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Mad Travelers : Reflections On the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses Hacking, Ian. University of Virginia Press 0813918235 9780813918235 9780585120942 English Fugue (Psychology)--Case studies, Tissié, Philippe,--1852-1925, Social psychiatry, Niche (Ecology) 1998 RC553.F83H33 1998eb 616.85/232 Fugue (Psychology)--Case studies, Tissié, Philippe,--1852-1925, Social psychiatry, Niche (Ecology)
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Mad Travelers Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses
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Page - Barbour Lectures for 1997
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Mad Travelers Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses Ian Hacking UNIVERSITY PRESS OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE AND LONDON
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THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF VIRGINIA © 1998 by the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First published 1998 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hacking, Ian. Mad travelers: reflections on the reality of transient mental illnesses/Ian Hacking. p. cm. "Page-Barbour lectures for 1997" CIP t.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8139-1823-5 (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Fugue (Psychology) Case studies. 2. Tissié, Philippe. 1852-1925. 3. Social psychiatry. 4. Niche (Ecology) I. Title. RC553.F83H33 1998 98-20894 616.85'232 dc21 CIP Frontispiece: Dr. Phillipe Tissié hypnotizing Albert in the presence of Professor Azam. From Foveau de Courmelles (1890).
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For Chloe
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Contents Acknowledgments
ix
Introduction
1
1 The First Fugueur
7
2 Hysteria or Epilepsy?
31
3 Niches
51
4 Five Questions, Five Answers
80
Supplements 1 What Ailed Albert?
103
2 The Wandering Jew
113
3 Wandertrieb in Germany
125
Documents 1 Albert's Tale (1872 May 1886)
135
2 Albert Observed (June 1886 February 1887)
149
3 Dreams (May 1887 September 1889)
165
4 A Pathogenic Dream (1892)
185
5 Experiments (1888, 1893)
187
6 Epilogue (1907)
192
Notes
195
Bibliography
223
Index
235
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Illustrations Dr. Phillipe Tissié hypnotizing Albert in the presence of Professor Azam Frontispiece Fig. 1. Four photographs of Albert in different states
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Fig. 2. Two photographs of Albert, awake and hypnotized 161 Map 1. Albert's longest journeys
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Map 2. The Bordeaux region
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Acknowledgments I have to thank the Hannah Foundation for the History of Medicine for a grant that supported André LeBlanc's research in Bordeaux, and which covered incidental expenses. We received help from many individuals in Bordeaux itself. Mme Avisseau and Mme Prax, Sous-directrices of the Archives Départmentales de la Gironde, and Olivier Renou, the archivist who helped locate, among other things, the birth certificate of our key patient. M. Savoyac and Dr. Daniel Roy, who helped clear some research paths. Three journalists from Sud-Ouest, the principal Bordeaux newspaper: Michèle "Mimi" Sporny, Anne-Céline Auché, and especially Dominique Richard who wrote up our research for a long article which, in turn, paved the way to more contacts. M. Michel Rateau, historiangenealogist-heraldist. Cristophe Dabitche and Mark Eagersall, whose cheerful ambivalence toward their city gave me a better sense of it. The helpful librarians at the Bibliothèque de Médecine et de Pharmacie, Université de Bordeaux, and the Bibliothèque Municipale de Bordeaux. I also thank Alexander Furrer for his help obtaining materials in the Zentralbibliothek, Zürich. I discussed some of these topics at a seminar in the University of Toronto and in the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zürich, and in talks at McGill University, the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of British Columbia, Memorial University, Newfoundland, and the University of Calgary. Two early accounts of this work have appeared, one in History of Psychiatry 7 (1996): 425-49 and the other, a talk at the Whitney Humanities Center, Yale University, in Modernism/Modernity 3, 2 (1996): 31-43. It was, however, the Page-Barbour Lecture Committee at the University of Virginia, under the leadership of Allan Megill, who provided the incentive to bring all this material together and a wonderful audience to criticize it. These lectures were given in February 1997. The fourth lecture is a
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rational reconstruction of the answers I tried to give in Virginia, and which I presented, in March in a more organized form to an audience that had not asked the questions but was generous with more as a MillerCom lecture at the University of Illinois, organized by Andrew Pickering. I am grateful to André Gombay for help in proofreading French and to Vincent Gullin, who located the 1907 newspaper story that completes my epilogue. Thanks again to everyone, but especially to André LeBlanc.
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Introduction These lectures tell about a forgotten epidemic of insanity inaugurated by a mad gas fitter and his doctor, an energetic pioneer in physical education. I intend this story to speak for itself, both as fact and as a parable about mental illness and psychiatry. The strange events that I describe prompt some reflections on transient mental illnesses. Readers who are more keen on theory than adventures may want some advance notice of the use that I make of the story. By a ''transient mental illness" I mean an illness that appears at a time, in a place, and later fades away. It may spread from place to place and reappear from time to time. It may be selective for social class or gender, preferring poor women or rich men. I do not mean that it comes and goes in this or that patient, but that this type of madness exists only at certain times and places. The most famous candidate for a transient mental illness is hysteria, or at any rate its florid French manifestations toward the end of the nineteenth century. Cynics would offer multiple personality today as another transient mental illness and go on to compose a list of other disorders that will prove transient chronic fatigue syndrome, anorexia, intermittent explosive disorder, or whatever they choose to criticize. Transient mental illnesses provoke banal debates about whether they are "real" or "socially constructed." We need richer tools with which to think than reality or social construction. My theoretical ambitions in these lectures were modest. I did not want to understand reality. I wanted to provide a framework in which to understand the very possibility of transient mental illnesses. The most important contribution here is the metaphor of an ecological niche within which mental illnesses thrive. Such niches require a number of vectors. I emphasize four. One, inevitably, is medical. The illness should
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fit into a larger framework of diagnosis, a taxonomy of illness. The most interesting vector is cultural polarity: the illness should be situated between two elements of contemporary culture, one romantic and virtuous, the other vicious and tending to crime. What counts as crime or as virtue is itself a characteristic of the larger society, and the virtues are not fixed for all time: prudence, a virtue for the Protestant bourgeoisie of early modern Europe, had been mere weakness in the feudal era. Then we need a vector of observability, that the disorder should be visible as disorder, as suffering, as something to escape. Finally something more familiar: the illness, despite the pain it produces, should also provide some release that is not available elsewhere in the culture in which it thrives. The lectures are rich in historical anecdote and curious details. But they are not mere stories. They lay out, by an example, the power of the concept of an ecological niche for a transient mental illness. I take for granted that a mental illness something that counts as madness within a society requires both victims and experts. We call these patients and clinicians, but in Lecture 3 I give an example from Greek myths where we have madness, the afflicted, and the experts, though we hesitate to speak of patients and clinicians in any modern sense. The idea of madness is more cross-cultural than the categories of late twentieth-century medicine. Since both victims and experts play such an important part, Lecture 1 tells a great deal about the first victim and the first doctor in an epidemic of mad travelers that broke out in 1887. The book comes in several parts. There are four Lectures. The first three tell a detailed story, and the fourth discusses matters arising: it reflects on the reality of transient mental illnesses. One cannot, in a set of lectures, include all the rather astonishing historical asides that arise in a true story. Many incidents are relegated to the Notes. They do give references, of course, but they are an integral part of the Lectures, providing a reservoir of information and anecdote that confirms, for me, the simpler statements in the Lectures themselves. There were also some odds and ends. Three Supplements examine other matters arising. Finally there are some translated Documents relating to my star patient and his doctor. Some readers will begin with the Documents, others with the Lectures. It would be by no means foolish to begin with the Notes. Soon after giving the lectures, I found myself rebelling at a curious
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strand in the intellectual life of our times. There is a macabre fascination with the relationship between long-dead lunatics and their long-dead doctors, a fascination that blurs fact and fiction. Pat Barker's trilogy Regeneration, The Eye in the Door, and The Ghost Road won the Booker Prize for the third volume, although the first is the best. Its focus is the interaction between William Rivers, anthropologist and doctor of shell shock, and the poet Siegfried Sassoon; many another doctor (Henry Head) and writer (Wilfred Owen, Robert Graves) get cameo parts, although the star patient is, I think, fictional. Margaret Atwood's Alias Grace is about the relationship between a mad servant girl who co-murdered her bosses a century and a half ago and the young doctor who goes to study her in the asylum to which she has been consigned. The young woman is historical, and so are the Ontario institutions and doctors, although here it is the star doctor who appears to be fictional. These are novels. They deploy the past using recent psychiatric obsessions. Throughout Barker's books post-traumatic stress disorder does the work, though we get some multiple personality in the third volume. In Atwood multiple personality is a permanent question mark; did Grace do the killings in a second personality, or was that personality fabricated not by the good young New England doctor who speaks with her every day but by Jeremiah the peddler who is playing the role of a psychic investigator by the time the quasi-denouement occurs? There is much more fiction, most of it quite tiresome, in which the dead lunatic and the doctor go about their business, but I have just mentioned the very best of novels from 1995 and 1996. Equally striking is the writing of cultural history that parallels Barker and Atwood. None is more notable than the work that has Daniel Paul Schreber as star patient and Paul Emil Flechsig as star doctor, with Sigmund Freud as star kibitzer. Schreber, appointed as president or chief justice of the Saxon Supreme Court, was a paranoid schizophrenic who wrote memoirs of himself in an insane asylum. Elias Canetti's Crowds and Power (1978) used these writings to make an amazing comparison between the private madness of Schreber and the public madness of Hitler. Both, Canetti thought, were driven by an insane sense of the potential of power. Canetti was theoretical. More recently there has been so much detailed examination of the life and times of Schreber that I am inclined to say that we know "everything" about him, especially thanks
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to the passionate research of William Niederland, The Schreber Case: Psychoanalytic Profile of a Paranoid Personality (1984), and Zvi Lothane, In Defense of Schreber: Soul Murder and Psychiatry (1992). Thanks to plenteous photographs obtained by Lothane, we even know what everyone in the Schreber story looked like. Louis Sass, in The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind (1995), has used Schreber to understand schizophrenia from within, to see the schizophrenic as solipsist, and thereby to comprehend Wittgenstein's battle with solipsism, if not with schizophrenia itself. And let us not forget that Thomas Bernhard's one-sentence novella, Wittgenstein's Nephew, was a tour de force using just the themes that Sass took up. Bernhard, superb artist, was not quite writing about our Ludwig Wittgenstein, and certainly not about Schreber, but there in the book is the solipsist in the garden of the Viennese asylum, Wittgenstein's nephew, looking at the sun. Sass took Schreber inward. Eric Santner's My Own Private Germany: Daniel Paul Schreber's Secret History of Modernity (1996) goes so far inside that it uncovers, in the mad mind of Schreber, the modern world and the makings of the German disaster. I read most of these works after lecturing about a bicycling physician and his patient, a demented gas fitter who obsessively and uncontrollably takes off for days or months or years, often walking 40 miles a day, losing his papers, his identity, but not his demand to go, go, go. So I found this obsession with mad individuals and their doctors quite unnerving. What kind of understanding do we strive for, in the fact and fiction of madness? What type of escape is this, in which we pretend to understand our world in terms of dead lunatics and their equally dead and possibly equally mad doctors? I even saw a dreadful symmetry. Barker, in fiction, doing the truly famous doctor and patient; Atwood, in fiction, doing the truly obscure doctor and patient. Canetti through Santner writing fact, not fiction, about the now famous patient Schreber and his doctors, in order to tell a story about the whole of the modern world, plus Hitler and Wittgenstein. And I, in miniature, doing a factual account of a truly obscure patient and equally obscure doctor. The symmetry, of course, is that the Canadian authors, whether in fiction or in fact, prefer to write about obscure provincials. But what are we all doing? Are we engaged in more than voyeurism? It was only when I turned back to read some new histories of psychiatry, or of branches of that discipline, that I could put my discomfort aside. For
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the histories of medicine to which by chance I turned had so little to say about the patients, the real people. We desperately need the great narrative scope of the old French case histories, even of Freud himself, to get a glimpse of how our fellow men and women break up, in a time and at a place. The novelists give us the sense of the time and the place in which madness is both intelligible and yet insane. That too is done by the historical work of Lothane and Niederland and the larger placings, albeit with agendas, of Sass or Santner. According to Karl Jaspers, Schreber's written-down thoughts were absolutely impermeable, unintelligible, the perfect exemplar of how madness cannot be accessed. But by now they are, in a way, all too intelligible. They are invested not with too few meanings but too many. That is a real danger, to forget we are talking about the mad judge Schreber, who, even after he got better and went home, then got worse and died in an asylum. We can get so close, and so inside, that we lose just as much touch with the patient as do those historians of psychiatry. The novelists provide a better model, for they give us suffering and comedy and avoid profundity. One reader of my story wanted more history of the politics of psychiatry, for example, and how it fitted into nineteenth-century French politics. Instead I added more about buildings, more about the sense of being in provincial, closed-in Bordeaux, where Albert went mad. I am no novelist, but I hope to have invited the reader into the mean dark streets of a town that suffocates under its own pride or into the spacious cloister of the hospital where my compulsive walker found a safe place. I talk more about my doctor's enthusiasm for cycling than the latest news from Paris. I came to realize that I was less a voyeur than a companion, and that this was the right experience with which to frame the theoretical questions and concepts which, at another level, are the topic of these lectures.
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1 The First Fugueur It all began "one morning last July when we noticed a young man of twenty-six crying in his bed in Dr. Pitres's ward. He had just come from a long journey on foot and was exhausted, but that was not the cause of his tears. He wept because he could not prevent himself from departing on a trip when the need took him; he deserted family, work, and daily life to walk as fast as he could, straight ahead, sometimes doing 70 kilometers a day on foot, until in the end he would be arrested for vagrancy and thrown in prison." 1 Thus begins our story in a ward in the ancient Bordeaux hospital of Saint-André.2 The young man's name was Albert; he was an occasional employee of the local gas company, and the first fugueur. He became notorious for his extraordinary expeditions to Algeria, Moscow, Constantinople. He traveled obsessively, bewitched, often without identity papers and sometimes without identity, not knowing who he was or why he travelled, and knowing only where he was going next. When he "came to" he had little recollection of where he had been, but under hypnosis he would recall lost weekends or lost years. Medical reports of Albert set off a small epidemic of compulsive mad voyagers whose epicenter was Bordeaux, but which soon spread to Paris, all
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France, Italy, and, later, Germany and Russia. Fugue became a medical disorder in its own right, with earthy labels like Wandertrieb and suitably Latinate or Greek-sounding ones such as automatisme ambulatoire, determinismo ambulatorio, dromomania, and poriomanie. Fugues, that is to say strange and unexpected trips, often in states of obscured consciousness, have been known forever, but only in 1887, with the publication of a thesis for the degree of doctor of medicine, did mad travel become a specific, diagnosable type of insanity. Albert's strange tale is one of picaresque adventure and bitter pathos, but why tell it now? Because we are besieged by mental illnesses, more neurotic than psychotic, and we wonder which of them are affectations, cultural artifacts, clinician-enhanced, or copycat syndromes, and which ones are, as we briefly and obscurely put it, real. We are profoundly confused about an entire group of mental disorders, feeling that their symptoms are both nurtured and natural, both moral and neurological. Is PMS, premenstrual syndrome, a disorder or something that a predominantly male profession of psychiatrists has written into its nosology to deal with irritable and irritating female patients? Fidgety children have been with us forever; then came hyperactivity; next, attention deficit; at present attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, for which the steroid Ritalin is prescribed. Is that a real mental disorder? Or is it an artifact of psychiatry demanded by a culture that wants to medicalize every annoyance that troubles parents, teachers, bus drivers, and all the other powers that be? Anorexia and bulimia cause immense distress to patients and their families. The suffering is manifest, but are we talking about behavior that is produced by stereotypes of female beauty, combined with a way of rebelling against parents, or are we talking about a "real mental disorder"? Is multiple personality disorder, now named dissociative identity disorder, "a true psychiatric entity and a true disorder" afflicting perhaps 5 percent of college students and also 5 percent of admissions to any acute care adult psychiatric in-patient unit? 3 Or is it a a self-indulgent way to express genuine and profound unease that has been cultivated by clinicians and the media, but which has no medical content at all? Are we to take seriously antisocial personality disorder or intermittent explosive disorder, blaming a good deal of violent crime on these psychiatric entities? Or are we to see these as part of the apparatus of forensics by which
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justice and medicine conspire to define and control the criminal element, all the while burying systemic poverty as a critical ingredient in crime? It is not only what used to be called neuroses whose reality is called in question. Schizophrenia, or rather "the group of schizophrenias," was first named in Switzerland in the first decade of the twentieth century. It was long a popular diagnosis. Yet it has been withering away. Not only have the symptoms been ameliorated by several generations of psychotropic drugs, but the proportion of actual diagnoses has declined markedly in a large number of medical jurisdictions. Most psychiatrists who try to help schizophrenics speak of it as a dreadful disorder that strikes young adults (among others) and destroys not only the patients but their families and friends. Yet it has been repeatedly argued that there is no such entity, that it is a "scientific delusion." 4 Symptoms aplenty, yes, but different congeries of symptoms in different decades of this century, with no determinate medical entity from which they emanate. I happen not to be a skeptic about schizophrenia. My focus in these lectures is not on psychoses but on those disorders that were once called neuroses. That group of medical entities may be about to explode. The New York Times Tuesday "Science Times" of 4 February 1997 bore the headline, "Quirks, Oddities May Be Illnesses." The occasion was a new book, Shadow Syndromes, featuring subclinical autism, depression, and the like.5 People exhibit shadow syndromes when they satisfy part of a checklist for a disorder but not enough to diagnose that disorder; on the other hand, there is ''clinically significant distress or dysfunction." Such proposals do not come from a lone psychiatrist and his coauthor. Plenty of support for the new diagnoses is cited by the newspaper, which includes favorable comments by, among others, Robert Spitzer, who directed the teams that produced the successive official diagnostic manuals of the American Psychiatric Association the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, DSM III (1980), DSM III-R (1987), and DSM IV (1994). A new form of the reality question arises. Many people are, to use some of the popular adjectives mentioned by the Times, "weird," "odd ducks," and "nerdy." Some of us were uncoordinated in sports as children and were, or are, not very good at making new friends. Are we suffering from an illness (a real illness!), in this case subclinical autism? With multiple personality, some skeptics urge that unhappy people have evolved symptoms in concert
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with their doctors and the media. With shadow syndromes, there is no question (yet) of doctors or media cultivating loners and ball-fumblers; that behavior is real enough, as we inveterate lonesome ball-fumblers know to our cost, but are we to be conceptualized as ill? Above all, are we to be treated as ill by the experts, with their array of medications, therapy, and bills? I do not predict a quick answer to that question. Passions run high about old questions and will run high about new ones. Ideologies are intense. In play are feminism, Marxism, and scientism; psychiatry and antipsychiatry. Lobbying is vigorous, whether in the committees that settle the approved entries for official diagnostic manuals or in groups of patients and their families that try to take some control over their problems. Lurking behind these activities, sometimes sedate, sometimes frenzied, is a nagging question. What counts as evidence that a psychiatric disorder is legitimate, natural, real, an entity in its own right? Ludwig Wittgenstein said that in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. 6 We have more than that for the mental illnesses. We have the clinical methods of medicine, psychiatry, psychology; we have the innumerable variants of and deviations from psychoanalysis; we have systems of self-help, group help, and counselors including priests and gurus; we have the statistical methods of epidemiology and population genetics; we have the experimental methods of biochemistry, neurology, pathology, and molecular biology; we have the theoretical modeling of cognitive science; and we have conceptual confusion. Perhaps all our problems will be erased when we have enough objective scientific knowledge. I have another view. We do have a limitless reservoir of ignorance, but we also have conceptual confusions that new knowledge seldom helps relieve. There are a number of reasons for this, but I am especially impressed by the way that scientific knowledge about ourselves the mere belief system changes how we think of ourselves, the possibilities that are open to us, the kinds of people that we take ourselves and our fellows to be. Knowledge interacts with us and with a larger body of practice and ordinary life. This generates socially permissible combinations of symptoms and disease entities. We often express our malaise about this phenomenon, which we do not correctly identify, by asking whether certain disorders or their manifestations are real. The first chapter of my recent book about multiple personality was
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titled "Is It Real?" "I am not going to answer that question," I wrote; "I hope that no one who reads this book will end up wanting to ask exactly that question." 7 Vain hope! Time and again people have taken me aside and quietly asked what I actually believe: Is multiple personality real or not? There is, to be sure, a special skepticism about multiples. My interrogators tend to hope that I will side with the angels (or rather, whichever side they believe the angels to be on). They hope I will say that there definitely is such an illness, whose symptoms I describe with great precision and with such a depth of sympathy. Or they hope that I will say that there is no such illness, that the phenomena I describe so ironically are part of a "social construction." Or the disorder is "iatrogenic" caused by doctors or, ingeniously, "doxogenic" caused by a belief system cultivated by therapists and the media.8 People are not going to stop using the word real or its co-workers such as true in connection with controversial mental problems. Reasons for this range from finance to responsibility, from semantic theory to scientific metaphysics. Health insurance should pay only for real mental illnesses, right? Responsibility is the crux. We have a profoundly moral attitude to disease. If something is a real disease, you are not responsible for it or are responsible only insofar as you engaged in vice that brought on the disease. Sex, drink, and idleness are typical vices. But if you need costly hip-replacement surgery because you continued playing boyhood games such as basketball into middle age, you are not blamed or held responsible; this is because in our world continued youthful activity is a virtue. In the case of mental illness, responsibility may be diminished or removed altogether if the illness is a real one. And the names for real illnesses have objective, individuated referents; scientific metaphysics and popular science alike demand that the referent is biochemical, neurological, organic, something localized in the body that could in principle be isolated in the laboratory. But these are matters for Lecture 4. Analytic philosophers like myself are trained to make distinctions and clarify ideas. We like to think that this helps to remove confusion. I believe that most important conceptual difficulties are rather unyielding. This is because they result from some fundamental incoherence in the underlying organization of our ideas ideas that we will not give up partly because they are essential to the ways in which we do think. Reality and responsibility like reference, science, and the body are
