Making Sense of Heritability In this book, Neven Sesardic defends the view that it is both possible and useful to measu...
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Making Sense of Heritability In this book, Neven Sesardic defends the view that it is both possible and useful to measure the separate contributions of heredity and environment to the explanation of human psychological differences. He critically examines the view – very widely accepted by scientists, social scientists and philosophers of science – that heritability estimates have no causal implications and are devoid of any interest. In a series of clearly written chapters he introduces the reader to the problems and subjects the arguments to close philosophical scrutiny. His conclusion is that antiheritability arguments are based on conceptual confusions and misunderstandings of behavior genetics. His book is a fresh, original, and compelling intervention in a very contentious debate. neven sesardic is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. His areas of specialization are philosophy of biology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind.
cambridge studies in philosophy and biology General Editor Michael Ruse Florida State University Advisory Board Michael Donoghue Yale University Jean Gayon University of Paris Jonathan Hodge University of Leeds Jane Maienschein Arizona State University Jesus ´ Moster´ın Instituto de Filosof´ıa (Spanish Research Council) Elliott Sober University of Wisconsin Alfred I. Tauber The Immune Self: Theory or Metaphor? Elliott Sober From a Biological Point of View Robert Brandon Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology Peter Godfrey-Smith Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature William A. Rottschaefer The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency Sahotra Sarkar Genetics and Reductionism Jean Gayon Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (eds.) Biology and the Foundation of Ethics Jack Wilson Biological Individuality Richard Creath and Jane Maienschein (eds.) Biology and Epistemology Alexander Rosenberg Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science, and Policy Peter Beurton, Raphael Falk, and Hans-Jorg ¨ Rheinberger (eds.) The Concept of the Gene in Development and Evolution David Hull Science and Selection James G. Lennox Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology Marc Ereshefsky The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy Kim Sterelny The Evolution of Agency and Other Essays William S. Cooper The Evolution of Reason Peter McLaughlin What Functions Explain
Steven Hecht Orzack and Elliott Sober (eds.) Adaptationism and Optimality Bryan G. Norton Searching for Sustainability Sandra D. Mitchell Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism Greg Cooper The Science of the Struggle for Existence Joseph LaPorte Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change Jason Scott Robert Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution William F. Harms Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes Marcel Weber Philosophy of Experimental Biology Markku Oksanen and Juhani Pietorinen Philosophy and Biodiversity Richard Burian The Epistemology of Development, Evolution, and Genetics Ron Amondson The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought Sahotra Sarkar Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy
Making Sense of Heritability NEVEN SESARDIC Lingnan University, Hong Kong
cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521828185 © Neven Sesardic 2005 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2005 isbn-13 isbn-10
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The denial of genetically based psychological differences is the kind of sophisticated error normally accessible only to persons having Ph.D. degrees. David Lykken
Contents
List of figures
page xi
Acknowledgments
xii
Introduction
1
1
The nature–nurture debate: a premature burial? 1.1 A convenient jingle of words 1.2 No fair hearing for Francis Galton 1.3 Heritability 101 1.4 Can monomorphic traits be heritable? 1.5 Philosophers at work: caveat lector!
11 11 16 18 28 33
2
A tangle of interactions: separating genetic and environmental influences 2.1 Two concepts of interaction 2.2 The rectangle analogy 2.3 Lewontin against ANOVA 2.4 Non-additivity 2.5 Locality 2.6 Causal irrelevance 2.7 The second look at interactions
48 48 51 56 60 75 81 86
3
4
Lost in correlations? Direct and indirect genetic causes 3.1 The conceptual route: a Pickwickian notion? 3.2 The methodological route: tracing the paths of causality 3.3 The sociologist’s fallacy
105 121
From individuals to groups: genetics and race 4.1 The “master argument”
127 128
ix
89 90
Contents
4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
VE theories X-factor theories Unfair to facts The hereditarian strikes back
138 140 142 148
5
Genes and malleability 5.1 Genetic and environmental causation 5.2 PKU 5.3 Local modifiability and modifiability “in principle” 5.4 Comparing apples and oranges 5.5 A clumsy attempt to appease the critics 5.6 Limits to egalitarianism
153 153 157 162 169 177 178
6
Science and sensitivity 6.1 Mistaken because politically motivated 6.2 Politically motivated because mistaken 6.3 Consequential fallacy 6.4 Double standards 6.5 From “is” to “ought,” non-fallaciously 6.6 Looking into the abyss 6.7 From groups to individuals 6.8 Fair, therefore biased?
183 184 186 193 201 208 212 217 224
7
Conclusion
229
References
235
Index
259
x
Figures
1.1 1.2a 1.2b 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1a 3.1b 3.1c 5.1a 5.1b 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2a 6.2b
A simple illustration of heritability A monomorphic trait (genetic) A monomorphic trait (environmental) Common sense interaction – yes, statistical interaction – no Statistical interaction: no main effects Rectangle area, length and width Bricks and mortar A “not atypical case”? G–E interaction in rats Testing for interactions Attractiveness and IQ Heritability without G–E correlation G–E correlation with zero heritability Is PKU 100% heritable? Not any more. Is PKU 100% heritable? Yes, it still is. Confusion about range Whose heritability, whose plasticity? The taxicab problem and Bayes’ theorem A terrorist suspect (Group A) A terrorist suspect (Group B)
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page 19 31 31 50 52 54 59 64 66 72 118 119 120 159 160 170 173 219 221 221
Acknowledgments
While working on this book, I presented drafts of some chapters on different occasions and received useful feedback. I gave talks at Lingnan University, Konrad Lorenz Institute, the University of Rijeka, the University of Braunschweig, the University of Pittsburgh, Duke University, the University of Hannover, the University of Munich, the meeting of the British Society for Philosophy of Science in Glasgow (July 2002), the eighteenth biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association in Milwaukee (November 2002), and the annual conference of the Australasian Association for Philosophy in Adelaide (July 2003). I also presented some of the material in Alex Rosenberg’s graduate seminar in philosophy of biology at Duke University in April 2004, which was a valuable opportunity to test my ideas and have very stimulating discussions. I am very grateful to my colleagues at Lingnan University for approving my request for a free semester at the crucial, final stage of my writing. My research assistant Mr. Chin Po San helped a lot with literature searches and with preparing the bibliography. The work on this book was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, China (Project No. LU3005/01H), by an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation research grant, and by two Lingnan research grants (DA03A5 and DR04B6). I am grateful to the University of Chicago Press for permission to use the material from my two papers c 2000 and 2003 by the Philosophy published in Philosophy of Science ( of Science Association). I would like to thank Michael Ruse, the editor of the series Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, for his support for the project. I benefited a lot from comments on earlier drafts that I received from the
xii
Acknowledgments following colleagues: Thomas J. Bouchard, Arthur Jensen, Noretta Koertge, Stefan Linquist, Paisley Livingston, John Loehlin, David Lubinski, Samir Okasha, Katie Pleasance, Robert Plomin, Nils Roll-Hansen, and Terry Sullivan. It should not be assumed that any of these people agree with the basic claims defended in this book.
xiii
Introduction
What is heritability? The heritability of a trait in a given population tells us what proportion of differences in that trait is due to genetic differences. It provides an answer to the main question in the nature–nurture controversy. Heritability can be calculated both for physical and psychological characteristics but it generates controversy mainly in the context of human behavioral traits like intelligence, personality differences, criminality, etc. For this reason I will focus here only on discussions of heritability in psychology (i.e., human behavior genetics). Criticisms of heritability claims in this area are frequently based on a curious mixture of methodological objections and warnings about political motives and/or implications of this research. A systematic study that would try to disentangle all the argumentative threads that are often run together in this contentious debate was long overdue. So this book was simply waiting to be written. I was introduced to the nature–nurture debate by reading Ned Block and Gerald Dworkin’s well-known and widely cited anthology about the IQ controversy (Block & Dworkin 1976a). This collection of articles has long been the main source of information about the heredity– environment problem for a great number of scientists, philosophers, and other academics. It is not an exaggeration to say that the book has been the major influence on thinking about this question for many years. Like most readers, I also left the book with a feeling that hereditarianism (the view that IQ differences among individuals or groups are in substantial part due to genetic differences) is facing insuperable objections that strike at its very core. There was something very satisfying, especially to philosophers, about the way hereditarianism was criticized there. A strong emphasis was on 1
Making Sense of Heritability
conceptual and methodological difficulties, and the central arguments against hereditarianism appeared to have full destructive force independently of empirical data, which are, as we know, both difficult to evaluate and inherently unpredictable. So this looked like a philosopher’s dream come true: a scientific issue with potentially dangerous political implications was defused not through an arduous exploration of the messy empirical material but by using a distinctly philosophical method of conceptual analysis and methodological criticism. It was especially gratifying that the undermined position was often associated with politically unacceptable views like racism, toleration of social injustice, etc. Besides, the defeat of that doctrine had a certain air of finality. It seemed to be the result of very general, a priori considerations, which, if correct, could not be reversed by “unpleasant” discoveries in the future. But very soon I started having second thoughts about Block and Dworkin’s collection. The reasons are worth explaining in some detail I think, because the book is still having a considerable impact, especially on discussions in philosophy of science. First, some of the arguments against hereditarianism presented there were just too successful. The refutations looked so utterly simple, elegant, and conclusive that it made me wonder whether competent scientists could have really defended a position that was so manifestly indefensible. Something was very odd about the whole situation. Second, the selection of texts in the anthology was extremely biased. Throughout the book the view that IQ is important and heritable was exposed to an unrelenting barrage of attacks, but in its more than 500 pages there was not a single text, however short, that would help the reader understand the basic rationale for that view, before its demolition began. The book started “in the attack mode,” with a series of articles from the 1920s, in which a famous journalist with no obvious expertise in psychology criticized IQ tests and the idea that IQ differences are heritable. Here is a brief excerpt that gives the flavor of Walter Lippmann’s polemical style: If, for example, the impression takes root that these tests really measure intelligence, that they constitute a sort of last judgment on the child’s capacity, that they reveal “scientifically” his predestined ability, then it would be a thousand times better if all the intelligence testers and all their questionnaires were sunk without warning in the Sargasso Sea. (Block & Dworkin 1976a: 19)
2
Introduction In the anthology, Lippmann’s combative articles were not preceded by any context-setting piece in which at least the bare essentials of psychometric theory would be explained in a neutral or sympathetic way. Similarly, two sections devoted to Arthur Jensen’s and Richard Herrnstein’s views on IQ and its heritability again started in a paradoxical way, with Lewontin’s and Chomsky’s attacks, without the reader being given any opportunity to learn beforehand about Jensen’s and Herrnstein’s theories from an impartial source, let alone from their own writings. The only firmly hereditarian texts included in the book were two brief responses to criticisms, but they were also immediately neutralized by further rejoinders. Although this way of introducing the debate (presenting objections to a theory, without first presenting the theory itself) is so openly prejudiced and illogical, no one ever drew attention to it nor suggested that, because of the obvious bias, the anthology should be supplemented with an “antidote” reading list. Oddly enough, Peter Medawar (1977a) even praised the editors for their judicious selection of texts. Philip Kitcher similarly said that he “learned much” from the book, but he also apparently didn’t notice that he could have learned from it only about one side of the debate. Worse still, he mistakenly claimed (Kitcher 2001a: 209) that Jensen’s controversial article (Jensen 1969b), the main target of criticisms, was reprinted in Block and Dworkin’s anthology. Kitcher’s mistake is somewhat surprising because Jensen’s book-size article, if included, would have completely dominated the anthology: it would have taken up nearly one-third of it. Block and Dworkin themselves gave a very veiled hint of their own bias in the extremely short introduction. They wrote: “The title of the reader [Critical Readings] is accurate. We do not attempt to present ‘all sides of the issue.’ We have brought together the best of the critical literature” (Block & Dworkin 1976a: xi). Notice the scare quotes, which seem to suggest that the goal of presenting all sides of the issue in an anthology is somehow problematic or not really desirable. Furthermore, the word “critical” is ambiguous. First, “critical” can mean “critical of one specific point of view.” In that sense, choosing “the best of the critical literature” would not be a good editorial decision because it simply means “a very biased presentation of the literature.” Second, “critical” can mean, according to Webster, “characterized by careful evaluation and judgment (example: ‘a critical reading’),” in which case it is indeed highly commendable for an anthology. But clearly in that sense, 3
Making Sense of Heritability
their selection did not contain “the best of the critical literature,” because one-half of the best literature was virtually not represented. Block and Dworkin traded on this ambiguity. They encouraged the reader to understand “critical” in the second sense by giving the title “Critical Readings,” which even the dictionary links to the second sense, and by failing to reveal in the introduction the all-important fact about their book that supports the first-sense reading, namely, that the literature they selected was highly skewed against one position in the debate. Apart from Jensen’s and Herrnstein’s short texts, each of which was placed between the hammer and anvil of two rebuttals, practically all other texts were critical of psychometrics and/or hereditarianism, in one way or another. But the first sense of “critical” had a useful function too. It gave Block and Dworkin a convenient fallback position in case they were criticized for not declaring their undeniable editorial bias. No other word could have served the purpose so well. Despite its glaring tendentiousness, the book has been taken by many people as the only source of information about the controversy. Moreover, it is still being widely quoted and used as a recommended reading, with no warning about its bias or the need to balance this one-sided intellectual diet with texts in which hereditarianism is defended, or at least treated as a serious theoretical option. Although other, similarly biased books (Gould 1981; Rose et al. 1984) are also often uncritically advertised as good introductions to the nature–nurture debate, Block and Dworkin’s anthology played a special role in the emergence of the anti-hereditarian consensus in mainstream philosophy of science.1 It contained two articles written by Richard Lewontin, which quickly won almost universal acceptance and which are still regarded as disclosing the allegedly fatal methodological shortcomings of hereditarian thinking. When it comes to discussions about measuring the strength of genetic influences on psychological differences (whether among individuals or among groups), the importance of heritability is immediately dismissed just by quoting Lewontin’s arguments, which are typically treated as the last word on the topic. (For references, see particularly chapters 2 and 4.) As Stephen Downes says in his article on heritability for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “the current consensus among philosophers of biology is that heritability analyses are misleading about the genetic causes of human traits . . . The consensus 1
Paul Meehl said in 1970 that at that time most philosophers received “the environmentalist brainwashing” from their undergraduate social science classes (Meehl 1970: 393–394). The situation changed in the mid-1970s: philosophers started to be exposed to the antihereditarian indoctrination in their own departments.
4
Introduction among philosophers of biology is that broad heritability measures are uninformative” (Downes 2004: 7, 13). To the best of my knowledge, there have been only three attempts to crack the philosophical consensus, all of them unsuccessful. First, even before the anti-heritability view hardened into a dogma, Peter Urbach published an article (Urbach 1974) in which he argued, using the Lakatosian approach to philosophy of science, that hereditarianism is a more promising research program than environmentalism. Only two brief responses appeared immediately after publication, but Urbach’s contribution made no long-term impact. Second, Michael Levin raised objections to the “received view” on heritability in his thought-provoking book about racial differences (1997: 91–102; see also Levin 1994 and Hocutt & Levin 1999). However, his work was largely ignored in the philosophical literature, at least in part, I suspect, because Levin also defended heretical political conclusions about race in such an open and blunt manner that his views were simply regarded as too shocking to deserve comment. Last (and least), I myself published three papers (1993; 2000; 2003) in the attempt to soften the anti-hereditarian consensus, but without much success. I try again here. The peculiarity of the philosophical consensus is that it has been preserved for thirty years, with very little interest among philosophers of biology in taking a closer look into the propulsive field of behavior genetics and seeing how heritability analyses look from the perspective of real empirical research. In a way, this is understandable. For if a given research orientation is methodologically doomed, why should one waste time on examining an enterprise that one “knows” must inevitably end in failure? Those who remain under the spell of Lewontin’s dismissal of hereditarianism can explain a persistent interest in heritability in no other way than as “an unfortunate tic from which [behavior geneticists] cannot free themselves” (Kitcher 2001b: 413). Indeed, if you go with the consensus and strongly believe that hereditarianism is intellectually bankrupt and demonstrably so, but nevertheless see a lot of people still expressing enthusiasm for that very view, you will soon despair and start asking yourself: “Hey, how come this totally discredited position is having a revival? How many times do we have to kill this already dead beast?” You will have a feeling that you are fighting a “vampire” (Griffiths 2002a) that haunts people even after being killed (refuted), that you are confronting “the ghost of dichotomous views of development” (Gray 1992: 172), that the issue is “periodically disinterred from its well-deserved grave” (Johnston 1987: 150), that you are “battling the undead” (Kitcher 2001b), 5
Making Sense of Heritability
that “the corpse will not stay dead” (Paul 1998: 83), that the dead will not “remain in their coffins” (Kitcher 1984: 9), and you will look for the final “stake-in-the-heart” move (Oyama 2000c: 31; Oyama et al. 2001: 1) that will finish off this theoretical monster.2 Griffiths, Kitcher, and Oyama disagree about many things, as do others who belong to the consensus. The consensus is not monolithic. Yet virtually all of them agree that Lewontin’s canonical arguments conclusively demonstrated methodological limitations that severely reduce the theoretical importance of any heritability estimates obtained with nonexperimental methods (which is the only available approach in the context of human psychology). The alternative that these authors never seriously tried is to question the consensus and open their minds to the possibility that research in behavior genetics (including the measurement of heritability) actually makes more sense than they think. Curiously, those on the other side of the debate did not show much interest, either, in meeting the opponents on their ground. Behavior geneticists typically respond to very general methodological objections in an ad hoc manner, often in the course of reporting about their own empirical research, and rarely address these global criticisms head-on or in a systematic way. Although they are very responsive to critical comments that can help improve the design of their studies or suggest new ways of hypothesis testing, there is a distinct impatience with those highly conceptual arguments that produced the philosophical consensus and that have no immediate relevance for daily scientific practice. Thomas Bouchard explains well why many people think that this type of argument does not deserve serious consideration: We need not dwell on these arguments for long. If they were at all persuasive there would be little, if any, need to attack the evidence underlying the hereditarian viewpoint. It would fall of its own weight. The massive, and vituperous, attacks on hereditarian findings clearly signal how seriously the environmental program is challenged by this evidence. (Bouchard 1987: 58)
This attitude explains why in the literature about heritability, even after all these years, there is still no systematic study in which methodological arguments against hereditarianism would be given full attention and examined in critical spirit. This lacuna harms the hereditarian case. I think 2
By the way, the use of the metaphor of beating a dead horse that is not really dead to make a point about the nature–nurture debate is usually attributed to Susan Oyama, but it actually originates from Donald Hebb (1980: 70).
6
Introduction that Bouchard is seriously mistaken when he says that there is “no need to dwell on these arguments for long,” and that it is enough just to focus on collecting empirical evidence and hope that it will eventually sway public opinion in favor of hereditarianism. The problem with his view is that the persuasiveness of empirical evidence for a given hypothesis crucially depends on the perceived methodological soundness of that hypothesis. If someone believes that hypothesis H has inherent and ineradicable methodological shortcomings, then further accumulation of empirical evidence will not make that person change his mind about H. If H is thought to have a “construction defect,” piling up new evidence will look like pouring water into a bucket that has a hole in it. Of course, Bouchard would be justified in not worrying too much about these global methodological criticisms if the only people who made a fuss over them were philosophers of science. Even with this unfriendly stance becoming a consensus in philosophy of science, scientists might still remain unimpressed because many of them would probably be sympathetic to James Watson’s claim: “I do not like to suffer at all from what I call the German disease, an interest in philosophy” (Watson 1986: 19). But the situation is worse than that. Methodological doubts about the usefulness of partitioning causal contributions of heredity and environment have already spread outside of philosophy to many areas of social science. Most importantly, however, the same views that are part of the anti-hereditarian consensus in philosophy of science were presented in a watered-down form to the general audience, and they carried a lot of conviction there. Popularizers of science bombarded the public with all sorts of arguments that all pointed in the same direction, such as that the attempts to measure heritability are unscientific, naive, crude, obviously wrong, etc. To support these criticisms they made different points on different occasions: that genetic and environmental influences are inseparable in development; or that the impact of genotype cannot be measured because it depends on the environment; or that genetic causes often produce their effects through environmental pathways, and that classifying them as genetic is therefore bound to create confusion; or that twin studies, an important source of heritability estimates, are based on an uncritically accepted assumption that is probably false; or that the heritability of a trait says nothing about its malleability, and is hence uninteresting; and so on. The reader is forced into submission by the sheer abundance and diversity of objections. Even if he finds some of these objections unpersuasive, there will be others to which he doesn’t have a ready response, and so 7
Making Sense of Heritability
he will in the end join the camp of heritability skeptics. There is nothing wrong in principle with this kind of approach, where a given view is disputed by pulling together very different strands of argument against it. For it may well be that although each of these arguments has some problems, they nevertheless collectively build a formidable case against the criticized position. But then again, it may be that the situation is different and that, taken individually, these arguments are so weak that even when they are harnessed together, they still do not amount to something very impressive. Simply, we cannot know what the situation is before we undertake a careful and detailed examination. An additional reason why Bouchard is wrong that there is not much need to discuss purely methodological criticisms is that, unless they are addressed and opposed, these criticisms tend to mix with political considerations to form a deadly anti-hereditarian combination that is extremely difficult to dislodge by mere argument. Let’s face it, many people wish that hereditarianism not be true because the hypothesis of inherited psychological differences doesn’t sit well with their deeply ingrained beliefs about human equality and “perfectibility of man.” In particular, the idea that groups with physically recognizable characteristics differ in the average genetic potential for intellectual achievement offends political sensibilities so much that there is a positive desire to find reasons against it.3 In fact, both hereditarians and environmentalists recognize that there is widespread and deep-seated repugnance toward the heritability of psychological traits. This is one of the very few things about which even people as politically opposed as Richard Herrnstein and Bill Clinton can agree: Biological determinism runs “against the American grain.” (Herrnstein 1973: 5) I disagree with the proposition that there are inherent, racially based differences in the capacity of the American people to reach their full potential; I just don’t agree with that. It goes against our entire history and our whole tradition. (Clinton’s comments on The Bell Curve, at the White House press conference, September 21, 1994)
Therefore, in the inhospitable situation where hereditarianism is resisted because it is perceived (rightly or wrongly) to threaten cherished 3
I concede that some people’s wishful thinking may go in the opposite direction, in the sense that they would revel in the discovery of such genetic differences. Yet it is undeniable that the first tendency is immensely more prevalent among scientists, academics, journalists, public intellectuals, politicians, and other opinion makers.
8
Introduction political values, and where even highly dubious methodological arguments are welcome if they are the best way to protect these values, hereditarians are well advised to put these arguments under the magnifying glass, dissect them, and highlight problematic inferences, questionable assumptions, or outright fallacies. In fact, this is even more of a task for philosophers of science, who are after all specially trained to be attentive precisely to methodological and conceptual aspects of scientific controversies. But for some reason, in this debate philosophers have displayed a surprising lack of intellectual curiosity and analytical acuity. They hastily accepted some general anti-hereditarian arguments that possessed only superficial plausibility. Soon these arguments, without being exposed to adequate critical scrutiny, rigidified into a philosophical consensus. The paradigm was established and ruled for decades, not because of its theoretical advantages but because its problematic sides went unnoticed. Easily anticipated objections were not considered at all, obvious alternatives were not explored, and gross misinterpretations created the illusion of an easy victory. To make things worse, and quite unusually for this field otherwise known for its high intellectual standards, in this small segment of philosophy of science even prominent scholars are often poorly informed about basic scientific facts in the very domain of their philosophical explorations. This book is an attempt to dispel a number of obstinate misconceptions and pseudo-arguments about heritability that have dominated the intellectual scene for too long and that have diverted scientific and philosophical attention from the really interesting issues. Is such a predominantly negative goal worth the effort? I think it is. For if John Locke could have thought in his time that “it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge” (Locke 1959: 14), wouldn’t it be arrogant on my part to declare that this kind of task is too small for me or not rewarding enough? At this point I am afraid I may lose some of my scientific readers. Remembering Steven Weinberg’s statement that the insights of philosophers have occasionally benefited scientists, “but generally in a negative fashion – by protecting them from the preconceptions of other philosophers” (Weinberg 1993: 107), they might conclude that it is best just to avoid reading any philosophy (including this book), and that in this way they will neither contract preconceptions nor need protection from them. But the problem is that the preconceptions discussed here do not originate from a philosophical armchair. Scientists should be aware that to a great 9
Making Sense of Heritability
extent these preconceptions come from some of their own. Philosophers of science uncritically accepted these seductive but ultimately fallacious arguments from scientists, repackaged them a little, and then fed them back to the scientific community, which often took them very seriously. Bad science was mistaken for good philosophy. Here is a brief overview of the content of the book. In chapter 1, I consider some criticisms of the nature–nurture dichotomy and some elementary confusions about heritability. Chapter 2 addresses the complaint that heritability estimates are devoid of causal implications because of statistical interaction between genotypes and environments. (I discussed this topic in my first published paper on heritability [Sesardic 1993], but the argument presented here is completely reworked, much expanded, and, I hope, more convincing.) The topic of chapter 3 is the question whether the possibility of genetic effects being mediated by environmental influences shows, as many scientists and philosophers believe, that heritability is not a very helpful causal or explanatory notion. In chapter 4, the focus is on between-group heritability and its relation to within-group heritability. The political temperature rises in this context because the between-group heritability obviously becomes an issue with respect to the racial gap in IQ. In chapter 5, I discuss whether a trait’s being heritable tells us anything about the modifiability (or malleability) of that trait. Finally, chapter 6 contains my thoughts about connections between science and politics, and about possible political implications that would follow from the high heritability of some psychological traits.
