vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of contributors
ix
1. Introduction Jaroslav Peregrin
1
PART I: FOUNDATIONS 2. Structural Properties of Dynamic Reasoning Johan van Benthem 3. Construction by Description in Discourse Representation Noor van Leusen and Reinhard Muskens 4. On the Dynamic Turn in the Study of Meaning and Interpretation Richard Breheny 5. Real Dynamics Wolfram Hinzen
15 33 69 91
PART II: SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, DISCOURSE 6. Growth of Logical Form: the Dynamics of Syntax Ruth Kempson, Wilfried Meyer-Viol and Masayuki Otsuka 7. The Double Dynamics of Definite Descriptions Klaus von Heusinger 8. Dynamics in the Meaning of the Sentence and of Discourse Petr Sgall 9. On the Meaning of Prescriptions Timothy Childers and Vladimír Svoboda 10. Imperative Negation and Dynamic Semantics Berislav Žarnić
121 149 169 185 201
PART III: SEMANTIC GAMES 11. Dynamic Game Semantics Tapio Janasik and Gabriel Sandu 12. About Games and Substitution Manuel Rebuschi 13. In Defense of (Some) Verificationism: Verificationism and Game-Theoretical Semantics Louise Vigeant
215 241 259
1
INTRODUCTION Jaroslav Peregrin, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague*
1 CONTEXTS IN FORMAL SEMANTICS It is, of course, not obligatory, to take ‘folk semantics’, according to which to be a (‘meaningful’) expression is to have a ghostly pendant called meaning, at face value. There are many linguists and philosophers who argue that it is futile to see the meaningfulness of an expression as a matter of a thing it possesses. However, there is also a strong tradition which does take meanings at face value, and tries to find out what they are, or at least in which way they should be reconstructed or explicated. The modern history of this tradition starts especially with Gottlob Frege, who proposed to exempt meanings from the legislation of philosophy and to subordinate them rather to logic. The logico-philosophical approach to meaning, elaborated by Wittgenstein, Russell and Carnap and resulting in the Montagovian and post-Montagovian formal semantics, wanted to abstract from the way language is actually put to use and account for the semantics of language as an abstract system1. The pioneers of this approach to semantics also concentrated on language as a means of encoding knowledge; and hence first and foremost as a means of expressing contextindependent propositions, which thus appeared as the primary subject matter of semantics. Context-dependence was seen mostly as a marginal and unimportant phenomenon: everything, so the story went, worth being said can be articulated by means of a context-independent sentence or sentences – and using context-dependent means is only an oblique (though sometimes perhaps handy) way of doing the same. Such view of language was imputed also into the foundations of formal semantics and governed it for some time. * 1
I am grateful to Klaus von Heusinger for helpful comments on a previous version of this text.
Elsewhere (Peregrin, 2001) I pointed out that that ambition may be seen as establishing an interesting kinship between this program and Ferdinand de Saussure’s program of concentrating solely on language as langue (as contrasted to parole) and that, consequently, formal semantics can be seen as a way of carrying out his structuralistic program.
2
Meaning: the Dynamic Turn
However, even within this framework there were, from the beginning, serious attempts to incorporate context-dependence into the agenda2. In his path-breaking paper on formal semantics, David Lewis (1970) made some proposals in this direction; but the first systematic accounts of context dependence within this tradition were provided by David Kaplan and Robert Stalnaker. Kaplan (1970) pointed out that ‘circumstances’ intervene into the process of determining an utterance’s truth value twice, rather than only once, as possible-worlds semantics appeared to suggest. He urged that the utterance must be first confronted with its context to yield an intension which can be only then confronted with a possible world to yield the truth value of the utterance w.r.t. the world. Thus, deciphering an utterance such as I am hungry we must first exploit the context to unfold the indexical I, whereby we reach a proposition which then can be true w.r.t. some possible worlds (namely those in which the current utterer is hungry) and false w.r.t. others. Whereas Kaplan concentrated on contexts as inputs to utterances, Stalnaker (1970; 1978) was the first to study contexts also as outputs from utterances, thus introducing a truly dynamic perspective. According to him, an utterance ‘consumes’ the actual context to yield a proposition (which may than be evaluated w.r.t. various possible worlds), and parallelly produces a new context which can be consumed by subsequent utterances. In the simplest case, where both contexts and propositions are seen as sets of possible worlds, the new context may be seen as simply the intersection of the context with the proposition. Thus when I say I am hungry, two things happen: the content of the sentence uttered gets amended by the context to yield a proposition which becomes the utterance meaning; and the context gets in turn amended by this proposition to yield a new context.
2 SYSTEMS OF DYNAMIC SEMANTICS Despite such pioneering work, up to almost the beginning of the 1980s, the mainstream of formal semantics still approached language as a static system. Then, especially after pathbreaking papers of Lewis (1979), Kamp (1981) and others, the situation started to change: it started to be ever more clear that the anaphoric structure of natural language, which is being put to work in almost any kind of discourse, cannot be accounted for without some kind of ‘going dynamic’. Moreover, Kamp has indicated how to carry out a dynamic turn without abandoning the framework of formal semantics in the wide sense (although perhaps abandoning one in the narrow, i.e. strictly model-theoretic sense). And later Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991), van Benthem (1997) and others showed that the turn can be accomplished even within the narrow bounds of logic and model theory: they presented logical systems which were dynamic just in the way needed for the semantic analysis of the anaphoric structure of language3.
2
Prior to the establishment of formal semantics, context-dependence was explicitely addressed for example by Bar-Hillel (1954).
3
Earlier versions of dynamic logic originated especially within the context of computer science.
Introduction
3
The most general idea behind the dynamic turn in semantics appears to be the acceptance of the Stalnakerian insight that our pronouncements must be seen both as ‘context-consumers’ and ‘context-producers’. A sentence such as He wears a hat is not truly intelligible (and is neither true, nor false) without there being a context for it to ‘consume’ and to furnish its he with a referent. Such a context might be constituted by the circumstances of utterance of the sentence (which may include pointing at a person), but often it is produced by some previous utterances: e.g. by the previous utterance of a sentence like Look, there is a man passing by! Turning the idea of sentences being context-producers and context-consumers into the formally-semantic cash leads to thinking of a sentence as something which has a contextchange potential: i.e. is able to bring about a change of the actual context. This, in turn, often leads to viewing the denotation of the sentence as something which involves (or simply is) a function mapping contexts on contexts (which is taken to be the formal reconstruction of the potential). Contexts are often seen also as information states: they are constituted by all the information amassed by the discourse so far. (And, importantly, they contain what can be called an individuary4 – a collection of individuals having been made salient by the discourse – which acts as the casting agency for the needs of the pronouns and other anaphoric expressions of language.) Hence the resulting semantic model consists of (i) a set S of information states and (ii) a family of functions from S to S. Thus, while on the Kaplanian picture a proposition came to interact with the context to produce the content of the actual utterance (‘what is said’), now it is recognized to fulfill also one more important task: to create a new context. And if the Kaplanian picture led to the explication of the proposition as a function from contexts to contents (which were explicated as intensions), now they, prima facie, come to be explicable as a pair of functions: one mapping contexts on contents (the character, in Kaplan’s term) and the other one mapping contexts on contexts (the context-change potential). But in fact these two functions need not be independent: one of the possible ways in which an utterance may produce the new context is to take its content and somehow add it to the old context. In this way, the production of the content may appear as a by-product (or an intermediate product) of the production of the new context; and the contextchange potential might be looked at as fulfilling both the tasks. This appears to be what has led some of the semanticists to the identification of propositions with context-change potentials5. A variety of dynamic semantic models of language emerge from various kinds of explications of the notion of context or information state. Take, as an example of one kind of such approach, Hans Kamp’s discourse representation theory (DRT)6: there the role of the information states is played by discourse representation structures (DRSs), each of which consists of a set of individuals and a set of conditions supplied for them by the discourse. Thus a sentence like 4
See Peregrin (2000a). Note, however, that as a sentence must interact with the context to yield not only a new context, but also the content of the actual utterance (‘what is said’), identifying its meaning with the context change potential is subsuming the latter task under the former, which may not be unproblematic (cf. Stalnaker, 1999). 6 Kamp (1981); Kamp and Reyle (1993); van Eijck and Kamp (1997). 5
4
Meaning: the Dynamic Turn A man owns a donkey
introduces two individuals together with the conditions that the first of them is a man, the second one is a donkey and the first owns the second. This gives rise to the following DRS:
x
y
man(x) donkey(y) owns(x,y)
Hence sentences produce DRSs; but they can, and some of them need to, consume DRSs. Thus a sentence such as He beats it needs a context delivering the reference for its pronouns. If it is uttered in the context represented by the above DRS, it enriches it with the condition that the first of the individuals of the DRS beats the second; hence produces, in effect, the following DRS:
x
y
man(x) donkey(y) owns(x,y) beats(x,y)
All in all, a sentence is to be seen as something which in general upgrades a given DRS to another, more elaborated one. Quite a different explication of the notion of context is provided by such systems as Groenendijk & Stokhof’s (1991) DPL7. Here the role of information states is played by sets of assignments of objects to the so called discourse markers. The intuitive idea behind this could be explained as follows: uttering a man introduces an individual which becomes the potential referent for he; hence the context produced by the utterance can be reconstructed as assigning this object to he. In general, the context is an assignment of all potential referents to all possible anaphoric phrases of language, which are established by the previous utterances. And discourse markers are what assume the role of the phrases within the language of DPL.
7
See also van Benthem (1997) and Muskens et al. (1997).
Introduction
5
Thus, (1) is analyzed as ∃d1d2(man(d1)∧donkey(d2)∧owns(d1,d2)) and produces the context consisting of all functions which map d1 and d2 on some elements of the universe such that the first of them is a man, the second one is a donkey and the first owns the second. The subsequent utterance of (2) which is analyzed as beats(d1,d2) then reduces this set to the set of only those functions which map d1 onto an individual which beats d2. (Thus, within DPL, ∃d1d2(man(d1)∧donkey(d2)∧owns(d1,d2))∧beats(d1,d2) is – surprisingly – equivalent to ∃d1d2(man(d1)∧donkey(d2)∧owns(d1,d2)∧beats(d1,d2)). The reason is that the operators ∃ and ∧ are not the well-known operators of predicate logic: the former in fact establishes an assignment of an ‘arbitrary’ value to a discourse marker, whereas the latter represents a concatenation.) A dynamic approach also based on logic but in a rather different way (and in fact older than the previous ones) is represented by Hintikka’s proposals to account for the semantics of sentences in terms of games8. It is well known that the usual semantics of standard logic (first-order predicate calculus) can be alternatively formulated as based on games: each formula is taken to represent a game of two players (Me, attempting to show that the formula is true, and Nature, attempting the opposite), such that one of them (Me) has a winning strategy just in case the sentence is true. Thus the formula ∃x1x2(man(x1)∧donkey(x2)∧owns(x1,x2)) of the standard predicate logic is thought of as representing a game in which I am first to pick up two individuals of the universe, a1 and a2, so that the game is to continue with the formula man(a1)∧donkey(a2)∧owns(a1,a2). (What I aim at is picking up some such individuals that the latter formula will be true.) In the next turn, Nature chooses one of the three conjuncts with respect to which the game is to continue then. (What it aims at is choosing that which is most unlikely to be true.) And then the game comes to an end: if the selected atomic formula is true, I win, if not, the victory belongs to Nature. Hintikka proposed various kinds of broadening of the range of games representable by sentences, going behind the boundaries of those naturally associated with the formulas of firstorder logic. And we can also think of modifying the rules in such a way that they produce
8
Hintikka (1973); Hintikka and Sandu (1997); and also the contributions in the last part of this volume.