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rather grand examples of organizing concepts. No amount of analysis makes deep confusion evaporate; no amount of heated debate boils it off. But there are things we can do. One is to examine in some detail a manageable example in which many of the ingredients of the confusion are plainly on view. Enter Albert. Enter the fugue epidemic of the 1890s. It is elegantly constrained. We know exactly where and when the diagnosis of fugue begins, and we can watch it peter out. Here we have one diagnosis that is extinct and yet, in certain respects, curiously up-to-date. It resembles recent epidemics in that it is important only at a time, in a locale, it has a vogue, spreads, decays, and the world passes on to next year's affliction. I ought to say that my example is not entirely antiquarian. Dissociative fugue is a diagnosis in the handbooks of the 1990s, in the manuals of both the American Psychiatric Association and of the World Health Organization. 9 Even there hangs a tale, for especially in America fugue is a grandfathered diagnosis. That is to say, it is kept on the books partly because it has been on the books, and also for certain reasons of political rhetoric that I mention in Lecture 4. The diagnosis is never or almost never made and yet is listed as a possible diagnosis as if it were a bit like measles, and very much like depersonalization disorder, which you can just "have." After I have told you enough about cases of fugue, you will begin to feel torn. Yes, you will be inclined to say, these people did suffer from a "true psychiatric disorder" (perhaps more than one). The doctors of the day used a diagnosis that did fit their cases; fugue was a viable entity. Yet at the same time the phenomenon is steeped in the social circumstances of the day. We are tempted to say that whatever ailed these patients (and they were ailing!), the manifestations, the marks of their illness, were entirely socially conditioned. Here, then, is my method: I tell you a true story about a disorder of which you have never heard. It is a sufficiently gripping story that you will attend to it and take in its salient features very quickly. Yet you will realize that this more or less "dead" disorder is a vignette of a type of problem that vexes us today. Why take an old case rather than a present one? Because partisan reactions will not arise immediately; when they begin to surface, you may reflect on why they do appear for so dusty and obscure a chain of events long ago, about which we ought to be indifferent. Fugue is a happy choice because it is just plain interesting in its own right fascinating to me, and I hope to you, in part because travel has
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become so integral a part of the learned world. Throughout this century the Page-Barbour Lectures have invited travelers from afar to tell Virginians, if not of wonders, at least of "some fresh aspect or aspects of the department of thought," as the deed of trust puts it. Each person in the audience takes for granted that a vacation may, and often will, involve a trip. Albert's own trips are so striking that I sketch a few of them here. Albert's own account, as taken down by his doctor, is the first of the documents that follow the lectures. Fugue itself conveniently illustrates many social facets of mental illness that are by now rather old hat. It is highly gender-specific. It is class-specific. It is directly involved with systems of social control, and I do not mean abstractions about power and knowledge. I mean the police and the military. One is hard-pressed to say who has the greater role in defining, in realizing, the disorder as a correct diagnosis the class of patients or the class of physicians. Fugue is closely connected to the late nineteenth-century mental illness that has, in the past two decades, attracted most attention by cultural historians: hysteria. That standing conundrum, hypnotism, plays its role in fugue. There is a preenactment of one of today's embarrassments for affluent cities, the homeless. Anti-Semitism rears its conventional head, for who is the archetypal fugueur but the Wandering Jew? I take up that issue in Supplement 2. These matters strike familiar chords, albeit in somewhat novel arrangements. I prefer to emphasize another idea. It uses as metaphor a notion that became fashionable in another field some time ago: the ecological niche. We are struck by the phenomenon that some types of mental illness and some arrangements of symptoms are central at some times and places and absent in others, even in the history of one fairly continuous culture. These are the ones that I call transient, not in the sense that they come and go in the life of a single person, but that they exist only at a time and a place. I argue that one fruitful idea for understanding transient mental illness is the ecological niche, not just social, not just medical, not just coming from the patient, not just from the doctors, but from the concatenation of an extraordinarily large number of diverse types of elements which for a moment provide a stable home for certain types of manifestation of illness. Now, however, I ask you to be content with an introductory story about a young gas fitter of Bordeaux. We first hear of him in a thesis with an unusually romantic title: Les Aliénés voyageurs. 10 We may fear already that the
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author, the by no means young medical student Philippe Tissié (1852-1935), liked a good yarn. Tissié would not pass as your average intern in any hospital, at any time. When he first set eyes on Albert he was thirty-three years old. He had been orphaned at fourteen, had worked twelve hours a night as a bookkeeper's clerk at a Toulouse railway station. 11 During the day he took music classes at the local conservatory. When he turned sixteen he moved up to a day job as a delivery man, all the while going to night school. After providing for the education of two younger sisters by savings from such menial work, he got his big break when on his twenty-third birthday he shipped out of Bordeaux on a steamer, the Niger, on the Bordeaux-Senegal run.12 He worked as a supercargo's clerk.13 The ship's doctor took a shine to him and after a couple of years urged him to apply for a post as underlibrarian to the medical faculty in Bordeaux. He got the job, completed his baccalauréat in the sciences, and by 1886 finally had fulfilled all qualifications for the medical degree except his thesis. He was working in the ward of Albert Pitres, a hotshot neurologist who had been a student of Charcot's in Paris, and who in 1881 had become professor in Bordeaux at the age of thirty-three, the age when Tissié was still completing his studies. In 1886 Pitres was giving lectures on hypnotism and hysteria, and it was no surprise that Albert was assigned to his ward. So Albert was there for Philippe Tissié to describe in his thesis. But so were a great many other patients. About sixty were assigned to a ward. Tissié did not choose Albert by chance. The man and his doctor were made for each other, opposite but parallel. Opposite: Albert was barely lettered, able to read, but he could hardly write. Tissié was always at his letters, even as an adolescent doing full-time menial jobs. Where Albert was the victim of impulse and uncontrollable drives, Tissié was a model of goal-directed planning and achievement. But parallel: Tissié, like Albert, was always close to movement, keeping books at night in the train station, that center of all movement, or delivering, or on the good ship Niger whose very name is redolent of colonial travel and adventure in darkest Africa. There is more to it than that. The only thing I know about Tissié's boyhood is that early on he heard of the latest wonder, the vélocipède, "the wonderful invention that needs neither a horse nor a carriage." One day in the early sixties the great Léotard came through town on his way to Toulouse: Léotard, the man-bird, the greatest trapeze artist of the day, and a pioneer of
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cycling (and, yes, the man after whom that athletic garment, the leotard, is named). All the children turned out to watch him whiz by. Tissié recalled how "he went so quickly, on two great wheels, I heard the grinding of metal and wood. I had seen a vélocipède!" His father had the local wheelwright make a wooden tricycle for his son, and the cycle remained a love of Tissié's life and a part of his profession later on. 14 When Albert came to Tissié's notice in 1886, the bicycle had just become the middle-class sporting instrument of choice; indeed, in France cycling was the very first popular, that is, nonaristocratic, sport.15 A few dates sum up the story. In the early 1880s the Safety bicycle became generally available the prototype of the modern bicycle with two equalsized wheels and driven by pedals and a chain. The free wheel was invented in 1881. The first long-running magazine devoted to the sport, Le Sport Vélocipédique, commenced in 1880.16 In 1881 a national federation of cycling clubs was established, Union Vélocipédique de France. There had been racetracks for horses forever. In 1884 the first track for (human) runners was built in Paris. The first velodrome preceded it, in Paris, in 1879. Montpellier built one in 1885, and Bordeaux immediately followed. There had been long-distance cycle races for quite some time: Paris-Rouen on 7 November 1869. The Paris-Bordeaux race did not begin until 1891, but it was established as the first of the "classiques": one-day road races on the professional cycling calendar. In that year inflatable rubber tires came on the market in France. In January 1890 the Touring Club de France was founded for cyclists. By the end of the decade it had 73,000 subscribers, thirty volumes in the series Sites et Monuments de France, and numerous manuals rating local hotels and mechanics. When you think of Bordeaux, you think of wine, and perhaps of a town that has just overcome its ruination, the phylloxera louse that destroyed the vines. That began in 1863 but had been solved by Albert's time, thanks to grafting the old vines onto California stock. If you are learned, you recall that just as Albert was checking into the hospital, Emile Durkheim was moving to Bordeaux to begin the course of lectures that would invent modern sociology. But you did not know that Bordeaux was the absolute center of activity for the first popular French sport. Albert's doctor soon became the official doctor of the Véloce-Club de Bordeaux, and he was writing columns for its magazine, Le Véloce-Sport, which were collected into a Cyclists' Guide for
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Training, Racing, and Tourism. 17 He was one of the architects of the Bordeaux-Paris race, and there he is, in charge, in the photograph at the starting line. And apparently he scandalized his colleagues and the good citizens of Bordeaux by making house calls on a bicycle.18 I fancy that my newfound friend was the first physician in the world who pedaled on his rounds. I shall spare you Tissié's later history as a leader in physical education, a rather astonishing story but one far too complicated for us. Physical education was one battleground for the reformation of France, its youth, its education, its glory. Those who like simplification may find that those on one side Tissié's happened to be Dreyfusards. We who have nothing to do with France, or physical education, or a long-dead scandal, have inherited the wind in the form of the Olympic Games, pushed by Coubertin and other anti-Dreyfusards over the anguished protests of men like Tissié, who did not much like competitive sport on the English model and who favored rational and moderate exercise, aerobics, Swedish gymnastics, cycling, and long walks. But all that, except for the long walks, is quite another story. Histories of French physical education are a bit bemused when they come to Tissié's medical thesis; they suppose that Tissié studied Albert precisely because the man was able to travel such prodigious distances on foot, a veritable instance of training to excess.19 The historians of physical education have lost touch with Tissié's psychiatric practice. Historians of medicine, on the other hand, have now amply described the political schisms that divided the French medical profession, French alienists in particular, and French society in general. In Rewriting the Soul I observe how useful multiple personality was for those doctors who were anticlerical and ill disposed to the idea of a unitary immortal transcendental metaphysical (etc.) soul. Those same doctors were usually positivist, in the strong and proper French sense of the word, derived from Auguste Comte, who invented it; that is, opposed to theory in favor of experiment and observation, opposed to invisible entities, opposed to what they called metaphysics, and opposed even to the idea of causation, preferring a rather Humean notion of constant conjunction and in general being much impressed by the Scottish idea of the association of ideas as a guide to psychology. In addition, the doctors who figure in the story of multiple personality were mostly republican, that is, deeply opposed to any restoration of the monarchy. Republicanism, positivism, and anticlericalism usually went hand in hand.
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Historians of medicine have not yet, however, sufficiently connected this trio of attitudes to other aspects of French life, for example, physical education. The great physical education movements were rich in political significance. Thus in January 1890 a Ligue Nationale pour l'Education Physique was founded in Paris by the anarchist communard Paschal Grousset, who having been exiled in England was determined on his return to introduce competitive sports in a systematic way for the improvement of French youths. 20 Only a couple of months later in 1890 Tissié founded the Ligue Girondin pour l'Education Physique. Gironde is the department in which Bordeaux is situated. Was Tissié's league a provincial society analogous to the national one but smaller? Not at all. It was the only significant provincial society for gymnastics in France, and in many ways it played a greater part in French physical education than the national league. Tissié is now lauded in physical education circles as a pioneer of regionalism, which has become an important theme in late twentieth-century France. He was far more than that. He detested statism, centralism, Jacobinism, Napoleon, and most things that came from Paris. Girondin did not just denote a region, La Gironde. It meant politics. Tissié's Girondin League was founded early in 1890. Now 1889 was the centenary of the Revolution, the year of the great World's Fair in Paris, the year the Eiffel Tower was constructed. Soon afterward Bordeaux began to build what is still its own tallest monument, the Monument to the Girondins.21 The Girondins: that was the name later given to the club of men who clustered around Brissot, and who in 1789 stood for change with moderation. Many of its members were from the Bordeaux region. The Girondins lost out to Robespierre and the radical Jacobin club. In one of the most dramatized scenes of the Terror, some twenty went to the guillotine. Thus the erection of this rather astonishing monument, glowing in the green of weathered copper, surrounded by les chevaux des Girondins steeds galloping through spouting water was commenced in 1894 as a memorial to moderation and provincial integrity, against the folly of the capital. The year 1889, the centennial of the Revolution, was by no means tranquil. In the spring the populist General Boulanger was generally supposed to be about to march on the Elysée, the presidential residence, in order to abolish the Third Republic and establish a popular dictatorship that would consult the people with occasional plebiscites.22 The coup d'état did not take place, but it is still widely believed to have been a very near thing. I do not wish to dwell
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on political history, but we should see Tissié, founding the Ligue Girondin, as engaged in a deeply political act, whose meaning was plain for all to see. It meant the independent moderation which was part of the self-image of Bordeaux. Moderation ran to all things. When Tissié's professor, Albert Pitres, published his treatise on hypnotism and hysteria, one of his students reviewed the book. "The hysteria of the Saint-André Hospital is," wrote the disciple, "in comparison to the grande hystérie of the Salpêtrière [Charcot's hospital in Paris] a petite hystérie." 23 The same goes for the political views of the members of the medical profession who concern us. The great positivism, republicanism, and anticlericalism of their Parisian colleagues was reproduced, in Bordeaux, as a modest positivism, a moderate republicanism, a gentle anticlericalism. Albert, employee of gas companies, was not involved in these grand schemes. His fantasies were of faraway places; I doubt that he noticed what engaged his own doctor, let alone the political upheavals and battles going on in France. Before saying more about him, I should first enter a caveat. The interest in Albert is not about what really happened in the course of his life, or what was the cause of his curious behavior. He matters to my story because he is the first in a line of fugueurs. He and his doctors establish, in a hyperbolic way, the possibility of fugue as a diagnosis in its own right. Everything I am about to describe could be fantasy. Everything could be what in the trade is called folie à deux, half madness, half folly, produced by the interaction of doctor and patient. Such folly could still inaugurate an epidemic. And folly it may be, for after a brief account of Albert's parental antecedents, Tissié launched into a bizarre tale. Worse, although the tale was told in Albert's own voice, as if he were reciting it on the couch, we know that nearly all the facts were obtained from Albert under suggestion and hypnosis, perhaps the least reliable sources of testimony known to the human race. Document 1 below is Tissié's first report of Albert's travels. We read what are supposed to be Albert's words, yet Albert must have spoken with an extremely heavy Gascon accent, now the preserve of great-grandfathers. Hypnotism is suspicious, but we have, nevertheless, some controls. Quite a number of doctors had a go at Albert. That is not in itself a ground for verisimilitude, but one may be impressed by a figure in the French military
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establishment. Men from the medical corps, especially one just promoted to the most important French military hospital, Val de Grâce, and well trained in the detection of malingering, ought to have some skepticism in their bones. Such a one, Emile Duponchel, had been garrisoned in Bordeaux before his promotion and helped debrief Albert. He describes how Albert ''is easily hypnotizable and readily submits to suggestions. In hypnotic sleep he recalls a certain number of details of his adventurous life, which had been forgotten during his waking state. It was thus that we were able, little by little also by writing to French consuls abroad and by consulting the civil and military authorities at home to reconstitute with commendable patience and by means of indubitable external proofs, the successive episodes of his romantic existence." 24 There is a drawing of Albert in Tissié's thesis. There are four photographs from Pitres's textbook of 1891. These show Albert in four states: two normal, front and side, then hypnotized, and then fugueur (fig. 1). Beware, however, for I suspect that these photographs may have been taken at one sitting, perhaps even in the photographer's studio.25 These shots show how Albert was supposed to look in each of his states. It was urged in many quarters that photography introduced true objectivity into science. No longer did we have to rely on artist's impressions or verbal reports. Caveat emptor! Louis Vivet, the very first multiple personality in history that is, with more than two distinct and diagnosed personalities was photographed in some ten supposedly distinct personality states, representing different stages of his life, but the photos were taken in at most two sittings, and mere changes in posture represent hypnotic suggestion.26 Jean-Albert Dadas was born on 10 May 1860, son of Romain Dadas and Marie Dumeur.27 Marie died of pneumonia at age fifty, in 1877. Albert always remained devoted to her memory, in a sentimental, or even maudlin, way.28 The men in the family worked for gas companies. The father Romain had once had a little money but lost or squandered it. He died of softening of the brain at age sixty-one, in 1881. Father Dadas was first of all a hypochondriac you had only to tell him he looked poorly and he would go home to bed, complaining of pains. As he aged, "he devoted himself, in excess, to the pleasures of sex; he frequently left home; then he became senile. Symptoms of general paralysis." Very probably he was syphilitic. One son had gone up in the world and managed a gas factory in the Midi, but he died of meningitis
Page 20 Fig. 1. Four photographs of Albert in different states by F. Panajou, director of photography at the Bordeaux Faculty of Medicine. From Pitres (1891), vol. 2. Top: In his normal state. Bottom left: At the end of an attack of "ambulatory automatism." Bottom right: When hypnotized.
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at the age of thirty-five. A second, also hypochondriac, worked in town, once again for the gas company, but suffered from headaches. He died in 1892. Albert's sister was in good health, married to another gas worker. These were solid artisans, respectable, seldom without work when they needed it, loyal to their employer who in turn took patronal responsibility for their welfare. Albert fell from a tree at age eight and had a concussion, with vomiting and subsequent migraine. From the very start we can read this story as a case of childhood head injury, but let me first tell it Tissié's way. Albert was apprenticed to a manufacturer of gas equipment at the age of twelve. He worked well and then disappeared. His brother found him in a nearby town helping a traveling umbrella salesman. Tapped on the shoulder, he acted as if he were awaking from a deep sleep, groggy and confused, astonished to find himself where he was, carting umbrellas. Then began a standard pattern. He was given 100 francs to obtain coke for the gas company and woke up on the train with a ticket to Paris. How much was 100 francs? When young Tissié worked nights in the train station, he was paid 30 francs a month; when he was underlibrarian for the medical faculty, his annual salary was 1,200 francs. So 100 francs was real money, but not a lot of money. At any rate, Albert was found sleeping on a bench at the Gare d'Orléans in Paris, kept in custody for a fortnight, and then sent back to his family. But his employer wanted the 100 francs from his family, so Albert stopped en route and worked in domestic service for some months, saving up before he returned home. That was how it went. Overhearing a place-name, Albert felt compelled to set out. At some point he was astonished at where he had got to, often destitute, sometimes arrested. He tried to find work, did odd jobs, scrounged, and managed to get home, often under conditions of terrible hardship. Thus once someone spoke of Marseille; when he got there, people talked of Africa, so he took ship for Algeria, where he had numerous adventures and, in some desperate place, was counseled by a Zouave to go home. He obtained tips for trifling services, implored a ship's captain, and went back to France, scrubbing pots in the galley. He arrived in Aix at harvesttime, was arrested in the fields as a transient agricultural laborer without papers, and did a month's forced labor. His major trips began when he voluntarily enlisted in the 127th Infantry
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Regiment, where he served as a cook. He encouraged a chance-met childhood friend to join up, but the friend was posted to the 16th Dragoons. Since the two chums could not billet together, both deserted, and then Albert led the march through bitterest winter, Belgium, Holland. Very early on the friend died from cold, hunger, but especially exhaustion. Extensive wandering in Germany, to Nuremburg, then down the Danube. By Linz, Albert had lost his papers and was imprisoned for eight days. The prison doctor saw he was very ill and had him released. On to Vienna where he got work in the gas factory and yes, we have letters from the manager to prove it. After some more travel he learned of a general amnesty for French deserters and made his way home. Although besieged by headaches and diarrhea, he soon headed out again. One is struck, in reading these tales of flight, how easy it was to get around Europe a century ago, even if travel was not without its perils. Albert's standard modus operandi was, when he found himself in a strange place, to report to the French consul, who would give him just enough to get home on the train, fourth class. Albert would then hear a chance place-name, leading him to head in the opposite direction. He also begged from Frenchmen in foreign parts. Students would take up a collection for him, a village populated by descendants of émigré Huguenots was always kind to Frenchmen, and there was sometimes a Societé Française to give him some pennies and a loaf of bread. His greatest flight began with his politely taking his uniform and military equipment to the police office in Mons and then heading east Prague, Berlin, Posen, Moscow. En route, passing through East Prussia, he was attacked by a vicious dog while begging at a manor owned by a Frenchman. The scars were permanent; in the short run the owner paid for two weeks in the hospital. In Moscow a superintendent of police said, "I know who you are!" much to Albert's delight. Except he was arrested as a known nihilist, in the great sweep following the assassination of the czar, 13 March 1881. He spent three months in prison with all the other nihilists. The prisoners were separated into three groups, one to be hung, one to Siberia, and the rest to be walked out of Russia, to Turkey. The story of the exodus at least in Tissié's hands is truly vivid, the Cossack guards, the accompanying Gypsies, "unbelievably filthy," who are starving and who copulate on the fields with the other deportees for a scrap of bread or sip of brandy. Albert is chaste,
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despite valiant attempts at seduction to cheer the lad up, after which he satisfies himself "in his usual way." I did not mention that according to the case report, by the time he was twenty-six, Albert had had sexual intercourse only three times in his life, the first time in Vienna, but that he was an "inveterate masturbator." He made it to Constantinople, where an ever-obliging French consul gave him the funds to get to Vienna, where he went to work once again with the gas company. Fantasy? The fixed points, the consul, the former employer, certain French people who helped him, were confirmed. The arrest, the forced march from Moscow to the border? Well, anyone who read the newspapers would have known about the police rounding up nihilists, even the proportions that were executed, sent to Siberia, or exiled. Albert did not need to go to Moscow to overhear this story. He had learned to read in the army and preferred to read reports of distant parts of the world. The events in Moscow were the talk of Europe, so he could have composed his adventure entirely in his head. I confess I believe him; certainly the skeptical Duponchel did. There is plenty more bizarre detail on this trip, but the upshot was that Albert finally reported back to his regiment and was found guilty of desertion. He was sentenced to three years hard labor in Algeria. He worked well, but the shaving of his head caused him unbearable pain; he spent much of the time in the hospital. He was released from the army for good conduct and because he had a damaged eardrum. He returned to Bordeaux to work for the gas company, fell in love, became engaged . . . and disappeared on 18 June 1885. He turned up early in September in Verdun, having no idea what had happened during that time. His girlfriend had meanwhile had the sense to tell him never to speak to her again. On 9 December he was given a sort of welfare ticket home and on 17 January 1886 entered Saint-André. He was transferred to Pitres's ward on 24 February. The next day, when Pitres and his assistants went to examine him, he had disappeared . . . but he now spent most of his time in hospices until his return to Bordeaux, 3 May 1886. What was Albert like? I plunge into speculations about Albert and what ailed him in Supplement 1. For the present let us content ourselves with the simplest facts. In his normal state, at home, in the factory, or as a cook in the army, he was a good worker, timid, respectful, shy with women. He never drank and when he was on a fugue had a particular hostility to alcohol. At
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home he would have a regular and uneventful life. Then would come about three days of severe headaches, anxiety, sweats, insomnia, masturbation five or six times a night, and then he would set out. Usually a fugue was not exactly unplanned. He would get a little money together and some identity papers. At the last moment he would drink several glasses of water or stop at a bar and order a couple of glasses of barley water (orgéat) or some other soft drink. Then off he would go. Over and over again he would lose his identity papers. 29 It is hard not to think that he sometimes wanted to lose his identity. Yet late in his journeys he knew perfectly well who he was and how to get help. Overall, there is a curious mixed quality to his trips. There is no doubt that he got into a terrible state before taking off, and it can truly be said that the need to go overpowered him. Nevertheless he had very variable states of consciousness on the road, sometimes making quite deliberate choices. His reaction when the fate of the nihilists was being decided: Great, the czar will send me to Siberia, beyond my wildest dreams! His nocturnal masturbation fantasies often involved a woman he had seen during the day, with a picture of the two of them setting out on a great trip together. This man hated the fact that his "imperious need to travel," as Tissié called it, prevented him from living a normal life. But he also wanted to travel and from childhood had been fascinated by stories of faraway places. People did not notice Albert much on his travels. Even though he slept rough, he was very clean, taking care to wash in streams and scraping the mud off his shoes. When he "came to," he usually would have no idea of how he had arrived where he was. Later, he might have a general idea of where he had been, with some casual and to my mind rather suspicious touristic details about the sights on the way, but no memory for any specific happenings, such as the dog bite. "How did you get that mark on your arm?" "Oh, I suppose I have had it all my life." "No, it is a bite." "A bite? Me bitten by a dog?"