10
1 The nature–nurture debate: a premature burial?
The nature–nurture problem is nevertheless far from meaningless. Asking right questions is, in science, often a large step toward obtaining the right answer. Theodosius Dobzhansky
1.1 a convenient jingle of words Heritability is basically a measure of the strength of genetic influence on phenotypic differences.1 The emphasis is on the word “differences.” It was Francis Galton who initiated a systematic study of human variation in the nineteenth century. He chided statisticians of his time for being only interested in the mean values and never in differences: It is difficult to understand why statisticians commonly limit their inquiries to Averages and do not revel in more comprehensive views. Their souls seem as dull to the charm of variety as that of the native of one of our flat English counties, whose retrospect of Switzerland was that, if its mountains could be thrown into its lakes, two nuisances would be got rid of at once. (Galton 1889: 62)
Heritability is usually defined as the proportion of phenotypic variation that is due to genetic differences. So giving a particular value to a heritability estimate of a given trait is solving the nature–nurture equation in that specific context. There is no general answer to the nature–nurture question. As J. B. S. Haldane said: “The important point is to realize that the question of the relative importance of nature and nurture has no 1
“Phenotype” refers to all observable characteristics of an organism, as contrasted with its genetic constitution, or its “genotype.”
11
Making Sense of Heritability
general answer, but that it has a very large number of particular answers” (Haldane 1938: 34). Dobzhansky concurs: “There is not one nature– nurture problem but many” (Dobzhansky 1956: 21). Before going into a more detailed discussion of heritability, it is interesting to note that there is a widespread tendency to see the whole nature– nurture question as the paradigm of extremely crude and unsophisticated thinking. In contrast to Galton, who believed that the phrase “nature and nurture” is “a convenient jingle of words” (Galton 1874: 12) that delineates a fascinating scientific problem, it has been often suggested that quantifying the contributions of these two factors is meaningless, and moreover manifestly so. The standard argument for dismissing the controversy is that both nature and nurture are necessary for the life of any organism, and that for this reason the idea of measuring the relative importance of the two factors must be the result of serious confusion. In defending this diagnosis, Friedrich Hayek invokes the authority of the biologist Gavin de Beer: On the whole we must probably conclude, as does Sir Gavin de Beer . . . that the old controversy between “Nature” and “Nurture” ought to be allowed to die because “it is necessary to regard both nature and nurture as cooperating, without our being able to say in any one case exactly how much has been contributed by either.” (Hayek 1978: 294)
Patrick Bateson’s judgment is even harsher. After briefly reviewing the development of the nature–nurture discussion, he says: Any scientific investigation of the origins of human behavioral differences eventually arrives at a conclusion that most non-scientists would probably have reached after only a few seconds’ thought. Genes and environment both matter. The more subtle question about how much each of them matters defies an easy answer. There is no simple formula to solve this conundrum, and the problem needs to be tackled differently. (Bateson & Martin 2000: 61)
It is hard to imagine a more damning criticism of a scientific research area than the blunt claim that most non-scientists would probably have reached the right conclusion about the matter in question “after only a few seconds’ thought.” In fact, it is safe to argue, contra Bateson, that since it would be astonishing if scientists did not recognize such a trivial answer in their own domain of research, it must be that the real issues lie elsewhere, and that the debate simply could not have been so patently meaningless. Also, the fact that there is indeed no “easy answer” in 12
The nature–nurture debate dividing the contributions of nature and nurture and that there is “no simple formula to solve this conundrum” does not immediately show that “the problem needs to be tackled differently.” It may be that the question is neither so trivial as to be unworthy of investigation nor so intractable that a completely different approach is necessary. Joseph LeDoux also treats the nature–nurture controversy as an easy target for criticism in a short, tangential remark: One of the most important contributions of modern neuroscience has been to show that the nature/nurture debate operates around a false dichotomy: the assumption that biology, on one hand, and lived experience, on the other, affect us in fundamentally different ways. Research has shown that not only do nature and nurture each contribute (in disputable proportions) to who we are, but also that they speak the same language. Both achieve their effects by altering the synaptic organization of the brain. (LeDoux 1998)
Two critical comments. First, surely the fact that both nature and nurture achieve their effects mostly by influencing the brain was widely known before modern neuroscience developed. Second, even though both kinds of causes do speak the same language (“brainese”), it may still be true that they tend to affect us in sufficiently different ways as to justify keeping them analytically apart in some contexts. Therefore, let us not too hastily agree that the nature–nurture debate is a “pseudoquestion” (Lewontin 1976a: 181; Hirsch 1976: 171), “an illogical construct” (Daniels et al. 1997: 64), “dead” (Ridley 2003a: 280), “a naive question” (Mazur & Robertson 1972: 83), “an incorrectly phrased question” (Kagan & Snidman 2004: 29), “faulty” (Gottlieb 2001: 402), “a dead issue” (Anastasi 1958: 197), “an unnecessary detour” (Sternberg & Grigorenko 1999: 536), “an unnecessary debate” (Khoury & Thornburg 2001), “a graveyard of rotting doctrines” (Kitcher 1996: 250), “a false dichotomy” (Ehrlich 2000), “the false, dichotomous model” (Gould 1995), “dull query” (Jones 1994a: 226), “the foolish question” and “a fool’s errand” (Meaney 2001: 50–51), “sterile” (Wahlsten 1990b: 150; Oyama 1992: 228), “counterproductive” (Keller 2001: 299), “deader than a doornail” (Schneider 2003: 137), “rubbish” (Jacquard 1985: 51), or that it should be “silently carried to its grave” (De Waal 1999: 99), etc. It is true that, interpreted in some ways, the issue is indeed “unworthy of further consideration” (Anastasi 1958: 197), but the sillier these versions are, the less likely it is that they really connect with the focal scientific debates of the past. 13
Making Sense of Heritability
It is simply a historical distortion to present the heredity–environment controversy as having been resolved by the “insight” that both genes and environment matter for development. No one ever doubted this obvious and rather unilluminating truth. It is not surprising, therefore, that when criticizing the idea that nature and nurture are independent, separable sources of influence, each of which can act “in isolation from the other,” Lerner (1986: 83–84) can list the names of those who disputed that claim (Anastasi, Lehrman, Hebb, Schneirla) but that he cannot cite a single source where such a patently absurd idea has been defended. Also, when Lewontin says that “it was supposed that the phenotype of an individual could be the result of either environment or genotype, whereas we understand the phenotype to be the result of both” (Lewontin 1976a: 181), no reference is given for the preposterous monocausal view, simply because no such references exist. The suggestion that there are (or were) some people, usually called “genetic determinists,” who believe that genes are “self-sufficient causes” of behavior (Keller 1994: 118; Buchanan et al. 2002: 23), that “genes alone can produce traits” (Moore 2001: 13), that “only genes matter” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 59), that “we are completely determined by our genes” (Millstein 2002: 233), or that “the development of an organism is determined solely by genetic factors” (Baker 2004: 17) is ludicrous. Everybody has always known that, as David Lykken puts it, “without environmental input, your genome would have created nothing more than a damp spot on the carpet” (1995: 85). Therefore, if “genetic determinism” is defined as the doctrine that an organism’s phenotype is determined by genotype alone,2 it soon becomes obvious that “every first-year biology student knows [that it is false]” (Antony 2000: 17), and then surely the question must arise: why should such a silly belief be dignified with a name, or debated at all? As there is literally no one who ever subscribed to genetic determinism,3 the meaning of this doctrine obviously cannot be inferred from the texts of its (non-existent) proponents. But then the only way to reconstruct the thesis of genetic determinism is, oddly enough, to distill it from 2 3
“[T]he phrase ‘genetic determinism’ would, strictly speaking, mean that every event has a genetic cause sufficient for that event’s occurring” (Wachbroit 2001: 31). One of the rare philosophers who said the right thing about genetic determinism is Robert Richardson: “I know of no historical writer of merit or competent contemporary theorist that has embraced a genetic determinism according to which specific behaviors or behavioral types are expressed despite, or even independently of, environmental influences. The only question having any significance is one of the relative contributions of genetic and environmental factors” (Richardson 1980: 481).
14
The nature–nurture debate the texts of its opponents: “in denying the thesis of genetic determinism various researchers and other writers make various sorts of claims, and from these claims some ideas about the form of the thesis they are arguing against can be gleaned ” (Kaplan 2000: 10, italics supplied). A straw man in the making? To make things worse, the new and much discussed Developmental Systems Theory (DST) is sometimes described as “rejecting the idea that genes or environments can create traits by themselves” (Moore 2001: 8), and this trivial claim is even occasionally represented as the “essence” of the new perspective (Moore 2001: 61). Similarly, it is claimed that the main conclusion of the developmentalist argument is that “both genes and environment make essential developmental contributions to all aspects of our behavior” (Johnston 2003), or that it is “at the heart of developmental analysis” that “genes in themselves cannot cause development” (Gottlieb 1992: 162), or that from the DST perspective, a gene (or an environmental influence) does not “singly” determine the phenotype (Moss 2003: 115). But if this is really its crucial message, then one might as well read the abbreviation DST as “Definitely Superfluous Theory.”4 The following quotation from a very early overview of heritability research shows that reminding behavior geneticists that both genes and environments matter is like carrying coals to Newcastle: if there is no environment, no organism can develop to display any phenotype whatsoever. Likewise, without a genetic constitution, there will be no organism. It is clear that a question asking if a trait is due to heredity or to environment is nonsense. Without both, there would be no trait at all. A meaningful answer, however, may be sought to a question concerning the relative contributions of genetic differences and environmental differences to the variability of a characteristic. (McClearn 1964: 167)
To go even further into the past, Francis Galton, whom many regard as “the founder of behavior genetics” (McGuffin 2000: 243), was clearly aware of that truism. He stated it just in passing, having regarded it already 4
I don’t want to say that the whole DST consists of trivial claims. But I do want to say, first, that the dismissal of heritability in DST is just an uncritical repetition of Lewontin’s arguments, and, second, that sometimes it is really hard to see who is the addressee of their criticisms of hereditarianism. Example: “Nature has no existence prior to or separate from the concrete living organism in its concrete, often living, surroundings: no Platonic ideals here, no underlying reality more basic than the being itself, no instruction manuals or little engineers in the cell nucleus” (Oyama 2002: 164). Who is being attacked here? Who thinks that nature has existence prior to or separate from the concrete living organism?
15
Making Sense of Heritability
at that time as too self-evident to require further elaboration: “It is needless to insist that neither [nature nor nurture] is self-sufficient” (Galton 1874: 12, italics added).
1.2 no fair hearing for francis galton Speaking of Galton, “that versatile and somewhat eccentric man of genius” (Fisher 1959: 1), some criticisms of his work additionally illustrate the widespread tendency among contemporary scholars to misrepresent the hereditarian theorizing from its historical beginnings, and make it appear as overly crude, simplistic, or downright silly. For example, discussing Galton’s famous attempt to determine the influence of heredity on achieving eminence, David Moore finds a fatal flaw: Galton “ignored what is now obvious to us,” i.e., that the children of eminent people shared not just heredity with their parents but also favorable environments. According to Moore, this oversight shows that Galton “had a preexisting bias that sometimes prevented him from seeing the contributions that environmental factors can make to the appearance of our traits” (Moore 2001: 35–36). In reality, Galton was too much of a statistician to be unaware of such an obvious need to consider an alternative explanation. At the beginning of Hereditary Genius he writes: “I must not compare the sons of eminent men with those of non-eminent, because much of which I should ascribe to breed, others might ascribe to parental encouragement and example” (Galton 1892: 37, italics supplied). It was precisely for this reason that he undertook to compare the proportion of eminent people among the biological children of eminent people with adopted sons of Popes and other dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, in the attempt to disentangle possibly confounding influences from heredity and environment. In his own words: “If social help is really of the highest importance, the nephews [adopted children] of the Popes will attain eminence as frequently, or nearly so, as the sons of other eminent men; otherwise, they will not” (Galton 1892: 42). And the data clearly indicated a significant difference between the two groups, leading Galton to conclude that the environmental explanation could not be the whole story. This does not prove that Galton was right, of course, but it does show that his argument was immensely more sophisticated than Moore pictured it. Notice also how quickly Moore resorts to the attribution of “a preexisting bias.” Apparently, the conviction that early hereditarianism must 16
The nature–nurture debate have been appallingly prejudiced and unrefined is acquired through social osmosis, with the result that the view is dismissed on invented grounds and with no acquaintance with the relevant texts. (Although Moore discusses Galton’s views extensively, there are no references to Galton’s works in his text or bibliography.) The ill will toward the father of eugenics – Peter Medawar referred to him as “wicked old Sir Francis Galton” (Medawar 1977b) – seems to be so strong that even his indisputable achievements tend to be recognized only grudgingly.5 For example, Moore describes Galton not as a person who invented regression analysis, but as someone who “stumbled” onto it (2001: 37). The word “stumble” is singularly inappropriate here because in reality Galton not only introduced the concept of regression, but also slowly and single-handedly refined it over a period of twenty years in what a historian of statistics called “one of the grand triumphs of the history of science” (Stigler 1999: 177). Galton suffered a similar fate at the hands of geneticist Steve Jones: Galton, in Hereditary Genius, went to great lengths to show that talent runs in families and was coded into our biology. Oddly enough, he never pointed out that more than half his “geniuses” turned up in families with no history of distinction at all. Such was the power of prejudice that he concentrated only on those who supported his hereditarian views. (Jones 1994a: 225)
Again, an alleged methodological gaffe is unearthed, with an imputation of prejudice promptly following. But Jones’s methodological criticism is both factually incorrect and entirely irrelevant. First, Galton did point out that among poets, musicians, painters, divines, and scholars, more than half of the illustrious men came from families with no history of distinction (Galton 1892: 228, 239, 249, 274, 283, 300). Furthermore, summing up the information for all the professions that he considered, Galton concluded from his tabulated data that, cumulatively, “exactly one-half of the illustrious men have one or more eminent relations” (Galton 1892: 5
In his diatribe against “the unnatural science” of IQ and its heritability, Medawar says that “God alone knows how [Lewis Terman] estimated Galton’s IQ as 200” (1977b), implying that such an estimate could have been based only on some very weird and ridiculous speculation. But in fact Terman’s method was very simple and straightforward (Terman 1917: 209). On the basis of Karl Pearson’s biography of Galton, which gave ample evidence of Galton’s extraordinary precocity, Terman concluded that between the age of three and eight years Galton’s mental age (MA) was approximately double his actual age (CA). Now if in Galton’s case MA = 2 × CA, then in accordance with the then standard practice of calculating IQ, the equation “IQ = (MA/CA) × 100” immediately gives the value of his IQ: (2 × CA)/CA × 100 = 200.
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Making Sense of Heritability
322), from which it deductively follows that one-half of the illustrious men did not have any eminent relations. Second, it is unclear why Jones thinks that the fact of more than half of geniuses turning up in families with no distinction would create a problem for Galton’s hereditarianism. Since Galton’s illustrious men were selected in such a way that their ratio to the general population was 1 to 4,000, the hereditarian explanation could easily accommodate the proportion of eminent people from no-distinction families significantly higher than 50 percent.6 It may seem surprising that Jones dismissed the views of the founder of his own laboratory (Galton Laboratory, University College London) in such a manner. But then again this should perhaps not be so surprising. One can hardly be expected to study seriously the work of a man whom one happens to call publicly “Victorian racist swine” – the way Jones referred to Galton in an interview (Grove 1991). Also, in Jones’s book Genetics for Beginners (Jones & Van Loon 1993: 169), Galton is pictured in a Nazi uniform, with a swastika on his sleeve.
1.3 heritability
101
Although both genes and environmental influences are absolutely necessary for the development (and even just for the continuing existence) of organisms, this does not mean that the importance of these two factors must be the same. One measure of that difference is heritability, usually symbolized by “h2 .” Let me illustrate how the concept works in a very simple situation. Consider a population that consists of organisms with three different genotypes (G1 , G2 , and G3 ) that are randomly distributed in three different environments (E1 , E2 , and E3 ). Table 1.1 represents the phenotypic values in a given trait for all nine G–E combinations, and phenotypic means of particular genotypes (G-means) as well as phenotypic means of specific environments (E-means). Even without any statistical analysis it is easy to see that in this population genetic effects on phenotype are considerably stronger than the environmental ones. Keeping the environment fixed, a change from G1 6
The same criticism is leveled against Galton by Joseph L. Graves, who in the end concludes that Galton was “an intellectual mediocrity, a sham, and a villain” (Graves 2001: 100). In a brief review of Graves’s book, Loring Brace (professor of anthropology at the University of Michigan) praises the author for these very words and says that “his demonstration of the truth of this description is worth the price of the book” (Brace 2001).
18
The nature–nurture debate Table 1.1
G1 G2 G3 E-means
E1
E2
E3
G-means
1 4 7 4
2 5 8 5
3 6 9 6
2 5 8 Grand mean: 5
to G2 , or from G2 to G3 always results in the phenotypic increase of three points, whereas the corresponding transition from one environment to the other produces the phenotypic rise of only one point. The so-called “main effect” of genotype is visible in the last column, and the main effect of environment is seen in the last row. The fact that a genotypic change affects the phenotype more strongly than an environmental change is manifest in Figure 1.1. An alternative way to describe the data in Table 1.1 is by using the concept of variance. The total phenotypic variance (VP ) in the population is calculated by first squaring every individual deviation from the overall phenotypic mean (5), then adding up all these values, and finally dividing the result by the number of individual cases (9). When we do this, we obtain the result: 6.66. Now this total phenotypic variance can be decomposed into two parts: the one due to genetic differences (genetic variance, or VG ) and the one caused by environmental differences (environmental variance, or VE ). To calculate VG , we square the deviations of three genotypic means from the grand mean, add them up, and divide by 3: (32 + 02 + 32 )/3 = 6. So, the genetic part of phenotypic variance (or
Phenotype
10 8 G1
6
G2 4
G3
2 0 E1
E2
E3
Environment Figure 1.1 A simple illustration of heritability.
19
Making Sense of Heritability
genetic variance, in short) is 6. Mutatis mutandis, we do the same thing for the environmental part, and we get the value for environmental variance (VE ): (12 + 02 + 12 )/3 = 0.66. Now we are ready to calculate the heritability, i.e., the proportion of genetic variance in the total phenotypic variation. We divide genetic variance VG by total variance VP : 6/6.66 = 0.9. The heritability (h2 ) is 90 percent. (Let me stress that this is an unrealistically high value of heritability for most real-life examples.) The contribution of environment to phenotypic variance (sometimes called environmentality, or e 2 ) is 0.1 (0.66/6.66), or 10 percent. All this connects directly to what was discussed before: The partitioning of the variance into its components allows us to estimate the relative importance of the various determinants of the phenotype, in particular the role of heredity versus environment, or nature and nurture . . . The relative importance of heredity in determining phenotypic values is called the heritability of the character. (Falconer 1989: 125–126)
It should be stressed again that my illustration with three genotypes and three environments is an unrealistic simplification, introduced just for expository convenience at this early stage.7 The real-life examples get much more complicated, basically in two ways. First, genetic variance (VG ) can itself be further partitioned into additive variance (VA ), dominance variance (VD ), epistatic variance (VEP ), and variance due to assortative mating (VAM ). VA includes independent genetic effects that get fully transmitted from parents to offspring. VD includes phenotypic differences arising from interactions of different alleles at the same locus, while VEP subsumes interactions of genes at different loci. VAM measures the degree to which variance is increased or decreased through non-random pairing of parents’ genotypes. Total genetic variance can then be expressed as the sum: VG = VA + VD + VEP + VAM The ratio of total genetic variance to phenotypic variance (VG /VP ) is called “heritability in the broad sense” or “coefficient of genetic determination.” 7
Table 1.1 is a way to explain the meaning of “heritability,” but it does not correspond to the way heritability is calculated in empirical practice. Usually we do not know the number of genotypes, let alone the numerical values of genotypic means, and the same is true of the environmental side. Still, this idealization is useful for getting some basic conceptual understanding, and it also prepares the ground for discussing issues about genotype–environment interaction (in chapter 2).
20
The nature–nurture debate On the other hand, the so-called “heritability in the narrow sense” is the ratio of additive genetic variance to phenotypic variance (VA /VP ). Since in this book I will primarily address issues in which broad heritability is more relevant, from now onwards the term “heritability” will be understood as broad heritability (unless specified otherwise). Second, additional complications in the variance story arise from other possible sources of variation (beside VG and VE ). These include gene–environment interaction or VI (to be discussed in chapter 2), gene–environment correlation or CovGE (to be discussed in chapter 3), and measurement error or VError . Finally, in contemporary behavior genetics, environmental variance (VE ) is usually also divided into two parts: between-family variance (VBF ) and within-family variance (VWF ). Between-family variance and within-family variance are sometimes referred to, respectively, as being due to shared (or common) and nonshared (or unique) environments. Summing all this up, total phenotypic variance can be represented in the following general way: VP = VA + VD + VEP + VAM + VBF + VWF + VI + CovGE + VError Of the two ways of understanding heritability, narrow and broad, I said I will focus on the latter. But I have to mention the third interpretation of heritability, which also exists in the literature and which sometimes creates confusion. Some biologists and philosophers (Lehrman 1970: 22; Roughgarden 1979: 136; Lerner 1986: 129; Sober 1984: 151; Feldman 1992: 151; Brandon 1996: 70, 93) regard a trait as heritable if there is a requisite kind of resemblance between parents and offspring – irrespective of whether that resemblance is due to genetic or environmental causes. There is nothing wrong with that definition, of course. As Jacquard (1983) says, it just happens that there is one word (“heritability”) but three different concepts: (1) broad heritability (the ratio of genetic variance to total variance), (2) narrow heritability (the ratio of additive genetic variance to total variance), and (3) heritability in the sense of parents–offspring resemblance. In terms of ordinary language semantics, (3) comes probably closest to what the word “heritable” means in English. Moreover, under certain assumptions, (3) can be regarded as an “operational definition” of (2). That is, when it is hard to measure narrow heritability directly, under some conditions one can measure (3), the regression of offspring phenotype on mid-parent phenotype, and take it as an estimate of (2), narrow heritability. Sense (1), on the other hand, has much less to do with the ordinary meaning, and it is therefore a rather unfortunate historical accident 21
Making Sense of Heritability
that the term “heritability” was chosen to designate that concept. Hence, it cannot be stressed enough that the reader should always think about the notion by relying on its definition, and not on what it means in English. The troubles start when people switch from one concept to its homonym without noticing it. Here is an example from one of the widely used introductions to philosophy of biology (the numbering of the two sections is added for easy contrast): [1] It is a common mistake to think that high heritability means that a trait is genetically determined – a matter of nature rather than nurture. In fact, heritability has very little to do with how traits are built in the growing organisms. Selection cares about whether your children resemble you. But it doesn’t care why. Heritability is purely a measure of how well the state of the parent predicts the state of the offspring . . . [2] One way to make a trait highly heritable is to make the environment the same for everyone. By controlling other causes of variation, we can make heritable variation a higher proportion of total variation. For example, IQ scores will be more heritable if we provide equality of educational opportunities. Conversely, genetic uniformity in a population will reduce heritability. (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 35)
Sterelny and Griffiths are here criticizing the muddled thinking about heritability (the box from which the quotation comes is entitled “A Caution on Heritability”), but in the end they manage to contradict themselves in the space of a single page. First, they insist that heritability is neutral between genetic and environmental influences (because it is “purely a measure of how well the state of the parent predicts the state of the offspring”), and then after just a few sentences they say that the existence of genetically caused differences increases heritability. The source of this contradiction is fairly clear. In section [1], Sterelny and Griffiths have in mind the third concept of heritability (parent–offspring resemblance), and in section [2] they speak about variance-defined heritability. But it is simply a confusion to run these two concepts together. The heritability claims have been regarded as important primarily because it was expected that they would furnish some valuable information about the causal strength of genetic influence on phenotypic differences. Let us recall that J. L. Lush, who is credited (wrongly) with introducing the term “heritability,” defined it “as the fraction of the observed variance which was caused by differences in heredity” (quoted in DeFries 1967: 324 – emphasis added). Sewall Wright, who introduced the symbol h2 for heritability in 1920, defined it as “the degree of determination by heredity” (quoted in Bell 1977: 297). 22
The nature–nurture debate There is a big methodological divide between two domains of heritability research: studies of animals and humans. Animal studies use the experimental approach. Here organisms with different genotypes can be exposed to a number of different environments, and then observing the phenotypes resulting from all G–E combinations makes it relatively easy to infer the causal impact of the two factors. In human studies such an approach is impossible for ethical reasons. Behavior geneticists cannot assign babies with different genetic characteristics to different environments just to satisfy their scientific curiosity. They had to find another way to do it. And they did. Twin studies, studies of relatives of different degrees of genetic affinity, and adoption studies are the best known methods of human behavior genetics. For a detailed exposition of more advanced methods see Neale & Cardon 1992. As David Fulker (1974: 91) said, it was precisely the absence of experimental control and the complexity of human behavior genetics that forced the field to develop models of high statistical sophistication. (For a more accessible overview of contemporary methods see Plomin et al. 2001: 327–371, and also very nice “behavioral genetic interactive modules,” developed by Shaun Purcell and freely available at http://statgen.iop.kcl.ac.uk/bgim/.) This fundamental methodological difference between animal and human studies was a point where many critics tried to drive a wedge between the two approaches. They claimed that the search for heritability makes sense in the animal domain because there the experimental manipulation of the two variables makes it possible to separate their causal contributions. But in research on humans, they insisted, there is an inherent methodological limitation that dooms the whole enterprise in advance. For example, Oscar Kempthorne said: “The only way to infer causality, and then only perhaps a very limited sort of causality, is by way of controlled experiments, which are essentially impossible in the human genetic-environment milieu” (in Pollak et al. 1977: 13 – italics added; cf. Kempthorne 1997: 111; Platt & Bach 1997: 139). It is in the context of human behavior genetics that it has been said that the term “heritability” is “no longer suitable for use in human genetics and its use should be discontinued” (Guo 2000: 299); that to apply the heritability formula to humans is “virtually impossible” (Park 2002: 407); that heritability estimates are “both deceptive and trivial” (Hirsch 1976: 168); that they are “nearly equivalent to no information at all for any serious problem of human genetics” (Feldman & Lewontin 1975: 1168); that they are “unscientific and, indeed, meaningless” (Layzer 1976: 199); that they have “as much scientific validity as horoscopes” (Layzer 1976: 239); that it 23
Making Sense of Heritability
is dubious whether a clear meaning can be given to “genetic determination of traits” (Burian 1981: 51); that inferences about genetic determination of traits should be “disavowed once and for all” (Kitcher 1990: 97); that “mathematical estimates of heritability tell us almost nothing about anything important” (Jencks et al. 1972: 76); that the attempt quantitatively to determine the part of the phenotypic variance due to genetic causes is “biological nonsense” (Lewontin 1982: 14–15); that the concept of heritability is “questionable” (Schaffner 1999: 61), or “an imposing illusion” (Moore 2001: 40); that “the next century will treat heritability analysis with the same regard that this one treats phrenology” (Sarkar 1999: 230); that heritability analysis “ought to be relegated to the history of science along with phlogiston, penis envy and cold fusion” (Wahlsten 1994: 265); that “[the ‘facts’ from which the heritability of IQ has been calculated] have been so scandalously bad as to constitute a veritable Watergate of human behavioral genetics” (Lewontin 1976b: 10); that the talk about substantial heritability of IQ is “scientifically meaningless garbage” (Lewontin 1973 – italics in the original), and so forth. Two central arguments drive this methodological pessimism: one based on the possibility of genotype–environment interaction, and another relying on the possibility of genotype–environment correlation. These two objections will be extensively discussed in chapter 2 and chapter 3, respectively. Another reason for many people’s skepticism about heritability is clearly articulated by Patrick Bateson: “Another problem with heritability is that it says nothing about the ways in which genes and environment contribute to the biological and psychological cooking processes of development” (Bateson 2001b: 565). Indeed, heritability is supposed to give us causal knowledge, but it gives us no information about causal details or mechanisms underlying the process of development. But it is wrong to criticize a concept for not delivering something that it was not supposed to deliver. The very purpose of heritability estimates is to give us some knowledge about causality precisely in those situations where we are ignorant of causal specifics. Arthur Jensen once said that “a heritability study may be regarded as a Geiger counter with which one scans the territory in order to find the spot one can most profitably begin to dig for ore” (Jensen 1972b: 243). That Jensen’s advice as to how to look upon heritability is merely an application of a standard general procedure in causal reasoning is confirmed by the following observation from an introduction to causal analysis: “the decomposition of statistical associations represents a first 24
The nature–nurture debate step. The results indicate which effects are important and which may be safely ignored, that is, where we ought to start digging in order to uncover the nature of the causal mechanisms producing association between our variables” (Hellevik 1984: 149). High heritability of a trait (in a given population) often signals that it may be worthwhile to dig further, in the sense that an important genetic mechanism controlling differences in this trait may thus be uncovered.8 The attraction of the heritability approach is that it is supposed to give us some causal knowledge even though we are unable to peek inside the black box and see how the cogs and wheels fit together. And if it can do what it is supposed to do, is it not odd to complain that it did not do more? We usually do not see it as the fault of the hammer that it cannot smash the atom. Several critics of heritability (Hirsch 1997: 208, 213; Hirsch 1990: 137; Wahlsten 1997: 73; Sarkar 1998: 72; Schiff & Lewontin 1986: 179; Daniels et al. 1997: 53; Gigerenzer 1997: 145; Stoltenberg 1997: 90; Guo 1999: 227; Guo 2000: 298; Vitzthum 2003: 544) use an argument from authority to prop up their position. They all quote Ronald A. Fisher, who once called heritability “one of those unfortunate shortcuts, which have often emerged in biometry for lack of a more thorough analysis of the data” (Fisher 1951: 217). There are five problems here. First, all of these authors invoke Fisher in the context of their discussion of human behavior genetics, whereas Fisher’s paper addressed issues connected with animal breeding problems. This is odd because most of these critics insist that it is human behavior genetics that suffers from specially grave methodological defects, while they are usually happy to concede that heritability works fine in experimental studies of animals (like cattle breeding, for example). So, Fisher’s argument seems to be an inappropriate instrument for their purpose. Second, Fisher certainly did not argue that heritability is useless and that the concept should be abandoned by geneticists. After all, he himself spoke about heritable variation (Bennett 1983: 140), about the genetic component of variance vs. total phenotypic variance (Bennett 1983: 228), etc. Even in his historical book The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Fisher speaks about “the fraction of the total observable variance of the measurement, which may be regarded as genetic variance” (Fisher 1930: 33), which is nothing if not heritability by another name. (He left that part 8
“Discovering [components of variance] is a necessary first step, but it is just a first step, and few would argue that it is sufficient in itself ” (McGuffin & Katz 1990: 142).
