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Page i Local Shakespeares ‘Local Shakespeares shows just how timid and pr...
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Page i Local Shakespeares ‘Local Shakespeares shows just how timid and predictable most comparative criticism is. Timid and predictable Local Shakespeares is not.’ Bruce Smith, University of Southern California., USA. This remarkable volume challenges scholars and students to look beyond a dominant European and North American ‘metropolitan bank’ of Shakespeare knowledge. As well as revealing the potential for a new understanding of Shakespeare’s plays, Martin Orkin explores a fresh approach to issues of power, where ‘proximations’ emerge from a process of dialogue and challenge traditional notions of authority. Since their first performances, Shakespeare’s plays and their audiences or readers have journeyed to one another across time and space, to and from countless and always different historical, geographical and ideological locations. Engagement with a Shakespeare text always entails in part, then, cultural encounter or clash, and readings are shaped by a reader’s particular location and knowledge. Part I of this book challenges us to recognise the way in which ‘local’ or ‘non-metropolitan’ knowledges and experiences might extend understanding of Shakespeare’s texts and their locations. Part II demonstrates the use of local as well as metropolitan knowledges in exploring the presentation of masculinity in Shakespeare’s late plays. These plays themselves dramatise encounters with different cultures and, crucially, challenges to established authority Questioning the authority of metropolitan scholarship, twenty-first-century global capitalism and the masculine imperatives that drive it, Professor Orkin’s daring, powerful work will have reverberations throughout but also well beyond the field of Shakespeare studies. Professor Martin Orkin, who teaches in the Departments of English and of Theatre at the University of Haifa in Israel, is author of Shakespeare Against Apartheid and Drama and the South African State. He is also co-editor, with Ania Loornba, of Postcolonial Shakespeares, and editor of At the Junction: Four Plays by the Junction Avenue Theatre Company.
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Page iii Local Shakespeares Proximations and power Martin Orkin
LONDON AND NEW YORK
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Page iv First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2005 Martin Orkin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Orkin, Martin. Local Shakespeares: proximations and power/Martin Orkin. p. cm. 1. Shakespeare, William, 1564–1616—Tragicomedies. 2. Shakespeare, William, 1564–1616—Appreciation-Foreign countries. 3. Power (Social sciences) in literature. 4. Social problems in literature. 5. Tragicomedy. I. Title PR2981.5 O75 2005 822.3’3—dc22 2004027981 ISBN 0-203-64107-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-415-34878-1 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-34879-X (pbk)
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Page v For Joan, for Chloë and for Mikhail
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Page vii Contents Acknowledgements
ix
1 Introduction: travelling to Shakespeare’s late plays PART I Local knowledges and Shakespeare’s global texts 2 Intersecting knowledges: Shakespeare in Timbuktu 3 Active readers: whose muti in the web of it? 4 William Tshikinya-Chaka, I presume? Cultural encounter in performance PART II Encountering men in Shakespeare’s late plays 5 Prologue: the ‘infirmities of men’ in Pericles 6 Cymbeline: ‘…that most venerable man which I/Did call my father’ 7 The Winter’s Tale: ‘Let no man mock me’ 8 The Tempest: ‘Any strange beast there makes a man’ 9 Afterword: the unruliness of patriarchy Notes Select bibliography Index
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1 15 17 29 43 61 63 82 112 142 165 171 203 213
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Page ix Acknowledgements This book has taken me a very long time to write and I have several different profound debts of gratitude to record. I want firstly to thank Bruce Smith, not only for the wonderful example he and his work give, but for his meticulous reading of my manuscript and for his always acute and excellent criticisms and advice. Whatever deficiencies this book may now be free of, is due to his unerring care. I also thank Maurizio Calbi for his generous and critical reading of two of the chapters of my manuscript and for his always heartening emails. I am most grateful to the Shakespeare Association of America, for the opportunities its annual meetings have given me to meet and learn from the community of scholars and students who gather there. For comments on early work that was, unbeknownst to them, to lead to this book, I thank Valerie Wayne, a member of Jodi Mikalachki’s seminar ‘Cymbeline and the State of the Art’ (Cleveland, 1998); Simon Palfrey, a member of Suzanne Gossett’s seminar ‘New and Old Approaches to Pericles’ (San Francisco, 1999); Shankar Raman, who ran the seminar ‘Into the Archives and Back Again: Shakespeare and the End(s) of History’ (Montreal, 2000); Natasha Korda and Margaret Owens, members of Ian Smith’s seminar ‘Racial CrossDressing on the Renaissance Stage’ (Minneapolis, 2002); and Michael Schoenfeldt, who ran the seminar ‘Physiology, Psychology, and Psychoanalysis’ (New Orleans, 2004). On a more general level it is important to me to thank Alan Sinfield, Jonathan Dollimore, Terence Hawkes and John Drakakis for the inspiration of their work, for their encouragement over the years and for their friendship. As this book will show, I owe everywhere a huge debt to the work of numerous other scholars and I thank each one of them. I thank, too, the Folger Shakespeare Library for the very kind award to me of a Bess and Philip Rosenblum Fellowship. I also wish to thank David Macfarlane, Craig Bregman, Zodwa Motsa and Joseph Sherman for facilitating, when I was not there, my acquisition of information and material available in South Africa; Bongani Majola and Jubie Matlou for translating parts of SeZaR for me; and Leonid Shtramel for the invaluable help he provides me in Haifa. Yael Farber was most generous in speaking to me, corresponding with me, and providing me with an original script for her production of SeZaR. I thank Liz Thompson for her consistent support and encouragement, and Stuart Macfarlane and the Routledge production team for impeccable editorial help. I will always be grateful to my mother, Jenny Orkin, for teaching me about the meaning of love and of feeling. My wife, Joan Orkin, shows me the importance of its giving and receiving every day She is my fiercest intellectual antagonist and my closest
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Page x friend. I dedicate this book to her; to Mikhail Orkin, who shares her qualities, both depth of feeling and intellectual rigour, and than whom a finer son surely no one can have; and to my beloved daughter, Chloë Orkin, whose unflinching commitment to the alleviation of suffering and the finding of better treatment for AIDS fills me with awe. Very early versions of some of the material in this book appear in: 1. ‘Shifting Shakespeare’, PMLA, Vol. 118, No. 1, January 2003, pp. 134–6. 2. ‘Whose Muti in the Web of It? Seeking “Post”-Colonial Shakespeare’, The Journal of Commonwealth Literature, Vol 33, No. 2,1998, pp. 15–37. 3. A Sad Tale’s Best for South Africa?’, Textual Practice, 11 (1), 1997, pp. 1–23. 4. ‘Whose Things of Darkness? Reading/Representing The Tempest in South Africa after April 1994’, in John J.Joughin (ed.), Shakespeare and National Culture, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 142–69.
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Page 1 1 Introduction Travelling to Shakespeare’s late plays 1. Shakespeare’s local readers Since their first performances, Shakespeare’s texts have been and are, in a manner of speaking, travellers to countless and always different locations. The ‘journeyings’ of the plays, involving the passage of time as well as geography, include, firstly, as destination, successive and diverse communities within Europe and North America: as well as theatre practitioners and audiences who draw on Shakespeare scholarship, the European or North American academies, the larger educational systems of which they are part, the libraries they possess and use, or the broader social and cultural terrain they inhabit. These communities and academies in their encounters with the texts have shared and continue to produce a common bank of Shakespeare scholarship and knowledge. Constituting the centre of Shakespeare studies, they may be thought of as the Shakespeare metropolis. But over time, as a result of the processes of colonisation and globalisation, Shakespeare’s texts have long since travelled further afield as well, to various communities in Australasia, Asia, Africa and South America. All Shakespeare scholars, including Shakespeareans who are located beyond the geographical borders of Europe and North America, depend and draw upon the ongoing acquisition of what might be called this metropolitan bank of Shakespeare knowledge. Nevertheless, the assumed commonality of shared understandings remains complicated. We know well enough that changing ideological or cultural developments affect conventions of reading.1 The romantics read Shakespeare differently from nineteenth-century philologists, or late twentieth-century new historicists. Readers of Shakespeare before the second half of the twentieth century do not have the same kind of access to Shakespeare libraries or information systems, including that provided in cyberspace, which is now, at the beginning of the twenty-flrst century, available. Different kinds of women as well as different kinds of men go to Shakespeare performances or study the plays. Present-day readers of Shakespeare, within as well as beyond the Shakespeare metropolis, come from diverse places and occupy multiple positions, even as, in their choice of the Shakespeare text and use of its knowledges, they manifest a common interest. Certainly, none of our present-day locations can be equated with what we know about seventeenthcentury London. Engagement with the Shakespeare text always entails in part, therefore, cultural encounter or clash—as Richard Halpern has it in a different context, a ‘dissonant
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Page 2 conjunction of…contemporaneity and historical difference’2—in which readers and audiences too, are required to travel from their local conditions to Shakespeare, becoming, in their encounters with the texts, voyagers within foreign terrain. By ‘local’ I mean here what characterises each reader who comes to the text, in terms of her or his place and time, what is within that place epistemologically current, the particular institutional position or struggles within which she or he is situated or with which she or he is actively engaged or, again, the particular knowledges and ideologies she or he exemplifies or legitimates. Freudian or Marxist readings of the Shakespeare text—initially derived from, for instance, a twentieth-century male Jewish Austrian who moved to Britain, or a nineteenth-century male German of Jewish extraction who worked in the British Museum—pose just such dimensions of the ‘local’. As is often pointed out, versions of New Criticism in the mid-twentieth century emerged from a mostly male academy within the United States or Britain. Later critics located differently would come to define it as gender insensitive. In terms, again, of classical psychoanalytic readings of Shakespeare, it has more recently been argued that ‘the historical emergence of the Oedipus complex as a paradigm depends upon structures of colonial and patriarchal domination’.3 The historically contingent, and so volatile and always, in the long term, evanescent impact of any critical practice, together with the knowledge-systems that inform it, may in turn be taken as evidence for the relativity of any dominantly exclusionist policy towards particular local knowledges lying outside currently dominant critical terrain. No prescription (or proscription) has so far proved permanently durable. Moreover, there is no telling what knowledges will be discovered, will emerge or will, from currently disempowered localities, in time both come to prominence and, in turn, also foreground limitations to what until then had been the dominant epistemological assumptions underlying critical practice. There is therefore always a negative potential in the necessary pragmatics of current conventions of reading when set in the context of a Shakespeare text, that is always travelling to new locations where readings of it will inevitably be in one or other way partly hybridised by those locations and their particular knowledges. Although twenty-first-century readers of Shakespeare within Europe and North America are also ‘foreigners’ to what we may severally wish to construct as ‘Shakespeare’s world’, my particular interest in the first section of this book is in the epistemological unsettlings, complications or clash that might result when not only they but also readers from locations that lie beyond Europe and North America travel, so to speak, into the various worlds of these texts. What may recognition of and exploration of the knowledges and experiences of such, in many respects, markedly dissonant locations contribute to understanding of the text and its location? Without denying the simultaneous indispensability of the already existing shared achievements and knowledges of metropolitan Shakespeare scholarship, I want to argue that the kinds of knowledge that, especially, particular non-metropolitan locations—whether they are located within twentyfirst-century Europe and North America but outside the Shakespeare metropolitan academy, or beyond it—might afford, may themselves, in turn, offer additional opportunities for thinking about Shakespeare’s plays. Such knowledges may otherwise often be denied to the Shakespeare metropolis, which, in its great libraries, holds domain over the essentially important primary texts or ‘evidence’ it possesses, and which, conventionally,
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Page 3 maintains a close watch (one that, none the less, regularly over time transforms and changes itself) over the kinds of secondary knowledges or evidence that may be turned to as complement to or constitutive of textual study. The kinds of knowledge that readers who are situated in locations outside the scholarly Shakespeare metropolis might bring to the text, are, I maintain, also worth exploring so long as the global reach of the Shakespeare text—because of colonialism and its aftermath, or because of, say, middle-class processes of globalisation—continues. Shakespeareans and their publishers within Europe and North America have no difficulty exporting Shakespeare or work on Shakespeare to whatever market within or beyond their own geographical domain may be interested. As well as questions of profitability, this entails, presumably, a metropolitan assumption that knowledge of the Shakespeare text and its byproducts are, beyond the provenance of the metropolis, worth disseminating. But if the assumption that such epistemologies are, in a culturally beneficent way, exportable, the reverse should also be true. Presumably, knowledge may be benignly imported. Despite this, we know from the experience of colonial or post-colonial locations that although colonial powers were never averse to importing the gold and silver of the colonies they colonised, they were notably resistant to the importation of anything else—even if recent research argues that, in the case of cultural formation and growth, assimilation of local knowledges by colonisers was more extensive and significant than has so far been acknowledged. The present readiness of constituencies within the Shakespeare metropolis to disseminate the Shakespeare text and their work on Shakespeare to any location and to harvest the attending profits, while at the same time eliding nonmetropolitan knowledges that might intersect provocatively not only with the Shakespeare text but with the current ways in which they receive that text, regrettably echoes, albeit in an educational domain, a colonial habit. It can, moreover, be argued that the situation of present-day European and North American readers and audiences of Shakespeare and their knowledges is partly irreversibly hybridised as a result of colonialism (and more recently globalisation) and its effects— albeit in ways that even now remain far too hidden.5 Furthermore, if ‘history’ remains an important preoccupation in present-day Shakespeare studies, it partly entails the history of readers and audiences as they come to the text. Simple elision of factors of cultural clash between reader and text—which in all readings, not only non-metropolitan ones, entail intersection between, on the one hand, readers from within particular locations and their current knowledges, and, on the other hand, the text—can rarely have no consequences. But prioritisation and privileging of approaches to the text ‘in its world’ with attendant neutralisation (erasure) of the reader’s in the process of cultural encounter often predominates. It surfaces recently, for instance, in David Scott Kastan’s call for ‘more facts, however value-laden they will necessarily be, that will reveal the specific historic conditions that have determined the reading and writing of literature’ (my emphasis).6 It is true that his argument that: [i]f theory has convincingly demonstrated that meaning is not immanent but rather situational, or, put differently, that both reading and writing are not unmediated activities but take place only and always in context and action, the specific situations, contexts and actions, that is, the actual historical circumstances of literary
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Page 4 production and reception cannot merely be gestured at but must be recovered and analysed. (my emphases; 31–2) does at least acknowledge the reader as part of the transaction in the encounter with the literary text—one would also hope not merely in terms only of the renaissance reader. But in the course of developing his arguments Kastan, in his subsequent description of the kinds of transactions he recommends, appears to lose sight of present-day reader as well as of situational and historical circumstance in presentday reception as one of the dimensions in this encounter, perhaps loses sight of any reader but the kind he himself represents. While this may be, in terms of his critical project, necessary, and while I don’t question the particular approaches in themselves that Kastan advocates, I suggest that a certain exclusivity to be inferred from his arguments drastically narrows potentials for understanding that attend the complexities of the act of reading—so long as, that is, other readers, besides Kastan’s kind, have access to the text. As I will remark more fully in the next section of this chapter, cultural encounter destabilises and challenges, for all participants, existent epistemological certainties. Local knowledges that lie outside these certainties, will always, at the least, frame them and, at the best, provocatively illuminate or adjust them. In Part I of this book, ‘Local knowledges and Shakespeare’s global texts’, I focus on instances of how particular knowledges within present-day locations might offer additional purchase on the plays. ‘intersecting knowledges: Shakespeare in Timbuktu’ (Chapter 2) examines the well-known essay by the North American cultural anthropologist Laura Bohannan, ‘Shakespeare in the Bush’, which provides an account of her mid-twentieth-century attempt to introduce a group of West Africans to Hamlet. ‘Active readers: whose muti in the web of it?’ (Chapter 3) investigates how Othello’s handkerchief might provide the focus for a discussion as to what other kinds of evidence or knowledge besides Western ones might be brought to bear upon Othello’s gift to Desdemona. ‘William Tshikinya-Chaka, I presume? Cultural encounter in performance’ (Chapter 4) explores two recent translations and adaptations of Shakespeare in production, both first performed in South Africa—uMabatha (Macbeth) and SeZaR (Julius Caesar). It traces ways in which local knowledges might be a factor in either the critical reception of the contemporary Shakespeare production, or subsequent critical readings of Shakespeare’s original text. 2. Whispers in the ears of death Part I of this book argues, in addition to knowledges from the metropolitan centres of Shakespeare study, the usefulness of local knowledges for the understanding of Shakespeare. Part II, ‘Encountering men in Shakespeare’s late plays’, thus uses local as well as metropolitan knowledges in order to explore aspects of the presentation of masculinity in Shakespeare’s Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest. I choose several of Shakespeare’s late plays for particular study in the second section of this book partly because of their own dramatisations of movement and travel to strange places, entailing encounters with different cultures and with the unknown. It is true that—barring perhaps The Tempest—they do not often directly allude in a
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Page 5 possibly topical way to projects of seventeenth-century travel or settlement, to cultural encounters or to cultural clash. But all of them present travel and geographical change of one or other kind.7 In Pericles, focus upon questions of rulership and authority is abidingly presented in the context of travel or movement between countries. The move from the court of England to the caves of Wales in Cymbeline includes journey through unknown terrain, while the play also meditates upon the relationship between ‘Britain’ and Rome. As well as presenting the motif of movement between the courts of Bohemia and Sicily, The Winter’s Tale significantly shifts its terrain from the location of court to that of country and then back again in ways that go significantly beyond conventions of pastoral evident in similar movements in the comedies. Concern with sea travel and even shipwreck recurs in this play, as it does again in The Tempest. Indeed this, and the possibility of settlement, again entailing the conditions of cultural encounter or clash, are omnipresent in The Tempest, which also dramatises desire to leave the margin and to voyage back home. Moreover, while it may be true that Shakespeare’s sporadic use of ‘Romance’ conventions partly explains the diversity of location in these plays, each is, as well, written at a time when, in addition to exploration and contact with the New World, and to say nothing of interaction with seventeenth-century Europe, England is engaged in ongoing conquest and colonisation of Ireland, travel in the Mediterranean and trade with Africa and the East, entailing often either negotiation or confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. It is true that determination and hope characterised the development of trade, the adventures of travel and exploration and incipient attempts at colonial settlement.8 But the contemporary seventeenth-century moment of travel, exploration and settlement also produced equivocation about traditional notions of authority. Such equivocation could not, at the same time, be easily admitted, for instance, from the point of view of attracting future investment. Nevertheless, protonationalist, Protestant or Catholic enunciations of authority or identity were complicated by experiences that might sometimes seem to unsettle or threaten home-bound security and inner faith.10 Henry Hudson’s Voyages registers how ‘we gaue thankes to God, who maruellously preserued vs from so many dangers, among so huge a quantitie of Ice and Fogge’,11 and elsewhere that ‘it pleased God to make this North-west, and by West wind the meane of our deliuerance: which wind wee had not found common in this Voyage. God giue vs thankfull hearts for so great deliuerance’ (573), while on yet another occasion, more overtly, ‘sure our course was so much the longer, through our euill steeredge: for, our men became so weake, that they could not stand at the Helme, but were faine to sit’ so that ‘Robert Iuct dyed, for mere want, and all our men were in despaire’ (608). Sir Francis Drake insisted that his sailors pray twice daily and his choice for reading matter of Foxe’s Booke of Martyrs bespoke the need, in conditions of existential uncertainty, to posit providentialist backing for his enterprises.12 John Hawkins, engaged in piracy and the slave trade, in presenting the suffering of his men on a voyage in 1568, calls similarly on the image of Foxe’s martyrs: If all the miseries and troublesome affairs of this Sorrowful Voyage should be perfectly and thoroughly written; there should need a painful man with his pen, and as great a time as he, that wrote the Lives and Deaths of the Martyrs.13
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Page 6 Even if attempts to enunciate national identity or validation of particular familiar epistemologies or cultural systems became for travelling Europeans a priority—either immediately or in the subsequent narration of experience—they were also continuously challenged, their familiar assumptions at the least framed, if not openly questioned when they found themselves not only in unknown, sometimes dangerous terrain, but amidst other languages and cultural practices, or when they were brought to contemplate manifest contradictions in their own behaviour. Although ‘European travellers often presumed to interpret and understand indigenous peoples upon initial encounter’,14 William Hamlin, approaching encounter with other peoples as an early form of ‘inchoate ethnography’, notes ‘ambivalence’ and ‘thoroughgoing confusion’ among the habitual responses in European documents attempting to represent non-European peoples.15 He remarks that ‘the attempt of one society to comprehend another inevitably forces it to reappraise itself…this process is bound to be an agonizing one, involving the jettisoning of many traditional preconceptions and inherited ideas’16 and argues that ‘[i]f the Old World’s discovery of the New led to the razing of many features of New World culture, it also led to a partial erasure and reconstitution of certain Old World habits of thought.17 Thomas Scanlan, in turn, records the English fear in Ireland that ‘colonial activity will inevitably lead to the degradation of [English] identity’18 and argues the omnipresence of this anxiety in Spenser’s A View of the Present State of Ireland. He also explores the extent to which colonial endeavour in the New World ‘could nourish an emerging sense of national and religious identity’ while simultaneously charting uncertainties and doubts underlying the project.19 In a discussion of DeBry’s engravings of the natives of the New World he writes of ‘the fears and desires of the English as they confronted the prospect of establishing colonies in the New World’: The English desired to imagine themselves in possession of orderly colonies. They desired to imagine themselves as loved by the native people. They desired also to recover through colonialism something from the past—a simplicity and honesty that these people seemed to possess. But the English also had much to fear. They feared losing control of themselves and their colonies. They feared being attacked by native inhabitants. They feared the very strangeness of them …And probably most of all, the English feared that they would arrive in the New World and become the same monsters that the Spanish had become in their colonies…those fears and desires of the English couldn’t be articulated openly. (my emphasis)20 Writing almost a decade and a half earlier on the ‘ensemble of linguistically-based practices unified by their common deployment in the management of colonial relationships’, Peter Hulme pointed to related discrepancies in the colonisers’ articulation of ‘knowledge’ about native Americans.21 And, more recently, Joan Pong Linton has traced disjunctions in the enunciations of colonialism, for example in her discussion of Lodge’s work A Margarite of America.22 She argues a ‘compensatory need among early colonists in view of the confusion and adversity they experienced in America’ because the technological advantages that were ‘for [the colonists] a source of cultural advantage in the making of their colonial identity [were]…rendered problematic by the material conditions of an unfamiliar land’.23
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Page 7 In such contexts, presentation of the sea itself in Pericles as well as in the plays that follow it—the ‘surges’, for instance, ‘Which wash both heaven and hell’ (III.i. 1–2) in the ‘great vast’ (1) of the sea storm in which Pericles finds himself at the beginning of Act III, with its ‘winds’ (3), ‘deafening dreadful thunders’ (5) and ‘nimble, sulphurous flashes’ (6)— gain particular resonance in inference of a limit to available knowledge.24 Although the narratives to which Marina later clings in Act IV (IV.i.50–63), as means of recalling her father, may foreground, in nautical register, details of the craft of navigation, the boatswain’s whistle, part of her composite detail, becomes, in tempestuous conditions, like the skill of navigation itself, a mere ‘whisper in the ears of death’ (III.i.9). Pericles’ own prayers to Neptune (II.i. 1–11) foreground human limitation when he acknowledges that the ‘substance’ of ‘earthly man…must yeild’ (2, 3) to the sea’s uncontrollable force. While presentation of the sea itself here and elsewhere in these plays sometimes predicates a creative source or turbulent origin of recovery and redemption, such acknowledgements of an unpredictable, unknowable, or threatening sea, propose as well the condition of epistemological uncertainty. This complicates, in turn, the concept of effective human agency. Further, if it parallels the epistemological unpredictability, vulnerability and danger that at times might punctuate actual projects of travel, discovery and settlement, it also entails further possibilities of equivocation, about the very men engaged in such projects. 3. Mapping men in Shakespeare’s late plays The famous moment in the opening scene of The Tempest when the sailors question the authority of Gonzalo and the other Italian courtiers is anticipated in Pericles when, faced with his dead queen aboard ship, Pericles is told by the sailors that ‘your queen must overboard. The sea works high’ (III.i.48). To his answer, ‘That’s your superstition?’ they respond: Pardon us, sir; with us at sea it hath been still observed, and we are strong in custom. Therefore briefly yield ‘er, for she must overboard straight (III.i.51–3) to which Pericles—hierarchically their superior—unprotestingly submits: ‘As you think meet’ (54). Again, Florizel’s choice, in the pastoral setting of Act IV of The Winter’s Tale, of a shepherdess’s daughter unsettles traditional notions of hierarchy, and the implications of this may not entirely evaporate by the end of the play. Equivocation about authority in the late plays, hinted at in such or other moments, has been scrutinised particularly at the level of dynasty, governance or ‘nation’ in a number of ways. Both Leah Marcus25 and Erica Sheen26 in probing the political topoi of Cymbeline, have suggested ambiguities which impact on James I’s desire for a united kingdom of Britain. More recently, Jodi Mikalachki27 registers for the same play implicit anxieties about an older British matriarchy while Jeffrey Masten, in the case of Pericles, collocates dynastic concerns with ambiguities in issues of sexuality and authorship.28 Other critics have noted complicating implications for traditional authority, for The Winter’s Tale, in brief glimpses of a market economy or, for The Tempest, in counter-voices suggesting perspectives from, capacity for independent thought about or open resistance from those located beyond the provenance of conventional authority.29
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Page 8 Despite such studies of ambiguities in the presentation of an authority that by the end of the plays is usually seen, none the less, to realise or reassert itself, the fact that the plays repeatedly, if sporadically, return to the possibility, sometimes very specific, of a disordered or unruly or degenerate masculinity has not, in my estimation, been pursued as far as might be possible. Feminist readings of the plays do direct us to the workings of patriarchy but primarily in terms of its impact upon the presentation and treatment of women. Less attention has been given to what the men in these plays sometimes actually say and do and, in turn, to the potentially nonpatriarchal ways in which we might read this. While we do have general—and some specific—studies of the representation of masculinity in the Renaissance,30 more work on the specific treatment of complexities in the representation of men in individual plays is still needed. Further, where recognition of ambiguities in the presentation of authority in the late plays does occur, this rarely extends to interrogations about male corporeality, or scrutiny of male cognition, and too often disappears again, amidst teleologically motivated attempts in one or other way to homogenise or resolve whatever complexities may surface. But sporadic epistemological incertitude about the male body as well as male governance and intellect remains a reiterative feature in all the late plays. In the second section of this book I explore such episodes of uncertainty, directly and almost emblematically (if also comically) posed, for instance, in the brief moment of cultural encounter in Act II of The Tempest when the European Trinculo comes upon Caliban—technically one of the natives of the island to which his travels have brought him—who is trying to hide from him by means of his loose smock: What have we here—a man or a fish?—dead or alive? A fish, he smells like a fish; a very ancient and fish-like smell; a kind of not-of-the-newest poor-John. A strange fish! Were I in England now, as once I was, and had but this fish painted, not a holiday-fool there but would give a piece of silver. There would this monster make a man—any strange beast there makes a man. (II.ii.24–30)31 Trinculo’s use of comic insult to handle his encounter with this stranger immediately domesticates the islander, turned as he is not merely into a deprecatingly non-human ‘fish’, but one seen as a market commodity, ‘not-of-the-newest’, a ‘poor-John’ or ‘dried hake, a poor person’s staple’.32 Trinculo then positions Caliban as potential commodity for, back home, both advertisement and display for profit, resonating what for the English audience would have been the practice of ‘popular and lucrative enterprise’ in displaying ‘New World natives’ brought back to England. He wins further mileage by suddenly extrapolating from the difference he is encountering, for his own (English) audience, a crack at the variations upon the human (‘man’) also to be found among them. At the same time, this language, despite its manifest containment of encounter with a stranger by way of domesticating jokes entailing disparagement and commodification, belies a measure of epistemological uncertainty or disorientation as to exactly what kind of man it is that Trinculo has found. Furthermore, in the context of what we now know to be conventional sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ascription of the ‘monstrous’ to women, the inversion ‘There would this monster make a man—any strange beast there makes a man’, albeit in peripheral island conditions, admits
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Page 9 the possibility of a masculine grotesque at the centre, in England, the assumption indeed on which his joke about English diversity hinges. That such an encounter brings assumptions about corporeal and cognitive ‘man’ himself into question also punctuates the humour in the lines that follow, for instance after Stephano’s entry, in his resort to proverbial assertions of authentic masculinity in the first moments of, in turn, his encounter with Caliban. Coming upon the two men under the cloak he asks: What’s the matter? Have we devils here?…I have not scaped drowning to be afeard now of your four legs; for it hath been said,’ As proper a man as ever went on four legs cannot make him give ground’. (II.ii.56–60) Proverbs, as is well known, are traditionally assertions of commonplace wisdoms and Stephano clutches comically in these lines at the proverb As good a man as ever trod on shoe (neat’s) leather (as ever went on legs) (c. 1570, Dent, M66) 33 to assert the authenticity of his ‘manly’ courage, even as his fear simultaneously prompts him, illogically, to adapt the proverb to the case of four legs instead of two, thus ludicrously attempting by way of a commonplace to reassure himself that the irregularity he sees is regular, is not devilry or a version of male monstrosity but rather something that might also be containable within the concept of the ‘human’. A moment later he speculates on the nature of what he has found as potential commodity, again by way of proverbial wisdom: If I can recover him, and keep him tame, and get to Naples with him, he’s a present for any emperor that ever trod on neat’s-leather (II.ii.66–8) alluding once more to the proverb As good a man as ever trod on shoe (neat’s) leather (as ever went on legs) (1560–77, Tilley, M66).34 The signification of this formulation also proposes a generalised normative masculinity which Stephano depends upon to negotiate the (comic) strangeness of what confronts him, even as, again, he imagines appropriating, domesticating and exploiting it. These observations about Caliban, although in jest, ostensibly turn on the question of Caliban’s generic authenticity as ‘man’ or ‘human’. Recent studies have probed, further, the importance of humorology and climatology for early modern conceptualisation of the ‘human’. Arguing that in early modern humoral structurations of the human subject, ‘bodily condition, subjective state and psychological character are…fully imbricated’,35 Michael C.Schoenfeldt notes the importance of this, for, in the early seventeenth century: the ‘scientific’ language of analysis had not yet been separated from the sensory language of experience. Whereas our post-Cartesian ontology imagines psychological inwardness and physiological materialism as necessarily separate realms of existence, and thus renders corporeal language for emotion highly metaphorical, the Galenic regime of the humoral self that supplies these writers with much of their vocabulary of inwardness demanded the invasion of social and psychological realms by biological and environmental processes. (8)
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Page 10 Again, Mary Floyd-Wilson probes the ways in which location and changing climatological factors impacted on humoral knowledge, contending that ‘when read through the grid of classical gender distinctions, the northerner’s fleshiness, fluidity, temperature, and even color could be cast in feminine, or barbaric, or other socially subordinate terms’.36 But just as the English were trying to come to terms with ‘their own inherent barbarism, their contact with other “barbarians” [had] increased’ so that’ their own sense of whiteness and ethnicity was in flux’ (18–19). In such contexts, if the late plays are in different ways engaged with the motifs of travel and of changing place, it is also noticeable that each one of them begins with or proposes a problematic masculinity which the remainder of the play goes on repeatedly, though not always consistently, to contemplate and explore. Thus Pericles starts with a problem of incest in which attention to the male supersedes female involvement. The first three acts of Cymbeline are inescapably fixated on versions of male treachery and its consequences. Similarly, the first half of The Winter’s Tale is notoriously focused upon masculine irrationality and its potential for destruction. The Tempest begins with a tale of fraternal hatred together with an extended attempt at self-justification, by a male ruler, of his own politically catastrophic behaviour. If, in any critical reading, ‘pattern’ is inescapable, then the ‘pattern’ I am registering here—in addition to, not as replacement for the many other (more teleologically oriented) critical patterns that have been discovered for the late plays—is a recurring muscle of thought in which equivocal aspects of the corporeal, cognitive, social and political elements of masculinity are posed, then repetitively struggled with or sporadically meditated on but not ever decisively dispensed with or resolved. This persists, it must be emphasised, in addition to, never instead of, ensuing attempts in each of the late plays to order such evidences of disordered or unruly masculinity. Sporadic preoccupation with an equivocal masculinity may indeed be said to feature in Shakespeare’s histories and tragedies, and even his comedies as well, and these plays too need, in this respect, further investigation. But my present project is to explore further this muscle of equivocation about masculinity in each of the late plays and, given the undeniable movement in these plays towards reinscriptions of patriarchal authority of one or other kind, to assess, where men are concerned, the significance of these dissenting moments. 4. Local knowledges and Shakespeare’s late plays Upon what local knowledges do I especially draw in discovering and choosing to explore equivocation about masculinity in these plays? Firstly, to understand its occurrence I bring to them a different enunciation about experience, derived from the Southern African location, than that evident in conventional metropolitan Shakespeare searches for epistemological consistency implicit in discovery of an informing telos of one or other kind. To help identify and conceptualise the reiterative counter-strands of disquietude about masculinity woven into the plays’ other concerns, I draw upon Southern African Tswana models of conflict dispute. I am interested in ways in which the process-oriented view of experience evident in Tswana processes of conflict resolution, as outlined in John Comaroff’s and Simon Roberts’ Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African Context, might intersect with what happens in the texts.37 Chapter 5, ‘Prologue: the “infirmities of
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Page 11 men” in Pericles’, introduces those aspects of Tswana conflict resolution procedure, although, as is the case with each of my chapters on the late plays, I depend inevitably too on metropolitan research. The Tswana people, in procedures of conflict dispute, register the importance of cultural norms but only as starting points against which the evidence of actual behaviour and experience is given equal weight. By analogy, flexibility about what might count as evidence in a text or what might be concluded about it, that process-oriented readings invite, contrasts with more teleologically oriented ‘Western’ readings which often rank evidence according to a particular expectation in terms of which, in the text’s unfolding, a correspondent and, more important, prescriptive structuration is discovered. This is not to deny the presence of or importance of structure, or our need to discover it, but to recognise that more than one signification and structural unfolding, and sometimes contrary ones, may be operating and may remain at the same time unresolved—unrecuperatedwithin the same text. Tswana dispute practice provides opportunity for acknowledgement of such diverse directions in the reading of experience, ones that might contradict or be exceptional to any one particular patterning or structuration of experience, without at the same time dislodging that one particular pattern, thus admitting the simultaneous presence of a range of differing or conflicting phenomena and perceptions. Secondly, I bring to the late plays a contemporary sense of the lingering power of patriarchy—despite decades of modern feminist and gender work within the academy as well as beyond it—and patriarchy’s continuing simultaneous evasion of a more conflicted or equivocal masculinity than it, with its rhetorical processes of elision, is ever ready to admit. R.A. Foakes, for instance, writing on Shakespeare and ‘the human propensity, especially among males, to violence’,38 finds male violence to be a perennial problem and one powerfully present in his contemporary world—even as he acknowledges that it may be differently explained as, on the one hand, ‘a part of what constitutes the nature of human beings, especially men’ or, on the other, ‘culturally constructed’ (3).39 I would add, to the instances he delineates, my sense that in Southern Africa the overwhelming predominance of men in acts of violence both throughout the apartheid period as well as after the process of its dismantling had begun is inescapable, evidenced, for example, in the extent to which testimonies delivered at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission recounted episodes of male torture, violence or cruelty. During the period of reconstruction in South Africa, now ruled by a government elected by universal franchise, the incidence of male-generated violence remains alarmingly high. My sense of the problems of an enduring patriarchy, whose rhetoric in no way explains the ongoing predicament of such predominantly male violence, has been heightened, inevitably, after a relatively recent relocation to Israel and to a Middle East characterised, when I first arrived, by an Oslo agreement which seemed to promise the same kind of irreversible momentum towards reconciliation that I had to a degree witnessed in South Africa. I had originally not wanted to address a location that I did not and still do not fully understand, which, as time went by, included the appalling and tragic disintegration of the promise of Oslo coinciding with events such as that of 11 September 2001, or the second intifada with its homicide bombings on the one hand, and the ravages accompanying renewed Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza on the other, or the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Again, the
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Page 12 participants in such projects of violence and death prove overwhelmingly to be men. I wonder about our use of Shakespeare’s texts in such contexts. If they are still iconic, how may the evident workings of patriarchy we discern in them not also insidiously contribute to the reiteration of its (ongoing) symbolic violence? It has been argued, it is true, that the very act of identifying patriarchy might help to inoculate the reader against its workings, or that the identification, sometimes in the representation of women, of sequences subversive to patriarchy might also provide a means of avoiding, within present-day readers, subtle forms of the re-inscription of patriarchal assumptions. In my study of equivocal and controversial presentations of men in the late plays I have been struck by a rhetorical habit of simultaneous absorption, erasure or denial of male unruliness or inadequacy, even as it is presented. I call this ‘selfadmiring rhetoric’. It is my hope that this present examination of male unruliness and the self-admiring rhetoric that often accompanies it may be a further way of diminishing (ongoing) patriarchal reiteration. Thirdly, I am interested in the way in which certain gender articulations deriving from my contemporary location within the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries might intersect with these texts. These may be anticipated, for the early modern period, for example, in Michael Schoenfeldt’s remark that: An overriding emphasis on gender has sometimes skewed the interpretation of Galenism, making fluidity the exclusive province of female corporeality. Female bodies may have been imagined as fluid, but so were male bodies; both sexes aspired through a variety of unpleasant therapies to attain the solubility necessary to stay alive. Despite Lemnius’s description of the psychopathology of menstruation, females were sometimes thought to possess a physiological advantage because their monthly menstrual flow functioned as a purge, accomplishing naturally what men would have to achieve through the comparatively invasive technique of blood-letting.40 Rather than to insistence on difference, that is, to the more usual patriarchal predilection for the establishment or ratification of binary opposites, Maurizio Calbi, in Approximate Bodies: Aspects of the Figuration of Masculinity, Power and the Uncanny in Early Modern Drama and Anatomy, attends to approximation in the behaviour of men and women as means to explore gender.41 I draw on such a model of approximation to investigate the contention that men and women—although in certain obvious respects importantly different and not identical—are in equally crucial respects ‘proximates’ rather than ‘opposites’ of one another. The notion of proximation, it is worth adding, in its refusal to assert simple oppositions as pivotal, also unsettles the binaric mode of conceptualisation inferred in the term ‘the other’. As, furthermore, does the Tswana perspective, in its focus on the processual significations to be discovered from actual empirical behaviour rather than on more familiar, metropolitan, teleological insistence on ‘decisive’ norms and structuration. My ensuing chapters on the other late plays pursue concerns established in the chapter on Pericles or sometimes more briefly anticipated in Part I of this book. Chapter 6, ‘Cymbeline: “…that most venerable man which I/Did call my father”’, traces evidence of recurrent processual meditation upon the slipperiness of male cognition as well as male corporeality. In the context of post-apartheid attempts to
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Page 13 achieve justice and reconciliation by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and of a present-day instance of the use of self-admiring rhetoric emanating from current struggle within Israel and Palestine, it probes the play’s concern also with justice and accountability. Chapter 7, ‘The Winter’s Tale: “Let no man mock me”’, explores Shakespeare’s contemplation of male hysteria, as well as sporadic recognition of proximations between men and women, evident too, not only in Robert Greene’s Pandosto, but also in the extraordinary contestation of binaric modes of gender representation to be found in Pedro Almodóvar’s All About My Mother. In Chapter 8, ‘The Tempest: “Any strange beast there makes a man”’, I examine the equivocal, sometimes self-admiring, rhetoric possible for women but explored especially in the case of men, that, disturbingly present in Athol Fugard’s, John Kani’s and Winston Ntshona’s The Island, features prominently in The Tempest. I attempt to return this study to my own, at present benighted terrain, in a brief Afterword. In each of my chapters on the late plays I discover a processual meditation on masculinity, a struggle towards and away from complexities within male cognition and corporeality as well as male authority, towards and away from, in the matter of gender, proximations that challenge conventionally binary modes of perception, towards and away from one or other search for telos. I reiterate that my sense of the importance of concern with equivocal masculinity in the late plays insists that it is an attendant, intermittent and recurrent meditation accompanying and occasionally intersecting with other (teleological) concerns in each play in diverse ways agreed upon as central in metropolitan studies. It is never my intention to suggest that Shakespeare’s additional meditations on an equivocal masculinity or on the factor of proximation ever displaces such concerns. But such recurrent meditation presents a persistent counterpoint, remains in open-ended dissonance to them. Local knowledges of different kinds provide, further, an additional route to such complexities, in the encounter between the travelling but always local reader and the seventeenth-century and still iconic Shakespeare text.
