and is no longer what it was before. If we look at all these factors together, we shall understand how glorious and momentous is the task we have set ourselves, the task of "building a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally." We now want to build this kind of party, but how shall we go about it? We are

11ow determined to build this kind ofparty, but what must we do to reach this goal? The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the history of our Party's eighteen years of struggle. It is fully eighteen years since our Party's First National Congress in June 1921. In these eighteen years the Party has gone through many great struggles. The members of the Party, its cadres, and its organizations have tempered themselves in these great struggles. They have experienced both splendid victories and grave defeats in the revolution. They have experienced the establishment of a national united front with the bourgeoisie, and they have also experienced the breakup of this united front and engaged in a bitter armed struggle with the bourgeoisie5 and its allies. During the last three years, it has again found itself in a period of establishing a national united front with the bourgeoisie. The road of development of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party has passed through this kind of complex relationship with the Chinese bourgeoisie. This is a special historical feature, a feature peculiar to the revolutionary process in colonial and

2. Large numbers of new Party members and many new branches -. Many new branches composed of large numbers of new Pany members 3. Civil war---~> Revolutionary civil war 4. A national party ... A major national party 5. Bourgeoisie .....,. Big bourgeoisie

246

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

semicolonial countries and not to be found in the revolutionary history of any capitalist country. Furthermore, since China is a semicolonial and semi feudal country whose political, economic, and cultural development is uneven, a country whose economy is predominantly semifeudal and whose territory is vast, it follows that the character of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is bourgeois-democratic, that the revolution's principal targets are imperialism and the feudal forces,6 and that its primary motive forces are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. At certain times and to a certain extent, various other elements, such as the national bourgeoisie, have also participated. It also follows that the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution is armed struggle. Indeed, the eighteen-year history of our Party may be called a history of armed struggle. Comrade Stalin has said: "A specific feature ofthe Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting the armed counterrevolution."' This is perfectly true. This specific feature, peculiar to semicolonial China, is absent or is different in Communist parties' in the various capitalist countries. Thus, two basic specific features of the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party emerged in the process of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution: (I) a revolutionary national united front with the bourgeoisie9 is either established or forced to break up; and (2) armed struggle is the principal form of the revolution. Here we have not considered the Party's relations with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic special feature, first, because these relations are in principle the same for Communist parties all over the world and, second, because armed struggle in China is, in essence, peasant war, and the Party's close relations with the peasant war and its relations with the peasantry are one and the same thing. It is because of these two basic specific features, in fact precisely because of them, that the process of building up and bolshevizing our Party is proceeding under special circumstances. Its failures and successes, its retreats and advances, its contraction and expansion, its development and consolidation are all inevitably

6. Feudal forces ... Feudalism 7. "A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting the armed counterrevolution." ... "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific features and also one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."

The above citation is from Stalin's speech of November 30, 1926, to the Executive Committee of the International, entitled ''The Prospects of the Revolution in China," which appears in Volume VIII of his Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 379. Stalin's own term was "armed revolution," not "the armed people." This is a particularly flagrant instance of citing out of context. As Mao knew very well, when Stalin made this statement, the ..armed revolution" he was talking about was represented by the Northem Expedition, under the leadership of Chiang Kaishek, in whose revolutionary credentials Stalin still had full confidence. 8. In Communist parties . . .,. In the history of the revolutions led by Communist parties 9. With the bourgeoisie.....,. Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie

OCTOBER 1939 247

linked to its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When our Party takes a correct political line on forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization. Similarly, when our Party handles the question of revolutionary armed struggle correctly, it moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it handles this question incorrectly, it moves a step backward in these respects. Thus, for eighteen years the processes of building and bolshevizing the Party have been closely linked to its political line, to the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This judgment has clearly been confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history. Or, conversely, the more bolshevized the Party becomes, the more correctly it can decide upon its political line and handle the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion, too, is clearly confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history. Consequently, the questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our Party in China's revolution. Having a correct grasp ofthese three questions and their interrelations with each other is tantamount to giving correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution. We are now able to draw correct conclusions 10 by virtue of our country's'' abundant experience during the eighteen years of the Party's history, a rich and profound experience of failures and successes, retreats and advances, contraction and expansion. Which is to say that we are now able to handle the questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building correctly. It also means that eighteen years of experience have taught us that the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the Chinese Communist Party's three magic weapons, its three principal magic weapons for defeating the enemy in China's revolution. This is a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and a great achievement of the Chinese revolution. Here let us briefly discuss each of these three magic weapons, each of these three questions. In the last eighteen years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the Chinese bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different sets of circumstances or during three different stages: the first Great Revolution,l2 ten years of civil war, 13 and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the course of these three stages, the following laws have been proved: (I) Because the greatest

10. Correct conclusions....., Correct conclusions concerning these three questions II. Our country's....., Our 12. The first Great Revolution -+ The first Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927 13. Ten years of civil war...,. The war of agrarian revolution from 1927 to 1937

248 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

oppression in China is national oppression, the Chinese national bourgeoisie can be counted on to take part in the struggle against imperialism and the feudal warlords at cenain times and to a certain extent. Therefore, at such times the proletariat should form a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it as much as possible. (2) Because, on the other hand, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is economically and politically feeble, in other historical circumstances it will vacillate and become turncoat. Therefore, the composition of China's revolutionary united front cannot remain the same at all times, but is liable to change. At a certain time the bourgeoisie 14 will take pan in it, at anothertime it may not.' 5 (3) Because ofthe vacillating nature of the bourgeoisie, even when the bourgeoisie 16 (especially the big bourgeoisie) joins the united front alongside the proletariat in struggling against the common enemy, they 11 still view as disadvantageous to them any ideological, political, and organizational development of the proletariat and its political pany, try to impose restrictions on them, and employ disruptive tactics such as deception, blandishments, undermining, and savage attacks on them. Moreover, they are doing all this to prepare for capitulating to the enemy and splitting the united front. (4) The firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry. (5) The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally. Not only were these laws proved during the period of the first Great Revolution and during the ten years of civil war, 18 but they are also being proved during the three years of the War of Resistance. 19 Therefore, with regard to the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie (and, in panicular, with the big bourgeoisie), the political party of the proletariat must carry on a stern, resolute struggle on two fronts. On the one hand, it must oppose20 neglecting the possibility that the bourgeoisie may make revolution at certain times and to a cer-

14. Bourgeoisie ..... National bourgeoisie 15. In the Selected Works version, the following passage is inserted here: (3) The Chinese big bourgeoisie, which is comprador in character, is a class that directly serves imperialism and is kept by it. For this reason, China's comprador big bourgeoisie has always been a target of the revolution. But because the various groups within this Chinese comprador big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialisms, when contradictions among these imperialist powers become sharper and when the spearhead of the revolution is directed against a particular imperialism, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other imperialist powers may join the struggle against that particular power to a certain extent and for a certain time. At such times, in order to weaken the enemy and add to its own reserves, the Chinese proletariat may form a united front with these big bourgeois groups and should maintain it as much as possible, provided that it is advantageous to the revolution. As a result of this addition, points 3, 4, and 5 have been renumbered. 16. The bourgeoisie ..... The comprador big bourgeoisie 17. They ..... It continues to be very reactionary, and it firmly opposes 18. Ten years of civil war ..... Agrarian revolution 19. Three years of the War of Resistance ..... Present War of Resistance 20. It must oppose ..... It is necessary to combat the error of

OCTOBER 1939 249

tain extent, regarding the bourgeoisie in China as the same as the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries and consequently neglecting the policy of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie and maintaining it for as long as possible. This is "Left"deviationist closed-doorism. On the other hand, it must also combat treating the revolutionary nature and revolutionary program, policies, ideology, practice, and so on of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie as though they were one and the same, and neglecting the differences in principle between them; neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie2 t not only exerts an influence on the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry but does its utmost to influence the proletariat and the Communist Party in a strenuous effort to put an end to their ideological, political, and organizational independence, to tum them into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and to ensure that it will reap the fruits of the revolution for itself or its party alone; and that they betray the revolution whenever the revolution conflicts with their own selfish interests or with those of their party. For us to neglect all this is Right opportunism. The characteristic feature of Chen Duxiuism22 in the past is that it amounted to a Right opportunism that led the proletariat to accommodate itself to the selfish interests of the bourgeoisie and its party, and this was the subjective reason for the failure ofthe first Great Revolution. This dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution has an enormous effect on the political line of the Chinese Communist Party and on party building. Without an understanding of this dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie it is impossible to understand the political line of the Chinese Communist Party and party building. One important component of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is the political line of both unity with the bourgeoisie and struggle against it. An important component ofthe Chinese Communist Party's party building is, in fact, its development and tempering through both unity with and struggle against the bourgeoisie. Unity here means the united front. 23 Struggle means the "peaceful," "bloodless" ideological, political, and organizational struggle that goes on when we are united, 24 and which turns into armed struggle when we are forced to break with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand that it should unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, the Party cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop. If our Party does not understand that it should wage a stem and resolute "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, then the Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and the revolution will fail. If our Party does not wage a stern and resolute armed struggle against the bourgeoisie when forced to break with it, our Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will likewise fail. All this has been proved by the history of the last eighteen years. 21. The bourgeoisie- The bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie) 22. Chen Duxiuism .... Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism 23. United front .... United front with the bourgeoisie 24. United -+ United with the bourgeoisie

250 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party is peasant war under proletarian leadership. Its history, too, can be divided into three stages. The first stage was participation in the Northern Expedition of the bourgeoisie. At that time our Party had already begun to realize the importance of armed struggle, but it did not understand it fully, and it had not yet understood that armed struggle is the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution. The second stage was the ten years of civil war. 25 Our Party had already established its own independent armed forces, learned the art of fighting independently, and established base areas of the people's political power. Moreover, it was already able to achieve direct or indirect coordination of armed struggle, the principal form of struggle, with many other necessary forms of struggle-that is, to coordinate it directly or indirectly on a nationwide scale with the workers' struggle, the peasants' struggle (this is the main thing), the struggle of the youth, the women, and all the people, with the struggle for political power, the struggles on the economic, anti-espionage, and ideological fronts, and with other forms of struggle. And this armed struggle was the agrarian revolution of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, which constitutes the second stage in our Party's history of armed armed struggle. The third stage is the present stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan. In this stage we are able to make use of our experience of armed struggle in the first, and especially the second stage, and our experience of coordinating armed struggle with all other necessary forms of struggle. In general, this kind of struggle26 means guerrilla warfare. What is guerrilla warfare? It is the unavoidable27 and therefore the best form of struggle for the people's armed forces to employ over a long period in a backward country, a large semicolonial country, to defeat the armed enemy and create their own bases. For the past eighteen years28 both our Party's political line and its party building have been closely tied to this form of struggle. It is impossible to understand our political line or to understand our party building in isolation from armed struggle, from guerrilla warfare. Armed struggle is an important component of our political line. For the past eighteen years, our Party has increasingly learned the line of armed struggle and has persisted in it. We have come to understand that, in China, without armed struggle neither the proletariat nor the · people nor the Communist Party would have any standing, and it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. Over the past eighteen years the development, consolidation, and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolutionary wars and are inextricably linked to guerrilla warfare; without armed struggle, without guerrilla warfare, the Communist Party would not be what it is today. All comrades throughout the Party must not forget this experience, which was paid for in blood. 25. Ten years of civil war .... War of agrarian revolution 26. This kind of struggle -+ Armed struggle at the present time 27. Unavoidable ..... Indispensable 28. For the past eighteen years -+ Down to the present

OCTOBER 1939 251

The process of building up the Party, the process of its development, consolidation, and bolshevization, likewise has three distinct stages. The first stage was that of the Party's infancy. In the early and middle phases of this stage, the Party's line was correct and the revolutionary zeal of the rank and file and of the cadres was extremely high; hence the victory of the first Great Revolution. But, after all, ours was then still an infant party, a party lacking experience with regard to the three basic problems of the united front, armed struggle, and party building, a party without any knowledge of, or without ample understanding of the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution or of Chinese history and society, a party that did not yet have a comprehensive, unified understanding of the relation between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence, in the last phase of this stage, at the critical juncture of this stage, those elements occupying a dominant position in the Party's leading body failed to lead the Party in consolidating the victories of the revolution, were deceived by the bourgeoisie, and caused the revolution to suffer a defeat. During this stage, Party organizations expanded, but were not consolidated, and they were unable to help Party members, Party cadres, and Party organizations become solid ideologically and politically. There were a great many new Party members, but they were not given the necessary Marxist-Leninist education. There was also considerable work experience, but it was not properly summed up. Many opportunists sneaked into the Party, but they were not purged. Both enemies and allies were scheming to stab our Party in the back, 29 but there was no sense of vigilance. Activists came forward in great numbers within the Party, but they were not able to form the backbone of the Party in time. The Party had some revolutionary armed units under its command, but it was unable to keep a tight grip on them. All these circumstances stemmed from lack of experience, lack of a profound revolutionary consciousness, and lack of a unified understanding of30 the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. This was the first stage of party building. The second stage was the ten years of civil war. 31 Because it had gained experience in the first stage, because it had achieved a better understanding of the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution and of Chinese history and society, and because of progress in linking the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution, 32 our Party was therefore able to wage a victorious soviet struggle33 for ten years. Although the bourgeoisie turned traitor,

29. Both enemies and allies were scheming to stab our Party in the back -+ Our Party was caught in a maze of schemes and intrigues of both enemies and allies 30. Lack of a unified understanding of-+ Lack of skill in integrating 31. Ten years of civil war-+ War of Agrarian Revolution 32. Because of progress in linking-+ Because our cadres had a better grasp of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and had learned more about how to integrate Marxist-Leninist theory with Chinese revolutionary practice 33. Soviet struggle ... Agrarian revolutionary struggle

252

MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

the Party was able to rely firmly upon the peasantry. The Party organization not only developed once again, but also achieved consolidation. Although the enemy tried daily to stab our Party in the back, the Party drove out the saboteurs. Not only did large numbers of cadres come forward within the Party, but these cadres were able to become the Party's backbone. The Party blazed the trail of people's political power and thereby learned the art of ruling the country and bringing peace and security to the people. The Party created strong armed forces and thereby learned the art of war. All these were great advances and great successes for the Party. In the course of these great struggles, however, some Party members34 fell into the quagmire of opportunism or did so for a time. This stemmed once again from their failure to learn humbly from past experience, the fact that they did not understand35 the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution and sorely lacked knowledge of Chinese history and society, and their failure to achieve a unified understanding of the relation between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution. As a consequence, throughout this stage some people in the Party's leading organs were unable to adhere completely and at all times to correct political and organizational lines. At one time the Party and the revolution were damaged by Li Lisan's 36 "Left" opportunism, and at another time by "Left" opportunism in the revolutionary war and in the work in the White areas. All of this, however, was defeated at two historic meetings of the Party, its Founh Plenum and its Zunyi Meeting. It was after the Zunyi Meeting (the meeting37 at Zunyi, Guizhou, in January I935) that the Party definitively took the Bolshevik road, 38 and laid the foundation for its subsequent victory over Zhang Guotao's Right opportunism and for the establishment of an Anti-Japanese National United Front. This was the second stage in the process of the Party's development. The third stage in the process of the Party's development is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This stage has lasted three years already, and these three years of struggle have extremely great significance. Drawing upon its experience in the preceding two revolutionary stages, upon its organizational strength and the strength of its armed forces, upon its high political prestige among the people of the whole country, and upon its deeper and more unified understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution, the Party has not only established the Anti-Japanese National United Front but has also been conducting a great War of Resistance Against Japan. Organizationally the Party has stepped out of its narrow confines and has become a major national party. Its armed forces are also growing anew and are becoming still stronger in the struggle against the Japanese bandits. The Party's influence among the people of the whole country is

34. Party members -+ Comrades 35. The Selected Works text inserts here: "Chinese history and society and" 36. Li Lisan's-+ Comrade Li Lisan's 37. The meeting~ The meeting of the Central Politburo held 38. Bolshevik road -+ The road of bolshevization

OCTOBER 1939 253

becoming more extensive. These are all great achievements. On the other hand, the Party has developed, but large numbers of new Party members39 and many new organizations have not been consolidated. There is still a vast difference between them and the older members and organizations. They<'l do not yet have very much 41 revolutionary experience. They do not understand, or have limited understanding of, the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution or about Chinese hiswry and society. They are still far from having a deeper and more integrated understanding of the unity between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution. During the expansion of the Party's organizations in the past, even though the Central Committee stressed the slogan, "Greatly42 expand the Party, but do not let a single bad element in," actually many careerists and enemy saboteurs did manage to sneak in. Although the united front was formed and has been maintained for three years now, the bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie, has constantly been trying to destroy our Party, the big bourgeois capitulators and diehards have been instigating serious friction and conflict throughout the country, and the anti-Communist clamor can be heard everywhere 43 The big bourgeois capitulators and diehards seek to use all this as preparation for capitulating to Japanese imperialism, breaking up the united front, and dragging China backward. ideologically, the bourgeoisie44 is attempting to dissolve communism; politically and organizationally, it is trying to abolish the Communist Party, abolish the border regions, and abolish the Party's armed forces. Under such circumstances, it is undoubtedly our task to overcome these threats of capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression, to maintain as far as possible the national united front and Guomindang-Communist cooperation, to strive for continued resistance against Japan and continued unity and progress, and at the same time to prepare against all possible eventualities so that, in case they occur, the Party and revolution will not suffer unexpected losses. To attain this goal, it is necessary to consolidate the Party's organization and its armed forces, and to mobilize the people of the whole country for resolute struggle against capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression. The accomplishment of this task depends upon the efforts of the whole Party, upon the unrelenting and persistent struggle of all Party members, Party cadres, and Party organizations everywhere and at every level. We are confident, moreover, that the Chinese Communist Party, with its eighteen years of experience, will be able to accomplish all these goals through the joint efforts of its experienced older cadres and its vigorous and youthful newer members and cadres, through the joint efforts

39. Large numbers of new Party members-+ Large numbers of new Party members have not been given education, and 40. They -+ Many of the new Party members and new cadres 41. Very much-+ Sufficient

42. Greatly ~ Boldly 43. Everywhere ..... Incessantly 44. Bourgeoisie -+ Big bourgeoisie

254

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of its well-tried Bolshevik Central Committee and its local organizations, and through the joint efforts of its powerful armed forces and the progressive popular masses. These are the principal experiences and principal problems of our Party in its eighteen years of history and during its three separate stages. Eighteen years of experience tells us that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. The party organization is the heroic soldier wielding the two weapons of united front and armed forces to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. That is how the three are related to one another. How are we to build up our Party today? How can we build a "Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party, a Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a Party that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally"? All this may be grasped by studying our Party's history, by looking at party building in connection with the united front and armed struggle, in connection with the problem of both uniting with and struggling against the bourgeoisie, and with that of persistence in guerrilla warfare against Japan by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the establishment of anti-Japanese

base areas. To sum up eighteen years of experience and the present new experience on the basis of a unified understanding of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution and to spread it throughout the Party so that the Party becomes strong as steel and avoids repeating past mistakes-this is our task.

Inscription for the Second Anniversary of the Anwu Youth Training Class (October 5, 1939)

Young people, who bring fresh blood and enthusiasm with them when they join the revolutionary ranks, are all very precious, whether they are Communists or non-Communists. Without them, the revolutionary ranks could not grow and the revolution could not triumph. But lack of experience is the natural failing of our young comrades. Revolutionary experience must come, however, from personal participation in revolutionary struggle. If one begins working at the grass roots and if, for several years, one does work that is genuine, not false, then experience will come to those who do not have it. This is written to commemorate the second anniversary of the youth training class. MaoZedong

This inscription originally appeared in 1940 on the cover of a volume entitled Zhong guo qingnian wenxuan. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, p. 81, which reproduces it from this publication. 255

ToLu Chao 1 (October 7, 1939)

To his excellency Mr. Hanqun: Mr. Wang Youyu 2 is on a visit to Yan'an, and we have had very delightful conversations. I have had the honor of reading your instructions and am all the more drawn to you. You, sir, serving in the Center, boast great achievements and command high prestige; we inferiors, craning our necks and looking up to you, cannot possibly suppress our admiration. When the country is faced with disaster, unity is of first and foremost importance; I believe I share this understanding and aspiration with you, sir. This reply is respectfully submitted. With best wishes, Respectfully, Your younger brother, Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shw:in xuanji, p. 158, where it is printed from the manuscript. 1. Lu Chao (1890-1952), zi Hanqun, a native of Sichuan, had studied at the Banding Military Academy, joined the Tongmenghui before the 1911 Revolution, and served in Sun Yatsen's Guangzhou headquarters in 1921-22. At this time he was chief of the Military Inspectorate in the National Government. 2. Wang Youyu was an inspector in the Guomindang Military Inspectorate. 256

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Cu"ent Situation and the Party's Tasks 1 (October 10, 1939)

1. The outbreak of the imperialist world war is a new stage in the second great imperialist war; it is the result of the attempt of the imperialist countries to extricate themselves from a new economic and political crisis. Whether on the German side or the Anglo-Franco-Polish side, the war is unjust, predatory, and imperialist in character. The Communist parties throughout the world must resolutely oppose this war and must also oppose the criminal action of the social-democratic parties in betraying the proletariat by supporting it. The socialist Soviet Union is persevering as before in its policy of peace and is maintaining strict neutrality toward both belligerents. By sending its armed forces into Poland at a time when the Polish government had already collapsed, it has consolidated the German-Soviet Pact of Mutual Nonaggression,2 strengthened peace in Eastern Europe, and liberated its brother nations in western Ukraine and Belorussia who were oppressed by the Polish fascist rulers. The Soviet Union has, moreover, concluded a number of pacts with neighboring countries to prevent any possible attacks by the forces of international reaction and is struggling to restore world peace. China should maintain strict neutrality in the war between Britain, France, and Germany. We must resolutely oppose any political conspiracy that aims to lure China into joining the Anglo-French side ,for this is merely a reactionary step in preparing for surrender to the Japanese bandits and disrupting national unity. 2. The policy of the Japanese bandits3 in this new international situation is to concentrate its attacks on China and settle the China question, in order to prepare for extending its international adventures in the future. The overall policy by which

This document was first published in Jiefang, nos. 87/88, October 30, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 83-86, which reproduces that text. 1. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Cur-

rent Situation and the Party's Tasks-+ The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks 2. Consolidated the German-Soviet Pact of Mutual Nonaggression -+ Checked eastward expansion of the German forces of aggression 3. Japanese bandits -+Japanese imperialism

258

MAO'S ROAD 7V POWER

it is settling4 the China question is total subjugation of the whole of China under the general slogan of what it calls "establishing a New Order in East Asia": a. With regard to the areas behind the enemy's lines, 5 its policy is to tighten its hold on the occupied areas, in preparation for subjugating the whole of China. To achieve this end, it must "mop up" the guerrilla war,6 exploit economic resources, set up puppet regimes, and destroy our national spirit. 7 b. With regard to China's rear areas, its policy is to launch mainly political offensives, supplemented by military offensives. Political offensives mean concentration not on launching large-scale military attacks but on disrupting the anti-Japanese united front, breaking up Guomindang-Communist cooperation, and inducing China8 to capitulate. In the present period the enemy is not likely to launch big strategic offensives, like the one against Wuhan, because of the blows dealt to the enemy by China's heroic resistance during the past two years and the inadequacy of his armed strength and financial resources. In this sense, the War of Resistance has already basically reached the stage of strategic stalemate. From the standpoint of the enemy, this stage of strategic stalemate is the stage of the political offensive; from the standpoint of China, it is the stage of preparation for our counteroffensive. But, first, when we say that basically a strategic stalemate has already been reached, we by no means rule out the possibility of further offensive campaigns by the enemy; he is now attacking Changsha and may attack other places in the future. Second, as the possibility of a stalemate at the front grows, the possibility ofa stalemate in the enemy's rear areas will diminish, and the enemy will intensify his "mopping-up" operations against our guerrilla base areas. Third, if China is unable to disrupt the enemy's occupation of the areas he has seized, and allows him to succeed in his attempts to tighten his hold on them and exploit them, and if China is unable to repulse the enemy's political offensives and to persist in resistance, unity, and progress, so as to accumulate strength for the counteroffensive, then if China does not surrender of its own accord, the enemy may still launch big offensives.9 In other words, the strategic stalemate that has already been reached may still be broken by the enemy or by the capitulators, and the grave danger of national subjugation still exists. 3. The danger of capitulation, splits, and retrogression within the anti-Japanese united front remains the greatest danger at present. The current anti-Communist

4. Settling -+Attempting to settle 5. The areas behind the enemy's lines-+ The occupied areas 6. Guerrilla war -+Anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas

7. Our national spirit-+ The national spirit of the Chinese 8. China -+The Guomindang government 9. If China does not surrender of its own accord. the enemy may still launch big offensives. -+ Either the Guomindang will surrender of its own accord, or the enemy might still launch big offensives.

OCTOBER /939 259

and retrogressive phenomena of vacillating elements among the bourgeoisie 10 continue 10 be preparatory steps to their capitulation. It remains our task, in cooperation with all the patriots throughout China, to mobilize the masses for the effective application of the general policy 11 put forward in our Party's Manifesto of July 7: "Support Chairman Chiang," "Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation," "Persist in unity and oppose splits," and "Persist in progress and oppose retrogression," in order 10 build up strength for the counteroffensive. To achieve this objective, behind the enemy lines we must resolutely persist in guerrilla warfare, introduce political and economic reforms beneficial to the masses who are resisting Japan, consolidate the guerrilla base areas, defeat the enemy's "mopping-up" operations, and disrupt his occupied areas. At the front, we must sustain military defense and repel any offensive campaigns the enemy may launch. In China's rear area, we must speedily and strictly eliminate capitulators, smash anti-Communist activities, stop retrogression, carry out political reforms, end one-party dictatorship, 12 convene a national assembly truly representative of the people's will and invested with real power, draw up and adopt a constitution, and put constitutional government into practice. Only thus will it be possible to avoid the danger of national subjugation and accumulate strength for the counteroffensive. Any vacillation or procrastination, any orientation contrary to this, is absolutely wrong. At the same time, the leading organs of our Party at all levels and all Party members must heighten their vigilance in the present situation and do their utmost to achieve the ideological, political, and organizational consolidation of our Party, as well as of the anti-Japanese armed forces and anti-Japanese organs of political power under its leadership, in order to be ready for any emergency endangering the Chinese national War of Resistance,B and to prevent unexpected losses to the Party and to the national War ofResistance. 14

The Double Tenth Holiday ofthe 28th year ofthe Republic of China.

10. The bourgeoisie ~ The big landlords and big bourgeoisie II. The general policy ~ The three great political slogans

12. One-party dictatorship ..... The Ouomindang's one-party dictatorship 13. Chinese national War of Resistance -+ Chinese revolution 14. The national War of Resistance ..... The revolution

To Lin Zhonghe 1 (November 5, 1939)

To my elder brother and senior fellow student Roxu: I seemed to be seeing my old friend again when I received and read your wonderfulletter. I did not dare to procrastinate, because your first letter failed to reach me. Here enclosed please find a hundred yuan, merely a supplement to your salary. This is a very small sum, which serves only as a token of my regard. I sincerely hope you will keep up your efforts in imparting your knowledge to the young and training people for the War of Resistance. The south sky is within sight, and I will crane my neck to look in that direction. With respect and best wishes for success in your studies. Respectfully, Your younger brother, Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 159, where it is printed from the manuscript.

I. Lin Zhonghe, zi Roxu, was a native of Ningxiang, Hunan Province. He had been a classmate of Mao Zedong' s at the Hunan First Normal School. 260

Inscription for Liu Xian (November 1939)

I know very little about the methods of making woodcuts, but I like to look at them. It has not been long since Comrade Liu Xian came to the border region, but he has already produced many works. I hope he will continue his efforts and strive to create a new art of the Chinese nation.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 149. 261

Decision ofthe Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting lntellectuals 1 (December 1, 1939)

I. In the long and cruel war of national liberation, in the great struggle to build a new China, the Communist Party must be good at recruiting intellectuals, for only thus can we organize great strength for the War of Resistance, organize the peasant masses in their millions, develop the revolutionary cultural movement, and expand the united front. 2 Without the participation of the intellectuals, victory in the revolution is impossible. 2. Our Party and our army have made considerable efforts to recruit intellectuals during the last three years, and many revolutionary intellectuals have been recruited to join the Party, the army, and the organs of government and to participate in the cultural movement and the mass movement, thus broadening the united front. This is a major achievement. But many army units3 have still not paid attention to the importance ofthe intellectuals and still regard them with some apprehension or are even inclined to reject them. Many of our training institutes are still hesitant about enrolling young students in large numbers. Many of our local Party branches are still reluctant to recruit intellectuals to join the Party. All these phenomena result from the failure to understand the importance of the intellectuals for the revolutionary cause, the difference between intellectuals in colonial and semicolonial countries and those in capitalist countries, and the difference between intellectuals who serve the landlords and the bourgeoisie and those who serve the working class and the peasantry. They also result from the failure to grasp the seriousness of the situation in which the bourgeois political parties are desperately contending with us for the intellectuals and in which the Japanese imperialists are also trying in every possible way to buy over Chinese intellectuals or poison their minds. Above all, this problem results from the failure to understand the favorable conditions created by the fact that our Party and our army have already developed a strong Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 87-89, which reproduces a version issued by the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in 1942. 1. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting Intellectuals - Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals 2. United front - Revolutionary united front 3. Army units ..... Army cadres 262

DECEMBER /939

263

core of well-tested cadres and are thus capable of leading the intellectuals. Because of this, erroneous tendencies have arisen regarding the question of intellectuals. 3. Consequently, from now on attention should be paid to the following points: a. All Party organizations in the war areas and all army units led by the Party should recruit large numbers of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals into our army and training institutes, and to work in our organs of government. Provided only that they are willing to fight Japan, and are fairly loyal, hardworking, and able to endure hardship, we should try in every possible way to recruit all intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, give them political education, and help them to temper themselves in war and work and to serve the army, the government, and the masses. Taking each case on its merits, we should admit into.the Party those intellectuals who measure up to requirements of Party membership. As for those who do not qualify, or do not wish to join the Party, we should have good working relations with them and lead them to work side by side with us. b. In applying this policy of recruiting intellectuals in large numbers, we must without a doubt take great care to prevent the infiltration of those elements sent by the enemy and the bourgeois political parties and to keep out other disloyal elements. We must be very strict about keeping out such elements. Those who have already sneaked into our Party, army, or government organs must be cleaned out resolutely but discriminately, on the basis of conclusive evidence. But we must not on that account suspect reasonably loyal intellectuals, and we must be strictly on guard against the false accusation of innocent people by counterrevolutionaries. c. We should assign appropriate work to all intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who are reasonably loyal and useful, and we should earnestly give them political education and guidance so that in the long course of the struggle they gradually overcome their weaknesses, revolutionize their outlook, identify themselves with the masses, and merge with the older Party members and cadres and the worker and peasant members of the Party. d. We must earnestly persuade those cadres, especially certain cadres in the main forces of our army, who are opposed to the admission of intellectuals to participate in our work and make them understand the necessity of recruiting intellectuals for our· work. At the same time, we should work effectively to encourage worker and peasant cadres to study hard and raise their cultural level. Thus we will bring about simultaneously the transformation of worker and peasant cadres into intellectuals, and the transformation of intellectuals into members of the worker and peasant masses. e. In the main, the principles stated above are also applicable in the war zones4 and in the occupied areas,' except that, on admitting intellectuals into the 4. The war zones ... The areas ruled by the Guomindang 5. The occupied areas ..... The areas occupied by the Japanese bandits

264

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Party, even greater attention must be paid to their degree of loyalty, so as to ensure still tighter Party organization in those areas. We should maintain suitable contact with the broad masses of non-Party intellectuals who sympathize with us and organize them in the great struggle for resistance against Japan and for democracy and in the cultural movement and the work of the united front. 4. All comrades must understand that a correct policy toward the intellectuals is an important condition for victory in the revolution. There must be no repetition of the incorrect attitude toward the question ofthe intellectuals which Party organizations in many localities and army units adopted during the Agrarian Revolution. Moreover, the proletariat's goal of producing its own intellectuals can absolutely not be attained without the help of the existing intellectuals. The Central Committee hopes that the Party headquarters6 at all levels and all Party comrades will give this matter their serious attention.

6. Party headquarters ..... Party committees

The Clashes Between the New and Old Armies in Southwestern Shanxi, and Our Overall Policy 1 (December 6, 1939)

Zhu, Zuo, and Peng,2 Chen and Lin,3 Peng and Luo,4 Zhao,5 and for the information of Liu and Deng, Nie, and Peng:6 I. Serious armed clashes have already occurred between the new and old armies under Yan in southwestern Shanxi, making it increasingly apparent that the old faction in Shanxi is capitulating to the Japanese bandits and that its nature is to betray the cause of resistance to Japan. The details are as follows:

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2. pp. 497-99. where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. The "Old Army" refers to forces in Shanxi loyal to Yan Xishan, the long-time governor of the province. which were anti-Communist to a greater or lesser degree. The "New Army'' refers to more recently fanned units under the command of secretly Communist officers or officers sympathetic to the Communist cause. Early in the war, Yan had invited collaboration with the Communists, and he was an important target of the united front in North China. From this start, the Communists expanded their influence, infiltrated much of Van's administration and military apparatus, and created territorial bases beyond his control. These actions led to the tension and conflict described here. Sec also below, the texts of December 31. 1939, and January II, 1940. 2. The reference is to Zhu De, Zuo Quan, and Peng Dehuai. On Zuo, see above, the note to the telegram of June 12, 1939, addressed to him. 3. Chen and Lin are Chen Shiju (1909--1995). a native of Hubei, and Lin Feng (1906-1977), a native of Heilongjiang Province, who were at this time, respectively. commander and political commissar of the Western Shanxi Detachment of the II Sth Division or the Eighth Route Army. 4. Peng Shaohui (1906--1978), who was born in Mao's native village of Shaoshan, Hunan, and Luo Guipo ( 1908-1995), a native or Jiangxi Province, were, respectively, commander and political commissar of the 358th Brigade of the !20th Division of the Eighth Route Army. S. Zhao Lin (1906-2003), a native of Jiangxi, was at this time secretary of the Chinese Communist Party's Northwest Shanxi Bureau. 6. Liu and Dcng are Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were at this time commander and political commissar of the I29th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Nic is Nie Rongzhen, who was then commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District. Peng is Peng Zhen, then secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 265

266 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

a. The Japanese bandits, after occupying Xianxian, Daning, and Puxian, all of a sudden withdrew of their own accord. b. At exactly the same time, the sixty-first, nineteenth, and seventy-third armies of the Old Army suddenly joined forces to encircle the headquarters of the !96th Brigade of the New Army in the Sixth District from Wuchen, Puxian, Xianxian, Yonghe, and Shilou. The brigade headquarters were wiped out on the 3rd near the Yonghe xian town. In the other regions, the Old Army is being actively redeployed, in preparation for eliminating the New Army,the progressive governments, and the progressive mass organizations. c. Armed rebellion against the New Army and against the cause of resistance to Japan may spread further in southwestern and northwestern Shanxi. 2. Our overall policy: a. See clearly that such clashes may spread further. Notify the progressive elements quickly, and be on the alert immediately, so as to be prepared to deal resolutely with any incidents. We shall absolutely not yield in the face of the attacks of the rebel forces. We shall fight back resolutely, and immediately put forward, through the New Army,the slogan of opposing the rebel forces. But we should not oppose Yan. b. Quickly consolidate Party leadership within the New Army. Resolutely replace those who are unreliable. Avoid panicking. All New Army forces should prepare to engage in guerrilla war against the rebel forces. c. The Eighth Route Army itself should be even more on the alert, to guard against any unexpected events, and should also give encouragement, cover, and support to the New Army. In form, we should appear to play the role of mediation, to prevent the Old Army from attacking the New Army. For the time being, the Eighth Route Army should not advance the slogan of opposing the rebel forces. d. If the rebel forces attack the Eighth Route Army, we should join forces with the New Army to wipe them out. e. The strategic position in southwestern and northwestern Shanxi is extremely important. We absolutely cannot abandon it. Military Affairs Commission

Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]

Views on Military Work in Shandong (December 6, 1939)

Xu and Zhu, 1 Li and Jiang,2 and also forthe information of Chen and Luo, 3 Huang,4 Zhu and Peng,5 Yang,6 Zuo, 7 and Fu and Lu8: Regarding the work in Shandong, apart from the telegraphic instructions from the Central Committee, we would submit the following views: I. The work in Shandong has already achieved great successes as a result of our comrades' hard yet creative labor. Under the circumstances of an absence of Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 500--502, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Xu is Xu Xiangqian (1901-1990), zi Zijing, a native of Shanxi. A graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy, Xu joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. He was one of the founders of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet in the early 1930s, became commander of the Fourth Red Army, fought his way to Sichuan in 1933, and followed Zhang Guolao when Zhang and Mao split during the Long March. When he reached Yan'an in 1937, his Fourth Front Army was absorbed into the I29th Division of the Eighth Route Army. In the spring of 1939, he had been sent to Shandong to command the newly created First Column of the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu Rui as political commissar. Regarding Zhu see above, the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1939. 2. Li is Li Yu (1906-1986), a native of Shanxi, who joined the Communist Party in 1926, and worked underground in Beiping, Tianjin, and other northern cities. At this time, he was political commissar of the Shandong Column of the Eighth Route Army. Jiang is Jiang Hua (1907-1999), the director of the Political Department of the same column. 3. Chen is Chen Guang (1907-1954), acting commander of the I 15th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Luo is Luo Ronghuan (1902-1963), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Pany in 1927 and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was political commissar of the I 15th Division. 4. Huang is Huang Kecheng (1902-1986), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and participated in lhe Long March. At this time, he was political commissar of the 344th Brigade of the I 15th Division of the Eighth Route Army. 5. The reference is to Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. 6. Yang is Yang Shangkun ( 1907-1998), a native of Sichuan, who joined the Communist Party in 1926, studied in the Soviet Union from 1926 to 1931, and went to Jiangxi in 1933. He participated in the Long March and in the Zunyi Conference. At this time, he was secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee. 7. Zuo is Zuo Quan; see the note to the previous text. 8. Fu is FuZhong (1900-1989), a native of Sichuan, who had studied in France and then in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Political Department for Eighth Route Army field troops. Lu is Lu Dingyi 267

268

MAO'S ROAO TO POWER

assistance from the Eighth Route Army or from enough cadres who have military experience, the local Party has already created all by itself forces which are relatively combat-effective and are on the way to becoming regular ones. They will become the main force with which to persist in the War of Resistance in Shandong. 2. Make an effort to expand the Shandong column and to engage in the work of consolidation and training, so as to turn them rapidly into regular forces. Use the troops to cover and support the local Party in the extensive organization of local armed forces, so as to check the enemy. Gradually replace the losses of the main force, in order to free it from regional constraints so it can cope with battles on a larger scale. 3. Establish a regular supply system. The temporary method of taking food from the people cannot last long and affects adversely the combat effectiveness and regularization of the forces. The Jiaodong Bank 9 may issue bank notes. After exchanging them for other currencies, they can be sent to southern Shandong and other regions for use. After we obtain political power, money shall be printed, grain procured, and taxes collected so as to develop a long-term plan for solving the problem of supplies for our forces. 4. Improve the work in the political organs and strengthen their linkages with the various contingents. Clarify the organizational principle of our forces (the Eighth Route Army is an armed force of the workers and farmers, and also of the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; it is not a united front armed force) and all the most important posts should be filled by Party members. Correct the improper democratic style of work and the local Party work-style

in our forces. 5. Enhance the role of the Party cells and Party members. Not only is the Party cell a school to recruit and educate Party members, but also, in particular, it should become a strong fortress within the company. Every Party member should be not only a model soldier but also a leader for the non-Party masses. 6. There are many cadres with an intellectual background in the Shandong column. An effort should be made to do a good job in educating them, correcting their weaknesses and strengthening their revolutionary stand. We propose that the Shandong column send a batch of cadres of intellectual background to the !15th

(1906--1996), a native of Jiangsu, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and participated in the Long March. In 1939 he was deputy head of the Political Department for field troops. The distribution lists for this telegram, and for the preceding one of the same date, forcefully illustrate how far down the chain of command Mao was prepared to reach in order to communicate his instructions and opinions. 9. The Jiaodong Bank was a branch of the Beihai Bank, which had been established in 1938 to serve the needs of the base areas. Its headquarters were in Shandong.

DECEMBER 1939 269

Division and the !15th Division send a batch of cadres with military experience to the Shandong column. This will be of great benefit to the work of both sides. 7. Those forces which are near the !15th Division may establish contact with it, organize tours by cadres, and absorb the experience of the main force. The !15th Division should take the matter of allocating 2,500 men to the Shandong column very seriously. A good job should be done to educate and explain things to those officers and men who are to be sent. 8. A study should be done with regard to work on the armed forces formerly belonging to the Buddhist associations which have already been reorganized into the Eighth Route Army. Generally speaking, an effort should be made to assimilate them and to tum religious armed forces into progressive armed forces. Party organizations should be set up within these forces. But caution and a step-by-step approach are required, so as to avoid provoking rebellion. Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang] Teng [Daiyuan] Tan [Zheng]

The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement1 (December 9, 1939)

Comrades: Today we are holding an assembly to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the "December Ninth movement." All the young people filling this hall are fresh and energetic. What a lively and vigorous meeting this is! This is not the first assembly to commemorate the "December Ninth movement" in Yan'an, but since I was unable to attend those in the past, I am extremely happy to come to this meeting today. 2 I think that things in China are easier to manage now. What are the things in China? They include opposition to imperialism and to the dark forces. It has been a hundred years now since the Chinese people began to fight against imperialism and the dark forces in the Opium War. This is a very long time, and although this

Extracts from this talk delivered by Mao at an evening meeting on December 9, 1939, appeared in Xin Zhonghua bao, December 16, 1939, and are reproduced in Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 133-34. The present, much fuller text was first published in Hongqi, no. 23, December I, 1985; that version is reprinted in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 25(}... 58, which is our source. 1. The December Ninth movement was an initially spontaneous response of university and middle school students in Beiping to Japanese pressure on five North China provinces to declare independence from the Nanjing government and also a protest at Nanjing's apparent willingness to accept these Japanese demands. After large·scale demonstrations in

Beiping on December 9 and 16, 1935, the movement quickly spread into other areas and other strata of the population, becoming known as the National Salvation movement. From the very start, Communists (many of them under cover) played a leading role in the movement. In the official Chinese historiography, the December Ninth movement is seen as the beginning of a fundamental shift in public opinion, favoring internal unity and resistance against Japan. 2. Not only had Mao attended no meetings commemorating the December Ninth movement, but we have found few previous mentions of it in his writings. Nianpu, which refers to virtually all of Mao's utterances, even when it does not cite the texts, says nothing of any remarks by him on earlier anniversaries of these events. In his speeches of May 3 and 7, 1937, to a Party congress of the soviet regions, Mao stated that a ''new period in the Chi· nese revolution" had begun with the December Ninth movement, but did not further dwell on the nature of that movement. (See the translations of these texts in Volume V of our

edition.) Apart from this, the texts for the years 1935-1938 available to us and translated in Volumes V and VI do not even allude to December 9, 1935. 270

DECEMBER /939

27/

matter has not yet been completed, it is much easier to deal with it now. Because the diehard faction in the Guomindang has greatly strengthened its anti-Communist activity and attacked progressive intellectual circles, some people now say that things in China have become difficult to manage. They are making great efforts to achieve progress, and are fighting for the interests of the state and the nation; they are full of enthusiasm, their hearts are filled with good will, and they want to do their best for our state and our nation. And yet, precisely at this critical moment ofthe War of Resistance Against Japan, they see around them the shadow of surrender, splits, and retrogression laid down by the diehard forces, and their efforts are limited and repressed in many ways. Inevitably, they feel that things are difficult to manage. But this is looking at only one side of the matter. Certainly we are firmly againsi the perverse actions of the diehard faction, but, looking at the whole picture, we think that, compared to the past, things in China are not difficult to manage at all. Quite the contrary, they are easier to manage now. Why? Here we must begin with the December Ninth movement we are commemorating today. First, you comrades are all aware of what the December Ninth movement was about. Besides, Comrade Li Chang has just talked about it. 3 We should, however, take another step forward in our understanding. In what kind of political environment did it take place? What kind of political significance did it have? What kind of influence did it have on Chinese politics? When we have understood these issues, we will be able to see that the present situation in China is very different from that in the past. Not only are things no more difficult to manage now than they were in the past, but they are much easier to manage than in the past. After the Long March, the Red Army arrived at Wuqizheng in northern Shaanxi in October 1935. At that time the enemy was still attacking us. In the last ten days of November of that year, we won three victories in Fuxian. How happy we were to learn the news ofthe December Ninth movement in Beiping on December 10 in the midst of our celebration of the victories! 4 The Red Army comrades had completed

3. Li Chang ( 1914- ), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1933. The following year, he became a student at Qinghua University in Beijing, and in that capacity he played a significant role in the December Ninth movement and in the creation of the National S~vation movement. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in May 1936 and occupied various responsible posts in the Communist Youth League. In October 1938 he went to Yan' an, where he attended the Sixth Plenum. Soon thereafter he became head of the Organization Department of the Party's Committee on Youth Work. In this capacity, he chaired the meeting on May 4, 1939, at which Mao gave the report on the May Fourth movement translated above. 4. As already noted, there is no available record in Mao's own words expressing any such sentiments. That is not to say, of course, that when news of the events in Beiping reached him, he was not happy to hear about the December Ninth movement, but, having just arrived in the northwest after the Long March, he had many other things on his mind. Regarding the situation in which he found himself and the views he did put forward in December 1935. see the Introduction to Volume V of this edition and the relevant texts.

272

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

such a great Long March, and the student comrades had launched such a great movement of national salvation in Beiping. Both of these were struggles for the liberation of the nation and the people, and the direct significance of both lay in promoting the War of Resistance Against Japan. Therefore, historically speaking, the December Ninth movement was an extremely important aspect of the preparation for the anti-Japanese war. Some people say that the December Ninth movement is not equal to the May Fourth movement, that is to say, the political significance of the former is not as great as that of the latter. Is this correct? No, it is incorrect. We think that the significance of the two is equally great. The May Fourth movement was the preparation for the Northern Expedition. Without the May Fourth movement, the Northern Expedition would have been unthinkable. Some people hold that student movements have no strength, but what are the facts? The May Fourth movement of the broad student masses gave an impetus to the struggle against imperialism and against the government that was selling out the country, as manifested in the nationwide strike of workers, merchants, and students on "June 3," which developed into a movement of the whole nation. After the May Fourth movement, the Chinese Communist Party emerged, and this led to the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, to the May Thirtieth movement, and to the Northern Expedition, thus bringing about the First Great Revolution. Thus it is very evident that without the May Fourth movement, the First Great Revolution would have been impossible. The May Fourth movement truly prepared public opinion, and people's hearts and thoughts, as well as the cadres for the First Great Revolution. As regards the December Ninth movement, it was the preparation for the great War of Resistance Against Japan, just as the May Fourth movement was a preparation for the First Great Revolution. "December Ninth" pushed forward and prepared for the "July 7" War of Resistance Against Japan. Let us consider the circumstances under which the December Ninth movement took place. On the one hand, it took place in the territory ruled by the Guomindang, in which the Communist Party was regarded as absolutely without authority or legitimate status. It took place at the time of a war to "suppress the Communists" by the Nationalist reactionaries, in an environment of military as well as cultural "encirclement and suppression." In the previous so-called campaigns to "suppress the Communists," the difficult situation of the Communist Party and that of the Red Army was so obvious that we need say little about it. Later the Red Army began the Long March, and once it began marching, it marched for 25,000 li. There were also people behind, "seeing us off' for 25,000 li, as well as people "greeting" us in front. To these must be added those who were "giving us gifts" from the sky above; these gifts were called bombs. Although those who were seeing us off did "see us off' trip after trip, and those who were greeting us did "greet us" at every stop, the Red Army still arrived in northern Shaanxi. Yet the enemy continued to use bullets as gifts to greet us in the front and see us off from behind. That is to say that after arriving in northern Shaanxi, the Red Army was

DECEMBER /939

273

still in a situation of being "encircled and suppressed." Such was the situation of military "encirclement and suppression." How about the cultural "encirclement and suppression?"The enemy's "blockhouses" were built in schools, and in books, newspapers, and magazines, as well as in social, cultural, and educational societies, and it looked as if they were going to "go ahead steadily and strike sure blows, and consolidate at every step." As far as this is concerned, it will suffice to read Mr. Lu Xun's essays. His fighting essays criticizing and condemning the evils of the time were aimed at opposing cultural "encirclement and suppression" and opposing the repression of young people's thought. On the other hand, the Japanese imperialists had already occupied the Northea't and were discussing a "special status for North China." Moreover, they were actively preparing to destroy all of China. Consequently, every one of the 450 million people wanted to act and to fight Japanese imperialism. Nonetheless, strangely enough, some people obstinately refused to agree. They also wanted to fight, but against whom did they want to tight? They wanted to fight the Communist Party, the young students, and the progressive people in intellectual circles. The common people of the whole country told them: Your direction of attack is wrong, we resolutely oppose it. This is the other side of the circumstances in which the December Ninth movement took place. After the December Ninth movement, things gradually became easier to manage. With the peaceful resolution of the Xi' an Incident, the Guomindang government's method of fighting only the Communist Party and not fighting Japanese imperialism was no longer feasible. Hence they had no choice but to give up the policy of suppressing the Communist Party, and take the road o' preparing for a War of Resistance, which led to the Third Plenum of the Guomindang, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front was actually proclaimed. The December Ninth movement contributed greatly to these developments. Here, there is one point to which we should pay special attention, namely, the close relationship between the Long March of the Red Army and the December Ninth movement. The December Ninth movement took place at the time when the Red Army had arrived in northern Shaanxi on its march to the north to resist Japan. The victory of the 25,000-/i Long March helped the December Ninth movement, while at the same time the December Ninth movement also helped the Red Army. The combination of these two things helped to mobilize the people as a whole for the War of Resistance, helped the Chinese nation, and advanced the interests of the entire nation. The August I Declaration by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee' called on the people of the whole country to resist Japanese imperialism and 5. This declaration was not actually written or issued by Mao and the Central Committee in China, but was drafted by Wang Ming in Moscow, in the context of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. Mao learned of it only in November 1935, though copies had become available in some parts of China earlier. On these events, see the Introduction to Volume V of this edition. These facts about the origin of the declaration do not, of course, invalidate Mao's argument, in the present document, about its impact in China when it did become known.

274

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

pushed forward the tide of the development of uniting the whole country for the anti-Japanese war. The December Ninth movement took place in circumstances when the Chinese Communist Party had published the August I Declaration, when the Red Army had won some victories after arriving in northern Shaanxi, and when Japanese imperialism was just then intensifying its invasion of China. The broad mass of young students stood up and opposed the authorities' oppression of them, opposed the invasion of China by Japanese imperialism, and demanded an end to civil war and a unified resistance war against Japan. The outbreak of this movement caused a sensation throughout the country. In conjunction with the Red Army's Northern Expedition to resist Japan, it promoted domestic peace and the War of Resistance Against Japan and turned the anti-Japanese movement into a nationwide movement. Thus, the December Ninth movement was a movement that mobilized the whole nation for a resistance war; it prepared the thoughts, the human hearts, and the cadres for the War of Resistance. If we make a comparison to the relationship between the May Fourth movement and the Northern Expedition, it is very plain that the relationship between the December Ninth movement and th'e Resistance War Against Japan is closer, and the interval between them is shorter, because the December Ninth movement was coordinated with the victory of the Long March of the Red Army. In sum, the December Ninth movement will become an extremely important date in Chinese history. After the December Ninth movement, after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, it is much easier to pursue the anti-imperialist cause in China. Second, it is also much easier to oppose the oppression of young students and intellectuals by the dark forces, and it is harder for the dark forces to oppress the young students and intellectuals. This has been proved by the December Ninth movement. The dark forces oppress progressive thought, but, in the end, the dark forces always suffer defeat. Before the December Ninth movement, they had been carrying on anti-Communist education for more than eight years, and it was carried out according to plan. Every course in the schools which had political tendencies had as its first principle opposition to the Communist Party and to Marxism. Among the faculty, all those who were regarded as Communists and Marxists were dismissed and oppressed. Beginning in the second half of 1927, they used this kind of education and trained people for more than eight years. Most unfortunately, this training produced a "December Ninth." In the eyes of those antiCommunist gentlemen in the Guomindang, this was certainly a colossal misfortune. Some people said that the December Ninth movement was a student rebellion. The students accepted this point; it was indeed a rebellion. Nevertheless, against whom did they rebel? They rebelled against those who oppressed the students, and those who sought to "encircle and suppress" thought, as well as those who propagated false Three People's Principles. The purpose of their rebellion was to carry out the real Three People's Principles, that is, the Three People's Principles of uniting with the Soviet Union, uniting with the Communist Party, and assisting the peasants and workers. They rebelled in order to eliminate all the obstacles to car-

DECEMBER 1939 275

rying out the real Three People's Principles. Was such a rebellion necessary or not? The answer is yes, yes, and again yes. There are really strange things in this world. Some people hit their heads against a brick wall, but, afterward, they forget about it. Just consider that in the past some people simply refused to recognize the May Fourth movement, yet today everybody recognizes it. Now there are some people who refuse to recognize the December Ninth movement, but in the light of the experience of the May Fourth movement, at some future time, we cannot say exactly when, these people will have to recognize the "December Ninth movement." If they persist in refusing to recognize it, then we should ask them to choose the best of the thirty-six strategems, or to put it in simple words, ask them to beat it! Because the world is always moving forward, it is impossible to move backward. The Chinese people no longer have pigtails, so they cannot pull us back even if they want to. The old and backward things will have to fall down and let the new and progressive things replace them. If, in the midst of the tide of progress, they still refuse to recognize the progressive December Ninth movement, and still want to look down upon this movement, then they will certainly be out of luck. The young students now understand more truths and are much cleverer than when I was a young student. In the first few years after I went to school, I only learned stuff like "it is written in the Book of Poetry," and "the Master says," and in my heart I always thought that all those officials and emperors were good people. Later, when I entered a school run by foreigners, I encountered revolution. It was then that I learned that our master the emperor was no good, the capital of the United States is Washington, and the capital of England is London. I also heard about things such as x plus y equals z, molecules, atoms, and electrons. Now you know not only these things but also Marxism! At that time I did not know anything about Marx. This is one of the proofs that the present is more progressive than the past. During World War I, the upper strata wanted to join Britain and France ofthe Entente to attack Germany and Austria. Their speeches were beautifully delivered, and indeed some people were fooled. In 1918, when World War I ended, China also held a meeting in Beijing. At the meeting a tablet was set up, upon which the four characters [meaning]"universal truth is victorious" were inscribed. This was of great renown and influence for a time and confused the minds of some people for a time. Now things are different. China is forever moving forward. The people of China have now already come to understand the major events in the world, they understand revolutionary principles. They have understood these principles step by step; in the past, they understood little, but now they understand more. Everyone has understood that an imperialist war is unjust and predatory in nature, understands the plots and schemes of Japanese imperialism, understands the sinister and ruthless nature of the capitulationists and the diehard faction, and understands democracy and constitutional government. They understand these things clearly and want progress, democracy, and participation in government and politics. But the true realization of democracy and constitutional government also

276

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

requires that everyone stand up and struggle hard. Only when the young students, workers, and peasants in the whole country stand up and struggle hard can we succeed in this matter. Now people are cleverer, and cannot be deceived so easily. Everyone's eyes are wide open and watching. They want to see who does not want democracy. Who wants splits. Who wants to surrender. Who wants to go backward. In the novel The Investiture of the Gods, there is a character named Shen Gongbao. He is an unworthy classmate of Jiang Ziya; his face is at the back and his eyes look to the back. 6 Hiding at present in the ranks of the War of Resistance are a pack of "Shen Gongbaos," a bunch of experts in retrogression. They are holding China up and trying to make it go backward. The dark forces in China are oppressing the bright forces; this is called the freedom of oppression. Nonetheless, the great mass of young people, workers, and peasants throughout China also have another freedom: this is called the freedom to resist the dark forces. We will not allow the dark forces to pull China backward. Do we have confidence in our ability not to allow them to do that? Yes, we do. An important reason is that at present people are not easily duped; it is not easy to deceive the common people of the whole country. Now the majority of the people would not allow these people to oppress them like this and want to resist their oppression. They will not allow them to surrender and want to carry on the War of Resistance. They will not allow them to split and want to maintain unity. They will not allow them to go backward, and insist on progress. Let's wait and see how this whole bunch of"Shen Gongbaos" ends up. Third, how about the relationship between the December Ninth movement and the Chinese Communist Party? There is no doubt that the Communist Party played the role of backbone in the December Ninth movement. If the Communist Party had not served as the backbone, the December Ninth movement could not have taken place. First of all, the August I Declaration of the Communist Party provided the young students with a clear political orientation. Second, the Red Army had arrived in northern Shaanxi and was acting in concert with the National Salvation movement in the north. Finally, the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party and the Party organizations in Shanghai and other places provided direct leadership. Only this made it possible for the December Ninth movement to take place and, moreover, caused it to expand and develop at every level throughout the country and to become a great political force in the National Salvation movement of the entire nation. The young students were just like the firewood in the December Ninth movement; everything was ready, and the only thing needed was to set the fire. Who set the fire? It was the Communist Party. Ever since the day it came

6. Shen Gongbao, a character in the traditional Chinese novel The Investiture of the Gods, was skilled at summoning up the spirits. He did so in support of the last emperor of the Shang dynasty, commonly regarded as a tyrant; his antagonist, Jiang Ziya, armed with the weapons described above in a note to the text of July 9, 1939, fought on behalf of King

Wu, the founder of the ensuing Zhou dynasty.

DECEMBER 1939 277

into existence, the Communist Party has been closely united with young students and intellectuals; by the same token, only in concert with the Communist Party can the young students and intellectuals take the correct road. If the intellectuals do not unite with the workers and peasants, they will not be able to have great strength and will be unable to achieve great things. Similarly, if there are no intellectuals in the revolutionary ranks, we will not be able to achieve great things either. Only when the intellectuals, workers, and peasants are properly combined will there be a force which will always be victorious and can never be stopped. Therefore, intellectuals must integrate themselves with the Communist Party, with the large number of worker and peasant masses, with the revolutionary armed forces, and with the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Every Communist Party member must make it clear to non-Party sympathizers that our Communist Party welcomes intellectuals very much and wants to unite with the intellectuals. Of course, we are against those few bad intellectuals who sabotage the revolution, those intellectuals who are Chinese traitors, and intellectuals of the "Shen Gongbao" type. It is a crime if we do not oppose this kind of intellectuals; it will benefit both the country and the people to oppose this kind of intellectuals. Now many young intellectuals do not have any freedom; they do not have the right to walk along the roads. Take the road from Xi'an to Yan'an, for example. Numerous security measures are set up along it, and it is very difficult for progressive educated youths to pass. Because they do not have green dragon crescent swords, or red horses that fly like the wind, and because they do not have the capacity to decapitate six generals at five passes,7 they can only go to the "training regiments" in the concentration camps. It seems that this is a rather difficult thing to deal with. But if the intellectuals join with the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the guerrillas, that is, if pens can be combined with guns, it will be easy to deal with things. Napoleon said that one pen can equal three thousand Mauser rifles. Nevertheless, if there were no Mauser rifles made of iron, this pen would be of no use. If you have a pen plus a Mauser rifle, according to Napoleon, you will have 3,001 Mauser rifles. 8 With these, you will not fear any imperialism or any diehard elements. With these, will those dogs dare to come and bite you? Beginning with the Opium War, the Chinese people have had a hundred years of experience in struggling against imperialism and the forces of darkness. If we add the Communist Party's eighteen-year experience of struggle, will there be anything that we cannot accomplish? If you look at it this way, things in China are easier to manage than they were before. We must be determined to carry on the War of Resistance to final victory, overthrow Japanese imperialism, and create a 7. The reference is to the great sword and fleet horse ofGuan Yu (long known in China as Guan Gong, the god of war), one of Liu Bei 's sworn brothers in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and to his exploits in combat. 8. Regarding this anachronistic reference to Napoleon and Mausers, seep. 302 of Vol· umeVI.

278 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

democratic republic! Although there are still imperialists and "Shen Gongbaos" who constantly try to stop us from doing so, that is of no importance. We are cleverer now, and stronger, too. We are no longer what we were yesterday; instead we are what we are today. Imperialists, "Shen Gongbaos," it is time you got out of here!

The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (December 15, 1939)

Chapter 1: Chine5e Society A. The Chinese Nation Our China is one of the largest countries in the world, covering a territory larger than the area of the whole ofEurope. 1 In this vast territory, there are large stretches of fertile land that provide us with food and clothing; there are mountain ranges, plateaus, and plains across its length and breadth, with extensive forests and rich mineral deposits; there are many rivers and lakes that provide us with facilities for water transport and irrigation; and there is a long coastline that facilitates communication with the various nations beyond the seas. From the most ancient times, the ancestors of our Chinese nation have labored, lived, and multiplied on this vast land. Today, China borders on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the north· east, the northwest, and part of the west; 2 India, 3 Bhutan, and Nepal in the south· west and part of the west; Thailand, Burma and Indochina, and Taiwan as a close neighbor in the south; and Korea in the east, where it is also a close neighbor of Japan 4 China's geographical setting has its advantages and disadvantages for the Chinese revolution. 5 It is an advantage to be adjacent to the Soviet Union and fairly distant from all the major imperialist countries in Europe and America and to have mostly colonial or semicolonial countries around us. It is a disadvantage

This text was published as a pamphlet in Yan'an in 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 93-131, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao's writings. According to a note to the Selected Works, the first chapter was written by others and revised by Mao; the second chapter was entirely Mao's own. There was to be a third chapter on party building, but because of pressure of other work it was never completed. I. Larger than the whole of Europe -+About the size of the whole of Europe 2. The west; ..... The west; the Mongolian People's Republic in the north 3. India, -+ Afghanistan, India, 4. Japan -+ Japan and the Philippines. 5. The Chinese revolution-+ The Chinese people's revolution 279

280 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

that Japanese imperialism, making use of its sea, land, and air proximity to China, is constantly threatening the very existence of China and the Chinese revolution. 6 Today our China has a population of 450 million or almost a quarter of the world total. Of these 450 million, nine-tenths' are Hans. In addition, there are also many8 minority nationalities, including the Hui, Mongol, Tibetan, Man, Miao, Yi, and Li9 nationalities. Although they are at different levels of civilization, 10 all have long histories. Thus China is a country with a very large population composed of many nationalities. Developing along the same lines as the other great nations of the world, the Chinese people (here we refer primarily to the Hans) went through some tens of thousands of years of life in egalitarian and classless primitive communist societies." Five thousand years 12 have gone by from the collapse of these primitive communist societies 13 and the transition to the era of class society, which took the fonn, first, of slave society and then of feudal society. Throughout the history of the development of the civilization of the Chinese nation, mainly that of the Han nationality, its agriculture and handicrafts have been renowned for their high level of development; there have been many great thinkers, scientists, inventors, statesmen, and strategists, 14 and there is a rich store of classical works. The compass was invented in China as early as three thousand years ago. 15 The art of papermaking was discovered as early as 1,700 years ago. 16 Block-printing was invented 1,20017 years ago, and movable type 800 years ago. Gunpowder was also used by the Chinese long before the Europeans. Thus China has one of the oldest civilizations in the world, with a history of five thousand years. 18 The Chinese nation is known throughout the world not only for its industriousness and endurance but also for its ardent love of freedom and its rich revolutionary traditions. The history of the Hans, for instance, demonstrates that the Chinese people can never submit to the rule of the dark forces, and, that in every case, they make use of revolutionary means to achieve the goal of overthrowing and trans-

6. Of China and the Chinese revolution-+ Of all China's nationalities and of the Chi· nese people's revolution 7. Nine tenths -+ More than nine-tenths 8. Many -+ Dozens of 9. The Hui, Mongol, Tibetan, Man, Miao, Yi, and Li -+ The Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Zhuang, Zhongjia, and Korean 10. Civilization .... Cultural development II. Communist societies ..... Communes 12. Five thousand years -+ Some four thousand years 13. Communist societies..,. Communes 14. Strategists .... Strategists. men of letters, and artists 15. 3,000 years ago-+ Very early 16. I, 700 years ago -+ 1,800 years ago 17. 1,200 years ago-+ 1,300 years ago 18. History of five thousand years .... Recorded history of nearly four thousand years

DE.CE.MBER 1939

281

fanning such rule. In the thousands of years of Han history, there have been hundreds of peasant insurrections 19 against the dark rule of the landlords and the nobility. As for the dynastic changes, each and every one20 was able to succeed only as the result of a peasant insurrection. All the nationalities of China have always rejected foreign oppression and have always striven to shake it off by acts of resistance. They accept only a union on the basis of equality, but reject the oppression of one nationality by another. In its thousands of years of recorded history, the Chinese nation has given birth to many national heroes and revolutionary leaders and also to many revolutionary strategists, statesmen, men of letters, and thinkers. Therefore the Chinese nation has a glorious revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage.

B. The Old Feudal Sockty Although China is a great nation-state, and although it is a vast country with an immense population, a long history, a rich revolutionary tradition, and a splendid historical heritage, it stagnated for a long time after the transition from the slave system to the feudal system. This feudal system, beg inning with the Zhou and Qin dynasties, lasted for more than three thousand years. Because of the prolonged existence of the feudal system, its economy, politics, and culture21 were sluggish and even at a standstill over a long time. For three thousand years, Chinese society remained a feudal society. The main features of the economic and political system of China's feudal era were as follows: I. A self-sufficient natural economy predominated. The peasants produced for themselves not only agricultural products but most of the handicraft articles they needed. The land rent gained by the landlords and the nobility from agriculture22 was also chiefly for private enjoyment of the landlords and not for exchange. Although exchange developed as time went on, it did not play a decisive role in the economy as a whole. 2. The feudal ruling class composed of the landlords, the nobility, and the emperor owned most of the land, while the peasants had very little or none at all. The

19. Insurrections..,. Uprisings, large or small. Here, and throughout the whole of Mao's writings included in the Selected Works, the expression baodong (insurrection), commonly used by the Chinese Communists in the 1920s and 1930s to refer to their own actions, has been replaced by qiyi (uprising), which evokes an uprising in a righteous cause, rather than simply an act of violence. This variant, which occurs repeatedly in the present text, wil1 not be footnoted again. 20. Each and every one -+ Most 21. Economy, politics, and culture-+ Economic, political, and cultural development 22. The land rent gained by the landlords and the nobility from agriculture ~ What the landlords and the nobility exacted from them in the fonn of land rent

282

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

peasants tilled the land of the landlords, the nobility, and the royal family with their own farm implements and had to turn over to them for their private enjoyment 40, 50, 60, or even 70 percent23 or more of the crop. In effect the peasants were still serfs. 3. Not only did the landlords, the nobility, and the imperial family live on rent extorted from the peasants, but the landlord state also exacted tribute, taxes, and corvee services from them to support a horde of government officials and an army which was used for their repression. 4. The feudal landlord state was the organ of power protecting this system of feudal exploitation. Whereas the feudal state was torn apart into rival principalities in the Zhou dynasty ,24 it become autocratic and centralized after the first Qin emperor unified China, though some feudal separatism remained. The emperor reigned supreme and absolute in the feudal state, appointing officials in charge of the armed forces, the law courts, the treasury, and state granaries in all parts of the country and relying on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire system of feudal rule. It was under such feudal economic exploitation and political oppression that the Chinese peasants lived like slaves, in poverty and suffering, through the ages. Under the bondage of feudalism they had no personal freedom. The landlord had the right to beat, abuse, or even kill them at will, and they had no political rights whatsoever. The extreme poverty and backwardness ofthe peasants resulting from ruthless landlord exploitation and oppression is the basic reason Chinese society remained at the same stage of socioeconomic development for several thousand years.

The principal contradiction in feudal society was between the peasantry and the landlord class. The peasants and the handicraft workers were the basic classes which created the wealth and culture of this society. The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression of the Chinese peasants forced them into innumerable insurrections against landlord rule. There were hundreds of these, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary warsfrom the uprisings of Chen Sheng, Wu Guang, Xiang Yu, and Liu Bang in the Qin dynasty, those of Xinshi, Pinglin, the Red Eyebrows, the Bronze Horses, and the Yellow Turbans in the Han dynasty, those of Li Mi and Dou Jiande in the Sui dynasty, those of Huang Chao25 in the Tang dynasty, those of Song Jiang and Fang La in the Song dynasty, that ofZhu Yuanzhang in the Yuan dynasty, and that ofLi Zicheng in the Ming dynasty, down to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the Qing dynasty. The scale of peasant insurrections and peasant wars in Chinese

23. Even 70 percent ~ 70, or even 80 percent 24. The Zhou dynasty ~ The period before the Qin dynasty 25. Huang Chao-+ Wang Xianzhi and Huang Chao

DECEMBER 1939 283

history has no parallel anywhere else. The peasant insurrections and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of the progress of Chinese history. 26 For each of the peasant insurrections and wars dealt a blow to the feudal regime of the time and hence more or less changed the social relations of production and furthered the growth ofthe social productive forces. However, since neither new productive forces nor new modes of production,27 nor new class forces, nor any advanced political party existed in those days, the peasant insurrections and wars did not have the correct leadership of an advanced class or an advanced political party such as the proletariat and the Communist Party provide today; every peasant revolution failed, and the peasantry was invariably used by the landlords and the nobility, either during or after the revolution, as a lever for bringing about dynastic change. Therefore, although some social progress was made after each peasant revolutionary struggle, the feudal economic relations and political system remained basically unchanged. It is only in the last hundred years that a change of a different order has taken place.

C. Present-day Colonia~ Semicolonial, and Semifeudal Society As explained above, Chinese society remained feudal for more than three thousand years. But is it still completely feudal today? No, China has changed. After the Opium War of 1840 China gradually changed into a semicolonial and semi feudal society. Since the incident of September 18, 1931, when the Japanese imperialists started their armed aggression, China has changed further into a colonial, semicolonial society. We shall now describe the course of this change. As discussed in Section B, Chinese feudal society lasted for more than three thousand years. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, with the penetration of foreign capitalism, that great and fundamental changes took place in Chinese society. The penetration of foreign capital played a part in the disintegration of China's social economy28 ; on the one hand, it undermined its29 self-sufficient national economy and wrecked the handicraft industries both in the cities and in the peasants'

26. The peasant insurrections and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of the progress of Chinese history ..... The class struggles of the peasants, the peasant uprisings, and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development. 27. Modes of production ~ Relations of production 28. The penetration of foreign capital played a part in the disintegration of China's social economy;- As China's feudal society had developed a commodity economy, and so carried within itself the seeds of capitalism, China would have developed slowly into a capitalist society by itself even without the impact of foreign capitalism. Penetration by foreign capitalism accelerated this process. Foreign capitalism played an important part in the disintegration of China's social economy; 29. Its --~> The foundation of its

284 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

homes, and, on the other, it hastened the growth of a commodity economy in town and country. Apart from its disintegrating effects on the foundations of China's feudal economy, this state of affairs gave rise to certain objective conditions and possibilities for the development of capitalist production in China. For the destruction of the natural economy created a market for the sale of products for capitalism, while the bankruptcy oflarge numbers of peasants and handicraftsmen provided it with a market for the purchase of labor. In fact, some merchants, landlords, and bureaucrats began investing in modem industry as far back as sixty years ago, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, under the stimulus of foreign capitalism and because of certain cracks in the feudal economic structure. About forty years ago, at the turn of the century, China's national capitalism took its first steps forward. Then, about twenty years ago, during the first imperialist world war, China's national industry expanded, chiefly in textiles, flour milling, and silk weaving, because the imperialist countries in Europe and America were preoccupied with the war and temporarily relaxed their oppression of China. During this period,the number offactories in China's textile industry increased from 22 in /915to 44 in 1922; the number offactories in the flour milling industry increased from 67 in /916to 107; the silk weaving industry had 63 more factories. There were 108 more Chinese banks at the time. The history of the emergence and development of national capitalism is at the same time the history ofthe emergence and development ofthe Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat. Just as a section of the merchants, landlords, and bureaucrats were precursors of the Chinese bourgeoisie, so a section of the peasants and handicraft workers were the precursors of the Chinese proletariat. As distinct social classes, the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat are newborn and never existed before in Chinese history. They have evolved into new social classes from the womb of feudal society. They are twins born of China's old (feudal) society, at once linked to each other and antagonistic toward each other. However, the Chinese proletariat emerged and grew simultaneously not only with the Chinese national bourgeoisie but also with the enterprises directly operated by the imperialists in China. Hence, the Chinese proletariat30 is older and more experienced than the Chinese bourgeoisie and is therefore a greater and more broadly based social force. However, the development" of capitalism is only one aspect ofthe change that has taken place since the imperialist penetration of China. There is another concomitant and obstructive aspect, namely, the collusion of imperialism with the Chinese feudal remnants 32 to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism.

30. The Chinese proletariat ..... A large section of the Chinese proletariat 31. The development -+ The emergence and development 32. Feudal remnants .... Feudal forces

DECEMBER 1939 285

It is certainly not the purpose ofthe imperialist powers invading China to transform feudal China into capitalist China. On the contrary, their purpose is to transform China into their own semicolony or colony. To this end, the imperialist powers have used and continue to use every military. political, economic, and cultural means of oppression, so that China has gradually become a semicolony and colony. They are as follows: 1. After defeating33 China in war, the imperialist powers seized many Chinese protectorates and parts of China's territory. 34 Japan35 occupied Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Penghu Islands, and the port ofLushun, 36 Britain seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hongkong, and France occupied Vietnam. 37 Even a miserable little country such as Portugal seized our Macao. In addition to annexing territory, they exacted huge indemnities. Thus heavy blows were struck at China's huge feudal empire. 2. In accordance with treaties, the imperialist powers have the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China,38 and they have carved up the whole country into imperialist spheres of influence. 3. The imperialist powers have gained control of all the important trading ports in China by these treaties39 and have marked off areas in many of these ports as concessions under their direct administration. They have also gained control of China's customs, foreign trade, and communications (sea, land, inland water, and air). Thus they have been able to dump their goods in China, tum it into a market for their industrial products, and at the same time subordinate40 its agriculture to their imperialist needs.

33. After defeating -+ The imperialist powers have waged many wars of aggression against China, for instance, the Opium War launched by Britain in 1840, the war launched by the Anglo-French Allied Forces in 1857, the Sino-French War of 1884, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and the war launched by the Allied Forces of the Eight Powers in 1900. After defeating 34. The imperialist powers seized many Chinese protectorates and parts of China's territory ..... The imperialist powers not only occupied many neighboring countries formerly under its protection but seized or "leased" parts of its territory. 35. Japan ..... For instance, Japan 36. The port of Lushun ... "Leased" the port of Lushun 37. Occupied Vietnam ... "Leased" Guangzhouwan. (Guangzhouwan was a bay opposite Hainan Island used by the French as a naval station.) 38. In accordance with treaties, the imperialist powers have the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China, .... The imperialist powers have forced China to sign numerous unequal treaties by which they have acquired the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China. 39. Treaties .... Unequal treaties 40. Thus they have been able to dump their goods in China, tum it into a market for their industrial products, and at the same time subordinate .... Thus they have been able to subordinate

286

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

4. The imperialist powers operate many enterprises in light and some sections ofheavy industry in China in order to utilize her raw materials and cheap labor on the spot. and they thereby directly compete with China's national industry. 41 5. The imperialist powers monopolize China's banking and finance by extending loans to the Chinese government and establishing banks in China. Thus they have not only overwhelmed China's national capitalism in commodity competition, but they have also secured a stranglehold on its banking and finance. 6. The imperialist powers have established a network of comprador and merchant-usurer exploitation right across China, from the trading ports to the remote hinterland, and have created a comprador and merchant-usurer class in their service, so as to facilitate their exploitation of the broad Chinese peasantry. 42 7. Besides the comprador class, the imperialist powers still need larger social forces as the props of their rule in China.43 Imperialism "first forms an alliance with 44 the ruling strata of the previous social structure, with the feudal landlords and the trading and money-lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people. Everywhere imperialism attempts to preserve and to maintain those precapitalist forms of exploitation (especially in the villages) which serve as the basis for the existence of its reactionary alliance"45 (the Guidelines of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International on the Movement of Colonies and Semicolonies). "Imperialism, with all its financial and military might, is the force in China that supports and promotes46 the feudal survivals, together with their entire bureaucratic-militarist superstructure, to Europeanize them and tum them into conservative forces" (Speech by Stalin at the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1927). 8. The imperialist powers supply the Chinese government47 with large quantities of munitions and a host of military advisers, in order to keep the warlords fighting among themselves and to suppress the Chinese people. 9. Furthermore, the imperialist powers have never slackened their efforts to poison the minds of the Chinese people. This is their cultural policy. 48 And it is carried out through missionary work, through establishing schools,49 publishing

41. Directly compete with China's national industry ... Directly exert economic pressure on China's national industry and obstruct the development of its productive forces 42. The broad Chinese peasantry ~ The masses of the Chinese peasantry and other sections of the people 43. Besides the comprador class, the imperialist powers still need larger social forces as the props of their rule in China. ~ The imperialist powers have made the feudal landlord class as well as the comprador class the main props of their rule in China. 44. Fonns an alliance with ..... Allies itself with 45. Alliance ..... Allies 46. Supports and promotes ..... Supports, inspires, fosters. and preserves 47. Chinese government ..... Chinese reactionary government 48. Cultural policy -+ Policy of cultural aggression 49. Schools ~ Hospitals and schools

DECEMBER 1939

287

newspapers, and inducing Chinese students to study abroad. Their aim is to train intellectuals who will serve their interests and to dupe the people. 10. Step by step, the imperialist pawers turned China into a semicolony. This situation was the result of many brutal wars waged by them. For instance, the British Opium War of 1840, the attack on Beijing by the British and French Allied Forces in /857, the Sino-French War of 1884, the Sino-Japanese War of /894, the attack on Beijing by the Allied Forces of Eight Countries in /900. The abovementioned situation emerged when China became a semicolony jointly ruled and rivaled for by the major imperialist pawers after these wars. Since September 18, 1931, the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism has turned a big chunk of China'0 into a Japanese colony. These facts represent the other aspect of the change that has taken place since the imperialist penetration of China-the blood-stained picture of feudal China being reduced to semifeudal, semicolonial, and colonial China. It is thus clear that in their aggression against China the imperialist powers have, on the one hand, hastened the disintegration of feudal society and the growth of elements of capitalism, thereby transforming a feudal into a semi feudal society and, on the other, imposed their ruthless rule on China, reducing an independent country to a semicolonial and colonial country. Taking both these aspects together, we can see that China's colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal society possesses the following characteristic: I. The self-sufficient natural economy" of feudal times have been destroyed, but the feudal exploitation of the peasantry by the landlord class, which is the basis of the feudal exploitation,'2 not only remains intact but, linked as it is with exploitation by comprador and usurer capital, clearly dominates China's social and economic life, either in the areas controlled by the Chinese government that is resisting Japan or in the areas occupied by Japan. 2. National capitalism has developed to a certain extent and has played a certain" part in China's political and cultural life, but it has not become the principal pattern in China's social economy; it is flabby and is associated with foreign imperialism and domestic feudal remnants." The destruction and plunder ofmost of the national industry by Japanese imperialism especially since the September 18 Incident have greatly changed the situation in China. 3. The autocracy'' ofthe emperors and nobility has been overthrown, and in its place there have arisen either the warlord-bureaucrat rule'6 of the landlord class or 50. China ..... Semicolonial China 51. The self~sufficient natural economy ..... The foundations of self-sufficient natural economy 52. Feudal exploitation ..... System of feudal exploitation 53. Certain ..... Considerable 54. Feudal remnants ....., Feudalism in varying degrees 55. Autocracy ..... Autocratic rule 56. Warlord-bureaucrat rule ..... Warlord-bureaucrat rule of the landlord class

288 MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

the joint dictatorship of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In the occupied areas there is the rule of Japanese imperialism and its puppets. 4. Imperialism controls not only China's vital financial and economic arteries but also its political and military power. In the occupied areas, everything is in the hands of Japanese imperialism. 5. China's economic, political, and cultural development is very uneven, because it has been under the complete or partial domination of many imperialist powers, because it has actually been in a state of disunity for a long time, and because its territory is immense. 6. Under the twofold oppression of imperialism and feudal remnants,57 and especially as a result ofthe large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, and particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have even been pauperized,58 living in hunger and cold and without any political rights. The poverty and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on a scale seldom found in other flfltions of the world. Such are the characteristics of China's colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal society. This situation has, in the main, been determined by the Japanese and other imperialist forces; it is the result of the collusion of foreign imperialism and domestic feudal remnants. The contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contra· diction between feudal remnants and the great masses of the people are the basic contradictions in contemporary 59 Chinese society. Of course, there are others, such as the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the contradictions within the ruling classes60 themselves. But the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation is the principal one. These contradictions and their intensification must inevitably result in the incessant growth of revolutionary movements. The great revolutions in modem and contemporary China have emerged and grown on the basis of these basic contradictions.

Chapter 2. The Chinese Revolution

A. The Revolutionary Movements in the Last Hundred Years The history of China's transformation into a semicolony and colony by imperialism in collusion with Chinese feudal remnants is at the same time a history of

57. Feudal remnants ..... Feudalism (This change occws repeatedly in this text and is not further footnoted.)

58. Pauperized-+ Pauperized in large numbers 59. Contemporary

~

Modem

60. Ruling classes

-+

Reactionary ruling classes

DECEMBER 1939 289

slfllggle by the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys. From the Opium War, the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Boxer movement, the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement, the May Thirtieth movement, the Northern Expedition, and the Agrarian Revolution,61 to the present War of Resistance Against Japan-all these testify to the Chinese people's unre1enting62 spirit in fighting imperialism and its lackeys. Thanks to the Chinese people's unrelenting and heroic struggle during the last hundred years, imperialism has not been able to subjugate all of China, nor will it ever be able to do so. The valiant Chinese people will certainly fight on, even though Japanese imperialism is now exerting its full strength in an all-out offensive, and many landlord and big bourgeois elements, such as the overt and covert Wang Jingweis, have already capitulated to the enemy or are preparing to do so. This heroic struggle, already waged by the Chinese people for three years, will not cease until they have driven Japanese imperialism out of China and have achieved the complete liberation of the country. The national revolutionary struggle ofthe Chinese people has a history of fully one hundred years counting from the Opium War of 1840, or of thirty years counting from the 1911 Revolution. It has not yet run its full course, nor has it yet performed its tasks with any signal success; therefore the Chinese people, and, above all, the Communist Party, must shoulder the responsibility of resolutely fighting on. What are the targets of the revolution? What are its tasks? What are its motive forces? What is its character? And what are its perspectives? These are the questions we shall now deal with.

B. The Targets of the Chinese Revolution From our analysis in the third section of Chapter I, we know that present-day Chinese society is a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society. Only when we grasp the nature of Chinese society will we be able to understand clearly the targets, tasks, motive forces, and character of the Chinese revolution and its perspectives and future transition. A clear understanding of the nature of Chinese society, that is, of Chinese conditions, is therefore the key to a clear understanding of all the problems of the revolution. Since the nature of present-day Chinese society is colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal, what are the chief targets or enemies at this stage of the Chinese revolution?

61. Agrarian Revolution-. Agrarian Revolutionary War 62. Unrelenting ..... Indomitable

290

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

They are none other than imperialism and the semifeudal forces, 63 the bourgeoisie of foreign countries,64 and the landlord class of our country. For it is these two that are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of Chinese society at the present stage. The two collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people, and imperialism is the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the Chinese people, because national oppression by imperialism is the more onerous. Since Japan's armed invasion of China, the principal enemy of the revolution has been Japanese imperialism together with all the Chinese traitors65 in league with it, whether they have capitulated openly or are preparing to do so. The Chinese bourgeoisie, which is also a victim of imperialist oppression, once led or played a principal or partial role in glorious revolutionary struggles such as the 1911 Revolution and has participated in revolutionary struggles such as the Northern Expedition and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the long period from 1927to 1936,66 however,they67 collaborated with imperialism, formed a reactionary alliance with the landlord class, betrayed the friends who had helped it-the Communist Party, the proletariat, the peasantry, and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie-betrayed the Chinese revolution, became the common enemy of the people, and brought about its defeat. At that time, therefore, the revolutionary people and the revolutionary political party (the Communist Party) could not but regard the bourgeoisie68 as one of the targets of the revolution. In the War of Resistance a section of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Jingwei, has turned traitor and deserted to the enemy. Consequently, those among the people who are anti-Japanese cannot but regard these big bourgeois elements who have betrayed our national interests as one of the targets of the revolution. It is evident, then, that the enemies ofthe Chinese revolution are very powerful. They include not only powerful imperialists, as well as powerful semifeudal forces but also the bourgeoisie,69 which, at times, collaborates with the imperialist and semifeudal forces to oppose the people. Therefore, it is wrong to underestimate the strength of the enemies of the Chinese revolution. 70 In the face of such enemies, the Chinese revolution cannot be other than protracted and ruthless. With such powerful enemies, the revolutionary forces cannot be built up and tempered into a power capable of crushing them except over a long

63. Semifeudal forces ... Feudalism 64. Foreign countries -+The imperialist countries 65. Chinese traitors .... Chinese traitors and reactionaries 66. 1927-1936 ~ 1927-1937 67. They ...,. Its upper stratum, namely, the section represented by the reactionary clique within the Guomindang, 68. The bourgeoisie -+ These bourgeois e1ements 69. The bourgeoisie ..... The bourgeois reactionaries 70. The Chinese revolution -+The revolutionary Chinese people

DECEMBER /939

29/

riod of time. With enemies who so ruthlessly suppress the Chinese revolution, the pevolutionary forces cannot hold their own positions, let alone capture those of the ~emy. unless they steel themselves and display their tenacity to the full. It is there~ore wrong to think that the forces of the Chinese revolution can be built up in the twinkling of an eye or that China's revolutionary struggle can triumph overnight. In the face of such enemies, the method or principal form of the Chinese revolution must be armed struggle, not peaceful struggle, for our enemies have made peaceful activity impossible for the Chinese people and have deprived them of all political freedom and democratic rights. Stalin says, "The characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting against the armed counterrevolution."71 This formulation is perfectly correct. Therefore, it is wrong to belittle armed struggle, revolutionary war, guerrilla war, and army work. In the face of such enemies, there arises the question of special revolutionary base areas. Since China's key cities have long been occupied by the powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies, it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to tum the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic, and cultural bastions of the revolution from which to fight their vicious enemies, who are using the cities for attacks on the rural districts, and in this way gradually to achieve the complete victory of the revolution through protracted fighting; it is imperative for them to do so if they do not wish to compromise with imperialism and its lackeys but are determined to fight on, and if they intend to build up and temper their forces and avoid decisive battles with a powerful enemy while their own strength is inadequate. Such being the case, victory in the Chinese revolution can be won first in the rural areas, and this is possible because China's economic development is uneven (the rural economy not being entirely dependent on the cities),72 because its territory is extensive (which gives the revolutionary forces room to maneuver), because the counterrevolutionary camp is disunited and full of contradictions, and because the struggle of the peasants who are the main force in the revolution is led by the Communist Party;73 but, on the other hand, these very circumstances make the revolution uneven and render the task of winning complete victory protracted and arduous. Clearly then the protracted revolutionary struggle in the special revolutionary base areas consists mainly in peasant guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the necessity of using rural districts as revolutionary base

?

I. The characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting agamst the armed counterrevolution . .... In China, armed revolution is fighting armed counterrevolution. That is one of the characteristics and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. be. 72. Th~ rural economy not being entirely dependent on the cities .... Its economy not •ng a umfied capitalist economy 73. The Communist Party ..... The Communist Party, the party of the proletariat

292

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

areas, to neglect painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla warfare. However, stressing armed struggle does not mean abandoning other forms of struggle; on the contrary, armed struggle cannot succeed unless coordinated with other forms of struggle. And stressing the work in the rural base areas does not mean abandoning our work in the cities and in the other vast rural areas which have not become base areas; 14 on the contrary, without the work in the cities and in these other rural areas, our own revolutionary base areas 75 would be isolated and the revolution would suffer defeat. Moreover, the final objective of the revolution is the capture of the cities, the enemy's main bases, and this objective cannot be achieved without necessary and adequate work in the cities. It is thus clear that the revolution cannot triumph either in the rural areas or in the cities without the destruction of the enemy's army, his chief weapon. 76 Therefore, there is the extremely important task of disintegrating them. 77 It is also clear that the Communist Party must not be impetuous and adventurist in its propaganda and organizational work in the urban and rural areas, which have been occupied by the enemy dominated by the forces of reaction and darkness for a long time, but that it must have cadres78 working underground/or a long time, must accumulate strength and bide its time there. In leading the people in struggle against the enemy, the Party must adopt the tactics of advancing step by step slowly and surely, keeping to the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, and making use of such open forms of activity as are permitted by law, decree, and social custom; empty clamor and reckless action can never lead to success.

C. The Tasks of the Chinese Revolution Imperialism and the feudal remnants79 being the chief enemies of the Chinese revolution at this stage, what are the present tasks of the revolution? Unquestionably, the main tasks are strike at these two enemies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal remnant80 oppression, the foremost task being the national revolution to overthrow imperialism.

74. Which have not become base areas...,. Which are still under the enemy's rule 75. Revolutionary base areas ..... Rural base areas 76. Chief weapon - Chief weapon against the people 77. Task of disintegrating them ... Task of disintegrating them, besides annihilating the enemy's troops in battle 78. Cadres - Well-selected cadres 79. Feudal remnants - Feudal landlord class 80. Remnant - Landlord

DECEMBER 1939 293

These two great tasks are interrelated. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, the rule of the feudal remnants81 cannot be terminated, because imperialism is its main support. Conversely, unless the feudal remnants are wiped out, the imperialist rule cannot be overthrown, because the feudal remnants are the main social base of the imperialist rule in China. 82 Therefore the two fundamental tasks, the national revolution and the democratic revolution, are at once distinct and united. In fact, the two revolutionary tasks are already linked, since the main immediate task of the national revolution is to resist the Japanese imperialist invaders and since the democratic revolution must be accomplished in order to achieve victoryBl in the War of Resistance Against Japan. It is inappropriate84 to regard the national revolution and the democratic revolution as two entirely contradictory stages85 of the revolution.

D. The Motive Forces of the Chinese Revolution Given the nature of Chinese society and the present targets and tasks of the Chinese revolution as analyzed and defined above, what are the motive forces of the Chinese revolution? Since Chinese society is colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal, since the targets ofthe revolution are mainly foreign imperialist rule and domestic semi feudal forces, 86 and since the tasks of the national revolution and democratic revolution are to overthrow these two oppressors, which of the various classes and strata in Chinese society constitute the forces capable of fighting them? This is the question of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution at the present stage. A clear understanding of this question is indispensable to a correct solution of the problem of the basic tactics of the Chinese revolution. What classes are there in present-day Chinese society? There are the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, constituting the upper-stratum ruling classes. 87 And there

81. Feudal remnants ~ Feudal landlord class 82. Unless the feudal remnants are wiped out, the imperialist rule cannot be overthrown, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of the imperialist rule in China~ Unless help is given to the peasants in their struggle to ovenhrow the feudal landlord class, it will be impossible to build powerful revolutionary contingents to overthrow imperialist

rule, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of imperialist rule in China and the peasantry is the main force in the Chinese revolution 83. Achieve victory ..... Achieve victory in the war

84. Inappropriate ~ Wrong 85. Contradictory stages ....,. Different stages

86. Semifeudal forces

~

Feudalism

87. Bourgeoisie, constituting the upper-stratum ruling classes-+ Bourgeoisie, the landlord class, and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie constituting the ruling classes in Chinese society

294 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the different sections of the petty bourgeoisie,88 all of which are still the subjected classes in vast areas. The attitude and the stand of these classes toward the Chinese revolution are entirely determined by their economic status in society. Thus the motive forces as well as the targets and tasks of the revolution are determined by the nature of China's socioeconomic system. Let us now analyze the different classes in Chinese society. /. The Landlord Class The landlord class, a representative of the feudal remnants, forms the main social base for imperialist rule in China; it is a class which exploits89 and oppresses the peasants, obstructs China's political, economic, and cultural development, and brings no benefits whatsoever. 90 Therefore, the landlords, as a class, are a target and not a motive force of the revolution. However, the most reactionary in the landlord class is the big landlord stratum. Medium-size and small landlords, especially small landlords in bankruptcy and semibankruptcy, are rather different. When the revolution only opposes imperialism and the big landlords, they often can keep neutral and temporarily join the struggle. This is especially true for many intellectuals who come from such backgrounds and have received scientific education. In the present War of Resistance, a section of the big landlords, along with one section of the big bourgeoisie (the capitulationists), has surrendered to the Japanese aggressors and turned traitor, while another section ofthe big landlords, along with another section of the big bourgeoisie (the diehards), is increasingly wavering even though it is still in the anti-Japanese camp. But a good many of the enlightened gentry who are medium and small landlords and who have some capitalist coloration display some enthusiasm for the war, and they are still worth uniting with 91 in the common fight against Japan.

2. The Bourgeoisie There is a distinction between the comprador big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The comprador big bourgeoisie is a class which directly serves the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is nurtured by them; countless ties link it closely with

88. The different sections of the petty bourgeoisie -+The different sections of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry 89. Which exploits ...., Which uses the feudal system to exploit 90. Brings no benefits ... Plays no progressive role 91. They are still worth uniting with-+ We should still unite with them

DECEMBER 1939 295

the feudal forces in the countryside. Therefore, it is a target of the Chinese revolution, and never in the history of the revolution has it been a motive force. However, different sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie owe allegiance to different imperialist powers, so when the contradictions among the latter become very acute and the revolution is directed mainly against one panicular imperialist power, it becomes possible for the sections of the comprador class which serve other imperialist groupings to join the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain period. But they will turn against the Chinese revolution the moment their masters do. In the anti-Japanese war the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie (the capitulationists) have either surren~ered or are preparing to surrender. The pro-European and proAmerican big bourgeoisie (the diehards) are wavering more and more, even though they are still in the anti-Japanese camp, and they are playing the double game of simultaneously resisting Japan and opposing the Communist Pany. Our policy toward the big bourgeois capitulationists is to treat them as enemies and resolutely strike them down. Toward the big bourgeoisie diehards, we employ a revolutionary dual policy; on the one hand, we unite with them because they are still antiJapanese and we should take advantage oftheir residual anti-Japanese enthusiasm,92 but, on the other hand, we firmly struggle against them because they pursue a high-handed, anti-Communist, reactionary policy detrimental to resistance and unity, both of which would be jeopardized without such a struggle. The national bourgeoisie is a class with a dual character. On the one hand, it is oppressed by imperialism and fettered by feudal remnants and, consequently, is in contradiction with both of them. In this respect it constitutes one of the revolutionary motive forces. In the course of the Chinese revolution, it has displayed enthusiasm for fighting imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords. But, on the other hand, it lacks the courage to oppose imperialism and the feudal remnants thoroughly because it is economically and politically flabby and still has economic ties with imperialism and the feudal remnants. This emerges very clearly when the people's revolutionary forces grow powerful. It follows from the dual character of the national bourgeoisie that, at cenain times and to a certain extent, it can take part in the revolution against imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords and can become a revolutionary motive force, but that, at other times, there is the danger of its following the big

bourgeoisie93 and acting as its accomplice in counterrevolution. The national bourgeoisie in China, which is mainly the middle bourgeoisie, has never really held political power but has been restricted by the reactionary policies

92. Take advantage of their residual anti-Japanese enthusiasm .... Make use of their contradictions with Japanese imperialism 93. The big bourgeoisie .... The comprador big bourgeoisie

296 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie which are in power, although it followed them in opposing the revolution in the period from 1927 to 1931 (before the September 18 Incident). In the present war, it differs not only from the capitulationists of the big bourgeoisie94 but also from the big bourgeois diehards, and so far has been a fairly good ally of ours. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to have a prudent policy toward the national bourgeoisie. 3. The Different Categories of the Petty Bourgeoisie95

The petty bourgeoisie consists of the vast numbers of intellectuals, the urban poor, office workers, handicraftsmen, professional people, and small tradesmen. 96 Like the peasantry, they all suffer97 under the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, and the big bourgeoisie, and they are being driven ever nearer to bankruptcy or destitution. Hence the petty bourgeoisie98 constitute one of the motive forces of the revolution and are a reliable ally of the proletariat. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can they achieve their liberation. Let us now analyze the different sections of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry. First, intellectuals and student youth. Their numbers99 have grown considerably during the past few decades. Apan from that section of the intellectuals which has associated itself with the imperialists and the big bourgeoisie and works for them against the people, most intellectuals and students are oppressed by imperialism, feudal remnants, and the big bourgeoisie, and live in fear of unemployment or of having to discontinue their studies. Therefore, they tend to be quite revolutionary. They are more or less equipped with modem 100 scientific knowledge, have a keen political sense, and can play a vanguard role or serve as a link with the masses in the present stage of the revolution. The movement of the Chinese students abroad before the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth movement of 1925, and the December Ninth movement of 1935 are striking proofs of this. In particular, the large numbers of more or less impover94. The big bourgeoisie ~ The big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie 95. The petty bourgeoisie -. The petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry 96. Intellectuals, the urban poor, office workers, handicraftsmen, professional people, and small tradesmen -+ Intellectuals, small tradesmen. handicraftsmen, and professional people

97. Like the peasantry. they all suffer -+ Their status somewhat resembles that of the middle peasants. they all suffer 98. The petty bourgeoisie ..... These sections of the petty bourgeoisie 99. Student youth. Their numbers .... Student youth. They do not constitU[e a separate class or stratum. In present-day China, most of them may be placed in the petty-bourgeoisie category. judging by their family origin, their living conditions, and their political outlook. Their numbers 100. Modern-+ Bourgeois

DECEMBER /939

297

ished intellectuals and semi-intellectuals can join hands with the workers and peasants in supporting or participating in the revolution. In China, it was among the intellectuals and young students that Marxist-Leninist ideology was first widely disseminated and accepted. Without the participation of revolutionary intellectuals, the revolutionary forces cannot be successfully organized and revolutionary work cannot be successfully conducted. But the intellectuals often tend to be impractical101 in their thinking and irresolute in action until they have thrown themselves heart and soul into mass revolutionary struggles or made up their minds to serve the interests of the masses and live like them. 102 Hence although the mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China can play a vanguard role or serve as a link to the masses, not all ofthem will remain revolutionaries to the end. Some often drop out of the revolutionary ranks at critical moments and become passive, while a few may even become enemies of the revolution. Chen Duxiu and Zhang Guotao are representatives of these few intellectuals. Intellectuals are often subjective and individualistic. The intellectuals can wash away 103 their shortcomings only in mass

struggles over a long period. Second, the urban poor. 104 The urban poor includes bankrupt handicraftsmen, small tradesmen, peasants who left their native places to seek jobs in cities and cannot find work, and large numbers of coolies who earn their living by sporadic piece work. They constitute a big section of the masses, and their status, more or less similar to that of the poor peasants, is that of a kind of semi proletarians. Their status encourages them to support the revolution and makes them more receptive to the leadership of the proletariat. So, like the poor peasants, they are an excellent revolutionary force and natural allies of the proletariat. Third, the office workers. This category consists of staff in industrial and commercial enterprises and the vast numbers of monthly salary earners in government I0 l. Impractical ... Subjective and individualistic, impractical 102. Live like them ..... Become one with them 103. Wash away ..... Overcome 104. Second, the urban poor ... who hold a vacillating attitude toward the revolution.

(i.e., Jhe balance of this section, down to heading 4. The Peasantry) -+ Second, the small tradesmen. Generally they run small shops and employ few or no assistants. They live under the threat of bankruptcy as a result of exploitation by imperialism, the big bourgeoisie, and the usurers. Third, the handicraftsmen. They are very numerous. They possess their own means of production and hire no workers, or only one or two apprentices or helpers. Their position is similar to that of the middle peasants. Fourth, professional people. They include doctors and men of other professions. They do not exploit other people or do so only to a slight degree. Their position is similar to that of the handicraftsmen. These sections of the petty bourgeoisie make up a vast multitude of people whom we must win over and whose interests we must protect because in general they can suppon or join the revolution and are good allies. Their weakness is that some of them are easily influenced by the bourgeoisie; consequently, we must cany on revolutionary propaganda and organizational work among them.

298 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

and cultural organizations. They are also an important revolutionary force, as they do not exploit other people, but make their living by selling their mental work or technical skills and are under serious threat of unemployment. This category has quite large numbers of people, and they are indispensable for the development of the country and its culture. Fourth, the handicraftsmen and professional people. The handicraftsmen, being independent producers and very numerous, are the builders of China's economy now. Hit by the competition of foreign goods and unable to extricate themselves from the trap of commercial usury capital, they can stand on the side of the revolution. They are also an important force of the revolution. Some of them employ a few workers, and others do not. The latter are more reliable allies. Professional people such as doctors, often influenced by the bourgeoisie ideologically, belong to the same category as the handicraftsmen and constitute an indispensable sector of social life. They may also become a revolutionary force, as they are oppressed by imperialism and feudal remnant forces as well. Fifth, the small tradesmen. They are generally under the oppression of imperialism and the big bourgeoisie class and make up a large number of the masses. The lower stratum of them do not exploit the labor of others and are themselves exploited by usuries, thus they are a useful force in the revolution. Only members of the upper stratum who exploit other people's labor and are associated with imperialism, the comprador class, or feudal remnants are those who hold a vacillating attitude toward the revolution. 4. The Peasantry The peasantry constitutes 105 80 percent of China's total population and is the main force in its national economy today. Generally speaking, the peasantry are all petty bourgeois, but a sharp process of polarization is taking place among them. First, the rich peasants. They form about 5 percent of the rural population (or 10 percent 106 together with the landlords) and are called the rural bourgeoisie. Most of the rich peasants in China are semi feudal in character, 107 and are linked with the urban bourgeoisie. But the revolutionary government 108 should notre-

105. Constitutes .... Constitutes approximately I 06. 10 percent -+ About 10 percent 107. Semi feudal in r:haracter,-+ Semi feudal in character, since most of them let a part of their land, practice usury, and ruthlessly exploit the farm laborers, 108. But the revolutionary government-+ But they generally engage in labor themselves

and in this sense are part of the peasantry. The rich-peasant form of production will remain useful for a definite period. Generally speaking, they might make some contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peasant masses and stay neutral in the agrarian revolutionary struggle against the landlords. Therefore we

DECEMBER /939

299

gard the rich peasants as belonging to the same stratum 109 as the landlords and should not prematurely adopt a policy of attacking 110 the rich peasantry, because rich peasant production is indispensable for a certain period of time. Second, the middle peasants. They form about 20 percent of China's rural population. They are economically self-supporting (they may have something to lay aside when the crops are good and occasionally hire some labor or lend small sums of money at interest); and generally they do not exploit others but are exploited by imperialism, the landlord class, and the big bourgeoisie. Apart from some rich middle peasants, most of them do not have sufficient land, nor do they have political power. 111 Not only can the middle peasants resolutely join the antiimperialist revolution and the Agrarian Revolution, but they can also participate in the socialist revolution. 112 Therefore the whole middle peasantry can be a reliable ally of the proletariat and is a very good 113 motive force of the revolution. The positive or negative attitude of the middle peasants is the factor 114 determining victory or defeat in the revolution, and this will be especially true after the Agrarian Revolution, when they become the majority of the rural population. Third, the poor peasants. The poor peasants in China, together with the farm laborers, form about 70 percent of the rural population. They are the broad peasant masses with no land or insufficient land, the semi proletariat ofthe countryside, the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, the natural and most reliable ally of the proletariat, and the main contingent of China's revolutionary forces. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can the middle and poor peasants achieve their liberation, and only by forming a firm alliance with the middle and poor peasants can the proletariat lead the revolution to victory. Otherwise neither is possible. The term "peasantry" refers mainly to the middle and poor peasants. 5. The Proletariat

Among the Chinese proletariat, the modem industrial workers number from 2.5 million to 3 million, the handicrafts workers in the cities'" total about 12 million, and in addition there are great numbers of rural proletarians. 116 109. Stratum~ Class 110. Attacking ~ Liquidating Ill. Apart from some rich middle peasants, most of them do not have sufficient land, nor do they have political power. -+ They have no political power. Some of them do not have enough land, and only a section (the well-to-do middle peasants) have some surplus land. 112. Participate in the socialist revolution ... Accept socialism 113. Very good~ Important 114. The factor ... One of the factors 115. The handicraft workers in the cities -+ The workers in small-scale industty and in handicrafts, and the shop assistants in the cities 116. Proletarians .. Proletarians (the farm laborers) and other propertyless people in the cities and the countryside.

300 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities. 117 What are they? First, the Chinese proletariat is much more resolute and thoroughgoing in revolutionary struggle than any other class because it is subjected to a threefold oppression (imperialist, bourgeois, and feudal), which is marked by a severity and cruelty seldom found in other countries. Since there is no economic basis for social reformism in colonial and semicolonial China, as there is in Western Europe (however, it must be noted that sometimes Chinese national reformism may easily influence a number of workers), the whole proletariat, with the exception of a few scabs, is most revolutionary. Second, from the moment it appeared on the revolutionary scene, the Chinese proletariat came under the leadership of its own revolutionary party-the Chinese Communist Party-and became the most politically conscious class in Chinese society. Third, because the Chinese proletariat by origin is made up largely of bankrupt peasants, it has natural ties with the peasant masses, and this facilitates its forming a close revolutionary alliance with them. Therefore, in spite of certain unavoidable weaknesses, for instance, its smallness (as compared with the peasantry), its youth (as compared with the proletariat in the capitalist countries), and its low educational level (as compared with the bourgeoisie), the Chinese proletariat is nonetheless the basic motive force of the Chinese revolution. Unless it is participated in and led by the proletariat, the Chinese revolution cannot possibly succeed. To take an example from the past, the 1911 Revolution miscarried because the proletariat did not consciously participate in it and the Communist Party was not yet in existence. More recently, the Great Revolution of 1925-27 118 achieved great success for a time because the proletariat consciously participated 119 and the Communist Party was already in existence; it ended in defeat because the bourgeoisie 120 betrayed its alliance with the proletariat and abandoned the common revolutionary program, and also because the Chinese proletariat and its political party did not yet have enough revolutionary experience. Now take the present anti-Japanese war-because the proletariat and the Communist Party are exercising leadership in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the whole nation has been united and the great War of Resistance has been launched and is being resolutely pursued.

117. The Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities. -+ In addition to the basic qualities it shares with the proletariat everywhere-its association with the most advanced form of the economy, its strong sense of organization and discipline, and its lack of private means of production-the Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities. 118. 1925-27 ~ 1924-27 119. Participated-+ Participated and exercised leadership 120. The bourgeoisie -+ The big bourgeoisie

DECEMBER 1939 301

The Chinese proletariat, under the leadership of the Communist Party, completely understands 121 that, although it is the class with the highest political consciousness and sense of organization, it cannot win victory by its own strength alone. In order to win, it must unite, according to varying circumstances, with all classes and strata that can take part in the revolution and must organize a revolutionary united front. Among all the classes in Chinese society, the peasantry is a firm ally of the working class, the urban petty bourgeoisie is a reliable ally, and the national bourgeoisie is an ally in certain periods and to a certain extent. This is one of the fundamental laws established by China's modem revolutionary history. China's status 122 as a colony and semicolony has given rise to a multitude of rural and urban unemployed. Denied proper means of making a living, many of them are forced to resort to the so-called disreputable and illegitimate ones, hence the robbers, gangsters, beggars, prostitutes, and the numerous people who live on superstitious practices. This social stratum is unstable; while some are apt to be bought over by the reactionary forces, others may have revolutionary qualities. 123 These people lack constructive qualities and are given to destruction rather than construction; they 124 become a source of roving-rebel and anarchist ideology. 125 Therefore, we should know how to guide 126 them, pay attention to organizing revolutionary qualities, and guard against their destructiveness. The above is our analysis of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution.

E- The Character of the ChiMse Revolution We have now gained an understanding of the nature of Chinese society, that is, of the specific conditions in China; this understanding is the essential prerequisite for solving all China's revolutionary problems. We are also clear about the targets, the tasks, and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution; these are basic issues at the present stage of the revolution and arise from the special nature of Chinese society, that is, from China's specific conditions. Understanding all this, we can now understand another basic issue of the revolution at the present stage, namely, the character of the Chinese revolution. In the final analysis, what is the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage? Is it a bourgeois-democratic or a proletarian-socialist revolution? Obviously, it is the former, not the latter.

121. Completely understands ~ Should undersland 122. The revised version inserts a heading, "6. The Vagrants, .. before this paragraph. 123. Have revolutionary qualities ... Join the revolution 124. They ..... After joining the revolution, they 125. Roving-rebel and anarchist ideology~ Roving-rebel and anarchist ideology in the revolutionary ranks

126. Guide

~

Remold

302

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Given that Chinese society is still a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society; that the principal enemies of the Chinese revolution are still imperialism and the semi feudal forces; that the task of the Chinese revolution consists in a national

revolution and a democratic revolution to overthrow these two principal enemies; that the motive forces of this revolution include at times the national bourgeoisie and even a pan of the big bourgeoisie, so that even if the big bourgeoisie betrays the revolution and becomes its enemy, the spearhead of the revolution will still be directed against imperialism and feudal despotism and not against all capitalism and capitalist private property-since all these things are true, the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist but bourgeois-

democratic. But in present-day China the bourgeois-democratic revolution is no longer of the old, general type, which is now obsolete, but of a special, new type. This kind of revolution is developing in China and in all other colonial and semicolonial countries, and we call it the new-democratic revolution. This new-democratic revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution; it resolutely opposes imperialism, that is, international capitalism. Politically, it means the joint revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the imperialists, Chinese traitors, and reactionaries and opposition to the transformation of Chinese society into a society under bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it means nationalization of all the big capital and big enterprises of the imperialists, Chinese traitors, and reactionaries and the distribution of large landed property 127 among the peasants, while assisting small and medium-size private enterprises, without eliminating the rich-peasant economy. Thus, the new type of democratic revolution clears the way for capitalism, on the one hand, and creates the prerequisites for socialism, on the other. The present stage of the Chinese revolution is a stage of transition between the abolition of the colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society and the establishment of a socialist society. It is a new revolutionary process, that of the new-democratic revolution. This process began only after World War I and the Russian October Revolution; it started in China with the May Fourth movement of 1919. A new-democratic revolution is an anti-imperialist and anti feudal revolution of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. It is a revolution of the united front of several revolutionary classes. China 128 can advance to the socialist revolution only by going through such a revolution; there is no other way. This kind of new-democratic revolution differs greatly from the democratic revolutions in the history of various European and American countries in that it results not in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie but in a dictatorship of the united front of all the revolutionary classes. 129 In the anti-Japanese war, the anti-Japanese 127. Large landed property ... The land of the landlord class 128. China ..... Chinese society 129. Revolutionary classes ..... Revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat

DECEMBER 1939 303

democratic political power which ought to be established is the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, no this is neither a "one-party1l 1 dictatorship" of the bourgeoisie, nor a "one-party dictatorship" of the proletariat, but a "joint dictatorship of several parties" belonging to the anti-Japanese united front. 132 All those who stand for resistance to Japan and for democracy are qualified to share in this political power, regardless of their party affiliation. This kind of new-democratic revolution also differs from a socialist revolution in that it overthrows only the imperialists, Chinese traitors, and reactionaries, but does not overthrow all those capitalist elements which are still capable of participating in the anti-imperialist, anti feudal struggle. This kind of new-democratic revolution is basically identical to the revolution of the Three People's Principles as proclaimed by Mr. Sun Yatsen in 1924 (the. Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang). For in this manifesto, 133 Sun Yatsen declared: The so-called democratic system in various modem states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. Now, the Guomindang' s Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few. He also said:

Enterprises, such as banks, railways, and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreignowned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administrated by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital. Once again, in his Testament, Sun Yatsen pointed out the fundamental principle for domestic and foreign policy: We must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations which treat us as equals. The Three People's Principles of the old democracy, which were adapted to the old international and domestic conditions, were thus reshaped into the Three 130. The anti-Japanese democratic political power which ought to be established is the politicaJ power of the Anti-Japanese NationaJ United Front --. The anti-Japanese democratic politicaJ power established in the base areas which are under the leadership of the Communist Party is the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front 131. One-party -+ One-class 132. "Joint dictatorship of severaJ parties" belonging to the anti-Japanese united front ..., Joint dictatorship of the revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat 133. In this manifesto, ._. In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang issued in that year,

304

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

People's Principles of New Democracy, which are adapted to the new international and domestic conditions. The Chinese Communist Party was referring to the latter kind of Three People's Principles and to no other when, in the manifesto of September 22, 1937, it declared, "The Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization." These Three People's Principles embody Sun Yatsen's Three Great Policies-alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and union with the peasants and workers. In the new international and domestic conditions, any kind of Three People's Principles which departs from the Three Great Policies is not revolutionary. (Here we shall not deal with the fact that, while communism and the Three People's Principles basically agree on the political program for the democratic revolution, they differ in all other respects.) Thus, the role of the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be ignored, either in the alignment of forces for the struggle (that is, in the united front) or in the organization of state power. Anyone who tries to bypass these classes will certainly be unable to solve the problem of the destiny of the Chinese nation or indeed any of China's problems. The Chinese revolution at the present stage must strive to create a democratic republic in which the workers, the peasants, and the intellectuals 134 all occupy a certain position and play a certain role. In other words, it must be the democratic republic of a revolutionary alliance of the workers, peasants, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, 135 and all others who oppose imperialism and feudalism. Only under the leadership of the policies of the proletariat can such a republic be completely realized. 6. The Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution Now that the basic issues-the nature of Chinese society and the objectives, tasks, motive forces, and character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage-have been clarified, it is easy to see its prospects, that is, to understand the relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian social revolution."' and between the present and future stages of the Chinese revolution. Since China's bourgeois-democratic revolution at the present stage is not a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the general, old type, but a democratic revolution of a special, new type-a new-democratic revolution-and since the Chinese revo-

lution is now taking place in the new international environment of the 1940s and

134. The intellectuals~ Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie 135. Petty bourgeoisie-+ Urban petty bourgeoisie

136. Social revolution-+ Socialist revolution (This variant occurs repeatedly below and is not further footnoted.)

DECEMBER 1939 305

1950s, 137 characterized by the rise of socialism and the decline of capitalism, in the midst of the second great imperialist war 138 and on the eve of139 the second world revolution, there can be no doubt that the prospect for the Chinese revolution is not capitalism but socialism. 140 There can be no doubt that the purpose of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is to change the existing colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal state of society, that is, to strive for the completion of the new-democratic revolution. That being the case, it is not at all surprising, but entirely to be expected, that a capitalist economy will develop to a certain extent within Chinese society with the revolution sweeping away the obstacles to the development of capitalism after the victory of the revolution. A certain degree of capitalist development will be an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward China. Of course, it cannot be denied that this will be only one aspect of the outcome of the Chinese revolution and not its overall outcome. The overall outcome of the Chinese revolution will be the development of capitalist factors, on the one hand, and of socialist factors, on the other. What will these socialist factors be? They will include the growing relative weight of the proletariat and the Communist Party among the political forces in the whole country and the actual or possible recognition of the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party by the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie. 141 All these will be socialist factors. Together with the favorable international environment, these factors render it highly probable that China's bourgeois-democratic revolution will ultimately avoid a capitalist future and move toward the realization of socialism.

7. The Twofold Task of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party Summing up the foregoing sections of this chapter, we can see that the Chinese revolution as a whole involves a twofold task. That is to say, it embraces both the bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and a revolution that is proletarian-socialist in character, that is, the twofold task of the revolution both in its present and in its future stages. And the leadership in this twofold revolutionary task rests entirely on the shoulders of the party of the Chinese proletariat, the Communist Party. Without the leadership ofthe Chinese Communist Party, no revolution can succeed.

137. 1940s and 1950s

~

1930s and 1940s

138. The second great imperialist war__. World War II 139. On the eve of- In the era of

140. Socialism ... Socialism and communism 141. Petty bourgeoisie - Petty bourgeoisie; and the state sector of the economy owned by the democratic republic, and the cooperative sector of the economy owned by the work· ing people

306 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

To complete China's bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and to prepare for the transition to the stage of the socialist revolution when all the necessary conditions are ripe-such is the sum total of the great and glorious revolutionary task ofthe Chinese Communist Party. Every Party member must strive for its accomplishment and must absolutely never give up halfway. Some immature Communists think that our task is confined to the present democratic revolution and does not include the future socialist revolution or that the present revolution or the agrarian revolution is in fact the socialist revolution. It must be pointed out emphatically that both these views are wrong. Every Communist ought to know that the Chinese Communist movement 142 as a whole is a complete revolutionary movement embracing the two stages of the democratic revolution and the social revolution. These are two revolutionary processes different in nature, and the second revolutionary process can be carried out only after the first revolutionary process has been completed. The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the social revolution, and the social revolution is the inevitable trend ofthe democratic revolution. And the ultimate aim of all Communists is to strive for the final building of socialist society and communist society. Only on the basis of a clear understanding of the differences between the democratic and the social revolutions, and of the interconnections between them, is it possible to lead the Chinese revolution correctly. Except for the Communist Party, no political party (bourgeois or petty-bourgeois) is capable of assuming the taskofleading China's two great revolutions, the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, to their complete realization. But the Chinese Communist Party, from the very day of its birth, has taken this twofold task on its own shoulders and for eighteen years has fought strenuously for its accomplishment. Such a task is extremely glorious, but at the same time most arduous. It cannot be accomplished without a Bolshevik 143 Chinese Communist Party which is nationwide in scope and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. It is therefore the duty of every Communist to take part in building such a Communist Party. Next, we will discuss step by step the problem of building the Chinese Communist Party.

142. Chinese Communist movement Chinese Communist Party 143. Bolshevik ~ Bolshevized

~

Chinese revolutionary movement led by the

Stalin Is the Friend of the Chinese People (December 20, 1939)

December 21 of this year is Comrade Stalin's sixtieth birthday. It can be anticipated that this birthday will call forth warm and affectionate congratulations in the hearts of all those people in the world who are aware of this event and who know suffering.' To congratulate Stalin is not merely doing something to observe the occasion. To congratulate Stalin means to support him, to support his cause, to support the cause ofthe Soviet Union, to support the victory of socialism, to support the orientation he points out for humanity, and to support our own close friend. Today in the world the great majority of humanity is suffering and only by following the orientation pointed out by Stalin, and with Stalin's aid, can humanity be rescued from disaster. We Chinese people are now living in a time of profound calamity unprecedented in history, a time when help from others is most urgently needed. The Book of Poetry says, "Ying goes its cry, seeking with its voice its companion."2 We are precisely at such a juncture. But who are our friends? There is one kind of so-called friends who style themselves our friends, 3 and some among us also unthinkingly call them friends. But such friends can only be classed with Li Linfu of the Tang dynasty. Li Linfu was a prime minister of the Tang dynasty, a notorious man who was described as having "honey dripping from his tongue and a sword concealed in his heart." These friends today are precisely friends with "honey dripping from their tongues and swords concealed in their hearts." Who are these people? Part ofthose imperialists who say that they sympathize with China. There is another kind of friends who are different; they have real sympathy for us, and regard us as brothers. Who are these people? They are the Soviet Union, 4 and Stalin.

This article was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, December 20, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 133-35, which reproduces that text. 1. Who know suffering . ....., Who are revolutionary. 2. See the Shijing (Book of Poetry), II, I, V, 2-3 (Legge, Vol. IV, p. 253).

3. Our friends -+ Friends of the Chinese people 4. The Soviet Union -+ The people of the Soviet Union 307

308

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Not a single country has renounced its special rights and privileges in China; only the Soviet Union has done this. At the time of the Northern Expedition,5 all the imperialists opposed us, and the Soviet Union alone assisted us. Since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, not a single government of any imperialist country has really helped us. The Soviet Union alone has helped us

with its great resources in men, materiel, and money. 6 Is this not clear enough? To the cause of the liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, only the socialist country, the socialist leaders, the socialist people, and socialist thinkers, statesmen, and toilers are truly giving assistance. Without their help, it is impossible to win final victory. Stalin is the true friend of the Chinese nation and of the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people. The Chinese people's love and respect for Stalin, and our friendship for the Soviet Union, are wholly sincere. Any attempt, from whatever quarter, to sow dissension by rumor-mongering and slander will be of no avail in the end.

5. At the time of the Northern Expedition ... In the period of the First Great Revolution 6. With its great resources in men, materiel, and money .... With its air force and material resources

Speech at a Meeting ofAll Circles in Yan 'an to Commemorate Stalin's Sixtieth Birthday (December 21, 1939)

Today we are holding a meeting to congratulate Stalin on his sixtieth birthday. "From ancient times, few men have reached the age of seventy," and living to the age of sixty is also rare. But why do we celebrate only Stalin's birthday? And why, moreover, are such celebrations taking place not only in Yan'an but in the whole country and in the whole world? Provided only that they know who the man is who was born this day, provided that they know what manner of man he is, then all those who suffer oppression will congratulate him. The reason is that Stalin is the savior of all the oppressed. What kind of people are opposed to congratulating him and do not like to congratulate him? Only those who do not suffer oppression but, on the contrary, oppress other people, first of all, the imperialists. Comrades! A foreigner, who is separated from us by thousands of miles, and whose birthday is celebrated by everyone-is this not an unprecedented event? This is because he is leading the great Soviet Union, because he is leading the great Communist International, because he is leading the cause of the liberation of all mankind, and is helping China to fight Japan. At present, the whole world is divided into two fronts struggling against each other. On the one side is imperialism, which represents the front of the oppressors. On the other side is socialism, which represents the front of resistance to oppression. Some people imagine that the national-revolutionary front in the colonies and semicolonies occupies an intermediate position, but its enemy is imperialism, and hence it cannot do otherwise than call upon the friendship of socialism, and it cannot but belong to the revolutionary front of resistance to the oppressors. China's diehards imagine that they can play the harlot and, at the same time, set up arches in honor of their own virtue, fighting communism with one hand, and resisting Japan with the other. They call themselves the middle-of-the-road faction, but they will never achieve their aims. If they do not repent, they will certainly end by going over to the side of counterrevolution. Both the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary fronts must have someone to act as their leader, someone to serve

as their commander. Who is the commander of the counterrevolutionary front? It

This speech was first published in Renmin ribao, December 20, 1949. We have translated it from Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 137-40, where it is reproduced from this source. 309

310 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

is imperialism, it is Chamberlain. Who is the commander of the revolutionary front? It is socialism, it is Stalin. Comrade Stalin is the leader of the world revolution. This is an extremely important circumstance. Among the whole human race, this man, Stalin, has appeared, and this is a very great event. Because he is there, it is easier to get things done. As you know, Marx is dead, and Engels and Lenin too are dead. If there were no Stalin, who would give the orders? This is indeed a fortunate circumstance. Because there is now in the world a Soviet Union, a Communist Party, and a Stalin, the affairs of this world can be dealt with more easily. What does a revolutionary commander do? He sees to it that everyone has food to eat, clothes to wear, a place to live, and books to read. And in order to achieve this, he must lead a billion and more people to struggle against the oppressors and bring them to final victory. This is precisely what Stalin wants to do. Since this is the case, should not all those who suffer oppression congratulate Stalin? I think they should, I think they must. We should congratulate him, support him, and study him. The two aspects of Stalin which we want to study are the doctrinal aspect and the practical aspect. There are innumerable principles of Marxism, but in the final analysis they can all be summed up in one sentence: "To rebel is justified." 1 For thousands of years everyone said, "Oppression is justified, exploitation is justified, rebellion is not justified." From the time that Marxism appeared on the scene, this old judgment was turned upside down, and this is a great contribution. This principle was derived by the proletariat from its struggles, but Marx drew the conclusion. In accordance with this principle, there was then resistance, there was struggle, and socialism was realized. What is Comrade Stalin's contribution? He developed this principle, developed Marxism-Leninism, and produced a very clear, concrete, and living doctrine for the oppressed people of the whole world. This is the complete doctrine for establishing a revolutionary front, overthrowing imperialism, overthrowing capitalism, and establishing a socialist society. The practical aspect consists in turning doctrine into reality. Neither Marx, Engels, nor Lenin carried to completion the cause of the establishment of socialism, but Stalin did so. This is a great and unprecedented exploit. Before the Soviet Union's two five-year plans, the capitalist newspapers of various countries proclaimed daily that the Soviet Union was in desperate straits, that socialism could not be relied upon, but what do we see today? Chamberlain's mouth has been stopped, as have the mouths ofthose Chinese diehards. They all recognize that the Soviet Union has triumphed. Apart from helping us from the doctrinal standpoint in our War of Resistance Against Japan, Stalin has also given us practical and concrete aid. Since the vic-

1. This is the first known occurrence in Mao's writings of the famous slogan which played such a central role in the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.

DECEMBER 1939 3JJ

tory of Stalin's cause, he has aided us with many airplanes, cannons, aviators, and military advisers in every theater of operations, as well as lending us money. What other country in the world has helped us in this way? What country in the world, led by what class, party, or individual, has helped us in this way? Who is there, apart from the Soviet Union, the proletariat, the Communist Party, and Stalin? At present, there are people who call themselves our friends, but in fact they can only be classed with Li Linfu ofthe Tang dynasty. This Mr. Li Linfu was a man who had "honey dripping from his tongue and a sword concealed in his heart." The imperialists all have honey dripping from their tongues and swords concealed in their hearts, and Chamberlain is a present-day Li Linfu. What imperialist country has abolished the special privileges enjoyed by many countries in China such as the right to stbtion troops. consular jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, and so on? Not a single one. Only the Soviet Union has abolished them. In the past, Marxism-Leninism provided theoretical guidance to the world revolution. Today something has been added: it is possible to give material aid to the world revolution. This is Stalin's great contribution. After we have celebrated Stalin's birthday, we must continue to carry out propaganda among the people of the whole country to make these facts known. We must explain things clearly to the 450 million Chinese, so that our whole people understands: only the socialist Soviet Union, only Stalin, are the good friends of China.

In Memory of Norman Bethune (December 21, 1939)

A memberofthe Progressive Workers' Party of Canada, Comrade Norman Bethune was more than fifty years old when, sent by the Progressive Workers' Party of Canada and the Communist Party of the United States to help China in the antiJapanese war, he made light of a distance of thousands of miles and arrived in China. He came to Yan'an last spring, then went to work in the Wutai mountains and unfortunately died a martyr to his duties. 1 What kind of spirit is this that would make a foreigner, with no selfish motive whatsoever, take the cause ofthe Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, and every Chinese Communist must learn from this spirit. Leninism teaches that the world revolution can succeed only if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the people of the colonies and semicolonies, and the proletariat of the colonies and semicolonies supports the struggle for liberation of the proletarians of the capitalist countries. Comrade Bethune put this Leninist line into practice. We Chinese Communists must also carry out this line. We must unite with the proletarians of all the capitalist countries, with the proletarians of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany,ltaly, and all other capitalist countries; only then can we overthrow imperialism and liberate our nation and people, and the nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both national chauvinism

and narrow patriotism. Comrade Bethune's spirit of utter devotion to others without any concern for the self was expressed in his boundless sense of responsibility toward his work and his extraordinary warm-heartedness toward all comrades and the people. Every

Our source for this eulogy is Mao Zedong xuanji, val. 2, pp. 659-61. No contemporary text is available. I. Norman Bethune (189(}-November 12, 1939) was a Canadian-born medical doctor, who in 1936 became a member of the Canadian Communist Party (known as the Progressive Workers' Party of Canada). He arrived in China in early 1939, after having served as a doctorto the Republican side in the Spanish civil war. By May 1939, he had passed through Yan'an on his way to setting up a forward field hospital in the Wutai mountains, a part of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area. In November, while operating on a wounded soldier, he suffered a minor wound that became infected, and he quickly died of septicemia. During the Cultural Revolution decade, Mao's eulogy hailing him as a model of proletarian internationalism became one of the "Three Constantly Read Articles." 312

DECEMBER 1939 313

Communist must learn from him. Many people are irresponsible in their work, picking the easy jobs and shirking the hard ones, foisting the heavy burdens onto others' shoulders and taking the light ones for themselves. At every turn, they think first of themselves and then of others. Having made some small effort, they swell with pride and love to brag about it for fear that others will not notice. Toward comrades and the people they are not filled with ardent sincerity but are, instead, cold, indifferent, unfeeling. Such people are actually not Communists or at least cannot be considered entirely Communist. Whenever people returning from the front speak of Bethune, there is no one who fails to admire him, no one who is not moved by his spirit. Of the soldiers and civilians in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area, anyone who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had witnessed the way he worked could not be but deeply moved. Every Communist must certainly learn from Comrade Bethune this genuine communist spirit. Comrade Bethune was a doctor, and his profession was the art of healing. He constantly strove to perfect his skills. In the Eighth Route Army's medical service as a whole, his medical skills were outstanding. This is also an excellent lesson for those irresolute people who change their minds as soon as they see something new or those who despise technical work as of no consequence or as promising no future. Comrade Bethune and I met only once. Subsequently he wrote me many letters. But because I was busy, I replied only to one of his letters, and I don't even know if he received it. I am deeply grieved over his death. Now we are all commemorating him, which shows how profoundly his spirit inspires people. We must all learn his spirit of absolute selflessness. With this as a starting point, one can become very useful to the people. An individual's capabilities may be great or small, but as long as he has this spirit, he is a noble-minded and pure person, a person of moral integrity, a person above vulgar interests, a person of value to the people.

Speech at the Evening Welcome Party for General Ma Zhanshan, the National Hero (December 22, 1939)

(Special to this newspaper) ... Following the speeches of welcome, Comrade Mao Zedong was invited to speak. He started with a welcome to General Ma and other gentlemen, who are constant in their attitude, and will cany the War of Resistance through to the end. He went on to say:

In ancient times, our Chinese society admired people who were constant in their attitude and would bring what they had started to completion without stopping halfway. This has remained the case to the present day. Those who leave things unfinished are unwelcome. Resistance to Japan is a great mission; we must be consistent and continue to resist to the end. General Ma was among the first when he started to resist Japan in Heilongjiang Province eight years ago. t The Red Army, then in the south, promptly sent a telegram to pledge our warm support. So, as early as eight years ago, the Red Army became a comrade of General Ma's in fighting Japan. We are confident that General Ma will definitely persist in the War of Resistance to the very end. At present there are some capitulationists, who, in like a lion and out like a lamb,2 are making compromises midway. We stand side by side with General Ma and all those throughout the country who are fighting Japan. We sincerely welcome these national heroes, who are consistent and will fight Japan to the end. Since they are fighting the War of Resistance to lhe finish, our welcome to them is equally endless. General Ma is now over fifty and is still contending with the enemy in the forefront. Such a spirit is worthy of the admira-

tion of the entire nation. This text was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, December 30, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 135, where it is reproduced from that source. I. Ma Zhanshan (1885-1950), zi Xiufang, was a native of Jilin Province. As a youth he looked after the family horses and, after losing some of them, fled and became an outlaw. At the time of the 1911 Revolution he joined the army and rapidly rose in rank. By 1927 he was the commander of a cavalry division, and in 1930 he became the garrison commander in Heilongjiang Province. When the Japanese sought to pacify Manchuria following the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, he was one of the few who resisted. Later, he feigned collaboration, only to renew his resistance. During the Sino-Japanese War, he held a command in the Eighth War Zone, and in May 1940 he became governor of Heilongjiang. 2. The Chinese metaphor used by Mao, longtou shewei, literally "dragon's head and snake's tail," conveys an idea similar to this English expression. 314

In Refutation of the Rumor Spread by the Military Headquarters in a Certain War Zone (December 27, 1939)

(Special report to this newspaper) This newspaper has learned that the military headquar-

ters in a certain combat district issued a circular stating: "It is reported that Mao Zedong has returned to Yan 'an from Xinjiang. In his talk to responsible persons among his subordinates on the fifth of this month, he told them that Li Lisan,' leading 730 people, some of whom are Russians. accompanied by a number of airplanes from the Soviet Union, will, taking advantage of our counterattack against the enemy, capture political power at the Center and make Lanzhou China's Moscow." Seeking confinnation of the report, our correspondent interviewed Comrade Mao Zedong, who had the following to say in reply: This news was manufactured by the Japanese; how come it was spread by a Chi· nese military headquarters in a war zone? This is truly strange. It says that I "have returned to Yan'an from Xinjiang," but as yet I have made no plans for a visit to Xinjiang. As for Li Lisan, shortly after his arrival in the Soviet Union, he was arrested because he had joined the reactionary Trotskyist clique, so I don't see how he could have come back. All those who want to separate the Guomindang from the Communist Party and prepare to capitulate to the Japanese bandits have manufactured thousands of items of intelligence, but this one is the clumsiest. If there are people who believe even this, they are truly foolish. ''To capture political power

This document was first published in Xin Zhonghua baa on December 27, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 137-38. where that version is reproduced. I. Li Lisan (1899--1967) was a native of Hunan. He had been acquainted with Mao Zedong since their student days in Changsha, but, as Mao later remarked to Edgar Snow,

their friendship "never developed." During the period from late 1928 to the fall of 1930, when Li, although he never formally assumed the office of secretary general, was the dominant figure in the Chinese Communist Party, he and Mao were frequently in sharp conflict over the policies which should be pursued. For a discussion of the issues involved, see the Introduction to Volume IV, passim, especially pp.liv-lviii. In December 1930, Li Lisan had been summoned to Moscow for a "trial" conducted by the Executive Conunittee of the Communist International, where he was denounced both for what were viewed as his "Trotskyite" tendencies and for his ..extreme localism," in other words, for his emphasis on the role of China in the world revolution. Thereafter, he remained in the Soviet Union, returning to China only in the spring of 1946. The rumor that Mao is refuting in this document was thus manifestly absurd, since even if Stalin had endorsed such a hare-brained SCheme as that described, he would never have trusted Li Lisan to carry it out. 3/5

.!16 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

at the Center," what an idea! The fact is the capture of the Border Region. Xunyi, in the Border Region, was snatched in July of this year, and two more towns, Zhengyuan and Ningxian, have recently been seized, and with airplanes and big guns too. It is said that they also want to seize Qingyang, Heshui, Chunyao, and Luxian in the border region, so as to provide a basis for the capture ofYan'an.2 At the front, the Japanese are conquering large portions of China's territory, while, in the rear, it is the Chinese who are seizing a small piece of land in the border region. Altogether, there are only twenty-three xian in the border region, of which only twenty remain. Even if they were all captured, these xian would not amount to one-ten-millionth of what the Japanese have seized. Nevertheless, these gentlemen can be called brave. Your newspaper should write an article, exhorting these brave gentlemen to place more restraint on themselves and stop playing the tyrant. If they are truly brave, they should demonstrate it by going to confront the Japanese. Our past experience has already taught us that to swagger around at home will, in the end, lead nowhere.