Then the memory would seep in, usually, it seems, when he was hypnotized. Albert had many of the then standard symptoms of hysteria. When he was
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first interviewed, his tongue felt no pain, to the extent that a needle could be pushed through it without hurting. He had a restricted field of vision, a standard sign of hysteria in those days. He had regions of the skin which were hypersensitive and others that were completely insensitive. There is more to tell about Albert yes, he did marry, in July 1887, and had a daughter, Marguerite-Gabrielle. They lived in Paris. His wife died of tuberculosis. The daughter was adopted by a family of market gardeners. Albert visited her regularly but continued to go on fugues. He always wanted to go north. In 1901 he was in Berlin, where he was (according to Tissié) recognized as "le voyageur de Tissié" and given assistance to get back to Tissié, who by that time had moved from Bordeaux to a smaller town in the Southwest, Pau. He stayed with the doctor for some time. 30 He died on or about 28 November 1907. Tissié wrote a sad epilogue which takes us up to 7 December 1907. Marguerite-Gabrielle, aged fifteen and a half, is looking at a notice board that posts job opportunities. A woman comes up and offers her a job as a dressmaker. Next day, overjoyed, she puts on her best frock and sets out for work, and meets the stranger. A prostitute watching the scene says, "She'll be gone in two days." She is about to be abducted into the white slave trade. Document 6 is a newspaper report of these events. I end this lecture not with Albert but with more about Bordeaux. It was not only bicycle city but also double consciousness city. For it was here that the first of the new wave of French multiples began. But I need to be more precise, for a moment. Strictly multiple personality, in the sense of more than two personalities, was first noticed about a year before Albert checked into Saint-André Hospital. I mentioned Louis Vivet. The first descriptions of this man as a multiple, with more than two personalities, appeared in print in 1885, and the expression "multiple personality" was introduced into English expressly to describe Louis Vivet. There was however a long history of people with two alternating personalities often called double consciousness. The first modern instance of this phenomenon was spotted in Bordeaux. Her name was Félida. I like to quote Pierre Janet's lectures at Harvard in 1906: "She is a very remarkable personage who has played a rather important part in the history of ideas. . . . But for Félida it is not certain that there would be a professorship of psychology at the Collège de France and that I should be here speaking to you of the mental state of hystericals."31 The first public statement about Félida as a case of double consciousness
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was at a meeting of the Bordeaux Society of Medicine and Surgery, 14 January 1876, although the speaker, Eugène Azam, had first encountered her during early experiments with hypnotism some eighteen years earlier. Azam was a thoroughgoing provincial, a loyal Bordelais and Gascon, a distinguished bourgeois doctor. Naturally Tissié came to know Azam, even if Azam was of an altogether different social class than the self-made Tissié. 32 Azam refers to Albert with great interest and favors an account in terms of double consciousness. Azam thought that Albert was more intelligent in his second state of "total somnambulism" than in his ordinary waking state.33 A popular book on hypnotism, published in 1890, has a long account of Albert, mostly abstracted from Tissié. It includes an engraving of "Dr. Tissié hypnotizing Albert in the presence of Professor Azam" (see frontispiece). An English translation of the book was published in London in 1890 and in Philadelphia in 1891, with snippets from the more sensational parts of Tissié's thesis.34 Two points must be emphasized here. Albert was never hypnotized (so far as we can tell) until some months after he entered Saint-André. He did not come from the culture of hypnotism in which so many hysterics and certainly multiples found themselves. He joined it. Second, Tissié to some extent did come to assimilate Albert to multiplicity, but only after he had published his medical thesis. Later he occasionally thought of Albert as having two states, taking the terminology of "first" and "second" from Azam.35 In this way Albert came to be compared to cases of double consciousness. Tissié continued his reporting of Albert in a book titled Dreams Freud referred to Tissié's book on nine different occasions in The Interpretation of Dreams, but only in rather general terms. Tissié came to believe that Albert's fugues often were initiated by dreams, and he developed a surprising mode of dream therapy.36 In my opinion, Albert was substantially influenced by Tissié's therapy, but that is only opinion. I speculate about Albert in Supplement 1 and examine the dangers of hypnotic influence. But in these lectures proper I do not wish to become too fixated on that one patient, paradigm though he was. Let us stand back and notice a few general points. First, as I confirm in Lecture 2, Albert did initiate an epidemic of fugues, or better, Tissié initiated an epidemic of diagnoses of fugues. Second, it has been observed in the past twenty years that about nine out of ten people suffering from multiple personality, or dissociative identity disorder, are women. That has prompted the odd question, where are the male multiples? (One
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canvassed answer is, in jail.) In fin-de-siècle France it was also true that about nine out of ten multiples were women. But after Albert there was an easy answer to the question, where are the male multiples? On the road. But the fugueur was no average man on the road. He was sober, clean, respectable, a member of the working poor, by no means permanently destitute. An artisan, a delivery man, a clerk, a small shopkeeper, not to be confused with the broad mass of tramps and vagrants whom the French population in the 1880s came increasingly to see as a fundamental social problem. The fugueur was not from the middle classes. But he was urban or had a trade. There are almost no reports of peasant or farmer fugueurs. We have been led, very largely by the example of Michel Foucault, to ask whether madness is a mirror of sanity; in Foucault's exceptional case, to ask if madness, as conceived during the Enlightenment, is not a mirror of the Age of Reason and an essential part of that arrangement of ideas. I resist the suggestion that fugue is an essential part of anything grand. But it does reflect something: the age of tourism. Tissié saw that himself. His last comment when Albert was still alive, published in 1901, describes Albert in exactly those terms, as suffering from "pathological tourism." Make no mistake about it. This is the era of popular tourism, epitomized in the Englishspeaking world by the company that ran the business of touring Europe and the Levant for many years: Thomas Cook and Son. We are not talking about the grand tours of British aristocrats, county landowners, or American figures in the novels of Henry James. I refer to tourism for the masses. Cook began by hiring railway coaches to take evangelicals to temperance meetings. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Cook's tourists, as they were called, were everywhere. We are talking about seven million tickets a year by the end of the century. And these tourists, though they had to pay, were as classless as the English were capable of being. 37 There were many smaller travel agents, more German than French. Tourism was expanding in the south of France, but more in the direction of Nice and Caens than Bordeaux or Biarritz. The great era of building popular tourist hotels was in full swing. You can chart the expansion of Switzerland as a destination simply by the hotels completed year by year and yes, in 1882, the year of the biggest spurt in hotel construction in Switzerland, Albert found a friend who talked about Switzerland, filling Albert with an obsession to go there, which he did. Travel was not only for Cook's tourists. Travel was rebellion, poetry.
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Flaubert's orientalism, trips to Egypt, Salammbô. Baudelaire and the flâneur, the intensely curious stroller, the traveler untroubled by time, who notices everything. 38 Baudelaire penned some of his fantasies from a Bordelais balcony and embarked from the port of Bordeaux itself.39 Can we see Arthur Rimbaud (1854-1891) as fugueur? Mad? Yes, or so some would say. Traveler? Par excellence. But mad traveler? He did himself often speak of fugue, meaning the word in its ordinary sense, "flight." His flights took him to places even more exotic than Albert's, even to the heart of Ethiopia, and they took place about the same time as Albert's fugues. In "Sea Breeze," an early poem by Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1898), the poet exhorts himself to take flight, "Fuir! là-bas fuir!" and concludes, "Je partirai" (I will leave).40 Jules Verne (1828-1905) captured the minds of whole generations with his trips to the center of the earth, to the moon, to the bottom of the sea, and (when Albert was thirteen years old) around the world in eighty days. This is the golden era of travel journalism, Robert Louis Stevenson with a donkey in the Cévennes or describing the new vineyards of Napa and Sonoma, whose rootstock was the savior of the ancient but infected grapes of Bordeaux.41 There is Mark Twain at one end of travel writing and Karl Baedeker at the other. Not that they were separate. When I wanted old Baedekers of northern France and Germany from the library at the University of California in Berkeley, I was told to look for them in the Mark Twain collection of the Bancroft Library; yes, Samuel Clemens had them in his pocket. To tell the truth, I have no proof that Albert did not travel with French-language Baedekers in his pocket.42 Popular tourism was one part of the ecological niche in which a new type of mental disorder, and behavior, was able to locate itself. And what better doctor to recognize it than the great advocate of outdoor exercise, the man who, opposed to fancy gymnastic equipment and fancy athletic tracks, said that the whole of France is an exercise track, a piste du cirque? I must emphasize that tourism is only one part of the niche. In Albert's day travel had its darker side, the vagrancy scare, described in Lecture 3. I said that Albert fascinates some of us because travel has become part of the learned life and of middle-class life in general. But more than tourism hovers in the background. The "voyage" is our metaphor for self-discovery. Michel Montaigne mayor of Bordeaux, 1581-85 created the genre that we call the essay, but he also, in a small way, contributed to another genre,
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the travel diary. Montaigne was a driven traveler, seeking out health, or at least relief from the crippling pain of gallstones, but his journey to Rome via Austria and Switzerland in 1580-81 is recorded in minute detail. 43 He was by no means happy to learn, while in Rome, where he had been made a citizen in the course of his five months' stay, that he had been elected mayor at home and was thereby enjoined to take up residence there. Travel, for Montaigne, was not exactly flight, but it was escape, a way stage between one set of Essays and the next. The idea of life as a journey was cemented for the English reader by Pilgrim's Progress. The reader of German will invoke Goethe in Italy. Montaigne, Bunyan, Goethe: these are not just accounts of travel but epigones for their respective cultures. The trip is a manyfaceted symbol for our moral consciousness, sometimes positive, but also negative, as in that great amorality play, contemporary mass tourism, whose destination is 10 percent cathedrals, 20 percent eating, and 70 percent shopping. The ship of fools; the cruise ship. Thomas Mann's Death in Venice: see it as ''a splendid parable on the demonic and unsettling aspects of tourism."44 What did the world of travel look like? In the introduction to Rewriting the Soul I mentioned seeing "a handsome poster of a rainy Paris street" that reminded me that we all know what the world of double consciousness looked like it looked like the "world of the impressionists." In the spring of 1998 there was an exhibition in Paris, gloriously represented by Juliet Wilson-Bareau's catalogue Manet, Monet, and the Gare SaintLazare (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1998). Paris saw the Saint-Lazare railroad station as the center of Europe. Located at the Place de l'Europe, it was spanned by a triumph of engineering, the Pont de l'Europe. The streets that radiate from it bear names dear to Albert: rue de Constantinople, rue de Vienne, rue de Moscou. It was here that the impressionists congregated. Gustave Caillebotte's "Paris Street, Rainy Day" the poster that I saw in a café portrays the intersection of the rue de Lisbon and rue de Moscou. His family owned much land near the Place de l'Europe, and some of his most famous paintings depict the Pont de l'Europe itself. Edouard Manet lived at 4 rue de SaintPétersburg from 1872. His stunning "The Railway" (often called "the Gare Saint-Lazare") is painted from rue de Rome. After 1878 Claude Monet (whom Caillebotte supported) had his home on the rue d'Edimbourg, just off the rue de Rome. Monet painted twelve impressionist classics of trains
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inside the Gare Saint-Lazare. Emile Zola declared: "That is where painting is today. . . . Our artists have to find the poetry in train-stations" (Wilson-Barreau, p. 105). The impressionist exhibition of 1877 was, in effect, about railways, the station, the Europe bridge, and the Europe quarter generally. Hence we know exactly what the world of travel looked like at the time that Albert began his astounding trips. And Caillebotte's painting of Monet on a dirt road, used as the cover of this book, could be a portrait of Albert's alter ego. Albert's obsessive and uncontrollable journeys were systematically pointless, less a voyage of self-discovery than an attempt to eliminate self. In Lecture 2 I describe how they inaugurated an epidemic of mad travel and use that as a peg on which to hang issues about the reality of mental illness. You can read Albert in so many other ways precisely because travel signifies so much in the whole of Western civilization, from the Odyssey to outer space, with much else, including John Bunyan's soul, packed in between. Yet for all these important excursions, let us not lose sight of our main topic, the reality of mental illness. Tissié himself, furious at the way in which military tribunals had treated Albert, without taking notice of medical advice, had this to say: "When we consider the damaged life led by this poor lad and the number of times in which he had business with the law, which led regularly to prison, we cannot help protesting against the arrogant and criminal incompetence of the magistrate who exclaimed: `What need have we of the help of the physician in order to appreciate the disorders of the mind? If madness is evident, everyone can recognize it by its extravagances or its fits of rage; if there is a doubt, a doubt exists equally for the doctor!'" 45 "That," wrote Tissié at the end of his study, "is the moral that we would like to draw from our thesis." He was rejecting a very old text indeed, a forensic treatise of 1830.46 We now take for granted that courts of law do need expert medical testimony, although in the back of our minds there still lurks, I suspect, a certain longing for that simple jurisprudential doctrine of 1830 deep in our hearts, we know what madness is! But we have moved on. Today the issue is not expert witnesses but the relationship between what they tell us and the way in which their patients become ill. We have not got clear in our minds, yet, the interaction between expert knowledge and the behavior of troubled people. That is the underlying theme that we must pursue.
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2 Hysteria or Epilepsy? How can a form of mental illness emerge, take hold, become an obsession in some place and time, and then, perhaps, fade away? I am leading you through an example. First, a single patient. In this lecture, a plethora. How could Albert and his doctors have started a veritable cascade of fugueurs, or at any rate of fugue diagnoses? This is not just a question about fugue but an exemplar for thinking about a whole group of mental illnesses, past and present. I need to document the outbreak, but that is the stuff of notes. There was a pretty pattern of national spheres of influence. In 1887 Bordeaux. In 1888 Paris. Soon, many regions of France and northern Italy. Then, a decade later, in 1898, a German physician, observing the French work, exclaims, where are the German fugues? Where is the German research? His countrymen rally round. Within five years the number of published German studies of fugue swells, and there is even a survey article so that other German doctors can catch up. That is only the beginning. Russia follows suit. 1 The contours of German fugue are different from those in France. The niche for fugue not only was found later in Germany than in France but also made use of a slightly different medical, social, and military context that I describe in Supplement 3. More interesting to us is that fugue did not "take"
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in America. We have something like an experiment, not a controlled one, to be sure, but a living example of how fugue became a common diagnosis in some milieus and was rejected by others. First I need to describe the dynamics of the outbreak of fugue in the heartland, in France itself. I have talked about 1887. In this lecture it is 1888-95, a jumble of competing cases that in seven years culminates in a synthesis. I talked about Bordeaux, the provincial capital, superbly bourgeois, self-confident, and, for all its sunny southern exposure, dark. Now we go to the metropolis. An epidemic may exist in the provinces, but an epidemic of diagnoses needs support from the center. Paris obliged. It did more than that. It created a controversy which unexpectedly went to the heart of mental illness, as then conceived. But now I have a problem. The great debate makes very little sense in today's terms. Yet without this debate, fugue would have been a mere curiosity instead of a cutting-edge disorder. That is my problem. I must create, in a few brush strokes, a profound disagreement over what ailed those mad travelers of long ago. I hope that when I have done so, you will see striking resemblances to current debates. The two great but mysterious mental pathologies of the day were hysteria and epilepsy. Bordeaux said that fugue was a hysterical condition. Paris said that it was latent epilepsy. Peacemakers said that some fugues are hysterical while others are epileptic. This issue, once burning, has been extinguished to the point where we find it hard to make sense of. Yet it was part of the environment that enabled fugue diagnoses to thrive. Hysteria does not even exist as a possible diagnosis today, while our understanding of epilepsy has been radically changed ever since the advent of the electroencephalograph. Yet these two maladies, both bearing Greek labels and named in ancient times, were two comparable puzzles confronting French psychiatry in 1887. 2 The greatest neurologist of all, Jean-Martin Charcot, at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, would sometimes speak, in a way that seems nonsensical to us, of hystero-epilepsy. Both hysteria and epilepsy have been so intensely studied by historians of medicine and culture that I want to say as little as possible about both.3 I need to remind you of just two relevant facts, one about hysteria and one about epilepsy. First, male hysteria. Hysteria was by its very name a woman's complaint, exhibited in the other sex, if at all, only by effeminate men. Charcot legitimated the hysteria diagnosis for burly laborers. One suggests unkindly that
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this was a power grab. Women's doctors, gynecologists and obstetricians as we would now call them, used to own hysteria, named after the womb itself. Charcot wanted to study hysteria as a branch of neurology. What better way to wrest the illness from wombdoctors than to produce a raft of male hysterics? But Charcot was by no means an equal opportunity employer when it came to hysteria. Yes, men and women could both be hysterics. The predisposing cause in both cases was heredity, generously understood. There was a nineteenth-century program of research into degeneracy, analogous to, although of course far sketchier than, our contemporary program of finding genetic bases for mental and physical illness. The predisposing causes of hysteria in men and women were hereditary, or, more crudely, bad stock, but the occasioning causes were by no means the same. Moral causes could incite hysteria in women, but in men, unless the disorder appeared when the patient was very young, physical trauma, or shock, was the main predisposing cause, alongside poisoning, either industrial or alcoholic. A further difficulty for us, in understanding Charcot, is that the most common use today of the word trauma has to do with a wound to the psyche. Charcot still used the word in the old sense of physical injury. He had gone so far as to use it to refer to shock, but the shock had to have a purely physical (or chemical) cause. The extraordinary transition from the idea of physical trauma to the idea of psychical trauma was happening all around Charcot, in part because of his own contributions, but he himself never made that step. 4 Thus Charcot would not diagnose hysteria in a mature man unless it had appeared in his youth or there had been some physical trauma, a railway accident or lead poisoning, for example. Now let us turn to latent epilepsy. Epilepsy had meant being susceptible to seizures, grand mal. During the middle of the nineteenth century there arose a new conjecture. Epilepsy was a condition of the brain that was not always manifested by classic seizures. In the late 1850s the young English physician and journalist Hughlings Jackson wrote an essay about epilepsy and syphilis. He wanted to change the way we thought about epilepsy, generalizing the concept and including many instances of sudden change in mood or behavior. For example, falling into an apparent rage for no cause. He thought that his idea preserved the original meaning of the Greek epilepsia: "taking hold of, a something seizing the subject as though that `something'
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were outside himself." Thus began the reconceptualization of epilepsy. 5 Hughlings Jackson also had gone on to characterize a distinct form of epilepsy, to be called Jacksonian epilepsy, and also not identified by grand mal seizures. He was one of the few contemporaries whom Charcot acknowledged in lectures, almost fulsomely. In France, Bénédict-Auguste Morel had made similar suggestions.6 Hughlings Jackson had a truly exceptional clinical sensibility, recognized as master by that other great clinical neurologist, Charcot. In fact a 1991 study of epileptic amnesia and fugue searched the literature for a combination of the best phenomenological description of epileptic fugue and known local brain damage determined post-mortem. The authors fixed on a report by Hughlings Jackson published in 1888.7 Not many contributions to clinical and pathological medicine have a shelf life of 103 years. One began to speak of latent epilepsy. Patients did not have seizures of any of the ordinary sorts. Instead there would be other unusual events in the troubled person's life which were described as "psychological equivalents" of seizures or as "epileptic equivalents." Since some epileptics wander in a dazed state after an attack, might not there be fugues of a purely epileptic origin? The connection between an equivalent and a seizure was one of analogy. For example, if the event involved some sort of forgetting, perhaps amounting to amnesia, this would be compared to the amnesia or twilight period of an epileptic after an attack. If there was vertigo or the incident was preceded by headaches, that was relevant. If there was bedwetting, if there had been scarlet fever or childhood head injury, all that was confirmation of an underlying epileptic condition. A sudden fugue might fit into this picture. There were etiological conjectures in abundance, for example, an alleged strong connection between parental alcoholism and inherited epilepsy the alcoholic parent had latent epilepsy. Also there was a widespread belief that after an attack many epileptics were liable to commit violent crimes of which they later had no memory and for which in law they could not be held responsible. This was a dire threat to society, analogous to the fear that hysterics in a state of somnambulism or simply hypnotized could become criminals, even assassins. Degeneracy was deeply implicated in both hysteria and epilepsy. Doctors,
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novelists, and the population at large imagined that when hysteria showed in one generation, epilepsy might show in the next, exemplifying the terrible prospect of racial degeneration. Hence the puzzling concept of hystéro-épilepsie. Confronting a disturbed patient, one looked exhaustively into the health and attitudes of the relatives. The military doctor Duponchel, briefly summarizing Tissié's observation of Albert Dadas, laconically wrote "hériditaire" at the start. Tissié began his own summary of the case with the words, "Albert is an héréditaire." They meant that Albert inherited a disposition to mental instability from his father, the hypochondriac who died of senility, paresis, and softening of the brain. I hope these rather recondite remarks will suffice for me to lay out before you an extraordinary confrontation. In 1887, when Tissié published Les Aliénés voyageurs, Charcot, aged sixty-five, was just passing the peak of his influence. From the worldhistorical point of view, his most famous student, Sigmund Freud, had been in Paris on a scholarship two years earlier and was busy translating Charcot into German. Eugen Bleuler studied with Charcot shortly before Freud. In addition to his foreign students, Charcot was still producing a generation of French disciples, although he had antagonists aplenty, and some of his own favorite students, such as Joseph Babinski, were later to betray his memory. In his amazing Tuesday lectures, or performances, Charcot would exhibit one or more patients and develop their cases and their symptoms before the admiring eyes of a crowd. One Tuesday, 31 January 1888, he presented a mad traveler, albeit a far less ambitious wanderer than Albert. "Mén" was a thirty-seven-year-old delivery man for a company that sold and repaired brass art objects, such as candelabra. 8 He also delivered bills and collected payments. He had his first flight on 15 May 1887, when he was thirty-six. On a second and more dramatic trip in July, he was calling for some goods when he made a complicated trip through Paris, found himself on the train with no money and an inadequate ticket, and then jumped into the Seine to avoid being charged. It did not work. The ticket inspector came to the railway infirmary, where he had been taken after he was rescued. After another fugue on 27 August, he went to the Salpêtrière. You might expect that Charcot, the great advocate of male hysteria, would say that Mén was a hysteric. No. There was no record of any shock or injury in his recent history; otherwise he was simply too old for an outbreak of hysteria. Charcot
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was of the opinion that "this man's illness is epileptic in origin. I will use the expression ambulatory automatism based on descriptions that I made in the past of patients who walk about automatically and do not show any external signs that their walking is unconscious." 9 Charcot rejected the alternatives.10 One consideration clinched the case: medication. We use the same type of reasoning today. Is a person depressed or manic-depressive (bipolar disorder)? If the condition responds well to a substance such as Prozac, she is probably depressed, while if she gets better when taking lithium, it is more likely to be bipolar disorder. In those days there was at most one specific drug in psychiatry, potassium bromide for epilepsy (chloral was also used widely but less specifically). Bromides were administered with great abandon despite the side effects. One hospital in London used two and one half tons of potassium bromide in a year.11 French medical journals had advertisements for innumerable patent medicines using bromides. For example, le sirop de Henry Mure was a patent medicine for "épilepsie hystérie névroses." A one-teaspoon dose of this substance (of "pureté chimique absolue et au dosage mathématique du sel employé") contained 2 grams of potassium bromide in bitter orange syrup. Two grams was a standard daily dose.12 Charcot on Mén: ''If the man's flights are equivalent to epileptic seizures, then I can treat him." Charcot prescribed cyclical dosages of 4 grams the first week, 5 grams the next, and 7 grams the third week, and then back to 4. "You must never in your life," he said to the patient, "stop taking bromides." All went well for fourteen months, but the medicine left Mén weak and tired, so the dosage was reduced to one gram daily and then in September 1888 suspended entirely. On 18 January he took off again, with a substantial sum of his employer's funds in hand 900 francs nine months' salary for Tissié when he was a sublibrarian in Bordeaux. Eight days later Mén reached the naval port of Brest, without having any idea how he got there. But he had spent 200 francs. Scared that he would have another attack, he sought protection from a policeman. He told his story and even showed a letter from Dr. Charcot. The constable said, in effect, "Oh yeah?" and arrested him for vagrancy. A magistrate assumed that the 700 francs still in Mén's possession were stolen. Six days later, after confusing telegrams from his employer in Paris, the wretched man was released. Charcot declared that such individuals should be identified, and that they should always carry an
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official certificate, signed by a doctor and bearing an official stamp. 13 Thus wanderers would be able to distinguish themselves from vagabonds and extricate themselves from their predicaments. Charcot discussed these developments on 12 February 1889.14 He confidently ended his second demonstration of Mén with the words: "This is plainly a special variety of epilepsy. Thanks to the bromide treatment, we have already helped him, and I hope that by the use of the same medication I shall continue to be of service to him."15 Charcot never did (it seems) tell his public what happened to Mén. That was left to a medical student and not one of Charcot's own!16 Georges Sous records that despite substantial increases in the dosage of potassium bromide, Mén had three more major fugues, starting on 14 December 1889. There were also minor ones, when he would come to in a strange place, with a complete blackout for the previous few hours. The last known fugue took place on 30 June 1890. Despite vigorous inquiries by the police, he was never seen again. Regardless of his unfortunate disappearance, Mén became a new, metropolitan, and epileptic paradigm alongside Albert, the hysterical and provincial paradigm. The word paradigm has been much overused since Thomas Kuhn popularized it in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. What I mean here is that these two cases were the first and standard examples upon which later work in the field was modeled. That is one of the two meanings of the word upon which Kuhn himself settled.17 I do not mean that either Mén or Albert was your typical epileptic or hysterical fugueur. Both were too perfect or too exceptional to be typical. I mean only that they were the foremost reference points for subsequent diagnoses. Duponchel, the military doctor who wrote about Albert, signaled the split between the two paradigms soon after Charcot's first presentation of Mén. After describing both Albert and another military fugueur, he said that "alongside ambulatory automatism, we need to distinguish what by analogy I would like to call déterminisme ambulatoire."18 This name did not catch on in France, but it became standard in Italy as determinismo ambulatorio, naming hysterical rather than epileptic fugue.19 And what did Charcot think of Albert? Not much. He was an original. He was totally different from the epileptic Mén.20 Two paradigms ensured a competition, very roughly between the Charcotians and the anti-Charcotians such as Pitres, although out of respect for
