Living with God. Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and Life after Death (Thomas Instituut Utrecht)

CARLOLEGET Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht New Series, Volume V

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eVING WITH GOI2.J

Editorial Board

THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LIFE ON EARTH AND 'LIFE' AFTER DEATH

Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis (Catholic University, Nijmegen) Prof. dr. K.-W. Merks (Tilburg Faculty of Theology) Prof. dr. H.W.M. Rikhof (Catholic Theological University at Utrecht) Dr. R.A. te Velde (Tilburg Faculty of Theology)

Managing Editor Dr. H.J.M. Schoot (Thomas Instituut, Utrecht)

Previously published in this Series: Vol. I Vol. II Vol. ill Vol. IV

Henk J.M. Schoot, Christ the 'Name' of God: Thomas Aquinas on Naming Christ, 1993 Jan G-J. van den Eijnden ofm, Poverty on the Way to God: Thomas Aquinas on Evangelical Poverty, 1994 Henk J.M. Schoot (ed.), Tibi soli peccavi: Thomas Aquinas on Guilt and Forgiveness, 1996 Harm J.M.J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will, 1996

PEETERS © Stichting Thornasfonds - Nijrnegen ISBN 90-6831-966-3 D.1997/0602n5

LEUVEN

1997

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction . . . • . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Conventions . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • ..

1 4

CHAPTER!

IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE PERSPECTIVE: AQun-jAS ON GOD AND LIFE

To Mieke,

1. S~int Thomas Aquinas ............................. " 1.1 The incomprehensible God as the core of theology ....... 1.2 God's revelation as the source of theology. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.3 The unity of theological science •..........•.......•. 2. God, life and death ..........•...................... 2.1 The meaning and use of the words 'life' and 'death' ......• 2.2 'Life' as a name for God's essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2.2.1 Summa Theologiae I 18.1-3 .................... 2.2.1.1 God's essence: the metaphysical order ..•.. 2.2.1.2 God's essence: the logical order .......... 2.2.2 Summa Theologiae I 18.3-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 2.2.3 The life of God and the life of man . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 2.3 Divine life and the divine Persons . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . •. 2.3.1 Distinguishing the divine Persons ....• ,......... 2.3.2 The divine Persons and life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3. The relation between life on earth and 'life' after death ....... 3.1 Rephrasing the question .............. . . . . . . . . . . .. 3.2 The framework of this study ....................•..

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nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae quam convivere amico (SIb TI-TI 25.3.co)

8 8 9 13 17 20 20 25 25 30 35 41 46 48 49 54 61 62 63

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE WITH GOD This publication is published with the financial

support of (a.o.) the

Stichting Thomasfonds, the Radboudstichting, the J.E. Jurriaanse Stichting and the Catholic Theological University at Utrecht.

1""uNiV£rAim ."1

67

1. The human condition and the tradition of living with God. . . •. 68 1.1 Creation and the place of man ...................... 68 1.2 Death as evil: the separation of body and soul . . . . . . . . . .• 77 1.3 Death as punishment: Original Sin and its effects . . . . . . . .. 82

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.3.1 The harmony in the state of integrity .•.......... 83 1.3.2 Original Sin and the meaning of death .. • . • . . . . . .. 88 1.3.3 The human condition, evil and punishment ......... 91 2. Christ, revelation of God and source of grace .............. 95 2.1 Life, death and the (first) coming of Christ ..........•.. 96 2.2 Christ as veiled revelation of God .................... 104 2.3 The suffering and dying of Christ: revelation and grace .... 109 2.3.1 The passion and death of Christ as restoration of a relationship ................................ 110 2.3.2 The passion and death of Christ as example ........ 119 2.4 The resurrection of Christ and the perspective of life .. ; • . . 121 3. The participation in the work of Christ through the sacraments . 125 3.1 The partial sharing in the fruits of Christ'S passion .•..... 126 3.2 The effectuating .and disclosing power of the sacraments . . . . 130 3.3 The sacraments as foundation and framework of life with God132

CHAPTERll

DYNAMISM OF LIFE WITH GOD

141

1. Living with God and acting as a human being .............. 141 1.1 The moral order and practical science ................. 142 1.2 God, happiness and the ultimate end of human life ....... 145 1.3 The virtues and life with God ........•............. 150 2. The augmentation of grace and the attitude towards one's own death ....•.•.................................... 155 2.1 Theological virtUes and their augmentation ............. 156 2.2 De ordine caritatis: charity and the hierarchy of objects .... 167 2.3 The Evangelical Counsels ..................•....... 171 2.4 Manyrdom ........•.......•............. ; . . . . . 176 3. Living with God and dealing with life and death ............ 180 3.1 The social order and killing people ......•............ 181 3.1.1 Killing guilty people ....•.................... 183 3.1.2 Killing heretics •..•..•...................... 188 3.1.3 Killing innocent people .........•............. 192 3.1.4 Killing and Christian perfection ................. 194 3.1.5 Killing oneself ...•......................... 198 3.2 God and homicide ............•.....•.•.....•.... 202

CHAPTER IV

PERFECTION OF LIFE WIlli GOD

207

1. The nature of the reflection on the consummated life with God . 207 1.1 Eternal life •...............•.........•.......... 208 1.2 Ultimate end ................................... 209 1.2.1 The order of execution .........•......•••.... 210 1.2.2 The order of intention ...................•... 212 1.3 God's glorifying work: the tract of ~schatology .......... 213 2. Living with God in the mode of perfection .••......••..... 217 2.1 Eternal life .........................•.......... 217 2.1.1 The glorified ,soul ........................... 217 2.1.2 The glorified body ........................•. 225 2.1.3 The glorified creation .............••......... 230 232 2.2 Eternal death ......•...................•....... 2.2.1 The 'logic' of hell ..... : ..............•...... 233 2.2.2 The limits of reflection .....................•. 238 3. The impact of eternal life on ~arthly l.ife .•................ 244 3 1 Eternal life as consummation of life of grace ............ 244 3:2 The communication between the living and the dead ...•.. 247 CHAPTER v

CONCLUDING OUR STUDY: LIVING WIlli GOD AS MEANING OF LIFE

254

1. The meaning oflife ............ , .......•......•..... 255 1.1 Life and ends ..............•......•.......•.... 257 1.2 Life and signification ........................•.... 259 1.3 Living with God as meaning of life ................... ;~; 2. The' meaning' of death .•.....•...................•.. .....••. 269 ·.I AppendIX ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Appendix II ........................................ 272 Bibliography ....•.......................•........... 275 Indices .•..•..•...........•.•....................•. 290

INTRODUCTION From its very beginning human life, in its inexhaustible beauty and riches, is accompanied by the dreadful perspective of death. We know that one day all of us will die; we know that one day we will be separated from our beloved ones - insofar as this is not already the case; we know that we cannot pass on life to our children without, at one and the same time, condemning them to the same fate. This inescapable cruelty makes us players in a tragedy from the moment we are born. In the Christian traqition the evil of death is interpreted from the perspective of the 'Good News'. In Holy Scripture we are told about the Living God, who is a God of Life, wanting us to live and be happy. We are told about God The Father, Son and Holy Spirit, working in history and revealing Himself in order to communicate life, Eternal Life. We are told about the Son Incarnate, Jesus Christ, who lived among us and gave His life for the sake of our well-being. We are told that Christ resurrected from the dead in order to enjoy a blessed life eternally and that we may hope to share this Eternal Life. Nevertheless, the perspective of death remains a daily reality. The many ways in which Death shows its horrible face display a cruelty one never becomes inured to; a cruelty which raises serious questions for the believer who searches for the understanding of his or her faith. One of the most widespread of these is the question as to how God's goodness is compatible with all the suffering in the world - since the 17th century known as the problem of theodicee. Closely related to this, though deliberately put in different terms, is the question which is central to this study. Given the suffering entailed in human life on earth; given the promise of Eternal Life; and given the insights that both are related to God, the question is: what is this all good for? If we are created for happiness in Eternal Life, what is the sense of this earthly mixture of happiness and misery? Why the cruelty and the pain? Why earthly life anyway? In other words: what is the meaning of human life and how does it relate to the promise of another 'life' after death? In order to deal with this last question, the work of one of the great Teachers of the Church: Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) has been studied. Special attention is paid to the way he approaches the matter at hand; the perspective he adopts when dealing with life and death in relation to the incomprehensible triune God. To a large extent this specific interest is due to the context within which this study was written: the research group 'Thomas Aquinas' of the Catholic

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Theological University at Utrecht. By this group special consideration is given to the profound theological character of the work of the Angelic Doctor and his attention for the use of language, in particular in divinis.' In the first chapter both the appropriateness of the theological perspective and what I wish to accentuate will be indicated. Considering the secondary literature on Aquinas' view on life and death, this study makes a contribution as regards both its central question and the broadness by which the matter is approached. Until our day the only monograph on life in Aquinas' theology dates from more than seventy years ago'; there is no book exclusively dedicated to Aquinas' view on death. As far as the various articles are concerned which have been written on Aquinas' account of life and death: they all approach the subject from limited viewpoints and are restricted to certain aspects.' In the study at hand the attempt is made to integrate the'various viewpoints and bring the different aspects with regard to Aquinas' view on life and death into relation with one another. This task could only be set to right from a particular (theological) perspective and within certain limits. The limits of this study are due to the fact that 'life' is a key-word in Aquinas' theology. For this reason it was clear from the outset, that selections had to be made, lest this study would end in recovering and rephrasing Aquinas' entire theology from the perspective of the concept 'life'. At the same time, however, it was also clear from the very fact that 'life' is a key-word that the whole of Aquinas' theology had to be taken into account so that none of its overtones would be missed. It was apparent that this is of special importance because of the variety of notintegrated perspectives of study mentioned before and the fact that an

answer to the central question cannot be found in one of the tracts of Thomas' theology when considered separately. Thus the choice was made to concentrate on the systematic coherence of Aquinas' account of life and death from an explicitly theological perspective. As a consequence certain limits and characteristic features were entailed: * Since not every reader will be at home in Aquinas' entire systematic theology, each chapter opens with an introduction into the specific field at issue, written from the perspective of t\le key-word 'life'. * In order to safeguard systematic coherence and clarity, the various discussions on details in tracts of Aquinas' theology are not exhaustively listed add scrutinized. They are treated only insofar as they directly concern our central theme. * For the same reason this study is less explicitly focused on historical and doctrinal discussions in which Aquinas was involved, or developments in his thinking. As point of departure the Summa· 1beologiae is taken, accompanied by other works from the last years of Aquinas' life.

, ,

This group includes the following authors quoted in this study: J. van den Eijnden, H. Goris, F. de Grijs, H. Rikhof, H. Schoot, W. Valkenberg, F. Vosman and J. Wissink. For a short characterisation and determination of the position of this approach in the 'landscape' of research on Aquinas, cf. H. Rikhof, 1995[a]. M. Grabmann, 1922. On death, cf. A- lippi, 1965 and 1966; A- Pegis, 1974; T. Janez Barrio, 1978; M. Rousseau, 1978 and 1979; B. de Margerie, 1983; L. Dewan, 1988j A. Zimmermann, 1992; The most comprehensive are the studies of L.F. Mateo-Seeo, 1974, 1975, 1978,

1982[a] and [b], who, however, is never quoted (whieh is probably due to the fact that he writes in Spanish). On Aquinas and life, the only articles I found are those of G. Kreiing, 1928 and I. Yarza, 1987. Apan from these StUdies, which explicitly deal with life and death, a lot of material can be found in Studies on Aquinas' anthropology, esehatology, Christology and other tracts and themes.

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Having presented the limits and characteristic features of this study, I cannot but express the hope that the book may be helpful as a guide to the texts of Aquinas himself and - via these texts - to Holy Scripture and to the One who was the centre of his life. This study was completed on March 7, 1997.

CONVENTIONS

CONVENTIONS

De virt card Quodl

Works of Thomas Aquinas The classification and enumeration is based on the brief catalogue of authentic works of J. Weisheipl, 1974, p. 355-405. In brackets the supposed year(s) of writing are indicated, following Weisheipl. After the year of writing, the edition used is mentioned. If available, the edition of the Commissio Leonina, S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XlII P.M edita, Romae 1882-, is used. If not, the text is adopted from R. Busa, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia ut sunt in Indice Thomistico, (Indicis Thomistici Supplementum), Stuttgart/ Bad Cannstatt 1980, apart from Aquinas' commentary on the Sentences (see below). Leonina is the standard edition and still incomplete. Busa has the advantage of being a complete edition, to be consulted in print or on CD-Rom. For the sake of clarity the spelling of all editions is made uniform, following Busa. Theological syntheses In Sent Scriptum super libras Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi (1252-1256), ed. P. Mandonnet (vol. 1 - 2, Paris 1929) and M.F. Moos (vol. 3 - 4.22, Paris 1933, 1947); the rest of vol. 4 according to Busa. ScG Summa contra gentiles (1259-1264), Leonina. The second Arabic number (in Latin quotes sometimes in between brackets) refers to the paragraph as indicated in Busa. STh Summa Theologiae (1266-1273), Leonina. Academic disputations Quaestiones disputatae De veritate (1256-1259), Leonina. De ver De pot Quaestiones disputatae De potentia (1265-1266), Busa. De malo Quaestiones disputatae De malo (1266-1267), Leonina. QD De anima Quaestio disputata De anima (1269), Busa. De virt Quaestio disputata De virtutibus in communi (1269-1272), Busa [18.1]. De car Quaestio disputata De caritate (1269-1272), Busa [18.2]. De corr Quaestio disputata De correctione fraterna (1269-1272), Busa [18.3] Despe Quaestio disputata De spe (1269-1272), Busa [18.4].

5

Quaestio disputata De virtutibus cardinalibus (1269-1272), Busa [18.5]. Quaestiones quodlibetales (7 to 11: 1256-1259, the rest: 1269-1272), Busa.

Expositions of Holy Scripture bcpositio in Job ad litteram (1261-1264), Leonina. In Job In Psalm Postilla super Psalmos (1272-1273), Busa. Catena Glossa continua super Evangelia {Catena Aurea} (12621267), Busa. Lectura 'super Matthaeum. Reportatio (1256-1259), Busa. In Mat Lectura super Johannem. Reportatio (1269-1272), Busa. In Joan Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos (1270-1272?), Busa. In Rom Lectura super Epistolam I ad Corinthios (1259-1265?), In I Cor Busa. Leetura super Epistolam II ad Corinthios. Reportatio (1259In II Cor 1265?), Busa. Leetura super Epistolam ad Hebraeos. Reportatio (1259InHeb 1265?), Busa. Expositions on Aristotle In De anima Sententia super De anima (1269-1270), Leonina. In Eth Sententia libri Ethieorum (1271), Leonina. Sententia super Metaphysicam (1269-1272), Busa. In Met Other expositions In De Trin Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate (1258-1259), Leonina.

In Div Nom In De causis

Expositio super Dionysium De divinis nominibus (12651267), Busa. Expositio super librum De causis (1271-1272), Busa.

Other writings De per! De perfectione spiritualis vitae (1269-1270), Leonina. CImp Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionum (1256), Leonina. Compendium Theologiae (1269-1273), Leonina. CompTh De substantiis separatis (1271-1273), Leonina. De sub De reg princ De regno (or De regimine principum) ad regem Cypri (1265-1267), Leonina,

6

CONVENTIONS

Deform De art In Orat In duo praec In Symb

CONVENTIONS

De fonna absolutionis sacramentalis ad generalem magistrum Ordinis (1269), Leonina_ De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis (1261-1265), Busa_ Collationes super Pater Noster (1273), BU,sa. Collationes de Decem Praeceptis (or De duobus praeceptis caritatis et decem legis praeceptis) (1273), Busa. Collationes super Credo in Deum (1273), Busa.

All abbreviations, even those in the Latin texts quoted, are following the

,j

New Jerusalem B i b l e : ! Co Col Dt Ep Ex Ezk

Ga Gn Hab Heb Is

Jb Jm Jn K

Corinthians Colossians Deuteronomy Ephesians Exodus Ezekiel Galatians Genesis Habakkuk Hebrews Isaiah Job James John (lJn= 1" letter) Kings

Lk Lv Ml Mt P Ph Ps Rm Rv Sg Si Th Tt Ws

Luke Leviticus Malachi Matthew Peter Philippians Psalms Romans Revelation to John Song of Songs Ben SiralEcclesiasticus Thessalonians Titus Wisdom

Other conventions Patrologia cursus completus, series latina, J.-P. Migne (ed),

DH

Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et marum, H. Denzinger/P. Hiinermann, Freiburg i. Br'!Basei/RomalWien 1991".

Paris 1844-1890.

[1 [Busa:

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ij,

li

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il >J

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i !j

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~

~ " ;1 "J "

'II '"

PL

1

Word(s) or numbers added by me for the sake of clarity. Number of a line according to the Busa edition.

ag sc co ra prol

q.

Quaestio

a.

Abbreviations of Biblical books

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ii

I

1

Number of a line according to the Leonina edition. Article Objection Counter-argument Response Answer to an objection Prologue

(Leon:

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CHAPTER!

9

CHAPTER I

IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRlATE PERSPECTIVE: . AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE In this chapter we will establish the foundations on which the rest of this book is based. Firstly, our interpretation of Thomas Aquinas is sketched (1). This may be helpful in locating our approach from within the variety of interpretations the work of Aquinas has witnessed since th~ thirteenth century. Having done this, a first investigation in the field thiS stU?y covers ~ollows (2). Our aim is to find an appropriate perspective from which the theological question of the relation between life .on earth and 'life' ~er de.ath can be dealt with. Once this perspective IS settled, our question wdl be rephrased in terms of the concepts that are relevant for Aquinas and a framework is proposed within which the various aspects of the question can be examined (3).

1. Saint Thomas Aquinas The .impact o~ Tho~as Aquinas on the tradition of Western theology and phllo~ophy IS coOS/derable. The Saint (since 1323), Teacher· of the Church (since 15~7) and Patron of all Roman Catholic schools (since 18~0) has been Interpreted, followed and criticized by all kinds of thinkers over the past 700 years. During the first centuries after his death his wor~s were used as manuals for students of theology, from the 19th century till only a few decades ago his teaching was the inspiration for the N eo-Thomist!c manuals and moreover, he still challenges the t~oughts of many, ~ IS shown by the hundreds of papers and studies on him tha; are pu~l~shed every year'. The doctor communis is 'public p;operty and writing about hiS theology one will almost inevitably dlscov~r oneself to be one in a long line of interpreters. This study is no exceptIOn. The interpretation of Aquinas presented here IS a theological one.

Cf. the Bulletin Thomi". (1940-1965), continued in lWsegna di letteralura Tomistica (1966- ).

The portrait which inspired our investigation is not that of the thinker who wrote the definitive "tourist guide to the highways and byways of divinity".' It is the portrait of a Dominican Mendicant Friar whose theological activities should be seen within the framework of his life dedicated to God.' The relationship with the triune God was the centre of Aquinas' life of prayer and study and this is reflected in his theology. How this influences the perspective from which the questions concerning God, life and death are asked, will become clear as we proceed by sketching the features of Aquinas' theology.' 1.1 The incomprehensihle God as the core of theology Theology for Aquinas is what the word already says: God-talk, sermo de Deo.' More precisely: theology is about God and everything else insofar as it is related to God.' The same ardour we perceive in Aquinas' tracing every possible question in theology back to its relation with God, can, however, be observed in his allegiance to a second principle: the fundamental impossibility of knowing, in this mortal life, what God is. This sounds strange for a theologian who is famous for his penetrating philosophical reflections and systematic rigour. To what degree is Aquinas clinging to this principle? How can he proceed as a theologian on this basis? What kind of incomprehensibility is at stake here?'

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B. Davies, 1992, p. 193. Friar Thomas d'Aquino J. Weisheipl significantly entitled his biographical staitdard work. The works of Thomas Aquinas cover a period of two decades of writing (1252·1274). This study does not concentrate on doctrmal developments in his teaching, although imponant shifts will be reponed when relevant. Point of depanure is the Summa Theologiae, taken as his most original, mature and extended systematical work. STh I 1.7.sc: Olud est subiectum scientiae. de quo est sermo in scientia. Sed in hac scientia fit sermo de Dea; dicitur enim theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo Deus est subiectum huius scientiae. STh I 1.7.co: Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra'doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt . ipse Deus,' vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad primipium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus 'Om sit subiectum huius scientiae. Quod etiam manifestum sit ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli,fidei, quae est de Deo. Cf. also STh I 1.3.ral: sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex aequo, sed de Deo principaliter, et de creatu:ris secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem. Cf. 1. Oeing-Hanhoff, 1974; W. Hoye, 1988, with suggestions for more literature on the subject.

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AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER I

In the first place, it is imponant to see that the incomprehensibility of God. refers to knowledge of God which creatures have. It is not a property of God as such, but a feature which should be considered within the relation of God and creature. God quoad se is supremely knowable, incomprehensibility is at stake only quoad nos.' In the second place, one should notice that the awareness of this incomprehensibility is considered as the highest and most perfect knowledge of God a creature can obtain.' Thus a number of possible misinterpretations are ruled out. Aquinas' sayings are not the dramatic result of a failed effort; they are not an obligatory pious remark before the real reflections start; they should not be interpreted within the context of a measure of secularisation in which God has 'evaporated' after an ongoing process of criticism of and distrust in the possibility of human reason", neither is it the result of a fundamental option for agnosticism. In the third place, it should be kept in mind that God's incomprehensibility is not nullified by grace: revelation intensifies rather than softens the incomprehensibility." The supreme knowledge of God's nature attainable in this life has the character of a learned ignorance (docta ignorantia): the more perfect we know God in this life, the more we understand how He surpasses all that can be comprehended by the created intellect. This 'ignorance' remains, no matter how much we are joined with Him by grace (quasi ignoto coniungamur). And still we can learn to know Him more fully as we learn to appreciate more how everything is connected with God and how things can be attributed to

Him which can only be known by divine revelation." The reason for underscoring the incomprehensibility of God follows from Aquinas' account of God as a free Creator. This account is based on the revelation of Scripture where God has made Himself known as the One who is the first cause and the final end of creation. As such God cannot be a part of creation. This means that He cannot be adequately thought of in terms of distinctions that can be made within the created world. Thus the distinction between Creator and creatures becomes more fundamental and of a different nature than all other possible distinctions betwee? creatures: "God differs. differently"." . Since the incomprehensIble God IS no deus OtlOSUS, but the trlUne God who ultimately founds, sustains and perfects the dynamism of .all creation up to the achievements of human reason, one of the major tasks of theology is to respect God's otherness during the process of clarifying God's concern with the world. Aquinas found a way of respecting God's incomprehensibility by placing major attention on the deficiency of our language in representing what God is. Even the most sophisticated philosophical distinctions, in his view, s?f~er f:om a mode of signifying which is apt for creatures only. The dIstInctIOn between God and creature can be expre seer at best by showing how and why our language fails to represe God." Aquinas' God-talk has a .radical negative strain: it is deep marked by a respect for God's Incomprehensibility."

10

12

•

Aquinas compares the rdation betWeen the human mind and God with a bat blinded by the light of the sun: S7b I.12.1.co: dieendum quod, cum un~ue sit cognoscibi/e secundum 'ql«Xi est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixlione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime

cognoscibile in se, aiieui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intel/igibilis supra intellectum, skut soi, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum luminis. Cf. also S7b I 2.1. , This statement is made by Aquinas throughout his works: Cf. S7b II-II 87 .CO: elSi non videamm de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid non est, et tanto in hac vita Deum perfoctius cognoscimus quanta magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu com· prehenditur; De pot 7.S.rat4: iIlud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod seiat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, iI/ud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo intelligimus, excedere; Cf. also In De Trin 1.2.ra1; seC I 30.5; ScG ill 49.8; In De causis 6; De 'VeT 2.1.ra9. " J. WLSSink, 1992, p. 46-48 and 1994, p. 32-33. " W. Hoye, 1988, p. 121-122.

I

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5Th I 12.13.ral: licet p reve1ationem gratiae in hac vita non cogtWscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quaSi igoo coniungamur; tamen plenius ipsum cognoscinuls, inquantum plures et excellentiores ectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua attribui· mus ex revelatione div' dt/ quae ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 2 2. The distinction between God and creation as a fundamental

insight determiniug uinas' procedure has been stressed by J. Pieper, 1953. Recendy it has been Iy expouuded by R. Sokolowski, 1982, whose book has been a great inspiratio for this study. Cf. also 2.2.1.1 in this chapter, p. 30ff. ,. In this respect I am uch debted to the interpretation of Aquinas proposed by D. Burrell, 1979 and 198 . What Burrell works out with regard to God's essence is adopted and applied the manner in which God actS by K. Tanner, 1988 and M. Dodds, 1993. The sam is worked out with regard to Aquinas' Christology by H. Schoot, 1993. . " Cf. F. de Grijs, 1988, . 35: "The incomprehensibility of the living God should, therefore, not be underst od as one of God's many attributes or propenies. Rather

when speaking of God's comprehensibility one gives a characteristic feature of all attributes and thus of all od-talk." [translation c.!..] Cf. also K. Rahner, 1974, p.

CHAPTER I

AQUlNAS ON GOD AND LIFE

thus, with regard to our knowledge of God two aspects are to be ',"owledged simultaneously. On the one hand God is sought in and aC"'·. . d (but not comprehended) by the be10nd creatIon, He can be recogruze pings He effects", He can be the object of one's devotion and - as in ~quinas' case - the centre of one's life. Being capax Deiv, man is desigd to know and love God as we will see in the next chapter. On the peper hand, the triune God remains the incomprehensible God the ~dden One: The. combin~ti?n of ~hese two aspects is characteristic of Ipe process I~ which m~ IS Increasl~gly united with the incomprehensible God. T~'s process IS so c~ntral In Aquinas' theology that he uses it characterISe the mortal hfe of human beings. Our life with the ~ocOJIlprehensible God is a life on the way, in via, never reaching its '~ al destination as long as we live. The life in via is a restless life IIIided by the perspectlve 'h t at Go d may be seen as He is, according to' fr;e promise of lJn 3,2: Videbimus eum sicuti est and leo 13,12: Videmus

f

13

nunc in speculum et in aenigmate; tunc autem focie ad faciem. 18 This vision of God is like a home-coming (in pat:ria): a beatific vision that fulfills all our desires. Nevertheless, even then God will not be known insofar as He is knowable. Even the visio beata does not entail that we will be able to 'comprehend' God, in the sense of grasping God's essence intellectually." Getting to know the incomprehensible God takes a lifetime and concerns all the intellectual capacities we have, both volitional and cognitive. It transforms these capacities and changes our view on reality. It even changes our approach to reality and our appreciation of the different kinds of knowledge we can obtain. Theology is also a form of knowledge. Therefore, what impact the principle of God's incomprehensibility has on Aquinas' account of theology, is the subject of the next paragraph.

1.2 God's revelation as the source of theology

----

43 and 1975, p. 306·319. , STh I 12.12.00: Respondeo dicendum quod natura/is nostra cognitio a sensu principium 1 stpnit, unde tantum se nostra natura/is cognitio exiendere potest, inquantum manuduci pteSt per sensibilia: .Ex sensibil~bus a~tem non potest usque ad hoc intel/eetus noster ptingere, quod dZ'fJmam essentzam videat, qu~ .c:eaturae s~~ibiles sunt eJfoctus Dei (ljrmtem causa: non adaequantes. Und~ ex senstbiltum cogmtume non potest tota Dei llirtus cogoosct, et per consequens nee euts essentia videri. Sed quia sunt eius efJectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perdue; POssumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est, et ut cognoscamus de ipso ~ quae neeesse est ei eonvenire secundum quod est prima o~nium c~ excedem O~~ltt sua ~ausata. Unde cognoseimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad (ftdturd!' quod s~~et omntum est edUSt;· et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso. quod scilicet non est alzquid eorum quae ab eo causantur,' et quod haec non reJnOventur ab eo prop~er eOO defectum, sed qu~ superexeedit. . 17 j\.qutnaS adopts the ex?~on froa; Augustme's XIV De Trinitate 8 [pL 42,1044]; eo ip!O quod focta est ad ,:",:~",em Det, .'~pax est Dei per gratiam. Cf. 5Th I·II 113.10.co 3l1d S'lb m.4.1:~: ~unilltud~ l11l4gmlS att~nditur in natura humana secundum quod est capax Det, scilKet IpSum attmgendo propna operatione eognitionis et amoris. Cf. also S'fh . ~ .23.1.00: Deus IlUtem est in/inita.e. bonitatis. ex qua contingit quod ad par&telpatronem bonoru:n su:u crea~as admutlt et praecipue rationales creaturas, quae, i"quantum ~u~t .ad ~gmem .Del jactae. sunt capaces beatitudinis divinae. Quae quit/em, COnslStlt In f:t!itrone. Det, p~ quam etiam ipse Deus beatus est et per seipsum Jives, mquant«m s'.ilKet selpSO Jruttur. On the history of the capacitas Dei in the theo10!lY of AugustIlle and Peter Lombard as well as the reception by Aquinas, d. F. de Gn~, 1967, p. 222·252 (the capacrty for God, grounded in the belief that man is created after God's image, is a key·word in this study on the image of God in In

sent).

The impact of God's incomprehensibility on Aquinas' account of theology becomes apparent as soon as we begin to examine the word he chooses for what we call theology. In the first question of the Summa Tbeologiae, Thomas asks "whether another doctrine is required apart from philosophical studies".'o The necessity for such a doctrine is evident, for man is directed at the incomprehensible God as his ultimate destination. This final end of man should be known by him so he can direct his intentions and actions towards this end.21 With the help of

18

19

20

"

Both verses play an imponant role in Aquinas' reflection on the perspective of life, and are often quoted in 5Th I 12. We will come back to this in chapter N, p. 217f!. In 5Th I 12.7.ral Aquinas points out that the word comprehernio may be used in two ways: Uno modo. striete et proprie. secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendenIe. Et sic nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nee intellectu nee aliquo alia, quia, cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid /initum eum infinite capiat, skut ipse infinite est. Et sic de comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Cf. also STh I·n 4.3.ral and 5cG m 55. 5Th I 1.1: Utrum sit necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haber;. 5Th I 1.1.co: Resporuleo dicendum quod necessarium foi' ad humanam salurem, esse doctrinam quandam secundum reveiatronem divinam, praeter philosophicas discipfinas. quae ratione humana investigantur. Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum skut ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit. secundum ii/tid Js 64,4: "Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praepariasti diligentibus te." Finem autem

CHAPTER I

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

natural reason, cultivated and brought to perfection in the philosophical disciplines, some truth about God may be found, but only by a few thinkers and after a long time, mixed with a multitude of errors. For the sake of the welfare of man, which is dependent on this knowledge of God, another kind of knowledge is needed, in which God Himself teaches the truth. So by divine revelation man is more appropriately and securely brought to his own destination." This doctrine, based on divine revelation, is called a sacred doctrine. Aquinas discerns sacra doctrina from theologia. The latter can be the name of the philosophical procedure which is aimed at the knowledge of God insofar as this can be obtained by the light of natural reason. But it can also be the name of a part of the sacred doctrine." 1beologia in the second meaning can be compared with what we understand by theology nowadays. Because of its relation with sacra doctrina, it is, however, important to take a closer look at both concepts and the connection between them.24 Sacra doctrina is a body of knowledge which is founded in God's revelation, or, as Aquinas puts it, which proceeds from principles which are known by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God

15

and the beatified." By putting it this way, Thomas underlines that the divine subject of theology is also the source and the centre of theology. In the first place this is shown by the relation bet:",ee? sacra doctri~ and sacra scriptura. The content of the sacred doc~rlOe IS what ~d. IS teaching us through Scripture. The sacred doctrIne IS first and pn.marlly handed down to us in Scripture, which makes this book normative for all that is part of or springs from the sacred doctrine. Th~ connection between the two is so close, that Thomas uses sacra doctrtna and sacra scriptura side by side, sometimes using the one when the reader would expect the other." . In the Christian traClition, the sacred doctrine has been summarized in the Articles of Faith, since the knowledge of the content of Sc~ipture is too important to remain reserved for only those who have time to occupy themselves with the difficult study. of Script~re.~ But sa::ra doctrina is broader than Scripture and the ArtIcles of FaIth: It comprISes all manner of instructive communication from God to man, directly or ., . indirectly." . 1beologia, as a part of the sacra doctrina, IS the sClentI~c reflection. on the content of faith. Drawing an analogy between the SCIences, AqulOas considers the Articles of Faith as the principles of theology. Since these articles are nothing more than the summary of the content of ~cripture, the eminent position of Scripture in the process of theology IS beyond

oportet esse praecognieum hominibus, qui SUdS intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in

jinem. "

"

Z4

S7b I I.l.co: Unde necessarium foil homini ad salutem, qund ei nota /ierint quaedam per revelationem divittatn, quae rationem humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratkme humana investigm possunt, necessarium foit hominem instrui revelatione divina quia veritds de Dea, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum erro~ homini proveniret, a (uius tamen 'fJeritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. S7b I 1.!.ra2: Unde nihil prohibet de eitdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tradam secundum quod Junt cognoscibilia tumine natura/is ratum~ et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine Jivinae revelationis. Unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam peninet, differt secundum genus ab ilIa theologia quae pars phi·

25

" 27

losophia< ponitur. M. C;:orbin, 1974, has ~ollowed the shifts in Aquinas' account of theology and its rdatlon to philosophy m four stages (In Sent, In De 7nn, ScG, S7b). The book has met some serious critique (lv.!. Jordan, 1981) but for the character of theology as

intellectus fidei its analy';' remains valid; Cf. also T. Gilby, 1964, p. 58-66; J. Wa1grave, 1982/1976, p. 3·15; B. Davies, 1992, p. 10·14; M. Jordan, 1993, p. 232.251; J. Wissink, 1993, p. 15·36; H. Rikhof, 1995[b], p. 435-439.

28

5Th I 1.2.co: Et hoc modo sacra doetrina est screntia, quia proeedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est sCientia. Dei et beatorum. J. WlSSu:.k , 1994, p. 18, paraphrases sacra doctrina as "the doct:rmal content of Holy SCrJpture as taught by the Church and in university classes by magistri". Cf. J. Wissink, 1994, p. 17, footnote 4. 5Th IT-IT 1.9.ral: veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura di}fose continetur et variis modis. et in quibusdam obscure,· ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex ~a 5criptura. ~uir~tur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenn-e omnes illt qutbus necessarium est cognoscere fidei writatetn, quorum plerique. aliis negotiis occupatio studio 'Vacare non possunt. Et ideo foit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae 5cripturae aliquid manifestum surnmarie co//igeretUT quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, sed podro ex sacra Scriptura assumptum. Cf. T. Gilby, 1964, p. 63: nSacra doctrina, then, is expressive in all manner of w~ys, and should not be restricted to the rational exposition of a system of widely·rangmg yet consistent propositions, on which score alone the Summa has been sometimes admired, by those, however, who have not gone beyond its outward appearance."

16

17

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER!

any doubt." In Aquinas' days this was reflected in the official title of the professor of theology at the university: Magister in Sacra Pagina. The first task of the Magister was reading and explaining Holy Scripture, guided by the tradition centered around the Anicles of Faith and with the help of the finest tools natural reason (i.e. philosophy) can offer. The entire undenaking of theology is centered around the bener understanding of the revealed sacred doctrine. The' fact that the first principles of this doctrine are revealed, deeply influences its mode of procedure. The principles - the Anicles of Faith - can not be proved, since they are directly related to the incomprehensible God." They can only be approved of, defended and clarified in their interrelation, their unity and their connection with God." This leads us to a second manner in which God is at the centre of theology. For Aquinas, theology is the understanding of faith (intellectus fidei) and God is also the source and core of faith." Faith is a gift from God, by which the intellect is illuminated by a light of a quality differing from the light of natural reason. Thus the mystery of God, once again, appears at the core of theology: this time not as the formal subject of theology, but as guiding and helping those whose faith searches for understanding.

Completing the picture, it should be kept in mind that the. direct context of theology is the community of faithful who are searchmg for understanding of their faith. It is a context in which the 'object' whic~ is studied is already part of the investigator's life. The One sought, IS the One addressed in daily prayer, met in the sacraments of the Church and, in the case of Aquinas, the One on whom life is orientated, even to be seen in determining his daily timetable. For Aquinas, therefore, theology has its p.oint ?f ~eparture and destination in a lively relationship with God. It IS a sClentlfi.c endeavour in which God is sough~ with the double help of God. Studymg theol~gy has the character of a reaction, it is part' of an answer to a call which precedes and, ultimately, escapes the undenaking."

2' All. elaborate study of the place and function of Scripture in the theology of Aquinas

:JO

is: w. Valkenberg, 1990. In his concluding reflections Valkenberg states: "In its primary function, Scripture functions as the source aod framework of theology. As the Word of God, it is received and interpreted in theology; as presupposition of Christian theology it determines the theological horizon." (p. 300). On 'the clear-cut role of natural reason in theology, d. 5Th I 1.8.ra2: Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidm; quia per hoc

tollere_ meritum fide~ sed ad mani/estandum aliqua alia quae
"

1.3 The unity of theological science In the light of what has been said the third aspect of Aquinas' theology which deserves our attention can: quit~ easilr, be ~resented. As Thomas explains, the unity of theological sCience IS 70nstltuted ~y t~e unity of its formal subject. In the sacred doctrme everythmg IS considered under the formal consideration of being revealed by God." This formal consideration grants a unity which covers different philosophical disciplines. In philosophy a distinction is made between speculative and practical science. The?logy covers bot~ areas. It has a practical side which is concerned WIth human acts msofar as these prepare man for the perfect knowledge of God (eternal beatitude). Mainly, however, it is speculative and concerned with God." "

)4

35

As 11. Corbin puts it (1980, p. 14): "En bref, Ie croyant n'~ ni

a

a

fonder ni j~tifier un appel dont il n'est point Ie maltre et qu'il ne peut jamatS se, donn~ deter~e et revendique, dans toUS les domaines de sa vie, .par la Parole de I Autre, il ~olt s~~ ment permission et commendement de se Sltuer et rec:onnrut.re comme un temaln parmi d'autres." . . . 5Th I Ij.co: Quia igitur sacra Scriptura consU/erat aliqua secundum quod sunt d~v~n~tus Yevelata, secundum quod dictum est [STh I 1.2fi omnia quaecumque sunt dzvtnttus reveJabi/ia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti hums scientiae. Et ideo comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sieut sub scientia una. 5Th I 1.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est, una exist~, se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philo~0f"icas, f1!Opter ratt~~~ formalem qUtfnJ- in diversis attendit, scilie~t prout ~unt dwt~o lumlr:e cognosCtbilza. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis ali4 Stt speculattva et al~ J7r.actzc~ sacra. &amen doctrina comprehendit sub se utTamque; sicut et scu:nt~ s~ cogn?sctt, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practtctt, quta pnnctpaltus aglt de rebus

neu: eaden:

19

AQUJNAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER I

With regard to the hermeneutical distance which separates us from Aquinas, it may be appropriate to examine this idea of unity. In contrast to a lot of contemporary theology, the unity of theological science appears at three levels. In the first place, there is, what I would like to call, a unity of tracts. Aquinas is famous for his rigour in making distinctions and with the expression 'unity of tracts' I do not mean that he mixes up the questions he deals with. The general structure of the Summa Tbe%giae, for instance, is very much refined and its lucidity and elegance has been compared to a Gothic cathedral." What I mean by the 'unity of tracts' is the extraordinary coherence of Aquinas' theology.37 The greater one's acquaintance with Aquinas' theology, the more one discovers how, in the Summa, every article has the nature of a hologram in which the rest of the work is reflected. Studying moral theology, one cannot pass over the sacraments which are the context of Christian life. Studying the sacraments, one cannot omit paying attention to Christ who founds them. Studying Christ, one has to take a look at Thomas' God·talk and so on. In every key Aquinas strikes the resonance can be heard of the whole of his theology. Therefore one can hardly speak of his Christology, eschatology or moral theology: they are all different aspects of the one science of theology the centre of which is the incomprehen. sible God. For our study on Aquinas' account of the relation of life on earth and 'life' after death this entails that we cannot limit ourselves to a single tract of his theology. A second form of unity is realized in the unity of theological sub· disciplines. In the past seven centuries the scientific landscape has undergone some profound changes and Christian theology has become a collection of specialized disciplines. Nowadays the book-shelf of the average Biblical scholar will hardly show any overlapping with that of the moral theologian specialized in medical ethics.. In the thirteenth

century the situation was different. Due to the relatively orlglflative phase of medieval theology, Aquinas could approach his subjects as a theological uomo universale. Philosophy, Biblical science, psychology, moral theology, dogmatics, ascetical and mystical theology: they all can be traced in the Summa and they all are pointed towards the central mystery of faith, at the service of which they were developed." Thus Aquinas' systematic rigour and formal approach should not be played off against his Biblical inspiration. In fact we should bear in mind that Aquinas, in his systematical works, tries to be as close to the Biblical inspiration as in his commentaries on Holy Scripture." In the third place, was already examined in the last paragraph, a unity can be perceived with regard to the life of the theologian and the way of proceeding in this science. Both are pervaded with God's activity and find their coherence in this divine activity. For Aquinas studying theology properly cannot be confined to intellectual virtues alone. As we have seen, theology is faith searching for understanding !fides quaerens intelleaum) and the theological virtues (faith,. hope and charity) are intrinsically connected with moral and intellectual virtues.'" Theology is performed at the service and within the context of the union of man with God. Moreover, an important aspect of theology is

18

as

38

"

divinis quam de actibus humanis,· de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo

ad perflCt4ln Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit. The discussion about the piau only confirms its brilliant architecrure. Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 4-5, with an overview of the relevant literature. '7 With this observation I do not mean to state that Aquinas should have constructed a closed system of thinking in which everything. our Creator included, is controlled. Nor do I mean that he has made no developments in his thinking, even in the years he was working on the Summa Theologiae. I want to place emphasis on Aquiuas' central intuition of the incomprchensible God of love which pervades his entire theological work.

"

"

This, as well as the 'unity of tracts', has a direct bearing on the limits of this study which covers, roughly the whole field of theology Aquinas knew: the secondary literature on the varied subjects, tracts and sub-disciplines has become highly specia· lized and comprehensive. In this respect we do not mean to be exhaustive. As L. Sentis (1992, p. 286) puts it, "Ie but de la theologie est de donuer accOs aux Ecritures Saintes, et non de proposer un ensemble doctrinal qui les remplace". The kind of misinterpretations Senrls warns us against is obvious in our days in which a widespread aversicn for and suspicicn of toralitarian systems of thinking can be observed. Aquiuas' theology is easily identified with such a s)"tem, and played off against a more Biblical narrative theology in which the sense of mystery is claimed to be safeguarded in a better manner. M. Corbin (1974) has urged, rightly, that most wanting in our days, is a speculative theology in which the various results of the different specialties are confronted with each other and brought into relation with one another. On the connection of the virtues cf. STh 1·11 65.1·5; In STh I 1.6.co and raJ Aquinas explains that judgement in matters of faith may be the result of either the wisdom (sapientia) which is a gift from the Holy. Spirit or the wisdom which is the result of studying the sacred doctrine. The former is higher, like the judgement, with regard to moral affairs, of the vinuous person is higher than that of the moral philosopher who knows everything about virtues but possesses none of them. Cf. J. Walgrave, 1982/1974(a1, p. 119; Cf. also 5Th 11·11 45.2.co.

20

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER I

its reflection on the dynamism of this union." Summarizing these three features of Aquinas' theology, we can say that in this study Aquinas' theology is interpreted as based on the interpretation of Scripture, centered around the incomprehensible God and, in more than one respect, concerned with the unity of the theological discipline. The interpretation thus carried out, has the character of following Aquinas in his attempt to show the nexus mysteriorum with regard to God, life and death.

meanings the words 'life' and 'death' can have. Throughout his works Thomas consequently discerns three meanings of vita which can all be traced back to distinctions Aristotle makes." In a first meaning of the word, vita refers to the existence of a being which possesses the ability to move itself in a certain manner. In this first meaning vita is a substantial predicate, referring to the being of the subject, as is reflected in Aristotle's definition vivere viventibus esse est.43 In a second- meaning, which is less familiar to us than the first and the third, vita refers to a specific act of a living substance which is

characteristic for its mode of being. Thus the volitional and cognitive acts of human beings can be called their 'life': these acts are characteristic for the human mode of being regarded as self-

2. God, life and death Having sketched our interpretation of Aquinas, we will proceed with a first orientation in the field this study covers. Our aim is to find an appropriate perspective from which the theological question of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death can be dealt with. In order to find this perspective we will, first, take a look at Aquinas' use of the words 'life' and 'death' (2.1). We will discover a network of meanings and contexts in which 'life' and 'death' are used. This variety raises questions concerning the connection of the words and the realities th.ey .refer .to. In order to discover the way the network is organized, we wIll InvestIgate Aquinas' explanation of 'life' as a name of God's essence (2.2) and as a name which can be attributed to each of the divine Persons (2.3). This will give us insight into the connection of life and death with the incomprehensible God and provide us with a perspective from which the theological question can be rephrased. 2.1 The meaning and use of the words 'life' and 'death' In various instances in his works Aquinas accounts for the different "

21

Which Aquinas practices in his account of the theological vinues and the gifts of the _ Holy Spirit. Cf. M. Corbin (1974, p. 901) who remarks as a conclusion of his reading of STh I·II 68.2: "ces trois modes mltapbysique, the%gique, mystique devien. ~t les troIS degres d'une echelle unique qui trouve son point culminant dans la

a

VlSlon de Dieu face face qui' rejouit- les bienheureux. La faute de l'interpretation couran~e est d'oublier ~u·une. distinction n'est point une separation figee mais une dyn~l9.ue, q~'une ~l&archre n'est point une repanition statique de diverses posslbilites maIS une ligne ascendante dialectique qui maintient la fois la consistence de la niveau inferieur et sa tendence a se depasser pour s'egaIer au niveau superieur."

a

movement.44 In a third meaning, with the word vita the chief occupation or

direction of man is signified. Thus one can lead a honorable life, a contemplative life, etc."

" 4)

«

Cf. R. Defecrari, 1948, p. 1170·1172. 7 (415b13): vivere autem vivemibus est esse, causa autem et principium horum anima (quoted in 5Th I 18.2.sc). In this study, focusing primarily on Aquinas' reception of Aristode, I will quote the latter in Latin. Aquinas did not know Greek and studied the works of Aristode in translations, mosdy provided by William of Moerbeke (d. J. Weisheipl, 1983', p. 374-381). The text of Aristode is adopted from the edition of Aquinas' commentary which was consulted. IX Eth 11 (1170a16): Yivere autem determinant anima/ibm-potentia sensus, hominibus

n De anima

autem sensus vel intel/eetus. Potentia autem. ad operationem reducitur; principaJe autem in operatione. Vuietur autem vivere esse principalieer sentire vel intelligere. Aquinas comments (In IX Eth 11 [Leon: 30D: in omnibus animdJibus communiter determinatur vivere secundum potentiam sensus, in hominibus autem determinatur secundum potentiam sensus, quantum ad itt quod habet commune cum aliis animalibus, vel secundum potentiam inte/lecms, quantum ad id quod est proprium sibL Omnis autem in potentia reducitur ad operationem skut ad propriam peifectionem: uOOe id quod est principale consistit in operatione et non in potentia nuda, actus enim est potior quam potentia, ut probatur in IX M£taphysicae. Et ex hoc patet quod principaliter Viflert anima/is vel hominis est sentire vel intellig~. " I Eth 5 (1095bl4-19): Bonum enim et felicitatem non irrationabiJiter videntur ex his quae huius 'Vitae sunt "existimare. Multi quidem et gravissimi voluptatem. Ideo et vitam diJigunt voluptuosam. Tres enim sunt maxime excellentes. et quae nunc dicta est et quae civilis est et tertia quae contemplativa est. Aquinas comments (!n I Eth 5 [Leon: 62]: unusquisque id ad quod maxim< aflicitur reputat vitam suam, sicut phiJosophus phiJosophar~ "venator venari et sic de allis. Et quia homo maxime afficitur ad ultimum finen; necesse est quod vitae diversificentur secundum diversitatem ultimi finis.

22

23

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER 1

These three meanings in which the word vita is used are closely connected by the notion of 'self-movement'. Since the human mode of being is an intelligent mode of being, one could even say that, in the case of human beings, these meanings of the word 'life' imply each other. The species homo is differentiated from the genus animal by the predicate rationale which refers to the intellectual operations; the nature of these operations determine the specific nature of human existence. In other words: the life (in the third meaning) we lead follows from our free deliberate choices flife' in the second meaning) which follow from our mode of being ('life' in the first meaning)." Generally speaking, Aquinas considers mors as the opposite of vita. The logical definition of death is privatio vitae. Taken as a privation mors is called a malum and like any malum can only be known insofar as the bonum in which it inheres is known, mors can only be known insofar as vita is known. Therefore, in these paragraphs we will mainly concentrate on Aquinas' use of life. The three meanings of vita just mentioned may serve as a first orientation in the matter. When we turn to Aquinas' actual use of the word, however, a somewhat more complicated picture takes shape. The word vita, taken in each of the meanings, functions in a variety of contexts, with a variety of applications." With regard to vita in the first meaning, Aquinas speaks of vita animae or spiritualis on the one hand and vita corporis or corporalis on the other hand. He distinguishes vita temporalis from vita aeterna. Theologically he makes a distinction between vita naturae or naturalis, vita gratiae and vita gloriae or gloriosa. With regard to the human soul he discerns vita nutritiva, vita sensibilis and vita intellectiva or rationalis. He speaks of vita angeli and vita Dei, of vita praesens and vita !utura,

vita corruptibilis or mortalis and vita incorrupu.bil~ or. immortalis .and many more kinds of life. An entire network of slg~ficatlOns comes I?to perspective and it becomes clear that the question of the relation between our life on earth and 'life' after dea~ in Aqu~nas' the~l0!l! cannot be dealt with unless the connection of different kInds of VIta IS taken into account and their order and hierarchy is revealed. . . . Vita in the second meaning is less frequently used by AqUInas: m thIS meaning he only distinguishes vita secundum actum from vita secundum potentiam. . . With regard to vita in the m~aning of the ch~ef. Occup~tlOn ~f man, however we can again ,find a Wide array of variations: VIta actt'Va and vita con;emplativa, vita practica and vita speculativa, vita bestialis and vita spiritualis, vita laboriosa, vita luxuriosa, VIta monasttca and many

46

In In IX Eth 7 the connection of the different meanings can be detected [Leon: 74]: Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu, esse enim nostrum est vivere et per

consequens operari (non enim est vita absque vitae operatione quacwnque), unde unimi-

que est amabiJe operari opera vitae,' {adem autem in actu est quodam modo ipsum opus facientis. actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et patiente; ideo itaque diJigunt opus mum et -artifices et poetae et bene/aclores, quia diligunt suum esse. " For an introductory overview the lists of R. Deferrari, 1948, p. 117()'1172 (vita) and p. 703 (mays) are a useful guide. On these pages the references to the works of Aquinas can be found as well. For a full consideration of the matter one should also take intO account words like vivus, vi'lJijicare, mortalis (culpa morta/is, peccatum martdeO and monifer. Since aile these words are derived from the meanings of vita and t1WYS as they are introduced here, they will be discussed later in this study.

more.

As we have already noticed, mors as a privation shares the 'para· sytical' nature Aquinas attributes to ~l kinds of evil. T~e vari~ty ~f combinations is less elaborate than In the case of VIta (which IS theologically appropriate, of course), but some. i~teresting dis~inctions should be mentioned: mors carnalis or corporalts In contrast With mors spiritualis, mors temporalis as against mors aeterna and mors naturalis opposed to mors violenta. . . . From this first impression of the VarIOUS ways In which the words vita and mors occur in Aquinas' works, we can justly draw the conclusion that 'life' and 'death' are words which are found throughout the entire field of theological reflection: referring to the lowest vegetative creatures as well as to th~~ supreme ~r~ator. Moreover, b! the fact that vita is also one of the dIVIne names, It IS suggested that thiS 'omnipresent' aspect of the word in Aquinas' theology has a special theological importance. This suggestion is confirmed when we take a closer look at how Aquinas attributes 'life' to God: in his view vita is maxime proprie referring to God." This means that, looking at the signification of vita, God is the subject wh~ch most ap~r.o~ri~tely may be called 'living'. God is even more appropnately called IIvmg than are human beings. Looking for insight into what 'life' is, this would mean that we should take a look at God first, in order to determine what all the other kinds of life essentially are. In a way this is appropriate since .. SIb 1 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita maxime proprie inDeo '7'. Cf. also ScG I 97.3: Sed Deus maxime non ab alio. sed a seipso operatur: cum SIt pnma causa agens. Maxime igitur ei compet;t vivere.

24

25

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER!

God is the formal subject of theology. But how does this relate to God's incomprehensibility which we noticed at the centre of Aquinas' theological reflection? In order to proceed, we will have to take a closer look at the way in which Aquinas attributes 'life' to God, what this reveals regarding his perception of God's mode of being and what this entails for the human mode of being. Before we take a closer look, however, at the procedure Aquinas follows two observations are of importance. In the first place we must bear in mind the context of Thomas' work: the exposition of Holy Scripture. The variety of meanings in which vita and mars occur in the writings of Aquinas are the result of his close reading of Scripture. At first sight this may seem strange, since we started our orientation on the use of the word 'life' with the observation that the distinctions Aquinas makes are all to be traced back to Aristotle. As we will see later in this study, however, Aristotle does nothing more than provide an instrument which helps Aquinas to make a meticulous analysis of what is told in Holy Scripture. One of the main sources of Aquinas' theological reflections on life is the gospel of Saint John" in which the word 'life' is one of the key words. so In this gospel Christ Himself is called vita as well as panis vitae, knowing God is called vita aeterna, Christ is said to be giving aqua viva and the Father is said to have vita in semetipso. In the gospel of Saint John questions arise as to what exactly is meant by 'life' and how it is related to God: Father, Son and Spirit. Apart from the fourth Gospel the word vita as a divine name is found in various places in

Holy Scripture.'1 In the second place, since we aim to give an interpretation of Aquinas as a theologian and a thinker close to Scripture, our intention is to take into account, from the outset, that the God he speaks about is the triune God: Father, Son and Spirit. For the sake of clarity, however, Aquinas often treats first the one nature of the triune God and later the three Persons in the one God." We will do the same by focusing on 'life' as a name for the divine nature in the first place. 2.2 'Life' as a name for God's essence

In Summa 1beologide I 18 Aquinas devotes an entire quaestio to the inquiry as to whether God can be called 'living' or 'life'. We will present an analysis of this question" because it offers an excellent opportunity for picturing Thomas' approach with regard to 'life' as a name for both creatures and Creator. 2.2.1 Summa Theologiae I 18.1-3

The question of the life of God is treated within the context of the knowledge of God, since Aquinas considers knowing to be a kind of living. This knowledge of God is situated within the larger framework

"

52

., Apart from Scripture, Aquinas' attention for 'life' as a name of God, seems to be raised also by the fact that pseudo-Dionysius dedicates a chapter to vita in his famous De divinis nominibus; which was a highly esteemed work with authority close to Holy Scripture in Aquinas' days. Cf. G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649. " The most important passages are in the words of the vulgata: (Tn 1,4) in Ipso "ita era., (Tn 1,4-5) et "ita erat lux Imminum; et lux in tenebris luret. .. ; (Tn 3,16) sic enin> duexit Deus mundum. ..ut omnis•... habeat vitam aeternaTnj 3,36) qui credit in Pi/ium habet vitam aeternatnj (In 4,10) tu forsitan petisses ab Eo et dedisset tim aquam vi'lJd.mj 5,21) sicut enim Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat... ; 5,26) sicut enim Pater habet "itam in semet Ipso; (Tn 6,35) Ego sum panis "itae...; (Tn 6,52) panis quem ego dabo earo mea est pro mundi vita; 6.58) skUI mis;t Me vivens Pater et Ego vivo propter Patrem. .. ; (Tn 11,25) Ego sum resurrectio et "ita; (Tn 12,24) nisi granum frumenti eadens in terram mortuum fomt; 14,6} Ego sum via et veritas et vita; 17,3} haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verum Deum.

an

an

ern

an an

an

53

Cf. e.g. p, 35,10: apud Te fons 'Vitae, a verse which Aquinas often quotes as referring to Christ who is with the Father; and Ps 83,3: cor meum et earo mea exultavit in Deum vivum, quoted in 5Th I 18.3.sc. According to K. Rahner, this distinction of two perspectives on the triune God is found for the first time in Aquinas' work. In the history of theology it was a major factor for the development of a division of the doctrine of God into twO treatises: de deo uno and de deo trino. This separate treatment, with negative side-effects, became common practise aher the Summa Theologiae had ousted Peter Lombard's IV Libri Sententiarnm (K. Rahner, 1967, p. 323-324). In contemporary theology the observation and warning of Rahnec have been acknowledged and taken to heart. Cf. N. Lash, 1993. Other places of interest are: SeC I 97-99, I~ XII Met 8, In Joan 14.2, In Div Nom 6. We have chosen for S'Ih I 18 because it is Aquinas' most mature work, here he treats the subject more extensively than in other places and he is not bound by any texts on which he has to comment. In Div Nom 6 would be a good alternative because of the unique condense enumeration of the various kinds of life which God bestows. The text of pseudo-Dionysius. however. forces Aquinas to place all emphasis on the causality and pre-existence of God's life: a position which Thomas corrects in his own systematic works.

26

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER!

of the consideration of God's operations: His knowledge (STh I 14-18), His will (STh I 19-24) and His power (STh I 25)." In the first two articles of STh I 18, Aquinas' intention is to specify what we are talking about when we call a substance 'living'. In the first article (utrum omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere) it immediately becomes apparent that the one word 'life' is used to signify different substances in reality; plants and animals as well as a natural element like water. In order to distinguish between living and non-living things, Aquinas takes as point of departure a substance of which it is clear that it is living: an anima!." He observes that in our common use of language we begin to call an animal 'living' from the moment that it moves itself and we call it 'dead' from the moment this ability of selfmovement has disappeared. Thomas concludes that we call a substance 'living' in the proper meaning when it moves itself according to a certain sort of motion. Motion may be taken in the proper meaning as referring to the act of something existing in potentiality of existence (in this case 'life' regards the being of the substance) or it may be taken in the wider meaning as regarding the act (c.q. operation) of a substance which already possesses the first perfection of being. Thus vita in the proper meaning refers to the first perfection (esse) or second perfection (operatio) of a substance in which motion in the proper or wider

meaning can be detected. Not all natural things, however, exist in this way. Water, for instance, does not have the ability to move itself. It can be moved by something else, and thus be called 'living': not in the proper meaning but having a similitude with life. . . . In this approach we see how one word, VLta, may be applied In lts proper meaning to different realities on the basis of a common ratio of self-movement." When the element of 'movement' in the ratio of vita is taken in a wider meaning (as in the case of the operatio) we still speak of 'life' in the proper meaning, but when the element of 'self is taken away, there can only be talk of 'life' by means of similitude. One may observe tfrat Aquinas, in this article, moves between the logical and the (meta)physical order in his analysis of what life is. He gains insight by scrutinizing the implicit rules we adopt in our common sense language and by testing these rules with the help of metaphysical distinctions. The reason why Aquinas proceeds in this way is that in his view our naming of things is determined by our mode of knowing. Thomas explicitly brings this into discussion in the second article of the question (utrum vita sit quaedam operatio). In this article the question posed is whether life is an activity (secunda perfectio) or a mode of being (prima perfectio)- In his reply Aquinas states that our intellect is apt to know the essence of things, but that it can do so only after having received information from the senses." The information the senses provide is restricted to the external, accidental qualities of the object. We name things as we know them: with regard to life this becomes apparent by our use of the word 'life'. Sometimes the word refers to

54 5Th I 14.prol: Quia vero inte/ligere quoddam vivere est, post comider4tionem divinae scientiae, considerandum erit de vita divina. Thomas reflects on the operations of God after he has taken God's substance into consideration (STh ! 2-13). In these first questions of the Summa Tbeologiae, after an inquiry about the nature of sacred doctrine, Aqoinas asks whether God is (STh ! 2), how God is (or rather, how He is not, since we cannot know God's essence) (5Th I 3-11), how God is known to us (STh ! 12) and how God can be named by us (STh ! 13). In the questions regarding God's substance (STh ! 2-13), the mOst fundamental decisions about our knowing and speaking of God are made; decisions which heavily influence the rest of the Summa Theologiae. We will therefore return to these initial questions in our interpretation of STh! 18 when necessary. S5 5Th I 18.1.eo: Respondeo dicendum quod ex his quae manifoste vivum, accipere possumus quorum sit 'Oivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste anima/ibus convenit... Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando ineipit ex se motum habere... Ex quo patet quod ilia proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent,' sive accipiatur motus proprie, situt matus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfect~ prout intelligere et sentire dicitur nu)'Ver~ ut dicitur in III De anima 7 {431a6} ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel ,operationem aliquam...

27

me

S6

57

STh I 13.4.co: Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen. Cf. R. McInerny. 1961, p. 61·64 who underscores that the ratio or definition is produced by the intellect. 5Th I 18.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dietis patet, intel/ectus noster, qui proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiect~ accipit a sensu, cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod ex his qU4e exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoseendam essentiam reL Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam 'vitae' nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc signifzcandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, 'vivere' nihil aliud est quod esse in tali natura. et 'vita' significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen 'CW'sus' significat ipsum CurTere in abstracto. Unde 'vivum' non est praedicazum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque tamen 'vita' sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen 'Vitae assumitur,' situt dicit Philosophus, in IX Ethicorum 9 [1170a18], quod vivere principaliter est sentire, vel inteJligere.

28

AQUlNAS ON GOD AND LIFE

activities such as willing and knowing (by which the essence of a living substance is made known) and sometimes to the essence of the substance itself. Both meanings of the word 'life' are proper, but the second is the more proper meaning, being the term of our knowledg~. In the third article, Aquinas arrives at the central Issue of SIb I 18: whether life can be attributed to God (utrum Deo conveniat vita). He begins the article with three arguments that seem to contradict the view that life can be attributed to God. All the arguments are based on the seeming discord between the simplicity of God and .certain eleme.nts that are to be found in all living substances mentioned m the precedmg two articles (movement, a soul as principle of life and corp orality). As an argument in favour only Psalm 83,3 is quoted: Cor meum et cr:ro mea

exultavit in Deum vivum. Thomas begins his reply with the statement th~t 'life', in t~e most proper meaning, is in God. The explanation of this statement ~s based on an analysis of the shifts in signification that take place m both elements that form the ratio of 'life' ('self' and 'movement'), when the word is attributed to living substances at different ontological levels. At the lowest level of living substances we perceive self-movement (growth and decrease) which is restricted to carrying a movement into effect, the end and form of which are determined by nature: the life of plants. 58 At a second level of animated substances both the nature of motion as well as the degree of self-determination are modified. The degree ~f self-determination is higher, since those beings acquire the form of theIr self-movement for themselves through their senses. The more complete their senses are, the more elaborate their self-movement is. In the case of the oyster, equipped with the sense of touch only, the self-movement is restricted to dilation and contraction. In the case of animals endowed with more senses, the self-movement can be elaborated up to ~ocal movement. Thus an increase in self-determination is combined WIth a change in the nature of motion. The amount of self-determination in animals, however, is considerably restricted: the objective of their move-

51

5Th I 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita rnaxime proprie in Deo est. Ad tuius e'Uidentiam, considerandum est quodJ cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab diu mota,' quanta perfectius competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo in-venitur vita ... lnveniuntur igitur quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habita respectu ad formam vel fin~ quae inest eis a natura, sed solum ad executionem motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt, determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmcdi sunt plantae...

CHAPTER I

29

ment is implanted in them by nature. Their instinct moves them by means of the form conceived by the senses. 59 At a third level self-movement embodies the substance choosing the end of the movement as well. At this level human beings are situated, endowed with an intellect which is able to control the senses and . produce external movement. Here not only self-determination is still greater, the nature of motion is changed as welL Movement in the wider meaning, as referring to intellectual and volitional activities, is the cause for greater self-determination. 60 Aquinas leaves no doubt that, however free the self-movement of human beings might be; metaphysically man is bound by nature. The intellect can only be actuated according to the first principles and the will can only be moved by virtue of the ultimate end which it cannot refuse. Thus, he concludes, a substance whose nature is not determined by anything else, but whose nature is its very act of knowing, obtains self-movement in the highest possible degree. Such a being would have life in the highest degree. Since God is such a Being, He must possess life in the highest degree." This final conclusion seems to contradict the negative start of SIb I 3.prol (quia de Deo non possumus scire quid sit). God's nature is identified as His very act of knowing and thus we seem to know what God's nature is: ipsum eius intelligere. Did Aquinas change his mind and does he admit that God's essence can be properly named by us with the help of the same words we use for the naming of created substances? Can knowledge of divine life be gained by simply investigating the subses' STh I 18.3.co: Quaedam vera utterius movent seipsa. non solum hahito respectu ad executionem matus, sed etiam quantum ad fonnam quae est principium TTWtus, quam per se acquirunt. Et huOOmodi sunt animalia ... 60 STh I 18.3.00: Unde supra talia animalia sum ilia quae movent seipsa, etiam habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuOO est cognoscere proportionem finis et eOO quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in alterum. '1 STh I 18.3.co: Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad a/iqua se agat, tamen aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura,. sicut sunt prima principia, circa quae non potest aliter se habere. et ultimus finis, quem non potest non velie. Unde. licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad a/iqua ab alia moveatur. Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum intelligere. et cui id quod natura/iter habet non determinatur ab alia, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxinie est vita. Urule PhiloSfJphus. in XlI Metaphysicorum 11 [1072b27J, ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens. eoncludit quod habeat vitam peifeetissimam et sempiternam, quia intelleetus eius est perfectissimus. et semper in actu.

30

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

quent levels of created life? In order to appreciate more precisely what Aquinas says here, we should interpret this article of STh I 18 in the light of what has been said before in the Summa Theologiae. Both orders, according to which Aquinas works in STh I 18, the metaphysical and the logical, are scruti· nized with regard to God in the first 13 questions of the Summa. In order to appreciate more precisely how to interpret quaestio 18, we will therefore take a look at both. 2.2.1.1 God's essence: the metaphysical order

Vivere viventibus esse est, Thomas learns from Aristotle and he says that 'life', in its proper meaning, refers to the act of being. Asking for the nature of God's life, therefore, is inevitably connected with the question of God's mode of being. Thinking in terms of being, in all the objects we come to know through our senses the 'being' is determined by the essence.62 The distinction between the esse of a substance and its essentia is, ontologically, the most fundamental distinction one can make. Therefore, asking for God Thomas begins to ask for the being or existence of God (STh I 2) followed by an investigation into His essence (STh I 3-11). The triune God who revealed Himself through Holy Scripture, however, is not exactly an object which we come to know directly by our senses. Though Thomas builds up his argument according to the distinction between God's being and His essence, in q.3 he blurs that distinction by saying that in God, being and essence cannot be separated. How is this to be interpreted? Beginning with q.2, interpreting the five ways as proofs of God's existence and reading the following questions as providing information about the object, the existence of which has just been proved, Aquinas' claim about the iden· tification of being and essence in God could be interpreted as a confirmation of having the possibility to know God's essence. At the very beginning of STh I 3, however, Aquinas explicitly states that we cannot know God's nature or essence and that we should rather

62

Here we touch upon a long discussion about the relation between esse and essence in Aquinas' thinking. For literature d. R. te Velde, 1995.

CHAPTER!

31

investigate how God is not." Taking this remark seriously, the identification of God's being with His essence takes the shape of a prohibition sign. Moreover, after this identification of being and essence, q.2 should be read again, in order to see what exactly Aquinas is up to here. Thus, in order to gain insight into Thomas' view on God's life we will, firstly, ask what he intends with the identification of being and essence in God and, secondly, ask how this identification affects the reading of Aquinas' remarks on God's being. It has been argued, and I hold this to be the most elucidating and theologically coherent i(lterpretation of Aquinas that, with the identification of God's existence and His essence he articulates the most fundamental insight that determines his entire theological undertaking: the distinction between creatures and Creator." Thus, by blurring the most basic distinction in the ontological order Aquinas intends to make· a new distinction, one between God and creatures. What is at stake here for Thomas is the possibility for maintaining the Biblical idea that God is at one and the same time Creator of all creatures (which implies that He cannot be part of creation and has to be radically distinguished from it) as well as the One who is intimately linked with all creatures as their final goal (which implies that He is present in creation as its sustainer, redeemer and the One who perfects it). In fact it is the reflection on the triune God, Father, Son and Spirit, articulated by the Councils and recognized in Holy Scripture, that causes Aquinas to modify the use of Aristotle's philosophical instruments. How the life of God is articulated in the doctrine of the three Persons of God will be treated in the next paragraph. For the moment we are concerned with showing the

63

STb I 3.prol: Cognito de a1iquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit. ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed poems quomodo non sit. Primo ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis cognoscatur [q.12],· tertia quomodo

nominetur [q.13j.. .. 10 a compact and penetrating book D. Burrell (1986) shom the history of development of this distinction by thinkers of the three great monotheistic religions: "The candidate proposed Mthe distinction between essence and existence- finds its roots in Alfarabi, its firSt aniculation in IbnMSina, is approved by Maimonides, and brought to a refined status by Aquinas." (po 35) With this interpretation Burrell is in line with J. Pieper's observation of creation as the hidden key in Aquinas' philosophy (quoted by Burrell on p. 34, the note on p. 119 fails however). Pieper makes his observation in: J. Pieper, 1953, 1974 and 1978, among other places. Pieper's position is also adopted by O.H. Pesch (1988), and worked out by R. Sokolowski (1982) in what he C3lls 'the Christian distinction'.

32

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AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER I

rightfulness and meaning of the attribution of 'life' to God. Can we be more precise about what Thomas tries to establish? In order to do so, as a first step, it may be helpful to take into account which positions he tries to avoid. Aquinas tries to maintain God's ultimacy, His transcendence, as much as His intimacy, His immanence. On the one hand, he tries to avoid a point of view on God's ultimacy in which God is set apart from the world in such a way that He loses direct contact with creation. This can be worked out in various manners. In Aristotle's metaphysics the unmoved mover has no interest in the world and Plotinus' first Being can only be met through intermediaries. On the other hand, Thomas wants to avoid a perspective on God's intimacy in which God becomes tied up with creation in such a way that He becomes part of it. This also can be worked out in different manners. God can be regarded as being part of creation as the soul of the world, as the Stoics held, or He can be seen as 'the biggest thing around' which would turn Him into an "oversized creature. ,," Looking back now at the first questions of the Summa, we can recognize how Aquinas' procedure is aimed at avoiding the extremes just mentioned and we can discern how this affects his remarks on God's being. From the very first question in the Summa Theologide where God is the subject of investigation, Thomas tries to do justice to an understanding of God in which both God's intimacy and ultimacy are respected. In STh I 2, where the esse or existence of God is questioned", Aquinas claims that God can be known and that His exis· tence can be demonstrated by His effects. However, these effects are not proportioned to the peculiar character of God's causality.67 This is worked out in STh I 2.3, the article of the famous five ways, in which God is identified" with some primum movens, causa efficiens prima,

world, He being the first cause and ultimate end of creation. As its first cause and ultimate end God cannot be a part of creation. At the same time, since God's working is at the basis of the existence as well as the perfection of everything that is, a close connection is suggested. This coincidence of continuity and discontinuity in the distinguishability of the relation between God and the world is expressed in the verbs intelligere, nominare, dicere. Thus, in a way, God's existence can be demonstrated and, in a way, His existence escapes our grasp because the manner in which God moves, causes, understands and orders remains unknowable to us." The consideration of God's essence as it is in itself is undertaken in STh I 3-11." Aquinas begins these quaestiones with the words: "But because we cannot know what God is, only what He is not, we cannot consider of God what He is, but better what He is not." Thus in the very beginning of the undertaking a reversal is made and the analytical distinctions," that were designed for an analysis of the created reality in terms of being, are declared to fall short when they are used in order to get a grip on God's nature. Metaphysics and logic cannot help us to know positively what God's essence is. In fact, all distinctions used in philosophy so as to get a grip on created reality, are declared invalid when the formal subject of theology is approached according to its essence.72 This 'negative theology' of Aquinas, however, does not lead to

aliquid per se necessarium, omnibus entibus causa esse et bonitatis et cuius· tibet perfectionis and aliquid intelligens a quo. omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem. In all these instances God is distinguished from the

" Cf. M. Dodds, 1993, p. 211. G6 The Latin is more open: an Deus sit. God does not share in the mode of bcing of creatures which could be falsely suggested by the word 'exist'. " This is the limit which lies at the basis of the success or failure of the so-called 'proofs of God's existence'. For God's causality d. H. Goris, 1996, p. 289-304. " Cf. the final words of each of the five ways: et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum, .,. quam omnes Deum nominant, ... quod omnes dicunt Deum, ... et hoc dicimus Deum, ", et hoc

dicimus Deum.

On the basis of the connection of causa and finis in Aquinas, I regard this to be in line with Aquinas' response to the first objection of STh I 2.1, where it is suggested that God would be known to us as a prime principle. Thomas explains: ... homo enim natura/iter desiderat beatitudinem> et quod natura/iter desideratur ab homine, natura/iter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse,' sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens... " Thus STh I 2·13 is organized according to the structure res (2·11), ratio (12) and

69

verbum (13) moving away from the metaphysical consmeratioll of what God is towards the logical investigation of our God-talk. Since our naming of things is determined by our mode of knowing, the ratio of the word in the intellect mediates between the res and the verbum. " These analytical distinctions (called 'formal features' by D. Burrell, 1979, p. IS) imply all metaphysical distinctions like act-potence, materia-forma, substanceaccident, being-essence and all logical distinctions like subject-predicate, verb-noun, '1

etc. Thus in STh I 3 all compositions are denied of God: forma et materia (a.2), quidditas/essentia et natura/subiectum (a.3), essentia et esse (a.4), genus et differentia

(a.5) and subiectum et accidens (a.6).

34

35

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

CHAPTER!

agnosticism. It is based on the positive appreciation of God being the prime cause of all creation. What needs to be determined next, however, and in this respect metaphysical tools are most helpful, is how the distinctions to be made with regard to creation fail to be applicable to God. We will not examine all logical and metaphysical distinctions Thomas rejects with regard to God in qUdeStio 3, but concentrate on Aquinas' statement that God is His esse as well as His essentia." How do we have to interpret this? Can this provide us with information about what God's life is like? Can 'being' be regarded as a positive description of God's essence? Can this remark about God's essence tell us anything about God's life as a mode of being? D. Burrell points out that in our reflection on esse we always have the tendency to consider 'being' as an extra property which can be added to the essence of a substance; In doing this, however, we deny the irreducible difference between 'what a thing is' and 'whether a thing is'. As Burrell explains: "But Aquinas never puts it that way; he offers an analogy of essence to esse as matter to form, each displaying something of the yet more basic proportion of potency to act. And to say that esse is act and to suggest thereby that we understand it by analogy with act, warns us away from considering it to be a form or an essence. And that, I submit, is the real conversion to which Aquinas is inviting us."" By considering esse on the model of actus, Thomas reverses the perspectives of our thinking. All perfections that can be attributed to a substance (and 'life' is a perfection) are not regarded as additions to a basic property of 'being'. Instead, esse is seen as the actuality of a substance, restrained by its specific essence. Esse as actuality contains every possible perfection and the fact that a substance does not possess every perfection must be ascribed to the limitations of its essence. What Aquinas intends to achieve with the identification of God's esse and His essence now becomes apparent. Identifying God's being with His essence, His esse cannot be restricted by His essence. This entails

that every possible perfection can be ascribed to God." At one and the same time, however, by blurring this most fundamental ontological distinction, the possibility of knowing what God is disappears. Thus, after the so-called 'proofs of God's existence' Aquinas explicitly states that we cannot know that God is." The restriction caused by the essence, which supplies the object with the specific differences that make it discernible, has vanished. By the identification of esse and essence, the question 'what God is' from now on points to the question 'how God is' and vice versa. We become imprisoned by the limitations of our created concepts and philosophical instruments. Even calling God ipsum esse subsistens does not tell us anything more about God's nature than we already knew: that He is the prime cause of our being and that we participate in esse whereas He does not!' The gap between Creator and creatures is localized and not bridged. The nature of God's incomprehensibility becomes specified. By denying all logical and metaphysical distinctions with regard to God, Aquinas tries to express how God "differs differently". How can he maintain that this does not lead to agnosticism? As we have seen, with the characterization of God as causa prima and finis ultimus, Thomas sets out to distinguish God from creation and, at the same time, to link Him with creation. In the history of interpretation of Aquinas the connection of God with the world has, for centuries, been thematized in his so-called 'doctrine of analogy'. How does this relate to the metaphysical procedure just described? Can analogy provide us with a procedure that can help us to gain more insight in God's nature? 2.2.1.2 God's essence: the logical order Considering analogy, we are moving away from Summa Theologiae I 2-11 to STh I 13. In other words, we are shifting from the metaphysical

" 76

7' 1"

And it entails that in Himself God is most knowable. S7b! 3.4.ra2: Ad secundum dicendum quod 'esse' dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat

5Th I 3.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia. ut ostensum est fa.3], sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. D. Burrell, 1986, p. 45; Burrell comments here on De pot 7.2.ra9. Since the work is contemporary to the Summa 1beologiae and Burrell's interpretation in accordance

«tum essendi; alio modo, significat compositiQnem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo acCipiendo 'esse', non possumus scire esse De~ sieut nec eius essentiart; sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus 'Deus est~ vera est. Et hoc scimus ex

with his reading of SIb ! 3 (D. Burrell, 1979), both instances can elucidate each other; Cf. also D. Burrell, 1979, p. 115·179 where he investigates the "master metaphor actus, showing that it is apt to be used in divinis because of its nondescriptive formal quality.

eius e/foctibus, ut supra [S7b I 2.2J dictum est Cf. E. Scbillebeeckx, 1964/1952, p. 206. n Cf. R. te Velde, 1995, p. 119-125; p. 120: "By saying that God's essence consists in being itself, we are not in the possession of an insight into God's essence, just as we

K

have no insight into the nature of being itself."

