L O G O S A N D L A W IN T H E L E T T E R O F JAMES
SUPPLEMENTS TO
NOVUM TESTAMENTUM EDITORIAL BOARD
O K . BARRETT, Durham - P. BORGEN, Trondheim J . K . ELLIOTT, Leeds - H J . DEJONGE, Leiden A J. MALHERBE, N e w Haven M . J J . MENKEN, Utrecht - J. SMIT SIBINGA, Amsterdam Executive Editors MM.
MITCHELL, Chicago & D.P. MOESSNER, Dubuque
V O L U M E C
LOGOS AND LAW IN THE LETTER OF JAMES The Law of Nature, the Law of Moses, and the Law of Freedom
BY
M A T T A. J A C K S O N - M c C A B E
BRILL LEIDEN • B O S T O N • K O L N 2001
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jackson-McCabe, Matt A . Logos and law in the letter o f James : the law o f nature, the law o f Moses, and the law o f freedom / by Matt A . Jackson-McCabe. p. cm. — (Supplements to Novum Testamentum, ISSN 01679732 ;v. 100) Revision o f the author's thesis—University o f Chicago, 1998. Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index. ISBN 9004119949 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Law (Theology)—Biblical teaching. 2. Bible. N T . James—Criticism, interpretation, etc. I. Title. II. Series. BS2785.6.L34 J33 2000 227'.9106—dc21
00-050733 CIP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufhahme Jackson-McCabe, Matt A.: Logos and law in the letter o f James : the law o f nature, the law o f Moses, and the law o f freedom / by Matt A. Jackson-McCabe.. - Leiden ; Boston; Koln : Brill, 2000 (Supplements to Novum testamentum ; Vol. 100) Zugl. : Chicago, Univ., Diss., 1998 ISBN 90-04-11994-9
ISSN ISBN
0167-9732 90 04 11994 9
© Copyright 2001 by Koninklijke Brill NV,Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy itemsfor internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriatefees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 DanversMA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
For A. J. and Jeremy
CONTENTS
Abbreviations
xi
Acknowledgments
xv
Introduction I. I M P L A N T E D LOGOS
1 IN T H E
INTERPRETATION
OF JAMES
7
Jewish C o m p o s i t i o n and Stoic Logos
11
Christian C o m p o s i t i o n and Logos as G o s p e l
16
T h e Thesis o f a Superficial Stoic Influence
17
T h e Rejection o f Stoic Influence L u d w i g ' s Wort als Gesetz T h e P r o b l e m and the Thesis II. L A W A S I M P L A N T E D LOGOS:
20 23 24
CICERO AND
THE STOICS O N NATURAL LAW
29
L a w as Logos
32
Natural L a w as C o s m i c Logos
34
Natural L a w as H u m a n R e a s o n
36
T h e Development o f Human Reason
40
T h e Stoic D o c t r i n e o f Implanted Preconceptions
43
T h e Problem
44
C i c e r o and S e n e c a o n the C o n c e p t o f the G o o d
53
okelcocK; a n d the Implanted Preconceptions
59
Epictetus o n Implanted C o n c e p t s
62
Excursus: Belief in the G o d s as ejjxpDxoc;
67
Conclusions
72
Natural L a w as "Implanted R e a s o n " Implanted Preconceptions, H u m a n R e a s o n ,
73 and
Natural L a w
73
Natural L a w as ratio insita Ratio insita as Xoyoq eiiymoq: o f the De Legibus
75 T h e Greek Source 81
viii
CONTENTS
III. T H E L A W O F M O S E S , T H E T E A C H I N G
OF
JESUS, A N D N A T U R A L L A W
87
Philo o f Alexandria
89
Philo and the Stoics
89
T h e L a w o f Nature and the L a w o f M o s e s
91
T h e Sage as e|i\|n)%o<; vojioq
93
C o n c l u s i o n : Philo o n Natural L a w
95
4 Maccabees
95
H u m a n R e a s o n and Jewish L a w
98
H u m a n Nature and Jewish L a w
100
C o n c l u s i o n : T o r a h as Natural L a w in 4 Maccabees
103
T h e Apostolic Constitutions
105
T h e Question o f a Non-Christian Prayer Collection ....
106
T h e Implanted L a w and the L a w o f M o s e s
113
Implanted L a w as H u m a n R e a s o n
117
C o n c l u s i o n : Implanted L a w in the Apostolic Constitutions
121
L a w and Logos as " I m p l a n t e d "
122
T h e Second Apology o f Justin M a r t y r
123
Methodius
127
Early Interpretation o f J a m e s 1:21
131
Conclusion I V . T H E I M P L A N T E D LOGOS
132 AND THE LAW OF
FREEDOM
135
Implanted Logos and the Perfect L a w o f F r e e d o m
139
The Law o f Freedom
145
T h e Perfect L a w
152
The Royal Law
153
C o n c l u s i o n : J a m e s and the Stoics o n L a w
154
T h e L a w o f F r e e d o m and the T o r a h
154
Acts o f Partiality in 2 : 1 - 1 3 Partiality, L o v e o f N e i g h b o r , and the " W h o l e L a w "
157 ....
T h e Argument o f 2:8-11 T h e L a w o f F r e e d o m and the T o r a h Implanted Logos in Light o f the T o r a h and J u d g m e n t V . LOGOS
A N D DESIRE
H u m a n Desire and the Logos o f T r u t h A c q u i r i n g " G o o d Gifts"
165 169 176
....
186 193 196 200
CONTENTS
ix
Desire and the Gifts o f G o d in 4 : 1 - 6
201
Desire and the Gifts o f G o d in 1:13-18
206
T h e T w o W a y s and the W a n d e r i n g
Children
of G o d Xoyoq akrfiziaq
208 and Euxpmoq Xoyoq
Conclusion
214 215
Logos and Erga
216
Enduring T e m p t a t i o n
221
oXoK^ripoq
223
xekeioq EV jir|8evi
224 tauto^evoi
7teipaouo<; in J a m e s
230 231
Birth b y Logos
233
Logos and Desire as " T w o W a y s "
238
Conclusion
241
Bibliography
255
I n d e x o f A n c i e n t Literature
265
I n d e x o f M o d e r n Authors
279
ABBREVIATIONS
AB
A n c h o r Bible
ABD
Anchor Bible Dictionary
AJP
American Journal of Philology
ANF
The Ante-Nicene Fathers
ANRW
Aufstieg und Medergang der rbmischen Welt
APOT
R . H . Charles (ed.), Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old
ATR
Anglican Theological Review
BA
Biblical Archaeologist
BAGD
W . Bauer, W . F. Arndt, F. W . Gingrich, and F. W . Danker,
BDF
F. Blass, A . D e b r u n n e r and R . W . Funk, A Greek Grammar
Testament
Greek-English Lexicon of the New of the New
Testament
Testament
BHT
Beitrage zur historischen T h e o l o g i e
Bib
Biblica
BJS
B r o w n J u d a i c Studies
BWANT
Beitrage zur Wissenschaft v o m Alten und Neuen Testament
BZNW
Beihefte zur
CBQ
Catholic Biblical Quarterly
CNT
C o m m e n t a i r e du N o u v e a u T e s t a m e n t
CSCO
C o r p u s scriptorum christianorum
Ebib
Etudes bibliques
Q(W
orientalium
FB
Forschung zur Bibel
GCS
D i e Griechischen christlichen
HNT
Handbuch z u m Neuen Testament
HR
History of Religions
Schriftsteller
HTKNT
Herders theologischer K o m m e n t a r z u m N e u e n Testament
HTR
Harvard Theological Review
HUCA
Hebrew Union College Annual
HUT
Hermeneutische
IBC
Interpretation: A Bible C o m m e n t a r y
Untersuchungen
zur T h e o l o g i e
Preaching ICC
International Critical
JBL
Journal of Biblical Literature
Commentary
for T e a c h i n g
and
Xll
ABBREVIATIONS
JJS
Journal of Jewish Studies
JR JSJ JSNTSup
Journal of Religion Journal for the Study of Judaism Journal for the Study o f the N e w Testament, Supplement Series
KEKNT
Kritisch-Exegetischer K o m m e n t a r iiber das Neue Testament
LCL
L o e b Classical Library
LSJ
Liddell-Scott-Jones, Greek-English Lexicon
MGWJ
Monatsschrift fur Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums
MNTC
Moffatt N e w Testament C o m m e n t a r y
MPG
J. P. M i g n e (ed.), Patrologjtae cursus completus. Series Graeca
NHMS
N a g H a m m a d i a n d M a n i c h a e a n Studies
NICNT
T h e N e w International Commentary o n the N e w Testament
NIGTC
T h e N e w International
NovT
Novum Testamentum
G r e e k Testament C o m m e n t a r y
NovTSup
N o v u m Testamentum,
NRSV
N e w Revised Standard V e r s i o n
Supplements
NTD
D a s N e u e Testament Deutsch
NTS
New Testament Studies
OTKNT
Okumenischer Taschenbuchkommentar z u m Neuen Testament
OTP
J. H . Charlesworth (ed.), The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha
PVTG
Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti graece
RAC
Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christentum
RB
Revue biblique
RevScRel
Revue des sciences religieuses
R G W
Religionsgeschichdiche V e r s u c h e u n d V o r a r b e i t e n
RivistB
Rivista biblica
SB
Sources bibliques
SBLSP
Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers
SBS
Stuttgarter Bibelstudien
SO
Symbolae osloenses
ST
Studia Theologica
SVF
H . v o n A r n i m (ed.), Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta
SVTP
Studia in Veteris Testamenti
TDJVT
G . Kittel a n d G . Friedrich (eds.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
TSK
Theologische Studien und Kritiken
TU
Texte und
Untersuchungen
Theologische ^eitschrift
pseudepigrapha
xiii
ABBREVIATIONS
WBC
W o r d Biblical C o m m e n t a r y
WTJ
Westminster Theological Journal
WUNT
Wissenschafdiche Untersuchungen z u m N e u e n T e s t m a m e n t
ZKT
Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie
ZKW
Zeitschrift fur die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
Concerning References to the Ancient Sources W h e r e possible, abbreviations
for ancient literature given in
the
Society o f Biblical Literature H a n d b o o k have b e e n followed. For other ancient works, the abbreviations list o f TDKT
has b e e n used as a
guide, though some have been slightly modified. References to SVF are to v o l u m e and entry n u m b e r unless explicitly identified otherwise.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
T h i s study is a revised version o f a dissertation
submitted to the
D e p a r t m e n t o f N e w Testament and Early Christian Literature at the University o f C h i c a g o in D e c e m b e r , 1998. Its publication gives m e an opportunity to express, o n c e again, m y gratitude to m y teachers. H a n s Dieter Betz, A d e l a Y a r b r o Collins, Arthur J. D r o g e , J o h n J. Collins, and the late Arthur W . H . Adkins have p r o v i d e d not only invaluable guidance and e n c o u r a g e m e n t , but m o d e l s o f excellence in scholarship that I c a n only h o p e to have a p p r o x i m a t e d in these pages. I w o u l d also like to thank D a v i d M o e s s n e r and the Editorial B o a r d o f Supplements to Novum Testamentum for publishing this study. I a m especially grateful for the very insightful criticisms and suggestions o f their a n o n y m o u s reviewers. I have followed them wherever p o s sible, a n d the result is a substantially i m p r o v e d manuscript.
Many
thanks are also due to Z e b a C r o o k , w h o proofread the entire m a n uscript and, with the help o f Nicholas Jesson and K e l l y Q u i n n , c o m piled the indices. T h e i r help was m a d e possible b y a generous grant from the Niagara University Research C o u n c i l , for w h i c h I a m most grateful. It goes without saying, o f course, that all remaining p r o b lems are m y o w n responsibility. Finally, and always, I w o u l d like to thank A . J. for her patience and constant e n c o u r a g e m e n t , and J e r e m y for giving his d a d d y per spective o n the w h o l e project. T h e dedication o f this study to them is a small s y m b o l o f their important role in its c o m p l e t i o n .
INTRODUCTION
T h e Letter o f J a m e s ranks a m o n g the most enigmatic works o f early Christian literature. O n e searches critical scholarship in vain for any consensus o n fundamental questions regarding its place in e m e r g i n g Christianity. R o u g h l y equal n u m b e r s
o f scholars argue that it rep
resents an authentic w o r k o f J a m e s , the brother that it is p s e u d o n y m o u s ;
1
o f Jesus, as argue
that it was written in Palestine, as that it
was written f r o m the diaspora; that it is to b e included a m o n g the earliest works o f the N e w T e s t a m e n t , as that it is a m o n g the latest. S o m e , m o r e o v e r , have argued that the Letter o f J a m e s has n o place in early Christianity; that it was originally a Jewish w o r k o n l y subsequendy "christianized" b y the insertion o f references to Jesus Christ, w h o is in fact explicitly m e n t i o n e d only twice (Jas
1:1; 2:1).
A s there is n o certain attestation o f J a m e s prior to the third c e n tury,
2
the historian is d e p e n d e n t
a b o v e all o n e v i d e n c e internal to
the w o r k itself for locating it within early J u d a i s m o r Christianity. T h e e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , is frustratingly scanty. T h e address o f the letter to "the twelve tribes w h o are in the diaspora" has
suggested
to s o m e that it was c o m p o s e d in Jerusalem, a n d thus n o later than the
m i d - 6 0 ' s C E . H o w e v e r , the
possibility that a
pseudonymous
author has assumed the guise o f J a m e s o f Jerusalem, a n d the that Jas address,
fact
1:1 must in any case b e u n d e r s t o o d as a highly s y m b o l i c 3
renders this supposition m o s t uncertain. O t h e r elements o f
the letter w h i c h have often b e e n taken as indications o f its provenance, such as the author's g o o d G r e e k diction o r the reference to the early a n d late rains in Jas 5:7, must b e considered equally
1
tenuous.
4
Over the history o f the discussion, one also finds, though less frequently, sugges tions that the author is James the son o f Zebedee, or some otherwise unknown James. For references see M . Dibelius, James: A Commentary on the Epistle of James (11th ed., rev. H . Greeven; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 5 1 - 5 2 . All references to Dibelius's commentary in the present work cite this edition, unless otherwise noted. Throughout this study, I will refer to the letter and its author as "James." T h e latter is done only for the sake o f convenience and is not intended to convey my advocacy o f any particular theory o f authorship. See M . A . Jackson-McCabe, " A Letter to the Twelve Tribes in the Diaspora: Wisdom and 'Apocalyptic' Eschatology in the Letter of James," SBLSP 35 (1996) 510-15. For a recent survey o f the various views regarding James's provenance see P. H . Davids, " T h e Epistle of James in Modern Discussion," ANRW 2.25.5 (1988) 3622-25. 2
3
4
2
INTRODUCTION
S o m e w h a t m o r e p r o m i s i n g are indications o f the rhetorical situa tion envisioned in the letter. O f particular i m p o r t a n c e in this regard is James's relation to Paul. T h i s issue, h o w e v e r , is quite c o n t r o v e r sial in its o w n right. Interpreters argue variously that James's tique o f the n o t i o n o f "faith without w o r k s " is a p o l e m i c
cri
against
Paul himself; that it is a c o r r e c t i o n o f a " m i s u n d e r s t o o d " (by James) o r "misused" (by others) pauline idea; o r that it has n o c o n n e c t i o n to particularly pauline ideas at all. R e s o l u t i o n o f this controversial p r o b l e m d e p e n d s largely o n o n e ' s reconstruction o f James's v i e w o f "faith" a n d " w o r k s , " a n d its relation to his interest in law (cf. 1:25; 2:8-12; 4:11-12). Ultimately, then, o n e w h o wishes to locate the Letter o f J a m e s within ancient J u d a i s m o r Christianity has little m o r e to w o r k with than his o r her reconstruction o f its religious thought. O f course, the first a n d m o s t basic requirement o f any attempt to define James's place within (or without) e m e r g i n g Christianity o n this basis is s o m e b r o a d reconstruction o f the origins and development o f early Christian thought m o r e generally. M o s t often in the history o f scholarship, such reconstructions have b e e n i m a g i n e d o n an essentialist p a r a d i g m . Luther's w e l l - k n o w n assessment o f the Letter o f J a m e s a n d its place in early Christianity is quite instructive in this respect. J a m e s , a c c o r d ing to Luther, "is flatly against St. Paul a n d all the rest o f Scripture in ascribing justification to w o r k s . " M o r e o v e r , t h o u g h its "purpose is to teach
Christians,"
in all this long teaching it does not once mention the Passion, the res urrection, or the Spirit o f Christ. He names Christ several times; how ever he teaches nothing about him, but only speaks o f general faith in G o d . . . All the genuine sacred books agree in this, that all o f them preach and inculcate [treiben] Christ. . . But this James does nothing more than drive to the law and to its works. 5
In short, the Letter o f J a m e s "has nothing o f the nature o f the gospel a b o u t it."
6
Luther ultimately c o n c l u d e d , therefore, that J a m e s "is n o t 7
the w o r k o f any apostle." I n d e e d , it is reported that o n at least o n e o c c a s i o n Luther
anticipated
the later critical theories o f the
non-
Christian authorship o f the letter b y suggesting "that s o m e J e w w r o t e it w h o p r o b a b l y heard a b o u t Christian
p e o p l e but never e n c o u n
tered any."
5
6
7
E. T . Bachman, ed., Luther's Works (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1967) 35. 396. Ibid., 35. 362. Ibid., 35. 396.
INTRODUCTION
3
Since he heard that Christians place great weight on faith in Christ, he thought, "Wait a moment! I'll oppose them and urge works alone." This he did. He wrote not a word about the suffering and resurrec tion of Christ, although this is what all the aposties preached about. 8
A s emerges quite clearly from these remarks, Luther's evaluation o f James
a n d its place in early Christianity was d e t e r m i n e d in large
measure b y t w o related assumptions: first, there was s o m e essential message, o r " g o s p e l , " that was c o m m o n to "all the apostles"; a n d second, this essential message underlies "all the genuine sacred b o o k s . " T h i s m o d e l for imagining Christian origins is at least as o l d as c o m peting Christian
claims o f originary o r t h o d o x y o v e r against diver
gent, d e c a d e n t heresy. A s a hermeneutical
a p p r o a c h to the N e w
T e s t a m e n t c a n o n , o n e sees a critical step in this direction already in Irenaeus's v i e w that the " S o n o f G o d , " through M a t t h e w , M a r k , Luke and J o h n ,
"has
g i v e n us the
Gospel under four
aspects."
9
I n d e e d , the assumption that a single such essence—often, as with Irenaeus a n d Luther, spoken o f in terms o f "the G o s p e l " — u n d e r l i e s e a c h o f the various writings o f the N e w T e s t a m e n t is reflected in the very formulation a n d arrangement o f the c a n o n itself.
10
S u c h an essentialist a p p r o a c h to early Christianity is, at least for the historian, quite p r o b l e m a t i c .
11
Simply put, the historian has "nei
ther a theoretical basis n o r an empirical warrant" for assuming the persistence o f any given trait, o v e r time, w h i c h might b e taken to constitute the "essence" o f Christianity.
12
A n d while historical criti
cism, as H a r r y G a m b l e has rightly observed, "has traditionally dis r e g a r d e d the c a n o n as irrelevant for the interpretation documents,"
13
o f individual
the influence o f this long-standing p a r a d i g m o n the
m o d e r n critical study o f Christian origins a n d the N e w T e s t a m e n t
8
This suggestion was reportedly made in the Summer or Fall o f 1542; see Luther's Works 54. 424. A. H. 3.11.8. This approach to the gospels is correlated with the later use o f the titles "Gospel according to" by H . Y . Gamble [The New Testament Canon: Its Making and Meaning [Guides to Biblical Scholarship, N T Series; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985] 35; cf. 76). See Gamble, New Testament Canon, 73-82. T h e appropriateness o f this model for the theologian is another matter, but one that need not be addressed for the purposes o f the present study. O n the problem o f using an essentialist (monothetic) paradigm for the classi fication of historical phenomena, see the very important essay of J. Z . Smith, "Fences and Neighbors: Some Contours o f Early Judaism," Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press, 1982) 1-18. T h e phrase "neither a theoretical basis nor an empirical warrant" is taken from p . 4. The New Testament Canon, 80. 9
10
11
12
13
4
INTRODUCTION
should n o t b e underestimated. In fact, though perhaps not as o v e r d y so, such an a p p r o a c h continues to inform critical scholarship o n the Letter o f J a m e s . This is n o w h e r e m o r e evident than in the interpretation implanted logos" (6
ejLtcpuxoq
o f "the
Xoyoq) w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g to the
author
o f J a m e s , "is able to save y o u r souls." " T h a t the gospel, if o b e y e d , is able to save a person's self [cf. \|/u%f|]," writes o n e interpreter o f Jas
1:21, "is certainly a truism o f the N [ e w ] T f e s t a m e n t ] . "
14
This
assumption regarding the centrality o f "the g o s p e l " in early Christian or, in this c o m m e n t a t o r ' s terms, " N e w T e s t a m e n t " soteriology m a n ifests itself n o less definitively, if m o r e subtly, in the c o m p a r i s o n s w h i c h various interpreters have formulated to illuminate the m e a n 15
ing o f James's "implanted logos'."
A r n o l d M e y e r and M . - E . Boismard,
w h o argued for the non-Christian origin o f J a m e s as a w h o l e (so M e y e r ) o r at least o f Jas
1:17-21 (so Boismard), a d d u c e d passages,
respectively, from C i c e r o ' s De Legibus and the Apostolic Constitutions in support o f the thesis that the association o f "implanted logos" with a perfect law in J a m e s results from a d e p e n d e n c e o n the Stoic equa tion o f h u m a n reason with natural law. W i t h the rejection o f these scholars' m o r e general views regarding the non-Christian origin o f J a m e s o r o f this passage, h o w e v e r , has c o m e a (usually tacit) rejec tion o f their interpretation o f its logos. Regardless o f their views regard ing the philosophical origin o f this expression, those scholars w h o do identify J a m e s as a Christian w o r k have generally i g n o r e d the rele vant passages from C i c e r o o r the Apostolic Constitutions, and e m p h a sized, rather, the similarities between the language used in c o n n e c t i o n with the logos in J a m e s and the treatment o f "the G o s p e l " elsewhere in the N e w Testament. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , Martin Dibelius, w h o reasoned from James's description o f the "implanted logos" as that " w h i c h is able to save y o u r souls" that, regardless o f the expression's philosophical p r o v e n a n c e , James's logos must b e interpreted as "the 1
'saving' word—hence, the gospel" ** If J a m e s is a Christian w o r k , it is evidendy reasoned, then the logos which, according to its author, "saves" must b e that w h i c h is the unique possession o f Christians, the essence o f Christianity; in a w o r d , "the G o s p e l . " Such reasoning finds par-
14
P. H . Davids, The Epistle of James: A Commentary on the Greek Text ( N I G T C ; Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1982) 95. For what follows, see the detailed discussion below in Chapter O n e . Dibelius, James, 113 (emphasis mine). 15
16
INTRODUCTION
5
ticularly vivid expression in M a r t i n Klein's recent interpretation o f the Xoyoq aXrfieiaq
o f Jas
1:18. " M i t B e z u g a u f G o t t , " K l e i n writes,
sind es vor allem zwei 'Worte', die so bezeichnet werden konnen: die Tora und die christliche Verkundigung. Da es sich nun beim Jahobusbrief um ein christliches Schreiben handelt, wird auch mit dem 'Wort der Wahrheit' in irgendeiner Form die christlische Verkundigung gemeint sein} 1
O n e suspects that the "riddle o f J a m e s , " w h i c h has b e c o m e almost proverbial since the publication o f M e y e r ' s Das Ratsel des Jacobusbriefes, results as m u c h f r o m the i n a d e q u a c y o f the interpretive
paradigms
b r o u g h t to the w o r k as f r o m the ambiguities in the text itself; that it is a c o n s e q u e n c e , particularly, o f treating the category "Christian" as t h o u g h it c o n n o t e d s o m e essential and static sine qua non. W h a t e v e r the case, it is the guiding assumption o f this study that neither the simple classification o f the Letter o f J a m e s as "Christian" n o r
its
presence in the N e w T e s t a m e n t c a n o n p r o v i d e a sufficient basis o n w h i c h to formulate conclusions regarding its understanding o f what constitutes the " w o r d o f truth" o r the means for "salvation." In fact, while I d o classify J a m e s as a Christian w o r k , I will argue that it is precisely c o m p a r i s o n with C i c e r o ' s De Legibus, the Apostolic Constitutions^ a n d other works w h o s e authors d r a w o n the Stoic theory o f natural law, w h i c h best illuminates its correlation o f 6 euxpuxoq Xoyoq with a law that is b o t h "perfect" a n d " o f f r e e d o m . " T h e fabric o f J a m e s ' s soteriological thought
has b e e n w o v e n f r o m Jewish,
Christian and
G r e e k philosophical discourse. T h e demonstration o f this claim, the elucidation o f its significance for understanding the religious thought o f the Letter o f J a m e s m o r e b r o a d l y , and its implications for the his torian's attempt to locate this w o r k within the early Christian m o v e ment, will b e taken u p in the pages w h i c h
17
follow.
Martin Klein, "Ein vollkommenes Werk": Vollkommenheit, Gesetz und Gericht als the ologische Themen des Jakobusbriefes ( B W A N T 139; Stuttgart, etc.: Kohlhammer, 1995) 131, emphasis mine. Klein considers the usual description o f this "proclamation" as "the gospel" to be problematic inasmuch as the latter term most often refers specifically to Jesus's death and resurrection, which are scarcely mentioned in James (ibid). Note at the same time, however, his comparison o f James's "law o f free dom"—precisely inasmuch as it is "identical" with the Xoyoq aXrfieiaq—with Pauline concepts: "Es [sc. the 'law o f freedom'] umgreift also auch die Funktionen, die bei Paulus das Evangelium v o n Jesus Christus und die Gabe des heiligen Geistes innehaben" (ibid., 144).
CHAPTER ONE I M P L A N T E D LOGOS
IN T H E
INTERPRETATION
OF JAMES
A m o n g the
earliest extant interpretations o f "the
implanted logos"
(6 euxpuToq Xoyoq) described in the Letter o f J a m e s as that " w h i c h is able to save y o u r souls" (Jas
1:21) is that o f an a n o n y m o u s
Greek
exegete w h o s e e x p l a n a t i o n is p r e s e r v e d , with s o m e m i n o r
varia
tions, in the
Greek
Theophylactus.
1
c o m m e n t a r i e s attributed to O e c u m e n i u s
and
T h e implanted logos, a c c o r d i n g to this interpreter, is
h u m a n reason: it is that w h i c h makes us "rational" (XoyiKoi). It is associated, m o r e o v e r , particularly with the general h u m a n ability to distinguish "the better and the w o r s e " (xou feXxiovoq ral xou %£(povo<;). A quite similar interpretation, t h o u g h o n e at least n o t d e p e n d e n t u p o n that o f O e c u m e n i u s
2
obviously
and T h e o p h y l a c t u s ,
is f o u n d
in the c o m m e n t a r y o f the 12th century Syriac exegete Dionysius bar Salibi. H e t o o explained
this phrase with reference
to the
human
ability, " i m p l a n t e d " in o u r nature b y G o d , to m a k e ethical distinc 3
tions: in natura enim inseruit Deus, ut amet bona et odio habeat mala. addition, Dionysius identified
the
implanted logos itself as
l a w " {legem naturalem); the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " o f Jas
1
In
"natural
1:25 is thus
It is difficult to date this interpretation in any precise way. T h e Oecumenius in question was bishop o f Thessaly in the 1 Oth century, and Theophylactus was an 11th century exegete; but M . Dibelius, at least, expresses doubts regarding these attributions, and dates the commentaries (or at least their contents) to "the Ancient Church," i.e., prior to the Middle Ages (James, 262). T h e accuracy o f these attri butions, in any case, matters littie for our purposes. It is most doubtful that the interpretation o f Jas 1:21 which concerns us here was the original contribution o f either one, as both seem to have been above all collectors o f prior comments. For the sake o f convenience I will refer to the compilers o f these commentaries simply as Oecumenius and Theophylactus. Oecumenius: M P G 119. 468; Theophylactus: M P G 125. 1145. I. Sedlacek, Dionysius bar Salibi in Apocalypsim, Actus et Epistulas Catholicas ( C S C O , Scriptores Syri 2 / 1 0 1 ; R o m e : de Luigi, 1910) 91; throughout this study I depend on Sedlacek's Latin translation o f Dionysius's Syriac. That the natura in question is in fact human nature is clear from the prior paraphrase o f 1:21, excipite verbum insitum naturae nostrae (ibid., 9 I f ) , as well as from his comment on 1:25, quoted imme diately below. 2
3
CHAPTER ONE
8
a
"law which G o d from
the
b e g i n n i n g p l a c e d in h u m a n
nature"
{legem quam Deus ab initio posuit naturae humanae)* W h i l e it has generally b e e n agreed b y critical scholars that the author o f J a m e s d o e s equate freedom,"
and
the i m p l a n t e d
logos with the
"perfect l a w o f
t h o u g h it has often b e e n n o t e d that his association
o f l a w a n d f r e e d o m finds p r e c e d e n t s particularly in the Stoic sources, the interpretation o f J a m e s ' s logos in light o f S t o i c c o n c e p t s o f h u m a n reason a n d natural l a w as f o u n d in these ancient c o m m e n t a r i e s found few advocates.
5
has
It has l o n g b e e n n o t e d that the t e r m euipuxo*;
d o e s n o t always carry its usual c o n n o t a t i o n o f " i n n a t e " o r " i n b o r n " ; a n d the vast majority
o f J a m e s ' s interpreters h a v e a r g u e d
that
6
the
c o n t e x t in w h i c h the t e r m is used in this w o r k militates against read i n g it in this sense.
7
T h i s , in turn, is t h o u g h t
to p r e c l u d e a n y sub
stantive Stoic influence o n J a m e s ' s use o f the phrase euxpuToq Xoyoq. Thus,
when
mentioned
at
all, the
interpretation
o f James's
logos
offered in these ancient c o m m e n t a r i e s is v i e w e d as little m o r e than an o d d relic o f past interpretation, a n d o n e that merits n o consideration.
4
8
serious
M a r t i n D i b e l i u s , w h o s e interpretation o f this passage
Ibid. O n the use o f the term "natural law" in connection with Stoicism, see the opening remarks o f Chapter T w o . O n the relation o f these early commentaries to the Stoic understanding o f human reason and natural law, see Chapter Three, under the heading "Early Interpretation o f James 1:21." Note the analogous discussion o f the possibilities for translating this term by those attempting to reconstruct Chrysippus's doctrine o f implanted preconceptions (e|i,qn)T0i 7cpoX,r|\|/ei<;), on which see below, Chapter T w o . T h e term euxp-DToq, despite the presence o f a cross reference for it, is not discussed in TDNT, which omits the promised entry on the term cpuco; see TDJVT 2. 537. T h e most extensive discussion o f the term seems to be that o f H . Heisen, Novae hypotheses interpretandae epistolae Jacobi (Bremen: 1739), which is cited b y Hort, Ropes and Adamson. This work remains unavailable to me. A notable exception is F. J. A . Hort, The Epistle of St. James: The Greek Text with Introduction, Commentary as far as Chapter IV, Verse 7, and Additional Notes (London: MacMillan, 1909) 3 7 - 3 8 . Hort argued that the author o f James would not have used the term euxpanoc;, the proper meaning o f which is "inborn" or "congenital," to describe the "outward message o f the Gospel": "[h]e could never have used in that sense a word which everyone w h o knew Greek would o f necessity understand in the opposite sense." A similar interpretation, though one argued more broadly from the context of James 1, is offered b y A . T . Cadoux, The Thought of St. James (London: Clarke & C o . , 1944) 1 9 - 2 4 . Neither author, however, emphasizes Stoic usage in particular. Those w h o argue for the Jewish authorship o f James have argued along similar lines; see on this below. So J. E. Huther, Kritisch exegetisches Handbuch uber den Brief des Jakobus ( K E K N T ; 3d ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1870) 84; cf. the later edition o f the M e y e r commentary b y W . Beyschlag, Der Brief des Jacobus ( K E K N T ; 6th ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897) 83. See more recently the summary 5
6
7
8
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
9
r e m a i n e d essentially u n c h a n g e d f r o m the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the first edi tion o f his c o m m e n t a r y in 1921 to the final edition revised b y Heinrich G r e e v e n in 1 9 6 4 , formulates this position with a d m i r a b l e if
euxp'OToq
concision:
were to mean "innate, natural" here . . . then in accordance
with Stoic concepts one would have to think o f that portion o f the 9
cosmic Reason which is innate in every human being. In fact, O e c , T h e o p h and Dionysius bar Salibi have interpreted it in just this way. Yet it would hardly be said o f reason that it is able to save souls— an expression which here quite clearly must be understood eschatologically. In addition, the transition . . . to the theme doing" [in Jas
"hearing and
1:22~25] precludes a reference to reason and demands
a reference to the word, indeed, the "saving" word—hence, the gospel.
10
T h a t is t o say, while the Stoics w o u l d scarcely say that h u m a n rea son
can b e "heard and d o n e "
are
used o f "the
1 1
G o s p e l " in the
o r "save s o u l s , "
12
such
expressions
early Christian literature. J a m e s ' s
dismissal by F. MuBner: "JUSTIN . . . spricht von d e m 'dem gesamten Menschengeschlecht eingepflantzten Logoskeim'; in der altkirchlichen Auslegung v o n Jak 1,21 wurde teilweise mit diesem Gedanken operiert, so von O K U M E N I U S , T H E O P H Y L A C T und D I O N Y S I U S . Dock daran denkt Jak sicher nicht" {Der Jakobusbrief [3d ed.; H T K N T 1 3 / 1 ; Freiburg, etc.: Herder, 1975] 102 n. 2, italics mine). Cf. L. T . Johnson, The Letter of James: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 37a; N e w York, N Y : Doubleday, 1995) 202: "Rather oddly, Oecumenius and Theophylact take it to mean the ability to discern between that which is better and that which is worse." Dibelius refers at this point to A . Bonhoffer, Epiktet und das Neue Testament ( R G W 10; GieBen: Topelmann, 1911) 97, on which see immediately below. Dibeius, James, 113; cf. the first edition o f this commentary, Der Brief des Jakobus ( K E K N T ; 7th ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1921) 107-8. Cf. the similar formulations o f the problem by J. B. Adamson, The Epistle of James ( N I C N T ; Grand Rapids, M I : Eerdmans, 1976; repr. 1984) 9 8 - 9 9 ; Davids, Epistle of James, 95; R . P. Martin, James ( W B C 48; W a c o , T X : W o r d , 1988) 49; and most recently M . Tsuji, Glaube zwischen Vollkommenheit und Verweltlichung. Eine Untersuchung zur literarischen Gestalt und zur inhaltlichen Koharenz des Jakobusbriefes ( W U N T 2.93; Tubingen: M o h r [Siebeck], 1997) 108 n. 58. Cf. Adamson, Epistle of James, 98; Davids, Epistle of James, 95; Martin, James, 49; see also S. Laws, A Commentary on the Epistle of James (Black's; London: Black, 1980) 82. Cf. J. H . Ropes, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of St. James ( I C C ; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991 [= 1916]) 172; also Laws, Epistle of James, 82; C . H . Felder, "Wisdom, Law and Social Concern in the Epistle o f James" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982) 74; F. Manns, "Une tradition liturgique juive sousjacente a Jacques 1,21b," RevScRel 62 (1988) 85; Davids, Epistle of James, 95. T h e description o f euxputoq X6yo<; as that which "saves souls" receives particular empha sis in this context by Klein, w h o argues, in addition, that reading Jas 1:21 along the lines o f Justin's adaptation o f the Stoic logos would make sense only "in eine Missionspredigt, aber nicht in die Gemeindeunterweisungen" (Ein vollkommenes Werk, 135). Justin and the author of James, however, make quite different use o f this Stoic idea; cf. the discussion o f Justin in Chapter Three with that o f James in Chapters Four and Five, and especially in the Conclusion. 9
1 0
11
12
CHAPTER ONE
10
c o m m a n d to
" r e c e i v e " the
i m p l a n t e d logos is e v e n m o r e
frequently
emphasized in this c o n n e c t i o n : such a c o m m a n d , it is argued, excludes understanding this logos as s o m e t h i n g "innate"; a n d p r e c l u d e interpreting it b e e n p o i n t e d out
a l o n g Stoic l i n e s .
that the
13
this is taken
to
M o r e o v e r , it has
often
expression 8e%oum xov Xoyov ( c f Jas
1:21,
8e£aa0£ xov euxpuxov Xoyov) is f o u n d in a n u m b e r o f Christian works, typically with reference to Jas
1:18
to the
"the
fact that G o d
o f truth (Xoyco dXriGeiaq)" has
Gospel."
not
o n l y is the
2 Tim
"the
13
interpretation o f Jas
in
1:21:
15
used in o t h e r Christian works
G o s p e l " (cf. C o l
the verse as a w h o l e recalls the
n o t i o n o f "re-birth" o r " n e w
reference
itself b e e n an i m p o r t a n t — a n d i n d e e d ,
phrase A,6yo<; aXrfieiaq
2:15), but
Finally, the
" g a v e birth to us b y m e a n s o f a logos
for s o m e , d e c i s i v e — c o n s i d e r a t i o n in the
with explicit reference to
1 4
creation."
16
1:5,
Eph
1:13
and
c o m m o n Christian
In short, as A d o l f Bonhoffer
So Huther, Kritisch exegetisches Handbuch, 84; Adamson, Epistle of James, 98f, and esp. idem, James: The Man and his Message (Grand Rapids, M I : Eerdmans, 1989) 397; Davids, Epistle of James, 95; Martin, James, 49. Cf. further J. B. Mayor, The Epistle of St. James: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, Comments and Further Studies in the Epistle of St. James (3d ed.; London: MacMillan, 1913; repr. Classical Commentary Library; Grand Rapids, M I : Zondervan, 1954) 68; Ropes, St. James, 172; J. Chaine, LEpitre de Saint Jacques (2d ed.; EBib; Paris: Gabalda, 1927) 29f; J. Moffatt, The General Epistles: James, Peter and Judas ( M N T C ; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928) 25; J. Marty, LEpitre de Jacques. Etude critique (Paris: Alcan, 1935) 53; Johnson, Letter of James, 202; P. Perkins, First and Second Peter, James, and Jude (IBC; Louisville: John K n o x , 1995) 104. Dibelius, James, 114; H . Windisch, Die katholischen Briefe (3d ed.; H N T 15; Tubingen: M o h r [Siebeck], 1951) 11; Laws, Epistle of James, 82; F. Vouga, LEpitre de Saint Jacques ( C N T , d.s. 13a; Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1984) 63; Johnson, Letter of James, 202. See, e.g., Huther, Kritisch exegetisches Handbuch, 84; B. Weiss, Die katholischen Briefe. Textkritische Untersuchungen und Textherstellung (Leipzig: Hinrichs'sche Verlag, 1892) 96; Beyschlag, Der Brief des Jacobus, 83; M . Meinertz and W . Vrede, Die katholischen Briefe (4th ed; Die Heilige Schrift des Neuen Testamentes 9; Bonn: Hanstein, 1932) 2 4 - 2 5 ; Chaine, LEpitre de Jacques, 30; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 102; J. Cantinat, Les Epitres de Saint Jacques et de Saint Jude (SB; Paris: Gabalda, 1973) 104; Adamson, Epistle of James, 99 and n. 10; Johnson, Letter of James, 202. Dibelius rejected this particular line o f argument: given his literary assessment o f James, he felt that "one cannot rely upon such evidence from other sayings" (James, 113, n. 30). H e in any event inter preted both the Xoyoq d^r|9e{a<; and the enqnnoq Xoyoc, with reference to "the gospel." It is to be noted, though, that the interpretation o f Jas 1:18 remains contro versial. A variety o f authors doubt whether it refers to a new creation at all; see F. Spitta (Der Brief des Jakobus [Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1896) 4 5 - 4 7 ; Hort, The Epistle of St. James, 3 1 - 3 5 ; G . H . Rendall, The Epistle of James and Judaic Christianity (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1927) 6 3 - 6 5 ; C . - M . Edsman, "Schopferwille und Geburt Jac I 18. Eine Studie zur altchristlichen Kosmologie," %NW 38 (1939) 1 1 - 4 4 (though cf. idem, "Schopfung und Wiedergeburt: Nochmals Jac 1:18," Spiritus et Veritas [Eutin: Ozolin, 1953] 43-55); L. E. Elliott-Binns, "James 1.18: Creation or Redemption?" NTS 3 (1957) 148-61; O . J . F. Seitz, "James and 1 4
15
1 6
11
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
put it in his Epiktet und das Neue Testament, t h o u g h the a p p e a r a n c e o f the term euxpuxcx; in Jas
1:21 might r e m i n d o n e o f the Stoic sources,
it is used in J a m e s "in e i n e m ganz ungriechischen u n d in e i n e m entgegengesetzten Sinn als bei d e n Stoikern." F o r " [ w ] a h r e n d er hier [sc. for the
Stoics] g e r a d e
die naturliche,
allgemein
menschliche
geistige Ausstattung bedeutet, versteht J a k o b u s . . . eine
bestimmte,
historisch in Jesus aufgetretene Lehre, die ubernaturliche, W a h r h e i t des Evangeliums!"
geoffenbarte
17
JEWISH COMPOSITION AND STOIC LOGOS
T h e r e have b e e n t w o notable exceptions to this general rule o f dis allowing substantive Stoic influence o n James's c o n c e p t o f logos. A r n o l d M e y e r , in
1930, a n d M . E. Boismard, in
1957, each argued
that
J a m e s ' s reference to 6 e u x p u i o q Xoyoq is to b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the equation
o f h u m a n reason a n d natural law m a d e b y
ancient
G r e e k philosophers. It is interesting, a n d likely indicative o f the sta tus o f the early c o m m e n t a r i e s in critical scholarship o n J a m e s , that neither author cites O e c u m e n i u s , T h e o p h y l a c t u s , o r Dionysius bar Salibi in this context. In fact, there are n o indications that Bois m a r d was at all influenced b y the earlier w o r k o f M e y e r . It is all the m o r e striking, then, that in b o t h cases, this interpretation o f J a m e s ' s logos is a c c o m p a n i e d b y doubts regarding the
classification
o f J a m e s — o r at least o f a hypothesized source b e h i n d Jas as a Christian w o r k .
1:17-21—
18
the Law," Studia Evangelica II (ed. F. L. Cross; T U 87; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1964) 486; H . Frankemolle, Der Brief des Jakobus (2 vols.; O T K N T 17; Giitersloh: Giitersloher; Wiirzburg: Echter Verlag, 1994) 1. 2 9 7 - 3 0 5 ; Tsuji, Glaube, 6 8 - 6 9 . Epiktet und das Neue Testament, 97. Bonhoffer referred particularly to the Stoic doctrine o f implanted preconceptions (ejxtp'OTOi 7tpoA,f|\|/ei<;) in this connection. Inter estingly, when discussing in another context the controversial problem o f Chrysippus's understanding o f this doctrine, Bonhoffer argued that the term e j i q w E o q could only mean "inborn." See idem, Epictet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie (Stuttgart: Enke 1890; repr. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Gunther H o l z b o o g ] , 1968) 192f, and further Chapter T w o , under the head ing " T h e Implanted Preconceptions and Human Reason." Spitta also argued that James's logos was innate in connection with his argu ment for the non-Christian origin of James. H e did not, however, emphasize Stoic influence in this connection. See Der Brief des Jakobus, 4 9 - 5 2 . Different again is L. Massebieau, "L'Epitre de Jacques: est-elle l'oeuvre d'un Chretien?" RHR 32 (1895) 2 4 9 - 8 3 . While arguing that James was not originally a Christian composition, Massebieau nonetheless interpreted the "implanting" o f logos in James as part o f a "new creation." 17
1 8
CHAPTER ONE
12
In line with his b r o a d e r thesis that a J e w i s h Grundschrift underlies our
present Letter o f J a m e s , M e y e r a r g u e d that the
d o m " m e n t i o n e d in Jas Gesetz." dom,"
19
1:25 and
Pointing out
"law
of
2:12 is n o n e other than "das
that J a m e s ' s association o f law
as well as its description as
"perfect" and
free
ATliche
and
"free
"royal," could
be
u n d e r s t o o d apart f r o m any peculiarly Christian ideas simply in terms o f a merger o f Jewish and a r g u e d that the
Greek philosophical thought,
e q u a t i o n o f the
"law
20
Meyer
o f f r e e d o m " with i m p l a n t e d
logos in J a m e s 1 is also to b e u n d e r s t o o d in this light. G r e e k p h i l o s o phers, and particularly the Stoics, he observed, had l o n g since identified true law with 6p66<; Aoyoq, "right reason." C i c e r o , in fact, h a d law
as
ratio summa insita in natura, and
Citing 4 Maccabees and was
not
the
writings o f Philo, he p o i n t e d out
Stoic t h e o r y o f law.
i m a g i n e d that it was
the J e w i s h p e o p l e in particular w h o
entrusted with natural l a w .
22
S u c h authors, he
21
that it
u n c o m m o n for J e w i s h authors o f this p e r i o d to v i e w
T o r a h in light o f the
1 9
defined
"therefore Aoyoq euxpuxo*;."
the
argued,
had
been
In a c o n t e x t such as this, then, a p h i l o -
A. Meyer, Das Ratsel des Jacobusbriefes ( B Z N W 10; GieBen: Topelmann, 1930) 156; cf. 149-50. Meyer apparently follows Dibelius's analysis o f Jas 2:8-12, which is the key passage for identifying James's law. According to Dibelius, James under stands the love c o m m a n d not as "the chief commandment," but as "one c o m mandment alongside others" (Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 133; James, 142); cf. Ratsel, 149-50. Dibelius himself, however, had argued that James's use o f the phrase "law of freedom" was "a clear indication that in his ritual and moral injunctions the author does not have the Mosaic Law in mind at all" (James, 18; Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 16), but rather "the gospel" conceived as a new Christian law (James, 119; Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 112-13). Meyer (Ratsel, 151f n. 7), though, rightiy pointed out the tension between Dibelius's view that the love c o m m a n d in James is "one command alongside others" rather than "the chief commandment," and his subse quent remark that James's law "is a Christian law, and consequently it is not obeyed by being ever so careful in tiny matters, but rather by fulfilling the great c o m mandment o f love"; cf. Dibelius, James, 142 with 144 (= Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 133 and 135). T h e problem o f the relationship o f the "law o f freedom" to the Torah on the one hand, and to the love c o m m a n d on the other, is treated in detail in Chapter Four. Ratsel, 1 5 0 - 5 5 . Ibid., 156, with reference to Cicero, De Leg. 1.18. Meyer also refers in this con nection to Justin's use o f the term euxpvTCx; to describe the "seed" o f reason (Xoyoq) which is implanted in all human beings, but does not make the significance o f the passage for the interpretation o f James explicit (Ratsel, 156 n. 7). Cf. Meyer, Ratsel, 158: "Gott hat in diesen Menschen [sc. Israel] eine andere vollkommene Natur erzeugt, daB sie recht leben und handeln konnen—wurde Philo sagen." It is, however, most doubtful that Philo thought the Jewish people were o f a different "nature" than others; for Philo, rather, Israel's distinction resides pri marily in the sages o f its history, and in the fact that Moses—the epitome o f the 20
21
2 2
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
13
sophical t e r m like Euxpuxoc; A,6yo<; w o u l d h a v e taken o n the cialized sense o f the J e w i s h national l a w . it is said that G o d
23
Jas
1:18,
m o r e spe
therefore, w h e r e
" g a v e birth to us b y m e a n s o f a logos o f truth,"
is to
be
God,
b y giving Israel this law, b e s t o w e d u p o n t h e m a " u n i q u e dis
interpreted m e t a p h o r i c a l l y with reference to
the
fact
tinction b e f o r e all his o t h e r creatures": "All o t h e r creatures are dren o f G o d the A
law."
t h r o u g h the
creation; Israel is the
first fruits
that
chil
through
2 4
little m o r e than a quarter o f a century later, a n d
independently
of Meyer,
advanced by M.-E.
an
a n a l o g o u s line
Boismard.
ties b e t w e e n 1 Peter a n d
the
25
apparently
o f interpretation
A r g u i n g that the
Letter o f J a m e s are
oft-noted
was
similari
to b e e x p l a i n e d in
terms o f their c o m m o n d e p e n d e n c e o n an ancient baptismal liturgy,
26
sage—left his people a written expression o f natural law. See further on Philo's understanding o f natural law below, Chapter Three. Ibid., 157. See Ratsel 157-59: "Es handelt sich also auch 1.18 um eine Zeugung durch das Gesetz; das ist ein bildlicher Ausdriick dafur, daB Gott den zwolf Stammen durch das Gesetz einen einzigartigen V o r z u g vor all seinen andern Geschopfen geschenkt hat. . . Alle anderen Geschopfe sind Kinder Gottes durch die Schopfung, Israel ist Erstling durch das Gesetz." M.-E. Boismard, "Une liturgie baptismale dans la Prima Petri: II.—Son Influence sur l'Epitre de Jacques," RB 64 (1957) 161-83. Boismard does not cite Meyer's study, and in fact seems entirely unaware o f the relevant passage from Cicero's De Legibus. T h e "liturgy" upon which these—and several other N T works—are under stood by Boismard to depend is not so much a written text as "un certain scheme c o m m u n " which was "sujet a de nombreuses variations. . . . O n ne peut done parler d'une liturgie baptismale chretienne primitive, mais d'un certain nombre de formes paralleles de cette liturgie, qui auront influence / Petr., Jac. Paul ou Jean" ("Une liturgie," 180). Boismard's account o f the relationship between 1 Peter and James is in fact quite complex. H e argues, for example, that 1 Pet 1:6-9 (and R o m 5:3-5) depends "more or less directly" on Jas 1:12—which is to say, upon the source which is supposed to underlie this verse—while Jas 1:2-4, on the other hand, depends on 1 Pet 1:6-7 (and R o m 5:3-5); see "Une liturgie," 162-67. This source analysis is in any case less than persuasive. Boismard's literary understanding o f James as a collection o f disparate and merely artificially linked materials, while not uncom m o n , is highly questionable. Regardless, his. interest in establishing literary links between James and 1 Peter often leads him to overlook the argumentative struc ture o f particular units o f the former; cf., e.g., his treatment o f Jas 1:19-20 ("Une liturgie," 170) with the analysis o f these verses presented below in Chapter Four. 2 3
2 4
2 5
2 6
T h e several similarities between James and 1 Peter are indeed intriguing, but they admit o f a number o f possible explanations, none o f which, at least thus far, has been persuasively argued to the exclusion o f the others. At any rate, it is more the relation o f the thought o f these two works than their literary relationship that is o f concern in the present study. See further on the former issue below, Chapter Four, under the heading "Implanted Logos in light o f the Torah and Judgment."
CHAPTER ONE
14
B o i s m a r d identified "the primitive ' c o r e ' " o f that p o r t i o n o f it sup p o s e d l y f o u n d in Jas
1:17—21 a n d
1 Pet
"par l'effet de la Parole d e D i e u . " an
2 7
1:22—2:2 as a divine birth
Nonetheless, B o i s m a r d felt that
"essential t h e o l o g i c a l difference w h i c h separates
J a m e s " was evident in these w o r k s ' divergent "word."
2 8
W h i l e that o f 1 P e t e r is quite
1 Peter
from
c o n c e p t i o n s o f this
clearly
"la
predication
e v a n g e l i q u e , " in J a m e s it is the l a w — i n d e e d , the M o s a i c law rather than a n e w Christian o n e . entire fragment" o f Jas
2 9
N o t i n g "the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t o n e o f the
1:17-21,
30
B o i s m a r d , like M e y e r , a r g u e d that
the association o f the l a w o f M o s e s with the i m p l a n t e d logos reflects "the themes o f Jewish p r o p a g a n d a " w h i c h , in d e p e n d e n c e o n Stoic thought, human
" e m p h a s i z e d the links b e t w e e n M o s a i c law a n d the law o f reason."
[TJhese were not two different laws, but one and the same law expressed in two successive forms, in the form o f natural law first, the Xoyoc, euxpuxoq, then in the form o f Mosaic law, the Xoyoq
3]
ypanxoq.
In support o f this v i e w , B o i s m a r d cited a passage f r o m the Apostolic Constitutions w h e r e such a distinction b e t w e e n an euxpuxoc; a n d a v6\ioq is in fact
evident:
ypambq
32
O Almighty G o d , eternal one, Master o f the whole universe, Creator and President o f everything,
27
Ibid., 168. Ibid, 172. Ibid., 1 7 0 - 7 1 . Boismard's identification o f the law o f freedom as the Mosaic law is based primarily o n his understanding o f Jas 2:8-11. H e does not, however, present a detailed analysis o f this passage, but apparently depends o n the exposi tion o f F. Spitta; note the repeated references to the former in ibid., 171. Note that Boismard suggests that Jas 2:1-13 also depends to some degree on the primitive baptismal ritual; curiously, though, the question o f the "law o f freedom" [cf. 1:25 and 2:12!] is not explicitly raised in this connection; see ibid., 175-77. Citing Jas 1:17, where the author refers to the unchangeableness o f G o d ; cf. Boismard's reference to the similar idea found in the Apostolic Constitutions, on which see below and esp. note 33. Boismard, "Une liturgie," 172: "ce n'etaient pas deux lois differentes, mais une seule et meme loi exprimee sous deux formes successives, sous forme de loi naturelle d'abord, le Xoyoq e^moq, puis sous forme de Loi mosaique, le Xoyoq ypowrcoq." Note that the e\iq>mo<; V6\LO<; o f the Apostolic Constitutions, though specifically as found in AC 8.12 (which Boismard does not mention), had already been correlated with Oecumenius's interpretation o f Jas 1:21 by Huther (Kritisch exegetisches Handbuch, 84), and echoed in a later edition o f the Meyer commentary by Beyschlag (Der Brief des Jacobus, 83). Both commentators, however, mentioned this passage only to dis miss it summarily as irrelevant for the interpretation o f James. 28
29
3 0
3 1
3 2
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
the one who showed forth man the
15
as a (micro-)cosm o f
cosmos through Christ, and who gave an implanted and written law (vouov . . . euxpmov
KOCI y p o u r c o v )
to
him,
so that he might live lawfully as a rational being (©<;
tayiicov)
. . ,
3 3
Q u i t e unlike 1 Peter, therefore, w h e r e "it is a question o f a rebirth by
the
1:18
Word
of God
c o n t a i n e d in
the
apostolic k e r y g m a , " in
Jas
"it is n o t a question o f rebirth" at all. M u c h like M e y e r , rather,
B o i s m a r d a r g u e d that for J a m e s (or at least J a m e s ' s s o u r c e ) it is the Jewish people who God
gave them the
law,
have been born once and
that law which was
34
for all when
itself only the
written
expression o f the law inscribed in the very nature o f the human being. That way, the Jewish people were indeed the "first fruits o f the tures" of G o d .
crea
35
Perhaps influenced b y his a c c e p t a n c e o f G o o d e n o u g h ' s theory regard ing the
non-Christian J e w i s h origin o f the
prayers f r o m the
Apostolic
Constitutions, B o i s m a r d c o n c l u d e d that t h o u g h J a m e s itself is a J e w i s h Christian w o r k , the
source w h i c h underlies Jas
pre-Christian f o r m o f the
3 3
baptismal l i t u r g y . "
1:17—21 is likely
"a
36
AC 8.9.8. I cite the translation o f D . R . Darnell, "Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers," OTP 2.689 (Prayer 11), w h o however underlines the words "through Christ" as a later Christian insertion; cf. Boismard's French translation in "Une liturgie," 172 n. 1. Boismard also cites in this connection AC 8.15.7ff, where G o d is described as "the one w h o does not admit change; the one w h o by nature is unchangeable" (trans. Darnell; cf. Jas 1:17), as well as 7.26.3, where it is said that G o d "implante (KaxzymevGaq) la loi dans nos ames." Curiously, however, he does not refer to the long prayer at 8.12.6-27, which gives the fullest account o f this law and its rela tion to the law o f Moses. See further on these prayers below, Chapter Three. See immediately below, with note 36. "Une liturgie," 172: "Dans Jac, il n'est pas question de renaissance; c'est le peuple juif qui a ete enfante une fois pour toutes lorsque Dieu lui a donne la Loi, cette Loi qui n'etait elle-meme que {'expression ecrite de la loi inscrite dans la nature meme de l'homme. Par la, le peuple juif etait bien les «premices des creatures» de Dieu (1,18)." Note that on this interpretation, the Xoyoq aXrfieiaq must be taken with reference to the written law given to the Jewish people in particular (the vojioq ypanxoq) rather than to the e\i(pmoq Xoyoq which is given to all humanity. Ibid., 172 and n. 1. There seems to be a certain equivocation on the question o f the source, however, as he later describes it as "juive ou fortement judaisante" ("Une liturgie," 175). Cf. his appraisal o f James itself: "c'est un ecrit judeo-chretien, emane d'un auteur, ou d'un milieu de pensee, pour qui la Loi mosaique restait la seule norme devant regler les activites morales de l'homme" (ibid., 171). 3 4
3 5
36
CHAPTER ONE
16
CHRISTIAN COMPOSITION AND LOGOS AS GOSPEL The
analyses
o f James's "implanted
logos" offered b y M e y e r
B o i s m a r d have h a d little discernible i m p a c t o n subsequent ship. T h e vast majority
and
scholar
o f J a m e s ' s interpreters have rejected these
scholars' respective theses regarding the non-Christian origin o f the letter as a w h o l e o r o f this passage in particular. A n d this affirmation o f the Christian origin o f J a m e s has resulted in a wholesale rejec tion o f their interpretation o f its logos. T o b e sure, the earlier argu ments regarding
the
J a m e s ' s logos are
" u n - S t o i c " language
repeatedly
used in c o n n e c t i o n with
cited. H o w e v e r , w h a t B o i s m a r d
and
M e y e r had, in effect, suggested, was a m o r e sophisticated m o d e l for a p p r e h e n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f logos in J a m e s : a m o d e l that allows for traditions o f diverse origins to b e simultaneously at w o r k in the text; a m o d e l that allows for the possibility o f a creative fusion o f Jewish and G r e e k philosophical traditions. O n e finds little o r nothing in the way
o f attempts to r e c k o n with this m o d e l b y subsequent
scholars
w h o posit a Christian origin for J a m e s . T h e possibility that an anal o g o u s fusion might b e at w o r k if J a m e s is a Christian c o m p o s i t i o n has simply n o t b e e n considered. Consequently, the relevant passages from
Cicero and
the Apostolic Constitutions a d d u c e d b y M e y e r
and
B o i s m a r d — m u c h like the interpretations offered in the ancient c o m mentaries—are rarely even m e n t i o n e d b y subsequent interpreters, let alone seriously e x a m i n e d as potentially relevant for clarifying James's 31
c o n c e p t o f logos.
37
Works published subsequent to the appearance o f these studies that neglect to mention the relevant passages from Cicero's De Legibus and (in the case o f those published after Boismard's study) the Apostolic Constitutions in connection with the interpretation of Jas 1:21 include M . Meinertz and W . Vrede, Die katholischen Briefe, 25; Cadoux, The Thought of St. James, 19-24; F. Hauck, Die Briefe des Jakobus, Petrus, Judas und Johannes (6th ed.; N T D 10; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1953) 12; E. C . Blackman, The Epistle of James: Introduction and Commentary (Torch Bible Commentaries; London: S C M , 1957) 6 2 - 6 4 ; L. Simon, Une ethique de la Sagesse: Commentaire de lEpitre de Jacques (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1961) 96-100; J. Schneider, Die Brief des Jakobus, Petrus, Judas und Johannes: Die katholischen Briefe (9th ed.; N T D 10; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961) 12; B. Reicke, The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude: Introduction, Translation and Notes (AB 37; Garden City, N Y : Doubleday, 1964) 19-25; Dibelius, James, 112-14; E. M . Sidebottom, James, Jude and 2 Peter (Century Bible, N e w Edition; Greenwood, S C : Attic, 1967) 3 4 - 3 5 ; W . Schrage, "Der Jakobusbrief," in H . Balz and W . Schrage, Die "Katholischen" Briefe: Die Briefe des Jakobus, Petrus, Johannes und Judas (11th ed.; N T D 10; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973) 2 1 - 2 2 ; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 98-103; Adamson, Epistle of James, 8 1 - 8 2 , 98-100; idem, James: The Man and his Message, 397-99, 411-15; Laws,
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
The
17
Thesis of a Superficial Stoic Influence
A t m o s t , o n e finds in such studies the
suggestion that the
use
of
the
phrase euxpuioq Xoyoq in J a m e s represents an entirely superficial e m p l o y m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l l a n g u a g e to c o u c h a patently Christian n o t i o n . Dibelius, for e x a m p l e , w o n d e r e d a l o u d "whether this usage e m p l o y e d b y J a [ m e ] s is
not
s o m e w h a t influenced
by
philosophical
concepts
Epistle of James, 8 1 - 8 5 ; Davids, Epistle of James, 95; Felder, "Wisdom, Law and Social Concern," 7 2 - 7 4 ; W . Popkes, Adressaten, Situation und Form des Jakobusbriefes (SBS 1 2 5 / 1 2 6 ; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1986) 136-56, esp. 1 4 6 - 5 1 ; Martin, James, 49; Frankemolle, Der Brief des Jakobus, 1.329-35; Perkins, First and Second Peter, James, and Jude, 103-5; Johnson, The Letter of James, 202.; Tsuji, Glaube, 108-15. There are some minor exceptions. Whereas in the first edition o f R . Leconte's brief commentary on James, published before the appearance o f Boismard's essay, the e|j,(pa)Toq Xoyoq was interpreted with reference to Jas 1:18 as "la Parole de Salut qui a procure la regeneration du fidele," in the second edition, citing Boismard and several passages from the Apostolic Constitutions, he comments "or pour le judaisme hellenistique, la Loi contenue dans l'Ecriture passait pour etre inscrite dans la nature meme de l'homme." T h e implications o f this revision for Leconte's understanding of James's logos are not altogether clear, however, as he continues to interpret Jas 1:18 with reference to a "new birth." Cf. Les Epitres Catholiques de Saint Jacques, Saint Jude et Saint Pierre (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1953) 30 and note d, with Les Epitres Catholiques (2d ed., 1961) 3 4 - 3 5 and note f. J. Cantinat's Les Epitres de Saint Jacques et de Saint Jude similarly interacts explic itly with Boismard's interpretation o f James's logos. Oddly, however, the Apostolic Constitutions (and Cicero's De Legibus) receive no mention; see Les Epitres, 9 5 - 9 7 and 102-106. Cf. in this respect R . Fabris, Legge delta Liberta in Giacomo (Supplementi all RivistB 8; Brescia: Paideia, 1977), on which see below. R . B. W a r d cited Meyer's thesis (though not, explicitly, De Leg. 1.18) in connec tion with Dibelius's suggestion that James's phrase ejKp'O'cog Xoyoq may have been influenced by Stoic language, but rejects the idea. While citing Justin's similar phrase as the "closest apparent parallel," and noting in addition AC. 8.12.8, as well as pas sages from Procopius o f Gaza and Methodius (on the latter o f which see below, Chapter Three), Ward dismisses their explanatory utility for James. In fact, W a r d ultimately concludes that "no satisfactory linguistic parallels are available" which clarify the meaning of James's e n q r u x o c ; Xbyoq. See "The Communal Concern o f the Epistle o f James" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1966] 127-34, as well as the "Summary" at the beginning o f his study. Cicero, De Leg. 1.18, is mentioned in connection with Jas 1:21 by Windisch (Die katholischen Briefe, 11), as well as by V o u g a (LEpitre de Saint Jacques, 63) and Klein (Ein vollkommenes Werk, 135 n. 90). Klein also refers in this connection to AC 7.33.3, where the author speaks of e | j , ( p i ) T o q yv&oiq, but not to those passages from this work which treat the e | j , ( p \ ) T o q v o j i o q (ibid., n. 91). Klein in any case considers Deuteronomy 30, not the Stoic sources, to be the model behind James's notion o f an ejoxp-uxoc; Xoyoq, even while conceding that the latter does reflect—albeit entirely superficially— Stoic terminology (ibid., 136-37). N o n e o f these authors in any case discusses the passages in question at length, as each rejects the idea that substantive Stoic influence underlies Jas 1:21; see further on this below.
CHAPTER ONE
18
38
regarding 'seminal reason' (Xoyoq amp^iaxiKoq)" ;
but the
question
was for h i m in any case o f n o real c o n s e q u e n c e for the interpreta tion o f the letter. G i v e n his literary assessment o f J a m e s as a "trea sury" o f earlier traditions linked only superficially to o n e a n o t h e r , not only did he c o n c l u d e that it, in any event, "has no 'theology'" he posited in addition that, in the case o f such paraenetic
39
but
collec
tions, "it is not always possible to deduce from adopted concepts the intellec 0
tual environment of the author who appropriates them"*
I n d e e d , for Dibelius
the possible Stoic p r o v e n a n c e o f this term was n o t even particularly significant for the interpretation
o f the phrase in its immediate c o n
text: " [ e ] v e n if 'the implanted w o r d ' (ejKpuToq Xoyoq) in 1:21 should actually p r o v e to b e an e c h o o f Stoic t e r m i n o l o g y , " he w r o t e , "the expression as J a [ m e ] s used it h a d obviously already b e e n given a new
m e a n i n g b y the
Christians."
which use the term e^moq
41
Citing several Christian
texts
with n o connotations o f something "innate,"
Dibelius suggested that J a m e s , as with his c o m m a n d to " r e c e i v e " this w o r d , was " p r o b a b l y following an existing Christian usage"; a n d this, already, h a d re-defined the (possibly) Stoic expression in a m a n n e r wholly at o d d s with its original m e a n i n g .
42
In short, even if the phrase
euxpuxoq Xoyoq is to b e c o n s i d e r e d o n e w h i c h has "a technical usage in the ' w o r l d ' , " it is at m o s t o n e " w h o s e actual m e a n i n g is either not u n d e r s t o o d o r only half-understood b y J a [ m e ] s . " Interpreted
43
a l o n g these lines, the question o f the origins o f this
expression is purely a c a d e m i c . T h u s , strikingly, the possible Stoic derivation o f the phrase Euxpuxoq Xoyoq is n o t e v e n m e n t i o n e d b y
Finally, the £(xcpt)To<; VOJLIOC; o f the Apostolic Constitutions is also mentioned in con nection with Jas 1:21 by M . Ludwig (Wort als Gesetz: Eine Untersuchung zum Verstandnis von "Wort" und "Gesetz" in israelitisch-jruhjudischen und neutestamentlichen Schriften. Gleichzeitig ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Jakobusbriefes [Europaische Hochschulschriften 2 3 / 5 0 2 ; Frankfurt am Main, etc.: Peter Lang, 1994] 164). T h e issue o f Stoic influence, how ever, is not raised in this connection. See further on Ludwig below. Dibelius, James, 114 (= Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 108), referring to C . Clemen, Primitive Christianity and its Non-Jewish Sources (Edinburgh: Clark, 1912) 54—despite, apparently, Bonhoffer's rejection o f Clemen's suggestion in Epiket und das Neue Testament. Cf. Dibelius's reference to the relevant passage from Bonhoffer in James, 113 n. 29 (= Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 107 n. 2). See Dibelius, James, 1—11. T h e view is summed up well on p . 3 (with empha sis removed): "we may designate the 'Letter' of James as paraenesis. By paraenesis we mean a text which strings together admonitions o f general ethical content." Ibid., 21 (= Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 19). Ibid. For the things which, in Dibelius's view, make this "obvious," see above. Ibid., 113 (= Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 108), citing Barn. 1:2; 9:9 and Ign., Eph. 17:2. Ibid., 35 (= Der Brief des Jakobus [1921] 34). 3 8
3 9
40
41
42
43
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
19
Dibelius w h e n he then p r o c e e d s to argue that the phrase "law o f f r e e d o m " — w h i c h the author equates with 6 £uxpuTo<; A,6yo<;—must b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f Stoic c o n c e p t s .
44
T h e notion that J a m e s (or his "tradition") has taken a Stoic phrase, drained it o f its philosophical significance, and filled it with an entirely n e w m e a n i n g has b e e n a d v o c a t e d in various forms b y a handful o f scholars.
45
G i v e n this a p p r o a c h , it is n o t surprising that, even a m o n g
these authors, the passages cited b y M e y e r and B o i s m a r d are rele gated to footnotes a n d parentheses, if m e n t i o n e d at all.
46
Referring
inter alia to C i c e r o ' s summa ratio insita in natura, Justin's euxpuxov cni£p|j,a xov Xoyov,
and
the £uxpuxo<; yvcoau; o f the Apostolic Constitutions,
but
emphasizing that the author o f J a m e s describes his e\i
der Stelle [Jas
1:21] aber w e n i g hilfreich."
47
fur
That
is to say, given the divergences b e t w e e n the language used in c o n nection with the euxprnoq Xoyoq in the Letter o f J a m e s and that f o u n d in the Stoic sources, o n e is dealing at m o s t with a superficial
con
nection existing sheerly at the terminological level. A n y further
com
parison between James and those works that are substantively influenced b y Stoicism, therefore, w o u l d n o t p r o v e illuminating.
Regardless o f
the p r o v e n a n c e o f the phrase, James's use o f it is in any event "ganz ungriechisch u n d unstoisch."
48
T h u s even w h e n inclined to see Stoic
influence in J a m e s ' s c o n c e p t o f a "law o f f r e e d o m , " such scholars, like Dibelius before them, d o n o t correlate this with J a m e s ' s equa tion o f the "law o f f r e e d o m " with Euxpuxo*; Xoyoq.
44
49
See Dibelius's excursus on " T h e Perfect Law o f Freedom" in James, 116-20. Windisch, Die katholischen Briefe, 11; Laws, Epistle of James, 83-84; Vouga, LEpitre de Saint Jacques, 63; Felder, "Wisdom, Law and Social Concern," 73-74; Frankemolle, Der Brief des Jakobus, 1. 329; Tsuji, Glaube, 108 n. 58; cf. Marty, LEpitre de Jacques, 53; Cantinat, Les Epitres, 96 and 104-5. See further the comment o f R . Fabris men tioned below in note 84. Note that neither Cicero nor the Apostolic Constitutions is even mentioned in this connection by Dibelius-Greeven, Laws, Frankemolle or Tsuji. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 135; emphasis mine. Klein, in fact, identifies Deuteronomy 30 as the "Schlussel" for interpreting Jas 1:21, suggesting that the author of James simply couches a deuteronomistic notion in philosophical language; see Ein vollkommenes Werk, 136-37. So Frankemolle, Der Brief des Jakobus, 1. 329; cf. Bonhoffer, Epictet und das Neuen Testament, 97. So, particularly strikingly, Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 152: " S o diirfte die Rede vom Ax5yo<; e^micx; letzlich ihren Ursprung in der deuteronomistischen Theologie 45
46
47
48
49
20
CHAPTER ONE
The Rejection of Stoic Influence M o r e often o n e finds interpreters dispensing with the Stoic e v i d e n c e altogether.
In this case, J a m e s ' s n o t i o n o f a "saving" euxpuToq Xoyoq
is e x p l a i n e d b y c o m p a r i s o n with the use o f planting i m a g e r y in early Christian missionary (puxeuco)
50
contexts, as for e x a m p l e in
1 Cor
3 : 6 - 8 (cf.
and, a b o v e all, in the synoptic p a r a b l e o f the s o w e r ( M a r k 51
4 : 3 - 2 0 pars.; cf. G7Ee{pco). A l o n g these lines, o n e also finds comparisons with 1 Peter's description o f "the w o r d (pfj(ia) w h i c h was a n n o u n c e d to y o u as the g o s p e l " as an imperishable " s e e d " (cnropd), o r with the use o f seed imagery in 1 J o h n . in fact,
some have
1:18, 21 a n d baptism. one,
53
1 Pet
argued
5 2
In a m a n n e r reminiscent o f Boismard,
that a c o m m o n tradition underlies
1:22-2:2—a
tradition associated, perhaps,
H e r e , t h o u g h , the tradition is c o n s i d e r e d to b e a Christian
a n d B o i s m a r d ' s detection o f a difference b e t w e e n
J a m e s has
Jas with
generally b e e n d i s r e g a r d e d .
54
Indeed,
the s u p p o s e d baptismal Sitz im Leben o f Jas
1 Peter
MuBner
and
considers
1:18, 21 itself to b e d e c i
sive for the interpretation o f b o t h the Xoyoq aXi\Qeiaq a n d 6 Euxprnoq Xoyoq as " d [ i e ] urapostolischen Paradosis," that is, as "the G o s p e l . "
5 5
des Alten Testaments haben, wahrend die Spur des vojioq ekevftepiaq eher zu griechischem Denken, besonders zu d e m der Stoa fuhrt"; cf. ibid., 136-37. Cf. also Vouga, UEpitre de Saint Jacques, 6 5 - 6 6 . It should be pointed out in this connection that the term ejaxp-utoq derives not from ejLKp\)T£{)co, but from e^wptxo; see, e.g., Ropes, St. James, 172. O f course, this does not o f itself preclude comparison o f Jas 1:21 with 1 C o r 3:6-8. Beyschlag, Der Brief des Jacobus, 83; Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 6 8 - 6 9 ; Meinertz and Vrede, Die katholischen Briefe, 25; Hauck, Die Briefe, 12; Reicke, The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude, 21; MuBner, Der Jakobusbriefe, 102 and n. 2; Adamson, Epistle of James, 81; Davids, Epistle of James, 95; Martin, James, 49; cf. Cantinat, Les Epitres, 105. See also F. Manns, "Une tradition liturgique," 8 7 - 8 9 , w h o locates the roots of this terminology, as well as the "seed" imagery o f 1 John and 1 Peter, in Jewish liturgical usage; cf. in this respect Fabris, Legge, on w h o m see below. 1 Pet 1:22-25 (cf. 1 Pet 1:23: Xoyov ^wvioq Beou Kai nevovxoq); 1 John 3:9. See Beyschlag, Der Brief des Jacobus, 83; Moffatt, The General Epistles, 24; Manns, "Une tradition liturgique," 89; cf. Hauck, Die Briefe, 11; also Cantinat, Les Epitres, 105. See esp. Popkes, Adressaten, 136-56; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 9 5 - 9 7 and 101-3; Schrage, "Der Jakobusbrief," 21; Adamson, James: The Man and His Message, 397; H o p p e , Der theologische Hintergrund des Jakobusbriefes (2d ed.; FB 28; Wurzburg: Echter, 1985) 94. See also Fabris, Legge, o n which see immediately below. Others are more reticent regarding the baptismal connection; see in this respect Davids, Epistle of James, 93; also Laws, Epistle of James, 18-20. Boismard's study is often overlooked altogether. Note, however, the works o f Cantinat and Leconte discussed above in note 37, and the study o f Fabris discussed immediately below. MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 95f, 102. Note that neither the Apostolic Constitutions nor Cicero's De Legibus is mentioned in this connection. Cf. Schrage, "Der Jakobusbrief," 21. 5 0
5 1
5 2
5 3
5 4
5 5
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
21
It is this line o f interpretation w h i c h is advanced in R i n a l d o Fabris's Legge della Libertd in Giacomo. Fabris's intensive study o f the issue pre sents b y far the m o s t direct and
sustained challenge to the
inter
pretation o f M e y e r a n d B o i s m a r d to date. W i t h an eye b o t h to these scholars a n d to those, like Dibelius, w h o find Stoic influence b e h i n d J a m e s ' s association o f law a n d f r e e d o m , Fabris formulates the p r o b l e m in terms o f a c h o i c e b e t w e e n interpreting J a m e s in light o f an "ambiente biblico, g i u d a i c o " o r an "ambiente greco-ellenistico,"
56
and
finds decisively in favor o f the former. H e c o n c e d e s , o f course, that o n e d o e s see analogies in the Greek, and particularly Stoic, sources b o t h for James's equation o f law with euxpuToq Xoyoq a n d for the var ious epithets given to the law in J a m e s .
57
T h e crux o f his argument,
t h o u g h , is that the context in w h i c h such phrases are used in J a m e s is "tipicamente b i b l i c o e g i u d a i c o , " and that o n e must therefore l o o k exclusively to Jewish literature for the ultimate source a n d o f such expressions.
meaning
58
T h e phrase euipuioq AxSyoq is o f particular interest to Fabris since it dominates the immediate c o n t e x t in w h i c h the "perfect law w h i c h is o f f r e e d o m " is first m e n t i o n e d , that is, Jas
1:19~27.
59
I n d e e d , he
considers the interpretation o f this phrase to b e the decisive factor in determining for J a m e s .
60
the significance o f the expression "law o f f r e e d o m "
Fabris observes that the former phrase was read in line
with Stoic c o n c e p t s already in the commentaries o f O e c u m e n i u s a n d T h e o p h y l a c t u s . Against such an interpretation, h o w e v e r , he argues that o n l y limited analogies to J a m e s ' s phrase are f o u n d in the G r e e k literature; there are n o expressions precisely parallel to it.
5 6
61
While
See Legge, 13, 31 and passim. Note that throughout Fabris's study, the expres sion "biblico," which is used in opposition to "greco," "ellenistico" and "stoico," includes not only the Jewish scriptures, but the N e w Testament as well; see, e.g., his treatment o f the phrase AxSyoq &Aj|9e{a<;, on which see immediately below. This peculiar dichotomy effectively excludes the possibility o f hellenistic influence on any works later included within the Christian canon. Ibid., 3 3 - 4 8 . See esp. his ch. 3, "II contesto della «legge di liberta»: il suo carattere biblico e guidaico" (Legge, 53-81), noting particularly the concluding comments on p . 81. Ibid., 5 5 - 5 9 . Ibid., 113: "Infatti il Xoyoq, che ha il potere di salvare le anime 1,21 . . . e la «legge perfetta» . . . Percio la comprensione di questa formula di lac. 1,21 e decisiva per chiarire il significato della «legge della liberta»." Cf. ibid., 27: "Si deve notare che questa esspressione di G i a c o m o 1,21 e decisiva per tutti gli autori, assieme all'altra A,6yo<; aX^deiaq, di lac. 1,18, per determinare la natura e il significato della «legge della liberta»." See Legge, 43: "Pero nella letteratura e nei documenti greci non si trova la 57
5 8
5 9
6 0
6 1
CHAPTER ONE
22
very strictly speaking accurate, this claim is nonetheless quite mis leading i n a s m u c h as Fabris curiously neglects to m e n t i o n , here o r elsewhere in his lengthy m o n o g r a p h , C i c e r o ' s definition o f law in terms o f ratio insita, the euxpuTog v6uo<; o f the Apostolic Constitutions, o r the ejLicpx)Tov orceupoc ^oyou o f Justin—and this despite his interaction with b o t h M e y e r a n d B o i s m a r d .
62
I n d e e d , the similar phrases
w h i c h he refers in this c o n n e c t i o n are, apparently, only the expressions £v8id0£xo<; ^6yo<; a n d 6p06<;
to
Stoic
63
Xoyoq.
As m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , Fabris argues in any case that it is the c o n text in w h i c h the phrase is used in J a m e s w h i c h is decisive: the treat m e n t o f the euxpuToq A,6yo<; in J a m e s is " b i b l i c o e g i u d a i c o , " n o t G r e e k or
Stoic.
64
T h e usual observations a n d arguments are m a d e in this
c o n n e c t i o n : the ascription o f "saving" p o w e r to this logos is particu larly reminiscent o f early Christian literature; ing
65
the t h e m e o f "hear
a n d d o i n g " is typical o f Jewish a n d Christian w o r k s ;
66
the euxpUToq
Xoyoq is to b e identified with the Xoyoq afo^dziaq o f 1:18, w h i c h is itself u n d e r s t o o d n o t only to refer "decisamente ad un contesto b i b lico-giudaico,"
67
but to b e a clear reference to "the g o s p e l " ;
68
Jas
1:18 a n d 1:21, w h i c h are "perfectly parallel" to 1 Peter l:22ff, reflect ancient baptismal paraenesis.
69
T h e r e f o r e , Fabris concludes, o n e must
attempt in the first p l a c e to locate precedents for the phrase eu-qn)loq Xoyoq in the biblical literature;
70
a n d this p r e c e d e n t , he argues, is
f o u n d in Jeremiah's expectation that G o d w o u l d place his law within the h u m a n heart in the eschatological era.
71
M o r e specifically, Fabris
formula Twyoq £\i(pmoq, come in lac. 1,21, dove essa rivela un caraterre stereotipo e fisso"; see further 43f and 46. See Legge, 42~44; cf. 26f, as well as his extensive interaction with Boismard's interpretation of Jas 1:21 on p p . 142-46. See Fabris, Legge, 43. Ibid., 59. Ibid., 62, 148. Ibid., 6 3 - 6 4 . Ibid., 62, citing Jewish works such L X X Ps 118:43 and T.Gad 3:1, as well as Col 1:5; Eph 1:13 and 2 T i m 2:15. See the discussion of Jas 1:18 in Legge, 134-42, esp. 138-40. Ibid., 191; cf. 5 9 - 6 2 and his anticipation o f this line o f argument already on 58-59. Ibid., 113: "Dato il carattere biblico e giudaico del contesto nel quale essa [sc. the formulaic expression e\i(pmoq Xoyoq] e inserita, e indispensabile esaminare in quale misura questo concetto della «parola impiantata» trova un riscontro in quell'ambiente." Ibid., 116, 130, 148-49; see further 113-21. This passage from Jeremiah had already been adduced in this connection by a number o f other authors; for a list see Legge, 24 n. 46, and note in addition Cantinat, Les Epitres, 105. 62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
23
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
argues that J a m e s ' s euxp^xoq Xoyoq is the law o f love as the internal ized "messianic law"; the equivalent, in essence, o f w h a t Paul c o n ceives in terms o f the h o l y spirit.
LUDWIG'S
72
WORT ALS GESETZ
M a r t i n a L u d w i g ' s recent Wort als Gesetz represents another sustained attempt to interpret the Letter o f J a m e s as a Christian w o r k ,
and
its logos without recourse to G r e e k philosophical sources. A t the same time, this study differs significantly from those discussed a b o v e in that its fundamental aim is in fact to overturn the usual " g o s p e l " interpretation o f James's logos. It is L u d w i g ' s contention that J a m e s ' s equation o f law a n d logos is r o o t e d in a Jewish "nomistic w o r d the o l o g y " w h i c h first surfaces in works o f the deuteronomistic
school.
Primarily o n the basis o f this thesis, L u d w i g argues that James's logos is not "the G o s p e l , " but the
Torah.
7 3
I f there is p r o m i s e in L u d w i g ' s ability to c o n c e i v e o f J a m e s as a Christian w o r k without immediately c o n c l u d i n g that "the must b e its central soteriological c a t e g o r y ,
74
Gospel"
the f o r m w h i c h her argu
m e n t takes, unfortunately, is less than persuasive.
75
A m o n g the c h i e f
p r o b l e m s is the apparent formulation o f the question in terms o f a strict d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n "Jewish" and "Hellenistic" precedents J a m e s ' s c o n c e p t o f logos. G i v e n the overall aim o f L u d w i g ' s
for
study,
her use o f these categories as mutually exclusive is less explicit than with Fabris.
F o r e x a m p l e , her emphasis
o n the Jewish
precedents 6
for J a m e s ' s use o f expressions like 8 e x o u m xov . . . XoyovJ
7 2
"hearing
See Legge, 133-81. Cf. with respect to this latter comparison Klein, Ein voll kommenes Werk, 158-59; further J. A . Kirk, " T h e Meaning o f Wisdom in James: Examination o f a Hypothesis," NTS 16 (1969-70) 2 4 - 3 8 . See, e.g., the summary o f the argument as found in Wort als Gesetz, 169: "Bestimmte Formulierungen aus Jak 1,12-25 sind . . . zufriedenstellend aus judischnomistischer Tradition zu erklaren. Danach scheint es mir erwiesen, daB der Jak in 1.18.21-23 mit Xoyoq nicht das Evangelium, die christliche Lehre o.a. bezeichnet, sondern das jiidische Gesetz." Interpretation of Jas 2:8-11 is presented as being o f secondary importance: it is discussed along with other relevant passages found outside o f James 1 only in order to provide "ein vollstandigeres Bild der judisch gepragten Theologie des Jak" (ibid.,. 171; cf. 171-75). See in this connection also Tsuji, Glaube, 108-115, w h o relies in large meas ure on Ludwig. See my review in JBL 115 (1996) 3 7 2 - 7 5 . I have drawn freely on portions o f this review for what follows. Wort als Gesetz, 1 5 9 - 6 1 . 7 3
7 4
7 5
76
CHAPTER ONE
24 and
doing,"
7 7
78
a n d Xoyoq dcXriGeiocq
is n o t m e a n t to refute
Stoic
influence o n James's c o n c e p t o f logos, but to s h o w that such usages c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d apart f r o m c o m p a r i s o n with Christian treatments o f "the G o s p e l . " A similar aim underlies the c o m p i l a t i o n o f Jewish texts that use agrarian imagery to speak o f the internalization o f the law in o r d e r to explain J a m e s ' s description o f the logos as euxpuxoq.
79
In short, L u d w i g rejects the possibility o f Greek philosophical influence o n James's c o n c e p t o f logos, but the rejection is tacit—a
function,
apparentiy, o f her thesis that J a m e s relies o n a Jewish tradition o f equating law a n d logos. L u d w i g ' s treatment o f Philo's analogous equation o f law and logos is especially suggestive in this respect. Philo's extensive reliance u p o n Greek philosophy, according to Ludwig, renders any similarity between his language a n d the "Jewish W o r d - t e r m i n o l o g y " " o n l y a c c i d e n t a l . "
80
In fact, analysis o f Philo's writings suggests that "the taking u p o f the nomistic Jewish W o r d t h e o l o g y is apparently n o t to b e e x p e c t e d in authors heavily influenced b y H e l l e n i s m . " seem, o n e ought n o t e x p e c t J a m e s — w h i c h
81
Conversely, it w o u l d
a c c o r d i n g to L u d w i g is
influenced b y this Jewish tradition—to exhibit significant
hellenistic
influence. A n d in fact, the possibility that J a m e s ' s understanding o f these terms has also b e e n influenced b y G r e e k philosophical thought is entirely o v e r l o o k e d in Ludwig's study. T h e interpretation o f James's euxpDToq Xoyoq offered b y M e y e r , B o i s m a r d a n d mentaries o f O e c u m e n i u s , T h e o p h y l a c t u s o v e r in silence,
82
in the
early
com
a n d Dionysius is passed
as are the often discussed Stoic precedents for the
work's repeated association o f law a n d f r e e d o m .
T H E PROBLEM AND THE THESIS W h e t h e r b y rejecting Stoic influence outright o r b y positing an entirely superficial adoption o f Stoic terminology to c o n v e y a patendy Christian
77
Ibid., 164-67. Ibid., 151-57. Wort als Gesetz, 162-64. Cf. Ward, "Communal Concern," 130-33; Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 136-37; Tsuji, Glaube, 109. Ibid., 86. Ibid., 194. Note that Ludwig does refer to the Apostolic Constitutions when discussing the expression E\i(pvxoq Xoyoq; but she gives no indication that its phrase e\iq>x>Toq vo\ioq may be in any way indebted to Stoic thought. It is cited, rather, primarily because it "sounds like a clarification of Jas 1:21" (ibid., 164). 78
79
80
81
8 2
25
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
meaning, those interpreters w h o view J a m e s as a Christian c o m p o sition have uniformly rejected the proposition that its notion o f a "saving logos' might b e illuminated b y comparison with texts informed b y G r e e k philosophical tradition. T h e relevant passages
cited b y
M e y e r and Boismard, like the commentaries o f O e c u m e n i u s , T h e o phylactus
a n d Dionysius b a r
Salibi, are scarcely d e e m e d
worthy
o f mention, let alone substantive discussion. W h e n cited, the
pas
sages are quickly dismissed as irrelevant to the interpretation o f James. T h e striking c o i n c i d e n c e o f terminology in this rather diverse series o f works has not led to their collection and systematic
study.
S u c h a hasty dismissal o f evidence, c o u p l e d with the fact that the t w o authors w h o do detect substantive Stoic influence d o so while doubting the Christian origin of, at least, this portion o f J a m e s , sug gests that this state o f affairs is symptomatic o f a wider set o f assump tions regarding the centrality o f "the G o s p e l " in early Christian—or, perhaps m o r e to the point, " N e w Testament"—soteriology.
If it is
taken to b e a "truism o f the N e w T e s t a m e n t " that the gospel saves; if it is understood that the "logos o f truth" in a Christian w o r k must naturally refer to "the Christian message"; then it is scarcely sur prising that the philosophical notion o f a logos innate in the h u m a n animal w o u l d b e seen as relevant to J a m e s only if it was originally a non-Christian w o r k .
83
In any event, scholarship's consistent failure to reckon with possibility that James's correlation o f law and logos—even
the
if it is a
Christian c o m p o s i t i o n — m i g h t represent a creative fusion o f tradi tions o f diverse origins is problematic. Despite the formulation o f the p r o b l e m in the works o f Fabris and L u d w i g , it does not i m m e d i ately follow from James's use o f typically Jewish o r Christian expres sions in association with Euxpuioq Xoyoq that the latter phrase itself was c o i n e d entirely apart from G r e e k philosophical influence. A s Dibelius a n d others have r e c o g n i z e d , it is quite possible that an
expression
o f philosophical p r o v e n a n c e is simply used in J a m e s alongside expres sions o f Jewish or Christian origin.
8 3
84
A t the same time, against Dibelius
See the further discussion o f this problem in the Introduction. Note, in fact, the apparent concession in Fabris, Legge, 81. Having concluded regarding the context in which James's "law o f freedom" occurs that "non solo il complesso delle nozioni, ma anche il loro rapporto si spiega esclusivamente alia luce della tradizione biblica e giudaica," Fabris goes on to write that the presence of "[ajlcune somiglianze esterne di vocabolario con l'ambiente greco" does not alter the fact that the "carattere biblico e guidaico" of James excludes "l'ambiente greco e stoico c o m e matrice delle nozioni di G i a c o m o . " Rather, "al massimo possono 8 4
CHAPTER ONE
26
a n d others, it d o e s n o t immediately follow from the fact that J a m e s speaks o f euxpinoq Xoyoq in a m a n n e r uncharacteristic o f Stoic discus sions o f h u m a n
reason that the original m e a n i n g o f the phrase is
entirely irrelevant to J a m e s . S u c h facile conclusions bespeak a m u c h t o o simplistic a p p r o a c h to the very c o m p l e x p r o b l e m o f the m e r g e r o f Jewish, Christian a n d G r e e k tradition in the early Christian
lit
erature. A n u m b e r o f ancient Jewish a n d Christian works sought to incorporate Stoic concepts into religious traditions with which they were n o t originally associated, a n d this inevitably resulted in the adapta tion a n d modification o f the philosophical ideas. I f the treatment o f euxpuxoq Xoyoq in the Letter o f J a m e s is n o t typical o f Stoicism, nei ther is its Christian author a typical Stoic. T h e question, h o w e v e r , remains. Is the expression euxpuioq Xoyoq in fact o f G r e e k philosophical p r o v e n a n c e ? A n d if so, to w h a t extent are its original connotations significant for understanding
the reli
gious thought o f the Letter o f J a m e s ? In w h a t follows, I will s h o w that the phrase Euxpuioq Xoyoq was in fact c o i n e d in philosophical circles, in c o n n e c t i o n with the Stoic the o r y that h u m a n
reason comprises a divinely given "natural" law.
M o r e specifically, the theoretical b a c k g r o u n d o f the phrase lies in the Stoic correlation o f the inchoate logos with w h i c h humans
are
b o r n with "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " (euxpuxoi 7tpoAr|\|/£i<;), that is, with the h u m a n
animal's innate disposition to f o r m c o n c e p t s like
" g o o d " a n d " b a d " (Chapter T w o ) . W e shall see, further, that as the Stoic theory o f law was adapted b y various Jewish a n d Christian authors, it was, naturally, variously modified to a c c o m m o d a t e aspects o f these authors' thought w h i c h w e r e alien to Stoicism. M o s t c o m m o n is the identification o f s o m e b o d y o f instruction—the
T o r a h o r the teaching o f Jesus—as a ver
bal expression o f this innate natural law (Chapter T h r e e ) . It is m y contention that the Letter o f J a m e s , with its correlation o f implanted logos with the "perfect" law, a "law o f f r e e d o m , " presents
another
e x a m p l e o f the Christian adaptation o f this philosophical c o n c e p t i o n o f law. T h o s e aspects o f James's treatment o f qncpuToq Xoyoq w h i c h diverge from the discussion o f h u m a n reason in the Stoic sources
suffragare l'ipotesi di una assunzione materiale da parte di Giacomo della terminologia greca, perb con un significato nuovo e diverso nel contesto attuale della lettera" (emphasis mine). Fabris does not refer specifically to 6 z\x.yx>Toq A,6yo<; in this connection, but cf. 33-48, esp. 42-44.
27
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN JAMES
result f r o m the fact that J a m e s has incorporated the Stoic c o n c e p t into a set o f religious and historical convictions w h i c h derive f r o m Jewish and Christian tradition rather than Stoic philosophy. In J a m e s it is assumed that the T o r a h represents a written expression o f the implanted
logos that all h u m a n beings possess b y nature; and it is
e x p e c t e d that the g o d w h o authored this law will execute an eschatological j u d g m e n t in a c c o r d with it at the parousia o f Jesus Christ (Chapter
Four). A c c o r d i n g l y , logos and its opposite, h u m a n
desire,
are presented as the t w o " w a y s " u p o n w h i c h o n e can travel toward this j u d g m e n t : the latter is characterized
by "deception,"
manifests
itself in "sin," and leads to eschatological "death," while the former is characterized b y "truth," manifests itself in " g o o d w o r k s " (epyoc), a n d "saves souls" f r o m death (Chapter Five). T h e soteriology o f the Letter o f J a m e s , in short, has b e e n w o v e n from strands o f tradition that derive from Jewish, Christian and G r e e k philosophical discourse. T h e implications o f this analysis for attempts to locate the Letter o f J a m e s within early Christianity, a n d particularly in relation to Paul, will b e discussed at the close o f the
study.
CHAPTER T W O L A W AS IMPLANTED
LOGOS:
CICERO AND THE STOICS O N NATURAL LAW
It will have b e e n o b s e r v e d f r o m the p r e c e d i n g chapter that a rather remarkable c o i n c i d e n c e o f t e r m i n o l o g y exists b e t w e e n Dionysius bar Salibi's c o m m e n t a r y o n the Letter o f J a m e s , C i c e r o ' s De Legibus, a n d the Apostolic Constitutions. In e a c h w o r k the term "implanted"
(euxpu-
xoq, insita) is used, in the course o f a discussion o f natural law, to describe either that law itself o r the "reason" (Xoyoq, ratio) with w h i c h it is identified. Further instances o f this t e r m i n o l o g y c a n b e a d d u c e d ; for e x a m p l e , the
"implanted
natural l a w " (e\Lymoq
(puoncoq vouoq)
treated b y M e t h o d i u s , o r "the seed o f the logos implanted
in every
race o f h u m a n s " (TO euxpuTov rcavTi yevei dvGpcoTccov arcepjia TOU Xoyov) that Justin correlates with the "natural l a w " manifested
b y and
in
Jesus Christ. Finally, o n e might also cite that text w h i c h Dionysius b a r Salibi was interpreting, and w h i c h is the central c o n c e r n o f this study: the Letter o f J a m e s itself correlates "implanted
logos" with a
law that is b o t h "perfect" and " o f f r e e d o m . " It is the purpose o f this chapter to s h o w that the recurrence o f this t e r m i n o l o g y is not, in fact, m e r e c o i n c i d e n c e . T h e similar lan g u a g e f o u n d in these otherwise w i d e l y disparate w o r k s is to
be
explained in terms o f their c o m m o n d e p e n d e n c e o n the Stoic the o r y o f law. In o r d e r to demonstrate this point, it will b e
necessary
to delve somewhat deeply into this important, but surprisingly neglected, aspect o f Stoic p h i l o s o p h y .
1
Before turning to an examination o f the
e v i d e n c e , though, a c o u p l e o f introductory remarks are in order.
1
P. A . Vander Waerdt describes the "detailed consideration" o f the problem presented in his recent dissertation as "never previously attempted"; see " T h e Stoic Theory o f Natural Law" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1989) 5. Cf. the ear lier studies o f H . Koester, "NOMOI O ^ I E Q I : T h e Concept o f Natural Law in Greek Thought," Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Randall Goodenough (ed. J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1970) 5 2 1 - 4 1 ; G. Watson, " T h e Natural Law and Stoicism," Problems in Stoicism (ed. A. A . Long; London: Athlone Press, 1971), 216-38; R . Horsley, " T h e Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero," HTR 71 (1978) 35-59; G. Striker, "Origins o f the Concept o f Natural Law," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (ed. J. J. Cleary; N e w York: University Press o f
CHAPTER T W O
30
Law
was
a
subject
significant a m o u n t
to w h i c h
the
Stoic philosophers
devoted
a
o f attention. Treatises o n the subject are associ
ated with the m o s t i m p o r t a n t n a m e s in the early m o v e m e n t : Z e n o , Cleanthes
and
Chrysippus
all w r o t e works entitled
On Law
or
2
Laws, as d i d Sphaerus a n d D i o g e n e s o f B a b y l o n . Unfortunately
On
these
works are entirely lost to us, with the e x c e p t i o n o f a c o u p l e o f i m p o r tant fragments f r o m Chrysippus's On Law. In fact, C i c e r o ' s De Legibus is b y far the m o s t extensive treatment o f natural l a w that has preserved f r o m antiquity. T h e use o f this treatise for the
early
Stoic theory,
reconstructing
h o w e v e r , is c o m p l i c a t e d b y the
fact
Cicero's primary source m a y
have
philosopher w h o had
skeptical A c a d e m y to f o r m his
left the
been
that
been Antiochus o f Ascalon, a own
b r e a k a w a y " O l d A c a d e m y , " a n d w h o s e thought represented a b l e n d o f Stoic a n d Platonic e l e m e n t s . a c c o u n t s that the the Stoic t h e o r y ,
4
theory
3
A c c o r d i n g l y , while it is clear b y all
o f l a w presented
b y C i c e r o is
essentially
a n u m b e r o f authors h a v e variously identified this
o r that detail o f C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t as departures f r o m Stoicism. T h i s question will in fact i m p i n g e o n o u r discussion precisely at its m o s t
A m e r i c a , 1987) 7 9 - 9 4 . O n C i c e r o ' s De Legibus in particular L. P. K e n t e r , M. Tullius Cicero, De Legibus: A commentary on book I. (Amsterdam: Adolf M . Hakkert, 1972); S. Benardete, "Cicero's De Legibus I: Its Plan and Intention," AJP 108 (1987) 295-309. Note also those studies published since the appearance o f Vander Waerdt's dissertation: G . Striker, "Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 9 (1991) 1-73, esp. 3 5 - 5 0 ; P. Mitsis, "Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy. T h e Stoics and their Critics," AJVRW 2.36.7 (1994) 4 8 1 2 - 5 0 ; J. G . DeFilippo and P. T . Mitsis, "Socrates and Stoic Natural Law," The Socratic Movement (ed. P. A . Vander Waerdt; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) 252-71. See also Vander Waerdt's own more recent studies: "Philosophical Influence o n R o m a n Jurisprudence? T h e Case o f Stoicism and Natural Law," AJVRW 2.36.7 (1994) 4 8 5 1 - 4 9 0 0 ; "Zeno's Republic and the Origins o f Natural Law," The Socratic Movement, 2 7 2 - 3 0 8 . See the index in SVF 4, p . 100, under v6|io<;. T h e most recent and sustained argument for this position is that o f P. A . Vander Waerdt, " T h e Stoic Theory o f Natural Law"; see also idem, "Philosophical Influence on R o m a n Jurisprudence." For a sketch o f the earlier discussion o f the question see L. P. Kenter, De Legibus, 9 - 1 0 . A g o o d introduction to Antiochus o f Ascalon is found in J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) 5 2 - 1 0 6 . This point will b e c o m e clear over the course o f this chapter, and is at any rate not disputed in the secondary literature. Vander Waerdt's approach is properly cau tious: "Cicero's account provides a check against which to evaluate the evidence that does survive from the early Stoa, but not a starting point for our enquiry" ("The Stoic Theory o f Natural L a w , " 30). Nonetheless, he finds significant conti nuity from Z e n o to Cicero (ibid., 28)—and this despite his strenuous argument that Cicero's source was Antiochus o f Ascalon. 2
3
4
31
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
critical juncture: the analysis o f C i c e r o ' s treatment o f the Stoic d o c trine o f "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " (euxpuxoi 7tpoAr|\|/ei<;) as it pertains to his theory o f natural law. Ultimately, resolution o f the issue will have little bearing o n o u r present c o n c e r n , w h i c h is simply to iden tify the theoretical basis for C i c e r o ' s definition o f law in terms o f "implanted reason." F o r o u r purposes, it matters little w h e t h e r this basis is p r o p e r l y Stoic o r A n t i o c h a n . Nonetheless, for the sake o f clarity, a n d because the Stoic theory is o f interest in its o w n right, the question will merit s o m e attention. It will in any case b e argued that this aspect o f C i c e r o ' s theory is essentially consistent with that o f Chrysippus. A w o r d t o o , finally, should b e said regarding the use o f the term "natural l a w " in c o n n e c t i o n with Stoicism. W h i l e the significant steps the Stoics t o o k in the direction o f a theory o f natural law must b e c o u n t e d a m o n g their most enduring and influential legacies, the pre cise nature o f their contribution has b e e n a matter o f s o m e debate. It has often b e e n n o t e d that the terms "law o f nature" o r "natural l a w " d o n o t o c c u r in the extant Stoic sources prior to C i c e r o a n d Philo,
5
a n d at least o n e scholar has c o n c l u d e d that in Stoicism "the
real c o n c e r n o f the truly wise m a n was the positive correlation o f reason a n d nature (X6yo<; a n d (puaic;), whereas the relation o f law a n d nature was still seen as an irreconcilable antithesis."
6
This con
clusion, h o w e v e r , is the result o f a rather misleading emphasis o n the actual terms
" l a w o f n a t u r e " o r "natural l a w " — a
restriction
w h i c h is p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m the start given o u r extremely fragmen 7
tary k n o w l e d g e o f the writings o f the early Stoics. A s w e shall see,
5
Koester, e.g., takes this observation as his starting point in "NOMOI OYIEQI"; see further on this the following note. See also Vander Waerdt, " T h e Stoic Theory o f Natural Law," 9 - 1 0 and 8 1 - 8 6 . Koester, "NOMOI OYIEQI," 527. Koester argues that the dissolution o f the Greek antithesis between vojiot; and (p\>ai<; is achieved only when Greek ideas are wedded to a Jewish emphasis on the law o f Moses. In Philo's writings, he argues, "[t]he new antithesis has n o w become that o f the 'law o f nature' and the numer ous laws o f men." Something resembling this latter antithesis, however, is already evident in Zeno's Republic, on which see below. Moreover, such a thesis fails to account for Cicero's use o f similar terminology, as was pointed out by R . Horsley in " T h e Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero," 3 5 - 5 9 . It is indeed noteworthy that such terms are not in evidence for the earliest Stoics. O n the other hand, the absence o f this term in the extant fragments o f Zeno—fragments which d o not, it is to be noted, include even a single scrap o f his On Law—scarcely warrants Koester's assurance that it is "quite certain that Z e n o never used this term [sc. natural law]"; see "NOMOI OYIEQI," 529. Cf. in this respect Cicero, De Nat. Deor. 1.36, w h o speaks explicitly o f Zeno's view o f the naturalis 6
7
CHAPTER T W O
32
it is clear that the Stoics did, at least, define law in terms o f a logos that was "positively correlated" with nature. A n d in fact, Chrysippus himself h a d spoken o f law as (puaei. . . m i
JLIT]
Geaei.