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the Master, hostility was veiled. Controversy ensures publicity. In this case it made people think about fugue or automatism. But there is a far more important point here. The niche for fugue as a diagnosis is built of diverse ingredients that I call vectors, since they point in different directions. In Lecture 1, I spoke of virtuous tourism, and in the third I talk about vicious vagrancy, a pair of elements in the environment that jointly were hospitable to fugue. But there are factors of a very different kind. The easiest way to make sense of a new form of madness is to lodge it within an existing taxonomy. That means it must be a subordinate disorder, falling under a superordinate disorder. There were two candidates for superordinate disorder: hysteria and epilepsy. In his final contributions to philosophy, Thomas Kuhn argued that a scientific revolution occurs when an existing taxonomy of natural kinds must be broken up in order to accommodate a new kind of thing. Conversely, you don't need a revolution if the new kind of thing fits within the established order. 21 The epilepsy-hysteria debate provided publicity for the new diagnosis. It also ensured that no matter who won, fugue could be accepted into the established taxonomy of mental illness without any need for revolution. That was not good for fugue in the long run. When hysteria left the scene as a superordinate disorder, it carried all its subordinates with it. The shattering of a genus (hysteria) can eliminate the species (hysterical fugue). I feel quite uncomfortable at this point. Mén and Albert Dadas were real people. The medical profession used them as paradigms. I use them as exemplars to think with. But what about the men themselves? They are dead, there is nothing we can do, and it would be sheer sentimentality to sorrow for them. But these are not happy lives. I do worry about how even the long-ago dead become pawns for psychiatric talk. When they were relatively prosperous, they usually have left a substantial paper trail behind them. We know an enormous amount about Freud's patients, such as Dora. We know about their lives after Freud; they are by no means happy lives, but we know these individuals as people. We can find out about them because they were rich, well connected, even if, for example, the Wolfman lost his incredible Russian estates after the revolution. Breuer's Anna O., namely Bertha Pappenheim, merited a 1952 German postage stamp honoring her pioneer work as social worker activist and feminist, particularly dedicated to poor, exploited Jewish women in Germany. But Mén and Albert Dadas pass from sight, and
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we know almost nothing about their helpmeets or their children. We know that Albert's wife died young of tuberculosis, and we believe that his daughter, thinking she was getting a good job as a dressmaker, was abducted to become a prostitute. We have hints of such disasters, but what was it like to be a good woman married to Albert? I am unhappy about using such hapless depersonalized individuals as paradigms. But such they were. That said, let us look more closely at the controversy arising from the two paradigms. Less than a month after Charcot's second lecture, two doctors from the Charité Hospital in Paris presented a fugue and a carefully argued statement against a diagnosis of epilepsy; the title was "A Case of Hysteria with Ambulatory Automatism and Trembling." 22 "Ambulatory automatism is usually attributed to epilepsy," they wrote. Note how quickly things are going. The very term ambulatory automatism is hardly one year old, as is Charcot's diagnosis of latent epilepsy. Yet already the connection is "usual." In July, Jules Voisin, no friend of Charcot's, reported a fugueur with double personality. The gender rule applies here: doubles tend to be female. She was a thirty-six-year-old charwoman, mother of eight, of whom five were alive and not one of them had ever had a convulsion. Ancestral history way back was diligently searched no trace of epilepsy. The woman was a classic case of hysteria: she was anesthetic over half of her body. She had repeated headaches and attacks of trembling during her sleep. Ambulatory automatism, doubled personality; she was cured by hypnotism. This was critical. Epileptics did not respond to hypnotism. There were a dozen more symptoms of hysteria. Voisin stated: "The case is interesting from many points of view, but I wish to draw the attention of the society to the phenomenon of fugue, of ambulatory automatism. Cases of unconscious fugues are not rare in science, and the majority are classed as latent epilepsy. I believe that a large number of them ought to be considered as cases of doubled personality in hysterics. This observation is a striking case."23 Note the "not rare," the "majority." A disorder that had barely begun to be diagnosed was already regarded as commonplace. Voisin continued the defense of hysterical fugue in a speech to the Congrés de Médecine Mentale on 6 August. The long title conveys the message. "Unconscious Fugues in Hysterics. Ambulatory Automatism. Differential Diagnosis between These Fugues and Epileptic Fugues." Voisin reported five cases of unconscious fugues in hysterics. By way of making peace with Charcot, he maintained
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that there could be two distinct types of fugue, one hysterical and one epileptic. But he favored hysteria. A person who was dispositionally epileptic could experience purely hysterical fugues! All five fugues took place in something analogous to what Azam called the second state. All were treated successfully by hypnotism. 24 All this was happening in 1889, the year of the Universal Exposition and the Eiffel Tower, commemorating the centennial of the Revolution. These were politically troubled times, as I reminded you in Lecture 1 (especially note 22, which says a few words about the coup d'état that was anticipated in mid-1888). But 1889 was also a year of selfcongratulation. Paris was full of congresses. The mental medicine congress, at which Jules Voisin (and also Tissié) spoke, ran 4-10 August. The First International Congress for Hypnotism and Therapy was 8-12 August, somewhat as an adjunct to the Congress for Physiological Psychology. William James, who was there, reported that "everyone seemed to think that the original Salpêtrière [viz., Charcotian] doctrine of hypnotism, as a definite pathological condition with its three stages and somatic causes, was a thing of the past."25 When it comes to solemn proceedings, James is the man to read. "The most striking feature of the discussions was, perhaps, their tendency to slope off to some one or other of those shady horizons with which the name `psychic research' is now associated." And people had a good time: "The congress wound up on Saturday night with a feast of other things than reason and a flow of something besides soul on the platform of the Eiffel Tower." The assembly was an international Who's Who of psychology, hysteria, and hypnotism, but Charcot was not present.26 At the hypnotism congress there was the obligatory tour of the famous Salpêtrière, but August Voisin's ward was on show, not that of Charcot. Voisin claimed to hypnotize one in ten psychotics and ameliorate their condition; the procedures were more those of Hippolyte Bernheim from Nancy, rather than of Paris and Charcot. In short, Charcot's reign was rapidly coming to an end, not over the minor issue of fugue but over the major one of the nature of hysteria, of hypnotism, and their interrelation. Tissié published in 1887, Charcot in 1888, and the first debates took place in 1889. After that it was a free-for-all, with numerous cases pouring in, enriched with rhetoric. Here is an example. One of Jules Voisin's students presented nine cases, all known to Voisin.27 The first in this list was none
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other than the juvenile delinquent and petty offender Louis Vivet, whom I have called the first truly multiple personality. Voisin had been proud to present Vivet as a male multiple in 1885. In 1889, after fugue had become a medical entity, Louis Vivet acquired a new property, retroactively, so to speak. He was a fugueur. Why? Because Voisin and his student needed to establish the legitimacy of hysterical fugue. Vivet was a useful ally, because he had been so intensely reported by many investigators. 28 He was known to be a hysteric treated by hypnotism. He was a fugueur. Ergo: fugueurs could be hysterics rather than epileptics.29 Voisin's student again urged differential diagnosis. The efficacy of hypnotism and the uselessness of bromides were part of the argument. Incidentally, only one of the nine patients did anything "wrong" he absconded with 32 francs while in his state of fugue (he was acquitted on grounds of nonresponsibility).30 Doctors, then as now, cannot help liking some patients and detesting others. Voisin's student went further, urging that hysterics were basically attractive people with a problem. But epileptics given to sudden impulses were described in a somber, indeed sordid, light. Latent epileptics who experience sudden attacks "are filthy and lewd, they exhibit their genitals, urinate in a salon, at the theater or in a church, make shocking gestures, or at least are found naked in the staircase, in the courtyard of their home, or in the street."31 We are told of the man in the train compartment who emptied his pockets, took off his hat, put his watch into it, urinated on the knees of an eight-year-old girl, and sat down, astonished, as he came to, at the anger of his traveling companions. That is the model for the epileptic fugueur! The epileptics are horrid, crazy. The hysterical fugueur is not like that at all. By implication Charcot's own example from the Tuesday lectures a thoroughly decent type must be a male hysteric, not an epileptic. That thesis was defended on 21 July 1890. Three days later it was the turn of Georges Sous, the student who told us of Mén's final disappearance. Although he showed that Charcot's treatment failed, he was faithful to Charcot's model.32 We are not shown the epileptic orduriers but instead learn the sad story (for example) of a thirty-two-year-old mechanic who from time to time left his workshop, doors and windows open, and disappeared for two or three days. On the last occasion he took a boat from Le Havre to Trouville and was arrested outside the estate of Thiers, then president of the Republic.
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The most interesting new case that Sous contributes is a splendid example of epilepsy a small shopkeeper with a long history of seizures, good response to bromides, and the occasional fugue. The message: epileptics who travel impulsively are nice people, as, indeed, was Charcot's Mén himself. Both these theses use the same rhetoric: Disorder X rightly bears a stigma; you wouldn't want to have anything to do with a person afflicted with X. But disorder Y is a misfortune that happens to basically decent souls. You would not want to diagnose someone you like as X (choose X = hysteria or X = epilepsy, depending on which side you are on.) What excellent medical rhetoric! This is a good moment to direct our attention to a more cultivated milieu. 33 I have insisted that in my large roster of cases, the patients are usually workingmen, fairly solid citizens, regularly employed if poorly paid. But there are of course counterexamples. So let me tell you about Emile, a Paris lawyer aged thirty-three. Here is a new social class, and even the venue in which we learn about him is new. My sources tend to be medical meetings, conferences, the toils of graduate students completing their medical degrees and where André LeBlanc has done the work, the actual records of lunatic asylums. But now we go to a highbrow location, the Academy of Moral Sciences, in its meeting of 20 January 1890. A long abstract of the lecture was printed the next day in the Bulletin Médical. An editorial note stated that this was published "according to the wishes expressed, we believe, by one of the most eminent members of that society [viz., Paul Janet, uncle of Pierre], who is well informed about this case of ambulatory automatism and doubling of the personality. This initiative, by one of the masters of modern philosophy, . . . and the reception of the audience . . . testify to the importance that more and more philosophers attach to knowledge of certain facts in nervous pathology."34 The title was anti-Charcotian: "Ambulatory Automatism in a Hysteric." Emile "presents all the manifest signs of hysteria." He was "almost instantaneously hypnotizable" he had only to be asked to fixate on a point in space or to hear a sharp sound (the clap of a hand), and he would fall into hypnotic sleep. He even went into a trance when he caught himself looking into the mirror in a café by the Bourse. It was perhaps not too surprising that every once in a while he lost his memory. "A new life, a new memory, a new me,
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begins. He walks, takes the train, makes visits, buys things, gambles, etc." Some of the events in Emile's second state were not altogether unrelated to events in his normal state. Thus he visited his stepfather, with whom he had a fight, before changing state on 23 September 1888. He returned to his normal state in the middle of October. Meanwhile he had for example visited one of his uncles, a bishop. There he had broken furniture and torn up books and even manuscripts. He also incurred 500 francs of debts during his peregrinations, which led to a charge of swindling. Since no one knew exactly where he was, he was tried and convicted in absentia. The decision was reversed once medical evidence had been heard. 35 He did it again, and also stole a small sum of money, and was again apprehended. Two well-known expert witnesses made a favorable deposition. The charge was dismissed. In the first incident the man recalled, under hypnosis, that he had borrowed 500 francs to gamble, and he described in detail the games he had played and how he had lost. The second incident furnished even more compelling evidence of the power of hypnosis (and hence of the hysterical nature of the case). Emile knew he had, before he lost consciousness in his normal state, a wallet containing 226 francs. It disappeared during his second state. He had no idea where or how. Six months later, under hypnosis, he recalled the hotel in which he had left it. Awakened, he was told to write to that hotel, and next day he received the wallet in the mail. Here we find what was to become the central criterion for hysterical fugue: amnesia for or confused memory about the trip, which could be resolved under hypnosis.36 Emile may not be new to you. The physician and public health official who read the paper to the Academy of Sciences was Professor Adrien Proust, father of Marcel. Henri Ellenberger, that exemplary and encyclopedic student of the history of dissociation, mentions "idle talk in Madame Verdurin's salon" about a double personality and writes, "It is noteworthy that this very story had been published by Marcel Proust's father, Adrien Proust, as a significant psychopathological case."37 That may be pushing things, because ambulatory automatism, the very point (and title) of Dr. Proust's report, is not mentioned by his son, and the disorder had virtually disappeared in France by the time Le Temps retrouvé was published. Marcel Proust's Dr. Cottard, "with the delicacy which reveals the man of distinction," is changing the course of conversation from a disagreeable
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subject. He "relates in more philosophical terms than most physicians can command" how the trauma of a fire had changed Mme Verdurin's footman into a new man, with new handwriting and an intolerable character which led to his being dismissed. Then, as they moved from the dining room to the Venetian smoking room, "Cottard told us that he had witnessed actual doublings of the personality, giving as example the case of one of his patients whom he amiably offers to bring to see me, in whose case Cottard has merely to touch his temples to usher him into a second life in which he remembers nothing of the other, so much so that, a very honest man in this one, he had actually been arrested several times for thefts committed in the other during which he had been nothing less than a disgraceful scamp." 38 Is this the specific story of Emile, reported in 1890 by Adrien Proust? Or is it more of an amalgam? No matter. Emile himself is not a prototypical fugueur because he was of the middle classes, a lawyer. And in his fugue he was dishonest, a swindler. The prototypical fugueur was an honest craftsman, artisan, clerk, or regularly employed laborer or a conscript. He was not your Paris lawyer, nor was he a tramp. In his fugue state he never stole, and if he did, it was out of absentmindedness or out of necessity, a piece of food.39 To return to hysteria-epilepsy: new cases on both sides kept on appearing. Bordeaux did its bit. The second volume of Pitres's Lectures on Hysteria has ample discussions of fugue and includes the four photographs of Albert shown in figure 1.40 One of many theses about fugue written under Pitres's direction begins: "During our stay at the Faculty of Medicine of Bordeaux, we had the opportunity to examine, in the outpatient clinic attached to Dr. Pitres's ward, a good number of patients who complained of a problem which, if not grave, was at least deeply troubling to them. They were, they said, taken by an overpowering desire to walk, and off they went, in spite of themselves, abandoning everything in order to satisfy this need."41 Then come eighteen cases, including a little more on the travails of poor Albert but many new examples, classified as epileptic, hysterical, and neurasthenic. That is 1892, in Bordeaux. Charcot died in 1893. One no longer had to tremble in Paris for fear of the Master. It was time to take stock. By 1894 there were enough fugues on record for there to be a major survey article. Forty cases were summarized. The list was far from complete and at the same time included cases that could only have been put in for the sake of bolstering the epilepsy family of diagnoses at the expense of the hysteria family.42 Next year
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came two attempts at synthesis. The field had become mature: only established fields have survey articles and syntheses. Not surprisingly, one synthesis came from Bordeaux, the other from Paris. The metropolitan one became canonical. Two years after Charcot's death, the successor in his chair, Fulgence Raymond, gave his measured summing up of the state of play. 43 But first the less systematic events in Bordeaux. In that medical milieu the proliferation of fugues and the resulting distinction between fugue episode and cause prompted new nomenclature. Ambulatory automatism should not be seen as a disorder in its own right: It is "a morbid episode of variable causation, whose relation to the great neuroses is now well understood."44 Sometimes it is an epileptic equivalent and sometimes a hysteric equivalent. The hysterical fugueur is overcome by unknown compulsions and behaves very much as if he had received a hypnotic suggestion. He is to be treated by hypnotism, while the epileptic fugueur responds to bromides. But then there are other patients who engage in impulsive vagrancy without the symptoms of either hysteria or epilepsy.45 Members of this new class of nonhysterical, nonepileptic fugueurs were sometimes tagged with the American label of neurasthenia. Etienne Régis was an increasingly close associate of Pitres. He devised yet another name for our disorder: dromomanie.46 One suspects that Tissié, the physical education enthusiast, had a hand in this coinage; dromo is a Greek stem signifying a racecourse. By dromomania Régis meant a nervous disposition, a state in which one had a compulsive drive toward taking flight. The fugue became the episode, and dromomania became the disorder of impulsive fugue, covering not only hysterical and epileptic fugues but also people who did not fit either label but were, to use the imported American diagnosis, neurasthenic. The name was preferred (wrote Régis) over automatisme ambulatoire, because there was no commitment to the idea of automatism, to amnesia, to change in identity, or to confusion about identity. To our eyes it was not so much a specific disorder as a group of complaints with distinct etiologies. Whereas hysteria and epilepsy had an element of theory behind them, dromomania was purely descriptive. This to some extent destroyed the taxonomic structure that I mentioned earlier, but there was an organizing principle: degeneracy. Dromomania, a generalized fugue-for-all-seasons, was absorbed into the larger degeneracy program that I describe in Lecture 3. But why insist on a single named disorder, dromomania? In part for legal
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reasons. There was seldom any way of telling what ailed a fugueur. The hysteria-epilepsy debates were inconclusive. But it did not much matter whether a fugue was purely psychogenic (hysterical) or epileptic or even if it was the consequence of brain injury. If the fugueur did something wrong, like inadvertently going on a fugue with his employer's money or, worse, deserting from the army, there was a diagnosis at hand that could exculpate him. The upshot of this approach appeared in a book Régis published jointly with Pitres in 1902 titled Obsessions and Compulsions. 47 To return to Paris, Charcot had not denied that there are hysterical fugues; he thought only that they were rare and of little interest. He wanted neurological bases for mental disorder, and epilepsy, including latent epilepsy, was fixed on as the neurological basis of fugue. Conversely those in the other camp did not deny that there were epileptic fugues. They maintained only that there were a great many hysterical fugues. In his magisterial lecture of 1895, Fulgence Raymond surveyed the published cases. He expressed fulsome respect for his predecessor but insisted that even a manifest epileptic could suffer from hysterical fugues. A man can have two diseases at once, and if he is hysterical, his traveling problem should be treated by hypnosis, not bromides. Raymond had his own cases.48 The central figure of the lecture was P., a man of thirtyone who made one flight, of which he had no memory afterward. When one looks at the story, as Raymond says, the man had cause to escape. His wife was away in Paris, he had drunk too much, not gone home, slept with a woman he did not know, and headed off from Nancy to Brussels, staying at worse and worse accommodations until his money ran out. He left home on 3 February; on the eleventh he was found sleeping in the snow in a suburb of the Belgian capital. We may add that P. had always solved his problems by traveling. To begin with, altogether reasonably: at seventeen this Frenchman had left his home in Lorraine so as not to be conscripted into the German army. He had signed on for a voyage of exploration to South America but could not go because of injury. He then spent two years in Gabon under Brazza. He married at twenty-four; his wife soon left him, upon which his family prevented him from joining the Foreign Legion. He remarried at twenty-six and settled down as an employee of the Compagnie de l'Est, working in the Paris railway station. He was still writing up his experiences in Gabon, which were
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published in installments by the Société de Géographie. Travel and escape were deeply inscribed on his soul. Raymond had some trouble getting P. to undergo hypnosis (''doubtless because he is from Nancy" a dig from Paris at Bernheim's school in Nancy), but after a series of unplanned but suggestive incidents, the man recovered the memories of the trip and was declared to be a hysteric. Raymond then used him as his own paradigm of hysterical fugue. Raymond confidently defined fugue and stated criteria for distinguishing among epileptic, hysterical, and what he called psychasthénique fugue. The third category, using a term invented by Pierre Janet, does not seriously involve amnesia. The fugueur remembers where he has been, pretty well. He has an irresistible desire to travel without any loss of consciousness or any of the usual stigmata of hysteria. He is typically a degenerate. A fugue, Raymond stated, is characterized by three features. (1) There is an irresistible compulsion to travel or in fact perform any other enduring unmotivated act. Thus every type of automatism was, for the nonce, drawn into the fugue classification. (2) The act is accomplished intelligently, in a regular and apparently normal way, without violence. (3) Afterward there is no memory of the act at all. In distinguishing hysteria, epilepsy, and psychasthenia, one must attend to factor 3, the degree of amnesia. Amnesia implies either epilepsy or hysteria, as opposed to psychasthenia. Moreover, in the case of hysterical fugues, memories can usually be recovered by hypnosis or suggestion. But that is not the key difference. When one is sure that the fugue is not psychasthenic and thus is epileptic or hysterical, one proceeds to "the degree of intelligence and coordination of the acts, which separates fugues properly called, that is hysterical phenomena, from, in my opinion, the procursive deliria of epilepsy." 49 "Procursive" referred to the aimless wandering that sometimes follows an epileptic fit. Raymond did not say it, but Charcot's Mén was not an instance of procursive aimless walking around in circles! Raymond was claiming, or rather on Tissié's behalf reclaiming, the core concept of fugue for hysterics. He succeeded. As long as hysteria remained a viable diagnosis (not long!), it was accepted that there were both epileptic and hysterical fugues, with the hysterical ones predominating.50 As for treatment: fugues of an epileptic nature were to be treated by chemical means. Hysterical fugueurs should be given hypnotic therapy. That is true whether or not the patient is also an epileptic, for suggestion and
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hypnosis are the surest road to amelioration. As for psychasthenic flights, various kinds of moral persuasion are in order. One must try to remove some idée fixe, but neither hypnosis nor drugs are appropriate for the result of inherited degeneracy. I expect that William James got a copy of Janet's account of Raymond's lecture from Janet himself. He certainly used it in 1896, when he gave the Lowell Lectures at Harvard. The topic was "Exceptional Mental States." There he took ambulatory automatism as the name of virtually any sort of exceptional mental state or aberrant behavior that involved some amnesia including multiple personality. 51 In these lectures ambulatory automatism became what psychiatrists call a superordinate disorder, grouping other disorders under it. James seems to have been trying out the idea, flying a kite: He never published these lectures, and he did not continue to use ambulatory automatism as an organizing concept for variations of the personality. I have led you through an outbreak of fugues, a controversy about their nature, and its temporary resolution. The medical debate is important to the fugue diagnosis. It made the topic interesting to doctors. I suggest that such a polarization of professionals helped a new mental illness to establish itself. It is also important that the polarization went within established taxonomies. There was no need for a Kuhnian scientific revolution, a transformation in "natural kinds," in this case, kinds of mental illness. I dwelled on a second element in Lecture 1: mass tourism, of which our fugueurs are parodies. Tourism was deemed to be good, a positive activity. It was supposed to be both romantic and intellectually rewarding, witness Baedeker's improving guides or the Touring Club de France with its thirty volumes of Sites and Monuments. It was supposed to be healthy, what with the Touring Club de France with its 73,000 paid-up tourists on bicycles or the new Alpinism. That was part of the niche in which fugue located itself. But there was a darker side to travel, an especially French obsession with vagrancy. Our doctors were keen to insist that their fugueurs were not vagrants and provided them with documents to prove it. But this dark side, as I explain in Lecture 3, is also part of the niche for fugue. There I suggest that one of the features of a new mental illness is that it embeds itself in a two-headed way in a culture. The simplest way is that there are two versions "of the same thing," one held to be virtuous and one held to be vicious, between which the illness insinuates itself, as fugue lives between tourism
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and vagrancy. That is too simple, but I suggest that at least there is something approved and something disapproved between which transient forms of madness insert themselves. Thus in Lecture 1 I gave you the cheerful, healthy, hearty, wholesome side, and in Lecture 3 I give you the gloomy side, full of hapless tramps and policemen. But here I conclude by repeating another theme: the bodily expression of male powerlessness. That is a phrase I adapted from the description of nineteenth-century hysteria as "the bodily expression of female powerlessness." 52 Male as opposed to female? Yes, of course. An American neurologist lecturing on fugue said in 1907 that "early in my investigations I was struck by the enormous preponderance of men. In the very considerable number of reported cases, I have found only two women. . . . Why no ambulatory automatism in women? . . . It is quite natural that a hysterical woman should not go off on a long and complicated journey but, for her attack, should have one of the `regular' manifestations of the disease."53 Quite natural! More accurately, a man in a daze with shabby clothes and little money could travel for days, quite safely, until he was arrested by the vigilant police, but a woman simply could not do that, then or now. I have been struck less by the gender difference than by the matter of class and occupation. It is something more specific than not being prosperous, not being of the middle classes. When I review my fugueurs I see that the paradigms are a gas fitter and a delivery man. Raymond's latter-day paradigm was a clerk in a railway station. I find small shopkeepers, carpenters, mirror makers, tailors, cobblers. They have had some education but usually were sent out to work, at least as apprentices, between the ages of twelve and fifteen. Typically urban, virtually no peasants or farmers.54 But also not day laborers or factory hands. These are men with a certain amount of, if not autonomy, at least freedom from immediate supervision. Albert is sent on various missions, to buy coke or to install a gas jet in a workshop making women's clothes. We must be cautious about selection effects. Could there have been an equal proportion of middle-class fugueurs who do not show up in the medical records? That is possible, but the presence of Proust's Emile shows that the prosperous hysterical fugueur was not automatically excluded from medical publications. I suspect that the selection effect actually goes the other way, excluding not the rich but the destitute. You must have a home in order
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to be a fugueur. Look at the very definition of dissociative fugue in place today in the diagnostic manuals (as quoted in note 9 of Lecture 1). A fugueur is someone who leaves home or place of work . . . so you must have a home or place of work. That is equally implied in Pitres's more metaphorical 1891 description of the fugueur: "Swearing by all the gods never again to quit his Penates, he returns home but sooner or later a new attack provokes a new escapade." The fugueur has to have household gods and hence a household. It follows that we will seldom see true members of the underclasses showing up as fugueurs, unless they are there because of their intrinsic medical interest. Once again I think of Louis Vivet, reclassified as a fugueur but singled out for study because of the multiplicity of his personalities. Thus I do not minimize the possibility of selection effects, that we are simply not seeing many fugueurs who were merely jailed as tramps and then moved on. There is nevertheless a distinct class of prototypical fugueurs, all drawn from very similar social backgrounds. Such men have all sorts of problems, and they are curiously powerless in the face of their daily lives. It is these men who find, in the possibility of fugue which after all, means flight an escape over which they have no control, and for which, after the event, they have no memory except when they make use of another device that allows them to remember, namely, hypnotism. I do not find in these cases any significant vestige of fraud or shamming. Instead, their powerlessness, which produces temporary mental breakdown, finds release in a mental illness which relieves them of responsibility, is cultured by medicine, and is medicalized in the culture of the day, a culture that includes both tourism and vagrancy.