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Making Sense of Heritability
unchanged in the significantly revised second edition of 1958.) Elsewhere, again, Fisher praised Galton for trying to give numerical precision to concepts like “the strength of inheritance” (Fisher 1959: 2), and as we know, “Galton’s original question about the ‘strength’ of inheritance is the same as the contemporary common sense understanding of heritability” (Nuffield 2002: 20). Third, Fisher’s disparaging comment about heritability was far from being universally accepted. His worry was mainly about the heritability value being under undue influences of measurement error and changes in population parameters. For instance, his view was criticized by Johansson for “missing the important point that for practical breeding work we need estimates of heritability that are valid under the conditions where they will be applied” (Johansson 1961: 9). Fourth, Fisher’s grounds for dissatisfaction with heritability were completely different from the reasons of the critics who quote him in support of their own views. In the opinion of most of the authors who cite Fisher, one of the main problems with heritability is that genetic variance (the numerator) cannot be determined because of the confounding influence of gene–environment interaction. But Fisher himself had nothing but contempt for this kind of criticism, as seen from his letter to the son of Charles Darwin in 1935: “There is one point in which Hogben and his associates are riding for a fall, and that is in making a great song about the possible, but unproved, importance of non-linear interactions between hereditary and environmental factors. J. B. S. Haldane seems tempted to join in this” (Bennett 1983: 260). It is rather funny that contemporary critics of heritability (some of them doing research in history of biology!) press the interaction objection, which Lewontin basically took over from Hogben (1933), and then even present Fisher as their ally in this. By the way, Fisher’s judgment that Haldane “seems tempted to join in this” proved correct. Haldane’s book in which he defended Hogben’s position on interactions soon followed (Haldane 1938).9 Fifth, while there is nothing wrong with these authors trying to support their opposition to human behavior genetics by relying on Fisher as a supreme authority in genetics (after all, he was one of the architects of 9
Similarly, when Medawar says that objections to heritability “seem to be beyond the comprehension of IQ psychologists, though they were made clear enough by J. B. S. Haldane and Lancelot Hogben” (Medawar 1977a), he did not consider the possibility that IQ psychologists were intelligent enough to understand the objections but that, like Fisher, they were simply not convinced by them.
26
The nature–nurture debate the Modern Synthesis), they should be aware that they might not find his other views about genetics so appealing. Some of them would probably be shocked to know that, despite his derogatory aside about heritability, Fisher actually believed that genetics supports the heritability of racial differences in intelligence. At about the same time that he wrote the article they quote, he suggested the following formulation for the UNESCO statement on race: “Available scientific knowledge provides a firm basis for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development, seeing that such groups differ undoubtedly in a very large number of their genes” (quoted in Provine 1986: 875 – italics added). This shows that one should be careful in choosing one’s authorities because they can force one to go in an unwanted direction. It is worth stressing that influences of genes and environment are inseparable epistemologically: we cannot know one without the other. For this reason it is wrong to regard the interest in heritability as a symptom of an obsession with genes. By knowing heritability one knows ipso facto the possible size of complementary contribution of environment to phenotypic variation, which is called “coefficient of environmental determination” (DeFries 1972: 12) or “environmentality” (Plomin et al. 2001: 297). It is hence curious to see heritability attacked by people who want to emphasize the importance of environmental influences. For, if their criticism succeeds in making the heritability methodologically suspect or scientifically useless, they are thereby pulling the rug from under their own feet: they have then no right to speak about the environmental impact on phenotypic variation, either. A concept complementary to a meaningless concept is itself meaningless. Some scholars adamantly reject the possibility of separating the causal contributions of heredity and environment, but without noticing any logical inconsistency they at the same time cheerfully advocate environmentalist explanations. For example, in an article written for the APA Encyclopedia of Psychology, Douglas Wahlsten (2000b: 382) criticizes methods of behavior genetics and claims that its partitioning of phenotypic variance into genetic and environmental components is “flawed in principle.” Then in the very next sentence he says that behavior genetic studies “have valuable applications in the study of nongenetic effects.” Apparently, the partitioning of variance is flawed only in one direction: nature is “in principle” inseparable from nurture, whereas somehow nurture turns out to be quite easily separable from nature. 27
Making Sense of Heritability
1.4 can monomorphic traits be heritable ? A frequent objection to heritability is that although it is supposed to be a measure of genetic influence, some traits have zero heritability despite being obviously under genetic control. These are monomorphic traits, i.e., those possessed by all members of a given population. Take the example of the human characteristic of walking on two legs: the trait seems to be under genetic control, while nearly all the variation in this trait is presumably the result of environmental disturbances. The trait is genetic but not heritable. Some people (Ariew 1996: S23; Bateson 2001a: 151–152; Bateson 2001b: 565; Dupre´ 2001: 30; Dupre´ 2003: 105; Vitzthum 2003: 544) think that this consequence is a serious problem for heritability, mainly because it shows that even despite zero heritability genes can still have an important role to play in development. But this is a serious misunderstanding for two reasons. First, no geneticist or behavior geneticist ever took zero heritability to mean that genes are unimportant for development. What is taken to follow from zero heritability is only that genes are unimportant for explaining the existing phenotypic differences in the population in question. Second, even if a trait is shared by all organisms in a given population it can still be heritable – if we take a broader perspective, and compare that population with other populations. The critics of heritability are often confused, and switch from one perspective to another without noticing it. Consider the following “problem” for heritability: the heritability of “walking on two legs” is zero. And yet walking on two legs is clearly a fundamental property of being human, and is one of the more obvious biological differences between humans and other great apes such as chimpanzees or gorillas. It obviously depends heavily on genes, despite having a heritability of zero. (Bateson 2001b: 565; cf. Bateson 2001a: 150– 151; 2002: 2212)
When Bateson speaks about the differences between humans and other great apes, the heritability of walking on two legs in that population (consisting of humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas) is certainly not zero. On the other hand, within the human species itself the heritability may well be zero. So, if it is just made entirely clear which population is being discussed, no puzzling element remains. In the narrower population (humans), the question “Do genetic differences explain why some people walk on two legs and some don’t?” has a negative answer because there are no such genetic differences. In the broader population (humans, 28
The nature–nurture debate chimpanzees, and gorillas) the question “Do genetic differences explain why some organisms walk on two legs and some don’t?” has an affirmative answer. All this neatly accords with the logic of heritability, and creates no problem whatsoever. The critics of hereditarianism like to repeat that heritability is a population-relative statistic, but when they raise this kind of objection it seems that they themselves forget this important truth. The same pseudo-problem for heritability is created by Susan Oyama. After describing a standard situation where gene differences explain phenotypic differences, she tries to show that sometimes genes are in an unprincipled way also invoked to explain lack of differences. Her example is “a species universal, like the human smile, or walking” (Oyama 2000b: S334). But again, in explaining species universals, what we account for is why a particular species has a given trait, while other species don’t. It is a question about (inter-species) variance, not invariance. And the genetic answer, far from violating “causal democracy” (the general symmetry between the roles of genes and environments), is entirely in accordance with it. Andre´ Ariew falls into the same trap. He says that “on the proposal that innateness is high heritability, the possession of opposable thumbs [which has low heritability in human population] is in this case (counterintuitively) not innate” (Ariew 1996: S23). In fact, there is no counterintuitive result at all. The low heritability of opposable thumbs among humans reflects the fact that, indeed, in this population (humans) there is no genetic variation in that trait. However, the reason we regard the trait as genetic is that we actually think about the variation in this trait in a wider population (say, consisting of humans and monkeys like tamarins and marmosets). In that population, heritability of having opposable thumbs is high, and the trait is genetic.10 Let me try to make the point in a very general way, by using a highly simplified example of a population of organisms with just two genotypes (G1 and G2 ) living in two different environments (E1 and E2 ). Suppose that they all have the same phenotypic trait, P1 , which means that there is no phenotypic variation with respect to that trait. Now if someone nevertheless says that in that population trait P1 is genetic, what could that possibly mean? Apparently, it cannot mean that the trait is heritable because the heritability of P1 is not well defined in this case. Since h2 is 10
It is odd that Ariew did not consider this approach, given that Fred Gifford (1990: 336) defended it using the very same example.
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the ratio of genetic variance to the entire variance, and since both values are zero here, the talk about heritability seems to make no sense at all. But let’s not move too quickly here. If the claim that the universally shared trait P1 is genetically caused means anything, it means that it is the actual genetic constitution of these organisms that explains why they all have P1 , instead of having some other trait (say, P2 ) or a distribution of other traits (Pi , Pj , Pk . . .). In other words: had the genetic constitution of the population been different, not all the organisms would have had P1 . So, in attributing the monomorphic trait to genes we are actually saying that different genes would have resulted in a different phenotypic structure of the population. We are in fact contrasting the existing population with another population (actual or possible, depending on the context) in which different genes produce a different phenotypic outcome. Without such a contrasting case, I submit, it is difficult to make sense of the statement that P1 is genetically caused. If this is correct, then it will turn out that the talk about genetic causation with respect to monomorphic traits is intelligible only if there is heritability – in a wider context. Namely, what happens when we contrast the existing population with another one is that our perspective is broadened and, most importantly, something is introduced that has not existed earlier: variation. In the expanded situation, which includes both the original population and its contrast case, it becomes entirely legitimate to look for the source of the phenotypic difference between them. And if the source is genetic, it will be because the difference in question is heritable. Figures 1.2a and 1.2b show one and the same population (solid line) contrasted with two different possible situations (dashed lines). The answer to the causal question about what produces P1 is different in the two figures because the contrast cases are different. In Figure 1.2a, P1 is genetic simply because it is the variation in genotype, (G1 or G2 ) vs. G3 , that determines whether an organism will have P1 or P2 . In Figure 1.2b, on the other hand, P1 is environmental because organisms have this phenotype due to being exposed to environments E1 or E2 , rather than E3 (which leads to P2 ). Figure 1.2a basically corresponds to Bateson’s example (mentioned above), where walking on two legs is regarded as genetic because the genetic difference between us and chimpanzees explains why we have the trait and chimpanzees do not. The variation in the way of locomotion is heritable in the population that comprises humans and chimpanzees. Notice, however, that if we stick to the example of “walking on two legs” 30
The nature–nurture debate
P
G1 & G2
P1
G3
P2
E1
E
E2
Figure 1.2a A monomorphic trait (genetic).
P
G1 & G2
P1
P2
E1
E2
E3
Figure 1.2b A monomorphic trait (environmental).
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Making Sense of Heritability
there is no readily available contrast case that would correspond to the situation represented by Figure 1.2b. Here we have to resort to our imagination and picture a population in which, say, all people contract polio (environmental influence) and become paraplegics. Compared to that situation, our walking on two legs would indeed be environmental. So, the puzzle about how a monomorphic trait (for which heritability is undefined) can still be regarded as genetic is resolved by realizing that in such cases we always expand the population (be it only implicitly), thereby creating a phenotypic variation which did not exist in the first place and which can then be explained by genetic differences. In other words, a monomorphic trait can be regarded as genetic simply because in the broadened context it is no longer monomorphic and is heritable. My claim is that if we look at monomorphic traits without introducing a contrast case (and variation that goes with it), the question “Genetically or environmentally caused?” cannot receive a meaningful answer.11 Consider the same solid line in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b and forget completely about contrast cases pictured by two alternative dashed lines in these figures. Now focusing exclusively on what that solid line represents – the population of four types of organisms (G1 + E1 , G1 + E2 , G2 + E1 , G2 + E2 ), which all have the same phenotype P1 – try to ask yourself whether trait P1 is genetic or environmental. What could possibly sway you one way or the other? Without recourse to additional information (a contrast case) the question is unanswerable. This diagnosis can help us avoid a pseudo-problem for heritability created by Ned Block. He argues that the concept heritable is different from the commonsense concept genetically determined. He first points out that we would all agree that the number of fingers on the human hand is genetically determined, but then he finds it puzzling that the heritability of the number of fingers in humans is very low, and exclaims: “What’s going on?” (Block 1995: 103). Well, here’s what’s going on. Block uses the concept “genetically determined” in such a way that he explicitly links it to the normal environment (“it depends on the idea of a normal environment”). But then, of course, if the environment is fixed to a normal environment (which never produces an abnormal number of fingers), it follows that the only possible contrast case (not having five fingers on each hand) can be the organisms that are phenotypically different because they are genetically different. And clearly, once there is a genetically produced 11
Essentially the same point, I think, is made in a different way by Elliott Sober in Sober 1994: 194–195.
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The nature–nurture debate phenotypic difference, heritability reappears. Contrary to what Block says, the trait being genetically determined turns out to be inseparable from its being heritable. There are two sources of Block’s confusion here. First, he does not realize that if the concept of a genetically determined trait P is semantically linked to what happens in a normal environment (which is not a source of variation for the trait in question) then the only remaining possible reason for an organism not to have P must be a genetic difference – which therefore makes it certain that any phenotypic difference emerging under the stipulated conditions will be heritable. Second, Block fails to see that, in this context, the postulation of a genetic difference is essential for attributing any causal role to genes (“genetically determined”). For instance, when in a later footnote (1995: 109) he claims that there is no guarantee that it will always be possible to expand the relevant population along the lines that correspond to my Figure 1.2a, he may be right about this. But without such an expansion that would point to a genetic difference, there would be absolutely no reason to say that trait P is genetically, rather than environmentally, determined. To drive this point home, consider a population in which everyone suffers from a given disease, and let us also assume that in this population everyone has the same genotype G1 and is exposed to the same environment E1 . Now is this disease genetic or environmental? The truth is that the question just makes no sense unless we are allowed to go beyond that situation and explore whether the disease would still be there under a different regime, say, with some members of the population having genotype G2 (instead of G1 ), or environment E2 (instead of E1 ). No difference, no comparison, no causal attribution.
1.5 philosophers at work:
CAVEAT LECTOR!
In those scientific controversies where methodological issues loom large, philosophers rightly feel that their contribution might be helpful. Their careful analysis of opposing views promises to unearth some unrecognized points of disagreement, help the sides in the conflict to understand each other’s positions better, and eventually maybe remove some obstacles to a more fruitful exchange of ideas. It is all the more disappointing, therefore, that here where philosophical intervention is really needed it has so often just compounded the confusion. George Berkeley’s famous diagnosis of philosophers’ troubles applies here very well: 33
Making Sense of Heritability Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves – that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. (Berkeley 1996: 8)
Let me illustrate how the anti-hereditarian consensus in philosophy (mentioned in the Introduction) led the field to be completely dominated by highly prejudiced opinions, uninformed statements, and occasional downright ignorance. It is almost as if there was a competition in poohpoohing heritability research, in which everyone won a prize, just for participating. Many philosophers represent the nature–nurture debate as being the result of dreadfully crude thinking, or even occasionally as “having little to do with thinking” (Blackburn 2002). In the attempt to reduce to absurdity the notion that the relative importance of inheritance and environment could be measured, Gilbert Ryle observed that, in speaking about Edmund Hillary’s climbing Everest, we are not permitted to say “that Hillary’s inherited physique got him up 15,000 feet, leaving the remaining 14,000 feet to be contributed by his acquired expertness” (Ryle 1974: 57). Of course, it would be silly to say this, but it is curious that the evident silliness of that claim did not lead Ryle to draw the only logical inference, i.e., that serious people who tried to gauge causal contributions of nature and nurture must have had in mind something different from the ridiculous idea he “refuted.”
1.5.1 g or not g, that is the question The heritability of IQ is the best researched area in the heredity– environment controversy (McGue & Bouchard 1998: 4; Plomin 1987: 51; Herrnstein 1973: 53; Plomin 2002: 212). It is therefore interesting to take a look at some typical philosophical excursions into the topic of human intelligence, and especially “general intelligence,” which some influential writers (see 1.5.2) closely associate with discussions about heritability. Gilbert Ryle disputed the belief in general intelligence (Spearman’s g factor) in the following way: “Only occasionally is there even a weak inference from a person’s possession of a high degree of one species of intelligence to his possession of a high degree of another” (Ryle 1974: 55). This statement is empirically false. In psychology, there has been a consensus for quite some time that different cognitive abilities are substantially correlated. Nevertheless, we should not make too much of Ryle’s 34
The nature–nurture debate mistake. It is very uncharacteristic of his way of doing philosophy to issue statements about empirical issues. It goes against his view that philosophy should be insulated from empirical considerations and be limited to conceptual analysis or, as he used to put it, “logical geography.” What most probably happened is that Ryle (wrongly) regarded the independence of different forms of intelligence as an obvious truth, and then just used this alleged commonsense truth to make a “conceptual” point against the idea of general intelligence. More worrying, however, is when the same mistake is repeated by contemporary philosophers who are trained to pay attention to results of the relevant empirical research. Philip Kitcher, relying on a paleontologist and two philosophers as his sole authorities on the research on human cognitive abilities, proclaimed general intelligence a “myth” (Kitcher 1985: 200–201). To see how far off-base his judgment is, notice that the American Psychological Association’s task group on intelligence stated that the theory of general intelligence is “the most widely accepted current view” (Neisser et al. 1996: 81). Also, g is regarded as “perhaps the most replicated result in psychology” (Deary 2000: 318), and as “probably the best measured and most studied human trait in all of psychology” (Gottfredson 2002: 25). Another prominent researcher on psychology of intelligence calls the general intelligence factor “certainly the most robust phenomenon in the social sciences,” and adds: “Despite torturous method of factor analysis, attacks from outraged critics and even long periods of being ignored, g [general intelligence] just keeps reappearing like the insistent relative that won’t go away” (Detterman 2000: 136). In a recent conference attended by leading experts on human intelligence Michael Rutter, who is known for his moderate views, said: “All of us accept [g’s] reality. It is not merely a statistical artefact, rather, it really does represent something that is biologically important” (Rutter 2000: 282 – italics added). But it is not merely that Kitcher’s view on g is out of touch with contemporary science. His reason for dismissing g is extremely puzzling: “Many scientists are now convinced that there is no single measure of intellectual ability – no unitary intelligence. Their suspicion of the concept of intelligence is based on the view that various intellectual capacities are not well correlated” (Kitcher 1985: 200–201). Kitcher is simply uninformed here. For example, the correlations between four different intellectual abilities measured by WAIS III (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III) are between 0.6 and 0.8. In social science one rarely gets correlations higher than that. The correlation between various cognitive abilities has 35
Making Sense of Heritability
been such a consistent and robust result of measurement since the 1940s that today even the psychologists who oppose g never deny this fact. For example, one of the most prominent critics of general intelligence had to concede: “The evidence in favor of a general factor of intelligence is, in one sense, overwhelming . . . One would have to be blind or intransigent not to give this evidence its due” (Sternberg 2003: 375). Hilary Putnam also asserted, without supplying any references, that all the statistical evidence is against the hypothesis of a single factor (1973: 141). John Dupre´ even goes so far as to suspect that no coherent sense can be attached to the concept of general intelligence (Dupre´ 2004: 513). He also claims that any measurement that ranks individuals on a single scale of intelligence must include some weighting of specific cognitive abilities, and that this weighting “can surely only be a value judgment.” But this is simply false. In fact, the scale of general intelligence is created by taking an IQ correlation matrix and then extracting g from that matrix as the first principal component (that accounts for the highest proportion of IQ variance). This statistical procedure is usually done by a computer, without the machine being fed any “value judgment” about specific cognitive abilities. Again, a statement that very much sounds like a summary (and uninformed) rejection of general intelligence has found its way even into the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (see Blackburn 1996: entry “intelligence”). Also, despite having no obvious expertise in the relevant research areas, a dozen philosophers from Ohio State University published a short letter in 1990, in which they claimed that, “as is now well known,” the g factor accounts for little variance in IQ (Boer et al. 1990). Judging by the similarity of wording and reliance on L. L. Thurstone as an authority, it appears that the philosophers’ pronouncement derived from Stephen Jay Gould’s claim to the same effect (Gould 1981: 314– 315). In reality, however, the g factor typically explains about half of the variation in IQ (Carroll 1995; Deary 2001: 222; Deary 1998; Lubinski 2004: 98), quite a large effect by any measure. Interestingly, what almost a whole department of philosophy publicly declared to be “now well known” is regarded by the world’s leading expert on factor analysis as “truly an egregious error on Gould’s part” (Carroll 1995). Even the prominent opponents of g, like Ulric Neisser, reject Gould’s views because they regard his critique of general intelligence “as actually rather thin, relying chiefly on rhetoric and ignoring empirical evidence” (Neisser’s response to a question in the PBS Newshour Online Forum, on April 28, 1998). 36
The nature–nurture debate Why do the philosophers present the research on g and its heritability as a failure and an irrational enterprise, despite plenty of evidence that it is in reality a bustling and fruitful research program? If we accept Paul Meehl’s diagnosis of why the very idea of general intelligence still faces obstinate resistance, there are three possible explanations of philosophical g-phobia: “A century of research – more than that if we start with Galton – has resulted in a triumph of scientific psychology, the footdraggers being either uninformed, deficient in quantitative reasoning, or impaired by political correctness” (Meehl 1998).