6
Meaning: the Dynamic Turn
‘contexts’ with ‘individuaries’. (Keeping track of the moves of the game produces, besides other things, a list of individuals picked up by Me in the course of the game9.)
3 EXPRESSION MEANING VS. UTTERANCE MEANING Whereas formal semantics in its original form saw context-dependence as a form of imperfection, and the relationship between ‘true’ semantics and discourse analysis or pragmatics as akin to that between pure and applied mathematics, the above sketched dynamic turn has necessarily implied a blurring of this boundary. Formal semanticists have recognized that we can hardly account for meanings of a nontrivial part of natural language without taking into account how discourse functions, how what is said can depend on context, and how it can in turn change the context. In this way formal semantics has come into contact with a different semantic tradition, the tradition which has, from the beginning, concentrated on the actual processes of communication rather than on language as an abstract system and thus has given pride of place to utterance meaning over expression meaning – for it is, after all, the utterance meaning which does the job of communication. Within philosophy, this tradition has its roots especially in the Oxford ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin, P. Strawson and G. Ryle; but it has been later reinforced by many linguists and cognitive scientists who aimed at an account of how people actually communicate. The most influential conceptual framework for studying utterance meaning (and its relationship to expression meaning) is due to the Oxford philosopher H. Paul Grice (1957; 1989). His idea was that to understand an utterance is to grasp what the utterer intended to convey, i.e. to grasp the ‘speaker meaning’, which is only indirectly related to the meaning of the sentence he uttered. (Thus, by uttering It is late one may want to say that he should go home, or that his neighbor should not make such a noise etc.) Grice argued that the meaning of the sentence uttered is used only as an indirect indicator of the speaker’s meaning, which it yields only in interaction with many general assumptions about the speaker’s goals and intentions (such that the speaker intends to convey something, that she intends to convey something which is relevant to her audience etc.). The idea that to understand somebody’s utterance is to find out what he intends to say (using the meaning of the expression he uttered as a mere clue) resulted, within the context of cognitive science, into conceptions of linguistic communication as based on something like a ‘mind-reading’ (see, e.g., Sperber and Wilson, 2002; and also Breheny, this volume). In a slightly different way, Noam Chomsky and his followers have also contributed to this tradition in that they have turned the attention of linguists to the processes of generating utterances, i.e. to the processes which result in the utterer’s making the particular utterance she makes (see Hinzen, this volume).
9
See Hintikka and Kulas (1985); and also Janasik and Sandu (this volume).
Introduction
7
4 BUT ... WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT? After the dynamic turn, the conceptual foundations of formal semantics became a little bit ambiguous. The static semantic theories of possible worlds or situations were replaced by theories centering around the concepts of context or information state. However, while possible worlds were readily explainable as our means of accounting for “what (empirical) truth is relative to” (Stalnaker, 1986) and hence possible-worlds semantics could be seen as a relatively straightforward account for truth conditions, the foundations of dynamic semantics are still much less clear. To be sure, there seems to exist an almost universal agreement that what dynamic theories are about is something like an ‘information flow’ or ‘kinematics of discourse’. Thus, Chierchia (1994, 141), claims that what we are now after is the question “how [meaning] affects the information available to illocutionary agents”; and van Benthem (1997, p. ix) urges that even logic is now to concentrate on “the logical structure of cognitive actions, underlying human reasoning or natural language understanding”. However, what exactly does this mean? Prima facie there might seem to be no great fuzziness here. There are information states, so the story goes, and there is communication which changes them; and dynamic semantics is to account for this. However, in what sense do information states exist and how do they actually get changed by means of communication? There seems to be at least two quite different answers available, answers which can be called individualistic and collectivistic, respectively. According to the first, the contexts we describe are a matter of (i.e. ‘are in the head of’) an individual speaker, according to the other they have a status of some socially-constructed reality. Both many cognitive scientists and some linguists with the Chomskyan background appear to be more sympathetic to the individualistic interpretation. Many of them saw a great deal of previous formal semantics as simply chimerical in that it addressed something which did not really exist, and now hail dynamic semantics as a means of turning attention to what is really there: to the manipulation of some mental representations or to workings of some language faculty. After the dynamic turn, these theoreticians have been joined by a host of those which were inspired by DRT interpreted in a mentalist way. Many logicians and some philosophers, on the other hand, are more or less reluctant to make meaning into a matter of mind or cognition. After all, they feel, it was the most crucial lesson Frege taught us that to subordinate logic, and consequently also semantics, to psychology is a way to hell; and some of them also accept Wittgenstein’s or Quine’s arguments to the effect that language cannot but be social through and through. Hence they often prefer the collectivistic understanding of information states. According to this, information states are not within the heads of individual speakers, they are rather our means of hypostasing certain states of groups of speakers: states of sharing the acceptance of some beliefs or pieces of knowledge. Now notice that whereas on the individualistic reading the dynamic turn involves a substantial change of the subject matter of semantics (from studying meanings to studying processes
8
Meaning: the Dynamic Turn
behind the production or comprehension of utterances), on the collectivistic reading this is not necessarily so. True, we can still see semantics as turning its attention to a description of certain processes (though now not cognitive, but rather ‘socio-logical’ ones); but we can also go still further on the way of rendering information states ‘virtual’ and claim that they are not something which we describe, but rather something which we only use as a tool for describing the semantic aspect of language and of communication. This ‘instrumental’ approach to dynamic semantics should be better recognized as a reading of its own: as it usually assumes that the ultimate data semantic theory is to account for with the help of meanings are our linguistic inferences and inferential rules, let us call it inferentialistic. The situation is similar to the one which obtained during the heyday of possible worlds. Though there almost did not exist the possibility of a mentalist interpretation (more precisely those who wanted such an interpretation found possible world semantics straightforwardly inadequate10), there still remained two possible ways of making sense of possible worlds, a ‘metaphysical’ one and an ‘instrumental’ one. According to the first, possible worlds existed in some metaphysical sense (and prior to language) and to do possible world semantics was to reveal their relationship to natural language expressions. According to the other, possible worlds were only in the eye of the beholder (semanticist), who used them as a tool for explicating facts about meaning (which were usually seen as a matter of the rules of language, especially the inferential ones). Thus, a possible world semanticist of the latter kind might say that what he is after is simply and straightforwardly meaning, but as he wants to explicate also meanings of modal and counterfactual locutions, he needs a richer semantics than offered by standard first-order logic, and arguably the most handy one, due to Kripke, employs entities which are suitably called possible worlds. And similarly, an information-state semanticist might say that as what he is after is explication also of anaphoric locutions, he arguably needs a semantics of ‘updates’ and entities suitably called contexts or information states11. It might seem that these three interpretations of dynamic turn differ only in some not so important ideology. But this is not so; their differentiation has profound consequences for the way we are to assess the success of the individual theories. Suppose that two theoreticians disagree about the meaning of an expression and want to find a criterion for resolving their disagreement. If they are both subjectivists, then they are bound to search for the criterion within the minds of the speakers, for then their theories are meant to depict something which is to be found there. If, on the other hand, they are both collectivists, they will have to look at the praxis of communication. And if they are both inferentialists, then they will have to check the inferences governing the usage of the expression. Of course the worst situation obtains if each of them interprets the dynamic turn in a different way – then they can hardly not talk past each other. And, as a matter of fact, this is quite a frequent situation.
10
As, e.g., Partee (1980).
11
See Peregrin (2000b).
Introduction
9
5 IS MEANING DYNAMIC? Different interpretations of the dynamic turn also lead to quite different answers to the question what the turn tells us about the nature of meaning. Some exponents of the turn would see it as abandoning the (‘futile’) search for expression meanings and concentrating on utterance meanings or on the very process of communication. Others would see it as disclosing the real nature of meanings – telling us that what meaning really is is not a class of possible worlds or a situation type or something of this kind, but rather an update, a function from information states to information states (where the information state may be explicated as a class of possible worlds, as a DRS, as a set of mappings of discourse markers on individuals etc.). And still others would see it as opening a new way of explicating meaning, which can coexist alongside the older ones, but which is particularly suitable for the explication of the anaphoric features of language. It was with these questions in mind that we organized the workshop “Is Meaning Dynamic?”, which was held in Prague in September 2001 and at which most of the papers included in this volume were presented. Its topic was suggested by the fact that the problems concerning the interplay between the dynamics of language and the nature of meaning have been affecting different areas of logic, linguistics and philosophy of language in such a way that they appear to foster a true paradigm shift: indeed, this question itself appears to be not only a ‘contextconsumer’ (i.e. is the product of the recent status of the discussions of the nature of meaning), but also a ‘context-producer’ since it actually changes the character of the discussions. And though the papers do not provide ready-made answers to this question or to questions related to it, the book can hopefully facilitate a kind of brainstorming which might lead us either to some answers, or to reconsidering the questions. The book consists of three parts. The papers in the first deal with foundational questions: why should we think that meaning is dynamic, what exactly does it mean that it is dynamic and what does this imply for the methodologies of semantics. The fact that the dynamic view has also already achieved a certain tradition in forming theories is reflected by the papers of the second part. These papers show different applications of dynamic theories / views / approaches in different areas of the theory of language, such as the compositional process of interpretation, the lexical meaning of the articles, the interaction with a discourse structure or the semantics of imperatives. Papers of the last part then address the game-theoretical variety of dynamic semantics. Johan van Benthem realizes that if we take the shift from the static perspective on language to the dynamic one, we will have to reconsider our very concept of inference: for the traditional view of inference as reflexive, transitive, obeying cut etc. turns out to be obsolete. Therefore he considers quite different kinds of inference and indicates that it is this very kind which is of a piece with the usual kinds of dynamic semantics. The paper by Noor van Leusen and Reinhard Muskens considers the problem of ‘procedurality’ versus ‘declarativity’ of dynamic theories. Whereas the common wisdom appears to be that whereas DRT is decidedly procedural, DPL and related theories are declarative, the authors
10
Meaning: the Dynamic Turn
argue that a synthesis between the two perspectives can be reached if logic is used as a metalanguage for the description of natural languages. Procedural aspects, they claim, are then associated with the proof theory of this logic, declarative aspects with its model theory. A thorough criticism of the foundations of dynamic semantics is presented by Richard Breheny. He concentrates on the question of what exactly it is that is accounted for by dynamic theories of formal semantics; and he argues that some of these theories are based on an unwarranted ‘semantization’ of what are essentially pragmatic effects of utterances. Wolfram Hinzen confronts the kind of dynamics which appears to fuel current dynamic theories of the kind of DPL with the different kind of dynamics implicit in the Chomskyan view of language. His point is that “given that the philosophical theory of meaning has long since moved on to the philosophy of mind, it remains surprising that the Chomskyan enterprise continues to be as marginal to it” and that “it seems desirable to have more discussions on how these partings of ways could be fruitfully overcome.” Ruth Kempson, Wilfried Meyer-Viol and Masayuki Otsuka argue that there is a sense in which we should see the dynamics of language as grounded already within syntax; and moreover, that syntax may be the only place of the system of language where we need to ‘go dynamic’. What they propose is to concentrate on the process of interpretation of strings, which they account for as a process of building syntactico-semantic trees; and argue that “the old question of whether we need structures in representing interpretation in semantics is transformed into a new question: Do we need any mode of representation other than growth of logical forms in order to express generalisations about natural-language syntax?” The nature of the dynamic turn can be clearly seen in the analyses of the English articles. While the static versions of formal semantics often accepted the obviously inadequate Russellian approach (according to which a amounted to existence and the to unique existence), the dynamic turn has opened the door for much more adequate analyses replacing existence with referential availability and uniqueness with top salience. Klaus von Heusinger’s paper discusses this very development and attempts to elaborate on it. While the focus on the dynamic aspect of language is a relative novum for formal semantics, it has been long discussed within some linguistico-semanticist circles, notably within the so-called Prague School. And this is the background of the paper of Petr Sgall: he discusses the interplay of semantics and the workings of discourse, trying to accommodate the insights of the Praguian theory (with its concepts of communicative dynamism, topic-focus articulation etc.) within the formally semantic framework. Dynamic semantics can be, in fact, seen as switching from seeing our assertoric statements as representing or expressing something (classes of possible worlds, DRSs etc.) to seeing them as effecting something – namely the change of the actual information state or context. This not only maneuvers semantics of natural language into the vicinity of that of programming languages (Groenendijk and Stokhof, for example, explicitly admitted theories of semantics of programming languages as a source of inspiration for their DPL), but it also reduces the semantic gap between the assertoric mode of speech and the imperative one. And the semantics
Introduction
11
of imperatives is the subject matter of two papers closing the second part: while Berislav Žarnić discusses more the technical side of the semantic theories of imperative discourse, Timothy Childers and Vladimír Svoboda deal more with the foundational problems. The last part of the book is devoted to the game-theoretical approaches to semantics. Tapio Janasik and Gabriel Sandu discuss the way in which such approaches can deal with anaphoric reference. Manuel Rebuschi argues that game-theoretical semantics should be based on substitutional, rather than on the objectual, quantification. And Louise Vigeant scrutinizes the step from the original version of game-theoretical semantics to the independence-friendly logic and concludes that the step contains an undesirable ‘intensionalization’, which takes it away from laudable verificationism. What all the discussions appear to indicate is that the ‘dynamics’ which is in play is more than a mere hypothesis – that it rather aspires to become an integral part of our general view of meaning. The dynamic turn is thus responsible not only for some new theories, but also for a change in our overall notion of semantics. Hence, however we want to answer the question whether meaning is dynamic, it is simply no longer possible for us to ignore it.