36

order to the logical order. By acknowledging this, an important step has been taken." Let us be more explicit. As we have seen, in the structure

78

For centuries the interpretation of Aquinas' account and use of analogy has been practised with Cajetan de Vio's De nominum analog;" et de conceptu entis (1498) as a guide. Based on a combined reading of In I Sent 19.5.2.ral and De ver 2.11. Cajetan

distinguishes four analogical types in Aquinas: analogy of inequality, of attribution/proportion, of improper metaphorical proportionality and of proper proportionality. The last type of analogy is considered the only genoine analogy. providing knowledge of God on the basis of the univocity of the concept of being. Cajeran's leading interpretation has been heavily criticized in our century. G. Kreling (1979/1941) shows that not the analogy of proportionality but the analogy of proponion is the prime and decisive analogy, and that the preference of CaJetan is based on the misplaced observation that in the analogy of proponion only one of the analogates containes the res signi[U:4ta in essence. Because analogy .is a matter of relation, Kreling argues, only the division between analogy of proporuon and analogy of proportionality (a proportion of proportions) is valid. In a remarkable article. which is sddom quoted. E. Schillebeech (1964/1952) demonstrates that the

Cajetan tradition of interpretation is ultimately based on a Scotistic univocal concept of being as well as on a special preference for texts of Aquinas which stem from a short phase in the devdopment of his view on aua1ogy. H. Lytt\<ens (1952) also shows that, the analogy of proper proportionality is not the primary form of analogy, and demonstrates that this form of analogy is not without serious internal problems. S. Ramirez (1953) shows that the two texts from the early Thomas cannot be combined intO a total theory since they are not para1ld. G. Klubertanz (1960). B. Montagues (1963) and J. Walgrave (1982/1974[c] and 1978) show. in geeat accordance with Schillebeeckx., that a devdopment in three stages can be, discerned in Aquinas' account of aua1ogy. Aquinas dropped the aua10gy of proportionality as soon as he realizes that the aualogy of proportion alone could safeguard the infinite distance between Creator aud creatures. R. McIneroy (1961. 1978) insists that aua10gy should

be seen as a logical doctrine, blaming Cajetan for having obscured the concept by confusing the logical order with the real order. D. Burrell {1973 and 1979 ['Aquinas

is perhaps best known for his theory of analogy. On closer inspection it turns out he never had one.", p. 55] works out' the observations of McInerny applying them to Aquinas' God-talk in general. He confirms the observation (Schillebeeckx. Walgrave) that once haviug clarified his view on the analogical use of words. Aquinas, in his mature works, hardly pays attention to the theoretical background of analogy and is more interested in the theological question of its foundation. K. Miiller (1983) argues that analogy in Aquinas is not primarily logical or metaphysical. but can be characterised as semiotica1. G. Rocca (1993). in line with

Burrell, argues that Aquinas' reflection on analogy should be seen as "in Thomas's eyes the only valid way of explaining epistemologically. in a secondaty. after-the-fact reflection, what takes place in the primary ontological and theological judgements that bear upon God's very being.... (p. 653). From this overview. it may be clear that Aquinas' account of aua10gy has nothing to do· with the conceptualistic Cajetan version with its univocal core of being that was attacked in the protestaut tradition.

37

CHAPTER I

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

of the first 13 quaestiones of the Summa, three orders are discerned which are closely connected and easily confused. Quaestiones. 2-11 are about God as He is in reality (res), question 12 is about God msofar as He can be known by human beings (ratio) and question 13 is concerned with the way God can be named by us (verbum). The connectio,:," of the three approaches is to be located in the fact that we cannot thmk and talk about God as He is in reality, apart from concepts and wo~ds .that find their origin in human perception. In other words: .the mSlg~ts which are thematized in question 12 and 13 are already put mto practice in question 2-11. Th~ confusion. exists in :he. i~ea that this cl?se connection gives one tile opportumty to combme mSlghts from. question 2-11 with insights from question 13 without being very precise about I 2;11 Thomas talk~ what Aquinas is up to in each of the orders. In about God in the ratio recta. He wants to determme whether God IS and 'what God is'. The upshot of this enterprise is double: on the one hand we learn to appreciate ourselves and the created world as. effects from a cause which has to exist, in one way or another, and which can be identified with God. On the other hand we realize that if this Cause is really conceived as not being a part of creation, on~ cannot teJl 'whether' nor 'what' God is unless we do so by showmg how our distinctions fall short. In SIb I 13 Aquinas is talking about our Godtalk." Here he gives an analysis and an evaluation of what he has been putting into practice in SIb I 2-11. This analysis is based on t!'e insights of quaestio 12, which, in its own turn, is ?ui!: on the conclUSIOns of the first 11 quaestiones. However, the scope IS different. SIb I 13. does not provide us with new information about God's esse or essence, It helps uS to be more aware of the logical peculiarities that are at stake when talking about the incomprehensible God. Therefore, what Aquinas !'as to say about analogy in this quaestio has more the nature. of a reflectIOn on what he already does all the time than a formula which helps us to

STk

The expression analogia entis does not occur in Aquinas and. appears only at .the end of the fifteenth century. Speaking anachronistitally in terms of analog;" entlS versus analog;" fidei one should say that Aqoinas·. analogy ultimatdy captures the latter (Cf. E. Jiinge1. 1977. p. 357-408; J. Wissink. 1983. p. l3l-~5? .and.377-388; H. Rilthof. 1990); With regard to the aualogical use of the word life with regard to God d. also O.H. Pesch. 1967. p. 606-628. aud especially 613·617. where he stresses - ill accordance with Lyttkens, Schillebeeckx, McInerny, and. others . the 'agnostic moment' in our knowledge of God. n For a Dutch translation, introduction and clarifying commentary on STh I 13 d. H. Rilthof. 1988.

38

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

bring light to the divine 'darkness'. Let us turn back to our subject, the 'life' of God, and see what Thomas tells us about our actual speaking about God's 'life' in quaestio 13. In the first article, Aquinas takes the Aristotelian epistemological stand that we can name things insofar as they are known by our intellect." Since God can be known in this life only from creatures, according to the relation of His being the principle of all creatures, excelling them all and lacking all created imperfections, the words we have can never express the essence of God as it is in itself. The only words available are the words which stem from our perception of creatures. They consignify compositeness and temporality, they carry the overtOnes of a created world, a world in process." With this restriction in mind, Aquinas proceeds by asking whether we can use words for God substantia/iter, expressing what He is. The problem here seems not to arise with regard to words which are said negatively about God (as e.g. 'infinite'), or words expressing a relation (as e.g. 'causality'), but with words which are said of God in an absolute and affirmative way. 'Good' and 'wise' are such words, but also the word 'life' in which here we are primarily interested. Aquinas makes his position clear in contrast with two other positions: the first is the stand of Moses Maimonides who understands 'God is living' as expressing the conviction that God is not an inanimate thing: thus the word 'living' is said affirmatively, but is in fact used to deny something of God rather than to assert anything. The other position which can be identified as the account of pseudo-Dionysius who explains 'God is life' as 'God is the cause of life'." Thomas rejects these positions for three reasons. 8J In his own account, Aquinas then

"

5Th! 13.l.co: Respondeo dicendum quod secundum Philosophum, I Perihermeneias 2 (16a3]. "Voces sum signa intellectuum, et intel/eetus sunt rerum similitudines", et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intel/eetus. Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest

" "

D. Burrell, 1979, p. 38. Cf.. M. Jordan, 1983, p. 165·175, who presents a reading of De pot 7, a quaestio wntten in the same years as STb I 13; On pseudo.Dionysius cf. also G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649. STh I 13.2.00: Primo quidem, quia secundum neutram ha:rum positionum possel assignari ratio quare quaedam nomina magis de Dea dicerentur quam alia. .. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo, per posterius dicerentur de ipso... Tertia, quia hoc est contra intentionem loquentium de Deo.

nominari.

8)

CHAPTER!

39

makes an interesting turn which reminds uS of what he did with actus with regard to God's being and which brings us closer to an understan- . ding of STh I 18. He draws a parallel between the direct objects of our knowledge (creatures) which represent God imperfectly as effects which resemble Him only insofar as they contain some perfection on one hand and the names we use for signifying God's substance on the other. Since God can only be known by His effects, which represent Him imperfectly, we can only name Him with words which denote Him imperfectly. The causal relation between Creator and creatures, however, entails a turn in perspective which affects the mode of understanding and signifying Go'd. At the end of the response Aquinas shortly sketches this in confrontation with Maimonides and pseudo-Dionysius. Applied to our subject": "God is life" does not mean that God is the cause of life (Dionysius) or that He is not inanimated (Maimonides), it means that what we call 'life' in creatures pre-exists in God in a higher way; a way which is higher than we can understand or signify. Aquinas insists that God is not called 'life' insofar as He is the cause of created life, but because He is 'life', created life flows from Him. Thus the perspective is reversed and as with actus, we should understand all created forms of life as restricted and imperfect representations of God's own life. Thus, metaphysically as well as logically, the standard is set by God's life. A standard, however, which remains incomprehensible to us. In the words of the third article: with regard to the res significata 'life' is more appropriately said of God than of creatures, with regard to the modus significandi, the word 'life' is said inappropriately of God, having a mode of signifying which is only fit to name creatures." But what, then, is happening exactly when we call God 'life'? The infinite distinction between Creator and creatures seems to suggest that here we use the word 'life' equivocally: the same word used with two different definitions. The causality, however, of God's life, seems to entail that 'life' is used univocally: only when it is used in one and the same definition the link between God's life and created life seems to be safeguarded. So a dilemma arises: our God-talk is either univocal, at the price of considering God ultimately as part of creation, or equivocal, at

.. Aquinas does so explicitly in 5Th ! 13.2.ro2. 85 5Th I 13.3.co: Quantum igitur ad id quod significant hujusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ;psis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad modum signiflCand~ non paprie dicuntur de Deo, habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.

40

CHAPTER!

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

the price of agnosticism." Aquinas rejects both horns of the dilemma and states that things can be said of God and creatures by analogy, which is: according to some proportion." Thomas discerns two versions of analogical or proportional use of names: the proportion of two things to a common third (a diet can be called 'healthy' [1] as a complexion can be called so as well [2], since they are the cause and the sign of the human being called 'healthy' [3D and the proportion between two things (a diet can be called 'healthy' [1] as the cause of health [2] in a man). The latter proportionality is helpful in order to explain what happens when we call God and human beings 'living'. In this case the definition (ratio) of the word 'living' is partly the same, partly different. Aquinas works this out in more detail in the next article of quaestio 13 where he asks whether words are attributed primarily to God or to creatures? Here he explains that analogical use of words is based on the order of those subjects to a central subject. In order to explain the analogical use, the central subject has to be in the definition of all the other instances. Thus, the 'health' of a medicine can only be explained with regard to the 'health' of an animated being, to which the health of a medicine is ordered as a cause. 'Health' refers primarily to the health of animated beings and only secondarily to medicines. Since we have seen that God is the first cause of all creatures, one could draw the conclusion that the same mechanism is to be applied here: what 'life' means when it is attributed to God could only be explained when looking at human life because 'life' refers primarily to human beings and secondarily to God. But this is exactly what happens when the position of pseudo-Dionysius is adopted, according to whom 'God is life' only means 'God is the cause of 'life'. Aquinas argues, however, that names can be said essentially of God, referring to what He is. Therefore, when we call God 'life', we not only say that He is the cause of all created 'life', but also that 'life' exists in Him in an eminent way (however incomprehensible to us). Though, according to the imposition, the word 'life' refers primarily to the creatures which we know first, according to

" Cf. G. Rocca, 1993, who characterises Aquinas' approach as hovering over the abyss of God's incomprehensibility, an abyss between the cliff of univocity and the cliff of equivocity; Cf. H. Rikhof, 1988; J. Wissink, 1994. 17 Aquinas' account of analogy is a modified version of what he learns from Aristode. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, 1964/1952, p. 214; B. Montagnes, 1963, p. 2+25; D. Burrell, 1973, p. 68-91; J. Walgrave, 1982/1974[c], p. 17·20.

41

the res significata per nomen, 'life' is said primarily of God. 2.2.2 Summa Theologiae I 18.3-4 Now we can" begin to understand the road Aquinas travels in SIb I 18.3 and interpret the sentences at the end of his response. When he investigates the definition of 'life' (self-movement) as it can refer to creatures at different ontological levels, he perceives a shift in the ratio of the elements 'self and 'movement'. In this combined continuity and discontinuity the analogical procedure can be seen at work. In accordance with the lirdo impositionis Aquinas starts at the level at which 'life' is found most evidently. The further he pushes his investigation, the closer he comes to the central subject with regard to which the rest of the instances is determined. In God the ratio of 'self is to be found in its fullest sense. By the fact that in His movement God is not determined by anything whatsoever, His movement is to be called free in the highest degree and can be ascribed to Him unlike anything else. Since Aquinas introduces his account of God's freedom with a discussion of the increasing amount of freedom in the different grades of life, one is almost likely to forget that with God's freedom we enter a realm of a different quality. In fact the kind of freedom Aquinas refers to with regard to God, is the freedom of the Creator. All necessity and all determination by anything outside of God is unthinkable here. In other words: the 'concept'" of freedom which is part of the 'definition' of God's life, points to the distinction between Creator and creatures. Is the same true for the element of 'movement'? In the first objection of SIb I 18.3 Thomas formulates the argument that 'life' cannot be attributed to God, since life implies movement which does not apply to God." The argument is rather compound and can be so because in SIb I 9 Aquinas already devotes two articles on the question as to whether God is immutable. It may be elucidating to take a short look at these articles in order to understand better the shift which takes place with regard to the element of 'movement' in God's

BS

8?

The word 'concept' is put b~ quotation marks as a reminder that God's freedom shares in the incomprehensibility of His essence. 5Th I 18.3.agl: Vuietur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo non competit mcweri. Ergo neque vivere.

42

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

life. 90 In STh I 9.1 the question is raised by a seeming discord between

auctoritates where motion seems to be implied in the working of the Spirit, God's wisdom and His relationship with creatures on the one hand and a verse from Holy Scripture (and not from Aristotle!) on the other hand: Ego enim Dominus et non mutor (Ml 3,6). In his response Aquinas immediately recurs to STh I 2.3, the famous article of the 'five ways'. As he explained there the first Being which we call God can only be pure actus." Thus 'motion' as a transition from potentiality to act can never be ascribed to God. We have seen before that this notion of God's pure 'actuality' enables Thomas to express God's perfection and His incomprehensibility at one and the same time. In line with this, Maleachi's suggestion of God's immutability is interpreted by Aquinas as an expression of God's incomprehensible perfection. A perfection which can be approached when God is taken as the prima causa and finis ultimus of all creation, but which retains its incomprehensibility. Thus speaking about God's immutability becomes another way of expressing the distinction between the Creator and His creation and being immutable can be regarded as a proprium of God." If, however, immutability is a proprium of God, how can 'life' (defined by 'self' as well as 'movement') ever be attributed to Him and how can be made a reasonable case for the claim that it is ascribed to God even more properly than to anything else? On the crucial moment of STh I 18.3.co Thomas bases the idea that God possesses life in the

CHAPTER I

43

highest degree on the formula that God's nature is His act of knowing. In other words, the concept of motion which is necessaty in order to be able to ascribe 'life' to God, is connected with God's knowing." In the

response to the first objection of STh I 18.3 Thomas explains that willing and knowing can be called 'motion' by means of a similitude." As immanent actions they imply an actualization of the agent which bears a likeness with transient actions like heating or cutting which are forms of actualization that are discernable by an external motion. The difference between both kinds of action, however, is that the transient action implies a perfection of the external object with regard to which the action takes plrl, whereas the immanent operation leads to a perfection of the one who acts. In creatures this immanent operation of knowing and willing can only be found as a process which can be analysed in terms of potentiality and act. In God, however, there can only be actuality: God is actus purus. By recurring to the notion of actuality, Aquinas reintroduces the concept which has helped him to express God's incomprehensible perfection. The similitude may serve as a basis for calling God's knowing a kind of motion, it may not, however, suggest that this actualization has the shape of a process in which potentiality is involved. Can we gain more insight here by investigating Aquinas' account of God's knowing and willing? Cutting short this question one could answer that God's simplicity does not allow for making a distinction between God's being and His operations secundum rem. Therefore, God's operations share- in the incomprehensibility of His nature." But Aquinas explicitly investigates God's willing and knowing and, as we

~

M. Dodds, 1986, after his analysis of the various places in which motus functions with regard to creatures and God, arrives at the conclusion that motion as well as immutability as such can be ascribed to God, as long as they are purged from their connotations of imperfection. He writes {po 224}: "Although both motion and immutability may be predicated of God, immutability seems to signify divine being (c,si) more appropriate since it more clearly indicates that the distinction of divine being from all other things and the ttansceodeoce of divine being above all our human concepts and knowledge.' " 511> I 9.1.co: Respondeo dicendum quod ex praemissis [S11> I 2.3] ostendiEuT Deum esse omnino immutabiJem. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aJiquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum aliquo modo mutari. The other two arguments are based on God's simplicity and His perfection. 92 STh I 9.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem ere.tUT. "'iquo """'" est mutahiiis. Cf. D. Burrell, 1979, p. 36-38.

"

In S11> I 9.1 as wdl as S11> I 18.3 the fust objections and the responses to them deal with God's 'Velie and intelligere. Remember funhermore that STh I 18 is treated within the context of God's intelligere.

.. 511> I 18.3.ra1: skut dicitur in IX Metapbysicae 8 [1050.22], duplex est actio, una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare.· alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et wile. Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsim moti; secund4 autem actio est perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda.actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dkitur motus eOO,' ex hac similitudine, quod, sicut matus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi actio est actus agentis; lket motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti, idest existentis in acta, III dicitur in m De anima 7 [431a6J, Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est matus, id quod se inte1ligit, dicitur se movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato pos«it quod Deus movet seipsum [ef. STh I 9.1.ral], non eo modo quo motus est actus imperflcti. " Cf. M. Dodds, 1993, p. 219·220.

CHAPTER!

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

have observed, he deals with the question of God's life within the context of God's knowing. Can the wider context of our question bring us some more information about the nature of motion involved here? We cannot give an elaborate reading of STh I 14-25 here". For our purpose it may be sufficient to pay attention to the central 'reversions' Aquinas maltes with regard to God's knowing and willing; 'reversions' which stem from a consequent consideration of God as prima causa and finis ultimus of creation. With regard to God's knowing this entails that operations, in which the intellect is informed by any object, do not talte place." All possible objects are created by God and thus we should say that they are in God's mind before they come into being. The potentiaactus scheme does not fit God's pure actuality. God's essence remains incomprehensible and with regard to creation a reversal is observed in the primacy of the knower above the object known." The same reversal is to be observed with regard to God's willing. In the created world the goodness of an object which is known raises the desire of the will. As prima causa God is at the basis of all being and goodness. Thus He constitutes the goodness of the object by willing it." The investigation in both, God's intelligere and His velie, only maltes clear that we are dealing here with the same modifications. of words that we come across in our investigation in God's 'life'. A full account of Aquinas' view on God's knowing and willing would at least take as much space as our present sketch of his views on God's life and provide us with no more insight into the strict incomprehensibility of God's

" 91

98

"

This is carried out by J. Wissink, 1994. STb I 14.2.co: Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus purns, aponet quod in eo intelleetus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis... STh I U.s.co: Respondeo dicendu.m quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestwn est enim quod seipsum perfecte inte/figit. alioquin suum esse non esset per/ectum, cum mum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte aliquid cogrwscitur, necesse est qU<Jd virtus eim perfecte cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius re perfecte cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscantur eft ad qU4e 'Virtus se utendi!. Unde. cum virtus divina se extendat ad aik4 eo quod ipsa est prima causa ejJecti'lJ4 omnium e'ntium. ut ex supradictis {STh I 2.3] patel,' necesse est quod Deus alia a se cognoscat. S'Ib! 19.4 and S'Ib ! 20.2.co: Unde, cum amare nil alind sit quam "elle bonum alicui manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt amat. Non tamen eo modo situt nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa honitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab obiecto, amcr noster, quo bonum alicui vo/umus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eOO, vel vera vel aestimata, provocat amcrem, quo ei volumus et bonum

comeroari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.

45

essence. What becomes clear, however, is that Aquinas works out his analysis of God's operations along the line of God's pure actuality. Thus he retains the element of the potentia-actus scheme which is decisive in the analysis of motion (namely: actus) without being obliged to ascribe potentiality to God. Doing this, Thomas seems to achieve two things at the same time. By denying potentiality of God, actus is bereaved of its correlate and becomes incomprehensible. It retains, however, the connotation of perfection at which Aquinas aims. Summarizing the procedure Aquinas adopts, we see a double shift taking place in the definition of 'life'. With regard to the element of 'self we see an increase in freedom ending at the incomprehensible selfdetermination of God who is not bound by anything outside Himself.. With regard to the element of 'movement' we observe a shift from 'movement' proprie dicta (first perfection) to communiter dicta (second perfection), ending at intellectual operations which are called movement per similitudinem. When this last step is applied to God, we end up with an incomprehensible kind of movement, as we are reminded of by the identification of God's nature and operation!OO Thus Aquinas opens the way to a fuller understanding of why 'life' can be ascribed to God. But at the crucial moment, when God is arrived at, he does two things at one and the same time: he explains that God is to be called 'life' in the most proper sense and he c.uts off all further understanding by reminding us of the essence of God which does not allow for any of the distinctions we use for our understanding. Thus the analogical use of the word 'life' leaves us with a direction being pointed, based on the created effects of God we know.'Ol In fact the procedure is that of the three viae by which Aquinas modifies the position of pseudo-Dionysius: God is 'life', (via positiva/causaliratis), however not in the mode of created life (via negativa) but in an infinitely higher mode {via eminentiae).'02

tOO

101

102

SIb I 18.3.co: Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum ems intel/igere, et cui id quod natura/iter habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Cf. E. Schillebeech, 1964/1952, p. 211-212. Cf. M. Jordan, 1983, p. :167; G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649; M. Dodds, 1986, p. 196-197, notes tbat tbe three viae keep eacb otber balanced: 'Since all three of tbe ways of

causalityI negation and eminence are involved in any knowledge which we have of God, none may be omitted without jeopardizing tbe integrity of our knowledge of God. If tbe way of causality were omitted, then tbe metaphysical foundation of tbe otber ways would be lacking, and tbey would no longer be able to answer tbe

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CHAPTER!

With all this in mind, the fourth article of STh I 18 is relatively easy to read. At first sight the question "whether everything in God is life" looks like a grammatical mistake. The question is raised, however by John 1, 3-4 which indeed had raised some grammatical difficulties in the ages before Aquinas.1O' When it is read against the background of God's simplicity, however, the sentence Quod factum est in ipso vita erat becomes intelligible. Since the intellect, the object known and the act of knowing are the same in God secundum rem, the content of what is known by God is identical with His essence. In fact, all creatures are known by God even before they come into existence, as we have seen. Thus, all created being, as it is known by God, cannot be distinguished from God's essence secundum rem. Since God's essence is life, all creatures are life in God.">! With the fourth article of this quaestio the life of God is brought in relation to creation by the identification of God's essence and His intelligere. The relation is discussed insofar as the living and non-living creatures share in the life of God according to an incomprehensible mode of being which is God's 'mode of being'.I05

triune God according to His essence, we will continue our investigation turning to the way 'life' is ascribed to the divine Pe~s?ns in G?d. Before we consider the 'life' of Father, Son and Holy SPlrlt, we Will shortly recur to our initial question. We began this investigation, in order to find an appropriate perspective for our question regarding the relation of earthly life with 'life' after death. Does the upshot of what we have found so far help us further with our search for the right perspective? In the first place, we have discovered some connections between the incomprehensible God and the word 'life'. In the metaphy~ic~l. o;~er we have seen what Aquil(as means when he says that G?d IS .hfe III the highest degree. In the logical order we have seen. what It entatls when he says that life in its proper sense can only be attributed to God. We have seen how at one and the same time Aquinas distinguishes and connects God with creation by regarding God as the prima causa and finis ultimus of creation. Being the prima causa of human life God designs and sustains human nature. The human degree of life, located among the other forms of life in STh I 18.3.co, is essentially an intellectual life with its own level of intellectual and volitional activities, the boundaries of which being set by God. However important this is for the theological appreciation of human life, the importance for our question of what has been said of God. becomes even greater, when we take into account the fact that God IS also finis u!timus of human life. According to Thomas' interpretation of Scripture, man was created to share in the life of God; the same incomprehensible life of God sketched so far. Thus, at least two words become of importance in our attempt to rephrase the initial question. In the first place vita naturalis as the specific mode of being according to human nature. In the second place vita aeterna as both, a name for God's essence as well as a name for the perspective of the perfection of the human vita naturalis. Eternal life, according to Thomas, is the ultimate end of human life. Participation in God's life is the activity for which human beings are designed. In the natural order, as we have seen, human beings already participate in God's life as all created beings participate in His life.I06 The participation 'eternal life' refers to, isof a different kind. Firstly, because Aquinas thinks of this participation as an activity in accordance v:ith the specific (intellectual) capacity of human beings: a perfected knowmg and

2.2.3 The life of God and the life of man Having exposed Aquinas' interpretation of vita as a name of the

arguments of those who claim that knowledge of God is nothing more than a projection of knowledge of self. Without the via negatioIDs, which underlines the radical difference between God an creatures, the God affirmed in the via causalitatis would become nothing more than a son of benificent creature "writ large". And without the via eminentiae. we would know none of the attributes which may properly be predicated of God. God would then remain for us a son of faceless enigma Standing somehow behind the created world." to) Aquinas examines the different possible punctuations in In Joan 1.2 [Busa: 615-781]. 104

lOS

5Th I 18.4.co: Respondeo dkendum quod. skut dictum est. vivere Dei est eOO intelligere. In Deo autem est idem intelleetus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum intelligere eOO. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita ems. Untie, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Dea, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa 'Oita divina. Cf. STh I 18.4.ral: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina... Alio modo dicuntur res esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sum in Deo per proprw ratio. nes, quae non sum aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res, prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essemitt divina. Et quia essentia divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo loquend~ in Deo non sunt motus sed vita; ra2: in mente divina habent esse divinumj ra3: quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum.

". Cf. SIb ! 18.4.ra1.

47

48

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loving of God. Secondly, because the possibility of such an intellectual participation seems to be frustrated from the outset by the distinction between creatures and Creator. Thus, eternal life includes a quality by which, somehow or other, the gap between Creator and creatures is bridged: a divine initiative by which human natural life is lifted towards eternal life. In Holy Scripture we are told about this process. Guided by the great Councils of the Church the personal God of the Covenant, who is incomprehensible, is recognized in Scripture as Father, Son and Spirit. In the Christian reading of the stories of the Bible the relationship of humankind with God is discovered to be initiated and sustained by the work of Father, Son and Spirit. The growing union of man with God, the quality which is bestowed on man in order to personalize the relationship of Creator and creatures, is thematized in Aquinas' theology by the name of vita gratiae: life of grace. In order to complete our account of Aquinas' view on the 'life' of God, we will now turn to the divine Persons who are connected with the life of grace in different ways.

creation and, more important, the welfare of humankind which is perfected by the Son incarnate and the gift of the Holy Spirit. lOS Thus, the knowledge of the triune God is connected with the success of the course of earthly life. How this knowledge of the Father, Son and Spirit works out for our theme in detail can be explained after having taken a short look at Aquinas' account of the divine Persons in God. 2.3.1 Distinguishing the divine Persons The point of departure of Aquinas' account of the divine Persons is God's own revelation in Scripture.'" In Scripture the words, concepts and images are found which have led to the trinitarian expressions of the Creeds and the Councils. Subsequently, it is the task of the theologian to investigate how these words can be truthfully said of God wi~hout denying His divine otherness. Thus, in Thomas' consideration of the divine Persons two approaches can be discerned. On the one hand, he reflects on the relations of the three Persons on the basis of a similitude to the created intellectual natures.''' On the other hand, he

2.3 Divine life and the divine Persons Reflecting on the Trinity, the ability of the theologian who makes an effort to respect God's incomprehensibility is challenged once more. As we have seen, Aquinas tries to do justice to God's otherness by showing hawaii our analytical distinctions fall short when they are applied to God. Metaphysically the limit is reached when he states that secundum rem God's nature is His being and God's being is His essence. We have sketched how this respect for God's incomprehensibility does not prevent Thomas from ascribing 'life' in its most proper sense to God, claiming that God's essence is His life and calling His nature vita. ls the truth that the one nature, the one 'life' of God is shared by three divine Persons of relevance for our investigation? The answer is affirmative. Knowledge of the divine Persons, although not obtainable by natural reason'O', is necessary for the correct appreciation of

lOB

liendum de salute generis human;, quae perficilUY per Filium incarnatum, et per donurn 10')

110

", STh ! 32.1.co: Respondeo die,ndum quod impossibile esl per ralionem naluralem ad cognitionem Trinitatis divinarum personarum peruenire. Ostensum est enim supra [STb I 12.4+12J quod homo per rationem natura/em in cognitionem Dei peroenire non potest nisi ex creaturis. Creaturae autem ducunt in Dei cognitionem, skut efJectus in causam. Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod competere ei necesse est

secundum quod est omnium entium principiutn, et hoc fundamento usi sumus supra (STb I 12.12], in consideratione Dei. Vtrtus autem creativ(J Dei est communis toti Trinitat~ unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non ad distinctionem personarum. Per rationem igieur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinent ad unitatem essentiae, non autem ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum. For this reason Aquinas deals with God's esseoce in ScG! and with the divine Persons in ScG IV. STh I 32.1.ra3: cognitio divinarum Personarum fuit necessaria nobis dupliciter. Uno modo, ad reete sentiendum de creatione rerum. Per hoe enim quod dicimus Deum omnia /ecisse Verbo suo, excluditur error ponentium Deum produxisse res ex necessitate naturae. Per hoc autem quod ponimus in eo processionem amoris, ostenditur quod Deus non propter aliquam indigentiam creaturas produxit, neque propter aliquam aliam causam extrinsecam,' sed propter amorem sui bonitatis... Alio modo, et principalius, ad ncte senSpiritus saneti. . . Cf. SeG N 2.1: Principium autem considerationis a secreto divinae generatwnu sumentes, quid de ea secundum sacrae Scripturae documenta teneri de'beat, praetermittamus. Dehine vero ea quae contra veritatem fidei infideJitas adinvenit argumenta ponamus. STh I 27.1.eo: Cum autem Deus sit super omn~ ea quae in Deo dicuntur, non sunt inteJligenda secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quae sunt corpora; sed secundum similitudinem suprema-rum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae,· a quibus etiam similitudo aeeepta deficit a repraesentatione divinorum. Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corpora/ibus, vel per matum loea/em, vel per actionem alicuius causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a ealefaciente in ealefactum;

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stresses that the three divine Persons can only be thought of in terms of relations of origin.'" The first line of thought is possible because Scripture tells us that God has created man after His image and likeness (Gn 1,26).112 The processio of the Son from the Father, mentioned in In 8,42, can be understood with the help of the similitude to the intellectual operation of the human mind. In the act of understanding one can discern a processio of a conception of the thing understood. This conception (verbum interius) is an internal product of the intellect.ll3 Thus by the

relation of intellect and internal word a similitude is found for the relation of procession of Father and Son who share the same divine

50

111

112

in

sed secundum emanatwnem intelligibiJem. utpote verbi inteJligibilis a dicente. quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides catholica processionem ponit in divinis.. STh I 27.prol: Et quia Personae divinae secundum relationes originis distinguuntur. secundum ordinem doctrinae prius considerandum est de origine, sive de processicne; secunda, de relationibus originis; tenio, de Personis. In the Summa Theologiae it takes two quaestiones in which the concepts of processio and relatio are examined, before Thomas is able to explain what is meant by persona, within the context of Trinitarian formula's (5Th! 29.3.00): Respondeo dicendum quod persona significat id quod est peifectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistem in rationali natura. Unde. cum omne illud quod est perfectionis. Deo sit attribuendum, eo quod eius essentia continet in se omnem pe:rfoctionem; conveniens est ut hoc nomen persona de Deo dicatur. Non tamen eadem modo quo dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo; sicut et alia nomina, quae, creaturis a nobis imposita, Deo attribuuntur,· sicut supra [STh I 13.3] ostensum est> cum de divinis nominibus ageretur. , Cf. ScG IV 26.6: Hujus autem divinae Trinitatis similitudinem in mente hU1n4n4 possu· mus considerare... [7] Et propter hoc> sic consideratur divina simi/itudo in homine simt simi/itudo HercuJis in lapide: quantum ad repraesentationem formae> non quantum ad convenientiam naturae: unde et in mente hominis dicitur esse imago Dei: secundum illud Gn 1>26: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram". Cf. 5Th I 39.7.co: Sicut igitur similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad mani/estationem divinarum personarum ita et essentialibus attributis. Cf. also S1b I 45.7; F. de Gri;s> 1967, in his study on imago Dei in In W Sent, explains that the image of God in man is always an image of the Trinity. He shows a great sensitivity for the graceful reflections that occur when the faithful theologian is occupied with the consideration of the Trinity. Cf. his 'serial story' about the position of -the theologian, p. 37·38, 63·64, 345·346 {'Who knows God, can recognize Him in his image. Who does not know Him, may be able to know the image, but merely as spirituality and potentiality, not as a reference to God."[translation C.L.D and 592· 603. STh I 27.1.co: Sed, cum omnis processio sit secundum aliquam actionem, sicut secundum

actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam> est aliqua processio ad extra; ita secundum actionem quae manel in ipso agente, attenditur processio quaedam ad intra. Et hoc maxime patet in intellectu, cuius actio> scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente. Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit> procedit aliquid intra ipsum> quod est conceptio rei intellectat? ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia

nature. 1l4

The same procedure is followed with regard to the second processio, the 'procession' of the Spirit we are told of in In 15,26. Here the operation of the will. may serve as a s~militude. ;Ac.cording to this procession, the processIOn of love, the th'~ loved IS I~ the one who 10ves.ll5 This second processio (of the Spmt) has a different nature compared with the one of the Son. The intellect works by means of a procession which consi~ts in th~ p:oduction o~ .a similitude of the. object known in the knower. The WIll IS an appetltlve power by which the thing known is positively accepted. Nothing new is generated here, b';t the object known is loved, which means that the one who loves IS moved or drawn to the object.'" This first positive line of thought, providing a way of dealing with the texts in the Scripture about three divine Persons, is constantly corrected by a negative line according to which we must be aware of the

114

procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat, et dicitur 'verbum cordis', significatum verba vocis. Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 173-179. . In ScG IV 11 Thomas works out this similitude in some length by expanding on a consideration of various degrees of being. Here he adopts the point of view that secundum diversitatem naturarum diversus emanationis modus invenitur in rebus: et quanto aliqua natura est altiar, tanto id quod ex ea emanat, magis ei est intimum (ScG IV 11.1). With the help of this principle he discerns an increase in the degree to which a procession becomes more internal at the succesive levels of esse, vivere and intelligere. The highest created level is that of the angels in quibus intellectus ad sui cognitionem non procedit ex aliquo exterion, sed per se cognoscit seipsum (ScG IV 11.5). Similar to his procedure in 5Th! 18.3.co Aquinas uses this highest created similitude as a final moment of comprehension before facing the incomprehensible God:

lts

116

Ultima igitur perfectio vitae competit Deo, in quo non est aliud intelligere et aliud esse> ut supra ostensum est, et ita oportet quod intentio "intellecta in Deo sit ipsa divina essentia (5cG IV 11.5). Cf. H. Berger, 1990. STh I 27.3.co: Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris> secundum quam atnatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta, est in intelligente. STh I 27.4.co: Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis> non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus, quo nomine quaedam vita/is motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moven vel impe/li ad aliquid faciendum.

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CHAPTER I

truth that - secundum rem - in God there cannot be a distinction between His intellect and His will."' In the approach according to which the divine Persons can only be distinguished by an investigation into their relation of origin, the notiones are a great help.118 They make it possible that proprw. can be discerned with regard to the different divine Persons; words that can only refer to one of them.ll9 As we have explained before, vita is a name for God's essence. Thus it refers to the common divine nature which Father, Son and Spirit share: the trinitarian life of God, which cannot be assigned to one of the Persons as a proprium. Nevertheless, there seems to be a special connection between the Spirit and 'life' as we can read in various places in Scripture and as is proclaimed in the Nicene Creed. I" Aquinas honors this fact by the procedure of approprw.tio by which a word, which refers to the common nature of the divine Persons, is attributed to one of them because of a special convenience. 121 What bearing does this appropriation have on our subject? How is this special relation between the Spirit and vita? How does it relate to the fact that the Father and the Son also share in God's 'life'? An important text which can bring us close to the answers Aquinas deve!ops is STh I 45.6. In quaestio 45 Aquinas deals with creation, or to put It more precisely, the processio of the creatures from God, using the same word for the relations of origin of the divine Persons as well as for creation. In the sixth article the question is posed whether creare is a prop~ium ?f one of. the divine Persons. The question is raised by a see~l1ng discord which resembles the way 'life' is, on the one hand, attributed to the common nature of all divine Persons and on the other appropriated to the Spirit. In this case creare on the one hand is to be

assigned to God's nature (being the prima causa), while on the other we see, e.g. in the Nicene Creed, different aspects of causality attributed to different divine Persons122 • Aquinas deals with this problem by explaining, firstly, that creare refers to the Trinity according to the one nature of God. Subsequently, he investigates how, in the common causality of the three Persons, different aspects can be distinguished which can be connected to the relations of origin by which the divine Persons are distinguished. Thus, the Father creating through the Son and the Spirit is compared with a craftsman who designes and produces by his intellect and will."'. In the response to the second obiectio Aquinas explains how 'this can clarify the various attributions in the Nicene Creed. It can be explained either from the relations of origin of the three Persons, or with reference to the attribution of essential attributes. This second approach is of special interest for our inquity since it can provide us with a heuristic matrix which can help us in the rest of our study. As Thomas explained before (in STh I 39.8.co) one can, with Augustine, appropriate potentw. to the Father, sapientia to the Son and bonitas to the Spirit.'" This appropriation is in line with the different relations of origin of the divine Persons. The Father is distinguished as

117 lIB

III

123

Cf. 5Th I 27.3.ra3. 5Th I 32.2-3j The five notiones are: innascibilitas, paternit4S, filiatio, communis spiratio

and processio. l19

12.0

U1

Thus ingenitus is a proprium of the Father, for He is the one who is distinguished by the notion innascibililds, being the first principle of the processiones (STh I 33.4). Imago is a proprium of the Son, being the Word by which the Father knows Himself (STh I 35.2). Cf. Ezk 37,6: Dabo 'VObis Spiritum et vivetis, In 6,64: Spiritus est qui vivificatj 2eo 3,6: Littera enim occUit Spiritus autem vivificatj Nicene Creed: et in Spiritum sanctum. Dominum et vivijicantem. 5Th I 39.7.co: SKut igitur similizudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum Personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec manifestatio Personarum per essentialia attributa, 'appropriatic' nominatur.

U4

53

STh I 45.6.ag2: nam in Symbolo Fidei Patri attribuitur quod sit "Creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium~' Filio autem attribuitur quod "per eum omnia facta sunt~· sed Spiritui sancto. quod sit "Dominus et vivijicator". STh I 45.6.co: Respondeo dicendum quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum.. Unde creare non est proprium alicui Personae. sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen divinae Personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra [STh [ 14.8 and 19.4J ostensum est, cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur. Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. Artijex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum. operatur. Unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam per mum Verbum. quod est Filius.' et per suum Amorem qui est Spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones Personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum. irzquantum includunt essentialia attrihuta, quae sunt scientia et voluntas. STh I 39.8.co: 'Potentia' enim habet rationem principii. Untie habet similitudinem cum Patre cae/est;' qui est principium totius divit1;itatis... 'Sapientia' vera similitudinem habet

cum Filio cadesti, inquantum est Verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapienti· ae... 'Bonitas' autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris. habet similitudinem cum Spiritu divino. qui est Amor.... Once this similitude is appreciated. a foreshadowing of the Trinity seems to be perceivable in the quaestiones of the Summa (STh I 14-25) where the operations which pertain to the one divine essence are treated:· STh I 14-18 God's knowing (the Son), STh I 19·24 God's willing (the Holy Spirit) and STh I 25 God's power (the Father).

54

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the origin, associated with being and creating. The Son is distinguished as the one springing from the Father. He is the one who became a man, Jesus Christ who lived among us in order to reveal the Father. The Spirit is the one who proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit is the one known by us as the Spirit of Christ and working through the power of the Father and the Son. By spelling out the relations of the divine Persons in this way, we are shifting from the trinitarian point of view to the involvement of the same triune God with His creatures. This shift in perspective, which Thomas often makes, is a legitimate one: in accordance with God's 'via revelationis', the reflection on the history of salvation through Christ leads towards the reflection on God's trinitarian life. For only as a result of the stories of the life and death of Christ in Scripture has the Church been forced to reflect on the triune mystery of Father, Son and Spirit. But apart from being legitimate, the shift is theologically significant: God has revealed Himself as being involved in creation as Father, Son and Spirit. That both perspectives are views on the same triune God is reflected in Aquinas' use of the same word, processio, for the procession of the Son from the Father, as well as for the presence of the Son by

consideration of the life of the three Persons and that of the life of the creatures.

grace in man. ill

The appropriations of esse (potentia), verum and bonum to Father, Son and Spirit help uS to perceive the ubiquity of the involvement of the divine Persons in creation. Thus the knowledge of sacra doctrina (which implies God's revelation) enables two things at the same time: with the help of God's created effects the divine Persons are distinguished and with the help of these distinctions God's involvement with creation is elucidated. What does all this entail for our subject, vita as a name of God? How is vita related to the different divine Persons? 2.3.2 The divine Persons and life

God's nature, which is vita, is common to the three divine Persons. According to the order of origin"', however, the Son receives the divine nature, which is vita, from the Father, and the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. One verse appears again and again in these reflections on trinitarian life, viz. John 5,26: 5icut enim Pater habet vitam in semet ipso sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semet ipso.tv Thus, within trinitarian life, vita in the sense of esse, is appropriated to the Father, being the ground of this divine life. Since the Father is the principium of divine life, God's power is appropriated to the Father. From the point of view of creatures, the most basic articulation of God's power is found in His creative activity. Aquinas understands creare as the production of something out of nothing.'" When the production of being (esse) is the first and most fundamental way in which God's power is manifested, and when one remembers that life is a mode of esse, the Father, as source of the virtus creandi, may be truly (and appropriately) called the Creator of the natural life of man's proper mode of being."" It is well worth considering more closely the relation of man's natural life to the Creator, in order to appreciate the peculiarity of the life of grace as the perfection and fulfilment of natural life. In 5Th I 43.3 Aquinas distinguishes twO ways in which the triune God is present within His creation. Communiter God is in all creatures by presence, essence and power, just as the cause (prima causa) is in the '" This order of origin is displayed with regard to God's vinus creandi in STh ! 45.6.ra2: sicut natura divina, licet sit communis trihus Personis,. ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum Filius aceipit naturam divinam a Patre et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque; ita etiam et virtus creand~ licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit,' nam Filius habet earn a Patre, et Spiritus samtus ab utroque. Since creare, like vita, regards God's nature, we can understand the distinction of the J

When the divine Persons are distinguished by their relations of origin, the Father is the principle of the processiones. Being the origin 'of the other divine Persons, the Father is associated with esse and potentia. This characterization of the Father as principium works out for both the

divine Persons with regard to crear< parallel to vita. 127 128

Cf.ln Joan 5.5. SIb I 45.1.co: creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil. In the sed contra the Glossa on Gn 1,1 is quoted: ''creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere It must be noticed that, as far as I can see, nowhere does Aquinas explicidy appropriate the production of natural life to the Father. I chose to bring this connection, which is implicidy present in his theology, to the fore in order to bring more intO relief the distinction of the divine Persons with regard to their involvement in the different orders of 'Vita. lr

•

129 125

STh I 43.2.co: 'Processio' autem et 'exitus' dicuntur in divinis et aeterna1iter et

temporaJiter, nam Filius ab aeterno processit ut sit Deus,· temporaliter autem ut etiam sit homo, secundum misswnem visibilem; vel etiam ut sit in homine, secundum invisibilem missionem.

56

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effects which participate in its goodness!" This relationship with God which all creatures have in common, is investigated where Aquinas deals with God's ubiquity.l3l Thomas explains that these words 'presence, essence and power' have to be understood as follows: all created substances are in God's power, they are all present for Him as before His eyes and - since He is esse in essence Himself - all that is created participates in God's esse. Putting it the other way round: God is in all things in a way as most intimate as the being of the thing.'" Thus, apart from the life of grace, God is already intimately tied up with the natural life of man, as He is with all creation. This is, however, not the only way in which God is said to be 'in' human beings!" Aquinas knows a second way of presence: a presence of God specialiter in creatures endowed with reason, attributed to the Son and the Spirit. This presence is explicitly called 'life' (vita gratiae) and it can help to elucidate the specific relations of the Son and the Spirit with life as well as God's involvement with the life of man. Again we will turn to 5Th I 43 where both the eternal and temporal missions of the divine Persons are treated. Doing so, some more light

can be shed on appropriatio with regard to 'life'. In the fifth article of this quaestio Aquinas makes clear that the inhabitation of God in the soul of the human being endowed with grace is not the work of one of the divine Persons alone.'" Any separation of the divine Persons in this respect would entail a denial of the oneness of the Trinity. In Scripture, however, is spoken of missiones with regard to the Son and the Spirit (the Father, as origin, being the one who sends). These missions can be distinguished by their different origins, or (implicitly following the rule that God is known by His effects) different effects of God's grace can be distinguished in man which can be attributed to different divine Persons; Thus, the illumination of the intellect can be appropriated to the Son and the enkindling of desire to the Holy Spirit.'" One can easily recognize the matrix for appropriation here. The Son is associated with the cognitive aspects of the process (verum). The Spirit is linked with the volitional side (bonum). Aquinas uses strong terms to link up the life of grace with the divine Persons: he speaks about the soul being conformed to God, about an assimilation (of the one endowed with grace) with the divine Person who is sent. Thus, by the gift of caritas the soul is 'assimilated' to the Holy Spirit.'" Weare touching here a central element in Aquinas' theological appreciation of life. This conformatio, or assimilatio refers to the ultimate end of human beings: the union with their Creator. This bestowed process of union takes place supposing and perfecting vita natura/is, it is discussed under the name of vita gratiae and, after this

130

5Th I 43.3.co: Est enim unus communis modus quo Deus est in omnibus rebus per

essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, sieut causa in effectibus participantibus bonitatem

;pslus. m 5Th I 8 and especially the third article, Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Cf. 5Th I 8.3.co: Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eOO potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est (a.1). The triad refers to the expression praesentia, potentia et substantia by Gregory the Great, d. 5Th I 8.3.sc. The expression occurs 27 times in Aquinas. works, half of which are in his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Cf. also F. de Grijs, 1967, p. 66-71 and 447451. m STh I 8.1.eo: Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu aportet quod Deus adsit e~ secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est iilud quod est magis intimum cui/ihet, et quod J1Y.ofi!ndius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dtctzs patel [STh I 4.1.ra3J. Unde aportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime. '" STh I 8.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re a1iqua dupficiter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus. creatis ab ipso. Alia modo sieut obiectum operatwnis est in operante, quod proprium est in .operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secunda modo, Deus speciaJiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit ilium

actu vd habitu. Et quia hoc habet ratkina/is creatUTa per gratiam, ut infra patebit [STh 43.3], dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam; and STh I 8.3.ra4, where apart from these two modes a third unique mode of presence is referred to: the union of the divioe and the human nature in Christ. Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 133-134.

13+

135

134

STh I 43.S.co: Respondeo duendum quod per gratiam gratum /acientem tota Trinitas inhabitat mentem, secundum illud In 14,23: "Ad eum veniemus, et mdnsionem apud eum faciemus. " STh I 43.5.ra3: Ad tertium dicendum quod. cum missio importet originem Personae missae et inhahitationem per gratiam, ut supra dictum est, si loquamur de missione quantum ad originem, sic missio FiJii distinguitur a missione Spiritus saneti. fiatt et gener-atro a processione. Si autem quantum ad effectum gratia€; sic communicant duae missiones in ratlice gratiae, sed distinguuntur. in effectibus grtttiae, qui sunt illuminatio intelleetus, et injlamm4tio affectus. Et sic manifestum est quod una non potest esse sine alia, quia neutra est sine watia gratum faciente, nee una persona separatur ab alia. STh I 43.5.ra2: Ad secundum dicendum quod anima per gratiam confonnatur Deo. Unde ad hoe quod aliqua Persona divina mittitur ad aJiquem per gratiam, oportet quod fiat assimilatio illius ad divinam Personam quae mittitur per aliquod gratiae donum Et quia Spiritus sanctus est Amor. per donum eantatis anima Spiritui saneta assimilatur, unde secundum donum caritatis attenditur missio Spiritus saneti.

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earthly life, is glorified in vita aeternaY' In this process, specific effects that spring from the divine essence are appropriated to the Son and the Spirit.

have seen in STh I 18.3.co. Thanks to the intellect, man is able to communicate with other creatures as we1l as with God. Human beings have a capacity for God, they are capax Dei, because they are intellectual. The intellect is the faculty which is able to perceive God's tracks in the world, it can receive the light of faith (which Thomas calls inchoatio vitae aeternae'H) by which one is imperfectly united with God and it can be perfected by the light of glory.''' The visio beata, the ultimate operation of the intellect endowed with glory, is the ultimate end of human life. The ultimate end means the end of all ends: the end at which a1l other ends are ordered. This ultimate end, the one thing man was created fGr, is the inte1lectual operation of the visio beata: a sharing in God's life, vita aeterna.''' Thus, when the relation of the Word with God's life is contemplated, the entire domain of life is covered under the special consideration of its intellectual (and more precise: cognitive) nature.

58

All effects which have to do with cognitivity are appropriated to the second Person of the Trinity. To the Son, or the Word, God's wisdom is appropriated and inasmuch as God's wisdom pertain~ to the m"'!festation of the hidden divine life as well as the prodUCtion, restauratlon and perfection of all creatur:s, the Son is to be .recognized in all these processes.''' As is rev:al~d m. the Gospel of S~mt John, the Word of God was in the begmmng, It became flesh m order to restore the relationship of humankind with God and it will ~e there at th~ end when creation is judged.''' As we have seen Aqumas calls the hfe of grace an assimilation or conformation wi.th t~e ~on and t~e Spirit. Concerning the Son one could say that the Illummation of the mtellect which in fact is the light of faith - is a direct perfection of the natural life of man. Intellectual activity pertains to the highest degree of life'40 and human life is essentially intellectual life. By its intellectual capacity man is able, to a large degree, to determine his self-movement, as we

1'7

Thomas uses the words assimi/atw, unio, conformatio, participatio referring to the ultimate end of creation in general and of human beings in panicu1ar. Cf. e.g. 5Th I 50.l.eo: ld enim quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intend;t est bonum quod consist;t in assimilatione ad Deum, and STh I 103.4.co: Finis autem gubernationis mundi est

bonum essentiale [- God], ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Cf. also 5Th I 93.4.00 where the conformity- of grace appears in a passage where a threefold image of God in man is discerned; in the natural order, in the order of grace and in the consummated order of grace (gloria). 1)S Cf. In I Sent prol.: Per sapientiam enim Dei manifestantur divinorum abscondita, producuntur creaturarwn opera, nee tantum producuntur, sed restaurantur et perftciuntur. 131 In Joan 5.4 [Busa: 287]: Ratio huius est, quia Filius nihil aliud est, ut dictum est supra, quam conceptus patenue sapientiae; unusquisque autem per conceptum suae sapientwe iudicatj unde sicut Paler omnia per Filium fadt, ita et omnia per Ipsum iudicat. 1<, Cf. 5Th I 18.pro4 On the intimate connection of essMiivere-intelligere and the meaning of the identification of the three in God, cf. R. te Velde, 1995, p. 25+279. Te Velde inteIprets the connection with the help of In De causis 18 [Busa: 21]: Ad hums autem propositwnis inte/lectum primo quidem considerandum est quod omnes rerum gradus ad tria videtur reducere quae sunt esse, vivere et intelligere. Et hoc ideo quia unaquaeque res trip/kiter potest considerari: primo quidem secundum se. et sic con'tlenit ei esse, secunda prout tendit in aIiquid aliud, et sic convenit ei mover~ tertw. secundum quod alia in se habet, et sic convenit ei cognoscere quia secundum hoc cognitio perficitur quod cognitum est in, cognoscente non quidem materia/iter sed fonnaliter.

Thomas calls the operations of the intellectual natures, comprISIng the activity of intellectus and voluntas, 'life'. In the triad 'vivere-esseintelligere' this 'life' seems to be culminating in the cognitive aspect and in accordance with this, Aquinas deals with vita as a name for God's essence within the context of God's intelligere in the Summa Theologiae. How, then, do we have to appreciate the fact that considering the Triune God, he appropriates 'life' not to the Son but to the Holy Spirit? As a first reason for this we may surmise that Aquinas wishes to be true to the way the Spirit is connected with 'life' in Holy Scripture and Creed. Moreover, both the heuristic matrix, according to w.hich the semantic field of bonum is appropriated to the Spirit as well as Aristotle's analysis of what life is, offer a good opportunity for Aquinas to explain this preference of the Bible and the Creed. Living things are known by the fact that they move. 'Self-movement' is the definition of life. Motion can be understood in terms of the approach of an end (finis) and a finis has its quality of being attractive because of its goodness. Thus motion is to be located in the semantic field of bonum and vita

141

142

143

Cf. 5Th IT-IT 4.l.co; De ver 14.2.co; In 5ymb pro!.; In Hebr l1.l. Cf. In 17,3: Haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verutn Deum et quem misisti Iesum Christurn. We will examine the special nature of the ultimate end (finis ultimus) in chapter ill, 1.2, p. 145fl. We will deal with the visio beata in detail in chapter IV, 2.1.1, p. 217fl.

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should be appropriated to the Spirit.'" This connection of the Spirit with life is found in Aquinas' reflection on the processions within the Trinity as well as with regard to his view on the working of the Spirit in creation. The procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son is understood from the similitude to the operation of the will. By this operation no similitude, in the shape of an image or word is produced, but the subject is anracted, moved by the object (perceived as a good).'" This lively quality of the Spirit is found wherever the activity of the third divine Person is examined. Like the Son, the Holy Spirit shares in the divine nature. God's nature cannot be distinguished from His operations secundum rem, and thus the Spirit can be said to operate, according to His own propria. Since God's goodness is the reason that He wants other things to be, the love for His own goodness (which is the Spirit) is the cause of creation.'''' God's gubernatio can be appreciated as the movement by which He directs creatures towards their final end and helps them to attain this end.'" With regard to the intellectual creatures divine guidance takes the shape of grace, and as we have seen, Aquinas speaks of grace in terms of assimilatio and conformatio. As we will see later in this study''', it is

the theological virtue of charity, the effect of grace appropriated to the Spirit, by which the development
t+l

ScG IV 20.6: Item. Vita maxime in motu mani/estatur: move:ntia enim seipsa vivere

dicimus, et universaliter quaecumque a seipsis aguntur ad operandum. 5i igitur ratione amoris, Spiritu; sancto impulsio et modo compelit. convenrenter etiam sibi attribuitur vita. Dicitur enim In 6.64.. ·Spiritus est qui vivij'tcat", et Ezk 37,6: "Dabo vobis Spiritum et vivetis",' et in Symbolo fidei nos in Spiriuun sanctum viviftcantem credere profitemur. Quod etiam et nomini 'spiritus' ,amonat: nam etiam corporalis vita animalium est per spiritum vita/em a principia vitae in cetera membra difJusum; ScG PI 15-25 offers one of Aquinas' finest elaborations on the Holy Spirit. 104S STh I 27A.co: Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non comideratuT secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impeJlentis et tnOventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modlim amoris, non procedit ut genitum vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus,· quo nomine quaedam vita/is nwtio et impulsio designatur. prout aJiquis ex amore dicitur moveri vel impeJli ad aliquid fackndum; Cf. also ScG IV 19. .., ScG IV 20.2: Ostemum est enim in superwribus [ScG I 86] quod bonitas Dei est eius ratio 'Volendi quod alia sine. et per suam voluntatem res in esse producit. Anwr igitur quo suam bonitatem amat, est causa creationis rerum 141 ScG N 20.4: Rursus. Rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum qU4ndam motionem esse intelligitur, secundum qt«Jd Deus omnia dirigit et movet in proprws fines. Si igitur tmpulsus et motw ad Spiritum sanctum ratione amoris pertinet, convenienter rerum gubernatw et propagatio Spiritui saneto attribuitur, Cf. also Comp 1b I 147. ... In chapter Ill, p. 161££, the theological virtue of charity is considered as at the basis

of the dynamism of life with God.

61

Before we return to the question about the relation of human life on earth with 'life' after death, we may summarize what we have discovered about Aquinas' account of vita as a name of God. The first part of our investigation. has been aimed. at a better u,:,derstanding of what it means when AqUInas states that VIta can be aS~f1be~, in its most proper meaning, to God. We have learned that AqUInas IS able to make this claim by discerning the res significata which is maxime proprie signified, from' the modus significandi which falls. short in representing God's essence. Since we cannot abst~act .from thiS mode ~f signifying, our knowledge of God's essence remaInS Imperfect. AnalYSIS of the analogical use of the word life can only make us aware of a direction in which we have to look for the incomprehensible God. It can only help to discern more precisely in what ranges this perfection is found in the created world, thus pointing to the Creator as effects point to their infinitely different cause. In the second part of our investigation attention has been focused on the way 'life' is brought in connection with the distinct divine Persons in Holy Scripture and the reflection of Aquinas on Scripture. We saw that Thomas ensures the unity of divine nature by distinguishing the divine Persons by their relation of origin. With the help of a similitude with the operations of the human intellect, Aquinas is able to classify the different properties of the divine Persons of which we are told in Scripture. On this basis 'life' can be appropriated to the Holy Spirit. We have, however, also paid attention to the Father and the S~n. Thus, following the same via inventionis from effects to causes, we discovered, once more, God's close connection with the different orders of human life. Having clarified this, we will return to our initial question. 3. The relation between life on earth and 'life' after death Theology, for Aquinas, is about God and everything else insofar as it is related to God. Since some far reaching implications follow from the things that have just been said, we have dwelled long on the relation of 'life' with God according to the logical as well as the metaphysical order. Logically speaking, God is the criterium for the proper sense of vita. To put it metaphysically, only God possesses 'life' by essence;

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human beings have 'life' merely by participation. A theological understanding of what human life is, is dependent on a theological understanding of what God's life is. The latter remains incomprehensible as well as intrinsically connected with the first. How, then, can we proceed here with our initial question about the relation of life on earth and 'life' after death? We will have to look more closely at the relation of God's life with human life in order to rephrase our question in terms of the concepts that are relevant for Aquinas (3.1). So we can propose a framework within which the various aspects of the question can be examined (3.2). This framework will be fined in during the subsequent chapters of this study.

with divine life. The human soul is capax Dei as far as its intellectual part is concerned, a capacity which is gradually realized and brought to its fulfilment by the activity of the divine Persons. Thus, this life of grace (vita gratiae), this quality of the soul by which the conversation with God is established and developed, appears as the central element in our investigation on life. The life of grace is the perfection of natural life and the beginning of eternal life. What does this entail for our initial question of "the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death?" In the first place, the question can now be rephrased in terms that are relevant for Thomas: "what is the relation between vita 'natura/is and vita aeterna?"I" In the second place, a first answer can be given: the relation between the two, the connection of both is called vita gratiae. But then, of course, an entire network of questions emerges, regarding different l~vels o~ the?logi~al reflection and covering different tracts: how can thiS relationship With the incomprehensible God take place in this earthly life? How do the natural life of man and the life of grace relate to one another? What does the perspective of an eternal life mean for the value and meaning of life on earth? What is the use of this earthly life anyway? What does the perspective of eternal life mean for our interpretation of death? What is the impact of death on our relationship with God? How is God's relation to the death of man to be interpreted? Does the perspective of eternal life have any influence on the impact of death in life on eanh? What do the life and death of Christ (man and God) mean for our interpretation of life and death? Etc, etc. In order to deal with these questions, we have chosen to organize them from the theological perspective we have found in this chapter: the relationship with God. With this choice we arrive at the last issue that we will have to explain in this chapter: the framework of this study.

3.1

Rephrasing the question

Thomas uses the formula of God as prima causa and finis ultimus of all creation in order to distinguish the Creator from His creation and, at one and the same time, indicate a close connection between both of them. The fact that Aquinas presents God as the ultimate end of human life should be explained with the outcome of our previous section in mind. Participating in the incomprehensible life of the eternal God is the finis ultimus, the vita aeterna of human beings, it is proclaimed in Scripture. Human beings are designed for this: the creation of man is directed at sharing God's life. Once this is seen, the same radical apophatic or negative strain we perceive in Thomas' God-talk can be expected with regard to his eschatology. Knowing what vita aeterna is, means knowing what God is and as we have seen, in this earthly life this kind of knowledge cannot be obtained. The ultimate end, incomprehensible as it is, consequently has a great impact on all that precedes it. Once the glorified union with God is believed and hoped for to be the ultimate end of man, natural life is appreciated within the larger framework of God bestowing life on man. This bestowal takes place within different orders (the orders of nature, grace, and glory) and, in accordance with the human condition, in different stages. From the perspective of the ultimate end of human life, natural life of man (vita natura/is) is discovered to be directed at the perfection of vita aeterna. The natural potencies of the soul are recognized to be open for a gratuitous perfection by God, a perfection by which the relationship with God is established and strengthened. Earthly life of man is appreciated as being open towards a process of development, a gracious and gratuitous growth towards a glorified union

63

3.2 The framework of this study Studying 'life' in the theology of Aquinas, one is dealing with a

147

The exact equivalents of 'life on earth' and 'life after death' in Aquinas' theology are haec vita and alia vita; or vita praesens and vita jittura. When the question is rephrased in termS of 'Vita naturae and vita aeterna one has to keep in mind that haec vita is broader than vita naturae: it comprises both vita naturae and vita r;ratiae.

I

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concept ranging "from oysters to angels"!50 and intimately connected with the most central elements of his doctrine about the triune God. In order to do justice to the work of Aquinas, our study cannot escape having the width of a thematic study of the subject, although the central question can be formulated as having regard to the relation between vita naturae and vita aeterna. Because we have seen that the life with God is the central issue in Aquinas' theology from which the questions about life before and after death are defined, we will continue our investigation on the basis of three dimensions of this relationship:!51 its foundations, its dynamism and its perfection. Thus, as regards

content the structure of our study reflects the core of it. In this way we hope t~ do justice to Aquinas' theological reflections on the life ~nd death of man in relation to the 'life' of God, discussing every questlOn within the framework of the central and modifying element: the communion or life with God.

64

ISO

1St

As M. Dodds (1986, p. 39) remarks with regard to the concept of motion which is intrinsically connected with vita. I will use the word 'relationship' for what Aquinas means with conversatio, the 'life' in the sense of 'living together with someone'. This is what is referred to by the tide of this study 'Living with God'. Cf. S7h I·II 65.5.co: cari,., non so/urn signijicat amorem De~ sed etiam amicitiam quandam ml ipsum. .. Haec autem societas hominis ad Deum, quae est quaedam fomiliaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hie in

praesenti. per gratiam, pe:rficietur autem in foturo per g/oriam... Thomas also speaks of convivere of God and man, using Aristotle's analysis of friendship so as to examine the charity which God bestows on man. Cf. STb n·IT 25.3.00: quia omnis amicitia Jundatur super aliqua communicatione vitae, nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae sicut convivere, ut patet per Philosophum, VIII Eth 5.3 (1151b19), and In m Sent 21.2.2.co, oportuit haberi quattu:Ltm amicitiam ad Deum, ut sibi conviveremus; et haec est ,aritas. For the sake of clarity it might be appropriate to stress that this 'relationship' cannot be equalled with Thomas' concept relado. 5Th I 13.7.co e.g., where Aquinas denies a relatro realis from God to His creatures, should not be interpreted as a denial of God's commitment to creatures (Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod c:reaturae rea/iter rf/eruntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem taneum, inquantum c:reaturae reforuntur ad ipsum). Thomas ensures God's otherness here, stating that between Creator and creatures there is an asymmetrical relation. The relation of the creatures to God as their finis ultimus is given with their nature, God's relation to His creatures is not given with His nature but the result of His choice. Cf. D. Burrell, 1979, p. 78·89; R. Sokolowski, 1982, p. 34: "This should not be taken psychologically, it should not be taken in terms of human emotions, and it does not mean that God is unconcerned with the world; it describes how God exists."j F. de GrijSi 1984, who offers a reading of S7h I 13.7 as a correction of P. Schoonenberg's interpretatton of thIS arucle; M. Dodds, 1986, p. 235·240 (p. 240, "Thus we affirm that God, w~o as Creator is most intimately present to each creature, has no real relationship WIth any of them. For he is much more intimately involved with each one of them than would be possible in a real rdationship of transcendental causal motion.") and 1993, p. 222·227; Cf. also H. Rilthof, 1988, p. 82·93 and H. Goris, 1996, p. 24-31.

Considering the following chapters, firstly we will concentrate on the foundations of life with God (chapter Il). The word 'foundation' does not refer to a specific equivalent in Latin, but is chosen in order to organize some issues tllat are of fundamental importance in order to understand Aquinas' view on life and death. The chapter as .a whole deserves this title because, here, the larger framework of the hIstOry of salvation is introduced, in which life and death relate in different ways to one another dependent on different stages of the history of humankind with God. Each of the sections, however, is focused also on a basic issue regarding life with God. The first section deals with the natural life of man as supposing and being open towards the life of grace. Within this context the pl~e and meaning of. death in t.he theology of Aquinas will be determmed. The second sectIon deals WIth the work of Christ which is fundamental for the relationship with God since He both reveals who God is, as well as effects the grace which enables uS to live with God. In this place we will deal with the death of Christ and its meaning for human life and death. The third section deals with the sacraments. Their basic importance lies in the fact that they make it possible that we share in Christ's work. By the sacraments we are led into the Christian life with God: by Baptism we are 'regenerated' and introduced into the practice of the christiana religio which is the historical context of our life with God. In the remaining sacraments this conversation is further cultivated. The next chapter is called 'dynamism of life with God' (chapter Ill) and again we do not intend to capture a specific Latin term of Thomas. The word 'dynamism' is used in the sense of 'vitality' and could cause an association with the propria of the Holy Spirit. This association is justified. In this chapter we will deal with the process, the growth of the life of grace and the way this interferes with the way natural life and death are dealt with. We will focus on some moral issues of life and death as well as pay attention to some items that have found their place in the ascetical and mystical theology in the centuries after Aquinas. We will perceive how the growth in the life of grace changes the outlook of natural life and death.

66

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

. The fourth chapter is called 'perfection of life with God' and this ~me ,;e can ~ra~slate the term perfectio as Aquinas uses the word The r£0rd( h~1ec~lOn, how~ver, does not refer to the perfection of spi~itual Ie. w ~c IS treated 1o. chapter IIl) but with, what may be called tt~u1Ofh e~~tology. Th~ chapter mainly examines the final stage of .w t . from whIch we are separated by death Th consIderatIOn of the dimensions of the relationship with ~do~r completed. IS

fift~fte~ ~av~ng ~onsidered

I.ife with God in its three dimensions in a an. 10 c pter we WIll return to the initial question conc;rnin t e relatIOn h The outcome of g . " berween. life on earth and 'life' aft er deat. our I?VeStlgatlon WIll be worked Out in terms of Aquinas" h mean10g of life and death. VIew on t e

~

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE WITH GOD In the first chapter we found an appropriate perspective for studying the relation between human life on earth and 'life' after death: the relationship with God, which Aquinas considers in terms of vita gratiae. In this chapter the foundations of this relationship are studied. Since the relationship of creatures with God is established by God's initiative, the Person of Christ plays a central role in the following sections, for He is the one in whom God has revealed Himself and made Himself present among us. In the first section we study the larger framework of the history of salvation as Thomas understands it from his reading of Holy Scripture. Within this context a more precise account of both the philosophical as well as the theological interpretation of death is presented and the connection berween vita naturae and vita gratiae is elucidated {1}. Subsequently the work of Christ is focused on, since it is the basis of our life with God and indispensable for a Christian understanding of life and death {2}. In the third section we will deal with the sacraments which make us share in the work of Christ. They constitute the framework of our life with God {3}.' "On peut eue thomiste en organisant ses exposes tout autrement, mw on ne Ie sera pas si on n'a pas d'abord compris pourqoui saint Thomas en a traite en ce lieu", M.M. Labourdette, 1985, p. 362. We have chosen to organise our account of Aquinas' view on life and death by taking the major part of the Tertia Pars, his teaching on Christ and the Sacraments, as foundations. As for the reason that Aquinas deals with the teaching on Christ in the third part of the Summa The%giae, I think that both

Y. Congar and M. Corbin are right. Y. Congar (1958, p. 282) states that the place is motivated by a culmination in unionesj STh I deals with the union by creation, STh II with the operative union and STh III with the hypostatic union of God and man. M. Corbin (1974, p. 782-806) argues from the shifts in the plans of the systematic works of Aquinas, that only after having dealt with God (STh 1) and man (STh IJ), Aqninas is prepared to deal with Christ, Mediator betWeen God and man (STh IIJ). Both argumentations are confirmed by H. Schoot (1993) whose stUdy can be read as an attempt to show how the language-rules in divinis developed in STh I are applied in the reflection on Christ in STh III (for the hierarchy of unions cf. p. 197). The

reason for the place of the sacraments in the Summa Theologiae, I suggest, is their complexity. A profound understanding of what they are and what they embody presupposes all previous tracts, especially Christology. Nevertheless, as acts of cult, they constitute the context of the relationship with God upon which the theologian

66

AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE

. The fourth chapter is called 'perfection of life with God' d h' time we can translat e the term perfiectlO 'as . t IS AqUinas uses the w and Th word'p rfet" 'h d or. e r£ ( h~ h c.lOn, ow~ver, oes not refer to the perfection of spiritual Ie. w ,IC IS treated 10. chapter III) but with, what may be called tt~u~~h e~~to:ogy. Th~ chapter mainly examines the final stage of . t. rom which we are separated by death Thus OUr conSideration of the dimensions of the relationship with God . completed. IS

fifttfte~ ~av~ng~onsidered

I.ife with God in its three dimensions in a I an. n c pter we Will return to the initial question conc 'r . h The outcome e mng the relation . " between. life On earth and 'life' after deat. of our l:,vestlfgal~flOn Will be worked out in terms of Aquinas' view on the meamng 0 I e and death.

CHAPTERlI

FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE WITH GOD In the first chapter we found an appropriate perspective for studying the relation between human life on earth and 'life' after death: the relationship with God, which Aquinas considers in terms of vita gratiae. In this chapter the foundations of this relationship are studied. Since the relationship of creatures with God is established by God's initiative, the Person of Christ plays a central role in the following sections, for He is the one in whom God has revealed Himself and made Himself present among us. In the first section we study the larger framework of the history of salvation as Thomas understands it from his reading of Holy Scripture. Within this context a more precise account of both the philosophical as well as the theological interpretation of death is presented and the connection between vita naturae and vita gratiae is elucidated (1). Subsequently the work of Christ is focused on, since it is the basis of our life with God and indispensable for a Christian understanding of life and death (2). In the third section we will deal with the sacraments which malse us share in the work of Christ. They constitute the framework of our life with God (3).' MOn peut eu-e thomiste en organisant ses exposes tout autrement, roais on ne le sera pas si on n'a pas d'abord compris pourqoui saint Thomas en a trarte en ce lieu" I M.-

M. Labourdette, 1985, p. 362. We have chosen to organise our account of Aquinas' view on life and death by taking the major pan of the Tertia Pars, his teaching on Christ and the Sacraments. as foundations. & for the reason that Aquinas deals with the teaching on Christ in the third pan of the Summa Theologiae. I think that both Y. Congar and M. Corbin are right. Y. Congar (1958, p. 282) states that the place is motivated by a culmination in uniones; SIb I deals with the union by creation, SIb II with the operative union and STh ill with the hypostatic union of God and man. M. Corbin (1974. p. 782·806) argues from the shifts in the plans of the systematic works of Aquinas. that only after having dea1t with God (STh 1) and man (STh IJ). Aquinas is prepared to dea1 with Christ. Mtdiator between God and man (STh IIJ). Both argumentations are confirmed by H. Schoot (1993) whose study can be read as an attempt to show how the language-rules in divinis devdoped in STh I are applied in the reflection on Christ in STh ill (for the hierarchy of unions d. p. 197). The reason for the place of the sacraments in the Summa Theologiae, I suggest, is their complexity. A profound understanding of what they are and what they embody presupposes all previous tracts. especially Christology. Neverthdess. as acts of cult. they constitute the context of the rdationship with God upon which the theologian

68

CHAPTERll

FOUNDATIONS

It should be noticed from the· outset that not all possible aspects of Aquinas' discussion of Original Sin, Christ and the sacraments are taken into account. This study concentrates on the lines that emerge when the key-word 'life' is focused on in Aquinas' theology. 1. The human condition and the tradition of living with God

The life of human beings with God takes place in a historical process. A process entails development and change. Thus, in the history of the relationship of God and man, as it is written down in Scripture, one can see the meaning of life and death changing. For humankind, corporal death has entered the world during the process of time, within the framework of the relationship of the first man with God. The meaning of death has been changed by the work of Christ. Therefore, in order to find an answer to our initial question, the different stages of the relationship of God with humankind have to be studied. First, the central place of man in the universe is sketched and it is shown how this place is reflected in the soul, which is the principle of man's natural life. The human condition is characterized as a process of growth towards the perfect knowledge and love of God within the coordinates of materiality and time (1.1). Having established this, we will concentrate on Aquinas' account of the unity of the rational soul as unique form of the body and the consequences that follow from this when the definition of death as separation of body and soul is explained (1.2). After this interpretation of death as evil, in a third paragraph the meaning of death as punishment is studied. The relationship between vita naturae and vita gratiae is examined and within this context Original Sin and its effects, by which the human condition is changed, are theologically interpreted (1.3). .

we have seen him following Aristotle's division of De anima in which the life of man is regarded as the highest degree in a scale, surpassing .the life in which plants and animals participate'..In other places, .Aqumas discerns four levels of created life: plants, ammals, human beings and angels.' In this more comprehensive division, man is situated between animal and angel. What then is the nature of man like and what does this central position mean for the nature of his natura.1 life and d~th? In the preceding chapter, searching for an appropnate perspectIve,we took as a point of departure Aquinas' consideration of God's life. In this examination we discovered that the life of grace - the middle between natural life and eternal1ife+ - offers the appropriate key for interpreting Aquinas' theological interpretatio.n of life ~d death. Studying the natural life of man, the ali-embraCing perspectIve of God Creator seems to be appropriate, since here basic distinctions are worked out. As we discussed·in the first chapter, in Aquinas' view, one can only do justice to God's supreme otherness when He is dis:i~gui~hed from creation by a distinction which differs from all oth~r dlstInc:lO:'s made within the created world.' God ·i5 no part of creatIOn. He IS Involved with His creatures, even more intimately than they are involved with themselves, but He is in no way dependent on them. God does ~ot need creation in order to be a better or more supreme God. CreatIOn does not add anything to God. Thus, when one speaks of the goal of creation, in the sense of 'the goal God had in mind when creating the world' one should be aware of any anthropomorphism.' Taken into

1.1 Creation and the place of man

As we have seen in our reading of SIb I 18, Thomas understands human life as a level of created life among other levels. In this quaestio 6

reflects. Cf. L. Walsh, 1993, p. 328: "The sacraments are, in fact, the concrete and historically current practice of that christiana religio that Thomas has wanted to study from the outset of the Summa. For this reason we study them in this second chapter, entided 'Foundations of life with God'. M

69

Cf. In H De Anima 3 [leon: 135], ponit autem quatuor modo, 'Vi'Vend~ quorum unus est per,'imeJlectum, secundus per sensum, tertius per matum et statum local~ quartus per matum alimenti, decrementi et augmenti. ". [Leon: 144J in qui~ ~nim 'Viv.en~i. urn inveniuntuT tantum alimentum, augmentum et decrementumJ scilzcet In plantzs; m quibusdam autern, cum his invenitur sensus sine motu local~ sicut in animalibus imperfectis sicut sunt ostreae; in quibusdam autem ulterius in'lfeni~ur motus secundum l~. cum, sicut in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu progresstVO, ut 1m et equus; In quibu.sdam 'Vero. cum his ulterius invenitur intellectm, scilicet in hominibus. Cf. ScG IV 11, where these four levels are surpassed in perfection by a fifth: the uncreated life of God. Cf. e.g. SIb I 62.3.ag3: gratia sit medium inter naturam et gloriam ordine naturae... Cf. R. Sokolowski, 1982; d. also chapter I, 1.1, p. 11 and 2.2.1.1, p. 30. STh I 44A.co! orrz,ne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. .. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum..non convenit agere propter- acquisitionem alicuius finis; sed intendi~ solun: comm".nzeare suam perfectionem, quae est eOO bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura tntendtt consequ: suam perfectionem, quae est simiJitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divin4e. Sic ergo divina bonitas

70

account the perfection and incomprehensibility of God's nature and operations, one should say that, in the sense of a perfection that needs to be acquired by God through creation, there is no goal set. In Aquinas' theology this is expressed by retracing God's intention regarding creation to His own goodness. Creation has its origins in God's own overflowing goodness. It is purely a gift, 'grace' in a sense. It did not have to be there and its existence has no other purpose than the reflection and manifestation of God's goodness. As manifestation of God's goodness, creation has a different mode of being than its originating source. God's incomprehensible simplicity is expressed in composed being. The incomprehensible unity of God's perfection is reflected in creation in many different ways and at different levels. In a number of places Aquinas refers to this central thought of his in the words of Rm 1,20: invisibilia enim Ipsius a creatUTa mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntuT.' With regard to this thought Thomas incorporates the classical thought of the perfection of the universe': the thought that the universe is a whole consisting out of substances which are ordered as a continuous chain of being. Ranging from the purely material inanimated beings Oike stones) up to the purely spiritual beings Oike angels), man is situated in the middle, on the border of the material and the immaterial world. Being the expression of God's goodness, every creature manifests this goodness according to its own level of being. In this sense, one could speak of the goal of creation

1

•

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS

est finis rerum omnium. Cf. also rah Et ideo Ipse [-Deus] solus est maxim< libera/is, quia non agit propter suam utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem. Rm 1,20 is quoted explicitly 80 times in Aquinas works, 20 of which in the Summa Theologiae. It is interesting that the verse appears at crucial places, e.g.: 5Th I 2.2.sc, STh I 12.3.ra2, STh I 13.5.00, STh I 43.7.co. STh I 65.1.ra3. STh I-II 111.4.co. STh II-II 2.3.ag3, STh II-II 175.1.ral, S1b II-II 180.4.00, STh ill !.losc and STh ill 60.2.agl; F. de Grijs (1969) makes clear that Aquinas did not understand the verse in the epistemological opposition between natura/is ratro and fides divina, as it was interpreted by the constitution Dei Filius (1870) of Vatican I and later ecclesiastical documents. The interpretation of Aquinas, as well as that of Peter Ahelard and the Commentarius Cantabrigensis, is more in line with the constitution Dei Verbum (1965) of Vatican II in which the history of salvation is the framework for understanding. STh I 89.1.co: Manifostum est autem inter subslantias intellectuales, secundum naturae ordinem, infimas esse animas humanas. Hoc autem perfectio universi exigebat. ut diversi gradus in rebus essent. On the perfection of the uni.verse according to Aquinas, d. O. Blanchette, 1992.