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Page 15 Part I Local knowledges and Shakespeare’s global texts
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Page 17 2 Intersecting knowledges Shakespeare in Timbuktu 1. A Shakespearean world very much itself In a recent essay on ‘Prospero’s Book’, published in Shakespeare Quarterly, Barbara Mowat proposes a study of ‘early modern wizard and sorcerer plays and their magic books’ as a way into a better understanding not only of The Tempest but also of ‘the world that is supposedly our own scholarly bailiwick’.1 Articulation of this world is for her a current mission of Shakespeare scholarship, perhaps the mission, as she adumbrates it more fully in an editorial introduction to another number of Shakespeare Quarterly a few years earlier: what impresses me most about present-day ‘scholarly Shakespeare’ as exemplified by these essays is the toughness of their questions, the refusal of sentimentality, the effort to see our world with the clearest of eyes and to see Shakespeare his plays and his world—with equal clarity. In the four centuries that separate us from Shakespeare, many worldviews have come and gone, each bringing with it its own image of the Bard. While our view may only seem more clear-sighted, I sense in today’s ‘scholarly Shakespeare’ a greater involvement with Elizabethan and Jacobean mores, material cultures, legal systems, and cultural pressures and limitations than one finds in the scholarship of previous generations. What is emerging is a Shakespearean world that is very much itself, quite unlike the England of the Romantic or Victorian periods, but a world with much to teach us about our own.2 Mowat’s enthusiastic approval of construction of a present-day ‘Shakespearean world that is very much itself foregrounds one aspiration of current metropolitan Shakespeare scholarship. I want to set a second passage beside the above quotation. Appearing in the editor’s foreword to the recent number of Shakespeare Quarterly in which ‘Prospero’s Book’ appears, it is in praise of Mowat’s methodology in that article: It offers the accumulated, nuanced responsiveness of a career-long immersion in a Shakespeare play. It provides a major reinterpretation of that play and its relation to early modern cultural history through the meticulous scholarly recovery of a lost literary tradition—in this case the magic manuscript books possessed by the real conjurors of early modern Europe such as John Dee. Its
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Page 18 account of these books in the context of how one is used in The Tempest adds to the twinned histories of the book and of reading which are currently among the most exciting frontiers in literary scholarship. And, finally, it makes its case through the description of a unique artifact in the Folger collection—the grimoire catalogued as Folger MS Vb26— several pages of which we reproduce herein.3 Such scholarship, according to the editor, ‘combines within itself nearly all of what I consider the classic virtues of an SQ article’ (iii). In terms of this enunciation the Folger and its contents—in this case MS Vb26—constitute part of the district that Shakespeare scholarship, according to Mowat, both inhabits and seeks to comprehend. Paster’s authentication of Mowat’s procedures also evokes the classic distinction made between, as one discussion of questions of evidence in the past decade has it, ‘primary (archival) sources and secondary materials’ in which: [t]he former tended to privilege documentary materials belonging to (or contemporary with) the past under study, while the latter were classified as later writings and accounts on the particular subject. In addition to this differentiation of evidence, historians grappled with the need to establish a stable referent external to the actual reconstruction that was supposed to authenticate the historical veracity of a past or an event ‘guaranteed by the “real”.’4 While I do not cite these passages in order necessarily to dispute the aspiration and goals they articulate, I note them in order to address what I propose as an additional and complementary domain for Shakespeare study. This results from the fact, as I have just noted in my Introduction, that, for better or worse, Shakespeare’s plays travel far beyond Paster’s and Mowat’s geographical and scholarly constituency. While users of the Shakespeare text situated elsewhere—not least, the thousands of young adults who as undergraduates themselves become for a while students of Shakespeare—will gratefully receive and draw upon impeccable and indispensable scholarship and criticism of this kind, which itself travels to them among other routes via Shakespeare Quarterly, are there as well any other more active roles possible for them as students, performers,5 or audiences of the texts? Mowat is, in the passage from her writing I quote above, not unaware of the inescapable importance of the locations of Shakespeare scholars and readers, or audiences themselves, when she notes, as part of her detection of a current Shakespeare scholarship at its best, a simultaneous (and surely individual and varying) concern to ‘see our world with the clearest of eyes’, when she acknowledges that ‘many worldviews have come and gone, each bringing with it its own image of the Bard’, and when she recognises that ‘our view may only seem more clear-sighted’. Moreover, she identifies the significance of reader location directly in her article on ‘Prospero’s Book’ when she acknowledges the ‘long and difficult colonial and postcolonial history’ (32) that has impacted upon readers of The Tempest. This produces a ‘divided response’ to it—with, on the one hand, what the Renaissance (metropolitan) authority of magic books as source of power invites and, on the other, what the view that ‘those who instead share Caliban’s view of Prospero, who see Prospero as little more than a tyrant and Western civilization as little more than tyranny’6 precipitates. This will in turn complicate, she argues, the need of the ‘early-twenty-first-century viewer/ reader’,
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Page 19 firstly, ‘to grapple with the meanings of literacy, of history, of civilization’, and, secondly, ‘to confront the clash of values and of worlds implied in The Tempest’s larger story’ (32). My concern in this chapter, as elsewhere in this book, is with just such questions arising from location, involving especially students, performers or audiences of a travelling Shakespeare, who have little or no access to Mowat’s or Paster’s particular bailiwick. Ania Loomba cites Ali Farka Toure’s comment that ‘[f]or some people, when you say “Timbuktu” it is like the end of the world, but that is not true. I am from Timbuktu, and I can tell you we are right at the heart of the world.’7 What might this mean for present-day engagements with Shakespeare, beyond the Shakespeare metropolis? In addition to what we can find in, say, the British Library or the Folger, what other kinds of knowledge might we bring to bear, from peripheral locations, for a reading of these texts? Or are such knowledges not merely secondary, but inadmissible? How, indeed, might Shakespeare be read in Timbuktu? 2. Living among those who know things In ‘Shakespeare in the Bush’ the anthropologist Laura Bohannan gives an account of her attempt to introduce Hamlet to the group of West Africans among whom she was, at the time, living. With increasingly ironic sensitivity to the limits of her own perspectives in the context of the reactions of people within a very different location from her own contemporary United States or the British university where she was currently studying, she tells of the reception of the Tiv to her attempt to narrate to them the events and meanings in Shakespeare’s play. First broadcast by the BBC in the mid-1950s, several times republished in book form,8 and still used in undergraduate courses in both anthropology and literature, particularly in North America,9 the essay is celebrated as offering a didactically valuable demonstration of ‘cultural differences’10 or, as the editors of a collection of readings in cultural anthropology, in which it appears in the 1970s, have it, as providing an illustration of ‘the way in which different cultures provide distinct and separate worlds of meaning for those who have learned to live by them’.11 The essay invites investigation as an almost paradigmatic instance, in the midtwentieth century, of cultural encounter or clash.12 On a remarkably literal level, it provides an instance of ‘travelling Shakespeare’, posing questions about reception that scholars interested in the use of Shakespeare in colonial locations have repeatedly addressed. In this, it raises the issues of the local and the global, the particular and the universal. It invites consideration as an archival project, problematising, in the process, the use of and clash of varying epistemologies. In terms of the Tiv and Bohannan, it involves spatial clash and, in terms of the engagement of both with Hamlety chronological clash. From the perspective of cultural encounter, and despite her sporadically ironic acknowledgement throughout the essay of the limits of her own knowledge in this new environment, Bohannan displays a by now well-recognised ‘imperialist’ or pseudo-colonialist tendency in Western encounters with other epistemologies which suggest implicit or explicit projects of penetration, domination and erasure. Her deference, as a North American reading anthropology—albeit, as the tale unfolds, an ambitiously defiant one as well—to the Oxford voice she quotes at the outset
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Page 20 (‘You Americans…often have difficulty with Shakespeare. He was, after all, a very English poet’),13 establishes a strongly colonial metropolitan base from which she moves to the periphery, the ‘African bush’ with its ‘primitive surroundings’ (22), ‘one of its remote sections—an area difficult to cross even on foot’ (22).14 Moreover, in contrast to the author ascription which identifies the ‘I’ of the narrative, all the other people in the article whose voices she represents are given only generic titles—an Oxford ‘friend’, an ‘old man’, the ‘woman’ to whom he is married, other ‘elders’. This may suggest the anthropologist’s desire to engender from these different voices a taxonomy of cultural types, behaviours, predilections. Her avoidance of the particular underlines her own position as subject, with the Tiv as objects of scrutiny. Indeed, the Tiv’s voices, albeit represented by Bohannan in direct speech, remain always mediated by her. Absence of a Tiv particularity strengthens the impression of the anthropologist’s desire, by means of generalisation to map what she finds, to write an (unspeaking) ‘Tiv’ into discursive anthropological categories. This contrasts markedly with the proper names that do appear in the text, those of the characters in Hamlet, and the illusion of materiality that this habit of (literary) ‘particularity’ ironically brings with it. The only identities invested with the authority and particularity of the proper name, besides the author, are fictions of which the (Western) text is the bearer. Bohannan’s at least pseudo-colonial or imperial impulse may be detected too in her Western predilection for the written over the oral, most markedly evident in her almost incidental acknowledgement of the orality of the culture in which she finds herself, presenting it, in terms of its dependence upon the few who can read letters, or its view of the limited provenance with which ‘papers’, the written word, may deal (23–4), as a culture of illiteracy and consequent lack. By contrast, Tiv interest in dancing and singing, conversation and the telling of stories is primarily presented not only as distraction during the rainy season, but also as appendage to what appears to be—but what she most certainly does not admit to be—in some respects a Tiv equivalent of the British, if not European and North American love of conversation and beer (23). She notes that she joined the community at one point ‘in the hope of having some serious talk before the beer party’ (23). This apparently persistent predilection towards idleness, she implies to the reader, prompts her to seek refuge in Shakespeare’s text. Significantly, only when challenged herself to tell a tale about the ‘paper’ she has been reading, does she venture more engaged comment on aspects of this oral culture: I protested that I was not a storyteller. Storytelling is a skilled art among them; their standards are high, and the audiences critical—and vocal in their criticism …Finally the old man promised that no one would criticize my style ‘for we know you are struggling with our language’. (24) Such moments in her tale are important. Against her tendency towards colonial or imperial ‘othering’, Bohannan also, as I remarked, admits into the narrative evidence of her own lack in the presence of a culture and language she does not fully understand. Indeed, as it unfolds, her essay also provides a record of the extent to which the colonial or imperialist gaze I have just noted is, in the course of her encounter, repeatedly limited and undermined. Elsewhere in her narrative, she
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Page 21 contrasts her sense of being at the periphery with the sense of the centrality of their knowledge systems—and of their sense of the marginality of the place from which Bohannan comes—which the community she has joined possesses. This is best captured by the old man’s final comment which Bohannan uses to conclude her own story: ‘Sometime’, concluded the old man, gathering his ragged toga about him, ‘you must tell us some more stories of your country. We who are elders will instruct you in their true meaning, so that when you return to your own land your elders will see that you have not been sitting in the bush, but among those who know things and who have taught you wisdom’. (32)15 One of the strengths of Bohannan’s narrative is to be found in this ability to recognise the extent to which her own ironies about apparent lapses from cultural practices with which she is familiar are matched by Tiv patronage of her assumptions. In this respect Bohannan’s account repeatedly provides a fascinating record of epistemological unsettling, as well as posing problems of location and reception attendant upon a travelling Shakespeare. Bad weather interferes with her plan to map tribal ceremonies. If she comes with a Western indifference to orality, her own tale itself suggests a measure of de facto absorption into the culture of orality. Again, despite her attempt in presenting Hamlet to the Tiv to promote or extend the horizons of the ‘Western’ gaze, anxieties, inadvertently or otherwise, repeatedly surface. The insecurity, or splitting, this bespeaks is implicit in the self-consciousness about her own lack of authority among the Tiv to which her narrative voice sporadically admits. When the old man reminds her that she is the object of the Tiv gaze, ‘You should sit and drink with us more often. Your servants tell me that when you are not with us, you sit inside your hut looking at a paper’ (23), she notes ‘I did not wish them to think me silly enough to look at any such papers for days on end, and I hastily explained that my “paper” was one of the “things of long ago” of my country’ (24). Her narrative reads as slow acknowledgement of an increasing loss of control and power over the story she is imparting. In the face of an assertive and different epistemology which is, in its location, empowered, her tone moves from occasionally patronising encounter with difference, to open irritation, anger, impotence and, on one or two occasions, even panic. This may be taken as ironic manifestation of her own possibly unplanned-for discovery of what it is to be located within a minority—in a manner of speaking, subaltern—status.16 Her essay thus provides a provocative enactment for her Western audience of the kinds of dismissal or erasure usually non-Western cultures are forced to experience in the course of the colonial/imperialist encounter. Most interesting, perhaps, in terms of the intersection between global and local in her account, the engagement of present-day reader, in a non-metropolitan location, with early modern text prompts Bohannan to a crucial narrative decision. She attempts to ‘communicate’ the Hamlet story by appropriating aspects of Tiv cultural practice. Here spatial clash—between the Tiv and Bohannan—intersects with chronological clash—between both of them and the Shakespeare text. Despite her own proclaimed sense of an essentialist interpretation of Hamlet—‘Before the end of the second month, grace descended on me. I was quite sure Hamlet had only one possible interpretation and that one universally obvious’ (23)—on the ground in
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Page 22 West Africa, in delivering this Western artifact to the Tiv, she herself recognises the inadequacy of the ‘archival’ apparatus she has brought with her: ‘I began in the proper style, Not yesterday, not yesterday, but long ago, a thing occurred’ (24), she reports, and it is quite clear that it is ‘their’—to recall her own prejudices for a moment—‘style’ that she means (however ironically): ‘One night, three men were keeping watch outside the homestead of the great chief, when suddenly they saw the former chief approach them’ (24). Bohannan realises here and throughout her experience that in order to communicate the tale of Hamlet to the Tiv, she must attempt to find or appropriate equivalents in what she knows about Tiv cultural practice/discourse/epistemology. It might be argued that this proffers a mild instance of what Stephen Greenblatt calls, in the context of Renaissance New World encounters, ‘improvisation’, a means of penetrating her audience in ways that will render them more receptive to her interpretation.17 But her hoped-for transmission of what she assumes to be a universally applicable artifact proves complex: for any interaction at all to take place she is obliged to intersect with local and particular knowledges. Towards the end of her account she acknowledges that ‘Hamlet was again a good story to them, but it no longer seemed quite the same story to me’.18 3. Ancestral ghosts Bohannan’s interaction with the Tiv attitude to ghosts provides an instance of the inescapability of location as a factor in reading, in terms of both spatial clash—Western vs African attitudes to ghosts—as well as chronological clash— contemporary readings of the supernatural and sixteenth—or seventeenth-century ones. On the subject of Hamlet’s ghost, Bohannan encounters repeated scepticism from her audience throughout her tale because, for the Tiv, speaking ghosts cannot exist whereas omens, or beings that lurk in forests, or zombies, dead bodies made to walk again—all controlled or sent by witches—can. In itself, this may be read as failure to penetrate the target culture. It is also usually taken as the most notable instance in the essay of evidence of (insurmountable) cultural difference. But in fact, Renaissance as well as mid-twentieth-century West African representation of or explication of extra-human phenomena/supernatural agency appear to work similarly, through just such articulations. In this connection it is worth noting that Dipesh Chakrabarty has recorded related tendencies among present-day subaltern working group cultures in India. ‘Anyone who visits India,’ he argues, cannot go two steps without seeing the sign of some non-human presence being invoked…a world that, for right or wrong reasons, remains open to the miraculous, the magical and the supernatural. Yet we are obliged—as historians and social scientists—to translate this world back into our prose which is both realist and secular. Realist in that we subscribe to some notion of an objective and real world that remains describable in prose, and secular in that the world, for us as historians, remains in Weber’s terms, disenchanted. Gods and spirits cannot have any agency in our descnptions.19 Chakrabarty argues that this dimension, which Western historiography is unable discursively to comprehend, remains an ongoing reality in the experience of
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Page 23 present-day subaltern working life in India. Against this I briefly juxtapose two wellknown observations by Derrida, in the course of his meditations about the archive. Reflecting at length on the significance for the historian of Yerushalmi’s attempt, at the end of his study Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable,20 directly to address Freud’s phantom, he emphasises that ‘the structure of the archive is spectral …a trace always referring to another whose eyes can never meet, no more than those of Hamlet’s father, thanks to the possibility of a visor’21 while later, he observes that: if the psychoanalytic explanation of delusion, of hauntedness, of hallucination, if the psychoanalytic theory of specters, in sum leaves a part, a share of nonverisimilitude unexplained…this is because…there is a truth of delusion, a truth of insanity or of hauntedness…this truth is repressed or suppressed. But it resists and returns, as such, as the spectral truth of delusion or hauntedness. It returns, it belongs, it comes down to spectral truth. (87) Words within memory, the archive, concepts of the repressed or suppressed, are some of the varied means whereby we may try to account for destructive as well as benign phenomena, attempt to discover within experience (spectral) traces of ‘meaning’, ‘explanation’ or ‘truth’ residing within the impenetrable, the secret or the non-explicable. In what ways might this intersect with twentieth-century African or Renaissance European articulations? Tiv structurations of those who appear to deal with or to be themselves literal bearers of ‘spectral truths’ certainly coincide in hermeneutic aspiration with Renaissance formulations about ghosts and their possible meanings. This is repeatedly evident in Bohannan’s narrative: ‘You mean’ he said, ‘it actually was an omen, and he knew witches sometimes send false ones. Hamlet was a fool not to go to one skilled in the reading of omens and divining the truth in the first place. A man-who-sees-the-truth could have told him how his father died, if he really had been poisoned, and if there was witchcraft in it; then Hamlet could have called the elders to settle the matter.’ The shrewd elder ventured to disagree. ‘Because his father’s brother was a great chief, one-who-sees-the-truth might therefore have been afraid to tell it. I think it was for that reason that a friend of Hamlet’s father—a witch and an elder—sent an omen so his friend’s son would know. Was the omen true?’ (28–9)22 ‘Was the omen true?’/‘the truth of delusion or hauntedness’—set in such contexts it is surely not so much cultural differences per se, as the need to grasp at ‘spectral’ truth that such varying strategies over time bespeak in common, that invites attention. This is not, however, to deny, at the same time, the fact of difference in the cultural encounter, but to argue that such differences also include the possibility of complex intersections. We may cite in this connection Satja Mohanty’s discussion of the Zande category of magic.23 He addresses the apparent problems that arise when nonWestern cultural practices appear to be ‘untranslatable into the language of the Western anthropologist’s culture’ (132). But if, as he argues, in cultural encounters dialogue is to be the issue, then ‘we’ need to ‘extend our understanding by interrogating its limits in terms of Zande categories of self-understanding’. Other forms of understanding frame our own and vice versa; moreover, when ‘two systems
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Page 24 of understanding encounter each other to just the extent that both are contextualized as forms of life’, the encounter ‘leaves open the possibility of a fundamental change in both’ (133). Tiv reformulations of the ghost in Hamlet in terms of omens or witches might, accordingly, productively be compared with early modern (Western) versions. This might, again, in the context of present-day cultural practice, in the manner of Chakrabarty, challenge the easy assumption of our own, usually secular, gaze. Nor should this obscure the mutual foregrounding, for instance, in both articulations of the extra-human, of a common desire for articulation of explicable agency, as well as need to locate accountability.24 In the context of the local and hence changing nature of any critical practice, as I suggested it in the previous chapter, it is interesting to add that the particular challenge Bohannan reports the Tiv as presenting to a reading of the ghost in Hamlet, in its invitation to more deliberate address of nonsecular spirituality, occurs in mid-twentieth-century West Africa. But only much more recently, decades after Bohannan wrote, did interest in ‘a new, ethically- or even religiously grounded literary criticism’ within the scholarly preserves of metropolitan Shakespeare begin to re-emerge.25 4. Consulting the elders Bohannan’s attempt to impart to her Tiv audience her version of Renaissance familial and political crisis in Hamlet also comes unstuck. This too has been seized upon as evidence of the unavoidable reality of cultural difference. Bohannan discovers, for example, on the issue of Claudius’s remarriage, that the old man approves: ‘He did well,’ the old man beamed and announced to the others, ‘I told you that if we knew more about Europeans, we would find they really were very like us. In our country also,’ he added to me, ‘the younger brother marries the elder brother’s widow and becomes the father of his children. Now, if your uncle, who married your widowed mother, is your father’s full brother, then he will be a real father to you. Did Hamlet’s father and uncle have one mother?’…The old man told me severely that these genealogical details made all the difference and that when I got home I must ask the elders about it.26 This passage reflects a marked difference in the way Tiv agnatic practice, as compared with seventeenth-century monarchy, handles the death of a father. At the same time, Bohannan also reports repeated Tiv criticism of the failure of the community in Hamlet to recognise the seniority of male elders, the need for a son to respect his uncle, as well as his mother. The intensity of their debate reflects concern with or compulsion to articulate underlying postulations of political, social, familial or personal decorum which the Tiv actually share with the dramatis personae in Bohannan’s narrative, or Bohannan herself, as they, in turn, encounter and struggle with evidence of political, communal or familial breakdown in Shakespeare’s play. Anxiety at phenomena of disjunction or transgression as well as an equally insistent desire for recovery of or structuration of an—albeit variously defined—‘order’ is evident in both Bohannan’s explication and the Tiv’s responses.
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Page 25 It is also worth observing that this dependence upon or need for order, of particular kinds, in both Bohannan and the Tiv implies an accompanying and proximating epistemological insensitivity or vulnerability or insecurity in each. This is implicit in Bohannan’s narrative, in terms of the colonial/imperialist tendencies I noted earlier. It is apparent, too, in the Tiv’s patronage of Bohannan’s position and their repeated dismissal of evidence of cultural practice or value judgement that differs from their own. This is not to deny that, as I suggested at the outset, the extent to which Bohannan’s ‘Tiv’ voices are themselves no more than ventriloquisations, produced by her own determining gaze, must remain open. Nevertheless, insofar as they may be granted at least a mediated ‘presence’ in her narrative, it is clear that, in responding from within their own epistemological models, they operate in an analogous way to that evident in colonial discursive practice. The old man seizes upon the Hamlet story to instruct the young in the importance of Tiv norms. Bohannan repeatedly dramatises Tiv confidence about the universality of their knowledge, again similar to that evidenced in the Oxford voice’s paradoxical sense of its exclusive grasp of the universality of Shakespeare, with which she begins her essay. In all of this, the Tiv appear to be as insensitive about what lies beyond their horizons as that Western gaze that Bohannan struggles, at times in her essay, to question or resist. In their encounter with one another, both participants prove in this respect proximates of one another, engaging at least partly in a mutual process of self-affirmation together with disparagement or erasure of alterity. Response to gender conventions evident in the exchanges between Bohannan and the Tiv also suggest approximation even as they too diverge. If Bohannan reflects the patriarchal bias of Shakespeare’s play in the way, for instance, in which her first namings of identity, within her recounting of the plot of Hamlet, occur at a crucial moment over the issue of patriarchal dynasty (‘Then the man who knew things—his name was Horatio—said this event was the affair of the dead chief s son Hamlet’ (24–5)27), this connects with the overtly patriarchal structuration of the Tiv social order that is evident in her descriptions of their interactions. Furthermore, against Bohannan’s problem in communicating the practice of monogamy to the Tiv may be set the fact that, as in Renaissance Europe, women in the Tiv community appear in roles that are basically subordinate to men. At the same time, however, although the old man’s wives perform subordinate functions, they also appear to have no difficulty in entering the conversation Bohannan is having with the male members of their community. Thus Bohannan comments at one point, ‘determined to save what I could of the mother motif, I took a deep breath and began again, “The son Hamlet was very sad because his mother had married again so quickly” ’ (25) but she is interrupted at once by one of the wives who feels as easily able as the men to enter the conversation, albeit to articulate Tiv cultural practice involving women. Even more significant, the Tiv have no problem in providing Bohannan herself with space to present and discuss her tale. While it may be true that her role as a ‘Western’ guest or anthropologist or outsider facilitates this, the fact that she is a woman is equally significant, particularly in view of the ways in which their conversation around the plot of Hamlet moves often into investigation of and generalisations about appropriate and inappropriate social action or communal and political accountability. Her interventions, in this predominantly male Tiv gathering, contrast markedly, it is worth adding, with the decorum that sets boundaries for the intervention of women
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Page 26 within Hamlet not only in terms of their literal participation, but also in terms of the subjects they discuss. As is well known, it is prominently Hamlet and not Ophelia or Gertrude who soliloquises about problems of agency in Shakespeare’s play. 5. Intersecting knowledges and active readers Bohannan’s discovery that to negotiate with the Tiv and with Hamlet necessitates recognition of, adaption to or provocative engagement with local epistemology, briefly foregrounds the particular project of this book and also questions those aspects of the constructions of ‘others’ that imply the irreconcilability and absoluteness of difference. Rather, in the matters of spectral phenomena or social and gender hierarchy, the Tiv’s responses and concerns intersect with, frame and sometimes approximate those in Hamlet or those, in turn, that Bohannan brings with her. As has often been argued, meaningful connection may be proscribed in comparative projects where the project of ‘othering’ provides merely a fortification of constructed ‘differences’. Bohannan’s essay offers by contrast an extraordinary instance when the ethnographic desire to locate and fix the objects of its gaze as ‘other’ is unsettled by a series of recognitions, which, even as they register difference, suggest, invite or probe as well, contact, dialogue, mutual understanding. Such points of connection ultimately bring into question the viability of any inflexible concept of ‘otherness’ whether racial, gendered or, indeed, scholarly (‘a Shakespearean world that is very much itself). They allow for difference, but in a way that registers or enables, as well, recognition of or exploration of the extent to which predicament and experience intersect. As Satya Mohanty argues it: To believe that you have your space and I mine; to believe, further, that there can be no responsible way in which I can adjudicate between your space—cultural and historical—and mine by developing a set of general criteria that can have interpretative validity in both contexts (because there can be no interpretation that is not simultaneously an evaluation)— to believe both these things is also to assert something quite large. Quite simply, it is to assert that all spaces are equivalent, that they have equal value, that since the lowest common principle of evaluation is all that I can evoke, I cannot—and consequently need not—think about how your space impinges on mine or how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end by denying that I need to take you seriously.28 Such a notion of relativism, Mohanty argues, does not facilitate a ‘genuine dialogue between the anthropologist and the native, the ex-colonizer and the ex-colonized’ (131). Mohanty goes on to wonder how we may negotiate ‘between my history and yours’. He argues that a genuine dialogue ‘would become possible only when we admit that crucial aspects of the non-Western culture may have a great degree of coherence as part of a larger web of ideas, beliefs and practices, and, moreover, that some of these aspects may be untranslatable into the language of the Western anthropologist’s culture because of its historically sedimented and institutionally determined practices of knowing’ (132). In this connection, Mohanty seeks recovery
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Page 27 of a ‘commonality’—not, it should be stressed, of ‘the ambiguous imperial-humanist myth of those shared human (and indeed almost divine) attributes that are supposed to distinguish us absolutely from animals’—but, more significant, recovery of a sense of ‘the imbrication of our various pasts and presents, the ineluctable relationships of shared and contested meanings, values, material resources’ (130).29 He posits the possibility of such a commonality on the belief that ‘rational agency is a basic capacity shared by all humans across cultures’ to argue that in understanding the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, it is this common space we all share that needs to be elaborated and defined.30 His project is an historicised view of agency,31 simultaneously dependent on mutual respect across cultures32 as well as the readiness, in each, to learn from the other:33 If ‘we’ decide that ‘they’ are so different from ‘us’ that we and they have no common ‘criteria’…by which to evaluate (and necessarily, even to interpret) each other, we may avoid making ethnographic errors, but we have also, by the same logic, precluded the possibility that they will ever have anything to teach us (144)…[n]either agreement nor disagreement is possible in a cross-cultural encounter where otherness provokes nothing but ‘wonderment’ as a cognitive stance. If we adopt this stance or accept the skeptical or relativist premises on which it is based, it is difficult to make decolonization a meaningful project, involving cross-cultural contact and dialogue. And it is equally difficult to imagine any kind of multiculturalist project that requires learning from others. (145) By the same token, however impeccable we may believe a current putative ‘bailiwick’ might be, we may reasonably remain open to the possible additional value of (local) knowledges that lie beyond that particular scholarly terrain, with which each of us comes to the text. If Bohannan’s essay falls within the ambit of the fascination with and valorisation of ‘local cultures’ that, Richard Halpern has argued,34 as a result of a ‘shared ethnographic influence’ characterises both modernism and New Historicism, as it unfolds, it transcends the dangers which Halpern notices in ‘primitivist’ modernism, of imperialist projection and appropriation,35 or (Western) construction of an essentialist and irreconcilably alien, archaic (savage) ‘other’. Moreover, if it begins in an ‘ethnographic moment…that is to say, the scene of contact wherein a colonial representative both records and intervenes in an indigenous culture’ (46), Bohannan’s representation of the Tiv presents them not as passive representatives of a (surviving or savage) archaism, but as contemporary and insistent presence, arguing with Bohannan over central issues of experience, in which their knowledges—part, in Mohanty’s terms, of ‘a larger web of ideas, beliefs and practices’—have, for them, living, immediate and central (metropolitan) currency. Their reactions, in terms of my present concerns, in a manner of speaking, anticipate Michel de Certeau’s well-known and provocative challenge to the construction of the reader as unquestioning ‘consumer’ of the text. Postulating what he calls ‘the assimilation of reading to passivity’,36 he argues that ‘to read, is to wander through an imposed system (that of the text, analagous to the constructed order of a city or of a supermarket)’, that ‘every reading modifies its object’, that ‘a system of verbal or
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Page 28 iconic signs is a reservoir of forms to which the reader must give a meaning’ so that ‘the book is a result (a construction) produced by the reader’ (169). This emphasis attempts to take as strategic advantage, to mobilise, the very conditions some metropolitan conventions may be said to want, ideally, rigorously to contain if not to repress. For de Certeau, in the act of reading, the focus is on the reader’s presence, one not merely epistemological but material in any number of other ways including, for the reader too, conditions such as status, privilege, class, the space or location where the act of reading occurs, particular material aspects of the moment in her history when the act of reading happens. Such aspects of Bohannan’s intersections with the Tiv in her essay invite, finally, a rather different response than that which editors of the collection in which her essay appears, which I cite at the outset of Section 2, propose. These editors maintain that Bohannan primarily confirms the ‘distinct and separate worlds of meaning’ that different cultures learn to live by and thereby shows that Western knowledge has boundaries. The effect of this is to push beyond the borders of its ‘knowledge’ the ‘Tiv’ whose cultural practices and assumptions remain implicitly ‘different’. Such a reading of Bohannan may further be made to fit comfortably with—as Mohanty has it—more recent versions of multiculturalism or postmodernist arguments that ‘truth and rationality are always socially and discursively constructed and their validity and applicability…necessarily limited to their particular contexts or situations’.37 But Bohannan’s own impulse in her essay propels her in a different direction, one that, in order to read Hamlet, voluntarily intersects with Tiv epistemology (her essentialist assumptions about the text notwithstanding). I have been arguing that even as her engagement with the Tiv and with Hamlet enacts or suggests attendant complexities in cultural interaction, it especially provides, inadvertently or otherwise, evidence, as much of those points of connection which Mohanty suggests we should register in the processes of cultural encounter, intersection or clash, as it might also connote points of ‘difference’. To register ‘points of connection’ is to bring the location of the reader, whose social location has, as Mohanty points out, epistemic consequences, back into the transaction.38 It is moreover, as he points out, to sharpen our awareness of the ‘social basis of knowledge’, of the complex processes of interaction that problematise both what is there and also what we are likely to find. The framing, then, that our ‘otherness’—whether located within the scholarly Shakespeare metropolis or beyond it, and in terms of our materiality, time and contemporary culture as well as geographical location—brings to early modern texts and, as important, the discovery of our possible proximities, may prove as provocative (stimulating) as it will itself inevitably (like anything else) also be limiting, but it is something the lack of which has its own epistemologically reductive consequences.