REFERENCES Bar-Hillel, Y. (1954). Indexical Expressions. Mind, 63, 359-379. van Benthem, J. (1997). Exploring Logical Dynamics. CSLI, Stanford. van Benthem, J. and A. ter Meulen, eds. (1997). Handbook of Logic and Language. Elsevier / MIT Press, Oxford / Cambridge (Mass.). Chierchia, G. (1994). Intensionality and Context Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 3, 141-168. van Eijck, J. and H. Kamp (1997). Representing Discourse in Context. In van Benthem and ter Meulen (1997), pp. 179-238. Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review, 66; reprinted in Grice (1989). Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof (1991). Dynamic Predicate Logic. Linguistics and Philosophy, 14, 39-101. Hintikka, J. (1973). Logic, Language-Games and Information. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Hintikka, J. and J. Kulas (1985). Anaphora and Definite Descriptions. Reidel, Dordrecht. Hintikka, J. and G. Sandu (1997). Game-theoretical semantics. In van Benthem and ter Meulen (1997), pp. 277-322. Kamp, H. (1981). A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation. In: Formal Methods in the Study of Language (J. Groenendijk, T. Janssen and M. Stokhof, eds.), pp. 277-322. Mathematical Centre, Amsterdam. Kamp, H. and U. Reyle (1993). From Discourse to Logic. Kluwer, Dordrecht. Kaplan, D. (1970). On the Logic of Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 81-98. Muskens, R., J. van Benthem and A. Visser (1997). Dynamics. In van Benthem and ter Meulen (1997), pp. 587-648.
12
Meaning: the Dynamic Turn
Lewis, D. K. (1970). General Semantics. Synthèse, 22, 18-67. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language-Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 339-59. Partee, B. (1980). Montague Grammar, Mental Representation and Reality. In: Philosophy and Grammar (S. Kanger and S. Oehman, eds.), Reidel, Dordrecht. Peregrin, J. (2000a). Reference and Inference. In: Reference and Anaphoric Relations (K. von Heusinger and U. Egli, eds.), pp. 269-286. Kluwer, Dordrecht. Peregrin, J. (2000b). The Logic of Anaphora. In: The Logica Yearbook 1999 (T. Childers, ed.), pp. 191-205. Filosofia, Prague. Peregrin, J. (2001). Meaning and Structure. Ashgate, Aldershot. Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (2002). Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading. Mind & Language, 17, 3-23. Stalnaker, R. (1970). Pragmatics. Synthèse, 22, 272-89. Stalnaker, R. (1978). Assertion. In: Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics (P. Cole, ed.), pp. 315-22. Academic Press, New York. Stalnaker, R. (1986). Possible Worlds and Situations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15, 109123. Stalnaker, R. (1999): ‘Introduction’, in Stalnaker: Context and Content, pp. 1-27. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
THE ‘CAUSAL STORY’ AND THE ‘JUSTIFICATORY STORY’ (reflections on a McDowellian theme) Jaroslav Peregrin* www.cuni.cz/~peregrin
Suppose for a moment, that J.R.R. Tolkien, the famous author of the cult fantasy saga Lord of the Rings, did not publish anything of his writings during his lifetime; suppose that after his death the manuscripts of all his writings are lying on his table. Where, then, is the Middlearth, the glorious land of hobbits, dwarfs, elfs and human heroes, situated? We might be tempted to say that it is within our world, namely inside the pile of the papers on the writer’s table for it exists solely through the letters written on these papers. However, to say this would be wrong (or at least strongly misleading) - surely we do not expect that should the heroes of the book walk in a straight line long enough, they would cross the boundaries of the book and appear in Mr. Tolkien’s room. Middlearth is, of course, not within our world - despite existing solely due to certain things which are within it. Now the situation is not substantially different actually, when Middlearth does not exist solely through a single pile of papers, but rather through millions of printed copies of Tolkien’s books and through the minds of millions of their readers. Again, the land exists exclusively through the existence of entities which are parts of our world (albeit that they are now scattered throughout the whole Earth), but this does not mean that the land itself is a part of our world. The point of this anecdotal excursion is now that this relationship between our world and Middlearth is, in a sense, similar to the relationship between our physical space of things and „the space of reasons“ (Sellars, 1956, §36); or between „the causal story“ and „the justificatory story“ (Rorty, 1991, 148). Like Middlearth, the space of reasons exists exclusively due to us, humans, and our minds (and perhaps also of some of our artifacts), and in this sense we might be tempted to situate it in our world, to see it as a certain, perhaps scattered, compartment of the world of things within which we live; but just as in the case of Middlearth, this might be dangerously misguiding. The rationale of talking about something as the space of reasons comes from Sellars’ argument, recognized as sound by his followers, that we have to distinguish carefully between thing-like entities, particulars, which enter into causal (in a broad sense) relationships, and proposition-like entities, facts (and potential facts, which we may call simply propositions), which enter into justificatory relationships. These are two essentially different kinds of entities, living essentially different kinds of ‘lives’ within their different realms. Particulars typically inhabit our spatiotemporal world and are denoted by names; whereas propositions inhabit the space of reasons and are expressed by sentences. And as Brandom (1984, 6) stresses, it is the grasp of propositional contents that in an important sense distinguishes rational or sapient beings.
*
This work was supported by the Research Support Scheme of the OSI/HESP, grant No. 280/1997.
1
The necessity of separating these two kinds of entities was what underlay Sellars’ rejection of the traditional empiricism with its ‘sense data’ - for the ‘sense data’ are nothing else than entities that are supposed to belong to both these categories of entities at once. The sense-data-theorist assumes that the sense datum is a point in which the causal chain going from the outside world to the subject’s mind changes into a justificatory chain, he „insists both that sensing is a knowing and that it is particulars which are sensed.“ (Sellars, 1956, §3) Thus what is sensed is assumed to be knowledge, a true belief, but knowledge which is immediately ‘given’ to the mind, for it is directly delivered into it by the world itself (and is thus infallible). This is what Sellars famously called the Myth of the Given. However, if a particular cannot be a reason for a belief, we inevitably have to conclude, as Davidson (1986, 310) did, that „nothing can serve as reason for a belief save another belief“. But if this is true - if the world has no way of penetrating the space of beliefs -, beliefs appear to be turned loose from the world, to be condemned to blindly and aimlessly revolve within the mind. John McDowell (1994, p. 7) writes: „The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere. The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to allow it to incorporate non-conceptual impacts from outside the realm of thought.“ However, he continues (p.8), „it can seem that if we reject the Given, we merely reopen ourselves to the threat to which the idea of the Given is a response, the threat that our picture does not accommodate any external constraint on our activity in empirical thought and judgment.“ This is what McDowell does not like, and why he seeks a third path, a path that would lead us safely between the Scylla of the Myth of the Given, and the Charybda of Davidsonian coherentism. What we would like to indicate here is that both the Myth of the Given and the threat of leaving our thought externally unconstrained, broken loose from the outside world, presupposes the picture on which the space of reasons is somehow inside the space of things, so that causal chains from the outside world can penetrate into the inner one (thereby changing their nature to justificatory chains). I am going to argue that although this picture might appear to be extremely natural or even unavoidable, it is one more picture which „holds us captive“ (Wittgenstein, 1953, §115) - and that what is really needed is to abandon it. Before we turn to the discussion of the relationship of the space of reasons to the realm of things of our everyday life, and thereby of the ‘justificatory story’ to the ‘causal story’, let me point out that the distinctions between the two realms and the two stories are related to another interesting distinction, the distinction between two ways we can approach a mind (and, I think, also a language1). We can look at a mind ‘from without’: to look at it as one of the objects which feature within our the causal story (and, indeed, also within our justificatory story). We could hardly have failed to notice that among the objects which surround us there are some quite specific ones, which we have come to classify as mind-havers, thereby positing minds, specific objects the having of which distinguishes mind-havers. (It is, of course, not necessary to treat
1
Cf. Peregrin (1995, esp. §11.6).
2
minds as genuine objects, rather than only as ‘properties’ or ‘aspects’ of mind-havers, but this is not a question we will consider now.) But we can also try to look at a mind ‘from within’: we may notice that the justificatory story urgently points to somebody who has invented it and who ‘harbors’ it - who is in the business of justification. (This contrasts this story with the causal story, which, in a sense can be imagined to be ‘told’ - i.e. performed - by the inanimate world itself.) Thus, the justificatory story points out to a mind (or, indeed a ‘community of minds’), which is ‘behind’ it, to a ‘transcendental ego’. So telling this story we are in a sense assuming the standpoint of a mind, we approach it ‘from inside’. Now I think that the advise of keeping apart the causal and the justificatory story should be understood as also entailing the advice not to try to be simultaneously inside and outside a mind. And if we do follow this advice, the relationship between the mind and the world is no mystery: If we look at the mind from without, then there is nothing mysterious about its relationship to the rest of the world: mind-havers, and thereby minds, enter in all kinds of causal interactions with their surroundings. And if we approach the mind from within, then asking about its relationship to the outside world makes no sense at all: then the mind, the thinking subject, is not part of the world (but rather its boundary, as Wittgenstein, 1922, §5.632, duly points out2) and hence there simply is no outside for it to have. This vantage point may also help us distinguish the question we are considering, the question of how to cope with the „threat that our picture [of the relationship of the mind and the world] does not accommodate any external constraint on our activity in empirical thought and judgment“, from some other, related questions, with which it sometimes appears to be intermingled in McDowell’s book. First, there is a question which arises from looking at mind from outside, the question about the nature of mind and about the specificity of its role within the causal story. We have seen that from this perspective minds cannot be anything else than kinds of objects (or properties of objects) causally interacting with other objects. However, one can legitimately wonder whether the causal story really gives us resources to account for the peculiarity of minds in the first place. Do we need a specific kind of vocabulary to account for them, say a normative vocabulary?3 Second, there is a question that arises from looking at the world from within a mind, the question of whether we do see the world through the prism of the mind adequately. We
2
Cf. Kripke’s (1982, p.123ff.) discussion of this Wittgenstein’s passage.