71

but now, from the perspective of creatures.' God is then considered as . . . . The idea that all creatures are directed at God as theIr fints uitlmus, IS worked out from two perspectives. In the first place, Thomas discerns different levels of perfection according to different levels of being. Thus, every creature is regarded as reaching God insofar as it is reaching its own perfection. In this way every creature imitates its CreatPr .and reflects His goodness. At the inanimated level of stPnes Aqumas recognizes this striving for perfection by the natural tendency of stones to fall down and, according to the Aristotelian physics, reach their proper place. At the 'level of plants and animals this perfec~ion is reached when they live according to their inborn natural tendenCies. At the level of creatures endowed with intellect, this perfection is reached when their highest potencies, will and intellect, are brought to perfection: a process which begins with the natural cognitive and volitional operations and is perfected by God's grace.'· In the second place, Thomas works out the idea that, from the perspective of the connection of creation as a whole, all creatures are aimed at God. In this perspective, creatures of different grades of being help each other, cooperating in a way, in order to reach their own perfection." Thus the perfection of the whole is attained by means of the various processes through which different individual creatures reach their perfection: creation as a whole returns to God_ In both perspectives, the central place of man in the universe is affirmed; a position which is closely connected with the specific human condition. In the first perspective, focusing on the different species varying in degree of perfection, Thomas elucidates this position with the aid of considering the condition of the angels. Being purely intellectual substances, angels are immaterial. As intellectual creatures, angels have

finis ultimus of all creatures..

"

11

Cf. above, footnote 6. Thus man not only reaches God by. means of imitation through the perfection of his operation, but also by the operation of his intellectual faculties: the perfected kuowledge and love of God. For the different ways in which creatures imitate God by their striving for perfection, d. ScG ill 19·22. Cf. ScG ill 21.7: Prius est unumquodque in se perfectum quam passit alterum causare, ut

iam dictum est. Haec igitUY perfectw ultimc acddit re~ ut aliorum causa existat. Cum igitur per multa tendat res creata in di'tJinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum ei restat, ut . di'tJinam similitudinem quaerat per hoc quod sit a!wrum causa. Unde Dionysius dicit, 3 cap. Cae/estis Hierarchiae, quod "omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri"; secundum quod Apostolus dicit, lCo 3,9: "Dei adiutores sumu.s".

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FOUNDATIONS

CHAPTER II

the same final end as human beings: vita aetema which consists· in knowing and loving God as He is in Himself. Both, their way of being as well as their way of knowing, are not subjected to materiality and, therefore, exempted from the influence of the heavenly bodies which constitute time. 12 Two important consequences follow from this. In the first place, the angelic way of knowledge is not by abstraction from phantasmata which are obtained by perception of the senses. Being exempted from the process of acquiring knowledge by abstraction, their knowledge is free from the flaws that possibly arise during the human process of knowledge. Angels are born with perfect natural knowledge. In the second place, with regard to their way of being, their 'life' does not take the shape of a process: on· the basis of their perfect natural knowledge their free will - endowed with grace - decides for or against God the instance in 'time' after they are created. 13 Thus, from the perspective of their intellectual powers human beings are less perfect than angels. In fact, in accordance with the idea of the perfection of the universe, angels vary in the degree of perfection of their intellects. As a result, a scale of perfection can be discerned within the range of all intellectual creatures. The human mind holds the lowest rank on this

in the cosmos is expressed when Thomas characterizes man as horizon and confinium of the material and spiritual world." This central position of man in the universe - a position which is characteristic for the human condition - is reflected in the human sou!." Following Aristotle's treatise On the Soul, Thomas distinguishes different parts of the soul (pa~. animae) corresponding to va;i?us functions which reflect the position of man among other hvmg creatures. At the lowest level he discerns the pars vegetativa, the level which is occupied with nutrition, production and growth of the living substance. The soul of plants coincides with this vegetative part. Animals share this pars'vegetativa with plants and human beings, but they also have a pars sensitiva in which the apprehensive and a~petitive functions are rooted. Human nature compnses both vegetative and sensitive parts, above which a pars intellectiva is situated. By this last level - containing intellect and will - man, together with the angels, is part of the intellectual world. Since the angelic nature does not share in the material world (intellectuality, as such, being immaterial), the parts of the human soul illustrate the central position of man by their 'overlap' of vegetable, animal and angelic parts." Although Thomas speaks of 'parts' of the soul, one would misrepresent his position by meaning that the different parts of the human soul could be isolated from one another without destroying human nature. In his day, Aquinas took an original and controversial stand by

scale. 14

From another point of view, however, the nature of man - being part of both the spiritual and the material world - is broader than the angelic one. Human beings share the dimension of embodiment with all other animales that are in the same genus. The spiritual dimension of man is distinctive for its species, animal rationale. This unique position of man

" 12

13

A~as works out the idea of angelic 'time' in the concept of 'aevum', being the middle between time and eternity. Cf. STb I 10.5-6. Cf. also H. Goris, 19%, p. 43 and 217-218. STh. I ~2.5.co: Re5fondeo dicendum quod angelus post prim-urn actum caritatis quo heatztudznem meruIt, statim heatus foil. Cuius ratio est, quia gratia perflcit naturam secundum. modum naturae, sicut et amnis peifectio recipitur in perfectibili secundum modum ems. Est autem hoc proprium naturae angeJicae, quod natura/em perfectionem non per discursum acquirat, sed statim per naturam habeat, sicut supra [STh I 58,)} ostensum est... Cf. also ra1: homo secundum suam naturam ncn statim natus est ultimam perfectionem adipisc~ simt angelus. Et ideo homini longior via data est ad

merendum heatitudinem, quam angelo. 14

Although they are separated substances, they are composed of being and essence like

:my o~er creature,. As a consequence, Thomas holds that the angelic genus is divided

lD.to different speCles which contain no more than one member, or putting it the other way round: every individual angel has an unique nature (STh I 50).

Thus, in STb I, after having consideted the spiritual creature quae in Scrip~a Sacra angelus nominalur (STh I 50·64) and the COIpOral creatures (STh I 65-74, In fact an

exegesis of Gn 1) Aquinas concentrates on man qui ex spirituaJi et corporali substantia

componitur (STb I 75-102). The expression horizon el confinmm is used only three

times by Thomas, at different stages of his career of writing: In m Sent prol, ScG II 68.6, STh I 77.2.co. Cf. also G. Verbeke, 1976, who sketches the genesis of this account in the works of Plato, philo, Plotinus, Simplicius and the Fathers of the Early Churth. 16

.

Since angels are purely spiritual creatures, their nature is not individuated by matter.

73

17

Aquinas follows Aristode in the opinion that the soul is that by which creatures live. Cf. e.g. In II De anima 1 [Leon: 207]: per animam enim inteiJigimus id quo habens 'Vitam vivit; and [Leon: 228]: materia autem corporis vi'Vi est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad acturn, et hic actus est anima, secundum quam corpus vivit. , STh I 96.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunl omnia... Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animaiibus,' vires naturales secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis.

74

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FOUNDATIONS

CHAPTER II

defending the unity of the sou!." Commenting on Aristotle's On the Soul, he states that in human nature body and soul are proponioned to each other as matter (materia) and form (forma): only the combination of both constitutes a human being. According to this view, the human soul as a whole is seen as the substantial form of the body. This unique substantial form causes this individual· to be, to be this substance and to be this animated body." Within this one human rational soul

different parts can be distinguished, as two triangles can be distinguished within one square." The different parts form a new whole in the higher soul, an indivisible form constituting a new nature. Thus vita vegetativa, vita sensitiva and vita intellectiva or rationalis of man together constitute his vita naturae." This account of the unity of the soul has a great impact on Thomas' view on human life and death. It underscores the inextricable connection of the material and the spiritual in the human condition. Human beings are born within the material world; acquiring and perfecting their knowledge in a process through time; departing from materiality with sensiti~e knowledge and striving for immateriality with intellectual knowledge. Materiality and time are the basic coordinates of the human condition. The human way of reflecting God's goodness, of reaching its perfection takes shape in between these coordinates. Thus, life on earth· compared with its ultimate end· cannot be played down, for the earthly process within the coordinates of materiality and time is precisely the human way of reflecting God's goodness. However exalted the final goal of vita aetema is, as the perfection of a process it is totally dependent on this very process which takes place in this earthly life and which supposes vita naturae. In this latter process the different levels of the human soul as form of the material body cooperate so as to attain the perfection of unity for which man is designed to be. 22 The powers of the intellectual part of the soul are rooted in and determined by the powers of the sensitive part. The capacities of the sensitive part, in their turn, are rooted in and determined by those of the vegetative part. At the same time, the intellectual and volitional powers, control the lower

"

Cf. A. Pegis, 1934, 1974, 1978; A. Lipp~ 1965 and 1966; T. Schneider, 1972, p. 1·73; W. Kluxen 1974, 1984; L.F. Mateo·Seco, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1982[al and 1982[b}, R. Heinzmann 1965, 1986; O.H. Pesch, 1988, p. 187·207; 1. Scheffczyk 1989; The various studies on the subject show that the position of Aquinas is a creative innovation of his own. It is not simply a choice for. an Aristotelian point of view instead of a neo·PlatonisticlAugustinian theory. In fact Aquinas uses Aristotle's distinctions so as to serve the theological goal for which Augustine was heading. Thus Schneider speaks of a fusion of two traditions of thinking. "Diese Verschmelzung ist allerdi.ngs keine Kreuzung zu gleichen Teilen, sondem, wenn man so will, das augustinische Menschenbild in aristotelischer Gewandung. Wir stehen hier an einer seltsamen Uberschneidung der geistgeschichtlichen Linien: Thomas steht, zwar unter Berufung auf Aristoteles, gerade in der Sieht des Menschen Augustinus vie! nah.e.r a1s manche franziskanische Theologen, die 'unter der

wortlichen Ubernahme augustinischer und neuplatonischer Gedanken faktisch weith.i.n verschleiern, wie stark sie von der naturphilosophischen Scite des Aristotelismus fasziniert und gepriigt sind" (Schneider, p. 54-55). Although Thomas uses Aristode

in order to overcome the ultimately dualistic conception of man inhereted

from Augustine, his solution means a deviation from the viewpoint of Aristotle and especially the Averroistic interpretation of the latter (Pegis, 1974, p. 13; Heinzmann, 1986, p. 251). Apan from the resistence which was aroused by the novdty of Aquinas' position, in his days his view was controversial because it reduces the materia prima to potentiality. Were the rational soul to be the only substantial form of man, and the body have no forma corporeitatis, then some important traditional views seem to be threatened: How to justify that children have congeniality with their parents for the rational soul is directly created by God? How to think of the traduction of Original Sin? What about the veneration of relics when the corpse of the saint is not identical with the body of the living saint? What about the identity of the resurrected Christ? etc. (Cf. T. Schneider, 1972, p. 57-63). " In II De anima 1 [Leon: 265]: Oportet enim secundum praemm. dicere quod una et eadem forma substamialis sit per quam hoc indi1liduum est hoc aliquid sive substantia et per quam est corpus et animatum corpus et sic de aliis: forma enim perfectior dat

" "

materia< hoc quod dat forma minus perftcta et adhuc amplius. Unde anima non soium facit esse substantiam et corpus, quod etiam facit forma /apidis, sed etiam facit esse animatum corpus: non est ergo sic intelligendum quod anima sit actus corporis et quod corpus sit eius materia et subiedUm, quasi corpus. sit constitutum per unam formam quae faciat eum esse corpus et superveniat ei anima fadens ipsum esse vivum corpus, sed quia ab anima est et quod sit et quod corpus sit et quod sit corpus vivum; sed hoc quod est esse

corpus, quod est imperfectius, est quasi materiale Tespectu vitae. Cf. also QD De anima 9.co [Busa: 98]: Sic igitur cum anima sit forma substantia/is, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantia/is media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos r;radus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. In II De anima 5 [Leon: 248ff]. In the genesis of each human being the different levels subsequently emerge in the embryo. Cf. S7b II·II 6U.co (in generationis via natura ab imperftctis ad perftcta procedit. Et inde est quod sicut in generationt hominis prius est vivum, deinde animal, ultimo autem homo) and ScG m 22.7, quoted in foomote 24. Cf. also E.·H.W. Kluge, 1981, who, however, draws some questionable conclusions on the basis of Aquinas' texts.

22

Cf. ScG

m 144.2: anima enim indiget corpore ad consecuticnem sui finis:

per corpus perfectionem acquirit, et in scientia et in 'Virtute.

inquantum

76

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FOUNDATIONS

CHAPTERIl

powers and regulate their contribution to the process. Thus, with regard to the unity of man, the connection of the different senses of 'life' appears once more. 'Life' in the first sense, as way of being, is the foundation for 'life' in the second sense: the specific human operations of willing and knowing. The latter, in their turn, determine 'life' in the third sense: the chief occupation or main direction of the process which takes place within the coordinates of materiality and

chosen for God, are no longer subjected to a process of growth in love of God. Their existence serves man by means of guiding and helping, thus imitating the Creator and reflecting His goodness. In fact their help in promoting the love of God in the human soul is part of their happiness." Even demons, the spiritual creatures . who h.ave chosen against God the next moment a~er they came mto eX,!St~nc~, are directed at the welfare of human bemgs for they serve God s Justice by punishing man."

time.

It is because of the central and embracing position of the species of man, that the entire creation returns to God through the perfection of man. As a consequence of this view - and reasoned from the second perspective, of the cooperation of creatures by which the perfection of the whole of the universe is brought about - Aquinas holds that the universe was created because of man." This goes for corporal as well as spiritual creatures. Inanimated beings, plants and animals serve man as food or help in external operations which are required for his material existence. Heavenly bodies move in order to cause generation and corruption in the sublunar world." Angels, the substances that have

23

24

In II Sent 1.2.3; Cf. sc2: Ordo universi est finis totius creaturae. Sed in homine est quaedam simiJitudo ordinis universi; unde et minor mundus dicitur: quia omnes naturae quasi in homine confluunt. Ergo videtur quod ipse sit quodammodo finis omnium; Cf. also 5Th I 91.1.co: Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eOj For the background of this teaching, d. M.D. Chenu, 1957, p. 34-43. ScG m 22.7: In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia primo ad /onnam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi existens est in potentia ad formam mixti: propter quod elementa sunt materia mixt;. Sub forma autem mix!i considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem: nam talis corporis anima actus est. Itemque anima vegetabilis est potentia ad sensiti'Vam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam. Quod processus generationis ostendit: primo enim in generatione est fetus vivens vita plantae. postmodum vera vita anima/is. demum vero vita hominis. Post hanc autem formam non invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus posterior forma et dignior. Ultim.us igitur finis generationis tatius est anima humana, et in hane tendit materia situt in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; haec 'Vero propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter hominem animaJia; anima/ia 'Vero propter hominem. Homo igitur est finis. totius generationis. After having worked out the use of inanimated, vegetative and sensitive creatures, Thomas continues: [8J Et super hoc omnibus sensibilibus utitur ad ineellectualis cognitionis pe-tfectionem. Unde et de homine in Psalmo dicitur. ad Deum directo sermone: "Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius" [Ps 8.8J Et Aristoteles dicit, in I PoUticorum 5. quod "homo habet naturale dominium super omnia animalia". [9J Si igitur motio ipsius caeU ordinatur ad

1.2 Death as evil: the ,separation of body and soul Having characterised Thomas' view on vita natura/is as a process open for growth towards the perfect knowledg~ and love o~ God .wit~in the coordinates of materiality and time, we Will now conSider hiS view on death. Aquinas deals with death within different contexts as well as in different orders and at various levels. In order to appreciate his account of death, these levels and orders not only need to be distinguished, but also be considered according to the hierarchy in which Aquinas places them. Eventually, I take the theological interpretation of death as being the most comprehensive framework in which all other levels and orders fall into their proper place. Before this theological interpretation is studied, the level of natural philosophy will be considered, since here,

generationem.· generatio autem tota ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem hums generis. mani/estum est quod finis motionis caeli ordinatur ad hominem sicut in

u/timum finem in genere generabilium "

26

et

mobilium. [10J Hinc est quod Dt

4,19

dicitur

quod Deus corpora caelestia fecit "in ministerium cunctis gentibus". Cf. 5Th I 62.9.ag2 where the argument runs that the ministry of angels is of no use to them when it does nOt give them the opportunity to increase in beatitude. In the response Aquinas answers that their service to humankind is of use to them as part of their own happiness: (ra2) sicut pars est utilis ad tatum, ut paries ad domum. Et hoc mcdo ministeria angelorum sunt utilia angelis beatis, inquantum sune quaedam pars

beatitudinis ipsorum, diffundere enim perflctionem habitam in alia, hoc est de ratione petfocti inquantum est perflctum. lu this respect the ange1ic service reflects God's 'motive' of creation; On the conversation of the angels with man, cf. STh I 110-113. STh I 114.1.co: ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis ut~ ad bona ea ordinando. Thus the demons can be brought in by God, functioning within the larger framework of creation in which creatures cooperate in order to bring about the perfection of the universe. This does not exclude the motives of the demons as being malicious. Cf. 5Th I 114.1.ral: Et tamen daemones ad puniendum miss~ alia intentione puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia; mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.

78

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CHAPTER II

the consequences which follow from Aquinas' doctrine of the unity of the soul are worked out.

What happens to the soul after this separation, however, is more complex. Although Aquinas speaks of the human soul after death as anima separata, the separated soul is no longer a human being. By the separation of form and matter human nature is destroyed. Thus, neither the separated soul nor the remaining corpse can be called a 'human being' and neither can be called a 'person' in the Boethian sense (rationalis naturae individua substantia)." What then is this separated soul like? Do Aquinas' considerations of the anima separata reveal any· thing about the situation or even about 'life' after death? . Here the second definition may help us further. By definmg death as privatio vitae, it is presented as malum: the privation of a perfection that should have been there. Death is an evil since it is a privation of being. Vivere viventibus esse est, Thomas learned from Aristotle and since death is the end of life, man is deprived of his being which is good insofar as it is being. Thus death appears as a malum naturae, an evil which may have some good side·effects" but which is, in itself, evil: the greatest corporal evil of this earthly life, naturally filling man with horror." The fact that death is explicitly seen as evil has two important consequences. In the first place, as any evil, death has no positive ess~. Being the privation of esse and perfectio, it cannot be pursued for ItS own sake." Like any other evil, it has no positively identifiable cause. It

Nowhere does Aquinas, in his extended works, devote a quaestio or articulus to the question as to what death is. As a point of departure for discussing Thomas' view on death, two definitions . which appear throughout his works - are taken: separado animae a corpore" and privatio vitae". The first definition brings to the fore the two elements that are constitutive for human nature. Since the soul is regarded as the form, motor and goal of the body, metaphysically the soul is the stronger of the two." Contrary to common sense experience . according to which the soul seems to be a function of the body· Aquinas follows Aristotle in stating that metaphysically the soul contains the body rather than the reverse. 30 The body is held together by the soul. When the soul is separated from the body, as is expressed in the definition of death separatio anima corporis, the body dissolves."

v

21

n

Cf. In 1II Sent 21.1.3.sc2: Nul/us homo dicitur mortuus nisi ex eo quod anima eOO a corpore separata est; co: Mors autem in nobis est secundum separationem animae a corpore; Comp 1b I 229 [Leon: 71: Mors enim corporis nihil est aliud quam separatio animae ab ipso; QD De anima 8.ag4: poena autem peccati mors est, id est separatio

animae a corpore. d. QD De (lnima 14.ag8: moTS est priv4tio vitae; 5Th m 53.1.ral: Skut peccatum est casus a iustitia, ita moTS est casus a vita. QD De anima 8.co; Dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso, ex parte animae aportet accipere rationem, quaJe debeat esse corpus cui unitur. Unde in II De anima dicitur quod anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed

etiam finis.

30

31

m

I 76.3.co: Et propter hoc. in I De anima, contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat iIlas, idest quid faciat ex eis unum. Et non potest dici quod uniantur per corporis unitatem quia magis anima continet corpus, et facit ipsum esse unum, quam e conversOj In I De anima 14 [Leon: 84]: Et quod nihil sit continens et uniens aniinam, sic patel, quia aut est corpus in quo est aut aliquid aliud; sed corpus non unit eam et continet, immo magis anima continet corpus. Aristode's text in I De anima 14 (411b6-8): Quid igitur continet animam, si pmibiJis est apta natura? Non enin: utique corpus. Vtdetur enim contrarium magis, animam corpus continere: egrediente enim expirat et marescitj Cf. also J. Lott, 1988. In II De anima 1 [Leon: 282] (continuing the quote from footnote 19, above): Et inde est quod recedente anima, non remanet idem corpus specie; nam oculus et caro in mortuo non dicitur nisi aequi'Voce, ut patet per Philosophum in vn Metapbysicae. Reee· dente enim anima, succedit alia forma substantia/is quae dat a/iud esse specifzcum, cum corruptio unius non sit sine generatio a/terius.

"

Cf. W. Kluxe.n, 1974 and 1984; R. Heinzmann 1986; The definition of Boethius is found in his De duabus naturis, cpo 3 [PL 64,1343]. Cf. also In I Cor 15.2 [Busa: 236]:

constat quod homo natura/iter desiderat sa/utem sui ipsius, anima autem cum sit pa:rs corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego; unde licet anima consequatur salutem in a/ia vita, non tamen ego 'Vel quilibet homo. " Thus, within the larger picture of entire creation the death of corporal living creatures is natural. Cf. A. Zimmermann, 1992. 34 ScG m 48.6: Homo natura/iter refugit mortem, et tristatur de ipsa: non solum ut nunC, cum earn sentit, earn rejugiens, sed etiam cum earn recogitat. Hoc autem quod non moriatur, homo non potest assequi in hac vita. Non est igitur possibiJe quod homo in hac vita sit felix. 35 Since things can only be pursued insofar as they are good, and things are only good insofar as they have beinj;, death (as privatio "itae lacking any ratio hom) cannot be pursued for its own sake. It can, however, be pursued and even regarded as attractive, as a means that is used in order to reach a goal. In this way death can be attractive, as a way of escaping from the misery of this eanhly life, or because of the beatitude which is expected after this life. Cf. In IV Sent 49.1.1d.ra4: quam"is homo natura/iter desideret finem, non :amen natura/iter desiderat est quae sunt ad finem ... nee est incon'Veniens, aliquid quod secundum se est odibile, esse appetibile in ordine ad finem,: skut sectio membri est appetihilis propter sanitatem; et hoc modo morS, quam natura/iter

80

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appears only as the side-effect of something else and if any cause at all should be assigned to it, this cause should be called causa dejiciens. In the second place· and this also follows from the ontological privative status of death - death cannot be known immediately. Since things can only be known insofar as they have esse, death can only be known by the mediated knowledge of the ens of which it is a privation. This negative line in Aquinas' account of death should be taken very seriously. It is maintained throughout his reflection on what happens when a human being dies and should not be forgotten when reading his account of what comes after death. Focusing on the first definition, mors est separatio animae a corpore, death again appears as evil. Because Thomas underscores the unity of man, the separation of body and soul - by which human nature is destroyed . is contrary to any natural tendency of a substance to maintain its own existence and strive for its own perfection." The separation of body and soul is contrary to the nature of man. As a privation, the separation of body and soul is not a positive act. It can be effected indirectly by severe injury to the body, but the separation as such is endured passivily. This negative approach towards dying - negative according to the possibility of knowing as well as performing the actual separation of body and soul - is reflected in Thomas' use of talking either about the process of dying (mors in jim) or about the situation of death (mors in esse)." Because it is not knowable as such, nowhere is the moment of dying (articulus mortis) examined. We can recognize the process of dying; being a process of a living creature and pertaining to the realm of being. We can recognize a corpse; a body bereft of its natural form. The transition between the two of them is not open to our knowledge. Therefore nowhere does Thomas speculate about it." No matter how 'negative' (in the sense of 'apophatic') Thomas' account of death may be, he focuses on the anima separata in various

works of his." How should these elaborate reflections on the situation of the separated soul be interpreted? To begin with, Aquinas is well aware of the fact that the dead are cut off from communicating with the living by divine ordination.40 Nevertheless, questions emerge and not in the last place because of stories in Holy Scripture like that of Lazarus and the poor man (Lk 16,19-31) which is quoted in the arguments of half the articles of SIb I 89. The answers Aquinas gives, however, show three - rather 'negative' - features. In the first place, his discussion of the knowledge of the anima separata is based on the account of the soul united to the body. Thomas regards the separated soul as a dan'laged substance, neither a person nor belonging to human nature. Stripped of the functions of the vegetative and sensitive parts, which are intrinsically connected with the bodily human nature, all that remains is the rational part which cannot corrupt because of its immateriality." In the second place, Aquinas notices that this situation of a forma, existing apart from the materia it was meant to inform, is against human nature!' It has' a different, not natural mode of being and, consequently, a likewise mode of knowing, according to which it is not able to use the phantasmata which are so important and characteristic for the human mode of knowing. In the third place, the anima separata is dependent on God. As it is

"

Cf. STh I 89; QD De anima 15-21.

40

5Th I 89.8.co: Animae autem mortuorum s.ecundum ordinationem divinam, et

<41

36

quiJibet refogi~ est appetibilis propter beatitudinem, sku, dici'ur Ph 1,23: "Desiderium habens disso/v;, et esse cum Christo. " Cf. M. Rousseau, 1979, p. 602: "His [- Aquinas] pessimism about death is thus not only consistent with. but a reflexive confirmation of, his optimism about the unity

of man.

>7

n

A

Cf. STh II-II 164.1.ra7. In. our century Aquinas' account of death has been point of depanure of a theological speculation about the moment of dying and the situation of the soul

after death. Cf. appendix I, p. 269.

<42

secundum modum essendi segregatae sunt a conversatione 'Vi'Ventium, et coniunctae con'Versationi spiritualium suhstantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur ignorant. This, however, does not mean that the living and the dead are not concerned about each other. Cf. ra1: animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus 'Vi'Ventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quam'Vis eorum statum ignoremus. The relationship between the living and the dead will be discussed in chapter IV, 3.2, p. 247ff. I agree with R. Heinzmann that Aquinas' reflections on the separated soul should be regarded as the philosophical expression of the theological confirmation that God is true to His plan of creation. Cf. Heinzmann, 1986, p. 256: 'Wenn man clie verscruedene Gesichtspunkte zusammenfaBt, so scheint mir, daB incorruptibilitas animae separatae so etwas ist wie ein Grenzbegriff zwischen Sein und Nichtsein, dec philosophisch formulieren soli, daJ! sich Gottes SchOpfungsplan durchhiilt. (...) Die forma wird nicht vemichtet, aber sie fallt gewissermafien zuriick ins Pcinzipsein, da das von dem Prinzip anima Konstituierte, der Mensch, nicht mehr ist." In STh I 89.1.co Thomas speaks of praeter naturam, in ScG IV 79.10 of contra na'uram, meaning the same thing. Cf. A. Pegis, 1974, p. 12·13.

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FOUNDATIONS

worked out in chapter IV, the separated soul is no longer in via. It has lost the human flexibility of willing which makes it possible that the process of a growing relationship with God does take place. Thanks to Thomas' stern focusing on the subject the present reader of his reflections on the separated soul easily forgets that the separated soul, in Aquinas' view, is always in purgatory, in heaven or in hell. Its mode of being is totally determined by its relationship with God. In the situation of the separated soul a tension comes to the fore which, according to Aquinas' Aristotelian inspired metaphysics, cannot remain forever. Thomas uses this philosophical insight as an argument to indicate that it is not unreasonable to believe in a resurrection of the body." In order to understand this, we will have to broaden our scope and consider the more comprehensive theological framework."

83

Original Sin will be studied, insofar as we examine the place and meaning of death (1.3.2). In the third place, we will focus on the human condition after Original Sin, in order to offer an interpretation of the theological meaning of evil, of which death is the most horrible in ~ human life on earth (1.3.3). . As a method of working, the order of elements (world - body - soul relationship with God), which was instructive .in the. pr~vious p~­ graphs, is studied. In this way we can show that m Aqumas theological interpretation corporal death ultimately points to life with God. 1.3.1 The hannony in the state of integrity

The theological .framework, within which the meaning of death according to Aquinas can be found, is based on the stories that are told in Holy Scripture. According to these stories, during the history of the relationship between God and man some profound changes with regard to the human condition took place. These changes are the result of what happened between humankind and God and have a direct bearing on the meaning of death. Thus, in the first place we will consider the condition of the first man and the place of death in this condition, so as to determine the 'point of departure' of the relationship between humankind and God (1.3.1). In the second place, Aquinas' account of

Thomas' account of the condition of the first man is based on his reading of the first chapters of Genesis." The theological importance of this account is that it functions as a standard for all further anthropological reflection." Aquinas interprets the status originalis iustitiae, which is sketched in the first stories of Genesis, as the situation of optimum human relationship with God within the coordinat~s. of materiality and time. It is in fact a consideration of the human condmon as originally intended by God: perfectly organized so as to enable man to know and love God. Against this standard the actual human condition shows lots of· defects (malum as privatio) which are theologically interpreted. . The situation of optimum human relationship with God is characterized by harmony" between man and God; between human beings among one another; between man ·and other creatures; and - man being

4' Cf. SeC N 79.10: anima corpon natura/iter unitur: est enim secundum suam essentiam

" S'Ib I 90-102.

1.3 Death as punishment: Original Sin and its effects

corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque

46

corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oport~t eam corpori iterato coniungi: quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animttrum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum +f

jUturam. We have already noticed that Thomas calls the situation of the separated soul praeter naturam. This should warn us that here something is at stake which he considers to be deviant from the original institution by God in creation. Indeed, the situation of the anima separata is a result of the separation of body and soul which has been inflicted upon humankind within the process of the relationship of humankind with God. Since the philosophical oudook of the issue is determined by this theological framework, the anima 'eparata is dealt with again in chapter N, 1.3, p. 213ff. Considering the 'perfection of life with God' we will be able to discuss the issue from the decisive perspective.

STh I t02.1.eo: Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tratiit, -est pro jUndamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones flbricandae. In this study we will concentrate on Thomas' spiritual exposition of the story of the first man in Paradise. As Thomas himself explains, knowledge of Paradise is still useful for humankind in order to get to know the origins of the actual human condition. Funhermore it serves as instruction for what penains to the heavenly destination of man. 5Th lI-lI 164.2.ra4: locus ille Paradisi terrestris, quam'Vis non serviat homini ad ~ servit tamen ei ad documentum, dum cognoscit propter peccatum se tali loco fuisse privatum; et dum per ea quae corporaliter in ilia Paradiso sunt, instruuntur de his quae pertinent ad Paradisum cae/estern, quo aditus homini praeparatur per Christum. Thus the stories of Paradise have the same function as the eschatological ones, as shown in chapter N, 1.2.1, p. 210.

<47

Cf. STh I-IT 82.1.co: ,.. harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio origina/is iustitiae...

will be

84

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a minor mundus - between the different faculties of the soul. In the ordo thus consituted, a hierarchy can be discerned according to which everything is directed at the goal for which man is created: the vision and enjoyment of God. In this way the state of original justice reflects the place and purpose of the elements pertaining to the hierarchy, showing how all elements contribute to the core of material creation: the human relationship with God. 48 The harmony of the state of original justice is warranted by God's commitment to His creation. Being material, man is bound to live in a material surrounding. This location, Paradise, is entirely directed at the good of man, providing him with the necessities of material life and contributing to the optimum functioning of the sou!." This entails that in paradise food is easily obtainable and that there is no threat or danger of whatsoever nature. With regard to living creatures the same harmony reigns as between the different powers of the human sou!." With regard to inanimated creation, no danger is to be expected in the form of possible natural disasters (malum naturae), because partially the perfection of his intellect makes him avoid possible dangers, and partially God's providence ensures that no man will be harmed." With regard to the human soul, the different powers are organised according to their contribution to the relationship with and enjoyment of God." The sensitive part of the soul is in complete harmony with and under total control of the intellective part. Thus the soul, as rational form of the body, contains the soul completely, and nothing occurs

which runs counter to internal harmony.53 The passions (vires concupiscibiles et irascibiles) are controlled by the rational soul and in total accordance with their function at the sensitive level. The intellective part of the soul is endowed with the gift of sanctifying grace which enables it to know and love God in a mode that perfects its natural capacity. Thus the first man possesses the theological vinues of faith, hope and charity, and along with them, all cardinal virtues.54 Possessing all vinues, the first man is not only in harmony with God and himself, but with his neighbour as well. In Thomas' exegesis of Genesis 1 social relations also reflect the situation of optimum human relationship. This entails that all dominion has the character of enabling man to live as an animal sociate and slavery is out of the question.55 Apart from the fact that the gift of original justice warrants the unity of man by organizing the different powers of soul and body, this unity is manifested in the control of the incorruptible soul over the corruptible body. Since the soul is the form of the body, and matter is in favour of the form, the incorruptible soul should have a body with this sarne quality." Man, being the middle of creation, has been given a body which is composed of the four elements (earth, water, air and fire). Being composed of the four elements, this body functions as a sensible instrument that is fit to feel, see, hear, smell and taste the natural world which is also composed of four elements. The fittingness of the composition, however, is accompanied by the corruptibility of the body, having the same corruptibility as any other creature composed of four elements. Because this is not suitable for the incorruptible soul, the first man is endowed with the supernatural gift of grace which warrants the complete dominion of the soul over the body, including its preservation

<48

STh I 96.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sum omnia. et ideo secundum mcdum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum

competit ei dominari aliu. 5Th I 102.3.00: et sic Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso. 50 5Th! 96.2.co: Vrribus autem sensitivis. sicut irascibili et concupiscibiJi. quae aliqualiter obedmnt ration; dominatur anima imperando. untie et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur. " STh I 97.2.ra4. 52 De malo. S.1.co [Leon: 175]: Est enim homo compositus ex anima et corpore et ex ~tura mtellectuali et sensibili.. quae quodammodo si mae naturae relinquantuT. lntellec~um agpavant et impediunt ne libere ad summum fastigium contemplationis peroenzre possu. Hoc autem auxilium foit originaJis iustitiae, per quam mens hominis si ~ubd~tur Deo ut ei subderentur tota/iter in/eriores vires et ipsum corpus, neque ratio ~mpedtretur quominus posset in Deum tendere. Et sicut corpus est propter animam et sens~. propter intellectum, ita hoc auxilium quo continetur corpus sub anima et vires sensWvae sub mente intellectual;· est quasi dispositio quaedam ad illud auxilium quo 4?

mens humana ordinatur ad videndum Deum et ad frugendum Ipso.

STh II-II 163.1.co: Sie autem homo erat in statu innocentiae institutus ut. nulla esset rebellio camis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani ex hoc quod appetierit aliquod sensibile bon.um, in quod camis concupiscentia tendit praeter ordinem rationis. ,. Cf. 5Th I 94-95. " STb I 96.3-4; A;; we learn from STb ll·ll 164.2.00, there was also originally no dominion of the spouse over his wife in d.omestic life: Quantum vera ad domesticam conversatwnem, punitur [mulier1 secundum hoc quod suhiicitur dominationi viri, per 5'

hoc quod dicitur: "Sub viri potestate eris"[Gn 3,16j. 56

STh I 91.3.00: Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis. Dieo ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenien·

tiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes.

86

from mortality. This preservation from mortality - and here we touch upon the theological core of the story - remains valid as long as the soul remains subjected to God." Thus, in the state of original justice, 'Vita corpora/is is connected with "Vita gratiae, life with God. In order to perceive the proportion between corporal life and corporal death, it is important to take a closer look at this connection between 'Vita corpora/is and 'Vita gratiae. It has been shown that 'Vita corpora/is is directed at 'Vita animae. In different places in his works Thomas points to a similitude of proportion between 'Vita gratiae and vita animae on the one hand, and between vita animae and vita corporis on the other." The similitude is used in a discussion concerning the core of the relationship between God and man: the theological virtue of charity. Aquinas wants to underscore the freedom of the human will by denying Peter Lombard's account according to which the act of loving God is directly produced by the Holy Spirit. God is the effective cause of the life of the soul (by charity) as well as of that of the body (by the soul). The soul is the form of the body and, likewise, charity is a

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STh I-IT 85.6.co: Similiter corpus humanum est materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc, est temperatae complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et ai14rum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarutn [on this convenientia cf. al$o 5Th I 91.3.ral]. Sed quod sit corrnptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nee est electum a natura, quin potius natura digeret mater-iam incorruptibilem, si posset. Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnii natura, in ipsa institutione hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis dedit carpon in~ptibilitatem quandam, ut in Primo [97. I} dictum est. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod "Deus mortem non fecit" [WS 1,13, quoted. in the sed ~n~a1 e~ quod n:ors est poena peecati; 5Th I 97.1.00: Non enim corpus eius erat mdlSSolubiie per alzquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentent,· sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus dataj per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptiOne praeseroare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia e~im anima ratio~is excedit proporticnem corporalis materiaeJ ut supra [STh I 76.t} dICtum estJ convenrens fuit ut in principic ei virtus dareturJ per quam corpus cOTlServare posset supra natur4m corporalis materiae. In.l Sent 17.1.1.ag2: sicut anima se habet ad corpus ut vita ipsius, ita se habet Deus ad anIma",!, ut dicit Augustinus, De verbis Apostol; serm. xvm et XXV7llj STh I-IT 2.8.sc: Augustmus dicit, XIX De civitate Dei 26: I/Ut vita cami! anima est· ita beata vita hominis Deus est"; STh IT-ll 23.2.ag2: Deus est spiritualiter vita animae, ;icut anima vita corporisJ secundum iiluti Dt 30,20: I/Ipse est vita tua 1/; ScG N 17.4: Skut vita naturae corporis est per animam, ita vita iustitlae ipsius animae est per Deum; De malo 7.1.00 [L~on: 303]: Per caritatem enim anima coniungitur Deo, qui est vita animaeJ sicut a~tma, est vi~ c0Y'fJ!J~is; In Rom 1.6 [Bnsa: 196]: sicut corpus vivit per animam naturali VIta, tta amma VWlt per Deum vita gratiae; Cf. also De car 1.ag1+2; Cf. also P. O'Callaghan, 1987, p. 395·396.

87

habitual form added to the natural powers, causing the life of grace in the sou!." As habitual form, perfecting the powers of the soul, the life of grace is accidental. This does not mean, however, that it is less important or less valu~ble ~han the ~u?st~ce. in wh.ich it inhe:~. Because the life of grace IS a kmd of partICipatiOn m the hfe of God, It IS more worthy than the soul that has received it.60 As far as the mode of being is concerned, grace is an accidens and thus less worthy than t~e substantia in which it is inherent. As far as the nature of grace IS concerned, it is a participation in divine nature: because divine nature is infinitely higher than human nature, grace is far more worthy than the human soul which is endowed!' Thus Aquinas can state that compared to the life of grace, natural life is almost nothing. 62 In these considerations vita gratiae, the relationship with God, emerges as the core of human existence. It is conceived as something of infinite value, qualifying the natural life of man in a new way. an~ i? such a manner that this creature is brought to the goal for whlch It IS designed. By charity the soul receives a new form, a form which operates a conformity with God in the soul and plants the seeds of VIta

q~

58

STh ll-II 23.2.00: Unde maxime necesse est quod ad actum caritatis existat in nobis aliqua habitualis forma superaddita potentiae natural; inclirums ipsam. ad car.itatis actum, et facrerzs earn prompte et delectabiliter operarij and tal: Deus est VIta e/fecllve et animae per caritatem et corporis per animam, sed /orr;zaiiter c~itas es.t vit~ anWz:te, sieut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludt quod, su:ut amma unmedtate unitur corpori, ita caritas animae. Cf. also In I Sent 17.1.1.ra2j Cf. also STh I-II llQ.2.ra1: gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam non per modum . causae e}ficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et iustitia iustum. 60 STh II-IT 23.3.ra3: omne accidens secundum suum esse est inferius substantia, quia substantia est ens per Sf, accidens autem in alio. Sed secundum rationem suae speciel, accidens quidem quod causatur ex principiis subiect; est indignius subiecto, sicut eJfictus causa. Accidens autem quod causatur ex participaticne alicuius supericris naturae est dignius subieclO, inquantum est similitudo superioris naturaeJ skut lux diaphano. Et hoc modo caritas est dignior anima, inquantum ~t participatio quaedam Spiritus saneti. " Cf. STh I-II llO.2.ra2: Secundum hoc ~, quia anima imperfecte participat di"inam bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis quae est gratia, imperfectiori .modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat. Est tamen nobilior quam natura animae, inquantum est expressio vel participatic divinae bonitatisJ non autem quantum ad modum essendi. Ii2 In duo praec 6 (de quarto praecepto [Busa: 124J): vita naturalis quasi nihil est in comparatione ad vitam gratiae.

51

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aet:errJ463

Considering what we have said so far, it is apparent that a hierarchy appears. The world is created to be at the service of man, in order to enable him to grow towards the union with God by grace, within the coordinates of materiality and time. Looking at man, the body is made to be at the service of the sou!. Being the stronger part, the soul contains the body and within this unity the intellectual operations appear as the most genuine human functions. Considering the soul, a further hierarchy appears, since all powers serve the intellectual operations which are open towards perfection by grace. With the help of the light of grace, the human faculties for knowing and willing are discovered to be directed at the relationship with God. Having reached this point, one can begin to understand what happens when the relationship with God is disturbed: the hierarchy breaks down, the order vanishes and the elements are deprived of their direction and reason for being. This profound emptiness and disorder is at the core of Original Sin, and death as punishment for Original Sin must be interpreted from this point of view." 1.3.2 Original Sin and the meaning of death In Thomas' account of Original Sin, the act is in direct opposition to the relationship with God. This sin consists primarily in striving for equality with God with regard to determining what is good and bad for man. Secondarily, it consists in the longing to obtain divine happiness (beatitudo) by man's own efforts and on the basis of natural powers." 5Th I-II 114.3.ra3: gratia Spiritus sanet; quam in praesenti habemus, etsi non sit aequalis gloriae in actu, est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut et semen arborum in quo est virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem Spiritus sanetus, qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, umie et dicitur esse "pignus hereditatis nostrae If, 2Co 1,22. .. Aquinas deals with Original Sin in: In II Sent 29·33; In Rom 5.3; ScG IV 50-52; o,mp 7b I 185·199; S7b I 94-102 (indirectly), S7b I·II 81·83 and 85, S7b II-II 163-165; De malo 4-5; Since we will restrict our account of this truth of faith to its connection with our central theme, we will not discuss the problems concerning its traduction. For this, d. J.·M. Dubois, 1983; and M.·M. Labourdette, 1985. &S STh II-II 163.2.co: primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, simt serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operand~ ut scilicet virtute propri4e naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam. .. Verumtamen u

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Both elements point to a fundamental denial of the relation of creatures with their Creator. IT man could find and attain his good by his own efforts, leaning on himself (sibi innitt) alone, God would no longer be needed. The thought is absurd, when one believes that man's happiness consists precisely in knowing and loving God. Beatitudo without God is impossible and the rejection of God: s inst.ruction and help so as w rea0 this happiness is opposed to the orlentauon of the creature seekmg hIS happiness in God. The various elements by which the initial state of harmony is constituted appear again in the enumeration of punishments that have followed upon the firSt sin. Aquinas considers the privation of vita gratiae (in other words: the right ordo according to which the soul is subjected to God) resulting in the exclusion from vita gloriae/aeterna, as the punishment in the strict sense." Subsequently all other elements of the ordo are brought into disorder. Man is excluded from Paradise, the place of optimum human relationship with G.:d, and he is thro~n int? a world which is marked by labour and suffering. Apart from thIS he IS punished with regard to body and sou!. The soul loses its dominion over the body and can no longer save it from corruption. The rational part of the soul (intellectus and voluntas) . loses its dominion over the lower parts (the vires concupiscibiles et irascibiles or passiones animae) and solicitude, anxiety as well as conflicts between the sexes appear." Thus man is not only punished by mortality, but also by the inescapable thought of his own future death." Resuming what we have studied so far, the relationship with God plays a key-role in the harmony of the state of integrity, in Thomas'

quantum ad aliquid uterque [both, the first

man and the devil] Deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine. 66 De malo S.l.co: Cum autem aliquis peccando abiicit a se illud per quod disponebatur ad aiiquod bonum acquirendum, meretur ut ei subtrahatur iJlud bonum ad quod obtinendum disponebatur, et ipsa subtractio iI/ius boni est conveniens poena eius: et ideo conveniens poena peecati originalis est subtractio gratiae, et per consequens visionis divinae, ad quam homo per gratiam ordinatur, J.-M. Dubois, 1983, p. 290, stresses the character of privation of both Original Sin ?-D.d its effects: "il n'y a pas de corruption positive de la nature, mm un de£aut strictement privatif. L'homme se trouve simplement reduit ases principes naturels. Get optimisme relatif de saint Thomas est profondement original." Cf. also p. 293. " S7b II-II 164.1-2. 68 5Th II-II 164.2.co: Tertio, quantum ad commemorationem Juturae mortis, secundum quod ei dictum est: "Pulvis est et in pulverem reverteris" [Gn 3,19]. Ad quod etiam pertinet quod "Deus fecit eis tunicas pelliceas" [Gn 3,21]. in signum mortalitatis eorum.

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account of Original Sin and in the effects of Original Sin. Comparing the core of Original Sin with the core of its effects one immediately notices that materially they are the same. In this respect one could say that the first man has got what he wanted, namely a life apart from God. In the first chapter of this study it was shown that human life is directed at participation in God's life by the life of grace. The fact that God freely bestows the life of grace on man - man being unable to claim it in any respect - does not mean that this life can be considered as an accidental ornament for natural life. To the contrary: vita gratiae, though pure grace, imposes itself as the core of human existence and the fulfilment of vita naturae. When this life with God is refused, the stories of Genesis tell us, the result is self-destructive. Denying the destination for which he was created, man turns himself against the ordo of creation that constitutes the integrity of his own nature. The evil he experiences as effects of Original Sin reveals the violence he commits towards himself by transgressing the order of creation which is directed at his own happiness. What light does all this shed on the theological meaning of corporal death? According to the order of creation the hierarchy of elements (world - body - soul - grace) is directed at the human relationship with God. Man is situated at the border of the material and the spiritual world. The faculties of the soul are designed by its Creator according to the principle, that the material dimension of man is at the service of the spiritual one. Thus we have seen, for instance, that the human way of knowledge proceeds from the visible to the invisible. Furthermore, the spiritual life of man is perfected by the life of grace, the relationship with God. Vita natura/is is directed at and perfected by vita gratiae. Although this perfection is accidental and gratuitous, it is so infinitely more valuable than natural life, that its loss reduces natural life to almost nothing. This is expressed by Aquinas as follows: it is fitting that the soul which abandons God, is abandoned by its body by corporal death, and eventually abandoned by God by eternal death." Natural

life is cut off from the objective .for which it was designed and, in a way, loses its reason for being. Visible natural life no longer serves the invisible life of grace, the relationship with God for which it was designed. Thus - though Aquinas never puts it this way explicitly - one could say that corporal death reflects and signifies the spiritual death of grace, of which it is an effect. Corporal death is the most horrible of the effects of Original Sin. It is, however, part of the various forms of evil that determine the human condition after Original Sin. These evils are interpreted as punishments from God. What does this mean, and how does this affect the appreciation of suffering'after the Fall of Man?

69

In Rom 1.8 [Busa: 356]: Dignum est enim quod anima, quae deserit Deum, It corpore suo deseratur per mortem corporalem, et fina/iter deseratur a Deo per mortem aeternam. The same view is expressed in the thought of the double death of man, moTS corporis and mOTS animae, the second of which is worse and compared to annihilation: STh I~ IT 87.4.ral: omnirro redig; in nihilum eum qui peccat, non convenit divinae iustitiae, quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae. quae est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est [art. 3). Sed in nihilum redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis pt7.v4tur: secundum illuti

91

1.3.3 The human condition, evil and punishment In Aquinas' theology the problem of evil, human suffering and death should always be discussed taking Original Sin into account. The refrain from Genesis 1 ("And God saw that it was good") cannot be applied to the world we live in nowadays without considering the history of humankind with God. In the state of original justice the relationships between God and creatures, creatures among each other and the different parts of each individual. creature were marked by great harmony. In Paradise man was protected, by God's grace, from all possible kinds of natural evil and defects. With Original Sin this situation changes and evil now enters human existence. Evil is introduced in two forms: moral evil (malum morale), for which man is responsible, and natural evil (malum naturale), which has its origin outside the free will of man." Strange as this division initially may seem, it is telling when one realises that both concepts, guilt as well as punishment, are concepts that refer to a relationship. And indeed, this division can only be understood when the relationship of God with His creatures is taken as point of departure. From this point of view all evil either separates from (malum culpae) or leads towards God (malum poenae}." Thus Aquinas offers a radical theological interpretation of evil

leo 13,2: "Si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum"; Cf. also P. O'Callaghan, 1987, p. 401-403. 70 71

Notice that 'nature' is used here in contrast with 'morality' and not with 'grace'.

With regard to malum poenae one must distinguish between punishment in this life and punishment after death. The first is medicinal and pe4agogical, the second is not (cf. ScG ill 144). Whereas the first leads to God in the sense that by this punishment

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according to which all moral evil is regarded as guilt and all natural evil as punishment. When natural evil is focused on - leaving the moral order for the following chapter - death can be placed within the hierarchy of evils by which the human condition is marked. As we have seen in the previous paragraph corporal mortality is not the greatest evil of the punishments. It is the effect and sign of the infinitely more horrible death of grace. The relationship with God in grace, vita gratiae, is seen as the highest good for man. According to the hierarchy of elements, the integrity of the soul is the second greatest good, followed by corporal welfare and external goods." Aquinas notices that many people are more afraid of corporal than of spiritual punishments." That the loss of the life of grace is infinitely

more undesirable than that of corporal life, is not evident for those who are only familiar with the sensible and corporal goods. For humankind in the human condition after the Fall, the faculties of his soul being in disorder, the appreciations of the order of punishments according to the initial order of creation, implies a process. It takes a growth, a development towards being able to appreciate and understand the order of punishments according to its relation to the life with God. We will devote the next chapter to the dynamism of this development, which must be passed through by each individual human being. In the shifts that occur in this process one recognizes the movement from material to immaterial. The more ~ch individual man learns to 'read' creation as pointing to its Creator, and the more his life is directed a~ the relationship with the Invisible, the more he learns to apprecIate cognitively as well as affectively - what human existence is really about. Acknowledging this, the view that God punishes humankind for Original Sin by corporal death has. a special dimension: corporal death is the evil which is feared most by those who prefer corporal above spiritual goods. By corporal death those who are cut off from the life of grace are striken in their deepest fears." The need for developing the relationship with God in order to understand the function of evil is of basic importance for anyone who seeks to understand Aquinas' treatment of the questions which have, from the 17th century onwards, been subsumed under the term 'theodicee'." According to Thomas, all natural evil is interpreted as malum poenae and - in accordance with the pedagogical function of punishment - aimed at the restoration of the relationship of grace between man and God. Thus he retraces all evil to human sin. This line of reasoning

the subject punished is incited. and motivated to change his behaviour,

me second

only leads to God in the sense of pointing to God's justice (and eventually motivating other subjects in this life to change their behaviour). We will come back to this in chapter IV, 2.2, p. 232ff, where Aquinas' reflections on hell and eternal

damnation are studied. Cf. ScG ill 141.1 where Aquinas speaks of malum poenae: Malum autem est priv4tio boni. Unde aportet quod secundum differentiam et ordinem bonorum, sit etiam differentia et ordo poenarum. f2] Est autem summum bonum hominis Micitas, quae est ultimus finis ems; quantoque aJiquid est huic fini propinquius, tanto praeeminet inter hominis bonum. Huic autem propinquissimum est virtus, et si quid est aliud quod ad bonam operationem hominem projiciat, qua pervenitur ad beatitudinem. Consequitur autem et debita dispositio rationis, et virium ei subiectarum. Post hoc autem et corporis incolumitas, quae necessaria est ad expeditam operationem. Demum autem ea quae exterius sunt, quibus quasi adminiculantibus utimur ad virtutem. Pi Erit igitur maxima poena hominem a beatitudine extlutli. Post hanc autem, virtute privar~ et perfectione quacumque naturalium virtutum animae ad bene agendum. Dehinc autem, naturalium potentiarum animae deordinatio. Post hoc autem, corporis pocumentum. Demum autem, exteriorum bonorum sub/atio. cf. also ScC IV 52.1: Patitur autem communiter humanum genus diversas poenas, et corporales et spirituales. Inter corporales potissima est mars, ad quam omnes aliae ordinantur: scilicet fomes, sitis, et alia huiusmodi. Inter spirituaies autem est potissima debilitas rationis, ex qua contingit quod homo difficulter pervenit ad veri cognitionem, et de facili labitur in errorem; et appetitus bestiales omnino superare non potest, sed multotres obnubilatur ab eis. n Cf. SeC ill 141.4: Sed quia de ratione poenae est non solum quod sit privativa bon~ sed etiam quod sit eontraria 'VOluntat~· non autem cuiuslibet hominis voluntas existimat bona secundum quod sunt: contingit interdum quod id quod est maioris boni privativum, est minus contrarium voluntati, et propter hoe minus poenale esse videtur. Et inde est quod plures homines, qui bona sensibilia et corporaJia magis aestimant et cognoscunt quam intellectualia et spirituaiia, plus timent corporales poenas quam spirituaJes. Secundum quorum aestimationem, contrarius ordo videtur poenarum ordini

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supradicto. Apud hos enim maxima poena aestimantur laesiones corporis, et damna rerum exteriorum; deordinatio autem animae, et damnum virtutis, et amissio fruitionis divinae, in qua consistit ultima hominis felicitas. aut modicum aut nihil reputatur ah eis. ,. The reversal of this motif is expressed in Ph 1,23: "I desire to depan and be with

7S

Christ, which is better by far:' We will return to this wheu discussing the perfection of earthly life with God, in the second section of chapter ill, p. 164ff. L. Sentis, 1992, convincingly shows that Thomas Aquinas does not offer a theodicee in the sense G.W. Leibniz {1646-1716} and later philosophers speud much effon on achieving. After having sketched the devdopments in the work of Aquinas, he

stresses the fact that Aquinas does not offer a system of thinking in which the providence of the incomprehensible God can be calculated. For a survey and evaluation of Seutis' study, cf. C. Leget, 1994.

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reflects an inspiration motivated by love for God, a deep faith in divine providence and a desire to interpret even the painful side of creation as contributing to the gracious union between mankind and God." This attitude is recognized where Aquinas deals with apparent injustice that appears in the observation that some people seem to be more heavily inflicted by the effects of Original Sin than others.'7 Thomas provides two answers which both preserve God's justice and refer to mankind. In the first answer, he seeks for a cause and alludes to the situation of man: embedded in human relations and determined by the concrete heritage (natural as well as moral) of one's parents, each of the effects of Original Sin is transmitted to each individual in a particular way. In the second answer, Thomas concentrates on the goal at which the particular natural defects are ordered: it might prevent one from sinning or contribute to increasing the possession of virtues." According to this 'pedagogical' interpretation of evil, the punishment of the just is considered (and even explicitly so) as consonant with God's justice and mercy."

human body at the service of the soul; the soul is directed at the perfection of its operations by the life of grace. Thus the relat.ionship with God emerges as the destination for w!llch ?,-an !s created. This hier~rc~y of elements, organized from the relationship With God, appears agam m Thomas' account of Original Sin and the punishments which result from it. Within this theological framework of the human history of the relationship with God, Thomas is able to integrate the classical interpretation of death as natural to man in a new framework. 80 By interpreting the malum and privatio . which death is - as punishment, the death of the body emerges as a sign which refers to the spiritual death of grace which is'infinitely. more horrible. It takes, however, a development of one's relationship with God in ord~r to fu~ly appreciate and understand this ordo. The development of thiS relationship takes place in a world marked by the punishments of Original Sin. A first appreciation of Aquinas' interpretation of death is obtained. Nevertheless we are still unable to give an answer to our initial question concerning the relation between vita naturae and vita aeterna, for the historical process in which the relationship of human beings with God is embedded, has reached a climax and a new start with God's incarnation in human nature. By the life and death of Christ, human life and death have received new possibilities for the restoration of the relationship with God in grace."

Summarizing this first section of chapter II, we have studied foundations of life with God, as these appear in the first stages of the . relationship of humankind with God. The central position of man within creation is reflected in the ordo of the elements that are relevant to human life: the world is created to be at the service of man; the

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L. Sentis, 1992, p. 203: "Le lieu propre de la parole chr&ienne a propos de la souffrance est ex.plicitement la foi nue et obscure en la divine providence." Sentis'

2. Christ, revelation of God and source of grace

analysis is co.nfirmed by Aquinas' commentary on Job, which the latter considers as a book on divine providence. Cf. De malo 5.4.co; STIJ II·II 164.l.r.4. Cf. also STIJ I·II 85.5.r.l: secundum divmita. tem natura/is complexionis, quorundam corpora pluribus defectibus subiacent, quorundam vera paucioribus, quam'tJis existente original; peecata aequali. STh nwil 164.1.ra4: sed vet in poenam paternorum peccatorum,. inquantum fJius est

Created in order to participate in God's beatitude, after Original Sin humankind lost vita gratiae which is open for perfection by vita gloriae.

quaedam res patris, umie frequenter parentes puniuntur in prole; vel etiam propter

remedium salutis eills qui huiusmodi poenalitatibus subditur, Itt scilicet per hoc a peccatis arceatur, vel etiam de virtutibus non superbiat, et per patientiam coronetur. One may suspect the influence of Job· example par excellence of the just who has blind faith in divine providence - who interprets his suffering as being put to test by God in order to be purified by inflictions and help others to carry their suffering; Cf. M. Yaffe, 1989. ,~ STh I 21.4.ra3: in hoc etiam quod iusti puniuntur in hoc mundo, apparet iustitia el misericordia; inquantum per huiusmodi afflictiones aliqua le1Jia in eis purgantur, et ab affectu terrenorum in Deum magis eriguntur; secundum illud Gregorii (XXVI Moralia 9): "Mala quae in hoc mundo nos premunt, ad Deum nos ire compellunt . .

10

ScC IV 52.4: Sic igitur huiusmodi defectus, quamvis naturales homini videantur, absolute considerando humanam naturam ex parte ems quod est in ea infer~ tamen, considerando divinam prO'Oidentiam et dignitatem superioris partis humanae naturae,

satis probabilite7 probaYi potest huiusmcdi defoctus esse pomales. Et sic coUigi potest

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humanum genus peccato aliquo originaliter esse tnfectumj De malo 5.4-5; NotiCe also ScC IV 81.3: Est igitur moTS quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, consi· derata institutione humanae naturae. Cf. M.-M. Labourdette, 1985, p. 390, footnote 45: "Pour Ie chretien, les souffrances et Ia mort ne sont plus d'abord peines du peche originel; elles Ie sont aussi, radicalem.enti mais, plus profondement, elles ont change de sensi elles sont d~abord moyen d'assimilation Jesus Christ Sauveur, souffrant et mourant sur la crolX. Cf. STIJ I·II 85.5.r.2...S71:> III 69.3.co+ra3."

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No longer able to attain its ultimate end, the human species seemed to be created in vain, left alone with its monal natural life. Therefore God sent a mediator between God and man in order to restore the relationship and remove the impediments which were effected by Original Sin.1l2 In Christ, God's nature - which is His blessed Life, the same vita aeterna man is created to share in - is united with human nature. By this union of two natures in one Person (unio hypostatica), the situation of mankind regarding the relationship with God is changed. In this second section of the chapter 'Foundations of life with God' we will investigate how the human condition is changed by the life and death of Christ. The discussion of the life and work of Christ is opened by gaining insight into Aquinas' account of the motives for incarnation. This enables us to perceive the gratuitous character of the Word becoming flesh and establish some connections with the previous chapter, in which the relation between the divine Persons and the one 'Life' of God was studied (2.1). Subsequently, the hypostatic union is focused on, working out some lines from the same initial chapter, by considering this unio from the point of view of the distinction between Creator and creatures (2.2). Having studied the esse of Christ, in the following paragraph the work of Christ is dealt with, in accordance with the scholastic adagium agere sequitur esse." Here we discover how the suffering and dying of Christ operated and revealed a new relationship between humankind and God (2.3). In the final paragraph, the resurrection of Christ and its significancy for the renewed approach to life and death is examined (2.4).

more and more wondrous reasons for this mystery are made manifest." Aquinas considers the mystery of the incarnation not only to be the work of God which most exceeds the human intellect, he also considers it - as the most marvellous event - to be the central marvel at which all other miracles are ordered." This central place of incarnation among the other marvels of faith is explained with the help of the Aristotelian saying "that which is greatest in any genus seems t.o be the cause of the others."" And indeed, in the theology of Aqulllas, the incarnation is the foundation for Christian life with God, the ground for all marvels which are involved in this relationship. Confronted with this central mystery, the attitude of the theologian is one ot diligenter et pie considerare.87 Seeking understanding of one's faith, the appropriate approach towards this mysterr: is endeavouri~g to elucidate its fitness or suitability (convenientia). In thIS procedure neIther the mystery itself is comprehended (as we will see in 2.2), nor are God's 'motives' screened. Aquinas is very clear about his conviction that those gratuitous operations which ·stem solely from God's will and which are beyond what He 'owes' to creatures, can only be ~nov:n by man insof~ as they are revealed by Holy Scripture. IncarnatIon IS a truth of thIS kind and thus our knowledge of its suitability must be guided by what Scripture tells."

2.1 Life, death and the (first) coming of Christ Attentively and devoutly considering the mysteries of divine incarnation, one finds a depth of wisdom so great that it exceeds all human knowledge. Moreover, devoutly considering the incarnation,

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De malo S.lora!: homo jrustra et vane Jactus esset si beatitudinem consequi non posset, sicut quae/ihet res quae non potest consequi ultimum finem. Unde ne homo jtustra et vane foctus fieret cum peccato originali nasCen5, a principio human; _generis proposuit Deus homini remedium per quod ab hac vanitate liberaretur, scilicet ipsum mediatorem Deum et hominum Iesum Christum, per CHius fidem impedimentum peecati originalis subtrahi posset. Cf. e.g. ScG ill 69.20: agere sequitur esse in actu.

ScG N 54.1: Si quis autem diJigenter et pie incarnationis mysteria consideret, inveniet tantam sapientiae profunditatem quod humanam cognitionem excedat, secundum illud Apostoli: "Quod stu/tum est De~ sapientius est hominibus" [I Co 1,25J. Unde fit ut pie consideranti semper magis ac magis admirabiles rationes huius mysterii manijestantur. Cf. also STh m 1.2.co, where Thomas, after having enumerated ten reasons for the suitability of the incarnation, ends saying! Sunt autem et aliae pturimae utilitates quae consecutae sunt, supra comprehensronem sensus humani. 85 ScG IV 27.1: de ipso nunc incarnationis mysterio restal dicendum. Quod quidem inter divina opera maxime rationem excedit: nihil enim mirabilius excogitari potest divinitus factum quam quod verus Deus, Dei FiJius, fieret homo verus. Et quia inter omnia mirabilissimum est, consequitur quod ad hums maxime mirabilis fidem omnia alia mfracuJa ordinentur: cum id quod est in unoquoque genere maximum, causa aliorum esse videatur. " Aristode, II Metaphysica 1 (993b25). 87 Note that the word diligenter in Latin is derived from diJigere; this overtone of love is lost in the translation "attentively". as S1b ill 1.3.co: Ea enim quae ex sola Dei voluntate proveniunt, supra omne debitum creaturae, nobis innotescere non possunt nisi quatenus in sacra Scriptura traduntur, per quam divina w/untas innotescit. Umie, cwn in sacra Scriptu~a ub!<Jue inc.~tionis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur, convenrentius dicttur tncarnatroms opus

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This anitude of Thomas is in accordance with the central position of God's incomprehensibility in his theology, which we sketched in chapter 1. In this style of studying theology any anempt to penetrate into God's 'psychology' is loathed, since all these attempts are based on the false anthropomorphic supposition that in God's will one can

In SIb ill 1.2.co, after having underscored that the necessity of incarnation is to be appreciated as a necessity of suitability, Thomas lists ten arguments of suitability which are all confirmed by auctoritates of Augustine. In the first five arguments, he considers how the incarnation contributes to the human advancement to its good (promotio hominis in bonum). With these arguments Aquinas directly connects to the central thoughts of what he works out in the Secunda Pars of his Summa. The last five arguments refer to withdrawing from evil. We will concentrate on the first five arguments since they make sufficiently clear what place Christ occupies in the relationship between God and man. The first three arguritents concern the theological virtues, fides, spes et cariras, by which the life of grace is working in the soul. Since God Himself speaks, man is more secured in his faith, or as Augustine puts it: the Truth self, the Son of God become man, constitutes and founds

discern 'before' and 'after', 'sooner' and 'later', 'means' and 'ends'.89

Respecting God's simplicity the appropriate attitude is to scrutinize Scripture in search of insight into the fitness of the mysteries revealed. Considering the motivum incarnationis with this reservation, in his works Aquinas offers various enumerations of suitabilities, differing in number and content." Underlying these enumerations, two motifs play a role which correspond to two possible answers to the question whether the Son would have been incarnated if the first man had not sinned. A first group of authors, following Anselm, argue that since the incarnation is ordered at the restoration of the fallen human nature (reparatio-motif), the incarnation would not have taken place if the first man had not sinned. A second group of authors consider it suitable that God crowns His creation with a perfect union of God and man (consummatio.motif). In this view the perfect union also plays a role in the perfection of humankind, but separately from Original Sin. Aquinas knows both opinions and, although in his later works he judges the former to be more in accordance with Scripture as primary source of Revelation", both views playa major role in his reflection."

89

hoth motifs do not contradict one another, but interlock: according to Scripture and

sed non propter hoc vult hoc; and De pot 3.15.ra14 (written in the same years): quod Deus earn communicare vult: non enim agit propter suam bonitatem quasi

" 91

appetens quod non habet, sed quasi volens communicare quod habet: quia agit non ex appetitu finis, sed ex anum finis. Cf. also G. Kreling, 1979/1939, p. 248·257; M. Corbin, 1980, p. 145·148; H. Goris, 1996. Cf. In ill Sent 4.3.1.ro3; In IV Sent 10.1.1.ro3; In IV Sent 43.1.2.1.ra2; ScG N 54; Comp 7b I 210; S7b ill 1.2; In Psalm 45. In In 1II Sent 1.1.3.co Aquinas starts with the reparatio-motif and after having sketched the consummatio-motif he comments: Et hoc etiam probabiliter sustineri potest. In S7b ill 1.3.co he chooses for the opinion of those who decide for the reparatio-motif quorum assertioni magis assentiendum 'llidetur., M. Corbin, 1980, p. 111·158 makes an analysis of the shifts that can be detected with regard to the place that both motifs adopt in different stages of Aquinas' development. He shows that

of respect for God's incomprehensible simplicity the reparatio-m~tif ,imposes itself as more appropriate (hence the answer of S7b ill 1.3.co). ConslClering. that God's essence is the highest good, it is, however, most fining that He commumcates Himself to His creature in the highest degree, i.e. by hypostatic union (hence the argument of S7b ill I.l.co). This convenientia, founding the reparatia-motif and directly based on God's incomprehensible nature, is beyond all means and ends (d. footnote 89), and points to what Corbin calls the "surplus' of God's goodness which escapes our intellectual grasp (thus showing an important parallel with the structure of God's creative act, as discussed in 1.1). Corbin's argument concords with p. Engelhardt, 1988, 1-12 who shows that from the Summa contra Gentiles onwards Aquinas uses. more and more, the Aristotelian inspired motif of desiderium naturale (conceived as the natural desire for the truth) as frame of reference. It may now be clear that the traditional quarrelling between Thomists and ScotistS about the option for the restauratw. or consummatio-motif obscures much of Aquinas' subdety (C£. G. Krding, 1979/1939, p. 157; M. Corbin, 1980, p. 111·113). Cf. e.g. STh m 4.1.co where a tWofold congruence is detected with regard to God's 'choice' to incarnate in the human nature: Secundum dignitatem quidem (in which the consummatio-motif can be recognized), quia humana natura, inquantum est 1'ationa/is et intellectualis. nata est contingere aliqualuer ipsum Verbum per suam operationem, cognoscendo scilicet et amando ipsum. Secundum necessitatem autem (in which the 1'eparatio-motif can be recognized), quia indigebat reparatione, cum subiaceret originali peccato. Considered apan from their theological .accentuations in the motivum incarnationis debate (d. footnote 91), both motifs seem to be complementary. Thus they can be detected in the Summa 7beologiae up to the treatment of the function of the sacraments which are reparation as well as perfection. In our study, guided by the key-word vita, we focus mainly on the consummatiomotif. As a result of this Aquinas' considerations of sin, redemption, and satisfaction with regard to the work of Christ are less worked out here than does Aquinas. Ollt

ordinatum esse a Deo in remedium peccat~ ita quod, peccato non existente, incarnatio non fumet. Cf. 5Th I 19.5.co: ve/fe finem non est ei [.", God] causa va/endl ea quae sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari. ad finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis, sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cuius amore est

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faith." Our hope is raised by the fact that God showed how much He loves us: and, as Augustine says, what more manifest indication of this is thinkable than that the Son of God has worthied Himself to keep us company in our nature?" Our love is raised by the fact that God shows His love for us: in concordance with both the 'laws' of natural love and that of grace, the divine initiative of love effectuates our loving

human conduct." With this argument Thomas builds on his prologue to the Tertia Pars, in which he introduces Christ as having demonstrated to us the way of truth in Himself, the way (via, alluding to In 14,6) by which we can arrive at the happiness of eternal life." Reading the prologue of the SIb I 2, where Aquinas explains the ~eneral stl:ucture of the three books, one discovers that ChrISt (accordmg to HiS human nature) is also introduced as our way to God." According to the human condition, marked by materiality and time, man is designed to 'move' towards God by acting in grace and augmenting his virtues. In other words: by acting human beings attain their destination, for action is the way to beatitudo':" Thus, in the prologues of the Summa, both, Christ as well as human action, are called the way to God. This is exactly what this fourth suitability brings together by the word exemplum. We touch here on an important line of thought in Aq~inas' theology, which will be worked out in a moment, though not until the fifth suitability is discussed. According to the fifth argument it is suitable for humankind that Christ was incarnated, because the full participation in Divinity - which is our real happiness and end of human life - is bestowed on us by his humanity. Again Augustine is quoted: God became man, so that man would become God.'oo The union with God, the real end of human life, is bestowed on us by Christ. Reconsidering the fourth and the fifth argument, Christ plays a

response. 9S

By connecting the convenientiae for incarnation directly to the theological virtues which are the core of the relationship with God, Thomas makes clear that the life of Christ has a direct and fundamental bearing on our relationship with God. This is made explicit in the fourth argument according to which Christ gave the .example of right

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m 1.2.co: Primo quit/em quantum ad fidem, quae magis certificatur ex hoc quod ipsi Deo loquenti credit. Unde Augustinus dicit XI De Civitate Dei 2: "Ut homo foientius ambulaTet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas, Dei Filius, homine assumpto, constituit STh

"que funda~it fidem. • 5Th m 1.2.co: Secunda, quantum ad spem, quae per hoc maxime erigitur. Unde Augustinus (Xlll De Trinitate 10) dicit, "Nihil tam necessarium Juit ad erigendam spem nostram quam ut demonstraretur nobis quantum diligeret nos Deus. Quid vero huius rei ista indicio mani/estius, quam ut Dei Filius naturae nostrae dignatus est inire consortium? In ScG IV 54.2 Thomas elaborates this argument by sugg~ that, because of the .infinite distance between the two natures, without the incarnation it may seem impossible to become united with God: et sic circa inquisitionem beatitudinis homo tepesceret, ipsa desperatione detentus... Unde post incarnationem Christi homines coeperunt magis ad cae/estem beatitudinem aspirare. STh ill 1.2.co: Tenia, quantum ad caritatem, quae maxime per hoc excitatur. Unde Augustinus dicit in libro De Catechiz. Rudibus 4: "Quae maior causa est adventus Domin~ nisi ut ostenderet Deus dilectionem suam in nobisf" et postea subdit: "Si amare pigebat, saltem reamare non pigeat." In ScG IV 54.5 Thomas gives the following consideration:· Nihil autem sic ad amorem alic~ius nos inducit sicut experimentum illOO ad nos. Amor autem Dei ad homines nullo modo effKacius homini potuit demonstrari quam per hoc quod homini uniri voluit in persona: est enim proprium amoris unire amantem cum amato, inquantum possibile est. Notice also the next argument in ScG N 54.6 which anticipates the theological vinue of charity as friendship between man and God: Cum amicitia in quadam aequalitate consistat, ea quae multum inaequalia sum,- in amicitia copulari non posse videntur. Ad hoc igitur quod familiarior amicitia esset inter hominem et Deum, expediens foit homini quod Deus fieret homo, quia etiam naturaliter homo homini amicus est: ut sic, dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, in invisibilium amorem rapiamur. In the last sentence one can recognize an implicit liturgical quotation which stems from the praefatio Nativitatis Domini ("ut, dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in in'Visibilium amorem rapiamur".

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STh ill 1.2.co: Quarto, quantum ad rectam operationem, in qua nobis exemplum se praebui'. STh ill prol: Quia Salvator noster Dominus Jesus Christus, teste angelo, popu/urn suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum, 'Viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstra'Vit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis 'Vitae resurgendo pervenire possumus;.-.. For Christ as 'way', cf. also Comp Th I 2: quia Christi humanitas 'Via est qua ad Di'Vinitatem pervenitur. Oportet igitur et in 'Via 'Viam cognoscere, per quam possit perveniri ad finem; et i~ patria Dei gratiarum actio sufficiens non esset, nisi 'Viae per quam sa/vall sunt, cognttionem haberent. STh I 2.prol: primo, tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de 11U)tu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tenio, de Christo, qu~ secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum. STh I.n 6.prol: Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus a/iquos necesse est pervenire, oportet ,onsequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, 'Vel impediatur beatitudinis 'Via. STh ill 1.2.co: Quinto, quantum ad plenam participationem Di'Vinitatis, quae 'Vere est hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et hoc collaturn est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone De Nativ. Domine, [13 de Temp.]: "Factus est Deus homo, ut homo freret Deus. "

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double role: in the former He appears as the way, the example for morally good action; in the latter He is conceived as the one bestowing on us the beatified union with God. These roles are performed by Christ on the basis of the union of divine and human nature, but in different ways. Christ is exemplum because of His human nature. According to His human nature (secundum quod homo), He is 'on the way' (viator) within the coordinates of materiality and time. Christ can make us share in divine life, thanks to His divine nature (secundum quod Deus). He is auctor unionis, insofar as He has reached the goal (comprehensor) or better: insofar as He is the goal Himself. These two dimensions, exemplum and auctor, viator and comprehensor, are recognized by Thomas in In 14,6: Ego sum via [secundum quod homo] et

the concept of missio. Being sent can only refer to the Son and the Spirit, since it implie.s. a proc~ssi?~ fro,:,. an orig!~."3 Thomas distinguishes between vlSlble and mVlSlble mISSIOns. InvlSlble mISSIOns refer to sanctifying grace, the vita gratiae by which the human soul participates in God's life. These missions can be ascribed to the Son as well as to the Spirit.'" Visible missions refer to what is told in Holy Scripture about the incarnation of the Son and the Spirit of God descending like a dove (Mt 3,16). Since it is connatural to man to arrive at the invisibilia Dei by visible creatures, it is suitable that the invisible missions are disclosed by visibilia. Thomas argues that the visible mission of the Son and that of the'Spirit have a different suitability. This difference can be retraced to their relations of origin. The Son is sent by the Father and both send the Spirit. Thus the Son is (together with the Father) the principle of the Spirit. Towards the Spirit, the Son has a relation of causation, production, effectuation. When the Son is visibly sent by the Father, this 'effectuating' relation to the Spirit is maintained. At the same time, however, the visible mission corresponds with the fact that the cognitive (verum) aspects of divinity are appropriated to the Son.'" Thus the Son simultanuously reveals the Father and produces (together with the Father) the Spirit. In the visible mission of the Son (the incarnation) these two dimensions can be recognized. The incarnated Son shows who the Father is ern 14,9) and He is Originator (Auctor) of the Spirit to whom sanctification (communication of vita gratiae) is appropriated. The Spirit is regarded as a gift of sanctification.

veritas et vita [secundum quod Deus].'o, These two images, Christ as exemplum and as auctor unionis, that we encounter here in Aquinas' discussion of the arguments for the suitability of the incarnation, are part of two longer lines of thought that run through the entire Summa Theologiae. These lines can be characterized as the revealing and the effectuating dimension of the work ascribed to the Son. In the Summa, they can be recognized from reflection on the triune God in the Prima Pars up to the treatment of the sacraments _ which effect what they signify - at the end of the Tertia Pars. As an exercise in theology of nexus mysteriorum and in order to show the '~nity of tracts' in Aquinas' theology, it may be helpful, at the end of thIS considerati.on of the suitability of the incarnation, to turn shonly to the same question from the perspective of the reflection on the triune God. This may elucidate how Aquinas' considerations of vita with regard to the triune God (as we have studied them in chapter I, 2.3) make themselves felt in his account of the suitability of the incarnation of the Word. In STh I 43.7 Aquinas deals with the question as to whether it is suitable that the Holy Spirit is sent visibly.'o, The quaestio deals with

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Moreover, the Word especially fits human nature, since the latter is _~entially

Cf. In Joan 14.2. It should be taken into consideration that although. Christ is exemplum according to His human. nature, He can be so only because this nature is

united to -divine nature. The same reflections are carried. Out from a different perspective in STh m 3.8 where the su~tab.ility of the incarnation of the Son is considered from the perspective of the assummg Person (the question of the suitability of human nature is treated in STh ill 4.1). ill this amcie me cognitive dimension of the Word emetges in each ~onv~nrentta which JS discovered. Considered from the point of view of the union it IS SUItable to restore a creature by the same form that has functioned as its exemplar.