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3 Niches When is traveling mad? When do the mad express their insanity by travel? When is the madness of travelers taken to be a kind of madness in its own right? From time to time mad people have traveled, but usually their traveling has not been presented as a specific kind of madness. For example, about 1825 the young German poet Eduard Mörike (18041875) fell in love with one Clara Meyer, whom he immortalized in a song cycle as Peregrina. 1 Other men than he described her as intensely beautiful. She had been a member of a group of itinerant Christian revivalists. After they were proscribed, she began to have fits of compulsive wandering. She would fall into a swoon, wake up, and have no idea where she was. She was held to be insane but helpless, fascinating, lovely. Had she been French and young in the 1880s, she would have been a canonical fugueur. But she never entered the annals of medicine. We know of her only through verse. Aimless wandering driven by irresistible impulses seems, when you come to think of it, such a natural way to be insane. Perhaps we ought to be asking why, in the course of human history, has not compulsive traveling without purpose more often, and in more places, been thought to be a kind of madness? We should look not merely for trips that we regard as crazy but for travel that in its time and place is or was diagnosed as representing a type of insanity, and not merely insane behavior.
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As is the case for so many aspects of the human condition, Greek stories serve us well. Western literature opens with the two epics, one of collective endeavors, the Iliad, and the other of one man's tribulations and achievement, the Odyssey. The two pieces between them set the official poles of Western thought, the community and the individual. The second epic is, among other things, the greatest travel story ever told. Grumpy readers may grumble that Odysseus was as mad as could be, but that is not what the story says. He was, for all his breakdowns, a man who overcame his confusions and triumphed. Albert Dadas was a parody of Odysseus. He traveled more miles and had many an adventure, but for him traveling in itself was an obsession, while Odysseus traveled because of his obsession, which had become his quest. Oedipus was no more insane than Jack Kerouac, on the road. Many of the memorable events of Greek mythology happened while the characters were en route. Arrogant Oedipus was traveling on foot through the narrow defile between Delphi and Daulis when he encountered his father coming the other way in a carriage. Tragic, doomed, but not mad. Yet I suggest that you have to have exceptional, admired travel, a heightened form of travel, even tragic travel, in order for mad travel to be its mirror and recognized as madness. Oedipus and Odysseus were part of a space that truly insane Greek travel could occupy. So who were the mad Greeks? It would be fierce anachronism to foist our concept of mental illness onto ancient Greece, but notice this. To call something an illness, and not just madness, is to imply that there are experts to be called in, professionals who can attempt or achieve cures. There are just such experts in the myths. They treat mad travelers with medicines made of herbs or powdered rock. They use dance therapy, water therapy, and a good deal else. There is an almost endless stream of mad Greek travelers. 2 Take just one example, the three daughters of King Proetus of Tyrins: Iphinoe (the eldest), Lysippe, and Iphianassa. The women went mad, "according to Hesiod, because they would not accept the rites of Dionysius, but according to Acusilaus, because they disparaged the wooden image of Hera. . . . When these damsels were grown up, they went mad. . . . In their madness they roamed over the whole Argive land, and afterwards, passing through Arcadia and the Peloponnese, they ran through the desert in the most disorderly fashion."3 A physician, Melampus, knew how to cure the
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madness. He used strong young men to chase the women "from the mountains of Sicyon with shouts and a sort of frenzied dance. In the pursuit . . . the eldest of the daughters expired, but the others were lucky enough to be purified and so regain their wits." In other versions of the myth, Melampus used herbs to cure the sisters. Or secret purification rituals at the sanctuary of Artemis. Or by having the women washed in the river Clitor. 4 Everything is writ large in Greek myth; cynics will suggest that Lacan would have loved Melampus's fee structure. One-third of the kingdom for a cure! Proetus refused. The women got worse, and other women became mad in the same way. In the end Melampus demanded another third for his brother, Bias. Proetus caved in. One sister died, and two survived. Proetus squared things up by marrying his two surviving daughters to doctor Melampus and brother Bias, thus keeping the kingdom in the family. When it comes to scholars writing about those very travelers, we are in luck: the reality question rears its tiresome head, and we are led off in another direction, to another place and time. Early in the twentieth century Sir James Frazer, the translator of one version of the myth, fitted the story of the three daughters of Proetus right into our theme of the reality of mental illness: "It is possible that the tradition describes, with mythical accessories, a real form of madness by which the Argive women, or some portion of them, were temporarily affected. We may compare a somewhat similar form of temporary insanity to which the women of the wild Jakun tribe in the Malay peninsula are said to be liable."5 "A real form of madness" Frazer goes on to quote from a colonial traveler, anthropologist, and archaeologist. Ivor Evans, publishing in 1920, said that the Jakun women "were frequently seized by a kind of madness presumably some form of hysteria and that they ran off singing into the jungle, each woman by herself, and stopped there for several days and nights, finally returning almost naked, or with their clothes torn to shreds. [The informant said] that the first outbreak of this kind occurred a few years ago, and that they were still frequent, one usually taking place every two or three months. They were started by one of the women, whereupon all the others followed suit."6 The ''wild Jakun tribe," to use the language of the British, was an aboriginal people, that is, a people who inhabited the Malay Archipelago before the arrival of the Malays. Whatever was going on, we appear to have a transient mental illness. I do not mean that the women were affected for at most a few weeks at a time. I mean
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that the illness itself had appeared only recently: the first "outbreak" of this aberrant pattern of behavior began "a few years ago." Frazer led us from ancient Greece to twentieth-century Malaya. We may seem to be drifting hopelessly into irrelevance. Yet the circles are surprisingly tight. We are not so far from the Salpêtrière as we might think. The Malayan behavior or state called latah has fascinated European travelers and administrators for two centuries. British, but also Dutch reporters from what is now named Indonesia, reported that Malays would suddenly and inexplicably (to Europeans) have a fit of strange and jerky movements and give vent to uncontrollable obscene shouting ("coprolalia") and imitation of what other people were doing or saying ("echolalia"). Charcot's student Georges Gilles de La Tourette picked this up when, by coincidence, Albert was on his last fugue before checking into the SaintAndré Hospital in Bordeaux. Gilles asserted that some people in Siberia and also some French Canadians in Maine do something very similar. In Maine it was called ''jumpers" a label that must come from the New Englanders, not the Canadiens. Gilles asserted that we in the Salpêtrière observe exactly the same behavior in some of our patients! 7 This was a common move. For example, in Supplement 2 I describe how the Wandering Jew turns up in the Salpêtrière suffering from fugue. Anything anomalous from the ends of the earth was to be pathologized in the Paris mental hospital. Gilles proposed a new pathology and thereby gave rise to the diagnosis now called Tourette's syndrome, made famous in our time by Oliver Sacks. Charcot, ever the able diagnostician, corrected his pupil, distinguishing between latah and Tourette's syndrome; yet it remains the fact that Tourette's syndrome got into the books via Malaya.8 What is latah? Recent opinion ranges all the way from biology to sociology. Ronald Simons argues that the behavior is basically biological, the so-called startle reflex, a human universal, which is given a social role in the Malay Archipelago and some other parts of the world. The anthropologist Michael Kenny has long contended that the phenomenon is purely social in character, a cultural adjunct of some parts of Malay life; it has no significant biological or cognitive basis. If other people elsewhere behave in similar ways, they do so for reasons peculiar to their culture, and not because they share in some biological quirk common to all human beings.9 When hysteria was in full bloom, doctors and anthropologists alike read
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latah as hysteria. In the heyday of psychoanalysis, Freudians emphasized the outbreaks of uncontrollable obscenity and attributed them to intense sexual repression. In the 1990s we favor the biological and cognitive as the underpinning of strange behavior and are offered the startle response. Yet at least one Malayan psychiatrist explicitly connected latah and fugue and suggested that a tendency to wander is the core phenomenon, on which mimicry and obscenity are epiphenomena. 10 If fugue, rather than hysteria, had been a dominant diagnosis in the English-speaking world in the 1890s, would the British have seen latah as a variant on fugue, with the obscenity and mimicry mere epiphenomena? To recapitulate. Frazer took it to be an objective question as to whether there was a definite mental illness, manifested in aimless travel in the wilderness, from which women suffered in ancient Greece. The implication was that if some 1920s expert had been on the spot in ancient Greece, then the question could have been answered, just as the traveler in a Malayan jungle could assume that temporary outbreaks of running off were "hysteria." My own view is different. Wandering over deserts and mountains, often also taking on the behavior of cattle, was a way to be mad, or to be thought of as mad, in the era represented by the myths. I venture the same for latah, though it would be foolhardy to enter the latah controversy.11 I suggest that scholars should not turn to psychiatrists, asking, what disease ailed these women, be they Argive or Jakun? Instead we should ask, what in Greek or Jakun culture made this a possible way to be mad? The biological metaphor of an ecological niche comes into its own. We have innumerable species of living things on the face of the planet, past and present, many of which, when you reflect, appear to be obvious kinds of ways to be alive. Yet it requires a quite exceptional combination of circumstances for any particular species to emerge in a habitat. There is also the doctrine of convergent evolution. Functionally similar species will evolve in similar niches the marsupial rat, for example. The marsupial rat, which carries its little offspring in a vest pocket, is of a species unrelated to the Norway rat. Yet it has the same lifestyle, even the same habit of adapting readily to the city life of humans. But our comparison should invert the relation. The marsupial rat and the Norway rat are distinct species inhabiting similar ecological niches, while mad Greek travelers and French fugueurs are similar species of madness inhabiting distinct ecological niches. I would venture the same
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remark for French Canadians in Maine in the nineteenth century, compared to Malayan villagers. Latah still exists in Malaysia, but jumpers does not exist in Canada or adjacent parts of the United States. In one case the niche persists, while in the other, it has long gone. If we want to grasp the nature of a niche, we need on the one hand examples of species that inhabit it and on the other hand slightly different habitats that lack anything like the species in question. Thus far in these lectures I have concentrated on the presence of fugue. Now, enlarging our view to the niche in which fugue thrives as a kind of madness, we need new environments where fugue is found and similar environments where fugue is not found. That is the primary topic of this lecture, but the very character of this topic means we must look in diverse quarters. I have my eye out, then, for fuguelike behavior taken to be madness. There are the Greek myths. Frazer's Malays are described as "being seized by a kind of madness." I am told of crazed walkers who have been striding along the coastal highway of Peru for as long as anyone can remember, as if there were a ritualized way of expressing madness on that mostly wild and desolate coast. 12 Anthropologists and psychiatrists have more instances to give. There is a temptation to say each of these phenomena must be a manifestation of the same underlying biological madness. That is a possibility. Another question to ask is, what makes it possible, in such and such a civilization, for this to be a way to be mad? It is with that question that I return to fugue around 1890. In looking for an answer we need to examine not only positive cases, where fugue became an acceptable medical diagnosis, but also negative cases, where it did not. For a short time fugue found a niche in France and then in most of the continent of Europe. It did not take in the British Isles or the United States. Why fugue on one side of the Atlantic and not on the other? What circumstances in one environment made it possible for the best doctors of the day to argue the niceties of diagnosis, while in another environment the matter did not arise? In order to raise the question, I must convince you that fugue was never taken seriously as a medical entity in America. Then I return to Europe and speak seriously of the dark side of fugue, of degeneracy, vagrancy, the police, and the military. If my ecological approach is correct, we should expect a disorder to mutate or disappear if its habitat is destroyed. So this lecture ends
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with a man whom I call the last fugueur, strangely reminiscent of Albert and presented at the last major public event in France when fugue was in view. That was in 1909. The fugue epidemic lasted only twenty-two years. But first let us go through each of these themes in order, beginning with the United States. Fugue and its diagnosis never did settle into America, but not for want of trying. For the record, there was a predecessor diagnosis that could possibly have interfered with the reception of ambulatory automatism. In 1850 the Louisiana State Medical Society appointed a commission to study the characteristics of the Negro race. One peculiarity was that some and only some slaves had a tendency to run away. This was clearly a type of madness, so the commission invented a diagnosis of "drapetomania." The word is derived from a Greek root meaning, to run away. Slaves who tried to escape their masters were said to be insane and to suffer from drapetomania. 13 Drapetomania, an invention of white medical men, was a short-lived diagnosis, but one may suspect that it lingered long in southern minds. It was part of a larger project. For example, it was briefly maintained that the U.S. census of 1850 proved that there were far more mad blacks in the North, especially in the state of Massachusetts, than in the South. Ambulatory automatism was something else. American doctors were kept up-to-date on the new illness. Each of Charcot's two Tuesday lectures on Mén were accurately summarized in the Medical News within a few weeks of their delivery. And where an English report in the Lancet began with a note of skepticism about Mén" a singular case which borders on the incredible, and yet, if accepted, is full of interest from a medicolegal point of view" the American assessments were properly respectful.14 Between 1890 and 1905 quite a few troubled people in many parts of this continent were described with symptoms and behavior that in France during the same years would have indicated hysterical fugue. But in the United States different sets of symptoms were emphasized. A number of men deemed to be mentally ill did travel, in some cases prodigious distances. When out on a fugue they lost any sense of their old identity. They had no recollection of where they had been. Memories in some cases could be restored by hypnotism. But these people were not presented as fugueurs. Ambulatory automatism was not mentioned. The diagnosis was double consciousness or multiple personality. And I have been saying men: America of
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1890-1905 is the only place and time, since double consciousness was first explicitly diagnosed two centuries ago, in which a majority of recorded multiples were male. Simplistic minds may opt for one of two explanations: Fugueurs were wrongly diagnosed as multiples; they were men all right but should not be tallied among the multiples. Or, only at that time did American doctors attend to the fugueurs, who are mostly men, and file them with the multiples, thus giving a correct gender ratio. I am not here concerned with the "right" diagnosis. Many doctors who today treat the dissociative disorders would say that the turn-of-the-century American doctors put the right foot forward, namely, dissociation, while the French ones put the wrong foot forward, namely, fugue. My point is that whereas in some American cases hysterical fugue fits like a glove, this diagnosis was never even mentioned. Only in 1906-7 did the French literature cross the Atlantic in a serious way, and by then, despite the care with which it was discussed, it was oddly irrelevant. Only one mad American fugueur, if that is what he was, became famous. The Reverend Ansel Bourne was a born-again preacher in Coventry, Massachusetts. He disappeared and woke up two months later tending a little shop in Norristown, Pennsylvania, under the name of John Brown. He had no memory of how he got there. He took off on a day that had been nationally dedicated to the rebirth of the American nation and family values. Ansel Bourne, thrice reborn. He was interviewed by William James in person and was discussed in The Principles of Psychology. The great Boston student of spiritism, Richard Hodgeson, wrote the man up, in over thirty pages, for the 1891 issue of the Proceedings of the Society for Psychic Research. 15 Why that journal, of all things? Because the Bostonians you will recall Henry James were fascinated by all things psychic and wondered if multiple personalities, in their second state, might not be spirits. The spiritist tinge to multiple personality, although by no means unknown in France, was pretty much an English-speaking adventure. Spiritism was one element in the ecological niche found for multiple personality in New England. Hodgeson wrote Bourne up as "A Case of Double Consciousness," and that is how William James described him too. Bourne was not obviously a fugueur because he moved but once and established a new life, amnesic for the old one.16
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I mention Ansel Bourne for his fame. Less well known cases are more plausible examples of hysterical dissociative fugue. A respected fifty-year-old Virginian doing business in "a Northern city" suddenly disappeared, only to reappear six months later in "a distant Southern city." He had no memory of what happened. When he came to, he was emaciated and still had the same suit of clothes. In no sense did this man do what Bourne did, assume a new and settled life. He was on one almighty fugue, but he was duly reported as suffering from ''duplex personality." 17 Even when there was a fugue along classic French lines, with compulsive disappearance, aimless wandering, loss of memory, and recovery by hypnotism, the doctor saw "A Case of Multiple Personality."18 Conversely, even when the case was avowedly standard epilepsy, events could be interpreted as multiple personality, worth publishing not only for psychiatry but for spiritist research.19 Single disappearances, removal, recovery of self, and amnesia for travel and activity in between seem to be an American mode of behavior, located somewhere between hysterical fugue and double consciousness but always described under the rubric of doubling or multiplicity. Fiction is full of multiple personality, to the extent that I am sometimes unsure which is at the cutting edge, fiction with strange behavior and subsequent medical observation following in train, or vice versa.20 Mark Micale has speculated on the extent to which the great and the lesser novels of the nineteenth century are not patterned on medical hysteria but lead it.21 Multiple personality has acquired its share of novella and what I have called multobiographies that hover between fact and fiction. Amnesia is a staple of thrillers, but fugue as a specific syndrome has not evolved its own literature unless you take a large part of Simenon's oeuvre to be a series of studies in fugue.22 Ansel Bourne and the Virginia businessman do seem to be recollected in a fragment from Arthur Schnitzler's 1926 Traumnovelle, where the protagonist self-consciously contemplates becoming like an American fugueur-double: "He recalled certain strange pathological cases which he had read in books on psychiatry, so called double-lives. A man living in normal circumstances suddenly disappeared, was not heard from, returned months or years later and didn't remember where he had been during this time."23 This is no simple case of a man considering whether to feign fugue as a way of absconding, because the hero is (ambiguously) already in a trance state.