3
This seems to be a question which divides Quine and Rorty (whose answer to the question seems to be no) from Davidson and Brandom (who seem to accept that need for some kind of a specific vocabulary). However, we could also see the question as directly challenging the very constitution of the causal story: Since the dawn of modern science, from Descartes, Leibniz and Newton, we have come to see the causal world as made exclusively of passive materia; but in view of the existence of minds, is this really right? Do we not need also an active ‘pateria’ (to use the terminology of the Czech mathematician and philosopher Petr Vopìnka) to describe the world containing minds? Do we not need to assume that there may exist entities which are not only subject to causal law, but are also able to insert new causes into the causal chains?
3
may wonder whether our conceptualizations which underlie our justificatory story do not corrupt the world, whether the story we thus tell presents the world ‘as it really is’. This is the question about the nature of the unconceptualized world, about the outlook of bare facts stripped of our values4. Both these questions, which we are not going to address here, are to be distinguished from our question of the relationship of the thoughts inside mind to the things outside it. How do elements of the causal world of things manage to restrain the elements of our inner space of reasons, to make our minds work somehow dependently on what is going on outside them? Note that this question arises only if we attempt to account for minds within the world by making the causal story continuous with the justificatory story in such a way that the justificatory story would account for minds and the causal story for the rest of the world. This leads to the picture of minds as spaces of their own within the physical space, as certain islands governed by the justificatory relations within the vast sea governed by the causal ones. To understand the real nature of this question, we now turn our attention back to the concept of the space of reasons. What is the space of reasons and where is it situated? What is the nature of propositions which constitute it? On my construal, the concept of the space of reasons and the concept of proposition are two sides of the same coin. Intuitively, it is very hard to say what a proposition is, to get any kind of a firm grip on them. However, there are facts about propositions which seem to be obvious: we would, for example hardly call something a proposition unless it has a negation. Similarly, it seems to be constitutive of the concept of proposition that propositions can be conjoined, that a proposition can imply something etc. In short, propositions necessarily exist within a network, or a space, of logical relationships. And it is these logical relationships which constitute the most general shape of the space of reasons. Now as a matter of fact, some propositions happen to be true, or, in other words, are facts. It was Wittgenstein (1922), who famously insisted that it is facts, and not things, of which our world consists. Why does Wittgenstein find it so important to deny that the building blocks of the worlds are things, despite the fact that probably any normal, philosophically uncontaminated person would say that world does consist of things (perhaps things which stand in certain relationships)? Well, one answer might be that as he wants to put forward his correspondence theory of language, he needs the world cut into pieces corresponding to the pieces of language, and thus he invokes facts, the „sentence-shaped items“ (Strawson5), or „ghostly doubles of the grammarian’s sentence“ (Collingwood6). A little bit more sympathetic answer would be that this „linguistic“ structuring of the world is not only something Wittgenstein needs to accomplish his project, but in fact something that is
4
This is a question many philosophers have warned us is illusory: the idea that there is a story which would be told by the world itself - as contrasted by the stories told by the mind-havers -, they say, is an idea not worth being taken seriously.
5
As quoted by Rorty (1988, p. 35).
6
Quoted by Putnam (1994, p. 301).
4
in a sense how the world sometimes really looks to us, language-users. Although we perceive our worlds as the world of things, having language we sometimes reflect it, and reflecting it we see the world as the world not of things, but of facts. Thus, our „language instinct“ (as Pinker, 1994, dubbed our ability to use language) makes us see our worlds in terms of facts and propositions. „Language is“, as Davidson (1997, 22) put it recently, „the means of propositional perception“. Thus, the causal story (featuring things in their causal interaction) and the justificatory story (featuring propositions in their inferential dependencies) are, in an important sense, two different stories with the same subject, namely our world (which is what makes this case different from the Middlearth one). We may say that the sun sends its rays thus causing the air to become warm; and we may also say that the fact that the sun shines implies (via the „observational categorical“ saying that if the sun shines, the air becomes warm) that it is warm. Seen from this perspective, the space of reasons is not embedded within the realm of things, it is merely the very same realm differently conceived. However, propositions do not merely reside within the abstract space of reasons; some of them come to be entertained or endorsed by rational individuals, thereby becoming the individuals’ thoughts or beliefs7. It is, for example, me, who believes that the sun is shining and that (therefore) it is warm outside. Are then not my beliefs, the propositions that I endorse, situated inside the physical world, namely inside my head? And is it not necessary to secure that they do properly reflect the world outside the mind? It is this picture which makes the Myth of the Given so attractive - it seems that if we do not want believers’ minds to be completely independent of the world, there must be a path from the outside space of things into the inside realm of beliefs. There must be a boundary of the space of beliefs at which the causal chain gets transformed into the evidential and justificatory chain, there must be a spot on the boundary between mind and world at which a particular becomes a proposition which thus constitutes direct, given knowledge. The answer to this temptation is, again, the rejection of the conflation of the causal story with the justificatory story and to situate the space of beliefs inside the physical space. Beliefs are better not imagined as being within one’s head. We have the causal story: the world, e.g. the sun sending its rays, impinges on my (or whoever’s) sensory receptors, the receptors send signals to the brain, there some kind of causal interaction between the neurons takes place, and then the brain perhaps sends a signal to some motoric nerves which do something, e.g. make the hands put off the coat and hang it into the wardrobe. What is important is that this story is causal through and through, the causal chain nowhere changes into anything non-causal. Now we could perhaps improve on this causal story by assuming what Dennett (1987) calls the intentional stance: instead of addressing the proceedings of one’s neural machinery (which we can hardly really know), we can adopt a much more rough and a much more useful 7
Of course the very existence of propositions and of the space of reasons is parasitic upon the rational (predominantly linguistic) practices of us humans, the space being in fact nothing more that a hypostasis vividly envisaging the structure of our linguistic practices. However, once we accept this hypostasis, it is clear that propositions may exist without being anybody’s beliefs.
5
way of speaking, and characterize the person as, e.g., believing that it is warm. There is still nothing non-causal about this: believes that it is warm is our rough way to specify the physical state of the person in question. And believes here should not be construed as is in the possession of a thing called belief let alone has a belief floating somewhere inside his head. And it is important to realize that the situation does not change even when we grant Davidson and Brandom that assuming the intentional stance means a more substantial change than simply starting to discern more global patterns, namely that it is the place where some kind of normativity creeps in. Ascribing beliefs and even thoughts to somebody is still, as Davidson stresses, not situating propositions into an inner space of that person, it is using propositions as a classificatory scale in the same way in which we use the number scale for the purpose of classifying weights of things: „In thinking and talking of the weights of physical objects we do not need to suppose there are such things as weights for objects to have. Similarly in thinking and talking about the beliefs of people we needn’t suppose there are such entities as beliefs. ... The entities we mention to help specify a state of mind do not have to play any psychological or epistemological role at all, just as numbers play no physical role.“ (Davidson, 1989, 11) Now it is important to keep in mind that from this vantage point, we have to distinguish between the properties which a propositions has simply in itself, and those which it may have in virtue of being endorsed by a believer. The proposition that it is warm may be, for example, true (i.e. be a fact), which is, of course, independent of whether anybody believes it. On the other hand, the same proposition, happening to be my belief, might be, e.g., caused by the sun rays coming into my eye - which is obviously only the property of my belief, not of the proposition as such. Now to ask what is the reason of something is to ask about a property of the first kind, whereas to ask why did somebody come to believe something is to ask about a property of the second kind. To say that the reason it is warm is that the sun shines (and, possibly, that whenever the sun shines, it is warm) is to say something that does not depend on anybody’s in fact believing that it is warm. It is something essentially different from saying why X believes that it is warm. Now if I say „The reason why it is warm is that the sun shines“, I give a reason, I tell the justificatory story; whereas when I say „I believe that it is warm, because I believe that the sun shines“, I do not give reasons, I tell the causal story (or some its enhancement tailored to account for agents8) about myself. This means that the term belief is systematically ambiguous: it may mean a potential belief, a proposition from the space of reasons that may (or may not) become somebody’s belief, and it may also mean an actual belief of a concrete person. There is a belief as such, i.e. a proposition, and there is a belief of somebody similarly as there is a pint as such (the unit of measure) and there is a pint of something. If we ask whether beliefs are broken loose from the (rest of the) world, we must first clarify which sense of belief do we mean: if it is the first one, then the question does not make much sense, for there is nothing for abstract propositions to be broken loose from (similarly as pints and meters are not broken loose from anything); and if we mean the second sense, then beliefs are
8
See footnote 3.
6
trivially not broken loose from the world: they are part of the causal world and as such they causally interact with their environment in various ways (similarly as pints of beer do, e.g. by being drunk by people). What about, then, McDowell’s worry that the rejection of the Myth of the Given „threatens to make what was meant to be empirical thinking degenerate, in our picture, into a frictionless spinning in a void“ (p. 66)? Well the upshot of our considerations so far is that we should see thinking either as a causal matter, in which case it „spins“ unproblematically within its causal surroundings, or as a matter of the justificatory relationships, in which case it does not „spin“ in anything. I am convinced that this should be the right response to the „in the void“ threat. However, there is also the „frictionless“ threat. The causal story and the justificatory story differ in that although both must come to an end, there is no end to causes, whereas there has to be an end to reasons. Everything has, as we believe, its cause, and any causal chain can be traced back indefinitely; but there are reasons which do not require further justification, which are, so to say, justified in themselves. (This is not to say that such reasons could be distinguished once and for all - which reasons do not require further justification depends on the context of the justification, but in each context there are such reasons.) And does this not mean that such reasons are „unwarranted“, that accepting them our mind draws on willful on arbitrary foundations? That thinking is „frictionless“? Of course not: once we see that there is no outside from where such „unwarranted“, „border“ reasons could (fail to) be sustained, we should be bound to see that they are not representations of something outside there in the world, but rather parts of the world itself. Beliefs are propositions purported to be true, and if some of them are obviously true, their purport thus being veridical, then they are simply what true propositions are, viz facts. As Brandom (1994, p. 333) puts it: „Thus a demolition of semantic categories of correspondence relative to those of expression does not involve ‘loss of the world’ in the sense that our discursive practice is then conceived as unconstrained by how things actually are. ... What is lost is only the bifurcation that makes knowledge seem to require the bridging of a gap that opens up between sayable and thinkable contents - thought of as existing self-contained on their side of the epistemic crevasse - and the wordly facts, existing on their side“. If I look from the window and claim that the sun is shining, and somebody standing besides me asks „why?“, my reaction is probably not going to be to give a reason, but rather to cease to see him as a serious partner within the ‘practice of giving and asking for reasons’ (maybe only for that moment - maybe what he says is only a kind of joke, or his way of doing poetry). The fact that a claim does not need further justification does not mean that it is somehow broken loose from the world and thereby basically dubious - on the contrary, it means that it is the most indubitable9.