1o,

rational. From the viewpoint of the goal of the union a congruence JS to be perceived in me similitude of me natural sonship of me Son with me sonship by adoption which man attains by Baptism. A third congruence is to he detected in the fact that the first man, sinning by striving for disproportionate knowledge, is instructed by the Word of true wisdom. . Cf. 5Th I 43.4.co: missio in sui ratione importat processionem ab alia; et in.divinis, secundum originem, ut supra [a.!] dictum est. Unde, cum Pater non sit ab alia, nullo

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modo convenit sibi mitt;,- sed solum Filw et Spiritui sancto, quibus convenit esse ab alio. 5Th I 43.5. Because sanctifying grace is a gift, it "is primarily attributed to the Spirit. Insofar as this grace produces effects which pertain to the intellect, these can be appropriated to the Son: d. adl. This is founded on the proprium 'Imago Patris' of the Son; Cf. 5Th I 3S.2.co.

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When He is sent visibly, He is considered as indicium of sanctificati-

unio hypostatica and what does his procedure entail for the consideration of the work of Christ? We will begin with the hypostatic union. It may not come as a surprise that here at the core the same incomprehensibility is encountered which was sketched in the first chapter as a main characteristic of Aquinas' reflection on God's nature. Considering the different attempts made to think about the union of God and man in Christ that have been rejected by the Councils of the Church, Aquinas eventually locates the union of divine and human nature in the esse of Christ. Proceeding in this way, Thomas implies that the hypostatic union shares in the same incomprehensibility as God's esse. And like the incomprehensibility of God's esse, the union of God and man in Christ is approached by paying attention to the logical peculiarities that are at stake when the two natures in one Person are discussed. 109 Thus, when we speak of a union of human and divine nature, the word unio is used analogously. We find the same procedure here as we discussed in the first chapter, with regard to the word vita applied to God. On the one hand, with regard to the res significata this union is of a kind that outreaches any created union. Therefore, the word 'union' is said more appropriately of this incomprehensible union than of any created union we know. On

on. 106

By assuming human nature the Word becomes united with the human condition of materiality and time. Within the coordinates of this condition Christ fulfils His mission, revealing who God is and effectuating the relationship of grace between God and man. Before we turn to the event where effectuation and revelation reach their culmination, viz. the dying of Christ, we will have to pay attention to the union of divine and human nature in Christ. 2_2 Christ as veiled revelation of God Man was created in order to be united with God through the perfection of the operations of his intellectual faculties: knowing and willing. W~ saw before that this unio operativa, begun in the life of grace and perfected in eternal life, is not the only union between God and creatures. According to his natural life, man is already united with God who dwells in His creation by essence, presence and power. The highest possible union, however, is that between God and man in Christ. In this union the reflection on the distinction between Creator and creature is most severely challenged. I07 How, then, does Thomas conceive of the

I"

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STh I 43.7.co: Respondeo dicendum quod Deus providet omnibus secundum uniuscuiusque modum. Est autem modus connaturalis hominis, ut per visibilia ad invisibilia manuducatuT, ut ex supra dictis {STb I 1212} patet, et ideo invisibilia Dei aportu;t homini per visibilia manifestari. Sic"t igitur seipsum. Deus. et processiones aeternas PersotutrUfT; per creaturas visibiles, secundum aliqua indicia, hominibus quodamrrux/o demonstravit; ita conveniens fuit ut edam invisibiles missiones divin4YUm Personarum secundum aliquas visibiles creaturas maniJestarentur. Aliter £amen Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Nam Spiritui sancto, inquantum pacedit ut ArnOT, compelit esse sanctificationis donum, Filio autem, inquantum est Spiritui sancta principium, competit esse sanctiftcationis buOO Auctorem. Et ideo Filius visibiliter missus est tanquam sanctificationis Auctor, sed Spiritus sanctus tanquam sancti/icationis indicium. "" R. Sokolowski, 1982, p. 31-40, makes clear that the great Councils of the first centuries should be read as attempts to safeguard the distinction between God and man in Christ. As a consequence, "it is also the case that various heresies concerning such issues are heretical because they would, by implication, obscure the Christian distinction between the world and God" (p. 34). Studying Aquinas one can see how his treatment of the heresies concerning Christ are meant to illustrate the many traps one can walk into when dealing with this issue. Cf. e.g. his procedure in Comp Th I 202-208 and ScG IV 28-38. Intimately, however, as we shall see, on this point Aquinas' procedure has the character of negative theology. 106

109

Cf. Comp Tb I 211 [Leon: 39]: Sic igitur in aliis hominibus unio animae et corporis constituit hypostasim et suppositum, quia nihil aJiud advenit praeter haec duo. In Domino autem Iesu Christo paeter animam et corpus advenit tertia substantia divinitas: non est seorsum suppositum 'Vel hypostasis, sicut nee persona, id quod est ex corpore et anima consitutum. sed suppositum, hypostasis -vel persona est id quod constat ex tribus substantiis, corpore scilicet, et anima et deitate: et sic in Christo sicut est una tantum persona, ita- una hypostasis et unum suppositum. Alia autem ratione ad'Venit anima corpori, et di'Vinitas utrique. Nam anima advenit corpori ut forma eius existens, unde his duobus constituitur una natura, quae dicitur humana natura. Divinitas autem non advenit an~mae et corpori per moduf11, formae neque per modum partis, hoc enim est contra rationem divinae perfoctionis; unde ex divinitate et anima et corpore non constituitur una natura, sed ipsa natura divina in sepsa integra et pura existens, sibi quoc/dm incomprehensibii et ineffabili rmxlo univit humanam naturam ex anima et corpore constitutam: quod ex infinita virtute.eOO processit. (Bold by C.L.) Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, the main inspiration for this paragraph. Schoot makes clear that - in accordance with the truth that the triune God reveals Himself through the Word - eventually "(a) the union of Christ's created knowledge with the Word of God is primordial and exemplary to all naming of God. This union is the hean of all analogous naming of God" and "(b) naming Christ is analogous to the primordial union of the Word of God and created human knowledge of Christ. Naming Christ means to enter into this mystery and to as it were 'double' this mystery" (p. 189).

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the other hand, with regard to the modus significandi the word unio is said inappropriately of the hypostatic union, having a mode of signifying which is apt only for what is created. The union of created human nature with uncreated divine nature in one Person, remains beyond our intellectual grasp. Since it is the most perfect union between God and man, Thomas attributes to the unio bypostatica a central meaning which is in accordan· ce with the revealing and effectuating role of Christ. As is shown later in this chapter, the unio bypostatica, being the highest in the genus of unions, is the efficient cause of the unio operativa, for which man was created. Apart from this effectuating aspect, the hypostatic union also has a central position with regard to the revelation of the incomprehensibility at stake when the relation between Creator and creatures is considered. Thomas regards the union of two natures in Christ as exemplaty for God's hidden presence in creation. He draws an analogy between relations of the res significata and the modus significandi as they can be considered with regard to Christ and the Old Testament, the First Truth and the Articles of Faith, the suffering Christ and the species of bread and wine and, finally, the Word and His human nature. Thus, the way in which the latter is considered a mysterium is fundamental and exemplary for the hidden presence of the divine in the created mode of revelation. 110

Because two natures and one hypostasis can be distinguished in Christ one should say that what pertains to the nature of Christ is twofold and what pertains to His hypostasis is unique!12 Thomas tries to do justice to this truth of faith by making use of reduplicative statements. By discerning whether Scripture speaks of ChrIst secundum quod homo or secundum quod Deus, he tries to avoid t.hat. the two natures are mixed, or that the umty of the Person of Chnst IS threate-

Now we have learned that Christ's esse shares the same incomprehensibility as God's nature, the question arises as to what this entails for the operations Christ performed? Agere sequitur esse the scholastic adagium says. In Thomas' view the incomprehensibility of God's acting is indeed perceived in Christ's acting. Christ is God who became man. In Christ, free as a human being, God acts in His incomprehensible manner. Yet the relation between the two natures can be reflected on more closely, following John of Damascus' saying operatio sequitur naturam.1l1

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ned.l13

In divine nature as well as in human nature, intellect and will can be distinguished. Being t'l:!ly man ~d truly. God, ,!h~:.:'as th~~ di~cerns a twofold will and a twofold 10tellect 10 Chnst. Antlclpat10g the consideration of the voluntary suffering and dying of Christ at the cross, we will spend a few words on the relation. ~etwee.n Chri~t's human intellect and wiJI on the one hand and the dlVlne w!ll and 10tellect on the other. Proceeding from the unique hypostasis or ~ers.on of ~hrist,. T.hom~ stresses the unity of divine and human faculties 10 Chnst. Wllh10 thIS context Aquinas distinguishes between si",!pliciter. unum and ordi.ne unum. Simpliciter in Christ there are two WIlls; ardine, the human w!ll, however is ordered at the divine will to such a perfect degree that , not want anything that was not wanted by d"Iv10e WI'11 .11' Christ did For this reason it is understandable that some might think that in Christ there was only one wilL .., . However much Aquinas stresses the umty 10 Chnst secundum ordtnem; with regard to the question how the divine and hu".'an faculties cooperate Aquinas remains silent: we do .not know, because It .transcends the capacity of the created intellect. W,th ~egard to the ~mon of .t~e Word (the divine source of all knowledge) wllh the human 10tellect II IS clear that there is a profound influence of the Source on the creature, bringing about all intellectual perfections th~ created soul can contain. As to how this influence is to be apprecIated, one would have to

Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 9-40. In his concluding chapter Schoot shows that for Aquinas the word mysterium always points to a kind of relation analogous to the

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unio byp<JStatica (p. 190). John of Damascus is quoted in sTh ill 19.2.sc. Cf. also STh ill 19.1.ra3: operar; est hypostasis subsistentis, sed secundum formam et natlfYam, a qua operatic speciem redpit... Et similiter in Christo oportet quod sint duae operationes specie differentes, secundum

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eim duas naturas, quaelihet tamen operationum est una numero in Christo, semel facta,

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sicut una ambulatio et una sanatio. STh ill 17.2.00: Respondeo dicendum quod, quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una bypostasisl necesse est quod ea quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint dUal quae autem pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo sint unum tantum. On the logic of reduplicative statements, d. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 67~70. 5Th ill 18.1.eo.

ScG IV 36: For the relation between divine and human knowledge in Christ, d. H. Schoot, 1993, P' 169-191.

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understand how the union is to be conceived. And precisely this has been characterized as mysterium.!16 That the cooperation between the two natures in Christ shares in the incomprehensibility of God's nature, does not prevent Aquinas from giving a closer specification of the relation between the two natures. Following John of Damascus, Thomas compares the proportion between the divine nature and the human nature to that of the craftsman and his instrument.l!7 With regard to this analogy two things are of importance for our study. In the first place, one should be aware of the limitations of the image.l!S The analogy is meant to hold together divine initiative and efficacy with freedom and action of human nature. The image is only useful when taking into account that the divine and the human will are not working at the same level.l!' Thomas expresses this by saying that the nature of the instrument determines how its operation is proportioned to the first cause that sets it in motion. The human nature of Christ, conceived as an instrument, is endowed with a rational soul containing a will and is accordingly moved by this will."o In the second place, it is interesting that Aquinas explicitly compares the cooperation of the two wills in Christ with the manner in which

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Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 183-185. T. Schoof, 1974, shows the development of Aquinas' use of this model. It enables Thomas to maintain the efficacy of the work of Christ together with God's initiative with regard to the salvation of humankind. Thus the salvation of

humankind can be appreciated as a historical process. From De ver 27.4 onward the model of instrumentum .is adopted in order to elucidate the efficacy of the sacraments as well. De ver 27.4.co [Leon: 310]: Damascenus in III libro [cap. 13] dicit quod humana natura in o,risto erat velut quoddam organum divinitatis,' et ideo humana natura aliquid communicabat in operatione virtutis divinae, sicut quod Chris· tus tangendo leprosum mundavit; sic enim ipse tactus Christi causabat instrumentaliter salutem leprasi. Sicut autem humana natura in Christo communicabat ad effectum divinae virtutis instrumentaliter in corpora/ibus effectibus. ita etiam in spiritualibus,' ... [Leon: 325] et sic humanitas Christi est instrumentalis causa iustificationis; quae quidem causa nobis applicatur spiritualiter per fidem et corpora/iter per sacramentaj Cf. also P. Crowley, 1991; Cf. T. Schoof, 1974, p. 240-243: "It functions by grace of a certain indeterminateness, a 'quodammodo' ... " and in footnote 80: "Just the rigid reconstruction of a system of instrumentality renders the historical studies of one generation ago so hard to take. n [trans1ation: C.L.] For a more elaborate exposition on this issue d. K. Tanner, 1988. STh m 18.1.ral: Sic ergo natura bumana in Christo juit instrumentum Divinitatis ut moveretur per propriam voluntatem.

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God works in the soul of the human being endowed with grace. 12! By this analogy of the unio operativa with operations that stem from the unio hypostatica a reciprocal clarification takes place. What is brought about in secret by God's grace in the soul of the human being endowed with grace, is, as it were, recognized and revealed in the being of Christ. 2.3 The suffering and dying of Christ: revelation and grace

After the introductory sketches of 2.1 and 2.2 we now come to the heart of the matter: the importance of the suffering and dying of Christ for the human relatioriship with God. We have shown that Christ is via. veritas et vita, way and destination, viator and comprehensor. Embodying the perfect union between God and man, Christ effectuates and reveals the gracious relationship between man and God. Thus, Christ's attitude towards death and the way He behaved at the moment of His suffering and death have a double dimension for the Christian. They are an example of how we should bear the misfortunes and suffering of our vita natura/is, inspired by the faith, hope and charity of vita gratiae. At one and the same time Christ's suffering is the principle cause of vita gratiae which is bestowed on us in the sacraments, by which the bodily presence of Christ is prolonged.!22 In this paragraph we first deal with the effecting aspect of Christ's passion and death (2.3.1) and subsequently with its revealing dimension (2.3.2).123

'" STh ill 18.1.ra1. In both contexts we find the image of the instrumentum. Cf. ScG ill 70.7: Patet etiam quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae vtrtuti attribuitur quasi partim a Deo, et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum: sicut idem eJfectus totus attrihuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus; Cf. also P. Crowley, 1991, p. 454. For the imponance of this for contemporary theology d. p. 474-475. 122 123

Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, 1959, p. 48. In order to be able to concentrate on the essential elements of Aquinas' theology with. regard to life and death, in this study. we focus on the passion of Christ, which, for Aquinas, is indeed the culmination of Christ's work. In order to do justice to Aquinas, it should be noticed that he pays much attention to the earthly life of Christ in what is called mysteri4 vitae Christi (d. G. Lohaus, 1985; d. also T, Schoof, 1974). Reading Thomas' interpretation of the story of Christ's hinh (STh ill 36) or His way of social intercourse (STh ill 40). one detects how he interprets every detail as a revelation of God and being directed at the restoration of the relatioI;lship with God.

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2.3.1 The passion and death of Christ as restoration of a relationship

essentially inchoatio vitae aeternae, this faith can only be so if it is informed by caritas. And it is indeed this theological virtue of charity, radix, mater et forma of all other virtues, which occupies the central place in the work of Christ at the cross as Aquinas conceivesit."7 This becomes clear when a crucial chapter in the Summa Theologiae is examined, where Aquinas reflects on the manner in which Christ's passion is the cause of human salvation: STh ill 48. Here Aquinas adopts an interesting procedure. In Scripture - and subsequently in the tradition of the Church - what Christ accomplishes with regard to the relationship between God and man, is understood in different ways: as satisfaction, sacrifice, reoemption. All these approaches take as point of departure a relationship between two human beings, or between man and God. In the work of Christ however, the one acting is God and man, and what He effectuates concerns the relationship between humankind and God. Thus, the manner in which satisfaction and other procedures are realized, has to be critically considered when applied to Christ. Aquinas does not choose for one of the approaches, rejecting the others, but uses each of them in order to elucidate different aspects of the same event.· He closes the quaestio with a responsum in which the different ways of elucidating Christ's work are situated with regard to each other ."8

In Compendium Theologiae I 239, Thomas Aquinas offers a text in

which the death and resurrection of Christ are connected with vita naturae and vita gratiae as well as their counterparts, mors corporis and mors spiritualis. '24 In this condensed 'chapter' we find the same elements as in the story of Original Sin, however in reversed perspective. In the story of the First Sin, corporal death is introduced as a result of the punishment that. was inflicted on the first man when he cut off his relationship with God in grace. In the death and resurrection of Christ, the resurrection of the dead body results from the restoration of the life of grace of man. Both perspectives point to the same core: the relationship with God or vita gratiae. The scheme that is provided by this condensed 'chapter' - a scheme based on the Pauline opposition of Adam and Christ'" - makes us sensitive for the core of the work of Christ at the cross. The external {material and corporal} event is informed by a spiritual event in which the life of grace occupies a central place. In Comp Th I 239 Thomas specifies this life of grace as follows: et haec est per fidem, per quam Deus inhahitat in nobis. By faith we are cognitively united with God. By knowing, the object known is in the intellect {although according to an immaterial intelligible form}: thus contact is made on the basis of which the will is incited."6 But whereas the theological virtue of faith is

12~

Comp Th I 239: Sicut autem Christus sua mone mortem nostram destruxit, ita sua resurrectione vitam nostram reparavit. Est autem hominis duplex mors et duplex vita: una quidem mars est corporis per separationem ab an~ alia VeTO mars est animae per separationem a Dea. ClJristus igitur. in quo secunda moTS locum non habuit, per primam mortem quam subiit, scilicet corporalem, utramque in nobis mortem destrUXit, scilicet corporalem et spiritualem. Similiter autem per oppositum intelligitur duplex vita:

IV

una quidem corporis ah anima, quae dicitur vita naturae, alia animae a Deo, quae

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126

dicitur vita iustitiae vel ~ita gratiae: et haec est per fidem, per quam Deus habitat in nobis. secundum iiluti Hab 2,4: "Justus autem meus ex fide vivit", et secundum hoc etiam est duplex resurrectio: una corpora/is, qua anima iterato coniungitur corpor;; alia spiritualis, qua iterato coniungitur Deo. Et haec quidem secunda resurrectw in Christo locum non habuit, quia numquam eius anima fuit per peccatum separata a Deo. Per resurrectionem igitur suam corpora/em utriusque resurrectionis, scilicet corpora/is et spiritualis, nobis est causa. Cf. Rm 5,12-21. Aquinas firmly holds to the tenet nihil amatum quod non cognitum. Hence the primacy of the Word before the Spirit in via processionis. In fact, however, the cognitive and the volitional cannot be separated: without knowledge the will would

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be locked within itself and could not be attracted to any object; without volition the intellect would not be incited to know. Thus, .intellectual life comprises both and necessarily does so; Cf. In m De anima 15. It also plays a central role in the dynamism (ch. Ill) and the perfection (ch. IV) of the relationship with God. Cf. In Rom 1.6 [Bus", 200], Nee tamen est perfect. habitatio [Christi in cordibus nostrisJ nisi fides per caritatem sit flrmata, quae per vinculum peifectionis nos unit Deo, ut dicitur Col 3,14; De perf 2 [Leon: 27]: Consistit autem principaliter spiritualis vita in caritate, quam qui non habet nihil esse spiritualite:r reputatur,' unde Apostolus lCo 13,2 dicit: "Si hahuero prophetiam• .,. caritatem autem non habuero. nihil sum. " Beatus etiam Johannes Apostolus totam spiritualem vitam in dilectione consistere asserit, dicens IJn 3,14: "Nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte in vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Qui non diligit manet in morte. " Simpliciter igitur in spirituali vita perfectus est qui est in cantate peifectus; In Symb 8 [Busa: 40-47]. SIb m 48.6.ra3: Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi, secundum quod comparatur ad divinitatem eiusJ agit per modum efficientiae; inquantum vero comparatur ad voluntatem animae ChristiJ agit per modum merit;; secundum vera quod consideratur in ipsa carne Christi, agit per modum satisfactionisJ inquantum per eam liberamur a reatu poenae,' per modum VeTO redemptionis. inquantum per eam liberatnlfr a servitute culpae; per nwdum autem sacriflCii, inquantum per eam reconciliamur Deo, ut infra [SIb m 49.4J dicetur. Cf. T. Schoof, 1974, p. 236, 'The traditional models of understanding

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It is telling that in all approaches caritas plays a central role. In STh ill 48.1 Aquinas deals with the question whether Christ caused our

salvation by manner of merit. Introducing the concept of merit (meritum) in this context, Thomas puts effort in elucidating the way in which the effect of Christ's passion motivated by caritas is transferred to those who belong to his Church. Meritum is the effect of the works performed by those endowed with the life of grace, in terms of which future participation in eternal life is expressed.'" In the consideration of Christ as causa meritoria, the idea of merit is combined with the motif of Christ as Caput EcclesiaeP' Thus it can be made clear that the work of Christ has the same effect of merit in those who are in communion with Him, as the works performed by someone endowed with the life of grace have for himself.l3l In STh ill 48.2 the question is posed whether Christ operated our salvation by manner of satisfaction. In this article Thomas does not ask for the suitability of considering the work of Christ as satisfactio. This article is meant to highlight the abundance of caritas: the love out of which Christ suffers is greater than all possible destruction of the relationship between God and humankind. This is also demonstrated by the infinite dignity of the

are not turned down, but acquire additional significance exactly in the light of instrumentality." [translation: C.L.] m For Thomas meritum is: an effect of grace and not a cause, as one might be inclined to think staning from a false opposition between God's grace and human activity (5Th 1·11 114). Cf. O.H. Pesch/A. Peters, 1981, p. 106, "Damit wird der tie/ste Sinn der Verdiensdehre deudick Sie solI - in> Bild einer Art 'Kaufkraft' - die innere Tele%gie der Gnade auf ihre Ent/altung zur ewigen Gemeinschaft mit Gott bin zur 5pracbe bringen.· Cf. also G. Kreling, 1979/1959, p. 431-439; O.H. Pesch, 1967[a] p. 771-784 and 1967[b], p. 1882-1890. 1~

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5Th m 8.1.ral: dare gratiam aut Spiritum sanctum convenit Christo secundum quod Deus, auctoritative, sed instrumentaliter ei convenit. secundum quod est homo, inquantum scilicet eOO humanitas foit instrumentum divinitatis eOO. Et ita actiones ipsius ex virtute divinitatis fuerunt nobis salutiferae. utpote gratiam in nobis causantes, et per meritum et per effidentiam quandam. Note how the verum·aspect ascribed to Christ and the bonum-aspect to the Spirit appear again with regard to Christ as capu" 5Th m 8.1.ra3: caput habet manifestam eminentiam respectu exteriorum membrorum, sed cor habet quandam inf/uentiam occultam. Et ideo cordi comparatur Spiritus sanctus, qui invisibiJiter Ecclesiam vivicat et unit, capiti autem comparatur Christus, secundUm visibilem naturam, qua homo hominibus jJraefertur. STh ill 48.1.co: Christo data est gratia non solum sicut singulari personae, sed inquantum est Caput Ecdesiae, ut scilicet ab ipso redundaret ad membra. Et ideo opera Christi hoc modo se hahent tam ad se quam ad sua membra, sicut se habent opera alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum.

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life which is offered as satisfaction - not human life, but human life united with divine life - and the extent and amount of suffering.'" Sacrificium (STh ill 48.3) is also used to express the magnitude of Christ's caritas at work. A sacrifice is an action which is performed in honour of God - an honour which is particularly due to God - so as to be reconciled with Him. Thomas quotes Augustine who says that in a true sacrifice we adhere to God by a holy union, and through being related to that end we can be truly happy. By suffering Christ gives Himself for us. This is utmost worthy of acceptance by God, since it is motivated by the greatest charity, which is - as grace - of course connected to the One 'who makes us truly happy. Christ's sacrifice is recognizable as sacrifice par excellence. In every sacrifice one can discern four things: the one adressed to, the one sacrifying, that which is sacrified and those who are benefited. As one and true Mediator, Christ is one with Him to whom the sacrifice is addressed (God), one with those who are benefited (man), and He himself is the one who performs the act and who is sacrificed. 133

The same central role of charity, though more implicitly, can be detected in Aquinas' consideration of redemptio (STh ill 48.4-5). Again the greatest gift of all, corporal life (symbolised by the blood) is offered,

STh ill 48.2.co: Cbristus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo, maius aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius ofJensae humani generis. Primo quidem, propter magn#udinem caritatis ex qua patiebatur. Secundo, propter dignitatem vitae suae, quam pro satisfoctione ponebat, quae erat vita Dei et hominis. Tertio, propter generalitatem passionis et magnitudinem doloris assumpti. In Aquinas' view, the dignity of the life which is offered confirms the amount of cmtas, according to the Aristotelian saying that the vinuous person loves his life the most. How suffering shows the amount of caritas is worked out in chapter ill, 2.4, p. 176~. '" 5Th ill 48.3.co, Respondeo dicendum quod sacri/icium proprie dicitur aliquid factum in honorem proprie Deo debitum, ad eum placandurn. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, in X De Civitate Dei: "Verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut saneta societate Deo inhaereamus, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veradter beati esse possumus." ... hoc ipsum opus, quod wluntarie passionem sustinuit, foit Deo maxime acceptum, utpote ex caritate proveniens. Unde mani/estum est quod passio Christi fuit verum sacrificiurn. .. et, "cum quatuor considerentur in omni samficw", ut Augustinus dicit in IV De Trinitate, scilicet "cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro quibus offeratur, idem ipse qui unUS verusque mediator per sacrificium pads reconciliat nos Deo, unum cum illo maneret cui offerebat, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat, unus ipse esset qui offerebat, et quod offerebat. "

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,",

motivated by (the spiritual life o~ carittts.'J4 Thomas ends this quaestio with the determination that God is the prime efficient cause of human salvation, and Christ, according to his human nature, the instrumental cause. We have seen how carittts appears at the centre of all approaches according to which the work of Christ at the cross is considered. As carittts, as effect, is ascribed to the Spirit, it is apparent that the Spirit plays a central role in the suffering and dying of Christ. The question then arises, what this instrumental efficient causality of the suffering of Christ relates to the central place of caritas as an effect ascribed to the Spirit, or, putting it more generally: how is the relation between the Father, the incarnated Son and the Holy Spirit with regard to corporal and spiritual life of the dying Christ? The death of Christ is voluntary and violent at one and the same time. His death is violent as He dies on the cross, being executed by His persecutors. It is voluntary since He neither prevents His adversaries from nailing Him to the cross nor prevents His body from being harmed by their torture. 135 In accordance with Ph 2,8 (jactus obediens usque ad mortem) Aquinas considers the death of Christ as a death in obedience. In Thomas' view the motives of obedience and charity should not be played off against each other: Christ fulfils the precepts of charity out of obedience, and He is obedient to the commanding Father out of charity."6 Let us take a closer look at this relationship between Christ and the Father. Thomas states that there are three ways in which the Father can be said to have delivered Christ to his passion: insofar as by preordination

'*'

of His eternal will the passion of Christ was directed at the liberation of humankind; insofar as God inspired Him with the will to suffer for us, infundendo ei caritatem; and insofar as God did not protect Him from suffering, exposing Him to His persecutors. l3' Especially the second way is revealing as to the relationship between the Father and the Son incarnate. The line of thought is prolonged in the answer to the second obiectio in which the argument is based on the premise that someone cannot be delivered to death by himself and by someone else at one and the same time. In his response, Aquinas answers that Christ, insofar as God, surrenders according to the same will as the Father delivers Him; insofar as man, He su'rrenders according to a will inspired by the Father.'" By determining the proportion of the Father to the Son incarnate with the help of the procedure of reduplicative statements, Aquinas twice implicitly touches upon the involvement of the Spirit. In the first place he does so, where the relation of the Father with Christ secundum quod Deus is considered. Christ is said to deliver Himself according to the same will and action as the Father delivers Him. This identity can be accounted for, seeing that the oneness of the divine nature cannot allow for separating the operations of different Persons of the triune God (operatio sequitur naturam).'" When we think of the distinction between the divine Persons by their origin, a striking coincidence comes to the fore: the third Person, originating

STh ill 47.3.co! Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus passus est voluntarie ex obedientia Patris. Unde secundum tria Deus Pater tradidit Christum passioni. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod sua aeterna volun!4te praeordinavit passionem Christi ad humani generis liberationem, secundum illud quod dicitur Is 53,6: "Dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum"; et iterum, "Dominus wluit conterere eum in infinnitate". Secundo, inquantum inspiravit ei 'Voluntatem patiendi pro nobis, ;n/undendo ei caritatem. Unde ibidem sequitur, "Oblatus est, quia voluit". Tertio, non protegendo eum a passione, sed exponendo persequentibus. Unde, ut legitur Mt 27,46, pendens in cruce Christus dicebat: "Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti quia scilicet potestati persequentium eum exposuit, ut Augustinus dicit. tJa STh ill 47.3.ra2: Christus, secundum qwxl Deus, tradidit semetipsum in mortem eadem voluntate et actione qua et Pater trdidit eum. Sed inquantum homo, trdidit seipsum voluntate a Patr:e inspirata. Unde non est contrarietas in hoc quod Pater tradidit Chris· tum, et ipse tradidit semetipsum. m Cf. In Joan 5.4 [Busa: 147]: nam non aliud vult Filius quam Pater: sicut enim est illis una substantia, sic est illis una voiuntas,' For this reason, as was explained in chapter I, p. 52, the procedure of appropriatio is applied: in order to do justice to both the oneness of God and the mode of speaking of Holy Scripture.

n7

1)4

S10 ill 48.4.co: Oristus autem satisjecit, non quidem pecuniam danda aut aliquid huiusmod~ sed dando id quod fuit maximum, seipsum, pro nobis. Behind this one.. can hear the words of In 15,13: Mawretn hac dilectionem nemo habet ut animam suam qu~ ponat pro amicis suis. The same thought is worked out in the corpus of the next article (SIb m 48.5.co), Pretium autem redemptionis nostrae est s,tnSUinis amst~ vel Vlta elUS corporalis, quae "est in sanguine" {Lv 17,11], quam ipse Christus exsolvit. Unde ~trumque

istarum [actus et pretium redemptionis} ad Christum pertinet immediate

'mz.uantum est homo, sed ad totan: Trinitatem sicut ad causam primam et remotam, erat et ipsa vita Christi skut prim; auctoris. et a qua impiratum foit ipsi homini o,risto ut pateretur pro nobis. ~1h ill 47.1.co: Quia ergo anima Christi non repulit It proprio corpore nocumentum iIlatum, sed wluit quod natura corporalis ilti nocumento succumberet, dicitur suam animam posuisse, vel 'voluntarie mortuus esse. 5Th ill 47.2.ra3: eadem ratione ,Christus passus est ex caritate, et obedientia, quia et praecepta caritatis nonnisi ex obedientia implevit,' et obet/iem foit ex dilectione ad Patrem praecipientem. CUUIS

1)5

1)6

mer

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from the Father and the Son, is conceived as the Love between the Father and the Son. This Love is none other than the Holy Spirit and associated with God's will. Thus, the common will of the Father and the Son can be none other than the third divine Person: the Holy Spirit!'" In the second place, where the relation of the Father with Christ inquantum homo is considered, attention is drawn to the involvement of the Spirit by words like inspirare, caritas and infondere. The language used here is that of caritas as infused virtue being a participation in the love of the Son and the Father and rendering the will to be in conformity with the divine will'''. Again the Spirit appears at the core of the work of Christ, the latter now considered according to his human

In both 'slides' the specific revealing role of the Word is evident. In the first, the dying Christ reveals the mystery of the triune God as a mystery of self-communicating Love. In the second, He gives an example of the perfection of the way towards God. Moreover, in both 'slides' it also becomes apparent how the effecting aspect of the work of Christ should be appreciated'''': viz. as revealing and bringing about the Holy Spirit to whom the human relationship with God in grace is ascribed.'" Thus, at the centre of the suffering on the cross, one discovers the forma, mater and radix of all virtues: the theological virtue of caritas."6

nature.

Thus, in the passion of Christ a double perspective reveals the same central truth twice, like two slides running together and cooperating so as to bring the same image to the fore.'42 From the perspective of Christ secundum quod Deus we discover a 'picture' of the triune God; the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. From the perspective of Christ secundum quod homo we discover a 'picture' of the perfection of human moral conduct: the image of the martyr offering his corporal life out of perfect caritas."3

'" In this reading I disagree with D. Wiederkehr, 1974, who holds the thesis that in Aquinas' Christology the inner-Christological perspective of the two natures of

Christ overrules the relational trinitarian perspective in which the relations between the Son and the Father are studied. Reading STh m 18.4·5 (among other places) Wiederkehr observes a shift according to which the will of God is identified with the will of Christ: "Es bleibt nicht mehr unbestimmt, wer der personale Trager auch dieses gotdichen Willens ist: es ist die g1eiche Person Christi. Damit ist aber die trinitarische Perspektive durch cine christologische abgeiOst worden." (p. 401). I do not see how Aquinas could accept Wiederkehr's objections without ending up with a threefold will in God. H1 Cf. STh IT-IT 24.2.co: Unde caritas non potest neque natura/iter nobis inesse, neque per vires naturales esse acquisita, sed per infosionem Spiritus sanct~ qui est arnoT Patris et Filii, cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata. H2 The same running together of 'slides' can be found at the end of STh ill 1.2.co where Thomas follows Anselm by sketching the reparatio-motif which is appropriate for Christ secundum quod Deus, combined with the satisJacticrmotif which fits Him secundum quod homo. '" Cf. STh m 7.5.co: dona proprre sunt qUd
Rephrasing the passion of Christ in terms of life and death, here we recognize the same structural proportions between vita corporalis and vita spiritualis, as we have done in the story of Original Sin. In the story of Original Sin, corporal death is inflicted upon man as a result of the loss of the life of grace. This has brought us to the conclusion that the meaning of corporal life and death must be interpreted within the larger framework of the life and death of grace. Reading the story of the passion of Christ against the background of this framework, one discovers in Gethsemane the mirror image of what happened in the

est recipiens et dans dona Spiritus sanct~ sed dat secundum quod Deus, et accipit secundum quod homo. •" Cf. also J. Wissink, 1996, p. 247-253; Wissink states th.t by the death of Christ a modification takes place in the missio of the Spirit: the Spirit receives the shape ("gestalte") of Christ, it becomes His Spirit (p. 250). It goes without saying that this 'modification' refers to the created history of humankind with God and leaves intact God's immutabilitas. HS A structure parallel to this can be found in STh m 23.2.ra3: fe/iatio adoptiva est quaedam similitudo filiationis aeternae, sicut omnia quae in tempore facta sunt, similitudines quaedam sunt eorum quae ab aeterno foerunt. AssimiJatur autem homo splendori aeterni Filii per gratiae claritatem, quae· attribuitur Spiritui sancto. Et ideo adoptatio, licet sit communis toti Trinitat~ appropriatur tamen Patri ut auctori, Filio ut exemplari, Spiritui sancto ut imprimenti in nobis huius similitudinem exemplaris. H6 Considering Aquinas' account of the passion and death of Christ, caritas appears in STh m 46.3.co; STh m 46.6.ra4; STh m 46.9.ra4; STh m 47.1.ra2; STh m 47.1.ra3; STh m 47.3.co; STh m 47.3.ra3; STh m 47.4.ral; STh m 47.4.ra2; STh m 48.l.ag3; STh m 48.1.ral; STh m 48.2.co; STh m 48.2.r.1; STh m 48.2.ra2; STh m 48.3.co; STh m 48.3.r.1; STh m 48.3.ra3; STh -m 48.4.ra1; STh m 49.1.co; STh m 49.3.ra1; STh m 49.4.ag2; STh m 49.4.ra3; STh m 49.5.co; STh m 49.6.ra2.

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Garden of Eden.'" The inobedientia and mors gratiae of the first man is answered by obedientia and caritas of the First Man. Again corporal life and death are interpreted and dealt with within the larger framework of the life of grace, but now in a new way. The punishment of death is suffered in connection with the life of grace.'" Thus corporal death, once a sign of the death of grace, is transformed from punishment into sacrifice. The curse is transformed into an expression of love for God!" This exemplary transformation, to which all men are called, is performed by Christ. By this work of Him· being God and man - the perfect love of God, the centre of what life (in any sense) is about, is effectuated and revealed in terms of flesh and blood. In accordance with the human condition in materiality and time, this perfect love has the shape of an historical event, perceivable by the

sensitive powers. . _ By restoring the relationsh!~ ~etween ~u~ankmd .and God, Chnst roots the reception of the SPirit m maten~l~ty and tim,: ..I:Ie effects a new beginning of this relationship by provIdmg the possIbIlIty for each human being to enter into it, taking. into ac::ount the freedo~ of the human wiII and the human condmon wIth.m the c.oordmates. of materiality and time. Thus Thomas speaks of thIS restoration by ChrIS.t, as a restoration that has been achieved in causa: :he r~stora:lOn tn individual human bemg, IS arrIved at ef/ectu, with regard to feach · 150 gradually, in the course 0 hIStory. . . Within this procesS- of restoration, t~e other Ime of. thought, according to which Christ's work is conceIved ~ exempium, IS also of great interest. We now turn to this line of revelatIon.

118

2.3.2 The passion and death of Christ as example 147

H$

149

A Pauline line of thought which has been worked out in Patristic exegesis. Cf. e.g.

the parallel1ism of the tree and the cross in STh m 46.4.00 and other 'suitabilities' in STh ill 46.4-11; Cf. also the three gardens (Eden-Gethsemane-Revdation) in: N. Lash, 1993, p. 121-124. 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' Christ exclaims on the cross, according to Mt 27,46. In Thomas' view this exclamation cannot refer to a separation from God's grace. Cf. Aquinas' exposition of the verse in In Mat 27.2 [Busa: 597]: ideo cum dicit 'Deus mem, Deus meus' etc. manifestum est quod secundum quod est homo, loquitur; ideo ingeminat, ut magnitudinem ajfectus human; designel. Et quod dicitur 'Derelequisti me', dicitur per similitudinem, quia quod habemus, a Deo habemus; untie sicut cum aliquis alicui malo exponiturl dicitur derelictusl sic quando Dominus dereliquit hominem cadere in malum poenae vel culpael dicitUr dere/iclusl' ideo Chrislus dicitur derelictus non quantum ad unioneml nec quantum ad gratiam. sed quantum ad passionem. In STh ill 46.5-8 it is said that the passion of Christ secundum quod homo is more comprehensive and intense than the suffering of other human beings (viator-motil), whereas secundum quod Deus His rational soul enjoys the 'Visio beata (comprehensor-motif). Aquinas' view is based on three considerations: (1) Offering redemption for the malum culpae of humankind, it is suitable that Christ suffers all malum poenae which is the result of Original Sin: bodily as well as spiritual suffering. (2) The perfection of Christ secundum quod homo makes His body and

soul more sensitive than those of other human beings. (3) The perfection of Christ secundum quod Deus does not render His passion as human being less painful; Cf. also Comp 71J I 231-232. Cf. B. de Margerie, 1983, p. 403: "La mon a donc un sens radicalement different chez celui qui a ~ (m~e avant l'usage de la raison, en etat d'enfance, par Ie baptfune) et chez cdui qui n'a pas r"9lla gclce de la justification par Ie juste Jesus, chez Ie premier, elle consUme un moyen de satisfaction coredemptrice; chez Ie second, un signe de condamnation, - sans qu'on puisse jamais, de l'exterieur, lire pareille signification puisque Dieu peut toujours accorder invisiblement une gclce interne et efficace de conversion au dernier moment."

In ScG IV 53 Thomas lists 27 arguments which appear to speak against the suitability of the incarnation. In the 18th a~~ment. it ~s reasoned that in order to demonstrate an example of humIlIty (whIch IS connected with caritas, as we have seen), it was not necessary that the Word of God was incarnated and put to death. For thIS purpose instructions in Holy Scripture or the example of human beings would have served. In his response to this obiectio, Thomas argues that dee~s are more provocative of actions than words. Moreover, the more certam the one performing the deeds is of the goodness of them, .the more effectively they move. In this respect the example of the mcarnate~ Word is most suitable: in Christ there could not be any error and his l5l humility is the more wondrous as is his majesty the more sublime.

ISO

Thomas uses the image of Christ who has prepared a medicine waiting to be applied so as to be effective: STh ill 49.!.ra3. G. Krding, 1979/1944, p. 294-305, argues that Aquinas' manner of speaking in terms of :e:t~Ptio in rtx!en;ptio ~n e/fect~ ~ more precise and less confusing than the diy,ision between ?bJ~ ~d subJect1ve redemption which came into use in later ~es. I ~ WIth ~ op~u;'~' Because this study is focused on vita I choose for 'restoration of a relauonship InStead of

cau:" :

151

'redemption'. . . .. . . . ScG IV 55.20: licet hominis ad humilitatem tnJormart potue:rtnt dz'VtnlS sermombus instructi ut decimaocta'iJ4 ratio proponebat tamen ad agendum magis pro'()ocant facta quam v~ba et tanto efficacius facta 11UJ'Vt!nt, quanta certior opinio boni~~is ~abetur de eo qui huiusmodi operatur. Unde, licet aliorum homin~ mufta humilttatts exempla invenirentur) tamen expedientissimum foit ut adhuc homtnlS Del provocarentur exemp/o, J•

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By this line of reasoning, the consideration of Christ as via, veritas et vita is connected with the human condition according to which man reaches his ultimate end through moral action within the coordinates of materiality and time. By his exemplary passion and death the human way to God is revealed in its own terms: through moral action. Actions speak louder than words. In the moral order deeds are more provocative of actions than words. Remembering the argument that Christ became man so as to attain a greater familiarity in friendship between man and God!52, one could say that God 'could not speak any louder' than by putting Himself in our place and live the human life in a perfect way as an example that would attract all people to do the same. The exemplary character of Christ's passion and death is treated in the Summa Theologiae in the passage where Thomas deals with the question whether it is fitting that humankind is restored in its relationship with God by Christ's dying on the cross. Like the incarnation of Christ, the passion is considered as the most suitable way of liberating humankind, since it is accompanied by many advantages profitable for faith. In the first place, Thomas mentions once again the theological virtue of caritas: by the passion of Christ man comes to know how much he is loved by God (who has become man, and given His life for us), thus being incited to love God in return (in which the perfection of his human welfare consists).'" We recognize the motif of God's initiative here, connected with an explicit statement about charity being the perfectio salutis humanae. In the second place, in his manner of dying Christ gave an example of obedientia, humilitas, constantia, iustitia and other virtues that are necessary for human salvation.!" This

second argument is repeated in the next article where the question is asked whether the death on the cross is the most suitable death for Christ. The argument that by dying on the cross He gives an example of virtue, is based on an interesting quote of Augustine, in which ~he latter remarks that by giving the example of dying - the most hOrrific genus of death thinkable - God shows that the Christian should not fear any sort of death.155 These considerations are in accordance with the thought that the passion of Christ comprises all possible modes of suffering.!56 In these considerations the passion and death of Christ are permitted to function as an =plum for the moral conduct of any Christian in any situation. Thus a Christian attitude towards natural evil is constituted, according to which all natural evil is used as an opportunity to train and express one's love for God. Remembering that all natural evil and human suffering originates from the effects of Original Sin, one recognizes the structure of optimum justice according to which punishment is willingly undergone, inspired by the love to mend the broken relationship.

152 153

ts.

quem constat errare non potuisse; et cuius humilitas tanto est mirabilior quanta maiestas sublimior. ScG IV 54.6, quoted. above in footnote 95. STh ill 46.3.co: Primo enim, per hoc homo cognoscit quantum Deus hominem diligat, et per hoc prowcatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanae sa/utis .consistit. Unde Apostolus dicit, Rm 5,8-9: "Commendat suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. " SIb m 46.3.co: Secunda, quia hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientiae. humilitatis, constantiae, iustitiae et ceterarum virtuturn in passione Christi ostensarum, quae sunt necessariae dd humanam salutem. Unde dicitur IP 2,21: "Christus passus est pro nobis, nobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamur vestigia eOO. It (Apart from these Thomas gives three other reasons in this corpus). Again we see how with these_first two reasons Thomas builds on the Secunda Pars: charity'being the essence of morailife, and the other virtues as cornerstones of the Christian life inspired by charity; Cf. also In Symb 4 (passus sub Pontio Pilato, etcJ where we encounter the double neces-

121

2.4 The resurrection of Christ and the perspective of life The passion and death of Christ play an important role with regard

sity for the suffering of Christ: remedium contra peccata (effectuating) and exemplum

quantum ad agendum (revealing). [Busa: 166], Quicumque enim vult perfecte vivere, nihil aliud faciat nisi quod conremnat quae Christus in cruce contempsit, et appetat quae

iSS

per

156

Christus appetiit. Nullum enim exemplum virtutis ahest a cruce. Consequendy Thomas distinguishes a five-fold exemplarity in the suffering and death of Christ: exemplum caritatis, patientiae, humilitatis, obedientiae et contemnendi terrena. STh ill 46.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit Christum pati mortem crucis. Primo quidem, propter exemplum virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libra Octogintatrium quaest. [q. 25: PL 40,17J: "Saprentia Dei hominem, ad exemplum quo Tecte viveremus, suscepit. Pertinet autetn ad vitam rectam ea quae non sunt metuenda, non metuere. Sunt autem homines qu~ quam-vis mortem ipsam non timeant, genus tamen mortis horrescunt. Ut ergo nul/urn genus mortis Tecte viventi homini metuendum esset, illius hominis cruce ostendendum foit, nJhil enim erat, inter omnia genera mortis, illo genere execrabilius et fonnidabilius.• This exemplum-character of the passion and death of Christ can also be found in: STh III 1.2.co, STh III 14.l.co and STh III 46.3.00. Cf. STh ill 46.5.co: secundum genus, passus est omnem passumem humanam. Quod quidem potest considerari tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte hominum... Alia modo patet idem ex parte eorum in quibus homo potest pati... Tertio potest considerari quantum ad corporis membra. ..

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to the restoration of the relationship with God in grace. What happened on Good Friday, however, is only half of the story. Christ's resurrection from death holds a complementary place and here Aquinas discerns the same aspects of .effectuation and revelation. 15' He distinguishes, however, different aspects of the restoration of the relationship with God in grace, connecting them either with Christ's passion and death or His resurrection. The reason for this is not that there are different efficient causes with regard to the restoration of life with God: this restoration is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ as first efficient cause and to His human nature as instrumental cause. Considered, however, from the perspective of the revealing aspect of Christ's work, His death is seen as the cause of the eventual destruction of our death, and His resurrection is regarded as the cause of our

with the Word in the unio bypostatica and subsequently to all those who are united with Christ.'" As it was shown in the first section of this chapter, corporal life is proportioned to spiritual life as materia to forma. Thus, the fact that Christ is causa efficiens and causa exemplarn of corporal resurrectIOn implies that He is the same for the resurrection of the soul. In order t? clarify this, Aquinas uses a formula that has been Introduced before: It stems from God that the soul lives by grace and that the body lives by the soul. '60 This clarification is completed by referring to the character of process which the restoration of corporal and spiritual life has: the exemplary character of-Christ's resurrection of the soul implies that Christians should grow towards conformity with Christ. This process of conformity refers not only to the perfection of the human soul by grace, but also to a conformity with the suffering and dying Christ in this mortal life.'" The exemplary character of Christ's resurrection functions in the manner of a revelation of the destination of those who are united with Christ. The members of Christ's body are informed about their destination by what happens to the Caput Ecclesiae.'62 This 'information' has a special character: it has an impact on the moral conduct of Christians. Not in the manner of displaying an exemplum of moral conduct, but in the manner of indicating a perspective of life. The resurrection of Christ is necessary as a commendation of divine justice, a

resurrection.1ss

We have seen that Aquinas speaks of corporal and spiritual life. Both are involved in the restoration of Christ and the aspects of effectuation and revelation can be distinguished with regard to both of them. With regard to the restoration of corporal life the resurrection of Christ is causa efficiens and causa exemplaris. Thomas explains this with the help of the Aristotelian principle that what is first in a genus, is the cause of what comes after. That Christ is the first who resurrected can be understood from the union of human nature with divine nature. The Word of God is the principle of human vivification: thus it is rational that this vivification is first applied to the human body that was united

159

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158

Both aspects, effectuation and revelation, are to be found in Thomas' consideration of the death of Christ, his burial, descent into hell, resurrection, ascension and his judicial power at the Last Judgeruent. Cf. STb ill 51·59 and T. Schoof, 1974. This study is limited to the examination of the resurrection, being the counterpart complementing Christ's restoration of life with God. 5Th ill 56.1.ra4: secundum rationem e}ficientiae, quae dependet ex virtute divifl4, communiter tam mors Christi quam etiam resurrectio est causa tam destructionis mortis quam reparationis vitae. Sed secundum rationem exemplaritatis, mars Christi, per quam recessit a vita mortal;" est causa destructionis mortis rwstrae, resurrectio vera eOO, per quam inchoavit vitam immortalem, est causa reparationis vitae nostrae. Passio tamen Christi est insuper causa meritoria, ut supra dictum est. In this study the death of Christ is not examined in detail (Cf. STb ill 50). This issue is of great imponance for the unity of human nature, but Aquinas' view on this subject has already been discussed in the first section of this chapter. As for the revealing aspect of the death

of Christ, it shows the incomprehensible perfection of the hypostatic union by the permanence of the union of both the separated body and the soul with the divine

Word.

160

161

162

STh ill 56. Leo: principium humanae vivijicationis est Verbum De~ de quo dicitur in Ps 35,10: "Apud Te est Jons vitae", uOOe et ipse dicit, In 5,21: "Sicut Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et Filius quos vult vivificat." Habet autem hoc natura/is ordo rerum divinitus institutus, ut quaelibet causa primo operetw in id quod est sim propinquius, et per id operetur in alia magis remota... Et ideo Verbum Dei primo attribuit vitam immortalem corpori sibi naturaliter unito, et per ipsum operatur resurrectionem in omnibus aliis. Cf. also STb ill 56.!.ra3 and Comp Tb I 239. STh ill 56.2.co: a Deo enim est quod anima vivit per gratiam, et quod corpus vivit per animam; Cf. also Comp Tb I 239. STh ill 56.2.co: Similiter autem habet rationem exemplt+ritatis respectu resurrectionis animarum. Quia Christo resurgenti de~us. etiam secundum animam conJormari, "ut sicut", secundum Apostolum [Rm 6,4], "Christus resurrexit a mortuis per gloriam Patris, ita et nos in novitate vitae ambuJemus"; et sicut ipse resurgens ex mortuis iam non montur, ita et nos existememus nos mortuos esse peccato, ut iterum vivamus cum illo. J.~M. Dubois, 1983, p. 300-305, points to a development in Aquinas' work regarding the unus homo-motif which is used in order to consider the connection of humankind with the Original Sin of the first man. Parallel with this runs the development of the Caput Ecciesiae-motif in Christology.

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confirmation of our faith in the divinity of Christ, and an alleviation of our hope!" But also other events which took place after His death have this impact. The burial of Christ is in order to give hope for those who have already been buried.'" His ascension is profitable for us with regard to the augmentation of faith, the alleviation of hope and in order to raise a love for heavenly things!" The hope which is mentioned, again and again, is the theological virtue according to which man is longing for the perfect happiness which consists in sharing God's eternal life. It is the eschatological power which is one of the ways in which the dynamism of life with God gives shape to the Christian way of life. All this is examined in the next chapter. For now it suffices to point to the eschatological impact of Christ's resurrection as exemplum, which is still part of His restoration of the relationship with God: a restoration that has been accomplished in causa but which still needs to be applied to each individual human being, in a process of growing in likeness to the New Adam, the Image of God. Summarizing this second section, the effectuating and revealing role of Christ regarding the restoration of the relationship with God, emerges in different ways. With regard to the effectuating role it has been shown that Christ's passion, death and resurrection resulted in the

STh m 53.1.co: Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium foit Christum resurgere, propter quinque. Primo quidem, ad commendationem divinae iustitiae, ad quam pertinet exaJtare illos qui se propter Deum humiJiant... Secundo, ad rulei nostrae instructionem. Quia per ems resilrrectwnem confirmata est fides nostra circa divinitatem Christi... Tertio, ad sublevationem nostrae speL Quia. dum videmus Christum resurgere, qui est caput nostrum, speramus et nos resurrecturos... Quarto, ad informationem vitae fidel;um... Quinto, ad complementum nostrae salutis... 16-4 STh ill 51.1.co: Secundo, quia per hoc quod Christus de se:pulcro resurrexit. datur spes resurgendi per ipsum his qui sum in septdcro: secundum illud In 5,25·28: "Onmes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem Filii Dei. et qui audierim, vivent. " '" STh ill 57.1.ra3: licet praesentia corporalis Christi fuerit subtracta fiddibus per ascensionem, praesentia tamen divinitatis ipsius semper adest fide/ihus, secundum quod ipse dicit, Mt 28,20.... Sed ipsa ascensio Christi in cael~ qua corporalem suam praesentiam nobis subtraxit, magis foit utiJis nobis quam praesentia corporalis foisset. Primo quidem, propter fidei augmentum, quae est de non visis... Secundo, ad spe sublevationem... Per hoc enim quod Christus humanam naturam assumptam in cae/o col/ocavit, dedit nobis spem iIluc perveniendi. .. Tertia, ad erigendum caritatis affectum in caelestia... One easily recognizes the theological vinues - faith, hope and charity here by which the rdationship with God in grace is established.

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restoration in causa of life with God. Christ gave new access to God when He rooted the Spirit, God's vivificating power, in a new way in the history of humankind. This act of salvation needs to be applied to each individual Christian in the form of an internal restoration. By this internal restoration the soul is restored with regard to life with God, vita gratiae, waiting and hoping to be once united with God and be restored with regard to corporal life. With regard to the revealing aspect of Christ's restoration, three things have been demonstrated. In the first place, we have shown that according to His being (esse) Christ is a revelation of the incomprehensible God in the 'language' of human nature, thus indicating and revealing how God works the life of grace iIi the human soul. In the second place, we have examined how Christ is the way to God by giving the perfect example of moral action through which human beings attain their ultimate end and happiness. In the third place, it has been indicated how the eschatological impact of what happened after the death of Christ has its impact on the moral life of the Christian by raising the theological virtue of hope. With exception to the first aspect of revelation, all these lines will be recurred to in the remainder of this study. Aquinas' eschatology is the subject of chapter IV where the perfection of life with God is examined. The theological virtue of hope is dealt with in chapter ill In that chapter moral life, as the human 'way' to God, is focused on and the passion and death of Christ emerge again as the eminence of moral perfection. . " . As for the effectuating dimenSIOn - the restoration tn causa of bfe with God - we have observed that this restoration needs to be applied to each individual human being. That leads us to the last section of this chapter. 3. The participation in the work of Christ through the sacraments In accordance with the human condition - marked by the coordinates of materiality and time - the restoration of the relationship with God in grace is effectuated and revealed in an historical event. These same coordinates, however, raise the question as to how the effect of the work of Christ is received by each individual human being. The answer to this question is the sacraments, which mediate between the work of Christ in causa and the salvation of the individual human being in

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127

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iii·

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effectu. In this third section firstly the suitability of the sacraments as

mediation between the work of Christ and our life with God is examined. It is shown that sharing in the fruits of the passion of Christ is partial and part of a process in which the Christian is involved (3.1). Subsequently, the double dimension of effectuation and revelation of the sacraments is focused on, thus prolonging the two dimensions that were discovered in the work of Christ as causa instrumentalis and exemplaris (3.2). Finally, the place of the sacrament as foundation and framework for the relationship with God is considered. This makes it possible to study the conformities Aquinas notices between natural life and life of grace effectuated by sacraments (3.3). 3.1 The partial sharing in the fruits of Christ's passion Christ has liberated us from the punishments which have been inflicted upon humankind after Original Sin and which culminate in corporal death. Nevertheless people are still mortal and actually dying as though nothing has changed. How does Thomas account for this? According to Aquinas the passion and death of Christ is a sort of universal cause of salvation which needs to be applied to every individual. '66 This application to individual human beings is realized through the sacraments, for which every human being can choose freely. Thus, it is understandable that the work of Christ does not change the condition of every individual. Nevertheless, even baptised Christians, sharing in the life of grace effected by the sacraments, are not exempted from inescapable death. How does Thomas deal with this observation? In his answer to this question Aquinas refers again to the proportion between vita gratiae and vita naturae. As we showed in the preceding sections of this chapter, the rupture between God and man at the level of the life of grace (mors gratiae) resulted in a rupture between the disgraced soul and its body (mors corporalis), by which man was cast in a condition as opposed to

'"

Cf. S,G IV 55.28 (answer to the 26th obiectio): Mors enim Christi est quasi quae;l,un universalis causa salutis: sicut peccatum primi hominis foit quasi universalis causa damnationis. Oportet autem universalem causam app/ican ad unumquemque speciaJiter, ut efJectum universalis causae percipiat. This line of thought is repeated when Thomas inttOduces the sacraments. Cf. S,G IV 56, STh m 49.1.ra3+4, STh m 49.3.ral·3, STh m 52.1.ra2.

:~,

!Ii his original destination. The passion and death of Christ brought about the restoration of vita gratiae by a renewed communication of the Spirit. Thus the core of human life was restored, and man was reinstalled in the context of his original destination of life with God. With regard to this restoration, however, Thomas distinguishes between culpa and poena. Thus he is able to account for the fact that the spiritual restoration remains hidden for what concerns the corporal life of man. Aquinas follows the tradition of the Church, according to which the satisfaction of Christ has removed the guilt of Original Sin, in accordance with the order of justice, whereas the punishment remains intact. l67 We will take 'a closer look at. this thought in order to get a better understanding of the role of the sacraments in the Christian attitude towards life and death. Thomas acknowledges that it is hard to understand why the punishments for Original Sin remain intact after the passion of Christ.''' The fact that Christ's restoration in causa is not immediately followed by an abolishment of all the effects of Original Sin is to be ascribed to divine ordination.''' As in the case of the motivum incarnationis one can only try to elucidate the suitability (convenientia) of this ordination. The arguments that Thomas puts forward show the same pattern we discovered in 1.3 of this chapter where we dealt with the interpretation of malum naturae as effect of Original Sin: everything is considered as pointing at and contributing to the relationship with God. In ScG IV 55 Thomas gives three reasons of suitability for the fact that the punishments continue after the work of Christ. The first reason is that in this way there is a conformity between the faithful (membra) and Christ (Caput Ecclesiae). Christ reached the glory of immortality

W

Stricdy speaking for those who are baptised the discomforts that remain are not poenae, but poenaiitates. Cf. B. de Margerie, 1983, p. 402-404.

168

Cf. ScG IV 53.26 (25th argumentum): Si Christus pro peccatis humani generis sufficienter satisfecitl iniustum videtur esse quod homines adhuc poenas patiantur, quas pro pcccato Scriptura divina inductas esse commemoratj Aquinas deals with this issue in: In 11 Sent 44.2.2.ra2+3j In m Sent, 19.3.2j In IV Sent 4.2.1.1; In IV Sent 46.2.2a.ra3; S,G IV 55; STh I-II 85.5.ra2; STh I·II 87.7.ral; STh m 49.3.ra3; STh m 52.5.ra2; STh m 69.3; STh m 69.7.ra3; De malo 4.6.ra4; QtrodI6.9.1. STh m 56.1.ral: resurrectio Christi causa est nostrae resurrectionis per virtutem Verbi uniti. Quod quidem operatur secundum voluntatem. Et ideo non oportet quod statim sequatur ejfectus. sed secundum dispositicnem Verbi De~ ut scilicet primo con/ormemur Christo patienti et morienti in hac vita passibili et mortal~ deinde perveniamus ad participandum similitudinem resurrectionis [Rm 6,5}.

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through immense passion and so it is not unsuitable that those who follow Him are also subjected to passion before they reach the likeness of His glory.vO I want to argue that for Thomas this argument has a spiritual depth that exceeds the esthetical longing for symmetry which at first sight it seems to express. Conformitas is an important concept in Aquinas' consideration of the proportion between God and the soul in gratia and gloria: by caritas the will is rendered conform with God's will and in patria the saints possess a conformity with God.V! Love seeks conformity and connection with the loved one.172 As we discussed in the first chapter, the love of God differs from the love of creatures among other things - by its relation to the good at which it is directed. Love of creatures is aroused by something good existing in the object loved. Divine love produces the good in the object loved and is creative rather than responsive. Thus the Holy Spirit, to whom the love of God is attributed, produces the justification by which one is endowed with the life of grace and enabled to love God in return. In the previous section the work of Christ was considered as effectuating and revealing the vita gratiae of the Spirit. This internal regeneration - by which a spiritual conformity and imitation of Christ is constituted 17' - is expressed by an external conformity with his passion, in accordance with the human condition marked by the coordinates of materiality and time. According to the second reason of convenientia it would not be suitable when those who are baptised share immediately in corporal

incorruptibility: many would enter the Church for the sake of these corporal benefits, whereas Christ's precise intention was to transfer people's love for corporal matters to that of spiritual affairs,v' According to this pedagogical argument, closely connected with the revealing aspect of Christ's work, the access to glory by imitation. of the passion of Christ forces one to focus on the proportion between corporal and spiritual affairs and to acknowledge that the core of this sharing in Christ's glory lies in its spiritual side. Corporal incorruptibility without sharing in the relationship with God in grace is a horrible perspective and in fact, as will be shown in chapter N, a definition of hell. ' The third argument, continuing the line of reasoning of the second, is based on the importance of human freedom. If those who come to Christ would be immortal immediately, people would, in a way, be compelled to accept faith in Christ and its merit would be diminished. v, By its insistence on human freedom the argument is closely connected with the specific human mode of being: life as self-movement. Man is designed to move freely - with the help of God's grace - towards his final destination, the knowledge and love of God. In this free love for God the glory of God is manifested and the effectuating and revealing work of Christ is exactly proportioned to the integrity of this freedom.v' Apart from these arguments in the Summa contra Gentiles, in various texts Aquinas adopts a fourth argument in which we recognize a motif mentioned earlier in this chapter (1.3, p. 94), where the impact of Original Sin on the appreciation of evil in the world was examined. The

SeC N 55.27: Quamvu autem Christus pro peccato originali sua mone sufficienter satisfocerit, non est tamen inconveniens quod poenalitates ex peccato originali consequentes remaneant adhuc in omnibus qui eliam redemptionis Christi participes jiunt, ut vigesimaquinta ratio procedebat. Hoc enim congruenter et utiliter factum est ut poena remaneret, etiam culpa sublata, Primo quidem, ut esset con/onnitas fidelium ad Christum, SicUl membrorum ad caput. Untie, skU: Christus prius multas passiones sustinuit, et sic ad immortalitatis gloriam pervenit,' sic decuit ut [tdeles eOO prius passionibus subiacerent, et sic ad immortalitatem pervenerint, quasi portantes in seipsis insignia passionibus Christ~ ut simiJitudinem gloriae eius consequerentur; skut Apostalus, Rm 8,17, dicit. Cf. also 5Tb ill 49.3.ra3. '" Which explains why they fed no pity for the misery of the damned, this would not be compatible with the perfection of their beatitude, d. e.g. Comp Tb I 232; We will return to this in chapter IV, 2.2.2, p. 242. '" Cf. 5Tb I-II 27.3.sc where Si 13,19 is quoted, Omne animal diligi' simile sibi. In his Ethica Nico1l14Cheia (VIII.I, 1155b6·7) Aristotle mentions the same thought and attributes it to Empedocles. VJ Cf. 5cG IV 22. 170

V4

ScG IV 55.27: Secundo quia, 5i homines 'Venientes ad leswn statim immortalitatem et impassibilitatem consequerentur, plures homines ad Christum accederent magis propter haec corpora/ia benefzcia quam propter spiritualia bona. Quod est contra intentionem Christ~ venientis in mundum ut homines ab amore corporalium ad spiritualia

17.5

176

transforret. SeG IV 55.27: Tertio quia,-si accedentes ad Christum statim impassibiles et immorta/es

redderentur, hoc quodammodo compel/eret homines ad fidem Christi suscipiendam. Et sic meritum lulei minueretur. The same line of reasoning is adopted. in the answer to the 7th argument in ScG IV 55.9: Est siquidem incamationis divinae 'Virtus sufficiem ad omnium hominum salutem: sed quod non omnes ex hoc salvantur ex eorum indispositione contingit. quod incarnationis jructum in se suscipere nolunt, incarnato Deo per ftdem et amorem non inhaerendo. Non enim erat hominibus subtrahenda libertas arbitri~ per quam possunt 'Vel inhaerere vel non inhaerere Deo incamato: ne bonum hominis coactum esset, et propter hoc absque merito et illaudabile redderetur.

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penalties that remain are considered useful as a spiritual exercise enabling one to train virtues and obtain humility.'" In these arguments of suitability a pattern appears according to which man is invited to share, to a certain extent, in the fruits of what Christ accomplished at the cross. According to the process of growth towards his final destination within the coordinates of materiality and time, man is invited to share in the restored relationship with God, the corporal perfection of this life ~mpassibility and immortality) being postponed. The earthly life of the Christian thus has a double dimension: partly redeemed and sharing in the life of grace (inchoatio vitae aetemae); partly involved in a painful process of growth and development towards the perfection of this life of grace. The sacraments reflect this double dimension and are a help in the process of earthly life with regard to its core.

3.2 The effectuating and disclosing power of the sacraments In order to participate in the effects of the passion of Christ, there has to be contact between the individual Christian and the work of Christ. In accordance with human nature, directed at intellectual knowledge mediated by the senses, this contact is provided by signs which are perceptible to the senses: the sacraments.'" Thus one can see the motif of familiaris conversatio cum Deo reflected in the way God, after His close presence by union with human nature in Christ, continues to be tangibly present and close to humankind via the sacraments. '79 Aquinas defines a sacrament as signum rei sacrae, inquantum est sanctificans homines.'" In this definition two aspects, which are characteristic for the work of Christ, can be recognized: as a 'sign' the

177

178

v, 180

Cf. STh ill 69.3.co: Secundo, hoc est conveniens propter spirituale exercitium, ut videlicet contra concupiscentiam et alias passibiJitates pugnans homo victoriae coronam acciperet... ; Cf. also In IV Sent 4.2.1.3.co: Sed per gratiam baptismalem efficitur ut hae poenae remanentes non dominentur in personam, sed magis ei subiiciantur, et in utilitatem ipsius cedant, inquantum sunt materia virtutis, et occasio humiJitatis et exercitii. SeC N 56.2: Est autem ta/is hominis conditio quod ad spiritualia et intelJigibilia capienda natura/iter per sensibilia deducitur. Oportuit igitur spiritualia remedia hominibus sub signis sensibilibus dari. Cf. also S1b III 60.4 and S1b III 61.1. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx (1959, p. 50) who considers sacraments as encounters C"ontmoetingen") with Christ.

5Th

m 60.2.00.

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,

;~~; sacrament is signifying, revealing, disclosing. The word 'sanctifying' l" refers to an effectuating dimension according to which a sacrament is ,. instrumentum. Thus, being signum and causa, a sacrament is said to effectuate what it signifies.'S! By this double dimension of invisible cause mediated by visible signs, a sacrament is similar to the effectuating and revealing dimensions of its first cause: Christ, in whom God is hidden in human nature.'" Insofar as a sacrament is causa, it effectuates in a manner similar to the way the divine nature of Christ operated, by using human nature as its instrument. God is causa principalis of the grace effected, the sacrament functions as' causa instmmentalis''' Through this instrument we are touched by the Holy Spirit (to whom vita gratiae is attributed as effect): our soul is informed by the caritas that we have discovered to be at the core of the passion of Christ. As a sign, each sacrament also reveals what it effects. Accordi~g to Aquinas this revelation has three dimensions. As signum rememorauvum a sacrament refers to the cause of our sanctification, the passion of Christ. As signum demonstrativum it refers to what is effect~ated .in us by virtue of Christ' passion: vita gratiae and the theologIcal VIrtues which are the forma of our sanctification. As signum prognosticum it

1&1

1U

18)

5Th ill 62.1..ral: Et secundum hoc, sacramenta novae legis simul sunt causa et signa. Et inde est quod, sicut communiter dicitur, "efficiunt quod figurant". ScG N 56.2! instrUmenta oportet esse primae causae proportionata. Prima autem et universalis causa humanae salutis est Verbum incamatum, ut ex praemissis apparet. Congruum igitur foit ut remedia quibus universalis causae virtus pertingit ad homines, iilius causae similitudinem haberent: ut scilicet in eis virtus divina invisibiliter operaretur sub visibilibus signis; H. Schoot (1993, p. 28.35) aIgUes that the analogy between the sacrament and the union of divine and human nature in Christ should be seen within the framework of Aquinas' theology of nexus mysterwrum. STh III 62.1; Cf. also 5Th ill 62.5.co: Sacramentum operatur ad gratiam causandum per modum instrumenti. Est autem duplex instrumentum, unum quidem separatum, ut baaJus; aliud autem coniunctum, ut manus. Per instrumentum autem conciunctum movetur instrumentum separatum, fieut baculus per manum. Principalis autem causa efficiens gratiae est ipse Deus, ad quem comparatur humanitas Christi sicut. instrumentum coniunctum, sacramentum autem sicut instrumentum separatum. Et ideo oportet quod virtus salutifera derivetur a divinitate Christi per eius humanitatem in iifa sacramenta. The development in Aquinas' use of the concept of instrumentum Wlth regard to Christ (cf. above, footnote 117) resulted in a development in his apprecia· tion of instrumental causality of the sacraments. Cf. L.·M. Chauvet, 1994, p. 103·105.

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refers to the ultimate end of our life: vita aeterna. 18' Thus, by the sacraments earthly life of man is placed in a new context in a double way. On the cognitive side (verum: the Son) man is given the orientation of the history of life with God; a history in which foundations are established. for one's own growth in grace towards the perfect union with God which is revealed as perspective. Simultaneously with the revelation of this new context, man is effectively placed within it (bonum: the Holy Spirit, originating from the Father and the Son). Sacraments effect the life of grace: the beginning of eternal life, founded on the passion of Christ. This central significance of the sacraments for earthly human life is brought to the fore by Thomas in his considerati· ons of the isomorphy between vita naturae and vita gratiae.

community he lives in.''' Concerning the first category, the place of birth in natural life is similar to Baptism by which one is spiritually regenerated. Corporal growth in dimensions and power is spiritually equalled by Confirmation in which the Holy Spirit is given for strength. The Eucharist is the sacrament in which life and virtue are conserved: a function which is fulfilled in natural life by food. The Sacrament of Penance cures from spiritual weakness, restituting spiritual health in the same way medicine performs this task for corporal health. Extreme Unction, removing the remnants of sins and preparing for final glory, can be compared to diets and exercises by which health in natural lif~ is promoted. With regarc/'to the individual as a member of a community, the power to rule and perform public acts is similar to what is

132

3.3 The sacraments as foundation and framework of life with God 186

Dealing with Church, in most natural life and perfection of the

18-1

the question why there are seven sacraments of the of his works Aquinas points to a conformity between life of grace. 185 Thomas distinguishes between the individual person viewed apart and with regard to the

m 60.3.co. The reader may recognize a similarity with the structure of this study: signum rememorativutn (foundations, ch. ll), signum demonstrativum (dynamism ch. Dl) and signum prognosticum (perfection, ch. IV).

sTh

m 65.l.co; De art 2 [Busa: 38·48]; In In IV Sent 2.1.2 Thomas gives a different explanation for the fact that there are seven sacraments. Although. the onset is there (d. In IV Sent 7.2.1.3.co: per baptism-urn qui est spiritualis rege·

'" Cf. ScG IV 58; STh

neratio, homo acquirat subsistentiam in vita spirituali christianae religionis). Aquinas does not draw the parallel between vita spiritualis and vita naturalis in the Scriptum. This shift seems to fit in with an increasing attention for the concept vita in Aquinas' works (cf. e.g. the fact that in his major theological works (ScG I 97·99, STh I 18) he explicitly deals with vita as a name for God). This increasing attention

may be connected with Thomas' predilection for the Gospel. of Saint John and Ps.D~onysius' De divinis nominibus in which vita is explicidy used for the relationship With God. Cf. also M. Grabmann, 1922, p. 75-78; I am not sure whether this consi-

deration of the sacraments against the' background of the parallellism between 'Vita naturae and vita gratiae is an invention of Aquinas himself. It is, however, at least a choice of his which is significative and fitting from the perspective of the remainder of his theology. Moreover, in most secondary literature, this division is presented as the position of Aquinas (cf. J. Finkenzeller, 1967).

STh m 65.1.00: Vita enim spiritualis conformitatem aliquam habet ad vitam corpora· lem, sicut et cetera corporalia similitudinem quandam spiritualium habent. In vita autem corporali dupliciter aliquis perfteitur, uno modo, quantum ad personam propriam; alio modo, per respectum ad totam communitatem societatis in qua 'Vivit, quia hom~ natura/iter est animal sociate. Respectu autem sui ipsius perficitur homo in 'Vita corporalt dupliciter, urw modo, per se, acquirendo scilicet aliquam 'Vitae perjectionem,' 'alio modo, per accidens, scilicet. removendo impedimenta vitae, puta aegritudines, 'Vel aliquid huiusmodi. Per se autem perficitur corporalis vita tripliciter. Primo quidem, per generationem, per quam homo incipit esse et 'Vivere. Et loco hums in spirituali 'Vita est baptismNs, qui est spiritualis regeneratio, secundum illud Tt 3,5: "Per /a'Vacrum regenerationis, etc." Secundo, per augmentum, quo aliquis perducitur ad perfectam quantitatem et virtutem. Et loco huius in spirituali vita est confirmatio, in qua datur Spiritus sanctus ad robur. Unde dicitur discipulis iam baptizatis, Lk 24,49, "Sedete in ci'Vitate, quousque induamini 'Virtute ex alto. " Tertio, per nutritionem, qua conservatur in homine vita et vireus. Et loco huius in spirituali 'Vita est eucharistia. Unde dicitur In 6,54: "Nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii hominis, et biberitis eius sanguinem non habebitis -vitam in vobis." Et hoc quidem sufficeret homini si haberet et corporaliter et spiritualiter impassibilem 'Vitam, sed quia. homo incurrit interdum et corporalem infirmitatem et spiritualem, scilicet peccatum, ideo rrecessaria. est homini curatio ab infirmitate. Quae quidem est duplex. Una quidem est sanatio, quae sanitatem restituit. Et loco huius in spirituali 'Vita est poenitentia, secundum illuti Ps 40,5: "Sana animam meam, quia. peccavi tibi". Alia. autem est restitutio 'Valetutiinis pristinae per co~venien­ tern diaetam et exercitium. Et loco hums in spirituali vita est extrema ImdW, quae removet peccatorum reliquias, et hominum. paratum reddit ad finalem gloria.m. Unde dicitur Jm 5,15: "Et si in peccatis sit, dimittentur ei. " Perficitur autem homo in ordin~ totam communitatem dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod aceipit potestatem regendt multitudinem, et exercendi actus pub/icos. Et loco hums in spirituali 'Vita est SdCTamentum ordinis, secundum illud Heb 7, quod sacerdotes hostias offerunt non solum pro se, sed etiam pro populo. Secunda, quantum ad naturalem propagationem. Quod fit per matrimonium, tam in corporali quam in spirituali vita, eo quod est non solum sacramentum, sed naturae officium. [Bold by C.L.]