1.5.2 Measure for (mis)measure In philosophy of science, Gould’s book The Mismeasure of Man is standardly praised as disclosing serious weaknesses and fallacies of hereditarianism. Here are just a couple of representative examples: No one has done as much as Stephen J. Gould to expose race and intelligence studies for the garbage that they often are. (Brown 1998: 5; 2001: 206) Stephen Jay Gould has lucidly analyzed how filling the skulls with lead shot, and comparing the weights of the lead, could easily be infected with unconscious biases. (Kitcher 1996: 171)
Brown is urging others to follow in Gould’s footsteps and fight bad science in the same way. He says that philosophers of science are “uniquely situated” to do this job well: “More than anyone else, they have the skills – logical, mathematical, statistical, methodological, and many more – to ferret out bad science” (Brown 1998: 5). Perhaps. But are the views attacked by Gould really bad science? Brown, Kitcher, and many others have no doubt about this although they provide no supporting evidence for this belief other than Gould’s authority. However, The Mismeasure of Man is quite controversial as a piece of scholarship. The reviews of Gould’s book in Nature, Science, and some other professional journals were highly negative and severely critical (see Davis 1986), in contrast to typically favorable and laudatory comments in the popular press. Therefore, although it still remains perfectly legitimate for philosophers of science to side with Gould and express their admiration publicly, one would expect them, if nothing more, then at the very least to notify the reader about the massive presence of these strong dissenting voices as well (assuming of course that they are aware of them). 37
Making Sense of Heritability
For illustration, here are some extracts from the review in Nature written by Steve Blinkhorn: With a glittering prose style and as honestly held a set of prejudices as you could hope to meet in a day’s crusading, S. J. Gould presents his attempt at identifying the fatal flaw in the theory and measurement of intelligence. Of course, everyone knows there must be a fatal flaw, but so far reports of its discovery have been consistently premature . . . [The Mismeasure of Man] is a book which exemplifies its own thesis [that science is necessarily influenced by social prejudices]. It is a masterpiece of propaganda, researched in the service of a point of view rather than written from a fund of knowledge . . . But verbal fluency is no substitute for good arguments in the long run. The substantive discussion of the theory of intelligence stops at the stage it was in more than a quarter of a century ago . . . Gould even gives a perfectly straightforward account of what heritability would and would not mean in terms of the modifiability of intelligence, but fails to point out that such arch-hereditarians as Eysenck and Jensen have published essentially identical accounts . . . The truth of the matter is that Gould has nothing to say which is both accurate and at issue when it comes to substantive and methodological points . . . [Many of his assertions] have the routine flavor of Radio Moscow news broadcasts when there really is no crisis to shout about. You have to admire the skill in presentation, but what a waste of talent. (Blinkhorn 1982: 506)
More to the point, however, Gould’s central argument against hereditarians happens to be based on a misunderstanding of the position he is criticizing. He says: “a reified Spearman’s g is still the only promising justification for hereditarian theories of mean differences in IQ among human groups . . . The chimerical nature of g is the rotten core of Jensen’s edifice, and of the entire hereditarian school” (Gould 1981: 320). In reality, Jensen’s views on the genetic explanation of racial differences in IQ are totally independent from the question whether there is only one factor of intelligence or more factors. Here is what James Flynn, a consistent critic of Jensen, had to say on the matter: Gould’s book evades all of Jensen’s best arguments for a genetic component in the black-white IQ gap, by positing that they are dependent on the concept of g as a general intelligence factor. Therefore, Gould believes that if he can discredit g, no more need be said. This is manifestly false. Jensen’s arguments would bite no matter whether blacks suffered from a score deficit on one or 10 or 100 factors. I attribute no intent or motive to Gould, it is just that you cannot rebut arguments if you do not acknowledge and address them. (Flynn 1999a: 373)
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The nature–nurture debate Another argument against hereditarianism in The Mismeasure of Man has no problems with misinterpretation or logic. However, it seems to have serious troubles with empirical reality (although the news about this is traveling slowly, and has not yet reached mainstream philosophy of science). The argument that made Gould’s book famous and that left the strongest impression on many readers is certainly his criticism of the skull measurements undertaken by the nineteenth-century scientist Samuel George Morton. Gould claimed that the results of Morton’s measurements indicating systematic differences in cranial capacity between different races were due to Morton’s unconscious bias, and ultimately his racist beliefs: “Morton’s summaries are a patchwork of fudging and finagling in the clear interest of controlling a priori convictions” (Gould 1981: 54). Gould then went on to propose a concrete explanation of how the bias worked to distort the measurements (e.g., Morton’s pushing mightily with his thumb in the attempt to fill Caucasian crania with more seed, and make them appear larger). It is this account that Kitcher called “lucid.” Now, elementary logic demands that if you want to argue that someone’s mistake is due to some kind of bias or prejudice, you have first to be sure that the person really made a mistake. In the case of Morton’s measurements there appears to be no room for doubt about his having made the mistake. For, the idea that human races differ in average cranial capacity or brain size sounds to many people like the crudest possible form of racist and pseudo-scientific belief. But notice that the belief is nevertheless empirical, and that its truth-value cannot be determined by conceptual analysis or political condemnation. John S. Michael thought that it was worth checking the data, and in 1986 he remeasured the cranial capacities of 201 specimens from the Morton Collection. In a paper published in Current Anthropology (Michael 1988) he presented the results, and showed that the differences reported by Morton were basically corroborated by his remeasurements. Although Michael had qualms of a more general kind (e.g., about the legitimacy of “race” as a biological category), with respect to the issue at hand (the craniological data) his conclusion was that he could find no indication of the systematic bias Gould ascribed to Morton, and that in his opinion “Morton’s research was conducted with integrity” (Michael 1988: 353). Gould’s explanation of Morton’s “error” in terms of racial bias fails for the simple reason that there is no error that needs to be explained (i.e., there is no explanandum). In other words, what Morton discovered was a genuine difference. Moreover, this fact is accepted today in standard reference books (see Sternberg 1982: 773; Brody 1992: 301; Mackintosh 39
Making Sense of Heritability
1998: 184), and even by scholars who are staunch advocates of the environmentalist account of the racial IQ gap. For instance, Ulric Neisser (one of the leading critics of the genetic hypothesis and the chair of the American Psychological Association Task Force that prepared the report “Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns”) did not hide his strong aversion to the hereditarian views of J. Philippe Rushton when he said: “I do not have the space or the stomach to reply to all the points raised by Rushton” (Neisser 1997: 80). Yet, as a responsible psychologist who knows that this kind of dispute is ultimately resolved by empirical verification, he had no other choice but to concede that with respect to the racial differences in the mean measured sizes of skulls and brains, “there is indeed a small overall trend in the direction [Lynn and Rushton] describe” (ibid.). Apparently, this lesson in respect for hard empirical data has yet to be learned by many lovers of wisdom. Philip Kitcher (2004: 13–14) recently replied to my criticism (which was first published in Sesardic 2000), but he only managed to dig himself into a deeper hole. Kitcher tried to justify his position by making the following two claims: (1) The fact that he ignored Michael’s paper is not objectionable because virtually nobody saw that paper as a refutation of Gould, with the exception of the authors of The Bell Curve and J. Philippe Rushton, who – as Kitcher for some reason felt a need to stress – has “highly controversial views on race”; (2) Michael’s measurements are not very strong evidence against Gould’s views because Michael was a mere undergraduate student, whereas Gould was a professional paleontologist “whose own specialist work included some very meticulous measurements of fossil snails.” Let me briefly comment on both points. (1) Why does Kitcher think that it is all right to ignore a paper if it is cited “only” by Herrnstein, Murray, and Rushton? Does he want to say that the works cited by scholars with “highly controversial views on race” may (or should) be completely disregarded? Well, in that case it would be useful if he could provide the full list of these “untrustworthy” authors so that we all know which bibliographic sources are suspect and not to be consulted. But more to the point, Kitcher is wrong that Michael’s paper is cited against Gould “only” by the three authors he thinks he can dismiss so easily on ideological grounds. It is actually also mentioned in two recent books on human intelligence that are widely considered to be the best contemporary introductions to this research field. We can read there that Michael’s paper “provides some corrections to Gould’s account” (Mackintosh 1998: 234), and that “Gould’s allegations of bias 40
The nature–nurture debate were refuted” by Michael (Deary 2000: 265 – italics supplied, cf. 9). The good news is that these two texts are admissible on Kitcher’s censorious criterion because neither Mackintosh nor Deary has “highly controversial views on race.” It is somewhat odd that in his hunt for “untainted” references to Michael’s article Kitcher searched the Internet but failed to look into two most obvious sources, and particularly Mackintosh’s book, which I quoted in the very passage in which I criticized him.12 (2) Although Kitcher speaks about Gould’s “measurements” and suggests that, because of Gould’s rich paleontological experience and professional skills, his “measurements” are not less trustworthy than Michael’s, the truth of the matter is that in this case Gould did no measurements at all. He only reanalyzed Morton’s data and then concluded from this reanalysis that Morton’s measurements must have been wrong and biased. Professor Janet Monge, Keeper of Physical Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania Museum, says (personal communication): “We had never hosted Gould, and the Morton collection had been at the Museum at Penn since the early 1960s.” It was Michael who did the measurements and he found no systematic error, no bias. Furthermore, it is unclear why Kitcher makes so much of the fact that Michael was an undergraduate student at the time when he published his article. The article passed the usual peer review process and came out in a leading anthropological journal. I would have thought that at that stage an author’s rank and position in the academic pecking order become irrelevant, and that the quality of the argument is the only thing that counts. Kitcher should just think about what his own reaction would be if, by using the same reasoning, somebody downplayed the importance of his criticism of sociobiology (Kitcher 1985) on the grounds that he (Kitcher) was never even an undergraduate student of biology, whereas E. O. Wilson is a professional biologist. But Kitcher is wrong as well when he says that the disagreement between Gould and Michael is currently unresolvable without “further measurements” and “further analysis of the data.” As I pointed out in my Philosophy of Science paper (Sesardic 2000), further measurements had been made a number of times (on samples other than Morton’s collection), and the fact of a significant racial difference in brain size is today accepted 12
Two other scholars from Kitcher’s university also recently invoked Gould in rejecting Morton’s conclusions and condemning them politically in no uncertain terms. But although they suggested that Morton was wrong in a way they regarded as “hideously immoral,” they nevertheless referred the reader to Michael’s paper “for a critique and reanalysis more favorable to Morton” (O’Flaherty & Shapiro 2004: 53). Ideology does not always trump scholarship.
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in standard reference works13 (see above). So, it is consistency with later measurements (conducted with better technologies and more precision) that makes it reasonable to believe that Michael was right and Gould wrong. Inexplicably, Kitcher did not address that part of my argument at all. Notice, however, that even if I were mistaken about this and if the jury were still out about who is right (Gould or Michael), my basic criticism of Kitcher would still stand. Namely, if experts in a given field cannot agree about what the basic facts are, a responsible scholar is not expected to report about these matters by mentioning only one side in the debate.14 1.5.3 The shadow of Cyril Burt The case of British psychologist Cyril Burt is widely regarded as a dark episode in the history of hereditarianism. Burt’s studies were once the cornerstone of the case for the high heritability of IQ, but nowadays his publications are no longer cited because of many serious doubts about his data collection and even his scientific integrity. Philosophers again proceed too quickly here. Eager to use the Burt scandal to further discredit the hereditarian approach, and apparently not interested in trying to understand what really happened in this complicated affair, they manage to get things wrong both about the historical context and about the scientific details of the story. Kitcher starts his book about sociobiology (Kitcher 1985) with a grave warning about dangers of biological speculations about human psychology. His illustration of how hereditarianism can do social harm is the so-called “eleven-plus” exam, which for a number of years all children in Britain had to take at the age of eleven (including Kitcher himself, as he describes in a brief autobiographical aside). The purpose of the exam, which often involved an IQ test, was to select the most academically able children, who would then be accepted by schools with more demanding educational programs. Before telling a story about a girl who failed the exam, Kitcher claims that the educational division at age eleven 13
14
A good source on these matters is Kitcher’s own colleague at Columbia University, the physical anthropologist Ralph L. Holloway, who confirms (personal communication) that autopsy cases in general, and the collection at Columbia in particular, clearly show that Gould’s denial of racial differences is empirically untenable. By the way, Gould also ignored Michael’s contribution completely. Michael personally sent him his article but Gould didn’t even mention it in the second edition of The Mismeasure of Man, despite its obvious relevance for the book’s central theme.
42
The nature–nurture debate was introduced under the influence of Cyril Burt’s psychological theories about general intelligence, especially about its non-malleability. Luckily, he says, it is all now a thing of the past, but it shows how the whole educational system was wrecked by irresponsible psychological theorizing. Kitcher’s diagnosis is endorsed by other philosophers (Dennett 1995: 483; Blackburn 2002: 30–31). Although Dennett says that Kitcher’s tale is “unanswerable,” there is an easy answer: Kitcher is simply wrong about the facts. The introduction of the eleven-plus exam had nothing to do with Burt or IQ testing. The system actually started in the 1920s when secondary schools, which were until then fee-paying, opened up some free places. At first, students were chosen for these places in an ad hoc and chaotic way, sometimes on the basis of interviews with students (or even just with their parents) or exams in English and mathematics. It was only later that IQ tests were proposed and accepted as a more objective and fairer method of selection. So the educational division at age eleven, the main point of Kitcher’s complaints, was already in place before IQ tests came on the scene: Britain’s notorious “11+ examination” was not a creation of psychometricians led by Cyril Burt; it developed slowly out of the “free place examination” for grammar school scholarships, instituted before any IQ tests existed. The testers’ growing influence produced the eventual inclusion of an IQ test and a new rationale for 11+, but not the examination itself or its social functions. (Samelson 1982: 656, italics supplied) Whatever Gould . . . or Kamin . . . may say, Burt was certainly not responsible for the institution of the 11+ exam in English schools after the 1944 Education Act, let alone for the practice of selection for “free places” in secondary schools in the 1920s and 1930s. Selection was already built into the system: the only question at issue was the basis on which it was to occur. (Mackintosh 1995a: 95, italics supplied) IQ tests were thus not used to establish a system of selective secondary education. That system was already in effect. (Mackintosh 1998: 24)
Notice that Mackintosh’s correction of the widespread but factually mistaken claims about the 11+ exam starts with the words “Whatever Gould or Kamin may say.” This suggests the most likely source that the philosophers relied on. Also, despite all the outrage at the harm done by IQ tests, there is evidence that their effect was actually quite beneficial: “When the local education authority [in Hertfordshire] dropped IQ tests from its 11+ exams, there was an immediate and significant decrease in the proportion 43
Making Sense of Heritability
of children from working-class families entering grammar schools, and a comparable increase in the proportion of children from professional families” (Mackintosh 1998: 24). So, contrary to what Kitcher says, IQ tests were not behind the introduction of the eleven-plus exam, and when IQ testing was eventually incorporated in the exam, it did not harm the underprivileged (under the circumstances as they were then, it actually opened up more educational opportunities for kids from poor families). It is odd that Kitcher, who describes how traumatized he was by having to take the eleven-plus exam himself, showed no curiosity to look into the matter more deeply and learn about the real historical roots and rationale for that educational reform. Simon Blackburn criticizes Steven Pinker because in his discussion of studies of identical twins (Pinker 2002), “he does not refer to Cyril Burt, the British psychologist who wrecked the education system on the basis of such evidence [studies of identical twins], having made it all up” (Blackburn 2002: 29–30). This half-sentence has two problems. First, as we saw, it is not true that Burt wrecked the education system. Second, the claim that Burt “made up” the evidence in his twin studies is just one opinion in the ongoing debate about the whole affair.15 The fraud theory was, for example, strongly disputed in two books devoted to the Burt case (Joynson 1989; Fletcher 1991) and in several scholarly articles. Even Mackintosh, who enjoys the reputation of a fair and impartial commentator, concluded his detailed analysis of the topic in this way: “If the MZ twin data were the only grounds for accusing Burt of fraud, one would probably have to give him the benefit of the doubt” (Mackintosh 1995b: 68). Blackburn’s resolute pronouncement on an issue that is still under debate (see also Ward 1998; Joynson 2003) shows the modus operandi of the anti-hereditarian consensus: an argument of one side is repeated so often that it comes to be regarded as the truth, and there is no evidence of awareness at all of the existence of alternative opinions.16 15
16
Blackburn does not seem to be aware that with his assertion that Burt’s data were all made up, he has a problem of how to explain the fact that some of the best contemporary studies agree quite well with these alleged total fabrications. For example, recently several behavior geneticists laughingly said that they were “grateful as hell” that in their study of monozygotic twins reared apart, the IQ correlation turned out to be .78, and so mercifully not bang identical to the infamous magnitude of .77, reported by Burt (Miele 2002: 99–100). Contrast Blackburn’s precipitate judgment (shared by Goldman 1999: 34) with Susan Haack’s judicious comment: “That Burt was a fraud came to be taken as established fact
44
The nature–nurture debate 1.5.4 Racism ex nihilo One of the rare cases in which a philosopher of biology devoted an entire text to discussing heritability is Sahotra Sarkar’s chapter “Obsessions with heritability” in his book Genetics and Reductionism. The result is disappointing and further confirms the grim picture. After rehearsing the old arguments against the use of heritability (based on the possibility of statistical correlation and statistical interaction), Sarkar clinches his attack with a standard speculation about motives: “It is hard, therefore, not to suspect that the continued pursuit of [heritability] is guided, at least to some extent, by non-cognitive, especially political, factors” (Sarkar 1998: 92). He mentions three sets of considerations that point to that conclusion, all of which are utterly inadequate to establish such a sweeping political accusation. I will comment only on two of them. First, Sarkar infers political motivation from the fact that “the traits for which [heritability] continues to be pursued often include those carrying social judgments, even if they are ill-defined” (Sarkar 1998: 93). After giving examples of religiosity and IQ, Sarkar continues: Bouchard . . . reports relatively high values of [heritability] for “openness,” “agreeableness,” “conscientiousness,” “neuroticism,” and “extroversion,” each of which is a trait that carries social judgment. (Sarkar 1988: 93 – italics added)
Sarkar’s point is very clear: the continued pursuit of heritability must be politically motivated because the traits picked out for heritability research often include those carrying social judgment, like the five traits mentioned. Indeed, why were exactly these five traits singled out for heritability studies? One possibility is, as Sarkar suggests, that some people had a sinister political intention to take traits “that carry social judgment” and then perform a heritability analysis in order to develop the hereditarian argument and justify the oppression of certain social groups. But acquaintance with some very basic psychology points to a much simpler and quite benign explanation for the choice of the quintuple. Namely, these five traits are known in psychology as the five main personality traits. If one happens to know this, it becomes quite obvious that these traits were put in the after his biographer, Leslie Hearnshaw . . . endorsed it. [Later], however, Robert Joynson argued that Burt was guilty of nothing worse than the occasional carelessness. Now, after reading Joynson’s book, I can honestly say I don’t know” (Haack 2003: 200 – italics added).
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foreground not by Bouchard, but by the wide consensus of personality psychologists. And then, there is absolutely no need to invent a rightwing conspiracy of scientists in behavior genetics. The traits in question became salient in psychology simply because they emerged as very robust results of the systematic empirical research on human personality. (Needless to say, one could criticize the way these traits were picked out as “the big five,” but that would be a completely different topic, unrelated to discussions about heritability.) Second, Sarkar fortifies his imputation of political motives by introducing another consideration as well. He says that it is “hard not to suspect” that research on heritability is guided by political factors because “the work on [heritability] and IQ has been routinely used to argue for genetic inferiority of certain groups, particularly African-Americans” (1998: 92– 93). There is no argument here at all. Sarkar hypothesizes (without offering any evidence) that scholars who accept the genetic explanation of the racial IQ difference entered this research area just because they wanted to give an aura of scientific respectability to their racist prejudices. But ironically, Sarkar himself provides the best refutation of his own claim. Speaking about those authors who advocated the genetic account of the IQ differences between ethnic groups, Sarkar gives reference to Richard Herrnstein’s article “IQ” from Atlantic Monthly (Herrnstein 1971) and his book IQ and Meritocracy (Herrnstein 1973). In reality, however, Herrnstein at that time did not subscribe to the genetic hypothesis about white–black IQ variation. In the early 1970s he disagreed with Jensen, and it was only later that he changed his mind, and was converted to hereditarianism with respect to racial differences. In the book IQ and Meritocracy, Herrnstein complained about frequent misinterpretations of his views, and distanced himself from Jensen very explicitly: My article took what might be called an explicitly agnostic stand on racial (i.e., black white) differences in tested intelligence . . . I believe that racial and ethnic group differences are hard to pin down as regards inheritance. My interest was not race, but social class differences. (Herrnstein 1973: 12)
As one of the authors of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray 1994), Herrnstein has become notorious for his views on race, genetics, and IQ. This may be a reason why many people who did not take the trouble to study the sources tend to believe that he must then have defended the very same ideas in his writings from the early 1970s, which gave rise to a heated political controversy too. But although this mistake is not uncommon (see Etzioni 1973: 112; Nelkin & Lindee 1995: 114; Segerstrale 2000: 270, 283) 46
The nature–nurture debate and is in a sense expected from lay readers, it is disturbing when it comes from a philosopher of science writing about heritability in a high-profile philosophical publication.17 Another philosopher who made the same mistake is Michael Dummett (Dummett 1981: 295–296). He also accused Herrnstein of racism, although at that time Herrnstein had resolutely refused to take a stand on issues involving race. 17
Surprisingly, despite the non-existence of support for these ideological accusations, Samir Okasha says that Sarkar’s conclusion about political motivation driving heritability research is “based on a meticulous and technically expert critique of [the] underlying methodology” (Okasha 2000: 183).
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2 A tangle of interactions: separating genetic and environmental influences
No aspect of human behavior genetics has caused more confusion and generated more obscurantism than the analysis and interpretation of the various types of non-additivity and non-independence of gene and environmental action and interaction. Lindon J. Eaves
2.1 two concepts of interaction A widespread conviction that heritability claims are devoid of almost any interesting explanatory content is often based on an argument that genes and environments interact, and that for this reason their causal contributions to phenotype cannot be separated and measured independently. An immediate problem with this argument is that there are two very different meanings of “interaction”: commonsense and statistical. According to the commonsense notion (interactionc ), to say that two causes A and B interact means that neither can produce the effect without the presence of the other. To use a standard example, striking a match and the presence of oxygen interact to produce fire. According to the statistical notion (interactions ), however, to say that two variables A and B interact means that a change in one variable does not always have an effect of the same magnitude: its effect varies, depending on the value of the other variable. For instance, the very same life event, such as parental divorce, may affect children with different personality characteristics quite differently. Already a half a century ago Waddington proposed that, in order to avoid confusion, the term “gene–environment interaction” should be 48
A tangle of interactions reserved for the statistical concept: This expression [gene–environment interaction] is derived from statistical terminology and, as this example makes clear, is used in a much more restricted sense than might appear at first sight. It is to be avoided when one wishes merely to indicate that the phenotypic effects of a genotype are influenced by the environment, in order that it can be restricted to its special use to designate cases in which phenotypic effects of different genotypes are differently affected by a given environmental change. (Waddington 1957: 94)
As usually happens with such attempts at terminological legislation, Waddington’s intervention did not have much effect. The equivocation continued. This is unfortunate because it does tend to generate confusion in the following way. Interactionc of genes and environments is always present but it generates no problems for the estimation of heritability. On the other hand, the existence of strong interactions between genes and environments may really undermine the usefulness of heritability claims, yet the existence of such interaction is itself an open empirical question. Briefly, interactionc is ubiquitous but irrelevant for discussions about heritability, whereas strong interactions is potentially a problem for heritability, but the extent of its presence remains a contentious issue. Nevertheless, due to the equivocation, a quick and fallacious argument against heritability is occasionally developed. The argument (reconstructed from Vreeke 2000a: 54; Wahlsten 2000a: 46; Meaney 2001: 52) goes like this: (1) Heritability claims are based on the assumption of additivity. (2) Additivity means that genes and environments act separately (i.e., do not interact). (3) Obviously, genes and environments do not act separately (i.e., they interact). Therefore: (4) Heritability claims are based on a false assumption. The argument trades on the ambiguity between interactionc and interactions . Statement (2) is true in the sense that additivity is indeed incompatible with some forms of strong interactions . Statement (3) is true in the sense that interactionc between genes and environments is empirically indisputable. But if we consistently stick to one meaning of 49
Making Sense of Heritability
10 9 8 Phenotype
7
G0
6
G1
5 4
G2
3
G3
2 1 0 E0
E1
E2
E3
Environment Figure 2.1 Commonsense interaction – yes, statistical interaction – no.