2. The places named here are xian and districts in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, against which Nationalist forces were exerting military pressure, as part of their effort to regain lost ground.

The Present Situation in Western Shanxi and Our Military Deployment (December 31, 1939)

I. As a result of battle between the new and old armies in southwest Shanxi,' our Chen detachment2 and two decisive columns, with a total strength of five regiments, left southwest Shanxi on the 27th and reached Zhaoxianzhen north of the Fen[yang]-Li[shi] blockade line. 3 The Internal Security Brigade and our Third Guerrilla Regiment, as well as four guerrilla brigades, are left behind in southwestern Shanxi. 2. At present, looking at the situation as a whole, Yan is going all out to attack southwestern Shanxi. After prevailing there, he is prepared to move to attack northwestern Shanxi, so as to sever communications between North China and the border regions and among the various regions in North China. For this purpose, the Central forces are being mobilized in southeastern Shanxi and are prepared to expand the war in southwestern Shanxi at any time. One division under Hu Zongnan4 has already reached a point southeast of Yichuan. This will have an impact on the whole situation in North China and affect the major struggles facing the whole Party.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 503-4, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. See above, ''The Clashes Between the New and Old Armies in Southwest Shanxi and Our Overall Policy," December 6, I939, and the notes thereto. The tension had now peaked and broken out in actual combat. Mao was determined to avoid the separation of the various base areas in Shanxi and their isolation from one another. He was particularly concerned to maintain the corridor through northwestern Shanxi, which was the main line of communication between the Van' an area and the bases farther east in North China. 2. The Western Shanxi Detachment of the II 5th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Shiju. 3. The reference is to the blockade line established by Yan Xishan along the highway between these two points. 4. Hu Zongnan (1896- I962), hao Shoushan, was a native of Zhejiang. He graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in I 924, attracted the attention of Chiang Kaishek by his performance, and rose steadily in rank. As commander of the Guomindang First Anny, he fought against the Red Army during the Long March. (For details, see the many references to him in Volume V of our edition.) In August 1939, he had become commander of the Guomindang Thirty-fourth Group Anny, and it was this force which was assigned the task of containing the Communists in northern Shanxi. 317

318 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

3. The central question for the present is to wage this struggle victoriously, so as to keep the base areas in Shanxi for resisting Japan within our hands and maintain communications between North China and the northwest. To this end: a. The 358th Brigade and the New Army in northwestern Shanxi shall immediately concentrate in suitable regions to get ready for combat. b. The !20th Division shall dispatch two to three regiments to northwestern Shanxi. He and Guan5 should immediately depart for northwest Shanxi to take command of the battle, the faster the better. For the question of command will affect victory or defeat in the battle, and we hope that there will be no delay. c. The defense sector of the I 20th Division in the military district shall be completed by forces to be transferred from the middle ofHebei by Nie [Rongzhen]. Nie shall also make plans for wiping out all of Yan [Xishan]'s old forces in the surrounding areas of the military district. d. The Chen detachment and the new army under his command shall be strictly on guard against sudden attacks from the old army. Peng and Luo6 shall support them. e. Redeployments for southwestern Shanxi shall be made separately by Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

5. The reference is to He Long (1896-1969) and Guan Xiangying (1902-1946), respectively commander and political commissar of the I20th Division of the Eighth Route Anny. 6. Regarding Peng Shaohui and Luo Guipo, see the relevant note to the text of December 6, 1939, on the clashes between the old and new annies.

To Wu Yuzhang 1 (1939)

Venerable Mr. Wu: 1 have written SQmething of a theoretical character,2 with the primary purpose of refuting the diehards, and I am sending it to you with the request that you will favor me by reading and correcting it. Your instructions will be gratefully received! Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 160. I. Wu Yuzhang (1878-1966) was born in Rongxian, Sichuan Province. During the anti-

~apane~e war, he was member of the Standing Committee of the Culture Association of the haanx•-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, provost of the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Litera~· ~d chairman of the Cultural Commission in the government of the Shaanxi-GansuJngxta Border Region. C 2. The reference is to Mao's article "New Democratic Politics and New Democratic F u~ture," which was published in the first issue of the Yan'an periodical Chinese Culture in e ruary 1940. The article, translated below, was later retitled "On New Democracy." 319

Inscription for the Production Campaign of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (1939)

At present, take part in production while studying; in the future, take pan in production while fighting. Such is the style ofthe Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, a style powerful enough to defeat any enemy.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 151. 320

Inscription on Women's Liberation (1939)

Women are becoming emancipated, and are suddenly coming to the fore; 200 million in number, they are striving to equal men. Men and women moving forward side by side, like the sun just rising in the east; thus they will dominate the enemy, for no enemy can resist them.

Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 151. 321

--------1940--------

Inscription in Commemoration ofthe Anniversary of Dazhong Ribao (January I, 1940)

Mobilize all possible forces, such as newspapers, periodicals, schools, propaganda organizations, cultural and artistic corps, political departments in the army, and mass groups, to develop the consciousness of the nation, stimulate national confidence and sense of pride, oppose any attempt to capitulate or compromise, and, defying difficulties and sacrifice, resolutely carry the War of Resistance through to the end. We must have freedom. We must win the victory.

Our source for this inscription is Mao ZLdong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 9, p. 377, where it is reproduced from the text as first published in Dazhong ribao on January I, 1940. 325

Get Ready to Cope with Rapid Changes in Central China 1 (January 5, 1940)

Comrade Xiang Ying I. If there are rapid changes in the situation and you are unable to move north, naturally you can only move south. Your resolution is correct. 2. Chen Yi 2 should strive by every means to go to the north ofthe [Yangzi] river. 3. Chiang Kaishek's capitulation will not take place immediately. You still have time to prepare, but the preparation should be carried out internally and secretly without leaving any traces behind. 4. Make an effort to win over sympathizers from all the forces. E. Rely on ourselves for everything. Do not rely on any outside assistance. The Central Secretariat

Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji. Vol. II. p. 505, where it is reproduced from Mao's manuscript as preserved in the Central Archives. l. This is the first reference in the texts translated here to the problem of the disposition

of New Fourth Anny forces north and south of the Yangzi. Mao came increasingly to favor transfer north of the river, as urged by Liu Shaoqi, but he remained ambivalent about timing, circumstances, and whether any concessions could be obtained from the Guorrtindang. 2. Chen Yi {1901-1972) was a native of Sichuan Province. who participated in the Work and Study Program in France in 1919-1921. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in

1923 and was active in the Nanchang Uprising of August 1927. Thereafter he played an important role during the Jinggangshan and early Jiangxi Soviet periods. When the main Red Army forces embarked on the Long March. he was left behind together with Xiang Ying to conduct guerrilla warfare. When the New Fourth Anny was established, he became its commander. .126

At Present It Is Impossible to Take New Recruits (January 11, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: Under the present conditions it is not possible to take new recruits. If the new recruits are to be trained within the forces, to recruit 24,000 men, food, bedding, uniforms, and so on will cost at least 600,000 yuan. At the moment, we do not have such financial capability. All we can do is increase the amount of training for the self-defense forces. The principle is that the civilians will eat their own food and wear their own clothes. Now is a transitional period between the stage of selfdefense forces and the stage of taking recruits in the future. This was the method adopted in the Central Soviet Base Area. It was the same in the Wutai mountains, the Taihang mountains, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. This is my reply. Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 506, where it is reproduced from the manuscript as preserved in the Central Archives. 327

The Current Situation and Our Policies (January 11, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: The Secretariat has already sent a reply to your telegram of the 30th, and I expect that you have received it. At present, it is not yet the rainy season in the whole country. Our task in the whole country is still organizing the progressive forces, trying hard to win over the middle forces, and smashing the wavering and reaction of the big bourgeoisie. This possibility has still not been lost. The most serious problem right now is the reaction of Yan Xishan. He now constitutes the most reactionary segment of the big bourgeoisie. His plots are extremely vicious. He has already blockaded the LUiiang and Zhongtiao mountain ranges.' Our policy is to use He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying]'s forces 2 first of all to seize the whole or at least most of northwestern Shanxi, use our forces in southeastern Shanxi to consolidate those positions there which are not yet lost, and seize back some of the positions which have been lost. It is extremely urgent that a road to Luoyang be opened. Afterward, when He and Guan have opened a road to southeastern Shanxi, they should attack the Ltiliang Range. At least they should recover the positions of Chen's detachment3 and a line of communication and break through the Yanshui Pass. If, by that time, Yan Xishan is willing to talk peace (such a possibility has not yet been lost), we will let him occupy the greater part of the Ltiliang Range, and we will only occupy a small part of it and a line of communication, and leave it at that. Otherwise, the war is likely to expand. There is a tendency for the problem of the border region to evolve in a positive direction. The Ninety-seventh Division at Longdong has already been withdrawn, and, on orders from Chiang, Cheng Qian

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 507-8, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. These ranges are located, respectively, in western and in southwestern Shanxi. 2. For Mao's decision to entrust this mission to the I20th Division of He Long and Guan

Xiangying, see above, the text of December 31. 1939. 3. The reference is to the independent detachment of the I 15th Division of the Eighth

Route Army, commanded by Chen Shiju. 328

JANUARY 1940

329

and Zhu Shaoliang4 have expressed a wish for peace. We have just sent the venerable Xie5 to Gansu as representative to the talks. Japan has decided to support wang Jingwei. The policy of the Japanese forces in China is still hard, and this cannot but affect the attitude ofthe Guomindang. Hence, the possibility of a change for the better can still not be ruled out. At the present, the struggle within Japan is still one focusing on the issue of whether Japan should occupy China entirely for its own benefit or give some rights to Britain and the United States. The policy of the Japanese military according to which they should keep China all for themselves seems to have the upper hand. In Japan, the cabinet is just now being overturned, and in a few days we will know the outcome. Zedong

4. Cheng Qian (1883-1968), zi Songyun, a native of Hunan Province, studied military tactics in Japan, where he joined the Tongmenghui. He participated in the 191 I Revolution and. in the early 1920s, was closely associated with Sun Yatsen.ln 1938, he became commander of the First War Zone. At this time, Cheng was in charge of the field headquarters of the Guomindang government's Military Commission in Tianshui. Zhu Shaoliang (1890-= 1963), a native of Fujian Province, studied at the Military Academy in Tokyo, participated in the Northern Expedition, and fought with limited success against the Corrununists in Jiangxi. At this time, he was commander of the Eighth War Zone. 5. Xie Weiyun (1884-1971), commonly known by his pen-name Xie Xuezai, was a native of Hunan who had participated in t921-1923 in two of the organizations established by Mao at that time, the New People's Study Society and the Self-Study University. He joined the Guomindang in 1924 and the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In 1933, he went to the Jiangxi Soviet Republic and subsequently participated in the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Secretariat of the border region government. He is here referred to as "the venerable Xie .. because he was a decade older than Mao and most of his comrades in the Party.

On New Democracy (January 15, 1940)

I. Whither China? A lively atmosphere has prevailed throughout the country ever since the War of Resistance began. There is a general feeling that a way out ofthe impasse has been found, and people no longer knit their brows in despair. Of late, however, the dust and din of compromise and anticommunism have once again filled the air, and once again the people are thrown into bewilderment. Most susceptible, and the first to be affected, are the intellectuals and the young students. So the questions "What is to be done?" and "Where is China headed?'' have once again arisen. On the occasion of the publication of Chinese Culture, it may therefore be profitable to clarify the political and cultural trends in China. I am a layman in matters of culture; I would like to study them, but have only just begun to do so. Fortunately, there are many comrades in Yan'an who have written at length in this field, so my rough and ready words may serve the same purpose as the beating of the gongs before a theatrical performance. Our observations may contain a grain of truth for the nation's advanced cultural workers and may serve as a modest spur 1 to induce them to come forward with valuable contributions of their own. We hope that they will join in the discussion to reach correct conclusions which will meet our national needs. To "seek the truth from facts" is the scientific approach, and presumptuously to claim infallibility and lecture people will assuredly never settle anything. The disaster that has befallen our nation is extremely grave, and only a scientific approach and a spirit of responsibility can lead it on to the road of liberation. There

This article, based on a speech delivered on January 9, 1940, at the first meeting of the Border Area Cultural Association, was given its final revisions by Mao on January 15, 1940, and was first published in the inaugural issue of Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese Culture)

on February IS, 1940, under the title "On New-Democratic Politics and New-Democratic Culture." When it appeared in issue no. 98/99 of Jiefang on February 20, 1940, the title was changed to "On New Democracy." Our translation is based on Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 143-202, which reproduces the text from the 1944 edition of Mao :Udong xuanji, including a slight error in the date, which is given as January 19, 1940. Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 15657, confirms that the manuscript was put into final form by Mao on January 15, as indicated at the end of the version in Jiefang. I. Mao here uses one of his favorite metaphors, "Casting a brick to attract jade." 330

JANUARY 1940 331

is but one truth, and the question of who has it depends not on subjective boasting but on objective practice. The only yardstick of truth is the revolutionary practice of millions of people. This, I think, can be regarded as the attitude of Chinese Culture.

JI. We Want to Build a New China For many years, we Communists have struggled not only for a political and economic revolution, but for a cultural revolution, as well. The goal of all these revolutions is to build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation. That new society and new state will have not only a new politics and a new economy but a new culture. In other words, not only do we want to change a China that is politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous, but we also want to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture. In short, we want to build a new China. Our aim in the cultural sphere is to build a new Chinese national culture. III. China's Historical Characteristics We want to build a new national culture, but what kind of culture should it be? Any given culture (as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in tum has a tremendous influence upon the latter; politics is the concentrated expression of economics? This is our fundamental view of the relationship of culture to politics and economics and of the relationship of politics to economics. It follows that the form of culture is first determined by the political and economic form; only then does culture influence the given political and economic form. Marx says, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." He also says, ''The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." For the first time in human history, these scientific formulations correctly solved the problem of the relationship between consciousness and existence, and they are the basic points of departure 3 underlying the dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, which was later elaborated so profoundly by Lenin. These basic points of departure must be kept in mind in our discussion of China's cultural problems.

2. Politics is the concentrated expression of economics . ...,. Economics is the base and politics is the concentrated expression of economics. 3. Basic points of departure ... Basic concepts

332

MAO'S ROAD TO POWf:R

Thus it is quite clear that the old national culture4 we want to eliminate is inseparable from the old national politics and economics, while the new national culture which we want to build up is inseparable from the new national politics and economics. The old politics and economics of the Chinese nation form the basis of its old culture, just as its new politics and economics will form the basis of its new culture. What are China's old politics and economics? And what is its old culture? From the Zhou and Qin dynasties onward, Chinese society was feudal, as were its politics and its economy. And the culture,5 reflecting the politics and economy, was a feudal culture. Since the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist elements in Chinese society,that is, during the hundred years from the Opium War to the Sino-Japanese War, the country has changed by degrees into a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society. China today is colonial in the enemy-occupied areas6 and basically semicolonial in the nonoccupied areas,7 and it is predominantly feudal 8 in both. Such, then, is the character of present-day Chinese society and the state of affairs in our country. The politics and the economy of this society are predominantly colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal, and the culture, reflecting the politics and economy, is also colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal. It is precisely against these predominant political, economic, and cultural forms that our revolution is directed. What we want to get rid of is the old colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal politics and economy and the old culture.• And what we want to build up is their direct opposite, that is, the new politics, the new economy, and the new culture of the Chinese nation. What, then, are the new politics and the new economy of the Chinese nation, and what is its new culture? In the course of its history the Chinese revolution must go through two stages: first, the democratic revolution and, second, the socialist revolution. By their very nature they are two different revolutionary processes. But what I call democracy no longer belongs to the old category. It is not the old democracy; it belongs to the new category-it is New Democracy. It can thus be affirmed that the new politics of the Chinese nation are the politics of New Democracy, and the new economy of the Chinese nation is the economy of New Democracy, and that the new culture of the Chinese nation is the culture of New Democracy.

4. The old national culture ~ The reactionary elements of the old national culture 5. The culture -+The dominant culture 6. Enemy-occupied areas ... Japanese-occupied areas 7. The nonoccupied areas ..... The Guomindang areas 8. Feudal ~ Feudal or semi feudal 9. The old culture -+ The old culture in their service

JANUARY 1940

333

Such are the historical characteristics of the Chinese revolution at present. Any political party, group, or person taking part in the Chinese revolution who fails to understand this will not be able to direct the revolution and lead it to victory, but will be cast aside by the people and left to grieve out in the cold. IV. The Chinese Revolution Is Part of the World Revolution The historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in its division into the two stages, democracy and socialism. but the first stage is no longer democracy in general, but democracy of the Chinese type, a new and special type-namely. New Democracy. How, then, has this historical characteristic come into being? Has it been in existence for the past hundred years, or is it of recent origin? A brief study of the historical development of China and of the world shows that this characteristic did not emerge immediately after the Opium War, but took shape later, after the first imperialist world war and the October Revolution in Russia. Let us now examine the process of its formation. Clearly, it follows from the colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal character of present-day Chinese society that the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages. The first step is to change the colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal form of society into an independent, democratic society. The second is to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society. At present the Chinese revolution is taking the first step. It can be said that the first step 10 began with the Opium War in 1840, that is, when China's feudal society started changing into a semicolonial and semifeudal one. Then came the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the coup of 1898, 11 the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement, the May Thirtieth movement, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution, 12 the December Ninth movement, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. Together these have taken up a whole century and in a sense they represent that first step, being struggles waged by the Chinese people, on different occasions and in varying degrees, against imperialism and the feudal forces in order to build up an independent, democratic society and complete the first revolution. The 1911 Revolution was in a fuller sense the beginning of that revolution. In its social character, this revolution is a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist revolution. It is still unfinished and still demands great

I 0. The first step _,. The preparatory stage for the first step II. Here, as in his speech of May 4, 1939, translated above, Mao refers to the events of 1898 as a "coup." Obviously he was thinking of the suppression of the Reform movement.

rather than of that movement itself. In the Selected Works version, this event has been moved to its proper chronological place, after the Sino-French and Sino-Japanese wars, but it remains a coup. 12. The Agrarian Revolution ... The War of the Agrarian Revolution

334

MAO'S ROAD TO POWE.R

efforts, because to this day its enemies are still very strong. When Mr. Sun Yatsen said, ''The revolution is not yet completed, all my comrades must struggle on," he was referring to the bourgeois-democratic revolution. A change, however, occurred in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution after the outbreak ofthe first imperialist world war in 1914 and the founding of a socialist state on one-sixth of the globe as a result of the Russian October Revolution of 1917. Before these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution came within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, of which it was a part. Since these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution has changed, it has come within the new category of bourgeois-democratic revolutions and, as far as the alignment of revolutionary forces is concerned, forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Why? Because the first imperialist world war and the first victorious socialist revolution, the October Revolution, have changed the whole course of world history and ushered in a new era. In an era in which the world capitalist front has collapsed in one comer of the globe (a comer which occupies one-sixth of the world's surface), and has fully revealed its decadence everywhere else, in an era in which the remaining capitalist portions cannot survive without relying more than ever on the colonies and semicolonies, in an era in which a socialist state has been established and has proclaimed its readiness to fight in support of the liberation movement of all colonies and semicolonies, and in which the proletariat of the capitalist countries is steadily freeing itself from the social-imperialist influence of the social-democratic parties and has proclaimed its support for the liberation movement in the colonies and semicolonies-in such an era, a revolution in any colony or semicolony that is directed against imperialism, that is, against the international bourgeoisie and international capitalism, no longer comes within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but within the new category. It is no longer part of the old bourgeois and capitalist world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Such revolutionary colonies and semicolonies can no longer be regarded as allies of the counterrevolutionary front of world capitalism; they have become allies of the revolutionary front of world socialism. Although during its first stage or step, such a revolution in a colonial and semicolonial country is still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic in its social character, and although its objective demand is still basically to clear the path for the development of capitalism, it is no longer a revolution of the old type, led entirely by the bourgeoisie, with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It is, rather, a revolution of the new type, in which the proletariat participates in or exercises the leadership, and having as its aim, in the first stage, the establishment of a new-democratic society and a state under the

JANUARY /940

335

joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. 13 In the course of its progress, there may be a number of further substages, because of changes on the enemy's side and within the ranks of our allies, but the fundamental character of the revolution remains unchanged and it will remain the same until the time of the socialist revolution. Such a revolution attacks imperialism at its very roots and is therefore not acceptable to imperialism, which opposes it. But it is acceptable to socialism and is supported by the socialist state and by the international socialist proletariat. Therefore, such a revolution cannot but become part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. The correct thesis that "the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution" was put forward as early as 1924-1927 during the period of China's Great Revolution. 14 It was put forward by the Chinese Communists and endorsed by all those taking part in the anti-imperialist and antifeudal struggle of the time. At that time, however, the significance ofthis thesis was not fully expounded, and consequently it was only vaguely understood. I remember that during his eastern expedition against Cheng Jiongming in 1925, Mr. Chiang Kaishek made a speech on reaching Chao Shan,i' in which he also said, "China's revolution is part of the world revolution." 16 The "world revolution" no longer refers to the old world revolution, for the old bourgeois world revolution has long been a thing of the past; it refers to the new world revolution, the socialist world revolution. Similarly, to form "part of' means to form part not of the old bourgeois revolution, but of the new socialist revolution. This is a tremendous change unparalleled in the history of China and of the world. The Chinese Communists put forward this correct thesis on the basis of Stalin's theory. As early as 1918, in an article commemorating the first anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin wrote: The great worldwide significance of the October Revolution chieny consists of the following three points. First, it has widened the scope of the national question and

13. Classes. ~ Classes. Thus, this revolution actually serves the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of socialism. 14. Great Revolution -+ First Great Revolution 15. The reference is to Chaoxian and Shantou, two small cities in the northeastern corner of Guangdong, or to the short railroad connecting them. 16. Chiang uttered the same identical sentence in a speech of August 1926 in Changsha during the Northern Expedition, in which he also declared: "In the present world revolution, there is the Third International, which can be called the general staff of the revolution." For a translation of the relevant passage from the Changsha speech, see S. Schram, Mao Tse-rung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 83.

336

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

converted it from the particular question of national oppression 17 to the general question of emancipating the oppressed peoples, colonies, and semi-colonies from imperialism. Second, it has opened up wide possibilities for their emancipation and the right paths toward it, has thereby greatly facilitated the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the West and the East, and has drawn them into the common path of the victorious struggle against imperialism. Third, it has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East, thus creating a new front of revolutions against world imperialism. extending from the

proletarians of the West, through the Russian Revolution, to the oppressed peoples of the East. (See J. V. Stalin, Works [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953], Vol. 4, pp. 169-170.)

Since writing this article, Stalin has again and again expounded the theory that revolutions in the colonies and semicolonies have broken away from the old category and become part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. The clearest and most precise explanation is given in an article published on June 30, 1925, in which Stalin carried on a controversy with the Yugoslav nationalists of the time. Entitled "The National Question Once Again," it contains the following passage: Comrade Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's book Marxism and the National Question, written at the end of 1912. There it says that "the national struggle 18 is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves." Evidently, by this Semich is trying to suggest that his formula defining the social significance of the national movement under the present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists' fundamental demand for the right to self-determination was regarded not as part of the proletarian socialist revolution, but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war in Europe, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, transformed the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article ''The Discussion on Self-Determination Sununed Up," Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right to self-detennination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution. I do not even mention many other profound works on the national question by Lenin and by other representatives of Russian communism. What significance can Semich's reference to the passage in Stalin's book, written in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, have at

17. National oppression_,. Combating national oppression in Europe (We have included this and the immediately following variant to show how carefully those involved in revising Mao's writings for the Selected Works in the early 1950s checked references to Stalin and other Soviet authors, restoring words which Mao, or the book he quotes here, had omitted.) 18. The national struggle ..... The national struggle under the conditions of rising capitalism

JANUARY /940

337

the present time, when as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have entered a new epoch, the present epoch of world proletarian revolution? It can only signify that Comrade Semich completely quotes outside of space and time, without reference to the living historical situation, and thereby violates the elementary re· quirements of dialectics and ignores the saying that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another historical situation. (See J. V. Stalin, Works [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953], Vol. 7, pp. 225-227.)

From this it can be seen that there are two kinds of world revolutions. The first is in the bourgeois or capitalist category. The era of this kind of world revolution is long past; it came to an end as far back as 1914, when the first imperialist world war broke out, and above all in 1917, when the Russian October Revolution took place. The second kind, namely, the proletarian-socialist world revolution, thereupon began. This type of revolution has the proletariat ofthe capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed peoples of the colonies and semicolonies as its allies. No matter what classes, panies, or individuals in an oppressed nation join the revolution, and no matter whether they are conscious of this point or understand it subjectively, so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and they become its allies. Today, the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater significance. This is a time when the economic and political crises of capitalism are dragging the world more and more deeply into the second imperialist war, 19 when the Soviet Union has reached the period of transition from socialism to communism and is capable of leading and helping the proletariat, oppressed nations, and at: revolutionary people of the whole world in their fight against imperialist war and capitalist reaction, when the proletariat ofthe capitalist countries is preparing to ovenhrow capitalism and establish socialism, and when the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie20 in China have become a mighty independent political force under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Situated as we are in this day and age, should we not make the appraisal that the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater world significance? I think we should. The Chinese revolution is a great pan of the world revolution. Although the Chinese revolution in this first stage (with its many substages) is a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution and is not yet itself the newest type of proletarian-socialist revolution in its social character, it has long become a pan of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and now even a very imponant pan and a great ally of this world revolution. The first step or stage in our revolution is definitely not, and cannot be, the establishment of a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie, but will result in the establishment of a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes

19. Imperialist War~ World War 20. The petty bourgeoisie ..... Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie

338 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of China. 21 The revolution will then be carried forward to the second stage, in which a socialist society will be established in China. This is the fundamental characteristic of the Chinese revolution of today, ofthe new revolutionary process ofthe past twenty years (counting from the May Fourth

movement), and its concrete living essence. V. The Politics of New Democracy The new historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution is its division into two stages, the first being the new-democratic revolution. How does this manifest itself concretely in internal political and economic relations? Let us consider the question. Before the May Fourth movement of 1919 (which occurred after the first great imperialist war of 1914 and the Russian October Revolution of 1917), the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie (through their intellectuals) were the political leaders of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese proletariat had not yet appeared on the political scene as an awakened and independent class force, but participated in the revolution only as a follower of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Such was the case with the proletariat at the time of the 1911 Revolution. After the May Fourth movement, the chief political leader of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution was no longer the single class ofthe bourgeoisie, and the proletariat also participated in the political leadership. 22 The Chinese proletariat rapidly became an awakened and independent political force as a result of its maturing and of the influence of the Russian Revolution. It was the Chinese Communist Party that put forward the slogan "Down with imperialism" and the thoroughgoing program for the whole of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and it was the Chinese Communist Party alone that carried out the Agrarian Revolution. Because the Chinese bourgeoisie23 is the bourgeoisie of a colonial and semicolonial country, and because it is oppressed by imperialism, it retains at certain periods and to a certain degree-even in the era of imperialism-a certain revolutionary nature which leads it to fight against foreign imperialism and the domestic governments of bureaucrats and warlords (instances of opposition to the latter can be found in the periods of the 1911 Revolution and the Northern Expedition, that is, during periods when the bourgeoisie itself did not exercise power). It can ally

21. Revolutionary classes of China -. Revolutionary classes of China headed by the Chinese proletariat 22. Political leadership . ..., Political leadership, although the national bourgeoisie con~ tinued to take part in the revolution. 23. Chinese bourgeoisie --~> Chinese national bourgeoisie (Throughout this text, Mao replaced "bourgeoisie" by "national bourgeoisie" in revising it for the Selected Works. 'This variant will not be noted again.)

JANUARY /940

339

itself with the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie against such enemies as it is ready to oppose. In this respect the Chinese bourgeoisie differs from the bourgeoisie of the old Russian empire. Since the old Russian empire was itself already a military-feudal imperialism which carried on aggression against other countries, the Russian bourgeoisie was entirely lacking in revolutionary quality. There, the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with it. But because China is a colonial and semicolonial country which is a victim of aggression, the Chinese bourgeoisie has a revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree. Here, the task of the proletariat is not to neglect this revolutionary quality of the bourgeoisie or the possibility of establishing a united front with it against imperialism and the bureaucrat and warlord governments. At the same time, however, precisely because the Chinese bourgeoisie is the bourgeoisie of a colonial and semicolonial country, it is extremely flabby economically and politically, and it also has another quality-namely, a proneness to compromise with the enemies of the revolution. The Chinese bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie,24 even when it takes part in the revolution, is unwilling to break with imperialism completely and is, moreover, closely associated with exploitation through the land21 in the rural areas. Thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow imperialism thoroughly, still less to overthrow the feudal forces thoroughly. So neither of the two basic problems or tasks of China's bourgeoisdemocratic revolution can be solved or accomplished by the bourgeoisie. During the long period between I 927 and 1936, it26 nestled in the arms of the imperialists, fonned an alliance with the feudal forces, betrayed its own revolutionary programs, and opposed the revolutionary people ofthe time. During the War of Resistance,27 the section of the big bourgeoisie represented by Wang Jingwei has once again capitulated to the enemy. This constitutes a fresh betrayal on the part of the big bourgeoisie. This is also a point with respect to which the bourgeoisie in China differs from the earlier bourgeoisie of the advanced countries in Europe and America, especially France. When the European and American countries were still in their revolutionary era, the bourgeoisie of those countries, and especially of France, was comparatively thorough in carrying out the revolution. In China, the bourgeoisie does not possess even this degree of thoroughness. On the one hand, revolutionary nature28 and, on the other hand, proneness to compromise-such is the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie, which faces both ways. Even the bourgeoisie in European and American history shared this 24. Chinese bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie --. Chinese national bourgeoisie 25. Through the land-+ Through land rent 26. During the long period between 1927 and 1936, it-+ As for China's big bourgeoisie, whoch os represented by the Guomindang, throughoutthe long period from 1927 to 1936, it

.27 · During the Wax of Resistance ... In 1927 and for some time afterward, the Chinese nal!onal bourgeoisie also followed the counterrevolution. During the War of Resistance 28. Revolutionary nature ..... Possible participation in the revolution

340

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

dual character. When confronted by a formidable enemy, they united with the workers and peasants against them, but when the workers and peasants awakened, they turned around to unite with the enemy against the workers and peasants. This is a general rule applicable to the bourgeoisie everywhere in the world, but the trait is more pronounced in the Chinese bourgeoisie. In China, the situation is extremely clear. Whoever can lead the people in overthrowing imperialism and the feudal forces will be able to win the people's confidence, for the mortal enemies of the people are imperialism and the feudal forces, especially imperialism. Today, whoever can lead the people in driving out Japanese imperialism and introducing democratic government will be the savior of the people. If the Chinese bourgeoisie can fulfill this responsibility, no one will be able to withhold his admiration; but if it cannot do so, the responsibility will inevitably fall upon the shoulders of the proletariat. 29 Therefore, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie undoubtedly constitute the basic forces determining China's fate. These classes, some already awakened and others in the process of awakening, will necessarily become the basic components of the state and governmental structure in the democratic republic of China. 30 The Chinese democratic republic which we now desire to establish can only be a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all the anti-imperialist and antifeudal people. 31 That is, it will be a new-democratic republic, a republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. 32 On the one hand, this new-democratic republic will be different from the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which is the old democratic form and already out of date. On the other hand, it will also be different from the socialist republic of the newest Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which is already flourishing in the Soviet Union, and which, moreover, will be established in all the capitalist countries and will undoubtedly become the dominant form of state and governmental structure in all the advanced countries." For a certain historical period, however, this form is not suitable for the colonial and semicolonial countries. 34 During this period, there-

29. If the Chinese bourgeoisie can fulfill this responsibility, no one will be able to withhold his admiration; but if it cannot do so, the responsibility will inevitably fall upon the shoulders of the proletariat. _.., History has pi-oved that the Chinese bourgeoisie cannot fulfill this responsibility, which inevitably falls upon the shoulders of the proletariat. 30. China ... China, with the proletariat as the leading force. 31. People

~

People, led by the proletariat

32. A republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People's Principles with their lbree Great Policies .. A republic of the genuinely revolutionary Three People's Principles or a republic of the Three People's Principles with Sun Yatsen's Three Great Policies 33. Advanced countries ....Industrially advanced countries 34. Suitable for the colonial and semicolonial countries ... Suitable for the revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries

JANUARY /940

34/

fore, a third form of state must be adopted in all colonial and semicolonial countries, namely, the new-democratic republic. This is a form suited to a certain historical period and is therefore a transitional form; nevertheless, it is a form which is necessary and cannot be dispensed with. Thus the multifarious types of state system in the world, classified according to their social character,35 can be reduced to three basic kinds: (!) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. The first kind comprises the old democratic states. Today, after the outbreak of the second imperialist war, there is already not the slightest trace of democracy in any of the capitalist countries. They have all been transformed, or are about to be transformed, into bloody military dictatorships of the bourgeoisie. Certain countries under the joint dictatorship ofthe landlords and the bourgeoisie can be grouped with this kind. Apart from the Soviet Union, the second kind is ripening in capitalist countries, and, in the future, it will be the dominant form throughout the world for a certain period. The third kind is the transitional form of state in the revolutionary colonies and

semicolonies. To be sure, the various colonies and semicolonies will necessarily have different characteristics, but these are only minor differences within the general framework of uniformity. So long as they are revolutionary colonial or semicolonial countries, their state and governmental structure will of necessity be basically the same, namely, a new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes. In China today, the new-democratic state takes the form of the anti-Japanese united front. It is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist; it is also a united front, an alliance of several revolutionary classes. But unfortunately, despite the fact that the War of Resistance has been going on for so long, the work of democratizing the state has hardly started, 36 and the Japanese imperialists have exploited this fundamental weakness to stride into our country. If nothing is done about it, our national future will be gravely imperiled. We hope that the movement for constitutional government that has just started will prevent this danger. 31 The question under discussion here is that of the "state system." After several decades of wrangling since the last years of the Qing dynasty, it has still not been cleared up. Actually it is simply a question of the status of the various social classes within the state. The bourgeoisie, as a rule, conceals the problem of class status

35. Social character ... Class character

36. Has hardly started, ... Has hardly started in most of the country outside the democratic anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party 37. The importance of establishing constitutional government was a central theme in Mao's discussion of political issues at this time and is mentioned frequently in the texts translated below. See in particular his speech of February 20, 1940, entitled "New-Democratic Constitutional Government.''

342 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

and carries out its one-class dictatorship under the "national" label. Such concealment is of no advantage to the revolutionary people and the matter should be clearly explained to them. The term "national" can be used, but the people of the nation do not include counterrevolutionaries and Chinese traitors, and consist of all the revolutionary people. The kind of state we need today is a dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counterrevolutionaries and Chinese traitors. "The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. In contrast, the Guomindang's principle of democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few." Such was the solemn declaration made in the manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, held in 1924. 38 For sixteen years the Guomindang has violated this declaration, and as a result it has created the present grave national crisis. This is a gross blunder, which we hope the Guomindang will correct in the cleansing flames of resistance to Japan. As for the question of"political power,"39 this is a matter of how political power is organized, the form in which one social class or another chooses to arrange its apparatus of political power to oppose its enemies and protect itself. There is no state which does not have an appropriate apparatus of political power to represent it. China may now adopt a system of congresses,40 from the national congress41 down to the provincial, xian, district, and township congresses, with all levels electing their respective governmental bodies. But if there is to be proper representation for each revolutionary class according to its status in the state, a proper expression ofthe people's will, a proper direction for revolutionary struggles, and a proper manifestation of the spirit of New Democracy, then a system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective of sex, creed, property, or education, must be introduced. Such is the system of democratic centralism. Only a government based on democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people and fight the enemies ofthe revolution most effectively. There must be a spirit of refusal to be "privately owned by the few" in the government and the army; without a genuinely democratic system this cannot be attained and the system of government and the state system will be out of harmony. The state system, a joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes, and the system of government, democratic centralism-these constitute the politics of New Democracy, the republic of New Democracy, the republic of the anti-Japanese united front, the republic of the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies, the Republic of China in reality as well as in name. Today we have

38. In I924- In I924 during the period ofGuomindang-Communist cooperation 39. Political power""* Political system 40. Congresses ... People's congresses 41. National congress ..... National people's congress

JANUARY 1940 343

a Republic of China in name but not in reality, and our present task is to create the reality that will fit the name. Such are the internal political relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, should and must establish without fail; such is the orientation, the only correct orientation, for our present work of national reconstruction.

VI. The Economy of New Democracy If such a republic is to be established in China, it must be new-democratic not only in its politics but also in its economy. The big banks and the big industrial and commercial enterprises will become state-owned. Enterprises such as banks, railways, and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreignowned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

This is another solemn declaration in the manifesto of the Guomindang's First National Congress.'2 and it is the correct policy for the economic structure of the new-democratic republic. 43 But at the same time the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as it does not "dominate the livelihood of the people," for China's economy is still very backward. The republic will take certain necessary steps to confiscate the land of the big landlords and distribute it to those peasants having little or no land, carry out Mr. Sun Yatsen's44 slogan of "land to the tiller," abolish feudal relations in the rural areas, and turn the land over to the private ownership of the peasants without establishing a socialist agriculture. A rich peasant economy will be allowed in the rural areas. Such is the policy of "equalization of land ownership." "Land to the tiller" is the correct slogan for this policy. 4s

42. Congress,

-+

Congress held during the period of Guomindang-Communist

cooperation,

43. Republic ....... Republic. In the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat, the state enterprises will have a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national economy. 44. Mr. Sun Yatsen's-+ Sun Yatsen's

45. Policy.-+ Policy. In general, socialist agriculture will not be established at this stage, though various types of cooperative enterprises developed on the basis of "land to the tiller" will contain elements of socialism.

344 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

China's economy must develop along the path of the "regulation of capital" and the "equalization of landownership" and must never be "privately owned by the few"; we must never permit the few capitalists and landlords to "dominate the livelihood of the people"; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old semi feudal society to survive. Whoever dares to go counter to this line of advance will certainly not succeed but will run into a brick wall. Such are the internal economic relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, must and necessarily will establish. Such is the economy of New Democracy. And the politics of New Democracy are the concentrated expression of the economy of New Democracy.

VII. Refutation of Bourgeois Dictatorship More than 90 percent of the people are in favor of a republic of this kind with its new-democratic politics and new-democratic economy; "without such a republic, nothing can be achieved, for it accords with the natural principles and people's sentiments, goes with the trend of the world, meets the demands of the people, and has been pursued resolutely by people offoresight" (Sun Yatsen 'swords). There is no alternative road. What about the road to a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship? To be sure, that was the old road taken by the European and American bourgeoisie, but whether one likes it or not, neither the international nor the domestic situation allows China to do the same. Judging by the international situation, that road is blocked. In its fundamentals, the present international situation is one of a struggle between capitalism and socialism, in which capitalism is on the downgrade and socialism on the upgrade. In the first place international capitalism, or imperialism, will not permit it.46 Indeed the history of modern China is a history of imperialist aggression, of imperialist opposition to China's independence and to its development of capitalism. Earlier revolutions failed in China because imperialism strangled them, and innumerable revolutionary martyrs died, bitterly lamenting the nonfulfillment of their mission. Today a powerful Japanese imperialism is forcing its way into China and wants to reduce it to a colony; it is not China that is developing Chinese capitalism but Japan that is developing Japanese capitalism in our country; and it is not the Chinese bourgeoisie but the Japanese bourgeoisie that is exercising dictatorship in our country. True enough, this is the period of the final struggle of dying imperialism-imperialism is "moribund capitalism." But just because it is dying, it is all

46. Pennit it. ..... Permit the establishment of a bourgeois society under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

JANUARY 1940 345

the more dependent on colonies and semicolonies for survival and will certainly not allow any colony or semicolony to establish anything like a capitalist society under the dictatorship of its own bourgeoisie. Just because Japanese imperialism is bogged down in serious economic and political crises, just because it is dying, it must invade China and reduce it to a colony, thereby blocking the road to bourgeois dictatorship and national capitalism in China. In the second place, socialism will not permit it. All the imperialist powers in the world are our enemies, and China cannot possibly gain its independence without the assistance ofthe land of socialism and the international proletariat. That is, it cannot do so without the help of the Soviet Union and the victory ofthe struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany,ltaly, and other countries against capitalism in their own countries. Their victory is a help to us. Although it cannot be said that China's victory41 must necessarily wait upon the victory of the revolution in all these countries, or in one or two of them, there is no doubt that we cannot win without the added strength of their proletariat. In particular, Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance, and the revolution will fail. Don't the anti-Soviet campaigns in China from 1927 onward provide an extraordinarily clear lesson? The world today is unquestionably dying and socialism is unquestionably prospering. In these circumstances, would it not be sheer fantasy to desire the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship after the defeat of imperialism and feudalism? What if it is said that, owing to certain specific conditions (the victory of the bourgeoisie over Greek aggression and the extreme feebleness of the proletariat), a tiny Turkey ruled by a bourgeois dictatorship of a Kemalist type did still emerge after the First Imperialist World War and the October Revolution? Well, after World War II and the completion of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, there can be no second Turkey, much less a ''Turkey" with a population of 450 million. In the specific conditions of China (the bourgeoisie, with its tendency toward compromise, and the proletariat, with its revolutionary thoroughness), 48 things just never worked out so easily as in Turkey. After the Great Revolution failed in 1927, did not bourgeois elements in China loudly clamor for something called Kemalism? But where is China's Kemal? And where are China's bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist society? Besides, even the so-called Kemalist Turkey finally had to throw itself into the arms of Anglo-French imperialism, becoming more and more a semicolony and a pan ofthe reactionary imperialist world. In the international situation of the 1940s and 1950s,49 the heroes and brave fellows, whoeverthey may be,

47. China's victory .... Victory of the Chinese revolution 48. The bourgeoisie, with its tendency toward compromise, and the proletariat, with its revolutionary thoroughness .... The flabbiness of the bourgeoisie with its proneness to conciliation and the strength of the proletariat with its revolutionary thoroughness 49. The 1940s and 1950s

~

Today

346 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

in the colonies and semicolonies, either line up on the imperialist front and become part of world counterrevolution or line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of world revolution. They must do one or the other, for there is no third way. Judging by the domestic situation, too, the Chinese bourgeoisie should have learned its lesson by now. No sooner had the strength of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie brought the revolution of 1927 to victory than the Chinese bourgeoisie50 kicked the masses aside, seized the fruits of the revolution,51 and strained themselves to the limit in a war of "Communist suppression" for ten years. But what was the upshot? Today, when a powerful enemy has penetrated deep into our territory and the anti-Japanese war has been going on for two years, is it possib.Je that there are still people who want to copy the obsolete recipes of the European and American bourgeoisie? A decade of war was spent on "suppressing the Communists" out of existence, but no capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship was "suppressed" into existence. Is it possible that there are still people who want to have another try? True, a "one-party dictatorship" was "suppressed" into existence through the decade of ''Communist suppression," but it is a semicolonial and semi feudal dictatorship. What is more, at the end of four years of ''Communist suppression" (from 1927 to the incident of September 18, 1931 ), "Manchukuo" was "suppressed" into existence and in 1937, after another six years of such "suppression," the Japanese imperialists made their way into China south of the Great Wall. Today if anyone wants to carry on "suppression" for another decade, it would mean a new type of "Communist suppression," somewhat different from the old. But is there not one fleet-footed person who has taken up the torch for this new enterprise of "Communist suppression"? Yes, Wang Jingwei, who has become the new-style anti-Communist celebrity. Anyone who wishes to join his gang can please himself; but wouldn't that tum out to be an added embarrassment when talking guilefully about bourgeois dictatorship, capitalist society, Kemalism, a modem state, a one-party dictatorship, "one doctrine," and so on? And if, instead of joining the Wang Jingwei gang, someone wants to come into the "fight Japan" camp of the people but imagines that once the war is won he will be able to kick aside the people fighting Japan, seize the fruits of the victory of the fight against Japan, and establish a "perpetual one-party dictatorship," isn't he just daydreaming? "Fight Japan!" "Fight Japan!" But who is doing the fighting? Without the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie,52 you cannot move a step. Anyone who still dares to try to kick them aside will break his own foot. 53 Hasn't this, too, become a matter of common sense? But the diehards among the Chinese bourgeoisie (I am referring solely to the diehards) seem to have learned nothing in the past twenty years. Aren't they still shouting: "Restrict communism," "Dis50. The Chinese bourgeoisie....,. The Chinese bourgeoisie, headed by the big bourgeoisie 51. Revolution, .... Revolution, formed a counterrevolutionary alliance with imperialism and the feudal forces 52. Petty bourgeoisie ....., Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie 53. Will break his own fool~ Will himself be crushed

JANUARY 1940 347

solve communism," and "Combat communism"? Haven't we seen "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" followed by "Measures for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem" and still later by "Directives for Dealing with the Alien Party Problems"? Good God! With all this ''restricting" and "dealing with" going on, one wonders what kind of future they are preparing for our nation and for themselves! We earnestly and sincerely advise these gentlemen: Open your eyes, take a good look at China and the world, see how things stand inside as well as outside the country, and do not repeat your mistakes. If you persist in your mistakes, the future of our nation will of course be disastrous, but I am sure things will not go well with you either. This is absolutely true, absolutely certain. Unless the diehards among the Chinese bourgeoisie wake up, their future will be far from bright-they will only bring about their own destruction. Therefore we hope that China's anti-Japanese united front will be maintained and that, with the cooperation of all instead of the monopoly of a single clique, the anti-Japanese cause will be carried to victory. This is the only good policy-any other policy is bad. This is the sincere advice we Communists are giving and do not blame us for not having forewarned you. "If there is food, let everyone share it." This old saying, mentioned by the late President Li Yuanhong of the Republic of China, contains much truth. Since we all share in fighting the enemy, we should all share in eating, we should all share in the work to be done, and we should all share access to education. Such attitudes as "I and I alone will take everything" and "no one dare harm me" are nothing but the old tricks of feudal lords which simply will not work in the 1940s and 1950s. We Communists will never push aside anyone who is revolutionary (so long as he rejects capitulation and does not oppose communism); we shall persevere in the united front and practice long-term cooperation with all those classes, strata, political parties, and groups and individuals that fight54 Japan to the end. But it will not do if certain people want to push aside the Communist Party; it will not do if they want to spoil the united front. China must keep on fighting Japan, uniting and moving forward, and we cannot tolerate anyone who tries to capitulate, cause splits, or move backward.

VIII. Refutation of "Left" Phrase-Mongering If the capitalist road of bourgeois dictatorship is out of the question, then is it possible to take the socialist road of proletarian dictatorship? No, that is not possible either. Without a doubt, the present revolution is the first step, which will develop into the second step, that of socialism, at a later date. And China will attain true happiness only when it enters the socialist era. But today is not yet the time to introduce socialism. The present task of the revolution in China is to fight imperialism and 54. Fight -+ Are willing to fight

348 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

feudalism, and socialism is out of the question until this task is completed. The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New Democracy and then of socialism. Moreover, the first step will require quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us. Certain malicious propagandists, deliberately confusing these two distinct revolutionary stages, advocate the so-called theory of a single revolution in order to prove that the Three People's Principles apply to all kinds of revolutions and that communism therefore loses its raison d'etre. Utilizing this "theory," they frantically oppose communism and the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Their real purpose is to root out all revolution, to oppose a thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution and thoroughgoing resistance to Japan, and to prepare public opinion for their capitulation to the Japanese aggressors. This is deliberately being fostered by the Japanese." Since their occupation of Wuhan, they have come to realize that military force alone cannot subjugate China and they have therefore resorted to political offensives and economic blandishments. Their political offensives consist in tempting wavering elements in the anti-Japanese camp, splitting the united front, and undermining Guomindang-Communist cooperation. Their economic blandishments take the form of the so-called joint industrial enterprises. In Central and southern China, Japanese aggressors are allowing Chinese capitalists to invest 51 percent of the capital in such enterprises, with Japanese capital making up the other 49 percent; in northern China they are allowing Chinese capitalists to invest 49 percent of the capital, with Japanese capital making up the other 51 percent. The Japanese invaders have also promised to restore the former assets of the Chinese capitalists to them in the form of capital shares in the investment. At the prospect of profits, some conscienceless capitalists forget all moral principles and itch to have a go. One section, represented by Wang Jingwei, has already capitulated. Another section lurking in the anti-Japanese camp would also like to cross over. But, with the cowardice of thieves, they fear that the Communists will block their exit and, what is more, that the common people will brand them as traitors. So they have put their heads together and decided to prepare the ground in cultural circles and through the press. Having determined their policy, they have lost no time in hiring some "metaphysics-mongers" plus a few Trotskyites, who, brandishing their pens like lances, are tilting in all directions and creating bedlam. Hence the whole bag of tricks for deceiving those who do not know what is going on in the world around them-the ''theory of single revolution," the tales that communism does not suit the national conditions of China, that there is no need for a Communist Party in China, that the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies are sabotaging the anti-Japanese war and are merely moving but not hitting, that the

55. The Japanese ..... The Japanese imperialists

JANUARY /940

349

Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is a feudal separatist regime, that the Communist Party is disobedient, dissident, intriguing, and disruptive-and all for the purpose of providing the capitalists with good grounds for getting their 49 or 51 percent and selling out the nation's interests to the enemy at the opportune moment. This is "stealing the beams and pillars and replacing them with rotten timbers"-preparing the public mind for their projected capitulation. Thus, these gentlemen who, in all apparent seriousness, are pushing the ''theory of a single revolution" to oppose communism and the Communist Party are out for nothing but their49 or 51 percent. How they must have cudgeled their brains! The "theory of a single revolution" is simply a theory of no revolution at all, and that is the heart of the matter. But there are other people, apparently with no evil intentions, who are misled by the "theory of a single revolution" and the fanciful notion of "accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution at one stroke"; they do not understand that our revolution is divided into stages, that we can proceed to the next stage of revolution only after accomplishing the first and that there is no such thing as "accomplishing both at one stroke." Their approach is likewise very harmful because it confuses the steps to be taken in the revolution and weakens the effort directed toward the current task. It is correct and in accordance with the Marxist theory of revolutionary development to say ofthe two revolutionary stages that the first provides the conditions for the second and that the two must be consecutive, without allowing any intervening stage of bourgeois dictatorship. However, it is a utopian view rejected by true revolutionaries to say that the democratic revolution does not have a specific task and period of its own but can be merged and accomplished simultaneously with another task, that is, the socialist task (which can only be carried out in another period), and this is what they call "accomplishing both at one stroke."

IX. Refutation of the Diehards The bourgeois diehards in their tum come forward and say: "Well, you Communists have postponed the socialist system to a later stage and have declared: The Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization. All right then, fold up your communism for the time being." A fearful hullabaloo has recently been raised with this sort of argument in the form of the "one doctrine" theory. In essence it is the howl of the diehards for bourgeois despotism. Out of courtesy, however. we may simply describe it as totally Jacking in common sense. Communism is at once a complete system of proletarian ideology and a new social system. It is different from any other ideology or social system and is the most complete, progressive, revolutionary, and rational system in human history. The ideological and social system of feudalism has a place only in the museum of history. The ideological and social system of capitalism has also become a museum

350

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

piece in one part of the world (in the Soviet Union), while in other countries it resembles "a dying person who is sinking fast, like the sun setting beyond the westem hills" and will soon be relegated to the museum. The Communist ideological and social system alone is full of youth and vitality, sweeping the world with the momentum of an avalanche and the force of a thunderbolt. The introduction of scientific communism into China has opened new vistas for people and has changed the face of the Chinese revolution. Without communism to guide it, China's democratic revolution cannot possibly succeed, let alone move on to the next stage. This is the reason the bourgeois diehards are so loudly demanding that communism be "folded up." But it must not be "folded up," for once communism is "folded up," China will be doomed. The whole world today depends on communism for its salvation, and China is no exception. Everybody knows that the Communist Party has an immediate and a future program, a minimum and maximum program, with regard to the social system and its actions. For the present period, New Democracy, and, for the future, socialism; these are two parts of an organic whole, guided by one and the same Communist ideology. Is it not, therefore, in the highest degree absurd to clamor for communism to be "folded up" on the ground that the Communist Party's minimum program is in basic agreement with the political tenets of the Three People's Principles? It is precisely because of this basic agreement between the two that we Communists find it possible to recognize "the Three People's Principles as the political basis for the anti-Japanese united front" and to acknowledge that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization"; otherwise no such possibility would exist. Here we have a united front between communism and the Three People's Principles in the stage of the democratic revolution, the kind of united front Mr. Sun Yatsen had in mind when he said: "Communism is the good friend of the Three People's Principles." To reject communism is in fact to reject the united front. The diehards have concocted absurd arguments for the rejection of communism just because they want to reject the united front and practice their one-party doctrine. Moreover, the "one doctrine" theory is an absurdity. So long as classes exist, there will be as many doctrines as there are classes, and even various groups in the same class may have their different doctrines. Since the feudal class has a feudal doctrine, the bourgeoisie a capitalist doctrine, monks'6 Buddhism, the Christians Christianity, and the peasants polytheism, and since in recent years, some people have also advocated Kemalism, fascism, vitalism, the "doctrine of distribution according to labor," and whatnot, why then cannot the proletariat have its communism? Since there are countless "isms," why should the cry of "Fold it up!" be raised at the sight of communism alone? Frankly, "folding it up" will not work. Let us rather have a contest. If communism is beaten, we Communists will admit

56. Monks

~

the Buddhists

JANUARY 1940 351

defeat in good grace. But if not, then let all that stuff about "one doctrine," which violates the Principle of Democracy, be "folded up" as soon as possible. To avoid misunderstanding and for the edification of the diehards, it is necessary to show clearly where the Three People's Principles and communism do coincide and where they do not. Comparison of the two reveals both similarities and differences. First, the similarities. They are found in the basic political program of both doctrines during the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The three political tenets of the revolutionary Three People's Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood as reinterpreted by Mr. Sun Yatsen in 1924 are basically similar to the Communist political program for the stage of the democratic revolution in China. Because of these similarities and because of the carrying out of the Three People's Principles, the united front of the two doctrines and the two parties came into existence. It is wrong to ignore this aspect. Next, the differences. (I) There is a difference in part of the program for the stage of the democratic revolution. The Communist program for the whole course of the democratic revolution includes the eight-hour work day57 and a thorough agrarian revolution, whereas the Three People's Principles do not. Unless these points are added to the Three People's Principles and there is the readiness to carry them out, the two democratic programs are only basically the same and cannot be described as altogether the same. (2) Another difference is that one includes two stages,58 and the other does not. Communism envisages the stage of the socialist revolution beyond the stage of the democratic revolution, and hence, beyond its minimum program it has a maximum program, that is, the program for the attainment of socialism. 59 The Three People's Principles, which envisage only the stage of the democratic revolution and not the stage of the socialist revolution, have only a minimum program and not a maximum program, that is, they have no program for the establishment of socialism. (3) There is the difference in world outlook. Communism60 is dialectical and historical materialism, while the Three People's Principles explain history in terms of the people's livelihood and vitalism;61 the two world outlooks are opposed to each other. (4) There is the difference in revolutionary thoroughness. In communism, theory and practice go together; in other words, it possesses revolutionary thoroughness. With the followers of the

57. Includes the eight-hour work day

-+

Includes full rights for the people, the eight-

hour working day

58. Two stages -+ The stage of the socialist revolution 59. Socialism ...... Socialism and communism. 60. Communism -+ The world outlook of communism 61. In terms of the people's livelihood and vitalism; ..... In terms of the people's livelihood, which in essence is a dualist or idealist outlook:

352

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Three People's Principles,62 except for those completely loyal to the revolution and to truth, theory and practice do not go together and their deeds contradict their words; in other words, they lack revolutionary thoroughness. The above are the differences between the two. They distinguish Communists from the followers of the Three People's Principles. It is undoubtedly very wrong to ignore this distinction and see only the aspect of unity and not of contradiction. Once all this is understood, it is easy to see what the bourgeois diehards have in mind when they demand that communism be "folded up." If it does not mean bourgeois despotism, then there is no sense to it all. X. The Three People's Principles, Old and New The bourgeois diehards have no understanding whatsoever of historical change; their knowledge is so poor that it is practically nonexistent. They do not know the difference either between communism and the Three People's Principles or between the new Three People's Principles and the old. We Communists recognize "the Three People's Principles as the political basis for the Anti-Japanese National United Front," we acknowledge that "the Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization," and we admit the basic agreement between the Communist minimum program and the political tenets of the Three People's Principles. But which kind of Three People's Principles? The Three People's Principles as reinterpreted by Mr. Sun Yatsen in the manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, and no other. I wish the diehard gentlemen would spare a mo-

ment from the work of "restricting communism,'" "dissolving communism,'' and "combating communism," in which they are so gleefully engaged, to glance through this manifesto. In the manifesto Mr. Sun Yatsen said: "Here is the true interpretation of the Guomindang's Three People's Principles." Hence these are the only genuine Three People's Principles and all others are spurious. The only "true interpretation" of the Three People's Principles is the one contained in the manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, and all other interpretations are false. Presumably this is no Communist fabrication, for many Guomindang members and I myself personally witnessed the adoption ofthe manifesto. The manifesto marks off the two epochs in the history of the Three People's Principles. Before it, they belonged to the old category; they were the Three People's Principles of the old bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolony, the Three People's Principles of old democracy, the old Three People's Principles. After it, they came within the new category; they became the Three People's Principles of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolony, the Three People's Principles of New Democracy, the new Three People's Principles. These and these alone are the revolutionary Three People's Principles of the new period. 62. The Three People's Principles-+ The world outlook of the Three People's Principles

JANUARY /940

353

The revolutionary Three People's Principles of the new period, the new or genuine Three People's Principles, embody the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. Without each and every one of these Three Great Policies, the Three People's Principles become either false or incomplete in the new period. In the first place, the revolutionary, new, or genuine Three People's Principles must include alliance with Russia. The present situation is perfectly clear. If there is no policy of uniting with Russia, if we do not unite with the land of socialism, there will inevitably be a policy of uniting with imperialism, we will inevitably unite with imperialism. Is it not evident that this is exactly what happened after 1927? During the first two years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, because the great imperialist war had not yet broken out, the contradictions between Britain, the United States, and other countries, and Japan could still be exploited. Since the outbreak of the imperialist World War, these contradictions, although they have not entirely disappeared, have g really diminished. If we were to make improper use of them, then Britain and the United States could demand that China participate in their struggle against the Soviet Union. /[China then complied with their demand, it would immediately place itself on the side of the reacrionary front of imperialism, thus putting an end to all national independence. Once the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and imperialist Britain and the United States63 grows sharper, China will have to take its stand on one side or the other. This is an inevitable trend. Is it not possible to avoid leaning to either side? No, that is an illusion. The entire globe will be swept into one or the other of these two fronts, and henceforth "neutrality" will be merely a deceptive term. Especially is this true of China, which is fighting an imperialist power that has penetrated deep into its territory; its final victory is inconceivable without the assistance of the Soviet Union. If alliance with Russia is sacrificed for the sake of alliance with imperialism, the word ''revolutionary" will have to be expunged from the Three People's Principles, which will then become reactionary. In the final analysis, there can be no "neutral" Three People's Principles; they can only be either revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. Would it not be more heroic to "fight against attacks from both sides" as Wang Jingwei once remarked, and to have the kind of Three People's Principles that serves this "fight"? Unfortunately, even its inventor WangJingwei himself has abandoned (or "folded up") this kind of Three People's Principles, for he has adopted the Three People's Principles of alliance with imperialism. !fit is argued that there is a difference between Eastern and Western imperialism, and that, unlike Wang Jingwei who has allied himself with Eastern imperialism, you should ally yourself with some mother:fUcking [lama] Western imperialists to march eastward and attack, then would not such conduct be quite revolutionary? But whether you like it or not, the Western imperialists are determined to oppose the Soviet Union and communism, and, if you ally yourself with them, they will ask you to march 63. Imperialist Britain and the United States _.The imperialists

354 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

northward and attack, and your revolution will come to nothing. All these circumstances make it essential for the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People's Principles to include alliance with Russia and, under no circumstances, alliance with imperialism against Russia. In the second place, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People's Principles must include cooperation with the Communist Party. Either you cooperate with the Communist Party or you oppose it. Opposition to communism is the policy of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Jingwei, and if that is what you want, very well, they will invite you to join their Anti-Communist Company. But wouldn't that look suspiciously like turning traitor? You might say, "I am not following Japan, but some other country." That is just ridiculous. No matter whom you follow, the moment you oppose the Communist Party you become a traitor, because you can no longer resist Japan. If you say, "I am going to oppose the Communist Party independently," that is arrant nonsense. How can the "heroes" in a colony or semicolony tackle a counterrevolutionary job of this magnitude without depending on the strength of imperialism? For ten long years, virtually all the imperialist forces in the world were enlisted against the Communist Party, but in vain. How can you suddenly oppose it "independently"? Some people outside the Border Region, we are told, are now saying: "Opposing the Communist Party is good, but you can never succeed in it." This remark, if it is not simply hearsay, is only half wrong, for what "good" is there in opposing the Communist Party? But the other half is true, you certainly can "never succeed in it." Basically, the reason lies not with the Communists but with the common people, who like the Communist Party and do not like "opposing" it. If you oppose the Communist Party at a juncture when our national enemy is penetrating deep into our territory, the people will be after your hide; they will certainly show you no mercy. This much is certain, whoever wants to oppose the Communist Party must be prepared to be ground to dust. If you are not keen on being ground to dust, you had certainly better drop this opposition. This is our sincere advice to all the anti-Communist "heroes." Thus it is as clear as can be that the Three People's Principles of today must include cooperation with the Communist Party, otherwise those Principles will perish. It is a question of life and death for the Three People's Principles. Cooperating with the Communist Party, they will survive; opposing the Communist Party, they will perish. Can anyone prove the contrary? In the third place, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People's Principles must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Rejection of this policy, failure wholeheartedly to assist the peasants and workers or failure to carry out the behest in Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament to "arouse the masses of the people" amounts to preparing the way for the defeat of the revolution and one's own defeat in the bargain. Stalin has said that "in essence, the question of colonies and semicolonies 64 is a peasant question." This means that the Chinese revolution 64. The question of colonies and semicolonies ... The national question

JANUARY 1940

355

is essentially a peasant revolution and that the resistance to Japan now going on is essentially peasant resistance. Essentially, the politics of New Democracy means giving the peasants their rights. The new and genuine Three People's Principles are essentially the principles of a peasant revolution. Essentially, mass culture means raising the cultural level of the peasants. The anti-Japanese war is essentially a peasant war. We are now living at a time when the "doctrine of going up the mountains"65 applies; everyone is on the top of the hills; meetings, work, classes, newspaper publication, the writing of books, theatrical performances-everything is done up in the hills and all essentially for the sake of the peasants. And essentially it is the peasants who provide everything that sustains the resistance to Japan and keeps us going. By "essentially" we mean basically, not ignoring the other sections of the people, as Stalin himself has explained. As every schoolboy knows, 80 percent of China's population are peasants, more than 80 percent after the fall of the big cities. So the peasant problem becomes the basic problem of the Chinese revolution and the strength of the peasants is the main strength of the Chinese revolution. In the Chinese population the workers rank second to the peasants in number. There are several million industrial workers in China and several tens of millions of handicraft workers and agricultural laborers. China cannot live without them, because they are the producers in the industrial sector of the economy. And the revolution cannot succeed without them,66 because it is the leader of the Chinese revolution and is the most revolutionary class. In these circumstances, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People's Principles must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Any other kind of Three People's Principles, which lacks this policy, does not give the peasants and workers wholehearted assistance, or does not carry out the behest to "arouse the masses of the people," will certainly perish. Thus it is clear that there is no future for any Three People's Principles which depart from the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. Every conscientious follower of the Three People's Principles must seriously consider this point. The Three People's Principles comprising the Three Great Policies-in other words, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People's Principles-are the Three People's Principles of New Democracy, a development of the old Three People's Principles, a great contribution of Mr. Sun Yatsen, and a product of the era in which the Chinese revolution has become part of the world socialist revolution. It is only the Three People's Principles which the Chinese Communist Party 65. Shangshanzhuyi. Mao is referring to the tactics of going up the mountains (or hillsthe word is the same in Chinese), which he had advocated in July 1927 and applied on the linggangshan. (See Volume III of our edition, especially pp. 10-11, 18, and 34.) More loosely, the reference is, of cowse, to the practice of establishing bases in remote or inaccessible places, which Mao had pursued ever since 1927, and to what was then going on in Yan'an.

66. Them -+ The modem industrial working class

356

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

regards as "being what China needs today" and for whose "complete realization" it declares itself pledged "to fight." These are the only Three People's Principles which are in basic agreement with the Communist Party's political program for the stage of democratic revolution,67 namely with its minimum program. As for the old Three People's Principles, they were a product of the old period of the Chinese revolution. Russia was then an imperialist power, and naturally there could be no policy of alliance with it; there was then no Communist Party in existence in our country and naturally there could be no policy of cooperation with it; the movement of the workers and peasants had not yet revealed its full political significance and aroused people's attention, and naturally there could be no policy of alliance with them. Hence the Three People's Principles of the period before the reorganization of the Guomindang in the 13th year ofthe Republic belonged to the old category, and they became obsolete. The Guomindang could not have gone forward unless it had developed them into the new Three People's Principles. Mr. Sun Yatsen in his wisdom saw this point, secured the help of Lenin68 and the Chinese Communist Party, and reinterpreted the Three People's Principles so as to endow them with new characteristics suited to the times. As a result, a united front was formed between the Three People's Principles and communism, GuomindangCommunist cooperation was established for the first time, the sympathy of the people of the whole country was won, and the First Great Revolution69 was launched. The old Three People's Principles were revolutionary in the old period and reflected its historical features. But if the old stuff is repeated in the new period after the new Three People's Principles have been established, or alliance with Russia is opposed after the socialist state has been established, or cooperation with the Communist Party is opposed after the Communist Party has come into existence, or the policy of assisting the peasants and workers is opposed after they have awakened and demonstrated their political strength, then that is reactionary and shows ignorance of the times. The period of reaction after 1927 was the result of such ignorance. The old proverb says, "Whoever understands the signs of the times is a great man." I hope the followers of the Three People's Principles today will bear this in mind. Were the Three People's Principles to fall within the old category, then they would have nothing basically in common with the Communist minimum program, because they would belong to the past and be obsolete. Any sort of Three People's Principles that oppose Russia, the Communist Party, or the peasants and workers are definitely reactionary; they not only have absolutely nothing in common with the Communist minimum program but are the enemy of communism, and there is no common ground at all. This, too, the followers ofthe Three People's Principles should carefully consider.

67. Democratic revolution ...., Democracy 68. Lenin - The Soviet Union 69. The First Great Revolution-+ The revolution of 1924-1927

JANUARY /940

357

In any case, people with a conscience will never forsake the new Three People's Principles until the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism is basically accomplished. The only ones who do are people like Wang Jingwei. No matter how energetically they push their spurious Three People's Principles, which oppose Russia, the Communist Party, and the peasants and workers, there will surely be no lack of people with a conscience and sense of justice who will continue to support Sun Yatsen's genuine Three People's Principles. Many followers of the genuine Three People's Principles continued the struggle for the Chinese revolution even after the reaction of 1927, and the numbers will undoubtedly swell to tens upon tens of thousands now that the national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory. We Communists will always persevere in long-term cooperation with all the true followers of the Three People's Principles and, while rejecting the traitors and the sworn enemies of communism, will never forsake any of our friends.

XI. The Culture of New Democracy In the foregoing we have explained the historical characteristics of Chinese politics in the new period and the question of the new democratic republic. We can now proceed to the question of culture. A given culture is the ideological reflection of the politics and economics of a given society. There is in China an imperialist culture which is a reflection of imperialist rule, or partial rule, in the political and economic fields. This culture is fostered not only by the cultural organizations run directly by the imperialists in China but by a number of Chinese who have lost all sense of shame. Into this category falls all culture embodying a slave ideology. China also has a semi feudal culture reflecting its semifeudal politics and economy, whose exponents include all those who advocate the worship of Confucius, the study ofthe Confucian canon, and the old ethical code and the old ideas in opposition to the new culture and new ideas. Imperialist culture and semifeudal culture are devoted brothers and have formed a reactionary cultural alliance against China's new culture. This kind of reactionary culture serves the imperialists and the feudal class and must be swept away. Unless it is swept away, no new culture of any kind can be built up. There is no construction without destruction, no flowing without damming, and no motion without rest; the two are locked in a life-and-death struggle. As for the new culture, it is the ideological reflection of the new politics and the new economy which it sets out to serve. As stated in Section III, Chinese society has gradually changed in character since the emergence of a capitalist economy in China; it is no longer an entirely feudal but a semifeudal society, although the feudal economy still predominates. Compared with the feudal economy, this capitalist economy is a new one. The political forces of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat are the new political forces which have emerged and grown simultaneously with this new capitalist economy. Various revolutionary parties,the Guomindang and the Communist Party being the most important among them, are the representatives of the

358 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

awakened bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and th~ proletariat. And the new culture reflects these new economic and political forces in the field of ideology and serves them. Without the capitalist economy, without the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, and without the political parties of these classes, the new ideology or new culture could not have emerged. These new political, economic, and cultural forces are all revolutionary forces which are opposed to the old politics, the old economy, and the old culture. The old is composed oftwo parts, one being China's own semi feudal politics, economy, and culture, and the other the politics, economy, and culture of imperialism, with the latter heading the alliance. Both are bad and should be completely destroyed. The struggle between the new and the old in Chinese society is a struggle between the new forces ofthe people (the various revolutionary classes) and the old forces of imperialism and the feudal class. It is a struggle between revolution and counterrevolution. This struggle has lasted a full hundred years starting from the Opium War and nearly thirty years starting from the 1911 Revolution. But as already indicated, revolutions too can be classified into old and new, and what is new in one historical period becomes old in another. ThecenturyofChina's bourgeois-democratic revolution can be divided into two main stages, a first stage of eighty years and a second stage of twenty years. Each has its basic historical characteristics. China's bourgeois-democratic revolution in the first eighty years belongs to the old category, while in the last twenty years, owing to the change in the international and domestic political situation, it belongs to the new category. Old democracy is the characteristic of the first eighty years. New Democracy is the characteristic of the last twenty. This distinction holds good in culture as well as in politics. How does it manifest itself in the field of culture? We shall explain this next.

XII. The Historical Characteristics of China's Cultural Revolution On the cultural or ideological front, the two periods preceding and following the May Fourth movement form two distinct historical periods. Before the May Fourth movement, the struggle on China's cultural front was one between the new culture of the bourgeoisie and the old culture of the feudal class. The struggles between the modern school system and the imperial examination system, between the new learning and the old learning, and between Western learning and Chinese learning were all of this nature. The so-called modern schools or new learning or Western learning of that time concentrated mainly (we say mainly, because in part pernicious vestiges of Chinese feudalism still remained) on the bourgeois natural sciences and social sciences. 70 In addition to the natural

70. Bourgeois natural sciences and social sciences ... Bourgeois social and political

theories, which were needed by the representatives of the bourgeoisie

JANUARY /940

359

sciences at the time, the new schools before the May Fourth movement were dominated by the ideology represented by Darwin's theory of evolution, Adam Smith's classical economics, Mill's formal logic, and French Enlightment scholar Montesquieu 's socialism introduced to China by Yan Fu. At the time, this ideology played a revolutionary role in fighting the Chinese feudal ideology, and it served the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old period. But becauSe the Chinese bourgeoisie lacked strength and the world had already entered the era of imperialism, this bourgeois ideology was only able to last out a few rounds and was beaten back by the reactionary alliance of the enslaving ideology of foreign imperialism and the "back to the ancients" ideology of Chinese feudalism; as soon as this reactionary ideological alliance staned a minor counteroffensive, the so-called new learning lowered its banners, muffled its drums and beat a retreat, retaining its outer form but losing its soul. The old bourgeois-democratic culture became enervated and decayed in the era of imperialism, and its failure was inevitable. But since the May Founh movement, things have been different. A brand-new cultural force carne into being in China, that is, the Communist culture and ideology guided by the Chinese Communists, or the Communist world outlook and theory of social revolution. The May Founh movement occurred in 1919, and in 1921 came the founding of the Chinese Communist Pany and the real beginning of China's labor movement-all in the wake of World War I and the October Revolution, that is, at a time when the national problem and the colonial movements71 of the world underwent a change, and the connection between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution became quite obvious. The new political force of the proletariat and the Communist Pany mounted the Chinese political stage, and as a result, the new cultural force, in new uniform and with new weapons, mustering all possible allies and deploying its ranks in battle array, launched heroic attacks on imperialist culture and feudal culture. Although this vital force has not yet had the time to occupy the field of natural sciences and carry out a fight in it, in general allowing the bourgeois world outlook to dominate it temporarily, it has aroused a great revolution in the social science field, which provides the most important ideological weapons in the era of revolutions in the colonies and semicolonies. This new force has made great strides in the domain of the social sciences, 72 whether of philosophy, economics, political science, military science, history,literature, or art (including the theater, the cinema, music, sculpture, and painting). For the last twenty years, wherever this new cultural force has directed its attack, a great revolution has taken place both in ideological content and in form (for example, in the written language). Its influence has been so great and its impact so powerful that it is invincible wherever it goes. The numbers it has rallied behind it have no parallel in Chinese history. Lu Xun was the greatest and the most courageous standard·bearer

71. Colonial movements_,. Colonial revolutionary movements

72. Social sciences _,. Social sciences and of the arts and letters

360

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of this new cultural force. The chief commander of China's cultural revolution, he was not only a great man of letters but a great thinker and revolutionary. Lu Xun was a man of unyielding integrity, free from all sycophancy or obsequiousness; this quality is invaluable among colonial and semicolonial peoples. Representing the great majority of the nation, Lu Xun breached and stormed the enemy citadel; on the cultural front, he was the bravest and most correct, the firmest, the most loyal and the most ardent national hero, a hero without parallel in our history. The road he took was the very road of China's new national culture. Before the May Fourth movement, China's new culture was a culture of the old-democratic kind and pan of the capitalist cultural revolution ofthe world bourgeoisie. Since the May Fourth movement, it has become new-democratic and pan of the socialist cultural revolution of the world proletariat. Prior to the May Founh movement, China's new cultural movement, its cultural revolution, was led by the bourgeoisie, which still had a leading role to play. After the May Fourth movement, the culture and ideology of this class became even more backward than its politics, and it was incapable of playing any leading role; at most, it could serve to a cenain extent as an ally during revolutionary periods, while inevitably the responsibility for leading the alliance rested on proletarian culture and ideology. This is an undeniable fact. The new-democratic culture is the anti-imperialist and anti feudal culture of the broad masses; today it is the culture of the anti-Japanese united front. This culture can be led only by the culture and ideology of the proletariat, by the ideology of communism, and not by the culture and ideology of any other class. In a word, new-democratic culture is the proletarian-led, anti-imperialist, and anti feudal culture of the broad masses.

XIII. The Four Periods A cultural revolution is the ideological reflection of the political and economic revolutions, and serves them. In China there is a united front in the cultural as in the political revolution. The history of the united front in the cultural revolution during the last twenty years can be divided into four periods. The first covers the two years from 1919 to 1921, the second the six years from 1921 to 1927, the third the nine73 years from 1927 to 1936,74 and the founh the three years from 1937 to the present. The first period extended from the May Founh movement of 1919 to the founding of the Chinese Communist Pany in 1921. The May Founh movement was its chief landmark. The May Fourth movement was an anti-imperialist as well as an antifeudal movement. Its outstanding historical significance is to be seen in a feature which 73. Nine ..... Ten 74. 1936 ~ 1937

JANUARY 1940 361

was absent trom the 1911 Revolution, namely, its thorough and uncompromising opposttJon to imperialism as well as to feudalism. The May Fourth movement possessed this quality because capitalism had developed a step further in China and because new hopes had arisen forthe liberation ofthe Chinese nation as China's revolutionary intellectual class" saw the collapse of three great imperialist powers. Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, and the weakening of two others, Britain and France, while the Russian proletariat had established a socialist state and the German, Hungarian, and Italian proletariat had risen in revolution. The May Fourth movement came into being at the call of the world revolution of the ume, of the Russian Revolution and of Lenin. It was part of the world proletarian revolution of the time. Although at the time of the May Fourth movement the Chinese Communist Party had not yet come into existence, there were already large numbers of intellectuals who approved of the Russian Revolution and had the rudiments of Communist ideology. In the beginning the May Fourth movement was a revolutionary movement of the united front of three sections of peopleCommunist intellectuals, revolutionary petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and bourgeois intellectuals (the last forming the right wing at that time). Its weak point was that it was confined to the intellectuals, and the workers and peasants did not participate in it. But as soon as it developed into the June Third movement, 76 not only the intellectuals but the mass of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie joined in, and it became a nationwide revolutionary movement. The cultural revolution ushered in by the May Fourth movement was uncompromising in its opposition to feudal culture; there had never been such a great and thoroughgoing cultural revolution since the dawn of Chinese history. Raising aloft the two great banners of the day, "Down with the old ethics and up with the new!" and "Down with the old literature and up with the new!," the cultural revolution had great achievements to its credit. At that time it was not yet possible for this cultural movement to become widely diffused among the workers and peasants. The slogan of "Literature for the common people" was advanced, but in fact the "common people" then could only refer to the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois intellectuals in the cities, that is, the so-called urban intelligentsia. Both in ideology and in the matter of cadres, the May Fourth movement paved the way for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, for the May Thirtieth movement of 1925, and for the Northern Expedition. The bourgeois intellectuals, who constituted the right wing of the May Fourth movement, mostly compromised with the enemy in the second period and went over to the side of reaction.

75. Intellectual class -+ Intellectuals 76. The term "June Third movement" refers to the wave of strikes by merchants and workers, and the boycotting of Japanese goods, which began around June 3, 1919, as an expression of sympathy and support for students who had been arrested because of their participation in the May Fourth movement.

362

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

In the second period, whose landmarks were the founding of the Chinese Communist Pany, the May Thirtieth movement, and the Northern Expedition, the united front of the three classes formed during the May Fourth movement was continued and expanded. 77 This united front78 also took form politically, this being the first instance of Guomindang-Communist cooperation. Mr. Sun Yatsen was a great man not only because he led the great Revolution of 1911 (although it was only a democratic revolution of the old period) butalso because, "adapting himselfto the trends of the world and meeting the needs of the masses," he had the capacity to bring forward the revolutionary Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers, to give new meaning to the Three People's Principles, and thus to institute the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. Previously, the Three People's Principles had exerted little influence on the educational and academic world or on youth, because they had not raised the issues of opposition to imperialism or to the feudal social system and feudal culture. They were the old Three People's Principles, which people regarded as the time-serving banner of a group of men bent on seizing power, in other words, on securing official positions. a banner used purely for political maneuvering. Then came the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. The cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and the joint efforts of the revolutionary members of the two parties spread the new Three People's Principles all over China, extending to a section of the educational and academic world and the mass of student youth. This was entirely because the original Three People's Principles had peveloped into the antiimperialist, antifeudal, and new-democratic Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. Without this development it would have been impossible to disseminate the ideas of the Three People's Principles. During this period, these revolutionary Three People's Principles became the political basis of the united front of the Guomindang and the Communist Party and of all the revolutionary classes, and since "communism is the good friend of the Three People's Principles," a united front was formed between the two of them. In terms of social classes, it was a united front of three classes of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie,79 and the bourgeoisie. Using the Guomindang's Republican Daily News 80 of Shanghai, and other newspapers in various localities as their bases of operations, the two parties jointly advocated anti-imperialism, jointly combated feudal education based upon the worship of Confucius and upon the study of the

77. Continued and expanded . ....., Continued and expanded, and the peasantry was drawn into it. 78. This united front """ This multiclass united front 79. The petty bourgeoisie, ,... The peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, 80. Using the Guomindang's Republican Daily News ... Using the Communist Guide Weekly, the Guomindang's Republican Daily News

JANUARY /940

363

Confucian canon, and jointly opposed feudal literature and the classical language and promoted the new literature and the vernacular style of writing with an antiimperialist and anti feudal content. Bt During the wars in Guangdong and during the Northern Expedition, they reformed China's armed forces by the inculcation of anti-imperialist and antifeudal ideas.82 The slogans "Down with the corrupt officials" and "Down with the local bullies and bad gentry" were first raised among the peasant millions, and great peasant revolutionary struggles were aroused. Thanks to all this and to the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Northern Expedition was victorious. But no sooner did the bourgeoisie83 climb to power with the help of workers and peasants than it put an end to this great revolution, thus creating an entirely new political situation. The third period was the new revolutionary period of 1927-1936.84 As a result of the changes which had taken place within the revolutionary camp at the end of the previous period, with the bourgeoisie8' going over to the counterrevolutionary camp of the imperialist and feudal forces, 86 only two of the three classes87 formerly within the revolutionary camp remained, namely, the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasantry, the revolutionary intellectuals, and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie). Thus the Chinese revolution inevitably entered a new period in which the Chinese Communist Party alone exercised the leadership. 88 This period was one of reactionary89 campaigns of "encirclement and suppression," on the one hand, and of the deepening of the revolution, on the other. There were two kinds of reactionary campaigns of "encirclement and suppression," the military and the cultural. The deepening of the revolution was of two kinds: both the agrarian and the cultural revolutions were deepened. At the instigation of the imperialists, the reactionary forces of the whole country and of the whole world were mobilized for both kinds of campaigns of"encirclement and suppression," which lasted no less than ten years and were unparalleled in their ruthlessness; hundreds of thousands of Communists and young students were

81. The new literature and the vernacular style of writing with an anti-imperialist and antifeudal content ..... The anti-imperialist and antifeudal new literature and the vernacular style of writing 82. Ideas - Ideas forthe first time

83. The bourgeoisie ..... The big bourgeoisie 84. I 927- I 936 - 1927-1937

85. The bourgeoisie ..... The big bourgeoisie 86. Forces ... Forces, and the national bourgeoisie trailing after it 87. Two of the three classes ..... Three of the four classes. Here, and throughout the

balance of this text, Mao envisages not a four-class bloc (workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie) but a three-class bloc (workers, petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie), lumping together the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie in the second category. For comments on this usage, see above, the Introduction. 88. Exercised the leadership~ Gave leadership to the masses 89. Reactionary ... Counterrevolutionary

364

MAO'S ROAD TO /'OWER

slaughtered, and millions of workers and peasants suffered cruel persecution. The people responsible for all this apparently had no doubt that communism and the Communist Party could be "exterminated once and for all." But the outcome was different; both kinds of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns failed miserably. The military campaign resulted in the northern march of the Red Army to resist the Japanese, and the cultural campaign resulted in the outbreak of the December Ninth movement of revolutionary youth in 1935. And the common result of both was the awakening of the people of the whole country. These were three positive results. But the negative result was the attack by a powerful enemy; thiJ is the key reason why the people of the whole country to this day bitterly deteJt tire anticommunism of those ten years. The most amazing thing of all was that the Guomindang's cultural"encirclement and suppression" campaign failed completely in the Guomindang areas as well, although the Communist Party was in an utterly defenseless position in all the cultural and educational institutions there. Why did this happen'! Does it not give food for prolonged and deep thought'! It was in the very midst of such campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" that Lu Xun, who believed in communism, became the giant of China's cultural revolution. 90 In the struggles of this period, the revolutionary side firmly upheld the people's anti-imperialist and anti feudal New Democracy and their new Three People's Principles, while the counterrevolutionary side, under the direction of imperialism, imposed the despotic regime of the coalition of the landlord class. 91 That despotic regime butchered Mr. Sun Yatsen 's Three Great Policies and his new Three People's Principles both politically and culturally, with catastrophic consequences to the Chinese nation. The fourth period is that of the present anti-Japanese war. Pursuing its zigzag course, the Chinese revolution has again arrived at a united front of the three92 classes. But this time the scope is much broader. Among the upper classes it includes all the rulers. 93 Among the middle classes, it includes the petty bourgeoisie in its totality. Among the lower classes, it includes the entire proletariat. All classes and strata of the country have become allies and are resolutely resisting Japanese imperialism. The first stage of this period lasted until the fall of Wuhan. During that stage, there was a lively atmosphere in the country in every field; politically there was a trend toward democracy, and culturally there was widespread activity. With the fall of Wuhan the second stage began, during which the political situation has undergone many changes, with one section of the big bourgeoisie capitu-

90. Revolution . .-. Revolution. The negative result of the counterrevolutionary campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" was the invasion of our country by Japanese

imperialism. This is the chief reason why to this very day the people of the whole country still bitterly detest those ten years of anticommunism. .. 91. The landlord class -+ The landlord class and the big bourgeoisie 92. Three -i> Four 93. All the rulers -i> Many from the ruling class

JANUARY /940

365

lating to the enemy and another desiring an end to the War of Resistance. In the cultural movement, this situation has been reflected in the reactionary activities of Ye Qing, Zhang Junmai, and others, and in the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press. To overcome this crisis, a firm struggle is necessary against all ideas opposed to resistance, unity, and progress, and unless these reactionary ideas are crushed, there will be no hope of victory. How will this struggle tum out? This is the big question in the minds of the people of the whole country. Judging by the domestic and international situation, the Chinese people are bound to win, however numerous the obstacles on the path of resistance. If we consider Chinese history as a whole, the progress achieved during the twenty years since the May Founh movement not only surpasses that of the preceding eighty years, it truly surpasses that previously achieved in several millennia. Can we not visualize what funher progress China will make in another twenty years? The unbridled violence of all the forces of darkness, whether domestic or foreign, has brought disaster to our nation; but this very violence indicates that, while the forces of darkness still have some strength left, they are already in their death throes, and that the people are gradually approaching victory. This is true in the East94 and in the entire world. XIV. Some Wrong Ideas About tbe Nature of Culture Everything95 comes from the forge of hard and bitter struggle. This is also true of the new culture, which has followed a zigzag course in the past twenty years, during which both the good and the bad were tested and proved in struggle. The bourgeois diehards are as hopelessly wrong on the question of culture as on that of political power. They neither understand the historical characteristics of this new period in China nor recognize the new-democratic or the new Three People's Principles culture of the masses. Their starting point is bourgeois despotism, which in culture becomes the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie. It seems that a section (and I refer only to a section) of educated people from the so-called European-American school who in fact supponed the government's "Communist suppression" campaign on the cultural front in the past are now supponing its policy of "restricting" and "corroding" the Communist Pany. They do not want the workers and the peasants to hold up their heads politically or culturally. This bourgeois diehard road of cultural despotism leads nowhere; as in the case of political despotism,96 the domestic and international preconditions are lacking. Therefore this cultural despotism, too, had better be "folded up."

94. In the East

-+

In China, in the whole East

95. Everything- Everything new

96. As in the case of political despotism political despotism

-+

As in lhe case of the erroneous direction of

366

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

So far as the orientation of our national culture is concerned, it is not yet a socialist culture.97 In the sphere of national culture, it is wrong to assume that the existing national culture is, or should be, socialist in its entirety. That would amount to confusing the dissemination of Communist ideology with the carrying out of an immediate program of action and to confusing the application of the Communist standpoint and method in investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work98 with the general policy for national education and national culture in the democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. A national culture with socialist content will necessarily be the reflection of a socialist politics and a socialist economy .99 But we do not have such a politics and economy yet, so that there cannot be such a national culture. 100 Since the present Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, the new culture of China today is part of the world proletarian-socialist new culture and is its great ally. However, it joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not as a socialist culture,101 but as the anti-imperialist and antifeudal new-democratic culture of the broad popular masses. And since the Chinese revolution today cannot do without the leadership of the Chinese proletariat, China's new culture at present cannot depart from the culture and ideology ofthe Chinese proletariat, 102 that is, it cannot do without the leadership of Communist ideology. But 103 this kind of leadership means leading the masses of the people in an anti-imperialist and anti feudal political and cultural revolution, and not in a socialist political and cultural revolution.

97. It is not yet a socialist culture. ~Communist ideology plays the guiding role, and we should work hard both to disseminate sociaJism and communism throughout the working class and to educate lhe peasantry and other sections oflhe people in socialism properly and step by step. However, our national culture as a whole is not yet socialist. Because of lhe leadership of the proletariat, the politics, economy, and culture of New Democracy all contain an element of socialism, and by no means a mere casual element but one with a decisive role. Taken as a whole, however, the political, economic, and cultural situation so far is new-democratic and not socialist. For the Chinese revolution in its present stage is not yet a socialist revolution for the overthrow of capitalism but a bourgeoisdemocratic revolution, its central task being mainly that of combating foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism. 98. And handling work ~ Handling work and training cadres 99. Economy .. Economy. There are socialist elements in our politics and our economy, and hence these socialist elements are reflected in our national culture; but taking our society as a whole. 100. Such a national culture .. Such a wholly socialist national culture 101. It joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not as a socialist culture, -+While this part contains vital elements of socialist culture, the national culture as a whole joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not entirely as a socialist culture, I 02. The culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat ~ The leadership of lhe culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat 103. But, .. At the present stage, however,

JANUARY 1940 367

Therefore, taken as a whole, the content of the new culture 104 is still not socialist but new-democratic. Beyond all doubt, now is the time to expand the propaganda in favor of Communist ideas, and to intensify the study of Marxism-Leninism, for without such propaganda and study, not only will we be unable to lead the Chinese revolution forward to the future socialist stage, but we will also be unable to guide the present democratic revolution to victory. But the basic character ofthe present national culture is not socialist, but new-democratic.for it is the anti-imperialist

and antifeudal culture of the broad masses of the people, not the anticapitalist culture of the proletariat. Consequently, we must keep the spreading of Communist ideas and propaganda about the Communist social system distinct from the practical application of the new-democratic program of action; we must also keep the Communist method 105 of investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work 106 distinct from the new-democratic line for national culture. It is undoubtedly inappropriate to mix the two up. It can thus be seen that the content of the new culture at the present stage is neither the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie nor the socialism of the proletariat, but the anti-imperialist and anti feudal New Democracy of the masses, under the leadership of proletarian culture and ideology 107 or of the new Three People's Principles.

XV. A National, Scientific, and Mass Culture New-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to this nation of ours and bears our own national characteristics. It links up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of other nations and establishes with them the relations whereby they can absorb something from one another and help one another to develop, mutually forming a part of a new world culture. But it can absolutely not link up with any reactionary imperialist culture of whatever nation, for our culture is a revolutionary national culture. China must assimilate on a large scale the progressive culture of foreign countries, as an ingredient for enriching its own culture. Not enough of this was done in the past. We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the older cultures of foreign countries, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we absolutely cannot gulp down any of this foreign material uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food-first chewing it in the mouth, then subjecting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and l 04. The new culture -+ China's new national culture 105. The Communist method .... The Communist theory and method 106. Handling work-+ Handling work and training cadres 107. Proletarian culture and ideology .... Proletarian-socialist culture and ideology

368

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

separating it into essences to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded-before it can nourish us. So-called wholesale Westernization is wrong. China has suffered a great deal in the past from the formalist absorption of foreign things. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or, in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must have a national form 108 if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content-such is our new culture today. New-democratic culture is scientific. Opposed as it is to all feudal and superstitious ideas, it stands for seeking the truth from facts, for objective truth, and for the unity of theory and practice. On this point, the possibility exists of a united front against imperialism, feudalism, and superstition between the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat and those Chinese bourgeois materialists and natural scientists who are progressive, but in no case is there a possibility of a united front with any reactionary idealism. In the field of political action Communists may form an anti-imperialist 109 united front with some idealists and even religious people, but we can never approve of their idealism or religious doctrines. A splendid ancient culture was created during the long period of China's feudal society. Therefore, to clarify the process of development of this ancient culture, to discard its feudal dross and assimilate its democratic essence, is a necessary condition for developing our new national culture and increasing our national self-confidence, but we absolutely cannot swallow anything and everything uncritically. We must separate the fine, old popular culture, which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character, from all the rotten things of the old, feudal ruling class. China's present new politics and new economy have developed out of its old politics and old economy, and its present new culture, too, has developed out of its old culture. Consequently, we must respect our own history and absolutely cannot mutilate history. Respect for history means, however, giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every drop of feudal poison. As far as the masses and the young students are concerned, the essential thing is to guide them to look forward and not backward. New-democratic culture belongs to the broad masses and is therefore democratic. It should serve the toiling masses of workers and peasants who make up

108. Must have a national fonn ..... Must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form 109. Anti-imperialist ... Anti-imperialist and antifeudal

JANUARY 1940 369

more than 90 percent of the nation's population and should gradually become their very own. There is a difference of degree, as well as a close link, between the knowledge imparted to the revolutionary cadres and the knowledge imparted to the revolutionary masses, between the raising of cultural standards and popularization. Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for the broad masses of the people. It prepares the ground ideologically before the revolution comes and is an important, indeed essential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front during the revolution. People engaged in revolutionary cultural work are the commanders at various levels on this cultural front. "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." One can thus see how important the cultural movement is for the practical revolutionary movement. Both the cultural and practical movements must be of the masses. Therefore all progressive cultural workers in the anti-Japanese war must have their own cultural battalions, that is, the broad masses. A cultural worker or a cultural ideology 110 detached from the popular masses is a "shadow" commander without an army, whose firepower cannot bring the enemy down. To attain this objective, written Chinese must be reformed under the requisite conditions and our spoken language brought closer to that of the popular masses, for the people, it must be stressed, are the inexhaustible source of our revolutionary culture. A national, scientific, and mass culture-such is the anti-imperialist, anti feudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy and the new Three People's Principles, the new culture of the Chinese nation. Combine the politics, the economy, and the culture of New Democracy, and you have the new-democratic republic, the Republic of China both in name and in reality, the new China we want to create. Behold, New China is within sight. Let us all hail it! Its masts have already risen above the horizon. Let us all cheer in welcome! Raise both your hands. New China is ours!

110. A cultural worker or a cultural ideology-+ A revolutionary culturaJ worker

Congratulatory Speech at the Mass Meeting Sponsored by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to Celebrate the Sixtieth Birthday of Comrade Wu Yuzhang (January 15, 1940)

(A sketch written for this paper) ... Comrade Li Fuchun 1 told the people present that the

party was held to celebrate the sixtieth birthday of Comrade Wu Yuzhang.' After that, Comrade Mao Zedong, beaming with heartfelt joy, stood up and said: Today, as you all gather joyfully in this hall to honor the venerable Wu on his birthday, I am reminded of what I felt when we were celebrating the birthday of the venerable Xu two years ago. On that occasion, I emphasized that it was not without a reason that we offered him birthday congratulations. I remember that when I was small, I did not like old folks, because they treated young people highhandedly. Who does not err when young? But you could not afford to err: they were so overbearing when you did. Children and young people had no say about anything. Young people of China suffered very bitterly from feudalism in the family and in society. But now the world has changed, and young people love old people. Thus our venerable Wu, Lin, 3 Xu, 4 Dong, and Xie, 5 for example, are all This speech was first published in Xin7ltonghua bao, January 24, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 139-40, where it is reproduced from thar. source. I. Li Fuchun (1900--1975) was a native of Hunan, who had spent several years in France. He went to the Jiangxi Soviet Area in 1931, and participated in the Long March. At this time he was deputy head of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party. 2. Regarding Wu Yuzhang, see above the note to Mao's letter to him dated 1939. 3. Regarding Lin Boqu, see the note in Volume V, p. 622.

4. The reference is to Xu Teli (1877-1968), who had been Mao's teacher at the First Normal School in Changsha. Regarding Xu's sixtieth birthday three (not two) years earlier.

see Mao's letter to him dated January 30, 1937, in Volume V, p. 601. 5. The last two persons on this list are Dong Biwu (1886-1974) and Xie Juezai (18841971 ). Dong was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. After studying in Moscow. he returned to China, went to the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, and then participated in the Long March. At this time, he was working with Zhou Enlai in the Eighth Route Army liaison office in Chongqing, and was also a member of the People's Political Council. Xie had joined the Communist Party in 1925, and worked in the Shanghai underground. He participated in the Long March, and was a leading official in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The five individuals mentioned here by Mao are those who were commonly regarded as the "elders" of the Party. 370

JANUARY 1940 371

extremely popular with the young people. Why has this change taken place? Because these senior comrades, far from treating the young people high-handedly, are very warmhearted in helping them. They act in a way that has made them models for the young people, so they are respected highly by the young. There are also many old people outside the Party who are esteemed by the young. Ma Xiangbo,6 for example, is one of them. When he was celebrating his birthday, the Communist Party sent him a congratulatory telegram because he favored resistance against Japan and democratic politics. All men will grow old alike. Why are old people valuable? If they were valuable simply because they were old, there would be too many valuable people. So we must have a criterion. That is, a person is valuable if he has done good things all his life, and not bad things; if he has done things that are beneficial to humanity, and not things that harm people. If one does good things at first, and bad things later, this is what is called lack of consistency. It is not at all hard for a person to do a few good things. What is difficult is to do good things all one's life and nothing bad; to be beneficial throughout to the broad masses of the people, to youth, and to the revolution; to persist tirelessly in hard struggle for decades. That is truly the most difficult thing. Our venerable comrade Wu Yuzhang is precisely such a person who has been consistent for decades. He is sixty years old this year. From the time of the Tongmenghui until the present, he has been making revolution for forty years. He remained resolute and unchanging despite the miseries of all sorts he suffered in a homeless and drifting life. That is truly not easy. Of the people who joined the Tongmenghui, very few are still alive today. Fewer still are those who have persisted in working for the revolution and under no circumstances have given up their revolutionary aspirations. To do this, one must not only have a firm and correct political orientation but also a spirit of hard struggle. Without this, one can never succeed in fighting evil forces or conquering dangers of all kinds, such as threats of death, starvation, and failure of the revolution. Our Comrade Wu Yuzhang has survived numerous such threats and dangers. So we should emulate all his good points and learn from him his persistence in revolution in particular. That is a quality that cannot be praised enough, which brings honor to our Party and to the Chinese revolution. In my opinion, it is here that the main significance of our most joyful meeting to celebrate his sixtieth birthday lies.

6. Ma Liang (184(}-1939), referred to here by his zi, Xiangbo, was a noted Catholic educator, who had also played a role in diplomacy under the empire. As early as 1906, he advocated democracy, and in 1931-1932 he wrote articles denouncing Japanese aggression. The binhday celebration to which Mao refers is presumably that in early 1939, when Ma attained the Chinese-style age of 100 sui. He had died on November 4, 1939, but Mao was probably not yet aware of this.

Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition of the Border Region (January 16, 1940)

Comrades: I have not been to the exhibition and cannot tell if it is good or not. But I am told that it is pretty good, better than the one held last year. I did go to see that one last year. If this one is better than the one of last year, the result has been brought about by the efforts of our comrades among the common people and those of the government workers. If the people in the government do not unite with the common people, not much can be achieved. There are two kinds of governments: one that knows nothing but extortion, and the other that helps the common people. The government of the border region is a helpful government that falls into the latter category. Behind the one or two packages of flour that the common people have sent from hundreds of li away to be exhibited, there is an important truth regarding our fight against Japan, that is, it demonstrates the enthusiasm of the comrades among the common people. The government of the border region, supported by the common people, has done a lot of good things, also out of enthusiasm, and we must develop this kind of enthusiasm. But enthusiasm alone is not enough, and there is something else: we must strive to make progress. There has been progress in this year's exhibition. We should encourage and reward these labor heroes, because they are not only enthusiastic but also want to make progress. Among them, there are members of the Eighth Route Army, but the Eighth Route Army is also made up of the common people. So the army must not forget its origins, that is, the workers and peasants. Present at today's meeting are many comrades from the Eighth Route Army. You should salute the common people and not abuse them. The common people may swear at us, but we must not swear at them, because they are the masters; our food is provided by them, and our houses are built by them. We want cooperation between the army and the people. The Eighth Route Army

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 3, 1940. We have trans~ lated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 141-42, where it is reproduced from that source. 372

JANUARY 1940

373

has two rules: one is cooperation between the officers and the men, and the other is cooperation between the army men and the people. If everyone unites closely and intimately, Japan will surely be defeated. There are twenty-three .xian in our border region, neither more nor less. But there are some elements bent on creating friction who have sent troops to attack us, and they have attacked several of our xian. That won't do. What is more, you comrades who are leaving to work outside [the border region] should take the opportunity to tell them that we must rely on unity, and not on friction. If you rely on friction, it will cause you pain, it will kill people, and it will even cause the country to perish. Many comrades have come to attend today's meeting, among whom are Mr. Zhang and comrades from Mongolia. All of us should rely on unity, and not on friction. The only friction should be friction with Japanese imperialism, designed to scrape them right into the ocean, and not friction within our own nest.

On Small Guerrilla Groups-An Important Form of Struggle in Guerrilla Areas (January 22, 1940)

The experience of the War of Resistance in North China in the past two and half years tells us that the War of Resistance in the enemy rear in the future will involve protracted and hard struggle. Under the circumstances, if we want to persist in the struggle until victory is achieved, the work of the local Party organizations must concentrate on the launching of the mass campaigns, because the mobilization of the masses is the foundation for the perfonnance of all the work of the Party, the government, and the army. Broadly speaking, areas in North China can be classified into three categories. The first is the base areas for the War of Resistance, that is, those areas that are relatively consolidated, large, and already joined in one piece so the enemy cannot enter them at will, like Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, southeast Shanxi, and northwest Shanxi. The second is the enemy-occupied areas, that is, the strong points the enemy has seized by force and their neighboring areas. The third is the guerrilla areas, places held now by the enemy and now by us. The third category is the largest in area. The above-mentioned areas are not always fixed. They can and often do change categories from time to time. When urban and rural strongholds held by the enemy and their puppets are captured by us and after we have done some work there, they are turned from the category of guerrilla areas to that of base areas, and our already existing base areas are expanded. If a part of our base area is occupied by the enemy or by the puppets, that base area is reduced that much in area, and the enemy-occupied area or guerrilla area is augmented by that much. This kind of shift in category has happened before, is still happening now, and may well continue to do so for some time to come. It should be understood that temporary reduction of the base areas and the temporary augmentation of the enemy-occupied or guerrilla areas are possible. Our overall policy is to attack the enemy in guerrilla areas, reduce and eliminate the enemy strongholds, turn the guerrilla areas back again into base areas, and expand our base areas so that in the future they can be coordinated with the efforts of the whole country and finally drive the Japanese bandits out of China.

Our source for this text is Chen Yun wenxuan, Vol. I, pp. 124-27. This text was written by Chen Yun in Yan'an and revised by Mao Zedong. 374

JANUARY 1940

375

I am not going to dwell on the establishment of base areas or the work in enemyoccupied areas. Let us now study the methods that can be used to mobilize the masses to fight the enemy in guerrilla areas. What method have the people in the guerrilla areas ofNorrh China adopted? Nothing exceptional: all the activists among the people in the guerrilla areas have been organized into "small guerrilla groups" under the leadership of Party branches, township governments, or mass organizations. Although the small guerrilla groups vary in size, in weaponry, and in the role they are able to play, they have one thing in common, that is, they serve as links that join the Party, government, and mass organizations together and have dealt blows to the Japanese bandits. The small guerrilla groups are armed organizations of the masses. They were invented by the people in the Jiangxi soviet area when they were combating the five campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression." The invention later developed vigorously under the active leadership of the Party, and is now widely applied in North China. It has been proved by actual experience to be an imporrant form of struggle and a pattern of organization well suited to the circumstances of the guerrilla areas. After a study of the circumstances in seven districts of North China, I have come to the conclusion that this experience can be widely applied. Naturally, the small guerrilla groups cannot last long without the backing of guerrilla detachments and regular armies. The role that the guerrilla groups have played is very imporrant. Specifically speaking, it is manifested in the following aspects: First, the small guerrilla groups are a form that can best mobilize the masses to participate in the War of Resistance. In guerrilla areas, which suffer constant devastation from the enemy, the people, to protect their own interests, have to get organized and exercise armed resistance. Thus the struggle of these people to protect their own interests has become identical with the interests of the War of Resistance of the whole nation; the struggle of every household and every village to safeguard its home has become identical with the struggle of the people of the whole country to defend the base areas for the War of Resistance. That is why it is easy for the people in guerrilla areas to see that their own interest is inseparable from the interest of the War of Resistance. The use of small guerrilla groups as a method to mobilize the masses to parricipate in the War of Resistance is readily embraced by the masses of the people. Second, in small guerrilla groups, Party members are toughened, cadres trained, and the Party, government, and mass organizations consolidated. Historical experience has demonstrated that only by relying on armed forces can the Chinese Communist Parry survive (as a big party, not as an underground small party) and develop. This has become even clearer in the present war zone. The Party cannot survive without an armed force. The Parry's survival depends on armed struggle, and armed struggle in return can temper and develop the Parry. Similarly, without armed struggle, it is impossible to set up and enhance political power in base areas. Had there been no guerrilla groups, guerrilla areas would have become enemyoccupied areas and. then, the Party and government organizations of the area in

376 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

question would have shrunk or even collapsed. Party members joining in guerrilla groups and leading the masses of the people in the struggle against the enemy and puppets: this is the best way to train new Party members. Bad elements who have sneaked into the Party will reveal their true colors in ruthless struggle. Those wavering elements who cannot endure will be cleared out. At the same time, military cadres for local Party organizations will be trained and brought up from the tough, complex, and extensive struggle. Third, small guerrilla groups are a powerful aid to the regular armies and guerrilla detachments. Regular armies operate within the base areas and occasionally in guerrilla areas, and guerrilla detachments, making the regions bordering base areas and guerrilla areas their support, mainly operate in guerrilla areas, while small guerrilla groups stay in regions bordering base areas and guerrilla areas and in all guerrilla areas and serve as an aid to regular armies and guerrilla detachments. Small guerrilla groups are the core of self-defense corps, and they exist even in the absence of the latter. If the guerrilla areas are covered with guerrilla groups, regular armies and guerrilla detachments will find it much easier to carry out their operations. Small guerrilla groups are not only an aid to the regular armies and guerrilla detachments but also a reliable foundation for the expansion of the regular armies and guerrilla detachments. So, the necessity to intensify our work with guerrilla groups is self-evident. How shall we intensify our work with guerrilla groups? First, it is important to enhance the understanding of the guerrilla groups by the cadres, transform the perfunctory manner of dealing with them, and do a good job in organizing small guerrilla groups, as a basic way of mobilizing the masses to carry on the armed resistance against Japan. Party branches should become the cores of guerrilla groups. At the initial stage, it is advisable to form one or two guerrilla groups made up of advanced elements and, then, developing it step by step, set up a large number of groups, with the primary group led by the cadres as their center.

Second, do not incorporate guerrilla groups at the wrong time. When there is a widespread growth of guerrilla groups, it is then right to incorporate some of them into guerrilla detachments or regular armies, and at the same time continued efforts should be made to foster more small guerrilla groups. The small guerrilla groups should not be incorporated when they are only beginning to burgeon and their incorporation would deprive the masses of something they rely on, and consequently make them vulnerable to the enemy's devastation. In this case, guerrilla groups should be helped to a vigorous growth before some of them get incorporated. Last, Party organizations in all base areas for the War of Resistance Against Japan and in all guerrilla areas should sum up the work, from the lower levels to upper levels, on guerrilla groups and the growth of guerrilla detachments, selfdefense corps, and guerrilla groups in coordination with each other, and study their correct interrelationship. The summing up of work will lead to further development in our work in guerrilla areas: this is what we hope for.

Concentrate All Our Efforts to Develop Armed Forces and Set Up Base Areas1 (January 28, 1940)

To the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Subbureau, the !15th Division, and for the information of the Central Plains Bureau, Peng Xuefeng,2 Xiang Ying,3 and Chen Yi: I. The long telegram sent to you by the Central Committee on December 9 demanded that you raise an armed force hundreds of thousands strong and that you organize a self-defense corps of several million men throughout Shandong Province and North China. We understand that the Central Plains Bureau has already started the work, but, having received no telegrams from Shandong and the !15th Division, we do not know whether or not you agree with this plan, and whether or not you think it feasible. 2. The development of the situation has fully demonstrated that only by extensively expanding the revolutionary armed forces in coordination with the general effort of the whole nation will it be possible to check capitulation and anticommunism, consolidate the united front, and secure a change for the better in the situation. And at present, Shandong Province and North China remain the principal places where the armed forces can be developed. 3. Consequently, we ask that you pay serious attention to this matter and make the development of the armed forces the central focus of all your work. In the course of this year, the Shandong Branch Bureau and the !15th Division should raise an armed force (guerrillas included) of at least 150,000 men and rifles. The !15th Division should dispatch officers and men to all parts of Shandong, while the Central Plains Bureau should raise at least one hundred thousand men with the same number of guns. On the basis of these broad targets, concrete results should be achieved by stages. On the basis of what people from Shandong have told us, to the effect that a lot of guns are scattered among the population of the province, Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 509-11, where it is reproduced from Mao's original manuscript, conserved in the Central Archives. I. This telegram was drafted by Mao on behalf of the Central Secretariat. 2. Peng Xuefeng (1907-1944), a native of Henan, joined the Chinese Communist Pany

in 1926 and served as political commissar in various units of the Eighth Red Anny in the early 1930s. At this time, he was commander and political commissar of the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army. 3. On Xiang Ying see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1939.

378

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

there should be no problem about achieving this target. Hu Fu4 has informed us by telegram that the Central Plains could reach the figure of a hundred thousand in six months, but it is you who must decide on a concrete plan. 4. Without a broad expansion of the self-defense corps, it is impossible to expand the army in a big way or to build up and consolidate the base areas. Consequently, a well-organized and properly trained anti-Japanese self-defense corps should outnumber the regular armies and guerrillas by at least ten to one. For example, Shandong, which has an army of 150,000 men, should have at least 1.5 to 2 million men in well-organized and properly trained self-defense corps; North China, which has an army of 100,000 men, should have at least I to 1.5 million in well-organized and properly trained self-defense corps. At present your self-defense corps is still much too small. 5. It is impossible to develop so large an armed force without political power. You must, therefore, with resolute and step-by-step plans, make the utmost efforts to see to it that the greater part of the political power in Shandong, eastern Henan, northern Anhui, and northern Jiangsu is held in our hands and those of other progressive personages. 6. Building up such armies, self-defense forces, and political power, as described above, will involve a process filled with serious struggles. Consequently, we must not avoid friction that is justified and favorable to us. We must strike back resolutely at all the reactionary forces and diehards who obstruct the progress of the War of Resistance and attack us. Toward such people, there must not be the slightest concession on matters of principle. At the same time, we must try our best to win over all the forces that are progressive or relatively progressive and work together with them to establish anti-Japanese base areas. As for the intermediate forces, such as Yu Xuezhong and Li Mingyang,5 our policy is to neutralize them. 7. The Guomindang plans to send more troops to the war zone of Jiangsu and Shandong, so you should speed up your deployment and have your positions consolidated before they arrive. 8. You must make all the cadres of our Party understand this correct line of development, for only thus can you create a style of driving courageously forward and carry out this plan. It is your primary task to concentrate all your efforts to develop armed forces and set up base areas. You must make the cadres understand that without powerful armed forces and vast revolutionary base areas, victory in the resistance against Japan can never be achieved. Central Secretariat 4. Hu Fu was the pseudonym of Liu Shaoqi, who was at this time the secretary of the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee and was aJso active in the headquarters of the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi River.

5. Yu Xuezhong ( 1890-1964), a native of Shandong, was the Guomindang commanderin-chief of the Combat District of northern Jiangsu and Shandong. Li Mingyang (18911978), a native of Jiangsu, was at this time the Guomindang general commander of guerrillas in the areas bordering Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui.

Overcome the Danger of Capitulation, and Strive for a Turn for the Better (January 28, 1940)

Current developments confirm the correctness of the Central Committee's appraisals. The line of capitulation taken by the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie runs sharply counter to the line of armed resistance taken by the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie, and there is a struggle between the two. Both lines exist at present, and one or the other can win out in the future. What all our Party comrades must realize in this connection is that the serious cases of capitulation, anticommunism, and retrogression which have occurred in various places should not be viewed in isolation. We should realize their seriousness, combat them resolutely, and not be overwhelmed by their impact. If we lack this spirit and a correct policy for dealing firmly with these incidents, if we let the Guomindang diehards continue their "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" and are in constant dread at the thought of the breakup ofthe united front, then the War of Resistance will be jeopardized, capitulation and anticommunism will spread throughout the country, and there will be a real danger of the breakup of the united front. But it must be made abundantly clear that many objective conditions favorable to our struggle for continued resistance, unity, and progress are still present both at home and abroad. For example, Japan's policy toward China remains as tough as ever; it is very difficult to rig up a Far Eastern Munich conference because there has been no real reconciliation between Japan, on the one hand, and Britain, the United States, and France, on the other, despite some lessening of the contradictions between them and because the British and French positions in the East have been weakened by the European war; and the Soviet Union is actively helping China. These are the international factors which render it difficult for the Guomindang to capitulate or compromise, or to

launch a nationwide anticommunist war. In these circumstances, our Party has a twofold task. On the one hand, it must resolutely resist the military and political offensives of the capitulators and diehards. On the other, it must actively develop the united front of the political parties, the government organs, the armed forces, the civilian population, and the intellectuals; it must do its utmost to win over the

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Mao for the Central Committee. Our source is the second edition of Mao Zedong xuanji (1991), Vol. 2, pp. 712-14. 379

380 MAO'S ROAD TV POWER

majority of the Guomindang, the intermediate classes, and sympathizers in the armies fighting Japan, to deepen the mass movement, to win over the intellectuals, to consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, expand the anti-Japanese armed forces and the organs of anti-Japanese political power, and consolidate our Party and ensure its progress. If we do both of these tasks simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to bring about a tum for the better in the whole situation. Therefore, the present general policy ofthe Party is to strive for a tum for the better and, at the same time, to be on guard against any emergencies (such emergencies, so far, being on a limited and local scale). Now that Wang Jingwei has announced his traitorous pact.' and Chiang Kaishek has published his message to the nation, it is beyond doubt that the agitation for peace will suffer a setback and that the forces favoring resistance will grow. On the other hand, the "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" will continue, there will be more local incidents, and the Guomindang may stress "unification against the foreign enemy" in order to attack us. The reason is that the forces supporting resistance and progress cannot build up enough strength in the immediate future to overwhelm the forces supporting capitulation and retrogression. Our policy is to spare no effort in extending the propaganda campaign against Wang Jingwei's traitorous pact in all parts of the country with Communist Party organizations. In his message, Chiang Kaishek states that he will carry on the War of Resistance, but he does not stress the need to strengthen national unity, nor does he mention any policy for persevering in resistance and progress, without which it would be impossible to persist in the war. Hence in the campaign against Wang Jingwei we should stress the following points: (I) support the national policy of waging the War of Resistance to the very end and oppose Wang Jingwei 's traitorous pact; (2) the people of the whole country must unite and overthrow the Chi-

I. On December 30, 1939, Wang Jingwei signed a secret agreement with the Japanese, based on a "Program for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations" submitted to him by the Japanese in November 1939. It included five main provisions: l. Manchukuo was to be recognized, and the "Mongolian territory" (i.e .. the area

north of the Great Wall), North China, the lower Yangzi valley, and the islands off China's southern coast were to be marked off as "zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration," that is, as zones permanently occupied by Japanese troops. 2. From the central government down to the local governments, Wang's puppet r~gime was to be under the supervision of Japanese advisers and officials. 3. The puppet troops and police were to be trained by Japanese military instructors,

and their equipment was to be supplied by Japan. 4. The puppet government's fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural enterprises, and its means of communication were to be controlled by Japan, and China's natural resources were to be freely exploited by Japan. 5. All anti-Japanese activities were to be prohibited, and the Wang government was to cooperate with Japan in opposing communism.

JANUARY /940

38/

nese traitor Wang Jingwei and his puppet central government; (3) support Guomindang-Communist cooperation; down with Wang Jingwei 's anticommunist policy; (4) anti-Communism is Wang Jingwei's plot for splitting the anti-Japanese united front; down with the hidden traitors of the Wang clique; (5) strengthen national unity and eliminate internal friction; (6) introduce political reforms, unfold the movement for constitutional government, and establish democratic politics; (7) lift the ban on political parties, and grant legal status to anti-Japanese parties and groups; (8) guarantee the people freedom of speech and assembly, in order to combat the Japanese and the Chinese traitors; (9) consolidate the antiJapanese base areas and oppose the disruptive plots of the Chinese traitors of the Wang faction; ( 10) support the armies that are fighting successfully against Japan, and give adequate supplies to the fronts; and (11) promote cultural activities which help the cause of the War of Resistance, protect progressive youth, and proscribe all expression of the views of Chinese traitors. The above slogans should be widely publicized. Large numbers of articles, manifestos, leaflets, talks, and pamphlets should be published everywhere, and other slogans suitable to local circumstances should be added. A rally of the popular masses to denounce Wang Jingwei's traitorous pact is scheduled to be held on February I in Yan'an. Together with the people of all circles and with the anti-Japanese members of the Guomindang. we should organize similar mass rallies in all areas in early or mid-February, in order to create a nationwide upsurge against capitulation, against the Chinese traitors, and against friction.

The Forces in Southern Anhui Must Cross to the North of the River (January 29, 1940)

Comrades Xiang [Ying] and Ye [Ting]: 1

I. Your main way out lies to the north of the river, and, though a good opportunity has already been lost, there is no way out except striving to cross the river to the north. 2. You should secretly prepare a number of crossing points, to be used in time of need. 3. There is no other source of funds; the whole Party will have to rely on its own efforts. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 512, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Centra] Archives. 1. Xiang Ying was, as noted above, the deputy commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army, and Ye Ting was the commander-in-chief. 382

Abiding by the Principle of Self-Defense, Deal a Thorough Blow to the Attackers (January 30, 1940)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information ofZhu [Rui] and Xu [Xiangqian], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]: Any forces within the borders of Hebei and Shanxi, no matter if they are Central forces, Shanxi and Suiyuan forces, or Shi Yousan's forces,' if they attack theregions of the Eighth Route Army, we should resolutely resist and thoroughly eliminate them, abiding by the principle of self-defense when it is reasonable and beneficial to do so. We should call on all our Eighth Route Army forces and all the people of the two provinces to deal a firm blow at all those who are attacking from the rear of the front on resisting Japan. We should publicly and comprehensively propagate the following: "Those who are attacking from the rear of the resisting Japan front are Chinese traitors"; "Down with the Chinese traitors who are attacking the Eighth Route Army"; "Down with the Chinese traitors who are attacking the dare-to-die contingent"; and "Down with the Chinese traitors who are sabotaging the resisting Japan base areas." Only by creating a trend of all forces and all the people opposing Chinese traitors, opposing the attacks, and dealing vigorous blows at the attackers, will the ploys of those schemers and adventurers be frustrated, will they be divided from within, will we prevent those wavering forces from daring to join the attacks, and will we effectively coordinate with the united front work, which is being energetically carried out within the armed forces. This policy also applies to Shandong. It is hoped that Shandong will firmly follow suit. Central Secretariat

This telegram was drafted by Mao for the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Our source is Mao Zedongjunshiwenji, Vol. 2, pp. 513-14, where it is reproduced from Mao's original manuscript, conserved in the Central Archives. I. Shi Yousan (1891-1940), zi Hanzhang, was a native of Jilin Province. In the 1920s and 1930s he served under Feng Yuxiang, Chiang Kaishek, Zhang Xueliang, and others. In June 1940, he concluded an "Anti-Communist Agreement" with the Japanese Anny; as a

result, he was executed for treason in December 1940. 383

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks (February I, 1940)

I. One distinguishing feature of the domestic situation during this current period of strategic stalemate between the enemy and ourselves is the increasingly apparent and intense struggle between the big bourgeoisies capitulationist tendencies, on the one hand, and the orientation of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie toward resistance, on the other. Because the progressive anti-Japanese forces within the country are not yet sufficiently strong to prevail over the forces of capitulation and retrogression, the danger of capitulation and retrogression is still grave and remains the major danger in the current situation. But as a result of the resistance to capitulation and retrogression on the part of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army, on the part of a majority of the Guomindang, and on the part of people throughout the country, because of Japan's resolute course toward the destruction of China, because of the continuing existence of relatively serious contradictions between Britain, the United States, and France, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other, and because the war in Europe has weakened the positions of Britain and France in the Far East, thus making it very difficult to convene a Far Eastern Munich conference rapidly, as well as the strength of the Soviet Union and its policy of active support for China-all these internal and external conditions make it very difficult to capitulate and to launch an anti-Communist war on a national scale. The conditions prevailing on the two sides of the issue have given rise to a situation of intense conflict between the progressive anti-Japanese forces and the forces of capitulation and retrogression. The outcome of this conflict will be either a turn for the better or a turn for the worse in the current situation. But the possibility that the situation may improve has by no means been ruled out. If the overall policy is correct, and if in addition the whole nation makes an effort, it is possible to change the present situation and secure a turn for the better. Our primary task is to reinforce the progressive anti-Japanese forces, resist the forces of capitulation and retrogression, strive for a turn for the better in the situation, and prevent it from This text was first published in Jiefang, no. 98/99, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao lRdong ji. Vol. 7, pp. 205-8, where it is reproduced from this source. 384

f"EBRUARY /940

385

taking a tum for the worse. It is obviously wrong to believe that the situation can only become worse and rule out the possibility of improvement and, as a result, to give up any effort in that direction and merely prepare passively to cope with any nationwide contingencies. 2. The recent disclosure of the Japan-Wang [Jingwei] agreement, the preparations for setting up a puppet central government, and the publication of Chiang Kaishek's declaration denouncing Wang have dealt a new blow to the capitulationist. anti-Communist, and diehard factions within the country and given a new impetus to the forces in favor of the War of Resistance, uniting with the Communists. and the pursuit of progress. This is conducive to the achievement of an improvement in the situation. But at present, not only have the forces of capitulation and retrogression not yet been dealt a fundamental blow, but they are likely to become even more rampant. and partial and localized incidents may continue to break out. This is because the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie headed by Wang Jingwei is working in concert with the domestic forces of capitulation and retrogression, while at the moment the progressive anti-Japanese forces are not yet able to unite rapidly to overcome the forces of capitulation and retrogression. In his declaration Chiang Kaishek emphasized the War of Resistance, but he did not emphasize unity and progress. Without nationwide unity and progress, however, it would be impossible to persist in the War of Resistance or to win final victory. Therefore, a process of arduous struggle lies ahead in order to avoid a possible turn for the worse in the situation and to strive for a tum for the better. Also, we must be prepared at all times to deal with any incidents (at the moment, mostly partial and localized incidents) that may arise, and maintain a high level of vigilance at all times. 3. To strive for an improvement in the situation and overcome the danger of a turn for the worse, it is imperative to emphasize the three points of the War of Resistance, unity, and progress, without omitting a single one of them. Moreover, on that basis, we must resolutely carry out the following ten great tasks. First, we must make our propaganda against Wang and the Chinese traitors even more widespread and universal, resolutely expose all the plots for capitulation and splits, strike at the capitulationists and anti-Communists ideologically and politically, demonstrating resolutely. unequivocally. and concretely that to oppose the Communist Party is a counterrevolutionary measure of the capitulationists as they prepare to capitulate. Second, we must energetically develop the united front throughout the country in every domain, including parties, governments, armies. people. and scholarship, organize the progressive forces, and cooperate closely with the majority of the Guomindang members in order to oppose the capitulationists and anti-Communists. Third, we must launch a broad movement in favor of constitutional government and strive to create democratic politics. Without democratic politics, victory in the War of Resistance is mere fantasy. Fourth, we must resist all the attacks by the capitulationist and anti-Communist forces. All the attacks waged by capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards must be resolutely countered according to the principle of self-defense, applying the principle: "We will not

386

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack." 1 Otherwise these forces may run rampant, the united front will disintegrate, and the War of Resistance will be lost. Fifth, we must develop in a big way an anti-Japanese movement of the popular masses. We must unite with all the intellectuals who are in favor of resisting Japan and help them to integrate themselves with the antiJapanese movements of the popular masses and with the guerrilla war against Japan. Otherwise, our strength will be insufficient for striking blows against the capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards. Sixth, we must conscientiously carry out r~nt, interest, and tax reduction, improve the lives of the workers, and give economic assistance to the popular masses. Only thus can the anti-Japanese enthusiasm of the popular masses be unleashed; otherwise it would be impossible. Seventh, we must consolidate and enlarge all our anti-Japanese base areas and set up in all these base areas anti-Japanese democratic regimes which are wholly elected by the people and exclude completely the capitulationists and anti-Communists. Such regimes are not regimes of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, but democratic regimes of all those who support resistance to Japan and support democracy. They are joint democratic dictatorships of several revolutionary classes. All the plots to undermine the anti-Japanese base areas must be resolutely smashed. All the Chinese traitors and anti-Communists who are hidden in the anti-Japanese armed forces, the anti-Japanese regimes, and the anti-Japanese organizations must be eliminated. Eighth, we must consolidate and expand the progressive armies, for without these armies China would perish. Ninth, we must expand and develop the anti-Japanese cultural movement and raise the cultural and theoretical level of the anti-Japanese people, armies, and cadres. Unless there is an anti-Japanese struggle on the cultural front, integrated with the overall anti-Japanese struggle, the resistance to Japan cannot be victorious. Tenth, we must consolidate the organization of the Communist Party and develop the Party organization in those localities where it is nonexistent or weak. Without a powerful Communist Party, none ofthe important problems relating to resisting Japan and saving the country can be solved. If the above-mentioned ten great tasks can be performed resolutely, concretely, and correctly, the progressive anti-Japanese forces can definitely be strengthened and consolidated, so as to overcome the forces of capitulation and retrogression, secure an improvement in the situation, avoid a tum for the worse, and smash the plots of the big-bourgeois elements to sabotage the War of Resistance and the united front. 4. The slogans for propaganda and agitation at present are: a. Support the national policy of fighting Japan to the end, oppose the traitorous agreement signed by Wang Jingwei!

I. Mao repeated this formulation of the "principle of self-defense" in the text of March II, 1940, translated below, and in other statements of this period. He also used it freely, in rather difference circumstances, in the course of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969.

FEBRUARY 1940

387

b. People of the whole country, unite! Suppon Chairman Chiang and strike down the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei! c. Suppon the National Government and overthrow the puppet Central Committee headed by Wang Jingwei! d. Support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Pany and ovenurn Wang Jingwei's anti-Communist policy! e. Anticommunism is Wang Jingwei's plot to split the united front! Down with all anti-Communist Chinese traitors! f. Reinforce national unity and eliminate internal friction! g. Reform domestic politics, promote the campaign for constitutional government, and set up anti-Japanese democratic regimes! h. Abolish the restrictions on political parties! Legalize all anti-Japanese parties and groups! i. The people have the right to freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association to resist Japan and save the country. j. Promote movements of the popular masses, carry out the reduction of rent, interest, and taxes, improve the lives of the workers! k. Consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, oppose the plots and sabotage by the national traitors, anti-Communists, and diehards! I. Support the troops that have performed meritorious service in the War of Resistance Against Japan and make ample provisions for the battlefront! m. Develop a culture of resistance to Japan, protect progressive youth, and suppress the speeches of Chinese traitors! n. Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

The Situation and Tasks in the Stage of Mutual Support1 Speech delivered at a mass rally in Yan 'an to denounce Wang [Jingwei] and support Chiang [Kaishek]

(February 1, 1940)

Comrades, why have we, people from all walks of life in Yan 'an, come here today to hold a big meeting? To denounce Wang [Jingwei] and support Chiang [Kaishek] 2 and to fight Japan and save the country. 3 Recelllly Wang Jingwei signed a treaty with Japan that totally sells out China. We had been fighting Japan for two and a half years and had achieved a breakthrough. The enemy went crazy and did a deal with Wang Jingwei, who sold out the country. Now the situation is different in several ways, and now we have several new tasks, which are what/ want to talk about today. The weather is so cold today, yet so many people are here. We are not afraid of the cold, we want to clear up a number of things. I. Japan wants to turn China into a colony, and Wang Jingwei, the representative of China's big bourgeoisie, has knelt down before Japan We Communists have repeatedly pointed out that it is the fixed policy of Japanese imperialism to destroy China. No matter what cabinet changes there may be in Japan, its basic policy of destroying China's independence and turning China into a colony will definitely not change, because if this policy were to change, then Japan's militarist capitalist government would fall. Frightened out of his wits by this fact, Wang Jingwei, the political representative of the pro-Japanese faction of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, grovels on both knees before his Japanese masters,•

This speech was originally published in Jiefang, no. 98/99, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 209-22, where it is reproduced from the 1944

edition of Mao's works. I. The title in the Selected Works is ..Unite All Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Diehards." 2. Denounce Wang and support Chiang....., Denounce the traitor Wang Jingwei

3. And to fight Japan and save the country -+ And also to unite all anti-Japanese forces and to combat the anti-Communist diehards 4. His Japanese masters ..... Japan 388

FEBRUARY /940

389

signs the traitorous Japan-Wang treaty that sells out the whole of China to Japanese imperialism. He also wants to set up a puppet government, in opposition to the anti-Japanese government. He also wants to set up a puppet army, in opposition to the anti-Japanese army. He also has a puppet Guomindang, in opposition to the anti-Japanese Guomindang. His policy has three main principles: pro-Japanese, anti-Chiang, and anti-Communist. Pro-Japanese means kneeling down before the Japanese masters and giving the Chinese people, from the hair on their heads to the soles of their feet, to the Japanese masters. Recently he has said little about opposing Chiang and is said to have shifted to "alliance with Chiang," in a11 attempt to pull Mr. Chia11g into the water. But Mr. Chia11g sees through it, realizi11g that this is simply a Japanese ruse to stop the anti-Japanese war, to split the Guomindang, to overthrow Mr. Chiang. Mr. Chiang is an intelligent man who u11derstands all this. In the past he sharply rejected the [Wa11g[ Jingwei declaration, and now he has also sharply rejected the Japan-Wang agreement and, moreover. has called upo11 che popular masses to fight to the end against Japa11, advisi11g those who harbor illusion; of peace to hurry up and look around. As for anticommunism, that is one plot within the plot of the Japanese masters and this fellow Wang Jingwei. 5 They know that withi11 the borders of China it is the Communist Party that is the most thorough anti-Japanese force and that cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is the fundamental condition• for the resistance against Japan, so they are making every effort to split the GuomindangCommunist cooperation, to separate the two parties, or better yet, to get the two parties to fight each other. Thus they have used a smallfactioll ofdiehards within the Guomindang to create disturbances everywhere. In Hunan they perpetrated the Pingjiang massacre; 7 in Henan they perpetrated the Queshan massacre; in Shanxi the old army attacked the new army; in Hebei Zhang Y inwu attacked the Eighth Route Army; in Shandong Qin Qirong attacked the guerrillas; in eastern Hubei Cheng Ruhuai massacred six hundred8 Communists; and in the Shaanxi-GansuNingxia Border Region, the diehards are trying to set up a spy network from within, and a "blockade" from without, and are preparing an armed attack. In addition, they are manufacturing thousands of pieces of intelligence to deceive Mr. Chia11g, have arrested a large number of young people, and have put them in concentration camps. They have also hired metaphysics wizards such as Zhang Junmai a11d others to make the proposal 9 to eliminate the Communist Party,the border region, 10

5. As for anticommunism. that is one plot within the plot of the Japanese masters and this fellow Wang Jingwei ~Anticommunism is the main objective of both Japan and Wang Jingwei 6. Is the fundamental condition .... Means greater strength 7. Regarding the Pingjiang massacre of June 12, 1939. sec above, the note to the text of August I, 1939. 8. Six hundred -+ Five or six hundred 9. The proposal-+ The reactionary proposal 10. Border region .... Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

390

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. They have hired Trotskyites such as Ye Qing and others to write articles roundly condemning the Communist Party. All such rubbish has 11 the sole purpose of splitting the unity of the war of resistance and turning the Chinese people into slaves without a country. All of this, in a word, is the plot of the Japanese and of those among the Chinese big bourgeoisie who are capitulationists or are preparing to join the capitulationists and to destroy China. We are holding this great meeting today precisely to oppose this plot, to expose this plot. This meeting of ours is called a denounce- Wang supportChiang meeting, which shows what our orientation is. We have no other orientation than that of opposing the treasonous capitulation of Wang Jingwei and of supporting Mr. Chiang to fight Japan to the end.

11. Strive to turn the situation around and oppose pessimism and despair Here I want to say a little more about the situation as it is now. Everyone understands that the Wang Jingwei traitors are in cahoots with the diehard faction, working together from the inside and the outside to create pandemonium. This situation has confused 12 1arge numbers of people within the country who think that the times can only go against us, that the future cannot be turned around for the better. 13 I believe that such a view is totally wrong. The Central Committee of our Communist Party has from the beginning pointed out that 14 although both the destruction and the revival of the state, both a future that turns against us and a future that turns for the better, exist and are possibilities, domestic conditions and international conditions all determine that China can revive, that the times can turn around for the better. This is definitely not a time for sad laments or cries of despair. I wrote a small volume 15 last June entitled "On Protracted War," and last November I wrote another small volume entitled "On the New Stage," both of which adamantly rejected the theory of national destruction and the theory of a quick victory. Regarding the Guomindang, I have stated firmly that there is a bright future for most of its members, that it is only a small portion of them for whom the future is black. These are the views of the Central Committee of the Communist

II. All such rubbish has ~ All such activities have 12. Confused ~ Infuriated 13. The Selected Works text inserts here: "and that memhers of the Guomindang are all scoundrels who ought to he opposed." 14. The Central Committee of our Conununist Party has from the beginning pointed out ..... We must point out that their fury is altogether justified, for how could anybody help becoming infuriated in the face of such a grave situation? But resistance to Japan is not finished and done for, nor are all Guomindang members scoundrels. Different polices should be adopted toward the different sections of the Guomindang. IS. The tenn employed here, x;ao shu, has the meaning of a child's primer, but Mao uses it to indicate that these two reports (both translated in Volume VI) were slim or modest works, later published separately.