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Page 29 3 Active readers Whose muti in the web of it? 1. Objects of whose evidence? The editors of Questions of Evidence (1994) register in an introductory survey how, in recent decades, ‘the status of evidence was altered’ so that, notwithstanding traditional distinctions between primary and secondary sources as means to establishing a stable object of inquiry, that object itself has become subject to ‘the indeterminacy of disciplinary divisions and the all-too-contingent nature of the conventions that motivate their practice’: In place of appealing to evidence as a dictation of reality that authorized a reconstruction of the past, it was necessary to view materials as evidence for the constitutive role they played in shaping the image of the past. After it was recognized that the authority of the past as an object had become problematic, the crossing of boundaries invited a vast broadening or diversification of materials that might be consulted, a kind of ‘dehierarchicization’ of evidence, the abandonment of ironclad and often arbitrary differentiations between primary sources and secondary literature and the gradual acknowledgement of a discursive practice more constructive than reconstructive.1 I want to explore this phenomenon of a ‘broadening or diversification of materials that might be consulted’ in the particular direction I have been proposing in the last two chapters, by taking as a case in point Othello’s handkerchief in Othello—according to these editors, ‘one of the classic texts on the theme of evidence in our tradition’ (4). In fact they pose the interpretative problems that result from the process of broadening and diversification of materials they identify, partly by focusing on this very handkerchief as well as on Stephen Greenblatt’s reading of it. Attending to Greenblatt’s thesis that ‘what Professor Lerner calls “empathy,” Shakespeare calls “Iago”’, they observe: Greenblatt then develops an interpretation of the play (for us) that centres in Iago’s interpretation of the world (for Othello). Iago emerges as the figure of the theatrical improviser-appropriator, a counterpart, in domestic affairs, as it were, for the English explorer abroad. Empathy, then, is cultural appropriation …But since this argument implicates the motives underlying the critical tradition that has defended itself under the banner of interpretative empathy, it
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Page 30 also has implications for Greenblatt’s own critical procedures: for the improviser Iago is to Othello as the improviser Greenblatt is to us. This analogy in Greenblatt’s work between figures in his essays and the figure of himself as essayist is more pronounced in his more recent work, where he comments on those sixteenth-century go-betweens who report back to their European home bases in now-obscure diaries and journals on the wonders discovered in the New World; for these are clearly stand-ins for the Greenblatt who reports to us on the wonders of these almost completely unread texts. Insofar as the analogy holds, however, it becomes remarkable that the thematics of evidence, so conspicuous in the exchanges between Othello and Iago—the famous line, ‘Give me the ocular proof,’ belongs to an elaborate system of such references in the play—are so little explored by Greenblatt. Specifically, Othello’s appetite for evidence and Iago’s falsification of it (with the planting of the handkerchief) are not acknowledged as having implications for the handling of evidence in the counterpart relationship of the critic (Greenblatt) and his readers. We thus come upon the repressed question of evidence in Greenblatt’s book: is there an equivalent of the planted handkerchief in the argument of Renaissance SelfFashioning?2 If the problematic of interpretation posed at the end of this passage on Greenblatt’s procedures appeared to the authors urgently in need of theorisation, it is not one that they suggest can be necessarily, simultaneously easily resolved. It is in a sense, in any reading, inevitable. I want, then, in this chapter to focus on the problem of Othello’s handkerchief in the context of this interpretative conundrum, that the ‘object of inquiry’, the ‘referent’, remains problematically ‘not on the other side of signification but inside the historian’s discourse that posits it as referent’ (5), always subject to the critic’s interaction as herself go-between. My aim is also to question further that demarcation of a limit to ‘broadening and diversification of materials’ in ways that at the same time still seek to admit only knowledges available from within the Shakespeare metropolis. 2. Othello’s North African handkerchief Thomas Rymer famously dismissed Othello’s handkerchief- ‘No Booby, on this side Mauritania, cou’d make any consequence of it’3—but metropolitan Shakespeare readings that attempt to argue its significance often remain determinedly selfengrossed. A.C.Bradley long ago took it as signifier of a ‘mysterious’ Othello4 and a hundred years later Virginia Mason Vaughan still refines and extends this view: the ‘handkerchief denotes Othello’s exotic otherness, his Orientalism, his alienation from Christian, hence Venetian culture’.5 We now understand that the ‘mysterious’, the ‘exotic’, the ‘other’, or the ‘Oriental’ Othello all insist in part on Othello’s impenetrability, leaving him imaginable, as Vaughan’s remark makes explicit, only in terms of lack, or absence. Such an exoticism and otherness includes nothing but ‘alienation’ from Christianity and from European culture. While this in some limited senses may be true of some of the perspectives expressed within Othello, and even perhaps of aspects of Othello’s situation as a black man in Venice, it cannot also be true of that of which the text’s Othello is a representation. The men or women from Africa in
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Page 31 western Europe in the seventeenth century were bearers of cultures and languages of their own. Yet much metropolitan criticism does not seem to trouble itself about this point.6 How do we get beyond the boundary which, in encounters with other cultures, the insistence upon the ‘mysterious’, the ‘exotic’ and the ‘other’, sets? On what kinds of knowledges can we draw in order to understand it? Since Robert Heilman wrote in 1956 that ‘when Othello sums up the myth of the handkerchief, “there’s magic in the web of it” (III.iv.71), he guides us beyond the literal object into the symbolization of love’,7 feminist, psychoanalytic and historicist criticism of past decades has significantly extended our sense of what the handkerchief might denote. For such criticism, the handkerchief resonates, for instance, sexual and erotic symbolism within Elizabethan rituals of marriage,8 or a ‘fetishistic representation’ of ‘maternal virginity’9. Again, it is ‘the locus and medium of a complex motivational conflict between agents who displace or alienate their agency from themselves to it as to a scapegoat, a pharmakon, a fetish’.10 That such and much other recent work operates securely from within Western epistemologies is of course in no way to deny its importance. Other readings, however, in attending to constructions of ‘race’ move towards the border zones of Western epistemologies. Karen Newman11 and Michael Neill12 situate the handkerchief and the play within European anxieties about ‘race’ and miscegenation, ‘the extraordinary fascination with and fear of racial and sexual difference which characterises Elizabethan and Jacobean culture’.13 Recent research investigates the nature of these anxieties: ways in which ‘the construction of Englishness depends on the simultaneous construction of what is non-English’14—of which Mary FloydWilson’s work cited briefly in my introductory chapter is one other instance—discovery narratives of the ‘monstrous’ and ‘obscene’,15 the emerging ‘link between blackness and the monstrous…particularly a monstrous sexuality’,16 Moors and effeminacy.17 While these and other studies provide us with greater understanding of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Western gaze, we know far less about the Africa that is in such ways being interpellated. This may result in part from the geographical imprecisions in the sixteenth and seventeenth century about Africa—the word ‘Ethiopia’ is used relatively loosely, early Renaissance maps locating it in southern Africa for example, while use of the word ‘Moor’ is often unstable, applied not in Africa but ‘in Turkey, India, the Moluccas’.18 The word ‘Barbary’ usually applies to North Africa, but Othello, who says that his mother received the handkerchief from an ‘Egyptian’—thus suggesting that she was not an Egyptian—has, according to his own early travel narrative, at the very least moved about and experienced sub-Saharan Africa. Again, we need to investigate more fully the extent to which the anxieties in travel narratives suggest, beneath the presentation of what Emily Bartels calls ‘demonisation’ and the ‘heightening of exotic differentness’, a ‘hiding of the threatening sameness of the Moor’ and what this similarity might entail.19 Evidence of anxiety in the Western gaze at Africa has also been detected by Kim Hall, who traces in travel narratives a ‘process of inscribing order on native culture’,20 and shows how John Pory’s translation of the converted Moor, Leo Africanus’s A Geographical Historie of Africa (1600), displays ‘a nervousness about where the boundaries of difference lie with this newly converted Christian’ (29).
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Page 32 There was indeed an Africa not only outside dominant European representations of it but also discernible within them. Emily Bartels argues that ‘part of what drew the Portuguese—and after them the English—to Africa was that it was already “civilised”…that it had several internal networks of trade already in place long before any Europeans arrived’.21 She cites Richard Jobson’s description in The Golden Trade (1620) of the sources for the gold traded between England and the Moors of Barbary: the great aboundance of that rich gold they have is fetcht and brought into the Country, by the naturall inhabitants, for which they undergo great travailes… yet so commodious is their trade, and followed with such great dilligence and government, that amongst themselves, none are admitted but principall persons, and by especiall order The Portuguese themselves, of course, did not respect what they found. Almost a century earlier, in the Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar completed in 1516, by one Duarte Barbosa (thought by some to have been Magellan) the same acknowledgement is made, but more disturbingly: further on along the coast is a town of the Moors, well walled, and built of good houses of stone and whitewash, which is called Brava. It has not got a king; it is governed by its elders, they being honoured and respectable persons. It is a place of trade, which has already been destroyed by the Portuguese, with great slaughter of the inhabitants, of whom many were made captives, and great riches in gold, silver, and other merchandise were taken here, and those who escaped fled into the country, and after the place was destroyed they returned to people it.22 Notwithstanding such tendencies towards recognising that there was (and is) an Africa beyond Western representations of it, the dominant Western apparent disinterest in identifying not merely the nature of its own gaze, but the nature of that which its gaze has misrepresented, is replicated even in the matter of Othello’s handkerchief. Arthur Little is one of the few critics who attempts to consider the significance of the handkerchief as an aspect of Othello’s own culture.23 He refers to Leo Africanus’s Geographie which relates the custom in which the bridegroom shows a blood-stained handkerchief ‘before the bride-chamber doore’ as proof of the bride’s virginity, to argue that the handkerchief is ‘[s] teeped in consummation ritual from a culture of the Other’ (312)—though it might be added that he simultaneously replicates the mystification that the term ‘other’ brings with it.24 More recently, Natasha Korda provides the richest and most extensive investigation we have had so far into the handkerchief, exploring not only early modern ‘English ambivalence toward the extravagant importance of household stuff’ but also the intersections of this with what she calls the ‘alienating strangeness of the African fetish’.25 She takes her notion of the object as (African) fetish, primarily from narratives of travel to Africa that ‘represent Africans’ overvaluation of “trifles” and undervaluation of “true” worth’, which for her provide a ‘template for understanding Othello’s tragic fall into jealousy and the pivotal role the handkerchief
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Page 33 plays in precipitating it’ (116). Korda’s account of the significance of the word ‘fetish’ does, it is true, briefly register the extent to which disparate systems of value are here involved (117), the fact that ‘meanings and values attributed to material objects other than their commodity-value’ were dismissed by ‘the market-driven attitudes of Dutch and English traders’ (118), and especially, William Smith’s observation of West African fetish worship that every one of them have some Trifle or other, to which they pay a particular Respect, or Kind of Adoration, believing it can defend them from all Danger’s …and this they call their Fittish, which Word not only signifies the Thing worshipped, but sometimes a Spell, Charm or Inchantment.26 But Korda makes no attempt beyond this to probe the significance of the handkerchief from potentially African perspectives in ways that might also lie beyond the version of them to be found in travel narratives or other Western analyses. Moreover, her subsequent discussion of the play relies largely on that early modern fetish discourse that constructs it as sign of the extravagant and curious overvaluation of trifles and trash to be expected from what were considered to be barbarous and alien cultures.27 In this respect her fine analysis of ‘Iago’s ability to interpellate both Desdemona and Othello into subject positions that are woven together out of numerous, and often contradictory discourses stigmatising women’s and Africans’ relations to material objects’ (158) overlooks the fact that, in addition to the anxieties Othello might have in the context of early modern English laws governing marital property, and particularly paraphernalia, Othello’s anxieties might stem also partly from, as, indeed, his language insists on in the play, a cultural belief that the material object in question is the opposite of a ‘trifle’. 3. Herbert Dhlomo and hybridity I want now to attempt to contribute to an approach to Othello’s handkerchief by way of Africa, firstly, in view of the focus of recent articles on the dividedness or hybridity of Othello, by considering what might be said to be an African instance of the general model of hybridity, and secondly, by an exploration of the use of muti28 in African cultural practice, which Othello’s description of his handkerchief, at the least, resonates. I take as my example of the Westernised or colonised African intellectual, the South African writer, journalist and dramatist Herbert Dhlomo. Born in 1903 in Natal and educated at the American Board Missionary School in Johannesburg as well as at the Amanzimtoti Training Institute, he wrote at least twenty-four plays of which nine have survived in fairly complete form.29 My aim will be to chart the multilayered, conflicting and contradictory impulses evident in his work in order to develop some sense of the nature of his hybridity and his interactions with colonialism. Dhlomo’s critical essays lauding Shakespeare as well as the influence of Shakespeare on his plays suggest the impulse, noted in post-colonial theory, towards affiliation, assimilation, mimicry. Men and Women (1939), described by his biographer as his most ambitious play, reflects, for example, the influence of the Romantic and Victorian writers dominant in British imperialist culture and
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Page 34 missionary education.30 The play is also full of Elizabethan and Jacobean resonances. Part of its tormented concern is with the dansrers of desire both within31 and outside32 the institution of marriage. Earl Nkomo, the lascivious and sexually unscrupulous womaniser in the play, convinces the protagonist, George Khaba, that his wife is unfaithful to him in a sequence strongly reminiscent of Iago’s seduction of Othello (36–8). Throughout the play, he prompts jealousy and suspicion to exploit and destroy Khaba’s marriage as well as other relationships. Khaba, a writer modelled on Dhlomo himself, is located in several scenes, like Dr Faustus, in his library. At one point a tableau depicts his agonistic jealousy as well as the frustrations of his artistic ambitions by means of a Faustian figure who is eventually torn at by ‘richly and loudly’ gaudily dressed dancing women, ‘baboons and ugly Devilish Forms’.33 Occasionally, the language of the play echoes Julius Caesar,34 Hamlet,35 King Lear,36 and, as it moves towards its climax, Men and Women becomes positively Jacobean.37 Khaba’s friend, John the musician, undone by venereal disease, offers a series of insane outpourings which expose the corruption of his community. In the final sequence, a statue is, as in The Winter’s Tale, brought to life—in this case it is the Iago-like figure Nkomo, now literally translated into an ugly dwarf. After various struggles with his conscience, Khaba enacts a grotesque and violent murder upon his wife and her lover. But despite such evidence of an impulse to assimilation, Men and Women also suggests in three important ways that this mimicry or use of British literature is appropriated at the same time to more contestatory ends. Firstly, Dhlomo’s focus on (hetero) sexuality, desire and the institution of marriage has a powerful political implication.38 If Men and Women is written in the context of the South African racist project of segregation in the 1930s, with its attendant devaluation of the oppressed (black) body, then the very presence of this topic in Dhlomo’s work asserts—against the racist positioning of it —sexual/emotional identity and complexity for that body. Secondly, this assertion may be said to parallel the political project Dhlomo had already undertaken in his earlier plays.39 To take one example, Cetshwayo (1936/7)—one of several of Dhlomo’s works likely to be inspired by Shakespeare’s history plays—is an explicit challenge to the segregationist policies of the time.40 It also contests colonial misrepresentations of (pre-colonial) black political practice, anticipates the Black Consciousness Movement in South African politics from the late 1960s, and manifests an almost Brechtian view of history.41 Thirdly, Men and Women is concerned not only with the problematic aspect of desire but with social, familial and economic frustrations attendant on black artistic endeavour. Dhlomo’s presentation of this often smacks of the petty bourgeois elitism and individualism that has been said to characterise a later (1950s) generation of writers. At the same time, his implicit arguments (in his representation of the frustrations of writers and musicians in Men and Women) for space for black music and writing occurs long before what theatre historians tend to identify, for the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the beginnings of the attempt to dislodge eurocentric colonial emphases in educational and cultural structures in South Africa. If we detect in Dhlomo, then, the impulse to contestation as well as to assimilation, we can observe also that this contestation at times mobilises specifically African practices. This can be seen in Dhlomo’s representation in his play of the herbalist, who uses muti. Before we examine this, what is muti?
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Page 35 In traditional Zulu healing, muti is a material substance ‘ranging from stones, earth and minerals to practically all the various species in vegetation…believed to contain amandla, power’.42 This power is held to be neutral and ‘[l]ike all power… can be used illegitimately or legitimately…amandla…in material substances is manipulated to work good or evil, depending on who the manipulator is and his [sic] aims in manipulating the power’ (256). Muti also works in terms of the notion that the spiritual is always dependent on and experienced through the physical.43 Protecting or healing the body will heal the spiritual condition. Particularly in terms of an interest in Othello, we may note especially that muti is important for the treatment of a variety of love relationships and for a variety of reasons. It may be applied in matters of love and fertility. Thus ‘besides observing traditional rules pertaining to pregnancy, an expectant mother takes certain medicines which are believed to make delivery safe and less painful. A bride takes medicines prior to departure to her new home [according to one informant] “in order that she may be received nicely and that she may…not fear anything”.’44 Muti may also be used to treat impotence, to facilitate courtship, and to make the woman love her man. Again, with Othello in mind, we may ponder the fact that a man who fears adultery may apply muti as ‘a justified precautionary step taken because he is defending his marital and legal rights’ (264). Men may also bury muti outside their homes or kraal to keep their wives faithful. It is significant too that muti is not only used in the context of love. Indeed, awareness of muti and its uses appears commonplace knowledge, not restricted to specialist practitioners. To quote Berglund: the wide field in which [muti] operate[s] allows for a range of operators who are the manipulators of the power embedded in materia. Evidence shows quite clearly that practically every Zulu has some knowledge of the use of medicines. Even herd-boys sometimes reveal considerable insight into local fauna and flora, and collect medicines for their seniors. (346) Belief in muti not only exists but has always existed not merely in Zulu but in most if not all sub-Saharan African cultures —even the South African soccer team, when they played Zaire in Togo some years ago, consulted a local voodoo priest, Polo Kodzo, to apply the right muti in order to ensure their victory!45 How does the West read such knowledge or practices? If colonialism is anything to go by, negatively. For one thing the orality in the transmission of knowledge about muti prompts immediate Western scepticism. But this should be set within the context of traditional Western devaluation of the richness of orality. This usually accompanies the traditional (Western) ‘continental division of labour with regard to orality and literacy: Africa has oral literature, Europe written’.46 Furthermore even though we may recognise that oral transmissions of cultural/medical practice over time are subject to development and change, it is also important to acknowledge that, as the oral historian Jan Vansina points out, oral traditions connect us with the past. While ‘oral traditions are documents of the present, because they are told in the present…they also embody a message from the past, so they are expressions of the past at the same time. They are the representation of the past in the present.’47
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Page 36 Having laid the ground, then, for what I hope may be a more serious consideration of the use of muti, I would like, before turning again to Othello’s handkerchief, to focus briefly on Dhlomo’s presentation of the herbalist in Men and Women and on the question of Dhlomo as not only a specific instance of African hybridity but as a possible model for addressing the hybridity of Othello. Given at least putative Western scepticism towards muti as well as towards orality, to which I have just referred, it is interesting to find that, despite the relatively extended treatment of the herbalist and the use of magic in Dhlomo’s play, his biographer Tim Couzens dismisses the herbalist in one sentence, which reads, ‘Dhlomo also indirectly attacks fraudulent herbalists’.48 It is true that Men and Women presents the herbalist as engaged in the kind of trickery that the putative desire for Christian and Western affiliation in an assimilative Dhlomo might have despised. At the same time, the herbalist’s function for his community as healer is firmly delineated in the play. The first person consulting him before George Khaba arrives, is given muti to help him win the woman he is courting. A second couple seek muti to overcome impotence and childlessness. The herbalist also offers moral resort or refuge for those who seek retribution for an injustice that legally49 or conventionally cannot be resolved.50 As important, the herbalist sequences are placed at a turning point. Khaba comes to the herbalist for help while the herbalist is busy misleading a group of men into believing that they will be able to find hidden treasure. Khaba joins them and later, when on his own, he actually finds this treasure. Although obvious fantasy, this enables Dhlomo to present an economically potent Khaba in the final sequence of the play. Moreover, he endows him with magical power. With this power, commented on repeatedly by his assistant, Khaba is able to turn his enemy Nkomo into a dwarf-like statue and then to bring him to life for Khaba’s final enactment of revenge on both Nkomo and his wife. The sequences with the herbalist thus precipitate a fantasy of economic and retributive empowerment. Further, when the herbalist and the men undertake their search for treasure, they sing a song which is the only time Zulu is used in the play: Vukuthu! O Strife! Blackman toiling; Vukuthu! O Life! White man reaping.51 The Zulu word ‘vukuthu’ is an ideoform, meaning ‘rise up’. To notice these conflicting tendencies towards assimilation, contestation and a contestation in which Dhlomo turns, albeit equivocally, to the significance of muti as part of an African epistemology,52 is of course only part of the story. Such tendencies suggest a continual, fluctuating and contradictory negotiation and struggle to find space for what colonial or metropolitan or segregationist discourse elides. But Dhlomo’s endeavour to write at all in the 1930s also occurs within a social order that makes publication for a black writer immensely difficult. In fact, Men and Women remains in manuscript form and has never been published. Indeed, of all of his plays only The Woman Who Killed to Save was published in his lifetime. Long after Dhlomo’s death, the manuscripts of his plays were discovered quite by chance in a cupboard in
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Page 37 the Natal University library canteen.53 Nine of them were subsequently published by two academics, but only in 1985. This inescapable reminder of institutional power tempers further any impulse towards unhistoricised constructions of ‘colonial subjectivity’. Whatever we might want to conclude about Dhlomo’s subjectivity, we have also to acknowledge that it is caught within a web of segregationist and then apartheid hegemony and subject to its pressures. The power of its institutions to censor, suppress, elide his voice is as important as any theoretical articulation of his subjectivity based on his written texts alone. Furthermore, although I have been noting aspects of Men and Women that trace the ways in which Dhlomo not only appropriates the coloniser’s language, but also contests it, it is equally significant that, in his exploration of human sexuality, Dhlomo’s text at times displays strongly misogynist tendencies. Dhlomo’s representation of women in the text suggests the dividedness of Western constructions on the one hand idealised, on the other licentious and treacherous— with the woman’s body in the play positioned by both Khaba54 and John55 as receptacle of blame. This reading, then, of Dhlomo’s hybridity discourages any homogenised generalisation we might be tempted to arrive at: colonised subjectivity appears to be a conflicted, multi-layered, sometimes contradictory terrain. It is, moreover, always located within conflicted and particular environments. But if it is not without its contradictions, it is at times actively engaged in the search for resistance and agency, at times bringing with it also its own non-Western discourses and epistemologies. In this, we may discover for Dhlomo a hybridity that depends finally not on the model of dependence, assimilation, the vitiation of his own cultural position, but one that, within a system of colonial dominance, works also continually towards appropriation and contestation.56 Given the contingencies of Dhlomo’s historical moment, this struggle towards contestatory subjectivity and agency resonates what Gyan Prakash in another context has defined as ‘subalternity as a position of critique, as a recalcitrant difference that arises not outside but inside elite discourses to exert pressure on forces and forms that subordinate it’ [my emphasis].57 This is a position of critique, too, that sporadically manifests the recalcitrance—or the actuality—of its own non-authorised epistemologies. 4. Hybridity in Othello In what ways, then, might this route via Herbert Dhlomo’s hybridity and African medical/cultural practices involving muti help us to read Othello’s handkerchief? To consider such material is not, of course, to imply that the Shakespeare text ought to or ever could have been aware of either Herbert Dhlomo, or of the use of muti. But it does, at the least, foreground the text as representation, something of which we are, in theory, well aware. It alerts us firstly to the fact that in identifying hybridity in Othello, as readers, we must be assuming in what we each do particular models of the interaction between the dominant group or coloniser and the colonised, subaltern or minority group, the Venetians and Othello. Moreover, it underlines that, whatever the text does, there is also something beyond it, that which the text represents. Yet, such awarenesses notwithstanding, frequently the text’s ‘representation’, always conceptualised by particular readers, is reified in criticism, and taken for the thing itself. It is remarkable how, for example, in the matter of the
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Page 38 representation of cultural difference, critical versions of Shakespeare’s representation of the ‘Jew’ become reified in criticism as point of reference for Judaism altogether—regardless of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jewish writing confirming the extent to which The Merchant of Venice misrepresents Jewish practice and behaviour within and beyond its own community, including basic tenets in Judaism which proscribe revenge, and which invest centrally in the concept of a merciful God.58 By the same token, the editor of the recently published third Arden Othello, E.A J. Honigman, observes that ‘[b]ecause of Shakespeare’s vivid characterization and powerful effect on later writers, Othello perhaps impresses us now as a quintessential Moor, representative of his race’,59 while later he notes that if the play suggests the ‘emerging social problem’ of ‘Europe’s response to the other’, [b]e he black or a north African Moor…Othello’s otherness remains…he comes from a mysteriously ‘other’ world, a world that lies beyond our reach, hinted at rather than defined. Despite his self-identification with Venice and Christianity the Moor cannot shake off this mystery, a by-product of his dark skin and of the associations this had in European minds…Who will dare to say, in the more liberal 1990s, that we have changed so completely that Othello’s ‘otherness’ no longer affects us in the theatre. (27, 31) The black ‘mysterious other’ is hereby perpetuated while on the handkerchief itself, Honigman remarks: ‘Othello’s first account of the handkerchief…associates his parents with an undefined paganism, reminiscent of the witch doctors of North Africa (who were described by John Leo)’ (23, my emphasis).60 The complex nature of hybridity as evidenced in the example of Herbert Dhlomo is one way of moving beyond such boundaries as well as the tendencies they facilitate. In coming to Othello, we need perhaps to read hybridity as indicating a more strongly active move to appropriation and contestation as well as assimilation; negotiation, interaction, strategy and empowerment as well as division, mimicry and dependence; a continuing struggle, often against enormous odds, for agency. George Lamming long ago remarked on the extent to which, from the coloniser’s point of view, attempts at assimilation only underline the colonised’s lack or inferiority,61 hinted at again in Honigman’s remarks that ‘a too perfect command of an acquired language’ can accentuate ‘otherness’ and that ‘Othello’s longer speeches are, as rhetoric, almost too self-consciously measured—Iago would call them bombastic—another instance of cultural assimilation gone wrong or overdone’.62 Against such positions, I am trying to argue in this chapter that beyond, or instead of, the construction of the mysterious ‘other’ there is (and, again, also in Mohanty’s terms) a recognisable and particular predicament and struggle to be apprehended. Furthermore, as in the case of Dhlomo, instead of mimicry and division in Othello, or, as well as mimicry and division, we need to read skill, survival, negotiation, struggle. While we already recognise in Othello’s case the odds against him, not only in terms of his minority and isolated position, but in terms of an intensifying racist, miscegenationphobic culture, we might also focus more on his extraordinary ability in negotiating, appropriating, playing this world. We need to resist, that is, recycling that tendency in the criticism of the nineteenth century, notoriously disseminated in
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Page 39 the twentieth, among others, by T.S. Eliot, to read an Othello who is in one or other way ultimately ‘inferior’ to the culture within which he finds himself. The service he has done the signory, both military and in his (in certain respects contradictory) role of colonial administrator on Cyprus, provides some evidence of an Othello who is the opposite of Eliot’s racist fiction. The appropriation evident in his linguistic powers and eloquence provides more. His narrative of his early experiences in part offers particular evidence of a tactical ability to cater for expectations and prejudices as means to survival, and to getting his way. Such skills bespeak an impressive capacity, within a culturally complex situation that works against him, to achieve agency. 5. Proximate foreigners and foreign critics It is, however, arguable that for a reading of Othello, the model of hybridity needs also somewhat to be adjusted. For Dhlomo was born into an already segregationist, hybridised southern Africa. Although, when Shakespeare’s play begins, Othello lives in Venice, he is not born there. He has himself been a traveller so that, as is well known, his situation is partly characterised by cultural encounter germane to travel: those intersections between guest and host, foreigner and native, outsider and insider probed by Maurizio Calbi in the context of the following passage from Derrida’s writings on hospitality: hospitality is…the greeting of the foreign other as a friend but on the condition that the host…the one who receives, lodges or gives asylum remains…the master of the household, on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his own home…and thereby affirms the law of hospitality as the law of the household, oikonomia, the law of his household… thus limiting the gift proferred and making of this limitation, namely, the being-oneself in one’s own home, the condition of the gift and of hospitality.63 Calbi, to whose essay I am throughout this entire section deeply indebted, argues, in terms of this, that ‘the reverse side of…initial affectionate welcoming of the stranger’ (31) entails potential hostility. The foreign other puts the host ‘into question’ (as does the host the foreigner), structuring from within ‘even the most benevolent welcoming of the stranger’ a continuity between or an ‘uncanny conjunction of hospitality and hostility’ (28). He reads multiple variants of this in, for instance, Iago’s, Roderigo’s and Brabantio’s questioning of Othello as foreigner, the Duke’s controlled containment of his ‘difference’ even as he defends him, Othello’s own movement from guest in Venice to host or master on the island of Cyprus. Calbi also remarks that Othello is not merely about travelling but is a play ‘whose language incessantly travels’ (40). Not simply a matter of the geographical movement from Venice to Cyprus, or the geographical travels in the histories Othello recounts, travel in Othello entails, too, multiple narratives which, in turn, in a manner of speaking also ‘host’ their auditors, take them too on particular journeys. Thus the hosts, Desdemona and Brabantio, are in turn hosted by Othello’s narratives. Again, Othello, master on Cyprus, is nevertheless also hosted by Iago’s narratives, encouraged by them, for instance, to entertain versions of himself as ‘Islamic other’ or of his wife as dangerous and indiscriminate host to other men.
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Page 40 In such or other ways the categories of guest and host are, suggests Calbi, frequently unsettled. At the beginning of the play, Othello is foreigner and guest but also ‘not quite’ (34). He ‘fetch[es] [his] life and being/From men of royal siege’ (I.ii.21–2), is a general in the Venetian army, marries the daughter of a Venetian nobleman, is proficient in the language of his hosts. For those members of Shakespeare’s first audiences in some way themselves involved in or connected to trade and travel, the predicaments of host and guest/foreigner might well have been meaningful in more than one way. The English themselves, after all, not only encountered the foreign on their journeys but were themselves guests and foreigners, hosted by others. In the shiftings and mergings of the roles of host and guest, distinctions between the master’s hospitality as ‘law of the household’ and the laws of other (foreign) households begin to engage, merge, clash. To listen to, understand and be a guest of a foreign other is to become, as guest, participant in the foreign other’s household. Questioning the foreigner, that is, works in more than one direction: as the categories of host and guest change, differing ‘host-laws’ engage and sometimes approximate one another in value or importance, producing multiple overlapping layers and anxieties informing the positions of both host and guest/ foreigner. I suggest that recognition of the incidence of muti in African cultural experience provides one such instance of complicated intersection or, to use Calbi’s notion, proximation between ‘host-law’ and ‘guest-law’. I am obviously not concerned, as I have said, directly to argue that Shakespeare’s text leads us to this cultural practice. But I have suggested that the fact of orality in the transmission of cultural practices in Africa may plausibly lead us from the present to the past, from Western senses to this particular African knowledge. Nabil Matar’s observation that ‘England’s relations with sub-Saharan Africans were relations of power, domination and slavery, while relations with the Muslims of North Africa and the Levant were of anxious equality and grudging emulation’64 may be set beside Othello’s indication that his past includes slavery. If the use of muti, in one or other form, is to be found in most subSaharan cultures, the likely experience of a seventeenth-century equivalent of Othello—not only in terms of his travels beyond the confines of Muslim-dominated Barbary, but also because of Barbary’s own trade with sub-Saharan Africa—would confirm encounters with or links with African cultural practices.65 But even if we disregard such arguments, what we now know of the contemporary significance of muti and its origins in African cultures is surely at least as useful a model for analysing Othello’s language about the origin and meaning of the handkerchief as, say, contemporary Western Freudian or Marxist notions of fetishisation. For, if the magic in the web of the handkerchief has for Othello significance because of the epistemology that he brings with him from Africa to Europe, if it relates to, as Calbi might put it, his ‘being of himself in his own house’, the focus of our discussions about the importance of that handkerchief must shift—away from propositions as to Othello’s lack or other putative problematics of interiority read purely in terms of host-culture (Western) knowledges. We need to address awareness of the difference between his reading of the handkerchief- as part of a cultural African belief in the innate power of materia to affect and protect marriage—and Western uninterest in or ignorance of this. Recognition, furthermore, that Othello’s investment in the handkerchief may relate to his particular cultural tradition,
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Page 41 inheritance and being, must further, in turn, shift our attention back from his interiority to the cultural encounter in which he participates. There are multiple aspects to this encounter. Stephen Greenblatt’s famous postulation of the improvisatory skill of the Iago who turns cultural difference to his advantage66 is one way this may be addressed and it invites focus on the destructive capability that lies at the heart of Iago’s ‘whiteness’. In this, however much we may wish to argue for Othello —as Karen Newman and Michael Neill among others have done—an active participation in emergent racism, we are also brought back to the text’s own anxiety about that racism, its concern with the divisions within its own culture that such destructive capabilities confirm, or its partial incapacity, like Iago at the end of the play, to address directly its own violence. This European impulse to violence is of course contemporaneously relentlessly active even as it simultaneously constructs a culturally blank, exotic or impenetrable other—as Barbosa’s comment on the effect of the Portuguese upon the Africa they found, which I noted earlier, indicates. Such a shift also takes us away from Othello’s hybridity, back to the dividedness of the Europe/West that not only insists on constructing this divided other, but relies on it, not only in the matter of colonialism, but as some critics suggest, in the construction of gender, ‘race’, sexuality. Patricia Parker focused long since on this hidden European anxiety, in her discussion of Othello when she noted how the French surgeon Ambrose Paré addresses ‘a forbidden (and threatening) female sexuality at home’ by projecting it onto ‘a story of the women of “Barbarie”’,67 arguing, moreover, that Othello as a whole is really about ‘“the [European] civil monster”’, a play that in ‘pervasive, and unsettling ways exposes the contradictions at the heart of the [European] civilised or “civil”’ (100). In 1908 Gandhi, foregrounding the extent to which ‘the violence of colonialism emerges as the central truth of the modern capitalist civilisation’, writes with bitter irony, ‘Civilization is not an incurable disease, but it should never be forgotten that the English people are at present afflicted by it.’68 Located within such contexts, Othello’s final speech, too, may suggest more than evidence of a ‘tragic’ disabling version of hybridity. It is true that Othello speaks, as Calbi has it, ‘from the multiplicity of positions he hosts (i.e. the Christian Venetian general, the base Indian or Judean, the Arabian, the ‘turban’d Turk’). But that speech may also partly be read as —in order to punish himself—a violent act of partial self-abjection or self-abuse, an embittered and angry appropriation of the European, reductive and ultimately murderous practice of ‘othering’. It is anxiety about just such a European and, indeed, masculine potential for violence that I will argue, in the second part of this book, is a recurring preoccupation in the late plays. If such arguments take us to Calbi’s foregrounding of approximation and proximity, in guest-host relationships, rather than difference, there is another way in which the practice of muti, taken seriously, proposes intersections between Othello’s view of the handkerchief and the host European culture in which Othello finds himself. Muti is used in accordance with an admittedly patriarchal and misogynist view of the dangers of sexual betrayal and the need to guard against adultery. This view is remarkably coincident with Christian fears of adultery, famously probed in the context of the play, among others, again by Greenblatt. Othello’s religious and moral constructions of morality in the context of marital sexual conduct—in Calbi’s argument, the ‘guest-laws’ that he brings with him—
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Page 42 may be situated in turn in the context of Calbi’s observation via Derrida that questioning of the foreigner can also be seen as a kind of defence mechanism. It indicates anxious and oblique acknowledgement of the overproximity of the ‘object-foreigner’—she or he is too close, unbearably proximate. Awareness of the use of muti in this case takes us via anxieties in African cultural practice directly back to the fact of promiscuity within European cultural practice as well as to the moral or theological discourses that attempt to contain or explain it, evident in Othello’s agonised cry, ‘demand that demi-devil/Why he hath thus ensnared my soul and body?’ (V.ii.298–9), or in his earlier expressed fear that Desdemona may herself may be an instrument of the devil, ‘have the office opposite to Saint Peter,/…keep the gates of hell’ (IV.ii.93–4), and perversely too underlying Iago’s intense envy, with which the play begins. What kind of guest, then, to use again Calbi’s term, do Western critics severally make of Othello, in their reading of him? I began this chapter by arguing that the knowledge systems within which much recent criticism has operated ignore implications suggested within the text that direct us to the African dimension in Othello. This still, despite, say, the recent attention given to the writings of Leo Africanus. To what extent, one wonders, does this avoidance indicate an abiding proto-colonial metropolitan predilection for the authority of its own knowledges and simultaneous denial to people beyond its boundaries of possible agency within their own, local, epistemologies?