“interaction,” the two statements cannot both come out true. If statement (2) is interpreted as saying that additivity is incompatible with interactionc , it is false. Similarly, (3) is false if it says that interactions of genes and environments is a matter of obvious truth.1 Figure 2.1 is supposed to clarify things by showing a situation where there is interactionc but no interactions . If zero indicates non-existence, then the trivial fact of interactionc (namely, that without either genotype or environment there is no organism) is illustrated by the phenotype being zero for the zero genotype (whatever the value of the environment), and also for the zero environment (whatever the value of the genotype). However, despite interactionc , there is no interactions because as long as neither variable has zero value, the contribution of environment is always the same (whatever the genotype), and the contribution of genotype is always the same (whatever the environment). The absence of statistical interaction is reflected in the parallel lines of the three genotypes (G1 , G2 , and G3 ) in the environmental range from E1 to E3 . This shows perspicuously that moving from one environment to another always produces the same phenotypic change (independently of 1
By the way, I disagree with (1) as well. Heritability claims do not presuppose additivity. Or, to put it differently, it makes sense to talk about heritability even when there is no additivity at all. In cases of complete non-additivity (i.e., where the entire variance is due to statistical interaction between genes and environments), heritability is simply 0.
50
A tangle of interactions the genotype), and that moving from one genotype to another always produces the same phenotypic change (independently of the environment). Strictly speaking, there is a whiff of statistical interaction in Figure 2.1 because the genotype lines are not parallel throughout the whole range. The extreme cases of no genotype (G0 ) and no environment (E0 ) destroy the parallelism, because in these cases any change in the other variable has zero effect (instead of the effect of its usual magnitude). However, if we ignore these extreme cases and just concentrate on the situations where organisms exist (i.e., where phenotypes have non-zero values), the parallelism reigns supreme and statistical interaction completely disappears.2
2.2 the rectangle analogy Let us consider a situation where statistical interaction makes it impossible to assign separate causal contributions to genes and environments. For simplicity, take a population of organisms (see Figure 2.2) with two different genotypes, G1 and G2 , that are with equal frequency distributed in two different environments, E1 and E2 . In environment E1 organisms with genotype G2 have higher phenotypic value (with respect to some trait P) than organisms with genotype G1 ; in environment E2 , on the other hand, it is G1 organisms that have higher P value. Now, should the phenotypic differences in that population be ascribed to genes or to environment? Either answer is plainly wrong. Assuming that genotypes and environments are uniformly distributed, neither the genetic difference (between G1 and G2 ) nor the environmental difference (between E1 and E2 ) has a net effect on P: their average effect is clearly zero. The reason for this is that the effect of genotype is opposite in the two environments, and the effect of environment is also opposite for the two genotypes. Therefore, phenotypic variance is here due neither to genes nor to environment alone: it is the outcome of statistical interaction between genes and environments. The change in factor G from G1 to G2 increases phenotypic value P if factor E has value E1 , whereas it has negative effect otherwise (if E is fixed on E2 ). Under these circumstances it hardly makes sense to ask what is the effect of G tout court. It depends. 2
Recall, the point of this example is not to show that parallelism is frequent or typical, but just that interactionc does not necessarily imply interactions .
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P
G1
G2
E1
E2
Figure 2.2 Statistical interaction: No Main Effects.
In the case pictured in Figure 1.1, however, we could easily divide phenotypic variation into genetic and environmental parts. In that case, moving from one environment to the other brought about the same phenotypic change, irrespective of genotype. Similarly, shifting from one genotype to another had always the same phenotypic effect (in both environments). Environmental and genetic contributions to variance added up to total variance: VP = VG + VE . This neat solution is in marked contrast to the intractable case from Figure 2.2 where norms of reaction cross and where the effects of genes and environment become hopelessly jumbled. It would be a serious mistake, though, to conclude on the basis of Figure 2.2 that the presence of statistical interaction always precludes the existence of main effects. The situation depicted in Figure 2.2 is an extreme case of statistical interaction, and no general conclusions should be hastily drawn from it. There are moderate forms of statistical interaction that leave a lot of space for the operation of main effects. That there is not enough awareness of this simple point is attested in the frequently made claim that the nature–nurture discussion is as meaningless as asking whether the area of a rectangle is more determined by its length or its width (Cosmides & Tooby 1997; Hebb 1980: 72; Johnston 52
A tangle of interactions 2003: 99; Ehrlich & Feldman 2003: 102; Lerner 1986: 85; Ehrlich 2000; Herbert 1997; Meaney 2001: 51; Eisenberg 1995: 1571; 2001: 378; 2002: 339). This notorious rectangle analogy is problematic for at least four reasons. (1) It presupposes the existence of statistical interaction between genes and environments, thus prejudging a controversial issue. (2) It assumes (wrongly) that the non-linear dependence of the area of a rectangle on its length and width makes it impossible to separate and measure the contributions of these two factors. (3) By focusing on an individual rectangle, the analogy misrepresents the nature–nurture debate, which is best construed as being about population differences, not about an individual case. (4) Finally, even when talking about an individual case, the question whether a particular person’s phenotypic deviation from the mean is more due to genes or environment is not necessarily meaningless. Let me briefly explain each of these four points. (1) The relation of the area of a rectangle to its length and width is multiplicative: area = length × width. Those who offer the rectangle analogy usually supply no evidence (or no convincing evidence) for the belief that heredity–environment relation is generally non-linear. This is a completely arbitrary assumption on their part. By the way, it should be stressed that in some situations a non-linear relationship can be turned into an additive one by a simple scale transformation. In the rectangle case, the multiplicative nature of the relationship (area = length × width) is readily changed into additivity by a logarithmic transformation: log(area) = log(length) + log(width). (2) Look at Figure 2.3 to see that even in cases of non-linear causal dependence it may still be possible to separate and quantify the contributions of the statistically interacting causes. Here we have an example with nine different rectangles, which include all possible combinations of three different widths (1, 2, and 3) and three different lengths (1, 50, 100). Statistical interaction is conspicuous: the three lines, representing the changing areas of rectangles with different lengths, are not parallel. Nevertheless, it is easily seen from the graph that, on average, a vertical change (a change in length) produces a stronger effect on the area than a horizontal change (a change in width). In other words, the variation in rectangle areas is more influenced by length differences than by width differences. Moreover, if we want numerical precision, a simple ANOVA (analysis of variance) calculation tells us that the total area variance (9312) can be decomposed into three parts: width variance (1687), length variance (6495), and variance due to width–length interaction (1130). So, the contribution of differences of lengths to the 53
Making Sense of Heritability
350 300
Area
250 Length = 1
200
Length = 50
150
Length = 100
100 50 0 1
2
3
Width Figure 2.3 Rectangle area, length, and width.
area variation is around 70 percent while the two remaining sources are considerably less important. The width contribution is 18 percent, and the interaction of length and width accounts only for 12 percent of the entire area variance. The point of this simple and artificially constructed example is not to argue that statistical interaction always leaves room for the existence of meaningful main effects. Rather, the purpose is to show that the existence of statistical interaction does not exclude a priori the possibility of main effects.3 (3) Raising a question about how the area of an individual rectangle is influenced by its width and length amounts to abandoning a population perspective. With this move the connection with the nature–nurture controversy becomes tenuous because that debate makes most sense as looking for answers at the level of population differences. (4) It is often said that in individual cases it is meaningless to compare the importance of interacting causes: “If an event is the result of the joint operation of a number of causative chains and if these causes ‘interact’ in any generally accepted meaning of the word, it becomes conceptually impossible to assign quantitative values to the causes of that individual event” (Lewontin 1976a: 181). But this is in fact not true. Take, for example, the rectangle with width 2 and length 1 (from Figure 2.3). Its area is 2, 3
So it is not true that statistical interaction is “the bane of heritability analysis” (Wahlsten & Gottlieb 1997: 176), or that “nonadditivity of the contributing causes makes it invalid to partition the variance into distinct components and thereby renders heritability coefficients meaningless” (Wahlsten 1990a: 110).
54
A tangle of interactions which is considerably below the average area for all rectangles (around 100). Why is that particular rectangle smaller than most others? Is its width or its length more responsible for that? Actually, this question is not absurd at all. It has a straightforward and perfectly meaningful answer. The rectangles with that width (2) have on average the area that is identical to the mean area for all rectangles (100.66), so the explanation why the area of that particular rectangle deviates so much from the mean value cannot be in its width. It is its below-average length that is responsible. Even the usually cautious David Lykken slips here by condemning the measurement of causal influences in the individual case as inherently absurd: “It is meaningless to ask whether Isaac Newton’s genius was due more to his genes or his environment, as meaningless as asking whether the area of a rectangle is due more to its length or its width” (Lykken 1998a: 24). Contrary to what he says, however, it makes perfect sense to inquire whether Newton’s extraordinary contributions were more due to his above-average inherited intellectual ability or to his being exposed to an above-average stimulating intellectual environment (or to some particular combination of the two). The Nuffield Council on Bioethics makes a similar mistake in its report on genetics and human behavior: “It is vital to understand that neither concept of heritability [broad or narrow] allows us to conclude anything about the role of heredity in the development of a characteristic in an individual” (Nuffield 2002: 40). On the contrary, if the broad heritability of a trait is high, this does tell us that any individual’s phenotypic divergence from the mean is probably more caused by a non-standard genetic influence than by a non-typical environment. For a characteristically clear explanation of why gauging the contributions of heredity and environment is not meaningless even in an individual case, see Sober 1994: 190–192. Cosmides and Tooby also argue that a heritability value tells us nothing about an individual: A heritability coefficient measures sources of variance in a population (for example, in a forest of oaks, to what extent are differences in height correlated with differences in sunlight, all else equal?). It tells you nothing about what caused the development of an individual. Let’s say that for height, 80% of the variance in a forest of oaks is caused by variation in their genes. This does not mean that the height of the oak tree in your yard is “80% genetic.” (What could this possibly mean? Did genes contribute more to your oak’s height than sunlight? What percent of its height was caused by nitrogen in the soil? By rainfall? By the partial pressure of CO2 ?) When applied to an individual, such percents are meaningless, because all of these
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Making Sense of Heritability factors are necessary for a tree to grow. Remove any one, and the height will be zero. (Cosmides & Tooby 1997)
They criticize some manifestly absurd ways of applying a population percentage to an individual, but they never consider a quite simple population-to-individual inference that is not “meaningless” at all. In fact, Cosmides and Tooby are wrong that heritability tells us nothing about what caused the development of an individual. If the heritability of a normally distributed trait in a given population is .8, this does tell us that the deviation of an arbitrarily chosen individual organism from the phenotypic mean is in all likelihood caused more by its deviation from the genetic mean than by its deviation from the environmental mean. Someone may object (as did a reader of an earlier draft of this chapter) that an individual phenotypic deviation from the group mean should not “really” count as a fact about an individual. Being a relational fact, and not an intrinsic fact about an individual, it is not information “about an individual” in the natural sense of that phrase. I disagree. I think that many population-relative facts are usually regarded as giving important information about individuals, like being an Olympic champion, having an IQ above 140, being a best-selling author, being a surgeon with an unusually high patient mortality, etc.
2.3 lewontin against anova The best known anti-hereditarian argument based on statistical interaction of genes and environment is presented in Richard Lewontin’s paper “The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes” (Lewontin 1976a). It was first published in the American Journal of Human Genetics in 1974, but I quote it from the version reprinted in Block and Dworkin’s anthology because this book is more accessible. The article made a big impact on later discussions of these issues (see Block & Dworkin 1976b: 533; Layzer 1976: 201; Sober 1984: 107–108 and 266; Kitcher 1985; Gifford 1990: 328; Wahlsten 1990a: 110; Oyama 1992; Griffiths & Gray 1994: 304; Wahlsten 1995: 253; Berkowitz 1996; Godfrey-Smith 1998: 51; Kitcher 1999: 89; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 16–17; Godfrey-Smith 2000: 27; Kaplan 2000: 38–42; Oyama 2000a: 39, 107; Vreeke 2000b: 38–39; Falk 2001: 132–134; Gray 2001: 187; Kitcher 2001b: 396, 412; Oyama et al. 2001: 3; Pigliucci 2001: 58–65; Godfrey-Smith 2002: 587; Johnston & Edwards 2002: 31; 56
A tangle of interactions Robert 2003: 976; Wahlsten 2003: 21; Downes 2004; Maclaurin 2002: 116– 121; Garfinkel 1981: 119). Although Lewontin’s article is called a “landmark paper” (Pigliucci 2001: 58), “classic discussion” (Godfrey-Smith 2000: 27), “classic essay” (Kitcher 1989: 264), “locus classicus” (Okasha 2003), “seminal paper” (Griffiths & Knight 1998: 257; Pigliucci 2001: 65), “key article” (Schaffner 2001: 488), “brilliant analysis” (Gray 2001: 187), or even “the single most influential contribution to the literature on the interpretation of behavioral genetics” (Griffiths 2002a), it is not easy to see what its main contribution really is. Its importance is sometimes ridiculously overstated, as when Pigliucci, for example, says that in that paper Lewontin was “the first to suggest that heritabilities can change depending on the environment” (Pigliucci 2001: 65). Needless to say, the environment dependence of heritability logically follows from its being a population statistic, and it is ludicrous to suggest that quantitative geneticists were totally unaware of this trivial fact4 until Lewontin “discovered” it in 1974. Before I go to the main argument of Lewontin’s paper, let me briefly discuss a powerful analogy that he uses to illustrate the absurdity of separating the influences of heredity and environment: if two men lay bricks to build a wall, we may quite fairly measure their contributions by counting the number laid by each; but if one mixes the mortar and the other lays the bricks, it would be absurd to measure their relative quantitative contributions by measuring the volumes of bricks and of mortar. It is obviously even more absurd to say what proportion of a plant’s height is owed to the fertilizer it received and what proportion to the water, or to ascribe so many inches of a man’s height to his genes and so many to his environment. (Lewontin 1976a: 181–182)
There is no doubt that of the two situations, “brick–brick” and “brick– mortar,” the nature–nurture problem much more resembles the latter. In the brick–brick situation, either of the two workers could build the wall alone. But obviously genes and environments cannot build an organism 4
But, as we have learned by now, if something is a matter of elementary knowledge in biology it is not necessarily so in philosophy of biology. John Dupre, ´ for example, says: “The heritability of a trait . . . is affected only by phenomena at one structural level, the genetic . . . different samples of a population can be expected to reveal approximately the same trait heritabilities, since these will not depend on environmental variables” (1995: 137 – italics added). Dupre’s ´ mistake is hard to explain. Since heritabilty is the proportion of the entire variance that is due to genes, it is evident that as the environmental contribution to the total variance increases, the proportion of genetic influence (heritability) will decrease, and vice versa (even if nothing changes at the genetic level). Heritability does crucially depend on environmental variables.
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in isolation from one another. Both are needed. So, since the heredity– environment problem is more similar to the brick–mortar situation, and since in that situation it is absurd to quantify the contributions of bricks and mortar, Lewontin wants us to conclude that it is also absurd to quantify the contributions of heredity and environment. But this is too quick. The fact that the heredity–environment indeed resembles the brick– mortar situation more than the brick–brick situation does not mean that it resembles the brick–mortar situation enough to allow inferences from one case to the other. There are two important differences. First, the heredity–environment problem is about populations, whereas the brick–mortar situation is about an individual wall. And second, in the brick–mortar situation, what is claimed to be absurd is measuring the relative quantitative contributions of the two men by measuring the volumes of bricks and of mortar. There is no analogy to the heredity–environment problem in this respect because no one wants to measure the relative quantitative contributions of genes and environments by measuring the quantities of genes and environments. Rather, the idea here is to measure the effects of different kinds of genes and environments. Now after locating the two crucial differences that show the weakness of Lewontin’s analogy, let us modify the brick–mortar situation in these two respects in order to make it as similar as possible to the heredity– environment problem. This is a very illuminating exercise because we will see that in the reconstruction of the brick–mortar situation that keeps relevant similarities with the nature–nurture problem, quantifying the relative contributions of bricks and mortar is no longer absurd. First, instead of discussing an individual wall, we will discuss a population of walls. And second, instead of trying to measure the contributions of different volumes of bricks and mortar, we will attempt to measure the contributions of different kinds of bricks and mortar. Suppose there are three kinds of bricks (B1 , B2 , and B3 ) and three kinds of mortar (M1 , M2 , and M3 ). We want to measure the contributions of these different kinds of bricks and mortar to the stability of walls that arise out of nine different B–M combinations. Here is the translation manual for the analogy: bricks are genes, mortar is environment, and wall stability is phenotype. Figure 2.4 shows a hypothetical distribution of stability values for nine walls (all possible B–M combinations). Now, does it make sense here to quantify the contributions of bricks and mortar? Yes, it does. We see from the graph that switching from one kind of brick to another makes a much bigger difference to the wall stability than changing the kind of 58
A tangle of interactions
Wall stability
110 105 B1
100
B2
95
B3
90 85 M1
M2
M3
Mortar
Figure 2.4 Bricks and mortar.
mortar. The main effect of B is 5 and the main effect of M is 1. If we want further numerical precision, a simple ANOVA calculation tells us that the variation in stability of these walls is 97 percent due to the brick variation and only 3 percent to the mortar variation. The relation between the two causes is completely additive, and there is no brick–mortar interaction (in the statistical sense). I deliberately chose an example with an extremely strong influence of one factor in order to show that, despite both causes being causally necessary for the effect, their contributions to the population variance can be measurable, and there is no guarantee that these contributions will be even remotely equal. The general moral: when the brick–mortar situation is presented in the way that makes it relevantly similar to the heredity–environment problem, there is nothing absurd in the attempt to quantify causal contributions of the two factors. Notice also that once the population perspective is in place, it becomes possible to quantify the contributions of the two factors even in individual cases. For instance: the wall made of bricks B1 and mortar M1 has a below-average stability exclusively because of the below-average quality of its bricks. Enough of bricks and mortar, and back to the central argument from Lewontin’s paper. What he tries to show was that, contrary to widespread opinion, the analysis of variance cannot bring us knowledge about the extent to which genes causally determine phenotypic differences. Why not? Well, here is a three-step structure of his argument, extracted from the original text by careful reading and a sincere attempt to make the strongest case for his views. (I invite the readers to check the source and satisfy themselves that my interpretation is fair and that it isolates the main thread of the argument.) (1) Non-additivity. Genes and environment typically interact (in the statistical sense) to produce phenotypes. 59
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(2) Locality. Because of (1), a high heritability value obtained in a given range of environments may be just the local characteristic of environmental and genetic influences within that particular narrow range of environments, with the situation dramatically changing over a more extended set of environments. Therefore, heritability claims are not generalizable. (3) Causal irrelevance. Because of (2), analysis of variance is useless as an instrument for gaining etiological knowledge, in that we have no reason to believe that it will give us a correct picture of the general relationship between cause and effect. Let us take a closer look at each of these three steps.
2.4 non-additivity Lewontin’s criticism of ANOVA is often presented as making a purely theoretical point about inherent limitations in any attempt to derive causal conclusions from statistical data by using the analysis of variance. This interpretation is supported by the way he himself describes the upshot of his argument at the outset: “I will begin by saying some very obvious and elementary things about causes, but I will come thereby to some very annoying conclusions” (Lewontin 1976a: 180). However, a brief look into the argument is enough to show that the quoted description is incorrect. The “annoying” conclusions, far from being derived merely from “some obvious and elementary things about causes,” are in reality obtained only with the help of an additional, contingent (and, as we will see, highly controversial) empirical premise, namely, that strong statistical interaction between genes and environments is rampant. Lewontin concedes twice (Lewontin 1976a: 184, 189) that there are possible empirical situations in which his objections to causal implications of heritability do not work. These are the situations where statistical interaction between genes and environments is either non-existent or present just to a mild degree. So how does Lewontin know that non-additivity prevails over additivity? There are two things in his article that can be seen as an attempt to establish the domination of non-additivity: first, the choice of graphs representing various possibilities, and second, empirical evidence. There are eight graphs in Lewontin’s article, illustrating some of the possible relations between genotypes, environments, and phenotypes. Interestingly, most of these graphs (six out of eight) represent especially 60
A tangle of interactions strong cases of interaction, so-called “non-ordinal” interactions, in which the norms of reactions of two genotypes cross each other and in which it becomes difficult to talk about main effects (genetic and environmental). In the remaining two cases, in which the norms of reaction of two genotypes are parallel or nearly parallel, the considerations that Lewontin uses for mounting a methodological attack on heritability inferences are “irrelevant,” by his own admission (Lewontin 1976a: 189). Now, although the crossing norms of reactions so strongly dominate Lewontin’s selection of examples and although he calls the situation of additivity or near-additivity “a very special case” (Lewontin 1976a: 184), it is clear that the issue cannot be resolved a priori, by a tendentious choice of examples. James Maclaurin falls into a trap here. Relying on Lewontin, he states that “in most cases, genes and environment are not independent causes of phenotype” (Maclaurin 2002: 119 – italics added), and that “perfect additivity is the exception, not the rule” (Maclaurin 2002: 119), but the only consideration he gives in support of these claims is that just one of Lewontin’s eight graphs (all duly reproduced in Maclaurin’s paper) illustrates perfect additivity, whereas “all the other graphs represent a lack of additivity.” Well, perfect additivity is indeed an exception among Lewontin’s diagrams, but this hardly constitutes an adequate reason to believe that it is also an exception in reality. Whether it is or not is an empirical question, which Maclaurin answers in a non-empirical way (i.e., by looking at Lewontin’s pictures, instead of looking at the world). All this reveals that the impact of Lewontin’s criticism of behavior genetics crucially depends on how much the additivity of genetic and environmental influences on human phenotypes is empirically violated. For to the extent that additivity is even approximately preserved, his argument loses most of its force. Given the absolutely essential role that the empirical premise plays in his argument, it is surprising how little evidence he actually provided in its support. In two brief paragraphs specifically devoted to empirical evidence Lewontin (1976a: 190–191), says three things: (a) measurement of human norms of reaction for complex traits is impossible “because the same genotype cannot be tested in a variety of environments”; (b) even in research on animals and plants (where experiments are possible) very little work has been done to characterize the norms of reaction; (c) in one study on plants and one on Drosophila strong G–E interaction was discovered. Each of these claims raises serious questions that, to my knowledge, have never been asked before. 61
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The strange thing about (a) is that, despite defending an extreme methodological claim that measurement of human norms of reaction is impossible, Lewontin neither discusses nor so much as mentions what were then most important contributions to the literature on that issue. At the time, the most sophisticated analysis of methodological problems in human behavior genetics was undoubtedly the paper by Jinks and Fulker (1970), which was an important step in the development of powerful model-fitting methods that dominate the contemporary scene. Moreover, John Jinks and David Fulker did suggest how G–E interactions could be empirically detected without testing the same genotype in a variety of environments (see below), which directly contradicted Lewontin’s impossibility claim. It is hard to explain why Lewontin fails to address their argument, or at least inform the reader about this “landmark paper” (Neale & Cardon 1992: 31).5 If somebody thinks that Jinks and Fulker’s article was too recent and maybe for that reason unknown to Lewontin (it was actually published four years before Lewontin’s paper), there are still some older and highly relevant works that Lewontin also completely ignores. What first comes to mind is Raymond Cattell’s attempt to approach G–E interactions by using his method of multiple abstract variance analysis (MAVA), also a crucial precursor of the current research techniques in behavior genetics (Cattell 1963; Cattell 1965). As for (b), the fact that there has been very little work on animal norms of reaction is actually a reason against accepting Lewontin’s belief about the omnipresence of interaction. It rather supports agnosticism. As for (c), it is interesting that, by way of empirical evidence, Lewontin cites only two studies, and that even these two studies are not presented as being representative or giving typical results, which is the only way they could support his strong conclusion. Instead, the study of plants is introduced as “the classic work,” and the study on Drosophila is described as “an example of what has been done in animals” (Lewontin 1976a: 191 – italics added). Even in a recent article written for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Lewontin 2004), with all the empirical evidence accumulated in the thirty years since 1974, Lewontin’s premises are still insufficient to 5
Even Michael Lerner, who usually sees eye to eye with Lewontin over many issues about human behavior genetics, says: “In any case, the paper of Jinks and Fulker is a must for any serious student of the subject” (Lerner 1972: 408).