FEBRUARY 1940

39/

Party; they are not just my personal views. They are also the views of the great majority of the people of the entire nation; they are not the views ofjust the Communist Party. Just look at how the great majority of the people throughout the nation have welcomed the proposals of the Communist Party and yo~ will understand. But not everyone agrees with our views. There are some who do not understand the bigger picture. It is they who do not agree with us. When we came out with these two pamphlets, there were quite a few people who were skeptical of these views of ours. There are some who are still skeptical of our views. This is specially because the diehard faction of the Guomindang everywhere stirs up provocative strange things such as "the means for dealing with the activities of other parties," "the means for dealing with the problem of other parties," "the plan for dealing effectively with the problem ofother parties," which, added to the fact that an atmosphere of domestic peace is brewing everywhere, really confuse a lot of people. They do not know how to distinguish the minority from the majority, and they do not know that, in dealing with the minority of bad eggs, we must use a policy different from that used to deal with the majority ofanti-Japanese elements. There is no question but that, with regard to those conscienceless scoundrels who had the audacity to shoot from behind at the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, to perpetrate the Pingjiang and Queshan massacres, to disrupt the border areas, and to attack progressive armies, progressive organizations, and progressive individuals, these scoundrels must not be tolerated but must be dealt counterblows; any concession to them is out of the question. Otherwise, unity will be broken, resistance against Japan will fail, and China will perish. For such scoundrels have become so utterly devoid of conscience that they are even creating friction, perpetrating massacres, and causing splits at a time when our national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory and the nation and its people face a life-and-death crisis. Whatever they may think subjectively, their actions actually help the enemy 16 and Wang Jingwei, they are actually subverting the national policy of a unified War of Resistance, serving as good friends to the Chinese traitors, and some of them have been undercover traitors from the very beginning. Our failure to punish these people, and our failure to strike the necessary blows against those who have dared to attack the progressive anti-Japaneseforces, would be a crime; 11 it would be an encouragement to the Chinese traitors and collaborators; it would be disloyalty to the national War of Resistance and to our native land. It would be a failure to maintain the united front firmly and an invitation to the scoundrels to disrupt the united front. It would be a violation of the Party's policy. But the sole reason for striking back at these capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards is to keep up the War of Resistance, to maintain unity and sustain forward progress, all of which is to safeguard the anti-Japanese united front. Therefore, toward the great majority of people who are loyal to resistance 16. The enemy ..... Japan 17. A crime ..... A mistake

392

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

against Japan, toward all those who are not capitulators or anticommunists or diehards, and toward the great majority of the members of the Guomindang, we should always express goodwill and do our utmost to unite with them and do our utmost to respect them, and be willing to continue our long-term cooperation with them so as to put the country in order. Whoever does otherwise is not staunchly defending the anti-Japanese united front and is also violating the policy of the Party. Here are our Party's two great policies. On the one hand, to unite the progressive forces and all those loyal to the resistance against Japan-this is one policy. On the other hand, to oppose all the heartless scoundrels, all capitulators, antiCommunists, and diehards-this is another policy. Such policies of our Party have a single objective, which is to bring about a turn for the better so as to defeat Japan, and this objective can be achieved. Why is it that the object of striving to bring about a tum for the better in order to defeat Japan can be achieved? We have many domestic and international conditions. Which conditions? The first one is the existence of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Whoever wants to revolt, whoever wants to capitulatewe first ofall will not accept it, and we will definitely struggle with them to the end. The second condition is the great majority of Guomindang members who also oppose capitulating to Japan, who are in favor of the War of Resistance, and who agree with unity and being progressive. This is true of everyone in the Guomindang except the capitulationists, the anti-Communists, and the diehards. The third condition is the anti-Japanese progressive elements among the people of every party and every faction throughout China, who also oppose capitulation, divisiveness, and retreat. The three items above are the domestic conditions. The fourth condition is the fact that the Japanese plan to destroy China is extremely rigid. The Japanese militarists and capitalists have laid out two paths before the Chinese people and told us to choose one ofthem. These two paths are either the nation will be destroyed or it will be liberated. There is no middle road. The fifth condition is that today there is still no way to resolve the contradiction between Japan and Britain, the United States, and France. Since the outbreak of the European Great War, the situation has changed greatly. One ofthe important changes has been the reduction in the position of Britain and France in the Far East. As a result, the Far Eastern Munich conference that they wanted to convene very soon has become impossible. Unavoidably this has greatly disappointed a certain number ofpeople. There were some who in the first half of last year were still suggesting that the nine-nation treaty conference be used to solve the China question. With the outbreak of the European war. they had no choice but to change their tune to propose that the China question could be solved only along with the European war. The United States is still sitting on the mountain watching the tigers fight. It still wants to make Japan and China fight it out. It is now holding the Pacific Conference. Since Japan is not attending, the United States too is reluctant. Although the United States has annulled the trade treaty with Japan, it still wants to do business, which means giving Japan the resourcesto wage war that will allow it to fight well. At the same time, it may still give China a tiny bit of material assistance. As I see it, the

FEBRUARY /940

.193

plan of the U.S. capitalists is to prepare to come forth and intetvene sometime in the second half of this year or next year and order Japan to cough up a portion of the booty, in the name of the "Open Door Policy." The United States will share the booty with Japan because the United States believes that Japan's economic strength cannot hold out beyond the second half of this year or the first half of next year or the second halfofnext year. This wishful thinking of the American capitalists is the same as the wishful thinking of the Chinese pro-European pro-American faction (which is different from the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie). The two are singing a duet. Thus the danger ofa peaceful compromise has certainly not been eliminated, and the fact that at present they are not singing the peace song is strictly temporary. In the future they will return to strumming the old melody again. But,just for

the present, there is a rather serious contradiction between Japan and Britain. the United States, and France, and this is one condition that may turn the situation around for China. The sixth condition is the strength of the Soviet Union and its policy ofactively assisting China. Everyone understands this quite clearly. Anyone who thinks that he can bypass the Soviet Union and covertly go on to solve the European question is definitely mistaken. Anyone who thinks that he can bypass the Soviet Union and covertly go on to solve the Far Eastern question is also mistaken. Even though there are still those wishful thinkers both in China and abroad who are still thinking of ignoring the Soviet Union or are even thinking of preparing to stir up some anti-Soviet magic, this is nothing but wishful fantasy. This too is an important condition that may make it possible to turn the situation in China around. Generally speaking, the three domestic conditions, the adherence to an anti-Japanese stance by the Communist Party, the Guomindang, and the people, and the three international conditions,the strength and rigidity of Japan, the situation of Britain, the United States, and France, and the Soviet Union's assistance to China-
394

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

priority of resistance against Japan, 19 unity also comes first, as does progress. 20 Some people have emphasized the War of Resistance21 but are reluctant to emphasize unity and progress, and even fail to mention them. This is wrong. Without genuine and firm unity, without rapid and solid progress, how can we persist in resisting Japan; how can we overthrow Wang Jingwei; how can we drive out Japanese imperialism? That would be an utterly impossible pipe dream. The diehards 22 within the Guomindang (I am talking about the diehards) emphasize unification, but their so-called "unification" is a sort of fake unification, not a genuine unification. It is a sort of irrational, rather than a rational, unification. It is a unification in form rather than in substance. Why is this? They clamor about unification, but what they really want is to liquidate the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the border region 23 on the pretext that China will not be unified as long as the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the border region exist. They want to turn everything over to the Guomindang and not merely to continue their system of one-party dictatorship but to extend this system. If this were the case, however, what unification would there be? In truth, if in the past the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Border Region 24 had not stepped forth and sincerely advocated ending the civil war and uniting in resistance against Japan, there would have been nobody to initiate the Anti-Japanese National United Front or to take the lead in the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident, and there would have been no way at all to carry out resistance against Japan. And if today the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the border areas 25 did not step forth and sincerely sustain the resistance against Japan and combat the dangerous tendencies toward capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression, the situation would be a terrible mess. The several hundred thousand troops of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are holding in check two-fifths of the enemy forces, engaging in battle seventeen out of the forty [enemy] divisions. Yet they have received only 730,000 yuan in pay. The Eighth Route Army got 600,000, the New Fourth Army /30,000, which makes a total of730,000, but with devaluation of the currency by 75 percent, each person received less than 1 yuan per month, so wliy should they be disbanded? The border areas 26 are the most progressive places in the country, they are democratic anti-Japanese base areas.

19. Given the top priority of-+ In order to wage

20. Unity also comes first -+The unity and progress of the people of the whole country are essential 21. The War of Resistance-+ Only resistance against Japan 22. Diehards -+ Anti-Communist diehards 23. Border region-+ Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region 24. Border region-+ Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region 25. And the border areas-+ The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the various anti-Japanese democratic base areas 26. Border areas -+ Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

FliBRUI!RY 1940 395

Here there are, first, no corrupt officials; second, no local bullies and bad gentry; third, no gambling; fourth, no prostitutes; fifth, no concubines; sixth, no beggars; seventh, no narrow self-seeking cliques; eighth, no atmosphere of dejection and laxity; ninth, no professional friction-mongers; and tenth, no war profiteers. So why should they be abolished? Only people with no shame could say something so shameful. What right have the diehards to breathe a word against us? Comrades, it is not so. What needs to be done is not to abolish the border areas but, rather, to have the whole country follow their example; not to disband the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army but, rather, to have the whole country emulate them; not to liquidate the Communist Party but, rather, to have the whole country follow its example; not to have progressives fall back to the level of those who are backward but, rather, to have the latter catch up with the former. We Communists are the staunchest advocates of unification. We initiated the united front, we maintained the united front, and we put forward the slogan for a unified democratic republic. Who else could have proposed all this? Who else could have put all this into effect? Who else would accept pay of only 5 yuan [a month]? Who else could create such a clean, incorruptible government? There is unification and unification. The capitulationists have their idea of unification, which is for us to unify into capitulating; the anti-Communists and diehards have their idea of unification, which is to have us unify into fragmentation and retrogression. Could we ever accept these ideas? Could unification not based upon resistance, unity, and progress be considered genuine unification? Or rational unification? Or real unification? What a pipe dream! We are meeting here today to put forward our own idea of unification. Our idea of unification is that of the people of the whole country, that of every single person with a conscience. This idea of unification is based upon three things: resistance, unity, and progress. Only through progress can unity be achieved, only through unity can there be a War of Resistance, and only through progress, unity, and a War of Resistance can there be unification. This is our idea of unification, a genuine unification, a rational unification, a real unification. The idea of a fake, irrational, and formalistic unification is one of national subjugation and extermination, one of those utterly devoid of conscience. They want to destroy the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the base areas,27 to wipe out all local anti-Japanese forces, so as to achieve unification under one party and one faction 28 This is a form of a plot, a way of carrying out autocratic rule under the guise of unification, of selling the dogmeat of their one-party dictatorship under the label of the sheep's head of unification, a plot of brazen-faced braggarts who are lost to all sense of shame. We meet today precisely to punch holes in this paper tiger of theirs. Let us relentlessly combat the diehards. 29

27. Base areas~ Anti-Japanese democratic base areas 28. One party and one faction --+ The Guomindang 29. Diehards ... Anti-Communist diehards

.196

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

IV. The Communist Party's Ten Major Tasks We shall resolutely combat the diehards, firmly unite with the progressives, and use these two policies to reach our overall goal of gaining an improvement in the situation so as to triumph over the Japanese bandits. There is much work for us to

do toward this end. Just a few days ago, the Central Committee of the Communist Party held a meeting and decided upon ten major tasks to gain an improvement in the situation. What are these ten major tasks? I shall now read to you comrades the Communist Party Central Committee's resolution: "To strive toward an improvement in the situation and overcome the danger of its deterioration, it is essential to emphasize resistance, unity, and progress-all three without exception-and upon this basis to carry out resolutely the following ten major tasks: "First is to expand greatly the propaganda against Wang {Jingwei] and the Chinese traitors, to expose firmly all plots to capitulate and cause splits, and combat the capitulationists and the anti-Communists ideologically and politically. Firmly, clearly, and concretely prove that anticommunism is a counterrevolution-

ary step taken by the capitulationists in preparation for capitulation. "Second is to develop vigorously a nationwide united front in the arenas of the Party, the government, the military, the masses, and education, to organize the progressive forces, and to collaborate closely with the majority in the Guomindang, for the purpose of opposing the capitulationists and the anti-Communists. "Third is to unfold broadly the constitutional movement and work hard for democratic politics. Without a democratic political process, victory in resisting Japan is no more than a fantasy. "Fourth is to defend against all attacks from the capitulationist anti-Communist forces. Any attack from capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards must be firmly resisted on the principle of self-defense and the principle of 'we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.' Otherwise, if they are allowed to run rampant, then the unitedfront will be smashed and the War of Resistance Against Japan will end in defeat. "Fifth is to develop greatly the papular mass movement to resist Japan, unite all anti-Japanese intellectuals, and cause the intellectuals to cooperate with the anti-Japanese popular mass movement and anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. Otherwise there will not be sufficient power to fight the capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards. "Sixth is to carry out earnestly reduction in rents, interest, and taxes and improvement in the workers' lives. Only by giving economic assistance to the popular masses can their enthusiasm for resisting Japan be aroused; otherwise it is

impossible. "Seventh is to consolidate and expand each anti-Japanese base area and, entirely by popular election, establish in these base areas anti-Japanese democratic regimes without the participation of any capitulationist or anti-Communist ele-

FEBRUARY /940

397

ments. Such a regime would not be one of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie but, rather, a regime of all people who advocate resistance against Japan and also advocate democracy, a regime ofthe Anti-Japanese National United Front, and a democratic dictatorship of the several combined revolutionary classes. All plots to sabotage the anti-Japanese base areas must be resolutely fought against. All Chinese traitors and anti-Communist elements hidden within the anti-Japanese armed forces, the anti-Japanese regimes, and the anti-Japanese organizations must be purged. "Eighth is to consolidate and expand the progressive armed forces. Without such armed forces, China will become subjugated. "Ninth is to develop broadly an anti-Japanese cultural movement so as to raise the cultural and theoretical level of the anti-Japanese people, the anti-Japanese armed forces, and the anti-Japanese cadres. It is also impossible to triumph in resistance against Japan without a struggle on the anti-Japanese cultural front to coordinate efforts with the overall anti-Japanese struggle. "Tenth is to consolidate the organization of the Communist Party and to develop a Communist Party organization in places where there is none or where the Party is weak. Without a strong and poweiful Communist Party, it is impossible to solve any important problems in resistance against Japan and saving the nation. "If these ten major tasks can be resolutely, concretely, and correctly carried out, then the anti-Japanese progressive forces can surely be strengthened, the capitulationist and retrogressive forces be overcome, an improvement in the situation can be gained, its worsening can be avoided, and the plots of the big bourgeois elements to sabotage the War of Resistance and the united front can be smashed." Comrades, these are the ten major tasks recently decided upon by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Do you believe that these ten major tasks are appropriate ones? These ten tasks constitute a suitable remedy for our ills; they are bound to snatch the patient from the jaws of death and to drive out Japanese imperialism. The ten major tasks were put forth by the Communist Party, but when it comes to undertaking them. it cannot be done by the Communist Party alone; it has to be done by the people of the whole nation. This is not something that concerns only the Communist Party as a single party but, rather, something that concerns the people of the whole country. It is something of concern to all those with a conscience who wish to save the nation. Of course, Japanese imperialism is not happy about these ten major tasks, and nor is Wang Jingwei, nor are the antiCommunists, nor are the diehards. That they are unhappy is as it should be; there is no need for us to try to please them. Let them be displeased about this. We are holding this meeting today because we wish to shout out our cry to all people, panies, and groups nationwide, to save our motherland, which is in peril, to create a new China, to drive out Japanese imperialism, to bring down Wang Jingwei, and to bring down that bunch of anti-Communist "heroes." We wish to proclaim loudly the following slogans:

398 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Support the national policy of carrying out the War of Resistance to the end, and oppose Wang Jingwei 's traitorous agreement; People ofthe whole nation, unite to support Chairman Chiang and bring down the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei; Support the National Government and bring down Wang Jingwei's puppet Central Committee; Support Guomindang-Communist cooperation, down with Wang Jingwei's policy of anticommunism; Anticommunism is Wang Jingwei's plot to split the united front; down with all

anti-Communist Chinese traitors; Strengthen national unity; eliminate internal friction; Reform domestic affairs, carry forward the constitutional movement, and establish democratic politics; Liberalize bans on parties, and legalize the existence of anti-Japanese parties and organizations; The people have the right to freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and

association in order to resist Japan and save the nation; Develop the movement of the popular masses, and bring about reduction in rents, interest, and taxes, and improvement ofworkers'lives,· Consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas; combat the plot of the Chinese traitors, anti-Communists, and diehards to sabotage them; Support the troops with a fine record ofservice in resistance against Japan, and give ample material assistance to the front; Develop a culture of the War of Resistance Against Japan, protect progressive youth, and suppress the expression of opinion by Chinese traitors; Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

Telegram from the Mass Meeting of the Popular Masses in Yan'an Denouncing Wang [Jingwei] and Supporting Chiang [KaishekP (February I, 1940)

To President Lin, Chairman Chiang, the various yuan, ministries, and associatious of the National Government in Chongqing, the Central Commillee and all departments of the Military Commission ofthe Chinese Guomindang, the People's Political Council, the Ami-Aggression Grand Alliance, the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association, thefromline party and government commiltees, the Shenghuo Bookstore, the Commercial Press, the China Publishing House, the Young Journalists' Association, the Resist the Enemy Association of Cultural Circles, the Cemral News Agency, the National News Agency,the Dagong Bao, the New China Daily News, the Saodang Bao, the Central Daily News, the Three People's Principles Youth League, all provincial governments, assemblies,party headquarters, associations

of logistic support of the resistance against the enemy, provincial press associations and major newspapers, various universities in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Hanzhong, 2 garrisons in Xi'an and Zhulin, commanders of all war zones, commanders-hz-chiefofall army corps, officers and soldiers in the whole country, and ami-Japanese compatriots:

This mass rally against Wang Jingwei and for Chiang Kaishek, held in Yan'an on

February 1, Uitanimously resolves, in righteous indignation, to denounce his treason and capitulation and to support Chairman Chiang in waging the War of Resistance Against Japan to the very end. To overcome the present crisis and ensure victory in the War of Resistance, we hereby submit ten major points for saving the country, in the hope that our National Government, all political parties and groups, all oflicers and men fighting in the War of Resistance, and all our fellow-countrymen will accept them and act upon them. This document was first published in Jiefang, no. 98199, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7. pp. 223-29, which reproduces that source. 1. Telegram from the Mass Meeting of the Popular Masses in Yan'an Denouncing Wang and Supponing Chiang ~Ten Demands Addressed to the Guomindang 2. Hanzhong was a prefecture in the extreme southwest comer of Shaanxi. 399

400

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

I. Let the whole country denounce Wang. Now that Traitor Wang has gathered his gang together, betrayed his country to the enemy, and signed the secret pact selling out the country, playing the jackal to the tiger, all our countrymen demand his death. But this only takes care of the open Wang Jingweis, and leaves out the undercover ones. The latter are either craftily seizing key posts and swaggering about, or working obscurely and worming their way deeply into society. In effect, the corrupt officials are part of the Wang Jingwei gang, and all the friction-mongers are its underlings. Unless there is a nationwide campaign to denounce the Wang Jingweis, a campaign in town and country and from top to bottom in which everyone is mobilized, including all political parties, government organs, armed forces, civilian bodies, the press, and the educational institutions, the Wang Jingwei gang will never be eradicated but will persist in its nefarious activities, doing incalculable damage by opening the door to the enemy from without and by subversion from within. The government should issue a decree calling on the whole people to repudiate Wang. Wherever the decree is not carried out, the officials should be called to account. The Wang Jingwei gang must be extirpated, and thrown to the jackals and tigers. This the first point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 2. Strengthen unity. Nowadays, some people talk not of unity but of unification, and the implication is that unification means nothing short of liquidating the Communist Party, disbanding the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, abolishing the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and demolishing the anti-Japanese forces everywhere. What this kind of talk ignores is the fact that the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are the staunchest advocates of unification in all China. Was it not they who recommended the peaceful settlement of the Xi 'an Incident? Is it not they who have initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, proposed a unified democratic republic, and worked really hard for both? Is it not they who are standing at the forefront of the nation's defenses, resisting seventeen enemy divisions, shielding the Central Plains and the Northwest, defending northern China and the regions south of the lower Yangzi, and resolutely applying the Three People's Principles and the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction? Yet the moment Wang Jingwei openly carne out against the Communists and sided with the Japanese, sorcerers like Zhang Junmai and Ye Qing3 chimed in with tendentious articles, and the anti-Communist and diehard cliques joined in by stirring up friction. Autocratic rule has been imposed in the name of unification. The principle of unity has been discarded and the thin end of the wedge of disruption driven in. This Sima Zhao trick is obvious to every man in the street.• The Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth 3. Zhang Junmai (1887-1969), better known in America as Carson Chang, was at this time principal of the Institute of National Culture, founded in 1939 with the backing of the Guomindang government. Regarding Ren Zhouxuan, alternative name of the Ye Qing, see above, note 43 on page 128. 4. During the period of the Three Kingdoms Sima Zhao, the prime minister of Wei, aspired to the throne. The emper.or remarked, "Sima Zhao's intention is obvious to every man in the street."

FEBRUARY /940

401

Army, and the border region stand firmly for genuine and against sham unification, for rational and against irrational unification, and for unification in substance and against unification in form. They advocate unification for resistance and not for capitulation, for unity and not division, for progress and not for retrogression. Unification on the basis of these three-resistance, unity, and progress-is genuine, rational, and real unification. To seek unification on any other basis, whatever intrigues or tricks are used, is like "going south by driving the chariot north"; with that we beg to disagree. All the local anti-Japanese forces should be looked after equally well, without discriminating against some and favoring others; all of them should be trusted, provisioned, supported, and encouraged with rewards. There should be sincerity and not hypocrisy, large-mindedness and not pettiness, in dealing with people. If things are really done in this way, all except those with ulterior motives will unite and take the road of national unification. It is an unalterable truth that unification must be based on unity and unity in its tum must be based on progress, and that only progress can bring unity and only unity can bring unification. This is the second point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 3. Put constitutional government into effect. The long years of political tutelage5 have yielded nothing. Things tum into their opposites when they reach the extreme; hence constitutional government is now on the order of the day. But there is still no freedom of speech, the ban on political parties has not been lifted, and actions contrary to constitutional government are constantly taken. If the constitution is drawn up on these lines, it will be a mere scrap of official paper. Such constitutional government will be no different from one-party dict·•torship. Now that there is a profound national crisis, with the Japanese and Wa1.g Jingwei harassing us from without and the traitors disrupting us from within, our existence as a nation and people will be placed in jeopardy unless there is a change of policy. Our government• should immediately lift the ban on political parties, and encourage freedom of opinion, as a manifestation of sincere support for constitutional government. Nothing is more urgent than this in order to win the full confidence of the people, and shape the destiny of the nation anew. This is the third point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 4. Put an end to friction. Since the so-called "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" were introduced in February7 last year, the clamor for "restricting," "corroding," and "combating" the Communist Party has reverberated throughout the country, there has been one tragic incident after another, and

5. "Political tutelage" (xunzheng) was the second of the three periods in China's progress toward democracy laid down by Sun Yatsen, immediately preceding constitutional government. In his interview of September 16, 1939, translated above, Mao had argued that Sun himself had changed his views toward the end of his life, and that the immediate establishment of constitutional government was now on the order of the day. 6. Our government """' The government

7. February ... March

402

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

blood has flown freely. As if this were not enough, the so-called "Measures for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem" were introduced in October last year. Then there are the "Directives for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem" in the Northwest, in North China, and in Central China. People have been saying, and quite justifiably, that political restriction ofthe Communist Party has been succeeded by military restriction. In fact, restricting Communism equals anticommunism. And anticommunism is the cunning and pernicious scheme used by the Japanese and Wang Jingwei for subjugating China. That is why the people are suspicious and shocked and are telling one another about it, and are afraid that the bitter tragedy of a decade ago is being reenacted. Matters have gone far enough, with the Pingjiang massacre in Hunan, the Queshan massacre in Henan, the attack on the Eighth Route Army by Zhang Yinwu in Hebei, the attack on the guerrillas by Qin Qirong in Shandong, the ruthless slaughter of between five and six hundred Communists by Cheng Ruhuai in eastern Hubei, the large-scale assaults on the garrison forces of the Eighth Route Army by the Central Army in eastern Gansu, and more recently the tragedy in Shanxi, where the old army attacked the new army and invaded positions held by the Eighth Route Army. If such incidents are not immediately prohibited, both sides will be doomed, and what hope will there be then of victory over Japan? For the sake of unity in the War of Resistance, the government should order the punishment of all the perpetrators of these massacres, and announce to the whole nation that no such incident will be allowed to recur. This is the fourth point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 5. Protect young people. Concentration camps have recently been set up near Xi'an, and people have been horrified to learn that more than seven hundred progressive young people from various provinces in the Northwest and in the Central Plains have already been interned there, subjected to mental and physical bondage, and treated like convicts. What crime have they committed to deserve such cruelty? Young people are the cream ofthe nation, and the progressive ones in particular are our most precious asset in the War of Resistance. Everyone should enjoy freedom of belief; ideas can never be suppressed by force of arms. The crime of the ten years of cultural suppression is known to everyone; why should anyone desire to repeat it today? The government should immediately issue a nationwide order for the protection of youth, for the abolition of the concentration camps near Xi'an, and for the strict prohibition of the outrageous attacks on young people in various places. This is the fifth point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 6. Support the front. Troops who are fighting Japan in the very frontline and have scored successes, such as the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other units, are receiving the worst treatment; they are thinly clad, badly fed, and kept short of ammunition and medicines. Yet unscrupulous traitors are allowed to slander them. There is a deafening din of countless absurd slanders against them. Merit goes unrewarded and distinguished service unci ted, while false changes and malicious plots become more and more brazen. This fantastic state of affairs dampens the ardor of our officers and men and wins applause only from the en-

FEBRUARY 1940

403

emy; on no account must it be allowed to continue. To lift up the hearts of the troops and serve the war effort, the government should adequately provision the frontline troops who have good service records, and at the same time strictly prohibit the treacherous slanders and accusations against them. This is the sixth point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 7. Proscribe the secret service organs. People are comparing the secret service agents to Zhou Xing and Lai J unchen of the Tang dynasty and Wei Zhongxian and LiuJin of the Ming dynasty, because of their lawlessness and violence.• Ignoring the enemy and concentrating on our own countrymen, they are committing innumerable murders and insatiably taking bribes; in fact the secret service is the headquarters of the rumor-mongers and a breeding ground oftreason and evil. Ordinary people everywhere recoil and turn away in fear from these fiendish brutes of agents. To preserve its own prestige, the government should immediately proscribe these

activities of the secret service and reorganize it. defining its duties as exclusively directed against the enemy and the traitors, so that the people's confidence may be restored and the foundations of the state strengthened. This is the seventh point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 8. Dismiss corrupt officials. Since the beginning ofthe War of Resistance, there have been cases of officials netting up to 100 million yuan out ofthe national crisis and taking as many as eight or nine concubines. Conscription, government bonds, economic control, famine relief, and war relief, all without exception have become money-making opportunities for corrupt officials. With such a pack of wolves running wild, no wonder the country's affairs are in chaos. The people are seething with discontent and anger, yet none dare expose the ruthlessness of these officials. To save the country from collapse, drastic and effective steps should immediately be taken to clear out all corrupt officials. This is the eighth point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 9. Put the Testament of the Director General 9 into effect. The Testament says: "For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution, with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people .... "What great words these are. We, the 450 million people of China, are all familiar with them. But the Testament is more often chanted than carried out. 10 Desecrators of the Testament are rewarded, while those who honor it in their acts are punished. What could be more preposterous? The government should decree that anyone who dares to violate the Testament and who tramples

8. Zhou Xing and Lai Junchcn were notoriously cruel inquisitors of the Tang dynasty. LiuJin and Wei Zhongxian were eunuchs of the Ming dynasty who controlled large secret services that tortured and murdered their opponents. 9. Sun Yatscn.

.

10. Since Sun's death, his Testament had been read out at the beginning of every meet-

Ing of a Guomindang organ at whatever level.

404

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

on the popular masses instead of arousing them will be punished for profaning Director General Sun's memory. This is the ninth point which we urge you to accept and act upon. 10. Put the Three People's Principles into effect. The government and Chairman Chiang have repeatedly enjoined that the Three People's Principles should be carried out throughout the country, and regard this as an important matter. 11 While it has been made in earnest, this injunction has fallen on deaf ears. Many people, making anticommunism their first duty, are giving up the war effort and doing everything possible to suppress and hold back the people as they rise to resist Japan. This is tantamount to abandoning [Sun's] Principle of People's Rights; they are ignoring the people's sufferings, which is tantamount to abandoning the Principle of the People's Livelihood. Such persons pay only lip service to the Three People's Principles, and either ridicule as busybodies those who seriously try to put them into effect, or severely punish them. Thus, all sorts of fantastic abuses have sprung up, and the government's prestige has reached rock bottom. An unequivocal order should immediately be issued for the strict carrying out of the Three People's Principles throughout the country. Those who violate the order should be severely punished, and all who carry it out amply encouraged. It is only in this way that the Three People's Principles can at long last be put into effect, and the foundations laid for victory in the war. This is the tenth point which we urge you to accept and act upon. These ten proposals are essential measures for saving the nation and winning the war. Now that the enemy is stepping up his aggression against China and Traitor Wang is running wild, we dare not remain silent on what we feel to be crucial issues. Please accept and act upon these proposals, and great advantage will ensue to the War of Resistance and the cause of national liberation. It is with a keen sense of urgency that we state our views, and we await your considered opinion. Respectfully from the members of the Presidium of the Yan'an Mass Rally of the Popular Masses on Denouncing Wang and Supporting Chiang-Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, Lin Boqu, Wu Yuzhang, Wang Jiase, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Deng Fa, Li Fuchun, Gao Gang, Xiao Jinguang, Zhang Hao, Zhang Bangying, Xu Guangda, Meng Qingshu, Tan Zheng, Tang Hongchen, Gao Langting, Feng Wenbin, and Guan Ruicai-and all the 30,000 members of the popular masses {in attendance at the meeting].

11. The government and Chairman Chiang have repeatedly enjoined that the Three People's Principles should be canied out throughout the country, and regarded this as an important matter._. The Three People's Principles are the platform of the Guomindang.

Telegram to the People's Political Council Sent by Mao Zedong and Other Councilors (February 3, 1940)

For the perusal of all the gentlemen of the Secretariat of the People's Political Council in Chongqing: Recently we have been informed by repeated reports that espionage agencies in Shaanxi, Gansu, Shanxi, Hebei, and Henan have issued a general order to their subordinates to the effect that the North China Inspection Corps of the People's Political Council is about to visit these places. Its primary mission is to collect evidence demonstrating that the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are to blame for the incidents of friction in these provinces. It will bring back the evidence, propose solutions to the government, and put forward a motion at the next session of the Political Council to end the special position of the border region and the Eighth Route Army, thus creating an opportunity to attack the Communist Party. The special agents all over these provinces were told to gather material carefully, and to help the offices of the Party, the government, and the army in making preparations for welcoming the inspection corps and in achieving the above-stated purposes. We could not bring our humble selves to believe the story, for it seemed far too strange. We did not know for sure ofthe actual existence of such an inspection corps until we received a telegram from your respected office a short while ago. After carefully looking into the matter, we have discovered that not a single Communist councilor participates in the leadership or in the membership of the inspection corps. Not only that, but of the people like Shen Junru, Zou Taofen, and Tao Xingzhi, 1 who were

This telegram was first published in Jiefang, no. 98199, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 231-32, where it is reproduced from this source. I. Shen Junru ( 1874-1963) and Zou Tao fen (1895-1944) were both members of the "Seven Gentlemen" (Qige junzi). prominent public figures arrested by the Guomindang in

1935 for advocating the end of the civil war and united resistance to Japan. (Sec Volume V of this edition.) Shen was a legal scholar and judicial official under the Qing and under the National Government; Zou was an outspoken patriotic journalist and editor of the weekly Shenghuo. Tao Xingzhi ( 1891-1946) was a prominent educator and philosopher who based his ideas on those or John Dewey and Wang Yangming. During the 1930s. he was active in the mass education and rural education movements. 405

406

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the first to propose the organization of such an inspection corps at the Fourth Session of the National Council, or of those who are known for their seniority, good reputation, fairness, and selflessness, such as Zhang Yilin,2 Huang Renzhi,3 Jiang Hengyuan,4 and Zhang Biaofang, not a single one is included therein. With the exception of two gentlemen, Liang Shiqiu,5 a member ofthe National Socialist Party, and Yu Jiaju,6 a member of the Nationalist Youth Party, both of whom made erroneous speeches supporting Wang and advocating peace, and therefore entered into a fierce argument with the Communists and other councilors who supported the War of Resistance, all the leaders and members of the inspection corps are councilor comrades from one party, that is, the Guomindang. No doubt, the materials collected and the conclusions reached by an inspection corps, organized in such a way, can only be biased and detrimental to the public interest. Taking into consideration that secret organs are working in collaboration with the inspection corps, we have all the more reason to believe that there is something going on behind the scenes. It is fresh in our memory that, in December two years ago, Zhang Junmai7 published his proposition that the so-called special positions of the border areas and the Eighth Route Army be abolished and Communism banned; not long after that, Wang Jingwei dispatched a public telegram going so far as to advocate a fight against the Communist Party. Assuming the inspection corps harbors the same purpose as Wang and Zhang, it may as well simply take the writings of Wang and Zhang as a draft, make a big fanfare out of it in Chongqing, and work it into a motion, so as to save the trip back and forth, traveling in this freezing wind and icy cold. If the designation of on-the-spot inspection is believed to be indispensable to manipulate public opinion, it is then ridiculous to have these people, who have such special connections, prepare a fat book of two or three hundred thousand words, based on the fabricated materials gathered from secret agencies, to denounce the Communist Party and have it serve as the legal basis for opposing, restricting, and dissolving the Communist Party. Political issues ofthe country can only be solved on rational political principles. How can mystifying the matter help 2. Zhang Yilin (1867-1943), despite having been closely associated with Yuan Shikai,

had in the 1920s and 1930s gained a reputation for integrity and public service. When the war broke out, he sought to organize an "Old Men's Army" of men over sixty. He was the oldest member of the People's Political Council, and was frequently outspoken in mising questions critical of and embarrassing to the Guomindang and the National Government. 3. Huang Yanpei (zi Renzhi) ( 1878-1965) was a leading protagonist of vocational educa-

tion. At this time, he had gone to Manila to supervise the sale of Chinese war bonds there. 4. Jiang Hengyuan (1886-1961) was a native of Jiangsu. He taught during the 1920s

and 1930s at various universities. 5. Liang Shiqiu (1903-1987), a native ofZhejiang, studied English literature at Harvard

and Columbia, and later taught at Beijing University and other institutions. 6. Yu Jiaju (1898-1976) was a native of Hubci. He studied philosophy at the University

of Edinburgh, and afterward taught this subject at various universities. 7. On Zhang Jumnai, sec above, the relevant note to the text of January 28. 1939.

FEBRUARY 1940

407

in the actual solution of the problems? Perhaps you will say that we Communists have misjudged the matter; the trip of the inspection corps is altogether for just and honorable purposes, without the slightest ulterior motive; its mission is to foster the cooperation of the two parties in order to lay a foundation· of unity and progress and seek a rational solution of the problems in border areas. Should that be the case, we would be happy to be proved wrong because the state affairs will benefit and thus improve; when the inspection corps arrives in Yan'an, we will treat our fellow councilors to millet and to sorghum wine, specialties ofYan'an, raising our wine cups against a snowy background and talking to our hearts' content about plans for unity and the salvation of the nation, and try to be good hosts to our distinguished guests. Your office is respectfully requested to convey this message. Kindest regards and best wishes. Councilors of the People's Political Council MaoZedong, Chen Shaoyu, Lin Zuhan, and Wu Yuzhang bow respectfully

Speech at the Founding Meeting of the Natural Science Research Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (February 5, 1940)

(Beginning omitted.) Just as Comrade Chen Yun was making his speech, Comrade Mao Zedong, our respected and beloved leader, arrived. People applauded warmly and rose to pay their respects. When Comrade Chen Yun had finished his talk, Comrade Mao Zedong went to the rostrum in the midst of thunderous applause and began by saying: I am all in favor of today's meeting to found the Natural Science Research Association, because natural science is a good thing. It can solve problems related to the necessities of our daily lives, such as food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, so everyone should approve of it and study it. Some people maintain that China has never had natural science. That is incorrect. In China, from the very beginning of human existence, people have had the need for food, and food can only be provided by production, so there were sprouts of natural science, which gradually developed later on. It is true, however, that in the past natural science was not developed so as to constitute a system, that is all. He also said:

Natural science is an instrument which people employ to achieve freedom. To obtain freedom in society, people make use of social science to understand and transform society, and to make social revolution. To obtain freedom in the natural domain, people must make use of natural science in order to understand, conquer, and transform nature. Natural science should be employed under the guidance of social science to transform nature, but the development of natural science is obstructed in capitalist societies. So this irrational social system must be transformed. The border region, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, has undergone a social transformation. The relations of production have been changed, thus creating the preconditions for the transformation of nature. The productive forces have thus been increasing daily. This is borne out by the production cam-

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, March 15, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6..pp. 143-44, where it is reproduced from that source. 408

FEBRUARY 1940

409

paign in the border region, and the agricultural and industrial exhibitions. Thus, the present social system of the border region is conducive to the development of

natural science. He went on to say:

The economy in the border region is still backward, but just for that reason it is more significant to work on it. As long as we all try hard, we definitely can tum this into a better place. Finally he pointed out: Marxism includes natural science, and everyone should begin to study natural science. Otherwise he cannot be accounted an excellent revolutionary, because there will be so many things in this world he does not understand.

Strengthen Unity and Progress 1 (February 7, 1940)2

A year has passed since New China News in Yan' an became the newspaper of the Communist Party organizations. In my opinion, this small newspaper is the best one in China. The main reasons are, first, that it is run by the Communist Party and, second, that it operates in a context of democratic politics. Without the existence of these two prerequisites at the same time, it would be impossible for it to be run so well. The direct efforts of the comrades working for the newspaper are another important prerequisite. It is also impossible to run it well without their initiative and creativity. But there is no limit as to how "well" it can be run. This year is its second year, and I hope that it will improve further.

Resistance, unity, and progress-these are three major principles which the Communist Party put forward last July 7 on the second anniversary of the War of Resistance. The three form an organic whole, and not one of them can be dispensed with. If the stress is solely on resistance to the exclusion of unity and progress, then such a so-called "War of Resistance" cannot be relied on, and cannot last. A War of Resistance without unity and progress, although at present it is still a War ofResistance, will ultimately tum into capitulation or end in defeat. We Communists hold that the three must be combined. For the sake of the War of Resistance, it is necessary to oppose capitulation, oppose Wang Jingwei's traitorous pact [with Japan], oppose his puppet government, and oppose all the Chinese traitors and capitulators concealed in the anti-Japanese ranks. For the sake of unity, it is necessary to oppose splittist activities and internal friction, to oppose attacks on the Eighth .Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other progressive forces from behind the front of resistance to Japan, to oppose disruption of the antiJapanese base areas at the front, 3 and to oppose the disruption of the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia Border Region, which is the rear area of the Eighth Route Army,

This document was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 7, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 145-46, where it is reproduced from this

source. The version in the Selected Works includes only the second paragraph, in slightly revised fonn. I. Strengthen Unity and Progress -+ We Must Emphasize Unity and Progress 2. February 7 ~ February I 0 3. At the fronl -+ Behind the enemy lines 410

FI!.BRUARY 1940 4/J

to oppose the denial of legal status to the Communist Party and the avalanche of documents for "restricting the activities of alien parties." For the sake of progress, it is necessary to oppose retrogression and the shelving of the Three People's Principles and of the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, to oppose the refusal to carry out the injunction in the Director General's Testament to "arouse the masses of the people," to oppose the internment of progressive young people in concentration camps, to oppose the suppression of what little freedom of speech and of the press there was in the early days of the War of Resistance, to oppose the scheme to turn the movement for constitutional government into the private concern of a few bureaucrats, to oppose the attacks on the new army, the eradication• of the League of Self-Sacrifice, and the massacre of progressives in Shanxi, to oppose the activities of the Three People's Principles Youth League in kidnapping people along the Xianyang-Yulin Highway and the Longhai railway, to oppose such shameless practices as taking nine concubines and making fortunes of 100 million yuan out of the national crisis, and to oppose the unbridled brutality of the corrupt officials and the rampages ofthe local bullies and bad gentry. Without opposing all these, and without unity and progress, the so-called "War of Resistance" will be just empty talk and victory a vain hope. What will be the political orientation of New China News in its second year? In my view, it will be to stress unity and progress, and to oppose all the vicious practices which are detrimental to the War of Resistance, so that further success can be achieved in our cause of resistance to Japan. On the occasion of the first anniversary ofNew China News,/ write this article to express my sincere hope, and I wish to work with our compatriots throughout the country toward its realization.

Introducing The Chinese Worker1 (February 7, 1940)

The publication of The Chinese Worker meets a need. Led by its own political party, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese working class has for the past twenty years waged heroic struggles and become the most politically awakened section of the nation's people and the leader of the Chinese revolution. Rallying the peasantry and all revolutionary people against imperialism and feudalism, it has fought to establish a new-democratic China and to drive out Japanese imperialism, and its contribution has been outstanding. But the Chinese revolution has not yet triumphed, and great efforts are still needed to unite the working class itself and to unite the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the entire revolutionary people. This is a tremendous political and organizational task. The responsibility for its accomplishment rests on the Chinese Communist Party, on the progressive workers, and on the entire working class. The ultimate liberation of the working class and the people as a whole will be achieved only when socialism is realized, which is the final goal the Chinese proletariat must struggle to attain. But before the stage of socialism can be reached, it is necessary to pass through the stage of the anti-imperialist and anti feudal democratic revolution. The immediate task ofthe Chinese working class, therefore, is to strengthen unity in its own ranks and unite the people, to oppose imperialism and feudalism, and to struggle for a new China, a China of New Democracy. The Chinese Worker is being published with just this task in view. Using simple language, The Chinese Worker will explain the bows and whys of many issues to the workers, report the realities of the working-class struggle in the War of Resistance Against Japan and sum up the experience gained, and in this way it will endeavor to fulfill its task. The Chinese Worker should become a school for educating the workers and for training cadres from their midst, and the readers will be its students. It is necessary to educate many cadres from among the workers, knowledgeable and capable cadres

Our source for this text is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp. 727-28. I. The Chinese Worker was a monthly founded in February 1940 in Yan'an and pub-

lished under the auspices of the Trade Union Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 412

FEBRUARY /940

4/3

who do not seek empty fame but are ready for honest work. It is impossible for the working class to attain liberation without large numbers of such cadres. The working class should welcome the help of the revolutionary intellectuals and never refuse it, for without their help the working class itself cannot go forward, nor can the revolution succeed. I hope that the journal will be well edited and that it will publish a good deal of lively writing, carefully avoiding wooden and trite articles that are flat, insipid, and unintelligible. Once started, a journal must be run conscientiously and well. This is the responsibility of the readers as well as of the staff. it is very important for the readers to send in suggestions and write brief letters and articles indicating what they like and what they dislike, for this is the only way to make the journal a success. With these few words I express my hopes; let them serve as an introduction to The Chinese Worker.

Speech at the Founding Meeting of the Yan 'an Young People's Association for Promoting Constitutional Government (February 19, 1940)

(Dispatch to this paper) (Omission) First the person in charge of preparatory work reported on the course of the preparatory work. Then Feng Wenbin, the chairman, delivered the opening speech. After that, Comrade Mao Zedong, the person most beloved by the young people, spoke to the young people roughly as follows: Now the diehards want retrogression, while the nationwide campaign for constitutional government demands progress and will see to it that progress takes place shortly. He went on to say:

New-democratic constitutional government is constitutional government of the broad masses of the Chinese people. In conclusion, he said:

In fighting Japan, we need young people; for constitutional government, we also need young people. Young people must not only do things but also take the lead. Young people are in the vanguard of the campaign for constitutional government, and it is essential that there should be young people in the National Assembly. Today' s meeting of the young people of Yan' an marks the correct orientation for young people throughout the country. The young people of Yan'an must work hard to arouse the young people of the whole country to struggle to push forward the movement for constitutional government.

This report of Mao's speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 24, 1940. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 147, where it is reproduced from that version. 414

New-Democratic Constitutional Government (Speech at the Rally of the People of All Circles in Yan' an for the Inauguration of the Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government) (February 20, 1940)

Comrades! It is highly significant that representatives of all circles in Yan'an are gathering here today for the meeting to inaugurate the Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government and that everyone has taken an interest in constitutional government. What is the purpose of our meeting? It is to facilitate the full expression of the popular will, the defeat of Japan, and the building of a new China. Democratic Resistance to Japan

Resistance to Japan, which we all support, is already being carried out, and the question now is only one of persevering in it. But there is something else, namely, democracy, which is still not being carried out. Both are of paramount importance to China today. To be sure, China lacks many things, but the main ones are independence and democracy. In the absence of either, China's affairs will not go well. And while there are two things lacking, there are also two superfluous ones. What are they? Imperialist oppression and the oppression of the feudal forces. 1 It is because of these two superfluous things that China has become a colonial, semicolonial, and semi feudal country. The principal demands of the people of the whole country today are for independence and democracy, and therefore the oppression of imperialism and the feudal forces must be destroyed. These things must be destroyed resolutely, thoroughly, and without the least mercy. Some say that only construction is needed, not destruction. Well, we should like to ask: Should

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, March I, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 233-44, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao's works.

I. Feudal forces - Feudalism 415

4/6

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Wang Jingwei be destroyed or not? Should Japanese imperialism be destroyed or not? Should the feudal system be destroyed or not? Unless you destroy these bad things, this pile of dog shit, you can give up thinking about construction. Only by destroying them can China be saved and construction be undertaken; otherwise, it will all be an idle dream. Only be destroying the old and the rotten can we build the new and the sound; otherwise, a lovely flower on cow dung is an atrocious sight. Combine independence and democracy and you have resistance to Japan on the basis of democracy, or democracy in the service of resistance to Japan. Without democracy, resistance to Japan will definitely fail. Without democracy, resistance to Japan cannot be maintained. With democracy, we shall certainly win even if we have to go on resisting for eight or ten years. New-Democratic Constitutional Government

What is constitutional government? It is democratic politics. I agree with every· thing that our old Comrade Wu [Yuzhang] has just said. But what kind of democratic politics do we need today? New-democratic politics, new-democratic constitutional government. This is not the old, outmoded, European-American type of so-called democratic politics, which is bourgeois dictatorship, nor is it the newest type, the Soviet type of democratic politics, which is the dictatorship of the proletariat. Democracy of the old type, which has been practiced in other countries, is on its way out; it is unsuited to the needs ofour times and has become reactionary. Under no circumstances should we accept such a reactionary thing. The Chinese diehards still want such a thing,2 but they can never have it. For the Chinese people as a whole do not want such a government and would not welcome a one-class dictatorship by the bourgeoisie. China's affairs must be decided by the vast majority of the Chinese people, and the monopoly of government by the bourgeoisie alone must be absolutely rejected. Then what about socialist democracy ofthe newest type? Of course, it is very good and will prevail in all advanced countries throughout the world. 3 But today this type of democracy is not yet practicable in China, and we must therefore do without it for the time being. Not until certain conditions are present will it be possible to have socialist democracy. The kind of democratic politics we need today is neither democracy of the old type nor democracy of the

2. The Chinese diehards still want such a thing,...., The sort of constitutional government

which the Chinese diehards are talking about is the old type of bourgeois democracy found abroad. But while they talk about it, tbey do not really want even that; they are using such talk to deceive the people. What they really want is a one-party fascist dictatorship. The Chinese national bourgeoisie, on the other hand, does want this type of constitutional government and would like to establish a bo\ll'geois dictatorship in China. 3. And will prevail in all advanced countries throughout the world -+ And will eventu-

ally prevail throughout the world

FEBRUARY /940

4/7

new type, 4 but New Democracy, which is suited to the trend in the world and to the conditions of present-day China. The constitutional government to be instituted5 is

new-democratic constitutional government. What is new-democratic constitutional government? It is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. Li Yuanhong6 once said, "If there is food, let everyone share it." I think this can serve to illustrate New Democracy. Just as everyone should share what food there is, so there should be no monopoly of power by a single party, group, or class. This idea was well expressed by Mr. Sun Yatsen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang: The so-called democratic system in modem states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Guomindang' s Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few. Comrades, in studying constitutional government we must read all sorts of books, but above all, we must study this manifesto, and this passage should be learned by heart. "Shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few"this is the essence of what we describe as New Democracy,7 as the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. Such is the constitutional government we need today. And it is the form which a constitutional government of the anti-Japanese united front should take, and the constitutional democracy of Mr. Sun Yatsen 's revolutionary Three People's Principles.

The Need for Promotion Our meeting today is called a meeting for the promotion of constitutional government. Why do we have to ''promote" or "urge" it? If everybody were advancing, there would be no need for urging. Why do we trouble to hold this meeting? Because some people, instead of marching forward, are lying down and refusing to move. Not only do they refuse to move forward, but they would tum backward,

4. Nor democracy of the new type ....., Nor yet democracy of the socialist type 5. Instituted- Promoted 6. Li Yuanhong ~Someone. Li Yuanhong (1864-1928), zi Songqing, a native ofHubei, became head of the new revolutionary government in October 1911 much against his will. He was elected vice-president to Sun Yatsen, and then to Yuan Shikai, when Yuan succeeded Sun in early 1912. He subsequently participated, reluctantly once again, in Yuan's attempt at restoration of tbe monarchy in 1915. Following Yuan's death in 1916, he became president, but was forced to resign in August 1917 by the powerful leader of the Anhui faction of militarists, Duan Qirui, whom he had dismissed from the premiership. 7. New Democracy -+ New-democratic constitutional government

4/8

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

pulling tails and acting like Shen Gongbao in {the traditional novel about] the investiture ofthe gods, 8 and they would rather die than move forward; these people are diehards. They are so stubborn that we have to hold this meeting to give them an "urging." Where does the term "urge" come from? Who first applied it in this connection? As I explained at the Youth Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government yesterday, not 1,9 but that great man, Mr. Sun Yatsen, who said: "For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution." Read his Testament and you will find the following words: "Most recently I have recommended the convocation of the National Assembly ... and its realization in the shortest possible time must in particular be urged. This is my heartfelt charge to you." Comrades, not an ordinary "charge" but a "heartfelt charge." A "heartfelt charge" is not just the usual kind of charge, so how can it be lightly ignored? Again, "the shortest possible time"; first, not the longest time, second, not a relatively long time, and third, not just a short time, but "the shortest possible time." If we want the National Assembly to come into being in the shortest possible time, then we have to "urge" it. Mr. Sun Yatsen has been dead for fifteen years, but to this day the National Assembly he recommended has not been convened. Fiddling every day with political tutelage, certain people have senselessly fiddled away the time, turning "the shortest possible time" into the longest time, and yet they are forever invoking Mr. Sun Yatsen' s name. How Mr. Sun's ghost would rebuke these unworthy followers of his! It is perfectly clear that without "urging," there will be no moving forward; "urging" is needed because many Shen Gongbaos 10 are moving back and many others are not yet awakened. As some people are not moving forward, ·we must urge them. We must urge others because they are slow. That is why we are calling many meetings to urge the establishment of constitutional government. The young people have held such meetings, and so have the women, the workers, the schools, government organizations, and army units. It is all very lively and very good. And now we are holding this general meeting for the same purpose, so that all of us can go into action to urge the speedy application of constitutional government and the immediate application of Mr. Sun Yatsen's teachings. Some say: "You are in Yan'an while those people are in various other places. What is the use of your urging them if they take no notice?" Yes, there is some use. Things are moving, and they will have to take notice. If we hold more meetings, write more articles, make more speeches, and send more telegrams, they will find it impossible not to take notice. I think our numerous meetings in Yan'an to promote constitutional government have a twofold purpose. One is to study the problem, and the other is to push people forward. Why do we have to study? Because if 8. Regarding Shen Gongbao, see above, the relevant note to the text of December 9, 1939, ''The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement." 9.I~we

I0. Shen Gongbaos _.. People

FEBRUARY /940

419

they do not go forward and you urge them, and they then ask why you are pushing, it is necessary to be able to answer. To do so, we have to make a serious study of the bows and whys of constitutional government. This is exactly what our old Comrade Wu has been talking about in some detail. All schools, government organizations, and army units, and all sections of the people should study the problem of constitutional government confronting us. Once we have studied it, we can push people forward. To push them forward is to urge them on and, as we push in all fields, things will gradually move ahead. The many little streams will merge into a great river to wash away all that is rotten and filthy, and new-democratic constitutional government will emerge. The effect of such pushing will be very great. What we do in Yan'an is bound to influence China as a whole.

The Task Is Difficult Comrades, do you imagine that once the meetings have been held and the telegrams dispatched, the diehards will be bowled over, will start moving forward, will submit to our orders? No, they will not be as docile as that. A great many of them are graduates of special training schools for diehards. Diehards they are today, and diehards they will remain tomorrow and even the day after. What does diehard mean? "Hard" means to be inflexible and "die" means to be dead set against progress today, tomorrow, and even the day after. Such are the people we call diehards. To make them listen to us is no easy matter. As far as the constitutional governments the world has so far known are concerned, whether in Britain, France, the United States, or the Soviet Union, a body of basic laws, that is, a constitution, has generally been promulgated after a successful revolution to give recognition to the actual establishment of democracy. But China's case is different. In China the revolution has not yet succeeded and, except in areas like our border region, democratic government is not yet a fact. The fact is that China today is under semicolonial and semi feudal rule, and even if a constitution'' were promulgated, it would inevitably be hindered by the feudal forces and obstructed by the diehards, so it would be impossible to carry it out smoothly. Thus the present movement for constitutional government has to strive for a democracy that is not yet achieved, rather than to affirm a democracy that has already become a fact. This means a struggle, 12 and it is certainly no light or easy matter. Those who have all along opposed constitutional government are now paying it lip service. Why? Because they are under pressure from the people, who want to fight Japan, and they have to temporize a little. They are even shouting at the top

11. A constitution -+A good constitution 12. A struggle -+ A major struggle

420 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

oftheir voices, "I have always stood for constitutional government!" and making a terrific din. For years we have been hearing the words "constitutional government," but so far we have seen no trace of it. These people say one thing and do another and may be called double-dealers in constitutional government. Their "always stood for" is truly an example of their double-dealing. The diehards of today are precisely such double-dealers. Their constitutional government is a swindle. In the not -too-distant future you may get a constitution and a president into the bargain. But as for democracy and freedom, heaven alone knows when they will give you that. China has already had a constitution. Did not Cao Kun promulgate one? 13 But where were democracy and freedom to be found? As for presidents, there have been a number of them. The first, Sun Yatsen, was good, but he was edged out by Yuan Shikai. The second was Yuan Shikai, the third Li Yuanhong, the fourth Feng Guozhang.' 4 and the fifth Xu Shichang, 15 indeed a great many, but were they any different from the despotic emperors? Both the constitution and the presidents were fakes. At present the so-called constitutional and democratic politics of countries like Britain, France, and the United States are in fact murderous 16 governments. The same is true of South America, 17 where many countries display the republican signboard but in fact have no trace of democracy. Similarly with China's presentday diehards. Their talk of constitutional government is only "selling dog-meat

13. Cao Kun (1862-1938), zi Zhongshan, was born in Tianjin and trained at the Tianjin Military Academy, and occupied a series of high posts under Yuan Shikai and during the struggles following Yuan's death. In I920, after the defeat of Duan Qirui (see note 2I below), Cao, as leader of the Zhili faction, became a dominant figure in Beijing. After the resignation of Xu Shichang as president in I922 (see note I5 below), and the brief return to powerofLi Yuanhong in mid-1922, Cao forced Lito resign in 1923, in order to secure the

presidency for himself. He persuaded the members of the National Assembly to vote for him with the promise that they could draft a new pennanent constitution. This text, adopted soon after Cao took office in October 1923, was called the "Cao Kun constitution." A year

later, with the defeat ofCao's most important military subordinate, Wu Peifu (see note 21 below), Cao in tum was forced to resign, and his political career came to an end.

I4. Feng Guozhang (I 859-I9 I9), zi Huafu, a native of Hebei, became vice-president following Yuan Shikai's death, and then acting president in 19I7 after Li Yuanhong was forced from office. He was the leader of the Zhili clique, which opposed the Anhui faction of Duan Qirui, who had once again become premier. Under pressure from Duan, he agreed

to retire when his term of office ended in October I918 and he was succeeded by Xu Shichang. I5. Xu Shichang (1855-1939), zi Juren, a native of Henan, was a protege of Yuan Shikai, though he did not support Yuan's attempt to restore the monarchy. In 19I6 he had attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Duan Qirui and Li Yuanhong and came to be regarded as an impartial elder statesman. In September 1918 he was elected to the

presidency by the National Assembly, becoming the first civilian to occupy that office. He soon found himself a prisoner of Duan Qirui and his faction, and his popular suppon was further eroded when he took a strong stand against the May Founh demonstrations. In June 1922 he resigned under pressure from Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. 16. Murderous_,. Man-eating 17. South America_,. Central and South America

FEBRUARY 1940 421

under the label of sheep's head." They display the sheep's head of constitutional government while selling the dog-meat of one-party dictatorship. I am not attacking them groundlessly; my words are well founded because for all their talk about constitutional government, they do not give the people a panicle of freedom. Comrades, real constitutional government will never come easily; it can be obtained only through hard struggle. Therefore you must not expect that it will come immediately after we have held our meetings, sent out telegrams, and written our articles. Nor must you expect that, after the People's Political Council passes a resolution, the national government issues a decree, and the National Assembly meets on November 12, promulgates a constitution, and even elects a president, everything will be fine and all will be right with the world. That is impossible, so don't get confused. This needs to be explained to the common people so that they will not be confused either. Things will never be that easy.

There Is Great Hope Should we then lament the cause as lost? Things are so difficult that it seems hopeless. But that is not so either. There is still hope for constitutional government, and great hope at that, and China will certainly become a new-democratic state. Why? The difficulties arise because of trouble-making by the diehards, but they cannot go on being diehards forever, and that is why we still have high hopes. The diehards of the world may be diehards today and remain so tomorrow and even the day after, but not forever; in the end, they will have to change. Wang Jingwei, for example, was a diehard for a very long time, yet he could not keep on acting the diehard within the anti-Japanese ranks and had to go over to the Japanese. Zhang Guotao, to take another example, was also a diehard for a very long time, but he, too, took to his heels after we held a number of meetings and struggled repeatedly against him. Actually, the diehards may be hard, but they are not hard unto death, and in the end they change-into something filthy and contemptible, like a pile of dog shit. Some change for the better, and that is also the result of our repeated struggles against them-they come to see their mistakes and change for the better. In short, diehards do change eventually. They always have many schemes in hand, schemes for profiting at others' expense, for double-dealing, and so on. But they always get the opposite of what they want. They start by doing others harm but end by ruining themselves. We once said that Chamberlain was "lifting a rock only to drop it on his own toes," and this has now come to pass. Chamberlain had set his heart on using Hitler as the rock with which to crush the toes of Stalin, 18 but since August 23 last year when the Soviet Union and Germany signed the pact, 19 the 18. Stalin ~ The Soviet people 19. Since August 23 last year when the Soviet Union and Gennany signed the pact .,. Since that September day last year when war broke out between Gennany on the one side and Britain and France, on the other

422

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

rock in his hands has fallen on his own toes. To this day, he is still smarting from it. Similar instances abound in China. Yuan Shikai wanted to crush the toes of the common people but in the event hurt himself, and he died just three days 20 after becoming emperor. Duan Qirui, Xu Shichang, Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and all the rest wanted to repress the people, but finally they were all overthrown by the people. zt Whoever tries to profit at others' expense will come to no good end. I think that, unless they move forward, the anti-Communist diehards of today can be no exception to this rule. On the high-sounding pretext of unification, they are planning to liquidate the progressive Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the progressive Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the progressive Communist Party, and mass organizations. They have any number of schemes of this sort. But I believe the outcome will be not the liquidation of progress by diehardism but the liquidation of diehardism by progress. Indeed, to escape liquidation the diehards have no alternative but to move forward. Hence we have often advised them not to attack the Eighth Route Army, the Communist Party, and the border region. If they must, they had better make a resolution starting as follows: "Determined as we are to liquidate ourselves,22 we, the diehards, assume the responsibility for attacking the Communist Party and the border region." The diehards have had plenty of experience in "suppressing the Communists," and should they now want to have another go, they are free to do so. If after eating their fill and having a good sleep, they feel like doing some "suppression," that is up to them. However, they should please draw up a resolution which states,23 "As the Communist Party is too small, it is necessary to expand it greatly, and as the Eighth Route Army has too few guns, it is necessary greatly to increase its guns; and our diehards are responsible for suppressing the Communist Party." This is a resolution that is unalterable.

The "suppression of the Communists" in the past ten years invariably turned out in conformity with this resolution. Any further "suppression" will also conform to it. Hence I advise them not to go in for "suppression." What the whole nation wants is not "suppression of the Communists" but resistance, unity, and progress. Therefore, anyone who tries to "suppress the Communists" is bound to fail.

20. Three days ~ A few monlhs 21. Wu Peifu (1874--1939), a leader of the Zhili faction, was the dominant military figure in North China in 1922-1924, but never held high political office. Duan Qirui ( 18651936), the head of !he Anhui faction, played a decisive role in 1916-1918 as premier and served as provisional chief executive from November 1924 to April 1926, but was never actually president. Xu and Cao, as indicated in the notes regarding them above, did each serve as president. 22. To liquidate ourselves _., To liquidate ourselves and provide the Communist Party with ample opportunity to expand 23. They should please draw up a resolution which states ... They must be prepared for the above resolution to go into effect

PEBRUARY /940

423

In short, retrogression eventually produces the reverse of what its promoters intend. There is no exception to this rule either in modern or in ancient times, in China or elsewhere. The same is true of constitutional government today. If the diehards keep on opposing it, the result will certainly be the reverse of what they intend. The movement for constitutional government will never follow the course decided on by the diehards, but will run counter to their intentions, and it will inevitably take the course decided on by the people. This is certain, for the people throughout the country demand it and so do the current of China's historical development and the whole trend of world affairs. Who can resist it? The wheel of history cannot be turned backward. However, the work we have undertaken requires time and cannot be accomplished over night; it requires effort and cannot be done in a slipshod way; it requires the mobilization of the great masses of the people and cannot be done effectively by a single pair of hands. It is a very good thing that we are holding this rally here today; after our meeting we shall write articles and send telegrams to all parts of the country, and we shall also hold similar meetings in the Wutai mountains, the Taihang mountains, North China, Central China, and all over the country. If we go on doing this and keep it up for several years, that will be just about right. We must make a good job of it, we must win democracy and freedom, and we must establish new-democratic constitutional government. If this is not done and the diehards are allowed to have their way, the nation will perish. This is the way we must work to avoid national subjugation and genocide. For this purpose everyone must exert himself. If we do so, there is great hope for our cause. It must further be understood that, after all, the diehards are only a minority, while the majority consists not of diehards but of people all capable of moving forward. With the majority pitted against the minority, plus the efforts we exert, the hope will be even greater. That is why I say that, difficult though the task may be, there is great hope.

Declaration of the Association ofAll Circles in Yan 'an for the Promotion of Constitutional Government (February 20, 1940)

To the National Government, the People's Political Council, the Chinese Guomindang, all parties and factions, armies, organizations of the popular masses that are fighting Japan, and all newspaper offices for their inspection: The Yan'an Association of All Circles for the Promotion of Constitutional Government held its inaugural meeting on February 20. Here we solemnly proclaim the views of this association regarding constitutional government. We respectfully request that the government adopt them and put them into practice. We hope, moreover, that people in all walks of life will join us in promoting them, so that a truly democratic government can be realized, as the future of the War of Resistance hinges on it. I. The significance of putting into effect constitutional government at present lies in following the will of the people, and thoroughly defeating Japanese imperialism. It has been twenty-nine years now since the founding of the Republic of China, but, though it is called a republic, in reality it is a dictatorship. We do not have to discuss the generation of Yuan [Shikai], Feng [Guozhang], 1 Duan [Qirui], and Cao [Rulin] 2 Since the Guomindang has been in power, because it has been following the same old track it has also failed to make any improvements. The reason lies in the fact that it has indulged in a lot of empty talk about political tutelage, but failed to take as its only guide calling upon the will of the people and resisting imperialism. The statement of the First National Congress of the Guomindang in I 924 contains the following passage: "The so-called democratic system, as it exists today in various countries, frequently extends only to the bourgeoisie and has therefore been turned into a tool for the oppression of the common

This declaration was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 28, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 245-49, which reproduces that text. 1. Feng Guozhang (1858-1919) became vice-president and then acting president in 1916-18 after the death of Yuan Shikai. 2. Cao Rulin ( 1876-1966), a strongly pro-Japanese politician, was one of the principal targets of the students during the May 4th demonstrations. 424

FEBRUARY 1940

425

people. The 'people's rights' 3 advocated by the Guomindang is enjoyed also by the common people; it is not something privately possessed by a minority." What admirable words! If this manifesto had been put into effect, the tragedy of the civil war could have been avoided, and the foreign invasion could have found no entry. Unfortunately, famous dicta such as this have actually been laid aside and neglected, while the ruthless application of one-party dictatorship has been described by the high-sounding term of political tutelage. The fact is that, throughout China, from the south to the north, from great cities to the remote hinterland, not a single person has been enlightened nor a single wrong addressed in the course of all this tutelage. On the contrary, the only result of these many years of political tutelage has been merely that we see corrupt officials running amuck, the local bullies and bad gentry committing endless iniquities, the moral standards of the state and the vitality of the nation utterly destroyed, and opportunities created for disaster to enter from abroad. it was not until the beginning of the War of Resistance that the whole nation rose up in indignation and fought to save the country. The problem of paramount importance at the moment is how to make full use ofthe popular will and utterly defeat Japanese imperialism. There are those who argue, on the contrary, that the establishment of constitutional democracy has nothing to do with unleashing the popular will and driving out the Japanese invaders. They do not see

constitutional government as an instrument for saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival, but merely as a clever expedient for deceiving public opinion. Consequently, the people's campaign for constitutional government is banned, the people's freedom of speech, assembly, and association is curtailed, and they declare that political tutelage, which all our compatriots believe should be abolished, will continue. They deem it unnecessary that the representatives to the National Assembly who were elected before the start of the War of Resistance should be reelected, and they consider that the Organic Law of the National Assembly, with which people are dissatisfied, still applies.• We, the members of this association, declare our firm opposition to all the points listed above, which run counter to the will of the people and do not answer the needs of the War of Resistance. The members of this association venture to say that if that is how constitutional government is to be carried out, no problem, whether domestic or foreign, will ever be solved. Without a thorough change in accordance with the will of the

3. Sun Yatsen's term for democracy, corresponding to the second of the Three People's Principles. 4. The reference is presumably to the Organic Law of the National Assembly, which had been promulgated on May 4, 1936, but was not put into effect because of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Mao's point about the reelection of representatives to the National Assembly is somewhat more obscure, since there had been no body with this title in China for more than twenty years. Mao may have been thinking of the Legislative Yuan, which had drafted several proposals for constitutional government between 1934 and 1936, and some of whose members (appointed rather than elected) might have been included in the new assembly. In fact, no National Assembly was elected untill948.

426 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

people, it will be absolutely impossible to win the support of the people or to benefit the War of Resistance. This is the first thing this association wishes to proclaim to our compatriots. 2. The Electoral Law of the National Assembly must be thoroughly revised, and representatives reelected. Although some of the representatives elected before the War of Resistance are fair-minded people, the so-called election was by and large fraudulent. This is because Chu Minyi, today a Chinese traitor, was the one who directed the election, while the party headquarters secretly shielded his actions.5 There were all sorts of secret dealings, which have incurred ridicule from people both at home and abroad. Among the representatives, there are many Chinese traitors, enemy spies, corrupt officials, and local bullies and bad gentry. The constitution produced by an assembly of such delegates must necessarily be some worthless bureaucratic document, and the application of a constitution under such an assembly will definitely be the same old one-party dictatorship with a different label. If there is something you want to do, just go ahead and do it. Why bother to disguise it as constitutional government? The members ofthis Association declare their resolute opposition to this practice. At the same time, they would like to propose to the government that the Electoral Law of the National Assembly be thoroughly revised and the representatives reelected. That has to be done, as it is called for by the necessity to persevere in unity and in the War of Resistance. Otherwise it would be like heading north when you actually want to go south, thus incurring ridicule from people who truly know about the matter and in no way bringing good fortune to the nation or to the state. That is the second thing that this Association wishes to proclaim to the people of the nation. 3. The Organic Law ofthe National Assembly must be thoroughly revised. The National Assembly should be the organ of supreme power. In the present Organic Law, however, the office of the National Assembly is specified as nothing beyond the making of the constitution and determining the date of its entry into force, and its mission terminates at the end of the session. It was designed in this way to avoid the actual establishment of constitutional government and to prevent the National Assembly from becoming an organ of power responsible for the salvation and development of the nation. The evil influence behind it was the obsession of one-party dictatorship. The comrades of this Association absolutely cannot accept the Organic Law of the National Assembly, which does not fit with the needs of the War of Resistance. We demand that it be thoroughly revised and that the

5. Chu Minyi (1884-1946), who had long been associated with Wang Jingwei, became

secretary general of the Executive Yuan in Nanjing when Wang became premier in 1932 and retained the post until 1935, when Wang was wounded in an assassination attempt and resigned. When Wang Jingwei broke with Chiang Kaishek and sought peace with Japan, Chu became secretary general of Wang's "Reformed Guomindang." From 1940 to 1944 he

served as foreign minister of Wang's collaborationist regime, and in 1946 he was executed in Nanjing as a traitor.

FEBRUARY /940

427

National Assembly be designated as the supreme organ of state power. First, apart from making the constitution and determining the date of its entry into force, the National Assembly should be designated as the organ for carrying out the constitution. Second, the National Assembly should be entrusted with the authority to decide on the overall orientation of domestic policy and foreign affairs. Third, the National Assembly should have the right to select, supervise, and dismiss the members of the government. Fourth, the National Assembly should have the authority to make laws for the state. Fifth, the National Assembly should have a standing organ to perform tasks when the Assembly is not in session. Only thus can the needs that have arisen in the present critical situation be met, and the National Assembly avoid turning into something which merely serves to maintain appearances. If it is argued that the organ that has the right to enforce the constitution should be determined by the constitution, so the Organic Law should not entrust the National Assembly in advance with the right to enforce the constitution, that is an argument that deceives oneself as well as others. It was Mr. Sun Yatsen who specified that the National Assembly was the suprome organ of state power, when he said, "After the promulgation of the Constitution, the Center's right to rule is to be exercised by the National Assembly. The National Assembly is authorized to select and dismiss the government officials and to formulate and revise the state laws." Aside from the National Assembly, is there a second organ which deserves to be the executive body of the constitution? Sincerity is indispensable if anything is to be accomplished. To practice democracy without sincerity is as good as not talking about it at all. Sincerity in opening up the government, in practicing democracy, and in rousing people to manage their own business of safeguarding themselves as well as the country, without taking these as temporary expedients, is an initial prerequisite for summoning the National Assembly. That is the third thing this Association wishes to proclaim to the people of the nation. 4. An all-embracing and thoroughgoing campaign for constitutional government should be unfolded throughout the country. People are entitled to the freedom to discuss constitutional government and to participate in the election of the representatives to the National Assembly. All parties and factions that are fighting Japan are entitled to the right of existence and the freedom to participate in the election of representatives to the National Assembly. Constitutional government without participation by the popular masses, popular masses without the freedom of speech, assembly, and association, anti-Japanese parties and factions without the right to legal existence and legal activity denote constitutional government in empty words and devoid of any actual effect. As long as this practice remains unchanged, tne constitution, however comprehensive and well-phrased its articles, will be nothing but a bunch of meaningless printed characters. No matter how certain people may boast that they promoted constitutional government a long time ago, this is nothing but a camouflage for the monopoly of political power by a single party or faction. On the other hand, if they are truly sincere in changing the old course of doing things and have the determination to turn over a new leaf together with the people,

428

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

they will necessarily start by allowing the people as well as all anti-Japanese parties, factions, and mass organizations the freedom to discuss constitutional government and to elect their representatives to the National Assembly. That is the fourth thing that this association wishes to proclaim to our compatriots. The four issues discussed above are proposals of this Association as well as the common will of people all over the country. The members of the Association are convinced that carrying out democracy and constitutional government is the general trend of events both at home and abroad and will therefore achieve its ends despite obstacles of all kinds. At a time when the enemy of our nation is driving deep into the country, the democratization of the state is truly the fundamental guarantee for the salvation and preservation of the nation. The combined efforts of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all the other anti-Japanese parties, factions, and people will no doubt gradually lead to the prospect of democracy and constitutional government. That is, once again, something of which the members of this Association are profoundly convinced, and something that they wish to state to the people of the entire country. At the moment when this association is established, we have put forward with utmost sincerity our propositions and are seeking for advice from the people of this world. People with aspira-

tions, arise! February 20 of the 29th year of the Chinese Republic The Yan' an Association of All Circles for the Promotion of Constitutional Government Chairman of the Board of Directors Wu Yuzhang Directors

Mao Zedong, Chen Shaoyu, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Deng Fa, Lin Boqu, Li Fuchun, Gao Gang, Gao Zili, Luo Mai, Xiao Jingguang, Tan Zheng, Zhang Bangying, Xie Juezai, Ke Qingshi, Teng Daiyuan, Zhang Hao, Meng Qingshu, Feng Wenbin, Zhang Qinqiu, Ding Ling, Cao Yi'ou, Ai Siqi, Zhou Yang, Wang Xuewen, Xu Guangda, Wu Liangping, Chen Boda, Nan Hanchen, Li Chuli, Yang Song, He Sijing, Zhou Yimin, Chen Kangbai, Fu Lianzhang, Gao Langting, Cao Juru, Rao Zhengxi, Wang Lin, Ye Jizhuang, Lei Jingtian, Bai Zhengbang, Gao Shuxian

Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions and Consolidate the Positions Won (March 5, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. There is the necessity and the possibility that the armed struggle against friction may decline for a time in the major regions of the northwest and of Nonh China. This is because we have already basically put down Chiang [Kaishek]'s military offensive, while at present Chiang is in no position to carry out a largescale campaign to ··suppress the Communists." We have won great victories in Shanxi. Hebei, and the border region. The question of winning the upper hand in North China has basically been resolved. Chiang, Cheng, Yan, and Wei 1 cannot ignore these facts. Consequently, there is the possibility that their side's armed offensive may be halted temporarily and that they may seek a harmonious understanding with us for a time. During the past two weeks, Chiang, Cheng, Yan, and Wei, together with Jiang of Shaanxi and Zhu of Gansu. 2 have more or less revealed this intention. 2. The present task for our side is to strive for internal peace in the major regions. so that we may be able to concentrate our forces to consolidate our existing positions within half a year. This task is of very great significance. If we are able to consolidate twenty-three xian in the border areas to make them really like the border region; consolidate northwestern Shanxi and the eastern part of Sui yuan in the Shanxi-Sui yuan region; consolidate the area north of the Linfen, Tunliu, Huguan, Linxian, Zhanghe, and Darning line in southeastern Shanxi and in Hebei,

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ju11shi wtnji, Vol. 2, pp. 517-20, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. The reference is to Chiang Kaishck. Cheng Qian, Yun Xishan. and Wei Lihuang. Regarding Cheng. sec the relevant note to the text of January I I. 1940. Regarding Yan Xishan, see Vol. V, p. 61, note 8, and ahove, the note to the text of December 6. 1939. Wei Lihuang ( 1897-1960). a native of Anhui. had participated in the Northern Expedition and in the campaigns of 1931-1934 against the Communists in Jiangxi. At this time. he was

commander of the First War Zone, and governor of Henan. 2. Jiang of Shaanxi is Jiang Dingwen (1895-1974). Regarding him, see above the rel.::vant note to Edgar Snow's September 24 interview with Mao. Zhu of Gansu is Zhu Shaoliang. commander of the Eighth War Zone. See above, the relevant note to "The Current SiiUation and Our Policies." January II. 1940. 429

430

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

as well as part of Shandong; and consolidate the area west of the Tianjin-Pukou railroad, east of Kaifeng, south of the old Yellow River, and north of the new Yellow River 3 in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan-Anhui Border Region within half a year-then there will be some possibility that the united front may take a turn for the better. (Of course, the diehards will hate us all the more.) Besides, if our military counteroffensive does not stop for a while in the major regions, even though

our military actions are still defensive in nature, the intermediate factions may regard us as extreme and excessive. There will then be the possibility that we might lose the sympathy of the intermediate factions. Therefore, whether from the point of view of consolidating our forces or from the point of view of striving to win over the sympathy of the intermediate factions, it is necessary to halt temporarily the military struggle between the two sides. 3. Now that it is necessary and possible for the military struggle between the two sides to come to a halt, our specific steps should be: (a) Seriously restore our ties with Yan Xi shan; look for concrete ways to work out a compromise between the new and old armies and to bring the New Army and the Sacrifice League again under the command of Yan Xishan4 ; (b) Strive to get Chiang, Yan, and Wei to recognize that the Jundu, Fenyang, Linfen, Tunliu, Huguan, Linxian, Zhanghe, and Darning line should constitute the battle line between the two sides. 5 Their units, such as those under Zhu Huaibing,6 located north of that line should be transferred southward, and our forces south of that line should be transferred northward. We shall only keep two lines of army service stations, one from Huanqu to

3. In June 1938, in order to impede the progress of the Japanese armies, the Chinese authorities broke open the Yellow River dikes. The river swept across the path of the advancing Japanese and found a new outlet to the sea south. rather than north, of the Shandong peninsula. (for a brief account of the circumstances, see the Cambridge Hislory of China, Vol. 13, p. 555.) This change in the course of the river still persisted in 1940; hence the distinction between the "old" and the "new" Yellow River. 4. Regarding the old and new armies, see above, the text of December 6, 1939. The Sacrifice League, or League for Sacrifice to Save the Country, had been founded in Septem-

ber 1936. Outwardly, it was a bureaucratic organization controlled by Yan Xishan's officials, but in reality it was an anti-Japanese mass body under the direct leadership of members of the Chinese Communist Party. 5. The line of demarcation suggested by Mao, running from Jundu through intermediate points to Darning, lies in southeastern Shanxi. In naming these and other places, Mao was seeking to define areas assigned to Guomindang units and to the Communist forces. This was part of the scaling down of conflict at the end of the ''First Anti-Communist Upsurge" and was intended to restrain Peng's Eighth Route Army from pushing its tactical advantage too far. This document shows how detailed and specific Mao could sometimes be in his directives to lower levels. It should be read in conjunction with the more general statement of the following day. 6. Zhu Huaibing (1892-1968), a native of Hubei, had participated in the 1911 Revolution. After graduating from the Baoding Military Academy in 1917, he held a variety of military and political posts in the 1920s and 1930s. In April 1938, he was appointed commander of the Ninety-seventh Army, a position he still occupied in March 1940.

MARCH 1940 431

the Taihang mountains and the other from Yonghe to Linshi. Some troops will be deployed along these two army service station lines, their sole mission being to safeguard communications and not to engage in any local work. If their side can guarantee that they will not carry out attacks to the north of this line, then even if they have Shi Yousan, Gao Shuxun, Ding Shuben, 7 Zhu Huaibing, Pang Bingxun, Fan Hanjie, and Wang Jingguo8 build defensive fortifications to the south of this line, we can only accept this. Only if their forces cross this line and attack northward will we launch a resolute counterattack. (c) Of the two points noted above, the emphasis at present should be put on the second. And the emphasis within the emphasis is on Zhu Huaibing's withdrawing from the three xian of Cixian, Wuan xian, and Shixian, and recognizing that Huguan and Linxian are areas for us to station troops. Please consider whether, if their side is only willing to recognize the Pingshun-Cixian line as the border between the two forces and demands that we withdraw from Huguan and Linxian, we can agree to withdraw from these two xian. Also, please think about postponing for a couple of days the measures for carrying out the counteroffensive against Zhu Huibin, so as to wait for the results of the negotiations. Yuan Xiaoxuan9 should continue the negotiations in Luoyang. It is appropriate that he not leave for the time being. We will not attack the three units of Shi, Gao, and Ding south of Darning. What is my elder brother's view? I hope that you will consider these matters and let me have your reply. [Mao] Zedong

[Wang] Jiaqiang 10

7. Shi Yousan was at this time deputy commander of the Hebei-Chahar Military Region and commander of the Sixty-ninth Army (see also above note, January 30. 1940). Gao Shuxun was at this time commander of the New Eighth Anny of the Thiny-ninth Group Army. Ding Shuben, a native of Anhui, was at this time commissioner of the Guomindang government in the Puyang Special Region. 8. Pang Bingxun was deputy commander of the Hcbci-Chahar Military Region and commander of the Twenty-fourth Anny Group. Fan Hanjie was at this time commander of the Guomindang's Twenty-seventh Anny. Wang Jingguo was commander of the Thirteenth

Group Army of the Guomindang Second Wax Zone. 9. Yuan Xiaoxuan was at this time head of the operational office of the Eighth Route Army in Luoyang. 10. As noted earlier, Jiaqiang is an alternative ming for Wang Jiaxiang.

On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (March 6, 1940)

I. This is a time when the anti-Communist diehards of the Guomindang are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in North China and Central China and other places, while we for our part must set them up, and in the anti-Japanese base areas it is already possible for us to do so. Our struggle with the anti-Communist diehards over this issue in North China, Central China, and the Northwest can help to promote the establishment of united front organs of political power throughout the whole country, and it is being followed attentively by the whole country. Therefore, this problem must be handled carefully. 2. The nature ofthe political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese period is that of a national united front. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance to Japan and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and the reactionaries. It differs from the counterrevolutionary dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, as well as from the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants of the Agrarian Revolution period. A clear understanding of the character of this political power and conscientious efforts to put it into practice will help greatly to push forward democratization throughout the country. Any deviation, either to the Left or to the Right, will create a very bad impression on the people of the whole country. 3. The convening of the Hebei Provincial Assembly and the elections to the Hebei Administrative Council, preparations for which have just been started, will be of exceptional importance. Equally important will be the establishment of new organs of political power in northwestern Shanxi, Shandong, areas north of the Huai River, the xian of Suide and Fuxian, and eastern Gansu. We must proceed according to the principles noted above and do our utmost to avoid any Right or Left deviations. At the moment the "Left" deviation of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger. This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Mao for the CentraJ Committee in the light of discussions at a meeting of the Politburo held earlier on the same day. (See Nianpu. Vol. 2, p. 175.) Our source is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp. 741-43. No contemporary text is available. 432

MARCil 1940 433

4. In accordance with the principle of the Anti-Japanese National United Front concerning political power, as regards the allocation of posts to individuals, there should be one-third Communists, one-third non-Party Left progressives, and onethird intermediate elements who are neither Left nor Right. 5. It is necessary to ensure that Communist Party members play a leading role in the organs of political power. Therefore we must see to it that the Party members who occupy one-third of the positions are of truly superior quality. Provided only that this condition is fulfilled, the Party's leadership will be assured, and there will be no need for a larger representation. What we call leadership is neither a slogan that needs to be shouted from morning until night, nor an arrogant demand for obedience. It consists, rather, in using the Party's correct policies and the example we set by our own work to convince and educate people outside the Party, so that they willingly accept our proposals. 6. Non-Party progressive elements must be allocated one-third of the places, because they are linked with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. Such a measure on our part will be of great importance in winning over the petty bourgeoisie. 7. Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate elements is to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Winning over these strata is an important step in isolating the diehards. At present we must not fail to take into account the strength of these strata, and we must be circumspect in our relations with them. 8. Our attitude toward non-Communists must be one of cooperation, whether or not they have party affiliations and whatever these may be, so long as they favor resistance to Japan and are willing to cooperate with the Communist Party. 9. The allocation of places described above represents the true policy of the Party, and we must on no account be half-hearted about it. To execute this policy we must educate the Party members who work in the organs of political power,

overcome the narrowness manifested in their reluctance and uneasiness in cooperating with non-Communists, and encourage a democratic style of work, that is, consultation with non-Party people and winning majority approval before taking action. At the same time, we must do all we can to encourage the non-Party people to express their views on various problems and must lend an attentive ear to their suggestions. We must never think that, because we hold military and political power, we can force unconditional compliance with our decisions and on that account shun the effort to win the non-Party people over to our views so that they carry them out gladly and wholeheartedly. 10. The above figures for the allocation of places are not rigid quotas to be filled mechanically; they are in the nature of a rough provision which every locality must apply according to its specific circumstances. At the lowest level, the ratio may be somewhat modified to prevent the landlords and evil gentry from sneaking into the organs of political power. Where such organs have been in existence for some time, as in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, the central Hebei area, the Taihang mountain area, and the southern Hebei area, there should be a reexamination of our

434

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

policy in the light of this principle. And this principle should be observed whenever a new organ of political power is established. II. The policy on suffrage of the government of the anti-Japanese united front should be that every Chinese who has reached the age of eighteen, and who is in favor of resisting Japan and of democracy, should enjoy the right to vote and be elected, regardless of class, nationality, sex, creed, party affiliation, or educational level. The organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front must be elected by the people. Their form of organization should be that of democratic centralism. 12. The administrative policy of the organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front should take as its point of departure opposition to Japanese imperialism, protection of the people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants, and suppression of Chinese traitors and reactionaries. 13. Non-Party people who participate in our organs of political power should not be expected to live, talk, and act like Communists; otherwise, they may feel dissatisfied or ill at ease. 14. All regional and subregional bureaus of the Central Committee, all area Party committees, and all heads of army units are hereby instructed to give a clear explanation of this directive to Party members and to ensure that it is fully carried out in the work of our organs of political power.

Telegram of Condolence Mourning the Death of Cai Yuanpei1 (March 7, 1940)

for the perusal of the family members of Mr. Cai Jiemin, Austin Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong: We are shocked to learn that Mr. Jiemin, a giant in the world of learning and a model for man, has breathed his last. This telegram conveys our sincere condolences, and urges you to restrain your grief. MaoZedong bows respectfully

This document was first published in the Chongqing Xinhua ribao, March 8. 1940. We have translated it from Mao 7..edong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 149, where it is reproduced from

that source. I. Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), hao Jiemin, was a Hanlin scholar, a revolutionary activist before 1911. and the leading liberal educator of early Republican China. It was during his tenure as chancclor, from 1916 to 1926, that Beijing University became the center of the

Chinese renaissance and the May Fourth movement. In 1928. he became the first president or Academia Sinica, but in 1935 he resigned all official posts and issued a public stataement denouncing the political and intellectual controls exercised by the Guomindang government. Already in retirement and in poor health when the war broke out. he made his way to Hong Kong, where he lived in partial seclusion. Cai was the translator of Paulsen's work on ethics which Mao had studied assiduously while at school in Changsha in 1917-1918 and had been chancclor of Beijing University when Mao spent some time there in 1919 and 1920. (See Volume I. passim.) In a letter of September 22, 1936. to Cai. translated in Volume V of this edition. urging him to support resistance to Japan, Mao recalled having heard Cai "expound his marvelous ideas in the classrooms of Beijing University" during the May Fourth period. 435

Uphold Long-Term Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (March 9, 1940)

To Comrades Wu and Li.' and for transmittal to Comrades Liu and Yuan2 in Luoyang: I. We have taken notice of all your telegrams. Now is definitely not the time to turn small ruptures into big ruptures. When negotiating [with people] outside [the Party], you must remain calm, firm, and quietly await instructions. Concerning the problem of southeastern Shanxi, Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuaij have replied to you about reestablishing unity. As for the question of the overall policy, Zijiu3 can go to Xi'an to meet with the venerable Lin4 on the 18th of this month and receive instructions. In about a week, the venerable Lin will leave Yan'an for Xi'an. 2. When Yuan sees Mr. Wei, 5 he can inform him that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party firmly upholds the long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and has never varied in this respect. He

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu. no. 3. 1985, p. 5 (pp. 165-66 of the annual volume).

I. The reference is to Wu Yunfu (1904-1969), and Li Tao (1905-1970). both of whom were natives of Hunan and had joined the Communist Party in 1926. Wu was subsequently given training as a radio specialist. played a leading role in radio communications during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet, and participated in the Long March. During the period of the anti-Japanese war, he served as secretary of the Military AITairs Commission and in various other capacities. At this time, he was assigned to the Eighth Route Army Liaison Office in Xi'an and was subordinate to Lin Boqu. Li served in the Political Department of various Red Army units during the Jiangxi period. participated in the Long March. and assisted Zhou Enlai with negotiations during the Xi'an Incident. At this time. he was head of the Communist Party liaison offices in Xi'an and Wuhan. 2. Liu is Liu Shaoqi. Yuan is Yuan Xiaoxuan. referred to above in the text of March 5. 1940, p. 431. 3. Zijiu is Liu Zijiu (c. 1901-1988), who was head of the Henan Party Organization Depanment during the early years of the war. 4. The venerable Lin (Lill lao) is Lin Boqu; for his biography see the relevant note to Mao's letter of August 26, 1939. to his sons. In addition to his role in Xi'an. Lin was also chairman of the border region government in Yan'an. 5. The reference is to Wei Lihuang. Regarding him. sec above, the relevant note to the text of March 5. 1940. 436

MARCH 1940 437

can express our deep respect for Messrs. Chiang [Kaishek], Cheng [Qian], Wei [Lihuang], and Yan [Xishan], who are leading the War of Resistance. It is only with that group of people who will not talk of cooperation, and talk only of friction, that we are dissatisfied. We express our profound dissatisfaction with the unfair treatment of the Eighth Route Army, with the refusal to recognize the border region, with the refusal of North China to recognize the anti-Japanese political power, with the fact that the freedom of parties and factions is not recognized nationwide, with the oppressive policy adopted toward constitutional government, and with the deprivation of any freedom of public opinion. We hope that Mr. Wei will convey to Mr. Chiang our hopes that these points will be dealt with justly, and be resolved reasonably. MaoZedong the 9th, noon Also inform Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Yang [Shangkun]

Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front (March II, 1940)

I. The present political situation is as follows: (a) Japanese imperialism has been dealt a heavy blow by China's War of Resistance and is already incapable of launching any more large-scale military offensives, so the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves has now reached the stage of strategic stalemate. But the enemy is still holding fast to its basic policy of destroying China and is pursuing it by such means as undermining the anti-Japanese united front, intensifying the "mopping-up" campaigns in the rear areas, and stepping up economic aggression. (b) Britain and France are finding their positions in the East weakened by the war in Europe, while the United States is continuing its policy of "sitting on the mountaintop watching the tigers fight," so that an Eastern Munich conference is out of the question for the moment. (c) The Soviet Union has gained new successes in its foreign policy and is maintaining its policy of giving active support to China's War of Resistance. (d) The pro-Japanese section of the big bourgeoisie, already having completely capitulated to Japan, is ready to play the puppet. The pro-European and pro-American big bourgeoisie may continue to resist Japan, but its proneness to conciliation remains serious. It follows a dual policy. While desiring to remain united with the various non-Guomindang forces to cope with Japan, it is doing all it can to suppress them, and especially the Communist Party and the other progressive forces. It forms the diehard section of the anti-Japanese united front. (e) The intermediate forces, including the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups, often take a middle position between the progressives and the diehards because of their contradictions with the main ruling sections of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and with the working class and the peasantry, on the other. They form the middle sector of the anti-Japanese united front. (f) Recently, the Communist-led progressive forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie have grown much stronger and in the main have succeeded in creating base areas in which anti-Japanese democratic political power has been established. Their influence is very great among the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie

Our source for this text is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp.

744-52. 438

MARCH I 940

439

throughout the country and is also quite considerable among the middle forces. On the battlefield the Communists are fighting roughly as many Japanese troops as is the Guomindang. They form the progressive section of the anti-Japanese united front. This is the present political situation in China. In these circumstances the possibility still exists of preventing the situation from deteriorating and of changing it for the better; the Central Committee's resolutions of February 11 are entirely correct.

2. The basic condition for victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is the extension and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front. The tactics required for this purpose are to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and combat the diehard forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle. In the period of the antiJapanese united front, struggle is the means to unity and unity is the aim of struggle. If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding, it will perish. This truth is gradually being grasped by Party comrades. However, there are still many who do not understand it; some think that struggle will split the united front or that struggle can be employed without restraint, and others use wrong tactics toward the middle forces or have mistaken notions about the diehard forces. All of this must be corrected. 3. Developing the progressive forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, boldly expanding the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, establishing anti-Japanese democratic base areas on an extensive scale, building up Communist organization throughout the country, developing national mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women, and children, winning over intellectuals in all parts of the country, and spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a struggle for democracy. Steady expansion of the progressive forces is the only way to prevent the situation from deteriorating, to forestall capitulation and splitting, and to lay a firm and indestructible foundation for victory in the resistance to Japan. But the expansion of the progressive forces is a serious process of struggle, which must be ruthlessly waged not only against Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors but also against the diehards, because the diehards are opposed to the growth of the progressive forces, and the middle sector is skeptical. Unless we engage in resolute struggle against the diehards and, moreover, achieve tangible results, we shall be unable to resist their pressure or dispel the doubts of the middle sector. In that case the progressive forces will have no way of expanding. 4. Winning over the middle forces means winning over the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups. They are three distinct

I. See the document dated February I, 1940, "Resolution of the Centra! Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks."

440 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

categories, but as things are, they all belong to the middle forces. The middle bourgeoisie constitutes the national bourgeoisie as distinct from the comprador class, that is, from the big bourgeoisie. Although it has its class contradictions with the workers and does not approve of the independence of the working class, it still wants to resist Japan and also would like to grasp political power for itself, because it is oppressed by Japanese imperialism in the occupied areas and kept down by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in the Guomindang areas. When it comes to resisting Japan, they are in favor of united resistance; when it comes to winning political power, they are in favor of the movement for constitutional government and they try to exploit the contradictions between the progressives and the diehards for their own ends. This is a stratum we must win over. Then there are the enlightened gentry who are the left wing of the landlord class, that is, landlords with a bourgeois coloration, and their political attitude is roughly the same as that of the middle bourgeoisie. Although they have class contradictions with the peasants, they also have their contradictions with the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. They do not support the diehards and they, too, want to exploit the contradictions between us and the diehards for their own political ends. On no account should we neglect this section either, and our policy must be to win them over. As for the regional power groups, they are of two kinds-the forces which control certain regions as their own and the troops of miscellaneous brands which do not. Although these groups are in contradiction with the progressive forces, they also have their contradictions with the current Guomindang central government because of the self-seeking policy it pursues at their expense; they, too, want to exploit the contradictions between us and the diehards for their own political ends. Most of the leaders of the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and, therefore, progressive as they may appear at certain times during the anti-Japanese war, they soon tum reactionary again; nevertheless, because of their contradictions with the Guomindang central authorities, the possibility exists of their remaining neutral in our struggle against the diehards, provided we pursue a correct policy. Our policy toward the three categories of middle forces described above is to win them over. But this policy differs from that of winning over the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and it also varies for each category of the middle forces. While the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie should be won over as basic allies, the middle forces should be won over as allies against imperialism. Among the middle forces, it is possible for the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight against Japan and also in the setting up of anti-Japanese democratic political power, but they fear land revolution. In the struggle against the diehards, some may join in to a limited degree, others may observe a benevolent neutrality, and still others a rather reluctant neutrality. But, apart from joining us in the war, the regional power groups will at most observe a temporary neutrality in our struggle against the diehards; they are unwilling to join us in establishing democratic political power since they themselves belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie.

MARCH /940 441

The middle forces tend to vacillate and are bound to break up, and we should educate and criticize them appropriately, with special reference to their vacillating attitude. The winning over of the middle forces is an extremely important task for us in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, but it can be accomplished only under certain conditions. These are: (a) that we have ample strength; (b) that we respect their interests; and (c) that we are resolute in our struggle against the diehards and steadily win victories. If these conditions are lacking, the middle forces will vacillate or even become allies of the diehards in the latter's attacks on us, because the diehards are also doing their best to win over the middle forces in order to isolate us. These middle forces carry considerable weight in China and may often be the decisive factor in our struggle against the diehards; we must therefore be prudent in dealing with them. 5. The diehard forces at present are the forces of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. Divided at the moment into the group that has capitulated to Japan and the group that favors resistance, they will gradually become still further differentiated. Within the big bourgeoisie, the group favoring resistance to Japan is now different from the group that has already capitulated to Japan. It pursues a dual policy. It still advocates unity against Japan, but at the same time it follows the extremely reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces in preparation for its eventual capitulation. As it still favors unity against Japan, we can still try to keep it in the anti-Japanese united front, and the longer the better. It would be wrong to neglect our policy of winning over this group and cooperating with it and to regard it as having already capitulated and as being on the verge of launching an anti-Communist war. But at the same time, we must adopt tactics of struggle to combat its reactionary policy and carry on a determined ideological, political, and military fight against it, because all over the country it pursues the reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces, because instead of carrying out the common program of the revolutionary Three People's Principles it stubbornly opposes our efforts to do so, and because it works hard to prevent us from going beyond the limits it has set for us, that is, it tries to confine us to the passive resistance it practices itself and, moreover, it tries to assimilate us, failing which it applies ideological, political, and military pressure against us. Such is our revolutionary dual policy to meet the dual policy of the diehards, and such is our policy of seeking unity through struggle. If in the ideological sphere we can put forward correct revolutionary theory and strike hard at their counterrevolutionary theory, if in the political sphere we adopt tactics suited to the times and strike hard at their anti-Communist and antiprogressive policies, and if in the military sphere we take appropriate measures and strike back hard at their attacks, then we shall be able to restrict the effective range of their reactionary policy and compel them to recognize the status of the progressive forces, and we shall be able to expand the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate their forces. What is more, we shall be able to induce those diehards who are still willing to resist Japan to

442

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

prolong their participation in the anti-Japanese united front and shall thus be able to avert a large-scale civil war of the kind that broke out before. Thus the purpose of our struggle against the diehards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front is not only to parry their attacks in order to protect the progressive forces and enable the latter to go on growing. It is also to prolong the diehards' resistance to Japan and to preserve our cooperation with them and avert large-scale civil war. Without struggle, these progressive forces would be exterminated by the diehard forces, the united front would cease to exist, there would be nothing to hinder the diehards from·capitulating to the enemy, and civil war would break out. Therefore, struggle against the diehards is an indispensable means of uniting all the antiJapanese forces, achieving a favorable tum in the situation, and averting large-scale civil war. All our experience confirms this truth. There are, however, several principles that must be observed in the struggle against the diehards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front. First, the principle of self-defense. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation, but once attacked we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. The military attacks of the diehards must be smashed-resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely. Second, the principle of victory. We will not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. We must know how to exploit the contradictions among the diehards and must not take on too many of them at a single time, but must direct our blows at the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle of a truce. After repulsing one diehard attack, we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close before another attack is made on us. A truce should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity with the diehards and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with them. On no account should we fight on ceaselessly day after day or be carried away by success. Herein lies the temporary nature of each struggle. Only when they launch a new attack should we counter with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are to fight "on just grounds," "to our advantage," and "with restraint." By keeping to this kind of struggle, waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate the diehard forces, and we can also make the diehards think twice before attacking us again, compromising with the enemy, or starting large-scale civil war. Thus a favorable turn in the situation will become possible. 6. The Guomindang is a heterogeneous party which includes diehards, middle elements, and progressives, but taken as a whole it must not be equated with the diehards. Some people regard the Guomindang as consisting entirely of diehards because its Central Executive Committee has promulgated such counterrevolutionary friction-mongering decrees as the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" and has mobilized every ounce of its strength for counterrevolu-

MARCH /940

443

tionary friction-mongering in the ideological, political, and military spheres throughout the country. But this is a mistaken view. The diehards in the Guomindang are still in a position to dictate its policies, but numerically they are in a minority, while the majority of the membership (many are members in name only) are not necessarily diehards. This point must be clearly recognized if we are to take advantage of the contradictions among them, follow a policy of differentiating between their sectors, and do our utmost to unite with the middle and progressive sectors of the Guomindang. 7. On the question of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, we must make sure that the political power established there is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. No such political power exists as yet in the Guomindang areas. It is the political power of all who support both resistance and democracy, that is, the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. It is different from the dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and is also somewhat different from a strictly workerpeasant democratic dictatorship. Places in the organs of political power should be allocated as follows: one-third to the Communists, representing the proletariat and the poor peasantry; one-third to the Left progressives, representing the petty bourgeoisie; and the remaining one-third to the middle and other elements, representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Only Chinese traitors and anti-Communist elements are disqualified from participation in these organs of political power. This general rule for the allocation of positions is necessary; otherwise it will not be possible to maintain the principle of Anti-Japanese National United Front political power. This allocation of places represents the genuine policy of our Party and must be carried out conscientiously; there must be no halfheartedness about it. It provides a broad rule which has to be applied according to the specific conditions, and there must be no mechanical filling up of quotas. At the lowest level the ratio may have to be somewhat modified to prevent domination by the landlords and evil gentry, but the fundamental spirit of this policy must not be violated. We should not labor the question of whether the non-Communists in these organs have party affiliations or what their party affiliations are. In areas under the political power of the anti-Japanese united front, all political parties, whether the Guomindang or any other, must be granted legal status so long as they cooperate with and do not oppose the Communist Party. On the question of suffrage under this political power, the policy is that every Chinese who reaches the age of eighteen and is in favor of resistance and democracy should have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, party affiliation, sex, creed, or educational level. The organs of anti-Japanese united front political power should be elected by the people and then apply to the National Government for confirmation. Their form of organization must be based on democratic centralism. The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the anti-Japanese united front organs of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, opposition to confirmed Chinese traitors and reactionaries, protection of the

444

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the antiJapanese social strata, and improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants. The establishment of this anti-Japanese united front political power will exert a great influence on the whole country and serve as a model for anti-Japanese united front political power on a national scale; therefore this policy should be fully understood and resolutely carried out by all Party comrades. 8. In the struggle to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate the diehard forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals, whom the diehards are doing their utmost to win over; therefore it is an important and indeed an essential policy to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring them under the influence of our Party. 9. In propaganda, the following guidelines should be stressed: a. carry out the "Testament of the Director General" by arousing the masses for united resistance to Japan; b. carry out the Principle of Nationalism by firmly resisting Japanese imperialism and striving for complete national liberation and the equality of all the nationalities within China; c. carry out the Principle of Democracy by granting the people absolute freedom to resist Japan and save the nation, by enabling them to elect governments at all levels, and by establishing the revolutionary democratic political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; d. carry out the Principle of the People's Livelihood by abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing land rent and interest, enforcing the eight-hour workday, developing agriculture, industry, and commerce, and improving the livelihood of the people; and e. carry out Chiang Kaishek's declaration that "every person, young or old, in the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland." All these points are in the Guomindang's own published program, which is also the common program of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But the Guomindang has not been able to carry out any part of this program other than resistance to Japan; only the Communist Party and the progressive forces are able to carry it out. It is a simple enough program and is widely known among the people, yet many Communists fail to use it as a weapon for mobilizing the popular masses and isolating the diehards. From now on we should keep attention focused on the five points of this program and popularize them through public notices, manifestos, leaflets, articles, speeches, statements, and so on. In the Guomindang areas it is still only a propaganda program, but in the areas reached by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army it is already a program of action. Acting according to this program we are within the law, and when the diehards oppose our carrying it out, it is they who are outside the law. In the stage of the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution, this program of the Guomindang is basically the same as ours, but the ideology of the Guomindang is entirely different from that of the

MARCH 1940 445

Communist Party. It is only this common program of the democratic revolution that we should put into practice, and on no account should we follow the ideology of the Guomindang.

Think About What Concessions Need to Be Made to Avoid a Split in the Unity of the Two Parties (March 15, 1940)

Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]: Chiang [Kaishek] and Wei [Lihuang] have already ordered the main forces of Pang Bingxun, Fan Hanjie, Liu Kan, and Chen Tie 1 to assemble in vicinity of Tainan and have, moreover, sent a dispatch transferring six more divisions from the Longhai railroad across the river. You elder brothers are requested to pay careful attention to the imponance of this matter and think about what concessions need to be made to Chiang and Wei in order to avoid letting it shatter the unity of the two panies. Please consider the problem of giving up the Lingchuan-Hejian-

Linxian line. 2 Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for !his !ext is Wenxian he yanjiu, no. 3, 1985, p. 6 (pp. 166-{;7 of the annual

volume). I. Regarding Wei Lihuang, Pang Bingxun, and Fan Hanjie, see above, the relevant notes to the text of March 5, 1940, "Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions and Consolidate the Positions Won." Liu Kan (1907-1948), a native of Hunan, graduated in the First Class of the Huangpu Military Academy and participated in the Fifth "Encirclement and

Suppression" campaign against the Communists. He was at this time commander of the Guomindang Ninety-third Army. Chen Tie (1898-1982), a native of Guizhou, had also

graduated from the Huangpu Academy in the First Class. At this time he was commander of the Fourteenth Anny. The First War Zone, which Wei commanded, included Henan and southern Shaanxi, adjacent to the Communist-controlled areas, so all of those listed here were his subordinates. 2. Lingchuan is in southeastern Shanxi; Hejian and Linxian (later the site of the Red Flag Canal) are in Henan, north of the Yellow River. The line mentioned here runs from southwest to northeast and was another suggested line of demarcation between Communist and Guomindang forces. 446

Print and Circulate Widely the Open Telegram in Condemnation ofWang and for National Salvation (March 15, 1940)

The open telegram of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in condemnation of Wang and for national salvation was published on the 15th. 1 Each

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 52-53, where it is

reproduced from the manuscript. I. Wang Jingwei had concluded a secret agreement with Japan on December 30, 1939 (for details see the relevant note to "Overcome the Danger of Capitulation," January 28,

1940), and had set up a puppet government in Nanjing in March 1940. On March IS, 1940, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, respectively commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-

chief of the Eighth Route Army, together with Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, respectively com· mander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army, had published their open telegram in condemnation of Wang and in favor of national salvation in the name of all the officers and men of the two armies. In view of the importance attached by Mao to this document, the full text is translated below: The whole nation is shocked and angered at the appearance of Traitor Wang on the political scene. It has been tbree years since we led our troops driving deep into the enemy rear and fighting to safeguard our native land. We have come to understand profoundly that it is a scheme of the invaders and puppets to undennine our internal unity, so as to achieve their purpose of overthrowing our state, destroying our nation, and trampling upon our people. Recently, in all the places that they have reached, the invaders and puppets have had the audacity to hoist illegally the blue-sky-and-whitesun flag, forming puppet armies and setting up puppet governments, and calling for peace and opposition to the Communist Party. It is all too clear that what they mean by peace is capitulation, and by opposition to the Communist Party, the destruction of China. There is, however, a certain number of frenzied and perverse individuals who respond positively. With the increasing scale of the European war and the collu· sian between the world conspirators and the Japanese and their puppets in an attempt to establish the so-called anti-Communist front in the East, our War of Resistance Against Japan is in an extremely critical situation. At a time like this, a small number of people in our country, lacking in understanding of important principles, are either instigating capitulation or opposing communism. Opposing Communism is, however, a preparatory stage for capitulation, for anticommunism at its extreme will eventually result in capitulation, and, before capitulation, it is necessary to advocate anticommunism. This has been clearly demonstrated by the disastrous track followed by Wang Jingwei. As far as the present-day situation is concerned, the crisis that 447

448

MAO'S ROAD TO POWliR

locality must, upon receiving it, immediately print and distribute a number of copies. Send a copy to every organ, every school, every army unit, every newspaper office, every mass organization, and every well-known personage. In particular large numbers of copies should be sent to friendly armies, making sure that th~ commanders of all armies. divisions, brigades. and regiments are reached in every possible way. All our open publications are to print it without exception, and you must see to it that there are no mistakes about this.

threatens our War of Resistance is not caused by the frenzy of the Japanese invaders and their puppets, but is brought about by the existence of capitulationist and anti·

Communist elements within our resistance front. When the enemy is aJready close at hand in the Zhongtiao Range, from radio broadca.
Party, and imminent civil war in China. Alas! What a way to talk! The enemy's strength is our weakness, and what grieves us gladdens our enemy. We people, who have been fighting in one battlefield after another, have given no consideration to the safety of our lives, but have been concerned only that the whole country should continue to unite, frustrate the enemy schemes, eliminate friction, oppose the civil war, get the 450 million people to unite as one, persist in the War of Resistance, and strive for final victory. The territory of China is so vast, and the mass of its population so great, that while Japan and the traitors are weakening and Europe is locked in a fierce war, we are bound to win the War of Resistance and succeed in building up China, if only we can strengthen our unity, do not undermine the great wall of our defense by our own hands, continue to strive, and do not cause ourselves to lose heart. Our virtue is not extraordinary, but we swear that we wi11 mobilize our whole army. shed our last drop of blood for our native land, drive out the invaders and the puppets, and recover our lost territory. To achieve this end, we will not flinch even if we are called on to go through fire and water. It is our sincere hope that the progressive personages in all circles as well as all our fellow countrymen will work with collective wisdom and concerted effort for the salvation of the nation. We send you with this telegram our respect and best wishes.

Turning the Military Posture in North China into a Defensive One so as to Establish a Politically Reasonable and Advantageous Position (March 16, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: I have read carefully your telegram dated the 13th. Judging from the general situation, it is necessary to avoid clashing once again with the Central forces in the Linchuan-Linxian area. If the other side presses on, we should retreat northward. If the other side presses on again and again. then. when our forces stage a counterattack, they are in the wrong. Otherwise, it would be very harmful to us politically. At present, the center of gravity of the struggle should be moved to the region through which the Huai River flows, for Li Pinxian 1 is now sending troops to put pressure on the areas of Xuefeng and Hu Fu. 2 Chiang Kaishek has already taken

note of those areas and is trying to sever the communications between us and the New Fourth Army. The way out for our forces in the future is the Central Plain. If we do no! fight over it now, it will be more difficult in the future. It is thus proposed that the 344th Brigade be moved to the area between Longhai and the Huai River to assist Peng Xuefeng in establishing a base area and to support Hu Fu. In the future, some units shall be moved deep into northern Jiangsu so as to link up

Our source for this text is Mao Z.edong junshi wenji. Vol. 2, pp. 523-24. I. Li Pinxian ( 1892-1987). a native of Guangxi, had participated in the Wuchang Uprising which marked the beginning of the 1911 Revolution. and in the Northern Expedition. In October and November 1939 he was governor of Anhui, commander of the Twenty-first Group Army. commander of the Anhui Security Bureau, and head of the Guomindang's Anhui Provincial Party Bureau. He was identified with the Guangxi faction and was thus under the overall command of Li Zongren. Li Zongren (1891-1969), zi Delin, a native of Guangxi, had been the dominant figure in his native province since 1924, sometimes in alliance with Chiang Kaishek, sometimes in opposition to him. In August 1937, he had

been appointed commander of the Fifth War Zone, composed of northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and southern Shandong. Following Japanese attacks in 1938, he moved into westem Anhui and eastern Henan and established his headquarters in northern Hubei. 2. Xucfeng is Peng Xuefeng; Hu Fu was the nom de guerre of Liu Shaoqi. 449

450

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the areas occupied by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Such action will also serve to create a new problem in the east. This will force Chiang and Wei 3 to turn their attention to the east and reduce the attention they pay to North China. In this way, North China may indeed be consolidated. At the present, it is extremely necessary that the struggle in North China come spontaneously to a halt. Otherwise, there is the danger that we would be put in a passive position. Once our forces get into a passive position politically, Chiang Kaishek will then engage in a pol.itical counteroffensive. They will make propaganda in a big way, accusing us of being unreasonable. Then we will be put in a very disadvantageous situation. Our previous reasonable position will have been lost. Chiang will also take advantage of the Zhu Huaibing Incident4 and expand on it. He Yingqin has already made a report once to the Standing Committee of the People's Political Council. Next month, the People's Political Council will hold its fifth session. It is now sending the Inspection Group which is now in Luoyang and other places to Sichuan. It will definitely try to make a big fuss out of the whole thing. We should prepare now to cope with the new political offensive by Chiang Kaishek. Therefore, we must immediately stop all military operations and turn our military posture into a defensive one. If their forces press on, our forces will retreat without firing a shot, obeying orders. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a politically reasonable and beneficial position. Please give consideration to this and send me a rep! y. [Mao] Zedong

3. The reference is to Chiang Kaishek and Wei Lihuang. 4. At this time, Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Guomindang Ninety-seventh Army. In February and March 1940, Chiang had ordered him to join with various other Guomindang forces and launch a three-pronged attack on the Eighth Route Anny, but this was defeated by the Eighth Route Army.

Consolidate North China and Expand in the Five Provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhu~ Henan, and Hubei (March 19, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai, and inform Zhu [De] and Yang [Shangkunj: I have taken note of your telegram and am replying as follows: I. It is very correct to do your utmost to enlarge the forces. The emphasis should be put on North China as far as consolidation is concerned. I have read all your plans, and they are all correct. As for expansion, the emphasis should be put on the five provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei. For the moment, please pay particular attention to Shandong. We already have a foundation in that province, but we lack a leadership core there. When the enemy's new offensive reaches there, please consider and resolve the question of the leadership core. We should also make southern Shandong responsible for expansion in northern Jiangsu. As for expansion in the three provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, Henan in particular is a region that plays the role of an axis in the protracted War of Resistance, and at present strenuous efforts to get prepared should be made, even though there is no possibility of expanding there in a major way. 2. For a certain time now and in the future, cadres from Yan'an should be supplied mainly to Central China. At the same time, we should prepare some for use in the Northwest, some for the South, and some for the Northeast. As for North China, it will be mainly instructors and teaching materials that are provided. 3. There may be the possibility that we may approach our friends to ask them to provide us with people to work in our weapons factories, but we must await the result of the negotiations. I am afraid they cannot necessarily be relied on. In the main, we will have to rely on people from within the country. 4. In the border region, we are developing the production campaign. We are preparing so that if the worst comes to the worst, we can become self-sufficient. Cao Juru 1 is now responsible for the Ministry of Finance and Economy and cannot

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 525-27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. See above, the note to the text of March 19, 1939. 45/

452

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

be moved. We can, however, release Li Liuru 2 for your place. The only problem is that he is ill and will be able to come only after he has recuperated a bit. At the same time, I am also working to identify others. I will inform you later of the results. 5. It is very correct that you at the front pay attention to banking and taxation, but production is the most fundamental thing. In those areas that are relatively stable, please consider not only calling on the popular masses to increase production, but also mobilizing government organs, schools, and military units (provided that their work, study, and combat are not affected) to engage in production. You yourselves should also participate personally in production. There is already quite a lot of experience here in the rear, and it will be provided to you for reference. 6. On the job study for cadres is important. It should be turned into a movement (provided that it does not hamper work or combat). There should be an organ and a method for administering study. In relatively quiet organs, the system of two hours of study should be adopted. The Central Committee has already established a Department of Cadre Education. The experience of the rear may also be provided to the front. 7. It is very correct to avoid meeting Lu Zhonglin. 3 The only effective way to deal with people of this kind is to uphold one's position and engage in a resolute counteroffensive without any appeasement. You should deal with Shen Honglie of Shandong in the same way. 4 At present, Shen is engaged in persistent attacks on us. Please take care to engage in a resolute counterattack. 8. It has been decided to hold a meeting of the Politburo at the end of April to discuss many important questions. Headquarters and the Northern Bureau have already decided to send Zhu Rui to participate. There is still more than a month between now and the time of the meeting. Please consider whether or not you will be able to come toY an 'an at that time. MaoZedong

2. Sec above, the relevant note to Mao's letter of January 22, 1939. As indicated there, Li was the head of Mao Zedong's personal Secretariat. At this time, he was also deputy

head of the Economic and Financial Department of the Central Committee. 3. See above, the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1939. In accordance with Chiang Kaishek' s orders, he had created friction with the Eighth Route Army. 4. As indicated above in a note to the text of March 19, 1939, Shen Honglie was at this time governor of Shandong.

Solidify the Communications Between the Center and Southeast Shanxi as Well as Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (March 19, 1940)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Teng [Daiyuan], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], and Nie [Rongzhen]: In order to solidify communications between the Center and southeastern Shanxi as well as Shanxi-Chahar-Heboi: I. It is requested that comrades He, Guan, and Nie Rongzhen be responsible for assuring communications between northwestern Shanxi and the military district. The military district shall designate the units which will move westward to reach the Datong-Tongguan railroad.' He and Guan shall designate the units to move eastward, which will get in touch with the forces of Nie's military district now moving westward. If this route is not solidified, there is the danger that the whole of North China may be complete! y set apart from the rear of Yan' an. We hope you will telegraph us about your deployments. 2. There has been great difficulty in communications between the Center and southeastern Shanxi, as a result of obstruction at Huanqu and the temporary inability to establish the line of military service stations in southwestern Shanxi (the original reason being that the Ninetieth Army of the Central Forces got there). It is requested that Peng, He, and Guan send out reconnaissance squads northward and establish a line of communications between northwestern and southeastern Shanxi, crossing the Datong-Tongguan railroad between Yuci and Pingyao. Please inform us of your views. Military Affairs Commission Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 528-29, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. This was the line from Datong southwestward to the great bend in the Yellow River along which the Japanese army had advanced in 1937-1938. 453

The Tasks ofthe New Fourth Army's Political Work (March 19, 1940)

Comrade Guoping: 1 I. We have taken note of your telegram dated the lOth and received much comfort from it. We hope that you will send us telegrams more often in the future to tell us how the Central Committee's line is being carried out with regard to the various aspects of the political work. 2. Please notify us one by one how you propose to ensure that the most important political tasks from a positive standpoint are effectively carried out, including the resolute and extensive establishment of independent, self-reliant, anti-Japanese democratic governments in the enemy's rear; the establishment of financial organs; the collection of contributions and taxes for resisting Japan; the establishment of economic organs; the development of agriculture, industry, and commerce; the founding of various kinds of schools; the training of large groups of cadres; the carrying out of the plan to expand our forces, so as to expand the first, second, and third detachments to approximately 100,000 men and rifles within one year, and expand the fourth, fifth, and sixth detachments and Li's detachment2 to 150,000 men and rifles within one year; develop united front work so as to win over vari-

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 530-31, where it is reproduced from Mao's original manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. This telegram is addressed to Yuan Guoping (1905-1941), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. During the Jiangxi Soviet period, he participated in the struggle against the five campaigns of"Encirclement and Suppression," and he was a veteran of the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army. 2. The reference is to the advance column commanded by Li Xiannian. Li Xiannian (1909-1992), a native of Hebei, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. During the Jiangxi period, he was part of the Fourth Front Army under Zhang Guotao and arrived in Yan' an in 1937 only after enduring great difficulties. At this time, he was commander of the Hubei-Henan Assault Column of the New Fourth Army. On Li Pinxian, see the relevant note to lhe text of March 16, 1940. 454

MARCH 1940 455

ous middle forces and isolate the forces of the diehards; expand the work of carrying out sabotage against the enemy and actively disintegrating the enemy and puppet. Wang [Jiaxiang]

Tan [Zheng] 3

3. For a biography of Tan Zheng, see above, the text of February 19, 1939. Although this telegram is signed by Wang and Tan, it was, according to the Junshi wenji, drafted for them by Mao.

Assist the New Fourth Army in Establishing Anti-Japanese Base Areas in Eastern Anhui, North of the Huai, and in Northern Jiangsu (March 21, 1940)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Yang [Shangkun]. and for the information of Chen, Luo, Xu, Zhu, Liu, Deng, 1 Peng, 2 Hu, and Xiang: 3 Concerning assistance to the New Fourth Army: 1. Chairman Li Pinxian of Anhui, under instructions from a certain quarter, is adopting a completely reactionary policy. He engages in a resolute attack on the New Fourth Army in eastern Anhui and north of the Huai, in an attempt to eliminate completely the units under Zhang Yunyi,4 Peng Xuefeng, and others, sever the lines of communications between our New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army, and put our New Fourth Army south oftheYangzi in a position in which its retreat is cut off. Under such circumstances, our Eighth Route Army has the urgent

This telegram was drafted by Mao for the Military Affairs Commission. Our source is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 532-33, where it is reproduced from Mao's original manuscript. preserved in the Central Archives. I. Chen is Chen Guang, Luo is Luo Ronghuan, and Xu is Xu Xiangqian. (For biographies of these three, see the relevant notes to "Views on Military Work in Shandong," December 6. 1939.) Zhu is Zhu Rui (see the relevanl note to the text of March 19, 1939). Liu and Deng are Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were, respectively, commander and

political commissar of the I29th Division of the Eighth Route Army. 2. Peng is Peng Xuefeng (see above the note to the text of January 28, 1940). At this time, the territory of the Sixth Detachment, which he commanded, was the main corridor of communications and reinforcements from the north. 3. Hu is Hu Fu (Liu Shaoqi); Xiang is Xiang Ying. 4. Zhang Yunyi (1892-1974). a native ofGuangdong, participated in the 1911 Revolution as a member of the Tongmenghui. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926, occupied various military posts during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, and participated in the Long March. At this _time, he was chief of staff of the New Fourth Army, and commander of the New Fourth Army's North Yangzi Command, comprising the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Detachments in Anhui and Jiangsu, north of the Yangzi River. 456

MARCH /940

457

task of firmly and rapidly assisting the New Founh Army, smashing the reactionary attacks by Li Pinxian, establishing a democratic anti-Japanese base area in eastern Anhui, north of the Huai, and in nonhero Jiangsu, and consolidating the line of communications between the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army. 2. Apan from the specific deployments on which Zhu and Peng have been asked to make decisions quickly, we now inform you as follows regarding the overall

situation in that area. a. Li Pinxian has been bought off by a cenain quarter. In going to Anhui this time, he was given full powers by a certain quarter to adopt completely antiCommunist policies. b. After arriving in Anhui, Li immediately reorganized the provincial government and disbanded all progressive organizations. More than three thousand student trainees who refused to accept repression willingly came to the New Fourth Army in batches. Not a single xian is free of incidents of arrests and executions. The Anhui regime has now already become extremely anti-

Communist. c. In order to liquidate the New Founh Army by force, Li Pinxian, besides transferring two divisions to eastern Anhui and nonh of the Huai, is also bringing an army from northern Hubei. Its 172nd Division is now moving from western Hubei to western Anhui. d. Between March 4 and 7, Director Li Benyi of the Administrative Office of Nonh Anhui, in obedience to Li Pinxian's orders, led a force of more than two thousand men to make a three-pronged attack on our New Founh Army stationed in south Dingyuan and the command center on the nonh side of the [Yangzi] river, with the purpose of eliminating that command center and killing comrades Hu Fu and Zhang Yunyi. As a result of resolute counterattacks waged by the various routes of our forces, his forces were defeated. Several hundred guns were seized, and several hundred captives were taken. e. A unit from the Guizhou forces, and other units from various forces, with a total strength of six regiments, have reached a certain place in eastern Anhui. A brigade from their 183rd Division, which was originally attacking north of the Huai, is now reportedly turning in the direction of eastern Anhui. f. Our New Fourth Army in eastern Anhui now already has nine regiments totaling approximately fifteen thousand men. Because these forces neglected in the past the task of establishing base areas, even in the dozen or so xian north of the Yangzi, south of the Huai River, east of the Huainan railroad, and west of the Grand Canal in which our forces are active, these places are still occupied by diehard anti-Communist regimes and their anti-Communist armed forces. But in the past two weeks, that is, after defeating the attack in three columns by Li Benyi, we have begun to eliminate resolutely the anti-Communist factions, and to establish anti-Japanese democratic governments. We

have also captured many arms in anticommunist localities, so as to cope even more resolutely with Li Pinxian's massive attacks.

458 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

g. In the area north of the Huai River, since Li Pinxian sent forces to attack Commissioner Shen Zijin5 of the intermediate faction, a unit of reinforcement from the Guizhou forces has been sent and is now advancing. There are already founeen regiments in our forces led by Peng Xuefeng, which are preparing to defend themselves. We also have there already some democratic anti-Japanese governments, which are more consolidated than those in eastern Anhui. h. The feelings of the popular masses in favor of resisting Japan and opposing the dieliards in the areas of eastern Anhui and nonh of the Huai are very intense. Neither the Guizhou armies nor the local troops among Li Pinxian's attacking forces have consolidated their positions, but the New Fourth Army is also a recent creation. Hence they need to be assisted by the Eighth Route Army, for only thus will they be able to defeat thoroughly the advancing forces and consolidate this extremely important strategic region for resisting Japan. Military Affairs Commission

5. Shen Zijin was at this time commissioner of the Sixth Prefecture of the Guomindang government of Anhui Province.

Our Tactics in Dealing with the Diehards (March 25, 1940)

In our struggle against the attacks launched against us by the diehard faction, and before a given diehard element has openly become a puppet soldier or Chinese traitor, it is inappropriate to point out a particular person and say that he has surrendered to the Japanese invaders or to designate someone as a Chinese traitor and to state this publicly and so inform the Guomindang. If we behave in this way, not only will society be unable to understand, so that we will lose the sympathy of the intermediate faction and anger the Guomindang, but we will also jeopardize our united front work, in which once the campaign against friction has come to an end, we will again speak of unity with the diehard faction. Therefore, in the future, we should not publicly and specifically condemn anyone as a Chinese traitor, except for those who have openly turned into puppet soldiers or surrendered to the enemy. In particular, we must be extremely prudent as regards the armies of the central government. If any of them create friction against us, we should merely collect evidence of their friction and report and always remember never to put a label on someone lightly. In addition, we should make our cadres understand that the so-called cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party consists mainly of cooperation with the army of the central government. In strengthening the work of unity and persuasion directed toward every army, all of our cadres should lay particular emphasis on the work of unity and persuasion aimed at the army of the central government. Now with the military struggle against friction in the entire Northwest and North China over, it is very urgent that every unit should stress this kind of united front work, every military and political leading comrade should be responsible for guidance and planning. Secretariat of the Central Committee and Military Affairs Commission

This document was drafted by Mao for the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Military Affairs Commission. Our source is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 277-78, where the texr is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. 459

The Present Military Tactics in Central China (March 29, 1940)

Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Hu Fu, and Xiang Ying: I. Eastern Anhui, [the region] north of the Huai [River], and northern Jiangsu in Central China are a region the diehard faction will definitely try to seize. Their goal is to cut the lines of communications between our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army so as to get the New Fourth Army into a dangerous situation. 2. We are in complete agreement with the determination of Zhu and Peng to transfer the 344th Brigade to the south of the Longhai railroad to reinforce Central China and to move Chen's detachment' to the Jiaodong Peninsula. The 344th Brigade should break camp quickly, and use its radio to contact Hu Fu. 3. Since the diehard faction, after engaging in friction in North China, has suffered a severe defeat, and since we have moreover sent reinforcements to south of the Longhai railroad, the center of friction will now move to Central China. 4. In the armed friction in Central China, our military tactics should be as follows: Take the Huai River and the Huainan railroad as the dividing line. Avoid armed struggle to the west of this line. The area to the east of this line should be firmly kept in our hands. First eliminate the local diehard faction. Try to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the Guizhou forces. With regard to Han Deqin's2 forces, under reasonable and advantageous conditions, when they advance to the places where our forces are stationed, eliminate them resolutely. Chen Yi's forces should step up their effort to expand to northern Jiangsu. 5. Under the circumstances in which friction with the New Fourth Army is daily becoming more acute in Central China, it is possible that the diehard faction

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 535-36, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. The reference is to a detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army operating in western Shanxi and commanded by Chen Shiju. 2. Han Deqin (1892-1988), zi Chuzhen, a native of Jiangsu, was a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy. He participated in the second and third campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Communists during the Jiangxi Soviet period. At this time, he was deputy commander of the Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone and also commander of the Jiangsu Provincia] Security Department. He was the principal adversary of the Communists in that part of Jiangsu north of the Yangzi River. 460

MARCH /940

46/

will make use of its stronger military forces to attack the area where the New Fourth Army headquarters are located. Therefore, the headquarters and the south Anhui forces should have advance preparation in order to ward off surprise attacks. If the worst comes to the worst, they can move closer to the Chen detachment in southern Jiangsu, 3 and then redeploy to northern Jiangsu. Military Affairs Commission Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

3. Here the reference is to the First Detachment of the New Founh Anny, commanded by Chen Yi. In November 1939, the First and Second Detachments of the New Fourth Army had been combined to form the South Yangzi Command Headquarters, with Chen Yi

as commander.

Our Current Policy in North and Central China (April 1, 1940)

To Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Xu [Xiangqian] and Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], [Peng] Xuefeng, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], Xiang Ying, and Chen Yi: Our present policy in North and Central China: I. A certain party is currently amassing a large army north of the Yellow River and in the Luliang mountain range. Our task is to exert every effort to ease relations with them and to avoid all words or actions that would be provocative to that party. Our army will thus hold a strictly defensive line, of deep trenches and high ramparts, and be prepared for any contingency. Toward military provocations exercise extreme patience and do not fire back. Write a lot of letters, leaflets, and posters that are sincere, firm, and not provocative, with the objective of creating good feelings that will stabilize our front and restore peace and tranquility in the Shanxi and Hebei region. Military clashes are not to occur, unless approved by the Central Committee. 2. A certain party is currently attacking the New Fourth Army in central Hubei, eastern Anhui, and north of the Huai River. Our New Fourth Army should firmly and in a planned manner carry out defensive warfare. In the eastern Anhui and north of the Huai River areas, it must hold out alone for three months and await the arrival of reinforcements before mounting a large-scale counterattack. 3. The task of our Eighth Route Army is to transfer enough forces to go south into Central China to reinforce the New Fourth Army, to fight back the reactionary attacks, eliminate the capitulationist anti-Communist forces, and establish a new great anti-Japanese base area. This base will include the areas north of the Huai River, east of the Huainan railroad, north of the Yangzi River, and west of Dahai. Its leaders and troop forces will be coordinated under the general direction ofZhu and Peng. Its schedule will be divided into three periods. In the first period, one main column by rapid march will arrive in eastern Anhui in about one month. In the second period, the 344th Brigade must arrive in the vicinity of the Huai

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 537-39, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives. 462

APRIL 1940 463

River within two months. In the third period, quite a large force of troops (no fewer than 15,000 men) must reach the Yangzhou environs in nonhem Jiangsu. The total troop strength for periods one, two, and three must be between fony thousand and fifty thousand, for this urgent great task to be accomplished. 4. Our troops in Jiaodong, in southern Shandong, must move actively to eliminate all the most reactionary capitulationist anti-Communist forces, to expand the anti-Japanese base area, and while fighting hard to become the central force, they must work hard to make contact with all units that will still cooperate with us against Japan and even with those bad units that have not yet attacked us, and not fire a single shot at them. 5. Both in Nonh China and in Central China, the repeated instructions of the Central Committee to take the offensive politically, to call together all friendly troops, to oppose civil war, to suppon Chiang Kaishek and attack Wang Jingwei, to unite in the War of Resistance, must be strictly followed. 6. The overall objective is to beat back the reactionary attack, to expand the anti-Japanese forces, to overcome the threat of capitulation, and fight to tum the situation around for the better. 7. Concrete arrangements should be planned in all places in accordance with this general policy. Central Committee and Military Affairs Commission

Is the New Fourth Army Able to Cope with the Attacks by the Guomindang? (April 3, 1940)

Comrade Xiang Ying: Please inform us by telegraph of your views on each of the following points: (I) When the army headquarters and the southern Anhui forces are subject to sud-

den attack from certain quarters, is there a way for them to break out of the encirclement and avoid major losses? Which method is more advantageous, to fight a guerrilla war southward or to move east to join forces with Chen Yi? Will it be already absolutely impossible to cross the [Yangzi] River to move northward? (2) Are cadres who are Party members fully prepared mentally to cope with possible sudden attacks from certain quarters? (3) Among the various friendly troops in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu, are there high-level or middle-level progressive officers or units who persist in resisting Japan and sympathize with our Party? If sudden incidents occur, is it possible that they might provide cover for, or act in unison with, our forces? How is our united front work within the friendly troops nearby? (4) What is the intention of certain quarters in the Third War Zone? What is the attitude of the Central forces under Gu Zhutongt and others? What is the attitude of Huang Shaoxiong?2 Is the local Party under the leadership of the Southeast Bureau prepared, mentally and in reality, to preserve cadres, accumulate strength, and cope with sudden incidents? [Mao] Zedong Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 540-41, where it is reproduced from the handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives. I. Gu Zhutong (1893-1987). zi Mosan, a native of Jiangsu, participated in the 1911 Revolution and taught in 1924-1925 at the Huangpu Military Academy, where he estab-

lished a lasting relationship with Chiang Kaishek. He fought against the Communists in the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of 1933-1934. At this time, he was governor of

Jiangsu and commander of the Third War Zone, south of the Yangzi, with headquarters in Suzhou. His forces posed the greatest threat to Xiang Ying and those elements of the New Founh Army south of the river. 2. Huang Shaoxiong is an alternate name for Huang Shaohong (1895-1966), a native of

Guangxi, who participated in the 1911 Revolution and subsequently graduated from the Baoding Military Academy. A ve.teran military leader associated with the Guangxi faction, he was at this time governor of Zhejiang and deputy commander of the Third War Zone. 464

Deployments and Strategies for the Expansion and Consolidation of Base Areas in Central China (AprilS, 1940, 5:00P.M.)