8
F o r these reasons it seems to m e that the terms "natural l a w " a n d "law o f nature" are a fair designation Stoics w e r e c o n c e r n e d w h e t h e r
o f the law with w h i c h
o r not they themselves
ever
the used
phrases like v6uo<; (puaecoc; o r vouo<; cpuaiKoq, a n d I will not, therefore, a v o i d them. T h a t b e i n g said, h o w e v e r , it should b e emphasized that the Stoic " l a w , " unlike the natural laws o f most later thinkers, is n o t to b e u n d e r s t o o d
as an
inviolable set o f p r e c e p t s
that a d m i t
of
codification. N o t o n l y is there n o r e c o r d o f any attempt at a writ ten formulation
o f this law in the early sources, but the
theoretical
principles that p r o v i d e the basis for Stoic ethics in general, a n d
the
Stoic theory o f law in particular, make such an attempt highly i m p r o b able f r o m the start.
9
L A W AS LOGOS
Fundamental to the Stoic theory o f law was the identification o f law a n d logos. G i v e n the state o f the evidence, it is possible to trace this formal identification with certainty o n l y as far as Chrysippus; it is, h o w e v e r , rather difficult to believe that it was n o t already central to Z e n o ' s n o t i o n o f law as w e l l .
10
Plutarch reports that in his Republic,
Z e n o h a d envisioned a state in w h i c h all h u m a n beings were fellow-
lex. While it is o f course possible that Cicero himself has read this phrase into Z e n o (or his source for Zeno's thought), the state o f our sources prohibits such sweeping assessments as Koester offers here. Diog. Laert. 7.128. This distinction is echoed by Arius Didymus, w h o char acterizes 6 Xoyoq as (puaei vo\ioq (SVF 2.528). T o this extent, Vander Waerdt's claim that "the early scholarchs avoid the term nomos phuseos because it is a singularly inappropriate term to describe their theory" would seem to g o beyond the evidence; that such a term is "a singularly inappropriate" description o f the Stoic theory is in any case questionable as, indeed, the title o f Vander Waerdt's dissertation itself suggests. See " T h e Stoic Theory o f Natural Law," 10. This is argued at length in Vander Waerdt, "The Stoic Theory o f Natural Law"; see esp. p p . 8 9 - 9 9 . See further B. Inwood, "Commentary on Striker," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2, 9 5 - 1 0 1 . For a different view see Mitsis, "Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy," 4 8 1 2 - 5 0 . So also M . E. Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa (New York: J . J . Augustin, 1951) 9 - 1 0 ; Vander Waerdt, "The Stoic Theory o f Natural Law," 38 and 123-134. Cf. also the comment o f Cicero (De Nat. Deor. 1.36) that " Z e n o believed the natural law to be divine, and that its function is to c o m m a n d what is right and to forbid the opposite," with the most commonly attested Stoic definition o f law, on which see immediately below. 8
9
10
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
citizens, a n d
in w h i c h the
different
33
local systems
o f justice
SIKCXIOK;) were replaced b y the "universal l a w " (icoivoq vouog). d o e s n o t describe this universal
11
(ISioiq
Plutarch
l a w further; b u t w h e r e the
"world
city" is discussed in later literature, its " l a w " o r "constitution" is reg 2
ularly identified as logos} law
with
equates Hymn
In fact, the identification o f the
logos is a p p a r e n t l y a s s u m e d
n e g l e c t o f the
f o r m e r with
already
ignorance
universal
b y Cleanthes, o f the
latter in
who his
to £eus:
For you [Zeus] have so welded into one all things g o o d and bad that they all share in a single everlasting reason (Xoyov). It is shunned and neglected by the bad among mortal men, the wretched, w h o ever yearn for the possession o f goods yet neither see nor hear god's uni versal law (9eo\) KOIVOV VOJIOV) by obeying which they could lead a g o o d life in partnership with intelligence.
13
In any event, the identification was m a d e explicit at least b y Chrysippus, as is clear f r o m D i o g e n e s Laertius's report
that he h a d
character
i z e d the universal l a w (6 vo\ioq 6 Koivoq) as "right reason w h i c h per v a d e s all things" (6 opQbq Xoyoq, 8 i a TKXVTCOV ep%6u£vo<;). Firmly
in p l a c e in
our
later sources for S t o i c p h i l o s o p h y , this
identification o f l a w a n d logos is in fact fundamental Stoic definition o f l a w .
11
1 5
14
to a well-attested
A c c o r d i n g to Stobaeus, the Stoics
Plutarch, Alex. Fort. Virt. 3 2 9 A - B (= SVF 1.262). Plutarch's report that Z e n o said all people were citizens should be read in light o f Diog. Laert. 7.32—33, where it is reported that Z e n o held that only the virtuous were to be considered citizens o f the universal politeia, while the non-virtuous were "aliens" and "enemies." It is most reasonable to conclude that Z e n o held that all human beings have the poten tial to be citizens owing to their possession o f logos, though only those w h o perfect their reason, and so live in accord with the cosmic law, actually are such. Cf. in this respect Philo's limitation o f the term "world citizen" to the £|i\|n)%oi v6|noi, on which see below, Chapter Three. See, e.g., Cicero De Leg. 1.23. Cf. the remark o f Arius Didymus that gods and humans "are members o f a community because o f their participation in reason, which is natural law" (cp-uoei voiioq); for text and translation see A . A . Long and D . N . Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) §67L (= SVF 2.528). Cf. in addition the use o f such terminology by Philo and in the Apostolic Constitutions, o n which see below, Chapter Three. See fur ther the works o f Reesor and Vander Waerdt cited above in note 10. A tantalizing fragment from Heraclitus seems to suggest that he may have been an important precursor to the Stoics in this respect; for text, translation and c o m mentary see G . S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments Edited with an Introduction and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954) 4 8 - 5 6 ; see more gen erally A . A . Long, "Heraclitus and Stoicism," Philosophia 5 / 6 (1975-76) 133-56. T h e translation is that o f Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.326f. Diog. Laert. 7.88; all translations o f Diogenes Laertius are taken from L C L unless otherwise noted. M . Schofield writes that "the proposition that law is simply right reason 12
13
14
15
34
CHAPTER TWO say that the law is good, being right reason commanding, on one hand, that which ought to be done, and forbidding, on the other, that which ought not be d o n e . 16
T h i s definition is e c h o e d elsewhere b y Stobaeus, and is f o u n d with m i n o r variations in the works o f a n u m b e r o f other authors, includ ing C i c e r o , Philo, A l e x a n d e r o f Aphrodisias, a n d C l e m e n t o f A l e x andria.
17
T h e fact that this definition is so widespread and
never
attributed to any particular p h i l o s o p h e r suggests that it was rather standard Stoic fare. All o f its elements, m o r e o v e r , are at least pre sent in the writings o f Chrysippus, w h o not only, as w e have seen, identified law as "right r e a s o n " (opGoq Xoyoq), but also w r o t e the fol l o w i n g in the o p e n i n g o f his On Law: Law is king o f all things human and divine. Law must preside over what is honourable and base, as ruler and as guide, and thus be the standard o f right and wrong, prescribing to animals whose nature is politi cal what they should do, and prohibiting them from what they should not do ( K C C I XCGV ( p t l O e i TCO^IXIKCGV £(DCOV a>v ox> 7 i o i r | X £ o v ) .
TCpOOXaKXlKOV
U£V G)V 7tOlT|X£OV, arcayOpE'DXlKOV
8e
1 8
Natural Law as Cosmic L o g o s T h e Stoics closely associated the logos w h i c h is law with G o d . C i c e r o , for e x a m p l e , reports divine."
19
that " Z e n o b e l i e v e d the
natural l a w to
T h i s association at times t o o k the f o r m o f
be
out-and-out
identification. A c c o r d i n g to C i c e r o , Chrysippus "identifies Jupiter with the mighty law, everlasting a n d eternal, w h i c h is o u r guide o f life a n d instructress in d u t y . "
20
A g a i n , D i o g e n e s Laertius reports
Chry-
employed in prescribing what should be done and forbidding what should not be done is a securely Stoic and indeed Chrysippean thesis"; see The Stoic idea of the City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 6 8 - 6 9 . Note further the attribution of a quite similar definition to Z e n o by Cicero in De Nat. Deor. 1.36: "Zeno's view is that the law o f nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite" {f(em autem. . . naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria). All translations o f Cicero's works, unless otherwise noted, are taken from L C L . SVF 3.613: xov X E vofiov O7to\)8ociov eivai cpaai, Xoyov 6p96v ovxa 7cpooxaKxiKov 16
|1£V 0)V 7tOVT|X£OV, (XTCayopEVXlKOV 8£ (OV Ot) 7tOlT|X£OV. 17
See SVF 3.614; Cicero, De Leg. 1.18-19; 1.42 2.8; 2.10; cf. De Rep. 33; Philo, Jos. 29; Praem. Poen. 55; Migr. Abr. 130; see further SVF 2.1003; 3.332. SVF 3.314; the translation is that o f Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.432 (§67R), with my emphasis. De Nat. Deor. 1.36. De Nat. Deor. 1.40: Idemque [sc. Chrysippus; cf. 1.39] etiam legis perpetuae et aeter18
19
20
LAW
sippus's v i e w that "the
35
AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
law c o m m o n to all things, that is to
say,
the right reason w h i c h pervades all things . . . is identical with this Z e u s , lord a n d ruler o f all that i s . "
21
O n the other h a n d , the Stoics
w e r e apparently equally comfortable using language that
indicated
that G o d a n d the law were not, strictly speaking, identical. God
22
Thus
is strictly identical with neither "universal reason" (icoivoq Xoyoq)
n o r law in Cleanthes's Hymn
23
to £eus.
A passage f r o m
Plutarch
might evidence a similar distinction o n the part o f Chrysippus, also, a c c o r d i n g to C i c e r o , c o u l d identify
the t w o .
2 4
who
Brad I n w o o d ,
in fact, has m a d e the plausible suggestion that the Stoic (or at least Chrysippus's) "universal l a w " should b e interpreted specifically as the will (PouA,r|Gi<;)—that is, the rational impulse (6pur|)—of Z e u s , o n the basis o f the Stoic p s y c h o l o g y o f a c t i o n .
25
T h e fluidity o f the
usage in this respect is perhaps to b e u n d e r s t o o d similarly fluid use o f the term " g o d . " T h e association
Stoic
in light o f their
2 6
o f law with the reason o f G o d is also f o u n d
C i c e r o ' s De Legibus. In 2.8ff, C i c e r o attributes to the "wisest
in
men"
(sapientissimorum) the v i e w that "the ultimate a n d primal L a w is the m i n d o f G o d , w h o s e reason directs all things either b y c o m p u l s i o n or restraint."
27
T h i s law, he explains, is " c o e v a l " (aequalis) with G o d ,
nae vim, quae quasi dux vitae et magistra qfficiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse; cited according to LCL. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.134 where xov Beov is identified with xov Xoyov; and note further the introduction to Chrysippus's On Law, where it is said that "Law is king of all things human and divine" (SVF 3.314). D i o g . Laert. 7.88: 6 vo\ioq 6 K o i v o q , ocrcep eoxiv 6 6p96<; Xoyoq, Siot rcdvxcov £px6|ievo<;, 6 ambq ©v xcp Aii, KaOriyeiiovi xot>xq> xfj<; xcov ovxcov Sioncrioeax; ovxi. Against Horsley, "Law o f Nature," 42, who finds the tendency o f Philo and Cicero to distinguish G o d from law as the "most significant" o f all the indications of Platonic influence on the Stoic ideas o f these authors. See SVF 1.537 (= Stobaeus, Eel 1.25.3-27.4), noting esp. the following clauses: Ze\) (pboeq apxriye, VO^IOD \ie.xa navxa KDpepvcov . . . Kax£i)9'6v£i<; KOIVOV Xoyov, oq 8ia rcdvxcov cpoixa. Plutarch, St. Rep. 1050D; the extent to which the phrase xov xov Aibq Xoyov . . . Kod von-ov m i Siicnv KOCI 7tp6vouxv represents Chrysippus's own words, however, is not immediately clear. Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 107f and 160. See further on this immediately below. Cf. in this respect Philo Opif. 3. See, for example, the Epicurean critique o f Stoic theology reported by Cicero in De Mat. Deor. 1.36-41; see further Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.323-33. De Leg. 2.8. I diverge from the translation o f the L C L only in reading principem . . . et ultimam as descriptive o f legem Mam rather than the mentem dei; cf. in this respect 2.10, cited below, where the law, in a similar context, is described as vera et princeps. 21
22
2 3
2 4
2 5
2 6
27
36
CHAPTER TWO
"for the divine m i n d c a n n o t exist without reason, and divine reason c a n n o t but have this p o w e r to establish right a n d w r o n g . "
2 8
Thus,
before h u m a n beings ever b e g a n to codify laws, this "eternal l a w " (legem sempiternam) was in effect: For reason did exist, derived from the nature o f the universe, urging men to right conduct and diverting them from wrong-doing, and this reason did not first become Law when it was written down, but when it first came into existence; and it came into existence simultaneously with the divine mind. 29
30
C i c e r o then offers a version o f the standard Stoic definition o f law which identifies the "right reason" in question m o r e closely: "Wherefore the true a n d primal law, applied to c o m m a n d a n d prohibition, is the right reason o f supreme Jupiter."
31
T h e s e passages from De Legibus 2 o c c u r in the context o f a recap o f the main points o f De Legibus 1, w h i c h itself provides the theo retical basis for the De Legibus as a w h o l e .
32
It is therefore not sur
prising that the association o f the law with the divine ratio emerges clearly in b o o k o n e as well, especially in c o n n e c t i o n with C i c e r o ' s argument that the c o m m o n possession o f reason (and therefore right reason) b y the gods a n d humanity entails the c o m m o n possession o f law as w e l l — a series o f inferences that leads ultimately to the famil iar Stoic thesis o f the citizenship o f gods and h u m a n beings in the c o s m i c civitasP Natural Law as Human Reason Just as logos, a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics, is b o t h a divine, c o s m i c force a n d a particular characteristic o f the h u m a n animal, so t o o c o u l d the law c o m p r i s e d b y this logos b e c o n c e i v e d as b o t h permeating the c o s m o s and internal to the h u m a n individual. W h i l e explicit testi m o n y is lacking in the extant early fragments, the Stoic espousal o f
28
Ibid., 2.10. Note that Cicero's own attempt to write up a law based on this "natural law" seems rather at odds with the early Stoic theory; see on this point above. In this respect, though, his project is not unlike later Jewish and Christian attempts to find verbal expressions o f this law in their own traditions o f instruction; see further on this Chapters Three and Four. De Leg. 2.10. Ibid. See the comments o f Cicero in De Leg. 2.8, and those o f Quintus in 2.9. De Leg. 1.23. 2 9
30
31
3 2
33
37
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
this latter v i e w is nonetheless
certain, at least f r o m the
time o f
Chrysippus. Suggestive in the first place is the fact that w h e r e
the
u n d o u b t e d l y early Stoic c o n c e p t o f the h u m a n animal as citizen o f the W o r l d City appears in later sources, it is consistendy
empha
sized that the h u m a n ' s status as citizen o w e s to his o r her share o f the
logos w h i c h constitutes the law o f the C o s m o p o l i s .
34
The
most
decisive e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , c o m e s from the sphere o f the Stoic psy c h o l o g y o f action. W e have seen the specification o f the law's func tion as " c o m m a n d i n g that w h i c h is to b e d o n e a n d forbidding that w h i c h is n o t to b e d o n e " appears repeatedly in the Stoic sources. It is attributed to Z e n o , q u o t e d f r o m Chrysippus's On Law, a n d is part o f the standard Stoic definition o f law f o u n d in a diverse b o d y o f ancient
literature. It is therefore
o f great interest that
Chrysippus
u n d e r s t o o d these functions to b e intimately b o u n d u p with the w o r k ings o f the h u m a n logos as well. All animal action, a c c o r d i n g to the with "impulse" (6pur|).
35
Stoics, originates
ultimately
E a c h impulse is itself p r o m p t e d b y a par
ticular type o f "presentation" (cpavxaoia), namely a " h o r m e t i c
pre
sentation," w h i c h "indicates to the animal the presence o f something o f interest to it, something w h i c h will contribute to its health, wellb e i n g , pleasure, the fulfillment o f its individual nature, e t c . "
36
In the
case o f the mature h u m a n animal, the logos functions to p r o v i d e a propositional content to the h o r m e t i c (and other) presentations that he o r she experiences, a n d rational h u m a n action is caused b y the impulse w h i c h results f r o m assent to the proposition a c c o m p a n y i n g a given h o r m e t i c presentation.
3 4
37
I n w o o d makes the quite
plausible
See above, note 12. For the summary o f the Stoic doctrine o f impulse which follows I rely on In wood's very illuminating study, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism; see esp. pp. 4 7 - 5 3 on impulse as the cause o f action. See further Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.346-54, w h o offer translations o f some o f the basic evidence along with comments. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 56. As Cherniss points out {Plutarch: Moralia [LCL. Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1976; repr. 1993], 4 5 1 - 5 2 note c), the term 6pur|, as is so c o m m o n in Stoic schemes o f classification, seems to have been used both in a more general way (i.e., to designate that movement o f the soul which is generative o f action) and with a more specific referent (i.e., as one species of the former, namely that directed toward something desired). T h e latter is to be contrasted with another species o f the more general 6pur|, namely the acpopuri, which is directed away from something rejected. See further the detailed discussion of the Stoic terminology in Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 2 2 4 - 4 2 . Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.86, where the logos is said to supervene "as the craftsman 3 5
3 6
3 7
CHAPTER TWO
38
c o n j e c t u r e that the a c c o m p a n i e s the
Stoics w o u l d h a v e h e l d that an imperatival clause
h o r m e t i c presentation in
addition to
tional clause that a c c o m p a n i e s all p r e s e n t a t i o n s . thirsty w o m a n e x p e r i e n c e s the on
a hot
her
day,
her
assent to the
38
For
the
proposi-
e x a m p l e , if a
presentation o f a glass o f ice
drinking that water will d e p e n d not
p r o p o s i t i o n "it is a p p r o p r i a t e for m e
water
only
upon
to drink this
ice water," but her o b e d i e n c e to the imperative "drink the ice water!" that her
logos w o u l d
issue s u b s e q u e n t to
m e n t i o n e d p r o p o s i t i o n . In
her
assent to
the
short, rational h u m a n a c t i o n is the
afore result
o f o n e ' s o b e d i e n c e to the imperatival c o m m a n d s issued b y o n e ' s
own
logos in response to h o r m e t i c presentations. T h u s C h r y s i p p u s defined a
human
animal's impulse (6pur|)—impulse, that is, in
39
s e n s e — a s ^6yo<; TTPOGTCCKTIKO*; am& djiayo pe\)TiKO<;.
xou TCOIEIV, a n d
the
40
41
T h i s description o f the h u m a n logos as TTPOGTOCKTIKOC; a n d miKoq
stricter
d(popur| as A,6yo<;
dTtotyope-
is rather striking in light o f the w i d e l y attested Stoic definition
o f vojLioc; as
Xoyoq opQbq TTPOGTOCKTIKOC; jiev obv Ttornxeov, dTrayopeuxiKOc;
8e a>v ou 7ioir|xeov. It is highly significant, therefore, that the
definitions
o f h u m a n 6pur| and dcpopuri given a b o v e were in fact taken b y Plutarch f r o m Chrysippus's treatise On Law,
a work which had
used the
terms
o f impulse," as "a more perfect leadership" in action. (The translation o f the lat ter phrase [xeXeioxepav rcpoaxamav] is taken from L C L ; for xe%v(xr|<; ydp ovxoq [Xoyoq] emywexai xr\q opfxfjq, however, I have cited the more literal translation o f Long and Sedley, The Hellenstic Philosophers, 1.346 [§57A].) Assent is thus a neces sary part o f human action, and is in fact the locus o f human ethical responsibility according to the Stoics; see further on this Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 6 6 - 9 1 . Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 6 0 - 6 6 . See above, note 36. Plutarch, St. Rep. 1037F. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 61, in writing that "Chrysippus seems to have defined an impulse as man's reason commanding him to act" has apparently read Chrysippus's xo\) dvOpamoi) as dependent upon 6 Xbyoq rather than f| opfirj. While grammatically this is possible, the genitive is more likely dependent upon r\ 6pui| for two reasons. First, by Inwood's own account (ibid., 107-8), it is not only human reason that commands; cf. in this respect De Leg 2.10: " . . . the divine mind cannot exist without reason, and divine reason cannot but have this power to establish right and wrong" (neque. . . esse mens divina sine ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravisque sanciendis habet). M o r e importantly, this definition must in any case be understood as concerning specifically v\ bp\n\ xov dvGpamou since the impulse o f non-rational animals is not governed by reason. Note that where L C L hasrcpooxcxxiKoq,SVF readsrcpoaxoeKxiKoq.I have found no indication that this confusion is based on textual variants; see further the edi tion o f M . Pohlenz (Plutarchi Moralia (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1925) vol. 6, pt. 2, p . 12) which agrees with SVF with no indication o f textual variants. T h e use o f rcpoaxaxiKoq in L C L is perhaps an oversight:rcpoaxaxiKoq,from the verb Tipocxfjvai, means " o f or for a prostates [i.e. a leader]"; npocxaiaiKoq, meaning " o f or for commanding," comes from 7 i p o a x d a c o > , a term whose forms are used repeatedly by Plutarch in this passage. 3 8
3 9
4 0
4 1
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS 7EPOGTOCKTIK6V a n d
39
dcTrayope'OTiKov to describe the functions
in its o p e n i n g lines.
42
o f law
I n w o o d quite reasonably c o n c l u d e s that this
treatise must have been a work setting out in detail the relation o f man to the will o f Zeus . . . In doing this he [sc. Ghrysippus] seems to have developed a theory o f the similarity o f the mind o f man and o f god, and o f the consequent need o f a man to assimilate his will to that o f god. A man's correct actions (katorthomata) are the result o f his impulses, obedience to commands to himself which are at the same time the commands o f the Law o f Nature, the will o f Zeus. 43
44
T h e fact that Chrysippus c o n c e r n e d himself with the topic o f "impulse" in his treatise On Law, and that he m o r e o v e r used the same terms to describe the functioning o f h u m a n reason a n d natural law in this w o r k , m a k e it quite difficult to escape the c o n c l u s i o n that the iden tification o f law with the logos o f the sage was an important o f his theory o f l a w .
element
45
Several explicit statements o f the identification o f the law o f nature with h u m a n reason are in fact f o u n d in C i c e r o ' s De Legibus, alongside its identification with the reason o f G o d . In 2.8 C i c e r o writes that that Law which the gods have given to the human race has been justiy praised; for it is the reason and mind o f the sage applied to command and prohibition. 46
T h i s definition is obviously reminiscent o f what w e have f o u n d to have b e e n a c o m m o n Stoic definition o f law. A s in 2.10, it is altered only b y a m o r e precise identification
o f the ratio in question; this
time, h o w e v e r , C i c e r o specifies that it is particularly
the reason o f
the sage. T h e parallel b e t w e e n 2.8 a n d 2.10 is m a d e explicit in 2 . 1 1 . T h e text is corrupt but the sense is clear in any case: Therefore, just as that divine mind is the supreme Law, so, when [rea son] is perfected in man, [that also is Law; and this perfected reason exists] in the mind o f the wise man. 47
42
Plutarch, St. Rep. 1037F; cf. SVF 3.314. Inwood cites in this connection Cicero, De Nat. Deor. 2.58. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 108. Note also that Plutarch's critique o f Chrysippus's On Law in St. Rep. 1038A seems to assume that Chrysippus had made this identification. De Leg 2.8; I have altered the translation o f L C L only in rendering ratio mensque sapientis as "the reason and mind o f the sage" rather than " o f a wise lawgiver." De Leg. 2.11; I cite the L C L translation, which follows the conjectural emen dation o f Vahlen. 43
44
45
46
47
40
CHAPTER T W O
T h e identification o f law with the ratio o f the sage, as was the case with its equation with the ratio o f G o d , is also clear f r o m B o o k O n e . It emerges m o s t clearly in De Leg. 1.18-19, w h e r e C i c e r o attributes to "the m o s t learned m e n " (doctissimis viris) the v i e w that Law is highest reason implanted in nature (summa ratio insita in natura) which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when strengthened and perfected in the human mind, is law. And so they believe that Law is intelligence, whose natural func tion it is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing. . . [Law] is the mind and reason o f the sage . . . 4 8
It is clear f r o m the subsequent reference to the mens ratioque prudentis a n d the p r e c e d i n g m e n t i o n o f the hominis mens that C i c e r o ' s pri m a r y c o n c e r n here is h u m a n reason. O n the other hand, the general equation o f law with "intelligence" (prudentiam) w h i c h naturally c o m mands
a n d prohibits m i g h t b e spoken with reference
humanity,
49
to G o d o r
a n d at least o n e author has in fact interpreted the initial
definition o f law as summa ratio insita in natura with reference to the divine reason w h i c h pervades the c o s m o s .
50
A s this is precisely the
definition w h i c h is o f central c o n c e r n to the present study, it requires closer examination. W h i c h ratio in particular d o e s C i c e r o have
in
m i n d here? Is a G r e e k Xoyoq eVcpmoq, as M e y e r suggested, in fact to b e seen b e h i n d C i c e r o ' s Latin ratio insita? Is there any particular significance to the use o f the term "implanted" in this c o n n e c t i o n ?
T H E DEVELOPMENT OF H U M A N R E A S O N
I b e g i n with the observation that the Stoic identification o f natural law with h u m a n reason implies a developmental aspect to their the o r y o f law. A c c o r d i n g to the Stoics, the h u m a n animal is b o r n with only a potential
logos, and c a n n o t b e p r o p e r l y described as
"ratio
nal" until a r o u n d the age o f seven, at w h i c h time the logos b e c o m e s
48
De Leg. 1.18-19: lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est. itaque arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem, cuius ea vis sit, ut recte facere iubeat, vetet delinquere. . . ea est enim naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis... I have slighlty altered the L C L trans lation. Cf. also De Leg. 1.23. Cf. De Leg. 2.10: "For the divine mind cannot exist without reason, and divine reason cannot but have the power to establish right and wrong." Renter, De Legibus, 8If. 4 9
50
41
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
"completed from the preconceptions" (EKTCOVrcpoAr|\|/£CDVGU|i7cAr|poua6ai).
51
T h i s maturation at a r o u n d seven years o f age is to b e sharply dis tinguished from the ultimate perfection o f the logos attained o n l y b y the sage. Unlike the former, w h i c h occurs quite naturally and inde pendently o f any intentionality in every h u m a n individual, the lat ter o c c u r s only through great intellectual effort, and is in fact rarely, if ever, a c h i e v e d .
52
T h i s initial maturation will b e discussed
more
fully b e l o w . A t present I wish o n l y to emphasize that, inasmuch it is the perfected reason (opGoq Xoyoq) w h i c h is identified b y
as the
Stoics as natural law, there is necessarily a developmental aspect in the
theory.
W h i l e explicit evidence for early Stoic discussion o f this natural c o n s e q u e n c e o f their identification o f natural law with h u m a n rea son is lacking in the extant fragments, such a developmental aspect is in fact quite explicit in C i c e r o ' s De Legibus. T h e thought the corrupt passage from 2.10, w h e r e C i c e r o apparently
behind identifies
the law as reason " w h e n it is perfected in the h u m a n b e i n g " (cum in homine est perfecta), and w h i c h thus exists particularly in "the m i n d o f the sage" (in mente sapientis), is spelled out m o r e clearly in
1.18.
H e begins b y stating, as his initial definition o f law, an o b v i o u s vari ant o f the c o m m o n Stoic definition discussed a b o v e : lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. H e then p r o c e e d s to clarify: "this reason, when strengthened and completed in the human mind, is l a w . "
53
This statement obviously assumes a time
w h e n the ratio was less than "strengthened" and " c o m p l e t e d , " and this is precisely what o n e w o u l d e x p e c t given the Stoic a c c o u n t o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the h u m a n reason. T h e particular developmental process w h i c h informs C i c e r o ' s De Legibus is stated m o r e fully in 1.26-27. H a v i n g secured the premise o f the providential g o v e r n a n c e o f the universe (1.21) and the
kin
ship o f h u m a n s with G o d ( 1 . 2 2 - 2 5 ) , C i c e r o rehearses a litany o f the gifts that divine Nature has b e s t o w e d u p o n humans as a result o f this family tie. I n c l u d e d a m o n g these are not only the senses, w h i c h serve as o n e ' s "attendants and messengers," but also the disclosure
51
SVF 2.83; on the Stoic doctrine o f preconception, see below. See Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.381 (§6IN). De Leg. 1.18: eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est. As was the case in the citation o f this passage above, I have altered the translation o f LCL; the emphasis in the translation, too, has been added. 52 53
CHAPTER TWO
42
o f "vague c o n c e p t i o n s o f the m o s t important things" {rerum plurimarum obscuras. . . intelligentias) w h i c h p r o v i d e , "as it w e r e , the 54
o f k n o w l e d g e " [quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae).
foundations
C i c e r o continues,
describing the further d e v e l o p m e n t o f these " o b s c u r e c o n c e p t i o n s " into the ratio itself: But, whereas G o d has begotten and equipped the human being, desir ing it to be the chief o f all created things, it should now be evident, without going into all the details, that nature herself—by herself— (ipsam per se naturam) goes a step farther; for, with no guide to point the way, she starts with those things whose character she has learned through the rudimentary and inchoate conceptions, and herself—by herself—strengthens and perfects the faculty o f reason (ex prima et inchoata intelligentia genera cognovit, confirmat ipsa per se rationem et perficit). 55
As
K e n t e r has r e c o g n i z e d , De Leg. 1.26-27 is to b e u n d e r s t o o d in
light o f the Stoic view, m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , that the h u m a n logos matures to the p o i n t w h e r e it c a n b e described as p r o p e r l y "rational" as the result o f a natural process i n v o l v i n g p r e c o n c e p t i o n s (7ipoAr|\|/£i<;). A c c o r d i n g to C i c e r o , then, the mature h u m a n ratio—and
56
ultimately,
ideally, the "right r e a s o n " that is natural l a w — d e v e l o p s directly out these
" o b s c u r e c o n c e p t i o n s . " M o r e o v e r , it is clear f r o m C i c e r o ' s
depiction o f these "foundations o f k n o w l e d g e " as a divine e n d o w m e n t o f the same o r d e r as the senses a n d the h u m a n f o r m that he understands
t h e m to b e innate in the h u m a n a n i m a l .
57
In fact, the
Stoics d i d speak o f a certain c a t e g o r y o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h they described as euxpi)TO<;, a n d it is u n d o u b t e d l y this class o f p r e c o n c e p tion that C i c e r o here has in m i n d . T h u s for C i c e r o the
potential
ratio with w h i c h h u m a n s are b o r n is intimately associated with the "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " (euxpuxoi 7ipoAr|\|/£i<;): h u m a n reason in the p r o p e r sense o f the term develops naturally and direcdy out o f t h e m . The
54
fact that this d e v e l o p m e n t a l s c h e m e is assumed in the
58
initial
De Leg 1.26; translation mine. T h e L C L translation o f intelligentias as "mean ings" fails to bring out the connection with the Stoic doctrine o f conception and preconception; on this use o f intelligentia in Cicero, see Marin O . Liscu, Etude sur la Langue de la Philosophie Morale chez Ciceron (Paris: Societe d'Edition «Les Belles Lettres», 1930) 114 and 126. O n the textual problem here see Kenter, De Legibus, 111-112; the intention is sufficiently clear for our purposes in any case. De Leg 1.27; the translation is based on the LCL. Kenter, De Legibus, 111-12. Ibid. See further on this point below. 55
56
57
58
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
43
a c c o u n t o f natural law, w h e r e law is defined as ratio insita (cf. A,6yo<; ejucprjioq), requires closer
attention.
T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , an important preliminary issue w h i c h must first b e sorted out. T h e Stoic doctrine o f "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " has b e e n the subject o f n o small debate, a n d it has b e e n suggested b y m o r e than o n e author that C i c e r o ' s belief that these are present in human
individuals from
tion o f the Stoic p o s i t i o n .
birth represents 59
a platonizing interpreta
It will b e necessary to bring s o m e clarity
to the Stoic theory, a n d thus to C i c e r o ' s relation to it, before p r o c e e d i n g further. T h e s e questions are o f o b v i o u s i m p o r t a n c e for the m o r e general issue o f the p r i m a r y source for the De Legibus a n d its relation to the early Stoics. M o r e i m p o r t a n d y for o u r present
pur
poses, this analysis will greatly illuminate the recurring use o f the term " i m p l a n t e d " to describe the h u m a n logos o r the natural law it comprises in the ancient literature.
T H E STOIC DOCTRINE OF IMPLANTED PRECONCEPTIONS The
debate surrounding the Stoic doctrine o f "implanted p r e c o n
c e p t i o n s " (euxprjioi 7ipoAr|\|/£i<;) c o n c e r n s , specifically, the early Stoic understanding o f their o r i g i n .
60
B o t h Chrysippus a n d Epictetus used
the term eiiymoq to describe h u m a n p r e c o n c e p t i o n s o f basic ethical categories such as g o o d a n d b a d . It is clear b y all accounts that Epictetus, in a m a n n e r reminiscent o f C i c e r o , used this term to c o n vey
that these p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are in s o m e sense " i n b o r n " in
the
h u m a n animal. T h e r e has b e e n w i d e disagreement, h o w e v e r , regard ing Chrysippus's use o f the term a n d its relation to that o f Epictetus. In what follows, therefore, it will b e necessary to reconstruct Chrysip pus's doctrine as far as possible without reference to the e v i d e n c e o f Epictetus.
59
E.g., Renter, De Legibus, 112. T h e most extensive discussions are those o f A. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophic (Stuttgart: Enke 1890; repr., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Giinther Holzboog], 1968) 187-222; F. H . Sandbach, "Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic Theory o f Rnowledge," Classical Quarterly 24 (1930) 4 4 - 5 1 ; reprinted with supplementary notes in Problems in Stoicism, 2 2 - 3 7 ; and M . Pohlenz, Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophic (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen 3 / 2 6 ; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1940; reprinted in Stoicism, [ed. Leonardo Taran; Greek & R o m a n Philosophy 38; N e w York & London: Garland, 1987]) 82-103. 60
CHAPTER TWO
44
The Problem T h e basic contours o f the Stoic doctrine o f c o n c e p t i o n a n d p r e c o n c e p t i o n are reported b y Aetius: When man is born, he has the commanding part o f his soul like a sheet o f paper serviceable for writing upon. O n this he inscribes each one o f his concepts (TCOV EVVOICGV). The first method o f inscription is through the senses (5id TCOV aia0f|o-£cov). For perceiving something, e.g. white, they have a memory (uvr|UT|v) o f it when it has departed. And when many memories o f a similar kind have arisen, then we say we have experience (£U7t£ip(cxv). Experience is the mass o f similar presen tations ((pavxcxGicov). He
continues: O f conceptions, some come about naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, but others through our instruction and attention. The latter are called "conceptions" only, the former are also called "pre conceptions" (TCOV 8e EWOICOV ai u£v cp-uaiKCoq yivovTai KCXTCX TOOX; dprujivoax; TpoTtoix; Kcxi &v£7tiT£%vr|Tco<;, ai 5E r\bx\ 81' f|U£T£pa<; 5i5aaKcxA,{a<; m i zn\\\zkeiaq' ourcai u£v otiv evvoiai KCXXOUVTCXI uovov, £K£ivou 8E KOU 7cpoAr|\{/£i<;). Reason (6 Xoyoq), for which we are called rational (XoyiKoi), is said to be com pleted from our preconceptions (eic TCOV 7tpoA,r|\{/£cov o\)U7tA,r|po\)G9ai) over the first seven years o f life. 61
P r e c o n c e p t i o n (7tp6A,r|\|/i<;) is thus a type o f c o n c e p t i o n (EWOIOC). T h e term evvoia is used b o t h in this m o r e general sense, as the
genus
o f w h i c h p r e c o n c e p t i o n is a species, as well as in a m o r e restricted sense to d e n o t e a particular species o f c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h contrasts with the p r e c o n c e p t i o n .
62
A c c o r d i n g to Aetius, the distinction between
p r e c o n c e p t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t i o n s in this strict sense is o n e o f origin: 7tpoA,T|\i/ei<; arise "naturally" whereas Evvoiai in the strict sense to those c o n c e p t s w h i c h result from conscious intellectual
refer
effort.
63
T h u s p r e c o n c e p t i o n can fairly b e described as o n e ' s initial c o n c e p tion o f something, w h i c h is as such rather ill-defined a n d in o f further refinement.
61
64
B o t h the
need
natural origin o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n s
SVF 2.83; the translation is that o f Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25f. Pohlenz (Grundfragen, 84) speaks o f "Ennoia im engeren Sinne" and as "Oberbegriff." Bonhoffer's limitation o f the preconceptions to the "ethischen und asthetischen Begriffe," (e.g. Epictet und die Stoa, 191, 193) and the concept o f G o d [Epictet und die Stoa, 218-22), as well as his identification o f them with the K o i v a i evvoiai have been well refuted by Sandbach; see "Ennoia," 26f and 23-25; also Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 8 4 - 8 5 . Both result from his confusion o f 7ipoA,r|\|/£i<; in general with the eVqn)TOi 7ipoXr|\|/ei<;. See further on this below. Cf. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25: "This, then, is one distinguishing mark o f the 62
63
64
LAW
and
the
rather general
45
AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
character o f their c o n t e n t
are
apparently
reflected in Chrysippus's definition o f 7tp6A,r|\|A<; as evvoioc (p-oancri xcov 65
KocGoAxn).
It is the precise m e a n i n g o f this "natural" acquisition o f the pre conceptions that has b e e n at the center o f the scholarly debate regard ing the Stoic doctrine o f 7tp6A,r|\|/i<;. A t least o n e sense is clear e n o u g h from Aetius's o w n report: p r e c o n c e p t i o n s result f r o m the
"natural"
t e n d e n c y o f the c o m m a n d i n g faculty to organize sensual e x p e r i e n c e , even b e f o r e an individual has b e c o m e p r o p e r l y rational.
66
It has l o n g
b e e n noted, h o w e v e r , that while Aetius speaks o f the "aforesaid w a y s " (plural) in w h i c h p r e c o n c e p t i o n s c a n arise, he indicates only o n e such way,
namely, b y means o f sensual e x p e r i e n c e .
67
It is therefore
gen
erally agreed that b e h i n d Aetius's a c c o u n t lies s o m e source that h a d described m o r e fully the "natural" a n d " u n d e s i g n e d " acquisition o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , a n d that something approximating such a source is preserved b y D i o g e n e s Laertius:
68
O f things conceived (xcov voo-ouivcov), some have been conceived by direct experience ( m x a 7tep{7CTcoaiv), some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, some by con trariety . . . and some things are conceived by inference, like proposi tions and space; and something just and good (8{KOCI6V TI m i dyaGov) is conceived naturally ((p\)aiKc5<;); and by privation, for instance a man without hands. 69
preconception; it is an undeveloped conception, as opposed to the thought-out definition"; further Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 83-84. T h e technical term for this refinement seems to have been 8idp9pcooi<;; the evidence for this term comes primarily from Epictetus, but cf. Diog. Laert. 7.199. See further Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 188-90. Diog. Laert. 7.54, citing from the first b o o k o f Chrysippus's FTepi Aoyoi). O n the translation o f this rather difficult phrase, see Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25 and 35 n. 12, w h o translates it as a "natural conception o f the general characteristics o f a thing." It has been variously understood but seems to suggest the rather general (which is to say, neither precisely nor adequately defined) nature o f the informa tion such a conception bears; so Sandbach, "Ennoia," 25; Pohlenz, Grundjragen, 84; Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 2 0 3 - 4 . Indeed the human logos, which is itself present at the time o f an individual's birth only in a potential form, is "completed" by means o f their accumulation. This, in fact, is introduced as Ttpokoq Tfj<; &vaYpa(pfj<; xponoq, upon which no "second" or "third" follows. This lacuna was apparently first detected by Zeller; see Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 195. U p o n this matter all the major expositors o f this Stoic doctrine are agreed; cf. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 195; Sandbach, "Ennoia," 26; Pohlenz, Grundjragen, 82f. Diog. Laert. 7.52-53. T h e translation cited is a slightly altered version o f Sandbach's translation; cf. "Ennoia," 26. 65
66
67
6 8
6 9
CHAPTER TWO
46
T h e "direct e x p e r i e n c e " w h i c h heads the list in this passage
corre
sponds to the conceptions acquired " b y the senses" in Aetius's account, with the rest o f it apparently comprising his unspecified ways."
70
"aforesaid
M o s t o f the items o n this list represent " s o m e simple
u n c o n s c i o u s mental operation
f r o m the data given b y the
and
senses"
similar to that described already b y Aetius in his illustration o f the "natural" acquisition o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n s .
71
Significantly, however, the only conceptions singled out b y Diogenes Laertius as acquired
"naturally" here are those o f "something just
a n d g o o d . " A s s u m i n g that something like this a c c o u n t lies
behind
the report o f Aetius, therefore, w e have a p r o b l e m . A r e w e to under stand that the c o n c e p t s o f "something just a n d g o o d " are the o n l y p r e c o n c e p t i o n s (i.e., (puaiicai evvoioci) o n this list, o r that they have a "natural" origin in a still m o r e specialized sense than the
other
types o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n ? It must b e p o i n t e d out at o n c e that if Aetius has, in fact, relied o n an a c c o u n t such as that f o u n d in D i o g . Laert. 7 . 5 2 - 5 3 , he provides clear a n d strong evidence for the latter inter pretation: n o t o n l y d o e s Aetius characterize the acquisition o f c o n ceptions " b y m e a n s o f the senses" (8ia xcov aia0r|G£cov; cf. D i o g e n e s Laertius's KOCTOC 7cepi7CTCoaiv)
72
as o c c u r r i n g (p^anccex;, but he explicitly
classifies such c o n c e p t i o n s as 7cpoX,r|\|/ei<;. T h i s m u c h was clear to Bonhoffer. H o w e v e r , g u i d e d b y his the ses (i) that p r e c o n c e p t i o n s c o n c e r n e d only c o n c e p t i o n s in the spheres o f ethics a n d t h e o l o g y a n d (ii) that all p r e c o n c e p t i o n s were Bonhoffer
nonetheless
held that o n l y the
concepts o f
inborn,
"something
g o o d " a n d "something j u s t " f r o m D i o g e n e s Laertius's list were to b e c o n s i d e r e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . H e argued that Aetius used cpuaiKcbg in a less technical
sense w h e n
referring to the
other c o n c e p t i o n s to
d e n o t e simply the "unsophisticated m a n n e r " in w h i c h a c o n c e p t such as " w h i t e " was f o r m e d . appended
the
73
In fact Aetius, he c o n t e n d e d , epexegetically
t e r m dv£7ciTe%vf|TC0(; to m a k e
this m e a n i n g
clear.
74
Bonhoffer c o u l d not, h o w e v e r , dispense with Aetius's explicit class-
70
So Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 195; Sandbach, "Ennoia," 26; Pohlenz, 82f. See further Diog. Laert. 7.53 for the association o f Tcepijcxcooi^ with ia aioO^Ta. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 26; similarly Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 195f. See above, note 70. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 194-96; cf. however ibid., 192, where Bonhoffer regards precisely this interpretation o f the term "natural" in the context o f the gen eral Stoic doctrine o f (puaiKotl e v v o i a i as "unleugbar etwas Gekunsteltes." Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 195. 71
72
73
74
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
47
ification o f such c o n c e p t i o n s as 7tpoA,f|\|/£i<; so easily. Calling this " d e n zweiten w u n d e n Punkt der S telle," he writes: I confess that I can only dispose o f this obstacle by the assumption either that the author, with the division o f the e v v o i a i into kunstlose and kunstmdssige, has thoughdessly considered only the c p D G i i c a i e v v o i a i under the former so that, as in Epictetus 2.11, the division is there fore an incomplete o n e , or that he has mistakenly extended the term 7tp6Xr|\|A<; to such concepts to which it, at least in the stricter sense, is not suitable. 75
76
S u c h mistrust o f the fundamental evidence for the Stoic doctrine o f 7tp6Xr|\|/i<; w h i c h Aetius's a c c o u n t provides was rightly questioned b y Sandbach.
77
H e s h o w e d that Bonhoffer's limitation o f the
precon
ceptions to c o n c e p t s in the areas o f ethics a n d t h e o l o g y was in any case m i s g u i d e d .
78
H e p o i n t e d out further that if o n e assumes that
s o m e , at least, o f the p r e c o n c e p t i o n s were held to originate
from
empirical experience rather than being inborn in humans—an assump 79
tion warranted even apart from the evidence o f A e t i u s — t h e o f Aetius a n d D i o g e n e s Laertius are actually quite
reports
complementary:
The two passages together give a perfecdy consistent account o f a pre conception as the first conception o f a thing, arrived at without spe cial mental attention, and derived either directly or by some simple unconscious mental operation from the data given by the senses. 80
Such mental operations
as are described b y D i o g e n e s Laertius are
simple enough, as Bonhoffer himself recognized, to warrant their char acterization as "naturally" arising. T h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f 7 5
"something
See further Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 194 on this supposition o f an incom plete classification. Bonhoffer's belief that there was a "third category" o f concep tion results from his mistaken limitation o f the term npokryyiq to the euipuxoi 7tpoXr|V|/£i<;. In effect, this third category comprises all 7tpoA,f|\|/ei<; which are not at the same time euxponoi 7tpoA,r|V|/ei<;. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 196: "Ich gestehe, dass ich diesen Anstoss nur zu beseitigen weiss durch die Annahme, entweder dass der Verfasser, bei der Einteilung der evvoiai in kunstlose und kunstmassige, nachlassigerweise unter den ersten nur die (pDOiical evvoiai ins Auge gefasst hat, so dass also, wie bei Epictet II, 11, die Einteilung eine unvollstdndige ware, oder dass er die Bezeichung npoX^iq irrtumlich auf solche Begriffe ausgedehnt hat, auf welche sie, wenigstens im engeren Sinne, nicht passt" (emphasis his). Sandbach, "Ennoia," 26. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 26f and 2 3 - 2 5 . See further Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 8 4 - 8 5 . See on this Epictetus, Diss. 4.8.6-10, where the npokx\y\q o f a carpenter is mentioned. It is difficult even in the case o f Epictetus, w h o clearly believes in "innate" conceptions o f ethical notions, that such a concept was held to be innate. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 26. 7 6
77
7 8
7 9
8 0
CHAPTER TWO
48
just a n d g o o d " must thus b e u n d e r s t o o d to arise "naturally" in a m o r e specialized sense than is the case with the other p r e c o n c e p t i o n s .
81
W h a t , then, is the nature o f this m o r e "natural" origin? S a n d b a c h was well aware that Chrysippus himself, in a m a n n e r w h i c h recalls this passage from D i o g e n e s Laertius, h a d spoken o f euxpuxoi 7tpoA,r|\|/£i(; of " g o o d " and
"bad."
82
H e rightly rejected, h o w e v e r , Bonhoffer's
assertion that euxpmoc; c o u l d m e a n nothing other than i n b o r n , citing several examples to the c o n t r a r y .
83
In fact, S a n d b a c h argued, to inter
pret euxpuxoc; as " i n b o r n " is "contrary to all the other e v i d e n c e , a n d in particular
inconsistent with the i m a g e o f the soul at birth as a
sheet o f p a p e r ready to b e inscribed with c o n c e p t i o n s . " in addition the following passage from
84
H e cited
C i c e r o , w h i c h reports that
the Stoics u n d e r s t o o d the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d to b e arrived at b y means o f " a n a l o g y " : N o w notions o f things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or combination o f ideas or anal ogy or logical inference. The fourth and last method in this list is the one that has given us the conception o f the G o o d . The mind ascends by inference from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion o f the G o o d . 85
In fact, he argued, the especially "natural" origin o f the c o n c e p t o f "something g o o d " is itself clarified b y this report. W h i l e all p r e c o n c e p tions are b y definition "naturally" acquired, the origin o f o u r c o n c e p t o f the G o o d results, in the w o r d s o f the Stoic spokesman C a t o , from the fact that "the
m i n d ascends b y inference f r o m
the things
in
a c c o r d a n c e with nature till finally it arrives at the n o t i o n o f G o o d . " T h a t is to say, S a n d b a c h argues, " w e recognise the g o o d the force o f its o w n n a t u r e . "
81
87
8 6
through
Bonhoffer's c o n t e n t i o n that this pas-
Ibid., 28f. Plutarch, St. Rep. 104IE. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 28; so also Pohlenz, Grundjragen, 88-89. Cf. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 192f. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 28, apparently referring to Aetius, Plac 4.11, who describes the f|ye(x6viKOV in this way. Cicero, De Fin. 3.33; cf. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 28-29. Cicero, De Fin. 3.33: ab iis rebus quae sunt secundum naturam ascendit animus collatione rationis, turn ad notionem boni pervenit. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 29. In the appendix to the reprint of this article, Sandbach revises this position, stating that the "nature" concerned with the term cpvaiKCOc; "must be that o f the man w h o forms the concept, not that o f the concept itself" ("Ennoia," 33). However, he gives no indication o f how, if at all, he understands this revision to effect his overall thesis o f the origin o f the ethical preconceptions in empirical experience. See further below. 82
8 3
8 4
8 5
86
87
49
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
sage referred to a c o n c e p t i o n o f the G o o d — w h i c h is to say an evvoioc in the strict sense as o p p o s e d to a m o r e hazy rcp6A,r|\|/i<; o f something g o o d — i s for S a n d b a c h
" u n c o n v i n c i n g in itself," a n d
" i m p o s s i b l e " in light o f a passage
from
in any
Seneca where
a
case
similar
a c c o u n t is presented in the context o f a discussion o f the initial o c c u r rence o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d . plays the
8 8
Finally, S a n d b a c h
also d o w n
e v i d e n c e f r o m D i o g e n e s Laertius b y characterizing
the
entire sentence "something just a n d g o o d is c o n c e i v e d naturally" as being, in any case, "a kind o f postscript to the original list" a d d e d only because "the g o o d , t h o u g h c o n c e i v e d ' b y analogy', was not c o v e r e d b y any o f the examples given" elsewhere in Diogenes Laertius's source.
89
F o r S a n d b a c h , then, there can b e n o question o f innate p r e c o n ceptions in early Stoicism.
90
In the end, however, he found it "difficult,"
despite his o w n arguments to the contrary,
"to feel confident that
Chrysippus did not m e a n ' i n b o r n ' w h e n he wrote the w o r d [sc. euxpvx o i ] . " H e thus settled u p o n the rather unsatisfying c o n c l u s i o n that Chrysippus's
use o f this term was " o n l y a t e m p o r a r y a b e r r a t i o n . "
91
Ultimately, therefore, S a n d b a c h merely replaced Bonhoffer's mistrust o f the evidence o f Aetius with similar misgivings regarding evidence from Chrysippus himself. M o r e o v e r , while S a n d b a c h is u n d o u b t e d l y c o r r e c t in pointing out that at least some p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are
acquired
only t h r o u g h sensual experience, his argument that the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d is also ultimately derived from sensual experience fails to c o n v i n c e . It is not altogether clear that Bonhoffer's detection o f a subtle difference between D i o g . Laert. 7.53 and De Fin. 3.33, w h e r e b y the
latter passage
c o n c e r n s a well defined
7tp6A,r|\|/i<;, is " i m p o s s i b l e " in light o f the Sandbach
8 8
maintains. I n d e e d ,
Sandbach
evvoioc rather than
evidence o f Seneca,
relegated
to his
a as
endnotes
Sandbach ("Ennoia," 29) refers to Seneca, Ep. 120, the topic o f which is " h o w we first acquire the knowledge o f that which is g o o d and that which is honorable" (quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenit); the translation is cited according the L C L , with emphasis added. All translations o f Seneca, unless otherwise indi cated, are taken from L C L . Cf. Bonhoffer's treatment o f this passage in Epictet und die Stoa, 2 1 5 - 1 6 . Sandbach, "Ennoia," 29. Sandbach ("Ennoia," 29f) seems to attribute their presence in Epictetus to the "syncretism o f the first century," at which time "Platonism gave to Stoicism a belief in inborn conceptions." Sandbach, "Ennoia," 28. J. M . Rist, in contrast, has no compunction about reading Chrysippus as intending "ingrained" rather than "inborn" ("The Criterion o f Truth," Stoic Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, repr. 1990] 134). 8 9
9 0
9 1
CHAPTER TWO
50
m e n t i o n o f Seneca's additional assertion that while k n o w l e d g e o f the G o o d is arrived at b y m e a n s o f analogy, Nature herself "has given us the seeds o f k n o w l e d g e . "
92
In addition, S a n d b a c h ' s c o n t e n t i o n that
the n o t i o n o f innate p r e c o n c e p t i o n s contradicts Aetius's characteri zation o f the c o m m a n d i n g faculty at birth as a "sheet o f papyrus serviceable for writing u p o n " is an overly hasty a n d rather superficial dismissal o f Bonhoffer's position. Bonhoffer, in fact, h a d suggested that the "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , " like the logos itself, are present at birth only in " s p e r m a t i c " — w h i c h is to say, potential—form, a n d S a n d b a c h n o w h e r e answers this particular
argument.
93
T h e possibility therefore remains o p e n that certain p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , n a m e l y those o f the ethical sphere, are in s o m e sense i n b o r n in indi vidual humans. But is this in fact the case? A n d if so, h o w did the Stoics explain their existence? It is M a x P o h l e n z w h o introduces the key e v i d e n c e for the solu tion to this p r o b l e m . H a v i n g rejected, with S a n d b a c h , Bonhoffer's c o n t e n t i o n that Chrysippus's use o f the term euxpmoq was in itself decisive, P o h l e n z nonetheless cited a previously n e g l e c t e d passage f r o m Plutarch in w h i c h Chrysippus is criticized for his supposed c o n tradiction o f the " c o m m o n c o n c e p t i o n s " :
94
and this [offense against common conceptions on the part o f Chrysippus occurs] too in matters concerning good things and evil and objects o f choice and avoidance and things congenial and repugnant (oiiceiov TE KCXI &Mx)Tp{(ov), the clarity o f which ought to be more manifest than that o f things hot and cold and white and black, since the mental images o f these are incidental to the sense-perceptions entering from without (eKewrov jiev yap e^coGev eioiv ai (pavxaaiai xaiq aio0r|G£aiv £7ceia65ioi) whereas the former are generated intrinsically from the prin ciples within us (xama 5' EK TCOV dp%a>v TCQV ev f||xiv ox>\i
92
Seneca, Ep. 120.4, which continues: "some say that we merely happened upon this knowledge; but it is unbelievable that a vision o f virtue could have presented itself to anyone by mere chance" (Quidam aiunt nos in notitiam incidisse, quod est incredibile, virtutis alicui speciem casu occucurrisse); translated according to LCL. For Sandbach's inter pretation o f the "seeds o f knowledge," see "Ennoia," 36 n. 23, and further below. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 194f. Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 89. It is not necessary to enter into the vexed question of K o i v a i evvoiai here since they are not simply identical with ejx(p\)XOi rcpoAr|\|/£i<;, as Bonhoffer had believed, nor with the 7cpoA.f|\|/ei<; in general. See on this point Sandbach, "Ennoia," 23—25, w h o is followed by Pohlenz (Grundfragen, 85 n. 1). See further R . B. T o d d , " T h e Stoic C o m m o n Notions: A Re-examination and Reinterpretation," SO 48 (1973) 4 7 - 7 5 . Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1070C; all translations o f Plutarch's works are taken from L C L unless otherwise indicated. 9 3
9 4
95
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
51
H e r e the ethically oriented c o n c e p t s are said to arise d i r e c d y
EK XCGV
dp%cov o f the h u m a n individual, a n d are o n this basis explicitly dis tinguished The
from those originating "externally" b y means o f the senses.
96
use o f the term auuxpuxoq to describe the "internal" origin o f
ethical notions such as g o o d a n d b a d , etc., is, m o r e o v e r , strikingly reminiscent o f Chrysippus's reference
g o o d and b a d . The human
to the
euxpuxoi 7CPOA,f|\|/ei<; o f
97
theoretical basis for the c l a i m o f the
"internal" origin o f
ethical categories, P o h l e n z argued, is the Stoic doctrine o f
OIKEICOAK;.
9
8
T h e Stoics h a d argued that the first sensation that any
given animal experiences is o n e o f self-awareness: . . . as soon as an animal is born it perceives itself. . . the first thing that animals perceive is their own parts . . . both that they have them and for what purpose they have them . . . " Moreover, An animal's first impulse (xrjvrcpcoxriv6pur|v), say the Stoics, is to selfpreservation, because nature at the outset endears it to itself (OIK£iot>or|<; outtcp xfj<; (pt)0£o<; an' dp%f|<;), as Chrysippus affirms in the first book o f his work On Ends: his words are, "The dearest thing (rcpcoxov O I K E I O V ) to every animal is its own constitution (ovoxaow) and its consciousness thereof"; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution
9 6
Cf. further Comm. Mot. 1058F: d
9 8
9 9
52
CHAPTER TWO
(oi)T£ yap dMoxpicooai £IK6<; rjv oruxo [auxcp] T O £a>ov, oi)X£ 7iour|oaoav a m o , UTJT'
dAAoxpicoaai
UTJX' O I K E U O O O C I ) .
nature in constituting the
W e are forced then to conclude that
animal made it near and dear to itself
(oiKeuoaai 7tp6<; eoano); for so it comes to repel all that is injurious (xd ptaxrcxovxa) and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it (xd oiKeia).
100
In a nutshell, the Stoics argued that the primary drive o f all animals (including humans) is that toward the preservation o f self. Providential Nature, m o r e o v e r , e n d o w s all animals b o t h with an awareness o f their o w n "constitution" (cboxaoiq),
and with a natural tendency to
evaluate their e x p e r i e n c e subjectively, distinguishing those
things
w h i c h are helpful (xd oiKeia) from those w h i c h are harmful (xd fihanxovxoc; xd dAAoxpioc) to that constitution.
101
T h u s , Pohlenz argued, o u r
ethical c o n c e p t s f o r m a special category o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n inasmuch as they alone ultimately originate f r o m s o m e t h i n g i n b o r n in the h u m a n animal rather than from empirical experience. Curiously, h o w e v e r , P o h l e n z did not offer an explicit response to 102
Consequently, w h e n
S a n d b a c h a d d e d a supplementary note to the
1971 reprint o f his
Sandbach's contrary a c c o u n t o f their o r i g i n .
" E n n o i a and Prolepsis in the Stoic T h e o r y o f K n o w l e d g e , " he offered only o n e significant revision to his prior account: he c o n c e d e d that his explanation o f the "natural" origin o f the c o n c e p t s o f "something just" and "something g o o d " was "inadequate
and
unsatisfactory,"
and stated that the "nature" in question "must b e that o f the m a n w h o forms the c o n c e p t , not that o f the c o n c e p t itself."
103
However,
S a n d b a c h gave n o indication that his general thesis regarding the origin o f these conceptions was any less secure as a result o f Pohlenz's study. In fact, he remained rather c o o l to the latter's thesis:
1 0 0
Diog. Laert. 7.85. Cf. Pohlenz, Grundfragen, p . 90: "Die Oikeiosis bewirkt also, daB das Lebewesen die AuBendinge nicht nur objektiv wahrnimmt, sondern zu seinem eigenen Ich in Beziehung setzt und subjektiv als niitzlich oder schadlich wertet. Den WertmaBstab liefert unsre eigene Natur und das, was ihr gemaB ist und sie fordert." Pohlenz only interacts specifically with Sandbach to endorse the latter's rejec tion o f both Bonhoffer's limitation o f the preconceptions to matters o f ethics and theology, and his identification o f them with the " c o m m o n conceptions." See Grundfragen, 85 and n. 1. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 33. Note, however, that he gives no indication that this revision is indebted to the work o f Pohlenz. 101
1 0 2
1 0 3
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
53
I see no reason why this account [from Pohlenz] should not have been welcomed by a Stoic, but also no evidence o f its connexion with e u x p u TOI 7tpoAri\|/£i<;. In any case Pohlenz makes no claim that it is relevant to the way in which the concept o f 'just' is formed. 104
I n d e e d , such a r e n o w n e d scholar o f Stoicism as J.
M . Rist c o u l d
continue after the publication o f Pohlenz's w o r k to cite "masterly
article" as a successful refutation
Sandbach's
o f the n o t i o n that the
early Stoa espoused beliefs in "innate" p r e c o n c e p t i o n s similar to those f o u n d in Epictetus. " T h e r e is n o other ' e v i d e n c e ' in the O l d Stoic writers for a theory o f any kind o f ' i n b o r n ' belief," he writes; "their p h i l o s o p h y needs n o such beliefs and should not b e saddled them."
105
with
In what follows, therefore, I shall re-examine the e v i d e n c e
cited b y S a n d b a c h from C i c e r o a n d S e n e c a with a view, specifically, to the respective theses o f S a n d b a c h
and
P o h l e n z . Is
Sandbach's
assertion that there is " n o e v i d e n c e " to c o n n e c t the "implanted pre c o n c e p t i o n s " to
OIK£{COGI<;
a fair assessment?
D o e s his o w n r e c o n
struction a c c o u n t for the e v i d e n c e in a m o r e satisfactory
manner?
Cicero and Seneca on the Concept of the Good T h e importance o f
OIKECCDGK;
to Stoic p h i l o s o p h y in general is clear
from the c o m p l a i n t o f Plutarch that "in every b o o k o f physics, yes a n d o f morals t o o , " Chrysippus repeatedly writes " a d nauseam that f r o m the m o m e n t o f birth w e have a natural congeniality to our selves, to o u r m e m b e r s , a n d to o u r o w n offspring" (cb<; oiK£iou|Li£0a npbq auxoix; euGix; y£v6|Li£VOi m i xa pipr) K O U xa £Kyova xa
106
feauxuv).
T h i s doctrine, in fact, p r o v i d e d the starting p o i n t for all o f Stoic ethics, as is clear f r o m a variety o f s o u r c e s .
107
O n e such source is the s u m m a r y o f Stoic ethics in the third b o o k o f C i c e r o ' s De Finibus w h e n c e , it will b e recalled, c o m e s the a c c o u n t o f the origin o f the concept o f the G o o d that is so central to Sandbach's
104
"Ennoia," 34. J. M . Rist, " T h e Criterion o f Truth," 134 with notes 3 - 4 . Plutarch, St. Rep. 1038B. See on this, in addition to the works mentioned above in note 98, A . A . Long, " T h e Logical Basis o f Stoic Ethics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970/71) 85-104; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.350-54. Inwood (Ethics and Human Action, 194) comments that "Chrysippus wanted to make good his point about orientation [i.e., oiKEicooic;] because his entire system o f ethics would be founded on it." 105
106
107
54
CHAPTER TWO
refutation
o f the idea o f " i n b o r n " ethical p r e c o n c e p t i o n s in
Stoicism. It is with this passage, therefore, that I shall b e g i n .
early 108
It will b e recalled that S a n d b a c h argued that Bonhoffer's thesis o f the i n b o r n origin o f the c o n c e p t o f " g o o d " s t o o d in clear contra diction to the position o f C i c e r o ' s Stoic spokesman C a t o , w h o attrib uted its origin to a process o f analogy. S a n d b a c h rejected Bonhoffer's c o n t e n t i o n that, since C i c e r o ' s C a t o focused u p o n the G o o d w h e r e D i o g e n e s Laertius spoke only o f something g o o d , the f o r m e r was c o n c e r n e d specifically with the origin o f a fully d e v e l o p e d than a
7tpoA,r|\|A<;.
109
E W O I O C
rather
D e s p i t e its dismissal b y S a n d b a c h , h o w e v e r ,
Bonhoffer's observation, as w e shall see, is quite to the point. C i c e r o ' s C a t o , in his remarks regarding " a n a l o g y " in De Finibus 3, is c o n c e r n e d with o u r acquisition o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d in the strict Stoic sense o f the term. T h e ultimate origin o f the h u m a n ability to conceptualize the distinction b e t w e e n " g o o d " a n d " b a d " is another matter altogether. It is i m p o r t a n t
first o f all to b e a r in m i n d the b r o a d e r p h i l o
sophical c o n t e x t in w h i c h the s u m m a r y o f De Finibus 3 was written, namely, in that o f a sharp disagreement regarding the question o f the nature o f the G o a l , o r Highest G o o d .
1 1 0
C a t o , as C i c e r o ' s Stoic
representative, argues that the Highest G o o d consists o f virtue alone. H e rejects, therefore, the Platonic a n d Peripatetic v i e w that " b o d i l y advantages" such as health, strength, etc., contribute anything t o w a r d the G o a l ,
1 1 1
a n d for this reason rejects, t o o , the classification o f such
things as " g o o d s " at all. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , his treatment o f health: " W e d e e m health to b e deserving o f a certain value but w e d o n o t place it a m o n g the g o o d s . "
1 1 2
T h e Highest G o o d , w h i c h is to say
virtue o r honestum, is in fact the sole g o o d .
1 1 3
In effect, the Stoic C a t o
makes a technical distinction b e t w e e n bonum, o r the G o o d in
the
strict Stoic sense as virtue alone, a n d aestimabile, o r "the valuable,"
108
Cf. Pohlenz's treatment of this passage in Grundfragen, 86-92, and esp. 90-92; see also Engberg-Pedersen's analysis in chapters 3 and 4 of his The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis. See above, p p . 4 8 - 4 9 . See esp. De Fin. 3.22-31, 4 1 - 4 8 , and the critique o f the Stoic position in De Finibus 4; see further 5.15-23, which greatly illuminates the dispute. Cicero's De Finibus as a whole intends to present, with subsequent critiques, the positions o f the Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochus o f Ascalon on this question. De Fin. 3.41-48. De Fin. 3.44: Nam qui valitudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque earn tamen in bonis ponimus; I have slightly altered the L C L translation. See e.g. De Fin. 3.21, where Cicero's Cato speaks o f honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur. 109
110
111
112
113
55
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
under w h i c h fall those bodily advantages classified as " g o o d " b y the Platonists, Peripatetics, and m o r e generally in c o m m o n
parlance.
114
This distinction is scrupulously observed throughout C a t o ' s summary, a n d will in fact p r o v i d e o n e o f the chief points o f C i c e r o ' s subse quent c r i t i q u e .
115
Secondly, w e must understand De Fin. 3.33, the specific passage to w h i c h S a n d b a c h referred, in the context o f the larger a c c o u n t o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the notion o f the G o o d presented in De Finibus 3. Significandy, the c o n c e p t o f the V a l u a b l e , as the prima divisio, is said to o c c u r to the h u m a n individual before that o f the G o o d .
1 1 6
It
represents a conceptualization o f the distinction that is m a d e natu rally b y all animals a c c o r d i n g to the doctrine o f
OIKECCOOK;:
the dis
tinction b e t w e e n those things that are "deserving o f c h o i c e " because in a c c o r d with nature, and their opposites, w h i c h are thus called ul
the Non-valuable (inaestimabile). T h e formation o f the c o n c e p t o f the V a l u a b l e is thus the inevitable result o f the c o m b i n a t i o n of, first, the innate tendency o f all animals to distinguish those things w h i c h are beneficial to their constitutions from those that are harmful, a n d sec ond,
the particularly h u m a n possession o f logos, the natural tendency
o f w h i c h is to organize experience into concepts. In the d e v e l o p ment that results ultimately in the formation o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d , therefore, the formation o f the c o n c e p t o f the V a l u a b l e is sec ond
only to the practical recognition o f that w h i c h is valuable, an
ability w h i c h is innate in all animals.
118
In contrast, C a t o reports that the recognition o f "that w h i c h c a n truly b e said to b e g o o d " (quod vere bonum possit dici) is a subsequent development.
1 1 4
119
O n e senses nonetheless a certain tension in this distinction owing to the fact that the G o o d , as a concept, is a derivative o f the Valuable. Thus while the G o o d is on one hand "supremely valuable" (plurimi aestimandum), it is nonetheless different from the Valuable (which is itself neither g o o d nor evil) in kind rather than degree; see De Fin. 3.34. See further Pohlenz's references to analogous Stoic evidence in Grundjragen, 94. See, e.g., De Fin. 4 . 5 6 - 6 1 . Cicero here takes the characteristically Antiochan view, apparently originally espoused by Carneades (see De Fin. 3.41), that the Stoics differ on this issue from the Peripatetics and Platonists only in terminology, not in substance; cf. De Fin. 4.3-5 and 2 1 - 2 3 . De Fin. 3.20. Ibid. See De Fin. 3.16 and 3.20. De Fin. 3.20; emphasis mine. O n the concept o f the G o o d as a later devel opment relative to that o f the Valuable, see further 3.21-22. 115
116
117
1 1 8
119
CHAPTER TWO
56
Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature (ea quae sunt secundum naturam); but as soon as he has understanding (intelligentiam), or rather becomes capable o f "conception" (notionem)—in Stoic phraseology evvoia—and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise o f intelligence and reason infers the con clusion (cognitione et ratione collegit) that herein resides the Chief G o o d of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake (summum Mud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum) . . , 120
C a t o speaks in this instance o f the first recognition o f the
Highest
G o o d (summum bonum); there is h o w e v e r , as w e have seen, o n l y o n e bonum in his system, and that is the virtue w h i c h comprises the G o a l . Honestum, he continues, is "that G o o d w h i c h is the E n d to w h i c h all else is a m e a n s " a n d w h i c h "alone is c o u n t e d a m o n g the g o o d s . "
1 2 1
It is striking that C i c e r o ' s C a t o associates the later d e v e l o p m e n t o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d with the ability to f o r m evvoiai. T h a t this term is used in its strict sense is clear from the following c o n siderations. T h e formation o f the c o n c e p t o f the V a l u a b l e , a c c o r d i n g to C a t o ' s s c h e m e , h a d already o c c u r r e d several stages prior to the formation o f that o f the G o o d ; thus the stipulation that the
Good
can b e arrived at o n l y with the ability to f o r m e v v o i a i w o u l d make little sense if he simply m e a n t the general t e n d e n c y o f the rational animal to f o r m (pre-)conceptions from experience. M o r e i m p o r t a n d y , the ability to f o r m p r e c o n c e p t i o n s o c c u r s quite early in h u m a n devel o p m e n t , a n d in any case well before o n e is c a p a b l e o f the type o f rational inquiry requisite, a c c o r d i n g to C a t o , for recognition o f the Good.
1 2 2
C i c e r o ' s C a t o associates the ability to f o r m evvoiai with the
possession o f intelligentia, w h i c h , as is clear from the context, is char acterized b y a capacity for rational examination and inquiry (cognitione et ratione). T h e formation o f c o n c e p t s b y this intellectual means is, as w e have seen, the mark o f evvoiai in the strict sense, not 7tpoAr|\|/ei<;. W e are n o w in a position to evaluate p r o p e r l y the notice c o n cerning the origin o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d in De Fin. 3.33 to w h i c h S a n d b a c h referred in his refutation
o f Bonhoffer. T h e char
acterization o f the notitia boni as having arisen " f r o m the things in
120
De Fin. 3.21. De Fin. 3.21: id bonum quo omnia referenda sunt. . . quod solum in bonis ducitur; I have slightly altered the L C L translation. SVF 2.83. 121
122
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
57
a c c o r d a n c e with nature" b y means o f " a n a l o g y " (collatione rationis) is to b e interpreted in light o f the fuller exposition found in 3 . 2 0 - 2 1 w h i c h has just b e e n examined. T h e "analogy" m a d e from "the things in a c c o r d a n c e with nature" to w h i c h he here refers, as is clear from 3 . 2 0 - 2 1 , is n o t a simple mental process like those w h i c h o c c u r auto matically a n d result in the formation o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n s in the p r e rational stages o f early c h i l d h o o d . O n the contrary, it requires
a
properly rational m i n d a n d the ability to f o r m evvoiai in the strict sense o f the term. M o r e o v e r , the " c o n c e p t i o n " that C i c e r o ' s C a t o has in m i n d , as Bonhoffer h a d already recognized, is n o t o f the hazy a n d ill-defined variety that characterizes p r e c o n c e p t i o n , but is in fact a c o n c e p t i o n o f that w h i c h is g o o d in the Stoic sense, as o p p o s e d to that w h i c h is merely "valuable." Cato's c o n c e r n here, that is, is the m a n n e r in w h i c h o n e arrives at the c o n c e p t o f that w h i c h the Stoic considers the G o o d ; a n d this notion, he reports, is attained b y means o f a rational analogy from those things w h i c h the individual h a d l o n g since considered "valuable." In order to understand the ultimate origin o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d , therefore,
o n e must
inquire after the origin o f the c o n c e p t o f the Valuable. A n d this, it is clear, results from the inborn disposition, characteristic o f all ani mals b y virtue o f oiKeicoaiq, to distinguish b e t w e e n that w h i c h is beneficial for oneself a n d that w h i c h is not. A n examination o f Seneca Ep. 120.4ff, the other passage to w h i c h S a n d b a c h referred in arguing against the thesis o f the innate origin o f the c o n c e p t " g o o d , " yields quite similar results.
123
T h e question
addressed in this letter is " h o w w e first acquire a c o n c e p t i o n o f bonum m
and honestum"
Seneca, like C i c e r o ' s C a t o , uses the term bonum in
its stricdy Stoic sense, identifying it o n o n e h a n d with honestum, a n d distinguishing it, o n the other, from utile ("advantageous," "useful"), w h i c h , like Cato's aestimabile, describes the advantages pertaining to the b o d y .
1 2 5
T h u s Seneca's chief c o n c e r n is h o w o n e first arrives at
a c o n c e p t i o n o f the G o o d , w h i c h is to say virtus o r honestum, n o t the ultimate origin o f the h u m a n tendency to make ethical distinctions.
123
126
Cf. Pohlenz's treatment o f Seneca, Ep. 120 in Grundfragen, 86-88, 92. Ep. 120.3: quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit. Note that L C L renders notitia as "knowledge," thus obscuring the connection with the Stoic doc trine o f conception. C f , however, Cicero's use o f this term, on which see Liscu, Etude sur la Langue, 114. Ep. 120.1-3. T h e bulk o f the letter is in fact concerned with the further stimulus toward 124
125
126
CHAPTER TWO
58
Seneca proceeds to describe h o w one arrives at a notion o f the (Stoic) G o o d in a m a n n e r that is o n c e again reminiscent o f De Finibus 3: our school o f philosophy hold that honestum and bonum have been com prehended by means o f analogy (per analogia) . . . N o w what this "anal ogy" is, I shall explain. W e understood what bodily health was: and from this basis we deduced the existence o f a certain mental health also. W e knew, too, bodily strength, and from this basis we inferred the existence o f mental sturdiness. 127
A s in De Fin. 3.21 a n d 3 3 , the n o t i o n o f the G o o d is arrived at b y analogy f r o m those things that benefit the b o d y , w h i c h is to say, b y 128
analogy f r o m the c o n c e p t o f the utile.
S e n e c a d o e s n o t pursue the
question o f the origin o f this latter c o n c e p t further. H e d o e s , h o w ever, make reference to "seeds" o f the k n o w l e d g e o f the G o o d w h i c h have b e e n given to the h u m a n animal direcdy f r o m Nature herself: Nature could not teach us this [sc. the boni honestique notitia] directly; she has given us the seeds o f knowledge, but not knowledge itself (semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit). Some say that we merely hap pened upon this knowledge; but it is unbelievable that a vision o f virtue could have presented itself to anyone by mere chance. 129
A similar reference is f o u n d in Ep. 108, w h e r e o n c e again Nature is d e p i c t e d as the giver o f these "seeds" to all o f humanity: It is easy to rouse a listener so that he will crave righteousness; for Nature has given the foundations and the seed o f virtue (fundamenta semenque virtutum) to us all. 130
Sandbach
interpreted these " s e e d s " as a reference
to "the
facts
observed" from which, apparendy, the analogy to the G o o d is m a d e .
131
In Ep. 121, h o w e v e r , S e n e c a discusses a type o f k n o w l e d g e given b y Nature in a m o r e direct w a y , a n d w h i c h stands in clear contrast to knowledge gained from empirical experience: " T h e teachings o f e x p e -
the formation o f this conception which comes from the observance o f the deeds o f great individuals; but the fact that one should find oneself in admiration o f such deeds presupposes, as Pohlenz recognized (Grundfragen, 86-88), a prior evaluative disposition to distinguish good from bad. Ep. 120.4, 5; I have altered the L C L translation only in retaining the Latin terms honestum and bonum. Cf. the partial list o f things considered "useful" at Ep. 120.2-3, which includes wealth, possessions, status, and physical strength. Ep. 120.4. Seneca, Ep. 108.8 Sandbach, "Ennoia," 36 n. 23. 127
128
129
130
131
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS rience are slow a n d irregular; but whatever
Nature
59 communicates
b e l o n g s equally to e v e r y o n e , a n d c o m e s i m m e d i a t e l y . " f r o m the w i d e r context o f Ep.
132
121, m o r e o v e r , that the
It is clear knowledge
given directly b y Nature rather than w o n f r o m empirical experience is r o o t e d in an animal's natural desire for well-being. It results, in other w o r d s , f r o m
OIK£{(OGI<;.
I n d e e d , Nature is said to have
"com
m u n i c a t e d nothing [to animals] except the duty o f taking care o f them selves a n d the skill to d o s o . "
1 3 3
T h e "seeds" o f the k n o w l e d g e o f
the G o o d , therefore, result ultimately from the h u m a n animal's innate t e n d e n c y to r e c o g n i z e that w h i c h is beneficial for itself. oiKeicomg and the Implanted Preconceptions G i v e n this analysis o f the accounts o f the origin o f the c o n c e p t o f the G o o d b y C i c e r o and Seneca, S a n d b a c h ' s claim that there is " n o e v i d e n c e " to link the epxp^xoi rcpo^r|\|/£i<; to oiKeicoaiq is scarcely accurate assessment. His o w n a c c o u n t , in any case, fails to
an
con
vince. It is in fact precisely oiKeicoaiq w h i c h b o t h C i c e r o a n d S e n e c a locate at the beginning o f the d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h , b y w a y o f anal o g y from the antecedent c o n c e p t o f the V a l u a b l e , results finally in o u r c o n c e p t o f the (truly) G o o d . O u r ethical c o n c e p t s , therefore, n o t entirely the products
are
o f empirical experience, as P o h l e n z well
recognized: Empirical experience is indispensable [for the formation o f the con cepts o f "beneficial" and " g o o d " ] , but the primary cause lies in the nature o f the Aoyncov £a>ov, in which the predisposition for the for mation o f the ethical concepts is contained. 134
S u c h an origin gives the ethically oriented p r e c o n c e p t i o n s a unique standing a m o n g other p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . It is thus quite understandable that D i o g e n e s Laertius has singled out the c o n c e p t o f
132
"something
Seneca, Ep. 121.20: Et tardum est et varium, quod usus docet; quicquid natura tradit, et aequale omnibus est et statim. Ibid.; cf. Ep. 121.23: Haec [natura] nihil magis quam tutelam sui et eius peritiam tradidit; the emphasis in the translation is mine. Note also that Seneca characterizes the initial stage o f this natural self-understanding in terms reminiscent o f precon ceptions: one's constitution is initially understood crasse. . . et summatim et obscure. Cf. in this respect De Finibus 5, on which see below. Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 92: "Die Empirie ist dabei unentbehrlich, aber die primare Ursache liegt in der Natur des Xoyncov £(pov, in der die Anlage zur Bildung der sittlichen Begriffe enthalten ist." 133
134
CHAPTER TWO
60
g o o d , " even a m o n g the other p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , as b e i n g "naturally" acquired. A n d thus, t o o , d o e s Plutarch distinguish c o n c e p t s such as "white" a n d
" w a r m " f r o m those o f ethical categories like
"good"
and " b a d , " o r o i K e i o q a n d aXkoxpioq—this latter pair b e i n g techni 135
cal terms in the doctrine o f o i K £ i c o a i < ; — o n the basis o f the latter's 136
cb\i(pv%oq yeveciq.
G i v e n the centrality o f oiKeicoaiq to the p h i l o s o
p h y o f Chrysippus in general, it is u n d o u b t e d l y in this context that his characterization ticular
o f the p r e c o n c e p t i o n s o f g o o d a n d b a d in par
as euxpuTOi 7ipoA,r|\|/£i<; is to b e understood.
T h e link b e t w e e n the "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " a n d oiKeicooK; is c o n f i r m e d b y a further examination o f the "seeds" o f k n o w l e d g e o r virtue to w h i c h S e n e c a refers, and w h i c h , as w e have seen, are understood to have been given to h u m a n beings from Nature b y means of oiKricoaiq.
137
This imagery o f "seeds," as well as the analogous image
o f "sparks," o f knowledge o r virtue is also found repeatedly in C i c e r o ' s works. In o n e such passage, the "seeds" o r "sparks" o f k n o w l e d g e and virtue are said to b e "innate" (innata) in the h u m a n
animal: 138
N o w if at our birth nature had granted us the ability to discern her, as she truly is, with insight and knowledge, and under her excellent guidance to complete the course o f life, there would certainly have been no occasion for anyone to need methodical instruction [i.e., phi losophy]: as it is, she gives to us tiny sparks (parvulos igniculos), which we, being quickly corrupted by bad morals and opinions, extinguish, so that the light o f nature never appears. For inborn in our constitu tions are the seeds o f virtue, which, if they were permitted to grow, would lead us by nature itself to happiness o f life (Sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret); as things are, however, as soon as we come into the light o f day . . . we at once find ourselves in a world o f iniquity amid a medley o f wrong beliefs . . . we become infected with deceptions so varied that truth gives place to unreality and the voice o f nature to fixed prepossessions. 139
140
135
Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.85. Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1070C. For a general discussion o f the use o f "seed" terminology, see Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 95-99. O n the intimate relationship between O I K E I C O O K ; , virtue, and the knowledge o f "nature," see esp. De Fin. 4.25 and 5.41. While these passages come from Antiochan rather than Stoic sources, the assumed agreement between the Stoics and Antiochus on the crucial point in the former passage is to be noted. T h e beata vita is another expression for the "Goal," or "highest good"; see, e.g., De Fin. 5.12. 140 jjy 3 2f- J have altered the L C L translation only to bring out more clearly the imagery o f the "seeds" and "sparks." 136
137
138
139
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
61
In another passage it b e c o m e s clear that these "seeds" are
them
selves nothing other than the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s : . . . the highest and noblest part o f man's nature she [sc. divine Nature] neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable o f receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions o f the loftiest ideas (ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum), laying the foundation o f its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, o f virtue (tamquam elementa virtutis). But v i r t u e itself she initiated—and noth ing more (sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit; nihil amplius). 141
T h e elementa virtutis are here quite clearly identified as the "little c o n cepts" (notitias parvas) that Nature has
"implanted"
(ingenuit) in
the
h u m a n m i n d , and these "rudiments o f virtue" are referred to else w h e r e in this w o r k as the "seeds" and "sparks" o f v i r t u e . A n t i o c h a n rather than p r o p e r l y Stoic in orientation,
142
While
this passage
nonetheless has significant points o f contact with o u r Stoic sources. T h e idea that Nature o n l y gives the individual the beginnings o f the k n o w l e d g e o f virtue is b y n o w familiar f r o m Seneca, as well as f r o m TD 3 . 2 .
1 4 3
M o r e o v e r , as the passage continues, the A n t i o c h a n Piso
emphasizes that the development o f these "rudiments" into full fledged virtus a n d honesta o u g h t to b e the n u m b e r o n e priority in l i f e .
144
This
sentiment, as w e shall s o o n see, recalls in a striking m a n n e r Epictetus's c o n v i c t i o n that the refinement
and p r o p e r application o f the ejiqyo-
xoi evvoicu is the central task o f the philosophical education,
and
likely reflects Chrysippus's o w n emphasis. Sandbach
also o b j e c t e d that P o h l e n z h a d m a d e n o attempt to
s h o w the relevance o f oiKeicooK; for the formation o f the n o t i o n o f "something just," w h i c h is singled out b y D i o g e n e s Laertius along side that o f "something g o o d " as "naturally" arising. T h e details o f the Stoic treatment o f the origin o f justice are notoriously difficult to reconstruct, a n d a discussion o f the p r o b l e m s w o u l d lead us m u c h too
141
far from o u r present c o n c e r n .
1 4 5
W h a t is clear in any case is
De Fin. 5.59. T h e L C L rendering o f the final clause as "but o f virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more" correctly recognizes the connection o f this passage with the "seed" terminology that appears elsewhere in De Finibus 5. I have nonetheless given a more literal rendering here, while otherwise following L C L . De Fin. 5.18, 43. Cf. also De Leg. 1.30 and 33, on which see further below. De Fin. 5.60. See on this question esp. Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 122-26; I n w o o d , " C o m m e n t s o n Professor G o r g e m a n n s ' Paper," 1 9 0 - 9 9 ; Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," 121-32. 142
143
144
145
CHAPTER TWO
62
that the Stoics did in fact locate the origins o f justice in oiKeicoaK;: "the followers o f Z e n o , " Porphyry says quite explicitiy, "make the b e g i n n i n g o f j u s t i c e . "
146
it is m o s t p r o b a b l e that the
OIK£{CGCI<;
T h o u g h the details are rather o b s c u r e , Stoics p l a c e d the natural affection o f
parents for their offspring—an affection w h i c h was said to b e p r o v identially guaranteed b y oiKeicoaiq—at the center o f their a c c o u n t o f justice.
147
It is n o t insignificant,
therefore, that C i c e r o describes this
parental affection, t o o , as b e i n g "implanted" b y N a t u r e . Finally, it is to b e p o i n t e d out against S a n d b a c h doctrine
o f oiKeicoaiq, there is n o contradiction
148
that given
b e t w e e n the
the
Stoic
theory o f "innate p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " a n d their characterization o f the c o m m a n d i n g faculty at birth as a tabula rasa. T h e h u m a n
individual
is b o r n not with ethical c o n c e p t i o n s per se, but rather, given its sta tus as a "rational animal," with an innate predisposition these c o n c e p t s .
149
to f o r m
Indeed, the practical ability to r e c o g n i z e that w h i c h
is, generally speaking,
" g o o d " and
" b a d " for oneself, a c c o r d i n g to
the Stoics, is not limited to the rational animal, but characteristic o f all animals regardless o f their ability to abstract f r o m experience for mal c o n c e p t s o f " g o o d " a n d " b a d . " Nature gives to the rational ani mal the "seeds o f k n o w l e d g e , " but not k n o w l e d g e itself.
Epictetus on Implanted Concepts Sandbach
criticized Bonhoffer for taking Epictetus as his starting
p o i n t for reconstructing
the early Stoic doctrine o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n .
H e argued that o n e o u g h t rather e x a m i n e first the e v i d e n c e for the early Stoa a n d then read Epictetus to determine the extent o f the
1 4 6
Porphyry,, Abst. 3.19 (= SVF 1.197): XT^V 8e oiKeicoaiv dpxriv xiGevxai 5iKaioown<; oi cato Zr|vcovo<;; on the question o f the precise referent o f "the followers o f Z e n o , " see the comments o f Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," 122. It is scarcely accidental that Chrysippus's espousal o f the natural origins o f parents' affection for their offspring emerges from a fragment from the first book o f his On Justice preserved in Plutarch, St. Rep. 1038B; see further De Nat. Deor. 2.128-29; De Fin. 3.62. De Off. 1.12: natura. . . ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt. Cicero speaks here o f the human animal in particular, whose affection for its offspring, however, differs only in degree from that o f other animal species; cf. De Off. 1.11. See further De Fin. 5.66. Cf. Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 92: "Bei der Geburt sind die Begriffe freilich noch nicht vorhanden. Die Seele gleicht der tabula rasa, und es gibt in ihr keine Begriffe, weder fertige noch unfertige. Angeboren ist aber dem Lebewesen nach seiner seelischen Struktur durch die Oikeiosis die Tendenz und die Fahigkeit, zu den Dingen wie zu sich selbst wertend Stellung zu nehmen." 147
148
1 4 9
63
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
agreement.
150
F r o m a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l point o f view, S a n d b a c h ' s cri
tique is a s o u n d o n e ; I have therefore h a d litde recourse to the evi d e n c e o f Epictetus in the p r e c e d i n g a c c o u n t o f the Stoic doctrine o f implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . T u r n i n g n o w to Epictetus, h o w e v e r , what emerges is an a c c o u n t that is in fact quite consistent with that o f the early Stoa. Epictetus says the following: we come into being (TIKOJIEV) without any innate concept (cpuaei evvoiav) of a right-angled triangle, or o f a half-tone musical interval, but by a certain systematic method o f instruction ( E K T I V O C ; Te%viKfj<; 7capccA,f|(p£CG<;) we are taught the meaning o f each o f these things . . . But, on the other hand, who has come into being (eA,r|ta)0ev) without an innate concept (euxpDTOv evvoiav) o f what is good and evil, honourable and base, appropriate and inappropriate, and happiness, and o f what is proper and falls to our lot, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to d o ? 151
152
T h e contrast
b e t w e e n c o n c e p t s achieved b y intellectual
those a c h i e v e d "naturally" is familiar from Aetius as the b e t w e e n c o n c e p t s in the
strict sense (evvoiai) a n d
labor
and
distinction
preconceptions
(7ipoAr|\|/£i<;), respectively; a n d that Epictetus considers these "natural c o n c e p t s " to b e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s is in fact clear from the c o n t e x t .
153
A s S a n d b a c h has p o i n t e d out, Epictetus elsewhere uses the term npofoxyxq with reference to several conceptions w h i c h , b y any account, must b e understood, at least in the context o f Stoicism, to derive from
empirical e x p e r i e n c e .
154
In o n e lecture, for e x a m p l e , he dis
cusses p r e c o n c e p t i o n s o f musicians, carpenters a n d other artisans, as well as o f philosophers, to make a point that o n e needs to question a n d refine o n e ' s p r e c o n c e p t i o n s in o r d e r to arrive at a m o r e ade quate understanding o f their subject m a t t e r .
1 5 0
155
In the passage cited
Sandbach, "Ennoia," 2 2 - 2 3 . T h e LCL's translation o f the phrase (puoei evvoiav as "innate concept" antic ipates the subsequent (and synonymous) e}i(p\)T0v evvoiav. Cf. Justin App 6.3, w h o describes the name " G o d " as an ejKpDTO^ xfj cpvoei TCOV av0pcb7tcov hotp.. (On the idea o f an innate belief in G o d , see below.) Diss. 2.11.2f. T h e L C L captures the sense o f the rather elliptical TiKO|iev and eXf|ta)0ev by translating them as "come into being"; cf. "come into the world" for TO f|Keiv in the translation of Diss. 2.11.6. Cf. in this respect Cicero, De Leg. 1.59: the introspective person will realize that (s)he "came into life" (in vitam venerit) wellequipped by nature. All translations o f Epictetus are taken from L C L unless other wise noted. Diss. 2.11.4, 10, 11. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 27. Diss. 4.8.6-10. Cf. the discussion o f the Kpokx\y\<; o f the Cynic's 7cpay|Lia at 151
152
153
1 5 4
155
64
CHAPTER TWO
at the beginning o f this section, though, Epictetus
uses the phrase
cpuaei evvoioc synonymously with euxpuxoq evvoioc, w h i c h in the
con
text clearly implies an innate c o n c e p t , as even S a n d b a c h r e c o g n i z e d : "it must b e admitted that w h e n w e c o m e to e x a m i n e Epictetus
he
can hardly b e interpreted otherwise than as believing in ' i n b o r n ' pre conceptions."
156
O n c e again, these "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " c o n
cern ethical c o n c e p t s in particular: while w e d o n o t " c o m e the c o n c e p t s o f music theory a n d geometry, w e d o c o m e
with" already
having p r e c o n c e p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g ethical categories. H e p r o c e e d s to explain, in similar terms, the fact that e v e r y o n e , e d u c a t e d o r not, makes ethical evaluations: " T h e reason for this is that w e c o m e as if already taught b y nature certain things in this a r e a . "
157
T h e attri
bution o f such k n o w l e d g e to nature's o w n instruction recalls Seneca's discussion o f the "seeds o f k n o w l e d g e " gained b y means o f oiKefcoaK;, and the
similar passages from C i c e r o discussed a b o v e . A n d while
there is n o explicit evidence that Epictetus u n d e r s t o o d the eVcpmoi evvoioci to result f r o m oiKeicoaK; (which d o e s n o t receive treatment in his extant lectures nonetheless
in any c a s e ) ,
158
the
extensive
c o n n e c t i o n is
quite likely: not o n l y are they present f r o m birth, but
they c o m p r i s e ethical c o n c e p t s in particular. W h i l e all h u m a n s are
thus b o r n with
159
ethical
preconceptions,
Epictetus stresses that these, as such, are not sufficient to ensure the correct assessment o f one's experiences in terms o f " g o o d " and " b a d . " There lies the whole question, and there opinion (ovnai*;) comes in. For men start with these principles upon which they are agreed, but then, because they make unsuitable application (ecpapuoyfjc;) o f them, get into disputes. 160
Diss. 3.22. T h e idea that such preconceptions require refinement clearly reflects the technical Stoic distinction between npo'kr\\\fiq and e v v o i o c . This emphasis on the importance o f developing the former into the latter is in fact quite characteristic o f Epictetus, particularly in the ethical sphere. See on this immediately below. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 29. Diss. 2.11.6: TOUTOD 8' otmov TO T[KEIV r\§K) TWOC hub xr\q cpuaecoc; Kocia TOV xorcov cocrcep 8e8i8ocY|xevo'i)<;; translation mine. That oiKeicocic; was nonetheless important for Epictetus is clear, for example, from Diss. 1.19.11-15, where it is understood to be fundamental to all human behavior. Cf. Sandbach, "Ennoia," 24f. Indeed, note esp. that when Epictetus asserts in Diss. 1.22.1 that 7ipo^r|\|/£i<; K o i v o d 7iaciv dev0pamoi<; e i o i v , the particular precon ceptions he has in mind are those o f TO deyocGov and TO SIKOCIOV—precisely those sin gled out as being acquired (puciKOx; in Diog. Laert. 7.53. Diss. 2.11.8; cf. 1.22.1-8. For the corrupting influence o f opinion on this process, cf. Cicero, TD 3.2, quoted above. 1 5 6
157
1 5 8
1 5 9
160
LAW
65
AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
Epictetus, therefore, places this all important p r o b l e m o f "applica t i o n " at the center o f his n o t i o n o f the true education: What then, does it mean, to be getting an education? It means learn ing h o w to apply ( e c p a p u x S ^ e i v ) the natural preconceptions (qyuaiicas 7ipoA,riv|/£ic;) to particular cases, each to the other in conformity with nature, and, further, to make the distinction, that some things are under our control while others are not under our control. 161
W h i l e all p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are a c q u i r e d "naturally," so that the
term
(puoucdq in the phrase (puaiKoc*; 7tpoA,f|\|/ei<; in this passage c o u l d b e used pleonastically rather than with reference to those p r e c o n c e p t i o n s w h i c h are "natural" in a m o r e specialized sense, it is clear f r o m b o t h the Dissertations in general a n d from this passage in particular that Epictetus's foremost c o n c e r n , at least, are those p r e c o n c e p t i o n s w h i c h are especially "natural," that is, the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . the r e m a i n d e r
162
Thus
o f this particular lecture centers o n this question:
" W h e r e , then, shall w e p l a c e TO dyocGov? T o what sort o f things shall we
apply it (etyocpuoaoiiev)?"
163
I n d e e d , the i m p o r t a n c e o f mastering
p h i l o s o p h y ' s subtle theoretical principles pales in c o m p a r i s o n with that o f learning to correctly " a p p l y " o u r ethical p r e c o n c e p t i o n s to particular e x p e r i e n c e s :
164
is the source o f all e v i l s ,
for while the i m p r o p e r application o f t h e m 165
p r o p e r application makes o n e " p e r f e c t . "
166
It will b e recalled that p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are themselves, b y definition, rather vague and ill-defined conceptions. Prerequisite for p r o p e r appli cation, therefore, is refinement The
a n d systematization
(SidpGpcocnq).
167
first step in such a process is the confession o f o n e ' s i g n o r a n c e
in the matter: o n l y such an admission will lead to k n o w l e d g e a n d
161
Diss. 1.22.9-10; cf. 1.2.6. That which is under the control o f the human is assent (pvyKaxaBeoiq) to impressions ( c p a v x a a i a i ) ; see above, note 37. Epictetus refers to this most often as "use o f impressions" (%pfjai<; ( p a v T a a ( c o v ) or something simi lar; see e.g. Diss. 1.1.7; 1.12.34; 2.19.32; and Frag. 4. So also Pohlenz, Grundfiagen, 85: Epictetus "ist im wesentiichen nur an ihnen [sc. preconceptions o f the ethical sphere] interessiert." Note also the use o f the phrase c p u c e i e v v o i a to denote specifically the ejxcptjxoi e v v o i a i in 2.11.2; and see fur ther, in addition, n. 159 above. Diss. 1.22.11. See Diss. 2.17, and cf. esp. 2.17.1-3 with 2.17.29-40. Diss. 4.1.42: xomo y a p e o T i T O a i T i o v T O I C ; dv0pcorcoi<; rcdvTcov TCOV K a K c o v , T O TOCC; 7ipo^r|\|/£i<; xaq K O I V O C C ; \n\ o u v a a G a i ecpapuxS^eiv xdiq mi jiepODc;. Diss. 2.11.10. See on this process esp. the whole o f Diss. 2.17, which is entitled: Ticoq e c p a p u o a T e o v Ta<; 7ipo^f\\|/ei<; T O I C ; mi \iepovq; see further the discussion o f Bonhoffer, Epictet, 189-92. 162
163
1 6 4
165
166
167
CHAPTER TWO
66
progress, "for it is impossible to get a m a n to b e g i n to learn that w h i c h he thinks he k n o w s . "
1 6 8
H a v i n g thus repudiated
"opinion"
(otnoig), o n e c a n b e g i n honest enquiry into the p r e c o n c e p t i o n s with the goal o f establishing a standard
(KOCVCOV)
" o p i n i o n " for their practical a p p l i c a t i o n .
169
w h i c h is higher than m e r e I n d e e d , the establishment
o f this "standard" is itself the very generative p r o b l e m and uing task o f p h i l o s o p h y : m i PePociofiv xovq
KCCI T O
KOCVOVOCC;.
contin
(piAoGocpeiv xomo eaxiv, ETiioKETixeaGai
1 7 0
W h i l e Epictetus's classification o f the different types o f c o n c e p t i o n is consistent with that o f the early Stoics, the centrality o f the euxprnoi evvoiai to the a c h i e v e m e n t o f m o r a l progress in his ethical
system
goes b e y o n d anything explicitly attested in the scant extant evidence for
the latter. H o w e v e r , given the Stoic understanding o f rational
h u m a n action as caused b y the impulse resulting f r o m assent to the propositional content o f a given h o r m e t i c presentation, it w o u l d seem that an accurate c o n c e p t i o n o f "the g o o d " w o u l d b e absolutely crucial for virtuous action for t h e m as well. S o , for e x a m p l e , a m a n ' s a c c e p tance o f s o m e p u b l i c office will d e p e n d u p o n his assent to the p r o p o sition "it is g o o d for m e to a c c e p t this office." S u c h assent will o b v i ously presuppose
s o m e c o n c e p t i o n o f what is " g o o d " a n d w h a t is
not, o n the basis o f w h i c h the m a n will either give o r withhold his assent to the proposition. I f his c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d is incorrect, his assent to such a proposition m a y w e l l — t h o u g h n o t necessarily— issue in an impulse t o w a r d i m p r o p e r a c t i o n ;
171
conversely, the only
w a y to ensure virtuous action w o u l d seem to b e the possession o f an accurate c o n c e p t i o n o f the G o o d . T h a t Chrysippus did, in fact, place a similar emphasis o n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the EjicpDioi 7tpoA,f|\|/£i<; is suggested b y D i o g e n e s Laertius's g r o u p i n g o f several series o f C h r y sippus's E V V O U O V .
168
treatises as w o r k s c o n c e r n i n g 1
7
2
TT^V
8idp9pcoaiv
TCOV
fiGiKcbv
Further evidence for the centrality o f the Ejicpmoi 7tpoA,r|\|/ei<;
Diss. 2.17.1; cf. 2.17.39f and 2.22.17ff. Diss. 2.11.17f; a g o o d example o f this process is found in Diss. 1.22.11-16, where the question concerns the application o f the term " g o o d " to those things that are not under our control. Cf. also Diss. 1.28.28, where Epictetus refers more gen erally to the preconceptions as the "standards" people use for judging g o o d and evil. Diss. 2.11.24; cf. 2.11.13-14. According to the Stoics, one can act "appropriately" in spite o f his or her mis taken understanding o f the G o o d ; thus the Stoic distinction between "appropriate" and "right" action, on which see Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.359-68. Diog. Laert. 7.199f; cf. the comments o f Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 84 n. 1. Note also Plutarch's citation o f Chrysippus's view that "physical speculation (life (puonciic; Gecopiaq) is to be undertaken for no other purpose than for the discrimination o f g o o d and evil" (St. Rep. 1035D); cf. with this Epictetus, Diss. 1.22.11, cited above. 169
170
171
172
67
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
to the early Stoic understanding o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t might also b e seen in their role in the m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y o f A n t i o c h u s o f A s c a l o n w h i c h , as has already b e e n p o i n t e d out, is quite similar to that f o u n d in Epictetus. It is thus m o s t likely that in this respect t o o , Epictetus's discussion o f the ethical p r e c o n c e p t i o n s simply reflects earlier Stoic teaching.
173
Excursus: Belief in the Gods as e^icpvtog F o r the sake o f completeness, a n d because the question will i m p i n g e to s o m e degree o n o u r discussion o f Justin M a r t y r in the following chapter, the description o f a supposed universal h u m a n belief in a g o d o r g o d s as e ^ u T o q o r its Latin equivalents
in several
ancient
philosophical works also warrants s o m e attention. D i o C h r y s o s t o m , in the
oration
entitled " T h e
O l y m p i c Discourse, o r O n
the
First
C o n c e p t i o n o f G o d , " describes the origin o f the h u m a n belief in the divine as follows: O f man's belief in the deity (zx\q . . .rcepiTO Geiov b*6fy\q) and his assump tion that there is a god we were maintaining that the fountain-head, as we may say, or source, was that idea which is innate in all mankind (TT)V euxpDTov obtaaiv &v0pco7toi<; e7i(voiav) and comes into being as the result o f the actual facts and the truth . . . being, one may almost say, a c o m m o n and general endowment o f rational beings (a%e56v TI Koivrjv m i 5r)|ioo{av TOV ^oyiKo\) yevoix;).
174
Similarly, Justin M a r t y r characterizes belief implanted
the c o n c e p t o f " g o d " as
"a
in the nature o f h u m a n b e i n g s " (euxpuioq xf\ cpuaei
icov ccvGpamcov 5 6 ^ a ) .