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A tangle of interactions establish the conclusion that he wants his readers to draw. When he says that “the mapping of different genotypes into phenotypes in one environment is often completely unpredictable from their mapping in another environment” (italics added), the word “often” is clearly too weak to justify the claim of ubiquitous non-additivity. When he says that “many experiments on many different organisms . . . show this same result” (italics added), the word “many” allows for the possibility that much more experiments on much more different organisms do not show the same result. When he says that “it is the common experience that norms of reaction of different genotypes are curves of irregular shape that cross each other” (italics added), it leaves open the possibility that non-crossing norms of reaction are in fact a much more common experience. Had Lewontin formulated his premises more strongly, they would have supported his conclusion. But then the big question would be how to show that they are really true. The advantage of the current phrasing is that Lewontin is on pretty safe ground with his premises, and he also seems to advance his conclusion. Yet more careful readers will notice that such weak premises cannot justify the intended inferential move. Despite all this being a manifestly poor ground to support the sweeping claim of pervasiveness of non-additivity in biology, Lewontin’s paper has been nevertheless widely regarded as establishing precisely that. For example, Russell Gray thinks that it is “very clear” that the relationship between genotype and environment is “strikingly non-additive” (Gray 1992: 174), but his sweeping generalization about biological development is backed up only by one empirical study of plants, the same one that has been repeatedly cited by Lewontin (1976a: 191; 2000: 21; 2004; Feldman & Lewontin 1976: 14), and which, by the way, was conducted about seventy years ago. Block and Dworkin show a graph with crossing norms of reaction of two genotypes (see Figure 2.5), and maintain that this type of case is “not atypical” (Block & Dworkin 1976b: 483–484). They give no sources to support this claim but in a note to the same paragraph they say that they “are indebted to [Lewontin 1976a] for many of the points in the rest of this section” (Block & Dworkin 1976b: 533). Did they have good grounds to think that their example was not atypical? Well, let us see. At about the same time that Block and Dworkin published their piece, a group of leading quantitative geneticists declared that “a trait was atypical if more than about 20 per cent of the measured variation could be attributed to G × E [interaction]” (Eaves et al. 1977: 3). I calculated the variances 63
Making Sense of Heritability
P
G1
G2
E Figure 2.5 A “not atypical case”? (From Block & Dworkin 1976b: 484.)
for the Block–Dworkin graph (Figure 2.5),6 and it turned out that the contribution of interaction in that situation was around 75 percent! When Sterelny and Griffiths insist that gene–environment interactions “are typically not additive” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 16), they exclusively rely on Lewontin’s article. Griffiths also says that in that paper “Lewontin pointed out that the empirical evidence suggests that actual norms of reaction are likely to be non-additive” (Griffiths 2002a – italics added). Two things are strange here. First, as we saw, Lewontin did not give much empirical evidence to support his views. Moreover, in a later article he himself admitted that except for one of the studies he cited in 1976a, “no study of the norms of reaction of naturally occurring heterozygous genotypes [had] appeared until [1982],” and that the basic data for judging how particular genotypes react to different environments “are simply lacking” (Lewontin 1983: 277). But immediately after pointing out that the empirical data are simply lacking, Lewontin continued, incoherently, by insisting that “the little that is known shows clearly that the developmental responses of different genotypes to varying environments are non-linear and do not allow the simple ordering of genotypes along a one-dimensional scale of phenotype” (Lewontin 1983: 277). By the way, it seems that Lewontin’s 1983 statement about the paucity of data on the significance of G–E 6
I have assumed that the two genotypes (G1 and G2 ) were uniformly distributed across three focal environments.
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A tangle of interactions interactions in natural populations is still true even after twenty years (cf. Boomsma & Martin 2002: 186). Second, since the context in which Sterelny and Griffiths discuss the operation of genes and environments is human behavior genetics, their readiness to follow Lewontin in extrapolating so quickly the results from a couple of studies of fruit flies to people is quite surprising. It is worth recalling that, in comparison, sociobiological generalizations from animal research to humans had a much more solid empirical foundation but they were, as we know, condemned by most philosophers as unbearably crude and sometimes even as pseudo-scientific. Worse still, in the case of human behavior genetics there is actually no need to use a roundabout route through animal research. There is already a lot of direct empirical evidence (not mentioned by Sterelny and Griffiths at all) showing that in the human domain, G–E nonadditivity is extremely difficult to find, despite much research effort in that direction. As if this were not bad enough, Griffiths goes further and asks: “Why do so many intelligent scientists appear to ignore facts that are well known to them, such as the likely nonadditive interaction of genotypes and environment?” (Griffiths 2002a). He thereby suggests that behavior geneticists behave very irrationally (they ignore facts that are well known to them). But why should they be so unreasonable? And, more importantly, where is the empirical evidence that they “ignore facts” (non-additivity) in the first place? Contrary to what Griffiths says, Lewontin actually does not provide that evidence. Nor, oddly enough, does Griffiths himself. He just issues a charge of massive irrationality but gives no supporting references, no data, basically no reason except Lewontin’s authority. This best illustrates the mesmerizing influence that Lewontin has had on philosophers of science. I am sure that in any other context it would be unimaginable that philosophers of science form a judgment about a highly contested scientific issue by trusting completely the word of one participant in the debate, even to the point of showing total disregard for other literature sources. In discussions about heritability, however, it has happened for some reason that the philosophical consensus is largely built on the basis of ipse dixit. It would be a serious omission in this context not to discuss a famous study of rats conducted by Cooper and Zubek (Cooper & Zubek 1958), which is often mentioned in discussions about G–E interactions. Although this study is not mentioned in Lewontin’s paper about the analysis 65
Making Sense of Heritability
Number of errors
200 150 Bright
100
Dull 50 0 Restricted
Normal
Enriched
Environment Figure 2.6 G–E interaction in rats. From Cooper and Zubek (1958).
of variance, it holds pride of place among empirical arguments for non-additivity, and has been called “the most widely cited report of heredity–environment interaction in psychology” (Wahlsten 1990a: 116), and “something of a classic in the nature–nurture controversy” (Platt & Stanislow 1988: 257). Many interactionists strongly rely on this paper in disputing additivity (Wahlsten 1995: 247; Wahlsten & Gottlieb 1997: 173– 176; Kaplan 2000: 29–31, 62–63; Bateson 2001a: 151; Bateson 2001b: 565; Meaney 2001: 56–57; Pigliucci 2001: 259–260; Gottlieb 2003a: 344–345). Two genetically different strains of rats (maze-bright and maze-dull) were tested in three different environments (restricted, normal and enriched). Figure 2.6 shows the mean number of errors these animals made under different conditions. In the normal environment there is a clear effect of genotype, but in the two other environments there is no significant phenotypic difference between the two strains. The norms of reaction of the two genotypes not being parallel indicates the presence of G–E interaction. There are several reasons why one should be skeptical about the wideranging implications sometimes drawn from that experiment. (a) Since it is just one study, any generalization from it must obviously be very shaky. As the study has never been replicated one should not rush to draw far-reaching conclusions from it. In fact, Henderson’s experiments from the 1970s (see Plomin 1986: 98–99) involving thousands of mice revealed little statistical interaction, which 66
A tangle of interactions shows that the empirical evidence here does not speak with one voice. (b) There is no good reason to expect that the results of the Cooper and Zubek experiment on rats would immediately carry over into the area of human behavior genetics, although this kind of overhasty extrapolation has been defended (see Alland 2002: 96). (c) As the rats belonged to two inbred strains it becomes even more questionable whether the results would be similar in normal organisms that are typically hybrid. (The point is made by Bouchard 1997: 143; Bouchard & Loehlin 2001: 261.) (d) The observed interaction is not of a radical (non-ordinal) type, i.e., the norms of reaction do not cross. But it is non-ordinal interactions that most strongly undermine the attribution of main effects, and consequently the causal import of heritability claims as well. It is interesting to note here that Lewontin, with his insistence on the pervasiveness of non-ordinal interactions, seriously misrepresents Cooper and Zubek’s study (although he doesn’t mention the authors by name): strains of rats can be selected for better or poorer ability to find their way through a maze, and these strains of rats pass on their differential ability to run the maze to their offspring, so they are certainly genetically different in this respect. But if exactly the same strains of rats are given a different task, or if the conditions of learning are changed, the bright rats turn out to be dull and the dull rats turn out to be bright. (Lewontin 1993: 28 – italics added; cf. Lewontin 1977: 11)
The italicized phrase seems to suggest that the two genetically different strains of rats switch their positions on the bright–dull scale, but this actually never happened, as can be seen in Figure 2.6. (e) Cooper and Zubek themselves warned about methodological limitations of their experimental set-up. They suggested that the two strains of rats might have actually differed in their real learning ability even in those situations where their performance was indistinguishable. It may have been, they said, that the ceiling of the test was simply too low to differentiate the animals (Cooper & Zubek 1958: 162). Moreover, they mentioned that something similar really happened with some tests of human intelligence “on which adults of varying ability may achieve similar I.Q. scores although more difficult tests reveal clear differences between them” (Cooper & Zubek 1958: 162). So there is a kind of vicious circle here. While critics of human behavior genetics 67
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often use Cooper and Zubek’s experiment to raise methodological objections against research on IQ, unbeknownst to these critics, it is precisely the research on IQ that led the authors of that study to warn the reader that the results of their experiment should not be overinterpreted. Let us leave Cooper and Zubek’s rats rest in peace, and let us finally address the central question: how much interaction is there really? What does the empirical evidence say? Is the relation between genes and environments “typically non-additive,” as Lewontin insisted, and as philosophers of science have usually been happy to repeat after him? It is actually amazing that the philosophical consensus could have been preserved for such a long time despite the fact that this view was under constant attack from people doing empirical research in the relevant fields. A few examples will illustrate the skepticism about massive interactions: Feldman and Lewontin should at least make explicit that their proposition is purely a speculation about as yet untested environmental conditions and that what data we do have concerning normal people moved around within common environmental situations show their norm of reaction for IQ to be in fact rather flat. (Havender 1976: 609 – italics added) nonadditive interactions rarely account for a significant portion of variance. (Plomin et al. 1988: 228–229) the simpler additive model in most cases comes close to fitting the expectancies. (Cattell 1982: 66) there is very little empirical support for [the] existence [of genotype– environment interactions] in the behavioral domain. (McGue 1989: 507) the data from the twins reveal no interaction (in the technical sense) of heredity and environment. (Herrnstein 1973: 180) since armchair examples of significant interactions in the absence of an additive effect are pathological and have never been demonstrated in real populations, we need not be unduly concerned about interaction effects. The investigator with a different view should publish any worthwhile results he may obtain. (Rao et al. 1974: 357) The Colorado Adoption Project analyses lead to the conclusion that genotype–environment interactions in infancy, if they exist at all, do not account for much variance. For this reason, Plomin and DeFries . . . proposed the following principle concerning the development of individual
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A tangle of interactions differences in infancy: “Genetic and environmental influences of infant development coact in an additive manner.” (Plomin 1986: 106–107) Interactions are known to occur, but they are far from invariable occurrences. Under many, if not most, circumstances, effects are additive and, moreover, people tend to show broadly similar responses to the same environmental stimuli. (Rutter quoted in Plomin et al. 1988: 228) Thus, as they stand, these results support the conclusion that genetic and environmental influences on individual differences in development in infancy and early childhood coact primarily in an additive manner. (Plomin et al. 1988: 240, cf. 250) There is no conspiracy against interaction: If an interactive model could be shown to fit the data better than the traditional model, researchers would be quick to use it. (Plomin 1990: 144) [The studies of interactions in nonhuman species have established that] although genetic control of sensitivity to the environment is widespread, the contribution of G × E to the overall population variance is typically smaller than the main effects of G and E even in controlled experiments using extreme environments. (Rutter & Silberg 2002: 465) One aspect of genetic influence that environmental researchers seem to support is that of genotype–environment interaction. I agree that intuitively it seems as if these interactions must exist; however, genotype– environment interactions are non-existent in human literature. (Thompson 1996: 181) on the whole it seems unlikely that disordinal interactions will be common. Instead I believe that “good” environments will be similar for all individual members of a species with a similar history of natural selection. Similar environments will not ensure equal performance; “better” environments may help some to achieve above the average. Rarely will a “bad” environment be good for any individual. G–E interactions are most likely to reflect quantitative variation in threshold of stimulation, persistence in problem solving, and slope of learning curves. (Fuller 1972: 473) If variation in man has any similarity to variation in other organisms we would conclude that a trait was atypical if more than about 20 per cent of the measured variation could be attributed to G × E [interaction]. (Eaves et al. 1977: 3) there is little or no formal evidence that personality and intelligence are determined by genetic × environmental interactions. (Brody & Crowley 1995: 66)
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Making Sense of Heritability Attempts to identify G × E effects for personality . . . and general cognitive ability . . . did not yield significant findings. (McGue & Bouchard 1998: 17) The most plausible explanation . . . for the dearth of genotype–environment interactions in human behavior-genetics research on intelligence . . . may be . . . that genotype–environment interaction may not be important for individual differences in intelligence in most populations, given the ranges of intelligence, genotypes, and environments represented in these populations. (Waldman 1997: 558, the word order slightly changed, for ease of citation)
Even the research on Drosophila, on which Lewontin drew so heavily in his attack on additivity, sometimes points in the opposite direction and fails to uncover massive interactions. For example, as Plomin (Plomin 1990: 144) reported, although some G × E interactions were uncovered in a 1978 study of twelve Drosophila strains reared under twenty different environmental conditions, the largest effect accounted only for 2 percent of the total variance. Speaking about attempts to determine empirically the scope of statistical interaction, it should be emphasized that, indeed, it is more difficult to discover interaction effects than main effects. In statistical terminology, the power of the test for interactions is lower than the power of the test for main effects. Radical and unjustified conclusions are sometimes drawn from this asymmetry. Douglas Wahlsten, for instance, argued that inferring additivity in human behavior genetics is necessarily fallacious precisely because the ANOVA non-experimental research design is especially insensitive to the presence of interactions. To see the mistake in Wahlsten’s argument, let us see what is right and what is wrong in his claim. Wahlsten is right that if a given sample can detect only main effects of a given size (say, those that account for more than 5 percent of the entire variance), then because of the asymmetry this sample will fail to detect some interaction effects of that size (if they exist). But Wahlsten is wrong that there is some intrinsic impossibility of capturing interactions in that way. Put differently, more evidence is needed to accept the null hypothesis about interactions than about main effects, but this certainly doesn’t mean that evidence will never be sufficiently strong to refute the existence of interactions. Although for a given effect size, the detectability of interactions will lag behind that of main effects, it is still true that for a statistical interaction of 70
A tangle of interactions any magnitude there will always be a sample that is large enough to test for its presence. Also, the stronger an interaction, the easier to confirm it empirically. Therefore, negative results in search for non-additivity support the hypothesis that there are no massive interactions (accounting for a high percentage of total variance), but they still leave room for the existence of weaker interaction effects. As Douglas Detterman said: “Wahlsten must agree that H × E interactions do not account for a large portion of the total phenotypic variance. If H × E interactions accounted for larger portions of the variance then even statistical techniques with lower power would be able to detect them” (Detterman 1990: 132). This point is important because it is only in the presence of strong G–E interactions that it becomes difficult to put a useful causal interpretation on heritability coefficients. With a small contribution of interaction variance, however, this kind of problem does not arise. Another argument against partitioning the variance into main effects is the non-experimental nature of research in human behavior genetics. Here the claim is that since for obvious moral reasons we cannot assign people with different genotypes to different environmental treatments, we will never be in the position to disentangle causal contributions of these two different types of causes: “In man, measurements of reaction norms for complex traits are impossible because the same genotype cannot be tested in a variety of environments” (Lewontin 1976a: 190 – italics added). But this is again too quick. There are a number of ways to get around this difficulty and acquire causal knowledge without using experimental methods: comparing sums and differences of twins’ phenotypic values (Jinks & Fulker 1970), adoption design (Plomin et al. 2001: 315–316), fitting models with and without an interaction term and seeing which one better conforms to available empirical data, etc. In an important article, McClelland and Judd (1993) showed how samples with different preselected structures have different efficiencies for detecting interactions, and how researchers can maximize their chances of finding interactions (if they exist) by choosing samples that are specially conducive to this task. The base square in Figure 2.7 represents 5 × 5 combinations of two variables, each of which takes five values: −1, −0.5, 0, 0.5, and 1. The heights of the columns show how many observations come from a 71
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1.
0.92
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1.
0.44
0.25
0.24
0.06
0.
0.06
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0.1
Figure 2.7 Testing for interactions (From McClelland & Judd 1993). Copyright c by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
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A tangle of interactions particular combination. We see that the optimal design for detecting first-order interactions is sampling at the extremes (corners). The statistical power for finding interactions decreases from the optimum (1.), and the decline in sensitivity depends on how a given sample deviates from the optimal design. Note that even when a full one-half of observations comes from one of the corners, the efficiency of detecting interactions is not significantly decreased, as long as the remaining observations are taken at other corners (the third case in the first row). This shows that oversampling at extremes is a good strategy in searching for genotype– environment interactions. It also shows that even without using an experimental approach there are ways to make research more interactionsensitive. It is interesting that despite their frequent invoking of empirical evidence, “interactionist” critics of behavior genetics actually tend to rely on aprioristic arguments in their defense of non-additivity. Here is a typical reasoning to that effect: because cognitive skills develop through complex and as yet little understood interactive processes involving many kinds of genetic and environmental factors, it would be unduly optimistic to expect such skills – even if they could be adequately measured – to fall into the rather narrow category of traits for which heritability is a meaningful concept. (Layzer 1972b: 423)
Now even if at some level developmental processes are highly interactive, context-sensitive, and extremely complex, it is a fallacy to conclude that just because of this “messiness” of developmental processes the main effects of heredity and environment are unlikely to be found. To use an analogy, the emergence of lung cancer must be a tremendously complicated process dependent on the combined action of many factors and coincidences, but despite all these unfathomable causal convolutions and elusive contingencies, we have very good reasons to believe that there is a quantitatively specifiable main effect of smoking on cancer. Layzer’s argument (defended by many other authors) that complexities of developmental processes preclude the possibility of partitioning the phenotypic variation into genetic and environmental components seems to be the result of confusing different levels of analysis. This conflation is clearly explained by H. H. Goldsmith: Individual differences are the stuff of behavioral genetics, and classic behavioral genetics inferences are confined to genetic and environmental effects
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Making Sense of Heritability on phenotypic variance, not genes and environments per se. There is no contradiction in analyzing individual differences by linear regression of outcome on sources of variation, even when the individual differences result from highly contingent developmental processes operating in the life of individuals. In fact, psychologists frequently do analogous exercises. For example, both earlier IQ and quality of schooling might predict later academic achievement of children in a linear fashion. Computing the relevant regression and interpreting the partial regression coefficients is a legitimate and potentially useful exercise even though the actual learning experiences of the children were highly contingent, interpersonal, and context bound. Analyzing the nature of the contingencies and contextual influences is simply a different task. (Goldsmith 1993: 329)
Many developmentalist criticisms of heritability (advocated by Wahlsten, Gottlieb, Oyama, etc.) would be more relevant if they showed that they appreciated the difference between the two tasks and that they did not try to prove, hastily and fallaciously, that the separation of causal contributions is impossible only because these causes work together in development in a very complicated way. When the authors of the DST manifesto mention the question whether intelligence is 50 percent or 70 percent genetic (the natural interpretation of “genetic” in this context being “heritable”), and when they say that “DST rejects the attempts to partition causal responsibility for the formation of organisms into additive components” (Oyama et al. 2001: 1), they seem to forget that additivity is ultimately an empirical issue and that it cannot be decided by a priori speculation. Their descent into the worst tradition of Naturphilosophie is obvious in the following statement: “Whenever a number of causal factors interact to produce an outcome, we should expect that the effect of changing one factor will depend on what is happening to the others” (Oyama et al. 2001: 3). How do they know? On what basis do they state that we should expect non-additivity whenever a number of causal factors interact to produce an outcome? This is a dogmatic and arbitrary claim. Moreover, we do not have to wait to see whether, so to speak, the planet Ceres will be discovered. They are already proved wrong now because those contexts in which additivity or near-additivity reigns represent a straightforward refutation of their “whenever” statement. Notice that, using the terms from the beginning of this chapter, Oyama et al. basically infer interactions (statistical interaction) from interactionc (commonsense interaction). Their conclusion (what “we should expect”) is that “the effect of changing one factor will depend on what is happening 74
A tangle of interactions to the others.” But this is actually how interactions is defined. Therefore, when they speak about interaction in the premise (“Whenever a number of causal factors interact to produce an outcome”) they cannot mean interactions , because this would make their inference tautological. Surely, they don’t want to tell us that whenever there is interactions we should expect interactions . The most charitable interpretation is that by “interaction” in the premise they mean interactionc , and then their inference is fallacious rather than tautological. The idea that the effect of changing one factor always depends on what is happening to other factors is an empirical claim, and a demonstrably false one at that. A dramatic refutation is what happens with genetically modified organisms, where particular genes often continue to have the same effect even after being transplanted across species and placed into a drastically different genetic and environmental context: For example, the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis produces a protein that is toxic to caterpillars. Scientists have placed a gene from these bacteria into plants, such as cotton, that are extremely susceptible to insect damage. When a caterpillar takes a bite of one of these modified plants, it consumes some of the toxic protein and dies. (Crawford 2003: 856)
2.5 locality If genetic and environmental effects happen to be additive in a given population, can it be inferred from this that additivity will then probably exist also in similar populations or in the same population under slightly changed conditions? Can a heritability value obtained in one population be extrapolated to some other situation? The answer is often a resounding “No,” on the grounds that heritability is a population statistic, and that it applies only to the population for which it was measured and under the exact circumstances in which it was measured. And indeed, if the claim of massive non-additivity and pervasiveness of statistical interaction is correct, then a high heritability value measured in a given range of environments will rightly be regarded as an “atypical” case of additivity and it will be expected to revert to a tangle of interactions as soon as the population parameters are even slightly altered. As Lewontin said: “the usual outcome of an analysis of variance in a particular population in a restricted range of environments is to underestimate severely the amount 75
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of interaction between the factors that occur over the whole range” (Lewontin 1976a: 190). Although, strictly speaking, it follows from Lewontin’s statement that one is actually entitled to infer that heritability will be lower whenever the range of environments is broadened (because the “usual outcome” is that the amount of interaction is “underestimated” in a restricted range), the prevalent view is that no inference is permissible to new situations. It is useful at this point to distinguish between two statements about heritability and its generalizability: (1) a heritability value obtained in a given population is not automatically generalizable to all other populations; (2) a heritability value obtained in a given population can never be extrapolated to any other population. Claim (1) is trivially true and hence uninteresting, while claim (2) is interesting but false. (1) When Patrick Bateson says that “the heritability of any given characteristic is not a fixed and absolute quantity – tempted though many scientists have been to believe otherwise” (Bateson 2001a: 150), what immediately catches the eye is that he gives no references, no names. Who are these “many scientists” who believe that the heritability of any given characteristic is “a fixed and absolute quantity”? My bet is that these scientists do not exist, particularly not in behavior genetics. Competent people in the field simply do not make such a mistake. Similarly, when Ned Block (Block 1995: 108) maintains that there is “the temptation (exhibited in The Bell Curve) to think of the heritability of IQ as a constant (like the speed of light),” there is no quotation to support that charge. The reason for this absence is again non-existence. To make things worse, Block contradicts himself on the same page when, in criticizing Charles Murray’s statement from a CNN interview, he writes: “The Bell Curve itself does not make these crude mistakes. Herrnstein, the late co-author, was a professional on these topics.” How can Herrnstein be a professional on these topics if he thought that heritability is a constant, like the speed of light? The implausibility of Block’s accusation7 is manifested in the fact that already in his classic 1969 paper Jensen stated in passing, as a matter of obvious truth: “From what has already been said about heritability, it must be clear that it is not a constant like π and the speed of light” (Jensen 1969b: 43). Herrnstein and Murray also explicitly warn “nonspecialists” 7
Spencer and Harpalani (2004: 57), who quote Block’s paper, also state that in The Bell Curve, heritability is misrepresented as “a static, unalterable entity.”