Dehuai, Kecheng, Chen, Luo, Xuefeng, and Hu Fu: 1 Han Deqin has withdrawn back to north of the Huai River after his offensive in eastern Anhui was defeated. Li Pinxian has the intention of halting his attack on eastern Anhui under threat of attack in the direction of the Dabie Mountain Range by the five regiments of the Li Xiannian column. Chiang Kaishek also has the intention of terminating the military conflict and negotiating with us regarding the conditions with a view to getting all our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army forces to the north of the Yellow River, designating the north of the Yellow River as the defense sectors for our two armies. 2 But first of all, the enemy-occupied area in North China is expanding constantly. Our struggle is Jecoming increasingly hard. We cannot survive without entering Central China. Second, with any possible sudden turn of events of national importance, our forces absolutely cannot be restricted to north of the Yellow River and not move to China proper. Hence, Central China is our most important lifeline. Third, this time Chiang orders Han Deqin, Li Pinxian, Li Zongren, Wei Lihuang, and all the different forces in Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangsu to attack our New Fourth Army. They are the provocateurs. Hence, we still should take advantage of this opportunity to move necessary forces southward. The 344th Brigade under the command of Huang is now recuperating where it is. After getting in touch by radio with Hu Fu and

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 542~. where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Dehuai is Peng Dehuai. Kecheng is Huang Kecheng (for a biography, see above the relevant note to "Views of Military Work in Shandong," December 6, 1939). Chen is Chen

Guang. Luo is Luo Ronghuan. Xuefeng is Peng Xuefeng. Hu Fu is, as noted earlier, the name used by Liu Shaoqi at this time. 2. This is the first mention in the documents translated in this volume of an effort by the Guomindang to compel all Communist forces to move north of the Yellow River. An order to this effect was issued by the Nationalists on October 19, 1940; see below. the various texts responding to this threat, notably the telegram of November 9, 1940, from Zhu De and others to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, which had been drafted by Mao. 465

466

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Xuefeng, it should move to the north shores of the Huai River following the instructions ofZhu and Peng. Hu Fu will have arrived there first and will wait forthe 344th Brigade. After it arrives, it shall be deployed and work arranged following the views ofHu Fu. The Peng-Wu column shall also follow the views ofHu Fu and Kecheng to start moving to north Jiangsu. It shall bit by bit move southward near Xuzhou and first occupy the various xian north ofYanchen and Baoyin. The watchword for the 344th Brigade and the Peng-Wu column moving southward remains to rescue and assist the New Fourth Army and support friendly forces in resisting Japan. If by that 'time Li Pinxian has withdrawn his forces used for attacking eastern Anhui, restored the office in Lihuang, released Madame Zhang3 as well as all our Party members under arrest, and returned our military funds, then for the time being our forces need not move south of the Huai and will for the first step take Yanchen, Baoyin, Bangbu, and Mengchen as the border. If Han and Li go on the attack, eliminate them. If they are willing to concede the area north of that line to be our defense sector, then we make a temporary compromise with them. If Peng and Wu do not have enough forces, the 344th Brigade should give them assistance. The only thing is that we cannot but fight over the whole of northern Jiangsu, easternAnhui, and the area north of the Huai. We must establish a democratic base area to resist Japan within a year in all the areas north of the Yangzi River, east of the Huainan railroad, north ofthe Huai River, east of Kaifeng, south ofthe Longhai railroad, and west of the sea. Entrust full responsibility to the 344th Brigade, the Peng-Wu column, the Xuefeng column, the Luo-Dai4 column, and Ye Fei's5 unit under Chen Yi in collaboration with the local Party. All military actions shall be commanded by Generals Zhu and Peng and comrade Hu Fu. Hu Fu shall be responsible for all the specific deployments, political slogans, construction of governments, development plans, and policy on the united front. The decisions shall be made after consultation with Kecheng and Xuefeng and shall be reported to Zhu, Peng, and the Central Military Affairs Commission. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

3. Madame Zhang refers to Han Bi, the wife of Zhang Yunyi, who had been arrested by Guomindang military police. 4. Luo and Dai are Luo Binghui and Dai Jiying. Luo Binghui (1897-1946), a native of Yunnan, had joined the Communist Party in 1929. In 1930 he participated in the assault on Nanchang by the forces of Mao Zedong and Zhu De. During the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic he was commander of the Ninth Army Corps. In the course of the Long March, he followed Zhang Guotao to the west and arrived in Yan'an only in the spring of 1937. At this time, he was commander of the Fifth Detachment, and Dai Jiying was the commander of the Fourth Detachment of the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi. 5. Regarding Yc Fei, see the note below to the text of May 4, 1940.

The Policy That Should Be Adopted Toward the Intermediate Forces (April 12, 1940)

Chen and Luo, Xuefeng, Hu Fu, 1 and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] (for transmittal to Zuo and Huang), Xu and Zhu, Liu and Deng,2 and Xiang Ying: The policy in a certain quarter is to get all the intermediate factions to struggle against us, thus causing injury to both sides, and causing us to give offense to the various intermediate factions and putting us in an isolated position. Therefore, we must adopt the following policy toward Yu Xuezhong, who is near Chen and Luo, He Zhuguo and Sun Tongxuan, 3 who are near Xuefeng, the Sichuan army, the Guizhou army, and the Northwest Army, who are near [Li] Xiannian, and the Guizhou army, which is near Hu Fu: I. Send people over directly, or indirectly ask people to convey the message, or openly send letters and leaflets to express our position: that we are totally unwilling to get involved in friction with them. We should ask them to consider the overall situation and preserve friendships so as to avoid injuries to both sides while the third party benefits. Such appeals should be constantly repeated. 2. When they are attacking us, under pressure by the orders from a certain quarter, we should first make some concessions, on condition that our fundamental interests are not harmed, so as to demonstrate our sincerity. We should strive for compromises and patching up our relations before things go too far.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 545-46, where it is repro-

duced from Mao's handwritten manuscript conserved in the Central Archives. I. The reference is to Chen Guang, commander, and Luo Ronghuan, political commissar, of the !15th Division of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Xuefeng, commander and political commissar of the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army, and Liu Shaoqi (whose

pseudonym at this time was Hu Fu). 2. Zuo Quan and Huang Kecheng were, respectively, deputy chief-of-staffofthe Eighth

Route Anny and political commissar of the Second Column of the Eighth Route Anny. Xu Xiangqian and Zhu Rui were, respectively, the commander and the political commissar of the First Column of the Eighth Route Army. Liu and Deng are Liu Bocheng and Deng

Xiaoping. 3. He Zhuguo was at this time the commander of the Second Anny of the Guomindang cavalry. Sun Tongxuan was the commander of the Third Anny Group, and of the Twelfth Division. 467

468

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

3. When they attack us in total disregard of everything, hurting our fundamental interests, we should resolutely deal a heavy blow at some of their units to serve as warning. Afterward, we still strive for mutual compromise. 4. It is only when the intermediate factions turn into firm, immutable diehards like Lu Zhonglin and Shi Yousan that we shall adopt the policy of breaking with them completely and wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, and cleanly. The nature of this policy is also to serve as warning to other intermediate factions, to make them fearful, so they will refrain from engaging in friction. It is lett to you to decide how the above orientation should be carried out concretely in view of the circumstances. When the central forces attack us, we should adopt the same policy. This is because among the various ranks of officers in the central forces, only some officers and the system of political instruction are diehards. Most are intermediate factions, and there are also some progressives. We absolutely must not regard all central forces as diehards. Central Secretariat and Military Affairs Commission

Congratulatory Telegram to Sheng Shica~ the Governor of Xinjiang 1 (April IS, 1940)

To Mr. Sheng Jinyong at Dihua for his inspection: Your telegram of the 8th has been received. It is hoped that, as the leader both of the army and of the people, you will consider [X][X][X][X) the magnitude of the political task, and devise a great and enduring plan for the future. We live far away from you but our congratulation is sincere. With respect, MaoZedong

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 151, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, May 7, 1940. I. Sheng Shicai (1896-1970), zi linyong, was a Manchurian-horn adventurer who had pursued advanced military studies in Japan. He seized power in Xinjiang in 1933 and ruled the province for a decade with Soviet support. In 1938 he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The year 1940 marked the peak of Sheng's cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. According to the report in X in Zhonghua bao, Sheng sent Mao a telegram of thanks for this message. In 1942, he broke with the Soviet Union and switched to the Guomindang side, and in 1943 he apprehended and executed a number

of "pro-Soviet" and Communist elements, including Mao Zemin, Mao's younger brother. He was removed from his post by the Nationalists in 1944. 469

Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces, and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Diehards (May 4, 1940)

I. In all regions behind enemy lines and in all war zones, stress should be laid not on particularity, but on identity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. While each region has its individual peculiarities, they are all identical in that all are confronted by the enemy and all are engaged in the War of Resistance, whether in North, Central, or South China, in the areas north or south of the Yangzi River, or in the plains, the mountain or lake regions, and whether the force involved is the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or the South China Guerrilla Forces. 1 It follows that in all cases we can and should expand. The Central Committee has pointed out to you this policy of expansion time and again. To expand means to reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Guomindang's restrictions but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Guomindang, not to expect official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support but, instead, to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly, independently arouse the masses in those areas to action, and build up united front organs of political power under the leadership of the Communist Party. In Jiangsu Province, for example, despite the verbal attacks and the restrictions and oppression by anti-Communist elements such as Gu Zhutong, Leng Xin, and Han Deqin,2 we should gain control of as many districts as possible from Nanjing in the west to the seacoast in the east, and from Hangzhou in the south to ·xuzhou in the north, and do so as fast as possible and yet steadily and systematically; and we should independently expand the armed forces, establish organs of political power, set up fiscal offices to levy taxes for resistance to Japan and economic agencies to promote agriculture, industry, and commerce, and open up Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xuanji, 2nd edition (1991), pp. 753-58. No

contemporary text is available. l. The South China Guerrilla Forces was the name given at this time to a number of Communist-led guerrilla detachments in Guangdong. 2. On Gu Zhutong, see the relevant note to the text of Apri13, 1940. Leng Xin (19001987), a native of Jiangsu, graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in the first class. In 1939, he became commander of Guomindang guerrilla forces in the Third War Zone. On

Han Deqin, see the relevant note to the text of March 29, 1940. 470

MAY 1940 471

schools of various kinds to train large numbers of cadres. The Central Committee previously instructed you to enlarge the anti-Japanese armed forces to 100,000 men, with as many rifles, and to set up organs of political power promptly in the regions behind the enemy lines in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces before the end of this year. What concrete measures have you taken? Opportunities have been missed before, and if this year they are missed again, things will become still more difficult. 2. At a time when the anti-Communist diehards in the Guomindang are obstinately persisting in their policy of containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party in preparation for capitulating to Japan, we should stress struggle and not unity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. Therefore, whether in the theoretical, the political, or the military sphere, we should as a matter of principle firmly resist all verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist diehards designed to contain, restrict, and oppose the Communist Party, and our attitude toward them should be one of firm struggle. This struggle must be based on the principle of fighting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, that is, on the principles of self-defense, victory, and truce, which means that every concrete struggle at present is defensive, limited, and temporary in nature. We must take tit-for-tat action and conduct a determined struggle against all the reactionary verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist diehards. For instance, when they demanded that our Fourth and Fifth Detachments be moved to the south, we countered by insisting that it was absolutely impossible to do so; when they demanded that the units under Ye and Zhang3 be moved to the south, we countered by asking permission for a portion of these units to move to the north; when they charged us with having undermined their conscription plans, we asked them to enlarge the recruiting area for the New Fourth Army; when they said we were carrying on wrong propaganda, we asked them to stop all their anti-Communist propaganda and to rescind all decrees and orders that cause friction; and whenever they launch military attacks against us, we should smash them by counterattacks. We are on just grounds in carrying out this tit-fortat policy. And it is not only the Central Committee of our Party that should take action whenever we are on just grounds, but every unit of our army should do so.

3. Ye is Ye Fei (1914-1999), a native of Fujian, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1932. After the main force of the Red Army embarked on the Long March, Ye was involved in setting up the eastern Fujian base area and led guerrilla warfare there for three years. In 1938-1939, he served as a regimental commander in the Third Detachment of the New Fourth Anny. At this time, he was commander of the First Detachment under the northern Jiangsu headquarters. In the notes to the first edition of the Selected Works (p. 731 of the Chinese edition, and p. 436 of the English edition) Zhang is identified as Zhang Yunyi, who is referred to below. The second edition indicates that the reference is to Zhang Daoyong (aJtemate name Taoyong). Since the revised edition has been more carefully edited on the basis of a wider range of sources, we assume this is correct, but have been unable to find more information about this commander.

472

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

What Zhang Yunyi did to Li Pinxian and what Li Xiannian did to Li Zongren 4 are both good examples of strong protests from the lower levels to the higher-ups. This kind of strong attitude toward the diehards and the policy of struggling against them on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, are the only way to make the diehards somewhat afraid of repressing us, to reduce the scope of their activities in containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party, to force them to recognize our legal status, and to make them think twice before causing a split. Therefore, struggle is by far the most important means of averting the danger of capitulation, of achieving a tum for the better in the situation, and of strengthening Guomindang-Communist cooperation. Within our own Party and army, persistence in the struggle against the diehards is the only way to heighten our fighting spirit, give full play to our courage, unite our cadres, increase our strength, and consolidate our army and Party. In our relations with the intermediate sections, persistence in the struggle against the diehards is the only way to win over the waverers and give support to our sympathizers-there is no other way. Similarly, struggle is the only policy which can ensure that the whole Party and the whole army are mentally on the alert against a possible nationwide emergency and are prepared for it in their work. Otherwise, the mistake of 19275 will be repeated. 3. In appraising the present situation, we should clearly understand that, although the danger of capitulation has greatly increased, it is still possible to avert it. The present military clashes are still local and not national. They are acts of strategic reconnaissance by our opponents and not yet "Communist suppression" on a large scale; they are steps preparatory to capitulation and not yet steps immediately preceding capitulation. Our task is persistently and vigorously to carry out the threefold policy laid down by the Central Committee, which is the only correct policy, namely, to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate the diehard forces, for the purpose of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation. It would be perilous not to point out and correct any Left or Right deviations in appraising the situation and in defining our tasks. 4. The battles of self-defense fought by the Fourth Detachment and the Fifth Detachment against the attacks of Han Deqin and Li Zongren in eastern Anhui and those fought by Li Xiannian's column against the diehards' attacks in central and

4. On Zhang Yunyi, see the relevant note to the text of March 21. 1940. In the spring of 1940, Li Pinxian and Li Zongren of the Guangxi clique launched a large-scale assault against the areas of Anhui and Hubei where the New Fourth Army was active. According to the notes to Mao's Selected Works, Zhang Yunyi and Li Xiannian "firmly resisted their actions aimed at sabotaging the resistance to Japan, and carried out a resolute battle to defend themselves." 5. The reference is to the excessively conciliatory attitude toward the Guomindang, which the notes to the Selected Work.s: blame on Chen Duxiu, but for which Stalin was primarily responsible.

MAY 1940 473

eastern Hubei, the determined struggle carried on by Peng Xuefeng's detachment north of the Huai River, the expansion ofYe Fei 's forces north of the Yangzi River, and the southward movement of more than 20,000 men of the Eighth Route Army to areas north of the Huai River and to eastern Anhui and northern Jiangsu6-all these were not only absolutely necessary and correct in themselves, but were indispensable for making Gu Zhutong think twice before attacking you in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. That is to say, the more victories we win and the more we expand north of the Yangzi River, the more Gu Zhutong will be afraid to act rashly south of the Yangzi River, and the easier it will be for you to play your role in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. Similarly, the more the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Guerrilla Column expand in northwestern, northern, central, and southern China, and the more the Communist Party grows throughout the country, the greater will be the possibility of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation, and the easier it will be for our Party to play its role in all parts of the country. It is wrong to make the opposite appraisal or adopt the opposite tactics in the belief that the more our forces expand, the more the diehards will tend toward capitulation, that the more concessions we make, the more they will resist Japan, or that the whole country is on the verge of a split and Guomindang-Communist cooperation is no longer possible. 5. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is our policy for the whole country in the War of Resistance Against Japan. The establishment of democratic antiJapanese base areas in the enemy rear is part ofthis policy. You should firmly carry out the Central Committee's decisions on the question of political power. 6. Our policy in the Guomindang areas is different from that in the war zones and the areas behind the enemy lines. In the Guomindang areas our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and bide our time, and to avoid rashness and exposure. In conformity with the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, our tactics in combating the diehards are to wage steady and sure struggles and to build up our strength by using all Guomindang laws and decrees that can serve our purpose as well as everything permitted by social custom. If a member of our Party is forced to join the Guomindang, let him do so; our members should penetrate the baa jia1 and the educational, economic, and military organizations

6. In March 1940, in order to repulse Guomindang attacks on the New Fourth Army mentioned above, the Central Committee ordered units of the Eighth Route Anny to move southward. In the summer of 1940, these units, totaling more than 20,000 men, arrived in

the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu border area, and established the Huai-Hai Anti-Japanese Base Area in northern Jiangsu, in cooperation with the forces of the New Fourth Anny led by Peng Xuefeng (see the note to the text of March 21. 1940) and other units. 7. A traciitional system of mutual surveillance, reestablished by the Guomindang government at this time.

474 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

everywhere; they should develop extensive united front work, that is, make friends, in the Central Army and among the miscellaneous troops. 8 In all the Guomindang areas the Party's basic policy is likewise to develop the progressive forces (Party organizations and mass movements), to win over the middle forces (seven categories in all; namely, the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, the miscellaneous forces, the intermediate sections in the Guomindang, the intermediate sections in the Central Army, the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and the small political parties and groups), and to isolate the diehard forces, in order to avert the danger of capitulation and bring about a favorable turn in the situation. At the same time we should be fully prepared to deal with any emergency on a local or national scale. Our Party organizations in the Guomindang areas must be kept strictly secret. In the Southeast Bureau9 and in all the provincial, special, xian, and district committees, the entire personnel (from Party secretaries to cooks) must be strictly scrutinized one by one, and no one open to the slightest suspicion should be allowed to remain in any of these leading bodies. Great care should be taken to protect our cadres, and whoever is in danger of being arrested and killed by the Guomindang while working in an open or semi-open capacity should either be sent to some other locality and go underground or be transferred to the army. In the Japanese-occupied areas (in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhu, Wuxi, or any other city, large or small, and also in the countryside), our policy is basically the same as the one in the Guomindang areas. 7. The present tactical directive was decided upon by the Politburo of the Central Committee at its recent meeting, and comrades of the Southeast Bureau and the military subcommission are requested to discuss it, relay it to all cadres in the Party organizations and the army, and to carry it out resolutely. 8. Comrade Xiang Ying is to relay the directive in southern Anhui and Comrade Chen Yi is to relay it in southern Jiangsu. Discussion and relaying should be completed within a month of receiving this telegram. Comrade Xiang Ying has the overall responsibility for arranging Party and army work in the whole area in accordance with the line of the Central Committee, and should report the results to the Central Committee.

8. As noted elsewhere, the "miscellaneous forces" (za pai jundui) were those armies which did not belong to the Guomindang Central Army. Though often regarded as inferior, they were in some cases very good fighters and could also be more easily influenced because they were not under Chiang Kaishek's direct control. 9. The Southeast Bureau was the representative organ of the Central Committee in charge of work in southeast China at this time. Its area of competence included the whole ofZhejiang and Fuji an and parts of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi.

The Main Direction of Expansion of the New Fourth Army Is the Broad Areas of Southern and Northern Jiangsu (May 5, 1940, 5 P.M.)

Comrades Xiang Ying and Chen Yi: I. We agree that the army headquarters, the rear organs, and the main force in southern Anhui should be moved to southern Jiangsu. We ask only that you take note that the forces in southern Anhui should not be too weak. Moreover, a light and easily movable command center should be established to facilitate holding and expanding the positions in southern Anhui. 2. The main direction of expansion ofthe main force of the New Fourth Army's First, Second, and Third Detachments is not areas near the Central Forces, such as Liyang, Lishui, Langxi, or Guangde, but the broad areas of several dozen xian in the rear of the enemy in southern and northern Jiangsu extending to the sea, and particularly the area to the north of the Yangzi. Please deploy your forces, allocate commanders, and locate your command centers, in accordance with this orienta· tion. You should deploy only a part of your forces and the personnel of your organs in the area of Langxi, Guangde, Liyang, and Lishui. Also, it is necessary to seize political power in that area at an appropriate time. 3. Control the majority of ferry points in the area between Wusongkou and Zhenjiang, between Zhenjiang and Nanjing, and along the south and north shores of the river to the west of Wuhu. Mobilize the masses to set up political power. Establish local guerrilla forces. Be sure not to let the enemy sever communications across the river. You should entrust the Fourth and Fifth Detachments with the task of restoring Wuwei xian. 4. Quickly order Ye Fei to expand his forces and set up political power on the north shore ofthe river, ignoring the opposition ofGu Zhutong, Han Deqin, and Li Mingyang. 1 Central Secretariat

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junsh; wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 547-48, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Regarding Li Mingyang, see the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1940. 475

To Xiao Xiangrong1 (1940)

Comrade Xiangrong: The textbook for soldiers is very well written. I have read lessons I, 2, and 4, and they can be printed. I hope you will send me lesson 3, so that I can have a look at it. Some revisions should be made. You should add the distinctions between the big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, between the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie that is not pro-Japanese (i.e., the British and American factions), and between the big landlords and the middle and small landlords and enlightened gentry. In a book that is just now being printed by the Propaganda Department, I have already revised the part of chapter 2 of "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" that deals with this. 2 Please ask Comrade Luo Mai 3 to let you read it. In lesson 3, you should speak mainly of the attitude of each class toward the anti-Japanese war, for only then will it have real meaning. Please take note of this too. MaoZedong

Our source forthis letter is Mao adong shuxinxuanji, pp. 161-62. There it is dated simply 1940, and we have been unable to find any other references to it indicating the day or even the month when it was sent. Mao must have written it between March II, 1940, when he made the report mentioned in his postscript, and September 5, 1940, the date of the letter which appears inunediately after this one in Shuxin xuanji, and probably earlier rather than later, because the edition of "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" in book form, published later in 1940, was still at the proof stage. We have therefore placed it, quite arbitrarily, in May. I. Xiao Xiangrong (1910-1976), a native of Guangdong, joined the Chinese Commu-

nist Party in 1927. During the Jiangxi period, he occupied various important posts in the Political Department of the Red Army, and he participated in the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Eighth Route Army's General Political

Department and editor-in-chief of the Military-PoUtical Magazine. 2. Regarding these modifications, see above the relevant note to ''The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," which appears under the date of December IS. 1939. 3. Luo Mai was the pseudonym of Li Weihan, whose biography can be found above, in the relevant note to the text of May 20, 1939. At this time, he was deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and would therefore have been involved in the publication of a work such as this. 476

MAY 1940 477

I'll show you lesson 25 in a few days. Chapter 2 of "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" was written in December of last year, at the time of the first few months of the first antiCommunist high tide, when it was still not clear whether there would be any difference in attitude between the national bourgeoisie and enlightened gentry as compared to the big bourgeoisie and big landlords. By March of this year this could be seen. Please refer to my "Problems of Tactics in the United Front" of March 11. 4

4. See above, the translation of this text.

Strategic Deployments in North and Central China (June 1, 1940)

Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], and Zuo [Quan], and infonn also Chen [Guang] and Luo Ronghuan, and [Huang] Kecheng: I. To assure the occupation of North China is the fixed policy of the enemy. The enemy's "scorched earth campaign" has added to the difficulties suffered by our forces and made it difficult for us to expand. There are also increasing problems with the finances and with the food, rifle, and ammunition supplies of our forces. 2. The Guomindang's policy is to lock us up in therearoftheenemy and make us fight a war of attrition with the enemy, prevent us from moving southward, and sever the routes by which our forces can move to our own rear. 3. Therefore, as regards strategic deployment, we have the following views: a. Along the northern line, that is, areas such as central Hebei, Hebei-ChaharShanxi, and northwestern Shanxi, the primary orientation is to persist in struggle rather than to expand our forces. This is because if we are to expand our forces [there], we will have problems with supplies and guns. We would only add difficulties to persisting in our struggle. Therefore, a portion of the main force in this area should move southward, but the local forces there should be very greatly strengthened, and the guerrilla war should be greatly expanded. In the main force in these areas, the rule that 60 percent ofthe men must have guns should be observed, and the phenomenon of many men and few guns should be avoided. b. Along the south line, that is, the areas of southeastern Shanxi, southern Hebei, Shandong, and so on, except for Shandong, it is difficult to have major expansion. Kecheng's column and the detachments of Peng and Zhu 1 should immediately move to Central China. Their original defense sector shall be

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 549-50, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. The reference is to the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan Detachment of the I 15th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Peng Mingzhi as commander and Zhu Diaox.in as political commissar. 478

JUNE 1940 479

taken over by the !29th Division, and the forces being moved southward from the northern line. c. Central China is an area the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party must fight over. Although the situation is not very tense right now, it is the best opportunity for our forces to move southward. We will not be able to move southward if there is some slight result from the negotiations. The ZhuPeng detachment and the Huang Kecheng column should set out immediately. Huang should command in person all the forces, or at least two brigades, in the move southward. If there are some small losses in North China, they can be compensated. But if we should miss the opportunity in Central China, the whole position will become more difficult in the future. We request that [Peng] Dehuai consider the above and reply by telegram. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Talk at the First Annual Session of the Yan 'an New Philosophy Society (June 21, 1940)

(Special to this paper) ... On the afternoon of the 21st, on the occasion of the first meeting of the annual conference called by the Cultural Club ... , the chairman invited Comrade Mao Zedong to give us his instructions. The entire hall immediately resounded with enthusiastic applause. Smiling, he stood up and said: Today, with the opening of this conference, I am really delighted. Thinking back to the year before last, it has been two years since that day when the founding meeting of the New Philosophy Society took place. The work has yielded results. This year, with the convening of this conference, it will definitely be even better. Theory is very important. The Chinese revolution has been going on for a number of years, but is still very backward in theoretical activities. This shortcoming is highly regrettable. We must be aware of the fact that, unless a revolution raises the level of revolutionary theory, it cannot possibly succeed. In the past, we have paid far too little attention to this, and from now on, we should intensify our theoretical studies. Now the human factor is better than it was in the past, for a good many cultural workers and philosophers have come together here. Only by recognizing that our theoretical level is still very low, that the theoretical level of the entire country is still very low, can we all assume responsibility for overcoming this phenomenon. We ask the entire nation to work hard in this regard, asking first of all that people in Yan'an work especially hard. With the convening of the annual conference, the future of the New Philosophy Society is bright.

This report was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, June 26, 1940. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 153, which reproduces this version. 480

Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Political Situation on the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the War of Resistance (July 5, 1940)

Fellow countrymen of all China, officers and men, and comrades in the War of Resistance of all parties and factions! On this third anniversary of the great War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party expresses, with the utmost sincerity and warmth, national-revolutionary salutations to compatriots of the whole nation, the officers and men on the battlefront, and the comrades in the War of Resistance from all parties and factions. It sends immeasurable condolences to the martyrs who have given their lives for the country over the past three years and extends heartfelt regards to our wounded officers and men as well as our compatriots who have been killed. The three heroic years of the War of Resistance have proved that Japanese imperialists will inevitably collapse, China will assuredly never perish, and final victory will certainly belong to our Chinese nation. This is because Japanese imperialism has already been greatly weakened in our three heroic years of the War of Resistance, the will to carry on China's War of Resistance to the end has already been firmly established in the minds of the whole nation, and changes in the current international situation are basically favorable to China. At the same time, however, an unprecedentedly difficult period in the War of Resistance has anived. Japanese imperialism has just stepped up its offensive against China and announced its Eastern Monroe Doctrine. Some people on China's antiJapanese front are beginning to waver, while, as regards international plots, it is possible that the German and Italian policy of reconciliation may replace the British, American, and French policy of a Far Eastern Munich. Japanese imperialism's intensified offensive against China is operating in concert with the airplanes and big guns of Hitler and Mussolini, in an attempt to achieve

This manifesto, first published in X in Zhonghua bao, July 5, 1940, was drafted by Mao (see Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 196). Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 249-54. 481

482

MAO'S ROAD TO POW/iR

the objective oftheir imperialist war: to redivide the world and enslave the world's people. On the other hand, under the suicidal policy of opposing the Soviet Union and the Communist Party and making concessions to Germany, Italy and Japan consistently applied by the British, American, and French imperialists, France has suffered the horrible disaster of being conquered, Britain has suffered serious defeats, and the interests of the United States are being seriously threatened both in the Pacific and in the Atlantic. The great imperialist war has already progressed to a new phase, and the conflicts among imperialist powers are not over. In addition, an unprecedented economic and political crisis brought about by the imperialist war is just now having an impact on the existence of all mankind and will inevitably lead to the outbreak of world revolution. The revolutionary crisis is now beginning to ferment deeply among all the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations. We are living in a new age of war and revolution. All imperialist wars are wars that massacre people. The great, powerful, and prosperous socialist country, the Soviet Union, is alone in not having been drawn into the whirlpool of the imperialist war and is the only genuine helper of all the world's oppressed peoples and oppressed nations. The reliable friends of China's War of Resistance are none other than the Soviet Union and people all over the world. In the new international situation today, the Japanese imperialists, struggling with all kinds of domestic and foreign crises, are taking their last-ditch chance by attempting methods that will increase pressure and difficulty such as blockades to cut off our international lines of communication, frontal attacks, and air bombardments, to achieve their goal of creating splits inside China and forcing China to surrender. Under this kind of increased pressure and increased difficulty, some of the wavering elements in China will inevitably waver even more and take the road of surrendering to the enemy. These people are muddleheaded and weak-willed, unable to endure difficulties and hardships, and unable to see clearly the prospects of the War of Resistance. As soon as difficulties are encountered, they are tempted to waver. These people are the most dangerous elements in the anti-Japanese front. Fellow countrymen of the whole nation, officers and men, comrades from all parties and factions resisting Japan! Now is a time when the danger of capitulation and the difficulties of the War of Resistance in China are unprecedented. We must not cover up such dangers and difficulties. The Chinese Communist Party regards it as its duty to warn the whole nation of these dangers and difficulties, as well as to point out that the whole country should strengthen its unification and overcome such dangers and difficulties. Wang Jingwei's capitulation has come to nothing, and he and the members of his clique have now already become the most despicable playthings in the hands ofthe Japanese imperialists. The capitulation of the French bourgeoisie has turned all the people of France into the slaves of Hitler. With capitulation, there is absolutely no way out. The Chinese Communist Party has complete sympathy for the plight of the French people. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that, under the resolute leadership of the French Communist Party, the great nation of

JULY 1940 483

France will not perish. The French people's struggle will be coordinated with that of the Chinese people to overcome the foreign oppressors. Fellow countrymen of all of China, officers and men, comrades from all parties and factions resisting Japan! All attacks from the enemy must be resisted, all difficulties must be overcome, all conspiracies to surrender must be opposed, and all capitulationists must be struggled with to the end. The unity of the whole country must be strengthened, internal friction must be eliminated, the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must be adjusted, and the danger of civil war must be eradicated. The Anti-Japanese National United Front must be strengthened, the people of the whole country must fight the War of Resistance against aggression to the end under the leadership of Mr. Chiang Kaishek, and the promises of every party and faction must be carried out. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party hereby declares to compatriots of the whole country and comrades of friendly parties that we have carried out our own promises all along. Our declaration of September 22 of the twenty-sixth year of the Chinese Republic pledged to strive for the thorough realization of the Three People's Principles, put an end to land revolution, abolish the policy of insurrections, change the Red Army to the National Revolutionary Army, turn the soviets into local democratic governments, and so on. We have already conscientiously carried out all these promises and have never violated them. Policies carried out in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear have been entirely in keeping with the policy of the Three People's Principles and not a single one goes beyond the scope of the Three People's Principles. We would like to state once again that we shall carry out the policy of the Three People's Principles from beginning to end, throughout the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and construction of a democratic republic. Any accusation that the Chinese Communist Party has broken its promises is completely malicious slander. On this issue, we demand that the Chinese Guomindang also honor its own promises and conscientiously bring about all those political and concrete conditions it has consented to the people and our Party for the benefit of unification and the War of Resistance. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declares that, during the period of unification and the War of Resistance, as well as during cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, any policy of internal insurrection or sabotage is absolutely impermissible. We have consistently supported the policy of Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the National Government to carry the War of Resistance through to the end and have never broken our promise not to rebel or engage in sabotage. All reports that the Communist Party will once again adopt the policies of rebellion and sabotage of the past civil war period are nothing but rumors spread by wicked people. At the same time, we demand that the Chinese Guomindang also give up its policy of sabotage in dealing with the Communist Party, in order to guarantee the consistent unity and long-term cooperation between the two parties.

484

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declares that we shall keep within bounds the armed forces fighting Japan under our command and limit their operations to the war zones, the enemy rear, and the twenty-three xian in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. They will do nothing in all other areas that might provoke conflicts with friendly forces. Moreover, they will coordinate operations with friendly forces fighting Japan in the war zones and in the enemy rear. We ask, however, that friendly forces fighting Japan also restrain the troops under their command and refrain from any actions toward the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army that would lead to conflict in order to guarantee uniting as one on the anti-Japanese front. At the same time, we ask that the National Government make a strong effort to support the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all guerrilla forces fighting Japan, because the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all the guerrilla forces fighting Japan are still the forces situated on the very frontline of national defense. Moreover, in the past three years the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have fought more than ten thousand heroic battles both large and small, persisted in the War of Resistance in the vast areas behind enemy lines, and put pressure on 40 to 50 percent of the enemy forces in this country. But they are in the most perilous position, their lives are the hardest, and they are most lacking in ammunition. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declares that we shall continue to carry out the resolution "not to develop any Party organizations in the friendly forces," passed by the Sixth Plenum of this Party in November of the twenty-seventh year of the Republic. Some local Party headquarters which have still not implemented that resolution strictly shall be rectified. The policy of our Party toward all the friendly forces that are fighting Japan is to unite with them and strengthen them, and not to split or undermine them. But we demand that the Chinese Guomindang and all friendly forces that are fighting Japan also treat the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army with the same kind of policy in order to dispel suspicion and to be of one mind in the War of Resistance, and so that all the armies can, under the overall command of the supreme commander, together take on the responsibility of fighting the enemy. The colleagues of this Party consider that in order to overcome the unprecedented danger of capitulation and the unprecedented difficulties of the War of Resistance that are at hand, it is imperative to eliminate the present policies of "opposing the Communist Party," "restricting the Communist Party," "dissolving the Communist Party," "guarding against the Communist Party," and "controlling the Communist Party," because, in the course of carrying out these policies, the serious results of weakening the force of the War of Resistance and causing anxiety among the people have already arisen. It should be understood that a policy of fighting on both the domestic and foreign fronts cannot under any circumstances be adopted in the War of Resistance. This kind of policy is as good as suicide. China should learn a profound lesson from the dual-track anti-Communist policy of the Daladier government of France.

JULY 1940 485

The colleagues of this Pany consider that to overcome the unprecedented danger of capitulation and the unprecedented difficulties of the War of Resistance it is imperative to change many of the practices in the present War of Resistance; it is imperative to implement freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association in the War of Resistance; it is imperative to set free all imprisoned Communist Pany members and patriots; it is imperative to acknowledge the legal right to exist of all anti-Japanese ponies and factions; it is imperative to convene a democratic national assembly; it is imperative to put an end to the harmful ways of secret agents; it is imperative to alter the policies of finance and economy, the policies of culture and education, and the policy of military service that are out of keeping with the times; it is imperative that the focus of the War of Resistance be placed on selfreliance and should not rely on any undependable foreign assistance. Fellow countrymen of the whole nation, officers and men, comrades from all panies and factions resisting Japan! The unprecedented danger of capitulation and the unprecedented difficulties of the War of Resistance have arrived and we must simply overcome these dangers and difficulties. The Chinese Communist Pany resolutely believes that it is entirely possible to surmount these dangers and difficulties, as there exist in China all the conditions needed to overcome any danger or difficulty. The Chinese government and the Chinese people need only be adept at taking advantage of them. China is a country vast in area, rich in resources, and huge in population, in no way comparable to Abyssinia or Spain, even less to Holland or Belgium, and not comparable to France, while Japan, on the other hand, is far inferior to Germany. China still maintains a large army of several million, has unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Pany and the majority of the country's population, can take advantage of the contradictions among imperialists, and has the support of the powerful Soviet Union and the world revolutionary struggle. In the entire one hundred years since the Opium War, China has experienced countless calamities and accumulated rich experiences; the heroic struggle of Mr. Sun Yatsen in particular serves as a good example for our entire nation. At this time, when the nation is in a period of extremely serious difficulty and disaster, we must definitely carry out the great teachings bequeathed to us by Mr. Sun Yatsen and apply his revolutionary Three People's Principles and the three major policies of uniting with the Soviet Union, uniting with the Communist Party, and helping the peasants and workers. We must carry out his last testament, smashing all sentiments of pessimism, vacillation, and despair, and carrying on the struggle unyieldingly and persistently so that the danger of capitulation will surely be overcome, the War of Resistance will inevitably triumph, the building up of the country will certainly succeed, and the future of the Chinese nation will be infinitely bright. Down with Japanese imperialism! Carry the War of Resistance through to the end! Remain united to the end! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation! Central Committee ofthe Chinese Communist Pany

Unity to the Very End (July 5, 1940)

The nineteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party falls precisely at the same time as the third anniversary of the War of Resistance. 1 In commemorating the anniversary of the War of Resistance today, we Communists feel our responsibility all the more keenly. To fight for the survival of the Chinese nation is aresponsibility which falls on the Chinese Guomindang, on all the anti-Japanese political parties and factions, and on the people of the whole country, but, as we see it, an even heavier responsibility falls on us as Communists. The Central Committee of our Party has already issued a declaration on the present situation, the essence of which is a call for resistance and unity to the very end. We hope that this declaration will meet with the approval of the friendly parties and armies, and of the people of the whole country. But at the same time the Communists2 must conscientiously carry out the line laid down in it. All Communists must realize that only through resistance to the very end can there be unity to the very end and vice versa. Consequently, Communists must set an example both in resistance and in unity. Our opposition is directed solely against the enemy and against obstinate capitulationists and anti-Communists; with all others we must unite in earnest. And the obstinate capitulationists and antiCommunists are in a minority everywhere. I made an investigation of the composition of one local government, and found that, out of I ,300 staff members, only 40 to 50 or one twenty-sixth, or 4 percent,3 were confirmed anti-Communists, while a majority ofthe others all wanted unity and resistance. Of course we cannot tolerate these obstinate capitulationists and anti-Communists, because that would amount to allowing them to sabotage resistance and wreck unity. Therefore we must resolutely oppose the capitulationists and, in self-defense, firmly repel the attacks of the anti-Communist elements. Failure to do so would be Right opportunism and

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 255-58, where it is dated simply July. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 196, it was published in Xin Zhonghua bao on July 5, and we have dated it accordingly. l. The nineteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party falls precisely at the same time as the third anniversary of the War of Resistance ...... The third anniversary of the War of Resistance and the nineteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party occur precisely at the same time. 2. The Communists ... The Communists in particular 3. 4 percent ... Less than 4 percent 486

JULY 1940 487

would harm unity and the War of Resistance. But toward all those who are not absolutely set in their capitulationism and anticommunism, our policy must be one of unity. Some are two-faced, others are acting under compulsion, and still others have temporarily gone astray. For the sake of continued unity and resistance, we must win over all these people. Failure to do so would be Left opportunism, and this, too, would be harmful to unity and to the War of Resistance. All Communists should realize that, having initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we must maintain it. Now that the national crisis is deepening daily, and the world situation is undergoing a great change, we must shoulder the very heavy responsibility of saving the Chinese nation. We must defeat Japanese imperialism and build China into an independent, free, and democratic republic, and to do so we must unite the greatest possible number of people, with or without party affiliations. Communists should not enter into unprincipled united fronts and must therefore oppose all such schemes as corroding, restricting, containing, and repressing the Communist Party, as well as opposing Right opportunism within the Party. But, at the same time, every Communist must respect the Party's united front policy and must therefore unite, on the basis of the principle of resistance, with all those who are still willing to resist Japan and must oppose Left opportunism within the Party. To this end, as far as political power is concerned, we advocate a political power of the united front. Thus we do not approve of one-party dictatorship by any other party, nor do we advocate one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party; we stand for the joint dictatorship of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces, that is, for united front political power. Whenever Communists establish organs of anti-Japanese political power in the enemy rear after destroying the enemy and the puppet regimes there, they should adopt the "three thirds system" as already decided upon by the Central Committee of our Party, so that Communists take only one-third of the places in all government or people's representative bodies, while the remaining two-thirds are taken by members of other parties or groups4 or by nonparty people. Anybody may take part in the work of the government so long as he is not a capitulationist or an anti-Communist. Every political party or group shall have the right to exist and carry on its activities under the anti-Japanese political power, so long as it is not in favor of capitulation

and is not anti-Communist. As regards the question ofthe armed forces, our Party's declaration has made it clear that we shall continue to observe the decision "not to develop our Party organizations in any friendly army." Those few local Party organizations which have not strictly observed this decision should immediately put the matter right. A friendly attitude should be adopted toward all armed forces that do not initiate armed friction with the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army. Friendly relations

4. Members of other parties or groups.....,. Members of other parties or factions that stand for resistance to Japan and for democracy

488

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

should be restored even with those units that have created "friction," once they stop doing so. This is our united front policy with regard to the armed forces. As for our policies on other matters, whether financial, economic, cultural, educational, or eliminating traitors, we must follow 5 the united front policy by adjusting the interests ofthe different classes and must oppose both Right and Left opportunism. As regards the current international situation, the imperialist war is expanding to engulf the whole world, and the extremely grave political and economic crises to which it has given rise will inevitably cause a world revolution• to break out. We are in a new era of war and revolution. The Soviet Union, which has not been drawn into the maelstrom of this imperialist war, is the supporter of all the oppressed people and all the oppressed nations of the world. These factors are favorable to China's War of Resistance. But, at the same time, the danger of capitulation is more serious than ever before because Japanese imperialism is intensifying its attacks on China in preparation for aggression against Southeast Asia, and this will certainly induce some of the vacillating elements in China to capitulate. The fourth year of the War of Resistance is going to be a most difficult one. Our task is to unite all anti-Japanese forces, oppose the capitulationists, surmount all difficulties, and persist in nationwide resistance. All Communists must unite with the friendly parties and friendly armies to accomplish this task. We are confident that, through the united efforts of all members of our Party, of the friendly parties and armies, and of the whole people, and the steadfast and unchanging national policy of waging the War of Resistance of Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the National Government, we shall succeed in preventing capitulation, in conquering the difficulties, in driving out the Japanese aggressors, and in recovering our lost territories. The prospects for our War of Resistance are indeed bright.

5. We must follow -+ For the sake of resistance to Japan we must follow 6. Cause a world revolution -+ Cause revolutions in many countries

Decision of the Central Committee Concerning the Present Situation and Party Policy (Third anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan) (July 7, 1940)

I. The Present Situation The present international and domestic situations both show that we have entered a new period of great change. I. The special characteristic of the present international situation is the struggle on three fronts. The first is the front of German, italian, and Japanese imperialism. The second is the front of British, French, and American imperialism. The third is the peace front of the Soviet Union. The imperialist war in which most ofthe states on both imperialist fronts are striving to divide up the world anew has already progressed to the stage of a life and death struggle, while the peace front led by the Soviet Union, because of the great national strength of the Soviet Union and its correct policy, has not been pulled into the imperialist war but, rather, stands outside the war. This is the most basic characteristic of the present situation. 2. The two great opposing imperialist fronts are the result of Germany's attack, Italy's joining the war, France's surrender, and the fact that Britain has already withdrawn from the European continent, leaving a seriously unbalanced situation. At present both sides are reorganizing their forces in preparation for a monumental new clash. Germany and Italy are preparing to attack Britain, while Britain has taken over the French colonies in preparation for resisting Germany and Italy. Japan is preparing to join the German-Italian front in the Pacific, and the United States is arming intensively right now and preparing to embark on the road to war. The imperialist wars have a tendency to be European wars that spread out to engulf the whole world, and there is no end to the clashes among the imperialists. 3. The Soviet Union, which stands aside from the imperialist war, is now engaged in resolving the problem of consolidating its security on the Polish sea front,

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 155-62, where it is reproduced from a collection published in China in 1979. Although the decision is not signed by Mao, Nianpu indicates (Vol. 2, pp. 196-97) that it was based on a speech he gave on July 6. We thus feel justified in including it here. 489

490 MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

in the Balkans, and on the Near Eastern front, and is even now preparing a great revolutionary force in order to deal with the vast changes in the world and to fight to secure permanent world peace. 4. The imperialist war, which has disrupted the entire world order with unprecedented intensity, is now rapidly revolutionizing the great masses of the people in the capitalist countries and the oppressed peoples in the colonies. Revolution is now brewing seriously throughout the world, especially in Europe and India. The Second International is rapidly going bankrupt, the faith of the masses in the Communist Party is· rapidly increasing, and the faith of the people of the world in the Soviet Union is rapidly rising high. 5. Since Japan has cut our southwestern international road and is actively carrying out a frontal attack, in an attempt to use even greater pressure to split China internally and force China to surrender, this has created a new environment on the front of China's War of Resistance. There will soon be a period of unprecedented difficulty and an unprecedented threat of capitulation. But, at the same time, there is also an increased possibility that the threat of capitulation can be conquered, and the situation can take a tum for the better. 6. The origin of the threat of capitulation today is no longer the Eastern Munich policy of Britain, the United States, and France but, rather, the Japanese pressure and the encouragement that the German and Italian victories give Japan and a possible appeasement policy. The diehard faction of the Guomindang has also greatly weakened itself with its anti-Communist policy. Because of this, a further split in the Guomindang and the rise of a new Wang Jingwei faction were unavoidable, and the feeling that there was no way out inevitably increased among people throughout the country. 7. And yet a great many favorable conditions exist internationally and domestically that will help us carry out the task of overcoming capitulation and securing a tum for the better. These conditions are: (a) Britain, the United States, and France are no longer seduced by the most important factor in a Chinese capitulation. Although Britain and the United States are willing to sacrifice China in order to preserve the South Seas, Japan can no longer listen to them. We can make use of the conflict between the two imperialist fronts, Britain, the United States, and France against Germany, Japan, and Italy, especially the growing contradiction between Japan and the United States in the Pacific. (b) Japan has its own internal and external difficulties, and its strength has been greatly weakened during the three years of our War of Resistance. (c) The incomparable power of the Soviet Union and the development of the world revolutionary movement are reliable friends of the Chinese War of Resistance. (The foregoing are three external conditions.) (d) Our party's strength in the War of Resistance has increased greatly, and this is the main determining factor in overcoming capitulation and securing a tum for the better. (e) The broad intermediate forces still maintain a positive attitude toward the War of Resistance (these intermediate forces include the majority ofGuomindang members, the majority of the officers of the Central Army, the majority of the miscellaneous forces, the middle bourgeoisie, the medium and small landlords and the

JULY 1940 491

enlightened gentry, the upper levels of the petty bourgeoisie, and the various antiJapanese minor parties and factions). (f) The internal contradictions among the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, and the contradiction between them and the middle and petty bourgeoisie, make it impossible for them to unite to carry out capitulation or to carry out an anti-Communist campaign. (The foregoing are three internal conditions.) Together these conditions give us a real possibility for avoiding the threat of a unified capitulation and of a unified Communist annihilation campaign and are gradually turning the situation around for the better. The pessimism about the current situation must be overcome by recognizing these conditions. 8. The increased threat of capitulation and the increased possibility of a tum for the better will be revealed in the divisions within the anti-Japanese battlelines. First of all will be the divisions in the big landlord-big capitalist class, some of whom, because of pressure from Japan, and the difficulties of the War of Resistance, fearful of the Communist Party and the masses, will inevitably break off and become a capitulationist faction. The rest of them, for various reasons (especially our policies) will make a turn for the better, will turn into a relatively positive antiJapan faction. Although this portion of the big landlord-big capitalist class can only make a turn for the better under conditions that do not harm their basic class interests and cannot make a thorough tum for the better, it is nevertheless possible to lengthen the period of anti-Japanese cooperation. Next, divisions may also develop among the intermediate forces. Our task is to fight for all possible turns for the better, to fight to lengthen the period of cooperation with the main forces of the Guomindang, and to isolate and drive out all capitulationist factions. 9. The year ahead will be an unusually difficult year. The entire Party must become very active and turn itself into the core of the nationwide anti-Japanese organizing force, conscientiously and clearly carry out the central policies, and achieve the objective of overcoming the difficulties, overcoming the threat of capitulation, and fighting to achieve a turn for the better in the current situation. II. The Party's Policies Based on the above analysis of the international and domestic situation, the entire Party should carry out each and every one of the Party's policies as listed below: I. The main thing is notto emphasize the threat ofthe Eastern Munich policy of Britain, the United States, and France, but to emphasize the danger that some people, under Japanese pressure, may become pessimistic, lose hope, and actually capitulate. It is not to cover up the real truth like some in the Guomindang. who say such things as "Everything will work out for the good of China" but, rather, to point out the difficulties in the War of Resistance and the unprecedented gravity of the threat of capitulation and call upon the people to fight to overcome these difficulties and this threat. 2. Point out that the reason Britain and France have failed is that they are antiSoviet and anti-Communist. Point out the tragic lesson of the French capitulation. that if China should now become anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. it would

492

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

inevitably follow the disastrous track taken by France. The anti-Communist policies of the past have already greatly weakened the anti-Japanese forces, and unless this policy is changed, there is no hope of victory against Japan. 3. Emphasize the conditions that are favorable to the War of Resistance. Especially emphasize the great strength of the Soviet Union, and the advantages of the world revolutionary situation. Emphasize that the resistance forces in China are in no way to be compared with those of France. Make propaganda regarding the achievements of the Chinese people in three years of heroic struggle, in order to strike a blow at the feelings of pessimism and isolate the capitulationist faction. 4. Emphasize self-reliance. To this end, we must demand that the Guomindang change its way of doing things in the War of Resistance. For example, it should immediately convene a democratic national assembly, abolish its anti-Communist policy, change its workstyle of relying on secret agents, change its erroneous financial and economic policies, its cultural and education policies, its military conscription policy, and so on, and publicize the fact that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are model examples of self-reliance. 5. Emphasize uniting as one. It was entirely necessary for us to emphasize the struggle for self-defense during a period of time in the past, for otherwise it would not have been possible to beat back the anti-Communist high tide of that period and bring about a renewed awakening of the diehard faction. Now that the anti-Communist high tide is receding, we should once again emphasize uniting. Past struggles, too, were precisely for the purpose of achieving unity. Party members must be made to understand that the present emphasis on uniting in no way means a halt to all struggle. So long as the anti-Communist policy of the Guomindang does not stop for a single day, we cannot stop struggling from a position of self-defense. But now the main firepower of our struggle should be directed against the real capitulationist faction, rather than against the ordinary diehards. At a time when the anti-Communist high tide has already receded and some of the diehards have shown the beginnings of a tum for the better, we should emphasize unity in dealing with them, to make it easier to get an extension of the period of cooperation. 6. The development of our military strength (this is absolutely essential) is limited to the war zone, to the area behind the enemy lines, and to the territory within the twenty-three xian of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and we shall take no actions whatsoever in the Guomindang rear areas that could lead to conflict. There are certain units that are unwilling to penetrate the enemy's rear but, when the situation is very grave, want to move into the Guomindang rear areas and think of returning to the guerrilla life of the civil war period. This is a mistaken way of thinking. 7. There are some Party members who, in accordance with the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, which in the end was not upheld, laying down the policy of not developing Party organizations in any friendly armies (including the Central Army and miscellaneous forces), have completely ceased all organizing activities, in order to help establish the credibility of the Party and

JULY 1940 493

expand the work of making friends, in the attempt to get 2 million friendly troops to continue the War of Resistance. Those areas in which this work of making friends has yielded no results whatsoever should he severely criticized by the Party. 8. Let it be announced to the Guomindang and to the whole country that we have not turned our backs on our declaration of September 22, 1937 (that in order to fight for the thorough realization of the Three People's Principles, we have stopped land revolution, abolished the policy of insurrections, turned the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army, and turned the soviets into local democratic governments). In the past, in the present, and in the future, we have carried out and will resolutely carry out this promise of ours. But the Guomindang has turned its back on its promises, for example, on the question of the right of political parties to exist legally, on the question of recognizing the border regions, and on carrying out the Three People's Principles and the Program for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. All of these promises have been violated. We must demand that the Guomindang fulfill its promises and smash the fraudulent declaration that "the Communist Party has turned its back on its promises." 9. Rectify leftist errors in carrying out the united front policy. For the past year, a great many leftist errors have occurred in the struggle against friction. For example, in the military struggle some places were unable to maintain the principle of self-defense; Chinese traitors were beaten indiscriminately; in our financial and economic work, there were ultraleftist policies encroaching on the property of merchants through excessive fines and punishments, and so on. The principle of the political power of the union of the various classes was not put into practice, and there was a go-slow in applying the directive of the Central Committee on the political power of the ''Three-Thirds System." Long-term plans were not made for the base areas, no care was taken of the base areas, and human and material resources were wasted. These people displayed skepticism toward the Central Committee directive on "recruiting large numbers of intellectuals" and did not carry it out. 1 In dealing with the diehard elements, they simply struggled with them without trying to unite with them. They regarded the Guomindang as made up entirely of diehards and failed to understand that the majority of Guomindang members belong to the intermediate faction, and that there are many progressives, so the diehards constitute only a very small minority. They even go so far as to treat diehards as if they were Chinese traitors, and intermediate elements as if they were diehards, and to demand that the intermediate elements act just like progressives, not recognizing the position of the intermediate elements. They showed a lack of confidence in non-Party cadres, did not get close to them, and were not accustomed to working together with non-Party cadres. They even went so far as to execute diehards who had been arrested and execute spys and so on. All these

I. See above, the direclive of December I, 1939.

494

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

phenomena are expressions ofthe left deviationist errors which result from narrowminded thinking. If they are not corrected, they will damage the Party's united front policy. But at the same time, we should not show leniency to rightist errors, such as feeling pessimistic about the current situation, unprincipled accommodation to the Guomindang, having a negative attitude toward establishing antiJapanese bases or toward the development of the anti-Japanese forces, failing to be alarmed by the Guomindang secret agent policy, confusing the differences between the principles of communism and of the Three People's Principles, concern among the cadres with getting rich, greed and corruption, bureaucratism and routinism at work, and even fear of self-criticism, and so on. If these are not corrected, the Party will lose its independence and its revolutionary future. 10. Strengthen education on the united front for the whole Party. Party members must be made to understand that united front education is an important part of class education. While Party members must understand how to realize the independence of the proletariat, it is also necessary that they be made to understand how the proletariat can join in a united front with other classes to defeat the common enemy. These two points are inseparable aspects of Party education, and neither of them can be casually discarded. In the Party, even today, there are still a number of cadres who do not understand questions of tactics within the united front. They simplify complex issues, and all kinds of errors result from this. For this reason, the entire Party must strengthen tactical education and overcome the phenomenon of cadres who oversimplify. Such tactical education should be introduced into the formal curriculum for cadre education and made an important criterion for a passing grade. II. Continue the work of consolidating the Party. At present, the basic organizational direction is consolidation rather than expansion and an emphasis on quality rather than on quantity. We must strictly examine cadres and eliminate secret agents within our ranks, in order to defend ourselves effectively against the Guomindang policy of infiltration. We must clean out three kinds of people: spies (those elements sent by the enemy and by the Guomindang, and those who have been bought), opportunists (those who have infiltrated the Party for the sake of their personal interest, as evidenced by serious corruption and degeneration, and divorced themselves from the masses), and excessively backward elements (nominal Party members who do not attend meetings, do not pay Party dues, and do no work at all). Toward other elements, we must intensify our educational efforts. We must see to it that Party members understand the two different principles of"Within the Party be strict, outside the Party be generous" and know that these two different principles complement each other in practice. At present, the opposite phenomenon exists: within the Party, we are, on the contrary, generous, and outside the Party we are, on the contrary, strict. This phenomenon must be corrected. 12. Strengthen organizational work within each and every base area. Now there are some base areas, such as the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, in which there has been good organizational work, and in which military affairs, politics,

JULY 1940 495

finance, economics, cultural work, and education are all on the right track. But in a number of other districts, because there is insufficient understanding of how to maintain long-term struggle, some big weaknesses still exist. We must realize that from now on the struggle will be extremely arduous. In order to sustain it for the long term, it is necessary to change our former crude and careless work-style, and replace it with organizational work that is well planned and careful, and also to carry out the correct Party tactics in all areas. Otherwise we shall inevitably fail. 13. We must continue to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units. These are the most basic forces that will guarantee victory in the War of Resistance. The direction of expansion is the territories occupied by the enemy. In districts where manpower and material resources have already created difficulties, the primary orientation is toward consolidation, while in other districts the primary orientation is toward expansion, while consolidating at the same time. 14. In all districts within which the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are engaged in battle, the Central Committee directive on disintegrating the enemy armies and the puppet armies must be resolutely applied. Within one year from now, there must be evidence of success in disintegrating the enemy and puppet armies. We must recognize that our successes in this area over the past three years have been very slight. 15. In Guomindang-held areas, the Party must strictly carry out the Party's policies of organizational concealment and selectivity. But toward those outside the Party, we must carry out the tactics of a broad united front, in order to expose and isolate the capitulationists. 16. In those territories occupied by the Japanese, we must carry out strictly the tactics of concealing the Party organizations and of careful selection of cadres. Outside the Party, while cautiously organizing the masses, strengthen the workers' movement, actively disintegrate the enemy and puppet armies, and win over Chinese traitors who are double agents, in order to isolate the Japanese bandits and Chinese traitors, and finally drive them out. 17. Strengthen work among overseas Chinese. Find ways to make contact with the national independence movements in India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Annam, Siam, and the Philippines, give them as much support as possible, and bring about coordination between their struggles and our struggle. The Central Committee calls upon all Party comrades to fight resolutely to carry out the above tactics, for this is the way to guarantee that difficulties will be overcome, that the threat of capitulation will be overcome, and that the situation will be changed for the better.

At Present in Central China We Should Indeed Develop Our Efforts Toward Northern Jiangsu (July 12, 1940)

[Zhou) Enlai, Hu Fu, Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, [Peng] Xuefeng, and [Huang] Kecheng: We have taken note ofEnlai's telegram, and we all agree with it. I. Ye and Guan's troops' have scattered the diehard forces. Chen Yi has already arrived in northern Jiangsu, and has ordered Su Yu2 to take command of the headquarters south of the Yangzi, as well as of the Second and Sixth Regiments, and to cross the river. Our troops to the east of the Tianjin-Pukou railway line in northern Anhui are also on their way to provide assistance. 2. At present, the tactics of the struggle in Central China should be to concentrate all our forces to deal with Han Deqin 3 and the other diehard troops in northern Jiangsu and truly to develop [our position in) northern Jiangsu. In terms of your tactics toward Li Pinxian,4 you should adopt a defensive posture while, at the same time, trying to reach a detente so as to be on guard if Chiang Kaishek and the Guizhou faction should combine against us. Do not cut off the passages from Anhui to transport private goods from the enemy-occupied territory. Furthermore, please tell Xuefeng to protect the road used by Yu Xuezhong5 to transport revenue

Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 551-52, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives. I. Ye is Ye Fei. commander of the Advance Column of the People's Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, under the headquarters of the New Fourth Army for the area south of the Yangzi. For his biography, see above the relevant note to the text of May 4, 1940. Guan is Guan Wenwei (1903-1993), deputy commander of the same column, a local Party leader who had been fighting for several years in the area with his own semiguerrilla forces. 2. Su Yu (1907-1984), a native of Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1927 and participated in the Nanchang Uprising. He went to the Jinggangshan with Zhu De and held

various commands during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic. In 1935, he was sent to southern Zhejiang to lead guerrilla war there. In 1939, he became deputy commander of the New Fourth Army Headquarters south ofthe Yangzi, and, at this time, in July 1940, he was appointed deputy commander of the New Fourth Anny Headquarters for northern Jiangsu.

3. See above, the relevant note to the text of AprilS, 1940. 4. See above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.

5. On Yu Xuezhong, see above," the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1940. 496

JULY 1940 497

and ammunition. Do not prevent them from passing. If they get in touch with us, our forces should take responsibility for the protection. 3. Since Chen Yi and Su Yu have marched northward, our troops in southern Jiangsu are relatively weaker, and no one is in command. Ask Comrade Xiang Ying to make suitable arrangements, so as to maintain our troops' original territory. Be prepared also to move the army headquarters as well the main forces in southern Anhui to southern Jiangsu at the proper time. Mao [Zedong)

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

The Current Situation and Our Party's Policy 1 (July 13, 1940)

I. Problems of War and Revolution I. Regarding the fact that the Soviet Union did not enter the war: In the two groups of imperialist countries, when war could not be prevented, their people rose up against the war, and the Soviet Union did not enter the war. This realization of the plan not to enter the war is a result of a struggle by the Soviet Union for the past twenty years; it is a result of the suppon for the Soviet Union by people all over the world; it is a result of the Soviet Union's skill at taking advantage of the contradictions between different imperialisms. It is the greatest victory ofthe world strategy ofthe proletariat, because it not only protects the Soviet Union but also guarantees the victory of the world revolution. This victory was accomplished after the signing of the agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union, and between the Soviet Union and Finland. Since then, the task has been to consolidate it. 2. Regarding the two big imperialist fronts: When we talk about the two big fronts and two big united fronts of imperialism, we do not mean to say that there are no contradictions and struggles among the allied countries on each side. There are contradictions and struggles, and very serious ones. For example, there are contradictions and struggles between Britain, the United States, and France and between these three countries and the other small countries. Again, there are also contradictions and struggles between Germany, Italy, and Japan and between these three countries and the other small countries. Nor do we mean to say that each front is fixed and unchangeable. Quite the contrary. They are not fixed and are going to change; moreover, changes have already occurred.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 286--92, where it is reproduced from a copy of the text bearing Mao's corrections. I. This is a summary of the main points of the conclusions which Mao presented at a meeting of high-level cadres in Yan' an to discuss the resolution of July 7, 1940, translated above. 498

JULY 1940 499

On the one hand, there are the changes in northern Europe, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Balkans and the big changes in France, which show a weakening of the front, that is, of the Anglo-Franco-American front. On the other hand, there is the strengthening of the front, that is, ofthe GermanItalian-Japanese front. This has created the present state of imbalance. There was a time when Japan was favorable to Britain and the United States, but now it looks as though it is going to become favorable to Germany and Italy. This is because within Japan the fascist faction has replaced the pro-British and pro-American faction. Neither side has a completely fixed treaty of alliance, for example, the United States with Britain and France, or Britain and France with northern Europe, the Netherlands, and Belgium, or Germany and Italy with Japan. These are the so-called contradictions, struggles, and changes within the fronts. In the future there will still be contradictions and struggles, as well as changes. Leaving all this aside, then, on the one hand, Germany, Italy, and Japan want to change the status quo, while, on the other hand, the so-called democratic countries (including the Netherlands and Belgium) want to maintain the status quo. The various [countries] on the two sides have common interests, so they were able to form a kind of united front, which in fact already exists. Each side comprises several dozen or more than a dozen countries. At the moment, in terms of territory, economic strength, and the navy, Britain and the United States are still stronger, but, because of Germany's victories in the war and the extensive territory it is occupying, Germany, Italy, and Japan appear to be very strong. Whether in the East or in the West, the main struggle between the two imperialist fronts is no longer on land, but has shifted to the sea. In this respect, there has still been no decisive engagement, so great conflicts are in the offing. If Britain surrenders, there will still be the hegemony of the United States on the sea. The United States professes the Monroe Doctrine plus globalism: "Mine is mine, yours is also mine." It will not give up its interests in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Both Germany and Italy have relatively weak navies; even the surrender of France has not changed this situation. If Germany, Italy, and Japan do not destroy the navies of Britain and the United States, they will not be able to take care of the colonies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. On the one hand, there is the Versailles-Washington system, while, on the other hand, there are those who are against this system and are attempting to establish a new Versailles-Washington system and a new Pacific system. This struggle is not over yet.

That is to say, there are between the imperialist countries contradictions which can be taken advantage of by the revolution. Consequently, we must go ahead and exploit them. The Soviet Union must exploit them, India must exploit them, China must exploit them, and the proletariat and oppressed nationalities in all the other countries must exploit them.

500

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The present is an era of great upheaval and great change in the world, it is not an era of so-called "peace" and "capitalist stability." That era came to an end long ago, and it can never be reestablished in the future either. If we fail to see this, it is because we do not have a correct appraisal of the following points: a. Overestimating the counterrevolution. (i) Because of the war, the contradictions between the imperialist countries, instead of being reduced, have developed further; (ii) People have lost confidence in the bourgeoisie and in the capitalist system in every country; (iii) The Social Democratic Party has lost support; (iv) The destructive character of the war, and so on. b. Underestimating the revolutionary forces. (i) the existence ofthe Soviet Union; (ii) the existence of the Chinese revolution; (iii) the upsurge of the Indian revolution; (iv) the existence of Communist parties in Europe and various countries. 3. The revolution is unavoidable: a. If Germany and Italy defeat Britain and France, that will amount to breaking two imperialist chains. Moreover, it is possible that the new imperialist chains may be broken as soon as they are put on, or even before they are put on. The capitalist front may be broken in three places-Europe, India, and China. This would be as though the entire capitalist front had been broken. b. In Europe, a pure October Revolution is impossible. The only possibility there is an October Revolution plus the Soviet Red Army. Nevertheless, such an opportunity has not arisen yet. c. At the moment, instead of a world revolution, the eight-hour workday in the Soviet Union and a world revolutionary situation have reached maturity, but there is not yet a world revolution. Now we must still take advantage of the imperialist war; it is now the eve of the world revolution.

II. Problems Relating to China I. About the change for the better a. Initial change for the better-external cooperation between the two parties and two armies, the purpose of which is to awaken the broad popular masses, and isolate the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. b. Thorough change for the better-possible only when a political regime of a united front consisting of all the parties, factions, social groups, and armies, with the participation of the Communist Party. has been established. c. Get rid of pessimism-the possibility both of an initial change for the better and of a thorough change for the better exists. Our allies are extremely extensive; at the present, the national bourgeoisie is still our ally. d. Get rid of illusions-a thorough change for the better is impossible while the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are in power.

JULY /940

501

2. About the retreat: At the moment it is a partial tactical retreat in the midst of a strategic offensive (a policy of concealment). But in strategy, as regards the overall orientation, it is still offensive (tactics of a broad and extensive united front). 3. The question of the national revolution and the democratic revolution: a. Resisting Japan and revolution are the same thing. b. A national revolution is different from a democratic revolution, and yet they are one. In general, we can divide the revolution into two periods, that of a partial resistance war and that of a complete resistance war, but both of them fall within the process of the War of Resistance. At present it is an entire revolutionary period of resisting Japan and eliminating the Chinese traitors; there is no additional period of pure agrarian revolution. The problem is resisting Japan and eliminating Chinese traitors, not a pure agrarian revolution. c. "The fundamental question in every revolution is the question of political power."2 Slogan: Down with Japanese imperialism, establish a democratic republic"War of Resistance and building the country." Strategy and tactics: the Anti-Japanese National United Front. There are four types of united fronts-(i) In the areas controlled by the Guomindang: a united front of those who are not in power and those who are in power. (ii) In the areas controlled by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army: a united front of us and the other parties and classes within the regime. (iii) The united front between the Guomindang regime and our regime. (iv) In the big cities occupied by the enemy: a united front at the lower levels. d. At present it is a regime of a partial united front; in the future it must become a nationwide regime of the united front. Without such a regime, there will be no victory in the resistance against Japan. e. The national revolution and the democratic revolution take place simultaneously; it is not the case that the democratic revolution takes place only after the national revolution is over. The Wutai maintains type 3-in the early and middle periods of resistance against Japan. Nationwide-during the tinal period of resistance against Japan. Opposing friction-a democratic revolution in the midst of the national revolution.

2. This heading is put in quotation marks because it is taken from Stalin, who borrowed it from Lenin in Section IV of his "Foundations of Leninism."

3. The reference is to the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Anti-Japanese Democratic RCgimc, which was established in the Wutai mountains.

502

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

4. About the intermediate faction: a. In terms of the whole world: the oppressed nations are the intermediate faction between imperialism and the proletariat, but they are part of the allies in the proletarian revolution. b. In terms of the different camps in the War of Resistance (as distinguished from the enemy camp): the diehard faction or the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China are the ruling class, the wavering class, and not an intermediate faction. If we regard them as an intermediate faction, we will confuse the sight and hearing of the people. The middle bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie-the intermediate faction. The lower petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat-the progressive faction. 5. About the emphasis on unity and struggle: a. We have always emphasized unity, and we will continue to do so in the future-in order to deal with every faction which supports the War of Resistance. b. We have always emphasized struggle, and we will continue to do so in the future-in order to deal with all the capitulationist factions. c. We emphasize both unity and struggle-to deal with all the diehard factions that resist the Japanese, but also oppose the Communists. d. Sometimes stress unity and at other times emphasize struggle-make our decisions on the basis of the attitude of the diehard faction, depending on whether its main theme is unity or anticommunism. e. The purpose of struggle is unity-for the sake of extending the time of cooperation. f. At present, the emphasis as regards every aspect (political, military, cultural) should be laid on unity. But in dealing with every aspect, there is simultaneous struggle as well. Because the anti-Communist policy of the diehard faction in the Guomindang remains unchanged. g. Even at present, in some places the struggle against friction may also take the form of an upsurge in certain localities, as in northern Jiangsu. 6. About the sources of deviations: Rightism-comes from the influence of the landlords and bourgeoisie. "Leftism"-comes from the influence of the peasants and petty bourgeoisie. Objective ones-the aforementioned two. Subjective ones-insufficient education (insufficient self-criticism). 7. About the border areas: The two base areas that have set their feet on the right track-the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar Border Regionbecause of the efforts of the Party, the government, and the military.

JULY /940 503

Shortcomings: insufficient revolutionary order; too few united fronts; too much bureaucracy. To be strengthened: the Central Committee, the border regions, and the efforts of everyone. 8. About study: a. We are in a new era of war and revolution. b. Everything is in the process of changing. We must not use rigid formalist viewpoints but, rather, lively dialectical viewpoints to examine every change. c. Take the decisions we are making on this occasion, for example, in which there are many new things. This does not mean that we were wrong in the past; it means, rather, that the objective world has changed, and consequently the subjective world has to adapt itself to these changes: internationally, the superiority of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the fact that the Soviet Union remains outside the war, the revolutionary ferment; domestically, new difficulties, a new danger of capitulation, the possibility of an initial change for the better, the decline in the antiCommunist upsurge (it has already been falling for three months), the development of "leftist" dangers, and so on. d. The united fronts during three periods: the period of the Great Revolution, the period of the Civil War, and the period of the War of Resistance. There were successes during both of the first two periods, but both saw mistakes as well-Chen Duxiu's absolutism (everything for the sake of unity, negation of struggle) and the absolutism in the final period of the Civil War (down with everything, no correct tactics toward certain potential parts [of the revolutionary front]). Now we should expand our successes and avoid mistakes. We must intensify tactical education on how to win over allies while at the same time maintaining our own positions. Neither self-importance nor formalism is useful. Claims that someone has mastered a certain thing by a certain year or month, or that someone is a genius, are all deceptions. The useful thing is to employ a Marx-

ist viewpoint to study concrete circumstances and concrete tactics, and to work hard.

Our Opinions About Political Work in the Field by the Eighth Route Army (August 13, 1940)

Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Luo [Ruiqing] and Lu [Dingyi], Nie [Rongzhen], Peng [Zhen] and Zhu [Liangcai]:t At your meeting, 2 you should discuss in detail the July 7 decision of the Central Committee, 3 as well as the various recent instructions of the Central Committee and the General Political Department. Apart from this, we also have the following suggestions: I. In the War of Resistance, the political work in the military forces under the leadership of the Communist Party should have an independent character. This independence is based on the Party's policy, as well as on the independence of the Communist Party in the national struggle. Consequently, it is wrong to blur the principle of independence in our political work and to ignore the bad influence of the tradition and practices of the Guomindang army on us. Nonetheless, what we call the independence of our political work in no sense requires that we copy all the practices of the Civil War period. On the contrary, we should determine the various concrete policies of our political work in accordance with the environment of the national war. We must turn the political work of the army into a powerful weapon for realizing every single one of the Party's policies. 2. The political organs of the army, and the military officers at every level, particularly the military and political cadres, must understand and master the Party's policy and tactics. We must recognize that the understanding and mastery of the Party's policy and tactics by the cadres in the army is far from adequate. Hence we Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 553-55, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives. I. Zhu Liangcai (1900-1989), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Beginning in the Jiangxi period, he served as political commissar in a number of

Red Army units and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was deputy head of the Political Department of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Information about all the other recipients of this telegram can be found in notes to documents translated above. 2. This is a telegram to a meeting of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Anny for Field Operations and of cadres of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. 3. That is, the "Decision ConCerning the Present Situation and Party Policy" translated above. 504

AUGUST 1940 505

must strengthen tactical education among the cadres, so that it will become one of the most important items in the education of the cadres. The military must observe the strictest discipline in relations with the population. In places where our political power and local Party [organizations] have not yet been established, the political organs of the army should be totally responsible for setting up political power and the local Party, and, during the process of establishing them, the Party's policies must be strictly carried out. In districts where political power and the local Party have been completely established, the arrny should not interfere in the work of the local political power and of the Party. Instead, it should respect them and become a model in observing the laws and decrees. We should wage a rigorous struggle against behavior in the arrny which violates discipline in dealing with the residents, does not take good care of the base area, wastes manpower and material supplies, or shows disrespect for the government and the local party, as well as every action that departs from the Party's policy. 3. In order to sustain the bitter struggle in the enemy's rear, we must unite all the cadres in the entire Party. Thus it is necessary to stipulate clearly the following relationships: a. As regards relations between the Party in the military and the local Party, the Party in the army should be held responsible more often and more strictly; when a dispute occurs, the Party in the military should be reprimanded more. b. As regards relations between the cadres from outside the local area and the local cadres, we should demand more from the cadres from outside the local area and reprimand them more often. c. As regards relations between the veteran cadres and the new cadres, we should demand more from the veteran cadres and reprimand them more often. d. As regards relations between the regular army and the local armed forces, and between the old units and the new units, we should demand more from the regular army and the old units and reprimand them more often. 4. Taking into consideration the dispersed circumstances of the units, and the present situation of political work, we should pay attention to the following in the mode of leadership and workstyle of our political work: a. Its overall character. We oppose those who care only about partial interests and selfish departmentalism. b.lts progressive character. Study more, summarize more, and oppose conservatism and the failure to seek progress. c. Its complexity and diversity. Oppose those who simplify everything, who are formalistic, and who perforrn their duty in a perfunctory way. d. Its planned and organized character. Oppose those who are impetuous, act blindly, and do reckless things. e. Its unity. Strive to unite dispersion and concentration, spontaneity and obedience to orders. f. Its practicality. Oppose those who are unrealistic, extravagant, and exagger-

ate their achievements.

506 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

g. Its meticulousness. Oppose those who are crude and careless and pay attention only to appearances. h. its militancy. In an attempt to ensure that political work is truly adapted to the combat environment. 5. As regards the work to root out the traitors from the enemy and puppet troops, the General Political Department has already sent out instructions in a telegram. Regarding work with the cadres, work with civilians, propaganda and education work, and so on, the General Political Department will send out instructions in subsequent telegrams. Mao [Zedong] Wang [Jiaxiang]

Zhu [De] Tan [Zheng]

The Future Tasks of the Shandong Base Area (August 28, 1940)

Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], and for transmittal to Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun],and Li Yu:

I. Great successes have been achieved by the !15th Division and the Shandong Column, as well as in local work in Shandong. 2. We think that in the future Shandong should work hard at the following tasks: a. Strengthen and expand the !15th Division and the Shandong Column, so that the two units become one. Firmly support the base area in Shandong, and in the future, when it becomes necessary, prepare to move another unit to expand into northern Jiangsu. Hence, Shandong is your fundamental base area, but Central China is the direction in which you should be prepared to expand. Consequently, it is your joint task to make the utmost efforts to strengthen the Shandong Column, promote local cadres from Shandong, and regularize the Shandong Column. b. For the purpose of long-term planning for the War of Resistance in Shandong, you must carry out correct policies, especially the financial and economic policies. Although Shandong has already proposed the policy of unified revenue and spending, nonetheless, according to the students in the Military and Political Institute' who are from Shandong (though they left there six months ago and are not familiar with the latest developments), every unit still raises and spends more revenue, and the burden on the popular masses is very heavy. What is more, there are no strict rules, and some members of the popular masses have escaped to enemy-occupied territory. There are still some units that are guilty of waste (for example, the Fourth Detachment). Consequently, the subbureau, the !15th Division, and the Shandong Column should orga-

nize a unified financial and economic committee. so that financial income and spending can be truly put in order. The Party, the government, and the army in each district should organize similar committees. The policies should be centralized and unified, but their application should be decentralized. Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 556-57, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. The reference is to the Military and Political Institute of the Eighth Route Anny, which was formally set upon January I, 1941. 507

508

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

c. Develop the united front in Shandong, adopt the principle of pure self-defense, reduce military friction. This does not mean, however, that we must stop the struggle against the capitulationist elements. On the contrary, it demands that we try even harder to win over the intermediate faction politically and to isolate the diehard elements. d. We should be more active in our operations against the enemy, squeeze the enemy's territory, reduce the territory occupied by the enemy, and expand the territory under our control. e. As regards our policy toward the capitulationist troops under Shi Yousan, 2 Shen Honglie, 3 Miao Chengliu,4 and others, we should adopt the overall policy of separation and disintegration. The only thing is that the troops engaged in this separation should appear to be leftist troops, not belonging to the Eighth Route Army, but peripheral to the Eighth Route Army. 3. In order to unify the leadership in Shandong, the subbureau and the division headquarters should draw close to one another. Please discuss this, and decide on a specific location. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

2. Regarding Shi Yousan, see above the relevant note to the text of January 30, 1940. 3. Regarding Shen Honglie, see above, the note to the text of March 19, 1939. 4. Miao Chengliu was at this time commander of the Guomindang Fifty-seventh Anny in the Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone.

To Fan Wenlan 1 (September 5, 1940)

Comrade Wenlan: I have read your outline,2 and am really delighted. If you can write this, it will certainly be very useful, because this is the first time that Marxism has been used to settle accounts with classical studies. Because the reactionary restoration of antiquity by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie is now running rampant, the first task of the thought struggle at present is precisely to oppose such reaction. Your continuing work in historical studies will certainly have a great influence on this struggle. Because of illness I did not hear your third lecture and do not know whether or not you criticized the erroneous sides ofKang [Youwei], Liang [Qichao], Zhang [Binglin], and Hu [Shi]. 3 I do not know whether or not you mentioned

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 163-64, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. I. Fan Wenlan ( 1893-1969), a native of Zhejiang, graduated from Beijing University in 1917 and thereafter spent two years in Japan in private study of works by Japanese Marxists, including Kawakami Hajime. On returning to China, he taught at various institutions

in North China. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, he published commentaries on the TwentyFive Histories, the Confucian classics, and other classic writings. At the time of the December Ninth movement, he was arrested for complicity with Communists involved in those demonstrations and was released only after the intervention ofCai Yuanpei and Wang Jingwei. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, he began to participate in the Communist underground movement in Henan, where he was then teaching, and joined the Chinese Communist Party in September 1939. He arrived in Yan'an in January 1940 and was shonly thereafter appointed director of the Department for Historical Research of the MarxistLeninist Academy. 2. The reference is to an outline of a lecture which Fan had delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of the New Philosophy regarding a brief history of Chinese classical studies. This outline was funher developed in the course of 1940 and published in val. 2, nos. 2 and 3 of Zhongguo wenhua, under the title of ''The Evolution of Chinese ClassicaJ Studies." 3. Kang You wei ( 1858-1927), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Zhang Binglin (1869-1936), and Hu Shi (1891-1962) were prominent intellectuals. all of whom had influenced Mao significantly in his student days. (See the numerous references to them in Volume I of our edition, and also the relevant note to the text of February 22, 1939 above.) Following his conversion to Marxism in late 1920 or early 1921, he viewed them differently, and at this time he wished their non-Marxist interpretations of early Chinese history to be refuted. 509

510 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

people such as Liao Ping, Wu Yu, or Ye Dehui.4 The more these persons of modern times are criticized, the greater will be the influence on the academic world. I have not studied history at all. If I can learn a little from your research, I shall be very happy indeed. With respectful salutations, Mao Zedong

4. These three were somewhat less well-known schOlars of roughly the same generation as the previous four. Liao Ping (1852-1932), a native of Sichuan, obtained tllejinshi degree in 1881. He was a defender of the "new text" school in the interpretation of the Chinese classics, and Kang You wei borrowed many ideas from him. Wu Yu ( 1871-1949), a native of Sichuan, studied in Japan and rapidly developed the view that Confucianism was the source of China's misfortunes in the twentieth century. In 1919, he accepted Chen Duxiu's invitation to join the Beijing University faculty of literature and continued to propagate his antiConfucian views during and after the May Fourth movement. It is not clear why Mao disapproved of him. Ye Dehui (1864-1927), a native of Hunan, obtained tllejinshi degree in 1892. He opposed tl!e Reform movement in 1898, supported Yuan Shikai's attempt at restoration in 1916, and throughout his life remained staunchly conservative. In the spring of 1927, during the upsurge of the peasant movement in Hunan, he mocked the peasant associations and their Communist cadres in contemptuous tenns and was executed on the orders of a special court for the trial of "local bullies and bad gentry."

A Notice Regarding the Investigation of Landlords, the Bourgeoisie, and Guomindang Army Officers (September 6, 1940)

[Zhou] Enlai, [Ye] Jianying, 1 [Li] Kenong, 2 and [Rao] Shushi: 3

I. Distinguish between the big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, and, taking the individual as the unit, investigate from several dozen to a hundred in every category and every province.4

Our source for this text is Mao ildong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 298-99, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Ye Jiaoying (1897-1986), a native of Guaogdong, attended the military academy in Yunnan, and on graduation served under Sun Yatsen in Guangzhou. He joined the Communist Party in July 1927 aod participated in the Naochaog Uprising, as well as in the "Canton Commune" of December 1927. From 1928 to 1930, he studied in the Soviet Union. Returning to China, he served in various importaot Red Army posts during the Jiaogxi period aod participated in the Long March. In the aftermath of the Xi' ao Incident, he participated in Zhou Enlai's negotiations with Chiaog Kaishek. At this time, he was chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army aod a member of the Staoding Committee of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee. He also played a leading role in the Party's united front work in Wuhao aod Chongqing. 2. Li Kenong (1899-1962), a native of Anhui, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. From 1928 to I931, he served in the Party's intelligence apparatus in Shaoghai, under Zhou Enlai aod Gu Shunzhaog. When Gu was arrested aod betrayed his comrades to the Guomindang, Li was sent to the Jiangxi base area, where he served in the Political Security Bureau, raoking second only to Deng Fa. He participated in the Long March aod was one of those chosen to participate in the negotiations with the Guomindang following the Xi'an Incident, together with Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. At this time, he was head of the Eighth Route Army's liaison office in Gullin. 3. Rao Shushi (1903-1975), a native of Jiaogxi, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In 1929, he became secretary ofthe Communist Youth League for Northern Maochuria. In 1935 he went to the Soviet Union as the representative of the All~China Federation of Labor Unions to the Red International of Trade Unions. At this time, he was deputy secretary of the Southeastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 4. The investigation described in this notice was plainly not a social survey, as in the case of many of Mao's investigations of the 1930s translated in earlier volumes, but the creation of extensive biographical files for intelligence purposes. Zhou Enlai was the most prominent Communist in Chongqing, where he could order that such an effort be rapidly 5/1

512

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

2. The big bourgeoisie have a comprador character; they have connections with foreign capital. Big banks and big commercial enterprises, as well as large-scale industry associated with foreign capital, belong to this category. They are the major powerholders at present, and include people such as Chiang Kaishek, Kong Xiangxi, Song Ziwen, and Yu Qiaqing. 5 3. The national bourgeoisie are controlled by the big bourgeoisie. They have few connections with foreign capital, and basically they do not have any political power at present. They advocate uniting for the War of Resistance and include such people as Chen Guangfu, Mu Ouchu, Kang Xinru, and Fan Xudong. 6 4. Distinguish the big landlords from the enlightened gentry. Once again, taking the individual as the unit, investigate several dozen to one hundred in every category. 5. Investigate by province. Let Enlai please be responsible for the investigation in the five provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, and Hubei. Kenong will be responsible for the investigation in the three provinces of Guangxi,

undertaken. Ye Jianying, Li Kenong. and Rao Shushi all had experience either of intelli· gcnce work or of liaison with the Guomindang or with the Soviet Union. Thus each of them was well situated to gather the sorts of intelligence for which Mao was calling. 5. Kong Xiangxi (1881-1967), commonly referred to in English-language accounts as H.H. K'ung (from the Wade-Giles romanization of his name, K'ung Hsiang-hsi), was a native of Shanxi who served as minister of finance from 1933 to 1944 and as president of the Executive Yuan in 1938-1939. Song Ziwen (1894-1971), commonly known in his lifetime as T.V. Soong, was a native ofGuangdong, and was minister of finance from 1928 to 1933. At this time he was Chiang Kaishek's personal representative in the United States. Chiang and Kong were married to two of the Song sisters, so these three influential figures were brothers-in-law. Yu Hede (1867-1945), zi Qiaoqing, was a native ofZhejiang. He was a wealthy businessman and banker who had been chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in the 1920s, and who had provided financial support to Chiang Kaishek. 6. Chen Huide (1881-1976), zi Guangfu, was a native of Jiangsu. In 1915, he founded the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, which extended its operations into the interior of China and into the field of agricultural credit. instead of confining its activities to the foreign concessions like most other banks. In 1938-1940. he negotiated credits for China from the United States and also served as chairman of the Foreign Trade Commission of the Ministry of Finance, then headed by Kong Xiangxi. Mu Xiangyue ( 1876-1942), zi Ouchu, was born in Shanghai. Though he lacked formal education. he succeeded in gaining admission to the University of Illinois and then to Texas A & M. from which he earned an M.S. degree in 1914. specializing in the study of the textile industry. On his return to China, he established a cotton mill in Shanghai and played an important role in the development of the textile industry in China. At this time, he was director of the National Government's cotton, yam, and cloth control bureau. Kang Xinru ( 1890-1969), a native of Sichuan, had founded numerous periodicals and newspapers beginning in I912. At this time, he was also a banking executive in Chengdu. Fan Rui (1883-1945), zi Xudong, a native of Hunan, had studied in Japan and also spent some time in Europe. Beginning in the 1920s. he played an important role in the salt and chemical· industries. In 1938, he became a member of the People's Political Council.

SEPTEMBER 1940

513

Guangdong, and Fujian, as well as in Hong Kong. Xiao Yao7 will be responsible for the investigation in the four provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu, as well as in Shanghai. Kenong's and Xiao Yao's reports must be sent to Enlai by December I so that he can bring them to Yan' an, and they can be used for the Seventh National Party Congress. 6. Everyone must have his own file, which should include place of birth, age, family background, resume, faction, financial activities, hobbies, political orientation, attitude toward us, and so on. 7. As regards the investigation of army officers, there should be four items: commanders-in-chief, army commanders, division commanders, and regimental commanders. Everyone must have his own file, which should also include resume, faction, financial activities, political orientation, attitude toward us, and so on. 8. The aforementioned investigation should be called the list of eminent persons. We will start first with economic and military circles. In the future we might add political and cultural figures as well. Mao

7. Yao is an altemativex;ng for Rao Shushi. Presumably Mao refers to him as Xiao Yao or "Little Yao" because he was born a decade later than Mao and the others addressed here.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai and Others Concerning the Military Troop Movements ofthe Chiang and Guangxi Forces in Central China and Our Countermeasures (September 19, 1940)

I. According to information from Xi'an, the three divisions under Li Xianzhou 1 now deployed in the border area between Anhui and Henan are ready to move east to the assistance of Han. 2 There are reports that they will cross the Huai River and advance toward Tangshan. Apart from the !38th Division and part of Li's troops, seven regiments in all, the Guangxi forces attacking eastern Anhui have now been strengthened by the addition of the 172nd Division. Tang Enbo's forces' probably constitute the general reserves. He is first sending three regiments reorganized to constitute three reconnaissance detachments, which will advance to Taihe, Fuyang, and Huangcheng. in eastern Henan and western Anhui, at the beginning of next month. His main force is undergoing training and consolidation in western Henan, getting ready to move east. The information from various sources all indicates that Chiang and the Guangxi forces are determined in their offensive in Central China.• Our source for this letter is MaoZedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 163, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982, under the title »:'annan shibian (Ziliao xuanji) (Collected materials on the Southern Anhui Incident) (hereafter Wannan shibian). I. Li Xianzhou (1894-1988), a native of Shandong. graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in the first class of 1924. He was associated with the Anhui faction, which was influential in Anhui and parts of Henan. 2. The reference is to Han Deqin; for his biography, see the relevant note to the text of March 29, 1940. 3. Tang Enbo (1899-1954), a native of Zhejiang, studied at the Military Academy in Japan, and on his return to China became a staff officer in the National Revolutionary Army. He participated in the "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns against the Communists during the Jiangxi period and fought against the Japanese at the battle of Tai'erzhuang. At this time. he was commander of the Thirty-first Group Army in the HubeiHenan region. 4. As the conflict between the New Fourth Army and Han Deqin was moving toward crisis in Jiangsu, Mao is here expressing his concern about the possibility that the antiCommunist forces under Li Xianzhou and Tang Enbo might move eastward from Anhui into Jiangsu. in order to attack the rear of the New Fourth Army and reinforce Han Deqin. 514

SEPTEMBER /940

515

2. With the aim of striking a blow at Li Xianzhou, Peng and ZuoS are expected to order Yang Dezhho lead his forces toward the south and to reach Peng Xuefeng's area 7 within a month and a half. Chen and Luo8 are expected to order the Fifth Brigade southward immediately, with no further delays, and get to ZhangAiping's area9 within two weeks. Ye and Xiang 10 are expected to lead their forces immediately across the river. They must complete the crossing and reinforce the forces in eastern Anhui within two weeks.

5. Pcng is Peng Dchuai. Zuo is Zuo Quan; as indicated in a note to the text of June 12, 1939, he was at thistime deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army. 6. Yang Dezhi (1911-1994), a native of Hunan, had joined the Red Anny in 1928.

fought against the Encirclement and Suppression campaigns in Jiangxi and participated in the Long March. Beginning in early 1939, he established a military base in the border region known as the Hebci-Shandong-Henan Military Region. 7. Regarding Pcng and his area, sec above, the relevant note to the text of March 21, 1940. 8. Chen and Luo are Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan; see above, the relevant note to

the text of December 6, 1939, on military work in Shandong. 9. Zhang Aiping (1910-2003), a native of Sichuan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 and the Red Anny in 1929. He held various regimental-level commands

during the Jiangxi period and participated in the Long March. During the anti-Japanese war, he was secretary of the Military Commission of the Zhcjiang Party Committee. and of the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Party Committee as well as political commissar of the JiangsuAnhui Column of the Eighth Route Anny. 10. Ye and Xiang are Ye Ting and Xiang Ying. Sec above, the note to the text of January 29, 1940.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others Concerning the Arrangements in Dealing with the Attacks by the Chiang and Guangxi Forces (September 22, 1940)

I. Five divisions of the Guangxi army, Li Xianzhou's three divisions, and Zhou Yan' s three divisions are gathering in the west of Anhui; one division ofthe Guangxi army has crossed over to the east of the railway in Huainan; Tang Enbo's nine divisions have been marching for days and are gathering in Nanyang, ready for an eastward move in a matter of days. It is estimated that the various troops are all heading for the new Yellow River' and Huainan area before they start their attack on Peng Xuefeng and Zhang Yunyi, which we guess is timed for the middle of next month. When the time comes, apart from ordering Peng Xuefeng and Zhang Yunyi to support the east of Anhui and Huaibei with guerrilla warfare temporarily, our main force in northern Jiangsu will waste no time in disposing of Han Deqin. 2. It would be advantageous for the troops in the south of Anhui and the army headquarters to move to southern Jiangsu before taking actions to dispose of Han Deqin. Let us know about your preparations and how many days you need.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 165, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. See above, note 3 to the text of March 5, 1940. 516

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others Regarding the Direction in Which the New Fourth Army Headquarters and the Forces in Southern Anhui Should Move (October 8, 1940)

I. Chiang has given orders to Gu [Zhutong] and Han [Deqin] to wipe out the New Fourth Army stationed on both the south and the north of the Yangzi River, and large-scale military friction is likely to take place on either side of the river. The battle between the main forces will be fought in northern Jiangsu and south of the Yangzi. Han attacked Chen Yi's army and suffered a loss of more than two thousand men. Then thereis Gu and Leng [Xin]'s 1 division, which has reached the river and appears ready to cross over to the north to assist Han. Li Pinxian and others, on the other hand, might also coordinate their operations in support, but this is a secondary aspect. 2. Most difficult is the fighting in southern Anhui and the army headquarters. Our opinion is that the army headquarters should be moved to the area ofthe Third Regiment. 2 In the event of attacks from diehard armies making it hard to carry on long-term resistance, the Yangzi may be crossed to the north, or if it is still possible to move to southern Jiangsu, then a transfer to southern Jiangsu may be made. To go deep into the Huangshan Range toward the south and engage in guerrilla warfare is most disadvantageous, both politically and militarily. If [X] 3 is resolved to move to northern Anhui, the Fourth Regiment should send a unit to Wuwei to provide support. 3. Northern Jiangsu is to concentrate all forces on beating back Han's attack and disposing of Han's forces. Toward diehards such as Li Pinxian, He Zhuguo, and the like, attempts should be made to ease tensions, but attention should be paid at the same time to the Japanese bandits' mopping-up [campaigns]. The Japanese

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 167, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. See note 2 to the text of May 4, 1940.

2. The Chinese term is zhi, which presumably stands for zhidui, a guerrilla unit equivalent to a regiment in the regular army. 3. The name is omitted in the Chinese text. 517

518 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

bandits are likely to take advantage of this friction and wage a mopping-up campaign from all sides in our areas in Central China. 4. The New Fourth Army troops in southern Jiangsu should maintain their original areas by means of guerrilla warfare.

No Matter Which Unit Attacks Us You Must Wipe It Out Resolutely (October 9, 1940)

To Hu Fu, Chen Yi, and for the information ofYe [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: No matter which unit attacks us, it is necessary to wipe it out resolutely. Only by destroying anti-Communist forces such as these is it possible to attack the Japanese bandits. Your deployments and your resolution are absolutely correct; pay no attention to any unreasonable criticism from the Guomindang. The great victory of Chen's forces' has braced the morale of our troops and struck fear into the hearts of those bandits. Our only concern is that Han and Leng2 still have additional strength, and we must concentrate our forces and do battle with equanimity. It is absolutely appropriate for Huang Kecheng to go southward to provide reinforcements. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 558-59, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives. 1. The reference is to the victory of New Fourth Anny forces under Chen Yi over a Guomindang force of 30,000 men commanded by Han Deqin at the beginning of October 1940.

2. The reference is to Han Deqin and Leng Xin. 519

Our Current Policy Orientation Is to Reduce Friction and Emphasize Unity (October 11, 1940)

[Peng] Dehuai, Zhu Rui, Chen [Quang], and Luo [Ronghuan]: Our current policy orientation is to reduce friction and to emphasize unity. In addition to telegraphing Hu Fu, Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying] to reduce the tension in relations with Han [Deqin] and Li [Pinxian], tensions should also be reduced in relations with Shen [Honglie] and Qin [Qirong] in Shandong. As long as Shen's and Qin's forces have not attacked us, we will not make moves against them either. Both sides should maintain the status quo, and each should guard its present positions. Only when the other side attacks us will we retaliate. Please consider this and reply by telegram. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 560-61, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 520

Operational Principles of the New Fourth Army (October 12, 1940)

To Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, Chen Yi, and Huang Kecheng: With regard to operational principles for the New Fourth Army. I. Under instigation by Britain and the United States, Chiang [Kaishek] may join the British-American front, and there is the possibility of the entire southern region's turning into a world of darkness. Because Chiang takes an anti-Japanese stand, however, we cannot start any guerrilla warfare in the areas under Guomindang control in the south. The defeat ofZeng Sheng's troops in the East River area 1 is proof of this. Therefore, headquarters should seize this opportunity to cross the river immediately and make eastern Anhui its base area. This may certainly not be delayed any longer. As for the combat troops in southern Anhui, some of them should be moved northward, and the rest should stay and persist in guerrilla warfare. 2. Han [Deqin] has been thoroughly defeated and is suing for peace,2 which is clearly for the purpose of gaining a respite and awaiting reinforcements. At this time Huang Kecheng should, under the pretext of providing reinforcements to Chen Yi, send troops to Dongtai to join with Chen's troops, and with his main forces take the vast area to the north and to the east of Xinghua (the Eighth Route Army is responsible for the area north of the Dongtai River), thereby forcing Han to give up his policy of opposing us, to recognize our anti-Japanese base areas, and to stop the operations of his troops attacking western Anhui. On the other hand, Chen Yi will not refuse peace negotiations and, at the same time, will consolidate

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 562-63, where it is reproduced from Mao's manuscript original, preserved in the Central Archives. I. On March 8, 1940, an advance guerrilladetachmeniied by the Chinese Communist Party in the Fourth Wax Zone, consisting of a newly organized battalion commanded by Zeng Sheng, and the Second Battalion, in all nearly 700 men, was encircled by the Guomindang I86th Division in Guangdong. They succeeded in escaping from the encirclement and retreated toward Haifeng and Lufeng, but this was the Guomindang rear area, and they were obliged to flee into the forests and mountains. By July and August, only about a hundred of them remained.

2. At the beginning of October 1940, Han, who was chainnan of the Jiangsu provincial government and commanded more than 30,000 troops, had been decisively defeated by a force of only 7,000, led by Chen Yi and Su Yu. 52/

522

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

and enlarge the forces and expand the base areas, to demonstrate that we are acting in self-defense and not otherwise. Our troops in eastern Anhui should arrange immediately to build up a westward defense and hold fast to the base areas in eastern Anhui. At the same time the Guangxi army should be called on to oppose civil war and emphasize unity in facing the enemy. We cannot afford to lose eastem Anhui. If it is lost, Chiang Kaishek will necessarily set up blockade lines along the Grand Canal and the Huai River to block off our future westward advance. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Pay Attention to Recruiting National Capitalists and Their Representatives to Participate in the Construction of the Base Areas (October 14, 1940)

To Hu Fu, Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng, and for the information ofYe [Ting], Xiang [Ying], and [Peng] Xuefeng: You are quite right to pay attention to recruiting Tao Xingzhi and the other members of the Life and Education Society to take part in the cultural and educational work in northern Jiangsu. This is the principal aspect. At the same time, however, you should also pay attention to the fact that the Vocational Education Society, under the leadership of Huang Yanpei, Jiang Wenyu, and others' has considerable influence among the intellectuals in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, because Huang and Jiang are not only celebrities in cultural and educational circles, but also wellknown representatives of national capitalists who are engaged in industry and business. Therefore, you should also attract members of the Vocational Education Society and people in all the related areas to participate in our cultural, educational, financial, and economic enterprises. Meanwhile, through Han Guojun,2 Li Mingyang, Li Changjiang, and other members of the local gentry and cultural circles, you should be in touch with Jiangsu and Zhejiang national capitalists other than those in nonhern Jiangsu, such as Zhang Yilu, Huang Yanpei, Jiang Wenyu, Chu Fucheng, Mu Ouchu, and so on, 3 explain to them the true story about the Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 300-301, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Huang Yanpei (1878-1965), who was born near Shanghai, obtained the juren degree in 1902. During a period in Japan before the 1911 Revolution, he developed an interest in the study of vocational education, which remained his central concern thereafter. In the 1930s, he was critical of the Guomindang, and, in the early 1940s, he became a strong advocate of constitutional government. We have been unable to find information about Jiang Wenyu. 2. Han Guojun (1857-1942), zi Zishi, a native of Jiangsu, had obtained the xiucai degree at the age of twenty-one. During the decade following the 1911 Revolution, he served as governor of several provinces. He also played an important role in economic and military affairs until very late in his life. 3. For a note regarding Mu Ouchu, see Volume II, p. 158. All the individuals mentioned here were influential figures, though some were leaders of local elite circles, while others had regional or even national reputations. 523

524 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Northern Jiangsu Incident, and ask them to send or recommend people to panicipate in the work of the local government, of public opinion institutions, and of economic, cultural, and educational construction in nonhero Jiangsu. We have been in touch with Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying] by telegraph. If they refer people to northern Jiangsu in the future, these people should be received and cooperated with in business, to serve as concrete examples of winning over Jiangsu and Zhejiang national capitalists. This will benefit the development of the united front. MaoZedong

Methods for Handling Captured Anti-Communist Officers and Soldiers (October 18, 1940)

As for the question of captured anti-Communists, in principle it is not permitted to execute any officers, soldiers, spies, special agents, and traitor elements of the domestic anti-Communist factions attacking us whom we capture, no matter how reactionary they are and how heinous the crimes they commit. This policy is the best way to isolate and disintegrate the anti-Communist factions, and the entire Party and army from top to bottom should be made to have a widespread and thorough understanding of it. The method for handling this matter is that all reactionary elements and those who are of no use should be treated well and set free, and any soldiers who can join our army and those who can be useful to us should be kept, and it is forbidden to humiliate them (by beating, verbal abuse, [forced] writing of confessions, and so on) or to take revenge on them. If there are specific elements who for some important reason must be executed, permission must be obtained from institutions above the rank of division or equivalent institutions in the army, from above the rank of subbureaus and district Party committees in the Party, or from the highest-level government institutions in each base area. Those below the brigade, below the district committee, and below the administrative commissioner level have no right to authorize executions. Detailed regulations on this issue are set out in a separate communication of the Central Committee, but each area is to act for the time being according to this general regulation and general order. Secretariat of the Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji. Vol. 2, pp. 564-65, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 525

Be on Guard Against Making "Leftist" Mistakes While Carrying Out the Policies (October 18, 1940)

To Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng (by way of Hu Fu), [Peng] Xuefeng, [Li) Xiannian, and for the information ofPeng [Dehuai) and Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng) and Deng [Xiaoping], Yang [Xiufeng) and Song [Renqiong], Chen [Guang) and Luo [Ronghuan], and Zhu Rui: Because we failed to see to it that our middle-level and lower-level cadres understood thoroughly, and because the upper levels failed to take precautions in advance and to investigate in a timely fashion, many places made ultraleftist mistakes, which are mainly expressed in overly leftist land policy, labor policy, financial policy, policy to eliminate traitors, policy toward intellectuals, policy toward captives, and policy toward members of the Guomindang, as well as in the organization of our political regime. The result has been that our social base has shrunk, fear has been aroused among the neutral forces, and the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitor Wang [Jingwei], and the diehards have been given an opportunity to win overthe masses and assemble reactionary forces. Waiting until the mistakes have taken shape before correcting them has already caused us to suffer great losses. The work in Central China is developing at present (as it is in Shandong), and you must prevent your subordinates from making leftist mistakes in carrying out the policies. You must be aware that the major danger at present is "leftist" mistakes, and you must make timely investigation of your subordinates' work and correct any leftist actions. Otherwise, between attacks by both the enemy and the diehards, it will be impossible for our Party and our army to achieve the great victory of development and consolidation and to sustain our base areas for a long time. We hope that you will sharply draw to this matter the attention of the entire Party and the entire army; it must not be underestimated and ignored. Secretariat of the Central Committee

Our somce for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 302-3, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. 526

Estimate Regarding the Cu"ent International Situation, and Policy for Dealing with a Possible Guomindang Attack (October 25, 1940, midnight)'

Zhou [Enlai): I. There is certain to be large-scale action on the part of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the near future. If Gennany does not attack Britain, it will tum toward Africa and India, and Britain will soon have more than it can handle. Japan will adopt a policy of first occupying the South Seas and then sweeping up China, and as soon as the four territories of Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, and the Dutch East Indies fall into Japanese handa, the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction will, in turn, have more than it can handle. America's preparations are not complete, so it might not enter the war right away. If Germany attacks Britain, the U.S. Navy will simultaneously have to take care of the Atlantic and be unable to concentrate its forces to deal with the Pacific. So when Japan attacks various places in the South Seas, a war between Japan and the United States will not necessarily result. At that time Chongqing's pro-British and pro-American faction will look on in helpless anxiety. Their present intense infatuation is rather one-sided. To drop the war for independence and join the Anglo-American alliance is the wish of the Chongqing pro-British and pro-American faction, but they also fear that Britain and the United States are unreliable. If Japan occupies the South Seas but war between Japan and the United States keeps failing to break out, and Britain is severely defeated by Germany, Italy, and Japan, they still have the possibility of going over to the Petainist line. So they are now still vacillating between the BritishAmerican line and the Petainist line, they still dare not offend the Soviet Union too much, and they find it difficult to make the decision to be completely anti-Communist. Since the big bourgeoisie is vacillating, the national bourgeoisie, the upper level of the petty bourgeoisie, and a number of middle-of-the-road factions are also vacillating. Given circumstances like these, there is a lot of hidden meaning behind all this for us. Our source for this directive is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 566-68, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. The time is indicated by a character signifying between II P.M. and I A.M. 527

528 MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

2. We must, however, take into account the most difficult, the most dangerous, the blackest of possibilities, and make that situation the starting point of all our dispositions, rather than taking an optimistic situation as our starting point. The blackest of situations would be a long unsuccessful Japanese attack on Singapore, leaving Singapore under the control of the U.S. Navy, and an unsuccessful German attack on Britain, which would increase the danger that the Chinese proBritish and pro-American faction would abandon the war for independence and join the Anglo-American alliance, and also the danger that the majority of middleof-the-road factions would go along with Chiang Kaishek. It is also necessary to consider these possibilities: that the U.S. Navy might concentrate its forces and defeat the Japanese Navy; that Japan might surrender to the United States; that the Japanese Army might pull out of China; that the United States might arm the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction financially and militarily so that China would be turned from a Japanese colony into an American colony; and that the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party would tum into a large-scale civil war. This is the blackest of all possible scenarios. But we would not fear even such a situation, because our party has already been tempered, the Chinese people are going through deep waters and burning flames, and within the ruling class multiple contradictions and many serious difficulties have appeared, such that world revolution is bound to break out, and the Soviet Union is in support of world revolution. 3. There is an intermediate situation in which Japan and the United States are locked in a stalemate, China and Japan are in a stalemate, as are the Guomindang and the Communists, and there is also a stalemate in Europe between Britain and Germany, so that the whole world and all of China remain superficially unchanged. We must also be prepared to deal with such a situation, and we are able to do so. 4. In short, we must be prepared to deal with all situations; we must have a way to deal with any kind of situation. At present we should prepare to face the blackest of situations. Our policy is to deal firmly with the attacks of the Guomindang. Militarily we adopt a defensive position; if it does not attack, we do not make rash moves. Politically we emphasize unity against Japan, explaining to the Guomindang and the middle-of-the-road factions and the broad masses of the people the dangers of both the Petainist line and the Anglo-American line, emphasizing an independent autonomous war against Japan, and explaining that the present anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attacks are preparations to abandon the independent war and enter the Anglo-American alliance. In the Guomindang areas, the Party will carry out a total and thorough withdrawal, and a policy of total selfreliance will be carried out in the base areas (the border areas have already made preparations). After holding out for another year, the world situation will be greatly changed. The present is a time for preparation and waiting for opportunities. (This telegram should be further transmitted to [Peng] Dehuai, Hu Fu, and Xiang Ying.) Zedong

On How to Prepare for Any Dark Circumstances Given the Present International Situation 1 (October 25, 1940)

I. Germany is still preparing to attack England, and even if England is not attacked, Egypt, Turkey, Arabia, and Iraq are certain to fall into the hands of the German army, and Japan is certain to attack Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, and the Dutch East Indies. In short, Britain's luck is about to run out. Whether or not the United States enters the war soon, Britain's luck has definitely run out. Even if the United States enters the war soon, it will not save Britain from running out of luck, and, for this reason, the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction will also be out of luck. 2. When the war between Japan and. the United States becomes intense, there is a possibility that Japan will give up Yichang and Wuhan, to allow the conflict between the Guomindang and the Communist Party to reduce the anti-Japanese forces. 3. The new anti-Soviet, anti-Communist movement that the Luomindang is now starting is, on the one hand, a preparatory step toward abandoning the independent war and joining the Anglo-American alliance, and its objective is to clear the road for joining the Anglo-American alliance and facilitate winning over the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, it also has the function of demonstrating to Japan that the Guomindang is willing to assume responsibility for suppressing the Chinese national revolution on Japan's behalf, in the attempt to get Japan, in exchange, to make concessions to the Guomindang. At the same time, frightening Japan with the threat of joining the Anglo-American alliance is an attempt to get Japanese concessions. Thus the antiCommunist activities of He Yingqin et al. are especially intense, and Japan is seeking to win over Chiang and He. 4. We must be prepared for the fact that Chiang Kaishek may become a de Gaulle or a Petain. We must be prepared for his declaring us counterrevolutionary and thereby starting an all-out anti-Communist campaign. We must be prepared to deal with the darkest situation, and we are not afraid of any dark eventuality.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 173-74, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 1. This was a telegram addressed to Zhou Enlai. 529

Instructions on the Cu"ent Situation 1 (November 1, 1940)

Concerning the current situation: I. The struggle in China for the past month between England and America, on one side, and Japan, Germany, and Italy, on the other, has been extremely fierce. The latter group demands that the Chinese government cease the Sino-Japanese War and join the alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy, while the former demands that China give up the independent war and join the alliance of England and America. At present, the battle has turned white-hot and Chiang [Kaishek] has changed his attitude considerably as a consequence. 2. Britain's opening up of the Yunnan-Burma Road and America's loans to China and withdrawal of its nationals from China are all signs by which England and America express their determination to oppose Japan and their demand that China not go over to the side of Germany, Japan, and Italy; the British and American ambassadors stay in Chongqing and perform their office in person so that they can keep a tight grip on Chiang Kaishek and prevent him from running off. 3. The closure of the two airports in Yuncheng and northern Hubei, Abe's2 return home, the withdrawal of troops from Nanning and Longzhou, and the official establishment of Haitong Press in Chongqing are, on the other hand, signs of concessions from Japan, a beginning of Germany's mediation 'effort and a tendency which is likely to take a sudden turn and then develop rapidly. 4. Chiang Kaishek is now waiting for the highest bid. On the one hand, he is ready to join the Anglo-American alliance; on the other, he is prepared to ally himself with Japan, Germany, and Italy. Ifthe U.S.-Japanese war breaks out soon and victory is assured, he is willing to join the Anglo-American alliance. In the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 177-79, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. It should be noted that this set of instructions and positions is suspended by the message to Zhou Enlai issued on the following day. This was a time of rapidly changing circumstances and consequent uncertainty on the part of Mao and the Yan'an leadership. 2. The reference is to Abe Nobuyuki (1875-1953), who had been prime minister in 1939 and at that time advocated the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government. He had recently served as special envoy to China. 530

NOVEMBER /940

53/

past month, he has made use of the strength of the alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy and he will before long take advantage of the Japanese concessions to exact yet a higher price from Britain and America. 5. If a war between the United States and Japan, which is of a decisive nature, does not break out soon (which is the more likely case), or if it does break out but the United States is not certain of victory (there is no certainty within two years), if Britain is utterly routed by Germany, Japan, and Italy this winter or next spring (very probable), if Japan is to retreat from Wuhan and other places, limits its occupation to the coastal areas and North China, and declares that they remain under Chinese sovereignty and are to be governed by Chiang's appointees (highly likely), if the Chinese bourgeoisie can make a huge fortune by joining the alliance of Germany, Japan, and Italy and opposing Britain and America, he would want to surrender to Japan. This is the path that Chiang Kaishek is most likely to take. 6. The current upsurge of the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist tide is preparation for ceasing the independent war and joining the Anglo-American alliance, but it is still more a preparation for ending the anti-Japanese war, surrendering to Japan, and joining the alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan. We must not be taken in by Chiang Kaishek's propaganda. His uniting with England and America is propaganda, but capitulation to Japan is the reality. 7. Two strategies are needed to obtain concessions from Japan: coercion and luring by promising gain. That is why Chiang is, on the one hand, making a show of joining the Anglo-American alliance as a means of coercion, while, on the other hand, instigating an anti-Communist upsurge as a lure. Chiang Kaishek knows that Japan needs a consolidated rear, a China "at peace;• before it can move south, and the Communist Party has today become the most decisive factor undermining Japan's rear. So Chiang Kaishek offers to take up the task of consolidating the rear on Japan's behalf in exchange for Japan's concessions to him. At the same time, Europe's Germany and Italy also need to exchange resources with Asia, and Chiang Kaishek's opposition to the Communists is advantageous to Germany and Italy, so this anti-Communist upsurge is mainly a preparatory step in capitulation to Japan, Germany, and Italy. 8. In July and August, when Chiang Kaishek was prepared to move his capital to Tianshui in the event of the fall ofChongqing, he was getting ready to get closer to the Soviet Union, make peace with the Communists, and adopt some political reforms. He had already begun to waver in September and changed drastically in October. This was a result of the alliance of Germany, Japan, and Italy, and Britain and America's growing enthusiasm toward Japan.

9. (Omitted [from the Chinese text]) 10. Whatever situation prevails, however, the fierce struggle between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is unavoidable. Regardless of whether it is to Japan, Germany, and Italy or to Britain and America that Chiang Kaishek surrenders, it will strike a heavy blow to our Party. He is surely determined to carry out his plan of using armed forces to drive the New Fourth Army and the Eighth

532

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Route Army north of the old Yellow River and heavily besieging them, so we must immediately figure out countermeasures. II. No matter how serious the situation, we are nonetheless surely able to break through it. This kind of confidence should be built up throughout the Party. We have to, on the one hand, hold fast to our base areas in North China and Central China and, on the other, repel the attacks from Chiang Kaishek; such is the serious situation in which we find ourselves. How to break through the situation in a methodical, planned, and orderly fashion is the problem we seek to solve today. 12. We look forward to hearing your opinions.

Telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi and Others on Intensifying Preparations to Smash Chiang Kaishek's Serious Attack (November I, 1940)

I. Chiang Kaishek has already informed us that those elements of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army now in Central China and Shandong must all move to North China before November 20. 1 According to reliable reports, Chiang has already ordered Tang Enbo, with nine divisions under his command? and Li Pinxian, with three divisions under his command, 3 to leave immediately for Henan and Anhui, and prepare to attack you once the deadline has passed. There are undoubtedly already deployments in southern Anhui and central Hubei set for attack. 2. You should immediately intensify all aspects of military and political preparation, reinforcing the troops, strictly carrying out training, gathering assets, intensifying the creation and consolidation of bases, strengthening united front work within friendly armies, reinforcing political work within the military ranks, and planning in advance how to smash this serious attack by Chiang Kaishek. It is of utmost importance to carry out propaganda in advance among the masses within [the border areas] about how evil anticommunism is.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 175, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. The November 20 deadline had been set forth in a telegraphic order sent to the Communist leadership on October 19, signed by Bai Chongxi and He Yingqin. This was the socalled hao order (hao being the telegraphic code designation for that date), which constituted the Guomindang' s response to the New Fourth Anny' s defeat of Han Deqin and the expansion of its influence in Jiangsu and Anhui. This order directed that a11 Communist troops, whether south or north of the Yangzi, be moved within one month to a staging area north of the Yellow River. For the context, see above, the Introduction. 2. Regarding Tang Enbo, see above the note to the text of September 19, 1940. 3. Regarding Li Pinxian, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940. 533

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Analysis of the Situation of Chiang Kaishek Opposing the Communist Party and Our Arrangements (November 2, 1940)

The Central Committee has met several times, and each time reached the same conclusion that the ongoing anti-Communist campaign is different from that of the last time and it will greatly affect our future if it is not dealt with properly. So the statement and instructions have been suspended even though they have already been drafted. Today's conference discussed your proposition of the first of this month and still advocated relaxation on the surface and resistance in actuality; it was agreed that the statement is to be held up for a while and only a brief instruction is to be circulated within [the Party] as well as a reply to the "October 19" telegram from He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi]. The ongoing anti-Communist campaign was instigated by the Guomindang and the danger of capitulation remains grave. Let the various middle-of-the-road elements talk, comment, and conjecture. We shall not put forward any positive proposals before the time is ripe, and it will not hurt to wait a little bit before we speak. There are now twerity days to go before the deadline set in the "October 19" telegram from He and Bai. We plan to draft the reply telegram in the next few days and dispatch it around the lOth; there is no need for an earlier reply. As to the statement on the current situation, although we have made a basic assessment of the situation and actually drafted the resolution, we want to wait and see the developments following the Japan-USSR negotiations and the American general elections, and the development of relations between Japan and Chiang, before we decide to issue it. All the comrades [present at the meeting] agreed without reservations with you and the South China Bureau on deployments in the south and on matters such as propaganda and refutation. As for military deployments in Central China and North China, maneuvers of small numbers of troops will get started in the next few days, while those involving a large number (150,000 as planned) is under discussion with Old Peng; 1 similarly we deem it proper to go slow about it and do not see any reason for haste. If

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 181. where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Peng Dehuai. 534

NOVEMBER /940

535

Chiang Kaishek capitulates this time, the consequence will necessarily be the disintegration [of the nation]. We have under our command an army half a million strong and enjoy the support of the people throughout the country, so we are able to open up a new prospect despite numerous difficulties. On the matter of attacks from Tang [Enbo] and Li [Pinxian], we are not going to be blocked by them and must counterattack and penetrate to the rear of the anti-Communist armies: that is the unanimous view of all the comrades in the Secretariat. We look forward to hearing your opinions.

To Zhou Enlai on the Internal Circumstances and the Need to Oppose Capitulation and Strive to Bring About a Turn for the Better in the Current Situation (November 3, 1940)

Pan Youxin's opinion is correct. It is also our assessment that Chiang [Kaishek] still finds himself at a fork in the road and is still in a bargaining stage in his negotiations with Germany and Japan. Only what things are today is quite a different matter from what they will be tomorrow. To estimate objectively, it is not very likely that Chiang will seek alliance with Britain and America; it is much more likely that he will ally himself with Germany and Japan. Because both the pressure and the attraction from Germany and Japan are great, the pressure being cutting off his artery and attacking Chongqing, and the attraction being recovering the occupied territories, making a fortune in a world war, and joining efforts to fight the Communists. On the other hand, Britain and America cannot do much within the next two years, and Chiang does not have two years to wait. Even after two years, England and America are not absolutely certain of victory. It is possible that the two sides would be locked in a stalemate, fighting for two or three years with no final outcome, and that then a revolution would break out and finish them off. Another possibility is that the British Empire would be defeated quite soon, the whole of the old continent would be occupied by Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the United States would feel isolated, powerless, and frustrated, and would have to wait until revolution breaks out on the old continent to attack Europe and Asia as a way of intervening in the revolution. All in all, over the next two or three years Chiang Kaishek cannot triumph by relying on England and America. Only pressure from the Communist Party, the Chinese people (including various middle-ofthe-road factions and people such as Chen Cheng, Tang Enbo, 1 and so on), plus the Soviet Union, can stop the Chiang clique from capitulating. Ifthese three forces

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 183-185, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Chen Cheng (1897-1965), a native ofZhejiang, was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Sixth War Area. Tang Enbo ( 1899-1954), likewise a native of Zhejiang, was commander of the Thirty-first Group Army. 536

NOVEMBER 1940 537

of pressure cooperate well, the possibility for such a turn for the better exists, and there is still time for it. What Chiang Kaishek fears most is internal revolt and the Soviet Union. On this we can take advantage of him. He wants to suppress the Communist Party, so we must oppose the suppression of the Communist Party. If we are not afraid of civil war even under the slogan of opposing civil war, when his Communist-suppression troops advance, we shall send out 150,000 crack troops (300,000 will support the various base areas) who will go to his rear and fight a few big triumphant battles and then raise the demands of dismissing He Yingqin (the strategy of purging the close company of the ruler), withdrawing the Communistsuppression armies, sticking to the national policy of waging a war of resistance, restoring internal peace, carrying out the Three People's Principles, reforming political structure, allowing the people the freedom to fight Japan, releasing antiJapanese political prisoners, convening a national people's congress, and so on (basically as in the eight points put forward by Zhang and Yang). If Japan by then has already moved south, relations between the United States and Japan are tense, and Japan is even unable to fend for itself; if the various middle-of-the-road factions in the country and the middle forces within the Guomindang come forward to offer assistance (such as organizing pacification groups and severing battle lines); if some people in the country or some people within Chiang's clique take this opportunity to rebel, in activity not disadvantageous to Chiang (these people are now urging Chiang to fight the Communists, with the intent to cause disturbances and put Chiang under fire so that they can find a chance to take his place; He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi] are people of this sort); if at that time the Soviet Union comes forward and makes some adjustments, this sort of turn for the better is possible. It may just be the case that a real turn for the better for China is not a sure thing even at that time, in the same way that childbirth involves great pain. But it is also possible that Chiang Kaishek will become another Petain, and ultimately a second Wang Jingwei, which would mean a final disintegration. This sort of possibility may even be greater; it is hard to tell. Now that he has formed armies to suppress the Communist forces, however, we naturally cannot just sit by and wait to be murdered. We cannot just sit by without acting while he sets up dozens of blockade lines running far and wide, beginning in Ningxia in the west and extending to the eastern coast (a new 10,000 li Great Wall), and while he sets us up for destruction under the attacks of both Japan and his own forces. Therefore, when the Communist-suppression troops set out we must strike out and break through, to make a change in the situation and cause a turn for the better. If Chiang has become a Petain at that time, it will prove that we have been right in countering the attack, and we will change our banner of purging the close company of the king (or petitioning with armed force) into the banner of fighting the Chinese traitors, and fight to the finish. This would be a national revolutionary war in the form of a civil war (the fighting to counter friction in the past and present are ofthe same nature). Only we must do it with extreme forbearance. It has been the correct and necessary thing to do to delay the actions of Tang Enbo and Li Pinxian as best

538

MAO'S ROAD TV POWER

we can at present, to agree to move our southern Anhui troops northward, to assent to a peaceful solution, to appeal for the avoidance of civil war, and to adopt an accommodating attitude. Our current policy is of a dual nature. On the one hand, we are doing everything in our power to make the situation take a tum for the better and avoid civil war, and, on the other hand, we are getting ready to deal with capitulation and civil war. The emphasis is on dealing with capitulation and civil war, which is the way to avoid losses and avoid being taken in by Chiang. The whole Paf\y's central task is to prepare immediately to cope with a dark situation. In this way we shall avoid following in Chen Duxiu's disastrous footsteps. But on the two matters of an explosive statement and petitioning with armed force, we must have a firm and sure grasp of the timing; there is no room for rashness or error. One mistake today would leave behind endless troubles in the future. Now is a turning point in history, a juncture when the Chinese revolution is making an abrupt tum, and a moment when the big bourgeoisie will either back out from or remain in political power, so it must be met with intense effort. The above is an outline of my humble opinion; please take it into consideration.

Military Dispositions for Dealing With the Joint Attack on the Communists by Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese (November 3, 1940, 7:00 to 9:00A.M.)'

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: 1. The present anti-Communist high tide is preparation for direct capitulation. The so-called uniting with England and America in resisting Japan is nothing more than a smokescreen put up by Chiang Kaishek. Chiang has given orders for Tang Enbo to lead a force of 100,000 to attack northeastern Anhui and for Li Pinxian to lead a force of 50,000 to attack eastern Anhui. It is estimated that the first step of their plan is to drive our army north of the Longhai railroad and set up a number of horizontal and vertical blockade lines (there are five blockade lines around our border region); the second step is to coordinate with the Japanese invaders to wipe out our army. A serious danger exists that China and Japan might reach a compromise and that Japan and Chiang might join together in "Communist suppression." Although other possibilities exist, capitulation is the most probable. At present it

is extremely necessary to make such an estimation. 2. The central problem at the moment is the concrete strategy for combating capitulation and anticommunism. There are presently two options: The first is a political offensive and a military defense. This means to counterattack the antiCommunist troops only in areas close to our base areas, and that our army does not

force its way into their rear; that we do not counterattack in their rear area until Chiang's capitulationist inclination is revealed to the whole nation. Should this strategy be adopted, it would be sufficient to move 50,000 of our men south, while the main force may remain on the various anti-Japanese fronts. If this strategy were adopted, it would have one political advantage. which is that it would deprive Chiang of his political excuses. But it would pose a political disadvantage on the other hand, which is that we could not prevent capitulation with our actual strength. Militarily it is disadvantageous, because our troops are bound to suffer severe losses from joint attacks by the Japanese and Chiang once Chiang has successfully

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 569-71. where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. The time is indicated by a character signifying this two-hour period. 539

540 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

completed his network of blockade lines. The second is a political offensive as well as a military offensive. This means that our army would not wait until Japan and Chiang join forces to attack us but that, instead, we would select at least 100,000 to 150,000 crack troops from among our 500,000 men and have them break into their rear in different directions, while the rest of our forces (the majority) would stay where they are and resist Japan. If this plan were adopted, it would have a political disadvantage, because it gives Chiang political capital. In another way, however, it could have a political advantage, because it might prevent capitulation (but not necessarily). Militarily it is advantageous, because it provides initiative, and could prevent the most severe joint attacks by both Japan and Chiang (a joint attack is unavoidable, but its severity can be reduced). 3. No matter which strategy we adopt at present, if capitulation becomes a fact, the outcome can only be a fierce civil war (national revolutionary war in the form of a civil war), so it is necessary to consider the overall military deployments right now. It is planned to divide the entire military command into three columns. The left column is to consist of the armies south of the old Yellow River, 2 its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, which will strike out from the area on the Hubei, Henan, and Shaanxi borders. The right column is to consist of the armies north of the Fenli line, the Zhengtai line, and the Cangshi line, its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, which is to strike out from the area on the Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan borders. The central column is to consist of the armies stationed in between these two areas, its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, who will strike in the direction of the left column or that of the right column, depending upon future conditions. 4. It is of utmost importance to our future whether or not the concrete strategy we have chosen at present is correct, so it is necessary to give it careful consideration. We hope to be informed of your opinion so that we can discuss it (Commander Zhu [De] will be going to Suide in a few days). Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

2. Regarding the change in the course of the Yellow River in June 1938, see above, the note to the text of March 5, 1940.

Letter from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang ]iaxiang to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying Regarding the Northward Movement of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (November 3, 1940)

The Central Committee has decided that the "telegram of the 19th" 1 from He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi will he answered in the names of Zhu, Peng [Dehuai], Ye, and Xiang adopting a conciliatory attitude so as to delay the outbreak of the anti-Communist war. It has been decided to yield on the matter of southern Anhui and agree to move [the army] north. We look forward to your immediate response.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. Vol. 6. p. 189, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

I. The telegram dated October 19 from He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi is here called the "lwo telegram" and is frequently so referred to in texts of the period. Similarly, the reply sent to the Guomindang on November 9 was called the ''jia telegram." The use of these characters to designate respectively the 19th and the 9th days of the month is purely con-

ventional and bears no relation to the meaning of the words in question. We have therefore not translated or transcribed them here. 541

Mobilize All Forces to Carry Out the Work of Gaining the Support of Friendly Armies (November 4, 1940)

Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, [Zhang] Yunyi, Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng, [Peng] Xuefeng, and [Li] Xiannian: I. Based on the experiences of the campaign against friction in North China (while the three divisions under Zhu Huaibing were fighting the Eighth Route Army, thanks to our united front work at the front, one of the divisions remained neutral), in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (while the security forces were at war with us, because of our ·communication work, the Third Preliminary Division looked on and did not make any movements at all), and in Huangqiao in northern Jiangsu (as a result of Chen Yi's united front work, lhe two Lis 1 and Chen Taiyun2 remained absolutely neutral), in lhe armed struggle against friction it is not only of great significance but also very possible to intensify the work of trying to win the sympalhy of the friendly armies toward us or trying to make them remain absolutely neutral. 2. Under the present situation in Central China, on lhe one hand, the troops of lhe Guomindang have an advantage in numbers over us and, on the other hand, !here are many local and miscellaneous troops from all kinds of factions gathered there. If, as a result of our efforts to win over friendly armies, not only many miscellaneous troops remain neutral or take actual sympathetic actions toward us, but within Tang Enbo's and Li Pinxian's troops an anti-<:ivil war movement show-

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 306-9, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. The same text appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 572-75. 1. The reference is to Li Mingyang and Li Changjiang, who were, respectively, commander and deputy commander of the Guomindang guerrilla forces in the area in question. Nominally subordinate to Han Deqin, they were very much out for themselves. Regarding Li Mingyang, see the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1940. Li Changjiang (18901956) was a native of Jiangsu, who had been engaged in fighting the Japanese together with Li Mingyang since 1937. 2. Chen Taiyun ( 1898-1951 ), a native of Guizhou Province, graduated in the first class from the Huangpu Academy. At this time, he was commander of the Guomindang's Tax and Garrison Regiment in Jiangsu. 542

NOVEMBER 1940 543

ing sympathy for us occurs while Tang's and Li's troops attack us, this will not only be of great importance and contribute to our counterfriction armed struggle in Central China, but will at the same time impose a heavy blow upon the antiCommunist conspiracy in the whole nation. Therefore, it is one of your most central tasks today to start mobilizing immediately every possible force in the Party, the administration, the military, and the people to conduct the work of winning over friendly armies. 3. Select and send at once capable representatives with Mao's and Zhu 's (Zhou [Enlai]'s and Peng [Dehuai]'s names can be used in some cases as well) sincere letters, together with your own letters making contact, to the various friendly armies around you to make friends. In places where it is inconvenient for us to send representatives directly, local gentry, celebrities, scholars, and all those who have relations with the friendly armies as relatives, fellow villagers, classmates, or fellow clansmen may be asked to facilitate communications on our behalf, explaining to the friendly armies in detail what exactly happened in the Northern Jiangsu Incident, the difficulties and reasons why the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army are unable to march to the north of the old Yellow River, explaining to them sincerely the necessity of uniting to resist the foreign invaders when the big enemy is in front of us, as well as the danger of our nation's extinction as a result of disintegration and civil war, and asking them not to participate in the anti-Communist war, or to fire shots into the air if they have to follow orders. At the same time, with regard to the various friendly armies, apart from publicizing the great truth of resistance and unity, it is necessary to emphasize issues of direct relevance to their own interests. For instance, with regard to the Sichuan army, the friendship between the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Sichuan army must be emphasized, along with Chiang Kaishek's conspiracy to invade and occupy Sichuan and destroy the Sichuan army. With regard to the Northeast Army, what is to be emphasized is the traditional friendly relations between the Eighth Route Army and the Northeast Army, our sympathy for the present plight of Zhang Hanqing 3 and the Northeast Army, and our indignation toward a certain party which used recognition of the puppet regime in Manchuria as the first condition of surrender. With regard to Feng Zhi'an, Sun Lianzhong,4 and others, to be stressed is the necessity of a united resistance war, the necessity of sharing with us both the difficulties and the benefits, and so on. In sum, making the local and miscellaneous troops calculate their own interests, learn how to avoid being taken in by Chiang, and avoid engaging in a confrontation with us. With regard to Li Pinxian and his forces, it is also necessary

3. Hanqing was the zi of Zhang Xueliang. 4. Feng Zhi' an ( 1896-1954) was the commander of the Guomindang Thirty-third Group Army. Sun Lianzhong (1893-1990) was the deputy commander of the Fifth War Zone, and commander of the Second Group Army.

544

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

to emphasize the many years of friendship between the Eighth Route Army and the Fifth Route Army, and that we should not let the instigation of others make us hostile toward each other, which would only create an opportunity for Chiang to attack the Eighth Route Army and the Fifth Route Army. With regard to Tang Enbo and his subordinates, it is also necessary to adopt a friendly attitude to win them over, thereby promoting their disintegration from within. 4. According to various sorts of experiences, slogans such as "Carry on the Resistance War to the end, unite until the very end," "Faced with a strong enemy, Chinese shall not fight Chinese, and Chinese armies shall not fight Chinese armies," "All Chinese fellow countrymen and friendly Chinese armies, unite to resist Japan and save the nation," and "Oppose civil war, oppose Chinese people killing each other" are still powerful weapons to disintegrate the anti-Communist troops and to win over the sympathy of friendly armies toward us. If friction battles erupt, it is hoped that these slogans will be written out and posted everywhere around the campsites of our troops and within the encampments of the friendly armies. It is important in particular to find ways to mobilize the popular masses and sympathetic elements to write out and post such slogans everywhere along all the routes taken by those such as Tang Enbo' s and Li Pinxian 's troops. When Tang's and Li' s troops are approaching the environs of our areas, large-scale celebrations should be organized, and even after battle operations have begun, there can be no slackening in shouting at the front slogans about uniting to resist Japan and in the work of partial negotiation and compromise. At the same time, these sorts of slogans must not be used wantonly on the troops of Chinese traitors and diehard armies. Based on past experience, the abuse of such slogans has the opposite effect of raising the level of annoyance and unity among the anti-Communist forces. 5. Chen Yi has rich and valuable experience in united front work with regard to the two Li's and Chen Taiyun. It is hoped that everyone will study it carefully, develop it, and apply it extensively so that every unit will achieve the greatest results in the work of winning over the friendly armies. Many military units did a woefully inadequate job in this respect in the past. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

To Li Kenong and Others on Mobilizing All Forces Inside and Outside the Party to Stop the Campaign to Suppress the Communists and Capitulate to Japan (November 6, 1940)

At present Japan and Germany and the pro-Japanese and pro-German faction have surrounded Chiang [Kaishek] and are pressuring Chiang to mount an antiCommunist war and capitulate to the Japanese bandits. We should urgently call upon members of the Guomindang and people everywhere and in sincere and moving words explain that suppressing the Communists means the end of the Party and the end of the country, that capitulation to the Japanese bandits would inevitably mean the toppling of Chiang, bringing only harm and no benefits. We should mobilize the majority of the members inside and outside the Party to come forth to become involved in the positive and moving activities listed above. When talking about this, do not curse Chiang or the Guomindang; curse only the proJapanese faction. Demand that everyone pay attention to the question of their own survival or destruction. We, the Communist Party, love and defend Chiang, love and defend the War of Resistance and unity. They simply must not annihilate the Communists or capitulate. If we wait until they have annihilated the Communists and capitulated, have destroyed the Party and the country, then we cannot help them even if we want to. All Party members and all those opposed to Japan must be told that if only everyone will unite and act positively, it will still be possible to stop the campaign to suppress the Communists and capitulate, that it is not too late, that there is still time. Please, by all means, inform the Central Committee regarding the conditions in the various localities.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 193, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 545

To Zhou Enlai, on Strengthening Domestic and Foreign Contacts to Stop Capitulation and Division (November 6, 1940)

The important intelligence report of the 3rd, I read only this morning. There may be some advantage and no harm if Chiang [Kaishek] joins the British-American group, but it would be only bad, with no advantages, if he joined the GermanItalian-Japanese group. We should no longer emphasize our opposition to joining the British-American group, though we should not promote it either (because it is an imperialist war group). At present, not only should the three forces ofthe Communist Party, the Chinese people, and the Soviet Union unite, but we should also have diplomatic contacts with Britain and America, in order to prevent capitulation and to strike a blow at the pro-Japanese, pro-German activities. According to the intelligence report of the 3rd, if the four forces mentioned above are able to join together and coordinate actions, there is still a possibility of turning things around for the better. Suppressing the Communists would mean the end of the Party and the end of the country, and capitulation to the Japanese bandits would inevitably mean splitting China four or five different ways and the toppling of Chiang. Please take this opportunity to go around calling upon all sides of the Guomindang in sincere and moving words to attempt to save the situation. Please also consider whether or not you should request a meeting with Chiang [Kaishek] and Chen [Cheng] at the appropriate moment. In all areas of activities we should mobilize the majority of the people to get involved (both Party and non-Party). The activities of Madame Chiang are worthy of attention.' On the Guilin side, please tell [Li] Kenong to do this too.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 195, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. 1. The thrust of this remark was no doubt to stress that, in view of her relatively moderate and conciliatory position on domestic affairs, and her pro-American sentiments, Mme. Chiang might well be a positive influence. 546

To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Main Points of the Reply to the Telegram from He [Yingqin] and Bai [ChongxiP (November 6, 1940)

The draft of the reply to the telegram from He and Bai has already been drawn up. It says at the beginning that their "telegram of the 19th" has been received; as the matter is of vital importance and the nation is in an extremely critical situation, we have, taking the interest of the whole country into account and with a view to the salvation of the nation, discussed it through telegrams many times. Having reached a consensus, we are sending this telegram specially in reply and hope it will be submitted to the supreme commander for his instructions to follow. The remaining part is divided into (a) operations; (b) defense stations; (c) size of the army; (d) provisions; and (e) the overall orientation of unity and resistance to Japan. Five points in all. Point A explains that our army has always taken it as its one and only mission to carry out the national policy, obey orders, and persist in the War of Resistance; it then reviews briefly our past experience; finally it says that it is true, as their respected telegram has pointed out, we have had some incidents of discord with other armies, and it has been a painful experience for us; every time that happened, we reported in written form to the higher authorities the causes of the discord and put forward proposals as to how they could be eliminated. The incident in northern Jiangsu, which occurred not long ago, has been related in detail in our telegram sent on the 21st. The incident in southern Shandong has commanded our serious attention because of the complexity of the causes, so we ask them, apart from subjecting the subordinate troops to the orders, to send men over for a thorough investigation. Point B states in a brief manner that we have every reason to obey the orders from the Center, but it is also proper to describe to the higher authorities the awkward situations we subordinates are landed

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 191-92, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 1. This message is part of the orchestration of a major campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to influence policy and sway public opinion, in concert with the reply of November 9 to the Guomindang order of October 19. It should therefore be read in conjunction with the numerous other documents issued between November 6 and 16, which form a consistent pattern. 547

548

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

in. Our troops stationed in Central China are composed mostly of local people who have joined in the army to defend their homeland, so it would be hard to persuade them to go far away from home; that is why we proposed to the Center through Zhou Enlai and sought the approval that we move only the main forces to the north while letting the local troops stay where they are. We have just received the telegram ordering us to complete the maneuver within a stated time. Yet we request that the Center permit us to give consideration to public opinion and sentiment at the same time that we carry out the order, so that apart from the original main forces, a painstaking effort can be made to persuade the more concentrated local troops to obey orders and move northward. We also request an extension of the time limit so as to allow more time for the persuasion to take effect, and to prevent the occurrence of any further mishaps. Point C explains the reasons we were compelled to expand our army in waging a war of resistance behind enemy lines. The fact is that, of an army 500,000 strong, only 45,000 are provisioned, and no one, however clever, can make bricks without straw, so there was no other alternative but to request an expansion of the given size of our army. The Center has, accepting a fait accompli, approved the expansion in its draft resolution; only we wish to have it carried out at an earlier date so as to strengthen the morale of the army. Point D relates the fact that we have received no ammunition or medicines for fourteen months and asks for such supplies, and other such matters. Finally, pointE states that war in the Pacific is pressing closer and closer each day, which affords a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for a war of resistance. In the meantime, Japan has intensified its effort to lure us into surrender; Germany is trying hard to make peace; certain people at home have stirred up an antiCommunist high tide to clear the way for capitulation and joined with foreign forces in instigation, with the intent of putting an end to the War of Resistance by the so-called joint Sino-Japanese Communist suppression. We are giving our all on the battlefield, ready to lay down our lives for the interests of the nation; what we want is only a nation in unity and resistance, free from the disaster of capitulation and disintegration. It is requested that this be passed on to higher authorities and adopted. Please let us know quickly what you think so that we may revise and send it out within the next few days.