9
We must not be confused by the fact that we sometimes appear to voice further justifications by switching from the justificatory to the causal story. If somebody asks why X believes that it is warm, I can answer „because he believes that the sun shines and he infers that it is warm from it“, or „because he feels it“ or whatever: in short, I can investigate and describe the causes of his adopting the belief. Also if I claim „It is warm“ and somebody asks „why do you think so?“, I can sometimes
7
This gets us to the Kantian story about spontaneity: it tells us that while the inanimate world is the realm of law, the mind constitutes the realm of freedom. The mind does not simply behave according to rules, but it rather acts according to conceptions of rules - as it is thus possible for it to disobey a rule (see Brandom, 1994, §4.1). Thus, the mind is free in a way other objects are not. And this leads to a further problem: if mind is free, how is it that the world forces upon it, in perception? Does it mean that perception takes place somewhere still behind the bulwarks of mind, or does it mean that mind is not as free it seems to be? This is an important theme for McDowell; and his answer is, in effect, that the space of one’s beliefs does not coincide with the realm of his freedom. This squares with the fact which we urged above: namely that justification must come to an end, that every justificatory claim must end with a reason for which no justifications appears to be required (in the corresponding context). If there were any freedom with respect of the acceptance of such a reason, there would be necessarily a further „why?“. Thus I think that if McDowell speaks about the „threat of empirical thinking degenerating into a frictionless spinning in a void“ we should see this rather as two different kinds of challenges: we have to explain why our thinking is not „frictionless“, and we have to show why it is not „in the void“. To show that it is not „frictionless“ we need to show that the realm of our beliefs does not coincide with the realm of our freedom - and making this obvious is one of the achievements of McDowell’s book. On the other hand, to show that it is not „in the void“ requires, I am convinced, to show that the whole picture in which our thinking is „in something“ is basically misleading - which appears to be something McDowell is not willing to settle for. „Thus the fate of all ‘philosophical problems’ is this: Some of them will disappear by being shown to be mistakes and misunderstandings of our language and the others will be found to be ordinary scientific problems in disguise“, wrote Moritz Schlick in 1932 thus expressing the opinion of a great majority of analytic philosophers of his age that philosophical problems could be dispensed with by means of a careful analysis, or indeed an adjustment, of the semantics of language. This was, no doubt, an exaggeration; but the conviction surely did have a certain rational core. Some of the problems we try to solve in philosophy can be dissolved by means of changing the way we see certain things and the way we speak about them. I think that the relationship between mind and the world is one of them: it is the postCartesian picture of mind as an ‘inner space’ which has given rise to most of the questions we ask now. And it is, I think, the consequential abandonment of this picture which may help us deal with them. People like Rorty, Davidson and Brandom have done very much to bring out the misleadingness of the „representational model“ of thought. McDowell seems to think that in some respects they might have been to hasty: that in the course of cleaning away pseudoproblems they swept under the table also some genuine problems, such as the problem construe the question as „What has caused you to have the belief?“ and give similar kinds of explanations; otherwise the only thing I can do is to voice a reason for it being warm - if there is one.
8
of „empiricism“. Although his book is surely a deep discussion of many issues concerning human mind, I cannot help feeling that the author, by resurrecting the problem of empiricism, restores also a picture which we should be glad to have gotten rid of.
References: Davidson, D. (1986): ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (ed. LePore, E.), Blackwell, Oxford, 307-319; reprinted (with added 'Afterthoughts') in Reading Rorty (ed. R.Malachowski), Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, pp. 120-138. Davidson, D. (1989): ‘What is Present to the Mind?’, in The Mind of Donald Davidson (eds. J. Brandl, W.L. Gombocz), Rodopi, Amsterdam, 3-18. Davidson, D. (1997): ‘Seeing Through Language’, in Thought and Language (ed. Preston, J.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 15-27. Dennett, D. (1987): The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Kripke, S. (1982): Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). McDowell, J. (1994): Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Peregrin, J. (1995): Doing Worlds with Words, Kluwer, Dordrecht. Pinker, S. (1994): The Language Instinct, W. Morrow, New York. Putnam, H. (1994): Words and Life, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.. Rorty, R. (1991): ‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth, in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Philosophical Papers, vol. 1), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Rorty, R. (1998): Truth and Progress (Philosophical Papers, vol. 3), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Schlick, M. (1932): ‘The Future of Philosophy’, College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy 1, 45-62; reprinted in and quoted from R. Rorty, ed.: The Linguistic Turn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967. Sellars, W. (1956): ‘The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1; eds. H. Feigl & M. Scriven), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis; reprinted as and quoted from Sellars: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1997. Wittgenstein, L. (1922): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge, London; English translation Routledge, London, 1961.
9
POSSIBLE WORLDS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS Jaroslav Peregrin1 www.cuni.cz/~peregrin Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics 59-60, 1993, pp.9-21] [appeared in
1 The Emergence of Possible Worlds Frege has proposed to consider names as denoting objects, predicates as standing for concepts and sentences as denoting truth values. He was, however, aware that such denotation does not exhaust all what is to be said about meaning. Therefore he has urged that in addition to such denotation (Bedeutung) an expression has sense (Sinn). The sense is the "way of presentation" of denotation; hence the expressions Morning Star and Evening Star have identical denotations, but different senses. Carnap has proposed to replace Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung by the distinction between intension and extension. Extension is, according to Carnap, what is shared by every two expressions which can be truthfully declared equivalent; where equivalence means a bit different things for different grammatical categories. In the formalism of the classical logic, the equivalence of two terms T1 and T2 is expressed by the formula T1=T2, that of two sentences S1 and S2 is by the formula S1↔S2, and that of two unary predicates P1 and P2 by the formula ∀xP1(x)↔P2(x). Hence the extension of a term can be identified with the individual the term stands for, that of a statement with its truth value, and the one of a unary predicate with the class of individuals which fall under the predicate. This means that Carnap's intension is something quite close to Frege's sense. Carnap's intension is, on the other hand, not a mere reincarnation of Frege's sense. Frege has been never quite explicit with respect to the nature of sense, but his reluctance to speak about it quite explicitly was conscious and purposeful: Frege was convinced that the only entities that can be really talked about are objects, and sense was not an object for him. To speak about a sense we would have to name it, and hence make the sense into a denotation of an expression. Carnap's intension is, on the other hand, not an entity of a category essentially different from that of extension, it is only something that casts a finer net over the space of expressions. Carnap has defined both extension and intension as derivatives of an equivalence, as that what so-and-so related expressions share. However, while in the case of extension there has been suitable things that could be considered as reifications of such equivalence (namely individuals, truth values and classes of individuals), in the case of intensions no such candidates were at hand. 1
The first version of my views of the matters discussed in this paper were presented at the '87 LOGICA symposium at Bechynì and published in the proceedings under the title The Notion of Possible World in Logic and in Logical Analysis of Natural Language. The present paper is based on my contribution read at the '88 LOGIC AND LANGUAGE conference at Hajdúszoboszló, Hungary, but (from reasons unknown to me) not included in the proceedings. The present version draws heavily on detailed comments of Petr Sgall and especially of Barbara Partee.
9
Help came from formal logic. In 1963 Kripke has developed the model theory for modal propositional calculi; he has based it on the concept of possible world. This concept, and the whole Kripkean semantics has proven itself to offer a fruitful explication of the notion of intension. The era of possible-worlds-semantics begun. Kripke's idea has come to be amalgamated with an idea of another logician, with the ideas underlying Church's formulation of the simple theory of types, and this has given rise to the grandiose systems of intensional logic as we know them from the writings of Montague, Cresswell, Tichý and others. The notion of a possible world, reminiscent of the philosophical views of Leibniz, thus has moved to the centre of discussion of theoreticians of language. However, although the results reached by means of the intensional logic (and its possible-worlds semantics) have been considered great, the nature of the concept of the possible world has been subject to various discussions. What is such a possible world? Are possible worlds "real", are they elements of our "mental world", or are they objects of a Platonic "third realm"? Is it at all reasonable to transfer this more or less obscure notion into a rigorous conceptual framework of formal semantics? These are questions which bothered people dealing with possible-worlds semantics and which in fact have not stopped bothering us yet.2 The first step to a proper solution of a philosophical problem is to achieve its proper formulation. In the present context this means that we have to consider the above mentioned questions and inspect them to see if we are able to make a proper sense of them. The first thing to see is that it is not right to speak about a transfer with respect to the concept of possible worlds: the terms of a formal system necessarily have a rigorous formal definition (explicit or implicit) and by giving them one or another name we do not "give" them anything belonging to the intuitive sense of the name. Such a term can only more or less faithfully render the character of the corresponding intuitive notion; i.e. it can be more or less considered as its explication3. By calling an element of our formal system a possible world we in no way guarantee that it has anything in common (besides the name) with possible worlds in the intuitive sense; that this is so is something to be shown.
2 The model theory for modal calculi For the Kripkean introduction of the concept of possible world as well as for the Montagovian logistic formalization of natural language the methods of the model theory are essential. Let us thus now investigate into the very nature of the notion of model and into the place of the concept of possible world within the theory. A model of a theory, i.e. of a class of statements (propositional formulas) of a language, is a special kind of interpretation of the language. An interpretation is considered as a function assigning extralinguistic entities to expressions of the language; a model of a theory is then such an interpretation which to all and only statements belonging to the theory assigns a distinguished element (typically the value T, "the truth"). However, not every mapping of the class of expressions can act as an interpretation. For specific logical systems restricted classes of such mappings are defined as admissible 2
See e.g. Cresswell (1973), Putnam (1975) or Partee (1980).
3
In the sense of Carnap (1950) and Quine (1960).
10
interpretations. An interpretation of the traditional propositional calculus is, for example, a mapping which assigns (i) one of the two truth values T or F to any atomic propositional formula; (ii) the usual truth tables (i.e. certain functions from {T,F} or {T,F}x{T,F} to {T,F}) to propositional operators; and (iii) the relevant function value of the relevant truth table to any non-atomic propositional formula. The model theory for the classical first-order predicate calculus employs, in addition, a universe of discourse (an arbitrary set), such that individual terms are interpreted by elements of the set and predicates by relations over the set. In general we can say that we have defined a model theory for a given logical calculus iff we have specified a class of interpretations of the language underlying the calculus such that any propositional formula is derivable in the calculus if and only if it is assigned the distinguished element by any of the class of interpretations. We then also say that the calculus is sound and complete with respect to this class of interpretations4. Let us also notice what kinds of functions interpretations in general are. First, it seems that a substantial characteristic of any interpretation is that it is compositional, i.e. that the interpretation of a complex expression is a function of the interpretations of its parts. Moreover, the interpretation of one of the parts of a complex expression is usually a function and the interpretation of the complex is the function value of this function applied to the interpretations of the other parts. Second, the interpretation of expressions which are considered as "logical" is fixed once for all while that of the other, "non-logical" expressions is left open5. Let us try to consider what kind of modifications the model theory of the non-modal logic would require to be applicable to the modal calculus. It can be shown easily that if L is a logical calculus and I an admissible interpretation of it, then two propositional formulas which have the same interpretation must be "L-intersubstitutive", i.e. that if we substitute one for the other in a complex propositional formula, then the resulting formula belongs to L if and only if the original did. It is clear that if L is the classical propositional calculus, then two propositional formulas are L-intersubstitutive if and only if they have the same truth value; this enables us to interpret propositional formulas directly by their truth values. However, the situation is different with respect to the modal propositional calculus: there are propositional formulas which coincide in truth values, although they are not intersubstitutive. From this it follows that propositional formulas of the modal calculus cannot be interpreted by means of their truth values. So let us assume that propositional formulas will be interpreted by elements of a set P; members of P will be called propositions. Then, however, to retain compositionality, the logical operators have to be interpreted by functions from P or PxP into P. This seems to be implausible: the classical logical operators have been explicated in terms of the non-modal calculus in an exhaustive way, and now we seem to have to abandon their truth-functional interpretation. It seems that it would be plausible to define their interpretation within the modal 4
Note that such a class of interpretations exists not only for first-order logic. Leblanc (1976), for example, shows that in spite of the well-known results of Gödel there exists a class of interpretations with respect to which the second-order predicate calculus is sound and complete. In fact, by means of the well-known method of Henkin (1950) the model theory in the present sense can be defined for a predicate calculus of any order.