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A tangle of interactions that heritability is not a constant: “The heritability of a trait may change when the conditions producing variation change” (Herrnstein & Murray 1994: 106). (2) After we reject the idea (held by no one) that heritability measured in one population immediately applies to all other populations, how about inferring the magnitude of heritability in a population from the one measured in some other population? We know that this kind of inference is not always legitimate. But is it ever legitimate? Notice that I am talking about inductive inference here, not a deductive relationship. So, when Alland says that “a measure of heritability in one population, let us say 0.80, is no guarantee that the heritability will be the same (for the same trait) in another population in another environment” (Alland 2002: 91; italics added), this is easily conceded. No guarantee, of course, but is there at least a high probability that a measure of heritability will carry over from one population to another, in some cases? The negative answer seems to be given in the following passages: the [heritability] figures are population specific; that is, they apply only to the particularsamples studied at a particular time. (Rutter 2002: 2 – italics added) Heritability estimates are necessarily specific to the particular time and to the sample from which the measures were collected. Heritability estimates describe only what is the case now and have no implications for what could, or would, happen if circumstances changed. (Rutter 1997: 391) But heritability could be 1.0 in one condition and near zero in another, for heritability is condition dependent, as already discussed. The most that can be said from a high value of heritability is that phenotype determination is highly influenced by genotype in the conditions observed. (West-Eberhard 2003: 102–103) it is almost impossible to extrapolate the heritability of a character for one population from information about another. (Daniels et al. 1997: 54 – italics added) heritability applies only to the set of environments in which the determination was made and cannot be extrapolated to other distributions of environments. (Lewontin 1976b: 9) whatever [heritability] tells us is relative to that population and the existing sources of variation it tells us nothing whatever about populations that
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Making Sense of Heritability differ from the initial one in genetic and environmental variation. (Block & Dworkin 1976b: 486–487 – italics added) Heritability estimates are relevant only for the specific environment in which they are measured. (Nelkin & Andrews 1996: 13)
Interpreted literally, Rutter’s two passages make heritability figures totally useless because they carry information only about samples at a given time (not even about populations at a given time). West-Eberhard also robs heritability estimates of any interesting content because they can never go beyond what is directly observed. Daniels and his colleagues use an odd phrase “almost impossible” to describe the prospects for a population-to-population extrapolation of heritability. Since the main reason for disputing the generalizability of heritability is that it is a population statistic, the argument is clearly quite general (it is not restricted to behavior genetics). But this is precisely what makes it unconvincing. Can we really agree that statistical information obtained with ANOVA methodology applies only to samples that were examined in the initial phase of research, and that this information is totally irrelevant for any context that transcends the narrow evidential base? Indeed, to raise this question is to answer it negatively. The more similar a new context is to the examined one, the stronger the expectation that the inference from one case to the other will not be mistaken. For example, if there was a ratio of 3:1 between the incidence of lung cancer and stomach cancer in a given country in 1990, then one would not be surprised if that particular ratio was of the same order of magnitude in 1980 or in 2000. Surely, if the only thing one knew was that in 2000 there were approximately three times more cases of one kind of cancer than the other, one would have more reason to believe that the 1990 ratio was preserved than that it was reversed. The inference would be fallible, no doubt, but the fewer changes in these ten years, the more secure the extrapolation. Moreover, a cautious and appropriately qualified generalization of that ratio to other populations that did not differ much from the country in question cannot be a priori dismissed as illogical. Yes, a heritability coefficient refers to a particular trait in a particular population, but “this does not mean that if one finds a given trait to be highly heritable in one human population, he should be astonished to find it also highly heritable in another” (Loehlin et al. 1975: 81 – italics added). One should actually expect similar heritabilities in similar populations. And conversely, “the greater [the differences between the populations] 78
A tangle of interactions are, the riskier the generalizations will be” (Loehlin et al. 1975: 81). If the “locality extremists” looked into the standard introduction to quantitative genetics they would see that heritability estimates typically go beyond the information given and can readily be extrapolated to other (similar) cases: whenever a value is stated for the heritability of a given character it must be understood to refer to a particular population under particular conditions. Values found in other populations under other circumstances will be more or less the same according to whether the structure of the population and the environmental conditions are more or less alike. (Falconer 1989: 164)
The question of generalizability of heritability estimates is ultimately an empirical issue (cf. Bouchard & Loehlin 2001: 247). For this reason, blanket condemnations of any such inference are misconceived. Ned Block (1995: 108) claims: “There is no reason to expect the heritability of IQ in India to be close to the heritability of IQ in Korea.” How does he know? The troubling aspect of Block’s resolute statement is that it is in fact directly contradicted by relevant empirical research: The question of generalizing [the components of variance] to other samples and other times can only be answered empirically (the evidence with respect to cognitive abilities suggests considerable generalizability). (Plomin & DeFries 1976: 11 – italics added)
Block also ignores one of the most important contributions to that topic, which was published six years before his paper. In an article “The Generalizability of Genetic Estimates” (in the leading psychological journal Personality and Individual Differences), J. Philippe Rushton concluded from research on Japanese-American, European-American, Korean, British, Australian, and Canadian samples that “from the data reported here, estimates of genetic influence appear to have a greater robustness across populations, languages, time periods and measurement specifics than has been considered to date” (Rushton 1989: 988). Needless to say, Rushton’s conclusion may be disputed, but for someone to discuss the issue without even mentioning this important contribution to the literature is not the best example of responsible scholarship. By the way, later research seems to have confirmed Rushton’s view: “Although heritability could differ in different cultures, moderate heritability of g has been found, not only in twin studies in North American and 79
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western European countries, but also in Moscow, former East Germany, rural India, urban India, and Japan” (Plomin 2002: 213). David Moore radicalizes Block’s position by saying that the generalization of heritability is unjustified not just across countries but across state borders in the United States as well: “If alcoholism is heritable among Iowans, it need not be the case that it is heritable among Ohioans. (I am not simply being recalcitrant here: heritability estimates calculated for one population do not apply to another population)” (Moore 2001: 47). Moore’s position approaches the limit, i.e., the idea that any heritability value is valid only within the sample on which it was calculated. Critics of heritability seem to be unaware that because of the socalled “causal democracy” (the symmetrical status of genetic and environmental factors), the non-generalizability of heritability implies the non-generalizability of environmental influences as well. Therefore, it would follow from Moore’s pessimism about state-to-state inferences that if a new teaching strategy had good effects in schools in Ohio there would be no reason whatsoever to expect that the strategy would work in Iowa. This consequence is absurd, but it should not be surprising that it can be derived from the criticism of heritability, because that criticism is not based on specifics of genetic causation. On the contrary, it has a very general import and is bound to have broad implications since it applies to any ANOVA causal inference, independently of the subject matter. This is why, when fully understood, it looks less like an argument about behavior genetics and more like a full-fledged inductive skepticism. Interestingly, the non-experimental nature of research in human behavior genetics, which is frequently regarded as its serious methodological deficiency (Michel & Moore 1995: 209), may actually work in its favor in this context. Not dealing with artificial, laboratory conditions but with real-life situations, its conclusions obtained on given samples are easier to extrapolate to other similar populations: “Human behavioral genetic researchers have the mixed blessing of working with naturally occurring genetic and environmental variation. The cost is a loss of experimental control; the benefit is an increased likelihood that the result of the research will generalize” (Plomin et al. 1988: 231; cf. Plomin 1986: 99; Plomin & Hershberger 1991: 33). Causal claims in human behavior genetics are more difficult to confirm, but once they gain plausibility they have more ecological validity than studies using clones-in-cages design. 80
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2.6 causal irrelevance Even if heritability estimates are generalizable within a given range (of environments and genotypes), it seems very likely that, if pushed far enough, these generalizations will eventually break down. This fact is used to argue that heritability claims cannot give us knowledge of causal relations between genes and phenotypes. Here is Lewontin again: [the result of the ANOVA approach] has a historical (i.e., spatiotemporal) limitation and is not in general a statement about functional relations. (Lewontin 1976a: 183) the analysis of variance will give a completely erroneous picture of the causative relations between genotype, environment, and phenotype because the particular distribution of genotypes and environments in a given population at a given time picks out relations from the array of reaction norms that are necessarily atypical of the entire spectrum of causative relations. (Lewontin 1976a: 188 – italics added) In view of the terrible mischief that has been done by confusing the spatiotemporally local analysis of variance with the global analysis of causes, I suggest that we stop the endless search for better methods of estimating useless quantities. (Lewontin 1976a: 192 – italics added)
Why is ANOVA an inappropriate instrument in the search for causes? In Lewontin’s picture, since ANOVA has a historical (spatiotemporal) limitation and is necessarily restricted to local, particular distributions of the relevant variables, it cannot deliver the global analysis of causes, or knowledge of functional relations and of the entire spectrum of causative relations.8 But how can we hope to get knowledge of these functional or global causal relations? Well, they are “embodied in the norm of reaction” (Lewontin 1976a: 189), but unfortunately “in man, measurements of reaction norms for complex traits are impossible because the same genotype cannot be tested in a variety of environments” (1976a: 190 – italics added). It follows that it is impossible to know how genes and environments cause human phenotypic differences. Lewontin is right that if causal knowledge in behavior genetics were contingent on knowing the full norms of reaction then such knowledge 8
The DST manifesto also quotes Lewontin as showing that “heritability estimates are not measures of global causal importance” (Oyama et al. 2001: 3; cf. Oyama 1992: 221; Gray 2001: 187).
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would be absolutely outside of our reach. Norms of reaction cannot be known in their entirety: Complete knowledge of a norm of reaction would require placing the carriers of a given genotype in all possible environments and observing the phenotypes that develop . . . The performance of a genotype cannot be tested in all possible environments, because the latter are infinitely variable. (Dobzhansky 1955: 75 – italics added) To test the reactions of a given gene constellation (or a cluster of kindred ones) in all environments is obviously impossible. For example, how could one discover the highest stature that I could have reached in some very propitious environment, or the lowest one at which I could have stopped growing and still remained alive? (Dobzhansky 1973: 8) As a rule, it would be difficult or even impossible to denote the whole range of the norm of reaction (NOR) of a characteristic, and we must be content with a partial [norm of reaction]. (Falk 2001: 121 – italics added) Ideally one would like to know the reaction of every genotype in every environment. Given the practically infinite variety of both environments and genotypes, this is clearly impossible. (Bodmer & Cavalli-Sforza 1970: 24 – italics added)
Evidently, the dubious part of Lewontin’s position is his making the complete knowledge of norms of reaction a necessary condition for understanding causal influences of genes and environments on the phenotype. First of all, why should we accept that the search for causal explanations always has to have as its goal the “global analysis of causes,” or knowledge of “functional” relations across “the entire spectrum of causative relations”? In many etiological contexts researchers settle for a less ambitious and less grand task of finding causal relations that obtain only under contingent and antecedently specified conditions. In biology, in particular, a maximalist epistemic aim of looking for global causal connections sounds distinctly unrealistic and utopian. For instance, saying that a chromosomal abnormality associated with Down’s syndrome causes a significantly lower IQ does not commit us to the claim that, globally, a norm of reaction of that genotype will always (in all possible environments) be below the norm of reaction of a normal genotype. If the distance between the two norms of reaction has been consistently preserved over a number of environmental regimes that had been tried (including those introduced in the hope of eliminating the difference in question), then we are perfectly entitled to speak about 82
A tangle of interactions causality, even if we allow that there might be some (presently inaccessible) environments where the difference disappears. A good slogan for many biological contexts would be: observe locally, think causally (and forget “globally”). Imagine that we discover a linear causal relation between human height and intake of calories, according to which, in the developmental period after birth, a yearly intake of n × X calories results in the growth of n inches. Suppose now that someone disputes the causal connection between the two variables by pointing out that the functional relation is not global, i.e., that it breaks down when n becomes very small or very big. Babies exposed to an extremely poor diet (small n) do not grow to become 2–3 inches tall in adulthood. Likewise, babies absorbing drastically large amounts of food do not grow to “predicted” heights of 20–25 feet. (I am indebted for this analogy to Turkheimer et al. 1995: 147.) This criticism would rightly be dismissed as ridiculous because, if cogent, it would undermine practically all causal explanations except perhaps those in fundamental physics. In biology, as in most other explanatory contexts, we know in advance that any causal relation will break down if the regime of the relevant parameters is pushed far enough beyond a given range. The weaknesses of this “possible-worlds” approach to the heredity– environment controversy are best recognized in Kitcher’s attempt at reconstruction of the nature–nurture debate. He starts by supposing that each camp misrepresents the opposite standpoint by understanding it to claim that only genes or only environment determine phenotype: too facile a victory is won by attacking these men of straw. Kitcher then argues that there must be a point of real and rational disagreement between the two sides, even after they acknowledge the “interactionist truism” – the fact that both genes and environment determine phenotype. His proposed solution is to burden the “genetic determinists” with a claim about what happens in all possible environments (Kitcher 1985: 25–29; Kitcher 1987: 66). Accordingly, genetically determined phenotypic differences are identified as those that either cannot be eliminated or are too costly to eliminate, for any possible environment. Kitcher believes that this reinterpretation is fair to hereditarianism, in that it avoids making it either simplistic (“only genes determine phenotype”) or unexciting (“genes have some influence on phenotype”). It is more than doubtful, though, that real hereditarians will be happy with such a division of roles. They would most probably regard playing the 83
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part assigned to them in the debate by Kitcher as equivalent to admitting defeat. For, the one who takes upon himself the Herculean task of proving that something holds literally under all circumstances9 should be aware that he has no defense against Kitcher’s quite correct claims about “the immensity of our ignorance about the environmental influences on human behavior” (Kitcher 1985: 29) and about “our [profound] ignorance of the shapes of the norms of reaction” (Kitcher 1987: 66). Human behavior geneticists are checkmated in two moves. First, they are told that they should try to discover human norms of reaction in their entirety, but then, second, they are told that it is impossible to trace out human norms of reaction for any trait (Lewontin 1977: 10). Chess, anyone? But our criticism should try to strike at a deeper level. Let us therefore raise the following question: is the norm of reaction approach superior to other approaches in some important theoretical respect? That is, would we lose anything if we decided to abandon the search for complete norms of reaction,10 and if we instead adhered to the precisely defined concept of statistical interaction? Robert Plomin argues that we would thereby only free ourselves from many vague connotations which the term “norm of reaction” drags in its wake: Indeed, the connotations of the phrase may be responsible for its popularity. Reaction range suggests the notion that, regardless of genotype, an individual can grow up to be a pauper or a prince depending on environmental circumstances. Although such plots make good fairy tales, all we can assess is environmental variance, genetic variance, and variance due to genotype–environment interaction. The term reaction range adds nothing to these concepts. (Plomin 1986: 95)
Plomin’s “fairy tale” irony is here remarkably pertinent. For, the norm of reaction (as used by some authors) does indeed tend to divert our attention from the manageable empirical data over which we have some control, and directs it to the question of what might have been the case in some extremely different and not very clearly defined circumstances. Speculation about these remotely conceivable situations may then begin to dominate the picture so much that we witness the curious triumph of 9 10
According to Kitcher (Kitcher 2001b: 399), the norm-of-reaction approach requires that “the entire space of nongenetic causal variables is covered” (italics added). Notably, when Schiff and Lewontin analyzed eleven genetics textbooks written by prominent scientists in the field (Schiff & Lewontin 1986: 188–189), none of them contained a reference to the norm of reaction. My search gave a similar result. Despite being so often criticized, the concept of heritability is extensively discussed in all textbooks, whereas the much advertised norm-of-reaction approach is usually not mentioned at all.
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A tangle of interactions the possible over the actual. We should resist this and try to interpret the heredity–environment discussion so that it deals with our real world, not with uncontrollable “might-have-beens” and counterfactuals gone wild. But then we would not get very far with the “norm of reaction,” understood in the aforementioned way, which only encourages flight into speculation. Rather, it would be advisable to aim at discovering the connections that hold non-globally, the only piece of knowledge that remains a realistic research goal. The following quotations illustrate the two opposite views that might be called “possibilist” and “actualist” standpoints: We suspect that dissemination of the idea that genes and other developmental factors may interact with the environment in multifactorial, non-additive ways to produce outcomes would greatly improve the debate over the role of genetic factors in determining human behavior. It is probably fair to say that many people assume additivity when discussing gene–environment interactions simply because they overlook the full range of the possible. (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 16–17 – italics added) The scarcity of evidence for interaction does not mean that interaction is forever impossible, only that it is not accounting for much now. It is, in fact, entirely possible that science could uncover ways of raising people’s I.Q.’s by special sorts of environments, tailor-made for them. A world in which each person enjoyed something approaching his optimal environment – let us assume a different environment for each – might register large interaction and little overall variation in I.Q. That is, however, not our world, and we have as yet hardly an inkling of how to get from here to there, or even of whether or not the way exists in any practical sense. (Herrnstein 1973: 180)
It is easy to agree with Sterelny and Griffiths that we should keep an open mind to the possibility of gene–environment interactions in new, unexplored domains of environmental variation. But it is harder to see how “the idea that genes . . . may interact with the environment . . . would greatly improve the debate over the role of genetic factors in determining human behavior.” True, genes may interact with environments, but then again they may not. Surely, both possibilities should be taken seriously, yet perhaps not too seriously as long as they are just that, mere possibilities. “Overlooking the full range of the possible,” which Sterelny and Griffiths condemn as a methodological shortcoming, is better regarded as the characteristic bias toward actuality that is the essential mark of empiricism. 85
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To recapitulate, the result of our discussion is that Lewontin’s argument has problems in each of its three steps. First, the claim of massive non-additivity is not supported by empirical evidence. Second, the claim of locality is false if interpreted as saying that any generalization of heritability is unjustified. And third, the claim of causal irrelevance fails because its explanatory pessimism mainly springs from describing the research goal of behavior geneticists in such maximalist and unrealistic terms that it sends the whole field on an epistemic “mission impossible.”
2.7 the second look at interactions The use of ANOVA in behavior genetics (and elsewhere) requires great caution. Applying the technique uncritically can easily lead to inferences that distort the picture of actual causal connections. Therefore, it is perhaps good from time to time to be reminded (e.g., Wahlsten 1990b: 152) that a large sample size is necessary for the test of statistical interactions, that if the functional relationship of two factors is non-additive then it may be difficult to speak of separate causes of variation, that ANOVA is appropriate in some situations but not in others, and so forth. But pointing to all these possible pitfalls and limitations cannot support the strong claim that we should abandon the goal of partitioning variance among mutually exclusive causes and calculating heritability coefficients (Wahlsten 1990b: 109), or that the ANOVA approach is somehow irremediably and intrinsically defective as an instrument in the search for causes. An occasionally misused method is not a useless method. It is sometimes suggested that the analysis of variance imposes a straitjacket of additivity on the world that is fundamentally characterized by non-additivity. This is also wrong. True, ANOVA gives useful results only if measured factors are largely additive, but if they happen not to be, no reasonable person would be inclined to continue pushing this approach. There is nothing in ANOVA itself that leads to its being applied in totally inappropriate contexts. As Ronald A. Fisher says: “[T]he main point is that you are under no obligation to analyze variance into its parts if it does not come apart easily, and its unwillingness to do so naturally indicates that one’s line of approach is not very fruitful” (in Bennett 1983: 218). Another objection is that, rather than starting with idealizations that abstract from the world’s complexity, the research should already at the beginning face reality in all its glory and richness of intricate causal connections and interactions: “Causal interconnectedness in the world is not 86
A tangle of interactions DST’s invention. We just deal with it differently, by including it in our formulations from the start, rather than bringing it in only when forced to do so, and then perhaps marginalizing it in some way” (Oyama 2000b: S344). Is this actually a good idea? To motivate skepticism about Oyama’s proposal let me quote an opposite view defended by behavior geneticist John Loehlin in another discussion: “This is a bit like saying that when a train hits a bus, events are extremely complicated at the level of the molecules involved. Well, yes, they are, but is that the level at which to look at things first?” (Loehlin 2001: 169). Or, as William Thompson said: “In the initial stages of a genetic analysis it might be better to oversimplify than to overcomplicate” (Thompson 1975: 1126). Critics of behavior genetics often point to the enormous complexity of developmental processes, as if this fact were unknown to psychologists who talk about heritability of different traits. Gilbert Gottlieb, for example, repeatedly argues that behavior genetics is “conceptually deficient,” and he likes to warn those working in that field about complexity by giving a graph in which intricate causal relations between different levels of biological organization are displayed (Gottlieb 1995: 138; Gottlieb 2003b: 11; Gottlieb 2004: 95; Wahlsten & Gottlieb 1997: 183). Is this kind of reminder really necessary? I think not, because no researcher worth his salt ever thought that the partition of phenotypic variance into components exhausts all the relevant information about causality of trait development. The underlying complexity is fully recognized and taken for granted, but the claim is that even causally most convoluted situations still leave open the possibility of additivity of genetic and environmental influences.11 That behavior geneticists are indeed perfectly aware of the causal labyrinth and interrelations between different levels of organismic functioning is best reflected in the fact that Gottlieb’s diagram, which he constantly uses as a weapon of criticism of behavior genetics, is old news in the discipline he criticizes. We can find a strikingly similar graph as an illustration of biological complexity in a popular overview of research in behavior genetics that was published more than forty years ago (McClearn 1964: 167). Searching for main effects in the nature–nurture debate certainly involves a simplification, but the main question is whether it is a fruitful simplification. If there is something fundamentally wrong with this 11
“Fortunately, relationships at the population level may often be additive, or nearly so, over the ranges of genetic and environmental variation found in natural situations, even though the underlying biochemical and behavioral processes are highly complex and non-linear” (Loehlin et al. 1975: 79).
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method, we should condemn it in other situations as well. Do we really want to do that? Let me use an argument from analogy. Suppose that it is discovered that in criminal court cases white judges (and white judges only) sentence black defendants more harshly than white defendants. On the basis of this observation it could be argued that there is a causal tendency here, whereby one variable (the race of the judge) influences another variable (the severity of sentence for black defendants). This could be taken as strong prima facie evidence of racism in the legal system. But imagine now that person X resists the conclusion by saying that the “development” of a judicial decision is an extremely complicated process, and that it is unbearably crude and naive to think that we can separate or measure the influences of two factors that interact to produce the sentence (the two factors being the race of the judge and the nature of the crime). X may also insist that the observed correlation between the race of the judge and the severity of sentence for blacks applies only to the sample from which the data were obtained, and that no justification exists for extrapolating this regularity from the observed sample to any other context (e.g., from Iowa to Ohio). Furthermore, now X can no longer be stopped in his Lewontinian outburst, the fact that the “norm of reaction” of white judges is consistently higher than the one of black judges (the white judges tending to react to black defendants with harsher sentences than black judges) is just a local phenomenon. It may well be, he continues, that there are situations (not yet explored) where the two norms of reaction cross, which all just shows that the available statistical data are insufficient to warrant any conclusion that the race of the judge is causally influencing the severity of sentence: the analysis of variance is different from the analysis of causes. Wouldn’t we rightly regard this train of thought as a disingenuous attempt to turn a blind eye to the strong evidence of judicial prejudice based on race? This analogy shows that by moving to other contexts of discussion we can recognize fully the radical nature of Lewontin’s methodological purism. Following his advice would throw out many innocent and very healthy babies together with the alleged bathwater of hereditarianism.
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3 Lost in correlations? Direct and indirect genetic causes
Unless you are willing simply to deny that causality is a meaningful concept then you will need some way of studying causal relationships when randomized experiments cannot be performed. Maintain your skepticism if you wish, but grant me the benefit of your doubt. A healthy skepticism while in a car dealership will keep you from buying a “lemon.” An unhealthy skepticism might prevent you from obtaining a reliable means of transport. Bill Shipley
The fact that organisms with genotype G1 may have phenotype P1 more often than organisms with genotype G2 is not necessarily a good indication that a G-difference is directly responsible for a P-difference. It may well be that (for whatever reason) G1 organisms simply find themselves more frequently in environment E1 than G2 organisms, and that it is E1 which causally leads to phenotype P1 (while E2 produces P2 ). This phenomenon is called “genotype–environment correlation.” It has been extensively discussed in the behavior genetics literature, but it has also been widely used in methodological criticisms of heritability. The expression “genotype–environment correlation” usually refers to the situations where two separate sources of phenotypic variance (genetic and environmental) happen to be correlated. Sometimes, however, it is interpreted more broadly to cover also the cases where there is a correlation between a genetic and environmental characteristic, even when the genetic characteristic is not directly influencing the phenotype. For example, if a difference between G1 and G2 is in itself irrelevant for the phenotype but if this genotypic difference is statistically correlated with a trait-relevant environmental difference, this situation would be regarded 89
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as the case of G–E correlation on the second interpretation (because there would be a correlation between a genetic characteristic and an environmental influence on phenotype), but it would not count as such on the first interpretation (because genetic and environmental differences would not both be separate and independent sources of phenotypic variance). I will use the broader connotation because the criticism of heritability is sometimes couched in these terms. There are two main objections to heritability that are based on the existence of genotype–environment correlation: (a) conceptual and (b) methodological. Allegedly, the ever-present possibility of G–E correlation shows (a) that the notion “heritability” is logically odd because it does not keep genetic and environmental influence conceptually separated, or (b) that the genetic and environmental influences, although conceptually distinct, cannot be empirically disentangled from one another. These two strands of argument are not always clearly distinguished. For clarity and better focus I will discuss them separately. First, the conceptual tack.
3.1 the conceptual route: a pickwickian notion? Does the fact that a given phenotypic trait is heritable entail that it is genetic (i.e., that the differences in that trait are due to genetic differences)? Many influential social scientists and philosophers (Christopher Jencks, Ned Block, Elliott Sober, Allan Gibbard, and others) give a negative answer to that question. They all support this answer by using an essentially same example, which originates from Jencks et al. 1972. 3.1.1 The redheads example Imagine that red-haired children are for some reason singled out for abuse and are frequently hit on the head by parents and teachers. As a result they get a lower IQ on average than other children. Now, although it is in a certain sense true that in this situation having a gene for red hair leads to a lower IQ, it just doesn’t sound right to say that the IQ deficit of red-haired children is genetic. For, the manifestly critical influence here is the environmental one (the abuse), which explains the deficit, and furthermore explains it completely. Jencks and his followers claim that according to the way “heritability” is used in behavior genetics, the IQ difference between red-haired and other children in this hypothetical 90
Lost in correlations? example would be heritable and counted as genetic. Since this strongly conflicts with common sense (which regards that difference as 100 percent environmental) they conclude that heritability is a somewhat Pickwickian causal notion, and that for that reason, the heritability of a trait by no means implies that the trait is also genetic in the important sense of that word which we ordinarily use to divide causal responsibility between genes and environments. Here are several characteristic passages: If, for example, a nation refuses to send children with red hair to school, the genes that cause red hair can be said to lower reading scores . . . Attributing redheads’ illiteracy to their genes would probably strike most readers as absurd under these circumstances. Yet that is precisely what traditional methods of estimating heritability do. If an individual’s genotype affects his environment, for whatever rational or irrational reason, and if this in turn affects his cognitive development, conventional methods of estimating heritability attribute the entire effect to genes and none to environment. (Jencks et al. 1972: 66–67) It is a by-product of the methodology for measuring heritability to adopt a tacit convention that genes are taken to dominate environment . . . If there is a genetic difference in the causal chains that lead to different characteristics, the difference counts as genetically caused even if the environmental differences are just as important. (Block 1995: 117) But the methods used to assess the heritability of IQ automatically count variance produced by genetic variation as genetically caused variance even if it is also environmentally caused. (Block & Dworkin 1976a: 480) imagine [that] blue-eyed children are fed to lions, but some of them survive, maimed. If eye color is inherited and this grim ritual is the predominant cause of anyone lacking a leg in that population, then non-two-leggedness in that population has substantial heritability. (Gibbard 2001: 169) If blacks are badly treated because of their skin color, and their skin color is genetic, then the lower IQ will be assigned to genes, not to environment. (Sober 2001: 74; cf. Sober 2000: 366)
(See also Levins in Callebaut 1993: 249–250; Jencks 1980: 730; Garfinkel 1981: 119–120; Jencks 1992: 106; Taylor 2001: 179; Wachbroit 2001: 39; Wasserman 2004: 25; Billings et al. 1992: 230; Moore 2001: 46; Parens 2004: S12.) Summarizing his views on the heredity–environment controversy, Jencks (1980: 731) gives a two-by-two table, containing a taxonomy of various kinds of phenotypic effects. For our present purposes it is worth 91
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noting that differences resulting from sexual discrimination are classified there as being genetic! These differences are of course usually regarded as being purely environmental in origin. The surprising outcome of labeling them as genetic directly follows from Jencks’s interpretation of heritability, according to which any variation ultimately caused by genetic variation is heritable (and hence genetic). Clearly, sexual discrimination is initially triggered by a genetic difference. Take the following four factors in the causal sequence: (1) two X chromosomes → (2) being female → (3) being discriminated against → (4) being paid less. In this scenario, the causal link between (2) and (3) stands out for us so saliently as the nervus explanandi of the observed income difference that any account mentioning only factor (1) would strike us as a joke, stupidity, or perhaps just a non-standard causal attribution. And this is exactly the point that Jencks, Block, Sober, and others want to make: if the logic of heritability is so permissive that it counts even consequences of sexual or racial discrimination as “genetic” effects, this means that heritable differences (in the technical and counter-intuitive sense of behavior genetics) are not necessarily genetic effects in our usual sense of the word. Conclusion: heritability estimates, whatever their magnitude, are never by themselves evidence that genes play an important explanatory role simply because even variation that is 100 percent heritable (i.e., ultimately due to genetic differences) may well be 100 percent proximately explained by much more relevant environmental differences. I will try to show that far from being so semantically perverse, the term “heritability,” when properly understood, actually accords quite well with our commonsense etiological ascriptions. Before embarking on this task, however, I have to do some preliminary definitional work, and explain three different kinds of genotype–environment correlation (or covariance):1 passive, reactive, and active. These terms were introduced in Plomin et al. 1977, although a very similar distinction was informally made earlier and often discussed through examples (see especially Jensen 1969b: 38; cf. Cattell 1963: 200; Cattell 1965: 110). 3.1.2 Three types of G–E correlation Genotype–environment correlation is present when organisms with a given genotype tend to find themselves more often in one type of environment than do organisms with another genotype. I will follow the usual 1
The correlation is standardized covariance.