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effectuated by the sacrament of Ordination. The goal of marriage is propagation. Marriage is a natural institution as well as a sacrament and thus natural generation is parallelled by spiritual generation. It would be interesting to work out the isomorphy between vita naturae and vita gratiae with regard to each sacrament. Because the sacraments are studied here for the sake of understanding the relation between human life before death and 'life' after death, we will, however, confine ourselves to a short consideration of two of the sacraments which hold a primary rank in both Thomas' view and with regard to our subject: Baptism and Eucharist!"

be recognized, together with the central role of the working of the . Spirit as a result of the sacraments instituted by Christ. However much spiritual (or Spiritual) the core of the sacrament may be, it is performed by water. Aquinas notes three reasons for this.''' The first reason is based on a consideration of the human condition: a human being consists of soul and body. The materia of the sacrament (water) makes clear that the regeneration which is effected by Baptism, concerns the entire human being, body and soul.'" Thus, by the Sacrament of Baptism man is not only granted a new start, a new "biography"''', he is also placed in a new context: a process of union with God by which his entire natural life, body and soul, is perfected. By Baptism the soul is perfected with life of grace and at the end of the process the body is renewed in life of glory. The second reason implicitly touches the sapientia Dei ordinantis and is closely connected with the general suitability of the sacraments which are, like the incarnation, in accordance with the human way of obtaining knowledge per visibilia ad invisibilia. Thus the cleansing of the body with sensible water makes us see that the Holy Spirit purifies from all sins that prevent life with God in grace.'92 The third reason is a congruity of causes. Aquinas' compact expla· nation can be elucidated as follows: by the Sacrament of Baptism we are

An interesting text with regard to the Sacrament of Baptism, is Aquinas' commentary on Christ's conversation with Nicodemus as reported in John 3. In this text we find some of the items we already discussed, now applied to the Sacrament of Baptism. Baptism is called spiritual regeneration, in opposition to carnal generation, by which natural life of man begins. In fact, however, a double opposition is made here. By connecting the word 'spiritual' with the Holy Spirit, apart from the opposition between 'carnal' and 'spiritual' the opposition between nature and grace is introduced. By spiritual regeneration we are assimilated to the Son of God: we are {re)born according to life of grace, becoming sons (and daughters) of God ourselves by adoption. This assimilation is caused by the Holy Spirit and it consists in a conformity of human intellect and will with God!" The motif of conformity can

189

181

Cf. 5Th ill 65.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod. simpliciter [oquendo, sacramentum eucharistiae est potissimum inter alia sacramenta. Quod quidem triplkiter apparet... Alrorum autem sacramentorum comparatio ad invicem potest esse multipliciter. Nam in via necessitatisi baptismus est potissimum sacramentorum; in via autem perfection is,

190

sacramentum ordinis; medw autem modo se habet sacramentum confirmationis.

188

Sacramentum vero poenitentiae et extremae unctwnis sunt inferioris gradus a praedictis sacramentis, quia, sicut dictum est [a.2], ordinantur ad vitam Christianam non per se, sed quasi per accidens, scilicet in remedium supervenientis deflctus. In Joan 3.1 [Busa: 400]: Quod autem spiritualis regeneratio ex Spiritu fiat, rationem habet. Nam Dponet generatum generari ad similitudinem generantis; nos autem regeneramur in filios De~ ad similitudinem veri Filii: oportet ergo quod regeneratio spiritualis fiat per id quod assimilamur vera Filw; quod quidem est per hoc quod Spiritum ems habemus. Rm 8,9 "Si quis Spiritum Christi non habet, hie rum est eius", lJn 4,13: "in hoc cognoscimus, quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis, etc... " Oportet ergo quod spiritualis regeneratio per 5piritum sanctum fiat. Rm 8,15: "Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis filiorum"; infra Rm 6,63: "Spiritus est qui vivijicat, etc. "Cf. also In Rom 8.2

and In Rom 8.3. Cf. also 5Th ill 66.3.co where Aquinas gives four reasons, three of which differ from the arguments in In Joan 3.1. In Joan 3.1 [Busa 417]: Et etiam huic regenerationi necessaria aqua propter tria. Primo quidem propter human« naturae conditionem. Homo enim ex anima et corpore constat, et si in ems regeneratione esset spiritus tantum, solum quod spirituale est hominis, ostenderetur regenerari. Ut ergo regeneretur etiam caro, oportet quod sicut est ibi spiritus, per quem regeneratur anima, ita sit ibi aliquid corporale, per quod regeneretur corpus,' et

hoc est aqua. 191

192

Cf. F. de Grijs, 1996[a], p. 279: "That communion with God, however, is so real that entire life is transformed by it. In the sacrament of baptism really a different histoIY is joined and the old one is even forsworn, it is renounced. By the connection with Christ, each baptised getS. a new biography, .in which, from day to day, he is asked to tum and convert to the calling God." [T11lllSiation: C.L.] In Joan 3.1 [Busa: 427]: Secundo propter humanam cognitionem ... Naturalis autem modus huius cognitionis est ut spiritualia per sensibilia cognoscat, cum omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipiat. Oportuit ergo ad hoc quod intelligamus id quod spirituale est in hac regeneratione, quod esset in ea aliquid sensibile et materiale, scilicet aqua: per quod intelligamus quod sicut aqua lavat et purgat corporaliter exterius, ita et per baptismum homo lavatur et purgatur interius spiritualiter.

136

buried with Christ and we resurrect with Christ. The immersion in water has a certain congruity with Christ descending into hell. Rising from the water the baptised is endowed with new life, life of grace, which corresponds with Christ's resurrection from death. Thomas sees this life-bestowing mystery of water and Spirit prefigured in the story of Genesis 1. In the first days of creation the Spirit of the Lord touched the water and it produced livings souls. After the Baptism of Christ in the river Jordan the contact of his body gave water the power to produce spiritual souls, souls endowed with grace!" Although Thomas does not say so explicitly, in the three reasons of suitability concerning the use of water in Baptism one may recognize the three dimensions of each sacrament: signum demonstrativum (first convenientia, the actual spiritual cleansing), signum prognosticum (second convenientia, the perspective of future corporal resurrection) and signum rememorativum (third convenientia, the passion of Christ). Thus it becomes clear that Baptism is an event by which our natural life is placed in a new context with a new orientation, in virtue of Christ's

work at the cross. It has been demonstrated that in the restoration of Christ, the Spirit plays a crucial role and continues to do so in the Sacrament of Baptism. This central role of the Spirit is confirmed when one appreciates how Aquinas compares the Sacrament of Baptism to the Baptisms of Desire and of Blood. In STh ill 66.11.co, Thomas explains that the baptismus aquae receives efficacy from the passion of Christ and from the Holy Spirit as first cause. However, the first cause exceeds the effect to such a degree, t~at it does not depend on the effect. Therefore, the same effect· regeneratlOn of spiritual life, vita gratiae - is brought about by the Spirit in those who suffer for Christ or those whose hearts are moved by the

137

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FOUNDATIONS

I

Spirit towards fides, caritas and repentance. for sins. ." .Baptismus sanguinis is the best of these three: her: the passlOn of Christ IS brou~ht about by an imitation of operations mstead of a figural representatIOn ~ (baptismus aquae) or a desire (baptismus flaminis vel P?enitentiae): nowherecaritas is effected and revealed more ardently than m one who .~. lays down his (corporal) life f~r hi~ friends. 195 Thu~, the Baptism of Z Bl.ood shows, in a paradox, the mfimte value of the hfe of grace above . that of natural life: the regeneration by the Spirit is accomplished by the loss of corporal life.'''

I'

As the Sacrament of Baptism is appreciated as regeneratio spiritualis, because of the same conformity of spiritual life with corporal life, the Eucharist is considered as spirituale alimentum. l97 This sacrament also contains the threefold dimension of sign, which is reflected in the three names it receives. When it is called sacrificium, the perspective of signum rememorativum is highlighted, remembering the sacrifice of Chri~t o.n the cross. As communio it refers to the unity of the Church, whIch IS established by the union with Christ in caritate, effectuated by this sacrament (signum demonstrativum). By the name viaticum (and eucharistia) its dimension as signum prognosticum is underscored, as it

STh ill 66.11.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, baptismus aquae efficaciam habet a passione Christi, cui aliquis configuratur per baptim1:um; et ulterius, sicut a prima causa, a Spiritu sancto. Licet autem effietus ~ependeat a prmz'! causa, causa tamen superexcedit efJectum. nee dependet ab effectu. ~t ideo, rr.ae. ter. baptmnum tUJ.uae,. potest aliquis consequi sacramenti efJectum ex passtone ChnstJ, mquantum qU.lS. et conformatur pro Christo patiendo... Eadem etiam ratione aliquis per virt~tem ~ptyttus saneti consequitur effectum baptismi, 'non solum sine baptismo aquae, sed etram sine bapad tismo sanguinis, inquantum scilicet alicuius cor per Spiritum sanctum credendum et diligendum Deum, et poenitendum de peccatis; unde ethtm dmtur baptismus poenitentiae. . . . .. us STh m 66.12.00: Baptismus autem aquae ejJzcaciam habet a p~zone ~lStt et a SPt;ttu sancto, ut dictum est. Quae quidem duae causae operantur tn quolzbet horum trtum baptismatum, excellentissime autem in baptismo sanguinis. Nam pas:io Chr~ti oper~tur quidem in baptismo aquae per quandam, figura/em repraesentatronem; tn bapttsmO autem flaminis vel poenitentiae per quandam affectionem; sed in baptismo s~nguin~ per imitationem operis. Similiter etiam virtUS Spiritus saneti operatui... In bapttsmO sanguinis per potissimum dilectionis et affec~ionis jervorem, secu~um ilI~ In. 1:,13: "Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut anunam suam ponat qulS pro amtcts SUIS. 196 Cf. chapter m, 2.4-, p. 176££ where martyrdom is studied as the perfection of moral

114

n:ovetw:.

193

In Joan 3.1 [Busa 443]: Tertio propter causae congruitatem: nam causa nostrae regenerationis est verbum incarnatum. Supra In 1,12: "Dedit eis potestatem filiDS Dei

fieri." Congruit e1'Xo quod in sacramentis, quae efficaciam habent ex virtute Verbi incarnati, sit aliquid correspondens Verbo, et aliquid correspondens carni, seu corpori. Et hoc spiritualiter aqua in sacramento baptismi, ut scilicet per earn configuramu:r morti Chrzm, dum submergimur in ea, quando baptizamur, sicut Christus tribus diebus foit in ventre ,terra,!: Rrr: 6,4: "Consepulti enim sumus cum ilIo per baptismum." Hoc etiam mystenum tn puna rerum productione signatum est, Gn 1, quando Spiritus Domini Jerebatur super aquas. Sed per tactum mundissimae carnis Christi maior virtus collata est aqu~: quia in prineipio producebant aquae reptile animae viventis; sed ex quo aristus baptlZatus est in Iordane, animas spirituales aqua reddit.

:st,

1'7

life. s10

m 73.1.co.

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prefigures the blessed enjoyment of God in eternal life.'" In Aquinas' account of the Eucharist, the primacy of spiritual life as core of corporal life is once again affirmed. Moreover, a peculiar reversal can be appreciated which reminds us of his view on the order of the universe and the relation between the material and the spiritual world. Again we turn to Aquinas' Commentary on the Gospel of Saint John, in which some elucidating connections are worked out. John 6 is dominated by the story of Christ feeding the Five Thousand and the speech in which He presents Himself as the Bread of Life. Aquinas interprets this chapter as referring to the Eucharist.'" Discussing verse 27, he examines the similitude between the corporal and spiritual world. This similitude enables one to speak of spiritual nourishment, referring to that by which the spirit is fed. From the outset Thomas. determines the relation between the two as follows: corporal things are caused by and derived from spiritual, a hierarchy which has already been observed many times in this chapter. Next, Thomas observes a difference between the two orders: whereas corporal food is transformed into the matter of the body, with regard to spiritual nourishment the reversal is the case.'"' The spirit turns into that by

"~ ThU =h:Pfill

I f; c"

.rum ;, ill " - - . . : : meant when Christ is called the Bread of Life and what is at stake when the Eucharist is considered as spiritual food. Receiving the Sacrament of the Eucharist, the union with Christ is intensified. R~c~iving t?e consecrated bread and wine, one receives Christ. Recelvmg Christ means: being transformed into Him with regard to the capacities by which life with God in grace takes place.''' This transformation has the character of intellect and will, receiving new forms: the theological virtues of caritas and fides which are, as we have seen, participations in the life of God attributed to the working of the Holy Spirit. Thus the Eucharist contributes to the growth of the Christian towards a greater conformity with Christ, who secundum quod Deus is the Life of God. This union with Christ, by the theological virtue of fides, emerges as the beginning of vita aeterna. Studying Aquinas' account. of Baptis~. and Eu~haris~ we. begin t? understand how, in Thomas' View, the spiritual relatIOnship With God IS cultivated with the help of corporal events which are familiar to man.

Church: Sic ergo spiritualiter manducat' carnem et bibit sanguinem per compar~tionem l?B

5Th ill 73.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod hoc sacramentum habet triplkern

ad Christum contentum et signatum, qui coniungitur ei per fidem et caritatem, lta quod

signiflCationern. Unam quidem respectu praeteriti: inquantum scilicet est commemorativum Dominicae passionis, quae foit verum sacrificium, ut supra [STb m, 48.3] dictum est. Et secundum hoc nominatur 'sacrificium'. Aliam significationem habet

respectu rei praesentis, scilicet ecclesiastiae unitatis. cui homines congregantur per hoc sacramentum. Et secundum hoc nominatur 'communio' 'Vel 'synaxis·... Tertiam significationem habet respectu futur~

inquantum scilicet hoc sacramentum est

praefigurativum fruitionis Dei, quae erit in patria. Et secundum hoc dicitur ''Viaticum~ quia hoc praebet nobis viam illue perueniendi. Et secundum hoc etiam dicitur

1?9

2.00

'Eucharistia~ idest 'bona gratia': quia "gratia Dei est 'Vita aeterna", ut dicitur Rm 6,23; vel quia realiter continet Christum, qui est "plenus gratia" Un 1,14}, I am indebted here to the penetrating reading of Aquinas' In Joan 6 in: M. Corbin, 1980, p. 161·209. In Joan 6.3 [Busa: 158]: Unde sciendum est circa hoc, quod corporalia sunt quaedam similitudines spiritualium, utpote ab eis causata et deri'Vata, et ideo imitantuT ipsa spiritualia aliquo modo. Unde sicut corpus sustentatur dbo, ita iilud quo sustentatUT spiritus, dicitur eius cibus, quidquid sit illud. Illud autem quo sustentatur corpus, cum transeat in corporis naturam, corruptibiie est; sed cihus quo sustentatur spiritus est incorruptibilis, quia non mutatur in ipsum spiritum, sed potius e converso spiritus in cibum. Unde dictum est, Augustini: "cihus sum grandium.· cresce et manducabis me. Nec tu me mutaberis in te, ut cibum carnis tuae, sed mutaberis in me", ut dicitur VII Jib. Con/essionum 10 [PL 32,742). Cf. also In Joan 6.7 [Busa: 186) where the thought is worked out with regard to the mystical body of Christ, the community of the

2.01

transformatur in ipsum, et ejfICitur eOO merr:~: non enim cihus. iste c~n~itur. in eum qui sumit, sed manducantem con'Verttt zn se... [Busa 2141 Ule qUt sptrttualtter manducat et bibit, fit particeps Spiritus sanct~ per quem unimur Christo unio.ne Julei et ca~itatis, et per quem efficimur membra EccJesiae. The same thought (refernng t~ ~e same text of Augustine) can be found in S7b m 73.ha2; The reversal IS In accordance with Aquinas' teaching of the asymmetrical relation between Creator and creature: by consuming the body of Christ not God is changed, but the human being who receives the sacrament (Cf.. c:hapte~ I, footnote 15~ on p. 64). In Joan 6.6 [Busa: 24]: Panis autem vwificat tnquantum sumltur. Constat autem quod qui credit in Christum, sumit eum intra seipsum, secundum illud Ep 3,17: "habitare christum per fidem in cordibus nostris." Si ergo Ule qui credit in Christum habet vitam, manifestum est quod manducando hun~ panerr: vivificatu:: .ergo ist; panis ~t. panis 'Vitae. Et hoc est quod dicit: "Amen, amen dleo vobis, qUI cred,t In me... ,.(ide sciJt~et fo.rmata, quae non solum perficit intelJectum, sed etWr; affec.tum (non em": tend~tur tn. creditam nisi ametur) "habet 'Vitam aeternam. Chr~tus autem est zn nobrs duplzezter: scilicet in intellectu per fidem, inquantum Jules est: et in affectu per cari~tem, quae. informat fidem: lJn 4,16 "Qui manet in caritate, in Deo. manet, et ~eu: In eo." QU'. ergo credit sic in Christum ut in eum tendat, ~~bet Ipsum In ~ffect~ et '~ tntellect~: e~ Sl addamus, quod Christus est vita aetern:z, ut dICltu: lJn 5,20: Ut smu:; t~ 'Vero fil,O em; lesu Christo: hie est Veru5 Deus et 'Olta aeterna ; et supra Jn 1,4: In 'pso Vtta erat ) possumus inferre, quod quicumque credit in Christum, habet vitam aeternam. Habet, inquatl; in causa et in spe, quandoque habiturus in reo

r:m

.,

140

FOUNDATIONS

Thus the relationship with God has the form of a familiaris conversatio. Baptism and Eucharist are only two of seven sacraments by which life of grace is bestowed on human beings. Each of the other five sacraments has its own special contribution to Christian life.''' Together they constitute the foundation and framework of life with God in a manner which is suitable for creatures whose mode of being is determined by the coordinates of materiality and time. They are the foundation of life with God since they establish (repair, promote) and reveal the life of grace in the human soul. They are the framework of this life as they effectuate and reveal - with regard. to different aspects of life - that the life of each individual is connected with the restoration of Christ (signum rememorativum), the life of God f2ignum demonstrativum) and the perspective of eternal life (signum prognosticum). Gratia supponit naturarn et perficit earn: by the sacraments natural life is perfected with regard to its relationship with God, and it is revealed how natural life is directed at life with the incomprehensible God. Asking for the relation between life on earth (vita naturae) and 'life' after death (vita aeterna) - which is the central question of this study, the role of the sacraments can be determined as embodying the cultivation of vita gratiae, the middle between natural and eternal life. Being a mediation, however, entails being part of a larger whole. As foundation and framework of life with God, and having conformity with natural life, the sacraments are fitting for functioning in a process of development and growth, which human life ultimately is. The foundations, framework and coordinates of this process have been sketched in this second chapter. We have shown how natural life and death receive their Christian meaning within the history of the relationship between God and man (i), how the life, death and resurrection of Christ have an impact on the Christian meaning of life and death (2) and how the sacraments mediate between Christ and Christian (3). The next chapters will be focused on life on earth (chapter III) and 'life' after death (chapter IV), from the perspective of the foundations sketched in this chapter. Thus, after having examined the two terms of the question, we will be able to deal with the relation between the two in chapter V and obtain an answer to the initial question.

201

For the manner in which, in Aquinas' view, the Sacrament of Penance is an integrated part of the life of the Christian, d. C. Leget/F. Vosman, 1996, p. 123-135.

CHAPTERID

DYNAMISM OF LIFE WITH GOD In the preceding chapter we studied the foundations of life with God. This chapter is dedicated to the dynamism of life with God; a dynamism which presupposes the framework of that which was studied in chapter II. In the following sections it is shown that living with God is to be conceived as a process. Like all kinds of life, vita gratiae can be characterised by self-movement, whereas in this case the incomprehensible God (or by appropriation: the Holy Spirit) is seen as the first cause of this dynamism. With regard to our initial question - the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death - this chapter is of importance because it will be shown how the augmentation of life of grace transforms the appreciation of life on earth, death and 'life' after death. This chapter consists of three sections. Firstly the general framework within which the dynamism unfolds, is presented (1). Subsequently we will examine the dynamism of life with God, transforming human life and the attitude towards one's own death (2). Finally it is shown how the relationship with God plays a central and determining role In Aquinas' treatment of moral matters with regard to life and death (3). 1. Living with God and acting as a human being

The dynamism of life with God is treated by Aquinas in the second part of ,the Summa Tbeologiae, in what is known as his 'moral theology'.' So far, we have dealt mainly with issues which concern passages of the first and the third part of the Summa, which are speculative in character. The Secunda Pars is of a different kind: it deals

1

STh I 1.4.co: Untie licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramq~ej Thomas lived and worked long before dogmatics and moral theology developed. into two separated sciences. Therefore, speaking of the 'moral theology' of Aquinas one must be cautious so as to avoid an anachronistic interpretation of the term. In the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologi. at Thomas concentrates on God (the formal subject of theology) insofar as He works in human actions, leading human beings towards Himself. In the following sections the word 'moral theology' is put in quotation marks as a reminder of this historical shift; Cf. D. Eickelschulte, 1963, p. 172-173; R. Guindon, 1956, p. 269-278_

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DYNAMISM

with human actions as they take place within the moral order. Following Aristotle, Thomas considers speculative science to be unfit for dealing with human actions: in order to determine the good to be done one needs practical science.' Since practical knowledge differs from speculative with regard to its nature and mode of procedure, this section is opened by presenting basic observations concerning the difference between the two (1.1). Next attention is focused on the incomprehensible God, who is the subject of theology and who is presented in the moral order as finis ultimus humanae vitae (1.2). Finally Aquinas' account of the virtues is introduced and it is shown how the incomprehensible God works as a transforming power through human action (1.3).

,

1.1 The moral order and practical science Man is designed to grow towards perfect participation in the life of God through acting as a free and rational creature. One can study these actions according to the natural as well as the moral order.' In the first case attention is directed at the specific movement which is made by sensitive or rational powers, corporal movements which are at hand and external objects which are involved. The natural order comprises all possible acts performed by, human beings; whether these are conscious or unconscious, both types are labelled as actio hominis. In this way one can equally study the behaviour of human beings, animals and other moving creatures. In the second case the action is considered insofar as it is directed at a freely chosen end. In this case attention is drawn to the role of intellect and will, the deliberations which are made, the means which are chosen and the goals which are intended. Within the moral order one considers the actio humana: conscious acts which are performed by human beings

In In I Eth 1 Thomas deals with the division of the sciences and the special nature of mora/is philosoph.,. Cf. the classical study of W. K1uxen, 1964, p. 21·107. On Aquinas' division of the sciences in general, cf. M. Jordan, 1986[.].

Until now a distinction has been made between the natural order and the order of grace. Following Aquinas' division in genus naturae and genus moris (or the ordo iustitiae), a new distinction is introduced. distinguishing the natural from the moral order. The first distinction, between nature and grace, is more basic and can be used with· regard to both genus moris and genus naturae.

CHAPTERll

143

qua human beings, viz. free, rational and responsible creatures.4

The distinction between the natural and the moral order is so basic that it is easily overlooked. The importance of the distinction, however, emerges when one realizes that two actions which are identical according to the natural order, can be opposed with respect to their evaluation ilccording to the moral order. Aquinas gives the example of the killing ofa human being which can be justified when it is performed in defense of justice, whereas it is a sin when it is done out of anger. 5 Elsewhere he makes clear that the marital act, which is a duty towards one's own spouse, is a sin when it is enjoyed with the spouse of one's neighbour. Goodness in the moral order is dependent on four elements: the perfotlnance of the action considered at the pre-moral level (actiO), the chosen end !finis), the object which is involved (obiectum) and the circumstances that are an hand (circumstantiae).' An action which is morally good demands that all four kinds of goodness are present.' Because of the immense variability of these four factors, it is impossible to map out all variations that can possibly OCcur in human life. One can formulate some general rules or maxims but what is really indispensable

" STh I-ll 1.1.co: Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc. quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde iI/ae so/ae actiones 'VOcantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et vo/untaten:, unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur focultas voluntatis et rationis. lllae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deli'berata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt did quidem hominis actiones; sed non proprie humanae, cum non sit hominis inquantum est homo. S STb I-IT 13.ra3: Possibile est quod unus «tus secundum speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voIuntatis, sicut hoc ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem secundum speciem naturae, potest ordinari sicut in flnem ad conservationem iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus secundum speciem moris, quia uno modo erit actus virtutis. alia modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod est terminus per accidens. sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per se. Fines autem morales accit/unt rei naturali; et e converso ratio naturalis finis accidit nwrali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actUS qui sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem moris, et e converso. Cf. STh I-ll 18.1-4, where the four elements are introduced. 7 STh I·ll 18.4.ra3: nihil prohibet actioni habenti u114m praedictarum bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias. ordinari ad /inem malum, et e converso. Non tamen est actio bona simp/iciter, nisi omnes bonitates" concurrant, quia "quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa" ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. De divinis nominibus.

tamen

DYNAMISM

CHAPTERll

here, is practical knowlegde: knowledge which is obtained by concrete knowledge and experience. Only this kind of knowledge will do justice to the particular situations to which human action is tied.' . The end is the most important of the four factors by whIch the moral goodness of an action is determined. The end is the proper object of the will. Since actions are the subject of moral judgement insofar as they are voluntary, the end chosen by the will is decisive for the moral goodness or badness of an action. Aquinas compares the proportion between the internal and the external act of the will with the proportion between forma and materia.' Thus the end chosen by the internal act of the will, is of moral relevance for the external action. Reconsidering the example just mentioned; the moral goodness of killing a human being (external actjon) is dependent on the end chosen (internal action): justice or revenge born out of anger. ... Having distinguished the natural and the moral order, It IS Important to consider their interrelation. The end is the proper object of the will. An end, however, can only be pursued insofar as it is attractive. This attractiveness is dependen~ on the goodness - in one respect or another of the end. This goodness, subsequently, is based on the perfection of the object, which can, eventually, be expressed in terms of esse." Metaphysically considered, goodness is the motor of human action, since by goodness the will is set in motion. This goodness, however, is not moral goodness; it is natural goodness on the basis of which objects are attractive and appeal to the human senses. In order to perform a morally good action, the intellect has to discern whether the good which is apprehended is also a good within the larger framework of one's life. In Aquinas' view, this framework can be freely constructed or chosen, but not without being related to the basic structures of creation. In chapter I we discussed the triad vita naturae - vita gratiae - vita aeterna. In cbapter II we studied the hierarchy of world - body - soul -

God. Since they both structure the different goods which play .a role in moral life, both orders are relevant for moral life. Both point to God as highest good and ultimate end. How then does the incomprehensible Gad function as summum bonum and finis ultimus in moral life? How does this relate to what we studied in the preceding chapters?

144

5Th I-II 6.prol: Sed quia operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur; 5Th II-II prol: sermones enim morales universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt; In this study attention is focused on the manner in which life and death are related to the life with God. When moral affairs are discussed in this chapter, the main objective is not to provide criteria for moral action but to give insight into the theological considerations OJ}. which Aquinas' viewpoints on moral matters of life and death are based. One could say that we focus on the speculative aspects of practical science. , STh I-II 18.6.co. " Cf. J. Aertsen, 1993, p. 75-89.

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1.2 God, happiness and the ultimate end of human life In the Summa 7beologiae, Thomas begins his consideration of human agency on the way to God with five quaestiones which concern the ultimate end of human action. 11 In the first quaestio he explains that all human actions are structured according to a direction towards an end.

When these ends are considered within the larger framework of one's life, they appear to be functioning as a means (ad finem) towards a greater end. This dynamism is crowned by one final end of human life ljinis ultimus humanae vitae) by which all human actions are set iri motion. Considered in connection with the intellectual faculties of man, this final'end must be an end by which the potentiality of intellect and will is fulfilled. Thus Thomas arrives at the identification of the ultimate end of man with the highest good (summum bonum) and the first truth (primum verum). This, of course, is none other than God. In the first chapter of this study we demonstrated how Aquinas uses the formula causa prima et finis ultimus in order to determine God's relation with creation. The formula is used not only to make a distinction between God and creation but also, at one and the same time, to connect them. God is distinguished from creation in a way which differs from the way creatures are distinguished from each other: God differs differently. As a consequence, when Gad is regarded as finis ultimus He ,is not considered as just an end among other ends. The ultimate end and the proximate (created) ends are in the proportion of the highest good (which is good in itself) to the created goods (which are good by participation). In other words: all created ends are attractive because of their relation to the ultimate end. This entails that the ultimate end has a certain inevitability: whichever end a human being strives for,this very striving is only possible because of the goodness of created ends, which partiCipates in the goodness of the ultimate end.· How then, does this ultimate end, which is God, play its major role

u 5Th I-II 1-5.

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in the concreteness of moral life? Aquinas approaches this issue by looking at man's natural desire for happiness." Following Aristotle's. mode of procedure in his Ethica Nicomacheia, Thomas evaluates the various lives (vita in the third meaning, referring to one's main occupation) which people lead." He analyses them as processes which are set in motion by the potentiality of the faculties of the human soul. The human soul is open for a second perfection which consists in the operations of its faculties. Thanks to these faculties all created being which can be perceived by the senses, is known and loved insofar as it is knowable and attractive or good. Thus human beings act according to their natural tendencies when they strive for satisfaction of their desire for goodness and truth. The attainment of this satisfaction is the happiness for which human beings are longing and thus happiness can be considered formally as the fulfilment of the potentiality of knowing and willing." Summarizing; the attractiveness of God as ultimate end corresponds with man's natural desire for happiness, a desire of which God the Creator is causa e/ficiens. This search for happiness, according to the natural order, is a process in conformity with the human mode of knowing. Because this mode of. knowing has 'as point of departure the perception obtained by the senses, it 'remains subjected to the limits of the created world. The faculties of the soul, however, are infinitely open towards created being; intellectual and volitional activities cannot be satisfied by any created object. Complete fulfilment of human desire can only be attained by the possession of the universal good (bonum universale) which is God." Thus, one could say that the natural desire

of man asks for fulfilment which cannot be attained by the natural potencies of man. Thomas observes this when he considers Aristotle's account of happiness: according to the Greek philosopher ultimately no man can be happy in his life on earth. All satisfaction is temporarily, partially and eventually tempered by the horrible fact of mortality. In this earthly life, beatitude can only be imperfect (beatitudo impeifecta)." At the same time, Aquinas cannot believe that a natural desire is in vain (inane, jrustra) , especially not when this desire concerns the striving for happiness which is so intimately tied up with intellect and will - the faculties by which human beings distinguish themselves from other animales. Thus Aristotle's analysis of happiness" is connected with the promises of Holy Scripture"; the intellect reaches the prima veritas and the will the summum bonum; human natural faculties are brought to perfection by the consummation of grace (vita gloriae). In Aquinas' account of happiness, imperfect and perfect beatitudo should not be played off against each other. Both name differen\ aspects of the same process. Both find their place within the framework of God bestowing His life on creatures in different modes and degrees; or more basically; the framework of God's self-communication in the work of creation." One could say that God crea\ed man in order to communicate His beatitude; He created beings endowed with intellect and will so as to be known and loved by them.20 The view that happiness is the ultimate end of human life and that this happiness consists in union with God, is worked out in STh I 93, where the end !finis) or goal (terminus) of the creation of man is examined. The' formal definition of human happiness - knowing and

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"

Cf. H. Kleber 1988: J. Porter, 1986: B. Bujo, 1984, p. 93-122.

"

"

STh I-II 2, S,G ill 25-37, In I E,h 5. Notice that the manner in which Thomas speaks about visio beala as beatitudo or happiness of man is metaphysical and not psychological, although psychological realities are concerned. Cf. K. Staley, 1989, p. 233, who points out that after I. Kant the psychological interpretation of happiness as a state of affairs according to which all personal desires are fulfilled, easily misguids our understanding of Aquinas and Aristotle's account of happiness. Cf. also S. Pinckaers, 1964; B. Bujo, 1984. STh I-II 2.S.co: Respondeo dicendum quad impossibiJe est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum peifectum, quod lotaliter quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum ! autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem panicipatam.

17

H

15

18

19

Cf. S,G ill 48. I Ethica Nicomau.neia 13.1 (1102aS): Jelicitas est operatio secundum virtutem pe:rfectam. Three imponant verses for Aquinas in this respect are: In 17,3 Haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verutn Deumj IJn 3,2 Cum apparuerit similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est; ICo 13,12: VuJemus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum. K. Staley, 1989, reports of the discussion that followed upon H. de Lubac's Surnaturel, published in 1946. Staley says (p. 227), "Thomas does not argue that man has two ends, the one natural and the other supernatural. Rather, he speaks of a single end which is twofold, which is realized at both a natural and supernatural level, and which he describes in the Summa Theologiae as imperfect and perfea

beatitude respectively." Cf. also B. Bujo, 1984, p. 93·122. 10

Cf. STh I 73.1.co: Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo sanctorum; quae erit in ultimo consummatione saeculi.

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loving God - appears according to three orders (natura, gratia, gloria) in this quaestio. Thus, in three ways man can be said to be created after God's image (ad imaginem Det), as is revealed in Holy Scripture (Gn 1,27). In the prologue to STh I-II, where Thomas begins his consideration of human agency on the way to God, this imago Dei-motif is to be found again. 21 By the central position of the imago Dei-motif, the continuity of vita naturae, vita gratiae and vita gloriae is elucidated and it becomes clear that man's openness towards God implies an openness towards a process of perfection. In this process the operations of human faculties and their perfection by grace are involved in a dynamism leading towards the perfect sharing in God's happiness. In the first place, one may detect a dynamism at the natural level, rooted in the powers of the soulAntellect and will are faculties which are designed to know and desire. Aquinas calls the operations of intellect and will the second perfection of man (the first perfection is existence), and thus one may ~ay that the fact that man is open towards creation and God, belongs to his nature. Thanks to this openness human life can be a process of communication with other creatures and God. This natural ability to know and love God, is the first way in which man can be considered as the image of God." Reflecting on this openness, a second dynamism can be discerned, by which the first dynamism is placed in a new context. In Aquinas' view, the openness of the human faculties is directed at a particular end: the life or communion with God in grace. The more a human being knows and loves God, the more he imitates God: his intellect and will perform the same acts with regard to the very same object as does God's intellect

and will." Thus Thomas states that man can be considered as image of God, again, insofar as he is - with the help of God's grace - actually knowing and loving God." Life of grace is open towards perfection by life of glory. This perfection is'regarded as the ultimate end of man, or man's happiness." Thus by the fact that man actually reaches eternal felicitas or beatitudo, once again man appears as image of God." God's perfect knowledge and love can be called his 'beatitude', since the word beatitudo refers to nothing else than the perfect good of an intellectual nature. 27 The beatitude of man, his happiness, is nothing else than sharing in this eternal life of God." Thus we see that - though gratuitdus - the ultimate end of man, his happineis or beatitudo is to share in God's life (by knowing and willing). This sharing has to be effected through a process within the coordinates of materiality and time. In order to show how this is realized through singular human actions, we will introduce the central element in Aquinas' consideration of moral action and life of grace:

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virtue.

23

U

25

26

21

STh I~II prol: Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo Jactus ad imaginem Dei dicitu?', secundum quod per imaginem significatur 'inteltectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se poteslati'IJum~

22

postquam praedictum est de exempiari, scilicet de Dea, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restal ut comideremus de eOO imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem. STh I 93.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse duatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imagineTn Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest consideran in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudem naturalem ad intelligeudum et amaudum Dewn, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus.

27

lS

The difference with God's knowledge and love is that in this case faculties, operations and object coincide secundum rem. Cf. chapter I, 2.2.2, p. 43. STh I 93.4.co: Afio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imper{ecte, et haec est imago per confonnitatem gratiae. STh I93.4.co: Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et tUnat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gforiae. Looking back in the Summa Theologiae, one can see the imago Dei motif (intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum) prepared in Aquinas' examination of the operations of the' Exemplar: after God's knowledge (STh I 14-18), will (STh I 19-24) and power (STh I 25) Aquinas closes the section focusing on God·s beatitudo (STh I 26). STh I 26.1.co: Nihil enim aiiud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum

per{ectum intellectualis naturaej cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod habet; et cui .competit ut ei contingat aiiq,uid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum opera· tionum domina. Utrumque autem istorum excelfentissime Deo convenit, scilicet per{ectum esse, et intelfigentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo. Thus in STh I·n 3.1.co Aquinas distinguishes between two meanings of beatitudo: beatitudo dt res, id in quo consistit beatitudo, which is God; and beatitudo ut adeptio rei, the operation of the soul by which God is attained. Only in God . in whom there is no distinction in re between His essence and His operations· do these two coincide; Cf. B. Bujo, 1984, p. 77; On the identification of beatitudo, finis uttimus, summum bonum d. D. Ei<:kdschulte, 1963, p. 158-160.

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1.3 The virtues and life with God

In the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologiae, Thomas concentrates on God (the formal subject of theology) insofar as He works in human actions, leading human beings towards the blessed communion with Himself. Thus he distinguishes between two principles of human action: external principles by which God instructs and helps man with regard to moral action ~aw and grace) and internal principles (virtues and vices) by which human beings direct themselves. In STh I-II, where Aquinas discusses moral action in general, the internal as well as external principles are examined. In STh II-II, where he focuses on moral acts in particular, he chooses to take as point of departure the internal principles of moral action: the virtues." In this way he is able to do justice, as far as possible, to the practical /character of 'moral theology'. Taking the virtues as a point of departure, however, has a second advantage: it is helpful as a framework for displaying how moral action is intimately tied up with human life as a process within the coordinates of materiality and time. In the preceding chapter it was shown that human beings - unlike angels - arrive at their final destination through a process of action. Man is designed in order to develop his life with God." The faculties of 'the soul are perfected or distorted by using them: the 'instruments' used are themselves perfected when acting. Thus, in the evaluation of moral action, the situation of the subject agent plays a major role: the development of his potencies makes the action more or less difficult, desired, etc. . The faculties involved in moral action comprise the sensitive as wei as the intellectual level of the human soul. Both are intimately related, comprising the material and the intellectual world at the border of which the human condition is situated. The importance of the sensitive level for human knowledge was discussed before: the intellect is dependent on what is received through the senses. The importance of the sensitive level for moral action is equally great. Sensitive knowledge has a direct impact on human experience at the level of what we nowadays call 'emotions': love, fear, anger, sadness, etc. Aquinas speaks

Z~

)0

In fact,. in 5Th Il·II law, grace and virtues are reconsidered from the perspective of the virtues. Each vinue is treated with its opposed vice, the corresponding gih(s) of the Holy Spirit (grace) and the precepts that ate related to it ~aw). Even the first man, who possessed all virtues, was created in order to augment his grace: d, STh I 95.4.

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of passiones animae, which he divides into two parts: the concupiscibile and the irascibile.31 At this level the impact of human corpotality emerges most acutely for the rational creatures which human beings are. Like our way of gaining knowledge, our moral action is rooted in this premoral level of emotions. In order to lead a human life, man has to be aware of his emotions, integrate them in his intellectual and volitional life and direct them towards self.chosen ends. A virtue is a perfection of a faculty of the soul. Aquinas' account of virtue can be introduced with the help of two definitions that he uses. The first definition ultimately goes back to Augustine: "Virtue is a good quality of mind by which one lives righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us"" Excluding the last part of the defmition for a moment, the importance of virtues for our investigation immediately becomes clear. Virtues concern vita recta: the right life ('life' in the third meaning, referring to one's main occupation in earthly existence). The 'right life' is the life according to the order of justice, or, in other words, the morally good life. This life is accomplished by the right quality of the faculties of the soul. To put it more precisely: by the right habitus, the right form of the potencies. The second definition springs from Aristotle's Erhica Nicomarheia: "a virtue is that' which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise"." Although this 'definition' is more a description of the effects of a virtue than a precise account of its essence, it elucidates that virtues are important because they connect the natural and the moral order. An act which springs from a virtue is good since it comes from a good principle. At the same time, by acting virtuously, the faculty

31

,)2

II

On the difficulty of translating passiones animae in contemporary English d. E. d'Arcy in the "introduction to vol. 19 of the Blackfriars-edition of the Summa Theologiae, p. xix-xxxii. I follow his suggestion to choose for 'emotions'. For Aquinas' analysis of the use of the word passio in this context, d. STh I-II 22.1. For an account of Aquinas' view on the interrelation of passiones animae and corp orality d. M. Satet, 1992, p. 104-119. lIirtus est bona q~itas merz.tis. qua nete viviturl qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis- operatur, the English translation is from the Black£riars edition by W.D. Hughes. OR. Pesch (1987) repons that the formulation stems from Peter of Poitiers (Glossae super Sententias III 1, [PL 211,1041], founded on Peter Lombatd (II Sent 27,5) and 'ultimately based on Augustine (II De libero arbitrio 19, [pL 32,1268], Aquinas discusses tills definition in STh I-ll 55.4. II Eth 6 (1106a1S.17): Dicendum igitur, quoniam virtus omnia emus utique fuerit virtus et id bene habens perficit, et opus ems bene reddit. Again the English translation is from W.D. Hughes; Cf. also Aquinas' quotation of the sentence in STh I·ll 56.l.ag2.

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which possesses the virtue is confirmed in its habit. Thus the human faculty is changed, not essentia/iter but accidentaliter. This means that human action according to the moral order, has a bearing on the state of affairs with regard to the goodness of the soul in the natural order. By moral action human beings are enabled to develop and grow towards (imperfect) happiness. Aquinas distinguishes four main or cardinal virtues which can come into existence by repeating good actions: prudence (prudentia), which consists in the ability of the intellect to determine how to act according to reason; justice (iustitia), which is the ability of the will to give each person his due; temperance (temperantia), which is the perfection of the vis concupiscibile by which this sensitive faculty is able to deal with its emotions according to reason; and courage !fortitudo), which does the same for the vis irascibile;' Via the four cardinal virtues human beings have entrance to the right human life." They are enabled to act according to human reason and to do so prompte, faciliter et delectabiliter. Acting virtuously, they use their natural capacity for human action at its best and contribute to the happiness man can reach by his natural powers (beatitudo imperfecta). Having distinguished' and classified the virtues into four cardinal virtues, Aquinas places emphasis on their interrelation: the virtues are connected with each other and influence one another. In moral perfection the entire soul is involved." Nevertheless, from different points of view, different virtues reveal their importance. Iustitia is the greatest of the virtues which concern moral action, since in this perfection of the will the good of reason is most evident. 37 Religio - a virtue connected with iustitia and which was not even listed among the cardinal virtues - excels all other moral virtues. The· reason for this is that of all virtues which are subsumed under the four cardinal virtues, it is the one most directly concerned with the ultimate end at which all virtues are ordered: the reverence of God Himself."

Despite its excellence, religio ultimately remains a moral virtue of the natural order, open towards perfection by grace. Human natural life which is shaped by the cardinal virtues can become conversatio familiaris cum Deo, life with God, when it is perfected by vita gratia
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In STh HI 61.2 Thomas distinguishes four cardinal vinues, considered either

according to their formal principles or their material subjects. Cardinal vinues are the hinge (carda) of the door to human life: De virt card 1.co. " 5Th 1·11 65. " 5Th I-II 66.4.co. '8 Cf. S'Fh II~II 81.6.co: Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt ad finem rortiuntur bonitatem ex ordine ad finem. et ideo quanta sunt /ini propinquiora, tanto sunt meJiora. Vwtutes autem morales, ut suprlJ dictum est, sum circa ea quae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Religio autem magis de propinquo accedit ad Deum quam aliae virtutes 35

morales, inquantum operatur ea quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum. Et ideo religio praeeminet inter alias virtutes morales. On the place of religio cf. also M. Sanchez, 1959. ~ On the relation between the grace of sacraments and virtues/gifts d. STh m 62.2. ~o 5Th I-II 68.1.co: Et ideo ad distinguendum dona a virtutibus, debemus sequ; modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine spirituum. 41 STh I-II 62.1.co: Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas reele ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntUY; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur: 42 STh I-II 68.1.co: Oportet igitUT inesse homini alteriores perfectiones, secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae per{ectiones 'f)()cantur dona: non solum quia infunduntur a Deo, sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Is 50,5.

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to their modus operandi. Therefore they are necessary for human salvation." Both, the theological virtues and the dona Spiritus sancti, have an impact on the cardinal virtues: caritas can function as forma with respect to" other virtues and the gifts of the Spirit render the faculties more sensitive for the impulse of the Spirit (instinctus Spiritus sanett)." The importance of the theological virtues is so great that Thomas makes a reversal which reminds us of the analogical procedure which we have encountered with regard to God's name vita. The infused (theological) virtues are perfect and called virtues simpliciter, because they alone direct man toward the final end simpliciter. The acquired (cardinal) virtues are called virtues in a certain respect (secundum quicl).45 Only theological virtues direct a man towards his beatitudo perfecta. Therefore, Aquinas considers them - and especially caritas - to be decisive for the moral goodness of an action. It is remarkable that the theological virtues are listed among the internal principles of human operation and, at one and the same time, considered as the effect. of grace. This reveals the special character of these virtues. In accordance with the 'logic of grace' they are simultanuously the. result of both human and divine action." For this reason, Thomas explains that the in nobis sine nobis of the first definition of 'virtue', must be understood as: the fact that God works in our soul does not mean that our activity is excluded."

with regard to human action has been indicated. Thus the hierarchy of elements (world· body - soul - God, cf. chapter Il) was related to the moral order. Secondly, extending the finis·motif, attention was focused on Aquinas' account of God as finis ultimus humanae vitae. After a clarification of the relation between the natural human striving for happiness and God as the ultimate end of man, the dynamic nature of human life was presented, taking Aquinas' consideration of man as threefold image of God as point of departure. The intellectual nature of man (imago Dei according to the natural order) is designed to know and love God. These operations are to be bestowed on man by the gift of grace (imagogratiae, manifesting itself through theological virtues and gifts of the Spirit) and perfected after life on earth by sharing in God's blessed'life (imago gloriae, man's perfect beatitude). In the third place attention was focused on the central element of Aquinas' account of moral life: virtue. Virtues are accidental perfections of the sensitive and intellectual faculties of the soul, developed by moral action. By Baptism natural life is placed in a new context: the acquired virtues are adopted en perfected by functioning under guidance of the theological virtues and the gifts of the Spirit.

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In this first section we sketched the main features of Aquinas' 'moral theology' so as to provide a framework within which the dynamism of life with God can be presented. First, it was shown how the moral order is distinguished from and related to the natural order. The criteria for moral goodness were introduced and the primacy of the end !finis)

., STh l·ll 68.2. ... Cf. J. Walgrave, 198211969. ~5 STh I-II 65.2.co: Patet igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes in/usae sunt perfectae. et simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet arquisitae, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter... 4(, Cf. O.H. Pesch/A. Peters, 1981, p. 64-107; K. Tanner, 1988. 47 STh ,I-IT· 55.4.ra6: virtus infusa caUSdtur in nobis a Dca sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur. "quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatUY", Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni wluntate et natura.

155

2. The aUgIl\entation of grace and the attitude towards one's own death Having sketched the main features of Aquinas' 'moral theology', in this section the scope is narrowed down and the dynamism of life with God is studied as it emerges in Aquinas' discussion of theological virtues. We begin with a discussion of theological virtues and their augmentation (2.1). Next attention is focused on the central role of the theological virtue of caritas. Charity played a major role in chapter II and continues to do so in this chapter, being the "mother, form and root" of all other virtues (2.2). Having considered the growth of the relationship witl> God in grace, the Evangelical Counsels - which contribute to a further development of this growth· are examined. This confronts us once again with some elements which are constitutive for Aquinas' apneciation of Original Sin (2.3). This section is completed by studying Aquin,\,' account of martyrdom which surpasses the Evange. lical Counsels and reveals the rationality of his appreciation of life and death by means of a paradox (2.4). Thus it is gradually unfolded how

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vita naturae is transformed and perfected by vita gratiae; a process which has a specific bearing on one's appreciation of and attitude towards the relation between vita spiritualis and vita corporalis.

this life, is only the beginning of the perfect knowledge of God, face to face, in 'life' after death. For the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death, this entails that fides names something which displays a continuity, viz. the relationship or life with God considered with regard

156

2.1 Theological virtues and their augmentation

Human life is a process of development in which man is called to grow towards his perfection: sharing the lif~ of God, :whi~h is called ~ita aeterna or vita gloriae. As long as human hfe IS hfe In Vta, the relatiOn· ship with God is established by God in an initial stage onl~. This participation in the life of God i~ via is call:d vita gratiae and IS to be recognized as a gratuitous perfection of the 1.ntel~ectual facult1~s of ~he soul: the theological virtues. Bec;ause of their direct conneetlon with God as finis ultimus humanae vitae, faith, hope and c~arity are of cru~ial importance in order to understand what human hfe IS. Moreover, bemg called· 'life' themselves (as manifestation of vita gratiae) they determine the process afid direction of human life on earth as a whole." ill this first paragraph it is shown how, in two respects, the theological virtues are connected with our theme vita. Since they are the articulation of life with God (conversatio cum Deo) their character of personal relationship is examined. Subsequently, and in accordance with their relational character, their development and dynantism is focused on. Thomas defines the theological virtue of faith as habitus mentis, qua inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus." This definition is helpful in enabling us to elucidate some important features of Thomas' account of faith with regard to the central theme of this study. ill the first place, by the words "by which eternal life begins in us" from the outset the eschatological perspective of faith is taken in consideration. By faith, eternal life - the beatific vision of God - begins. The kind of knowledge which is had by faith in

~8

Cf. In Symb pro! [Busa: 24]: per [uJem inchoatur in nobis vita aeterna: nam vita aetema nihil aJiud est quam cognoscere Deum ... [BUIlt.: 29] Haec autern cognitio Dei ineipit hie per fidem. sed perficitur in vita jutUTtt, in qua cognoscemus eum sicuti est... [Busa: 38J fides dirigit vitam praes,.tem: nam ad hoc quod home bene vivat, opart" quod seial necessaria ad bene viveruium. With regard to caritas as 'life' d. STh II-II 23.2.ra2.

49

STh II-II 4.1.coj On Aquinas' account of faith in general, d. E. Schockenhoff, 1987, p.355-417.

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to its cognitive ·dimension.

In the second place - and focusing on the cognitive dimension of faith - Aquinas speaks of a "habit which makes the intellect assent to things that appear not". This part of the definition qualifies the cognitive dimension of faith in more than one respect. As for its object in the sense ohhe reality with which the act of believing is concerned faith concerns the unseen: that which is not attainable by man's natural capacity which is mediated by sense perception. ill the first chapter of this study. Aquinas' account of theology was introduced and it was said that in the sacred doctrine everything is considered under the formal consideration of being revealed by God." It was also explained that for Aquinas theology - being part of sacra doctrina - is the understanding of faith." Dealing .with the theological virtue of faith, we will have to deterntine more precisely what the object of faith is. Aquinas distinguishes .between the object of faith in the sense of formal objective (ratio formalis obiectt) and in the sense of that which is materially affirmed by believing (materiale obiectum)." The first is "the basis in the object upon :which the action relies in its termination"": God Himself as prima ventas. The second is the reality in which the act of believing terminates: God and everything created insofar as it is directed at God. Corresponding to this distinction, Thomas discerns between believing in God (credere Deum); the act of faith with regard to the material object; and believing God (credere Deo) by which a person holds fast to the prima veritas because of Whom he assents to what is proposed_" By this account of faith, Thomas is able to keep together that, on the one hand faith has a 'dogmatic' side - comprising propositions (in the form of the Articles of Faith) - while on the other it cannot do without personal commitment and assent." The assent

~

Chapter I, 1.3, p. 17. Chapter I, 1.2, p. 16. 52 STh n~II l.1.co. " T.C. O'llrien in. Blackfriars vol. 31, p. 7. Cf. also his elucidating appendixes in the same volume, p. 178-215. ~ STh ll-ll 2.2.00. " Cf. J. Walgrave, 1974[a]. 51

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which is characteristic of faith, however, is more than an operation of intellect alone: it entails the operation of intellect and will. Thomas teaches that faith, because of its object which is the truth, is an act of the intellect. The intellect, however, assents to the divine Truth because it is incited by the will. Perfect faith is informed by charity." Therefore, Aquinas follows Augustine in speaking also of believing unto God (credere in Deum), by which this movement of the will towards God, which is implicit in faith, is expressed. Thomas uses the expression instinctus Spiritus sancti in order to indicate that man is moved by the Spirit for the knowledge of faith. By being the object and first cause of faith it becomes clear that informed faith implies an intimate union with God. God not only provides that which is seen by faith, but also th~ light by which it is seen. We become united with divine nature, participating in it, and this brings about a knowledge per modum connaturalitatis. This connaturality can increase by the gifts of the Holy Spirit. During life on earth, the theological virtue of faith is perfected by the gifts intellectus and sdentia. They accomplish that the intellect is more easily moved by the Spirit. Intellectus has a bearing on the ability to penetrate more intimately into what is known." Sdentia is the gift which enables one to discern what is to be believed and what not." The result of the perfection of the donum intellecrus is certitude of faith, a fructus Spiritus sancti, accompag· nied by joy." The theological virtue of faith, as effect in the human soul, is appropriated to the Son, who, as we have seen, is associated with the cognitive aspects of the triune God.'" Since the mystety of incarnation and passion of Christ is the human way to beatitudo, this mystety is the centre of the Articles of Faith.61 Thus, what was worked out in the preceding chapter with regard to the role of Christ as foundation of the

relationship with God, is affirmed here in the core of the first theological virtue. Aquinas calls faith 'beginning of eternal life', placing faith, from the outset, in a perspective which transcends life on earth. Living on earth, however, the perspective of eternal communion with God may cause great distress as regards the possibility of attaining it." Therefore, in accordance with the bestowed familiaris conversatio with God, a special theological virtue is concerned with reaching this future good which is difficult (but possible) to attain": the theological virtue of hope.

158

The virtue of hope (spes) cannot be understood properly without realizing that it is concerned with the personal relationship with God." In fact, hope is part of living with God. The theological virtue of hope is the appetite of the will which is directed at the perfection of the knowledge and love of God which is bestowed on us in via by the life of grace. God is object of spes in two ways: God's essence, His Life, He Himself is hoped for as that which constitutes our eternal happiness (causa finalis).", At the same time He is object of our hope as the one by whose help we attain eternal life (causa e!fidens). Thus this virtue is an important impulse in the human struggle for the good life. 66 Like faith, the theological virtue of hope has the capacity for development and perfection. Thomas works this out in his discussion of the gift of the Holy Spirit which belongs to hope: the donum timoris." Like hope, fear is a passion of the potentia irascibilis of the soul. From

Cf. SeC ill 152; Cf. also chapter IT, 2.1, p. 100 where the elevation of spes is considered as one-oaf the convenrentiae incarnationis. 6J 5Th II-II 17.1.co: obiecturn spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi. .. Spes as theological vinue (SIb 11·11 17·22) must be distinguished from pes as passion of the soul (Sn 1·11 40). On spes as theological vinue, d. E. Schockenho££, 1987, p. U

Cf. SIb 11·11 4.2·3. STh IHI 8.6.co. 51 5Th II-II 9.1.co: ad hoc quod intelJectus humanus peifecte assentiat veritati fidei duo requiruntUT. Quorum unum est quo sane capiat ea quae prQponuntuy, quod pertinet ad donum intel/eetus, ut supra dictum est.. Aliud autem est ut habeat certum et rectum iudicium de eis, discernendo scilicet credendtt non credendis. Et ad hoc necessarium est donum scientiae. 5? STh IHI 8.8.co: dono intel/ectus r.espondet pro proprio /rue!u fides, idest rulei certitudo, sed pro ultimo !ruetU respondet ei gaudium, quod pminet ad voluntatem. ., Cf. In Joan 5.4 [Busa: 325£l]. " SIb 11·11 2.8.

"

57

6.S

66

67

418-175; H. Rikhof, 1993. STh II-II 17.2.00: Hoc autem bonum est vita aeterna, quae in fruitione ipsius Dei consistit, non ~nim minus aliquid ab eo sper-andurn est quam sit ipse, cum non sit minor eius bonitas, per quam bona creaturae communicat, quam eius essentia. Et ideo proprium et principale obiectum spei est beatitudo aeterna. Cf. also SIb 11·11 17.5·6. For this reason the opposite of hope, desperaero, is considered to be a great dap.ger: d. SIb 11·11 20.3.00. STh II-II 19.9 .ral: timor fiJialis et spes sibi invicem cohaerent et se invicem perficiunt.

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this common basis, the double opposition between fear and hope" can be elucidated. This enables Aquinas to show the connection between hope and fear and distinguish between different meanings in which the word 'fear' is used in Holy Scripture. These different meanings can be recognized as referring to different stages of development of the relationship with God. Thus a telling shift appears, characteristic for the development of life with God. A first kind of fear is timor humanus or mundanus according to which one withdraws from God because of the evil that He might inflict upon one. This kind of fear can never be good: it springs from love for created goods and turns away from the highest good for wanting lower goods." A second kind of fear has the opposite effect: as a result of the evils which are feared, one converts to God and clings to Him. Because evil can be divided into malum culpae and malum poena., two variants of this fear can be distinguished. When God is clung to out of fear for punishment, Aquinas speaks of timor servilis. When He is adhered to out of fear for sinning against Him, it is called timor filialis, as it resembles the attitude of the son who is afraid to offend his father. A mixture of both motives results in a third variant: timor initialis. In S7b II-II 19 Thomas subsequently deals with these different kinds of fear and examines how they interrelate. He notices a development which is connected with the growth of caritas. Timor servilis is a kind of fear which is not yet informed by charity, but leads towards the love

for God.'o Timor initialis is the medium between timor servilis and filialis, but in such a manner as the imperfect being is the middle between being and non being: substantially it equals the former and differs from the laner. Likewise, timor servilis is inspired by charity." To the degree that caritas grows, however, timor initialis decreases and timor filialis increases: the more one loves God, the less one fears punishment." Thomas gives two reasons for this. In the first place: the more one loves God, the less one minds about one's own good, which is possibly threatened by punishment. In the second place, the more one clings to God, the'more confidence one has in the reward and the less one worries about punishment. These shifts are characteristic for the development of· the relationship with God. They express a shift according to which the centre of one's life is gradually placed outside oneself and which will be discussed later in this chapter. 7J The dynamism of this shift, as we have seen, is ascribed to charity.

160

In our centuty, Aquinas' account of the theological virtue of charity has been the subject of many discussions." One thing, however, upon which all scholars agree, is the central place of charity in the 'moral theology' of Aquinas." This central place is reflected in Thomas'

STh II-II 19.8.ra1: timor qui est initium dilectionis est timor seroilis. qui "introducit caritatem sicut seta introducit Unum", ut Augustinus dicit [Tr 9, on I In 4,18; PL 35,2047]. 71 STh II-II 19.8.sc+ra3. 72 STh II-II 19.10.co: Timor autem jiJiaiis necesse est quod crescat crescente caritate, simt elfectus crescit crescente causa: quanto enim aJiquis magis diJigit a/iquem, tanto magis timet tum offendere et ab eo separari. Sed timor serviJis. quantum ad servitatem, tota/iter wllitur caritate adveniente: remanet £amen secundum substantiam timor poenae. ut dictum est [a.6}. Et iste timor diminuitur caritate crescente, maxime quantum ad actum; quia quantum aliquis magis diJigit Deum, tanto minus timet poenam. Primo quidem, quia minus attendit ad proprium bonum, cui contrariatur poena. Secunda, quia firmius inhaerens magis confidit de praemio, et per consequens minus timet de poena; The reversal of this 'is: timor mundanus, roOted in false self·love: cf. STh II·II 19.6.co: secundum quod a/iquis refugit poenam contrariam bono suo naturali simt principale malum contrarium bono quod di/igi
The relation between spes and timOr, both belonging to the potentid irascibiJis and bom dealing with the future, is one of double opposition: spes is the passion which concerns the approach (accessus) of a good under the formal consideration of being difficult to reach (fecundum arduum), timor is the passion which concerns the withdrawal (recessus) from an evil under the same formal consideration. Cf. STh I-II 25.4 and 5Th 1·11 40.1·2. 6' STh II-II 19.2.co: de timore nunc agimus secundum quod per ipsum aJiquo nwdo ad

68

Deum convertimur vel ab eo avertimur. Cum enim ohiectum timoris sit malum,

quandoque homo propter mala quae timet a Dea reeed;t, et iste dicitur timor humanus vel mundanus. Quandoque autem homo per mala quae timet ad Deum convert;tur et ei ihhaeret. Quod quidem malum est duplex, scilicet malum poenat; et malum culpae. Si igitur aJiquis convertatur ad Deum et ei inhaereat propter timorem poenae. erit timor servilis. Si autem propter. timorem culpae, erit timor fiJialis. nam fdiorum est timere of1ensam patris. Si autem propter utrumque. est timor initialis. qui est medius inter utrumque timorem. For the argument that timor mundanus is always bad, d. sTh II-II 19.3.

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qualification of caritas as forma, mater and radix of all other virtues." But apart from the impact of charity on other virtues, the virtue of love owes its value to the fact that it directly concerns the relationship with God in earthly life and continues to do so in 'life' after death. Caritas is the only one of the three theological virtues which remains in patria and can do so because it is essentially the very communication of God's life." In STh II·II 23.1, the first article in which Thomas examines caritas in the Summa, the tone is set by the assurance that caritas is friendship (amicitia) with God, based on God's communication of divine life: beatitudo." Although all theological virtues have God as their object, they differ with regard to the way in which God is object. Fides and spes reach God insofar as He provides)ls with respectively the knowledge of the truth or the possession of the highest good. Caritas attains God so as to rest in Him. Because of this, charity is the most excellent of all vir·

tues." As has been shown earlier, Thomas calls caritas created part!c!pation in the love between the Father and the Son, which is infused in us by the Spirit." Thus, the Spirit is recognized at the core of Aquinas' 'moral theology', by the central role of charity in moral life. Or, to put it differently: the heart of Thomas' 'moral theology' is friendship with God; a friendship which is, as an effect, appropriated to the Holy Spirit and which is called caritd" Characteristic for the Spirit, in its relation to 'life', is the aspect of movement and liveliness. This has been observed in Aquinas' account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit which make the faculties of the soul fit to be moved, by the impulse of the Spirit (instinctus Spiritus sanctt), more easily. By caritas man is moved towards his ultimate end as long as he is in via. By charity we approach God, we are united to Him, we participate in the likeness of the Holy Spirit." This process of development involves a dynamism according to which acts of charity increase the theological virtue." Thomas discerns three degrees of charity: the love of those who begin, those who' advance and those who are perfect." In the first degree one is occupied with avoiding sin and everything else which threatens ihe love fcir God. The second degree is dominated by striving

162

SIb I.n 62.4.co: OpoTlet quod ordine .generationis, Jules praecedat spem et caritatem ... Ordine vera perfectionis, caritas praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem formalur, et perfectionem virtutis «quirit. Sic enim caritas est mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum forma, ut infra dicetur; Cf. also STh 11·11 23.7-8. The ceotral position of charity is in line with the ceottal place of arnoT in the theology of Aquinas. On the various levels at which arnor is found, d. A. ilien, 1974 and]. Aumann, 1978. " Cf. STh I-II 67, especially art. 6. The thought is based on ICo 13,8 (Caritas numquam acidit) quoted in the sed contra of an. 6. " STh 11·11 23.l.co: secundum Phaosophum, in VIII EthicoTum 2 [l155b31] non quaibet arnOT habet rationem amicitiae. sed amor qui est cum benevolentia. quando scilicet sic amamus aJiquem ut ei bonum velimus... Sed nee benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae. sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutlftt benevolentia fUndatur super aliqua communicatione. Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam be4titudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fUndari. De qua quidem communicatione dicitur tCo 1.9: "Fidelis Deus. per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii eius. "Amor autem super hac communicatione Jundatus est caritas. Unde mani/estum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum. E. Schockenhoff, 1987, p. 501526 shows that the interpretation of caritas in connection with amicitia js an inven-

76

tiOl~

of Aquinas. On this point one can discern a development in his writings. Cf. also G. Mansini 1985[a]j On the central place of caritas .in Aquinas' account of beatitudo d. B. Bujo, 1984, p. 137·182. As is remarked with regard to beatitudo above in footnote 14, it has to be streSSed that Aquinas' examination of charity is not psychological. Cf. Th. Beemer, 1983 and 1973, p. 39-40 with refereoces to S. Pinckaers and ]. Maritain.

STh II-IT n.6.co: Fides autem et spes attingunt quit/em Deum secundum quod ex ipso provenit nobis vel cognitio veri vel adeptio boni; sed caritas attingit ipsum Deum ut in ipso sistat, non ut ex eo aliquid rwbis proveniat. Et ideo caritas est excellentior fide et spej et per consequens omnibus aliis virtutibus. so STh IT-II 24.2.co: Unde caritas non potest neque naturaliter nobis inesse, neque per vires naturales esse acquisita, sed per in/usionem Spiritus saneti, qui est arnor Patris et Filii, cuius participatione in nobis est ipsa caritas creata, sicut supra dictum est [STh D·D 23.2}; Cf. also chapter I, 2.3.2, p. 61 and chapter II, 1.3.1, p. 86. U A beautiful analysis of caritas on the model of amicitia is offered in ScC IV 21-22, where Thomas discusses the effects of the Holy Spirit. 82 STh II·II 24.4.00: Ex hot enim dicimur esse viatores quod in Deum tendimus, qui est ultimus finis nostrae beatitudinis. In hac autem via tanto magis procedimus quanto Deo magis appropinquamus,-· cui non appropinquatur passibus corporis. sed affectibus mentis. Hane autem propinquitatem facit caritas, quia per ipsam mens Deo unitur. Et ideo de ratione caritatis viae est ut possit augeri, si enint. non posset auger;, iam cesserat viae processUSj STh II-II ~4.5.ra3: quod perfectius similitudo Spiritus sancti participetur in anima. " STh 11·11 24.6-8. .. R. Garrigou-Lagrange (1923, p. XDI) identifies these three degrees with the vw purgativa, via illuminiti'Va and 'Via unitiva. On the problem of discerning stages of spiritual perfection d. K. Rahner, 1957', p. 11-34.

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to proceed in the good and strengthening charity. The third degree is recognized by the intention to cling to God and enjoy Him. 8S The highest degree of charity, which is recognized in the first chapter of Saint Paul's letter to the Philippians, is important to take into consideration with regard to the initial question of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death. It shows that the dynamism of 'life' of grace - the beginning of eternal life - can be so strong that corporal death is no longer feared. 86 The friendship with God is so intense that one no longer yearns to be in via but in patria, perfectly united with God. This dynamism of attraction, inherent in the relationship with God, can become so preponderant that a tension between corporal life and spiritual life comes into being. In Quaestio disputata De caritate 11, where the problem is posed whetjIer evetyone ought to possess perfect charity, Aquinas presents this tension in one of the obiectiones. He argues that someone endowed with carita>, loves vita aeterna more than vita temporalis. Evety one ought to have charity, so it seems that every one should love eternal life more than corporal life. This line of reasoning is supported by a quotation of Ph 1,23 by Augustine. In his response to this argument, Aquinas affirms that there are two inclinations; one belonging to carita> and one pertaining to natural life. According to the first, a person desires to leave this life so as to. be with theist. According to the second, one flees from death by whlch body and soul are separated and human nature is destroyed. The result of the

combination of these affects is that one desires to be united with God without the separation of body and soul: an impossibility in mortal life. Aquinas recognizes this struggle in 2eo 5,4-8 and he observes that in the case of Saint Paul, endowed with perfect charity, the desire of carita> overcomes the natural striving. However, in those in whom charity is not perfect, the resistance of the natural affect is so strong that the victory of charity is not felt." Although Aquinas speaks of perfect charity here, carita> can grow further infinitely. In this life on earth the end of this process can never be fixed, for it is a kind of participation in infinite love which is the Holy Spirit, being effectuated by God's infinite pnwer and so structured that along with charity the ability of augmentation grows." Therefore no one may say "it is enough" and leave the way to God - which life on earth ultimately is - before its end." Moreover, Aquinas takes away all doubt that one might reach the quantity of heavenly charity in this life: the latter is of a different order and not a simple extrapolation of the

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85

16

STh'II-II 24.9.co: Respondeo dicendum quod spirituale augmentum caritatis considerari potest quantum ad aliquid simile corporali hominis augmento... Ita etiam et divers; gradus caritatis distinguuntur secundum diversa studia ad quae homo perducitur per caritatis augmentum. Nam primo quidem incumbit homin; studium principale ad recedendum a peecata et resistendum concupiscentiis eOO, quae in contrarium caritatis movent. Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes. 'in quibus caritas est nutrienda 'Vel fovenda ne corrumpatur. Secundum autem studium succedit, ut homo principaJiter intendat ad hoc quod in bono proficiat. Et hoc studium pertinet ad proftcientes. qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt ut in eis caritas per augmentum roboretur. Tertium autem studium est ut homo ad hoc principaliter intendat ut Deus inhaereat et eo /ruatur. Et hoc pertinet ad perfectos, qui cupiunt "disso/vi et esse cum Christo" [ph I,23]. Note how in STh II-IT 24.6.co and S1b II-II 24.9.co Thomas elucidates the augmentation of spiritual life with the help of the same in corporal life: a procedure he also adopts with regard to sacramentalli£e. Within the context of the vinue of caritas, Ph 1,23 is quoted in STh II·II 24.8.80, 5Th II·II 24.9.co and 5Th II·II 25.5.agl. Cf. In Orat 3 [Busa: 190]: desideramus vitam aeternam ... Et hoc desiderium sanctorum est ita vehemens quod propter hoc desiderant mortem, quae secundum se [ugienda est: 2eo 5,8.

87

88

a~

De car 1Lra8: in--homine sunt duo affectus; unus caritatis, quo anima desiderat esse cum Christo; a/ius autem naturalis, quo anima refugit separationem a corpore, qui adeo est homini natura/is, quod nee etiam Petro senectus abstuJit. ut Augustinus dicit super loan. [tract. 123]. Ex coniunctione ergo horum duorum a/fectuum veIJet anima sic coniungi Deo, quod non separa:retur a corpore; secundum ilIud Apostoli, 2eo 5,4: "Nolumus expoliari, sed supervestiri,' ut absorbeatur quod mortale est a vita." Sed quia hoc est impossibile ("quamdiu enim sumus in corpore, peregrinamus. a Domino"[2 Co 5,6]),' insurgit quaedam contrarietas inter praedictos affectus, et quanta caritas est perfectior, tanto sensibilius a/fectus caritatis vineit affectum naturae; et hoc ad perfectionem caritatis pertinet. Unde et Aposto/us ibidem subtiit: "Audemus autem, et bonam vo/untatem habemus magis peregrinari a corpore; et praesentes esse ad Dominum" [2eo 5,8]. Sed in his in quibus est caritas imperfecta, si tantum a}fectus caritatis vincat, ex repugnantia tamen natura/is aJfectus redditur insensibilis victoria caritatis. Quod ergo aperte et indubitanter, sive audacter, Aposto/us dicit: "Cupio disso/vi, et esse cum Christo" [Ph 1,23], hoc perfectae caritatis est; sed quod qualitercumque, licet insensibiliter, praeferat anima fruitionem Dei unioni corporis, est de necessitate caritatis. STh II-II 24.7.co: est "enim [caritas] participatio quaedam infinitae caritatis. quae est Spiritus sanctus. Similiter etiam causa augens caritatem est infinitae virtutis, scilicet Deus. Similiter etiam eX parte subrecti terminus huic augmento praefigi non potest, quia semper caritate excrescente, superexcrescit habilitas ad ulterius augmentum. Unde relinquitur quod caritatis au~nto nullus terminus praefigi possU in hac vita. STh II-II 24.7.sc: Sed contra est quod Aposto/us dicit ad Ph 3,12: "Non quod iam acceperim, aut iam perfectus sim, sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam ",' ubi diett Glossa [PL 192,246]: "N,mo [zdeliwn, 'lSi muitum profecerit, dieat: 'sufficit mihi~ Qui enim hoc dicit, exit de via ante /inem. "Ergo semper in via caritas potest magis ae magis augeri.

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love on earth. A line will never gain the quantity of a square, however much it is augmented. 90 The virtue of charity is perfected by the gift of sapientia. The gift of wisdom enables one to consider the highest cause by which all other things can be judged and at which they can be directed." The surprising fact that sapientia is a perfection of the cognitive part of the soul - whereas carita:; belongs to the volitional part - may be explained by pointing to the close interrelation of the two faculties which cannot operate apart from each other." Thomas regards sapientia as a kind of connaturality with God, resulting from the union by carita:;. This connaturality provides one with the knowledge how to act according to God's will." It is, in fact, the theological explanation of the experience that one does not need to acquir~ the expertise of a 'moral theologian'

By the virtue of faith, infused through the Sacrament of Baptism, the incomprehensible God is known in a way which transcends the natural capacity of the human intellect. This knowledge has. the character of entrusting oneself to. God's revelation, condensed in the articles of faith. By faith eternal life begins in the human soul. This perspective of eternal union with God may ever increasingly be the orientation of one's life. By the virtue of hope a dynamism begins by which a human being increasingly trusts in God and hopes for the perfect union with God after this life. Love for God qualifies hope as no longer primarily hoping for one's own good, but for whatever God wants. Finally, in the virtue of charity a dynamism can be appreciated according to which a human being is increasingly focused on living with God. This love for God pervades and inspires moral action. It even introduces a new attitude towards life on earth. The friendship with God can become so intense that eventually, one can long to leave behind earthly life and be united with God in eternal life. The shift towards God as the new centre of life is of great importance for the theme of this study. It has been shown that within the development of theological virtues, by which God is increasingly recognized as the centre of one's life, carita:; plays a major role. Examining charity, .Aquinas explicitly studies the proportion between the love for God and the love for creatures. This consideration of the hierarchy of the objects of charity may be considered as the 'backbone' of Aquinas' 'moral theology'. The order of charity upholds Aquinas' views on moral issues with regard to life and death, as we will show in the next section. For this reason, we will examine this hierarchy in detail in the following paragraph.

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in order to become a saint.

Now we have examined the theological virtues as to their character of personal relationship with God as well as their development and dynamism, some remarks can be made with regard to the theme of this study. The theological virtues have been sketched as perfections by which a human being is increasingly united with God. This union has an impact on the appreciation of life on earth and the attitude towards one's own death. The theological virtues display a dynamism according to which one is increasingly concerned about God instead of oneself. God becomes the new centre of one's life and the virtues help so that the process of commending oneself to the incomprehensible God can be developed. 90

5Th II~n 24.7.raJ: skut linea, quantumcumque crescat, non 4ttmgtt quantitatem supeifteiei. Non est autem eadem ratio quantitatis caritatis viae, quae sequitur cognitionem fide~ et cltY'itatis patriae, quae sequitur visionem apertam.

5Th II-IT 45.1.00: secundum Philosophum, I Met 2 [982a-bJ, ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam aitissimam, per quam de aliis certissime iudicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari aportet. '2 STh I-II 67.6.ra3: Deus autem quanta perfoctius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius amatur. 9~ 5Th II-II 4S.2.co: Sic igitur circa res divinas ex rationis inquisitwne rectum iudicium habere pertinet ad sapientiam quae est virtus intellectualis, sed rectum iudicium habere de eis secundum quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa, pertinet ad sapientiam secundum quod rfonum est Spiritus sanct~... Huiusmodi autem compania sive connaturaiitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo, secundum iI/ud leo 6,17: "Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est. "Sic igitur sapitntw quae est donum causam quidem habet in voluntate, scilicet caritatem, sed essentiam habet in intelJectu, cuius actus est recte iudicare, ut supra habitum est.

'.il

2.2 De ordine caritatis: charity and the hierarchy of objects liAs Augustine says, there are four a man must love: one is above him (namely God); another is himself; the third is close by him (namely his neighbour); and rhe fourth is beneath him (namely his own body)"." The four objects of charity raise the question as to how they

i4

Augustine in I De doctrina christiana 23 [PL 34,27), quoted by Aquinas in STh II-II 25.12.sc: "Quatuor sune diligenda, unum quod supra nos est", scilicet Deus; "alterum quod nos sumus; tertium quod iuxta nos est", scilicet proximus; "quartum quod infra nos est ", scilicet proprium corpus. The translation is by R. -Batten in Blackfriars vol. 34;

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are interrelated and whether there is a hierarchy of these objects which is of importance in moral life. The answer to this question is of great interest for the relation berween life on earth and 'life' after death: the order Aquinas examines in STh II-ll 26 reflects the hierarchy of elements which was studied in chapter ll. It has already been discussed that this hierarchy is of significance for issues with regard to life and death. The fact that there is an order, is easily discovered: ordo refers to prior and posterior and wherever a principle is found, one can discern an order. It has already been explained that God is the principle of caritas, since this love is founded in the communication of his beatitudo." Thus, God is the first in the ordo caritatis, the one who is to be loved more than anything else. God, however, although He is placed at the top of this hierarchy of objects, is distinguished from creation in a way which differs from the manner creatures are distinguished from one another, as it was explained in the first chapter of this study. When God differs differently, how then is his 'place' in the hierarchy of objects to be interpreted? In chapter I the formula prima causa et finis ultimus proved to be helpful in order to appreciate the way God is connected and distinguished from creation. With regard to charity, again God is the first cause and ultimate end. He is the first cause since life of grace is participation in His own divine life, the communication of which takes place on His initiative. He is the ultimate end, since charity has no other goal than the union with God, participation in His blessed life. In the first section of this chapter, the peculiarity of God as ultimate end was examined. The same 'logic' is at stake when God is considered as the first object of caritas. On the one hand, God is the highest of the objects, being the summum bonum; on the other, loving God pervades the love for created objects in such a way that they are loved because of their relation with God. According to the hierarchy of objects, then, a man ought to love God more than himself. Thomas explains this by pointing to the fact that our natural love is founded on God's communication of natural goods to us. Thus our natural love is drawn to the origin of all goodness, which it loves more than ourselves, who spring from that very origin." At different levels of creation Aquinas recognizes this

inclination of the part to love the whole to which it belongs more than itself. The first man was endowed with the same natural inclination, a state of affairs disturbed by Original Sin." In the state of corrupted nature, in which: we live, the will prefers the private good above the highest good, which (or rather: who) is God. The result of this is, that 'loving God more than oneself' is easily misunderstood as a disguised self-interest: God is loved above everything else, because union with Him effectuates the greatest happiness." Thomas makes clear that the love by which God is loved for the sake of Himself, is greater than the love by which He is loved for the enjoyment which is caused by union with Him. The former is the desinterested amor amicitiae, which concernS the infinite goodness of God for the sake of Himself; the latter is the self-interested amor concupiscentiae which is confined to the goodness in which is participated by the creature." This means that by charity man is not primarily interested in his own profit: one submits to God's will (cf. Mt 26,39: the passion of Christ is exemplary) however difficult and painful this might be. In fact - as the fact that caritas is based on the communicatio beatitudinis shows - by charity God is loved with God's love, The love for God is basically love of God. The 'centre of gravity' has shifted from oneself towards God.lOO Next to God, man ought to love himself more than anything else. Again, however, this love is qualified by the relationship with God.. Thus self-love according to caritas must be distinguished from natural self-love. The latter is the amor sui according to which each being wishes to maintain itself in his existence. This self-love is natural and not necessarily opposed to charity. It can be so, however, when one considers this self-preservation as ultimate end. Self-love according to caritas is based on love for God. One loves oneself from a new centre,

168

;

" "

On the order of charity d. J. Poner, 1989 and G. Mansini, 1995(a}. S11> 11·11 26.1.co. S11> 11·11 26.3.