5
For a detailed discussion see Peregrin (1992b).
11
calculus in such a way that it would be reducible to their classical interpretation. The solution of this problem is, of course, simple; it is based on the identification of the members of P with subsets of a set L, or, which is clearly the same, with functions from L to {T,F}. If we denote the class of all functions from a set A into a set B as [A→B], the propositions become members of [L→{T,F}] and the interpretations of the logical operators become functions from [L→{T,F}], or [L→{T,F}]x[L→{T,F}], into [L→{T,F}]; they then can be induced in a natural way by functions from {T,F}, or {T,F}x{T,F}, into {T,F}.6 Besides this it is possible to interpret also the operator of necessity in a plausible way within this framework; the relevant completeness proofs have been presented by Kripke (1963)7. Kripke has called members of such a set L possible worlds. So returning to the questions of the nature of possible worlds we can conclude that a possible world is something on the basis of which a proposition yields a definite truth-value. This means that (Kripkean) possible worlds are entities relative to which the truth values of propositions obtain. Let us add some explanations. It is clear that the definition of the concept of possible world within Kripke's approach is not explicit; we cannot put the concept on one side of an equality sign. However, an implicit definition is also a definition; the concept of possible world is defined in the same way as the concept of number within Peano arithmetic or the concept of a set within the axiomatic set theory. In contrast to the explicit definition, the implicit one, however, does not allow us to reduce the concept to simpler ones, we cannot explicate it. Roughly speaking, anything could be a possible world, providing it has the capacity of sorting propositions into true and false.8 Let us now try to look for an explicit definition of the concept.
3 Which worlds are 'really' possible? The Kripkean theory thus assumes that there are possible worlds (i.e. that there is something relative to which statements have truth values), but it makes no attempt to inquire into the 'real nature' of the space of possible worlds. On the contrary, the theory purposefully aims at truths valid independently of what such a space might in reality look like, just as the predicate calculus aims at truths independent of what the domain of individuals might be. However, there has to be one 'real' space of possible worlds, just as there seems to be one 'real' domain of individuals. To expose the problem from this side, let us return to the point of departure of the model theory for modal logic from that of the non-modal one. We have concluded that we have to interpret propositional formulas by means of elements of a set P which has to be "richer" than 6
The "modal" interpretation of a classical binary logical operator is then that function which to any two propositions (i.e. functions from L to {T,F}) P and P' assigns such a proposition P'' that, for any element l of L, P''(l) equals the "extensional" interpretation of the operator applied to the truth values P(l) and P'(l).
7
Kripke introduces a binary relation over L, called the relation of accessibility, and he interprets modal operators as functions assigning to a subclass L' of L the subclass of all elements of L accessible from L'.
8
Stalnaker (1986) writes: "What is a possible world? It is not a particular kind of thing or place; it is what truth is relative to, what it is the point of rational activities such as deliberation, communication and inquiry to distinguish between."
12
the set of the two truth values. The reason is that some formulas coinciding in truth values are not intersubstitutive within the modal calculus and thus have to be interpreted by different items. Formulas which surely are intersubstitutive even in this calculus are those the equivalence of which is derivable, i.e. which have necessarily the same truth value; such necessarily equivalent formulas thus need not be interpreted differently. This indicates that it would be possible to identify propositions with the classes of necessarily equivalent propositional formulas. Explicating propositions in this way we can see that the class P constitutes a Boolean algebra. Indeed, if we consider logical entailment as inclusion, then all axioms of Boolean algebra are fulfilled (see Rieger, 1967); the supremum of two propositions is their disjunction9 and their infimum is their conjunction. The well known theorem of Stone states that any Boolean algebra is isomorphic with the Boolean algebra of subsets of a set, in the typical case of the set of the atoms of the original algebra. An atom is in our case a proposition which is not inconsistent and from which any other proposition or its negation follows. In this way a natural transfer from propositions to subclasses of a set L can be achieved; just as required by the Kripkean strategy. The elements of L, i.e. of the Boolean algebra of propositions, then do really have the capacity of sorting propositions into true and false: we have observed that truth or falsity of any proposition is, indeed, implied by any possible world. Atoms are in fact infima of some "maximal" classes of propositions, and as infima are conjunctions, possible worlds are conjunctions of certain maximal lists of propositions. It seems to be reasonable to assume that for every maximal consistent class of propositions there is a corresponding possible world and vice versa. Here we have come close to the way in which the model theory for the modal calculi has been approached by Hintikka (1969). Let us call the resulting notion of a possible world Hintikkian. Now we can give an alternative answer to the question of the nature of possible worlds: (Hintikkian) possible worlds are maximal consistent classes of propositions.10 In contrast to the Kripkean definition, this definition is explicit and it allows us to reduce the concept of a possible world to the concept of proposition, which in turn can be reduced to the quite transparent concept of an equivalence class of propositional formulas. This seems to deprive the concept of a possible world of whatever mysteries might be connected with it.
4 Are possible worlds POSSIBLE WORLDS? So far we have discussed the definition(s) of the concept of possible world in terms of formal logic. If we now want to conclude that possible worlds do belong to logic, we have to show something more: that what has been defined within logic under the name of possible world really corresponds to what we normally understand under this name. Let us write POSSIBLE WORLDS for possible worlds in the intuitive sense of the expression, 9
If [F] and [F'] are two equivalence classes of propositional formulas, then [F&F'] is their conjunction. It is easy to prove that this is a correct definition; similarly for the other operators. This means that we can speak about conjunction, disjunction, negation etc. of propositions.
10
The case of truth value gaps is left out of considerations here; however, under suitable restrictions this case need not be incompatible with the present view.
13
not for the possible worlds of formal logic. Let us investigate into the correspondence between POSSIBLE WORLDS and classes of statements of our natural language. Let us associate with any POSSIBLE WORLD the class of all and only statements which hold in this world. What can be said about such a correspondence? First, let us recall that for me to posit two distinct POSSIBLE WORLDS makes sense only when I am able to tell one from the other. This leads to the following principle THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCERNIBILITY For any two distinct POSSIBLE WORLDS there exists a statement which is true in one of them and false in the other. From this principle it follows that the mapping of possible worlds onto the classes of statements true in them is injective. From the other side, whatever is possible, holds in some POSSIBLE WORLD. This gives THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTUALIZATION OF POSSIBILITIES Any consistent class of statements (i.e. any class of statements which is imaginable as true simultaneously) is true in some POSSIBLE WORLD. Further we surely cannot refute THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSISTENCY The class of all statements which are true in a POSSIBLE WORLD is consistent. Finally, a POSSIBLE WORLD is a world, it is maximal, it cannot be a proper part of another world.11 Thus we can formulate THE PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMALITY If a statement is consistent with what holds in a POSSIBLE WORLD, then the statement holds in the POSSIBLE WORLD. The four principles clearly guarantee that there obtains a bijective correspondence between POSSIBLE WORLDS and maximal consistent classes of statements of our language. The notions of consistency and maximality now, of course, cannot be defined formally; however, they possess a clear sense: a class of statements is consistent if all the statements can be true simultaneously, and it is maximal if adding any statement to it makes it inconsistent. From these four principles which seem to be indisputable it now follows that a possible world in the intuitive sense can be explicated as a maximal consistent class of statements. This shows that (Hintikkian) possible worlds may serve as good explications for POSSIBLE WORLDS.
11
It is, of course, possible to work with "partial possible worlds", but we prefer to call these situations or something like that.
14
5 Possible Worlds vs. Classes of Statements The first outcome of our identification of possible worlds12 with maximal consistent classes of statements is that some possible mysteries may be swept away from the concept in this way. This is not to say that all problems regarding possible worlds vanish; however, they are no more mysterious. We cannot say for sure if there is a possible world in which there is a round square; however, now we know that this problem can be reduced to the problem if the sentence there is a round rectangle may be true and that our indecision regarding it arises due to an inner obscurity of the statement and not due to an obscurity of our notion of a possible world. We are not sure if there is a POSSIBLE WORLD in which the fifth Euclid's postulate is false; however, we now know that this is the problem of our uncertainty of whether the axiom might or might not be false. The possible worlds actualize possibilities; and they do it in a most straightforward and transparent way. If we were able to decide perfectly which statements are consistent and which are not, possible worlds would be specified without any vagueness. However, as we are vague with respect to consistency, also possible worlds reflect this vagueness. Pythagoras' theorem states a quite precise relation between the sides of a triangle; however, if we measure the two sides with some vagueness, we cannot expect that the third one will be computed precisely. Another outcome is that we can reveal possible worlds even where they are not declared as such. For this it is essential to realize that what follows from our analysis is not that possible worlds are reducible to classes of propositions, but rather that they are such classes, and any class meeting the conditions stated above is a possible world13. In this way we have gained a substantial criterion for marking approaches to semantics as possible-worlds-based, a criterion which is independent of what proponents of these approaches declare.14 Let us take as an example the logical system presented Bealer and Mönnich (1988). It is a system the interpretation of which is based on model structures which the authors specify as follows: "Omitting certain details for heuristic purposes, we may characterize an algebraic model structure as a structure containing (i) a domain D comprised of (items playing the role of) individuals, propositions, properties, and relations, (ii) a set K of functions which tell us the actual and possible extensions of the items in D, and (iii) various fundamental logical operations on the items in D" (p.215). Then they describe the basic difference between this kind of model structures and the more traditional ones: "In a possible-worlds model structure, ..., (i) is typically replaced by a domain consisting of actual individuals and 'nonactual individuals'; then PRP-surrogates are constructed from these items by means of set-theoretical operations; and (ii) and (iii) are omitted" (p.216). Now I agree that there is a substantial difference between the two kinds of model structures, and I also agree that the employment of the algebraic model structures 12
As we have concluded that POSSIBLE WORLDS coincide with possible worlds, there is no more need of capitalization.
13
This is what Wittgenstein (1921) says: "The world is a collection of facts."
14
Such an independence seems to be quite important: I think that if one presents a theory equivalent to the set theory, then he does use sets even if he happens to call the members of the universe of his theory, say, lattices. Or, to offer a more metaphorical but a more lively example, an absolutist society remains absolutist no matter how intensely it may declare itself democratic.
15
is really superior to the more traditional approaches; however, what I do not agree with is that this difference or superiority has something to do with an absence of possible worlds. In fact, they are not absent within Bealer's and Mönnich's approach, as (for all that has been concluded so far) their set K is nothing other than a set of possible worlds. Thus, I think, we can conclude that this approach does not abandon possible worlds.15
6 Possible Worlds as First-order Structures Various explications of the notion of possible world have been historically presented; from Leibnitz' considerations16 to Cresswell's complicated formal metaphysics17. Our results need not be in contradiction with such explications18. However, if what has been said so far is correct, then any acceptable explication of the notion of possible world should be compatible with our notion of such a world as a class of propositions. Let us use an example to show how a concretization of the notion corresponds to positing certain restrictions with respect to the space of propositions. One of the most straightforward approaches to possible worlds is to view them as classes of all distributions of some set of basic properties among a given universe of individuals. This would mean that the space of possible worlds can be considered as the class of all structures of a relational language with a given carrier, i.e. as the class of all models of a first-order theory without special axioms with a fixed universe19. Such a space would be plausible to deal with; therefore this approach is tempting20. We shall not consider the question of adequacy of such a view here; we only want to show what its adoption would mean for our framework. Without going into technical details, it is clear that as under the view in question the class of possible worlds coincides with the class of all structures of a relational language, any possible world is to contain the diagram21 of one and only one structure and the diagram of any structure is to be contained in one and only one world. This, roughly speaking, means that there exists a class P of "protocol statements" such that22 15
What it does abandon is the reduction of meanings to possible-worlds based functions, and this is what the ingenuity of the approach consists in.