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Fugue did surface as an academic question late in the day. In 1906 Morton Prince, the great American student of multiple personality, published his patient, that classic American multiple Sally Beauchamp, in a seven-hundred-page book. She had plenty of fugue episodes, but ambulatory automatism was not diagnosed. In the same year Prince founded the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, for which he solicited articles, especially ones that had to do with multiplicity. One of these, "The Clinical Differentiation of the Various Forms of Ambulatory Automatism," was something of a two-finger exercise. The topic was mainly Jules Voisin's discussion of differential diagnosis of epileptic and hysterical fugue, which was seventeen years out of date. The author was sympathetic to Charcot. His contempt for hysteria was plain enough: "Since Charcot's time the attitude of certain clinicians towards the phenomenon [of fugue] appears to have undergone a radical change, and at present it seems to be their main endeavor to entangle it within the meshes of the capacious semiological dragnet of hysteria." 24 ''Since Charcot's time" is a little odd, considering that Charcot published in 1888 and 1889, and that Jules Voisin, the author's prime example of someone who tried to entangle fugue in the capacious semiological dragnet, also published in 1889. This skeptical essay prompted the first, and last, serious American study of fugue, Hugh Patrick's 1907 President's Address to the American Neurological Association. "In this country the subject has received little systematic attention."25 He used Pitres's definition of ambulatory automatism of 1891. He surveyed French work and presented six new cases from his practice in Chicago. I have some hesitation in calling these men "mad travelers," for although their fugues were indeed compulsive, at best semiconscious, and accompanied by amnesia, they had awfully good reasons to get away. Patrick noticed this too, suggesting that medical fugue was half intentional and half irresistible impulse. He began with a henpecked husband, in turn-of-the-century mold; his wife "boxes him on the ears" when she is irritated. Or a businessman in debt and with substantial "irregularities" being charged to him. Then there is our first black fugueur on record, whose story would be better told by W.E.B. Du Bois than Dr. Patrick. Let's see. He is a skilled steelworker aged forty-three. Starting in 1902, his home and all his possessions
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are washed away in a flood. The next month his leg is injured at a rolling mill. As soon as he is able to start work again, the mill closes. He has four healthy children, a sturdy wife, and is out of work and in debt. In 1905 there is a railway accident, loss of teeth, and concussion. In 1906 he is mugged and beaten unconscious. The only sign of mental imbalance in his history is "that once he came home with ten dollars, gave them all to one of his children, and `carried on' like a child." The occasion of his last fugue, in 1906, was his inability to buy Christmas presents for his family. He went on many fugues along classic lines. He recovered memories of his trips when hypnotized. What impresses me in a story that when fully told makes one weep, is the man's courage, his dedication to his family, and the way that his wife manages everything under conditions of appalling adversity. I would have cracked up long before he did. Patrick presented him as a hysterical fugueur. There were three more cases. Throughout them Patrick favored hysteria and doubted even Charcot's paradigm, Mén. "It seems strange that Charcot and his pupils did not hit upon hysteria as an explanation for some fugues, for they were near it at many times." The discussion throughout is exemplary, better, perhaps, than anything in France. But I am reminded of the phenomenon that the sailing ship was perfected only after it had become obsolete I refer to the great China clippers. Or, since I have spoken of early bicycles, it reminds me of the penny-farthing, invented only after it had been made obsolete by the patented Safety bicycl, but still, briefly, the speediest thing on two wheels in a velodrome. In both cases the obsolescent invention could, for a moment, go faster than its rivals, but after that it became a mere curiosity. Likewise Patrick's learned study was about to be irrelevant because hysteria, as a diagnosis, was about to disappear. There are obvious reasons why America should not be preoccupied by fugue. Go west, young man: the fugueur never came back. This motto also applied to some extent to Englishmen. They could disappear to America, the dominions, or the colonies far more readily than Frenchmen could or chose to. Emigration was not a French way of life in the way that it was for Britons. An English remittance man, reported in the first volume of Morton Prince's journal, settled in Rochester, New York, but did most of his real or imagined wandering in Canada, including the forests of the North and the prairies of
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the West. 26 There was no equivalent role for a Frenchman to adopt overseas: yes, a few Frenchmen went to Africa, South America, Southeast Asia, where inhospitable climates discouraged wandering off to the frontier.27 There were other major reasons for the lack of anglophone interest in fugue. Neither Britain nor America had conscript armies. There was nothing corresponding to a basic category of young French and German men who would take off: draftees. I do not mean wartime deserters, filled with fear of battle, most of whom would now be assigned to the post-traumatic stress disorder clinic. Because of current dogma about trauma, it is taken for granted by psychiatrists who work with dissociated patients that the place to look for fugue is in men who have been in battle and are scarred by the psychic trauma. The truth is quite the opposite. Fugue was a medical entity of peace, boredom, and dull regimentation. The first deserters to be called fugueurs had not reached puberty by 1870, and in France the medical entity withered before 1914. Men had shell shock in the Great War. They ran away when they could. But compulsive aimless wandering as a medical entity was a thing of the past, part of the end of the nineteenth century and la belle époque. Military service had two consequences. First, young men on the road were far more rigorously scrutinized on the European continent than in the English-speaking countries. They were also more controlled. Throughout the nineteenth century there was a Napoleonic law on the books that required a French citizen to have a passeport in order to leave his region (canton) of France and travel to another one. Even if this came to be honored more in the breach than the observance, the law was there. It was a way of controlling individual movement and, in particular, checking on deserters. And in addition to the passport, a young man who had done his military service was supposed to be carrying his livret, recording his time in the army and stating the circumstances in which he could be called up again. We have seen that over and over again Albert lost his papers, so when he was stopped, found sleeping rough, or walking in a dazed state, he was suspect. During a fugue he used his livret as ID to pawn his watch and later lost it. He had no memory of what happened to either object, but during hypnosis he recalled the pawnshop which still had the watch and the public garden where he had left his livret. A fugueur in Britain or North America was
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invisible so long as he kept his nose clean. One in France was always liable to be checked, and if his papers did not answer, he could be stopped, jailed, or hospitalized. Conscription had a second consequence. A body of medico-forensic expertise was needed to distinguish the willful deserters from those who could be excused on account of a medical condition. The French, and later the German and Russian, army or naval authorities who published on the topic took the side of conscript deserters remarkably often. They could thereby establish themselves as independent authorities vis-à-vis the rest of the military. There is no evidence that British or American army or naval doctors favored deserters, who were of course volunteers. The present situation of fugue in France may be of interest. I know of only three long series of cases of fugue in recent times ten, sixty-two, and twenty-nine fugueurs respectively, although only five of the sixty-two cases are given in detail. All three were published in France, the first in 1956, the second in 1967, and the third in 1993. France still had a conscript army. You are supposed to carry identification papers. Police can still "control" anyone they like, that is, ask for papers without stating any reason. And, to remind us that medical traditions do not always die, the base for the doctors who wrote the 1967 and 1993 reports is Bordeaux. One thing I would emphasize is that the thirtynine men of the first and third reports are peacetime conscript fugueurs. The 1956 report deals with conscripts before France's colonial wars erupted in earnest, and the 1993 report describes young men who were drafted after the wars had finally been put to rest. The five men of the second report included volunteers and conscripts, all stationed in barracks near provincial towns; none of their units was even threatened with being sent overseas. 28
I have said that fugue became a medical entity in Germany only after 1898. Now it is important that hysteria, especially male hysteria, was never such a major topic in Germany as it had been in France in the days of Charcot. Moreover, hysteria was disappearing, even in France, in the face of German diagnoses such as dementia praecox. German doctors who wanted to get deserters off the hook could not usefully plead a hysterical disorder of males before a court-martial. Hence while in France hysterical fugue was a useful plea until the early years of the twentieth century, after a brief struggle
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latent epilepsy became the thing in Germany. Practical facts like these, discussed further in Supplement 3, are often the central determinants of the contours of a medical entity. But why should not a military court conclude that a deserter was just that: a deserter who became bored with the army? In 1902 Pitres the head doctor of the ward in which our Albert first appeared wrote a book with one of his students, Régis, the man who coined the word dromomanie as a blanket name for an underlying disposition, the impulsion toward fugue. The book is called Obsessions and Compulsions. Fugue was one of its topics. Fugue was common among conscripts. Because they did not like being conscripted? No, it "is to be explained by the large number of degenerates of every degree found among them, in the absence of a system of psychological selection as rigorous as the physical one, and thanks to the natural tendency toward escape that pathological impulsion tends to take among individuals who are rigorously controlled by discipline." 29 This is an early plea for psychological testing of conscripts. It also implied that desertion should be medicalized. This strategy is not to be thought of in terms of the usual recent cant about oppressive medicine, Michel Foucault's power/knowledge, and all that. It was a matter of power, certainly, power to be grasped by the doctors, who thereby declared themselves to be experts in these cases. But the point was to prevent deserters being jailed and then assigned to long terms of hard labor. If they could be proved to be dromomaniacs, then they were released or given mild punishment. Régis gave some florid examples. Summing up the case of one M.: "Hysterical degeneracy. Impulses toward fugue and theft. A very attenuated sense of responsibility." Theft? Not exactly. This man had rented bicycles over and over again, then took a job with a bicycle mechanic, and one day flew out the door with the speediest cycle in town. "Not only has he never stolen in the proper sense of the word, even though that would have been very easy for him, but he never attempted to profit in any way from the objects that he did take." On the occasion of one disappearance, the local newspaper described him as a mad shopper "il a manie des achats" and told merchants not to sell anything to him. When in the army, the man deserted. Régis attempted hypnotic treatment, which helped for a while, but in the end the patient disappeared. Summing up the case, Régis concluded that "(1) M. is a hysterical degenerate, intellectually and morally feeble, incapable
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of resisting impulsive solicitations. (2) His punishment [when he is found], without being nonexistent, should be unusually light." 30 Degenerate! "M. is in fact a degenerate. . . . Several physical stigmata of degeneracy. . . . He is not only a feeble degenerate but also, like his mother and grandmother, a hysteric." What is this degeneracy? It is an all-purpose notion whose primary connotation is the decline of France compared to Britain and Germany. Throughout the century it was connected with low birth rates, and hence with suicide, prostitution, homosexuality, insanity, and, among much else, vagrancy. In Lecture 2 I mentioned a persistent program of research into degeneracy. Let us now address that. Degeneracy had been deemed a problem in France throughout the nineteenth century, and this concern was exacerbated by the loss of the war with Germany, proof of a debilitated population.31 Heredity and degeneracy. Charcot was convinced that epilepsy, hysteria, and neurasthenia were inherited, although not in any simple way. There was the hysterical family a family of conditions which differ within members of a genealogical tree, but which could all be traced to weak organic stock. Take for example the distinct failings alcoholism (chronic drinking) and dipsomania (binge drinking). Both could be inherited, and both could lead to the family line becoming degenerate, so that drunkards would breed hysterics who would breed epileptics. Hysterics and epileptics were degenerates. Hence fugueurs of either type were degenerates too. Here we have another reason why fugue did not take in America: there was no degeneracy program. The nearest one got was an inferiority program: systematic proof of the inferiority of African Americans and arguments against miscegenation to prevent degeneracy. There was a space for drapetomania, the madness of runaway slaves, but none for dromomania. Nothing is ever quite that simple. There was the upsurge of eugenics, connected with the doctrine that immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe were inferior, in every respect, to those of British and North European stock. Hence they should be stopped from immigrating, for fear of diluting good stock. That is how the European degeneracy program was picked up in the United States. I shall cite just one amazing instance of the intersection of eugenics and fugue. The author is distinguished enough. Charles Davenport was director of the Department of Experimental Evolution at Cold Spring Harbor and the leading scientist campaigning to keep America pure: Norwegians
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yes, Sicilians no. In 1915 the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C., published a set of his studies, 158 pages in length and with this title on the cover: THE FEEBLY INHIBITED. Nomadism, or the Wandering Impulse, With Special Reference to Heredity. Inheritance of Temperament. The "Inheritance of Temperament" section is itself subtitled "With Special Reference to Twins and Suicides." The cost of the entire body of field work for these studies was paid by "Mrs. E.H. Harriman, founder and principal patron of the Eugenics Record Office, and Mr. John D. Rockefeller." It is "Nomadism" that concerns us here. The title The Feebly Inhibited was a deliberate allusion to the then current usage of "The Feeble Minded." Davenport's idea was that there is an innate tendency to nomadism in the human race, which is inhibited by civilization and culture. Mad travelers are afflicted, quite literally, by feeble inhibitions, which are inherited and correspond to some extent to the French notion of degeneracy. On the opening page we have a discussion of terminology. The German Wandertrieb is admired. "Vagabondage" connotes pauperism and won't quite do. "Fugue is usually applied to the extreme cases, of most markedly pathological nature, where normal consciousness is impaired. Dromomania has been used as a synonym for ambulatory automatism. Nomadism has often been applied to a racial or tribal tendency to wander. On the whole, I am inclined to use the word `nomadism' just because it has a racial connotation. From a modern point of view all hereditary characters are racial." 32 One hundred family pedigrees formed the data. A total of 168 cases of male nomadics were found but only 15 female nomadics; "this fact leads one to formulate the hypothesis that nomadism is a sex-linked trait." This hypothesis is shown to fit the data. Full scientific method is followed. Rival hypotheses are considered for example, that it is easier, in human society, for men to be nomads. That will not do, as is shown by Gypsies and data furnished by the Gypsy Lore Society. "All the evidence supports the hypothesis that the nomadic impulse depends upon the absence of a simple sex-linked gene that `determines' domesticity."33 All this is carefully explained in terms of the genetics
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of the day ("Nomadism is probably a sex-linked recessive monohybrid state"). Has madness then disappeared? Not quite. The American focus has shifted from psychiatry to eugenics, but we do have this conclusion: The nomadic impulse frequently occurs in families showing various kinds of periodic behavior, such as depression, migraine, epilepsy, and hysteria. It is concluded that these periodic states are not the true cause of nomadism, but rather that, for the better inhibited part of the community, the nomadic tendency is released in the periodic state which paralyzes the inhibitions. The feebleminded and demented may wander without going into a periodic state. The periodic psychoses are frequent concomitants, but not the fundamental cause, of nomadic impulses. They merely permit the nomadic impulses to appear. 34
The abstracts of one hundred family histories are themselves fascinating. They are rich in italics that reveal the excitement of the author as he recounts his titillating tales. (In Case 1: "The mother's father was a Western desperado; drank hard at times and was involved in murder, etc.") In many of the entries, especially but not exclusively for the women, we find the discreet symbol Sx, which, we are told on page 13, "is frequently used as a symbol indicating uncontrolled eroticism, leading to various unsocial acts in the sexrealm." And of course drink plays a major role in these stories, often in a rather splendid way (Case 94: "has always been an alcoholic, drinking whenever he got the chance. Now at 73 he has developed insane ideas, of which one is to travel all over the country on a bicycle. . . . When not riding his bicycle, he will walk for hours at a time.") When degeneracy moved to the United States and the eugenics movement, it transferred to a quite different environment. Nomadism is not madness, even if madness can inhibit the domestic instincts. Nomadism is an atavistic throwback to a time before the domesticity gene had emerged. Nomadism is hereditary, and as Davenport states, "all hereditary characters are racial." To return to France and 1890, it was equally to be expected that the alcoholic and the dipsomaniac, standard figures on the stage of degeneracy, would join the actors for the part of fugue. And so they did, not as the classic
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hysterical fugueurs but as a new breed. Where would you find the drunkards? At the Infirmerie Spéciale du Dépôt, next to the Prefecture of Police, where "all the mad or presumed such, who are creating a public nuisance, are taken." In 1889, when Charcot was still a force, this was said to be the ideal place to examine patients "in the state of nature," in contrast to Charcot's displays. 35 Two cases were presented. The second was a hysterical automatism, but the first was alcoholic automatism. But not drunken wanderings. The man's fugues were made after he had sobered up. They were very similar to epileptic fugues, but after careful examination a diagnosis of alcoholism had to be made as the veritable cause of the ambulatory automatism. The police were not only on the lookout for drunkards and deserters. The degeneracy program worked at the intersection of theories of heredity and what were deemed social problems. Its foci were not so different from today. You have heard of the search for suicide genes, alcoholism genes, for the "homosexual gene," for genes that predispose toward violent crime. A French scientist of the nineteenth century, reincarnated in 1997, would not raise an eyebrow; that was what he was after a century and more ago. The degeneracy portfolio of the nineteenth century, like that of the late twentieth century, took stock in different ways at different times. At the beginning of the century, suicide, madness, crime, and prostitution were favored choices. After 1870 vagrancy vagabondage became important, and by 1885 tramps were deemed to be a critical social problem. A fierce set of antivagrancy laws was passed in that year. It made a sharp distinction between habitual and redeemable offenders. The redeemable ones were to be released on their own recognizance, although subject to a sort of parole. They were also given assistance to find their way to the place they might best call home. The vagrancy laws went hand in hand with recidivism laws passed in the same year, according to which recidivists were liable to transportation to a penal colony. The habitual vagrant was liable to imprisonment in exile. It is important not to identify vagrancy in 1897 with homelessness in 1997. The meaning of the homeless to us is different from the meaning of vagrancy to the French a century ago. To us, the homeless signify no home, i.e., the great fear of the 1980s, the end of the nuclear family. To French people in the 1880s, the vagrant signified racial degeneracy, no reproduction, or reproduction of those very features that the French race ought to get rid of.
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Jacques Donzelot, with grand exaggeration, has said that vagrancy became the "universal of mental pathology, the prism through which all the categories of madness and abnormality could be distributed." 36 Vagrancy was straightaway medicalized. Vagrants were degenerates, sure enough. And many must suffer from ambulatory automatism. There is one book-length study of French fugues, a polemical but insightful essay by Jean-Claude Beaune, The Vagabond and the Machine, an Essay on Ambulatory Automatism: Medicine, Technology, and Society in France, 1880-1910. Note the dates, which in Beaune's judgment mark the beginning and the end of the vagrancy scare. Beaune went so far as to describe the medicalization and medical incarceration of tramps and hoboes as a species of "genocide" the elimination of a class of people, occasionally, perhaps, by actually killing them but usually by putting them in institutions. He also speaks, but only metaphorically, of the "murder of the vagabond."37 The population of vagrants was extinguished, he argues, in asylums and jails. That, says Beaune, was what the medical topics of fugue and ambulatory automatism were all about, really. Did physicians think of their role in this way? To some extent. René Beck wrote a thesis for the medical faculty at Lyon on the relationships between vagrancy and madness. Vagrants, he wrote, "must be eliminated systematically from society, because they are noxious, but they must be cared for, because they are above all ill."38 That is a fine example of the liberal solution to society's problems, eliminate by putting in care. The long arm of the law was indeed astonishing. There is a fascinating tale of one André R., in pretty much the most rustic and isolated region of France.39 André was a stranger who in 1892 set up as a fortune-teller and healer. In no time the law was on to him for false practice of medicine and for being a vagrant. The very fact that his portable library included works on mesmerism and the tarot made him an object of suspicion. "I don't practice medicine; I give information based on divination; if I give simples [herbs] I do so because I am asked for them." He did not charge for his services but accepted gifts: "I have to eat, you know." Fined, he stayed on. But, wrote the doctor and expert medical witness who interviewed him: "Some day, without doubt, pushed by necessity or by some new fantasy of his troubled mind, he will once again take up the stick of the traveler and ask for help at one of the temporary shelters that the authorities provide for men like him. I have simply wanted to describe an episode in the life of one of those thousands of
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outlaws who are beginning to disturb the mechanisms of modern life.'' 40 An "outlaw." The American word was used in this French text, a strange blending of the Wild West and an old French village. This way of thinking about an itinerant homeopathic fortune-teller does confirm the way in which Donzelot and Beaune discuss vagabondage. Nevertheless they seem to give an unduly romantic reading to it. They ignore one of the causes of the vagrancy scare, or scares.41 These were not only politically troubled times for the French body politic, with a competition for power, and for a conception of the nation, between republicans and authoritarians (if we may so call the mix of monarchists, Bonapartistes, and religious figures). These were also economically hard times, a belle époque that danced to the tune of massive unemployment. The Boulangist near-coup of 1889, mentioned in Lecture 1, was fueled by a depression that drove men out on the road in search of a better place, or in despair. The Boulangists, for a moment, were close to whipping this dreary scene into a sort of national socialism that would march on Germany and wreak its revenge. Despite some appealing individuals such as André R., it is mere radical chic to present the vagrants as free spirits. What is true in the versions of Beaune and Donzelot is that policemen and jails have lurked behind the scenes of my stories. Charcot's Mén was caught in the railway infirmary after he leaped into the Seine. In a subsequent fugue the man was jailed in Brest where he had asked for help from the police. Albert was arrested over and over again. Tissié speculated that half the time the poor lad was on his travels he was in jail. So what did the police think about it all? Doubtless the medical literature is not the place to look, but there is one remarkable series of essays written jointly by Benon, a police doctor at the Paris Prefecture, and Froissart, a physician at a mental hospital who was widely used as an expert witness in prosecutions. In one respect these two men wrote with exemplary clarity. Fugue is definable only within the context of the social order. The point is straightforward. As I said at the end of Lecture 2, an incident is counted as a fugue only if the individual has a regular style of life, a regular location. If Charcot's unfortunate patient Mén had fled the first time for keeps, as he did the last time, that would not be a fugue incident. That would be a missing person. Benon and Froissart likewise put the word domicile into their definition.