~1

•

~7

100

STh I-II 109.3; Angels also love God more than themselves by natural inclination: S11> I 60.5. . This interpretation was put forward by H. Reiner, 1963, and was refuted by S. Pinckaers, 1963. For an evaluation of the discussion d. B. Bujo, 1984. In STh II-II 26.3.ag3 the argument is close to Reiner's positionj For an elaborate account of the relation between amor amicitiae and conc"piscentiae cf. G. Mansini, 1995[b]. STh II-II 263m: hoc quod aliquis velitfrui Dea, pmmet ad amorem quo Deus amatur amore concupiscentiae. Magis autem amamus Deum· amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae. quia maius est in Se bonum Dei quam panieipare possumus jruendo ipso. Et ideo simpliciter homo magis diligit Deum ex caritate quam seipsum. Cf. G. Mansini, 1985[a}, p. 26, to whom lowe this expression. Cf. also what has been said of spes in the preceding paragraph, p. 159ff.

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as a creature which reflects God's goodness insofar as one participates in

happiness is closer and a stronger reason for loving than enjoying such happiness as a kind of overflow (which is why we love our own body).1O' The view that the spiritual well-being of our neighbour is of greater value than our own corporal life confirms the primacy of vita gratiae in moral life. Considering the ordo caritatis (God - soul of oneself - soul of one's neighbour - body), one can recognize the order of creation which was worked out in chapter II (God - soul - body - world). Only the last element (world) is left out here, because only rational creatures have a capacity to share in God's life directly.!OS Although the hierarchy of the objects of charity might be equally simple as it is clear106 and although I consider it to be the 'backbone' of Aquinas' 'moral theology', living and acting according to this hierarchy is a matter of development and grace. The ultimate consequence of the primacy of spiritual well-being of one's neighbour above one's own body coincides with the perfection of moral behaviour. This becomes dear when attention is focused on the Evangelical Counsels.

that goodness. Charity comprises natural self-love: one loves oneself for the sake of God and in God.1O! From this perspective, the sinner does not really love himself. His self-love is based on a false estimation of what he is. The rational soul that which Saint Paul calls the interior man - is the principle part of man by which he distinguishes himself from other corporal animalUt. From this perspective, the corporal and sensitive dimension of man - the external man - is secundary. The sinner reverses the hierarchy of the two; the false appreciation of what he essentially is prevents him from really loving himself.!02 The reason for this primacy of the soul above the body is not the metaphysical consideration that ~ the soul is the stronger part, 'containing' the body and determining what human nature is, but the theological insight that according to the rational soul man is united with God. By their intellect and will human beings have a capacity for God (capacitas Del). Sharing in God's beatitude by life of grace renders an infinite value to the soul. Participation in God's life is more worthy than the soul in which this takes place. 1O' Whereas the soul participates directly in the life of God, the body does so only by an 'overflowing' (redundantia) of the beatitudo of the soul. On the basis of this consideration Thomas draws the radical theocentric conclusion that although self-love has priority over the love for one's neighbour - (the soul of) one's neighbour ought to be loved more than one's own body: the association with our neighbour in the full enjoyment of eternal 101 STh II-II 19.6.co: ArnOT ~utem sui tripliciter se potest habere ad caritatem. Uno enim modo contrariatur caritati, secundum scilicet quod aliquis in amore propii boni finem constituit. Alio vero modo in caritate includitUT. secundum qucd homo se propter Deum et in Deo diligit. Tertia modo a caritate quidem distinguitur, sed caritati non contrariatur... Cf. also 5Th II-II 25.4.co: Et sic inter cetera quae ex caritate diligit quasi ad Deum pertinentia, etiam seipsum ex caritate diligit. 102 STh IT.IT 25.7.co: non omnes aestimant se esse iii quod sunt. Principale enim in homine est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura semitiva et corporalis, quorum primum Aposto/us nominat "interiorem hominem ", secundum "exteriorum~, ut patet 2eo 4,16. Boni autem aestimant principale in seipsis rationaiem naturam, sive .interiorem homin~ unde secundum hoc aestimant se esse quod sunt. Mali autem aestimant principaie in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporal~ scilicet exteriorem hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt it! quod seipsos esse reputant. Boni autem, '/Jere cognoscentes seipsos, vere seipsos diligunt. On the 'interior man' d. also In Rom 7.4. 103 STh II-II 23.3.ra3. quoted in chapter II, footnote 60.

2.3 The Evangelical Counsels It has been shown that one can be endowed with caritas in various gradations. Participation in the life of God is a dynamic reality which is intrinsically directed at augmentation and growth. With regard to this process - which coincides with human life on earth - Thomas

104

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STh IT-II 26.5.co: ii/ud magis est ex cantate diJigendum quod habet pleniorem rationem diligibilis ex caritate, ut dictum est [STh lUI 26.2+4J Consociatio autem in plena participatione beatitudinis, quae est ratio diligendi proximum, est maior ratio diJigendi quam parricipatio beatitudinis per redundantiam, quae est ratio diligendi proprium corpus. Et ideo proximum, quantum ad salutem animae, magis debemus diligere quam proprium corpus,' ra2: corpus nostrum est propinquius animae nostrae quam proximus quantum ad constitutionem propriae naturae. Sed quantum ad participationem beatitudinis maior. est consociatio animae proximi ad animam nostram quam etiam corporis proprii. STh IT·II 25.3 . For the sake of completeness it must be stressed that this account of Aquinas' consideration de ordine carita tis is based on his discussion in the Summa Tbeologiae, leaving out the part on the hierarchy within neighbours (friends, enemies, relatives), by which the natural love is taken into account. Altqpugh this does not alter the essence of what has been said, it offers some complkations and nuances. Cf. G. Maruini 1995[.].

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distinguishes between commandments which are necessary to be obeyed in order to attain the ultimate end of eternal happiness and counsels which are not necessary but helpful so as to reach this end better and more easily. Aquinas considers this distinction to be in accordance with the New Law of Christ, which is a law of freedom. lO' The counsels, which are called Evangelical Counsels according to the tradition of the Church, are directed at the optimal human relationship with God. They comprise human life iri all its dimensions and .are meant to help man avoid everything which distracts from God. Aquinas distinguishes three Evangelical Counsels: Poverty (regarding bona exteriora), Chastiry (concerning one's corpus) and Obedience (respecting the voluntas). In these three one can recognize the three dimensions of man which were studied in chapte~ II: world - body - soul. In accordance with the hierarchy in which Aquinas places these three dimensions, the three Counsels display an increasing commitment. External goods are the least connected with us, being separated from our nature, and thus they should be the first to be left behind. After that, things which are, in a way, necessarily united with and adjacent to our nature should be abandoned: one's family or the pleasure and concern of having a spouse and children. lO' The dynamism of life with God, however, moves us even further than this. It is not enough to abandon external goods and those who are corporally united with us; in order to obtain perfect charity, one ought to leave, in a way, oneself behind. Thomas recognizes this in the view of pseudo-Dionysius, who teaches that divine love makes ecstatic: one is placed outside oneself, no longer

belonging to oneself, but to the one by whom one is loved. This is confirmed by the wo.rds of Saint Paul: "yet it is no longer I, but Christ living in me" (Ga 2,20) and "because you have died, and now the life you have is hidden with Christ in God." (Col 3,3)'" In Aquinas' discussion of the Evangelical Counsels one can discern tWO approaches. On the one hand the Counsels are considered as becoming increasingly more difficult: the possession of external goods, the different dimensions of family life and one's free will are so intimately linked with the appetitive side of human nature, that it is extremely hard and difficult to choose for this way of perfection. The hardest of all is to give up the free decision of one's own will, because apart from death, man naturally flees from slavery more than from anything else."O Thus life according to the Evangelical Counsels is regarded as a sacrifice, or more precisely: as a burnt-offering, because the entire human being is dedicated to God, leaving nothing behind.!ll On the other hand, religious life is considered as a sign as well as an effect of perfection."' The view of pseudo-Dionysius, quoted above, shows, that it is congruent to the dynamism of love that the entire natural life is transformed and perfected. It has been shown that caritas is characterised by giving human life a new centre: the life of God. Even the love for oneself is determined and transformed by the love for God.

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STh I-IT t08A.co: Rfjpondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter consilium et praeceptum, quod praeceptum importat necessitatem consilium autem in optione ponitur eius qui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quae est lex libertatis, supra praecepta sunt addita cansi/ia: non autem in veter; lege, quae erat lex seroitutis. Oportet igitur

103

quod praecepta novae legis intelligantur esse data de his quae sunt necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis, in quem lex nova immediate introducit. Camilia vera aportet esse de iIlis per quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum. Cf. also STh I 19.12, where the difference between both categories is introduced; Cf. J. van den Eijnden, 1994, p. 84-86, who bases his account on Quodl 4 and 5, where Aquinas .is more precise than in earlier works. De perf 9 [Leon: 11]: Prius enim relinquenda occurrunt quae minus nobis coniuneta existu:nt,' unde in primo loco occUTTil ad perfectionem tendentibus exttrior4 bona rel£nquere, quae 4 nostra natura< sunt separata. Post haec vero relinquenda occurrunt'ea quae nobis naturae communione et affinitatis cuiusque necessitate coniunguntur. Unde Dominus dicit Lk 14,26: "Si quis venerit ad me, et non odit patrem suum et matrem et uxorem et foios et Fratre! et sorores, non potest meus esse discipulus".

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De perf 11 [Leon: 3]: Non solum autem necessarium est ad perfeclionem cantatlS consequendam qupd homo exteriora abiiciat, sed etiam quodammodo se ipsum dereJinquat. Dicit enim Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, quod divinus amor est extasim fadem, id est hominem extra seipsum ponem, non sinens hominem sui ipsius esse, sed eius quod amatur. Cuius rei exemplum in se ipso demonstravit ApOSIOlus dicens Ga 2j20: "Vivo ego iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus", quasi suam vitam non suam aestimans, sed Christi; quia quod proprium sibi erat contemnens, totus Christo inhaerebat. Hoc etiam in quibusdam esse completum ostendit, cum dicit Col 3.3: "Mortu; estis, et vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo". De perf 11 [Leon: ·u 4]: quanto aliquid magis naturaliter amatur, tanto perfoctius contemnitur propter Christurn. Nihil enim est homini amabilius tibertate propriae voluntatis; per hane enim homo est aJiorum dominus, per hane aliis uti vel frui potest, per hane etiam S#is actibus dominatur. Unde sicut homo dimittens divitias vel personas eoniunet4S. eas abnegat,' ita deserens propriae voluntatis arbitriurrt, per quod ipse sui dominus est, se ipsum abnegaTe invenitur. Nihilque est qS«Jd homo naturali affectu magis refugiat quam servitutem,' unde et nihil posset homo pro alio amp/ius impendere, post hoc quod se ipsum in mortem pro eo tradere4 quam quod se servituti eius subiugaret. Cf. also De perf 12 and S17> n·n 186.8. De perf 12; Cf. J. van den Eijnden, 1994, p. 156·169. Cf. J van den Eijnden, 1994, p. 144-148.

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Similarly, life according to the Evangelical Counsels shows how God perfects a human life. That the motif of sequela Christi is found here, is obvious. lll The first approach can be understood as departing from natural life; the second as taking life of grace as a point of departure. It is important to take both perspectives into account; moreover, they complement each other. Aquinas keeps them well balanced, for one·sidedness misrepresents reality. When putting too much stress on the first perspective, the ardour and joy of charity by which one is motivated, might be forgotten. By emphasizing the dynamism of vita gratiae too much, one might overlook the effort and labour which is necessary in order to cultivate one's relationship with God up to perfection. Some people organise their entire life accQrding to the Evangelical Counsels and devote their life explicitly to the relationship with God. Such a life (vita in the third sense: one's main activity, that at which one's entire life is directed) is called vita religiosa.''' The religious life is entered by taking vows (vota). Thomas considers this life to be a life in the state of perfection, since it is immediately directed at the ultimate end of human life: life with God. Life according to the three Evangelical Counsels is directed at one's own spiritual perfection. More perfect than this, however, is the life of those who dedicate their existence to the well·being of their neighbour: they display not only the love for God, but also the love for one's neighbour, inspired by the love for God. Thomas has an interesting passage on the connection between the love for God aod the love for one's neighbour. Those who have little or no charity are easily separated from the contemplation of God for the sake of earthly matters. Others, endowed with charity, enjoy divine contemplation to such a degree that they do not wan.t to stop doing it, even when they should· out of divine obedience· devote themselves to the well·being of their neighbour. The highest degree of charity, however, is of those who - despite the pleasure they experience in the contemplation of God • turn to the salvation of their neighbour. Aquinas recognizes this in the attitude of Saint Paul as is expressed in

Rm 9,3 and Ph 1,23·24.'15 Thus, the service to one's neighbour is motivated by the relationship with God, or, putting it more precisely, the relationship with God is perfect to such a degree that it 'overflows' to the service of one's neighbour. For this reason, Aquinas considers the vita activa of the religious orders which are devoted to the spiritual salvation of humankind, to be more perfect than the vita contemplativa of those who are solely committed to prayer.'" This way of life, dedicated to preaching and teaching, was that of Thomas' own religious order and he saw it as an imitatiQn of the lifestyle which Christ chose."' In chapter II, 2.3.2 (p. 119) the exemplary character of Christ's life and actions was discussed, an exemplarity which culminates in His violent passio!l and death on the cross. In this He displayed a degree of moral perfection which outreaches that of the Evangelical Counsels. By giving up corporal life for the sake of spiritual life He revealed in a

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Cf. A. Moue, 1987, p. 450-452.

114

s11) n~n 186.1.ra2: si aliquis totam vitllm suam divino se'fVitio deputet, tota vita sua

ad

re/igionem pertinebit. Et secundum hoc, ex vita religiosa quam ducunt, religiosi dicuntur qui sum in statu perfoctionis.

115 De caT 11.ra6: After having compared the amicitia honesti and delectabilis, Aquinas applies result to charity. Hos igitur tres gradus considerare possumus in caritate. Deus autem maxime propter seipsum est diligendus. Sum enim quidam qui libenter, vel sine Tnag#a molestia, separantur a vacatione divinae contemp/ationis, ut terrenis negotiis implicentur, et in his vel nihil vel modicum ,aritatis apparet. Quidam verum in tantum delectantur in vacatione divinae ,onrempiationis, quod eam deserere nolunt, etiam ut divinis obsequiis mancipentur ad salutem proximorum. Quidam vero ad tantum culmen ,mtatis ascendunt, quod etiam di'Vinam contemplationem, !icet in ea maxima delectentur, praetermittunt, ut Deo serviant in salutem proximorum; el haec p~dio in Paulo apparel, qui dicebat Rm 9,3: "Optabam ego ipse anathema", id est separatus, "esse a Christo pro Jratribus meis"; et Ph 1,23·24: "desiderium habens dissolv4 et esse cum Christo; permanere autem in ,arne necessarium propter vos". 116 'STh II-II 182.2.co: ex suo genere ,ontempiativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa f. ..j Potest tamen contingere qwxJ aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus meretur quam alius in operibus vitae ,ontemplativae, puta si propter abundantiam divini amaris, ut eius voluntas impleatur propter ipsius gloriam, interdum sustinet a duicedine divinae contemplationis ad tempus separari. Sicut ApoSlolus dicebat, Rm 9,3: "Optabam ego ipse anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis."; STh II-II 188.6.co: Sicut enim maius est illuminare quam lucere so/urn, ita maius est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum coneemplari... Sic ergo summum gradum in religionibus tenent quae ordinantur ad docendum et praedicandum. Quae et propinquissimae sunt perfectioni episcoporum ... Secundum autem gradum tenent iIlae quae ordinantur ad contemplationem. Tertius est earum quae occupantur circa exteriores actiones. 117 STh ill 4O.1.ra2: vita contemplativa simpliciter est melior quam activa quae occupatur circa corporales actus, sed vita activa secundum quam aliquis praedicando et docendo contemplata aliis tradit, est p~ctior quam vita quae solum contemplatur, quia talis vita praesupponit abumlantiam contemplationis. Et ideo Christus talem vitam eligit. Cf. also M.·D. Chenu, 1974, p. 3+43.

me

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paradox what human life is really about. To this action of highest moral perfection, the following paragraph is dedicated.

danger - is connected with the intellect. In this way the corporal-sensitive impulse is interpreted within a larger framework. Thus a coherence of the different parts of the soul emerges; a coherence which Thomas works out in detail in STh II. At the level of the passiones, courage (audacia) is connected with fear and hope."2 At the level of virtues one can equally find a connection between the different faculties. The virtue of prudentia is important in order to discern whether one should flee, endure or aggress the danger which menaces. The virtue of hope is connected with regard to the support of God in whom one has confidence.!23 Fides is intimately linked with martyrdom, since the martyr testifies to the invisible truth of Christ by despising the greatest visible good: his corporal life.'" The theological virtue of charity is intimately linked with martyrdom, qualifying the action of fortitudo in terms of relationship with God. Thomas discusses the relation between fortitude and caritas explicitly in a text where he examines whether martyrdom is an act of highest perfection. 125 He argues that the act of bravely undergoing one's death

2.4 Martyrdom

Of all good things, people naturally cling more to their life than to anything else. Of all corporal evils, death is feared the most because it deprives one of all natural goods.!18 Therefore, a human being who despises his life for the sake of God, is called most perfect in his love for God.'" From the first followers of Christ onwards, this deed of highest perfection is known as martyrdom."° Aquinas links martyrdom with the virtue of fortitudo and caritas. Because it shows how love for God transforms the attitude towards one's own life and death, we will examine this action of highest moral perfection in detail. In Aquinas' account of moral life, fortitudo is the cardinal virtue which concerns fear of death. 121 It is the perfection of a sensitive part of the soul which human beings share with animals: the vis irascibilis. This is the faculty which' is tied up with the human body and which comprises fear (timor), despair (desperatio), hope (spes), boldness (audacia) and anger (ira). As we -have explained before, the vis irascibilis is concerned with the approach towards the good insofar as it is difficult to attain (bonum secundum arduum). Thus the fear of death is deeply rooted in human nature: as deep as the passiones animae by which the corporal dimension of man is directly connected with the sensitive part of the soul. In animals the passiones are recognized as instincts, directed at self-preservation. In the human soul they are coloured by the intellectual part of the soul. Although the sensitive part is not perfectly subject to the control of the rational part - as was the case before the Fall of man - the passiones are qualified and controlled by intellect and will. In the human soul the aestimatio - by which animals recognize a 5Th II~II 123.4.00: Mttxime autem terribile inter omnia corporalia mala est moTS, quae tollit omnia corporalia bona. m De Perf 11 [Leon: 100]: Hoc autem perfectissimum ideo diximus, quia martyres illud propter Deum contemnunt, scilicet propriam vi~ propter quam omnia temporalia quaerumur, et cuius conservatio, etiam cum omnium aliorum amissione, omnibus diu praefertUT. Magis enim homo vult et divitias perdere et arnicos, adhuc autem corporis infirmitati succumbere et in servitutem redig;' quam vita privari. 120 For minyrdom in the first centuries, d. Th. Baumeister. 1983. For the same in the history of theology and Aquinas' view, cf. R. HOOde, 1928. 121 S1b II.II 123.4.co.

111'

'" 5Th I-II 45.2-3. '" 5Th 11·11 123.3.ag3/ra3. t2~ STh IT-II 124.4.co: martyr dicitur quasi testis fidei christianae, per quam nobis visibilia pro invisibilibus contemnenda proponuntur, ut dicitur Reb 11. Ad martyrium ergo pertinet ut homo testificetur fidem. se opere ostendens cuncta praesentia contemnere, ut ad [utura et ad invisibilia bona perueniat. Quandiu autem homini remanet vita corporalis, nondum opere· se ostendit temporalia cuncta despicere: consueverunt enim homines et consanguineos et omnia bona possessa contemnere, et etlam dolores corporis pati, ut vit4m conservent. Unde et Satan contra Job irniuxit (Jb 2,4): "Pelfem pro pelle: et cuncta quae habet home, dabit pro anima sua", idest, pro vita corporali. Et ideo ad perfectam rationem martyrii requiritur quod aliquis mortem sustineat propter Christum. 125 STh II-IT 124.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo actu virtutis dupJiciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, s«undum speciem ipsius actus) prout comparatur ad virtutem proxime elicientem ipsum. Et sic non potest esse quod martyrium) quod consistit in debita tolerantia mortis) sit peifectissimus inter 'Uirtutis actus. Quia tolerare mortem non est laudabile secundum se, sed solum SeCundum quod ordinatur ad aliquod bonum quod consistit in actu virtutis, puta ad fidem et dilectionem Dei. Unde ule actus virtutis, cum sit finis, melior est. Alia modo potest considerari actus virtutis secundum quod comparatur ad primum motivUtn, quod est amor caritatis. Et ex hac parte praecipue aliquis actus habet quod ad peifectionem 'Uieae pmineat, quia, ut Apostolus dicit, Col 3)14, "carita! est vinculum peifectionis". Martyrium autem, inter omnes actus 'Uiytuosos, maxime demonstrat perfectianem caritatis. Quia tanto magis ostenditur aliquis aliquam rem arnare, quanto pro ea rem magis amatam contemnit, et rem magis odiosam eligit pati. Manij'estum est autem quod inter omnia alia bona praesenti! vitae, maxime amat homo ipsam vi~ et e contrario maxime odit ipsam mortem, et praecipue cum

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is not yet an act of moral perfection. Stunt men are brave, but when they die on the filmset their death is not regarded as a matter of moral perfection. This perfection depends, among other factors, on the object for the sake of which one is willing to die. When someone dies out of love for God, the highest good, this can be seen as an" action of moral perfection. Yet, not every act of fortitude motivated by charity is an act of moral perfection according to Aquinas. We have seen that one is obliged to love the spiritual well-being of one's neighbour more than one's own body. Thus, in cases of emergency when a neighbour is threatened with regard to his faith (vita spiritualislgratiae) - viz. when a non-believer seduces him - one is obliged to risk one's life (vita corporalis). Only risking one's life in favour of the welfare of one's neighbour, apart from cases of direct emergency, pertain:s to the perfection of the Evangelical

spiritual joy.12? Thus Aristotle says that it is enough for the brave man to lack sorrow. To enjoy the act cannot be asked. Nevertheless, God may strengthen the soul of the brave man who adheres more to God than to his own life: love for God is so strong that one is gtanted to undergo, readily and delightfully, that which is most feared in this life. m In chapter II, 1.3.1 (p. 87) it was explained that life of grace is an accidental perfection of the soul. Life of grace qualifies a substance, the human soul, which is the form of the human body. Human nature is composed of body 'and soul; natural life of man consists in a soul giving life to a body. When the body is separated from the soul, natural life ends and Aquinas speaks of natural death. The corrupting corpse cannot be called a human being, as little as the separated soul can so be called. Although the body (materia) is the weaker part, it is indispensable for the functioning of the human soul: for natural knowledge the latter is dependent on the information provided by the senses, which are corporal. Now, when corporal life is sacrificed for the sake of life of grace, natural life of man is sacrificed. The paradox then consists in the fact that the substance (natural life, dependent on the integrity of corporal life) is sacrificed for the sake of the accident (life of grace), and precisely this action reveaIs what natural life (including corporal life) is all about. Yet this is not unreasonable: life of grace is of infinitely greater value than natural life, as was shown in the same paragraph of chapter II. Vita gratiae is a kind of participation in God's life. When natural life is given up for the sake of the life of grace, all confidence is placed in God's life. The end of natural life implies the end of the status merendi, the state in which man develops his relationship with God through moral action. The separated soul is entirely dependent on God. Thus, this act of faith, hope and charity is ultimately eschatological and

Counsel. 126

It is characteristic for the virtues that they make one act prompte, /aciliter et delectabiliter. In the case of martyrdom Aquinas asks whether the brave man delights in his act. Thomas is quite realistic here and does not hIde the fact that corporal afflictions are more manifest than

doloribus corporalium tormentorum, quorum metu etiam bruta animalia "a maximis voluptatibus absterrentur", ut Augustinus dicit, in libra Octoginta trium quaest [q. 36, PL 40,25]. Et secundum hoc patet quod martyrium inter cetero! actus humanos est perftctior secundum suum genus, quasi m4ximae caritatis signum, secundum illud In 15,13: "Maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis". 126 De pe:rf 16 [Leon: 88]: Aliud autem consideratUT in anima secundum quod viviftcat corpus et est primipium vitae humanae; et secundum hoc pro Jratribus animam ponere debemus: plus enim debemus proximum duigere quam corpora nostra. Unde vitam corporalem pro salute spiritual; proximorum ponere convenit, et cadit sub necessitate praecepti in necessitatis articulo: puta si aliquis videret aliquem ab injideJibus seduci, deberet se mortis periculo exponere ut eum a seductione liberaret. Sed ut aliquis extra hos necessitatis casus pro salute aliorum mortis periculis se exponat, pertinet ad peifectwnem iustitiae vel ad perfectionem consilii,' cuius exemplum ab Apostolo accipere possumus... Aquinas' view that martyrdom pertains to the perlection of the Evangelical . Counsels, does not entail that it is seen as an other Counsel. Manyrdom outreaches the perfection of those who live according to the Counsels, for natural corporalli£e itself is offered, above which nothing else can be given. There is, however a congruity with obedience which is also out of love, comprising everything one has and is. The big difference with the Evangelical Counsels, however, is that one cannot commit oneself to martyrdom by a V9W (votum). Aquinas speaks of 'counsel' here so as to bring to the fore that it is an action which does not pertain to the commandments. Cf. STh I-II 108.4 and E. Dublanchy, 1938, p. 1176-1182.

127

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STh II-II 123.8.m3. 5Th I 95.4.ra2: promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine caritatisj Cf. also Quod! 4.10.1 where the question is posed whether one can be a martyr without perfect charity. In this a.nicle, which is contemporary to the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas assesses charity as having more impact: ojJerre se martyrw, vel eti4m martyrium sufferre, potest /acere rwn solum caritas perfec~ sed etiam imperfec~ et quod plus est, etiam ille qui caret earitate, secundum llIud Apostol; lCo 13,1: 'si !radidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habeam nihil mihi pradest. " Sed cantas perfecta hoc facit prompte et deJectabiliter, sfcut patet de Laurentio et Vincentia, qui in tormentis hilaritatem ostenderunt. Hoc autem non potest facere caritas imperfecta., vel etiam iIle qui caritate caret.

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the greatest expression of love for and confidence in God that can be thought of. In the action of the martyr the highest degree of charity (ph 1,23 and 2Co 5,4-8) is directly related to the greatest sign of love one can exhibit for one's neighbour 15,13}.'" This action of highest perfection is to be recognized as the work of the Spirit: an invisible mission or new inhabitation in the human sou!.'" By giving up one's corporal life in this manner, one directly enters the life of God. It is the most perfect way of imitating Christ and it makes one share directly in the effects of his passion as is made clear by the fact that martyrdom is considered as baptismus sanguinis.l3l

are examined so as to determine more precisely the proportion between vita naturalis (vita animae et corporis), vita gratiae and vita gloriae. By far the largest part of this section is dedicated to the moral evaluation of the killing of human beings, as takes place within the social context of a community and as is discussed by Aquinas within the framework of the cardinal virtue of iustitia (3.1). First, the killing of guilty people is studied, in order to introduce the general criteria which Thomas adopts in this matter (3.1.1). Secondly, an attempt is made to make explicit the theological foundation of the general principles which Aquinas offers. This is established by examining his view on the killing of heretics (3.1.2). Subsequently, by focusing on Aquinas' attitude towards the killing of innocent people, it is shown how the theological foundation found in 3.1.2 also underlies the general criteria introduced in the first paragraph (3.1.3). After this, the relation between killing and Christian perfection is studied, providing a link between the previous section and this one (3.1.4). The section is concluded with an analysis of the opposite of the perfect attitude towards death which is shown by the martyr: the killing of oneself (3.1.5). Having clarified these moral issues in their social context and their relation with life with God (vita gratiae), Aquinas' interpretation of Genesis 22 is examined. According to this interpretation God is seen as the (only) one who is justified to kill innocent people. This enables us to test our view according to which in Aquinas' theology, life with God is the core and ultimate criterion of human life on earth (3.2).

an

Summarizing this second section, it has been shown that vita gratiae implies a dynamism by which thp appreciation of and attitude towards vita naturalis is changed. Firstly, we demonstrated how this dynamism unfolds itself within the three theological virtues • faith,' hope and charity . and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, by which the virtues are perfected. After that, we focused on the 'backbone' of Aquinas' moral theology: the hierarchy of objects of charity which reflects the hierarchy of elements examined in the preceding chapter. Thus it was shown how moral life is organised from the perspective of the relationship with God, the centre of love shifting from oneself to God. In accordance with the dynamism of the Holy Spirit· leading man towards perfection by endowing him with charity . the state of perfection was examined. Again the hierarchy of 'world . body· soul' was recognized, together with a movement towards the summit of perfection: martyrdom. We studied this last issue in order to bring to light how the working of the Spirit transforms natural life in all its dimensions and how it roots the primacy of vita gratiae by which one participates in God's life. 3. Living with God and dealing with life and death In the preceding section we examined how developments in vita gratiae bring about shifts in the appreciation of vita and mars corporalis. In this third section attention is focused on moral action with regard to life and death. Aquinas' discussions about the killing of human beings

Cf. In II Cor 5.2. uo S1b I 43.6.ra2i Cf. chapter TI, 2.1, p. 103 and chapter 1,2.3.2, p. 57. m Cf. chapter II, 3.3, p. 136.

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3.1 The social order and killing people The first thing of importance with regard to the interpretation of Aquinas' view on the killing of people is the place in the Summa 7beologiae where he discusses the subject. Homicidium 132 is discussed within the framework, of the cardinal virtue iustitia. More precisely:

112

Aquinas uses differeJlt words for 'killing' in this anicle. The most general is occisio which is the killing of a living substance (plant, animal or human being). Homicidium refers to the killing of a human being. As verbs occidere and interficere are used. Although occisio seems to be more neutral than homicidium (d. STh IMII lOO.8.ra3: nee talis occisio est homicidium, quod praecepto DecaJogi prohibetur) it is also used in the neutral meaning of 'killing'. In this section I prefer the term 'killing' and I sometimes use the term 'homicide' according to its neutral meaning in English of 'killing'. I consider 'murder' and 'manslaughter' too far qualified by legal ovenones.

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within the context of the vices which regard involuntary commutation. Of these vices, homicide is considered as the evil by which a fellow human being is harmed the most.''' Thus a significant perspective is determined, even before Aquinas begins discussing the subject. From the outset homicide is considered as an eviL Apart from the fact that it is an evil according to the natural order (privatio vitae), killing is also qualified as moral evil: it is a disturbance of the equality of justice that should be among human beings. This means that killing can never be good as such. Thus, Aquinas' moral inquiry on this subject starts from the clear view that killing is a double evil. What remains to be examined can be no other question than whether it is, on certain occasions, for some people, legitimate (Jicitum) to subject fellow human beings to this eviL STh II-II 64 (de bomicidio) consists of eight articles, and is structured according to a specific principle: after an introductory article which deals with the question whether it is legitimate to kill any living creature at all (a.l), homicide is considered insofar as it is foreseen and intended (a.2-6); foreseen but not intended (a.7}; and neither foreseen nor intended (a.8}.'34 In the first article, Aquinas immediately refers to the order of creatures which was examined in the second chapter of this study. The guiding thought here is the position of Augustine which is quoted in the sed contra: "You shall not kill" (Ex 20,13) does not refer to plants which have no feeling, neither to animals which are not associated with uS by reason. So the fifth commandment can only refer to human beings.'" In his response Thomas works out this thought according to the principle that imperfect beings are created to be at the service of more perfect creatures. Thus, plants can be used as food for animals, and animals as well as plants can be used as food for human

beings. Apart from Aristotle (I PoUt 5 and 7), this view is endorsed by Gn 1,29 and Gn 9,3.'36 The central position of man in the universe again emerges when the question is answered whether the fifth commandment concerns all living creatures. The principle imperJectum ordinatur ad perfecrum is used in order to argue that the Biblical prohibition to kill refers to human beings. In the next article, however, the same principle is used in order to formulate an exception to this general rule: the sinner.

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m 5Th II-II 64.prol: Deinde considerandum est de 'Uitiis oppositis commutativae justitiae. Et primo considerandum est de pe"4tis quae committuntur circa involuntarias commutationes... et pritm>, de homicidio, per quod maxime nocetur proximo; On the relation between homicide and the social order cf. also J. Porrer, 1990, p. 124-154. 1)4 Here I agree with J. Rojas, 1995, p. 112 who refers to V. Alonso, 1937, p. 217. 'The latter explains that the principle of organisation is introduced in 5Th I-II 73.8, where Aquinas deals with the question whether the seriousness pf sin is augmented to the .-degree that the damage done is greater. 13S sTh II-II 64.1.sc: Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I De Civitate Dei 20 {PL 41,35]: ·Cum audimus Won occides~ non accipimus hoc dictum esse de fructetis, quia nullus eis est sensus. nec de irrationalibus animaJibus. quia nulla ncbis ratione sociantur. Restat ergo ut de homine intelligamus quod dictum est Won occides~. "

3.1.1 Killing guilty people After having listed three obiectiones against and one in favor of the legitimacy of killing a sinner, Aquinas begins the corpus of STh II-II 64.2 by repeating that animals are allowed to be killed by human beings, since the imperfect is ordered at the perfect. Subsequently he uses the latter principle to elucidate that the part is ordered at the whole. Thomas gives the example of the corruptive limb which is cut off in order to save the body. Then he reaches his conclusion in tWO steps: a single person is related to the entire community as is the part to the whole. Therefore, when a person is a danger to the community, and corrupts it because of a certain sin, it is praiseworthy and healthful that he is killed, so that the common good is preserved.'"

1'6

U1

Aquinas interprets qn 9) in the sense that only after the Flood man began to use animals as food: 5Th I-ll 102.6.ra2. STh II-II 64.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est {a.l~ licitum est occidere animalia bruta inquantum ordinantur ad hominum mum, sicut imperfictum ordinatur ad perfectum. Omnis pars ordinatur ad totum ut'imperficmm ad perfectum. Et ideo omnis pars naturaJiter est propter totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si saluti totius corporis humani expediat praecisio aJicuius membri, puta cum est putridum vel corruptivum aJiorurn, laudabiJiter et saJubrieer abscinditur. Qu4eJibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad totam communitatem skut pars ad totum. Et ideo si aliquis homo sit periculosus communitati corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter (Jccidituy. ut bonum commune conservetur. "Modicum" enim "Jermentum totam massam corrumpit", ut dicitur lCo 5.6. The theologians and canonists of the tweJ.#h and thirteenth century practically unanimously agreed upon the legitimacy of me, death penalty when imposed by public authority. Discussion on the subject did no more than clarify its circumstances or requirements Rojas. 1995, p. 99; S. Sullivan, 1976, p. 14-17). Aquinas did not differ from his contempora· ries in this respect. Because of his great influence in later centuries, however, he has become known as one of the authorities endorsing the view that capital punishment is legitimate (N. Blazquez, 1983 and 1985).

a.

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A first criterion for the exceptional legitimacy of homicide is formulated: the person who is executed is not innocent but a sinner (peccator) and more precisely: a sinner who is a danger to the community. Thus homicide is regarded as a kind of 'self·defense' of the community. Sinners who are no danger to the community - no matter how great their sin might be - should be granted time for penance, like . bd . f or converSIOn. . 138 God also gives a peop Ie t.h e opportUnity . The fact that the single person is compared to the commumty as imperfect to perfect, does not imply that the former is of less value than the latter. In fact there is a reciprocity between both parties. On the one hand the individual person cannot live apart from the community, as the limb cannot live apart from the body; thus, by corrupting the community, the sinner is a danger to the basis of his own life!" On the other hand, the community cannot exist without individual persons: it consists of individual members, as the body consists of limbs; thus the well·being of individuals . who are constitutive for the community . deserves to be protected. This primacy of the innocent individual as constitutive for the community is explicitly formulated as a criterion by Aquinas. In STh II·II 64.2.ral Thomas reacts on the Glosse on the parable in Mt 13,24·30 according to which it is seems that it is not permitted to kill sinners ('to root out darnel'). Thomas explains that the parable refers to the situation in which the killing of sinners would endanger good people. The well·being of individual innocent people emerges as a criterion by which the bonum commune is measured. We will recur to this in 3.1.3 of this section (p. 193). A following criterion, also connected with the common good, is worked out in STh II·II 64.3 where the question is examined whether it is legitimate that sinners are killed by private persons. Extending the comparison with the limb and the body, Thomas argues that as the doctor· to whom the care of the entire body is entrusted· is allowed to cut off the corrupting limb, likewise the killing of the dangerous sinner

is only legitimate when it is done by the public authority charged with the care for the common good. In this criterion the competence of the public authority is suggested as an indispensable condition ensuring that the correct decision is made. This is explicitly formulated in ra2. But also a different motif can be detected, which emerges in full colour in STh II-II 64.7 where Aquinas deals with the question as to whether a person is allowed to kill someone out of self·defense. The argument in this article comes down to the principle that apart from the intention that must be good, the means which are chosen should be proportionable to the end. When this is applied to homicide, there is a fundamental difference between the self-defense of the community and that of the private person. Both are obliged to use as little violence as possible. In the case of self-defense of the private person, the intention should be to save one's own life. The appropriate means which is chosen, is (moderate) corporal violence. When this action of self·defense results in the death of the agressor, this is an explicitly unintended (unlucky) side·effect of the action of self-defense. The person who causes the death of the agressor is not to be blamed, lest he used more violence than necessary, motivated by an inordinate desire. When the self·defense of the community is considered, the intentionality becomes more complicated. At the level of the community, the rule that the means should be proportionable to the end, means that the death penalty should only be used as a last resort in order to defend the common good. The community ought to intend to save the life of the sinner, so as to grant him time for repentance, unless he is a direct danger to the life of innocent people. When the latter is the case, he is legitemately put to death by a servant of the public authority. The direct end of the servant's action is the execution of the sinner. His intention is legitimately . to kill the internal agressor of the community, an end subordiated to that of the self·defense of the community. Again, the means which is chosen should be proportionable to the goal which is intended. Again the action should not be motivated by private inordi· nate desire, but should promote the common good.'" The position of

184

STh II-II 64.2.ra2: Deus, secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, quandoque statim peccatQres occidit, ad liberationem bonorum,' quandoque autem eis poenitendi tempus ,oncedit; secundum quod ipse nov;t suis electis expedire. Et hoc etiam humana iustitia imitatw pro posse, il/os enim qui sunt perniciosi in alios, occidit,' eos 'Vera qui peccant aliis graviter non nQcentes, ad poenitentiam reservat. '" On this point I disagree with the analysis of N. BI""!uez, 1983 and 1985. Although I share his passionate plea for the abolition of capital punishment I think that he misinterprets Aquinas' comparison and underestimates the importance of the community for the private person.

138

140

STh II-IT 64.7.co: nihil pYohibet unius actus esse duos eJfectus, quorum alter solum sit in intentiom; alius vera sit pratter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per accidens, ut ex supradictis patet [STh [·ll 721]. Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest, unus quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis. Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae,

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the servant of the public authority is complex. He is obliged to carry out what his superior tells him, unless this contains a manifest injustice. HI The fact that the decision whether a sinner is a danger to the community is made by the public authority, does not imply that the common good is entirely at the mercy of the persons that represent the public authority. When the public authority .does not serve the c0llll'?0~ but the private good of those In power - as In the case of a tyrant - It IS legitimate to defend oneself.'" Thus again the well-being of innocent people emerges as the ultimate criterion for the legitimacy of violence. The criteria which are relevant for the exceptional legitimacy of homicide - and which we have gathered in our reading of SIb II-II 64 are the same as Thomas formula5es in SIb II-II 40, where he discusses the question whether waging war is always a sin.'" Here the context in the Summa is also one of vices: bellum is regarded as a sin of external

deeds which is opposed to one of the effects of caritas, viz. peace (pax)"'" Again the collective use of violence is regarded as evil and again criteria are formulated according to which this evil is legitimate. In the first place, Aquinas requires the authority of the ruler who is charged with the care of the common good. As in the case of homicide a private person is not allowed to wage war. In the second place a just cause is required: war is not waged against innocent people, but against those who deserve it because they are guilty of having commited evil. In the third place, the intention of those involved in a war should be right: good has to be promoted and evil avoided. Aquinas attributes so much importance to this criterion that a vicious intention can render a just war illicit. 1+S Resuming the line of thought so far and considering homicide in comparison to war and the killing of a tyrant, a pattern emerges, according to which the criterion is the well-being of innocent people. As community they are allowed to defend themselves inwards (against the corrupting and dangerous member), outwards· (against the external agressor) and 'upwards' (against the tyrant). In fact, Aquinas states that the community is even obliged to defend itself in order to prevent not only the killing of many innocent people but also numerous temporal and spiritual evils. Abstaining from warfare in case of necessity is tempting God.!46

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non habet rationem illiciti: cum hoc sit cui/ihet ruttwale quod se conservet in esse quantum potest. Potest tamen aliquis actus ex: bona intentione prO'lJeniens il/icitus reddi si non #: proportionatus fini. Et ideo si aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur mawri violentia quam oporteat, erie illicitum. Si vera moderate violentia repeJJat, erit !idta defensio, nam secundum iura [Deer. Greg. IX 5.12.18J "vim vi repellere licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae.· Nee est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelae praetermittat ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere quam vitae aJienae. Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patetj illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum ,defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicum auctoritatem, qu~ intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, re/ert hoc ad publicarn bonum, ut patee in muite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones. Quamvis et isti etiam peccent si privata libidine 11U)veantur. On the history of interpretation of this anicle d. J. Rojas, 1995. 141 STh 11-11 64.6.ra3. ,n STh 1I.1I 42.2.ra3; In II Sent 44.2.2.ra5: De reg prine 1.7 and 11. Cf. also F. de Gri;s. 1974, p. 28()'287. 14) Aquinas himself suggests that war and homicide can be compared to each other. Cf. STb II-II 40.1.00: Et sieut lkite defendunt eam materiali gladio contra interiores quidem perturbatores, dum male/actores puniunt (..J ita etiam gladia bellico ad eos pertinet rempublicam tueri ab exteriarihus hostibus. War concerns the combat of a community against an external agressor. Nevertheless, the word is used in a wider meaning for private fights, d. STh ll-ll 123.5.co: in particular; impugnatione, quae communi, nomine bellum did potest.

Cf. 5Th II-l1 37.prol: Deinde considerandum est de peccatis quae opponuntur paci. Et primo. de discordia, quae est in corde; sea4ndo, de contentione, quae est in are,' tertio de his quae pertinent ad opus. scilicet. de schismate. rixa et bello. m STh 1I·1I 40.1.eo: RespondeD dicendum quod ad hoc ·quod aJiquad bellum sit iust_ tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, auctoritas principis, cuius mandato bellum est gerendum. Non enim pertinet ad personam privatam bellum movere... Cum autem cura rei publi· cae commissa sit principibus, ad eos pertinet rem pub/icam civitatis vel regni seu provinciae sibi subditae tueri... Secunda, requiritur causa iusta, ut scilicet illi qui impugnantur propter a/iquam culpam impugnationem mereantur... Tertio, requiritur ut sit intentio bellantium rec~ qua scilicet intenditur vel ut bonum promoveatur, vel ut malum vitetur... Potest autem contingere quod etiam si sit legitima auctoritas indicentis bellum et causa iusta,_ nihilominus propter pravam intentionem belJum reddatur ut illicitum. A founh criterion, that the innocent people may not be endangered is not mentioned. Presumably because in the case of war out of self-defense the innocent people are already endangered. H6 STh l1.n 40.4.co, where the question is put forward as to whether one is allowed to wage war on days of feast: Multo autem magis est conservanda salus rei publicae, per quam impediuntur occisiones plurimorum, et innumera mala et temporalia et spiritualia, quam sa/us corpora/is unius hominis. Et ideo pro tuitione reipuhlica fuielium licitum est

Hi

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Defending one's life is a natural reaction which can be found in all living creatures. The question for what sake the lives of innocent people are defended is less simple to answer. In Aquinas' view, corporal life is no absolute good. Human beings are deprived of their lives for the sake of other human beings. Some human beings risk their life for fellow· human beings. In order to appreciate Aquinas' view on dealing with corporal life in its deepest dimensions, a wider scope has to be sou~ht. Again the answer to this question be~omes clear whe~ the .the~loglcal framework is studied and the connectlon between dealmg wIth hfe and death and the relationship with God is examined. The most direct approach to this relationship is perhaps via the only reason for the death penalty to which Aquinas devotes an entire quaestio: heresy. 3.1.2 Killing heretics Thomas discusses heresy in SIb II-II 11, within the context of vices which are opposed to the theological virtue of faith. He follows Hieronymus in tracing back the meaning of the word haeresis to the Greek word for 'choice' (electio).1<7 Electio does not relate to an end directly but to things which are ordered at an end, according to Aquinas' analysis in SIb I-II 13.3. The infidelity of the ~eretic is. distin· guished from that of the pagan and the Jew by acceptmg Chfl~t (the end, which is not accepted by pagans and Jews) but not evetything by which one chooses for Christ (the things directed at the end). Instead of this, the heretic follows what his own ideas suggest and thus he debases the tenets of Christian faith.14' Aquinas considers this perversion of the truth . on which Christian faith is based - as a vety serious sin: it directly concerns the relationship with God. For, as Thomas explains in the vety first article of the Summa Ibeologiae, the entire salvation of

man depends on knowledge of the truth.'" In the attitude towards the heretic one can discover the same tension between self-defense and room for repentance which has been observed in the more general problem of capital punishment. On the one hand the heretic deserves to be excluded not only from the Church by excommunication, but also from the world by capital punishment. Thomas compares the perversion of faith with the forgety of money. The forger agrees with the system of money, but makes his own version of it. This forged money has no value. Those who use it deceive themselves and their fellow human beings. Thus forgers are a danger to the community by undermining the basis of temporal life. For this reason they are executed by secular authorities; since they deserve capital punishment, the heretic does so all the more. His deceiving activities endanger the life of the soul by which the relationship with God, the end of temporal life, is constituted.'so On the other hand, however, since the Church is directed at the salvation of all people, she should have mercy so that the misguided can convert. There should be corrections, as Saint Paul suggests. Only when there is no hope for conversion and the heretic is obstinate, then does the Church have to take care of the salvation of the other members by separating the sinner by excommunication and leaving him to the secular powers for execution.'51 The attitude of the Church towards heretics is examined in more detail when Thomas asks whether those who turn back from heresy should be received by the Church. Here it becomes clear that

1+9

1SO

iusta bella excercere in diebus festis, si tamen hoc necessitas exposeat, hoc enim esset tentare Deum, si quis, imminente tali necessitate, a bello vellet abstinere. On the sin of tempting God cf. STb n·n 97. . 147 STh II-II 11.1.agl: Dicit enim Hieronymus, et habetur in Decretis x.:rav; q.3: "Haeresis graece ab electione dicituy, quod scilicet earn sibi unusquisque eligat disciplinam quam putat esse mdiorem". Hieronymus is quoted from In Gal. 3 [PL 26,445). 14~ STh II-II 11.1.co: intendit quidem Christo assentire, sed defoit in eJigendo ea quibus Christo assentiat, quia non eligit ea quae sunt vere a Christo :radita, sed ea quae sibi propria mens suggerit. Ee ideo haeresis est infuJeJitatis species pertinens ad eos qui fidem Christi profitentuy, sed eius dogmata eorrumpunt.

189

151

SIb I l.1.co: a euius tamen veritatis eognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. STh II.II 11.3.co: Ex parte quidem ipsorum est peecatum per quod meruerunt non solum ab &desia per excommunicationem se:parari, sed etiam per mortem a mundo excludi. Multo enim gravius est corrumpere luiem, per quam est animae vUa, quam falsare peeu· niam, per quam temporali vitae subvenitur. Unde si falsarii peeuniae, vel alii maiefactores, statim per saeeu/ares principes iuste morti tradunturj multo magis haeretic~ statim cum de haeresi convincuntur, possent non solum excommunicari, sed et iuste oceidL The par;illel betweeu heresy and forgery is less successful with regard to the intention underlying both actions: (possible) sincerity versus deliberate deceit. STh II.II 11.3.co: Ex parte autem Ecclesiae est misericordia., ad errantium conversionem. Et idoo non statim condemnat, sed "post primam et secundam correctionem") ut Apostolus docet (Tt 3,10). Postmodum vera, si adhuc pertinax inveniamr, &desia,' de eius conversione non sperans, aliorum saluti providet) eum ab Ecelesia separando pey excommunicationis sententiam; et ulterius reJinquit eum iudicio saeculari a mundo exterminandum per mortem.

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underlying the position towards heretics one can detect the hierarchy of elements which was discovered in chapter II, continued to its extreme consequence. Aquinas explains that according to Mt 5,44 the charity of the Church is extended to all people: friends, enemies and persecutors. To want and to operate the good for one's neighbour belongs to caritas. The good, however, is twofold. The spiritual good, the salvation of the soul (in other words: the relationship with God) is mainly related to charity: one ought to wish for every human being this vita gratiae out of charity and therefore the Church has mercy on those who are misguided. 15' Secondary to charity are the temporal goods, to which corporal life, wordly possesions, a good name and ecclesiastical or secular dignity belong. These ought to be wished insofar as they are directed at eternal salvation of thQSe who enjoy them and others. Now, when the possession of one of these temporal goods hinders eternal salvation of many people, out of charity one no longer wants this person to possess that good. One rather wants him to do without it for two reasons: because eternal salvation is to be preferred above temporal goods and because the good of many ought to be chosen above the good of the individual. When heretics are always received back into the Church, when time after time their life and other temporal goods are preserved, other faithful may be damaged: when they relapse they may (spiritually) kill other people, and when they escape their punishment they may surely bring others to commit heresy.'53 This hierarchy of goods (possessio mundana . vita corporalis . salus animae) according to which the attitude towards heretics is determined,

was introduced in chapter II and it plays a role in the hierarchy of objects of charity and the Evangelical Counsels. We have shown that the development of the life of grace transforming a human being is necessary so as to appreciate this order. According to the human mode of knowing the material is closer than the spiritual. Thomas reckons with this tension in his discussion of the question as to how the seriousness of a sin is determined by distinguishing between the seriousness of a sin with regard to the object (gravitas secundum obiectum) and with regard to the damaging effect (secundum e!fectum nocend,). Considered from the point of view of the objects, the hierarchy of goods is followed: a sin which is directly against God !finis) is more serious than one against one's neighbour (ad finem). Thus infidelity and blasphemy are more serious sins than homicide. IS< With

190

152

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STh II-II l1.4.co: Pertinet autem ad caritatem ut aliquis bonum proximi et veiit et opereeur. Est autern duplex bonum. Unum quidem spirituale, scilicet salus anim4e, quod principa/iter Yespicit caritas> hoc enim quiJibet ex caritate debet alii velie. Untie quantum ad hoc, haeretid reuertentes, quotiescumque Telapsi juerim, ab Ecclesia recipiuntur ad poenitentiam, per quam impend;tur eis via salutis. STh II-II l1.4.co: Aliud autem est bonum quod secundario respicit caritas. scilicet bonum temporaie: situt; est vita corporaiis, possessio mundana, bona foma, et dignitas ecclesiastic-a sive saecularis. Hoc enim non tenemur ex caritate allis velie nisi in ordine ad salutem aeternam et eorum et aliorum. Untie si aliquid de huiusmodi bonis existens in uno impedire POSSil atternatn salutem in mullis, non oponet quod ex caritate huiusmodi bonum ei velimus, sed potius quod velimus eum illo carere, tum quia salus

a'lerna praeJ
temportd~

tum quia bonum mullorum pra'Jmur bono

unius. Si autem haeretici rwertentes semper reciperentur ut conservarentur in vita et aliis teniporaJibus bonis, posset in praeiudkium sa/utis aliorum hoc esse, tum quia, si relaberentur alios inficerent; tum etiam quia, si sine poena watierent, alii semrius in haeresim relaberentur;

regard to the damaging effect, however, homicide is a more serious sin

than blasphemy: one's neighbour is damaged more by homicide than God is by blasphemy.'ss Returning to the heretic, it now becomes clear that he not only commits the greatest sin secundum obiectum, but also secundum e!fectum nocendi in a double way: he kills himself spiritually by cutting off his relationship with God, but also kills spirituaily those who are misguided by him. This is even more serious than corporal killing, since eternal salvation is at stake here. In the case of the heretic, the relationship with God functions explicitly as a good, higher than corporal life, which is legitimately defended right up to using the shedding of blood. This primacy of life with God, however, is also to be observed in other cases. In fact it is the STh I-II 73.3.co: Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur diversitas gravitatis in peecatis. Skut patet quod res exteriores ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad jinem,' homo autem ordinatur ulterius in Deum sicut in jinem. Unde peccatum quod est circa ipsam suhstantiam hominis, sicut bomicidium est gravius peecato quod est circa res exteriores, sicut furtum; et adhuc est gravius peecatum quod immediate contra Deum committitur, sicut infidelitas, b1asphemia"et huiusmodi. Cf. also STh II-II 10.3. 155 "STh II-II 13.3.ral: homicidium et blasphemia si comparentur secundum obiecta in quae peccatur, manifesium est quod b/asphemia, quae est directe peecatum in Deum, praeponderat homicidio, quod est peccatum in proximum. Si autem comparentur secundum e.ffectum nocendi, sic homicidium praeponderat, plus enim homicidium nocet proximo quam blaspehmia Deo. Sed quia in gravitate culpae magis attenditur intentio voluntatis perversae quam eJfectus operis, ut ex supradictis patet [STh [·II 73.8Jj ideo, cum b/aspbemus intendat nocumentum inferre honori divino, simpliciter loquendo gravius peecat quam homicida. Homicidium tamen primum locum tenet in peecatis inter peccata in proximum commissa. Cf. also QuodI1.9.2, Quod/5.10.2 and S7b II·II 70.4.

1>1

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basis for the rule that no one, under any circumstance, is allowed to kill

perspective of beatitudo, is so fundamental that every human being ought to be loved out of charity: innocent people as well as sinners. lS' It is important to bear in mind this theological foundation, because once again it shows the complicated interrelation of vita naturae and vita gratiae. On the one hand natural life is the foundation of life of grace, the substance without which there can be no accidental perfection. This 'conditional' quality of natural life - and precisely the fact that it is directed at the life of grace - legitimises that those who seriously undermine the common good are deprived of their corporal life, while, on the other hand, this self-defense of the community is motivated by life of grace. Sinners ought to be loved for their capacitas Dei. One should hope that their relationship with God is restored and help them in doing so. When there is no hope for conversion and they are a serious danger to the common good, then, close friendship might end, but not charity. Even the judge who condemns a sinner to death is motivated by the love of charity - a love comprising innocent people as well as sinners. And he does so, thanks to the perspective of life ·with God - after death - to which the sinner is called, as is every human being.!60 From the perspective of the primacy of charity, Aquinas' view on the relation between the single person and the community can be determined more precisely. Common good is to be preferred above private good, according to Thomas. Ultimately, however, the common good points to the good of the single person in at least two ways. In the first place, there is no common good, when this good is not experienced

192

an innocent person.

3.1.3 Killing innocent people Dealing with the question whether J in a certain circumstance, it is

allowed to kill innocent people, Thomas begins by recalling that homicide is, in itself, an evil. When people are considered as private human beings, no one may be killed: in every human being, sinner or not, one ought to love human nature which is made by God and destroyed in homicide. When considered with regard to the common good, only then may a person be considered such a danger that killing becomes legitimate. Subsequently" Thomas relates the life of the righteous people also to the common good: they promote and conserve the common good because they are the principle part. Therefore this 'selfdefense' of the community by homicide does not apply to them. 15' That it is a serious evil to kill innocent people, is so evident that it seems ridiculous to try to argue in favour of it. According to Thomas the interdiction of killing innocent people belongs to Natural Law: the moral truth is obvious by the use of natural reason alone, whereas it is also part of the Decalogue.!" Yet, the theological virtue of charity plays a central role in Thomas' considerations: the answer to the question why innocent people ought not to be killed is ultimately because of their relationship with God. Not natural sympathy or connaturality are fundamental, but the capacity for God which all rational creatures share.''' This capacity for God, the shared

159 156

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ISS

SIb ll-TI 64.6.co: a1iquis homo dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo, secundum Ie; alia modo per comparationem ad aliud. Secundum se quidem considerando hominem, nul/urn occidere Iicet, quia in quolibet, etiam p«catore, debemus amare naturam quam Deus fecit, quae per occisionem corrumpitur. Sed sicut supra dictum est, occisio peccatoris fit licita per comparationem ad bonum commune, quod per peccatum corrumpitur. Vita . autem iustorum est conservativa et promotiva boni communis, quia ipsi sum principalior pars multitudinis. Et ideo nullo modo licet occidere innocentem. STh I-II 100;1.co: Quaedam [praecepta mora/fa] enim sunt quae statim per se ratio natura/is cuiuslibet hominis diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda; sicut: ·Honora patrern tuum, et matrem tuam·, et: "Non occides", "Non furtum/acies" et huiusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. This does not mean that natural sympathy and connaturality do not play a constitutive role in the process in which people learn to see the theological

foundation. Both natural love of friends and relatives (Cf. STh II·II 26.6-12) as well as Natural Law are the bw for the via inventionis.

STh II-II 25.6.00: in peccatoribus duo possunt considerar4 scilicet natura, et culpa. Secundum naturam quidem, quam a Deo habent, capaces sum beatitudinis, super cuius communicatione caritas jundatur, ut supra dictum est,' et ideo secundum naturam suam sunt ex caritate diligendi... Debemus enim in peccatoribus odire quod .peccatores sunt, et diligere quod homines sunt beatitudinis capaces. Ee hoc est eos vere ex caritate diligere

propter Deum. 160

SlO IT-II 25.6.ra2: amicis peccantibus, sicut Philosophus dicit, in IX Ethicorum 3 [1165b13] non .qtnt subtrahenda amicitiae beneficia, quousque habeatur spes sanationis eorum, sed magis' est eis auxiliandum ad recuperatianem virtutis... Sed quando in maximam malitiam incidunt et insanabiles jiunt, tunc non est eis amiciti4e familiaritas exhibenda. Et ideo huiusmodi peccantes, de quibus magis praesumitur nocumentum aliorum quam eorum emendatio, secundum legem divinam et humanam praecipiuntU1' occidi. Et tamen hoc facit iudex non ex odia eorum, sed ex caritatis amore quo bonum publicum praefertur vitae singularis personae. Et tamen mors per iudicium injlicta pecca· tori prodest, sive convertatur, ad culpae expiationem,' siw non convertatur, ad culpae terminationem, quia per hoc totJitur ei potestas amp/ius peccandi.

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by individual human beings. Common good is only recognized as 'good' when it is part of the private good of individual persons. In the second place, the common good has no other end than the private good of each individual. This private good is ultimately nothing else than the relati· onship with God, to which every individual is called according to his capacitas Dei.'" On the other hand, and thus the private good points back to the common good, the first can only be realized within the context of a community. Human beings are social beings who reflect the image of God to one another. Thus the love for God flows back to one's neighbour. This 'flowing back', as was worked out in the preceding section, is most evident in the works of Christian perfection. How, then, do these relate to the evil of killing?

beings have no other ultimate end in life than being united with God by charity; this, can now be attained in different ways. Thus a diversity of states and offices can be discerned in the Church. Aquinas considers this diversity appropriate for at least three reasons: it pertains to the perfection of the Church itself that the plenitude of grace overflows from the head (Christus Caput) to the limbs in a variety of manners . like the perfection of the one God is. found in creation in multiple forms and ways. Moreover, it is better that the different kinds of actions which are necessary in the Church are performed by different people so that they are more free and less hindered by confusion in their work. Finally, it pertains to the dignity and beauty of the Church that there is an order.l64 The diversity of states is directed at the perfection. of Christian life. As was explained before, some human beings commit themselves to living with God in such a way that they are entirely free for the development of the relationship with God. By making a vow to live according to the Evangelical Counsels, they enter a religious order which is, because of its stability, called a religious state. The diversity of offices, however, is based on the diversity of actions that need to be performed. Thus, Thomas discerns seven offices which are directed at the ministry of the Church: sacerdos, diaconus, subdiaconus, acolythas, lector, exorcista, ostiarius.'" Those of them who are directly concerned with the Sacrament of the Eucharist are also called clerici.'" With regard to dealing with life and death, it is important to take into consideration the distinction between state (status) and office (officium). Namely, on the basis of this distinction does Aquinas consider it suitable that a religious order is occupied with waging war, but not appropriate that clerics are involved in the shedding of blood. This position of Aquinas shows the ambivalent character homicide has as malum secundum se and sometimes simultaneously bonum secundum

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/

3.1.4 Killing and Christian perfection Homicide is an evil, according to both the natural order and the moral order. It has been shown that on certain occasions Aquinas considers the evil of killing to be legitimate: as an act of self·defense by the community of innocent people. Thus homicide is justified in order to defend the precondition of the relationship with God: natural life. But how does this relate to Christian perfection, to which all human beings are called? Can those who defend the precondition of the relati· onship with God themselves attain the· perfection of Christian life? What does it e.g. mean that Thomas argues that clerics should not be involved in the shedding of blood?'62 Is killing a 'dirty job' which should be left to less perfect Christians? In order to find an answer to this question, it must be clear from the outset that according to Thomas the perfection of Christian life is measured by one single criterion: the amount of caritas.;6> Human

'" Ultimately the private good 01 each individual is nothing else than the perfection 01 the rdationship with God, at which all other goods are directed. Cf. Aquinas' discussion in 5Th 1·11 19.10 where he takes pains to keep in halance the multiplicity of perspectives and interests on the one hand and the unity of God as highest good on the other.

'" Cf. 5Th 11·11 40.2 and In W 5ent 25.2.2h. 163 STh TI.II 184.1.co: unumquodque dicitur esse perfectum inquantum attingit proprium finem, qui est ultima -rei perfoctio. Caritas autem est quae unit nos Deo, qui est ultimus finis humanae mentis, quia -qui mane: in caritate, in Deo mane&, et Deus in eo", at dicitur tJn 4,15. Et ideo secundum caritatem specialiter attenditur perfectio 'Vitae christiana<.• CI. also 5Th 11·11 184.2.

,.. 5Th 11·11 1832. '" 5eG IV 75. 166 In reality the distinction between status and officium is complicated by the fact that someone may belong to a religious order and be a priest at one and the same time. Moreover, in order to be fit for an officium one should lead a life which has a cert· ain perfection. -A further complexity is introduced by the position of the Bishop. Thomas considers the status episcopalis as a status perfectionis which is more perfect than the status reiigionis. At the same time the episcopal state implies the ministry of leadership, pastoral care and priesthood. Thus it overlaps status and officium and is the crown of both categories.

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quid. At the same time it affirms that Aquinas regards self-defense as the

killing is basically in Opposltlon with Christian perfection.''' The religious military orders prove that, in his view, killing and Christian perfection are not incompatible. The problem is that military office is not compatible with the office of clerics and bishops,v' Thomas gives two arguments for this. The general reason is that warfare involves much disquietude by which a cleric is distracted from contemplation of divine things, praising God and praying for the people. For this reason clerics are also interdicted from trading (and the same goes for soldiers). The special reason is that clerics are directed at the ministry of the altar in which the passion of Christ is represented by the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore they should be prepared rather to be slain (imitating the work. of Christ) than to kill,v' This special reason, I suggest, should be interpreted within the context of the general. It claims the suitability of clerics imitating Christ in their attitude and

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. only reason for the legitimacy of homicide. The fact that a religious order can be directed at waging war is explained by the fact that the opera vitae activae pertain to the aid of one's neighbour and obedience to God. The military office (officium) is also directed at the aid of fellow human beings. Thus the two may overlap in objective, when the aid and defense of people is related to the defense of the divine service, the public safety or the poor and oppressed. 167 In the military religious order the killing of sinners is related to the perfection of one's relationship with God. This is done under the formal consideration of help and defense.''' The religious who fight in such an order, do so out of love for their neighbour. Out of this motive they, in fact, risk their lives in the danger of warfare, and come close to the perfection of the martyr, as does the soldier in a just war.169

action concerning death, since the represention of His sacrifice is central

Despite their noble objective, Thomas considers religious military orders as the lowest in rank. The corporeal is directed at the spiritual. The use of spiritual weapons in the combat against the errors of heretics and the temptations of demons is more directly aimed at spiritual salvation and thus better and preferable.!70 According to Aquinas, clerics and bishops are not allowed to wage war because of their office. The different activities which are necessary for the good of human society are done better arid more easily by different people with different offices. The fact that clerics are not to be involved in the shedding of blood is not because in Thomas' view

to their ministry. Because of this representation, Aquinas considers it unfit that they are involved in corporeal killing: this would confuse their character of reference. Thus, Thomas' account of killing as impediment to ordination is to be seen at the same level as e.g. the impossibility that women are ordained: it concerns the character of the sacrament as sign.

All this, however, does not mean that clerics are not involved in warfare; they definitely are, but in accordance with their office:

171

172

167

161

169

STb II-II 188.3.co: religio institui potest non solum ad opera contemplativae vitae, sed etiam ad opera vitae activae, inquantum pertinent ad subventionem proximorum et obsequium Dei, non autem inquantum pertinent ad aliquid mundanum tenendum. Cf. the words which are used in STh II·II 1883: resistere, tueri, defendere, CUTa, subsidium. The same words appear within another context within which warfare and life with God are related: the man who makes a vow to take up the cross in support of the Holy Land. For this d. in chronological order. In W Sent 20.1.3b, In W Sent 32.1.4, In W Sent 38.1.4, amp 6.6.raI2, De form 5 [Leon: 20], Quod/ 2.8.2, De p
'" STh II-II 188.4.co and

S1b II-II 188.5.co.

173

Cf. also STh II-II 40.2".raJ: Non enim interdicitur eis bellare quia peccatum sit, sed quia tale exercitium eorum personae non congruit. On this point I do not share the conclusion of F. de Grijs, 1987. p. 3-4, who ascribes to Thomas aan approach of fragmentiza:tion" as regards the interdiction for clergymen to kill. For Aquinas the incompatibility of ordination and homicide is a matter of functionality and representation as will be shown.

STh II-II 40.2.co: ad bonum societatis humanae plura sunt necessaria. Diversa autem a diversis melius et expeditius aguntur qUtfm ab uno; ut patet per Philosophum, in sua I Politica 1.5 [1252b3J... Bellica autem exercitia maxime repugnant illis officiis quibus episcopi et cleric; deputantur, propter duo. Primo qu~ generali ratione, quia bellica exercitia maximas' 'inquietudines habent... Et ideo sicut negotiationes, propter hoc quod nimis implicant animum, interdicuntur clericis, ita et bellica exercitia. .. Secunda, propter speciaJem rationem. Nam omnes clericorum ordines ordinantur ad altaris ministerium, in quo sub Sacramento repraesentatur passio a,rist~ secundum iIlud leo 11,26; HQuotrescumque mt:tnducabitis panem hunc et calicem bibetis, mortem Domini anuntiabitis, donee venial. " Et ideo non competit eis occidere vel effundere sanguinem, sed magis esse paratos ad propriam sanguinis effusionem pro On-isto, ut imitentur opere quod gerunt ministerio.

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contributing to peace through the use of spiritual weapons.!" 3.1.5 Killing oneself" Now the different kinds and aspects of homicide are being examined, it is easy to see why killing in which the same person is subject and object of the action can only be seen as malum. All the criteria Aquinas uses in the other anides of STh II-II 64 can be discovered in the fifth artide where the question is posed whether it is allowed to kill oneself. The general principle by which Aquinas judges homicide to be legitimate is in the defense of the common good. By killing oneself quite the contrary is at hand: the community is done injustice (ral). A second criterion is that the sinner is juftged and executed by those who are charged with taking care of the common good. No one, however, can be in the position of accused and judge at one and the same time (ra2). Thirdly, killing oneself is such a great evil, that it can never be chosen in order to evade a greater evil (ra3). This last argument is interesting, because here Thomas lists different deliberations as to why a person might kill himself, which reveal something of the greater perspective in which earthly life is embedded. In the obiectio the example of body and limb is used, an example which we remember from his argument why it is sometimes legitimate to kill a dangerous sinner. In this case the argument runs as follows: someone might spontaneously undergo ,a minor danger so as to evade a major one, like a limb is amputated in order to save the bo'dy. Likewise, by killing oneself a person might evade the misery of life or the disgrace of sin. Aquinas begins his answer by pointing out that a human being is lord over himself by free will,

and free to decide with regard to the things of this life. But the transition from this life to another more happy one is not subjected to the free will, but to God's power. A human being, therefore, is not allowed to kill himself in order to pass to a more happy life.17' Thomas does not give an argumentation by which it is made clear why only God may decide about life and death. The examples he gives all come down to fleeing from natural (miseriae) or moral evil (peccatum commissum, ab alia corrumpari, timor consentiendi in peccatum). Killing oneself is the greatest natural and moral evil one can do to oneself and thus it never outweighs any evil in either of the two categories. V7 All four examples seem to reflect the thought which is expressed at the beginning of the responsio: deciding to leave this life for another more happy life is not up to man. Earlier we have read the expression that a person who causes his own death 'leaves the road before the end.'v, The examples given here all endorse this view: natural and moral evil are pan of this eanhly life, part of the process of living, with God within the coordinates of materiality and time. Leaving these coordinates means leaving the human mode of being and reaching for a

176

177

n·n 40.2.ra1·2, CI. also SIb n·n 64.4. I prefer to not use the word 'suicide' in this paragraph, for two reasons: 1) Aquinas did not know the term. It was invented in later centuries; thus it would sound anachronistically. 2) From the perspective of charity, man does not belong to him,cll, but to God. This 'distance' between the one killing and the one killed (though both, materially, coincide in the case of a person killing himself) is suggested by placing 'oneself' on the same line as guilty people, innocent people and heretics. On suicide in the Middle Ages, c!. J..C!. Schmitt, 1976. Schmitt offers some

interesting observations concer.o.ing the way suicide was approached in the Middle Ages: in contrast with contemporuy approaches (c!. Th. Beemer, 1984) the suicide is considered as author rather than as victim (p.5). The 'psychological' approach to suicide took place within the moral framework of vinues, vices and the Sacrament 01 Penance (p. \3.17).

5Th IT-IT 64.5.ra3: Ad tertium dicendum est quod homo constituitur dominus sui ipsius per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo !iefte potest homo de seipso disponere quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad ba.nc 'Vi~ quae hominis limo arbitrio regitur. Sed transitus de hac vita ad aliam feliciorem non suhiacet libero arbitrio hominis sed potesta:i divinae. Et ideo non licet homini seipsum inteiflCere ut ad feliciorem transeat vitam. 5Th II-IT 64.S.ra3: Similiter etiam nee ut miserias quasJibet praesentis vitae evadat, quia ultimum malorum huius vitae et maxime terribile est moys. ut patet per Philosophum in m Ethicorum 6 [1115a26}. Et ita inferre sibi mortem ad alias huius vitae miserias e7Jadendas est maius malum assumere ad minoris mali vitationem. Similiter etiam non lice: seipsum occidere propter aliquod peccatum commissum. Tum quia in hoc sibi maxime nocet quod sihi adimit necessarium poenitentiae tempus. Tum etiam quia male· Jactorem occidere non licet nisi per iudicium publicae potestatis. Similiter etiam non licet mulieri seipsam occidere ne ab alia corrum-patur. Quia non debet in se committere crimen maximum. quod est sui ipsius occisio, ut vitet minus crimen alienum (non enim est crimen mulieris per violentiam violatae, si consensus non adsit, quia "non inquinatur corpus nisi de CQnsensu mentis", ut Lucia dixit}... Constat autem minus esse peccatum fornicationem -vel adulterium quam homicidiJ.tm, et praecipue sui ipsius, quod est gravissimum, quia sibi ipsi nocet, cui maximam dilectionem debet. Est etiam periculosissimum, quia non restat tempus ut per poenitentiam expietur. Similiter etiam nulli licet seipsum oecidere ob timorem ne comentiat in peecatum. Quia non sunt focienda mala ut veniant bona, vel ut vitentur mala, praesertim minora et minus ceria. Incertum enim est an aliquis in futurum camentiat in peecatum, patens est enim Deus hominem quacumque tentatione superveniente, liberare a peecata. J

,,. SIb 1l$

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171

Cf. above, 2.1, foomote 89 on p. 165.

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life (vita gloriae) which can only be hoped for as the perfection of a relationship which began in this earthly life, however miserable it may be. This interpretation of the respondo may be sustained by what was examined in chapter IT (especially the first section). A more positive determination of why killing oneself is such a great sin in Aquinas' view, can also, however, be obtained by reading the corpus of the article. Here Thomas lists three reasons why it is illegitimate to kill oneself; they concern oneself, the community and God. Killing oneself is an evil against oneself in two respects. Within the natural order man loves himself and tries to evade his corruption for as long as possible. Thus killing oneself is against one's natural inclination and against Natural Law. But nature is open towards perfection by grace and, according to the order of grace, killing oneself is also a mortal sin. In the hierarchy of objects of charity, it was shown that after the love for God man ought to love himself. Loving oneself out of caritas is the perfection of natural self-love by which one loves oneself as a creature made by and directed at God. Killing oneself goes against all this and is thus a major evil against oneself.'" At the same time, killing oneself is committing an evil towards the community. The importance of the community for the life of the individual has as its counterpart the importance of the individual for the community. Every good individual contributes to the common good and thus' promotes the life of himself and his fellow human beings. A person can be considered apart from the community, but he is always connected with it in reality. By killing oneself, one deprives the community of a constituting member. Thus one causes damage to the

means killing someone who in this respect does not belong to himself but to God who decides about life and death.l8l In contrast with the ra2, the three lines of reasoning in the corpus seem to imply that the one who kills himself is an innocent person. The three parties against whom is sinned are: oneself, one's neighbour (represented by the community) and God"': the three objects of the ordo caritatis (considering one's spiritual well-being and one's body as one). This makes clear that killing oneself is a major sin since it is contrary to life in all its meanings and at all levels: it appears as the opposite of the good of nature and grace. Like the negative of a photograph it reveals the reverse image of what human life is heading for: the love for God, oneself and one's neighbour. The picture of a person killing oneself seems, superficially, considered as being almost identical with the sacrifice of the martyr"': the willingness to give up one's life seems to connect the ultimate act of charity with the greatest sin against oneself. The great difference, however - in which they are diametrically opposed - is the attitude towards oneself, one's neighbour and God. In the case of the martyr the perfection of caritas entails that the centre of love has shifted outside oneself, to God (Ga 2,20: non ego vivo, sed Christus in me). This love for God flows over to being of a total availability to one's neighbour. In the case of the one who kills himself, the centre of love has disappeared and is, even, no longer in oneself (5Th IT-IT 64.5.co: contra inclinationem natura/em). For what concerns the relationship with his neighbour, this person is unavailable and closed in himself. Thus killing oneself is a double murder: not only corporal life is destroyed, but spiritual life as well.'" The relationship with God,

common good. 1sO

Finally, a person who deprives himself of his life is acting beyond what is subject to his free will. Life is a divine gift and killing oneself

STh II-II 64.S.co: Tertia, quia vita est quoddam donum divinitus homini attributum, et eius potestati subiectum, qui occidit et vivere facit. Et ideo qui seipsum vita privat in Deum peccat, sicut qui alienum servum inter/kit peccat in dominum cuius est serous,' et sicut peccat ille qui usurpat sibi iudicium de re sibi non commissa. Ad solum enim Deum pertinet iudicium mortis et vitae, secundum iI/ud Dt 32,39: "'Ego occidam, et ego vivere faciam". 182 Cf. also STh IT-II 59.3.ra2 where me same three appear. '" This thought is workM out by Gabrid Marcel: d. P.-F. Ruelius, 1995, p. 168-197, especially p. 196. 184 In duo praec 7 (de quinto praecepto [Busa: 96]: Et- sciendum, quod aliqui occidunt solum corpus, de quo dictum est; alii animatn, auferendo vitam gratiae, trahendo scilicet ad peccatum morta/e. In 8,44 "me homii:ida erat ab initio", inquantum scilicet ,traxit ad peccatum. Alii autem utrumque, et hoc dupliciter. Primo in destructione praegnantium,'

181

179

5Th II-II 64.5.co: seipsum occidere est omnino illicitum triplice ratione. Primo quidem quia natura/iter quaelibet res seipsam llmat, et ad hoc pminet quod quaelibet res natura/iter conservat se in esse et corrumpenti'bur resistit quantum potest. Et ideo quod ttlitjuis seipsum oceidat est contra inclinationem natura/em, et contra Cilritatem, qua

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qui/ihet debet seipsum diligere. Et ideo occisio sui ipsius semper est peccatum mortale, utpate contra natura/em legem, et contra caritatem existens. STh ll-II 64.s.co: Secunda, quia quae/ibet pars id quod est, est. totius. QuUibet autem homo est pars communitatis, et ita id quod est, est communitatis. Unde in hoc quod seipsum inter[tCit, iniuriam communitati tacit, ut paw per Philosophum, in V Ethicorum 9 [1138411J.

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however, remains aod since this core of humao life is qualifying 'life' after death, the damage done to oneself is the greatest one cao imagine.