16
See Mates (1968).
17
Cresswell (1973).
18
As Stalnaker (1986) claims, "it is not part of any widely shared conception of possible worlds semantics that possible worlds are indefinable or unanalyzable."
19
Thus logical truth, i.e. truth in all possible worlds is closely connected in such a framework with first-order logical validity.
20
The approach is not only promising from the point of view of knowledge representation; also, e.g., a thorough ontological analysis of Tichý (1988) leads to a similar view.
21
I.e. the class of all first-order propositional formulas without quantifiers holding in the model structure.
22
The situation is quite simple if any individual is supposed to have a name; in the opposite case everything is much more complicated; however, these are technical complications, by the treating of which we would not like to obscure the main idea.
16
(i) any statement of P is of an atomic structure, i.e. it is a statement of a certain relation holding among certain individuals; (ii) the truth values of all statements are fixed by fixing the truth values of the statements of P; (iii) the statements of P are independent, i.e. each of them can be true or false independently of the truth values of other statements; and (iv) if a statement belongs to P, then a statement which arises from the substitution of a subject term for another subject term in P also belongs to P. I do not say that these four conditions are not fulfilled in reality, but I insist that we cannot simply assume that they are fulfilled without a thorough discussion. In fact the discussion has been started by Carnap, Schlick and the other logical positivists, and it does not seem to have yielded a definite conclusion.
7 Possible Worlds and Beliefs Probably the most tricky problem the possible world semantics has to face is the interpretation of belief sentences. The problem reappears in writings of nearly anyone who inquires into the semantics of natural language.23 The problem is that while the sentences One plus one equals two. Every first-order theory which has a model has an at most denumerable model.
(1) (2)
are both true under any imaginable circumstances, the statements John believes that one plus one equals two. (3) John believes that any first-order theory which has a model has an at most denumerable model. (4) may well differ in truth value. As it seems to be clear, two statements which are not intersubstitutive salva veritate cannot coincide in meaning24, (1) and (2) differ in meaning, i.e. express different propositions. However, if we then apply the conclusions of the previous paragraphs, we come to the conclusion that there has to exist a possible world in which (1) and (2) differ in truth value (there has to exist an atom of the corresponding Boolean algebra of propositions which belongs to one of them and does not belong to the other). So do there exist possible worlds in which some truths of mathematics do not hold? The answer to this question is not at all simple. A positive answer to the question seems to be in contradiction with our Principle of Consistency. However, should to be consistent be understood as to be imaginable as true, then either the negation of (2) would have to be consistent, or (4) could not be false. The point is that if belief sentences are accepted into the 23
For a survey see Bäuerle and Cresswell (1989). Cf. also Peregrin (1987).
24
Elsewhere (Peregrin, 1992b) I have called this fact the Principle of Verifoundation; Bäurle and Cresswell (1989) call it the Most Certain Principle.
17
range of our investigation, then in fact any subject we are able to speak about is granted the power to establish a distinction between the meanings of two statements. This leads to the conclusion that the possible worlds which arise in this way are something of the kind of Hintikka's (1978) epistemically possible worlds.25 However, it is important to realize that the existence of such epistemically possible worlds is not a conclusion of metaphysical considerations; simply if we insist on calling the atoms of the Boolean algebra of propositions possible worlds, then the possibility mentioned cannot be logical possibility. Elsewhere (Peregrin, 1988) we have argued for a "gradual" view of meaning in correspondence to what kinds of contexts are included in semantic analysis. Four kinds of contexts were distinguished: (i) extensional contexts; (ii) intensional contexts; (iii) contexts involving propositional attitudes; and (iv) quotational contexts. To this inclusive chain of four kinds of contexts there correspond four semantic correlates of sentences ("levels of meaning") in a natural way: (i) extension (sentences denote truth values, predicates denote classes of individuals); (ii) intension (sentences denote classes of possible worlds, predicates denote functions from possible worlds to classes of individuals); (iii) "hyperintensions" (disambiguated correlates of sentences such as Lewis', 1972, structured meanings, Barwise and Perry's, 1983, situations-based meanings or tectogrammatical representations of Sgall et al., 1986); and (iv) surface shapes. I think that here we have another fact corroborating this view: if we consider the algebras of propositions corresponding to these contexts and their atoms we can see that we have: (i) a single element (the "actual world") for extensional contexts26; (ii) logically possible worlds in intensional contexts; (iii) epistemically possible worlds in contexts involving propositional attitudes. As for quotational contexts, for them also the outer form of statements comes into consideration; this means that corresponding atoms become something like "inventories of sentential expressions".
8 Conclusion Possible worlds are, as far as semantics is concerned, primarily mere indices relative to which propositions have truth values. However, if we accept the principles of Section 4 (which I consider indispensable), then we see that there is an intrinsic interconnection between possible worlds and propositions, namely that a possible world can be identified with a maximal consistent class of propositions. Any asserted structure of possible worlds and/or their space means certain structure of propositions and/or their consistent classes. For example, to say that possible worlds consist of individuals and relations is to say that atomic propositions have the predicate-terms structure; and to say that there is a one-to-one correspondence between possible worlds and first-order structures is to say that atomic propositions are independent. It is, of course, more usual to go the other way round and to identify a proposition with a class of possible worlds. Such identification is surely useful for various purposes, but is not useful for the explication of either the concept of possible world (which it takes as primitive), or 25
Cf. also an interesting essay of Kroy (1976), in which the author argues for an identification of possible worlds and "products of imagination".
26
The Boolean algebra of propositions contains in this case two elements ("truth" and "falsity"), and hence is isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of the power set of a set with a single element.
18
the concept of proposition (which is reduced to the problematical concept of possible world). The viewpoint proposed here hints, on the other hand, at a real explication: the concept of possible world is reduced to the concepts of proposition and consistency, whereas that of proposition is in turn reduced to the concepts of sentence and logical equivalence. As the concepts of consistency and logical equivalence are definable in terms of (logical) consequence, the terms we have to take as basic and unanalyzed are sentence and consequence; and this seems to be really the concepts which are given to us quite directly27. Someone might object that my conclusion implies that possible worlds are languagedependent. However, I am convinced that this is indeed the case: there is no absolute, unbiased reality structured independently of any language, there is, as Goodman (1960) puts it, no "innocent eye"28. Semantics is no metaphysics; but I do not believe that there is a metaphysics beyond semantics.
27
This indicates that, contrary to the usual opinion, I believe that model-theory should be reduced to proof theory, not vice versa. For the general grounds for such a belief see Peregrin (1992a,b).
28
See Peregrin (1992b).
19
References Barwise, J., Perry, J.(1983): Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts). Bäuerle, and Cresswell, M.J.(1989): Propositional Attitudes, in: Handbook of Philosophical Logic, ed. by D.Gabbay and F.Guenthner, Reidel, Dordrecht. Bealer, G. and Mönnich, U.(1989): Property Theories, in: Handbook of Philosophical Logic, ed. by D.Gabbay and F.Guenthner, Reidel, Dordrecht. Carnap, R.(1950): The Logical Foundations of Probability, Univ. of Chicago Press. Church, A.(1940): A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types, Jour. of Symb.Logic 5, 56-68. Cresswell, M.J.(1973): Logic and Languages, Meuthen, London. Goodman, N.(1960): The Way the World is, The Review of Metaphysics 14. Henkin, L.(1950): Completeness in the Theory of Types, Jour. of Symb. Logic 15, 81-91. Hintikka, J.(1969): Models for Modalities, Reidel, Dordrecht. Hintikka, J.(1978): Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated, in: Game-Theoretical Semantics, ed. by E.Saarinen, Reidel, Dordrecht. Kemeny, J.G.(1948): Models of Logical Systems, Jour. of Symb. Logic 13. Kripke, S.(1963): Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic, Acta Philosophica Fennica XVI, 83-94. Kroy, M.(1976): Mentalism and Modal Logic, Athenaion, Wiesbaden, 1976. Leblanc, H.(1976): Truth-value Semantics, North Holland, Amsterdam. Mates, B.(1968): Leibnitz on Possible worlds, in: Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science III, North Holland, Amsterdam. Lewis, D.K.(1970): General Semantics, Synthese 22, 18-67; reprinted in: Semantics of Natural Language (ed. by D.Davidson and G.Harman), Dordrecht, 1972). Materna, P.(1983): On Understanding and Believing, Prague Studies in Math.Linguistics 8. Montague, R.(1974): Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of R.M. (ed. by R.Thomason), Yale Univ.Press. Partee, B.H.(1980): Montague Grammar, Mental Representations, and Reality, in: Philosophy and Grammar (ed. by S.Kanger and S.Oehman), Reidel, Dordrecht. Partee, B.(1989): Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65 (ed. by S.Allen), de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 93-123. Peregrin, J.(1987): A Contribution to the Theory of Propositional Attitudes, Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics 48, 13-36. Peregrin, J.(1988): Intersubstitutivity Scales and Intension, in: Proceedings of the '87 Debrecen Symposium on Logic and Language (ed. by I.Ruzsa and A.Szabolczi), Budapest. Peregrin, J.(1992a): Meaning, Truth and Models, From the Logical Point of View 2/92, 67-75. Peregrin, J.(1992b): Words and Worlds, Studies in Theoretical and Computational Linguistics, Charles University, Prague. Putnam, H.(1975): The Meaning of "Meaning", in: Language, Mind and Knowledge (ed. by K.Gunderson), Univ. of Minnesota Press, Mineapolis. Quine, W.V.O.(1960): Word and Object, M.I.T.Press. Rieger, L.(1967): Algebraic Methods of Mathematical Logic, Academia, Prague. Rieger, L.(1967): Algebraic Methods of Mathematical Logic, Academia, Prague. Sgall, P., Hajièová, E., Panevová, J.(1986): The Meaning of the Sentence in its Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects, Academia, Prague.
20
Stalnaker, R.(1986): Possible Worlds and Situations, Journal of Philosophical Logic 15, 109-123. Tichý, P.(1980): Logic of Temporal Discourse, Linguistics and Philosophy 3, 313-369. Tichý, P.(1988): Foundations of Fregean Logic, Springer. Wittgenstein, L.(1921): Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Annalen der Naturphilosophie 14; printed in Werkausgabe, Band 1, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1969.
21
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC* ABSTRACT. The concept of semantic interpretation is a source of chronic confusion: the introduction of a notion of interpretation can be the result of several quite different kinds of considerations. Interpretation can be understood in at least three ways: as a process of "dis-abstraction" of formulas, as a technical tool for the sake of characterizing truth, or as a reconstruction of meaning-assignment. However essentially different these motifs are and however properly they must be kept apart, they can all be brought to one and the same notion of interpretation: to the notion of a compositional evaluation of expressions inducing a "possible" distribution of truth values among statements.
1 WHAT IS A SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION? The concept of semantic interpretation might seem quite unproblematic. Expressions of our natural language stand for a kind of objects; therefore, if we make a logical formalization of language, we should make the expressions of the formal language also stand for something. Semantic interpretation is then what establishes the link between the formulas and what they stand for. According to this view, semantic interpretation is a formal imitation of the real denotandum/denotatum relation. However, such a view, although accepted by many theoreticians of language, is utterly naive; it rests on the identification of language with a kind of nomenclature. We assume that expressions are sort of labels which we attach to pre-existing, real-world objects to make the objects capable of being referred to. Accordingly, our world is a great museum, the exhibits of which are waiting to be classified and named by us; therefore Quine (1969) calls this view the museum myth. However, there are also other meanings in which we use the term interpretation. Even if we disregard the sense which underlies the enterprise of hermeneutics, there remain at least two other meanings, both of which are essential for formal logic and for the logical analysis of language. In one of these meanings interpretation is an assignment of concrete instances to items of an abstract formal system, typically an assignment of concrete language expressions to abstract formulas. Then there is the technical sense of interpretation used in textbooks of mathematical logic, where interpretation is regarded as a technical means 1 of characterizing truth. Erkenntnis 40: 5-20, 1994.