Regulations of the Military and Political Committees (Draft) (November 7, 1940)

To Peng, Yang, and Luo, Lu, and Zuo: 1 Please discuss and make suggestions regarding the following document so that we can make the final announcement. I. The guerrilla warfare environment and the separate operations of various military units demand a certain degree of collective leadership and a certain degree of collective command. 2. For this purpose, a military and political committee is to be set up at army, division, brigade, regiment, and column, detachment, and subdistrict levels (all military and political committees organized in the past jointly by the military and the local Party and administration must be renamed as the Party military and political committee so as to distinguish them), to serve as the organ of collective leadership at each level. 3. The military and political committee at each level is to be made up of the commander, the political commissar, the political director, and the chief of staff, as well as the main leaders at the next lower level, the total number of people not to exceed nine or ten. Suggestions are to be put forward at each level, and appointments made by higher levels. Chairmanship of the military and political committee is generally to be held by the political commissar. 4. The military and political committee is the planning organ for carrying out instructions from higher levels, deciding on the main policies of a given unit, and arranging as well as discussing work tasks. It may discuss and decide upon all military, political, Party, and logistical tasks having to do with its own unit. The Our source for this text is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 576-78, where it is reproduced from a copy held in the Central Archives. These regulations were fonnally promulgated on February 7, 1941. The changes in the final version as compared to this draft were relatively slight, and, unlike the text which appears here, it does not bear Mao's signature, so we have not included it in this volume. I. This telegram was addressed by Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai;

Yang Shangkun, then secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee; and Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Zuo Quan, who were, respectively, head and deputy head of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Anny in the field and deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army. 549

550

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

military and political committee, on the other hand, is not the executive body, and its decisions should be handed over to the various departments to be carried out. Decisions regarding military work, for example, should be handed over to the commanding headquarters to be carried out, and decisions regarding political work should be handed over to the political department for execution, and so on. The military and political committee should be discussing the more important issues; it is wrong to hand over all the minutiae and minor issues to the military and political

committee for discussion. 5. The military and political committee should approve the promotion and transfer of cadres. Punishment of Party members, acceptance of membership into the Party, and other such matters, however, are still to be discussed and decided upon by the Party Affairs Committee. 6. Decisions of the military and political committee are not to be issued in the name of the military and political committee but, rather, should be issued by the commanding organs or the political organs, depending on the nature of the respective decision. Reports from lower levels to higher levels should, likewise, not be made in the name of the military and political committee, but should rather be made separately by each department. 7. When, in discussion of certain issues, the military and political committee encounters debate and cannot reach an agreement, a report should be submitted to higher levels for decision. With regard to urgent matters, however, the commanding officer and the political commissar still retain final decision-making authority, although they should report the various dissenting opinions to higher levels. 8. The military and political committee at each level is to meet at least once a month and at most twice a month. Failure to convene a meeting without good reason is not permitted. 9. It should be explained to the cadres that the military and political committee is established for the purpose of adapting to the scattered circumstances of guerrilla warfare and achieving the result of collective leadership and unity among the cadres, but that the army is still a centralized organization, and subordinates should absolutely carry out orders from their superior commanders, political commissars, and higher-level departments. Lower-level military and political committees do not have the right to discuss refusing to carry out orders, and different departments at the same level should, likewise, carry out orders from above. The phony democratic sentiment, which holds that absolutely everything must go through the military and political committee, is wrong and should be prevented and corrected. The establishment of the military and political committee by no means weakens the system of individual responsibility. 10. The authority to explain and revise these regulations rests with the Central Military Commission. II. These regulations are approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

To Zhou Enlai, on the A"angement of Various Tasks Following the Sending Out of the Telegram of the 9th 1 (November 9, 1940)

I. The wording of the "telegram of the 9th" was finally fixed today, and it has already been sent for encoding. Tomorrow it can be sent to your office simultaneously by the war report station and by telegraph, and your office can turn it over to He and Bai. We have not sent it directly, so when you receive it please correct any mistaken characters. 2. A distinction should be clearly made between the military units north and south of the Yangzi River. It has been decided that the main forces south of the Yangzi are to move north as a demonstration of concession, and it has been decided to request that the forces north of the Yangzi not be redeployed for the time being. Using the words "for the time being" is so as to give Chiang [Kaishek] face, and phrasing it "not be redeployed" is so as to quash Chiang's illusions. In your office's external propaganda, please stress the various reasons against redeployment (the telegram has already listed them: first, the ancestors' tombs; second, it is certainly not wrong to go along with Chiang's "Letter to Fellow Countrymen in the Occupied Areas"; third, there would be no protection for the families; fourth, the five calamities of North China). 2 Also, the telegram of the 9th, in your heartfelt words, hints that ifthe other side attacks our side will have to defend itself, putting it in terms of the saying about the snipe and the clam and the fisherman. 3 Please also publicize this externally, in the hopes of stopping their attacks.

Our source forthis telegram is Mao adongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 201-2, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. As in the case of the telegram dated October 19 from He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, often referred to in the texts translated above as the "hao telegram," the reply sent to the Guomindang on November 9 is here called in the Chinese text the ·~;a telegram." The use of these characters to designate respectively the 19th and the 9th of the month is purely conventional, and we have therefore not translated or transcribed them here. 2. The five calamities are listed in the telegram from Zhu De and others, also dated November 9, which follows. 3. The reference is to a Chinese saying frequently quoted by Mao, to the effect that when the snipe grapples with the clam, only the fisherman benefits. See above, the texts of June 10 and September 28, 1939. 551

552

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

3. On the tenth, Ye Xiyi4 will go to Shangrao [in Jiangxi] to meet with Gu. The plan is to talk about such conditions as expenses for moving the troops, supplements for military necessities, guaranteed safe passage, and a short stop in southern Jiangsu. 4. It is reported that Li Zongren is about to go from Guangxi to Lihuang5 for a meeting. If he passes through Chongqing, please have a sincere talk with him. Whether or not Tang Enbo has moved, we have just sent an inquiry to Luoyang and have not yet received a reply. Please investigate in Chongqing and report. Whether or not Tang has moved will be an indication of whether or not Chiang is resolved to attack. We judge that, before our telegraphic reply expressing our attitude has been sent, Tang would probably just make preparations to move and would not actually move. Therefore we should find a way to act that will cause him not to move. Please consider whether or not we can indicate to Zhang Chong6 that if Tang advances east it will be very difficult to avoid hostilities, that if the southern Anhui forces move north it will also be hard to avoid unexpected turns, and that our side will not take responsibility for any of this. Can you inform the two Mas and others of the seriousness of the situation and ask them to find a way to ease the situation and keep the two armies of Tang [Enbo] and Tan from moving east? (Tan Lianfang' s7 two divisions reached Shangcheng and Gushi two weeks ago, and they are still resting and reorganizing. Tan and his two division commanders, Zhang and Lin, have all gone to Lihuang for meetings.) 5. Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi] has already reached Yancheng and right now is meeting with [Huang] Kecheng and Chen Yi in preparing to deal with attacks by Tang and Tan. They plan, if Tang and Tan attack, to move to take care of Han Deqin immediately, which is also a matter of serious concern for Chiang and Gu [Zhutong]. Please consider making an appropriate gesture that might put off their attacks.

4. Xiyi is the zi ofYe Ting. 5. A xian in western Anhui. 6. Zhang Chong ( 1899-l980) was the commander of the New Third Anny. 7. Tan Lianfang (d. 1958) was at this time the commander of the Guomindang 84th Army.

Telegram from Zhu De and Others1 to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi (November 9, 1940)

To Chief of Staff Ye Jianying of the Eighteenth Army Group in Chongqing, to be forwarded immediately to Chief of the General Staff He Jingzhi and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Bai Jiansheng for their inspection: We have received and respectfully read the telegram (of October 19) from you two gentlemen, which was forwarded to us by Chief of Staff Ye. Since this is a

matter of crucial importance arising at a critical moment for our national survival, and in consideration of the overall interests and to save the nation from peril, after discussions among all of us via telegram, we have reached a consensus and are hereby sending you our response and respectfully await your further instructions. We beg of you as well to transmit this message to the Generalissimo for his honorable examination and venerable direction. I. With regard to operations. All troops in our army have always regarded as their sole task adhering to national policy, obeying orders, and persisting in the War of Resistance. Over the course of the past four years, we have resisted great numbers of enemy troops and regained large amounts oflost territory, and all such battle victories are there for the whole nation to see. They have also been the object of clear orders from the Supreme Command, issued repeatedly, for commendation. The recent Hundred Regiments Offensive in North China is such an example. Two and a half months have passed since its beginning on August 20, and it has just entered the second stage. We have received explicit orders from the Supreme Command on this, which spurred us on no end, making the entire army feel moved and inspired. Another example that also took place in the most recent

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 310-1 S, where it is reproduced from the text published on November 17, 1940, in Xin Zhonghua bao, with corrections based on the documentary collection Liuda yilai. 1. Although Mao's signatw-e does not appear on this telegram, a note to the text in Mao Zedong wenji confinns that he drafted it. For Mao to have signed it would not have been appropriate, for that would have implied lowering himself to the same level as He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, to whom this reply to their telegraro of October 19 is addressed. Not having either Chiang's or Mao's name on these two documents also left both sides room for maneuver. 553

554

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

period is the campaigns in eastern and southern Anhui, in which. the enemy's offensives were shattered. Such things are enumerated here not because we dare to brag about our own meritorious achievements but, rather, out of a desire to make clear that our resolve to follow national policy and obey orders and to fight to the finish to defend the nation and the country actually is in effect throughout the entire army, from top to bottom, and that even the slightest deviation would not be permitted. There was once an instance of discord between one unit and that of another army, as pointed to in your honorable telegram, and mention of it causes heartfelt sorrow·. We have long since gone on record repeatedly to explain clearly the reasons for its occurrence and the measures to ameliorate it. As for the recent incident in northern Jiangsu, we have explained everything in detail by telegram on the 21st to the Supreme Command. The southern Shandong incident also had complex causes which merit special attention. Apart from ordering our troops in this region to obey your orders and to act with restraint, our intention is to ask the Center to select and dispatch an impartial high official to make a thorough investigation. If the blame is found to belong with our army, we will certainly not shield them but are, rather, willing to accept punishment under the laws of the land. If blame is found to lie with the other side, we pray that it will be handled in like manner so as to clarify responsibility in the matter. As the ancients are known to have said, hearing both sides provides clarity, whereas hearing only one yields darkness. In any event, the highest value of using reason lies in arriving at justice. Especially when fighting a resistance war under extreme duress in the enemy's rear, more friction means that many more difficulties, so that no one, unless he fails to take the interests of the whole into consideration and makes it his business to create friction, is unwilling to do away with disputes and unite to face the enemy. For this reason, we advocate a thorough investigation into the facts of the case in the hopes of putting a final end to disputes for the sake of the War of Resistance. In the event that we are fortunate enough to be granted your approval, we entreat you to see to the implementation. 2. With regard to defense stations. As for the measures enumerated in the Center's guidelines,2 ever since they were relayed by Comrade Zhou Enlai between July and August we have taken them as the Center's will and, as such, that which must be followed. Yet a subordinate's difficulties that he is reluctant to mention are better reported to his superiors. The fact is that most of the troops in the enemy's rear in Central China are local people organized for the purpose of resisting the enemy bandits and defending their homeland. They are so tied to the tombs of their ancestors, their farmland and dwellings, their parents, wives, and children that for them to put aside what the enemy is doing right in front of their eyes in brutally raping, burning, and pillaging, and to go instead to far away North China would be something difficult in the extreme. As for the Supreme Command's in-

2. "Center" refers, of course, to the central authorities of the Guomindang.

NOVEMBER /940

555

structions as conveyed in the Lushan talk3 and the open letter to the people in the occupied territories,• they have been following them to the letter with utmost sincerity. For them to be suddenly ordered to leave their native places and forced onto the road is a miserable thing indeed. Ever since the Pingjiang massacre' and the Queshan massacre,6 all over in the rear areas of the New Fourth Army, such as in southern Jiangxi, western Fujian, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region, eastern Hubei, western Anhui, and southern Henan, their family members and the rear personnel have been flagrantly trampled upon without the slightest protection. And now that the various troops in Central China are about to be moved north, they are extremely afraid offollowing the same disastrous course, so that to a man they turn pale at its very mention. All the more because the North China region has been struck at once by the five calamities of flood, drought, windstorms, insect invasions, and enemy aggression, the people are subsisting on leaves, and many are starving to death. In this area both the military and civilians are having severe difficulty carrying on; some have asked to be moved south, and some have asked to be transferred elsewhere. For our part we have been making efforts to stop this, urging them to stick it out through the hardships, and it truly would be extremely difficult to accommodate any troops. For all these various reasons, Enlai was asked to inform the Center and to request permission for the various units both north and south of the Yangzi to remain where they are to fight the War of Resistance. Once the enemy has been driven out of the country and the War of Resistance has been victorious, there will naturally be transfers of troops so as to have concentrated defense sites. Now we have received the telegram with instructions to move north by a certain date. We have weighed the matter over and over in our minds and believe that there is carrying out orders and there is deferring to public opinion and sentiment, and request that the Center take both into consideration. As far as the regular forces south of the Yangzi are concerned, our intention is to make every effort to persuade them to take the interests of the whole into consideration and move north as ordered. Still we sincerely hope that the Center will extend the time limit so that explanations may be made in depth and so that further untoward incidents, which would only add to our already considerable guilt, can be avoided.

3. The reference is to Chiang Kaishek's talk of July 17, 1937, from Lushan, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in which he called for a resolute war of resistance in response to the Japanese aggression. For Mao's reaction at the time see, in Volume V, the text ofJuly 23, 1937. 4. In this letter, dated August 13, 1938, Chiang declared that, in thirteen months of war, military, strategic, spiritual, and diplomatic victories had been achieved and he called on the people of the occupied territories to struggle resolutely to the end. 5. For details on this incident, which took place on June 12, 1939, see the relevant note to the text dated August 1, 1939, ''The Reactionaries Must Be Punished in Accordance with the Law of the Land." 6. The Queshan massacre involved a surprise attack by Guomindang forces on a Communist guerrilla column in Shandong, in which more than 400 soldiers were killed.

556

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

As for the troops north of the River, forthe time being we wish to request that they be exempted from transfer, to hold them responsible for strictly maintaining military discipline, to make agreements with friendly armies, to intensify counterattacks on the enemy, to cooperate with the fighting at the front, all of which is so as to avoid acting in undue haste and inviting more trouble. We have expended exhausting efforts in this matter. Wishing to take the interests of the localities into account, we were afraid that we might be going against orders from the Center; desiring to follow orders, we feared that we might lose the local people's hearts and minds. And the victory of the War of Resistance depends entirely upon the support of the people, which is something of which you two gentlemen are well aware, as your lofty vantage point affords you farsighted vision. Right now is a time when both Chinese traitors and puppet troops are acting outrageously and rumors are rife, so it is most advantageous to coordinate on all sides and unite against the enemy so as to avoid being tricked by the enemy and bringing on ourselves the disaster of fragmenting into a million pieces. What must not be allowed is becoming pressed to the limit so that mutual agitation arises, which would lead to mutual defeat and damage to both sides. Such a situation is not the original wish ofthe Center, and it likewise violates our original intention. We would be the snipe and clam to the enemy's fisherman, the result would be in violation of our intent, and by that time it would be too late to regret. These words are straight from our hearts, and we wanted very much to share them with you two gentlemen. The two of you gentlemen have minds as open as a valley and always have the overall situation at heart, so you are surely capable of maintaining harmony and stability in remedying the current difficult situation, and we need not go on at length here. 3. With regard to the authorized strength of the army. Because our forces are isolated in the enemy's rear, if we are to maximize our destruction of enemy troops and fulfill the strategic tasks entrusted to us by the Generalissimo, we have to act according to the Three People's Principles as well as the principles expressed in the Guidelines for the War of Resistance and Building the Country,' to rouse the popular masses and organize guerrilla forces. For this reason we have exceeded our original recruitment figures, but this close interrelationship between the task and the organization [of troops] is something that can hardly be avoided. Yet of our current 500,000 troops, only 450,000 are provisioned, and no one, however clever, can make bricks without straw, so we have had no choice but to seek help from the popular masses. As a result, in places in the enemy's rear where there are only enemy bandits and no friendly armies, after driving out the bandits we have set up anti-Japanese political regimes, created anti-Japanese base areas, used the clothing and food ofthe popular masses to provide them with their own armed forces to resist the cruel and vicious bandits and defend their own homelands, so there is

7. This document, promulgated by a provisional congress of the Guomindang in March 1938, dealt with military, political, economic, and diplomatic policies in the war against Japan and contained a guarantee of basic rights to the citizens.

NOVEMBER 1940 557

truly no cause for much criticism in all this. Our clothing is spare and our food meager, but we fight with all our might and have suffered the worst possible hardships known in this world. Yet we are not legally recognized, nor are we assisted by the rear areas, and such spiritual suffering is painful in the extreme. This is why we took action to ask for permission from the Center to expand our military organization. Also with the interests of the whole in mind, the Center granted us permission to expand as necessary, as indicated in the proposal, and, upon hearing the news, our army was deeply pleased and jubilant. What we seek here is that it be carried out at the earliest possible date, and we also request that figures for expansion be appropriately increased so as to provide comfort to the minds of the officers and soldiers at the front, and also to train for the nation a reliable force in the War of Resistance. Not only is it the case that the bow lost by a man ofChu will be found by a man of Chu,8 but it is also true that we harbor no intention here of comparing relative merits. Our true purpose is, rather, to defend the country and our homelands, which is precisely why we trust in the judgment of a great leader. 4. With regard to supplies. The hardships in the enemy's rear are as described above, but what we lack in particular is ammunition, medical supplies, and so on. For the last fourteen months our army has not been issued a single bullet or a single dose of medicine. There are those with only four or five rounds of ammunition left in their guns, and some whose wounds have been treated with medication only once or twice, so that we have had to rely mainly upon hand-to-hand combat, and leave the wounded to their own devices. Although we are well aware that the Center also finds itself in dire circumstances, we are compelled to report to higher levels the special difficulties of our troops in the hope that we may attain some modicum of assistance in the midst of our trials. As for various other supplies, we have previously made a detailed list and submitted it, and we respectfully request that these be dealt with together. 5. With regard to the border regions. The case of the twenty-three xian in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been left in a state of indecision for more than four years now. Recently, however, more than 200,000troops have been stationed around the border region, and civilians have been mobilized to build five blockade lines. They start from Ningxia in the west, go along the Jingshui River in the south, and end on the banks of the Yellow River in the east, and cover several provinces. The project is on a huge scale and the expenditures are enormous, amounting to the building of another Great Wall. Yet the young students traveling a long way from the north and personnel from our army going back and forth have

8. This is an allusion to a story recounted in the Shuo yuan of the Han dynasty writer Liu Xiang, about a king of Chu who lost a bow. His attendants looked everywhere for it, but the king said, "The bow of a man of Chu will be found by a man of Chu, so why bother looking for it?" This has become a commonly used expression meaning that such losses and gains are of no importance so long as both parties are on the same side.

558 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

been detained, assassinated, or confined in concentration camps. These roads have become the object of alarm and suspicion; nobody talks about a large-scale attack, only about preparing for a compromise. Such talk goes against our grain, but it is most difficult to refute. But because the case is still pending, and there is the blockade on top of that, weakness lends wings to rumors, suspicions can easily arise, and it seems hardly surprising that it should be so. It stands to reason that we should sincerely implore the Center to provide a resolution to the suspended case and put an end to the blockade so as to eliminate the doubts of the troops and the people and strengthen the basis of our cooperation. These are truly simple things to accomplish. 6. With regard to the grand plan of uniting for a war of resistance. We believe that, as far as the War of Resistance is concerned, today is truly a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to win final victory. Given that an expanded and prolonged imperialist war has already become a reality, the Japanese bandits are busy dealing with the serious situation in the Pacific, so if a national policy of uniting to fight a resistance war can be maintained without compromising halfway or courting the disaster of fragmentation, then under the leadership of our highest leader and the Central Government, our Chinese nation is bound to be able to find the way toward independence and liberation. Because of the various international and domestic conspiracies taking place over the past few months, however, we strongly feel that there are words we cannot keep to ourselves. We have heard it said repeatedly that the Japanese bandits are scheming for China to surrender, that they are trying both soft measures and tough ones, applying lures and pressure at the same time. Germany, on the other hand, has adopted a policy of persuasion, wishing to seduce China into joining the three-nation alliance. A certain number of people inside the country, moreover, are again plotting a so-called anti-Communist upsurge in an attempt to pave the way for surrender. There are those working handin-glove both within the country and without in an attempt to bring to an end the War of Resistance by means ofa so-called joint Sino-Japanese "suppression of the Communists," to replace the War of Resistance with a civil war, to replace independence with surrender, unity with fragmentation, and to turn light into darkness. The situation is so perilous and the plot so vicious that everyone is discussing it, and people's hearts are filled with terror. This critical situation is truly unprecedented in its severity. We have been doing battle from place to place all our lives and do not begrudge spilling our blood and dying ten thousand deaths for the sake of our country. We seek only unity within the country, not courting fragmentation, continuation of the War of Resistance, and sticking to national policy. For this reason we are doing our best to act according to all instructions from the Supreme Command and to speedily overcome the weaknesses of our subordinates. We also implore the Center to clarify its guidelines with regard to the current situation and trends, refuse to participate in the international conspiracy, check the forces of reaction within the country, and refute the rumors about a joint "Communist suppression," civil war, and surrender, so as to ease the minds of all the nation's

NOVEMBER 1940 559

troops and people. It is further hoped that politics will be reformed, corruption will be purged, the people's livelihood will be improved, principles will be applied, and that the emphasis in the War of Resistance will be laid upon the foundation of self-reliance. All these are crucial factors in the success or failure ofthe nation and its people, and in the lives of our children and grandchildren for generations to come, so that, sensing the danger in our hearts, we dare not remain silent. We respectfully implore you to transmit this to the Supreme Command for appropriate consideration and implementation. We await most anxiously and respectfully your further orders. Commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Army Group

Zhu De

Deputy Commander-in-chief

Peng Dehuai

Commander of the New Fourth Army

Ye Ting

Deputy Commander

Xiang Ying

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying on the Problem of Asking Gu Zhutong at the Negotiations to Stop the Two Armies of Tang and Tan from Advancing Eastward (November 10, 1940)

When [Y e] Xiyi 1 meets Gu, please ask that Gu send a telegram to Chiang [Kaishek] to stop the armies of Tang Enbo and Tan Lianfang from advancing eastward. Otherwise this will lead to hostilities, for which the other side will be responsible. Two divisions of Tan's army have already reached Shangcheng and Gushi [in southeastern Henan], and Tan and all of his division commanders have gathered in Lihuang in preparation for an attack on eastern Anhui. Nine divisions of Tang's army at Nanyang are planning to move eastward, and the situation is very tense. Please question Gu as to the motivation for, on the one hand, talking peace in northern Jiangsu and in southern Anhui ordering us to move northward while, on the other hand, deploying a large army of200,000 to advance eastward. Does this mean that the other side is already preparing to effect a split? During the negotiations Xiyi should place this overall situation in the number one position. All the rest are secondary questions.

Our sow-ce for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 203, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. I.e., Ye Ting. (See above, the first text of November 9, 1940.) 560

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai on Work Arrangements Following the Telegram of the 9th (November 13, 1940)

In accordance with the Central Committee's November 7 directive and the political position taken in the "telegram of the 9th" in reply to He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi], jointly signed by Zhu, Peng, Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying] (this telegram will be sent out to you within the next few days), the decision has been taken to wage a defensive battle in self-protection against the military attacks launched by the Guomindang in Central China. With regard to our military forces, except for redeploying the troops of Chen [Yi] and Luo [Ruiqing], all units in North China will not move for the time being. Apart from this, in Chongqing and other places united front activities shall proceed for the purpose of gaining a politically reasonable and advantageous position and keeping the War of Resistance going for a period of time. This possibility has not yet been altogether lost.

Our source for this text is Mao Udong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 205, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 56/

Directive on Launching a Large-scale Antisu"ender and Anti-Civil War Movement to Counter Chiang Kaishek's Anti-Communist High Tide (November 15, 1940)

I. In accordance with the Central Committee's November 7 directive on the current situation and the political stance adopted in the "telegram of the 9th" in reply to He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi],jointly signed by Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying], 1 with regard to Chiang Kaishek's present antiCommunist attack, it has been decided to adopt a policy of concessions in southem Anhui (i.e., to move northward) and a policy of self-defense in Central China and on a nationwide basis to launch a large-scale movement against surrender and civil war. This is in order to win over the middle-of-the-road forces, to strike a blow against the plots and provocations of He Yingqin's pro-Japanese faction, to neutralize Chiang Kaishek's anti-Communist assault, and to keep the resistance to Japan and the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party going for a period of time so as to gain for ourselves a reasonable and favorable position in the country as a whole.2 2. Chiang has already resolved to put pressure on Central China, so we must therefore prepare ourselves actively for self-defense. But Chiang also faces some difficulties in his attacks: First, if we adopt a moderate attitude, He Yingqin will be deprived of a pretext for his provocations (although other pretexts can always be found), and Chiang Kaishek and Bai Chongxi will have to take into consideration the position of the middle-of-the-road forces. For this reason we should make known very widely the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 207-9, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 1. See above, the translation of this text. 2. This directive was issued in the aftermath of the Communist victory at Huangqiao and of the "October 19 message" it called forth, when the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi was seeking to calm the situation and consolidate its gains, and the danger to Xiang Ying and the New Fourth Anny in southern Anhui was growing. Mao is here offering to move the southern forces north of the river in return for cessation of the Guomindang moves against the improved position of the Communists in central and northern Jiangsu. 562

NOVEMBER /940

563

contents of the November 9 telegram so as to deprive Chiang, He, and Bai of their political capital. Second, Chiang Kaishek is very much afraid of the Eighth Route Army's moving southward and especially of our striking out suddenly from Xi 'an. So we should spread propaganda to the effect that, if the other side attacks the New Fourth Army, the Eighth Route Army cannot sit idly by and watch without going to its rescue and request that the other side halt the actions of their twenty-nine divisions, because otherwise the Eighth Route Army will not let the New Fourth Army take a beating. This sort of attitude should be appropriately disseminated all around as an offensive stance toward the diehards [X][X][X], so that they will have something to fear and not dare act foolishly. Third, Chiang Kaishek is afraid that we will not move from southern Anhui but, rather, disrupt his rear area. For this reason we must, on the one hand, make earnest preparations for moving our southern Anhui troops northward so that this can be offered as a condition in exchange for the other side to ease up on its attacks and, at the same time, demand that the other side promise to halt all military actions in Central China in exchange for our side's withdrawal of its troops from southern Anhui. Fourth, both Chiang Kaishek and Gu Zhutong are afraid that we might wipe out Han Deqin. Hence we should spread the following impression all over: that we have resolved the Northern Jiangsu Incident peacefully in accordance with orders and will let bygones be bygones, but if Tang [Enbo],3 Li [Pinxian],4 Huo (Shouyi),5 and Mo (Dehong) 6 do not halt their attacks, we will have no choice but to attack Han Deqin. This impression should be created especially by beginning directly with Han himself and with Gu Zhutong, as an indication that we can continue to protect Han Deqin's safety, but in exchange for halting the attacks of Tang, Li, Huo, and Mo. Fifth, Chiang Kaishek faces another difficulty in his attacks, which is that until he has actually settled on any conditions with the Japanese (if conditions were agreed upon, the whole situation would be greatly changed), his theater of operations for Communist suppression is full of inconveniences. His large forces advancing eastward will have difficulty getting through the two Japanese blockade lines, the Huainan railroad and the Tianjin-Pukou railroad; his large forces advancing northward would also have trouble getting through the enemy's fortress at Huohe and the enemy bases to the north. If they were to use only small units, such

3. Regarding Tang Enbo, see above, the relevant note to the text of September 19, 1940. 4. Regarding Li Pinxian, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940. 5. Huo Shouyi, a native of Liaoning, had served under Zhang Xueliang and was a divisional commander in the Northeast Army.

6. Mo Dehong (1894-1951). a native of Guangxi, had participated in the Northern Ex· pedition and in the campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Red Anny. He was the commander of the I38th Anny.

564

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

as those of Huo, Mo, and others, our guerrilla detachments would be more than sufficient to deal with them. For this reason, with regard to all forces that are approaching near at hand, such as thoseofHuo, Mo, He [Zhuguo), Sun [Tongxian],7 and Ma [Biao],8 our propaganda should stress that there should not be civil war in the face of a great enemy. In addition, united front work is to be intensified. When their smaller units (such as those of Huo and Mo) attack, we will use only our multitudinous guerrilla forces to pester them (such guerrilla forces play a role primarily as propaganda teams) and avoid doing battle with them face to face and damaging our relationship with the Guizhou faction and the Northeast Army, so as to leave room to bargain with them in the future. At the same time, it should be explained that eastern Anhui is a defense station assigned to the New Fourth Army by the late Chairman Liao,9 and that northeastern Anhui was recognized by the commander of the guards as a guerrilla area for Peng's forces. In sum, in these areas we want to ensure that our military forces and the people have plenty of plausible arguments and the attackers haven't a leg to stand on. 3. If we do a good job in all these respects, it will be possible to beat back the anti-Communist high tide this time, even though we certainly should not figure that Chiang will give up his policy of suppressing us (this is absolutely impossible) and must even be prepared to deal with the darkest possible scenario, which is surrender and a pincer attack. Please give serious thought to the above opinions and act accordingly.

7. Regarding He and Sun, see above, the relevant note to the text of April 12, 1940. 8. Ma Biao ( 1885-1948), a native of Gansu, was a Muslim. He had recently commanded the Guomindang Eighth Cavalry Division, but in August 1940, he was sent to northern Anhui, where he fought the Japanese. 9. The reference is to Liao Lei (1890-1939), a native of Guangxi, who had been the principal commander, and governor, of Anhui. Until his death from illness in October 1939, the Communists had been on reasonably good terms with him-better, in any case, than with his strongly anti-Communist successor, Li Pinxian.

It Is of the Greatest Importance to Conduct United Front Work Among the Huangpu Faction of Military Men (November 16, 1940)

In the recent Northern Jiangsu Incident, the Tax and Garrison Regiment' did not participate in the anti-Communist battles, although the majority of the officers in this regiment are graduates of the Huangpu [Academy]. In the past, when there was a confrontation with Zhu Huaibing in North China, one division also did not participate in the anti-Communist warfare, and there were likewise some Huangpu graduates among the officers in that division. Comrade Wang Shiying, 2 head of our liaison office stationed with Yan [Xishan]'s forces, is able to do very good united front work with the senior cadres in the Central Arrny there (Hu Zongnan) who are Huangpu graduates. All this shows that the long-standing idea in our Party and our army that Huangpu graduates are uniformly to be regarded as an anti-Communist clique is wrong and is harmful. Given the current critical situation, it is a matter of urgency that this way of thinking be changed, that advantage be taken of every opportunity to conduct united front work with military men who are Huangpu graduates. They should not be provoked but, rather, should be inspired with the idea of the supremacy of the nation so that they will refuse to surrender to the Japanese and so that they will adopt a neutral or passive attitude toward the anti-Communist fight. This has great significance in reversing the cur-

rent perilous situation. MaoZedong

ZhuDe

Wang Jiaxiang

Our source for this text is Mao Udongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 581-82. where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. Commanded by Chen Taiyun; see above, the relevant note to the text of November 4, 1940. 2. Wang Shiying (1905-1968), a native of Shanxi, joined the Chinese Communist Pany in 1925. He graduated from the Huangpu Academy and served in the late 1920s and early 1930s under Yang Hucheng and Yan Xishan. In 1935. he became head of the Intelligence

Department of the Chinese Communist Party in North China. In J938, he took up an administrative post in the Eighth Route Army. 565

The Tasks of the Troops in North China This Winter (November 16, 1940)

To all units in North China and Shandong: Under the present situation, important domestic incidents are about to take place, and the enemy's "mopping-up" operations this winter will be even more cruel. The tasks of the troops in North China this winter are as follows: I. Persist in the War of Resistance and tight against the enemy's winter "moppingup" operations. 2. Carry out a winter military recruitment campaign and add enough soldiers to the presently existing units. It would be even better if we could establish supplementary battallions. But in the work of recruiting soldiers, attention should be paid to manpower in the base areas, and more recruitment should be done in border areas and densely populated regions. 3. Efforts are to be made to gain time for rest and reconsolidation of the ranks. Carry on fighting and reconsolidation at the same time and have all or most of the troops rested and reconsolidated during the intervals of fighting against the "mopping up." Make sure that our main forces are able to sustain the fighting at the same time as they maintain their energies so as to deal with possible sudden incidents. 4. Strengthen the political work and transmit in depth the Center's evaluation of the current situation and its various policies. Make sure that all officers and soldiers unite as one and prevent the occurrence of such sentiments as pessimism, disappointment, and hopelessness because of increased difficulties of resistance in the enemy's rear and tensions in the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists. Be on guard, at the same time, against possible opportunistic sabotage within our army by Japanese bandit agents and Guomindang spy agents and prevent the repeated occurrence of ultraleft mistakes. 5. Strengthen the unity of the cadres and the unity of the Party. In a difficult environment, cadres must be dealt with in a correct relationship. Those who are indeed irresponsible and consequently unable to fulfill their duties should certainly be criticized and punished, but those who cannot discharge their duties be-

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 579-80, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 566

NOVEMBER 1940 567

cause of objective difficulties or capabilities should not be funher attacked. We must bear in mind the lessons learned when opposing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign in the Central Soviet Area, where many of the cadres who were unable to fulfill theirtasks because of objective difficulties were attacked and made to feel utterly hopeless. Now with increased difficulties, the spirit of sharing a common fate and common hardships with the cadres must be emphasized. MaoZedong Wang Jiaxiang

ZhuDe Tan Zheng

Deployment for the Campaign in Northern Jiangsu (November 19, 1940, between 9:00 and II :00 P.M.)

To Hu [Fu], Chen [Yi], and Huang [Kecheng], and for the information ofYe [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: We have taken note of your telegram. I. It is possible that the general situation will change. Right now we are trying to stop the attack of Tang [Enbo] and Li [Pinxian]. 2. For the short period of time immediately ahead, your general orientation is to consolidate the troops actively and wait calmly for changes. As long as the troops can fight, passivity can be turned into activity. The Huangqiao campaign' is proof of this. 3. The main forces of the Fifth Column should be placed between Han [Deqin]'s and Huo [Shouyi]'s troops to cut off their communications. Under no circumstances can they be allowed to join together. If this can be achieved, the attitude of Huo 's division may change for the better, and Han Deqin will also compromise. 4. In order to achieve this objective, you should set out at once to prepare for a local battle. That is, the main forces of the Fifth Column are to set out from Donggou and Yilin, take the two points of Fenggucun and Cheqiao by storm, and after that proceed to take the areas of Pingqiao, Yangnian, Huangpu, and Anfeng, and fight through to link up eastern Anhui and northern Jiangsu 2 You must complete preparations within five days after the arrival of this telegram and then wait for the order to attack. At present, Hu Zongnan has concentrated four divisions and is planning to attack our border region in central Shaanxi. After Hu has begun his attack, we will have reason to attack the aforementioned areas. 3 The movement of Hu's diviOur source for this text is Mao ledong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 583-84, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

I. Sec above, the relevant note to the text of October 9, 1940, and the discussion of this episode in the Introduction. 2. The places named here are in Jiangsu and run roughly south to north in the vicinity of the Grand Canal. Controlling them would effectively prevent the unwanted link-up between Huo Shouyi's forces from Anhui and those of Han Deqin, whose hcadquaners were located in Xinghua, directly east of Lake Gaoyou. 3. Mao intended to usc the expected att'a.Ck by Hu Zongnan against the border region as justification for the action to be taken in Jiangsu. In fact, Hu's attack never materialized. 568

NOVEMBER /940

569

sion southward and the advance ofMo's division eastward are your direct reasons. All of you, and especially Kecheng, should concentrate all your energies on waging this battle. 5. The fundamental orientation is still to win over Han and oppose Tang and Li. Following victory in the aforementioned battle, it is possible that Han will compromise. 6. To the west of the Tianjin-Pukou railway line, a resolute guerrilla war should be launched to halt the expansion of Mo Dehong. Capable people should go there and take command. Luo Binghui should return to eastern Anhui at once. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

To Zhou Enlai and Others on Smashing Chiang Kaishek's Anti-Communist Conspiracies (November 21, 1940)

I. As long as Chiang Kaishek has not compromised with Japan, a large-scale suppression of the Communists is not possible. All of his tactics are to scare us into making concessions. Sending the "October 19" telegram was for intimidation, He [Yingqin]'s speech at the commemorative meeting was for intimidation, and the eastward advance of Tang [Enbo] and Li [Pinxian] was also for intimidation. Hu Zongnan's consolidating four divisions to attack the central Shaanxi plain was for intimidation, and ordering Li Kenong to close his office was a scare tactic as well. He may very well do more things in addition to scare people. Besides intimidation, there is one more trick up his sleeve, which is to blockade. There are no other reliable measures (although it is of course still possible to attack Zhang Yunyi and Peng Xuefeng). Many middle-of-the-roaders have been scared by him and have all asked me to make concessions, so I have needed to find good ways of explaining things to them. Aside from expressing conciliation in the text of the "November 9" telegram, and a very small concession on southern Anhui (actually we have been intending to move northward for a long time, but are now delaying for another month or two on purpose), we will not yield even an inch. Anyone who attacks us will be crushed. We have already prepared an iron hammer, and, as soon as the political conditions are ripe, we are sure to deal him a heavy blow. At present all our propaganda literature is for the purpose of ripening this political condition. 2. Aside from He Yingqin's having other schemes up his sleeve (to instigate civil war), Chiang Kaishek must have secretly told Bai Chongxi about his magic weapon (intimidating the Communists into making concessions), so Bai is making a show of being serious about this. Actually Bai does not want to fight. He is really afraid that fighting might actually break out. So we should make use of this weakness to frighten Bai. We should use our own magic weapons to frighten, in turn, all those other than Bai who are trying to scare us. Our magic weapons are the expressions of indignation on the part of the lower-ranking officers and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; their requests to be transferred

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 211-12, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 570

NOVEMBER 1940 571

southward; that we have not been issued any ammunition for fourteen months; that there is no food to eat in North China; that if Tang and Li move eastward, there is bound to be a great conflict and the peace of northern Jiangsu would be broken; that northern Shaanxi has suffered severe famine this winter and the famine victims have requested to be moved to other places for food, and so on. These [X][X][X] political offensives should also be put before those naive middle-of-the-roaders so as to arouse their concern so that they will influence that old scoundrel, Chiang Kaishek. 3. Hu Zongnan has already given orders to the Twenty-eighth Division, the Twenty-fourth Division, the Preparatory Third Division, and the Eighth Division to prepare to attack the gourd-shaped region between the three points of Yijun, Chunhua, and Zhengning. 1 There will probably be a sudden attack within one or two weeks. Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] has already sent a telegram to Hu Zongnan and asked him to call a halt to it, at the same time as he has prepared a portion of the army to counterattack it. As soon as Hu starts something, we will respond by launching a partial battle in northern Jiangsu. In order to frustrate Han [Deqin]'s and Huo [Shouyi]'s purpose of opening up Anhui and Jiangsu, we will suddenly occupy a place between Zhunyin and Baoying. 2 If we succeed, Huo will definitely turn friendly and Han will be subdued. The immediate rationale is that Huo Shouyi attacks our Peng Mingzhi,3 and that Mo Dehong attacks our Zhang Yunyi. Right now we need to make this rationale widely known. 4. Only when we couple soft measures with hard ones and work along both lines can we crush Chiang Kaishek's schemes, stop He Yingqin's surrender, and win over the middle-of-the-roaders to our side. Neither soft tactics alone nor hard tactics alone will enable us to reach our goal.

1. These are three xian towns in west-central Shaanxi and neighboring Gansu, where Guomindang forces under Li Zongren were probing. 2. Zhunyin and Baoying are in Jiangsu, near the Grand Canal. 3. Peng Mingzhi ( 1907-1993), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and participated in the Nanchang Uprising. At this time he was commander of the Seventh Brigade of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army.

All Our Units in Southern Anhui Must Move Away by the End of December (November 24, 1940, 2:00A.M.)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: I. You must prepare to complete moving away all troops by the end of December. 2. Xiyi [Ye Ting] must lead one unit to set out at once. 3. Everything must be completely taken care of within twenty days. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 585, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives. 572

The Essence of Chillng Kaishek's Current Anti-Communist Policies and Our Basic Orientation (November 30, 1940, between 1:00 and 3:00A.M.)

To Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], and for transmittal to [Peng] Dehuai, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], and Xiang Ying: We have taken note of your telegram of the 29th. This time our plan is to send two telegrams. One is to He Yingqin, specifically asking him his rationale for halting distribution of military provisions [to us]. This telegram was already dispatched directly to He yesterday and is being sent at the same time to you and in a circular telegram to the whole nation. Please let us know when you receive it. The other telegram is to Chiang [Kaishek]. I hesitated over this for two days, but, after receiving your telegram, decided to send it out today, also directly to Chiang and to you as well, and then dispatch a circular telegram after a slight delay. This time Chiang, He, and Bai [Chongxi] all worked hand in glove, using such measures as the telegram of [October] 19th, transferring troops, halting provisions, manipulating the atmosphere, and threatening our liaison offices. All were aimed at frightening us into making concessions, and they actually have no other magic weapons. Li Renchao's estimate is absolutely correct and is what we have always said, which is that they can neither surrender nor "suppress the Communists." This possibility still exists. He only has scare tactics-he is trying to scare Japan, and he is trying to scare us too. Except for these hooligan's tricks, he has no other way out. Chiang's current characteristic is lack of stability both internally and externally (beset by both internal and external crises). Under his rule, nothing is stable, be it military and political affairs, financial and economic matters, culture. or popular sentiment. These crises are unprecedented in Chiang's history, and this is the internal instability. He has no line of defense against the enemy or against us, and this is the external instability. For the purposes of resolving these crises and stabilizing the internal and external lines of defense, they have formed the alliance of Chiang, Guangxi, and He (the anti-Communist united front of the big bourgeoisie, whereas He and Bai have other objectives). Their central strategy is an offensive defense or Our source for this text is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 586-88, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 573

574

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

pursuing the goal of defense through the use of offensive measures, but absolutely not an overall strategic offensive, because this is impossible. All their scare tactics and possible partial attacks against us have an offensive character. And they are building blockade lines along the Jing River, the Wei River, the Yellow River, the Huai River, and the Huainan railroad to achieve their goal of strengthening external lines of defense, so as to create an anti-Communist atmosphere, restrict our activities, organize an anti-Communist alliance (on the basis of the alliance of Chiang, Guangxi, and He), and achieve their goal of strengthening the internal lines of defense. He is able to accomplish both of these things, which broadly speaking means achieving his goal of defense. In essence, Chiang is the same as he was in the past. He remains unchanged. He still has the dual policy of resisting Japan and opposing the Communists, but toward Japan he is absolutely on the defensive (no offensive position whatsoever), while toward us he maintains an offensive position of defense. Thus the three points of (I) instability, (2) a dual policy, and (3) offensive defense sum up Chiang's essence at present. Under these

circumstances, our basic orientation is one of outward moderation but resistance in reality, some softness and some hardness, and giving tit for tat. Moderation is to win over the masses; resistance is to protect ourselves. Softness is to give him a chance to save face; hardness is to strike fear into his heart. As regards actual troop movements, only two regiments of the !15th Division will be involved; the rest will not be moved at all. But there should still be active preparations everywhere. Apart from dealing with local attacks, over 70,000 crack troops can he moved at any time to inflict a fierce and heavy blow on anyone who dares to launch a largescale attack against us. The better prepared we are, the less likely they are to attack us, in accordance with the principle that where there is precaution, there is no danger. In reality, the scale of this anti-Communist attack cannot he greater than last time, but only smaller, because we have become stronger and they have become weaker. This last point should not be passed down to lower levels, to avoid laxity at lower levels. Feng Yuxiang's estimate is wrong. The idea that, if provoked, he will tear off his mask and strike out at random emanates from those who are frightened by Chiang's hooligans. Actually, Chiang is someone who excels at making calculations. He uses his hooligans only to scare people, but not to make policy. MaoZedong

ToZhou Wen 1 (November 30, 1940)

Comrade Zhou Wen: I have read both Qunzhong bao and Dazhong xizuo. 2 Your work is significant and fruitful, and all of us are very pleased. The characters on the cover of Dazhong xizuo are not very well written. How would it be if you could please have them redone? Salutations! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao li!dong shuxin xuanji, p. 165, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Zhou Wen (1907-1952), original name He Kairong, was a native of Sichuan. After arriving in Yan'an in 1940, he became head of the Education Department of the border

region government and head of the Society for Reading Materials for the Broad Masses. 2. The newspaper referred to here as Qunzhong bao (The Masses) is the Bianqu qunzhong bao (Border Region Masses), launched in March 1940 and aimed at a mass readership of workers and peasants. Dazhong xizuo (Exercises in Composition for the Broad Masses), first published in August 1940, was a periodical intended to provide guidance to basic-level correspondents and beginning writers in improving their writing skills. Both were produced by the Society for Reading Materials for the Broad Masses. 575

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong and Zhu De Concerning Agreement to the Actions and Deployment of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (November 30, 1940)

I. Your deployment for the 29th was quite correct. 2. The action in northern Jiangsu will not hurt the whole situation. A gap merely needs to be opened up between Huai'an and Baoying so as to cutoff Han [Deqin] and Huo [Shuoyi] and join up Jiangsu and Anhui. Gu [Zhutong] and Han [Deqin] will scream a little, so you'll just have to put up with that and be done with it. 3. There has been a break between Japan and Chiang [Kaishek], and a coming together between Japan and Wang [Jingwei], so the overall situation will be taking a new tum. Toward us Chiang will be even more at a Joss. Your move northward will give him some more leeway. Judging from the overall situation, Chiang and Gu will not give you problems. If you start to move now in groups, and finish by the end of December, it will not be too late.

We have translated this text from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 215, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. 576

Speech at the Meeting Called by the Central Bureau of the Border Region Regarding Economic Self-Sufficiency (December 3, 1940)

On the afternoon of December 3, the border region's Central Bureau held a 1941 production mobilization meeting in its auditorium . ... Comrade Mao Zedong is most concerned about the Production Movement. It is he himself who first called the Production Movement into existence. On this occasion, he found time to come here in the midst of his very busy schedule. When the chairman announced that Chairman Mao was invited to say a few words, thunderous applause resounded. In his speech, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: Now, the work in the base areas can no longer be done crudely and carelessly. This must be replaced by work that is meticulously organized. The task of economic construction must, therefore, be put forward in a manner adapted to current

circumstances. He went on to say:

You must be considerate of others, get to know the people around you thoroughly, treat them each as a separate individual, and unite with them, for only thus can we make the revolution advance toward victory. Today, as we carry out economic construction, we must also understand this truth. An isolated loner can accomplish nothing.

This text was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, December 19, 1940. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 217, which reproduces this version. 577

To Xiang Ying Regarding Whether the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui Has Made Various Preparations to Cope with Sudden Emergencies (December 3, 1940)

Please tell me what you think concerning the following: I. When under attack by certain forces, do the military department and the southern Anhui troops have concrete ways to break through the enemy encirclement and avoid severe losses? With regard to these ways, is it more advantageous to move southward to wage guerrilla warfare or to join forces eastward with Chen Yi? Is it absolutely impossible to move northward by crossing the River? 2. Are the cadres within the Party fully prepared psychologically to confront the possible attack by a certain force? 3. Are there any high-ranking and middle-ranking progressive officials and troops among the friendly armies in southern Anhui and the regions south of the Yangzi who, determined to resist Japan and sympathetic with our Party, during a sudden emergency might provide cover for our troops or act in concert with our troops? How is our united front work among the friendly armies nearby? 4. What is the intention of a certain party [i.e., the Guomindang] in the Third War Zone? What is the attitude of the Central forces, such as Gu Zhutong, and so on? What is Huang Shaoxiong's 1 attitude? Has the local Party, under the leadership of the Southeastern Bureau, made mental and practical preparations to deal with sudden incidents by reserving cadres and preserving strength?

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 219, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Shaoxiong is an alternative ming for Huang Shaohong. 578

The Various Policies That Should Be Carried Out in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (December 13, 1940)

To the Central China Bureau, and for the information of the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Sub bureau, the Southeastern Bureau, the Southern Bureau, and the Southern Committee:

I. When organizing organs of political power and organs reflecting public opinion in northern Jiangsu, the "three-thirds" system should be resolutely carried out. Communist Party members should constitute only one-third, and it could even be fewer than one-third at the beginning. Enlist the participation of all leaders of every party and faction, and of those not affiliated with any party or faction, who are not actively anti-Communist. The middle and leftist factions of the Guomindang should be included. Members of the national bourgeoisie, such as Han Guojun, 1 as well as enlightened landlords, should all participate. A few representatives of the rightists may also be allowed. In this way a united political power of all parties, factions, social groups, and armies can truly be organized, making every effort to avoid our being responsible for everything. This will have a great influence throughout the country. 2. Vigorously avoid ultraleftism in the labor policy. Carry out only minor reforms for now. For example, reduce the fourteen-hour workday to thirteen hours or twelve hours, but do not implement the eight-hour system, so as to guarantee that the capitalists can still make money. 3. With regard to the land policy, a partial reduction in rent and interest should be carried out so as to win over the basic masses of the peasantry, but the reduction should not be too great. Do not make it impossible for peasants to borrow money because of the reduction in the interest rate. Do not confiscate the land of the landlords by canceling old debts. At the same time, peasants should be required to pay rent and interest, landlords' ownership of the land should be guaranteed, and in principle management by the rich peasants should not be changed. It must be made clear within the Party as well as to the peasants that this is not the time to

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2. pp. 320-21, where it is reproduced rrom Mao's handwritten manuscript. I. Regarding Han. see the relevant note to the text of October 14, 1940. 579

580

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

carry out a land revolution and the ultraleftist mistakes that have occurred in North China should be avoided. 4. We agree with Hu Fu's ideas on tax collection methods. As long as no better methods have been devised, for the time being taxes should be collected by the old methods, except that exorbitant taxes and levies should be appropriately reduced. 5. The principle of the policy to eliminate traitors should be to suppress the few most reactionary elements who are hated by all, making great efforts to avoid killing too many people. No organs or groups except for the government are permitted to arrest and punish people at will. 6. The economic policy is to develop industrial and agricultural production as well as trade circulation to the greatest possible extent, to make every effort to avoid disrupting production and commerce, and to call upon the capitalists in Shanghai to set up enterprises in northern Jiangsu. 7. As for cultural and educational policies, only the cultural autocracy of the comprador big bourgeoisie should be eliminated, allowing the liberal thought of the national bourgeoisie to exist, and allowing liberal intellectuals and educators to run newspapers and schools. 8. In sum, at present your policy should be only to eliminate the autocracy of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the large feudal landlords, and to make initial improvements in the people's livelihood. On the one hand, human rights, political rights, and property rights, as well as freedom of speech, association, and assembly for the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie are to be guaranteed. On the other hand, human rights, political rights, property rights, and freedom of speech, association, and assembly of all capitalists and landlords, with the exception of the Chinese traitors, should also be ensured. As long as they do not engage in armed uprising, any party or stratum has freedom of activity. The Guomindang should be allowed to exist and a progressive Guomindang should be organized. 9. The above-mentioned policies should be carried out throughout Central China (and, of course, the same is true for North China). 10. We look forward to frequent telegrams informing us as to how you are concretely carrying out these various policies. Secretariat of the Central Committee

Propose to the Guomindang That It Should Stop Its Attack on the New Fourth Army (December 15, 1940)

The Southern Bureau and the Southeastern Bureau should raise the following to Gu Zhutong, He Yingqin, and the special committee of the [People's] Political Council, respectively: north of the Yangzi in the three provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Hubei, massive attacks are being launched against the New Fourth Army; the army headquarters of the New Fourth Army and its three detachments in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu have been completely surrounded by central government troops, and there is news that an attack is about to begin. Please have them halt the attacks north of the Yangzi and withdraw the encirclements in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. The purpose of making this kind of proposal is to let a certain party know that we are prepared and to mitigate their initiatives in southem Anhui and southern Jiangsu. It is particularly necessary to mitigate Gu Zhutong' s initiatives in southern Anhui while the Eighth Route Army moves southward for

reinforcements. Secretariat of the Central Committee

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 589-90, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 58/

The Southern Anhui Troops Must Cross the River with Utmost Speed (December 16, 1940,7:00 to 9:00A.M.)

To Hu [Fu] and Chen [Yi], and for transmittal to Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: I. We have taken note of all your telegrams. Dispositions are to be made according to Hu Fu's telegram of the 15th. 1 2. Viewed from the standpoint of the overall situation, a large-scale "suppression of the Communists" is impossible, but a partial offensive is inevitable. The struggle in Central China is a long-term, protracted struggle, so we must possess determination and patience. 3. The troops in northern Jiangsu must train, consolidate, and expand their ranks in a hurry for a short period, and then have a unit of the main forces serve as

reinforcements in eastern Anhui. 4. The southern Anhui troops must cross the Yangzi with utmost speed and become the core force for maintaining eastern Anhui. A large group of their cadres is to be assigned both to northern Jiangsu and to eastern Anhui to construct

base areas. 5. Two regiments of the !15th Division are urged to hasten southward. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

We have translated this text from Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 591-92, where it is reproduced from a copy in Mao's handwriting preserved in the Central Archives. I. On December 15, 1940, Liu Shaoqi had sent a telegram to Mao and others in the leadership proposing, in particular, that the Fourth and Fifth Columns should oppose the eastward advance of the Guangxi forces; that the main forces of the Fifth Column of the Eighth Route Army advance to eastern Anhui; and that two more regiments should be moved to northern Jiangsu. 582

The Situation in Chongqing Is Serious. Xiang Ying and Zeng Shan Should Not Leave the Army for the Moment (December 18, 1940) 1

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: I. The situation in Chongqing is serious. Neither Xiang nor Zeng2 should leave the army for the time being. 2. [Ye] Xiyi and a portion of the staff are to go northward; it is hoped that arrangements for this will be made quickly. 3. Secret documents must be burned and attacks strictly prevented. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 593, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives. I. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 241, cites both this document and another of the same date, which reads as follows: Your secret documents and reports should all be burned. You should absolutely not keep a shred of paper or a single word, in order to prevent its falling into enemy hands when you cross the blockade line. The code books should be carried personally by a trustworthy person. The authors and recipients are the same as those of the text translated above. We have not presented this second document separately, because there is no assurance that the passage quoted in Nianpu is complete, though it may well be. 2. The reference is to Zeng Shan ( 1899-1972), a native of Jiangxi, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. At this time, he was deputy secretary of the Southeast Bureau of the Central Committee. 583

To Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yifrom Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on A"angements to Meet Ye Ting on the Other Side of the Yangzi (December 20, 1940)

I. According to Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]'s report: Army Commander Ye and some of the cadres are planning to cross the Yangzi. You need to make careful arrangements along the banks of the Yangzi. 2. Transportation having been cut off, even if there are people in Yan'an they cannot be sent. Not until after the Seventh Congress would we be able to dispatch a group of people to make a detour through North China. The Center has already told the Northern Bureau to send a group of cadres to go southward. 3. When negotiating conditions with Han [Deqin] it will not do to be too harsh, and it is necessary to respect the interests of Li's and Chen's various units. The Xinghua and Gaoyou regions should be reserved for Han; our troops should stop outside the areas ofXinghua and Gaoyou. 1 All fighting in northern Jiangsu should stop completely, in an effort to seek compromise and consolidate the positions already obtained.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 223, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. These two towns are locatedjust north ofYangzhou, in the middle of Jiangsu. 584

Ye Ting Should Cross the River Quickly (December 20, 1940, between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M.)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: [Ye] Xiyi had better cross the River as soon as possible and should not ask Chiang [Kaishek]'s approval. If Chiang opposes it, then it is best not to cross the River. Careful arrangements have to be made along the River. Contact must be made quickly with Hu Fu and [Zhang] Yunyi so that they may prepare on the other side of the River. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 594, where it is repro· duced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 585

Do Not Declare That the Battle of the Hundred Regiments Has Been Concluded (December 22, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: Do not declare openly that the Battle of the Hundred Regiments' has been concluded. Chiang Kaishek is about to launch an anti-Communist upsurge, and we still need to use publicity about the Battle of the Hundred Regiments to oppose him. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Bailuan da:zhan lishi wenxian ziliao xuanbian (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), p. 14. I. Regarding Ihe Battle of the Hundred Regiments, see above, Pan III of the Introduction to this volume. 586

Work Hard to Strengthen the Bases in Northern Jiangsu (December 23, 1940, between 7:00 and 9:00A.M., in Yan'an)

Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng, [Peng] Xuefeng, and [Zhang] Yunyi: I. We have taken note of both Hu Fu's and Xuefeng's telegrams. 2. At the moment the focus is on northern Jiangsu and, secondarily, on Huaibei and eastern Anhui. Therefore, Chen's and Huang's troops, as well as the additional two regiments of the !15th Division, should all concentrate in northern Jiangsu now, intensify reconsolidation and expansion, and work hard to strengthen the base areas in northern Jiangsu. They should, moreover, be prepared to get rid of Han Deqin first when Chiang Kaishek really begins to attack us in Huaibei and eastern Anhui (the Central Committee will make the final decision) and only as a second step march to Huaibei and eastern Anhui. This was suggested in Hu Fu's last telegram, and we think that it is appropriate. 3. At the moment Huaibei and eastern Anhui must be sustained by Xuefeng's and Yunyi's troops alone. Whether the enemy or the diehard troops attack, they should all be handled with guerrilla warfare, and no reinforcements or assistance is to be expected. In North China reinforcement is impossible; nor is it appropriate. 4. Before Chiang Kaishek truly surrenders, a large-scale attack on us is impossible, since he does not have a convenient battlefield. Therefore, on the one hand, you should seriously prepare for Chiang Kaishek's attack, never relaxing for a minute your own preparations. But, on the other hand, you should also be aware of Chiang Kaishek's difficulties. He has numerous difficulties, among them the lack of a convenient battlefield, and with the enemy's occupation of Woyang and Mengcheng, this difficulty has increased. So you may well take advantage of this opportunity to prepare everything actively, including expanding and reconsolidating the troops, and strengthening and developing the base areas. 5. As your forces become more expanded, better trained, and stronger, and your base areas become more developed and consolidated, no attack need be feared.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 595-97, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives. 587

588

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

In this way, careful expansion and reconsolidation of the troops and careful development and consolidation of the base areas constitute reliable capital in shattering any attack. 6. At present the enemy is attacking to the west of the Wohe River, and this presents a favorable opportunity for Xuefeng to expand his area and reconsolidate the troops, and to develop and consolidate the base areas. In the eastern Anhui region, aside from using one strong unit to deal with the invasion ofMo Dehong's troops and also sending capable personnel to take command, arrangements should also be made according to these overall guidelines. 7. To recruit soldiers and consolidate the base areas, it is necessary to mobilize the ordinary masses and to mobilize the ordinary masses it is necessary to bring some benefit to the masses and necessary to suppress the reactionary elements. This task has two aspects to it. One aspect is that it is necessary to pay attention to the united front policy with regard to parties and society and to be on guard against ultraleft tendencies. The other aspect is that, toward reactionary elements who stand in the way of our mobilizing the ordinary masses, it is necessary to apply resolute suppression (which of course does not mean to kill every one of them), as otherwise it would be impossible to mobilize the masses and consolidate the base areas. As for the local bandits, they must be suppressed and eliminated. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang About How the New Fourth Army Must Move Immediately in Groups (December 24, 1940)

Start moving in groups immediately; otherwise, once the baules begin, the noncombatant personnel and supplies will certainly be dispersed.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 227, where it is reproduced from Wannan .shibian. The date has been corrected on the basis of Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 228. 589

A General Notice Concerning the Attitude of All the Guomindang Factions and the Circumstances of Our Deployment1 (December 25, 1940)

1. Chiang Kaishek's internal and external situations are such that he can only adopt a position of offensive defense, making a lot of noise but fighting very little. So it is best to stall with a telegram in answer; let's stall until the end of January and see. 2. Hu Zongnan completely lacks any intention to fight, and from this we can tell about the rest of the Central Army as well. If Bai Chongxi softens as well, the other side will be forced to make an about-face themselves. 3. Both HeYingqin's faction and theCC Clique want to fight, and both are proJapanese. But if the Central Army and the Guangxi Army are not willing to fight, then the pro-Japanese factions can do nothing. So it is hoped that some means will be found to inform the leading generals of the Central Army and the Guangxi Army about the pro-Japanese factions' scheme to have the whole world plunged into chaos. 4. Nan Hanchen has already done some work in Xi'an. 2 Hu and his subordinates have feted Nan four times and have gone out of their way to please him, telling him to his face that they do not want to fight.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 231-32, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Despite the title, this document refers entirely to North China and Central China above the Yangzi. Mao believes that He Yingqin and the CC Clique cannot fight because they have little direct command over troops in the field, and furthermore the Guangxi armies under Bai Chongxi and others block the way across Anhui to the main Communist units farther east in Jiangsu. The CC Clique was a conservative organization, led by the two brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, which supported Chiang Kaishek and opposed communism. 2. Nan Hanchen ( 1895-1967), a native of Shanxi, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. In the 1930s, he played a variety of political roles, in Shanghai and elsewhere, and was also involved in banking and trade. Following the Xi'an Incident, he was a member of a Communist Party delegation in Xi'an. In 1940, he went to Yan'an, where he became deputy head of the Central Committee's Department for United Front Work. 590

DECEMBER 1940 591

5. According to our intelligence, Tang Enbo's troops also have little interest in fighting. 3 As for the Guangxi Army, until now only four regiments of its !38th Division are positioned east of the Huainan Road and they are utterly dispersed; the 172nd Division is still halted near Shouxian; the other four divisions are stationed respectively at Huoqiu, Liu'an, Shangcheng, and Gushi, and there is no sign whatsoever of their moving eastward.4 Although Li Xianzhou is prepared to advance toward Dangshan, there is still no certain information as to when they will start moving. 6. Now the warfare in northern Jiangsu has come to a halt. It is hoped that it will be explained to Liu Weizhang5 that Li Xianzhou and Mo Dehong should be asked to refrain from advancing eastward; otherwise, a great conflict cannot be avoided. 7. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Brigades of our !15th Division have already reached northern Jiangsu, and they are now being concentrated, trained, and systematically reorganized together with Huang Kecheng's and Chen Yi's various forces. After a month or two, their combat capability will surely be greatly increased. Then the main forces will advance westward and teach the Guangxi Army some lessons, in the hope of indicating to Bai Chongxi that if he wants to maintain friendship he should please withdraw Mo's division. 8. Yang Dezhi's brigade may reach Huaibei in a month; southern Anhui 's three regiments have moved northward, which is enough to deal with the attacks of Chiang [Kaishek] and the Guangxi [Army]. As long as Chiang does not surrender, it is impossible for him to launch a large-scale attack. He has always just talked a good game but done very little fighting. 9. Wang Shiying has returned to Yan'an from Yan [Xishan]'s domain. 6 It is alleged that the office personnel and radio station captured by the Central Army have been released and transferred east of the River along with Yan, and the secret codes have not been lost either. It was rumored that this incident occurred because our forces attacked Taiquan Village. What actually happened is that around dusk on the 27th of last month, in that village one family's four cattle were being driven home, but in the darkness could barely be seen, and the 6lst Division defense troops mistook them for an attack of our cavalry unit from the town of Linzhen. All of a sudden the whole lineup started shooting, and the cattle started to run ahead. At least one regiment of the Yunyan-Taiquan line fortress-defending troops began retreating toward Yichuan, creating quite an uproar all over the town. Division Commander Zhong was so upset that he detained our office personnel. Wang Shiying happened to be where Yan was at the

3. For a note on Tang Enbo, see above, Mao's telegram of November I. 1940.

4. The places mentioned here are located in central and eastern Anhui. 5. Regarding Liu Fei, zi Weizhang, see below the note to the telegram of December 30, 1940 to Zhou Enlai.

6. On Wang, see the relevant note to the text of November 16, 1940.

592 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

time and was not arrested. On the basis of this misunderstanding, the division released them after four days of detention and declared that it was a misunderstanding. It seems that the Central Army has thus already lost its wits, so how could they fight? This incident wreaked havoc all the way to Xi 'an and Chongqing, but was actually nothing more than an attack by four cattle.

Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying Concerning the Negotiations with Chiang Kaishek on the New Fourth Army's Route for Moving Northward (December 25, 1940)

According to Xiang Ying, "Gu Zhutong has suddenly commanded the New Fourth Army to change its course and to cross the Yangzi at Fan[ chang] and Tong[ling], 1 while Li Pinxian is making arrangements to blockade north of the River. Moreover, the southern Anhui diehard troops again have us secretly surrounded so as to block our comings and goings. Along the southern banks we must break through the enemy's blockade and in the middle of the River we must avoid attacks by the enemy's boats. Unless we give ourselves plenty of time to sneak across the River in groups, we will not be able to cross at all, and will be unable to move forward or backward;' and so on. Please discuss with Chiang immediately the following points and quickly let us know the results: I. The move northward must be in two routes, southern Jiangsu and Fan[chang] and Tong[ling]. 2. We need two months to sneak across little by little in groups. 3. The southern Anhui troops should not surround or block the comings and goings. 4. The northern Anhui troops are to retreat from the four xian of Chao[xian], Wu[wei], He[xian], and Han[ shan], and Zhang Yunyi 2 is to dispatch a team to receive them and cover them as they cross the river. 5. Ensure that there will be no attack from Li Pinxian. 6. Expeditiously distribute ammunition and moving expenses.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 233, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Fanchang and Tangling are two regional towns close to the Yangzi in Anhui Province, north of New Fourth Anny headquarters at Yunling. The four xian of Chaoxian, Wuwei, Hexian, and Hanshan are located north of the Yangzi, to the nortl}west of Wuhu. 2. Regarding Zhang Yunyi, see above, the relevant note to the text

of March 21, 1940. 593

Directive ofthe Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Policy in the Cu"ent Situation (December 25, 1940)

I. Since the conclusion of the agreement between Japan and Wang Jingwei, the receipt of loans from the United States and Soviet assistance, and the launching of the struggle against capitulation by our Party, the present capitulation crisis has been overcome. Although such a danger may arise again in the future, the War of Resistance prevails in the current situation. Consequently, our military and Party personnel should not stress anticapitulationist propaganda at present as much as we did in the past. To do otherwise would not only be distasteful to the Guomindang, but would also give rise to misunderstandings among the people and the friendly armies. (The telegraphic code of what follows is not clear.i 2. As the Guomindang is still pursuing a dual policy of anticommunism and fighting the resistance war. we too therefore continue to adhere to a dual policy of unity and revolutionary struggle. In opposing communism, the Guomindang, apart from strengthening high-handed measures in the areas under its control, will inevitably launch military attacks against our forces in Central China. They have also built a great wall in the Northwest, creating a blockode against us. We must therefore fight against their attacks in Central China and their blockade in the Northwest. In particular. we must wage a resolute struggle of self-defense against their military offensives and smash them. The following reasons must be emphasized in opposing the other side's efforts to force us to withdraw north ofthe Yellow River within a specified time: a.It has been decided that our troops south of the {Yangzi} River will be transferred north as a conciliatory gesture.

Our source for this directive is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 9, pp. 379-83, where the original version of the first half of the document is taken from Guo Hualun, Zhonggong shilun, Vol. 4 (Taibei, 1973), pp. 21().-12. The text as reproduced by Guo does not include the final sections of the directive as it appears in the Selected Works (section IV of our version). We have added these, basing our translation on the Chinese text in Vol. 2 of the Xuanji, but since no earlier version is available, it is impossible to show the variants for this portion of the directive. 1. In other words, the ensuing passage is omitted because it does not make sense. 594

DECEMBER /940

595

b. Because of the serious natural calamities in Nonh China, some of the units there must move south to obtain food. The transfer of troops from Central China to the nonh would be tantamount to starving them to death. c. The areas of maneuver for the guerrilla war need to be expanded; to confine these forces to one area would necessarily lead to their annihilation. d. Since most of the armed units in Central China are organized by the people to defend their homelands, it would be extremely difficult for them to relocate. Besides, all such organizations have been organized in accordance with instructions given in Chairman Chiang's speech at Lushan (that all localities, whether southern or nonhern, and all people, whether old or young, have the responsibility to resist Japan and save the nation), and in the various public notices to compatriots in the enemy-occupied areas, so they are by no means without legal basis. e. As the entire New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies are pinning down half the enemy forces and have been praised by the people of the coumry for their outstanding service to the country, they should by right be rewarded, not punished. f. The armed units in southern Anhui have already moved north as ordered. The units north of the {Yangzi] River have real difficulties moving and are not deliberately defying orders. g. The cause of friction lies in the anti-Communist orders issued by the Guomindang (on measures for prevellling alien party activities and so on) and in the anti-Communist activities initiated by the pro-Japanese factioll (Shi Yousan 2 is proof) and does not come from our Party and our anny. h. It is highly unfair to give insufficient pay and provisions to the soldiers and to authorize too small an army (only three divisions for 500,000 men). It is even more unreasonable to force the New Founh Army and the guerrilla troops to relocate to the north. As for not having been issued military provisions for a long period of time and not knowing where our troops will be located, this is truly incomprehensible, and we therefore request continued issuance of pay. i. The personnel of the New Founh Army left behind in areas formally controlled by it, such as southern Jiangxi, nonhern Fujian, western Fujian, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region, the Southern Hunan Border Region, and the Hubei-Henan Border Region are all being massacred and have not the slightest protection. j. The relocation of the troops in Central China to the nonh will delight only the Japanese bandits and will be disadvantageous to persisting in the War of Resistance and to the defense of Central China. 2. Shi Yousan (1891-1940) had been appointed commander-in-chief of the 39th Anny

Group in April 1940. In June of the same year, he had signed an ''anti-Communist agreement" with the Japanese. This aroused dissatisfaction among his subordinates. one of whom took him into custody on December I and buried him alive.

596 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The above ten major reasons must be pointed out at every opportunity in order to resist the evil Guomindang policy of squeezing us into a narrow area north of the Yellow River and creating pretexts. (Unclear) 3 3. In the present high tide of anti-Communist attacks, the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But some cadres within our Party fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be fundamentally different from its policy during the civil war. 4 1t must be understood that under no circumstances will the Party change its united front policy for the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and that many of the policies adopted during the Soviet period cannot be duplicated.' In particular, many ultraleft policies of the late Soviet period6 are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then, arising as they did from the failure to understand the fundamental point that the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolonial country and the protracted nature of the revolution. For example, the notion that the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression [campaign] and the countercampaign against it constituted the decisive battle between two roads;' elimination8 of the capitalist class (the Left putschist policies9 ) and of the rich peasants (by allotting them poor land); elimination of intellectuals, 10 and the physical elimination of the landlords (by not allotting them any land); the Left-deviation policies in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries; the monopolizing by Chinese Communist Party members of the organs of political power; the focus on communism as the objective in education;" the ultraleft military policy; 12 and the policy within the Party of attacks on comrades through the abuse of disciplinary measures. These ultraleft

3. The parenthetical comment "unclear" (bu ming) at the end of this last paragraph of the Chinese text as reproduced by Guo Hualun may mean either that the document he is following is not altogether legible or that he professes not to understand how Mao could make the preceding statement about the Guomindang's "evil policy.'' 4. But some cadres within our Pany fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be fundamentally different from its policy during the civil war _. But many of our cadres fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be very different from its policy during the Agrarian Revolution 5. The policies adopted during the Soviet period cannot be duplicated _. The policies adopted during the ten years of the Agrarian Revolution cannot just be duplicated today 6. The late Soviet period ~ The latter period of the Agrarian Revolution 7. Two roads ..... The two roads of so-called counterrevolution and revolution 8. Elimination ..... Economic elimination 9. The Left putschist policies .... The ultraleft policies on labor and taxation 10. Elimination of intellectuals-+ The attack on intellectuals II. Education .... Popular education 12. The ultraleft military policy _. The ultraleft military policy (of attacking the big cities and denying the role of guerrilla warfare); the putschist policy in the work in the White areas

DECEMBER 1940 597

policies were exactly the reverse 13 of the Right opportunism of Chen Duxiu in the latter period of the Great Revolution. 14 It was all alliance and no struggle in the latter period of the Great Revolution, and all struggle and no alliance (except with the basic sections of the peasantry) in the latter period of the soviets 15-truly striking demonstrations of the two extremist policies. And both of these policies can cause 16 great losses to the Party and the revolution. 4. Today's Anti-Japanese National United Front policy is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but is a policy that combines alliance and struggle. Specifically, it means: a. All the popular masses 11 favoring resistance (that is, all workers, 18 peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and merchants) must unite in the AntiJapanese National United Front. b. Within the united front our policy must be one of independence and initiative, that is, both "alliance" 19 and independent "struggle" are necessary. c. As far as military strategy is concerned, our policy is guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our own hands within the framework of a unified strategy; but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost20 when the conditions are favorable. d. In the struggle against the anti-Communist diehards, our policy is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one, and to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, to strike at and draw in and draw in again after striking at, to be tough but not to the extent thot it breaks the united front, and to be soft but not to the extent that we give up our stand.

e. In the enemy-occupied and Guomindang areas our policy is, on the one hand, to develop the work 21 and, on the other, to have well-selected cadres working underground. With regard to the forms of organization and struggle, our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength, and to bide our time.

13. These ultraleft policies were exactly the reverse-+ The ultraJeft policies were manifestations of the error of "Left" opportunism, or exactly the reverse 14. Great Revolution -+ First Great Revolution 15. The latter period of the soviets-+ The latter period of the Agrarian Revolution 16. Can cause -+ Caused 17. Popular masses -+ People 18. All workers,-+ All anti-Japanese workers, 19. "Alliance"

~

Unity

20. A unified strategy; but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost ..... A unified strategy; guerrilla warfare is basic, but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost 21. To develop the work ..... To develop the united front to the greatest possible extent

598 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

f. With regard to the alignment of the various classes within the country, our basic policy is to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, isolate the anti-Communist diehard forces, and attack the pro-Japanese forces. g. With respect to the diehards, 22 ours is a revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them insofar as they are still in favor of resisting Japan and of isolating them insofar as they are determined to oppose the Communist Party. Moreover, the diehards have a dual character with regard to resistance to Japan, and our policy is to unite with them insofar as they are resolute, 23 and to struggle against them and isolate them insofar as they vacillate (for instance, when they collude with Japan 24 and show reluctance in opposing Wang Jingwei and other Chinese traitors). The diehards' anticommunism also has a dual character, which explains the tension over the past six months in the Guomindang with regard to Guomindang-Communist relations, and their recent adoption of a temporary and very modest reconciliation [on the other hand]. This is what Chiang [X][X] needs.25 h. Even among the Chinese traitors and pro-Japanese elements, there are those with a dual character, toward whom we should likewise employ a revolutionary dual policy. Insofar as they are pro-Japanese, our policy is to struggle against them and isolate them, and insofar as they vacillate, our policy is to draw them nearer to us and win them over. A distinction is to be made between two-sided elements of this sort and staunch Chinese traitors such as Wang Jingwei, Wang Yitang, 26 and Shi Yousan. i. A distinction must be made between pro-Japanese big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie who oppose resistance to Japan, on the one hand, and pro-British and pro-American big landlords and members ofthe big bourgeoisie who advocate resistance, on the other. A distinction must also be made between, on the one hand, two-faced big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie who advocate anti-Japanese resistance yet vacillate and who advocate unity yet are anti-Communist and, on the other hand, members of the national bourgeoisie, middle and small landlords, and enlightened gentry, all of whose two-sided nature is less pronounced. We build our policy on

22. The diehards

~

The anti-Communist diehards

23. They are resolute ..... They are still in favor of resistance 24. Japan~ The Japanese bandits 25. Which explains the tension ... needs ~ So that our policy, too, has a dual character;

that is, insofar as they remain unwilling to break up Guomindang-Communist cooperation altogether, it is one of alliance with them, but insofar as they are high-handed and launch anned attacks on our Party and the people, it is one of struggling against them and isolating them. A distinction is to be made between double-dealing elements of this nature and Chinese traitors and pro-Japanese elements. 26. Wang Yitang (1878-1949) was among the first to cooperate with the Japanese in 1937, and served in the puppet government established in Beijing. In 1946 he was executed for treason.

DECEMBER 1940 599

these distinctions. The diverse policies described above all stem from these distinctions in class relations. j. Imperialism is dealt with in the same way. Although the Communist Party opposes all imperialisms, a distinction must be made between Japanese imperialism, which is now committing aggression against China, and the imperialist powers that are not doing so now; between German and Italian imperialism, which are allies of Japan and have recognized "Manchukuo," and British and American imperialism, which are opposed to Japan; and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday, which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today, which have abandoned that policy and are now supporting China's anti-Japanese resistance. Our tactics are still guided by one and the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one. Our foreign policy differs from that of the Guomindang. The Guomindang claims, ''There is only one enemy and all the rest are friends"; it appears to treat all countries other than Japan alike, but in fact it is pro-British and pro-American. For our part we must draw certain distinctions. First, between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries; second, between Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other; third, between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist governments; and fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States during their Far Eastern Munich period and their policy at present. We build our policy on these distinctions. In direct contrast to the Guomindang, our basic guideline is to use all possible foreign help, subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the Guomindang does, to abandon this principle by relying entirely on foreign help or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another. To correct the lopsided views of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their consequent vacillations between ultraleft and ultraright, it is necessary to help them acquire an all-around and integrated understanding of the changes and developments in the Party's policy, past and present. The ultraleft viewpoint is creating trouble and is still the main danger within the Party. In the areas under Guomindang rule, there are many people who cannot seriously carry out the policy of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, of accumulating strength and biding time, because they underestimate the gravity of the Guomindang's anti-Communist policy. At the same time, there are many others who cannot carry out the policy of expanding the united front because they oversimplify matters and consider the entire Guomindang utterly hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do. A similar state of affairs exists in the Japanese-occupied

areas. In the areas under Guomindang rule and the anti-Japanese base areas, rightist views that were once prevalent to a serious extent have now been basically

600

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

overcome; those who held such views used to stress alliance to the exclusion of struggle and overestimate the Guomindang's inclination to resist Japan, and they therefore blurred the difference in principle between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, rejected the policy of independence and initiative within the united front, appeased the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and the Guomindang, and tied their own hands instead of boldly expanding the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and conducting resolute struggle against the Guomindang's policy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party. But since the winter of 1939 an ultraleft tendency has cropped up all over as a result of the anti-Communist friction engineered by the Guomindang and of the struggles we have waged in selfdefense. This tendency has been corrected to some extent but not completely, and it still finds expression in concrete policies in many places. It is therefore most necessary for us to examine and define our concrete policies now. As the Central Committee has already issued a series of directives on concrete policies, now only a few points are given here by way of summary. On the subject of organs of political power. The "three-thirds" system, under which Communists have only one-third of the places in the organs of political

power and many non-Communists are drawn into participation, must continue to be carried out resolutely. In areas such as northern Jiangsu, where anti-Japanese democratic political power has just begun to be established, the proportion [of Communists] may be even less than one-third. Representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the enlightened gentry who do not actively oppose the Communist Party must be drawn into participation both in the government and in the people's representative bodies, and those Guomindang members who do not oppose the Communist Party must also be allowed to participate. Even a small number of right-wingers may be allowed to join the people's representative bodies. On no account should our Party monopolize everything. We are only destroying the dictatorship of the big comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord class, not replacing it with a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party. On the subject oflabor policy. The livelihood of the workers must be improved if their enthusiasm in the fight against Japan is to be fully aroused. But we must strictly guard against being ultraleftist; there must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. Under present conditions in China, the eight-hour workday cannot be universally introduced and a ten-hour workday still needs to be permitted in certain branches of production. In other branches of production, the workday should be fixed according to circumstances. Once a contract between labor and capital is concluded, the workers must observe labor discipline and the capitalists must be allowed to make some profit. Otherwise factories will close down, which would be bad for the anti-Japanese resistance effort and would hurt the workers themselves. Particularly in rural areas, the living standards and wages of the workers should not be raised too much or else it would lead to opposition from the peasants, unemployment among the workers, and a decline in production. ·

DECEMBER /940

601

On the subject of land policy. It must be explained to Party members and to the peasants that now is not the time to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution and that the series of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution in the past cannot be applied today. Our present policy should, on the one hand, stipulate that landlords reduce rent and interest, for this serves to arouse the enthusiasm of the basic peasant masses for resistance to Japan, but the reductions should not be too great. As a general principle, land rent should be reduced by 25 percent, and ifthe masses demand a greater reduction, the tenant-farmer may keep up to 60 or 70 percent of his crop, but not more. Reduction in interest on loans should not be so great as to render credit transactions impossible. On the other hand, our policy should stipulate that the peasants pay rent and interest and that the landlords retain their ownership of land and other property. Interest should not be so low as to make it impossible for peasants to obtain loans, nor should the settlement of old accounts be such as to enable the peasants to get back their mortgaged land gratis. On the subject oftax policy. Taxes must be levied according to income. Except for the very poor, who should be exempt, all people with an income shall pay taxes to the state, which means that the burden shall be carried by more than 80 percent of the population, including the workers and peasants, and shall not be placed entirely on the landlords and capitalists. Arresting people and imposing fines on them as a means of financing the army must be forbidden. We may use the existing Guomindang system of taxation with appropriate alterations until we have devised a new and more suitable one. On the subject of anti-espionage policy. Confirmed Chinese traitor elements and anti-Communist elements must be resolutely suppressed; otherwise the antiJapanese revolutionary forces cannot be adequately protected. But there certainly must not be excessive killing, and no innocent person should be incriminated. Vacillating elements and reluctant followers among the reactionaries should be dealt with leniently. Corporal punishment must be abolished in the treatment of all criminals; the stress must be on the weight of evidence, and confession should not be taken on trust. Our policy toward prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet, or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Those elements among them who were coerced into joining [the reactionary forces] but who are more or less inclined toward the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should all be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. They should not be insulted or deprived of their personal effects, nor should recantations be exacted from them; without exception they should be treated in a kind and sincere manner. This should be our policy, howeverreactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the hard core of reaction. As for renegades, except for those who have committed heinous crimes, they should be given a chance to turn over a new leaf provided they discontinue their anti-Communist activities; and if they come back and wish

602

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

to rejoin the revolution they may be accepted, but must not be readmitted into the Party. The general run of Guomindang intelligence agents must not be identified with the Japanese spies and Chinese traitors; the two should be clearly differentiated and handled accordingly. An end should be put to the state of confusion in which any [governmental or nongovernmental] organization or group can make arrests. To establish revolutionary order in the interests of resisting Japan, it must be stipulated that, with the exception of army units in combat action, only government judicial or public security agencies shall be empowered to make arrests. On the subject of the people's rights.Jt must be laid down that all landlords and capitalists not opposed to the resistance against Japan shall enjoy the same rights of person and property, the same right to vote, and the same freedom of speech, assembly, association, political conviction, and religious belief as the workers and peasants. The government shall take action only against saboteurs and elements who organize riots in our base areas and shall protect all others and not molest them. On the subject of economic policy. Industry and agriculture should be actively developed, and the circulation of commodities promoted. Capitalists from outside should be drawn into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises here if they so desire. Private enterprise should be encouraged and state enterprise regarded as only one sector of the economy. The purpose in all this is to achieve self-sufficiency. Care must be taken not to damage any useful enterprise. Both our tariff and our monetary policies should conform to our basic line of expanding agriculture, industry, and commerce, and not run counterto it. The essential factor in maintaining the base areas over a long period is the achievement of self-sufficiency through a conscientious and meticulous, not a crude and careless, organization of the economy. On the subject of cultural and educational policy. This should center on promoting and spreading the knowledge and skills needed for resistance to Japan and a sense of national pride among the masses of the people. Bourgeois-liberal educators, men of letters, journalists, scholars, and technical experts should be allowed to come to our base areas and cooperate with us in running schools and newspapers and doing other work. All intellectuals and students who show enthusiasm for resisting Japan should be accepted into our schools, given short-term training, and then assigned to work in the army, the government, or in mass organizations; they should be boldly drawn in, given work, and promoted. We should not be overcautious or too afraid of reactionaries sneaking in. Unavoidably, some such elements will creep in, but there will be time to comb them out in the course of study and work. Every base area should establish printing shops, publish books and newspapers, and organize distribution and delivery agencies. Every base area should also, as far as possible, set up on a large scale schools for training cadres, and the more and bigger, the better. On the subject of military policy. There must be maximum expansion of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, because they are the most reliable

DECEMBER 1940 603

armed forces of the Chinese people in pressing on with the national War of Resistance. We should continue our policy of never attacking the Guomindang troops unless attacked and do everything possible to make friends with them. In order to help build up our army, no effort should be spared to draw those officers who are sympathetic to us into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, whether they are members of the Guomindang or are without party affiliation. Something must be done now to change the situation where Communists dominate everything in our armies by sheer numbers. Of course, the "three-thirds" system should not be introduced into our main forces, but so long as the leadership of the army is kept in the hands of the Party (this is an absolute and inviolable necessity), we need not be afraid of drawing large numbers of sympathizers into the work of building up the military and technical departments of our army. Now that the ideological and organizational foundations of our Party and our army have been firmly laid, not only is there no danger in drawing in large numbers of sympathizers (definitely not saboteurs, of course), but it is indeed an indispensable policy, for otherwise it will be impossible to win the sympathy of the whole country and expand the revolutionary forces. All these tactical principles for the united front and the concrete policies formulated in accordance with them must be firmly applied by the whole Party. At a time when the Japanese bandits are intensifying their aggression against China and when the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are pursuing high-handed policies and launching armed attacks against the Communist Party and the people, the application of the tactical principles and concrete policies outlined above is the only way to press on with the resistance to Japan, broaden the united front, win the sympathy of the entire nation's people, and bring about a turn for the better in the situation. In rectifying errors, however, we must proceed step by step and must not be so hasty as to cause discontent among the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counterattacks by the landlords, or other undesirable developments.

Organize Reserve Shock Units to Deal with the Critical Situation in Central China (December 25, 1940, between 7:00 and 9:00A.M.)

Hu [Fu] and Chen [Yi], Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: The situation in Central China is very critical. We will not be able to deal with large-scale campaigns unless we organize shock units in reserve. Therefore, we agree with what is suggested in the telegram of the 21st from Hu and Chen, to organize all troops in nonhero Jiangsu into two columns. Huang Kecheng's troops, 1 the Peng-Zhu Detachment,2 the two regiments of the Fifth Brigade of the !15th Division. and Tian Shouyao's Detachment 3 should be organized into one column, with Chen Yi serving as commander, Huang Kecheng as political commissar, and Lai Chuanzhu as deputy commander. The New Founh Army in northern Jiangsu should be organized into the other column, with Su Yu as commander and Liu Yan4 as political commissar. Division of the four military districts and the appointments of Zhang Aiping, Chang Yuqing, Ye Fei, and Wei Guoqing as the respective commanders of these military districts are to be done according to what has been planned. It is hoped that Chen and Luo will immediately notify the Fifth Brigade to submit to the command of Chen and Huang, in accordance with this regrouping. After the reorganization, the troops are to undergo consolidation and training for one to two months, and fully prepare everything necessary to deal with the attack of Chiang [Kaishek] and the Guangxi forces. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 598-99, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. Huang Kecheng was at this time the political commissar of the Fifth Column of the

Eighth Route Army. 2. The reference is to the First Detachment of the Fifth Column, of which Peng Mingzhi was the commander and Zhu Tiaoxin the political commissar. 3. The reference is to the Second Detachment of the Fifth Column, commanded by Tian

Shouyao. 4. Regarding Liu Yan, see the note to the text of May 9. 1941. 604

From Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Xiang Ying About the Necessity of Destroying All Secret Documents (December 26, 1940)

As to whether or not to carry out the destruction of secret documents, you should anticipate the special difficulties that might be encountered during the move. You may suffer attacks and you may suffer losses, so the situation needs to be regarded more seriously. Upon this basis, aside from making every possible effort to overcome difficulties, all secret documents must be completely destroyed as soon as they have been read. [X][XJ' should be carried on the person of the most trustworthy comrades, and the question of how to handle things when danger is encountered should be figured out beforehand. This directive applies not only to the military headquarters; the entire southern Anhui army should be ordered to carry it out without exception. Not leaving any trace whatsoever of secret documents is most important.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 235, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

I. In a passage very similar to this one, cited in a note to the text of December 18, 1940, the characters missing there stand for "code books," and that is very probably what has been omitted here. 605

You Must Resolutely and Methodically Achieve the Goal of Moving Northward (December 26, 1940)

Xiang [Ying], Zhou [Zikun], and Yuan [Guoping]: Your various telegrams have been received. In the face of difficulties you have sent telegrams several times asking for directives, but a year ago the Central Committee already gave you the directive, which was to develop northward and behind enemy lines, and you have been making excuses all along not to carry this out. Recently it has been decided to move north altogether, and, as for how to make the move northward and how to overcome the difficulties in the course of moving, you must find a way yourselves, and you must be determined. Although now, on the one hand, we have lodged a protest with the Guomindang and are requesting that they extend the deadline and issue provisions and ammunition, you must not harbor any illusions whatsoever toward the Guomindang and must not rely upon the Guomindang to help you with anything at all. Anything in the way of help that might be obtained should be regarded as unexpected. You must be determined and resourceful in breaking through the darkest and most disadvantageous circumstances to reach the goal of moving northward. If you are so determined and resourceful, then despite suffering some losses the basic core may still be preserved and the future for development remains bright. If, on the other hand, you waver and hesitate, lacking both your own solutions and determination, then you will be in great danger in the face of attacks from both the enemy and the diehards. Nowhere in the country is anyone as hesitant, wavering, unresourceful, and undetermined as you. If the Guomindang attacks you during your move, you have to be prepared and determined to defend yourselves, which is a directive we gave you long ago. We are unclear as to what sort of directives you want from us. Do you, after all, have any directives of your own? Now you have raised the question whether to delay or to leave. What is it that you yourselves think of this? Do you advocate delay or leaving? You are doomed to suffer tremendous losses in the future if you are so utterly lacking in definite opinions and in direction.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 600-601, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. 606

To Ye Ting and Others from Mao Zedong and Zhu De About How the New Fourth Army Should Still Be on the Alert When Crossing the River (December 27, 1940)

On the 23rd, Qu Shounian 1 said in a communication to Mo Dehong: "For the purpose of giving a send-off to the New Fourth Army from south of the River in its move north ofthe Yellow River to fight in the War of Resistance and recover [lost] territories, their route is hereby designated as the southern section of the [Bei] Ping-Han [Kou]line, along a certain route on the northern bank of the Yangzi River. In addition to reporting this to the Central Committee and the senior officers, please inform all the other commands as well. At the same time, it is essential that all officers and soldiers deployed in southern Henan and eastern Hubei as well as the popular masses in the various localities be notified also. These instructions are to be followed in all cases." But while crossing the river the New Fourth Army needs to remain on alert against the Guangxi Army to avoid being attacked. At the same time it is crucial that Zhou and Ye be asked to make representations to Chiang [Kaishek], and persuade him to order Li Pinxian not to make trouble in the areas of Chao[xian], Wu[wei], He[xian], and Han[shan] for the New Fourth Army while it moves northward.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol6, p. 237, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Qu Shounian (t902-1957), a native ofGuangdong, had participated in the Northern Expedition and in the Nanchang Uprising. In 1931, he became a division commander in the Nineteenth Route Anny, to which he returned in 1936 after a period studying military tactics in Germany. At this time, he was commander of the Forty-eighth Anny of the TwentyFourth Army Group. 607

To Ye Ting and XiJzng Ying from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang JiaxiJzng Concerning Agreement That the New Fourth Army Should Cross the River from Eastern Anhui in Groups 1 (December 29, 1940)

I. It is agreed that !he river he crossed in groups directly from eastern Anhui. A portion of supplies are to go via southern Jiangsu. 2. Capable cadres may he sent to lead !he first few groups, Xiyi [Ye Ting] may cross the river with !he middle groups, and there will he separate directives from the Center for Xiang Ying's movements.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 239, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. This document permits Ye and Xiang to deviate from the due north route suggested by the Guomindang, via Fanchang and Tongling-which, it was suspected, would be a death trap, both getting to the Yangzi and on the other side of it. Instead, two other general directions were authorized. 608

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Delayed Reply to Liu Weizhang's Telegram and Other Matters (December 30, 1940)

I. The earlier draft of a reply to Liu Weizhang' s telegram will not be dispatched as yet, as everyone takes the view that it would be better to delay it for a while. 1 Since they oppose the Communists, let them go on doing it; since they are suppressing the Communists, let them go on doing so, all of which will only provoke widespread indignation and discontent throughout the country. We can make our position known at that time and need not be in a hurry to do so now. 2. The "telegram of the 8th" must be refuted, but that can also wait to be done until January or February of next year. 3. The "telegram of the 8th" contains a terrible number of erroneous characters. For one thing, please send it out again through the battlefield telegram station, and, for another, please notify Liu Weizhang for him to send us a telegram through official channels. Because of sabotage by the telegraph office, there may be fewer mistakes if they send it themselves. 4. Mutual concessions in northern Anhui need not be mentioned; mentioning this may cause the Guangxi clique to look down upon us. Once our main forces are restored, we shall deal them a blow.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 241, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Liu Fei (1898-1983), zi Weizhang, was a native of Hunan. After participating in the Northern Expedition, he studied military science in Japan, returning to China in 1934. At this time, he was deputy chief of the Guomindang military command headquarters. The telegram referred to here had been drafted by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying on December 18, but never sent. 609

It Is Best That the Forces South of the River Move to Southern Jiangsu in Groups 1 (December 30, 1940)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: [Zhou] Enlai's telegram states, among other things: It would be dangerous for the forces south of the river to cross the river in different locations. Although Chiang [Kaishek] has agreed verbally to yield in northern Anhui, it would not be easy to give up the four xian ofChao[xian], Wu[wei], He[xian], and Han[shan]. Li Pinxian is already plotting a deployment to attack us. It is still best to move to southern Jiangsu in groups. We agree with Enlai's opinion that it is best to move to southern Jiangsu in groups.

Our source for this telegram is Mao 7..edong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 602, where it is repro· duced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. This document apparently countennands the one of the previous day and now speaks only of passing through southern Jiangxi. 610

Smash the Guomindang's Offensive and Bring About a Change for the Better in the Situation (December 31, 1940)

To the Central China Bureau, the Southeast Bureau, the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Subbureau, the Southern Bureau, the Southern Committee, and senior officers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army: I. Chiang Kaishek has already made up his mind to send Li Xianzhou, Tang Enbo, and Li Pinxian to attack our troops in Central China and Shandong, and Tang's and Li's troops are now advancing eastward. Our Party and army have the duty to launch a self-defense campaign to shatter this attack and to make efforts to change the current situation for the better. 2. Apart from ordering our troops south of the Yangzi River to move north immediately, and sending one unit from North China to reinforce our troops in Central China, the whole Party and all troops in Central China and Shandong must be mobilized without delay to struggle hard for the purpose of sustaining the antiJapanese base areas and shattering the attacks by the diehard faction. 3. As for military command, until Commander-in-Chief Ye Ting arrives north of the River, it should be unified under Deputy Commander-in-Chief Chen Yi and Political Commissar Liu Shaoqi; after Ye Ting arrives north of the River, it should be unified under the command of Ye Ting, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi. All units must absolutely obey their orders without violation or delay. 4. The Shandong Subbureau will be put under the leadership of the Central China Bureau, and the Central China Bureau will unilaterally command Shandong and Central China. 5. All places throughout the country (North China, Central China, the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Southeast) must resolutely oppose this attack by the Guomindang as well as its high-handed policy nationwide. We must point out that the danger of this operation by the Guomindang lies in the fact that it is weakening the forces of the War of Resistance day by day, which will not only hurt the Communist Party but will hurt even more the Guomindang and the people of the whole Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 603-6, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. 6/1

612 MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

country. It will only benefit the enemy and the pro-Japanese factions. If not stopped, it will surely become a nationwide civil war. Considering the fact that the soldiers of the anti-Communist troops are unwilling, most of the officers are under coercion, and many of the senior generals are wavering, we should therefore not only pay attention to dealing blows to the anti-Communist troops but also pay attention to winning them over, to united front work, and to using our tactics flexibly. 6. It is surmised that the slogans of attack among the anti-Communist troops may be about resisting the Japanese in the enemy's rear, rather than about attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. For this reason, it is worth considering that when they begin to attack, our army's tactics should remain to strike when we are attacked and to try peaceful means before resorting to force. The Central Committee will have further instructions on this point when the time comes, and you may voice your opinions. 7. Taking into consideration the fact that the struggle in Central China is a protracted one, rather than one that can be resolved in a short time, it is therefore necessary to link the struggle against friction closely with the expansion and strengthening of the base areas and with the expansion and strengthening of the armed forces. In this struggle the strength of the anti-Communist forces should gradually be weakened, our forces should gradually be enlarged and tempered, finally to shatter the anti-Communist troops. For this reason, we should be on alert in dealing with this situation but must, at the same time, make long-term, patient plans, without being too impatient and without attempting to win a complete victory in a short period of time. 8. Taking into consideration the various international and domestic conditions, it is certain that the anti-Communist attacks and high-handed policy of the Guomindang will fail and have no future whatsoever. Therefore, the entire Party and army must raise its confidence of victory, should not be intimidated by the attacks and high-handed policy of the Guomindang, and must overcome potential

pessimistic sentiments. 9. The task of the Central China Bureau at present is actively to carry out arrangements and strengthen forces to shatter this attack. The present task of the Southern Bureau, on the other hand, is to make use of various contradictions to shake the determination of Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang. Even though Chiang and the Guomindang are making a big show of attacking, they are actually very much afraid of a civil war and afraid of a fundamental breakup of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists. For this reason, there is still the possibility that their determination could be shaken. 10. With regard to the urgent demand of Chiang and the Guomindang that we make clear our final attitude and respond to Chiang's order, the Central Committee has decided to calmly ignore it. Ever since the telegram of [November] 9 from Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ye, and Xiang [Ying] was dispatched, no matter how they should curse and attack us, for the time being the Central Committee and Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang are simply to ignor~ them. When the time comes that they

DECEMBER 1940 6/3

have angered the heavens and incurred the wrath of the people with their troublemaking, and are unable tn back down, then we shall come forward with our statement and make clear our attitude. This is distinct from the fact that the lower levels [of leadership] and local Party organizations should make clear their attitude at all times, but is precisely the best way to deal with the Guomindang at present. Because Chiang Kaishek may be in a great hurry, but we are in no hurry at all. Secretariat of the Central Committee

--------1941--------

Ye Ting Should Cross to the North of the River Within Two Weeks (January 2, 1941, midnight)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]: I trust that you have received our telegram of between 9 and II P.M. on the I st. Xiyi 1 should cross to the north of the river within two weeks so that, together with Hu Fu [i.e., Liu Shaoqi] they may bring about a unified command of all our troops and shatter the imminent anti-Communist attack. I await your reply as to what happens. MaoZedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 607, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. Xiyi is YeTing'szi. 617

Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying Concerning the Immediate Move of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui to Southern ]iangsu (January 3, 1941)

It is absolutely correct that all your troops are to move resolutely to southern Jiangsu and that they should set out immediately.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 245, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 618

The New Fourth Army Should Not Stay Too Long in Maolin (January 7, 1941)'

Ye [Tingj and Xiang [Yingj: We are in receipt of your telegram of early morning on the 5th. It is not advisable that you stay long in Maolin. As soon as you have found out about the situation in the area around Xuancheng and Ningguo, it would be appropriate to move eastward. It is to your advantage to break through the encirclement lines of the diehard armies before they have completed their deployment. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 608, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. I. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was dispatched between 7:00 and 9:00A.M. 6/9

Mao Zedong and Zhu De Inquire of Uu Shaoqi About the Situation of Xiang Ying and Others (January 9, 1941)

You said that Xiang [Ying] and Yuan [Guoping] 1 had leftthe army, but we have not yet received news of this. It is expected that you will let us know immediately when they left, where they are now, how things are with Xiyi [Ye Ting] and Xiao Yao,2 and how things are with the army. We had a report from Ye [Ting] and Xiang on the 5th that they set out on the night of the 4th and reached somewhere between Taiping and Jingxian in the early morning of the 5th. Things are unclear after that.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 249, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Yuan Guoping was the head of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army. See the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1940. 2. As noted several times above, Yao was an alternative surname for Rao Shushi, and Mao frequently referred to him as "Xiao Yao" or "Little Yao," though Rao was only eight years younger than Mao. 620

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Uu Shaoqi and Chen Yi Concerning the Leadership of the New Fourth Army (January 11, 1941)

We are in receipt of the report by Ye [Ting] and Yao [Rao Shushi], which you forwarded to us. Ye and Yao are absolutely correct, and we hope you take advantage of being nearby to help them whenever necessary and give them encouragement. Only make no mention at this point of Xiang Ying's removal from office. Make sure that the other instructions are passed to Ye and Yao without delay.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 251, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 621

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang ]iaxiang to Liu Shaoqi, Ye Ting, and Others About How the Entire New Fourth Army Should Obey the Command ofYe Ting and Rao Shushi (January 11, 1941)

The leadership of Xiyi [Ye Ting] and Xiao Yao [Rao Shushi] is absolutely correct. It is expected that the entire Party and the entire army will obey the command of Ye and Yao and carry out the task of moving northward. Although you are in a difficult environment, it is still possible to preserve the backbone force by fighting guerrilla style and to reach southern Jiangsu.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 253, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 622

A Dispatch to Zhou Enlai and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning the Departure of Xiang Ying and Others from the Army When the New Fourth Army Was Breaking Out of the Encirclement (January 11, 1941)

The report from Ye Ting and Xiao Yao [Rao Shushi] on the 9th reads, "Today, on the 9th, we were advancing northward and again encircled. We are gathering all our forces to fight a fierce battle with the enemy and to try to break through the encirclement in groups and then move to the north. Early this morning Xiang [Ying] and Yuan [Guoping]led a section of the army and left without informing anyone, and it is unclear where they went. We are resolved to stay to the end for the sake of the safety of the entire army," and so on. We have told Ye Ting and Rao Shushi to take command of the entire Party organization and the entire army in resolutely carrying out the task of moving north, and you are hereby informed of this matter.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6. p. 255, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 623

It Will Be Best If the Troops in Southern Anhui Break Out of the Encirclement and Advance to the East or to the North in Groups (January 12, 1941)

To Ye [Ting) and Yao [Rao Shushi) (and for transmittal to Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi)): Does your present situation allow for breaking out of encirclement? If this is possible, it seems best that you break through and then advance in groups eastward or northward (to given destinations, splitting into several branches and advancing along different routes, with no time limitations, the principle being to preserve actual strength and to accomplish the task). It is urgently requested that you consider the matter and come to a decision. Because the negotiations in Chongqing probably cannot be relied upon, you should at the same time pay attention to talking with the commanders of the besieging armies, and please keep us informed of the situation by telegram. Mao [Zedong)

Zhu [De)

Wang [Jiaxiang)

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 609, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 624

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others to the Effect That Ye Ting Is to Command the New Fourth Army (January 12, 1941)

We are greatly relieved to know that you have led the main force of the army in successfully breaking out of encirclement. We hope that morale will be strengthened and that you will persevere to the end. Get to southern Jiangsu rapidly. Xiyi [Ye Ting] is to make all decisions within the army, with Xiao Yao [Rao Shushi) assisting him. The whole army is to obey Xiyi's orders. As for Chongqing, we are in the midst of negotiations. But you must not pin your hopes on this. In everything you must depend upon yourselves.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 259, where it is reprinted from Wannan shibian. 625

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Inquire ofYe Ting and Others About the Circumstances of the Breakthrough (January 13, 1941)

I. We are very happy and relieved to learn that you have led two ofFu Qiutao's 1 regiments in breaking out of encirclement. It is hoped that you will rapidly reach southern Jiangsu. 2. How many men have broken through? How many rifles? Where are they now? How are things with them? How many men and rifles were besieged in Maolin? Who was the commander? Let us know as soon as possible for use in the negotiations.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 261, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Fu Qiutao ( 1907-1981) was at the time commander and political commissar of the new organized First Detachment of the New Fourth Army's General Instruction Unit. 626

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying About How Serious Representations Should Be Made to the Guomindang Authorities (January 13, 1941)

The six regiments under the command ofXiyi's [Ye Ting's) headquarters are still being besieged in the area of Maolin south of Jingxian and have not yet come out. They are now running out of ammunition and food supplies, in an extremely dangerous situation, and it is possible that the entire force will be annihilated. Although two ofFu Qiutao's regiments have broken out and reached the hilly areas in Ningguo, they have not yet broken out of the larger lines of encirclement. Please make serious representations to Chongqing that we are appealing to the whole nation for support and so on. Please make the most serious representation to the authorities that if their encirclement is not lifted immediately we shall send troops in reinforcement right away, and that responsibility forthis split falls on their shoulders. Please distribute without delay the circular telegram we issued today.

Our source for this text is Maq Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 263, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 627

Dispatch to Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yifrom Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Countermeasures Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident (January 13, 1941)

I. We have lodged a most serious protest with the authorities. It was clearly stated that if they do not [X] 1 lift the encirclement, responsibility for the split will be theirs. 2. We shall immediately prepare for a major political and military counterattack on a national scale. 3. Tell Comrades Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], and Yao [Rao Shushi] without delay to try and break out of encirclement if possible, or to hold fast to their positions if they cannot break through, and that thus there will eventually be a way out.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 265, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 1. This character, missing in the original, probably stands for "immediately." See the previous text, also dated January 13. 628

Plan to Su"ound Han Deqin and Shen Honglie in Reprisal for Chiang Kaishek's Massacre ofthe New Fourth Army in SouthernAnhui (January 13, 1941)

To Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi]; Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]; Zhu [Rui]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], and Yao [Rao Shushi] (transmitted by Hu and Chen); Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

I. We agree to the plan in the telegram of the 12th from Hu [Fu] and Chen [Yi] that northern Jiangsu prepare to surround Han Deqin 1 and Shandong prepare to surround Shen Honglie. 2 Preparations must be completed within ten days after receipt of [this] telegram, and then orders must be awaited to attack. Zhu, Chen, and Luo are responsible for Shandong, and Hu and Chen are in charge of northern Jiangsu. This is in answer to Chiang Kaishek's plans to massacre ten thousand of our men in southern Anhui. 2. Zhou and Ye are right now lodging a protest in Chongqing, and we are sending out a public telegram of protest under the names of Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang. 3 Ye and Xiang are expected to contact by telegram the troops encircled in Maolin and tell them that, if breaking out of encirclement proves impossible, they should hold out for another ten days, after which a way out might be found. 3. If Chiang Kaishek annihilates our troops in southern Anhui, we should wipe out Han Deqin and Shen Honglie resolutely, thoroughly, and completely, putting an end once and for all to the problem of Central China. 4. To meet any serious emergency, North China should speed up the organiza-

tion of reserves. 5. To meet any serious emergency, our offices in Chongqing, Guilin, Xi'an, and Luoyang must immediately prepare against attacks from Chiang Kaishek. 6. Open propaganda should be carried out regarding the Southern Anhui Incident, and deployments to wipe out Han and Shen should be kept strictly secret. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 610-11, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. Regarding Han Deqin, see the note to the text dated March 29, 1940. 2. Regarding Shcn Honglie, see the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1939. 3. Refers to an open telegram dated January 13, 194 I. signed by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying that was published on January 16 in Xin 7..honghua bao. 629

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Inquire ofYe Ting and Others Whether or Not Chiang's Forces Have Ceased Fire and Lifted the Siege, and About the Situation of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (January 14, 1941)

I. Chiang Kaishek has issued orders to cease fire and lift the siege in southern Anhui. Please inform us immediately as to whether or not the fighting has stopped. 2. If the fighting has not ceased, please encourage all the troops to hold firm, and there will certainly be a way out. 3. Please find out and report to us without delay the number of our men who have been killed, wounded, or arrested, and the name and rank of our cadres who have been killed, wounded, or captured, so that representations may be made to Chiang.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 269, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 630

Circular to Ye Ting and Others Concerning the Circumstances of the Negotiations with Chiang (January 14, 1941)

We have received a report from [Zhou] Enlai that says: "Once on the 12th and once on the 13th Chiang [Kaishek] sent a telegraphic order to Gu Zhutong to lift the siege and approved the move to southern Jiangsu," and so on. You are being specially informed ofthis matter. It is hoped that you can hold firm for another two or three days, and a way out will be found.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 271, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 631

Circular to Liu Shaoq~ Ye Ting, and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Regarding the Status of Zhou Enlai's and Ye Jianying's Negotiations with Chiang Kaishek (January 14, 1941)

The report from Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying] reads as follows: "Zhang Chong conveyed our protest to Chiang yesterday by telephone regarding the encirclement and attack against the New Fourth Army. Chiang says: '(I) The Center will definitely not create difficulties for the New Fourth Army in its northward move. As to this instance of conflict, I hear that it was the New Fourth Army that fired the first shot. (2) We hope that the New Fourth Army will continue its move northward. (3) If there is no passage there, it is also permissible to move toward northern Anhui, and Li Pinxian is to be ordered not to create difficulties. (4) I have given orders that a hundred thousand bullets and soldiers' pay and provisions be provided after the New Fourth Army has crossed the river. (5) Please tell Zhou and Ye, and ask them to communicate this to the front, that one should not exaggerate the magnitude of the incident.' We are now writing directly to Chiang to lodge a protest and to tell him resolutely that, without passing through southern Jiangsu, it is impossible for the army to cross the river. The Central Committee is requested to inquire of Ye and Xiang which route they will take to enter southern Jiangsu, so that more specific representations may be made," and so on. You are hereby specially informed of this matter. Hold firm for a few more days, and there will be a way out.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 273, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 632

Circular to Zhou Enlai and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang About the Circumstances in Which Guomindang Forces Killed More Than 7,000 of Our Men (January 14, 1941)

According to reliable sources, Shangguan Yunxiang 1 did away with more than seven thousand of our men as of two o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, 2 and a firm order has been given to do away with another thousand.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 275, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. Shangguan Yunxiang (1895-1969), a native of Shandong, atlended military schools from an early age and rose in the ranks of the Guomindang army, particularly the "Bandit Suppression" forces. 2. The time is given here with a character meaning between 1:00 and 3:00P.M. 633

To Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying About Negotiating with Chiang Kaishek an Immediate Ceasefire and Lifting of the Siege (January 14, 1941)

I. We have read [your] report of the 13th and have passed it on to Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]. 2. The question now is not which route to take but, rather, a question of saving lives. If the attacks are not halted, the whole army will be annihilated. Please ask Chiang [Kaishek] immediately to order a ceasefire and a lifting of the siege. 3. Because he was unable to break out from under siege, Xiang [Ying] has returned to the ranks and is resolved to cast his lot with the whole army,live or die. 4. It is Fu Qiutao's two regiments that have broken through, but in fact they have not broken out of the larger encirclement lines. The main forces under Ye, Xiang, and Yao [Rao Shushi] are still where they were in Maolin, besieged by tens of thousands of troops. They have been in bloody battle for eight days, and the situation is extremely dangerous.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 277, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 634

Make Political and Military Preparations for a Great, Comprehensive Counterattack to Rescue the New Fourth Army (January 14, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen) and Peng [Zhen], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping), Lti [Zhengcao) and Cheng [Zihua], 1 Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen Yi, Zhou [Enlai) and Ye [Jianying]:

I. Ye [Ting) and Xiang [Ying], following orders to lead ten thousand men of the New Fourth Army northward, have been surrounded by seventy thousand men sent by Chiang Kaishek in the area around Maolin, south of Jingxian. They have been fighting a bloody battle for eight days and eight nights from the 6th to the 13th, and they are resolved to cast their lot with the whole army, live or die. Although one unit under Fu Qiutao did fight its way out of the smaller encirclement lines during the night of the 12th, the main forces have not been able to break through, and there is the danger of the entire army's destruction. 2. The Central Committee has decided to begin political and military preparations immediately for a comprehensive counterattack to rescue the New Fourth Army and smash the anti-Communist high tide. 3. Aside from the fact that northern Jiangsu and Shandong have been ordered to make all preparations immediately and await orders to annihilate Han Deqin and Shen Honglie, and we have at the same time issued a circular telegram of the most solemn protest and are in direct negotiations with Chiang Kaishek, all our troops in North China must comply with the previous order2 and organize reserve

forces in advance to prepare to meet the most serious incident. MaoZedong

ZhuDe

Wang Jiaxiang

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 612-13, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. At this time. LU Zhengcao (1905- ) was the commander of the central Hebei military district, and Cheng Zihua ( 1905-1991) was the political commissar. 2. The reference is to paragraph 3 of the "Plan to Surround Han Deqin and Shen Honglie in Reprisal for Chiang Kaishek 's· Massacre of the New Fourth Anny in Southern Anhui," dated January 13 and translated above. 635

Circular from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Regarding the Contents of the Emergency Telegram from He Yingqin to All Guomindang Units (January 15, 1941)

He Yingqin's emergency telegram to all troops reads as follows: "Over the last few days, the advance of bandit suppression armies has been very successful in all war zones. The bandit chiefs, Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, have both been captured. To guard against any retaliatory measures, all forces must take strict precautions and allow the bandits no opportunities," and so on.

Our source for this text is Mao Udong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 281. where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 636

To Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying Concerning Political and Military Preparations for an OveraU Counterattack (January 15, 1941)

I. All of Chiang Kaishek's talk about vinue and morality is a pack of lies and should under no circumstances be trusted. 2. The Central Committee has decided to launch an overall political counterattack and, militarily, to muster all necessary forces to smash their attack. 3. Propositions for compromise and concessions put fonh by middle elements such as Sun and Feng are harmful.' Only a fierce, resolute, and all-around counterattack can defeat Chiang Kaishek's provocations and attacks. We must not fear splits and launch a fierce counterattack. We must immediately put an end to the moderate attitude we adopted in our telegram of the 9th. 4. Gu Zhutong declared: "All administrative offices, news agencies, rear offices, warehouses, and repair shops, as well as all illegal organizations established by the New Founh Army all over are to be shut down, their arms confiscated, and their personnel detained," and so on, and ordered Shangguan Yun•iang to e•ecute this directive. Shangguan has been very resolute this time about annihilating Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]. 5. Between I and 3 P.M. on the 13th, Shangguan Yun•iang said: "More than 7,000 of the bandits on Lujiao mountain, Dongliu mountain, Fengli•i. and around Licun were killed or captured by us on the 13th. The more than a thousand remaining bandits are still struggling where they were. One o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th has been set as the deadline by which they are to be wiped out completely."

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 283, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. The references are to Sun Fo and Feng Yuxiang. 637

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Inquire of Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi About the Number of Men and Rifles of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui (January 17, 1941)

What is the actual number of men and rifles in the army in southern Anhui? You said there were nine regiments, and Zhang Dingcheng 1 said there were only three regiments. Shangguan Yunxiang claims to have captured 7,000 of our men, with a section of the army (presumably Fu Qiutao's) having broken loose. Is this true or not? Please let us know right away.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 285, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. The reference may be to Zhang Dingchcng (1898-1981), a native of Fujian, who commanded the Seventh Division of the New Fourth Army at this time. 638

Talk Given By the Spokesman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident (January 18, 1941)

The New Fourth Army stationed south of the Yangzi was moving northward in compliance with orders when it was suddenly attacked on orders from the government, which led to the enormous tragedy of troops fighting against Japan being annihilated. This news caused shock both at home and abroad. Our reporter interviewed the spokesman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, especially regarding this matter. What he said follows:

This tragic incident was by no means an accident but was, rather, the planned handiwork of pro-Japanese conspirators and anti-Communist diehards. From the time when the armed forces were mobilized to fight a war of resistance, the Red Army guerrillas in the various southern provinces were soon grouped together to form the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Over the past three years or more, this army has fought successively in various place north and south of the Yangzi River, resisting a powerful enemy and rendering one unusual meritorious service after another. This is widely known not only by the people of our country but also by people around the globe. An army like this, which has made contributions in resisting Japan, should by all rights be protected and cherished. Yet those in authority, just at a time when a powerful enemy approached and the nation was increasingly in peril, failed to uphold the righteous principle of putting the nation and the War of Resistance first. Under the sway of prejudices arising out of ten years of fighting the Communists, they have always looked upon the army led by the Chinese Communist Party as an alien military force, so that incidents of humiliation, cruelty, encirclement, and attack against us have been legion. Toward the New Fourth Army, of course, there has been no exception to this rule. Said army's detachment in Central Hubei under Li Xiannian was attacked many times by Cheng Ruhuait and others; the detachment under Chen Yi

This text was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, January 18, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 259--63, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1957. The text is not signed by Mao, but his participation in the meeting at which it was decided to publish this talk is discussed at length in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 257. I. Cheng Ruhuai (189~ ) was at this time a commander of guerrilla forces in Hubei. 639

640 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

in southern Jiangsu has been constantly harassed by Leng Xin; the troops under Guan Wenwei in northern Jiangsu have been harassed by Han Deqin; the troops under Luo Binghui in eastern Anhui and Peng Xuefeng north of the Huai River have been oppressed by Li Pinxian. In Pingjiang and western Henan, said army's rearguard personnel and wounded officers and soldiers were on repeated occasions murdered in cold blood; there have been the widely known Pingjiang massacre and Queshan massacre. The wife and small children of Zhang Yunyi, said army's chief of staff, were arrested and held in confinement. These are all actual incidents that have taken place overthe past few years and are still fresh in people's memories. Things have become further aggravated in the past few months. Largescale offensives have been launched in northern Jiangsu, eastern Anhui, Central Hubei, and so on, under the name of "bandit suppression," and there has long been a foul atmosphere throughout the whole Yangzi and Huaihe area. On top of all this, on October 19 of last year He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi sent a telegram, as general and deputy general chiefs of staff, to Commander Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander Peng [Dehuai] ofthe Eighteenth Group Army and to army commanders Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying] of the New Fourth Army, ignoring actual facts and stressing what they called army politics and army discipline, in order to compel all units of the New Fourth Army and· the Eighth Route Army to gather north of the Yellow River by a fixed deadline. Taking into consideration the interests of the whole nation, Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang agreed to move the New Fourth Army troops stationed south of the Yangzi northward and gave their reply in the telegram ofthe 9th. By the end of December, Army Commander Ye [Ting) and others of the New Fourth Army had made all necessary preparations for moving the troops. Just as they were about to set out, unexpectedly the Guomindang's organs for shaping public opinion all over openly disseminated the news that these troops were moving north, an act tantamount to giving away secrets to the enemy. At the same time we heard that the authorities issued orders to Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang to attack, and told them to "round up the whole gang in one fell swoop and capture alive Ye and Xiang." Outwardly, however, they said they had ordered all troops to assist in the passage, that no obstacles would be created, and so on. Believing that the word of the responsible authorities was to be trusted, on the 4th of this month Army Commander Ye and others resolutely began the move of approximately ten thousand men of the New Fourth Army's headquarters and its troops. It was altogether unexpected that they should be attacked just after they had begun their move. When they reached the area of Maolin Village, between Jingxian and Taiping, they suddenly met with a large-scale encirclement and attack by Tang Yunshan's Fifty-second Division, Rang Jiwu's 108th Division, Duan Maolin's Seventy-ninth Division, Fan Ziying's !44th Division, Zhan Zhongyan's Fortieth Division, Tian Zhongyi's New Seventh Division, and Wang Jingxiu's Tenth Division, a total of more than seventy thousand men, all under the command of Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang, who advanced separately and attacked together. Army Commander Ye and his men were forced into battle in

JANUARY /941

64/

haste and had to try and find a way out while in the midst of fighting; at the same time, they sent a telegram to the authorities demanding an explanation. Throughout the seven days and nights in which these troops were surrounded and engaged in bloody battle, the authorities maintained the fiction that they had questioned Gu Zhutong by telegram about what was going on and the lie that they had ordered Gu to lift the siege and offer passage. In fact they had instead secretly ordered their forces to carry out the plan of rounding up and annihilation. By the 13th, the fierce battle had gone on for eight days and nights, and our New Fourth Army, which was attacked while following orders to move northward, had run out of ammunition and food supplies and was sacrificed completely, thereby fulfilling the goal of the authorities to round up and annihilate! Yesterday, on the 17th, the Military Commission of the national government formally issued a general order declaring the New Fourth Army to be traitorous and directly acknowledging that the southern Anhui New Fourth Army's forces had been exterminated, that said army's commander, Ye Ting, had been wounded and captured, that Deputy Army Commander Xiang Ying was in flight and was being apprehended, that the New Fourth Army's designation had been cancelled, that Ye Ting would be handed over to a military court for trial, and so on. With this grand and stately document, their true colors of plotting to destroy the anti-Japanese forces have been revealed nakedly before the people of the whole country. It just so happened that on that same day, the 17th, Japan's Domei Press sent a startling dispatch from Nanjing. Said communication is summarized as follows: "The Chongqing government has issued a strict order for the Communist forces in the areas south of the lower reaches ofthe Yangzi to move north of the river before December 26. To make the Communist forces move north of the river sooner, the chief commanding officer of the Third War Zone has started to surround and attack the New Fourth Army and the other Communist armies near Dongliu. Some of the Communist forces have retreated north of the river in disorder on the lOth from near Digang. Since the 14th, the various troops ofthe Japanese Army have also mounted attacks on the New Fourth Army near Xuancheng and Jintan, and the pacification forces of the 'National Government' are assisting the Japanese Army in battle." At this point, the true story of a tragedy, that of a huge scheme to wipe out the anti-Japanese troops and destroy dissident forces, has become clearly known to all. What was called "moving north within the deadline" was actually nothing other than a trap to snare our army into encirclement to be annihilated. What was called "army discipline and state law" was but an excuse for designating them as traitors and handing them over to the court after the round-up and annihilation. All their glib and high-sounding talk in the past about strict army discipline and sacred laws of the state amounts to no more than a lie to cover up their destruction of the dissident forces and murderous schemes. The New Fourth Army is an anti-Japanese army and its move north was an action taken in compliance with orders, yet it met with the tragic fate of being rounded up and annihilated. Where, then, is army discipline? And what of the laws of the state? There is really no room for argument here, as the one who

642

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

gave the order is the one who violated it and the one who made the laws is the one who trampled upon them. Just when the New Fourth Army south of the Yangzi was being brutally attacked and exterminated, the authorities again ordered Tang Enbo, Li Pinxian, Li Xianzhou, Wang Zhonglian,2 and Han Deqin, with troops of more than two hundred thousand men, to mount a large-scale offensive against the New Fourth Army north of the river. Thus the plan of "striking them all in one fell swoop" was not limited to the areas south of the river. In the Northwest, at the same time, the troops surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region also numbered more than two hundred thousand men. The special agents organ in Xi'an, in addition to blockading and harassing the administrative office of the Eighth Route Army, a few days ago actually seized the water carrier for the office and coerced him into going back and putting poison in the drinking water. Meanwhile, the military police department in Guilin compelled the administrative offices of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to retreat immediately. As for Communist Party members and other progressive elements in various places throughout the country, they have long ago started making investigations and namelists in preparation for another "strike at them all in one fell swoop," so are they not probably just about ready to get down to it?! Judging from these various facts, the past tragedy of the civil war might be repeated, and there is a possibility that the valiant cause over the past three and a half years of the national war against Japan could be abandoned in midstream. The shameless crime of annihilating the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui is but part of the entire scheme that has been exposed and only the beginning ofthe open fulfillment of the entire scheme of the pro-Japanese conspirators and the anti-Communist diehards to replace the War of Resistance with civil war, and to replace unity with splitting. This crime of boosting the enemy and absolute lawlessness will not be tolerated by the hundreds of thousands of our Communist Party members, nor by the hundreds of thousands of officers and men of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. and neither will the soldiers and civilians and patriotic fellow-countrymen throughout the nation, and all who champion justice throughout the world, sit back and do nothing. We appeal to all patriotic soldiers and civilians and fellow-countrymen all over the nation, and we call upon fair-minded people throughout the world who sympathize with the cause of the Chinese nation's liberation to unite as one and struggle together toward the following goals: I. Severely punish the chief culprits who plotted to exterminate the New Fourth Army troops in southern Anhui! 2. Set free all captured officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army and protect the lives and safety of Army Commander Ye and other military and political cadres! 2. At this time, Wang Zhonglian (1903Army.

) was the commander of the Eighty-fifth

JANUARY /941

643

3. Offer compensation to the New Fourth Army officers and men killed and wounded in southern Anhui, and to their families! 4. Stop the war of suppressing the Communists waged by hundreds of thousands of troops in Central China! 5. Demolish the anti-Communist blockade lines in the Northwest! 6. Stop the criminal acts of brutally murdering and arresting Communist Party members and other patriotic personages all over the country, and release all patriotic political prisoners! 7. Eliminate He Yingqin and all other pro-Japanese elements! 8. Oppose all schemes and plots that undermine the War of Resistance and that

undermine unity! 9. Strictly reorganize the battle array against Japan and carry the War of Resistance against Japan through to the end! We are convinced that the majority of the soldiers, civilians, and fellow-countrymen from all parties and factions as well as those without party affiliation will value the destiny of the nation and country above all else, stand with us on the same frontlines to oppose the small number of pro-Japanese elements and other scum of the nation and frustrate their shameless scheme of fighting internally and pacifying externally and of capitulation and selling out their country. The Chinese nation is faced with the most serious crisis since the start of the War of Resistance. We Communists as well as the majority of soldiers and civilians throughout the country understand full well the responsibility we should assume and the measures we should take in this adverse and perilous situation.

Circular from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang }iaxiang Concerning the Circumstances of Chiang Kaishek's Orders to Attack Us in All War Zones (January 18, 1941)

I. Chiang Kaishek has declared: ''Zhu [De) and Ye [Jianying) have not obeyed the orders to move the troops under their command, so we should combine the forces of the Party, the government, and the army and compel them to submit. Only we must prevent these forces from fleeing helter-skelter toward the Dabie mountains and western Henan, which would upset the overall situation. We should stay clear of the difficult and cope with the easy, stay clear of the main force and strike at the weak points, and find opportunities to destroy them," and so on. 2. He Yingqin has declared: ''The New Fourth Army south of the Yangzi, defying orders, has not moved northward, and Commander Gu [Zhutong) has received orders to send troops to destroy it altogether. It is estimated that more than ten thousand have been killed and more than two thousand captured. Ye Ting, commander of said army, was wounded, and Xiang Ying, its deputy army commander, killed in battle. Strict defense should be mounted against the alien army's retaliating from Shaanxi and Shanxi," and so on. 3. Chiang has ordered all war zones to start an extermination campaign [against us). Li Zongren has appointed Tang Enbo commander-in-chief of the northern Huaihe zone, Li Pinxian commander-in-chief of the southern Huaihe zone, Wang Zhonglian commander-in-chief of the Central Hubei zone, and Feng Zhi 'an 1 commander-in-chief of the western Xiangyang zone, and ordered them to start attacking and to finish up within two months.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 287, where it is reproduced from Wannan .shibian. I. Regarding Feng Zhi'an, see above the text of November 4, 1940. 644

To Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqifrom Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Political, Military, and Organizational Measures That Should Be Adopted (January 19, 1941)

(I) The overall policy of the Central Committee will be sent separately. (2) Food

is being collected in the border areas. (3) Under present conditions it is very difficult to expand munitions factories. The construction of a third acid factory is under negotiation. 1 (4) Chiang's plan is to defeat our forces one by one, auacking the New Fourth Army lirst and then the Eighth Route Army. No attack is likely for now in the northwest, and we have no reason to rouse Hu Zongnan's attention, so no new military deployments shall be made in the border areas. (5) In North China, please follow the steps prescribed in our original plan, except that the urgency is to be increased. (6) In Central China we plan to carry on protracted guerrilla warfare, on the principle that it is to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the anti-Communist forces. (7) By declaring the New Fourth Army rebels and putting Ye Ting on trial, Chiang Kaishek seems to have made up his mind to break with our Party. The background influence seems to be mostly from Germany and Japan. We have decided to take the necessary political, military, and organizational measures. Politically, we shall fully expose Chiang's scheme (though making no mention of his name for the time being). Refer to the editorial and the statement made by the spokesman of the Chinese Communist Party in Xin Zhonghua bao on this. Only a defensive posture will continue to be taken so as to mobilize the masses of the people under the slogan of persisting in the war against Japan and opposing the civil war. Militarily. we shall first fight defensive warfare and fight our way, when necessary, to Gansu and Sichuan. Organizationally, we plan to make preparations to remove our various administrative offices. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 289, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. This sentence is not altogether clear, but it apparently refers to the preparation of acids to be used in making explosives. 645

To Zhou Enla~ Peng Dehua~ and Liu Shaoqi on the Change in the Relationship Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party After Chiang Kaishek Issued His "January 17" Order, and Our Countermeasures (January 20, 1941)

I. Chiang Kaishek has pushed us to a position altogether antagonistic to him, and we no longer have anything to say to each other. 2. The Central Committee has decided to abolish our various administrative offices step by step and recall their personnel in the same manner. The Eighth Route Army General Headquarters will no longer submit any reports on paper or by telegram to Chiang. 3. The Military Commission in Yan'an has issued orders in a statement. Please distribute it extensively after you have received it. 4. The relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party as it is now is of no use at all to us and to the revolution. But the split was caused by Chiang, so it is rather to our advantage. 5. The problem is [X] 1 disagreement and has not been resolved after much toing and froing during the past three months. As a result, we are politically very much on the offensive at the moment, while, militarily, we have to assume a defensive posture for the time being. We must, however, make active preparations for the offensive, so that we will be able to take the offensive effectively after four to six months. During the period of preparation, no large military deployment will be made in border areas or in northwestern Shanxi in order to avoid creating shocks. Eighth Route Army personnel are not to make anti-Chiang comments for now.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 291, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 1. Eleven characters are missing here in the available text. 646

Order and Statement of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Southern Anhui Incident (January 20, 1941)

I. Order Order of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ( Yan 'an, January 20, the 30th year of the Republic):

The New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army has won fame both at home and abroad by its distinguished service in the War of Resistance. Army Commander Ye Ting has an outstanding record in leading the army against the enemy. Recently, however, while it was moving northward in accordance with instructions, this army was treacherously attacked by the pro-Japanese clique, and Commander Ye, wounded and exhausted in the fighting, was thrown into jail. Informed of the whole course of the Southern Anhui Incident by telegrams from Chen Yi, commander of the First Detachment of said army, and Zhang Yunyi, the army's chief of staff, the Commission expresses its great wrath and its deep solicitude for our comrades. In addition to the adoption of separate measures to deal with the towering crimes of the pro-Japanese clique in sabotaging the War of Resistance, attacking friendly armed forces, 1 and launching a civil war, the Commission hereby appoints Chen Yi as acting army commander of the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, Zhang Yunyi as deputy army commander, Liu Shaoqi as political commissar, Lai Chuanzhu as chief of staff, and Deng Zihui2 as head of the Political Department. Acting Commander Chen Yi and

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 265-73, which reproduces it from a documentary collection published in China in 1942, indicating as usual the variants between that version and the text as it appears in Vol. 2 of the Selected Works. 1. Friendly armed forces .... The people's armed forces 2. Deng Zihui (1896-1972), a native of Longyan in Fujian, was at the time head of the New Fourth Anny' s Political Department. 647

648 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

his associates are hereby instructed to devote their efforts to strengthening the army, reinforcing unity within its ranks, ensuring good relations with the people, carrying out the Three People's Principles, adhering to the Testament of the Director General, and consolidating and expanding the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the struggle to defend our people and our country, to carry the War of Resistance forward to the end, and to guard against attacks by the pro-Japanese clique. It is so ordered. II. Statement3 Given that the National Government Military Commission's order of January 17 declaring the New Fourth Anny mutinous, cancelling its designation, and placing its army commander, Ye Ting, on trial in court is indeed a sudden and grave turn of events in the anti-Japanese ranks, a Xinhua News Agency correspondent conducted a special interview with the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the significance ofthe incident and their measures in response to it. Said Commission's spokesman made the following statement:

The recent incident4 had been brewing for a long time. Present developments are but the opening phase of a national emergency. Since the formation of their triple alliance with Germany and Italy, the Japanese bandits have redoubled their efforts to engineer changes within China so as to find a quick solution to the Sino-Japanese War. Their purpose is to use the Chinese themselves to suppress the anti-Japanese movement and consolidate the rear for Japan's southward drive, so that it will be free to drive south in coordination with Hitler's offensive against Britain. A considerable number of ringleaders from the pro-Japanese clique have long entrenched themselves in party, government, and army organizations' and have been carrying on agitation day and night. The preparations for their plot were completed by the end of last year. The attack on the New Fourth Arrny 6 in southern Anhui and the reactionary order of January 17 are only the first open signs of this plot. Incidents of the gravest nature will now be staged one after another. What are the details of the plot of the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese clique? They are as follows: I. To publish the two telegrams of October 19 and December 8 toZhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying over the signatures of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, in order to arouse public opinion.