175
T h a t this position was characteristic o f at least
s o m e Stoics seems clear f r o m a quite similar
assertion m a d e
by
Balbus, the Stoic spokesman o f C i c e r o ' s De Natura Deorum: " F o r innate in e v e r y o n e , a n d as it were engraved u p o n the soul, is a belief in the existence o f the g o d s . "
1 7 3
1 7 6
T h u s Seneca, t o o , writes:
Note further that Epictetus's (and Antiochus's!) general emphasis on the proper refinement o f our ethical notions is quite compatible with Inwood's reconstruction o f Chrysippus's teaching on "excessive impulse," esp. as this relates to an individ ual's ethical conceptions; see Ethics and Human Action, 155-65, esp. 1 6 2 - 6 5 . D i o Chrysostom, 12.39; cf. 12.27. Translations o f D i o are taken from L C L unless otherwise noted. App. 6.3. De Nat. Deor. 2.12: omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse deos\ translation mine. Cf. the Epicurean position as described at De Nat. Deor. 1.44: "For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus o f mankind; their existence is therefore 1 7 4
175
176
CHAPTER TWO
68
. . . we infer that the gods exist, for this reason, among others—that there is implanted (insita) in everyone an idea concerning deity (de dis opinio), and there is no people so far beyond the reach o f laws and customs that it does not believe at least in gods o f some sort. 177
S e n e c a characterizes the Stoic position regarding the insita opinio o f the divine as o n e argument a m o n g others for the truth o f the exist e n c e o f the g o d s . T h e p r o b l e m o f the existence o f the g o d s was the first division o f Stoic t h e o l o g y ,
178
a n d that there w e r e i n d e e d a vari
ety o f arguments m a d e in this c o n n e c t i o n is clear f r o m the s e c o n d b o o k o f C i c e r o ' s De Natura Deorum. C i c e r o ' s reference to this partic ular argument in De Nat. Deor. 2.12 o c c u r s at the c o n c l u s i o n o f the first series o f arguments presented b y B a l b o , a n d refers b a c k , appar ently, to the consensus omnium argument discussed in 2.5: Nothing but the presence in our minds o f a firmly grasped concept of the deity could account for the stability and permanence o f our belief (opinio) in him, a belief which is only strengthened by the pas sage o f the ages and grows more deeply rooted with each successive generation o f mankind . . . The years obliterate the inventions o f the imagination, but confirm the judgments o f nature. W h e n , h o w e v e r , C i c e r o rehearses Cleanthes's explanation o f this c o n sensus in 2 . 1 3 - 1 5 , there is n o hint o f a c o n v i c t i o n regarding innate b e l i e f in the causes.
179
any
existence o f the g o d s f o u n d a m o n g its four
In fact, this argument is m e n t i o n e d neither in the context
o f C i c e r o ' s rehearsal o f the arguments o f Z e n o , Cleanthes o r C h r y sippus,
180
n o r is it, for that matter, ascribed to any other particular
philosopher. I n d e e d , it is n o t discussed further b y Balbus, a n d goes without m e n t i o n in the A c a d e m i c critique o f Stoic t h e o l o g y pre sented in b o o k t h r e e .
181
It w o u l d thus seem that this argument
had
a necessary inference, since we possess an implanted—or better, an innate—notion of them (quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innata cognitiones habemus)"; I have slightly altered the L C L translation. Cf. De Fin. 4.4 for a similar juxtaposition o f the terms insita and innata. Ep. 117.6. For the divisions o f Stoic theology, see De Nat. Deor. 2.3. Cleanthes is said to have argued from divination, the beneficence o f the uni verse, the awe inspired by the display o f nature's power as instanced, e.g., in storms, earthquakes, etc., and above all the orderliness o f the heavens. For the particular arguments o f Zeno see De Nat. Deor. 2.20ff; on Cleanthes, 2.13-15; on Chrysippus, 2.16-19. Cotta's critique o f the consensus omnium argument is limited to the following comment: "Then is anybody content that questions o f such moment should be decided by the belief (opinione) o f the foolish? and particularly yourselves, w h o say 177
178
179
180
181
69
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
at best a marginal place in the source o f C i c e r o ' s De Natura Deorum, and this might suggest that it was in fact a later d e v e l o p m e n t in Stoic theology.
182
Assuming, h o w e v e r , that it was a viable Stoic position
at least b y the time o f C i c e r o , w e might fairly inquire as to its philo sophical basis: in what sense, given the constraints o f Stoicism, might this belief b e described as euxpuxo*;? In De Leg. 1.24, C i c e r o writes that humans alone have a notitia dei a n d attributes this fact to the unique kinship (agnatio) that humans have with the gods. T h i s kinship resides in the h u m a n possession o f the rational soul w h i c h , unlike the "fragile and perishable" elements o f the h u m a n animal derived from the mortal sphere, was "implanted by G o d . "
1 8 3
T h e h u m a n possession o f ratio is for C i c e r o crucial for
the formation o f the notitia dei, but not simply because it is requisite for c o n c e p t formation in general. T h e possession o f the ratio, a c c o r d ing to C i c e r o , necessarily entails recognition o f its ultimate source, and thus a belief in the existence o f the g o d s :
184
" T h u s it is clear that
m a n recognizes G o d because, in a way, he r e m e m b e r s and r e c o g nizes the source from w h i c h he s p r a n g . "
185
T h e reference to m e m
o r y in this latter explanation, h o w e v e r , has a curiously Platonic ring to it, and it is possible, as K e n t e r has suggested, that C i c e r o has here m e r g e d "Platonic elements with the doctrine o f the S t o a . "
186
Seemingly m o r e congenial to Stoicism, o n the other hand, is the a c c o u n t p r o v i d e d b y D i o C h r y s o s t o m . D i o , as w e have seen, argued that the ultimate source o f the c o n c e p t o f G o d was an euxpuioq ooiaaiv dv0pco7ioi<; £7tivoia w h i c h , unlike the c o n c e p t i o n s o f G o d that c o m e from poets and lawgivers, arises "naturally without a mortal teacher
that all the foolish are mad?" (De Nat. Deor. 3.11) T h e argument had already been dealt with from a somewhat different angle in the context o f Cotta's critique o f Epicurus; cf. De Nat. Deor. 1.62-64. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 219, is reluctant to attribute such an argument to Z e n o and Cleanthes, but assumes its presence at least in the theology o f Chrysippus. De Leg. 1.24: animum esse ingeneratum a deo. That Cicero has in mind here specifically the rational soul is clear from the fact that the Stoics held the human to be unique among other mortal animals owing to its possession o f reason, not soul, which latter, on the contrary, characterizes all animals by definition; see on this Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 313-23; further Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 2 1 - 2 6 . Cf. in this connection De Leg. 1.23 with Cicero's reference to the "divine" element in humans at De Leg. 1.59. So Pohlenz, commenting on this passage: "Auch die Gotteserkenntnis wurzelt also in der Struktur unsrer Physis" (Grundfragen, 100). De Leg. 1.25. Kenter, De Legibus, 105. 1 8 2
183
1 8 4
185
1 8 6
70
CHAPTER TWO
and mystagogue, without d e c e p t i o n . "
187
M o r e precisely, the belief in
the divine arises as a result o f t w o f a c t o r s : ship (^uyyeveia) w h i c h [ G o d ] has to t h e m m a n y evidences o f the truth."
189
188
"because o f the
[sc. humanity]
kin
and
T h e latter " e v i d e n c e s " are
the
those
p r o v i d e d b y natural p h e n o m e n a : the orderliness o f the astral m o v e ments, the a b u n d a n c e former reference
o f benefits received from nature, e t c .
to the
g o d s , o n the other
190
"kinship" b e t w e e n h u m a n beings and
h a n d , recalls the
The the
a c c o u n t o f C i c e r o discussed
a b o v e . It has b e e n suggested, in fact, that C i c e r o a n d D i o here d r a w u p o n a c o m m o n source, perhaps Posidonius, for their understand ing o f an innate c o n c e p t o f G o d .
1 9 1
D i o ' s explanation o f the significance
o f this "kinship" for o u r c o n c e p t o f g o d , h o w e v e r , is rather different from that o f C i c e r o : . . . the feelings o f the human race towards their first and immortal parent, whom we who have a share in the heritage o f Hellas call 7iorcpcpov A(oc, develop step by step along with those which men have toward their mortal and human parents. For in truth the goodwill and desire to serve which the offspring feel toward their parents is . . . present in them, untaught, as a gift o f nature and as a result o f acts o f kindness received (coco xfj<; (p-baecoc, Koci Tfj<; evepyeaiac, (X8I8CXKTO<; i)7cdpxei), since that which has been begotten straightaway from birth loves and cherishes in return (xot> yevvr|0evTo<; evOix; dvtiq>itan)VTO<; KCU &vTi0£pcx7te\>ovTO<;), so
far as it may, that which begat and nourishes and loves it. . ,
1 8 7
1 9 2
D i o Chrysostom 12.27: yivojievri Kotxd (pt>oiv avei) Ovrrcofi 5i8acK(xA,oa) m i x®PK OLndxj\q. I have altered the (protestantizing) translation o f L C L , which reads "without the aid o f human teacher and free from the deceit o f any expounding priest," and read iced |jA)OTaycoyo\) with avei) 0VT|TO$ SiSaoKcxXoi) rather than with x ^ p k 6\naxy\q. So also Pohlenz, Grundfiagen, 102. D i o Chrysostom 12.27; my translation. Note the textual problem here. 8id is to be preferred to eSriXoi) since the subsequent explanation o f the ^vyyeveiot and the (j.ocpT'opioc depict them as sources rather than consequences o f the So^ot Geoft; see further below. Note also that the immediate juxtaposition o f two finite verbs without a coordinating conjunction seems rather odd. Pohlenz [Grundfiagen, 102) fol lows this same reading, though there is no indication that he is aware o f a textual problem here. D i o Chrysostom 12. 2 8 - 3 4 . T h e fingerprints o f Cleanthes are perhaps to be detected here. See the references given by C o h o o n , Dw Chrysostom (LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 5.30f n. 2. Pohlenz assumes the dependence o f D i o upon Posidonius, characterizing this position as generally recognized (Grundfiagen, 101, with references in n. 2). D i o Chrysostom 12.42. jLL-oaTaycoyoi)
1 8 8
1 8 9
1 9 0
191
1 9 2
71
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
T h e key element o f this discussion is the parallel experiences o n e has vis-a-vis o n e ' s mortal a n d o n e ' s divine parent. A child's g o o d will toward its mortal parents is "natural"; it is an "untaught" response to the love (s)he experiences f r o m his o r her parent. T h i s latter love o f a parent for its offspring, o n the other h a n d , is itself, a c c o r d i n g to Chrysippus, providentially guaranteed b y oiKeicoai<;, as was p o i n t e d out in c o n n e c t i o n with o u r discussion o f the "natural" origin o f the concept o f "something just." parents' kindness language
toward
by
W h i l e D i o , to b e sure, cites
their child as a crucial factor here,
suggests that the w h o l e reciprocal relationship
guaranteed b y n a t u r e . tion
193
194
is in
the his effect
O n e might c o m p a r e in this respect the asser
o f C i c e r o ' s Stoic B a l b o that the n e w b o r n child "untaught a n d nature's g u i d a n c e " seeks its mother's
breast.
195
Thus too could
w e understand Philo's claim that o n e ' s "desire for [kin a n d country] m a y b e said to b e b o r n a n d g r o w with each o f us and is a part o f o u r nature as m u c h as o r even m o r e than the parts w h i c h unite to m a k e the w h o l e . "
1 9 6
W h a t e v e r the case, o u r initial belief in G o d , the "first a n d i m m o r tal parent," arises ultimately as a result o f this same d y n a m i c a c c o r d ing to D i o .
1 9 7
I n d e e d , the "first breast" that feeds the child is that
o f "the earth, its real m o t h e r " : it is the air w h i c h "after breathing into it a n d quickening it, at o n c e awakens it b y a nourishment liquid than milk a n d enables it to emit a c r y . "
1 9 3
1 9 8
more
Humans, according
Plutarch, St. Rep. 1038B; see above pp. 6If. Cf. the proofs adduced by the Stoics from Nature for the natural social ten dency o f humans in, e.g., De Nat. Deor. 2.128-29 and De Fin. 3.63. Cf. further the apparently c o m m o n Stoic discussion o f non-human animals which seem "naturally" to cooperate, esp. the sea pen discussed in De Nat. Deor. 2.123-124 and Philo, De Animal. 60 and 93. Cf. with this position Aristotle's view, cited by Inwood ("Comments," 198) that "the thing produced is oikeion to its source . . . but to the product the source is nothing, or less important" (such "products" including human children). This passage from D i o Chrysostom may in fact fill a crucial gap in the evidence for the Stoic doctrine o f social oiiceicocK; (felt, for example, by Pembroke ["Oikeiosis," 124f]) by emphasizing precisely the newborn child's love for its parents. De Nat. Deor. 2.128. Abr. 63: o w [ c o y y e v c o v m i 7 t o c T p i 8 o < ; ] 6rc69o<;eicdoTcp Tporcov t i v a a - o y y e Y e v n T o t i m i oa)vt|t)^r|Tai KCU \mk\o\ i i oi)% r\xxov TCOV f i v c o j i e v c o v j i e p w v ci)|i7te(p\)K£; translated according to L C L . Cf. De Fin. 5.65, where Cicero traces one's affection for, among others, one's family and fellow citizens, to "the fact that children are loved by their parents." Note esp. the description o f G o d as 7cp07C(xtcop in 12.29 and rcaipcpov Aia in 12.42. D i o Chrysostom 12.30-31. 1 9 4
195
196
1 9 7
1 9 8
72
CHAPTER TWO
to D i o , are thus unable to feel anything other than w o n d e r and love for the d e i t y .
199
In fact, D i o c a n speak rather loosely o f a similar
recognition and h o n o r t o w a r d G o d even o n the part o f plants and non-rational animals w h i c h , unlike humans, are o f course incapable o f formulating evvoiai at a l l .
200
T h e scant nature o f o u r evidence surrounding the Stoic position o n the origin o f the h u m a n belief in the g o d s prohibits the draw ing o f any decisive conclusions. It is noteworthy, h o w e v e r , that what evidence there is leads us back o n c e again to the doctrine o f
oiKemmq.
T h u s the description o f the h u m a n belief in the deity, b y at least s o m e later Stoics, as euxpuTo*; w o u l d seem to p r o v i d e still further c o n f i r m a t i o n o f P o h l e n z ' s general c o n t e n t i o n that the
implanted
p r e c o n c e p t i o n s must b e understood in light o f the Stoic doctrine o f OIK£{CDGI<;.
Conclusions T h e Stoics distinguished t w o types o f concepts. C o n c e p t s (evvoicci) in the strict sense o f the term are the result o f conscious intellectual effort a n d begin to b e f o r m e d only w h e n o n e has achieved an ini tial state o f rational maturity. Preconceptions (7ipoXr|i|/£i(;) o c c u r "nat urally," that is, from simple mental processes w h i c h d o not require conscious intellectual labor, and begin to f o r m , apparently,
almost
immediately. W h i l e empirical experience is necessary for the forma tion o f all c o n c e p t s a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics, fundamental ethical c o n cepts such as " g o o d " and " b a d " form a special class o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n , called implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s (eVcpmoi 7cpoA,r|\|/£i<;). T h e s e derive ultimately from the tendency, innate in all animals, to subjectively evaluate experience in terms o f that w h i c h is beneficial for oneself and that w h i c h is harmful. H u m a n s are not b o r n with ethical c o n ceptions per se\ nonetheless, as rational animals in w h o m c o n c e p t s naturally begin to f o r m almost immediately, they are predisposed to the formation o f these c o n c e p t i o n s regardless of the nature of their expe riences™ T h e imagery o f "sparks" and especially "seeds" o f knowl edge o r virtue is often used to describe this potential and inevitable
1 9 9
D i o Chrysostom 12.32. D i o Chrysostom 12.35. A n actual qLupvtoq 86£a or ercivoia o f G o d , o f course, is nevertheless the peculiar endowment o f the rational animal; see 12.27 and 12.39. T h e same cannot be said, for example, o f the concepts o f "white" and "black"; thus the distinction reported by Plutarch at Comm. Not. 1070C. 2 0 0
2 0 1
73
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
ethical k n o w l e d g e with w h i c h humans are naturally
e n d o w e d . In
what was perhaps a later d e v e l o p m e n t in Stoic theology, a posited universal h u m a n belief in the deity was also explained with refer ence to this d y n a m i c , and itself described as euxpuxoc;. O u r interest in the role o f the implanted preconceptions in C i c e r o ' s theory o f natural law has led us into a rather l o n g digression, but the matter is o n e o f great i m p o r t for o u r present study. T h i s Stoic doctrine is an important piece in the puzzle o f the recurring use o f the term "implanted" to describe either h u m a n reason o r the nat ural law it comprises in a range o f ancient literature. In o r d e r to clarify this point, let us n o w return to C i c e r o ' s definition o f law in terms o f "implanted reason."
N A T U R A L L A W AS "IMPLANTED R E A S O N "
Implanted Preconceptions, Human Reason, and Natural Law It is Cicero's view that divine Nature endows individual h u m a n beings with certain " o b s c u r e c o n c e p t s " in o r d e r to p r o v i d e them with the "foundations o f k n o w l e d g e . " W h i l e it is sometimes supposed that this view represents a platonizing interpretation
o f the Stoic doctrine o f
p r e c o n c e p t i o n , w e have found that this is not a necessary c o n c l u sion. T h e Stoics themselves argued that a certain class o f p r e c o n ception was different from all other concepts in that they arise not simply from empirical experience, but, ultimately, from the i n b o r n self-awareness and self-love guaranteed b y oiKeicooK;. T h e r e is thus n o reason to suppose that C i c e r o deviates from Stoic theory in locat ing the divine e n d o w m e n t o f these p r e c o n c e p t i o n s at the b e g i n n i n g o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f h u m a n reason, and ultimately t o o , therefore, o f "right reason" o r natural l a w .
202
In fact, this position is best understood in light o f Chrysippus's o w n v i e w o f h u m a n reason. W e have seen that h u m a n reason, for the Stoics, is the p r o d u c t o f d e v e l o p m e n t . Existing only in a p o t e n tial f o r m in n e w b o r n humans, it reaches an initial state o f maturity only a r o u n d the age o f seven, w h e n it is " c o m p l e t e d out o f the pre 203
conceptions" (EKTCDV 7ipoXf|\|/£cov OD|H7iA,npoftG0oci). 2 0 2
This latter statement
As I will suggest below, platonic influence on Cicero's understanding o f the epxp-utoi 7ipo^f|\j/8i(; themselves is in fact likely; nonetheless, their role in the theory of natural law as presented by him is intelligible quite apart from such influence. SVF 2.83. 2 0 3
CHAPTER TWO
74
must b e v i e w e d in light o f Chrysippus's understanding o f logos as an "assemblage" o f concepts and preconceptions.
204
Humans
are n o t
p r o p e r l y "rational"—which is t o say, o n e ' s logos is n o t a logos in the p r o p e r sense o f the term—until a sufficient c o m p l e m e n t o f p r e c o n ceptions has b e e n f o r m e d to allow for the higher thought processes w h i c h result in c o n c e p t s in the strict sense o f the t e r m .
205
It is o n l y
at this p o i n t that o n e begins to a p p r e h e n d o n e ' s rational nature a n d , thus, that o n e c a n b e g i n t o f o r m a c o n c e p t o f the (Stoic) G o o d .
2 0 6
Nature takes the h u m a n animal this far; henceforth it is the respon sibility o f the individual t o cultivate his o r h e r logos into the "right reason" o f the sage, w h i c h is natural law. Prior to this initial mat uration o n e has o n l y a potential
logos: an assemblage, it is to b e
inferred, o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n s alone. As
Kenter
r e c o g n i z e s , it is this Stoic theory that underlies the
description o f the maturation o f h u m a n reason in De Leg. 1 . 2 6 - 2 7 .
207
T h e maturation o f the ratio is here described as a natural p r o c e s s — it is effected b y "Nature h e r s e l f " — a n d the explanation o f the c o m pletion o f the ratio as arising from "obscure" a n d "insufficient" concepts rather o b v i o u s l y recalls Aetius's report that the logos is " c o m p l e t e d out o f the p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . " I n fact, C i c e r o ' s description o f these " o b s c u r e c o n c e p t s " as "the foundations o f k n o w l e d g e " is quite rem iniscent o f his description, elsewhere, o f the implanted p r e c o n c e p tions
as the "seeds" o r "sparks" o f k n o w l e d g e o r v i r t u e .
208
A c c o r d i n g to C i c e r o , then, the first stage in the d e v e l o p m e n t a l process w h i c h results in mature h u m a n reason is the divine e n d o w m e n t o f "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . " Unfortunately,
there is n o e x
plicit evidence a m o n g the early Stoic fragments for this association o f the potential reason with w h i c h h u m a n s are b o r n a n d the epxpuxoi 7ipoA,r|\j/ei^. O n the other h a n d , given Chrysippus's definition o f logos
204 £ ^ 2 . 8 4 1 : evvoicov xe xivcov KCCI 7cpoX,T|\j/ecov cxGpoiajiia. See further Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 7 2 7 4 ; "assemblage" is his translation. It is not altogether clear, however, h o w the Stoics envisioned the ability to exercise higher orders o f thought to result from the formation o f a certain number of preconceptions in the human mind. See Pohlenz, Grundfiagen, 92: "Erst wenn der Logos sich vollendet hat, kann daraus der klare Begriff werden, daB das wahrhaft Gute das ist, was unsrer Natur als X o y i K O v £cpov entspricht." See further on this the discussion of De Finibus 3 above. Kenter, De Legibus, 118, with further parallels. Cf. De Fin. 5.59, comparing esp. the rerum plurimarum obscuras nec satis. . . intelligentias o f De Leg. 1.26 with the notitias parvas rerum maximarum treated there, and described elsewhere in De Finibus as the "seeds" or "sparks" virtue (e.g., 5.18). Cf. further the "sparks" o f virtue discussed in De Leg. 1.33. _
205
206
207
208
75
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
as an "assemblage" o f concepts and preconceptions, it seems a rather small step to describe the "spermatic" logos with w h i c h h u m a n s are b o r n as an assemblage, as it were, o f "implanted preconceptions." T h u s just as virtue is a disposition o f the ratio, so t o o c o u l d the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s themselves b e described as the "seeds" o r
"sparks"
o f virtue. In fact, as w e shall see in the following chapter, the Apostolic Constitutions, under clear influence o f the Stoic theory o f law, under stands the natural law given to the h u m a n animal at its creation to b e c o m p r i s e d b y the "seeds o f divine k n o w l e d g e " — k n o w l e d g e w h i c h it refers to elsewhere as "implanted k n o w l e d g e " (Euxpuxoq yvSaiq). Similarly, there is n o explicit evidence in o u r scanty sources for the early Stoics that this theory o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the h u m a n logos was discussed in c o n n e c t i o n with natural law. It is h o w e v e r rather difficult to believe that Chrysippus, at least, h a d not under s t o o d a n d r e c k o n e d with this rather o b v i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n o f his identification o f that law w h i c h is cpuaei
K O C I JLLT|
Geaei with the logos
o f the sage. A s will b e c o m e clear in the subsequent
chapter,
the
incorporation o f the Stoic doctrine o f implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s into a theory o f natural law was, in any case, certainly not C i c e r o ' s o w n innovation. A n u m b e r o f ancient works, n o n e o f w h i c h c a n plausi bly b e linked directly to C i c e r o ' s De Legibus, share this theoretical a p p r o a c h to natural law. W h a t is m o r e , it is precisely here that o n e finds
the recurring terminology that is the central c o n c e r n o f this
chapter: the description o f natural law or, as in De Leg. 18, the logos w h i c h comprises it, as
"implanted."
Natural Law as ratio insita C i c e r o ' s statement in De Leg. 1.27 that Nature "strengthens" (confirmat) a n d " c o m p l e t e s " (perficit) the ratio e c h o e s De Leg. 1.18, where law is defined as "reason, w h e n it is strengthened
and c o m p l e t e d in the 209
h u m a n m i n d " (ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta). w e have seen, h o w e v e r , the natural maturation referred to in
1.27
results, a c c o r d i n g to Stoic theory, in a ratio that is " c o m p l e t e " only insofar as it has b e c o m e capable o f rationality in the p r o p e r sense o f the term. It is not yet the "right reason," characteristic o f the sage alone, that is natural law. In fact, C i c e r o explicitly and
repeatedly
states that law is the mens and ratio o f the sage in particular, including
De Leg. 1.18; translation mine.
As
76
CHAPTER TWO
o n c e immediately following this definition o f law as ratio. . . confirmata m
et corifecta. Similarly, C i c e r o specifies o n several occasions that law is n o t simply reason (ratio), but right reason (recta ratio) in particular.
211
Finally, law is associated with b o t h virtue and the highest g o o d : [I]t is undoubtedly true that to live in accordance with nature is the highest good. That signifies the enjoyment o f a life o f due measure based upon virtue, or following nature and living according to her law, so to speak; in other words, to spare no effort, so far as in us lies, to accomplish what nature demands; among these demands being her wish that we live by virtue as our law. 212
Certainly w i s d o m , virtue, and attainment o f the highest g o o d d o not a c c o m p a n y the natural maturation o f the ratiol T h u s while De Leg. 1.26-27 c o n c e r n s the initial stage o f maturation w h i c h occurs natu rally in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f h u m a n reason, 1.18-19 deals with the final perfection o f h u m a n reason in the m i n d o f the s a g e .
213
W h a t e v e r the case, the developmental aspect o f the Stoic theory o f natural law is clearly in v i e w w h e n C i c e r o writes, in 1.18, that "the same reason, w h e n it is strengthened
a n d c o m p l e t e d in the
h u m a n m i n d , is law." T h i s identification obviously assumes a time w h e n reason was less than "strong" and " c o m p l e t e . " W h a t is m o r e , the use o f the demonstrative p r o n o u n eadem ("the same") here specifies that the reason in question is that o f the previous sentence: the ratio w h i c h b e c o m e s law w h e n " c o m p l e t e d in the h u m a n m i n d , " that is, is the ratio summa insita in natura. D o e s this, then, imply that the phrase "implanted reason" refers particularly to the potential, spermatic rea son with w h i c h Nature e n d o w s the h u m a n animal? A t least o n e author has interpreted the phrase otherwise. Kenter, in his c o m m e n t a r y o n De Legibus I, explains it, rather, with refer e n c e to the c o s m i c logos w h i c h pervades universal n a t u r e .
210
214
This
De Leg. 1.19; cf. 2.8 and 2.11. De Leg. 1.23; 1.33; 1.42; cf. De Rep. 3.33, and further De Leg. 2.10. De Leg. 1.56; cf. further 1.18, where law is identified with prudentia\ and 1.60, where prudentia is described, in the context o f a discussion o f the happiness which accompanies the highest good, as a virtus o f the mind's eye in "selecting the good and rejecting the opposite." Against Vander Waerdt, The Stoic Theory of Natural Law, who argues that Cicero, depending upon Antiochus o f Ascalon, has consciously altered the Stoic theory so as to identify natural law with the reason o f the average human adult. This argu ment is most dubious in light o f several indications to the contrary mentioned in this paragraph. So Kenter, De Legibus, 8If. 211
2 1 2
2 1 3
2 1 4
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
11
interpretation suggests itself primarily in light o f De Leg. 2 . 8 - 1 1 , where C i c e r o presents a summary o f the theoretical position he h a d out lined in b o o k o n e . H e r e , C i c e r o emphasizes the identification o f nat ural law with the ratio o r mens o f b o t h G o d and the h u m a n sage, and Quintus remarks that C i c e r o has " t o u c h e d o n this subject sev eral times b e f o r e . "
215
G i v e n the fundamental i m p o r t a n c e o f this dual
identification to C i c e r o ' s general theory o f law, o n e might e x p e c t that he w o u l d include references to b o t h the ratio divina and the ratio hominis in his initial a c c o u n t o f the law in 1.18—19. I f so, reference to the former c o u l d b e f o u n d only in the phrase summa ratio insita in natura. T h e phrase insita in natura w o u l d in this case b e c o m p a r a b l e to Chrysippus's characterization o f 6 vojxoq 6 Sioc Tidvicov ep%6u£vo<;.
216
Koivoq
as 6 dpQbq Xoyoq,
T h e use o f the demonstrative p r o n o u n eadem
in the following sentence might thus serve to emphasize the g o d s ' a n d the h u m a n animals' c o m m o n possession o f "this same r e a s o n " — a p o i n t argued in detail in De Leg. 1.2 Iff. .This line o f interpretation, h o w e v e r , is most doubtful. It is to b e observed in the first place that the term natura appears often in the De Legibus, and b y n o means always with reference to universal nature. In at least o n e other passage, in fact, it is clear from the context that the term is used specifically with reference to h u m a n 211
despite the absence o f the limiting genitive hominis.
nature,
T h e immedi
ate context o f De Leg. 1.17-19, t o o , indicates quite clearly that the natura in question is to b e interpreted specifically with reference to h u m a n nature. De Leg. 1.18-19 as a w h o l e is introduced as an inquiry into the "origins o f justice" (iuris principia), and the a c c o u n t o f law
2 1 5
De Leg. 2 . 8 - 1 1 . Diog. Laert. 7.88; cf. Hymn to Z ( ! - > P- 122, lines 8ff), where Cleanthes speaks o f the K O I V O V Xoyov, o<; 5ia rcdvxcov (poixa. See De Leg. 1.27: "But, whereas G o d has begotten and equipped m a n . . . it should n o w be evident that nature, alone and unaided, goes a step farther; for, with no guide to point the way, she starts with those things whose character she has learned through the rudimentary beginnings o f intelligence, and, alone and unaided, strengthens and perfects the faculty o f reason." Note esp. that Cicero passes to this contrast between G o d and natura after having just used the two inter changeably; see 1.26-27. Cf. further the use o f "nature" in 1.33—a passage which is, however, apparently corrupt; see on this Kenter De Legibus, 132-33. Cicero's fluid use o f the term "nature" is not at all peculiar in this respect; see Long, " T h e Logical Basis o f Stoic Ethics," on the wide use o f the term (p\)Gi<; by the Stoics generally, and further the discussion o f Philo's use o f the term in E. R . Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935) 4 9 - 5 4 . See also in this connection Engberg-Pedersen's provocative argument for the importance o f human, as opposed to divine, nature in Stoic philosophy more generally in The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis. 2 1 6
2 1 7
EUS
S V F
5 3 7
CHAPTER TWO
78
w h i c h it includes is itself offered with this aim in m i n d .
2 1 8
It is i m p o r
tant to note, therefore, that C i c e r o has asserted, just prior to this a c c o u n t , that the "nature o f justice . . . must b e sought for in human 219
nature."
T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f h u m a n nature in particular for C i c e r o ' s
overall point, in fact, b e c o m e s quite clear at the c o n c l u s i o n o f his initial a c c o u n t o f law at
1.18-19:
N o w if this [preceding account o f law] is correct, as I think it to be in general, then the origin o f Justice is to be found in Law, for Law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the sage, the standard by which Justice and Injustice are measured. 220
Justice, that is, is "natural" inasmuch as it derives f r o m law; a n d the law, in turn, is natural to the extent that it is identical to the rea son of the sage. I n d e e d , it is to b e n o t e d that—excluding,
o f course,
the possibility o f the definition in q u e s t i o n — 1 . 1 8 - 1 9 contains not a single reference to the identification o f the law with the divine ratio. Nor
d o e s C i c e r o ' s a r g u m e n t at this p o i n t d e p e n d u p o n this iden
tification. C i c e r o , in fact, does not attempt to secure his interlocutors' concession that the c o s m i c ratio will b e relevant to their discussion at all until 1.21. As far as I have noted, in fact, C i c e r o elsewhere uses the term insita o n l y with reference being. with
221
to the nature o r animus o f the
In fact, the term appears in C i c e r o ' s works in c o n j u n c t i o n
themes
and
ideas
associated particularly
npoXrweiq: it is used as a description o f v i r t u e , oiKe{coai(;, 218
human
223
222
with
the
euxpuxoi
in c o n n e c t i o n with
a n d even in direct c o n n e c t i o n with the Stoic doctrine
De Leg. 1.18. De Leg. 1.17: natura enim iuris explicanda nobis est eaque ab hominis repentenda natura; I have altered the translation o f L C L only in adding emphasis, and in rendering hominis natura as "human nature" rather than the more gender-specific "nature o f man." De Leg. 1.19: quod si ita recte dicitur, ut mihi quidem plerumque videri solet, a lege ducendum est iuris exordium; ea est enim naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula. I have altered the translation o f L C L only in the addition o f the emphasis and in rendering prudentis as " o f the sage" rather than " o f the intelligent man." Regarding the latter, it seems to me rather clear in the context o f the De Legibus that it is the Stoic identification o f the law with the reason o f the sage that Cicero has in mind here; cf. Kenter, De Legibus, 83. Cf. T.D. 1.57; 4.26-27; De Off. 3.32; De Nat. Deor. 1.17; De Fin. 1.31; 4.4; Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino 53; Topica 31; Against Verres 2.48, 139, 177; Pro Murena 30; Brutus 213; Against Piso 15; Pro Cluentio 4. Pro Murena 30. Cf. Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino 53, where a father's love for his child is described as insitam, with the Stoic doctrine o f social OIICEICDGK;. O n e might also mention in this connection Cicero's description o f his love for R o m e as such in Verr. 2.139, 219
220
221
222
223
LAW
of conception. of
2 2 4
AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
79
W h i l e there is thus g o o d p r e c e d e n t for C i c e r o ' s use
the t e r m insita in c o n n e c t i o n with h u m a n
nature, a n d e v e n in
c o n n e c t i o n with the euxpuxoi 7ipoA,f|\|/£i<;, its use in c o n n e c t i o n divine nature w o u l d b e quite p e c u l i a r .
225
with
I n d e e d , w h e n , in a n o t h e r
w o r k , C i c e r o wishes t o c o n v e y the n o t i o n o f the o m n i p r e s e n c e o f the vera lex, h e c h o o s e s a phrase m o r e directly reminiscent o f C h r y s i p pus's: diffusa in
226
omnes
If, then, the natura into w h i c h reason has b e e n " i m p l a n t e d " a c c o r d ing
t o De Leg. 1.18 is thus h u m a n n a t u r e ,
227
the phrase ratio insita
w o u l d s e e m t o b e used with particular reference t o the initial e n d o w ment
o f r e a s o n in its potential, l e s s - t h a n - c o m p l e t e
state. I n
fact,
C i c e r o ' s use o f the t e r m insita in this c o n n e c t i o n , recalling as it d o e s the G r e e k euxpuxo*;, is quite striking given the foundational role p l a y e d b y the euxpmoi 7tpoA,f|\|/ei<; in his t h e o r y o f law. T h e perfected h u m a n reason w h i c h is identified with natural l a w is, in its initial f o r m ,
com
prised o f " i m p l a n t e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . " C i c e r o ' s usage, it w o u l d s e e m , simply applies the technical description o f the inchoate p r e c o n c e p t i o n s
with which o n e can compare De Fin. 5.65-66. See further the report in De Fin. 1.31 that some Epicureans had expanded upon Epicurus's doctrine o f the Goal, which was rooted in the belief that humans from birth naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain, b y arguing that this judgment rests not only with the senses, but is naturalem et insitam in animis nostris; such a position is perhaps to be understood as the adaptation o f Stoic ideas for the support o f Epicurean ethics. 224 JJJ i 57- Top. 31. Note also the description o f all human beings' notions (cognitiones) o f the gods as insitas... vel potius innatas in De Nat. Deor. 1.44, which admit tedly, however, is given in an account o f Epicurean theology; cf. though the use o f the identical phrase by Cicero in De Fin. 4.4 in connection with a report o f a Platonic/Peripatetic view concerning the universal desire for knowledge o n the part o f human beings. Kenter cites several passages to demonstrate the synonymity o f insita and innata, all o f which refer to the nature o r animus o f the human being; he does not, how ever, comment upon the possible significance o f this fact for the interpretation o f the account o f law at De Leg. 1.18. See Kenter, De Legibus, 8 2 . Rep. 3.33; cf. Chrysippus's 5 i a rcavtcov £p%6|i£V0<; (Diog. Laert. 7.88) and Cleanthes's 8ia JWXVTCOV (poixa (SVF 1.537; p . 122, lines 8ff). It is noteworthy that even in this passage the cosmic ratio manifesta itself in human beings in their expe rience o f their own nature. Thus when Cicero describes this lex further as naturae congruens, it becomes clear that the natura that he has in mind at the very least includes the natura hominis; for "[wjhoever does not submit to it [sc. the "true law"] is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and for this very reason will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered pun ishment"; the translation is an adaptation o f that o f L C L . Cf. in this respect Dionysius bar Salibi's paraphrase and explanation o f the £\i(pmoq Xoyoq o f Jas 1:21: Excipite verbum insitum naturae nostrae; h.e. legem naturalem innuit. In natura enim inseruit Deus, ut amet bona et odio habeat mala (Sedlacek, Dionusius Bar Salibi, 91-92); see further on this Chapter Three. Cf. in addition Justin's reference to the eVcpuToq xr\ (p\>o*ei tcov dvGpamcov 56£a o f G o d . 2 2 5
2 2 6
2 2 7
80
CHAPTER TWO
as "implanted" direcdy to the "spermatic" reason w h i c h the latter comprise.
228
In fact, the n u m b e r o f other ancient works w h i c h exhibit similar terminology in analogous contexts confirms this interpretation. T h e s e works will b e considered in detail in the following chapters, but the most striking instances c a n at least b e m e n t i o n e d here. In the Apostolic Constitutions, t o o , G o d ' s initial gift o f a natural l a w to the h u m a n ani mal is equated with an e n d o w m e n t o f "the seeds o f divine knowl e d g e , " also called "implanted k n o w l e d g e " (euxpuxoq yvtboiq), while the law
itself is described as an euipuxo<; vo\ioq. Similarly, the i n c o m p l e t e
logos possessed b y all h u m a n s is described b y Justin as the euxpuxov xou ^oyorj orcepuxx (cf. G7topd), while the teaching o f Christ, w h o brings this logos to perfection, is "right reason" o r natural law. It is pre cisely this theoretical understanding o f law, in fact, that Dionysius bar Salibi brings to his explanation o f the euipuxoq Xoyoq o f the Letter o f J a m e s : it is interpreted with reference to the ability to make eth ical distinctions,
229
"implanted" in human nature b y G o d , and identified
further with "natural l a w . " In sum, C i c e r o ' s definition o f law as ratio summa insita in natura is to b e understood in light o f the Stoic correlation o f the potential reason given to h u m a n s b y nature with an initial e n d o w m e n t o f euxpuxoi 7tpoA,r|\j/£i<;. M o r e o v e r , given the analogous descriptions o f either h u m a n reason o r the natural law it comprises as "implanted" in a variety o f ancient works, it is clear that the phrase ratio insita was n o t C i c e r o ' s o w n idiosyncratic c o i n a g e . This latter point is all
228
Cf. further in this connection De Leg. 1:24: "For when the nature o f man is examined, the theory is usually advanced . . . [that] a time came which was suit able for sowing the seed o f the human race (serendi generis hominis). A n d when this seed was scattered and sown over the earth (quod sparsum in terras atque satum), it was granted the divine gift o f the soul. . . . the soul was implanted (esse ingeneratum) in us by G o d . " I have altered the L C L translation only by rendering ingeneratum so as to make the continuation o f the "sowing" metaphor more explicit. See further on this passage above, n. 183. While one might object that the use o f the term summa to describe this ratio is problematic for this interpretation, it is perhaps more significant that the term most often used in the c o m m o n Stoic definition presented here to describe perfected rea son—namely recta ratio (cf. opdbqXoyoq); cf. De Leg. 1.23; 1.33; 1.42; 2.10; De Rep. 3.33—is avoided. Summa, unlike recta, might be taken simply with reference to the divine nature o f the ratio rather than specifying its "right" or "perfect" state. T h e former point is in fact made elsewhere in the De Legibus; see 1.23, with which c o m pare 1.59. Cf. further Justin, App. 3.3: jxepoix; iot> CMEPFICMKOU Geioi) Xoyov, on which see below, Chapter Three. Cf. on this point, too, the commentaries o f Oecumenius and Theophylactus. 229
81
L A W AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
the m o r e significant for o u r purposes given C i c e r o ' s heavy d e p e n d e n c e u p o n s o m e G r e e k s o u r c e o r sources for the t h e o r y o f law espoused in his De Legibus. It is safe to c o n c l u d e , that is, that C i c e r o ' s source h a d defined natural law in terms o f Xoyoq euxpuxoc;. T h e author o f this source is impossible to identify with any certainty, a n d the question is, fortunately, not crucial for the present study. T h e p r o b l e m is nonetheless o f interest in its o w n right, and merits at least brief consideration.
RATIO INSITA AS Xoyoq e\x
In general it is fair to say that C i c e r o was not a particularly origi nal philosopher. By his o w n admission, his philosophical writings were intended primarily to bring G r e e k ideas to the R o m a n w o r l d . His De Legibus, at least with respect to the theory o f law presented in its first b o o k , is n o e x c e p t i o n .
230
C i c e r o is in fact quite explicit
a b o u t his use o f sources in this treatise, particularly with respect to his treatment o f the central issue o f the natural origins o f law a n d justice.
231
His d e p e n d e n c e in this matter is so great that the Epicurean
Atticus, the primary interlocutor o f the De Legibus, quips sarcastically: And, o f course, you have lost your independence in discussion, or else you are the kind o f man not to follow your own judgment in a debate, but meekly to accept the authority o f others! 232
C i c e r o assures Atticus that such facile acceptance o f prior intellec tual authority is not his usual p r o c e d u r e , but is in this case p r o m p t e d b y the p r o f o u n d i m p o r t a n c e o f his subject matter and his desire for a secure theoretical foundation for his w o r k .
233
It c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d that the source for the theory o f natural law used in b o o k o n e o f the De Legibus, like those o f C i c e r o ' s other
2 3 0
O n the intention o f Cicero's philosophical writings, see De Fin. 1.1—12; De Nat. Deor. 1.1-14; TD 1.1-8; Acad. Pr. 5f. Cicero's attempt to use the Stoic theory of law as a foundation for a concrete body o f legislation in the De Legibus, how ever, is almost certainly original, at least in its R o m a n context; see on this imme diately below. Note, though, the similar Jewish and Christian moves discussed in the following chapters. De Leg. 1.18; 1.36. De Leg. 1.36. De Leg. 1.37. 231
2 3 2
2 3 3
82
CHAPTER TWO
philosophical works, was Greek. This is clear first o f all from his c o m m e n t s regarding the lack o f prior R o m a n c o n c e r n for questions o f legal theory as o p p o s e d to those regarding legal m i n u t i a e .
234
A
further indication lies in the e t y m o l o g y o f the G r e e k term vouoq given in 1.19, to w h i c h C i c e r o adds his o w n Latin e t y m o l o g y o f lex. O n the other hand, there has b e e n s o m e question as to w h i c h G r e e k author, precisely, p r o v i d e d C i c e r o ' s m a i n s o u r c e .
235
Several
scholars have argued that C i c e r o ' s source was not a p r o p e r Stoic, but rather A n t i o c h u s o f A s c a l o n , a personal acquaintance o f C i c e r o and founder o f the breakaway " O l d A c a d e m y " w h o s e p h i l o s o p h y is 236
treated b y C i c e r o in b o t h the De Finibus and the Academica.
This
philosopher is best k n o w n for his belief in the essential agreement o f the Platonists, Peripatetics and the Stoics; his philosophy, a c c o r d ingly, presented something o f a synthesis o f the thought o f these three schools. In fact, C i c e r o interacts explicidy with Antiochus in De Leg. 1.54, w h e n Atticus recognizes that C i c e r o ' s view o n the dis pute c o n c e r n i n g the G o o d agrees substantially with that o f A n t i o chus.
237
W h e t h e r agreement in this matter implies a d e p e n d e n c e o n
A n t i o c h u s t h r o u g h o u t the De Legibus, h o w e v e r , is far from
clear.
O t h e r indications o f A n t i o c h a n influence cited in support o f this idea are suggestive, but not d e c i s i v e .
238
Certainly, o n e can at least say
that the use o f Antiochus w o u l d have b e e n consistent with C i c e r o ' s h o p e to win approval for his theory o f law from the " O l d A c a d e m y , " the Peripatetics and the S t o i c s — a m o n g w h o m he, like A n t i o c h u s , finds essential a g r e e m e n t .
239
Even if A n t i o c h u s was C i c e r o ' s primary source, h o w e v e r , it is b y n o means clear that o n e should thereby reckon with a radical alter ation o f the Stoic theory o f law in the De Legibus. C i c e r o himself elsewhere writes o f A n t i o c h u s o f A s c a l o n that "had he m a d e very
2 3 4
De Leg. 1.14. See further Vander Waerdt, "Philosophical Influence on R o m a n Jurisprudence," 4 8 6 7 - 7 0 . For a sketch o f the positions, see Kenter, De Legibus, 9 - 1 0 . So most recently Horsley, " T h e Law o f Nature"; Vander Waerdt, "The Stoic Theory o f Natural Law." De Leg. 1.54; note however Cicero's hesitation: cui [sc. Antiochus] tamen ego adsentiar in omnibus necne mox videro. Especially those cited by Horsley, "The Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero," 4 2 - 5 0 ; see further the discussion immediately below. De Leg. 1.37-39. T h e view regarding the essential agreement o f these schools on the question o f the summum bonum, however, apparently goes back to Carneades, and is to this extent consistent with Cicero's skeptical leanings; see De Fin. 3.41. For Antiochus's dependence upon Carneades in this matter see De Fin. 5.16. 2 3 5
2 3 6
237
2 3 8
239
83
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
few modifications," he w o u l d have been "a perfecdy genuine S t o i c . "
240
O n the face o f it, then, the question w o u l d thus seem in any case to b e at most o n e o f "modifications" o f the Stoic t h e o r y .
241
T h e sub
stantive question, that is, is this: even if Antiochus was the primary source for this w o r k , in what w a y , if any, d o e s his theory o f law represent a departure from the Stoic theory? In its basic outlines, at least, the theory o f natural law presented in the De Legibus is unquestionably Stoic. A s w e have seen, its cen tral points have clear precedents in our sources for the early Stoics. C i c e r o takes the Stoic identification o f law with h u m a n reason as the point o f departure for his theory, and in fact repeatedly offers variants o f a c o m m o n Stoic definition o f law as "right reason applied to c o m m a n d i n g and p r o h i b i t i n g . "
242
T h e ratio in question, for C i c e r o
as for the Stoics, is b o t h the c o s m i c ratio o f G o d and h u m a n
rea
son. T h e notion that gods and humans are m e m b e r s o f a c o m m o n state in virtue o f their similar possession o f reason is also clearly Stoic in o r i g i n .
243
S o t o o , the developmental aspect o f C i c e r o ' s the
o r y o f law draws u p o n the Stoic a c c o u n t o f h u m a n reason and its development; and it is rather difficult to imagine that Chrysippus h a d altogether o v e r l o o k e d the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the latter for his identification o f natural law with the logos o f the sage. In fact, e v e n if o n e should grant the s u p p o s e d indications o f A n t i o c h a n influence f o u n d b y Horsely and V a n d e r W a e r d t , these represent only m i n o r modifications o f the Stoic theory—albeit, in the case o f V a n d e r W a e r d t , a slight modification with far-reaching implications. F o r V a n d e r W a e r d t the m o s t consequential c h a n g e effected b y A n t i o c h u s was the ascription o f "appropriate (KOCGTJKOVTOC)
actions"
rather than "right actions" (KaTopBcoumoc) to natural law:
"a simple technical modification, though o n e motivated b y funda mental revisions in Stoic p s y c h o l o g y . "
244
Horsley, o n the other hand,
finds t w o significant divergences from Stoicism in C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t .
2 4 0
245
Acad. Pr. 132. Thus Dillon (The Middle Platonists, 8 0 - 8 1 ) , w h o finds it "very likely that the discussion o f Natural Law in Cicero De Legibus I is basically Antiochan," nonethe less points out that "none o f this is original to Antiochus." De Leg. 1.18, 33, 42; 2.8, 10. De Leg. 1.23; cf. De Fin. 4.7. Vander Waerdt, "Philosophical Influence," 4873. Vander Waerdt's position is problematic in any case, as Cicero's law is explicitly identified with the reason o f the sage in particular; see above n. 213, and the discussion to which it is appended. Horsley, "The Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero," 4 0 - 4 2 . A third point 2 4 1
2 4 2
2 4 3
2 4 4
2 4 5
84
CHAPTER TWO
T h e first is C i c e r o ' s predilection for phrases like "divine m i n d " o r " m i n d o f G o d . " W h i l e perhaps suggestive o f platonic influence, this does n o t , in a n d o f itself, represent a significant alteration o f the Stoic t h e o r y .
246
Horsley's s e c o n d point, a n d that w h i c h he finds to
b e the "most significant" indication o f n o n - S t o i c influence, is the fact that C i c e r o "clearly distinguish [es] G o d from the law," whereas "Stoic doctrine h a d identified G o d with l a w as well as with r e a s o n . "
247
As
was p o i n t e d o u t earlier in this chapter, h o w e v e r , strict identification does n o t appear to have b e e n the early Stoics' only valid o p t i o n for 248
describing the relationship between G o d a n d law o r logos.
O n the
other hand, the consistency with w h i c h this distinction is maintained in the De Legibus, along with C i c e r o ' s predilection for describing G o d as "lawgiver," might suggest platonic influence—especially given that b o t h tendencies are also characteristic tonizing P h i l o .
249
o f the m o r e obviously pla-
B e that as it m a y , o n e c a n n o t in a n y case fairly
speak o f a substantive departure from the original Stoic theory. Potentially m o r e consequential for the present study are indica tions o f platonic influence in c o n n e c t i o n with C i c e r o ' s understand ing o f the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s .
250
W h i l e , as w e have seen, it is
not the case that C i c e r o ' s notion that these are present from birth owes to platonic influence, such influence might nevertheless b e seen in b o t h his references to m e m o r y in this c o n n e c t i o n a n d his appar ent v i e w that h u m a n s have implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s w h i c h extend b e y o n d the sphere o f ethics a n d belief in the deity. T h e Stoics, w e have seen, included a m o n g the Euxpuxoi 7tpoA,r|\|/£i<; only those c o n cepts w h o s e origin lies in oiKeicoaK;: a b o v e all o n e ' s ethical c o n c e p t s , though apparently for s o m e (later?) Stoics, at least, also a belief in G o d . C i c e r o , o n the other hand, speaks o f the " o b s c u r e notions o f m a n y things" (rerum plurimarum obscuras intelligentias) which Divine Nature gives to the h u m a n a n i m a l .
251
This statement w o u l d seem to suggest
made by Horsley concerning the frequent use o f the term Oeoucx; applies not to Cicero, but to Philo, who, Horsley argues, also depends upon Antiochus. O n Philo's theory o f law and its relation to that o f Cicero, see Chapter Three. In fact Horsley himself recognizes that there is some evidence for a similar use o f the term vouq among the early Stoics; see " T h e Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero," 41 n. 15. Ibid., 4 2 . See above, under the heading "Natural Law as Cosmic Logos." Horsley, " T h e Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero," 42. See Kenter, De Legibus,\\2; further Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 9 7 - 9 9 . Cicero, De Leg. 1.26. 2 4 6
247
2 4 8
2 4 9
2 5 0
2 5 1
LAW AS IMPLANTED LOGOS
85
p r e c o n c e p t i o n s from a wide range o f topics b e y o n d those discussed in this c o n n e c t i o n b y the Stoics, a n d C i c e r o in fact speaks elsewhere in De Legibus 1 o f " s h a d o w y concepts, as it were, o f everything w h i c h the individual h u m a n "from the start has formed in soul and m i n d . "
252
T h a t platonic influence is in fact at w o r k here is suggested b y an interesting passage in the Tusculan Disputations, where C i c e r o discusses the platonic theory o f anamnesis using Stoic sounding terminology: in no other way was it possible for us to possess from childhood such a number o f important ideas, implanted and as it were impressed on our souls and called e v v o i a i (insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas e v v o i a i vocant), unless the soul, before it entered the body, had been active in acquiring knowledge. 253
This passage is somewhat reminiscent o f De Leg. 1.25, where C i c e r o explains w h y it is that all h u m a n societies evidence s o m e belief in a deity: " T h u s it is clear that m a n recognizes G o d because, in a way, he remembers a n d recognizes the source from w h i c h he sprang." Interestingly, a synthesis o f the Stoic " c o n c e p t s " a n d the Platonic "ideas" was also apparently effected b y Antiochus o f A s c a l o n .
254
This
m a y provide further evidence for Cicero's dependence u p o n Antiochus for his presentation o f natural law, though the presence o f similar ideas in C i c e r o ' s other works has led at least o n e scholar to c o n clude that C i c e r o has effected this merger
himself.
255
W h a t e v e r the case, the importance o f this innovation for C i c e r o ' s general theory o f l a w is negligible. C i c e r o ' s primary interest in the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , b o t h in 1.26 a n d in 1.59, is in any case ethical. T h u s , referring b a c k to 1.26-27, C i c e r o writes that those inchoate concepts (inchoatae intelligence) to which I have referred, which are imprinted in our souls (in animis inprimuntur), are imprinted
252
De Leg 1.59: principio rerum omnium quasi adumbratas intellegentias animo ac mente conceperit. T h e translation and emphasis are mine. It is perhaps possible to interpret principio in 1.59 more loosely and, therefore, to take the reference more generally to the "natural" formation o f preconceptions which occurs even before an individ ual is properly rational, and thus to all preconceptions rather than the euxpDTOi npoXr\\\fEiq in particular. Note, however, the preceding reference to "how nobly equipped by Nature (s)he [sc. the human individual] entered life," which recalls rather strongly the passage concerning the divine endowment o f the obscuras intelli gentias in 1.26; cf. Kenter, De Legibus, 235. 253 jjy 1.57; I have deviated from the L C L only in rendering insitas as "implanted" rather than "innate." Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 91-96. So Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 99. 254
255
86
CHAPTER TWO
in all souls alike . . . In fact, there is no human being o f any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue. 256
S o t o o , in 1.59: after speaking o f " s h a d o w y c o n c e p t s , as it w e r e , o f everything" w h i c h form "from the start" in the h u m a n m i n d , C i c e r o goes o n to explain h o w the d e v e l o p m e n t o f these c o n c e p t s leads ulti 257
mately to a c o n c e p t i o n o f the summum bonum.
In sum, given the several indications o f platonic influence in the first b o o k o f his De Legibus, it is quite possible that C i c e r o depends u p o n A n t i o c h u s o f A s c a l o n for his theory o f law. H o w e v e r , it is b y n o means clear that his general theory differs substantially from that o f the Stoics. T h e instances o f platonic influence perhaps a d d s o m e distinctive c o l o r to the Stoic theory, but they d o not alter it in any substantial way. T h e theoretical foundation that allowed for C i c e r o ' s definition o f law as "implanted reason" is wholly Stoic in origin. T h e question o f C i c e r o ' s source in any case matters little for o u r present purposes. By the first century B C E at the latest, law h a d b e e n defined in terms o f Xoyoc, euxpuxoq in c o n n e c t i o n with the Stoic theory o f natural law. T h i s is suggested not only b y C i c e r o ' s explicit attribution o f this definition to prior (Greek) authority,
258
but, as w e
shall see in the following chapters, b y the similar language found in the Apostolic Constitutions, in works o f Justin Martyr and M e t h o d i u s , in early commentaries o n the Letter o f J a m e s and, in fact, in the Letter o f J a m e s itself.
De Leg. 1.30, I have slightly altered the L C L translation. De Leg 1.59-60. I.e., to "the most learned men"; see De Leg. 1.18.
CHAPTER THREE THE
L A W O F MOSES, T H E T E A C H I N G O F JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
A m o n g the enduring effects o f A l e x a n d e r the Great's incursions into the East was a vast a n d multi-faceted interplay o f G r e e k a n d Jewish culture.
1
Despite the rhetoric generated in response to the Hellenistic
reform o f Jerusalem
and, especially, A n t i o c h u s Epiphanes's subse
quent attempt to suppress traditional Jewish piety altogether, the J e w s o f this age w e r e n o t faced with a c h o i c e b e t w e e n "Judaism"
and
2
" H e l l e n i s m . " Hellenization was simply a fact. W h a t c o n f r o n t e d the J e w s o f the Hellenistic a n d Early R o m a n periods was rather
the
challenge o f p r o d u c i n g a synthesis o f G r e e k a n d Jewish ways that w o u l d yet preserve a distinctively Jewish identity amid the international Hellenistic culture.
3
T h e literary a n d other remains o f the J e w s o f
the Hellenistic age reveal a w i d e range o f responses to this challenge. One
strategy, the i m p a c t o f w h i c h w o u l d continue to b e felt in
subsequent centuries, particularly as Christian t h e o l o g y d e v e l o p e d , i n v o l v e d the Jewish appropriation o f G r e e k philosophical tradition. A
4
n u m b e r o f Jewish intellectuals f o u n d the rigor a n d insights o f
G r e e k philosophical discourse compelling. Rejection o f their o w n reli gious heritage in favor o f o n e o r another s c h o o l o f p h i l o s o p h y , h o w ever, was scarcely the only o p t i o n . O n the contrary, w h a t o n e finds in the extant literature are various attempts to bring the t w o traditions
1
See esp. V . Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (trans. S. Applebaum; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society o f America, 1959; reprinted with a pref ace by J. J. Collins, Peabody, M A : Hendrickson, 1999); M . Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (2 vols, in one; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981). See S. J. D . Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (Library o f Early Christianity; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1989) 3 4 - 4 5 ; also M . Hengel in collaboration with C. Markschies, The "Hellenization" of Judaea in the First Century after Christ (trans. J. Bowden; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1989). As Cohen well points out, the challenge was scarcely a new one: "Even in preexilic times the Israelites had to determine the extent to which they could draw on the riches o f the cultures among which they lived" (From the Maccabees to the Mishnah, 38). See J. J. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora (New York: Crossroad, 1983) 175-94. 2
3
4
88
CHAPTER THREE
together; to locate points o f contact from w h i c h o n e c o u l d forward claims o f compatibility. Inevitably, these endeavors led not o n l y to n e w interpretations o f Judaism, but to distinctive treatments o f G r e e k philosophical ideas as well. G i v e n the i m p o r t a n c e o f traditions o f M o s a i c legislation to S e c o n d T e m p l e J u d a i s m in general, it is n o t surprising that the Stoic c o n cept o f a divinely o r d a i n e d law p r o v i d e d o n e such p o i n t o f contact. F r o m at least the first century
o f the C o m m o n Era,
s o m e Jewish
thinkers c l a i m e d that their nation's law, revealed to M o s e s b y the creator o f the w o r l d , was in act a written expression o f the Stoics' natural law. A n a l o g o u s claims w o u l d continue to b e forwarded b y Christians, w h o , h o w e v e r , m o r e often asserted that it was rather the teaching o f Jesus w h i c h gave verbal expression to natural l a w .
5
In
either case, w h a t resulted w e r e diverse presentations o f the c o n c e p t o f natural law that diverged variously and significantly from the the o r y as originally c o n c e i v e d . T w o c o m m o n and fundamental
diver
gences are n o t e w o r t h y at the outset. T h e very n o t i o n , first o f all, that the "right reason" w h i c h comprises natural law can find definitive verbal expression in s o m e set o f ethical directives seems to have b e e n quite alien to the original Stoic idea.
6
S e c o n d , a n d perhaps m o r e
important, is the fact that the origin o f this law was n o l o n g e r asso ciated with the i m m a n e n t deity o f the Stoics. T h e author o f this law was n o w the transcendent g o d w h o s e past interaction with h u m a n ity, and with the descendants o f A b r a h a m in particular, is r e c o r d e d in the Jewish scriptures, a n d w h o s e future activity, at least in m u c h o f the Christian literature, w o u l d include an eschatological j u d g m e n t . In short, w h a t o n e finds in this literature are r e c o g n i z a b l y Stoic ideas associated with concepts and discussed in terms which are utterly foreign to Stoicism. T h i s p h e n o m e n o n greatly illuminates the treat m e n t o f the implanted
logos in the Letter o f J a m e s , a n d an exami
nation o f selected examples will b e instructive. In addition,
analysis
o f several works w h i c h speak particularly o f an "implanted" law o r logos in this context will confirm the findings o f the p r e c e d i n g chapter.
5
See, however, below in this chapter on the Apostolic Constitutions, and the fol lowing chapter on the Letter o f James. See the introductory comments in Chapter T w o , above. Note at the same time, however, that Cicero is also moving in this direction. 6
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL L A W
89
PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA T h e writings o f Philo o f Alexandria present the m o s t well-known and o b v i o u s e x a m p l e o f the Jewish appropriation
o f the Stoic the
ory o f natural law. Philo's recurring use o f p a t e n d y Stoic terms a n d c o n c e p t s leaves his indebtedness
to Stoicism b e y o n d d o u b t . Philo,
h o w e v e r , is n o Stoic. His general philosophical orientation is m o r e M i d d l e Platonic than S t o i c ,
7
a n d his discussion o f natural law, in
particular, shows strains o f Neo-Pythagoreanism. M o r e o v e r , in Philo's writings, these v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t s h a v e b e e n through a fundamental
filtered
c o n v i c t i o n that the writings o f " M o s e s " rep
resent an unparalleled expression o f philosophical truth, o f the "right reason" that the Stoics c o n s i d e r e d natural law. T h e e n d result is a quite distinctive treatment o f the c o n c e p t o f natural law: o n e clearly r o o t e d in, but also significantly different from, the early Stoic theory. Philo and the Stoics T h e Stoic correlation o f law a n d "right reason" is fundamental Philo's writings.
8
in
O n m o r e than o n e o c c a s i o n , he offers a version o f
what w e have seen to have b e e n a standard Stoic definition o f law as logos in its function o f c o m m a n d i n g and prohibiting.
9
Moreover,
his c o m m e n t at o n e point that " k n o w l e d g e o f the things w e o u g h t to d o a n d o f the things w e o u g h t n o t " (e7uaxr|ur|v . . . cbv xe 8 E I rcoieiv K O U d)v ur|) is the special p r o p e r t y o f the XoyiKov) o f the h u m a n s o u l ,
10
"reasonable
part" (|nepo<;
suggests that he, like Chrysippus
and
C i c e r o , used this definition o f law in c o n j u n c t i o n with a m o r e gen eral a c c o u n t o f the workings o f the h u m a n logos—albeit
with a v i e w
o f the soul that is quite at o d d s with the monistic p s y c h o l o g y o f the early S t o i c s .
7
11
F o r the Stoics, this definition c o n c e r n e d logos b o t h as
J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 139-83. Philo equates law specifically with 6p66<; Xoyoq in Opif. 143, Ebr. 142, Prob. Lib. 4 6 - 4 7 , and Agr. 51, but his terminology is in general rather fluid. As Goodenough points out, "the word opGoq is frequently omitted and Xoyoq alone put in formu lae where we know opGoq Xoyoq must have been understood by both Philo and his reader" (By Light, Light: The Mystical Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935] 56). See Jos. 29; Praem. Poen. 55; Migr. Abr. 130. Leg. All. 1.70. All translations o f Philo's writings, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the L C L . Cf. Plutarch, St. Rep. 1037F; also Cicero, De Leg. 10. O n the various divisions 8
9
10
11
90
CHAPTER
a divine principle that pervades
THREE
the c o s m o s as law o f the W o r l d
City, a n d as the reason o f the h u m a n sage, the citizen o f the C o s m o p o l i s . T h i s basic c o n c e p t u a l framework, patently Stoic, repeatedly in Philo's w o r k s .
surfaces
12
A particularly striking e x a m p l e is found in the treatise On Joseph, w h e r e the n o t i o n o f the w o r l d as a " G r e a t C i t y " is directly linked to the Stoic definition o f law: For this world is the Megalopolis and it is furnished with one consti tution and one law: the logos o f nature is that which commands what one must do, and that which prohibits what one must not d o . 13
T h e premise o f a W o r l d City g o v e r n e d b y logos is most
prominent,
h o w e v e r , in his On the Creation of the World. H e r e w e find, n o t sur prisingly, that citizenship in Philo's City, as with that o f the Stoics, is limited to rational beings; to beings, that is, w h o s e
"constitution"
is also c o m p r i s e d b y logos. T h i s includes in the first place, again anal ogously with the Stoics, a constituency o f divine beings: the Koci
^oyiKal
0eTai (pboeiq, such as the incorporeals a n d the stars, are citizens, 14
with G o d himself as ap%cov xf|<; [leyaXonoXecoq.
It also includes, o f
course, the h u m a n being. M o r e precisely, it is specifically the s a g e — that is, the o n e w h o s e constitution is defined b y right r e a s o n — w h o is the w o r l d citizen.
15
T h i s b e c o m e s quite explicit as Philo explains
A d a m ' s status as " w o r l d citizen": Now since every well-ordered State has a constitution, the citizen o f the world enjoyed o f necessity the same constitution as did the whole
of the soul espoused by Philo, see further Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 174-76. A further hint o f Philo's awareness o f the implications o f the Stoic psychology o f action for natural law might also be seen in Opif. 3, where he associates the universal law with "the will of Nature" (TO $oi)Xi(\\ia xfjq (puoeox;). Cf. the use o f the same phrase at Epictetus, Ench. 26 and SVF 3.180, and further the discussion o f Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 107-8. This passage from Philo, in fact, would seem to provide further confirmation o f Inwood's suggestion that the Stoics understood the law in this way. O n the Cosmic City see Mos. 2.51; Dec. 53; Spec. Leg. 1.34; Prov. frag. 2.39; Jos. 2 9 - 3 1 ; 69. O n the "world citizen" see Spec. Leg. 2.45; Migr. Abr. 59; Somn. 1.243; Conf. Ling. 61; Jos. 69. 12
1 3
Jos.
29: \\ jxev YAP (xeya^OTcoXiq o8e 6 Koa\ioq e o x i RAI jxia xpfjxou rcoXixem KAI
vonxp e v ( - Xoyoq 8e e o x i (puoeox; rcpooxaKxncoq \iev a>v rcpaicxeov, ATTAYOPEAMKCX; 8e a>v
ox> 7ioir|xeov; translation mine. Opif. 143-144; cf. De Leg. 1.23 and SVF 2.528. O n G o d as "ruler" o f this City, see Dec. 53, with which cf. Spec. Leg. 1.34, where humans are said to infer from the order o f the "Great City" o f the world a fiyejxcbv. Philo's god, however, is o f course distinct from the logos; see Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 155-58. See Diog. Laert. 7.33; cf. Cicero, De Leg. 1.23. 14
15
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
91
world: and this constitution is the right reason o f nature (6 xfj<; (ptxjecoq opQbq Xoyoq), more properly called an "ordinance", or "dispensation", seeing it is a divine l a w . . , 1 6
T h i s description o f A d a m , in fact, assumes his idealization as "in b o d y and
soul, surpassing all that n o w are
and
all that have b e e n before
us," since G o d created h i m not from a material pattern, but n o v o ) . . . TCG
EOCDTOU
17
AxSycp.
T h u s while all h u m a n s , b y virtue o f their posses
sion o f logos, have the and law"
potential to live in a c c o r d with right reason
thus b e c o m e w o r l d c i t i z e n s , who
18
it is "the
vouiuou avbpbq zvQvq ovxoq KoauoTto^vroi)), the
p u r p o s e and
who
observes
regulating his
world
the (xoS
doings
will o f Nature ( T O pouA,r|u<x xr\q (yboecoq), in
a n c e with w h i c h the fact, the
man
is "constituted t h e r e b y a loyal citizen o f the
entire w o r l d itself also is a d m i n i s t e r e d . "
o n l y other figure explicitly identified b y Philo as a
by
accord 19
In
"world
citizen" is M o s e s , the p a r a d i g m o f the sage and lawgiver o f the J e w s .
The Law
of Nature and the Law
If Philo's indebtedness to the
20
of Moses
Stoics for his understanding o f law
is
thus clear, his divergences from t h e m are n o less so. T h e
most obvi
ous
orientation
o f these c a n
be
t o w a r d J u d a i s m . It
16
c o r r e l a t e d with his is,
u n d o u b t e d l y , in
fundamental no
small part due
to
his
Opif. 143: ercei 5e i c a a a noXiq eiWojaxx; e%ei rcoXixeiav, A V A Y K A I A X ; aovepaive xqi> xpfjcOai RCO^ixeia f| m i avimaq 6 K O O J X O Q - aikr| 5e eaxiv 6 xr\q (pvoeax; opGoq Xoyoq, oq icopicoxepa KXX\GEI Tcpooovojia^exai Geauoq, v6(io<; Geioq C&V . . .; I have altered the L C L translation o f 6 xr\q (pvoeox; 6p96q Xoyoq as "nature's right relation" to make the reference to "right reason" more explicit. Note also in this connection Abr. 31, where Philo states that the "kin" o f the sage are other virtuous people rather than those to w h o m he is tied by blood. Opif. 139-40; I have altered the translation o f the L C L only to avoid the impression that Philo's language in 1.40 is gender specific. Cf., e.g., Abr. 5 where Moses is said to have included narratives concerning the patriarchs in his law so that "those who wish to live in accordance with the laws as they now stand have no difficult task, seeing that the first generations before any at all o f the particular statutes was set in writing followed the unwritten law with perfect ease . . . " Ibid.; cf. Mos. 1.157 where it is specifically 6 O7toi)5aio<; w h o is K O O J X O 7 C O X { X T | ^ . E.g., Mos. 1.156; Conf. Ling. 106; cf. also Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 44. O n Philo's idealization o f Moses, see esp. Mos 2.192 and Ebr. 94; further Goodenough, By Light, Light, 180-234. Winston characterizes Moses as Philo's "super sage" (Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria [Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985] 41). By the same token, one can safely assume that Abraham, Isaac and J a c o b were also considered to be such given their status as as e|i,\|n)%oi vojxoi. See on this con cept below, with note 36. KOOJIOTTO^ixri
17
18
19
20
CHAPTER THREE
92 assumption
o f the Jewish g o d , for e x a m p l e , that he inclines away
from the i m m a n e n t
Stoic deity and views the logos in relation to a
transcendent, m o r e platonic, g o d .
2 1
O f m o r e direct relevance to the
present study is his c o r e c o n v i c t i o n that the "right reason" w h i c h the Stoics equated with true law finds written expression in a law that M o s e s gave to the Jewish p e o p l e . In the o p e n i n g o f his On the Creation, Philo lauds M o s e s ' s decision to preface his laws with
an
a c c o u n t o f the w o r l d ' s creation. B y d o i n g so, says Philo, M o s e s in dicated that "the w o r l d is in h a r m o n y with the L a w , a n d the L a w with the w o r l d . "
2 2
I n d e e d , M o s e s thus i m p l i e d that the o n e w h o
observes his law "regulat[es] his doings b y the p u r p o s e a n d will o f Nature
(TO
pouXr||na
TTJ<;
cpuaecoq), in a c c o r d a n c e with w h i c h the entire
w o r l d itself also is administered." who
is the " w o r l d c i t i z e n . "
It is precisely this o n e , therefore,
23
If M o s e s ' s law is thus in h a r m o n y with the logos that structures the c o s m o s , it c a n also b e seen, from another vantage point, as a written expression o f the logos o f the h u m a n sage. O n o n e hand, to be sure, Philo considers the "right reason" o f the sage to stand o v e r against all "lifeless" (a\|ru%oi) written l a w s :
24
right reason is an infallible law engraved not by this mortal or that and, therefore, perishable as he, nor on any parchment or slabs, and, therefore, soulless as they, but by immortal nature on the immortal mind, never to perish. 25
Nonetheless, the "sacred b o o k s " o f M o s e s ' s law, says Philo, are "like nesses and c o p i e s o f the patterns enshrined in the soul, as also are the laws set before us in these b o o k s , w h i c h shew so clearly the said virtues."
21
26
T h a t is to say, the c o m m a n d s o f the law o f M o s e s are,
O n Philo's logos see esp. Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology; also Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 158-61. Opif. 3: TOO) K o a j i o i ) xa> vouoo KOD xov vouoi) xa> K O G U O O crovdSovxoq. Ibid. O n the "Higher L a w " in Philo see Goodenough, By Light, Light, 4 8 - 7 1 ; also J. W . Martens, "Philo and the 'Higher' Law," SBLSP 30 (1991) 309-22. Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 46: vouoq Se &\|/eo)8fi<; 6 6p06<; Xoyoq, ov% vnb xov 8eivo<; r\ xov Seivoq, Ovnxou cpOapxoq, £v %apxiSioi<; r\ axr|Xai<;, a\\fv%oq a\\fv%oi<;, dXX' \)7t' dGavdxov cpt>a£co<; a(p6apxo<; EV dOavdxcp 8iavo(a xvucoQeiq. O n the immortal nature o f the human 8idvoicc, see Opif. 135. Mos. 2.11; i.e., the four virtues chiefly required for legislation, all o f which Moses alone possessed. Those especially crucial for the task o f legislation are xo cpiXdvOpcorcov, xo (piXoSdcouov, xo (piXdyaOov, and xo uioorcovripov (2.9). Note that Moses's trainer in the quest for virtue was EV £0tt)xa> Xoyicuoq, and his single goal 22
23
24
25
26
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL L A W
so
to
speak,
"copies"
(
o f the
EIKOVCOV)
apx£TX>nox>q); c o p i e s , that is, o f the
"men
93
"originals"
(foq av
w h o lived g o o d and
blame
less lives, w h o s e virtues stand p e r m a n e n t l y enshrined in h o l y scriptures . . . for in these m e n and
reason (eu^i/u^oi m i ^ o y i K o i v o u o i ) . "
speaking, identical to the in
contrast to
copy
o f the
the
27
"higher law,"
a\\fx>%oi v o u o i o f all
ejjA|ru%oi v o u o i , the
past: A b r a h a m , Isaac, J a c o b and,
the
most
w e h a v e laws e n d o w e d with life In short, while not, the
law
other p e o p l e s
sages f o u n d
strictly
o f the J e w s stands 28
as
a
written
particularly in
a b o v e all, M o s e s himself.
Israel's 29
The Sage as ejny/vxog vdfioq Philo's n o t i o n that the t h o u g h o b v i o u s l y not m o d e l s o f the One
true law his
right reason o f the
sage—
v i e w that the J e w i s h patriarchs
is the
provide
sage!—is clearly r o o t e d in
the
Stoic t h e o r y o f
o f his m o s t characteristic expressions o f this idea, the
law.
descrip
tion o f the sage as ejivj/uxoq vojuoq, h o w e v e r , is not typical o f Stoicism. A s several scholars have p o i n t e d out,
this t e r m i n o l o g y seems in
fact
to h a v e b e e n derived f r o m N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n , not Stoic, p h i l o s o p h y .
30
was "the right reason o f nature" (xov opOov xfjq (puceex; Xoyov), which alone is the beginning and font o f the virtues" (Mos 1.48; cf. Abr. 6). Abr. 3 - 6 ; cf. Abr. 275-76; Virt. 194; Mos. 1.162. T h o u g h "right reason" is understood to be the "fountain head o f all other laws" (xoiq aXkoiq Trnyfi vojxok;) in Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 47, it is nonetheless assumed throughout Philo's writings that Moses's law alone presents the perfect written expres sion o f natural law. Cf. in this respect Justin's comparison, to be discussed below, o f the "natural law" promulgated by Jesus with "the laws o f men"; Justin's c o m parison, though, assumes a developmental-historical understanding o f the Xoyoq which would have been alien to Philo. Enos, Enoch and Noah, the first trio o f patriarchs discussed by Philo, are o f a lesser stature and are not called zivyxi%Q\ v6|lioi. So too Joseph, even in the more positive portrayal given him in De Josepho, nonetheless represents, as TtoXmicoq, an "addition" to the natural polity o f the World City and is for this reason never called £|i\|n)%o<; vouoq. Thus while Philo writes at Jos. 148 that "the nokxxxKoq takes a second place to the king," he makes it clear elsewhere that it is the king w h o is £|liv|/'u%0(; v6|no<; (Mos. 2.4); see further below. O n Philo's ambivalent portrayal o f Joseph, see E. R . Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus: Practice and Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) 2 1 - 3 3 , 4 6 - 6 3 . See most fully E. R . Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy o f Hellenistic Kingship," Yale Classical Studies 1 (1928) 55-102; also G. F. Chesnut, " T h e Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, M i d d l e Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy," AJVRW 2.16.2 (1978) 1310-1332. T h e closest analogue in the Stoic sources is found in Seneca, Ep. 92, on which see Chesnut, "The Ruler and the Logos," 1324-26. 27
2 8
2 9
3 0
94
CHAPTER THREE
Stobaeus has preserved the fragments o f several N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n treatises o n the subject o f kingship in w h i c h the king (fiaoikexjq), as o p p o s e d to the tyrant (xupavvoc;), is characterized as 8ji\|/u%0(; vouoc;.
31
T h a t Philo's use o f this term bears s o m e relation to this tradition is sufficiently clear from the fact that his fullest treatment o f it o c c u r s precisely in c o n n e c t i o n with a discussion o f the king (fiaaiXexjc;). It is a king's duty to command what is right and forbid what is wrong. But to command what should be done and to forbid what should not be done is the peculiar function o f law; so that it follows at once that the king is a living law and the law a just king. 32
W h a t emerges from this passage, in fact, is a remarkable
synthesis
o f Stoic and N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n concepts. Philo, in a m a n n e r unpar alleled in the N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n fragments, clarifies the sense in w h i c h the king c a n b e v i e w e d as an e,\i\\fvxoq vo\xo<; b y appealing to the Stoic definition o f law: he is such inasmuch as he shares the law's "peculiar function" o f c o m m a n d i n g what is to b e d o n e and forbid ding what is not. Philo's "king," m o r e o v e r , is n o t simply the literal (albeit idealized) m o n a r c h o f the N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n fragments. T h e "king" o f Philo's writings, like that o f the Stoics, is such simply b y virtue o f his sta tus as sage, regardless o f his possession o f an actual d o m i n i o n :
33
no one o f the foolish (is) a king, even though he should be master of all the land and sea, but only the wise and God-loving man, even if he is without the equipment and resources through which he may obtain power with violence and force. 34
31
T h e passages are conveniently Philosophy o f Hellenistic Kingship." 3 2
Mos
collected in G o o d e n o u g h ' s
"The
Political
2.4: p a o i t a i 7ipoof|K£i rcpooxaxxew a %PF| m i ATCAYOPEUEW a JIFI %pr| • rcpoaxa-
£iq 8e xebv TCPAKXECOV KAI (X7iay6pea)ai(; xcov ox> TIPAKXECOV i8iov vojioi),
3 4
95
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
Analogously with the offices o f pilot, physician, o r musician, king ship, for Philo, resides in the mastery o f the "certain kingly art" (T8%VTI TIC;
the trade.
PaaiXiKT|); it does not d e p e n d o n possession o f the tools o f 35
T h e titles sage, king and euyuxog vojuoc;, in short, simply
express different aspects o f the same basic character type. A n d here again, characteristically, it is the "sages" o f Moses's "sacred b o o k s " — whether literal kings o r n o t — w h o e m b o d y the t y p e .
36
Conclusion: Philo on Natural Law The
presence o f decidedly Stoic terms and c o n c e p t s in Philo's treat
m e n t o f natural law is quite clear. T h e definition o f law as logos c o m m a n d i n g and prohibiting; the identification o f the logos in question as b o t h that w h i c h structures the c o s m o s and that o f the
human
sage; the notions o f " W o r l d City" and "world citizen"; the identification o f the sage and the king; all these elements o f Philo's writings are patently Stoic. His presentation o f these ideas, h o w e v e r , is scarcely typical o f the Stoics in every respect. Philo's treatment o f these Stoic ideas is informed b y his d e p e n d e n c e o n other traditions o f discourse, whether M i d d l e Platonic, N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n , o r Jewish, w h i c h are in any case alien to Stoicism. T h e result is a quite distinctive presen tation o f the Stoic correlation o f logos and law.
4
MACCABEES
Like the writings o f Philo, 4 Maccabees a b o u n d s with terms and c o n cepts derived from G r e e k philosophy. Its stated theme o f reason's
35
See further Goodenough, Politics, 9 1 - 9 3 . O n A d a m as "king," see Opif. 148. O n Moses as ejiyoxoc; vojxoc; see Mos. 1.162, and further Mos. 1.158. Moses's role as king is the subject o f the whole o f book one o f the Life of Moses; see esp. 1.334. Abraham is described as "king" in QG 4.76 and, along with Isaac and J a c o b , as E\i\\fx>%0(; vojuoc; in Abr. 3 - 6 . Note also that the multi-book work that had discussed him, Isaac and J a c o b was given the alternate title On the Unwritten Laws, a designation intended to characterize the patriarchs themselves, as is clear from Abr. 3 - 6 and 276; on the equation o f "unwritten law" and "animate law" in Philo, see Martens, "Philo and the 'Higher' Law." Also significant in this connection, finally, is the fact that Joseph, as the type o f the TIO^IXIKOC; who takes "second place to the king," is characterized neither as "king" nor as £|in|A)%o<; vojxoc; despite his more literal rule; see Jos. 148. G o o d e n o u g h observes that the Joseph o f the De Josepho, "as a politician analogous to the R o m a n ruler o f Egypt, is a highly admirable being, almost one o f the vojxoi £|i\|A)%oi, though distinctly lower than the patriarchs" ("Philo's Exposition o f the Law and his D e Vita Moses," HTR 26 [1933] 116, emphasis mine). 36
CHAPTER THREE
96
s u p r e m a c y o v e r the 9iA,OGO(pcbTocTov) o n e .
passions is i n d e e d a "highly p h i l o s o p h i c a l " (1:1, 3 7
T o b e sure, neither the
philosophical knowledge nor
the
w h i c h he is m o s t i n d e b t e d are
d e p t h o f the
author's
particular s c h o o l o f p h i l o s o p h y
as clear as is the
case with Philo;
to but
a substantial measure o f Stoic influence is r e c o g n i z e d o n all a c c o u n t s . M o s t c o m m o n l y cited in the (right) dom,
4 1
39
his
tion o n the
3 7
latter c o n n e c t i o n are
reason with f r e e d o m n o t i o n o f the
and
kingship,
40
unity o f h u m a n k i n d ,
equality o f sins.
his 42
38
his association o f definition
o f wis
as well as his
posi
43
As A . Dupont-Sommer recognizes, this opening characterization o f the theme from the very start "donne, en quelque sorte, le ton: l'orateur est un philosophe, et c'est a des philosophes qu' il entend s'adresser" (Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees: Introduction, Traduction et Notes [Paris: Libraire Ancienne Honore Champion, 1939] 88). See R . Renehan, "The Greek Philosophic Background o f Fourth Maccabees," Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 115 (1972) 2 2 3 - 3 8 , esp. 2 2 3 - 2 6 for a brief summary of the scholarly discussion, and 2 3 3 - 3 8 on Stoic influence in particular. Renehan suggests that 4 Maccabees is directly dependent upon Posidonius. See further DupontSommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 55f; H . Anderson, "4 Maccabees: A New Translation and Introduction," OTP 2.538; U. Breitenstein, Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Gedankengut des Vierten Makkabaerbuchs (2d ed; Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe & C o . Verlag, 1978) 1 5 9 - 6 1 ; H.-J. Klauck, 4 Makkabaerbuch ( J S H R Z 3.6; Gutersloh: Gerd M o h n , 1989) 6 6 5 - 6 6 ; D . A . deSilva, 4 Maccabees (Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998) 13, 51-75. Even M . Hadas, who argues that the author is a Platonist, concedes that he also "knew Stoicism, of course, and at many points uses Stoic language and echoes Stoic views" (The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees [New York: Harper & Bros., 1953] 116-118, esp. 117 n. 57). Note that XoyiG\i6q connotes not simply "reason" in 4 Maccabees, but more specifically vovq |iexa opOov Xoyox) 7tpoxi|icov xov oo(p(a<; p(ov (4 Mace 1:15); see on this further below. 4 Mace 14:2; see Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 56 and 137; Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 215; Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 160; Klauck, 4 Makkabaerbuch, 740. See further on kingship 2:23, where the one w h o lives by the law is said to "reign over a kingdom," and 7:10, where Eleazar is rhetorically addressed by the author as {xeyiaxe poeci^ev. See further on freedom 5:38 and 13:2. 4 Mace 1:16:, " W i s d o m . . . is knowledge o f things divine and human, and their causes." See DuPont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 3 4 - 3 5 ; Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 149; G. W . E. Nickelsburg, Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 224; Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 159; P. L. Redditt, "The Concept o f Nomos in Fourth Maccabees," CBQ 45 (1983) 260. Note, however, the caveat o f Renehan, who points out that this definition was a "philosophical commonplace": "The extant evidence suggests that, even if this definition o f oocpia is Stoic in origin, nevertheless . . . it did not remain an exclusively Stoic definition" ("The Greek Philosophic Background," 228, 229). 4 Mace 12:13; see Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 56; Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 208; Klauck, 4 Makkabaerbuch, 735. 4 Mace 5:19-21: "you must not regard it as a minor sin for us to eat unclean food; minor sins are just as weighty as great sins, for in each case the law is 3 8
3 9
40
41
42
4 3
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
97
If a familiarity with a n d respect for G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y in general a n d Stoicism in particular o n the part o f its author is thus o b v i o u s , o n e o f the underlying c o n c e r n s o f 4 Maccabees is nonetheless the chal lenge such thinking m i g h t p o s e to traditional Jewish piety. H o w c a n the J e w w h o accepts the fundamental premises o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y c o n t i n u e to affirm the validity a n d i m p o r t a n c e o f o b s e r v i n g p e c u liarly Jewish customs? The
issue e m e r g e s with particular clarity as the m a r t y r d o m o f the
a g e d Eleazar during the persecution o f A n t i o c h u s is r e c o u n t e d . In 4 Maccabees, the story is recast to include an intellectual e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n A n t i o c h u s a n d the " p h i l o s o p h e r " E l e a z a r . to
persuade
Eleazar
t o eat
45
In an
attempt
p o r k in a s y m b o l i c act o f apostasy,
A n t i o c h u s offers a critique o f J u d a i s m "enlightened" G r e e k .
44
from
the perspective o f the
T h e critique, in short, is that "the religion o f
the J e w s " (f| Iou8a(cov GpnoKeia) is n o t really a p h i l o s o p h y at all, a n d a
"nonsensical" p h i l o s o p h y at best (5:7, 11). T w o specific
are leveled: that a d h e r e n c e to J u d a i s m
charges
is n o t reasonable (5:11; cf.
5:22); a n d that the J e w i s h law is o u t o f step with nature
(5:8-9).
4 6
despised." For a comparison with the relevant Stoic idea, see Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 55, 107, nn. 19-21; also Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 159. According to Hadas, 4 Maccabees "significantly diverges" from the Stoics in this mat ter by retaining a distinction between minor and great sins, though it is not alto gether clear whether he believes this to be a conscious divergence; see The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 172f, n. 2 1 , and note further p . 173, n. 23. Redditt is more explicit: "the author seems to distance himself slightly from the Stoic notion that all errors are everywhere alike in severity" ("The Concept o f Nomos," 254). Renehan, with whom, at least on this matter, I am in substantial agreement, remarks that "I myself cannot comprehend how the clear statement in verse 20 can be con strued as anything but general agreement (intended or not) with the Stoic teach ing"; see " T h e Greek Philosophic Background," 230, and further 2 2 9 - 3 1 . T h e author's point, after all, is that all sins are ultimately equally serious. Cf. deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 106-7. 4 Maccabees 5; cf. 2 M a c e 6:18-31, upon which 4 Maccabees most likely depends (Hadas, The Third & Fourth Books of Maccabees, 92-95; Klauck, 4 Makkabderbuch 6 5 4 - 5 7 ; deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 28-29). 2 Maccabees neither places Antiochus at the scene nor describes Eleazar as a "philosopher"; with respect to the latter, cf. 4 Mace 5:7, 21; 7:7, 9, 21; and 5:4 in some manuscripts; also 8:1, on the seven brothers. 4 Mace 6:21-22. Hadas characterizes Antiochus's critique as forwarded " o n the basis o f the Stoic philosophy which he [sc. Antiochus] assumes Eleazar follows" (The Third & Fourth Books of Maccabees, 170, n. 7); cf. Klauck, 4 Makkabderbuch, 710. Note, pace Hadas, that this assumption on the part o f Antiochus is accurate; see below. These overlapping points are supplemented by two further arguments which are not, however, directed against Judaism per se: Eleazar's capitulation in this mat ter would be the expedient course o f action (5:6, 10-12); and finally, even if Eleazar's piety should have some divine sanction, his transgression would be mitigated by the fact that it was committed under compulsion (5:13). 44
45
4 6
98
CHAPTER THREE
T h e author finds his solution to this challenge in the Stoic c o n c e p t o f a natural law. O n the lips o f Eleazar and throughout 4 Maccabees, the claim is d e v e l o p e d that the T o r a h a c c o r d s with b o t h "right rea s o n " a n d h u m a n nature. Human Reason and Jewish Law It is clear f r o m b o t h Antiochus's critique and Eleazar's rebuttal that the underlying claim o f E l e a z a r — a n d
the author o f 4 Maccabees—is
that a d h e r e n c e to the T o r a h is to b e v i e w e d not o n l y as the
"phi
l o s o p h y " o f the Jews, but a p h i l o s o p h y that is supremely rational. H a v i n g first explained the necessity o f fidelity to that law under any circumstances,
47
Eleazar begins to speak o f life a c c o r d i n g to law as
" o u r p h i l o s o p h y , " correctly perceiving the basic thrust o f Antiochus's argument: " Y o u m o c k at o u r p h i l o s o p h y as t h o u g h o u r living under it w e r e contrary to r e a s o n . "
48
H e defends the reasonableness o f his
" p h i l o s o p h y " b y asserting that the law trains its adherents in
the
virtues and, conversely, teaches control o f the passions: [our philosophy] teaches us temperance so that we are in control o f all our pleasures and desires; and it gives us a thorough training in courage so that we willingly endure all hardship; and it teaches us jus tice so that whatever our different attitudes may be we retain a sense of balance; and it instructs us in piety so that we most highly rever ence the only living G o d . Therefore, we do not eat unclean food . . . 49
5 0
W i t h Eleazar's claim that observance o f the Jewish law leads to virtue and control o f "pleasures and desires," w e are immediately r e m i n d e d o f the author's central thesis: that reason should b e master o f the passions.
47
51
T h e T o r a h , that is, functions vis-a-vis the passions
and
4 Mace 5:16-21; cf. Antiochus's argument in 5:13. 4 Mace 5:22: yXevalpiq he i]\i(bv TT\V (piXooocpiav (damp ox> uexa evXoyiGiiaq ev oroxfi fhovvxeov. All translations o f 4 Maccabees, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from Anderson, "4 Maccabees." T h e early Stoics would not, o f course, have spoken in terms o f "control" o f the passions, but rather in terms o f their elimination; see further Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.410-23. It is to be observed in this connection that the understanding o f the passions in 4 Maccabees is more in line with that o f Posidonius and other detractors o f the monistic psychology o f the earlier Stoics; see, e.g., 4 Mace 3:5 and 2:21. See further Renehan, "The Greek Philosophic Background," 2 2 6 - 2 7 ; deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 5 2 - 5 4 . 4 Mace 5:23-25. For the association o f pleasure and desire with the passions, see the author's discussion o f the latter in 1:20-29. 48
4 9
5 0
5 1
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
the virtues precisely as d o e s h u m a n r e a s o n .
52
99
In fact, he claims, just
as the creator gave humanity an intellect as its "sacred g u i d e , " so too
did he give a law to the intellect; thus, he says with a distinctly
Stoic ring, the o n e w h o lives in a c c o r d with this law "shall reign o v e r a k i n g d o m that is temperate a n d just a n d g o o d a n d b r a v e . " The
"divine l a w " protects reason in its struggle to maintain
n a n c e o v e r the passions;
54
reason, in fact, dominates the
precisely "through the law" (8ioc xov v o u o v ) .
55
5 3
domi
passions
T h e correlation o f reason
a n d law is such that the author c a n simply pass from 6 A,oyia|Li6(; to 6 vouoc; as t h o u g h the t w o are simply s y n o n y m o u s . 20:17
56
Indeed, E x o d
c a n b e cited as p r o o f o f reason's ability to d o m i n a t e the pas
sions: "Surely, then, since the L a w tells us not to c o v e t
(JLLT|
e7ri0u|Li£iv),
I should the m u c h m o r e readily persuade y o u that reason has the p o w e r to c o n t r o l the desires (xcov £7ti0ujLua>v)." The out
57
relationship b e t w e e n h u m a n reason a n d the T o r a h is spelled
systematically in
1 : 1 5 - 1 7 ,
w h e r e Xoyxa\i6q is defined.
XoyiajLioq, I suggest, is intellect selecting with right reason (vovq fiexa opOov X6yox> TtpoTijicav) the life o f wisdom. Wisdom, I submit, is knowl edge o f things divine and human, and o f their causes. And this wis dom, I assume, is the culture we acquire from the Law (f| zox> vo\iox> TiaiSem) through which we learn the things o f G o d reverently and the things o f men to our worldly advantage. 58
In 4 Maccabees's usage, therefore, son," 5 2
but particularly
A,OYIO|J,6<;
denotes n o t merely "rea
the "right reason" that amounts to w i s d o m
O n the relation between the passions, the virtues and reason, see esp. 4 Mace 1:2-4, 6, 13-30. Note that the verb Kpaxeco, used in 5:22 in connection with the Jewish philosophy's instruction in the domination o f the pleasures and desires, is used routinely in 4 Maccabees in connection with reason's control o f the passions; see the index o f Dupont-Sommer (Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 170), under Kpaxeco, for references. 4 Mace 2:23: K O C G ' ov rcoXixei)6|ievo<; (3aoiA,e\>oei paoiA,eiav aciwppovd xe Kai 5iKa(av Kai ayaGriv Kai dv5pe(av; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.122. 4 Mace 11:27. 4 Mace 2:8, 14. Conversely, it is "through reason" (8id xov A-oyiajiov) that one is brought under the rule o f law (2:9). Noted also by Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 38, 94, n. 10; Hadas, The Third & Fourth Books of Maccabees, 154, n. 10; Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 171; Anderson, "4 Maccabees," 546, note b . 4 Mace 2:6. This reasoning is to be understood in light o f 4 Mace 5:26, on which see below. Anderson's translation of vow; jiexd 6p0o$ hoyov Kpoxijicov in 1:15 as "the mind making a deliberate choice" is rather interpretive, and quite obscures the Stoic con nection. Hadas's (The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 149) and Redditt's ("The Concept o f Nomos," 258) translation "correct judgment," is more appropriate, but still fails to make the Stoic reference explicit. 53
54
55
5 6
57
5 8
100
CHAPTER THREE
and virtue.
59
A n d this w i s d o m is nothing other than that w h i c h is
taught in the T o r a h .
6 0
T h e upshot o f this string o f definitions is that
observance o f the law is, b y definition, life in a c c o r d with "right rea 61
s o n " — a n association w h i c h is b y n o w quite familiar from the Stoic sources. It is n o d o u b t this core conviction that has given rise to the author's c h o i c e o f Jews martyred during the persecution o f Antiochus as the chief e x e m p l a o f his formal thesis that "pious reason is absolute mas ter o f the passions." M o r e o v e r , it is in this light that his peculiar and characteristic phrase "pious reason" is itself to b e u n d e r s t o o d .
62
Like "right reason" itself, ultimately, piety t o o in 4 Maccabees c o n 63
sists "einzig u n d allein in Gesetzesgehorsam"
T h e treatise, that is, is
not merely c o n c e r n e d with the ability o f reason to master the pas sions; its interest lies, m o r e precisely, in the mastery o f the passions b y right reason specifically as it finds expression in the Torah.^ Human Nature and Jewish Law T h e other criticism o f Judaism raised b y A n t i o c h u s in his attempt to persuade Eleazar to eat p o r k is m o r e immediately to the point: " W h y should y o u a b h o r eating the excellent meat o f this animal w h i c h nature has freely b e s t o w e d o n us? . . . it is w r o n g to spurn nature's g o o d gifts."
65
T h i s providential and anthropocentric under
standing o f the existence o f the pig e c h o e s the Stoic view o f the
5 9
As opposed to the "weak reason" (xov dccGevfj Xoyiauov) o f those w h o d o not "with all their heart make piety their first concern," and w h o are thus unable to master their passions; see 4 Mace 7:17-23. Note that the law, like wisdom itself, is also said to concern things both divine and human (1:16-17). Cf. Heidland, "A,oy(£o|Liai," 286: " T h e norm o f Xoyiajnoq . . . is the Mosaic Law (2:6, 14). But for him this is identical with the principle o f reason." 4 Mace 1:1; 6:31; 7:16; 8:1; 13:1; 15:23; 16:1, 4. See further S. Lauer, "Eusebes Logismos in I V M a c e , " JJS 6 (1955) 1 7 0 - 7 1 ; R . B. Townshend, "The Fourth book o f Maccabees," APOT 2.664, 6 6 6 - 6 7 ; Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 168-71; Redditt, "The Concept o f Nomos," 2 5 8 - 5 9 ; deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 54. Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 171; emphasis his. Redditt describes the theme o f reason's dominance over the passions as "only the formal and not the crucial focus o f 4 Maccabeees," and finds the central issue, following Breitenstein, to be rather the importance o f piety, which is to say obedi ence to the law ("The Concept o f JVomos," 249); cf. Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 171. See also deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 44: "obedience to the Torah is the primary concern, for which the philosophical thesis becomes a sort o f cipher." 4 Mace 5:8-9. 6 0
6 1
62
6 3
6 4
65
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
relation o f h u m a n to
n o n - h u m a n creation, and
101
is in
fact
reminis
c e n t o f a sentiment f o u n d in C i c e r o ' s De Legibus: . . . Nature has
lavishly yielded such a wealth o f things adapted to
man's convenience and use that what she produces seems intended as a gift to us . . . and this is true . . . also o f the animals; for it is clear that some o f them have been created to be man's slaves, some to sup ply him with their products, and others to serve as his Eleazar counters the m e n t from
food.
p o i n t raised b y A n t i o c h u s with his
own
the world, in giving us the law, conforms it to our nature FJJLIIV G D u j c a O e i VOJLIOGETGW
6 xov
K 6 G | I O D KX(GXT|<;).
creator o f ( K o r e a (pt>aiv
He has commanded us
to eat whatever will be well suited to our souls
( x a jnev o i K e i c o & n a o i i e v a
xctiq \\f\)%ai<;), and has forbidden us to eat food that is the reverse.
Eleazar, in
short, argues that it follows
G o d is c r e a t o r o f the and
argu
providence:
Believing that G o d established the law, we know that the
fljicov
66
from
w o r l d ; (ii) G o d is the
the
premises that (i)
legislator o f J e w i s h
(iii) G o d is c o n c e r n e d for humanity, that the
law G o d
islated takes the nature o f the h u m a n b e i n g into a c c o u n t . T h e
has
law; leg
dietary
restrictions c o n t a i n e d in that law, therefore, must b e c o n s i d e r e d as in step with h u m a n nature.
66
68
T h u s the T o r a h as presented in 4 Maccabees
De Leg. 1.25; cf. De Nat. Deor. 1.37; Philo Opif. 77; see further the references cited by Kenter (De Legibus, 110), who describes this passage from Cicero as "specifically Stoic." 4 Mace 5:26. Cf. de Silva, 4 Maccabees, 134. Redditt, "The Concept o f Nomos," 256f, argues that KOREA cpuaiv here refers to yvciq as the general world order rather than human nature in particular. Against this, however, are the following considerations. First, Chrysippus himself used this same phrase to denote human as well as cosmic nature when speaking o f "life in accord with nature" (Diog. Laert. 7.89). Second, such a use o f the term would be unique among its eight total appearances in 4 Maccabees. (Against Redditt [ibid., 2 5 6 ] , 5:8f clearly uses "nature," in a manner reminiscent o f the Stoics, with reference to the deity as the giver o f gifts, not primarily "a struc ture in harmony with which men ought to live.") Third, and most importantly, it is clear from 5:26 that the author regards biblical law in any case as enacted with the nature o f the human being in mind: G o d "has commanded us to to eat what ever will be well suited to our souls and has forbidden us to eat the reverse"; in fact, the specific association o f the law with x a fiev oiKeicoGTiGojLieva f|(xcov xai<; \|A)%ai<; draws on the Stoic concept o f OIKEICOCU; (see below). Whether or not Redditt's claim that there is "no grammatical warrant" for Hadas's apparent translation o f the dative TIJLITV in 4 Mace 5:8 as indicating possession is valid (though cf. Smyth, Greek Grammar, §1480), it is not necessary to conclude that the nature in question is not human nature: the phrase K a x a
civ at the very least is intended to explain, in Stoic terminology, what it means that G o d f | u i v GX>\madei in giving the law. 67
6 8
67
CHAPTER THREE
102
can fairly b e described as natural l a w — t h o u g h , perhaps like the early Stoics themselves, the author never actually uses this term. D u p o n t - S o m m e r saw in this equation o f the law o f M o s e s with the law o f nature a c o n c e p t similar to that f o u n d in Philo, a n d o n e r o o t e d ultimately in the Stoic theory o f l a w .
69
For Hadas, however,
Eleazar's assertion that the law o f M o s e s c o r r e s p o n d s to the nature o f the h u m a n b e i n g is not, as it has been taken to be, a mechanical synthesis o f Judaism and Stoicism, but rather an affirmation o f the one (the Law as divinely ordained) and a refutation o f the other. Man is not to bring himself into harmony with an impersonal natural law; rather has the Law itself been designed to conform to and serve the nature o f man, who is paramount, as the dietary regulations prove. 70
H a d a s thus u n d e r s t o o d Eleazar's response to A n t i o c h u s ' s argument regarding the relation b e t w e e n Jewish law a n d nature to consist in the p o i n t that "the Stoic principle [ o f life
KCCTCC
cpuaiv] c a n . . . n o t
b e i n v o k e d as an argument to disregard the dietary prescriptions o f the l a w " since such prescriptions "are n o t necessarily in a c c o r d with the Stoic principle o f living a c c o r d i n g to nature" to b e g i n w i t h .
71
A n d e r s o n e c h o e s Hadas's sentiment regarding the difference b e t w e e n Eleazar a n d the Stoics: Whereas the Stoic thought o f nature's sovereignty and man's need to adapt himself to nature's gifts and demands, the (Jewish) thought here is o f the sovereignty o f the creator G o d who graciously confers on man the Law that is adapted to man's needs and nature, the dietary regulations, for instance, being given to man as morally purifying. 72
A t least in the formulation given b y A n d e r s o n , this contrast b e t w e e n the Stoic a n d Jewish understanding
o f law is b a s e d u p o n a rather
transparendy a p o l o g e t i c c o m p a r i s o n o f the " g r a c e " centered J u d a e o Christian tradition with its G r e c o - R o m a n counterpart. In any case, the contrast is r o o t e d in a fundamental misapprehension o f the Stoic understanding
o f the g o a l as life Korea (puaiv. F r o m the time o f
Chrysippus, the (puaic; in a c c o r d with w h i c h o n e was to live was u n d e r s t o o d at least as m u c h with respect to h u m a n
6 9
nature as to
Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 3 9 - 4 0 ; cf. deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 109; cf. 134. Hadas, The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 174 n. 25. Ibid., n. 26. Anderson, "4 Maccabees," p . 550, note g. 7 0
71
7 2
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW cosmic Nature.
73
103
T h e Stoic reasoning in this matter is in fact quite
analogous to that o f Eleazar, d e p e n d i n g as it d o e s u p o n a belief in a providential creator. G i v e n divine p r o v i d e n c e , the Stoics argued, it is unlikely that w h e n creating an
animal
nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution (oine ydp dMoxpicooou e i K o q rjv amb (cri)Ta>) TO £cpov, OISTE 7ioif|G(xo(xv ocuxo, ur|x' dAAoxpicooai UT|T' o i K e i c o o a i ) . We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the ani mal made it near and dear to itself ( o i K E i w o a i npbq eoroxo); for so it comes to repel all that is injurious (xd pA,d7ixovxa) and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it (xd o i K e i o c ) . 7 4
In fact, this doctrine o f
oiKeicoaix;,
as w e have seen, p r o v i d e d the
starting p o i n t for all o f Stoic ethics b y ensuring human and non-human,
that all
animals,
naturally strive to live m i d cpuaiv, that is,
in a c c o r d with their own natures. It is therefore
quite striking that
Eleazar alludes to this Stoic doctrine w h e n countering Antiochus's charge that the Jewish law is out o f step with nature: G o d , b e i n g b o t h creator a n d lawgiver, "has c o m m a n d e d us to eat whatever will be well suited to o u r souls ( i d oiK£ico0r|a6u£vcx
f||Licbv TCU<;
\|n)%oci<;), a n d
has forbidden us to eat f o o d that is the reverse" ( 5 : 2 6 ) .