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Page 43 4 William Tshikinya-Chaka, I presume? Cultural encounter in performance Contemporary performances of Shakespeare, especially beyond the Shakespeare metropolis, provide obvious instances, involving, especially, critics or theatre practitioners, of cultural encounter, of what Barbara Hodgdon refers to as the ‘distinct affective and interpretive experiences, produced historically in specific social formations’ which for audiences will ‘shape the cultural destinies of the text’.1 Before turning to the late plays I want to glance briefly in this chapter at some aspects of the question of local knowledges in the context of Shakespeare production and its reception. My concern, firstly, in the case of the Zulu version of Macbeth, called uMabatha, is to note briefly one way in which significant metropolitan Shakespeare criticism may, none the less, be as limited, inevitably, by its own locality as any other. I explore, secondly, ways in which, in the case of a recent version of Julius Caesar, called SeZaR, local knowledges, this time evident in production, may sometimes provocatively extend our sense of Shakespeare’s text. The particular foregroundings of an equivocal or complex masculinity with its implications for awareness of gender approximation in this particular production also anticipates what will be some of my preoccupations in my discussion of Shakespeare’s late plays in the second part of this book. 1. Spinning uMabatha The Zulu version of Macbeth, written by Welcome Msomi and called uMabatha, was first performed in South Africa and abroad in the early 1970s. It was later revived in South Africa in the mid-1990s and then taken abroad to participate in the opening season of the new Broadside Globe. I begin with an examination of aspects of the playtext: what does evidence of Zulu acculturation in Msomi’s project, such as the play’s detail of Zulu law and custom, which includes use of a praise singer (imbongi) and of sangomas (positive healers in the Zulu system) for the witches, together with assegais (spears) and shields, the location of kraal and veld, tell us about the original uMabatha? The imbongi’s introduction to Dangane (Duncan),2 and then, when he has become chief, Mabatha (Macbeth)—one of the few significant deviations from Msomi’s more usual conformity to Shakespeare’s plot3—evokes (even if this is not pursued) the political protocol and vitality of a non-colonised black culture, as do references elsewhere to the ‘Royal Kraal’ or to the councillors of the chief. Further, Msomi collocates Macbeth with the history of the great nineteenth-century ruler
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Page 44 Shaka, at a time when revisionist historiographical and anthropological moves in the rewriting of the history of Shaka had not yet occurred. In its presentation of an admittedly pre-colonial black power, this potentially challenges the parameters of what the government’s eurocentric and racist policy called Christian National Education was prepared to countenance. The use of Zulu also immediately displaces the centrality of the official apartheid languages of Afrikaans and English, something the editors of a recent collection of adaptations of Shakespeare are anxious to claim as indicative of the ‘decolonizing potential inherent in a play that crosses linguistic, ethnic, and national borders’.4 To a degree uMabatha thus invites, for white English-speaking and Shakespeareeducated South Africans, and then British audiences, cultural encounter. Msomi’s mostly unremarkable and unprovocative adaptation of the plot and procedures of Macbeth limits commentary on aspects of this encounter, but such a commentary is not, at the same time, impossible. For example, Msomi turns Lady Macbeth’s Make thick my blood, Stop up th’ access and passage to remorse, That no compunctious visitings of nature Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between Th’effect and it. Come to my woman’s breasts, And take my milk for gall, you murd’ring ministers, … That my keen knife see not the wound it makes, Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark To cry ‘Hold, hold!’ (I.v.41–52)5 into Kamadonsela’s I call again On all the spirits of my ancestors, Let my heart be like the devil’s thorn My blood of mamba’s poison, That where I strike no life returns, Dry up my woman’s tears And let my breasts shrivel with serpent’s milk, I call on you To shade my eyes And fill my ears with earth So none can see or hear Iklwa, The assegai’s clean path. (Act II, Scenei, 173) As I have noted elsewhere,6 the kind of translation/adaptation that Msomi effects here, partly apparent in the English version, in turn, of the Zulu, suggests a shift from an instance of seventeenth-century Jacobean Christianity, to a warrior/ agricultural,
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Page 45 oral culture, informed by ancestor/shade conceptualisation.7 The fact that, in Zulu lore, ‘like living seniors, the shades are believed to exercise legitimate anger in support of the moral code of law that lineage survivors are expected to observe’ (384) outlines the outrageous nature of Kamadonsela’s attempt at appropriation of ancestral legitimation. Zulu belief that ‘one of the three channels of power is that which is enveloped in materia’ (386), evident, in the previous chapter, in the case of muti, emerges from the contrast between Kamadonsela’s presentation of the ‘devil’s thorn’, ‘mamba’s poison’, ‘serpent’s milk’ and ‘assegai’ and the inextricable mix of imagery and particular theological and moral resonance which informs Lady Macbeth’s language. To what extent might such incidents of Zulu acculturation be significant in the early 1970s when the play was first performed and apartheid remained dominant? This was, of course, not the first time that black writers had resisted marginalisation or erasure of their own cultures. In the early decades of the twentieth century, as Brian Willan, David Schalkwyk and Lerothodi Lapula have shown,8 Solomon T. Plaatje put Shakespeare to use in projects, as Coppelia Kahn puts it, ‘of preserving and/or reinventing his own culture’.9 Even more pertinent perhaps, Herbert Dhlomo, whose play Men and Women I discussed in the previous chapter, wrote, as I noted there, several other politically highly contestatory plays in the 1930s, some of which were situated in the same period of history as that Msomi chose for uMabatha.10 But set against Dhlomo’s militant presentation of Zulu history and culture in order to interrogate his own (segregationist) moment, Msomi’s project, despite the various potentials for contestation latent in its incidents of acculturation, emerges as relatively muted and, certainly in terms of Dhlomo’s insistent contemporaneity, depoliticised. By Msomi’s own admission he satisfied the Theatre Professor, who wanted him to write an ‘African epic’, by an adaptation of Shakespeare accomplished, in the end, in three days.11 Engaged in an exercise in sophistication (for the word ‘sophistication’ OED supplies ‘2. disingenuous alteration or perversion of something; conversion into some less genuine form), he introduced elements of Zulu culture as well as the Zulu language, but he did so in a predominantly uncontentious way, which clearly deliberately avoids engagement with its own moment. Like Dhlomo, Msomi was writing within twentieth-century urban conditions, which in the early 1970s were further punctuated by increasing strains in the apartheid economy, by labour action and ongoing political resistance. But address of contemporary conditions would have politicised uMabatha in ways that might have made performance of it politically hazardous and the sponsorship of the academy difficult to sustain. Even though Msomi was working full-time for a pharmaceutical company, the kind of work he produced suggests that he was already in aspiration, primarily, as the editors of Adaptations of Shakespeare blandly put it, an ‘entrepreneur’ who had founded the IZulu Dance Theatre and Music in 1965 in Durban and has since gone on to become chief executive officer of Sasani Investments, an entertainment, communication and education multi-media group aimed at marketing ‘the richness of [South African] culture both here and overseas, much like Hollywood has marketed America to the rest of the world’.12
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Page 46 The notion of ‘Zulu culture’ in the play was itself pliable. In uMabatha, Mabatha’s wife Kamadonsela is told by drumbeat of her husband’s encounter with the witches and of Dangane’s imminent arrival at their kraal. The use of drums as medium of communication as opposed to celebratory or ritual accompaniment to dance is not part of what is considered Zulu practice in Southern Africa13 but an importation by Msomi of practices from Central Africa. Prefatory attention to the nature of Zulu acculturation in the playtext of u Mabatha, and some aspects of the context of its first appearance proposes, then, even for the original, a measure of depoliticisation and commodification. I want now to consider apects of Kate McLuskie’s discussion of the revival of uMabatha which she saw at the Globe in the mid-1990s.14 McLuskie, manifesting her own particular interest in the commodification of Shakespeare, cites the revived performance as an instance of what she wittily calls ‘the endless game of pass the parcel which Shakespeare production has become’ (155). Foregrounding the importance of those ‘discourses which articulate the intersection between performances of Shakespeare in the theatre and successive moments of cultural politics’, she aims to demonstrate the extent to which consideration of ‘the packaging of Shakespeare’ entails the ‘relationships between… performance, its reception and the surrounding commentary’ (165). She argues that uMabatha’s ‘initial use-value as a show created in and for a particular theatrical occasion was transformed by its commercial success into a potential exchange value as the performance was repeated in different national contexts’ (157). McLuskie explicates her reference to the original ‘use-value’ of u Mabatha as ‘a show created in and for a particular theatrical occasion’ by way of reference to selected reviews or studies of the play from sources available from within her own location. In the remainder of her essay she contrasts the ‘use-value’ in these first 1970s performances of u Mabatha and what she argues to have become its later ‘exchange-value’, evident particularly, she argues, in the subsequent ‘post-colonial spin’ (158) used to package it. In this, McLuskie is drawing on basic Marxist tenets including the notions of ‘surplus value’, ‘alienated wage labour’ and the ‘global drive of capitalist exploitation’.15 To strengthen her argument she relies too on Richard Halpern’s account of modernist and related early twentieth-century attempts to save theatre ‘from commercialism…by a return to an authenticity’, either ‘historical, like Elizabethanist miseen-scène’ or ‘primitive, and therefore outside commercial culture’ (162). She draws as well on more recent writing about theatre in circulation within her own location, including the work of Patrice Pavis, Michael Etherton and Antony Appiah, to argue the well-known problematics attached to the phenomenon of cultural exchange in a theatre that attempts to release ‘the arts of colonial cultures from their originating relationship to the cultures which produced them and reinvest them with both the symbolic value and exchange value of the metropolis’ (162–3). Such arguments foreground frequently explored anxieties about the ways in which colonisation deforms indigenous cultural forms and problematises claims both to authenticity and contemporaneity. They suggest ‘the opposition between art and commerce, between the authentic and the fake and, in this case, between the metropolitan and the third world’ (165). In this attempt to fit the first and second versions of uMabatha into such patternings, McLuskie is of course also applying Marxist articulations to another
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Page 47 location as well as her own. I want to examine the extent to which aspects of her inquiry, in making these shifts from her own British location to a different and earlier South African one, remain limited to her Western, European and British origin. While this is in no way intended to suggest that such inquiries are anything but desirable and helpful, it is to recognise that, even within the Shakespeare metropolis, currently empowered and authoritative knowledges always remain partly, and in more than an uncomplicated way, themselves local. Thus, McLuskie’s use of the term ‘Black Theatre’ in order to describe and perhaps fashion ‘use-value’ for the early uMabatha is problematic,16 even though she is commendably careful in pointing out, in the course of her attempt to discern a ‘usevalue’ for the original production, that in the 1970s black creative involvement in theatre rarely operated independently of some form of cooperation with white big business (sometimes), or progressive white theatre practitioners. Precisely because of this, indeed, for the early 1970s in South Africa, the term ‘Black Theatre’ applies more appropriately only to very radical ventures in black consciousness, undertaken by small groups of theatre practitioners, largely at first in Durban, which very soon came under deadly governmental surveillance.17 Conditions in the production of the first uMabatha were—in the context of such dangerous, struggling, poorly funded and politically threatened ventures in radical black theatre—economically, politically and even theatrically completely sheltered. Under the aegis of the then head of the Department of Speech and Drama, Elizabeth Sneddon, aided by faculty member Peter Scholz as artistic director, it was initially sponsored by the University of Natal,18 which, unlike the universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, was not in the forefront of the fight for academic freedom. It came at a time when the University of Natal’s newly appointed vice-chancellor was feared to have direct links with the nationalist government, going on, indeed, to become some years later one of the few English-speaking cabinet ministers in it. Moreover, even though uMabatha had a black author and black cast, it showed, as I have remarked, no interest in intersecting with current events, unlike emergent neo-realist black consciousness theatre which was attempting aggressively to intervene in contemporary social and political issues, or new multi-racial workshop theatre. Side by side with the endeavours of black consciousness theatre, John Kani, Winston Ntshona and Athol Fugard, again with little or no funding, in nontheatrical, sometimes township spaces, and repeatedly in danger of police interference, were attempting to dramatise their own sense of oppression, in the face of apartheid law, which prohibited white and black bodies working or acting on the same stage together. In contrast to this, Elizabeth Sneddon’s venture with Msomi was at the very least ambiguous. Its dramatisation of a black, relatively pre-colonial past might accord well with the fabrication of tribal ethnicities that the apartheid government encouraged. It was, appropriately for the apartheid system, under Sneddon’s and Scholz’s (white) tutelage. It also appeared to privilege a ‘colonial’ Shakespeare whose ‘universality’ might here, by way of ‘Zulu’ culture, be reaffirmed. Such ambiguities might certainly have strengthened the resolve of the anti-apartheid protestors McLuskie mentions, who maintained, when uMabatha went international, that the play had governmental support. On its return to South Africa, it was performed in Johannesburg at the Coliseum Theatre (a large commercial film venue patronised by the white middle classes) under the sponsorship of the South African
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Page 48 Steel Industry which, unlike the Anglo-American Corporation which had supported overtly progressive theatre ventures such as the Union of South African Artists, was hardly known for the sponsorship of liberal causes. The ‘spin’ that the apartheid government-sponsored magazine SA Panorama put on it was particularly telling: Fifty-five Zulu players stunned London theatre goers with Umabatha… Muscular, barefooted warriors in feathered headgear and monkey-tailed mutshas electrified packed houses with displays of frenzied war dancing and tribal fights. Women in colourful tribal dress won quieter appreciation for their singing and rhythmic dance routines. The cast stirred outright admiration for their portrayal of witchcraft, murder and tribal intrigue…[Msomi] took Shakespeare’s theme, recast it in Zulu tradition and custom and added tribal music, war dances and witchcraft.19 Such conditions of production and reception suggest again that the original uMabatha provides an instance of that very process of commodification with which McLuskie is engaged, rather than an example of what McLuskie notes as, although a conflicted and contradictory ‘black theatre’, one also ‘authentic’ as compared with an allegedly more compromised ‘exchange-value’ evident in its 1990s revival. Such reservations about her argument notwithstanding, McLuskie is of course quite right to regard the commodity she saw at the Globe equivocally. None the less, she betrays an additional occasional reserve towards ‘the foreign’ in three particular ways. She admits to, firstly, a touch of (local) irritation at the use of Zulu for Shakespeare, in remarking its intrusiveness for the Globe (British) audience subjected to ‘the spectacle of an actor, speaking an unknown language, by turns stroking his chin or furrowing his brow’ which ‘turned Mabatha’s…performance into a series of mimed set pieces’ (my emphasis, 155). Such an ‘unknown’ language was of course ‘known’ to Msomi and his actors, together with whatever Zulu members of his audience attended the early productions, not to mention the larger community of Zulu speakers elsewhere.20 Disinterest in the kind of possible cultural negotiations the retranslation of the Zulu into the modern English sur-titles, which accompanied the production, might suggest,21 displays a certain indifference not only to the production’s language, but to the language of Zulu cultural practice itself. Politically muffled and culturally diluted as Msomi’s uMabatha may have been, both originally and then at the Aldwych and the Globe, it was a product that, none the less, proposed the possibility of at least a measure of cultural encounter. It can, further, be argued that products that may be from within a particular (local) terrain of knowledge, regarded as ideologically suspect, may not therefore be lacking in any interest at all. Important as her interrogation into the processes of the ascription of exchange value is, McLuskie, in the course of this cultural encounter, shows little interest in such dimensions of the commodity she is discussing—or what such or other intersections of language and cultural meaning might suggest both for Zulu/African and British culture—regrettably echoing in turn, and most certainly unintentionally, the erstwhile colonising discursive gaze, uninterested in the object it is intent on appropriating, and, again, suggesting one that, as much as it discovers a ‘Shakespeare without his language’ (155),22 also receives uMabatha as Msomi without his language.
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Page 49 Reserve towards the foreign emerges, secondly, from McLuskie’s report of the production’s use of Zulu dancing and drumming. She complains that ‘the physical theatre of dancing and drumming, of course, diminished the dialogue and the soliloquies’ (155). The play’s ‘style of performance was too firmly tied to Zulu drumming and dancing to demystify the social relations of Shakespeare performance in the post-colonial world’ (155). The use of dancing and drumming in the production is further slotted into critiques of it which, taking the modernist route, argue the wrenching of (colonised/ native) cultural practices from their locations in ritual and the representation of them instead on stage as ‘theme parks’ for ‘international tourism’ (164). McLuskie and the critics she cites are of course right about the fact that the dimension of dancing and drumming in the production had immense popular appeal and must originally certainly have struck Msomi and his production team as something with high marketing potential. But if purely commercial ‘commodification’ of a Zulu ritual is all that is happening here, then this simply connects it to similar European commodifications of cultural practice everywhere, including, say, Stratford-upon-Avon. It is worth recalling Ann Rosalind Jones’s and Peter Stalleybrass’s insistence that in the matter of, for instance, clothing, even Renaissance theatrical practice, by very definition, was ‘founded upon the flouting of the sumptuary laws and upon the circulation of clothes from aristocrats to commoners’.23 John Stephens’s disapproval of the practice as ‘dayly Counterfeite’ (187) notwithstanding, players’ clothes, ‘new and cast-off alike, were translated across geographical divisions, across class divisions, across gender divisions, across “national” divisions [and such] boundary crossings provided a rich repository of stories for theatrical scripts’ (193). A similar point may be made regarding any cultural practice upon which theatre, always in part a commercial enterprise, may draw. Even if theatre practice inevitably appropriates cultural practices, discussion of the use of dancing or any other ritualrelated device need not be restricted merely to this particular discursive concern with ‘authenticity’ or ‘commercialism’ in the representation of an hypothesised ‘other’ and an alleged ‘primitive’. Given, for example, Zulu predilections for the foregrounding of physical, corporal, external visibility, Zulu dancing and drumming in the original production of u Mabatha at least, within apartheid conditions of production, might have resonated a measure of militant (masculine) bodily black power. Such resonances, in the context of the later productions at the Aldwych and the Globe, might, again, be explored, too, in terms of the intersections they might invite between British and African notions of ‘body’ and ‘masculinity’ or of ‘monarchy’. To what extent, for instance, is Msomi’s avoidance of the contemporary, attendant on this evocation of ‘historical’ military splendour, different from or evocative of presentday packagings of British monarchy? A third way in which McLuskie’s gaze is discernibly tinged by a sense of the foreign occurs when she observes how the programme notes for the mid-1990s Globe production: came with an endorsement from none other than Nelson Mandela. Unembarrassed by academic critical theory or a knowing appreciation of the witty paradoxes of global commercialization, he praised the production for its dramatization of ‘the universality of ambition, greed or fear’.24
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Page 50 McLuskie observes a little later in her argument that in post-colonial spin on theatre ‘the rhetorics and discourses of its description and evaluation pay scant attention to its conditions of production’ (158). But presentation of the recommendation of Mandela—marked as foreign to the academy or to the sophistications of global economics—elides the very conditions within which Mandela had called for a revival of u Mabatha. This was only a year after South Africa’s first democratic election, and two years, also, before the play was taken again to Europe to play this time at the Globe. It is significant that Mandela thought to ask for a revival of this 1970s play particularly, rather than, say, an example from the black consciousness or multiracial theatre, contemporary to it, to which I referred earlier. He did so in the context of the complicated and recently bloody history of rivalry between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. The latter, founded in 1976 by Chief Mongosuthu Buthulezi, although claiming to be open to all South Africans, was promoting its version of a militant Zulu nationalism. In the 1990s increasingly murderous violence between supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (sometimes working with the help of the apartheid police who exploited what was seen as ethnic and separatist tendencies) and followers of the African National Congress, particularly in Natal, threatened plans for a unified and democratic South Africa. Buthulezi rejected the call for Zulus to abandon carrying their traditional weapons which included the assegai or spear, and which were being used in incidents of violence which, in Natal alone, had already led to the killing of over 7,000 people. In 1991 in a speech in Soweto, he asserted: Long before there was a racist government, KwaZulu was there. KwaZulu was even there long before modern South Africa was formed. The great exploits of King Shaka ka Senzangakhona established the Zulu Kingdom as a powerful sovereign Kingdom with influences which reached down to the Caledon River in the Cape Province and far north into what is now Mo[z]ambique and also into the Transvaal.25 Although, after emerging victorious from the South African General Election of 1994, President Mandela had managed to persuade Buthulezi to join his cabinet, the dangerously divisive potential of the often violent proclivities of followers of the Inkatha Freedom Party remained powerfully present throughout the 1990s, paralleling the potential dangers throughout this period latent within the white South African Right. In such conditions, Mandela’s decision to recommend and promote a revival of u Mabatha bespeaks, before all else, a canny instance of his wellknown advocation of reconciliation. Msomi’s play did provide acknowledgement of Zulu history. At the same time it was relatively depoliticised, lacking, certainly, the particularly threatening kind of contemporaneity that Buthulezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party were giving their versions of Zulu history. His ‘universal Shakespeare’ was, in this context, similarly conveniently generalised and depoliticised. Mandela’s well-known support of the traditionally white Afrikaner love of rugby during the World Cup manifests a similar strategic move in the projected formation of what was simultaneously being referred to as the birth of the Rainbow nation. It is true that McLuskie refers (in a phrase) to Msomi’s exploitation of the ‘postapartheid desire for cultural cohesion’ (164), but in her concern to generalise from
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Page 51 the instance of the allegedly ‘European’ or ‘Western’ commodification of an ‘African’ uMabatha about the way in which (British) culture works, she remains silent about such difficulties and dangers in South African political struggles in the 1990s which, if receding, were still a potential threat to the stability and possibility of a peaceful and democratic shift in South Africa. The conditions within which Mandela called for the revival of uMabatha suggest, then, a use-value that for him was significantly different from that evident in the packaging given it by the promoters of the Globe production and different too, to adapt an enunciation of Shankar Raman, from the ‘European discursive formations…through whose framing’ McLuskie chooses to read it or, again, the various other productions of u Mabatha which she discusses and which emerge often, similarly, as ‘objects’ for repackaging in terms of a particular local ‘knowledge and practice’ only.26 The most serious erasure in this instance of a European attempt to read uMabatha—consequent on its disinterest in the exact kind of compromise that Msomi’s original work manifests—is that it elides the similarity between Southern African and British practices in commodification and the extent of already accomplished penetration of the former by the latter. In this, McLuskie’s de facto preference in her procedures for modernist and European binaries, in her account of the reception of the play, inadvertently aligns her alongside past habits of separatist construction of difference as part of processes demarcating at multiple levels an ‘alien’ from a ‘known’. The putative binary underlying her application of her chosen economic model of consumption and commodification, between an originary invented ‘authentic’ uMabatha and one that has had a ‘post-colonial spin’ applied to it, evades completely the continuums in economic practice within both South African and British locations. Recognition of this shifts the discussion more directly towards the problem of this connection itself. The original uMabatha, coming from complicated twentiethcentury Southern African urban conditions, is already a complex and, in particular ways, sophisticated commodity. If its subsequent European and then world success, both in the 1970s and the 1990s, confirms the fact that European entrepreneurs knew exactly the kind of pliable, culturally marked but simultaneously muted and depoliticised sophistication they were looking for, its commercial success shows too what European theatre audiences, but also, already before that, South African theatre audiences wanted.27 Collusion in the 1970s of two related or proximate systems of commodification within which the commercial production and exploitation of a Zulu version of Macbeth in South Africa and then in London (both at the Aldwych and, twenty years later, at the Globe) could so successfully occur, points, further, not so much to ‘modernist’ or ‘post-colonial’ evidence of Western ‘spin’ upon the ‘authentic’ and the ‘primitive’, as to the efficacy of an already wellestablished and functioning linked commodity system. This may be collocated, further, with the more general fact that throughout most of the twentieth century, that is, long before the word ‘globalisation’ came into currency, no less than a third of the British economy was intertwined with, thus supported, and clearly hugely benefited from that of the segregationist, the apartheid and now also the aspirant post-apartheid state. In this context it may be instructive that, notwithstanding Marxism’s provision of ‘a compelling framework through which to understand both contemporary texts and events and those of prior periods’,28 this does not render it immune to the limits of its own location, sometimes prone to those very replicatory habits of elision of which
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Page 52 McLuskie accuses uMabatha’s huge admiring and international located audiences, together with its metropolitan entrepreneurs. 2. Women marketing Julius Caesar/SeZaR Yael Farber’s SeZaR, an Africanised version of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, provides an instance of the potential value local knowledges manifest in production might have for understandings, in turn, of the Shakespeare text on which it draws. It was performed at the Market Theatre early in 2002 after a preliminary run the previous year at the Grahamstown Festival, and has since played at the Oxford Play house and other venues in Europe.29 In Farber’s version, Rome becomes Azania, the name that certain resistance groups during the apartheid period wanted to use for the putative new post-apartheid South Africa; the costumes the actors wear have strong African resonances; while the set has, as one of its main features, two huge urban steel pylons on wheels which are moved about the stage. The staging itself entails frequent use of smoke and strobe lighting and is also frequently punctuated by use of rap-style or contemporary music as well as the use of African ritual and dance. Indeed, after the assassination and Mark Antony’s speech, much of the remainder of the play is presented by way of a spectacular conflation of spoken word, music and dance, together with visual effects which might well invite connection with those processes of commodification and packaging registered by McLuskie, or the stricture, sometimes levelled at Baz Luhrman’s Romeo+Juliet,30 that the Shakespeare text is hereby simply repackaged as music video. But much more can be said about Farber’s production. SeZaR manifests, in de Certeau’s terms, active rather than passive interaction between theatre practitioners and Shakespeare’s text. Farber had invited her actors to use the text of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, but, when they felt uncomfortable or needed to switch, either to draw on Solomon T.Plaatje’s Tswana translation of Shakespeare’s play (1937), or to translate Shakespeare’s lines into their own spoken Zulu or Tswana. Such a move proposed interrogative and potentially anticolonialist linguistic encounter with the text.31 Furthermore, in its scrutiny of gender relations, SeZaR resonates the focus of Barbara Hodgdon, to whom I referred at the beginning of this chapter, on relations among a theatrical performance and its spectators as ‘site of knowledge-making and its attendant power’.32 For one thing, compared to most Shakespeare ventures in South Africa, SeZaR had a higher than usual level of female management and control. The director, the costume designer (admittedly usually mandatory) and the production manager were all women, as were the two collaborators in the process of adaptation.33 Three of the four voices used in the broadcasting voice-overs are also those of women. Moreover, if, as is well known, Julius Caesar is an overwhelmingly masculinist play, SeZaR itself meditates throughout on the problems consequent upon this privileging of men. It does this partly by presenting women not only as choric observers of but also as active, if simultaneously elided, interventionists in the unfolding masculinist struggles in which they are, by patriarchal force majeure, always implicated. Within SeZaR the ongoing reality of the presence of women in a world men claim for their own, is consistently evident in Farber’s use of female streetsweepers, with plastic bags tied around their waists, who clean the auditorium and stage, even
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Page 53 before the play begins, who sit in the auditorium during the performance, and who participate repeatedly in the stage action, taking what in Julius Caesar are the parts of the ordinary citizens. Unlike Julius Caesar, which only has men present at the play’s opening, these women gather onstage together with Kassius, Brutas, Sinna and Antony and SeZaR and they reappear repeatedly throughout. Their leader, Mashanela, also plays the part of Shakespeare’s soothsayer, by means of which, from the beginning of the play, Farber invests woman’s body with the power of political acumen or percipience.34 Repeatedly during the action the reluctance of men to countenance female intervention is further foregrounded by physical ejection of the women from the stage, for instance when Mashanela listens to the account of events in the forum35 or, later, when taking the part of Shakespeare’s soothsayer, she approaches SeZaR just before his assassination,36 or, once more, when Brutas and Kassius quarrel and Mashanela forces her way into their company to rebuke them.37 Again, for the famous domestic scene between Brutas and Porshia, Porshia speaks her native Tswana to Brutas’s Zulu. The actress’s interaction with the Shakespeare text, in this way, in her own cultural terms and, according to her own discretion, towards it or away from it into her own linguistic terrain when this proves preferable (more effective), establishes her voice—and Porshia’s—as the cultural equal of Shakespeare—as well as of Brutas—and the actor playing him who, similarly, chooses to use his first language, when preferred. The added intimacy suggested when husband and wife, in their interactions with one another, move to their own contemporary Zulu or Tswana as more potent expressions of that intimacy has also, as one of its effects, the foregrounding of Porshia’s feelings and active partnership in marriage as the equal of Brutas. At the end of the scene, Porshia actively stabs her thigh in front of Brutas, in contrast to what is only report of the deed in both Shakespeare’s text and in its source, again pointing to the extent to which Julius Caesar’s masculinist focus on political action is literally staged as operating in spite of the (active) femininity it exists among and with which it remains mutually entwined. In the following scene, between Kalphurnia and SeZaR, feminine political acuity is further emphasised, among other devices, by informing Kalphurnia’s vision with the African cultural authority of the sangoma. Moreover, whereas, after the fatal decisions made in Act II in the presence of their wives by Brutus and Caesar, the act ends in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar with Portia’s fearful enquiry after her husband, in SeZaR, several women come together on stage to provide a concluding choral gaze. Kalphurnia places SeZaR’s robe around his shoulders, and Porshia embraces Brutas before he leaves to join the other men accompanying SeZaR to the Senate. Kalphurnia then ‘lights a mourning candle, dons the robes of a widow and begins to sing a funeral song—anticipating her husband’s death’ (24). Mashanela, too, watches the men go, and both Porshia and Kalphurnia appeal to her to try to avert what in different ways they fear, while, ending the scene, Mashanela speaks the lines that Shakespeare gives to Artemidoris: My heart laments that virtue cannot live Out of the teeth of emulation (25) Coppelia Kahn argues that these lines point to personal rivalry among the Roman politicians which contradicts the ‘firm, masculine wall of principle’38 they construct for their republicanism, itself riven with contradictions.39 As in the case of the
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Page 54 prophecies given to Mashanela, ascription here of Artemidorus’s lines to her further privileges the accuracy of feminine political commentary. It is, furthermore, Mashanela who announces Porshia’s death to Brutas while, after the violent deaths of both Kassius and Brutas, the performance ends with the re-entrance of women who, the stage direction indicates, ‘move in to clean up the bodies and devastation. They sing a mourning song as the lights fade’ (45). This use of women throughout the play, partly inspired, Farber indicates, by the invisible tribe of women who move around Joburg silently cleaning up. They are a powerful presence—but we hardly notice them. They are the ones who generally know everything…more so in the Townships. They are the ones picking up used condoms and removing dead babies from dustbins thus foregrounds on stage conditions in which politicians are repeatedly seen to operate in the very presence of the (mostly) observing women among whom they live and on whom their political thinking and actions impact, but whom, at the same time, in the name of their own putative rationality or political acumen, they actively insult, elide and ignore. By insisting in such ways throughout the performance on the (excluded) presence of women as omnipresent and percipient although disempowered observers, the production contributes to an impression of patriarchy’s selfevisceration. It makes explicit in SeZaR what Shakespeare’s scenes between Portia and Brutus and Calphurnia and Caesar only infer, what Coppelia Kahn has called Julius Caesar’s ‘profound distinction between polis and oikos, between politics as the freely willed action of rational men and household as the realm of mere physical necessity, of women, children and slaves’.41 But SeZaR resists the passive acceptance of such a distinction—and much criticism of Julius Caesar that assumes it—providing throughout a provocative answering feminine gaze at the masculinity that proposes itself, as exemplar of virtus. In a country that has one of the highest incidents of rape in the world, SeZaR insists on renewed attention to the extent to which in Julius Caesar the potentials for violence, error and unruliness— indeed as much the centre of its concern as the more usually explored intellectual debates around republicanism and nobility of action—have to be marked as masculine. In several other ways too, SeZaR’s foregrounding of contradictory behaviour in its politicians directs us to that agonistic dimension in the representation of men in Julius Caesar which Coppelia Kahn, for instance, traces42 or to, as Alan Sinfield points out, the fact that whereas critical readings of modern productions of Julius Caesar ‘usually take it to be about the personal qualities and dilemmas of the patricians… centralizing Brutus as the intellectual tempted out of his study, where he has maintained a noble integrity, and into the corrupting political world’43 instead, ‘like many Shakespearean plays, [Julius Caesar] is about gaining legitimation for the exercise of state violence’.44 Thus, in the programme notes to her Market Theatre production Farber recalls: A year ago Newsweek Magazine ran a cover that astonished me. A young guerrilla soldier armed to the teeth and brandishing an AK-47 was framed by the shape of Africa. Emblazoned across the image were the damning words: ‘AFRICA THE HOPELESS CONTINENT’.45
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Page 55 In her repeated use of narrative voice-over commentary, Farber foregrounds the impulses to violence that masculinity’s claim to control and order sometimes belies. Thus, at the beginning of the play, media voice-over precedes SeZaR’s entrance, describing his triumphant return home after his defeat of Pompey in the North by highlighting its ambiguity: ‘A tyrant, a dictator, a monster some have called him, while others rejoice his returning home’ (3). The announcement ‘Ethnic cleansing has reached new heights as Marc Antony and Oktavius continue to purge the city’ (37) introduces the play’s depiction of civil war while, before the final battle, we hear: ‘the men who once ruled Golden new democracy are now the generals of armies bent on annihilating one another…once more hopes are shattered for Africa’ (44). Nowhere is this accentuation more clearly evident than in Farber’s presentation of the assassination. It is arguable that, in much critical discussion of the incident in Julius Caesar, recognition of the violence of the act of assassination itself is muted amidst, instead, evaluations of the relative putative authenticity, inherent nobility or political integrity and acumen of the various participating protagonists. Farber’s presentation, by contrast, reminds the audience that, in the first instance, assassination entails violent, treacherous and brutal murder. She comments that, in rehearsal, her male actors discussed with her experiences where they had themselves been, in township episodes of violence, unwilling witnesses of murder by stabbing.46 In SeZaR, an horrific sequence, on stage, of the unrestrained stabbing of SeZaR’s body is complemented by a voice-over announcing that: ‘It is reported that he had three and twenty wounds upon his body. The Divers [sic] and Conspirators did hurt themselves, striking one body with so many blows’ (32). Farber probes predilections to violence in other ways. Antony’s ensuing speech to the crowd ends with a semideification of the dead body of SeZaR but, simultaneously, men from the crowd, as a stage direction indicates, enter, carrying tyres, chanting the ‘Toyi-Toyi in the traditional manner of resistance’ (36), while enactment on stage of the civil wars is anticipated, as a stage direction again indicates, by bodies—represented in the staging by display mannequins— which ‘drop from gallows above them, as a symbol of the purging that they begin to conduct in Azania’ (37). Tyres were the implements used in the violent act of ‘necklacing’ while the ‘toyi toyi’, one of the famous anti-apartheid dances used during political protest, was a sign not only of the will to resistance but also of a threat of the readiness to retaliate with violence. After Antony and Oktavius prepare for war, by way of a dance, as the stage direction indicates, as ‘Traditional Waniors do in preparation for the Enemy’ (42), they go on ‘to fight a fierce and bloody battle’ (44) in which voice-over commentary informs the audience that ‘the last great hope of Africa is lost to the curse of violence and war’ (44), and in which further stage directions indicate that ‘Oktavius and Antony overpower Kassius and beat him to death’ (44) while, when finding Kassius dead, Brutas ‘plunges his knife into his stomach and dies’ (45). It is worth also recording certain of the performative aspects in the staging of SeZaR which further connoted disturbingly contradictory aspects of masculinity. The actor who played the ‘noblest Roman of them all’ (45) in performance evoked primarily Brutas’s prowess as soldier and fighter, an exemplar of physical strength, moreover delivering his Forum Speech after the assassination—against the grain of its reasoned rhetoric—with a brutal aggression that, deliberately paradoxical, resonated a highly undemocratic sense of menace and readiness to use force. The
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Page 56 start of the play immediately directs the audience to the potential of rhetorical selfadmiring doubleness in (male) political utterance. In a striking move, Farber chose a professional praise singer, Hope Sprinter Sekgobela, to play the part of SeZaR. Under the watchful gaze of a silent group of women, as well as of the competitive and envious eyes of a Kassius who immediately afterwards criticises SeZaR to the audience—he enters through billowing smoke, gyrating with staggered movements, to deliver an interpolated, original set speech.47 Its language, on the one hand, resonates material urban as well as rural power, the oral, agricultural culture of an African, ‘Azanian’ context,48 and the communal ownership of land. On the other hand, Sekgobela’s skilled talents as praise singer resonating political manipulation of ritualised or mythical performative gesture, underlined in performance the extent to which political rulers are themselves powerful image-makers. Sekgobela’s sometimes dissonant and strange physical movements had, furthermore, a suggestion of physical unpredictability, a remarkable bodily agility signifying sudden transition of mood and intention, perhaps anticipating the unfolding masculine variabilities and even treacheries emerging later in the play.49 3. Male and female proximation Farber’s treatment of the scenes between Brutas and Porshia and SeZaR and Kalphurnia insists on the various proximities of the—in each case, marital—spaces, physical, emotional and intellectual men and women share, in ways that also direct us to recognition of approximations in male and female conduct rather than conventional, gendered, individuation of each. Thus staging of the scene depicting Brutas’s inner conflict and subsequent negotiations with his coconspirators is, from the start, cast simultaneously in the context of his relationship with his wife. Although she only speaks to Brutas towards the end of the sequence, Porshia is on stage from its very beginning. Brutas leaves the bed in which Porshia is seen sleeping fitfully (upstage), an image that itself insists on the intimate proximity of their shared life together. He proceeds to centre stage to give voice to the conflict he is experiencing ‘between the action of a dreadful thing/And the flrst motion’ (15) and then meets with the conspirators outside the house (downstage). While they speak, Porshia wakes, ‘sensing something is amiss’ (16). Against the unfolding discussion which Brutas continues to have downstage with his coconspirators, she is seen pacing anxiously up and down. Finally, after the other conspirators exit, she comes up behind Brutas and ‘wraps a blanket around his shoulders’ (18). Her subsequent impassioned appeal to her husband in which, as I earlier remarked, the actress’s native Tswana translations of Shakespeare—itself a sign of (feminine) independence—are intermingled with the Zulu translations of the actor playing Brutas as well as with lines from Shakespeare’s original text, culminates in the active stabbing on stage of her own thigh. Even as it presents her husband’s engagement in his political project and her exclusion from it, the scene between Brutas and Porshia, then, also continually frames what is happening by simultaneous staging of Porshia’s actual role as proximate, and potentially active, marital partner. Marital proximity in this scene is paralleled in the following scene between SeZaR and Kalphurnia. It opens with SeZaR looking at a sleeping Kalphurnia, thus
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Page 57 replicating the previous scene’s accentuation on stage of the proximate, interdependent space which partners in marital relationships actually share. When Kalphurnia wakes and delivers her warning this interdependence is stressed. In the exchange that follows Kalphurnia is shown to have active purchase within the relationship. As a result of her arguments, SeZaR sends her to arrange ritual sacrifices. When Kalphurnia and the Prophets return, she is in a trance but the subsequent ritual enacted on stage itself affirms Kalphurnia’s warning. Legitimation of the quality of her understanding of the political implications of what her husband proposes to do, with the appendices of ritual, is also complemented and confirmed by subsequent events. If both these scenes parallel the proximity between men and women within marital space, both women in them manifest political acumen—Porshia, in understanding that her husband faces unprecedented political danger, and Kalphurnia, in anticipating the danger of her husband’s plan to go to the forum. If such evidence of canny political judgement in both women approximates that claimed by patriarchy only for men, both women emerge as proximate partners to, and as well, political commentators the equal of, or, indeed, more actively prescient than, their husbands. Again, the physical courage Porshia demonstrates in the stabbing of her thigh on stage approximates that reserved elsewhere only for men. Coppelia Kahn argues for the equivalent scenes in Shakespeare’s play that men, when they are influenced by their women, are perceived as feminised. But Faber’s production resists the binary oppositions in gendering characteristic of patriarchal structurations, within which Kahn’s recognition still works. In SeZaR, the foregroundings not only of the influence of these women but overtly of the reliability of their readings places them, in the matter of intellectual political analysis, in proximity to the men to whom such reliability is, by the writings of patriarchy, more conventionally reserved. Such a focus on the aspect in human behaviour of approximation (rather than of opposition) which, I have briefly noted previously, Maurizio Calbi too foregrounds, will be developed again in my examination of the late plays. Before turning to these plays, however, I want to examine briefly at least one way in which these incidents of approximation may lead us to a rereading of Julius Caesar. Seen from such perspectives in SeZaR, if Portia’s intervention in her husband’s meditations in Shakespeare’s play proves proximately active and reliable, it is also interesting that her interventions are wholly characterised by rhetorical skills which are, ordinarily, reserved, by way of the play’s privileging of the ‘rational’, ‘political’ or public realm, for the ‘masculine’. In approaching her husband at all, Portia defies a misogynist system that wills from her obedience, silence and domestication but she does so in ways that approximate exactly the reasoned application of rhetoric he and his colleagues practise elsewhere, displaying throughout her own disciplined implementation of the art. Thus in II.i.237– 97,50 she first appeals to her husband’s reason by delineating carefully to him the evidence of his observed behaviour and the nature of their relationship (logos). She also persuades him by means of an appeal to his emotions, not only reasoning from his behaviour, but citing by way of hyperbole and self-devaluation the value of her own relationship to him (pathos). And she does so, thirdly, by reminding him of her own character, lineage and worth (ethos). As Sister Miriam Joseph notes:
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Page 58 Rhetoric, as Aristotle defines it, is the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion, and since the orator addresses a popular audience including untrained thinkers the appeal is threefold: to their reason (logos), to their feelings (pathos), and to their confidence in his character, that is, in his virtue, competence, courtesy, good sense, good will (ethos).51 In the course of this, Portia uses, moreover, multiple figures and topics of invention or argument, including (11.237–56) prosopographia, the lively description of a person,52 mimesis, imitation of gesture, pronunciation, or utterance (127), and pragmatographia, the vivid description of an action or an event (128).53 In 11. 261–87 she utilises forms of persuasion designed to achieve both pathos and ethos such as erotema, a ‘rhetorical question by means of which one may affirm or deny an assertion’ (246) and epiplexis, by means of which ‘one asks questions not in order to know, but to chide or reprehend’ (256),54 as well as procatalepsis, by which the speaker may confute an objection the listener is likely to make (215) ,55 And she climaxes her appeal in: If this were true, then should I know this secret. I grant I am a woman; but withal A woman that Lord Brutus took to wife; I grant I am a woman; but withal A woman well reputed, Cato’s daughter. Think you I am no stronger than my sex, Being so father’d, and so husbanded? Tell me your counsels, I will not disclose ‘em. I have made strong proof of my constancy, Giving myself a voluntary wound Here, in the thigh: can I bear that with patience, And not my husband’s secrets? (II.i.291–302) These lines may be comprehended not merely as anti-misogynist protest, or, as Coppelia Kahn, again, argues, as lines that suggest the feminising and privatising of Brutus’s aspect of hesitation—thereby replicating an opposition between feminised ‘doubts’ and fear and masculinised ‘constancy’.56 Paradoxically, and against this, I suggest that they posit approximation in human behaviour, an acknowledgement of the actual proximity in intellect that characterises the actual men and women whom patriarchy prefers to write into being as binary opposites. It is true that much of the rest of Julius Caesar avoids this possibly inadvertent recognition by removing women from the stage. But in these very lines Portia directly and specifically questions those divisions separating her from her husband. And it is, lastly, worth specifying yet again the detail of her rhetorical skill in so doing. In addition to the use of single word or syntactical repetition, she applies other rhetorical devices such as paromologia, whereby one admits something unfavourable to one’s own position and then brings in a point that overthrows what was granted,57 or metastasis, ‘the turning back of an objection’ (217), also mixed in turn with antimetabole which is ‘akin to logical conversion in that it turns a sentence around’ (81) (all of this in ‘I grant I am a woman; but withal/A woman that Lord Brutus took to wife’ (II.i.292–3)) together, again, with auxesis, a figure that ‘advances from less to greater by arranging words or
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Page 59 clauses in a sequence of increasing force’ (149) (‘Think you I am no stronger than my sex,/Being so father’d, and so husbanded?’ (II.i.296–7)), and with epanorthosis, or correction, which ‘amends a first thought by altering it to make it stronger or more vehement’ (153) (‘I grant I am a woman; but withal/A woman well reputed, Cato’s daughter’ (II.i.295– 6)). In the first few decades of the twentieth century, when segregationist South Africa was intensifying, Solomon T. Plaatje, who was in a number of significant ways engaged in the attempt to resist unfolding and intensifying oppressions of his people,58 also translated five of Shakespeare’s plays into Setswana. He referred to Shakespeare himself as ‘William Tshikinya-Chaka’ which is a literal translation of Shakespeare’s name into Tswana, meaning William Shake-the-Sword. This, Plaatje maintained, better suited the Bechuana, whom he called ‘the people of the sharp spear’. We are now of course long since aware of the extent to which Shakespeare can be usefully appropriated, in this case into a TshikinyaChaka. In this, Plaatje’s William Shake-the-Sword—appropriate for his ‘people of the sharp spear’—may now stand as symbol for us of his use of Shakespeare as means not of affiliation or of colonial obeisance, but of preserving and strengthening his own culture. What I especially have wanted to emphasise, in the case of SeZaR, however, is the way in which the Tshikinya-Chaka of non-metropolitan productions might sometimes facilitate, in processes of adaptation and appropriation, the use of local knowledges which not only help to ‘tent [or probe] the wound’ as Shakespeare might have had it, of passive, neo-colonial submission to a (none the less vital) Folger or British-libraryderived Shakespeare reading, but also to sharpen, in the process, our sense of the several other ways in which the travelling global text, against and in view of these particular knowledges, itself may be understood further to signify.