3. Statement-+ Statement by the Spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee ofthe Chinese Corrununist Party to a Correspondent ofthe Xinhua News Agency (January 22, 1941) 4. Incident .... Anti-Communist Southern Anhui Incident 5. Party, government, and army organizations-+ Party, government, and army organizations of the Guomindang 6. New Fourth Army ~ New Fourth Army units

JANUARY 1941

649

2. To start a press campaign on the importance of observing military discipline and military orders, in preparation for launching civil war. 3. To wipe out the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui. 4. To declare that the New Fourth Army has mutinied and cancel its official designation. These four steps have already been taken. 5. To appoint Tang Enbo, Li Pinxian, Wang Zhonglian, and Han Deqin as Communist-suppression commanders of the various route armies in Central China, with Li Zongren as supreme commander, in order to attack the New Fourth Army units under Peng Xuefeng, Zhang Yunyi, and Li Xiannian and, if this comes off, to make further attacks on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in Shandong and northern Jiangsu, with the Japanese troops acting in close coordination. This step is now being taken. 6. To find a pretext to declare that the Eighth Route Army has mutinied, cancel its official designation, and order the arrest ofZhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]. This move is now in preparation. 7. To close down the liaison offices of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing, Xi'an, and Guilin, and arrest Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao. This move has also begun, with the closing down of the liaison office in Guilin. 8. To close down the New China Daily. 9. To launch attacks on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and seize Yan'an. 10. To make wholesale arrests of prominent people favoring resistance to Japan and suppress the anti-Japanese movement in Chongqing and in the provinces. II. To destroy Communist Party organizations in all provinces and make wholesale arrest of Communists. 12. To proclaim the recovery of lost tenitories by China7 upon the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Central and South China and at the same time to carry out propaganda on the necessity of concluding a peace with honor. 8 13. Japan to launch most ferocious attacks on the Eighth Route Army by bringing up its troops originally stationed in Central and South China as reinforcements to the north, and to carry out a joint attack by Chinese and Japanese forces9 in order to annihilate the whole Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. 14. Continue last year's state of ceasefire between the Chinese and Japanese armies 10 on all fronts in order to tum it into one of general truce and peace negotiations while ceaselessly attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. 7. The recovery of lost territories by China ,. A so-called "recovery of lost territories" by the Guomindang government 8. A peace with honor - A so-called "peace with honor" 9. Carry out a joint attack by Chinese and Japanese forces ... Cooperate with the Guomindang army

10. The Chinese and Japanese armies ... The Guomindang and Japanese annies

650

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

15. The two countries of China and Japan 11 to sign a peace treaty and China to join the triple alliance. Active preparations are now being made for all these moves. Such in general outline is the treacherous plot of Japan and the pro-Japanese clique. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out in its manifesto of July 7, 1939: "Capitulation presents the greatest danger in the current situation, and anticommunism is, in fact, the preparatory step to capitulation." Last year's July 7 manifesto declares, "Unprecedented danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulties in the War of Resistance are upon us today." Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying] pointed this out even more concretely in their telegram of November 9 of last year: "Certain people at home are engineering a so-called new anti-Communist onslaught in an attempt to clear the way for capitulation. They want to put an end to the War of Resistance by what they call Sino-Japanese cooperation in suppressing the Communists. They want to substitute civil war for the War of Resistance, capitulation for independence, a split for unity, and darkness for light. Their activities are most sinister and their designs most pernicious. People are telling each other the news, and all are horrified. Indeed, the situation has never been so critical as it is today." Thus the Southern Anhui Incident and the order of January 17 of the Military Commission in Chongqing are merely the beginning of a series of incidents. The order of January 17 in particular is full of grave political implications. The fact that those who issued this counterrevolutionary order dared to do so openly, risking universal condemnation, shows that they must have determined upon a complete split and out-and-out capitulation. Because without the backing of their masters the political representatives of the flabby class of big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China cannot move an inch, let alone embark on an undertaking as this which has shocked the whole world. In the present circumstances, it seems very difficult to make those who issued the order change their minds, and it will probably be impossible to do so without emergency action by the whole nation and strong diplomatic pressure from abroad. Hence the urgent task of the whole nation now is to watch developments with the utmost vigilance and prepare itself against any sinister eventuality that the reactionaries may precipitate; there must not be the slightest negligence. As for China's future, the matter is quite clear. Even if the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese clique are able to succeed in their plots, we Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will never allow them to keep up their tyranny indefinitely; not only are we duty bound to step forward and take control of the situation, but we are also confident of our ability to do so. However dark the situation, however thorny the road, and whatever the price exacted on that road (the [loss suffered by the] New Fourth Arrny 12 in southern Anhui is part of that price),

II. The two countries of China and Japan .... The Guomindang government and Japan 12. The New Founh Army~ The New Fourth Army units

JANUARY 194/

651

the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese clique are certainly doomed. The reasons are as follows: I. The Chinese Communist Party can no longer be easily deceived and crushed, as it was in the 16th year of the Republic. 13 It is now a major party standing firmly on its own feet. 2. The majority of members of other parties and groups in China, including the Guomindang, who are apprehensive of the disaster of national subjugation certainly have no wish to capitulate and fight a civil war. Some of them are hoodwinked for the moment, but they may come to their senses in due course. 3. The same is true of China's troops. Most of their opposition to the Communists is under compulsion. 4. The vast majority of the nation's people have no desire to be slaves without a country. 5. The imperialist war is on the eve of a great change. However rampant they may be for the moment, the parasites who depend on imperialism will soon find out that their bosses are not reliable. The whole situation will change when the tree falls and the monkeys scatter. 6. The outbreak of world revolution 14 is only a question of a very short time, and it is certain that this revolution will support the Chinese revolution in the struggle for victory simultaneously. 7. The Soviet Union is the preeminent great force 15 in the world and will definitely help China fight the War of Resistance to the very end. For all the reasons stated above, we hope that those who are playing with fire will not get too dizzy. We hereby serve them with this formal warning: You had better be careful. This sort of fire is no plaything. Look out for your own heads! If this group of people calms down and gives the matter some thought, they will have to take the following steps promptly and in earnest: I. Rein in on the brink of the precipice and stop the provocations. 2. Rescind the reactionary order of January I 7 and publicly admit that they are completely wrong. 3. Punish He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan Yunxiang, the three chief culprits in the Southern Anhui Incident. 4. Release Ye Ting and reinstate him as army commander [of the New Fourth Army]. 5. Return all the men and arms captured in southern Anhui to the New Fourth Army. 6. Compensate all the officers and men of the New Fourth Army who were wounded and the families of those who were killed in southern Anhui.

13. The 16th year of the Republic~ 1927 14. The outbreak of world revolution -+ The outbreak of revolution in many countries 15. The preeminent great forCe -+ The strongest force

652

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

7. Withdraw the troops sent to Central China for suppression of the Communists. 8. Demolish the blockade line in the Northwest. 9. Release all patriotic political prisoners throughout the nation. 10. Abolish the one-party dictatorship and introduce democratic government. II. Carry out the Three People's Principles and observe the Director General's Testament. 16 12. Arrest all ringleaders of the pro-Japanese faction and bring them to trial in accordance with the law of the land. There will, of course, be a return to normal if these twelve points are put into effect, and we Communists and the whole people will certainly not push matters to extremes. Otherwise, "I am afraid that the Ji Sun [family]'s troubles will not come from Chuanyu, but will rather be found within the screen of their own court." 17 In other words, [they] 18 will inevitably be "lifting a rock only to drop it on their own toes, and then we would be unable to help them even if we so wished. We value cooperation, but they must value it, too. To be frank, there is a limit to our concessions; the stage of concessions is over as far as we are concerned. They have inflicted the first gash, and a very deep one at that. If they still care for their own future, they should come forward of their own accord and dress the wound. "It's not too late to mend the fold even after sheep have strayed." It is a matter of life and death for them, and we feel obliged to give them this final piece of advice. But if they remain impenitent and keep up their wrongdoing, the people of China, having reached the end of their forbearance, will dump them on the muck heap and then it will be too late for repentance. As for the deployment ofthe New Fourth Army, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order on January 20, appointing Chen Yi as acting army commander, Zhang Yunyi as deputy army commander, Liu Shaoqi as political commissar, Lai Chuanzhu as chief of staff, and Deng Zihui as director of the Political Department. With more than 90,000 troops remaining in Central China and the southern part of Jiangsu, the New Fourth Army, though subjected to pincer attacks by the Japanese bandits and the anti-Communist troops, will certainly fight on despite all hardships and will never cease to render loyal service to the nation. Meanwhile, the units of its brother army, the Eighth Route Army, will not sit by and watch it suffer these pincer attacks, but will certainly take steps to give the necessary assistance-this I can say bluntly. As for the statement made by the

16. The Director General's Testament -+ ..The Director General's Testament." (This refers, of course, to Sun Yatsen.) 17. This is a quotation from the Analects of Confucius, Book XVI. Chapter I (see Legge, Vol. I, p. 309). Ji Sun was a minister in the state of Lu, who was planning to attack a neighboring minor state called Chuanyu. Confucius made the remark in chiding two of Ji Sun's underlings for going along with his foolishness in creating strife "within the family." 18.

[They]~

The reactionaries

JANUARY 1941

653

spokesman of the Military Commission in Chongqing, the only possible comment is that it is "self-contradictory." While the Chongqing Military Commission stated in its order that the New Fourth Army had mutinied, the spokesman said that its aim was to move into the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou triangle in order to establish a base there. Just suppose we accept what he says. Can a move into the NanjingShanghai-Hangzhou triangle be regarded as a mutiny? That blockhead of a Chongqing spokesman did not stop to think. Against whom would one mutiny in that area? Is it not an area under Japanese occupation? Then why should you prevent them from moving into that area and instead try to wipe them out while they were still in southern Anhui? Ah, of course. That is, after all, what loyal servants of Japan 19 would do. Otherwise, are they not afraid of offending their Japanese masters? Yes, it's true, if they did not eliminate the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui, their Japanese bosses would be angry and would say, "My sons, how useless you are. Just let me give you a few dozen lashes on your backsides." Ouch! Is it not going to be rather painful? Better to carry out the order. Hence their plan to mass seven divisions in an annihilation campaign arose; hence their order of January 17 was issued; hence Ye Ting was put on trial. Hence this and hence that, and there will be a whole series ofacts to be put on in future. All right, so the backsides will be spared a beating, but do they want to be praised into the bargain? I still call that Chongqing spokesman an idiot, however, for he spilled the beans on their fathers' plans. Without being pressed he voluntarily let the cat out of the bag and revealed the plans of the Japanese20 to the whole country and the whole world. 21

19. Japan ..... Japanese imperialism 20. The Japanese ..... Japanese imperialism 21. The whole country and the whole world

-+

The people of the whole country

Dispatch to Liu Shaoqi Regarding the Estimate of the Situation After the "January 17" Order (January 23, 1941)

I. [Paragraph I is missing in the original, as noted by the editors of the 1982 collection.) 2. Chiang Kaishek's order of January 17 marks the beginning of a sudden emergency on a national scale, the start of all-around capitulation, and the breakup of the whole country. Our estimate made before December 17 is no longer applicable.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, val. 6, p. 293, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 654

To Zhou Enlai on the Need to Adopt an Antagonistic Attitude Toward Chiang Kaishek, and Not to Fear a Breakup (January 25, 1941)

Now that they have declared us mutinous, we must no longer adopt a hesitant attitude. We must absolutely not tolerate any more, and we must not fear a breakup, or else we will commit serious mistakes. Consequently, the whole of the orders as well as the statement made from Yan'an, including the wording, are completely correct. 1 Now that we have clarified our position, it is left to Chiang Kaishek to cope with the situation. He will either comply with our twelve articles, so that the two parties can once again come to a compromise, or bring about an overall split. You should make it known to all parties concerned that Chiang Kaishek has pushed us into an antagonistic position. Unless Chiang Kaishek cancels his order of the 17th and takes other necessary measures, we will have no alternative but to stand in opposition to him, for we are left with no other way. You should hurry back to Yan'an. The remaining is detailed instructions from the Secretariat.

Our source for this dispatch is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 295, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. The reference is to the texts of January 20 translated above. 655

To Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai on Tactics for Dealing with Chiang Kaishek (January 25, 1941)

I. Regarding our handling of the Southern Anhui Incident and the Chongqing Military Commission's January 17 declaration that the New Fourth Army is mutinous, see the January 20 order and speech by the Yan'an Military Commission. We must firmly insist that this was planned by the Japanese bandits and the proJapanese faction (and not mention Chiang). We also firmly assert that the socalled army discipline and military orders compelling us to move north, and all the other counterrevolutionary actions happening in various places, such as arrests and killings, were the work of the pro-Japanese faction on orders from the Japanese bandits. In this way we can acquire an advantageous position politically, and Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang will be forced into a defensive position. It is not that Chiang has already made peace with Japan, but we can still make use of the contradictions between Chiang and Japan, even though they are very small. 2. Our strategy of January 20 is adequate to deal with either one of two situations: if Chiang is already prepared for a complete split, we shall meet his split with a split; if he is not ready to effect an all-out split, we shall secure temporary relaxation of tension by means of staunch opposition. 3. Our conciliatory attitude over the past three months (the telegram of the 9th and the troop withdrawal from southern Anhui) has won sympathy from the middleof-the-road faction, but has given Chiang an opportunity to attack us. This attitude should be put to an end immediately, and a shift should be made to a position of staunch opposition and resolute struggle. 4. The step taken on January 17 was a very unwise move on Chiang's part. We must take a firm hold of this and follow through in hot pursuit, without the slightest hesitation or compromise. 5. If a change is to be made, Chiang must first rescind the order of January 17 and make some other necessary indications; otherwise we certainly cannot make any changes.

Our sowce for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, vol. 6, p. 297, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 656

JANUARY 1941

657

6. Chiang's scheme is to defeat us bit by bit, looking upon the [attack on the] New Fourth Army as a local incident. We, however, cannot follow suit, and must regard it as a national incident. 7. Politically assume the offensive and militarily employ a defensive stance for the time being. 8. But Chiang has not yet made mention of the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party, so we too shall refrain from mentioning the whole of the Guomindang or the Central Army. Personnel of the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party will not appear openly. We shall wait and see how Chiang acts and then act accordingly. In this sense we remain on the defensive. 9. Within three months Germany is sure to attack Britain and Japan may very well resume its attack on China. The world situation is bound to change, and Chiang's arrogance might be abated. If Britain should be defeated fundamentally, however, and Roosevelt is unable to do anything about it, Chiang would be more likely to surrender. 10. What the middle-of-the-roaders say must not be disbelieved out of hand or altogether believed. Only by adopting a stand of resolute struggle without the least compromise can we truly win over the middle-of-the-road elements. Otherwise the vacillating stance of the middle-of-the-roaders is objectively to Chiang's advantage.

To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Policy for Dealing with Chiang Kaishek (January 27, 1941)

I. We agree with the method of a gradual retreat. 2. We must, however, take into consideration the possibility of Chiang's arresting all of our men, and we must be prepared to deal with such a wholesale arrest. 3. The twenty-five men withdrawing from Xi'an, led by Li Hua, all had completely legal passports but were detained by the Sixteenth Army when they reached Tongguan. Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] has already sent a telegram to Xiong and Hu, asking them to order the release of our men. The outcome remains unknown.

4. Negotiations cannot be resumed ifthe twelve articles are not carried out; this position is absolutely correct. 5. It is still possible to make use of the contradictions between Chiang and Japan. Li Zongren has given orders to all army groups in deployment against the enemy such that the enemy forces stationed in Xinyang and Yingshan moving north to concentrate in Xin'andian total more than twenty thousand men, a hundred big guns, thirty armored cars, and twenty airplanes. These numbers, moreover, continue to increase, and they intend to invade northern Henan. Tang Enbo's main forces are deploying a defense north of Queshan. Mo Dehong has ordered his various troops in Shangcheng to deploy against the enemy, as the main forces of the enemy army in Central China have concentrated near Xinyang, taking advantage of our elimination of the bandit armies. If the enemy makes a large-scale attack, it must be the work of the Japanese bandits in concert with the pro-Japanese elements, the aim being to threaten Chiang into surrender, and also a measure to bring Chiang to ruin. 6. Our orientation is to seize upon the Southern Anhui Incident and the "January 17" order and refuse to let them go. Chiang is the one who instigated the split, and it is Chiang who pushed us to a point where we cannot but stand in opposition to him. The armed forces under our leadership have been declared mutinous, and there is no way at all for us to maintain any relations whatsoever with Chiang. Unless he rescinds the "January 17'' order and carries out the twelve articles, there

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 299-300, which reproduces it from Wannan shibian. 658

JANUARY 194/

659

is no room for us to negotiate with him, as Chiang himself has thoroughly destroyed any such possibility. The fate of the staff of our administrative offices is in their hands, and they will decide whether to beat them or kill them. In any event, each of us is prepared to be put to death. If they still subscribe to the belief that when two armies encounter each other, no envoy should be killed, they will release our men to return to Yan'an; otherwise, they will do as they please with them. Before they declare a complete split (that is, cancel the designation of the Eighth Route Army and declare the Chinese Communist Party mutinous), we shall keep a few staff members in our administrative office, in the hope that they come to their senses. All this should be explained openly to Zhang Chong and others. 7. The circular telegram on inauguration of New Fourth Army commanders and the circular telegram denouncing the pro-Japanese elements will be sent to you later today. 8. If it is inconvenient to have the administrative office send out these kinds of documents from Yan'an,then use indirect means to distribute them secretly, so as to protect the safety of the administrative office.

Directive of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on Guidelines for the Action of the New Fourth Army After the Southern Anhui Incident1 (January 28, 1941)

I. The Military Commission in Yan'an has publicly announced the leadership appointments for the New Fourth Army, issued a talk denouncing Chongqing, and sent on your behalf a circular telegram of inauguration and a telegram denouncing the pro-Japanese elements. Have you received all of this? Please distribute them widely. 2. After the Southern Anhui Incident and after Chiang Kaishek's January 17 declaration that the New Fourth Army was mutinous, there must be an alteration in our policy toward the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, as represented by Chiang Kaishek. From a policy of fighting them and winning them over at the same time, it must change to one of isolating him completely and exposing his reactionary schemes as much as possible both inside and outside the Party. Nevertheless, until Chiang announces a complete break (by declaring the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party mutinous), we shall not raise anti-Chiang slogans for the time being, but employ words such as "the authorities" or other circumlocutions instead of Chiang Kaishek's name. But there will be no change at all in the application of the "three-thirds" system and the various policies embodied in the Central Committee's December 25 directive. The principle with regard to the united front also remains unchanged. 3. Zhang and Deng should find ways to send people across the river to give guidance to the forces that have scattered in southern Anhui. At present, except for those who cross the river, a force should also be gathered together around Wuhu to resist the Japanese so as to facilitate development southward in the future.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 301-2, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. According toNianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 261-62,this telegram was addressed to Liu Shaoqi, the newly appointed political commissar of the New Fourth Army; the acting commander~ in-chief, Chen Yi; the director of the Political Department, Deng Zihui; and the other commanders, including Zhang Yunyi, Peng Xuefeng, Li Xiannian, and Huang Kecheng. 660

JANUARY 1941

661

4. Guerrilla warfare should be planned right away in western Anhui, eastern Hubei, and in Henan. In the areas around Tongcheng, Shucheng, and Qianshan in western Anhui, Zhang and Deng are responsible for strengthening the columns of guerrilla troops so as to be able to advance before long toward the Dabie mountains. Xiannian is responsible for making arrangements in the areas around Xishui and Huangmei in eastern Hubei and in the areas under enemy attack in western Shanxi (the enemy has already occupied Miyang). Xuefeng should organize two guerrilla detachments of crack troops so that they may be sent to operate in western Shanxi at the appropriate time. In southern Jiangsu, it is hoped that Hu and Chen will quickly gather the forces that have moved east from southern Anhui, operate in southern Jiangsu for the time being, and prepare to head for the Tianmu mountains in the future.

Letter to Xiao San (January 29, 1941)

Comrade Xiao San: I have read the poems, and find them very interesting. Since the newspaper won't print them, issue them on the street comers instead.! hope you'll come have a chat with me when you have the time. Salutations! I'm returning the originals to you herewith. Mao Zedong

This letter was first published in Wenxian he yanjiu. 1982. no. I, p. 3. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 9, p. 385, where the text is reproduced. 662

Dispatch to Zhou Enlai Regarding Circumstances in the Development of the Current Situation (January 30, 1941)

1. There is no difference in principle between the Central Committee speech and the Military Commission speech, except that the Central Committee speech, delivered on the 18th, mainly explained only the Southern Anhui Incident, whereas the Military Commission order and speech, delivered on the 20th, raised the overall issues and indicated sharply that it was in opposition to the order and the speech of the Chongqing Military Commission. If you feel there is no harm in issuing both talks in Chongqing, then go ahead and issue both; otherwise, it is all right to issue only the Military Commission order and talk. 2. There still could be a period oftransition between the beginning ofa breakup and a complete split, the speed and duration of which depend upon various conditions both at home and abroad. Our orientation is not to spur it on, but we must be prepared for its happening fast. Before Chiang declares a complete split, a small number of staff members should remain in our administrative office to handle dayto-day affairs. For this reason, it may yet last a considerable length of time. The idea of [X][X][X] to prolong the time is correct. The fact is that we cannot dispatch troops until after six months at the earliest; at present we can wage only a defensive battle. 3. It would be very disadvantageous for the Soviet Union to supply any more arms to Chongqing. Please ask the military attache to find a way to stop it. 4. According to a United Press broadcast, the Japanese army has occupied Miyang and is likely to attack Nanyang. Tang Enbo has withdrawn the troops from Xincai and concentrated them in Shangcai in preparation against the enemy. 5. According to news from Xi 'an, Hu Zongnan has promised to send a telegram to Tongguan telling them to release Li Hua and more than twenty others. We shall see what happens. 6. The border regions are stepping up military and economic preparations. 7. So long as the Guomindang has not declared a complete split, we will not cut off all dealings with them. With regard to relations between the two parties, Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 303-4, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 663

664 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

however, we must insist on our twelve conditions and not discuss further any other issues (such as moving north, expanding the army, border areas, and so on). 8. In his talk on the 27th, Chiang moved over to a protective (or defensive) posture. This makes clear that all parties are dissatisfied, and he is beginning to be troubled by a guilty conscience. It has been decided today that I shall make a speech opposing him.

To Mao Anying and Mao Anqing (January 31, 1941)

Anying and Anqing, my sons: It was a long while ago that I received a long letter from Anying, a letter from Anqing, a photo album from Anying, and some scattered photos; in a word, several letters and photos. I am very sorry that I have not replied to any of this; I know you have been anxiously expecting to hear from me. I am very pleased that you have made progress. Anying's writing is coherent and flawless in syntax, and the handwriting is pretty good too. To have the will to improve is a very good thing. There is just one thing on which I would like to make a suggestion to you both, which is that, while you are still young, you study more ofthe natural sciences and concern yourselves less with politics. Politics should be given some attention, but at present it is advisable to concentrate on natural sciences as your major subject and supplement this with the social sciences. In the future you may reverse this and make the social sciences primary and the natural sciences secondary. In sum, pay attention to science, as science is the only true knowledge and can be put to infinite use in the future. There is one thing good about other people's complimenting and praising you, which is that it spurs you on to make progress. But it has one disadvantage as well, which is that you can easily become conceited, dizzy with success, and complacent, so there is the danger of forgetting to plant your feet on the ground and to be realistic. You will have your own future, be it good or bad, which will depend upon you yourselves and your direct environment. I do not wish to interfere in your affairs. My opinions are meant only as suggestions; it is for you yourselves to deliberate and make your own decisions. In other words, I love you and hope that you do better and better. Anying asked me to write some poetry. I can't come up with anything because I'm not in any sort of poetic mood. As for sending books, the year before last I had my old comrade from Xi 'an, Lin Boqu, send a whole pile of books to your youth group. I hear they failed to reach you, and this is really a pity. I have selected a few more to send you this time; you'll have to wait for a bigger batch.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 166-67, where it is printed from the manuscript. 665

666 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

My health is not quite so good this year, and I am dissatisfied with myself. I'm reading less too, because of too much work. How are you getting on? You are on my mind a lot. MaoZedong

Congratulatory Telegram to the British House of Commons (January 1941)

Special report to this paper: The British House of Commons convened on January 12. We are told that Comrade Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, has sent a telegram of congratulations on this occasion. The gist of the telegram is as follows:

The Chinese Communist Party wishes to extend its warm fraternal salutations to the House of Commons of the British people, who are fighting valiantly for democracy and peace in the midst of the cruel and [X] ever-expanding European war, [X][ X] and wish them success. The great Chinese nation has been fighting a War of Resistance Against Japan for three and a half years now. Relying on the strength of even greater unity, it will carry the War of Resistance through to the end so as to win the nation's complete liberation. We hope to strengthen and consolidate to a greater degree the international unity between the peoples of China and Britain.

This text first appeared in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 13, 194 I. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. Vol. 6, p. 305. which reproduces it from this source. 667

At Present the Command Center in Central China Should Focus on Three Basic Strategic Areas (February 1, 1941)

To Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], and for the information of [Peng] Dehuai: At present the command center in Central China should focus on three basic strategic areas. The first basic strategic area is the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region. The method is to have Peng Xuefeng, 1 Zhang Yunyi,2 and Li Xiannian 3 push westward gradually from their respective locations, with the objective of reaching western Hubei, western Henan, and southern Shaanxi and establishing guerrilla base areas there within one year, making use of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang [Kaishek] and also taking advantage ofthe present attacks by the Japanese bandits in the direction of northern and western Henan (the Japanese bandits have started an offensive campaign from Woyang in the east and Xinyang in the south, besieging Tang [Enbo], Li [Xianzhou], He [Zhuguo], and the troops of the Guangxi faction; Tang, Li, and He are likely to suffer huge losses). First of all you should order Peng Xuefeng to prepare several detachments of crack troops, and when the main forces of Tang, Li, and He are dealing with the enemy toward the west and are weakly defended in Huaixi, have them cross the Huai River and expand toward the area between the Huai River and the Beiping-Hankou [railroad]line. If this plan were to succeed, it would be a tremendous strategic victory and would clear the way to the south for our troops in North China. The designation as the New Fourth Army should be restored to the troops under Peng Xuefeng; if the North China troops move south in the future they will also use the New Fourth Army designation. The New Fourth Army has now been proclaimed by Chiang Kaishek a mutinous army, so it is not bound by any laws (some founding members of the Our source for this text is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 621-24, where it is printed from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. I. Peng Xuefeng was at the time commander of the Eighth Route Army's Fourth Column. 2. Zhang Yunyi was at the time deputy army commander and Second Division commander of the New Fourth Army. 3. Li Xiannian was serving at the time as commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army's Hubei-Henan Advance Column. 668

FEBRUARY /94/

669

Guomindang are fearful that bandits will be found everywhere in the provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Henan). if this plan succeeds, Huang Kecheng4 should prepare to expand into Henan. Second, you should order Zhang Yunyi and Deng Zihui to expand into western Anhui. They should be made to understand that, to repel the attack from the Guangxi armies, the main thing is to adopt the orientation of developing on exterior lines, and that the Tongcheng base area is an ideal strategic base. As for the enemy attack this time, Mo Shujie5 has ordered his troops in Shangcheng to meet the challenge, and if the enemy army turns to the main forces of the Guarlgxi army concentrated in the Dabie mountains after fighting Tang, Li, and He, then Zhang and Deng can shift their main target area for development toward western Anhui. Your telegram of reply last October said that the area between Chaohu and Wagehu is no more than 100 li and passage is very difficult. But now we have base areas in Wuwei and Tongcheng, and even though they cover no more than one or two xian, they are of greater strategic significance than large expanses of base areas in the enemy rear and deserve particular attention. Third, the directions for development for Li Xiannian are the three areas of western Hubei, western Henan, and eastern Hubei, and eastern Hubei can be assigned right away to the existing detachments of Xishui, Huanggang, and Ludong, and their political leadership capabilities strengthened. Development in western Hubei and western Henan will be pushed forward along with the advancement of the Japanese bandits. In all three areas mentioned above that are under Peng, Zhang, and Li, good use can be made of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang, to realize our strategic development. The second strategic center in Central China is the base area in South China, which is made up of four parts: southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, eastern Zhejiang, and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area. Southern Jiangsu is the center of our concentrated forces in South China, and much effort should be used in its management. We do not know much about the area, so we hope you will send us a detailed report. In the future this area should prepare to move into the Tianmu mountains. As for southern Anhui, people should be sent across the river to guide the remnant forces in their fight against Japan in the area around Wuhu and to build up a detachment of 2,000 to 3,000 men and rifles in a year's time. They should make contact with the local Party organizations and prepare eventually to develop into the Huangshan and northeastern Jiangxi. Not everyone should cross the river; those who have already crossed the river may stay for a period of recuperation, after which it may be considered to send them back to the Wuhu area. The situation has changed drastically since January 17, and Xiang Ying's erroneous policy in the past of moving southward would be correct if used from now on. Even by Guomindang reports, the losses in southern Anhui amount

4. Huang Kecheng was at the time commander and political commissar of the Eighth Route Army's Fifth Column. 5. Mo Shujie was at the time army commander of the Guomindang Army's EightyfounhArmy.

670

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

to only over two thousand casualties and more than three thousand captives. Xiang's troop originally totaled ten thousand, so it seems that about three thousand ofthem may have broken through or been dispersed. You should be sure to send people to guide them and gather them together. Those who have reached southern Jiangsu should operate in southern Jiangsu and should not cross back over the river. Wireless communication should be strengthened in southern Jiangsu; there should be at least five transceivers there. A transceiver should be set up right away in southern Anhui as well. Since Zeng Xisheng6 would prefer to engage in guerrilla fighting rather than do what he has been doing, you may have him lead the troops that are now in Wuwei and order him back to southern Anhui in the future. If possible and when necessary, you may also consider sending Sun Zhongde7 across the river with Zeng Xisheng. As for eastern Zhejiang, meaning the delta area between Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Ningbo, our forces have always been weak there. The General Command Headquarters 8 should open up one more strategic base here and build up through the Shanghai Party organizations a guerrilla base area in the region (with the small amount of armed forces originally existing in Songjiang and other places as a foundation). The Central China Bureau must pay attention to directing the Party organizations in Shanghai. The fourth strategic base in South China is the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area, where there are three small base areas holding small amounts of arms and where the popular masses are very good [and supportive]. You should start right now to learn about the region. Little Yao [Rao Shushi] once made a detailed report on it, and we could send it on to you if you do not have it. This region at present is to intensify underground work in preparation for armed uprising in the future and for restoring the open base areas of the past. The above constitutes the cardinal task for the four strategic bases in South China. Third is the Jiangsu-Shandong War Zone. This is the primary base area in Central China at present, where the main forces are, and where the greatest effort has been made. It is also the place where we should prepare to destroy, within a year, large numbers of anti-Communist armed forces that are amassed. But you should regard this place as the starting point for western and southern expansion. With regard to the overall task, its function is to produce cadres and as a place from which to send troops westward and southward, just like the central Shaanxi plain [guanzhong] during the founding Han emperor's time. We now have three large strategic bases: North China, Jiangsu-Shandong, and the south (Fujian-Guangdong). The task for North China is to deal with Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou; your 6. Zeng Xisheng had previously been head of the Second Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Military Commission. In 1940 he was transferred to the New Fourth Army's Military Department, and later that year led the effort to gather together the troops dispersed in the Southern Anhui Incident. 7. Sun Zhongde was at the time deputy commander of the Sixth Brigade of the New Fourth Army's Second Division. 8. This refers to the Central China New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army General Command Headquarters, established in November 1940.

FEBRUARY 1941

67 I

task is to take care of the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region and the FujianZhejiang-Jiangxi border area; the south's task is to manage to the north and south of the five ranges. Given the circumstances in which Chiang Kaishek is attacking only the New Fourth Army at present (his tactic of destroying [our forces] one by one), in addition to your proposal to form four divisions, Huang Kecheng's and Peng Xuefeng's units should be added to each form a division of the New Fourth Army, making six regular divisions altogether. Although the overall situation has changed greatly, the contradictions between Japan and Chiang can still be utilized, and they remain the most fundamental of all the contradictions we can make use of. No matter what sort of trouble Chiang Kaishek is making, he will only make the kind of trouble that will be his own ruin. The Central Committee's resolution on the new situation after January 17 will be sent to you within a few days. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Only by Restoring Unity Within the Country Will It Be Possible to Overcome the Offensive of the Japanese Bandits (February 2, 1941)

To Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu] (in Chongqing), Liao [Chengzhil' and Pan [Hannian] 2 (in Hong Kong), Liu Xiao 3 (in Shanghai), [Chen] Tanqiu4 (in Dihua),5 Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], [Li] Xiannian, [Zhang] Yunyi, [Peng] Xuefeng, Zhu Rui, Luo [Ronghuan] and Chen [Guang], Li [Yu] and Luo [Shunchu],6 Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], [Song] Renqiong, 7 Nie [Rongzhen] and Peng [Zhen], LU [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zihua], He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], Xiao Ke,8 and Gao [Gang] and Xiao [Jingguang] (copy and forward): I. Taking advantage of Chiang Kaishek's concentrating all his efforts to fight the Communists, the Japanese bandits have gathered a force of more than five

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2. pp. 625-28, where it is printed from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. I. Liao Chengzhi (1908-1983) was a native ofGuangdong. Since 1937 he had been the Chinese Communist Party representative in Hong Kong, and he remained there until the fall of Hong Kong to the Japanese in December 1941. 2. Pan Hanni an ( 1906-1977) was a native of Jiangsu. At this time, he was the head of the Eighth Route Army office in Shanghai. 3. Liu Xiao (1908-1988) was a native of Hunan. At this time he was secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and head of the Department for Urban Work of the Central China Bureau. 4. Chen Tanqiu (1896-1943) was a native of Hubei. In 1939, after a period in Moscow, he became the Communist Party representative in Xinjiang. He was arrested in 1942 on the orders of Sheng Shicai, and executed in 1943 at the same time as Mao's son, Mao Zemin. 5. Today known as Urumchi. 6. Luo Shunchu (1914-1981) was a native of Fujian. During the WOI of Resistance Against Japan, he occupied various positions, including that of chief of staff of the First Column of the Eighth Route Army. 7. Song Renqiong ( 1909- ), a native of Hunan, was at this time chairman of the South Hebei Administrative Office of the Chinese Communist Party. 8. Regarding Xiao Ke (1908- ), see note 2 to the text of May 9, 1941. 672

FEBRUARY 1941

673

divisions and regiments and divided it into several routes to surround about 150,000 troops under Tang Enbo, He Zhuguo, Li Xianzhou, and Li Pinxian east of the Beiping-Hankou railway. The enemy's main force is the Xinyang route, which has hurried northward and is engaged with Tang Enbo's main force in fierce battle. The xian of Miyang, Wuyang, Xi ping, and Shangcai have already been occupied. Telecommunication with Yexian has been blocked; Wei Lihuang has gone to Yexian in haste to supervise; the government offices in Luoyang have been moved to Lushi. At the same time, the enemy in Suxian has crossed the Huai River and occupied Mengcheng and Woyang and is now engaged in pitched battle with He Zhuguo and Li Xianzhou. It is also reported that the enemy in Kaifeng is coming down south via Weishi. The Central Army around Tongguan marched by night to the front for reinforcement. The enemy is also hitting out in the Jingzhou and Dangyang areas so as to pin down the Sichuan army and the northwest army and prevent them from being able to reinforce in the north. 2. The present Battle of Henan 10 is the biggest battle since the Battle of Yichang. 11 Whatever its military outcome, politically it is a heavy blow to Chiang Kaishek, because he instigated the Southern Anhui Incident, which created a deep rift between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and so the enemy was given a chance to step in. Chiang Kaishek has been in high spirits and has looked down upon Japan and concentrated his efforts on fighting the Communists with all his might ever since the three countries formed an alliance. The contradictions between Japan and the United States have intensified, and Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have been assisting China. Just after Chiang Kaishek singlehandedly created the rift between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (after destroying the New Fourth Army in the Southern Anhui Incident and issuing the order declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous on January 17), the enemy started a large-scale offensive during the second half of January. So obvious are the consequences of Chiang Kaishek's fighting the Communists. In our propaganda in various places it should be emphasized that such counterrevolutionary policies on Chiang Kaishek's part of concentrating solely on internal suppression can only create opportunities for the enemy, and that, if not changed, it will inevitably lead to national extinction. Also to be raised emphatically are the twelve conditions for a solution to the current situation put forward by our Party's Central Committee. Only if Chiang Kaishek immediately realizes the error of his ways and puts into effect the proposals made by our Party's Central Committee can I0. The Battle of Henan. also known as the Battle of Southern Henan, took place from January 24 to February 10, 1941. The Japanese Army launched a large-scale attack on southern Henan on January 24, and the Guomindang Army adopted the tactic of moving around its main forces under Tang Enbo so that the Japanese were unable to engage them in battle directly. In this way the Guomindang Army was able to recover territories occupied by the Japanese. II. This is the battle in which the Guomindang Army lost the area of Yichang to the Japanese in June 1940.

674

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

there once again be a restoration of domestic unity, which Chiang Kaishek has already begun to break apart Only when domestic unity is restored can the Japanese bandits' attack be resisted and our nation be saved from destruction. 3. After we expressed our unyielding stand and he met with the enemy's largescale attack, Chiang Kaishek offered us a cheap method of compromise, which consisted of conditions such as allowing an extension on the date for our Central China forces to move northward, reorganizing the New Fourth Army into the Eighth Route Army's newly designated First Army, and so on. This has been firmly rejected by Comrade Enlai, and in the end Comrade Ye Jianying is being sent back to Yan'an for discussions. His flight left Chongqing today and should arrive tomorrow. Chiang's eagerness to seek compromise in a crisis can already be perceived in a general way. We must maintain the stance of sharp struggle, and we certainly will not compromise with him unless our necessary conditions are met. It is of utmost importance to disseminate widely the twelve points regarding the way to resolve the current situation and to make them known to everyone in all circles of society, so as to create public opinion which will be helpful in finding a solution. We append the twelve conditions proposed to Chiang Kaishek by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the settlement of the current

situation. 12 Central Secretariat On the Jstll (Jianying has arrived in Yan'an as of the morning of February 2)

12. We omit the balance of this last paragraph, which consists of a verbatim repetition of the twelve conditions which appear toward the end of the ''Order and Statement of the Revolutionary Military Commission" dated January 20, 1941, translated above. 13. The editors of the Junshi wenji indicate that this telegram was drafted on February I, but finalized and sent out on the 2nd.

The Offensive Posture of the Japanese Army and Our Policies Toward the Guomindang (February 2, 1941) 1

Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Hu [Fu, or Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], [Peng] Xuefeng, [Huang] Kecheng, [Zhang] Yunyi, Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Li [Yu] and Luo [Shunchu], [Li] Xiannian, Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu] (in Chongqing): I. It is possible that the enemy will take Luoyang, and it is possible as well that the main forces of Tang [Enbo], Hu [Zongnan], and Wei [Lihuang] may be scattered. The two forces of Hu and Wei in the Zhongtiao mountains, and the Guangxi Army forces in the Dabie mountains2 may all end up in a very difficult situation. One unit of Hu's troops in the northwest may go to assist Henan, and the antiCommunist high tide may recede. The contradictions between China and Japan remain the main thing. 2. Our overall policies: a. With respect to the political aspect, continue the offensive, tit-for-tat, chase closely from behind, insist on the twelve demands,' do not let up with regard to the Southern Anhui Incident of January 13 and the reactionary order of January 17. Under appropriate circumstances, we will not refuse to compromise, but we definitely will not back down at present (Zhou and Dong are responsible for this aspect of things). b. With respect to military matters, the Eighth Route Army will remain where it is, without relaxing in its preparations, and the New Fourth Army will spare no effort in striving all out toward Henan. (Kecheng should immediately switch to the designation of the New Fourth Army; the New Fourth Army has become an army with a highly honored reputation among the people of

Our source for this text is Mao Zl!dong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 629-30, where it is printed from Mao Zedong's handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives. I. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was dispatched between 9:00 and II :00 P.M. 2. Refers to the forces of the Guomindang Army's Twenty-first Group Army, stationed

in the Dabie mountains at the time. 3. See above, the text dated January 20, 1941. 675

676 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the entire country, which is something won with the price of the Southern Anhui Incident.) 3. As for the united front, Peng and Zuo and Liu and Deng with regard to the various armies in Zhongtiao, Xuefeng with regard to the troops in Henan, and Xiannian with regard to the forces in Hubei and Henan, should all pay great attention to developing friendships and together beating back the Japanese bandits' invasion. This is a rare opportunity not to be missed to respond to evil with good. 4. In the two provinces of Jiangsu and Shandong, we will not attack anyone unless we are attacked, but we will resolutely destroy anyone who does attack us. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

An Analysis of the Situation as Regards the Japanese Attack, and of the Political Tendency of Chiang Kaishek (February 7, 1941)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

I. The scale of the enemy army's attack this time is very extensive and the fighting is fierce, apparently of an even larger magnitude than the Battle ofYichang. This has been brought on entirely by the anti-Communist schemes of Chiang [Kaishel<], He [Yingqin], and Bai [Chongxi]. 2. Tang [Enbo]'s group army 1 suffered considerable losses, three of his armies have turned back toward western Henan, and Nanyang fell on the 4th. Li Xianzhou is still on the western bank of the Huai River, where the battle is also fierce. A section of the enemy forces attacked and occupied Xiangcheng by way of Shangcai, threatening Li from the back; another section attacked and occupied Taihe by way of Haozhou, impinging upon Li's front. It is estimated that Li, too, will withdraw westward if defeated. The main force of the Guangxi army, now concentrated in the Dabie mountains, has been cut off from the rear, thus becoming a force in the enemy's rear. This is a heavy blow to the Guangxi faction, and it is estimated that Mo Dehong's troops are also likely to retreat westward in the future. Fan Hanjie's troops have been transferred south from the Zhongtiao mountains. These troops will be forced to cross the river if Luoyang is in danger. The earlier plan that Pang Bingxun' s troops move to southern Hebei to cut us off from Hebei and Shandong has to be abandoned, of course. Of Hu [Zongnan]'s troops, Li Tiejun's army2 was transferred eastward in great haste by night, and the Eighth Division is retreating from Zhengning to Binzhou, 3 probably in preparation for moving eastward. The forces surrounding the border areas have been weakened. As for the development

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 633-36, where it is reproduced from a manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. Refers to the Guomindang Anny's Thirty-first Group Army, under the command of Tang Enbo. 2. The Seventy-sixth Army, commanded by Li Tiejun, which was under the Guomindang Army's Thirty-fourth Group Army, whose commander-in-chief was Hu Zongnan. 3. An old xian name, now Binxian in Shaanxi. 677

678

MAO'S ROAD TO POW£R

of the war situation in Henan, it is possible that another unit will be transferred. In sum, the "Communist suppression" plan has been smashed fundamentally. 3. Chiang Kaishek did know that the enemy would attack some time within the months of January, February, and March. The reason he instigated the Southern Anhui Incident, issued the order of January 17, and deployed a large army to attack the New Fourth Army north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui and in central Hubei, was solely that he wanted to stop the enemy offensive by fighting the Communists. I'm fighting the Communists, [he thinks,] and when the clash between the Guomindang and the Communists is greatly exacerbated, Japan will probably just watch the tigers fight from atop the mountain, I should think. If we drag this on for a few months, then Hitler will order Japan to go farther south, and China will be at peace. What he doesn't know is that the Japanese think quite differently. First, time does not allow a wait. The Guomindang-Communist conflict is all very well and good indeed, but you're tricking me to buy some time. I'd rather take advantage of the contlict between the two parties and use it as a chance to attack, undermine your strength, and solve the China problem easily that way. Tojo4 said in his speech on the 30th, "The Chiang regime is locked in an internal conflict and thus unable to carry on a war of resistance, but Japan will in no way rely upon the fact that the Guomindang and the Communists are squabbling but, rather, upon our own strength to solve the China issue." So the attack in Henan is to Chiang like a huge bucket of cold water that washed away all his illusions. Second, the Japanese would not like us to go to North China. Tojo declared openly, "North China is Japan's base area, and if Chiang Kaishek drives the Communist forces from Central China to North China, that would undermine Japanese interests." This is something we failed to realize in the past. 4. When doing external propaganda, please emphatically point out the "words straight from our hearts" passage in our telegram of the 9th [of November 1940] (altogether 102 characters, from "Right now is a time when both Chinese traitors and puppet troops are acting outrageously and rumors are rife" to "wanted very much to share [these words] with you two gentlemen"),5 so that the Guomindang and the middle-of-the roaders might realize that what we predicted is, unfortunately, right on the mark in terms of the present dangerous situation that has come about between the Guomindang and the Communists and between China and Japan. They have insisted upon becoming "pressed to the limits so that mutual agitation arises, [leading to] mutual defeat and damage to both sides;· which has in turn led to "[our being] the snipe and clam to the enemy's fisherman, the result being in violation of our intent, and by that time too late to regret."6 4. Tojo Hidcki (1884-1948) was at this time the Japanese minister of war. In 1948 he was hanged as a war criminaL 5. See above. the telegram dated November 9, 1940, to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, paragraph 2. 6. The parable of the snipe and the clam is used both in the telegram of November 9, 1940, cited in the previous note, and in Mao's telegram of the same date to Zhou Enlai, likewise translated above.

FEBRUARY 1941

679

5. Military fighting against the Cpmmunists has actually come to an end (although attacks are still going on in eastern Anhui and the Guanzhong border areas), but please pay attention to how Chiang Kaishek and various others handle relations between the Guomindang and the Communists. According to my observations, they will have no choice but to seek a compromise. The enemy attacks are so fierce, the January 17 order is so unpopular, all his plans have failed, and the [People's] Political Council is about to be convened, so he must necessarily find a way to compromise or things will be even more to his disadvantage. Is this sort of estimation appropriate? What is your opinion? MaoZedong

Tendencies of the Various Parties After the New Fourth Army Incident (February 7, 1941)

Since Chiang Kaishek, He Yingqin, and others wiped out several thousand men of the New Fourth Army's forces in southern Anhui on January 13, and the Military Commission of the National Government in Chongqing issued the counterrevolutionary order declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous, abolishing the New Fourth Army's designation, and bringing Ye Ting to trial, the effect has been enormous changes in China's political situation. Following is a comprehensive summary of the situation in each of the parties involved: I. With regard to the Guomindang Center in Chongqing: It is making great efforts to mobilize public opinion against the Communists, forcing newspapers throughout the country to publish news and editorials slandering the New Fourth Army and asserting in its propaganda both in China and abroad that this is a matter of army discipline and not a political issue, a local problem and not a matter of overall importance, a matter of internal affairs rather than foreign affairs. In his January 27 speech Chiang Kaishek likewise tried to play down the gravity of the incident and pull the wool over the eyes of people at home and abroad by using the issue of enforcing military discipline. In areas under Guomindang rule, large numbers of Communist Party members and progressive elements are being arrested, conspiracy frameups are being perpetrated, a recantation campaign is being created, and staff members of various administrative offices are being watched and detained. Militarily, a large army of200,000 troops has been gathered under Tang Enbo and Li Pinxian to attack the New Fourth Army in Central China, and secret orders were issued to strike at the Eighth Route Army in Central China in the same way as was done with the New Fourth Army. Near the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, efforts are being stepped up to establish blockade lines and launch local attacks. These methods of theirs are all intended to use pressure to force us

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 15-18, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 267, indicates that sections S and 8 as they appear below were actually written and added to the document by Mao. The balance of the text was not written by him, but, according to a note to our Chinese source, Mao and Ren Bishi 1 revised the whole thing. I. Rcn Bishi ( 1904--1950), a native of Hunan, was at this time the secretary general of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 680

FEBRUARY 1941

68/

into submission. But there are differences of opinion within the Guomindang. He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi favor a direct strike, and the two of them sent a telegram to the generals at the front inquiring about their views on the problem of the Communist Party. In a telegram of reply, Chen Cheng advocated a comprehensive attack. It is said that He and Bai sent a telegram toFu Zuoyi 2 ordering him to make arrangements for an attack on the Eighth Route Army. He Jian 3 and Chen Jitang advocated killing Ye Tin g. Feng Yuxiang denounced He Yingqin and accused him of plotting, but made no mention of Chiang. Sun Ke expressed doubts. Yu Youren 4 indignantly stated that He had deceived him. Zhang Chong (the Guomindang Central Committee's designee to negotiate with us) indicated that there was nothing to be done and did not have the heart to face people. Some members of the Guomindang are concerned about a split, and some senior party members even said that this could lead to self-destruction. Many Guomindang members are also worried and angry, saying that this matter has been taken too far. There are also those who express fear. 2. The various small parties and middle-of-the-road elements are extremely disappointed with the Guomindang and feel deeply the need for unity in favor of democracy and against a civil war. Zhang Bojun 5 of the Third Party, Zuo Shunsheng6 of the Youth Party, and others intend to organize a united movement for democracy and have asked to unite actively with the Chinese Communist Party to resist Guomindang oppression. Madame Sun [i.e., Song Qingling], He Xiangning,7 Liu Yazi,8 and other members ofthe Guomindang Central Committee, along with other notable personages, sent a joint letter to Chiang pointing out the schemes of He Yingqin's pro-Japanese faction and expressing the profound hope that Chiang would not be hoodwinked by these base traitors, would ward off disaster before it is too

2. Fu Zuoyi (1895-1974), a native of Shanxi, was at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang forces in the Eighth War Zone. 3. He Jian (1887-1956) was a native of Hunan. At this time he was chairman of the Pensions Committee of the Guomindang Military Affairs Commission. 4. Yu Youren ( 1879-1964) was a native of Shanxi. At this time he was head of the Guomindang Control Yuan. 5. Zhang Bojun (1895-1969), a native of Anhui, had been a member of the People's Political Council until he was expelled in 1941 for his criticism of the Guomindang government's handling of the New Fourth Army affair. 6. Zuo Shunsheng (1893-1969) was a native of Hunan. At this time, he was head of the Secretariat of the China Democratic League. 7. He Xiangning (188()-1972), the widow of Liao Zhongkai. had resigned her posts in the Guomindang in protest against Chiang Kaishek's anti-Communist policies. She was living at this time in Hong Kong, where she supported the anti-Japanese democratic movement.

8. Liu Ya>i (1887-1958), a native ofSuzhou, was a poet and scholar who had passed the shengyuan examination at the age of fifteen. At the time of the New Fourth Anny Incident. he had sent a telegram to Chongqing condemning this action. and as a result had been expelled from the Guomindang.

682 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

late, and would call)' out the Director General's Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies. Many representatives of the national bourgeoisie, such as Huang Yanpei, have, on the one hand, shown sympathy for the New Fourth Army victims and, on the other hand, expressed their disappointment regarding the future of the War of Resistance. Huang Yanpei intends to meet Chiang and state the following three points: (a) The hope that Chiang will stop before going too far; (b) Military discipline is certainly important, but it is also essential to pay attention to winning popular support; and (c) A plea for Chiang to turn his attention outward. He has said to others that, regardless of the rights and wrongs of what has happened in the past, the manner in which the authorities have handled the affair is absolutely wrong, and he hopes that a big problem will be turned into a small one, and a small problem will become no problem at all. There are some among the middle forces who want the Chinese Communist Party to take an intransigent attitude, and there are some who are pessimistic and wavering. Most of the miscellaneous armies and local forces feel that the dissolution of the New Fourth Army marks the start of the dissolution of local forces. In saying, "By exterminating miscellaneous forces with miscellaneous forces, the Center refuses to tolerate the existence of miscellaneous forces," they have voiced their fears and their sympathy toward us. 3. In financial circles, all prices have been rising even faster since the incident, the foreign exchange rate has fallen, the banks are not doing any business, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation has announced its closing, and bankers such as Chen Guangfu9 have stopped investing in the interior. 4. The broad popular masses and progressive forces have expressed indignation toward the Guomindang and sympathy with the Communist Party, considering that the Guomindang is sabotaging the unity of the War of Resistance and that China will be destroyed if there is a civil war. On reading the news, many young students, workers, and office employees wept, felt depressed, or became angry, and many progressive elements in the schools fled. 5. The entire position of the Chinese Communist Party is evident in the orders and statement of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, issued on January 20, which included twelve demands. The whole Party unanimously supports these, and spirits are extremely high. People outside the Party, such as Feng Yuxiang, have said that the country's problems can be solved only by the Communist Party's twelve demands. Zhang Yijun and other members ofthe Political Council were very pleased on reading this document. The

9. Chen Guangfu (1881-1976), known in the West as K.P. Chen, had founded and developed the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, using modem Western methods. In the 1930s, he established branches in many parts of China's interior, while avoiding the Northeastern provinces. At this time he was chainnan of the Currency Stabilization Board, established in China after the United States and Great Britain had granted substantial credits to the Central Bank of China in 1940.

FEBRUARY 1941

683

middle elements, who used to be afraid that an intransigent attitude on the part of the Communist Party would give rise to a split, are now in favor of our Party taking a hard line. Chiang [Kaishek], He [Yingqin], and Bai [Chongxi] originally reckoned that we might be intimidated into submission, assuming that, because the Soviet Union does not want a split, the Chinese Communist Party surely would not dare take a hard line. Seeing how things are contrary to their expectations, they are now flustered. Chiang several times sent his representatives Zhang Chong and Zhang Zhizhong 10 to discuss with Zhou Enlai a method of compromise, and also sent Ye Jianying back to Yan'an. 6. With regard to Britain and the United States, except for a few people (such as the American ambassador, his naval attache, and his secretary, who all believed what He had to say and asserted that the New Fourth Army was not really fighting Japan), along with some reactionary journalists who held that this was a local problem within China having nothing to do with Britain and the United States, the majority of those outside believe that the matter has a direct impact on the future of China's War of Resistance and the interests of Britain and the United States. They have written articles and sent telegrams demanding that the authorities of Britain and the United States exert pressure on the Chinese authorities so as to keep the incident from expanding. A dispatch from a certain American reporter in Hong Kong said: The New Fourth Army did not disobey orders and, after talking with various key personages in Chongqing, he felt strongly that the situation in China is extremely serious and hoped that Britain and the United States would take note of it. He also called their attention to the fact that, after the entire Chinese Communist army had moved into Hebei, the Guomindang armies would certainly negotiate buffer zones with the Japanese army, thereby making it easier for the Japanese army to advance southward. A certain foreigner in Chongqing declared that foreigners, even old ladies in church groups, were all saying angrily that the New Fourth Army was indeed resisting Japan, no matter what argument is given. An editorial in Hong Kong's English-language newspaper, the South China Morning Post, pointed out: a. It is reported that the areas from which the New Fourth Army withdrew have been occupied by the armies of Wang Jingwei already. b. The Chinese Communist forces are acknowledged universally already as a part of the anti-Japanese forces all over China that cannot be overlooked. c. No matter how you look at it, the Chinese Communist Party is far stronger than the feudal national leaders with respect to China's basic needs and hopes as well as with regard to their foresight. d. The Guomindang has to strengthen its own internal discipline to be viable.

10. Regarding Zhang Chong, see the note on the text dated November 9, 1940. Zhang Zhizhong (1890-1969) was a native of Anhui. At this time, he was the head of the Political Department of the Guomindang Military Affairs Commission.

684 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

The British ambassador has been to see Chiang to persuade him to put an end to internal conflict. It is said that Britain and the United States have indicated to the Guomindang that, even though the Communist Party opposes capitalism, the (Guomindang) Center should still handle problems in the interest of China's overall situation and not act with undue haste in order to avoid creating an emergency situation. It is reported that the visit of America's Curry to China was related to investigation of the problem of the New Fourth Army, and that American loans as well as air traffic between China and India have both been hindered as a result of the New Fourth Army Incident. A dispatch from the German news agency states: The New Fourth Army was the best army in resisting Japan; Britain and the United States may have been involved in the attack on it by the main army when it was moving in compliance with orders; current internal conflicts in China are intense and might end in collaboration between Chiang and Wang. The reporter estimated that if war breaks out between the United States and Germany, Japan is bound to withdraw from the alliance and, when that time comes, Japan and the United States will ally at the expense of China. The Koreans were extremely indignant when they heard that Ye Ting had been captured, saying that, once civil war begins in China, Koreans will have lost all hope of liberation. 7. As for the Japanese bandits, they expressed jubilation. A celebration meeting was held in Nanjing at which Wang Jingwei made a speech saying that Chiang Kaishek had done nothing good in recent years, that only this one thing he had done quite nicely. Taking advantage of the fact that Chongqing was mustering all its forces to fight the Communists, especially after the January 17 order was issued, Japan began to move seven divisions and regiments on the 18th and launched a large-scale offensive in the direction of Henan on the 24th. Now that the Guomindang armies hastened to meet the enemy attack, many commanders felt that they had been greatly deceived by the pro-Japanese element He Yingqin. 8. Summing up all aspects ofthe situation to this day, for multiple reasons, such as the fact that Chiang Kaishek's actions have been terribly wrong, our reasonable and intransigent attitude, Japan's attack on Henan, diplomatic pressure from Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, internal contradictions within the Guomindang, the middle-of-the-roaders' sympathy toward us, the indignation of the masses of people toward Chiang, and so on, the basis for a compromise has begun to be laid, civil war can now be avoided, and there are signs that the changes

in China's current situation can develop in our favor.

Set Up an Artillery Headquarters and Put It Under the Direct Command of the Military Commission (February 7, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]: As regards the problem of artillery troops, in order to save and train our artillery troops, the artillery regiment of General Headquarters (leaving one unit at the front), the mountain gun troops in Nie [Rongzhen]'s military region,' and He [Long]'s division2 should concentrate near Yan'an for training and set up an artillery headquarters under the direct command of the Military Commission. Otherwise, if the Japanese bandits' blockade lines become denser in the future, our artillery regiments at the front may be unable to pass through. On the other hand, until there is a complete split between the Guomindang and the Communists we will be unable to fight our way out, and we probably cannot break through this year. 3 And when the artillery troops move westward, there will be no artillery available for use in North China. Mao [Zedong

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 631-32, where it is

reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Nie's region refers to the Eighth Route Army's Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, whose commander-in-chief was Nie Rongzhen. 2. He's division refers to the Eighth Route Anny's 102nd Division, under the command of He Long. 3. The editors of Junshi wenji indicate that a misprinted character and an omitted character in this sentence have distorted the original text, which reads, "On the other hand, only before there is a complete split between the Guomindang and the Communists can we fight our way out, and we probably can break through this year." We accept their emendations, which make far more sense. 685

Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party at Present, and Our Tactics (February 14, 1941)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai: We have taken note of all your telegrams. I. Our estimates are in agreement. Opposition to the Communists will not change, but the tide may ebb and the "Communist-suppression" campaign may come to a standstill (this can only be called a possibility). 2. As long as the current high tide does ebb and the "Communist-suppression" does come to a standstill, it would be difficult [for them] to instigate another high tide or to carry out another "Communist-suppression" (unless there were a surrender). Thus now is a crucial turning point in the situation. 3. The enemy will necessarily attack Chiang [Kaishek]. The estimate of a certain gentleman' is correct, and making use of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang remains at the core of our policy. 4. But to make concessions to Chiang would be dangerous (as you have said). Now is the time to force Chiang to make concessions to us, not a time for us to make concessions to him. Things will be easier once we have tided over this present period. 5. Chiang has never been so besieged as he is now with reproach both from within and without, and we have never before won over such a broad section of the masses as we have today (both at home and abroad). 6. Chiang will not launch a counterattack on the enemy; his primary idea is still to preserve his actual strength. But the likelihood that Japan will attack Chiang is great, so Chiang will be forced to meet the challenge and thus will be unable to preserve his strength after all.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 329-31, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. "A certain gentleman" refers to Tsuikov (1900-1982), who served at the time as military attache to the Soviet embassy in China and principal military adviser to the National Government.

686

FEBRUARY /94/

687

7. At present there is a stalemate between the Guomindang and the Communists,' but it will not last long. The time when the enemy launches a large-scale attack will be the day when the deadlock is broken (but if the enemy does not attack the stalemate will continue). 8. Only at that time, if Chiang expresses to us an easing up of tensions, can we respond with a similar attitude. But now is not that time. To let the stalemate exist for now is favorable; the more deadlocked we are, the more it is to our advantage and to Chiang's disadvantage. 9. The present deadlock exists only politically (deadlocked in terms of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists). Militarily, as far as we are concerned, there is no stalemate because we have not attacked him. !0. If Chiang again orders Tang [Enbo]'s group3 to attack Huaibei, he will be creating the deadlock himself, and eventually, when the enemy army strikes again, he will suffer even greater losses. If Chiang does not attack Huaibei again, then he could undo his own military deadlock right now and be left with only the political deadlock. If Chiang is smart, this is what he should do. II. Our political offensive (the twelve demands) has prevailed over Chiang's political offensive (the telegrams ofthe 19th and the 8th, the Southern Anhui Incident, the order of the 17th, the deadline for moving north, the disciplinary order, the attack in Central China, and so on). Our offensive has achieved results, and more is yet to be gained. 12. Our purpose is not to get Chiang to acknowledge our twelve demands or some of the twelve demands, as he will never do so (of course we should not say this to the masses inside and outside the Party and should still demand that Chiang acknowledge them), but to defeat their offensive with an offensive. 13. The situation has changed. Before January 17, he was on the offensive and we were on the defensive. Things turned inside out after the 17th, and he has landed in a defensive position, wherein lies our greatest victory. 14. Only a military offensive would prevent Chiang from resisting Japan and would be a very wrong policy. A political offensive, on the contrary, would only push Chiang to fight Japan and would not prevent him from doing so. Therefore, it is absolutely correct to talk about a military defensive and a political offensive, the two being both opposite and complementary. 15. In terms of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists, a military defensive and a political offensive will also only bring the two parties together rather than split them apart. If a powerful attacking force is beaten into a

2. Here the version of litis text in Mao "h!dong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 23-25, adds the parenlhetical remark "(as Chen Bulei has said)." Chen Bulei (1890-1948) was, at this time,

Chiang Kaishek's confidential assistant. 3. This refers to the Ouomindang Army's Thiny-first Group Anny, whose commanderin-chief was Tang Enbo.

688 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

defensive position to the point that it can no longer attack, there would be the possibility for the Guomindang and the Communists to come to a temporary easing of tensions. 16. Relations between the Guomindang and the Communists, which suffered a breach ripped by Chiang Kaishek's own hand, can be mended only by our hands. Our hands means the political offensive, which is the twelve demands. There is no other effective way aside from this. 17. Please explain the above points to a certain gentleman, and ask his opinion. 18. As soon as [a report on] the enemy's and our troop strengths and deployments in North China and Central China is ready, you will be informed. MaoZedong

Abridged Text of a Telegram from Mao Zedong and Six Other Councilors to the Secretariat of the Political Council (February 15, 1941)

To the Secretariat of the People's Political Council, for your perusal: Regarding the government's handling of the New Founh Army, our Pany's Central Committee has lodged a strong protest and put forward twelve demands as a way of dealing with the aftermath, which are, (I) to stop provocation; (2) torescind the order of January 17; (3) to punish He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan Yunxiang, the three chief culprits in the Southern Anhui Incident; (4) to release Ye Ting and let him continue to act as army commander; (5) to return all men and rifles to the New Fourth Army; (6) to compensate all New Fourth Army officers and men who were casualties of the Southern Anhui Incident; (7) to withdraw the Communist-suppression troops from Central China; (8) to dismantle the blockade lines in the Nonhwest; (9) to release all patriotic political prisoners throughout the country; (10) to abolish the one-pany dictatorship and practice democratic government; (II) to carry out the Three People's Principles and follow the will of the Director General; (12) to arrest the leaders of all pro-Japanese factions and have them tried under the national law. The government is requested to accept these points. Until the government has deliberated and made a decision, Zedong and the rest of us would find it difficult to attend. You are hereby notified and respectfully requested to give the matter your attention! MaoZedong Wu Yuzhang

Chen Shaoyu DongBiwu

Qin Bangxian Deng Yingchao

Lin Zuhan

Printed in abridged form

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 27, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. A virtually identical text, dated February 18, appears in Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 279--80, where it is taken from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 13, 1941. 689

The Policy of Military Defensive and Political Offensive in Dealing with Chiang (February 17, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen], Peng [Zhen], Lti [Zhengcao], Cheng [Zihua], Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Chen [Yi], and Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi]: (I) The central starting point of the Party's policy at present is to make use of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang. There are still serious contradictions between Japan and Chiang, so it is necessary to make use of them. Therefore, we have adopted a policy of a military defensive and a political offensive. The longer the duration of this policy, the more favorable it is to us; the shorter, the more unfavorable. (2) All armed forces under the leadership of our Party, including the New Fourth Army, should by and large wage defensive warfare only and abstain from offensive warfare against the anti-Communist armies. They should not attempt to launch guerrilla warfare against Chiang in the far rear. (3) The Eighth Route Army in particular should take advantage of Chiang's policy of differentiation (that of not involving the Eighth Route Army in the New Fourth Army question). The middle and lower levels may voice their support for the New Fourth Army, but apart from that the headquarters should keep quiet (this attitude represents, on the one hand, a gesture of restraint and, on the other, a protest), and militarily take a defensive posture. (4) Now that the New Fourth Army is without legal status, it could make a big scene. So as not to reduce the contradictions between Japan and Chiang but, rather, to expand them, however, they should not go to the far rear but, rather, take as their principle, for the time being, restricting their operations to enemy-occupied areas and their adjacent areas. When the Henan enemy has retreated, Peng Xuefeng should temporarily give up his effort to cross the new Yellow River, and the task of the main forces to develop toward Henan should be changed for now to preparation and not be carried out. (5) The same applies to preparations for the Eighth Route Army reserves, for now it is also a matter of preparation and not carrying out. The faster, the better as far as preparation is concerned, just in case; the slower, the better in terms of implementation, in

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, no. 3, 1985, p. 7 (pp. 17()-71 of the annual volume). 690

FEBRUARY 1941

691

order to meet the most favorable international and domestic conditions. Therefore, in stepping up preparations for the reserve forces, it is necessary to guard against impetuosity that may arise in the ranks. It is necessary to have people at higher levels in the armed forces understand that we must, on the one hand, be prepared to deal with a possible sudden event (such as an overall split), and, on the other, in our own actions we must avoid causing too early a split. It must be understood that the later the breakup, the more favorable it is, the sooner the breakup, the more harmful. (6) Therefore, at present only a policy of military defensive and political offensive fits in with the above requirements. Strategic military offensive is correct only when the necessary conditions are ripe. What is meant by necessary conditions is, first, that Chiang declares a complete split and surrenders (he will not declare an overall split unless he surrenders); second is the arrival of a most favorable moment internationally. Only when these conditions are met will we have the initiative; otherwise we will land in a politically and militarily passive position. We must take hold of this kind of initiative. (7) Please make military arrangements according to the orientation outlined above. These guidelines were decided upon by the Central Committee. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Inquiry of Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu as to Whether They Have Proposed the Twelve Articles to the Political Council (February 20, 1941)

1. As for submitting the twelve articles to the Political Council, have you done so yet or not? If you have, please inform us regarding the document, so we can publish it openly. 2. As for the order appointing seven division commanders of the New Fourth Army, please disseminate it in Chongqing as soon as you have received it. 3. We are thinking of sending Zhang Chong a telegram in reply in [Ye] Jianying's name. Is this necessary?

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 29, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. 692

Circular to Zhou Enlai Containing an Estimate of the Situation Regarding Chiang Kaishek's Anti-Communist Activities (February 26, 1941)

Chiang Kaishek can bully and act violently against our secret Party organizations and our administrative offices, but, apart from that, there is nothing he can do. In northern Jiangsu, Han Deqin is finished, and Wang Maogong, Leng Xin, and the others certainly cannot go, because of the developments after our battle with Li Changjiang. In western Anhui, our advance regiment has reached Tongcheng and Qianshan. In the Dabie mountains, our Li Xiannian is expanding to eastern Hubei, which is more than the Guangxi Army can handle. North of the Huai River, Li Xianzhou will definitely be unable to penetrate on a firm footing. In southern Anhui, we are sending Zeng Xisheng 1 across the river to gather the remnants and build a base area around Wuhu, and a section ofXiang Ying's forces are operating in Xiaofeng on the Zhejiang border. During March or April, Germany is sure to attack Britain, and Britain is bound to be defeated. At that time, Chiang will surely be in a great panic. So the situation both at home and abroad is more favorable to us by the day. Chiang Kaishek's fighting the Communists is a given, but a largescale offensive is not possible. The time when Chiang Kaishek is thrown into confusion is near at hand.

Our source for this text is Mao Zl!dongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 31, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. t. Zeng Xisheng (1904-1968) was a native of Hunan. Following the New Fourth Army Incident, he became political commissar of the reorganized Seventh Division. 693

Order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Appointments (February 28, 1941)

The following military and political responsible persons for all divisions under the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army are hereby appointed: I. SuYu as commander of the First Division of the New Fourth Army, Liu Yan as political commissar, and Zhong Qigu&ng 1 as head of the Political Department. 2. ZhangYunyi as commanderofthe Second Division of the New Fourth Army, Luo Binghui as deputy division commander, Zheng Weisan2 as political commissar, and Guo Shushen 3 as head of the Political Department. 3. Huang Kecheng as commander of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently political commissar, and Wu Wenyu as head of the Political Department. 4. Peng Xuefeng as commander of the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently the political commissar, and Xiao Wangdong as head of the Political Department. 5. Li Xiannian as commander of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently political commissar, and Ren Zhibin as head of the Political Department. 6. Tan Zhenlin4 as the commander of the Sixth Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently political commissar. 7. Zhang Dingcheng5 as commander of the Seventh Division of the New Fourth Army, and Zeng Xisheng as political commissar. Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 33, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. As indicated here, Zhong Qigong (1909-1991 ), a native of Guangdong, became at this time the head of the Political Department of the First Division of the New Fourth Anny. 2. Zheng Weisan (1902-1975) was a native of Hubei. 3. Guo Shushen (1904--1994) was a native of Hebei.

4. Tan Zhenlin (1902-1983) was a native of Hunan, who had joined the Communist Party in 1926 and participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927. 5. Zhang Dingcheng (1898-1981) was a native of Fujian, who had joined the Communist Party in 1927. 694

To Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu (March 1, 1941)

Zhou and Dong: Please subscribe to each of the following daily newspapers for us, starting March I: Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily), Saodang bao (Clean Sweep), Xin shubao (New Sichuan News), Xinmin bao (New People's News), Shishi xinbao (The China Times), Xin Zhongguo ribao (New China Daily), Huaguang ribao (Light of China Daily), Guojia shehuibao (National Socialist News), and various Yunnan newspapers. In addition, please purchase for us as soon as possible the following publications from the Chinese National Economic Research Institute on Zhongsi Road in Chongqing: Reference Materials on the Sichuan Economy, The Economy in Guiz:/wu,

Japanese Work on the Chinese Economy, The Military Force ofthe Various Powers, Yearbook on the Chinese and Foreign Economies ( 1931 and I 940 editions), and Chinese and Foreign Economic Digest (all issues from the beginning). Please ask the said institute to send these publications directly to us. Please also send by registered mail the copy of the Commercial Press edition of The Question of Industrial Capital in China, which we asked you to purchase for us previously. MaoZedong

Our source for this leuer is Mao 7.edong shuxin xuanji, pp. 168-69, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 695

To Zhou Enlai on the Question of Definitely Not Attending the Political Council (March 2, 1941)

I. I trust that the instructions of March I have reached you. 1 2. Last night at the meeting of the Secretariat your telegrams were discussed. 2 After long and careful consideration, we have concluded that Chiang is exerting every possible pressure to force us into submission, and that, if we were to attend, our reasonable and favorable political offensive position of the past would collapse altogether, our whole position would be lost, he could brush aside and ignore all our conditions, and we would be left without any recourse whatsoever. Therefore we certainly cannot attend unconditionally, but they will never accept the terms guaranteed in the open order, so we must resolve not to attend. 3. If we fail to attend, there is nothing he can do about it: a. Everyone in the whole country knows that he was wrong in the Southern Anhui Incident, so for us to protest by not attending would hardly be doing something wrong. b. We have set forth conditions for a compromise (a temporary measure) which they did not accept, so they are in the wrong. c. If because of this he should instigate even greater splitting action (by supporting the government's order of January 17, issuing orders for suppression, arresting our representatives, and so on), he would be even more in the wrong and this would be even more detrimental to their side. d. The international situation has reached a point that is unfavorable to the other side (the war between Britain and Germany and the conflict between Britain and Japan).

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 35-36, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. 1. According to Nianpu, Mao drafted a telegram on March I for the Central Committee Secretariat to Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao, on refusal to attend the Political Council in Chongqing if negotiations with the Guomindang failed. Presumably these are the instructions referred to here. 2. The available Chinese text has two characters missing here, but these are supplied in Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 278-79, where the content ofZhou Enlai's two "urgent" telegrams of March I is also summarized. The essential point ofZhou's message was that a clear deci· sion on attendance or nonattendance was indispensable. 696

MARCH 194/

697

e. The situation within the country is that the other side has absolutely no way of dealing with us, and we are not cowed in the least. 4. As long as we can hold out during the present difficulty, there is the possibility of a change for the better. If the conditions arising from the aftermath are resolved within six months, we are still prepared to attend the second Political Council in September. 5. The present political struggle is more acute than ever before. Many smaller parties and groups have already gone over to Chiang Kaishek's side and may create within the Political Council an atmosphere that is unfavorable to us. But this is a passing thing and will change in a short time. For this reason, what the smaller parties and groups have to say is not to be heeded or believed. What they say is meant to deceive us.

To Zhou Enlai on the Relationship Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (March 4, 1941)

l.(Omitted) 1 2. Chiang will continue to increase the pressure on us, so please be prepared. 3. Chiang's speech emphasized the seriousness for China of the Japanese southward advance, which probably means that China and Britain will sign an agreement to wage war. Once the Guomindang is dragged into the British circle, surrender becomes more difficult, and Communist-suppression becomes more difficult, so this is favorable to us. 4. The Political Council passed the resolution in support of Chiang as retaliation for our refusal to attend the session, but this resolution might have been adopted even if we had attended, which would have amounted to throwing the helve after the hatchet and to falling into a major trap, so it is absolutely right for us not to attend. As soon as the European war gets going in a big way, the Guomindang's arrogance will abate. 5. We have heard nothing about troop reinforcement in Yichuan, but there is the possibility. In Central China there is nothing to be done. After the two divisions of the Ninety-second Army under Hou and Ma occupied Woyang and Mengcheng, the enemy bombed them from across the river, and Hou and Ma withdrew. Please inform Elder BrotherLiu that our 344th Brigade ofPeng's forces is still between the Wo River and the new Yellow River.

Our source for this text isMaoZedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 37, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. This omission is indicated on the available Chinese text. 698

Reply of the Seven Communist Members of the Political Council Restating the Reasons They Cannot Attend the Current Session (March 8, 1941)

(Dispatch of the ninth from the Xinhua News Agency, Yan'an) The Second Session of the People's Political Council opened in Chongqing on March 1. All seven Communist members of the Council failed to attend. The reasons they cannot attend the session were given in the telegram of February 5 from the seven councilors to the PoliticaJ Council and also in the official letter of March 2 from Dong Biwu and Deng Yingchao, both councilors, to the Political Council. On March 6, the Political Council sent a telegram to the seven Communist councilors urging them to attend. Having received the telegram, the seven councilors sent a telegram in reply on March 8, elaborating the reasons they were unable to attend. The telegram reads as follows: To the Secretariat of the People's Political Council, and for transmittal to all councilors for their perusal: We are in receipt of your telegram of the 6th and are deeply touched by and filled with admiration for the concern about unity that you gentlemen show. During the past four years, your colleagues in the Chinese Communist Party have been making mentally and physically exhaustive efforts to uphold the national War of Resistance and internal unity, and this has long been commonly acknowledged among our fellow countrymen. You gentlemen have also witnessed that the Communist Party Council members have never failed to attend any session of the Political Council in the past. Only this session is an exception because there are obstacles preventing our attendance. The Communist councilors were appointed by the government, but recently the government has regarded the Chinese Communist Party as its foe, obliterating the armies under its command, arresting and killing its members, and banning its newspapers. The Southern Anhui Incident and the order of January 17, in particular, point to its anomalous deviation since the start ofthe War of Resistance, which has had an enormously disastrous impact upon domestic unity. Following the order of January 17, the enemy and the puppets applauded, our fellow countrymen were enraged, and the nations friendly to us were shocked, all anticipating an impending breakup between the Guomindang and the Communist Our source for this text is Mao Zedorzg ji, Vol. 7, pp. 281-82, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 13, 1941. 699

700 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Party. Recognizing this dangerous situation, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party could not but take proper measures to avert the crisis and preserve the unity, so it proposed to the authorities twelve conditions as a solution after the fact. Over a month has elapsed during which we have had no response whatsoever, and instead the political oppression and military attacks against us have been intensified further. The New Fourth Army has been labeled a rebel army, the Eighth Route Army called a bandit army, and the Communist Party dubbed a traitorous party. Along the road between Yan'an and Chongqing, appalling slogans such as "Down with the Communist Party," "Pay equal attention to resisting Japan and suppressing the bandits," and "Suppressing the bandits is not civil war" have been written all over walls in large characters by official governments and regular armies. Given this situation, unless there is a change, even if Zedong and the others should want to attend the session, to do so would be not only embarrassing and unreasonable, but also for various reasons impossible. With this in mind we sent a telegram on the 15th to the Secretariat of the Political Council in which we briefly stated our position and our hope to be understood. Subsequently quite a few fellow councilors busied themselves in an attempt to mediate. To express our gratitude for their good intentions and to give priority to the interests of the whole nation, Zedong and the others decided to compromise and have [Dong] Biwu and [Deng] Yingchao, both councilors in Chongqing, put forward twelve demands as a temporary expedient, requesting that the government accept them as a solution so that the Communist councilors could attend the meeting. We notified the Secretariat of the Political Council of this at the same time, but we have not had any response from the government on any of this. The conditions for an after-the-fact solution and a temporary expedient that Zedong and the others have put forward and asked that the government authorities, which appointed us as councilors, act upon, constitute the prerequisite for our attendance at the current Political Council session. The government, of course, has the freedom to accept or to reject them, just as Zedong and the others have the freedom to attend or not to attend. Zedong and the others remain unchanged in our concern with and care for the Political Council. If it is possible during the current meetings, through the promotional efforts of the various gentlemen and a prompt decision by those in government, to adopt the various measures put forward by Zedong and the others, then as soon as there is an agreement and a guarantee of its implementation, the Communist councilors at Chongqing will attend the conference as required, even though the session is coming to a close at this time. Otherwise we shall have to wait until the problem is resolved. Zedong and the others accepted the government's invitations only for the sake of unity and resistance to Japan. Ever since the Southern Anhui Incident, the deep rift it created in the unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party has not been eliminated for a single day. As long as these circumstances prevail, then, Zedong and the others find it difficult to attend any meeting called by the government. Herein lies the root cause for the fact that Zedong and the others are dealing with a rather different situation from you gentle-

MARCH 194/

701

men. We have respectfully laid out these trifling matters, hoping to have your understanding and consideration. Signed collectively by the political councilors from the Chinese Communist Party: Mao Zedong, Chen Shaoyu, Qin Bangxian, Lin Zuhan, Wu Yuzhang, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao

Telegram to Comrade Browder from Comrade Mao Zedong Protesting the Class-Based Verdict Against the American People by the Supreme Court of the United States (March 1941)

(Xinhua News Agency, New York, Airmail Dispatch on March 10) To [Earl] Browder: The decision by the U.S. Supreme Court has revealed the cruelty of the ruling class in domestic affairs during a time of imperialist war. We, along with the proletariat and other progressive people of the United States and other pans ofthe world, protest this class-based verdict against the American people. We are convinced that the Communist Party and the American people will unite around the slogan "Free Browder" to struggle for peace and democracy. In our struggle for victory in the War of Resistance, for unity, and for progress, we shall strengthen our militant unity with the Communist Party of the United States and the American people. Mao Zedong

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7. p. 283, where it is reproduced from Jiefang, no. 127. Earl Browder (1891-1973) had been sentenced to prison for passpon violations in 1940, and the Supreme Court had confirmed the sentence on February 17, 1941. Apart from his critical attitude toward American capitalism in general, Mao's reaction may well have been strengthened by the messages of support the Chinese Communists had earlier received from the C.P.U.S.A. (See Vol. V, p. 681, and Vol. VI, p. 423.) 702

A Dispatch To Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Estimates of the Present Political and Military Situation (March 12, 1941)

I. Our offensive (the twelve demands twice put forward' and our nonattendance) finally compelled Chiang Kaishek to make a direct reply, which brought the problem into the open nationwide (our twelve conditions made it into all the Guomindang newspapers, and this in turn exposed Chiang Kaishek's true features). Chiang had wanted to minimize the issue, but now it has become larger (from a military issue it has expanded into a political issue and a question of parties and factions). All this is the outcome of our offensive. 2. Chiang's speech on the 6th and the Political Council's resolution employ again the dual policy of hard and soft tactics. The telegram on the 8th from the seven of us Council members also involves the dual policy of hard and soft tactics. This kind of seesaw struggle will continue, or in other words, drag on, possibly for another year. 3. Chiang's speech on the 6th seems to have the same intention as Cheng Qian's 2 talk announcing our ten principal crimes, which was carried in Xi'an newspapers in April of last year. That is, a kind of Ah-Qism: by cursing us out he saves face and can use this as an excuse to call off the troops. Electing [Dong] Biwu as a standing member of the Political Council and freeing [our] people in Xi'an recently seem to be an indication of this kind of calling off of troops. 4. We should keep up our offensive, however, until the conditions in our temporary solution have been in fact accepted (mainly in terms of expanding the army, defense sectors, the New China Daily, and fewer arrests on the roads). 5. We plan to make no defensive replies to Chiang's speech of the 6th or to the Political Council's resolution, and to ignore them but, rather, to use the occasion of the Guomindang's Eighth Plenary Session to have our Central Committee send

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 39-40, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. I. See above, the demands of January 20, 1941 (pp. 651 and652) reiterated on February 2, 1941 (p. 674). 2. Regarding Cheng Qian, sec the note to "The Current Situation and Our Policies," January II, 1940. 703

704

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

them a telegram restating the necessity of the two sets of twelve demands, as a direct assault. What do you think of this idea? 6. Of the smaller parties and factions, the National Socialist Party and the Youth Party have for the time been turned into tools of Chiang Kaishek, but the groups headed by those such as Huang Yanpei and Zhang Biaofang, who truly represent the national bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry, remain middle-of-the-road. 7. Hu Zongnan has ceased his attacks on Guanzhong, and so we have in fact increased our area by one more district, and it is now quiet all around the border regions.ln eastern Anhui the Guangxi Anny was completely shattered by the Japanese bandits. Li Xiannian is expanding in eastern Hubei, and Mo Shujie's Eightyfourth Army is busy trying to deal with the situation. Chen Daqing in central Hubei and Li Xianzhou north of the Huai River also find themselves unable to do much. Things are quieting down on all sides. In a couple of months, when the European war gets going in a big way and things become tense in Southeast Asia, it is likely that Chiang Kaishek will have to make some concessions to us. This despicable scoundrel is in fact one who bullies the weak and fears the strong.

Telegram in Reply to Mr. Situ Meitang and Others (March 14, 1941)

To the head supervisor of the General Office of the Hong Men Society' of North America in New York, U.S.A., Mr. Situ Meitang, Mr. Ruan Benwan, and the department chief, Mr. Lti Chaoran, for the perusal of these three gentlemen, and to be transmitted for the perusal of all our fellow countrymen in America: We have received and have respectfully read your telegram of January 8, and we are full of admiration for the concern for the motherland and the appeal for unity therein. Today, China definitely cannot fight two wars at the same time, one domestic and one external. It is necessary to abolish completely the anti-Communist schemes of the Guomindang authorities, banish the pro-Japanese elements, unite all forces, and engage in combat with the Japanese bandits before we can hope to win the War of Resistance. But cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party has encountered a serious crisis since Chiang Kaishek ordered the extermination of the New Fourth Army and issued the counterrevolutionary order on January 17 declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous, revoking that army's designation, and handing over said army's commander, Ye Ting, for trial in court. The rampages of the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist elements within the Guomindang have inflicted direct and tremendous damage to the national War of Resistance. At this critical moment, when the nation is being threatened with extinction, unless the pro-Japanese elements are banished, unless the anti-Communist elements give up their plan to fight two wars at the same time, unless the one-party system is eliminated, unless political democracy is exercised, unless the Three People's Principles are put into practice, and unless the will of the Director General is carried out, then the future of the Chinese nation will be ruined in the hands of such people. The Chinese Communist Party has consistently put the interests of the nation above all else and has stuck to its policy of a national united front without the slightest deviation, only it is forced to seek a way to punish the monstrous crime of the pro-Japanese and the anti-Communist elements of sabotaging the War of Resistance, and so proposed to the government authorities mea-

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 41-42, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 20, 1941. 1. The reference is to the secret society of this name. 705

706 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

sures for the aftermath of the current situation as well as temporary measures, each containing twelve anicles. We beg that you gentlemen come to unanimous agreement and give your support, in the hope that these measures will be put into effect quickly so as to benefit unity and benefit the War of Resistance. MaoZedong

To Zhou Enlai Expressing Agreement That Zhou Enlai's Office Should Write an Article in Reply to Chiang Kaishek's Speech of the 6th (March 15, 1941)

I. We agree that your office should write something in reply to the speech of the 6th, and the Central Committee will not put out any more documents about the Eighth Plenum. 2. X in Zhonghua bao in Yan 'an has published an editorial commenting on the Political Council in general and on the reactionary policies of the current authorities, without referring to Chiang's speech. 3. When you issue the document, it would seem advisable also to make general comments (such as restating the crucial importance of the twelve articles, and so on), without mentioning Chiang's speech or making any defensive response.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 43, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. 707

Preface to Rural Surveys1 (March 17, 1941)

Publication of this material has been delayed until now, and the Xunwu investigation has again been lost. 2

The present policy3 of the Party is not one of Agrarian Revolution as during the civil war, 4 but is a policy for the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The whole Party should carry out the Central Committee's directives of July 7 and December 25, 1940,5 and the directives of the forthcoming Seventh Congress.• The following material is being published, on the one hand, to preserve the historical record and, on the other hand, to help comrades find a method for studying problems. Many of our comrades still have a crude and careless style of work, do not seek to understand things thoroughly, and may even be completely ignorant of conditions at the lower levels, and yet they are responsible for directing the work. This is an extremely dangerous state of affairs. Without a really concrete knowledge of the actual conditions of the classes in Chinese society, there can be no really good leadership. The only way to know conditions is to conduct social investigations and to investigate the conditions of each social class in real life. Extremely extensive investigation is impossible and unnecessary, but to focus on a few cities and villages according to a deliberate plan, 7 using the fundamental viewpoint of Marxism, that This text first appeared in the edition of the surveys published in Yao' ao in 1941 for internal use. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 285-88, which reproduces the original text as reprinted in the 1944 edition of Mao's Selected Works. I. This is, in fact, the second preface to the rural surveys. For the first preface, which was written in October 1937 for an edition which never appeared, see Volume VI of our series. 2. For a translation of the Xunwu investigation and infonnation on the history of its publication, see Volume Ill of our series, pp. 296-418. 3. Policy ~ Rural policy 4. Civil war .... Ten years of civil war 5. See above, "Decision of the Central Committee Concerning the Present Situation and Party Policy," July 7, 1940, and "Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Policy in the Current Situation," December 25, 1940. 6. As indicated above, in a note to the "Outline on Opposing Capitulation" of June I0, 1939, the Seventh Congress, originally scheduled for 1939, was in the end not held until 1945. 7. To focus on a few cities and villages according to a deliberate plan ,. For those responsible for directing the work to focus on a few cities and villages according to a plan 708

MARCH 1941

709

is, the method of class analysis, and make a number of thorough investigations is the most basic method for finding out about conditions. Only thus can we acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge of China's problems.B To do this, first direct your eyes downward, and do not just hold your head high and gaze at the sky. Unless a person is interested in turning his eyes downward and is determined to do so, he will never in his whole life really understand things in China. Second, hold fact-finding meetings. Certainly, no all-around knowledge can be acquired merely by glancing this way and that and listening to hearsay. Of the materials I obtained through fact-finding meetings, those on Hunan and those on the Jinggangshan have long ago been lost. 9 The Xunwu investigation was brought to Yan 'an and has disappeared again. The materials published here consist mainly of one Xingguo investigation, one Changgang Township investigation, and one Caixi Township investigation. By looking at these three, the reader can understand the method by which material may be found. Holding fact-finding meetings is the simplest, most practicable, and most reliable method, from which I have derived much benefit; it is a better school than any university. Those attending such meetings should be truly experienced cadres of middle and lower ranks or ordinary people. In my investigations of five xian in Hunan Province and of two xian in Jinggangshan, I approached responsible cadres of middle rank; in the Xunwu investigation I approached cadres of the middle and lower ranks, an older poor xiucai, 10 a bankrupt ex-president of the chamber of commerce, and a petty official in charge of xian revenue who had lost his job. All these people gave me a great deal of information that I had never even heard of. The man who for the first time gave me a complete picture of the rottenness of Chinese jails was a petty jailer I met during my investigation in Hengshan xian, Hunan. In my investigations of Xingguo xian and Changgang and Caixi Townships, I approached comrades working at the township level and ordinary peasants. These cadres, the peasants, the xiucai, the jailer, the merchant, and the revenue clerk were all my esteemed teachers, and as their pupil I had to be respectful and diligent and comradely in my attitude; otherwise they would have paid no attention to me and, though they knew, would not have spoken or, ifthey spoke, would not have told all they knew. A fact-finding meeting need not be large; from three to five or seven or eight people are enough. Ample time must be allowed, and an outline for the investigation must be prepared; furthermore, one must personally ask questions, take notes, and have discussions with those at the meeting. Therefore, one certainly cannot make an investigation or do it

8. Problems - Social problems

9. Have long ago been lost .... Have been lost 10. Xiucai (literally "cultivated talent") was the tenn commonly used for those who succeeded in the lowest of the three levels of the imperial examinations. Even though these were abolished in 1905, there were still many surviving xiucai in 1930, when Mao conducted this investigation.

710

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

well, without zeal, a detennination to direct one's eyes downward, and a thirst for knowledge, and without shedding the ugly mantle of pretentiousness and becoming a willing pupil. It has to be understood that the masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often childish and ignorant, and without this understanding it is impossible to acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge. I should like to repeat that the main purpose of publishing this internal Party reference material is to indicate a method for finding out the conditions prevailing at the lower levels; it is not to have comrades memorize the specific material and the conclusions drawn from it. Speaking generally, the infant bourgeoisie of China has not been able, and never will be able, to provide comprehensive or even rudimentary material, 11 as the bourgeoisie in Europe, the United States, and Japan has done. We have therefore no alternative but to do the collecting ourselves. Speaking specifically, people engaged in practical work must at all times keep abreast of changing conditions, and this is something for which no Communist Party in any country can depend on others. Therefore, everyone engaged in practical work must investigate conditions at the lower levels. Such investigation is especially necessary for those who know theory but do not know the actual conditions, for otherwise they will not be able to link theory with practice. Although the assertion that "Without investigation there is no right to speak" has been ridiculed as "narrow empiricism," to this day I do not regret having made it. What is more, I still insist that without investigation there cannot possibly be any right to speak. There are many people who "the moment they alight from the official carriage" make a hullabaloo, spout opinions, criticize this and condemn that; but, in fact, ten out of ten of them will meet with failure, for such views or criticisms, which are not based on thorough investigation, are nothing but ignorant twaddle. Countless times our Party has suffered at the hands of so-called "imperial envoys." Such "imperial envoys" rush here and there, and are all over the place. When it comes right down to it, Stalin was right when he said that "theory that is not linked with practice is no more than empty theory." He is, naturally, right again when he says, "Practice that is not linked with theory is also no more than groping in the dark." No one should be labeled a "narrow empiricist" except the practical one who gropes in the dark and lacks perspective and foresight. Today I still feel keenly the necessity for thorough research into Chinese and world affairs; this is related to the scantiness of my own knowledge of Chinese and world affairs and does not imply that I know everything and that others are ignorant. It is my wish to go on being a pupil, learning from the masses, together with all other Party comrades.

11. Comprehensive or even rudimentary material .... Relatively comprehensive or even rudimentary material on social conditions

Circular to Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Estimate of International Relations and Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (March 17, 1941)

I. Chiang is eager to save the situation, apparently because of current international relations. 2. The objective of Matsuoka's' trip to the West is to conclude two treaties, between Japan and Germany and between Japan and the Soviet Union, respectively. If the two treaties are signed, the great war will break out soon. Britain and the United States want to prevent Japan and the Soviet Union from concluding a treaty, and have ordered Chiang to effect a reconciliation with the Chinese Communist Party. It appears that Chiang, also fearful of a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union, is turning to us for assistance. Japan, on the other hand, taking advantage of deteriorating relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is seeking help from the Soviet Union to subdue Chiang. 3. If Japan and the Soviet Union sign an economic treaty only, and not a political one, Chiang might possibly accept all our conditions as a temporary solution. But if Japan and the Soviet Union conclude a political treaty, it is then possible that both the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists and that between China and the Soviet Union will deteriorate for a time. 4. (Omitted.)

Our source for this dispatch is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 45, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. I. The reference is to Matsuoka Yilsuke (1880-1946), who was at this time the foreign

minister of Japan. He was strongly pro-Axis, and did indeed conclude the two treaties mentioned by Mao-and a great war did indeed break out. He was arrested after the war as a "Class A" war criminal, but died before a verdict could be reached. 711

The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught (March 18, 1941)

1. The second anti-Communist onslaught, which was touched off by the telegram of the 19th of He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi] (dated October !9last year), reached its climax in the Southern Anhui Incident and Chiang Kaishek's order of January 17; the rearguard actions in this onslaught are Chiang Kaishek's anti-Communist speech of March 6 and the anti-Communist resolution of the [People's] Political Council. From now on, there may be some temporary easing of the situation. With the world's two major imperialist blocs on the eve of a decisive struggle, that section of China's big bourgeoisie which is pro-British and pro-American and which is still opposed to the Japanese aggressors finds it necessary to seek a slight temporary relaxation in the present strained relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Besides, the Guomindang cannot keep these relations strained to the pitch of the past five months because of the situation within the Guomindang (there are contradictions between its central and local authorities, between the CC Clique and the Political Study Clique, between the CC Clique and the Fu Xing Society, and between the diehards and the intermediate sections, and also contradictions within the CC Clique and the Fu Xing Society themselves).' because of the domestic situation (the broad masses of the people are opposed to the Guomindang's tyranny and sympathize with the Communist Party), and because of our Party's own policy (of continuing the protest movement). At the moment, therefore, Chiang Kaishek needs a slight temporary easing of the tension. 2. The recent struggle points to a decline in the standing of the Guomindang and a rise in that of the Communist Party, and this is the key factor in certain changes that have occurred in the relative strength of the two parties. All this has

Our source for this document is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, val. 2. pp. 778-80. 1. The CC Clique was a secret organization created in 1927 by the Chen brothers, Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, who played during the ensuing years a dominant role in the Guomindang. The Political Study Clique was a small group of prominent men, two of whom were Chiang Kaishek's sworn brothers. The Fu Xing Society was composed largely of middle-ranking militaJ)' officers. Members of all three of these organizations were intensely loyal to Chiang Kaishek. 712

MARCH 1941

713

compelled Chiang Kaishek to reconsider his own position and attitude. In stressing national defense and preaching that party politics are out of date, he is posing as a "national leader" who is above domestic contradictions and feigning impartiality to class and party, his aim being to preserve the rule of the big landlord class, the big bourgeoisie, and the Guomindang. But this attempt of his will certainly prove futile if it is only a subterfuge and means no real change in policy. 3. At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist onslaught, the policy of conciliation and concession which our Party adopted out of consideration for the general interest (as indicated in the telegram of November 91ast year) won the sympathy of the people, and we again won the support of the whole people when, after the Southern Anhui Incident, we turned to a vigorous counteroffensive (as indicated by our two sets of twelve demands, our refusal to attend the Political Council, and the nationwide protest campaign). This policy of ours, the policy of waging struggle on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, was entirely necessary for repulsing the latest anti-Communist onslaught, and it has already proved fruitful. Until there is a reasonable settlement of the major points at issue between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we must not show any slackening in our campaign of stem protest against the Southern Anhui Incident, which was engineered by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist cliques in the Guomindang, and against their political and military oppression in all its forms, and must intensify our propaganda for the first twelve demands. 4. The Guomindang will never relax its policy of oppression of our Party and other progressives or its anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under its rule; therefore our Party must heighten its vigilance. The Guomindang will continue its attacks on the areas north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui, and in central Hubei, and our armed forces must not hesitate to repel them. All base areas must strictly carry out the Central Committee's directive of December 25 last year, intensify inner-Party education on tactics, and rectify ultraleft views, so that we can unfalteringly maintain the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. Throughout the country, including, of course, all the base areas, we must reject the erroneous estimate that a final split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party has either already occurred or is about to occur, together with the many incorrect views arising therefrom.

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Problem of Nonparticipation in the Committee of Parties and Factions Before the Issue of the New Fourth Army Is Resolved (March 21, 1941)

I. The Central Committee has not yet discussed the question of the committee of parties and factions, so please do not give them any reply yet. 2. Please consider whether it may not be more appropriate to refrain from participation in the committee of parties and factions until the issue ofthe New Fourth Army is resolved, because Chiang means to bind us hand and foot by having us join the committee.

Our source for this text isMaoZedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 47, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. 714

Opinion Regarding the Strategic Arrangements in Shandong and Central China (April 5, 1941)

To Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and for transmittal to Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Chen [Yi], and Liu [Shaoqi]:

I. We are in receipt of the telegram of the 25th from Zhu, Chen, and Luo. Given the situation that sharp contradictions still remain between Japan and Chiang [Kaishek], there is no possibility that the anti-Communist armies will launch a large-scale attack on us. This point provides our Party with favorable conditions in which to strengthen and expand our base areas in Shandong and Central China. 2. But the triangular struggle between the enemy, the diehards, and us in Shandong and Central China is a protracted one, and none of the three parties will be able to resolve the problem quickly. 3. Although Chiang Kaishek has sent Hou Jingru's Twenty-first Division' under Li Xianzhou (and not He Zhuguo) north of the Longhai railway line to coordinate with Yu [Xuezhong] in Shandong and Han [Deqin] in Jiangsu,2 and this unit continues to try and find a way to advance (it is still south of the Wo River right now), because it is faced with too many difficulties, namely, obstruction by both Peng [Xuefeng]' s forces 3 and the Japanese bandits, it would be very hard to achieve its goal. Pang Bingxun's4 intention to enter Hebei and Han [Deqin]'s and Huo [Shouyi]'s5 to enter Shandong are the same as this (Pang, and Han and Huo, are still where they were originally). Our source forthis text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 637-38, where it is printed from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. I. HouJingru was at this time commander of the Twenty-lint Division of the Guomindang Ninety-second Army. 2. Yu and Han were, respectively, commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the Guornindang Army's Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone. Han served concurrently as chairman of the Jiangsu provincial government. 3. Peng was commander and concurrently political commissar of the New Fourth Army's Fourth Division. 4. Pang was at the time chairman of the Guomindang's Hebei provincial government and served concurrently as wen as deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army's Hebei-Chahar War Zone and commander-in-chief of the Twenty-fourth Group Army. 5. Huo was division conunander of the Fifty-seventh Army's I 12th Division, in the Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone. 715

716 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

4. Therefore, in making strategic deployments you must be in accord with the basic situation described above, make long-term plans, and not be swayed by the information of the moment. 5. Peng Xuefeng's task is to prevent the anti-Communist troops from marching northward. You should order the troops in southwestern Shandong to make efforts to weaken Feng Zigu' s6 and the other anti-Communist forces and to reconsolidate and expand our own forces and construct base areas that are more stable. As for moving the rest of the troops westward and southward, it is necessary to be very careful so as to avoid having too many things to attend to at once. 6. The Central Committee has approved the suggestion of the Central China Bureau that leadership of the Party and the army north of the Longhai railway line should revert to the Northern Bureau and the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, and that south of the Longhai railway line should be under the Central China Bureau and the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army. The bureau in Central China is still called the Central China Bureau. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

6. Feng was head of the xian government of Peixian, under the Guomindang's Jiangsu provincial government.

Views Expressed by the Chinese Communist Party on the Publication of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (April 16, 1941)

I. The Soviet Union, in pursuance of its long-standing policy of peace and neutrality, signed a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13. This is another great victory of Soviet foreign policy. The significance of this treaty lies first of all in the fact that it has secured peace on the Soviet Union's eastern frontier and has guaranteed the peaceful development of socialist construction. Such peaceful development in the Soviet Union is also in the interests of all the laboring people and the oppressed nations in the world. 2. The Soviet-Japanese treaty has greatly elevated the Soviet Union's international position. The Soviet Union has increased its prestige both in the East and in the West. This is disadvantageous to all reactionaries, but advantageous to all peaceloving people and oppressed nations. 3. The Soviet-Japanese treaty does not limit the Soviet Union's support for China in its independent and just War of Resistance Against Japan. As long as the policy of the Chinese government is to persist in its independent war of national liberation, as long as the Chinese government uses Soviet aid to fight the Japanese aggressor, and not against our own compatriots, as has occurred, for example, in January of this year with the destruction of the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhui, and the current large-scale attacks on the New Fourth Arrny in Anhui and Hubei, as long as [the Chinese government] doesn't do things like this, we are persuaded, on the basis of our knowledge of the policy of the Soviet Union, that they will continue to support China. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is one of independence and self-reliance; they will never bind themselves hand and foot in supporting the just actions of oppressed nations for the sake of the imperialists. This time, the Japanese did not attain their goal of limiting Soviet aid to China, and they were disappointed in this. For foreign aid, the Chinese people place their

This text was first published in Jiefang, no. 127, April30, 1941, p. I, and reproduced in Central Committee Documents, Vol. 13, pp. 75-77, which we have used as our source. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 288, this statement was drafted by Mao and adopted at a Politburo meeting on April 16. 717

718

MAO'S ROAD TO POW£R

hopes first and foremost in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has not disappointed China with this treaty, and it will never disappoint China. 4. As for the clause in the Soviet-Japanese declaration about mutually refraining from invasion of Outer Mongolia or Manchuria, this is par for the course, because so-called Manchuria has long since become a tool of Japan in harassing the borders of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The two battles fought at Zhanggufeng and Nuomengkan are evidence of this. In signing the peace and neutrality treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union would have to settle this problem at the same time. In pursuance of its policy of peace and neutrality, the Soviet Union, whether it has a treaty with Japan or not, is not prepared to invade the four Northeastern Provinces. Japan, however, has repeatedly invaded Outer Mongolia, even though Outer Mongolia has a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Japanese declaration guarantees that Outer Mongolia will not be violated. This benefits not only Outer Mongolia but also China's efforts to seek liberation. Recovery of the four Northeastern Provinces is, as a matter of fact, our own business. We should never, as some opportunists do, dream of a war between the Soviet Union and Japan that will enable us to reap the benefits without making any efforts of our own. Such penple wrongly blame the Soviet Union when they hear that it has promised not to invade Manchuria. They are cowards, lacking in resolution. We must recover all our own lost territories by fighting to the banks of the Yalu River and driving Japanese imperialism out of China. This is the sacred task of the whole Chinese people. The socialist Soviet Union is certain to assist us in this task. 5. After the signing of the Soviet-Japanese treaty, China must maintain the three basic orientations of fighting the War of Resistance, unity, and progress. First, no wavering about fighting the War of Resistance is admissible. Second, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must continue. Such divisive acts as dissolving the New Fourth Army must stop and never occur again. Third, all kinds of reactionary domestic policies must cease. Only if we follow these principles can we rely on foreign aid and expect to win the war against Japan. To act otherwise would be to betray our people and would lead to foreign enslavement. We, the Communist Party, sincerely hope that the Guomindang authorities will conduct a searching self-examination and handle the current situation properly. This is necessary not only in the interests of the Guomindang but also for the sake of national liberation.

Postscript to Rural Surveys (Apri119, 1941)

The experience of the work of the soviet political power 1 is the best and most pertinent point of reference for the current work of the political power of the antiJapanese united front. 2 This, however, refers to the aspect of how to link ourselves with the masses and mobilize them against the enemy, not to the aspect of the tactical line. As for the Party's tactical line, there is a difference in principle between present and past. In the past it was to oppose the landlords and the bourgeoisie;3 now, it is to unite with all those landlords and members of the bourgeoisie who are not against resisting Japan. Even in the latter stage of the soviet period,4 it was incorrect not to have adopted differing policies toward the reactionary government and political party which were launching armed attacks on us, on the one hand, and toward all the social strata of a capitalist character under our own rule, on the other; it was also incorrect not to have adopted differing policies toward the differing shades of groups within the reactionary government and political party. At that time, a policy of "all struggle" was pursued toward every section of society other than the peasantry and the lowest stratum of the petty bourgeoisie,5 and this policy was undoubtedly wrong. In terms of agrarian policy, it was also wrong to repudiate the correct policy adopted in the early and middle periods of the soviets,• whereby the landlords were given allotments of land in the same way as were the peasants so that they could engage in farming. 7 The Party's policy is now,

during the entire historical period of resistance to Japan and constructing a democratic republic, of necessity a different one. It is not "all struggle and no alliance,"

Like the "Preface to Rural Surveys," this text first appeared in the edition of the surveys published in Yan'an in 1941 for internal use. Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 29395, which reproduces the version contained in the edition published in 1949 by Jiefangshe. 1. The experience of the work of the soviet political power -+ The experience of the period of the ten years of civil war 2. For the current work of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front~ For the present period of the War of Resistance Against Japan 3. Bourgeoisie ...... Counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie 4. Soviet period-+ Ten-year civil war 5. Lowest stratum of the petty bourgeoisie-+ Lower strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie 6. Soviets ....., Ten-year civil war 7. Engage in fanning ....., Engage in farming and would not become displaced or go up into the mountains as bandits and disrupt public order 719

720 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

neither is it "all alliance and no struggle" (like the Chen Duxiuism of 1927). Instead, it is a policy of uniting with all social strata opposed to Japanese imperialism, of forming a united front with them, and yet of waging struggles against them, struggles that differ in form according to the different degrees in which their vacillating or reactionary side manifests itself in capitulation to the enemy and opposition to the Communist Party and the people. The present policy is a dual policy which synthesizes "alliance" and "struggle." In labor policy, it is the dual policy of suitably improving the workers' livelihood and of not hampering the development of capitalist production. 8 In agrarian policy, it is the dual policy of requiring the landlords to reduce rent and interest and of requiring the peasants to pay9 rent and interest. 10 In the sphere of political rights, it is the dual policy of allowing all landlords and capitalists" the same human rights, political rights, and property rights as the workers and peasants and yet of guarding against possible counterrevolutionary activity on their part (acts of sabotage against resistance to Japan and against the people). The state-owned and cooperative economy should be developed, although at present it is mainly not state but, rather, people's enterprise,12 and a free capitalist economy should be given the chance to develop so as to be used against Japanese imperialism and the semifeudal system. This is the most revolutionary policy for China today, and to oppose or impede this orientation13 is a mistake. 14 To preserve the Communist purity of Party members scrupulously and resolutely and to promote and guide IS the development of capitalism within the social economy 16 are both indispensable historical tasks for us in the period of resisting Japan and building a democratic republic. In this period, it is inevitable and not to be feared that some Communists may be corrupted by capitalism and the bourgeoisie. 17 The struggle against political and ideological corruption within the Party 18 should not be mistakenly carried over to the arena ofthe

8. The development of capitalist production -+ The appropriate development of the capitalist economy

9. Requiring the peasants to pay-+ Stipulating that the peasants should pay 10. Rent and interest ...,. This portion of rent and interest

II. All landlords and capitalists-+ All anti-Japanese landlords and capitalists 12. Although at present it is mainly not state but, rather, people's enterprise-+ But the main economic sector in the rural base areas at present consists not of state but of private enterprises 13. This orientation - The carrying out of this policy 14. A mistake-+ Undoubtedly a mistake 15. Promote and guide .. Protect

16. The development of capitalism within the social economy ..... Useful capitalist elements within the social economy and let them develop appropriately 17. That some Communists may be corrupted by .. ...,. It is possible that some Communists may be corrupted by the bourgeoisie and that capitalist ideas may emerge among members of the Party, and we must fight against these decadent ideas within the Party 18. The struggle against political and ideological corruption within the Party -+ The

struggle against capitalist ideas within the Party

APRIL /941

721

social economy. 19 We must draw a clear line of demarcation between the two. The Chinese Communist Pany is working in a most complicated environment, and every Pany member, especially every cadre, must be tempered to become a fighter who understands Marxist tactics. A one-sided and oversimplified approach to problems can never lead the revolution to victory. Written after proofreading the text, Apri119, 1941

19. The arena of the social economy ..... The arena of the social economy to oppose the capitalist sector of the economy

An Analysis of the Attitudes of the Various Political Forces in Britain, the United States, and China After the Japanese-Soviet Treaty (April 20, 1941) 1

Zhou [Enlai]:

I. We are in receipt of your telegram of the 19th, and the analysis therein is quitecorrect. 2 Under attack by Germany, Britain's relations with the Soviet Union will soon take a turn for the better, and the United States will basically follow in Britain's footsteps; they certainly cannot give offense to the Soviet Union. Under the influence of Britain and the United States, the wavering elements in the proBritain and pro-United States faction, the diehard faction, the middle-of-the-road faction, and the progressive faction in China will all try to curry favor with the Soviet Union. Only the very obstinate elements in the diehard faction are in danger of being drawn toward capitulation by the pro-Japanese faction. This is very much wonhy of attention, but right now it is not yet likely to happen. 2. The overall orientation of Britain and the United States is to deal first with Germany and then with Japan, and they definitely do not dare adopt a tough attitude toward Japan. It is even possible that they may concede the Dutch East Indies to Japan or even halt assistance to China. This sort of possibility exists as long as Germany occupies Suez and funher intensifies the bombing of London and attacks in the Atlantic, posing a real threat to Britain's survival, and as long as Japan agrees not to make war on Britain. When this situation emerges, great confusion, realignment, and wavering will occur among the wavering elements of what you referred to as the pro-British and pro-American faction, the diehard faction, the middle-of-the-road faction, and the progressive faction. They will become the objects of vociferous competition between the pro-Japanese faction and the Communist faction. The time for this to occur may be between this fall and this winter. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 332-33, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. I. The time of dispatch of this telegram is indicated by a conventional Chinese character signifying between 9 and II P.M. 2. Zhou Enlai had sent a telegram to Mao and the Central Committee Secretariat on April 19, in which he analyzed the attitudes of various factions in Chongqing toward the Japanese-Soviet pact. For extracts see Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, p. 333, n. 2. 722

APRIL 1941

723

Our orientation is to strive to have Chiang and the main body of the Guomindang move in the direction of being pro-Soviet, accommodating the Communists, and reform, on the condition that their regime be maintained and our status be recognized. At that time, Britain and the Soviet Union and the United States and the Soviet Union may have entered into mutual nonaggression pacts (such an agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union may very well be signed before long). 3. [We are] prepared to issue a document on political intelligence within a day's time and shall incorporate your point explaining narrow nationalism. 4. Chen Ruiting's regiment' has decided to rebel within a day or so. They will still be under the rubric of the 92d Army (to be called the independent brigade of the Ninety-second Army) and will move to Zhang Aiping's4 zone for training. Please be prepared to deal with possible inquiries from the Guomindang, answering to the effect that this is the Ninety-second Army's own business; that we counterattack anyone who attacks us and are friendly toward anyone who adopts a friendly attitude toward us; and that it is right for us to assist Chen's regiment, since it is friendly to us, but it is still the Ninety-second Army, not the Eighth Route Army. 5. Please ask the Guomindang whether it still plans to provide pay for the Eighth Route Army. If so, fine; otherwise, we will raise funds from the whole country and the whole world (including the Soviet Union), launch a general fund-raising campaign (we are truly prepared to do so), and act like beggars begging for food, because the Guomindang has pushed us into a comer, and we are about to starve to death. Mao Zedong

3. The 425th Regiment of the 142nd Division of the Guomindang Army's Ninety-second Army. Chen Ruiting (1906) was a native of Shandong. Following this action, he became in 1942 the chief of staff of the New Founh Army. 4. Zhang Aiping at that time commanded the Third Detachment of the Eighth Route Army's Fifth Column. ·

Telegram of Birthday Congratulations to Comrade Foster (Aprill941)

Mao Zedong, congratulating [William Zebulon] Foster, chairman of the Communist Party ofthe United States, on his sixtieth birthday, sent him a telegram, which reads as follows: To Foster: Our congratulations to you on your sixtieth birthday. Your leadership of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. and of the labor movement has made the American proletariat a powerful revolutionary force. At a time when war and Wall Street's reactionary schemes are destroying peaceful life and violently damaging the civil rights of the American people, the working class and all progressive people will unite ever closer around the Communist Party of the U.S.A. that you lead and carry on a triumphant struggle for peace and democracy. MaoZedong

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 49, where it is reproduced

from Xin Zhonghua bao, April 24, 1941. 724

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Problem of Continuing the Unity Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party to Resist Japan (April26, 1941)

I. When you meet Chiang, you may put forward a request to come back to Yan'an to attend the conference, ask him to send you here by plane, and ask him for his views on our conference. 2. Say that our Party wishes to continue to unite with the Guomindang to resist Japan, only we hope that the Guomindang will change its internal policies and that it will issue pay to the Eighth Route Army and provide a reasonable solution to the problem of the New Fourth Army.

Our source for this text is MaoZedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 51, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. 725

Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Broad Area from Shanghai to Fuzhou (April30, 1941)

[Liu] Shaoqi,Chen Yi,Xiao Yao: 1 The enemy has taken Ningbo, Fenghua, Wenzhou, and Fuzhou. If these places are occupied for a long period of time, you should pay attention to organizing guerrilla warfare in each place. Where there is a local party organization, direct the local organs in organizing it, and send a few people to help them. Where there is no local party, you should send people to organize it. From Wusong via Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and all the way to Fuzhou, extensive guerrilla warfare can be developed. Military leadership along the Shanghai-Hangzhou line should not be entrusted to Tan Zhenlin2 alone, as by himself he cannot take care of too much, and it is necessary to set up a separate strategic unit (this region is very promising for future development), which could be designated as the Eighth Division's region.3 What are your views, and how will you organize this? Please think it over and let us know by telegram. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 639-40, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. I. The surname Yao (here "Little Yao") stands once again for Rao Shushi. (See above the relevant note to the text of September 6, 1940.) 2. See above the relevant note to the text of February 28, 1941. 3. At the time, the New Founh Army had seven divisions, numbered one through seven. The eighth was never established. n6

The Administrative Program in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (May 1, 1941)

In order to strengthen the border region further, develop anti-Japanese political, economic, and cultural construction, and achieve our goal of persisting in a protracted resistance war and improving the well-being of the people, on the basis of the Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen, the Testament of the Director General, and the Chinese Communist Party Centnil Committee's principle of the anti-Japanese united front, while elections are being held for the Second Consultative Conference of the border region, the Chinese Communist Party Central Bureau of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region proposes the following administrative program to the 2 million people in our border region. If Communist Party members are elected as administrative personnel, they will strictly abide by this administrative program and resolutely carry it out. I. Unite every social class and all anti-Japanese parties and groups within the border region, and bring into full play all possible manpower, material power, financial resources, and human intelligence in the battle to defend the border region, defend the Northwest, defend China, and drive out Japanese imperialism. 2. Maintain unity with friendly parties and armies and with the people as a whole outside the border region; oppose surrender, divisiveness, and retrogressive behavior. 3. Increase the fighting capacity of the armed forces in the border region, guarantee their material supplies, improve the recruiting system and the mobilization system for rear services, and increase and improve the close unity between the army and the people. At the same time, strengthen the organization and training of the Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army and the Young Pioneers, and perfect their leadership systems. 4. Strengthen the work of preferential treatment for family members of antiJapanese soldiers, carry out thoroughly the regulations on preferential treatment, and make sure that family members of the Eighth Route Army and family members

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 334-38, where it is reproduced fromXin Zhonghua bao, May I, 1941. According to a note in this source, Mao either wrote or rewrote the greater part of this document. 727

728

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of friendly armies in the border region are guaranteed material support and spiritual comfort. 5. Our party wishes to join in an electoral alliance with all parties, factions, and all mass organizations. It has been determined, in addition, that Communist Party members shall constitute only one-third of the total candidates, so that all parties and factions as well as those with no party or factional affiliations will all be able to participate in the activities of the organs expressing the people's will and in the administrative management of the border region. When a Communist Party member is elected chief executive of a certain administrative organ, it should be ensured that two-thirds of the staff positions in this organ are held by those outside the Party. Communist Party members should practice democratic cooperation with these non-Party people and must not act willfully or domineeringly. 6. Guarantee the human rights, political rights, and financial rights of, as well as freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, belief, residence, and migration for, all those who are anti-Japanese (landlords, capitalists, peasants, workers, and so on). No institutions, military forces, or groups except judicial and public security organs carrying out their duties under the law may arrest, question, or punish anyone. The people, on the other hand, have the right to make accusations by any means whatsoever against the unlawful actions of any public servant. 7. Improve the judicial system, resolutely abolish corporal punishment, and emphasize evidence rather than verbal confession. As for Chinese traitors, except those who absolutely and steadfastly refuse to repent, regardless of how they have behaved in the past, they should all be dealt with under a policy of leniency, striving for transformation through persuasion, giving them a political way out and a way out in life. They are not to be killed, humiliated, forced to confess, or to write statements of repentance. Similar methods are to be applied in dealing with all elements conspiring to sabotage the border region, such as traitors, anti-Communist elements, and so on. 8. Carry out honest governance, severely punish corrupt acts by public servants, and prohibit all acts of robbery on the part of public servants. Communist Party members who violate the law are to be punished with severity. At the same time, carry out the principle of promoting honesty by providing an adequate salary, guaranteeing all public servants and their families the material necessities of life and ample cultural and recreational activities. 9. Develop agricultural production; carry out mass mobilization in spring plowing and autumn harvest; resolve the hardships of the poor peasants with regard to draft animals, agricultural implements, fertilizer, and seeds; open up 600,000 mu of wasteland this year; and increase grain output by 400,000 dan to reward immigrants from outside. 10. In regions where land has already been distributed, a private land ownership system is to be guaranteed to all peasants who have received land. In regions where land has not yet been distributed (for example, Suide, Fuxian, and Qingyang), the landlords' ownership of the land and the creditors' credit are to be guaranteed,

MAY /94/

n9

only the tenant farmers' rent and the interest rate on loans must be reduced. Thus tenant farmers pay a fixed amount of rent to the landlords, debtors pay a fixed interest rate to the creditors, and the government makes reasonable adjustments to the relationship between landlords and tenants and between debtors and creditors. 11. Develop industrial production and commercial circulation; reward private enterprises; protect private property; welcome investment from outside the region; carry out free trade; oppose monopoly rule. At the same time, promote the enterprise of people's cooperatives, and assist the development of handicrafts. 12. Adjust the relationship between employees and employers, implement the ten-hour workday system, increase the productivity of labor, strengthen work discipline, and appropriately improve the lives of the workers. 13. Carry out a rational taxation system. Except for the very poor, who should be exempt from taxation, all residents must be subject to a progressive tax that varies according to the amount of property owned or income received, so that the majority of the people can share the expenses of the War of Resistance Against Japan. At the same time, strengthen financial institutions, make adjustments to financial relationships, protect legal currency, and strengthen the border region currency, so as to benefit the development of the economy and the abundance of

financial resources. 14. Continue to push forward the policy of eliminating illiteracy, expand education in the new characters, perfect the formal school system, widely promote national education, improve the lives of elementary school teachers, carry out adult education programs, strengthen the education of cadres, encourage popular hooks and newspapers, reward independent research, treat intellectuals with respect, promote movements for scientific knowledge and literature and the arts, welcome scientists and artists, protect refugee students and youth who have dropped out of school, allow matriculating students the right to democratic self-governance, and carry out the system of two hours of study for public servants. 15. Promote health management, increase and improve medical equipment, and welcome medical personnel, for the purpose of alleviating people's illnesses, and at the same time offer relief to victims of natural disasters and refugees from outside the region. 16. Based on the principle of equality between men and women, raise the political, economic, and cultural status of women in society, bring into play women's economic initiative, protect female workers, pregnant women, and children, and persist in the voluntary, monogamous system of marriage. 17. Based on the principle of equality among all nationalities, carry out the policy of equal political, economic, and cultural rights with the Han people for the Mongolian and Muslim peoples, establish Mongolian and Muslim autonomous regions, and respect the religious beliefs and traditions and customs ofthe Mongolian and Muslim nationalities. 18. Welcome overseas Chinese nationals to the border region to study, to take part in the resistance to Japan, or to establish enterprises.

730

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

19. Provide vagrant elements in society with opportunities to cultivate the land, find employment, and receive education. Correct the harmful tendency on the part of public servants and people in all walks of life to discriminate against vagrants. Toward secret societies, carry out a policy of winning them over, uniting with them, and educating them. 20. Toward enemy soldiers and officers and soldiers of the puppet army captured in battle, carry out a policy of leniency in all cases, regardless of the individual's situation. Those who wish to participate in the War of Resistance should be accepted and treated favorably. Those not wishing to do so are to be released, and under no circumstances may they be killed, humiliated, forced to confess, or forced to write statements of repentance. Those who are recaptured after having been released, regardless how many times they have been captured, are all to be dealt with in this manner. If there are those within the nation who launch offensives against the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or any anti-Japanese forces, they are to be dealt with in a similar fashion. 21. On condition that he respects Chinese sovereignty and obeys governmental laws, any foreigner is allowed into the border region as a visitor, to participate in the work of resisting Japan, or to conduct entrepreneurial, cultural, and religious activities. Any such person coming to the border region as a result of repression by a foreign government for having committed revolutionary action, regardless of whether he is from a colonialist country or from a colony, will in all cases be given earnest protection by the government of the border region.

Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught (May 8, 1941)

As the Central Committee's directive of March 18 has stated, the second antiCommunist onslaught has come to an end. What has followed since is the continuance of the War of Resistance Against Japan in new circumstances, international as well as domestic. The additional factors in these new circumstances are: the spread of the imperialist war, the upsurge of the international revolutionary movement, the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, the defeat of the Guomindang's second anti-Communist onslaught, and the consequent decline in the political standing of the Guomindang and rise in that of the Communist Party, and, furthermore, the latest preparations by Japan for a new large-scale offensive against China. It is absolutely necessary for us to study and learn the lessons of our Party's heroic and victorious struggle against the recent anti-Communist onslaught, for the purpose of uniting the people throughout the country to persevere in the War of Resistance and for the purpose of continuing effectively to overcome the danger of capitulation and the anti-Communist countercurrent of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. I. Of China's two major contradictions, the national contradiction between China and Japan is still primary and the internal class contradiction in China is still subordinate. The fact that a national enemy has penetrated deep into our country is all-decisive. As long as the contradiction between China and Japan remains acute, even if the entire big landlord class and big bourgeoisie tum traitor and surrender, they can never bring about a 1927-type situation, with a repetition of the April12 and the May 21 Incidents of that year.' The previous anti-Communist upsurge2 was appraised as another May 21 Incident by some comrades, and the present upsurge as a repetition of the April 12 and May 21 Incidents, but objective facts

We have translated this document from the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp. 781-86. I. The reference is to Chiang Kaishek' s massacre of the Shanghai workers on April 12, 1927, and the massacre of peasant militiamen in Changsha on May 21, 1927. See the Introduction to Volume II, pp. li and lv. 2. The reference is to Guomindang probing operations in the fall and winter of 19391940. See above the Introduction to this volume. 731

732

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

have proved these appraisals wrong. The mistake of these comrades lies in forgetting that the national contradiction is the primary one. 2. Under these circumstances, the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie, who direct all Guomindang government policy, remain classes with a dual character. On the one hand, they are opposed to Japan, and, on the other, they are opposed to the Communist Party and the broad masses of the people represented by the Party. And both their resistance to Japan and their anticommunism, in turn, bear a dual character. With regard to their resistance to Japan, while they are opposed to Japan, they are not actively waging war or actively opposing Wang [Jingwei] and the other Chinese traitors, and sometimes they even flirt with Japan's peace emissaries. With regard to their anticommunism, they are opposed to the Communist Party, having gone so far as to create the Southern Anhui Incident and to issue the order of January 17, but, at the same time, they do not want a final split and still maintain their carrot-and-stick policy. These facts have been confirmed once again in the recent anti-Communist onslaught. Chinese politics, which are extremely complex, demand our comrades' deepest attention. Since the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie are still resisting Japan and are still using the carrot and stick in dealing with our Party, the policy of our Party is to "do unto them as they do unto us," stick for stick and carrot for carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy. So long as the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie do not completely turn traitor, this policy of ours will not change. 3. A whole range of tactics is needed to combat the Guomindang's antiCommunist policy, and there must be absolutely no carelessness or negligence. The enmity and brutality of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kaishek toward the people's revolutionary forces were not only demonstrated by the ten years of anti-Communist war in the past, but have been even more fully demonstrated in the midst of the war against Japan by the two antiCommunist upsurges, and particularly by the Southern Anhui Incident during the second anti-Communist upsurge. If a people's revolutionary force is to avoid extermination by Chiang Kaishek and to compel him to acknowledge its existence, it has no alternative but to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against his counterrevolutionary policies. The defeat resulting from Comrade Xiang Ying's opportunism during the recent anti-Communist onslaught should serve as a grave warning to the whole Party. But the struggle must be waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint; if any of the three is lacking, we shall suffer setbacks. 4. In the struggle against the Guomindang diehards, the big comprador bourgeoisie must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie, which has little or no comprador character, and the most reactionary big landlords must be distinguished from the enlightened gentry and the general run of landlords. This is the theoretical basis of our Party's endeavor to win over the intermediate sections and establish organs of political power on the "three-thirds" system, and it has been repeatedly stressed by the Central Committee since March of last year. Its correctness was proved afresh during the recent anti-Communist onslaught. The stand we took

MAY 1941

733

before the Southern Anhui Incident, as expressed in our "November 9 telegram," was entirely necessary for our shift to the political counterattack after the incident; otherwise we could not have won over the intermediate sections. Because unless they had been taught time and again by experience, the intermediate sections would have been unable to understand why our Party must wage resolute struggles against the Guomindang diehards, why unity can be gained only through struggle, and why there can be no unity whatsoever if struggle is abandoned. Although the leading elements in the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, generally they should also be regarded and treated as intermediate sections, since there are contradictions between them and the big landlords and big bourgeoisie who control the central government. Yan Xishan, who was most active in the first anti-Communist onslaught, took a middle stand in the second, and although the Guangxi clique, which took a middle stand in the first onslaught, came in on the anti-Communist side in the second, it is still in contradiction with the Chiang Kaishek clique and not to be identified with it. This applies with still greater force to other regional power groups. Many of our comrades, however, still lump the different landlord and bourgeois groups together, as though the entire landlord class and bourgeoisie had turned traitor after the Southern Anhui Incident; this is an oversimplification of China's complex politics. Were we to adopt this view and identify all the landlords and the bourgeoisie with the Guomindang diehards, we would isolate ourselves. It must be realized that Chinese society is big in the middle and small at both ends, and that the Communist Party cannot solve China's problems unless it wins over the masses of the intermediate classes and unless it enables them to play their proper role according to their

circumstances. 5. Because some comrades have wavered on the point that the contradiction between China and Japan is the primary one and hence have wrongly appraised class relations in China, they have at times wavered on the policy of the Party. Proceeding from their appraisal of the Southern Anhui Incident as another April I2 or May 21 Incident, these comrades now seem to think that the Central Committee's policy directive of December 25 last year is no longer applicable, or at least not altogether applicable. They believe that we no longer need the kind of political power that includes all who stand for resistance and democracy, but need a so-called political power of the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie, and that now is not the time for the united front policy of the period of the War of Resistance but, rather, for a policy of land revolution as during the ten-year civil war. The Party's correct policy has become blurred in the minds of these comrades, at any rate for the time being. 6. When these comrades were instructed by the Central Committee of our Party to be prepared against a possible split by the Guomindang, that is, against the worst possible development, they forgot the other possibilities. They do not understand that, while it is absolutely necessary to prepare for the worst possibility, this does not mean ignoring the favorable possibilities; on the contrary, such preparation for

734

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

the worst is precisely a condition for creating favorable possibilities and turning them into reality. On this occasion, we were fully prepared against a split by the Guomindang, and so the Guomindang dared not lightly bring about a split. 7. There are even more comrades who fail to understand the unity of the national struggle and the class struggle, and who fail to understand united front policy and class policy, and consequently the unity of united front education and class education. They hold that after the Southern Anhui Incident special emphasis should be placed on what they call class education, as distinct from united front education. Even now they do not understand that for the whole period of the anti-Japanese war our Party has a single integral policy-the national united front policy (a dual policy) which integrates the two aspects, unity and struggle-toward all those in the upper and middle strata who are still resisting Japan, whether they belong to the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie or the intermediate classes. This dual policy should be applied even to the puppet troops, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements, except for those who are absolutely unrepentant, whom we must resolutely crush. The education that our Party conducts among its own members and the people in general likewise embraces both these aspects, that is, it teaches the proletariat and the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie how to unite, in different ways, with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and the landlord class for resistance to Japan, and at the same time how to conduct struggles against them in varying degrees according to the varying degrees in which they compromise, vacillate, and are anti-Communist. United front policy is class policy, and the two are inseparable; whoever is unclear on this will be unclear on many other issues. 8. Other comrades do not understand that the social character of the ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas in North China and Central China is already new-democratic. The main criterion in judging whether an area is new-democratic in character is whether representatives of the broad masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether this political power is led by the Communist Party. Therefore, united front political power under Communist leadership is the chief mark of a new-democratic society. Some people think that New Democracy can be considered as accomplished only ifthere is a land revolution like that of the ten-year civil war, but this is wrong. At present the political system in the base areas is a political system of the united front of all the people who are for resistance and democracy, the economy is one from which the elements of semicolonialism and semifeudalism have been basically eliminated, and the culture is an anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the broad masses of the people. Therefore, whether viewed politically, economically, or culturally, both the anti-Japanese base areas that have only enforced the reduction of rent and interest and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, which has gone through a thorough land revolution, are new-democratic in character. When the example of the anti-Japanese base areas is extended throughout the country, then the whole of China will become a new-democratic republic.