75
Conclusion: Torah as Natural Law in 4 M a c c a b e e s 4 Maccabees o p e n s with an exhortation to "give earnest attention to p h i l o s o p h y , " w h i c h is itself described as an "indispensable b r a n c h o f knowledge."
76
I f indispensable, h o w e v e r , G r e e k philosophy is nonethe
less s e c o n d a r y in i m p o r t a n c e to this w o r k , the primary c o n c e r n o f w h i c h is to p r o m o t e o b s e r v a n c e o f the T o r a h . A s D a v i d deSilva has put it: "the
author uses G r e e k rhetorical
forms a n d philosophical
ideas in o r d e r to make being Jewish in a thoroughly Hellenized w o r l d b o t h tenable a n d sensible."
77
T h e divinely o r d a i n e d natural law is
not, as for the Stoics, defined as "riglit reason"; rather, "right reason"
73
Diog. Laert. 7.89. See further on this point Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, passim. Diog. Laert. 7.85. So also Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 160; Klauck, 4 Makkabaerbuch, 713. 4 Mace 1:1-2. I render xfj cpiAooocpCa more generically than Anderson's "to my philosophical exposition;" cf. the R S V . 4 Maccabees, 11. deSilva provides a nice discussion o f the social and cultural setting o f the work in his chapter 2, esp. pp. 4 3 - 4 6 . 74
75
76
77
104
CHAPTER THREE
is itself ultimately defined with reference to divine l a w — i n d e e d ,
the
law o f the Jews. T h e ideal life w h i c h G r e e k philosophers in general characterized as virtue, and w h i c h the Stoics in particular c o n c e i v e d in terms o f natural law is, a c c o r d i n g to 4 Maccabees, prescribed the
Torah.
Indeed,
it is r e m a r k a b l e that a p p e a l
is m a d e
to
in the
T o r a h ' s status as natural law particularly in c o n n e c t i o n with its p r o scription o f pork: Jewish
law d o e s not c o r r e s p o n d to natural law
merely inasmuch as it reflects the G r e e k virtues, but in its legislation o f peculiarly Jewish customs as w e l l .
78
T h u s c a n it b e said that "the
children o f the H e b r e w s alone are invincible in defense o f v i r t u e . "
79
T h e fact that G r e e k philosophical c o n c e p t s are used in 4 Maccabees in the service o f this larger Jewish agenda significantly impacts
the
terms o f their presentation. W e have already discussed the author's oft-noted predilection for the phrase "pious reason"; scarcely typical o f the Stoic sources, this expression is apparently the c o i n a g e o f an author interested in subordinating
reason
to the
Torah.
Dupont-
S o m m e r has noted, t o o , the consistent use o f the term XoyiG[i6q rather than the m o r e typically Stoic Xoyoq o r 6p06<; A,6yo<;. o w i n g to his lack o f familiarity with the latter, that the
81
80
Certainly
not
it is quite possible
author consciously avoids the m o r e usual Stoic terms in
o r d e r to distance himself f r o m certain aspects o f Stoicism w h i c h he finds
distasteful. In particular, he m a y have c o n s i d e r e d these terms
to b e t o o suggestive o f a divine principle i m m a n e n t
7 8
in the w o r l d ;
Note, against Hadas (The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees, 174 n. 25) and Klauck (4 Makkabaerbuch, 713), that the interpretation o f the Jewish dietary restric tions in 4 Maccabees differs significantly from that o f The Letter of Aristeas. In 4 Maccabees, the dietary prescriptions are not merely a symbolic, if nonetheless neces sary, component o f Jewish law; rather they correspond to the actual nature o f the human being. Cf. Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 4 0 - 4 1 . T h o u g h one might reasonably conclude that the author o f 4 Maccabees, if pressed, would argue for the corollary that all people, not merely Jews, should thus live in accord with Torah, there is no such "evangelistic" dimension to this work. His primary concern is to formulate a defense o f Jewish customs in the face o f the challenge posed by hellenistic philosophical conceptions; arguments for a subsequent proposition regarding obedience by non-Jews are apparently beyond the scope o f his concern, and are in any case not explicitly formulated in 4 Maccabees. Le Quatrieme Livre des Machabees, 3 9 - 4 0 . Indeed is defined in terms o f "right reason" from the outset (4 Mace 1:15). T h e only other reference to "right reason" in 4 Maccabees comes in the word play o f 4 Mace 6:7, where it is said that Eleazar's XoyiG\i6q remained 6p96<; despite the "bending" o f his body as Antiochus tried to force him to apostasize from the law under torture. Klauck recognizes this passage as "Reminiszenz an den stois chen Leitbegriff des 6p06<; taSyoq" (4 Makkabaerbuch, 715). 7 9
80
8 1
105
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL L A W
notably, just as Xoyic[i6q suggests h u m a n intellectual activity in par ticular, there is in fact n o hint o f anything analogous to the c o s m i c 2
dimension o f the Stoic theory o f law o r logos in 4 Maccabees?
It must n o t b e o v e r l o o k e d , finally, that the significance o f the T o r a h is n o t in any case limited to its status as natural l a w in 4 Maccabees. Alongside this m o r e universalistic notion lies a distinct interest in the T o r a h ' s significance vis-a-vis the c o v e n a n t w h i c h the creator m a d e with Israel in particular.
83
T h e a c c o u n t o f the events
surrounding the persecution o f Antiochus, in fact, has a positively deuteronomistic flavor. T h e p e a c e the Jews enjoyed prior to the per secution was due to "their observance o f the L a w , " and it was Jason's "disregard for the L a w " w h i c h p r o v o k e d the wrath o f "Divine Justice" and the rise o f the "arrogant a n d terrible" Antiochus, the instru ment o f vengeance.
84
T h e p e a c e was restored only through the faith
fulness o f Eleazar and the a n o n y m o u s m o t h e r and her seven sons, w h o "revived the observance o f the L a w in their land and repulsed their enemies' s i e g e . "
85
In 4 Maccabees, the Stoic n o t i o n o f natural
law walks hand in hand with the Jewish notion o f covenantai n o m i s m .
86
T H E APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTIONS
G i v e n the c o m m o n synthesis o f G r e e k and Jewish traditions evident in the early Christian literature in general, it is n o t surprising that Christian authors, t o o , attempted to incorporate the Stoic theory o f natural law into their o w n religious thought. T h e Apostolic Constitutions provides an example that is o f special interest for o u r purposes for t w o reasons. First o f all, this w o r k describes the natural law c o m prised b y h u m a n reason as an "implanted l a w " (£uxpi)To<; vouoq), a n d does so particularly from the same theoretical viewpoint that led to an analogous usage in the G r e e k source o f C i c e r o ' s De Legibus: the "implanted l a w " is correlated with an innate e n d o w m e n t o f "seeds o f d i v i n e k n o w l e d g e " (xa GTcepuxxxoc xfiq Geoyvcoaiaq), also c a l l e d
8 2
Cf. Townshend, "The Fourth Book o f Maccabees," 666; deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 54. See deSilva, 133-37. 4 Mace 3:20; 4:15-22. 4 Mace 18:4. A similar tension between universalistic and covenantai notions o f the law is found in Sirach; see L. G . Perdue, Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994) 2 8 4 - 8 5 . 8 3
8 4
85
8 6
106
CHAPTER THREE
"implanted k n o w l e d g e , " w h i c h consist particularly in the ability to distinguish ethical contraries. T h i s w o r k thus p r o v i d e s i m p o r t a n t c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the interpretation
o f C i c e r o ' s use o f the
phrase
"implanted reason" offered in the p r e c e d i n g chapter. Secondly, the Christian
r e d a c t o r o f the Apostolic Constitutions, like Philo a n d
author o f 4 Maccabees—and,
the
as will b e argued in the following c h a p
ter, like the author o f the Letter o f James—finds a written expres sion o f natural law in the law o f M o s e s . The
passages that are m o s t critical for o u r purposes, h o w e v e r ,
have often b e e n considered as Jewish (i.e., non-Christian) in origin. A few w o r d s must b e said, therefore, regarding the source p r o b l e m surrounding these passages before w e analyze the presentation o f the "implanted l a w " in the Apostolic Constitutions. The Question of a Non-Christian Prayer Collection The
Apostolic Constitutions is a fourth century c o m p i l a t i o n a n d re-
editing o f earlier works, only s o m e o f w h i c h are otherwise extant today. Books 1-6 rely heavily o n the Didascalia, while portions o f b o o k s 7 and 8 d r a w o n the Didache and the Apostolic Tradition o f Hippolytus.
87
T h e bulk o f the passages that are o f interest to us
appear in b o o k s 7 and 8 in a collection o f prayers o f u n k n o w n ori gin. It has b e e n widely agreed, since late in the 19th century, that s o m e o r all o f these prayers were not originally Christian, but rather Jewish prayers slightly re-touched b y a Christian
hand.
88
Evidence cited for the non-Christian origin o f these prayers is o f three kinds: similarities to k n o w n Jewish prayers; the presence, m o r e generally, o f Jewish ideas and themes; and traces o f Christian redac tion. K a u f m a n n K o h l e r , the first scholar to forward such a thesis, c o n c l u d e d from a c o m p a r i s o n o f AC 7 . 3 3 - 3 8 with the H e b r e w Seven Benedictions that the former represents a Christian version o f the latter.
87
89
W i l h e l m Bousset, apparently unaware o f the w o r k o f K o h l e r ,
See D . A. Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish: An Examination of the Constitutiones Apostolorum (BJS 65; Chico, C A : Scholars Press, 1985) 19-41, with his references to previous research; further R . H. Connolly, Didascalia Apostolorum: The Syriac Version Translated and Accompanied by the Verona Latin Fragments, With an Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929) xx-xxi. For a history o f the discussion see Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 1-17. K. Kohler, "Ueber die Urspriinge und Grundformen der synagogalen Liturgie. Eine Studie," MGWJ 37 (1893) 441-51, 489-97; idem, "The Origin and Composition of the Eighteen Benedictions with a Translation of the Corresponding Essene Prayers in the Apostolic Constitutions," HUCA 1 (1924) 410-25; repr. in Contributions to the 88 89
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
began
his a r g u m e n t for the
107
non-Christian origin
o f s o m e o f the
prayers o f AC 7 and 8 with a n a r r o w e r c o m p a r i s o n o f AC 7.35 to the H e b r e w K e d u s h a .
90
H e then p r o c e e d e d to point out the
Christian redaction o f the Sabbath prayer at AC 7 . 3 6 .
91
clear
In light o f
the p r e c e d e n t set b y these t w o rather o b v i o u s instances o f Christian redaction clustered together in AC 7, he w e n t o n to e x a m i n e
7.37,
7.38, 7.34, and 7.33 m o r e liberally, arguing primarily from the pres e n c e o f Jewish features and the lack o f distinctively
Christian ones,
and c a m e ultimately to a c o n c l u s i o n quite similar to that o f K o h l e r : "the entire prayer collection in the Constitutions 7 . 3 3 - 3 8 is b o r r o w e d from the contact
synagogue."
92
He
observed further the
striking points o f
shared b y 7.34 and the l o n g prayer at 8.12, arguing that
the t w o prayers represented distinct redactions o f the same Jewish original.
93
H a v i n g established the non-Christian origin o f this c o r e
o f prayers, Bousset w e n t o n to argue a bit m o r e cautiously for
the
similar origin o f still m o r e prayers from AC 7 and 8, based o n b o t h the presence
o f Jewish ideas and similarities in thought a m o n g
prayers themselves.
94
E. R . G o o d e n o u g h w o r k e d to clarify the
the the
ological t e n d e n c y in the prayers and, finding it at w o r k in other sec tions o f b o o k s 7 and 8, e x p a n d e d Bousset still further.
the list o f passages collected b y
95
Scientific Study of Jewish Liturgy (ed. J. J. Petuchowski; N e w York: Ktav, 1970) 5 2 - 9 0 . This line o f argument has recently been developed by David Fiensy, who explic itly enumerates the points o f contact that Kohler, apparently, felt were self-evident. Fiensy, however, rightly abandons Kohler's ascription o f the original prayers to "Essenes." See Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 129-34, 2 2 8 - 3 1 . W . Bousset, "Eine jiidische Gebetssammlung im siebenten Buch der apostolischen Konstitutionen," Nachrichten von der Kbniglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschqften zu Gottingen: Philologisch-historische Klasse [1915] 4 3 8 - 8 5 ; repr. in idem, Religionsgeschichtliche Studien: Aufsatze zur Religionsgeschichte des Hellenistischen ^eitalters (ed. A. F. Verheule; N o v T S u p 50; Leiden: E . J . Brill, 1979) 231-86; all references are to the reprinted edition. O n AC 7.35, see pp. 231-38. Note that Bousset makes no reference to Kohler, nor is he aware o f the similarities o f AC 7.33-38 to the Seven Benedictions; cf. Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 1. Bousset, "Eine jiidische Gebetssammlung," 2 3 8 - 4 1 . Ibid., 265: "Und so ware denn nachgewiesen, daB die ganze Gebetssammlung in den Konstitutionen V I I 3 3 - 3 8 der Synagoge entlehnt ist"; see pp. 2 4 1 - 6 5 , not ing also his interesting comparison o f AC 7.38 with a prayer form described by Philo at Spec. Leg. 1.211 on pp. 243f. Eine jiidische Gebetssammlung," 2 4 4 - 2 5 9 . Ibid., 2 6 5 - 8 2 . Goodenough (By Light, Light, 306-36), who was also apparently unaware o f Kohler's work, expanded Bousset's collection to include also 7.26.1-3, 8.16.3, and 8.40.2-4; he further included 8.6.5-8 and 8.41.2-5 whereas Bousset suggested only 8.6.5 and 8.41.4-5. 9 0
9 1
92
9 3
9 4
9 5
108
CHAPTER THREE
T h e argument that AC 7 . 3 3 - 3 8 as a w h o l e represents a Christian version o f a Jewish prayer collection, especially in the f o r m given it b y Fiensy, is compelling. Fiensy demonstrates that the prayers in this section o f the Apostolic Constitutions share not only similarities in o r d e r and content, but also a degree o f verbal equivalence to the H e b r e w Seven Benedictions. T h e argument from the rather obvious Christian redaction o f the Sabbath prayer at 7.36 is likewise impressive, and can b e taken as a confirmation o f the hypothesis regarding 7 . 3 3 - 3 8 . A r g u m e n t s based solely o n the presence o f Jewish ideas o r the lack o f distinctively Christian ones, h o w e v e r , are m u c h less persua sive. T h e f o r m e r arguments are dubious from the start given the b r o a d interaction with Jewish traditions o n the part o f Christians in general, while the latter suffer from the circularity that results from the systematic excision o f those distinctively Christian features that are present in the prayers as later additions.
96
I n d e e d , as Fiensy has
p o i n t e d out, at least o n e o f the "Jewish" elements o f the prayers enumerated b y Bousset is in fact characteristic o f the Christian c o m piler's o w n redactional w o r k .
97
It is precisely this failure to take into
a c c o u n t the redactional tendencies o f the c o m p i l e r o f the Apostolic Constitutions, as e v i d e n c e d in his use o f k n o w n sources, that is most problematic for the w o r k o f Bousset and G o o d e n o u g h .
9 8
S u c h evi
d e n c e is particularly important with respect to o u r present c o n c e r n : the correlation o f the M o s a i c law with a law o f nature innate in the h u m a n animal. Examination o f the redactor's handling o f Didascalia with an eye to this theme is quite instructive. Characteristic o f the Didascalia, the primary source for the first six b o o k s o f the Apostolic Constitutions, is the notion that biblical law actu ally consists o f t w o separate bodies o f legislation:
9 6
99
the law p r o p e r l y
In this connection one might note with Fiensy (Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 148) that the caution that had characterized the work o f Bousset in identifying originally Jewish prayers beyond 7.33-38 and 8.12 was entirely lost on Goodenough, who thought that Bousset's "fine methodology" had established with certainty the Jewish origin o f all o f these prayers; see By Light, Light, 306, 336. Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 136f, referring to the assembling o f lists o f heroes from Israel's past. T h e introduction o f this type o f evidence into the discussion o f the prayers is the chief contribution o f Fiensy. A redactional analysis o f AC 7.33 has also recendy been offered by P. W . van der Horst, in a paper presented at the 1997 meeting o f the Society of Biblical Literature entitled " T h e Jewish Prayers in the Apostolic Constitutions." I am grateful to Prof, van der Horst for giving me a copy o f this paper, and was gratified to find that we are in substantial agreement on several key issues in the interpretation o f the prayers. See the discussion o f Connolly, Didascalia, lvii-lxix. All translations o f the 9 7
9 8
9 9
109
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
so called, w h i c h is essentially the
ten
commandments,
deuterosis, w h i c h consists primarily o f the sacrifice a n d p u r i t y .
101
1 0 0
and
codes concerning
the temple
T h e latter, given to Israel o n l y as a punish
m e n t for their idolatry at Sinai in the first place, is believed to have been
"abolished"
"renewed properly
b y Christ. T h e
former,
and fulfilled a n d affirmed"
o n the
by Christ.
102
so called "is life to t h e m that keep i t . "
o t h e r h a n d , is I n d e e d , the
103
law
It is thus
the
bishop's duty "before all" to " b e a g o o d discriminator b e t w e e n
the
L a w a n d the S e c o n d
Legislation."
104
This distinction within the M o s a i c law is repeated in the first six b o o k s o f the Apostolic Constitutions, w h e r e the c o m p i l e r draws o n Didascalia. A t the same time, h o w e v e r , several significant changes
the are
introduced. First o f all, the redactor shows himself to b e rather squea mish regarding the absolute abolition o f the deuterosis: while he preserves a n u m b e r o f the Didascalicfs statements that Christ t o o k a w a y commands, them."
105
he repeatedly adds the
its
stipulation " t h o u g h n o t all o f
His understanding o f the original purpose o f the deuterosis,
similarly, is substantially less negative: G o d is n o w said to give Israel the laws regarding sacrifice and purity n o t simply as punishment, but to help t h e m return "to that law w h i c h is s o w n b y [ G o d ] into the
J
nature o f all h u m a n b e i n g s " (eiceivov xov vouov xov bn
euo\) xf[
Didascalia are those o f Connolly, and are cited according the page numbers o f his volume. I have also depended upon Connolly's edition o f the Latin fragments o f this work. Translations o f the Apostolic Constitutions are my own unless otherwise noted, though for passages from books 7 and 8 I have drawn liberally upon the translations o f D . R . Darnell ("Hellenistic Synagogal Prayers," OTP, 677-97), Fiensy (Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 43-127), and Goodenough (By Light, Light, 306-36); see also the translation in AJVF 7.391-508. For both the Didascalia and the Apostolic Constitutions I rely on the edition o f F. X . Funk, Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolororm (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1905), large sections o f which are reprinted by Fiensy. T h e Latin characteristically speaks o f decalogus et iudicia; the Syriac is consis tently rendered by Connolly as "ten words and judgments" (Connolly, Didascalia, 14f and esp. 218f). Connolly (ibid., lxvii) understands these "judgments" to refer to the legislation given at Exod 2 1 - 2 3 . Notably, the decalogue's Sabbath command ment is interpreted by the author o f the Didascalia as a "type o f the (final) rest," and is thus not generally to be observed by Christians; see Connolly, Didascalia, 233-38; cf. 190-92. Cf. the lists o f the types o f laws covered by the deuterosis in Connolly, Didascalia, 218, 222, and 252. 102 p p o a c h to biblical law is not u n c o m m o n in early Christian literature; cf., e.g., Ptolemy's Letter to Flora; Irenaeus, A. H. 4 . 1 4 - 1 5 ; Ps.-Clem. Rec. 1.35-39; and more generally H . Bietenhard, "Deuterosis," RAC 3 (1957) 8 4 2 - 4 9 . See esp. Connolly, Didascalia, 218-230; see further his General Index under "law" and "Deuterosis." O n the law as "life," see ibid., 228. Ibid., 34. Cf. AC 1.6: £i Kai \ir\ rcdvioov; cf. 6.22.1 and 6.22.5: £i Kai jnf| navxa. 1 0 0
101
a
1 0 3
104
1 0 5
r
CHAPTER THREE
110
cpuoei KaTaptaiOevTa 7taaiv dv0pamoi<;). say
that the
r e d a c t o r has
a
much
106
On
more
the w h o l e , o n e can
fairly
positive appraisal o f
the
T o r a h — a n d not simply the ten c o m m a n d m e n t s — t h a n does his source. In fact, the seven and On
the
w h o l e n o t i o n o f a deuterosis n e v e r surfaces at all in eight, w h e n the
Didascalia in o f the the
law
"law"
r e d a c t o r relies o n
o t h e r h a n d , the books
1-6
do
other sources.
c o m p i l e r ' s redactional additions to i n c l u d e several aspects o f the
f o u n d in b o o k s 7 - 8 .
T h a t w h i c h the
108
Similarly, the
b e e n " m o v e d b y natural law
Didascalia considers
patriarchs are
from themselves";
the
treatment
p r o p e r l y so called is repeatedly identified as "natural
((pi)GiKO<; vouo<;).
books
107
d e s c r i b e d as 109
and
law"
having
this law
is
fact said to be " s o w n " b y G o d "into the nature o f all h u m a n b e i n g s . " T h e s e r e d a c t i o n a l elements clearly anticipate the that law variously d e s c r i b e d as e^moq The
arguments o f Bousset and
in 110
fuller discussion o f
o r yvoiKoq in b o o k s 7 and
G o o d e n o u g h r e g a r d i n g the
Christian origin o f additional prayers f r o m b o o k s 7 and
8 are
siderably w e a k e n e d w h e n such characteristic c o n c e r n s o f the
8.
noncon
compiler
o f the Apostolic Constitutions are taken into account. Indeed, G o o d e n o u g h
106
AC 6.20.10. T h e fact that the law/deuterosis dichotomy that is so prominent in books 1-6 has been entirely left behind in books 7-8 is noteworthy. T h e only possible allu sion to this doctrine in the latter books comes at 7.1.3, where Didache's "way o f life" is called (pi)ciKr|, while the "way o f death" is called "additional" ( e j c e i o a K t o c ; ) . However, though on the face o f it, the contrasting use o f these two terms would seem to recall the compiler's treatment o f the Didascalia^ law/deuterosis dichotomy (cf. AC 1.6.7-10 and 2.35.1), even this reference is quite problematic. For while the "way o f life"—which is to say the "natural" way—is said to be the way "which the law also declares (7.2.1: Kai e a x i v cu)XT| [sc. r\ bhbq xr\q £coii<;], r\v KOCI 6 N o j i o q 5iayopevei), the "way o f death" is said to c o m e not from G o d or Moses, as the deuterosis clearly does, but from the "adversary" (7.1.3: k% in\$o\) kx\q x o v aXXoxpiov; cf. 6.20, esp. 6.20.6-11). Compare in this connection the compiler's characteristic qualification o f the Didascalia's belief in Christ's abolition o f the entire deuterosis (on which see immediately below). Certainly he would not wish to affirm that some elements o f the "way o f death" are still binding for Christians! Moreover, when the "way o f death" is described at 7.14, there is no hint o f the types o f practices char acteristic o f the deuterosis; it is characterized, rather, simply by behaviors opposite to the "way o f life." AC 1.6.8; 6.20.1-11; 6.22.5; 6.23.1; cf. 6.12.13' where the Noachide commands are described as "natural law." See in addition the redactional references to cer tain behaviors that are "contrary to nature," e.g., certain forms o f sexual activity (AC 6.[28].1; 7.2.10) or not divorcing an adulterous wife (AC 6.14.4). AC 6.20.4: ( p i ) a i K ( p 8e vojico KivriGevxac; d c p ' e a v x c o v . AC 6.20.10: eiceivov x o v v o j i o v x o v hn' kiiov xfj cei KaxafM.t|6evxa Tcdaiv dv6pamoi<;; the syntax here is difficult, but the intention is clear enough from the context o f 6.20 and the thought o f the Constitutions as a whole. See further below. 107
r
108
109
110
111
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL L A W
understood the c o n c e p t i o n o f a natural law b o t h innate in the h u m a n animal a n d written in the law o f M o s e s to b e o n e o f the
primary
indications that the prayer collection originated in the c o n t e x t o f the Jewish " M y s t e r y " w h i c h he f o u n d attested a b o v e all in the writings o f Philo o f A l e x a n d r i a .
111
S o important was this element, in fact, that
a m o n g the additions G o o d e n o u g h m a d e to Bousset's delineation o f the collection was AC 7 . 2 6 . 1 - 3 , w h i c h refers to the fact that G o d " s o w e d a law into the souls" o f all h u m a n b e i n g s .
112
T h i s statement,
however, is a redactional addition to material taken from the Didache— a fact o f w h i c h G o o d e n o u g h was apparently unaware, considerably complicates his h y p o t h e s i s .
113
and which
Goodenough, moreover,
r e c k o n e d neither with the references to the
"natural l a w " w h i c h
o c c u r repeatedly as redactional elements in b o o k s 1-6, n o r with the c o m p i l e r ' s characteristic
reluctance to endorse the Didascalia's stark 114
rejection o f the deuterosis. A s n o t e d a b o v e , Fiensy o b s e r v e d an anal o g o u s p r o b l e m in the case o f Bousset's singling out o f the lists o f Jewish heroes as distinctively Jewish elements o f the prayers f o u n d in AC 7 - 8 . In sum, the redactor's clear interest in the association o f biblical law with the law o f nature, especially w h e n c o u p l e d with his ten d e n c y to assemble lists o f heroes f r o m Jewish history, seriously c o m promises the arguments offered b y Bousset a n d G o o d e n o u g h for the non-Christian
origin o f m a n y o f these prayers. W h i l e AC 7 . 3 3 - 3 8 ,
at least, almost certainly represents a Christian version o f an origi nally non-Christian Jewish prayer collection, m u c h o f what Bousset
1 1 1
Goodenough, By Light, Light, 3 4 8 - 5 0 . What Goodenough saw as the chief indi cations o f the Jewish "Mystery" in these prayers are just as easily understood as the simple incorporation o f Greek philosophical ideas into Jewish or Christian thought. O n e should be careful not to confuse the two, as the Jewish (or Christian) adoption o f Greek philosophical ideas—regardless o f one's evaluation o f Philo's philosophical and religious orientation—is, in and o f itself, by no means necessar ily suggestive o f a "Mystery"; cf. in this respect the discussion o f 4 Maccabees, above. AC 7.26.3: vojiov KotTecpvTe-oGCK; ev tai<; yvxctiq y\[i&v. Goodenough, By Light, Light, 334f; see Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 22. Moreover, among the Greek philosophical terms which surface repeatedly in these prayers and which suggested to Goodenough the Jewish Mystery are several that are also characteristic o f the author's redaction. Regarding rcpovoia (found in the prayers at AC 7.33.2; 7.34.5; 7.35.10; 7.39.2; 8.12.8, 30), Fiensy reports that "In every case where the word occurs in A C , where we can compare the A C with its source, the word has c o m e from the compiler"; see Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 169, and the passages listed on p . 204 n. 15. A n examination o f the term >,OYIK6<;, par ticularly as descriptive o f human as opposed to non-human animals, yields similar results (ibid., 174, noting the passages listed on p . 204 n. 28). 112
1 1 3
1 1 4
CHAPTER THREE
112
and G o o d e n o u g h f o u n d to b e most distinctively "Jewish" a b o u t these and the other prayers o f AC
7—8 are in fact redactional
elements 115
characteristic o f the Christian c o m p i l e r o f the Apostolic Constitutions. It is possible, o f course, that the redactor has taken o v e r this asso ciation o f the law o f M o s e s with an innate natural law from an ear lier prayer collection w h i c h was itself edited a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d his larger w o r k .
1 1 6
into
O n e might find support for such a hypothesis in
the fact that a c o m m o n source apparently underlies 7.34 and 8.12, the latter o f w h i c h presents the fullest a c c o u n t o f this natural l a w . Certainly
117
he g o t the idea f r o m s o m e w h e r e : it w o u l d seem rather
i m p r o b a b l e that this fourth century c o m p i l e r has c o m e u p with the n o t i o n entirely o n his o w n , especially since the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f Stoic ideas into c o n c e p t i o n s o f biblical law had l o n g b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d . W i t h o u t further investigation, however, it can b e assumed neither that such a source existed, n o r , if it did, that it was not itself a Christian w o r k . T h e p r o m i n e n c e o f this idea a m o n g the c o m p i l e r ' s redactional interests in any case warrants caution; it is clear in any event that the ideas most characteristic o f such a supposed source were also characteristic o f the redactor o f the Apostolic Constitutions himself. Ultimately, whether these ideas c o m e from a s o u r c e — a n d
118
whether
that source, further, was Christian o r not—matters little for the pre sent investigation. T h e philosophical c o n c e p t s and t e r m i n o l o g y pre-
1 1 5
So also Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 143-44. van der Horst, w h o wrestles with a similar problem in the recurring phrase " G o d o f Abraham, Isaac and J a c o b , " formulates the difficulties in formulating such hypotheses quite well: " . . . the formula ' G o d o f Abraham, Isaac and J a c o b ' which has such a close parallel in Avoth that it is generally taken to be part o f the origi nal Jewish prayer, was also inserted twice into other texts by our compiler (VII 26,3 and VIII 40,3)! It could thus be argued that this formula is from the compiler's hand as well, but in view o f the parallel in Avoth it seems better not to d o that. But the matter does demonstrate painfully how difficult it is to separate tradition from redac tion and how many uncertainties remain." This problem is deserving o f more attention than can be given it in the pre sent context. Neither does Fiensy go into this issue in detail; but it is interesting that he finds the best parallels for such an underlying prayer in Christian sources; see Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 137-40. Cf. van der Horst, " T h e Jewish Prayers," w h o comments on AC 7.33.3 as follows: ". . . the intervening words, 'by implanted knowledge and natural judgment as well as through the teaching o f the Law', reflect recurring motifs in the AC T h e words 'implanted' (euxpi)To<;) and 'natural' ((puoncoc;) belong to the compiler's favourites in connection with the implanted law and natural knowledge, and his emphasis on the value o f the teaching(s) o f the Law recurs throughout the AC" 1 1 6
1 1 7
1 1 8
113
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
date his w o r k in any case, and the precedent for their i n c o r p o r a tion into a theory o f the M o s a i c law had b e e n established for c e n turies. W h a t e v e r his source for them, h o w e v e r , the Christian redactor has m a d e these ideas his o w n . The Implanted Law and the Law of Moses Scholarship o n the prayers in books 7 and 8 o f the Apostolic Constitutions has b e e n rather limited. W h a t studies have b e e n d o n e have focused primarily o n the question o f their possible Jewish origin, especially in c o n n e c t i o n with the larger p r o b l e m o f the d e p e n d e n c e o f the early Christians u p o n Jewish liturgical f o r m s .
119
E. R . G o o d e n o u g h , as far
as I have b e e n able to determine, remains the only scholar w h o has undertaken a detailed discussion o f the religious thought o f these prayers.
120
A s interesting as such a study might p r o v e to b e , a full
examination o f the thought o f the prayers w o u l d b e out o f place here, taking us m u c h t o o far afield from o u r present c o n c e r n . I will focus m y attention, rather, o n the m o r e apposite issue o f the "implanted l a w " and its relation to the law o f M o s e s . A s w e have seen, in the first six b o o k s o f the Apostolic Constitutions, the c o m p i l e r incorporated the idea o f a "natural l a w " w h i c h was " s o w n " b y G o d into all humanity into the understanding
o f the
M o s a i c law he took over from the Didascalia. H e associated the natural law particularly with w h a t the latter c o n s i d e r e d the true l a w as o p p o s e d to the prescriptions o f the deuterosis. This n o t i o n o f a nat ural law internal to the h u m a n b e i n g is articulated in m o r e detail in b o o k s 7 and 8. T h e fullest treatment appears in the h y m n o f praise to G o d at 8 . 1 2 . 6 - 2 7 , w h i c h cites in turn G o d ' s unique nature ( 8 . 1 2 . 6 - 7 ) , his role as providential creator ( 8 . 1 2 . 7 - 1 8 ) , his special c o n c e r n for the h u m a n animal in general and the descendants o f A b r a h a m — v a r i o u s l y called " H e b r e w s " o r "Israelites"—in
particular
( 8 . 1 2 . 1 9 - 2 6 ) , culminating in a final praise o f G o d to b e p r o n o u n c e d
1 1 9
See Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 1-10. Goodenough, By Light, Light, ch. X I , "The Mystic Liturgy"; see esp. 3 3 6 - 5 8 . Fiensy limits his discussion o f the "theology" o f the prayers to his reconstruction o f the Jewish source lying behind 7.33-38, and thus does not deal with the ejjxptuxx; vo\ioq. His treatment in any case consists simply o f a paragraph each on the top ics " G o d , " "Man," "Angels," "Eschatology," and "The Number Seven," and all told covers less than two full pages; see Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 23If. 1 2 0
114
CHAPTER THREE
b y "all 6:3).
121
the The
d e s c r i b e d as
p e o p l e " together with the creation o f the
angelic hosts ( 8 . 1 2 . 2 7 ; cf.
Isa
h u m a n b e i n g , narrated in 8 . 1 2 . 1 6 - 1 8 , is
follows:
And not only did you create the world, but you also made the world citizen ( x o v
KOOJJ,07IOX{TT|V)
of the world
(KOAUOI)
us make man
within it, declaring him to be the ornament
KOOJIOV).
For you said to your Sophia,
1 2 2
according to our image and
123
"Let
according to our likeness,
and let them rule over the fish o f the sea, and the birds o f the air." Therefore you made him
out o f an immortal soul and
body, the former out o f that which is not, and four elements.
125
And you gave to him,
tional discernment
(TT|V
124
a dissoluble
the latter out o f the
with respect to his soul,
X o y n c f | v S i d y v c Q G i v ) , ability to
ra
distinguish piety
and impiety (evo^fieiaq K A I aaefieiaq 5iaKpiaiv), [and] observation of just and
unjust (8iKa(o\)
K A I
aSiKov
TTAPATRJPRJAIV);
body, you granted the five senses Almighty God, through Christ,
121
126
128
and
with respect to
and progressive motion.
127
the
For you,
planted a paradise in Eden in
the
Goodenough (By Light, Light, 348) considered this prayer "our best guide to the theology and philosophy" o f the prayers. T h e phrase K O O J I O D K O O J I O V is found several times in the prayers (cf. 7.34.6; 8.9.8), and can be taken either with reference to the human as "microcosm" (so Darnell, "Hellenistic Synagogue Prayers," 692; 679, note c) or as the "ornament o f world" (so Goodenough, By Light, Light, 348; Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to Be Jewish, 65, n. 21) with some justification. T h e three translators I have just mentioned, while naturally favoring one or the other, all seem to recognize both possibilities. T h e idea that the human being is a "microcosm" o f the universe is itself c o m m o n enough in Hellenistic thought and is possible here as well, perhaps referring to the creation of the human body out o f the four elements and its soul out o f the stuff o f the divine; Fiensy, however, points out that this concept is usually denoted with another term (Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 65 n. 21). In favor o f the translation as "ornament o f the world," on the other hand, is the fact that the creation o f this "rational animal, the citizen o f the Cosmos," is understood to be the very "goal o f creation" (AC 7.34.6). xr| afj ao(p(a: Darnell translates this dative instrumentally, thus " b y your Wisdom"; it seems possible, however, that this is to be read in light o f God's words "Let us make man," which Philo also thought required explanation (see Opif. 72-75). Goodenough (By Light, Light, 322) and Fiensy, (Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 103) trans late it as I have. L X X Gen 1:26. Cf. Cicero, De Leg. 1.24: "For while the other elements o f which man con sists were derived from what is mortal, and are therefore fragile and perishable, the soul was generated in us by G o d " ; see further Philo, Opif. 135. O n the phrase 8 K X O O ) (afi ovxoq, see Goodenough, By Light, Light, 3 4 6 - 4 7 . Cf. Cicero, De Leg. 1.26 w h o similarly pairs the gift o f the senses with that of the implanted preconceptions, but considers the former as endowments o f the mind, not the body. O n the significance o f the implanted preconceptions for this passage from the Apostolic Constitutions, see below. rrrv J J - E X A P A X I K R Y V K i v r | O I V ; the translation is Goodenough's. 8ia Xpiaxot) is o f course believed to be an interpolation or an alteration o f an orignal 8ia Xoyoi) by proponents o f the view that this prayer was not originally Christian. 122
123
124
125
126
127
128
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW 129
115 130
east, sowing all sorts o f edible plants, in order; and into it, as if into an extravagant home, you led him; and in making h i m you have given him an implanted law (vojiov euxp'OTov), so that from within himself (oiKoGev m i Trap' k m o i ) ) , he should have the seeds o f divine knowledge (xa aTcepixaxa xfjq GeoyvcGcnaq). 131
T h e m e n t i o n o f the implanted law recalls the redactional reference, in AC 6.20, to the law s o w n b y G o d into the nature o f all h u m a n beings. Later in this prayer it is called simply "the natural l a w " (8.12.25) a phrase w e have also f o u n d to b e characteristic o f the author's redaction in b o o k s 1-6. T h i s implanted law is m e n t i o n e d several other times in c o n n e c t i o n with the creation o f the
human
animal in b o o k s 7 - 8 . W e have already seen o n e such instance in a redactional insertion into material
taken o v e r from
the Didache in
b o o k 7, w h e r e G o d is said to have "created the w o r l d a n d the things in it through h i m [sc. 'Inaou TOU 7iai86<; GOV] , a n d planted a law in our
souls."
132
A g a i n , in a petitionary prayer using language
quite
similar to that o f the t w o previous passages, it is said that G o d the creator "raised u p the h u m a n as Koauou KOOJIO*;, a n d gave it b o t h an i m p l a n t e d
a written
law."
1 3 3
Finally, a r e f e r e n c e t o
the
" i m p l a n t e d k n o w l e d g e " (euxpUTO*; YVGXJI<;) given to e a c h h u m a n
by
God,
and
b e i n g , as it is, reminiscent o f 8 . 1 2 . 1 7 - 1 8 , a n d c o u p l e d with
"natural j u d g m e n t " a n d "exhortation o f the l a w , " is also to b e under stood in c o n n e c t i o n with the giving o f the implanted l a w . Like the "natural l a w " o f AC
1 3 4
1-6, the implanted law o f b o o k s
7 - 8 is also u n d e r s t o o d to have a written f o r m : the law w h i c h G o d
129
Cf. L X X Gen 2:8. KOG|Licp; translated according to Darnell. KCXV xcp rcoieiv: translated according to Goodenough and Fiensy. Cf. Darnell: "Indeed, you have given him an implanted law to do" (emphasis mine). AC 7.26.3: o i ) 8ecntoxa rcavxoicpaxop, 6 Geoq xcov o t a o v , e V c i a a q x o v K o a u x w Kai xa ev oruxco 8 i ' amox), Kai v o j i o v Kaxecpuxe-ooaq ev xaiq yvxoiiq f|jLtcov; cf. also the redac tional material in 6.20.10. AC 8.9.8: I l a v x o K p a x o p G e e aicbvie, S e a r t o x a xcov o t a o v , K x i a x a K a i rcpvxavi xcov 7ECXVXC0V, 6 x o v avGpcorcov K o a u o u Koa|4,ov ava8e(£a<; 8ia X p i a x o f i K a i v o j i o v 8oi)<; a\)xcp e'mn)xov K a i y p a 7 i x o v . AC 7.33.3; cf. the "natural judgment" and " seeds o f divine knowledge" which comprise the implanted law in 8.12.17-18. The phrase £ K TTJQ xox) V O J I O D a)7co(pcovr|aeco<;, literally rendered "from the answer o f the law," or perhaps, reading an objective genitive, "by their response to the law" (so Darnell, "Hellenistic Synogogal Prayers," 678), is difficult. There seems to be general agreement, however, that it is to be read in relation to the exhortations o f the written law as opposed to the e\i(pmoq Yvcoaiq contained in the natural law. So Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 51, n. 17; Goodenough, By Light, Light, 349; Darnell, "Hellenistic Synogagal Prayers," 675. 130
1 3 1
132
133
134
CHAPTER THREE
116
gave to the h u m a n is a vouov euxpuiov
KOCI
ypajixov.
135
T h e relation
ship b e t w e e n these t w o forms o f the law is also clarified in the l o n g prayer in 8.12: But when men corrupted the natural law (xov qyucmcov vouov), at times considering the creation to be mere chance, and at times honoring it more than they ought, comparing it to you, the G o d o f the uni verse, you did not allow them to go astray, but rather raised up your holy servant Moses, through whom you gave the written law as an 136
137
aid to the
natural one (npbq por|0eiav xov (pvciKov
xov yparcxov vouov
5e5a>Ka<;); and you showed the creation to be your work, and exposed the polytheistic error (XTJV . . . noXvQeov 7itaxvr)v). 138
T h e n o t i o n that the written M o s a i c law was given in o r d e r to " h e l p " the natural law is also f o u n d in a redactional alteration o f a passage f r o m the Didascalia at AC 6.19.2, but there the " h e l p " c o m e s , o w i n g to the
s o u r c e material, specifically in the
f o r m o f the
m a n d m e n t s rather than the w h o l e o f biblical l a w .
139
ten
com
N o t a b l y , there
is n o hint o f such a limitation in 8.12. A s p o i n t e d out a b o v e , o n e finds not even the vaguest allusion to the Didascalia's characteristic division o f biblical law into the " l a w " p r o p e r a n d the deuterosis any w h e r e in b o o k s 7 and 8. In fact, as was also previously n o t e d , redactor regards the laws regarding sacrifice a n d purity
the
themselves
to have b e e n a f o r m o f aid: they were given to correct a polytheistic 140
error,
in the h o p e s that Israel w o u l d return "to that law w h i c h is
sown b y [ G o d ] into the nature o f all h u m a n beings" (EKEIVOV TOV vouov y
xov bn
£jiot> xfi (puoei KocTa|3A,r|9£VTa 7iaaiv dv9pc&7toi<;). T h i s
confusing
state o f affairs serves o n l y to underline the p r o b l e m o f the relation-
135
AC 8.9.8. oroxouaxov, rendered by Fiensy as "an accident." Goodenough interprets it as "self-caused," and Darnell as "happening without cause." T h e proper translation would seem to depend upon the relation o f this "error" to that mentioned subse quently (likening G o d to the world), and the determination o f the particular philo sophical theology which the author combats. T h e present translation suggests the Epicureans might be in view. See below note 154 for a similar passage from Philo. cuvxaxxovxcov: so Darnell and Fiensy; Goodenough renders it "made it the equivalent o f thee." AC 18.12.25. AC 6.19.2: 888COK8V vouov anXovv eiq por|6eiav xov yvaiKov, KaGapov, acoxf|piov, dyiov, ev a> Koci xo i8iov ovoua eyicaxeGexo, xeXeiov, aveAAeutfj, 8eK(x Xoyicov 7tA,T|pT| . . .; cf. Didascalia 6.15. AC 6.20.10: xi\q KOXVQEOV nXavr\q; cf. 8.12.25: xr|v rcoMGeov rctaxvriv. Note, however, that the "polytheistic error" o f 6.20, given the context, concerns Israel's worship o f Baal, while that o f 8.12 alludes to Greek philosophical doctrine. 1 3 6
137
138
139
140
117
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL L A W
ship b e t w e e n the understanding o f the law o f M o s e s f o u n d in b o o k s 1-6, which relies o n the Didascalia, and that found in books 7 - 8 , which is m o r e indicative o f the compiler's o w n thought, whether from a prior source o r n o t .
141
derived
Sufficiendy clear in any case is the
fact that the redactor, similarly to Philo and the author o f 4 Maccabees, understands M o s e s ' s law, h o w e v e r precisely interpreted, to b e a writ ten f o r m o f the implanted law given b y G o d to all h u m a n beings. Implanted Law as Human Reason T h e Apostolic Constitutions' association o f biblical law with a natural law innate in the h u m a n animal, as for b o t h 4 Maccabees a n d Philo, is ultimately r o o t e d in the Stoic philosophy o f law. A n u m b e r o f points o f contact at the level o f detail were pointed out already in the footnotes to the translation o f 8.12.16—18 given a b o v e . A fur ther hint o f such influence is f o u n d in a redactional passage from b o o k 6 where, in c o n n e c t i o n with a discussion o f the natural law, the c o m p i l e r , again like b o t h the author o f 4 Maccabees a n d Philo, interacts with a decidedly Stoic idea in his assertion that G o d " m a d e laws to cut out not the natural passions [themselves], but rather their excess."
142
Stoic influence emerges m o s t clearly, h o w e v e r , in
the
prayers o f b o o k s 7 and 8. T h e a c c o u n t o f the creation o f the h u m a n animal found in the l o n g prayer o f 8.12 begins with the description o f the h u m a n as " w o r l d citizen" (AC 8.12.16, KoouoTtoXvxnq), a tide repeated in sev eral o f the prayers. T h i s description o f the h u m a n animal is b y n o w quite familiar from o u r earlier discussions o f the Stoics a n d Philo: the h u m a n is a " w o r l d citizen" b y virtue o f his o r her possession o f logos w h i c h , in its ideal f o r m as "right reason," constitutes the law o f the great C o s m i c City. T h a t the use o f this designation in the Apostolic Constitutions, t o o , bespeaks a similar set o f assumptions can not b e d o u b t e d . In t w o o f the three passages where the title " w o r l d citizen" appears, it occurs in apposition to the characterization
141
of
This is clear from the fact that the redactor repeatedly attempts to integrate into books 1-6 the natural law theory which he presents most fully in books 7-8, while, conversely, the law/deuterosis distinction, so prominent in books 1-6 as a result o f his dependence upon the Didascalia, is not at all incorporated into books 7-8. 6.23.2: oike 8e xa (puouca n6Br\ 8 K K 6 J I T £ I V evouoGeTnaev, dAAa TTIV T O W C O V ajieipiav. This statement is only intelligible as a rejection o f the early Stoic understanding o f the passions. 142
118
CHAPTER THREE
the h u m a n as "the rational animal" (TO AoyiKov £fi>ov).
143
It is in fact
emphasized repeatedly throughout the Apostolic Constitutions, a n d par ticularly in b o o k s 7 a n d 8, that the h u m a n animal is ^ o y i K o v .
1 4 4
Thus
w h e n it is stated in the third passage containing this title that o n e who
wishes to b e initiated into the g r o u p must first
understand,
a m o n g other things, " w h y the h u m a n b e i n g was a p p o i n t e d w o r l d citizen" as well as " h i s / h e r o w n nature, o f what sort it is," it is al most certainly the case that the "nature" intended here is the rational h u m a n nature.
145
T h e c o n n e c t i o n is further attested b y the repeated
characterization, in these same passages, o f the h u m a n as KOGUOD K o c u o q , an a m b i g u o u s tide that seems in any case to b e related to the h u m a n animal's rational The to
nature.
146
c o m p i l e r never states categorically that the implanted law is
b e identified with the h u m a n logos. Perhaps o w i n g to the c e n -
trality o f M o s e s ' s l a w t o his p u r p o s e , he speaks directly o f an Ejicpuxoc;
vojLioq
rather than o f an euxpuToq Aoyoq w h i c h is vojioq, as in
the s o u r c e o f C i c e r o ' s De Legibus a n d the Letter o f J a m e s . It is nonetheless quite clear that he understands the relationship b e t w e e n the t w o as b e i n g o f the most intimate order; indeed, so m u c h is already suggested b y his characterization o f the h u m a n animal as " w o r l d citizen." M o r e o v e r , the close association o f h u m a n reason with b o t h the implanted a n d the M o s a i c law b e c o m e s quite explicit w h e n it said that G o d "raised u p the h u m a n
[to b e ] the KOOUOU
K o o u o q through Christ, a n d gave to it an implanted a n d written law so that it might live lawfully, as a rational [ a n i m a l ] " (Kai vouov 8ou<; a u x S euxpuxov Kai ypajrcov npbq TO tftv auTov evGeajifix; coq XoyiKov). Given to the h u m a n b o t h as an innate e n d o w m e n t and, later, in written form, G o d ' s law, as in 4 Maccabees, provides the definitive guidelines for the rational life. T h e phrase ox; XoyiKov, m o r e o v e r , must b e seen
143
AC 7.34.6; 8.41.4. It is noteworthy, too, that this latter description recalls the philosophical definitions o f avGpcorcoq as "a rational mortal animal"; cf. in this con nection esp. 8.41.4, where the human animal is further defined as Gvr|x6<;, thus echoing even more clearly the Stoic definition. For references see Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 204, n. 28. Note, however, that while Fiensy does not indicate that any o f the references in books 1-6 apply the term specifically to a "special characteristic o f man," this is clearly the impli cation in several o f these passages (see esp. 2.19.2; 6.10.2; 6.11.7). It is noteworthy that this designation is particularly prominent in the prayers o f books 7 and 8. AC 7.39.2: rcaiSeueaGco . . . 8 i ' o KoajiorcoMxriq 6 cxvGpco7to<; KaxeaxTp emyivcoaicexco xf^v eoroxov (puaiv, o i a xxq i)7tdp%ei. AC 7.34.6; 8.9.8; 8.12.16. See further above, note 122. 144
145
146
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
in light o f the repeated animal":
119
description o f the h u m a n as "the
rational
the law is given so that h u m a n s might live "as
rational
beings," w h i c h is to say in a c c o r d with their o w n nature, the definitive feature o f w h i c h is r e a s o n .
147
T h u s the repeated use o f the term "nat
ural l a w " ((puoiKxx; vouoq). T h e relationship—indeed, the implicit identification—of the implanted law
with h u m a n reason is also apparent from the association o f the
f o r m e r with "seeds o f divine k n o w l e d g e . " In the l o n g prayer o f 8.12, the implanted law is said to have b e e n given to A d a m , the first ra tional animal, "in o r d e r that f r o m his o w n self he should have the seeds o f divine k n o w l e d g e " (TOC a7iep|iaxa zr\q Geoyvcoaiaq).
148
Elsewhere
such " k n o w l e d g e " (yvcoaiq) is itself described as "implanted"
(Euxpu-
zoq yvSaiq); and this "implanted k n o w l e d g e " is closely associated b o t h with law a n d with the gift o f "natural j u d g m e n t " (cpuaucn^ K p i a E c x ; ) given b y G o d to e a c h h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l .
149
T h e significance o f the
latter is clarified m o r e fully in the prayer o f 8.12: And you gave to [the world citizen], with respect to the soul, rational discernment (xr)v ^oyncrjv 8idyvcoaiv), ability to distinguish piety and im piety ( e w e p e i a q Kai daepeiac; 5idKpiaiv), observation of just and unjust (8iKa(o\) Kai d 5 ( K 0 D Ttaparnpriaiv) . . . ° 15
"Rational discernment" o r "natural j u d g m e n t , " then, specifically c o n cerns the ability to distinguish ethical contraries—precisely the
sort
o f k n o w l e d g e that the Stoics discussed under the rubric o f "implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . " It is particularly noteworthy, then, that the reference to the "seeds o f divine k n o w l e d g e " here e c h o e s the imagery used b y b o t h C i c e r o and S e n e c a to describe nothing other than these same implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , the specific categories o f knowl edge singled out in 8.12.17—justice and piety (cf. belief in the deity)— are b o t h explicitly associated with o i K e i c o a i q in the Stoic s o u r c e s .
147
151
Cf. AC 7.39.2, where an understanding o f one's "own nature," o f one's sta tus as "world citizen," and o f "the judgment seats o f different legislation" are all required o f the initiate. T h e third element o f this triad is generally understood as a reference to the innate and written law; see Goodenough, By Light, Light, 327, n. I l l ; 350; and Fiensy, Prayers Alleged to be Jewish, 145. AC 8.12.18. AC 7.33.3. O n the phrase £K ifj<; xov V O J I O D i)7t0(pcovr|0£co<;, see above note 134. AC 8.12.17. See the discussion o f the origins o f the concept of justice and o f belief in the deity in Chapter T w o . T h e emphasis on piety here should also be viewed in rela tion to the prayer's account o f the corruption o f the natural law; see AC 8.12.25. 148
149
150
151
120
CHAPTER THREE
A further c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between the treatment o f the "seeds o f k n o w l e d g e " in the Apostolic Constitutions and the Stoic implanted pre conceptions c a n also b e seen in c o n n e c t i o n with the theme o f the corruption o f this divine e n d o w m e n t . A s w e have seen, C i c e r o repeat edly emphasizes the inevitable corruption o f these "seeds" and "sparks" o f virtue and k n o w l e d g e w h i c h results from mistaken h u m a n opin ion and i m m o r a l b e h a v i o r .
152
It is in c o n n e c t i o n with this theme that
the author o f the prayer, rather cleverly, finds a suitable entree for the introduction o f M o s e s ' s law into the Stoic theory: the implanted law, w h i c h in the Apostolic Constitutions is c o m p r i s e d o f "seeds o f divine k n o w l e d g e , " similarly gave w a y to the corruption caused b y errant h u m a n beliefs, a n d was thus supplemented b y G o d with the written law
o f M o s e s . It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that whereas C i c e r o
thinks chiefly o f mistaken c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d in this regard, the concern o f the Apostolic Constitutions lies first and foremost with improper conceptions o f the relation o f the deity to the w o r l d : But when men corrupted the natural law, at times considering the cre ation to be mere chance (OCUTOUOCTOV), and at times honoring it more than they ought, comparing it to you, the G o d o f the universe, you did not allow them to go astray, but rather raised up your holy ser vant Moses, through whom you gave the written law as an aid to the natural law . . . 1 5 3
This notion that the law o f M o s e s was given to correct mistaken notions o f G o d ' s relation to the w o r l d is reminiscent o f a similar sentiment found in Philo's On the Creation of the World, where " M o s e s ' s " view o f this relationship is contrasted with that o f those w h o h o l d "the w o r l d in admiration rather than the M a k e r o f the w o r l d . . . while with impious falsehood they postulate in G o d a vast inactiv ity."
154
Here, however, the Apostolic Constitutions seems to have integrated
critiques o f the t h e o l o g y and c o s m o l o g y o f the Greeks into the famil iar Stoic theme o f the corruption o f the "seeds o f k n o w l e d g e . " If it is thus clear that the "seeds o f divine knowledge" and "implanted k n o w l e d g e " o f the Apostolic Constitutions are to b e understood in light o f the Stoic doctrine o f implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , then this in turn confirms what has already e m e r g e d from a n u m b e r o f other c o n -
152
See, e.g., TD 3.1-4; De Leg. 1.47. AC 8.12.25. Philo, Opif. 7; see further Goodenough, By Light, Light, 3 4 9 - 5 0 . Dillon reads this complaint with reference to Aristotle and the Peripatetics (The Middle Platonists, 157). 153
154
121
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
siderations: the implanted law is nothing other than h u m a n reason. A c c o r d i n g to C i c e r o , the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s c o m p r i s e the ini tial divine e n d o w m e n t that eventually develops first into the mature h u m a n ratio, and ultimately, ideally, into the recta ratio w h i c h is itself natural law. It is therefore quite striking that in the Apostolic Constitutions, the gift o f the implanted law and that o f the "seeds o f divine knowl e d g e " are o n e and the same: " A n d w h e n y o u [sc. G o d ] m a d e h i m , y o u gave to h i m an implanted law (vouov euxpuxov) so that from his o w n self he should have the seeds o f divine k n o w l e d g e . "
155
T h e expla
nation, particularly in light o f the m a n y other points o f contact with Stoicism in this prayer, is clear: the author has taken over the Stoic identification o f natural law with h u m a n reason and utilized it, as h a d Philo and the author o f 4 Maccabees before h i m , in o r d e r to depict the law o f M o s e s as a written expression o f natural law. Conclusion: Implanted Law in the Apostolic Constitutions T h e Apostolic Constitutions exhibits an adaptation o f the Stoic theory o f law that is b r o a d l y similar to what is f o u n d in 4 Maccabees a n d the writings o f Philo. O n c e again, the deity associated with this law is identified as the g o d o f the Jewish scriptures: the g o d w h o also appointed A b r a h a m "heir o f the w o r l d , " delivered his descendants from Egypt and led them to victory over the Canaanites, a n d w h o has p r o m i s e d a resurrection o f the d e a d .
156
A n d o n c e again, a c c o r d
ingly, the claim is m a d e that the law this g o d gave to Israel through M o s e s is a written expression o f natural law. G o o d e n o u g h felt that the £uxpuxo<; vouo<; o f the Apostolic Constitutions 157
was "obviously a verbal variant o f Philo's vouoq E[i\\fx>%oq" "Literally," he w r o t e , "the t w o terms express the same n o t i o n f r o m
slightly
different angles. T h e L a w c o u l d b e said to have b e e n 'implanted' within the Patriarchs, o r they themselves c o u l d b e regarded as that Law become animate."
158
T h i s evaluation is accurate only in a very
general sense and requires significant refinement. W h i l e Philo's use o f the term e\i\\fv%oq vouoq is clearly informed b y his d e p e n d e n c e o n the Stoic identification o f the logos o f the sage as natural law, the term itself derives from the N e o - P y t h a g o r e a n theory o f kingship, as
155
1 5 6
1 5 7
158
AC 8.12.18. See esp. AC 8.12.20-26. Goodenough, By Light, Light, 325. Ibid., n. 98.
122
CHAPTER THREE
G o o d e n o u g h himself p o i n t e d out. T h e expression "implanted law," o n the other hand, c o m e s direcdy out o f the Stoic theory itself. M o r e precisely, it is r o o t e d in the theory that the "right reason" w h i c h comprises natural law develops out o f an initial divine e n d o w m e n t o f " i m p l a n t e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . " T h e Euxpuioq vouoq o f the Apostolic Constitutions thus finds its closest analogue not in the vouoq eu.\|ru%o<; o f Philo, but in the definition o f law in terms o f ratio insita in C i c e r o ' s De Legibus, where the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are similarly located at the beginning o f the developmental process that leads ultimately, ideally, to natural l a w .
159
L A W AND LOGOS AS "IMPLANTED"
T a k e n together, C i c e r o ' s De Legibus a n d the Apostolic Constitutions provide strong evidence that the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s played an important role in the Stoic identification o f h u m a n reason as natural l a w — a dimension o f the theory that was in all probability in place at least from the time o f C h r y s i p p u s .
160
It is therefore quite
striking that b o t h works use the term "implanted" not only with ref erence to the p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , but as descriptive o f the inchoate logos o r law itself that is c o m p r i s e d o f these "seeds o f k n o w l e d g e . " T h e recurrence o f this t e r m i n o l o g y is all the m o r e striking given the sim ilar correlation o f "the implanted logos'" and a "perfect l a w " in the Letter o f James. In fact, the use o f analogous t e r m i n o l o g y in a n u m b e r o f other early Christian works that deal with natural law reveals that this usage was m o r e widespread than might initially appear to b e the case. T h e remainder o f this chapter will establish this point b y briefly examining several such works. A l o n g the way, w e shall continue to note h o w the incorporation o f this Stoic c o n c e p t into worldviews alien to Stoicism influences the terms o f its presentation.
1 5 9
Horsley ("The Law o f Nature in Philo and Cicero"), in arguing that Cicero and Philo rely on the same source—namely Antiochus o f Ascalon—for their the ory o f law, does not take the origin o f Philo's characteristic term vojxoc; £UA|A)%o<; into account. His thesis appears all the more tenuous when the Apostolic Constitutions are brought into the comparison: more remarkable similarities exist, it seems to me, between Cicero and the Apostolic Constitutions than between Cicero and Philo. Chrysippus defined law as the logos o f the sage, the logos as a "collection o f conceptions and preconceptions," and worked with a doctrine o f implanted pre conceptions. It seems rather improbable that he would not have himself recognized the import o f this assortment o f doctrines for his theory o f law. 1 6 0
123
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
The S e c o n d A p o l o g y of Justin Martyr In the Second Apology o f Justin Martyr, the term Euxpuxog is used b o t h in c o n n e c t i o n with the Stoic doctrine o f implanted a n d to describe the less-than-complete beings.
161
preconceptions
logos c o m m o n to all h u m a n
T h e term appears twice in c o n n e c t i o n with Justin's well-
known Logos theory.
162
In App 13.2, Justin expresses his wish to b e
c o n s i d e r e d o n l y as a Christian despite his Platonic b a c k g r o u n d not because the teachings o f Plato are different from those o f Christ, but because they are not in all respects similar, as neither are those o f the others, the Stoics, and poets, and historians. 163
H e p r o c e e d s to explain this partial agreement o f G r e e k a n d Christian thought: For each man [among those just mentioned] spoke well in proportion to his share o f the divine spermatic logos (uipoix; xov 07cepuaxuan) 0eioa) Xoyov), seeing what was related to it. . . For all the writers were able to see realities darkly by means o f the implanted seed o f the logos which 164
was in them (8ia xfjq evot>oT|<; euxpuxoi) xov Xoyov orcopou;).
In contrast to the m e r e " s e e d " o f the divine logos possessed b y such earlier great thinkers, the Christians have access to the c o m p l e t e logos b y virtue o f their k n o w l e d g e o f the teaching o f Christ, w h o was h i m self its full e m b o d i m e n t . T h i s contrast is m a d e explicit elsewhere as Justin attributes the past persecutions o f philosophers a n d the
pre
sent Christian persecution to the same d e m o n i c source: And those o f the Stoic school—since, so far as their moral teaching (xov T|9IK6V Xoyov) went, they were admirable, as were also the poets in some particulars, on account o f the seed o f reason implanted in every race o f men
161
(5ia xo euxpuxov 7cavxi yevei avGpamcov orcepua xov
I follow throughout the recent Greek edition by M . Marcovich, Iustini Martyris Apologiae pro Christianis (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1994). All translations, unless otherwise noted, are taken from AJVF, vol. 1. For an excellent account o f this theory, including the history o f its interpre tation, see R . Holte, "Logos Spermatikos. Christianity and Ancient Philosophy according to St. Justin's Apologies," ST 12 (1958) 109-68. Note also, however, the recent attempt by M . J. Edwards ("Justin's Logos and the W o r d o f G o d , " Journal of Early Christian Studies 3 [1995] 216-80) to downplay the importance o f Greek philosophical thought for Justin's doctrine. O n the relative importance o f this the ory for Justin's notion o f the similarities between Christian and Greek thought, see Droge, Homer or Moses, 4 9 - 7 2 , esp. 6 5 - 7 2 . App. 13.2. App. 13.3, 5. I have slightly modified the translation o f AJVF. 1 6 2
163
164
124
CHAPTER THREE
Xoyov)—were, we know, hated and put to death . . . For, as we inti mated, the devils have always effected, that all those who in any case are zealous to live according to logos (KOCXOC Xbyov (3io\)v) and shun vice, be hated. And it is no wonder if the devils are proved to cause those to be much worse hated who live not according to a part only o f the spermatic logos, but by the knowledge and contemplation o f the whole logos, which is Christ ( Kaxd G T C E P J J X X X I K O I ) Xoyov jiepoq, aXXa KOCXOC xrjv xov navxbq Xoyov, o eaxi Xpiaxov). 165
In b o t h o f these passages, the application o f the term
"implanted"
(e[iq>vxoq) to the logos itself—more precisely, to the "seed" o f the logos— is analogous to its use in the Apostolic Constitutions and in C i c e r o ' s De Legibus. Strikingly, Justin uses the term particularly with reference to the divine, yet incomplete, logos that is implanted in all human beings. H e emphasizes
166
this i n c o m p l e t e state, m o r e o v e r , b y m e a n s o f the
"seed" (orcopd, a7iepjia) m e t a p h o r
that w e have found to b e c o m
m o n l y associated with the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s in the o f C i c e r o , Seneca, and the Apostolic Constitutions. T h e
writings
developmental
process that such language implies in these latter works, h o w e v e r , has u n d e r g o n e a radical alteration in the context o f Justin's presen tation: the process b y w h i c h the logos is c o m p l e t e d has b e e n r e m o v e d from the sphere o f individual
human development and
projected
o n t o the stage o f history. Maturation, so to speak, c o m e s not through an individual's o w n intellectual effort, but only as the logos is fully revealed in the person and teaching o f Jesus Christ. T h e result is a starkly pessimistic v i e w o f the possibilities o f h u m a n
achievement
apart from Christianity. A life g o v e r n e d b y right reason is positively impossible without C h r i s t .
167
It is likely that Justin's use o f the term "implanted" in this connection is informed b y an awareness o f the intimate relationship between the potential logos with w h i c h humans are b o r n and the preconceptions.
168
implanted
T h e evidence, however, is limited. In addition to
his use o f the "seed" imagery in this c o n n e c t i o n , it is noteworthy
165
App 8.1-3. T h e translation o f X V F h a s been slightly modified. Cf. in this respect Cicero's ratio summa insita. O n the other hand, Justin's remarkable claim that certain great men o f the past like Socrates, Heraclitus and Abraham were Christians is likely also to be understood in this context: the logos with which they lived in accord was indeed Christ the divine logos. Nonetheless, they did not have access to its complete reve lation, which became available only with the historical appearance o f Christ. So also Holte, "Logos Spermatikos," 136-40, who compares Justin with Cicero in this respect. 1 6 6
167
1 6 8
125
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
that the type o f k n o w l e d g e associated with the "implanted seed o f the logos" is characteristic o f p r e c o n c e p t i o n a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics: the possession o f this "partial" logos allowed pre-Christian thinkers to see TOC SVTOC, but only " d i m l y " (d|iu8pcD<;).
169
T h a t Justin was in fact
acquainted with the Stoic doctrine o f "natural c o n c e p t i o n s " is clear from his Dialogue with Trypho, w h e r e he associates humankind's uni versal k n o w l e d g e o f "that w h i c h is always and universally just, as well as all righteousness," with xaq (puaiKa<; zvvoiaq, even b l a m i n g h u m a n failings in these areas o n "education," "wicked customs," and "sinful institutions" in a m a n n e r reminiscent o f C i c e r o .
170
Moreover,
the only other use o f the term Ejicpuxoc; in Justin's extant writings, f o u n d also in the Second Apology, appears in c o n n e c t i o n with a sup p o s e d universal h u m a n belief in the deity. Pointing out that his g o d , in contrast with the m a n y gods o f the G r e c o - R o m a n w o r l d , has n o p r o p e r n a m e , Justin explains that the simple title ' g o d ' "is not a name, but rather an opinion o f a matter difficult to e x p o u n d implanted in the nature o f h u m a n b e i n g s " (7tpdy|iaTO<; 8ua8^r|yr|TO'o e\i
171
A s w e have seen, a universal
human
belief in the deity was c o u n t e d a m o n g the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s at least b y several later philosophers; it is particularly striking that Dio,
t o o , speaks specifically o f an implanted 86^a in this c o n n e c t i o n .
172
W h i l e Justin's c o n c e r n in the Second Apology lies elsewhere than with the theory o f law, o n e c a n nonetheless catch glimpses o f the significance o f his understanding o f the "implanted seed o f the logos" for
his understanding o f law. A c c o r d i n g to Justin, h u m a n laws (xouq
vououc; xcov dvGpofmcov) contain a mixture o f correct and incorrect ele ments. T h e g o o d elements apparently o w e their existence to the
169
App 13.5; cf. the similar characterization o f the knowledge given directly to the human being by nature in the form o f the "seeds o f knowledge," e.g., in Seneca, Ep. 121.23. Dial. 93.1; cf. Cicero, De Leg. 1.47; TD 3.2. App. 6.3; translation mine. According to App. 6.2, "'Father' and ' G o d ' and 'Creator' and 'Lord' and 'Master' are not names, but appellations derived from His g o o d deeds and functions." D i o Chrysostom, 12.27; cf. further Seneca's reference to the insita de dis opinio (Ep. 117.6). Holte, apparently unaware o f these parallels, considers Justin's use o f the term 86^a in this context "unexpected," and incorrectly regards it as "an obvi ous undermining o f the human 7ip6^r|\|/i<; Geou" ("Logos Spermatikos," 139 n. 94 and 152). W h y this term is used esp. in connection with the preconception o f G o d is not immediately clear; c f , however, Cicero's comment in De Leg. 1.24: "there is no race either so highly civilized or so savage as not to know that it must believe in a god, even if it does not know in what sort o f god it ought to believe." By the same token, preconceptions by definition are vague and ill defined. 170
171
172
126
CHAPTER THREE
share o f the logos that all humans possess, while the latter are said to result from the m e d d l i n g o f wicked angels w h o " a p p o i n t e d laws c o n f o r m a b l e to their o w n w i c k e d n e s s . "
173
This p r o b l e m , says Justin,
is o v e r c o m e only with the appearance o f Christ, w h o , as "right rea son," resolves the confusion that exists between the various "laws o f m e n " b y showing that " n o t all opinions n o r all doctrines are g o o d , but that s o m e are evil, while others are g o o d . "
1 7 4
If Christ is himself "right reason," Justin c a n also describe his teaching as such. In fact, given Justin's k n o w l e d g e o f the c o m m o n Stoic definition o f law in terms o f "right reason" in its function o f c o m m a n d i n g and p r o h i b i t i n g ,
175
it is not surprising that he identifies
Christ's teaching further with natural law. T h i s emerges most clearly from an a n e c d o t e in Second Apology 2, where Justin relates the story o f a w o m a n w h o , having a b a n d o n e d her former dissolute life w h e n "she c a m e to a k n o w l e d g e o f the teachings o f Christ" tried to c o n vince her husband to d o the same. H a v i n g introduced h i m , t o o , to these teachings, she w a r n e d h i m that "there shall b e punishment in eternal fire inflicted u p o n those w h o d o not live temperately
and
c o n f o r m a b l y to right reason" (xoiq ou aaxppovax; K a i jnexd AxSyou opGou piouaiv).
176
Justin informs us, h o w e v e r , that her husband, undaunted,
c o n t i n u e d in his pursuit o f those pleasures w h i c h are "contrary to the law o f nature" (napa xov xfj<; (pua£co<; vouov), so that the w o m a n was c o m p e l l e d to d i v o r c e h i m .
177
T h e phrases "teaching o f Christ"
(SiSdypxxxoc Xpiaxou), "right reason" (6p96<; taSyog), and "the law o f nature" (6 xf|<; (puaeax; vopxx;) are essentially interchangeable here. T h u s can w e understand Justin's repeated description o f Christ as lawgiver," o r even o f Christ himself as the " n e w l a w . "
1 7 8
"the
Justin's
Christ in this respect bears a limited resemblance to Philo's M o s e s :
173
App. 9.3-4; cf. App. 13.3, 5; 8.1; 9. App. 9 . 3 - 4 . Cf. his reference in App. 7.7 to "those men everywhere w h o have made laws and philosophized according to right reason, by their prescribing to d o some things and refrain from others" (oi rcavxa%ou Kaxd taSyov xov 6p66v vojLioGexrioavxeq Kai (piXooo(pr|oavxe<; avGpcorcoi EK XOV a)7tayop£i>eiv xd8e jiev rcpdxxeiv, xcbv8e 5e dxcexeaGai). Indeed, it would seem here that the commonness o f this definition has led Justin to a momentary lapse, as he attributes to non-Christians the formulation o f laws and philosophy according to right reason! In fact the only two references to the opGoc; Xoyoq in the Apologies are made in association with vo\ioq; see in addition to App. 7.7, also App 2.1-5; 9.3-5; cf. further Dial. 141.1. App. 2 . 1 - 2 . App. 2.3f. See, e.g., DM. 12.2; 18.3; cf. Dial. 43.1. 174
1 7 5
176
177
1 7 8
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
127
as "right reason," he b o t h e m b o d i e d and gave verbal expression to the law o f nature. In sum. Justin, in a m a n n e r analogous to C i c e r o and the author o f the Apostolic Constitutions, conceives o f the initial e n d o w m e n t o f the logos given to all o f humanity as an "implanted seed." It is likely that Justin was himself aware that the roots o f this terminology lie in the Stoic doctrine o f implanted preconceptions; his use o f such expres sions is in any case clearly to b e understood in light o f this doctrine. Nonetheless, like the other authors e x a m i n e d in this chapter, and in a m o r e radical fashion, Justin adapted the Stoic theory o f natural law to a c c o m m o d a t e a set o f religious and historical convictions alien to S t o i c i s m . A l l h u m a n s , he c l a i m e d , h a v e always r e c e i v e d
an
"implanted seed" o f the logos', life in a c c o r d with "right reason," and thus natural law, however, b e c a m e possible only comparatively recentiy, with the appearance
in history o f Jesus Christ. This theory allows
Justin to explain the partial overlap between the law o f nature and the laws o f various nations, while at the same time securing posses sion o f the w h o l e natural law for Christians alone. M o r e o v e r , Justin integrates this philosophical theory into a w o r l d v i e w that includes wicked angels and fiery eschatological punishment for "those w h o d o not live temperately
and c o n f o r m a b l y to right reason." If such
elements o f Justin's theology highlight the fact that he c a n n o t sim ply b e classified as a Stoic, it is n o less clear that concepts o f Stoic origin form a significant c o m p o n e n t o f his religious thought. Methodius A fragment from a w o r k o f M e t h o d i u s preserved in the Panarion o f Epiphanius provides an analogous instance o f such an a d a p t a t i o n .
179
Interpreting Paul's discussion o f his experience o f inner conflict in Rom
7 : 1 4 - 2 5 , M e t h o d i u s explains: there are two kinds o f thoughts (XoyiaucGv) in us. The one kind arises from the desire (TO (iev &7t6 xfjq emG'uuiaq) which lurks in the body, and
179
T h e excerpt, from a work in which Methodius critiques Origen's view o f the resurrection, is quite extensive, comprising Pan. 4.64.12-62. T h e particular passage which is most significant for our present purposes is Pan. 4.64.60-62. I cite the Greek text as found in K. Holl, Epiphanius (Ancoratus und Panarion), vol. 2: Panarion: Haer. 34-64 (GCS; Leipzig: Heinrichs, 1922). All translations, unless otherwise noted, are taken from F. Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Books II and III (Sects 47-80, De Fide) ( N H M S 36; Leiden: Brill, 1994).
128
CHAPTER THREE
has been caused . . . by the inspiration o f the material spirit. The other has come from our regard for the commandment, which we received to have as an innate natural law (TO 5e anb xov KOCTOC xfjv £vxoA,T|v, 6v euxpuxov eXa$o[LEv E%EW Kai cpDaiKov vouxw), and which urges and restores our thoughts to the good. Hence we "delight" [cf. R o m 7:22] in the law o f G o d in our minds (xr\ ulv vouoOeaioc xot> 9eov)—this is what the "inner man" means—but with the desire that dwells in the flesh (xf]v E v o i K o v a a v £7ci9\)(iiav £v %r\ aapKi) we delight in the law o f the devil (xp OE vo|iio0£a{a xov 8iap6tayu). For the law which "warreth and opposeth the law o f G o d " [cf. R o m 7:22]—that is, which opposes our impulse to the good (if[ npbq xo dyocGov opuri), the desire o f our mind, is the law which is forever fostering lustful, material diversions to lawlessness, and is nothing but a temptation to pleasures (7tavxa7taai npbq f|8ovd<; &v £A,KXlKO<;).
180
The "commandment"
w h i c h M e t h o d i u s identifies as the "implanted
a n d natural l a w " (euxpuxov . . . K a i cpuaiKov vouov) is apparently G o d ' s c o m m a n d to A d a m a n d Eve n o t to eat f r o m the tree o f the knowl e d g e o f g o o d and e v i l .
181
A d a m and Eve h a d lived briefly in free
d o m from irrational desire (dXoyoq emOuuxcc)—which, "with the enticing distractions o f pleasures (£A,KT{KOCI<; f|8ovcov)," leads to a lack o f self 182
c o n t r o l ( & K p o c o { c c ) — a n d w e r e thus free f r o m With
an
eye to R o m
sin
eat
o f the
and
death.
7:7~12, h o w e v e r , he writes that they
"infected with desire" after G o d ' s c o m m a n d m e n t not
183
184
were
to t h e m that they
tree o f k n o w l e d g e ; " f o r o n c e the
commandment
h a d b e e n given, the devil g o t his opportunity to p r o d u c e desire (fj emGuuia) in m e through the c o m m a n d m e n t . "
1 8 5
T h e result was that
the "natural law within us" (6 ev fijiiv cpuaiKcx; v6\ioq) was " f r o m its defeat b y the desire (emGuuioc) in o u r b o d i e s " ;
186
sent his S o n to c o n d e m n sin to destruction, so that "the m e n t o f the law o f nature w o u l d b e fulfilled."
180
187
The
weakened thus G o d require
" g o s p e l " (TO
Pan. 6 0 . 5 - 6 . I have altered the translation o f Williams only by translating £^d(3oji£V more literally than his "we have been given," and by rendering if\ . . . vofioOeoioc xot> Siapotan) as "the law o f the devil" in order to bring out the paral lelism (cf. ^ I E V . . . de) with xr\ \ikv vofioGEOia xov G E O I ) . Note the importance o f this "commandment" for his general exposition o f R o m 7:12; see Pan. 4.50.2ff, esp. 4 . 5 0 . 4 - 5 . Pan. 4.55.2-3. Pan. 4.50.5; cf. 4.60.1. For Methodius's account o f the origin o f death see esp. Pan. 4.28-34; also 4.56.4-5. Pan. 4.56.1; cf. R o m 7:8. Methodius identifies Paul's personified "sin" with the devil; see Pan. 4.56.5. Pan. 4.62.11. Pan. 4.62.11: xo SiKcucopxxxou (puoiKoft v6\iox> 7i>,ripco0Ti; cf. R o m 8:3-4 and fur ther Pan. 4.62.10. 181
182
183
1 8 4
185
186
187
129
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
euayyeAaov), as "the law o f the Spirit o f life" (cf. R o m 8:2), "is different f r o m the other laws a n d was m e a n t to foster o b e d i e n c e a n d the for giveness o f sins through its preaching"; it has "entirely the sin w h i c h rules the f l e s h . "
188
conquered
Nonetheless, "Christ did not c o m e
to a n n o u n c e the remaking o r transformation o f h u m a n nature into s o m e other, but its c h a n g e into its original nature before its fall (o T|v
ocpxn<; rcpo xou eKTieaeiv), w h e n it was There
are
several
obvious and
M e t h o d i u s ' s "implanted
immortal."
significant
189
differences
between
natural l a w " a n d the Stoic v i e w o f natural
law, o w i n g a b o v e all to the former's d e p e n d e n c e u p o n Paul a n d the m y t h o f the fall from the b o o k o f Genesis. In the first p l a c e , the precise relationship
b e t w e e n h u m a n reason a n d natural law is n o t
altogether clear: while the h u m a n was f r o m the start created as the "rational i m a g e " (TO ayccAuxx T O XoyiKov) o f G o d , was "implanted"
1 9 0
the natural law
o n l y w h e n G o d c o m m a n d e d A d a m a n d Eve not
to eat f r o m the tree o f k n o w l e d g e . M o r e o v e r , given the role o f the serpent in Genesis 3, M e t h o d i u s introduces a d e m o n i c d i m e n s i o n to the Stoic o p p o s i t i o n o f reason a n d h u m a n desire: the latter, stand ing o p p o s e d to the law o f G o d , represents the law o f "the devil" (6 8idpota)<;; cf. orcovripoq). In fact, in his attempt to m a k e sense o f R o m 7:23, M e t h o d i u s speaks o f the existence o f three laws: the "law o f the
m i n d " — G o d ' s l a w — w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s to
T O EUXJTUTOV
ev
TIJLUV
dyccGov; that o f the devil, w h i c h is "at w a r with the law o f the m i n d " (cf. R o m 7:23); a n d "the law o f sin w h i c h dwells in the
members,"
a n d " w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s to the sin that has b e c o m e habitual in the flesh because o f its lust (TTI<; emGuuiotq)."
191
W i t h a stark v i e w o f the
possibilities for h u m a n existence apart from Christianity reminiscent o f Justin, M e t h o d i u s believes that as a result o f the transgression o f A d a m a n d Eve, fulfillment o f the "requirement o f the natural l a w " was impossible before the G o d , in the flesh.
188
192
appearance
o f Jesus Christ, the
son o f
M o r e o v e r , as with Justin, transgression o f the
Pan. 4.62.13; cf. R o m 8:3-4. Pan. 4.41.6. Pan. 4.27.8. See further Pan. 4.26.1-27.4 on the creation o f the human being, w h o m Methodius, like the author o f the prayers from the Apostolic Constitutions, terms 6 KOOJJXX; xot) Koajiot) (Pan. 4.27.8). Pan. 4.61.1-3. Indeed, according to Methodius, even after the appearance o f Christ it is still impossible to fulfill the law o f nature prior to the dissolution that comes with death. This point, too, seems to result from his dependence upon Romans; see esp. Pan. 4.36.4-5; cf. 4.56.10-59.6. 189
190
191
1 9 2
130
CHAPTER THREE
law o f nature is given p r o f o u n d eschatological c o n s e q u e n c e s : there will b e a j u d g m e n t b y G o d " a c c o r d i n g to works a n d a c c o r d i n g to pursuits" (KCCTOC TOC £pya Kai Kaxd i d £ 7 i i x r | 8 e u ( i a T a )
c h o o s e evil will face
punishment.
193 ?
and
those
who
194
Despite the differences, h o w e v e r , the influence o f the Stoic v i e w o f law o n M e t h o d i u s ' s interpretation o f R o m a n s a n d the m y t h o f the fall is unmistakable.
195
M o s t significant in this respect for o u r
present purposes is o f course the n o t i o n o f an "implanted
natural
l a w , " given b y G o d to A d a m a n d E v e , w h i c h functions in o p p o s i t i o n to h u m a n desire (e7ii0\)(iia) a n d the pleasures (a! fi8ova(). M e t h o d i u s , notably, makes n o explicit m e n t i o n o f implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s o r "seeds" o r "sparks"
o f k n o w l e d g e in this c o n n e c t i o n ; still,
several
aspects o f the fragment might suggest that he was, nonetheless, aware o f this d i m e n s i o n o f the theory. B o t h his description o f virtue as oiKeia a n d his reference to the w i c k e d thoughts w h i c h first p l a g u e d h u m a n i t y after the
transgression
o f A d a m and
E v e as ^oyiouxov
dvoiKeicov w o u l d seem to suggest his familiarity with the Stoic d o c trine o f oiKeicoaK;.
196
Similarly, his passing reference to the fact that
"it is plain that the better a n d the worse (TO jiiv PeA/ciov TO 8e %£ipov) are within ourselves" might well b e u n d e r s t o o d in this c o n n e c t i o n ;
197
the language is in fact quite reminiscent o f that used b y O e c u m e n i u s and T h e o p h y l a c t u s as they interpret the implanted logos o f Jas Finally, it is tempting awareness
1:21.
198
to suppose that it is precisely M e t h o d i u s ' s
o f the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these theories that
underlies
his s o m e w h a t u n e x p e c t e d correlation o f the "implanting" o f this law n o t with the creation o f the h u m a n per se, but specifically with G o d ' s c o m m a n d regarding
the tree o f the k n o w l e d g e o f g o o d a n d evil.
W h a t e v e r the extent o f his familiarity with the details o f the origi nal theory, h o w e v e r , M e t h o d i u s ' s d e p e n d e n c e o n this philosophical tradition is plain.
193
Pan. 4.49.9. See e.g. Pan. 4.36.4-5. In addition to evidence cited in this paragraph, see esp. the account o f the creation in Pan. 4.26-27, in which G o d is said to have "brought all into being in g o o d order like a great city, and regulated ittcpAxSycp" (4.26.1), as well as his descrip tion o f the human being as 6 KOG\IO<; XOX> K O G J I O I ) (4.27.8). Pan. 4.58.9; 4.60.2. Pan. 4.61.4. See above, Chapter O n e , and further immediately below. 1 9 4
1 9 5
196
197
1 9 8
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
131
Early Interpretation of James 1:21 O f particular interest to the present investigation are the interpretations o f the phrase euxpuxoq Xoyoq in early Christian commentaries o n the Letter o f James. James itself will b e discussed in detail in the following chapters. Leaving aside for the m o m e n t the question o f its precise relationship to this philosophical tradition, it is noteworthy in any case that the G r e e k catenae o f O e c u m e n i u s and T h e o p h y l a c t u s preserve an interpretation
o f Jas
1:21 w h i c h clearly assumes the theory at
w o r k in Cicero's De Legibus and the Apostolic Constitutions. Theophylactus interprets the phrase as follows: "he [sc. James] calls 'implanted logos' that o w i n g to w h i c h w e have b e c o m e rational, able to distinguish the
better and
the
w o r s e " (Epxpuxov 8e AxSyov KocA,ei xov, KOC0' ov A,oyiKoi m
yeyovajiev, SiocKpvxiKoi xou ^eXxiovoq KOI xou %eipovoq).
The
same
interpretation, with s o m e m i n o r variations, is offered b y O e c u m e n i u s : Euxpuxov A,6yov KocA,ei, xov 8iaKpixiKov xou fieXiiovoq KOCI xou %eipovo<;.
K a 6 ' o K a i AoyiKoi eajiev KOCI A,ey6|ie6a.
200
Clearly these t w o works are
drawing u p o n s o m e c o m m o n prior s o u r c e
201
w h o s e author was aware
o f the G r e e k philosophical tradition that has b e e n reconstructed in the previous pages o f this study. T h e "implanted logos" o f Jas
1:21
is identified as h u m a n reason and, especially strikingly, associated particularly with the ability to distinguish ethical
contraries—pre
cisely, that is, the ability the Stoics attributed to oiKeicoaK; and asso ciated with the implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . Still m o r e impressive in this respect is the interpretation
o f the
12th century exegete Dionysius bar Salibi. C o m m e n t i n g u p o n the clause 8e£aa0e xov euxpuxov Xoyov in Jas
1:21, Dionysius first para
phrases, and then explains:
"Receive the word implanted in our nature." That is, he refers to nat ural law; for G o d implanted it into [our] nature, in order that it should love good things and have an aversion to bad things (excipite verbum insitum naturae nostrae; h.e. legem naturalem innuit. In natura enim inserui ut amet bona et odio habeat mala). 202
1 9 9
2 0 0
2 0 1
2 0 2
M P G 125. 1145. M P G 119. 468. See above, Chapter O n e , esp. note 1. Sedlacek, Dionysius Bar Salibi, 9 1 - 9 2 .
CHAPTER THREE
132
Dionysius, therefore, without c o m m e n t o r a p o l o g y , simply identifies 6 EjLKpuxoq Xoyoq as a reference to natural l a w . to the exegete w h o s e interpretation o f Jas
203
M o r e o v e r , similarly
1:21 is preserved in the
commentaries o f O e c u m e n i u s and T h e o p h y l a c t u s , he associates this law with the h u m a n tendency, "inserted" o r "implanted" b y G o d in 204
natura,
to love g o o d things and b e averse to b a d ones. Dionysius's
c o m b i n e d association o f the implanted
logos, natural law, and
the
ability to distinguish ethical contraries is immediately intelligible in light o f C i c e r o ' s De Legibus a n d the Apostolic Constitutions. It is clear that he, like the exegete followed b y O e c u m e n i u s and Theophylactus, is interpreting Jas
1:21 in light o f this apparently well-known philo
sophical tradition.
CONCLUSION T h e purpose o f this chapter has b e e n twofold. Analysis o f diverse Jewish and Christian adaptations o f the Stoic theory o f law has p r o v i d e d us with a m o d e l for apprehending those aspects o f the treat m e n t o f the implanted logos in the Letter o f J a m e s w h i c h are not typical o f the Stoic sources. All o f the works e x a m i n e d in this c h a p ter clearly d r a w o n the Stoic theory that h u m a n reason comprises a natural law. T h e authors o f these works, h o w e v e r , are not Stoics. In each case, Stoic terms a n d concepts are fused with ideas that are entirely alien to Stoicism, a n d this, inevitably, has i m p a c t e d their treatment. Similar in their correlation o f h u m a n reason and natural law,
these works nonetheless differ b o t h from the early Stoics a n d
from o n e another in the details and language o f their presentation. In the s e c o n d place, this chapter has e x a m i n e d several works that use the term "implanted" (euxpuxcx;, insitum) to describe either reason itself o r the law it comprises in order to confirm the findings o f the previous chapter. T h e recurrence o f this terminology in such other wise disparate works admit o f only o n e conclusion: each draws o n a philosophical tradition that identifies h u m a n reason as natural law;
203
Cf. his comments on "the perfect law o f freedom" in Jas 1:25, which he also, not surprisingly, takes to be natural law. Note the absence o f the limiting genitive hominis, and cf. in this respect Cicero De Leg. 1.18: summa ratio insita in natura. As in this passage from Cicero, it is nonethe less clear that it is specifically human nature that Dionysius has in mind here: cf. his paraphrase of euxpuxoc; Xoyoq as verbum insitum naturae nostrae. 204
133
MOSES, JESUS, AND NATURAL LAW
that correlated the inchoate logos with w h i c h humans are b o r n with implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s ; and w h i c h , accordingly, described either the logos o r natural law itself as "implanted."
T h e terminology o f
each o f these works, in other w o r d s , is r o o t e d in the Stoic theory o f natural law. T h e repeated appearance o f this terminology in works as different in date, p r o v e n a n c e and religious and philosophical orientation
as
C i c e r o ' s De Legibus (and its G r e e k source), the Apostolic Constitutions, Justin's Second Apology and the M e t h o d i u s fragment suggest that this c o i n a g e was in fact rather widespread. Indeed, the theory was appare n d y c o m m o n e n o u g h that b o t h Dionysius bar Salibi a n d the G r e e k exegete w h o s e w o r k is preserved b y O e c u m e n i u s and T h e o p h y l a c t u s , with little a p o l o g y o r explanation, simply read the euxp'uToq Aoyoq o f Jas
1:21 in light o f it. A n d this, as w e shall see in the
chapters, is precisely h o w it should b e read.
following
CHAPTER FOUR THE
I M P L A N T E D LOGOS A N D T H E L A W O F F R E E D O M
A c c o r d i n g to Stoic theory, the inchoate logos with w h i c h h u m a n s are b o r n , and w h i c h in its perfect f o r m as "right reason" is natural law, consists in an e n d o w m e n t o f i m p l a n t e d
p r e c o n c e p t i o n s (ejucpuxoi
7tpoA,f|y£i<;). A s is plain from the various works e x a m i n e d in the pre vious chapters, the term "implanted" c a m e to b e used o f the logos o r natural law itself in this c o n n e c t i o n b y at least the first century B . C . E . T h e Letter o f J a m e s , w h i c h equates "the implanted logos" (6 euxpwoq Xoyoq) with a "perfect law," "the law o f f r e e d o m " ( 1 : 2 1 - 2 5 ; cf. 2:12), provides another e x a m p l e o f this usage. W h i l e d e p e n d e n c e o n the Stoics has often b e e n cited in c o n n e c tion with James's association o f law and freedom, his correlation o f the "law o f f r e e d o m " with the implanted less attention in this respect.
1
logos has received m u c h
F o r those majority w h o have (rightly)
read J a m e s as a Christian c o m p o s i t i o n , the notion o f a logos w h i c h "saves souls" has seemed a rather o b v i o u s reference to the Christian G o s p e l ; the Stoics, o n the other hand, scarcely spoke o f h u m a n rea son in this w a y , n o r as something w h i c h c o u l d b e "heard a n d d o n e " or "received." A c c o r d i n g to this line o f interpretation, then, c o m parison with the Stoic sources is essentially irrelevant for under standing James's "implanted logos": the w a y that J a m e s talks a b o u t this logos, it is said, indicates that he is, at the very most, parroting a Stoic term that he either w h o l l y misunderstands o r has filled with an entirely n e w meaning. S u c h differences b e t w e e n J a m e s and the Stoic sources are i n d e e d quite significant. But the facile that conclusion the author o f James either does not d e p e n d o n Stoic thought at all, or that he at most uses a philosophical term with a sense entirely different from its original usage, betrays a m u c h t o o simplistic a p p r o a c h to the c o m p l e x p r o b lem o f the m e r g e r o f Jewish, G r e e k and Christian traditions in the early Christian literature. Justin differs quite significantly from C i c e r o
1
O n past interpretation o f Jas 1:21, see Chapter O n e .
CHAPTER FOUR
136
and the Stoics with respect to his claim that, while all humans are e n d o w e d with an "implanted seed o f the logos" life in a c c o r d with "right reason" a n d thus "natural l a w " b e c a m e possible only after the life and death o f Jesus o f Nazareth in first century Palestine.
His
d e p e n d e n c e o n Stoic c o n c e p t s is patent nonetheless; n o r is it b y any means o b v i o u s that this divergence results from his failure to "under stand" the Stoic theory as originally conceived. As seen in the previous chapter, such differences are not the exception in works that fuse Stoic c o n c e p t s with ideas alien to Stoicism, but the rule. James's language o f "hearing and d o i n g " the logos is in fact quite instructive in this respect. T h i s pair finds a certain analogue in the c o m m o n G r e e k pairing o f w o r d and deed, speech and action.
2
Use
o f the phrase "logos-doer" (noir{xi]q Xoyov) in this context, h o w e v e r , is hardly typical o f the Stoics. Indeed, as has often b e e n observed, this phrase w o u l d most likely conjure up images o f an orator o r p o e t in classical G r e e k usage. James's use o f rcoiecG to denote a carrying out o f logos in the sense o f o b e d i e n c e is a semitism;
3
it is thus in the
Jewish and Christian literature that o n e finds the " w o r d and d e e d " theme expressed in terms o f "hearing and d o i n g . " T h e pair is often used, in fact, particularly with reference to the law, as b y Paul: "it is not the hearers o f the law (oi ccKpoccToci vouou) w h o are righteous in G o d ' s sight, but the doers o f the law (oi 7toir|Tai vouou) w h o will b e justified."
4
Similarly, J a m e s himself elsewhere speaks directly o f
the " d o e r o f l a w " (noir\xr{q vouou) rather than, as in 1:22, the " d o e r " o f the logos w h i c h is also l a w .
5
If, then, J a m e s ' s n o t i o n that the
implanted logos can b e " h e a r d " and " d o n e " thus derives ultimately from Jewish rather than Stoic usage, his use o f this language nonethe less confirms that, quite like the Stoics, he conceives of the logos pre cisely as a law? T h a t is to say, this passage simultaneously points to a significant similarity a n d a significant difference between J a m e s and those w h o originally c o i n e d the expression "implanted logos." Both associate it with the perfect law, but in J a m e s the understanding o f
2
Johnson, Letter of James, 206-7. This point has often been made in the commentaries; see, e.g., Ropes, St. James, 175; Dibelius, James, 114; Johnson, Letter of James, 206; also Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 164. See further the following note. R o m 2:13. For further instances o f "hearing and doing," see, e.g., L X X Deut 30:8-20; Ezek 33:30-32; Sir 3:1; Matt 7:24-27 par. Luke 6:46-49; further Ropes, St. James, 174-75; Fabris, Legge, 63-64; Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 124f. Jas 4:11; cf. 1 Mace 2:67: xovq noir\xaq xov vo\iov. See further on this point below, under the heading "Implanted Logos and the Perfect Law o f Freedom." 3
4
5 6
137
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
that law is i n f o r m e d b y Jewish a n d Christian tradition. A s in
the
works e x a m i n e d in the previous chapter, the divine law c o n c e i v e d b y the Stoics, a c c o r d i n g to J a m e s , was legislated b y the creator o f the Jewish scriptures, the only true "lawgiver" (4:12).
7
A n d if J a m e s
assumes that this logos can b e "heard"—and, in s o m e sense, "received" (cf. 1:21, 8e^ao0e)—this suggests o n l y that he, like other Jewish
and
Christian authors w h o adapted the Stoic theory o f natural law for their o w n purposes, understands it, t h o u g h internal to the individual, to have s o m e external f o r m as w e l l .
human
8
T h e extent o f J a m e s ' s familiarity with the niceties o f the p h i l o sophical theories w h i c h gave rise to phrases like 6 euxpuxoq Xoyoq is less clear than is the case with the Apostolic Constitutions, Justin, o r even M e t h o d i u s . H e makes n o m e n t i o n o f implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s in this c o n n e c t i o n , n o r is there any explicit indication that he uses 9
the expression to d e n o t e specifically a potential logos. T h a t he has, nonetheless, at least a general grasp o f the term's original significance is immediately clear f r o m the fact that he, t o o , associates it precisely with divine l a w — a law, indeed, that is "perfect" and " o f f r e e d o m . "
10
O n e c a n n o t simply c o n c l u d e from the author's use o f " u n - S t o i c " language in this c o n n e c t i o n , therefore, that he w h o l l y misunderstands the original significance o f the expression, m u c h less that he is n o t ultimately i n d e b t e d to the philosophers in this respect at all.
7
11
Jas 4:12: eiq eoxiv [6] vo\iode.xr\q. As has often been noted, it is not always pos sible to tell whether the author o f James is referring to G o d or Jesus Christ, esp. when he simply uses the title icopux; as, e.g., in 5:7-8, 14, 15. That the "lawgiver" in question is G o d rather than Jesus Christ is clear, however, from the allusion in Jas 4:12 (elq eaxiv [6] vojioOexric;) to Deut 6:4 ( L X X : Kt>pio<; 6 9e6<; fijicov Kupioq ei<; eaxiv); cf. further in this respect Jas 2:19: ai) nxcxeveiq oxi elq eaxiv 6 Geoq, KaX&q rcoieiq. See further Ropes, St. James, 275; Dibelius, James, 229; Johnson, Letter of James, 294; and Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 163-65, w h o rightly correlates God's role as "lawgiver" with the "implanting" o f the logos. In fact, as will be argued below, the "law o f freedom" is nothing other than the law which G o d himself, according to the Jewish scriptures, gave through Moses. T h e c o m m a n d 8e^ao9e xov ejxcp'oxov AxSyov is equally difficult on any interpre tation o f the logos. Whether conceived as something inborn in all humans or inserted later in only a specific group, it is nonetheless already "implanted"—and thus the apparent contradiction. See further on this problem below, under the heading "Implanted Logos in light o f the Torah and Judgment." Note, however, that mere possession o f this logos ensures neither that one lives in accord with it nor, subsequently, "salvation." See immediately below, under the heading "Implanted Logos and the Perfect Law o f Freedom." As we shall see in the following chapter, moreover, this logos functions particularly in opposition to human desire (87ii9\)(j,{a) and the pleasures (ai f|8ova(). O f course, whether the author's acquaintance with this expression was mediated 8
9
10
11
138
CHAPTER FOUR
T h i s is as true o f his n o t i o n that the implanted logos "saves souls" as it is o f his assumption that it can b e "heard a n d d o n e . " In fact, in a passage w h i c h is, incidentally, reminiscent o f J a m e s in several respects, Philo writes similarly o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f the d o m i n a n c e o f reason o v e r that part o f the soul w h i c h is the seat o f anger: " F o r then is the soul saved (fi yu%Ti acp^exai), w h e n the seat o f anger (6 0\)jii6(;) is steered b y reason (bnb Xoyov) as b y a charioteer . . . "
1 2
Such
language o f "saving souls" does not seem to have b e e n typical o f the Stoics; o n the other hand, neither can Philo, n o r especially the eschatologically oriented author o f James, b e fairly described as typ ical Stoics. T o b e sure, it is b y n o means clear that "saving souls" means the same thing in Philo's Allegorical Interpretation as it does in the Letter o f James; but what this e x a m p l e from Philo does s h o w is that the use o f such language does n o t necessarily result from "mis understanding" o r a use o f philosophical c o n c e p t s with a m e a n i n g entirely unrelated to their original sense. T h e interesting question, in any event, is h o w a c o n c e p t o f "saving souls" c a m e to b e asso ciated b y Philo a n d — m o r e importantly for o u r p u r p o s e s — b y J a m e s , with a Stoic c o n c e p t o f logos. A n d if, o n the face o f it, James's eschatological orientation seems m o r e i n c o m p a t i b l e with Stoicism than Philo's mysticism, o n e n e e d only recall that the Christians Justin a n d M e t h o d i u s b o t h thought eschatological p u n i s h m e n t awaited those w h o did n o t live in a c c o r d with natural law. The
Letter o f J a m e s is indebted to the Stoics for its equation o f
"the implanted logos" with a perfect law. T h e elements o f James's presentation o f this c o n c e p t that differ from the Stoics, though, are just as illuminative o f its role in his religious imagination as are the similarities. Special attention must therefore b e given to several ques tions that arise with the observation o f apparent differences b e t w e e n
by other Jewish or Christian sources w h o drew on the Greek philosophers or results from a direct dependence upon the works o f Greek philosophers themselves is purely a matter o f speculation. T h e ultimate provenance o f the concept o f an implanted logos which represents the perfect law is in any case Greek philosophy. Similar ques tions can be raised with respect to the other usages o f the letter which are typical of G r e c o - R o m a n literature, e.g., the metaphors o f the bridle and the rudder in James 3. Leg. All. 3.137: T O T E yocp fj \|/u%r| ocp^exai, oiocv Kai 6 9i)uo<; fivio%T|0Ti bub Xoyov, my translation. (The L C L translation o f Colson, by rendering 6 0i)|i6<; fivio%T|0fi vnb Xoyov as "when the seat o f anger has received reason as its charioteer," might—in the present context—give the false impression that this passage is also similar to James with respect to the latter's expression Se^acOe T O V ejaxpuiov Xoyov.) For dis cussion o f Leg. All. 3.114-37 see below pp. 2 0 I f and 227f. 12
LOGOS AND THE L A W OF FREEDOM
J a m e s ' s understanding o f the i m p l a n t e d
logos a n d
139
Stoic discussions
o f h u m a n reason. I f the n o t i o n that it c a n b e " h e a r d " a n d , in s o m e sense, " r e c e i v e d " assumes that it has s o m e external f o r m , w h a t d o e s the a u t h o r c o n s i d e r this latter to b e ? W h a t , that is, is the
referent
o f the "perfect l a w o f f r e e d o m " ? In w h a t sense is the i m p l a n t e d logos u n d e r s t o o d to b e that " w h i c h is able to save y o u r souls"? W h a t ,
fur
ther, is the relation o f this logos to the "logos o f truth" b y w h i c h " G o d g a v e birth t o u s "
a c c o r d i n g to
1:18? W h e n , a n d
J a m e s i m a g i n e the euxpuxoq Xoyoq t o have b e e n
in w h o m ,
does
"implanted"?
T h e relationship b e t w e e n the implanted logos a n d the "logos o f truth" will b e taken u p in C h a p t e r Five. T h e present c h a p t e r will focus o n James's correlation o f the implanted logos with the "perfect law o f free dom."
After a closer e x a m i n a t i o n o f this correlation itself, it will b e
argued that J a m e s , like Philo, 4 Maccabees a n d the Apostolic Constitutions, finds a written expression o f the i m p l a n t e d
logos in the
Torah.
IMPLANTED LOGOS AND THE PERFECT L A W OF FREEDOM
Jas
1:19b contains a three-part a d m o n i t i o n : "let e a c h p e r s o n b e q u i c k
t o hear, slow t o speak, a n d slow to a n g e r . " of
this a d m o n i t i o n
"implanted
is e l a b o r a t e d
E a c h o f the
1:20-27,
and
the
elements phrase
logos'" o c c u r s as its last element, " s l o w to a n g e r " (ppaSuq
eiq opyfjv), is b e i n g e x p l a i n e d .