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Page 61 Part II Encountering men in Shakespeare’s late plays
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Page 63 5 Prologue The ‘infirmities of men’ in Pericles If Shakespeare’s late plays are, by common consent, characterised in important ways by concern with patriarchy, I suggested in my Introduction that there is, nevertheless, to be sporadically glimpsed in each one of them an ongoing meditation on masculine unruliness, corporeal and intellectual, which it is the concern of patriarchy to elide. Such a, what might be called, ‘haunting’ of plays which end with assertions of dynastic authority and (male) recovery, never prevents or obscures those final recuperations, but my interest in the second part of this book is concerned with the unease, and its significance, that precedes or punctuates these conclusions. Although Pericles begins with just such a moment of equivocation—involving sexual and political violence—that for the late plays initiates a repeated cycle of returning scepticism about masculinity—evidence of this concern in the play may be said to be, as compared with Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest, particularly intermittent, as much announcement of a concern, by way of prologue, as the concern itself. But, as is well known, Pericles is in a multiple number of ways considered a problematic text. Still, the critical desire to discover for it, and, indeed, for all the texts following it, an informing teleology, has a long tradition. The editors of the New Cambridge edition discover at its end presentation of a vision of ‘political wholeness’1 that includes ‘within it the proper fulfilment of [Pericles’] kingly role, and the marriage of princes whose responsibility is to propagate more heirs—the cornerstones of the foundations of good government ruled by the true prince’ (71).2 Tillyard long ago famously articulated, for all the late plays, an underlying movement from disorder, disjunction and disorientation to the miracle and wonder of recovery and the harmonious restoration of order.3 Such searches have sometimes also been characterised or complemented by quests for formalistic or stylistic unities. Writing several decades ago, Barbara Mowat begins with the premise that in all of Shakespeare’s late plays ‘the meanings are so intricately connected with the form that an understanding of the form is an essential first step toward an understanding of the plays’, and promises to discover ‘the pattern which determines and explains their strangeness’.4 But she admits that ‘refusing generic classification, [these plays] tantalize the critic who would place them, if he [sic] only could, somewhere’ (5). More recently, Constance Jordan situates her reading—of the way this play (like those that follow) crystallises, in the relations between monarch and subject, religious and moral structurations of conscience—in the contexts of Greek and medieval romance.5 Studies of Shakespeare’s style have similarly sought to foreground aspects of these
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Page 64 plays which confirm, at least, a desire for ordering structuration.6 Even Simon Palfrey, who is very conscious of the breaks with stylistic traditions which the late plays evidence, finds it necessary to argue for the emergence of an alternative patterning.7 This chapter in no way attempts to dismiss or displace such or other manifestly discernible patternings in the play, nor to intervene in the textual debate regarding Pericles, or in questions of its authorship. It seeks to examine, instead, those recognitions that sporadically or simultaneously go beyond, or in a different direction from, concern with restoration of male governance, authority, the integrity of male cognition and corporeality, and which, additionally, render such recuperations, by implication, less decisive and more tentative. 1. In vice their law’s their will The disturbing composition of an incest-ridden monarchy in the first scene of Pericles introduces counter-patterns of equivocation about masculinity, whose threads will be, subsequently sporadically, interwoven into the fabric of all the late plays. The violence with which Pericles begins is telling in a number of ways, suggested, firstly, by the display at Antioch of severed heads on stage. These can be proposed as offering the resonance of fairy tale and romance.8 At the same time, dismemberment was not, as we know, merely fairy tale for the Elizabethans and Jacobeans.9 Moreover the severed head features in other Elizabethan and Jacobean history plays.10 Displays of them were often dramatised as practices that ‘sixteenth-century European societies preferred to associate with ruthless Turks, wild Celts, New World cannibals, and other constructions of the barbarous Other’, but, in addition to such disavowal and projection, in some plays, ‘theatrical display of the severed head…often proves unstable and unsettling’, by implication, for the English themselves.11 In Pericles, Shakespeare’s Gower, in his initial account of the spectre of death that hangs over the morally tainted love quest Pericles is to embark on, gestures to the evidence provided by the severed heads of the deadly retributive force that, for suitors, awaits their failure (I.0.39–40). This emanates—as Pericles, who snatches at contemptus mundi sentiments to cope with what he sees (I.i.43–7), knows -from a fellow monarch whose daughter he seeks to marry. Antiochus himself gestures to the heads as ciphers of his secret (equivocal) victories (35–41). The ‘death-like dragons’ which ‘affright’ (30) Pericles with ‘speechless tongues’, ‘semblance pale’ (37) and ‘dead cheeks’ (40) are also ‘fearful objects’ (44) as Pericles’ (already defeated) rivals, in the competition promoted by the king allegedly to discern superior love and male virility. This proffers a particularly gruesome version of the triangular relationship characterising patriarchal and homosocial affect, in which, as Eve Kosovsky Sedgewick has suggested, ‘the bond that links the two rivals is as intense and potent as the bond that links either of the rivals to the beloved’.12 If, regarding the heads, this bond is implicit, the way in which ‘relationships between men and women appear to be dependent on the power relations between men and men’ (25) is overt in Pericles’ negotiations with a father who proves himself to be, secretly, his real and incestuous rival. Presentation of incest is the second way in which the violence of these opening scenes recognises, on a number of levels, particularly male forms of unruliness. In
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Page 65 early modern theatre incest was conventionally used as a ‘metaphor for moral decay’ although, as in the case of Ford, it might on occasion be turned to a more provocative assault upon the corruption inherent in social convention.13 In Pericles, it suggests degeneracy in at least two major ways. Firstly, incest was perceived as indicative of a’betrayal of previously established family relationships and the subsequent subversion of public “charitie” whereby social cohesion is fostered through exogamy’.14 Within the registers of twentieth-century conceptualisation of social relationships, Richard McCabe notes also that: [i]ncest is taboo because it constitutes a refusal of social obligations, a withdrawal from ‘the formation and maintenance of suprafamilial bonds on which major economic, political and religious functions of society are dependent’. This is not to deny the erotic dimension of the issue, but to recognise a social purpose in the regulation of erotic desire, a need for families to operate as component parts of larger societies.15 Incest, ‘[r]egarded as the ultimate breach of natural law…becomes a powerful metaphor for other forms of social or political corruption’:16 Pericles’ discovery of the relationship between the king and his daughter presents the spectacle of secret but adulterated political authority, foregrounding the disintegrating boundaries between law and criminality that result from empowered impropriety, and which may convert justice into tyranny—‘Kings are earth’s gods: in vice their law’s their will;/And if Jove stray, who dares say Jove doth ill?’ (104–5)— For wisdom sees, those men Blush not in actions blacker than the night, Will ‘schew no course to keep them from the light. One sin, I know, another doth provoke; Murder’s as near to lust as flame to smoke. Poison and treason are the hands of sin, Ay, and the targets to put off the shame. (135–41) The pseudo-proverbial style in this language suggests Pericles’ attempt, in the face of such degeneration, to clutch at commonplace wisdoms promising underlying order and control. From partly twentieth-century psychoanalytic perspectives, Pericles’ discovery might be described as one revealing the king’s adulteration of his exogenous social responsibility because of his transgressive diversion of erotic desire into the endogamous. Earlier, when this scene begins, Pericles speaks in ways that reflect his, as yet, unchallenged assumptions about the exogenous (and corporeal) ‘integrity’ of conventions of patriarchal desire, monarchy and family. As ‘apprentice’ in the search for what in the course of time will be his dynastic partner, he assumes what later proves to be, in the context of what he finds, a naïve and uncomplicated notion of masculine desire, in his appeal to ‘[y]ou gods that made me man and sway in love,/That have inflamed desire in my breast’ (20–1), and in his wish to become ‘son to great Antiochus’ (27). But very soon in the scene he finds that, despite its apparent ‘naturalisation’ and ordering within patriarchal and dynastic discourse, regal ‘masculinity’ and the desire it entails can, within actual existing relations,
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Page 66 prove to be corporeally polymorphous and unruly as well as violently endogenous. Orderly patriarchal negotiation, even that embedded in fairy-tale rites of passage, does not guarantee for Antiochus homogenous, ‘natural’ or ‘stable’ exogenous male desire. Pericles thus discovers not only the danger of touching the daughter’s body and what Adelman argues to be its contaminating sexuality,17 but the violence as well as the disorder of the father’s desire, simultaneously, also, kingly desire. In terms of psychoanalytic accounts of the progress of young male adults towards exogenous relationships, ‘the son’s identification with the father’, in ways that will allow for ‘social and cultural creativity’,18 depends simultaneously upon a measure of psychic Oedipal negotiation in which displacement of desire for the mother is coupled with a transgressive ‘necessity of a murder of the father in…fantasy’: This transgression relates to a rivalry with the father for a loved object (that is, the mother), a battle that the boy has lost (the father has kept the mother), forcing him to occupy a passive position (the boy renounces the mother and has to look for another woman outside the endogamic circle). And yet the boy fantasizes that he didn’t lose the battle (he kept the mother), thus identifying with the victor (his own father), and inheriting his phallic power, essential in his access to sexual enjoyment. (xi) But in incest such (or other) putative psychic boundaries in various ways collapse. In the case of Shakespeare’s play, Pericles’ own psychic potential for independence is doubly troubled by the proto-father figure of Antiochus whose role emerges as one of endogamous subversion. He tries to imagine a king who might not be ‘so bad/As with foul incest to abuse your soul:/Where now you’re both a father and a son/By your untimely claspings with your child,/Which pleasures fits a husband not a father;’ (I.i. 126–30). This language identifies a confusion of boundaries within the male body as well as within the familial or royal body. Ruth Nevo, in turn, relates this anxiety to a sense of ‘carnal taint’ to argue that ‘[w]hat Antiochus thus triggers in Pericles, by way of the condensations of primary process fantasy, is…a repetition of himself, an unconscious recognition’ (42).19 This recognition, made at the beginning of the play, of the possibility of masculine corporeal endogamous contamination ‘powers thenceforth his guilt-stricken, haunted drivenness’ (44) in royal, familial and sexual senses. The boundaries of Pericles’ own sense of desire within himself, subject to what psychoanalysis registers as the vulnerability of psychic and sexual boundaries, are hereby disturbingly threatened by the proximity of his own body in its royalty, to the royalty of the body of King Antiochus. Thus, in a manner reminiscent of Troilus watching Cressida among the Greeks in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida,20 for Pericles, after his discovery of incest, Antiochus is and is not a monarch. In this context, the gruesome images on stage of physical dismemberment— with which this authority seals its (violent and sexually disordered) power—complements the violent underpinnings of the patriarchal or masculinist rivalry over his daughter which the king engineers, intensifying the confusion of boundaries that the incest in this opening scene initiates. If the disembodied heads on poles in Pericles may be read as (equivocal and unsettling) signifiers of royal authority they are ones, too, in which the boundaries between the ‘other’ and the ‘self’, the exogenous and the endogamous, repeatedly threaten to come unstuck. The spectacle of the potential loss
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Page 67 of imagined homogenous selfhood challenges Pericles in terms of tyrannical governance as well as of the male body’s putatively polymorphous and violent potential in desire. The play’s subsequent presentation of a series of parallel father—daughter relationships (Cleon and his daughter, Simonides and Thaisa, Pericles and Marina) sporadically returns to the potential tenuousness of the psychosexual boundaries that underlie familial bonds. In Pentapolis, notwithstanding the major register of a move to recovery and marriage traced in the scene, there is simultaneously as well, as Jeffrey Masten argues,21 a disturbing, if muted, additional subtext. In presenting rituals of chivalric medieval tournament and courtesy, the scenes at Pentapolis appear to offer sublimation of the partly male violence and potential unruliness that has so provocatively launched the play, but the simplicity of its overtly literary associations belies a similarly determined dynastic point to the love-competition. Moreover, Simonides plays with his own potential to be the tyrannical and disapproving father in his dealings with Thaisa and Pericles, right up to the moment when he approves their marriage, thus holding up to them and to the audience his potential to behave differently. His behaviour in offering up his daughter as commodity to be competed for by the knights, his duplicity in misleading them with the help of Thaisa’s letter, even his concern over Pericles’ credentials all to an extent adulterate or complicate an ostensible role as impartial ‘lover of honour who judges men by their inner worth…delights in generous hospitality, the good will of fellowship, and the harmony of the civilised arts’.22 When he accuses Pericles of treachery, and attacks Thaisa for disobedience: I’ll tame you, I’ll bring you in subjection. Will you, not having my consent, Bestow your love and your affections Upon a stranger?… —Therefore, hear you mistress, either frame your will To mine, and you, sir, hear you, either be Ruled by me, or…(II.v.73–6, 79–81) he echoes (and perhaps reminds the audience of) the latent (incestuous) violence that potentially informs patriarchal interventions of this kind.23 If, at what emerges simultaneously as a playful moment, Simonides momentarily evokes Antiochus, the marriage negotiations between Antiochus and Pericles, again, frame and disturbingly parallel the marriage negotiations between Simonides and Pericles. Such unsettlings are glimpsed in Act V in Pericles’ line to Miranda, ‘Thou that beget’ st him that did thee beget’ (V.i.185) recalling once more, as editors recognise, the potential danger, particularly within fathers, of dissolving boundaries.24 2. Musings into my mind with thousand doubts ‘Haunting’ of that integrity of agency hypothesised for men by patriarchy, punctuates the remainder of a play that uses the motifs of travel and of encounter with the unknown, throughout. Pericles returns from Antioch to his own Tyre, but soon travels again, from there to the court of Tarsus. From Tarsus, he is
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Page 68 shipwrecked, and cast up on the shores of Pentapolis, from where, assisted by fishermen, he visits the court itself. After his stay at Pentapolis, once again on an ocean voyage, he nearly perishes at sea, to which he is obliged to give up the apparently dead body of his wife. Such or other changes in location, to the extent that they symbolically may have evoked contemporary English experience both in the Mediterranean and (perhaps) the Atlantic, must also have resonated its uncertainties, the attendant epistemological unsettling that is, I suggested in my Introduction, one aspect of sea travel, cultural encounter in strange lands, visits to foreign or ‘other’ courts. Constance C. Relihan has argued that unease about royal/ English authority may be detected in the very location of the play in an area that was, for the Jacobeans, politically equivocal terrain. Its geography is ‘part of an ambiguously imagined Asia Minor which’, she suggests, ‘resonates with Turkish and “reprobate” cultures as well as with Christian and classical traditions’ (292).25 Daniel Vitkus points out that there was ‘real contact with Muslim peoples in the Mediterranean’ under Queen Elizabeth, whose primary purpose was ‘to request loans or military aid…or encourage trade’.26 He notes that ‘[w]ith the establishment of the Levant Company in 1581, and subsequently, the rapid development of English commerce throughout the Mediterranean, the power of Islam became directly visible to those who followed the sea for a living’ (3). Vitkus identifies also the emergence in the early seventeenth century of English insecurity at this phenomenon as ‘Englishmen were converting to Islam, “Turkish” pirates were interfering with international trade, and the Ottoman empire was asserting itself militarily and economically’ (6). Nabil Matar emphasises that although ‘England had colonized Wales and Scotland and was waging a colonial war in Ireland, at the time Queen Elizabeth died, England did not possess a single colonial inch in the Americas’.27 He also sets English encounters in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of English ‘setbacks elsewhere in the world’ for, ‘[i]n 1558 England lost its last French outpost at Cala is…and in 1578, its proPortuguese mercenaries were defeated in Morocco’ while from ‘1594 until 1603 England encountered an ongoing rebellion against its colonization of Ireland’ (10–11). Pericles’ first journey to Antioch is one that leads to epistemological doubt, then panic, flight, and, when he is back at home, uncertainty about how to rule, which prompts him, very soon again, to leave on yet another voyage. As much as it has in his visit to Antioch, the ensuing visits to Tarsus and Pentapolis also occur for Pericles within an ambience of existential encounter with the unknown, as his counsellor Hellicanus tells Thaliard, putting himself once more ‘unto the shipman’s toil,/With whom each minute threatens life or death’ (I.iii.23–4)—conditions of unpredictability and danger underscored, too, only a few lines later by Thaliard as well when he surmises that ‘[h]e scaped the land to perish at the seas’ (28). Later, Pericles identifies explicitly his position as ‘outsider’ to Pentapolis when, fearing the ‘king’s subtlety to have my life’ (II.v.43), he pleads ‘O, seek not to entrap me, gracious lord,/A stranger and distressed gentleman’ (II.v.44– 5) while, just after his shipwreck, he speaks again of the epistemological disquietude into which his experiences have plunged him: ‘What I have been I have forgot to know;/But what I am want teaches me to think on’ (II.i.69–70). He comments sententiously on the knowledge he discovers among the fishermen in a way that partly parallels the impulse evident in
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Page 69 travel writing sometimes to discover, in strange lands, what the old world lacks. ‘How from the finny subject of the sea/ These fishers tell the infirmities of men/And from their watery empire recollect/All that may men approve or men detect’ (II.i.47–50). Moreover, Halpern argues that his encounter with the fishermen exposes the audience further to critical readings of royal authority through their explicit allusions to the practice of enclosing landlords.28 Such existential and even epistemological disorientations recur after his marriage to Thaisa, in further subjection to the ocean’s ‘surges/Which wash both heaven and hell’ (III.i. 1–2). If epistemological uncertainty unsettles male confidence, the play also sporadically glimpses the spectre of male impotence. Pericles’ discovery at Antioch produces the frustrated realisation that his only—limited—option in the face of Antiochus’s power is to flee from it. Fear of the knowledge he has encountered on his journey to Antioch as well as fear of what the Syrian ‘tyrant’ might do to him and his people, draws ‘sleep out of mine eyes, blood from my cheeks,/ Musings into my mind, with thousand doubts/How I might stop this tempest ere it came’ (I.ii.94–6). His visit to Tarsus fleetingly re-engages with the image of male impotence. There he flnds what would nowadays be called a desperate humanitarian situation. The predicament of a starving populace together with rulers incapable of resolving the crisis needs not to have been directly topical for there to be at least resonances evoking, say, the 1588 disaster in Virginia,29 or current problems in the settlement at Jamestown,30 coinciding, again, with currently unsettling social changes in England and the rest of Europe (137–8).31 At Tarsus, Cleon is a king unable to relieve the famine decimating his starving and dying subjects, while his later complicity in his wife’s treatment of Marina strengthens the impression of a not only impotent but also tainted form of kingly rule. After his departure from Tarsus, Pericles articulates a sense of existential powerlessness of his own, now on the coast of Pentapolis, shipwrecked, and by the sea ‘cast…on the rocks,/ Washed …from shore to shore’ (II.i.5–6). If masculine courage and action in the face of the unpredictability of sea travel and exploration is the implicit virtue of the seavoyager, the possibility of its opposite, helplessness and incapacity, must inevitably have dogged those engaged in early modern sea travel and exploration. He meditates on the impotence of ‘earthly man’ (II.i.2), and identifies himself explicitly as someone ‘whom both the waters and the wind/In that vast tennis-court hath made the ball/For them to play upon’ (58–60). Further fear of different kinds of impotence, disturbing negotiations with the normative patriarchal indice of the masculine as active and not passive, recurs again later, both as sexual spectre in the brothel scenes, as I will show, and in the image of a politically and administratively dishevelled and paralysed Pericles at the beginning of Act V. It is worth adding briefly that sporadic references to cannibalism in the first Act of the play also, if fleetingly, connote male unruliness. Cannibalism, an instance of transgressive violence, was something that, as Stephen Greenblatt points out, ‘Europeans had long identified…as an emblem of extreme horror.’32 It surfaces in the language of the riddle, enunciated in the first scene of the play, ‘I feed/On mother’s flesh which did me breed’ (I.i.65–6).33 Pericles conceptualises incest as cannibalism in his later reference to ‘she an eater of her mother’s flesh’ (I.i.131). Then, at Tarsus, Cleon laments that
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Page 70 Those mothers who to nozzle up their babes Thought nought too curious, are ready now To eat those little darlings whom they loved. (I.iv.42–4) The phenomenon of cannibalism is germane to the motif of sea travel, one of the problems listed by the legal historian Brian Simpson in his account of the long struggle to bring ‘ships under the rule of law’.34 He notes that cannibalism was practised for centuries on the high seas in times of distress, extending back to the seventeenth century and earlier.35 The taint of cannibalism is, of course, feminised in the references to it in Pericles at both Antioch and Tarsus, but, in an age when cannibalism was a problem among exclusively male seafarers, this suggests an instance of patriarchal displacement as means to handle what is evidence, contemporaneously, of an exclusively masculine potential for violent and unassimilable behaviour.36 3. Roast meat for worms At Mytilene, there is to be found an unusually intense obsession with male sexual unruliness and violence. The prospect of sexual violence and promiscuity in the (aristocratic or royal) male body, which sears Pericles’ vision at Antioch, is extensively articulated here. Moreover, while it may be argued that this violence may be broached by an English audience because it is partly displaced, mediated by the Eastern location as well as by references to a ‘Frenchman’, a ‘Transylvanian’ and a’Spaniard’—‘English’ travellers and traders were implicitly, even in this detailed respect, by implication, not far behind: ambivalence in travel writings about male sexuality in the context of travel, trade and settlement has long since been identified.37 Bawdy is arguably one of the ways in which (repressed) anxieties, contained within the safety net of ‘humour’, may surface. The first brothel scene at Mytilene opens with two men discussing how to recover the profitability of an institution presented as one designed to service male sexual appetite. Their jests inevitably draw on misogynist currency but they repeatedly entail acknowledgement of masculine dissipation as well. Thus, in the joke they make that the three working wenches they have left ‘can do no more than they can do, and with continual action are…even as good as rotten’ (IV.ii.7–8), the reference to their ‘rotten’, venereally diseased condition may replicate woman’s body as alleged origin of corruption, but the humour also points to the unstoppable demands of promiscuous and exploitative males. Their mockery about the ‘poor Transylvanian’ similarly may be based upon the extent to which the prostitute’s body has ‘pooped him…made him roast meat for worms’ (19–21) but it hints also at the unruliness that has rendered him so contemptibly vulnerable. As the banter in the scene unfolds, delineation of male promiscuity intensifies. If ‘men were as they have been’ (55), speculates the Bawd, they are likely to pay a great deal for a virgin. She is concerned with how women may be corrupted in order to serve dependable errant masculine lust. More significant, her comments cast men in the role of agents in their downfall: she tells Marina that her as yet untainted body requires male concupiscience to ‘comfort’ her, ‘feed’ her and ‘stir [her] up’ (82–3).38
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Page 71 Again, in the dialogue that follows about the Spaniard whose ‘mouth watered an he went to bed to her very description’ (92–3) and, particularly in the jokes she and Boult make about the French knight, fixation upon sexual disease and the lack of male control it bespeaks, remains firmly in view. Boult’s enquiry ‘[b]ut mistress, do you know the French knight that cowers i’th’ hams?’ (96–7) denotes the French knight’s syphilitic condition while his name ‘Verollus’ puns on the French word ‘verole’ meaning ‘syphilis’. In addition Gordon Williams suggests that when, as we hear, the Frenchman ‘cut a caper’ in sexual excitement at Boult’s proclamation but then made ‘a groan’ (99–100), this would suggest to the audience ‘an expression of pain caused by pox’, while the punning mockery of his hope that he might ‘repair’ (103) his disease in the brothel refers to the notion of ‘pox-cure by scape-person’ in which venereal disease transmitted to another was supposed to leave the infected free.39 Finally, the fact that, as the Bawd observes, the Frenchman ‘brought his disease hither’ and that he will ‘come in our shadow to scatter his crowns in the sun’ (102–4) again locates the origin and spread of disease uncompromisingly in the male body.40 For a culture ostensibly concerned to present the woman’s body as bearer of blame and origin of sexuality, this focus on unruly male desire ends with specific references to the male sexual function and to the penis, simultaneously thus bringing the hint of male violence and rape that hovers through the whole scene (tingeing the incestuous father at the beginning of the play) to a graphic point of clarity. Norton glosses the Bawd’s remark to Marina that she has ‘fortunes coming upon you’ (108) as ‘You have prosperity (wealthy men) about to come to (have an orgasm on top of) you’41 and the Bawd agrees that if Boult has ‘bargained for the joint’ he ‘may cut a morsel off the spit’ (121–3). Williams points out that the word ‘joint’ can indicate ‘penis’ while ‘cut’ can mean to ‘help oneself sexually’.42 Furthermore, he suggests, for Boult’s promise, ‘I warrant you, mistress, thunder shall not so awake the beds of eels as my giving out her beauty stirs up the lewdly inclined’ (134–6) that here ‘folklore acquires phallic implications’ presenting this as the earliest use of the word ‘eel’ to mean ‘penis’ (110). The image of the transgressive penis reappears at the opening of the following brothel scene, in the Bawd’s appalled declaration that Marina appears ‘able to freeze the god Priapus and undo a whole generation’ (IV.v. 12–13), even as the threat of rape43 intensifies in the Bawd’s ‘We must either get her ravished or be rid of her’ (13–14) and Boult’s response ‘Faith, I must ravish her’ (19). In this context, Lysimachus, the representative of authority in Miteline, enters and immediately manifests a casually libidinous intent of his own44 which further interrogates any patriarchal structuration of ‘virtuous’ male homogeneity. Moreover his prurience betrays the anxiety that repeatedly surfaces in these scenes about the risk of sexual disease, consequent upon male promiscuity—“Tis the better for you that your resorters stand upon sound legs. How now? Wholesome iniquity have you, that a man may deal withal and defy the surgeon?’ (IV.v.31–4)—even as his interest in the ‘deeds of darkness’ (33) quickens at the Bawd’s mention of and then presentation of ‘that which grows to the stalk, never plucked yet’ (47–8).45 Masculine lust is again foregrounded in his asseveration on seeing her that she would be an adequate palliative for even the most sexually starved of men.46 Moreover, his prurient questioning sharpens the sense of his pornographic intent, which is, finally, uppermost when he demands that she ‘bring me to some private place. Come, come’ (95).