The Cu"ent Situation and Our Overall Orientation (May 9, 1941)

To Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]; Chen [Yi], Liu [Shaoqi], and Lai [Chuanzhu]; 1 He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying]; [Nie] Rongzhen; Xiao Ke; 2 LU [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zihua]; Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]; [Song] Renqiong; Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang], and Luo [Ronghuan]; Li [YU] 3 and Luo [Shunchu]; Su [Yu] 4 and Liu [Yan];5 [Huang] Kecheng; Zhang [Yunyi] and Deng [Zihui]; [Peng] Xuefeng, [Li] Xiannian, and [Tan] Zhenlin:

l. The enemy is gathering forces in an attempt to attack Henan, Shaanxi, and Yunnan, fight through the Beiping-Hankou railroad, and cut off the two communication lines in the Southwest and the Northwest. As for Henan and Shaanxi, it is said that more than four divisions and regiments of troops have been mobilized, and, in recent days, the traffic has been very busy along both the Ping-Han and the Tong-Pu [Datong-Tongguan]lines. It is quite possible that battles will break out within a few days. 2. It is our estimate that, through the process of this campaign, the anticommunist sentiment of the Guomindang will be greatly reduced, and there is hope that the situation will take a turn for the better. The Soviet aid to China has not changed, and recently more than a hundred planes and two hundred cannon have arrived. There is also the possibility that relations between China and the Soviet Union will improve. Both Tang Enbo and Hu Zongnan are ready to fight the enemy. The

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. I. Regarding Lai Chuanzhu, see the note to the text of March 16, 1939. 2. Xiao Ke (1908- ), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and took part in the Nanchang Uprising. At this time, he was commander of the HebeiRehe-Chahar Forward Army. 3. Regarding Li YU, see the note to the text of December 6, 1939 (p. 267). 4. Regarding Su Yu, see the note to the text of July 12, 1940. At this time, he had become commander of the New Fourth Army's First Division and commander of the Central Jiangsu Military Area Command. 5. Liu Yan (1905-1946), a native ofTaoyuan in Hunan, served at the time as political commissar of both the New Fourth Army's First Division and the Central Jiangsu Military Area Command. 735

736

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Guomindang has asked us to cooperate in the campaign, again with the sole purpose of goading us into action, claiming that if the Chinese Communist Party does not compromise with Japan, it should launch an offensive in northern China and stop the enemy's advance. 3. Our overall orientation is definitely not to be moved by its goading tactics. We must continue to hold to our army's present posture, to strengthen all base areas, and to develop patiently our work in the three arenas of dealing with the enemy, the puppet troops, and the traitors (this is extremely important). According to what the local conditions permit, certain ofthe enemy's and the puppets' strongholds that cut deeply into our region are to be taken over. In the areas close to Henan and Shaanxi, there should be a considerable number of troops coordinating with the friendly armies in fighting, and united front work should be promoted vigorously in the meantime. But do not take this opportunity to actually expand into the Guomindang areas, so that the forces under Chiang [Kaishek] and the Guangxi clique will fight the enemy with their minds at ease. For the time being, attacks on the troops of Han [Deqin], Shen [Honglie], Yu [Xuezhong], and Gao [Shuxun] should be stopped. When war breaks out, the call to "unite all people in the country against the attack of Japanese imperialism" should be emphasized. 4. The Central Committee has already sent a telegram to Comrade [Zhou] Enlai to tell the Guomindang that our response to their request for our army to coordinate in the fighting is that this is a matter of course, and presents no problem. At the same time, items such as the following are to be raised: (a) an immediate resolution to the problem ofthe New Fourth Army; (b) immediate provision of pay and ammunition; (c) a halt in opposition to the Communist Party; (d) sending Zhou [Enlai] back to Yan'an by plane for the meeting, and so on. 5. It is hoped that our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army will make all deployments in a cool-headed manner in accordance with the orientation laid out above. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Unite to Wage War Against the Enemy in a Planned Way in Coordination with Friendly Armies (May 14, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: I trust that you received my last telegram. Right now the Guomindang is extremely worried, hoping desperately for our assistance. It is our estimation that under this blow by the Japanese bandits,' the Guomindang will have no choice but to ingratiate itself with us, the positions of the Guomindang and the Communist Party will undergo fundamental change, and our Party will hold more and more of a leadership position in the War of Resistance as time goes by. For this reason, our basic orientation is to unite to deal with the enemy and to coordinate in the fighting, but we certainly will not become excited because of the Guomindang' s goading measures. Instead we will take careful consideration of the situation and coordinate efforts in a planned fashion. [Zhou] Enlai wanted to include southeastern Shanxi, northwestern Shanxi, Wutai, central Hebei, southern Hebei, and Shandong in the scope of coordinated efforts, but in my opinion the main coordination areas should be southeastern Shanxi and southern Hebei, with the rest as secondary coordination areas (that is, carry on the fighting as under usual circumstances). Please think this over, make a concrete plan, and let us know so that we can tell Enlai and the principal adviser. 2 I look forward to your reply. (Send all combat reports as much as possible to Xi' an, Chongqing, and Yan' an.) MaoZedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 641-42, where it is repro· duced from the handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 1. "This blow" here refers to an attack on May 7 by the Japanese Anny on Wei Lihuang' s forces of the Guomindang anny in the Zhongtiao mountain area of southern Shanxi. 2. This refers to Tsuikov. who had served since December 1940 as military attach~ to the Soviet embassy in China and principal military adviser to the Guomindang government. 737

Notice Regarding Publication of Jiefang Ribao and Improving the Work of the New China News Agency (May 15, 1941)

Beginning on May 16, Xin Zhonghua bao (New China) and Jinri xinwen (Today's News), published in Yan'an, will be combined and published as Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily). The work of the New China News Agency will also be improved and put under the management of a single committee. All policies of the Party will be made known to the whole country through Jiefang ribao and the New China News Agency. Jiefang ribao editorials will be written by comrades of the Center or other key cadres. All locations should pay attention to receiving radio broadcasts from Yan'an. Aside from being carried in the newspapers and publications, important articles should be used as materials for discussion and education within the Party and in schools, offices, and army units. In addition, it is extremely important to expand the use of telegraphic receivers so as to enable reception everywhere as a way to promote widespread propaganda.

Our source for this text is Mao Udong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, p. 54. where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript. 738

Both the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army Are Attacking the Enemy Fiercely in His Rear (May 15, 1941, at noon)

Section Chief Wu [Yunfu] and Section Chief Yuan [Xiaoxuan]: 1 I. In the event that the enemy crosses the river, you will have to prepare to relocate. Aside from moving the clumsy objects to appropriate locations, Yunfu must stay with office director Xiong [Bin],2 ask for his instructions at all times, and request his protection. Xiaoxuan must be with Chief Officer Wei [Lihuang]. 3 2. Tell everyone that both the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are attacking the enemy fiercely in his rear and coordinating in the fighting with friendly armies at the front, and that they certainly will not make a fuss over the Guomindang's anti-Communist hatred. Only they are short on pay and ammunition, and hope for the government's assistance. The friendly armies around the border region have marched to the river to defend against the enemy's rear, and the garrison troops of the Eighth Route Army in the border region persist in their unity and are still holding their original defense posts. 3. Let us know by telegram at all times about the Guomindang's movements. MaoZedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 643-44, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. 1. Wu Yunfu was head of the Eighth Route Anny's administrative office in Xi'an, and Yuan Xiaoxuan held the same position in the Luoyang office. 2. Xiong Bin was then head of the Xi' an field headquarters office of the Guomindang government's Military Commission. 3. Wei Lihuang was then serving as chief commanding officer of the Guomindang Army's First War Zone. 739

Introductory Editorial to the Yan 'an Jiefang Ribao (May 16, 1941)

What is the mission of this paper? One phrase says it all: Unite the people of the whole country to defeat Japanese imperialism. This is the general line of the Chinese Communist Party, and also the mission of this paper. Given the current situation internationally and domestically, this mis-

sion is even more critical. The questions at hand are the following: Is the world one in which imperialist bandits slaughter one another, or is it one in which the world's people enjoy peace? Does China belong to Japanese imperialism, or does China belong to the Chinese people? Now that the imperialist war has turned into a world war and Japanese imperialism is attempting to destroy China once and for all, these questions face us sharply. There is not a single imperialist country that has not been brought into the war (the United States has actually already entered the war), and the war has turned the entire globe into a slaughterhouse. Unless the world's people rise up in strong opposition to war and strive for peace, the world is in danger of destruction and humanity is in peril of extinction. Now the struggle of people all over the world against imperialism and war has begun, and this is wherein lies true light for the world. The Communist Parties in various countries stand in the forefront of this struggle, which is one that will help the Chinese people's own struggle. The Chinese people have the duty to ally themselves with the people of the world. Having failed to solve the problem of China through four years of war, the Japanese imperialists are now attempting to effect a "final solution" to it. Any view that makes light of Japanese imperialist attacks is incorrect. Belonging under the rubric of this sort of attitude are friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, the anti-Communist high tide, and the two separate wars. What we advocate is unity between the Guomindang and the Communists, abolition of friction, and fighting a single war. It must be understood that only by waging one war, the war specifically against Japanese imperialism, can the attacks by Japanese imperialism be repelled, can Japanese imperialism be driven out. China's

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. SS-57, where it is reproduced from the version published in Jiefang ribao at the time. 740

MAY /94/

741

foreign policy necessarily has to be a pro-Soviet policy, despite the fact that at the same time it should not abandon its diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States. China's domestic political policy has to be one of democracy. All reactionary policies that are anti-Communist, antipopular, and antidemocratic must be abolished. The present moment is a critical juncture for China's survival. All anti-Japanese parties and groups and anti-Japanese people must unite as one against the primary enemy, Japanese imperialism. The Communist Party stands on the forefront of this struggle. It has been this way in the past, it is this way at present, and it will continue to be this way in the future. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party has always been one of a national united front against Japan. The Chinese Communist Party harbors good intentions toward others, and it gives the opportunity for self-reflection and repentance to anyone who has committed errors during the anti-Japanese war and strikes a resolute blow only at those who betray the national interest and yet absolutely refuse to repent. And this is totally necessary, because if national traitors who betray the interests of the nation yet are staunchly unwilling to repent are not hit hard, then the national War of Resistance will surely meet defeat. The mission of the Communist Party is the mission of this paper. All our colleagues on the paper firmly believe that, as a result of the concerted struggle of the world's people and the Chinese people, the world will surely become a bright new world belonging to people ofthe world, and that China will become a China where the Chinese people enjoy independence and sovereignty. We will be able to smash to bits any Japanese imperialist plots. Unity, unity, unity; this is our weapon, and this is also our slogan. On the occasion of this paper's inauguration, we wish to make this expression of utmost sincerity to our fellow countrymen.

Please Take a Look and See Whose Realm Our Land Is Today (May 18, 1941)

Those calculating the moves of Japanese imperialism often just start from the subjective needs of those in Japan who are extremists, or fascists, in dealing with the United States, and forget about factors that exist objectively and are actually primary in determining trends in Japan. Ever since the establishment of the tripartite pact [between Germany, Italy, and Japan], members ofthe Guomindang have been doing this, and some others have been doing the same. There are three major features in the present-day world situation: First is Germany's great victory; second is China's developing War of Resistance Against Japan; third is the Soviet Union's policy of peace. In studying international questions in general and in estimating the problem of Japan in particular, we must not stray from these three characteristics. Anyone who turns a blind eye to these three major characteristics or underestimates their importance will inevitably draw incorrect or somewhat incorrect conclusions. German imperialism has already conquered the whole of Europe with the exception of the Soviet Union and is expanding to Africa and the Near East, continuing to launch massive bombardments on the British Isles, and developing its submarine warfare in the Atlantic. All this indicates a trend toward global hegemony on the part of German imperialism. Britain and America, who are contending with them for hegemony, cannot but fight them with all their might. America's rapid preparations to enter the war are the result of this situation. Given these circumstances, the imperialist plan of Britain and the United States is to concentrate their forces against Germany. They figure that, as long as the British Isles can stand their ground, they can then make use of their naval superiority and recover their control in the air, which would compel Hitler to spread the fires of war eastward and become locked in a war of attrition with the Soviet Union. If the heavens cooperate, then sooner or later the anti-Soviet faction within Germany will be around and a war between Germany and the Soviet Union will break out, causing their "plan" to be "successful." To prevent Hitler from going westward, to prevent the

This editorial was first published in Jiefang ribao, May 18, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 297-301, which reproduces this text. The editorial was unsigned, but Nianpu,

Vol. 2, p. 297, confirms that it was written by Mao. 742

MAY 1941

743

Soviet Union from staying out of things, and to create another European Munich: such is their overall design. In the Far East it is to make use of the internal contradictions within the tripartite alliance, break up the Tokyo-Berlin axis, buy over Japan to their side, and once again create a Far Eastern Munich; to make use of the contradictions between China and Japan and between the Soviet Union and Japan to force Japan westward and northward, coordinating with their western policy of forcing Germany eastward. All this constitutes the "masterfully wise counsel" of the British and American imperialists. The more Germany is victorious, the more the British and American gentlemen are spurred to make painstaking efforts to discover the weaknesses of Germany and Japan. And what is behind all this has everything to do with the Soviet Union. Every time the British and American gentlemen are in crisis, they invariably try to find a way out at the Soviet Union's expense. This is a pattern they devised long ago. As for Japan, Germany's victory has given Japan's entire ruling class the impetus to take advantage of the situation, because Germany has occupied the efforts of Britain and America and is leading them increasingly toward the Atlantic and not toward the Pacific. On this matter, each of the three factions within the ruling body of Japan (the fascists who are proGermany and pro-Italy, the faction that wants to maintain the status quo who are pro-Britain and pro-America, and the intermediate faction which stands between these two)-although, with regard to the distribution of political power, they each try to take advantage of every change in the world situation that is unfavorable to the others so as to achieve their own goals, when it comes to making use of the contradictions in the West (between Britain and Germany, between America and Germany, and between the Soviet Union and Germany) so as to achieve the goal of Japanese expansion-they are as one and can unite with one another. Because they find it advantageous to have Hitler take up the heavy burden of Britain and the United States, and to have Hitler divert the Soviet Union's attention to the west so that they themselves can sit on the mountaintop and watch the tigers fight, and then reap the spoils in the end. Of the three countries in the alliance, unlike Italy, which serves as an out-and-out lackey to Hitler, Japan has a semi-independent nature. Japan refuses to obey those orders which only conform to Hitler's wishes and run counter to Japan's wishes, such as the one to launch a war in the Pacific immediately, as Japan's war against China, its national strength, and the internal conflicts among its rulers make it impossible to do so. In the past few months, and especially in the past week, this matter has given rise to a number of farces in which Japan works hand in glove with Britain and the United States. These farces can be explained only in that Britain and the United States on the one hand, and Japan, on the other, wish to avoid temporarily (but not permanently) a Pacific war. The only difference is that one side is concentrating its forces against Germany and the other side is concentrating against China and with regard to the West is sitting on the mountaintop watching the tigers fight so as to reap the spoils later. But this matter is like a bucket of cold water to some of the ruling personages of the Chinese Guomindang, because ever since the formation of the tripartite alliance, they have

744 MAO'S ROAD TD POWER

been hoping every day for a war between Japan and the United States to save them. Their Roosevelt refuses to take note of their supplications, and Japan's intentions run counter to their wishes as well. This is how we think the changes in the world situation occasioned by a German victory should be viewed. Many people have underestimated the anti-Japanese war that is developing in China. Some people even feel that Japan might be able to ignore China and just go ahead and advance southward to start a war between Japan and the United States. What they fail to realize is that things are just the opposite, and what basically determines Japan's moves is China, precisely this China that stands as a giant before Japan, that is awakening and getting stronger by the day, that is waging a War of Resistance. China is now a raging fire of national revolution. Holding high the torches here are several hundred million people, and the Communist Pany stands at the very forefront of the ranks of torchbearers. During the two and a half years since Japan's rulers occupied Wuhan, they have been carrying out a policy of concentrating forces against the Communists and slackening against the Guomindang so as to lure it into surrender. But this policy has failed. The Communists become more and more solid as they fight, and the Guomindang has not surrendered either. What is lamentable is that the ruling personages of our allied party have failed to reform their politics and strengthen unity during this period, but have, instead, instigated two anti-Communist high tides in the past two and a half years, imitating the ways of the Japanese by focusing forces against the Communists and slackening efforts against Japan. They might as well be saying: We're using all our might against the Communists, so you Japanese can go all out to make war on the Americans and stop launching attacks on us. But Japanese imperialism won't listen to such things. What it wants is all of China. [The Japanese] want not only "opposition to the Communists," but also "extermination of the party." The Japanese say: If you want us to stop advancing, you will either have to surrender or to stan a full-scale war between the Guomindang and the Communists; just the Southern Anhui Incident by itself is not enough. And, sure enough, since the Southern Anhui Incident the Japanese have made tremendous effons to incite a war between the Guomindang and the Communists. But because of the Communist Party Central Committee's effons to protect the nation as a whole, and because the principal leaders of the Guomindang also refused to be deceived by the Japanese, Japan's scheme to cause a rift went bankrupt, and it was forced to muster military forces and reluctantly launch a risky attack. This is the source of the recent sudden mounting of tension in the war situation. We can say with certainty: because of the unity between the Guomindang and the Communists and because of the daily expanding people's War of Resistance against Japan, the flames of opposition to Japanese imperialism will only rage higher and higher, and Japanese imperialism will meet its doom in the great fire of China. Naturally, this state of affairs does a great favor to Britain and the United States, as it contains for them Japan's southward advance and facilitates their concentration of forces against Germany. It is not by any means that they care about China. They are imperialists

MAY 1941

745

who will harm others to benefit themselves. As long as Japan does not launch war in the Pacific, they are willing to offer Japan all sorts ofthings, such as rubber, oil, cotton, machines-whatever it wants. And, on top of all that, Roosevelt and Churchill have even made it part of their bag of tricks to sacrifice China and the Dutch East Indies. To talk of the new danger of a Far Eastern Munich is certainly not wholly impossible neurotic chatter. As long as China stands up for itself and keeps on going, however, Japan may be pointing its spearhead toward the West, but we shall cast mountains of torches toward the East and bring on a glorious decisive battle and are entirely capable of triumph over Japan. The great nation of China has bound Japan hand and foot, so it must avoid a war in the Pacific for the time being. it is China that basically determines Japan's moves, just as it is Japan that basically determines China's moves; these are but two sides of the same coin. With regard to the Soviet Union's peace policy, it can be said to be a brake on the whole world, and its power will defeat the plots of all imperialists and reactionaries. Whether it be Britain and America's pipe dream of Hitler's war flames burning in the East, or any other plots against the Soviet Union, all these things will eventually be seen as a heap of metal beaten into scraps. [Rudolf] Hess's flight indicates the failure of the most recent scheme of Britain and the United States. A mutual understanding has been established between the Soviet Union and Germany. The danger of a new European Munich has been averted. This is a victory Stalin gained by resorting to "the East wind." It is like this in the West, and so it is in the East. Even if Britain and the United States were to come up with a new Far Eastern Munich and mobilize all their disciples and followers in Japan and in China, they could achieve nothing; the Monkey King Sun Wukong can never jump out from under control in the Buddha's palm. It is also impossible for Britain and the United States to throttle the anti-Japanese war. The flames of China's antiJapanese torch will be fanned by Stalin, and he can be counted on to fan them. If Japanese imperialism has the audacity to run amuck recklessly in the western part of China, they are sure to get badly bruised and battered, as there is not only the unshattered cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but also increasing cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. It is absolutely wrong simply to ignore or to underestimate the peace policy of the Soviet Union. Will Japan not advance southward? Yes, it will. But at present it wants to go west first, in vain hopes of settling the China problem first of all. For the time being, its plan is for Hitler to strike fiercely at Britain and the United States, and for Japan itself to strike hard at China. It intends to cut the two transportation lines in Northwest China and Northeast China, and break through to the Beiping-Hankou railway. After a bout of forceful attacks, they will sure! y come with a round of softer attacks, instigating action by their fifth column (people like He Yingqin), and do their best to rope people in so as to achieve the aim of luring China into surrender. Japan's two major magic weapons are hitting hard and winning over.Jt is estimated that at a certain juncture there will arise another capitulation crisis, so we should start to be vigilant right now. Japan's wishful thinking is roughly as follows: to

746

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

solve, or by and large solve, the China problem in not too long a period of time, and wait until Britain and the United States are even less able to devote attention to the Orient, in which case either you willingly hand over the Pacific to us or we reson to armed force against you. In other words, I shall have everything "as I please." All such subjective calculations of the imperialists must not be viewed as results. Between their subjective calculations and the final results may be a fundamental contradiction or a world of difference. Japanese imperialism's calculations should be viewed this way as well. Once again [the Japanese] want to "first dispose of' us. Let them try it again, then. No one can tell how many of their so-called "plans" for China have failed. Now let them fail once more. This is altogether possible; all reactionaries in this world have no way of calculating the development of the revolutionary forces, and this is a fatal weakness of the reactionaries. To whom does the world belong in the last analysis? The imperialist thugs say it is undoubtedly their world, but the people insist that it is definitely the people's world. To whom does China really belong? The Japanese imperialists say China, undoubtedly, belongs to them, but we insist that China definitely belongs to the Chinese people. "Please take a look and see whose realm our land is today?" Only the people, only we, can give a correct answer to this question. Only the people, only we, can be right, can be correct; definitely not the enemy, definitely not them. People of the whole country, unite and oppose the attack by Japanese imperialism. We have every assurance of victory!

Reform Our Study (May 19, 1941)

(This was my speech at a Yan'an cadres'meeting in May /94/, which I have now revised on the basis of the original outline for publication and discussion by comrades.)

I propose that we should reform the method and the system of study throughout the Party. The reasons are as follows:

The twenty years of the Chinese Communist Party have been twenty years during which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we recall how superficial and meager our understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was during our Party's infancy, we can see how much deeper and richer it is now. For the past hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disasterridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism and Leninism.' the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation. And the Chinese Communist Party has been the initiator, propagandist, and organizer in wielding this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, our Party, basing itself on the universal truth of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin,2 has taken a further step in its study of the concrete practice of this war and in its study of China and the world today and has also made a beginning in the study of China's yesterday and the day before.l These are all excellent signs. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 298-99, this report was delivered at a meeting of highlevel cadres in Yan'an on May 19, 1941. The text was first published in Jiefang ribao, March27, 1942. We have translated it fromMaoZedongji, Vol. 7, pp. 311-20, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao Zedong xuanji. 1. Marxism and Leninism ..... Marxism-Leninism 2. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and' Stalin ... Marxism-Leninism

3. China's yesterday and the day before ~ Chinese history 747

748

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

II But we still have shortcomings, and very big ones too. In my opinion, unless we correct these shortcomings, we shall not be able to take another step forward in our work, or advance the great cause of integrating the universal truth of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin4 with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. First, take the study of current conditions. We have achieved some success in our study of present domestic and international conditions, but for such a large political party as ours, the material we have collected is fragmentary and our research work unsystematic on each and every aspect of these subjects, whether it be the political, military, economic, or cultural aspect. Generally speaking, in the past twenty years we have not done systematic and thorough work in collecting and studying material on these aspects, and we are lacking in a climate of investigation and study of objective reality. To behave like "a blindfolded man catching sparrows," or "a blind man groping for fish," to be crude and careless, to indulge in verbiage, to rest content with a smattering ofknowledge--such an extremely bad work-style, a style utterly opposed to the fundamental spirit of Marxism-Leninism, continues to exist among many comrades in our Party. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have taught us that it is necessary to study conditions conscientiously, and to proceed from objective reality and not from subjective wishes, but many of our comrades act in direct violation of this truth. Second, take the study of history. Although a few Party members and Party sympathizers have undertaken this work, generally speaking it has not been done in an organized way. Many Party members are still in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the past hundred years (yesterday) or of ancient times (the day before yesterday). There are many Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing Greece; they can only recite set phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, but as for their own ancestors--sorry,they have been forgotten. There is no climate of serious study either of current conditions or of past history. Next, take the study of international revolutionary experience, the study of the universal truth of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. 5 Many comrades seem to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the sake of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin,6 and not at all for the sake of the practice ofthe Chinese revolution.' Consequently, though they study a great deal,8 they cannot digest it. They can cite set phrases

4. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin ... Marxism· Leninism 5. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin ... Marxism-Leninism 6. Many comrades seem to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the sake of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin-Many comrades seem to study Marxism-Leninism 7. Not at all for the sake of the practice of the Chinese revolution ... Not to meet the needs of revolutionary practice but, rather, purely for the sake of study 8. Study a great deal ~ Read it

MAY 1941

749

from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin very well,9 but are unable to apply the standpoint and method 10 of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to the concrete study of China's present conditions and her history or to the concrete analysis and solution of the problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude toward MarxismLeninism does a great deal of harm. particularly among cadres of the middle and higher ranks, and among young students. The three aspects I have just mentioned-neglect of the study of present conditions, neglect of the study of history, and neglect of the application of MarxismLeninism-all constitute an extremely bad style of work. Its spread has harmed many of our comrades. There are indeed many comrades in our ranks who have been led astray by this style of work. Unwilling to carry on systematic and thorough investigation and study of the specific conditions inside and outside the country, the province, the xian, or the district, they issue orders on no other basis than their scanty knowledge and "It must be so because it seems so to me." Does not this subjectivist style still exist among a great many comrades? They are not ashamed, but instead proud, to understand little or nothing of their own history. They really understand very little about the particularly important history of the Chinese Communist Party and the history of China in the hundred years since the Opium War. Hardly anyone has seriously taken up the study of the economic, political, military, and cultural history of the past hundred years. Some people are ignorant of anything that is their own, and so are left with only Greek and other foreign tales (they are really nothing but tales); this, too, is rather pathetic, consisting of odds and ends abstracted from old foreign books. For the past few decades, many of the returned students from abroad have suffered from this malady. Coming home from Europe, America, or Japan, they can only parrot a stock of undigested foreign things. They function as gramophones but forget their own responsibility to create something new. This malady has also infected the Communist Party. Although we are studying Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, 11 the way many of our people study them runs directly counter to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. 12 That is to say, they violate a fundamental principle earnestly enjoined on us by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin: the unity of theory and practice. Having violated this principle of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, they then invent an opposite principle oftheir own: the separation of theory from practice. In the schools and in the education of cadres at work, teachers of philosophy do not guide students to study the logic ofthe Chinese revolution; teachers of economics do not guide them

9. They can cite set phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin very well .... They can only cite odd quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in a one-sided manner I 0. The standpoint and method .... The standpoint, viewpoint, and method II. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin .... Marxism-Leninism 12. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin .... Marxism

750

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

to study the characteristics of the Chinese economy; teachers of political science do not guide them to study the tactics of the Chinese revolution; teachers of military science do not guide them to study the special features of Chinese military affairs; 13 and so on and so forth. The result is that error is disseminated, doing harm to the disciples. 14 A person does not know how to apply in Fuxian 15 what he has learned in Yan'an. Professors of economics cannot explain the relationship between the Border Region currency and the Guomindang currency, so naturally the students cannot explain it either. Seventeen- and eighteen-year-old babies are taught to nibble on Das Kapital and Anti-Diihring. Thus a perverse mentality has been created among many students; instead of showing an interest in China's problems and taking the Party's directives seriously, they give their whole hearts to the supposedly eternal and immutable dogmas learned from their teachers. Of course, what I have just said refers to the worst type, 16 and I am not saying that it is the general case. But people of this type do exist; what is more, there are quite a few of them and they cause a great deal of harm, so this matter cannot be treated lightly.

III In order to explain this idea further, I should like to contrast two opposite attitudes. The first type is the subjectivist attitude. With this attitude, a person does not make a systematic and thorough study of the environment, but works by sheer subjective enthusiasm and has a blurred picture ofthe face of China today. With this attitude, he chops up history, knows only ancient Greece but not China, and is in a fog about the China of yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude, a person studies the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin 17 in the abstract, without any aim, and without considering their relevance to the Chinese revolution. He goes to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin not to seek the stand and method 18 with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution but to deal in theory purely for theory's sake, and to deal in Marxism-Leninism purely for Marxism-Leninism's sake. He does not shoot the arrow at the target but, instead, shoots at random. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have taught us that we should proceed from objective realities and that we should derive laws from them to serve as our foundation for action. 19

13. The special features of Chinese military affairs -+ The strategy and tactics adapted to China's special features 14. Doing harm to the disciples

~

Doing people great harm

15. Fuxian is located about 45 miles south ofYan'an. 16. The worst type

~

The worst type in our Party

17. The theories of ... ...,.. Marxism-Leninism 18. Stand and method~ Stand, viewpoint, and method

19. Foundation for action-+ Guide to action

MAY /941

751

For this purpose, we should appropriate the material in detail and subject it to scientific analysis and synthesis. 20 Many of our people do not act in this way but do the opposite. A good number of them are doing research work but have no interest in studying either the China of today or the China of yesterday, and confine their interest to books already written. 21 Many others are doing practical work, but they too pay no attention to the study of objective conditions, often rely on sheer enthusiasm, and substitute their personal feelings for policy. Both kinds of people rely on the subjective and ignore the objective." When making speeches, they indulge in a long string of headings, A, B, C, D, I, 2, 3, 4. When writing articles, they turn out a lot of verbiage. They have no intention of seeking truth from facts, but only a desire to curry favor by claptrap. They are flashy without substance, brittle without solidity. They think they are always right, the number one authority under Heaven, imperial envoys who rush around all over. Such is the work-style of some comrades in our ranks. To govern one's own conduct by this style is to harm oneself. To teach it to others is to harm others. To use it to direct the revolution is to harm the revolution. In sum, this subjectivist methodological theory, which is contrary to science and to Marxism, 23 is a formidable enemy of the Communist Party, of the proletariat, 24 of the people, and of the nation; it is a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit. A formidable enemy stands before us, and we must overthrow him. Only when subjectivism is overthrown can the truth" prevail, can the revolution be victorious, can the Party spirit be strengthened. The absence of a scientific attitude or the absence of a completely scientific attitude, that is, the absence of or presence of an incomplete Marxist26 approach of uniting theory and practice, means that the Party spirit is either absent or deficient. There is a couplet which portrays this type of person. It runs: The reed growing on the wall-top-heavy, thin-stemmed, and shallow of root; The bamboo shoot in the hills-sharp-tongued, thick-skinned, and hollow inside. Is this not an apt description of those who do not have a scientific attitude, who only know how to recite dogmas by rote, 27 who enjoy a reputation unwarranted by

20. The Selected Work.s version adds here, "as Marx has said," referring to a passage from "Afterword to the 2nd German Edition" of Marx's Das Kapital.

21. Books already written ..... The study of empty "theories" divorced from reality 22. The objective ..... The existence of objective realities 23. Marxism .... Marxism-Leninism 24. Proletariat ..... Working class 25. The truth ..... The truth of Marxism-Leninism 26. Marxist ... Marxist-Leninist 27. Recite dogmas by rote -a. Recite by rote phrases from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin

752

MAO'S ROA/J TO POWF.R

any real learning, and who make a mockery of Marxism-Leninism? If anyone really wishes to cure himself of his malady, I advise him to commit this couplet to memory, or to show still more courage and paste it on the wall of his room. MarxismLeninism is a science, and science means honest, solid knowledge; there is no room for playing tricks. Let us, then, be a bit more honest. The second type is the Marxist-Leninist attitude or the attitude of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. With this attitude, a person carries out a systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment. 28 He does not work by enthusiasm alone, but combines revolutionary enthusiasm 29 with practicality. 30 With this attitude he will not chop up history and will not know only ancient Greece, but will also know China; he will know the revolutionary history not only of foreign countries but also of China, and understand not only today but also yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude, one studies the theory of Marxism-Leninism with a purpose, which is to integrate it with the actual movement of the Chinese revolution and to seek from it the method 31 with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude is one of shooting the arrow at the target. The "target" is the Chinese revolution, and the "arrow" is MarxismLeninism. We Chinese Communists have been seeking this arrow for no other reason, but only because we want to hit the target of the Chinese revolution and of the revolution of the East. Otherwise this "arrow" is nothing more than a curio to play with, without any use whatsoever. To take such an attitude is to seek truth from facts. "Facts" are all the things that exist objectively, "truth" means the internal relations among objectively existing things, that is, the laws governing them, and "to seek" means to study. We should proceed from the actual conditions inside and outside the country. the province, the xia11, or the district, and derive from them, as our guide to action, laws which are inherent in them and not imaginary, that is, we should find the internal relations of the events occurring around us. And in order to do that we must rely not on subjective imagination, not on enthusi-

asm," not on books," but on facts that exist objectively; we must "appropriate the material in detail" and draw correct conclusions from these facts a,uJ materials. 34

28. Carries out a systematic and thorough investigation and study of the cnvironment4 Applies the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism to the systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment 29. Enthusiasm -+ Sweep 30. The Selected Works version adds here. "as Stalin says," referring to an idea expressed in Stalin's "The Foundations of Leninism." 31. Method -+ Stand, viewpoint, and method 32. Enthusiasm -+ Momentary enthusiasm 33. Books

~

Lifeless books

34. The Selected Works version ackls here, ··guided by the general principles of MarxismLeninism."

MAY /941

753

Such conclusions are not mere lists of phenomena in A, B, C, D order or writings full of platitudes, but are scientific conclusions. Such an attitude is one of seeking truth from facts and not of currying favor by claptrap. Such an attitude is the Party spirit, is the Marxist-Leninist style of uniting theory and practice, and is the attitude every Communist Party member should have at the very least. He who adopts this attitude will be neither "top-heavy, thin-stemmed, and shallow of root," nor "sharp-tongued, thick-skinned, and hollow inside."

IV In accordance with the above views, I would like to make the following proposals: I. We should place before the whole Party the task of making a systematic and thorough study of the situation around us. On the basis of the method of historical materialism,35 we should make a detailed investigation and study of developments in the economic, financial, political, military, cultural, and Party activities of our enemies, our friends, and ourselves, and then draw the proper and necessary conclusions. To this end, we should direct our comrades' attention to the investigation and study of these practical matters. We should get our comrades to understand that the twofold basic task of Communist Party members and leading bodies is to know conditions and to master policy; the former means knowing the world and the latter changing the world. We should get our comrades to understand that without investigation there is no right to speak and that bombastic twaddle and a mere list of phenomena in I, 2, 3, 4 order are of no use. Take propaganda work, for instance; if we do not know the situation with regard to the propaganda of our enemies, our friends, and ourselves, we shall he unable to decide on a correct propaganda policy. In the work of any department, it is necessary to know the situation first, and only then can the work he well handled. The fundamental link in changing the Party's style of work is to carry out a policy 36 for investigation and study throughout the Party. 2. As for China's history in the past hundred years, we should assemble qualified persons to study it, in cooperation and with a proper division of labor, and so do away with 37 the present disorganized state of affairs. First it is necessary to make analyses and studies 38 in the several fields of economic history, political history, military history, and cultural history, and only then will it be possible to make synthetical studies. 3. As for education for cadres, whether at work or in schools for cadres, the focus should he on studying the practical problems of the Chinese revolution,

35. The method of historical materialism ..... The theory and method of Marxism-leninism 36. A policy ~ Plans 37. Do away with-+ Overcome 38. Analyses and studies ... Analytical studies

754

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

starting from there to study Marxism-Leninism, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded. Moreover, in studying Marxism-Leninism, the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 39 should be used as the principal material, all others to be used as supplementary material. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the best synthesis and summing up of the world Communist movement of the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory and practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world. When we see how Lenin and Stalin integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we shall know how we should work in China. We have taken many wrong paths.40 But error is often the precursor of what is correct. I am confident that, in the context of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution, which is so intensely alive and so richly varied, this reform of our study will certainly yield good results.

39. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union _,. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Short Course 40. Wrong paths-+ Detours

Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 1 (May 25, 1941)

I. A compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China and the creation of an Eastern Munich against communism and against the Soviet Union and Germany-such is the new plot that is now being hatched between Japan, the United States, and China. 2 We must expose this plot and fight it. 2. Japan has announced the end of its latest round of military attacks, which was designed to force Chiang [Kaishek] to capitulate, and there are bound to follow moves to induce him to capitulate. This is a repeat performance of the enemy's old policy of using the stick and the carrot, either alternately or simultaneously. We must expose this policy and fight it. 3. Simultaneously with its military attacks, Japan has launched a rumor-mongering campaign alleging that the Eighth Route Army does not want to fight in coordination with the [Guomindang] Central Army, that the Eighth Route Army is seizing every opportunity to expand its territory, that it is opening up an international route, that it is setting up another Central Government, and so on. This is a cunning Japanese scheme to foment discord between the Guomindang and the Communists and thus to make it easier for them to induce capitulation. The Central News Agency3 and the Guomindang press are copying and spreading these rumors, showing no qualms about echoing Japan's anti-Communist propaganda, and their intentions are thoroughly dubious. This, too, we must expose and fight. 4. Although the New Fourth Army has been declared mutinous and the Eighth Route Army has not been issued a single bullet or a single copper [from the Guomindang], it has never for a moment ceased fighting the enemy. The Eighth Route Army, moreover, has taken the initiative in coordinating its operations with the Central Army4 in the fighting in the present campaign in southern Shanxi, and

This document was first published in Jiefang ribao, May 28, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 305-6, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao Zedong xuanji. l. Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party -+ Expose the Plot for a Far Eastern Munich 2. China ~ Chiang [Kaishek] 3. The Central News Agency -+The Guomindang "Central News Agency .. 4. The Central Army -+ The Guomindang forces

756

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

for the past two weeks it has been launching attacks on all fronts in northern China, where fierce battles are raging at this very moment. The armed forces and the people led by the Communist Party have already become the mainstay in the War of Resistance Against Japan. All the calumnies against the Communist Party are aimed at sabotaging the War of Resistance and paving the way for capitulation. We should extend the military successes of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and oppose all defeatists and capitulationists.

Policies in the Struggle Against "Nibbling" on the Plains of Hebei (June 9, 1941)

To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], and Luo [Ruiqing]:

I. The purpose of the enemy's "nibbling" policy in southern Hebei is to reduce our area of operations and expand its own occupied area. If we do not smash it, then it will be very difficult for us to gain a foothold on the plains. 2. The main link in smashing this sort of policy lies in having a correct policy. The point of departure should be politics primarily, rather than military attack alone or mainly military attack. 3. Generally speaking, the starting point for the work of our Party and our army in this kind of triangular area should be to conceal ourselves well, to conserve our strength, and to always be considering the popular masses. The popular masses must be protected so that they are not harmed (which means protecting our own survival). As for certain actions to deal with the enemy taken by the popular masses when they had no choice under duress, not only is it wrong to oppose them severely (this is not Rightist backsliding), but based on the specific situation they should rather be made into planned methods for dealing with the enemy, or even tactics. Our Party and our army should help the popular masses come up with these methods to deal with the enemy. Only in this way will the masses not be divorced from us, and the enemy's vicious plot to break up the unity between our army and the people be smashed. 4. A purely military struggle and a policy of sharp opposition on the surface would lead to brutal suppression by the enemy. The result would be, in fact, to create terror among the masses, which would accomplish precisely the purposes of the enemy bandits' conspiracy. 5. Within these regions we should more often adopt a two-faced policy, strengthening our work with the puppet organizations and puppet armies, making more friends, and refraining from a lot of noisy boasting (in other words, conceal ourselves). Here associations and political power of the masses can be organized only

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 648-49, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 757

758

MAO'S RGW TO POWER

under cover, not the way it is done in the base areas. In sum, the more we are able to protect ourselves, unite the people, and isolate the Japanese bandits, the more likely we are to be able to hold out for longer. All methods are harmful that seek only the momentary gratification of fighting with all one's might and pay no attention to twists and turns. 6. A fundamental condition for holding out on the plains is to improve and strengthen the local armed forces, which are led by local cadres and tied by flesh and blood to the local people. In this sort of triangular area, their role is particularly weighty and significant. Without this kind of local armed forces, it would be difficult to rely solely on dispersing the main forces to engage in guerrilla warfare. 7. The spirit embodied in your telegram of the lOth 1 should be modified. At the same time, we hope that you will strictly examine the policies in this regard within the plains region. We feel that the occurrence of constant defections that has arisen recently among certain troops on the plains has something to do with this, and you must pay very serious attention to it. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

I. Here the character hui (gray), commonly used in telegrams to signify the tenth day of the month, appears. We assume that it has this meaning, but there is no way of determining whether Mao was referring to a telegram of May lOth or to one sent earlier in 1941.

Cooperate with Friendly Armies in the Battle; Resolutely Smash the Enemy's Attack (June 9, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

I. We have drafted a telegram to Wei [Lihuang]. 1 If you are in agreement, please send it on to Yuan Xiaoxuan. 2 2. To Section Chief Yuan, for transmittal to Commanding Officer Wei for his perusal: The current overall situation cannot be sustained unless both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, your honorable troops and our troops, cooperate closely with each other. After taking southern Shanxi, it is possible that the enemy will advance on Zheng[zhou], Luo[yang], and Xi'an. Under the leadership of the Supreme Command 3 and of you, our Elder Brother, the Eighth Route Army is resolved to cooperate with friendly armies in the campaign, resolutely smash the enemy's attack, and fight to defend Zheng[ zhou ], Luo[yang], and Xi' an. Only there are two kinds of cooperation, direct and indirect. Direct cooperation produces its effect more rapidly; indirect cooperation produces its effect more slowly. Our humble army is responsible for attacking and destroying the [Bei]Ping[Wu]Han, [Bei]Ping-[Tian]Jin, [Tian]Jin-Pu[kou], Bei[ping]-Shenyang, [Bei]PingBaotou, and Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railroad lines, the northern sector of the Bai[gui]-Jin[cheng]line, and the northern and central sectors of the Tong-Pu[kou] line, so as to pin down the enemy from the far rear as well as the near rear. This is indirect cooperation. If the Eighth Route Army were to send strong forces to the Zhongtiao mountains and the triangular area in Fennan, and take responsibility for attacking and destroying the southern sector of the Tong-Pu line, the southern sector of the Bai-Jin line, and the Dao[kouzhen]-Qing[huazhen]line, as well as taking control of the north bank of the Yellow River, to strike at the enemy from the flank and pin him down, so as to assist the efforts of your honorable army's main forces to surround the enemy from the south and west bank of the Yellow Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 645-47, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript. 1. Wei Lihuang was then chief commanding officer for the Guomindang Army's First War Zone.

2. Yuan Xiaoxuan was then head of the Eighth Route Army's Luoyang administrative office. 3. That is, Chiang Kaishek. 759

760

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

River, this would be direct cooperation. As regards this suggestion, those who fail to grasp the true purpose behind the painstaking efforts on [Zhu] De's and our part might think that we are motivated by the chance to expand our territory, but our real desire is to protect Zheng[zhou], Luo[yang], and Xi'an. In the humble opinion of [Zhu] De and the rest of us, deployments such as in this regard must be made or else it would be hard to effect quick results in pinning down the enemy. The enemy has concentrated troops heavily in the Jiyuan-Yuncheng area, and coordinating operations only from afar would be like trying to put out a nearby fire by fetching water from a distance, as the Battle of Zhongtiao clearly proves. We cherish strong hope that relations between our two parties and two armies will improve and certainly do not wish to add further impediments. For this reason, with regard to the retreat of Elder Brother Hu Zongnan's troops to the defense line along the river by way of Yichuan and Luochuan, we told our garrison forces in the border region that they were not to take a single step beyond our original defense area. In addition, with regard to Zhongtiao and the triangular areas, although we know clearly the advantages in terms of pinning down the enemy, we did not allow our own troops to operate freely there. All this was meant to avoid misunderstandings and to seek cooperation. The proposals we now make are also purely a matter of offering suggestions. If you think they are acceptable, you may order them carried out and, if not, you will simply ignore them. We wonder if we may prevail upon you, Elder Brother, to give the matter consideration and submit it for perusal and judgment to the Supreme Command, wherein rests the proper decision. Still there are some things that must be elucidated. If the Supreme Command and our Elder Brother were to approve the above proposals, when our humble troops have arrived in Zhongtiao and the triangular area we would need to request your permission to mobilize the popular masses and organize anti-Japanese guerrilla units, for [Zhu] De and the rest of us believe that only such a policy would be the most effective. Although the reasons for the failure this time in Zhongtiao are many, the major one is actually that there were no mass organizations to block the enemy's eyes and ears and to make ours more acute, rather than the charge that our troops lacked training, our officers lacked courage, or that our command was faulty. Should the above proposals fail to meet with approval, our humble troops will continue to shoulder the task of coordinating in the far rear and will certainly not back out of such responsibility. With all respect we offer our suggestions, and humbly petition your decision and notification. Your younger brothers Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, on the 9th. 3. It is our estimation that the above proposals are likely not to be approved, so our troops will still have to make arrangements for coordination in the far rear and the near rear according to the principle that, on the one hand, we have no choice but to fight (that is, fighting is mandatory), but, on the other hand, we cannot fight too fiercely (as in the Hundred Regiments Offensive). Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Our Present Policy Is to Drag Chiang Into the War of Resistance (June 12, 1941)

Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Li [Yu], and Luo [Shunchu]:

It has been reported as follows: On the 20th, the 686th Regiment of our !15th Division.' as well as part of our troops advancing eastward started an attack on Wang's regiment of Zhang's division in the area around Renhezhuang; on the 19th, a certain Second Regiment of ours and the Yimeng Detachment, around two thousand men, attacked Meng's brigade of Chang's division in the area of Qingshahu and Tangjialin; then, on the 24th, another unit of about three thousand men attacked the New Thirty-sixth Division at a certain village2 in Chenzhuang; our forces under Xu [Shiyou], Yu,3 and Peng [Jiaqing], about five thousand men, attacked Zhao's division around Wuji near a certain mountain in Kaicheng, and so on. Please check and reply to us as to whether such events have occurred. Our basic policy at present is to drag Chiang into the War of Resistance. Our army should adhere to the Party Central Committee's principle, "We shall not attack others unless they attack us; if others attack us, we shall definitely defend ourselves." If such attacks have actually taken place, we hope that they will be stopped immediately. Likewise inform Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], Chen [Yi], and Liu [Shaoqi]. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985, No.3. p. 7 (pp. 171-72 of the annual

volume). I. Here and later in this telegram the letters .. R" and "D" have been used instead of the Chinese tenns for "Regiment" and "Division." 2. Moujiacun, literally "a certain family village," that is, the family name identifying this village is omitted. 3. The editors of Wenxian he yanjiu were unable to identify this person, and suspect a misprint in the original text. 761

ToUnBoqu (June 13 and 15, 1941)

Venerable Lin: I have gone over the budget and the final accounting of income and expenditures and am hereby returning them to you. Please let me know about such matters as they arise in the future. Although I can hardly relieve you of your cares and responsibilities, with regard to adjustments in personnel I can be of some small assistance to you. What we talked about today was overall orientation and personnel policies and, thanks to your approval, we will certainly be able to put them into effect in the future. I would like to call your attention to two more things: I. Give approval to all expenditures that are absolutely unavoidable, 1 allowing the recipient all that is asked for. If he is to collapse eventually, let him collapse (actually this will not happen), but at this point do not haggle over every penny with him. The principle is in the words "absolutely unavoidable." Included within this principle is the idea of fostering the weak and the small. 2. Take on everything, whether it belongs to the Center, the army, or the locality, and make an overall plan. The army is not to be divided into a national army and local armies (no such designation is to be made), and all are to be included in the overall plan. The military was not included in the budget this time; please add it on in the future. We also request that you consider and decide whether or not what we have said is appropriate. This is also for the venerable Xi e. 2 Mao Zedong, night of June 13 All in all, the line for development is entirely correct. Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 170-72, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. l. As in the case of other letters, the words set in boldface were underscored by Mao in his handwritten manuscript. 2. Xie Juezai (1884-1971) was then deputy secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, secretary of the Party and the League of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government, and genera) secretary of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government. 762

JUNE 1941

763

P.S. 1. Additional expenses will be unavoidable, because it is impossible to plan everything beforehand. For example, no one could have predicted the expenses for Jiefang ribao before it was decided to publish the paper. Therefore, the only solution is to increase the general reserve fund in the budget, and then make allocations afterward according to need (that which is absolutely unavoidable). 2. There is no need to fix the maintenance of the border region currency at I 0 million; it would be best to figure on 15 million, which is less constraining. 3. The part that is raised independently should be indicated in the budget. For example, of the monthly expenditure of Kang Sheng's office, 3 which is 57,000 yuan, only 12,000 yuan will be allocated, and they will raise 45,000 yuan on their own; this figure should also be entered. Roughly speaking, public funding comprises one-third, and the remaining two-thirds is to be raised independently. It does not accord with reality to leave this sort of thing out of the budget. Therefore it is necessary to be in close touch with the actual state of affairs in each part of the Party, the government, and the army, and become familiar with their situations, before calculations can be made-especially the army. 4. It is not a good idea to persist in the theory of the proportionality of the circulation of commodities and money, as many new conditions should be taken into account and need to be studied at a later date. If we insist on it too strongly and it turns out to be inaccurate, our reputation will suffer. The above points are simply what comes to mind, and I have written them down for your consideration. MaoZedong on June 15th

3. This refers to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Social Department, of which Kang Sheng (1898-1975) was the head at the time. Kang, who was also the head of the Intelligence Department, woUld play a key role in the Rectification Campaign of 1942.

Decision Regarding the International United Front Against Fascism (June 23, 1941)

On June 22 the fascist rulers of Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This is a perfidious crime of aggression not only against the Soviet Union but against the freedom and independence of all nations. The Soviet Union's sacred war of resistance against fascist aggression is being waged not only in its own defense but in defense of all the countries and all the nations struggling to liberate themselves from fascist enslavement. Throughout the world 1 the task now is to mobilize the people of all countries and organize an international united front to fight international fascism and defend the Soviet Union, defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations. In the present stage,2 every effort must be concentrated on combating fascist enslavement, not on carrying out a socialist revolution. For the Chinese Communist Party, the tasks throughout China are as follows: I. Persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, persevere in Guomindang-Communist cooperation, drive the fascist Japanese bandits3 out of China, and by these means assist the Soviet Union. 2. Resolutely combat all anti-Soviet and anti-Communist activities of the reactionary elements among the big bourgeoisie. 3. In foreign relations, unite against the common foe with all those in Britain, the United States, and other countries who are opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, July 3, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 329-30, which reproduces this version.

1. Throughout the world -+ For Communists throughout the world 2. Stage -+ Period

3. Japanese bandits -+Japanese imperialism 764

During the War of Resistance Our Tactics Toward the Big Landlords and Big Bourgeoisie Should Involve Drawing !hem In While Attacking Them (June 28, 1941)

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: I am in receipt of your telegram of the 12th; it is all correct, and I agree with all of it. Only in the second paragraph there seems to be something in item A that does not fit in with item B, so please check it again and think about it. Our Anti-Japanese National United Front includes all big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are still resisting Japan. It is an alliance of the entire nation, not just an alliance of the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie. It is indeed so as far as resistance against Japan is concerned, but where democracy is concerned, the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are forces to be opposed resolutely. Within our base areas, on the other hand, in order to protect their economic interests and wage a legitimate struggle against us, the landlords and big bourgeoisie may support our democratic regime. Therefore, during the course of the War of Resistance Against Japan, whether throughout the country or within the base areas, our policy toward the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, except in the case of Chinese traitors, should be to draw them in, on the one hand, and to attack them, on the other. That is, draw them in with regard to resisting Japan and attack their anti-Communism and opposition to democracy. At present, however, drawing them in is the main thing, and attacking is supplementary; attacking is a means to attain the end of drawing them in. This point is in agreement with your view in item B of paragraph 2, but it seems to be not in harmony with item A, and I very much hope you will take this into consideration. (To isolate the big bourgeoisie in China is different from isolating the bourgeoisie in Russia. In China we only isolate their anti-Communist aspect, while in Russia the policy is absolute isolation.) As for the mistakes in Peng Xuefeng's telegram of May 3, I have a telegram in reply which will be sent to you at the same time, and when you receive it, please let me know what you think. MaoZedong Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 356-57, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. 765

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party Spirit (Passed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on July I, 1941)

I. The Chinese Communist Party, tempered during twenty years of revolution, has now become an important and decisive factor in the political life of the whole country, yet what is before us remains a great and arduous revolutionary cause. Thus our Party must take a step further to become a Bolshevik party that is consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and all members of the Party and all its component parts must unite on the basis of unified intention, unified action, and unified discipline, to become an organic whole. Without such a resolute, unified, and centralized party, we shall be unable to cope with the protracted, grueling, and complicated struggle in the course of the revolution or to accomplish the great historical task we shoulder. Therefore, our major job today in consolidating the Party is to demand that all members of the Party, particularly members who are cadres, strengthen their training in Party spirit, subordinate personal interests to the interests of the whole Party, and subordinate the interests of an individual Party organization to those of the Party as a whole, so that the entire Party may be united as one single person. 2. Even though our Party has a history of twenty years of valiant struggle and is already a bolshevized party with close ties to the broad masses of people, the following must be pointed out: our environment is that of the vast countryside, that of guerrilla warfare which has long been dispersed and where independent actions have been going on, where small producers and intellectuals make up a large proportion of the Party membership, so that various tendencies which run counter to the Party spirit may easily arise among certain Party members, tendencies such as "individualism," "heroism," "a state of disorganization," "assertion of independence," and "anticentralized dispersal ism." If allowed to develop, these tendencies would undermine the Party's unified intention, unified actions, and unified discipline and could develop into the organization of small groups and into factional struggles, and even go so far as open opposition to the Party, which would bring Our source for this text is Mao Zl!dongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 53-56, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979. 766

JULY 194/

767

tremendous damage to the Party and the revolution. And if individuals with these tendencies fail to correct themselves, they could end up bringing ruin and disgrace upon their own heads. Traitor Zhang Guotao's end may serve as a clear historical lesson. These tendencies that demonstrate a lack of Party spirit, although not a prevalent phenomenon within the Party today, do indeed exist in certain quarters and among certain comrades. These tendencies mentioned above are concretely manifested in the following ways: a. Politically, acting as one pleases, not asking for guidance or opinions from the Central Committee or higher authorities, not respecting the decisions of the Central Committee or higher authorities, speaking carelessly, coming up with something new in order to be different, substituting personal feelings or views for policy, making arbitrary decisions and taking peremptory actions, or inventing excuses to evade responsibilities, having a two-faced attitude, complying on the surface while opposing in private, and concealing things from the Party. b. Organizationally, becoming one's own system and one's own situation, emphasizing independent action, opposing centralized leadership, practicing departmental selfishness, not allowing people to be transferred out [of one's department], ignoring the interests of the organization and thinking only of one's personal interests; practicing paternalistic rule, demanding only that subordinates observe discipline but disregarding it oneself; resisting the Center, showing disrespect for higher authorities, solving problems by going over the heads of immediate superior leadership organs; allowing oneself to disobey resolutions adopted by the majority, attacking others and touting oneself; totally disregarding matters of principle on policy toward cadres, making promotions or demotions at will, trying to win support through sentimental ties, covering up one another's misdeeds, secretly ganging up, and engaging in factional activities. c. Ideologically, it is developing petty-bourgeois individualism to make use of it against proletarian collectivism, taking the individual as the starting point in all things, showing off the individual in all things, putting personal interests above all else, being conceited and arrogant, having an unduly high opinion of oneself, pushing oneself forward at every chance, seeking personal status, taking pleasure in flattery, talking big and exaggerating, hogging the limelight; failing to understand specific situations in a truthful way, failing to handle problems in a serious and prudent manner; being extravagant to make a good show on the surface but refusing to dig in for the hard work; failure to build truly close ties with the masses. 3. To rectify the above-mentioned tendencies that run counter to the Party spirit, the following measures must be taken: a. Within the Party, more emphasis should be placed on the unity of the entire Party, on the centralized nature of the Party, and on the importance of following the leadership of the Center. It is forbidden for any Party member or any local Party organization to exhibit the behavior of coming up with something new in order to be different, becoming one's own system, or making proposals at will to the outside world on national issues. Demand that those in the leadership in the

768

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

various independent working districts pay special attention to the fact that it is more necessary today than at any other time to trust and obey the Center's leadership. Within the Party a struggle should be waged against "dispersalism," "assertion of independence," and "individualism." b. Examination of the carrying out of all resolutions and decisions should be stricter, and the two-faced behavior of complying on the surface while opposing in private is to be eradicated with firm resolve. c. Only by discovering and rectifying errors in a timely fashion and not allowing them to develop further can cadres be saved and harm to the work be prevented. Oppose the practice of being polite to the person's face and making charges behind his back. All criticism should be made in a positive, frank, and sincere manner, the purpose being salvation and not an attack. Within the Party unity and mutual assistance should be stressed, along with concern for cadres and helping them make progress politically. But as for those who fail to mend their ways after repeated warnings, timely prevention must be exercised as well as disciplinary sanctions. d. Education about observing discipline should be strengthened throughout the Party, because a unified standard of discipline is a necessary condition for victory of the revolution. These basic principles must be followed strictly: submission of the individual to the organization, submission of the minority to the majority, submission of lower levels to higher levels, and submission of the whole Party to the Center. This must apply to everyone, ordinary Party members and cadre Party members alike. e. We should transform ourselves with the weapon of self-criticism and through the method of conscientious study so as to fit ourselves to the needs of the Party and the revolution. Every Party member, every responsible leading cadre in particular, should be expected to reflect on his weaknesses thoroughly, and regard the Party's interests as of highest priority. No one should be guilty of a conceited and self-satisfied or a selfish attitude. The style to be promoted is one of selflessness, faithful loyalty and simple living, being willing to work hard, being down to earth, practical, and realistic, and guarding against arrogance and shallowness. The tendencies to divorce completely theory from practice and study from work should be corrected, so as to resolve more firmly our class stand, our Party stand, and our Party spirit. f. Finally, it has been decided that all responsible leaders, from members of the Central Committee to heads of Party departments, must be organizationally affiliated with a Party branch, participate to a degree in Party organizational life, humbly listen to criticisms from rank-and-file Party members, and strengthen their own training in Party spirit.

Prepare for Strategic Cooperation with the Soviet Army (July 2, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

I. We trust that you have received our last telegram. It is extremely likely that war will break out between Japan and the Soviet Union, and relations between China and the Soviet Union will improve. 2. If Japan attacks the Soviet Union, for the purpose of eliminating its enemy in the rear, the enemy will step up its suppression in North China. 3. Our army must prepare to cooperate with the Soviet Army in combat and make such preparations right now so that, once the time is ripe, we can take action immediately. But this kind of coordination is strategic coordination, long-term coordination, not coordination in a single battle or temporary coordination. Please consider all questions on this basis. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong jun.shi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 650, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. 769

Manifesto ofthe Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the War of Resistance (July 7, 1941)

Fellow countrymen throughout the nation, officers and soldiers in the War of Resistance! It has been exactly four years that our great Chinese nation's sacred war to resist the Japanese bandits and defend our motherland has been going on. As the fifth year of this War of Resistance begins, the international situation is at the same time in the midst of serious changes. The mad German fascist archcriminal Hitler has started a massive attack on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government is leading 200 million people and several million Red Army soldiers in a great war to smash the fascist aggression. Fellow countrymen, officers, and soldiers! This antifascist war of the Soviet Union is entirely of the same nature as our war against Japan, both being just wars to safeguard independence and freedom and to resist aggression. On the other hand, as far as the German fascists are concerned, they are exactly like the Japanese fascists who are invading China, in that they are committing an act of aggression, of enslavement of others, and are unjust. Therefore, we stand on exactly the same frontline as the Soviet Union, sharing all victories and defeats and standing together through thick and thin. Since the outbreak of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, sympathy for the Soviet Union has been spreading rapidly all over the world. The concern of our nation's people in this regard is especially deep and intense. This is because, for one thing, the Soviet Union is a socialist state that has been supportive of oppressed nations, and, during the four years of our resistance war, the Soviet Union has been the one to give us the most and the strongest help; for another, because the war between the Soviet Union and Germany has a direct impact on our War of Resistance. Should Hitler succeed in the Soviet Union, China would face a serious crisis. So all the people of our country understand that the Soviet

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, July 7, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 9-14, where it is reproduced from that version. 770

JULY 194/

77 I

people are fighting a war not only to safeguard the Soviet Union but also to defend China and to defend the freedom and independence of all nations. The success or failure of the Soviet Union is also the success or failure of China, as well as the success or failure, for all nations, of democracy and freedom, of independence and emancipation, of righteousness and justice, of science and enlightenment. Thus Hitler is the enemy not only of the Soviet people but also of all free nations, especially China. Therefore, to defeat Hitler is not only the task of the people of the Soviet Union and the various other countries but also the task of the Chinese people. Without a doubt, the mad attacks of fascist Hitler will only hasten his doom. as the enemies of the fascists are all over the world. A powerful front against fascist aggression is now being formed in the world. Now is a time of great struggle worldwide between the fascist front and the antifascist front, and a decisive battle between the two has already begun. With the aims of drawing in Japan, consolidating the fascist alliance, and opposing China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, the fascist countries in Europe have gone so far as to brazenly recognize the Chinese traitor, Wang Jingwei, and Hitler and Mussolini have already stretched their claws toward the Pacific. That they are the common enemy of our 450 million people as well as the whole of humanity is a fact that has already been exposed fully. Fascist Japan, for its part, has sunk into the quagmire of China to the West and is contending with Britain and the United States to the South; its economy is on the decline and its people are resentful, and now as it is about to tear up the Japanese-Soviet neutrality treaty and make an enemy of the great Soviet Union, the day of its disintegration and doom draws ever nearer without fail. But the more critical the situation gets, the more difficult it becomes to stop Japan from becoming desperate and trying to get its own way. The anti-Soviet danger has thus been increasing, the orientation of destroying China will certainly not be abandoned, and the ambition to go southward to encroach upon Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and Australia still remains. The threat posed by the fascist alliance to the world is augmenting simultaneously in the West and in the East. Only by waging a resolute struggle on the basis of an international united front against fascism is it possible to extinguish the fierce flames as they bum and stem the tide as it rages. All forms ·of the mentality of taking pleasure at the misfortunes of others and hoping to win by mere luck are manifestations of shallowness and lack of understanding. As for Chamberlain's following the old disastrous path, Wang Jingwei 's following in other people's footsteps, the so-called pacification policy, and the capitulationist line, these are all moves that are hopelessly stupid, that should be rejected by China and democratic countries in Europe and America. The Chinese people will forever persist in their fight against the danger of a Far Eastern Munich. Our great Chinese nation's sacred War of Resistance Against Japan is not only to save our own motherland from destruction but is also of assistance to the international battle against aggression. During the past four years, soldiers and civilians throughout the country have been gallantly fighting the War of Resistance,

772

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

without begrudging sacrifice, without fearing hardship, stepping into the breach as soon as someone falls, making consistent and unyielding efforts. An enormous price has been paid, and numerous difficulties have been surmounted, thereby striking the enemy bandits with terror, winning respect all over the globe, laying the foundation for revitalization of the nation, and producing the embryonic form of a newborn China. All this is the result of our unity above and below, the concerted efforts of the army and the people, cooperation among various parties and groups, and aid from friendly countries. It merits our exuberant celebration and deserves to be writ large in the record. The enemy's attacks, on the other hand, are just in the ascendant, and colluding to destroy us is the brutal fascist alliance. The puppets in Nanjing are playing jackal to the tiger, and the pro-Japanese elements within our ranks are practicing all manner of deceit. Politics have yet to be clarified; the people's livelihood is worsening all the time; friction remains among the parties and groups; the will of the people is far from prevailing, and all sorts of terrifying specters are looming larger and larger, fiercer and fiercer on the horizon. What is most startling is that anticommunism has become policy, the term "alien party" appears in official documents, and the fine-sounding terms "army discipline" and "military orders" are applied to those most actively engaged in striking out against the anti-Japanese forces. And so the Southern Anhui Incident occurred, the New Fourth Army was disbanded, secret agents run rampant, and illegal arrests have been made one after another, such that the vitality of the War of Resistance has been undermined, and the new atmosphere during the early days of the War of Resistance has broken down. If all these dark aspects are not eliminated, then what has been achieved in the War of Resistance over the past four years may be lost in midstream, the soldiers and the people throughout the country would feel at a Joss as to what to do, and international sympathies would also be lost. This is something that everyone in the country should be fully aware of and guard against. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is of the opinion that the present time, when the War of Resistance is entering its fifth year and the international situation is undergoing change, offers a good opportunity for us to get rid ofthe old and make way for the new. Many highly significant military tasks must be performed by the people of the whole nation, and new reforms and innovations should be made from foreign affairs to domestic policy before we can adjust to the current environment, assume a new posture before our people, and achieve our goal of fighting the War of Resistance and building up the nation. Despite the limitations on its understanding, this Party wishes to set forth the following points: I. Support the international antifascist front, promote the united coalition of China, the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, and all other countries and nations that are opposed to fascism, oppose the fascist alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan, support the correct action of the National Government in severing diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy, and prepare for new measures.

JULY 194/

773

2. Intensify the struggle against the puppet government of Traitor Wang [Jingwei], eliminate the remnant followers of Traitor Wang, and consolidate the anti-Japanese camp. 3. Speed up the reorganization and training of all national armies, improve military coordination among the various armies at the front, supply army provisions and ammunition to the anti-Japanese troops in the enemy's rear. and wage active counterattacks against the enemy. 4. Improve the political, economic, and cultural facilities at all anti-Japanese base areas, which efforts are to be assisted financially by the government, so that they can persist in the enemy's rear over a long period of time and make it impossible for the enemy to move troops to advance westward, northward, or southward. 5. Strengthen cooperation among all anti-Japanese parties and groups, readjust relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, resolve the issue of the New Fourth Army, acknowledge the lawful activities of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, stop arresting members of the Communist Party and all other patriotic elements, eliminate internal friction, and build up real power for the War of Resistance. 6. Grant to all patriotic people freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, and mobilize the talents and power of the people for resistance against the enemy bandits. 7. Reform political institutions, dismiss corrupt officials from office, make use of enlightened people, purge the hidden pro-Japanese elements from government organs, and eliminate the enemy's fifth column. 8. Prohibit hoarding and speculating and manipulation of the national economy by corrupt officials, unscrupulous profiteers, and evil gentry, implement control over the grain supply, and regulate prices, so as to relieve the hardships of the people. 9. Reform the military service recruitment system, prohibit extortion, bribery, compulsion, and mistreatment, and substitute instead political mobilization through encouraging the people to go to the battlefront, so as to benefit the War of Resistance.

10. Readjust the relationship between the Center and the localities, trust and make use of local talent, and unite with the national minorities, so as to consolidate our rear.

This Party believes the foregoing items truly to be the basic guidelines for our foreign and domestic affairs today. If they could be put into practice, a new atmosphere would be created throughout the country, and all our difficulties could be overcome, thus laying a solid foundation for the victory of the War of Resistance and the construction of the country.

The Chinese Communist Party declares once again: This Party remains unchanged in adhering to its policy of the national united front against Japan and is willing to unite to the end with the Chinese Guomindang and all patriotic parties and groups and all patriotic people, and fight hard together for our common goals

774

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

of the War of Resistance and building the country. This Party has in fact been the most faithful in implementing the Three People's Principles and the program for resisting Japan and building up the country. This Party has been true to its word in carrying out its declaration of September 22, 1937, without the slightest violation. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have been part of the National Army from beginning to end, carried out their duties in the anti-Japanese war in the most faithful and most courageous manner, resisted and beaten more than half the enemy's forces, recovered a vast expanse of lost territory, and established a number of anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear. In these base areas, the Three People's Principles have been implemented step by step, the three-thirds system, a democratic political system that secures cooperation among various parties and strata, has been carried out, human rights, political rights, and financial rights are guaranteed for all anti-Japanese strata (including landlords and capitalists), a policy in the countryside has been carried out such that, on the one hand, land rent and loan interest are reduced, and, on the other hand, rent and interest must be paid, a labor policy has been implemented such that, on the one hand, the workers' livelihood is improved, and, on the other hand, labor discipline is strengthened, an economic policy has been carried out that develops agriculture, industry, and commerce and improves the livelihood of the people, and a cultural policy has been carried out to eliminate illiteracy and ignorance and enhance the spiritual quality of the nation. Each and every one of these instances testifies to the following: The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard in defending the motherland, a revolutionary political party that is true to its word, a model in uniting to fight the War of Resistance, and an examplar of tough struggle. On the other hand, the enemy, Traitor Wang and the pro-Japanese elements, have all made this Party their target and take pleasure in trying to undermine and destroy it, because they know full well that this Party's existence is the biggest obstacle to fulfillment of their plan to destroy China, and that they would never be able to destroy China without first destroying the Communists. What is strange is that some persons within our country who are still in the War of Resistance harbor exactly the same intentions as the enemy to slander, frame, and sabotage this Party, calling it a bandit army and slandering it as a traitorous party, sparing no effort to devastate and suppress it. Faced with such a formidable enemy, to act in such haste is truly something unfathomable no matter how one looks at it. It is hoped that such things will quickly be eliminated, that the state of affairs at the beginning of the War of Resistance will be restored, that animosity will give way to harmony, and mutual obstruction will give way to mutual assistance. If all together give first priority to the country and the nation, the future of the War of Resistance will brighten immediately, and the situation in this fifth year of the War of Resistance will tum into one of unity, progress, and victory. This is what our Party prays for in all earnestness. Fellow countrymen, officers, and men! The fifth year of the War of Resistance is a decisive year for the destiny of the world as well as for the destiny of China. Everyone should wake up, unite especially closely, make special efforts, persist in

JULY 1941

775

holding up our banner of national emancipation, keep our feet firmly planted on the ground, go forward in the fight, coordinate with the antifascist struggle of the peoples of all other countries, and strive for our complete victory. The Chinese Communist Party is thoroughly convinced that, as long as we persist in our efforts and do not make mistakes, we can surely achieve our goals. The final victory surely will be ours. Down with Japanese imperialism! Down with fascist enslavement! Support the Soviet Union! Long live the victory of the War of Resistance! Long live the victory of the antifascist front of the whole world! Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

To Assist the Red Army of the Soviet Union, We Have Decided to Adopt the Orientation of a Long-Term Struggle in the Form of Widespread Guerrilla War (July 15, 1941)

Comrade [Zhoul Enlai: I. The Central Committee held a discussion about the telegram you sent. 1 With regard to military preparation, we have decided to begin with the three measures of learning the Russian language, learning natural sciences, and preparing cadres in the Northeast. 2. With regard to Hong Kong, we think it is, indeed, very important, and we are preparing to send someone. Only selection of personnel still needs to be considered. We feel it may not be adequate for [Lil Fuchun2 to go on his own; what do you think about Bo Gu's3 going? 3. With regard to military operations, as soon as war broke out between the Soviet Union and Germany, we began to step up our spying operations and our preparations to destroy communications so as to pin down the enemy, and we are determined under the present circumstances to do everything possible to help the Soviet Red Army win victory. But because the Japanese bandits have occupied

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 651-53, where it is repro· duced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. 1. The reference is to Zhou 's telegram to Mao of July 3, in which he argued that America's policy of recognizing Japan's special economic privileges in China. and thereby persuading Japan not to use military force in its advance to the south, was unlikely to succeed. From a military point of view, the Communists should increase their acceptance of new weapons and study the natural sciences, the Russian language, and modem military knowledge. 2. As noted above, Li Fuchun was serving at the time as deputy head of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee. 3. Qin Bangxian (1907-1946), pseudonym Bo Gu, a leader of the Russian returned student faction, had been secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party in 1931-1935. Beginning in 1938, he had been a Communist delegate to the People's Political Council, and his name appears as a signatory of a number of documents in the earlier part of this volume, but he was not, in fact, very influential at this time. He had, however, recently become editor-in-chief of Jiefang ribao. 776

JULY 1941

777

North China for four years and have built strong fortifications in big cities, along railroad lines, and in the mines, besides which the discrepancy between our military technology and equipment and those of the enemy is too great, we face increasing difficulty with regard to manpower, material power, territory, and ammunition. If Japan invades the Soviet Union, I am afraid that our role in coordinating military actions will not be very large. Even if we take action regardless of all sacrifice to ourselves, it is still quite possible that we would be defeated and be unable to sustain the base areas for long. This would be a bad thing no matter how one looks at it. For this reason, rather than adopting a policy of putting all our eggs in one basket, we are adopting a policy of strengthening our base areas in the enemy's rear, carrying out extensive guerrilla warfare, and fighting a long, drawnout battle with the Japanese bandits. If we can enhance our provisions of ammunition, machine guns, cannons, and explosives, the effect of our operations will be even greater still. Rifle bullets are especially precious, because we have an average of only twenty bullets per rifle, our machine guns are very few, and our cannons are even fewer, nor can we get hold of the yellow explosive used in blowing things up. Please inform Elder Brother Cui 4 of this and ask him to pass it on to our friends in a distant place.' 4. With regard to the two incidents at Zhongtiao mountain in Luoyang described in the telegram of the 12th, we have drawn the attention of Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] to the matter. 5. As for meeting with Chiang [Kaishek], since Zhang Chong has come twice to urge it, perhaps it is worth a visit to see what he has to say. If he can release Ye Ting and give the Eighth Route Army a few months worth of pay, relations between the Guomindang and the Communists can begin to improve right away. But still it would not do to be too hasty, as undue haste would be counterproductive. Your being unhurried is quite reasonable. 6. The agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union will become the pivot of world politics. Politically, the United States cannot but follow this line and will no longer be able to control everything. The British-Soviet agreement will have an impact on Japan, adding to its worries, and it will also have an impact on China, promoting improvement in relations between China and the Soviet Union and between the Guomindang and the Communists. 7. The war between the Soviet Union and Germany has reached a stalemate in its third week, but the decisive battle is yet to come, and the danger is not over yet. If he is unable to fight his way in frontally, Hitler will strike at Turkey, Iraq, and the Caucasus, and this will be the main area in which the navies, armies, and air forces of Britain and the Soviet Union will coordinate their fighting.

4. This refers once again to Tsuikov, who since December 1940 had been the military attache! to the Soviet embassy in China and general military adviser to the Guomindang government.

5. As elsewhere, "in a distant place" refers to Moscow.

778

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

8. Japan has been concentrating its ships in the Pacific, appointed ltagaki 6 chief commanding officer in Korea, and transferred part of its forces from China to Manchuria, seeming to be preparing to attack the Soviet Union. But it mainly still depends on the outcome of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, and it looks as if at present they are still observing the situation. MaoZedong

6. General ltagaki Seishiro (1885-1948) was one of the leading partisans of Japanese

expansion in China, and it was he who had issued the orders for the "Mukden Incident" of September 1931 which constituted the first step in carrying out that policy. Ironically, it was the crack Fifth Division under his command that was the victim of Lin Biao's victory of September I 937 at Pingxingguan. In I 939, he became chief ofthe general staff of the China

Expeditionary Army. He was executed as a war criminal in 1948.

The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army Should Adopt the Orientation of a Long-Term Struggle (July 18, 1941)

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi: Your telegram of the 12th has been received.' I. The slogan of counteroffense is correct. The slogan of an active offensive was already used in the July 7 Declaration, and in the future we may use a slogan of strategic counteroffense. 2. But it remains inappropriate for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to carry out operations on a large scale. The orientation should continue to be a long-term struggle over a long period of time, the reason being that our army is weak in all respects, and any large movement would surely sap our strength and be disadvantageous both to us and to the Soviet Union. 3. The overall situation will be determined by the Soviet Union's winning victory. At present the Soviet Union's several million reserve troops are just being used, and it is possible that in a few days there will be a decisive battle to halt the German army's offensive, which would be most advantageous in terms of the overall situation. If Leningrad and Moscow fall, then Japan is certain to invade the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union's difficulties will increase, and it will tum into a protracted war. But the agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union has already determined the basis for a final victory. A confrontation between the United States and Germany and between the United States and Japan is unavoidable, and the overall situation still does not favor the fascists. 4. It is Chiang [Kaishek]'s policy to take any advantage to contain the Japanese and contain the Communists, so therefore our policy toward Chiang should continue to be that of no concessions but no attack either. In actuality it is impossible

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 654-SS, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. I. This refers to a telegram dated July 12, 1941, from Chen Yi and Liu Shaoqi to Mao, arguing that if Japan were to attack the Soviet Union, the Communists should call on the entire nation to counterattack, and if the Guomindang refused to do so, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should counterattack on their own. 779

780 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

for us to give up our territory to Chiang, and he certainly will not fight fiercely against the Japanese, as he is very opportunistic and very clever. 5. The suggestion in your previous telegram of using ''The Communist Manifesto" and "On New Democracy" as textbooks for veteran cadres does not seem appropriate because they are too difficult to understand. It is better to compile some new textbooks, and the Central Committee's Propaganda Department is making a start at that. 6. I hope you mail your two articles from Hong Kong so that I can read them as soon as possible. MaoZedong

Be Prepared to Persist for a Long Time in the Orientation of Self-Defense (July 30, 1941)

To [Huang] Kecheng, and for the infonnation of Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]: Both of your telegrams have been received. This anti-Communist propaganda campaign was carried out by He Yingqin under secret orders from Chiang [Kaishek], but it was opposed by the pro-British and pro-American elements such as Guo Taiqi 1 and Wang Shijie,2 and has been stopped for the time being after [Zhou] Enlai's counterattack. Chiang and He's purpose is none other than to prepare public opinion so that they will have an excuse to force us to move north ofthe Yellow River once Japan attacks the Soviet Union. But as long as the Soviet Union is able to defeat Gennany (in the past two weeks the German army has made no progress), Japan will certainly not dare to attack the Soviet Union, and as long as the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain cooperate (Britain and the Soviet Union have already signed an agreement, and the United States and the Soviet Union are getting closer day by day), Chiang will certainly not dare to launch an extensive anti-Communist campaign, so the whole situation is to our advantage. If Japan risks attacking the Soviet Union and Chiang forces us to move northward, there still will be no change in our orientation; politically it will continue to be an antifascist international united front and an anti-Japanese national united front, and, militarily, until there are changes in our weaponry, it will remain a timeless protracted guerrilla war against the enemy that is neither adventurous nor passive. The troops in Central China and Shandong will certainly not move north; our policy toward Chiang's attacks will be one of self-defense; our orientation toward all anti-Communist propaganda and every single anti-Communist action on the part of the Guomindang will continue to be that we will not attack anyone who does not first attack us. As for Chiang and He, if He attacks us we will attack him, and if He stops we will stop too. We should prepare to persist in this orientation for

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 656-57, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Guo Taiqi was minister of foreign affairs for the Guomindang government at the time. 2. Wang Shijie was then serving as secretary general of the Guomindang's People's Political Council. 781

782

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

a long time, and not be swayed by a panicular incident or time. I hope you will pay attention to this. MaoZedong

Resolution ofthe Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Investigation (August I, 1941)

I. Over the past twenty years, although our Pany has made gradual progress in studying the history and society of China and world affairs, gradually accumulating more and more knowledge, it is still greatly inadequate. Being crude and careless, being content with superficial understanding, arrogantly thinking oneself always in the right, and subjectivist and formalist work-styles still exist within the Party in a serious way. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, our Pany has taken a big step forward with regard to understanding Japan, understanding domestic economic and political relationships, and understanding social conditions, and subjectivist and formalist work-styles have lessened as well. But what has been found out is still mostly crude and rough, like a caricature, lacking in systematic, detailed, or thorough understanding. And subjectivist and formalist workstyles have yet to be eliminated altogether. The seriousness of the harm done to the revolutionary work over the past twenty years as a result of the subjectivist and formalist mentality of many of our comrades and lack of thorough knowledge of various aspects has yet to be recognized fully by all leading organs of the Pany and all our comrades. A number of comrades responsible for local work lack systematic and thoroughgoing understanding of the internal and external environment ofthe area in which they work, whether in relation to the society, the economy, and politics, to the enemy and the puppets, or to their own work. Many comrades within the Pany have yet to understand the truth that without investigation there is no right to speak. They have yet to understand that a systematic and thoroughgoing investigation of society is the basis on which policy is formulated. They still do not know that the fundamental tasks of a leading organ are to understand conditions and to master policies, and that if conditions are not understood, then policies are bound to be in error. They still do not know how finely detailed are Japanese imperialism's investigation and study of our country. Nor do they yet grasp that the subjectivist work-style of being crude and careless and arrogantly self-righteous is the first manifestation of an impure Pany spirit, whereas seeking truth

This resolution was first published inJiefang ribao, SeptemberS, 1941. Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 315-16, confirms that it was drafted by Mao. Our source isMaoZedongji, Vol. 8, pp. 1719, which reproduces the text that appeared in Jiefang ribao. 783

784

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

from facts and closely combining theory with practice is the basic attitude of a Party member with a strong Party spirit. Our Party has now become a large political party charged with a great revolutionary task, and whatever we say or do has a bearing on the future of the nation and society. So we must do everything possible to avoid emptiness and shallowness, do away with subjectivist work-styles, and take concrete measures so that everyone, from the Central Committee on down to each Party member, steps up his investigation and study of history, ofthe environment, and of actual conditions both inside and outside the country, the province, the xian, and the district. Only in this way can revolutionary forces in all classes throughout the country be effectively united to overthrow the rule of Japanese imperialism. 2. The following examples are provided with regard to methods of investigation and study: First, collect and then select, edit, and study all types of newspapers, magazines, and books from the three sources of the enemy, our friends, and ourselves, that concern political, military, economic, cultural, and social class relations. Second, gather together experienced people in groups of three to five or seven or eight at a time to hold fact-finding meetings and investigate typical cases of a township, a district, a xian, a city, a town, an army, a division, a factory, a shop, a school, or a problem (for example, the land problem, the labor problem, the problem of vagrants, and the problem of secret societies). To start with a typical case is the most feasible method. From one typical case you can move to another. Third, in the countryside, emphasis should be placed upon detailed investigation into the living conditions of, political needs of, and relations among the various social strata such as landlords, rich peasants, merchants, middle peasants, poor peasants, farm laborers, handicraft workers, vagrants, and so on. In the cities, emphasis should be placed upon the living conditions of, political needs of, and relations among the comprador big bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the masses of the poor, and the masses of vagrants. Fourth, use various sorts of cadre meetings and representatives' conferences to gather materials. Fifth, write biographies of well-known figures. Considering the important role played by leading figures in Chinese society, studying various aspects ofthese figures and compiling their biographies is an important link in studying the whole of China. Within the anti-Japanese front, biographies of several hundred to several thousand characters each should be written for all capitalists or landlords whose assets exceed 50,000 yuan, military officers above the level of regiment commander, officials above the level of xian magistrate, responsible persons above the xian level in the various parties and groups, famous scholars, cultural figures, journalists, religious leaders, social activists known inside and outside a xian, and foreign activists in China, so as to learn about their personal histories, their aspirations, and their interests and determine the appropriate steps to take in cooperating with them to resist Japan. As for those who have all along been discriminated against in society but have some noteworthy outstanding characteristic, such as heads of secret societies, vagabond chiefs, local bandit chiefs, celebrity

AUGUST 1941

785

actors, and prostitutes, they should be understood so that they may make some contribution to the cause of national liberation. It is even more necessary to have comprehensive knowledge about prominent enemy bandits and Chinese traitors, and the prominent elements who play the jackal to their tiger, or the targets of our present struggle, so as to achieve the objective of winning every battle by knowing both oneself and the enemy. Comrades of the prefecture and xian Party committees should be charged with sharing responsibility for this sort of biography. The contents of the biography must be true to the person's actual life history and must not be distorted because of personal likes and dislikes. Sixth, conduct individual oral interviews. Either send people to ask questions or have people come to be questioned. Ask questions of cadres, workers, peasants, educated people, sympathizers, merchants, officials, vagabonds, captives, and so on, all of them. Seventh, collect and make a study of gazeteers for xian, townships, and provinces, family tree records, maps, and so on. 3. Carry out education about understanding objective conditions (those of the enemy, our friends, and ourselves) among cadres in office and in schools where cadres are trained. Praise and encourage those comrades who know more and better about actual conditions, and criticize those comrades who engage in empty talk and are unrealistic. Praise and encourage those comrades who not only understand actual conditions but also pay attention to policy, and criticize those comrades who not only do not know objective conditions but are also careless about policy. Make it so that this practice of knowing actual conditions and being careful about policy is closely linked with the practice of studying Marxist-Leninist theory. In study, oppose the practice of only memorizing doctrine while ignoring actual reality, and the harmful tendency of separating the study of Marxist-Leninist theory and principles, on the one hand, from the understanding of Chinese social conditions and solving the problems of the Chinese revolution, on the other. Cadres and students should be encouraged to read newspapers and given guidance in the way to read newspapers and in analyzing each change in the current situation. Cadres and students should be provided with factual material about all sorts of conditions both inside and outside the country, the province, and the xian. The teaching and study of these materials and the conclusions therefrom should be incorporated into the formal curriculum, be given the necessary time, and be tested and examined.

ToXiaoJun 1 (August 2, 1941)

Comrade Xiao Jun: I have received and read both of your letters, and the books you asked for have been sent. Because I have had little contact with you in the past and do not know you well, there are certain things I have wanted to say to you, but then again I was afraid that, if my words went deeper than our friendship warrants, they would do you no good or even give rise to hard feelings, so I refrained from saying them at the time. There are very many bad things going on in Yan'an, and the ones you mentioned to me all merit attention and should all be corrected. But I would advise you at the same time to pay attention to certain of your own shortcomings, to refrain from thinking in absolute terms, to be patient, to take care of your relationships with others, and to force yourself deliberately to examine your own weaknesses. This is the only way to have a future and to "settle down and get on with one's life." Otherwise you will never be at ease, and that involves great suffering. You are an extremely frank and straightforward person, and I feel at ease with you, which is why I have made these suggestions. If you agree, I should like to talk with you again. Respectfully wishing you all the best! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxinxuanji, pp. 174-75, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. t. Xiao Jun (1907-1988) was a native of Liaoning. In the spring of 1940, she went to Yan'an, where, in 1941 and early 1942, she wrote articles urging the Party to be more tolerant of dissent. It was no doubt this tendency against which Mao was warning her here. 786

The Defense Along the River Along the Jundu-Jikou Line Should Be Strengthened (August 3, 1941)

To He [Long] and Zhou [Shidi], 1 and to inform Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]: According to reports the enemy has concentrated more than four thousand men along the Jundu-Jikou line and is preparing to cross the river, and it is evident that the main forces of Wang's brigade2 have been transferred northward to deal with He Wending,3 so that defense along the river is hollow. It is very possible that the Japanese bandits will take advantage of this weakness to cross the river and launch an attack, and, if the river is not defended, the impact will be extremely heavy. We hope that He and Zhou will swiftly make arrangements to strengthen the forces defending the river, prepare to impose a heavy blow on the invading enemy troops crossing the river, and at the same time threaten the enemy from the side with another unit, to make sure the enemy cannot succeed. Let us know quickly what arrangements you make. We also hope to be informed as to whether or not Shidi should be sent to take command in Jiaxian. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 658, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. He Long was then commander of the Eighth Route Army's I20th Division, and Zhou Shidi was its chief of staff. 2. Wang Zhen (1908-1993), a native of Hunan, participated in the Long March. Since 1937, he had been commander of the 359th Brigade of He Long's !20th Division of the Eighth Route Army. 3. He Wending (d. 1978) was a native of Shanxi who had been a member of the first class at the Huangpu Academy in 1924. At ~his time, he was commander of the 26th Division of the Guomindong Eighth War Zone. 787

To Xie Juezai1 (August 6, 1941)

Comrade Juezai: Recently I have been very interested in studying the problem of finance and economy in the border regions. Although my understanding is still not very deep, I feel that the law governing it, or its determining rule, seems to rest on two simple points, namely, (a) developing the economy, and (b) a balance of imports and exports. First is to develop a mainly private and partly public economy in the various fields such as agriculture, salt production, industry, animal husbandry, and commerce, and then to export to outside of the border more than 30 million yuan worth of products in exchange for bringing in 30 million yuan of necessities, so as to balance exports and imports or strive for a considerably favorable balance of trade. If these two things were accomplished, all problems would be solved. In turn, the key with regard to these two things lies in the management of grain and salt production. If grain production can be increased by 200,000 or 300,000 dan, and 300,000 to 400,000 pack animal loads of salt can be transported outside the borders, the two problems would basically be solved. If we evaluate our work in relation to these two points, it follows that: I. The fact that this year's investment of 8 million yuan is limited to public enterprises alone and does not cover any loans to private agriculture or to cooperatives is nothing other than an expedient for the transitional period. From now on, investments in public enterprise must be stopped, and investments in private enterprise must be initiated. In other words, advance large loans to farmers and cooperatives, as well as to herdsmen and private merchants at the same time, for the purpose of increasing grain production, increasing the number of livestock, and achieving relatively prosperous commerce. If 3 or 4 million yuan can be invested in agriculture, in addition to the government's mobilization for a spring cultivation and autumn harvest campaign, and the grain yield is increased by 200,000 to 300,000 yuan, then collecting taxes on 200,000 dan of grain and 10 million jin of hay will Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shwcin xuanji, pp. 176-79, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Xie Juezai (1884-1971), a native ofNingxiang in Hunan, was then serving as deputy secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Northwest Bureau, Party and League secretary for the Shaam;i·Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government, and general secretary of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government. 788

AUGUST 1941

789

not affect the livelihood of the people, and it might even be possible to export tens of thousands of dan of grain to Sui[dexian] and Yu[lin xian].lf animal husbandry can be made to grow and commerce is developed to a considerable extent, then a tax on sheep bringing in 2 or 3 million yuan per year and a tax on commerce amounting to 7 or 8 million yuan a year would not incur resentment from the people, and our financial problems basically would have been solved. The reason attention was paid only to investment in public enterprise and we were unable to take care of private sector investment this year is that there was the extenuating circumstance of depending on public enterprises to help cope with an emergency. But the adverse effects thus produced were contending with the people for profits (monopoly) and failure to solve the larger problem. This orientation certainly cannot be continued next year. Investment in the salt enterprise alone should be continued next year, and only the necessary portions in other publicly run enterprises in agriculture, industry, and commerce should continue. 2. Salt is the only means or the primary means of achieving a balance between imports and exports. As long as 300,000 pack animal loads of salt a year can be exported in exchange for 30 million yuan worth of cotton and cloth (calculated at a hundred French francs per pack animal load), then imports and exports could be considered balanced, as according to what the bank tells me, imports of cotton and cloth to the border areas amount to only 30 million yuan a year. If 400,000 pack animal loads could be exported, aside from bringing in 30 million yuan worth of cotton and cloth, there would be 10 million yuan in cash coming in, which would be even better. As for collecting 6 to 8 million yuan in salt taxes to make up part of the financial deficit, this is only its secondary advantage; the first advantage of salt is in solving the problem of balancing imports and exports. Once the import and export problem is solved, the two major problems of price of goods and value of currency are solved. Viewed in this light, this year's salt policy, of official supervision and the populace trading, not only gives little cause for criticism but is, rather, entirely appropriate. Although it is in no way certain that 300,000 or 400,000 pack animal loads can be sold, there is indeed no other way to solve the import and export problem, and as a consequence no other way but this to solve the two major problems of price of goods and value of currency. Therefore, the basic orientation underlying this policy is altogether legitimate. Because a policy of completely free trade cannot be implemented with regard to salt this year. The reasons are the high price of grain and of hay, as well as Guomindang restrictions. This year is different from last year, so there is no other way to be able to export 300,000 or 400,000 pack animal loads of salt except by official supervision and the populace trading (a semicoercive measure). I have not yet been favored with a reply to my previous letter from the Venerable Lin,2 so perhaps the issues I raised in it were not proper or to the point. But 2. Refers to Lin Boqu, then serving as chainnan of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government.

790

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

my humble intention was simply to see that this problem is solved in a rational manner so as to serve the purpose of unifying our determination and unifying our actions. The disunity of the past several months has been truly detrimental in the extreme. But unity rests first of all on a consensus with regard to the basic orientation for financial and economic construction. For this reason, I put forward the foregoing arguments as they came to my mind on reflection, so as to invite criticism and guidance from you and the Venerable Lin. If you and the Venerable Lin feel there are errors, I beg you to be frank and direct in correcting them one by one, so that a consensus may be reached. The Politburo held a meeting yesterday at which I was entrusted to call a meeting of the comrades concerned in order to find a solution to this problem. I think it would be best to have discussions with individuals first, and then hold the meeting. What is your opinion? Respectfully wishing you the very best! MaoZedong

To Xie Juezai (August 9, 1941)

Venerable Xie: I have received both your letter of the 8th and the report on Ansai. 1 I have read them once and shall read them more carefully later. The summing-up meeting that is in preparation is a positive thing and is not only for the purpose of debating certain specific issues. Please prepare an active proposal, including the whole question of finance and the economy, enumerating all points item by item, and include what is to be done this year and what is to be done next year. Please let me see it after it is drafted so that I can study it beforehand and exchange views with you before discussion takes place. The Venerable Lin has made a three-year plan, which I would very much like to have a look at. He kindly wrote to me yesterday saying that he plans to expand and rewrite it, and I wonder whether he will be able to have the draft completed within ten days or so. Everyone hopes that we can unify our determination and our actions, and my opinion is that we must map out a program of action; otherwise, there is no way to unify. Such a program of action, moreover, cannot be discussed and confirmed unless views are exchanged around a specific plan and without detailed study. I am someone who has not studied the matter at all, so I wish to increase my understanding for the purpose of participating in this meeting, and I have read your various letters with great care. It would be even better, provided the state of your health permits, if you could sketch a plan in outline form, or else make some additions and revisions to Venerable Lin's threeyear plan on the basis of recent experience and study. For the moment I have not yet gone to bed; if I am able to sleep well in the morning, I might go down or send a car to fetch you here for a chat, and we can decide then. Respectful salutations to you! MaoZedong early morning on August 9

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 180-81, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Ansai is a xianjust north of Yan'an. 791

792

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

[Li] Fuchun and [Chen) Zhengren2 have each written a proposal, which I have previously perused roughly but failed to give proper attention to. I should like to read them again more carefully. Have you read these two pieces?

2. Li Fuchun was then serving as deputy chief of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Organization Department. Chen Zhengren ( 1907-1972), a native of Suichuan in Jiangxi, was then a member of the Standing Committee and head of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Northwest Bureau.

To Xie Juezai (August 12, 1941)

Venerable Xie: I am in receipt of your letter of the II th. That forced labor must be accomplished through political mobilization is absolutely correct, and herein lies the difference in principle between our forced labor and that of the Guomindang. Our distinctive feature is making revolution in addition to fighting a war. The Party group 1 in the [Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia] Border Region government should not be confused with the commissions of the government. A Party group is made of no more than three to five people, whose job is to be in control of policy, meeting to discuss matters as they arise. After the matter is agreed upon, or written up as a plan, and then approved by the Northwest Bureau (or passed by its standing committee), it is submitted to the government commission for adoption. You are the one to convene the Party group meetings, and not every section has to be represented; it should be limited to those who can handle policy matters. Please consider this matter. The question of a deputy chairman merits consideration. Respectful salutations! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 182-83, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. At this time, the "Party group" (dangruan) was the Party organ leading the work of government, labor union, peasants' associations, and other mass organizations in the ShenGan-Ning Border Region. At the Seventh Congress in 1945, the name was changed to dangzu. 793

Talk with the Student Delegation from Sui[de] and Mi[zhijl (August 1941)

(From our local city reporter) Comrade Mao Zedong met yesterday at the border region government with a visiting group of a dozen or so student delegates from Sui[de] and Mi[zhi], and inquired about the conditions of the people in Sui[de] and Mi[zhi] and the demands of the popular masses. The meeting, which lasted about two hours, was like a big family gathering, with questioning and answers to the questions raised. He also exhorted

them again and again as follows: We Communists want to make China much better, which is what you hope for as well. We look forward to your going back and conveying this idea to your fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters in Sui[ de] and Mi[zhi], and hope as well that you will study hard and help improve the work in your localities. At the end, delegation members presented a flag with the inscription: "You are our glorious banner."

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, August 15, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 57, which reproduces this version. I. Suide and Mizhl are two neighboring towns in Shaanxi, located northeast of Yan'an. 794

Send One Regiment with Cadres to Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Zhongtiao Mountains (August 17, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: Since there are only enemy and puppet troops and no friendly armies at all in the ten xian in the Zhongtiao mountains, it is quite correct to send one regiment with cadres there to develop guerrilla warfare. If necessary a considerable number more may be sent, as long as it does not reach the point where Wei [Lihuang] 1 would feel threatened. Yan Xishan has a lot of conflicts with Chiang and is trying to come closer to us. Wang Jingguo's2 troops are moving eastward with the goal of occupying territory so as to be able to eat; we should let him occupy some of the territory and avoid friction with him. MaoZedong

Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 659-60, where it is

reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 1. Wei Lihuang was then chief commanding officer of the Guomindang Anny's First War Zone.

2. Wang Jingguo was then commander-in-chief of the Thirteenth Army Group of the Guomindang Anny's Second War Zone. 795

Our Policies Toward the Puppet Troops and Our Views About the Treatment of the Puppet Officers and Soldiers (August 17, 1941)

Chen [Yi] and Liu [Shaoqi]: With regard to your telegram of the 6th on policies toward the puppet troops and treatment of the puppet officers and soldiers, we have the following views: I. The method we should use toward the puppet troops is to apply both virtue and authority. If we do not fight, they cannot be compelled to submit and our army's authority cannot be established. Yet fighting alone is bound to create life and death enmity. Both extreme policies, that of not fighting and that of fighting and nothing else, are disadvantageous to us. 2. Two-faced elements do indeed exist among the puppet troops and are bound to exist. We should acknowledge the position of the two-faced elements and control them so that they do not go over to the enemy's side altogether and oppose us. This understanding is very neccessary. 3. In principle, whether they are officers or soldiers and no matter what social background they come from, no puppet troop captives are to be killed. Even those elements who have a deep hatred for us and come back to fight us again after being released may be spared execution. That is, the method of repeated capturing and releasing is better than killing, and its impact is greater. In releasing captives, there should be absolutely no posting of bail, and they should not be made to vow that they will never be puppet soldiers in the future. But they can be required to swear that they will not really help the Japanese oppose the New Fourth Army in the future. And if they do actually violate their oath and help Japan fight us, then we should still patiently carry out the policy of"seven times capturing Meng Huo." 1

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 661--62, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. This refers to an episode in the classic novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, in

which Zhuge Uang eventually wins over Meng Huo by capturing and releasing him seven times. 796

AUGUST 1941

797

4. More efforts should be made with !he captives from Li Changjiang' s2 troops, and a group of them should be won over to go and break up Li' s internal ranks. Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Tan [Zheng]

Fu [Zhong]

2. Li Changjiang had been a guerrilla commander in the Guomindang Army and surrendered with seven of his columns to Japan on February 13, 1941. They became the first army group of the puppet army.

Statement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning Recent International Events (August 19, 1941)

With regard to the declaration of Roosevelt and Churchill as well as the Moscow Conference that is about to be held, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issues the following statement: The declaration made jointly by U.S. president Roosevelt and British prime minister Churchill on August 14 and their proposal that a meeting of the three countries be held in Moscow are extremely important matters of world-historical significance and have opened a new stage in world history starting now. The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and their proposal for a Moscow meeting indicate the determination on the part of the United States and Great Britain to defeat fascism. This determination is entirely beneficial to the Soviet Union, to Britain and the United States, to China, and to the whole world, for the reason that the gravest danger in the past and at present is a group of pro-fascist reactionaries within these two countries who intend to accept the fascist peace against the will of the people, but the declaration has refused any such kind of a peace. [The danger comes also from those] who advocate watching the fire from the other side of the river and letting the Soviet Union single-handedly take on the heavy burden of fighting the fascists, so that they may eventually take advantage and reap the benefits. But the action on the part of Roosevelt and Churchill to propose holding a meeting in Moscow so that military tasks and supply of war materiel may be specifically allocated strikes a blow at this sort of passive attempt. As long as Britain and the United States acknowledge that "to disarm all aggressor nations is necessary," advocate "the final disintegration of Nazism," and agree to share military tasks and supplies of war materiel, then victory for the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States is ensured, and so is victory for China and the whole world. The reality of what Stalin referred to in his well-known speech of July 3, which is that the Soviet Union abided by the treaty whereas Germany violated it and attacked

This document was first published in Jiefang ribao, August 20, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 21-23. Although the statement does not bear Mao's name, according to Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 321-22, it was based in large part on his remarks at a meeting caJied on August 18 to discuss this issue. 798

AUGUST 194/

799

the Soviet Union, created a long-term political factor. This factor is in actuality the foundation for military victory, which truth has been completely proved in the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and their proposal to hold a meeting in Moscow. The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and their proposal to hold a meeting in Moscow demonstrate in particular that the United States has made up its mind to take part in the sacred fight against fascist aggression. And this determination on the part of the United States indicates that the great battlefront of the whole world against aggression has already been completed politically; it will be completed organizationally at the Moscow meeting. Fascism's aggressive front is now in a state of isolation, and fascism's fate of defeat has already been determined. The present situation could not have happened before the outbreak of the European war in the fall of 1939 because, at the time, although the Soviet Union and the people of the whole world strongly urged the formation of an antifascist front to ensure international security, the Munich policy, which was detrimental to others and themselves, still held sway in Britain and the United States. This erroneous policy was not changed until the cruel lessons of war were learned. In terms of direct factors, this was a result ofthe Soviet people's valiant struggles. Because the Red Army checked the German Army's offensive, Roosevelt and Churchill were able to summon the courage to hold this meeting and issue this declaration. It is also the result of the valiant struggles of the people of Britain and the United States. These struggles dealt a heavy blow to the pro-fascist reactionary elements within Britain and the United States, so that Roosevelt and Churchill dared to resist the temptation of a fascist peace, issued this declaration upholding justice for all humanity, and decided upon this politically far-sighted policy of firmly uniting the three great powers of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It is, in addition, the result of the Chinese people's valiant struggles. China blocked the attack of the fascist Japanese bandit troops, enabling Britain and the United States to summon the courage to call for disarming all aggressive nations. The declaration does not mention Japan by name. Article IV of the declaration hints that trade with and supplying raw materials to Japan is permissible, and Article VII implies that Japanese immigration is allowed, in an attempt to draw in Japanese interested in maintaining the status quo, indicating the aspect of a wish to compromise with Japan. But Article II of the declaration opposes the forced alteration of territorial boundaries; Article III calls forthe restoration of states deprived of rights; and Article VIII in particular acknowledges the necessity of disarming all aggressive nations. All these are in active opposition against Japan. All in all, the people throughout China all welcome the declaration of Britain and the United States and welcome the meeting to be held in Moscow of the three countries, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The Chinese people believe that this is not only the international foundation upon which the peoples of Britain, America, and the Soviet Union shall gain liberation from the fascist threat, but is also the international foundation upon which the people of the whole world shall gain liberation, as well as the international foundation upon which our Chinese people shall

800

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

gain liberation. The task of the Chinese people is to persist in unity and the War of Resistance, overcome the reactionary factors within the anti-Japanese united front attempting to undermine unity and the War of Resistance, and actively organize counterattacks against the Japanese bandits. Within China exists the enemy's fifth column, which are the pro-Japanese and pro-German factions. Going against national interests and the interests of humanity, within the country they advocate suppression of the Communists, which is purely a response to Hitler's call for an "anti-Bolshevik crusade" and clears the way for the Japanese fascists. Just now as the great unity of the whole world against fascism is being established, those in this sort of fifth column seem to be utterly without consciousness as they continue their criminal acts against the Communists, against the people, against the nation, and against the human race, and are bound to incur the contempt of the whole country and the entire world. We believe that as long as the people throughout the country increase their efforts and eliminate the fifth column, then unity can be consolidated, the War of Resistance can be continued, and counterattacks can be carried out. China is qualified to take part in the world antifascist front and become a powerful army therein. The fate of all of China and that of all humanity is tied up with this decisive battle against fascism. All parties and groups in China should take their rightful place in this chance of a lifetime, unite with the people of the whole nation, and strive as one toward the good and the progressive. This is what we Communists hope for most fervently. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

To Chen Zhengren (August 19, 1941)

Comrade Zhengren: Zhu Lizhi 1 has written a report at my request, and it is of considerable value; I wonder whether or not he made a copy for you and Gao Gang. 2 If not, please ask him for a copy, which can serve as a reference when you draft the program for finance and the economy. Before you draft this document, please discuss the matter with Nan Hanchen,3 Gao Zili,4 Ye Jizhuang.~ Zhu Lizhi, and the various people in the grain bureau and the trade bureau. They are the ones doing the actual practical work, so that acquiring accurate materials and opinions from them is the way to make what you draft more accurate. With respectful salutations! MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong .shu.x:in xuanji, pp. 184-85, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. I. Zhu Lizhi was serving at the time as president or the government bank ofthe ShaanxiGansu-Ningxia Border Region. 2. Gao Gang (1905-1954), a native orShaanxi, was then secretary or the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Northwest Bureau. 3. Nan Hanchen (1895-1967), a native or Hongdong in Shanxi, was at the time head or the Finance Department of the Shaanx.i-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government. 4. GaoZili (1900-1950), a native orPingxiang in Jiangxi, was then deputy chairman or the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government and concurrently head of the Construction Department.

5. Ye Jizhuang (1893-1967), a native or Xinxing, Guangdong Province, was then head of and political commissar of the Eighth Route Army's General Rear-services Department. 801

Seeking Suggestions on the Construction of Military Districts from All Strategic Units in North China (August 21, 1941)

To all stations in North China: During the current stage in the War of Resistance, in order to sustain the antiJapanese base areas in the enemy's rear and to prepare for new maneuvers of the main forces, the construction of military districts is more important. Meanwhile, since there are numerous differences in conditions for constructing military districts between the plains and the mountainous areas, for the purpose of discussing the work of the military districts, we are seeking suggestions on the following questions from the headquarters of all strategic units, and we hope you will study them and respond to us by telegram. I. What are the main characteristics distinguishing the regular forces from the local forces? 2. Is it necessary to have some regular forces in certain plains regions where mobile warfare is impossible? What should be done with the regular forces that are already in these regions? 3. How should commanding organs of the military districts and the regular forces be (should there be concurrent posts or not)? 4. What should be the relationship between the establishment and command of the armed forces in the military districts (excluding the regular forces)? 5. Is it necessary in military subdistricts in plains areas to command two kinds of troops (regular forces and armed forces of the military subdistricts)? 6. As for xian and district guerrilla detachments in plains areas, should their military operations be under the command of the military subdistricts or the xian and districts' own Party and administrative organs? 7. With regard to organizing armed forces in the plains, is it better to have large regiments or small regiments? 8. What sorts of characteristics should be present in the political work system of local armed forces? Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 663-64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. 802

AUGUST 1941

803

9. How should organs of political work be organized in local armed forces? 10. What is your opinion on the implementation of a system for recruiting soldiers? Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

To Xie Juezai (August 22, 1941)

Venerable Xie: I am in receipt of your letter of the 21st. What I asked for is what was drafted by the departments of finance and construction, per order of Venerable Lin [Boqu], not any other separate plans. You were right to say that with this year's experience the plans will be more realistic. This year's experience has been very full and actually unprecedented. The most significant experience is that problems were solved through cooperation between public and private (80,000 people cooperating with 1,400,000 others), proving that the policy is correct and that there are solutions. The mistakes and defects in carrying out the policy (with regard to border region currency, to the production, transportation, and trade of salt, to grain, to collection of taxes, and to publicly run industry and commerce) all resulted from lack of experience, and great efforts should be made to correct them in future. The reasons these policies were adopted this year have to do primarily with the two basic characteristics of revolution and war and only secondarily with other characteristics of border regions (such as extensive territory, sparse population, poverty, economic and cultural backwardness, and so on). In speaking, taking action, figuring things out, or making plans, anyone (and this includes Communist Party members) can take as his starting point or methodology nothing other than what he himself has seen and heard, which is to say his own experience. It is therefore very important to pay attention to absorbing new experiences; what one has not seen or heard one cannot even dream about. Having had this year's experience in the border regions, many things will be easier to cope with next year. This year's experience educated 80,000 people, and it educated another I ,400,000 as well (as is shown by the Luxian report); it educated cadres, and it educated leaders too. It is the duty of a leader to be good at summing up experiences. In the border regions there are various highly important matters to work on, such as politics, military affairs, the economy, finances, elimination of traitors, and culture, but if no major sudden changes occur in the present situation as it stands, then economic construction is the one central item among all the rest. When there is enough food, cloth-

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 186-88, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. 804

AUGUST 1941

805

ing, housing, and articles for daily use, then everything is enlivened, everything becomes manageable, and democracy or anything else need not be mentioned as the central work. I have not studied or thought very deeply about these ideas, and raise them only for your reference. Comrade Gao Gang sent me some material that merits attention; please give it back to Comrade Gao when you have finished reading it. I have read the account of Venerable Xu [Teli]'s 1 life and handed it over to the Organization Department. The Central Committee is planning to deal with this problem as a whole, and not simply with Venerable Xu as an individual. Hereby wishing.you all the best! Mao Zedong Wen 2

P.S. Zhou may be admitted into the Party group, to total six people; please raise this with the Central Bureau. The government's Party group is responsible to the Central Bureau and carries out resolutions of the Central Bureau. Its tasks are to be in charge of policy and to sum up experiences; important matters must be cleared with the Central Bureau. I would say that with regard to salt, supervision by the authorities and transportation by the populace involves partial3 forced labor rather than semi-forced labor, which is similar to your idea in speaking of mutual benefit between the public and the private. But the necessity of this partial coercion must be recognized. First, participation during slack seasons is mandatory and not negotiable; second, 60,000 pack animal loads of public salt is mandatory, not only this year but next year as well, and it should be included in next year's budget. Mobilization for spring plowing and autumn harvest also involves partial coercion, but the transportation of salt involves somewhat stronger coercion than spring plowing and autumn harvest, although all this is very different from completely uncompensated military mobilizations such as for transporting grain, or economic mobilizations such as for building roads. But transporting grain and building roads are also necessary, and this too must be recognized. We are only opposed to the sort of mobilization in which money and manpower are wasted and in which there is all harm and no good.

1. Xu Teli was then president of the Institute of Natural Sciences in Yan'an. 2. Zhou Wen was then director of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government's Department of Education. 3. As in a few other texts in this volume, the words in boldface are those emphasized by Mao in his handwritten text by the use of dots under the characters.

Note to "Lu Zhongcai~~ Account of the LongMarchm (August 26, 1941)

This is a report written in clear and simple language by Comrade Gao Kelin 2 which describes what actually happened, and is worthy of emulation by all. The practice of "writing torrents of words, all of which are miles from the mark" must now be wiped out, along with all that "indulging in exaggeration," as well as subjectivism and formalism. Comrade Gao Kelin wrote this report after an investigation meeting one evening with three people. He did a good job in his investigation meeting, and his report is very well written. What we need is this kind of thing, not all those "indulgent exaggerations" that repeat each other endlessly, or all those Party eightlegged essays.3

This comment was first published in Jiefang ribao, September 14, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, p. 58. The same text is reproduced in Mao Zedong ji,

Vol. 8. p. 25. I. According to a note to the Chinese text, this report describes Lu's leading a transportation team carrying salt a long distance to the "Sanbian'' (Yanbian, Jingbian, and Dingbian) area within the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. Lu has not been identified. 2. At this time Gao Kelin was associated with the newly founded Nationalities Institute

in Yan'an. 3. "Eight-legged essays" refers to a stereotyped form in which essays had to be written in the imperial examinations during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Mao (and other May 4th intellectuals) frequently used the term to signify formalistic jargon in general. Dang bagu, which we have here translated literally as "Pany eight-legged essays." is also frequently rendered as "stereotyped Pany writing" or "Party formalism." 806

Cooperate with the Guomindang Army in the Conduct of Operations, and Strive to Improve the Current Situation (September 9, 1941)

To Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], and Luo [Ruiqing]; Chen [Yi] and Liu [Shaoqi]; and Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]: The enemy is attacking northern Hunan and also attacking Zheng [zhou] and Luo [yang]. The Guomindang is gathering its forces to resist the enemy, and all of our forces in the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army should launch every possible attack on the important communication lines so as to cooperate with the Guomindang in its campaign. Meanwhile, all offensive operations against the various Guomindang troops in the enemy's rear should be halted, and defensive measures adopted only when they attack us. At the same time every unit of the Guomindang troops should be issued notification asking for coordinated action against the enemy. The aim of all guidelines mentioned above is to try and improve the current situation. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedongjunshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 665-66, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives. 807

Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism (September 10, 1941) 1

In the past our Party was dominated for a very long time by subjectivism. Both the [Li] Lisan line and the "Left" opportunism in the latter period of the soviet movement were subjectivist. The manifestations of subjectivism in the latter period of the soviet movement were more serious, their form was more complete, they were dominant for a longer time, and their consequences were more tragic. This is because these subjectivists claimed to represent the "international line"; they took on the outward appearance of Marxists, but they were sham Marxists. In the latter period of the soviet movement, the spirit of the Fifth Plenum 2 advocated carrying out a socialist revolution, denied the imbalance in the development of the revolution, and held that the struggle at the time was a decisive battle between two roads. All these things were manifested more completely in the political domain than the "leftist" tendency of the Lisan line. In military affairs, the Lisan line did not influence the soviet area completely, but "leftist" opportunism in the latter period of the soviet movement did achieve complete influence over the soviet area, and caused the Red Army to suffer greater losses. As regards organization, the latter period of the soviet movement attacked the cadres, disrupted the campaign for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and so on; it was more terrible than the Lisan line. The subjectivists proposed tasks incompatible with objective circumstances. For example, they demanded the expansion of the Red Army to a million men, attacks on the central cities, and so on. Hitherto, the Party's line for the period of more than three years from 1932 to December 1935 has never been summed up. Now we must prepare to summarize it at the Party's Seventh Congress. The resolution by the Central Bureau of the soviet area on May II, I932, was a totally subjectivist thing.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 372-77. I. This is Mao's address at the opening session of the Enlarged Plenum of the Politburo, which took place from September 10 to October 22, 1941.

2. The reference is to the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, held in January 1934. 808

SEPTEMBER 194/

809

In 1933 an article opposing the "Right opportunism" of Deng, Mao, Xie, and Gu was actually a case of making oblique accusations. 3 At that time it was considered that the "Luo Ming line" was to be found in Fujian and Jiangxi, in Jianning, Lichuan, and Taining;4 the entire Central Soviet Area was imagined to be the domain of the "Luo Ming line." This programmatic article directed against the "Luo Ming line" held that the principal errors of the "Luo Ming line" in Jiangxi were: (I) eliminating the anti-imperialist movement, (2) giving up the soviet area, (3) the rich peasant line, and (4) bureaucratism. The Zunyi Conference actually changed the political line. After the Zunyi Conference, the previous line could no longer be applied in the political, military, and organizational arenas, but the residual poison of subjectivism continued to exist in the realm of thought. The Sixth Plenum' waged a struggle against subjectivism, yet subjectivism still exists among some of our comrades and mainly manifests itself in every kind of work in Yan'an. Subjectivism and dogmatism still exist in the schools and among cultural workers in Yan'an. This kind of subjectivism stands in an antagonistic relationship to the Marxism of seeking truth from facts. Its sources are: I. Chinese tradition, "leftist" tradition. 2. Foreign tradition, and the past influence of the Communist International, as represented by people such as Bukharin, Zinoviev, and so on. 3. China is a country where science is not highly developed and where there exists a large and extensive petty bourgeoisie. At present in Yan 'an there is subjectivism in the style of study and sectarianism in the Party style. The methods for overcoming these incorrect styles are: I. To understand the seriousness of subjectivism. Yan 'an is situated in a peace-

ful environment in the rear area, and the manifestation of subjectivism is serious, but subjectivism exists throughout the country as well. 2. To distinguish creative Marxism from dogmatic Marxism. 3. To propagate creative Marxism. 4. We oppose subjectivism in order to raise the level of theory, not to diminish Marxism. We must Marxify 6 the rich reality of the Chinese revolution. 3. Deng is Deng Xiaoping; Mao is Mao Zedong·s brother, Mao Zetan ( 1905-1935); Xie is Xie Weijun (1908-1935); Gu is Gu Bo (1906-1935). Mao's statement about "oblique accusations" (using the Chinese expression "to point at the chicken and abuse the dog") refers to the fact that these attacks were in reality directed against him. 4. Regarding the "Luo Ming Line" see the Introduction to Volume IV, pp. lxi-lxiii.

Jianning and Taining in Fujian, and Lichuan in Jiangxi were xian controlled by the Chinese Communist Party in 1933. 5. This refers to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, held from September 29 to November 6, 1938.

6. The Chinese tennis Makesizhuyihua. Thus Mao establishes a grammatical as well as a logical parallelism between the "sinification of Marxism," and the "Marxification of Chinese reality."

8/0

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

5. For those whose theory is detached from reality, we propose that their status as "theoreticians" be abolished. Only those who study actual problems from a Marxist viewpoint, and can solve actual problems, can be regarded as real theorists. Stalin said thattheory detached from reality is hollow theory. 7 I considerthat hollow theory is utterly absurd theory. More should be paid for those articles which study actual problems. Only those teachers who can sinify Marxism are good teachers, and they must be paid more. 6. There is sectarianism now, too. In Yan'an only leading cadres are respected, and many scientists and men of letters are looked down upon. Sectarianism is a style which rejects non-Party cadres, it is exclusivism. At the same time, it also rejects insiders. Phenomena such as asserting one's independence, failure to obey decisions, and lack of discipline must be rectified. The line is the "kingly way" [wangdao]; discipline is the "way of the tyrant" [badao]. Both are indispensable.s In the past, a responsible person in the health department violated the policy toward the experts, [engaging in] selfish departmentalism, and violated Communist morality, so he was removed from his post. 7. It is necessary to wage a principled fight against sectarianism and selfish departmentalism. We must carry out a struggle on two lines, opposing subjectivism and sectarianism, and also opposing dogmatism and routinism. 8. The newspapers should publish more articles, reward dialectical materialist articles, oppose subjectivist articles. 9. Carry out a reform of the educational system, and thoroughly smash all the norms of the past. The study of the methods of thought of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the study of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will constitute the heart of our studies, and we should read more antisubjectivist writings. Organize study groups on methods of thought, beginning with the comrades from the Politburo. The fundamental professional concerns of the Politburo include thought, politics, policy, military affairs, and organization. In politics we must pay attention to the trend in the current situation. Central Committee members must increase their political knowledge. Military affairs are a task that must be studied during the present wartime period. To master ideological education is our foremost task. 10. The method of analysis should be used to solve problems. This is the scientific method put forward by the bourgeoisie in the past, but we must also carry out

7. The reference is probably to Stalin's statement, in Part III of Foundations of Leninism, that "theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice." 8. In other words, Mao, like many Chinese rulers, espoused both Confucianism and Legalism.

SEPTEMBER 194/

811

synthesis. We must use the method of analysis and synthesis, choose a topic from among our work as a whole, analyze, and then synthesize. 1!. Study the Central Committee resolutions from the Sixth to the Seventh Congress. The Central Committee Study Group will study Marxist methods of thought on the one hand, and on the other hand, the resolutions since the Sixth Congress. Mao Zedong will be the group leader, and Wang Jiaxiang will be the deputy group leader. 12. The work of the education committee (headed by Luo Fu9) will begin by carrying out an investigation before undertaking reform. 13. Hold a mass meeting to mobilize people in Yan'an. All the comrades of the Politburo of the Central Committee must go into action, everybody should get up on the platform and speak, gathering all our forces to oppose subjectivism and

sectarianism. 14. Down with these two isms, but keep the person. Oppose subjectivism and sectarianism, but keep those cadres who have made such mistakes safe and sound. 15. Telegraph [Liu] Shaoqi and [Zhou] Enlai and ask for their opinions. 16. Carry out a mobilization campaign in the whole Party. Apart from the Decision on Strengthening the Party Spirit and the Decision on Investigation and Study, 10 we should also write some articles.

9. Luo Fu was the pen name of Zhang Wentian, who was at this time the secretary of the Central Committee and the head of the Propaganda Department. 10. The first of these resolutions was adopted on July I, 1941, and the second on August I, 1941. Both were drafted by Mao and are translated above.

Concerning Investigations in the Countryside (September 13, 1941)

I. The Situation Is Understood Gradually, and This Requires Continuous and Uninterrupted Effort It is certainly no easy matter to understand the world. Marx and Engels worked hard all their lives and did a large amount of investigative work before they completed the theory of scientific communism. Likewise, Lenin and Stalin did a lot of investigation as well. Investigation and study are necessary in the Chinese revolution too, first of all to understand what is China (its past, present, and future). Unfortunately, many comrades are often subjective and opinionated, totally disregarding the work of investigation and study. We have faith in science and do not believe in theology. Therefore our investigation work should be oriented toward the lower levels and does not consist of abstract illusions. At the same time, we believe that things are in motion, in change, in progress. For this reason, our investigations are also long term. Today we need investigation, and in the future our sons and grandsons too will have to make investigations before they will be able to come to know new things and acquire new knowledge continuously. Our investigation work should be done with patience and in a planned way step by step, not hastily. As it was, it took me quite a few years of effort to understand the countryside myself. I recall that it was not until 1920 when I first read Kautsky's Class Struggle, Chen Wangdao's translation of The Communist Manifesto, and History of Socialism written by an Englishman, 1 that I came to know that class struggle has existed since the beginning of human history and that class struggle is the driving force for

This is the text of a talk by Mao to a group in Yan'an for investigating the lives of women. organized jointly by. the Women's Committee and the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee. It was first published as a pamphlet in December 1978. Our source is Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji. pp. 21-27. It is also reproduced in Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 59-66. 1. The reference is to History ofSocialism, Thomas Kirkupp (1844-1912), translated into Chinese by Li Ji and published in October 1920 by the New Youth Publishing Company. 812

SEPTEMBER 1941

813

the development of society, and that I took the first steps in acquiring a method of understanding things. But China's Hunan and Hubei, or China's Chiang Kaishek and Chen Duxiu, were not to be found in these books. I took from them only two words: "class struggle," and then staned to study in earnest the actual class struggle. I worked in the peasant movement for four months and carne to know some things about the conditions of the various classes. But this son of understanding is extremely shallow, not at all thoroughgoing. Later the Central Committee put me in charge of the peasant movement. I made a resolution, and I went around for a month and two days holding investigations in the fivexian ofChangsha, Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, and Liling. These five xian were just the places where the peasant movement was on the upsurge at the time, and many peasants had joined peasants' associations. The Guornindang cursed us as being "excessive" and "acting like vagrants" and cursed the peasants for "going to excess" in sullying the beds of the young misses in landlords' families by rolling around in them. Actually, according to what I gleaned from my investigations, not all cases were those of "excess" as they described; what happened was instead inevitable, necessary, because the peasants were too miserable. In my view, it is unavoidable that the peasants, who have suffered thousands of years of oppression, would go a bit ''too far" once they had stood up, so they might just as well roll around a few more times in the young ladies' beds! At the time, however, I still did not have a very clear understanding of the class structure in the countryside. It was not until after I got to the Jinggangshan and carried out investigations in Xunwu that my thinking on the problem of rich peasants and landlords became clear, and I proposed a solution to the problem of the rich peasants, which involved not only drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce but also drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, so that rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and farm laborers would all be able to subsist. If the landlords had been given no land at all, they would have had nothing to eat, and then if the rich peasants had been given only some poor land, they would have had a hard time feeding themselves, so that the rich peasants would have been forced to rebel and the poor peasants and farm laborers would have been plunged into isolation. At the time, some people cursed me as someone with a rich peasants' line, but, as I see it, this method of mine was the only correct one for that period. Today, of course, we are in the national united front against Japan, so it is not a time to deprive the landlords and rich peasants of their property rights but, rather, to reduce rents and reduce interest. Otherwise we would not be able to unite with them to resist Japan. My thinking on the problem of the poor peasants and farm laborers became clear only after I had made investigations in Xingguo. Only then was I able to recognize the irnponance of the poor peasants' leagues in the land redistribution process. As far as my own investigation of the countryside is concerned. then. it took six or seven years' time. Now that you have the benefit of other comrades' past

814

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

experience, you can take the straight road and complete within a few months the work of six or seven years. The task of our comrades today is to find things out and to make efforts in an earnest and down-to-earth manner. As long as you are not sleeping all day, working just six hours a day you will be able to accomplish a lot. But it requires continuous, ceaseless effort. II. Methods I. The unity of opposites and class struggle are our two starting points when we do anything. When we are looking at any given thing, all we are able to observe initially is the rough outline of the thing, and we can form only a general concept. This is exactly like someone who has just arrived in Yan'an, whose knowledge of Yan'an in the beginning is general and sweeping. But after he has visited the AntiJapanese University and our Women's University as well as the other institutions and schools in Yan'an, he will take the second step, which is to use the analytical method to study and analyze carefully, in an orderly fashion, the various parts of Yan'an. Then the third step would be to apply the method of synthesis, synthesizing the analysis of each individual part so as to obtain an overall view of Yan'an. At this point his understanding of Yan'an is different from what he knew when he first arrived. What he saw at first was the whole ofYan'an, and what he sees now is the whole of Yan 'an as well, but his understanding is different from what it was in the beginning. Now he has scientific understanding and concrete knowledge of Yan'an. Observing an area in the countryside is just like this. Marx used this sort of method in writing his Capital, first analyzing the various components of capitalist society and then synthesizing them, thereby discovering the laws governing the capitalist movement. What deserves attention here in particular is analysis. What should be done is analysis together with synthesis, and, even in the second step of analysis, there is some degree of synthesis. The ancients said that the way of composing essays involves both opening up and closing down. This is correct. In studying history, Su Dongpo used the method of "facing the enemy on eight sides," and he used the same method to study the Song dynasty, which is also correct. In our study of Chinese society today, we should also apply a method of "facing the enemy on four sides," dividing our studies into four parts-political, economic, cultural, and military-arriving at a conclusion on the Chinese revolution. If we observe things in the way one looks at flowers while riding on horseback, dabbling in a little of everything, that would only be a waste of time, and nothing would ever be accomplished. Therefore we must be sure to grasp the [right] points of view in this regard, and these points of view are the unity of opposites and class struggle. The methods of analysis and synthesis I just described, for example, make use of these points of view. If you comrades make use of these viewpoints to analyze the countryside, you can find out what classes exist in the countryside, what their main features are,

SEPTEMBER /94/

815

and how they are related to one another. One of the questions the comrades have raised for me is, What is a rich peasant? To my mind, a landlord mainly collects rent; a rich peasant mainly hires laborers and participates in the labor himself; a middle peasant's main characteristic is that he does not sell his own labor power and tills his own land; a poor peasant has to sell his labor power, as what he gets from his own land is not enough to live on; a farm laborer has no land and lives wholly by selling his labor. Of course, only major features are discussed here. Only by analyzing the various classes and strata in the countryside and their living conditions in this way can there be a correct and comprehensive understanding of the countryside. We should employ a method of close and intensive study to analyze objective reality and to analyze classes. We must not tum a blind eye to actual problems, and "big talk companies" should be brought down. One should use one's own head to think things over deeply, and one should combine theory and practice. In I 905, Lenin advocated overthrowing the tsarist government and organizing a government of workers and peasants in Russia, but Trotsky believed that it was possible only to organize a workers' government. This is because Trotsky did not truly combine theory with practice. We should draw from practice laws that govern the movement of matter and formulate new theories. For example, the protracted and lasting nature of China's War of Resistance is the law governing it. When you comrades go down to the villages to make investigations today, these are the viewpoints and methods that should guide your practice; on the other hand, your own theories should be continually perfected through practice. 2. Assimilate the material in detail, and grasp the essentials. The more material collected the better, but one must be sure to grasp the essentials, or the specific characteristics (the principal aspect of a contradiction). Marx in studying capitalism and Lenin in studying imperialism both gathered a lot of data and material, but they did not incorporate all of it; they incorporated only the portion that best manifested the special characteristics. Without investigation, there is no right to speak. But some comrades might ask, "Do I have the right to speak if I have investigated nine out of ten given matters, and there is only one that I have not investigated?'' I am of the opinion that if the nine matters you have investigated are all of secondary importance, and you have left out the main thing, then you still have no right to speak. The main contradiction in China today is the national contradiction, and class contradiction has become secondary. Before the Xi'an Incident, the principal contradiction was that between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but since the Xi'an Incident the main contradiction has been the one between China and Japan. Therefore, no matter what problems we solve today, we should take this principal contradiction as the starting point in understanding and solving the problem. Whoever fails to grasp the principal contradiction and instead goes in for the study of trivial things and minor details is like one who cannot see the forest for the trees and still has no right to speak.

816 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Therefore, when we do the work of synthesis we must not fall into narrow empiricism.

III. Answers to a Few Questions You comrades have raised many questions, and I can answer only a portion of them. Some of the questions, in fact, cannot be answered, because if they were all answered there would be no need for the comrades to go to the countryside. And it is necessary to go to the countryside oneself and make investigations before these many problems can be understood; depending upon varying specific targets and conditions, too, the solutions differ as well. How is an investigation meeting held? Such a meeting not only raises questions, but must also provide ways of solving problems. It is best to have three to five people take part in an investigation meeting. During my investigations in Xingguo, I learned that the landlords owned 40 percent of the land, the rich peasants owned 30 percent, and the landlords and rich peasants shared ownership of another 10 percent in temple lands. 2 1n total, the landlords and rich peasants owned 80 percent of all the land, and the middle peasants and poor peasants only 20 percent. But the landlords made up only I percent of the population and the rich peasants 5 percent, whereas the middle peasants and poor peasants comprised 80 percent of the population. So, on the one hand, 6 percent of the population owned 80 percent of the land, and, on the other hand, 80 percent of the population owned only 20 percent of the land. Therefore there is only one word for the conclusion I drew: revolution. My confidence in the revolution was thereby strengthened as well, trusting that this revolution could win the support and assistance of more than 80 percent of the people. How are typical subjects for investigation found? Typical subjects for an investigation can be divided into three categories: the advanced, the intennediate, and the backward. If two or three examples from each of these categories can be investigated, then the general conditions can be ascertained. How are materials gathered and organized? All of this must be done firsthand. In the process of doing the work, one accumulates experience, and such experiences may be used as necessary to improve the subsequent work of investigation

and organizing materials. How does one get the truth from one's subjects? Everyone has different characteristics, so the methods used vary in each case as well. But the main point is to make friends with the masses, not to spy on them and make them detest you. When the masses fail to tell the truth it is because they do not know whether your

2. The term used here is gong tang tudi, which refers to land belonging to various sorts of ancestral temples and religious societies, controlled primarily by landlords and rich peasants.

SEPTEMBER 1941

817

intentions in coming to them are advantageous or not. In the course of conversing with them and making friends with them, they should be given some time to get to know you so that they can gradually come to understand your true intentions and regard you as their good friends. Only this way can you learn the real situation. If the masses do not tell the truth, the masses are not to blame, one has only oneself to blame. When I was doing the investigations in Xingguo, I invited a few peasants to come over and talk with me. At first they were very suspicious of and apprehensive about me, not knowing what in the world I was going to do with them. So on the first day all we did was engage in a bit of chitchat about daily life. They didn't crack the slightest smile and spoke very little. Then I treated them to a meal and gave them large warm quilts to sleep under at night. In this way they started to understand my true intentions, gradually began to smile a little and to have somewhat more to say. In the end we became virtually without any restraints, everyone engaging in enthusiastic discussion, talking about everything under the sun, as warm and as close as members of one's own family. There is no need to go into the rest of the questions; it is better to have you go out as soon as possible to do your own investigations.

Telegram of Condolence from the Councilors in Yan 'an on the Death of Zhang Jiluan 1 (September 1941)

(Special to this paper) People of all circles in Chongqing are to hold a memorial meeting on the 26th of this month for People's Political Council member and former editor-in-chief of Dagong bao, the respected Mr. Zhang Jiluan. Mao Zedong and four other councilors in Yan'an from our Party have specially sent a telegram of condolence, which reads as follows: To the Memorial Meeting for Mr. Zhang Jiluan: At every session of the Political Council, Mr. Jiluan insisted on unity and the War

of Resistance, thus rendering meritorious service to the nation. We are shocked to learn of his death and feel deeply grieved. We solemnly send this telegram of

condolence to express our sincere sorrow. MaoZedong Wu Yuzhang

Chen Shaoyu Lin Zuhan

Qin Bangxian

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, September 22, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, p. 27, where this version is reproduced. I. Zhang Jiluan (1888-1941), a native of Shaanxi, had been a member of the Tongmenghui. In 1926, he became editor of the Dagong bao. and continued in that capacity until forced to retire by his last illness. 818

Decision of the Central Committee Regarding High-Level Study Groups (September 26, 1941)

I. In order to raise the theoretical and political levels of high-level cadres in the Party, the Central Committee has decided to establish high-level study groups. The study groups shall be composed of members of the Central Committee, the various central bureaus and their subbureaus, and members of the district Party committees or provincial committees; the leading cadres of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; certain staff members of the various high-level organs; and certain teachers from the various higher-level schools. For the whole country, the number of participants is limited to 300, with one-third from Yan'an and twothirds from outside. 2. The method used shall be the unity of theory and practice. The first term will last half a year, which will be devoted to the study of the modes of thinking of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and the twenty-year history of our Party as the two topics. Subsequently, other questions with regard to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and China's revolution will be studied, for the purpose of overcoming erroneous thinking (subjectivism and formalism) and developing revolutionary theory. 3. In Yan'an and other important outside locations, high-level study groups shall be established, in the military up to the level of divisions, military districts, or columns, and in the localities up to district Party committees or provincial committees. Each high-level study group shall have a group leader, a deputy group leader, and a study secretary. Under the study groups a number of small study groups shall be established, with a small study group leader in charge. The highlevel study groups in Yan'an as well as all locations shall be managed and directed by the Central Study Group (to include members of the Central Committee, with Mao Zedong as group leader and Wang Jiaxiang as deputy group leader), which shall assign materials as scheduled, sum up experiences, and answer questions. 4. This study shall proceed under the condition that the major tasks for which the respective comrades are responsible are not hindered. Central Secretariat Our source for this text is Mao Zedongji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 61~2. where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979. Although this document does not bear Mao's name, the text is quoted at some length in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 329, where it is indicated that Mao revised it. 819

To the Central Research Group and the High-Level Research Groups 1 (September29, 1941)

To all comrades ofthe Central Research Group and the high-level research groups: The overall guideline for the research work of this group has as its objective the combining of theory and practice. With regard to the materials concerning practice, the comrades should please read the documents issued since the Sixth Congress (see separate listing). 2 As for theory, emphasis for the moment is to be laid on the study of methods of thinking. All comrades should please read the following materials first: I. Left-wing Infantilism' (use the edition published in 1939 by Jiefangshe); 2. Chapter VIII of Ai [Siqi]'s translation of the Outline of the New Philosophy, "The Process of Cognition" (i.e., Chapter 4 of Selected Philosophical Writings);4 3. Chapter VI ofLi [Da]'s translation of A Course in Dialectical Materialism, "Materialist Dialectics and Formal Logic"; 5

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 189-90, where it is printed from the manuscript. 1. "Research group" (yanjiu zu) was an alternate name for what are referred to above, in the document dated September 26, as "study groups" (xuexi ZJJ).

2. This refers to the collection of documents that were formally published for innerParty use in December 1941 under the title Liuda yilai (Since the Sixth Congress). On the preparation of this volume, see Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, p. 276. 3. The reference is to Lenin's Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. 4. Mao had read this chapter in 1939 in the second of the two sources cited here, but had liuJe to say about it in his reading notes on philosophy. 5. Mao had read the Course in Dialectical Materialism, by M. Shirokov and others, translated by Li Da, in 1937, and taken copious notes, though his comments on Chapter VI are limited to a few question marks. For a complete translation of these materials and a discussion of the issues they raise, see Volume VI of this edition. 820

SEPTEMBER 1941

82/

4. "Introduction" to An Outline of Economics, by Kawakami 6 (mimeographed copies have been distributed). Central Research Group Group leader Deputy leader

MaoZedong Wang Jiaxiang7

6. Kawakami Hajime ( 1879-1946) was a Japanese Marxist economist. 7. Here Wang's name is signed with the alternate character he sometimes used, as Wang Jiaqiang.