13
over
13
14
T h e exact admonition o f 1:19b is not, to my knowledge, attested elsewhere in ancient literature. Cf. however the remarkably similar grouping o f speech, hearing and anger in the advice regarding the "best way to excercise authority" in Lucian Demon. 51: 'Aopyriioq, eVn, m i oAiya \ihv XaXcbv, noXXa 8e aicoucov. This would seem to suggest that James is at least following a traditional association o f the three, whether or not he has himself formulated the particular admonition o f 1:19b. O n 1:19-27 as structured around the saying o f 1:19b, see Dibelius, James, 108-23, esp. 108-9; cf. Fabris, Legge, 5 5 - 5 6 . Note, however, that I disagree with Dibelius in several points o f detail, the most important o f which, in this context, concerns 1:21 itself. T h e contrast o f ev npocutTiTi in 1:21 with the 6pyr| o f 1:20, particularly considering the use o f 8i6 to join these verses, seems to me to indicate that 1:21 is to be viewed primarily as part o f the elaboration o f the theme "slow to anger"; thus, to paraphrase: "anger doesn't produce righteousness; therefore, set aside all evil and receive the implanted logos with humility." Dibelius, while recog nizing the contrast between "anger" and "humility," nonetheless views this verse as a part o f the elaboration o f "slow to hear," albeit as "the transition to that theme" (ibid., 112; cf. 108-9). So also Fabris, w h o consequently considers the author's use o f the strong conjunction 816 to be somewhat less than appropriate: "II verso 21 presenta una nuova esigenza, c o m e conseguenza, 816, di quello che precede, anche se il nesso causale c o n il verso 20 sembra sproporzionato" (Legge, 56). 1 4
140
CHAPTER FOUR
For human anger (opyn) does not work God's righteousness. Therefore, setting aside all filth and evil excess (jcepiaaeiav Kaidac;), receive with humility the implanted logos (xov euxpmov Xoyov) which is able to save your souls (1:20-21). 15
16
T h i s logos, h o w e v e r , also receives emphasis in the immediately sub sequent elaboration o f the admonition's first element, "quick to hear" (TCCXIX; eiq TO &KOUGOCI), w h i c h consists o f a contrast b e t w e e n t w o types
o f "hearer" (dcKpoaxriq) o f the logos: 17
And (5e) become logos-doers and not merely hearers who deceive themselves. For if someone is a logos-hearer and not a doer, this one is like a man who looks at the face o f his birth in a mirror; for he looks at himself and departs, and immediately forgets what sort he is (ojcoioq f|v). But the one who looks into the perfect law which is o f freedom and remains becomes not a forgetful hearer but a deed-doer; this one will be blessed in his or her doing (1:22-25). 18
T h e expression
66
logos-doer" with this sense, as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , is
a semitism, a n d such a pairing o f "hearing" a n d " d o i n g " is in fact c o m m o n in Jewish a n d Christian ethical instruction. In this instance, the n e e d to " b e c o m e logos-doers a n d n o t merely hearers" is explained by
likening the latter type o f hearer to o n e w h o looks into a mir
ror, and contrasting his o r her b e h a v i o r in this respect to that w h i c h is typical o f the d o e r .
15
19
Cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 201: "excess o f evil"; Ropes, St. James, 171: "'excres cent wickedness', 'superfluity o f naughtiness'"; Dibelius, James, "profuse wickedness"; N R S V : "rank growth o f wickedness." O n the options for translating Ttepioaeia in particular see esp. Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 6 7 - 6 8 . I take the phrase rcepiaaEiav icaiaaq as a genitive o f quality on the model o f dicpoaxTi<; £nikr\G[iovr]q (Jas 1:25), Kpixoci 8ia^oyia|icov rcovripcov (2:4) and, perhaps, 6 Koauoc; xfjc; d5iK(a<; (3:6), ev npavxt|xi ao(pia<; (3:13) andfi zv%r\ xfjq rciaxeax; (5:15); see further B D F §165. In this case, desire—which, as we shall see, is the opposite o f logos; which is associated with impurity (cf. 1:21, pvnapia) in 4:8 (in contrast to "humility"!) and elsewhere; and which is linked with [xd] Kaicd in 1:13—would be thought o f in terms o f an "excess" or "rank growth." Cf. in this respect esp. 4 Mace 1:29; also AC 6.23.2; further Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, ch. 3, esp. 155-73. O n ev rcpomxTixi as modifying Se^ocoGe in particular, see below p . 189. This phrase, which sets up a contrast with 6pyf| (cf. 1:19, 20), may however have been positioned so that it can modify both dTtoGejxevoi and SE^OCGGE; cf. in this respect the phrase i)7i6 xfjc; e7ciGi)(xia<; in 1:14, which can (and should?) be read with both 7 i e i p d £ e x a i and e^e^Kojxevoc; Kai 5eXea^6(ievo<;. O n the force o f 8E here, see below p . 189, note 200. O n the sense o f this clause, see p . 142, note 26. M y gender inclusive language does not reflect the author's use o f the gender 16
17
18
19
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
141
J a m e s ' s m i r r o r m e t a p h o r has b e e n subject to a n u m b e r o f different, a n d often very exacting, interpretations.
20
It has b e e n argued variously
that h e intends t o liken the l a w t o a m i r r o r , between the law and a m i r r o r , o r contrast at a l l .
23
22
21
to set u p a
contrast
o r that he intends n o such c o m p a r i s o n
In addition, great significance is often attached to
the use o f different verbs o f " s e e i n g " in 1 : 2 3 - 2 4 (K(XTOCVO£CD) a n d
1:25
(jiapaKUTiTco) in the service o f o n e o r another o f these interpretations. T h e least likely b y far o f the three general positions r e g a r d i n g relationship
b e t w e e n the l a w a n d
the m i r r o r is that w h i c h
24
the
finds
a
contrast b e t w e e n t h e m . It is clear f r o m the e l a b o r a t i o n as a w h o l e that the self-deception characteristic o f the " m e r e hearers" (1:22) lies n o t in their attention t o s o m e deficient logos, b u t in their overestim a t i o n o f "hearing," a n d subsequent failure to r e s p o n d to,
the
tinction object
appropriately
logos w h i c h "saves souls" (cf. 1:21). T h a t is to say, the b e t w e e n the of, b u t
"hearing."
" m e r e h e a r e r " a n d the " d o e r " lies n o t in
rather in the
T h u s the
actions subsequent
dis the
t o , their respective
self-deception: the f o r m e r d o e s i n d e e d
"hear"
that " w h i c h is able to save souls," but "blessedness" consists in " d o i n g " (noii\aiq), n o t m e r e l y " h e a r i n g . "
25
T h e s u d d e n (and subde) injection
exclusive d v T | p for the purposes o f this simile (1:23). dvr|p was perhaps chosen over dvGpcoTtoc; for the sake o f a vivid illustration; cf. however the use ofdvrip also in 1:8, 12 and 3:2. See already the critical comments o f Dibelius o n this matter in James, 115. T h e most recent and, to my knowledge, most extensive treatment is that o f L. T . Johnson, " T h e Mirror o f Remembrance (James 1:22-25)," CBQ50 (1988) 6 3 2 - 4 5 . S o , e.g., Mayor, St. James, 72; Johnson, "Mirror." S o also apparently Ropes, w h o observes that Philo, in Vit. Cont. 10 §78, "compares the law (fj vo|xo6ea(a) to a mirror for the rational soul (i\ XoyiKTi \in)%r|), in a manner which recalls James's figure" (St. James, 176). Ropes, however, does not interpret the implanted logos as human reason; his point, apparently, is rather that both writers consider the law to be a mirror o f the soul. S o Laws, Epistle of James, 8 5 - 8 6 . S o Dibelius, James, 115; Blackman, Epistle of James, 64. Thus Laws, w h o argues that the author intends to set up a contrast between the logos and a mirror, suggests that TtapociomTCO suggests a mere glance while K a t a v o e c o suggests a more careful consideration; the author thus implies that just a quick look in the logos is sufficient, while even close study o f the image in the far inferior lit eral mirror is futile (Epistle of James, 86). It is indicative o f the confusion surround ing the meaning o f this simile that Johnson, w h o argues that the author intends to liken the logos to a mirror, argues precisely the opposite: that TtapaKtmtCG suggests a more steady "gaze" while K a x a v o e c o connotes a more transitory "noticing" or "fleeting glance"! See Johnson, Letter of James, 2 0 7 - 9 . O n the significance o f the use o f these different terms, see below, note 30. Cf. Dibelius, James, 114: "Merely hearing is equivalent to self-deception so long as one believes that even then the word can still 'save'." 2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3
2 4
2 5
CHAPTER FOUR
142
o f a distinction b e t w e e n the
objects o f the
tion w o u l d o n l y serve to distract o n e
respective hearers' atten
f r o m w h a t is clearly the
root
issue: the i m p l a n t e d logos w h i c h is "able to save y o u r souls" must only be On
" h e a r d , " but
the
not
" d o n e " as well.
o t h e r h a n d , it is quite possible, i n d e e d p r o b a b l e , that
the
simile implies that the a u t h o r u n d e r s t o o d the law to function in s o m e sense as a m i r r o r .
26
T h i s w o u l d in fact b e consistent with the
m i r r o r i m a g e r y b y G r e c o - R o m a n moralists, as J o h n s o n has while Dibelius's v i e w that the as
use
getting finds little support in the
precisely f r o m the
the
not pursued. R a t h e r , the
one
who
fogay-hearer
the
who
case text
is not also a d o e r
c o m p a r i s o n itself, m o r e o v e r ,
and is
basis o f three actions shared b y these
m e r e hearer is like a m a n
a m i r r o r i n a s m u c h as (s)he t o o
2 6
for
Nonetheless,
interpretation o f this passage results
looks into a mirror. T h e
types: the
28
o n l y c o m p a r i s o n that is explicit in the
formulated specifically o n the two
ancient literature.
fact that this particular c o m p a r i s o n is in any
is that d r a w n b e t w e e n the
27
m i r r o r appears in this passage m e r e l y
a result o f a p o p u l a r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n mirrors and
remarkable d i v e r g e n c e in
of
shown,
who
looks at
his
face
in
[i] looks at him/herself, [ii] departs,
Note in this case the peculiar use o f the phrase TOrcpoocoTiovxfj<; yeveaecoc; cruxov to describe that which is seen in the mirror. Assuming such a comparison is at work, xfj<; yeveoeax; might simply connote the "natural" face seen in a mirror (as opposed to the psychic reality reflected in the law o f freedom); so, e.g., Johnson, "Mirror o f Rembrance," 634. However, given the author's notion that " G o d gave birth (&7t£Kt>r|0£v) to us" by means o f logos—a birth which he has just mentioned in 1:18—it might be taken more literally as "the face o f one's birth," and thus as an allusion to the fact that the law reflects the logos that was was involved in "our" birth. Cf. in this respect Hort, Epistle of St. James, 39: "The yeveaiq is his birth strictly, in antithesis to his later degeneracy; but the face is the invisible face, the reflexion o f God's image in humanity"; cf. Sidebottom, James, Jude and 2 Peter, 35. Note also in this connection Jas 3:9: xoox; dcvGpamoix; xoix; Ka0' ouoicooiv Oeoft yeyovoxocq. If this is in fact the case, then 6rcoio<; rjv (Jas 1:24) would most likely refer to the nature o f the human being as Xoy\Kr\; cf. in this case AC 7.39.2: "Let him [sc. the one w h o is to be baptized] learn the order o f a distinguished creation, the sequence o f providence . . . why the world came to be and why man was appointed a world citizen. Let him understand his own nature, o f what sort it is (emyivcooKexco xryv eaoxov (puoiv, o i a xi<; {mdp%ei)"; see further on this passage p . 118, above. Note also in this connection Philo, Vit. Cont. 78, where the law (f| vouoOeoioc) is said to represent a mirror for the rational soul (f| A,oyiKTj \\fv%r\). See Johnson, "Mirror," 6 3 6 - 4 1 . Cf. Dibelius, James, 115 with n. 115. Ludwig argues that the theme o f "forgetfulness" in connection with the law is to be understood in light o f the Jewish literature in particular (Wort als Gesetz, 168-69). 2 7
2 8
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
and
143
[iii] i m m e d i a t e l y forgets w h a t (s)he has seen ( 1 : 2 4 ) .
29
Whether
o r n o t the use o f a v e r b o f " l o o k i n g " in 1:25 implies a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the m i r r o r simile—and thus a further, i f o n l y implicit, likening o f the
hearer w h o is a " d o e r , " t o o , t o o n e w h o looks into a m i r r o r —
it is precisely these three actions w h i c h p r o v i d e the basis for the c o m p a r i s o n that is the chief c o n c e r n o f the passage: that o f the " m e r e h e a r e r " a n d the " d o e r . " T h e looking, departing, a n d forgetting o f the m e r e hearer (1:24) are inevitably to b e c o m p a r e d with the looking, remaining, a n d not forgetting o f the d o e r ( 1 : 2 5 ) .
30
T h o u g h that w h i c h o n e has " h e a r d " a n d n o t forgotten in 1:25 is u n d e r s t o o d to b e that w h i c h was " s e e n " in the "perfect l a w o f free dom,"
the elaboration as a w h o l e , as p o i n t e d o u t a b o v e ,
assumes
that b o t h types o f "hearer" in fact " h e a r " the same logos. T h e cru cial difference b e t w e e n the " m e r e hearer" a n d the " h e a r e r " w h o is also a " d o e r " lies in their actions subsequent to "hearing," n o t in the o b j e c t o f their p e r c e p t i o n . T h e force o f the c o m p a r i s o n thus indi cates that "hearing the logos" a n d " l o o k i n g into the perfect l a w o f f r e e d o m " are equivalent actions. I n d e e d , it is t h r o u g h constant atten tion to the perfect l a w o f f r e e d o m that o n e b e c o m e s a "/cgtw-doer." As
2 9
has b e e n
r e c o g n i z e d b y the majority
o f James's
31
interpreters,
Note esp. the use o f yap in 1:24: the mere hearer "is like a man looking at the face o f his birth [or: natural face] in a mirror, for he looks at himself and departs and immediately forgets . . . " (I translate all o f the verbs—perfect and aorist— o f 1:24 with the present o n the understanding that they all function essentially as gnomic aorists; see BDF §344; cf. MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 105 n. 8. Ropes's view that the perfect aneXr\kvQEV is used "because o f reference to a lasting state" [see St. James, 176-77] seems to me weak in light o f the fact that the real "lasting state" with which the author is concerned is that o f forgetfulness. The perfect is perhaps used above all for the sake o f euphony [cf. amX'h'kvQev with enekaBEXo], as Dibelius suggests [James, 115 n. 41].) In fact, the use o f a verb o f "looking" at the beginning o f 1:25 may be intended above all to make the comparison in terms o f this series o f three actions all the more explicit; cf. the somewhat different view o f Dibelius, James, 116. It should also be noted, however, that the "law o f freedom" is in fact a written law (see o n this point below), and to this extent the use o f a verb o f "looking" is quite natural. In this connection, I find quite interesting a suggestion made by H . D . Betz, in a sem inar on James at the University o f Chicago, thatrcapaicwrcco(lit., "stoop," "bend over") might suggest a reading posture. O n e should not in any case, with Johnson, see in rcocpocKtmTa) a contrast with Kocxavoeco: the latter does not generally connote a "hasty glance" but, on the contrary, "contemplation" or considered reflection; see the entries for Kocxavoeco in B A G D and LSJ. In 1:25, the ideal type is described as arcovr|Tn<;epyov, but clearly not in dis tinction to the "logos-doer." O n the relation o f "doing" logos to "doing" epya, see Chapter Five, under the heading "Logos and Erga." 3 0
31
CHAPTER FOUR
144
regardless o f their divergent interpretations o f the relationship assumed to exist b e t w e e n the logos a n d the mirror, the ease with w h i c h the author m o v e s from logos to law in 1:21—25 indicates that "implanted logos" and "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " are functionally equivalent terms.
32
A s has b e e n argued at length in the previous t w o chapters, this equation o f implanted logos a n d law is r o o t e d in Stoic p h i l o s o p h y . While James, despite the interpretations o f Theophylactus, O e c u m e n i u s a n d Dionysius b a r Salibi, makes n o m e n t i o n o f anything analogous to implanted p r e c o n c e p t i o n s in this c o n n e c t i o n , the similarity o f his equation o f law a n d euxpuioq Xoyoq to C i c e r o ' s definition o f natural law in terms o f ratio insita, the association o f h u m a n reason with an euxpuxog vojuoq in the Apostolic Constitutions, the relationship b e t w e e n natural law and an e'jucpuToq ojtopa i o u Xoyou assumed b y Justin Martyr, and the enqnnoq c p D a t K o q vouoq o f M e t h o d i u s , c a n scarcely b e dismissed as m e r e c o i n c i d e n c e . J a m e s has not, alone a m o n g these authors, for mulated this equation entirely apart from Stoic influence. T h e under standing o f law in the Letter o f J a m e s , as in these diverse works, has b e e n i n f o r m e d b y the Stoic theory o f natural law. James's peculiarly lavish description o f the law as o n e that is b o t h "perfect" a n d " o f f r e e d o m " is striking in this c o n n e c t i o n .
33
O n e finds
limited analogies for these individual epithets in other ancient liter ature, but their c o m b i n a t i o n here is extraordinary, quite e m p h a t i c effect.
34
a n d creates a
B o t h , m o r e o v e r , are best u n d e r s t o o d in light
o f the correlation o f this law with 6 epxpuxoq Xoyoq.
32
In fact, many authors speak in terms o f identity in this connection: see, e.g., Kiihl, Die Stellung des Jakobusbriefes, 18-26; Ropes, St. James, 173; Dibelius, James, 116; Blackman, Epistle of James, 67; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 107; Fabris, Legge, 154 and passim', Martin, James, 51; Vouga, UEpitre de Saint Jacques, 65; Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 18 and passim', Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 135-44, 152-53; Tsuji, Glaube, 108-10. Others are more reticent in this respect, but posit a very close relation between the law o f freedom and the implanted logos nonetheless. See, e.g., Cadoux, The Thought of St. James, 74-76; Laws, Epistle of James, 79; Hoppe, Der theologische Hintergrund, 9 4 - 9 5 ; Johnson, Letter of James, 214. M y own view is closer to these lat ter authors: the "perfect law o f freedom" represents a written expression o f the implanted logos', while the two are thus functionally equivalent, they are not, strictly speaking, identical. See further on this below. Jas 1:25, vo^iov xeXeiov xov xr}q EXevQepiac,; cf. 2:12, vouo<; e7,ei)0epia<;. For a suggestion regarding the rhetorical context in which James's emphatic glorification o f the law is to be understood, see the concluding chapter of this study. 33
34
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
145
The Law of Freedom A s has often b e e n p o i n t e d out, the c o n c e r n for " f r e e d o m , " b o t h in itself a n d in c o n n e c t i o n with law, are characteristically
Greek,
and
typical o f the Stoics in particular, w h o s e p a r a d o x that " o n l y the sage is free" was well k n o w n in antiquity.
35
Fabris was well aware o f the
G r e e k a n d especially S t o i c p r e c e d e n t s for J a m e s ' s association o f l a w and freedom.
3 6
Nonetheless, o n the basis o f the p r e s e n c e o f clearly
Jewish a n d Christian traditions in the c o n t e x t in w h i c h the expression "law
o f f r e e d o m " is f o u n d in J a m e s , he c o n c l u d e d that it was n e c
essary to explain the expression entirely without recourse to the G r e e k sources.
37
T h e l o g i c o f this c o n c l u s i o n , h o w e v e r , is quite p r o b l e m a t i c .
A s has b e e n p o i n t e d out in o u r discussion o f the implanted logos itself, such an interpretation fails to account for the possibility that the thought o f J a m e s , like that o f m a n y
other
Christian authors o f his p e r i o d ,
represents a fusion o f Hellenistic, J e w i s h a n d Christian c o n c e p t s . Fabris's attempt to explain the r e p e a t e d use o f the expression " l a w o f f r e e d o m " in J a m e s " o n the and Jewish
background"
basis o f s o m e supposedly p u r e
is n o t persuasive
in any
case.
38
The
OT pri
m a r y " f r e e d o m " treated in the H e b r e w scriptures is that social state
3 5
For a discussion o f the development o f the Greek concept o f freedom, see M . Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought: The History of an Ideal (Dordrecht-Holland: D . Reidel; N e w York: T h e Humanities Press, 1966); H . Schlier, "eXeuOepoq, KTX.," TDKT 2.487-96; H . D . Betz, Paul's Concept of Freedom in the Context of Hellenistic Discussions about the Possibilities of Human Freedom (Protocol o f the 26th Colloquy o f the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture; Berkeley: T h e Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1977); F. S. Jones, "Freedom," ABD 2.855-59. For the Stoic interest in and understand ing o f freedom, see esp. Diog. Laert. 7.121 and 7.32-33; Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 5; Epictetus, Diss. 4.1; Philo, Every Good Man is Free; further Schlier, "eXeuGepoq," 4 9 3 - 9 6 ; and Dibelius, James, 116-17. Fabris, Legge, 3 3 - 4 2 . See ch. 3 o f Fabris, Legge, and esp. p . 8 1 : "E precisamente questo carattere biblico e giudaico del contesto delle formule di G i a c o m o che esclude l'ambiente greco e stoico c o m e matrice delle nozioni di G i a c o m o . " Fabris leaves himself some flexibility when he goes o n to assert that the "somiglianze esterne" between the lan guage of James and the Greek sources would allow at most the hypothesis that the author o f James has infused Greek terminology with an entirely new meaning. His openness to this possiblity is somewhat puzzling inasmuch as he elsewhere makes the methodological point that a determination o f the origin o f an expression is deci sive for its interpretation (see, e.g., Legge, 13, 32). H e does not in any case seem to take this possibility seriously, as it is not discussed further. See further on Fabris above, Chapter O n e . Jones, "Freedom," 858, explicitiy against Fabris. 3 6
3 7
3 8
CHAPTER FOUR
146
o p p o s e d to its
literal slavery,
c o g n a t e s in
erature,
41
the
LXX,
4 0
39
and
the
use
as well as
is largely consistent in
o f the
the
t e r m eXeuGepia
usage in
this respect. It
is n o t
dental, therefore, that o n e begins to find a clear a n d in
freedom
as
an
H a s m o n e a n and the
likely
acci
explicit interest
abstract value in Jewish t h o u g h t o n l y f r o m early R o m a n p e r i o d s : in
writings o f Philo and J o s e p h u s ;
revolts f r o m R o m e ;
3 9
and
later J e w i s h lit
4 4
43
p e r h a p s in the
o n the
1 and
2 Maccabees;
the 4 2
coins minted during
in the
eschatological expectations o f 4
Cf. the comments o f Jones, "Freedom," 855. £A,ei>0£p{a is nearly always used in the L X X with reference to a social state of individuals, whether with reference to nobility (e.g., 1 Kgdms 17:25; 3 Kgdms 20:8, 11; 2 Esdr 23:17) or, most often, in opposition to literal slavery (e.g., Exod 21:2, 5, 26, 27; Lev 19:20; Deut 15:12, 13, 18; 21:14). It is telling in this connec tion that, in contrast to the usual format for entries in TDJVT, Schlier's article on eXet)0£po<;, KTX. does not even include a section on the Jewish literature; see TDJVT 2.487-502. A . - M . Denis, Concordance Grecque des Pseudepigraphes dAncien Testament (Louvainla-Neuve: Universite catholique de Louvain, 1987) contains only twelve entries for cognates o f eXevdepia, seven o f which occur in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, three in the Letter of Aristeas, and one each in the Testament of Abraham (Recension A) and the Apocalypse of Sedrach. Again, the majority o f these occur in connection with the social institution o f slavery or literal captivity (T. Jud. 21:7; T Naph. 1:10; T Jos. 1:5; 13:6; 14:1; T. Abr. A 19:7; Ep. Arist. 27; 37); though cf. the use o f eXeuGepioc; in Ep. Arist. 246. O n T. Jud. 4:3, see the immediately following note; on Apoc. Sedr. 8:12; T. Ben. 10:8; and 4 Ezra 13:25-26, 29 and 7:96-98, note 45. Both 1 & 2 Maccabees depict the Maccabean revolt in terms o f a quest for the freedom o f Jerusalem (1 M a c e 2:11; 14:25; 2 M a c e 2:22; 9:13). Perhaps significantly, one such instance occurs in a letter purportedly from the hellenistic king Demetrius, which officially grants freedom to Jerusalem (1 M a c e 15:7). Cf. T.Jud. 4:3, where Judah and his brothers are said to have "liberated" (T]-/8A£u0epcoacx|i£v) Hebron. For an earlier, but somewhat different, use o f "freedom" as a political con cept, see 1 Esdr 4:49. According to Jones, discussion o f the Exodus under the rubric o f freedom such as is posited by Fabris first occurs in the writings o f Philo and Josephus ("Freedom," 856). Jones points out that Josephus also depicts both the Maccabean revolt and the first revolt against R o m e in terms o f a struggle for "freedom," commenting that "it is not least in this point that Josephus is indebted to Greek and R o m a n histo riography" ("Freedom," 856). See Fabris, Legge, 93, w h o must refer to the coins minted during the first revolt to demonstrate that the term nnn ("freedom")—which is not found in biblical lit erature—was even known in the first century C E . Note further in this connection that B. Kanel suggests that the shift from the legend "freedom (mn, nnn) o f Z i o n " on the coins o f the second and third years o f the first revolt, to "for the redemp tion (rbtolb) o f Z i o n " in the fourth year, has a religious significance: "Redemption seems to infer Messianic hopes current among the adherents o f Bar Gioras . . . T h e era 'Freedom o f Z i o n ' had probably implied only political freedom" ("Ancient Jewish Coins and their Historical Importance," BA 26 [1963] 57). So too, the shift from "redemption" in the first year o f the second revolt to "freedom" in the second year: noting that in the papyri, the followers o f Simon bar Kosiba continue in the sec ond year to date documents with reference to "the redemption o f Israel through 4 0
4 1
4 2
4 3
4 4
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
147
45
Ezra a n d the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs; and, finally, in a few passages from the rabbinic literature.
46
Fabris's c o n c l u s i o n that "[i]l r a p p o r t o tra legge e liberta n o n e . . . un fatto isolato nell'ambiente biblico e giudaico, m a una struttura p o r tante" based o n the myth o f the E x o d u s is in any case considerably
Simon bar Kosiba, Prince o f Israel," Kanel suggests that "the majority o f the Rabbis opposed the claim o f Simon to be styled 'Prince o f Israel' . . . as well as the assump tion held by Rabbi Akiba that Simon was the redeemer o f Israel; therefore in the second year o f the revolt the terminology on the coins was changed to claim only political freedom" (ibid., 62). A similar interpretation is offered by Y . Meshorer, Ancient Jewish Coinage. Vol. II: Herod the Great through Bar Cochba (Dix Hills, N Y : Amphora, 1982) 122-23, 150-52. If such a line o f argument as these authors pro pose is in fact correct, it tells quite strongly against Fabris's contention that "free d o m " and divine redemption g o hand in the hand in ancient Jewish thought! See T. Ben. 10:8 (b) which, however, is clearly from a Christian hand: "and the Lord will first o f all judge Israel for their wrongs toward him, for they did not believe G o d arrived in flesh [as] liberator" ( o n Tcapayevafxevov 0e6v ev oapKl eA,8\)6ep(0TTiv OVK eTUCTE'uoav); cited according to M . de Jonge, et al., The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Critical Edition of the Greek Text ( P V T G 1; Leiden: Brill, 1978). R . H . Charles bracketed the entire clause as an interpolation, and the key term eX8\)08pcotf|v, which apparently occurs only in ms. b , was placed in the mar gin o f his critical edition; see The Greek Versions of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. Edited from Nine MSS together with the Variants of the Armenian and Slavonic Versions and Some Hebrew Fragments (repr. ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960) 229. H . C . K e e , w h o generally follows the edi tion o f Charles, omits the clause altogether ("Testaments o f the Twelve Patriarchs," OTP 1.828). Cf. also 4 Ezra 13:25-26, where it is said either that the Messiah (so the Latin), or G o d through the Messiah (so most versions; cf. 13:29), "will liberate his [sc. G o d ' s ] creation" (liberabit creaturam suam). This is echoed in 13:29, with G o d as its subject even in the Latin, and with human beings in particular as its object: "Behold, the days are coming when the Most High will begin to deliver those w h o are on the earth (quando incipiet Altissimus liberare eos qui super terram sunt)" (the translation is based on that o f M . E. Stone, Fourth Ezra: A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990] 392; I cite the Latin text as found in A. F. J. Klijn, Der lateinische Text der Apokalypse des Esra [ T U 131; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1983]). See further 7:96-98, where those w h o have "kept the ways o f the Most High," after their death but before they reach their final heavenly destina tion, will "see the straits and great toil from which they have been delivered (angustum et plenum quo liberati sunt), and the spaciousness (spatiosum) which they are to receive and enjoy in immortality" (the translation is again based on Stone, 4 Ezra, 237). Stone points out that this passage is to be understood in light o f the discussion o f the "narrow road" which leads to the inheritance in 4 Ezra 7:3-13 (ibid., 244); that is, what they are "delivered" or "liberated" from is the exceedingly difficult journey toward Israel's "portion." Cf. further 4 Ezra 7:101. 4 5
Note too, finally, Apoc. Sedr. 8:12 (= 8:10 in S. Agourides, "Apocalypse o f Sedrach," OTP 1.611), where the seer requests G o d to "free the human being from punish ment" (eA,£\)08p(GOOv xov avGpomov EK xx\v KOAXXGIV), i.e., esp. eschatological punish ment; the Greek text is cited according to O . Wahl, Apocalypsis Esdrae. Apocalypsis Sedrach. Visio Beati Esdrae ( P V T G 4; Leiden: Brill, 1977). See Fabris, Legge, 8 4 - 1 0 3 , 113-21, 130-31. 4 6
CHAPTER FOUR
148
overdrawn.
47
As Jones
o f Israel f r o m umission
has
pointed
slavery in E g y p t
out,
"[t] h o u g h
is cited in
o f H e b r e w slaves in the
7th year
the
support (Deut
redemption
for the
man
15:15), the
OT
d o e s not d e v e l o p a t h e o l o g y o f f r e e d o m o n the basis o f the E x o d u s . "
48
In fact, the interpretation o f the E x o d u s u n d e r the rubric o f "free dom"
is first evident in the writings o f Philo a n d J o s e p h u s .
49
In
any
event, while the association o f l a w a n d f r e e d o m (or d i s o b e d i e n c e a n d slavery) is o c c a s i o n a l l y m a d e in the rabbinic literature,
50
a direct link
b e t w e e n the t w o in a m a n n e r c o m p a r a b l e to J a m e s ' s " l a w o f free dom"
is rarely f o u n d elsewhere in the Jewish s o u r c e s .
given the
combination
o f the
51
T o b e sure,
G r e e k interest in f r e e d o m
d y n a m i c s o f covenantal thought, the ingredients for the
and
the
formulation
o f a direct c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n o b e d i e n c e to the l a w a n d
freedom
w e r e in p l a c e b y the hellenistic p e r i o d ; h o w e v e r , there is little evi d e n c e to support the thesis that this was a w i d e s p r e a d Jewish
senti
ment—let alone o n e that emerged entirely apart from Greek influence. It is therefore
striking that Philo a n d the
52
a u t h o r o f 4 Maccabees,
e a c h o f w h o m are clearly i n d e b t e d to the Stoic understanding o f law,
47
Legge, 113. Cf. the similar judgment regarding Fabris in Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 140 n. 120. Note that even with respect to the key evidence provided by the interpretation o f Exod 32:16 (according to which nnn ["engraved"] is given the alternative vocalization nnn ["freedom"]), the rabbis disagreed regarding the significance of the "freedom" in question, i.e., whether it was best understood with reference to the exile, the angel o f death, or suffering; see Legge, 84. Moreover, the inter pretation o f this passage in m. Avot 6:2 has n o clear connection to the Exodus myth, and seems, in fact, to envision an individual rather than a corporate free dom; cf. Jones, "Freedom," 856, w h o describes this passage as "[m]uch closer to the Stoic understanding o f (internal) freedom." Jones, "Freedom," 855; perhaps with an eye to Fabris: cf. Legge, 9 7 - 9 8 . See above note 43. See Fabris, Legge, 8 4 - 1 0 3 , and further 113-21. See also, however, note 47 above. Certainly, given the circumstances in which the Maccabean revolt arose, the desired "freedom" was largely that to live and worship in accord with Jewish law; see, e.g., 2 M a c e 2:22; cf. 1 M a c e 2:6-13; 15:7. This, however, is quite different from the notion that the law itself guarantees freedom. Johnson argues that "the idea [apparently, "that obedience to the law renders a person free"] is widespread enough . . . to make any direct dependence on Stoic ideas [on the part o f the author o f James] unnecessary" (Letter of James, 209). T h e signficance o f the implicit distinction between "direct" and "indirect" dependence on Stoic ideas on the part o f James here is not altogether clear; whatever the case, of "the examples from Jewish literature" which Johnson cites in support o f his posi tion, at least two o f the three writings (Philo, That Every Good Man is Free and 4 Maccabees) are obviously indebted to Stoicism in this respect. 4 8
4 9
5 0
5 1
5 2
LOGOS AND THE LAW both
explicitly associate
the
OF FREEDOM
l a w with f r e e d o m .
149
5 3
F o r the
eA,£rj6ep{a was defined in terms o f "living as o n e w i s h e s , "
54
Stoics,
w h i c h is
to say, to b e subject neither to hindrance (KCDHKJOCI) n o r c o m p u l s i o n (dvayKaaai), self.
56
5 5
a n d thus, in a w o r d , to b e the sole master o f o n e
S u c h f r e e d o m is impossible if o n e longs for things w h i c h are
not entirely u n d e r his o r her o w n control, because o n e thereby ren ders oneself subject to hindrance
or compulsion.
57
If, o n the
other
h a n d , o n e c o n f o r m s o n e ' s will a n d aims entirely to those o f G o d , everything will o f necessity h a p p e n as o n e wishes; therefore, o n e will by
definition b e free. T h u s
Epictetus:
But I have never been hindered ( E K C O A U O T I V ) in the exercise o f my will, nor have I ever been been subjected to compulsion (f|vayKdo&nv) against my will. And how is this possible? I have submitted my impulse (uo\) T T I V 6p|LiT|v) unto G o d . . . He wills that I should choose (opuixv) some thing; it is my will too. He wills that I should aim for (6pey£G0ai) something, it is my will too. He wills that I should get something, it is my wish too. He does not will it; I do not wish it. 58
59
60
T r u e f r e e d o m , therefore, "is not acquired b y satisfying yourself with what y o u desire, but b y destroying y o u r desire" (ou . . . £K7iA
61
I n d e e d , desire
and the other passions are the ultimate source o f the soul's slavery. In the w o r d s o f Philo, " i f the soul is driven b y desire (£7ti9uuia<;), o r enticed b y pleasure (fi8ovi]<;), o r diverted f r o m its course b y
53
fear
Cf. the discussion o f these works by Fabris, Legge, 3 7 - 4 2 . Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.1: ekextQepoc, e o x i v 6 £cbv ox; ^oxtXexax; cf. Cicero, Par. 5.34: Quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis; Philo, Quod. Omn. Prob. Lib. 59: £ f j v cbq pov^etai. This expression already had a substantial history in Greek thought; see Pohlenz, Freedom, 48 and 186 n. 50. Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.1; Philo, Quod. Omn. Prob. Lib. 60; cf. Cicero, Par. 5.34. Cf. onkoTtpocyta (Diog. Laert. 7.121; Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 21); ametpvaioc, (Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.56, 62); a\rc6vo|Lio<; (Diss. 4.1.56). See esp. Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.62-84. Cf. Philo's discussion o f the endurance o f torture by Zeno the Eleatic and Anaxarchus in Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 105-109 (cf. Diog. Laert. 9.27, 59). Cf. Oldfather: "my freedom o f choice." O n the Stoic understanding of 6pur|, see above, pp. 37f. I alter the translation o f Oldfather, who renders opeyeoOai "desire." Such a translation might create a certain confusion given the c o m m o n use o f this English term to translate £7ii0a)|Lieiv and its cognates, which connote something quite different; cf. e.g. Diss. 4.1.175, which is cited immediately below. O n the Stoic understanding of ope^K;, see further Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 114-26 and 224-42, esp. 235-37. Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.89. Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.175. 54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
CHAPTER FOUR
150
(<pop(p), o r shrunken b y grief (Mwrn), o r helpless in the grip o f anger (opynq), it enslaves itself a n d makes h i m w h o s e soul it is a slave to a host o f masters."
62
F r e e d o m consists, rather, in o b e d i e n c e to G o d .
6 3
Specifically, says Philo, this entails living in a c c o r d with "right rea s o n , " the true divine law: just as with cities, those which lie under an oligarchy or tyranny suffer enslavement, because they have cruel and severe masters, who keep them in subjection under their sway, while those which have laws to care for and protect them are free, so, too, with men. Those in whom anger (6pyr|) or desire (e7ti0i)|Lna) or any other passion (TI aXXo naQoq), or, again, any insidious vice (raida) holds sway, are entirely enslaved, while all whose life is regulated by law are free (oaoi 8e \IEXO: voum) £ C O G I V , eXevQepoi). And right reason is an infallible law (vouxx; 8e a\|/£\)8fi<; 6 opQbq Xoyoq) engraved . . . by immortal nature on the immortal mind, never to perish. So, one may well wonder at the short-sightedness o f those who . . . deny that right reason, which is the fountainhead o f all other law, can impart freedom to the wise, who obey all that it pre scribes or forbids. 64
65
T h u s , t o o , c a n the author o f 4 Maccabees extol the reasoning faculties (Aoyiauoi) o f the seven brothers as "freest o f the free" (e^euGepcov etauGeparcocToi) in light o f their ability to o v e r c o m e their passions a n d remain faithful to the law, despite the tortures o f Antiochus Epiphanes.
66
T o b e sure, the fact that J a m e s shows n o interest in " f r e e d o m " apart from his o b v i o u s desire to associate it with law prohibits o n e from drawing any decisive conclusions regarding his
understanding
o f the c o n c e p t , o r even h o w , precisely, he c o n c e i v e d o f its relation to l a w .
6 2
67
O n the other hand, that he describes as vouoc; eXeuGeptaq
Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 159; cf. 17-18; see further Cicero, Paradoxica Stoicorum 5, passim. Cf. Seneca, De Vita Beata 15.7: deo parere libertas est; further Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.91-110. Philo here alludes to the associaton o f law and freedom found in Greek polit ical thought; see on this Schlier, "eXeuGepoc;," 4 8 8 - 9 2 . Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 4 5 - 4 7 (with a clear allusion to the Stoic definition o f law); cf. 62. See also Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.158, where Diogenes is said to be free because he did not consider his body to be his own, because he needed nothing (o\)8ev Seojxai), and because "the law (6 vojioq), and nothing else, is everything" to him. 4 Mace 14:2; cf. in this respect Philo's discussion o f Z e n o the Eleatic and Anaxarchus (see above note 57); and further Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.90, 172. O n the parallel use o f the phrase pocoiAecov paoiAiKcbiepoi in this connection in 4 Maccabees, see immediately below. Conversely, the author speaks o f "slavery" only in a positive sense, when describing himself (or his literary persona) as Geov Kai icupiou Tricot* Xipiauoa) 8oa)ta)<; (Jas 1:1). Presumably, he understands such "slavery" to be anything but opposed to etauGepia. 6 3
6 4
6 5
66
6 7
LOGOS AND THE L A W OF FREEDOM
151
precisely that law w h i c h he equates with the implanted logos is scarcely coincidental, ing
o f the
68
and
is at
term. In
the
very least suggestive o f his
fact, the
logos o f J a m e s , as
we
understand
shall see
in
the
following chapter, functions a b o v e all in opposition to desire (emGuuioc) and
the pleasures (ai fiSovai); indeed, James's admonitions to " r e c e i v e "
the
i m p l a n t e d logos and
attention to
the
"law
to b e c o m e a "logos-doer" b y giving constant
of freedom"
m e n t that h u m a n individuals, not tion,
and
(KOCK{OC),
6 9
is
is that the dom";
coupled,
and
and
further,
come God,
with a
on are
c h a r g e to
a n g e r (6pyr|) in p a r t i c u l a r .
70
heels o f an
lay
aside all
vice case
a u t h o r is o b v i o u s l y eager to associate the his
e q u a t i o n o f it with "the
argu
tempta
W h a t is clear in any law with
"free
i m p l a n t e d logos" is a
move
that i m m e d i a t e l y warrants this association.
6 8
the
responsible for
71
So also the libertatis lex o f Irenaeus (A. H. 4.34.4) which, though identified with "the word o f G o d , preached by the aposties," includes the "natural precepts" which were ab initio infixa. . . hominibus; these, according to Irenaeus, were given to Israel in the form o f the decalogue, and brought to fulfillment by Christ (A. H. 4.15.1; see further 4.16). Note also the connection assumed between freedom and ratio nality in, e.g., A. H. 4.4.3; cf. 4.2.4. At the same time, however, the "freedom" which is characteristic o f this "law" is opposed to the "slavery" which character izes the remainder o f Jewish law (e.g., A. H. 4.9.1-2; 4.13.4), which was imposed, at least in part, as a result o f Israel's proclivities toward idolatry (A. H. 4.14-15); this polemical use o f the concept o f "freedom" is somewhat reminiscent o f Gal 4:21-5:1. See further on Irenaeus's notion o f natural law W . R . Schoedel, " T h e Appeal to Nature in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought" (Ph. D . diss., University o f Chicago, 1963) 4 3 5 - 4 3 . Note in this connection Davids's formulation o f the problem o f the "law o f free d o m " in James: " . . . unless one finds specific Stoic concepts (such as natural law or passionless life) [in James] it is more likely that he [sc. the author o f James] is still within a Jewish Christian world" [Epistle of James, 99). In fact, the author o f James not only draws on the Stoic equation o f law and euxprnoq Xoyoq, but under stands this Xoyoc, to function above all in opposition to 87CiG\)|iia and a i fi8ova{; on this latter point, see Chapter Five. Whatever the case, Davids's assumption o f a sharp dichotomy between the concept o f freedom in the "Jewish Christian world" and in Greek thought is problematic. O n the meaning o f raKioc here, see the remarks of Johnson, Letter ofJames, 201. Cf. in this respect Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 4 5 - 4 7 , cited above. (On the relation o f Jas 1:21 to 1:20 and 1:13-18, see below.) Cf. the comment o f Reicke, The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude, 2 3 - 2 4 : " [ T h e expression 'law o f liberty'] may have been inspired by the Stoic ideal o f freedom, according to which men ought to strive for independence from every passion o f the soul, such as anger, fear, etc. Freedom o f this kind is o f interest here since in vss. 19-21 the author admonishes his readers to shun wrath and all evil passions." It is o f course possible that the author's interest in "freedom" works on more than one level; cf. in this respect Irenaeus's libertatis lex and above note 68. This possiblity is at least implicitly recognized, for example, by Dibelius, w h o interprets James's "law o f freedom" in light o f both Stoic concepts and a supposed freedom from "the burden o f ritualism" on the part o f Christians who found, in the teaching 6 9
7 0
71
152
CHAPTER FOUR
The Perfect Law Similarly, while a certain analogy for James's description o f his law as "perfect" is f o u n d in L X X Ps
72
18:8 (6 vouoq xou K u p l o u OCJLICOJLIOC;),
the epithet xekewq, t o o , is best understood in light o f the equation 73
o f the law with the implanted logos. T h e apologetic c o m p a r i s o n with other (imperfect) laws w h i c h this description implies is characteristic o f ancient treatments o f natural law. Z e n o himself, in his Republic, h a d envisioned a state in w h i c h the different local systems o f justice (i5(oi<; SIKOCIOK;) w e r e r e p l a c e d b y the KOIVO<; v o u o q .
74
Similarly, Philo
contrasts "right reason" with the laws o f S o l o n and Lycurgus: it is "engraved not b y this mortal o r that and, therefore, perishable as he, n o r o n p a r c h m e n t o r slabs, and, therefore, soulless as they, but by immortal nature o n the immortal m i n d , never to perish." It is, 75
in short, an "infallible" o r "trustworthy" law (vouoq d\j/erj8r|<;). Justin, t o o , contrasts the conflicting h u m a n laws (xovq vouoix; TCGV dv6pcG7tcov),
each o f w h i c h contains s o m e m i x o f p r o p e r and i m p r o p e r elements, to the "right reason" o f Christ, w h i c h dispelled the confusion engen dered b y this diversity b y presenting the true law, the law o f nature.
76
In fact, the theme o f perfection emerges elsewhere in J a m e s par ticularly in association with logos and the resistance o f desire. T h e "perfect m a n " (xekeioq dvr|p) is identified explicitly as o n e w h o does not stumble ev A,6ycp (3:2)—a phrase w h i c h surely intends a reference to speech, but speech, m o r e specifically, in its relation to the implanted logos. T h e definition o f such a xekeioq as o n e w h o is able to "bridle of Jesus, "a new law"; see James, 116-20. O n the author's interest in freedom, see the Conclusion o f this study. Cf. M T Ps 19:8: no-an. Cf. further the similar description o f the law o f the Jews, owing to its supposed divine origin, as "pure" or "without contamination" (&K£pociov) in Ep. Arist. 31. Note, however, that in this latter passage the law is also described as "most philosophical" ((pi^oao(pcoi£pav); cf. in this respect the presen tation o f the law o f Moses in 4 Maccabees as the "philosophy" o f the Jews (see above, Chapter Three). While Ps.-Aristeas, unlike the author o f the latter work, stops short o f identifying Jewish law with natural law, it is the implication o f the work as a whole—and o f this passage in particular—that it represents the Jewish "philoso phy," and one which ranks among the best o f the Greek philosophies, not least owing to its divine origin. In what follows I assume the discussion o f perfection found in the following chapter, under the heading "lekeiot;." SVF 1.262; on this passage see further above, pp. 32f. Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 46; the translation o f d\|/£\)8f|(; as "infallible" is Colson's. Note that despite Philo's disparaging reference to "parchment" and "slabs" here, the equation o f the law o f Moses with natural law is nonetheless assumed through out his writings; see, e.g., Opif. 3, and above, Chapter Three. App. 9 . 3 - 4 . 7 2
7 3
74
75
76
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
153
his w h o l e b o d y " (Jas 3:2) is in fact reminiscent o f the c o m p l e t e selfmastery w h i c h , for the Stoic, comprises the true f r e e d o m o f the sage. And
while the failure
results in "sin," the
to resist the temptation o f desire (e,KiQv\iia)
endurance
o f such t e m p t a t i o n — a n d thus
the
" d o i n g " o f logos—is said to manifest itself in a "perfect d e e d " (xetaiov epyov).
77
The Royal Law A w o r d should also b e said in this c o n n e c t i o n regarding the use o f the phrase "royal l a w " (vouoq PCCOIA,IK6<;) in Jas 2:8. T h e p r o b l e m o f the significance o f the epithet " r o y a l " here is c o m p l i c a t e d b y the fact that, ultimately, it is n o t entirely clear whether it is used to describe "the w h o l e l a w " (cf. 2:10), that is, the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m , " o r to describe L e v 19:18 in particular. If, as is m o r e likely, the f o r m e r is the
case,
78
it is n o t e w o r t h y
G r e e k a n d Stoic p r e c e d e n t s .
79
that this association, t o o , has
good
O f particular interest in the present
c o n t e x t is 4 Mace 14:2, w h e r e the reasoning faculties (Xoyiojuoi) o f the seven brothers,
w h o s e d o m i n a n c e o f the passions is such that
they c a n resist the tortures o r d e r e d b y the "tyrant" (not fiaoiXevql cf.
4 Mace 5:1, 14, 27) A n t i o c h u s and thus avoid apostasy from the
law,
are lauded as b o t h eXeuGepcov eXeuGeparcocxoi ("freest o f the free")
a n d pocaiAecov pocaiA,iKcox£poi ( " m o r e royal than kings"). O n e
might
note further in this c o n n e c t i o n Philo's v i e w that the sage will " h o l d that nothing is m o r e royal than virtue (paaiAiKcoxepov ou8ev apexfjq)," and will thus " n o t fear the orders o f others w h o m they regard as subordinates";
literal kings, o n the other hand, are " m o r e often in
the position o f the sheep than o f the shepherd" since they are caught "in the snares o f pleasure" (7tdyai<;ii8ovfj<;).
8()
U n d e r s t o o d in this light,
the law o f James w o u l d b e described as "royal" inasmuch as obedience
77
Jas 1:2-4; cf. 1:13-15, and further 1:25: it is through constant attention to the "perfect law" that one becomes a "deed-doer." See further on this point Chapter Five, under the heading "Logos and Erga." I am inclined to agree with scholars such as Ropes, Dibelius, Fabris, W a c h o b and Johnson—against those like Kiihl, Hort, MuBner, Laws and Ludwig—that the vouo<; PaaiAiKoq refers to "the whole law," i.e., to the "perfect law o f freedom," esp. as the nine other occurrences of vouoc; in James (four o f which occur in 2:8-12) clearly refer to the law as a whole. See Meyer, Ratsel, 150-53; Fabris, Legge, 4 4 - 4 6 ; see further above, p . 94f on Philo. Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. 154 and 31. 78
79
8 0
154
CHAPTER FOUR
to it renders o n e "kingly," just as o b e d i e n c e to the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " renders o n e "perfect" and "free." A t the same time, there is likely s o m e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the description o f the law as royal in 2:8 and the reference to the " k i n g d o m " (paai^eia) G o d p r o m i s e d "to those w h o love h i m " in 2 : 5 .
81
T h e t w o , h o w e v e r , are not mutu
ally exclusive options; indeed, the adjective m a y have b e e n attrac tive to the author precisely because it works o n m o r e than o n e level.
82
Conclusion: James and the Stoics on Law T h e understanding o f law in the Letter o f J a m e s is indebted to Stoic philosophy. James's use o f the terms "implanted
logos" and law as
functional equivalents derives f r o m the Stoic identification o f h u m a n reason as a divinely given natural law. His lavish description o f this law as o n e that is b o t h "perfect" and " o f f r e e d o m " is also best under stood in light o f the Stoics. Like the various works e x a m i n e d in the previous chapter, h o w ever, James's presentation o f these philosophical ideas is also informed b y his a d h e r e n c e
to traditions and historical c o n v i c t i o n s alien
to
Stoicism; ideas a n d beliefs with w h i c h the Stoic understanding o f the logos innate in each h u m a n individual was not originally associated. This is evident particularly w h e r e the author speaks o f the implanted logos with language that is m o r e typical o f Jewish and Christian than Stoic literature. James's notions that this logos c a n b e " h e a r d " and, in s o m e sense, "received" in particular suggest that he, like the Jewish and Christian authors e x a m i n e d in the previous chapter,
assumes
that this logos has s o m e external, verbal form. H o w does he c o n c e i v e o f that f o r m ? W h a t is the "perfect law w h i c h is o f f r e e d o m " ?
T H E L A W OF FREEDOM AND T H E T O R A H
T h e "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " that James correlates with the implanted logos in 1:21-25 is referred to with a m o r e abbreviated
expression
in 2:12, where the "brothers and sisters" are w a r n e d that they should
8 1
Cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 230. Note especially in this connection that the phrase xoiq dya7c6)oiv OCDTOV, used here to designate those to w h o m the kingdom was promised, is a formulaic expression typically used in Jewish literature with ref erence to those who are faithful to G o d ' s law. See below, p . 166. Cf. in this respect the author's use o f the expression "law o f freedom," on which see, in this connection, the Conclusion o f this study. 8 2
LOGOS AND THE L A W OF FREEDOM
155
"speak (XaXzixe) and act (jcoieixe) as those about to b e j u d g e d b y the law o f f r e e d o m " (Sua vouou eXevQepiaq). T h e references to speech and particularly " d o i n g " in c o n n e c t i o n with the law o f f r e e d o m in this a d m o n i t i o n e c h o the g e n e r a l treatment 1:19—26.
83
o f these t h e m e s in
In 2:12, h o w e v e r , the author has a specific type o f speech
and action in mind: the warning appears at the conclusion o f an extended a d m o n i t i o n against "acts o f partiality" ( 2 : 1 - 1 3 ) . In fact, the warning o f 2:12 c o m e s right o n the heels o f an argument intended to p r o v e that showing partiality is a transgression o f the law ( 2 : 8 - 1 1 ) .
84
If, then, this warning is to make any sense in its context, the "law o f f r e e d o m " b y w h i c h the "brothers and sisters" will ultimately b e j u d g e d must b e the same law w h i c h excludes acts o f partiality. Jas 2 : 8 - 1 1 thus emerges as a critical passage for determining w h i c h law, precisely, is referred to as the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " ; indeed, as the only passage in the entire w o r k in w h i c h the author explicitly identifies c o m m a n d s included in this law, it is the critical passage in this respect.
85
Despite Dibelius's claim that "in his ritual and m o r a l injunctions the author does n o t have the M o s a i c law in m i n d at all," but rather Christianity itself "as a n e w l a w , " it is clear from the outset that the "perfect law o f freedom" bears some significant relation to the T o r a h .
86
T h e love c o m m a n d is q u o t e d in 2:8 with specific reference to its context within the T o r a h (KOCTOC xx\v ypotcpriv). Similarly, the fact that the L X X o r d e r is followed w h e n reference is m a d e to the law's c o m m a n d s regarding m u r d e r and adultery suggests that here, t o o , it is
8 3
T h e difficulty in using the same English term to translate rcoiico and its cog nates idiomatically throughout the letter should not obscure the fact that the same Greek verb is being used in 2:12 as in 1:22~25. T h e connection between 2:12 and James 1 is also recognized, e.g., by Ropes, St. James, 201. See further below. Both Dibelius and Fabris view Jas 1:27, where the author defines characteris tics o f "pure and undefiled religion," as being significant in this respect as well; see Dibelius, James, 116; and Fabris, Legge, 6 4 - 6 6 , 73, 160-65 (though cf. further 176). However, while Jas 1:27 is undoubtedly revealing o f issues which are especially important to the author, it does not address the question o f the precise commands which the law o f freedom contains in the same way as does Jas 2:8-12. Dibelius, James, 18 and 119; see further 116-20. Dibelius felt that both the expression "law o f freedom" and the author's silence on matters such as circumci sion, diet and the Sabbath were decisive in this respect. He describes the content o f this "new law" as "Jesus's words as well as the ethics which developed from them or were contained in his words" (ibid., 119). Note also, however, that Dibelius himself elsewhere suggests that " c o r e " o f the "new Christian law" was "the ethical teaching o f the old Jewish law" (ibid., 143). 8 4
8 5
8 6
CHAPTER FOUR
156
particularly
the
scriptural c o m m a n d s w h i c h are
view.
87
The
precise
relation o f the " l a w o f f r e e d o m " to the T o r a h , h o w e v e r , is o b s c u r e d b y several factors. First, it is n o t immediately clear if it is specifically a scriptural c o m m a n d that is at stake in c o n n e c t i o n with the
main
c o n c e r n o f the passage, acts o f partiality. T h e T o r a h d o e s c o n t a i n several such prohibitions ( L e v 19:15; D e u t 16:19; cf. D e u t 1:16-17), but s o m e interpreters r e m a i n
skeptical as to w h e t h e r J a m e s intends
a reference to the biblical c o m m a n d in particular as o p p o s e d to s o m e m o r e general p r o h i b i t i o n o f partiality, as f o u n d elsewhere in tradi tional Christian instruction. in Jas
88
S e c o n d , the love c o m m a n d m e n t i o n e d
2 : 8 , o f c o u r s e , r e c e i v e s special e m p h a s i s
in
a number
of
Christian works as a (or e v e n the) central c o m m a n d o f Jewish law. T h u s a n u m b e r o f exegetes have argued that, while the author d o e s have a scriptural p r o h i b i t i o n in m i n d in 2 : 1 - 1 3 , the
argument o f
2:8—11 assumes that s h o w i n g partiality is a transgression
n o t simply
b e c a u s e it is p r o h i b i t e d b y the T o r a h , but, m o r e specifically, b e c a u s e it is e x c l u d e d b y the l o v e c o m m a n d .
8 9
A c c o r d i n g to Luke T i m o t h y
J o h n s o n , for e x a m p l e , the a u t h o r o f J a m e s regards the T o r a h the Jewish
scriptures generally) as s o m e t h i n g w h i c h o n l y lays
c o n c r e t e e x a m p l e s o f w h a t the
8 7
"law o f l o v e " requires.
90
(and out
Evaluation
D . Deppe, The Sayings of Jesus in the Epistle of James (Chelsea: M I : Bookcrafters, 1989) 35-36; W . H . W a c h o b , ' " T h e Rich in Faith' and 'the Poor in Spirit': T h e socio-rhetorical function o f a saying o f Jesus in the epistle o f James" (Ph.D. Diss., Emory University, 1993) 2 1 3 - 2 3 , 2 7 3 - 7 9 . L X X Deut 5:17-18 reverses the M T order o f these two commands; L X X Exod 20:13-15 likewises places the adultery command before that concerning murder, and in addition places the prohibition o f stealing between them. T o be sure, the author o f James's use ofur| plus the aor. subj. for these commands is different from both L X X Exod 20:13, 15 and Deut 5:17-18; but cf. Mark 10:19 par. Luke 18:20. C . Burchard seems to consider it to be equally plausible that this prohibition is merely part o f the nebulous mass o f paraenetic material available to early Christians ("Nachstenliebegebot, Dekalog und Gesetz in Jak 2, 8 - 1 1 , " Die Hebraische Bibel und ihre zjuueifache Nachgeschichte: Festschrift fiir Rolf Rendtorff zum 65. Geburtstag [ed. E. Blum et al.\ Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1990] 27); Davids considers an explicit ref erence to a biblical c o m m a n d by James to be no more than "an attractive hypoth esis" (James, 115). Dibelius, o n the other hand, sees the influence o f Lev 19:15 as the result o f the author's dependence upon a supposed "Jewish paraenesis which dealt with partiality in the context o f its treatment o f love on the basis o f Lev 19" (James, 142); in this respect he nears the later position o f L. T . J o h n s o n , " T h e Use of Leviticus 19 in the Letter o f James," JBL 101 (1982) 3 9 1 - 4 0 1 . See in greatest detail W a c h o b , "Rich in Faith," 197-223, esp. 198-212. See esp. Johnson, " T h e Use o f Leviticus 19." Johnson's understanding o f the author of James's approach to the Torah is also well illustrated in idem, "Mirror o f Rembrance," 6 4 1 - 4 5 . Note in this connection that Johnson apparently considers 8 8
8 9
9 0
LOGOS AND THE L A W OF FREEDOM
of
the author's understanding
to
the partiality c o m m a n d o n o n e h a n d ,
(2:10) o n the
other,
are
157
o f the relation o f " l o v e o f n e i g h b o r " a n d to "the w h o l e l a w "
thus critical for d e t e r m i n i n g
his
general
a p p r o a c h to the T o r a h . T h i r d , the letter is silent o n issues such as diet, ritual purification, the
calendar a n d
c i r c u m c i s i o n . G i v e n this
silence, o n e c a n d o little m o r e than speculate o n their role in
the
author's v i e w o f law; a n d the c o n c l u s i o n s o n e draws f r o m this silence will likely d e p e n d as m u c h o r m o r e u p o n o n e ' s understanding o f the p l a c e o f such J e w i s h practices in e m e r g i n g Christianity in general as u p o n interpretation o f J a m e s itself. Nonetheless, given the
impor
tance o f these matters in the formation o f groups within the Christian m o v e m e n t , this question deserves at least s o m e attention. T h e s e three issues will b e dealt with in turn.
Acts of Partiality in Jas
2 : 1 - 1 3 , as a c o h e r e n t a r g u m e n t
2:1-13
against the practice o f partial
ity, represents a discrete section within J a m e s . is instructed
91
In 2:1 the a u d i e n c e
n o t to " h a v e the faith" o f Jesus Christ together
acts o f partiality" (ev 7rpoaco7co^n|a\|/{ai<;).
92
"with
W h a t "partiality" entails is
the author o f James to have understood the Jewish scriptures in general (however precisely his "canon" may or may not have been defined) to represent the "law o f freedom": o f the several "models for imitation" which he finds in James, only one (Abraham) is actually found in the Torah (contrast Rahab, Elijah and Job); see esp. "Mirror o f Rembrance," 6 4 1 - 4 2 . Thus, e.g., does Dibelius refer to it as " A Treatise on Partiality" (James, 124); cf. Chaine, Saint Jacques, 39: "Ne faire pas acception de personnnes"; Hauck, Die Kirchenbriefe, 14-16: "Keine Verachtung der Armen"; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 114: "Personenkult und kommende Gericht"; Cantinat, Les Epitres, 119: "Reprobation de la partialite"; Fabris, Legge, 66 (cf. 165): "Parenesi contro il favoritismo"; Davids, Epistle of James, 105: " N o Partiality is Allowable." See further Burchard, "Nachstenliebegebot," 520ff; and esp. the recent analyses o f 2:1-13 in light o f ancient rhetoric by W a c h o b ("The Rich in Faith") and D . F. Watson ("James 2 in Light o f GrecoR o m a n Schemes o f Argumentation," NTS 39 [1993] 9 4 - 1 2 1 , esp. 102-108). While Johnson recognizes that Jas 2:8-13 "is not in the least a transition to another topic than that pursued in 2 : 1 - 7 " (Letter of James, 235), he nonetheless presents James 2 as "a single argument" made up o f three discrete sections: 2:1-7; 8-13; 14-26 (ibid., 218-19). Johnson is certainly correct to emphasize the overarching unity o f James 2 (see on this also Watson, "James 2 , " and further below, the Conclusion o f this study); however, his separation o f the chapter into three sections gives the impres sion that 2:8-13 and 2:1-7 are no more closely related to each other than they are to 2:14-26, while in fact they form, together, a single argument against the practice o f partiality. See further o n this below. O n the precise force o f the phrase ev 7rpooco7co^r|u\j/{ai(; as "a designation o f accompanying circumstance," see Dibelius, James, 126 n. 9. For the phrase exeiv 91
92
niaxiq,
cf. Jas 2:14, 18.
158
CHAPTER FOUR
illustrated in an e x a m p l e , framed as an accusatory rhetorical
ques
tion, w h i c h contrasts the deference shown to a wealthy m a n the disrespectful
treatment o f a p o o r m a n as b o t h enter a
with "syna
93
g o g u e " ( 2 : 2 - 4 , auvaycoyn). After a further series o f rhetorical ques tions i n t e n d e d
to reveal that such b e h a v i o r disregards
both
the
p r e c e d e n t set b y G o d ' s treatment o f the p o o r ( 2 : 5 b - 6 a ) a n d the audi ence's o w n social experience at the hands o f the wealthy (2:6b, 7), the author p r o c e e d s to argue m o r e formally that such b e h a v i o r is a transgression
o f the law ( 2 : 8 - 1 1 , esp. 2 : 9 ) .
94
In 2 : 8 - 9 , s h o w i n g par
tiality a n d thus transgressing the law are j u x t a p o s e d with
fulfilling
the "royal l a w " b y loving o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as oneself. T h e love c o m m a n d is q u o t e d f r o m the L X X , and cited with specific reference to its scriptural context
(2:8, KOCTOC TT^V ypoc<pr|v). It is therefore
striking
that within the T o r a h , just p r i o r to the c o m m a n d regarding love o f n e i g h b o r (Lev 19:18), o n e finds a prohibition o f partiality ( L e v 19:15): Y o u shall not render an unjust judgment; you shall not be partial to the p o o r ( L X X : oi) Xr)\i\\fr\ npooayitov nxcaxov),
or defer to the great: with
justice you shall judge your neighbor. A n u m b e r o f interpreters have thus c o n c l u d e d that the argument from the law in 2 : 8 - 1 1 is m a d e with the prohibition o f partiality as f o u n d in the T o r a h in m i n d .
95
T h e citation o f the love c o m m a n d specifically
as "scripture" w o u l d thus serve to p o i n t to the written context o f L e v 19:18, w h e r e o n e also finds an injunction against partiality.
9 3
Against, e.g., Spitta, Der Brief des Jakobus, 61 n. 3, the image o f these two "going into" ( E i o e p x o j x a i eiq) the covaycoyri and then being seated suggests that the term is used o f the meeting place o f the assembly rather than the assembly iself. (Cf. the use o f £KicA,T|oi(x with the latter meaning in Jas 5:14.) T h e author's use o f this term is interesting given other aspects o f the work which seem to suggest a self-understanding which is not formulated over-against "Judaism," e.g., the address o f the letter to "the twelve tribes," on which see the preliminary remarks in M . A . Jackson-McCabe, " A Letter to the Twelve Tribes in the Diaspora: Wisdom and 'Apocalyptic' Eschatology in James" (SBLSP 35 [1996]) 5 1 0 - 1 5 . It is, however, by no means decisive in this respect: as Dibelius points out, even Marcionite Christians could use cuvaycoyri as a term o f self-reference, whether with respect to their meet ing place or the community itself; see Dibelius, James, 132-34. Cf. Burchard, "Nachstenliebegebot," 524f. "Sprache und Sache wechseln [in 2 : 8 - 1 1 ] . Statt rhetorischen Fragen Argumentation mit wenn und weil, allgemeine moralische Urteile auf Grund von Normen statt Kennzeichen von Personengruppen." Spitta, Der Brief des Jakobus, 6 6 - 6 9 ; Ropes, St. James, 199; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 124; Laws, Epistle of James, 114; Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 172; Johnson, " T h e Use o f Leviticus 19," 393; idem, Letter of James, 231; cf. Martin, James, 64, 68; and Klein, Ein vollkommmenes Werk, 148 n. 171. 9 4
9 5
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
159
T h i s m u c h is in fact c o n f i r m e d b y a c o m p a r i s o n o f the illustration o f "acts o f partiality" in 2:2~3 ments o f the
t h e m e . I m m e d i a t e l y following the
against such acts in
2:1, the
a u t h o r offers an
initial a d m o n i t i o n
e x a m p l e o f the
o f b e h a v i o r he has in m i n d in o r d e r to explain the exhortation for his
author's
with o t h e r ancient treat
type
relevance o f this
audience:
M y brothers and sisters, do not hold the faith o f our glorious Lord Jesus Christ with acts o f partiality (ev 7upoaco7uoX,rmvj/{ai<;). For if into your synagogue should come a man with gold rings and brilliant clothes, and at the same time a poor man in filthy clothes should enter, but you look to the one wearing the brilliant clothes and you say, " y sit here, in an honored place" ( K O C X O K ; ) , while to the p o o r man you say, "you stand there" or "sit beneath my footstool", have you not made dis tinctions among yourselves and become judges who reason evilly? 96
o u
97
98
9 6
99
O n the somewhat awkward xox> icupiou f|(xcov 'Incou X p i o i o v rfjq 86£rj<;, see esp. Dibelius, James, 126-28; more recently, W a c h o b , "The Rich in Faith," 148-59. Ropes sought to account for this adverb by hypothesizing a conversational use o f this term analogous to the English "please" (St. James, 190). Regardless o f any such convention, its primary effect in James is to contrast the "honor" shown to the rich man in the seat given him with the "dishonor" shown to the p o o r man; note in this respect 2:6a: by acting in this way, the addressees have "dishonored the p o o r " (v\i£iq 8e T i T i j i d o a x e xov TCTO&XOV). Cf. W a c h o b , "The Rich in Faith," 167, 190-92. It is also likely that the much discussed invitation to the poor man to sit bnb T O imorcoSiov \iov ("under my footstool") in 2:3 is to be regarded less as realis tic dialogue than as an hyperbole which makes the point regarding the humiliation o f the poor man painfully clear; cf. the use o f the image o f the footstool in L X X Ps 109:1 (= Ps 110:1). Cf. Ward, "Communal Concern," 94f. O n the problems in the interpretation of o\) 8i£Kp{0T|T£ ev eauioTq, see Dibelius, James, 136-37, and further R . B. Ward, "Partiality in the Assembly: James 2 : 2 - 4 , " HTR 62 (1969) 8 7 - 9 7 . Some have found the use o f SioucpweoOai in 1:6 to be deci sive, and thus translate the clause in light o f the theme o f division within individ ual human beings which is so prominent in the letter (cf, e.g., the figure o f the 8u|/\)%o<; in 1:8, 4:8); so, e.g., Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 85: "Are you not divided in yourselves?, i.e., guilty o f 8i\|/\)x(a." In fact, Dibelius's objection to this, viz., that the example o f 2:2-3 does not concern a wavering between "the world" and G o d (James, 136-37), seems to me to be quite off the mark: such a courting o f the rich to the dishonor o f the poor might be taken to signify precisely that lack o f faith in the providence o f G o d against which the author rails in James 1 and 4 : 1 - 6 (see the discussion o f these passages below, in Chapter Five). At the same time, how ever, given the association o f partiality with "judgment" and making unjust dis tinctions between people on the basis o f their social status, it seems likely that the connotation o f "judging" or "making distinctions" is foremost on the author's mind. Mitton suggests that the author plays on both senses o f the verb (Epistle of James, 84); cf. in this respect the author's use o f SiaXoyiouwv in 2:4, on which see the fol lowing note. T h e characterization o f those who show partiality as those with "evil reason ings" (Sia^oyiojiwv 7tovt|pcbv) is noteworthy, for, as we have seen, the law which 9 7
9 8
9 9
160
CHAPTER FOUR
T h i s e x a m p l e , as definitive o f the type o f b e h a v i o r that the
author
has in m i n d , is fundamental to the elaboration as a w h o l e : it is an e x a m p l e o f the "partiality" (7ipoaco7coA,r|pi|/{a) that, he will argue, ren ders o n e a transgressor o f the The
n o m i n a l and
law.
verbal forms
100
o f 7ipoaco7ioXnp\|/ia,
not
evident
prior to their o c c u r r e n c e in several Christian works o f the first and s e c o n d centuries, are
compound
forms
o f the
expression 7ip6aco7iov
Xaji|3dveiv, with this, in turn, b e i n g a rather literal translation o f the H e b r e w D^S K t o l
101
A s used in the H e b r e w Bible and L X X , these
expressions d o not necessarily carry a negative c o n n o t a t i o n .
102
Such
a c o n n o t a t i o n is frequent, h o w e v e r , in judicial contexts, often imply ing particularly—as in L e v 1 9 : 1 5 — a subversion o f j u s t i c e .
103
It is this
negative usage w h i c h b e c o m e s m o s t p r o m i n e n t in later Jewish
and
Christian literature, w h e t h e r o r not the term is associated with a for mal judicial setting. In conformity
104
to this later usage, 7ipoaco7coX,r|pi(/{a carries a clearly
negative c o n n o t a t i o n in Jas
2 : 1 - 1 3 . H e r e it is flatly stated that faith
is not to b e held ev 7ipoaco7to^npi|/{ai<; (2:1), and
that those w h o
act
in this w a y " w o r k sin, b e i n g c o n v i c t e d b y the law as transgressors" (2:9). T y p i c a l , t o o , is the application o f the c o n c e p t particularly to the disparate treatment o f p e o p l e o n the basis o f their s o c i o - e c o n o m i c standing;
105
as "judges," the
term.
and the characterization o f those w h o act in this m a n n e r moreover,
recalls the
c o m m o n judicial associations o f
106
such people thereby transgress (see 2:8-12) is itself equated with 6 £\npVToq Xoyoq. There may in fact be a pun at work here, for SiaXoyiG\ioq, as Ward points out ("Partiality," 94 n. 32), can also have the more technical legal sense o f "verdict"; see B A G D , dwXoyiG\ioq §1. T h e audience would thus be characterized both as judges who "reason evilly" and "judges with evil verdicts." Such wordplay is by no means unknown to this author; cf., e.g., his description, in 2:20, o f f| nioxiq %(op\q TCQV epycov as &pyr|: it is "useless," but more literally a-epyoq. Cf. W a c h o b , "Rich in Faith," 199 n. 163. This point will become clearer in what follows. E. Lohse, "jipoocoTtov, KTA,.," TDJVT6. 779-80. O n the use o f such expressions in the Jewish and Christian literature, see further Ward, "Communal Concern," 41-77. Davids, Epistle of James, 105-6. Cf. Deut 1:16-17; Deut 16:18-20; 2 Chron 19:5-7; Prov 18:5. T h e term is explicitly connected with a (divine or human) judicial setting in Sir 35:14-16; PssSol 2:18; R o m 2:11; Did. 4:3; Ep. Barn. 4:12; 1 Pet 1:17; such a setting also seems to be implied in Col 3:25 (cf. Eph 6:9); Pol. Phil. 6:1. This asso ciation is less clear in Sir 4:22, 27; Gal 2:6; Luke 20:21 (cf. Mark 12:14 par. Matt 22:16); Jude 16; 1 Clem 1:3; Acts 10:34. Cf. Lev 19:15; Deut 1:16-17; Eph 6:9; cf. Deut 10:17; Sir 35:14-16. 106 While the author does use judicial language here, it is doubtful that he has a formal judicial setting in mind; see further on this below, note 118. 1 0 0
101
1 0 2
1 0 3
1 0 4
1 0 5
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
161
T h e use o f the term with reference particularly to disparate seat ing arrangements, o n the other hand, is not widespread. Analogies are found, h o w e v e r , in the rabbinic literature.
107
R . B. W a r d has p o i n t e d
out that rabbinic interpretation o f the instructions for j u d g i n g outlined in the T o r a h included, in a m a n n e r similar to Jas 2 : 2 - 4 , the formula tion o f hypothetical examples to illustrate partiality.
108
tion o f interpretation, a rich a n d a p o o r person are
In o n e tradi characterized,
as in J a m e s , b y m e a n s o f an extravagant contrast o f their clothing: H o w do we know that, if two come to court, one clothed in rags and the other in fine raiment worth a hundred manehs, they should say to him [sc. the rich man], "Either dress like him, or dress him like y o u ? " 109
T h e proof-text cited in this c o n n e c t i o n is E x o d 23:7, but the w o r d s w h i c h are to b e spoken to the rich m a n in such a situation are else w h e r e attributed to R . Ishmael in c o n n e c t i o n with the interpretation of Deut
16:19, o n e o f the biblical injunctions against
partiality.
110
T h e similar contrast in the descriptions o f the clothing o f the rich and p o o r m a n in J a m e s and this rabbinic tradition is, o f itself, n o t particularly remarkable: such stylized descriptions o f the rich a n d the p o o r are not u n c o m m o n in ancient literature generally.
111
M o r e strik
ing, h o w e v e r , is the tradition o f interpretation w h i c h reads the b i b lical injunctions against partiality particularly
as prohibiting j u d g e s
from inviting a rich litigant to sit while forcing a p o o r o n e to remain standing. In o n e passage, this tradition is c o n n e c t e d with the inter pretation o f D e u t 1:17 a n d attributed to R . M e i r :
107
Ropes (St. James, 190-91) has pointed to similar examples from the Didascalia Apostolorum 12 (= Apostolic Constitutions 2.58) and some later Christian church orders; perhaps the oldest o f these is the Ethiopic Statutes of the Apostles, where instructions are given to a presbyter regarding the reception o f wealthy or poor people w h o come into a Christian gathering. It is possible, as Dibelius (James, 134f n. 62) and MuBner (Der Jakobusbrief, 118f n. 5) assume, that such instructions depend upon James, though Ropes and Ward ("Communal Concern," 81 n. 4) are skeptical. James is in any case more similar to the rabbinic examples than to these; see on this below, esp. note 116. Ward, "Partiality," 8 9 - 9 1 . For what follows I depend upon Ward's findings. Note, however, that his primary concern is to identify the social situation envisioned in Jas 2:2-4, not to establish the author's interest in the biblical command con cerning partiality in particular. b. Shebu. 31a, as cited by Ward, "Partiality," 89f. Ward, "Partiality," 89, referring to Deut. R., Shofetim V , 6. See H . D . Betz, Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament: Religionsgeschichtliche und Paranetische Parallelen. Ein Beitrag zum Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti ( T U 76; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961) 197-98. Note also the close verbal similarities between Jas 2:2-3 and Philo Jos. 105: "Then they put on him a bright and clean raiment instead o f his filthy prison clothes" (&vxi p\)7tcooT|<; XauTtpav eoOfjta & V T I 8 O 8 6 V T £ < ; ) . 108
109
110
111
CHAPTER FOUR
162
Rabbi Meir used to say: W h y does the verse say, Y e shall hear the small and great alike (Deut 1:17)? So that one o f the litigants shall not be kept standing and the other sit. . . 1 1 2
T h i s tradition
is elsewhere presented as a saying h a n d e d d o w n b y
R . J u d a h , a n d m e n t i o n e d in c o n n e c t i o n with the interpretation o f L e v 19:15: R. Judah said, I heard that if they please to seat the two, they may sit. What is forbidden? O n e shall not stand and the other sit. 113
W a r d also points to additional passages in w h i c h the interpretation regarding standing a n d sitting a n d that regarding clothing are f o u n d side b y s i d e .
114
A s is clear f r o m these passages, the formulation o f examples illus trating partiality as manifest in disparate seating arrangements m a d e for rich and p o o r was an element o f an oral tradition o f interpre tation o f the T o r a h ' s partiality c o m m a n d s . striking that the author o f J a m e s ,
1 1 5
It is therefore
quite
t o o , goes o n to c o n d e m n those
"judges" w h o express partiality in this w a y as transgressors
o f the
law; this point, in fact, will constitute the c l i m a x o f his a d m o n i t i o n against partiality.
116
M o r e o v e r , his specific reference to the written
context o f the love c o m m a n d in this c o n n e c t i o n , as he contrasts its fulfillment to s h o w i n g partiality in 2 : 8 - 9 , serves to p o i n t the
reader
toward a section o f the scriptural law in w h i c h partiality is expressly p r o h i b i t e d ( L e v 19:15; cf. L e v 19:18)—a passage, in fact, w h i c h the rabbis interpreted b y means o f examples quite similar to his o w n .
112
Abot R. Nat. 1:10, as cited by Ward, "Partiality," 90. Note that a prohibition o f partiality immediately precedes the command to "hear the small and great alike" in Deut 1:17 ( L X X : O - U K eTCiyvcbari rcpoaomov E V Kpiaei). Sipra, Kedoshim Perek 4:4; cited by Ward, "Partiality," 90, who identifies the R . Judah in question as ben El'ai. See Ward, "Partiality," 90. T h e first certain attestation o f this tradition o f interpretation comes in the third generation o f Tannaites (i.e., ca. 1 3 0 - 6 0 CE); note, however, that R . Judah may himself be passing on earlier tradition (cf. "I heard . . . " ) . For the dates o f R . Judah and R . Meir, see H . L. Strack and G . Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (2d printing, with emendations and updates; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996) 75-77. Both with respect to its reference to the law and to its characterization o f the transgressors as "judges" (perhaps even as judges with "evil verdicts") in this con nection, Jas 2:1-13 is more similar to the rabbinic examples than those found in the later church orders and in the Didascalia and Apostolic Constitutions (on which see above, note 107). 113
1 , 4
1 1 5
1 1 6
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
The
peculiar similarity b e t w e e n Jas
2 : 1 - 1 3 and
163
these r a b b i n i c pas
sages, as W a r d r e c o g n i z e d , is best e x p l a i n e d in terms o f a
common
d e p e n d e n c e u p o n a shared tradition o f biblical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . W h e t h e r the
a u t h o r o f J a m e s , like the
mal
j u d i c i a l setting, or,
one,
1 1 8
the
rabbis, presupposes a
the
attributed to
1 1 7
only c o m m a n d s
the
all
of freedom"
are
from
the
bib
instruction
Letter o f J a m e s , then, the "law
for
as is m o r e likely, a m o r e general liturgical
a d m o n i t i o n o f 2 : 1 - 1 3 is m a d e particularly with the
lical p r o h i b i t i o n o f partiality in m i n d . A m o n g all o f the given in
117
explicidy
Torah.
It
is
Note also that the author o f James, like R . Meir and R . Judah, is concerned specifically with giving preferential treatment to the rich over against the poor, while Lev 19:15 addresses deference to the powerful (SuvdatTi*;) or p o o r (nxooxoq). Ward does not explore the question o f the genetic relationship between Jas 2:2—3 and this rabbinic exegetical tradition in detail, for his interests lie elsewhere; and indeed, there is little in the way o f evidence to discuss beyond the similarities them selves. Note, however, his comment that "It is possible that the author [of James], informed by judicial tradition, composed the example with relative freedom . . . Nevertheless, the formal similarity between the example in James and the rabbinic instructions do not allow us to speak simply o f 'free composition'" (Ward, "Partiality," 97 n. 38); cf. "Communal Concern," 97: Jas 2:2-3 is "informed by judicial tradition." It is the thesis o f W a r d that the example o f Jas 2:2-4, like the similar exam ples in the rabbinic literature, assumes a formal judicial setting, and he has w o n a significant following in this respect; see, e.g., Davids, Epistle of James, 105-11; Martin, James, 6 1 - 6 4 ; and W a c h o b , "The Rich in Faith," 166-69, and further his fifth chapter, " T h e Social and Cultural Texture o f James 2 : 1 - 1 3 . " It seems more likely to me, however, that the author o f James applies this tradition o f legal interpreta tion, originally associated particularly with formal judicial proceedings, to the more general ancient practice o f expressing social status through seating arrangements in public or private gatherings. That is to say, W a c h o b both correctly identifies the stasis o f 2:1-13 as one o f definition ("The Rich in Faith," 365-71) and rightly emphasizes that the argument is to be understood in light o f ancient patronage (ibid., esp. 383-94); but in my view what the author attempts to d o is to present the commonplace ancient practice o f reflecting disparate social status through seat ing arrangements in public (or semi-public) gatherings—not merely in formal judi cial hearings—under the rubric o f "partiality" and "unjust judging." I would suggest, in short, that the author o f James applies a traditional interpretation o f Lev 19:15, which saw partiality as being reflected particularly in disparate seating arrangements given to the wealthy and p o o r in formal judicial proceedings, to a situation which he finds current in Christian assemblies, in which the wealthy are given the seats o f honor by virtue o f their wealth a n d / o r patronage. W h e n the "brothers and sisters" engage in such practices, he argues, they have b e c o m e "unjust judges," and thus transgressors against the biblical prohibition o f partiality. Viewed from this per spective, Jas 2:1-13 appears as a quite radical critique o f a system o f patronage which was largely taken for granted in the ancient Mediterranean world. See fur ther the recent study by J. S. Kloppenborg, "Status und Wohltatigkeit bei Paulus und Jakobus," Von Jesus zum Christus: Christologische Studien. Festgabe fur Paul Hoffmann zum 65. Geburtstag (ed. R . H o p p e and U. Busse; B Z N W 93; Berlin and N e w York: de Gruyter, 1998) 127-54. I am grateful to Prof. Kloppenborg for providing me with a copy o f this article. 1 1 8
164
CHAPTER FOUR
therefore
quite clear that the
close relationship b e t w e e n
the
author assumes,
at the
scriptural l a w a n d
the
very least, a l a w o f free
d o m — a n d thus b e t w e e n the T o r a h a n d the i m p l a n t e d logos. I n d e e d , his j u x t a p o s i t i o n
o f loving one's neighbor
" a c c o r d i n g to the
scrip
ture" ( W c a xirv ypa(pf|v; cf. L e v 9:18) a n d s h o w i n g partiality (cf. L e v 19:15) assumes the law.
1 1 9
written c o n t e x t o f these c o m m a n d s within this
T h i s casts strong d o u b t u p o n the " n e w l a w " interpretation o f
the law o f f r e e d o m , at least as formulated to e m e r g e
b y Dibelius. W h a t
begins
as a m o r e likely possibility is rather a particular inter
pretation o f the T o r a h itself.
120
In this c o n n e c t i o n , the i m p o r t o f the
reference to L e v 19:18 in Jas 2:8 b e c o m e s crucial. J o h n s o n , for e x a m ple,
has
recently
command
o f the
a r g u e d that this c o m m a n d
represents the central
l a w in J a m e s ' s v i e w , with the
rest o f the
Torah
serving primarily as a privileged p o o l o f examples that illustrate the ways in w h i c h it is to b e c o n c r e t e l y o b s e r v e d .
121
D o e s J a m e s in fact
interpret the l a w entirely t h r o u g h the lens o f the l o v e c o m m a n d ? Is s h o w i n g partiality w r o n g particularly b e c a u s e it is a transgression o f the l o v e c o m m a n d , o r simply b e c a u s e it is p r o h i b i t e d in the
1 1 9
Torah?
O n the significance o f this juxtaposition, as well as the ei iLievioi... ei 8e con struction which makes it clear, see below. Cf. Ropes's view, based on James's description o f his law as one which is "per fect" and " o f liberty," that "he conceived o f Christianity as a law, including and fulfilling the old o n e . " Ropes goes on to speak o f a "new law" in this connection (St. James, 178-79). Ropes elsewhere speaks o f this law as "the Jewish law as under stood by Christians" (ibid., 167), with "the ten commandments and other precepts o f the O . T . " holding "a chief place . . . however much they may or may not be supplemented by other teaching and by Christian interpretation" (St. James, 30). O n this latter description, at least, the sense in which this represents a "new law" is not immediately clear—as Ropes himself apparently recognized, as suggested by his use o f sanitary pips with the phrase "new law." After all, divergent interpretations o f the Torah were an important factor in the formation o f Jewish groups, but one does not normally speak o f the "new law," for example, o f the Dead Sea Sect, the Sadducees or the Pharisees. See above, note 90. See esp. " T h e Use o f Leviticus 19," 400 (emphasis his): "keeping the law o f love involves observing the commandments explicated by the Decalogue (2:11) and Lev 19:12-18 in their e n t i r e t y . . . Breaking the prohibition against partiality is breaking the law o f love, for that prohibition is one o f its expli cations." See also W a c h o b , " T h e Rich in Faith," 2 6 8 - 6 9 : " [ L e v 19:15] is not sim ply a precept from the written law but a rhetorical judgment that is based on the scripture recited in Jas 2:8, the written summary o f the whole law. Hence the injunction against partiality in Lev 19:15 is effectively reinterpreted by our author as the opposite o f 'loving one's neighbor as oneself." 1 2 0
121
165
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
Partiality, Love of Neighbor, and the "Whole
Law"
L o v e o f n e i g h b o r , o f course, receives special emphasis in a n u m b e r o f early Christian works. O f particular interest in c o n n e c t i o n with Jas 2 : 8 - 1 1 are those instances in w h i c h L e v 19:18 is a c c o r d e d s o m e special status specifically a m o n g the other c o m m a n d s o f the l a w .
122
L o v e o f n e i g h b o r , paired with love o f G o d ( D e u t 6:5), is so elevated in e a c h o f the synoptic gospels. In Luke, Jesus agrees w h e n a legal expert singles out these t w o c o m m a n d s f r o m all that is "written in the l a w " as the particular requirements
for inheriting "eternal life"
(Luke 1 0 : 2 5 - 2 8 ) . Conversely, M a r k tells o f a scribe's approval w h e n Jesus ranks D e u t 6 : 4 - 5 a n d L e v 19:18 as first a n d s e c o n d , respec tively, o f all the c o m m a n d m e n t s ; and w h e n the scribe then suggests that these t w o are m o r e important
than d e m a n d s o f the
sacrificial
cult in particular, Jesus declares that he is " n o t far f r o m the king dom
o f G o d " ( M a r k 12:28-34). T h e Jesus o f M a t t h e w similarly names
D e u t 6:5 as "the greatest a n d first c o m m a n d m e n t , " a n d L e v 19:18 the " s e c o n d , " w h e n a Pharisaic legal expert asks h i m " w h i c h c o m mandment
in the law is the greatest" (Matt 2 2 : 3 4 - 3 9 ) .
Matthew's
Jesus then adds that these t w o c o m m a n d s are those u p o n w h i c h "the w h o l e law (6Xoq 6 v o u o q ) too
123
a n d the prophets h a n g " (Matt 22:40). S o
Paul, s o m e w h a t like M a t t h e w ' s Jesus, a c c o r d s love o f n e i g h b o r
a summarizing function vis-a-vis "the entire l a w . " Q u i t e unlike
the
former, h o w e v e r , Paul considers this c o m m a n d alone to b e an ade quate s u m m a r y in this respect: " T h e . . . entire law (6 . . . izaq vouoq) is fulfilled in a single w o r d , in ' y ° self" (Gal 5 : 1 4 ) .
1 2 2
u
will love y o u r n e i g h b o r as y o u r
124
As opposed, for example, to the general emphasis on love found in the Johannine epistles, where no explicit connection to scriptural law is made. I follow the text as rendered in the 26th edition o f Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece; note, however, that oXoq is omitted in some mss. In the context o f Galatians, the force o f this statement seems to me to be more pointed than the N R S V translation o f 7C£7c^r|pcoxai as "is summed u p " sug gests: Paul implies not merely that love o f neighbor is an apt summary o f the law, but that loving one's neighbor is in fact equivalent to fulfilling "the whole law." Cf. R o m 13:8: 6 . . . dyocTicov xov exepov v6|nov 7i£7tXr|pcoK8v; and further the nuanced discussion in H . D . Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 2 7 4 - 7 6 . This, perhaps, represents another significant difference between Paul and Matthew's Jesus, for it is not at all clear that the latter would agree that his summary has this implication. 1 2 3
1 2 4
166
CHAPTER FOUR
T h e formulation o f such summaries was not a peculiarly Christian p h e n o m e n o n ; nor, as the passages f r o m M a r k a n d Luke a b o v e already suggest, was the p l a c e m e n t o f emphasis on
love o f G o d a n d / o r
examined
particularly
love o f one's fellow h u m a n b e i n g in this
c o n n e c t i o n . L o v e o f G o d , while not, to m y k n o w l e d g e , explicitly cited as a s u m m a r y o f the law, is routinely used in Jewish literature as a shorthand expression for living in a c c o r d with the l a w .
125
In
fact, the repeated references in J a m e s to the eschatological rewards p r o m i s e d b y G o d "to those w h o love h i m " (1:12; 2:5: xoiq OCUTOV) e c h o e s a c o m m o n designation
ayan&aiv
o f those w h o maintain
the
c o v e n a n t b y keeping G o d ' s c o m m a n d s , and to w h o m G o d will there fore remain faithful.
S u c h usage is f o u n d already in the d e c a l o g u e ' s
prohibition o f idolatry as f o u n d in E x o d 2 0 : 5 ~ 6 a n d D e u t 5 : 9 - 1 0 : "I the L o r d y o u r G o d a m a j e a l o u s G o d , punishing children for the iniquity o f parents, to the third and fourth generation o f those w h o reject m e , but s h o w i n g steadfast love to the thousandth o f those w h o mandments."
love m e 1 2 6
The
( L X X : xoiq ayan&aiv
precise phrase xoiq ayan&Giv
is f o u n d repeatedly in such c o n t e x t s . law" be
jie) and
127
generation
keep m y
com
OCUTOV itself, in fact,
Paul's n o t i o n that "the entire
is fulfilled t h r o u g h love o f n e i g h b o r , o n the other h a n d , might
c o m p a r e d with Hillel's reported view: " W h a t is hateful to y o u ,
d o not to y o u r neighbor: that is the w h o l e law (H^ID rmm while the rest is c o m m e n t a r y t h e r e o f . "
128
KTI IT),
M o r e similar to the s y n o p
tics in this respect, finally, is Philo's division o f M o s e s ' s law u n d e r the
two
great h e a d i n g s
specified as zvaefizm (TO npbq
of them
1 2 5
(K£(pdXioc) o f d u t y to
God
(TO npbq
0E6V),
a n d ooiornq, and to o n e ' s fellow h u m a n b e i n g
dvGpcoTcouq), specified as (piA,av0pco7ua a n d SiKaioauvn,
splitting u p i n t o
multiform
branches,
all h i g h l y
"each
laud-
See Ludwig Wort als Gesetz, 144-50, esp. 1 4 4 - 4 6 . Note, however, that some o f the passages discussed by Ludwig are not entirely to the point; a number o f them, for example, speak o f love o f the commands themselves rather than love o f G o d in the form o f obedience to the commands o f his law (e.g. Ps 119:47, 48, 127, 159, 166-68). Cf. Deut 30:16, 20. Deut 7:9; 2 Esdr 11:5 (= Neh 1:5); Pss. Sol. 14:1-2; cf. further L X X Dan 9:4, where the object o f the phrase is second-person, being directly addressed to G o d . b. Shabb. 31a; the translation is that o f H . Freedman, Shabbath: Hebrew-English Edition of the Babylonian Talmud (2 vols.; London; Jerusalem; N e w York: Soncino, 1972). See further I. Abrahams, Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels. First and Second Series (repr. in Library o f Biblical Studies; ed. H . M . Orlinsky with a prolegomenon by M . S. Enslin; N e w York: Ktav, 1967 [= 1917-1924]) 1. 18-29; I cite the Hebrew as found on p . 23. 1 2 6
127
128
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
able."
129
167
T h u s for Philo the first table o f the d e c a l o g u e c o n c e r n s xa
iepcoxaxa and the s e c o n d xa npbq avOpcoTCoax; S i i c a i a ,
130
with these t w o
tables, in turn, presenting the " g e n e r a " o r "headings" u n d e r w h i c h the "special laws" w h i c h make u p the remainder o f the law c a n b e classified.
131
S u c h summaries,
m o r e o v e r , functioned
differently
for
different
authors. W h i l e figures such as Hillel o r Philo might have b e e n inclined to agree with Paul that "the mit adultery', ' y
o u
[commandments]
c
o u
y
s
n
a
c
shall n o t kill', ' y o u shall n o t steal', y
n
n
o u
o
s
t
n
com a
n
n
°t
covet', and any other c o m m a n d m e n t is s u m m e d u p (dvaicecpaAmouxai) in this w o r d ,
c
y
o u
l°
v e
y o u r n e i g h b o r as yourself,'" it is b y n o
means clear that they w o u l d have given unqualified assent to Paul's subsequent
inference
132
that " o n e w h o loves a n o t h e r has
fulfilled
(7i87iAripcoKev) the l a w " ( R o m 1 3 : 8 - 9 ) , that " l o v e is therefore
the
fulfilling o f l a w " ( R o m 13:10). T o the extent that Paul's v i e w o f the summarizing function o f the love c o m m a n d is a d v a n c e d with an eye to his m o r e general position o n the i m p o r t a n c e etc.,
133
o f circumcision,
Hillel and Philo w o u l d surely have chafed at the claim. Philo
elsewhere rails against so-called "extreme
allegorists" w h o , having
r e c o g n i z e d (correctly, a c c o r d i n g to Philo!) the s y m b o l i c nature o f the laws, neglect their literal sense a n d thus their observance "as t h o u g h they h a d b e c o m e d i s e m b o d i e d s o u l s . " for
134
A n d if the " w h o l e l a w " was
Hillel o n l y " c o m m e n t a r y " o n his version o f the g o l d e n rule, it
was a " c o m m e n t a r y " w h o s e details nonetheless attention and measure,
129
demanded
exacting interpretation—tasks to w h i c h he, in
d e v o t e d his life. T h e identification
careful large
o f basic principles in
De Spec. Leg. 2.63. Cf. in this respect the double command "Love the Lord and your neighbor" in T. Iss. 5:2, which follows on a still more general instruction to "keep the law o f G o d " (5:1); here, however, it is not explicitly said that love o f God and o f neighbor are understood to sum up "keeping the law o f God." Given the questions surrounding the literary history o f the Testaments generally, it is not altogether clear in any case whether this constitutes non-Christian evidence. De Dec. 106; cf. the superscript to De Specialibus Legibus. Note also Philo's expla nation in De Dec. 107 o f the fact that the fifth commandment, despite this schema, concerns honoring one's parents. De Spec. Leg. 1.1: x o t y e v r i . . . xcov ev ei8ei V O U X D V ; cf. De Dec. 175: KecpaAxxioe. . . xcov ev ei8ei vo^-cov. Note esp. that R o m 13:9, with its post-positive yap, is presented as an expla nation o f 13:8b—a logical connection which the N R S V quite obscures. It is noteworthy that Paul mentions the summarizing function o f the love c o m mand only in Galatians and Romans, i.e., in those letters in which he was most preoccupied with the question of Jewish customs. Philo, Mig. Abr. 8 9 - 9 3 . 130
131
132
133
134
CHAPTER FOUR
168
terms o f w h i c h the law o f M o s e s c o u l d b e s u m m a r i z e d was m a d e b y these figures with heuristic, n o t reductionistic, intentions. T h e reference in Jas 2:8 to fulfilling "the royal law a c c o r d i n g to the scripture, ' y °
u
will l °
v e
y o u r n e i g h b o r as y o u r s e l f " is u n d o u b t
edly to b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the emphasis p l a c e d o n love o f o n e ' s fellow h u m a n
beings in the Jewish a n d Christian
literature,
and m o r e particularly o n the emphasis p l a c e d o n L e v 19:18 b y early Christians. C o m p a r i s o n o f J a m e s with this literature, however, requires attention to t w o distinct questions. D o e s the author o f J a m e s under stand the love c o m m a n d to b e a s u m m a r y o f the T o r a h ? A n d if so, w h a t are the implications o f this fact for his understanding other c o m m a n d s w h i c h this law c o n t a i n s ?
o f the
135
In Jas 2 : 8 - 9 , l o v i n g o n e ' s n e i g h b o r and s h o w i n g partiality are c o n trasted b y m e a n s o f an ei u i v x o i . . . ei 8e construction: ei uevToi vouov T E X E I T E P O C O I X I K O V Kara Trjv ypotcpriv • dyaTcrjaeK; T O V nXr\oiov ax; G E O C O T O V , KOCXOX;rcoiEiTE-ei 8e 7tpooamoXr|U7rc£iT£, djiapxiav epyd^eaGe £A,£Yx6 VKO TOV V O J I O D ax; rcapaPaTai.
GOV
uev01
136
T h e s e verses are critical for understanding
the author's v i e w o f the
love c o m m a n d vis-a-vis the law as a w h o l e and its other c o m m a n d s . Isolated f r o m their context, h o w e v e r , they c a n a n d have b e e n taken to support a variety o f interpretations. T h e r e are t w o c h i e f a m b i guities w h i c h c o m p l i c a t e interpretation. First, it is unclear
whether
the "royal l a w " refers to the w h o l e o f the "law o f f r e e d o m " o r to L e v 19:18 in particular.
137
S e c o n d , and m o r e important for o u r pur
poses, is the relation o f the c o n d i t i o n o f 2:8 to that o f 2:9: taken b y themselves, these verses c a n b e construed either as a statement o f opposite o r o f simultaneous conditions. T h u s while the majority o f interpreters have argued that the author juxtaposes loving one's neigh b o r and s h o w i n g partiality because he views the latter as a trans gression o f the love c o m m a n d ,
135
1 3 8
a n u m b e r o f scholars have understood
T h e mere categorization of James as a Christian writing is not, o f course, sufficient grounds for concluding that he would have been more similar to Paul than to Philo or Hillel with respect to his understanding o f the implications o f such a summary for the other commands o f the law. As is clear from a variety o f sources (including Galatians and Romans themselves), Paul's stance on the question o f the law was anything but ubiquitous in early Christianity. For the textual situation as regards 2:8-9, see B. Aland et ai, Novum Testamentum Graecum. Editio Critica Maior. IV: Catholic Letters. Installment 1: James (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1997) 1. 31-32. For a sampling o f advocates o f each position see Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 147 with notes 157 and 158. Thus the vast majority of interpreters, whether or not they consider the author 136
137
138
169
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
h i m to b e arguing that those w h o s h o w partiality, even if they love their neighbor, are transgressors o f the law nonetheless.
139
G i v e n these
ambiguities, the author's v i e w o f the relation o f the love c o m m a n d to the biblical prohibition o f partiality and, b y implication, to " w h o l e l a w , " c a n o n l y b e determined in c o n j u n c t i o n with an
the
analy
sis o f the larger argument from the law presented in 2:8—11. The argument of
2:8-11
H o w e v e r o n e interprets 2 : 8 - 9 , it is clear that 2 : 1 0 - 1 1 is m e a n t to explain the charge that those w h o s h o w partiality are " c o n v i c t e d b y the law as transgressors."
140
Immediately after this latter charge, the
author states a m o r e general principle w h i c h justifies it: "for (yap) w h o e v e r keeps the w h o l e law (pXov xov vojiov), but stumbles in o n e [respect], has b e c o m e liable for all o f it (rcavxcov evo%o<;)."
141
As we
have seen, phrases analogous to James's okov xov vouov are used in c o n n e c t i o n with summaries o f the law b y Paul (Gal 5:14, 6 naq a n d Hillel (b. Shabb. 31a, H^ID m i m
^J), while precisely the
VOJJXX;)
same
phrase is f o u n d in at least s o m e manuscripts o f M a t t h e w (Matt 22:40, oXoq 6 vouoq), whether
with reference
to l o v i n g o n e ' s n e i g h b o r
as
oneself (Paul), the g o l d e n rule (Hillel), o r a c o m b i n a t i o n o f D e u t 6:5 a n d L e v 19:18 (Matthew). It is therefore striking that if—as is clearly the case—the
s e c o n d half o f the c o m p l e x c o n d i t i o n o f 2:10 (stum
bling in o n e respect) refers b a c k to the c o n d i t i o n o f 2:9 (showing partiality),
the first half o f the c o m p l e x c o n d i t i o n o f 2:10 (keeping
"the w h o l e law") c o r r e s p o n d s to the c o n d i t i o n o f 2:8 (fulfilling "royal l a w " a c c o r d i n g to L e v 19:18). In short: fulfilling "the l a w a c c o r d i n g to the scripture ' y
o u
the
royal
will love y o u r n e i g h b o r as y o u r
s e l f " in Jas 2 : 8 - 9 c o r r e s p o n d s with keeping "the w h o l e l a w " in Jas 2:10.
142
T h i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e is n o t likely to b e coincidental. O n the
to have Lev 19:15 in mind. See in most detail the recent analysis o f W a c h o b , " T h e Rich in Faith," 197-212. So Spitta, Der Brief des Jakobus, 6 6 - 6 9 ; Kuhl, Die Stellung des Jakobusbriefes, 4 - 1 1 ; Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 171-75. Note esp. the repeated use o f ydp in 2:10 and 2:11; cf. W a c h o b , " T h e Rich in Faith," 2 1 2 - 2 3 . For the sense o f rcdvtcov evo%o<; see Ropes, St. James, 200: "This is a rhetori cal way o f saying that he is a transgressor o f 'the law as a whole' (rcapocpdrnc; voum), v. 11), not o f all the precepts in it." Nonetheless, note in this connection that while the neuter evi cannot refer to an implied (feminine) £VTO^T|, it is clear from the con text o f 2:8-11—and particularly from 2:11, which is intended to explain 2:10 (note again the use o f ydp)—that the author here thinks o f " o n e " and "all" o f the law's commands. See the graphic depiction o f this structural parallel below, on p . 172. 1 3 9
1 4 0
141
1 4 2
170
CHAPTER FOUR
contrary, it strongly suggests that the author is aware o f the use o f L e v 19:18 as a s u m m a r y o f "the w h o l e law." T h e reference to the "royal l a w " in this c o n n e c t i o n supports this c o n c l u s i o n whether
it
describes the love c o m m a n d in particular or, m o r e likely, "the w h o l e law":
143
if the "royal l a w " c o n n o t e s "the w h o l e l a w , " 2:8 apparently
refers to "fulfilling the w h o l e l a w " b y loving o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as o n e self; a n d if the "royal l a w " refers specifically to the love c o m m a n d , this lavish description denotes its special i m p o r t a n c e relative to the law's other c o m m a n d s . Either w a y , the verse clearly indicates that Lev
19:18 is a c c o r d e d s o m e special status a m o n g the other
com
m a n d s o f the law; a n d given the c o r r e s p o n d i n g reference to keep ing "the w h o l e l a w " in 2:10, it c a n safely b e c o n c l u d e d f r o m
the
argument o f 2 : 8 - 1 1 that the author is aware o f the use o f " l o v e o f n e i g h b o r " as a s u m m a r y o f "the w h o l e law." O n the other hand, given this c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n 2:8 2:10a, and
2:9 a n d
and
2 : 1 0 b - c , respectively, 2 : 8 - 9 are clearly to b e
understood, like 2:10, as positing simultaneous
rather than opposite
conditions. T h a t is, despite the allusion to the love c o m m a n d ' s sum m a r y function, the author formulates a c o n d i t i o n in w h i c h o n e both (i) "keeps the w h o l e l a w , " that is, b y loving o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as o n e self and (ii) "stumbles in o n e respect," that is, b y showing partiality. T h e result is rather paradoxical—as, indeed, is 2:10 itself.