(vita gratiae) is seen as the core of earthly life. But what if God kills ao innocent human being? Does this fit in with what we have learned so far? Probably the thought would never have come to mind were it not that in Genesis 22 the story is told of Abraham who is charged by God to sacrifice his only son Isaac. Aquinas mentions the story in a number of places aod contexts.'" Usually Aquinas' interpretation of the story is dealt with in the context of the Decalogue or Natural Law.'" Although this context is evident from the examination of Aquinas himself, we study Thomas' interpretation of the story for the sake of what it reveals about the relationship between God and mao, and what it entails for the relation between vita naturae aod vita gratiae. In STh I-IT 100.8 the question is discussed whether the commaodments of the Decalogue are dispensable. In the third ohiectio it is argued that the fifth commaodment of the Decalogue is legitimately dispensed in the case of criminals aod enemies. In the corpus, Aquinas explains that a commaodment can be dispensed when, in a particular case, observing the words of the law would be in opposition to the intention of the legislator. The commaodments of the Decalogue, however, contain the very intention of the legislator, who is God. The precepts of the First Table (1-3) contain the order at the common aod final good, which is God. The precepts of the Second Table (4-10) contain the order of justice which ought to be observed among humao beings and which is organised according to the principle that each mao is given his due

Summarizing the first part of the third section, it was shown how the relationship with God (vita gratiae) is the larger framework as well as the ultimate criterion within which Aquinas deals with corporal life and death. First, we demonstrated that, although homicide is a natural and moral evil, according to Aquinas it is sometimes legitimate as selfdefense of the community of innocent people. For what concerns the strict conditions to which it is tied, capital punishment can be compared with the criteria which are applied to the justification of waging war and killing tyrants. Secondly, by examining Thomas' view on the killing of heretics, it was shown how the' life of grace determines dealing with corporal life aod death: life with God is such a great good that the temporal good of corporal life is subject to it. In situations of conflict the latter is to be sacrificed in order to safeguard the first. After having focused on the killing of heretics, we were able, in the third place, to appreciate that also the interdicton to kill innocent people is based on the fact that corporal life is the place to live aod develop humao life with God. In the fourth place, from ao examination of the difference between the cleric aod the religious with regard to the involvement of the shedding of blood, we ascertained that corporal life is for the benefit of life with God. The prevalence of the latter over the former is so great that, in Aquinas' view, even the killing of sinners in defense of spiritual well-being of one's neighbour can be included in religious life. In the light of what was found, in the fifth place, killing oneself appears as the negative-picture of martyrdom aod the greatest harm one cao do towards oneself. 3.2 God and homicide So far, homicide has been examined from the perspective of the community of humao beings. It was shown that the criteria which are listed in STh IT-IT 64 are meaot to safeguard the living together of people in a community. In this sense they establish the preconditions of natural life. Within the context of a safe community, people are called to live with God and develop their relationship with God. Thus life with God

occiduntur enim pueri in corpore et in anima: secundo interficiendo seipsum.

203

(debitum).187 The distinction between the precepts of the First Table and those of the Second Table is importaot so as to appreciate what is at stake when

185

186

117

In the Summa Theologiae the sacrifice of Isaac is mentioned in 5Th I 114.2.00; 5Th III 94.5.ra2; STh I-II 100.8.ra3; STh I-II 102.4.ra2; STh I-II 112.5.ra5; STh II-II 64.6.agl/ral; STh II-II 97.2.co; STh II-II 104.4.ra2; STh II-II 111.1.ra1; STh II·II 154.2.ra2; STh II-II 171.5.co; S1b III 10.2".1. The question is then whether Natural Law can be changed, or whether the commandments the Decalogue can be dispeosed. Cf. K. Hedwig, 1992. STh I.IT 100.8.co: tum in praecepti debet fteri dispensatio, quando oceurri: aliquis

of

partiadaris casus in quo, si verbum legis observetur. contrariatur intentioni legis/atons... Praecepta autem Deca/ogi continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scil~et Dei. Nam praecepta primae tabu/.ae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent ipsum ordinem ad bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est,' praecepta autem secundae tabulae continent ipsum ordinem iustitiae inter homines obseroandae, ut scilicet nuIIi flat indebitum, et cui/ibet reddatur debitum; secundum ham enim rationem sun: intelligenda praecepta DecaJogi. Et ideo praecepta DecaJogi sunt omnino indispensabilia.

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God kills a human being. The commandment "You shall not kill" is part of the Second Table by which the relations between human beings are arranged. Within this social context it is illegitimate to kill an innocent human being. As we have seen, howeverJ there are situations

in which the community defends itself against agressors from within or from the outside. This killing, Aquinas says, has the character of a debitum and is not the 'homicide' which is meant in the fifth commandment. Actions which are equal in the natural order can be opposed in the order of morality.18' Subsequently, Aquinas reasons that by consenting to kill his son, Abraham did not consent into homicide: in this case, namely, there is a debitum which dispenses with the -general rule. This can be made clear in two steps: Abraham consented to acting on God's command, who is the Lord of life and death; God does not fall under the order of justice among human beings, as the distinction between the two Tables shows. The debitum of killing an innocent human being is founded in the fact that God has condemned the entire human species to death as a result of Original Sin. Thus Abraham is no more than the executor of God's death sentence, which is passed on each human being from the moment of birth.'" The story of Abraham charged with sacrificing his only son is an exceptional story. Thomas takes great pains to make us see that God is just in this case, by interpreting the exception as falling under a more general rule by which the relationship of every human being with God

us 5Th I-IT lOO.S.ra3: occisio hominis prohibetur in Decalogo secundum quod habet rationem indebiti; sic enim praeceptum continet ipsam ratwnem iustitiae. Lex autem humana hoc concedere non potest, quod lieite homine indebite occidatur. Sed malefactores accid;, vel hastes reipublicael hoc non est indebitum. Unde hoc non contrariatur praecepti DecaJogi, nee talis occisio est homicidium, quod praecepto Decalogi prohibetur, ut Augustinus dicit in I De libero arbit., cap. 4, ante med [PL 32,1226]. 189 5Th I-II lOO.S.ra3: Similiter et iam Abraham, cum comensit Dcewere filium, non comensit in homicidium, quia debitum erat eum accid; per mandatum Dei, qui est Dominus vitae et mortis. Ipse enim est qui poerwn mortis infligit omnibus hominibus, iustis et iniustis. pro peccato primi parentis, cuoo sententiae si homo sit executor auctoritate divina. non erit homicida, simt nee Deus. Cf. also STh I-II 94.5.ra2: naturali morte moriuntur omnes communiter. tam nocentes quam innocentes. Quae quidem natura/is mcrs divina potestate inducitur propter peceatum originale; secundum iI/ud lK 2.6: "Dominus morti/icat et vivijicat". Et ideo absque alia iniustitia, secundum mandatum Dei, palest inj/igi mors cuicumque homini, vel nocenti vel Innocenti. Cf. also sn II-II 104.4.ra2, where God is called Auctor vitae et mortis, and In duo praec 7

(de quinto praecep,o).

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is characterised: ln this relationship, justice is a-symmetrical, in

accordance with the infinite distance between creature and Creator. Simply speaking, God owes nothing to any of his creatures.'" This frightening perspective is the other side of the grace which creation basically is, as was shown in chapter n. What does this mean for our question of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death? As I see it, Aquinas' interpretation of the story of Isaac's sacrifice is the radical consequence of thinking God as finis ultimus humanae 'Vitae. When God Himself is the final end of human life (insofar as His Life is participated in) the transition between this earthly life and the happiness of eternal life is indeed entirely up to Him. Corporal life, as was shown in the case of the heretic, is a temporal good which cannot be compared to life of grace and glory. God cannot act against the ultimate end of human life (which He is Himself), and thus He is not bound by precepts which arrange the actions of human beings on the way to this end. When God Himself deals with life and death, the rules concerning human beings among themselves show their character of precondition. Safeguarding natural life as a place for the growth of the life of grace is no longer relevant when the Source and Ultimate End of this life Himself acts. In this exceptional case, man no longer approaches the Ultimate End, but the Ultimate End, as it were, approaches man. The story of the sacrifice of Isaac confirms the central position of the life of grace for dealing with corporal life and death. With this story we come to the end of this chapter. Resuming the central lines of this study, two of the three dimensions of living with God have been dealt with. In the previous chapter 'foundations of life with God', the history of salvation, the work of Christ and the sacraments were studied in relation to life and death. One of the discoveries there was the hierarchy of elements (world/bona exteriora - body - soul - God) which plays a role in Thomas' account of life and death. In this third chapter 'dynamism of life with God', these elements have been recognized at central places: from the hierarchy of objects of charity and from the Evangelical Counsels with martyrdom as summit· of perfection, living with God emerged as a dynamic process in which a human being gradually shifts towards a greater participation in the life of God ('Vita

190

sn I 21.1.ra3: Et /ieet Deus hoc modo debitum alieui det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur. sed potms alia in ipsum. We Will return to this in chapter IV, p. 242.

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DYNAMISM

gratiae as inchoatio vitae aeternae). Along with this growth towards perfection, the centre of love is, more and more, placed in God. As a result of this, corporal life is increasingly regarded as a temporal good in service of spiritual growth. This was confirmed by Aquinas' account of dealing with life and death within the social order and in his exegesis of the story of the sacrifice of Isaac: the death of the marryr as well as that of the heretic and the innocent son of Abraham can only be fully understood within the larger framework of the relationship with God which is a participation in His Life, a Life transcending the borders of created life and death. In the following chapter the investigation is continued by focusing on the perfection of the relationship with God: vita aeterna, the beginning of which we discovered in the theological virtues.

CHAPTER IV

PERFECTION OF LIFE WITH GOD What is the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death in the theology of Thomas Aquinas? At the end of the first chapter this central question was rephrased as "what is the relation between vita naturalis and vita aeterna?". From the outset it has been clear that this relation is constituted by vita gratiae, the intimate and reciprocal relationship with God. In the preceding chapters we examined the foundations and dynamism of life with God so as to approach the relation proceeding from vita naturalis. In this fourth chapter the perfection of the life of grace is studied: vita gloriae or vita aeterna. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section is dedicated to the nature of the reflection on the consummated life with God (1). In the second section attention is focused on Aquinas' account. of vita aeterna (and moTS aeterna) in detail (2). In the third section the question is discussed as to what impact eternal life has on earthly life (3). After having studied these issues, our examination of the three dimensions of the relationship with God - foundations, dynamism and perfection - is completed. This enables us, in the next chapter, to formulate, in a well-balanced way, what the relation is between life on earth and 'life' after death in the theology of Thomas Aquinas.

1. The nature of the reflection on the consunnnated life with God

In this first section Aquinas' a",ount of the perfection of life with God is introduced in two steps. First, some remarks are made about the nature of eschatology, the reflection on God's glorifying work. This is done by recurring to some lines of thought which were developed earlier in this study. In this respect two concepts seem to be particularly elucidating: vita aeterna, which was discussed in chapter I; and finis u!timus which was studied in chapter m. The first is helpful in enabling us to become aware of how the 'negative' strain of Aquinas' God-talk rooted in God's copious perfection - works through to the core of his eschatology (1.1). The second is important in order to explain the special nature of the reflection on God's glorifying work and clarify the 'place' of eschatology in the whole of Aquinas' theology (1.2). Subsequently, we will examine the content of the tract itself. This enables us to

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pinpoint the reflection of the second section, issues discussed are examined in detail (1.3).

In

which some of the

1.1 Etema1life In the first chapter it was shown that vita aetema is a name for God's incomprehensible life as well as for the ultimate end of human life. Thus, as we noticed in 3.1, the same 'negative' strain we perceive in Thomas' God-talk can be expected with regard to his eschatology. In the preceding chapters we indicated that the ultimate end of man is the visio beata: the beatic vision in which God is seen face to face. This vision exceeds the natural powers of the created intellect. It can only be endowed by God Himself. Thus, not only the object of the beatific vision is incomprehensible from the perspective of our life on earth, the manner in which this vision is bestowed on us also shares this incomprehensibility. Thomas speaks of this endowment as God's glorifying work (opus glorificationis).' This entails at least three features which qualify the perfection of life with God, as examined in this chapter. In the first place, the opus glorificationis is entirely God's work and not that of creatures. The dynamism of the relationship with God, which is characteristic for life in via, is radically transformed in patria. During life on earth man is a free agent who is enabled, with the help of God's grace, to direct his life at union with God. In patria man is no longer a moral agent. The state of development in grace, the status merendi, comes to an end at the moment of death. Thomas speaks of status recipiendi: the state of receiving the fruits (reward or punishment) of what has been sawn in earthly life.' In this state the will - the faculty which is the motor of moral agency - is fixed and the glorifying work is entirely in the hands of the triune God. In the second place, glorification is the work of God according to

,

Cf. In Psalm.prol where Aquinas divides the matter of theology into four parts [Busa: 15]: Est autem quadruplex opus Dei: scilicet creationis ... gubernationis ". reparationis ... glorificationis ... Et de his omnibus complete in hac doctrina tractatur. Aquinas does not know the word 'eschatology', Nevenheless I will use the term when referring to his theological examination of God's glorifying work. In contrast with 'moral theology' I will not put it in inverted commas because of the difference in historical shifts. In IV Sent 45.1.3.co; SIb n·n 182.2.ag2.

209

which man is endowed with vita gloriae. The life of glory pertains to the same genus as the life of grace. Grace is nothing else than the beginning of glory in us; glory is nothing else than the consummation of grace.' Thus, and this will be worked out later in this chapter, vita gloriae is first and foremost the perfection of the relationship with God. This entails that, like the life of grace, this glorification of man is simultaneously the genuine end of human life as well as purely a gift. In the third place, the work of glorification escapes our grasp in a way which differs from the life of grace, because it will take place in the future. According to Aquinas' account of the human modus cognoscendi, knowledge is dependent on being. Because future things have no being (yet), they are not knowable.' The reason why God's glorifying work is the object of theological reflection, is because in Holy Scripture various stories are told in which the end of creation and the final destination of humankind is discussed. We will return to this in the next paragraph. A second reason, not less important, is because the glorification_ is the ultimate end of creation, by which all that precedes it is placed in its appropriate perspective. This leads us to a second access to eschatology: the concept of finis ultimus.

1.2 Ultimate end Eternal life is the ultimate end of human life on earth. As we explained in chapter ill, 1.2 (p. 145) the ultimate end has a special character compared to different ends which are pursued in earthly life. Since it fulfils all desires the end after which no other end can be strived for is the end of ends. Moreover, the ultimate end works through all proximate ends, because all created ends are attractive only to the degree that they are connected with the ultimate end. Both features are related to each other and provide finis ultimus with a twofold 'place' in Aquinas' theology. Firstly - in accordance with its nature of 'end of ends' - it is placed at the end of the systematic framework, as explicit reflection on the future destination of humankind.

,

STh II-II 24.3.ra2: Similiter etiam gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis; SIb I 95.1.ag6: natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummataj STh I 95.1.ra6: gloriam meremur per actum gratia,; Cf. also SIb I-n 111.3.ra2 and SIb I·n 114.3.ro3. Cf. H. Goris, 1996, p. 213·254.

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Secondly - due to its working through proximate ends - it has a more prominent and sort of 'omnipresent place' throughout Aquinas' theology. The place at the end of the framework is in accordance with the order of execution; the prominent place according to the order of intention. Both are connected with each other in the concept of causa finalis.' Both features deserve some closer investigation in order to clarify the nature of Aquinas' eschatology. 1.2.1 The order of execution Following the order of execution, God's glorifying work is appropriately treated at the end of the systematic framework, where the future destination of humankind is studied. Nevertheless, also in this place, because of its comprehensive nature, eschatology has a bearing on all that precedes it. Eschatology regards the consummation of everything which is created. Therefore there are many similarities with creation theology.' Both, the beginning and the consummation of creation do not take place within the coordinates of materiality and time, but concern the very beginning and consummation of these coordinates. As a consequence of this a great deal is revealed in the way both creation theology and eschatology are structured. In chapter II we discovered a hierarchy of elements (God - soul - body - world). This hierarchy turned out to be the foundation of the hierarchy of goodness in chapter m. In this fourth chapter, the same hierarchy of elements is helpful in enabling the typical character of eschatological reflection to be displayed. In chapter II we learned that the hierarchy of elements has a special significance. The elements are intimately linked up and all contribute, at different levels, to one ultimate goal. Schematically, and simplified, this interrelation can be presented in the following way:

Cf. STh I-II l.1.ral: finis, elsi sit POStreTnUS in executione. est tamen primus in

intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae. On Thomas' account of causa jinaJis in historical context, d. R. Spaemann/R. Low. 1991', p. 83-96; For the easy misunderstanding of Aquinas' account of finality, cf. J. Decorte, 1993, p. 90-106. Because of the central place of the end as causa jinaiis, Vatican I (DH 3016, quoted in chapter 1, footnote 31) underscores the importance of the finis ultimus for the elucidation of the nexus mysteriorum. Cf. H. Rikhof, 1992.

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world

->

body body

->

soul soul

->

union with God

This should be read as: the world is at the service of the corporal dimension of man; the corporal dimension is at the service of the spiritual one; the spiritual dimension is at the service of the union with God. Sometimes Aquinas takes the three steps as one, saying that the universe is created for the sake of the beatitude of the Saints.' As creation theology, eschatology comprises the entire universe. Thus we recognize the same elements, though in reversed order. This time the connection is not one of finality, of 'being at the service of something', but one beyond finality. Thus the scheme is: union with God

soul soul

=>

body body

=>

world'

This should be read as: the union with God glorifies the soul; the glorified soul expresses itself in a glorified body; the glorified body is endowed with a glorified creation. In this scheme, the same elements appear in a reversed order, this time organised radically from the central point at which the elements in via are directed. This reversed order is characteristic for the peculiar nature of God's 'opus glorificationis: the structure, according to which everything is connected, no longer has a character of finality (in the sense of showing a correlation of ends and means) but one of overflowing, copious expression. This is hardly thinkable from the perspective of a world in which everything is moving towards the ultimate end. But taking the ultimate end seriously, it cannot be conceived unless in terms of total arrival:. all striving comes to total rest. In fact here we come close to the very same incomprehensible non-motion of God's own life. Indeed, it is vita aeterna of which we are talking. Nevertheless, the distance between Creator and creatures remains, as we will see in the next section where this character of overflowing expression of glorified creation is examined in detail.

1

STh I 73.1.co: Ultima autetn per{ectio, quae est finis totius univers~ est perfecta beatitudo sanctorum,' quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi.

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1.2.2 The order of intention Following the order of intention, the ultimate end works as a cause prior to everything which is directed at an end. For this reason the ultimate end not only has a causal function but also an important epistemological function, since it helps to understand the world in which we live: one can only fully understand what is beginning to grow when the result is seen, like the power of the seed is only appreciated when the spike is observed.' In accordance with this principle, the ultimate end appears throughout the Summa Tbeologiae and thus one could speak of a genuine eschatological dimension of Aquinas' theolo· gy.' The ultimate end occupies a primary role in crucial places at both the beginning of the Prima Pars and the Secunda Pars.1O In the very first article of quaestio 1, the need for another (sacred) doctrine, apart from philosophical studies, is based on the fact that God is the ultimate end of human life: this end should be known so that men can direct their intention and actions towards it." Subsequently this sacra doctrina is defined from the perspective of the knowledge of God and the beatified." In the first set of questions regarding God (2-13) the ultimate end plays a key-role in STb I 12: the visio beata is the ultimate knowledge of God for the sake of which humankind has been created. Thus it is regarded as criterion from which all knowledge should be measured, including the earthly science of sacra doctrina. The primacy of the perspective of eternal life emerges prominently when Aquinas examines the completion of the work of creation on the seventh day: the end of the entire universe is the perfect beatitude of the Saints." The Secunda Pars opens with an investigation into the ultimate end of creation and the special character of the finis ultimus of man (STb ID). This perspective remains a guiding one throughout the 'moral' part

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of the Summa Tbeologiae: all 298 further questions are treated under the formal consideration of ea quae sunt ad finem. Subsequently, the perspective of finis ultimus continues to work through: the distinction between mortal and venial sins is based on the possibility of missing the ultimate end (mors aeterna); the theological virtues are directed at the blessed communion with God in patria (d. chapter III, 2.1, p. lS6f£); only theological virtues are called virtues simpliciter, because they alone make the ultimate end attainable; and within the context of the examination of the virtues, the question as to whether the virtue concerned will remain in patria has a regular place. In the Tertia Pars the eschatological dimension of the work of Christ has already been mentioned. It will be given some more relief in the next paragraph. In the consideration of the sacraments one may remember their dimension as signum prognosticum, inherent in each of the seven sacraments. And with this the final section of the work is reached, eschatology, to which the next paragraph is devoted. 1.3 God's glorifying work: the tract of eschatology In the prologue to the Terria Pars, Thomas formulates the intention to close the Summa Tbeologiae by considering 'the end which is inunortal life'.14 By placing this tract at the end of his work, he is in line with Peter Lombard's Liber quattuor sentenriarum and the order of the Creeds." From the perspective of the history of salvation the location seems to be natural since it concerns the end of time. When the place of this tract is examined more closely, one discovers that Aquinas attaches the perspective of immortal life to the life, death

STh m.prol AquinaS did not finish the Summa Theologiae. He stopped writing after 5Th ill 90 (in the middle of his consideration of the Sacrament of Penance) due to an experience he had while celebrating Mass on december 6th, 1273. Mer this experience he could. not write any further, for, as he said: "all that I have written seems like straw to me". Three months later he ditd. Weisheipl, 1983', p. 320-331). After his death the so-called Supplementum was "put together with scissors and paste from pieces cut out of AqUinas' writings on the Sentences" Weisheipl, 1983'2, p. 362). Because of this indirect authorship the Supplementum .is left out of consideration in this study. Our main sources are In W Sent 43-50, ScG IV 79-97, Comp Th I 149'184, 5Th I 12, 5Th I·II 1-5 aod sdected fragments of other works. " On the history of the place of the eschatological tract before Aquinas, cf. N. Wicki, 1954, p. 7-56.

14

Cf. P. Kiinzle, 1965, p. 233, taking up the Pauline image of !Co 15,37. Cf. P. Kiinzle 1961 aod 1965. 10 For what concerns the Tertia Pars this principle is covered by the fact that Christ is via'or et comprehensor (cf. chapter II, 2.1, p. 102). The primacy of finis u/,imus again points to the God-centered theology of Aquinas: the ultimate end is none other than God. 11 STh I 1.1.00, quoted in chapter I, foomote 21 on p. 13. 12 STh I 1.2.co: sacra doctrina est seremia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. U STh I 73.1.00, quoted above in footnote 7.

a.

a.

214

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and resurrection of-Christ." Christ is via, veritas et vita an 14,6): it is through Him that we enter the Life of God.17 Thus eschatology must be seen in the light of the redemptive work of Christ. Vita gloriae is the perfection of vita gratiae which is bestowed on human beings througb the sacraments, by which the restorative work of Christ is mediated. The importance of Christ, with regard to the perfection of the union with God, was discussed before when we examined the foundations of life with God in chapter ll. There it was also observed that according to Aquinas' interpretation, this restoration of the relationship with God is the beginning of a process which needs to be applied to every individual human being. In Christ the spiritual restoration is completed by His corporal resurrection. Thus, as Caput Ecclesiae, He reveals the destinati· on of humankind: life with God according to all dimensions of man, both spiritual and corporal. In (he community of Christ's followers spiritual restoration is obtained by the sacraments; the corporal side is delayed until the end of time." Thus the life, death and resurrection of Christ have a double eschatological character. Firstly - in line with the effectuating aspect with Christ the process of restoration of life with God begins. From that moment on the Holy Spirit is rooted in the history of humankind as the Spirit of Christ, communicated through the sacraments. By this new beginning the process of sanctification of creation has begun; a process which will be consummated by the glorification at the end of time. Secondly - in accordance with the revealing dimension - with the resurrection of Christ the plenitude and abundance of the restored (or rather: glorified) life with God is revealed to humankind. Thus,

interpreting the ,eschatological passages in Holy Scripture, the resurrection of Christ has an important hermeneutical function for Aquinas. The fundamental importance of Christ with regard to our relationship with God is based on the union of human ,and divine nature in His Person. Christ embodies the perfect relationship between God and man: His human life is entirely God-centered and the glorification of His human nature is the consummation of this God-centered life. Examining Thomas' eschatology, one recognizes this God-centered perspective as the guiding principle of his reflection. Everything is considered under the consideration of perfecting the relationship with God, on the model of Christ's resurrection and with the help of Biblical stories. The decisive framework, then, is that of corporal resurrection by which human nature is restored and the relationship with God is enjoyed and expressed in the integrity of body and sou!. According to this ultimate perfection, there can only be two states: that of total union with God (heaven) and that of total rejection of Him (hell). This corporal resurrection, however, will not take place until the end of time, when entire creation is purified, judged and reorganised proceeding from the relationship with God.19 This entails that the souls of those who die before the end of time 'wait' for reunion with their body, in order to enjoy the life of the beatified in accordance with the two dimensions of human nature. Aquinas also considers this situation of waiting from the perspective of the relationship with God. Since the will is fixed at the moment of death, the relationship with God measured in tenUs of charity - does not alter. Therefore, one could say that the quality of this relationship is decided upon at the moment an individual human being dies. In this particular judgement (iudicium singulare) it has already been decided whether or not there is a relationship of God ill grace which can be consumed in glorification. Thus, in Thomas' view, immediately after dying the separated soul endowed with charity is united with God in the visio beata; and that without charity is separated from God. In Aquinas' day, however, the conviction had grown that, a third option was possible: the situation of the soul endowed with grace, which, nevertheless, is in need of purification because of venial sin. The name for this state is purgatorium."

16

17

18

Cf. also the way in which Thomas opens his examination of eternal life in ScG IV 79: Quod per Christum resurrectio corporum sit futUTa. STh m.prol: Quia sa/valor noster Dominus Iesus Christus .. ' viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstr4vit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortaJis 'Vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus, necesse est ut, ad consummationem tatim theologici negotii .. , de ipso omnium Salvatore ac benefuiis eOO humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur.. Notice how In 14,6 is implicidy quoted. in order to connect Christology and eschatology. For the appropriateness of this, d. chapter II, 3.1, p. 126. Notice that in this manner the elements of the scheme presented above in 1.2.1 (p. 211) show a reversal concerning the order of coming to being and that of recreation: Comp Th I 17.. [leon: 70]: nunc enim anima in/unditur corpori seminato, et ideo convenienter transmutationes corporis sequitur; tunc vera corpus unietur animae praeexistenti, unde totaJiter sequetur eius conditiones.

19

"

Cf.ln IV Sent 43, 47 and 48. Cf.J. Le Goff, 1981. On the different locations after death which are organised from the perspective of the relationship with God, d. In W Sent 45.1.3.co.

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Keeping in mind this God-centered perspective, it becomes clear that for Thomas the incorruptibility of the soul occupies a subservient position within the larger, theological framework. For the ~heologian . who considers everything sub ratione Dei - and for the behever - who considers evetything from the God-centered perspective of charity - the question is not "what happens to me after death", but "what happens to my relationship with God, after death"". Aquinas' conviction that the soul is incorruptible because of its immateriality is helpful enabling him to conceive the continuity between earthly human life and life after death,but has no value apart from the relationship with God. To put it bluntly: because the relationship with God continues to exist after death - God's life (the life of grace) surpassing the boundaries of natural life there has to be a created entity.-to which this love is addressed. This, and nothing more or less, is the separated soul." The subservient position of the separated soul is evident when looked at from another perspective: being part of the damaged human nature, it is entirely directed at full human participation in eternal life. Only after the resurrection of the bodies can one speak of the glorification of human beings. Thus the resurrection of the body is not a bit of 'extra dessert' after the immortality of the soul; it is part of the 'main meal' and, more precisely, the part by which the glorification of human life takes place in accordance with the coordinates of (glorified) materiality and time, characteristic for the human condition. Because of the subservient position of the situation of the separated soul and the events at the end of time, we will focus our examination of Aquinas' account of eternal life and death on the situation of resurrected humankind in detail.

11

Cf. what we said in chapter ill, 2.1, p. 156ff and 2.2, p. 167ff about the shifts in the virtues according to which one increasingly loves oneself having God as •centre of gravity'. In the last decennia various studies show that one cannot playoff Aquinas' account of the incorruptibility of the soul against a so-called more Biblical idea of corporal resurrection (R. Heinzmann, 1965; H.J. Weber, 1973; H. Sonnemans, 1984; L. Schef£czyk, 1989). It is also shown which influences have caused oppositions like these (E. Lew3lter, 1935; J. Pieper, 1959 and 1968; H.J. Weber, 1973; G. Greshake/). Kremer, 19922 , p. 237-239). I want to stress the imponance of appreciating, what J. Ratzinger calls, the 'dialogical character of immortality' (T. Ratzinger, 1977, p. 127· 129, followed by H. Sonnemans, 1984 and P.·F. Ruelius, 1995, p. 346·369) which, in Aquinas' case, is entirely organised proceeding from the relationship with God. theol~gica1

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2. Living with God in the mode of perfection This section is dedicated to Thomas' account of the consummated life with God. Firsuhe structure of this eternal life, which was introduced in 1.2.1, is worked out in detail by examining Aquinas' account of the glorified soul, body and world (2.1). The counterpart of the reflection on man who has reached his ultimate destination is embodied in Aquinas' exegesis of the passages in Scripture about eternal damnation and hell. This account of 'eternal death' is studied next (2.2). Thus we will show that both, vita aeterna and mors aetema, primarily concern the relationship with God. 2.1 Etemallife

In IV Sent 49.1.2c is dedicated to the question as to whether beatitude is the same as eternal life. Aquinas' analysis of the concept vita aeterna is helpful in enabling us to appreciate how the theological appro· ach of eternal life is determined by God's incomprehensibility. By connecting this analysis of the Scriptum with the insights of chapter I, it is possible to understand Aquinas' radical theocentric approach to God's opus glorificationis. Aquinas' account of eternal life is examined in three stages: the glorified soul (2.1.1), the glorified body (2.1.2) and the glorified creation (2.1.3). In this way we move from the core of eternal life to the allcomprehensive perspective which is characteristic for eschatology. 2.1.1 The glorified soul

In In IV Sent 49.1.2c, where Thomas examines whether beatitudo is the same as vita aeterna, he subsequently investigates vita and aetema. With regard to vita he states that this word is used having two meanings: signifying the existence (esse) of a living thing and denoting the operation (operatio) at which a living creature is able to move itself. In the case of human beings the highest operations to which they can bring themselves are willing and knowing. According to this second meaning the main operation at which one's entire existence is directed,

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is called his 'life'." Having determined that vita, in vita aetema, refers to an operation, Aquinas proceeds by examining the other element of the concept: aeterna. Operations can only be measured by time when they are connected with motion. Operations which transcend all motion, cannot be measured by time; only by a measure which is beyond (supra) time. The vision of God is not an action which can be measured by time, because it is not successive: neither from the part of the one who sees, nor from the part of the One seen: both are beyond motion. The connection between the human and the divine part of the visio beata is clarified in the answer to the third obiectio: seeing God, man participates in the divine operation and, consequently, in God's eternity." By conceiving eternal life of man as a participation in God's operation, it becomes clear that glorification is God's work. Moreover, the approach of God's opus glorificationis is radically qualified by Thomas' 'negative' doctrine on God. We do not understand Aquinas' eschatology before having understood his doctrine on God. Therefore, we will first focus on God's eternity and investigate the 'negative' character of this word when used in divinis. Subsequently we will deal with what this participation in God's operation entails for the glorified intellect and will. In chapter I, 2.2.2 (p. 41) we examined the coincidence of God's life with the divine immutabilitas. The concept of aetemitas is closely related

to that of immutability, for it follows from the latter." Time is appreciated by considering the earlier and the later in motion. We can only approach the notion of eternity through considering what time is and subsequently follow the via negativa. Thus Thomas notes two characteristic aspects of eternity: it has no beginning or end and it lacks all succession. 26 . The distinction between time and eternity i~ easily treated as one within the created world. Eternity is then interpreted as a simultaneity which is stretched endlessly in time. In fact, however, this distinction directly imports that between Creator and creature, according to which God is said to be differing differently." In order to appreciate the distinction between time and eternity it may be helpful to introduce the concept of perpetuity. As eternity is beyond time, perpetuity can b.appreciated either according to the mode of eternity or that of time. Thomas observes a threefold opposition between the two modes. In the eternal mode perpetuity is fixed, all at once and undivided; in the temporal mode it is flowing, successive and consisting of subsequent parts." The .temporal mode of perpetuity is easily mistaken for eternity." Eternity, however, is a word denoting God's incomprehensible being. It

218

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In IV Sent 49.1.2c.co; vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsum esse viventis ... Ex hoc autem dicitur aliquid vivens quod potest seipsum movere secundum aliquam actwnem ... unde secunda trans/atum est nomen vitae ad significandum operationem ad quam aliquis seipsum move4 skut sentire dicitUT vita anima/is, et inteltigere vita hominis; et secundum hunc modum unusquisque ilJam operationem suam 'Vitam reputat cui maxime intendit, quasi ad hoc sit totum esse mum ordinatum; This is in line with In 17,3, quoted in sc2, where knowing God is called etemallife (d. Comp 7b I 163). Nome that Thomas takes the second and the third meaning of the word 'life' (d. chapter I, p. 21) as one. He is able to do so because the third meaning depends on the second. Cf. what we said about the interrelation of the three meanings in chapter II, 1.1, p. 76.

2~

In IV Sent 49.1.2c.ra3: sicat homo fit particeps divinae operationis in q)idendo Deum, ita fUJt particeps aeternitatis, qua divina operatio mensuratur; et sic ipsa eOO operatio dicitur vita aeterna. Notice that here eternal life is not primarily eternal existence, but eternal operation; an operation by which the relationship with God is constituted. Vita refers primarily to operatio; of course operatio implies esse; On the notion of 'panicipated eternity', d. C. Peter, 1964.

Cf. STh I 10.2.co: ratio aetemitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicat ratio temporis consequitur motum. 26 STh I 10.l.eo: sicut in eognitionem simplieium oponet nos venire per composita, ita in eognitionem aetemitatis oportet nos venire per tempus ... Sic ergo ex duobus notijicatur aeternitas. Primo. ex hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest prindpio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque re{eratur). Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul existens. For a more elaborate discussion of Aquinas' account of eternity with regard to God, d. H. Goris, 1996, p. 34-52. " Cf. chapter I, 1.1, p. 11. 28 In De causis 30 [Busa: 84]: duplex est perpetuitas vel perpetua durabilitas: una quidem per modum aeternitatis, alia vero per modum totOO temporis. et differunt hae perpetuae durationes triplieiter. Primo quidem quia perpetuitas aeternalis est fixa, stans. immobilis; perpetuitas au.tem tempara/is est fluens et mobilis. in quantum tempus est mensura motus, aeterni~ autem aceipitur ut mensura esse immobilis. Secundo quia perpetuitas aeternalis est tota simul quasi in uno col/eela; perpetuitas autem temporalis habet successivam extensionem secundum prius et posterius quae sunt de ratione temporis. Tertio quia perpetuitas aeternalis est simplex, tota secundum seipsam existens; sed universalitas sive totalitas perpetuitatis temporalis est secundum diversas partes sibi succedentes. 2' Aquinas does, though not often, speak of vita perpetua, referring to the perpetuitas of eternallif., d. In Rom 6.2 [Busa: 1181, In Rom 14.1 [Busa: 479·4801, In Heb 7.3 [Busa: 254-2551. :IS

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follows from God's immutability and, as we saw in chapter I, this immutability is based on God's perfection according to which He is called actus purus. Thus eternity should be seen as referring to the fullness of God's life. This fullness is well expressed in Boethius' definition which Aquinas adopts: "eternity is the perfect possession altogether and all at once of boundless life."" The copious perfection of God's life, blinding the human soul in via and being the reason that in earthly life God can only be approached as the incomprehensible God", is prominent in the analysis of eternal beatitude. As we have seen, Thomas conceives vita aeterna as a participation in God's operatio by which He is blessed. This operatio is the activity of His intellect and His will; both ;tre called 'life' (as we saw in chapter 1) and both are interrelated in their operation. How then do they contribute to eternal life, and how can the infinite distance between Creator and creature be bridged? The human intellect is organised so as to obtain knowledge by abstraction of information provided by the senses. God, however, is no object in the sensible world. He cannot be distinguished with the help of the same procedure by which created objects are distinguished, viz. by looking for differentiae. As we said in chapter I, God differs differently. His is outside any genus or species and none of our concepts or words is used univoce when naming the divine essence. Nevertheless, in Holy Scripture the promise is made that God "will be seen face to face and known as I am known" (lCo 13,12). How can God ever be known directly when the human intellect and the divine perfection seem to be so incompatible? The solution to this problem calls for the same approach we had when discussing God's incomprehensibility (chapter 1). Proceeding from the created intellect as potency, Thomas teaches that it should be strengthened and made available in order to be able to receive God. This is effectuated to the degree that the will is assimilated to God by charity. The result of this in the intellect is a similitude, a God·likeness (deiformitas) of the faculty of seeing which Aquinas calls lumen

gloria'?', according to the verse: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen (ps 35,10). This light is a created light, since it is a created participation in God's intellectual power." Apart from strengthening the intellectual power, God also provides the intelligible species, because of the fact that the glorified intellect is immediately united to God Himself. ill earthly life the agent intellect forms an intelligible species by which the object known is presented to the intellect. Because God is outside any genus, no intelligible species can contain Him. The only way of knowing Him directly is the manner in which God knows Himself: by being at one and the same time knower, object known, medium by which is known and act of knowing (thus discerning what, according to divine simplicity, cannot be separated). Therefore, in the visio beata or aperta God is not only object of knowing, but also medium by which the object is known." Here we reach the borders of what is comprehen· sible. The object as well as the medium by which is known, is God's incompreh<;llsible being. This is true participation in God's knowing which is His esse. The abundance of this sharing in God's perfection is expressed in the fact that the borders of the potency of the glorified soul (the soul conforted by lumen gloriae) are transcended. The intellect is entirely and totally in actu. Intellect and will, however, are intrinsically connected in performing their operation. The role of the will in eternal life is twofold: prevenient and subsequent with regard to the activity of the intellect. Since human agency is directed by the will, the will is the faculty by which the other potencies are set in motion. Thus the will plays an important role with regard to the question as to whether the intellect is directed at God. The will belongs to ,the appetitive side of the intellectual nature, associated with motion and therefore connected with the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus the theological virtues of hope and charity are located in the volitional poiency, as we saw in the preceding chapter. The decisive role of charity with regard to man attaining his ultimate end was mentioned " S,G ill 53, STh I 12.5. "

'0 Aeterm'td$ est interminabilis vitae tata simut et perfecta possessio (Boethius, "

V De consolatwne 6), quoted in STh I lO.1.ag!. For the tota simul character of vita aetenza, d. also Ccmp Th I 149. Cf. what is said in chapter I, 1.1, p. 9ff.

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Cf. Aquinas' indication of the light of glory, STh I 12.2.co, diqua similitudo ex par" vuivae potentiae ... confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum; SIb I 12.2.ral: simiJitudine quae est per participationem luminis gloriae; STh I 12.6.co: lumen gloriae, quod intellectUm in quadam deiformitate constituit; 5Th I 12.7.00: lumen gloriae creatum. ScG m 51.2: divina substantia non potest videri per intell«tum aliqua specie creata. Unde oportet, si Dei essentia videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intelleetus ipsam videat.' ut sit in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur, et quo videtur.

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many times before. The precise connection between caritas and finis ultimus is established in the concept of lumen gloriae. By the conformity of the human will with God's will - which charity basically is, as we saw in the preceding chapter - the intellect is rendered fitting for receiving the object desired. Thus the amount of charity determines the degree of panicipation in the visio beata or vita aeterna." Apart from this preceding and determining role of the will, it plays a second role according to its function as potency of enjoyment_ Whereas the appetitive motion of the will comes to rest by attaining the ultimate end, at the same time the faculty is brought to its limits by enjoying a pleasure which outreaches our desires and hopes_" Here we arrive at the notion of ultimate end as beatitude. According to the volitional order, the will reaches the ultimate end by attaining the highest good. By attainig this summum bonum" desire comes to rest and the soul is filled with enjoyment_ As we have seen, Thomas considers the intellect as the faculty by which the contact with God is made, being the potency by which the object is received in the potency according to the manner of the latter. Thus, strictly speaking, visio beata is the core of beatitude." Since beatitude is the ultimate end of entire man - and man is more than his intellect - it is accompagnied by the perfection of the will, which consists in its coming to rest and delighting in the good

,s 5Th I 12.6.co: intel/eetus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu [acultatem ad videndum Deum. quam alterius. Pacultas autem videndi Deum non compet;t intel/eetu; CYe4to secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen g/oriae, quod imeIJectum in quadam deiformitate constituit, ut ex superioribus [STh I 12.5} patet. Unde intel/eetus plus participans de lumine glariae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem panielpabit de lumine gl~ qui plus habet de caritate. Quia ubi est malor caritas. ibi est maim desideriumi et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior ent. For the necessity of the recta 'VO/untas d. also STh I-ll 4.4 (ra2: recta inclinatio voluntatis praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, situt rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem sigm). For the question whether all beatified share equally in the vision of God (based on the exegesis of 1Co 15,41: stel/a differt a stella in claritate) preceding Aquinas' account·, d. the classical study of N. Wicki, 1954, p. 23$-255. )6 Cf. In Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa; 40D: Item in perfecta satietate desideni: nam ibi habebit qui/ibet beatus ultra desiderata et sperala. Guius ratio est, quia nul/us potest in vita ista imp/ere desiderium suum, nee unquam aliquod creatum satiat desiderium hominis. Deus enim so/us satiat, et in infinitum excedit; et inde est quod non quiescit nisi in Deo . ... Quidquid enim delectabile est, totum est ihi superabundanter. " STh I-II 4.2.

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attained.l8

The perfection of the will - like that of the intellect - is appreciated in terms of the potency reaching its limits. By attaining the highest good, the will is necessarily loving God to its utmost." Union with the ultimate end renders the will a rectitudo by which it is impossible for it ever being averted from God: there is no created good which, to the slightest degree, approximates the infinite desirability of divine goodness. This rectitudo of the will implies a conformity with God's will, according to which it agrees with God no matter what the reward is_4O In fact we encounter here the same God-centered character which we discovered to be characteristic for the theological vinues in the preceding chapter. This God-centered character of beatitu?e is so ~1I­ determining that even the friendship with fellow human beIngs - whIch holds the second rank in the hierarchy of charity - is considered to be inessential to beatitudeY This, however, does not mean that Aquinas' eschatology. has an individualistic scope. Heavenly beatitude has a social character, like the Church and like human life - or rather 'life' - as such." Analysing the structure of the concept of beatitude, however, one should say that its essence consists in the union with God, whereas its perfection consists - among other things - in the communion with

STh I-II 4.1.00: quadYUpliciter aI;quid requiritur ad aliud. ... Quarto modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad bea~itudinem. De1ectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, ·cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptw summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine de1ectatione concomitante. n sTh I-II 4.4.co: Et ita .'VOluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voJuntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione bom quam novit. Cf. also ScG ill 62. -40 In IV Sent 50.2.4a-c. . 41 STh I-II 4.8.co: si loquamur de felicitate paesentis vitae ..., felix indiget amicis ... Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatimdine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae peifectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum. 42 In Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa; 92D: quarto consistit [vita aeternaJ in omnium beatorum iucunda societate. quae societas erit maxime delectabilis: quia qui/ihet habebit omnia bona cum omnibus beatis. Nam qui/thet diliget alium sicut seipsum; et ideo gaudebit de bone alterius skut de suo. Quo fit ut tantum augeatur laetitia et gaudium unius, quantum est gaudium omnium. Cf. R. Petry, 1944, who is right in his conclusion. though fails to appreciate the radical impact of the primacy of love for God. Cf. also In IV Sent 49.1.2•.

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other beatified." Eternal life is God's life in God's mode: it is knowing God with the double help of God. It is a life of perfection according to which all striving and desiring has come to rest. The ultimate end is arrived at and there is no further end, nor further future." For this reason eternal life has a character of overflowing expression to which we referred above in 1.2.1 (p. 211). The nature of this structure was already introduced in this study, when we discussed creation in chapter II (p. 70). There we noticed that God did not need to create for any goal. For the blessed the same is true: there is no further end apart from sharing in God's beatitude. Both motives flow together in the notion of eternal life: in giving eternal life, the triune God gives Himself, and giving oneself, is a sign of great love." In eternal lif~ man is assimilated to God's overflowing goodness (or love), sharing the same copious beatitude which is at the origin of creation." In the state of glory everything is there as an expression of this beatitude, and in the first place that which is by nature closest to the glorified soul: the body.

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In 5Th I-I[ 4.8.ra3 this is elucidated from the consideration that if friendship with

other human beings were essential to beatitude, a single soul could not be blessed: perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad diJectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens DeD, beara essa, non habens proximum quem diligent. Since this is not reality, Thomas continues: Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam. A similar relation (quasi concomitanttr, or as in the corpus: ad bene esse) is formulated with regard to the role of the body, of which we will speak in the next paragraph. +! 5Th IT·ll 18.2.ra2: beatitudo sanctorum dicitur 'Vita aetema, quia p~ hoc quod Deo [ruuntur, efficiuntur quod4mmodo participes aeternitatis divinae, quae excedit omne tempus. Et ita continuatio beatitudinis non diversijicatur per praesens, praeteritum et futurum; Cf. also De spe 4.ra3: continuatio beatitudinis non habet rationem futliri: quia inquantum aliquis homo fit betttus, aetemitatem participat, in qua non est praeteritum et futurum; unde in betttitudine ilia dicitur vita aeterna. "s Cf. In Joan 3.3 [Busa: 101]: In hoc autem quod dicit IIhabeat vitam aeternam" Un 3,16] indicatur divini 411Wris immensitas: nam dando vitam aeternam, dat seipsum. Nam vita aeterna nihil aliud est quam [rui Deo. Dare autem seipsum, magni amoris est indicium; Ep 2,4-5: "Deus autem qui dives est in misericordia, convivificavit nos in Christo", idest fecit nos habere vitam aeternam. 46 Although the infinite distance between the divine and the human nature remains in patria: d. S7b IT·IT 19.11.ra3.

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2.1.2 The glorified body In the preceding chapters we observed that, in Aquinas' view, human nature comprises a spiritual and a corporal dimension. Neither a disembodied soul, nor a disanimated body can be called a human being. In chapter II Thomas' emphasis on the unity of human nature was presented (1.1, p. 72fQ and it was stated that the shadowy existence of the separated soul is something quite different from the Christian conception of eternal life (1.2, p. 81). In a number of works Thomas points to. this unity of body and soul when he wants to increase the plausibility of the Biblical resurrection of the dead. Because the human soul is forma corporis, there remains a longing for its body after both are separated by death." The argument runs as follows: perfect beatitude requires that all striving has come to rest; a separated soul continues to long for its body and thus a human being cannot be perfectly happy until body and soul are reunited. Despite the importance of the unity of man for beatitude, in the Sumnut 1beologiae the contribution of the body to beatitude is reduced to an accidental status. Essentially, the vision of the divine essence - in which man's perfect beatitude consists - is an operation of the glorified intellect, without using corporal phantasnutta. The union with the divine essence - according to which God is siinultanuously object and medium of knowing - is achieved entirely by God's initiative and demands the intellectual faculties only. Thus, as far as the essence of beatitude is concerned, the body is not needed. This, however, does not mean that corporal resurrection is nothing more than an ornament of no genuine importance. Thomas makes subtle distinctions here, which are easily confused because of their wordily resemblance. The perfect act of the intellect, by which all striving for knowledge comes to rest, can be attributed to the separated soul. The intellectual part of man has subsistent being and can function on this basis." The separated soul cannot, however, perform this (perfect) act perfectly, viz. in accordance

"

Cf. De po. 5.10; SeG IV 79 and 91; Comp 7b 115.

U

STh I-II 4.5.ra2: Unde relinquitur quod post separationem a corpore perfictum esse habettt, unde et peifectam operationem habere potest; licet non habettt peifectam naturam speciei.

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with human nature." The separated soul is no human being and - as defective part of human nature - it longs to share its beatitude with its body. This longing is a defect, but not to such a degree that it impedes beatitude. Thus the essence of beatitude is reached; its ultimate perfection, however, is delayed until corporal resurrection." After the resurrection of the body this perfection of beatitude can be seen as an extensive growth - the beatitude of the soul being extended to the body

Thus, we come across the same view here as in the preceding article: the body is indispensible for perfect beatitude, but nevertheless not contributing to its essence. The relation between body and soul in the state of consummated life with God is one of overflowing expression. In 'Vita acterna human life is still material, corporal, but now radically 'redefined' proceeding from the completed relationship with God. In this 'redefinition' everything is consistently based upon the relationship with God." The human capacity for God is located in the soul, not in the body. The body which has helped us to grow unto eternal beatitude, is not able to reach it directly. It can only receive it from the soul by overflowing." In this God-centered eschatology the corporal dimension of human existence is not denied, but radically subjected to its core: life with God." In the. glorified soul, as we have seen, the faculties are in perfect harmony. Since the soul is forma corporis, the perfection of its faculties results in a perfect operation of those powers which are connected with

- and not an intensive one.51

After having reduced the role of the body as regatds the essence of beatitude, Thomas, as it were, underscores the importance of corporal resurrection in the next article in the Summa. He rejects a dualistic anthropology according to which the soul can only be blessed when it is separated from the body: the ukimate perfection of the soul cannot exclude its natural perfection according to which it should be united to the body. In his account of the precise role of the body, however, he tries to keep a balance between two demands. On the one hand, the perfect disposition of the body is necessary for a beatitude which is perfect in every respect. On the other, this perfect disposition of the body does not contribute to the essence of beatitude: its role is antecedenter et consequenter. The perfection of the body precedes perfect beatitude to the degree that it causes no hindrance for the operation of the intellect; it is subsequent to perfect beatitude by the fact that it shares in the perfection of the intellect by overflowing {redundantia}."

STh I-II 4.5.co: Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quando 4.nima perfectior erie in sua natura, tanto perj'ectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas consistit. Cf. also STh I-II 4.5.ra2. ,. STh 1·11 4.5.ra4. 51 With regard to the determination of the relation between the glorified soul and the glorified body one cannot hut take sides in an old controversy concerning a discordance between two texts of Aquinas. Cf. appendix II on p. 272. 51 STh I-II 4.6.co: si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod tUm requiritur ad beatitudinem aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad earn ut omnino anima sit a corpore separata ... sed hoc est inconveniens ... Et ideo dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam, requiritur perfecta dispositio c01pOYis et antecedenter et consequenter. Antecendenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII super ad Gen. ad litt. 35, si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficiJis et gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat animam, avert;tur mens ab iJIa visione summ; caeJi ... Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur, In In IV Sent 49.1.4 Thomas sketches a steadily increasing line: eanhly life, where union with the body is a hindrance for the perfect operation of the soul; after death, when the separated soul is liberated from the hindrance of 49

53

Sf

55

the body; after corporal resurrection, when the operation of the soul is intensively increased by union with the body. In STh 1·11 4.6, the role of the body in the third state is limited to a contribution to the beauty or perfection of beatitude (ra1: aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem), consisting in non-hindrance (ra2: requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis) and total subjection (ra3: non autem [requiritur abstractioJ a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritu; subiectum). In I Cor 15.5 [Busa: 223]: sic ergo et in resurrectione erit alia qualitas corporis resurgentis, quae tamen proportionabitWl' meritis morientis. STh II-II 25.5.ra2: corpus nostrum quamvis Deo /rue non possit cognoscendo et amando ipsu~ tamen per opera quae per corpus agimus ad perfectam Dei fruitionem possumus venire. Untie ex fruitione animae redundat quaedam beatitudo ad corpus... Cf. also the strong expressions in STh II-II 18.2.ag4: cum spes sit virtu,s theologica habens Deum pro obiecto. principale obiectum spei est gloria animae, quae in fruitione divina consistit, non autem gloria corporis. Gloria etiam corporis, etsi habeat rationem ardui per comparationem ad natWl'am humanam, non habet tamen rationem ardui habenti gloriam animae. Tum quia gloria corporis est minimum quiddam in compara· tione ad gloriam animae. Tum etiam quia habens gloriam animae habet iam su/ficienter causam gloriae corporis; SIb m 7.4.ra2: gloria corporis non pertinet ad beatitudinem sicut in quo principaliter beatitudo consistat, sed per quandam redundantiam a glOYia animae ... Unde spes, secundum quod est '£linus theologica, non respicit beatitudinem corporis, sed beatitudinem animae quae in divina fruitione consistit. Cf. also STb m 15.10.co+ ra2.

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the body." The passage of Holy Scripture which is most influential in the appreciation of the resurrected body, is lCo 15,42-44. Here the recreation of man, proceeding from his relationship with God, is qualified as the resurrection of a spiritual body instead of an animal-like one. The animal-like body - perfected by the soul - is the one which is inherited from the first man, Adam. The spiritual body is the one which is entirely directed at the spiritual dimension of human life. Moreover, the word 'spiritual' simultanuously refers to the life of grace. Here Christ is the ancestor, giving access to the life.giving Spirit." The perfection of the glorified body is discussed under the notion of dotes corporis. Thomas distinguishes four dotes corporis, dowries which God gives to the glorified so that the body shares in the glory of the soul: subtilitas, claritas, impassibilitas and agilitas." The dotes are not descriptions of the glorified materiality of the body. The four concepts describe the relation between soul and body: corporal dowries are the dispositions in the glorified body by which the body is made perfectly subjected to the sou!." The glory of the soul as forma is revealed in the first three dotes, the function of the soul as motor is perfected in the fourth. Subtilitas, or subtlety, is not a property which enables the resur·

rected to walk - like the resurrected Lord - through closed doors; it is a term which denotes the perfect accomodation of the body to the 'spiritual man'.60 Claritas, or lightsomeness, does not refer to a luminous skin, but indicates that the clarity of the soul is materially expressed in the beauty of the body." Impassibilitas, or the incapacity of suffering, corresponds to the perfect operation of the soul as forma corporis with regard to the preservation of the body." Agilitas, agility, concerns the perfect control of the soul over the body with regard to corporal movements. 63

By the dotes the spiritual perfection of the glorified human being is materially expressed. Nevertheless, although body and soul are in greater harmony than in via, the operations of the glorified can hardly be imagined. During life on earth corporal activities are directed at the continuation of the individual and the species. Human beings need food in order to survive and procreation in order to ensure their existence. In patria these two central activities are no longer necessary. The body is so completely informed by and filled with the glorified soul, that it no longer has the function of ensuring the basis of natural life. 64

60

S6

5?

58

59

In I Cor 15.6 [Busa: 247]: sed in statu resurrectionis cessabunt operationes animates a corpore, quia non ent generalia, nee augmentum aut nutrimentum, sed corpus absque a1iquo impedimenta et fatigatrom incessanter serviet animae ad spirituales operationes eius. In I Cor 15.6 [Busa: 199]: Apostolus non dicit quod resurgat spiritus, sed spirituale corpus. Ergo in resurrectione spirituale eril, non spiritus, sicut nunc est anima/e, non anima. Ad horum autem differentiam cognoscendam considerandum est, quod unum et idem in nobis est quod dicitur et anima et spiritus; sed anima dicitur secundum quod perficit corpus, spiritus autem proprie secundum mentem, secundum quam spiritualibus subslantiis assirnilamur; and funher: In I Cor 15.7 [Busa: 22]: Duo sunt principia humani generis; unum secundum vitam naturae, scilicet Adam, aliud secundum vitam gratiae, scilicet Chrisms,· sed anima/itas est derivativa in omnes homines a prima principio, scilicet Adam; ergo constat quod multo amplius a secundo principio, scilicet Christo, spirituaJitas derivabitur in omnes homines; Cf. also In Joan 5.5 [Busa: 275ff] where the resurrection of body and soul is connected with conformity to the Word. Cf. In IV Sent 49.4.5a-c; ScG IV 86; Comp Tn I 168. For the developments which have led to this exegesis, d. N. Wicki, 1954, p. 202·237. Apan from the four dotes corporis, Aquinas also distinguishes three dotes animae: visio, fruitio and dilectio. Cf. In IV Sent 49.4.5, STb I 12.7.ra1, De art 2. In IV Sent 49.4.5b.co: ita dispositiones quae sunt in corpore glorioso, ex quibus corpus efficitur peifecte animae subiectum, dicuntur corporis dotes.

61

62

6J

~

In IV Sent 44.2.2a.co: [Busa: 2] nomen subtilitatis a virtute penetrandi est assumptum,' ... /Busa: 86] dicta completio, ex quo corpora humana subtilia dicentur, erit ex dominio animae glorificatae, quae est fonna corporis, super ipsum,' ratione cuius corpus gloriosum spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui subiectum. Cf. also In IV Sent 44.2.2h-f. ScG IV 86.1: Erit [corpus] enim tota/iter subiectum animae, divina virtute hoc fociente, non solum quantum ad esse, sed etiam quantum ad actiones et passiones, et matus, et corporeas qualitates. {2] Sicut igitur anima divina visione [mens quadam spirituali claritate replebitur, ita per quandam redundantiam ex anima in carpus. ipsum corpus suo mado claritatis gloriae induetur. Cf. In IV Sent 44.2.4a-c. ScG N 86.4: Et corpus igitur perfoctum per animam proportionaiiter animae, immune erit ab omni malo. et quantum ad actuni et quantum ad potentiam. Quantum ad actum quidem, quia nulla in eis erit corruptio. nulla defonnitas, nulla delectus. Quantum ad potentiam 'Vero, quia non poterunt pati aliquid quod eis sit malestum. Et propter hoc impassibilia erunt. Quae tamen impassibiJieas non exdudit ab eis passionem quae est de ratione sensus: utentur enim sensibus ad delectationem secundum iJla quae statui incorruptionis non repugnant. Cf. In W Sent 44.2.1a-d. ScC IV 863: Anima etiam quae divina visione [metur, ultimo fine coniuncta, in omnibus experiemr mum desiderium adimpletum. Et quia ex desiderio animae movetur corpus, comequens erit quod corpus omnino spiritui ad nutum obediet. Unde corpora resurgentium beatorum fotura erunt agilia. Referring to the 'post-final' character of overflowing of eternal life, Aquinas adds: non quod matus sit in eis propter necessitatem, cum nullo indigeant qui Deum habent, sed ad virtutis dermmstrationem. Cf. In IV Sent 44.2.3a-c. In IV Sent 44.1.4<1; S,G IV 83; o,mp Tb I 156.

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2.1.3 The glorified creation In chapter II we learned that, in Aquinas' view, man holds a central place in creation. All creatures contribute to the perfection of man and in this perfection the entire creation arrives at its consummation. 65 For this reason eternal life of man has its impact on the entire universe: all creatures are ameliorated by the restoration of man. 66 This radical anthropocentric perspective can be found in all places where Thomas examines the innovation of the world at the end of time." In Aquinas' account of this 'amelioration', it once more becomes clear that the entire new creation is organised· having the glorified human soul as point of departure. All corporal creatures are adjusted to a state which is in harmony wit)l that of the glorified man." For the heavenly bodies, endowed with an incorruptible nature, this entails that they will cease moving. Not only because this is in conformity with the nunc stans of eternal life (time is measured by the motion of the heavenly bodies), but also because of a more specific, connected reason. According to what Thomas has learned from Aristotle, generation and corruption in the world are caused by the motion of the heavenly bodies. In the state of the world after the Final Judgement all corruption is banned and man is given an incorruptible body." The cessation of generation and corruption has no drastic impact on those creatures which are - partly or entirely - incorruptible by nature. For those which are entirely corruptible - like plants, animals and bodies consisting of two or more elements - this cessation is more far-reaching:

Thomas sees no reason for further existence. They do not directly participate with man in the beatific vision - as angels do - for they lack the rational nature which is a precondition to being endowed with charity.70 Neither do they occupy a subservient place in the eternal life of man. Their function of supporting the corporal life of man has ended. Nutrition, shelter, help and whatever other service is no longer needed, since the glorified body is entirely and perfectly kept in existence by the glorified soul." All functions with a final structure are incompatible with the character of overflowing of eternal life. Aquinas considers the lack of animals, plants and minerals in the glorified universe in agreement with Saint Paul's promise in leo 7,31 that the world, as we know it, will pass away." The new form of the world will be entirely in congruity with glorified man and for this reason the remaining bodies are endowed with glory," whereas in the world in which we live all corporal creatures do contribute to the knowledge of God, in the glorified universe this function is no longer thinkable. The most complete knowledge of God is directly obtained by beatific vision. The glorification of corporal creation pertains to the character of overflowing of eternal life. As comfort for the corporal eyes, which cannot attain the vision of God, they are enabled to see the divinity in his corporal effects: from the clarity of the resurrected body

(po 222), panicipation in eternal life is determined by the amount of charity. Plants and animals are excluded from charity: d. 5Th IT-IT 25.3. 71 Cf. De pot_5.9.co [Bwa: 35]: cum anima/fa habeant vitam imperj'ectam respectu vitae humanae, quae simpliciter perfecta est, et plantae respectu animalium; plantae sunt propter animalia, praeparatae eis in cibum a natura; animaJia vero propter hominem, necessaria ei ad cibum el ad alia auxilia. Isla autem necessitas est, vita anima/is hominis durante; quae quidem in ilia rerum innovatione tolletur, quia corpus resurget non animale sed spirituale. ut dicitur lCo 15,44; et ideo tunc etiam anima/ia et plantae ces,abunt. Cf. also ScG IV 97 and In IV Sent 48.2.5. 72 ScC IV 97.5: Sic igitur intelligendum est quod Apostolus dicit lCo 7,31: "praeterit figura huius mundi", quia haec species mundi quae nunc est, cessabit: substantia vero remanebit. n ScG IV 97.7: Quia igitur creatura corporalis finaliter disponetur per congruentiam ad hominis statum; homines autem non solum a corruptione liberabuntur, sed etiam gloria induentur, ut ex dictis [SeC IV 86J patet. oportebit quod etiam creatura corporalis quam/am claritatis gloriam suo modo consequatur. This is connected with Rv 21,1 and Is 65,17·18.

70

" 66

" 68

Cf. chapter II, 1.1, p. 76. Cf. In IV Sent 48.1.1.co: Et quia per redemptionem humani generis non solum homines reparavit, sed etiam universaiiter totam creaturam; secundum quod tota creatura reparato homine melioratur, ut habet Col 1,20: "pacifkans per sanguinem crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in cae/is sunt"j ideo non solum super homines, sed super universam creaturam Christus per suam passionem dominium prameruit, et iudicariam potestatem. Me 28,18: "data est mihi omnis potestas in coelo et in terra." Cf. In IV Sent 48.2.1·5, ScG IV 97, De pot 5.9, Comp 'Ih I 169·171. ScG IV 97.1: Peracto igitur finali iudicio, natura humana totaliter in suo termino

constituetur. Quia vero omnia corpora/ia sun! quodammodo propter hominem, ut in Tertia {ScG m 81] est ostensum, tunc etiam totOO creaturae corporeae conveniens est ut status itn.m.uretUY, ut congruat statui hominum qui tunc erunt. '9 ScG IV 97-.2: Generatio autem et corruptio quae est in inferioribus corporibus ex motu caeli causatur. Ad hoc igitur quod in inferioribus cesset generatio et corruptio, oportet etiam quod motus caeli cesset. Et propter hoc dicitur Rv 10,6 quod "Tempus amplius non erit. "

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As we saw above in 2.1

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of Christ to the bodies of the glorified souls and the heavenly bodies." In the glorified universe everything expresses the situation of consummated relationship with God. Even the location of the body within the glorified creation expresses this. The more noble the soul, the higher and closer to God the body is. Thus the fitting place for the glorified soul is high in heaven, just like Christ, "who went up above all heavens to fill all things (Ep 4,10)."" Likewise, the location of those who turn away from God is expressed by distance from heaven." This brings us to eternal death, the opposite of glorification. 2.2 Eternal death

Mors aeterna, the opposite of eternal life, is a serious factor in Aquinas' theology. In order to obtain a balanced interpretation of his account of life and death, this perspective of utter misery is dealt with in two steps. First, the 'logic' of hell is examined (2.2.1). The word 'logic' in this context refers to the structural principles which lie at the basis of Thomas' interpretation of those passages in Scripture which speak of eternal punishment. Second, the limits of reflection are investigated (2.2.2). It is argued that Aquinas is not insensitive to theological problems with regard to hell, but that his approach to this problem shows the primacy of God's incomprehensibility in his theology, without prematurely having recourse to agnosticism. .

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In IV Sent 48.2.1.co: omnia corporaJia propter hominem facta esse creduntur,· unde et omnia dicuntur ei esse subiecta. Seruiunt autem ei dupliciter. Uno modo ad sustentationem vitae corpora/is; alio modo ad profectum divinae cognitionis, inquantum homo "per fa quae facta sunt, invisibilia Dei conspicit", ut dicit Rm 1,20. Primo ergo ministeno creaturarum, homo glorificatus nul/o modo indigebit ... Secunda etiam ministerio non indigebit homo quantum ad cognitionem intellectivam; quia tali cognitione Deum sanel; videbunt immediate per essentiam. Sed ad hane visionem essentiae oculus carnis atlingere non poterit; et ideo, ut ei solatium congruens sib; de vis;· one divinitatis praebeatur, inspiriet divinitatem in suu eJfectibus corporalibus, in quibus manifeste indicia divi.nae maiestatis apparebunt, et praecipue in carne Christi; et post hoc in corporibus beatorum,' et deinceps in omnibus aliis corporibus... Cf. also QuodI8.9.2; With regard to Rm 1,20, d. chapter II, footnote 7 on p. 70. " Quoted in SeG N 87.1. 76 ScG IV 89: Sicut autem corpora beatcrum propter innovationem gloriae supra caelestia corpora elwabuntur,· ita et locus injimus, et tenebrosus, et poena/is, proportionaliter deputabitur eorporibus damnatomm. .. This is connected with Ps 54,16 and Rv 20,9·10.

233

2.2.1 The 'logic' of hell God's opus glorificationis concerns the perfection of what is begun by the life of grace, The will, which is averted from God by mortal sin, is fixed. The aversion from God has inevitably the character of eternal privation of the life of grace and glory. The privation of life is called death, so the name of this eternal privation is mors aeterna!' Like eternal life, eternal death is qualified by a tota simul. In this mode of existing there can be no more change or correction. Likewise in conformity with eternal life, eternal death has a 'post·final' character of overflowing expression: there is no development towards any further end. Whereas this overflowing expression is hardly imaginable with regard to eternal life, it concords with the idea of happiness as the ultimate end of human life. This concordance can be perceived in different areas. Theologically the idea of happiness as the ultimate end of man is easily harmonized with the 'good news' of Christ. Metaphysi. cally the idea of beatitudo as reaching the summum bonum to which all dynamism in life is due can easily be made plausible. Psychologically our inclination to agree to this perspective is, maybe, not totally devoid of self-interest. With regard to eternal death, however, the situation is different. What, then, does Thomas say about this tough element of Christian tradition? In ScG III 144 Thomas deals explicitly with the problem of how one has to conceive that by mortal sin one is eternally deprived of the ultimate end. In this caput he iists five arguments, in order to show the plausibility of the verse of Mt 25,46 quoted at the end of the arguments: "And they will go away to eternal punishment, and the upright to eternal life". The first one is telling as regards Aquinas' account of life on earth. Thomas begins by saying that a privation can only regard things with which one was born. Man is not born in order to attain the ultimate end in life on earth; attaining this end can only be realized after this life. After this life, however, man no longer has the faculty to reach the ultimate end: the soul is separated from the body, which it needs so as to be able to attain its end. Thus it is necessary that the one who is punished by privation of the ultimate end, remains deprived of it

" STh 11·11 10.12.ag2; STh 11·11 24.12.sc; STh ill 68.11.ag3.

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eternally.78 . The·argument rests on the distinction between the status merendi and the status recipiendi according to which the will is fixed after death. In chapter II 1.1 (p. 75) it was shown that it is characteristic for the human condition to grow towards the ultimate end within the coordinates of materiality and time. This flexibility of the will, as we have seen in the discussion of eternal life, is not compatible with the attainment of the ultimate end. The ultimate end is not an end among other ends, but the end of all ends. Whatever foJlows when flexibility has stopped, is the perfection of what has begun in· earthly life. Thus, the same quality which makes eternal happiness secure and free from corruption, renders hell its incomprehensible perpetuity. The consummated union with God in eternal life is as fixed as the completed aversion from God in eternal death: both are qualified by the same tota simul. Missing this point is missing precisely the difference between human life on earth and 'life' (or 'death')" after death. After having listed the five arguments, Aquinas recurs to the error of those who say that the punishments of the evil ones will eventually come to an end. Thomas calls this position persuasive for its conformity with what one is used to and what is reasonable. In human law punishment is inflicted in order to correct bad behaviour; it functions as medicine and as medium it can be placed within the framework of finality. Moreover, if punishment were not directed at something else (emendation, e.g.) it would seem that it is enjoyed for the sake of itself. This is not compatible with God's goodness. Thus it seems that punishment can only be inflicted for the sake of correction, which

implies that it is temporally restricted. 80 The character of overflowing expression of finis ultimus, however, prevents Thomas from accepting the motive of emendation and understanding punishment after death as being directed to a further ultimate end: something like a purified mortal sinner. In order to clarify the appropriateness of the punishment in terms of finality, he must search for a structure of finality outside that of the sinner. Thomas mentions two structures of this kind. In the first place - and this is the most basic explanation - he points to the order of creation, which is the good of the universe. According to this order good acts deserve merit and bad actions are punished. Some actions deserve eternal punishment, so that the appropriate order is served, by which God's wisdom is demonstrated.81 With this argument Thomas refers to what he teaches about the distinction within that which is created (distinctio rerum}." In sum, and remembering what has been discussed in chapter II (p. 70): creation is a communication of God's goodness. In order to communicate this supreme goodness in all its abundance, God created a universe comprising many levels of being. The choice for manifoldness and inequality of creatures which is thus produced, the distinction between good and evil: all is founded in God's incomprehensible will. The process of human beings developing towards a glorified participation in God's goodness ·is made possible due to this framework which is the result of the distinctio rerum. The same goes for eternal punishment. Both are, ultimately, expression of God's wisdom. The second structure of finality outside the sinner is the communion ScG ill 144.8:- Per hoc autem exc/uditur error dicentium poenas malorum quandoque esse terminandas. Quae quidem POSitio onum habuisse videtUT a positione quorundam pbiJosophorutn, qui dicebant omnes poenas purgatorias esse, et ita quandoque terminandas. £9] Vtdibatur autem hoc persuasibiJe: tum ex humana consuetudine. Poena enim humanis /egibus inferentur ltd emendationem 'IIitiorum: unde sicut medicinae quaedam sunt. Tum enim ratione. Si enim poena non propter aliud in/ertur a puniente, sed propter se tantum, sequitur quod in poenis propter se delectetur: quod bonitati di'llinae non congruit. Oportet igitUT poenas propter aliud in/erri. Nec videtur alius convenientior finis quam emendatio vitiorum ... at ScG ill 144.10: Est autem concedendum quod poenae inferuntur a Deo non propter se, quasi Deus in ;.psis deJectetur, sed propter aliud: scilicet propter ordinem imponendum creaturis, in quo bonum universi consistit. Exigit autem hoc o-rdo rerum ut proportionaliter omnia divinitus dispensentur ... Infligit igitur Deus pro quibusdam peccatis poenas aeternas, ut debitus ordo servetur in rebus, qui eOO sapientiam demonstrat. " ScG 1I 45; STh 147-48.

10 78

79

SeC m 144.1: Oportet autem bane poenam qua quis privatur ultimo fine. esse interminabilem. [2J Privatio enim alicuius non est nisi quando natum est haberi: non enim catu/us max natus dicitur visu privatus. Ultimum autern finem consequi non est homo aptus natus in hac vita, ut probatum est [c. 45) Privatw ergo huiusmodi finis aportet quod sit poena post ham vitam. Sed post bane vitam non remanet homini facultas adipiscendi ultimum finem. Anima enim indiget corpore ad consecutionem sui finis: inquantum per corpus perf'ectwnem acquirit et in scientia _et in virtute. Anima autem, postquam a corpore foerit separata. non red;t iterum ad hun, statum quod per 'corpus peif'ectionem accipiat. sicut dkebant transcorporationem- ponentes, contra quos superius disputatum est. Necesse est igitur quod ilIe qui hac poena punitur ultirrw fine privetur, in aetemum privatus remaneat. Hence the expression 'second death', in Rv 2,11; Rv 20,6 and 14j Rv 21,8, quoted in STh 1I-1I 125.3.sc.

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of the beatified. With this explanation Thomas takes up a different aspect of eternal punishment, also mentioned in the third argument: the exclusion from the Community of Saints. Aquinas compares this with capital punishment on earth, which is not directed at the emendation of the one sentenced, but to the profit of the community. This profit is double: the community is purified of the sinner and the fear for punishment may have a deterrent effect." What does this 'overflowing' eternal death look like? Aquinas' account of mors aeterna is in every respect the reverse of heaven. At the core of it is the greatest privation of all: eternal exclusion from communion with God and the Saints." As punishment this evil is greater than sensitive inflictions for which hell is known in popular images." This primacy of the relationship with God brings back to mind the hierarchy of punishments which we discussed in chapter II (p, 92). In the punish· ments for the First Sin, the core was the broken relationship with God, resulting in a disorder in soul, body and world. The punishment of eternal death has the same structure: the eternal privation of life with God is expressed in a disorder according to which soul, body and creation are turned against the punished. The happiness of eternal life is composed of the vision of God and the fruition of his goodness. In hell, the will is not directed at God, but averted from Him. Whereas the centre of the beatified, who is endowed with caritas, has shifted towards God, and everything - even one's own

degree of beatitude - is desired in accordance with God's will, in hell everything is sought in accordance with one's own profit. Averted from God, the will is fixed at a temporal good which can never fully satisfy all human desire. Thus the longing in hell has the character of pursuing an impossible objective. Running against the order of creation, one necessarily frustrates oneself. This frustration is brought about by an act of the free will and - as a result of the fixation of the will after death unchangeable. Because God does not bestow his grace against the free will of his creatures, it is the fixed will of the mortal sinner by which the gate of hell is closed: hell is locked from the inside." Thomas sees a mechanism according to which this self.centredness of hell - in contrast with the God-centredness of heaven - results in an increase in suffering. Those who are in hell wish damnation for all people (remember that this is the ·opposite of friendship, velie alicui bonum), although this only increases their suffering.87 Closely related to this is the thought that the demons are charged with tormenting the inhabitants in hell, a role which contributes to their own suffering." In eternal life, the glorified soul is endowed with four dotes corporis which concern the perfect control of the soul over the body. In hell, the material dimension of man leads to torment instead of expression of glorification. The misery of the soul is expressed in the body of the damned. Thus the bodies of the damned show qualities which are the reverse of the four dowries which are bestowed on the beatified. Instead of the subjection to the spiritual which is denoted by subtilitas, the body is rather carnally oriented. Instead of agilitas the inobedience to God is reflected in an inobedience of the body in respect of the soul: thus the body becomes ponderous, burdensome and in a sense unbearable to the soul. The torment of the soul, being entirely frustrated in its natural desire for beatitude, is reflected in a passibility (not: corruptibility) with

UScG m 144.11: Nihil igitur prohibe4 etiam si poenae non nisi ad emendationem morum ttdhibeantttr. quin, secundum divinum iudicium, aliqui debeant a societate bonorum perpetuo separari et in aeternum puniri, ut ex perpetuae poenae tirnore homines peccare desistant, et bonorum societas purior ex eorum separatione reddatur: sicut dicitur Rv 21,27.. "Non intrabit in earn ~ idest in Ierusa/em caelestt1'11, per quam designatur societas bonorum, aLi4uid coinfluinatum, aut [adem abominationem et mendacium. 8.. Comp Th I 174: Quia igitur miseria ad quam dude malitia contrariatur felicitati, ad quam dudt viytus, oportet ea quae ad miseriam pertinent sumere per oppositum eorum quae de felicitate sunt dicta. Dictum est autem superius quod Ultima hominis /eJicitas, quantum ad intellectum quidem consistit in plena Dei 'Visione, quantum ad affectum 'Vero in hoc quod 7J()luntas hominis in prima bonitate sit immohiliter firmata.. Erit igitur extrema miseria hominis in hoc quod intel/ectus tota/iter di'Vino lumine pri'Vetur, et ,affectus a Dei bonitate obstinate a'fJe"ftaturj et haec est praecipua miseria damnatorum, quae 'Vocatur poena damni. 85 In Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa: l04D: Mali vero. qui erunt in mone aeterna, non minus habehunt de dolore et poena quam boni de gaudio et gloria. Exaggeratur autem poena eorum, primo ex separatione Dei et omnium bonorum. Et haec est poena damn~ quae respondet aversion;' quae poena maior est quam poena sensus.

" Cf. J. Pieper, 1977, p. 115. 87

18

In IV Sent 50.2.1d.co: sicut in beatis in patria erit perfectissima caritas. ita in damnatis erit per/ectissimum odium; unde sicut sanctis gaudebunt de omnibus bonis, ita etiam mali de omnibus bonis do/ehuntj unde et /elicitas sanctorum considerata eos maxime ajJligiti and ra3: quamvis ex damnatorum multitudine poena singulorum augeatur, tamen tantum superexcrescet odium et invidia. quod eligerent torqueri magis cum multis quam minus soli. In IV Sent 47.1.2d.co: sicut hominibus per angelos divinae i/luminationis de/eruntur, ita etiam daenwnes sunt executores divinM! iustitiae in malos. Nec in hoc aliquid minuetUT de daemonum poena,' quia in hoc quod etiam alios torquent. ipsi torquebuntur. Ihi enim miserorum societas miseriam non minuet, sed augehit.