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They wanted to define vagabondage, not fugue. They did not care for the tedious medical arguments about hysteria versus epilepsy. They did not want accused persons getting off on a plea of generic fugue, or dromomania. "Fugue," they insisted, "is an antisocial act": "Every individual has obligations in which he lives. From the moment that he breaks the social contract, be it instinctively or voluntarily, he puts himself outside legality. That is the case of the fugueur who abandons his domicile, and that is why fugue is an antisocial act." 42 Fugue is distinguished from "procursive epilepsy, automatic somnambulism, alcoholic and all other displacements which are not accompanied by the disappearance of the subject.''43 In short, the police don't care about the medical niceties. If the person stays at home or at work, fine, no matter what ails him. If he flees for whatever reason or cause, that is antisocial, subject to detention and punishment. Thus do the police confront the medical men. Régis gave us dromomania, a nonspecific mental disorder covering all types of pathological flight and serving as a ground for excuses. It exculpated acts performed by traveling or in transit. The police countered by saying that the mental diagnosis has nothing to do with it. If the person is sick and stays home, that is none of our business, but if he leaves home, he has already shown himself to be antisocial, and we the police take charge. There were many expressions of this hard line, which was part of the medicalized assault on vagrancy.44 That attack had run its course around 1910. The team of Benon and Froissart, whose publications peaked in 1908-9, were at the end of the line. Now I want briefly to tell you how fugue itself declined. Undoubtedly the end of the vagrancy scares was salient. A vital ingredient in the ecological niche for fugue was eliminated. But other things disappeared too. A key player was Joseph Babinski, once Charcot's star student, who had fallen for the worst excesses of hypnotism. Back in 1887 he was transferring the hysterical symptoms of one patient to another at the touch of a magnet. But he grew out of that. In September 1899 he presented, in the manner of the great Charcot, a woman of fifty-five. She had taken short fugues for the past decade. Epileptic or hysterical? The question was still on the books, but the details were ambiguous. Babinski, like his old teacher, came down for epilepsy and administered 2 grams of bromide daily.45 In conclusion he took an hysteric patient, hypnotized her before his audience, and sent her on a
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trip around the block, as it were. On awakening, she had no memories of her little expedition, but they were restored when she was hypnotized again. "If a parallel state developed spontaneously and lasted twenty-four hours, wouldn't that be a veritable attack of ambulatory automatism?" This did not bode well for ambulatory automatism as defined by Babinsky's master, Charcot. Some years later Babinski demolished the medical substructure for fugue with his assault on hysteria. He became a rumbling volcano that erupted in 1908 at meetings of the Societé de Neurologie in Paris, 9 April and 14 May 1908. The classic stigmata of hysteria were, he asserted, the consequence of suggestion, sometimes directly from a doctor and more often culturally absorbed. Talk about Oedipal reactions: Charcot the father was slain, and with him his creature, hysteria. The famous Babinski reflex was a device for distinguishing neurological damage from hysterical suggestion. Joseph Babinski turned his back on hysteria and, from a position of considerable power in the military medical establishment as early as 1916, insisted that hysteric symptoms were not primarily neurological in origin, as Charcot had taught. They were the consequence at most of the suggestion of ideas and should be renamed. The chosen name was "pithiatism." After minor treatment for their fears, men could be returned to the front come what may, as the best cure for whatever troubled them. His work was published in English almost as soon as it came out in France. 46 Even a man as influential as Babinski even one as filled with Oedipal rage against Charcot as Babinski was did not do the deed single-handedly.47 Skepticism about hysteria was in place. Mark Micale argues that one ground for doubt was the influx of new types of diagnoses, including such German imports as dementia praecox, soon to be replaced by schizophrenia. Hysteria, writes Micale, "vanished into a hundred places in the medical textbooks."48 He means that the miscellany of symptoms was redistributed among a new set of illnesses. This is a rare unequivocal example of a scientific revolution, in the sense of Thomas Kuhn's last work.49 One taxonomy replaces another, to the point that we simply do not know what hysteria was any more. It was Kuhn's idea that when taxonomies are dumped in the course of revolution, a concept (or linguistic entity, a lexical item) from an old taxonomy could not be translated into a concept in the new taxonomy. Hence old ideas and practices become literally unintelligible to new-wave
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thinkers. Or, as Kuhn puts it, the old and the new taxonomic structures and languages express incommensurable ideas. Kuhn, I think, provides an analytic framework within which to understand the extinction of hysteria as a diagnosis. Here, however, I do not want to delve into grand schemes of intellectual history but to examine the transformation of ideas in terms of only one local curiosity, fugue. As new diagnoses came into play, fugue joined hands with them. Dementia praecox came into vogue in France at the turn of the century and by 1906 was firmly in place. One French pioneer of that diagnosis, Maurice Ducosté, was a Bordeaux graduate. He first found a fugue in dementia praecox, and within a year he generalized his analysis to a study of fugues in every kind of psychosis, as that term was understood at the time. 50 He thought that the word fugue was hopelessly vague. It had become increasingly important for social reasons, in assisting the law courts, and fortunately the obscurity of the word did not matter in questions of assigning responsibility. He was loyal to his roots: he stated that there was nothing much new in his ideas if only we had read Tissié carefully enough, we would have known that fugue was only an episode associated with many psychoses. Tissié, said Ducosté, devoted half his thesis to Albert, but he began with a basic list of five types of fugueurs the delirious, the hallucinating, the demented, the impulsive, and the captivated (the last being Albert). In addition Tissié had mentioned other psychoses as causes of fugue: erotomania, claustrophobia, anthropophagie (crazed cannibalism), and lycanthropy (assuming animal form, especially that of a wolf, and behaving accordingly). Ducosté in effect invited us to begin all over again, treating Albert as one among many types of fugueurs but adding the new dementia praecox to the list of possible causes of fugue. In short, the study of fugue had come full circle, back to zero. It had come back to that initial point where fugue was not yet an autonomous diagnosis. A present-day clinician who is skeptical about the fugue diagnosis may wonder if a large proportion of these old fugueurs would not now be diagnosed as manic-depressive (bipolar disorder).51 The fugue would be undertaken at the start of a "manic" state. This possibility virtually never comes up in the old literature. In France folie circulaire was diagnosed from the 1850s, and the descriptions are not so far from what we call manic depression. I have found one discussion, in 1903, that I reproduce in its entirety:
Page 74 M. Thivet. One can add to the different types of fugue that have been described, patients who are afflicted with folie circulaire, and who, at the moment of an attack, present themselves precisely in the form of migrateurs. M. Ballet. That is absolutely right; I can cite numerous examples in support of that; I recall in particular a fine fellow, a bit of an original, whom I diagnosed with folie circulaire only retrospectively, for I was young when I knew him. Normally he was a homebody, but he set out on an adventurous journey at the moment that he became excited. 52
The end of French fugues was signaled when the alienists and neurologists met in Nantes, 2-8 August 1909. Their congress was dedicated to two topics, mental illness in the military and fugue. Papers about fugue routinely discussed fugues by men with dementia praecox, or what we would now call schizophrenics.53 The survey presentation of fugues by Victor Parant began by distinguishing distinctive fugue types, namely melancholic fugues, oneiric fugues, epileptic fugues, the impulsive fugues of dementia praecox, dromomaniac fugues, second state (alternate personality) fugues, and systematic fugues. Those are the specific fugues; then there are the banal fugues, everything not included in the above. The old sortings were collapsing.54 Note the melancholic fugues in the above list. Melancholia! Now that is a very old category indeed. Parant introduced it in the light of a contribution from one of the Bordeaux contingent at the Nantes congress. Gaston Lalanne ran a private asylum on the outskirts of Bordeaux. His paper, Des fugues chez les mélancoliques et les persécutés mélancoliques, refers back to the very first paper with the title of Les Aliénés voyageurs of 1875 and notes that the author had said that it would be a complete mistake to think of mad traveling as a special kind of insanity, monomanie des voyages. Patients merely suffered from complex kinds of depression. Lalanne presented six new cases of melancholic fugue in which there was no amnesia.55 As for hysteria, our police-doctor contingent, Benon and Froissart, addressed that sarcastically: "Diagnosis of so-called epileptic and so-called hysterical fugue does not appear possible at present, to judge by the observations
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that have been published up to now." 56 Had we been at the Nantes conference, we would have felt ourselves entering a new era in psychiatry. Hysteria was out. Charcot had virtually disappeared. German-language psychiatry was increasingly to the fore. Fugue went out with a whimper. It is true that by the time of Parant's summary for the Nantes congress, there was a rapidly expanding array of fugue episodes, but hysterical fugue episodes were not among them. And as for hysterical fugue itself the diagnosis with which we began, and which seemed to fit the first fugueur perfectly it had virtually disappeared. I do not mean that French alienists or their heirs, the psychiatrists, never again mentioned fugue as opposed to fugue episodes. Men with an established interest in the field continued to contribute occasional cases. Roger Dupouy was the coauthor of a solid text from the year of the Nantes congress, 1909. It drew on cases presented by the authors the previous year, at the previous congress, in Dijon. They gave yet another tripartite classification, the obsessive, the persecuted, and the hysterical.57 Dupouy continued to classify fugues long after fugue ceased to be an autonomous disorder. In a coauthored paper published much later, in 1925, he made a final appeal to what he called grande fugue, strongly contrasted with epileptic fugue, although the prototype was furnished by the case reported in Dijon in 1908. "The ambulatory automatism of the great fugueurs, to which we have alluded, is not epilepsy. It is vigilambulisme, in every particular analogous to classic somnambulism, formerly linked with hysteria, and certainly very close to that neurosis, even if it is not to be confounded with it."58 The authors asserted that after years of attention to one ward for epileptics, there were no cases like Charcot's wellorganized Mén. The battles faded on. In 1933 Louis Marchand wrote a survey article on epileptic ambulatory automatism, insisting that one never saw fugue in epileptic wards (Dupouy was right), but that it was found in 6.4 percent of a series of 1,052 outpatients (Dupouy had drawn the wrong inference).59 Epileptic fugue was a phenomenon of the streets, not the wards. Three women and two men among the epileptic wandering patients had no other sign of epilepsy except fugue. Latent epilepsy lives, or so taught Marchand. The fact that fugue is wasting away as a distinct something is confirmed by the fact that Marchand's survey cited seventy-seven papers published before 1910 and only fifteen after 1918, most of them written or coauthored
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by Marchand himself, our friend Roger Dupouy, or Henri Claude. Claude had written extensively on childhood fugue and had shared in the description of fugues that occur in the manic phase following intense depression. 60 For a sense of how not only fugue but also the entire topic of dissociation had become the preserve of an old boys club, consider an event of 1937. Henri Claude (1869-1946) had just given a talk on the relations between hysteria and schizophrenia. Pierre Janet (1859-1947) was in the audience and said: "I thank M. Claude for the interesting way in which he has called to mind our old studies of psychological dissociation in hysteria. While I was listening to him I wondered whether this was still 1937, or if M. Claude had succeeded, by a trick of magic, in taking us back to 1892."61 It is ironic that Pierre Janet has been adopted as the godfather of the field of multiple personality and, more generally, of dissociation. He himself came to the conclusion that multiple personality was folie circulaire.62 And here, in 1937, we find him suggesting that dissociation was a fine conjectural idea for 1892 but not for the modern world. The same thing is true of fugue. Between 1887 and 1909 fugue was a significant, if transient, mental illness in France. And then it was no more.63 So I allow myself a moment of nostalgia. Why did Albert so grip the imagination of Philippe Tissié, future pedagogue of the velocipede? Because of the adventure. Those romantics among us who, although we pity Albert's very genuine suffering, nevertheless take a certain pleasure in his picaresque adventures, would not have been completely disappointed at the Nantes conference. One professor of medicine in attendance was Joseph Grasset (1849-1918). Grasset was another provincial, whose entire career was spent in the ancient medical faculty at Montpellier on the Mediterranean coast. He attained national recognition for his work on hysteria, writing the encyclopedia entry of 1889-112 pages long.64 That was a Charcotian account of the subject. But his views evolved in the course of successive editions of his textbook on nervous disorders. By 1905 he was stating a topography of the mind/brain that anticipates Freud's. In a popular article for the Revue des Deux Mondes he wrote of the two psychisms, one conscious, one unconscious, each correlated to a part of the brain; hysteria resulted when the two failed to interact with each other in an appropriate way.65 However, his lectures, when they turned to fugue, were more conventional and followed the Bordelais tradition.66
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Grasset presented to the Nantes congress the story of a patient who might restore us to the state of mind of the first students of fugue twenty years earlier. The subtitle, "Histoire d'un déserteur voyageur," has the right ring to it. The hero never arrives at quite such terrifying predicaments as did Albert, but the tale has something of the same charm. Henri C. was not, literally, the last fugueur. But he does mark the end of two decades in which impulsive uncontrolled traveling, with confused memories, was deemed to be a specific mental disorder in France. His is the story of a "demifou à fugues, who deserted over and over again, made the most improbable journeys, and would have ended by being severely punished by the court-martial if the military had not requested medico-legal expertise about his degree of responsibility." 67 Henri had not turned twenty at the time of his first desertion, in 1901. But that was not his first compulsive trip. At seventeen, when he had a good job as a garçon de café in Paris, he disappeared for Belgium. Next year, he left another café and traveled throughout the Midi, doing occasional work in the grape harvest or the coastal saltworks. He enlisted in 1900 and asked to be stationed in Montpellier on the ground that he had friends in a village nearby. His officers liked him. He adapted well to military discipline and had a cheerful disposition. But he would be struck by a fit of depression and leave his barracks. His own word for what I call depression was cafard, something that "took him," a black state that he "had." The army recorded eight fugues. He had little or no memory of the beginning of each of his journeys. He would recall later episodes and places and dates with greater clarity. He survived by occasional labor and by considerable native skill at sponging to the point of confidence trickery. He would claim to be a refugee from a French congregation that had been expelled from France; he feigned various nationalities and scrounged money from consuls of respective countries; in cafés he picked up the names of French residents to ask for help. His most spectacular fugue began on 9 September 1903. He traveled through Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia, Switzerland. Near the end, the French embassy in Vienna gave him 33 francs and letters for the railway and border authorities in Austria and Switzerland. One is forced to wonder: had he been told about Albert? Was he a true copycat? He got to Strasbourg, reported to a German officer as a French deserter, and said he wanted to join the German army. He received more small
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change and was on his way, going to Munich, reporting to a French official, promising to return to France and surrender as a deserter if given money. He did not, then, return, yet his fugues would always terminate in France, where he reported to French police, often at a point as far as possible from his unit, to which he then asked to be returned. He was sentenced to prison or hard labor on several occasions, but his incarceration usually ended in an asylum, and then his penalty was diminished. On one of his journeys he claimed to be Italian and enrolled in the French Foreign Legion, serving briefly in Oran before another compulsion to travel. The trips were real enough. Henri left a good enough paper trail, from the various authorities from whom he had scrounged, a trail patiently followed up by letters sent out by the military doctors. The experts wrote that Henri was above all, an "amoral. . . . The notions of good and evil do not exist in him: he has no idea of authority, of his superiors, of patriotism, of duty, of remorse." He fooled people about who he was in order to get their help, but he never stole, he never hurt anyone physically. The authorities noted, with some disdain, that Henri was absolutely indifferent to religious, political, or social questions; he scarcely knew the name of the president of the Republic. He drank absinthe, but this was held to be a consequence of his setting out on a fugue, rather than a cause. The doctors could not judge him to be insane, even at the moments of his desertion, at least not in the sense of the relevant section of military law. But they did conclude that Henri was in a state of diminished responsibility: (1) to a very great extent at the beginning of his fugues; (2) to some extent during the later period of his fugues; but (3) only to a slight extent for acts committed outside of his "attacks of ambulatory automatism." I have spoken of fugue as a mirror of tourism. I take Henri C. to be something of my own mirror image. His eighth and last reported fugue of 26 August 1907 took him over routes of which I am deeply fond. He had been in a military hospital at Montpellier, where he was struck by another fit of cafard. He managed to undo an iron bar on the window of the cell where he was detained (his only recorded damage to property, for which he was later to be fined 50 francs). He traveled on to Perpignan. From there he walked over the smugglers' trails between France and Spain, a network of glorious rocky walks in the Albères, the foothills of the Pyrenees, smothered, at the time of the year he traveled, with tiny flowers.
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The beekeepers of the region produce the best honey in the world, each peculiar to the flowers growing on a certain patch of chalky soil, where "the tiny pharmacists" 68 produce honey within which are ancient cures, while the old women of the region comb the stones for herbs, some as common as thyme or St. John's Wort, some so rare that they are named only in Catalan. Henri kept on traveling throughout Catalonia, as far as Barcelona. He even wrote to his unit from Gerona, the first major city on the Spanish side. In due course he reported, as usual, to the French police at the border town of Le Boulou. That is great fugue country. There on a flowery slope or on a windblown outcrop you may still encounter a nervous man who was hoping not to be seen. Today he is more likely to be a confused Moroccan making his way gingerly through to France than a dazed French infantryman heading for the safety of Spain. Today he is just a mixed-up illegal immigrant. Ninety years ago he suffered from a distinct mental malady, ambulatory automatism.
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4 Five Questions, Five Answers 1. What made fugue possible, as a medical diagnosis? An ecological niche, with four principal vectors to be named medical taxonomy, cultural polarity, observability, and release. 2. What did those old fugueurs suffer from? By 1990s criteria, some suffered from head injuries, some from temporal lobe epilepsy, and some from dissociative fugue. 3. Were doctors of the day warranted in holding hysterical fugue to be a real mental illness? Yes. 4. Was hysterical fugue a real mental illness? No. 5. Are analogous conclusions to be drawn about transient mental illnesses today? Yes. I have stated these answers abruptly, because I do not want to leave you asking, "and what does he really think?" I shall of course make some qualifications, but some parts of my considered answers will continue to be dogmatic. That is deliberate. The answers to the first four questions do not matter very much, but the
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framework within which the answers are given is of fundamental importance. No one now cares about hysterical fugue, but questions exactly like mine arise, right now, for many mental illnesses. I ask the questions about an obsolete diagnosis to prevent inflamed passions from obscuring our view about how to answer such questions. The ways in which I answer are intended as models for present debates. When I turn briefly to these I shall be forthright. I conclude with some strong words about the futures of both schizophrenia and the dissociative disorders. First Question What made the diagnosis possible? An ecological niche with four principal vectors to be named medical taxonomy, cultural polarity, observability, and release. I mean nothing technical by the word vector, whose origins are in mechanics, and which is also used in epidemiology. Here I use it as a metaphor. In mechanics, a force vector is a force acting in a direction. When there are several forces acting in different directions, the resultant force is the product of the different forces and their directions. The metaphor fails for niches, because we have no vector algebra to resolve forces. Yet the metaphor has the virtue of suggesting different kinds of phenomena, acting in different ways, but whose resultant may be a possible niche in which a mental illness may thrive. Medical taxonomy. Fugue fitted into a taxonomy, either as hysteria, or as epilepsy, or both. It did not dislodge existing systems of classification. But it invited a controversy: into which part of the established taxonomy should fugue be fitted? That made fugue theoretically interesting to physicians and alienists of the day. This was the medical taxonomy vector of the niche for fugue. Cultural polarity. Fugue perfectly fitted between two social phenomena that loomed very large in contemporary consciousness: romantic tourism and criminal vagrancy, one virtuous, one vicious. Both were deeply important to the middle classes, because one stood for leisure, pleasure, and fantasy escape, while the other stood for fear of the underworld. So fugue, as a phenomenon, was not interesting to ordinary people who did not go on meaningless and compulsive trips, people who could control their fantasies
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or indulge in them. It was an option that for the less fortunate lay between affluence and crime. This was a vector of cultural polarity. Observability. A substantial system of surveillance and detection was in place. French fugueurs had to have papers, if they went far. They were systematically subject to scrutiny as deserters or draft dodgers. You could not simply wander about the continent of Europe without being noticed by the authorities. In order for a form of behavior to be deemed a mental disorder, it must be strange, disturbing, and noticed. This is the observability vector of the niche for fugue. Release. Fugue was an inviting escape for a particular class, men who had steady work and a certain amount of independence. Their circumstances of income and family kept them this side of leisured travel. Their deep-set conformity to established mores kept them this side of crime. Fugue was a space in which dysfunctional men, on the edge of freedom yet trapped, could escape. This is the release vector of the niche for fugue. The metaphor of an ecological niche invites us to think of life in all its rich biocomplexity. I used to speak of the recent wave of multiple personality as parasitic upon child abuse. I said that in early twentieth-century America it was parasitic on spiritism and so on. The metaphor of the parasite is biological, but far too narrow. It is rather condescending, insulting even. It suggests that there is just one cultural element that enabled multiple personality to thrive. The concept of an ecological niche has the opposite effect. It reminds us that there must be many relevant vectors in play. To postulate a niche for an illness is to make two kinds of claim, one positive, one negative. In the presence of the relevant vectors, the illness flourishes; in their absence, it does not. We have controls in the past to check this. America and Britain, lacking both the cultural polarity and the observability vectors, had no fugue epidemic. Cultural polarity: Vagrancy was not a central social problem, and tourism within America had not yet become an industry. Observability: Travelers were not systematically inspected for papers; indeed one need have no identifying document on one's person. We also have controls in the present. Dissociative fugue is there on the books, in the 1994 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association. So this behavior fits a present medical taxonomy. But fugue as such (as opposed to fugue episodes) seems almost never to be diagnosed. When the committee for dissociative disorders, under the chair of
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David Spiegel, looked for published recent medical cases, it could find virtually none. Why is the disorder there in the American Manual but not on the highways and byways? There is an unkind answer. The dissociative disorders section of the Manual was introduced only in 1980 after a lot of jockeying by advocates of multiple personality. It is still highly contested. It is striking how recollections of the recent history of multiple personality disorder, written by members of the multiple movement, emphasize the importance of DSM-III; in 1980 multiple personality became an officially approved illness for Americans. Once multiple personality was on the books, it was diagnosed much more frequently. Advocates of this diagnosis write as if multiple personality just happened to get into that 1980 Manual. In fact it got there thanks to the insistent lobbying of the very authors who recall the history of their movement. One thing that helps keep dissociation in place is the existence of a small taxonomy under a single heading. Thus we have dissociative identity disorder, dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue, and depersonalization disorder. The last is, on my reading, not a dissociative disorder at all, but dissociation clinicians want to maintain it there in order to keep a taxonomic structure of interest. Fugue is there for the same reason. Spiegel, who chaired the dissociative disorders committee for the 1994 DSM-IV, is one of the most successful scientific investigators in contemporary American psychiatry and also a powerful figure in its corridors. He has many fields of expertise. His most famous contribution thus far has been the breast cancer study showing that women with a positive attitude to their illness and participating in various types of psychological selfimprovement have better life prospects, to the tune of eighteen months, than their sisters who are depressed by their illness. So far as concerns the dissociative disorders, he is above all a traumatologist, at the forefront of research in post-traumatic stress disorder. One of the incidental hazards of being involved in a mass disaster in America is that you will now be descended upon by traumatologists who will track you down for the rest of your life, to determine the long-term effects of the trauma upon your psyche. Spiegel helped give a strong trauma spin to dissociation. The dissociative disorders should be thought of as caused by trauma. In the case of fugue, he and his colleagues encouraged a search for trauma victims. In particular the
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case histories of soldiers were examined for trauma and fugue. They did not find much. The definitive ''Comprehensive Review" of psychogenic amnesia and fugue preceding DSM-IV was written by Richard J. Loewenstein, president of the International Society for the Study of Dissociation and Multiple Personality, 1991-92. Noting that the twentiethcentury literature is inconclusive and driven by many different theoretical perspectives (and not knowing about the nineteenth-century fugue epidemic), Loewenstein described his intention to "review conceptual and clinical issues in the study of amnesia and fugue with a particular focus on the relationship of these conditions to severe psychic trauma. The latter factor has only recently been systematically recognized as a significant determinant in the development of dissociative disorders." 1 In the literature reviewed, "amnesia and fugue" are very often jointly referred to, with the psychic trauma being associated with the amnesia. Differential diagnosis of amnesia and fugue is a bit of a mess, because one finds clear fugue episodes among individuals diagnosed with amnesia, and vice versa. To speak of "amnesia and fugue" is misleading, for the emphasis in nearly all the older wartime studies is amnesia.2 The review committee, theoretically dedicated to trauma as the cause of dissociation, did not realize that historical fugue in the military has been associated primarily with boredom, not fear. In the previous lecture I mentioned the only sustained studies of military fugue in recent times with which I am acquainted. All three report on French soldiers, mostly conscripts stationed in France, for a total of forty-four detailed cases, plus another fifty-seven who are listed. This is a very much larger sample of fugueurs than the American multiple personality movement has been able to uncover, and in none of the forty-four cases was there a reported history of significant trauma.3 Hence one has a good deal of caution with the assertion in a paper on amnesia, not fugue that fugues are most commonly reported in wartime.4 Better, perhaps, to state that "at this time there are no reliable statistical data that confirm any of the theoretical hypotheses advanced in connection with the disorder."5 I am not here taking a position on whether fugueurs may not all or most have experienced some kind of trauma, physical or psychic. Who has lived the trauma-free life, given present generous understandings of trauma?