144
Nonethe
less, the subsequent explanation o f 2:10 confirms that this is in fact the case; for the defense o f 2:10 in 2:11 also assumes a c o n d i t i o n in w h i c h o n e c o m m a n d is kept while another is b r o k e n . T h e
war
rant for 2:10 is presented as follows: 6 yap eirccov • \a\ uoi%£t>OT|<;, EVKEV m i - u,f| (pove\)cynq- d 8e ov uoi%et)£i<; (pov£t>£i<; 5
be, yeyovaq 7tapapdrr|<; vouoi).
145
T h e first half o f this verse identifies the basis for the general prin ciple that "stumbling in o n e respect" renders o n e "liable for the law as a w h o l e " (2:10). Citing, b y w a y o f e x a m p l e , t w o additional c o m -
1 4 3
See above, note 78. T h e condition envisioned in Jas 2:10, in which one "keeps the whole law" while failing with respect to one o f its elements is, strictly speaking, impossible. According to Johnson, "[i]t must be that someone tries to keep the whole law, since the condition o f not keeping each part shows that the translation 'whoever keeps the whole law' is impossible" (Letter of James, 232). This latter view, however, fails to recognize the irony o f the passage, on which see below. T h e only substantive variant in this verse is the replacement o f napa^dxr\q with anoGTaxr\q in $p and A . 1 4 4
1 4 5
74
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
mands (murder and the
various
adultery),
commands'
author grounds
this principle
c o m m o n s o u r c e , w h e t h e r c o n c e i v e d as
l a w o r the lawgiver h i m s e l f . o f the verse, to formulate these n e w l y i n t r o d u c e d
the
171
146
in the
H e then p r o c e e d s , in the latter half
a c o n d i t i o n parallel to that o f 2:10 using
c o m m a n d s . A c o n d i t i o n , that is, o f simulta
n e o u s o b e d i e n c e to the adultery c o m m a n d a n d d i s o b e d i e n c e to
the
m u r d e r c o m m a n d is posited in o r d e r to demonstrate m o r e forcefully the
specific c l a i m that such a c o n d i t i o n results in o n e ' s status as
transgressor o f the
a
law: n o o n e , it is assumed, w o u l d d e n y that a
m u r d e r e r w h o has n o t c o m m i t t e d adultery is any less a law-breaker!
147
T h e entire argument o f 2 : 1 0 - 1 1 , then, is predicated o n the assump tion o f a c o n d i t i o n o f simultaneous o b e d i e n c e a n d d i s o b e d i e n c e w h i c h renders o n e a transgressor o f the
law. T h e
argument moves
from
specific c o m m a n d s (love o f n e i g h b o r a n d partiality in 2 : 8 - 9 ) , to
the
statement o f a general principle (2:10), a n d b a c k to specific c o m m a n d s (adultery a n d
m u r d e r in
2:11) in o r d e r
to support the
claim
that
s h o w i n g partiality—even, paradoxically, if o n e "keeps the w h o l e l a w " b y l o v i n g o n e ' s n e i g h b o r — r e n d e r s o n e a transgressor o f the law. T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s b e t w e e n the t w o conditional statements o f 2:8—9 a n d the c o m p l e x c o n d i t i o n s o f 2:10 a n d 2:11 are in fact quite striking:
1 4 6
148
While the author o f James elsewhere refers to scripture itself as "speaking" (cf. 2:23; 4:5, 6) the aorist forms seem to suggest that it is the "lawgiver" (cf. 4:12) that is the implied subject; so MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 125; Laws, Epistle of James, 114; Davids, Epistle of James, 117; Burchard, "Nachstenliebegebot," 519; Johnson, Letter of James, 232; W a c h o b , " T h e Rich in Faith," 218f. In contrast to the position argued here, namely, that the principle o f 2:10 is based upon the c o m m o n origin o f all the commands, Fabris contends that the author argues that "stumbling in one respect" is to b e c o m e liable for "the whole" precisely inasmuch as the latter is summed up in the c o m m a n d o f love o f neigh bor. This argument, however, as Fabris himself acknowledges (Legge, 172), is sim ply not in the text. Fabris's interpretation is rather a function o f the problematic assumption o f a single "New Testament" view o f the love command which he brings to the text: "Questo precetto deH'amore del prossimo, secondo la tradizione parenetica del N . T . , non e solo il piu importante di tutti, ma e la sintesi ed il compimento di tutte le prescrizioni della legge" (ibid., 171). Laws, w h o finds this section o f James "curiously inept" since murder and adultery were "so generally accepted that assent to them would hardly be seen to entail assent to the Jewish Law and everything contained in it" (Epistle of James, 113), has missed the point o f 2:11b entirely. T h e argument is effective precisely because these commands were "so generally accepted"! Note further that, as W a c h o b points out ("The Rich in Faith," 219, 222), the conditional statements o f 2:8-9 and 2:11 are both present simple conditionals, while 2:10—as the general principle which undergirds both the judgment o f 2 : 8 - 9 and 2:11—is formulated as a conditional relative sentence which functions as a future more vivid condition (see on this latter point ibid., 214f). 1 4 7
1 4 8
172
CHAPTER FOUR
2:8-9
2:10
2:11b
ei jjivxoi
oaxiq yap
£1 8£
oXov xov vouov
OU |LLOl%£X)£l(;
VOJLLOV
TZXEIXE pocoiAiKov
Kaxa xfiv ypa(pT|v •
dyccTtfiaeiq xov
xr|pf|ar|
nXr\ciov
G O D coq GEauxov,
KaX&q 7coi£ix£ •
nxaior\ 8e ev £v(,
(pov£\)£i<; SE,
ajiapxiav £pyd^£a8£
y£yov£V 7cavxcov
yEyovaq 7capapdxr|(;
£^£y%6|LL£VOl i)7c6 xou vouou
£vo%oq.
VOfXOD.
£1 5k
KpoGGmofa\\mTeiT£,
coq 7iapapdxai.
G i v e n the fact that the juxtaposition o f fulfilling the royal law a c c o r d ing to L e v 19:18 with breaking the partiality c o m m a n d o f L e v 19:15 in 2 : 8 - 9 c o r r e s p o n d s to that o f keeping "the w h o l e l a w " with "stum bling in o n e respect" in 2:10; a n d given, further, that b o t h the gen eral principle w h i c h forms the basis for the j u d g m e n t o f 2:9 and the demonstration o f the viability o f that principle in 2:11 assume a c o n dition o f simultaneous o b e d i e n c e and disobedience; it c a n only b e c o n c l u d e d that 2 : 8 - 9 , t o o , are intended as positing simultaneous rather than formally opposite c o n d i t i o n s .
149
T h e upshot o f this analysis is that James assumes, at least for the sake o f argument, the use o f the love c o m m a n d as a summary o f "the w h o l e l a w . " Nonetheless, he presents for consideration a situa tion in w h i c h the love c o m m a n d is kept while another o f the law's c o m m a n d s — n a m e l y , that prohibiting partiality—is b r o k e n ; a n d he c o n c l u d e s that the subject o f such a c o n d i t i o n is a "transgressor o f the l a w " despite his o r her attention to the summarizing c o m m a n d of Lev 19:18.
1 4 9
150
T h e citation o f the latter specifically within its writ-
Against W a c h o b , it is scarcely an "immediate inference" from the simple jux taposition o f 2:8 and 2:9 that showing partiality is an offense against the love c o m mand ("The Rich in Faith," 208). O n this logic, one might also assert that it is an "immediate inference" from 2:11 that committing murder is an offense against the adultery prohibition. T o be sure, the author's primary concern lies with socio-economic matters rather than with legislation regarding diet or ritual purity; see o n this below, under the heading " T h e Law o f Freedom and the Torah." Nonetheless, it is clear from the logic o f the argument presented in 2:8-11 that he considers the love command, 1 5 0
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
ten c o n t e x t is quite effective in this r e s p e c t .
151
173
Unlike Paul, for e x a m
ple, w h o refers to l o v e o f n e i g h b o r m o r e generally as a " w o r d " w h i c h summarizes the w h o l e law (Gal 5:14; R o m is cited explicitly KOCTOC TTVV ypoc(pf|v: the bor
in
Lev
command (cf. L e v In
19:18
is thus presented as
one
alongside o t h e r s — i n c l u d i n g the
19:15!)—within the
fact, the
written
13:9), the
(albeit o n e prohibition
summarizes "the
law.
when
o f its 2:10
paradox
is
that
w h o l e l a w " while at the same time breaking a n o t h e r
m e n t o f 2:10. O b e y i n g "the one
important) o f partiality
a p p a r e n t tension b e t w e e n o b e y i n g a c o m m a n d
c o m m a n d o f that law is c a p t u r e d p e r f e c d y in the
to
love c o m m a n d
c o m m a n d to l o v e o n e ' s neigh
c o m m a n d s is,
is v i e w e d as somewhat
p a r a d o x i c a l state
w h o l e l a w " while stumbling with respect strictly speaking, impossible.
However,
a m o r e general restatement o f 2 : 8 - 9 ,
mitigated: k e e p i n g the
"whole law,"
in
the this
c o n t e x t , is actually a reference to o b e y i n g a particular c o m m a n d o f
regardless o f its summarizing function, to be one c o m m a n d among others within the Torah. Already in 1905, Kiihl characterized the failure o f exegetes to recog nize this fact as "eine der merkwurdigsten Erscheinungen in der Geschichte der Exegese." His attempt to account for this is quite telling: "Ich kann mir das nur aus der begreiflichen Scheu erklaren, innerhalb des neuen Testamentes unterchristliche Anschauungen von dem Werte des Gesetzes fur den Christen and von der Bedeutung des Liebesgebotes im Zusammenhange mit der Frage nach der Erfiillung des Gesetzes konstatieren zu miissen" (Die Stellung des Jakobusbrief es, 10; emphasis added). It is likely that such a general notion that "love o f neighbor" lies at the very heart o f Christianity is responsible for the tension, observed already by Meyer (Ratsel, 149 and n. 6), in Dibelius's assessment o f the understanding o f the love c o m m a n d in James: on one hand, it "is not considered in our passage to be the chief c o m mandment, in the sense o f the famous saying o f Jesus," but is rather "one c o m mandment alongside others" (though, it is to be noted, within a new Christian law, not the " o l d " Jewish one); at the same time, however, this "Christian law," as a Christian law, "is not obeyed by being ever so careful in tiny matters, but rather by fulfilling the great commandment o f love" (Dibelius, James, 142, 144)! Note also that Dibelius himself describes the author's remarkably hostile statements regarding "the rich" as "sub-Christian" (unterchristlichen); see James, 49 (= Der Brief des Jakobus, 49). In this connection, it is hardly coincidental that Spitta (Der Brief des Jakobus, 6 6 - 6 9 ) and Meyer (Ratsel, 149-50)—each o f w h o m understood James to have orig inally been a non-Christian Jewish writing—both argued that its author did not con sider loving one's neighbor to be tantamount to fulfilling "the whole law." T h e fact that these competing interpretations can be correlated with opposing general classifications o f James as "Christian" or 'Jewish" suggests that the issue here is not simply the text o f James: equally critical for interpretation are the assumptions regarding the nature o f "Christianity" and its relation to 'Judaism" which one brings to the text. 151
If the "royal law" does in fact refer to the "whole law" as suggested above, then 2:8 is to be understood as an ironic statement o f the view that one can fulfill the "whole law" simply by loving one's neighbor—an irony which emerges in any case in 2:10. See further on the ironic aspects o f this passage immediately below.
174
CHAPTER FOUR
the law, namely, L e v 19:18. T h e paradoxical quality remains nonethe less, lending, indeed, a rather derisive tone to the argument: there is an unmistakable irony in the author's allusion in 2:10 to keeping "the w h o l e l a w " b y fulfilling the love c o m m a n d given his larger point that o n e c a n love o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as oneself a n d yet still b e e x p o s e d by
the law as a transgressor.
152
W h i l e aware o f the use o f " l o v e o f
n e i g h b o r " as a s u m m a r y o f "the w h o l e law," the author himself is at best w a r y o f this summary,
at least to the extent that it might
lead o n e to neglect other specific points o f the law. Regardless o f its possible summarizing function, "loving o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as oneself" is not, without further a d o , simply equivalent to fulfilling the w h o l e law in the Letter o f J a m e s . F r o m a structural point o f v i e w , the primary difference
between
2 : 8 - 9 a n d the conditionals o f 2:10 and 2:11 is that while the latter two
present single, c o m p l e x conditional statements, 2 : 8 - 9 consists o f
two
formally distinct
conditions. Jas
2:8, that is, contains its o w n
apodosis: " y o u d o w e l l " (KOC^CCK; TCOIEITE). Even this difference, though, strongly supports interpreting 2 : 8 - 9 as presenting simultaneous
con
ditions, and reading a certain irony in the author's treatment o f the love c o m m a n d as a s u m m a r y
o f "the w h o l e l a w . " F o r this same
" c o m m e n d a t i o n , " differing o n l y in n u m b e r , appears with an unmis takable sarcasm in the immediately f o l l o w i n g — a n d closely r e l a t e d
153
—
discussion o f niaxxq a n d Epyoc: y o u w h o "believe that ' G o d is o n e ' , " the author says, " d o w e l l " (KO^CCK; noieiq); but n o m o r e so than the d e m o n s w h o also believe this " a n d shudder" (2:19)! It is particularly striking that while this " c o m m e n d a t i o n " is given in Jas
2:8 to those w h o " l o v e their n e i g h b o r " in a c c o r d with L e v
19:18, it is directed in 2:19 to those w h o believe that " G o d is o n e , " a passage w h i c h e c h o e s the S h e m a as found in D e u t 6 : 4 - 9 : aicoue, 'IoponA-- Kt)pio<; 6 Qebq
152
TIJLIGW
Kupioq
elq
EOTW
. . . ( L X X Deut
6:4).
154
That is, the author grants for the sake o f argument the claim o f his imag ined audience that they have observed the commandment in which "the whole law" is fulfilled by loving their neighbor as themselves. Nonetheless, he argues, they are still lawbreakers if they disregard other commands o f the law, e.g., Lev 19:15. In short, while granting that love o f neighbor might serve in some sense as a sum mary o f "the whole law," the author pointedly critiques the notion that one actu ally fulfills the whole law simply by loving one's neighbor as oneself. Put in the terms o f the distinction drawn above on pp. 167f, the author concedes the heuris tic use o f this summary while rejecting the reductionistic one. See on this point the concluding chapter o f this study. Dibelius, James, 159; Cantinat, Les Epitres de Saint Jacques et de Saint Jude, 147; Davids, Epistle of James, 125; Martin, James, 89; cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 240. 153
154
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
175
L e v 19:18 and this passage from D e u t e r o n o m y , w h i c h follows statement that " G o d is o n e " with an injunction
to love h i m
the
(Deut
6:5), are o f course precisely those t w o passages singled out in synoptic gospels as the t w o most important passages o f the T h o u g h s e l d o m n o t e d in the c o m m e n t a r i e s , b e t w e e n Jas
2:8 a n d
156
the
law.
155
this c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
2:19 g o e s a l o n g w a y t o w a r d
clarifying
author's interest in the love c o m m a n d in 2 : 8 - 1 1 . G i v e n the
the
empha
sis p l a c e d o n love o f n e i g h b o r particularly in c o n n e c t i o n with
sum
maries o f the law in Jewish and especially Christian literature, it is n o m o r e necessary to suppose that the reference to L e v 19:18 in 2:8 implies that s o m e " o p p o n e n t s " have defended b e h a v i n g in the m a n ner described in 2:2~3 b y claiming that they h a d thereby sought to " l o v e " the wealthy m a n
1 5 7
any m o r e than it is necessary to assume
that 2:19 reflects a situation in w h i c h s o m e actual interlocutor appealed
to his belief that " G o d is o n e " to defend his
has
extraordi
narily callous treatment o f the p o o r as narrated in 2 : 1 5 - 1 6 . N o r is it the case that the author wishes to d e n y the i m p o r t a n c e
o f Lev
19:18 o r D e u t 6:4ff., o r even the possibility that they might,
together
o r separately, represent in s o m e sense an adequate summation that w h i c h is required for "life" o r entrance into the
of
"kingdom."
1 5 8
Rather, the author singles out L e v 19:18 in 2:8 a n d alludes to D e u t 6:4ff in 2:19 because he is c o n c e r n e d that an eschatological confidence based o n attention to these general principles might lead to neglect o f other elements o f the law w h i c h are, ultimately, o f equal i m p o r tance.
1 5 5
159
Faith that " G o d is o n e " is c r u c i a l ,
160
but cannot, o f itself,
See esp. Mark 12:29-30, which includes Deut 6:4 in its citation; Matthew and Luke both omit Deut 6:4 in this connection, and cite the c o m m a n d to love G o d in Deut 6:5 immediately. This is apparently a consequence o f the failure to recognize the irony in the author's treatment o f Lev 19:18 in 2:8-11. Indeed, where the repetition o f the clause KaX(hq 7coieiTe, -eiq in 2:8 and 2:19 is noted at all by those w h o argue that showing partiality is a transgression o f the love command, it is generally only to point out that the phrase is used ironically in the latter, but not in the former! See Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 91; also Johnson, Letter of James, 231. So, e.g., Spitta, Der Brief des Jakobus, 6 6 - 6 9 ; Kuhl, Die Stellung, 4 - 1 1 ; Ropes, St. James, 197. T h e repeated designation o f those for w h o m God's promises o f "life" (1:12; cf. Luke 10:25-28) and "kingdom" (2:5; cf. Mark 12:28-34) will be fulfilled as "those w h o love him" would seem to suggest that he himself finds "love o f G o d , " at least, to be an apt summary. See above p . 166 on the use o f this phrase in other liter ature. T h e issue in 2:8-11 is not, however, merely one o f competing summaries. All commands, after all, come from G o d ; cf. Jas 2:10-11. Cf. Kuhl, Die Stellung, lOf; Ropes, St. James, 197. Note that the author himself elsewhere invokes this belief—indeed, likely Deut 1 5 6
1 5 7
1 5 8
1 5 9
1 6 0
176
CHAPTER FOUR
"save" (cf. 2:14); so t o o , those w h o "love their n e i g h b o r " d o well, but this, o f itself, does not ensure that they will not ultimately b e "convicted b y the law as transgressors" (2:10). S u m m a r y o r not, merely to love one's n e i g h b o r is not necessarily to "keep the w h o l e law." Attention to this c o m m a n d a l o n e , therefore, is n o t sufficient g r o u n d s for confidence in the face o f a c o m i n g j u d g m e n t w h i c h will b e executed b y the standard o f the w h o l e "law o f f r e e d o m " (2:12, 5ioc vouou zkevQepiaq), and o n e w h i c h will b e , potentially, "merciless" (2:13). The Law of Freedom and the Torah T h a t it is the T o r a h w h i c h the author o f J a m e s describes as the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " emerges with clarity from his
argument
that those w h o s h o w partiality are transgressors o f the law
(Jas
2 : 8 - 1 1 ) . All four o f the c o m m a n d s explicitly identified as elements o f the law in this passage—and indeed, in the letter as a w h o l e — are c o m m a n d s o f the T o r a h . H e follows the L X X o r d e r w h e n cit ing, as w o r d s o f the law o r o f G o d the "lawgiver" (cf. 4:12), the prohibitions o f m u r d e r and adultery; and he draws u p o n a tradition o f legal interpretation associated with the biblical prohibition o f par tiality in order to p r o v i d e an example o f the type o f b e h a v i o r he feels L e v 19:15 excludes. M o r e tellingly still, his references to love o f n e i g h b o r a n d partiality in 2 : 8 - 9 assume the written context o f these c o m m a n d s within the T o r a h : aware that "love o f n e i g h b o r " is used as a summary o f "the w h o l e law," the author effectively locates this c o m m a n d within its scriptural context, thus identifying it as o n e c o m m a n d alongside others within a larger b o d y o f l a w — a n d par ticularly alongside that w h i c h prohibits partiality, his chief c o n c e r n . O b e d i e n c e to each o f these c o m m a n d s is equally important
given
the fact that b o t h stem f r o m the same source, whether c o n c e i v e d as the law or, w h i c h is the implication in any case, the lawgiver him self. Regardless o f its summarizing function, therefore, adherence to the love c o m m a n d alone will not suffice for success at the eschatological j u d g m e n t , for this j u d g m e n t will b e e x e c u t e d b y the lawgiver in a c c o r d a n c e with the w h o l e o f the "law o f f r e e d o m " (2:12; cf. 4:12). Scriptural law—that is, the various bodies o f legislation that were gathered together and identified as a law given b y G o d
through
6:4ff itself—when arguing for the necessity o f "doing" rather than "judging" the law (4:12): ei<; E O X I V [6] vouo9exr|^ m i Kpvrnq 6 ovvduevoc; ocoaai K a i arcoAiaai.
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
177
M o s e s — w a s (and is), o f course, subject to a variety o f interpreta tions.
Differing interpretations o f this law w e r e o n e important
tor, albeit a m o n g others, in the formation Christian g r o u p s .
161
o f distinct Jewish
fac and
O n e c a n n o t , therefore, make facile conclusions
regarding the author's interpretation o f particular aspects o f this b o d y o f legislation b a s e d simply o n his general allegiance to it. I n d e e d , o f the four c o m m a n d s o f this law that he explicitly cites, the o n l y ones to w h i c h he devotes any e x t e n d e d attention are the prohibition o f partiality a n d the love c o m m a n d . Interestingly,
b o t h in c o n n e c t i o n
with the former a n d in the statement o f his general legal principle that " w h o e v e r keeps the w h o l e law but stumbles in o n e respect has b e c o m e liable for all" (2:10), o n e finds similarities to rabbinic tradi 162
tion.
O n e ought not, h o w e v e r , d r a w any sweeping conclusions from
these isolated examples. Litde m o r e than his a d h e r e n c e to this gen eral principle, his related insistence that o b e d i e n c e to the love c o m m a n d d o e s n o t o f itself constitute keeping "the w h o l e l a w , " a n d his particular interest in social a n d e c o n o m i c m a t t e r s m i n e d regarding his general a p p r o a c h to the
163
c a n b e deter
Torah.
T h e distinction b e t w e e n the written b o d y o f legislation a n d
its
interpretation at the hands o f different individuals o r groups takes o n a particular i m p o r t a n c e with respect to those aspects o f Jewish l a w w h o s e interpretation p r o v e d m o s t divisive in early Christianity, that is, the legislation c o n c e r n i n g the cult, purity, diet, the
calendar,
a n d circumcision. T h e author's silence with respect to these aspects o f the law w o u l d seem to indicate, at least, that they are n o t a m o n g his foremost c o n c e r n s .
164
O n the other hand, there is litde in the let
ter w h i c h suggests that he rejected these parts o f the law
161
outright.
See, e.g., E. P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice and Belief 63 BCE-66 CE (London: S C M ; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992) 13-29 and Part III: "Groups and Parties." Sanders's omission of, e.g., the Jerusalem Christians from this dis cussion is perhaps indicative o f a more general—and quite problematic—scholarly tendency to view the terms "Christianity" and "Judaism" as contrastive categories even within the earliest period o f the former's emergence. O n the author's treatment o f partiality, see above pp. 16 Iff; on the basic legal principle o f 2:10, see the passages assembled by Dibelius, James, 144. Interestingly, some (beginning with Augustine) have also pointed out the similarity between Jas 2:10 and the Stoic principle o f the unity o f virtue; see esp. M . O ' R o u r k e Boyle, "The Stoic Paradox o f James 2:10," NTS 31 (1985) 6 1 1 - 1 7 . See further on this immediately below. It is not at all clear, for example, to what extent the c o m m a n d "purify (KaGapioaxe) hands," coupled with that to "sanctify (ayv(oaxe) hearts" in Jas 4:8, is meant literally. What is clear in any case is that the only "impurity" for which the author shows any explicit concern is that which results from the pursuit o f one's 1 6 2
1 6 3
1 6 4
CHAPTER FOUR
178
His basic legal principle that stumbling
with
respect
to e v e n
one
c o m m a n d o f the l a w renders o n e a "law-breaker" is formulated with n o such stipulation. H e shows n o interest in the allegorical interpre tation e m p l o y e d to this e n d , for e x a m p l e , in Epistle of Barnabas) n o r is anything a n a l o g o u s to a deuterosis theory clearly at w o r k in his let ter.
165
W h i l e his description o f the law as b o t h
freedom"
"perfect" a n d " o f
has often b e e n taken as an indication that these
o f the law w e r e n o l o n g e r b i n d i n g ,
166
aspects
w e have already seen e x a m
ples o f Jewish authors w h o , also influenced b y the Stoic c o n c e p t o f law, view.
c o u l d describe the T o r a h similarly quite apart f r o m any 1 6 7
such
T h e m e r e fact that the author o f J a m e s was Christian, o f
course, is hardly decisive in this respect. T h e r e was n o single "Christian" position o n such matters, a n d it is b y n o m e a n s clear that those w h o held a m o r e conservative position with respect to t h e m
could not
themselves have m a d e apologetic use o f the Stoic theory. T h e author's o b v i o u s interest in associating the law with
"freedom"
(eXevQepia),
in fact, c a n just as easily b e explained as a reaction to Paul's p o l e m -
desires or the failure to control one's tongue. Thus d o the commands o f 4:8, given to "sinners" and 8i\j/i)%oi, respectively, follow the charge that such people's pursuit of the pleasures makes them enemies o f G o d and, conversely, constitutes "friendship with the world" (4:1-6); see Chapter Five under the heading "Desire and the Gifts of G o d in 4 : 1 - 6 , " and on James's understanding o f the diyvxoq in particular under the heading "6^6KXT|PO<;." Note, too, that it is the "tongue" above all else which leads to impurity; o n this notion, see Chapter Five under the heading "xekzioq." It is in light o f this association o f "impurity" with "the world" and "the tongue" that one should understand the author's definition o f "pure and undefiled religion" (0pT|CK8ia K o c G a p a K a i d j i i a v x o c ; ) as keeping oneself "unstained (aaniXov) from the world" (1:27); note, in fact, that this follows immediately upon the statement that the religion ( G p r i C K e i a ) o f one w h o fails to "bridle" one's tongue is "useless" (1:26). O n the use o f purity language in James, see further see Seitz, "James and the Law," 481-83. As is the case, e.g., with Irenaeus (see above, note 68), w h o also, incidentally, interpreted certain aspects o f Jewish law allegorically (A. H. 4.11.4; 4.14.3). See fur ther on the deuterosis theory the discussion o f the Apostolic Constitutions in Chapter Three. So, most recently, Tsuji, Glaube, 110-15. Cf. Ropes, St. James, 178: "there is no ground for the c o m m o n affirmation that this phrase implies a sublimated, spiritualised view o f the Jewish law, which, it is said, would have been impossible for a faithful Jew." Ropes, however, assumes that "[t]he use o f the phrase by a Christian implies that he conceived Christianity as a law, including and fulfilling (Mt. 5 ) the old one." I find no evidence in James, however, that the author had any concept o f an "old" law, nor that he conceived of "Christianity" as a "new" law which—as, presumably, in the conception o f Ropes (cf. p . 179)—stood over against the law o f 'Judaism"; cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 137. It is in any case problematic to draw conclusions regarding a given early author's view o f the law purely on the basis o f his/her status as a "Christian." 1 6 5
1 6 6
167
17
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
ical association o f it with " s l a v e r y "
168
179
as o n the assumption that the
c o m m u n i t i e s for w h i c h he w r o t e , as a "liberated D i a s p o r a J u d a i s m , " " n o l o n g e r h a d to b e a r the b u r d e n o f ritualism."
169
I n d e e d , the v i e w
o f the love c o m m a n d against w h i c h the author argues in 2 : 8 - 1 1 is particularly
reminiscent o f Paul's peculiar n o t i o n that, since " ' y o u
shall not c o m m i t adultery', ' y o u shall n o t m u r d e r ' (ou uoi%eua£i<;, ou (pov£UG£i<;; cf. Jas
2:11!), ' y o u shall not steal', ' y o u shall n o t c o v e t ' ,
a n d any other c o m m a n d is s u m m e d u p (avaKecpocAmouxcci) in ' y o u shall love y o u r n e i g h b o r as y o u r s e l f , " it is the case that "the w h o loves another has fulfilled the l a w " ( R o m 1 3 : 8 - 9 ) .
170
one
Moreover,
the immediately following, and closely related section 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 , despite the protestations
o f s o m e scholars, is almost certainly to b e under
stood in light o f Paul's notion o f salvation b y faith apart from w o r k s .
171
T o b e sure, the author's silence o n the law's c o m m a n d s in such areas as purity, diet a n d the calendar is significant, a n d all the m o r e so if he d o e s intend to interact with Paul, w h o s e association o f the law with slavery rather than f r e e d o m , w h o s e principle o f "faith apart f r o m w o r k s , " and w h o s e v i e w o f the love c o m m a n d , w e r e all for mulated especially with such issues in m i n d . It is in fact clear f r o m the letter as a w h o l e , a n d particularly
from 2:1-13 and
2:14-26
themselves, that the author o f J a m e s is c o n c e r n e d a b o v e all with social a n d e c o n o m i c issues. T o the extent that he d o e s interact with Paul, then, it c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d that his primary c o n c e r n regard ing a pauline formulation
such as nicxiq %copi<; epycov is its possible
implications for Christian attention to s o c i o - e c o n o m i c matters rather than a d h e r e n c e to the legislation regarding diet, the calendar, o r cir c u m c i s i o n b y Jewish o r non-Jewish Christians.
1 6 8
172
W h i l e it might fairly
I.e., as opposed to etavGepioc; see esp. Gal 4:21-5:1, and further the Conclusion to this study. Dibelius, James, 119. Cf. Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 184-87. Against, most recently, T . Penner, The Epistle of James and Eschatology: Re-reading an Ancient Christian Letter (JSNTSup 121; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996) 4 7 - 7 4 ; and Johnson, Letter of James, on which see my review in JR 78 (1998) 102-4. O n this point, see further the Conclusion o f this study. Cf. in this respect the very early caricature o f Paul's thought, reported by Paul himself in R o m 3:8: "Let us d o evil so that g o o d may c o m e . " It is by no means clear that xa KOCK(X refer specifically to the "evils" o f disregard for circumci sion or Jewish dietary customs. Whatever might have been the understanding o f the law o f those w h o formulated this caricature, the critique assumes a much more generalized understanding o f Paul's theological principles—or at least a concern regarding the implications o f his basic principles for Christian ethics in general. 1 6 9
1 7 0
171
1 7 2
180
CHAPTER FOUR
b e c o n c l u d e d f r o m his silence o n these matters that the author o f J a m e s was not a m o n g those w h o insisted o n the necessity o f cir c u m c i s i o n for non-Jewish adherents to the Christian m o v e m e n t , the question o f whether he a d v o c a t e d the continuation o f such practices b y Jewish m e m b e r s o f the m o v e m e n t is m o r e difficult to answer in light o f the following considerations. T h e debate regarding the o b s e r v a n c e o f Jewish customs b y n o n Jewish Christians in w h i c h Paul was e m b r o i l e d seems to have arisen in c o n n e c t i o n with a specific circumstance within the Christian m o v e ment: the increasing n u m b e r o f non-Jewish adherents to the m o v e m e n t gave rise to questions regarding (i) the conditions w h i c h should g o v e r n interaction
b e t w e e n Jewish
a n d non-Jewish
adherents, par
ticularly in the social c o n t e x t o f shared meals; and, perhaps as a c o n s e q u e n c e , (ii) the
extent to w h i c h non-Jewish
should live a c c o r d i n g to Jewish c u s t o m s .
173
group
members
T h e nature o f this p r o b
l e m admits o f a variety o f solutions. A t o n e p o l e is a position o f c o m p l e t e a d h e r e n c e , even b y non-Jews, to (some interpretation o f ) the law; so, apparendy, the so-called "false brothers" o f G a l 2:4 and the "Pharisaic Christians" in the narrative o f Acts 15:1, 5. A t the other p o l e , n o restrictions whatsoever were i n c u m b e n t o n non-Jews, whether o r not Christian J e w s themselves c o n t i n u e d to live b y them; so, apparently, Paul himself, a n d perhaps Peter before the
incident
at A n t i o c h (Gal 2 : 1 1 - 1 2 ) . In b e t w e e n these t w o poles o n e c a n c o n ceive o f m o r e m o d e r a t e positions, such as n o shared meals b e t w e e n Jewish and non-Jewish Christians unless s o m e degree o f non-Jewish o b s e r v a n c e obtained, at least in the context o f c o m m o n meals; so,
1 7 3
Such a generative context is reflected in Galatians 2; cf. Acts 10-11 and 15, where Peter's (reluctant) decision to share a meal with non-Jews prompts a debate about circumcision, resulting in a "decree" from James and the Jerusalem church on the requirements for non-Jews in this respect. T h e issues behind the controversy in Antioch recounted by Paul in Galatians 2 are notoriously murky; it seems rather clear, however, that the issue was related to Jewish dietary restrictions. If this is true, it appears that the simple connection o f eating and circumcision made by the author o f Luke-Acts—despite the impression left from reading Galatians, in which Paul recounts this incident before launching into an argument against the practice of circumcision—reflects a non-Jewish perspective on the issues: a Jewish concern for biblical purity regulations is viewed more simplistically as a Jewish reluctance to eat with those w h o aren't circumcised. See, however, E. P. Sanders, 'Jewish Association with Gentiles and Galatians 2:11-14," The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn (ed. R . T . Fortna and B. R . Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990) 170-88, w h o tends toward the view that no specific law was at issue in Antioch, with the conflict resulting rather from James's more general concern for "Peter's reputation" if he consorted too closely, too often, with non-Jews.
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
181
it w o u l d seem, the " m e n f r o m J a m e s , " a n d ultimately,
apparently,
virtually all o f the Christian J e w s in A n t i o c h after their arrival (Gal 2:12-13).
1 7 4
In fact, the evidence f r o m the first centuries o f the m o v e
m e n t indicates that n o o n e position was agreed u p o n b y all inter ested parties, A c t s 15 a n d
16:4 notwithstanding.
W h i l e the bulk o f
the extant early Christian literature—preserved b y later " o r t h o d o x " copyists!—reflects a m o r e liberal position, it is clear f r o m the
scat
tered reports o f a n u m b e r o f early authors that Christians contin u e d to disagree o n such matters. T h o u g h the details o f such reports are often confused, it c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d that s o m e Christians c o n tinued to assume the i m p o r t a n c e o f observance o f Jewish well b e y o n d the first c e n t u r y . from
175
customs
In a particularly interesting passage
the Dialogue with Trypho, in fact, Justin distinguishes
between
t w o types o f such Christians: those w h o observe Jewish customs a n d w o u l d further " c o m p e l those Gentiles w h o believe in Christ to live in all respects a c c o r d i n g to the law given b y M o s e s , o r c h o o s e n o t to associate so intimately with t h e m , " a n d those w h o continue
to
observe the law themselves, but w h o d o not require non-Jewish m e m bers o f the m o v e m e n t to d o the
same.
176
T h e r e is in any case little reason to suppose that the religious c o n cerns o f those Christians w h o assumed the enduring validity o f the Torah
as law—regardless
o f their position o n the matter o f n o n -
Jewish o b s e r v a n c e — r e v o l v e d a r o u n d the cult, purity, c i r c u m c i s i o n o r diet. T h e fact that o u r primary evidence for such Christians are pas sages from Paul's letters w h i c h deal specifically with
1 7 4
disagreements
It is by no means clear from this passage that all o f the Christian Jews in Antioch suddenly decided that the non-observant gentile Christians there could no longer be considered members o f the movement. M o r e likely, the issue was simply one o f the implications o f their non-observance for the interaction o f Jews and nonJews in the context o f shared meals. Note also the "mediating" positions on Jewish dietary restrictions reflected in Acts 15:28-29, as well as in Did. 6:2-3: "For if thou canst bear the whole yoke o f the Lord, thou wilt be perfect, but if thou canst not, d o what thou canst. A n d concerning food, bear what though canst, but keep strictly from that which is offered to idols, for it is the worship o f dead gods." Note that even Paul proved to be somewhat squeamish on the subject o f food that had been involved in sacrifices to other gods (1 C o r 10:14-22; though cf. 8:1-13). See, e.g., the discussion o f G. Strecker, " O n the Problem o f Jewish Christianity," in W . Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity (2d German ed., with added appendices, by G. Strecker; E T ed. by R . A . Kraft and G . Krodel; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971) 2 4 1 - 8 5 (Appendix 1). Justin Dial. 47; note that while Justin feels that the latter will "be saved," and thus interacts with them, he reports that other non-Jewish Christians disagreed with him on this matter. 1 7 5
1 7 6
CHAPTER FOUR
182
o n these issues has almost certainly distorted o u r picture o f their reli gious m o t i v a t i o n s .
177
In fact, there are several indications that social
a n d e c o n o m i c issues w e r e p a r a m o u n t for at least s o m e such Chris tians. Paul himself reports that the very leaders in Jerusalem
whose
misgivings regarding eating with non-Jews w o u l d later infuriate h i m initially (and quite possibly c o n t i n u a l l y )
178
m a d e o n l y o n e stipulation
regarding Paul's quest t o secure non-Jewish adherents t o the m o v e m e n t : they asked " o n l y " that they " r e m e m b e r the p o o r " ( G a l 2: 10, jnovov xcov nx(o%&v ivcc |Livr|jLiov8ucojLi£v), resulting
in Paul's
on-going
c o l l e c t i o n for Jerusalem f r o m his non-Jewish c h u r c h e s ( G a l 2 : 1 0 ) . Such a socio-economic
interest
is o f course f o u n d
throughout
179
the
synoptic gospels, a n d is particularly p r o m i n e n t in the synoptic say ings s o u r c e , w h e r e o i TTCCO%O{—as, Christians
perhaps,
(cf. G a l 2 : 1 0 ; R o m 15:25)—seems t o b e used as a self-
designation for m e m b e r s o f the m o v e m e n t .
177
a m o n g the J e r u s a l e m
1 8 0
S u c h a self-designation
Dibelius's interpretation o f the Letter of James, e.g., seems to be informed by an approach to early Christianity which assumes only two basic forms o f the move ment for which "the break with Judaism was not accomplished in the radical fash ion with which we are familiar from the Pauline Letters" (James, 119, with specific reference to the group I've numbered [i]): (i) a "liberated Diaspora Judaism," in which Christians "were n o longer bound to the letter o f the O l d Testament" and thus "no longer had to bear the burden o f ritualism" (ibid.); and (ii) "the advocates of a strict ritualistic praxis" characterized as a "hidebound Jewish-Christian piety," of which James the brother o f Jesus and "the people from James" o f Galatians 2 are taken to be representative (ibid., 17). Paul accuses Peter (and, by implication, apparently every other Christian Jew at Antioch except himself]) o f refusing to eat with non-Jews after "certain people from James" arrived (Gal 2:11-13)—which, o f course, implies that these latter also had misgivings about eating with non-Jews, at least under the circumstances obtain ing at Antioch. T h e extent to which those "certain people from James" attempted to force non-Jews into living in accord with Jewish customs, however, is by n o means clear. Note particularly that Paul's characterization o f Peter as "compelling the gentiles to live like Jews (ioa)5ou£eiv)" is not obviously based o n anything more than his withdrawal from c o m m o n meals. It is not clear, that is, whether the issue in Antioch was o n e o f gentile participation in the movement per se, or the extent of the participation in the movement by non-observant adherents. Note that the (evidently) uncircumcised Titus (cf. Gal 2:3!) was himself engaged in this collection according to 2 C o r 8:16, 23. J. S. Kloppenborg, The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Christian Wisdom Collections (Studies in Antiquity and Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 2 4 0 - 4 1 . On the question o f the relation o f "the p o o r " o f Gal 2:10 to the Jerusalem Christians, see Betz, Galatians, 102; further L. E. Keck, " T h e Poor A m o n g the Saints in the New Testament," %rVW 56 (1965) 100-29; idem, " T h e Poor A m o n g the Saints in Jewish Christianity and Qumran," £NW 57 (1966) 5 4 - 7 8 . Keck is skeptical regard ing the use o f "the p o o r " as a title among the early Jerusalem Christians. The theme o f poverty and wealth also receives special emphasis in Luke-Acts, 178
179
180
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
is also evident centuries
later, notably, o n the
183
part o f a g r o u p o f
Christians n o t o r i o u s for their c o n t i n u e d a d h e r e n c e to the T o r a h , the " E b i o n i t e s , " t h o u g h o u r scant e v i d e n c e for this g r o u p o b s c u r e s the extent to w h i c h this n a m e reflected their c h i e f c o n c e r n s .
181
It is w o r t h
noting, t o o , that w h a t little e v i d e n c e w e h a v e , apart f r o m Paul, for those
Christians w h o c o n t i n u e d
suggests
a particular emphasis
instruction
preserved
in
t o live b y J e w i s h
o n social relations.
Matthew's
customs
Thus
the
s e r m o n , for e x a m p l e ,
also cultic
assumes
participation in the Jewish cult, but subordinates it to social c o n c e r n s : " T h e r e f o r e , w h e n y o u b r i n g y o u r gift-offering (to b e p l a c e d ) o n the altar, a n d
there y o u r e m e m b e r
that y o u r b r o t h e r
has
something
against y o u , leave y o u r gift there in front o f the altar, a n d first g o a n d b e c o m e r e c o n c i l e d with y o u r brother, a n d then c o m e (back) a n d offer y o u r g i f t . "
182
O n e c a n also c o m p a r e in this respect the
follow
i n g " w o e " p r o c l a i m e d against the Pharisees (and scribes, a c c o r d i n g t o M a t t h e w ) in the synoptic sayings s o u r c e :
1 8 3
Luke 11:42: But woe to you Pharisees! for you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect the justice and love o f G o d ; these [latter] you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.
where it emerges with a vehemence rivalled only by 1 Enoch and the Letter o f James among the ancient Jewish and Christian literature; see G . W . E. Nickelsburg, "Riches, the Rich and God's Judgment in 1 Enoch 92-105 and the Gospel According to Luke," NTS 25 (1979) 3 2 4 - 4 4 . T h e parable o f Lazarus and the rich man, for example, preserved only in Luke, envisions a post-mortem reversal in which a wealthy man is punished in Hades, apparently for n o other crime than living in luxury while ignoring the p o o r man laying at his gate. T h e impoverished Lazarus, on the other hand, receives comfort "with Abraham" after his death (Luke 16:19-31; note esp. 16:25). It is o f particular interest in the present connection that this story assumes an interpretation o f "Moses and the prophets" according to which the problematic nature o f such behavior should be perfectly clear (Luke 16:29-31). Notably, such socio-economic interests are associated in the second b o o k o f Luke's work particularly with the Christians at Jerusalem, w h o are also portrayed as con tinuing in their adherence to Jewish religious practices and w h o are, indeed, as a group, "zealous for the law" (Acts 2 : 4 4 - 4 7 ; 4:32-5:11; cf. 21:20). See, e.g., the recent and concise survey o f the evidence in S. Goranson, "Ebionites," ABD 2 . 2 6 0 - 6 1 ; further Keck, " T h e Poor A m o n g the Saints in Jewish Christianity and Qumran," 5 5 - 6 6 . Matt 5:23-24, cited according to the translation o f H . D . Betz, The Sermon on the Mount: A Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, including the Sermon on the Plain (Matthew 5:3-7:27 and Luke 6:20-49) (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1995) 198; see further Betz's comments in ibid., 2 2 2 - 2 6 . Cited according to the translation o f J. S. Kloppenborg, Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes & Concordance (Foundations & Facets; Sonoma, C A : Polebridge, 1988) 113. 1 8 1
1 8 2
1 8 3
184
CHAPTER FOUR
Matt 23:23: W o e to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for you tithe mint and dill and cumin, and leave aside weightier matters o f the law, justice and mercy and faithfulness; these [latter] you ought to have done, without leaving aside the others. James's c o n c e r n with s o c i o - e c o n o m i c issues, t o o , is o f course patent. "Pure religion" is b o i l e d d o w n to an active c o n c e r n for " w i d o w s a n d orphans"
and
a v o i d i n g the
impurity o f "the
w o r l d " (Jas
W h i l e arguing for the necessity ofepyocin addition to niaxiq,
1:27).
184
he for
mulates as an e x a m p l e the callous treatment o f "a b r o t h e r o r sis ter" w h o "is naked a n d lacking daily f o o d " ( 2 : 1 5 - 1 6 ) . Similarly, his admonition
against acts o f partiality, the c r o w n i n g point o f w h i c h
warns that it is a transgression o f the law b y w h i c h p e o p l e will ulti mately b e j u d g e d , is c o n c e r n e d specifically with dishonoring the p o o r while h o n o r i n g the rich sheerly o n the basis o f wealth (2:2—4, 6). Inter estingly, he, t o o , apparently uses "the p o o r " as a it is specifically "the p o o r " (oi
TCTCO%O{)
self-designation:
185
w h o m G o d " c h o s e " (e^eXe^axo)
to b e "rich in faith" and "inheritors o f the kingdom which he promised to those w h o love h i m " ( 2 : 5 ) .
186
O n the other hand, he assumes a pat
tern o f b e h a v i o r o n the part o f "the rich" (oi nXovcioi)
w h i c h involves
oppression, legal suits a n d b l a s p h e m y ( 2 : 6 - 7 ) . T h e s e rich, the author warns with a searing irony, can expect a "day o f slaughter" for w h i c h their luxurious
living is "fattening t h e m " ( 5 : 1 - 6 ) . T h e
author o f
J a m e s ultimately expects an eschatological reversal w h i c h will r e m e d y the present circumstances: the h u m b l e will b e exalted and the humiliated (Jas
1:12; cf. 5 : 1 ) .
the parousia o f Jesus C h r i s t .
1 8 4
187
rich
This, apparently, will b e effected at
188
O n "impurity" in James, see above, note 164. So, e.g., Dibelius, James, 44: "Ja[me]s can express his sympathy with the poor with so litde reserve because for him being p o o r and being Christian were coinci dental concepts, not only by virtue o f his archaizing dependence on the literature [sc. the Jewish literature dealing with "the p o o r " ] , but also by virtue o f his own personal conviction." M o r e precisely, oi nxcoxoi TCD KOGUCO, i.e., "poor in the eyes o f the world." Note the subsequent description o f them as nXovoioi ev motet: in actuality they are "rich" in the sense which matters most. This somewhat peculiar phrase is undoubtedly to be understood in light of the author's negative portrayal of "the world" as fundamentally opposed to G o d (4:4), and a source o f impurity, the avoidance o f which gets at the very heart o f his understanding o f true religion (1:27). See further on "the world" in James, L. T . Johnson, "Friendship with the World/Friendship with G o d : A Study o f Discipleship in James," Discipleship in the New Testament (ed. with an introduction by F. F. Segovia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 166-83. Cf. Luke 16:19-31, on which see above, note 180. See Jas 5:7, 9, noting especially the ovv that joins 5:7 to 5:6. O n the "parou185
1 8 6
187
1 8 8
185
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
T o p o i n t out such similarities, o f course, is not necessarily to argue that the Letter o f J a m e s originated a m o n g Jerusalem Christians o r a m o n g s e c o n d century Ebionites, m u c h less that it represents authentic writing o f J a m e s the brother o f J e s u s .
189
an
It is o n l y to p o i n t
out that the question o f its author's position regarding matters o f diet, purity, cult and circumcision is m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x than is often thought to b e the case. E v e n if, as is most likely, the author's position regarding the relation o f the love c o m m a n d to the " w h o l e l a w " a n d his discussion o f Kicxiq and epya in Jas 2:14—26 are to b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f pauline formulations, it is n o t clear what c o n clusions are to b e drawn from the fact that he d o e s n o t feel c o m pelled to lay out his o w n position o n those aspects o f the w h i c h most rankled emphasis
Paul. W h i l e this, a l o n g with his
Torah
characteristic
o n s o c i o - e c o n o m i c c o n c e r n s , surely d o e s indicate
what
aspects o f the law mattered m o s t to h i m , he is a p p a r e n d y n o t alto gether
different
in this respect from a n u m b e r
o f Christians w h o
themselves c o n t i n u e d to follow Jewish customs. Such Christians c o u l d and did h o l d a variety o f positions regarding issues like diet a n d cir c u m c i s i o n ; a n d s o m e , at least, while continuing to live in a c c o r d with Jewish customs themselves, did not require such o f n o n - J e w s .
190
In short, firm conclusions regarding the position o f the author o n such matters require m o r e information regarding him and his intended audience than w e c u r r e n d y possess. W h i l e it is clear that James's law is the T o r a h , the question o f his interpretation o f those aspects o f it w h i c h legislate matters such as purity, diet, circumcision and the calendar must remain o p e n .
1 9 1
sia o f the Lord" in James, see Jackson-McCabe, " A Letter to the Twelve Tribes," 5 0 9 - 1 0 ; Johnson, Letter of James, 313-14. Such questions are difficult, perhaps impossible, to answer with any degree o f certainty given the paucity o f information in James regarding its origin, not to mention the meager evidence for the "historical James," the Jerusalem church, and the Ebionites. C f , e.g., Acts 21:17-26: the problem is that Paul teaches Jews w h o live among non-Jews not to live in accord with the law. Cf. W a c h o b , " T h e Rich in Faith," 291 n. 94: "Whatever the author may or may not have thought about the so-called cultic ordinances o f the law, matters like circumcision and dietary ordinances, we d o not know." Note that while W a c h o b refers to Seitz, "James and the Law," in this connection, Seitz himself is inclined to the view that the "law o f freedom," though representing "the 'old' law" to be sure, means "only the decalogue together with such ethical precepts as love o f neigh bor"; the author o f James "simply ignores" issues o f diet and cirumcision when using the expression "the whole law." See "James and the Law," 4 8 4 - 8 5 . 1 8 9
1 9 0
191
186
CHAPTER FOUR
IMPLANTED LOGOS IN L I G H T OF THE T O R A H AND JUDGMENT
T h e expression euxpuxoq AxSyoq was c o i n e d as a term for h u m a n rea son b y G r e e k philosophers, particularly in c o n n e c t i o n with the Stoic theory that h u m a n reason comprises a divinely given natural law internal to the h u m a n animal. T h a t the author o f J a m e s speaks o f "the implanted logos" in 1:21 with at least a general grasp o f its orig inal significance is clear f r o m the fact that he equates it with a "per fect law o f f r e e d o m . " Significantly, h o w e v e r , he also speaks o f this logos in ways w h i c h are not typical o f Stoic tradition. In a m a n n e r reminiscent, rather, o f Jewish a n d Christian literature, he considers it to b e something which can (and must) b e b o t h "heard" and " d o n e , " w h i c h "is able to save y o u r souls," and w h i c h can, in s o m e sense, b e " r e c e i v e d . " T h e s e differences reflect the fact that in J a m e s , as in the other Jewish and Christian writings e x a m i n e d in the
previous
chapter, the Stoic c o n c e p t o f law has b e e n fused with a set o f reli gious a n d historical convictions alien to Stoicism. G i v e n the o b v i o u s indications o f the author's d e p e n d e n c e u p o n Jewish and
Christian
traditions throughout the letter, such differences are hardly surpris ing. N o r are they b y any means insignificant: the aspects o f the treat m e n t o f the implanted logos in J a m e s w h i c h diverge from its treatment in G r e e k p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion are just as illuminative
o f the
author's understanding o f it a n d its role in his religious thought
as
the respects in w h i c h it is similar to them. O f particular i m p o r t a n c e in this respect is the fact that the author o f J a m e s , again like Philo, Justin, and the authors o f 4 Maccabees and the Apostolic Constitutions, assumes that this logos has an external, ver bal f o r m . T h e "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " is in fact the T o r a h , h o w e v e r p r e c i s e l y i n t e r p r e t e d b y the
a u t h o r . It is in light o f this
identification that James's peculiar notion that the logos can b e "heard" and " d o n e " is to b e understood; for while scarcely typical o f Stoic discussions o f natural law, such a pairing o f "hearing and d o i n g " is not u n c o m m o n in Jewish
discussions o f the T o r a h . In a m a n n e r
w h i c h recalls R o m a n s 2:13, the author o f J a m e s insists that o n e must not only b e a "hearer" o f the logos, but a " d o e r " o f it as well. M e r e l y to "hear" it is to " d e c e i v e (Tcapa-^oyi^ojievoi) oneself," for it is pre cisely "through d o i n g " (ev xfi 7coif|aei) that o n e will b e c o m e "blessed" (1:22, 25). O n e b e c o m e s such a "fogo^-doer" through constant atten tion to the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m , " w h i c h is to say, to the T o r a h .
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
J a m e s ' s emphasis and
187
o n b e c o m i n g a " d o e r " o f the
thus o f the logos—acquires
eschatological d i m e n s i o n
o f the
l a w (cf. 4 : 1 2 ) —
a particular u r g e n c y in light o f the letter. T h e parousia o f Jesus Christ
will entail j u d g m e n t ( 5 : 8 - 9 ) , e x e c u t e d in a c c o r d with the l a w b y the divine lawgiver himself; a n d it will b e , potentially, "merciless" (2:12—13; 4 : 1 2 ) . A w a r e o f the i d e a that " l o v e o f n e i g h b o r " represents a mary
o f "the
w h o l e law," he
cautions
against an
c o n f i d e n c e b a s e d o n attention t o this o n e general
command:
m a r y o r not, L e v 19:18 is still o n e c o m m a n d a m o n g m a n y the
law; transgressing any
o f the
others,
sum
eschatological
even if o n e
sum within
"loves one's
n e i g h b o r , " c a n still r e n d e r o n e liable to j u d g m e n t .
1 9 2
reminiscent
self-deception
o f his
earlier w a r n i n g r e g a r d i n g the
In a
those w h o d o n o t " d o " the logos, h e thus a d m o n i s h e s the and "as
sisters" t o speak those
(2:12).
193
about
and
to b e j u d g e d
b y m e a n s o f the
goes a long way toward
clarifying
the
of
"brothers
" d o " (jcoieue; m o r e idiomatically:
"act")
law o f freedom"
T h i s e x p e c t a t i o n o f an eschatological j u d g m e n t b y the
implanted your
manner
author's description
law
o f the
logos as that " w h i c h is able to save (xov Suvdjievov GCOOOCI)
souls"
(1:21).
Indeed,
it is in his
capacity
as
"lawgiver
and
192 Yhis is not to say that James envisions a judgment that will o f necessity pro ceed as a wooden accounting o f one's transgressions o f the law. Jas 2:13, in fact, points to an "escape clause": showing mercy to others will mean receiving mercy at the judgment. A similar notion is found both in the Matthean parable o f the unmerciful servant (Matt 18:23-35), and esp. in Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai's reported response to a companion's grief at the destruction o f the temple, and thus o f the mechanism for Israel's atonement: " D o not grieve. W e have another atone ment as effective as this. A n d what it is? It is acts o f lovingkindness, as it is said: 'I desire mercy and not sacrifice'" (Abot R. Nat. 6; cited as found in A . F. Segal, Rebecca's Children: Judaism and Christianity in the Roman World [Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1986] 131). In James, this notion can be correlated particularly with the author's emphatic concern for the socially and economically disadvantaged; see esp. 1:27; 2:1-13; 2:15-16; 5:1-6. Interestingly, he does not simply equate such a concern with the general notion o f "love o f neighbor." His notion that mercy "boasts over judgment," more specifically, is to be understood in light o f the cri tique, implicit in Jas 2:1-13, o f a social system in which tokens o f honor are granted on the basis o f wealth a n d / o r patronage. T h e argument o f 2:13 does not assume that one who "shows partiality" as defined in 2:2-4—perhaps by courting (or reward ing) a wealthy patron by granting him, rather than a beggar, an honorable seat in the synagogue—is violating the c o m m a n d o f "love o f neighbor." T h e argument, rather, is that they are violating the partiality c o m m a n d by acting as "unjust judges" o f the rich and poor. 1 9 3
Again, despite his wariness regarding the use o f the love c o m m a n d as a sum mary o f the law, his emphasis lies above all on socio-economic issues. See above all the construal o f "pure religion" as concern for widows and orphans in 1:27.
188
CHAPTER FOUR
j u d g e " that J a m e s ' s g o d himself is described as o n e " w h o is able to save" (6 8uvdu£vo<; acbooti)—and to destroy Somewhat
(4:12).
194
m o r e difficult to interpret is the author's notion
that
the implanted logos can in s o m e sense b e " r e c e i v e d . " I must insist at the outset that the c o m m a n d 8 e £ a c 0 e xov euxpuxov Xoyov (1:21) is equally p r o b l e m a t i c o n any interpretation o f the logos. T h e essential difficulty o f the passage is the fact that the author c o m m a n d s
his
audience to "receive" something that is already "implanted." Whether, therefore, the logos is u n d e r s t o o d to have b e e n so " i m p l a n t e d " in all humans from the time w h e n G o d created them, o r only m o r e recendy in a select g r o u p o f p e o p l e w h o consciously sought it, the apparent contradiction
remains. O f itself, therefore,
this c o m m a n d n o
more
excludes interpreting J a m e s ' s euxpuxoq Xoyoq in light o f Stoic ideas, as has frequently b e e n a r g u e d ,
195
than it excludes reading it in light o f
an already implanted " g o s p e l . " It is o b v i o u s in any case that the c o m m a n d ev 7ipocuxr|xi 8e^aa0e xov euxpuxov AxSyov is not intended to c o n n o t e a " r e c e p t i o n " to the
initial " i m p l a n t i n g " o f the
196
logos.
Even
analogous
b e y o n d the
clear
assumption in 1:21 that the logos is already " i m p l a n t e d " in those w h o are to " r e c e i v e " it, it emerges from the letter as a w h o l e that the author aims to i n d u c e
in his i n t e n d e d a u d i e n c e
something
more
appropriately characterized as " r e p e n t a n c e " than as " c o n v e r s i o n . " It is plain f r o m
1 9 4
197
1:22—25 in particular that J a m e s assumes an audi-
T h e soteriological significance o f the logos in the religious thought o f James will be taken up more fully in the following chapter. See Chapter O n e . Cf. Dibelius, James, 114. See esp. the conclusion o f the letter, where the concern is that any who have "wandered from the truth" (cf. 1:18, Xoyoq aXrfiziaq) be "turned back" (5:19-20). See also 4:1-10, where the author reminds his audience that their friendship with the world is incompatible with their (presumably desired!) friendship with G o d ; points out that they are acting as "adulteresses" and as though "scripture speaks in vain"; and ultimately urges a posture o f repentance upon them (4:7-10). In this respect, Johnson's use o f the term "conversion" in connection with the aim o f the letter as a whole, and with that o f this latter section in particular, is not particu larly helpful. Such a description apparently results from his classification o f the work as "protreptic"; cf. esp. Letter of James, 16-24 with his description o f 3:13-4:10 as a "Call to Conversion" (ibid., 267). Regardless o f the merits o f this generic classification (on which see esp. the discussion o f W a c h o b , "Rich in Faith," 98-122), it is clear from the letter as a whole that the author presupposes that his intended audience already has some manner o f "faith" (cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 47). T o this extent, "conversion" seems an inappropriate paradigm for characterizing the rhetor ical aim o f the letter. 195
1 9 6
197
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
e n c e w h o s e current " h e a r i n g " o f the deceived
r e g a r d i n g its
G i v e n the to b e
" s l o w to
particularly o n
within the
a n g e r , " the the
logos is such that they m i g h t
i m p l i c a t i o n s for
c o n t e x t o f 1:21
189
their e s c h a t o l o g i c a l
e l a b o r a t i o n o f the
emphasis o f the
admonition
c o m m a n d seems to
manner in w h i c h this logos is
"with m e e k n e s s " (ev 7ipociJrr|Ti), since a n g e r (opyn) " d o e s n o t
produce
" r e c e i v i n g " per
The
" r e c e i v i n g " itself, that is, is simply assumed, m u c h as the
ing"
o f the
1:21
must in
any
case b e
so u n d e r s t o o d , the
transition f r o m
ing
and
1:22~25 appears all
the
i m p l a n t e d logos with humility . . . and
and
not On
d o i n g " in
m e r e l y hearers w h o the
the
" i m p l a n t i n g " o f 1:21;
used with a sense o f "give ear 1:21
to,"
or
to the the
m
se.
"hear
" r e c e i v i n g " o f logos in
understood more on
" h e a r i n g " o f 1:22~25 than the in fact b e
1:22-25. T h e
lie
"received"—namely,
G o d ' s righteousness" (1:20)—rather than with the
logos is assumed in
be
status.
analogy o f
"hear."
199
200
Indeed,
discussion o f "hear
m o r e natural:
(8e)
the
and oe%oum c a n
become
"receive
logos-doers,
d e c e i v e themselves."
o t h e r h a n d , a n u m b e r o f authors h a v e sought to
account
for James's peculiar c o m m a n d to " r e c e i v e " something w h i c h is already
198
Note in this connection esp. the use o f S i o t o j o i n 1:20 to 1:21: "anger does not effect the righteousness o f G o d . . . therefore . . . receive the implanted logos with humility." Note also in this connection that whereas the (implied) c o m m a n d to "lay aside all filth" is paired with that to receive the logos with humility in 1:21, the call to "cleanse hands" and "purify hearts"—which follows a discussion o f the origins of social strife (cf. opyn)—is paired with an injunction to "humble oneself" before G o d in 4 : 8 - 9 . See further on this latter passage Chapter Five, under the heading "Desire and the Gifts o f G o d in 4 : 1 - 6 . " See LSJ, Sexojioci, §1.3: "simply, to give ear to, hear"; cf. also §1.2: " o f mental reception, take, accept without complaint." Again, the author o f James certainly assumes that his audience, on at least some level, "accepts" the logos: thus the prob lem o f "self-deception" (1:22). What concerns him is a perceived incongruity between this "acceptance" and their "doing." It is not immediately clear whether the 8e o f 1:22 should be read with an adversative or a conjunctive, explanatory force; on the c o m m o n use o f the latter see B A G D , 8e §2. If the former, the "hearing" connotation o f the "receiving" o f 1:21 emerges with partiular clarity: "receive the Xbyoq; but don't just hear it, do it." If the latter, it implies rather that 1:22~25 broaches, from a more general perspec tive the same point which the discussion o f anger in 1:20-21 addresses: "receive the Xoyoq with humility; that is, hear it and d o it." Mere "receiving" or "hearing," in other words, is not sufficient, but must be accompanied by a particular type o f behavior which can be characterized as "humility" and which consists in "doing"; cf. in this case 2:14-26, and esp. 3:13, 8ei^dxco EK TTJ<; KOX^C, dvocoTpo9fj<; xd soya amov ev 7tpott)TT|Ti oo(p(a<;, and further the discussion in Chapter Five under the heading "Logos and Erga." Given these latter passages and the emphasis on ev TtpcakriTi rather than the c o m m a n d to "receive" the Xoyoq per se in Jas 1:21, it seems to me better to interpret it with an explanatory force. 199
2 0 0
190
CHAPTER FOUR
" i m p l a n t e d " b y arguing that the author is d r a w i n g o n a fixed early 201
Christian expression, 5exea0ai xov Xoyov.
Such expressions are found
particularly in Acts a n d the pauline letters, a n d refer consistentiy to an initial a c c e p t a n c e o f the Christian p r o c l a m a t i o n ,
the " g o s p e l . "
202
Since the author o f J a m e s c a n n o t in any case b e using the phrase with reference to an initial a c c e p t a n c e o f the logos (i.e., the "implant ing" itself), such interpreters apparentiy understand h i m to b e using an expression w h i c h c o n n o t e s " c o n v e r s i o n " with reference to an o n g o i n g " a c c e p t a n c e " o f the n o w (i.e., post-conversion) implanted
203
logos.
I n d e e d , it is often n o t e d that J a m e s h a d just referred, in 1:18, t o the fact that G o d "gave birth t o us b y m e a n s o f a logos o f truth (Xoyco aXrfieiaq)
so that w e are a sort o f 'first fruits' o f his creatures."
N o t only is this verse as a w h o l e reminiscent o f the notion, in a variety o f early Christian works, that m e m b e r s m e n t have b e e n
"reborn"
o r have e x p e r i e n c e d
found
o f the m o v e
a " n e w creation,"
but the phrase Xoyoq d^nGeiaq is itself used with clear reference "the g o s p e l " in several pauline letters. Now
to
204
it must b e p o i n t e d o u t at o n c e that J a m e s ' s eyupmoq Xoyoq is
first a n d foremost a l a w — i n d e e d , an internal l a w w h i c h finds writ ten expression in the T o r a h — a n d n o t a " g o s p e l " in the usual sense o f that term as a narrative p r o c l a m a t i o n .
2 0 1
205
H o w e v e r , o n e might
See Chapter O n e . Note esp. the use o f this expression with reference to a past "reception" or "acceptance": 1 Thess 1:6, "in spite o f persecution you received (Se^dfxevoi) the word with j o y inspired by the Holy Spirit"; 2:13, "when you received (napaXafiovTEq) the word o f G o d that y o u heard from us, y o u accepted (e8e^ao0e) it not as a human word but as what it really is, God's word . . ."; Acts 8:14, " N o w when the apostles at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had accepted (SeSeKToci) the word o f G o d . . . " (with reference to Acts 8:4-13); Acts 11:1, " N o w the apostles and the believers who were in Judea heard that the Gentiles had also accepted (eSe^avxo) the word o f G o d . . ." (with reference to the conversion o f Cornelius and his household in Acts 10). Cf. further Luke 8:13, where m p a S e x o v x a i (cf. Mark 4:16, X a j i p d v o \ ) a i v ; but also 4:20,7tapa8e%ovTai) is used in the explanation o f the parable o f the sower. Note that Dibelius suggests that the clause "receive the word" was a fixed expression used "simply as a periphrasis for the Christian life," despite the fact that all o f the examples he cites in support o f such a usage employ the phrase with respect to an initial acceptance o f the "word"; see James, 114. Cf. MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 101: "Nehmt das euch bei der Taufe einst eingepflanzte Wort wirklich, in aller Konsequenz und vor allem ev T t p a u T n T i an . . . " For this line o f argument see Chapter O n e ; for a discussion o f the evidence, see Chapter Five, esp. p p . 193-95. 205 Q p l ' f term "gospel" as a shorthand expression for his soteriological narrative, see M . M . Mitchell, "Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argu mentation: T h e Functions o f 'the Gospel' in the Corinthian Correspondence," Gospel in Paul: Studies in Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker (ed. L. A . 2 0 2
2 0 3
2 0 4
n
a u
s
u
s
e
0
m
e
191
LOGOS AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
c o m p a r e in this respect 1 Pet 1:23-25, w h e r e a n o t i o n o f the " w o r d " (Xoyoq, pfjjLia) as p r o c l a i m e d " g o s p e l " seems to b e m e r g e d with a m o r e mystical c o n c e p t i o n o f an "imperishable seed" (arcopoc (p0apxf|) through w h i c h Christians have b e e n " r e b o r n " (dvayeyevvripivoi), a n d w h i c h entails a certain type o f b e h a v i o r .
206
A n o t i o n that s o m e "rebirth"
has b e e n e x p e r i e n c e d b y individual m e m b e r s o f the Christian m o v e m e n t as a result o f the insertion into t h e m o f s o m e divine substance, the possession o f w h i c h carries ethical c o n s e q u e n c e s , is o f course not u n c o m m o n in the early Christian literature. O n e thinks immediately o f the "spirit" o f the pauline corpus and o f Acts, o r the spirit/logos o f the j o h a n n i n e epistles.
207
O n e might argue, therefore, that J a m e s
simply c o n c e i v e s o f an analogous divine substance in Stoic terms, as euxputoq Xoyoq: a logos, that is, w h i c h is "implanted"
b y G o d in a
select g r o u p o f p e o p l e in c o n n e c t i o n with a new creation rather than in all h u m a n beings at the initial c r e a t i o n , ethic—quite
208
unlike, h o w e v e r , the j o h a n n i n e
a n d w h o s e associated a n d especially
pauline
epistles—is u n d e r s t o o d to c o i n c i d e with the T o r a h . O n e might think in this c o n n e c t i o n o f the p r o p h e c y o f J e r
31:31-35 (= L X X Jer
3 8 : 3 1 - 3 4 ) , w h e r e the deity promises a future era for Israel in w h i c h "I will put m y law within them, and I will write it o n their hearts." Fabris, in fact, has argued that the author o f J a m e s assumes
that
this p r o p h e c y has b e e n fulfilled particularly a m o n g his o w n g r o u p ("the twelve tribes"), w h i c h is living in "the last days" ( 5 : 3 ) .
209
Jervis and P. Richardson; J S N T S u p 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 6 3 - 8 8 . Note also that it is the " w o r d " o f the Christian proclamation which is "received" in the various passages o f Acts: cf. Acts 8:14 with 8:4; and Acts 11:1 with Acts 10, esp. 10:36-43. Cf. Dibelius, James, 105 n. 185, noting, however, that Dibelius rejects the idea that James has any such mystical notion in mind. T h e types o f behaviors which are to characterize such "newborns" in 1 Peter are described collectively as xo Xoyucov aSoXov ydXa. T h e term Xoyucov is surely intended to play on the "word" (1:25: pfjjj.oc; 1:23: Xoyoq) through which they have been born, and thus to indicate that the "milk" upon which they are to feed is to be Xoyucov in the sense o f "appro priate to that logos.'" It is noteworthy, however, that both this term and the descrip tion o f the logos as an "imperishable seed" are reminiscent o f the logos o f contemporary philosophical discussion. See, e.g., the comparisons drawn by Fabris, Legge, ch. 6. Note in this connection that the logos concept o f the johannine epistles seems to be informed by the Logos myth found in the opening o f the Fourth Gospel, or at least something very closely approximating it. See esp. 1 John 1:1-4, and fur ther R . Schnackenburg, The Johannine Epistles: Introduction and Commentary (New York: Crossroad, 1992) 4 9 - 6 9 , esp. 50: " O n e may say that the opening o f the letter [sc. 1 John] presumes the Gospel Prologue or the Logos hymn embedded in it." See on Fabris above, Chapter O n e . Note, however, that he understands the law in question to be a new "messianic law" rather than the Torah. 2 0 6
2 0 7
2 0 8
2 0 9
192
CHAPTER FOUR
This line o f interpretation, h o w e v e r , is most doubtful. W h i l e J a m e s does contain allusions to several scriptural p r o p h e c i e s ,
210
Jer 3 1 : 3 1 - 3 5
and the other passages cited b y Fabris in this c o n n e c t i o n are not a m o n g them. M o r e importantly, though the term euxpuxoc; alone is not a decisive indication that the logos o f J a m e s is "innate," the m o r e specific c o n c e p t o f an euxpuToq AxSyoc; o r vouoc; consistendy denotes some thing given to all p e o p l e at G o d ' s initial creation o f humanity else w h e r e in the ancient literature, including the Christian
literature.
Justin's adaptation o f the Stoic c o n c e p t o f law is particularly significant in this respect; for while he held that "right reason" o r "natural l a w " b e c a m e available to humanity only after the earthly appearance o f Jesus Christ, he nonetheless spoke o f the "implanted logos"
seed o f the
specifically with reference to that p o r t i o n o f the natural law
that all humans have always possessed. W i t h o u t s o m e clear indica tion that the author o f J a m e s c o n c e i v e d o f euxpuxcx; Xoyoq differently in this respect, then, o n e should b e most hesitant to assume that such a re-definition has taken place. In fact, the author's reference u
to G o d ' s "giving birth" to "us" b y means o f the logos o f truth"— w h i c h logos, w e shall see shortly, is to b e identified with "the implanted logos"—gives
n o such indication that what is imagined is a re-birth.
Indeed, in the context o f Jas
1:13-18, this statement is best under
s t o o d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o G o d ' s initial c r e a t i o n o f all Examination o f Jas
humanity.
1:13-18 in the following chapter will shed light
not only o n this issue, but will further illuminate, m o r e generally, how
2 1 0
logos functions in the religious thought o f James.
Cf. esp. Jas 1:10-11 with L X X Isa 40:6b-8, and Jas 5:5 with L X X Jer 12:3; see further D . Deppe, The Sayings of Jesus, 4 2 - 4 9 .
C H A P T E R FIVE LOGOS
A N D DESIRE
A few lines prior to the m e n t i o n o f the implanted logos in Jas 1 : 2 1 , reference is m a d e to a "logos o f truth" (Xoyoq aXnGeiocq) through w h i c h God
"gave birth to us, so that w e are a sort o f 'first fruits' o f his
creatures" (Jas 1:18). T h i s statement has b e e n seen b y s o m e inter preters as p r o v i d i n g decisive confirmation that the logos that, a c c o r d ing to James, "saves souls" is in fact "the Gospel.'.' The
1
expression Xoyoq aXnGeiocq is found in several other works o f
the Christian c a n o n , differing only in case o r in the use o f a definite article: Eph
2
2 C o r 6 : 7 (Xoycp aXnGeiocq), C o l 1:5 (TS Xoyco xfj<; dXnGeiaq),
1 : 1 3 (xov Xoyov xfjq dXnGeiaq) and 2 T i m 2 : 1 5 (xov Xoyov xfjq
dXnGeiaq). Colossians a n d Ephesians use this phrase with explicit ref erence to "the G o s p e l " (TO euayyeXiov), and such an identification is 3
also clearly implied in 2 T i m o t h y . J o s e p h M a y o r c o n c l u d e d from this c o l l e c t i o n o f passages that the phrase Xoyoq dXnGeiaq was vox technica o f early Christianity,"
4
"a
but this c o n c l u s i o n overstates the
evidence. It is to b e n o t e d in the first place that all o f the latter references appear in pauline o r pseudo-pauline writings; o n e should be
cautious in m a k i n g generalizing c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g
1
"early
See Chapter O n e . N o great weight should be placed o n the lack o f the definite article in identi fying the referent o f the Xoyoq dXriOeiaq o f Jas 1:18. As will be argued below, and as virtually all agree, it is the same Xoyoq as that described in 1:21 as oejicpvtoq Xoyoq. Compare in this respect the inconsistent use o f the definite article in connection with vojioq in James: see 1:25; 2:8, 9, 10, 11, 12; and 4:11. Note that just after ps.-Paul's words o f encouragement to "Timothy" to be "a worker who has no need to be ashamed, rightly explaining xov Xoyov xfjq dXnOeiaq" (2:15), he refers to those "who have swerved from rf|v dXriBeiav by claiming that the resurrection has already taken place" (2:18). This implies that the "right" expla nation o f xov Xoyov xfjq dXriOeiaq entails a proper understanding o f the resurrection; and this resurrection lies at the heart o f "the gospel" o f which ps.-Paul himself claims to be a "teacher" (1:11), and o f which he, too, is "not ashamed" (1:12, OVK 87caia%{)vo|iai); see 2:8, and cf. 1:8-14. M a y o r cites several other passages in the course o f his discussion o f the phrase Xoyoq dXnOeiaq, but it is apparently these which he has in mind when he refers to "the N . T . quotations" which show that "Xoyoq dXriOeiaq is a vox technica"; see St. James, 63. 2
3
4
194
CHAPTER FIVE
Christianity" o n the basis o f e v i d e n c e f o u n d in this limited c o r p u s . I n d e e d , a n a l o g o u s phrases d o o c c u r in o t h e r J e w i s h literature with different
meanings.
ture itself, in fact, the extent
5
E v e n within
to w h i c h w e are
the
and
Christian
pauline
litera
dealing with a
uni-
v o c a l "technical t e r m " is far f r o m clear. T h a t Paul uses the phrase in 2 C o r 6:7—its o n l y o c c u r r e n c e in the u n d o u b t e d letters o f P a u l — with reference t o the g o s p e l is b y n o m e a n s o b v i o u s . F o u n d a list o f attributes that, Paul says, characterize ing,
a m o n g o t h e r things, the fact that he has a c t e d with
p a t i e n c e a n d " g e n u i n e l o v e " ) , the phrase m i g h t well b e m o r e generally as c o n n o t i n g "truthful s p e e c h . " ciation o f 6 Xoyoq xfj<; afa]Qeiaq with "the
among
his ministry (includ
6
kindness,
understood
M o r e o v e r , the asso
g o s p e l " in b o t h Colossians
a n d Ephesians falsely inflates the e v i d e n c e for the fixity o f this expres sion, for in this case the similarity is m o s t likely to b e e x p l a i n e d b y literary d e p e n d e n c e , n o t i n d e p e n d e n t less an early Christian, "technical
attestation o f a pauline,
term."
much
7
T h e strong impression that this assembly o f passages m i g h t at first create
5
is significantly
tempered
through
these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,
and
Spitta had already pointed to L X X Ps 118:43, a passage which is often under stood with reference to the law; see Laws, James, 76; also Johnson, Letter of James, 198. Particularly interesting for our purposes is Clement o f Alexandria, Strom 1.13, where the phrase is used in connection with a concept somewhat reminiscent o f Justin's logos theory: "Since, therefore, truth (xfjq aXrfieiaq) is one . . . just as the Bacchanites tore asunder the limbs o f Pentheus, so the sects both o f barbarian and Hellenic philosophy have done with truth, and each vaunts as the whole truth (xfyv d^riGeiav) the portion which has fallen to its lot. But all, in my opinion, are illuminated by the dawn o f Light. Let all, therefore, both Greeks and barbarians, w h o have aspired after the truth (xdA.T|9o\)<;)—both those w h o possess not a little, and those w h o have any portion—produce whatever they have o f the word o f truth (xov xfjq aX^deiaq Xoyov)" (text in M P G 8.753-56; translation in AJVF 2.313). Cf. also T. Gad 3:1; Odes Sol. 8:8; Philo, Somn. 1.23. So the N R S V . Such a more general claim o f honest and straightforward speech would, o f course, include Paul's preaching o f "the gospel"; the question, however, is whether the phrase Xoyoq ahrfieiaq referred only and specifically to the latter. Note in this connection Paul's need to address the Corinthians' evident dissatisfac tion with his apparently vacillating travel plans (2 C o r 1:15-2:17); see esp. 2 C o r 1:18, 6 Xoyog T)[i(bv 6 npbq v^iaq OVK E O T I V val Kai ox*. Cf. in this respect the use o f the phrase EVtaSyoi<;aXrfieiaq with a more general reference to speech in Pss. Sol. 16:10; see further the Xoyov aXrfiziaq o f L X X Ps 118:43, in which, too, there is some ambiguity. It should not be forgotten, in this connection, that the phrase Xoyoq dA,T|G£ia<; does not appear elsewhere in any o f the undisputed letters o f Paul. For a concise sketch o f the problem o f the relation o f Ephesians to Colossians, see R . Schnackenburg, Ephesians: A Commentary (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991) 3 0 - 3 3 . Note also Tsuji's suggestion that the very fact that the "word o f truth" is explic itly identified as "the gospel" in these works suggests that the two were not obvi ously synonymous (Glaube, 68). 6
7
195
LOGOS AND DESIRE
M a y o r ' s c o n c l u s i o n has in fact found few adherents.
8
M o s t inter
preters have rightly c o n c l u d e d that the securest guide for identify ing the particular referent o f the "logos o f truth" o f Jas
1:18 is the
9
c o n t e x t in w h i c h the phrase o c c u r s in J a m e s itself. T h i s discussion has centered largely o n the question o f whether the divine "birthing" m e n t i o n e d in 1:18 is to b e interpreted with reference to the creation o f humanity in general o r to a n e w creation o f Christians in par ticular, a n d it has b e e n characterized b y significant
disagreement.
10
T o b e sure, the issue o f w h e n , a n d with respect to w h o m , the "birth" o f 1:18 is i m a g i n e d to have o c c u r r e d is an important c o n sideration in the identification a n d interpretation o f J a m e s ' s "logos o f truth." Equally important, h o w e v e r , is the question o f its relation to the
implanted
logos a n d ,
m o r e generally,
its role in the
religious
thought o f the letter. T h i s latter question, in particular, has received surprisingly
little attention. T h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n o f this chapter,
then, is to elucidate the function o f the logos, to w h i c h J a m e s refers 11
variously as "logos o f truth" o r "the implanted logos,"
in the thought
o f J a m e s . W e shall see that this logos, like its counterparts in the works e x a m i n e d previously in this study, functions primarily in o p p o s i t i o n
8
As far as I have noted, J. B. Adamson is alone among recent authors in his affirmation o f Mayor's view; see James: The Man and His Message, 397. Cf. the significantly watered-down version o f this thesis in Davids, Epistle of James, 89: "in the N T . . . while never becoming a univocally technical term, the word o f truth does frequently mean the gospel." See esp. Dibelius, James, 103-107; and most recently the treatment o f the prob lem in Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 151-57; Johnson, Letter of James, 197f and 205; and Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 129-34. Those arguing for a reference to the original creation o f humanity in general include Spitta, Der Brief des Jakobus, 4 5 - 4 7 ; Hort, Epistle of St. James, 3 1 - 3 5 ; Rendall, The Epistle of St. James and Judaic Christianity, 6 3 - 6 5 ; Edsman, "Schopferwille und Geburt Jac 118" (though cf. idem, "Schopfung und Wiedergeburt: Nochmals Jac. 1:18"); Cadoux, The Thought of St. James, 19-24; Elliott-Binns, "James 1.18: Creation or Redemption?"; Frankemolle, Der Brief des Jakobus, 1.297-305; Tsuji, Glaube, 6 8 - 6 9 . Arguing for a reference to a new creation o f Christians are Ropes, St. James, 165-68 (though seemingly with some hesitation); Dibelius, James, 103-107; Chaine, LEpitre de Saint Jacques, 25-27; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 92-97; Fabris, Legge, 134-42; Davids, Epistle of James, 8 8 - 9 0 ; Martin, James, 3 9 - 4 1 ; Popkes, Adressaten, 146-51; Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 129-34. Johnson feels that "the most obvious way" to read the phrase Xoyoq aXriGeiaq in 1:18 is with reference to "the Gospel, that is, the Christian proclamation"; he hastens to add, however, that "too great a distinction should not be made between Gospel, Torah and the word o f creation, since for James they all represent gifts o f G o d " (Letter of James, 214). Still less decisive are Sidebottom, James, Jude and 2 Peter, 3 2 - 3 3 ; and Laws, Epistle of James, 75-78, cf. 83. 9
10
11
O n the identity o f these logoi, see below pp. 214f.
CHAPTER FIVE
196
to h u m a n desire (£7ti0uuioc) a n d
the pleasures (aif|8ovoci). O n c e again,
h o w e v e r , James's presentation o f this characteristic philosophical o p p o sition o f logos a n d to J e w i s h a n d
desire is significantly i m p a c t e d b y
his
adherence
Christian ideas. In J a m e s , this pair functions in
c o n t e x t o f a w o r l d v i e w in w h i c h o p p o s i n g supernatural beings, and
the
D e v i l , vie to influence h u m a n b e h a v i o r , a n d
m e n t b y the tion as the
divine lawgiver l o o m s . Logos a n d
the God
in w h i c h j u d g
desire, in short, func
t w o mutually exclusive " w a y s " b y w h i c h o n e m i g h t travel
t o w a r d this eschatological j u d g m e n t . " I m p l a n t e d " at
G o d ' s creation
o f the h u m a n being, James's logos is the c o m m o n possession o f h u m a n ity in general; it is not,
in o t h e r w o r d s , "the
Gospel."
H U M A N DESIRE AND THE LOGOS OF T R U T H
It is w i d e l y r e c o g n i z e d that Jas
1:13-18 represents a discrete argu
mentative section in J a m e s , the
central c o n c e r n o f w h i c h is
in
1:13a: " n o
one
who
is t e m p t e d (Tceipoc^ojuevoq)
tempted ( T t e i p d ^ o u m ) by G o d . ' "
12
1 3
The
12
is to
say
a u t h o r insists that G o d ,
stated T
am
unlike
T h e rootrceipoc^- can connote both "temptation" arising from within and "tests" arising from without. Dibelius, w h o sought to drive a wedge between 1:2-4, 1:12, and 1:13-15 in the service o f his thesis that the various sayings and sections o f James were simply strung together on the basis o f catchword connections, argued that while this root is clearly used with the former sense in 1:13-14, it is used with the latter sense in 1:2-4 and 1:12. According to Dibelius, then, the link between 1:12 and 1:13 is merely a superficial catchword connection (James, 6 9 - 7 1 ) . T o draw such a hard distinction between the "external" and "internal" aspects o f the term, however, is misleading, particularly in the context o f James; see further on this below. I have been unable to locate an English term which adequately reflects both dimensions o f the Greek, and thus often leave the term untranslated in what follows. See, e.g., the heading for this section chosen by Dibelius: " T h e source o f temp tations" (James, 90); cf. Chaine: "Origine de la Tentation" (LEpitre de Saint Jacques, 18); Marty: "Origene humaine de toute tentation" (UEpitre de Jacques, 30); Windisch: "Die 'Versuchung' zum Bosen kommt aus uns selbst, alles Gute kommt von Gott" (Die katholischen Briefe, 8); Sidebottom: "God's Innocence" (James, Jude and 2 Peter, 30); MuBner: "Die Theodizee" (Der Jakobusbrief, 86); cf. also Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 39. A number o f scholars, emphasizing the connection between 1:12 and 1:13 which Dibelius denied (see the preceding note), consider this section to begin at 1:12: so Reicke, The Epistles, 16-17; Laws, Epistle of James, 6 6 - 7 8 ; Davids, Epistle of James, 7 9 - 8 3 ; Perkins, First and Second Peter, James and Jude, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; cf. Martin, James, 2 8 - 3 5 . As will b e c o m e clear in this chapter, I agree that there is an important con nection between 1:12 and 1:13. Nonetheless, I would emphasize that 1:12, echo ing much o f the language o f 1:2-4, forms, with the latter, something o f an inclusio around the difficult 1:5-8 and 1:9-11. See below, note 95; further Ropes, St. James, 150; Dibelius, James, 6 9 - 7 1 , 88; Johnson, Letter of James, 189; and see the comments o f Klein, Ein vollkommes Werk, 4 3 - 4 5 , 8 2 - 8 5 . 13
LOGOS AND DESIRE
h u m a n s , has
n o t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r to
e x p e r i e n c e s it himself, n o r
do
d o e s he
individual's o w n
15
true s o u r c e o f rceipaGudq. T h e
of both or
her
abduction own
and
ticular is d e v e l o p e d as the
16
The
exculpate
God
his
seduced
principles in
order
results o f giving in to desire: "then desire and
sin
(fj apxxpxia), w h e n
reaches maturity, gives birth to death (Odvocxov)" (1:15). T h e
to
terms
i m a g e r y o f seduction in par
a u t h o r personifies the
origin o f Tteipocaudq in from
the
experience
o f temptation,
particularly remarkably, " d e a t h " as w e l l .
17
(n it
explana
1 : 1 3 - 1 5 , therefore, serves n o t
human
14
desire w h i c h is
o f f (e^eXKOjLievoq) a n d
eTuOuuioc), h a v i n g c o n c e i v e d , bears sin;
f r o m sin and,
it.
seduction: " e a c h p e r s o n is t e m p t e d b y
(8eX£a£6u£voq) [by t h e m ] " ( 1 : 1 4 ) .
tion o f the
neither
experience
e x p e r i e n c e is d e s c r i b e d in
desire, b e i n g d r a g g e d
to describe vividly the
with Tteipocaudq: he
cause others to
It is rather, a c c o r d i n g to J a m e s , an the
197
only but
Conversely,
1 4
Jas 1:13b: 6 yap Oeoq drceipaoxoq eaxiv KOCKCOV, rceipd^ei 5e avxoq ouSeva. O n the translation o f drceipaoxoq, see esp. Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 5 1 - 5 3 ; on the philo sophical character o f the term see Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 86. T h e claim o f Jas 1:13b is quite remarkable. Note in the first place its apparent contradiction o f the Jewish scriptures, indeed, o f a passage to which the author o f James will later refer: cf. Jas 2:21 with L X X Gen 22:1-19 (esp. 22:1, 6 Geoq erceipoc^ev xov Appocap,). O n e might also contrast it with the Lord's Prayer, Matt 6:13 (cf. Luke 11:4; Did. 8:2): Kai \M\ eiaeveyicriq \\\iaq eiq 7teipaop,6v, on which see further Betz, The Sermon on the Mount, 4 0 5 - 1 3 . According to Johnson (Letter of James, 203), in fact, Jas 1:13 exer cised the early interpreters o f James even more than its apparent contradiction o f Paul in 2:14-26. Dibelius explains James's claim with reference to a wider trend toward dissociating G o d with human failings in the Jewish thought o f the Hellenistic period (James, 90-91). H e cites, for example, Jubilees'* account o f Abraham's sacrifice o f Isaac—the most intense, perhaps, in Abraham's series o f "trials"—in which Mastema is identified as the ultimate inspiration for this particular test (17:16; cf. 17:9, 12); nonetheless, in Jubilees it is still G o d w h o does the actual "testing" in this case, as, apparently, in the earlier "tests": see Jub. 17:17-18 and 18: Iff. Whatever the case, the remarkable position o f James on this matter is likely to be correlated more specifically with his view that rceipaojioq, by definition, is caused by desire (e7iiG'uu{a): this latter is understood to be entirely opposed to God's will (see below), and is therefore, apparently, wholly alien to God's nature; thus too, then, is rceipaouoq. 15
T h e problem o f the origin o f desire itself, on the other hand, is not addressed. Note that (mo xfjq iSiaq e7ii9'U|xiaq is positioned so that it can modify both rceipd^exai and e^e^Kouevoq Kai SeXea^ojxevoq. As Dibelius points out, the verb SeXed^ew, while "found elsewhere in the N e w Testament only in 2 Petr 2:14, 18, is frequently used by Philo precisely in connection with desire" (James, 93). Further, M a y o r cites a number o f passages from hellenistic moralists like Philo, Epictetus and Plutarch in which this term, as in Jas 1:13, is "combined with eXcco or its cog nates" (St. James, 54). A n allusion to Genesis 3 at this point in James has often been noted. Cf. also, however, Wis 1:12-16; 2:23-24; the death in question here is not death o f body, but o f soul (3:1-4). Similarly, the author o f James is concerned less with natural death than with eschatological death: even the "righteous" are subject to "death" 1 6
17
198
CHAPTER FIVE
it places responsibility for escaping this deadly progression squarely and emphatically u p o n the shoulders o f e a c h h u m a n individual: the entire sequence is set in m o t i o n b y a given person's o w n desire.
18
T h e references to the logos o f truth b y means o f w h i c h G o d "gave birth to us" in Jas 1:16-18 and, subsequendy, to "the implanted logos w h i c h is able to save y o u r souls" in 1 : 1 9 - 2 7 , follow this a c c o u n t o f the origin o f rceipoccuo*;, sin and death in h u m a n desire in 1 : 1 4 - 1 5 . U n c o v e r i n g the logic o f the c o n n e c t i o n between 1:14—15 and 1:16—18 and, further, b e t w e e n 1:13-18 as a w h o l e a n d 1 : 1 9 - 2 7 , greatly illu minates the role o f the logos in the thought o f J a m e s . T h e significance o f 1:16-18 within the larger argument o f 1:13-18 is typically construed as follows.
19
T h e admonition o f 1:16, ur] rctaxvaaGe,
is translated " d o not b e d e c e i v e d , " and the " d e c e p t i o n " in question is understood with reference to the position that the author has rejected, i.e., that G o d is the ultimate source o f Jas
Tteipocouo*;,
sin and
death.
20
1:17 is then interpreted as a terse—and i n c o m p l e t e — a r g u m e n t
in support o f the contrary view: f r o m the premises (i) all g o o d things c o m e from G o d a n d (ii) G o d d o e s not c h a n g e , the author expects the reader to infer that n o evil c o m e s from G o d . T h e reference to the fact that G o d "gave birth to us b y means o f a logos o f truth," o n this interpretation, is taken to offer further p r o o f o f premise (i) b y highlighting G o d ' s greatest act o f b e n e f i c e n c e , whether
under
stood as his creation o f humanity in general, his gift o f salvation to Christians, o r s o m e c o m b i n a t i o n o f these.
21
in the mundane sense; see esp. 5:6 (with which cf. Wis 2:12-20); on the other hand, those w h o endure, surely including those such as "the righteous" o f 5:6, are nonethe less promised "life" (1:12). Note also in this respect Jas 1:21: 6 ejicpimx; Xoyoq is able to save iaq \|n)%d<; vjicov. Jas 1:14: eKaaxoq . . . rceipd^exai i>nb xflq iSiaq emGuniaq. See, e.g., Spitta, Der Brief des Jakobus, 3 9 - 4 7 ; Ropes, St. James, 158-68; Dibelius, James, 70, 9 9 - 1 0 7 ; Chaine, UEpitre de Saint Jacques, 18-27; Gantinat, Les Epitres, 8 9 - 9 8 ; Laws, Epistle of James, 72-78; Davids, Epistle of James, 8 5 - 9 0 ; Perkins, First and Second Peter, James, and Jude, 100-103. So also, apparently Klein; cf. Ein vollkommenes Werk, 44, 8 7 - 8 8 , 129, 158. Cf. further Reicke, The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude, 16-18, and MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 8 9 - 9 7 , neither o f whom, however, emphasize that 1:18 is a proof o f God's goodness. MuBner's translation o f jllt| rcAxxvaaGe as "LaBt euch nicht verfuhren" would seem to relate this verse back to 1:14-15; cf. his comment on 1:14: "Die Begierde ist eine verfuhrerische, unheimliche Macht" (Der Jakobusbrief, 88). However, neither this specific connection nor the more general image o f Verfuhrung are developed in his discussion o f 1:16 itself, which is rather interpreted with reference to a mistaken idea (cf. 1:13) that G o d is the cause o f rceipaauoi and sin (ibid., 90). E.g., Johnson, Letter of James, 197: "God's creation o f humans is taken to be the great demonstration o f the conviction that he is the source o f all good gifts"; 18
19
20
21
LOGOS AND DESIRE
T h i s interpretation is questionable for to b e n o t e d , first o f all, that 1:18 tions m e r e l y to bolster the
has
199
a n u m b e r o f reasons. It
curiously little force if it
rather m u n d a n e p r e m i s e that G o d
is
func is
the
source o f g o o d things. Certainly the m o r e novel o f the t w o p r e m i s e s — and
i n d e e d , the
r e g a r d i n g the e v e n the
less self-evident f r o m the J e w i s h scriptures—is that
u n c h a n g i n g nature o f G o d .
a d v o c a t e s o f this interpretation are
explicit n e g a t i o n w h i c h 13ff"
on
would
be
further
is the
here is in any (i) that G o d not
fact that the
is the
In
fact, j u d g i n g f r o m Jas
g o o d and God,
2 5
the
also the 1:17,
23
as "the
after
responsible for
w evil,
A g g r a v a t i n g this p r o b
follow f r o m the things and
be
at
work
propositions
(ii) that G o d
source o f b a d
things.
does
24
w h i c h states that every (jiaaa, Tiav)
perfect gift—not "only" g o o d and " d e c e p t i o n " against w h i c h the
s e e m first and
importantly,
a r g u m e n t assumed to
source o f all g o o d is not
is not
1:16-18.
case invalid: it d o e s n o t
c h a n g e , that G o d
More
f o r c e d to c o n c e d e ,
particularly i m p o r t a n t
this reading, n a m e l y , that G o d
"remains strangely u n e x p r e s s e d " in lem
2 2
f o r e m o s t to c o n c e r n the
perfect gifts—comes f r o m a u t h o r warns h e r e w o u l d
source o f good things, n o t
the
cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 66f. O n the various views o f the precise reference o f the "birth" o f Jas 1:18, see Chapter O n e and above note 10. Note, e.g., that Philo felt compelled to clarify this point when commenting on Gen 6:5-7 in Deus Immut. 2 1 - 2 2 : "Perhaps some o f those w h o are careless inquir ers (lit.: "the unexamined"; xcov dve^etdaxcov) will suppose that the Lawgiver is hint ing that the Creator repented o f the creation o f men when He beheld their impiety, and that this was the reason why H e wished to destroy the whole race. Those w h o think thus may be sure that they make the sins o f these men o f old time seem light and trivial through the vastness o f their o w n godlessness. For what greater impiety could there be than to suppose that the Unchangeable changes (xov ocTpeTcxov TperceaGoci)?" It is noteworthy, too, perhaps, that while one finds hints o f it in the Jewish literature prior to the Hellenistic period (e.g., Mai 3:6), the notion that G o d is unchanging becomes emphasized in Jewish and Christian literature especially as a result o f Greek philosophical influence. Dibelius, James, 99. Typically, Dibelius himself assumes that this deficiency in the supposed argument results from the author's combination here o f two distinct "sayings" for his own novel purpose; cf. also in this respect Hauck, Die Kirchenbriefe (1949), 11; Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 87 n. 275; and already Ropes, St. James, 159. This, however, is hardly an adequate explanation: if one grants (as Dibelius and these others do) that the author is in fact trying to make a point here, the oddity o f his choice to leave that point unexpressed remains whether he has drawn upon an earlier source or not. Cf. Davids, Epistle of James, 88: "[According to 1:17, G o d ] actually sends all g o o d things and, since he is unchanging, could never send evil. But one notices that the argument could be more direct and clear." This was noted already by Hort (Epistle of St. James, 27) and M a y o r (Epistle of St. James, 56). See Ropes, Epistle of St. James, 158; Dibelius, James, 99 n. 151. 2 2
2 3
2 4
2 5
CHAPTER FIVE
200 origin o f e v i l .
26
T h e c o n n e c t i o n o f 1:16-18 to 1:13-15 must there
fore b e re-assessed. W e will d o well to begin b y attempting to under stand J a m e s ' s c o n c e r n that his audience not b e d e c e i v e d regarding the fact that all g o o d things c o m e f r o m G o d . Acquiring "Good
Gifts"
T h e characterization o f G o d as the source o f "gifts" is a m o n g m o s t p r o m i n e n t o f J a m e s ' s p r o p e r l y theological c o n c e p t i o n s ,
27
the
a n d is
closely linked to his understanding o f prayer. T h e letter itself is largely framed
b y the treatment o f these interrelated themes.
In
1:5,
the
author writes o f "the g o d w h o gives to all without reserve and with out r e p r o a c h "
(xou SiSovxoq Geou 7iaaiv anX&q KOI JLIT] oveiSC^ovxoq),
instructing a n y o n e w h o "lacks w i s d o m " to ask (aiTevrco) G o d ,
"and
it will b e given to h i m o r her." Despite G o d ' s giving nature, h o w ever, his granting o f such requests is not so automatic as this sim ple statement might suggest: the author immediately goes o n to w a r n that o n e must, m o r e specifically, "ask with faith, n o t at all d o u b t i n g " (1:6, aiTe(xco88 ev Tiioxei |Lir|8ev SiaKpivojuevoq), otherwise o n e can not e x p e c t to "receive anything from the L o r d " (1:7). T h i s t h e m e is revisited at the letter's end. In 5 : 1 3 - 1 6 , the author emphasizes
the
i m p o r t a n c e o f prayer in the case o f misfortune a n d sickness, directly linking the healing o f sickness to "the faithful prayer" (or: "the prayer o f faith"; cf. ti
^HS Tcioxecoq). H e then offers further
encourage
m e n t in this respect b y illustrating the p o w e r o f such prayer with the
example
withheld
o f Elijah,
"a h u m a n b e i n g like us" w h o
a n d subsequently
his p r a y e r s .
nonetheless
restored rainfall through, it is
assumed,
28
G o d ' s role as giver o f gifts, the i m p o r t a n c e m o r e specifically, the i m p o r t a n c e
o f asking G o d , and,
o f asking G o d in the proper manner
also figure p r o m i n e n d y in 4 : 1 - 6 . Analysis o f this section greatly illu-
2 6
T o be sure, the question o f the origin o f evil—or more accurately, the ulti mate source of, and thus responsibility for the human experience o f Tceipaafxoq, sin and death—is the basic concern o f 1:13-18. O n the relation o f 1:16-17 to this larger point, however, see below. So Johnson, writing o f the concept o f G o d in James: "Above all. . . it is James' characterization o f G o d as gift-giver that is most important" (Letter of James, 86). As has often been noted, the view o f G o d as gift-giver is typically hellenistic; see the passages listed, e.g., in Davids, Epistle of James, 86, and Johnson, Letter of James, 195. This emphasis also accords well with the author's characteristic concern for eco nomic issues. Jas 5:16b—18; cf. 1 Kings 17:1 and 18:42, neither o f which reports anything about Elijah praying regarding the rain. 2 7
2 8
LOGOS AND DESIRE
201
minates the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n J a m e s ' s c o n c e r n to locate the ori gin o f temptation, sin a n d death in desire in 1:13-15 a n d his ref erence to birth b y m e a n s o f logos in Desire and the Gifts of God in Jas
4:1—6
29
1:18.
4:1-6
begins as the author locates the origins o f social strife
(rcoXeuoi a n d \ia%a\)
in "the pleasures that w a r in y o u r
members."
30
T h e p r o p e r punctuation o f the lines following this in Jas 4:2 is n o t o riously difficult a n d has b e e n the subject o f m u c h discussion. It is m o s t likely, h o w e v e r , that the verse is to b e u n d e r s t o o d as an expla nation o f the claim o f 4 : 1 , depicting killing as a result o f frustrated desire, a n d — m o s t
tellingly—"battling a n d warring" as a result o f a
j e a l o u s striving for that w h i c h o n e does not possess. T h u s : Whence come wars and whence come battles (rcoGevrcoXeumKOCI rcoGev uxxxoci) among you? Is it not from within, out o f your own pleasures that wage war among your members (EK TCOV fi8ovcov i)|icov TCOV GTpcxTeuouivcov ev Toiq fxeXeaw i)uxov)? Y o u desire and you do not have, [so] you kill; and you are jealous and you are not able to obtain [that which you are jealous o f ] , [so] you battle and war (uxxxeoGe KCXI rcoXeiievre). 31
T h e logic here is quite similar to that w h i c h underlies Philo's dis cussion o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f reason dominating anger in a passage m e n t i o n e d at the beginning o f the previous chapter. When pleasure (r\ ii5ovr|) has the materials it needs to produce it, it haunts the belly and the parts below it. But when it is at a loss for these materials, it occupies the breast (TCX arnOri) where wrath (6 Guooq) is; for lovers o f pleasure ( o i . . . (piAr|8ovoi) when deprived o f their plea sures (TCOV TI5OVCOV) grow bitter and angry (opyi^ovTcxi KCCI 7capamKpcx{ovTcxi).
32
2 9
T h e relation o f 4 : 1 - 6 to what precedes and follows it is debated. Typically, 4:1-10 or 4:1-12 is regarded as a discrete section; however, as Johnson points out, 4:1-10 is closely related to 3:13-18 ('James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos nEPIOGONOY," NovT 25 (1983) 327-47). Jas 4 : 1 - 6 can in any case be examined as an argumen tative unit which concerns the proper and improper ways o f attempting to acquire things, as will become clear shortly. Jas 4:1; for the sense in which ev T o i q \iekeaiv is meant, cf. esp. the descrip tion o f the tongue as the small "member" (3:5, \ieXoq) "among our members" (3:6, 3 0
EV xolq \iekeGiv 31
f||xcbv).