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Page 72 Acknowledgement of male corporeal lust even in Lysimachus intensifies the scene’s underlying meditation upon male sexual violence and the latent threat of rape it entails, threatening Marina’s situation throughout the brothel scenes, and finally explicitly erupting when Lysimachus leaves. Boult refers explicitly to his own penis as the instrument necessary for the forcible subjugation of this woman to the servicing of male promiscuity: How’s this? We must take another course with you. If your peevish chastity, which is not worth a breakfast in the cheapest country under the cope, shall undo a whole household, let me be gelded like a spaniel. Come your ways…. I must have your maidenhead taken off. (126–30, 132) Boult’s reference to his own body is doubly interesting here because of his use of an image of castration as measure of the ‘impossibility’ of his own sexual incompetence. This could not more clearly point to the anxious underside of that male lust, sexual licence and aggression being exposed here, a fear of male impotence which, as I have earlier noted, sporadically nags at assertions of male authority throughout the play. For another important point about the brothel scenes is the (fortunate) failure of the men to gratify their lust, to, as in the Bawd’s angry cry, ‘take her away, use her at thy pleasure. Crack the glass of her virginity, and make the rest malleable’ (146–7).47 5. Mekgwa le melao ya Setswana How are such, admittedly intermittent, in Pericles, equivocations about masculinity to be taken? Their sporadic nature in no way enables us to argue for them a dominant or overriding significance for the play, particularly given its undeniable other alternative movements towards, say, the dynastic and patriarchal regeneration of family and state, on which many critics have focused. Are they then to be regarded as evidence merely of a (disavowed) binary opposite against which dominant Jacobean cultural norms are, particularly at the play’s conclusion, triumphantly asserted? I want to argue that instead they initiate and participate in an ongoing and unresolved meditation, in all four late plays, about the nonpatriarchal potentials to masculinity, an ontological masculinity that is complex and whose divergences from patriarchy do not disappear simply because of patriarchal rhetorical insistence. In these sporadic presentations of moments of more heterogeneous and often overtly negative aspects of masculinity inviting just such a reflection, Pericles may be said to be concerned with the very exclusions that teleological thinking, in order to discover resolution, might overlook or disparage. Against what might be identified as the teleological predilection for the discovery of dominant patriarchal and Jacobean structurations, categorisations or closure, evident in many metropolitan readings of these plays, the example of Southern African Tswana dispute practice invites an alternative mode for the conceptualisation of such moments of complication, contradiction or repeated refusal of closure. In essence, Tswana modes of conflict resolution privilege sensitivity to process rather than desire for resolution. The social anthropologists John Comaroff and Simon Roberts, in their studies of present-day Tswana epistemology and practice, take issue with certain accounts of Tswana instruments of social control which, in Westernised
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Page 73 (metropolitan) fashion, suggest for Tswana formulations an analogous teleological need. Such accounts imply that the Tswana ‘acknowledge explicit rules of behaviour’ or see their relationship to the social order and human activity within it as ‘an internally coherent set in accordance with which…[they] pursue daily life and resolve any conflicts that may arise to disturb its course’.48 But Comaroff and Roberts report that their own fieldwork questioned the assumed causal connection between rule and outcome envisaged, too, in more conservative accounts of Western legal systems. They find instead that (i) for the Tswana, ‘rules consisted of a loosely constructed repertoire rather than an internally consistent code’, (ii) the Tswana ‘were not unduly concerned if these rules sometimes contradicted one another’, and (iii) ‘almost any conduct or relationship was potentially susceptible to competing normative constructions’ (18). While, then, the Tswana do appear to share the view that their ‘normative repertoire governs the regularity of everyday life…they also perceive their social universe as inherently enigmatic, intensely competitive, and highly individualistic’ (19). One way in which this may be understood is in terms of the Tswana approach to the conjugal process. ‘Mekgwa le melao ya Setswana’ is ‘the body of norms that the Tswana perceive as ordering their everyday lives and which provide for them the terms of discourse in the event of a quarrel’ (70). The Tswana do stress ‘formalities associated with the conjugal process in classifying and conceptualising heterosexual bonds’ (133). At the same time, such formalities, which need not necessarily include the Western-type marriage ceremony, are not taken as conferring validity upon the union: the ambiguities that pervade the creation and categorization of such unions are not regarded as transient or anomalous by the Tswana themselves; unions are viewed, rather as potentially negotiable in the natural order of things…while the formal classification and definition of heterosexual unions are unequivocally shared, the status of many of them is open to negotiation for much of their existence. Moreover, the continuum itself will be seen to represent the range of possible constructions that an individual may seek to impose on a specific union. This characteristic of the continuum in turn is to be understood with reference to the process by which a legitimate union is ostensibly established. (my emphasis, 133, 134) The notion that human behaviour be regarded as a matter of negotiation within what may be (rhetorically) defined as the ‘natural’ order of things, but not fixed by that definition, shifts the emphasis from conformity to an underlying pattern to what might suggest a more inductive approach—except that the continuum of actual experience, what is potentially negotiable, remains always contributory to what might finally be established as ‘the natural order of things’. In terms of the actual continuum of present and future experience, ‘normalcy’ remains always also, therefore, potential and hypothetical. In these terms, if as the first scene of Pericles shows, Pericles arrives at Antioch with assumptions that reflect formal (patriarchal) cultural classifications and definitions of royal or familial authority, or masculinity, or affect and desire, the scene itself provides, in terms of the existing relations he discovers there, what we may think of as a series of negotiations around or reflections
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Page 74 upon these assumptions of or baselines of ‘normalcy’ which, in a rhetorical sense, inform this culture. This actuality may at times fit the shared formal classifications and definitions that are traditionally assumed, but in other, unpredictable instances, as evidence of a social universe that is ‘intensely enigmatic, intensely competitive and highly individualistic’, it moves away from them. To think of a play in this way enables us to pursue the extent to which it is itself in actuality a negotiation with different dimensions of experience in ways that sometimes move beyond the promise of singularity from the dominant cultural assumptions within which it is located and which might be used to contain or restrict what that experience reveals—but which it also nevertheless takes into account, and to which it might or might not by the end of the play return. Such scrutiny argues a more varied repertoire relating to a more diverse and enigmatic totality of experience. Any enunciation, even when culturally dominant, always imposes itself on indices within experience which might indicate this more enigmatic totality. A conservative, or indeed any other enunciation is thus always the product of rhetorical negotiation. To examine the late plays as either potentially perfect or imperfect rendition of any fixed pattern therefore, as in a jural or legal enunciation, would be to allege intentions to which, in practice, these texts do not only restrict themselves. In terms of my specific focus, therefore, the Tswana habit of meditative negotiation with the complexities of experience invites attention to sporadic interrogations and qualifications of patriarchal (unified) authority and masculinity, occurring not only in Pericles but in the other late plays I am concerned with, even when, as in Pericles, these are only intermittent moments in the play, sometimes even very brief. It admits a reading of movement towards and away from conventional postulate, back again to it and then again and again away from it as always manifestation of the inevitable meditations which existing relations prompt, albeit in the course of evidence of coincident teleological intent which has as its goal overriding assertion of one or other dominant and dominating pattern. If patriarchy is a writing of existence into being, the Tswana perspective also encourages attention to evidence in the text of that which patriarchy’s enunciations struggle against, attempt to contain, control or elide. Some details of a dispute between Molefe and Madubu cited by Comaroff and Roberts may illustrate this further. Originally, in the early 1940s Molefe fell in love with Madubu and wanted to marry her against his father’s plans to marry him to a member of the descent group from which Molefe’s own mother had come. Because of this opposition, Madubu’s family were unwilling to give their permission to the marriage, but Molefe took her away without it. None of the appropriate steps or rituals relating to a sanctioned marriage was taken. After a while, Molefe’s father, Mankge, the head of the household, began to be reconciled to Madubu, treated her as a daughter-in-law, and received her into his homestead. Madubu bore no children and in 1953, Molefe persuaded her to enter into a sororatic relationship with one of her younger sisters, again against the wishes of Madubu’s kinsmen. Madubu’s maternal uncle stated that such a relationship must await a proper marriage between Molefe and Madubu. Nevertheless her younger sister went on to conceive a daughter and then a son with Molefe. After a few years, however, Molefe left Madubu and her sister, and went to live with his father’s third wife Mmaseteba after his father’s death. By 1959 he had wholly ceased to maintain Madubu and her younger sister. As a result
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Page 75 Madubu made several claims of neglect, to Molefe’s younger brother who took her to the senior member of the descent group, and, when they supported Molefe, to the headman of the Tlagadi ward, Motshegare Ramalepa. The case was then taken to the chief, the only one empowered to issue divorce orders. The essential points of the dispute were, firstly, that: Madubu claimed that Molefe was her husband and that their marriage had been properly negotiated…The relationship had broken down because of Mmaseteba. Significantly, the women involved in the case—Molefe’s sister and Mankge’s surviving wives, including Mmaseteba—all supported Madubu’s assertion of her wifely status on the ground that it had been publicly accepted. In contrast, Molefe held that Madubu ‘is only a woman who lives with me,’ not a wife, since neither formal negotiations nor a promise of bridewealth had been entered into. (126) In giving his final judgement the chief found in favour of Madubu rather than Molefe, who was refusing to give her any acknowledgement or material support, by saying: Molefe and Madubu, I have listened to your case attentively. Molefe, you stole Madubu and lived with her for eight years. You point out [that in] the beginning your father was not keen on Madubu but ultimately accepted her as your wife. I gather from your relatives that Madubu is known to be your wife. Motshabi, your sister, Segonyane, your younger brother, Sefako Pilane, your father’s nephew and Mmamohutsiwa, your father’s wife, all speak to this. For those reasons there is no doubt in my mind that Madubu is your wife. You are now declaring before this kgotla [council] that you wish to divorce her. You must divide everything that you acquired in the last eighteen years between yourself and Madubu. You must share your thirty-six head of cattle. You, Molefe, will get twenty-six head, while Madubu will get the remaining ten. Out of the seven sheep you will give Madubu three and you will take four. As for the donkeys, each of you gets half of them. (148–9) In their citation of this case, Comaroff and Roberts note that the evidence given, as well as the chief s participation in the outcome of the complaint, depended on ‘the litigants’ strategic efforts to impose their respective paradigms of argument on the dispute’ (149) while neither litigant nor indeed the chief hearing the complaint ‘believed that the validity or jural definition of the union hinged directly on any formal incident’ (150). They conclude that ‘the Tswana tend to view a union as a marriage when it is recognised as such (or, at least, is not questioned) by the persons who occupy the social space immediately surrounding the couple’ and that, while the conjugal process is not held to consist of a series of formal incidents, these incidents, though they are not attributed the capacity to establish legitimacy, are deployed rhetorically as normative referents in the context of dispute…utilized in a highly specific fashion; together, they constitute a total gestalt in terms of which a composite image of any union is typically drawn and evaluated.
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Page 76 The closer a particular bond is made to conform to this gestalt—by careful construction of evidence of its recognition, of coresidence, of the assumption of conventional conjugal roles, and so on—the likelier it is to be defined as a marriage. It follows, too, that countersuits will seek to contrive just the opposite total impression…Outcomes depend in this respect, on the court’s estimation of fault: the apparently rightful or wrongful actions of the respective parties are held to reflect the veracity of their rival constructions. The elements themselves, then, subsume the normative indices through which the complexities of a current relationship—and of past interaction—may be reduced, debated, and when necessary, classified with reference to the continuum of unions…[b]ut since these normative indices are elements of a rhetorical order rather than clauses in a legal code, they cannot be applied with deductive exactitude…The shared conception of conjugal formation represents a normative statement of a culturally inscribed code; the ambiguities surrounding definition refer to the management of existing relations. (my emphasis, 150–1) It is particularly this sense of, on the one hand, a normative statement of a culturally inscribed code and, on the other hand, awareness of the ambiguities surrounding definition resulting from the management of existing relations, or, again, the position that ‘normative indices are elements of a rhetorical order rather than clauses in a legal code’ and that ‘they cannot be applied with deductive exactitude’, that I propose as frames for understanding the disjunctions and inconsistencies regarding masculinity in Pericles, as well as the plays following it. What becomes interesting is, firstly, what formal incidents the Shakespeare text admits; secondly, how these instances, or rather, which of them become ‘normative referents’ and what particular rhetorics, in the context of (academic) dispute, they serve; thirdly, what happens to those that remain, for any determined articulation of intent is in danger of leaving out incompatible indices that persist in the experience dramatised in the text. From the Tswana point of view, the fact that ‘authority’ and ‘masculinity’ are a rhetorical matter must mean that they remain vulnerable to the pragmatic evidence, they are always open to rhetorical reconceptualisation, may always be newly constructed from the (enigmatic) indices within experience itself. Evidence from the lived-in detail of behaviour itself, existing relations, those formal incidents on which rhetoric operates, must accordingly remain available for more than one attempt at gestalt. In their account of Madubu against Molefe, Comaroff and Roberts observe that, according to a more rigorous Western approach to the conjugal formalities that punctuate the continuum of unions, Molefe should have won his case, for in certain respects some of the formalities had not been implemented during the relationship between Madubu and Molefe. But they reiterate that the adjudication of validity does not depend on a legalistic deduction, and the intrinsic, jural weight of the individual elements is always limited. It is thus significant that the chief paid no attention to the occurrence or absence of ceremonial formalities in the course of delivering his judgement; even though Madubu had been ‘stolen,’ her acceptance by Molefe’s kinsmen and members of the Masiana kgotla was sufficient ground for construing her relationship with Molefe as a marriage. (150)
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Page 77 Madubu’s experience, the gestalt of her testimony, within the continuum of her relationship with Molefe received equal attention and it was the one whose validity, despite its deviations from the culturally inscribed code, that the chief in the end accepted. For Comaroff and Roberts, then, ‘Tswana dispute processes simply cannot be reduced to, or explained by, formalistic models or derivative legal logic’ (18). What they discover is in effect a ‘contradiction in Tswana ideology according to which the social universe is typified as at once rule-governed yet highly negotiable, ordered yet ambiguous, constrained yet competitive’ (19). They therefore pay more attention to ways in which Tswana dispute processes ‘involve confrontation either over the rival construal of facts in relation to agreed norms or over the normative evaluation of agreed facts’. And they also insist that ‘whichever it is, value and meaning are negotiated’, even as ‘this negotiation is predicated on shared symbolic categories and ideological assumptions’ (20). The presentation of male courtship amidst a threat of violence which leads to the discovery of incest, with which Pericles begins, proposes, as one of its several aspects, the topic of male concupiscience as well as male unruliness in governance. Presentation of existing relations in the scene conflict, as I remarked earlier, with conventional patriarchal normative indices. In its subsequent movements from Antioch back to Tyre, then to Tarsus, Pentapolis and Mytilene, the play, in its sporadic concern with the equivocal nature of male corporeality and authority, continues to meditate, in Tswana terms, on the processual, lived-in complexities of masculine experience. Acknowledgement of male ambiguities, sporadically recurrent throughout the play, offers a counter-focus to the more widely discussed teleological movements towards harmony, wonder or the gradual recovery of dynastic authority. Not brought to any resolution in Pericles, this counter-focus serves as prelude to processual meditation on aspects of male unruliness throughout the late plays. It is the tracing of this that will largely be my concern in the remainder of this book. 6. Approximate bodies Recognition of instances of male unruliness in Pericles, evidence of what Comaroff and Roberts might call ‘lived-in’ ontological process, are, as I have argued, intermittent, but, especially in the intensity of the focus on male sexuality at Mytilene, nevertheless salient acknowledgement of the partial nature of what patriarchal normative statements, at least by the end of the play, optimistically claim about men. While any dominant norm may be said to be informed by particular and vested claims as to exactly what constitutes (naturalises) the world, such moments of equivocation about authority presented in the play, from a Tswana perspective, may be understood as the play’s interweaving acknowledgement of or rumination over the fact that patriarchal ‘normative indices’ are after all only ‘elements of a rhetorical order’ and that existing relations invite the possibility of additional and other kinds of writing about masculinity. What these intermittent and sporadic incidents further propose is a masculinity that is always only a proximate of that asserted for it in patriarchal structurations. Moreover, the potential for or actual unruliness periodically identified in the behaviour of the play’s men suggests that men are proximates, too, of what the binary
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Page 78 mode of patriarchal structuration assigns to women instead of men. At Antioch, and at Mytilene especially, the origin of licentious, dangerous or violent sexuality is male as much as female. It is then interesting that, the text’s patriarchal predilections for misogyny notwithstanding, the play’s far less extensive presentation of women also intermittently, if far more briefly, suggests the way in which existing social relations which involve the participation of women as well as men may in turn also be written into being in a way that extends beyond the rhetorical order within which patriarchy situates them. Women, too, in the play, emerge on occasion as proximates of rather than opposites of what patriarchy claims for men. Before I examine this I want to note that this is not to deny evidence in the play also of the more dominant patriarchal predilection for conventional seventeenth-century gender binaries. Briefly, in the matter of incest at Antioch, for example, as compared with its sources, Pericles evidences an apparent intensification of misogyny. The sources are far more prepared to acknowledge the culpability of the king than is Shakespeare’s text.50 It is true that Shakespeare’s Pericles also acknowledges the king’s responsibility for initiating incest when Gower describes the daughter ‘with whom the father liking took,/And her to incest did provoke’ (I.0.25–6),51 but the impulse in Shakespeare’s text to include the daughter more deliberately in the process of blame is immediately evident in I.0.27, 31, I.i.85ff, 131. The best example of this process is to be found in Shakespeare’s reattribution of the lines of the speaking of the riddle from the father to the daughter.52 In the matter, too, of the representation of the action of desire, the text exhibits a predominantly patriarchal preference. There is predictably, according to the conventions of patriarchal narrative, relatively little to find in the play about (uncontaminated) female desire or the woman’s body. Antiochus’s daughter is given only two lines to speak, Dionyza’s none. The conventionally wicked and patriarchally inspired language of Creon’s wife proffers no evidence of an especially feminine subjectivity. There are two brief moments when feminine desire/sexuality is acknowledged, in presentation of Thaisa’s express attraction for Pericles in ‘All viands that I eat do seem unsavoury,/Wishing him my meat’ (II.iii.30–1)53 and in Simonides’ ‘It pleaseth me so well that I will see you wed,/Then with what haste you can, get you to bed’ (II.v.89–90), but if these admissions, albeit fleeting, of the fact of (feminine) physical desire for a moment threaten the patriarchal masternarrative, they are subsumed, as Masten shows, in a dynastic direction.54 The brothel scenes and the reunion scenes with Thaisa afford the most obvious opportunities for detecting representation in the play of a ‘feminine’ experience of desire. But inevitably only the promiscuous brand receives attention (one that approximates the male promiscuity evident throughout these scenes). The Bawd sees the female body and female sexuality primarily as commodity because she can exploit male desire for that commodity. If the prostitutes she and her husband have exploited are about to outlive their economic use, she speculates on the possible economic replacement that Marina’s body might provide. When she refers to her own ‘maternal’ function in the bringing up of eleven ‘poor barstards’, Boult points out that she has also ‘brought them down again’ (IV.ii. 13–14) by corrupting (commodifying) them in the brothel. Anticipating similar exploitation of Marina’s body, she offers her the opportunity for ‘pleasure’, to ‘taste gentlemen of all fashions’ (70–3). In terms of this version, the woman’s body is an object to be sexually aroused
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Page 79 by men (82–3) whose destiny as object, she asseverates, is ‘the way of womankind’ (IV.v. 153–4), and whose ‘reservations’ as Boult, joining in, promises, cannot but be ‘quenched’ by experience (IV.ii.l 16). She energetically as well as comically, then, positions women primarily as objects within a male economy of pleasure. Marina’s resistance in the brothel scene also, at least partly, resonates conventional misogyny. On the one hand, her challenge to the Bawd’s construction of femininity with, ‘Are you a woman?’ and then her assertion of her own prerequisite for femininity as being chastity—‘An honest woman, or not a woman’ (75–7)—both appear to resonate the madonna end of the wellknown ‘madonna–whore’ binary. In the last scenes, the appearance of Diana as well as the presentation of Thaisa similarly emphasise chastity.55 In all of this, such juxtapositions of women suggest masculine positionings of them, in which female desire appears to have little or no detailed presence or voice. From this point of view, as Peggy Phelan notes in the context of performance, ‘part of the function of woman’s absence is to perpetuate and maintain the presence of male desire as desire’.56 Yet another dimension to this problem may be recalled by Dympna Callaghan’s reminder that, in view of early modern stage practice, ‘femininity…comprised a subspecies of masculinity’.57 If Phelan’s comment directs us to the extent to which in patriarchal narrative the male remains the generic human, Callaghan’s underlines the complementary masculine limits in Elizabethan and Jacobean stage practice, that encapsulate female representation. On the other hand, the brief acknowledgement of Thaisa’s desire might be a fleeting analogous processual moment in the text when the rhetorics of misogynist normativity are momentarily exceeded, glimpsing what always lies beyond particular writings of ‘reality’—lived-in ontological experience itself. This may be observed, again, in the energy of the presentation of Marina in the brothel scene where, the more conventional resonances that might be attached to her role in this scene as chaste virgin of patriarchal desire notwithstanding, she manifests an impressive level of self-will and heroic defiance of the male society around her. Her fierce resistance to prostitution is actively disputatious, in view not only of the Bawd’s representation of femininity but especially in the context of the male violence directed at her. Pursuing this, Lorraine Helms argues a strong counter-voice in Pericles. Demonstrating that [t]he Senecan rhetoric of rape, originating in the semi-improvisational contexts of the Roman schools of declamation, returns via the scripted silences and antagonistic perspectives of the Shakespearean playtext to trouble the narrative closure that hagiography and romance had imposed on the motif of the Prostitute Princess58 she argues the possibility of ‘debate over the source, extent and legitimacy of female resistance to male violence’ (331). Helms’s endeavour recalls Peggy Phelan’s call for the invention of ‘a pedagogy for disappearance and loss and not for acquisition and control’.59 Deanne Williams focuses even more crucially upon Marina’s rhetorical efficacy, placing it in the context of her general argument that:
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Page 80 Pericles…contend[s] with incest as a paradigm that informs the social and sexual dynamics of patriarchy. The triumph of patriarchal will represented by Antiochus’s incestuous relationship with his daughter illustrates a binary of masculine licence and female submission, and of male speech and female silence …that affects the experience and articulation of sexual desire as well as the construction of gender identities.60 Williams argues that Marina’s speaking evidences an ‘effort to move beyond the old pattern of masculine domination and submissive feminine silence symbolized by incest’ (598–9). She argues further that ‘Marina’s rhetorical gifts place her squarely within the textual tradition of Gower’ (614). But Gower, who, Williams suggests, is ‘focal point’ for the play’s ‘examination of “fatherhood”’ (599), speaks a rhetoric that is used deficiently, and that reflects adversely on the paradigms that, Williams argues, incest evokes: ‘just as Antiochus supplies a verbal “gloze” to obscure his own crimes, Gower’s words conceal, behind an endless stream of moral verbiage, a profound investment in, and fascination with, the paradigms of incestuous desire’ (599). Williams’ detection in Gower of a male use of rhetoric that confirms the ‘alwaysmediated experience of narrative’ (609) and that suggests inner avoidance beneath a veneer of morality, the ‘symbiotic (or parasitical) relationship between moral commentary and sexual transgression’ (612), anticipates an increasingly significant motif, regarding the inadequacies of male speaking, in the plays to follow. But Marina’s rhetoric, argues Williams, stands in contrast to defective male rhetoric, ‘give[s] her the authority to forestall the possibility of father-daughter incest’ (614) and enables her to move beyond ‘the binaries that are produced by an incestuous paradigm’ (616). Such markings of active feminine desire or of feminine corporeal integrity and feminine intellectual strength which sporadically, if all too briefly, occur against the text’s more habitual instances of misogyny, propose in these women (particularly for Marina’s rhetorical skill) approximations to what patriarchy claims for the masculine. The cruxes arising from the contradictory presentations of Lysimachus in the text also hint at the factor of proximation. When Lysimachus misrepresents his original motives for visiting the brothel to Marina, the potentially duplicitous nature of authority, as well as location of sexual impropriety within the male body, is foregrounded. That this poses a problem about authority, hinting at a Tswana sense of the ‘ambiguities that pervade…categorization’ is apparent from the different reactions of editors to it. While the editors of the New Cambridge choose to stick to the quarto version of certain lines in Lysimachus’s dialogue with Marina, Walter Cohen, taking a ‘dual authorship’ route, follows the Oxford editors’ use of Wilkins’s Painful Adventures, on the grounds that ‘Q1 reports a politically censored version of the dialogue’ while the Wilkins version ‘initially places Lysimachus in a harsher light’.61 Against his decision, it may be argued that while restoration of blame to Lysimachus by use of lines from Wilkins may locate culpability from the perspective of modernday readers of the text, it also obscures the way in which seventeenth-century authority erases just such ascriptions of culpability. The silence that surrounds Lysimachus’s marriage to Marina in the final scenes offers further evidence of authority’s processually equivocal practice, suggested too
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Page 81 in the contradictions in the Q1 version. This silence may also be linked to Pericles’ perhaps culturally unremarkable (male) silence about the heads in Act I. His unquestioning participation in the bloody practices of homosocial negotiation shows the extent to which such violence is an unremarkable feature of dynastic authority, as it was, indeed, of seventeenth-century English monarchy. But the containment provided by the mode of fairy-tale love-test should not excise the aspect of predominantly masculinist depravity which Antiochus’s heads posit. Related silences and the epistemological unsettlings they betray might be said to resonate in Joseph Conrad’s twentieth-century tale, Heart of Darkness, where the narrator Marlowe’s account of his travels to Africa, his encounter there with Kurtz, and with the severed heads that adorn Kurtz’s hut, offers an analogous incident involving travel and cultural encounter, but at a late rather than incipient colonial moment. Conrad’s presentation of his narrator Marlowe’s unfolding understanding of the chilling predilection for cruelty in his gifted fellow European Kurtz disturbingly erodes the boundaries on which his measured and calm descriptive tone endeavours to insist. In the extended paragraph describing the moment when he first catches sight of the heads on stakes,62 the extent to which Marlowe deals with the horror of what he describes, partly by means of the measured rhythms, methodical recall of detail and controlled emergent realisation in his narrative, is not unlike the way in which conventions of fairy tale and romance have at one level the effect of containing, in Pericles, a story not only of incest, but one involving state decapitation and display. In The Romans in Britain, first performed in London in 1980, Howard Brenton articulates the self-contaminating attribute of violence by means of the same image. One of the village men—once themselves colonisers of the land they now live in, and now fleeing, in turn, the invading Romans—says: ‘We must get a Roman’s head. Carry it alive. In a little bag. On the end of a stick. So it can cry out in terror to its countrymen. And its screams will be clean, clean, clean as a knife, to cut out our humiliation.’63 The image of the decapitated head here also silently bespeaks the extent to which, during colonial or imperial clash, even in the loss as well as the acquisition of power, sadism and the impulse to terrorise, for both aggressor and defender, predominate. As horrifying metonym for male violence it betokens too, not only the spreading of fear, but also the power of that violence ‘to produce disorientation’.64 Male silences form a pattern in Pericles, from the hero’s confusion and inability to speak about incest, the silences of violence that lie behind the male speaking of Antiochus, as Williams argues it, the prolixities of Gower and what it hides, the duplicity of Lysimachus about his own prurience, which the text’s later silence surrounding his marriage to Marina only confirms. They are perhaps paralleled by readings of some critics who also, in focusing on fantasies of recovery or on visions of ‘wholesome’ government, as in some way recuperative, remain largely mute—barring perhaps mention of the momentary recall of Creon and Dionyza at the end—about propensities in the male body which approximate the unrulinesses conventionally proposed for, or reassigned to, the feminine but which are, none the less, processually meditated upon, in Pericles, sporadically but repeatedly, by way of the play’s men.
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Page 82 6 Cymbeline ‘…that most venerable man which I/Did call my father’ In one of the sequences in Cymbeline that suggest the motif of travel, encounter and epistemological destabilisation, Innogen, alone in Wales and dressed in male clothing, trying to make sense of her predicament, of the hardships of travel and of the strangers she has encountered, opines, ‘I see a man’s life is a tedious one’ (III.vi.1).1 She also attempts to reassure herself with further proto-sententious commentary in ‘To lapse in fullness/Is sorer than to lie for need, and falsehood/Is worse in kings than beggars’ (12–14), and in ‘famine,/Ere clean it o’erthrow nature, makes it valiant’ (19– 20). Later in the play, to handle her discovery of a headless corpse, she speaks in the same way, when she says, ‘[o]ur very eyes/Are sometimes like our judgements, blind’ (IV.ii.302–3), also comments, immediately on waking, on her own mental confusion, “Twas but a bolt of nothing, shot at nothing,/Which the brain makes of fumes’ (301–2), and explains the headless body (mistakenly) by means of speculative association with her own prior knowledge of her husband’s body These are not isolated incidents of unsettling existential encounter in the play The characters of Cymbeline are elsewhere repeatedly situated in changing locations in which the challenges of travel and cultural encounter, with their potentials for epistemological uncertitude, recur. The play begins with the separation of Posthumus from his wife, Innogen, his exile to Italy and the European company amidst which he finds himself there. The Italian Giacomo visits Britain where he encounters Innogen, who herself soon flees the British court into the unknown terrain of Wales, where she encounters mountain-dwellers (unbeknown to her, Belarius and her brothers), and then an invading Roman army. Roman emissaries negotiate with the Britons. Posthumus returns from Italy, but to join the Britons against the Romans. After the final military clash between Britons and invading Romans, the various protagonists including the Italian Giacomo, now again in Britain, in the presence of the Briton king, Cymbeline, attempt to fathom the significance of their earlier encounters. But despite the potential for unfixings in such situations, critics have also detected a strongly masculinist bias in the presentation of the play’s dramatic characters and events. For Coppelia Kahn, ‘a strong principle of paternal control subtends the play’s action’.2 Jody Mikalachki, observing that ‘Cymbeline concludes with the image of an exclusively male community’,3 argues that ‘the masculine embrace of Roman Britain became the truly generative interaction, producing a civil, masculine foundation for early modern English nationalism’ (114). And, in an earlier study of the play, Janet Adelman traces what she defines as the play’s ‘magical restoration of paternal authority
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Page 83 and the fantasy-accomplishment of a parthenogenetic family’.4 In the course of this she emphasises the play’s complementary ‘transference of power from female to male’ in which it is ‘female nature’ that emerges as ‘dangerous’ (203, 204). Such readings notwithstanding, the play itself also repeatedly presents incidents of particularly masculine rather than feminine disorder and violence. While it may be true that this may in turn be incorporated into, or redirected towards, say, teleological readings of regenerative, numinous and spiritual, patriarchal or proto-national/ethnic recovery,5 Tswana notions of dispute and conflict resolution invite an additional and different understanding of such incidents, as possible continuation of the processual meditation on masculinity which, I have argued, sporadically unfolds in Pericles. Valerie Wayne seems at least to infer an equivocal attitude towards masculinity in the play when she notes that ‘[m]isogyny is rebuked in Cymbeline even as the claims of patriarchy are reasserted’.6 For Cymbeline presents, in its first two acts, extended focus upon masculine vulnerability, duplicity and violence. Further, by way of its presentation of Cloten and Posthumus and its presentation of Innogen’s extended encounters with different kinds of men, it probes the limits set for men and sometimes for gender, which are prescriptively implied by the binaries that characterise patriarchal structuration. It registers proximities that also sometimes propose the fictive nature of patriarchy’s claims and that glimpse alternative, more inclusive, less violently disequalising ways of conceptualising human behaviour. Then, in its final act it focuses on two particular aspects of patriarchy’s contrasting self-regarding rectitude: the need for male selfaccountability but the problematic of self-admiring male rhetoric. These recurrently equivocal moves, in the play’s presentation of its men, occurring repeatedly amidst that patriarchal assertion and teleological recuperation which the text also indubitably manifests, reflect a view, as the Tswana have it, of masculinity and, indeed, the social universe of which it is part, as ‘experienced at the phenomenal level as enigmatic and shifting’, or, as one of Comaroff’s and Roberts’ informants further articulates it, as ‘never what it seems; you think one thing and find out it’s another and then another’.7 1. The hugeness of your unworthy thinking Acts I and II of Cymbeline are repeatedly concerned with active interrogation and evaluation of its men, and with the culpable vagaries not only of male corporeality and desire, but of male intellect. If the play begins with courtly speculation about the worth of Posthumus, set against corrosive evaluations of Cloten, which, over several scenes, entail bodily as well as moral comparison, even as Posthumus and Innogen plight their troth to one another, the king accuses Posthumus of a baseness that threatens to pollute his line. But the king’s opposition to the young man against the evidence and opinion of his court, and his link with a ‘dissembling’ queen (I.i.85), albeit presented swiftly in these early scenes and with the resonance of fairy tale, cast doubt on his own capacity for judgement. Then, in an ‘Italianate’ Renaissance Rome, presentation of men takes a further ambivalent turn:8 after brief speculation (yet again) about Posthumus’s worth, the young men engage in ‘praise of our country mistresses’, as to which of them might be ‘more fair, virtuous, wise, chaste, constant, qualified and less attemptable than any the rarest of our ladies in France’ (I.iv.51–8). Prurience very quickly characterises their focus upon the potential of feminine sexual availability, a distinctly ‘male tournament of value’9 in which, provocatively the sceptical Giacomo brings even Posthumus’s wife into
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Page 84 question. The ensuing wager about Innogen’s fidelity that they take, albeit a traditional literary motif, resonates as well the aspects of homosocial negotiation that I noted in my last chapter. Although putatively defending his wife’s reputation, Posthumus, when he agrees to the wager, uses the claim of his wife’s chastity and fidelity as marker of his own worth, even as he gambles on it, setting up Innogen’s chastity as possible prize for the taking, in a competition among men whose currency is the gratification of predatory male sexual desire. Valerie Wayne shows how this commodification of Innogen is implicit in the original gift exchange between the lovers.10 Thus, although the wager itself is traditionally designed to test not only female chastity but male and female fidelity, it hinges in actuality upon male competitiveness in concupiscience and philandering. When Giacomo insinuates about wives You may wear her in title yours: but you know strange fowl light upon neighbouring ponds.Your ring may be stolen too; so your brace of unprizable estimations, the one is but frail and the other casual. A cunning thief, or a that-way accomplished courtier would hazard the winning both of first and last (84–9) his images foreground male adulterers: the ‘strange fowl’, ‘cunning thief’ or ‘accomplished courtier’ who ‘light upon neighbouring ponds’ to steal and despoil. A prurient edge colours, further, several of his insinuations,11 as well as even Posthumus’s acknowledgement that Giacomo hopes literally to make his ‘voyage upon her’ (151–2). The encounter between the Italianate Giacomo and the Briton Innogen in what follows in I.vi intensifies presentation of a potentially heterogeneously fraught masculinity, although this is often contained by the argument that the encounter shows the influence of a decadent Renaissance Italy12 Without rejecting the significance of early modern English hypotheses about a corrupt Italy it is nevertheless important, in addition, for us to recall the generally complicated nature of negative ascription to others, particularly in contexts of race, nation or gender. Critics have long since observed, for example, that early modern English encounters with different peoples in the course of trade, travel or incipient settlement, were punctuated by English projection onto the other of disruptive or disturbing characteristics ‘which they found first, but could not speak of, in themselves’.13 I want to examine how Giacomo’s language, might, in view of this, also bespeak particularly early modern English anxieties. Giacomo’s fabricated case against Posthumus turns on the charge that, against all reason, and despite his marriage to Innogen, Posthumus consorts in Rome with prostitutes. In preparing the ground for this allegation, Giacomo, in a way that recalls Iago’s rhetorical strategy with Othello in the temptation scene of Othello, resorts partly to provocative generalisations that might facilitate, at opportune moments, shifts to his main target. That Giacomo be able in this to make his case effectively, depends in part on the Galenic generalisations about masculinity that he musters—to destabilise confidence in the particular instance of Posthumus’s behaviour—which stress the importance for the human body of both an internal balance of the humours and the need for temperance. In practice, as Bruce Smith points out, corporeal balance was considered always a struggle, not least because ‘early modern man was subject to conflicting physiological imperatives: on the one hand accept the promptings of blood that make you a man; on the other, be reasonable’.15 Masculinity,
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Page 85 for the seventeenth century, partly ‘a function of body chemistry’ (15), might be affected, further, by the stomach’s particular dietary order or lack of it. As Michael Schoenfeldt argues: The stomach receives such extensive attention in Spenser’s account of the welltempered individual because it is a concentrated site of physiological and psychological inwardness. If the stomach does not work well, the entire being suffers and/or dies…For the pre-Cartesian regime of the self Spenser inhabits, soul does not reside in a realm separate from the body but is in large part constituted by it.16 Schoenfeldt also presents Spenser’s representation of desire together with other passions as often threatening ‘the kinds of self-control on which any conception of manhood rested’ (51), identifying for early modern Englishmen a ‘quotidian struggle necessary to create and sustain an inner self’ (44),17 and noting also Thomas Wright’s sense of the thin line dividing men from their worst inclinations: ‘What Maladies grow by cares and heavinesse, many can testifie, and few men there bee, which are not subject to some melancholy humour, that often assaulteth them, troubling their mindes and hurting their bodies.’18 Read in such contexts, Giacomo’s rhetorical performance, in his encounter with Innogen, is multiply resonant. His (initially unmentioned) target is the intemperate and irrational madness of a Posthumus who has allegedly chosen the prostitutes of Rome in place of his absent Innogen. To prepare for this inference he begins (I.vi.31–8) by fashioning a generalised challenge to the notion of the rational male, albeit presented as unthinkable, and a little later, by means of a switch to colloquial gossip about a ‘Briton reveler’, a Frenchman and his ‘Gallian girl’ (64–73), he registers again putative deficiency in capacity to make moral distinctions, for which ‘heavens know/ Some men are much to blame’ (76– 7). He simulates the attempt to fathom the reason for or origin of such failures of male judgement in a series of compressed and disjunctive images: It cannot be i’th’eye—for apes and monkeys ‘Twixt two such shes, would chatter this way and Contemn with mows the other; nor i’th’judgement, For idiots in this case of favor would Be wisely definite; nor i’th’appetite: Sluttery, to such neat excellence oppos’d, Should make desire vomit emptiness, Not so allured to feed. (39–46) These lines start with an inversion of the conventional association of the bestial or the mentally challenged as devoid of reason, by claiming that apes, monkeys and idiots would still be capable of the act of judgement or discrimination in comparison to the putatively absolute degeneracy of which he infers men (the as yet unspecified Posthumus) are capable. He goes on, in fevered and almost metaphysical fashion, to hypothesise a ‘sluttery’ that, when opposed ‘to such neat excellence’ (by implication, the beauty of Innogen) would conceivably completely absorb or eliminate its own