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There is in fact one American example of a "young man who joined the army and served for a year during a fugue state." This underage soldier was very unhappy, teased by his schoolmates because of his large size, and generally miserable, but the data do not justify a claim of post-traumatic fugue, unless "trauma" means "unhappiness.'' 6 I am not arguing that trauma was irrelevant to dissociation. Elsewhere I have indeed urged a close and skeptical look at the ways in which psychic trauma, especially child abuse, became connected with multiple personality.7 Here I am making an uncontroversial statement of historical fact. The class of men in the military diagnosed with fugue is a class of peacetime draftees and occasional volunteers. It is not a class of battle-scarred veterans. But there is still a question as to why fugue is not diagnosed in America today. The trivial answer is that it is attached to a large number of different disorders, as an incident, not as a central disorder, but that is not very explanatory. Notice that even in the case of what would once have been called fugue, the very idea of fugue does not arise. Just before I gave these lectures, the San Francisco Chronicle had a story headlined "Police Need Help to Find Missing Epileptic Girl" (7 February 1997). A sixteen-year-old had "run away from her home." Her family was worried because she had not taken her epilepsy medication with her. A century earlier she might well have been sought as an epileptic fugueur. No sort of fugue has any niche today, except as a fugue episode in one or another disorder. The metaphor of the niche is my own, but there are many other metaphors in circulation. Readers of Michel Foucault have deluged us with descriptions of mental illness using the linguistic metaphor of discourse, or of a discursive formation. This is undoubtedly the most popular metaphor of the moment. I find this sad. Foucault carved numerous turns of phrase into ice sculptures, which had, for a moment, sharp contours. Then he walked away from them, insouciant, and let them melt, for he no longer needed them. His less gifted readers put the half-melted shapes in the freezer and, without thinking, reproduce these figures as if they still glistened in the midnight sun and meant something. Do not misunderstand me. My own debts to Michel Foucault are great. In a series of books published in 1975 and thereafter sometime before the
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anglophone Foucault industry took off I have been regularly acknowledging the profound influence of that wonderful thinker on my work. I used his thoughts but did not copy his vocabulary. But my lack of regard for the metaphor of "discourse" in connection with fugue is not just a matter of wanting to leave Foucault unscathed. It is because discourse does not do the work. Of course language has a great deal to do with the formation of an ecological niche, but so does what people do, how they live, the larger world of the material existence that they inhabit. That world must be described in all its peculiar and idiosyncratic detail. I hope that my example, drawing on diverse vectors of different types, may suggest the importance of not focusing on just one thing, not just discourse, not just power, not just suffering, not just biology, when one speaks of a niche. One point of the metaphor of an ecological niche is the complexity and sheer size of the manifold of elements that makes a new type of diagnosis possible. The only new generalization that I am suggesting is the existence of a good/evil pair. This polarity is mobilized by the new kind of illness in creating what we might, with some irony, call role models. The fact that I suggest that we look for both good and evil elements in society at large implies no commitment to any mystique of bipolarity. There could be several quite distinct "good" (or "bad") elements. The thought is more that madness may hover between virtue and criminality. 8 I do not venture onto the terrain of hysteria; that has been so intensely cultivated of late by historians of medicine and of nineteenth-century French society. We see, nevertheless, that the notion of an ecological niche fits that protean disease surprisingly well. The medical taxonomy vector was there to hand one had only to move hysteria out of gynecology and into neurology for Charcot's diagnosis to flourish. Hysteria, especially under the ministrations of that master, was quite extraordinarily visible, observable. And hysteria was a release, in words quoted in Lecture 3, a bodily expression of female powerlessness. What about the cultural polarity vector? This is the most original of my suggestions. Between which extremes of romantic virtue and frightening vice did hysteria hover? Micale has suggested that presentations of hysteria in novels, and among artists themselves, actually preceded the medical fascination and common diagnosis.9 That squares nicely with the picture of a
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romantic, higher, even virtuous type of behavior, above the constraints of society; mere madness could emulate that. On the other hand, there was the great scare of vice, of women falling prey to uncontrollable voluptuousness, of men and women giving way to crimes that they were not even aware of committing. Hysteria fits almost too nicely into my model of cultural polarity and indeed the entire formation of an ecological niche. The fit is so unnervingly good that it is necessary to repeat my caution. The ecological niche metaphor serves as a scheme in which to think about transient mental illnesses. It is not the whole story. Like any scheme or formalism, it omits the content of the illness. It is the warp and woof of the tapestry, not its vibrant life. Second Question What did those late nineteenth-century fugueurs suffer from? By 1990s criteria, some suffered from head injuries, some from temporal lobe epilepsy, and some from dissociative fugue. Historians of medicine have realized for a long time that retroactive diagnosis is a foolish game. It may be possible to play it in an amusing and instructive way, with this or that famous figure: a monster or a poet, a Hitler or a Byron. A certain type of biographer likes to find a rather uncommon present-day diagnostic category that nicely fits some of the odder features of the biographical subject. But when we turn from individuals to an extinct class of people, hysterics or fugueurs, there is no point in discussing what they "really" had, in part because there is no one present-day illness from which even the majority of them suffered. We can understand this as a striking instance of Kuhn's thesis, already mentioned in Lecture 2, that when an old classification collapses, we cannot translate the names for the old "kinds" (e.g., names for kinds of illness, such as "hysteria") into names for "kinds" in the new system of classification. The impossibility of retroactive diagnosis is the academically correct, official history-ofmedicine or philosophy-of-science teaching. But like many teachings that place great weight on propriety, this one contains more than a touch of self-righteous cant. We can say some things about old cases in the light of present experience. For example, when I described fugue in a seminar,
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two guests said, hey, those are our guys. Stanley Klein and Daniel Kaplan worked at a small clinic supported by public welfare funds rather than public medical funds. Community Head Injury Rehabilitation Services helps people for whom the health system has done what it can for severe head injuries but who have residual problems of living in the world. The clients are mostly men, because men, and especially young men, are the most likely to be head-injured: in motorcycle accidents, construction work, logging, barroom brawls. 10 In the past the most serious of head injuries were lethal. But medical technologies, many developed during the Vietnam War, now ensure that people who get to a trauma center within ninety minutes of their accident are quite likely to live. They are also quite likely to recover with various types of deficit, many of which heal slowly, if at all. The biggest problems for the most serious cases are amnesic lapses, sudden outbreaks of unmotivated rage and fury and fugue. The clients at CHIRS have, in effect, full-time backup support in the form of one or more social workers who know their full story. They carry a tag with a phone number. If they wake up with a feeling of amnesia or on the West Coast not knowing how they got there from Toronto, they phone in. Here is what is especially relevant to us: the social helper often has the task of filling in bits of memory, in ways that are eerily reminiscent of nineteenth-century memory recoveries done under the aegis of hypnotism. Mind you, the people helped by organizations like CHIRS are relatively lucky. I have met men elsewhere with a sorry tale to tell, for example, a man injured in a factory when a pile of pallets at a higher level fell on his head. Now he cannot hold down a job because from time to time, at work, he will break into a furious screaming fit of rage against his co-workers, of which he recalls nothing afterward. After the initial treatment for physical injury, the Workmen's Compensation Board denies any responsibility for his fits. It is tempting to play the retroactive diagnosis game with nineteenth-century fugue. You certainly can make a good case that childhood head injury, the result of a fall from a tree, was what really ailed Albert. I discuss that in Supplement 1. We find head injury in a number of other cases of fugue. We cannot avoid the conclusion that some of the fugueurs who made the French medical reports in 1887-1909 suffered from some sort of long-term
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brain damage. So there is a neurological, biological, element in the fugue epidemic, one that could not be well isolated at the time for lack of instrumentation and technology. That addresses only one aspect of the fugue epidemic. Perhaps we should attempt a different type of analysis, along the lines of Elaine Showalter's recent discussion of hysterical epidemics. Her examples include satanic ritual child abuse, alien abduction, multiple personalities, and delusional claims about government surveillance, as well as chronic fatigue syndrome and Gulf War syndrome. In my opinion Showalter, one of the most distinguished feminist historians of hysteria, is profoundly right in saying that hysteria is not dead. The word has so often had two connotations one of feminine overemotional reaction and the other of collective irrational hyperexcitement. Recent nonsense about aliens and Satan horrifically illustrate both the idea of psychological epidemic and the connotation of hysteria as contagious group excitability. Showalter demonstrates how our recent hysterias have one thing in common, a tormented fear of some evil other, from outer space, or from the depths of the soul, or from federal agents, or from the vicious patriarch, or from poisonous gas cocktails in the desert. After describing a few notorious examples, she says that "these sensational cases exemplify individual hysterias connecting with modern social movements to produce psychological epidemics." 11 I am inclined to treat the occurrence of Satan and similar devils in most of these epidemics as noncoincidental. I suspect that we are here concerned with an essentially Christian phenomenon, the devil, who has for two millennia stood in as a scapegoat to allow Christians to make sense of their own cruelty to Jews, heretics, women, witches.12 Mad bombers blow up federal buildings in the United States because these offices are in the devil's service. It must be a coincidence, but we should not forget that there was a Great Satan in the Gulf War. I do not claim that "hysterical" contagion of excess or madness is peculiarly Christian; I observe only the conjunction, in most of Showalter's examples, of hysteria with Satan or his surrogates. End-of-the-nineteenth-century fugue seems to me to be different. It was treated by a lot of positivist, republican (antimonarchist) scientific doctors who did not let the devil get a purchase. If we are to make a comparison between the dynamics of the fugue epidemic and the very recent and much
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more grand hysterias, we would point to the vagrancy scare of the 1880s. But there is a critical difference. Each individual afflicted with a current hysteria believes that he or she is being demonized. There is an enemy out there to be blamed, hunted, punished, destroyed. There is hardly a vestige of scapegoating in the stories of the hysterical fugueurs. There is a social history to tell about contagious psychological symptoms, but in the case of fugue, demons did not provide the catalyst not for the doctors, anyway. The nearest we get is another type of scapegoat, the great vagrancy fear studied by Beaune and emphasized by Donzelot. What does a more conventionally medical approach teach? In some cases we seem entitled to retroactive diagnosis. The category of dissociative fugue is there on the books, in DSM-IV and ICD-10 both definitions were quoted in full in note 9 to Lecture 1. It is to be expected that they should fit hysterical fugue, because the 1990s criteria are, as I put it, grandfathered from the earlier era. If we apply our current 1990s criteria mechanically, we can say that a good number of cases, right up to Hugh Patrick's sad 1907 story of the black steelworker, fit the template of dissociative fugue. From these we must exclude, by the official criteria, men with temporal lobe epilepsy or brain damage which might produce their behavioral problems. We have to insert a caution here. A number of cases discussed in Lecture 3, especially those under the care or scrutiny of Jules Voisin, were said to have double consciousness. DSM-IV explicitly excludes those patients from a diagnosis of dissociative fugue. When double consciousness was diagnosed, we ought, by definition, to file the case under dissociative identity disorder. Using the current format, then, some of the old fugueurs did not suffer from dissociative fugue but from dissociative identity disorder. This conclusion is more a matter of fiat than fact. Had the taxonomies been drawn differently as William James seemed to imply they should be, in his 1896 Lowell Lectures all fugueurs might have gone into the fugue box, while multiples who did not travel would have gone into the remainder box, the multiple box. At this point the question of what the old fugueurs "really" suffered from becomes arbitrary, much as today it may seem a mere matter of decision whether we say a person suffers from dissociative fugue (with extensive periods of amnesia) or dissociative amnesia (with fugue episodes). To conclude. My second question was: what did those late nineteenth-century
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fugueurs suffer from? For those who are content with the diagnostic manuals, the answer is: aside from those who had dissociative identity disorder, temporal lobe epilepsy, or brain damage, they suffered from dissociative fugue. Third Question Were doctors of the day warranted in holding hysterical fugue to be a real mental illness? Yes. There were disagreements, just as today there are disagreements about parallel questions. Charcot was skeptical about hysterical fugue, while Pitres, his student, thought that it was a real disorder. Both took for granted that if it were a real disorder, it would have a bodily, neurological, predisposing cause, activated by some occasioning circumstance. The belief in underlying neurology was more a research program than an established fact, in much the same way that a present-day commitment to the genetic basis of schizophrenia is programmatic rather than proved. I do not want to argue that the Charcotian program was as well warranted as the present searches for genetic determinants of schizophrenia, but it was in the same ballpark, and indeed the schizophrenia research program is a linear descendant of Charcot's. In both cases the evidence thought to be least controversial is derived from the incidence of illness in family trees. 13 Charcot did not have the bureaucratic resources of Danish records of diagnoses, family trees, and adoptions that have fueled more recent studies. I asked whether nineteenth-century beliefs were warranted. Unlike true, the praise word warranted is relational. A belief is warranted relative to available evidence and an underlying agreed conceptual structure. In 1997 a belief in the hereditary and neurological character of hysteria would be completely unwarranted. It was warranted in France in 1887. But what about hysterical fugue? That was controversial. Charcot was skeptical. Maybe you feel you would have been as skeptical as Charcot. Yet in 1907 Hugh Patrick, president of the American Neurological Association, argued that Charcot and his students were wrong in their skepticism. All the evidence, he said, pointed to fugue as hysterical in nature even in the case of Charcot's paradigmatic Mén. Many physicians, Tissié through Patrick, were confident that hysterical fugue is a real mental illness. Perhaps their confidence was not war-
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ranted they ought (we judge) to have been more cautious. But their conjecture, that it is a real mental illness, was altogether warranted. In brief, the answer to my third question is an emphatic Yes! Fourth Question Was hysterical fugue a real mental illness? No. Tense is confusing here. I am asking, in the present, a question about a past diagnosis. Since real is tenseless, we want to be asking whether hysterical fugue is a real mental illness, and yet we want to be referring to the past, past patients, past diagnoses. If you take the current diagnostic manuals the 1994 DSM-IV or the 1992 ICD-10 as authoritative, or at any rate the best available criteria for diagnosis, then it is easy to answer the question. Hysterical fugue was the old name for dissociative fugue. According to the manuals that is a mental illness. Hence, using the established criteria of 1997, what was once called hysterical fugue is a real mental illness. One way to answer the fourth question is, then: According to criteria approved by the American Psychiatric Association and the World Health Organization, hysterical (viz., dissociative) fugue is a real mental disorder. Unfortunately, people who ask my fourth question do not want to know what current manuals authorize. They want to know whether the disorder, by whatever name, is a real mental illness! The questioners want a more reliable authority than the current manuals. It would be hubris for a philosopher to profess to know better than the experts. That leaves us in a quandary. People who ask whether fugue was real do not want the DSM answer, and yet I have no right to go beyond that answer. What to do? Here is one possibility, at least for a philosopher. Invoke pragmatism. This is precisely the juncture at which the classical American philosophy, pragmatism, may seem to be useful. I do not mean latter-day pragmatism in its various guises, but the original product, propounded by C.S. Peirce, and which even by 1897 Peirce had renamed pragmaticism (not genuine without this signature). He renamed it because he disliked the way in which his creation was being abused even by his supporters, yes, even by William James. In a famous essay of 1878, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce briefly stated his understanding of the true and the real: "The opinion which is
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fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real." 14 Peirce explained that "fate means merely that which is sure to come true." Elsewhere Peirce observed that something akin to St. Paul's trio of faith, hope, and charity must be invoked in order to accept that something is fated to be agreed upon by all who investigate. In the case of psychiatry, even that may seem an understatement. One of the few domains in which I am a consistent pragmatist is pragmatism itself: use it when it is useful, but don't when it isn't. In a moment you will see why Peirce is so convenient to me here he allows me to evade a lot of endless debates and to do so without any shilly-shallying. I do not in general support Peirce's account of reality. I have long argued that the grammatical observations about the adjective real made by the Oxford linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin are more to the point than most philosophizing about reality.15 Obviously I cannot state what, at the end of inquiry, we shall think about dissociative fugue. Psychiatry has hardly begun its inquiry. But we are in a position to make a wellgrounded guess about future inquiries. The last time fugue was taken seriously as a major illness, worthy of collective discussion, was in 1909, at the Congress of Nantes. Fugue did continue a little longer, as a legitimate enterprise, in Germany. And it has been grandfathered into the diagnostic manuals of today. But it is not there because psychiatrists are diagnosing fugue in the wards and clinics. It is there to furnish an extra leg (or taxonomic branch) to prop up the category of dissociative disorders. Fugue is still discussed in the French tradition, literally in its home, Bordeaux. Is it the case that old diagnoses never die, they only fade away? No, just like old generals, they die. Dissociative fugue is on its deathbed. To tell the truth, an announcement of its death at the Congress of Nantes, in 1909, would not have been overly premature. Does not my very notion of an ecological niche contradict my negative judgment? Might not circumstances arise once more, in which dissociative fugue could thrive as a way to be mad? Yes, anything might happen in psychiatry. A Peircean answer requires Peircean virtues, faith, hope, and charity. The hopes of a curmudgeonly analytic philosopher will be very different from those of, let us say, a New Age prophet. The New Ager may hope that past-life regression comes to the point that we do all sorts of travel, in space
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and in the past, occupying new-old lives as we go. The New Ager may have faith that these cultural practices will come to pass and charitably hope that the curmudgeons will change their minds. More modestly, of course dissociative fugue could once again flourish as a type of mental illness. My hope is that the vector of medical taxonomy never succeeds in making space for it again. I have sufficient faith not based on good evidence or sound induction in the way in which psychiatry will work out to believe that fugue will never again appear as a distinct and autonomous and routinely diagnosed illness in its own right. Fugue episodes will continue aplenty, but they will be filed in many different interstices of the psychiatric taxonomies of the future. I could well be wrong. After all, traveling is such an obvious way to be mad that the human race may have an endless cycle of episodes in which fugue and its kind count as types of madness. Pragmaticism seems like a cheat. We did not want to know whether fugue would be accepted as a kind of madness "ultimately agreed on by all who investigated it." We wanted to know whether it was a real disorder! Some who protest so loudly are asking whether it will prove to be an identifiable organic, neurological, biochemical, maybe inherited (genetic) disorder. Well, if it were to prove to be genetic, and genetic disorders were to prove in the end to be the ones on which human beings agree, then it would count as real, on Peirce's criterion. Not everyone takes a biological attitude to every mental illness. Yet many may agree, each along their own line of thought, that fugue is not a real mental illness (Freud, for example, paid it no heed and pretty much dismissed multiple personality too). My answer to question 4, that fugue was not a real disorder, is one which a good many different attitudes to madness may be able to share. Peirce provides a neutral pragmaticist ground on which to do the sharing. So why do we feel dissatisfied with a Peircean answer? Because there is something more that we want to know. We have objective difficulties, at present, in grappling with the idea of real mental illnesses. This is not because we are in general prone to confusion about reality, but because psychiatry is in a transitional stage in the development of treatments for, and diagnoses of, mental illnesses. We think the problem is about reality when in fact the difficulty lies in the rapid progress of psychiatry itself. The philosopher Hilary Putnam recently wrote about a "common philosophical error of supposing
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that ''reality' must refer to a single super thing, instead of looking at the ways in which we endlessly renegotiate and are forced to renegotiate our notion of reality as our language and our life develops." 16 We have the feeling that there is some fixed, super thing about mental illness, a reality that divides the real illnesses from the fakes. I believe that our conceptions of real illnesses are of necessity being, as Putnam puts it, renegotiated at present. This is because of rapid changes in biological and chemical psychiatry. For two hundred years most psychiatrists have had the background vision that mental illness must be organically based. But classic figures such as Eugen Bleuler and Sigmund Freud, fully committed to that vision, had no trouble reconciling it with a psychological treatment. In their day the belief that mental illnesses were biological had few therapeutically significant consequences. We have seen Charcot with his bromides for epilepsy and today bromide means a palliative of no significant effect. Things have changed. There are now plenty of consequences of the biological approach thanks to the appearance of a wide range of quite successful drug therapies. At the same time psychological, so-called dynamic, therapy, still seems relevant to many clinicians, in all but the most grave cases. We simply have not sorted out our confusions about this. In America psychoanalysis is in disarray. In Europe and South America it still goes strong. I write these words in Zürich, rich in analysts of every known persuasion. Many of them have a very complex view of the value of analysis. Since they are so entrenched here, many have no problems about sending a patient for drug therapy if the patient prefers that. In their own work they speak not of cure but of a certain type of understanding. Events in medicine, not in philosophy, in time will lead to sorting out what we come to mean by a real mental illness. For the time being, it makes good sense to be pragmatists. Even the most charitable pragmatist may hope that fugue, as a diagnosis, will evaporate. Fifth Question Are analogous conclusions to be drawn about transient mental illnesses today? Yes. When we move to the present, it is the first and fourth questions that press on us. What makes an illness possible? Is it a real illness? My responses
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must be schematic. I shall run through the example I know best, namely, multiple personality, now named dissociative identity disorder. I invite readers to apply similar reasoning for other mental illnesses that appear to be transient. First question. What made possible the recent efflorescence of dissociative identity disorder? Was there, for example, anything like the cultural polarity, the tourism/vagrancy (romance/fear, virtue/vice) formation for multiplicity when multiple personality reemerged in America after 1970? Yes. One negative element in our world, on which multiplicity fastened, was child abuse. Child abuse was being presented as the gravest evil of all. One positive element on which multiplicity fastened was the rather romantic challenge to ideas of identity and selfhood that were going the rounds at the same time. These were taken to be very liberating. They overthrew the hegemony of the modern by the splintering glory of the purely "post-." (Post-modernism, which by definition implies a multiplicity of readings, especially selfreadings, can well be interpreted as a banalizing repetition of German romanticism, without the poetry.) People have criticized me for not discussing the self in connection with multiplicity. They were right, although not for the expected reasons. Worries about identity and the plethora of new identity options even sex changes that have appeared in our culture since 1970 are, in my opinion, rather like tourism for nineteenth-century fugue, a romantic opening up of possibilities, cast against the dark side of what is supposed to be identity destroyed and trust lost through child abuse. I do still maintain, as I argued in a long chapter of Rewriting the Soul, that multiple personality, as a disorder, shows nothing about those traditional philosophical conundrums labeled the mind, the self, the soul, the person, or identity. On the contrary, multiple personality, in my opinion, used some cultural events in the sphere of identity to embellish its niche. Multiple personality teaches nothing about "the self" except that it is an idea that can be exploited for many ends. So what makes a transient mental illness, like multiple personality, possible at a time and a place? I repeat my implausible answer. There is a pair of romantic-virtuous and frightening-vicious models manifest in the culture at large, between which the illness poses itself. On the virtue side is the liberation from hegemonic ideas about identity. On the vice side was child
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abuse. This pair forms a cultural polarity vector. But that is only one vector. An ecological niche must be constituted by many interacting elements. The observability vector always matters. In a quite literal sense multiple personality was highly observable not by policemen at the crossroads, as with the old fugueur, but by everyone watching afternoon talk shows. In the case of multiple personality we must never overlook the influence of feminism, trauma studies, the survival movements, the national fears about the dissolution of the family, and much more. There is also the internal history of dissociation in the psychiatric community and even the rediscovery of Pierre Janet by readers of Henri Ellenberger's The Discovery of the Unconscious, published in the critical year, for multiple personality, of 1970. Second question. What did recent multiple personality patients suffer from? In the case of fugue, I gave the rule book answer, namely, whatever the diagnostic manuals said they suffered from. Since multiple personality and now dissociative identity disorder are on the books, that is what many of the patients suffered from. Third question. Have recent clinicians been warranted in their diagnosis of multiplicity? Here we want not just the trivial answer, that the rule book OK's the diagnosis. We want to know whether the multiple personality movement was warranted in pushing its once iconoclastic diagnosis. I have often enough been asked my own opinion about this. Often the question "Is it real?" gets mixed up with "Were they warranted?" I am here giving my own opinion about whether they were warranted. My opinion is: yes, though I wish they had been more self-critical. It is pretty clear that I dislike the movement and many (but not all) of its practitioners. There were excesses beyond any expectation. The movement fed on a good many of the baser instincts of the human race. But (since I have been asked) I think that movement doctors were in the first instance warranted in their approach, even if they might have acquired some skepticism before lawsuits forced them to button their lips. Frederic Crews and others have engaged in therapeutically-induced-memory bashing, and in turn multiple bashing, as by-products of their industrial-strength Freud bashing. Doubtless in the dialectic of ideas bashing was called for, but I am not impressed by hyperbole on either side. Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen, who on the surface takes a much gentler (but perhaps in the
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end more seditious) line on Freud, has published an interview with the distinguished senior psychiatrist and expert on hypnotism Herbert Spiegel. Spiegel, as fate had it, was a consultant on the first modern multiple, fictionalized as Sybil. The headline in the New York Review of Books read: "Sybil Was Not a Multiple." 17 It is no accident that Frederic Crews's own wonderful anti-Freudian polemics first appeared in the New York Review. Several other patterns are evident. Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen (from whom I have learned a good deal) wrote increasingly skeptical analyses of Lacan. Then he did a delightful exposé of Anna O., the inaugurating patient for psychoanalysis.18 Anna O., you could say, has the role for the psychoanalytic movement that Sybil has for the modern multiple movement. Now even if we put the worst possible construction on the inaugurating patients, it does not follow that the movements to which their cases gave rise are corrupt, false, or evil. To think otherwise would be to commit a kind of genetic fallacy. Thus even granting every word of Herbert Spiegel's as literal truth, I am not persuaded that Cornelia Wilbur, Sybil's very eccentric clinician, was wrong in creating a veritable prototype of multiple personality out of Sybil, the disturbed young woman. Agreed, Sybil did not behave as a multiple for Spiegel. But that is characteristic of prototypical multiples, that they do not perform as multiples in all contexts and overtly deny their syndrome when convenient. I am not saying, contrary to the headline, that Sybil definitely was a multiple. I say only that Spiegel's repeated interviews with skeptical parties are not compelling. I shall leave it at that. I have been asked what I thought. I believe the multiple movement clinicians were warranted in their early diagnoses and treatment but then went wild. I judge that some of its leaders, like those of other flamboyant movements, are credible, and some are charlatans. Fourth question. Is dissociative identity disorder a real mental illness? Using Peirce's criterion of reality, I think not. But this is a matter of faith, hope, and charity. Some mental disorders are, in my opinion, real. In the case of schizophrenia, for example, despite the conflicting claims, I hope that within twenty years we shall have a grip on one or two or perhaps three fundamental types of schizophrenia. Possibly these will be completely distinct entities with distinct etiologies. One might be genetic in nature, one
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environmental. Or more complex stories may emerge. What I hope is that schizophrenia will emerge as one (or several) bodily dysfunctions, neurological, biochemical, or whatever, which we shall be able to help or cure in a theoretically well-understood and a practically well-articulated way. This hope must be shared by the majority of research scientists in the field, although there is a minority whose expectations run counter to this general trend. If this hope is fulfilled, then schizophrenia is a real disorder, or perhaps several distinct real disorders are at present called schizophrenia. My own expectations about the dissociative disorders are different in kind from those for schizophrenia. In the case of dissociation, I hope that history repeats itself, but once only. I hope it goes away, for keeps. Let me explain. It is a mere figure of speech, a conceit, to speak in terms of exact centuries, but it is a convenience. The situation, in the spring of 1997, was analogous to that in the spring of 1897. A few years ago a brief and working consensual synthesis about multiple personality was reached. In 1992 and 1994 the two manuals for psychiatric diagnosis were published. Each found a place for multiple personality; in the case of the American diagnostic manual, the disorder was named dissociative identity disorder. There were rules for differential diagnosis. Psychiatry was less bureaucratic a century ago, but in 1895, for example, Fulgence Raymond made his authoritative statement on hysterical, epileptic, and psychasthenic fugue, providing differential diagnosis to sort between the three. That event begins my centennial analogy. What about the future? The future of 1897 was 1909. It is true that in 1907 Hugh Patrick came out strongly in favor of hysterical fugue. But that position was, as I put it in Lecture 3, obsolescent. The Society of Neurologists and Alienists had its Congress of Nantes in 1909. One of the two topics was fugue. That was the last congress ever to address fugue as an autonomous illness. Hysterical fugue made its last glorious stand in France with Henri C., with whom I ended Lecture 3. And that was that. I would like something similar to happen in twelve years' time, in 2009. I would like to observe the very last congress at which the