So also Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 134-37; Ropes, St. James, 254; Johnson, Letter of James, 277; cf. the N R S V . Dibelius's primary objection against this read ing is its failure to account for the apparent harshness o f the charge "you kill" (James, 217); but see now, however, Johnson's excellent study "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos nEPI O0ONOY," and further below note 34. Leg. All. 3.114; Philo will go on say that "the soul is saved" only when rea son (taSyoq) dominates 6 Gvfxoq (Leg. All. 3.137). 32
202
CHAPTER FIVE
In a m a n n e r reminiscent o f J a m e s ' s p r e c e d i n g descriptions o f "the w i s d o m f r o m a b o v e " as "peaceful" (3:17, eipnviKri; cf. 3:18) and the pleasures
as "warring a m o n g y o u r m e m b e r s " (4:1), Philo p r o c e e d s
to characterize the pursuit o f such baser drives as a circumstance in w h i c h "war (7t6A,£uo<;) prevails in the soul," with reason
(^oyiauov),
w h i c h "is in us n o t as a c o m b a t i v e (pa%i|Liov) but as a peaceful (eip-
nvociov) inmate," b e c o m i n g a "prisoner o f w a r " (Leg. All. 3 . 1 1 7 ) . fact, such a causal c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n pleasure
(r|8ovr|) and
33
In
anger
as is m a d e b y Philo in this passage reflects a " l o g i c o f e n v y " w h i c h is c o m m o n p l a c e a m o n g the well
demonstrated.
Hellenistic moralists,
as J o h n s o n
has
34
F o l l o w i n g precisely such a logic, J a m e s locates the origin o f social strife in the h u m a n pursuit o f their o w n pleasures (4:1, fi8ovai). M o r e specifically, strife is thought to result from the fact that such a pursuit is precisely the wrong w a y to g o a b o u t acquiring something: £7ti9u|Li£iT£ K a i OUK e%8T8 . . . OUK e%£T£ 8 i a TO JLITI aixeiaGai b[iaq (4:2). T h a t is
to
say, TO aiTeiaGou, n o t TO 87ii9up£iv, is the w a y to obtain something.
In fact, so o p p o s e d are the t w o that even o n e w h o "asks" e x p e c t to receive anything if it is the o b j e c t o f his o r her that is requested: OUTEITE K a i ou taxppav£T£ 8I6TI xaiq f|8ovai<; upcov 8a7tavr|crnT£ ( 4 : 3 ) .
35
cannot
pleasures
KaKco^ aiT£ia9£, i v a
W o r s e than vain, the
ev
pursuit
o f desire is likened to "friendship with the w o r l d , " and thus "enmity with G o d " (4:4); i n d e e d , it emerges subsequently that it represents a failure to "resist the D e v i l " ( 4 : 8 ) .
3 3
36
T h e author thus reserves s o m e o f
Note also Philo's emphasis in this connection on the importance o f speech for healing anger (Leg. All. 3.124); see further on this below, pp. 227f. See Johnson, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos I1EPI O0ONOY." As Johnson shows, the charge o f 4:2, "you kill," when seen in this light, is far from surprising. O n the contrary, "it fits the context perfectly, because in the topos on envy, mur der is regarded as a logical concomitant o f envy" (idem, Letter of James, 277). In this connection, one should particularly note Jas 5:6, where "the rich," w h o are the pre-eminent pleasure seekers in James (cf., e.g., 5:5), are charged with having "killed (ecpoveuoaxe) the righteous"; note further the apparent echo o f Jas 4:6 in Jas 5:6, on which see below p . 223. Cf. in this respect the author's logic in 1:5-8: though G o d is described as "the G o d w h o gives to all," it is nonetheless the case that the one w h o petitions G o d incorrectly should not expect to "receive anything from the Lord." Note that the author refers to both types o f improper petitioners as 8(v|/\)xoi (1:8; 4:8); see further on this term below. For a similar synergy between human desires and God's angelic nemesis, see The Testaments of the Twelve Patriachs, esp. T Reu. 4:7-11, and further Johnson, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos nEPI O0ONOY," 3 4 1 - 4 6 . 3 4
3 5
3 6
LOGOS AND DESIRE
203
his harshest invective for those w h o pursue their o w n desires, address ing t h e m as "adulteresses" in the i d i o m o f the biblical prophets ( 4 : 4 ) . The
host o f exegetical p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d in the interpretation
4:5-6
37
of
h a v e m a d e this a n o t h e r o f the letter's m o s t controversial pas
sages. tion
38
T h e question o f w h e t h e r the author here introduces a cita
from
definitively
some
n o l o n g e r extant
resolved barring
the
"scripture"
is n o t likely t o
discovery o f some
be
ancient work,
d a t e d earlier than J a m e s , w h i c h contains either s o m e o r all this pas sage.
39
Fortunately,
this question is m o r e i m p o r t a n t for the
p r o b l e m o f the history o f the c a n o n than it is for the
general
interpretation
o f the passage itself. M o r e critical with respect to the latter are subject o f KaxcpKiaev The
40
in 4:5 a n d the p u n c t u a t i o n o f the verses.
the 41
neuter g e n d e r o f TO Tiveujua renders its syntax a m b i g u o u s : it
c o u l d b e taken either as the subject o r the o b j e c t o f £7ii7io0ei. I f it is taken to b e the
o b j e c t , J a m e s w o u l d thus b e i m p l y i n g that his
" a d u l t e r o u s " i n t e n d e d a u d i e n c e has underestimated o u s y (cpGovoc;) for t h e m .
4 2
the deity's j e a l
T h i s reading, h o w e v e r , is m o s t unlikely. In
the first p l a c e , that the author has c h o s e n to e m p h a s i z e the j e a l o u s y o f G o d in the c o n t e x t o f a discussion w h i c h repeatedly treats ousy"
3 7
(CfjAoc;)
as s o m e t h i n g entirely negative a n d
4
jeal
o p p o s e d to G o d
See the literature cited by Johnson, Letter of James, 278. Only the biting irony o f his (rhetorical) address to "the rich"—who, in James, are the pursuers o f desire and the "friends o f the world" par excellence—is harsher. Cf. the rather less threat ening address o f the foolish man in Jas 2:20, which is more reminiscent o f diatribe. For discussion o f the problems see the commentaries, esp. Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 1 4 0 - 4 5 and Dibelius, James, 2 2 0 - 2 5 ; further S. Laws, "Does Scripture Speak in Vain? A Reconsideration o f James I V . 5 , " NTS 20 (1973-74) 2 1 0 - 1 5 ; Johnson, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos nEPIOGONOY," 3 2 7 - 3 2 ; Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 111-15. See, however, the discussion below, with n. 59. T h e additional, textual problem o f whether this or the intransitive KaTCpKnaev is to be read here is largely inconsequential for the interpretation o f the passage: whatever the case, the author would n o doubt have assumed that it was G o d w h o made Tcveuuot dwell in the human being. Dibelius raises the possibilty that the rhetorical question introduced in 4:5 ends with 7ip6<; 906vov, but ultimately argues that it runs through 4:5b, which is to be understood as a citation (James, 2 2 0 - 2 3 ; cf. 207); cf. the N R S V . Laws argues that 4:5a and 4:5b are to be understood as two distinct rhetorical questions, and sug gests that the "scripture" in question is an allusion to L X X Ps 83:3 ("Does Scripture Speak in Vain?" esp. 214-15); cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 280. T h e 26th edition of Nestle-Aland punctuates the passage with a colon after Aiyei, and extends the question (and apparently a supposed citation) through 4:6a. So, e.g., Ropes, St. James, 2 6 4 - 6 5 ; Dibelius, James, 224; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 18 If. This is the reading which I myself assumed in " A Letter to the Twelve Tribes," 508 n. 35. 3 8
3 9
4 0
4 1
4 2
204
CHAPTER FIVE
(3:14,
16;
4:2)
is hardly p l a u s i b l e .
43
M o r e o v e r , while the
motif
of
G o d ' s j e a l o u s y is, o f c o u r s e , not u n c o m m o n in the J e w i s h scriptures, the
t e r m tfthoq
tions, and
is n o r m a l l y used in such contexts in
never, in any
event, is (pGovoc; so u s e d .
usage, phthonos is always a v i c e . " prima facie
likely that the
4 5
44
G r e e k transla
I n d e e d , "in
Greek
In light o f these observations, it is
a u t h o r rather refers to the 7iveujiia
46
which
resides within e a c h o f the
"adulterers" a m o n g his a u d i e n c e . In
a
i n t e n d e d a u d i e n c e as
characterization o f the
thing "to the
the
£nAome; cf. 3:14,
16), w h o
at m o s t petition G o d
"lesser" gift; and
o f the
4 3
jealous
(4:2,
pursue desire (4:2, e7ii0u|i£iTe), and
thus
with the
subsequent reference in
%dpiv), m o r e o v e r ,
God
fact, some
p o i n t o f e n v y " (rcpoq (pGovov) a c c o r d s quite well with
p r e c e d i n g depictions o f t h e m as
The
l o n g i n g for
would this can
gives with the
are
47
"evil m o t i v e " (KOCKCO<;) o f p l e a s u r e . 4:6
seem be
people who
to to
the
read as
satisfaction o f the
"greater gift"
imply
some
48
(jnei^ova . . .
comparison
to
a
a c o m p a r i s o n o f that w h i c h pleasures for w h i c h the
i m a g i n e d "adulteresses" vainly l o n g .
spirits
49
This seems to me to be a problem especially for those, like Dibelius, who advocate emending (poveuexe in 4:2 to (pGoveuete, for the author would thus be ascrib ing to G o d (cf. 4:5, (pOovov) the very behavior he condemns in his intended audi ence! Note also that the author understands "jealousy" (cf. £r|A,ot>T£) to be the result o f frustrated "desire" (cf. e7ci6o)(i8iTe) according to 4:2, and that G o d is not subject to temptation by em0i)uia (cf. 1:13-14). Incidentally, it might be pointed out that, ironically, the "logic o f envy" which Johnson describes applies quite well to the author's understanding o f his god in any case: his "resistance" o f such adulterous ones, at least in the case o f the rich, will ultimately take the form o f a brutal "day o f slaughter" (cf. 5:5, on which see below)! Laws, Epistle of James, 177-78; cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 282, who considers the attribution ofcpOovoqto G o d to be "virtually impossible." Johnson, Letter of James, 281, emphasis his. This 7ivea)(ia is not analogous to the "holy spirit" referred to in the letters o f Paul, but rather simply the life-giving human spirit; cf. Jas 2:26, and further Laws, "Does Scripture Speak in Vain," 2 1 2 - 1 3 . As Johnson rightly notes, not simply "incorrectly" (Letter of James, 278); cf. esp. 1:13, where "evil" (cf. KOIKCOV) is associated with temptation by desire. Note that the entire discussion leading up to 4 : 5 - 6 has dealt with the "envy" which results from the pursuit o f fi8ovt|; see Johnson, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos nEPI O0ONOY." See further on this phrase below, note 61. T h e debate over the translation o f %dpi<; as "gift" or "grace" owes more to comparisons o f James with Paul than the logic o f the passage itself. T h e following considerations seem to me to be decisive in favor o f translating this, with Johnson (Letter of James, 282), as "gift." First, while the author does not show any overt interest in a pauline concept o f "grace" else where in his work (though cf. the comments o f MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 96, and others on the use o f poi)A,r|6£{<; in 1:18), he is very interested in G o d ' s role as giver o f gifts. Second, and more importantly, 4 : 1 - 6 itself is concerned precisely with how one goes about acquiring things, contrasting a "vain" and "evil" way, i.e., pur4 4
4 5
4 6
4 7
4 8
4 9
LOGOS AND DESIRE
205
It is o b v i o u s in any case that the t w o references to the fact that G o d "gives a gift" (8{8coaiv %dpiv), o n e in a quotation f r o m Proverbs a n d o n e immediately prior to that quotation, are to b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the p r e c e d i n g discussion o f p r o p e r a n d i m p r o p e r ways o f acquiring things. T h e citation o f P r o v 3:34, w h i c h makes a distinc tion b e t w e e n the " h u m b l e " to w h o m G o d "gives a gift" (8(8coaiv xdpiv) a n d the "arrogant" w h o m he "resists," is intended as
proof
(816 Aiyei) o f the author's larger p o i n t regarding the evil a n d futility o f pursuing o n e ' s o w n pleasures. is, are interpreted
by James
50
T h e " h u m b l e " o f P r o v 3:34, that
with reference to those w h o simply
d e p e n d u p o n G o d for their needs; the "arrogant," hand,
51
o n the
are correlated with those "adulteresses" w h o either
their o w n pleasures a n d neglect to make requests o f G o d ,
5 2
other pursue
o r , just
as b a d , ask G o d in o r d e r that their desires might b e sated. I n d e e d , in the m o c k address o f 5 : 1 - 6 , the author subsequently warns
"the
r i c h " (oi 7iA,ouaioi)—whom he elsewhere contrasts with 6 xanzwoq (1:9-11;
cf. 4:6); w h o indulge themselves at the expense o f others
( 5 : 4 - 5 ) a n d w h o , indeed, "kill" to this e n d (5:6, (poveuaaxe; cf. 4:2); 53
w h o are, in short, the pre-eminent "arrogant" —that G o d ultimately will "resist" (dvxixdaaexai) t h e m in a decisive a n d brutal Jas 4:1—6 is thus f o l l o w e d
55
manner.
54
b y a call for repentance reminiscent o f
that w h i c h introduces the apostrophe to the rich in 5:1: those w h o seek to sate their o w n desires are to "lament a n d m o u r n a n d w e e p " ( x a t a x i 7 i c o p f | G o c x £ K a i 7iev0r|aaxe K a i K^auaaxe); they are, in short,
to
"humble themselves" (xarceivcbOrixe) so that G o d might exalt (u\|/cba£i) them.
56
S u c h "friends o f the w o r l d " are to resist the Devil, w h o will
thus "flee" from them, and draw near to G o d , w h o will thus draw near
suing one's own desires, with a "correct" and "effective" one, i.e., asking G o d , who has already been characterized as one "who gives to all generously and with out grumbling" (1:5), and from w h o m comes "every good gift and every perfect present" (1:17). Gf. Johnson, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos UE?l O0ONOY," 346; idem, Letter of James, 283. For the association o f cp06vo<; and i)7cepr|(pav{a, see Johnson, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos F1EPI O0ONOY," 335-36; idem, Letter of James, 283. Cf. Jas 4:13-15, where those who make their own plans—presumably business plans (cf. 4:13: "we will d o business [euTtopevaojieOa] and make a profit")—with out deferring to the will o f G o d are upbraided for their arrogance (dXa^ove(a). Gf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 115. Gf. Jas 4:6 with 5:6, and further 1:9-11. See L. A . Schokel, "James 5,2 [sic] and 4,6," Bib 54 (1973) 73-76; Davids, Epistle of James, 180; Johnson, Letter of James, 305; Penner, Epistle of James and Eschatology, 155. Note the use o f ox>v in 4:7. Gf. Jas 4:9, 10 with 5:1; see further 1:9-11. 50
51
52
53
54
55
56
206
CHAPTER FIVE
to t h e m ( 4 : 7 - 8 ) .
57
T h e y are "sinners" (6c|LiapTcoXo{) w h o must cleanse
their hands; 8i\|fu%oi w h o must "purify" (ayviaaxe) their hearts.
58
As the fact that the subject o f the clause 816 [f| ypoupfi] Xzyei must be
supplied f r o m 4:5 already
suggests, therefore,
the
charge
that
those w h o pursue an adulterous "friendship with the w o r l d " are act ing as t h o u g h "scripture speaks in vain" is issued with P r o v 3:34 in m i n d , whether o r n o t it is also m a d e with reference to s o m e n o w lost w o r k , cited in 4 : 5 ( - 6 a ) .
59
A c c o r d i n g l y , it seems to m e that Jas
4 : 5 - 6 is best punctuated as follows: O r do you think the scripture speaks in vain? The spirit which he [i.e., G o d ] made to dwell in us longs to the point o f envy (npbq (pGovov), but he [i.e., G o d ] gives a greater gift. Therefore it says . . . W h a t is clear in any case is that the author imagines t w o ways in w h i c h o n e c a n g o a b o u t acquiring things. T h e p r o p e r a n d effective way,
emphasized also in the o p e n i n g and closing sections o f the let
ter, is simply to ask "the g o d w h o gives to all without reserve
and
without r e p r o a c h " (1:5); m o r e precisely, to ask h i m h u m b l y , entirely apart from any intention o f sating o n e ' s o w n desires. T h e i m p r o p e r way,
conversely, is to attempt to sate o n e ' s desires, whether through
petitions to G o d o r not. T o engage in the arrogant pursuit o f o n e ' s own
desires is to b e c o m e an " e n e m y o f G o d " a n d thus, ironically,
to alienate the "gift-giver," w h o s e gifts are reserved for the h u m b l e .
Desire and the Gifts of God in 1:13—18 Immediately following the claim, in Jas
1:13-15, that the chain o f
temptation, sin a n d death originates with an individual's o w n desire rather than f r o m G o d , J a m e s states that "every g o o d gift a n d every
5 7
As has often been noted, these admonitions and promises find close analogies in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs; see Dibelius, James, 226. Cf. Jas 1:8, where the one w h o does not ask G o d ev juaieiis similarly described as 8i\jn)%o<;, dKaidaTocTO*; ev naaaxc, xai<; 68oi<; aircou. Note further in this connection the association o f a K a x a o x a a i a with an "earthly" and "demonic" wisdom in 3:16, while the "wisdom from above" is "in the first place" (rcparcov) "pure" (3:17, dyvri). This latter possibility, however, seems to me to be an unnecessary hypothesis in light o f the importance o f Prov 3:34 to the passage. While it is possible that the author combines two quotations here (a coupling, one might suggest, facilitated by the occurrence in both o f the phrase 8(8cooiv %dpiv), it seems more likely that the question in 4:5, " d o you think scripture speaks in vain," simply anticipates the 8i6 Xzyei which introduces the citation o f Prov 3:34; as pointed out, the subject o f 816 Xeyei must in any case be supplied from 4:5. Less plausible still is Laws's suggestion that the author alludes here to L X X Ps 83:3 ("Does Scripture Speak in Vain?" 214f). 5 8
5 9
LOGOS AND DESIRE
perfect p r e s e n t "
60
is " f r o m a b o v e " (avcoGev), i.e., f r o m G o d . T h e
n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these t w o
statements is g r e a d y illuminated b y
emphasis o n G o d ' s role as the letter, and
207
by 4:1-6
source o f g o o d things t h r o u g h o u t
con the the
in particular. All truly g o o d things, a c c o r d i n g
to J a m e s , c o m e f r o m G o d ; and
it is b y asking h i m
rather than pur
suing o n e ' s o w n desires that o n e can receive these gifts. O n his v i e w , scripture itself teaches that G o d w h i l e resisting t h o s e w h o
"gives a gift" o n l y to the
a r r o g a n t l y p u r s u e their o w n
humble, desires.
61
S u c c u m b i n g to desire, in short, represents a mistaken understanding o f h o w (truly) g o o d things can b e obtained: o n e must d e p e n d h u m b l y , simply and w h o l l y u p o n G o d . T h e pursuit o f o n e ' s o w n desires, while enticing, will ultimately achieve n o t h i n g g o o d , o n l y sin
6 0
and
death.
As has long been noted, rcaaa boGiq aya0T| m i nav 5cbpT||Lia xeXexov forms a hexameter. H . Greeven has argued, on the supposition that this line must there fore be a quotation o f an earlier saying, that Jas 1:17 actually consists o f two sen tences: a traditional statement and its explanation. Greeven thus paraphrases the verse as follows: "Jede Gabe ist gut, und jedes Geschenk ist vollkommen'. U n d warum? Weil es von oben stammt, herabkommt v o m Vater des Lichts . . . " ("Jede Gabe ist gut," 13). Greeven, however, does not seem to have w o n a significant fol lowing on this point; see, e.g., the subsequent translations o f MuBner (Der Jakobusbrief, 84), Cantinat (Les Epitres, 90), Laws (Epistle of James, 72), Johnson (Letter of James, 173); see further Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 6 6 - 6 7 . Davids suggests that even if the hexameter was proverbial, it is altered in James so that "every g o o d gift and every perfect present" is now the subject o f avcoGev eaxiv (Epistle of James, 86). In fact, whereas the author's interest in establishing that all g o o d things c o m e from G o d is readily understandable in the context o f 1:13-18 (see immediately below), it is difficult to see why he should suddenly feel compelled to defend the claim that all "gifts" are good or perfect. T h e significance to be accorded to the use o f two different phrases in connec tion with God's beneficence (i.e., boGiq ayoc0T| and 8copT|(xa xe^eiov) has also been the subject o f some discussion. Some read here a distinction between the act o f giving (doGiq) and the gift itself (8cbpT|(xa); see Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 5 6 - 5 8 ; Hort, Epistle of St. James, 28; more recently Johnson, Letter of James, 195. Ropes, on the other hand, argued that "there is no special distinction intended, the repetition being solely for rhetorical effect" (St. James, 159); see also H . Greeven, 'Jede Gabe ist gut, Jak. 1,17," TZ 14 (1958) 1-13; Cantinat, Les Epitres, 91; Davids, Epistle of James, 86; cf. Dibelius, James, 100. The issue is in any case not crucial for under standing the author's basic point, on which see below. Note that there is a certain tension between the author's view o f G o d and his perception o f his present economic realities: cf. Jas 1:7 and 4:2-3 with the wealth of the wicked "rich" (e.g., 5:2-3). This tension, perhaps, underlies his notion o f the "greater gift" in 4:6: the material luxuries o f "the rich" are not in fact the truly g o o d gifts, but only fleeting material possessions which ultimately work to their dis advantage; cf. in this connection James's use o f phrases KXOVGIOI EV MAREI and 7cxcb%oi T(p K6GJJ,(O (2:5). If this is the case, the tension is apparently resolved by means o f an imagined eschatological reversal o f the present fortunes o f "the humble," or "poor," and "the rich": despite their current oppression at the hands o f "the rich," the former will ultimately be the inheritors o f the promised kingdom. 6 1
208
CHAPTER FIVE
In fact, the correlation d r a w n b e t w e e n desire a n d sin in
1:13-15
is also implied in 4 : 1 - 1 0 , w h e r e those w h o pursue desire (cf. 4:2: £7ii0'u|H£iT£) are
addressed
as "sinners"
(djuapxcoXoi) w h o n e e d
to
"cleanse their h a n d s " (4:8). A c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n desire a n d death, t o o , is evident in the latter passage, w h i c h locates the origin o f "wars a n d battles" a n d
"killing" in the pleasures
w h i c h is o f f o r e m o s t c o n c e r n in
(4:l-3).
6 2
The
"death"
1 : 1 4 - 1 5 , h o w e v e r , is n o t
that
w h i c h those w h o pursue desire will inflict u p o n others; rather, it is the
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l o n e w h i c h they themselves, o r m o r e precisely
their " s o u l s , "
63
will e x p e r i e n c e as a result o f their sin.
64
Thus does
J a m e s contrast the "death" (Gdvaxoq) w h i c h results f r o m giving in to Tteipaauoc; in 1:14-15 with the " c r o w n o f life" (xov axecpocvov xr\q ^cofjc;) p r o m i s e d , in the i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g m a c a r i s m , endure rceipaauoq ( 1 : 1 2 ) .
to those w h o
65
The Two Ways and the Wandering Children of God A
c o n c e r n for the
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l " d e a t h " resulting f r o m sin also
e m e r g e s in the letter's c o n c l u d i n g instruction,
w h i c h presents
the
association o f d e c e p t i o n , sin a n d death m a d e in 1:13-16 under
the
rubric o f a " t w o w a y s " ethic ( 5 : 1 9 ~ 2 0 ) .
66
T h e t w o ways are charac
terized b y "truth" (n dA,r|0£ia) a n d " d e c e p t i o n " (rcAxxvn), respectively.
67
T h e "sinner" (duxxpxcoAoq) is i m a g i n e d to b e travelling o n the " w a y " or " p a t h " (686<;) w h i c h is characterized b y " d e c e p t i o n " (rcA,dvr|), and which
e n d s in d e a t h (Gdvaxoq). T h i s is p o r t r a y e d
anb xx\q d X n G d a q ,
6 2
68
a characterization
as rcXocvaaGai
w h i c h simultaneously exploits
Johnson, in fact, understands Jas 4:2 to explain the logic behind 1:14-15; see Letter of James, 276, citing Laws, Epistle of James, 172. Cf. also in this connection Jas 5:6, where it is said that "the rich," the pre-eminent devotees o f desire, are charged with "killing the righteous." See 1:21 and 5:20. Note also that "the righteous"—who, no doubt, will receive "the crown o f life"—can nonetheless be (and have been!) "killed" by the enemies of G o d (5:6). Note that "the rich" not only "kill" (5:6), but will themselves soon face a "day of slaughter" for which their indulgent lifestyle has served to "fatten" them (5:5). O n the relation o f therceipoca|Li6<;in 1:12 to that o f 1:13-15, see below pp. 22If. Cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 85. Cf. the use o f aXrfizm and nXavr\ as descriptive o f the "two spirits" in T. Jud. 20:1; 1 John 4:6; cf. 1QS 3:18-19. Some mss read anb xfj<; b&ov aXrfieiaq or xfj<; bdov xf\q aXrfiziaq in Jas 5:19, thus explicitly identifying "the truth" as a way. Even if the work o f later editors, how ever, these readings only make explict what is clearly implicit in any case: the author envisions two opposing "ways" which humans can travel, one characterized by "truth" (dXf|0eia) and the other by "deception" (nXavr]). Similarly, whether the phrase 6 3
6 4
6 5
6 6
6 7
6 8
LOGOS AND DESIRE
b o t h the set
up
spatial and
209
cognitive aspects o f 7tA,ocvdco: while the
b e t w e e n f| dXr|0eia a n d iikavx\ suggests that the
contrast
"sinner"
is
"deceived f r o m the truth," the portrayal o f such a o n e as traveling the w r o n g path and him the
o r her
n e e d i n g to b e
as having "wandered f r o m
w a n d e r i n g "sinner" f r o m
t i o n " and
"turned b a c k " (erciaTpecpco)
b a c k to "the
sins (dpxxpTicov)" and OCUTOU EK Gavdxou).
the
the
"way"
truth."
presents
One
who
characterized b y
truth" will, in effect,
"save his o r her
69
" c o v e r a multitude o f
soul f r o m d e a t h " (acboei \|/u%T]v
70
It is difficult to r e n d e r 7tA,avr|0ii anb rn<; &A,r|0£{a<; (5:20) in in a w a y w h i c h preserves b o t h its spatial and tions. T h e
g o d w h o is the
simply as such, but alteration o r
term rctaxvdco are
source o f every g o o d gift is not
as "the
cb OUK evi jcapaXXayn f\ TpoTtn.*; a j t o G K i a o u x x ) .
a u t h o r has the
in
(if any)
m i n d in
1:16—18 operative. described
Father o f Lights, with w h o m there is n o
s h a d o w o f c h a n g e " (1:17, TOU naipbq
diately clear w h a t
English
its cognitive c o n n o t a
translator is faced with a similar p r o b l e m in Jas
w h e r e , o n c e again, b o t h aspects o f the H e r e , the
turns
"decep
71
TCOV cpcoTcov, T i a p '
W h i l e it is not
imme
particular astrological p h e n o m e n a
1:17,
72
the
contrast b e t w e e n the
deity
the and
"lights" he created vis-a-vis such " c h a n g e s , " at least, is o b v i o u s .
Further, the
fact that the
a u t h o r p r o c e e d s to
p o i n t out
73
that this
E K nhxvr\c, boov amo\) is translated "from his or her way o f error" or "from the error o f his or her way," the basic idea o f a "way" characterized by error is clear. Cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 337; further Dibelius, James, 257 n. 94, w h o notes that " ' [ t ] o wander' (7ttaxvaa0(xi) occurs frequently in conjunction with 'way'," cit ing several relevant passages. Jas 5:20; the reference to "covering a multitude o f sins" is an allusion to Prov 10:12. Against Fabris, Legge, 69 n. 58, the "sins" which will be "covered" and the "soul" which will thereby be "saved from death" are most naturally read as those of the "sinner" whose deception leads him or her to death, not as those o f 6 £ 7 t i o T p e \ | / a < ; . See further Johnson, Letter of James, 338-39. I simply cite the text as given in B. Aland et ai, Novum Testamentum Graecum. Editio Critica Maior IV, Installment 1, 1.13-14. O n the severe textual problems here, see the discussions o f Ropes, St. James, 162-64; and Dibelius, James, 100-102. O n the astronomical connotations o f 7 i a p a ^ a y r | and Tp07tfj<; cx7ioaK(aajLia, see the commentaries and the relevant entries in B A G D . That the author had specific astrological phenomena in mind here, however, must be considered most doubtful. Indeed, judging from the profound textual confusion surrounding this passage, his terminology in any case confounded early copyists. In fact, his primary interest here, as I will argue below, is in the (apparent) deviations from the normally quite reg ular movements o f the heavenly "lights." It is therefore most doubtful that one should detect in this line a special con cern to associate G o d with "light" (as opposed to "darkness") as suggested, e.g., by Ropes, St. James, 160f; cf. MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 91. Indeed, the "lights" are introduced here above all because o f their association with change, in which respect they are contrasted with G o d ; cf. the comments o f Dibelius, James, 102. 6 9
7 0
71
72
7 3
CHAPTER FIVE
210
same "Father" also " g a v e birth to us" suggests b o t h an c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n " u s " a n d the "lights" ( w h o are b o t h
additional offspring
o f G o d ) , a n d an a n a l o g o u s contrast b e t w e e n "the Father" a n d
"us."
S u c h a contrast b e t w e e n G o d a n d h u m a n s has in fact already b e e n d r a w n in 1:13-15 a n d is, i n d e e d , the essential p o i n t o f the argument: while h u m a n s e x p e r i e n c e Tteipocouoq, G o d c a n n o t b e held
responsi
ble for this b e c a u s e h e , unlike t h e m , is aneipacToq.
T h e implication,
t h e n , is that the
"lights"
"changes"
evident
a m o n g the
but
not
reflective o f the nature o f their "father" are in s o m e sense c o m p a rable to the rceipocauoi e x p e r i e n c e d b y h u m a n beings but n o t b y the g o d w h o " g a v e birth" to
them.
74
T h e c o m m a n d w h i c h precedes the reference to G o d as the unchang ing "Father o f Lights," jxn nXavaaQe,
is particularly
suggestive in this
respect. W h i l e the regular m o v e m e n t s o f the astral b o d i e s was m o n l y e m p h a s i z e d in antiquity,
7 4
75
com
it was the p e r c e i v e d irregularities in
Laws seems to sense this connection as well: "While heavenly bodies can be seen to change, then, either through their own movement or when shadows are cast upon them by the movement o f others, G o d is both himself unchangeable and unaffected by change in anything outside himself (as in v. 13 he is both untempted and untempting)" (Epistle of James, 74). Laws suggests a comparison with Philo's con trast between God's unchanging nature and the observable movements in the heav ens which he created. In De Cherub. 8 7 - 9 0 , e.g., pointing out that "sabbath" means "rest" (avanavGiq), and commenting upon the fact that "Moses" often calls the sab bath "God's sabbath," Philo contrasts G o d and his creation in this way: G o d is the "one thing among that which exists (ev xoiq ovciv; cf. Colson: "in the universe") which rests (avaTtouojievov)." Philo singles out the astral bodies as the strongest case for purposes o f the contrast: even these "are not self mastering and move and revolve continually," and can thus be said to "suffer" while G o d is axpenxoq and d|ieT(xp^r|TO<; (De Cherub. 88, 89). Elsewhere Philo speaks o f this general contrast between G o d and his various creations in terms o f the latter being by nature "sub ject to becoming (ev y e v e a e i ) and constant change" (Opif 12; cf. Leg. All. 2.33). M o r e illuminating for James, however, is Philo's awareness that the concept o f "unchangeableness" can be used in another sense, in terms o f which the ideal human being can be compared, not contrasted, with the deity. Reacting to those who would infer from Gen 6:5-7 that "the Creator repented o f the creation o f men when H e beheld their impiety," Philo writes: For what greater impiety could there be than to suppose that the Unchangeable changes? Indeed some maintain that even among men vacillation o f mind and judgment is not universal; for those w h o study philosophy in guilelessness and purity, it is held, gain from their knowledge this as their chief reward, that they do not change with changing circumstances but with unbending steadfastness and firm constancy take in hand all that it behoves them to d o (Deus. Immut. 22). Such a one is described as 6 xzkexoq in §23; cf. his description o f Moses—and 6 aocpoq and 6 a7toi)8aio<; in general—in Gigant. 48, esp. the comment that "neither is virtue subject to movement nor the g o o d man to change, but both are stayed on the firm foundation o f right reason." Cicero, e.g., reports Cleanthes's view that "uniform motion and revolution o f the heavens" and "the varied groupings and ordered beauty o f the sun, m o o n and 75
LOGOS AND DESIRE
the
211
m o v e m e n t o f s o m e "stars" w h i c h l e d t o their designation
TttaxvfJToci, o r " w a n d e r e r s . " j e c t o f a popular Jewish e x p l a i n e d the
T h e s e astral " w a n d e r e r s " (and subsequently
s u p p o s e d anomalies
w e r e the
Christian)
in terms o f certain
myth, which stars' rebel
lious deviations f r o m the courses w h i c h w e r e laid o u t for t h e m God.
as
sub
by
T h e earliest reference to this m y t h in the extant J e w i s h liter
ature is perhaps f o u n d in o u r present 1 Enoch™ in w h i c h the W a t c h e r s are identified as "stars" w h o s e downfall, as it w e r e , was by
their illicit desire for the daughters o f "the
angels, the children o f h e a v e n , saw t h e m a n d desired t h e m " ( / Enoch 6 : 2 ) . paradigmatic for
77
precipitated
sons o f m e n " :
"the
(e7te9t>|Lir|o(xv)
In a n y case, these " w a n d e r i n g stars" b e c a m e
e x a m p l e s o f those w h o disregard
God's
commands
later writers, m a n y o f w h o m d o clearly identify t h e m with
7 8
the
W a t c h e r s . T h e a u t h o r o f the Letter o f J u d e , for e x a m p l e , likens a g r o u p o f Christian "intruders" w h o "defile the flesh, reject
author
ity a n d slander the glorious o n e s " to the doxepeq TtAxxvfJTOU, w h o m h e further
identifies
as the W a t c h e r s .
a n a l o g o u s l y o f the
79
Clement
o f Alexandria
speaks
Carpocratians:
stars" was "the most potent" o f the four causes o f the (supposed) universality o f human belief in the gods (De Nat. Deor. 2.15); see further De Nat. Deor. 2 . 4 9 - 5 6 , which includes a discussion o f the stars "which are falsely called planets or wan dering [stars]" (quae/also vocantur mantes). Cf. 1 Enoch 2:1, and further the account o f the laws governing the astral movements in the so-called "Astronomical B o o k " (/ Enoch 72-82). / Enoch 18:9-19. Note, however, that the rebellious stars are not explicitly identified as "wanderers" in / Enoch. T h e translation is that o f E. Isaac, "1 (Ethiopic Apocalypse o f ) Enoch," OTP 1.15; for the Greek fragment o f this passage see M . Black, Apocalypsis Henochi Graece ( P V T G 3; Leiden: Brill, 1970) 21. There is disagreement regarding the identification o f the Watchers with the rebellious stars in / Enoch itself; note esp. that while the latter are seven in number (18:13), the former are said to number two hundred (6:6). See further M . Black, The Book of Enoch or I Enoch: A New English Edition with Commentary and Textual Notes (in consultation with J. C . VanderKam, with an appen dix on the "Astronomical" Chapters [72-82] by O . Neugebauer; S V T P 7; Leiden: Brill, 1985) 160. Whatever the case regarding / Enoch 1-36, an understanding o f the Watchers as rebellious stars is clear at least in the so-called "Animal Apocalypse"; see / Enoch 86, with Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 54. Note in this connection / Enoch 18:15: " A n d the stars which roll over upon the fire, they are the ones which have transgressed the commandments o f G o d " ; cf. the enumeration o f such commandments in / Enoch 7 2 - 8 2 which, however, does not discuss the "planets." Jude 8, 13; cf. 6 - 7 . T h e charge that they "defile the flesh" in particular seems to hark back to the myth o f the Watchers; cf. esp. the reference to the Watchers' pursuit o f a a p ^ exepa in Jude 7; further R . Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter ( W B C 50; W a c o : W o r d , 1983) 56. Note also the further play o n the nXav- root in this connection, as the Christian "intruders" are said to abandon themselves xfj %kavr\ xov BaXad\i (Jude 11). See further Bauckham, Jude, 5 0 - 5 5 and 8 9 - 9 2 . 76
7 7
7 8
7 9
CHAPTER FIVE
212
these are the "wandering stars" (daxepEq 7itaxvfJTtxi) referred to in the prophecy, who wander from the narrow road o f the commandments (oi anb xfjq TCOV E V T O ^ C O V bbov . . . 7 i t a x v c b u £ v o i ) into a boundless abyss o f the carnal and bodily sins . . . [BJoasting that they are free, they have become slaves to servile desires (£7u0i)uicov). 80
81
A passage from T h e o p h i l u s ' s To Autolycus is also n o t e w o r t h y in this connection: The disposition o f the stars, too, contains a type o f the arrangement and order o f the righteous and pious, and o f those who keep the law and commandments o f G o d (TCOV . . . T n p o u v T c o v T O V v o u o v KOCI Totq hxoXJaq 0£o\)). For the brilliant and bright stars are an imitation o f the prophets, and therefore they remain fixed, not declining, nor passing from place to place. A n d those which hold the second place in brightness, are types o f the people o f the righteous. And those, again, which change their position, and flee from place to place, which are also called plan ets (oi m i 7 i t a x v r | T £ < ; Kocta){>u£voi), they too are a type o f the men who have wandered from G o d , abandoning his law and commandments (TCOV
dv0pCO7CCOV anb TOV amov).
d
TrpoGTdyucxTcx
0£O\),
KCXTCX^mOVTCOV
TOV
vouov
KOU Td
82
A final passage, from the Testament of Naphtali, in w h i c h the sons o f the patriarch are urged n o t to b e c o m e like S o d o m " w h i c h departed from the o r d e r o f its nature" (iixiq evr\XXa^e xd^iv cpuaecoq auxfjc;) is also instructive: Sun, moon, and stars (fjXioc; KCXI O E A T I V T J K O U dax£p£<;) do not alter their order; thus you should not alter the Law o f G o d (vouov Qeov) by the disorder of your actions. The gentiles, because they have wandered astray (rcA,ocvr|0£VTcx) and forsook the Lord, have changed the order, and have devoted themselves to stones and sticks, patterning themselves after wandering spirits (nvev\iaoi nXavr]qf .. . Likewise the Watchers departed from the order o f their nature (Td^iv qyuoEcoq OCUTCOV) . . , 3
8
80
4
An apparent reference to Jude 13; see on this point M . Smith, Clement of Alex andria and a Secret Gospel of Mark (Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1973) 8. Letter to Theodorus, 1.3-7. T h e text and translation are those of M . Smith, Clement of Alexandria and a Secret Gospel of Mark, 446-52; cf. the commentary on pp. 8-10, where the paradigmatic use o f the "planets" elsewhere in Clement's writings is noted. T h e "carnal and bodily sin" again likely reflects an identification with the Watchers. AdAut. 2.15. T h e text is found in M P G 6.1077; the translation is that oi AJVF 2.115. So Kee; cf. H . W . Hollander and M . de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary (SVTP 8; Leiden: Brill, 1985) 306: "spirits o f deceit." T h e divergence in the two translations highlights once again the difficulty in preserving the Greek word-play with nXavi\ and its cognates. TJVaph 3:2-5; I have slightly revised the translation o f H . C . Kee, "Testaments 81
82
83
84
LOGOS AND DESIRE
213
T h i s passage d o e s n o t explicidy m e n t i o n , at least as such, the daxepeq 7 t A , a v f J T a i , a n d i n d e e d seems to suggest that "stars" b y definition
not
"do
alter their o r d e r . " T h e astronomical context, h o w e v e r , a n d par
ticularly the a n a l o g y d r a w n from " w a n d e r i n g spirits"
85
the W a t c h e r s , suggests that the
after w h o m "the nations" patterned themselves
are to b e u n d e r s t o o d as " w a n d e r i n g " astral bodies. Previously in the Testaments, m o r e o v e r , the W a t c h e r s w e r e associated particularly with illicit desire, w h i c h is thus here a p p a r e n d y assumed to b e the under lying cause o f their " w a n d e r i n g . "
86
S a n d w i c h e d between a claim that h u m a n temptation, sin and death stem f r o m
desire rather than G o d a n d a reference to the
astral
"lights" w h o s e changes d o n o t reflect their creator's character, a d m o n i t i o n uri 7tA,ocvaa9e in Jas
the
1:16 is to b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f
this c o m m o n use o f the astral "wanderers" as paradigmatic e x a m ples o f rebellion from G o d ' s law as a result o f illicit desire. T h e allu sion to this m y t h is in fact quite apposite in the c o n t e x t o f the author's argument in 1:13-18, p r o v i d i n g a parallel e x a m p l e in the service o f the p o i n t m a d e in 1:13-15. T h o u g h G o d is the
"father"
o f the "lights," any w a n d e r i n g o n their part reflects n o t his nature, but represents, o n the contrary, a deviation from the path w h i c h G o d h a d m a r k e d out for them. S o t o o , though G o d is o u r "father," human
experience o f 7teipaauo<; d o e s n o t reflect G o d ' s
he is amxpaoxoc,—but
87
the
nature—for
rather stems from e a c h individual's o w n desire.
of the Twelve Patriarchs," OTP 1.812, which obscures the fact that the "nature" in question is specifically that o f the Watchers themselves. For the Greek text, see M . de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Critical Edition of the Greek Text; cf. idem, Testamenta XII Patriarchum: Edited according to Cambridge University Library MS FfI.24fol. 203a-262b, with Short Notes ( P V T G ; Leiden: Brill, 1964). See further on this passage Hollander and de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twehe Patriarchs: A Commentary, 305-308. See above, note 83. Cf. T Reu. 5:6. Note also in this connection the link between the Watchers and Sodom in this passage, which is, in fact, not uncommon; cf. Jude 6 - 7 , and the comment o f Hollander and de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary, 307-308. Note that while the peculiar use o f the verb ccrceKurioev in 1:18 suggests a maternal, rather than paternal, image o f God, its natural subject is the rcoxnp xcov (pcoxcov o f 1:17; cf. further the description o f G o d as "the Father" in 1:27 and 3:9, the latter o f which uses the term—as, clearly, in 1:17—with reference to God's role as creator: "with it [sc. the tongue] we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse the human beings w h o were made according to the likeness o f G o d . " As has often been pointed out, this verb was likely used in 1:18 mainly to effect some manner o f contrast with sin's "birthing" (drcoicoei) o f "death" in 1:15; so, e.g., Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 62; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 93; Davids, Epistle of James, 89; Vouga, UEpitre de Saint Jacques, 15; Johnson, Letter of James, 197. 85
8 6
87
214
CHAPTER FIVE
Xoyog aXrfieiaq and ejiicpvtog Xoyoq God,
a c c o r d i n g to James, is n o t the source o f temptation. It is rather
o n e ' s o w n desires that tempt o n e to stray from G o d ' s will and o n t o the path o f sin and death. T h e Father's will for "us," J a m e s on
goes
to say, far from tempting p e o p l e to pursue desire, is expressed
in the fact that he "gave birth to us b y means o f a logos o f truth so that w e are a sort o f 'first fruits' o f his creatures." rightly remarks, here,
89
88
If, as Dibelius
"the divine will to p r o v i d e salvation is stressed"
this strongly suggests that the logos o f truth stands in opposi
tion to desire, as the w a y w h i c h leads to "life" rather than "death." In fact, it is in the immediately following elaboration o f the a d m o nition "let each person b e quick to hear, slow to speak and slow to anger" that the author refers to "the implanted logos w h i c h is able to
save y o u r souls." T h a t these t w o logoi are i n d e e d o n e and
the
same c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d . A s w e have seen, the phrase euxpuToc; Xoyoc, itself, like the reference to the "birth" b y means o f logos in 1:18, is an i m a g e o f divine c r e a t i o n .
90
M o r e striking still is the fact that, just
as the " w a y " o f deception, sin and death in 5 : 1 9 - 2 0 corresponds to the failure to resist desire in 1 : 1 4 - 1 5 , so d o the t w o primary char acteristics o f the opposite w a y enumerated in the conclusion—that is, "truth" (5:19, f| &A,r|0£i(x) and its ability to "save souls from death" (cf. 5:20, acbaei \|/U%TIV auxou EK Gavaxou)—correspond, respectively, to the descriptions o f logos in 1:18 and
1:21: the logos b y w h i c h G o d
"gave birth to us so that w e are the 'first fruits' o f his creations" is " o f truth" (1:18, aXxfieiaq),
while the implanted logos is identified as
that " w h i c h is able to save y o u r souls" (1:21, xov 8uvd|LL£vov acooou ^raq \|A)%a<; The
UJJXOV).
c o n n e c t i o n o f 1:19-27 to 1:13-18 itself further confirms that
the Xoyoc, aXrfieiaq and 6 Euxpuxoq Xoyoc, are o n e a n d the s a m e ,
8 8
91
and
Jas 1:18; the use o f quotation marks around "first fruits" is meant to reflect what I take to be the deliberate employment o f metaphorical language by James (note the use of iiva). Interestingly, the same usage is found in Philo, w h o describes Israel as "set apart out o f the whole human race as a kind o f first fruits (nq anap%i\) to the Maker and Father" (Spec. Leg. 4.180). For the sense in which this birth ren ders "us" "first fruits" in James, see below p. 237. Dibelius, James, 103; "this can be seen," he continues, "from the position o f 'having willed' (Poi)A,T|6£{<;)." See further on this creation below, under the heading "Birth by Logos." T h e identification o f Xoyoq dA,T|6e{a<; and 6 e\i(pvTo<; Xoyoc, is widely assumed; see above, Chapter O n e . Even Dibelius, w h o objected in principle to interpreting 1:21 in light o f 1:18 given his literary approach to the letter, ultimately identified both as "the gospel." 8 9
9 0
91
215
LOGOS AND DESIRE
that this logos represents the " w a y " contrary to desire, i.e., the w a y w h i c h leads to "life." A s w e have seen, Jas 1:19—27 represents a dis crete section within the first chapter o f James: Jas
1:19b presents a
three part admonition, each element o f which is elaborated in 1:20-27. Its c o n n e c t i o n with 1:13-18, however, is clear nonetheless. D e p e n d i n g u p o n whether o n e takes icxe as an indicative o r an imperative, 1:19a refers to what has p r e c e d e d either as a reminder ("you k n o w this") or, m o r e generally, as something o f w h i c h the audience should in any case b e aware ( " k n o w this!").
92
W h a t e v e r the case, the use o f
m e . . . 8e to introduce the a d m o n i t i o n "let each person b e quick to hear, slow to speak, and slow to anger" implies that this latter rep resents an ethical inference drawn from what has p r e c e d e d , whether 1:13-18 as a w h o l e o r 1:18 in particular.
93
It is therefore
striking,
given the reference to the birth o f "us" b y means o f the "logos o f truth" in 1:18, that "the implanted logos" is central to the elabora tion o f 1:19b: since h u m a n anger doesn't p r o d u c e G o d ' s righteous ness, it is to b e received "with humility" (1:21); though o n e is to b e "quick to hear," o n e must not merely "hear" the logos, but " d o " it as well ( 1 : 2 2 - 2 3 ) ; and while the logos is not explicitly m e n t i o n e d w h e n the author explains b e i n g "slow to speak" in terms o f "bridling the t o n g u e " (1:26, %aAavaycoycov yAxoaaav), it emerges w h e n this theme is revisited in J a m e s 3 that "bridling the t o n g u e " is nothing other than not "stumbling" ev Aoyq) (3:2)—a phrase that certainly refers to speech, 9
but speech particularly in its relation to the implanted logos. * In short, knowledge that an individual's o w n desire is the ultimate source o f temptation, that giving in to temptation leads to sin a n d
death,
and, perhaps most especially, that G o d "gave birth to us b y means o f a logos o f truth," should give rise to a particular type o f b e h a v ior vis-a-vis the implanted logos w h i c h is "able to save souls." Conclusion T h e reference to the "logos o f truth" b y w h i c h G o d "gave birth to us" is m a d e in the context o f an argument that locates the origin o f temptation,
9 2
sin a n d death in h u m a n
desire rather than with
T h e reading (ftaie, while also strongly attested, is likely a later scribal attempt to solidify the transition from 1:18 to 1:19-26. So also Johnson, Letter of James, 199; cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 44, 133. Dibelius's characteristic rejection o f any coherent connection between 1:18 and 1:19-26 results more from his general literary approach to the letter than to exe gesis o f this particular passage; see James, 109. See below, pp. 2 2 4 - 3 0 . 9 3
9 4
CHAPTER FIVE
216
God.
A distinction is drawn between G o d a n d humanity: G o d , unlike
h u m a n beings, neither tempts n o r is himself tempted. T h e true source o f temptation, rather, is each individual's o w n desire. Playing, as in 5 : 1 9 - 2 0 , o n b o t h o f the c o m m o n connotations o f the v e r b rcXocvdco, the author warns his a u d i e n c e , \ir\ nXavacde:
they are n o t to b e
" d e c e i v e d " b y the allure o f desire a n d thus i n d u c e d to " w a n d e r " in sin toward death. Despite its seductive allure, nothing that is truly g o o d will b e achieved b y giving in to desire. "Every g o o d gift a n d every perfect present" c o m e s f r o m G o d . His "gifts" are reserved for those that h u m b l y d e p e n d u p o n h i m , while he "resists" those w h o arrogantly pursue their o w n desires. In the same w a y that a n y " w a n d e r i n g " o n the part o f the astral "lights" is n o t reflective o f the nature o f their "Father" w h o created them, so t o o , G o d is n o t responsible w h e n humans " w a n d e r " o n t o the path o f sin a n d death, despite the fact that he "gave birth" to "us." I n d e e d , far from tempting p e o p l e to pursue desire, G o d "gave birth to u s " b y means o f logos; h e "implanted" within us, that is, the logos w h o s e primary characteristics o f "truth" a n d the ability to "save souls" stand diametrically o p p o s e d to the d e c e p t i o n a n d death o f desire. K n o w l e d g e o f this fact should lead o n e to resist the "desire" w h i c h leads to death, a n d " d o , " rather, the logos " w h i c h is able to save souls."
LOGOS AND ERGA
The
antithetical relationship b e t w e e n logos a n d desire in J a m e s is
u n d e r s c o r e d b y the series o f contrastive terms associated with each. T h e y are portrayed as t w o " w a y s , " with desire characterized a b o v e all b y " d e c e p t i o n " ( 1 : 1 6 ; 5 : 1 9 - 2 0 , TCXOCVU) a n d
logos b y "truth" ( 1 : 1 8 ;
5 : 1 9 , dA-nOeia). T h e path o f desire leads to "death" ( 1 : 1 5 , 9dvocTo<;), while the logos is able to "save souls" from death
( 1 : 2 1 ; cf. 5 : 2 0 :
acooei \|/uxnv . . . 8K Bavdiou). E a c h " w a y , " m o r e o v e r , is characterized by
its o w n particular
category o f behavior. Just as s u c c u m b i n g to
desire results in "sin" ( 1 : 1 5 , duocpxia; cf. 5 : 2 0 , duxxpxcoXov), so t o o does " d o i n g " logos p r o d u c e a particular
type o f action, namely an
ergon: "the o n e w h o looks into the perfect l a w w h i c h is o f f r e e d o m and remains" a n d thus b e c o m e s a "logos-doer"
b e c o m e s , m o r e speci
fically, a 7ioir|Tn(; epyou ( 1 : 2 5 ) . A n a l y z i n g James's emphasis o n " w o r k s " from the perspective o f his v i e w o f logos a n d desire as " t w o ways," in fact, sheds a g o o d deal o f light o n this controversial topic.
LOGOS AND DESIRE
The
r o l e o f erga as
c o u n t e r p a r t to
217
sin
within the
ethical
and
soteriological t h o u g h t o f J a m e s e m e r g e s m o s t clearly t h r o u g h a c o m parison o f 1:2-4, 1 2 that the
9 5
with 1 : 1 4 - 1 5 . In Jas
" h a v e a perfect w o r k (epyov xekexov) fect, w h o l e , and epyov xekeiov a
1:2-4, the
author insists
" e n d u r a n c e " (i)7touovr|) p r o d u c e d (ideally) b y rceipaauoc; must in o r d e r that y o u m i g h t b e per
lacking in n o t h i n g . " T h e
has
s o m e w h a t peculiar phrase
b e e n variously interpreted.
rather p l e o n a s t i c anticipation
o f the
96
Dibelius t o o k it to
be
s u b s e q u e n t clause, ivoc rjie
xe^eioi K a i o^oKX-npoi ev pn8evi ^eucojuevoi. T h e latter, therefore, while "formally . . . dependent u p o n xekeiov
e%exco, is "in
fect w o r k . "
9 7
simply as the of
Rom
5:3-5
i m p e r a t i v e " f] 5e urcouovn epyov thus: "You
T h i s interpretation, h o w e v e r , treating 1:4
are
that per
as a
climactic element o f a c o n c a t e n a t i o n after the and 98
imperative e%eTco.
95
the
thought parallel to it";
1 Pet
1:6-7, utterly takes the
O t h e r s have taken the
teeth out
whole
manner of
phrase with reference
the to
Jas 1:12, picking up the key theme o f enduring 7ieipao|j,6<;, forms an inclusio with 1:2-4 (cf. esp. 1:2,7ceipao(xoi<; with 1:12,7ceipaop,6v; 1:3, 4, i)7co(iovr|(-v) with 1:12, i)7co(xevei; and 1:3, 8OK{JXIOV with 1:12, 86KI(XO<;). T h e problem o f the logical development o f the intervening verses—i.e., from 1:5-8 to 1:9-11—is among the most challenging problems in the interpretation o f the letter, and is Dibelius's strongest case for reading James as a collection o f disparate traditions; cf. the c o m ments o f Johnson, Letter of James, 174-76. Dibelius himself nonetheless recognized the resumptive character o f 1:12 (James, 88). However one construes the precise logical connection both between Jas 1:5-8 and 1:9-11, and between what precedes and follows them, it should be stressed that these sections address issues which are not only o f fundamental concern to the letter as a whole, but closely related to one another: the proper way o f acquiring things (namely, from G o d through prayer [1:5-8]), and the coming eschatological reversal o f the rich and humble (1:9-11). For recent attempts to discern the precise progression o f thought in these verses, see H o p p e , Der Theologische Hintergrund des Jakobusbriefes, 18-44; Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 92-100; Johnson, Letter of James, 182-84, 189-91; cf. Tsuji, Glaube, 6 4 - 6 7 . Klein, approaching Jas 1:2-4 as a traditional gradatio (cf. R o m 5:3-5 and 1 Pet 1:6-7), but finding no prior use o f the phrase epyov xeXeiov in ancient literature, considers the latter, at least, to have been coined by the author o f James himself (Ein vollkommenes Werk, 54). Indeed, it is Klein's view that this expression represents a summation o f the overarching interest o f the author of James: "Das Vollkommene Werk' ist die Forderung, in der die verschieden Mahnreden des Jakobusbriefes ihr Zentrum haben" (ibid., 12). For a discussion o f the past interpretation o f the phrase, see ibid., 5 4 - 5 6 . Dibelius, James, 74; emphasis his; followed by MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief 66f; P. J. Hartin, James and the Q Sayings of Jesus (JSNTSup 47; Sheffield: J S O T Press, 1991) 85. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 55. Dibelius, who o f course emphasizes the tra ditional nature o f this passage, reduces the significance o f the imperative to the level o f form, attributing the "obscurity o f the expression" to "the intention o f the author to let the concatenation end, not with a declarative statement, but rather with an admonition; for such is in accord with the paraenetic character o f his 9 6
97
9 8
CHAPTER FIVE
218
the
"complete"
endurance
a c h i e v e ; thus: "let accurate as far
that those e x p e r i e n c i n g mipao\ioq
[ e n d u r a n c e ] h a v e its full e f f e c t . "
as it g o e s , but
p r e c e d i n g o n e , overlooks the
99
must
T h i s r e a d i n g is
it remains t o o general. It t o o , like
significance o f the a p p e a r a n c e o f a
m a n d to " h a v e an ergon" in the
the
com
opening admonition o f a work whose
emphasis o n the soteriological importance o f erga has b e c o m e infamous. The is in
reference to the
"perfect ergon" that e n d u r a n c e is to
fact quite consistent with the
elsewhere in
the
letter. A n
treatment o f the
abstract n o u n is used as
£%eiv epyoc again in 2:17, t h o u g h there the than the
endurance produced by
the
"have"
t h e m e o f erga the
subject
of
subject is faith itself rather
testing o f faith as
in
1:2~4.
100
T h o u g h "faith" is the n o m i n a l subject, the issue, o f course, is nonethe less the
significance
(s)he d o e s n o t v i e w o f the
o f a p e r s o n " h a v i n g faith" (nicxiv
. . . e%eiv) if
also " h a v e " (e%n) erga, as is clear f r o m 2 : 1 4 .
matter is well k n o w n : "faith, if it d o e s n o t
101
James's
h a v e erga, is
d e a d " (2:17). S u c h a nioxiq %copi<; epycov, he p u n s , is dc-epyov, "useless" ( 2 : 2 1 ; cf.
2:26): it
cannot
effect
"righteousness" ( 2 : 2 4 ) ,
102
nor
is
"able to save" (2:14, SUVOCTOCI . . . GCOGOCI). I n d e e d , it is clear f r o m challenge p o s e d to the
" f o o l i s h " interlocutor in 2:18
understands erga to b e the "show me my
faith."
author
tangible manifestation o f a living faith:
y o u r faith apart f r o m
erga, m y
that the
it the
erga, and
I will s h o w y o u ,
out
103
of
104
writing" (James, 74). T h e similarities between Jas 1:2-4, R o m 5:3-5 and 1 Pet 1:6-7 are indeed noteworthy; such similarities, however, should serve to underline, not obscure, the peculiar use o f the imperative in Jas 1:4. So Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 36; cf. Martin, James, 16: "Let endurance yield its complete work." O n t o 8OK{JXIOV in Jas 1:4 as "the instrument or means by which a man is tested (8oKijxd^eTai) and proved ( S o K i j x o q ) , " see Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 3 4 - 3 5 ; more recently Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 47. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 55. Indeed, with further wordplay, the author writes that in the case o f Abraham's offering o f Isaac, faith "worked with" (cov-ripyei) epyot to accomplish righteousness (2:22). It might be noted, in light o f the association o f faith and erga with 7teipao|i6<; in 1:2-4, that Abraham's sacrifice o f Isaac is commonly presented as one—and sometimes the last and greatest—of a series o f "tests" endured by the patriarch; see Jub. 17:15-18:19, and the additional literature discussed by Dibelius, James, 168-70. Note also that Sir 44:20 and 1 M a c e 2:52 both speak o f Abraham's being found faithful ev Tteipaouxp. See further on this point Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 73-74. Contrast Jas 2:17, 26: faith without works is "dead." Jas 2:18 is another well-known crux in the interpretation of James; for a con venient description o f the problem and its various solutions, see S. McKnight, "James 2:18a: T h e Unidentifiable Interlocutor," WTJ 52 (1990) 3 5 5 - 6 4 , esp. 3 5 5 - 5 9 . T o my mind, it is the solution proposed by H. Neitzel ("Eine alte crux interpreturn im Jakobusbrief 2, 18," %m 73 [1982] 286-93) and advocated by Klein (Ein voll9 9
100
101
102
103
104
LOGOS AND DESIRE
219
A challenge quite similar to that p o s e d to the o n e w h o says (s)he has faith in 2:18 is offered to any w h o claim to possess w i s d o m in 3:13:
105
w h o e v e r is "wise and u n d e r s t a n d i n g "
106
is to " s h o w (8EI£(XXCO)
from a g o o d m a n n e r o f living his o r her erga with w i s d o m ' s humil ity (or: "wise humility"; cf. EV T t p a u x r i x i aocpiaq)." It e m e r g e s this passage that the 5:19—20
can
two
"ways" which
the
from
author imagines
also b e c o n c e i v e d as t w o o p p o s i n g
"wisdoms":
in one
w h i c h is "earthly" (eniyeioq), " p s y c h i c " (\|/UXIKT|) and " d e m o n i c " (8ociuovicbSriq) a n d God
o n e w h i c h is " f r o m
(cf. 1:17). H e r e again, e a c h
characteristic set o f actions,
a b o v e " (avcoGev), that is, o f these " w i s d o m s " has
its
from own
c o n c e i v e d as manifestations o f o n e ' s
inner state. T h e jealousy and social discord (C^Xoq KOU EpiGeicc) w h i c h , along with instability (ocKaxaaxaoia) and "every foul d e e d " (new (pauXov 7 t p a y | L L a ) , are the hallmark features o f "earthly" w i s d o m , arise from and are reflections o f " y o u r pleasures w h i c h fight a m o n g y o u r m e m bers."
107
T h u s o n e w h o s e pursuit o f pleasure reveals h i m o r her
to
b e a "friend o f the w o r l d " and near to the Devil (4:4, 8) manifests, in a c o r r e s p o n d i n g m a n n e r , at best a w i s d o m w h i c h is "earthly" and "demonic." The
" w i s d o m from a b o v e , " o n the other h a n d , is
ethic that corresponds
to the law laid d o w n b y G o d , and
terizes those w h o are friends o f G o d .
1 0 8
the
charac
N o t surprisingly, it is asso
c i a t e d particularly c l o s e l y with " h u m i l i t y " (cf. 3:13: EV rcpccuxrixi aocpiaq).
109
It is characterized as "peaceful"
(3:17, EiprrviKri; cf. 3:18)
rather than b y discord, and b y " g o o d fruits" rather than "every foul
kommenes Werk, 70-72) and others (see ibid., 72 n. 184) which is the most satisfying. O n this interpretation, the rebuttal o f the xxc, consists only in oi) niaxxv &%£\q, and is read interrogatively; thus: "But someone will say, 'do you have faith?' A n d I [will say], 'I have works. Show me your faith apart from works, and I will show my faith from my works'." It is generally agreed in any case that the "show me your faith" sentence is to be understood as a statement in the voice o f the author him self; see McKnight, "James 2:18a," 360. It is evident from the reprimand not to "boast" and lie KCXTCX xfjq aXrfiziaq in 3:14 that the author has in mind one w h o would make oneself out to be aocpoq m i £7ticrrr|ucov while not exhibiting proper ethical behavior, just as he deals with "some one" (xi<;) w h o claims (Aiyei) to have faith but does not have epya in 2:14-26. 106 p ^ f phrase oo90(; Kai £7Cioxr|ucov, cf. esp. Deut 1:13, 15, where it applies to the leaders o f Israel's tribes (cf. Jas 1:1!). Jas 4:1; cf. esp. 4:2, C,r\kox>xe, with 3:14 and 3:16, £fjAxx;. See further on a m i c c o xocoioc below, pp. 229ff. Note also in this connection the author's assumption o f a sort o f "unity o f vices" in 3:16: where there is £fjA,o<; Kai epiGeia, there is &KOCTCXOxacia and nav cpavXov jcpcxyua; cf. with this the legal principle stated in Jas 2:10, on which see O'Rourke Boyle, "The Stoic Paradox o f James 2:10." Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 1 5 4 - 6 1 ; cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 287. Cf. esp. 1:21: ev npax\xr\x\ O E ^ O C O G E T O V ejicp'OTov Xoyov. Note further the gen eral emphasis on humility elsewhere in the letter: 1:9-11; 4:6, 9 - 1 0 ; 5:1. 105
o r
107
108
109
u
s
e
Q
t
n
e
CHAPTER FIVE
220 d e e d " ( 3 : 1 6 - 1 7 ) . In
short, it manifests itself in
w h i c h , interestingly, is consistently used b y the tive sense o f " g o o d w o r k s " rather than its "works."
1 1 0
T h u s the
challenge o f 3:13:
erga ( 3 : 1 3 ) — a term a u t h o r with a posi
usual neutral sense
of
o n e ' s inner state necessarily
manifests itself externally; it is simply not possible to h a v e w i s d o m — that is, the In
both
" w i s d o m f r o m a b o v e " — w i t h o u t also h a v i n g erga. 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 (esp.
2:18)
and
3:13,
necessary external manifestations o f an variously as "the
111
H e r e the
faith.
The
say
t h o u g h t is quite similar
in
a u t h o r is c o n c e r n e d specifically with rceipocauoq,
w h i c h is u n d e r s t o o d to b e "the xf|<; nicxecdq).
the
w i s d o m f r o m a b o v e , " o r a living, w h i c h is to
s o t e r i o l o g i c a l l y efficacious, 1:2—4.
then, erga e m e r g e as
inner disposition t h o u g h t o f
testing o f faith" (1:3, TO 8OK(JIIOV . . .
S u c h a test o f o n e ' s faith, he
suggests, is to b e
positively, for it represents the opportunity to achieve the
viewed
"endurance"
(i)7co|xovf|v) w h i c h , it is subsequently p o i n t e d out, will lead ultimately to "blessedness" and h o w e v e r , the
"the
c r o w n o f life" (1:3; 1:12).
e n d u r a n c e that can
result from the
112
Like faith itself,
"testing o f faith"
in a situation o f rceipocauoq must also "have a perfect ergon"; it must manifest itself, that is, in results f r o m
110
the
a good work.
endurance
1 1 3
The
"perfect w o r k " that
o f 7i£ipaa|i6<; contrasts with the
"sin"
See 1:4, 25; 2:14-26; 3:13. Thus my hesitance to render this term simply as "works" or "deeds." Cf. the use o f Ttpayjioc as the corresponding negative generic term in 3:16, and a f x a p x i a in, e.g., 1:15. James's consistently positive use o f the term epyoc is likely to be correlated with his interest in refuting a position that f| T U O T K ; Xcopiq TCOV epycov can "save" (Jas 2:14-26). Cf. Johnson, Letter of James, 178; also Ropes, St. James, 137. Klein considers 2:14-16 "als Verteidigung des Themas von 1,2-4 gegen eine andere Auffassung des Verhaltnisses von Glauben und Werken" (Ein vollkommenes Werk, 69). H e too, therefore, interprets the xekeiov e p y o v with reference to "das konkrete Tun," but presses for an interpretation o f the singular e p y o v in the collective sense o f "das 'Lebenswerk' eines Menschen," i.e., that which one will ultimately have to show for oneself at the eschatological judgment (Ein vollkommenes Werk, 55-56). Though Klein can cite analogies from other early Christian works, such a usage o f e p y o v would be peculiar in James (cf. esp. the use o f the singular in 1:25). M o r e impor tantly, this interpretation seems to me to underestimate the extent o f the contrast between failing in a given instance o f Tieipaajioq and thus effecting "sin" (1:14-15) and enduring in such a circumstance and having an e p y o v (1:2-4). Cf. further 5:11: " W e consider as blessed (|iaKap{£o|iev) those who endure (xovq VTiojiewavtaq)," citing as examples "the prophets w h o spoke in the name o f the Lord" and J o b . O n the sense in which the prophets can be considered mod els o f endurance, cf. Matt 5:12 par. Luke 6:23; Matt 23:29-36 par. Luke 11:47-51; Matt 23:37 par. Luke 13:34. Note that in the immediately following l:5ff, the problem addressed is one in which someone lacks wisdom—which wisdom, as we have seen, manifests itself in erga (3:13), just as does a soteriologically efficacious faith. 111
112
113
LOGOS AND DESIRE
221
(ajiocpxioc) p r o d u c e d w h e n o n e succumbs to rceipaauog (1:15), just as the "death" to w h i c h such a failure leads contrasts with the " c r o w n o f life" received b y the o n e w h o endures (1:15; cf. 1:12).
114
The
description o f such an ergon as "perfect" (xetaiov), besides serving this contrastive purpose, anticipates the consistendy positive use o f the term epyoc throughout the remainder o f the letter. In sum, an action w h i c h results from the pursuit o f o n e ' s o w n desire—like that w h i c h results from transgressing the "law o f free d o m " (2:9)—is described as "sin" (1:13, ajiocpxioc), just as those w h o pursue pleasure and travel the w a y o f death are "sinners" (auapxcoAxn, -ov, 4:8; 5:20). T h e o n e w h o does erga, in contrast, is o n e w h o s e constant attention to "the perfect law o f f r e e d o m " renders h i m o r her not a "forgetful hearer" o f the logos that "saves souls," but
a
"hearer" w h o is also a " d o e r . " A s w e have seen, while this logos is "able to save (8uvdu£vov acoaai) y o u r souls," it is only through " d o i n g " that o n e b e c o m e s so "blessed" (1:25; cf. 1:12). T h u s t o o , faith is not "able to save" (8uvaxoci. . . acoaai) apart from erga (2:14): faith itself, like the " e n d u r a n c e " w h i c h its "testing" is to p r o d u c e , must "have erga" if it is to b e soteriologically effectual. F o r the author o f J a m e s , in short, h u m a n actions—whether " g o o d fruits" (3:17) o r "foul deeds" (3:16)—are c o n c r e t e and necessary manifestations
o f one's inner dis
position. Erga are inseparably linked to logos and the " w i s d o m from a b o v e , " just as the jealousy, strife and, m o r e generally, "sin" w h i c h arise from desire inevitably signal the presence o f that w i s d o m w h i c h is "earthly" and " d e m o n i c " ( 3 : 1 3 - 1 8 ) .
ENDURING TEMPTATION
A contrast e m e r g e s in Jas
1:2-4,
12 a n d
significance o f e n d u r i n g rceipaauoq a n d endure.
115
1:14-15
between
that o f the failure
E n d u r a n c e o f any given instance o f the diverse
the
t o so
rceipaauoi
h u m a n s face will manifest itself in a "perfect w o r k " and will ulti mately b e rewarded b y "the c r o w n o f life," while the failure to with stand rceipaauoq results in "sin," and places o n e o n the path toward "death." This contrast renders questionable
1 1 4
the v i e w ,
popular
Cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 85. Cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 45: " V . 13-18 nimmt dann nicht auf V . 12 allein Bezug, sondern ebenso auf V . 2 - 4 , wofiir auch die ahnliche Gestaltung spricht (Kettenreihen in V . 3f und V . 14f)." 1 1 5
222
CHAPTER FIVE
particularly in the wake o f Dibelius's e n o r m o u s l y influential mentary, that the term with entirely different
rceipaauoc; referents.
is used in 1:2-4,
com
12 a n d
1:14-15
Dibelius argued that "the
tempta
tions w h o s e origins are discussed in 1:13-15 are n o t the 'trials' in 1:2 o v e r w h i c h o n e is supposed to rejoice; while these must b e dan gers f r o m without,
1:13-15
deals with dangers o f the inner life";
indeed, "the seduction b y the lusts in w
1 3 - 1 5 has nothing what
soever to d o with the afflictions in v 12 [and 1 : 2 - 4 ] . "
1 1 6
T h i s posi
tion o w e s m o r e to Dibelius's general literary evaluation o f the letter as a "treasury" o f unrelated traditions o f diverse origins, linked
at
most b y c a t c h w o r d c o n n e c t i o n , than it d o e s to any consistent dis tinction d r a w n b e t w e e n "dangers f r o m without" and "dangers o f the inner life" in the ancient literature. T h e author o f 4 Maccabees,
for
e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r e d the quite external torture suffered b y the Jewish martyrs at the hands o f A n t i o c h u s to b e the ultimate p r o o f o f rea son's d o m i n a n c e o v e r the p a s s i o n s .
117
T h e rceipaopoi o f Jas
1:2-4
are
in any case said to b e "diverse" (rcondAoi), a n d thus include a range o f experiences. Jas diverse?)
rceipaGjuoi,
1:13-15
speaks n o t to a different
set o f (also
but seeks rather to locate the ultimate cause o f
all the various forms o f 7teipaau6<; in h u m a n desire. I n d e e d , for the author o f J a m e s it is the desire for s o m e p e r c e i v e d external desider atum that o p e n s the d o o r to the pleasures w h i c h w a r within
the
individual: the p o w e r o f desire lies precisely in its ability to deceive o n e that s o m e " g o o d gift" c a n b e obtained t h r o u g h its pursuit.
118
In fact, the p r o m i s e in 1:4 that those w h o e n d u r e Tceipaajnoi will b e "perfect
and
w h o l e , lacking in n o t h i n g "
(xeA,eioi K a i 6^0KX,npoi e v
pn8evi A,eui6|ievoi), far f r o m b e i n g a r e d u n d a n t a n d string o f s y n o n y m s ,
119
platitudinous
enumerates the specific results o f enduring the
temptation o f desire as presented throughout the letter.
1 1 6
Dibelius, James, 71, 90; Jas 1:12, on the other hand, "obviously belongs to the theme touched upon in 1:2-4" (ibid., 88). Dibelius is criticized by Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 4 6 - 4 7 and 8 2 - 8 5 . O n 4 Maccabees, see Chapter Three. Cf. further p . 150 n. 66. See on this above, pp. 2 0 0 - 2 0 7 . By way o f illustration o f this connection between "external" circumstances and "internal" struggles, one might imagine a sit uation in which a wealthy landowner withholds the wages owed to a laborer (cf. Jas 5:4). T h e resulting economic strain on the laborer might lead to a "test o f faith" vis-a-vis God's providence, and to questions regarding the wisdom o f relying solely upon prayer for acquiring needed things. Note in this connection, in fact, the author's characteristic concern for economic issues. So, in effect, Dibelius, James, 74. 1 1 7
1 1 8
1 1 9
LOGOS AND DESIRE
223
6X6KXT)PO<; A c c o r d i n g to Dibelius, while the term 6A,6KA,TIPO<; " p r o p e r l y designates the external intactness o f the physical b o d y , o r s o m e o t h e r similar c o n c r e t e n o t i o n , " the author o f J a m e s "quite o b v i o u s l y " uses it with a m o r e abstract sense o f " b l a m e l e s s . " of
"wholeness,"
121
120
Its m o r e usual c o n n o t a t i o n
h o w e v e r , is in fact quite a p p r o p r i a t e in the
con
text o f J a m e s . A s w e h a v e seen, those w h o give in t o desire b e c o m e subject to an inner division w h i c h the a u t h o r characterizes as " y o u r passions w a r r i n g within y o u r m e m b e r s " (4:1). Particularly significant in
this c o n n e c t i o n is his description o f such p e o p l e as 8i\|/u%oi w h o
must "cleanse their hearts" ( 4 : 8 ) — p r e s u m a b l y o f the pleasures w h o s e wars inevitably spill o v e r into inter-human
relationships.
122
James's
characteristic use o f the t e r m 8i\|/u%o<;, " d o u b l e - s o u l e d , " to d e s c r i b e those w h o s e faith in G o d ' s p r o v i d e n c e wavers ( 1 : 6 - 8 ) , o r w h o indulge their w a r r i n g pleasures ( 4 : 8 ) , given
his a s s u m p t i o n
123
is in fact
o f a fundamental
quite vivid a n d opposition
i m p l a n t e d logos a n d h u m a n desire within the i n d i v i d u a l .
120
concrete
between
the
124
Ibid. See W . Foerster, vXrypoq, YLXX, TDJVT 3.766-67. Cf. with the demand that 5i\|ru%oi "purify" (ayvioaxe) their hearts (4:8) also the description o f the "wisdom from above" as "above all ayvf|" (3:17). Note in addition the typical contrast between 8i\|A)%ia o n one hand and purity and whole ness in other early Christian literature; see O . J. F. Seitz, "Antecedents and Signification o f the T e r m A I ^ Y X O I , " JBL 66 (1947) 2 1 1 - 1 9 . These characteristics o f the 8i\|ro%o<; are two sides o f a coin: it is a lack o f faith in God's providence which opens the door to the temptation o f seeking the satisfaction o f one's o w n desires. T h e origins o f the concept o f the 8{\|n)%o<;—which term is not found prior to James, the Shepherd of Hernias, 1 & 2 Clement and the Epistle of Barnabas—are often sought in Jewish thought, esp. in the concept o f the g o o d and evil "inclinations"; see esp. Seitz's series o f articles o n the term: "Relationship o f the Shepherd o f Hermas to the Epistle o f James," JBL 63 (1944) 131-40; "Antecedents and Significa tion o f the T e r m A I ^ Y X O I " ; and "Afterthoughts on the T e r m 'Dipsychos'," JVTS 4 (1957-58) 3 2 7 - 3 4 ; also W . I. Wolverton, " T h e Double-Minded M a n in the Light o f Essene Psychology," ^477? 38 (1956) 166-75; cf. Tsuji, Glaube, 102f. See against this view and in favor o f Greek philosophical influence, however, Ropes, Epistle of St. James, 156; more recently Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 9 0 - 9 1 , w h o , moreover, raises the possiblity that the rabbinic concept itself was influenced by Greek thought. Whatever the case, one can say at the very least that the concept takes o n a dis tinctly "philosophical" coloring in James, where E7ci9t>|Li{a functions primarily in o p p o sition to 6 euxpt)To<; Xoyoq. Cf. in this respect the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: a contrast between anX6xr\q and being 5utp6cco7to<; which recalls James figures promi nently in this work, the "two spirits" ethic o f which is informed by Stoic ethics. See further H . C . K e e , " T h e Ethical Dimensions o f the Testaments o f the X I I as a Clue to their Provenance," JVTS 24 (1978) 2 5 9 - 7 0 ; and for a broad yet concise 121
1 2 2
123
1 2 4
224
CHAPTER FIVE:
xeXeioq The
sense in w h i c h o n e w h o endures rcEipocouoc; will b e
"perfect"
(xeJieioq), o n the other h a n d , is best u n d e r s t o o d in light o f 3:2, w h e r e the "perfect m a n " (xe^eioq dvrip) is described as o n e w h o is "able to bridle his w h o l e b o d y . "
1 2 5
erga, this identification
o f the xiXzioq specifically as o n e w h o d o e s
G i v e n James's characteristic emphasis o n
not fail with respect to s p e e c h — w h o does not "stumble," that is, ev Xoyco (3:2)—is quite r e m a r k a b l e . d e p e n d s o n an endurance
126
In
1:4 the p r o m i s e o f perfection
o f 7ieipao|Li6<; w h i c h manifests
itself in a
"perfect ergon." M o r e o v e r , b o t h this definition o f the "perfect in
cisely b e t w e e n t w o passages w h i c h insist o n the critical of
man"
3:2 a n d J a m e s ' s general discussion o f the t o n g u e are f o u n d pre importance
erga: 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 and 3:13. H o w , then, c a n he say that "perfection"
results from controlling o n e ' s speech? B e h i n d James's identification o f the xekewq as o n e w h o is perfect in
speech lies a n important presupposition
regarding
the
tongue's
relation to the rest o f the b o d y . T h e tongue, it is said, is "set u p " ( K a 0 i o T o c T a i ) a m o n g o u r m e m b e r s (Jas
in
3:6).
127
T h e use o f Ka0{aTn|LU
this context has at times b e e n considered a curiosity, for it is a
v e r b w h i c h often c o n n o t e s the conferring o f a u t h o r i t y .
128
Seen within
the w i d e r context o f J a m e s 3, though, the c h o i c e o f this term is entirely
appropriate.
In
3:4, this "small m e m b e r "
(cf. 3:5,
uiKpov
\iekoq) a m o n g o u r other " m e m b e r s " (cf. 3:6, E V xdiq juitaaiv fipcov) is
comparison o f the two works, Johnson, The Letter of James, 4 3 - 4 6 ; idem, "James 3:13-4:10 and the Topos nEPI O0ONOY," 3 4 1 - 4 7 . T h e theme o f perfection in James is discussed at length by P. J. du Plessis, TEAEIOI: The Idea of Perfection in the New Testament (Kampen: K o k , 1959) 2 3 3 - 4 0 ; P.J. Hartin, "Call to Be Perfect through Suffering (James 1,2-4). T h e Concept o f Perfection in the Epistle o f James and the Sermon on the Mount," Bib 11 (1996) 4 7 7 - 9 2 ; and most recently by Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 5 4 - 8 1 . Note that Klein interprets Jas 3:2 in light o f 1:4 (esp. ev ^ir|5evi ^eutouevoi) rather than, as here, 1:4 in light o f 3:2; see ibid., 79. Equally remarkable is the fact that the apparent oddity o f this identification in the context of James generally goes entirely without notice in the commentaries. A welcome exception in this respect is Johnson, The Letter of James, 256: " T h e use of teleios ('perfect') is somewhat startling. . . Can James seriously think that 'perfec tion in speech' can make a person perfect?" O n the notoriously difficult Jas 3:6, see the discussion o f Dibelius, James, 193-98. Whatever its relation to 6 Koajioq xfj<; dSndou;, however, it is clear that fi yX&oca is the subject o f KaG{atr|(xi. See the entry on KaOicrrn|ii in B A G D : doubt is expressed there regarding the correctness o f the text of James at this point, despite the fact that the manuscripts are quite consistent in this respect. 125
126
127
128
LOGOS AND DESIRE
likened to fore,
the
rudder o f a
is critical for
taint "the
ship.
129
c o n t r o l l i n g "the
225
C o n t r o l o f o n e ' s s p e e c h , there whole body." The
tongue
can
w h o l e b o d y " (3:6, r\ anxXovaa oXov TO OCGUXX); thus, just
as
o n e places bridles into horses' m o u t h s in o r d e r to lead their " w h o l e body"
(3:3,
oXov TO acopa), so t o o ,
taSytpis "able to bridle [his o r her] The
close c o n n e c t i o n assumed b y the
speech and and
one
c o n t r o l o f the
who
d o e s not
" s t u m b l e " ev
w h o l e b o d y " (3:2, oAov TO a S p c c ) .
130
author between control o f
w h o l e b o d y is remarkable. Baker's recent
quite extensive m o n o g r a p h o n "personal s p e e c h ethics" in J a m e s
fails to
l o c a t e any
little n e w
light o n
good
p r e c e d e n t s for
the
this aspect o f J a m e s 3 .
notion, and
131
The
thus sheds
connection,
how
ever, is quite well u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the close relationship b e t w e e n h u m a n reason (Xoyoq) and course considered
the
a u t h o r o f J a m e s to b e
s p e e c h posited b y
perfect
self c o n t r o l
enjoyed
only by
the
Stoics
1 3 2
—who
envisioned here b y
those w h o
lived in
accord
with "right r e a s o n . " Particularly n o t e w o r t h y in this c o n n e c t i o n is i m a g e o f the
h e l m s m a n in Jas
3:4. T h e
r u d d e r , w h i c h is said to g u i d e the the
1 2 9
one
steering it
133
the
t o n g u e is likened to a ship's
ship in
(TOU euGuvovToq).
of the
a c c o r d with the 6pur| o f
While
rare in
the
earliest
As has often been observed, the figures o f ships and rudders (3:4) and horses and bridle (3:3) are commonplace among the hellenistic moralists, and often used precisely in connection with speech; see esp. the discussion and references in Dibelius, James, 186-90, and further D . F. Watson, "The Rhetoric o f James 3:1-12 and a Classical Pattern o f Argumentation," NovT 35 (1993) 58. Jas 3:2-3; cf. further 1:26, where the author speaks o f "bridling the tongue." Klein considers the term xoc^ivocycDyeiv, which is found only in these passages o f James in the N T , to be o f Stoic origin; see Ein vollkommenes Werk, 78 and n. 224. W . R . Baker, Personal Speech-Ethics in the Epistle of James ( W U N T 2 / 6 8 ; Tubingen: M o h r [Siebeck], 1995) esp. 123-38. J. L. P. Wolmarans points in the direction o f Stoicism in his "The Tongue Guiding the Body: The Anthropological Presuppositions of James 3:1-12," Neotestamentica 26 (1992) 5 2 3 - 3 0 . However, he thinks primarily o f a view o f '"the word' as the steering mechanism o f an audience," as expressed in Plutarch, Quomodo adolescens poetas 33. Noting that "[t]his passage views 'the w o r d ' as the steering mechanism o f an audience, and not the tongue as the steering mech anism o f the body, as James has it," Wolmarans concludes that "James either mis understood Stoic teaching in this regard, or, more probably, understood it creatively" (ibid., 528). L. T . J o h n s o n notes that "the best parallel to James' assertion concerning the 'perfection' o f someone w h o controls speech" is found in Philo, Post. C. 88 and Migr. Abr. 73, but does not elucidate this comparison; see "Taciturnity and True Religion: James 1:26-27," Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (ed. D . L. Balch et ai; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) 3 2 9 - 3 9 , esp. 330 n. 9; and cf. idem, Letter of James, 256. For discussion o f these passages, see below. This aspect o f Stoic thought deserves fuller attention than can be given to it here. At present, I simply sketch the direction in which a more systematic investi gation might proceed. Note Philo's frequent use o f the term evBuvco in this connection, e.g., in Abr. 1 3 0
131
1 3 2
1 3 3
CHAPTER FIVE
226 Christian literature, writers," For
the
134
the
t e r m 6pur| is " c o m m o n in classical
Greek
a n d p l a y e d a crucial role in the Stoic t h e o r y o f action.
Stoics,
6pur| d e n o t e s
the
"impulse" with w h i c h
all
action
ultimately originates, a n d w h i c h , in rational a n i m a l s , takes the f o r m o f v e r b a l (though o f course n o t spoken) c o m m a n d s issued b y one's 135
logos. will
I f one's logos is n o t "right" (bpQoq), the c o m m a n d s it issues
not
c o n f o r m to those
o f the
divine
l a w , a n d one's
actions, therefore, will n o t b e characterized b y v i r t u e . The
resulting
136
relation o f uttered speech to the internal s p e e c h o f the logos
was c o n s i d e r e d to b e o f the m o s t intimate order. Philo speaks n u m e r o u s occasions nection,
o f the
drawing on 137
HpocpopiKoq Xoyoq.
the
The
"two-fold" nature o f logos in this
Stoic
distinction
on
con
b e t w e e n ev8id0£xoq a n d
f o r m e r is l o c a t e d in the c o m m a n d i n g fac
ulty (TO fiyeuoviKov) a n d the latter in "the t o n g u e a n d m o u t h a n d the rest
o f the
vocal
organism"
cpcovfjc; o p y a v o r c o u a ) .
138
(yX&xxa
in a m a n n e r reminiscent o f Jas "outflow."
139
The
K a i O T O j i a K a i r\ aXXr\
rcaaa
T h e relationship b e t w e e n the t w o is c o n c e i v e d ,
t w o divisions
3 : 1 1 , as o n e o f "spring" (Trnyn) a n d o f speech
are such, h o w e v e r ,
that
o n e c a n h a v e strengths with respect to o n e o f t h e m , b u t n o t in the other: "the so-called sophists," for e x a m p l e , "have s h o w n great abil ity in e x p o u n d i n g t h e m e s , a n d yet b e e n m o s t evil thinkers," while others
"reason
thought."
140
excellently,
but
find
speech
a b a d interpreter
of
Perfection (f| TeXeioTn^), a c c o r d i n g to Philo, d e p e n d s "on
b o t h divisions o f logos, the reason w h i c h suggests the ideas with clear ness
(KaGapccx;), a n d the
speech
which
gives
unfailing
(anxaicTtoq)
70; Leg. All. 3.224; also Conf. Ling. 115, where the image o f the helmsman, more over, is used in combination with that o f charioteer. See the additional passages cited in G . Mayer, Index Philoneus (Berlin and N e w York: de Gruyter, 1974) s.v. It is perhaps noteworthy that this term is found elsewhere in the N T only in John 1:23, and here in a "quotation" o f Isa 40:3 (though cf. L X X Isa 40:3). Ropes, St. James, 230, w h o also notes that the term does not appear in James's sense in the L X X . O n the Stoic understanding o f 6p|xr|, see B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, and above, pp. 37f. Note that a—indeed, perhaps the—key issue is the recognition o f what is " g o o d " in the true Stoic sense o f the term; see Chapter T w o , and cf. in this light the discussion o f 1:16-17 above. See esp. Mos. 2.127-130 and Migr. Abr. 7 0 - 7 3 . Mos. 2.127; cf. Migr. Abr. 71, where 8iavoia rather than TO Tryeuovucov is given as the realm o f £v8ia0£io<; Xoyoq. Migr. Abr. 71; Mos. 127; see also Somn. 2.281, and also the description o f speech as the "interpreter" o f thought in Migr. Abr. 72, with which cf. Cicero, De Leg. 30. Migr. Abr. 72; an analogous critique o f the sophists is found at Post. C. 86. 1 3 4
1 3 5
1 3 6
1 3 7
138
139
140
227
LOGOS AND DESIRE
expression to t h e m . "
141
T h a t is to say, it is the o n e w h o manages to
bring " s p e e c h (Aoyov) into h a r m o n y with intent (8iavo(oc), a n d intent with d e e d (epycp)" w h o is to b e c o n s i d e r e d
142
xzkzioq.
S o intimately related are these t w o aspects o f logos that Philo else w h e r e identifies c o n t r o l o f speech as the key for putting "the w h o l e soul" (xfiv oA,r|v \|/u%r|v) at rest. Interpreting E x o d 2 8 : 3 0 , Philo asserts that "the
Sacred W o r d k n o w i n g h o w strong is the impulse (6pur|)
o f either passion, o f b o t h high spirit (Gujuou) a n d lust (eTuGuuraq), puts a c u r b o n e a c h o f them, b y setting o v e r t h e m reason (xov Xoyov) as a charioteer
and pilot" (Leg. All.
3.118). H e thus interprets the
" o r a c l e " (TO AxSyiov) referred to in L X X E x o d 28:30 as "the o r g a n o f speech, w h i c h is the uttered w o r d , " pointing out that the
descrip
tion o f it as "the oracle o f j u d g m e n t " shows that M o s e s thinks par ticularly o f the spoken w o r d w h i c h is "well tested a n d rather than o n e simply "spoken at r a n d o m . "
1 4 3
examined"
H a v i n g identified the
U r i m and the T h u m m i m as the t w o virtues o f this w o r d , n a m e l y clearness and truthfulness,
144
he g o e s o n to discuss the
importance
o f controlling o n e ' s speech: It says, then, that the tested word, having the virtues which are pecu liarly its own, was enthroned upon the breast (Aaron's namely), that is, upon the spirited element (xov Qv\iov), that it might first o f all be guided by reason (^oyco), and not injured by its own irrationality; in the next place by clearness, for it is not the nature o f anger to be a friend o f clearness. D o we not see in those who are enraged how not their understanding (r\ 5iavoioc) only but their words (xa p n j u a T a ) also are full o f disturbance and confusion? . . . It must be guided in the third place by truthfulness, for together with its other faults anger has this one also as peculiarly its own, that o f lying. As a matter o f expe rience, o f those who give way to this passion, hardly one speaks the truth. . . . These are the antidotes for the region of anger (xov G D J L U K O I ) j n e p c u q ) : 1 4 5
reason (Xoyoq),
clearness of speech (accept veicc Xoyov),
truth of speech
(aXi\Qzia
avxov). For the three are virtually one, since reason, accompanied by the two virtues o f truthfulness and distinctness, acts as a healer o f anger, that sore sickness o f the s o u l . . . If high spirit (6 G-ujuoq) be trained in this manner . . . it will not only rid itself o f much ferment, but will render the whole soul (xr\v oXv\v \|/i)%r|v)
141
142
143
144
1
gentle. ^
Migr. Abr. 73. Poster. C. 88; on the use ofSiocvoiocin this connection, see above note 138. Leg. All. 3.119. Leg. All. 3.120. For this distinction cf. esp. Migr. Abr. 71; cf. further Leg. All. 3.120ff. Leg. All. 3.123-24, 28.
228
CHAPTER FIVE
T h o u g h Philo stops short o f explicitly equating control o f the tongue with control o f "the w h o l e b o d y " (pXov TO acojaa), his v i e w that truth fulness
a n d clarity o f s p e e c h is the starting p o i n t in
gentle "the w h o l e soul" (TUV o^nv \\fv%i\v) presents
rendering
a m u c h closer
a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f the thought o f J a m e s than any o f the other c o m parative
materials w h i c h h a v e p r e v i o u s l y b e e n a d d u c e d in this
respect. F o r Philo, this v i e w is based o n the Stoic distinction b e tween ev8i(i9eTO<; and TipocpopiKoq Xoyoq, the latter o f w h i c h is located in the tongue a n d the other organs o f speech. If the author o f James's view that o n e w h o s e speech is perfect is himself o r herself xiXeioq seems, o n the face o f it, rather starkly at o d d s with b o t h the emphasis o n erga that characterizes the letter in general
147
and the p r o m i s e o f perfection to the o n e w h o s e endurance
o f 7t£ipaauo<; manifests itself in a "perfect ergon" in 1:4 in particular, his emphasis o n speech here and elsewhere in the letter is readily understandable
in light o f the intimate relationship between speech
and the h u m a n logos posited b y the Stoics. It is especially n o t e w o r thy in this c o n n e c t i o n that while "the t o n g u e " recurs as the
main
subject o f Jas 3:2—12, the xkXzxoq w h o is able to control "the w h o l e b o d y " is identified not as o n e w h o is flawless with respect to r\ yX&aaa, but specifically as o n e w h o doesn't "stumble" ev Aoycp.
148
This is in
fact the only o c c u r r e n c e o f logos in J a m e s apart from 1:18 and the subsequent treatment o f the implanted logos in 1:21 and 1:22~25. It will b e recalled, m o r e o v e r , that these latter t w o references e a c h elab orate an element o f the three-part a d m o n i t i o n o f 1:19, the remain ing element o f w h i c h , "slow to speak," is elaborated b y a charge that the apparent religiosity o f o n e w h o does not "bridle the t o n g u e " (jLif| %aXivaycoySv yX&ooav) is "useless" (1:26). If, then, James's inter est in the t o n g u e is u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the close association between h u m a n
reason and speech posited b y the Stoics, each o f
the elements o f the elaboration o f 1 : 1 9 - 2 7 — w h i c h is itself, as w e have seen, presented as an ethical inference drawn from 1:13-18 (cf. 1:18, Xoyoq aXr\Qeiaq)—would
147
thus center o n the implanted
149
logos.
Note esp. the fact that immediately following this exposition o f the tongue, the true Goyoq (cf. 3:1, 8i8daKaA,o<;) is identified as one w h o has erga. Cf. the use o f nxaito to connote a transgression o f the law o f freedom in the statement o f the general legal principle in 2:10. Note in this connection the view, espoused in different forms by E. Pfeiffer ("Der Zusammenhang des Jakobusbriefes," TOT23 [1850] 163-80) and H . J . Cladder ("Die Anlage des Jakobusbriefes," £ A T 2 8 [1904] 37-57), that the three-part admo1 4 8
1 4 9
LOGOS AND DESIRE
T h i s w o u l d s e e m to interpretation. In
any
p r o v i d e a rather striking c o n f i r m a t i o n
event, the
a u t h o r considers c o n t r o l o f the 151
The
"unstable evil" (dicaxdaxaxov KOCKOV), and p o i s o n " (3:8).
L i k e n e d to
fires o f " G e h e n n a , "
at
1 5 2
the
h u m a n b e i n g o f the the
t o n g u e to
be
t o n g u e itself is called
an
said to b e
a flame w h i c h is itself lit
"the
bridling "the
1:27:
is that w h i c h 153
(cf.
3:8, dicaxdaxaxov) t o n g u e
dKocxaaxaaioc which, found wherever one
strife w h i c h the
acnikov);
ity," who,
"earthly" and
o r her
"stains"
thus c o n t r o l
who
a the
contrasts sharply w i t h
the
finds the j e a l o u s y a n d
social
hallmark features o f
"demonic."
1 5 4
Such
w e have seen, is precisely that w h i c h characterizes the w a v e r i n g in his
very
"tames"
pleasures inspire, is a m o n g the
that w i s d o m w h i c h is
the
whole b o d y " (3:2-3). Such
c o m p l e t e self-mastery as is e n j o y e d b y the xekewq unstable
from
v e r y "defilement" w h o s e a v o i d a n c e stands
w h o l e b o d y " (3:6; cf.
o f s p e e c h is critical for
"full o f d e a d l y
t o n g u e represents a p r i m a r y c o n d u i t into
heart o f "true religion" (1:26—27). It
(GKIXOVGO)
o f this
150
crucial, if extraordinarily difficult.
the
229
"instabil 8{\|n)%o<;
faith in G o d ' s p r o v i d e n c e , is "unstable
nition o f Jas 1:19 provides an organizing principle for the Letter o f James as a whole. This suggestion deserves closer consideration than is normally given to it. Incidentally, one might note in this connection, in addition to the several fea tures o f Jas 3:1-12 pointed out in the preceding discussion as being especially typical o f the hellenistic moralists, the very Greek distinction made in Jas 3:7-8 between "human nature" and the "natures" o f various other animals. For Stoics (but, o f course, among the Greeks not only the Stoics), this distinction was made on the basis o f the human possession o f logos, which, among other things, made speech possible. As is often noted, there is a certain tension between the author's notion that the religion o f anyone w h o can't control his or her tongue is "useless" and his pes simistic view that "no one is able to tame the tongue" (Jas 3:8). Is the religion o f everyone, therefore, "useless"? At least one o f these statements (if not both) must be considered hyperbolic, and it seems to me doubtful that 3:7-8 was intended as a statement o f the theoretical impossibility o f controlling the tongue. Note in this con nection 3:10-11, esp. 3:10b: ox> xpn, a8etapoi pov, Tonka omwq yiveaGai; cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 79. For Johnson (Letter of James, 265) this reference to Gehenna conjures up the specter o f the Devil; this connection is rejected by Klein, who prefers to describe the tongue, in James, as "Instrument der bosen £,niQx>\iia"; see Ein vollkommenes Werk, 103-106. Regardless o f the relation o f Gehenna to the Devil, it is clear from 4:7 that this latter figure has some connection with desire. Note also the association—however, precisely, it is to be interpreted—of the tongue with 6 Koo\ioq xr\q dSiidocq in 3:6; cf. the consistently bleak assessment o f 6 K6O~|lIO<; in Jas 1:27 (associated with impurity) and 4:6 (associated with desire, enmity with G o d , and the devil). Jas 3:16: onox> yap t,r\koq K a i epiGeia, E K E I a K a T o c a T a a i a ; cf. 4:1-3. T h e con trast between xeXzioq and a K a T a c r c a T o q in James is also noted by Klein, Ein voll kommenes Werk, 106. 1 5 0
151
1 5 2
1 5 3
1 5 4
CHAPTER FIVE
230
(dKocxdaxccxo<;)
in all his o r her w a y s , " a n d is thus c o m p a r a b l e to a
" w a v e o f the sea b e i n g b l o w n a n d tossed b y the w i n d "
(1:6-8).
1 5 5
ev jir]8evi Xeino^ievoi In contrast to the "unstable" 5i\\fx>xoq w h o should not expect to "receive anything f r o m the L o r d " (1:7), finally, those w h o e n d u r e 7ieipaauo<; will b e "lacking in n o t h i n g " (1:4, ev ur|oevi tauc6|H£voi). O n c e
again,
this statement c a n also b e a p p l i e d to the Stoic sage. T h e phrase is particularly reminiscent o f Aristotle's discussion o f the highest w h i c h he identifies
as " h a p p i n e s s "
(euScciuovia) i n a s m u c h
good,
as it is
"final" o r "perfect" (xeA,eicc) a b o v e all else, since " w e always c h o o s e it for its o w n sake a n d n e v e r as a m e a n s to s o m e t h i n g e l s e . " "perfect"
o r "final" g o o d
156
(TO xe^eiov dyocGov), he says, "must
The be
a
thing sufficient in itself" (ocuxapKe<;); a n d b e i n g self-sufficient, m e a n s , essentially,
to
" b e lacking n o t h i n g . "
1 5 7
The
identified " b e i n g h a p p y " as "the e n d (xekoq),
Stoics, w h o
similarly
for the sake o f w h i c h
everything is d o n e , but w h i c h is n o t itself d o n e for the sake o f any thing," correlated this state with v i r t u e .
158
T h u s the l o g i c o f C i c e r o :
1 5 9
. . . if everything is happy which has nothing wanting (si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest). . . and if this is the peculiar mark o f virtue, assuredly all virtuous men are happy . . . But to me, virtuous men are supremely happy: for what is wanting (quid enim deest) to make life happy for the man who feels assured o f the good that is his?
1 5 5
Cf. Philo Gigant. 4 8 - 5 1 , where it is said that one w h o is subjected to "the fierce mysterious storm o f the soul," itself "driven" (ccvappud^exai) "by life and its cares," is like one w h o is "in a storm or o n a wave o f the seething sea" (TI<; ev Xeipxovi zvdiav r\ ev KM8COVI ieu[iaivot>OT|<; QaXdxTr\q); such a one is contrasted with Moses, whose stability (oxdaic;) was "stayed on the firm foundation o f right rea son." Cf. further the use o f a similar image in Migr. Abr. 148, where the figure o f Lot is interpreted as a type o f the person whose mind has a tendency to incline variously toward what is g o o d and what is bad: "Often both tendencies are observ able in one and the same person: for some men are irresolute, facers both ways, inclining to either side like a boat tossed by winds from opposite quarters . . . with such there is nothing praiseworthy even in their taking a turn to the better course; for it is the result not o f judgment, but o f drift." See N.E. 1.7.1-8, esp. 4 - 5 . I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer o f this manuscript for the Supplements series to Novum Testamentum for this reference. See N.E. 1.7.6-7, with the note b in the L C L . See Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, §63A (= Stobaeus 2.77.16-27). TD 5.40; note that Cicero, w h o expressly notes his agreement with, among others, Aristotle on this point, identifies honestum as the sole g o o d in this context, in g o o d Stoic fashion (5.44). Cf. Long and Sedley's comment o n this passage: "the Stoics claim that a virtuous man does possess all that he needs to fulfill himself, to live well, to have his desires satisfied" (The Hellenistic Philosophers, 399). 1 5 6
1 5 7
1 5 8
159
LOGOS AND DESIRE
T h u s , t o o , Epictetus's
explanation
231
o f the " f r e e d o m " (eA,eu0epov) o f
D i o g e n e s : besides the fact that he did not consider his b o d y as his own,
and that "the law, and nothing else, [was] everything to [ h i m ] , "
D i o g e n e s , he said, was in n e e d o f n o t h i n g .
160
T h e phrase in any case takes o n a further dimension in J a m e s , w h i c h couples a general emphasis o n the efficacy o f prayer to the gift-giving G o d with a characteristic e c o n o m i c c o n c e r n . T h e latter, in particular, suggests that this absence o f want might n o t refer sim 161
ply
to " m o r a l a n d spiritual realities" —though
these are n o d o u b t
m o s t critical, as is clear from the subsequent instruction that those who
"lack" (A,eirceTai) w i s d o m should request it o f G o d .
1 6 2
In
any
event, given, especially, the author's insistence that all rceipocauoi orig inate with desire, the promise in 1:4 that those w h o endure 7 t e i p a a | L i 6 < ; will "lack n o t h i n g " stands in stark contrast to 4 : 2 - 6 : £7U0\)|Ll£lX£ Kai
Kai 0\)K £X£X£ . . . CftkoVTE Kai
ov ^ a j L t p d v £ T £ 8i6xi
KaKcoq
0\)
8\>VaG0£ e f l l T D X E W . . . aiX£lX£
a i x £ i c 0 £ , iva
EV
xaiq f|8ovai<; i)|j,a>v
8a7cavf|aax£ . . . 6 Qebq i)7t£pr|(pdvoi<; dvxixdoGExai, xarceivoT<; 8 E 8(8coaiv xdpw.
T h o s e w h o s u c c u m b to desire a n d pursue pleasure, as w e have seen, are d e c e i v e d regarding the source o f g o o d things. T h e o n l y things a c h i e v e d through s u c c u m b i n g to desire are sin a n d death; all g o o d things c o m e from "the without
reproach,"
G o d w h o gives to all without reserve
but w h o nonetheless
gantly seek fulfillment
and
"resists" those w h o arro
o f their o w n desires. It is thus the o n e w h o
withstands the temptation o f desire w h o will b e "lacking in nothing."