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Page 86 degenerate desires, to vomit only ‘emptiness’. But the subjunctive mood in which he casts his supposition, also implies its opposite. Although the emptying out of appetite ‘should’ be the result of the ‘neat excellence’ confronting it, male desire he asseverates, insatiably persists, to the point of vomiting/still allured to feed’. Gail Kern Paster has shown that, because ‘[i]n humoralism, disease and organic dysfunction were explained as manifestations of corrupt bodily humours that had to be expelled’,19 the diet of the early modern humoral body had to be carefully and seasonally controlled. If vomiting could be a sign, on the one hand, of imbalance, overeating and disease, it was, on the other, a means of purging in order to restore balance.20 The line separating disease from the restorative and the purgative, that is, the temperate from the intemperate condition, is thin. Further, Giacomo’s image of insatiable desire coupled with that of vomiting resonates not only excessive surfeit, indiscriminate consumption and the noxious humours it produces, but also the suggestion of perpetual re-consumption of the impure and the despicable, as, repulsively, animals might do their own vomit. OED, noting the similitude ‘He may be likined to an hound that turnith agen to his vomyt’ (spelling partly modernised) (c1440 Gesta Rom. lxiv 278 (Harl. MS)), indicates that the image, ‘chiefly in allusion to Prov.xxvi II and 2 Pet.ii 22’, was often used figuratively as in ‘Turne no more to the puddle and vomit of your filthye ydl life’ (1579 NORTHBROOKE Dicing (1843) 80) and ‘They likewise returned to the filthie vomite of their abominable idolatrie’ (1601 E GODWIN Bps of Eng 7). In such contexts, Giacomo’s image of the man in whom the diseased humours of desire (which should be expelled) incessantly multiply beyond any point of satiety, registers for men an inward condition of wilful predilection for the disgusting. On abjection, Julia Kristeva writes of the repulsed ‘jettisoned object’ that ‘is radically excluded’ in the attempt to construct identity, but that remains attracting, ‘draws [one] toward the place where meaning collapses’, that although it seems to lie ‘outside…yet from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master…[a] massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness…now harries [one] as radically separate, loathsome…[a] weight of meaninglessness about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes [one]’, a ‘reality that, if I acknowledge it, it annihilates me’.21 Thus ‘I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself (3). Focus upon inner compulsion towards what is at the same time ‘expelled’ as the repellent and the contaminated, is taken up again and again in Giacomo’s rhetoric, as in his reference to masculinity’s cloyèd will, That satiate yet unsatisfied desire, that tub Both filled and running, ravening first the lamb, Longs after the garbage (48–51)22 which may be set beside Robert Burton’s sense of this stubborne will of ours [that] perverts judgement, which sees and knowes what should and ought to be done, and yet will not doe it. Mancipia gulae, slaves to their severall lusts, and appetite, they precipitate and plunge themselves into a Labyrinth of cares, blinded with lust…23
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Page 87 Giacomo exclaims in mock bewilderment,‘What/To hide me from the radiant sun, and solace/I’th’dungeon by a snuff?’ (85–7) and searches feverishly for anticipatory equivalents of what he aims to allege to be also Posthumus’s particular and wilful selfabasement: should I, damn’d then, Slaver with lips as common as the stairs That mount the Capitol; join grips with hands Made hard with hourly falsehood—falsehood as With labour—then by-peeping in an eye Base and illustrous as the smoky light That’s fed with stinking tallow (104–10) Behind Giacomo’s image of the Capitoline steps with its resonances of temperate Roman governance, religious ritual or celebration of military triumph, and the simultaneous image of the very men who are part of that political, cultural and military life, consorting with the prostitutes available for them on those steps, is the Innogen from whom Posthumus, like other morally self-abusing men, has turned to ‘join’, instead, ‘grips with hands/Made hard with hourly falsehood’ and its ‘labour’. Male predilection for amoral ‘by-peeping’ is further evident in the glance that, turning away from the clear light of moral choice, actively elects the smoky, lack-lustre and sexual half-light of ‘stinking’ origin. Desire, as Robert Burton, again, writes, ‘hath no rest, is infinite in itself, endless, & as one calls it, a perpetual rack, or horse-mill…still going around as in a ring’.24 It is, for the early modern, argues Schoenfeldt, ‘a disease that threatens the physical and mental health of [the] self’25 and Schoenfeldt cites the character Grill, with which Spenser’s Book Two of The Faerie Queene ends, as eloquent embodiment of this negative potential within men, who actively choose ‘with vile difference/ To be a beast and lack intelligence’ (2.12.87) (71). Grill epitomises the spectre of wilful depravity, ‘the beast that all are capable of becoming in a moment of moral relaxation’, and provides a reminder of ‘the immense effort that is required to keep from sliding back into… congenital bestiality’ (72). If Innogen has been partnered with diseas’d ventures, That play with all infirmities for gold Which rottenness can lend nature; such boiled stuff As well might poison poison! (I.vi.123–6)26 Giacomo inverts the view that’ [p] oison may be incorporated semi-permanently into the body as a prophylactic to fight off more substantial toxins’,27 by suggesting that the diseased, rottenness and poison of Posthumus’s unruly desire is only intensified or superseded by his association with loose and diseased women. At the same time, the image of ‘boiled stuff’ and its evocation of the steamily sordid coincides with the notion that if there was, as seventeenth-century articulations claimed, greater heat in men’s bodies than in women’s,28 this was a difference not always considered ‘an unequivocal good’ but potentially disruptive.29 This is precisely the threat to temperate male agency within the hotter fluids of the male body that the resonances of ‘diseas’d’, ‘infirmities’ and ‘rottenness’ as well as ‘boiled stuff’ in these lines fleetingly also glimpse.30
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Page 88 This recurrent obsession, in Giacomo’s encounter with Innogen in I.vi with depravity and the predilection to selfannihilation, latent within, and always threatening the temperance of the (male) body, connects with early modern English preoccupations in ways that suggest, in the claim that Giacomo is ‘Italianate’, at least partly the displacement of local anxieties onto a putatively, and safely, more degenerate ‘Italy’. Giacomo’s fixation remains interesting in other contexts too. It appears, for instance, to anticipate aspects of what Freud later referred to as the human ‘death wish’. Much more recently, Jonathan Dollimore draws attention to the ‘forces of decreation’ that are ‘internal to creation [my emphasis]’31 and, citing Camilla Paglia’s observation that ‘the truth of the Dionysiac is not to be found in the earth’s surface but in its bowels, and if we have a deep revulsion for slime, it’s because that’s what we came from’ (79), Dollimore discerns as well a reluctance in critical responses to literature often to engage with what he sees as the nonetheless provocative willingness of writers (with whom critics engage) sometimes to confront the fact that ‘desire is perversely dangerous and often the more seductive for being so’ (73). Giacomo’s sense of an originary—that is, within the male body—negative, self-abasing and repulsive potential challenges generalised presentations of male agency as unified, harmonious and controlled, untrammelled by what patriarchy, when confronted with evidence of such agon, attempts at once, in its language, to effeminise. Furthermore, Giacomo proves in this scene to be himself an exemplar of the problem. His treachery—although not its full extent— evident to the audience from the start of his rhetorical performance, becomes clear to Innogen when (even as he alleges Posthumus’s degenerate and unruly promiscuity) he becomes himself sexually intemperate, overtly and insistently erotic, in his allusions to Innogen’s cheek and his own lips, her hand, and her body/which/ Takes prisoner the wild motion of mine eye,/Firing it only here’ (102–4). His explicit push Should he make me Live like Diana’s priest, betwixt cold sheets Whiles he is vaulting variable ramps, In your despite, upon your purse—revenge it. I dedicate myself to your sweet pleasure, More noble than that runagate to your bed (132–7) climaxes his sustained prior articulation of generalised as well as specific citations or examples of masculine libidinous intent. The inflammatory imagery, which in these lines evoke Posthumus’s alleged sexual rapacity, merges with simultaneous open display of Giacomo’s own venereal appetite as (mistaken) means of stoking the ‘sweet pleasures’ of an Innogen opportunistically misconstrued by him as essentially pliable. Furthermore, Giacomo’s slander of Posthumus’s capacity to distinguish, which slips continually into a problematisation of the slipperiness and unreliability of male rationality and intellect in general, is, as it unfolds, most exemplified by his own inversions, his—as James Sutherland has it about the occasional style of the late plays more generally—‘impetuous, violent, straining after the maximum of intensity’, 32 his ‘tortured and crowded metaphors’.33 His skilful use, and simultaneously excessive abuse, of rhetoric provides almost emblematic demonstration of what Schoenfeldt argues to be one of the ‘central questions of Renaissance ethical psychology’ as evident in Lodowick Bryskett’s A Discourse of Civill Life enunciation:
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Page 89 how cometh it to passe…that the soule being immorall and impassible, yet by experience we see dayly, that she is troubled with Lethargies, Phrensies, Melancholie, drunkenesse, and such other passions, by which we see her overcome.34 Spectacle of moral and rhetorical pillage in the name of salacious and diseased desire also informs Giacomo’s assertion a moment before his final brazen attempt to seduce Innogen himself, that ‘’tis your graces/That from my mutest conscience to my tongue/ Charms this report out’ (I.vi.115–17). These words are infused with a certain dark irony This is in no way obscured by the conventional, if fleeting, association, in his use of the word ‘charms’, with feminine witchcraft. Such an irony, which infers male rather than female rhetorical crafting, recurs a moment later when, his libidinous overture clearly rejected by Innogen, Giacomo switches his ground and, still in terms of his broader project of her despoliation, and still by way of a repellent use of a different, now less compressed and tortured mode of rhetoric, praises Posthumus as ‘such a holy witch/That he enchants societies into him’ (166–7). To forcibly adapt to my argument, for a moment, this claim of Giacomo’s, the lived-in experience of linguistic detail and situation characterising the whole of Giacomo’s rhetorical encounter with Innogen, as he unrestrainedly and, in a manner of speaking, promiscuously marshals one provocative conceit after another in the name of his own degenerate project of defamation and seduction, unflinchingly reveals—however much patriarchal ‘witchcraft’ with rhetoric may strive to elide it—a masculine potential for rhetorical as well as sexual and physical treachery and unruliness. This virtuoso but relentlessly duplicitous rhetoric, with which he endeavours both to hide and also to attain his motives, interrogates the putative integrity of male intellect as much as it points to male concupiscience, whereas Innogen’s unshakeable chastity, possessed with a mind and morality ‘so rare’ that she is ‘alone th’Arabian bird’ (16–17), frames and heightens the contrasting amoralities of this particular instance of an early modern and masculine, in its concerns in essence English, rhetorical performance. 2. Like a full-acorned boar When Innogen, shocked at Giacomo’s seductive pass at her, calls out ‘What ho, Pisanio’ (139), her reaction confirms a feminine innocence nevertheless ironically still dependent upon the male world within which she must move. Her vulnerability to its vagaries, often violent or even deadly, exacerbated by the absence in Italy of her husband, is repeatedly evident throughout the second act. In addition to the momentary reappearance of an insentient and mistakenly interfering father, she is subjected to Cloten’s rapist intentions, punctuated by sexual innuendo and puns.35 These scenes frame, in turn, Giacomo’s intrusion into Innogen’s bedchamber and his intellectual abuse of her. As aspirant rapist, Cloten provides literal equivalence for the rhetorical defilement in which Giacomo proceeds to indulge. The ‘civilised’ nature of the rhetorical skills Giacomo displays, the taste and cultivation he exhibits, even as he violates the sleeping Innogen’s privacy, as well as his rechannelling of violent and erotic sexual desire into a narrative about her that, designed to deny her sexual chastity, abuses her, has been much discussed.36 But this encounter, too, as that in I.vi, does not merely suggest Renaissance ‘Italianate’ decadence. For if, in his previous encounter with
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Page 90 Innogen, Giacomo’s language has directed us partly to a masculine—as much ‘English’ as ‘Italian’—predilection for despoliation and (self-) defilement, his actual skill in this scene, evident in the rhetorical fashioning from the artistic objects on which he gazes, of what will in essence be a destructive fiction about non-existent depravity, provides for the audience an object lesson in the potential doubleness not only of (male) cognition and intellection but of the very art that is one of its products. In such contexts, the story of Tereus, an abiding literary tale of male sexual violence, which Innogen is shown to be reading in this scene, provides nice complement to the various threats of rape, both literal (Il.i and II.iii) and rhetorical and artistic (II.ii) to which she is subjected. As Lynn Enterline, quoting Elissa Mader, writes: ‘The sexual violation of the woman’s body is itself embedded in discursive and symbolic structures.’ When Tereus ‘speaks the unspeakable,’ language becomes a productive, violent act that is compared to rape even as the act of rape resists representation.37 The story of Tereus complements, too, the violations wrought upon her reputation not only by Giacomo’s but by Posthumus’s rhetoric, in the final scene of the act. The injustice of Posthumus’s misogyny, also hitherto much examined, albeit inflamed by Giacomo, has its roots in early modern English—as much as these may also be European—traditions of patriarchy Janet Adelman is one of the critics who has paid particular attention to it. She remarks, of Posthumus’s reference to the ‘woman’s part’ in his long final speech ending II.iv, that it ‘cuts to the heart of anxiety about male identity and female power, associating both with the mother’s capacity to unmake the son’s identity through her sexual fault’.38 Her comment directs us to the possibility of male fears of an enabled femininity, attempts of men to disempower that femininity and their need to make woman the bearer of sexual blame. But acknowledgements of male sexual unruliness per se nonetheless erupt in these lines, too, and it is upon this rather less acknowledged dimension to Posthumus’s language in this scene that I want briefly to concentrate. When Posthumus opines Is there no way for men to be, but women Must be half-workers? We are all bastards, And that most venerable man which I Did call my father was I know not where When I was stamped. Some coiner with his tools Made me a counterfeit. (II.iv.153–8) his project is, as we well know, to libel women. However, the detail of his language implicates men as well. In his claim that ‘that most venerable man which I/Did call my father was I know not where/when I was stamped’, Posthumus may well express, as Adelman points out, ‘a rational uncertainty about male lineage and hence about the patriarchal structures on which identity is based’.39 But if this betrays a fear here that ‘his mother’s infidelity would make him counterfeit’ (212), his imagery insists simultaneously on phallic licentiousness, on the male ‘coiner’ who ‘with his tools’ might have acted the part of counterfeiter, illicitly to impregnate the woman. Audience knowledge of Innogen’s innocence, as well as of Giacomo’s treachery in his own betrayal
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Page 91 here of his actual knowledge of her innocence, complements this verbal recognition of male immorality informing the implicitly phallic image of male ‘coining’. Recognition of male complicity in sexual betrayal challenges, even though it may not erase, what Adelman claims to be the ‘covert equation that makes female sexuality—legitimate or illegitimate— responsible for the sexual fault in man’ (212). For, even as Posthumus may go on to reassign the ‘motion that tends to vice in man’ conventionally to the ‘woman’s part’, or, as Wayne also puts it, ‘looks for the “woman’s part” in himself’, he finds ‘instead the presence of the phallus that signifies the original loss and separation from the mother’.40 These lines also register, in the Tswana sense of lived-in experience, in dramatic situation as well as in its language, the lability of male corporeality: This yellow Giacomo in an hour—was’t not?— Or less—at first? Perchance he spoke not, but Like a full-acorned boar, a German one, Cried ‘O!’ and mounted; found no opposition But what he looked for should oppose (II.iv.166–70) Posthumus’s image of the ‘full-acorned boar’ resonates, Gordon Williams suggests, adulterous and insatiable male lust: The acorn as glans penis-figure is ancient; but the primary idea is of boar-food. Rich feeding while penned in a sty or frank makes the boar rampant41 while Posthumus’s comparison conceives, further, of a ‘German or Dutch’ ‘boor’42 whose insatiable desire prompts him to ‘mount’ the vaginal ‘O’. Although this does not, again, cancel the misogynist impulse about which Adelman speaks— surfacing in Posthumus’s language a moment later in the implicit criticism that this male ‘found no opposition… [that] she should from encounter guard’—it nevertheless begins with, and so restores, male concupiscience to the equation of illicit coital lust. There is no way indeed, in heterosexual union, for women to be ‘half-workers’ without male ‘halfworkers’, like, indeed, that very man whom Posthumus fantasises as having possibly displaced his father. Adelman’s stress that patriarchy makes ‘sexuality itself…the inheritance from the woman’s part in procreation’43 (213) to argue that Posthumus here ‘like Lear—catches a terrifying glimpse of the “mother” within’ (213), may register a patriarchal project of the processing of labile or promiscuous desire as ‘feminine’. But the images, in the lived-in detail of Posthumus’s language of male counterfeiter, ‘coining’ penis and mounting boar/boor all insist—as half-buried implosion of that which patriarchy attempts to write out of being—on male as much as female culpability in the matter of sexual unruliness, on the approximation of men and women, on the proximate nature of illicit male or female coital lust. Interestingly, potential recognition of the possibility of proximate behaviour in men and women informs both Janet Adelman’s and Ruth Nevo’s arguments as to the genital pun on ‘testimonies’ in Posthumus’s remark in his letter to Pisanio in III.iv: ‘Thy mistress, Pisanio, hath played the strumpet in my bed, the testimonies whereof lies bleeding in me’ (III.iv.21–2). For Adelman, ‘Innogen has in effect reversed the traditional marriage-bed scene, inflicting sexual damage on him, marking his genitals with the blood she should have shed, as though literalizing the woman’s part in him at the site
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Page 92 of his maleness’ (213). For Nevo, ‘Posthumus, in a perverse, self-contaminating turn, incorporates the woman’s part…It is he who is the violated virgin since he cannot be the violator that in his present sexual violence he would wish to be.’44 Both of these comments apply to a capacity for vulnerability and violation, marked by patriarchy as ‘feminine’ that proves possible for the male as well as the female body and so, although now assigned to Posthumus’s male body, programmed still, according to Adelman and Nevo, as the ‘woman’s part’. But such a use of the ascription of blood as (according to patriarchy) ‘inverted’ evidence of the ‘feminine’ betrayal of him, works only if Giacomo’s part in his alleged cuckolding, to which the pun on genitalia should, in terms of discussion of this pun, also admit, is elided. If Posthumus here incorporates the woman’s part at the site of his mutilation (by Innogen’s alleged adultery) it would be as much Giacomo’s genitalia as Innogen’s that violate him. The site of maleness thus emerges here not only as vulnerable and passive (in Posthumus’s case), but as potentially culpable (in Giacomo’s case). Moreover, the audience knows well enough that in terms of the dramatic situation, if Posthumus’s genitalia lie ‘bleeding’ it would be the ‘genitalia’, or, in the case of Giacomo’s performance, the rhetorical violence of another man, rather than, solely, the ‘woman’s part’ that has in fact effected this. As Wayne writes, the ‘flower image associated with the mole becomes a stain when [Giacomo] sullies it to entrap Posthumus’.45 To set this for a moment within Tswana conceptualisation, we may recall that the Tswana on the one hand recognise that ‘acknowledged social relations must correspond to a set of defining normative criteria’—which are, in the case of Shakespeare’s text, dominantly patriarchal—‘[b]ut simultaneously, the social field immediately surrounding any person is recognised to be ambiguous and potentially hostile’,46 subject always to the unpredictabilities and vagaries of heterogeneity The aspects of the text I have been probing here also confuse normative criteria of patriarchal assignations of difference and guilt, because of their simultaneous, processual meditation upon the mutilating and sadistic as well as the unruly aspects of a wandering, labile, rhetorically and intellectually as well as corporeally treacherous masculinity 3. Thou’rt poison to my blood Posthumus’s misogynist denunciation of women in II.iv elides his own betrayal of his wife when he agrees to the wager as well as when he credits Giacomo. At the same time his use of the economy of misogyny at the end of Act II simultaneously glimpses that very proclivity towards unruliness and treachery within the masculine that it strives to elide. If such unruliness emerges, further, as proximate to that capacity for treachery which patriarchy registers as feminine, this is only one of several instances in the play where the aspect of proximation in human behaviour, too, involving elsewhere sometimes different men, as well as men and women, surfaces in the text. Perhaps the play’s most direct address—against the patriarchal preference for binary modes of structuration—of this factor of proximation is in the extended evaluative and comparative presentations of Posthumus and Cloten. I noted at the beginning of this chapter that, in her encounter with the headless corpse, Innogen draws upon the knowledge and experience that she brings with her to conclude that she has found the headless body of Posthumus when in fact it is, as we know, the body of Cloten. What, we may wonder, does so strange a confusion of bodily
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Page 93 identity suggest? Why should the body of the noble hero and that of his antithesis, a brutish, lust-ridden male, a clot (Cloten), be hereby conflated?47 This moment of confusion runs counter to, from the start of Cymbdine, that process of differentiation, almost throughout the play, while Cloten is alive, in which Cloten is repeatedly presented as the opposite of Posthumus. Thus although the First Gentleman’s complex and partly unresolved use of phrase and interrupted clause suggests the difficulty of ‘delving’ Posthumus ‘to the root’, he is confident of his distinction between the ‘thing’ (I.i.16) that he calls Cloten and what he says is Posthumus’s ‘fair’ ‘outward’ (23). In the second scene of the play Cloten is introduced by the lords who serve him, in asides to the audience, as stupidly out of touch with his own inadequacies and as a violent if comic braggart (an ‘ass’, I.ii.33). Body and clothing in the following exchange develop further presentation of him as the inferior of Posthumus: First Lord: I would advise you to shift a shirt. The violence of action hath made you reek as a sacrifice. Where air comes out, air comes in. There’s none abroad so wholesome as that you vent. Cloten: If my shirt were bloody, then to shift it. (I.ii.1–5) If sweat, for the seventeenth century, was one of the ways in which the noxious humours within the body were to be purged,48 Cloten’s deafness to the First Lord’s irony and his indifference to his ‘reeking’ shirt infers his moral turpitude —for him only blood, as conventional sign of fighting prowess, would justify a change of clothing. The understanding of clothing as sign of what it covers, operative in this exchange, is, we may further note, only one of several exchanges in the play where the putative value of the bodies of Cloten and Posthumus, in the context of the clothing that covers them, is raised. Ann Jones and Peter Stalleybrass argue that the Renaissance imagined [t]he animatedness of clothes, their ability to ‘pick-up’ subjects [that is, the bodies they dress], to mold and shape them both physically and socially, to constitute [bodies] through their power as material memories…Clothing is a worn world: a world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body.49 Innogen suggests that if Cloten’s tailor has dressed him as a gentleman, that is no guarantee that his body is gentle, so that he may be just a ‘tailor-made’ man, not a proper one.50 At one point Cloten tries to reverse the insults directed at him, as to the inadequacy of the gentleman’s clothes he wears as measure of his bodily gentility, by redressing Posthumus in the imagery of the clothing of service, calling him ‘a base slave,/ A hilding for a livery, a squire’s cloth…’ (II.iii. 119–20). But it is Innogen who makes the most scathing joke of this kind when, as Jones and Stalleybrass have it, she dwells ‘upon the value [Posthumus’s] clothes have for her, particularly now that he is absent’51 because ‘[t] ouching Posthumus, Posthumus’s clothing have absorbed him into themselves’ (200). In a breathtaking dismissal she accordingly consigns Cloten’s body, as compared with Posthumus’s clothes, to a state of abjection. ‘His meanest garment/ That ever hath but clipped his body is dearer,’ she tells Cloten, ‘In my respect than all the hairs above thee’ (II. iii.130–2). It is this insult that persuades Cloten to put on Posthumus’s clothes in the hope that he will thereby acquire the attributes of Posthumus.
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Page 94 If these jokes affirm the fact that, for the Renaissance, clothes can be as misleading about the body they dress as easily as they may, as certain writers in the Renaissance believed, invest that body with significance, then Cloten’s decision to ‘cross-dress’ as Posthumus brings with it a further problematisation of the (male) body and what it, and/or the clothes that cover it, may signify Cloten’s use of Posthumus’s suit may be taken as a kind of cross-dressing if we situate it in the context of Jonathan Dollimore’s reminder that ‘to cross is not only to traverse, but to mix (as in to cross-breed) and to contradict (as in to cross someone)’ so that ‘cross-dressing potentially involves both inversion and displacement of… binaries’.52 Although Dollimore is concerned primarily with cross-dressing in the context of gender, he notes that the wearing of clothes intended for others was itself unsettling, that even if gender was not involved some early modern writers saw ‘dress confusion as symptomatic of impending social collapse’ (290) and that, on occasion,’ [d] ress underwrites not only class differences but national and racial ones’ (288).54 Theatre, he observes, was ‘seen both to epitomize and to promote contemporary forces of disruption in and through its involvement with cross-dressing’ (290). In these terms, then, cross-dressing might be said to facilitate that moment in which projects of differentiation, whether these be concerned with ‘sex’, ‘race’ or ‘gender’, are collapsed into unsettling moments of proximation and (re-) incorporation. Cloten’s wearing of Posthumus’s clothes may be regarded, in such contexts, then, as also potentially destabilising. But in what particular ways? Cloten’s first soliloquy when he arrives in Wales is: She said upon a time—the bitterness of it I now belch from my heart—that she held the very garment of Posthumus in more respect than my noble and natural person, together with the adornment of my qualities. With that suit upon my back will I ravish her; first kill him, and in her eyes; there shall she see my valour, which will then be a torment to her contempt. He on the ground, my speech of insultment ended on his dead body, and when my lust hath dined—which, as I say, to vex her I will execute in the clothes that she so praised—to the court I’ll knock her back, foot her home again. (III. v.132–43)55 In this passage, metaphoric even more than literal signification of Cloten’s word ‘belch’, his murderous intent, and his fantasy, ‘when my lust hath dined…I’ll knock her back, foot her home again’ all show him to be revoltingly brutal. This fits in with that aspect of the play that suggests a binary project to engineer his disparagement as compared with Posthumus. But Cloten speaks also of ‘my noble and natural person, together with the adornment of my qualities’. What here might be merely evidence of comic vanity is also problematic. In his next soliloquy, amidst the abundant bawdy in his talk of ‘fitting’ Innogen, Cloten’s body emerges—more explicitly in fact, as well as in deluded vanity as approximate56 to that of Posthumus: I am near to th’ place where they should meet, if Pisanio have mapped it truly. How fit his garments serve me! Why should his mistress, who was made by him that made the tailor, not be fit too? The rather—saving reverence of the word —for ‘tis said a woman’s fitness comes by fits. Therein I must play the workman. I dare speak it to myself, for it is not vainglory for a man and his glass to confer in his own chamber. I
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Page 95 mean, the lines of my body are as well drawn as his: no less young, more strong, not beneath him in fortunes, beyond him in the advantage of the time, above him in birth, alike conversant in general service, and more remarkable in single oppositions; yet this imperceiverant thing loves him in my despite. What mortality is! Posthumus, thy head, which now is growing upon thy shoulders, shall within this hour be off, thy mistress enforced, thy garments cut to pieces before her face; and all this done, spurn her home to her father, who may haply be a little angry for my so rough usage; but my mother, having power of his testiness, shall turn all into my commendations. (IV.i.1–20) As Frank Kermode remarks, ‘[w]e are bound to wonder why the clothes of the incomparable Posthumus fit Cloten exactly’.57 The comedy in this exercise of comparison between himself and Posthumus does not fully erase the surprising and even unsettling intimacy of certain of his remarks. This may well be initiated by the bawdy of his acting, as he says, the ‘workman’ to ‘fit’ [penetrate] Innogen. It shifts to an unusually intimate glimpse of his own nudity—‘it is not vainglory for a man and his own glass to confer in his own chamber’.58 Inescapably, in terms of the fact that Posthumus’s garment fits his body so well, the image he confronts in the mirror confirms that ‘the lines of my body are as well drawn as his: no less young, more strong’, an articulation that brings Posthumus’s own sinuous nakedness momentarily into view as well, even as it moves to those non-physical qualities that Cloten’s (also comic) selfadmiration claims for both of them, but for himself especially The literal fact of bodily proximation between Posthumus and Cloten registered here is disturbingly confirmed again in the startlingly disruptive effect of Innogen’s reading of Cloten’s corpse and the occasion of cross-dressing that has prompted it. When Innogen awakes, as I remarked at the outset of this chapter, she first resorts, on seeing the corpse without fully recognising it, to sententious generalisation on the universalising proximation that death brings with it: ‘These flowers are like the pleasures of the world,/This bloody man the care on’t’ (IV.ii.297–8). But if all human bodies can in this way be connected, in what ways may particular bodies be known? What does she really know about the body she sees, the headless ‘thing’ in front of her? If Innogen can go on to make the intimate mistakes which she does make, about the headless body before her, are we to conclude that it is merely clothing and the social significance attached to that clothing that gives the body signification? In what ways and on the basis of what are human (‘male’) bodies to be semanticised? A headless man? The garments of Posthumus? I know the shape of ‘s leg: this is his hand, His foot Mercurial, his Martial thigh, The brawns of Hercules: but his Jovial face— Murder in heaven! How? (IV.ii.309–13) This is not merely blazon: the point that the body whose physical features she so admires is in actuality that of the sexually uncontained and violently brutish Cloten undermines the process of differentiation until now uppermost in the unfolding comparison between Posthumus and Cloten in the play For, if Posthumus’s and Cloten’s corporeality is interchangeable, it suggests proximity in each to what is in the other. This brings into
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Page 96 question the very possibility of a project of homogenisation that a white patriarchal teleology of emergent authentic ‘British’ ‘masculinity’ might seek, the project that, as George Wilson Knight long ago had it, informed the play, culminating, in Cymbdine, with a marriage that at the play’s end ‘becomes at once the matrimonial peace of the individual, the social integrity of the nation and the union of British manhood with the …essence of royalty’.59 Indeed, implicit fear of contamination, or of the potential for unruliness within Authority’—evident in the very binary determination to distinguish the value of Posthumus from Cloten—within the alleged self-control of a patriarchally constructed homogenous male body, haunts the play in multiple other ways from the start. The use of the word ‘thing’ (which describes Cloten at the beginning of the play) very quickly proves tellingly slippery In his argument with Innogen over the value of Posthumus, Cymbeline accuses Posthumus of an unacceptable baseness of being by means of the same word: Thou basest thing, avoid hence, from my sight! If after this command thou freight the court With thy unworthiness, thou diest. Away, Thou’rt poison to my blood. (I.i.126–9) A moment later he also calls Posthumus a ‘disloyal thing’ (I.i.132) and his daughter a ‘foolish thing’ (I.i.151)—precisely because she has chosen Posthumus above Cloten. Semantically, as OED shows, the word ‘thing’ is richly charged with both positive and negative significations and therefore, potentially, profoundly slippery. Some of the positive meanings listed by the dictionary for the word include (sb) ‘2. a matter brought before a court of law’, ‘4. that which is done or to be done’,‘5b. that which is thought’,‘7. that which exists individually’,‘8. the actual being or entity as opposed to a symbol of it’. These possible meanings give some indication of the positive semantic potential, including existential/ philosophical possibilities informing the word ‘thing’.60 But the king draws on more negative significations, including something applied ‘10b. in contempt or reproach, without qualification implying unworthiness to be called a person’. Even these senses entail potential for semantic problematisation. To go no further, the last signification I quoted, ‘implying unworthiness to be called a person’, brings into question assumptions about what it is to be called human. Interestingly too, given what Coppelia Kahn suggests to be the ‘Priapic appetite’ of Cloten’s subsequent behaviour,61 it is worth adding in the context of the First Lord’s use of the word ‘thing’ to apply to Cloten earlier, that OED gives, as another of its significations ‘ll.c. euphem. Private member, private parts’. The slippery semantics of the word ‘thing’ itself- which range from the positive, to the disparaging, from specular impenetrability to problematisation of what it is to be ‘human’—complements the slipperiness that at times punctuates the project of measuring the opposing worth of these two men. If the binary mode of conceptualisation in the play, in the argument of some critics, seeks a model of temperance, possibly best exemplified by Arviragus and Guiderius, but struggled for also by Posthumus,62 this slipperiness in the semantics of the word ‘thing’ brings with it the possibility of multiplicity, the potential fear that (the male) body may bring with it more than one ‘thing’. Recognition of such complexity for masculinity evokes that aspect
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Page 97 which Maurizio Calbi identifies for Jacobean theatre of a ‘multi-layered crisis in the representation of the body’63 when he writes a representation of the body’63 when he writes about The Duchess of Malfi, that, ‘with Lacan’, in Antonio’s (male) gaze at the Duchess: Behind the Lady as a narcissistic projection filling in the (potentially castrating) lack in the Other there seems to show through the spectre of a distanced and inhuman ‘partner’, indicative of the traumatic Thing that cannot be specularised or symbolised. (47) As he sees it, this crisis involves continual eruption of that repressed ‘traumatic Thing’, a continual return, perhaps of what Freud referred to as the ‘unheimlich’, that haunts and unfixes attempts to conceptualise bodily homogeneity The attempt to distinguish between Posthumus and Cloten, to separate the one from the other, in the use of the word ‘thing’, also suggests, then, in the application of it to both of them potential connections between them.64 This partly blurs the very lines of separation designed, as Floyd-Wilson argues, to single out some men—Posthumus or, rather less complicatedly, Guiderius and Arviragus—as bearers of an uncontaminated temperate patriarchal ideal of homogeneity, from other men. This processual focus upon the aspect of ambiguity and heterogeneity within the male body, complicating the play’s binary project, also suggests Jonathan Dollimore’s argument that ‘[e]ven as civil society endlessly displaces corruption from the social body as a whole onto its low life, the latter reveals both the original source and full extent of corruption within the dominant itself’.65 From this point of view, one aspect of the ‘dominant’ in Cymbeline can be read through that postulate of a temperate inner nobility which, among other things, characterises Belarius’s description of the two princes, which the lords and Innogen attempt to assert for Posthumus, and which is also evident in the dynastic and patriarchal teleology of the play From this dominant there seems continuously to be displaced onto, particularly, Cloten the foregrounding of a corporeality presented as degenerate and base, and so, in consequence, disavowed.67 Furthermore, side by side with the (easy) recognition that what is displaced from Posthumus in the attempt to structure his masculinity as homogeneous and noble returns to haunt him/us in the headless corpse scene, the text also disturbingly manifests another kind of return that works against the play’s (and perhaps our) desire for separation and homogenisation, in a way, too, that the words ‘comic’, ‘bizarre’ and ‘grotesque’ do not fully explain. For, in a manner of speaking, in the case of Cloten, what is abjected or disavowed in his body from the image of the reeking shirt on, in the play, in the process of displacement, is bodily beauty, temperance, martial and Jove-like potential. But as this returns, corporeally, in the similitude of his and Posthumus’s sinuous nakedness, to ‘haunt’, in a manner of speaking, the process of his disparagement, it too destabilises the binary impulses to homogenise, demonise and expel which characterise the patriarchal project. It too glimpses the possibility lying outside or beyond binaric structuration, that within the male body —importantly within as well as what lies beyond it—or, indeed within as well as beyond the social, political, national/‘racial’ circle, men among themselves are likely to be approximates, and to be, as well, as easily approximates of one another as they may appear to be opposites. Although Calbi (drawing on the work of Judith Butler) foregrounds the argument that there is for the body no prematerial state, I understand this argument in a
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Page 98 discursive sense to mean that, even though men’s and women’s bodies are different from one another, whatever the ‘materiality’ that can be asserted for the body is always in important senses discursively arrived at. Calbi contends that any ‘body’ is constituted or ‘materialised’ at particular moments by particular relations of power and of necessity therefore, always incomplete, and only an approximation: any and every reference to a certain materiality of the body…is a constructive/redeployment of particular forms of materiality, and one which is intrinsically, even if inadvertently/violent’, in that it decides what counts, and what does not count as the ‘matter’ of the body…the relation between the body as ‘constructed’ and the ‘body as unconstructed’ is not a relation between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ which are clearly distinct from one another…not only is the body involved in relations of power. The body does not pre-exist such an involvement. Relations of power, that is, are formative of the body’s very materiality.68 Hence, if therefore, the body is ‘constituted and constitutive’ (20), then ‘the force of exclusion and abjection which constitutes the “outside” as an “outside”’ can be registered but so too ‘the persistent possibility of its disruptive return’ (20–1). According to this, the process in Cymbeline, of construction or materialisation of a certain kind of body for Posthumus and another for Cloten involving displacement, is a project that is not only trying to constitute and to be constitutive but that is, at the same time, always liable, despite this, to the disruptive return of what it termed abject, whether this entails the body of Posthumus or, as disturbingly, Cloten.69 Innogen’s encounter with the cross-dressed corpse affords a critical aperture, then, in which approximation in human bodies, in the moment of that encounter, implodes patriarchal production of the ideal male body as homogeneously constituted. This is a moment of explicit recognition, directly interrupting although not subverting the different dominant patriarchal and ultimately proto-colonial project of materialising homogenous (white) British masculinity It is a supplement whose effect is interrogative of this dominant epistemological project, in a way also, perhaps, analogous to Dollimore’s articulation, in the context of transvestism, of what he calls ‘transgressive reinscription’—‘a mode of transgression which seeks not an escape from existing structures but rather a subversive reinscription within them, and in the process their dislocation or displacement’.70 It is particularly in this articulation of an uncanny return from an ‘outside’ (which produces recognition of proximity and approximation—always and only reiteratively so) to a patriarchal ‘inside’ (dependent on the construction of binary oppositions, similarly reiteratively constituted and constitutive) that, I believe, the implications of the headless corpse suggest a telling complication in the early seventeenth-century production of, or writing into being of, corporeal masculinity. 4. So man and man should be Innogen’s other encounters in Wales also entail multiple existential unsettlings involving masculinity, desire and language. Her often interrogative style of address in these scenes—in her first speech in III.iv she asks no less than six questions in eighteen or so lines—reflect this existential uncertainty She equivocates about the nature of masculinity when Pisanio confronts her with Posthumus’s instruction that she be killed, defining