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Lost in correlations? practice and illustrate the three kinds of G–E covariance with hypothetical and non-tendentious examples involving IQ. First, if parents with higher IQ give to their children both genes for higher IQ and an intellectually more stimulating environment at home, this is passive G–E correlation. It is called “passive” because neither the children’s behavior nor their genotype is a causal factor that could account for the correlation. Second, if other people react to children with genotypically higher IQ by, say, imposing on them more intellectually demanding conversations and otherwise challenging and stimulating their ability even further, this is reactive (or evocative) G–E correlation. Finally, active G–E correlation occurs when brighter children themselves seek and eventually select those experiences and environments that they find specially stimulating. Passive G–E correlation is not relevant for Jencks–Block–Sober argument, as they all acknowledge (Jencks 1980: 725; Block 1995: 118; Sober 2001: 73). In this case, the common cause of the children’s double (dis)advantage (genetic and environmental) is the parental genotype, which produces the environmental effect on children through the parental phenotype, and the genetic effect through meiosis and conception. So, the two (dis)advantages accrue to children in a way that is not mediated by their own genotype at all. One of the reasons why the critics of heritability exclude passive covariance from their consideration is that the presence of this kind of G–E covariance can be tested with traditional methods of behavior genetics (the adoption design), and there is consequently little temptation to treat this recognizably separate source of variance analytically as a component of heritability. (For a limitation of this test see Rutter & Silberg 2002: 472.) What about active and reactive G–E covariance? Well, behavior geneticists are indeed inclined to subsume some instances of the former under genetic variance. However, they are reluctant to do the same with the latter, particularly when it comes to those types of reactive covariance that would make the notion “heritability” misbehave conceptually in a way described by Jencks, Block, and Sober. (As explained above, the red-haired example is not a case of G–E correlation in the strict ANOVA sense, because in this case there is no separate, direct contribution to phenotypic variance from the genetic side, but I will ignore this subtlety here.) In the case of active G–E correlation, the environments that lead to a phenotypic difference are selected by subjects themselves, whereas in reactive correlation they are imposed by others. Under some circumstances this distinction may affect the way we decide to apportion causal 93
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responsibilities. Namely, the influences of those environments that are chosen on the basis of genotype are typically difficult to keep apart from the influence of genotype itself. In many instances the selection of these environmental influences can be plausibly regarded as just a way a genotype is expressed, and hence as “a more or less inevitable result of genotype” (Jinks & Fulker 1970: 323) or “merely an extension of the phenotype” (Eaves et al. 1977: 19). Therefore, phenotypic effects of such environments are indeed sometimes classified as heritable, on the grounds that they are practically inseparable from direct genetic effects and that they merely represent the self-realization of the genotype (Jensen 1969b: 39; Jinks & Fulker 1970: 323; Jensen 1973a: 54, 368; Jensen 1976a: 92–93; Rowe 1994: 90–92). In contrast, the key illustrations used by Jencks and others (red-haired children, sexual and racial discrimination) all involve reactive covariance in which environments are arbitrarily imposed from the outside. Now, the assertion that behavior genetics incorporates environmental influences into genetic variance in this sort of situation (imposed environments) surely cannot be justified by merely giving examples where behavior genetics does that in a different type of situation (in cases of active G–E correlation, i.e., selected environments). I have to forestall a possible misinterpretation here. I do not want to suggest that active and reactive covariance differ intrinsically from one another with respect to their causal status, whereby, as it were, active G–E covariance should as a matter of principle be always treated as a part of genetic variance, whereas reactive G–E covariance ought never be subsumed under it. Rather, my claim is that G–E covariance is in the first place a source of variance that is sui generis and, as such, distinct from either the genetic or the environmental component of phenotypic variance (because G–E covariance involves both genetic and environmental influences). However, in certain specific situations researchers may wish to include the G–E covariance in genetic variance, but when they do that, they are typically guided by commonsense notions about causal attributions, rather than going against them. Namely, in some cases of active G–E covariance, G leads to E, which in turn leads to P, and all this unfolds in such a way that the genotype–environment correlation strikes us as just a self-actualization (or natural manifestation) of the genotype. Consequently, some behavior geneticists do tend to interpret phenotypic differences arising in this manner as resulting from genetic differences (that is, as being heritable) simply because they think that in that type of situation the role of the environment degenerates into its being a mere 94
Lost in correlations? reflection of the genotype, or the way the genotype expresses itself: “To what extent could we ever get a dull person to select for himself an intellectually stimulating environment to the same extent as a bright person might?” (Jinks & Fulker 1970: 323). The red-haired children example is totally different. In the cases of such blatant discrimination and abuse it would obviously be impossible to use the “self-realization” argument to incorporate the ensuing phenotypic variation into genetic variance. Actually, I am unaware that any serious scholar ever defended the idea that the indirect effects of Jencks-type scenarios should be treated as heritable.2 On the contrary, a prominent behavior geneticist, a co-author of the first behavior genetics textbook, resolutely rejected the proposal, addressing this very issue head-on: In our human societies discriminatory practices are often based upon superficial physical characteristics or upon cultural stereotypes. In these instances a G–E correlation will result if, and only if, the criterion for discrimination is heritable in a genetic sense. If the criterion is a superficial physical trait (skin pigmentation, for example) it is of trivial behavioral interest. Any correlation between it and behavior is logically attributable to environmental influences. (Fuller 1979: 472 – italics added)
In the face of this explicit repudiation of the Jencksian construal of heritability by the leading authority in the field, the reader will surely wonder whether the critics actually offered any textual support for their “paradoxical” reading of that crucial concept of behavior genetics. As a matter of fact, there has been surprisingly little effort to document the charge with quotations from relevant sources. To make things worse, even in those few rare cases where the attempt has been made to provide evidence, a closer look into these “probative” texts always reveals that they were taken out of context and seriously misinterpreted. Here are some of these exegetical miscarriages.
2
True, Loehlin et al. (1975: 87–88), discussing a fictional example of discrimination on the basis of eye color, say that since there the phenotype can be predicted from a knowledge of genotype, “in that sense it is not entirely incorrect to speak of a high heritability of this trait.” However, the phrase “not entirely incorrect” clearly indicates that they do regard this way of speaking as misleading (it is incorrect but not entirely), and that they are uncomfortable with describing a phenotypic difference arising in this way as “heritable” or “genetic.” Indeed, they consistently put scare quotes around these expressions in that context. (A similar case is treated in the same way in Lilienfeld & Waldman 2000.)
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3.1.3 R. C. Roberts: the witness for the prosecution? Both Jencks and Block make much of the following quotation from R. C. Roberts: it matters not one whit whether the effects of the genes are mediated through the external environment or directly, through, say, the ribosomes. (Roberts 1967: 218)
On the face of it, the quoted sentence does seem to express the view that it makes absolutely no difference for behavior-genetic analysis how genes cause phenotypic differences, the only important thing being that they are the ultimate causes. While Jencks quotes just that statement in isolation, Block gives a fuller version, and ironically the context he thereby supplies clearly reveals that even Roberts did not think that anything ultimately caused by genes should be automatically treated as a genetic effect. Here is the fuller version: The genotype may influence the phenotype either by means of biochemical or other processes, labelled for convenience as “development,” or by means of influencing the animal’s choice of environment. But this second pathway, just as much as the first, is a genetic one; formally it matters not one whit whether the effects of the genes are mediated through the external environment or directly, through, say, the ribosomes (Roberts 1967: 218 – italics added).
Roberts considers here just two kinds of genetic influence on phenotype, the one internal to the organism and the other via the animal’s choice of environment. Apparently, the latter is not meant to include any indirect causation that starts with genotype and also involves environment, but only processes that involve genotype-selected environments (i.e., active G–E correlation). In other words, a more careful reading of Roberts’s statement shows that it is restricted in content and that it does not apply to the cases of imposed environments at all. Therefore, it cannot be used (as it is by Jencks and Block) to impute to behavior geneticists the counterintuitive interpretation of heritability, according to which even effects of blatant discrimination would be heritable.3 3
Block’s attempt to fortify that imputation with a quotation from Jensen (Jensen 1973a: 54) fails for the same reason. Again, it escapes Block’s attention that in the very passage he quotes, Jensen only says that what should be included in the genetic variance is that part of the G–E correlation that is “a result of the genotype’s selective utilization of
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Lost in correlations? In Roberts’s article there is another passage (not quoted by Jencks and Block) that might appear to corroborate their diagnosis: the environment is defined as that which affects the phenotype independently of the genotype. If an effect stems from the genes, it is genetic; any other effect is an environmental one. (Roberts 1967: 218)
Again, a closer look changes the picture. First, in this context Roberts again seems to have in mind active G–E correlation because he speaks about “habitat selection” and “the animal’s choice of environment.”4 Second, the whole paper is manifestly focused on research on animals where, for obvious reasons, the complex interactions characteristic for Jencks– Block scenarios (like the red-haired children example) do not come into play. Third, Roberts’s position is subtler than could be judged from that single quotation. A few pages later he issues an explicit warning that the possibility of unrecognized G–E covariance could lead to overestimation of heritability: “The overriding concern at this stage is to avoid environmental sources of covariance that would lead to the wrong answer by inflating the estimate of the heritability . . . There is no substitute for common sense in avoiding the pitfalls in this respect” (Roberts 1967: 234–235 – italics added). And fourth, Roberts is an ill-chosen example for representing methods of behavior genetics simply because, strictly speaking, he is not a behavior geneticist at all, but a quantitative geneticist who, as he himself says, was just asked on that occasion to “look over the wall into the field of behavior genetics.”
3.1.4 The concept of “environment”: broad and narrow Jencks’s criticism of behavior geneticists is basically that they have changed the ordinary meaning of “environment” (Jencks 1980: 726). Allegedly, they narrowed the connotation of the term so that it came to include only the environments that are not correlated with genotype. Jencks also claims that, as the consequent terminological ambiguity is not
4
the environment” (italics added). Clearly, Jensen had in mind the active, not reactive correlation. (Cf. Jensen 1976a: 92–93.) Later he explicitly argues that passive G–E correlation should be excluded from genetic variance (Roberts 1967: 234–235). He never discusses anything that we would now call “reactive covariance,” which actually represents the key issue for Jencks and Block.
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readily recognizable, heritability information will frequently appear more interesting than it actually is: Narrowing the definition (while retaining the term itself) is certain to mislead all but the most attentive and sophisticated readers. Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that narrowing the definition of a term that has traditionally had a very broad meaning is meant to mislead – that is, meant to make one’s results sound more significant than they really are. (Jencks 1980: 726)
One would expect such a sweeping and damning criticism to be documented with a long list of references illustrating this massive semantic shift in the nature–nurture debate. However, Jencks gives only one example where the redefinition of “environment” is openly defended. Rather surprisingly, the source in question is actually his own article from 1977 (co-authored with Marsha Brown). Needless to say, the fact that in that article Jencks indeed introduced the idiosyncratically narrow definition of “environment” doesn’t begin to show that the same conception has been widely shared by others or that it is endemic to the whole field. Moreover, the suggestion from that article that “environment” should be treated as a remainder term after genetic effects are directly estimated was explicitly rejected in a seminal paper on genotype–environment correlation and in a classic book on racial differences in intelligence: If some appreciable fraction of the variation of a trait is due to the covariation of genes and environments, that portion of the variance can be assigned neither to heredity nor to environment – it is attributable jointly to both. If one’s analytic method proceeds by estimating the genetic effect directly and the environmental effect by subtraction, the presence of GE correlation could lead to a substantial underestimation of the latter. (Loehlin & DeFries 1987: 264 – italics added) The added component of variance [due to G–E association] cannot logically be assigned to either genes or the environment: it is a result of the association of their separate effects. (Loehlin et al. 1975: 78)
Although Block (1995) cites the paper by Loehlin and DeFries, he seems to be unaware of their unequivocal refusal to subsume G–E correlation under genetic variance, which directly contradicts his allegation that in behavior genetics, “if there is a genetic difference in the causal chains that lead to different characteristics, the difference counts as genetically caused even if the environmental differences are just as important.” 98
Lost in correlations? That the methods of behavior genetics are not as crude as painted by Block is further confirmed in an article from a book that also happens to be in his list of references: “The issues of genotype–environment correlation and interaction are complex – not nearly as simple as saying that their effects are incorporated wholly in estimates of genetic variance” (Plomin 1987: 43 – italics added). 3.1.5 Does twin research necessarily underestimate environmental influences? Here is how Block and Dworkin try to justify the claim that methods of behavior genetics necessarily generate counter-intuitive causal attributions in that they would count as heritable even those effects that we would usually classify as environmentally caused: To see how methods of estimating heritability automatically attribute to genes the effect of variance jointly caused by genes and environment, consider how this phenomenon [an imagined example of all red-haired children being given a near-starvation diet] would affect a study of one-egg twins reared apart. A pair of red-haired twins both will be ill-nourished in their respective adoptive homes, while a pair of blonde twins will both be adequately nourished. Thus the pervasive discrimination will contribute to the correlation between the twins’ heights, and thus contribute to the assessed heritability of height in the population. (Block & Dworkin 1976b: 481)
This is a serious distortion of the way twin studies are used to estimate heritability. Yes, the similarity of monozygotic twins reared apart (MZA) is indeed taken to be a direct measure of heritability, but only on the assumption that relevant environments of these twins are uncorrelated. If this assumption is not satisfied or if there is some suspicion that it is not, no one would be so foolish as to continue using MZA phenotypic similarity to infer heritability. On the contrary, as has routinely been emphasized in the literature, the inference is considered legitimate only if there are no common environmental influences that could explain the concordance between the MZA twins. The same applies to the method that compares MZ and DZ (dizygotic) twins. Already in the first book on behavior genetics (“the field-defining book,” according to Plomin 1987: 110), it is clearly explained that Holzinger’s formula5 for calculating heritability 5
h2 = (rmz − rdz )/(1 − rdz ). Here, rmz and rdz are phenotypic correlations between monozygotic and dizygotic twins, respectively.
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depends on the assumption that “MZ and DZ pairs are treated nearly enough alike so that environmental differences between cotwins are equal for both types” (Fuller & Thompson 1960: 113; see also McClearn 1963: 196; DeFries 1967: 328–329; Jensen 1969b: 51–52; Fulker 1974: 94– 95). This requirement has actually become an indispensable part of the twin research design and is known as “the equal environments assumption” (e.g., Plomin et al. 1976; Rowe 1983; Plomin 1987: 43; Rowe 1993; McGuffin & Martin 1999; Plomin et al. 2001: 80–82). All this shows that phenotypic similarity of MZA twins is by no means “automatically” counted as a measure of heritability. Also, there is nothing that should put the correctly interpreted methods of estimating heritability “in violent conflict with our ordinary socially important ideas of causation” (Block 1995: 116). For, if MZA twins have no more similar environments than pairs of randomly chosen individuals, this is indeed usually treated as a good reason to think that the degree of observed similarity between them correctly reflects heritability. Why would common sense be offended by that? If, on the other hand, MZA twins happen to have more similar environments than others, common sense would advise against deriving any conclusion about heritability because then the twins’ phenotypic similarity might be the result of that greater similarity of environmental influences. And behavior geneticists would wholeheartedly agree. As an analogy, consider the following “method” for recognizing murderers: if someone is convicted of murder in a court of law, conclude that the person is a murderer. This is a perfectly reasonable rule of inference. It would be ridiculous to criticize it as being “violently in conflict with common sense” on the grounds that, allegedly, the application of this rule would force us to regard someone as a murderer even if, for example, the trial judge was bribed to convict him. Of course, no such consequence follows. Our use of that rule in any particular case is based on the assumption that the procedure was fair, and that, among other things, the judge was not bribed. Clearly, this assumption can always turn out to be false, but the point is precisely that if we know (or suspect) that it is false, we would never apply that rule. It is the same with heritability. Take a method for estimating heritability, very roughly described as follows: if there is a strong correlation between MZA twins with respect to a given trait, conclude that the heritability of that trait is high. This method obviously makes sense only as long as we have reason to believe that there are no strong confounding influences of non-genetic factors (like the increased similarity of MZA 100
Lost in correlations? twins’ trait-relevant environments). As soon as we start to have doubts about this, the inference breaks down and we realize that knowledge about heritability cannot be obtained with that method. Briefly, if the crucial assumption is compromised and there is significant G–E correlation (as in the case of red-haired twins) the result is not, as Jencks and Block argue, that the method delivers a heritability estimate with a counterintuitive causal attribution. No, the result is that if the assumption is false, this particular method just becomes inapplicable: the MZA’s phenotypic correlation simply ceases to be a straightforward measure of heritability. But what about the assumption itself? Can we ever make reasonably sure that G–E correlation is absent? Jencks and Block (and many others as well) argue that we cannot. Note that this is a completely different argument from the one discussed until now. It addresses empirical matters, and leaves semantic and definitional issues behind. This argument will be discussed in section 3.2.
3.1.6 What Falconer did not say Elliott Sober also thinks that the semantics of heritability conflicts with common sense: Quantitative geneticists differ from the rest of us in the way they tend to use the term “environment,” and this difference in usage will probably persist. This means that when quantitative geneticists say that the variation in some phenotype has a genetic component, the rest of us must be very careful. (Sober 2001: 75; cf. Sober 2000: 366)
In discussing the example with the abuse of redheads, he warns that geneticists are forced to describe that kind of situation in a bizarre way, and that they have to interpret the lowering of IQ, counter-intuitively, as a genetic effect: “Quantitative geneticists do not regard abuse as an environmental factor . . . The lower IQ of redheads . . . is said to be genetic, rather than environmental, on the grounds that individuals experience abuse because of their genes” (Sober 2001: 73). He refers at this point to Falconer’s Introduction to Quantitative Genetics, directly in the context of the redheads example, which might be read as suggesting that Falconer both discussed that very example and claimed that in such cases the result of the abuse should be regarded as a genetic effect. But in fact Falconer did not address that kind of issue at all. His treatment of G–E correlation is very general and superficial (and is limited to just one paragraph). 101
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The only two examples of G–E correlation that he mentions deal with cows’ milk yield (where cows are fed according to their yield, the better phenotypes being given more food) and with human intelligence (where genotypically mediated phenotypes of the parents affect the environment in which the children grow up). In the latter case, Falconer explicitly refuses to count an individual’s environment as a part of its genotype, “because the environmental effects on the children are not a consequence of their own genotype, but of their parents’ genotype” (that is, because it is passive G–E correlation). In the former case (with cows), which in our taxonomy would correspond to reactive G–E correlation, he does include the environmental effect in genetic variance, but only under the assumption that the G–E correlation is “in practice unknown.” So, there is no suggestion, even here, that the effects of those environments known to be ultimately but just superficially associated with a given genotype should be imperatively attributed to that genotype (as Jencks, Block, and Sober would have it). Most importantly, although in the context of a selective breeding of cattle it might perhaps be all right to regard all consequences that ultimately originate from genetic differences as genetic effects (because the purpose here is to make the genotypic superiority manifest itself as much as possible), it by no means follows that the same causal analysis would be acceptable in incomparably more complex situations involving people’s behavior and intricate social interactions. Certainly, nothing Falconer says warrants the belief that he would endorse such an extrapolation. Besides, Falconer seems to be the wrong source for this discussion. To know how researchers would describe the redheads example and similar cases, it doesn’t seem appropriate to refer to a standard introduction to quantitative genetics, which will necessarily be too general and too coarse-grained to be a useful guide for situations of that level of social complexity. Rather, one is much better advised to look into those (numerous) publications in behavior genetics that try to deal precisely with such tangled mixtures of genetic and social influences. My search of this literature has uncovered no evidence that would corroborate the “paradoxical” reading of heritability advocated by many critics of behavior genetics. In fact, just the opposite is true. In a paper that addresses the very issue of estimating heritability in the presence of G–E correlation, it is claimed that under these conditions “the concept of heritability may not be informative or relevant” (Emigh 1977: 514), that it becomes “uncertain how to interpret the partition[ing] of variance” (508), and that what is a reasonable measure of heritability in those cases where G–E correlation is 102
Lost in correlations? small or non-existent “must not be applied blindly to all situations” (509 – italics added). So, the flaw that the critics attributed to the concept of heritability was of their own making. They first applied the notion to the situations outside of its proper range (against the explicit warning in the literature not to do this), and then they concluded that the concept was somehow defective or intrinsically confusing. 3.1.7 No “violent conflict” with common sense What then about this disciplinary revision of the concepts “environment” and “heritable” hypothesized by Jencks, Block, Sober,6 and others? Have these words really undergone a momentous change of meaning in behavior genetics, whereby “environment” so shrank in content that it started to exclude many bona fide environmental effects, while “heritability” correspondingly expanded to the point of getting, as Block would put it, violently in conflict with our ordinary socially important ideas of causation (Block 1995: 116)? I think that this whole story is a myth. It is, for example, clearly belied by the terminological practice in that large and notorious segment of the heredity–environment controversy, the race and IQ issue. In this debate, literally no one would say that explaining the black–white IQ gap by appeal to discrimination would show that the difference is heritable, although this is exactly how the situation should be described by using the “narrow definition” of environment. On that definition, if discrimination is correlated with a genetically mediated difference of skin color, its effects should not be regarded as an environmental influence (analogously to the red-haired children example). But no one is tempted to use the narrow definition here, and for a very good reason. Labeling the IQ gap resulting from discrimination as heritable would defeat the purpose of the term. It would make the IQ difference between the races heritable by definition, and then one would have to invent a new concept (“really heritable”?) to discuss the central question whether genes are explanatorily involved in a stronger and more interesting way than by just giving rise to a superficial characteristic which in turn becomes a target of discriminatory practices. Besides, contrary to what Jencks and others assert, there is no reason why the notion “heritability” should be extended to cover such cases. 6
Jencks speaks about “redefinition,” and Block and Sober about “tacit convention” and “convention.”
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True, there is a tendency to take some part of the variance due to G–E correlation and divide it between genes and environments. Thus active G–E covariance is occasionally subsumed under genetic variance, and passive covariance is assigned to the environmental side of the equation. However, it is important to stress that this redistribution is not a necessary consequence of some esoteric methodology for calculating heritability. Rather, it is a practical decision primarily guided by an attempt to follow the commonsense way of apportioning causal responsibility. If there happens to be any doubt about how to classify G–E correlation, the regular fallback position is just to treat it as a distinct component of variance, separate from heritability and environmentality. But even in those cases where a researcher opts for subsuming it under one of the two main effects, this is always just a pragmatic decision. There is no “correct” answer that is dictated, as it were, by the logic of heritability (cf. Jensen 1969b: 39; Jensen 1981a: 121). To see that the way of causal attribution in behavior genetics is not really anomalous or aberrant, look at one of the many examples where common sense would treat indirect causation in basically the same manner. Suppose that in a certain region a positive correlation is observed between rainy weather and the number of injured drivers. Consider the following two possible explanations of that correlation: (1) rain makes roads slippery, and this leads to injuries; and (2) there is a crazy gang of psychopaths who go out during rain to drop bricks on cars from highway bridges, and this leads to injuries. In (1) – which corresponds to the effects of self-selected environments – it seems perfectly natural to say that rain causes injuries, essentially because rain is regarded as almost inseparable from roads becoming slippery, which in turn is an immediate cause of injuries (rain → slippery roads → injuries). However, in (2) – which corresponds to the effects of imposed environments – it sounds wrong to say that rain causes injuries, although here, again, rain is an indirect cause of the greater number of injuries (rain → psychopaths with bricks → injuries). Why? I submit that one reason is that now rain has only a tenuous link with the mediating cause, and consequently the mediating cause gains in independence, salience, and explanatory importance. As a result, rain can no longer account for the effect on its own, i.e., without mentioning the middle link. Put differently, we would not regard the bricks falling from the bridges as a “natural” manifestation of rain. Another contrast to (1), and an additional similarity to the “imposed environments” scenario, is that in (2), the issue of blame is involved, and 104
Lost in correlations? in such cases we usually want to focus on the human action responsible for the final outcome, and not just on the antecedent conditions of that