KeipccGfiog in James T h e author o f J a m e s is aware that 7i£ipaa|no{ c o m e in diverse (rcoiKiAoi) forms. All, h o w e v e r , are ultimately r o o t e d in desire, w h i c h seduces
160
Cf. Epict., Diss. 4.1.158, on the lips o f Diogenes himself: ouSevoc; Seofiai. Cf. Johnson, The Letter of James, 179: "the 'lacking' here has nothing to d o with material realities (as . . . later in James 2:15) but rather moral or spiritual real ities; 'lacking' means 'falling short'." Cf. Dibelius, James, 74 n. 26, w h o cites in comparison the Stoic notion o f the unity o f virtue. O n e should not overlook in this connection the similar confidence in God's providence expressed in Luke 11:9-13 (par. Matt 7:7-11) which rather clearly includes material "gifts" (cf. Luke 11:3!), though certainly not exclusively so. Cf. further in this respect Matt 6:25-34 (par. Luke 12:22-32): the "soul" is clearly pri mary (Matt 6:25; Luke 12:23), but gifts pertaining to bodily needs are nonetheless promised as well. 161
162
232
CHAPTER FIVE
individuals into seeking to fulfill their o w n desires rather than sim ply
trusting in the p r o v i d e n c e o f G o d . 7 U £ i p a a u o { in general,
there
fore, represent "tests o f faith" (1:3)—faith, a b o v e all, that G o d will p r o v i d e for "those w h o love h i m " (cf. 1:12; 2:5). T h e immediate
result o f an experience o f 7t£ipoco|i6<; will b e o n e
o f t w o types o f action: sin, if o n e s u c c u m b s to desire, o r an ergon if o n e successfully endures. T h e o n e w h o withstands such
"tests,"
m o r e o v e r , will b e " w h o l e , " while the o n e w h o gives in to desire is characterized
as " d o u b l e - s o u l e d . "
163
T h e former will b e perfect inas
m u c h as (s)he will b e in full control o f his o r her while the
"whole b o d y , "
d o u b l e - s o u l e d o n e , like a w a v e b l o w n b y the w i n d , is
"unstable in all his o r her w a y s . " A n d while the latter, even if (s)he petitions "the
G o d w h o gives to all without
reserve
and
without
r e p r o a c h , " should n o t e x p e c t to receive anything ( 1 : 6 - 8 ) , the former will lack nothing.
T h a t w h i c h the o n e w h o endures 7 t £ i p a o u o ( ; will
ultimately " r e c e i v e " (^r||Li\|/£Tai), in fact, is "the c r o w n o f life" (1:12), while the o n e w h o d o e s n o t so endure will find his o r her e n d in "death" (1:13-15). As w e have seen, J a m e s emphasizes that G o d , t h o u g h creator o f the universe
and
o f humanity in particular, is not responsible
these "trials"; their r o o t cause is rather h u m a n desire itself.
164
for The
p o w e r o f desire lies a b o v e all in its deceptive seduction: o n e is led to believe that s o m e g o o d thing can b e obtained b y yielding to it, though the true result will only b e sin and death. G o d alone is the source o f g o o d things, a n d he, in fact, actively "resists" those w h o arrogantly pursue their o w n desires rather than h u m b l y
depending
u p o n h i m . In fact, far from tempting p e o p l e to follow desire wander,
d e c e i v e d , d o w n the path o f sin and
and
death, G o d ' s will is
expressed through the fact that he "gave birth to us" b y m e a n s o f the logos o f truth: the implanted logos that stands o p p o s e d to desire as the w a y w h i c h can "save souls" from death. T h e question
that
remains is w h o , precisely, this "us" is i m a g i n e d to b e .
1 6 3
So even the one who asks G o d , if (s)he does not ask ev m o i e i (1:6-8). As noted above, the question o f the origin o f desire, however, is not raised by the author. 1 6 4
LOGOS AND DESIRE
233
BIRTH B Y LOGOS
It is o b v i o u s b y all accounts that J a m e s uses creation language in 1:18. W h a t is disputed is whether he refers to the original creation o f humanity in general, o r to a n e w creation, e x p e r i e n c e d only b y m e m b e r s o f his o w n religious m o v e m e n t .
1 6 5
Less often realized is the
fact that the term "implanted logos" itself has creation c o n n o t a t i o n s as well: it refers to the logos that the deity " i m p l a n t e d " in
human
beings w h e n creating them. The
fact that it is precisely this "birth" b y logos w h i c h , for J a m e s ,
makes "us" stand apart from the rest o f G o d ' s creations as "a sort of
'first f r u i t s ' "
166
militates
against reading it with reference to a
general creation through logos, whether c o n c e i v e d o n the m o d e l o f Genesis 1, the c o s m i c logos o f the Stoics, o r s o m e m e r g e r o f the t w o as in the first chapter
o f the Fourth
Gospel.
1 6 7
G i v e n the
quent identification o f the logos o f truth o f 1:18 as "the logos"
subse
implanted
in fact, it c a n safely b e assumed that the birth b y logos m e n
tioned in
1:18 refers particularly
to G o d ' s implanting o f the logos
within "us" w h e n he created o r b o r e "us." But the fundamental ques tions remain. W h a t particular act o f creation is envisioned here? In w h o m , precisely, is G o d i m a g i n e d to have implanted this logos? The
n o t i o n that those w h o j o i n the m o v e m e n t e x p e r i e n c e s o m e
sort o f n e w birth o r n e w creation characterized s o m e forms o f early Christianity, a n d James's c o n c e p t o f a birth b y logos has often b e e n read in this l i g h t .
165
168
T h e c o n c e p t s o f re-birth f o u n d in the
Fourth
Cf. Davids, James, 89, commenting on 1:18: " W e agree with Elliott-Binns that the author intended some reference to creation . . . Yet is it not the case that redemp tion in the N T is often seen as a new creation, the creation terminology being used for effect?" T h e modification o f "first fruits" with xiva signals that the author himself would not press this metaphor too far, and for this reason should caution one against reading too much into carocpxiiv. Cf. Philo's use o f the same expression, describing Israel as "set apart out o f the whole human race (TOO) crujiTtocvToq avSpamoov yevovq) as a kind o f first fruits (xiq coiocpxil) to the Maker and Father," simply to denote Israel's special status among the rest o f humanity (Spec. Leg. 4.180). Contrast, for example, Tsuji, Glaube, 69 and 108. Mayor, Epistle of St. James, 6 2 - 6 4 ; Dibelius, 103-107; Marty, LEpitre de Jacques, 4 3 - 4 6 ; Moffatt, The General Epistles, 21-23; Hauck, Die Briefe des Jakobus, Petrus, Judas und Johannes, 11; Leconte, Les Epitres Catholiques, 30 note a (1st ed.) and 34 (2d ed.); Windisch, Die katholischen Briefe, 10; Reicke, The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude, 18; MuBner, Der Jakobusbrief, 92-97; Fabris, Legge, 134-42; Davids, Epistle of James, 89; Popkes, Adressaten, 136-56; with more hesitance Ropes, St. James, 166. Cf. further 166
167
168
234 Gospel,
CHAPTER FIVE
1 John,
1 Peter, Colossians and Ephesians
have received
special emphasis in this c o n n e c t i o n . 1 J o h n is o f particular interest here inasmuch as it associates b e i n g " b o r n from G o d " (yeyevvripevoq eic xou Geou) with the reception o f a " s e e d " (1 J o h n 3:9, cnrepjioc; cf. 1 Pet 1:23) c o n c e i v e d variously as logos o r spirit, a c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h is likely to b e u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the L o g o s m y t h f o u n d at b e g i n n i n g o f the Fourth G o s p e l .
1 6 9
T h i s logos/spirit
teristically associated with "truth" (aA,f|0eia),
170
the
is itself charac
a n d has clear ethical
implications for those in w h o m it "abides": "those w h o have b e e n b o r n o f G o d d o n o t sin, because the seed abides in t h e m " (3:9; cf. 5:18). A s in J a m e s , therefore, it is a b o v e all o n e ' s actions w h i c h ulti mately reveal whether o n e is aligned with G o d o r the Devil (3:10, 6 8idpota)<;).
171
T h e c o n c e p t is in several respects similar to Paul's
7 i v e u | L i a : it, t o o , is a divine substance, possessed o n l y b y m e m b e r s o f a particular g r o u p , with ethical implications that c a n b e s u m m e d u p with a c o m m a n d to " l o v e . " this internalized
fragment
1 7 2
In b o t h Paul and
1 John, moreover,
o f the divine stands o p p o s e d to h u m a n
desire, a n d functions, m o r e generally, in the c o n t e x t o f a supernat ural and ethical dualism w h i c h pits the Devil, desire and—particu larly strikingly, in 1 J o h n — " t h e w o r l d " against G o d and his will for humanity.
173
S u c h similarities b e t w e e n James's logos and the spirit o f Paul o r the spirit/logos
o f 1 J o h n might b e taken to suggest that the former
represents a c o m p a r a b l e divine substance
possessed u n i q u e l y
by
Christians, only conceived along Stoic lines as a divine law "implanted"
Laws, Epistle of James, 75-78, 8 2 - 8 5 ; Johnson, Letter of James, 197-98, 202, 205. See also, however, above note 10 for those w h o read this with reference to the origi nal creation o f humanity. See esp. 1 John 1:1-4 and further Chapter Four, note 208. See further on being "born o f G o d " 1 John 2:29; 3:9; 4:7; 5:1, 4, 18. Cf. in the Fourth Gospel 1:13: EK 9eo\) eyevvf|9r|oav; 3:3, 7: yevvr|9fjvai dvcoOev; 3:6, 8: yeyevvruievoq EK XOV 7CV£\>UXXTO<;; and 3:5: y£vvr|9fi £^ vSaxoq Kai nvev\iaxoq. 1 John 1:6-10; 2:3-6', 2 0 - 2 1 , 27; 4:6; 5:6; cf. 2 John 2; 3 John 3 - 4 , 8. Cf. also 1 John 1:6-10; 2:3-6, 9 - 1 1 ; and passim. E.g., Gal 5:16-26; R o m 8:1-17. O n "love" see, e.g., Gal 5:6, 13-14; R o m 13:8-10; and cf. the emphasis throughout 1 John. For the opposition o f enxdv\iia and nvev\ia in the thought o f Paul, see again esp. Gal 5:16-26. Cf. 1 John 2:16-17, where £7u9\)uia, moreover, is associated particularly with "the world" as opposed to G o d ; cf. in this respect Jas 4 : 1 - 6 , and further Johnson, "Friendship with the World," 170-71. For the devil see 1 John 3:8-10 (6 Sidpo^oq); cf. Paul's oaxavac;, esp. as "tempter": 1 C o r 7:5; 1 Thess 3:5; cf. 1 Thess 2:18; 1 C o r 5:5; 2 C o r 2:11; 11:14; 12:7; R o m 16:20. 169
170
171
172
173
235
LOGOS AND DESIRE
b y G o d in the c o n t e x t o f a n e w c r e a t i o n .
174
O n the other h a n d , the
use o f the term epqyuTOc; Xoyoq itself immediately casts d o u b t o n this line o f interpretation, for the analogous phrases in the works e x a m ined in the previous chapters—including
the Christian literature—
consistently d e n o t e something w h i c h is i n b o r n in h u m a n beings in general. A s was suggested earlier, the interpreter should thus b e w a r y o f assuming that the use o f the c o n c e p t in J a m e s is peculiar in this respect in the absence o f clear e v i d e n c e to the contrary. A n d in fact, unlike 1 Peter, 1 J o h n and the other Christian works with w h i c h it has typically b e e n c o m p a r e d in this respect, J a m e s gives n o indica tion that it is particularly a re-birth o r a new creation that is at issue. T h e critical factor in determining
the nature o f this "birth," as
was p o i n t e d out earlier in this chapter, is in any case the c o n t e x t in w h i c h the reference to it is m a d e . Dibelius formulated the p r o b l e m and its solution in this way: It is . . . upon the basis o f this connection [of 1:17 to 1:18] that we must examine the question o f whether v 18 is intended cosmologically or soteriologically. . . . N o w the cosmological idea does not at all suit the conclusion o f v 17; for if God's good will is supposed to be depicted by a reference to the creation o f human beings, then this argument has an extremely weak effect, and the fervor with which this allusion is made to something which is self-evident remains incomprehensible. The concept which is really important here is the stressing o f the divine will to provide salvation, and already upon the basis o f this general argument the soteriological meaning is to be preferred. 175
T h e soteriological i m p o r t o f Jas
1:18 is in fact quite clear. A s w e
have seen, the author stresses that the will o f G o d , far from aiming at tempting p e o p l e to pursue desire and, thus d e c e i v e d , travel o n the w a y t o w a r d death, is expressed in the fact that he has p r o v i d e d t h e m with logos, a w a y characterized b y "truth" w h i c h is "able to save souls." This, h o w e v e r , is scarcely decisive. G i v e n James's d e p e n d e n c e u p o n a philosophical understanding o f law w h i c h , originally
1 7 4
Cf. Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 143f; cf. further the comparisons formulated by Fabris, Legge, ch. 6, esp. 191-92 (on 1 Peter), 194-203 (on the Johannine liter ature) and 203-211 (on Paul). As we have seen, however, Fabris denies any Stoic influence on James's understanding o f logos. Dibelius, James, 103-4; cf. in this respect the apparent reasoning o f Johnson, w h o however stresses that "no hard and fast distinction need be drawn among cre ation, covenant and grace, for each builds on the other, and each is an expression o f the ' g o o d and perfect gifts that c o m e down from a b o v e ' " (Letter of James, 205; cf. 197-98). 1 7 5
236
CHAPTER FIVE:
at least, c o n c e i v e d it as having b e e n "implanted" b y G o d in all o f humanity w h e n he created them, the assumed d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n " c o s m o l o g i c a l " and "soteriological" interpretations w h i c h underlies this formulation o f the p r o b l e m is entirely unnecessary.
Dibelius's
exclusion o f a reference to creation in 1:18 o n the basis o f its sote riological implications, in other w o r d s , is unwarranted. W h a t Dibelius does c o r r e c d y perceive, h o w e v e r , is the significance o f 1:17 in this c o n n e c t i o n . In this verse the author invokes G o d ' s paternity o f the "lights" in the service o f his larger argument God
is not responsible for the h u m a n experience o f mipac\i6q,
that sin
and death. H a v i n g first drawn a distinction between G o d and human ity vis-a-vis the experience o f Tteipccauoq ( 1 : 1 3 - 1 5 ) , the author p r o ceeds to draw an analogous distinction between G o d and the heavenly "lights": following an a d m o n i t i o n w h i c h plays o n the description o f s o m e such stars as "wanderers" (1:16, \ir\ nXavaaQe), it is asserted that God,
t h o u g h the "father o f lights," is not himself subject to any o f
the deviations w h i c h are observable a m o n g them. H e r e , the image o f divine paternity is clearly used to denote G o d ' s (original) creation o f the astral "lights," a n d the point is that G o d c a n n o t b e held responsible for their " w a n d e r i n g " despite the fact that he is their "father," i.e., their creator. T h i s distinction b e t w e e n G o d ' s paternity o f the "lights" and his responsibility for their "wandering," follow ing u p o n the claim that G o d is not responsible w h e n humans w a n der o n t o the path o f sin a n d death, suggests rather strongly that a notion o f G o d as the creator o f humanity lies b e h i n d the formula tion o f the larger argument o f 1:13—18:
176
just as G o d ' s creation o f
the "lights" does not entail his responsibility for the deviations in their m o v e m e n t s , so t o o , o n e c a n n o t infer from G o d ' s creation o f humanity that he is responsible w h e n they are tempted to w a n d e r in sin t o w a r d death. O n the contrary, the "Father o f Lights," w h e n "giving birth" to humanity, e n d o w e d them with logos, w h i c h is char acterized b y "truth" and is "able to save s o u l s . "
1 7 6
177
In fact, one might find allusions to the myth o f the fall o f Genesis 3 in Jas 1:13-15 and to Gen 1:14-18 in Jas 1:17. Cf. also the association o f G o d ' s status as "father" with the creation o f human beings "in the likeness o f G o d " (KCXO' 6|LIO{(OOIV Oeov) in Jas 3:9, as the author attempts to expose the depths o f human hypocrisy: "with it [sc. the tongue] we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse the human beings who were made in the likeness o f G o d . " 177
237
LOGOS AND DESIRE
In fact, while the author's use o f the
KTUJJLUXTGC
("creatures," " c r e
ations") in 1:18 seems rather peculiar if his intention is to contrast Christians to the rest o f humanity w h o were not so b o r n ,
1 7 8
it is
readily u n d e r s t a n d a b l e w h e n the verse is r e a d with reference
to
G o d ' s "implanting" o f logos in humanity w h e n he created them. T h e h u m a n possession o f logos, in fact, renders humanity s e c o n d o n l y to the g o d s o n the Stoic scale o f n a t u r e .
179
Thus Cicero:
that animal which we call man . . . has been given a certain distin guished status (praeclara quadam condicione) by the supreme G o d who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties o f living beings who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived o f it. 180
T h i s v i e w o f humanity's place in the universe, t o o , is the assumption
o f o n e o f Chrysippus's
implicit
arguments for the existence o f
the g o d s , as reported b y C i c e r o : if gods do not exist, what can there be in the universe superior to man? for he alone possesses reason, which is the most excellent thing that can exist; but for any human being in existence to think that there is nothing in the whole world superior to himself would be an insane piece o f arrogance . . . 1 8 1
T h e Stoics, m o r e o v e r , c o n c e i v e d o f the rest o f creation primarily in terms o f "gifts" from the deity to h u m a n i t y .
182
In the later Jewish
a n d Christian literature, these Stoic notions are c o m m o n l y c o m b i n e d with the Jewish c o n c e p t o f humanity's " d o m i n i o n " o v e r G o d ' s other creatures as f o u n d in G e n e s i s .
1 7 8
183
Elliott-Binns considers the use o f this term alone to be a "practically conclu sive" indication that the author refers to creation ('James 1.18: Creation or R e demption?" 155); his formulation o f the problem as one o f "Creation or Redemption," on the other hand, is subject to the same critique registered above in connection with the interpretation o f Dibelius. See on the Stoic view o f humanity's place in nature Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 18-27. Note that the various astral bodies are also considered rational: see Cicero De Nat. Deor. 2 . 3 9 - 4 4 , where it is argued, in fact, that "the motion o f the heavenly bodies is voluntary" (2.44); cf. Philo, Opif. 73, 143-44. De Leg. 1.22. De Nat. Deor. 2.16. See, e.g., Cicero, De Leg. 1.25; De Nat. Deor. 2.37, 133, 1 5 4 - 6 2 ; De Off 2.11; cf. Philo, Opif. 77; 4 M a c e 5:8-9. Note further Renter's description o f this idea as "specifically Stoic" (De Legibus, 110). See esp. Philo Opif. 65ff, 77, and passim; Abr. 41; 45; Jos. 2; Leg. All. 1.30; 2.22; also AC 7.34.6; further D . Jobling, " ' A n d Have Dominion . . .': T h e Interpreta tion o f Genesis 1, 28 in Philo Judaeus," JSJ 8 (1979) 5 0 - 8 2 . Note in this connection 1 7 9
180
181
1 8 2
1 8 3
238
CHAPTER FIVE
In short, while the soteriological implications o f the author's ref erence in 1:18 to the fact that G o d "gave birth to us b y means o f a logos o f truth" are clear, the context in w h i c h this reference is m a d e indicates that he considers this logos to b e the c o m m o n p o s session o f all humanity rather than the peculiar possession o f Chris tians. W h i l e c o m p a r i s o n with other Christian literature reveals that the author's characteristic supernatural and ethical dualism, as well as his remarkable hostility t o w a r d "the w o r l d , " are quite at h o m e within early Christian thought, there is n o indication in his letter that he,
like Paul a n d the author o f 1 J o h n , considers the logos w h i c h is
"able to save souls" to b e the unique possession o f Christians.
In
d e e d , if the interpretation o f Jas 3:2 offered earlier in this chapter is correct, James's linking o f the logos to the h u m a n capacity for speech renders such an interpretation all but impossible. In fact, v i e w e d within the context o f the argument
o f 1:13-18
itself, the birth b y logos is best understood as G o d ' s creation o f human ity in general. Just as o n e c a n n o t infer from G o d ' s creation o f the "lights" that he is responsible w h e n they deviate f r o m their pre scribed courses, so t o o , o n e c a n n o t infer from G o d ' s creation o f humanity that he is responsible w h e n they " w a n d e r " from the logos he gave to them as their law. T h e subsequent identification o f the A,6yo<; atofiziaq
o f 1:18 as 6 euxpuxoc; A,6yo<; is itself a strong indication
that James's logos, like the euxpuxov cncepiioc xou AxSyou o f Justin and the euipuxoc; vouo<; o f M e t h o d i u s and the Apostolic Constitutions, is regarded as something "implanted" b y G o d in all o f humanity w h e n he ini tially created them. LOGOS AND DESIRE AS " T w o
The
WAYS"
logos that is central to the thought o f James, referred to vari
ously as 6 euxpuTo<; Xoyoq o r Xoyoq aXrfiziaq, b e e n implanted in all h u m a n
is o n e imagined to have
beings at creation. It is
intimately
related, in fact, to the h u m a n capacity for speech. Its i m p o r t a n c e in J a m e s , h o w e v e r , lies a b o v e all in the fact that it is definitive o f the
Jas 3:7-8, where the catalogue o f the diverse types o f creatures and the creation of humans (dv6p(07io\)<;) "in the image o f G o d , " both clearly reminiscent o f Genesis (cf. esp. Gen 1:26-28; also 9:2), are understood in a very Greek manner in terms of different "natures": naca (pvaiq 6r|p{cov xe Kai rcexeivcbv, eprcexcov xe Kai evaAiow versus fi cpuou; av9p(D7uvr|.
239
LOGOS AND DESIRE
will o f G o d for h u m a n beings. It functions, in short, as divine law, in opposition to the individual's o w n desire. If in all these respects James's c o n c e p t o f logos owes m u c h to G r e e k philosophical, and especially Stoic, discourse, James's treatment o f it is, nonetheless, also informed significandy b y Jewish and Christian tradition. T h e G r e e k o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n logos a n d desire is here v i e w e d in terms o f the " t w o w a y s " m o t i f o f Jewish and
Christian
m o r a l exhortation. Further, this opposition, as with M e t h o d i u s , has b e e n fused with the Judaeo-Christian opposition between G o d and the Devil, and is seen against an eschatological h o r i z o n that includes a parousia o f Jesus and a j u d g m e n t b y the divine Lawgiver in a c c o r d with his law. F o r J a m e s , h u m a n life—particularly,
o n e imagines, given his thor
oughly negative appraisal o f "the w o r l d " — i s characterized b y various temptations to pursue one's o w n desires rather than " d o " logos. T h e s e temptations are construed as "tests o f f a i t h " — o f the faith, particu larly, that G o d himself will p r o v i d e all g o o d gifts for those w h o d o his will. A soteriologically effective faith, w h e n tested, will manifest itself in erga, o r g o o d works; and as the implanted
logos finds writ
ten expression in the T o r a h , it is through constant attention to this law that o n e b e c o m e s a nov(\ix\q Xoyov and, therefore, a noir\xr\q epyou. T h e p r o b l e m o f temptation takes o n a particular urgency given James's eschatological orientation.
Both G o d ' s p r o v i d e n c e and
the
importance o f endurance are emphasized in the letter's o p e n i n g and closing sections. Successful endurance
o f temptation, for J a m e s , is
nothing less than a matter o f life o r death. A n y o n e w h o turns the sinner w h o has " w a n d e r e d from the truth" b a c k from his o r
her
erring w a y "will save his o r her soul from death, and c o v e r a mul titude o f sins" ( 5 : 1 9 - 2 0 ) . This, o n e imagines, is precisely what the Letter o f J a m e s was intended to d o .
CONCLUSION
That James the gospel
meant to speak of regeneration in 1.18 in 1.21
has
no support
but
and
of
the expectation
of
what it is thought he ought to mean . . . A.
T.
Cadoux, The
Thought
of St.
James
T h e Letter o f J a m e s identifies as that w h i c h is able to "save souls" an implanted logos that is closely associated with a perfect law o f freedom. W h i l e this logos was interpreted in light o f the Stoic the o r y that h u m a n reason comprises a divine, natural law b y several early exegetes, the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f James's critical readers have rejected this line o f interpretation
in favor o f its identification
as "the G o s p e l . " T h i s perhaps otherwise uninteresting fact in the his tory o f N e w Testament scholarship is symptomatic o f the p r e d o m i n a n c e o f the essentialist
a p p r o a c h in the critical study o f early
Christianity. T h e classification o f J a m e s as a Christian w o r k has gen erally b e e n thought to lead naturally to the interpretation o f its sote riologically central logos as that w h i c h is peculiarly and definitively Christian, "the G o s p e l " ; substantive Stoic influence o n the c o n c e p t , therefore, is out o f the question. Indeed, w h e n the interpretation o f James's logos along Stoic lines was re-introduced in the last century b y A r n o l d M e y e r and M . - E . Boismard, it was in b o t h cases a c c o m p a n i e d b y a hypothesis regarding the non-Christian origin o f J a m e s , o r at least o f the passage in question. T o b e sure, the s u b m e r g e d logic that leads from the classification o f J a m e s as Christian to the interpretation o f its saving logos as "the G o s p e l " has b e e n s u p p o r t e d b y explicit arguments
against
Stoic
influence o n J a m e s in this respect. T h e Stoics, it is p o i n t e d out, scarcely c o n c e i v e d o f h u m a n reason as something that "saves souls," let alone something that can b e "heard" and " d o n e " o r " r e c e i v e d " ; James's use o f this language is m o r e reminiscent o f the Jewish a n d Christian sources. S u c h arguments, h o w e v e r , fail to reckon with the possibility that the sort o f fusion o f Stoic and Jewish c o n c e p t s sug gested b y M e y e r and B o i s m a r d might b e operative even if J a m e s is a Christian c o m p o s i t i o n . T h e categories "Christian" and " S t o i c , " o r
242
CONCLUSION
"Judaeo-Christian" and " G r e e k , " rather, are treated m o r e as signifiers o f static and mutually exclusive realities than as heuristic tools. In its starkest formulations, the p r o b l e m has b e e n stated as o n e o f "Jewish" or "biblical" versus "hellenistic" influence o n James's logos. A t most, o n e finds the suggestion that a term o f Stoic origin has b e e n drained o f its original m e a n i n g and filled with an
essentially
Christian o n e . Little allowance is m a d e for the c o m p l e x interweav ing o f traditions o f diverse p r o v e n a n c e that in fact characterizes so m u c h o f the early Christian literature. U s e o f essentialist m o d e l s for the classification o f historical p h e n o m e n a is inherentiy shown.
1
problematic, as J o n a t h a n Z . Smith has well
Early Christianity is not an exception. In fact, the assump
tion o f such a m o d e l b y interpreters o f J a m e s has d o n e m o r e to obscure than to clarify its correlation o f "implanted logos" with a law that is perfect and o f f r e e d o m . T h e appearance
o f analogous ter
m i n o l o g y in C i c e r o ' s De Legibus and the Apostolic Constitutions, cited respectively b y M e y e r and Boismard, have b e e n summarily—indeed, usually tacitly—dismissed as irrelevant for understanding James's logos w h e n the letter is read as a Christian c o m p o s i t i o n . Examination o f these and other works, h o w e v e r , reveals that the term
"implanted"
(euxpuxoq, insita) is regularly used in the ancient literature to describe either h u m a n reason o r a natural law it comprises. This terminol o g y has its roots in the Stoic theory that h u m a n reason, w h i c h in its perfect f o r m as "right reason" represents natural law, develops out o f "implanted
p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " (euxpuioi 7upoA,f|\|/ei<;): the innate
h u m a n tendency to conceptualize moral distinctions like " g o o d " and " b a d , " often described as "seeds" o f knowledge o r virtue. It was pre cisely in light o f this theory that Dionysius b a r Salibi d e s c r i b e d James's euxpuxoq Xoyoq as "natural law," and that b o t h he and
the
exegete w h o s e interpretation o f Jas 1:21 is preserved b y O e c u m e n i u s and T h e o p h y l a c t u s identified it as something i n b o r n in all humanity, associated particularly with the ability to distinguish moral contraries. If the discussion o f logos in J a m e s differs in s o m e respects f r o m the Stoics' discussions o f h u m a n reason, it is not because J a m e s alone a m o n g these ancient works has formulated
the equation
o f "the
implanted logos" with the perfect law entirely apart from Stoic influence. On
the contrary,
such divergences are f o u n d w h e r e v e r the Stoic
understanding o f law is incorporated into worldviews alien to Stoicism. 1
J. Z . Smith, "Fences and Neighbors: Some Contours o f Early Judaism,"
1-18.
CONCLUSION
243
In J a m e s , the creator o f the w o r l d is the g o d o f the Jewish scrip tures, and the logos he has implanted in humanity finds written expres sion in the T o r a h , the "perfect l a w " he gave to the descendants o f Abraham. Human
desire, o n the other hand, is associated, as b y
M e t h o d i u s , with the m y t h o l o g i c a l T e m p t e r o f Jewish a n d
Christian
tradition, 6 8id|3oAo<;. T h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n logos a n d desire a n d the p r o b l e m o f temptation,
m o r e o v e r , are seen against a l o o m i n g
eschatological h o r i z o n , w h e n this g o d will execute a j u d g m e n t in a c c o r d with his law: "the r i c h " will b e punished for their
arrogant
a n d oppressive h e d o n i s m , while the h u m b l e p o o r w h o resist desire a n d love G o d will inherit the k i n g d o m he has p r o m i s e d . I f the central feature o f James's soteriology is n o t a " g o s p e l " b y w h i c h o n e can b e reborn, but a logos implanted b y G o d in all h u m a n ity at creation that finds written expression in the T o r a h , it is hardly necessary to c o n c l u d e that the letter was n o t originally a
Christian
composition. G i v e n the regular correlation o f interest in Israel's twelve tribes with messianism, particularly
in the literature o f the
early
R o m a n p e r i o d , the references to the figure o f Jesus Christ are quite consistent with the letter's address "to the twelve tribes w h o are in the diaspora," as well as with its eschatological o u d o o k m o r e b r o a d l y .
2
T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the Stoic understanding o f law into this w o r l d v i e w is itself, in fact, quite well u n d e r s t o o d in light o f the o n g o i n g early Christian
debates r e g a r d i n g the significance o f the
Torah.
I n d e e d , there is strong e v i d e n c e to suggest that James's treatment o f the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " was drafted particularly with an eye to Paul's formulation o f the p r o b l e m o f the law. It has b e e n w i d e l y agreed t h r o u g h o u t the history o f critical schol arship that J a m e s , particularly in its discussion o f faith a n d works in 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 , interacts o n s o m e level with Paul, o r at least with pauline slogans. This view, however, has not g o n e unchallenged. Luke T i m o t h y J o h n s o n , for example, has r e c e n d y argued that, "[djespite the remark able points o f r e s e m b l a n c e " b e t w e e n the discussions o f faith
and
works in Paul a n d J a m e s , "they appear n o t to b e talking with e a c h 3
other b y w a y o f instruction o r c o r r e c t i o n . " J o h n s o n ' s c o n c l u s i o n that
2
See on this Jackson-McCabe, " A Letter to the Twelve Tribes," 5 0 8 - 1 5 . It is thus most likely that the parousia that will signal the time o f the eschatological judg ment and reversal is that o f "the Lord Jesus," as in most early Christian works; see further Johnson, The Letter of James, 313-14. Letter of James, 64. For what follows, cf. my review o f Johnson's commentary in JR 78 (1998) 102-104. 3
244
CONCLUSION
"[t]here is absolutely n o reason to read this section [sc. 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 ] particularly responsive to P a u l "
4
as
is the function o f two key p r o p o s i
tions: first, that J a m e s , unlike Paul, "never c o n n e c t s erga to the l a w " ;
5
and s e c o n d , that the "unusual c o n c e n t r a t i o n " o f similar elements in these authors' respective treatments o f faith and works is best explained b y "the
simple fact that b o t h J a m e s and Paul w e r e first generation
m e m b e r s o f a messianic m o v e m e n t that defined itself in terms o f 'faith in Jesus'."
6
E v e n if o n e w e r e to grant J o h n s o n ' s v i e w regard
ing the early date o f J a m e s , there are weighty objections to b o t h o f these assertions. W h e r e a s the " w o r k s " w h i c h w e r e foremost in Paul's m i n d in discussions o f faith a n d
his
works w e r e epyoc vouou, J o h n s o n emphati
cally insists, as others have often c l a i m e d before h i m , that the author o f J a m e s "never c o n n e c t s erga to the l a w . "
7
It is to b e n o t e d in
the
first place that, even if this w e r e true, it scarcely follows that
the
author o f J a m e s is not interacting o n s o m e level with Paul o r pauline ideas. I n d e e d , a m o n g the m o s t c o m m o n views o f 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 is that the author either misunderstood Paul himself, or c o m b a t e d an " i m p r o p e r " 8
d e v e l o p m e n t o f pauline t h o u g h t . W h a t e v e r the case, the claim that erga have n o c o n n e c t i o n to law in the context o f J a m e s entirely over looks 1:25, w h e r e it is said quite explicitly that it is o n e w h o
gives
continual attention to the "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " w h o will b e c o m e
4
Ibid., 249. Ibid., 60, emphasis his. Ibid., 250. Ibid., 60 (emphasis his); note also his emphatic repetition later on the same page: "I underline the point: James' usage concerning 'works' is both unconnected to 'law' and is entirely consistent with the dominant N T usage concerning moral effort as an expression o f convictions"; cf. further pp. 30, 63, 242. Cf. among many others, Ropes, Epistle of St. James, 204f; Dibelius, James, 178-80; A . Lindemann, Paulus im altesten Christentum: Das Bild des Apostels und die Rezeption der paulinischen Theologie in der fruhchristlichen Literatur bis Marcion ( B H T 58; Tubingen: M o h r [Siebeck], 1979) 241, 247, 248f; Hartin, James and the Q, Sayings, 238-39; G. Luedemann, Opposition to Paul in Jewish Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) 144-46. Klein, however, represents a welcome exception: ". . . zwar wird in 2,14-26 das Gesetz nicht erwahnt, aber aus dem ubrigen Brief geht deutlich genug hervor, daB auch hier die Werke epyoc vo\iox> sind" (Ein vollkommenes Werk, 200). See the works listed in the immediately preceding note, and esp. Luedemann, Opposition to Paul, 145 and 287 n. 21. Lindemann reports that the view that the author opposes "eine 'entartete' paulinische Tradition" is "die in der Forschung iiberwiegend vertretene Annahme" (Paulus im altesten Christentum, 243 and n. 71). Lindemann himself, however, is rightly critical o f this view, arguing not only that the author o f James engages directly with Paul, but that "[d]er V f des Jak hat Paulus durchaus verstanden" (ibid., 250); cf. with this last remark, however, his c o m ment regarding the absence o f the phrase epya vojioi) in James on pp. 248f. 5
6
7
8
CONCLUSION
245
a 7uoir|Tf|<; Epyoi). J o h n s o n himself describes the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n Jas 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 and J a m e s 1 as " o b v i o u s , " at least "for the reader u n c o m mitted to theories o f literary fragmentation."
9
R e g a r d i n g 1:22~25 in
particular, he writes that "James h a d [there] insisted o n b e i n g 'not o n l y a hearer o f the w o r d ' but also a d o e r ; n o w , the contrast b e t w e e n 'faith
a l o n e ' a n d the d o i n g o f faith
(2:18-26)."
1 0
is
Stricdy
speaking, o f course, the author never writes o f a 7uoir|Tf|<; niaxEcoq, but only, significandy, o f the novr\zr\q epyou (1:25), Xoyov
(1:22-23),
o r vouou (4:11; cf. 2:12). In any case, the essential question for the author o f J a m e s is whether o n e w h o s e faith is tested will r e s p o n d b y giving in to desire, a n d thus sin, o r will resist desire a n d " d o " logos, thus effecting a (perfect) ergon. In short, while the author never uses the phrase epya vouou, all erga are nonetheless epya X6yox>, w h i c h is to say, deeds that result f r o m " d o i n g " the euxpuioq Xoyoq that is able to save souls. A c c o r d i n g to J a m e s , this logos finds written expres sion in the T o r a h ; a n d thus is it said that continual attention to this "perfect law o f f r e e d o m " will render o n e a rcovniTis epyov It is particularly cussion o f faith
(1:25).
significant in this c o n n e c t i o n that J a m e s ' s dis
a n d works (2:14—26) follows immediately u p o n its
a r g u m e n t against partiality ( 2 : 1 - 1 3 ) . O n c e again, J o h n s o n
himself
emphasizes the close c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these t w o sections, b o t h with respect to their c o m m o n c o n c e r n for the type o f b e h a v i o r (par ticularly
vis-a-vis the
e c o n o m i c a l l y disadvantaged)
that o u g h t
a c c o m p a n y "faith" a n d their argumentative structure.
11
to
As Johnson
sees it, in fact, the author o f J a m e s " d e v e l o p s a single a r g u m e n t " in these t w o sections o f J a m e s 2: From beginning to end, it concerns faith and its deeds . . . In this sense, the final part o f the discussion in 2:14-26 only provides the broadest formal framework for the specifics argued in 2 : 1 - 1 3 . 12
9
Letter of James, 246. Ibid.; cf. further his comment on 1:22, Kai u.r| jiovov aKpoaxai [Aoyai)]: "the use o f the adverb monon ('alone') alerts us to the exact parallel construction con cerning 'faith and deeds' in 2:24" (ibid., 206). See esp. Letter of James, 219, 246; cf. also the recent study o f D . F. Watson, 'James 2 , " esp. p . 96: 'James 2 is constituted by two related examples o f this [GrecoR o m a n ] elaboration pattern o f argumentation: 2.1-13 on the specific topic o f par tiality and 2.14-16 on the broader, related issue o f faith and works." Significant too in this connection, if less often noted, are the concerns for over-emphasis on Lev 19:18 in Jas 2:1-13 and on Deut 6:4ff in Jas 2:14-26—precisely, that is, the two pas sages regarded as the most important commands o f the law in the synoptic gospels. Letter of James, 219; thus his heading for James 2 as a whole as " T h e Deeds o f Faith." 10
11
12
246
CONCLUSION
T h a t is to say, the author o f J a m e s follows his m o r e specific argu m e n t against "having the faith" o f Jesus C h r i s t
13
while
performing
acts o f partiality (cf. 2:1) with a discussion o f the b r o a d e r
problem
o f "having faith" while lacking erga (cf. 2:14). If, as J o h n s o n rightly recognizes,
2:14-26
and
2 : 1 - 1 3 thus represent discussions o f the
same basic p r o b l e m o f faith a n d erga o n t w o different levels,
14
it is
quite striking that the climactic argument against showing partiality is the fact that such acts represent transgressions o f the "law o f free d o m " b y w h i c h h u m a n s will ultimately b e j u d g e d ( 2 : 8 - 1 3 ) . In light o f b o t h this c o n n e c t i o n and the fact that J a m e s says quite explicidy that it is o n e w h o looks continually into the
"perfect
law o f free
d o m " w h o will b e c o m e a 7rovnxf|<; epyou, the claim o f J o h n s o n others that the
erga o f J a m e s have nothing to d o with the
and
law is
w h o l l y untenable. G i v e n J o h n s o n ' s sensitivity to the
problems
which
scholarship's
overriding c o n c e r n for the James-Paul issue has caused for the inter pretation o f J a m e s ,
15
it is s o m e w h a t ironic that his understanding o f
the relationship o f law and erga in this w o r k is scarcely understand able apart from his o w n interest in eliminating the tension that the presence o f b o t h J a m e s a n d
the
poses for Christian interpreters.
16
letters o f Paul within the
canon
A similar c o n c e r n seems to under
lie his claim that the "unusual c o n c e n t r a t i o n " o f similar language in the discussions o f faith a n d works in J a m e s and the letters o f Paul
13
Precisely what the description o f niaxiq in 2:1 specifically as f| nioziq xov Tcupiou 'Ir|Goi) Xpxaxox) ifjc; oo£n<; is intended to signify is not immediately clear. T h e issue rests largely with the problem o f the author's understanding o f the significance of Jesus Christ. What is clear is that the niGZiq which is o f foremost concern else where in the letter is faith that G o d will himself be faithful to those who " d o " his logos or law. It thus seems most likely that f| nvaxiq TOU i c o p i a u f||icbv 'Inaoo) Xpiaxoi) zr\q 56£n<;—if we are in fact dealing with an objective rather than a subjective gen itive (though see W . W a c h o b , "The rich in faith," 146-48)—concerns above all faith that an eschatological reversal will right the wrongs which characterize the corrupt "world" at the glorious parousia o f Jesus as lord messiah, an event under stood as a fulfillment o f ancient promises made by G o d "to those who love him" (cf. 2:5; 1:12). Showing partiality is not discussed in terms o f an ergon. This, however, is not surprising given the author's negative focus in 2:1-13: here he argues against & "sin" (cf. 2:9: ei 5e 7tpoaco7toA,r||Li7tX£ix£, djuapiiav epyd£eo0e), not for an ergon. O n the use o f djiapxia and epyov as oppositional categories in James, see pp. 2 1 6 - 2 1 . See esp. Letter of James, 5 8 - 6 4 , 111-16, 156, 2 4 5 - 5 2 . This was already the case with Erasmus, as Johnson himself seems to recog nize: "And on the issue o f faith and works, Erasmus harmonizes', 'truly Paul [. . .] speaks o f the observance o f the law o f Moses, here (James) is concerned with the offices o f piety and charity'" (Letter of James, 141 [with emphasis added]). f|pxov
14
15
16
247
CONCLUSION
is best explained not b y "a hypothetical p o w e r struggle b e t w e e n early Christian leaders" o r b y "a subde [!] literary p o l e m i c , " but b y the authors' similar b a c k g r o u n d as "first generation m e m b e r s " o f a m o v e m e n t that "defined itself in terms o f the 'faith o f J e s u s ' . "
17
F o r while
it is n o d o u b t the case that the "necessary unity b e t w e e n attitude a n d a c t i o n " e m p h a s i z e d in J a m e s is typical o f ancient (and m o d e r n ) m o r a l exhortation generally, this theme
18
it is equally true that the treatment o f
specifically in terms o f 7T{OTI<; a n d
question o f w h e t h e r o n e c a n b e considered
by
nioxiq
general
%copi<; epycov—is n o t .
19
epya—let alone
the
righteous (SIKOCIOUGGOU)
Though Johnson
characterizes
the
context o f James's discussion o f faith a n d works as b e i n g
" n o t dissimilar to the language c o n c e r n i n g faith a n d deeds (erga)" in 20
several passages from 4 Ezra a n d 2 Baruch,
these works share with
J a m e s little m o r e than the basic notion that o n e ' s actions are i m portant vis-a-vis o n e ' s eschatological fate. I n d e e d , despite J o h n s o n ' s characterization o f the passages from these works as " c o n c e r n i n g faith a n d deeds (erga)"
o n l y t w o o f t h e m actually pair "faith" (fides) a n d
" d e e d s " (opera) (4 Ezra
9:7; 13:23) at all; o n l y o n e o f these e v e n
arguably envisions s o m e significant separation o f the t w o (4 Ezra 9:7); and
in n o case is the p r o b l e m o f the merit o f "faith apart from
d e e d s " addressed. In contrast, the author o f J a m e s clearly
17
assumes
Letter of James, 250. Note that where James's literary relationships to other works are concerned, Johnson is quite critical o f attempts to explain similarities in terms o f just such a "vague ' c o m m o n property o f early Christianity'" (ibid., 67). Note particularly in this connection his pointed critique o f Dibelius's assessment o f the relationship o f James to the Shepherd of Hermas: "[Dibelius's] refusal to acknowl edge dependence in this case appears to rest as much on his presuppositions as on the evidence" (Letter of James, 76f). Cf. ibid., 247. Cf. esp. Jas 2:18, 20, 26 with R o m 3:28; 4 : 4 - 6 . Note in this respect 1 Clem 30:3, "let us put on concord in meekness o f spirit and continence, keeping our selves far from all gossip and evil speaking, and be justified by deeds, not by words (epyoiq 8iKaio{>jLi£voi, \u\ A,6yoi<;), with which cf. 1 Clem 32:4: "we w h o by his will have been called in Christ Jesus, are not made righteous (5iKaiot)^eGa) by our selves, or by our wisdom or understanding or piety or the deeds (epycov) which we have wrought in holiness o f heart, but through faith (aXka 8ia zr\q Ttiaxeox;), by which G o d has justified (eSiKodcoaev) all men from the beginning o f the world." The former statement recalls the more general discussions o f "the necessary unity between attitude and action" which Johnson characterizes as "the fundamental assumption o f all ancient moral discourse," albeit with the infusion o f the Christian sense o f SIKCXIOVGGCXI. T h e latter statement, however, which assumes a significant distinction between becoming righteous before G o d 8ia epycov, etc. and 8ia xr\q niaxEdiq, clearly recalls the doctrine o f justification as formulated by Paul. Johnson, Letter of James, 238, citing 2 Bar. 14:12; 24:1; 51:7 and 4 Ezra 7:77; 8:32-36; 9:7; 13:23. 18
19
2 0
248
CONCLUSION
the existence o f the position that faith apart from works is sufficient for righteousness and eschatological salvation.
21
A t least as far as c a n
b e j u d g e d f r o m the extant e v i d e n c e , this position, w h i c h he repeat edly characterizes with the peculiarly
pauline.
tag KICTIC,
Epycov a n d
attacks, is
22
Particularly characteristic o f Paul t o o , m o r e o v e r , is another n o t i o n that the author presupposes a n d c o m b a t s in the immediately
previ
ous a n d closely related discussion o f partiality. J a m e s ' s a r g u m e n t that showing partiality renders o n e a transgressor o f the law regardless o f w h e t h e r o n e "keeps the w h o l e l a w " b y "loving o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as oneself," as w e have seen, presupposes the use o f L e v 19:18 as sum m a r y o f the " w h o l e l a w . " T h e formulation
o f summaries o f biblical
law, even vis-a-vis love o f G o d , o f o n e ' s fellow h u m a n beings, o r s o m e c o m b i n a t i o n o f the t w o , was practiced b o t h b y Christians and non-Christian Jews, and in a variety o f ways. But it is Paul in par ticular w h o emerges f r o m the extant ancient Jewish a n d
Christian
literature as an a d v o c a t e o f the position that the author o f J a m e s seeks to defuse. W h i l e M a t t h e w pairs D e u t 6:5 a n d L e v 19:18 as a s u m m a r y o f "the w h o l e l a w " (Matt 2 2 : 3 4 - 3 9 ; cf. M a r k
12:28-34;
Luke 1 0 : 2 5 - 2 8 ) , Paul stands apart from the synoptics in his e m p h a sis o n L e v 19:18 alone (Gal 5:14; R o m reductionistic
13:8-10).
23
M o r e o v e r , the
t e n d e n c y w h i c h most c o n c e r n s the author o f J a m e s ,
while clearly evident neither in M a t t h e w n o r in Hillel's summary, is a m o n g the c h i e f services r e n d e r e d b y the s u m m a r y use o f the love c o m m a n d in Paul's letters. T o b e sure, the author o f J a m e s is aware— and w a r y — o f the special emphasis p l a c e d o n both D e u t 6:4ff and L e v 19:18 in s o m e Christian c i r c l e s .
21
24
H o w e v e r , the
a r g u m e n t o f Jas
It is likely in connection with his attempt to discredit this position that James's consistently positive use o f the term erga as good deeds as opposed to "sin" (rather than its usual more neutral sense o f "deeds," g o o d or bad) is to be understood. Assuming the existence o f a position which holds that erga are unnecessary for eschatological salvation, James reacts by characterizing erga as the very mark o f God's wisdom (3:13) and o f a "living," i.e., soteriologically efficacious, faith (2:14-26; cf. 1:2-4, 12). It seems most likely to me, in fact, that Paul formulated this distinction between righteousness by faith and righteousness by works himself, to meet a specific problem that arose in connection with his own activity: disputes regarding the extent to which non-Jewish members o f the movement were obliged to observe the Torah. A n addi tional indication that the author o f James engages particularly with pauline teach ing in 2:14-26 is the importance o f Gen 15:6 to his argument; see on this below. Note that Hillel's use o f the golden rule as summary does not obviously refer to Lev 19:18. See above, note 11, and further pp. 174f. 2 2
2 3
2 4
CONCLUSION
249
2 : 8 - 1 1 presupposes a n d c o m b a t s specifically just such a
sentiment
as is found in R o m 13:8—10; namely, that since the various c o m m a n d s o f the law are " s u m m e d u p " (dvocKecpocAmoco) as " l o v e y o u r neigh b o r as yourself," " l o v e is therefore the fulfilling (nXr\p(o\ia) o f l a w , " so that " o n e w h o loves another has fulfilled (mnXr\p(OKev) the l a w . "
25
J a m e s ' s lavish description o f the T o r a h as the "perfect law o f free d o m , " t o o , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a response to Paul's statements regarding the soteriological i m p o t e n c e o f the law. T h i s is especially true o f his repeated description o f the T o r a h as a "law o f f r e e d o m . " A s " f r e e d o m " is n o t m e n t i o n e d elsewhere in the letter, it w o u l d seem that J a m e s ' s m a i n interest in the c o n c e p t is simply to make o f it an attribute o f the T o r a h . It is quite interesting, then, that Paul sharply contrasts the
" f r e e d o m " o f those w h o o b t a i n e d the spirit
through
faith in Jesus Christ with the "slavery" that characterizes life u n d e r the
Torah.
2 6
T h i s contrast
is e x p r e s s e d with p a r t i c u l a r f o r c e
in
Galatians, a n d especially in the allegory o f Sarah and H a g a r , w h e r e the law is in fact itself ultimately characterized as a " y o k e o f slav ery" ( 4 : 2 1 - 5 : 1 ) . T h u s , t o o , are the "false brothers" in Jerusalem w h o a p p a r e n d y felt that Titus should b e circumcised characterized as hav ing "slipped in to spy o n the f r e e d o m (ir\v eXevdepiav) w e have in Christ Jesus, so that they might enslave (KaTa8ouXcbaoi)aiv) us" (2:4). Seen alongside his refutation
27
o f the notions o f righteousness b y faith
apart f r o m works a n d o f fulfilling the law simply b y observing the love c o m m a n d , James's o b v i o u s c o n c e r n to associate the T o r a h with 28
freedom —the
o n l y explicit interest in f r e e d o m in the
work—can
b e well u n d e r s t o o d as part o f a b r o a d e r attempt to c o u n t e r pauline positions regarding the significance o f the l a w .
2 5
29
Far f r o m b e i n g a
Cf. Ludwig, Wort als Gesetz, 184-87; also Popkes, Adressaten, 116-18, w h o , how ever, reads Jas 2:8-11 in light o f a supposed polemic against later pauline "libertinists" (see below, note 29). T o be sure, Paul can (at least in Romans) describe the law itself as "spirit ual"—the highest compliment he could give it. It is, nonetheless, unable to effect that which Jesus Christ accomplished through his death and resurrection, namely, it could not liberate the sarkic human being from its slavery to sin; indeed, it only served to "increase the trespass." See esp. R o m 7:14-8:17, and cf. 5:20-21 and 7:13. This entire line o f thinking is alien to James. See further Gal 4:1-11, noting especially Paul's characterization o f the Galatians themselves as wanting to become "enslaved" (SouXe'ueiv) in 4:9. Note in this connection the emphatic effect created by the use o f the definite arti cle xov before if\<; eXevGeptocq in 1:25; noted also by Klein, Ein vollkommenes Werk, 138. Cf. Betz, Galatians, 91 n. 308; W a c h o b , "Rich in Faith," 284. Differently Popkes, Adressaten, 6 8 - 7 0 , w h o suggests that "law o f freedom" was a slogan developed by 2 6
2 7
2 8
2 9
250
CONCLUSION
" y o k e o f slavery," the T o r a h , as a written expression o f 6 euxpuxog Xoyoq, is the source o f " f r e e d o m . "
30
In sum, in c o n n e c t i o n with his treatment o f law, the author o f J a m e s presupposes, a n d seeks to refute, the existence o f at least t w o characteristically (indeed, p e r h a p s peculiarly) pauline notions: that o n e c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d righteous b y faith apart f r o m works, and that o n e c a n fulfill "the w h o l e l a w " simply b y loving o n e ' s n e i g h b o r as oneself. M o r e o v e r , J a m e s ' s o b v i o u s desire to associate the law with " f r e e d o m " is quite well u n d e r s t o o d in light o f Paul's contrary equa tion o f it with "slavery." T h e best explanation
for these points o f
contact is the m o s t straightforward: the author o f J a m e s writes with an eye to u n d e r m i n i n g Paul's position o n the
significance o f the
T o r a h . N o t a b l y , h o w e v e r , J a m e s is silent o n the issues that seem to have b e e n the impetus for these pauline formulations
in the
first
place: the i m p o r t a n c e o f circumcision, diet, etc., particularly for the non-Jewish m e m b e r s o f the m o v e m e n t . If, as p o i n t e d out earlier, it c a n n o t simply b e c o n c l u d e d f r o m this silence that J a m e s felt that such aspects o f the T o r a h were n o longer binding at all, it seems safe to suppose that such matters were not, at least, a m o n g his pri m a r y c o n c e r n s . Indeed, whatever his stance o n these issues, it is quite clear from the letter as a w h o l e , a n d from 2 : 1 - 1 3 (esp. 2 : 2 - 3 ) a n d 2 : 1 4 - 2 6 (esp. 2 : 1 5 - 1 6 ) in particular, that his m a i n c o n c e r n s
were
e c o n o m i c , a n d a b o v e all the treatment o f the socially disadvantaged: the " p o o r " ( 2 : 1 - 7 ) , the naked a n d hungry ( 2 : 1 5 - 1 6 ) , the w i d o w a n d the o r p h a n (1:27), the hired laborer (5:4).
31
His dislike o f the pauline
post-pauline libertinists, and is used ironically in James. Klein, w h o points out that there is no other evidence for such a group, finds it more likely that James's use o f pauline concepts is not ironic; rather, his association o f law and freedom results from the identification o f the law with the logos by which they have become Christians and which they possess within themselves: "Dies gibt ihnen die Moglichkeit und die Freiheit, das zu tun, was dieses Wort gebietet"; see Ein vollkommenes Werk, 143-44. Note, though, that Klein considers this logos to be the functional equivalent o f Paul's "spirit" {Ein vollkommenes Werk, 158-59); indeed, the notion o f humanity's funda mental inability to live in accord with the law apart from the reception o f some additional divine substance, which Klein apparently assumes to be operative in James, sounds strikingly pauline. Note that Irenaeus's interest in a "law o f freedom," while undoubtedly related to his familiarity with a Greek notion o f natural law, is also related to his partici pation in the ongoing early Christian debates regarding the significance o f the Torah. Interestingly, he too is engaged particularly with the pauline view—albeit, at least in part, via Marcion. See also 1:9-11 ("rich" and "humble"); 4:13-17 (travelling merchants); 5:1-6 (condemnation o f "the rich"); and further 4:1-10, which concerns acquisitiveness. 3 0
31
251
CONCLUSION
n o t i o n o f nicziq
%copi<; epycov a n d his wariness regarding the p l a c e
m e n t o f special emphasis u p o n L e v 19:18 a n d D e u t 6:4ff, that is, seems to b e motivated less b y his special interest in the
particular
issues w h i c h inspired Paul's formulation o f the p r o b l e m o f the law than b y a c o n c e r n that such principles might lead to neglect, m o r e generally, o f G o d ' s l a w — a n d particularly o f those aspects o f it w h i c h c o n c e r n the e c o n o m i c a l l y disadvantaged.
32
In this respect, perhaps,
J a m e s is n o t altogether different from those w h o leveled a m o r e gen eralizing critique o f Paul b y caricaturing his teaching as "let us d o evil so that g o o d m a y c o m e . "
3 3
W h e t h e r J a m e s b e c a m e familiar with these aspects o f Paul's v i e w through oral channels alone, b y direct access to s o m e collection o f Paul's letters (including at least R o m a n s a n d Galatians), o r through the writings o f later advocates o f the pauline position, h o w e v e r , is n o t altogether clear. W h i l e the several points o f c o n t a c t might sug gest his familiarity with s o m e written w o r k o r works, it is n o t difficult to imagine the individual points he counters as having b e e n trans mitted as pithy slogans: righteousness is attained b y nicxiq epycov; l o v e o f n e i g h b o r is the
fulfillment
o f the law; the
%copiq
law is a
" y o k e o f slavery." A s o m e w h a t stronger indication o f literary d e p e n d e n c e , perhaps, is use o f the A b r a h a m e x a m p l e in the argument o f 2:14-26.
3 4
T h e author is rather clearly c o n c e r n e d to interpret G e n
15:6, eTriaxeuaev 8e 'Appaap xco 0ecp, Kai eAoyia&n auxco eiq S i K a i o a w n v ,
Note esp., too, that while "the rich" are the arch-enemies o f the letter, "the p o o r " are said to have been chosen to inherit the kingdom (2:5). Significant too is his definition o f "pure religion" in terms not only o f avoiding the impurity o f "the world" (with which cf. esp. 4:1-10), but care o f widows and orphans (1:27). As is clear esp. from 2:1-13, proper treatment o f the poor is assumed by the author o f James to be a duty required by the law. Note also in this respect his charge that the rich withhold the wages owed to the laborers w h o work their fields, with which cf. Lev 19:13, and further the Jewish literature referred to in Dibelius, James, 238. In this respect, James is somewhat reminiscent o f the story o f Lazarus and the rich man in Luke 16:19-31, which clearly presupposes an interpretation o f the law (and prophets) in which concern for the poor is both obvious and o f critical importance. R o m 3:8. T h e lack o f evidence for the broader concerns which motivated this caricature, however, or for the nature and aim o f the particular pauline position they mocked (though cf. R o m 5:18-6:2), prohibit drawing any firm conclusions in this respect. Cf. however Luedemann's discussion o f this passage in Opposition to Paul, 109-11, noting that he also compares the caricaturization o f pauline teach ing in this passage with that found in Jas 2:14-26 (ibid., 146). Lindemann, Paulus im altesten Christentum, 2 4 5 - 4 7 ; Luedemann, Opposition to Paul, 143-46; Tsuji, Glaube, 189-94; contrast Penner, Epistle of James and Eschatology, 6 3 - 7 0 . 3 2
3 3
3 4
CONCLUSION
252
in such a w a y that A b r a h a m ' s "righteousness" c a n n o t b e said to p r o c e e d d i r e c d y f r o m his faith. T o ture" was Isaac;
35
and
actually "fulfilled"
this end,
sacrifice
thus, t o o , was A b r a h a m c o n s i d e r e d a "friend o f G o d . "
T h e interpretation o f G e n
question w h i c h i n t r o d u c e s the
4 : 2 ~ 3 ; cf. G a l
3 : 6 - 9 ) . In
directly o p p o s e d
f o u n d just p r i o r to Paul's o w n
fact,
e x a m p l e o f A b r a h a m in J a m e s ,
'Appocap 6 rcarnp TJJLICGV OUK et, epycov e8iKaicb0r| . . . (2:21), reminiscent o f — a n d
3 6
15:6 w h i c h he seeks to disallow, o f c o u r s e ,
is precisely that offered b y Paul ( R o m the
he claims that this "scrip
w h e n A b r a h a m a t t e m p t e d to
to
the
citation o f G e n
£^ epycov £8iKaicb0r|, £%ei K a u % r | j L i a , aXk'
is
quite
thrust o f — R o m
4:2,
15:6: £i yap 'AppaajLi
ou npbq 0£ov. Still, it seems
at least possible that Paul's apparentiy peculiar use
of Gen
15:6
to
p r o v e that A b r a h a m did
not
b e c o m e righteous e£ £pycov m i g h t also
have b e c o m e
the
author
known
dependence upon
to
Romans.
of James
apart f r o m
a
direct
3 7
35
Jas 2:23: K a i 87c^r|pa)9ri f] ypacpr| f] Xeyovcsa, KTA,.; note in this respect L X X Gen 22:15-18, where it is said that G o d will "indeed" (\ir\v) fulfill the promises first made to Abraham in Genesis 15 as a result o f his willingness to sacrifice his son. Included among those w h o similarly interpret Jas 2:23 on the model o f a prophetic fulfillment are Ropes, Epistle of St. James, 221; Lindemann, Paulus im altesten Christentum, 246; Johnson, Letter of James, 243. It seems most likely that the K a i which introduces the clause K a i (p(Xo<; Geot) £K^r|9r| coordinates with that which begins 2:23; thus: "and the scripture was fulfilled . . .; and he was called a friend o f G o d . " Dibelius's argument that the state ment regarding Abraham's friendship with G o d is "isolated and meaningless" if not read as a part o f the "scripture" being cited is by no means persuasive (James, 164). As is clear from 4:4, being a "friend o f G o d " is quite important to the author o f James: it is, in fact, a function o f resisting desire and thus, conversely, manifesting the endurance o f temptation in erga—in this case, Abraham's ergon o f executing God's c o m m a n d to sacrifice his son. Note here that Abraham's sacrifice o f Isaac was often understood as one o f a series o f "trials" successfully completed by the patriarch, as in Jubilees, which in fact similarly connects Abraham's "faithfulness" in the last o f his ten trials with his status as "friend o f G o d " : "he was found faith ful and he was recorded as a friend o f the l o r d in the heavenly tablets" (Jub. 19:9; cf. 19:6-8; 17:15-18). If, then, one insists with Dibelius that James's clause "and he was called a friend o f G o d " is to be read as part o f the "scripture" cited in 2:23, a reference to Jubilees might be considered as plausible a possibility as one to Genesis. Dibelius's conclusion that Jas 2:23 "is not actually a quotation, but rather . . . the sort o f 'automatic' statement which is often made in devotional lan guage" in any case seems to me to be contrary to the plain sense o f the intro ductory formula f| ypacpri f| Xeyovoa. 36
37
O n e cannot place too much weight on the (admittedly interesting) fact that the citation o f Gen 15:6 in Jas 2:23 agrees verbatim with that o f R o m 4:3, with both diverging from L X X Gen 15:6 with respect to their use o f 'Appadp, (not 'Appau) and the inclusion o f the particle 8E. With respect to the former, cf. 1 M a c e 2:52; with respect to the latter, cf. Philo, Mut. Norn. 177.
253
CONCLUSION
James's interaction with pauline ideas provides a secure basis for locating it within early Christianity. M o r e specifically, the Letter o f J a m e s was p r o d u c e d in s o m e circle o f Christians for w h o m the T o r a h r e m a i n e d the central expression o f love o f G o d , a n d thus a critical criterion for inheriting the p r o m i s e d k i n g d o m that w o u l d b e given to the "twelve tribes" at the parousia o f the messiah, Jesus. Its pre cise date a n d p r o v e n a n c e , h o w e v e r , remain elusive. Clearly it was n o t written prior to Paul's activity; a n d if it d o e s assume s o m e c o l lection o f Paul's letters, this w o u l d likely place it well after death,
38
Paul's
a n d thus after the death o f J a m e s the b r o t h e r o f Jesus ca.
62 CE. In fact, while the letter's emphasis o n the T o r a h seems c o n sistent with o u r e v i d e n c e for Jesus's brother, its enlisting, to this end, o f the Stoic v i e w o f law seems m o r e consistent with later d e v e l o p ments in the Christian
debates a b o u t the T o r a h .
3 9
All things
con
sidered, it seems m o s t plausible to view J a m e s as a p s e u d o n y m o u s w o r k , written in the late first o r early s e c o n d century, perhaps Syria o r Palestine.
40
in
In any case, the Letter o f J a m e s provides i m p o r
tant, if all t o o rare e v i d e n c e for a form o f the Christian m o v e m e n t w h e r e soteriology centered n o t o n rebirth through "the G o s p e l , " but o n o b s e r v a n c e o f the T o r a h .
3 8
T h e early history o f collections o f pauline letters, however, is quite obscure; see Gamble, The New Testament Canon, 3 5 - 4 1 . O u r knowledge o f the "historical James," however, is rather limited; for a con cise treatment, see R . B. Ward, "James of Jerusalem in the First T w o Centuries," ANRW2.26A (1992) 7 7 9 - 8 1 2 . T h e address o f the letter to the "twelve tribes" is best understood in the con text o f the marked increase o f interest in the tribes o f Israel that began around the fall o f the Hasmonean kingdom and apparently waned with the failure o f the Bar K o c h b a revolt; see Jackson-McCabe, " A Letter to the Twelve Tribes," 5 1 0 - 1 5 . T h e earliest attestation o f James in the Pseudo-Clementine De Virginitate and Origen's works is consistent with an eastern provenance. 3 9
4 0
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Smith, Morton. Clement of Alexandria and a Secret Gospel of Mark. Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1973. Smyth, Herbert Weir. Greek Grammar. Revised by Gordon M . Messing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. Spitta, Friedrich. Der Brief des Jakobus. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1896. Sterling, Gregory E. Historiography And Self Definition: Josephos, Luke-Acts and Apologetic Historiography. N o v T S u p 64. Leiden, New York and Koln: E. J. Brill, 1992. Stone, Michael E. Fourth Ezra: A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990. Strack, H . L., and Giinter Stemberger. Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash. Translated and edited by Markus Bockmuehl. Second printing, with emendations and updates. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996. Striker, Gisela. "Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 9 (1991) 1-73. . "Origins o f the Concept o f Natural Law." In Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2, edited by John J. Cleary, 7 9 - 9 4 . New York: University Press o f America, 1987. Tcherikover, Victor. Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews. Reprinted with a preface by John J. Collins. Peabody, M A : Hendrickson, 1999. T o d d , Robert B. "The Stoic C o m m o n Notions: A Re-examination and Reinterpretation." Symbolae Osloenses 48 (1973) 4 7 - 7 5 . Townshend, R . B. "The Fourth book o f Maccabees." APOT 2, 6 5 3 - 8 5 . Tsuji, Manabu. Glaube zwischen Vollkommenheit und Verweltlichung: Eine Untersuchung zur literarischen Gestalt und zur inhaltlichen Koharenz des Jakobusbriefes. W U N T 2 / 9 3 . Tubingen: J. C . B. M o h r (Paul Siebeck), 1997. Vander Waerdt, Paul A. "Philosophical Influence on R o m a n Jurisprudence? T h e Case o f Stoicism and Natural Law." ANRW 2.36.7 (1994) 4 8 5 1 - 4 9 0 0 . . "The Stoic Theory o f Natural Law." Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1989. . "Zeno's Republic and the Origins o f Natural Law." In The Socratic Movement, edited by Paul A. Vander Waerdt, 2 7 2 - 3 0 8 . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Vouga, Francois. UEpitre de Saint Jacques. C N T , d.s.l3a. Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1984. W a c h o b , Wesley Hiram. " T h e Rich in Faith' and 'the Poor in Spirit': T h e SocioRhetorical Function o f a Saying o f Jesus in the Epistle o f James." Ph. D . disser tation, Emory University, 1993. Wahl, O . Apocalypsis Esdrae. Apocalypsis Sedrach. Visio Bead Esdrae. P V T G 4. Leiden: E . J . Brill, 1977. Ward, R o y Bowen, Jr. "The Communal Concern o f the Epistle o f James." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1966. Ward, R o y Bowen. 'James of Jerusalem in the First T w o Centuries." ANRW 2.26.1 (1992) 7 7 9 - 8 1 2 . . "Partiality in the Assembly: James 2 : 2 - 4 . " HTR 62 (1969) 8 7 - 9 7 . Watson, Duane F. "James 2 in Light o f G r e c o - R o m a n Schemes o f Argumentation." NTS 39 (1993) 9 4 - 1 2 1 . . "The Rhetoric o f James 3:1-12 and a Classical Pattern o f Argumentation." NovT 35 (1993) 58. Watson, Gerard. "The Natural Law and Stoicism." In Problems in Stoicism, edited by A . A . Long, 2 1 6 - 3 8 . London: T h e Athlone Press, 1971. Weiss, Bernhard. Die katholischen Briefe. Textkritische Untersuchungen und Textherstellung. Leipzig: J. C . Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1892. Williams, Frank, ed. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis. Books II and III (Sects 47-80, De Fide). N H M S 36. Leiden: E . J . Brill, 1994.
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263
Windisch, Hans. Die katholischen Briefe. 3d edition. H N T 15. Tubingen: J. C . B. M o h r (Paul Siebeck), 1951. Winston, David. Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985. Wolmarans, J. L. P. "The Tongue Guiding the Body: The Anthropological Pre suppositions o f James 3:1-12." Neotestamentica 26 (1992) 5 2 3 - 3 0 . Wolverton, W . I. "The Double-Minded M a n in the Light o f Essene Psychology." ATR 38 (1956) 166-75.
INDEX OF ANCIENT
LITERATURE
A.Jewish B i b l e / O l d Testament B. New Testament C . Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, and Dead Sea Scrolls D . Philo E. Rabbinic Literature F. Apostolic Fathers G. Other Early Christian Literature H . Graeco-Roman Literature
A . JEWISH B I B L E / O L D TESTAMENT
Genesis 1:14-18 1:26 1:26-28 2:8 3 6:5-7 9:2 15 15:6 22:1-19 22:15-18
236 114 238 115 129, 197, 236 199, 210 238 252 248, 251, 252 197 252
Exodus 20:5-6 20:13-15 20:17 21:2 21:5 21:26 21:27 21-23 23:7 28:30 32:16
166 156 99 146 146 146 146 109 161 227 148
Leviticus 19 19:12-18 19:13 19:15
19:18
156, 164 164 251 156, 158, 160, 162-64, 169, 172-4, 176 153, 158, 162, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170,
19:20 Deuteronomy 1:13 1:15 1:16-17 1:17 5:9-10 5:17-18 6:4 6:4ff 6:4-5 6:4-9 6:5
172-75, 187, 245, 248, 251 146
7:9 10:17 15:12 15:13 15:15 15:18 16:18-20 18:19 21:14 30:8-20 30:16 30:20
219 219 156, 161, 166 156 137, 245, 165 174 165, 248 166 160 146 146 148 146 160 156, 146 136 166 166
1 Kingdoms ( L X X ) 17:25
146
3 Kingdoms ( L X X ) 20:8 20:11
146 146
160 162
174-76 248, 251
169, 175,
161
266 1 Kings 17:1 18:42
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
200 200
Proverbs 3:34 10:12 18:5
205, 206 209 160
160
Isaiah 40:3 40:6b-8
226 192
166
Jeremiah 12:3 31:31-35
192 191, 192
2 Chronicles 19:5-7 Nehemiah 1:5 Psalms 83:3 19:8 ( L X X 18:8) 110:1 ( L X X 109:1) 118:43 119:47 119:48 119:127 119:159 119:166-68
203, 206 152 159 22, 194 166 166 166 166 166
Ezekiel 33:30-32
136
Daniel 9:4
166
Malachi 3:6
199
B. N E W TESTAMENT
Matthew 5 5:12 5:23-24 6:13 6:25 6:25-34 7:7-11 7:24-27 18:23-35 22:16 22:34-39 22:40 23:23 23:29-36 23:37
178 220 183 197 231 231 231 136 187 160 248, 165 165, 169 184 220 220
Mark 4:3-20 4:16 4:20 10:19 12:14 12:28-34 12:29-30
20 190 190 156 160 165, 175, 248 175
Luke 6:23 6:46-49
220 136
8:13 10:25-28 11:3 11:4 11:9-13 11:42 11:47-51 12:22-32 12:23 13:34 16:19-31 16:25 16:29-31 18:20 20:21
190 165, 175, 248 241 197 231 183 220 231 231 220 183, 184, 251 183 183 156 160
John 1:13 1:23 3:5 3:6 3:8
234 226 234 234 234
Acts 2:44-47 4:32-5:11 8:4-13 8:4 8:14
183 183 190 191 190, 191
267
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
10-11 10 10:34 10:36-43 11:1 15 15:1 15:5 15:28-29 16:4 21:17-26 21:20
180 190, 191 160 191 190, 191 180, 181 180 180 181 181 185 183
Romans 2:11 2:13 3:8 3:28 4:2 4:2-3 4:3 4:4-6 5:3-5 5:18-6:2 5:20-21 7:8 7:13 7:14-25 7:14-8:17 7:23 8:2 8:3-4 13:8b 13:8-9 13:8-10 13:9 13:10 15:25 16:20
160 136, 186 179 247 252 252 252 247 13, 217, 218 251 249 128 249 127 249 129 129 128, 129 165, 167 167, 179 234, 248, 249 167, 173 167 182 234
1 Corinthians 3:6-8 5:5 7:5 8:1-13 10:14-22
20 234 234 181 181
2 Corinthians 1:15-2:17 1:18 2:11 6:7 8:16 8:23
194 194 234 193, 194 182 182
11:14 12:27
234 234
Galatians 2 2:3 2:4 2:6 2:10 2:11-12 2:11-13 2:11-14 2:12-13 3:6-9 4:1-11 4:9 4:21-5:1 5:6 5:13-14 5:14 5:16-26
180, 182 180, 160 182 180 182 180 181 252 249 249 151, 234 234 165, 234
Ephesians 1:13 6:9
10, 22, 193 160
Colossians 1:5 3:25
10, 22, 193 160
1 Thessalonians 1:6 3:5 2:13 2:18
190 234 190 234
2 Timothy 1:8-14 1:11 1:12 2:8 2:15 2:18
193 193 193 193 10, 22, 193 193
James 1 1:1 1:2 1:2-4
1:3 1:4
182 249
179, 249
169, 173, 248
155, 159 1, 150, 245 217, 222 13, 153, 196, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 248 217, 220, 232 217, 218, 222, 224, 228, 230, 231
268
1:5 l:5ff 1:5-8 1:6 1:6-7 1:6-8 1:7 1:8 1:9-11 1:10-11 1:12
1:12-25 1:13 1:13a 1:13b l:13ff 1:13-14 1:13-15
1:13-16 1:13-18
1:14 1:14-15 1:15 1:16 1:16-17 1:16-18 1:17
1:17-21 1:18
1:19 1:19a 1:19b 1:19-21 1:19-26 1:19-27
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
200, 206 220 196, 202, 217 159, 200 217 223, 230, 232 200, 207, 230 141, 159, 206 196, 205, 217, 219, 250 192 13, 144, 166, 175, 184, 196, 198, 208, 217, 220, 221, 222, 232, 246, 248 23 140, 196-98, 204, 210, 221 196 197 199 196, 204 153, 196, 197, 200, 206, 208, 210, 213, 222, 232, 236 208, 151, 192, 196, 198, 200, 201, 206, 207, 213, 214, 215, 222, 228, 236, 238 140, 197, 198 198, 208, 214, 217, 220, 221, 222 197, 213, 216, 221 198, 213, 216, 236 200 198-200, 209 14, 15, 198, 199, 205, 207, 209, 213, 219, 235, 236 4, 11, 14, 15 5, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 139, 142, 188, 190, 193, 195, 198, 199, 201, 213, 214, 215, 216, 228, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238 140, 228, 229 215 139, 215 13, 151 155, 215 21, 139, 198, 214, 215, 228
1:20 1:20-21 1:20-27 1:21
1:21-25 1:22 1:22-23 1:22-25 1:23 1:24 1:25
1:26 1:27 2 2:1 2:1-7 2:1-13
2:2-3 2:2-4 2:3 2:4 2:5 2:5b-6a 2:6 2:6a 2:6b 2:6-7 2:7 2:8 2:8-9 2:8-11
2:8-12 2:8-13
139, 140, 151, 198 140, 189 139, 215 4, 7 - 1 1 , 14, 16-22, 24, 79, 131-33, 135, 137, 140, 141, 151, 186-89, 193, 198, 208, 214, 215, 216, 219, 228, 242 135, 144, 154 136, 141, 186, 189, 245 140, 215, 245 8, 140, 141, 155, 188, 198, 228, 245 141 143 2, 7, 12, 14 , 132, 140, 141, 143, 144, 153, 186, 193, 216, 220, 221, 244, 245, 249 178, 215, 225, 228 155, 178, 184, 187, 213, 229, 250, 251 157, 245 1, 157, 159, 160, 246 157, 250 14, 155-57, 160, 162, 163, 179, 187, 245, 246, 250, 251 159, 161, 163, 175, 250 158, 159, 161, 163, 184, 187 159 140, 159 154, 166, 175, 184, 207, 246, 251 158 184 159 158 184 158, 169 153-56, 158, 164, 168-70, 172-75, 193 158, 162, 168, 170-74, 176 14, 23, 155, 156, 158, 160, 165, 169, 170, 172, 175, 176, 179, 249 2, 153, 155, 160 157, 246
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE 2:9 2:10 2:10a 2:10b-c 2:10-11 2:11 2:11b 2:12 2:12-13 2:13 2:14 2:14-16 2:14-26
2:15-16 2:17 2:18 2:18-26 2:19 2:20 2:21 2:22 2:23 2:24 2:25 2:26 3 3:1 3:1-12 3:2 3:2-12 3:2-3 3:3 3:4 3:5 3:6 3:7-8 3:8 3:9 3:10 3:10b 3:10-11 3:11 3:13 3:13-18 3:13-4:10 3:14 3:16
158, 160, 168, 169, 170, 172, 193, 221, 246 153, 157, 169-74, 176, 177, 193, 219, 228 170 170 169, 171, 175 164, 169-72, 174, 179, 193 171, 172 12, 14, 135, 144, 154, 155, 176, 187, 193, 245 187 176, 187 157, 176, 218, 221, 246 220, 245 157, 179, 185, 189, 197, 219, 220, 224, 2 4 3 - 4 6 , 248, 250, 251 175, 184, 187, 250 218 157, 218, 219, 220, 247 245 137, 174, 175 160, 203, 247 197, 218, 252 218 171, 252 218, 245 232 204, 218, 247 224, 225 228 225, 229 141, 152, 153, 202, 215, 224, 225, 238 228 225, 229 225 224, 225 224 140, 201, 224, 225, 229 229, 238 229 142, 213, 234, 236 234 229 229 226 140, 189, 219, 220, 220, 224, 248 201, 221 188 204, 219 204, 206, 219, 221, 229
3:16-17 3:17 3:18 4:1 4:1-3 4:1-6 4:1-10 4:1-12 4:2 4:2-3 4:2-6 4:3 4:4 4:5 4:5a 4:5b 4:5-6 4:6 4:6a 4:7 4:7-8 4:7-10 4:8 4:8-9 4:9 4:9-10 4:10 4:11 4:11-12 4:12 4:13 4:13-15 4:13-17 5:1 5:1-6 5:2-3 5:3 5:4 5:4-5 5:5 5:6 5:7 5:7-8 5:8-9 5:9 5:11 5:13-16 5:14 5:15 5:16b-18 5:18
269
220 202, 206, 219, 221, 223 202 201, 202, 219, 223 208, 229 138, 159, 178, 189, 200, 201, 207, 234 188, 201, 208, 250, 251 201 201, 202, 204, 205, 208, 219 207 231 202 184, 202, 203, 219, 252 171, 203, 204, 206 203 203 203, 206 171, 202, 204, 207, 219, 229 203 205, 229 206 188 140, 159, 177, 178, 202, 208, 219, 221, 223, 189 205 219 205 136, 193 2, 176 137, 171, 176, 186-88 205 205 250 185, 205, 219 184, 187, 205, 250 207 191 222, 250 205 192, 202, 204, 208 184, 198, 202, 205, 208 1, 184 137 187 184 220 200 137, 158 137, 140 200 234
270 5:19 5:19-20
INDEX
OF ANCIENT
5:20
214, 188, 219, 208,
1 Peter 1:6-7 1:6-9 1:17 1:22 1:22-25 1:22-2:2 1:23 1:23-25 1:25
13, 217, 218 13 160 22 20 14, 20 191, 234 191 191
2 Peter 2:14 2:18 1 John 1:1-4 1:6-10 2:3-6 2:9-11 2:16-17 2:20-21
216 208, 214, 216, 238 209, 214, 216
197 197
191, 234 234 234 234 234 234
LITERATURE
2:27 2:29 3:3 3:8-10 3:9 4:6 4:7 5:1 5:4 5:6 5:18
234 234 234 234 20, 234 208, 234 234 234 234 234 234
2 John 2
234
3 John 3-4 8
234 234
Jude 6-7 7 8 11 13 16
211,213 211 211 211 211,212 160
C . A P O C R Y P H A , PSEUDEPIGRAPHA, AND D E A D S E A SCROLLS
Apocalypse of Sedrach 8:12 146, 147 2 Baruch 14:12 24:1 51:7 / Enoch 1-36 2:1 6:2 18:9-19 18:13 18:15 72-82 86 92-105 4 Ezra 7:3-13 7:77 7:96-98
247 247 247
211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 183
147 247 146, 147
7:101 8:32-36 9:7 13:23 13:25-26 13:29
147 247 247 247 146, 147 146, 147
Jubilees 17:9 17:12 17:15-18-19 17:16 17:17-18 18:lff 19:6-8 19:9 252
197 197 218, 252 197 197 197 252
Letter of Aristeas 27 37 246 31
146 146 146 152
271
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE 1 Maccabees 2:6-13 2:11 2:52 2:67 14:25 15:7
148 146 218, 252 136 146 146, 148
2 Maccabees 2:22 6:18-31 9:13
146, 148 97 146
4 Maccabees 1:1 1:1-2 1:2-4 1:6 1:13-30 99 1:15 1:15-17 1:16 1:16-17 1:20-29 1:29 2:3 2:6 2:8 2:9 2:14 2:21 2:23 3:5 3:20 4:15-22 5 5:1 5:6 5:7 5:8 5:8-9 5:10-12 5:11 5:13 5:14 5:16-21 5:19-21 5:22 5:23 5:23-25 5:26 5:27 5:38
96, 100 103 99 99
6:7 6:21-22 6:31 7:10 7:16 7:17-23 8:1 11:27 12:13 13:1 13:2 14:2 15:23 16:1 16:4 18:4
104 97 100 96 100 100 100 99 96 100 96 96, 150, 153 100 100 100 105
Odes of Solomon 96, 99, 104 99 96 100 98 140 96 99, 100 99 99 99, 100 98 99 98 105 105 97 153 97 97 101 97, 100 97 97 97, 98 153 98 96 97, 98, 99 98 98 99, 101, 103 153 96
8:8
194
Psalms of Solomon 2:18 14:1-2 16:10 1QS
160 168 194
3:18-19
208
Sirach 3:1 4:22 4:27 35:14-16 44:20 Testament of Abraham A 19:7
136 160 160 160 218 146
Testaments of XII Patriarchs T Benjamin 10:8
146, 147
T Gad 3:1
22, 194
T Issachar 5:1 5:2 T Judah 1:5 4:3
167 167 146 146
272
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
13:6 14:1 20:1 21:7
T. Naphtali 1:10 3:2-5
146 146 208 146
146 212
D.
De Abrahamo 3-6 5 6 41 45 63 70 130 275-76 276
93, 95 91 93 237 237 71 225-26 89 93 95
De agricultura 51
202 213
Wisdom o f Solomon 1:12-16 2:12-20 2:23-24 3:1-4
197 198 197 197
PHILO
21-31 69 105 148
90 90 161 93, 95
De migratione Abrahami 59 90 70-73 226 71 226, 227 72 226 73 225, 227 89-93 167 130 34 148 230
89
De animalibus 60 93 De cherubim 87-90 88 89
210 210 210
De confusione linguarium 61 106 115
90 91 226
De decalogo 53 106 107 175
90 167 167 167
De gigantibus 48 48-51
210 230
De Iosepho 2 29
T. Reuben 4:7-11 5:6
71 71
237 34, 89, 90
De mutatione nominum 177
252
De opificio mundi 3 7 12 65ff 72-75 73 77 135 139-40 143 143-44 148
35, 90, 92, 152 120 210 237 114 237 101, 237 92, 114 91 89, 91 90, 237 95
De praemiis et poenis 53-55 55
94 34, 89
De providentia 2.39
90
De somniis 1.23 1.243 2.281
194 90 226
273
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE De sobrietate 94 142
91 89
De specialibus legibus 1.1 1.34 2.45 2.63 4.180
167 90 90 167 214, 233
De virtutibus 194
93
De vita contemplativa 10.78 78
141 142
93 91 91 95 93, 95 95 93, 94 92 92 90 91 226 226 226
Legibus Allegoriae 1.30 2.22 2.33 3.114
237 237 210 201
E.
b. Shabbat 31a
138 202 227 227 227 227 227 227 138, 201
3.224
226
Posteritate Caini
De vita Mosis 1.48 1.156 1.157 1.158 1.162 1.334 2.4 2.9 2.11 2.51 2.192 2.127 2.127-130 127
Abot de Rabbi Nathan 1:10 6 1
3.114-37 3.117 3.118 3.119 3.120 3.120ff 3.123-24 3.128 3.137
86 88
226 225, 227
Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin 4.76
94, 95
Quod Deus sit Immutabilis 21-22 22 23
199 210 210
Quod omnis probus liber sit 17-18 21 31 44 45-47 46 46-47 47 60 62 69 105-109 154 159
150 149 153 91 150 92, 152 89 93 149 150 149 149 153 150
RABBINIC LITERATURE
b. Shebu'ot 162 87
166, 169
31a
161
m. Abot 6:2
148
274
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
F . APOSTOLIC FATHERS
1 Clement 1:3 30:3 32:4
160 247 247
Didache 4:3 6:2-3 8:2
160 181 197
G.
Apostolic Constitutions 1-6 1.6 1.6.7-10 1.6.8 2.19.2 2.35.1 2.58 6.10.2 6.11.7 6.12.13 6.14.4 6.15 6.19.2 6.20 6.20.1-11 6.20.4 6.20.6-11 6.20.10 6.22.1 6.22.5 6.23.1 6.23.2 6.[28].1 7
7-8 7.1.3 7.2.1 7.2.10 7.14 7.26.1-3 7.26.3 7.33 7.33-38 7.33.2
Epistle o f Barnabas 1:2 4:12 9:9
18 160 18
Ignatius ad Ephesios 17:2
18
Polycarp Philippians 6:1
160
O T H E R E A R L Y CHRISTIAN LITERATURE
106, 110, 115, 117 109 110 110 118 110 161 118 118 110 110 116 116 110, 115, 116 110 110 110 110, 115, 116 109 109, 110 110 117, 140 110 106, 107, 109, 110, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118 110, 111, 112, 115, 117 110 110 110 110 107, 111 15, 111, 112, 115 107, 108 106, 107, 108, 111, 113 111
7.33.3 7.34 7.34.5 7.34.6 7.35 7.35.10 7.36 7.37 7.38 7.39.2 8 8.6.5 8.6.5-8 8.9.8 8.12 8.12.6-7 8.12.6-27 8.12.7-18 8.12.8 8.12.16 8.12.16-18 8.12.17 8.12.17-18 8.12.18 8.12.19-26 8.12.20-16 8.12.25 8.12.27 8.12.30 8.15.7 8.16.3 8.40.2-4 8.40.3 8.41.2-5 8.41.4 8.41.4-5
17, 112, 115, 119 107, 112 111 114, 118, 237 107 111 107, 108 107 107 111, 118, 119, 142 106, 107, 109, 110, 113, 116, 117, 118 107 107 15, 114, 115, 116, 118 14, 107, 108, 112, 116, 117, 119 113 113 113 17, 111 117, 118 114, 117 119 115 119, 120 113 120 115, 116, 119, 120 114 111 15 107 107 112 107 118 107
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
Clement o f Alexandria Excerpta ex Theodoto 1:3-7 Stromateis 1.13
93.1 141.1
125 126
212
194
Irenaeus Adversus haereses 3.11.8 3 4.2.4 151 4.4.3 151 4.9.1-2 151 4.11.4 178 4.13.4 151 4.14.3 178 4.14-15 109, 151 4.15.1 151 4.16 151 4.34.4 151 Justin Apologia 2 2.1-2 2.1-5 2.3f 3.3 6.2 6.3 7.7 8.1 8.1-3 8.9 9.3-4 9.3-5 13.2 13.3 13.5
126 126 126 80 125 63, 67, 125 126 126 124 126 126, 152 126 123 123, 126 123, 125, 126
Dialogus cum Tryphone 12.2 18.3 43.1 47
126 126 126 181
H.
Aetius Placita vestuta 4.11
275
48
Aristotle Mcomachean Ethics 1.7.1-8 230 1.7.6-7 230
Methodius apud Epiphanius's Panarion 4.26-27 130 4.26.1 130 4.26.1-27.4 129 4.27.8 129, 130 4.28-34 128 4.36.4-5 129, 130 4.41.6 129 4.49.9 130 4.50.2f 128 4.50.4-5 128 4.50.5 128 4.55.2-3 128 4.56.1 128 4.56.4-5 128 4.56.5 128 4.56.10-59.6 129 4.58.9 130 4.60.1 128 4.60.2 130 4.61.1-3 129 4.61.4 130 4.62.10 128 4.62.11 128 4.62.13 129 4.64.12-62 127 4.64.60-62 127 60.5 128 Oecumenius M P G 119. 468
7, 131
Ps.-Clementine Recognitiones 1.35-39
109
Theophilus Ad Autolycus 2:15
212
Theophylactus M P G 125. 1145
7, 131
G R A E G O - R O M A N LITERATURE
Cicero Academica Priora 5f 132
81 83
Brutus 213
78
276 De finibus 1.1-12 1.31 3 3.16 3.20 3.20-21 3.21 3.21-22 3.22-31 3.33 3.34 3.41 3.41-48 3.44 3.62 3.63 4 4.3-5 4.4 4.7 4.21-23 4.25 4.56-61 5 5.15-23 5.12 5.16 5.18 5.41 5.43 5.59 5.60 5.65 5.65-66 5.66 De legibus 1 1.14 1.17 1.17-19 1.18
1.18-19 1.19 1.21 1.22 1.22-25 1.23 1.24 1.25
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
81 78 54, 55 55 57 54, 55 54 48, 55 55, 54 54 62 71 54 55 68, 83 55 60 55 61 54 60 82 61, 60 61 61, 61 71 79 62
58, 74
56, 58
49, 55, 56, 58 82
78, 79
74
74
76, 83, 85 82 78 77 12, 17, 41, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 86, 132 34, 40, 76, 77, 78 76, 78 41, 77, 78 237 41 33, 36, 40, 69, 76, 80, 83, 90 69, 80, 114, 125 69, 85, 101, 237
1.26 1.27 1.26-27 1.30 1.33 1.36 1.37 1.37-39 1.42 1.47 1.54 1.56 1.59 1.59-60 1.60 2.8 2.8-11 2.10 2.11 18 30
42, 74, 84, 85, 114 42, 75, 77 41, 42, 74, 76, 77, 85 61, 86 61, 74, 76, 77, 80, 83 81 81 82 34, 76, 80, 83 120, 125 82 76 63, 69, 80, 85, 86 86 76 34, 35, 36, 39, 76, 83 77, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 76. 80, 83 39, 76 75 226
De natura deorum 1.1-14 1.17 1.36 1.36-41 1.37 1.40 1.44 1.62-64 2.3 2.5 2.12 2.13-15 2.15 2.16 2.20ff 2.37 2.39-44 2.44 2.49-56 2.58 2.123-24 2.128 2.128-29 2.133 2.154-62 10
80 78 32, 35 101 34 67, 69 68 68 67, 68 211 237 68 237 237 237 211 39 71 71 62, 237 237 89
De qfficiis 1.11 1.12
62 62
34
79
68
71
277
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
2.11 3.32
237 78
De republica 3.33 33
79, 80 34
In Pisonem 15
78
In Verrem 2.48 2.139 2.177 Paradoxa Stoicorum 5 5.34
78 78 78 145, 150 149
Pro Cluentio 4
78
Pro Murena 30 78 Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino 53 78 Topica 31
78, 79
Tusculanae disputationes 1.1-8 80 1.57 78, 79, 85 3.1-4 120 3.2 60, 61, 64, 125 4.26-27 78 5.40 230 5.44 230 D i o Chrysostum De dei cognitione 12.27 67, 70, 72, 125 12.28-34 70 12.29 71 12.30-31 71 12.32 72 12.35 72 12.39 67, 72 12.42 71, 70 Diogenes Laertius Vitae philosophorum 7.33 90 7.32-33 33, 145
7.52-53 7.53 7.54 7.85 7.86 7.88 7.89 7.121f 7.121 7.122 7.128 7.134 7.199 9.27 9.59
45, 46 46, 49, 64 45 52, 60, 103 37 33, 35, 77, 79 101, 103 94 145, 149 99 32 35 45, 66 149 149
Epictetus Dissertationes 1.1.7 1.2.6 1.12.34 1.19.11-15 1.21.1 1.22.1-8 1.22.9-10 1.22.11 1.22.11-16 1.28.28 2.11 2.11.2 2.11.4 2.11.6 2.11.8 2.11.10 2.11.11 2.11.13-14 2.11.17f 2.11.24 2.17 2.17.1 2.17.39f 2.17.1-3 2.17.29-40 2.19.32 2.22.17ff 3.22 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.42 4.1.56 4.1.62 4.1.62-84 4.1.89 4.1.90
65 65 65 64 64 64 65 65,66 66 66 47 63, 65 63 63,64 64 63, 65 63 66 66 66 65 66 66 65 65 65 66 64 145 148 65 149 149 149 149 150
278
INDEX OF ANCIENT LITERATURE
4.1.91-110 4.1.158 4.1.172 4.1.175 4.8.6-10
150 150, 231 150 149 47, 63
Enchiridion 26
90
Lucian Demonax 51
139
Plutarch De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 329A-B 33 De communibus notitiis contra stoicos 1058F 51 1070C 50, 60, 72 De stoicorum repugnatiis 1035D 66 1037F 38, 39, 89 1038A 39, 53 1038B 62, 71 1041F 48 1050D 35 Porphyry De abstentia 3.19
62
Seneca De vita beata 15.7
150
Epistulae morales 92 108 108.8 117.6 120 120.1-3 120.2-3 120.3 120.4 120.4 121 121.20 121.23
93 58 58 68, 49, 57 58 57 50, 58 58, 59 59,
Stobeus Eclogae 1.25.3-27.4 2.77.16-27
35 230
125 57
57, 58 59 125
SVF {Stoicorum veterum Fragment^ H. von Arnim, ed.) 1.262 33, 152 1.537 35, 77, 79 1.197 62 2.83 41, 44, 56. 73 2.528 33 2.841 74 2.1003 34 3.314 34, 35, 39 3.332 34 3.613 34 3.614 34
INDEX OF M O D E R N
Abrahams, I. 166 Adamson, J. B. 9, 10, 16, 20, 195 Agourides, S. 147 Aland, B. 168, 209 Anderson, H . 96, 98, 99, 101, 103 Appelbaum, S. 87 Bachman, E. T . 2 Baker, W . R . 225 Balch, D . L. 225 Balz, H . 16 Bauckham, R . 211 Bauer, W . 181 Benardete, S. 30 Betz, H. D . 143, 145, 161, 165, 182, 183, 197, 249 Beyschlag, W . 8, 10, 14, 20 Bietenhard, H . 109 Black, M . 211 Blackman, E. C . 16, 141, 144 Blum, E. 156 Boismard, M.-E. 4, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 241, 242 Bonhoffer, A . 10, 11, 18, 19, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 62, 65, 69 Bousset, W . 106, 107, 108, 110, 111 Boyle, M . O'Rourke 177, 219 Breitenstein, U. 96, 97, 99, 100, 103 Brink, C O . 51 Burchard, C . 156, 157, 158, 171 Busse, U. 163 Cadoux, A. T . 8, 16, 144, 195, 241 Cantinat, J. 10, 17, 19, 20, 22, 157, 174, 198, 207 Chaine,J. 10, 157, 195, 196, 198 Charles, R . H. 147 Cherniss, H . 37 Chesnut, G. F. 93 Cladder, H . J. 228 Cleary,J.J. 29 Clemen, C . 18 Cohen, S. J. D . 87 Collins, J. J. 87, 211 Colson, F. H . 138, 210
AUTHORS
Connolly, R . H. Cross, F. L. 11
106, 108, 109
Darnell, D . R . 15, 109, 114, 115, 116 Davids, P. H . 1, 4, 9, 10, 17, 20, 151, 156, 157, 160, 163, 171, 174, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 205, 207, 213, 233 DeFilippo,J. G. 30 de Jonge, M . 147, 212, 213 Denis, A . - M . 146 Deppe, D . B. 156, 192 deSilva, D . A . 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105 Dibelius, M . 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 164, 173, 174, 177, 179, 182, 184, 188, 190, 191, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 209, 214, 215, 217, 218, 222, 224, 225, 231, 233, 235, 236, 237, 244, 247, 251, 252 Dillon' J. M . 30, 83, 85, 89, 90, 92, 120 Droge, A. J. 123 Dupont-Sommer, A . 96, 97, 99, 102, 104 Edsman, C . - M . 10, 195 Edwards, M . J . 123 Elliott-Binns, L. E. 10, 195, 233, 237 Engberg-Pedersen, T . 51, 54, 61, 77, 103 Enslin, M . S. 166 Fabris, R . 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 136, 139, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 153, 155, 157, 171, 191, 192, 195, 209, 233, 235 Felder, C . H . 9, 17, 19 Fiensy, D . A . 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 Foerster, W . 223 Fortenbaugh, W . W . 51
280
INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS
Fortna, R . T . 180 Frankemolle, H . 11, 17, 19, 195 Freedman, H . 166 Funk, F. X . 109 Gamble, H . Y . 3, 253 Gaventa, B. R . 180 G o o d e n o u g h , E. R . 15, 77, 89, 9 1 , 92, 93, 94, 95, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121 Goranson, S. 183 Greeven, H . 1, 9, 19, 207 Hadas, M . 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 104 Hartin, P . J . 217, 224, 244 Hauck, F. 16, 20, 157, 199, 233 Heidland, H . W . 100 Heisen, H . 8 Hengel, M . 87 Holl, K. 127 Hollander, H . W . 212, 213 Holte, R . 123, 124, 125 H o p p e , R . 20, 144, 163, 217 Horsley, R . 29, 31, 35, 82, 83, 84, 122 van der Horst, P. W . 108, 112 Hort, F . J . A . 8, 10, 142, 153, 195, 199, 207 Huther, J. E. 8, 10, 14 Inwood, B. 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 51, 53, 61, 67, 69, 71, 74, 90, 140, 149, 226, 237 Isaac, E. 211 Jackson-McCabe, M . A . 1, 158, 185, 243, 253 Jervis, L. A . 191 Jobling, D . 237 Johnson, L. T . 9, 10, 17, 136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 164, 170, 171, 174, 175, 179, 184, 185, 188, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 213, 215, 217, 219, 220, 224, 225, 229, 231, 234, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 252 Jones, F. S. 145, 146, 148 Kanel, B. 146, 147 Keck, L. E. 182, 183 Kee, H . C . 147, 212, 223
Kenter, L. P. 30, 40, 42, 43, 69, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 101, 237 Kirk, J. A . 23, 33 Klauck, H.-J. 96, 97, 103, 104 Klein, M . 5, 9, 17, 19, 23, 24, 136, 137, 144, 148, 158, 168, 178, 188, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 203, 205, 207, 208, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 229, 235, 244, 249, 250 Klijn, A . F . J . 147 Kloppenborg, J. S. 163, 182, 183 Koester, H . 29, 31, 32 Kohler, K. 106, 107 Kraft, R . A . 181 Krodel, G. 181 Kuhl, E.
144, 153, 169, 173, 175
Lauer, S.
100
Laws, S. 9, 10, 16, 19, 20, 141, 144, 153, 158, 171, 194, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 210, 234 Leconte, R . 17, 20, 233 Lindemann, A . 244, 251, 252 Liscu, M . O . 42 Lohse, E. 160 Long, A . A . 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 51, 53, 66, 69, 77, 98, 230 Ludwig, M . 18, 23, 24, 25, 136, 153, 158, 166, 169, 179, 195, 249 Luedemann, G. 244, 251 Luther, M . 2, 142, 144 Manns, F. 9, 20 Marcovich, M . 123 Markschies, C . 87 Martens, J. W . 92, 95 Martin, R . P. 9, 17, 20, 144, 158, 163, 174, 195, 196, 218 Marty, J. 10, 19, 196, 233 Mayer, G. 226 Mayor, J. B. 10, 20, 140, 141, 159, 175, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 207, 213, 218, 233 Massebieau, L. 11 McKnight, S. 218, 219 Meinertz, M . 10, 16, 20 Meshorer, Y . 147 Meyer, A . 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 40, 153, 173, 241, 242 Mitchell, M . M . 190 Mitsis, P. 30, 32
INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS Mitton, C. L. 159 Moffatt, J. 10, 20, 233 MuBner, F. 9, 10, 16, 20, 143, 144, 153, 157, 158, 161, 171, 190, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 207, 209, 213, 217, 233 Neitzel, H . Neugebauer, Neusner, J. Nickelsburg,
218 O . 211 29 G. W . E.
96, 183
Oldfather, W . A. 149 Orlinsky, H . M . 166 Pembroke, S. G. 51, 61, 62, 71 Penner, T . 179, 205, 251 Perdue, L. G . 105 Perkins, P. 10, 17, 196, 198 Petuchowski, J. J. 107 Pfeiffer, E. 228 Philippson, R . 51 du Plessis, P. J. 224 Pohlenz, M . 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 69, 70, 74, 84, 85, 145, 149 Popkes, W . 17, 20, 195, 233, 249 Redditt, P. L. 96, 97, 99, 100, 101 Reesor, M . E. 32, 33 Reicke, B. 16, 20, 151, 196, 197, 233 Rendall, G. H . 10, 195 Renehan, R . 96, 97, 98 Richardson, P. 191 Rist, J. M . 49, 53 Ropes, J. H . 9, 10, 20, 136, 137, 140, 141, 143, 144, 153, 155, 158, 159, 161, 164, 169, 175, 178, 195, 196, 198, 199, 201, 203, 207, 209, 220, 223, 226, 233, 244, 252 Sandbach, F. H. 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64 Sanders, E. P. 177, 180 Schlier, H . 145, 146 Schnackenburg, R . 191, 194 Schneider, J. 16 Schoedel, W . R . 151 Schofield, M . 33 Schokel, L. A. 205
281
Schrage, W . 16, 20 Sedlacek, I. 7, 131 Sedley, D . N . 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 51, 53, 66, 69, 98, 230 Segal, A. F. 187 Segovia, F. F. 184 Seitz, O . J . F. 10, 178, 185, 223 Sidebottom, E. M . 16, 142, 195, 196 Simon, L. 16 Smith, J. Z . 3, 242 Smith, M . 212 Smyth, H . W . 101 Spitta, F. 10, 11, 14, 158, 169, 173, 175, 195, 198 Stemberger, G. 162 Stone, M . E. 147 Strack, H . L. 162 Strecker, G. 181 Striker, G. 29, 30 Taran, L. 43 Tcherikover, V . 87 T o d d , R . B. 50 Townshend, R . B. 100, 105 Tsuji, M . 9, 11, 17, 19, 23, 24, 144, 178, 194, 195, 217, 223, 233, 251 Vahlen, J. 39 VanderKam, J. C . 211 Vander Waerdt, P. A. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 76, 82, 83 Verheule, A. F. 107 Vouga, F. 10, 17, 19, 20, 144, 213 Vrede, W . 10, 16, 20 Wachob, W. H. 153, 156, 157, 159, 160, 163, 164, 169, 171, 172, 185, 188, 249 Wahl, O . 147 Ward, R . B. 17, 24, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 253 Watson, D . F. 157, 225 Watson, G. 29, 245 Weiss, B. 10 Williams, F. 127, 128 Windisch, H . 10, 17, 19, 196, 233 Winston, D . 91, 92 Wolmarans, J. L. P. 225 Wolverton, W . I. 223 Zeller, D .
45