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regard to sensible affliction. The fact that the soul is excluded from the light of divine cognition, is reflected in an opaque and dark body, lacking the claritas of the beatified." Thus the material dimension of man - originally intended to lead towards God in accordance with the human condition - becomes a source of suffering, leading further away from God, because man used it contrary to what it was meant for.

there is an equality between giver and receiver. Distributive justice can be ascribed to God in the proper sense (proprie), since He endows all creatures proportionally equally with His goodness. Commutative justice, however, is more complicated because of the infinite distance between Creator and creature. Since God is prima causa and finis ultimus of man, human beings owe all that they are and have to Him. Thus there can never be a iustitia commutativa in the proper sense,between God and man. There can only be a proportional equality between both of them, as there is between father and son, or between lord and servant. 91 Subsequently, Aquinas takes an important step by examining the relation between God's justice and His goodness." In chapter II it was argued that God did not create the universe in order to reach a goal. In this respect the motive of creation resembles the character of overflowing expression of the state of glory. Creation is purely an expression of God's infinite goodness. Justice, under the consideration of equality, determines this communication of goodness more closely. From this perspective, mercy can be understood as a modification of the same communication of goodness, in line with justice, but now considered insofar as it takes away evety defect." Having considered justice and mercy as modifications of God's goodness, the punishment of hell can be interpreted within this perspective. Thomas begins by explaining how eternal punishment is in accordance with God's justice. He discusses various kinds of punishment in earthly

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2.2.2 The limits of reflection In our examination of the 'logic' of hell, we reached the limits of reflection with Aquinas' explanation that eternal punishment is, ultimately, part of the order of creation. Asking for the reason why God created the universe in thi~ way, one is confronted with God's incomprehensible will. Since the arguments against the plausibility of eternal punishment are provided by its apparent incompatibility with God's infinite mercy, one can adopt a different strategy and focus on this incompatibility. In the Scriptum Thomas follows this procedure. In IV Sent 46 consists of two quaestiones. The first is dedicated to God's justice and the second to divine compassion. Both begin with a general consideration of iustitia and misericordia, and end with questioning the passages in Holy Scripture where eternal punishment is mentioned. Neither this combination of justice and mercy, nor their examination in this order is at random: Aquinas' account of mercy implies that of justice." Iustitia, in the proper sense, operates an equality between the one who gives and the one who receives. When there are more parties receiving from the same giver, one can, in two respects, speak of justice.

According to iustitia distributiva the different parties who receive are proportionally equally benefited. According to the iustitia commutativa

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ScG IV 89.2: Oportet enim et ilIa corpora animabus damnandorum propoYlionata esse. .. _[3] Quia vero eorum anima erit secundum 'VOluntatem a Deo aversa, et fine proprio destituttl, eorum corpora non erunt spiritU4iitt, quasi spiritui omnino subiecta, sed magis eorum anima per affectum erit camalis. Nee ipsa corpora erunt aguia, quasi sine difficultate animae obedientia: sed magis erunt ponderosa et gravia; et quodammodo animae importabilia, skut et ipsae animae a Deo per inobedientiam sunt aversa. Renu, nebunt etiam passibilia sicuf nunc-. vel etiam magis: ita tamen quod patientur quidem a rebus sensibilibus afflictionem, non tamen corruptionem: sicut et ipsorum animae torquebuntur a naturali desiderio beatitudinis tota/iter frustratae. Erunt etiam eorum corpora opaca et tenebrosa: sim: et eorum animae a lumine divinae cognitionis erunt aliena<. CI. also In IV Sent 44.3.1.-c and Comp Tb I 176. Cf. also STh I 21 where both are treated in a single quaestio.

In IV Sent 46.1.1a.co: {Busa: 41] iustitia commutativa, per quam aequalitas constituitur inter Deum dantem et creatura recipientem, Deo competere non potest secundum propriam acceptationem, quia beneficia Dei semper excedunt mentum creaturae,. sed tamen servatur etiam praporttonis quaedam aequalitas inter Deum d4ntem et creaturam recipientem, inquantum scilicet se habet ad suam superabundantiam, sicut creatura ad id quod competit ei secundum suam parvitatem. Et sic etiam quidam modus commutativae iustitiae invenitur in Deo respectu naturae, simt invenitur inter patrem et fiJium. " In IV Sent 46.l.Ib. n In the compact version of S1b I 21.3.co: elargiri perfectiones rebus pertinet quit/em et ad bonitatem divinam, et ad iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem et misericordiam, tamen secundum aliam et aliam rationem-. Communicatio enim perfeciionum absolute consi· derata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est [STh I 6.2+4]. Sed inquantum pe:rfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum proportionem, pertinet ad iustitittm ut dictum est supra fSTh I 21.2]. Inquantum vero non attribuit rebus perJectiones propter utilitatem sua.n1, sed solum propter suam bonitatem, pminet ad liberalitatem. Inquantum vera perflctiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt} pertinet ad misericordiam. '1

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life, differing according to intensity of vehemency or temporal duration. Punishments are adjusted to the degree of correction which is necessary so that the sinner is able to live peacefully in a city. As we also saw in chapter III, in Aquinas' view, someone who endangers the foundations of a community deserves to be expelled and even to be executed in

God's working can be considered as a medium between God and man. When approached from God's side, the aspect of bestowing goodness in superabundancy is characteristic. This is referred to by the concept of God's mercy. When approached from the side of man, reception in the right proportion is central. This refers to God's justice." Aquinas compares the proportion between these two with that between form and matter. What is related to the side of the agent is considered as forma, what is connected with the side of the recipient is seen as materia. As a consequence of this, the mercy-side of God's operation is always preponderant." When eternal punishment is considered in relation to God's mercy, Thomas only works out this basic position. He explicitly mentions the error of Origenes who, according to Augustine, held that the demons are liberated from their punishment by God's mercy." This error is rejected by the Church for two reasons: firstly, it is in contradiction with Holy Scripture; secondly, by extending God's mercy with regard to the demons, as regards the angels he automatically restricts it; for when the punishment of demons has an end, the beatitude of angels must also be limited to a certain period. Both have the same reason, namely, as Thomas indicates in the second sed contra, the aversion from

certain circumstances. Someone who sins against can'taS, sins against the

bond which holds together the Community of Saints. Thus he should be banned from this community forever." Subsequently Thomas gives four other reasons for eternal punishment, indicated by the Fathers of the Church: (1) because one sins against an eternal good (viz. eternal life); (2) because one sins, with a faculty which remains turned away from God eternally; (3) because man sins against the Eternal One: human beings are far too limited for undergoing an appropriate punishment qua intensity, so this defect can only be compensated by extension; (4) since the time of grace is over, guilt remains eternally." Having elucidated that eternal punishment is not contradictory to God's justice, Thomas makes a surprising step by arguing that it is not only also in accordance with God's mercy, but that in God's work his mercy is more basic than his justice. Iustitia and misericordia are not in opposition to each other: mercy is only laudable when it is according to the right reason (which'is the rule of justice) or according to the order of divine wisdom; moreover, mercy is not against justice but in addition to it." Both justice and mercy are discerned in God's working, because

?~

95

96

In W Sent 46.1.3.co: [Busa: 23] ita etiam secundum iustitiam divinam aliquis ex peecato dignus redditur penitus a civitatis Dei consortia separttrij quod fit per omne peccatum quo quis contra caritatem peccat, quae est vinculum uniens civitatem praedictam; et ideo

pro peccalo mortali, quod est contrarium em-itati, aliquis in aeternum a societale sanctorum exclusus aeternae poenae adiicitur. In IV Sent 46.1.3.co: [Busa: 48] inveniuntuy etiam aliae rationes a sanctis assignatae, quare iuste pro percalo temporal; aliqui poena aeterna puniantur. Una est, quia peccaverunt contra bonum aeternum, dum contempserunt vitam aeternam ... Alia ratio est, quia homo in suo aeterno peccavit ... {Busa: 86] potest et alia ratio assigMYi quare poena peccati mortalis sit aeternt4 quia per earn contra Deum, qui est infinitus, peccatur ... est et quarta ratio ad hoc idem: quia culpa manet in aeternum. cum culpa non possit remitti sine gratia, quam homo non potest post mortem acquirere: nee debet culpa cware quamdiu culpa "",net, Cf. also STh 1·11 87.3-4; STh ill 86.4; Comp Th I 183; In content the texts are close to ScG m 144, which we discussed above. The differences are due to the various perspectives which are taken. In IV Sent' 46.2.2b.co: nee iustitia misericordiae repugrutt,' quia misericordia non est laudabilis nisi sit secundum rationem rec~ quae est regula iustitiae, sive secundum ordinem sapientiae in divinis; nee misericordia repugnat iustitiAe; quia dargiri a/iquid

91

9i

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supra debitum de bonis, vel citra debitum de malis, non est contra iustitiam, sed praeter earn, ut ex dictis patet. In IV Sent .46.2.2b.co: Ex parte quidem [Dei] operantis exigitur ut sit superabundantia in collatione bonorum et diminutione malorum, cum ipse Deus sit excellentissimus operator, ut dictum est, et in hoc consistit divina misericordia,· ex parte autem operati requiritur receptiD, quae fit secundum proportionem recipiemis,' et in hoc ratio iustitia consistit. In IV Sent 46.2.2c.co: et ideo in quolibet opere divino supereminet misericordia iustitiae, sicut materiali f0171"'l4ie. In IV Sent 46.2.3a.co: error Origenis fuit, ut Augustinus 21 De civ. Dei dicit, quod "daemones quandoque per Dei misericordiam liberandi sunt a poenis. " Sed iste error ab £Celesia est reprobatus, propter duo. Primo, quia manifeste auctoritati Scripturae repugnat, quae habet Rv 20,9: "Diabolus qui seducebat eos, missus est in stagnum ignis et sulphurts. ubi bestia et psemiopropheta cruciabuntur die ac nocte in saecula saeculorum "; per quod in Scriptura significari aeternitas consuevit. Secunda, quia ex una parte Dei misericordiam nimis extendebat, et ex alia parte nimis eam coarctabat: eiusdem enim rationis esse videtur bonos angelos in aelerna beatitudine permanere, et maios angelos in aeternum puniri. Unde skut ponebat daemones et animas damnatorum quandoque a poena liberandas, ita pombal angelos el animas beatorum quandoque a beatitudine in huius vitae miserias de1J{)lvendas.

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and conversion to God.lOO Thus when the demons and the souls of the damned have the perspective of liberation, the angels and the souls of the beatified have the perspective of falling back into the misery of this life, which is in contradiction with the essence of beatitude. In the following quaestiuncula Thomas discusses a modified version of Origenes' view according to which at least all human beings are saved eventually. Again the position is judged to be 'entirely irrational', because of the fixation of the will: for demons this fixation is the result of the fall, human beings enter this state by death. '01 Summarizing Aquinas' procedure, we see that he consistently turns all questioning towards the acknowledgement of God's supreme goodness. This goodness is not only recognizable as justice, but, foremost, as mercy. Thus he ar~ives at a position according to which God's mercy is considered to be in total harmony with the suitability of hell. By the infinite distance between Creator and creatures God is placed beyond human accusations and all guilt is placed on the side of man.102 Nevertheless, despite all efforts to show the appropriateness of eternal punishment, one can observe that Thomas is aware of a tension between the human efforts to accept the perspective of hell and God's infinite wisdom. This gap can be traced when we observe his solution to the question as to whether the knowledge of hell does not spoil the complete happiness of the blessed. lO' At first sight this solution has the character of a logical trick: eternal damnation does not spoil God's beatitude, thus it cannot spoil the beatitude of those who share in God's happiness by conformity of their will to God's will. In the preceding

chapter, however, it was shown that complete conformity of the will is the perfection of a process in which the coordinates of appreciation shift from self-centredness to a complete God-centredness. Considered from this perspective, the affirmation of the appropriateness of hell cannot but have an eschatological character: it can only be experienced in patria. Thomas examines this gap between the human and the divine will _ and the tension between both of them - in an interesting passage of Compendium Tbeologiae I 232, in which he reflects upon the passibility of Christ's soul. After having considered Christ's grief about the evil which is done to Him, he turns to the grief about evils that occur to those who are loved by Christ. Although this grief pertains to the love of friendship and even to the friendship of carita>, Christ could not· experience the same grief which we feel, out of charity, about the mistakes of our neighbours. The reason for this is that Christ is not only viator, but also comprehensor; He is not only 'on the way', but also _ and simultaneously - enjoys the full vision of God. Thus Christ not only sees the faults of His neighbours, but also the larger framework: how these missteps are contained in divine wisdom, according to which it is appropriately ordered that one is permitted to sin and that sin is punished. Thus, Aquinas continues, neither the soul of Christ, nor the blessed who see God, can experience grief because of their neighbours' faults. The situation of the viatores, those who do not enjoy the vision of the essence of wisdom, is different: (and here Thomas formulates the tension in one sentence) for they feel grief for the faults of their neighbo~rs also a7"0rding to the higher part of reason, whereas they esteem It to pertrun to the honour of God and the exaltation of faith that some are saved who nevertheless are damned. '" Two things should be noticed about the viatores which are

In IV Sent "'6.2.3a.sc2: skut boni angel; effect; sunt beati per conversionem ad Deum, ita mali angel; effecti sunt miseri per aversionem a Deo. Si ergo miseria malorum ange/arum quandoque finietur; et beatitudo bonorum finem habebit; quod est inconveniens. 101 In IV Sent 46.2.3b.co: siCUl dicit Augustinus, 21 De civ. Dei, quidam in hoc ab errore Origenis dedinaverum, quod daemones posuere in perpetuum puniri,' sed omnes homines quandoque liberari a poena; etram info/e1es. Sed haec positio est omnino irrationabilis. SieUl ,enim daemones sunt in malitia ohstinat;, et ita perpetuo puniendi; ita et animae hominum qui sine caritate decedunt,' "cum hoc sit hominibus mors quod ange/is casus·, ut Damascenus dicit. 102 [n.W Sent 46.2.2b.ra5: Dico ergo, quod omnibus hominibus ex meritQ proprii peeeati debetur poena aeternai sed quod aliqui liberentur, hoc est ex sola divina libera/itate: posset enim omnes iuste damnare; et ideo nulla est iniustitia, si aliquos eligat et a/iquos reprobat in quibus tamen nulla differentia meritorum praeeessit. 103 In IV Sent 50.2Aa--c.

100

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Comp Th I 232 [Leon: 55]: Et quamvis dileetio proximi ad superiorem rationem quodam modo pertineat, in quantum proximus ex earitate diligitur propter Deum, superior £amen ratio in Christo de proximorum defoetibus tristitiam habere non potuit, sicut in nobis habere potest. Quia enim superior ratio Christi plena Dei visione Jruebatur, hoc modo apprehendebat quidquid ad aliorum defectus pertinet secundum q~od .in divina sapie.ntfa continetur, secundum quam decenter ordinatum existit et quod alzqU1S peccare penmttttur, et quod pro peeeato punietur. Et ideo nee anima Christi, nee aliquis beatus Deum videns, de defectibus proximorum tristitiam pati potest. Secus autem est in viatoribus, qui ad rationem sapientae videndam non attingunt; hi enim etiam secundum rationem superiorem de defectibus aliorum tristantur, dum ad honorem Dei et exaltationem fulei pertinere existimant quod aliqui sa/ventur, qui tamen damnantur.

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mentioned here. In the first place, they are human beings thought of as inspired by charity. Their God-centred love makes them feel sorry for their sinning neighbour, instead of being keen on their punishment by God. Eventually, however, they give priority to God's wisdom, which surpasses their own understanding. In the second place, these viatores comprise the theologians who search for understanding o~ their faith, and thus also Aquinas himself. In other words, the tenslOn between what is felt and what is accepted in faith concerning damnation is explicitly acknowledged and interpreted as belonging to life on the way to God. Eventually, acceptance of hell is an eschatological reality. The limits of faith in search of understanding are reached.

attitude towards one's own death. In his sermons on the Creed Thomas lists four utilities of faith in and hope for corporal resurrection. Firstly, it tempers the sadness we experience from the loss of our beloved ones. In the second place, it takes away the fear for death. Because we believe in an other better life after death, no one ought to fear death or commit evil out of fear for death. Without this perspective death would be seriously feared and people would do whatever possible so as to escape from death. Thirdly,

3. The impact of eternal life on"earthly life We examined Aquinas' account of eternal life as it is in itself. What impact, however, does eternal life have on life on earth? This question is dealt with in this third section. Firstly, the relation between life of grace and eternal life is reconsidered, this time from the reversed perspective. With everything we have learned about vita aeterna in mind, how Aquinas . appreciates the impact of this perspective on earthly life is studied (3.1). Secondly, some remarks are dedicated to the relationship between the living and the dead. We will focus on the cultivation of this relationship in prayer, as a concrete instance which illustrates Aquinas' appreciation of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death

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the perspective of receiving 'eternal goods' after resurrection incites us

to perform good actions. If earthly life were everything, people would not be motivated for acting well. In the fourth place, it withdraws one from evil: just as the hope for reward attracts one to good actions, the fear for punishment withdraws one from evi].!05 The framework of eternal life and death has its impact on earthly life as a directing perspective, not because it foretells the future. The 'picture' of heaven, painted by Aquinas, is in fact a collection of different sketches or work drawings which may help us to understand the various images which are presented in Holy Scripture. These sketches give access to Holy Scripture instead of proposing a doctrinal whole which replaces the Book.1O' This access is given by presenting

lOS

(3.2).

In Symb 11 (camis resurrectionem [Busa: 1811: tid quatuor est nobis utilis [ules et spes resurrectionis. Primo ad tollendum tristitias qUItS ex mortuis concipimus. Impossibile est enim quod homo non do/eat ad mortem can sui: sed per hoc quod sperat eum resurrectUrum, muJtum temperatur dolor mortis. ITb 4,12: "Nolumus vas ignorare, fratres, de dormientibus, ut non conlristemini, sieut et ceteri qui spem non habent. Secundo, au/erl timorem mortis. Nam si homo post mortem non speraret aliam 'Vitam meliorem, sine 1ubio mars esset valde timenda, et potius deberet homo quaecumque mala focere, quam mcurrere mortem. Sed quia credimus esse aliam 'Vitam meJiorem, ad quam perveniemus post mortem, constat quod nul/us debet mortem timere, nee timore mortis aJiqua mala focere. Heb 2,14-15: "Ut per mortem destmeret ewn qui habebat mortis imperium, id est, diabo/uni; et /iberaret eos, qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant seroituti. " Tertio, -reddit soOicitos et studiosos ad bene operandUm, si enim vita hominis esset tanturn ista, in qua vi'Vimus, non inesset hominibus magnum studium ad bene operan* dum: quia quidquid jaceret, parvum esset cum eius desiderium non sit ad bonum determinaturn secundum certum tempus, sed ad aeternitatem. Sed quia credimus quod per haec quae hic /acimus. redpiemus bona aeterna in resurrectione ideo studemus bona operari. leo 15,19: "Si in hac vita tantum in o,risto sperantes sumus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus. " Quarto retrahit a maio. Skut enim spes praemii ai/icit ad bonum operandurn, ita timor poenae, quam credimus malis res~ retrahit a malo. In 5,29: "Et procedunt qui bona /ecerunt, in resurrectionem vitae; qui vero ma/a egerunt, in resurrection em iudicii. " L. Sentis, 1992, p. 286. II

3.1 Eternal life as consummation of life of grace From the first chapter of our study, life of grace was conceived as the beginning of eternal life. Like the former, eternal life is a gift - pure grace. One cannot count on it. Neither is anyone allowed to leave earthly life for it. On the other hand, during life on earth, through the working of the Holy Spirit, one may become confident about one's future life with God. In the preceding chapter we sketched the developments in the life of grace according to which one's centre shifts towards a 'God-centred life. The greater one's love for God is, the greater is one's confidence in eternal participation in His life and the more the separation from God is appreciated as ultimate evil. Thus the perspective of eternal life has its impact on the appreciation of life on earth and the 106

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the framework which constitutes the inner 'logic' of heaven: a new creation, this time organised as proceeding from the consummated relationship with God. Despite the 'negative' and overflowing character of heaven, it may function as a: magnifying mirror in which the proportions of earthly life are reflected and blown up. The image of a magnifying mirror is fitting for more than one reason. In the first place, eternal life reflects to earthly life. It is this human being, composed of this very body and this very soul which are glorified; it is this relationship with God which is completed and taken as point of departure for the recreation of this person. This idea of reflection is important with regard to the relation between earthly life and eternal life: earthly life is, so to speak, the object which is reflected, the place where the relationship with god should be developed, and without which nothing is to be glorified or punished.!07 In the second place - as we also discovered with regard to the reflection on the condition of the first man - eternal life shows more clearly and magnified what is hard to see in earthly life. The relationship with God, which pertains to the most hidden core of a human being, is exposed in its full glory. Every element of eternal life points to this core, being the expression of it, either spiritually or materially.1O· The same goes for eternal death. This magnifying aspect has an impact on earthly life in teaching what is to be done. It reveals the incomprehensible core of life within the coordinates of materiality and time: the relationship with God. For this reason, life on earth and 'life' after death cannot be played off against each other. Both are totally human life, both are ultimately 'living with God', though in different modes. In this life each moment is communication with God and an invitation for closer friendship with God.'" Eternal life is the total and perfect expression of communication with God: the full abundance of God's friendship all at once, on the basis of earthly life. This dimension gives life on earth an infinite

depth, value and irreversibility. In Aquinas' time this irreversible and decisive character of earthly life was most pregnant because of the high mortality rate. In the thirteenth century people married, worked and died young.!10 Familiarity with death as a constant threat was expressed in the presence of Saint Christopher, patron of unforeseen sudden death, at the entrance of each cathedral."! This familiarity also came to expression in an other phenomenon: the relationship with the dead. To this we now turn.

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10'.1

This is sharply fdt in Thomas' view that unbaptized babies have no access to eternal life: whereas they are free from personal gwlt, their relationship with God is disturbed by the herited guilt of Original Sin: there .is no caritas which is to be glori'lied in eternal life. Cf. In W Sent 45.1.2c. In- Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa: 25]: in vita aetema primum est quod homo coniungitur Deo. Nam ipse Deus est praemium et finis omnium laborum nostrorum.

Cf. F. de Grijs, 1983, who works this out as regards the question of the meaning of history. This meaning is contained in God's relationship with each individual human being; ,a suppon as small as the point of a needle.

3.2 The communication between the living and the dead ll2 In chapter II we indicated briefly that the dead are cut off from communication with the living by divine ordination. ll3 This divine ordination is taken very seriously by Aquinas. In this respect he follows an ancient tradition, already present in the Old Testament, according to which it is forbidden to seek contact with the spirits of the dead by conjuring them up.!" Nevertheless, Thomas states· that the Church consists of three parts: one on earth, a second in heaven and a third in purgatory.ll5 Thus he suggests a communion between the living and the dead. How do these two approaches hang together and what do they reveal with regard to our central question? In order to understand both views, one should interpret them in

eighty, the average expectation for life in the thineenth century is estimated at between 30 and 35 years (re. Stiiber, 1976, p. 27; Ch. Lebbe, 1991, p. 70). This average, however, is so low because of the high monality rate of babies and children. For those who survived the first ten years the expectation of life was between 40 and 50 years (K. Stiiber, 1976, p. 42-43; T. Boase, 1972, p. 9-10).

no K. Stiiber, 1976, p. 149. Although some reached the age of

111

W. Goez, 1976. p. 122j J. Avril, 1983, p. 93·95. The fear of a sudden death was rooted in the conviction that the will was fixed at the moment of death. One was

afraid to die before having had the opponunity for confession. For a historical survey of the impact of the Last Judgement in the Middle Ages (with a critical approach towards the work of J. Delumeau), d. C. Viola, 1988. 112 On the historical roots of the communication with the dead in the Middle Ages, d. O. Oexle, 1983 and (focusing on the thirteenth century:) K. Stiiber, 1976. 11) Chapter II, 1.2, p. 81. 114 Cf. Dt 18,10-11, qUOted in SIb II-II 96.1.sc and ScG 154.17. One of the motives of cautiowness seems to be the link with the world of the demons. In Aquinas' day this fear for the deceased was widespread. Cf. W. Goo., 1976; Ch. Lebbe, 1991. us In Symb 9 (oatholi
m

terra, alia est in coeJo, tertia est in purg4torio.

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their proper framework. The separation of the living and the dead is. to be understood within the framework of vita naturae.. CommurucatlOn between human beings takes place within the coordinates of materiality and time. The human body is. the instrument by which they are perceptible and by which they can communicate according to the human condition: via the material to the spiritual.'!' When natural life is taken away, the disembodied soul is no longer within the range. of human natural perception. Moreover, and here we enter t.he theological framework the status merendi is over. The separated soul IS not a moral agent in th~ sense of being in via and acquiring merit. Thus the dead are isolated from the living, their fate having been decided upon. The communion of the Church is to be understood within the framework of vita gratiae, the relationship with God. From this perspective the focus is on co~union rather than separation. The central terms within this context are not 'the dead' or 'the separated souls' but 'the beatified' or 'those who exist (rather than: live) in purga;ory'. The framework of vita grariae is greater than that of v.ita naturae. The bond by which the living and the dead are connected With each other is the bond of caritas. l17 This bond forms the body of which Christ is the Head; a body of which one becomes a member by Baptism and which grows by the Sacrament of the Eucharist."8 • Aquinas is aware of a tension between the two frameworks, wh'c~ follows from his radical view on man as a unity of body and soul. ThiS leads to the question as to how we can address a deceased Saint in prayer, since the separated soul is no person."' In his answer to this question, Thomas implicitly agrees with the view that the anima sepa.rata is no person: npeter's soul is not Peter u. That we can, nevertheless, address Saint Peter is because of Peter's life on earth as

well as the perspective of his eternal life as having been resurrecte~; both are situations in which the entire man, body and soul, IS concerned. As a matter of fact, both situations qualify the separated soul. Life on earth determines the degree of being united with God which is decisive for the fate of the anima separata: Peter is a Saint and is being addressed on the basis of his ~ife. on earth. Eter~ life is the perspective at which the separated soul IS directed: Peter Will be restored and glorified in his integrity.12O . In this issue concerning the state of the separated soul It becomes clear that the framework of the relationship with God in grace • the bond of charity - is the only basis for communication between the living and the dead. In fact one recognizes a motif which we have already encountered many times in this study: the relationship between human beings is mediated by the relationship with God in grace. Life :vith G<;>d functions as a framework which surpasses the natural boundanes of hfe and death and thus - mediante Deo - those who are separated by death are enabl~d to communicate with each other. This communication differs from that among living people and can be called 'a·symmetri. cal'I21, but it is a sort of communication in the sense that the living and the dead are believed to be part of a larger whole within which they are enabled to contribute to the well-being of each other. The degree to which this communication is possible depends on the difference between the state of the living and the dead on the one hand, and the degree of . . charity on the other. Those who are in heaven are united with God by perfect chanty. The conformity of their will with God's will entails that they share in God's life bestowing goodness. Thus they can help the living and become mediators between God and humankind, and indeed we can implicitly trust that they are willing to help.l22 In this mediation we recognize a motif which was introduced in chapter II, where we

Cf. ScG m 147.2: Datus est etiam ei loquelae usus, per cuius oJficium veritatem quam aliquis mente coneipit, alteri manifestare possitj ut sic homines seipsos iuvent in cognitione ventatis, sicu: et in aliis rebus necessariis vitae, cum sit homo animal natura/iter socia/e. '" Cf. ScG ill 144.3 (third argument) where Aquinas speaks of the theological vinue of charity per quam est societas beatorum et tendentium in bea!itudinem. . . 11a Cf. the third section of chapter nj remember that Aqwnas explam.s commumo as name for the Eucharist referring to its dimension as signum demonstrativum (chapter II, 3.3, p. 137). . m STh II-II 83.11.ag5: anima Petri non est Petrus. 5i ergo animae sanctorum pro nobzs orarent quandiu sunt a corpore separatae, non deberemus interpeltare sanctum Petrum ad orandurn pro nobis, sed animam eius.

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5Th II-II 83.11.ra5: quia saneti viventes meruerunt ut pro nobis orarent, ideo eos invocamus nominibus quibus hic vocabantur, quibus etiam nobis magis innotescunt. Et iterum propter fidem resurrection is insinuandam, sicut legitur Ex 3,6: "Ego sum Deus Abraham, etc.· lej Mt 22,31J. Cf. also W. Kluxen, 1974 and what is said on p. 79.

m

Cf. H. Witte, 1992.

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In IV Sent 45.3.1.ra3: animae sanctorum habent voluntatem plenarie confonnem divinae voluntat~ etiam in volito,' et ideo quamvis affectum caritatis ad proximum retineant, non tamen eis aliter auxilium ferunt quam secundum quod per di-yinam iustitiam vident esse dispositum; et tam.en credendurn est quod multum proximos lUvent, pro eis apud Deum intercedendo.

250·

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discussed the order of creation: the higher creatures help the lower ones in their union with God. Thus they become helpers of God.'" This mediation has a counter part: the living ask the Saints for intercession.

intercession for the souls in purgatory contributes to their welfare.'" This help can only consist in mitigating the process of purification. The ultimate destination, the degree of sharing in the beatific vision of God, is determined at the moment of death when the will is fixed. Whereas the relationship with the souls in purgatory has a one-sided character - namely from the pan of only the living - participation in the life of grace enables a communication. This mediating function of the relationship with God, however, has another side. It entails that those who fall outside the bond of love are cut off from communicating with the living. We saw before that heU is, in many respects, the horrific mirror image of heaven. As regards those who are in hell, Thomas teaches that prayer, in order to alter their state, has no use. They have received their 'reward', once and for all. Moreover, they are excluded from the bond of love and the beatific vision. They do not know when the living seek contact and the work of satisfaction does not apply to them anymore.'" Finally, as we discussed before, according to the 'logic of heU' the damned do not accept intercession: they only wish for the damnation of others.!J1 Although the damned are isolated from the living - lacking both vita naturae and vita gratiae - and the Church does not pray for them, Thomas is clear that when it comes down to determining which particular persons are damned, then there is no certainty at all. We should never cease to pray for the living, because no human being has the capacity to distinguish between the living who will be blessed and those who will be damned. I" The same, however, goes for the deceased. As the example of a Roman Emperor displays, the deceased

Thomas even commends this for various reasonsY4

The Saints in heaven are free from all defects and needs, being inebriated with the plenitude of God's house.'" Prayer to them has the character of asking for their help in order to participate in their life with God. For those who are in purgatory the situation is different. They do not possess perfect beatitude and thus they cannot be asked to help us to attain it.'" Because they lack the vision of God, they do not even know when the living try to communicate with them.'" They are, however, connected with us by the bond of charity. Those who are in purgatory share the life of grace,. although some remnants of sinfulness prevent them from the beatific vision of God.'" They can be helped to overcome this defect on the basis of the principle that those who are united by caritas can carry each other's burden. Thus

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In W Sent 45.3.2.co: iste ordo est divinitus institutus in rebus, secundum Dionysium, ut

per media ultima reducantur in Deum. Untie cum sanet; qui sum in patria, sint Deo

124

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propinquissimi, hoc divinae legis ordo requirit, ut noJ qui manentes in corpore peregrinamur a Domino, in eum per sanctos medios retiucamur,' quod quidem contingit, dum per eos divina bonitas suum eJfectum diffundit. Et quia reditus noster in Deum respondere debet processu; bonitatum ipsius ad nos; skut mediantibus samtorum sujfragiis Dei beneficia in nos deveniunt, ita DpOrtet nos in Deum reduci, ut iter-ata beneficia eim sumamus mediantibus sanctis; et inde est quod eos intercessores pro nobis ad Deum constituimus, et quasi mediatores. dum ab eis petimus quod pro nobis orent. One can also recopUze another motif: conformity with Christ who is the Mediator between. God and man. In IV Sent 45.3.2.ra2. In IV Sent 45.2.2d.co: cum saneti qui sun: in patria, sint ab omni indigentia immunes, 'inebriati ab ubertate domus Dei~ eis iU1Jari per suffragi4 non competit. In IV Sent 15.4.5b.co: nihil petitur ab aliquo qui non habet ilJud. Unde cum beata vita sit quae in orando petitur, ad illos solos sanctos dirigi aliquo modo oratio potest qui bealam vitam habent, non autem ad ii/os qui in mundo sunt neque ad ilIos qui in purgatorio sunt; STh ll-ll 83.4.ra3: U/i qui sunt in hoc mundo aut in purgatorio, nondum jruuntur visione Verb;' ut possint cognoscere ea quae nos cogitamus vel dicimus. Et ideo eorum -suJlragia non implordmUS orando. sed a vivis petimus col/oquendo. Cf. also STh II-ll 83.1l.ra3.

128

In IV Sent 45.2.2b.ra3: purgatio animae per poenas purgatorii non est aliud quam expiatio reatus impedientis a perceptione gloriae.

12~

In IV Sent 45.2.2b.co: poena purgatorii est in supp/ementum satisfactionis quae non foerat plene in corpore consummata; et ideo, quia, sicut ex praedictis patet, et ex his quae supra, dist. 20, dicta sunt, opera unius possunt va/ere alteri ad satisfoctionem. sive vivis si'fJe mortuis; non est dubium quin suffragia per vivos facta, existentibus in purgatorio prosint. Cf. also QuodJ 2.7.2 and QuodJ 8.5.2. uo Cf. the long discussion of In IV Sent 45.2.2a.co, where Thomas concludes with the words: tutius est simpliciter dicere. quod sujfragia non prosunt damnatis. nee pro eis ecclesia oraTe intendit. Notice that also in this text he remarks that the resurrection of the body entails no essential change in beatitude. In Quod! 8.7.2.co: in eis [damnatisJ perfecte invidia est. ad quam pertinet dolor de bono alterius quod ipse non habet,· et sic etiam vellet omnes pati malum quod ipse patitur. 132 STh II-II 83.7.ra3: Sed sicut null;' quandiu hic vivit. subtrahendum est correctionis beneficium, quia non possumus distinguere praedestinatos a reprobatis, ue Augustinus dicit in libro De correctwne et gratia [cap. 15. PL 44,944J; ita etiam nulli est denegandum oyatwnis suffragium.

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can only be judged according to the earthly judgement of their own merits. There may, however, be higher causes which effectuate that they are not in heIl. '" In other words: human knowledge is secure as regards the determination of which sins deserve eternal punishment, but as to what concerns the actual punishment one can only hope and pray for the best. Whereas Aquinas maintains a reserva\ion with regard to answering the question as to who exactly are in hell, he considers it possible that the Church is able to recognize some Saints who are in heaven. From the perspective of the bond of charity - enabling the communication between the living and the dead - it is interesting that in the process of canonisation this communication plays a decisive role: Saints are recognized by miracles, signs by which their sanctity (their living from God as centre) is confirmed and/which refer to God's vivificating power as their first cause.'"

incomprehensible life. The same limits of reflection were reached when Aquinas' account of mors aelerna was examined. Again every aspect of eternal death refers to God's goodness, but now in the horrific distorting mirror of hell. The three elements - soul, body, world - were encountered in a blown up version of the punishments for Original Sin. We discovered two ways in which Thomas recurs to God's incomprehensibility with regard to the dark side of (re)creation. First, by taking God's justice and mercy as point of departure: the infinite distance between Creator and creature forces the theologian to take God's goodness for granted and pursue elucidation in the direction of the (intellectual and moral) shortcomings of man. Secondly, by stating that reconciliation with the thought of hell is an eschatological reality, pertaining to the conformity of the will with the incomprehensible God. In the third section the central theme of the relationship with God was affirmed again in two paragraphs in which the impact of eternal life on earthly life was studied. First we learned that the reflection on eternal life works like a magnifying mirror, elucidating the reading of the Scriptures as well as human life on earth: the most intimate core of both is displayed in full glory.135 Secondly, we observed how communication between the living and dead is entirely mediated by the reIationship with God. Again charity, effect of the vivificating power of the Spirit, turned out to be at the centre of communication.

In this chapter we have examined Aquinas' account of the consummated life with God. In the first section we studied the nature of the reflection 'On the completed life with God, by surveying two concepts which were introduced earlier in this study - vita aeterna and finis ultimus -as well as the tract of eschatology as a whole. In the second section we focused on vita aelerna and its counterpart, mors aeterna. We discovered that eternal life is to be conceived as perfect communion with God. By studying the three elements - soul, body, world - under the consideration of how they are involved in eternal life, we have been able to show how Thomas radically envisages all dimensions of post-mortal existence as expressing the relationship with God. Human life is recreated, reorganised from its most intimate core: life with God in grace. By its character of overflowing expression, eternal life is beyond the borders of human imagination, like God's own

~3'

n4

Having completed this chapter we have finished our examination of life with God in its three dimensions: foundations, dynamism and perfection. In the following chapter we will formulate an answer to our initial question about the relationship between life on earth and 'life' after death.

In IV Sent 4S.2.2a.ra5: de omnibus enim similiter dki oportet, quod non erant in

inferno finaliter deputati, sed secundum praesentem iustitiam propriorum meritorum,' secundum autem superiores causas, quibus praevidebantur ad vitam revocandi, erat de eis 'aliter disponendum. 5Th II-II 178.2.00: vera miracula non possunt fieri nisi virtute divina, operatur enim ea Deus ad hominum Ulilitatem. Et hoc duplidter, uno quidem modo, tid veritatis praedicatae con./irmationem; alia modo, ad demonstrationem 'samtitatis_ alicuius quem Deus vult hominibus proponere in exemplum virtutis ... Secunda autem modo, non /iunt miracula nisi a sanctis, ad quorum sanctitatem demonstyandam miracula fiunl vel in vita eorum vel etiam post mortem, sive per eos sive per alios.

t'S

Eventually the perspective of eternal life reflects entirely on ea.n:hly life. Ii gives a perspective for life on earmj a perspective beyond our grasp, but elucidat:ing ·and directing life on eanh. In this sense, chapter IV of this study can be called the chapter of hope, since it is concerned with the material object of hope, like the 'foundations' of the second chapter regard the object of faith and the 'dynamism' of the third chapter that of charity.

CHAPTER V

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CONCLUDING OUR STUDY: LNING WITH GOD AS MEANING OF LIFE Having examined the three dimensions of life with God, we are in a position to answer the question as to what, in Aquinas' theology, the relation is between life on earth and 'life' after death. As a conclusion we can say that two important insights are the result of our research. In the first place, when we consider the relation between earthly life and 'life' after death, Thomas shows us that the relation between these two is entirely qualified by the relationship with God, which functions as a framework comprising and qualifying both terms of the question. In fact we should say that both, life on earth and 'life' after death, are two modes of living with God. In earthly life human beings are invited to enjoy and develop the relationship with God within the coordinates of materiality and time; in 'life' after death this relationship is consummated and expressed in accordance with all dimensions of human nature. Both 'lives' qualify each other: eternal life provides life on earth with a perspective, a direction, a fulfilment which is helpful in enabling us to deal with the fragility of human existence. Earthly life is the place where the relationship with God is meant to be developed and without which there would not be anything to be glorified. In the second place, it was discovered that - in accordance with the idea of motion implied in life - in earthly life the relationship with God is ~ dynamic reality according to which the centre of one's life gradually shIfts towar,ds God. When this centre shifts, the relationship between earthly life and eternal life changes in character. The more one's 'centre of gravity' is in God, the more one's existence is appreciated as what it is: a relationship with the triune God. Proceeding from this relationship, , earthly ~istenc~ is i?cre~ingly considered as the place to develop and share thIS relationship wIth all fellow human beings and the entire creation; eternal life increasingly attracts as one's 'homecoming'. It depends on one's relationship with God to what degree this shift is appreciated. In other words: it needs the work of the Holy Spirit to allow one to live and die while, at the same time, to appreciate life and death from the perspective of life with God. In all this, the position of the theologian is directly involved.

The interesting thing about these two insights is, that their conteot directly bears upon the formal side of what is at issue. The first insight determines the perspective from which questions are approached, the second qualifies the plausibility of its outcome. Thus Thomas' dealing with the question displays an internal dynamism which is inherent in his appreciation of the living God as the centre of his theology. For the believer who searches for the understanding of his or her faith, this dynaroism is of great importance. In this respect Aquinas' view on the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death deserves to be worked out a little further, recurring to that which was studied in the previous chapters. This will be done against the background of the question as to what the meaning of life is; a question having both a formal and material similarity to the central question of this study. Working out the central question of this study against the background of the quest for meaning, we will be able to show that, as regard the meaning of life and death, Aquinas' thoughts offer the opportunity to take into account the different dimensions of what can be called the theological meaning of human life and death. Thus a contribution can be made to both the research on Aquinas and the theological reflection' on the quest for the meaning of life. 1 This chapter is divided into two parts. We will begin by working out the outcome of this study against the background of the question as to what the meaning of life is (1). After that we will devote some words to the 'meaning' of death (2).' 1. The meaning of life In our day the expression 'meaning of life' is used with connotations differing from those which Aquinas would have had, when he had been

1

2

In literature on the meaning of life Aquinas is rarely mentioned, which is not unreasonable insofar as the quest for meaning is appreciated as characteristic for our contemporary culture (which will be discussed in the following section); in studies on Aquinas, reflection on the contemporary quest for the meaning of life is absent. The only two anicles I found which expliciciy deal with Aquinas and the meaning of life are philosophicaI of character. W. Weier, 1978/1964 (aiming at the right appreciation of Aquinas' account of participation) and A. Pegis, 1978 (who sets out to show the Aristotelian basis of Aquinas' account of human existence).

I put the word 'meaning' between inverted commas when it is used as regards death in order to remind one of the fact that· as evil and privation of life - death has the character of 'non-sense' rather than 'sense',

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confronted with it. Retracing the ongm of our manner of speaking, there seems to be a shift in the way the word 'meaning' is used, which can be located in the second half of the 19th century.' In texts which date from before this period, the word 'meaning' (as its equivalents in other languages) is used for limited acts of intention and signification. In the last century, however, the application of the word is extended to the totality of what is meaningful for man: the meaning of human existence as such. Its counterpart is no longer a partial lack of signification or intention, but the meaninglessness or absurdity of the framework of human life itself. This shift in signification of the word 'meaning', can be placed within the major shifts in our culture which have taken place over the last centuries.' As a result of this, the quest for meaning as quest for orientation, has bec.llme symptomatic for' contemporary North-Atlantic culture.' Despite the specific character of the contemporary quest for meaning, as quest for orientation - as a result of the historical developments of North-Atlantic culture - the quest for meaning has deeper roots in Western culture and can be detected in Aquinas' thought as well. This can easily be shown by concentrating on the words which are used when people ask for the meaning of life. Apart from the expression 'what is the meaning of lifel', people use phrases such as 'what is the purpose of human existence?', 'what is the point or rationale of our lifel', 'what is the use of living?', or 'which goals are worth seeking in lifel' It is apparent that the question can be put in different terms. When we broaden our scope and take a look at other West-European languages, we see that, generally speaking, with regard to the quest for meaning, a word is used which is related to the Latin word sensus.6 Etymologists make clear that the origin of the word 'sense' is rooted in the sensory intentionality. It should be situated within the semantic field

of 'direction', not only in the meaning of 'taking a direction' (acquainted with 'way', 'road', 'travelling') but also in the sense of

Cf. G. Sauter, 1995, p. 14fi, S. Griffioen. 1994, p. 24, B. Vedder. 1990. p. 9-11. For these shifts d. G. Sauter, 1995, Th. de Boer, 1991', H. de Knijff• .1988, H. Berger, 1986, E. Jiinge!, 1983, R. Mokrosch, 1982, M. Muller, 1978; H. Gollwitzer, 1970 and 1974. Cf. J. van de Lao, 1995, B. Grom/J. Schmidt, 1988, J. de Valk, 1982, HJ. Pottmeyet, 1979, V. Frankl, 1978. 'Sons de la vie' (French), '=tido de la vida' (Spanish), 'Sinn des Lebens' (German), 'zin van het leven' (Dutch). The connection of 'meaning' and sensus is reflected in the English 'sense' which is used in about the same instances as 'sens" 'sentido', 'Sinn' and 'zin', Thus we see that in English. the expression 'does life make sense?' is

used, referring to the same question.

'directing one~s senses' (acquainted with 'wanting', 'striving' as well as

'taking one's bearings'). By later developments the signification of'sense' was extended to intellectual and volitional activities.' This etymological note has a heuristic interest: it can make us sensitive for the various

dimensions involved in the quest for meaning. Thus the contemporary quest for meaning can be recognized as a quest for orientation, rooted in the fact that human beings are endowed with sensitive and intellectual faculties. This quest is qualified by the specific culture to which one belongs. When we look at Aquinas' account of the meaning. of life, in the first place two semantic fields can be recognized in the terms which are used to ask for the meaning of life: verum (meaning, point, rationale)' and bonum (purpose, goal, use).' The first pertains to the cognitive, the second to the volitional dimension of human existence. In the second place, for Aquinas, from the ouset, the question of the meaning of life is not only related to but also qualified by his view on God. In chapter I we saw the impact of Thomas' view that God is called 'life' more properly than any creature. It has determined the perspective of our investigation. Examining Aquinas' view on the meaning of life on earth, we will have to take into account both semantic fields and the primacy of God. We will begin with the semantic field of bonum and focus on the ends or goals of life (1.1). After that the same will be examined in terms of verum, concentrating on the 'meaning' of life (1.2). This section will be completed by indicating how the relationship with God qualifies the nature of human life on earth (1.3). 1.1 Life and ends

When looking at the question as to the specific nature of the human mode of existence among other forms of life, in chapter n, 1.1 (p. 70) we distinguished between two levels as regards theological reflection on creation and goals or ends. Proceeding from the perfection of God's nature - God as actus purus - it was stated that, according to Aquinas'

Cf. C. Onions, 1966: 'mean' and 'sense'; A. Dauzet, 1938: 'sens'; P. van VeenlN.

van der Nijs, 1989: 'zin'; J. de Vries, 1987: lzin'j A. Walde, 1910: 'sentio', Cf. e.g. R. Hepburn, 1981/1965 and M. Sarat, 1993. Cf. e.g. O. Hanfling, 1988, p. 15-41.

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analysis, one cannot say that by creating the world God was pursuing a goal, in the sense of striving for greater perfection or completeness. Reasoned from the perspective of God's perfect nature, creation has no other purpose than the reflection and manifestation of God's goodness. Creation is purely a gift, the copious expression of God's abundant perfection: a 'post-final' structure which has also been discovered in Aquinas' reflection on God's glorifying work." As far as the goal of human life is concerned, in Aquinas' view this can be none other than the reflection of God's goodness within the coordinates of materiality and time as a creature which is part of both the spiritual and the material world. As was clarified in comparison with the angelic mode of existence, this implies that human life has the character of a process. Whereas God's relation to Elis creatures cannot be conceived in terms of finality, the relation of creatures to God is dominated by the latter as first cause and ultimate end." Every creature is regarded as reaching God insofar as it is reaching its own perfection. In the case of human beings this perfection consists in both the perfection of the intellectual operations and the actual attainment of God in eternal life. The ordo of elements (world . body - soul) which are relevant for human life is directed at the consummation of the process within the coordinates of materiality and time according to which man is designed so as to proceed towards his destination. Therefore, when we consider the end of human life on earth from the perspective of human beings, this end can be none other than the consummated life with God, which is nothing else but 'life' after death. Both perspectives, the one reasoning from God and the one proceeding from man, result in different answers to the question as to what is the goal or end of human life? In the first case, what Thomas in In II Sent 1.2.1 calls the finis operantis, the end of human life is the entire process of earthly development and heavenly consummation of the relationship with God. In the second case, the finis operis, the end of human existence is the perfection of the earthly process. Although one is inclined to conceive the question regarding the goal of human life in the latter sense, for a genuinely theological appreciation of this question, the theo-centric perspective is both more important and more comprising. Moreover, as we learned in chapter ill, at the very core of

the process of development of the relationship with God Thomas appreciates the shift of one's 'centre of gravity' from oneself to G?d. This entails that the first perspective is not only relevant for theologIcal reflection on God as Creator; living with God as one's new centre also changes one's self-appreciation: the God-centred perspective reflects on oneself. This brings us to the semantic field of verum and the examination of the 'meaning' of life.

" 11

Cf. chapter lV, 1.2.1, p. 211. On the asymmetrical relation between God and creatures, d. chapter I, footnote 151 on p. 64,

259

1.2 Life and signification Proceeding from the thought that God is called 'life' more properly than any creature, in Aquinas' vieW, the meaning of the word 'life' primarily refers to God. When looking at 'the meaning of life', however, one does not look for the meaning of the word 'life' in general; one searches for the meaning of the concrete existence of a particular human being. Putting it in different words, the question is as to whether one's life - one's existence within the coordinates of materiality and time - can be appreciated as referring to something else and have a signification in a manner analogous to words. Aquinas is not unfamiliar with this thought, as is displayed in his interpretation of Rm 1,20 and in other texts." Remembering that - reasoned from the perspective of God's perfection - creation has no other purpose than the reflection and manifestation of God's goodness, one could say that by their very .existence as rational creatures on the border between the material and the spiritual world, human beings refer to God: they signify the uncreated triune God in a created mode. Thus God's creative act of producing existence can be considered as an act of signifying Himself to Himself. The human mode of existence is one of a process within the coordinates of materiality and time. Thus, as regards God's act of signification according to this mode, different stages or degrees can be

12

5Th ill l.1.sc: ii/Uti videtur esse convenientlSStmUtn ut per visibiJia monstrentur invisibilia Dei, ad hoc enim totus munJus est jactus. ut patet per iilUti Aposto/i, Rm

1,20: "InvisibiJia Dei per ea quae facta sun; intellec... conspiciuntur"; 5Th m 12.3.ca2: Skut autem wees ab homine formatae sum signa intelkctualis scientiae ipsim, ita creaturae a Dea conditae sum signa sapitntiae eOO; 5Th m 65.1.co: Vita enim spiritualis confonnitatetn aliquam habet ad vitam corpora/em, skut et cetera corpora/ia ,imiJitudinem quaruiam spiritualium habent. On the crucial places of Rm 1,20 in the ID, d. chapter II, footnote 7 on p. 70.

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discerned, according to which God is, increasingly, more adequately signified. Thomas works this out in terms of the threefold image of God in man." At the level of the faculties of the human s()ul, the triune God is signified by the natural ability to know and love God (imago naturae: jacultas). Insofar as a human being - with the help of God's grace - actually knows and loves God, he signifies God more perfectly (imago gratiae: facultas, operatio). The most perfect signification of God is achieved by the consummation of the life of grace in eternal life: knowing and loving God in total conformity with God's own knowledge and love of Himself (imago gloriae: jacultas, operatio, consummatio).H In this stage a human being signifies God so perfectly that Creator (original) and creature (image) are almost one." Thus, in Aquinas' theology, vita aeterna becomes a name for both God's life and the ultimate perfection of human life. The meaning which human life has from the perspective of the Creator, can be appreciated by human beings - as is displayed by the fact that one can reflect on it. In fact it pertains to the very goal of human existence that human beings learn to know themselves as referring to the incomprehensible triune God. Here the three meanings of the word 'life', which Thomas adopts from Aristotle, prove to be instructive." In the first place, vita refers to the existence of a living thing: at this level - the level of being a creature within the coordinates of materiality and time, endowed with intellect and reason - all human beings are the image of God. Whatever meaning people intend to give to their life themselves, at the level of vita naturae their life already has a direction and a meaning, whether they know it or not. Human beings, however, are free 'self-moving' creatures and apart from 'existence' we see that Aquinas adopts a second meaning of vita from Aristotle: the specific act of a living substance which is characteristic for its being. This 'life' of man consists in the human volitional and cognitive acts by which man taltes his bearings and directs hImself at free chosen ends. Thus human beings are able - with the help

of God's grace - to become aware of their signifying dimension. When this happens they appreciate the meaning of human lifeY This is in accordance with the shift of the 'centre of gravity' characteristic for the relationship with God: the perspective of God becomes increasingly one's own and, growing in conformity with God, one 'reads' creation ~

oneself and one's neighbour - more and more with the eyes of God. Proceeding from the appreciation of the signifying dimension of human existence, the possibility is offered to affirm this signifying dimension of existence and operation. Man has the free use of his capacities and he can choose to direct his entire existence in conformity with the God-signifying dimension of his existence and operations. When this happens, we encounter the third meaning of the word vita which Aquinas adopts from Aristotle: one's chief occupation or direction of living. Thus man is able to malte his life 'meaningful' in the signifying sense: he is able to lead his entire life as referring to God. Thus referring to God - given with existence and operations - can be cultivated and made explicit. In this process, the God-referring meaning of life, the experience of life as meaningful and the activity of giving meaning to one's life are given the possibility to harmonize. When this unity is accomplished we can spealt of a meaningful life in the fullest sense. IS What has been worked out according to both semantic fields can also be formulated in terms of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death; Thus it can be made clear that, in Aquinas' view, human life on earth has the 'intrinsic' ends of signifying God and growing in its capacity to reflect God's goodness in the world. Thus each and every

"

18

" 14

"

16

Cf. chapter ill, 1.2, p. 148. In fact the three stages correspond with perfectio prima (esse!. peifectio secunda

(operatio) and consutnmatio. Cf. ch~pter ~, .p .. 221: God ;, both object and medium of knowledge. The perfeCtlon of Slgnifymg God by the conswnmated operative union (imago gloriae) is only excelled by Christ, the Word (Imago Parris) Incarnate. Cf. chapter I, 2.1, p. 21.

Cf. A. Peg;', 1978. In the words of N. Lash, 1993, p. 82, "We are enabled, in the Spirit's gift, to know our words, ourselves, all words and all the world, to be secure, in their fragility, as traces of God's utterance, echoes of the Creator's speech, given back to God." These three levels, according to which human life can be said to have a meaning, can still be encountered in the contemporary debate on the quest for meaning. For the first level, where human existence is appreciated as referring to something beyond itself (whether one is aware of it or not), d. M. Sarot, 1993; O. Hanfling, 1988; R. Hepburn, 1981/1965j For the second, where meaning is understood as something which is the result of a process of interpretation, d. P. Ricoeur, 1990, p. 180-193; A. MacIntyre, 1990', p. 208~218; R. Solomon, 1990', p. 274j For the third, where the aspect of actively giving shape to one's existence is take intO consideration, d. B. Grom/J. Schmidt, 1988; J. Kruithof, 1968.

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moment of human existence on earth is full of meaning: being there and knowing and loving God, human beings signify the incomprehensible triune God. By signifying their Creator, they help each other in making visible the Invisible and directing their lives even more, at loving and knowing God. Thus the relationship between man and God has its impact on the relationship between human beings and vice versa. As a whole this process is directed at consummation in the blessed, eternal union with God: 'life' after death.

level of human life is directed at communication with the triune God. As we have seen, this relationship with God has its influence on the relationship with one's fellow human beings. Eternal life and death are to be understood from the core of the relationship with God. Thus human life on earth is intrinsically characterised by 'living together' in two dimensions: vivere is essentially convivere. In the second place, this relational character of life is determined as a personal relationship with the triune God. As we saw in the first chapter of this study, Aquinas' theology helps to spell out this personal character of the relationship. He helps to map out the way in which human beings are involved in this relationship from the level of existence (founded by God's creative power, appropriated to the Father) up to that of the perfection of the operations of intellect (the illumination of which is appropriated to the Son) and will (the enflaming of which in love is appropriated to the Spirit). Thus from the outset one is prevented from approaching God as an impersonal Supreme Being. On the contrary: because the Son was incarnated and lived among us, the personal relationship with God is facilitated. 21 In the third place, a dynamic character is assigned to life as relationship. We have distinguished between the level of meaning which transcends the human capacity for orientation (the fact that, as creatures, we are directed at God whether we like it or not) and the level which we have in our hands (the human need for orientation, given with the free will and intellect of man). Putting it in terms of these two levels of meaning one can say that it takes a lifetime before the two levels of

262

1.3 Living with God as meaning of life

Presenting Thomas' account of the meaning of life in terms of signification and ends, we ha~e seen that all analyses point to the relationship with God as the core of human existence. More precisely, one should say: to the actual relationship with God in grace. For 'life' after death - the ultimate end of human life on earth - is conceived as the copious consummation and expression of the relationship with God in earthly life. In accordance with this, we have seen that, in Aquinas' theology, 'eternal life' reflects earthly life as a mirror." Having grasped this, we will examine how, in Thomas' view, the relationship with God qualifies the nature of human life on earth. From that which we have examined in this study, four important features come to the fore. In the first place, there is what I propose to call, the intrinsically relational character of life. The characteristic human faculties of intellect and will - which are called man's 'life' in the second meaning - are essentially faculties of communication. Man is a social animal by nature, Aquinas frequently quotes Aristotle with assent. 20 The entire natural

l'

"

Cf. chapter IV, 3.1, p. 246. Cf. e.g. ScG m 129.5; S7b I 95.4.co. Aristotle's phrase is quoted from I Politica 2 (1253a3-4). Lest Aquinas be accused of underestimating the role of fellow human beings as regards the development of the love for God, it must be sr.ressed that in this study relatively little attention is paid to the importance of the community and the interpersonal level of communication for the development of the relationship with God. Although both Original Sin and Redemption by participation in Christ's Church are embedded in the community of those who are part of a tradition, and the perfection of love for God 'overllows' to serving one's neighbour as the perfections of vita religiosa activa and the manyr display (chapter III, 2.3, p. 175 and 2.4, p. 180ft) . I have chosen to concentrate on the relationship between God and man in order to highlight the theological depth of Aquinas' account of the concept of life. ¥

meaning--are united. During this process, which calls for cultivation, in

different stages the things we experience are interpreted and valued differently.21 To the degree that one's 'centre of gravity' is placed more and more in God, the relationship with oneself also changes. Both, oneself and one's neighbour are increasingly appreciated as 'gifts' meant to reflect God's love, From this core, the appreciation of the goods and evils of life is transformed: by the life of grace, the intellectual influence on the sensitive basis is perfected so that everything is perceived from

21

Cf. the arguments of suitability for the incarnation discussed in chapter IT, 2.1, p.

96ff. 22

Here lies the imponance of the the great saints and mystics for theology: they tell us about how the world is to be appreciated from the perspective of the intimate life with God for which we are all designed.

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Ithe perspective of the relationship with God.2J In the fourth place, human life as a personal, dynamic relation with the triune God is appreciated as marked by God's incomprehensibility. In chapter I we have seen how Aquinas deals with the fact that, on the one hand, God is to be called 'life' more properly than any creature; on the other, God is and remains the Incomprehensible One. The know· ledge of God we obtain is a direction pointed at, based on the created effects of God." Only in eternal life is God seen facie ad faciem. This theological truth is based on the character of human existence as a life in via. It is a journey in which the destination . God Himself - is only fully revealed at the end." This leads to a paradoxical situation: the framework of the Christian tradition, by which the orientation in life is made possible, is needed in all its/extensiveness so as to help in aiming at its incomprehensible core: the triune God.26 In conformity with this paradoxical situation according to which the sign (creation) - being more

and effectuating dimension of Christ's work." In the sacraments both dimensions are present in a material way, so that communication with God is enabled to take place in concordance with both the material and spiritual dimension of human nature. Moreover, apart from the orientation provided by each particular sacrament (cf. its threefold dimension as signum rememorativum, demonstrativum and prognosticum), as a whole they also constitute a framework which allows one to appreciate the hidden, inner life of grace on the model of our natural life. This mirror is helpful as a revelation and effectuation of the meaning of life. Within this framework we are invited to appreciate the dynamic role of the Holy Spirit: God's love which animates the entire creation and moves us towards the consummation of our life with God. 2. The 'meanIng' of death

connatural to us, being 'signs' ourselves - seems to be more real than the

thing signified (God), the three theological virtues all display the character of surrender to the incomprehensible triune God: faith implies confidence in the Invisible and Ineffable One; hope implies surrender to that which outreaches our expectations; charity is letting oneself be moved by the Incomprehensible One. The intrinsical relational character of life, the trinity of God, the dynamic character of life with God and God's incomprehensibility - in their interrelation - qualify from the outset the approach of the living God. At the intersection of these four features with the human quest for orientation and the material dimension of human existence, the importance of Christian sacraments for the theological reflection on the meaning of life imposes itself. According to the heuristic matrix of appropriation we found in the first chapter, the semantic field of verum is associated with the Son (or rather: the Word) and that of bonum is connected with the Spirit." Both lines can be discerned in the revealing and effectuating dimension of the sacraments,28 rooted in the revealing

" " " 26

Cf. chapter n, 1.3.3 (p. 91) and chapter Ill, 2.1 (p. 156) and 2.2 (p. 167). Chapter ~ 2.2.2, p. 45. Cf. D. Burrell, 1979, p. 73. This state of affairs runs paralld to Aquinas' account of the material world which

expresses and points to the spiritual world.

Human life on earth can be characterised as a personal, dynamic relationship with the incomprehensible, triune God; what does this entail for the 'meaning' of death and one's attitude towards this evil which separates those who live on earth from Eternal Life? In order to answer this question we will first bring back to mind some basic conclusions concerning death. In the first place, Thomas appreciates death as privation of life (privatio vitae) and precisely as privation of being it is, ontologically speaking, an evil (malum)." Apart from being an evil according to the natural order, he also envisages the killing of a human being as a moral evil - though he considers it to be, sometimes, legitimate and even necessary to bring about this evil in order to prevent a greater evi!." In the second place, we have seen that, in Aquinas' view, the mortal condition of man has a 'meaning': it refers to something. It has been explained that corporal mortality is considered to be not only an effect (punishment) of the separation from God, but also a sign of it." Thus the principle is recognized according to which the material signifies the spiritual. In the third place, we have seen that Thomas places great emphasis

" . 30

21

Cf. chapter I, 2.3.1, p. 53.

11

18

Cf. chapter IT, 3.2, p. 132.

32

Cf. chapter n, 2.3, p. I09ff.

Cf. chapter IT, 1.2, p. 79. Cf. chapter m, 3.1, p. 182. Cf. chapter IT, 1.3.2, p. 91.

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on the death of Christ as exemplary in a double sense: not only as a perfect way of dying which should be followed by those who are baptized in Christ," but also as something which lies ahead of all of us and which calls for being used as an opportunity to become more united with God." These three features show a coherence. Death is an evil: as such it can be understood as punishment. When death is appreciated as punishment, it is interpreted within the framework of a relationship: that between man and God. Within this relationship the punishment of death is conceived according to the pedagogical objective of re·directing human beings at God. Both the example and the help are provided by the Son Incarnate. Inquiring as to the 'meaning' of death, it is clear that, as in the case of life, different answers can be given. When looking at the meaning of death in .terms of signification, it refers to the fact that by Original Sin human beings are averted from God. In terms of goals, the purpose of death is twofold: in the first place, signifying the broken relationship with God; in the second, offering an opportunity for restoration of this relationship by imitation of Christ. . In this appreciation of death, the greatest corporal evil is not extolled as the summit of life on earth, or played down as a minor hurdle which separates us from union with God: it is called just what it is, malum. In accordance with the degree that Aquinas appreciates the corporal dimension of human existence, the separation of body and soul is considered as a painful and cruel event, destroying human nature and naturally filling man with horror. Aquinas would never entitle a treatise de bono mortis as Saint Ambrose did: death is an evil and only as such can it be a punishment. Nevertheless, the greatest corporal evil is not the greatest evil: for Thomas the greatest evil thinkable is separation from God, the 'second death' of eternal damnation. It takes the development of the relationship with God to appreciate this truth of faith." At this point, the character of theology as faith in search of understanding" emerges in full colour. As we have seen, Thomas appreciates faith as a theological virtue and effect of vita gratiae which

implies persortal commitment and assent." Proceeding from this attitude the believer searches for reasons of suitability and interrelation of the mysteries of faith. It depends on the nature of this relationship whether these suitabilities are accepted or not: especially when existential problems as suffering and death are concerned. Thus there remains a gap between the relatively simple model of death as a pedagogical device for re·directing human beings at God and the complicated and hidden processes in the human soul through which a believer is enabled, in a fruitful way, to give shape to his or her relationship with God according to this model. Aquinas cannot bridge this gap - which is not a theoretical gap, but one between theory and experience" - nor can any other theologian perform this task. What can be done - apart from trying to show the fittingness and plausibility of the model - is to map out the dynamism of life of grace according to which one's 'centre of gravity' shifts towards God. As we have seen, this dynamism can develop towards both, a longing to be in patria in order to enjoy perfect union with God (according to the theological virtue of caritas) and a total surrender of one's faith into the hands of God (according to the virtue of spes)." The framework of this dynamism is provided by the faith and the sacraments of the Church, founded by Christ, Via, Veritas et Vita, and enabling man to become united with God. Living with God, in facing death, can become suffering and dying with Christ, thanks to the Word who has become flesh. When suffering and death are conceived .as participation in the suffering and death of Christ, it is obvious that the appreciation of and attitude towards death is entirely qualified by the· appreciation of life, with all its connotations. Within the dynamism of surrendering to God - with body and soul - enabled by the life of grace, death - as punishment for our inherited aversion from God by Original Sin becomes an opportunity to express this total surrender in its most

" ~

" "

Cf. chapter n, 2.3.2, p. 119. Cf. chapter n, 3.1, especially the first reason 01 suitability discwsed there (p. 127). CI. chapter n, 1.3.3, p. 93. CI. chapter I, 1.2 (p. 16) and 1.3 (p. 19).

" CI. chapter ill, 2.1, p. 157. ,. CI. C. Leget, 1994, p. 179·184. " Cf. chapter ill, 2.1, p. 164. The Pauline motif (ph 1,23; 2Co 5,4-8) 01 divine love which caUses longing for death in order to be united with Christ, has a long tradition. Cf. the works of another Teacher of the Church, Saint John of the Cross (1542.1591): cantico espirituJ 11.10 and llama de amor viva 1.28·36. Cf. also Saint Theresa 01 Avila (1515.1582), Castillo interior VI 6.1 and vn 3.1·7.

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extreme way. 40

The growth or sudden break-through of this total surrender effectuated by the augmentation of vita gratiae - can neither be enforced nor hastened_ Letting the life of grace grow is precisely one of the goals of earthly life, as we have seen. Experiencing suffering and death as meaningful within the framework of the relationship with God belongs to the part of meaning which cannot be made by oneself, but which, nevertheless, calls for great pains to be taken." That this. total surrender is a genuine possibility is displayed in the suffering of Christ at the Cross and in the testimony of those who arrive at total availability and transparency in relation to God's will during their life on earth.42 For most of us, less gifted and less heroic, these testimonies may serve to strenghten our confidence and invite us to be more involved in the dynamism of life with God; a dynamism - as we have learned - which is both entirely the work of the Holy Spirit and the result of our cultivation of faith. Now that we have found some understanding of this faith, it seems appropriate to close this study performing what has been examined, by joining the words of the famous hymn, which can now be understood in their profundity: Praesta mea. menti de Te vivere."

40

U

42

43

Cf. M.-M. Labourdette, 1985, p. 390, quoted in chapter II, footnote 81 on p. 95. This total surrender is characteristic for the way Christ died (chapter II, 2.3.1, p. 110ff, especially p. 118) and the perfect act of cantas by which Christ is imitated: martyrdom (chapter m, 2.4, p. 176). On the relation between suffering and the augmentation of charity. d. In duo praee.prol [Busa 403] Sunt autem et duo quae habitam caritatem augent. Primum est cordis separatio a terrenis... [Busa: 432] Secundum est firma patientia in adversis. Man;· Jestum est enim quod quando gravia pro eo quem diligimus, sustinemus. amor ipse non destruitur, immo cresci:. Sg 8,7: "Aquae multae" (id est tribulationes multae) "non potuerunt extinguere caritatem ", Et ideo sancti viri qui adversitates pro Deo sustinent, magis in eius dilectione fmnantur,' sicut ani/ex ilIud artificium magis diligit in quo plus laboravit. Et inde est quod fideles quanto plures afJIictiones pro Deo sustinent. tanto magis elevantur in amore ipsius. Gn 7,17: "Multiplicatae !Unt aquae" (id est tribulationes) "et elevaverunt arcam in sublime", idest Ecclesiam, vel animam viri iusti. Cf. the autobiography of Saint Theresa of Lisieux (1873-1897), who is even more radical than Aquinas in her passionate desire for suffering out of love for Christ: all theodicee-like questions seem to evaporate entirely through her burning love for Christ. "Give my mind to live on You", from the ,hymn Adoro Te, ascribed to Thomas Aquinas (on the authorship d. J. Weisheipl, 1983', p. 400.401).

APPENDIX I

THE MOMENT OF DEATH In 1932, P. Glorieux opens the discussion with an article in which he investigates Aquinas' account of the moment of death with regard to the last movements of the free will before it is fixed. In his hypothesis John of Damascus' sentence Hoc enim est hominibus moTS quod angelis casus (IT De fide ortbodoxa 4) plays a large role (quoted many times by Thomas: cf. In II Sent 7.1.2, In IV Sent 46.1.3, De ver 24.1O.sc4, SIb I 64.2.co). The argument runs as follows: if the moment of death is decisive for the eternal destination of man, and the separation of the soul from the body gives the soul a new, more angelic mode of being and knowing (freed from all passions) would it then not be probable that in the moment of dying the separated soul chooses freely for or against God? P. Glorieux is aware of the fact that Aquinas does not speak of this choice anywhere ("Encore qu'il ne Ie dise pas explicitement, et qu'il ne se prononce pas la-dessus, toute la logique du raisonnement de saint Thomas suppose que Ie choix decisif de I'£me se fait quand s'inaugure pour elle son etat d'£me separee", p. 879) and that he introduces a new interpretation of dying. L. Scheffczyk (1989, p. 14-27) shows that the thesis of Glorieux is adopted and modified by K. Rahner (1958) and L. Boros (1962), among others, in a discussion in which an ambivalent attitude towards Aquinas is shown. On the one hand Thomas is praised for the unity of body and soul which he establishes in his anthropology, on the other the eschatological implication of the anima separata is rejected, being regarded as too dualistic. Thus a new attitude towards death appears according to which - at the moment of dying - body and soul are considered to perish, whereas at the same time death is looked upon as the perfection of the earthly process. In recent years, under influence of the Reformed 'Ganztod'-theory (C. Stange, W. Elert, P. Althaus), a new effort has been undertaken to overcome the alleged dualistic implications of Thomas' anthropology in the' Auferstehung-im-Tode'-theory (G. Greshake/]. Kremer, 1986). Contrary to the reservation of P. Glorieux and K. Rahner, the view of dying as decisive choice is assigned to Thomas by M. Clark (1978, p. 453: "We will not fear death if we understand it as a moment of mercy when God makes his final appeal for love from a person fully himself and fully free for the first time in his life; surely at this moment a man

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APPENDIX!

has the choice that was offered the angels.") and T. Janez Barrio (1978, p. 463: lIAqUl tiene lugar su 'decision metaffsica ultima', Es su opcion definitiva, desprovista de accidentalidad. El acto que realice el hombre en el momento de su muerte metaffsica deviene 'ser', la opclon 'estado', y el tiempo 'eternidad'.). Also J. Pieper (1979, p. 125-149), spends much effort on thinking about the moment of dying as "letzte Entscheidung" and "auBerste Schritt auf dem Wege der Selbstverwirklichung", referring to K. Rahner, 1. Boros, P. Glorieux, 1. Roure, R. Troisfontaines and E. Mersch. In all his studies on death in the works of Aquinas, L.F. Mateo-Seco (1974, 1975, 1978, 1982[a] and 1982[bj) explicitly rejects this view: Glorieux, Boros and Rahner are attacked for their 'romantic' view of death. I agree with Mateo-Seco that Thomas interprets death explicitly as malum; an evil which destroys the human person. It seems very unlikely that the ultimat~ choice of human self-realization is made by a mutilated soul, neither being a person nor possessing human nature. In my opinion the sentence of John of Damascus - according to which death is for man what the Fall is for angels - should not be interpreted in the sense that the character of choice which resulted in the Fall of angels should be assigned to death. Thomas quotes the sentence only in order to determine the moment at which the will is fixed once and for all. Thus the moment of death is the moment at which free choice (characteristic for the status meremil) ends; this is the opposite of a moment of free choice 'par excellence'. For what concerns "the entire logic of Aquinas' reasoning" to which Glorieux refers, some other considerations deserve it to be mentioned as well. The fact that Thomas keeps silence with regard to the moment of death - which does not increase the plausibility of the interpretation proposed by Glorieux - concords with Aquinas' view that the very insecurity and anxiety about what happens in the moment of dying belongs to the character of death as punishment (ef. chapter II, 1.3.3, p. 93). This is supported by the historical observation that, in the thirteenth century, the process of dying was experienced as a struggle for the choice for God up to the ultimate moments of earthly life (and not after these moments). As K. Stuber (1976, p. 53-126) reports, the gift of perseverantia played a large role in Christian spirituality with regard to the process of dying. Confession, viaticum, oil, holy water, candles, crucifix, prayer: all that was available was put to use so that the dying person was enabled to be secured from turning away from God in the last minutes of earthly existence.

Moreover, a more fundamental question can be posed with regard to the enterprise of P. Glorieux and his followers. Looking at the first sentence of his article ("Les problemes mysterieux et troublants qui touchent la mort et au jugement, aux derniers combats qui se livrent dans l'~me avant qu'elle comparaisse devant son juge ... ont toujours excite la curiosite et passionne les recherches des fideles et des theologiens. ") one detects a motive which seems to lie at the basis of his thesis: curiosity. However much this curiosity may be motivated by care for the well-being of the dying Christian (as it ultimately is in the case of Glorieux), theologically the question can be posed to what degree speculations like these are really helpful for elucidating one's faith. The hypothesis of the moment of death as moment of ultimate choice rather adds another 'article of faith' attained by philosophical speculation, than that the believing Christian is helped in understanding the Scriptural interpretations of the relation between the brute process of dying and one's relationship with God.

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APPENDIX II

BEATITUDE OF THE BODY: EXTENSIVE OR INTENSIVE GROWTH? The question at stake is whether Thomas changed his mind and in the Summa Theologiae abandons his former opinion that beatitude grows intensively after the reunion of the separated soul with the body. The first text, in which Thomas speaks of intensive and extensive augmentation, is In IV Sent 49.1.4a.co: quod beatitudinem sanctorum post resurrectionem augeri extensive quidem manifestum est; quia beatitudo tunc erit non solum in anima, sed etiam in corpore; et etiam ipsius animae

beatitudo augebitur extensive, inquantum anima non solum gaudebit de bono proprio, sed de bono corporis. Potest etiam dici, quod etiam beatitudo animae ipsius augebitur intensive. The other text, in which he denies intensive growth, is STh I-II 4.5.ra5: desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex pane appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui sufficit Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive. The discordance between these texts is already noticed a few years after Thomas' death in the lists in which an inventory is drawn up of all the passages according to which Aquinas seems to have changed his mind (p. Glorieux, 1950, p. 121). It is discussed during later centuries (ef. Cajetan's treatment in STh. Ed. Leon. vol. VI, p. 43) and results in a still undecided discussion in our century (ef. E. Lewalter, 1935; P. Glorieux, 1950; F. Pelster, 1952; F. Paladino, 1953; F. Wetter, 1958, p. 220-221; C. Peter, 1964, p. 273-280; O.H. Pesch, 1967[a], p. 833, footnote 31; H.J. Weber, 1973, p. 202-217; OR. Pesch, 1988, p. 203-205; G. Greshake/J. Kremer, 1992', p. 231-239). The discordance raises questions of a different nature: if Aquinas changed his mind, why did he not say so? If he did so, why did Reginald of Piperno - his secretary and a dose friend of his who should have been acquainted with the change - decide to maintain the opinion of In IV Sent when he composed the Supplementum to the Summa? Is it not so that this change contributed to later developments as a result of which the accent is placed on the fate of the separated soul instead of resurrection, thus neglecting the corporal dimension of man as well as the community character of heaven? (When corporal resurrection is

nothing more than an ornament to an already blessed soul,· corporal resurrection and the Last Judgement are likewise: cf. G. GreshakelJ. Kremer, 1992', p. 239). Some scholars argue that the sentence non intensive, sed extensive in the Summa is due to a mistake in one of the earliest copies. The copyist must have left out the word solum. Thus the original would be: non solum intensive, sed (etiam) extensive (E. Lewalter, P. Glorieux, O.H. Pesch). E. Lewalter, in an elucidating article, assigns the opposite interpretation to the influence of the Bulle Benedictus Deus from Pope Benedict XII in 1336. In order to clarify our position, it may be helpful to define the question at stake as precisely as possible. First, we must rule out what is not at stake: what is clear, is that Aquinas - in accordance with the teaching of the Church - holds that separated souls can possess beatitude immediately after death (Cf. E. Lewalter). Secondly, it is clear that after the resurrection of the body beatitude grows extensively. What is under discussion is whether beatitude grows intensively. With intensive growth an increase in charity cannot be meant, since the augmentation of carita> is fixed at the moment of death. Thus, the question at stake can be formulated as: does the reunion with the body effectuate a more intense operation of the intellectual soul? Is the growth of beatitude after resurrection to be conceived as pure overflowing - having an impact on the body but not on the operation of the soul as such - or are the corporal and spiritual dimension of man interrelated to such a degree that the beatitude of the soul not only affects the body, but that the glorification of the soul has an impact on the intensi ty of the operation of the intellectual soul as well? In other words: does extensive growth imply intensive growth? In order to answer this question, we should be aware of the fact that in STh I-II 4.5 the question is not put in this way, neither is it in other texts such as De pot 5.10; ScG IV 79 or Camp Th I 151, from which one might hope to gain some support. Only In IV Sent 49.1.4 has this scope. In this respect, Aquinas' sentence non intensive, sed extensive comes indeed as a surprise, for the words were not introduced before in the question. WhenSTh I-II 4.5, however, is considered in relation to STh III 4.6, it becomes clear that the denial of intensive growth is coherent. Both articles complement each other and Thomas separates them for a pedagogical objective. In art. 5 he intends to underscore the sufficiency of the separated soul as far as the essence of beatitude is concerned; in art. 6 his aim is to stress the need of the perfection of the body with

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