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Page 99 men’s vows as ‘women’s traitors’ and her husband as epitome of perfidy: ‘[a]ll good seeming,/By thy revolt, O husband, shall be thought/Put on for villainy’ (III.iv.54–6). Placing Posthumus besides Aeneas and Sinon in a pantheon of male treachery, and citing his letters as ‘[c]orrupters of my faith’ (III.iv.83), she designates men—in explicit contrast to his charge against women at the end of II.iv—as precipitators of contamination: Thus may poor fools Believe false teachers. Though those that are betrayed Do feel the treason sharply, yet the traitor Stands in worse case of woe. (III.iv.84–7) But forced, a few moments later, yet again in the face of an unpredictable reality, to adjust her perceptions—this time of a supposedly treacherous Pisanio—she draws on more conventional patriarchal and xenophobic discourse, assigning blame for Posthumus’s alleged behaviour to ‘[s]ome jay of Italy’ (III.iv.49) or to ‘some Roman Courtesan’ (III.iv.123), just as, earlier, Pisanio, unsettled by Posthumus’s letters, speculates,’ What false Italian,/As poisonous tongued as handed, hath prevailed/On thy too ready hearing?’ (III.ii.4–6), a possibility that he also later repeats to her.71 However, such attempts to demarcate an ‘Italian’ degeneracy are, as I noted above, equivocal, and, here, also partly further vitiated by Innogen’s explicit reluctance, a little later, to return to the British court, itself populated by a sexually violent Cloten and a rebarbatively hostile father. To Pisanio’s response to her refusal to return, ‘If not at court,/ Then not in Britain must you bide’ (III. iv. 135–6), she declares: Hath Britain all the sun that shines? Day? Night? Are they not but in Britain? I’th’world’s volume Our Britain seems as of it, but not in’t, In a great pool a swan’s nest. Prithee think There’s livers out of Britain (III. iv. 137–41) These lines have troubled editors72 partly because Innogen, heiress to the British throne, suddenly argues, from the perspective of the larger world, the relative smallness of Britain, reflecting momentary indifference towards or interrogation of any imagined prior sense of dynastic73 or territorial nationhood.74 Furthermore, her language, which proffers a sudden glimpse of a potential unfixing of projects of ethnic or national structuration, is followed by Pisanio’s proposal (III.iv.155–66) that she cross-dress as a man, a familiar dramatic device that not only destabilises’ [w]oman its pretty self’ (158), but encourages Innogen to become empathetically ‘almost/[a] man already’ (167–8), to be ‘soldier to’ and to ‘abide…with/A prince’s courage’ (184–5).75 Her cross-dressing may be seen to be the latest step in an epistemological scrutiny of men in which she has implicitly been involved since the start of the play, evident in her concern to choose an ‘eagle’ and avoid a ‘puttock’ (I.i.140–1), to insist on precise distinction between her husband and Cloten (I.ii.167–9), and in her encounters with Giacomo as well as with Cloten. Now, travelling in Wales, herself disguised as a man, she meets Arviragus, Guiderius and Belarius and compares ‘great men’ unfavourably to ‘these twain’ (III.vii.79–85), reading from their example that, although ‘[o]ur
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Page 100 courtiers say all’s savage but at court;/…The imperious seas breeds monsters; for the dish/Poor tributary rivers as sweet fish’ (IV.ii.33–6). To Arviragus’s question Are we not brothers?’ she acknowledges that, although ‘man and man should be,/…clay and clay differs in dignity,/Whose dust is both alike’ (IV.ii.3–5), in subjunctive mood pointing to approximation even as she registers heterogeneity. Her brothers engage, in turn, in a version of existential enquiry as to her identity, wondering who or what she may be, for, ‘[b]ut that it eats our victuals I should think/Here were a fairy’ (III. vi.40–1) and declining their speculative diction from the possibility that she might be an ‘angel’ to the possibility that she might be an earthly ‘boy’ (42–4). The attempts of the participants in these scenes to see one another clearly and respectfully contrasts markedly with the manipulative deceptions or the latent or overt male violence evident throughout the first two acts. But as the Tswana might have it, in ‘a social field recognized to be ambiguous and potentially hostile’, it is ‘inherent in the quality of everyday life that individuals will be drawn into the contrivance and management of the linkages that affect them most closely’ but that the ‘mutual acknowledgement of many of these linkages [should be] as a result, expected to be transient’, and, given that ‘outcomes cannot be prescribed [merely] by normative reckoning’, fluctuating. The situation for the participants in these scenes in Cymbeline remains, because of ‘the encompassing nature of the lived-in universe’ (240), itself complex, and not only because of the fact of Innogen’s hidden identity. For one thing, even as they demonstrate care and respect for one another, the responses of the brothers and sister become erotically charged. Their mutual attractions, even though simultaneously self-proscribed, are, if briefly, coloured by the potentially incestuous and, by the—as the brothers are attracted to what they understand to be a boy—potentially homoerotic.77 Innogen’s response to them, too, glimpses, even as it rules out, transgressively erotic dimensions.78 Such loosenings of emotional, familial and sexual boundaries for both genders, posit again, albeit fleetingly, against the binaries of patriarchy, inner human heterogeneity and proximation. Moreover, if the domestic and child-like imagery and simplicity which is an aspect of the style in these exchanges—and the attempt to provide ‘linkages’ which they reflect—provides a contrast to the complexities of decadent courtly rhetoric heard elsewhere in the play, it nevertheless proves to be itself also subtly complex. Fidele becomes the brothers’ ‘housewife’ (IV.ii.45), she appears to them to have ‘good ancestors’ (48), sings ‘angel-like’ (49) and her ‘neat cookery’ of their broth cuts ‘our roots in characters’ (50–1). Fidele’s use of the letters of the alphabet in his cooking evokes childlike integrity, but the equivocation that I have already noted colours their mutual attraction, simultaneously, in the matter of language and ‘truth’ inflects this sequence too. For one thing, Fidele’s (that is, Innogen’s) domesticity resonates conventional misogyny. For another, Fidele is seen to be in inexplicable discomfort. He nobly ‘yokes/A smiling with a sigh’ (53–4) and ‘grief and patience, rooted in him both,/Mingle their spurs together’ (59–60) so that Arviragus prays that the ‘stinking elder, grief’ may ‘untwine/His perishing root with the increasing vine’ (61–2). Shakespeare’s use in these exchanges of, in the case of the word ‘root’, polyptoton—the changing of one form of a word into another, related form—delineates, not only by means of the metaphoric resonances, in Innogen’s alphabet letters in the broth, the possibility of an idealised (child-like) innocence of language rooted in transparency, of which the humanists dreamed, but also the simultaneous rootedness, as well, of mixed and conflicting human emotion and predicament, or,
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Page 101 again, the rootedness of mortality. These exchanges envision a wholesome simplicity of linguistic interaction but they too are punctuated by acknowledgement of the heterogeneous, the processual and the complex. The point is made also by way, finally, of repeated rhetorical attempts to address death in these sequences. Juxtaposition of the brutal death of the ‘slavish’ (75) Cloten against the apparent death of the paragon Fidele suggests yet again the enigma of experience, unfixing in consequence any illusion about the possibility of an effectively synoptic epistemology or language to account for the human (and so, for ‘masculinity’). Although Guiderius and Arviragus refer callously and contemptuously to the decapitated Cloten,79 Belarius, like Innogen earlier, glimpses proximity when he observes that ‘mean and mighty rotting/together have one dust’, and tries also to invest Cloten’s same dead body with distinctive hierarchical meaning (247–50). When these men encounter the apparently dead Fidele, they draw upon further verbal strategies. Firstly, Arviragus plays solemn music, then enters with the ‘dead’ Fidele in his arms. He and Guiderius try to register the meaning of her loss by way of analogical naturalism (198–9 and 202–4), Belarius speculates on melancholy as possible cause,80 while, in the language that follows, they elaborate on the commonplace proverbial comparison of death with sleep,81 address the dead body by way of imagery of the ceremonial laying upon it of flowers, which helps to convey ‘a haunting impression that the body is itself becoming a part of the natural world’ and which evokes also the literature of metamorphosis,82 and resort, in ‘Fear no more the heat o’th’sun,/Nor the furious winter’s rages’ (259–60) to ritual and lyrical acknowledgement in song, of the facts, for humanity in general, of time, of the ardours of life and of mortality Audience knowledge that Innogen is alive facilitates focus upon the styles to which they resort, none of them completely adequate but each brought into play in order to cope with the rebarbatively mysterious. These responses are also further processually collocated with language that simultaneously registers the physical corrosion of the body, in the ‘worms’ that Guiderius construes ‘will not come to thee’ (219), in the ‘grave’ that Belarius identifies—in which, rather than what he calls ‘wench-like words’, he reminds his sons, Fidele’s body must be buried (230–4)—in the body’s ‘rotting’ (247), in the fact that the flowers they strew on the graves will themselves wither (284–7) and, at the end of the scene, in Innogen’s understanding that the headless corpse is already decaying: But first, an’t please the gods, I’ll hide my master from the flies as deep As these poor pickaxes can dig (388–90) These recognitions of the inability of multiple modes of rhetoric to deal fully with (human) mortality may, further, be set, in this context of Shakespeare’s awareness of the body’s ‘debased corporeality’,83 beside David Hillman’s citation of Nietzsche’s sense of the ‘limits of…epistemological inquiry into the interior of the body’: ‘[O]ur moral judgements and evaluations too are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of acquired language for designating nervous stimuli’ (90). Moreover, such acknowledgements of the equivocal complexities in language usage in its sometimes limited ability to articulate not only mortality, but aspects of proximation and heterogeneity that inflect and complicate conceptualisation of the
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Page 102 ‘human’, further unsettle the homogenising assertiveness to say nothing of the often violently segregationist consequences of patriarchy’s binary insistence. 5. The heaviness and guilt within my bosom takes off my manhood In Act V, patriarchy’s recuperation is again contrapuntally meditated upon, particularly in sustained interest, throughout, in the question of male accountability 16 examine this I want to start by recalling the equivocal rhetorical performances of particularly Giacomo and Posthumus in the first two acts of the play These are suggestive of the danger of what I have referred to as ‘self-admiring rhetoric’. I mean by this a use of language and argument primarily informed by a relatively narcissistic self-interest, simultaneously masked by or unconnected to its ostensible or proclaimed, in some way allegedly altruistic, and therefore self-congratulatory, focus of attention. 16 explore this further, in order to address the concern with male accountability to be found in Act V, I turn briefly to some pertinent aspects of Joshua Sobol’s play, The Palestinian Girl,84 which comes from my present location, Israel, and to some equally pertinent aspects of the proceedings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which comes from my former location, South Africa. Sobol’s play, produced first in October 1985, was written when Israel had already for three years been embroiled in Lebanon, and two years, also, before the beginning of the first intifada. In it, Sobol attempts to conscientise his mainly Israeli audiences against both Israel’s entanglement in Lebanon and the excesses of right-wing Israeli nationalism. His title promises, moreover, an Israeli dramatist’s attempt to represent a Palestinian point of view, and the play presents a story in which Palestinians and Israelis work together to produce a film depicting a love affair between Magda, a Palestinian, and David, an Israeli. It repeatedly advocates the concept of a common humanity, as in Magda’s remark about David, ‘When we’re together, I’m not an Arab and he’s not a jew. We’re two people who’ve discovered one another’ (269), assertions that ‘we’re not so different from one another’ (276), ‘I’m talking to you like one human being to another’ (261) or, to the question ‘when there is a baby are you going to raise him as a jew? As an Arab?’, the answer ‘when there’s a baby, we’ll try and raise him as a human being’ (279). Such aspects of the play appeal to, say, a reading of the situation in Israel, which, against the extremisms on both sides of this conflict, might desire compromise and peace. But Sobol’s rhetorical practice elsewhere in the play is equivocal. A lack of historical or cultural specificity characterises his presentation of Arabs, and stereotype and caricature that of his Israelis. At one point in The Palestinian Girl, Magda and her friend, Adnan, perform a protest piece during the Israeli Independence Day, which presents Arab history in generalised mode of biblical or Aesopian fable, as a dispute between a lamb and a wolf. But nowhere in the play do its Arab voices move from this to localised specificity about its histories of conflict, whatever these might be—whether, say, to a communal sense of trauma relating to Arab subordination under an Ottoman past or to the disruptions experienced by Arabs after 1948.85 Sobol’s ‘Palestinians’ have, further, little beyond reactive purchase on oppression to express. Fahed’s dissatisfied ‘I’m sick and tired of following the cultivated rules of western civilisation’ (280) appears startlingly innocent of Middle Eastern structurations of the West as uncultivated and corrupt, while his expressions of angst are awkwardly Europeanised:
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Page 103 I haven’t read Shakespeare in years either. Or Ibsen. Or Chekhov. Actually since I graduated from University I haven’t read a single play except the ones I took part in. I’m in the actor’s guild at the theatre. What do you think we talk about at meetings? Work-hours, premiums, promotions…Who has the time to read anything…At our last meeting someone suggested that the actors should have a say in deciding our repertoire. Why shouldn’t they put on a play by Wedekind. (sic) (281) Samira, who takes the part of the character called Magda in the film they are shooting, conceptualises what has happened in the course of time, also only in reactive terms. In language that offers little beyond perhaps recognition of dislocated subjectivity, she reports that her friend, Adnan, is in jail now. Got ten years as an accomplice to a murder. They killed the Jewish thug who kicked me in the stomach and killed my baby Mine and David’s. David was a total wreck. He’s in some yeshiva…He wanted me to convert and then we’ld get married. He loves me. Adnan’s willing to forgive me too. Everyone’s willing to forgive me. One says to convert, the other says to come back to Islam, the third one coaxes me to London to be European. All I needed was to fall in love with someone from India. (272) Such a culturally deracinated voice appears, moreover, attractive to Sobol. His Palestinian woman emerges as valorised Western ‘existentialist’, best represented by her declaration, announced at the beginning of the play and reiterated at the end, that: Magda is something that nothing sticks to. No label. Magda is the kind of stuff that can’t be frozen in any form. Magda isn’t the result. She isn’t the continuation. Magda is what happens from one minute to the next. Magda is something that doesn’t belong, something that’ll never belong to anyone. (243) A related point may be made about Sobol’s representations of Israelis. But here, in mediating Jewish Eastern European origins as well as the orthodox Jewish religion, although he appears to include the occasional stroke of local acculturation, he does so by means only of securalist stereotype and caricature, thus again enacting a measure of elision: David’s father expresses consistently predictable right-wing conservative opinions, all the while dressed in the costume of a Purim Clown, while his mother is presented as a narrow domesticated stereotype obsessed with ‘gefilte fish’. David’s return to religion, dismissively reported but not dramatised, is read as automatic sign of disintegration. Adnan’s impersonation of a religious Jew and then a religious Muslim presents both, similarly, as self-evident embodiments of fundamentalist fanaticism and excess. For his strictures on aspects of Israeli nationalism,86 Sobol draws on the Nazi analogy current in left-wing Israeli discourse. At one moment in the play, Magda, in sarcastic response to a right-wing Israeli’s abusive requests for Adnan’s address, replies ‘Nuernberg Avenue, corner of Auschwitz’ (253). While this may be an instance of angry hyperbole on Magda’s part, elsewhere the text reinforces the connection.87 What is at issue in these presentations of Israeli as well as Arab voices is not merely that they are located in what we know well enough to be a fraught and shocking
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Page 104 situation manifestly ridden with multiple injustices, but the extent to which summative fable, cultural elision or the rhetoric of caricature, stereotype and easy analogy, disregards or erases the lived-in complexity of the objects of Sobol’s attention. In the, for a secular age, discomfiting instance of religion, for example, one might collocate Sobol’s aggressive anti-religious secularism, in his representation of religious Jew or religious Muslim, with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s contrasting position in his argument that subaltern studies need to ‘take the magical and the miraculous seriously, and… look on the archives of peasant existence as a repository that helps us illuminate the magical and the superstitious that actually belongs to all classes perhaps anywhere in the world’.88 I want, further, to set the example of Sobol’s procedures against certain aspects of the treatment of difference in the proceedings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the fractured conditions in which South Africa found itself at the end of four decades of Nationalist Party apartheid rule, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was one of several projects born out of the compromises, between all the opposing parties, arrived at in the negotiations at Kempton Park that preceded the first democratic elections in 1994. In seeking to contribute to a common humanity, and to a culture based on human rights, the Commission considered it important to establish ‘as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross human rights violations’89 committed under apartheid, and to facilitate the granting of amnesty to ‘persons who made full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective’ (vi-vii). Space was accordingly made for anyone who wished to come forward to speak their own stories. All who did were, in however multiply agonised ways, attended to. Even if the Commission endeavoured to be ‘responsive to the demands of the victims rather than those of the perpetrators’90 it not only did not ridicule or caricature, but it did not silence or erase the voices of the persecutors themselves. This respect for politically inconvenient, or unacceptable—from certain perspectives even ‘monstrous’— difference, as opposed to contempt for it, ridicule or erasure of it, is a striking aspect of the extraordinary attempt in South Africa to establish, as the South African constitution enunciates it, a secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu [the African philosophy of humanism] but not for victimization.92 This concept of ‘ubuntu and not victimisation’ informed publication of the report itself too, in its recognition of multiple forms of suffering, of a variety of positions, of different kinds of persecution. In fact, the Commission’s readiness to address more than one perspective with equal respect disturbed the by then ruling African National Congress, as well as the right-wing opposition Freedom Front. As a local newspaper reported: Tension is building up ahead of the release of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report, which is to hold the ANC and PAC ‘morally and politically accountable’ for gross violations of human rights as well as endorse the
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Page 105 international position that apartheid was a crime against humanity. Spin doctors and political leaders yesterday started working feverishly to minimise the report’s damage to their parties following the leaking of the TRC’s preliminary findings. Freedom Front leader, General Constand Viljoen said the leak was an attempt to give credibility to the final report ‘which, by all expectations would be nothing more than a witchhunt against Afrikaners’.93 Unlike the tactic of ridicule which the right-wing politician Viljoen applies in his particular attempt to minimise the Commission’s work by proposing that it is no more than a stereotypical ‘witchhunt’, Archbishop Tutu’s introductory speech, when he handed the report formally to the state president, evidences remarkable readiness to address and respect difference. Starting with recognition of past national trauma, moving to the jocular intimacy of shared personal friendship, he ended by speaking in Afrikaans, considered the language of the oppressors, as well as in Sotho and Xhosa, the languages of the, until very recently oppressed: Your Excellency Mr President, I ask that we stand to observe a minute’s silence in honour and memory of all those who were victims of gross violations of their rights, at, for instance, Sharpeville, Boipatong, Sebokeng, Soweto, Table Mountain, Pietermartzburg, King William’s Town Golf Course, Church Street and St James Church, Bisho, Heidelberg Tavern who were tortured or executed in prisons and camps inside and outside South Africa and those who died on the border needlessly and in unnecessary wars. Thank you Madiba, I am wearing a cassock so that if I am not nice about your shirt you can retaliate about my so-called dress. Dit is Mnr die President vir ons “n geweldige groot voorreg om kan vandag hierdie verslag van di WVK aan U oorhandig. Ke motlotlo ha ele mona re tla fana ka tialeho ena ea omishiiti ea Nete le Puelano, Li wonga elinqabileyo xa siza kunikela nga lengdxelo ye Komishini ye Nyaniso no Xolelaniso.94 Tutu’s list of past outrages in this extract includes incidents of violence visited on disparate, sometimes opposing sections of the South African community Whatever political and expedient motives may be alleged for this, the action itself bespeaks a particular position, a sensitivity to and respect for the dissimilar, in its acknowledgement as well, even in the jokes about the ‘ordinary’ matters of dress and appearance, of a culture of human rights in the plural. Set against such an understanding of the commonality of humanity, emanating from the newly empowered victims of apartheid South Africa, Sobol’s commitment to the notion of human commonality promises or asserts an affiliation that may suggest his credentials as an adherent of the tolerance, which acknowledgement of the notion of commonality urges, but it is one that is, simultaneously, absent in his rhetorical practice and elisions, so far as the various differences from the blandly universalised deculturated ‘existential’ secularism, which he privileges, are concerned. As we know, questions of language and accountability inform as well early modern humanist aspirations that language be, in usage, ideally, transparent, the use of rhetoric a means both to impart and to enact Christian ‘truth’. In such a context Posthumus’s and Giacomo’s rhetorical performances in Cymbeline are problematic. Posthumus’s reliance on the rhetoric of misogyny reflects a need for affiliation with legitimated conventional
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Page 106 ‘wisdom’, albeit misogynist, which affirms his ‘morality’ in contrast to an allegedly errant wife. But, as I have noted, what is simultaneously at issue is his own masculine integrity, the aspects of treachery and betrayal, with its attendant complicity with promiscuity, apparent in his involvement in the wager scene, which lie behind his resort to misogyny as means, by way of the culturally dominant linguistic articulation of a female depravity, of preserving his sense of inner integrity Giacomo’s use of rhetoric in his encounter with Innogen proves equally self-regarding. His language represents himself as conscientious objector to male depravity But situated within an economy of homosocial competitiveness and the libidinal and depredatory sexual urge that often characterises it, his aim is to win the wager and, if possible, take the woman. In both cases, the self-congratulatory ‘moral’ superiority the rhetoric of each speaker radiates, serves a simultaneously very different private and narcissistic intellectual, emotional or material need. This well-known issue, of language that appears performatively to allege a certain moral position in the context of behaviour that may belie it, informs the concern, in regard to the play’s men, with what nowadays we call the question of ‘accountability’, responsibility for or evasion of responsibility, for prior speaking and action, which punctuates Act V. Posthumus points directly at male culpability and error when he condemns husbands who ‘murder wives much better than themselves/For wrying but a little!’ (V.i.4–5). Again, when he asseverates,‘O Pisanio,/Every good servant does not all commands,/No bond but to do just ones’ (5–7), he recognises that authority may be equivocal and errant in its demands, even as he infers that in the codes of service, master as much as servant should be accountable to justice. He stresses his sense of his culpability for his past actions in his admission that the gods ‘Should have ta’en vengeance on my faults’ (8), noting that also in other instances the gods permit some to ‘second ills with ills’ (14)—even though he avers that this may be in order to make them ultimately ‘dread ill, to the doers thrift’ (15). Giacomo, in turn, registers his as yet undiscovered—and unpunished—guilt as, now, for him increasingly a burden that unmans his condition and falsifies his achievements: The heaviness and guilt within my bosom Takes off my manhood…Knighthoods and honours borne As I wear mine are titles but of scorn. (V.ii.1–2, 6–7) And Posthumus, again, seeks death, in battle and then in prison, as adequate recompense for his as yet unpunished crime against Innogen and as ‘penitent instrument’ (V.iii.104) for relief from a ‘fettered’ conscience (102). Proposing that, as in the case of coins where, “Tween man and man they weigh not every stamp’,95 he argues, ‘[t]hough light, take pieces for the pictures sake’ (118–19), thus proffering conceit of the taking of the ‘coinage’ of his body and life, as adequate ‘audit’ (121) for his treatment of Innogen.96 We may come to the concern with accountability in the final scene of the play, again by recalling the Tswana sense that in conflict dispute and resolution, the ‘significance of rhetorical factors is very great’,97 as was the case in the hearing of the dispute between Molefe and Madubu, which I noted in the previous chapter: It is contingent on the Tswana concept of veracity, which derives from the assumption that social reality exists primarily in the manner in which it is
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Page 107 constructed…There is no concrete set of social facts ‘out there’ against which the truth value of words or propositions can readily be measured; veracity subsists, rather, in the extent to which events and interactions are persuasively construed and coherently interpreted. (238) In V.iv the king himself is consistently at the centre of the presentation of narratives admitting accountability for past misdemeanours and errors. He hears the tale of the queen’s confession and suicide. He insists on the accountability of the Romans to the kinsmen of those whom they have slain. Innogen demands explanations from both Giacomo and Pisanio. Giacomo acknowledges his own past culpability and seeks—in an attempt at reparation—some form of punishment. Posthumus’s angry response to Giacomo (209–27), which almost immediately turns on himself, most clearly exemplifies assumption of responsibility for one’s actions. Moreover, after Pisanio is vindicated, the princes assume responsibility for the death of Cloten. Belarius ends the sequence by confessing that he abducted the king’s sons. Such moves in the men, in this scene and earlier, towards acknowledgement of accountability, proposes a regenerated and conscientised masculinity which coincides with particularly patriarchal modes of recuperation which, as I noted at the outset of this chapter, critics discern for the play’s conclusion. At the same time, however, this process of recuperation remains, in the Tswana sense, qualified, juxtaposed against not only what has happened earlier but also, even in the final scene, against ongoing meditation about male volatility and unreliability Glimpses of the latent potential in men for violence recur, for instance, in the king’s initially uncompromising insistence that the Roman prisoners be executed, foregrounded by Lucius’s reminder that the ‘day/Was yours by accident’ and that ‘[h]ad it gone with us,/We should not, when the blood was cool, have threatened/Our prisoners with the sword’ (75–8), in the threat Cymbeline makes when demanding accountability from Giacomo: Give answer to this boy, and do it freely, Or by our greatness and the grace of it, Which is our honour, bitter torture shall Winnow the truth from falsehood. (131–14) and in the momentary brutality Posthumus displays in striking down the Innogen who rushes towards him which, although in many ways unwitting, is a reminder of the violence of which he too remains capable. Most significantly, such violence is also repeatedly meditated insofar as the king’s own accountability for these events is concerned. Consideration of the king’s response is repeatedly invited. The presence of all the main protagonists on stage during the delivery of these various narratives of confession facilitates and heightens the stress upon accountability since each is subject to the gaze of the others, and no misrepresentation will go unchallenged. In every case, the unfolding histories are elicited by or reported to the king, heard by everyone on stage within the ambit of his all-encompassing gaze, so that part of the dramatic engagement in this final scene concerns the effects of these various stories on that royal gaze itself. Giacomo’s narrative refers explicitly to the king’s culpability The ring he carries was
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Page 108 Leonatus’ jewel, Whom thou didst banish: and—which more may grieve thee, As it doth me,—a nobler sir ne’er lived ‘Twixt sky and ground. Wilt thou hear more, my lord? (143–6) Throughout his story Giacomo stresses those very moral qualities in Posthumus that the two gentlemen strenuously endeavour to capture in the first scene of the play, and which the king has so determinedly ignored. He also repeatedly reminds the king of his ‘paragon’ (147), his ‘chaste daughter’ (194), whom the king has also grievously misjudged. Belarius too, in his account to the king of his past, reiterates the unjust nature of the king’s treatment of him (335–7, 343– 6). However, there is no evidence that the king is willing to pursue this aspect of the narratives he hears. It is true that, learning of the queen’s deceptions, he imagines his daughter’s putatively critical gaze when he says, ‘That it was folly in me thou mayst say,/And prove it in thy feeling’ (67–8), but this perfunctory acknowledgement does not provoke in him any further self-reflection. On the contrary, he continually eschews personal responsibility He asseverates, on hearing of the deceptions and death of the queen, that ‘[s]he alone knew this’ (40); he reasons, ‘Who is’t can read a woman’ (48), and he asserts that: Mine eyes Were not in fault for she was beautiful, Mine ears that heard her flattery, nor my heart That thought her like her seeming. It had been vicious To have mistrusted her. (61–5) When he rejoices at the recovery of his daughter and his sons his brief exclamations, ‘The tune of Innogen!’ (239), ‘How now, my flesh, my child?/What, mak’st thou me a dullard in this act?/Wilt thou not speak to me?’ (264–6) and ‘My tears that fall/Prove holy water on thee; Innogen,/Thy mother’s dead’ (268–70) have also the effect of a seal of silence upon the history of his own behaviour that precedes these moments of recognition, even as, towards the end of the scene, he allocates blame again to his dead wife,‘she was naught; and ‘long of her it was/That we meet here so strangely’ (271–2). As Janet Adelman observes, the queen becomes the scapegoat for Cymbeline’s misjudgement and tyranny: her death magically restores what we are presumably supposed to think of as his original goodness at the same time that it restores his autonomy; her magical death in fact construes his new moral stature as his renewed authority.98 While this is indubitably true, the scene’s simultaneous regard for the need for male accountability and the contrast between those who speak their accountability to the king, and his own rather different destination in his repeated questioning and ‘long inter’gatories’ (V.iv.393) invite recognition of his elision of his own accountability, confirmed again in the harmonies his own gaze (in contrast to his blindness earlier in the play) now acknowledges in the gaze of others: ‘See/Posthumus anchors upon Innogen,/And she, like harmless lightning, throws her eye/On him, her brothers, me,
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Page 109 her master, hitting/Each object with a joy; the counterchange/Is severally in all’ (393–8). Earlier, he has already cast himself in the role of author: ‘O, what am I?/A mother to the birth of three!’ (369–70). But he, if anyone, is the ultimate author of all the misfortunes to which his children have been subject.99 In terms of this concern with narratives of accountability and the accountability of the king, I want also briefly to frame his responses by means of two further points about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Firstly it worked deliberately to achieve a sense of inclusivity. Testimony dealing with the conflicts and traumas of the past delivered by victims at the Truth Commission was mostly given with the support of and in the presence of their families and communities. Proceedings often had to be interrupted because of the difficulty of testifying, or the grief of victims in the presence of their families. This differs from, say, the testimony of Shoah survivors who are literally survivors, speaking in isolation, amidst frequently almost complete loss of family and community, often in ruptured language as they struggle with ‘events exceeding referential language’s ability to represent them’.100 Such instances of inclusivity, of emotional breakdown, or of linguistic rupture help us to recognise something of the very different constituency and parameters that apply in the far more fluent ‘truth’ narratives delivered in the climactic address of accountability that unfolds at the court of Cymbeline, and the vested (aristocratic) group solidarity they reflect, together with their import (barring the language of the king himself) as uninterrupted evocations of an idealised seventeenthcentury humanist enactment of attained linguistic transparency.101 Secondly, I want to glance at the comments of the mothers of two victims killed by policemen during the apartheid period, who each, in the context of this policy of inclusivity, attended the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) sessions at which the murderers of their sons spoke. They proffer contrasting views as to the provenance and effect of procedures of narrative accountability and the possibilities of redress and reconciliation. Firstly Cynthia Ngewu asserts that: This thing called reconciliation…if I am understanding it correctly…if it means this perpetrator, this man who has killed Christopher Piet, if it means he becomes human again, this man, so that I, so that all of us get our humanity back…then I agree, then I support it all.102 But another mother, Mrs Kondile, argues that: It is easy for Mandela and Tutu to forgive…they lead vindicated lives. In my life nothing, not a single thing has changed, since my son was burned by barbarians… nothing. Therefore I cannot forgive. (109) These two equally painful and moving comments raise profound questions. Cynthia Ngewu envisions, as a consequence of the true narrative of her son’s murder, the possibility of a ‘truth’ determined by a narrative of recovery of ‘humanity’ for ‘all of us’. But Mrs Kondile’s refusal to forgive insists on a more inclusive narrative that will identify and deal with the consequences of her son’s death, which have left her forever without him. Mahmoud Mamdani develops further such interrogation of the efficacy of the Commission by addressing more extensively the question of the material consequences
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Page 110 of wrongdoing.103 He points out that the Truth Commission was involved primarily with perpetrators, being state agents, on the one hand, and victims, being political activists, on the other. But he maintains that the violence of apartheid was at the same time aimed less at individuals than at entire communities. Despite this the TRC did not directly address facts such as that between 1960 and 1982 an estimated 3.5 million people were forcibly removed, their communities shattered, their families dispossessed and their livelihoods destroyed. For him, in its focus upon perpetrators and political activists, the TRC neglected to consider the relations between beneficiaries of the system and its (ordinary) victims. He cites the question that Hannah Arendt posed in relation to another crime against humanity, the Shoah, asking what happens when crime is legal, when criminals can enthusiastically enforce the law. Mamdani maintains that in its eagerness to reinforce the new order, the TRC created what he calls a diminished truth that wrote the vast majority of apartheid’s victims out of its version of history Such a disquieting sense of the extent to which the TRC has remained within the legal parameters set by the apartheid system, rather than questioning the legitimacy of those parameters, poses the further difficulty of establishment forms of compromise and settlement as well as the price that must be paid for this. As Steven Robins asks: What about the millions of ordinary black South Africans who suffered the more mundane, everyday aspects of apartheid and who, unlike the activists, were not singled out for ‘special treatment’ by the state? How will these ordinary people relate to official accounts of apartheid that focus on the experience of ANC activists and privilege specific sites of memory such as Robben Island?104 Such questions about the efficacy of narratives of accountability and the law itself as means of healing division and oppression offer a less comforting intersection with the proceedings of the court of Cymbeline. They connect rather than contrast with systemic paradoxes particular to procedures of monarchy, registered, say, in Francis Barker’s observation in the particular case of representation in Titus Andronicus, that, for such a political system, ‘even when violence is shown it is occluded’.105 Thus, so far as the ordinary soldiers and the ordinary people whom they represent are concerned,106 the choice to reaffirm the relationship between himself and Caesar, which the king articulates at the play’s conclusion, also renders partly equivocal the battle just fought as well as the deaths of those participating in it. Such soldiers are in part the cause of Posthumus’s anger against the lords’ cowardice and insensitivity inV.iii.53–76 and it is, moreover, they who are evoked by Posthumus’s very disguise as himself a common soldier. Even as he presents himself as authoritative harbinger, in the context of recent readings of the play, say, of an emergent British ‘ethnicity’ or ‘nation’, such, admittedly inevitable, systemic exclusions by the king, in his procedure, together with his indifference to his own culpability, strike a parallel chord in Sobol’s valorisation, on the one hand, of his versions of humanism in The Palestinian Girl and his indifference towards and intolerance of, on the other hand, those who, in multiple ways that ‘tolerance’, were it more absorbent, might include. In the court of Cymbeline, in the last moments of the play, when the king’s gaze turns from those of his subjects107 to the present and future history of his kingdom—in the context of the scene’s previous insistent focus upon narratives of accountability—meditation upon his narrative is most especially invited. Even though the king’s function at the beginning of the play is little more than that of a
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Page 111 mechanism derived from romance and fairy tale, his symbolic value in the final scenes as monarch (albeit a blind, weak and malleable one) obtains. Moreover, in contrast to what has gone before he is, in the last scene of the play the focal point of the dramatic action. His authority to execute his prisoners, to torture those who are disobedient and to arrest and execute rebels108 confirms what Benedict Anderson would call a ‘divinelyordained, hierarchical dynastic realm’.109 But his simultaneous disregard of his own accountability, both personal and, perhaps more inevitably, systemic, provides stark confirmation of the limits that attach to royal reconciliation. As in the cases of Giacomo and Posthumus before him in the play his mode of speaking in the final act suggests, as Lynn Enterline has it, ‘the simultaneously productive and aberrant effects of rhetoric… language conceived not merely as a representation of the world but as a mode of action in the world’. That authority, especially, that appears recuperative by the end of Act V is characterised, simultaneously, by use of rhetoric indelibly self-admiring.
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Page 112 7 The Winter’s Tale ‘Let no man mock me’ I want to bring into this consideration of ways in which local knowledges may additionally aid the reading of the Shakespeare text, the phenomenon of cinema, not as a mode of Shakespeare adaptation, subtext or intertextual play,1 but —if cinema is arguably the major art form of the twentieth century and beyond—as instance of a present-day form of (aesthetic) ontological engagement. What opportunities for framing or intersection might contemporary films, that engage with concerns discernible in Shakespeare, offer? Both The Winter’s Tale and Pedro Almodóvar’s All About My Mother are engaged with maternity and pregnancy, with the facts, in this context, of human loss as well as joy that issue in the course of time. If, as Barbara Hodgdon has it, ‘[t]heatre, performance and cinema all respond to a psychic need to rehearse for loss, invite us to reassess our relations to grief and mourning’,2 how do the very similar concerns of the present-day film, or other aspects of its late twentieth-century location of concern, intersect with what may be discovered in Shakespeare’s play? Both works are, concomitantly, also sporadically engaged with masculinities of the kind I have so far been tracing. Unease about masculinity reaches a particular intensity in The Winter’s Tale, for the play contemplates, in the first three acts, the implications of the danger of, particularly, male unruliness in governance, in family, and in subjectivity, in the body of the king himself. Its remaining acts seek recuperation from what it confronts in its first half, but at the same time meditatively, in the Tswana sense processually. All About My Mother probes ways in which the dominant binaries of heteronormative patriarchy may be unsettled, will always be, in the lived-in detail of existing relations that lie beyond language, exceeded. The film, in its recognition of the proximations and heterogeneities that destabilise patriarchy’s boundaries, provides an important present-day instance, which intersects, in turn, with The Winter’s Tale, of struggle to move beyond the symbolic violence of binaric modes, glimpsing, instead, a possibility of less confrontationist, less discriminatory and less persecutory conceptualisations of the complexities of human subjectivity or interaction. In their meditation on the masculine, both works invite specific attention to, particularly, the male gaze itself. In The Winter’s Tale, the pregnant Hermione, accompanied by her ladies or defended by her friend, Paulina, is, in the first three acts, surrounded predominantly by, and gazed at by men: her husband, his best friend, the other men of Leontes’ court. The fourth act presents the gazes of various
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Page 113 men at Perdita. And the final act contemplates the father’s gaze at his wife, mother of their two children, one now dead. In All About My Mother, the stories of Manuela and the son whom she loses, of the pregnant nun Rosa, together with the various women with whom they come into contact, and, less frequently, of the men who intersect with their lives, meditate the meanings of motherhood. But it is Almodóvar’s gaze that nevertheless animates all of them. How then do Leontes and the other men of The Winter’s Tale, and how does Shakespeare in his play, as well as Almodóvar in his film, animate the women they present? I ask this partly in the context of Lynn Enterline’s recent argument as to the traditionally masculinist aesthetic practice whereby males attempt by way of various artistic languages to ‘animate’ women, a pattern that evokes and is often influenced by the story of Pygmalion’s attempt to animate his statue in Ovid.3 ‘[B]etween Pygmalion and womankind,’ argues Enterline, falls ‘a simulacrum’ (6), that is, the work of art, in literary endeavour or, indeed, to push this a little, in utterance itself the (misogynist) rhetoric that is chosen by men in order to give to ‘womankind’ the illusion of presence. What then, particularly, do both works, in turn, also suggest about the male gaze? How does the lived-in detail, in the Tswana sense, of The Winter’s Tale as well as All About My Mother glimpse those unrulinesses, hybridities and proximities which might be said to lie beyond what these gazes reflect, sometimes seek, or alternatively, prefer to elide? 1. Dost think I am so muddy, so unsettled The Winter’s Tale is, of course, famously concerned to present the destructivity of Leontes’ gaze in the first three acts, but his pathology is rarely related to the more general meditation upon an equivocal masculinity that processually punctuates all of the late plays. In this and particularly the next section of this chapter, I want to consider the play’s reservations about the male gaze as this may be perceived especially through the aspect of male speaking, in the context of seventeenth-century humanist validation of rhetoric and its conceptualisation of rhetoric as indicative of, and ‘confirmation’ of ‘superior’ male cognitive or intellectual faculty. Janet Adelman argues that Leontes’ early and instant jealousy ‘erupts out of nowhere’ and that ‘Shakespeare has deliberately left its expression fragmentary and incoherent, the better to engage us in its processes’.4 Several layers of dysfunction accentuate his sudden outburst: Too hot, too hot! To mingle friendship far is mingling bloods. I have tremor cordis on me: my heart dances, But not for joy, not joy. (I.ii.107–10)5 Turning Hermione’s persuasive power with Polixenes into, as Lynn Enterline has it, an erotic one,6 Leontes construes excess of heat in the friendship he watches, an imbalance in the interaction of both woman and man that leads him immediately to the explicitly coital spec