Build as Many Bomb Factories as Possible (October 23, 1941)

To Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan[, Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen] and Tang [Yanjie], 1 Chen [Yi], Liu [Shaoqi], and Lai [Chuanzhu], and Lti [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zihua]: 2 I. The Military Commission intends to call on all base areas in the enemy's rear to build as many bomb factories as possible as the major weapon for arming the popular masses in the enemy's rear. Please inform us by telegram of the experiences where you are in setting up bomb factories, the significance thereof, and the role played, for our reference. 2. Please inform the Military Commission in detail, by telegram within a day or two, of the recent situation in manufacturing hand grenades where you are, the average monthly output, the respective proportions distributed for use by the regular forces, the guerrilla forces, and the militia forces, as well as the number oftools currently on hand, the number of workers, and so on. Mao [Zedong]

Zhu [De]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Ye [Jianying]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 667-68, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. I. Tang Yanjie (1909-1988), a native of Changsha, studied in the Soviet Union. He was at this time commander of the Eighth Route Army for the Shanxi·Chahar-Hebei

Military Region. 2. Cheng Zihua (1905-1991) was a native of Shanxi. At this time he was politica1 commissar of the central Hcbei Military District. 822

At the Eastern Anti-Fascist Congress, Comrade Mao Zedong Calls Upon All the Nationalities to Strengthen Their Unity (October 30, 1941)

(Special to this paper) The central agenda of the fourth and fifth days of the Congress of the Nationalities Against Fascism was to have all the representatives continue to give presentations and analyses of their nationalities. At the meeting on the 29th, there were reports by

the Vietnamese representative, Huang Zhenguang; the Tibetan representative, Sang Yuexi; the Taiwanese representative, Cai Qian; the Mongolian representative, Ulanfu; the Muslim representative, Ma Ying; the representative of the northeast. Yu Bingran; and the representative of the Dutch East Indies, Aliahan. The 30th was the last day for special reports. After congratulatory telegrams from various quarters had been read aloud, first a representative from the Overseas Chinese Association gave a report. He explained in concrete terms the distribution of overseas Chinese in East Asia, their economic status, and their great contributions to labor and productivity. "They took risks to leave their motherland, bravely wandering a11 over to struggle ceaselessly for their own livelihoods and for the glory of their motherland. At the present time, when the world has been assaulted by violent waves of fascism, the overseas Chinese will form antifascist fighting fortresses all over!" At the end he confirmed this conclusion with concrete facts and evidence. The representative from Thailand, Ma Na, was the second person to speak: "Thailand is right now under the gun of Japanese aggression. At this point the trickster Japan has completely forsaken its false friendship of days gone by. The false friend of the past is in truth today's sworn enemy." When he spoke about the current situation in Thailand, he unmasked the conspiracies that Japan has perpetrated. For example: "buying bureaucrats, sowing dissention between the government and the people, fomenting emotional discord between the Thais and the overseas Chinese, creating an antagonistic atmosphere between the Thais and the foreign nationaJs of Britain and America, inducing Thai students to study in Japan, instigating Thailand to attack Vietnam, and so on and so forth." At the end he stated to the gathering the wishes of the Thai people: "Internally, to unite all smaJier nationaJities and all classes within the country against Japan, and to ally with foreign nationals living in Thailand, especially the overseas Chinese, to fonn a united front against fascism. Externally, to ally with all Eastern nations to tight as one, join the world front against fascism, and support the Soviet Union." Following this were reports by the representative of the Miao nationality, Shawajiegai, and by the representative of the Yi nationality, Mohan. Veteran worker Zhu Baoting conveyed greetings to the meeting on behalf of his employees' union. He pointed out that the way for the Japanese workers and farmers is to join us in overthrowing fascism!

This article was first published in Jiefang ribao, October 31, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedongji, Vol. 8, pp. 29-31, which reproduces this version. 823

824

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

He went on to speak of older workers in the Soviet Union who are now giving up their pensions and working with fervor on their days off, British workers who are stepping up their production of tanks, American workers who are intensifying their national defense

production, and the Chinese workers who are also working without stop despite all hardships. "I advocate the establishment of an antifascist alliance of workers, an antifascist alliance ofpea'iants, of merchants, of students ... " Comrade Zhu Baoting's talk, which was akin to storytelling, several times aroused hearty laughter from the entire audience. During a break, Comrade Mao Zedong arrived suddenly, having braved a drizzling rain, at which point the whole audience broke out in jubilation. He was full of vitality, glowing with health and radiating vigor. After asking the news reporters a few questions, he strode forcefully to the podium and addressed the crowd: This conference must certainly be going very well, and today's reports and discussions are certain to have contributed a great deal. That all nationalities are able to unite and rise up in unison to deal with Japanese imperialism is a very good thing. I think that the main goal of the congress is unity; to promote unity among all nations to overthrow fascism together. Japan and Hitler have been able to act as contemptible wretches making trouble and to run rampant for a time precisely because they seized upon our weakness, which is disunity. This weakness has been present in China, in East Asia, and all over the world.

At this point, after providing a deep explanation of past history, he went on to point out Now, precisely because China is united, it is able to wage a war of resistance. But this unity is still sorely inadequate, as there are some people who, on the surface, appear to be fighting Japan but are sabotaging the unity behind the scenes. There is another sort of person who is fighting the War of Resistance, on the one hand, but creating friction, on the other. These two kinds of people are different. The former are Chinese traitors, and the latter are those who fail to understand the overall train of events. Yan'an is a place where unity is particularly emphasized. Here there is a mosque, a Society for the Promotion of Mongolian Culture, a Nationalities Institute ... Here a congress of the nationalities against fascism can be held.

He then went on to expound upon the situation in the future: There is an even bigger battle to fight in the future. The fascists have tremendous ambition; they still have more strength, and they will go in for more frenzied aggression. Hitler is striking wildly all over the place in the face of the solidarity among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Difficulties exist, naturally, in the midst of war. Therefore, there will be a period of difficulty in the struggle against fascism. Everyone should be clear on this point. At present we face only 50 or 60 percent difficulties; 100 percent difficulties are yet to come. This meeting is of great significance. Moscow and the Far East are both holding meetings. This meeting of ours is also for the purpose of overcoming difficulties,

OCTOBER /941

825

and the fascists are taking advantage of these difficulties. In my view, the more territory the fascists occupy, the greater the danger [for them]. It is like with Napoleon, or the Macedonian Emperor Alexander, or Mongolia ... And now as long as we are united, it will not be hard to tear the fascists limb from limb. Japan is about to make incursions northward and southward; it will happen one way or another. At present we have three united fronts. One is China's Anti-Japanese National United Front. Another is the Eastern ABCD front. The third one is the allied actions of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In the face of these three united fronts, fascism will certainly be defeated. We need to acquaint ourselves with the circumstances and to overcome difficulties. We need not be afraid, rather we must have confidence. The revolutionary people are vital; historically they have life force. Fascism will die. The struggle of the popular masses must necessarily undergo difficulties before it can lead to victory. At the end he told all those assembled: Fascism is on its last legs, and we, the people, are in the prime of youth. Today, what is needed in the fight against fascism the world over is practical work, study of the problems, intensified study.... Even growing a bit more millet is a good thing. We should not indulge ourselves in exaggerations. Fascism has no soul, but we have souls. If we join hands tightly, unite together, love and help each other, then we will squeeze the fascists to their very death. I congratulate the congress for its success, for stressing equality, for emphasizing love and unity. After a quarter of an hour, Comrade Mao Zedong ended his speech, surrounded by the audience, which rose and cheered. Finally, the Jewish representative, Miss Yehua Sommergland, spoke as follows: "The 20 million Jewish people all over the world have recognized that Hitler is the deadly enemy of the Jewish people. We want to fight with determination to exterminate this plague upon the human race!"

In Refutation of the Third "Left" Line (Selected Extracts)I (1941)

According to what has always been our way of thinking, that which is called an estimation of a situation is the internal association with regard to objective circumstances that is reflected in our brain after investigation and study have been applied to actual situations that exist objectively. Such internal connections exist independently outside the subjectivity of human beings, and we can neither recognize nor deny them at will. Whether they are of benefit to us or harmful to us, or whether they can mobilize the masses or not, we have no choice but to investigate them, consider them, and pay attention to them. If we wish to go further and change objective circumstances, then we can set guidelines for action according to this kind of estimation that accurately reflects the internal association with regard to objective circumstances and, in turn, influence the objective situation and transform it. At this time, if objective circumstances are favorable to our going forward, we will say to the masses, "Go forward!" If they are unfavorable to our advance,

These extracts are taken from a long article written by Mao in 1941, probably in October or November. Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji. Vol. 2, pp. 339-48. I. This text appears between two May 1941 texts in MaoZedong wenji, but according to Nianpu Mao wrote the long article from which these passages have been excerpted sometime after the Enlarged Plenum of the Politburo, which met from September 10 to October 22, 1941. This inconsistency is perplexing, but the clear and detailed statement in Nianpu must be regarded as more authoritative. As can be seen from Mao's address to the September 10 meeting of the Politburo, translated above, one of the main topics of discussion was the ''Third Left Line," which had prevailed in the Chinese Communist Party from Septem· ber 1931to January 1935. Mao drafted the resolution on this subject adopted by the plenum. He then proceeded to compose a nine-part article on the same topic, of which this is the most complete text available. The complete article was not published or even circulated within the Party at the time it was written. In a note to a revised version, which he prepared in May 1965, Mao indicated that in 1941 in Yan'an, he had sent it only to Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi, and had not even shown it to other members of the Central Committee. The reason for this, he added, ''was probably that this article was couched in excessively sharp terms and was not conducive to uniting with comrades who had committed mistakes." (Sec Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 349-51.) 826

OCTOBER 194/

827

we will say to the masses, "Call a temporary halt." (This is close to "attentisme"), or we will say, "You should retreat (which smacks very much of "opportunism")! To my way of thinking, this can be called Marxism's minimum point of view!

II It must be understood that in all areas where the Japanese and the Guomindang have consolidated their rule (and such areas constitute more than nine-tenths of all regions in the country), the form of bloody armed struggle absolutely cannot be adopted; rather, only a form of bloodless, peaceful struggle can be employed. Peaceful struggle, in turn, falls into two categories. One kind is lawful and open struggle, and the other is unlawful and secret struggle, but both take the form of bloodless, nonviolent, unarmed struggle. Unifying these two is the strategic line for areas under enemy rule. It is necessary to adopt lawful and open forms of struggle in all regions where the Japanese and the Guomindang have consolidated rule. Even though China is not a democratic country ruled by law, the people have no political freedom, and oppression of the people is especially severe in the regions under Japanese rule, there are still many aspects of governmental law and social customs that can be made use of, and there are many contradictions, gaps, and loopholes that we can take advantage of. It is necessary to adopt all sorts of legal forms of struggle that can be carried out openly in order to have people participate, to avoid, on the whole, arrest and dispersal by the government, and to preserve and build up our own strength. The Provisional Central [Politburo], 2 on the other hand, strenuously opposes such forms of struggle. There are many kinds of struggle that are originally unlawful, but have the possibility of victory only if carried out through the use of open and lawful means. Take the labor strike, for example, which is unlawful. If we want to achieve victory and avoid failure, then we must make use of various sorts of economic, political, and social conditions of the time and place, and if it is possible to strike we proceed, abandon the strike if not, and call a halt to it if we strike and fail to win victory. Only by doing things in a rational and reasonable way and carrying out the principles of legitimacy, gain, and moderation can we survive and be victorious. Ignoring all such realities, however, the Provisional Central [Politburo] just went ahead and gave orders to "use all forces to organize anti-Japanese strikes." Take resistance to Japan as another example. It is against the law, but certain work still can be carried out by making use of public opinion in society and all kinds of political spaces or gaps. Yet all the Provisional Central [Politburo] did was make a lot of loud noise and lash out at random, with the result

2. Refers to the Provisional Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, established in September 1931 at the suggestion of the Comintem's Far Eastern Bureau.

828

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

that no even slightly broad or somewhat lasting anti-Japanese movement could ever get off the ground. In addition to work that is open, there must be secret work to coordinate with it. This is our Party's secret organizational work, the secret organizational work of the masses (serving as the core of the open mass organizations), the secret joint activities between political parties and groups, secret intelligence work, preparations done in secret beforehand for open organizations and open struggles, and so on. Without this sort of work, survival in regions under enemy rule would be impossible, and open work would lose its very soul as well. Yet the Provisional Central is not only unwilling to do open and legal work, but also unwilling to do secret work earnestly. In all things it goes in for exposing itself, showing its strength, playing the hero, and it likes to see overnight victory. As a result, within something over three years' time nothing was left of the Party in the areas under enemy rule, nor of the little mass strength there had been. Judging by all of this, what the Provisional Central calls "all kinds of forms" is nothing more than empty words. In actual fact they have only one form, which is to fight, to make trouble, and to scream; apart from this they have nothing whatsoever. They have no idea that what is particular to China is the unification of armed struggle and peaceful struggle and that, in terms of the peaceful struggle, it is the unification of open struggle and secret struggle. This is an entire system of political science that is extremely complicated, and if Chinese Communists do not master this complete system of political science, there is no way for them to win. Using the Provisional Central's simplistic, one-sided, adventuristic ways of doing things, how would it be possible to "make the working class the backbone in the anti-Japanese movement" and to "make the proletariat the leader and organizer of the Chinese nation"? No, instead it makes the working class into superfluous parts with no use and makes the proletariat into empty boasters and players without resources in China's national liberation. Why is it that some comrades dare not even mention the word "nation.. ? Since these overlords advocate overthrowing everything and go in for an extremely narrow closed-doorism and an extremely risky putschism, how could they boast about nation? What use would it be even if they did use the word "nation"?

III We would like to ask these overlords: Why is it that distributing all the land to all the people should be called "a thoroughly opportunistic viewpoint" or be called "completely ignoring the leadership of the proletariat"? Actually, I would like to teach these overlords a lesson or two myself! You people understand nothing at all and are totally removed from the lives ofthe peasant masses. You insisted on forcing on the soviet areas the erroneous line of "distributing no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants," dubbing it a "clear-cut class line," and then forced the elimination of the land distribution method favored and supported by

OCTOBER 1941

829

the peasant masses in the south, such as Jiangxi and elsewhere, which was to "draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce and draw on the fat to make up for the lean," calling it a "rich peasants' line" and "totally opportunistic." What is your justification for this? And are you aware that failing to distribute land to the landlords means to destroy them physically? Which tenet of Marxism-Leninism does this come from? Since in theory you do not advocate destroying the landlords' digestive systems, you will have to let them eat. It is said that, after the October Revolution, Lenin once sent a group of landlords to Siberia to carry logs so as to give lhem an opportunity to do physical labor and to eat. This is true Leninism. But our "Leninists" do otherwise. They give the landlords neither logs to carry nor a plot of land to cultivate. The result is to force them to become green guerrillas, carrying weapons to fight the soviets to the death. What is the good in this? Giving the rich peasants bad land reduces them to the level of abject poverty, which will tum this section ofthe peasantry against us as well. Just which item in Leninism says to use the policy of distributing no land and distributing poor land to landlords and rich peasants during the period of democratic revolution, before the democratic revolution has succeeded, at a time when a strong enemy is attacking and it is yet to be determined who will be victorious in the revolution? Can this nonsense of yours be called leadership? Absolutely not! This is destructiveness, a way to destroy the leadership role of the proletariat, a means of destroying the

revolution! On the land question, the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress holds that "in places where there are large numbers of unemployed and poverty-stricken peasants, a movement to 'distribute land equally' is bound to arise. If this slogan is espoused by the vast majority of the peasant masses, the Communist Party should lend its support, because this is a slogan that will thoroughly eliminate all dregs of feudalism, and it has a direct destabilizing effect on the system of private ownership." Most of this is correct, because it accords with the conditions in China where land is scarce but the population is large (in the north the average plot per person is only 3 mu, and in the south it is only I mu per person). In this passage, only the last sentence is inappropriate, because the result of "distributing the land equally" was not to destabilize the whole system of private ownership but, rather, to shake up only the feudalistic system of private ownership and turn it into a peasants' system of private ownership. Moreover, in the countryside there are still two possible future scenarios before us: to go the capitalist road or to go the socialist road, to say nothing of the fact that the private ownership system ofthe national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie in the cities was not destabilized at all. The resolution of the Sixth Congress went on to say that the peasants should be told explicitly that there is no possibility of realizing true equality under present conditions, so that the peasants should not be led in the direction of absolute egalitarianism (for example, violating the interests of the middle peasants or prohibiting the buying and selling of land after land distribution, which would mean not permitting the formation of new rich peasants). The Provisional Central Committee vio-

830

MAO'S ROAD "IV POWER

lated the Sixth Congress [resolution] and invented the Left-leaning opponunist line of "distributing no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants." Along with mistakes in the political, military, and organizational lines, this ended up bringing on a revolutionary failure. Should this, too, be called "absolutely correct'''! IV Knowing the world is for the purpose of transforming the world, and the history of mankind was created by mankind itself. But one cannot transform the world without knowing the world, and "Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement."3 In this respect, our overlords are utterly in the dark. For the realm of necessity to be turned into the realm of freedom, the two processes of cognition and of transformation must be undergone. European philosophers of the past already knew the truth that "freedom is the knowledge of necessity." Marx's contribution is not to have denied this truth but, rather, to have acknowledged it and then to have made up for what it lacked by adding the truth of "transforming the world" according to the knowledge of necessity. "Freedom is the knowledge of necessity"-this is the proposition ofthe philosophers of the past. "Freedom is the knowledge of necessity and the transformation of the world"-this is Marx's proposition. A Marxist who does not understand that we learn about the world by transforming the world, and that we transform the world by learning about the world, is not a good Marxist. A Chinese Marxist who does not understand that we learn about China by transforming China, and that we transform China by learning about China, is not a good Chinese Marxist. Marx says that man differs from the bees in that, long before he builds a house, he has the design for the house in his mind. 4 If we are to build the house of the Chinese revolution we, too, must first have the design for the Chinese revolution. Not only is it necessary to have a large design, an overall design, but also many small designs and subdesigns. And these designs are nothing but the active reflections of objective, concrete conditions that we have gained in the actual practice of the Chinese revolution (the active reflections of the situation with regard to such things as class relations inside the country,

relations among the nationalities within the country, international relations among the various countries, relations between the various countries in the world and China, and so on). The reason our overlords are subjectivists is that all of their designs for revolution, be they large or small, overall or panial, are not based on objective reality and are not in accordance with subjective reality. They have only a subjective desire to transform the world, or to transform China, or to transform

3. One of Lenin's favorite axioms. See section 4 of the first chapter of "What Is to Be Done?" 4. See Capital, Vol. I, chapter 5.

OCTOBER /941

83/

North China, or to transform the cities, but they have no design worthy of the term. Their design is not scientific but, rather, subjective and arbitrary, a complete mess. Even though the overlords have no knowledge whatsoever of this world, they still have a vain desire to transform it, and as a result they not only have broken open their own heads but have led a great many other people down the path of breaking open their heads as well. Since the overlords are blind to the inexorability of the Chinese revolution but still have the vain desire to play the part of guides for the people, theirs is truly a case of what is called "the blind on blind horses coming to the edge of an abyss at midnight."

v What the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line from "September 18th" to the Zunyi Conference call the struggle on two fronts is nothing but subjectivism. This is first of all because their own line, by which they measure everything, was not based upon objective reality but, rather, arbitrarily fabricated solely according to their subjective wishes. To judge the thought of others by measuring against a yardstick of opportunist thought, and then to find "opportunism" everywhere, is just like those who believe in ghosts seeing ghosts everywhere. Second, because their method of viewing things is subjectivist, and they use this method to create both their own subjectivist political line and their own sectarian organizational line, they then regard anyone and everyone they dislike as an "opportunist." They never view anything with a materialist, dialectical method, so naturally they would not view people in this way either. Yet trying to wage a struggle on two fronts divorced from a materialist, dialectical method would be nothing more than running wild on a rampage and could have no positive results to speak of. Third, they do not even have any idea what "a struggle on two fronts" is. They do not know that, in the eyes of a Marxist, to struggle on two fronts is a method of analyzing and synthesizing the past and present state of development of a given thing that moves across time and space, wherein its temporary stability may be assured (that is, the nature and attributes of said thing). For example, to know what the character of China's existing society is, it is necessary to apply scientific and concrete analysis to the past and present states of Chinese society and understand that it is different from an independent feudal society (the struggle on the first front) and also different from an independent capitalist society (the struggle on the second front) before the synthesized conclusion can be drawn, that it is a semicolonial (semi-independent), semi feudal society. As another example, if one wants to know the nature of the present revolution in China, it is necessary to use as a starting point the fact that Chinese society is particular in being a semicolonial and semifeudal society, and then apply scientific analysis to understand the following: that it is not the same as a country in which there is no national oppression but only feudal oppression, and the proletariat has not yet been awakened, such as France two hundred years ago, where the bourgeoisie leads the revolution to overthrow the feudal dictatorship

832

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

and a bourgeois dictatorship is established (a struggle on the first front), nor is it the same as a country in which, because of the awakening of the proletariat and after overthrowing the feudal class, both the social and political conditions permit the creation of a socialist system, such as Russia during the October Revolution, where the proletariat leads the revolution to overthrow the bourgeois dictatorship and a proletarian dictatorship is established (a struggle on the second front). Only then can a synthesized conclusion be drawn, to the effectthatthe present Chinese revolution is an anti-imperialist, antifeudal, new democratic revolution led by the proletariat to establish a joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. With regard to every specific matter and every specific person, to know its nature it is necessary to employ this method of struggling on two fronts and to apply concrete analysis and synthesized investigation and study before it is possible to come up with a definite conclusion. As soon as one deviates even slightly from this method, or is not in accord with the reality of the given matter or given person, a correct conclusion cannot be drawn. In subjectively and presumptuously adopting what they called a method of fighting on two fronts, the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line were completely divorced from concrete and scientific research work, and therefore their conclusion cannot but be wrong. The subjective method of waging a struggle on two fronts by the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line caused the thinking within the Party regarding this method to become extremely confused and vague. Many people know that we should wage a struggle on two fronts, but large numbers of people have not the slightest idea how to go about it, so it has become a worthless piece of jargon. Fourth, the subjective method of waging a struggle on two fronts by the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line, that is, their method of indiscriminate struggle, naturally cannot be as it is stated in the epilogue to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that it is necessary not only to struggle against the "opportunistic factions within the Party-those who espouse 'economism,' the Mensheviks, Trotskyist elements, Bukharinist elements, and those with nationalistic tendencies," and smash them (article 4 of the epilogue) but also to promote criticism and self-criticism and correct mistakes in the work done by the Party and its members (article 5 of the epilogue). The "Left" opportunist line's method of indiscriminate struggle has no way to distinguish between these two things (dealing with the enemy and dealing with comrades who have made mistakes) but, instead, uses the method for dealing with the enemy to deal with comrades, and this gave rise to a habit of indiscriminate struggle within the Party. Regardless of right or wrong, black or white, all matters large and small are met with "the most resolute merciless struggle," and "hatred" and "fervor in the struggle" are everywhere, giving rise to an atmosphere in the Party rife with dissension and discord, in which there is a constant state of anxiety. Unless this sort of antiscientific, petty bourgeois, subjectivist method of indiscriminate struggle is rooted out altogether,the Party cannot possibly achieve true solidarity and unity.

List of Reading Materials for Theoretical Study (November 1, 1941)

To group leaders and deputy group leaders of high-level study groups at all locations: It is hereby stipulated that the portion on theory of study materials for high-level study groups at all locations shall consist of the following: I. Dimitrov's report, conclusions, and final remarks at the Seventh Congress of theComintern (Selected Works of Mr. [Georgi] Dimitrov, 1 published by Jiefangshe, pp. 1-165). 2. The Conclusion to the History of the Communist Parry of the Soviet Union. 3. Studies on the dissemination of the histories ofthe five Communist Parties of France, Britain, the United States, Germany, and Italy, and resolutions on the propagation of Marxism-Leninism (Jiefang, no. 105). 2 4. Resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on how to go about propaganda work after the publication of the History of the Communist Parry of the Soviet Union (Jiefang, no. 79). 5. "Stalin and the History ofthe Communist Parry ofthe Soviet Union" (Jiefang, no. 128). 6. Left-wing Infantilism (Jiefangshe edition).' Please first read all of the above items; it would be best to memorize and read carefully one of them, or twice,• and have the group leader or deputy group leader raise the main points of each piece of material and hold a discussion.

Our soW'Ce for this text is We~~..tian he yanjiu, 1984, pp. 13-14 of the annual volume. 1. Dimitrov was, and had long been, the secretary general of the Comintem. 2. The reference is to an article originally published in the German edition of International Press Correspondence in August 1939,translated by Jing Lin and published inliefang, no. 105. 3. That is, Lenin's Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. 4. The editors of the Chinese text state that the original manuscript reads in this somewhat garbled manner, and they suggest that it may have been meant to read: "it would be best to read them carefully once or twice." 833

834

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

7. Chapter 8 of the Outline of Philosophy, ''The Process of Cognition," translated by Ai [Siqi], that is, Chapter 4 of Selected Philosophical Writings. 5 8. Chapter 6 of A Course in Dialectical Materialism, "Materialist Dialectics and Formal Logic," translated by Li [Da]. 9. The Introduction to Kawakami Hajime's An Outline of Economics (translated by Chen Baoyin). The above [X][X] 6 may be read later. 10. The entire History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The last item may be read later, and the methods of reading and discussion are the same as for the previous items. MaoZedong

Wang Jiaxiang

5. Regarding this and the following two items, see the notes to the tex.t of September 29, 1941.

6. The editors of the Chinese source suggest that the two characters missing at this point in the original may have been "three items."

Study Tasks and Study Methods for the Current Year (November4, 1941)

To group leaders and deputy group leaders of high-level study groups in all locations:

I. As a first step, the Central Study Group and all high-level research groups everywhere are to take as their scope Leninist political theory and our Party's political practice since the Sixth Party Congress. 2. The study materials have been announced over the Party radio station (please inform us as to whether or not they have been received). It has been decided that within this year the two books, Dimitrov's report to the Seventh Comintern Congress and Lenin's Left-wing Infantilism, plus the eighty-three documents issued since the Sixth Congress, are to be read through once. The aim of such a reading through is to acquire an initial general idea so as to be able to enter the stage of deeper study by next spring. 3. During the period of reading through the material, detailed discussion will not be pursued, but all group leaders must take responsibility for adopting suitable measures to check up on whether all group members have actually read the designated material and for answering the doubts and questions that arise in the course of reading. 4. There will certainly be instances everywhere in which many of the eightythree documents issued since the Sixth Congress are not available, 1 in which case those that are available may be read first, or the group leader may report on the ones he can remember. 5. Research on methods of thought will not be carried out for the time being. Central Study Group MaoZedong

Wang Jiaxiang

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, 1984, p. 15 of the annuaJ volume.

I. As indicated in a note to the text of September 29, 1941, the volume containing these materials was published for internal use only in December 1941. 835

Comrade Mao Zedong Delivers a Broadcast Speech (November?, 1941)

(Xinhua News Agency dispatch from Yan'an) Today Comrade Mao Zedong delivered a broadcast speech as follows:

As the Chinese Communist Party used to point out over and over again, the current task of human beings of the whole world is to unite to oppose fascism, and the task of the entire Chinese people is to unite to oppose Japan's attacks. At present, it is necessary to strengthen a lot more these two kinds of unity. From the standpoint of mankind as a whole, we maintain that Britain and America should use all means to offer more airplanes and tanks to the Soviet Union, to offer more funds and weapons to support China, and to offer more force to support the uprisings by the people of all nations that have been trampled by Germany. The United States should, without any hesitation, declare war against Germany, which is a step that absolutely cannot and should not be avoided. The longer this is delayed, the more American ships will be bombed and sunk by Germany. At the same time, the United States should never believe what it hears of Japan's conspiracies, nor should it reach any compromise with Japan. The United States should, together with China and Britain, punish the Japanese fascists with all its strength. Clearly this hope of ours is in accordance with the hopes of the majority of the people in Britain and the United States; it is a pity that within the governments and parliaments of these two countries, there is still a group of people who fail to understand the righteousness of the cause and are obstructing the realization of the people's will. Therefore, the British and American people must now make efforts to defeat such obstructions of the times and push to a higher stage the worldwide struggle against fascism. The situation in China is likewise at a turning point toward moving a step further. Although the Japanese fascists are preparing to advance simultaneously toward the south and toward the north, they will, no matter which of these risky paths they take, necessarily attack the West in order to exterminate China. Japan, after encountering defeats in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, Changsha,

This text was first published in Jiejang ribao, November 7, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 33-34, which reproduces this version.

836

NOVEMBER 1941

837

Zhengzhou, and other places, is now preparing for a new attack on China. The people and the armed forces of our whole country must certainly defend every front of resistance to Japan and have to smash the enemy's schemes for attack. The people of the whole country must become even better united, support the national government, persist in resistance to the end, and prepare all necessary conditions for a counterattack so as to drive the Japanese bandits out of China promptly. We Communists have consistently called for strengthening unity. On this very eve of a new enemy attack, improving relations among the various components of· the resistance camp is even more urgently needed. We hope the Guomindang authorities are able to decide promptly and opportunely to take various necessary measures speedily for this purpose. We believe that, as long as the whole country truly unites as one, attacks by Japan can surely be stopped, preparations for counterattack can certainly be accomplished, and the goal of driving out the enemy can definitely be realized.

On Sending Out the List of Materials on Theory and Other Issues (November 17, 1941)

Zhou [Enlai[ and Dong [Biwu]: We are in receipt of your telegrams of the 9th and the 12th. We did not, in fact, send out an outline of dialectics but, rather, sent out only a list of materials on theory, which included two sections, one on political theory and one on methods of thought. An outline of a history of the Chinese Communist Party can be considered. A selection of documents that have come out since the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has already been printed, 1 and a copy may be sent to you when someone is available to take it. The report to the Seventh Congress is Dimitrov's report. This in reply to your telegrams. Central Study Group Mao [Zedong]

Wang [Jiaxiang]

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, 1984, p. 16 of the annual volume. 1. As indicated in a note to the text of September 29, 1941, some sources indicate that the volume entitled Liuda yilai (Since the Sixth Congress) was published only in December 1941. Perhaps it was printed in late November and first distributed in December. 838

Speech at the Assembly of Representatives of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (November 21, 1941)

Members of the Assembly, comrades: Today's inauguration of the Border Region Assembly of Representatives is of great significance. The Assembly has but one objective, the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the building of a China of the Three People's Principles.' In the China of today there can be no other objective whatsoever, for our enemies2 are not domestic but, rather, foreign: German and Italian fascism and Japanese imperialism. 3 At present the Soviet Union, Brit-

ain, and the United States are allied as one against the Germiln and Italian fascist invaders, and the Soviet Red Army is fighting for the destiny of the whole of mankind. 4 Our objective is the same as theirs, which is only to oppose German, Italian, and Japanese fascism.' Japan6 is continuing its aggression with the purpose of destroying China's independence. 7 The Chinese Communist Party stands for uniting all forces throughout the country 8 to overthrow Japanese imperialism, and for cooperating with all parties,9 all classes, and all nationalities throughout the country. All Chinese people, except Chinese traitors, must unite as one in the common struggle. This has been the consistent stand of the Communist Party. For more than four years China 10 has been heroically waging the War of Resistance, a war that has been led by ChairmJJn Chiang and maintained through the cooperation of the Guomindang and the Communist Party and of all classes, parties, and

This speech was first reponed in Jiefang ribao, November 23, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 35-39, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of

Mao Zedong xuanji. I. A China of the Three People's Principles~ A China of New Democracy or, in other words, a China of the revolutionary Three People's Principles

2. Our enemies ~ Our chief enemies now 3. Gennan and Italian fascism and ........ Japanese and Gennan and Italian fascism 4. The whole of mankind ..... The Soviet Union and the whole of mankind 5. Our objective is the same ... fascism -+ We, for our part, are combating Japanese imperialism 6. Japan-+ Japanese imperialism 7. Destroying China's independence ..... Subjugating China 8. All forces throughout the country ..... AU anti-Japanese forces throughout the country 9. All parties ..... All anti-Japanese parties I 0. China

~

the Chinese people 839

840 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

nationalities. But it is not yet won, and to win it we have to fight on and ensure that the Three People's Principles" are put into effect. Why must we put the Three People's Principles 12 into effect? Because up to the present time Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles have not been translated into reality in all parts of China. Why don't we put communism into effect? 13 Of course communism 14 is a superior system and has long been in operation in the Soviet Union, but in China today the conditions for it are still lacking. It is the Three People's Principles that have been put into effect in the Shaanxi-GansuNingxia Border Region. In no construction effort and in no solution to any practical problems have we gone beyond their principles. 15 Of the Three People's Principles, the principle of nationalism means overthrowing Japanese imperialism,16 and those of democracy and the people's livelihood mean working in the interests not of just one section but of all the people nationwide who are resisting Japan. Throughout the country the people of all classes and nationalities should enjoy human rights, political rights, and property rights. 17 They should all have the opportunity to voice their opinions, and they should all have clothes to wear, food to eat, work to do, and schools to attend; some provision should be made for everyone. Chinese society is small at both ends and big in the middle, which is to say that the proletariat [at one end) and the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie [at the other) each constitute only a small minority, while the great majority of the people consists of the intermediate classes. 18 No political party that wants to run China's affairs properly can do so unless its policy gives consideration to the interests of the intermediate classes, unless some provision is made for the intermediate classes, unless they have the right to voice their opinions, and unless they have clothes to wear. food to eat, work to do, and schools to attend. The three-thirds system and all other policies put forward by the Chinese Communist Party aim to unite all the people who resist Japan and take into account the interests of all classes, 19 and especially the interests of the intermediate classes. 20 The three-thirds system poliII. The Three People's Principles-+ The revolutionary Three People's Principles 12. Here and in all subsequent references to the Three People's Principles, except where otherwise noted the Selected Works version inserts the word "revolutionary" before it. 13. Why don't we put communism into effect? -+ Why don't we now demand that socialism be put into effect? 14. Communism .. Socialism 15. Beyond their principles ..... Beyond their scope 16. Before this clause, the Selected Works edition inserts the words "in the present

context."

17. Human ... and property rights .. The right to freedom of the person, the right to take pan in political activity, and the right to protection of property 18. The intennediate classes -+ The peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and other intennediate classes 19. All classes ..... All classes that resist Japan 20. The intermediate classes.....,. The peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the other intermediate classes

NOVEMBER 194/

841

cies put forward by the Communist Party, which give all sections of the people the opportunity to voice their opinions and make sure they have work to do, 21 are policies embodying the genuine Three People's Principles. In agrarian relations, on the one hand, we carry out the policy of reducing rent and interest so that the peasants will have clothes to wear and food to eat, and, on the other, our policies provide for the payment of the rent and interest so that the landlords, too, have clothes to wear and food to eat. 22 In the relations between labor and capital, on the one hand we carry out the policy of helping the workers so that they have both work and food, and, on the other, we pursue a policy of developing industry so that the capitalists may obtain some profit. In all this, our purpose is to unite the whole people in the common endeavor of resistance to Japan and joining together to build the country. This policy is that of New Democracy, or the policy of the Three People's Principles. It is neither what is called a one-party dictatorship nor the old-style democracy as in foreign countries but, rather, embodies the thinking of Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles. It is the kind of policy that really suits the conditions in China,23 and we hope that its application will not be limited to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region or to the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear, but will spread throughout the country. We have pursued this policy with success and have won the approval of the people all over China. But there have also been shortcomings. Some Communists still are not good at cooperating with non-Party people in a democratic way and persist in the erroneous thinking24 of narrow-minded "closed-doorism" or sectarianism. They still do not understand the principle that Communists are duty-bound to cooperate with people outside the Party25 and have no right to shut them out, which is the principle of listening attentively to the views ofthe masses, keeping in close touch with them, and not becoming alienated from them. There is an article in the Administrative Program of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region which stipulates that Communists should cooperate democratically with non-Party people and must not act arbitrarily or keep everything in their own hands. It is meant precisely to guard against those comrades who still fail to understand the Party's policy. Communists must listen attentively to the view of people outside the Party and give others the chance to have their say. If what they say is right, we oughtto welcome it, and we should learn from others;26 if what they say is wrong, we should let them finish what they are saying and then patiently explain things to them. A Communist must never be opinionated or domineering, or think that he is good in everything while others are good in nothing; he must never shut himself

21. Work to do-> Work to do and food to eat

22. Have clothes to wear and food to eat -+ Can live 23. China -> present-day China 24. Erroneous thinking-> Work-style 25. People outside the Pany -> People outside the Pany who resist Japan

26. Learn from others - Learn from the strong points of others

842

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

up in his little room, or brag and boast and lord it over others. Apart from the enemy---Chinese traitors,27 and those28 who sabotage the War of Resistance and sabotage unity, who have no right to speak-everyone is entitled to freedom of speech. It does not matter even if what he says is wrong. Affairs of state are the public affairs of the whole nation and not the private affairs of a single party or group. Hence Communists have only the duty to cooperate democratically with non-Party people and not the right to exclude others and monopolize everything. The Communist Party is a political party which works in the interests of the nation and people and which has absolutely no private ends to pursue. It should be supervised by the people and must never go against their will. Its members should stand among the popular masses and certainly must not set themselves above them. Comrades, 29 our principle30 of democratic cooperation with non-Party people is fixed and eternally unalterable, and right now it31 should make a good start of beginning to be put into practice in this Assembly. With this policy of ours, I believe that Communist Party members of the Assembly will get a very good education32 here and overcome their "closed-doorism" and sectarianism. We are not a small opinionated sect, and we must learn how to open our doors and cooperate democratically with non-Party people. We certainly must learn the anitudes and work-style of being good at consulting with others. Perhaps even now there are Communist Party members who may say, "If we have to cooperate with others, then leave us out." But I am sure that such people are very few. I dare assure you all that the overwhelming majority of our Party members will certainly be able to carry out the line of the Central Committee of our Party. At the same time, I wish to ask all non-Party comrades to endorse33 what we stand for, to understand that the Communist Party is not a small sect or clique pursuing private ends. No! The Communist Party sincerely and honestly wishes to set the affairs of state to rights. But we still have many failings. We are not afraid to admit them and are determined to get rid of them. We shall purge these shortcomings by strengthening education within the Party and by cooperating democratically with non-Party people. This is called attacking by crossfire from within and without, to remedy our failings and really set the affairs of state to rights. Gentlemen members of the Assembly, you have taken the trouble to come here for this meeting, and I am happy to greet this distinguished gathering and wish it every success.

27. The enemy. Chinese traitors ..... Those Chinese traitors who are in league with the Japanese bandits 28. Those ~ Those reactionary diehards

29. Comrades ... Gentlemen representatives, Comrades, 30. Our principle ..... The Communist Party's principle 31. Right now it ... So long as parties exist in society, people who join them will always be a minority, while those outside them will always be the majority; hence Party members must always cooperate with people outside the Party, and it 32. A very good education~ Very good training 33. Endorse ... Realize

High-Level Study Groups Everywhere Should Operate According to the Organizational Regulations (November 26, 1941)

To all central bureaus, all district Party committees, all military branches, and all military and political committees: Because recently the organization of high-level study groups in all locations has been uneven in terms of strictness and laxity, uniformity has not been possible, and it is impossible for the Central Committee to investigate and approve each one in tum, organizational regulations for high-level study groups have been specially laid down.' Upon receipt, each locality should check on everything according to these regulations and decide what to keep and what to eliminate. Except for the group leader, deputy group leader, and secretary, whose names and professions2 must be reported to the Central Committee, the rest can simply be reported as numbers of people involved. As for the process of study, the group leader and deputy group leader must take responsibility for making timely reports. Central Secretariat

Our source for this text is Wen.>:ian he yanjiu, 1984, pp. 16-17 of the annual volume. The editors note that it was drafted by Mao on behalf of the Central Secretariat.

I. Refers to the "Central Committee Decision Concerning Organizational Regulations for High-Level Study Groups," adopted by the Central Secretariat on November 25, 1941.

2. The editors of the Chinese text suspect that this is a misprint in the original manu· script for ''positions. •• 843

Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the War in the Pacific (December 9, 1941)

On the 8th of this month, the Japanese fascist government declared war on Britain and the United States and bombed Hawaii, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Its army landed in northern Malaysia. After the Japanese declaration of war, the United States and Britain likewise declared war on Japan. War has already broken out in the Pacific. This Pacific War is an unjust war launched by the Japanese fascists for the sake of aggression against the United States, Britain, and other countries. On the part of the United States, Britain, and other countries who have risen to resist this aggression, it is a just war of liberation in defense of independence, freedom, and democracy. This aggressive act by the Japanese fascists is exactly like their acts of aggression against China over the past ten years and exactly like the acts of aggression of the German and Italian fascists against Europe and the Soviet Union. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, all democratic countries throughout the world find themselves subjected to the aggression of the fascist countries. At the same time, all the democratic countries have risen up in resistance. All countries and nations throughout the world have been divided into two camps: the fascist camp that has launched the wars of aggression, and the antifascist camp that is waging the wars of liberation. The situation is very clear. After the victory at Rostov, the great Soviet Red Army has moved to the phase of counterattacking the Germans. In the light of this change and the fact that the two great powers, Britain and the United States, possess enormous resources and military power, because China has fought heroically against the Japanese for five years, and because Germany, Italy, and Japan have nearly exhausted their resources and are facing domestic demoralization, the final defeat of the fascist camp and the final victory of the antifascist camp are now certain. This is certain even though Hitler and Mussolini might keep going for a while and the Japanese fascists might

This document was first published in Jiefang ribao, December 10, 1941, and we have translated it from that souroe. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 343-44, it was Mao who

proposed, at a meeting of the Politburo immediately after news of the attack on Pearl Harbor was received (on December 8, rather than December 7, because of the time difference between China and Hawaii), that such a statement should be issued. The Politburo discussed the matter for two days, and Mao revised this document before it was adopted on December 9, 1941. 844

DECEMBER 194/

845

win many victories in the initial stage of the Pacific War, or might cut off the Burma Road, or might launch another cruel war against us. The Chinese government and people should continue the heroic war they have been waging for the past nine years, stand resolutely on the side of the antifascist countries, mobilize all their strength, and struggle for the final overthrow of the Japanese fascists. In order to reach this unique objective, the following important tasks must be carried out: I. China must establish a military alliance with Britain, the United States, and other friendly -countries fighting Japan, coordinate our battles, establish a united front of all anti-Japanese nations in the Pacific, and persevere in fighting the war against Japan until victory is complete. 2. Military forces throughout the country must actively attack the enemy and prepare for a large-scale strategic counterattack. 3. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should continue to endure hardships, persist in the war in the enemy's rear in Central and North China, smash the enemy's extermination operations, and tie down large numbers of the enemy's troops. 4. Carry out ever more extensive anti-Japanese, antifascist propaganda and agitation among the Japanese army; the Japanese people; the peoples of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Chinese people in the areas that have fallen to the Japanese; and those struggling for the establishment of an antifascist front inside Japan. 5. Strengthen the Anti-Japanese National United Front and cooperation among the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and other parties; solve the disputes between the Guomindang and the Communist Party; restore the New Fourth Army; and supply the Eighth Route Army with pay and ammunition. 6. Punish pro-Japanese and pro-German cliques and eliminate the enemy's fifth column. 7. Carry out democratic politics, so that representatives from all parties and nonparty people can take on the political and organizational responsibilities of fighting the War of Resistance and building the country. 8. Strengthen the internal unity of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere; oppose the acts of division engaged in by some elements; at the same time, the overseas Chinese should work with all the friendly governments and local peoples to fight against the Japanese attacks. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party December 9, in the thirtieth year of the Republic

Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front (December 9, 1941)

I. As the Declaration on the Pacific War of our Party's Central Committee states, the War of Resistance Against Japan fought by Britain and the United States and all the Pacific countries is a just liberation war, and the victory of Britain and the United States over Japan is the victory of democracy and freedom. Therefore, the central task of the people of our whole country, of all our overseas countrymen, and of all the nations in Southeast Asia in the War of Resistance is to establish a broad united front to oppose Japan and to oppose fascism. The components of this united front should include the governments of all nations, parties, people of all social strata that oppose Japan's aggression, people inside Japan who are opposing the war and the people of the Japanese colonies of Korea and Taiwan, and Vietnam. This united front should be an alliance of the upper strata but, at the same time, also of the lower strata, an alliance of governments but, at the same time, also of the popular masses. A military alliance against Japan of China, Britain, the United States, and the other Pacific countries should be realized. A close cooperation between governments of suzerain states and aboriginal peoples should be established. At the same time, the political and economic status of the aboriginal peoples should be improved, their popular masses organized, and their enthusiasm raised. Moreover, guerrilla warfare within all areas occupied by Japan should be developed. Without all of this, it is not possible to defeat the Japanese bandits. 2. The Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party are of particularly great significance to the united front of Britain and the United States. On the one hand, it is a prerequisite to China's national liberation to annihilate the Japanese bandits, in cooperation with Britain and the United States. On the other hand, China's being internally united as one, reforming its politics and military, actively pinning down and striking the enemy, and actively preparing for strategic counterattacks are all, in turn, important conditions for Britain and the United States in defeating

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, December 13, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 41-42, which reproduces this source. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 344, Mao presided over the revision of this directive, as well as of the declaration which appears above. 846

DECEMBER 1941

847

the Japanese bandits. For these purposes, the Chinese Communist Party should sincerely and candidly make every effort to cooperate with British and American personages in all kinds of situations in order to strengthen British and American forces of resistance and to improve the situation in China's War of Resistance. 3. We must greatly develop our work with the overseas Chinese in the areas of Southeast Asia, Britain, and the United States. The guiding principle of working with overseas Chinese should be to unite all overseas Chinese, and to unite all of their strata and parties in order to carry on a joint struggle against Japan, to propagate and support the motherland's united War of Resistance, and to support and participate in all facilities and actions of anti-Japanese resistance by the governments in their localities. The ultraleft tendencies among the overseas Chinese and a group of Communist Party members should be corrected, and they should be asked to cooperate with the Chinese embassies and consulates in their localities, and with branches of the Guomindang. But toward the actions on the part of pro-Japanese and pro-German elements to split the unity of overseas Chinese and to sabotage the work of resistance to Japan, there must be firm but appropriate opposition. 4. Efforts must be made to develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the enemyoccupied regions of South China, Hainan Island, Vietnam, and all regions in Southeast Asia occupied by Japan and to coordinate, as much as possible, military actions with all friendly forces resisting Japan and the friendly nations resisting Japan such as Britain and the United States, and win their support in all areas. All policies carried out by guerrilla detachments should be in accordance with the demands of the anti-Japanese united front, and attention should be paid to preventing and correcting various leftist tendencies. 5. The work in all localities in Southeast Asia should be done in concert with the Communist Party of the given nation; help should also be extended to them in correcting existing leftist tendencies and in developing united front work on a broad scale.

Estimate of the Situation in the International War (December 12, 1941)

Zhou [Enlai]: I. There is the possibility that the Japanese army could take all of Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, Guam, Midway Island, Kalimantan, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand during the winter season. Within the next half year, neither Britain nor the United States can compete against Japan, but if two or three strongholds such as Singapore, Manila, and Darwin can be preserved, a situation of stalemate with Japan could occur after six months, so that after the Japanese army is exhausted a counterattack could be launched. 2.The overall orientation of Britain and the United States may be defensive toward Japan but offensive toward Germany, first gathering together the forces of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to defeat Germany, and then gathering together the forces of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to take care of Japan. The Soviet Union will be the decisive force on both fronts. If a second front appears in Europe in a few months, Germany can be finished off relatively quickly. This is a truly advantageous orientation, but do those indolent British and American military and political personnel have the necessary stamina? 3. Germany is now caught in a dilemma, but since he has no way out on the Eastern front, Hitler may be forced to adopt a defensive posture on the Eastern front and an offensive posture on the Southern front or the Western front. If this happens, it is Hitler himself creating a second front, and it also creates the possibility that Britain and the United States may be forced to concentrate their main forces (in Britain's case its main naval, infantry, and air forces, and in the American case its main air force and natural resources) to fight Germany. 4. The Pacific War offers six advantages for China and the Soviet Union: First, the enemy forces in North China and Central China will gradually be reduced, which is to say that there is no possibility of their increasing military forces on a large scale; second, the possibility of the Guomindang's attacking the border regions will be reduced; third, it deals a fatal blow to the pro-Japanese and pro-

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 672-74, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives. 848

DECEMBER 194/

849

German elements, and we increase the possibility that the Guomindang will be both unable to surrender and unable to "suppress the Communists"; fourth, China's prospects for democratic politics are increased; fifth, the Soviet Union may transfer some of its troops in the East to the West; and sixth, there is the possibility that a second front could be created rapidly in Europe. The above is an estimation made at the Politburo meeting on the 8th (for internal reference, not to be made public). I look forward to hearing your opinion. MaoZedong

To Cai Chang1 (December 16, 1941)

Comrade Cai Chang: I do not remember clearly when Comrade Li Liuru2 joined the Party; I only remember that he joined the League in 1921. This is my reply. MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji. p. 191, where it is printed from the

manuscript. 1. Cai Chang (1900-1990), a native of Hunan, was working at the time in the Chinese

Communist Party's credentials office for its Seventh National Congress. Like Mao, she had been a political activist in Changsha at the time of the May 4th movement. 2. Li Liuru was at this time head of Mao's Secretariat. 850

Decision of the Central Committee ofthe Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Yan'an Cadre School (This decision also applies to all anti-Japanese base areas) (December 17, 1941) 1

I. The basic shortcoming of the current Yan' an Cadre School lies in the disconnection between theory and practice and between what is learned and what is used and in the existence of subjectivism and dogmatism, which are serious problems. This kind of problem is manifested mainly in having students learn a whole lot of abstract principles of Marxism-Leninism but paying no attention or scant attention to understanding their essence and how to apply them to the specific Chinese environment. To remedy this kind of problem, it must be emphasized that the purpose of studying the theories of Marxism-Leninism is to enable students to apply these theories correctly in solving the concrete problems of the Chinese revolution, and not to memorize and recite these bookish principles mechanically. First, students must be made to distinguish between Marxist-Leninist terminology and the essence of Marxism-Leninism; second, students must be made to understand this essence (not to interpret literally without real understanding but, rather, to know the meaning deep in their hearts); third, students must be made to learn to be good at applying this essence to China's specific environment; all formalistic and hollow study, in other words, is to be discarded. To this end, in addition to correctly imparting Marxist-Leninist theory, it is necessary at the same time to step up education in Chinese history, China's actual conditions, and the history and policies ofthe Party, so that students will learn both theory and practice and be able to connect the two in a lively way. For cadres above the prefectural committee level in the Party and above the regimental level in the military (after the literacy problem has been solved), the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be the basic curricular material for studying Marxism-Leninism. This decision was first published in Jiefang ribao, December 20, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedongji, Vol. 8, pp. 43-47, which reproduces this version. I. It is indicated in a note preceding the text that this decision was adopted by the Politburo at its meeting on December 17. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 346, Mao not only chaired this meeting but revised the text of the decision before it was issued, adding several important sentences. 85/

852

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Particular attention should be paid to studying the concrete application of the basic concepts of dialectical materialism and historical materialism (not a huge pile of abstract principles in this regard), for the purpose of thereby overcoming the extremely pernicious problems of subjectivism and dogmatism. 2. Another shortcoming is that the various schools failed to stipulate clearly their own concrete goals. For this reason it is hereby stipulated that: a. The Central Research Institute shall be the higher-level research institution for fostering the Party's cadres in charge of theory. b. The Central Party School shall be the higher-level and middle-level school for training cadres who have the ability to work fairly independently, in the Party above the prefectural committee level involved in practical work, and in the army above the regimental level involved in political work. c. The Military Academy shall be the higher-level and middle-level school for training cadres above the regimental level in military affairs work who possess the ability to work fairly independently. d. Yan'an University, the Lu Xun Art Institute, and the Academy of Natural Sciences shall be schools for training talented people, both Party and nonParty, in the various higher-level and middle-level specialized fields of politics, culture, and science and iechnology. The curricula, teaching materials, and teaching methods of each of the various schools described above must be suited to its specific goals. 3. To strengthen the specific leadership of each school, and to see to it that the education provided in the various schools is coordinated with the various central organs doing the actual work, it has been decided that the Central Research Institute is to be directly under the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Party School is to be directly under the Central Party School Management Committee, the Military Academy is to be directly under the Military Commission's Staff Department, and Yan'an University, the Lu Xun Art Institute, and the Academy of Natural Sciences are to be directly under the Central Cultural Commission. The organ responsible for each school should treat the work of the school it is in charge of managing as an important part of its own professional work. The Central Propaganda Department should, in concert with the respective organs in charge of management, carry out unified planning, inspection, and supervision of the curriculum, instructors, teaching materials, and expenses of each school. 4. To realize the specific goals of each of the schools, and to maximize the effect of the limited energies and financial resources available, all schools should operate on the principle of fewer but higher quality in recruiting students. All schools and the organs in charge of them should reexamine the makeup of the student body, taking as the principle that all students who do not fit the specific goals of a particular school are to be assigned jobs or transferred to study elsewhere. 5. Improving the quality of the instructors is a determining factor in running a school well. The education of all cadres above the prefectural committee level and above the regimental level should be under the personal direction of Central Committee members and comrades in charge of the various central organs. Instructors

DECEMBER 194/

853

currently at the various schools should be reexamined and dealt with individually according to the new standards. The Central Propaganda Department should provide practical help to the specially appointed instructors at all schools so as to raise the level of quality. The political and material treatment of instructors should be improved. 6. The study of Marxist-Leninist theory is impossible without a relatively high level of education. Senior cadres above the xian level or the battalion level who are from worker and peasant backgrounds and who have too low an educational level but need to )earn and are capable of it should first be given remedial lessons. This kind of remedial learning should not be limited to simply recognizing more characters, but should include the attainment of reading and writing skills and of rudimentary knowledge in history and geography, social politics, and natural sciences. The criteria for constituting such basic education classes should be the students' level of education and not their rank on the job. 7. All schools of a specialized nature (such as military, politics and law, finance and economics, natural sciences, literature and the arts, normal education, medicine, and so on) should take as their main curricular focus the study of theory and practice relevant to their specialized field of work. The respective proportions of literacy courses, courses on politics, and courses in specialized subjects should be determined according to the situation at each school. Generally speaking, specializations should make up 50 percent of the courses (in schools where remedial education is not necessary, specialized courses should constitute 80 percent), literacy classes should make up 30 percent, and courses on politics should make up 20 percent. The abnormal phenomenon in the past of aiming to have courses on politics override all other courses must be firmly corrected. 8. All comrades who carry on educational work in the schools should earnestly examine the content of the curriculum and the teaching methods so as to put into effect the principle of unifying theory and practice with regard to curriculum content and teaching methods. As far as teaching methods are concerned, the style of inspiring, doing research, and experimentation should be adopted firmly so as to develop the students' self-motivation and creativity in their studies, and the styles of cram.ming, force-feeding, and using hollow words should certainly be abandoned. As far as the teaching process is concerned, the practical materials used in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and its adjacent areas should be fully utilized through all sorts of investigative and research methods. 9. As far as the teaching and learning of Marxism-Leninism are concerned, the erroneous orientation of the past, in which emphasis was laid not on understanding its essence but, rather, only on knowledge of its form, and in which emphasis was laid not on its application but, rather, only on repetition by rote, should be corrected resolutely. 2 The schools' authorities and instructors must pay full attention

2. The previous two sentences were added by Mao in the course of revising this decision. See Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 346.

854

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

to having the students progress from grasping the essence of Marxism-Leninism to specifically applying this essence to the study of China's environment. The standard by which to measure whether or not the student has truly grasped (comprehended, come to know, understood) something is whether or not he is able to apply it. What is meant here by application is using the spirit and methods of MarxismLeninism to analyze China's history and current concrete problems and to sum up the experiences of China's revolution, so that students will cultivate this habit of application, which will make them adept at applying the spirit and methods of Marxism-Leninism in analyzing problems and guiding their practice after they finish school. 10. As far as teaching materials in politics for the schools is concerned, full use should be made of Jiefang ribao, Central Committee documents, and the reference materials and books and publications put out by the various central depanments and committees. Various sons of necessary textbooks and supplementary reading materials should be compiled or reproduced according to a plan. In concert with the publishing organs and finance organs, the Central Propaganda Depanment should draw up a publishing plan and an expenditure budget in education for 1942 and submit them to the Central Committee for approval and implementation. II. Necessary improvements should be made with regard to student life and educational facilities in all the schools according to present circumstances. 12. The general principle for administrative organizations in the schools is shon and small in scope but strong and capable in action. The task of the Pany branch within a school is to ensure the completion of the school's educational plan and to correct the problematic phenomenon ofthe branch and the administration existing side by side. The branch may make suggestions to the school's administration through Party channels, but this cannot be done in an interfering manner.ln schools whose nature is that of the united front, the "Panification" work-style in which Party members run everything should be corrected. 13. Within the schools, the style of learning to be fostered among students includes thinking freely, seeking truth from facts, working hard and independently, abiding by discipline, being self-motivated and self-controlled, and helping one another in solidarity, and to be opposed firmly are the pernicious faults of subjectivism, sectarianism, dogmatism, aiming beyond one's limitations, making arbitrary assenions or following blindly, indulging in exaggeration, considering oneself always in the right, and being crude and careless or content with superficial understanding. Regarding the cultivation of this style of learning, the instructors themselves should serve as examples. 14. This decision shall apply to Yan'an. All basic principles within this decision, however, are applicable at the same time to all other anti-Japanese base areas. 3

3. The previous two sentences were aJso added by Mao during revision of this text.

Central Tasks in Our Work for the Year 1942 (December 28, 1941)

To the main responsible comrades in the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Party: The Pacific War is a long-term war, in that the Japanese bandits will be mired deeper and deeper in the southern Pacific, at present are moving troops southward from North China and Central China, and may possibly transfer other units in the future. Chongqing's policy is to use only guerrilla forces against the enemy instead of using the main force to fight them, so that the enemy will retreat, and we, too, should adopt this policy. Our base areas suffered great damage in 1941, and in 1942 we should take advantage of the enemy's being tied up in the Pacific and adopting a strategic defense position toward China to concentrate our efforts on regaining our strength. Firmly carry out the Central Committee's December 13 Directive' to develop better troops and simpler administration, develop the economy and the people's movement, develop our work in enemy-occupied areas, develop the political offensive against the enemy and the puppets, and train cadres in a planned fashion. Militarily it is to smash any possible "mopping up" on the enemy's part (any "mopping up" must be smashed firmly), regain areas from which the enemy has withdrawn; as for strongholds deep in our own areas, to the extent possible they should be forced into isolation and caused to withdraw of their own accord; with regard to certain of the most crucial places, the measure of regaining by force may be used in particular cases, but large-scale offensives should not be applied, as that could actually detain the enemy and provoke retaliatory "mopping up," which, instead of helping, would in fact harm us. Anything with overtones of adventurism, which could arise among the troops or in the localities, must be prevented. The overall world situation as well as the domestic situation will force the Guomindang to make certain political changes, but this process will be slow. The

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 385-86, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. 1. The editors of Wenji point out that this probably refers rather to the directive of December 17, "Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Work in Anti-Japanese Base Areas in the Enemy's Rear After the Outbreak of the Pacific War." 855

856 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

propaganda of our Party and our army must avoid provoking the Guomindang but, rather, must calmly observe the changes, criticize less, patiently endure as much as possible without becoming agitated. In sum, the central tasks for next year are to store up our forces, to regain our strength, to consolidate our internal ranks, and to consolidate the Party, the government, the military, and the people. With regard to the enemy and the puppets, political offensives are primary, supplemented by guerrilla warfare. With regard to the Guomindang, mediation and unity are primary, supplemented by preventing it from fighting against the Communists. If the enemy does not attack the Soviet Union, this is the policy we adopt as we wait to prey upon the enemy army's further weakness. If the enemy does attack the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union attacks the enemy, we have plenty of energy to coordinate with the Soviet Army in waging war. It is expected that all comrades will study this and carry it out. Central Secretariat Central Military Commission

-----.Part II: Brief Sayings and Inscriptions-----

Inscription for the First Issue of Military and

Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army (January 2, 1939)

Check the offensive of the enemy, and make preparations for our counterattack. Our source for this text is the index volume 10 Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. p. 143.

* * * Inscription fur Yang Haiquan (February 2, 1939)

Stay with the popular masses, and never keep aloof from them even for a second: then the Chinese Revolution will assuredly triumph. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. p. 143.

* * * Inscription for New China News of Yan'an (February 7, 1939)

Think more. Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. p. 143.

859

860

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Inscription for New China News of Yan'an (February 10, 1937)

Turn New China News into a vital new force in the War of Resistance. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujua11, p. 143.

* * * A Letter to Liang Yi (March 23, 19 [X) [X))1

China possesses excellent foundations. All we need to do is to organize them. First of all, we need to organize the people of the whole country in whom lies the victory of the resistance war. To Comrade Liang Yi MaoZedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, VoL 6, where it is reproduced from a Red Guard collection of 1967. I. The year is left blank in the available source.

* * *

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS

861

Inscription for the AntiJapanese Military and Political University (March 1939) On the one hand, study, and on the other, produce. Overcome hardships and the enemies will lose heart. Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 144.

* * * Inscription for Chen Xingmin (April18, 1939) Do not be afraid of difficulties or failures. If you insist on striving and studying hard, you will make progress and succeed! Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 144.

* * * Inscription for the AntiJapanese Military and Political University (April19, 1939) The deciding factor that makes an intellectual a revolutionary, a non-revolutionary, or a counter-revolutionary lies in whether he is willing to, and actually does, unite with the workers, peasants, and popular masses. This alone marks the distinction. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 144-45.

862

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Inscription for New China News of Yan'an (April19, 1939)1

Strive to eliminate illiteracy! Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 145. 1. Date of publication in the newspaper.

* * * Inscription for the Industrial Exhibit of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (April1939)

The proletariat are the vanguard in resistance to Japan. We must struggle resolutely to support the anti-Japanese war to the end, and to build a new China. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 145.

* * * Inscription for the Commemoration of the Third Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (June 1, 1939)

Stand at the foremost front line! Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Udong ji. Bujuan, p. 146.

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS 863

Dedication for Jiang Can (July, 1939)

Where there is spirit, anything can be accomplished. With every one working hard in the war of resistance against Japan and each person striving forward, there is no reason not to win after eight or ten years of fighting. We have translated this text from the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 147.

* * * Inscription for the Fuxiao Bao of the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army (1939)

Persist in the guerrilla war. We have translated this text from the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 147.

* * * Inscription for Xie Zizhang (1939)

Comrade Xie Zizhang is a national hero; Comrade Xie Zizhang, though dead, Jives in our hearts. Our source for this document is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 147.

864 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Elegiac Verse to the Memory of the Martyrs JiWio Died in the Pingjiang Massacre (August 1, 1939)

The Japanese bandits have encroached on us, a national crisis threatens, and the guns should be pointed outwards. We advocate war, and can rely on the spirit of the people, our wills must be concentrated. Our source for these verses is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 147.

* * * speech at the Graduation Exercises of the Fourth Group of Students at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (September, 1939)

We will unite the popular masses of the whole country, and with that concerted might we will overthrow Japanese imperialism and build a new China. This is not, however, a task that can be accomplished in a short period of time, so we must ··continue our efforts and strive for its realization." Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, where it is reproduced from Jiaoyu geming, no. 5.

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS

865

Inscriptiun for Han Zhongliang (September 1939) March along a bright road, struggle hard, and the final victory will be ours. Our source for this inscription i~ the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 149.

* * * Inscriptiun for the Volume Veritable Records of the Shaanxi-Ningxia-Gansu Border Area (1939) The border area is a democratic base area for the war of resistance against Japan, a place where the Three People's Principles are being carried out most thoroughly. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 150.

* * * Inscription for Esperantists of Yan 'an (December 9, 1939) I still maintain that Esperanto may and should be studied if it is used as a vehicle to convey the truths of genuine internationalism and revolution. MaoZedong December 9

This text was first published in Popola Mondo, Vol. I, no. 5, May 1950. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 131.

866

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Inscription for Xi 71umgxun (1939)

Put the interests of the Party in the first place. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 151.

* * * Inscripti(IIIS for the First Congress of the Cultural Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Work hard for the building of the new culture of the Chinese nation. Lu Xun's orientation is the orientation of the national culture of China.

Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 152.

* * * Inscription in Balujunjunzheng Zazhi (January 25, 1940)

Study while fighting, remain undaunted despite repeated setbacks, and make persistent efforts.

This inscription first appeared in Balujunjunzheng zazhi, Vol. 2, no. I; we have translated it from the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 152.

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS

867

Inscription for the Second Anniversary of the Founding of the Olina Branch of the Conference of the International Campaign Against Aggression (1940)

Just wars are bound to defeat wars of aggression. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 153.

* * * Inscription for New China News ofYan'an (February 7, 1940)

The war of resistance, unity, and progress-none of the three can be dispensed with. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 154.

* * * Inscription for Chinese Culture of Yan 'an (1940)

Let the cultural circles of Yan'an move into action, and struggle to defeat Japa· nese imperialism and build a new national culture. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 154.

868 MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Inscriptioo for The Chinese Worker (February, 1940)

Struggle to build a new-democratic Republic of China; best wishes on the publication of The Chinese Worker. This inscription first appeared in no. I of Zhongguo gongren, February 1940. Our source is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 154.

* * * Inscriptioo for Majin (Spring, 1940)

With a correct orientation and a style of hard struggle, victory will be ours. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 155.

* * * Inscriptioo for

Children~

Day

(April4, 1940)

Make progress every day. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 155.

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS

869

Inscription fur the May 4~~> Youth Day (1940)

The sole task confronting the young people of China at present is to defeat Japanese imperialism. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 156.

* * * Motto Inscribed fur Lun Xun Academy ofArt and Literature Gune, 1940)

Intensity, seriousness, industry, and modesty. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 156.

* * * Inscription fur the First Issue ofAmerican Overseas Chinese News Guly, 1940)

Arise, fight to the end for the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 157.

870 MAO'S ROAD 1V POWER

Inscription far the United Garment Workers' Union of the Overseas Chinese in New York, U.S.A. (July, 1940)

Consolidate and expand the national united front against Japan. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 157.

* * * Inscription far Wang Zhongfang and a Few Other Young Men from the Zedong Young Cadres' School (January 27, 1941)

One who is willing to learn and to do hard work, and is also revolutionary, is definitely useful, and definitely has a future. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 165.

* * * Inscription far Children'S Day (April13, 1940)

Take exceedingly good care of the children. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 168.

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS

871

Inscription on the Picture Album of a Painter (April, 1941)

A hazy and smoky village and a beach in the fog, Are easy to look at, but hard to paint; Had the artist known that this would not be appreciated by his contemporaries, He would have painted rather girls and flowers in red.

These lines were first published by He Qifang in Shidaide baogao, No. I, 1980. Our source is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 168, which reproduces this version.

* * * Inscription for "The special Issue Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University" (May, 1941)

Be brave, resolute and calm, learn in the struggle, and be ready at all times to sacrifice everything of our personal life for the cause of national liberation. Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 169.

* * *

872

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

To Liu Xuewei1 (July 15, 1941)

Comrade Xuewei: I have received and read your letter and the outline. 2 Although I cannot advise you, I am in favor of your writing this book. This is my reply to your letter. With salutations! Mao Zedong, July 15 Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 173, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. 1. Liu Xuewei was born in Langdai (now under the jurisdiction of the city ofLiupanshui) in 1912. 2. The reference is to the ''Outline of the History of the New Literature of China," written by Liu Xuewei.

* * * Telegram of Condolence to the Family of Zhang Chong (August 13, 1941)

Respectfully submitted to the family members of Mr. Zhang Huainan: We are shocked to learn of the death of Mr. Huainan, and feel deeply saddened. This telegram is specially sent to express our condolences. MaoZedong Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 59.

BRIEF SAYINGS AND INSCRIPTIONS

873

Elegiac Couplet fur Mr. Zhang Huainan (August 1941)

Supporting the great cause energetically, you have been working tirelessly to unite with the Communists internally and the Soviet Union externally, and constantly

persisting in this for seven years in succession; Hopelessly worn down by hard work, you have been hit by fever first and then by malaria, and deprived of your life to the accompaniment of endless weeping and tears. Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 171.

* * * Inscription fur Comrade Wang Guanlan (December 16, 1941)

Since we are here, we may as well make the best of it. You yourself do not worry at all, letting the forces of resistance gradually grow inside the body to fight against it until it is defeated in the end. This is the method for coping with chronic disease. If it is acute disease, you cannot do anything but let the doctor treat it. There is also no point in worrying about it, because your worry will not cure it. Toward diseases we should have strong fighting willpower, but not worry. This is my attitude toward disease. I am writing this for Comrade Wang Guanlan for reference. MaoZedong December 16 This inscription was first published in 1961. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. Vol. 7, p. 63, where it is reproduced from Dagong bao, March 16, 1961.

874

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Elegy to Mourn the Death of the Editor-in-Chief of Liberation Daily, Yang Song (December 26, 1941)

Comrade Yang Song was conscientious in his work, and was responsible. We should remember him, and learn from him! Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 173.

Bibliography

As in previous volumes, we include here, for the convenience of the reader, the short titles used for certain works, which are likewise given on the first appearance of each entry in the notes. The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2. Eds. John

K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Chen 11m wenxuan (Selected Writings of Chen Yun), Vol. I. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,

1984. Cheng Fangwu, Zhonhou zhong de daxue (A University in the Midst of the Fires of War). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982, p. 152. Chiang Kaishek, Soviet Russia in China. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Cudahy, 1958. Dangde wenxian (Party documents), nos. 2 (1992) and 4 (1995). Die rei guogong hez.uode xingcheng (How the Second Guomindang-Communist Cooperation Took Shape). Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989. Georgi Dimitrov, an Outstanding Militant ofthe Comintern. Sofia: Sofia Press. 1972. (Short title: Georgi Dimitrov.) Giles, Herbert A., A Chinese Biographical Dictionary, 2 Vols. Taipei, Chinese Literature House, 1962. Griffith, Samuel B., trans., Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963. (Short title: Griffith, Sun Tzu). lin Chongji, Mao Zedong zhuan 1893-1949 (Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893-1949). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996. (Short title: Jin, Mao.) JinChongji, Zhou Enlai zhuan 1898-1949(Biography ofZhou Enlai, 1898-1949). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989. (Short title: Jin, Zhou Enlai.) Jin Chongji, Zhu De zhuan (Biography ofZhu De). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993. (Short title: lin, Zhu De.) Kampen, Thomas, Die Fuhrung der KP Chinas und der Aufstieg Mao Zedongs ( 19311945) (The Leadership of the CCP and the Rise of Mao Zedong [1931-1945]). Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998. (Short title: Kampen, Rise of Mao.) Kampen, Thomas, Mao hdong, Zhou Enlai, and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist uadership. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000. Legge, James, The Chinese Classics. Vol. I, Analects and Doctrine ofthe Mean; Vol. II, The Works of Mencius; Vol. IV, The She King [Shijing}, or The Book of Songs; Vol. V, The Ch'un Ts'ew {Chunqiu} with the Tso Chuen [Zuo zhuan}. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960. Legge, James, The Sacred Books of China, part lll, the Li Ji, Vol. I. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vols. 1-4. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960-1965. (Short title: Selected Works.) Mao Zedongji (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), ed. Takeuchi Minoru. 10 vols. Tokyo: Hokuoosha, 1970-1972; second edition, Tokyo: Sososha, 1983.

875

876

8/BUOGRAPHY

Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan (Supplement to Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), ed. Takeuchi Minoru. 10 vols. Tokyo: Siisiisha, 1983-1986. Mao Zedong junshi wenji (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), Vols. 1-{i. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe and Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993. Mao 7-edong Nianpu. 1893-1949 (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893-1949), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi. 3 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993. (Short title: Nianpu.) Mao Zedong, "Concerning Investigations in the Countryside," in Mao Zedong noncun diaocha wenji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), pp. 21-27. Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983. Mao Zedong wenji (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wen xi an yanjiu shi. Vol. 2 (August 1937-December 1942). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993. Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan (Selected Writings by Mao Zedong on Journalistic Work). Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983. Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vols. 2 and 3. First edition, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1951. Second edition, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991. Mozi, book 10, chapters 40 and 41. Peng Dehuai zishu (Peng Dehuai's Autobiography). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981, p. 82. Saich, Tony, ed., The Rise to Power ofthe Chinese Communist Party. Documents and Analysis, 1920-1949. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. (Short title: Saich, Rise to Power.) Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967. Schram, Stuart, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. New York: Praeger, 1963. Sheng, Michael, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. (Short title: Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism.) Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988. (Short title: Shum, United Front.) Snow, Edgar, interviews in China Weekly Review, September 24-26, 1939. Snow, Edgar, Random Notes on Red China 1936-1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1957. (Short title: Snow, Random Notes.) Snow, Edgar, Red Star over China. London: Victor Gollancz, 1937. (Short title: Snow, Red Star.) Revised edition. New York: Grove Press, 1968. Stalin, Joseph, Works, Vols. 8 and 10. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954. Stalin, Joseph, Problems of uninism. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954. Teiwes, Frederick C., "Mao and His Lieutenants," in Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 19120 (1988), pp. 1-80. VanSlyke, Lyman, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. (Short title: VanSlyke, Enemies and Friends.) Wenxian he yanjiu (Documents and Research), ed. Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982, 1984, 1985, and 1986 volumes. Wu Xiuquan, Wode licheng (1908-1949) (My Career [1908-1949]). Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984. Xiao Yiping, ed,. Zhongguo gongchandang kangri zhanzheng shiqi dashiji, 1937-1945 (Important Events of the Chinese Communist Party in the Anti-Japanese War, 19371945). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988. Zhang Kuitang, ''Zhou Enlai yu Zhang Xueliang de jiaowang he youyi" (The Contacts and Friendship Between Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang), Dangde wenxian 3 (1991 ), pp. 51-56. (Short title: Zhang Kuitang, "Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang.")

8/BUOGRAPHY 877

Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao (A Summary Account of Chinese Communist Party Meetings), ed. Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Sheng. Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1991. (Short title: Party Meetings.) Zhongguo guomindang jiuqian jiangling (Nine Thousand Commanders of the Chinese Guomindang). N.p.: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1993. (Short title: Nine

Thousand Commanders.) Zhou En/ai nianpu, 1898-1949 (Chronological Biography ofZhou Enlai, 189&-1949), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and Renmin chubanshe, 1990. (Short title: Zhou Enlai nianpu.) Zhou Enlai shuxin xuanji (Selected Letters of Zhou Enlai). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988.

Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980, Vol. I. Zhu Xi, Sishujizhu (Annotations on the Four Books), p. 35.

Index

A

Abe Nobuyuki, 530 Academies, 87, 91, 852 Academy of Natural Sciences, 852 Accounting, 762-763 Agrarian Revolution, 299, 333, 432, 596n4, 708 Ah Q-ism, 214, 703 Ai Siqi, 820 Amau Eiji, 106 Anti-Comintern Pact, xliii, 171, 195,225, 232 Anti-Communist propaganda, 755-756

Anti-Communist upsurge, liiin31, Ixii, lxiv,lxvii Anti-Diihring, lxxii Anti-espionage policies, 601 Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, 42-43, 87, 9(}-91, 101-102, 159, 320, 814 Anti-Japanese National United Front: and big landlords and bourgeoisie, 765; Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party, 244, 252, 400; and Chiang Kaishek, 62~3; democratic culture, 360; democratic politics, 67; policies, 125, 597, 648, 708, 825; problems of tactics, 438-445; and Soviet Union, 764; Three People's Principles, 187, 352; and Wang Jingwei, 99; War of Resistance, 76, 120, 148, 226, 273, 300, 303, 394, 433, 473, 845 Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army, 727 Anti-Japanese War, 5, 9, 17n2, 18, 21, 26, 302, 308, 364, 744, 827; See also War of Resistance Anwu Youth Training Class, 255 April 12 Incident, 731, 733

Apter, David E., xxxviii, xi, xli, lxxii Army, expansion of, 57-59, 451, 475, 595, 693, 704 Artillery Regiment, 21 Associations: Border Area Cultural Association, 330; Chinese Communist Party Association, 91 n2, 93; Natural Science Research Association, 408; Northwest Youth Association for National Salvation, 93; Overseas Chinese Association, 823; Students' Salvation Association Conference, 166; Young Soldiers Association, 95-96 Attacks on Communist troops: antiCommunist movement, 529, 537; Chiang Kaishek, 539-540, 562-564, 57(}-571, 644, 781; Guomindang offensive, 611~13; New Fourth Army, 462, 464, 465-466, 671, 705; Southern Anhui Incident, 678, 680, 681, 683 August I Declaration, 273, 274, 276 B Bai Chongxi: 73rd Diet, 108; anti-

Communist stance, 537, 590; attacks on Communist troops, 681, 683; and Chiang Kaishek, lix, 570; Guangxi Army, 591 ; Japanese offensive, 677; November 9 telegram, 562; October 19 telegram, 533nl, 534, 541, 561, 640, 648, 712 Base areas, liii, lv, lvi, lxiv, 475, 496, 497, 516, 568, 569, 571, 576, 587 Battle of Henan, 673 Battle of the Hundred Regiments, lxii-lxiv, 586

879

880

INDEX

Battle of Yichang, 673, 677 Battle of Zhongtiao, 760 Bethune, Norman, 312-313 Bianqu qunz.hong bao (Border Region Masses), 575n2 BoGu, 776

Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party, lxvii, 244-254, 306, 766-768 Bomb factories, 822 Book of Poetry, 275, 307 Border Area Cultural Association, 330 Border Areas, 372-,373, 408-409, 579-580, 788_:790 Border Region Masses, 575n2

Border Region's Central Bureau, 577 Bourgeois classes: Anti-Japanese National United Front, 765; and the Chinese

revolution, 294-298; main factors in capitulation, 135-137; surrender to Japan, 116-119; and the War of Resistance, 440, 765 Boxer Uprising, 19n4, 66, 71 Britain: aid for China, 98-99; alliance with Chiang Kaishek and United States, 528, 529, 530-532, 536, 546; and Chinese surrender, 115-116; economic sanctions, 19, 118; foreign policies, 722-723; reaction to New Fourth Army Incident, 683-684; relations with China, 798-800, 845, 846-847; relations with Japan, 836; war with Japan, 844-845 Browder, Earl, 702 buji (falling short or rightism), 24nl2

c CC Clique, 590, 712 Cadre education. See Education of cadres Cai Chang, 850 Cai Qian, 823 Cai Tingkai, 121 Cai Yuanpei, 435

Caixi Township investigation, 709 Canada's Progressive Workers' Party, 312 Cao Juru, 58n I, 451 Cao Kun, 420, 422

Cao Rulin, 424 Capital. See Marx, Karl Capitalism, 283-284, 287, 332, 337 Capitulation, opposing, 104-115, 125, 129, 135-137, 144-147, 379-381, 384-386 Central Party School, lxix, 852

Central Plains Bureau, lvi Central Propaganda Department, 852

Central Research Institute, 852 Chamberlain, Neville: British

imperialism, 197; commander of counterrevolutionary front, 310; Communist Party policies, 12; and Hitler, 229; policies, 171-172, 194; and the Soviet Union, 195, 196, 222, 223, 225, 228, 232, 233, 236, 237, 421; view of Japan and Soviet aggression, 207 Chang, Carson. See Zhang Junmai Chang Yuqing, 604 Chang Zhongshi, 336 Changgang Township investigation, 709 Chen Boda, xxxix; "Philosophical Thought of Mozi, The," 22-25; "Philosophy of Confucius, The," 33-34, 38-39; study of Chinese history, 9 Chen Bulei, 687n2 Chen Cheng, 16, 536, 546, 681 Chen Detachment. See Chen Shiju Chen Duxiu, xxx, 75,297, 538, 597, 813 Chen Duxiuism, 249, 720 Chen Guang: bomb factories, 822; Communist Party policies, 462, 467, 520, 526, 675-676; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 690-691; deployments, 465,478, 515; and Guomindang, 807; Japanese offensive, 672-674; New Fourth Army, 456, 635; in Shandong, 267, 507, 715-716; situation in Central China, 604; Southern Anhui Incident, 629; and traitors, 383; War of Resistance, 735-736, 761 Chen Guofu, I08, 712n I Chen Huide, 512

INDEX 881

Chen Jitang, 121,681 Chen Lifu, 108, 213, 712nl Chen Ruiting's Regiment, 723

Chen Shaoyu, xxxvii, lxvii, lxviii, 29, 273n5 Chen Shiju, 265,317, 317n2, 318,328, 460 Chen Taiyun, 542, 544 Chen Tanqiu, 672 Chen Tie, 446

Chen Yi: and anti-Communist forces, lix, 519, 552; base areas, 587; bomb factories, 822; Communist Party policies, 462, 526, 675-676; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 690691; deployments, 568; guerrilla warfare, 726; and Guomindang, 639640, 807; January 20 order, 652; Japanese offensive, 672-674; military command of Communist forces, 611, 621; New Fourth Army, !vii, 464,474,475,497, 517, 521, 578, 582, 635, 638, 647-648, 660661; puppet troops and officers, 796-797; recruiting national capitalists, 523; in Shandong, 715716; situation in Central China, 326, 460, 496, 604; Southern Anhui Incident, 628, 629, 647; three strategic areas. 668-671; troop movements, 561, 584, 591; troops in Maolin, 624; united front work, 542, 544; War of Resistance, 377, 735736, 761 Chen Yun, 85, 408 Chen Zhengren, 792, 80 I Cheng Fangwu, I 52 Cheng Jiongming, 335 Cheng Qian, 328-329, 429, 437, 703 Cheng Ruhuai, 402, 639 Cheng Zihua, 635, 672, 690, 735, 822 Chiang Kaishek, xxxi; alliance with Britain and United States, 521-522, 528, 529, 530-532, 536, 546; antiCommunist upsurge, lxiv; Anti-

Japanese National United Front, 6263; attacks on Communist troops,

Chiang Kaishek (continued) !viii, 462,464, 465-466, 529, 537, 539--540, 562-564, 570-571, 611613,644,671,678. 680,705, 781; and Bai Chongxi, 570; Battle of the Hundred Regiments, 586; campaigns, xxxii; and Chen Yi, 690-691; on

China's revolution, 335; conunittee of parties and factions, 714; Communist troop movements, lv, 585, 593, 607, tllO; connections with bourgeois, 5 12; defection, xlix; Fifth Plenum, 206; and Gu Zhutong, 464, 517, 576. 578, 581, 637, 644, 517, 552, 563, 576, 578, 581, 63 7, 644; Guangxi Army, 591, 604; and the Guomindang, li, lix, 120, 598, 732; Guomindang-Communist conflicts, xxxiii, 672-674, 683, 686-688, 693, 698, 704, 711, 712-713, 795; and He Yingqin, 108, 571; and January 17 order, lxi, 646, 654; and Japan, xliii, 17, 107, 110, 111, 326, 534, 576, 668, 677, 736, 755-756; leadership, 99; and Lu Zhonglin, S8n3; Lushan talk, 555, 595; and Mao Zedong, xli, xliv, xlvi, 186, 187, 463, 545; military offensive, 429-431, 446, 449-450, 465, 496, 5 17-S 18, 590; and national spirit, 60-61, 213; and the Ninety-seventh Division, 328; November 9 telegram, 55 I; October 19telegram, 533nl; People's Political Council, 696-697; policies, 779; post Southern Anhui situation, 663-664; provincial and warlord forces, lvi; publications, IS; quotes, 76, 77, 96, 101; relations with Communist Party, 637, 645, 655, 656, 660, 777; scare tactics, 573-574; and the ShanxiChahar-Hebei Border Region, 40-41; Southern Anhui Incident, 629, 630, 631,634, 635; and Sun Yatsen, SOn!; and Tani Masayuki statement, I09; and Three People's Principles, 146; twelve demands, 703-704; and Wang Jingwei, 14, 108, 115, 128, 180, 380,

882 INDEX

Chiang Kaishek (continued) 385, 388-390, 399; and War of Resistance, 5, 112, 175, 178,437, 444, 483, 725, 761; and Zhou Enlai, 203 China: capitulation issues, 104-1 ! 5, 125, 129, 135-137, 144-147, 378-381, 384-386; cultural revolution, 358360; and democracy, 216-217, 22(}... 221, 319, 416-417; peace in the

major regions, 429-431; relations with Britain, 98-99, 798-800, 845, 846-847; relations with Soviet Union, xlii, 31, 119, 237-238, 735;

relations with United States, 798800, 845, 846-847; stalemate with Japan, 123-124, 135-136, 174, 201; struggle against Japanese imperialism, 44-47, 6(}...65; study movement, 81-89, 131; women's movements, 44-49, 132; youth movements, 69-79, 92-97, 132, 255, 414; See also "On New Democracy" Chinese Communist Party: accounting, 762-763; anniversary of War of Resistance, 77(}...775; antiCommunist propaganda, 755-756; appointments, 694; associations, 9ln2, 93; basic mission, 119-124, 74(}...741; a Bolshevik Party, lxvii, 244-254, 306, 400, 766-768; and the Chinese revolution, 305-306; December Ninth Movement, 276277; education of cadres, 131, 159, 747-754, 780, 783-785, 819, 820, 833, 835, 838, 851-854; founding fathers, 75n23, 76n24; General Command Headquarters, 670; investigation of prominent people, 511-513; leadership,lxvi-lxix; making leftist mistakes, 526; methods for handling antiCommunists, 525, 562-564; military and political committee, 549-550; military command, 620, 621, 622; military strategy, 449-450, 451-452, 453, 465-466, 478-479;

Chinese Communist Party (continued) model youths, 92-97; organization, 132-133; Party building, lxix-lxxv; policies, lxv, 467-468, 470-474, 491-495, 498-503, 504-506, 594603, 645, 69(}...691, 719-721, 839842; political power, 432-434; reactions to New Fourth Anny Incident, 68(}...684; on recruiting intellectuals, 262-264; relations with Soviet Union, 31, 119, 237-238, 663, 735, 769, 776-778; relations with United States, 546; in Shandong, 507-508; as social revolutionaries, 218-221; support of Chiang Kaishek, 186, 187, 463, 545; and tactics for consolidation, 138140; tasks towards war, 124-134, 257-259, 566-567, 764; ten major tasks, 396-397; three strategic areas, 668-671; twelve demands, lxi, 689, 703; University courses on, 42; women as comrades, 45; Young Soldiers Association, 95n 10 Chinese Culture, 330, 331 Chinese National Liberation Vanguard, 93 Chinese revolution: character of the revolution, 301-306; and Mao Zedong, xxix-xxxv; motive forces, 293-301; and "On New Democracy" (Mao), 333-338; revolutionary movements, 288-289; and Sun Yatsen, 7(}...79; targets of the revolution, 289-292; tasks of the war, 292-293 Chinese society, xxxi; capitalism, 283284, 287, 332, 337, 357; the Chinese nation, 279-281; class struggle, 813-814; classes. 293-301; feudal society, 281-285, 287, 332; imperialist powers, 285-288 ..Chinese Soviet Republic," xxxii Chinese Women, 100 Chinese Worker, The, 412-413 Chu Minyi, 426 Churchill, Winston, 745, 798-799 Class struggle in China, 812-814

INDEX 883

Closed-doorism, 26, 249, 841, 842 Communist-Guomindang conflicts, 1-li,

672-674, 698, 699-701, 711, 712-713; See also Southern Anhui

Incident Communist-Guomindang cooperation: after May Fourth Movement, 272; capitulation issues, 129; and January 17 order, 646; military relations, liv; and national spirit, 61, 127; stages of cooperation, 152; tactics for consolidation, 138; tasks towards war, 764; Three People's Principles, 113, 146; united front, 148-154, 253, 258, 362, 389, 807; and Wang Jingwei, 187; War of Resistance, xlviii-li, 436-437, 446, 459, 472 Communist International, lxvi Communist Manifesto, xxxi, 92, 812 Communist, The, lxvii, 244 Communist troop movements, 584-585, 591, 593,607, 610,617, 632 Concentration camps, 402, 411 Confucius: on agricultural production, 78; Ji Sun, 652; model youths, 92; quote, 204; theories, 36-37; Three Character Classic, 87-88; Xiang Tuo, 87-88; and Zai Yu, 84; Zhongni, 88; See also "Philosophy of Confucius, The" Congress of the Nationalities Against Fascism, 823 Constitutional government, 415-423, 424-428 Counteroffensive, preparations for, 181185 Course in Dialectical Materialism. See Shirokov Cultural and educational policies, 602 Current Affairs Series. 243 D Dai Jiying, 466 Daladier, Edouard, 172, 192, 194, 197, 232, 233 Das Kapital, lxxii

Dazhong Ribao, 325 Dazhong xizuo (Exercises in Composition for the Broad Masses), 575n2 December Ninth Movement, 270-278, 296, 333, 364 Democracy in China, 214, 216-217, 220-221, 319, 401n4, 416-417; See also "On New Democracy" Deng Xiaoping, lxiii, 265, 383, 456, 462, 467, 526, 635, 672, 675, 690, 735, 757, 809 Deng Yanda, 120 Deng Yingchao, 649, 699, 700 Deng Zihui, 647, 652, 660-661, 669, 735 Deployments, 465, 478, 479, 568 Deserters, 149-151,290 Diehards, liv, lvi, lxiv, 389, 419-423, 432, 433,438,441,442-443,459, 471, 472, 598

Dimitrov, Georgi, xxxiii, 833 Director General, SOn I; See also Sun Yatsen Doctrine of the Mean, 23n9, 24nll, 3435 Dong Biwu, 370, 649, 672, 675, 695, 699, 700, 703, 838 Duan Qirui, 422, 424 Dynasties: Eastern Han, 10; Han, 94n7, 282, 557; Ming, 9, 282, 403; Nonhero, 9; Qin, 281, 282, 332; Qing, 9, 282, 341; Shu Han, 48nl; Song, 282; Southern, 9; Southern Song, 9; Sui, 282; Tang, 282, 307, 311, 403; Yuan, 282; Zhou, 281,282, 332

E Eastern Han Dynasty, Ban Chao and, 10; See also Han Dynasty Economic and Financial Problems, lxxiii Economic policies, 602, 788-790, 791, 801 Education of cadres, Jxxi. lxxii, 84, 131, 159, 747-754, 780, 783-785, 819, 820, 833, 835, 838, 851-854 Educational Mobilization Meeting, 81

884

INDEX

Educational policies, 602 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, The, xxxi Eighth Route Army: accomplishments, 6; anti-Japanese campaign, 348; Artillery Regiment, 21; attacks by Guomindang, 531-532, 642; and British aid, 98-99; central tasks for 1942, 855-856; and common people. 372-373; composed of Party members. 32; deployment, 568-569, 582, 736, 759-760; and education, 131, 159; and guerilla warfare. 41; and Guomindang, 755-756, 777, 807; heroic deeds, 56; Japan's policy of inducing surrender, 115; longterm struggle, 779-780; medical service, 313; Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army,

5, 8, 144; military policies, 602-603; October 19 telegram, 533, 640;

Fan Wenlan, on classical studies, 509-510

Far Eastern Munich Conference, 379, 384, 392 Fascism, 799-800, 823, 824 Feng Guozhang, 420, 424 Feng Wenbin, 92, 94 Feng Yuxiang, 58n3, 121. 637, 681, 682 Feng Zhi' an, 543, 644 Feudal society, 281-285. 332, 333. 358 Fifth Plenum, 117, 129, 206, 808 Finance policies, 788-790, 791. 801 Foster, William Zebulon, 724 France, 115-116, 482-483 Friction, between communists and nationalists, I, liv, lvi, )viii, lxiv Fu Qiutao, 626, 627, 634, 635, 638 Fu Xing Society, 712 Fu Zhong, 42n I. 267 Fu Zuoyi, 681 G

organizational hegemony over workers and peasants, 219-220; Peng Dehuai, lv, lxiii, 504, 759-760; problems and shortcomings, 7-8;

Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, 18; and Soviet Red Army, 30; Staff Work Conference, 141142; study movement, 83, 89; support of other Communist forces, 266, 462; and traitors, 383; University courses on, 42; and Wang Jingwei, 17; War of Resistance, 739, 845 Electoral Law of the National Assembly, need to revise, 426

Encirclement and Suppression campaign, xxxii-xxxiii 375, 514n3, 596 Engels, Friedrich, 310, 812 Enlarged Politburo Plenum, lxix, lxxiv Exercises in Composition for the Broad Masses, 575n2

F Fan Hanjie, 431, 446, 677 Fan Rui, 512

Gao Luo, 74 Gao Gang, 672, 80 I, 805 Gao Kelin, 806 GaoZili, 801 de Gaulle, Charles, 529 General Command Headquarters, 670

Gennan invasion, xlv, xlvi, 208 Gennan~Soviet nonaggression pact, xliv, 170-174, 195, 221-222. 225, 228, 229,231,232, 233, 237, 257 Germany, 742-743, 764, 770, 776-778, 781, 798-799, 836; See also Hitler, Adolf Great Leap Forward, xxxv Great Revolution of 1927,95, 126, 165, 247. 272, 300. 335, 345, 597 Gu Zhutong: anti·Communist stance, 470, 475; base areas, lvi; and Chiang Kaishek, 552, 563; New Fourth Army, lix, 464, 517, 576,578, 581. 637, 644; Southern Anhui Incident, 473, 631. 640, 641, 651; troop movements, 560, 593; twelve demands, 689 Guan Gong, 277n7

INDEX

Guan Wenwei, !vii, 496, 640 Guan Xiangying, 318, 328, 453, 635, 672, 690, 735, 822 Guangxi Army, lvii, 591, 607, 675, 677, 704

Guangxi Clique, 733, 736 Guerrilla areas, 374-376, 668, 670

Guerrilla warfare: base areas, Iii, 587; behind Japanese lines, xxxiii, 16, 254, 258, 259, 846-847; behind Red Army, 326n2; in Central China, 645; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 521, 690--691; deployments, 478; Eighth Route Army, 7; enemy-occupied areas, 181, 182,202, 242; expansion of Army, 595; long-term struggle, 776-778, 781; Mao Zedong, xxxii; military and political committee, 549; and Mo Dehong, 569; and New Fourth Army, 266, 464, 518, 578; in North China, 5, 6, 834; People's Political Council, 17; policies, 597; from Shanghai to Fuzhou, 726; in Southern Anhui, 516, 517; and Wang Jingwei, 41; War of Resistance, 243, 250; in Zhongtiao Mountains, 795 "Guidelines for the War of Resistance and Building the Country," 556 guo (excess or leftism), 24nl2, 35 Guo Moruo, 38, 158 Guo Taiqi, 781 Guo Gaoru (Guo Moruo's father), 158nl Guomindang-Communist conflicts, 1-li, 672--{,74, 686--{,88, 698, 699--701, 712-713, 712-713 Guomindang-Communist cooperation: after May Fourth Movement, 272; capitulation issues, 129; and January 17 order, 646; military relations, liv; and national spirit, 61, 127; stages of cooperation, 152; tactics for consolidation, 138; tasks towards war, 764; Three People's Principles, 113; united front, 146, 253, 258, 362, 389, 807; and Wang Jingwei, 187; War of Resistance, xlviii-li, 148-154,436-437, 446, 459, 472

885

Guomindang (Nationalist Party): antiCommunist propaganda, 755; attacks on Communist troops, 462, 464, 465--466, 529, 537, 581, 594, 611613, 732; capture of Communist leaders, 636; and Chen Yi, 639--f>40, 807; and Chiang Kaishek, 120; Communist counterattack, 637; and Confucius, 36; December Ninth Movement, 272; and declaration of First National Congress, 342; Fifth Plenum, 18; Huangpu Military Academy, 91; second antiCommunist onslaught, 731-734; Sun Yatsenism Study Society, 95nl0; surrender, 104; Three People's Principles, 113, 115, 123; troop movements, 514-515, 516; and Wang Jingwei, 5n2, 16; and War of Resistance, 14, 26, 40--41, 117; youth organization, 77; Zhang Junmai, 17n2 H Han Deqin: anti-Communist stance, 470; anti-Japanese campaign, 736; attacks on Communist troops, lx, 640, 642, 649, 693; base areas, lvi, 475,516, 568, 569, 571, 576, 587; Communist offensive, 519, 552, 563; Communist troop movements, 584, 629, 635; in Eastern Anhui, 465, 472; Guangxi Army, Ivii; New Fourth Army, Iviii, 517, 521; relations with Communists, lix, 520; in Shandong, 715; situation in Central China, 460, 496, 514 Han Dynasty, 94n7, 282, 557; See also Eastern Han Dynasty Han Guojun, 523, 579 Han Yu (Han Wengong), 86n5 Hand grenades, 822 hao telegram, lix, 533nl, 534, 541, 5Sinl He Ganzhi, 9 He Long, 318, 328, 453, 635, 672, 685, 690, 735, 787, 822

886 INDEX

He Wending, 787 He Xiangning, 120, 681

He Yingqin: anti-Communist stance, 537, 590; attacks on Communist troops, 644, 651, 680, 681, 683, 745, 781; and Chiang Kaishek, lix, 108, 571; emergency telegram, 636; Japanese offensive, 677; military provisions, 573; New Fourth Army, 581; November 9 telegram, 562; October 19 telegram, 533nl, 534, 541, 561, 640, 648, 712; pro-Japanese faction, 681; speech at commemorative meeting, 570; traitor, xliii; twelve demands, 689; Zhu Huaibing Incident, 450 He Zhonghan, 186 He Zhuguo, 239,467, 517, 564, 668, 673, 715 He Zizhen, Mao's wife, xxxix Heraclitus, 22 Hess, Rudolf, 745 High-level study and research groups, 1xxiv, 819, 820, 833, 835, 843 Hirota, KOki, 106, 107, 110 History of Socialism, 812 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 832, 833, 834, 851-852 Hitler, Adolf: anti-Bolshevik crusade, 800; on socialism, 75; and Chamberlain, 192, 195, 223; Czechoslovakia, xliii; France, 482; German invasion, xlvi, 208,771, 844; and Hacha, 121; Japan, 481, 678, 824; Jews, 825; Middle East, 777; Poland, 227; Soviet Union, 214, 222, 228, 229, 232, 742, 743, 745, 770

Hong Kong strike against Wang Jingwei, 189 Hong Men Society (of New York), 705-706 House of Commons (UK), Mao's telegram to, 667 Hu Shi, 25, 38n3, 509

Hu Zongnan, 317, 565, 568, 570, 571, 590, 645, 663, 675, 677, 704, 735, 760 Huang Kecheng: base areas, 587; Communist offensive, 519, 552, 569; Communist Party policies, 526, 675-676; deployments, 465, 478, 479, 568; Eighth Route Army, 669; long-term struggle, 781-782; New Fourth Army, 521, 660-661, 671, 694; policy toward intermediate forces, 467; recruiting national capitalists, 523; in Shandong, 267;

situation in Central China, 496, 604; troop movements, 591; united front work, 542; War of Resistance, 735-736 Huang Shaohong, 464, 578

Huang Xing, xxix Huang Yanpei, 406, 523, 682, 704

Huangpu faction, need to cooperate with, 565 Huangpu Military Academy, 91

Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region, 668-669 Hundred Regiments Offensive, lxii-lxiv, 586, 760 Huo Shouyi, 563, 564, 568, 571, 576, 715

Imperialism, 44-47, 60-65, 599, 740741, 742-746 Incidents: April 12,731, 733; Maolin, 619, 624, 627, 635, 638, 640; Marco Polo Bridge, 105, 106, 144, 208, 555n3; May 21, 731, 733; Mukden Incident, I 06n4, 778n6; New Fourth Army, liiin31, Ivii, lxviii, 680-684; September 18, 207, 208; Shandong, 554; Xi'an, 815; Zhongtiao mountain and Luoyang, 777; Zhu Huaibing, 450; See a/.so Southern

Anhui Incident India, 240

Industrial cooperatives, 230

INDEX

International and domestic situation, 489-491' 529, 530-532, 836-837 International War, estimate of situation, 848-849 Investigations, lxxiii, lxxiv, 511-513, 709, 812-817 ltagai, Seishiro, Ill, 778

January 17 order: Chiang Kaishek, lxi, 654, 655, 679; Communist-

Guomindang cooperation, 646; Communist Party policies, 648; and Japan, 684; Military Commission, 650; New Fourth Army, 705; Southern Anhui Incident, 656, 658, 660, 673, 675, 678, 687, 696, 699, 732; twelve demands, 689 January 20 order, how to deal with, 656 Japan: capitulation issues, 104-115, 125, 129, 135-137, 144-147; economy, 18-19; leased territories, 19; policy of inducing capitulation, 104-115, 129, 135-137; puppet governments, 109-1 I0; relations with Chiang Kaishek, 17, 107, 110, Ill, 326, 534, 576; relations with Wang Jinwei, 17, 93, 112, 163, 329, 353, 354, 380n I, 385, 388-390, 410, 447-448, 576, 594; Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, xlvi, 717-718; stalemate with China, 123-124, 135-136, 174, 201; war with Britain, 844-845; war with United States, 527-528, 530-532, 844-845 Japan in the Occupied Areas, 243 Japanese imperialism, 44-47, 60-65 Japanese Imperialism at War; 243 Japanese offensive, 668, 672-674, 673, 675, 677 Japanese-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty, xlv, 237-238 Jiang Dingwen, 213, 241,429 Jiang Hengyuan, 406 Jiang Qing, xxxix

887

Jiang Ziya (Jiang Taigong), 74n20, 152, 276 Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily), 738, 740-741, 763, 854

June Third Movement, 361 K Kang Baiqing, 93, 94 Kang Sheng, lxix, 763 Kang You wei, 509 Kautsky, on class struggle, 812 Kawagoe, Shigeru, 108 Kawakami, Hajime, 82 Kemal, Mustafa (AtatUrk), 345; Kemalism, 346, 350 Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung), 512 Konoe, Fumimaro, 14, 109, 110, 118, 178; Konoe statement, 112 Krupskaia, 48n3

L Labor movement, 132 Labor policies, 600 Lai Chuanzhu, 52n2, 647, 652, 735, 822 Land policies, 601 Landlord class, 294 Leadership, Chinese Communist Party, lxvi-lxix League of Nations, 194, 232 Leased territories, 19 Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, 820, 833, 835

Leng Xin, 470, 517, 519, 640, 693 Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich, xxxv, 49n3, 190, 310, 331, 356, 361, 812, 815 Leninism, xxx, 42, 224, 251, 252,253, 254, 297, 310, 311, 312, 367 Li Benyi, attacks new fourth army, 457 Li Chang, 271 Li Changjiang, 523, 542, 693, 797 Li Fuchun, 370, 792 Li Kenong, 5 II, 5 12, 546, 570 Li Lisan, lxxiii, 252, 315, 808 Li Liuru, 13, 58n2, 452, 850 Li Mingyang, 378, 475, 523, 542

888

INDEX

Li Pinxian: anti-Communist forces, 520, 568; attacks on Communist troops, 535, 539, 542, 543, 544, 563, 570, 611. 640, 642, 644, 649, 680; Chiang Kaishek, 533; Communist troop movements, 449, 593, 607, 610, 632; Guangxi Army, !vii; Japanese offensive, 673; New Fourth Army, !viii, 456, 457, 458, 465; in Northern Jiangsu, 496; relations with Communists, lix; in Southern Anhui, 517. 538 Li Shengwu, 179 Li Tao, 436 Li Weihan, 88n7, 89, 476 Li Xiannian: Communist Party policies, 526, 675; diehards, 472; expansion of Army, 693, 704; Japanese offensive, 672; New Fourth Army, 454, 465, 649, 660-
Liu Shaoqi (Hu Fu) (continued) 822; Communist Party policies, 462, 526, 528, 580, 645, 675~76; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 690691; deployments, 378, 465, 568; guerrilla warfare, 726; and Guomindang, 807; January 17 order, 646, 654; January 20 order, 652; Japanese offensive, 672~74; longterm struggle, 779-780, 781-782; military tactics, 460; New Fourth Army,lxi, 326nl, 449,456, 457, 466, 584, 611, 621, 635, 638, 647, 6~61; policy toward intermediate forces, 467; puppet troops and officers. 79&-797; recruiting national capitalists, 523; in Shandong, 715716; situation in Central China, 604; Southern Anhui Incident, 582, 628,

629; subjectivism and sectarianism, 811; Third "Left" Line, 826n I; three strategic areas, 668~71; troop movements, 585, 617, 632; troops in Maolin, 624; united front work, 542; War of Resistance, 735-736, 761; on Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping, 620 Liu Xian (maker of woodcuts), 261 Liu Yazi, 681 Liu Zhidan, 165 Liu Zijiu, 436 Lloyd George, 195, 225, 232 Long March, xxxii, xl Lu Chao, 256 Lu Xun, 214, 273, 359, 360; Lu Xun Art Institute, 852 "Lu Zhongcai's Account of the Long March," Mao praises, 806 Lu Zhonglin, 58n3, 452, 468 Luo Binghui, 466, 640, 694 Luo Fu. See Zhang Wentian Luo Jialun, 93n6, 94 Luo Mai. See Li Weihan Luo Ronghuan: bomb factories, 822; Communist Party policies, 462, 520, 526, 675-676; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 690-691; deployments, 465, 478, 515; Guomindang, 807;

INDEX

Luo Ronghuan: bomb factories (continued) Japanese offensive, 672--674; New Fourth Army, 456, 635; policy

toward intermediate forces, 467; in Shandong, 267, 507, 715-716;

889

Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 105, 106, 144, 208, 555n3 Marx, Karl, 310,331,812,814,815 Marxism: beliefs of youth, 75; and classical studies, 509; closed-

situation in Central China, 604;

doorism, 26; Communist Party

Southern Anhui Incident, 629; and

curriculum, 133, 150, 367, 368; ideology, 297, 310, 708; Mao Zedong's education, 275; and natural

traitors, 383; War of Resistance, 735-736, 761

science, 409; and subjectivism, 808, M Ma Liang (Ma Xiangbo), 371 MaNa. See Thailand

Ma Zhanshan, General, Mao's welcome for, 314 Manchurian Incident, 106n4, 778n6 Mao Zedong: birth, xxix; brother, 469n I,

809; daughters, xxxix; December Ninth Movement, 270n2, 27ln4; favorite books, 48nl; "Lecture Notes

on Dialectical Materialism," xli; living conditions, xxxviii; "New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture," 319n2; "On Contradiction," xli; "On People's

809; theory and practice, 88, 251, 252, 253,254, 311, 749; Three People's Principles, 50, 63, 67--68;

three strategic areas, 86; War of Resistance, 28; Zhang Guotao, 76

Marxism-Leninism, xxxiii, lxvii, lxxi, 747-754, 785, 810, 829, 851-854 Massacres: Pingjiang, 160-164, 205, 389, 391, 402, 555, 640; Queshan, 389, 391. 402, 555, 640 Matsumoto, Shin' ichi, 113 Matsumura, Koryo, I06 Matsuoka, YOsuke, 711 May First Labor Day, 60

May Fourth Movement: and Chinese

144, 390; "On the New Stage,"

revolution, 47, 302, 333, 338, 358, 359, 360, 365; and December Ninth Movement, 274, 275; First Great Revolution, 272; growth and development, 66--68; student

xxxiv, xli, xlviii, 144, 390;

movement, 296; twentieth

Democratic Dictatorship," xxxiv; "On Practice," xli; "On Protracted War," xxxiii, xli, xlviii, liv, II, 43.

philosophies, xxx; "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan," xli, liv; "Problems of

Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerilla War," xxxiii; reading list, 812, 82~21; sons, xxxix, 168, 665, 665-666; teacher, 370n3; "Third Left Line," 826n I; views toward

Western powers, xliii; wives, xxxix; as young student, xxix, 92, 275, 509n3; See also "On New

Democracy" Maolin Incident, 619, 624, 627, 635, 638, 640 "March eighth" (Women's Day), Mao on, 44,47

anniversary, 69-79, 92-93; and

youth movement, 95 May Thirtieth Movement, 296, 333,361, 362

Military Affairs Commission, !vi, lviii, lxiii, 685, 852 Military and political committee, 549550 Military districts in North China, 802803 Ming Dynasty, 9, 282, 403 Mo Dehong, 563, 564, 569, 571, 588, 591, 607, 658 Mobile warfare, 5, 7, 16 Model youths, Mao on, 92-97, 103 Moist school, 23-25

890

INDEX

Movements: December Ninth, 270-278, 296, 333, 364; June Third, 361; labor, 132; May Thirtieth, 296, 333, 361, 362; production, 81-82, 131, 577; Reform, of 1898, 38n3, 71; revolutionary, 288-289; study, 8189, 131; women's, 44-49, 132; youth, 69-79, 92-97, 132, 255, 414; See also May Fourth Movement Mukden Incident, 106n4, 778n6 Mussolini, Benito, 75,481,771, 844 N Nagai, Ryfitaro, calls for overthrow of Chiang government, 110 Nan Hanchen, 590, 801 Nanhua, 189 Napoleon I, 277 National Assembly, Mao calls for revision of, 426-428 Nationalism, Mao on, 60-65

Natural Science Research Association, Mao launches, 408 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 169, 240 New-democratic constitutional government, 416-417 New Fourth Army: anti-Japanese campaign, 348; attacks by Guomindang, !viii, lxii, 462, 464, 465-466, 514n4, 531-532,581, 689; base areas, Ivi; central tasks for 1942, 855-856; deployment, 576, 593, 595, 607, 608, 632, 736; and Eight Route Army, 456-458; expansion of Army, 475; extermination, 641, 705; and Guomindang, 755-756, 807; heroic

Liaison Office, 161; regrouping, 668-{;69, 675; Shaanxi-Gansu-

Ningxia Border Region, 18; in Southern Anhui, lxi, 517-518,618, 619, 627,629, 630, 638; Staff Conference, 52-53; study movement, 83, 89; tasks towards war, 454-455; and Wang Jingwei, 17; War of Resistance, 739, 845; and Xiang Ying, 326n2; See also Southern Anhui Incident Nie Rongzhen, lxiii, 43n3, 265, 318, 453, 504, 635, 672, 685, 690, 735, 822 Northern Expedition, 66, 72, 272, 274, 290, 308, 333, 338, 361, 362, 363 November 9 telegram, 547-548,551-552, 553-559, 562, 570, 612, 640, 650, 656, 678, 713, 733

0 October 19 telegram, 533, 534, 541, 547, 553, 570, 573, 640, 648, 687; See also November 9 telegram Old and New Armies in Shanxi, 265-266, 317, 318 "On New Democracy," li, 330-369

"On People's Democratic Dictatorship," xxxiv ''On Practice," xli "On Protracted War," xli, xlviii, liv, 11, 43, 144

"On the New Stage," xxxiv, xli, xlviii, 144 Opium War, 66, 71, 270,277,283, 287, 332, 333, 358, 749

p

deeds, 56; Incident,liiin3l,lvii,

lx viii, 680-684; international reactions to battle, 680-684; leadership, 621, 622, 623, 625, 660661, 694; long-term struggle, 779-

780; military policies and tactics, 460-461, 589, 602-{;03; October 19 telegram, 533, 640; operational principles, 521-522, 578; Pingjiang

Pacific War, xlvii, 848-849, 855; See also World War 11 Party building, Communist, lxix-lxx v

Pearl Harbor, xlv, xlvii; See also Pacific War; World War 11 Peasantry, xxxi-xxxii, 298-299 Peng Dehuai: artillery headquarters, 685;

Hundred Regiments offensive, lxiv,

INDEX

Peng Dehuai (continued) 586; Communist Party policies, 328, 462, 520, 526, 645, 675-676; Eighth Route Army, lv, 504, 759--760;

expansion of Army, 451; guerrilla warfare, 795; and Guomindang cooperation, 807; consequences of Chiang Kaishek's January 17 order, 646; military and political committee, 549; Mao's instructions regarding military tactics, 460; New Fourth Army, lxi, 456, 635; order to prepare for cooperation with Soviet Army, 769; and Wang Jingwei, 16, 447n I Peng Xuefeng, 449,456,465-467, 516, 640, 649, 661, 668, 671, 690, 694, 715-716, 765 Peng Zhen, lxix, 43n3, 265, 504, 672, 690 People's Political Council: Chiang Kaishek, 17,679, 696-697, 698, 703; Communist Party's twelve demands, 689, 692; Conference, xlix; growth and development, 177180; Inspection Corps, 405-407; Southern Anhui Incident, 699-701, 713; War of Resistance, IS, 185 Petain, Henri Philippe, 528, 529, 537 Peter the Great, xxx v "Philosophy of Confucius," Mao on Chen Soda's interpretation, 33-34, 38-39 Pingjiang Massacre, 160-164, 205, 389, 391, 402, 555, 640 Poland, 227-228, 235-237, 257 Politburo, xxxii, xxxiv, xi, xlvii, lxix, lxxiv, 58, 89, 130, 452, 474, 766, 790, 826n I, 849 Production Movement, 81-82, 131, 577 Proletariat, Mao on, 299-301

Q Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu), 776 Qin Dynasty, 281,282, 332 Qin Qirong, 205, 520 Qing Dynasty, xxix, 9, 282, 341 Queshan massacre, 389, 391, 402, 555, 640

89/

R Rao Shushi: guerrilla warfare, 726;

investigation of prominent people, 511, 513; military command of Communist forces, 620, 621, 622, 623; New Fourth Army, 625;

report on Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area, 670; Southern Anhui Incident, 628, 629, 634; troops in Maolin, 624 Rectification Campaign, xxxiv, xxxvii, xi,

xli, lxvi, lxxii, lxxv Red Army, xxxii, 30, 233, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 314, 326n2. 364, 639, 808 Reform Movement of 1898, 38n3, 71 Ren Bishi, lxix, 826nl Ren Zhuoxuan. See Ye Qing Revolution of 1911, 47, 66, 67, 71, 290, 296, 300, 333-334, 338, 358, 361 Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 6n3, 48nl, 149, 277n7, 400n3, 796nl Roosevelt, Franklin D., 12, 223, 745, 798-799 Rural survey postscript, 719-721 Rural survey preface, 708-710

Russia. See Soviet Union Russian October Revolution of 1917, 334, 335, 337, 338, 345, 359, 747, 829

s Saich, Tony, xxxviii, xi, xli, lxxii Salt production, 789, 805

Schunnann, Franz, xli Sectarianism,lxix,lxxiii, Sl~ll. 841, 842 September 18 Incident, 207,208 Seventh Party Congress. xxxiv, xxxvii, Ixvi, Ixxi, 708 Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, xlix, 17, 18, 26, 48, 161, 165, 205, 215,219,327,642,649,680,727730 Shandong Base Area, 507-508 Shangguan Yunxiang, 633, 637, 640, 651. 689

892

INDEX

Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, 18, 40-41, 313 Shen Gongbao and the Investiture of the Gods, 276, 277,278, 418 Shen Honglie, 58n4, 452, 508, 520, 629, 635, 736 Sheng Shicai, 469 Shi Yousan, 383. 431,468, 508, 595, 598 Shimada, Toshio, I09 Shirokov, M., Course in Dialectical Materialism, 820, 834 Sino-French WOI, 287, 333 Sino-Japanese War, xxxvii, Iii, lxiii, 11, 66, 71, 287, 332, 333 Sixth Party Congress. 829 Sixth Plenum, xl; Communist-

Guomindang conflict, 17; Communist Party leadership, lxvi; Communist Party policies, 89; definition of stalemate, 135; documents, 157; Enluged Politburo

Plenum, lxix; Mao Zedong, xxxvii, li,liv, 171; milituy strategy, Iii; orientation, 125, 137; policies, 116, 118, 119; resolutions, 14, 130,484, 492; and subjectivism, 809; Wu of Resistance, 15, 18, 117 Smedley, Agnes, xxxixn3 Snow, Edgu, xlv, 240; on international issues, 221-229; on united front and policy issues, 212-216 Snow, Helen Foster, 230 Song Dynasty, 282 Song Jiang, 282 Song Qingling (Madame Sun), 120,681 ·Song Renqiong, 526, 672, 735

Southern Anhui Incident, lxi; Central Committee speech, 663; Chiang Kaishek, 629, 630, 631, 658, 673, 678, 687, 696, 712, 713; Communist-Guomindang conflict, 700, 733, 744; Communist POity protest, 628, 656, 675; development, 639-413, 647-653; Januuy 17 order, 699, 732; New Fourth Army guidelines, 660-661; three chief instigators. 689

Soviet -German nonaggression pact. See German-Soviet nonaggression pact Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, xlvi, 717-718 Soviet Red Army, 30, 233, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 314, 326n2, 364, 844 Soviet Union: attitude towards World War II, 233-235; cease fire agreement with Japan, 207, 237-238; foreign policies, 231-233; German invasion, 764, 770, 776-778, 781, 798-799; German-Soviet nonaggression pact, xliv, 170-174, 195, 221-222, 225, 228, 229,231, 232,233, 237, 257; Japanese-Soviet nonaggression treaty, xlv, 237-238; relations with China, 31, 119,237-238,663,735, 769; troops in Poland, 235-237 Stalin, Joseph: and Chamberlain, 229, 421; and Georgi Dimitrov, xxxiii; on investigations. 812; and nonaggressor countries, 115; quotes. 246, 335-337, 354, 355; relations with China, xlii, 307-308, 309-311; report of Communist Party, 238; and Soviet Red Army, 30; views on war, xlv, 192, 226 Stalin on the National Question, 336 Strive for the Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Pany,

lxviii Student social groups: Anwu Youth Training Class, 255; model youths, 92-97; Northwest Youth Association for National Salvation, 93; Shaanxi Student Delegation, 794; Student's Salvation Association, 166; study movement, 81-89, 131; Sun Yatsenism Study Society, 95-96; Three People's Principle Youth Corps, 77, 411; Ya'an youth movement. 69-79; young pioneers, 727; youth movements, 69-79, 9297, 132, 255, 414; Youth Party, 704 Su Dongpo, 814 Su Yu, 496,497, 521, 694, 735 Sugiyama, Gen, 107, 109

INDEX 893

Sun Yatsen: Communist Party policies, xxxi, xlix, 648, 682, 689, 705, 727,

840; constitutional government, 202; on democracy, 214, 216, 401n4; development of Three People's

Principles, 88; as Director General, 50, 92, 210; last will and testament, 40-41; as leader, 485; leader of Guomindang, li; and Mao Zedong, xli; and the National Assembly, 427; and "On New Democracy," 351, 364; on people's rights, 166; on principles, 63-65; quotations, 95, 303-304, 334, 343, 344, 354, 403, 411,417, 418; as rebel, 70-79; on a united front, 26, 350, 362, 444; See also Three People's Principles

T TOjo, Hideki, 678 Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, 47, 66, 71, 282, 333 Taiping Rebellion, xxix

Tan Sitong, xxix Tan Zhenlin, 694, 726, 735

Tanaka Giichi, advocates congress of China, 105 Tang Dynasty, 282, 307, 311, 403

Tang Enbo: anti-Communist stance, 591, 644, 658; anti-Japanese campaign, 735-736; attacks on Communist troops, 539, 542, 543, 544, 563, 570, 611, 642, 649, 663, 680; and Chiang Kaishek, 533, 536; Communist offensive, 552, S68; Guomindang-

Communist conflicts, 687; Japanese offensive, 668, 673, 675, 677; in Southern Anhui, 537; Thirty-first

Third "Left" Line, lxix, 826-832 Three Character Classic, 81-88 Three People's Principles: Anti-Japanese National United Front, 63-65, 187;

Communist Party basic mission, 119; Communist Party policies, 218, 303304, 483, 485, 493, 537, 648, 682, 689, 70S, 727, 774, 839-841; development of, 88; fake or intermediate principles, 128, 274275; and Guomindang, 113, liS, 123, 149; Mao Zedong's list of books, 92; and Marxism, SO, 67-68, 75; and "On New Democracy,'' 340, 342, 348, 349-350, 351, 352-357, 362, 364, 36S, 369; support from Chiang Kaishek, 404; on a united front, 26, 27, 127; and War of Resistance, 40-41 Three basic strategic areas, 668-671 "Three-thirds" policy, lxv Traitors: attacks on Eighth Route Army, 383; big landlords and bourgeoisie, 290, 732; and collaborators, 160; and diehards, 598; puppet governments, 773; rich people, 217; Wang Jingwei, 61-64, 17S, 187,203, 381, 399, 400, 401, 526, 771, 774; War of Resistance, 391, 824 Trautmann, Oskar, 108 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 236 Treaty of Versailles, 236 Trotsky, Leon, 815 Trotskyites, 5, 6, 61, 63, 75n23, 127, 315, 348, 390 True Story of Ah-Q, 214 Tsuikov, 686nl, 777 Turkey, 345-346 Twelve demands, lxi, 689, 692, 703-704

Group Army, 514; troop movements,

u

516, 560 Tani, Masayuki, 109 Tanikawa, Ryo, 107 Tao Xingzhi, 405, S23

Ugaki, Kazushige, Ill Ulanfu, 823

Teiwes, Frederick C., lxvii, lxix

United Front: among the Huangpu faction,

Teng Daiyuan, 43n4, 453 Thailand, Japanese aggression against, 823

565; and Chiang Kaishek, Ivi;

development, xxxiii; international

894 INDEX

United Front (continued) and domestic situation, 836-837; "On New Democracy," 36().-365; Three People's Principles, 350; War of Resistance, 26-28, 207-211, 245254. 325, 378-381, 391-395, 41().41 I. 438-445, 459, 483, 486-488; See also Anti-Japanese National United Front United States: alliance with Britain and Chiang Kaishek, 528, 529, 53().-532, 536, 546; and Chinese surrender, 115-116~ economic sanctions, 19, 118; foreign policies, 392-393, 722723; Hong Men Society, 705-706; reaction to New Fourth Army Incident, 683-684; relations with China, 798-800, 845, 846-847; relations with Japan, 527-528, 53().532, 537, 836; Supreme Court decision against Browder, 702; waf with Japan, 844-845 Universities: Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, 42-43, 87, 9().91, 101-102, 159, 320, 814; Beijing, 87; Fudan, 87; Military Affairs Academy, lxxii, 852; Minorities Academy, lxxii; Oxford University, 87; Women's University, lxviii. lxxii, 87, 155-156, 814; Yan'an Cadre School, 851

v Voroshilov, Klimenti Yefremovich, 30, 198

w Wang Jiaxiang, lviii, lxvi, lxix, lxxiv, 32nl. 54, 541, 811 Wang Jingwei: Anti-Japanese National United Front, 99; and Chiang Kaishek, 14, 108, 115. 128, 180, 380, 385, 388-390, 537; and Chinese capitalists, 101, 121, 145, 150, 348; as deserter, xliii, xlix, 149,

Wang Jingwei (continued) 151; in early years, 94; on Guenrilla warfare, 41; leader of Trotskyites, 5, 6; in opposition of War of Resistance, 174; opposition to Communist Pany, 406, 463; reaction to New Fourth Army Incident, 684; the rebel, 179; relations with Japan, 17, 93, 112, 163, 329, 353, 354, 380nl, 385, 388-390. 410, 447-448, 576, 594; telegram of condemnation, 447-448; on the Three People's Principles, 76; See also Traitors Wang Mang, 94 Wang Ming. See Chen Shaoyu Wang Shiying, 565, 591 Wang Zhen, 787 Wang Zhonglian, 642, 644, 649 War of Resistance, li; and big landlords and bourgeoisie, 765; British aid, 98-99; call to develop armed forces, 377-378; capitulation crisis, 104115, 104-115, 125, 129, 135-137, 144-147, 378-381. 384-386; Chinese revolution, 70-79; Communist Party's basic mission, 119-124, 761; conditions and political situation, 14-20; counteroffensive efforts, 181-185; democratic politics, 202-203; Eighth Route Army, 5, 6, 7, 8; expansion of Army, 57-59; foreign assistance, I I. 12; fourth anniversary, 77().-775; future prospects for China, 174-175; Guerrilla areas, 374-376; and the Guomindang, 117; heroic deeds, 56; leaders, 437; line of demarcation, 430n5; military districts in North China, 802-803; military policies, 602-603; model youths, 92; nationalism, 60--65; overall orientation, 735-736; People's Political Council, 177-180, 185; Politburo, 58n5; reply to October 19 telegram, 547-548; second antiCommunist onslaught, 731-734; in Shandong, 267-269; Shanxi-Chahar-

INDEX

War of Resistance (continued) Hebei Border Region, 40-41 ; and Soviet Red Army, 31; stalemate between Japan and China, 123-124, 174, 201,242, 258; study on enemyoccupied areas, 242-243; ten great tasks, 385-386, 399-404; third anniversary speech, 481-485; Women's University, 155-156; See also Communist-Guomindang

cooperation; Southern Anhui Incident; United Front Warlord forces, lv-lvi Wei Guoqing, 604 Wei Lihuang, 429, 430,436, 437, 446, 450, 465, 673, 675, 739, 759, 795 Wei Zhongxian, 403 Wen of Zhou, King, 94n7 Wen Wang, 74n20 Women's movements, 44-49, 132

Xiao Yao. See Rao Shushi Xie Juezai, lxxiii, 370, 762, 788, 791, 793, 804 Xie Weiyun (Xie Xuezai), 329, 809

Xingguo investigation, 709 Xinhua ribao, 144, 189, 703 Xiongnu, 10n3

xiucai (cultivated talent), 709 Xu Shichang, 420, 422 Xu Shiyou, 761 Xu Teli, 370n3, 805 Xu Xiangqian, 267, 383, 456, 467 Xunwu investigation, 708, 709

y Yan Fu, 359 Yan Xishan, liv, lv, 239, 318, 328, 429, 430.437, 565, 591,795 Yan'an Cadre School, 851

Women's University, lxviii, lxxii, 87,

Yan'an University, 852

155-156, 814 World War I, I 72, I 99, 302, 345, 359, 747 World War II, 345; See also Pacific War Wu Peifu, 422 Wu Yuzhang, 319, 370,371, 416 Wuchang Uprising, 23 Wylie, Raymond, xi

Yan'an youth movement, 69-79 Yang Dezhi, 515, 591

X

Xi' an Incident, xxxiii, 815 Xiang Jingyu, 48-49n3

Xiang Ying: Mao's criticism of, lx; defeat of, 636, 637, 644, 732; deployments,

Iviii, lix, lx; New Fourth Army, Ivii, 52-53, 326n2; Mao's orders to, 475, 582, 589, 608, 618, 619, 635; November 9 telegram, 612, 650; October 19 telegram, 640, 648;

secret documents, 605; situation in Central China, 326, 604 Xiang Yu, 282 Xiao Jingguang, 56nl, 672 Xiao Ke, 672, 735 Xiao San (Xiao Zizhang), 143, 662

895

Yang Kaihui, xxxix Yang Shangkun, 267, 383, 451, 456,462, 478, 504, 507, 526, 549 Ye Fei, 466,471. 473, 475,496, 604 Ye Jianying, 511. 524, 553, 635, 674, 649, 683; Southern Anhui Incident, 629, 634; troop movements, 632, 644 Ye Qing, 127, 365, 390, 400 Ye Ting: call for release, 777; capture by Guomindang, 636, 637, 641. 644; deployments, !viii, lix, lx, 568;

military command of Communist forces, 611. 620, 621, 622, 623; November 9 telegram, 612, 650; October 19 telegram, 640, 648; Southern Anhui Incident, 572, 628, 629, 630, 634, 647; troop movements, 515, 585, 610, 617, 626. 632. 640 Youth Corps, 77, 411 Youth movements, 69-79, 92-97, 132, 255, 414 Yu Xuezhong, 378, 467, 496, 715, 736 Yuan Dynasty, 282

896 INDEX

Yuan Guoping, 454, 606, 620, 623 Yuan Shikai, 420, 422, 424 Yuan Xiaoxuan, 43 t. 436, 739, 759

z Zeng Guofan, xxix Zeng Xisheng, 670, 693, 694 Zhang Aiping, 515, 604, 723 Zhang Binglin, 38, 509 Zhang Bojun, 681 Zhang Chong, 552,.632, 659, 681, 683, 692, 777 . Zhang Guotao, xxxvii, 76, 93, 94, 252, 297, 421 Zhang Hanqing. See Zhang Xueliang Zhang Ji, 186 Zhang Jingwei, 121, 145, 149, 150, 151 Zhang Junmai, 17, 365, 389,400,406 Zhang Wentian, xxxix, 33, 811 Zhang Xueliang, 121, 543

Zhang Yunyi: victim of anti-Communist conspiracies, 570, 571; arrest of wife and children, 640 Zhang Zhizhong, 683 Zhanggufeng Incident, II t, 237 Zhengfeng. See Rectification Campaign Zhong Qiguang, 694 Zhou Dynasty, 281, 282, 332 Zhou Enlai: base areas, 496; Britain and United States, xlv, xlviii, 722-723; in Central China, 548~ committee of parties and factions, 714; Communist Party policies, 675-676; counterattack against Guomindang, 637; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 693, 707; education of.cadres, 838; Eighth Route Army, 370n4; Guomindang-Communist conflict, lxi; Guomindang-Communist conflicts, 686-688, 698, 711, 736; and Guomindang cooperation, 736; international and domestic situation, 527; investigations, 511, 512; January 17 order, 646; Japanese

offensive, 672-674, 677-679; leadership, lxvi; Liu Fei's telegram,

Zhou Enlai (continued) 609; military situation, 703; New Fourth Army, lix, 635, 674;

newspaper subscriptions, 695; in northern Jiangsu, 524; November 9

telegram, 554; order for arrest, 649; Pacific War, 848-849; People's Political Council, 696-697; post Southern Anhui situation, 663-664; relations with Chiang Kaishek, 203, 655, 658-659, 683; Shaanxi-GansuNingxia Border Region, 215; Southern Anhui Incident, lx, 629, 631, 633, 634; Soviet-Japanese

Neutrality Pact, xlvi; subjectivism and sectarianism, 811; support of friendly forces, 543; support of Soviet Union, 77&-778; troop movements, 610, 632; twelve demands, 692; War of Resistance, 725, 781; Xiang Ying's removal of office, 623; Young Soldiers Association, 95n10 Zhou Gong, 94 Zhou Yang, 13 Zhu De: anti-Communist conspiracies, 571; Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, 42; arrest of comrades, 658; attacks on Communist troops, 540; communications in Shanx.i, 453; Communist-Guomindang cooperation, 436, 446; Communist Party policies, xxxii, 462; Eighth Route Army. 98; expansion of Anny, 451; military tactics, 460; New Fourth Army, 454, 541; November 9 telegram, 562, 612, 650; October 19 telegram, 640, 648; old and new armies, 265, 318; order for arrest, 649; policy toward intermediate forces, 467; in Shandong, 267; and traitors, 383; troop movements, 644, 760; and Wang Jingwei. 16, 447n I; War of Resistance, 5 Zhu Huaibing, 430, 431, 542, 565; Zhu . Huaibing Incident, 450

INDEX 897

Zhu Rui: Communist Party policies, 462, 520, 526, 675~76; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 69~91; Japanese offensive, 672~74; New Fourth Army, 456, 457, 635; policy toward

intermediate forces, 467; Politburo, 59, 452; in Shandong, 715-716; Shandong Base Area, 507; Southern Anhui Incident, 629; and traitors, 383; Wax of Resistance, 735-736, 761 Zhu Yuanzhang, 282 Zhuge Liang, 6 Zunyi Conference, xxxvii, lxvii, 252, 809, 831 Zuo Quan: artillery headquarters, 685; bomb factories, 822; Communist

Zuo Quan

(continued)

Party policies, 675~76; dealings with Chiang Kaishek, 69~91; defense along Jundu-Jikou line, 787; deployments, 478; Eighth Route Army,lxiii, 141; and Guomindang

cooperation, 807; Japanese offensive, 672~74; military and political committee, 549; New Fourth Army, 635; old and new armies, 265; policy

toward intermediate forces, 467; in Shandong, 267, 715-716; situation in Central China, 604; Southern Anhui Incident, 629; in southern Hebei, 757-758; troop movements, SIS; Wax of Resistance, 735-736, 761 Zuo Shunsheng, 681

About the Editor Stuart R. Schram was born in Excelsior, Minnesota, in 1924. After graduating fran the University of Minnesota in physics, he took his Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University. From 1954 to 1967, he conducted research at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, and from 1968 untill989, he was Professor of Politics with reference to China at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Since 1989, he has worked at the Fairbank Center, Harvard University, on the edition of Mao Zedong's pre-1949 writings of which this is the seventh volume. His research has dealt with Leninist theories and their application in Asia, Chinese history and politics in the twentieth century, and the influence of the Chinese tradition on the theory and practice of the state in China. His works include Mao Tse-tung (1967), The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (1969), Marxism and Asia (in collaboration with Helene Carrere d'Encausse) ( 1969), Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Plenum, /978-1984 (1984), and The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (1989). He has also edited a volume entitled Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (1987). Mao Tse-tung and The Thought of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Chinese and published in Beijing. Stuart Schram is a member of the Authors Guild.

About the Associate Editor Nancy J. Hodes was born in Philadelphia in 1946, and spent her formative years in Beijing, China, where her father taught physiology at the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. After graduating from Radcliffe College in Far Eastern Languages, she edited the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, taught Chinese, and worked as a freelance translator. She returned to China in the 1970s to teach English and work on A Chinese-English Dictionary at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (#1). Later she taught Chinese at Tufts University and Harvard Summer School, worked as a translator for M.E. Sharpe's translation journals and the Mao's Writings Project at Brown University, and served as Assistant Editor of the Harvard Journal ofAsiatic Studies. After receiving her Ph.D. in Chinese literature from Harvard University, she taught East Asian Civilizations and Chinese at Boston College, and worked beginning in 1991 with Stuart R. Schram on the present edition of the Mao Zedong's pre-1949 writings. Until 1995, she served concurrently as Associate Director of the Boston Research Center for the 21st Century, founded in 1993 by Soka Gakkai International President Daisaku Ikeda. 899

About the Guest Associate Editor Lyman P. Van Slyke was born in 1929 in Duluth and grew up in the iron mining region of northern Minnesota. He graduated (1951) from Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota with a degree in mathematics, then spent four years in the U.S. Navy during and after the Korean War, experiences which sparked a lifelong involvement with Asia. At the University of California (Berkeley), he subsequently earned an M.A. in East Asian Studies ( 1958) and a Ph.D. in History (1964), presenting a dissertation on the place of the united front in Chinese Communist history, the subject of his first book. In 1963, he was appointed to the history faculty at Stanford University, where he spent his entire career, retiring in 1994, but continuing to teach until 1998, twice winning teaching awards. During these years, he helped establish the InterUniversity Program for Chinese Language Studies, and served until his retirement as its Executive Director. He served three terms as Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford. From 1975 to 1978, he was Chairman of the China and Inner Asia Regional Council of the Association for Asian Studies. In 2004, he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree by Carleton College. Primarily a historian of modern China, Van Slyke has done much research and writing on the Chinese Communist revolution, particularly during the 1930s and 1940s. He has written extensively on Sino-U.S. relations. He is the author of a book on the Yangtze River, studies the Three Kingdoms period, and is engaged in a biography of Liang Ji, (1858-1918), father of the philosopher Liang Shuming. Van Slyke lived for several years in Taiwan, and made his first visit to China in 1975. Shortly thereafter, he began leading lecture tours to many parts of the Peoples Republic and elsewhere in Asia for Stanford Alumni Association and other organizations. Since his retirement, he has continued to make two or three such trips each year.

900