6
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
However, are these three meanings really essentially different? Some authors appear to feel free to pass from one to another (Tarski's, 1936, introduction of the concept of model is an example of a fluent passage from the second meaning to the third; while Cresswell's, 1973, easygoing switch from semantics to "metaphysics" does not seem to make any distinction between the third and the first meaning, nor do many other contemporary "metaphysical" considerations based on model theory). In order to be able to understand the proper role of the concept of interpretation within the enterprise of formal logic and logical semantics, we must first clarify the basic tenets of logical formalization.
2 TWO MODES OF DOING FORMALIZATION Formal logic is based on the utilization of symbols. Symbols function as substitutes for natural language expressions; it is the utilizations of symbols that help us to ignore the irrelevant aspects of natural language expressions and to point out patterns relevant for consequence. Thus, the symbolization is that which helps us, as Frege (1879, p. IV) put it, "die Bündigkeit einer Schlu_kette auf die sicherste Weise zu prüfen und jede Voraussetzung, die sich unbemerkt einschleichen will, anzuzeigen, damit letztere auf ihren Ursprung untersucht werden könne." However, symbols may be utilized in different ways. It is especially important to distinguish between two quite disparate modes of their employment, between the regimentative mode and the abstractive mode. Employing symbols in the regimentative mode means no more than to disregard irrelevant peculiarities of grammar of natural language. To express the fact that John loves Mary we may use various natural language statements, e.g. John loves Mary, It is John who loves Mary, Mary is loved by John; however, on the level of logical schematization all these ways may boil down to canonical loves(John,Mary), or, if we employ P to represent loves, T1 to represent John and T2 to represent 2 Mary, to P(T1,T2) . Hence regimentation means only the reduction of redundancies in the lexicon and/or grammar of natural language. This means that regimentation is simply a kind of sifting of natural language through the sieve of relevance; what is relevant is unambiguously retained in the resulting formal representation, that which is not, vanishes. Symbols and their concatenations utilized for the purposes of regimentation may be truly called constant: each of these stands constantly for a definite natural language expression or at least for a definite "pattern" common to several synonymous natural language
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
7
expressions. The other mode of employment of symbols - abstraction - is of a different nature. While doing regimentation we do not abandon the level of concrete expressions, abstraction leads to articulating types of expressions. We may use the symbol P to represent an arbitrary binary predicate and the symbols T1 and T2 to represent arbitrary terms; P(T1,T2) then represents every statement which shares the form with John loves Mary. Symbols employed in the abstractive mode may be looked at in varying ways; T1 used as a means of abstraction can be considered once as John, once as Mary, etc. The symbols are thus not constants in the proper sense of the word, they are rather a kind of parameters. In contrast to constant formal expressions, formal expressions containing such parameters shall 3 be called parametric formal expressions ; those parametric formal expressions which represent statements also will be called schemata. Hence a schema does not stand for a concrete natural language statement, it is a mere matrix. If we now look at standard logic, we can distinguish two kinds of symbols. There are symbols that are used unequivocally in the regimentative mode. The examples of these symbols are logical connectives, quantifiers, or the equality sign. Such a symbol as & is surely not meant to be considered once as and and once as or, it is meant to represent a definite way of conjoining statements, a way which is, in the prototypical case, expressed by and. Symbols of this kind are usually called logical constants. The other symbols, called extralogical constants, are ambiguous between constants proper and parameters. Their examples are nonspecific terms or predicates. The term constant T1, for example, can be understood as being a constant proper (representing, e.g., the name John), or it can be understood to be a mere schematic representation of an arbitrary term. This ambiguity then extends to all statements containing extralogical constants: P(T1,T2) may be understood to represent a concrete statement, such as John loves Mary, or it can be understood as an abstract schema amounting to all statements of the relevant form. The reason why we can treat extralogical, in contrast to logical, constants in this way is that properties of statements which are interesting from the point of view of
8
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
logic (especially their behaviour from the viewpoint of consequence) are invariant under the replacement of an extralogical constant by another one. Thus, we can replace T1 by any other term in an instance of consequence without disturbing its "consequencehood" (while we cannot so replace, e.g., & by another logical connective). The fact that it is not always fully clear in which sense some of the symbols of the languages of formal logic are employed is the reason for a profound ambiguity. We may view the predicate calculus (and indeed any other formal calculus) in two ways: the first view, the regimentative view, is that every statement of the calculus is constant, that it stands for a definite natural statement (although when it contains extralogical constants, we need not and do not say for which natural statement it stands); the second view, the abstractive view, is that each statement containing extralogical constants is a mere schema, that it amounts to all those natural language statements that conform to it.
3 INTERPRETATION AS "DIS-ABSTRACTION" The first notion of interpretation we are going to address is based on the abstractive view. If we understand a formula as an abstract schema, then the formula, and any argument or proof including it, covers a multiplicity of individual instances. If we say that, e.g., P(T1,T2) entails ∃x.P(x,T2), then what we say is that John loves Mary entails Someone loves Mary, that Peter hates Jane entails Someone hates Jane, etc. If reasoning about John's loving Mary, I can use the abstract schema understanding P as loves, T1 as John and T2 as Mary, if what I have in mind is Peter's hating Jane, then I may use it understanding P as hates, T1 as Peter and T2 as Jane. In other words, I may interpret P as loves, T1 as John and T2 as Mary, or P as hates, T1 as Peter and T2 as Jane. This leads to the first sense of interpretation, which can be called interpretation as "disabstraction"; dis-abstraction consists in pinning down parameters to constants, it is the assignment of constants to parameters (or constants proper to extralogical constants). Any assignment of constants to parameters induces an assignment of a constant expression to every parametric one, especially an assignment of a constant statement to every schema. Every schema is assigned one of its instances. Such an interpretation represents one of many possible "temporary" systematic identifications of abstract entities (parametric expressions) with their concrete instances (constant expressions).
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
9
This notion of dis-abstraction is thus quite straightforward; however, only up to the point when we try to do justice to our intuitive view that the ultimate instances of abstract formulas are concrete things rather than concrete expressions; that instances of P(T1,T2) are not the statements loves(John, Mary), hates(Peter, Jane), etc., but rather the facts of John's loving Mary, of Peter's hating Jane, etc. But to embrace this intuition seems to be the only way to gain the notion of dis-abstraction which is not trivially dependent on the resources of a particular language: there may clearly be an "obejctual" instance without there being a corresponding substitutional instance; we may imagine that Peter loves someone for whom we have no name. From this point of view it seems to be appropriate to consider interpretation as not an assignment of constants, but rather of things (some of which are denotations of constants and others possibly not). However, this way we face the problem of identifying the definite realworld objects which expressions stand or may stand for; the problem that has been recognized as essentially tricky. How should we investigate the world in order to find out the "objectual" instances of P(T1,T2)? Is John's yesterday's loving Mary an instance other than his loving her today? Is an instance's instantiating the formula itself an instance? To answer these questions by thinking about the world means to do speculative metaphysics; and was it not just this kind of speculative metaphysics that had to be overcome by means of logical analysis of language?
4 INTERPRETATION AS CHARACTERIZATION OF TRUTH An interpretation, as just revealed, maps every schema on a constant statement; and as every constant statement has a truth value, an interpretation induces a mapping of schemata on truth values. If a schema is mapped on truth in this manner, we shall say that it is verified by the interpretation; otherwise we shall say that it is falsified. Now if we switch from the abstractive mode to the regimentative mode, we cannot consider interpretation as a matter of schemata, but rather as a matter of constant statements; interpretation is then something that maps constants on constants, hence constant statements on other constant statements, and consequently constant statements on truth values.
10
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
Let us distinguish between true statements which are true contingently and those which are true necessarily. A statement is true contingently if it can be false; it is true necessarily if its falsity is impossible, if such a 4 falsity is beyond the scope of our imagination . Now, and this is of crucial importance, every necessarily true statement comes out verified by every interpretation. This follows from the way extralogical constants are chosen - they are the expressions which are freely interchangeable without disturbing consequence. Therefore, as consequence and 5 necessary truth are merely two sides of the same coin , they are also freely interchangeable without disturbing necessary truth. This means that no permutation of extralogical constants can turn a necessary truth into a falsity, and therefore no interpretation can falsify a necessary truth. Hence verification by every interpretation is a necessary condition of necessary truth. The idea behind the proposal of using interpretations for the purposes of characterization of necessary truth is to consider verification by every interpretation as not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition of necessary truth. Such a proposal was clearly articulated by Tarski (1936); 6 so let us call it Tarski's thesis . If we call a statement verified by every interpretation logically true, then Tarski's thesis amounts to the identification of necessary and logical truth, or, better, to the explication of the concept of necessary truth (which is a natural, empirical concept) by means of the concept of logical truth (which is a technical, defined concept). Let us stress that Tarski's proposal can be considered as a purely technical matter, as a general version of the matrix method as proposed (for the propositional calculus) e.g. by Lukasiewicz and Tarski (1930). The basis of this method is to consider certain collection of assignments of objects (prototypically of the two truth values TRUE and FALSE) to statements; some of the assigned objects are in a way distinguished (in the prototypical case it is the value TRUE) and a statement is declared logically true if it is always assigned a distinguished element. The matrix method, as Lukasiewicz and Tarski clearly saw, is simply an alternative to the axiomatic method of defining a formal calculus. However, Tarski immediately realized that if we use the "substitutional" notion of interpretation considered so far, then there is no guarantee that logical truth would always come out identical with necessary truth; there is no reason to be sure that every statement verified by every substitutional interpretation will in fact be a statement intuitively understood as necessarily true. Let us consider loves, John and Mary as
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
11
constants, and let us suppose that these three words are the only constants of our language; in that case every substitutional instance of P(T1,T2) may be true (in the imaginable case when John loves Mary and himself and Mary loves John and herself), and hence loves(John,Mary) may be logically true, although John's love for Mary is surely not a necessary matter. This means that if we accept Tarski's thesis, we are left with a kind of modification of the notion of interpretation: if there are some logical truths which are not necessary, then we have to postulate more interpretations and thus have to reduce the number of logical truths. The fact that loves(John,Mary) is not necessarily true implies (if we take Tarski's thesis for granted) that there must be an interpretation of P(T1,T2) which falsifies it; if there is no such substitutional interpretation, we have to postulate interpretations beyond the substitutional ones. If there is to be an interpretation of P(T1,T2) beyond the four interpretations making it into loves(John, Mary), loves(Mary, John), loves(John, John), loves(Mary, Mary), then there must be either an instance of T1 or T2 other than John and Mary, or an instance of P other than loves. Anyway, there must be instances of parameters beyond expressions; there must be something other than constant expressions on which parameters can be mapped by interpretations. The case of P(T1,T2) can be solved by assuming that besides John and Mary there is a third instance for parametric terms, an instance that leads to the needed falsifying interpretation; for example that there is some X such that if T2 is considered as this X then loves(John,T2) comes out false. What is the nature of this X? It is not a constant term; for we have fixed our language to have John and Mary as the only two terms. We may think of it as of a 'potential' term and assume that to consider it means to consider a potential extension of our language. However, the more straightforward way seems to be to give up the whole idea that term parameters are interpreted by constants, and to consider them as interpreted by some more abstract entities. The entities may be called 7 individuals . In our case we have to assume that we have three individuals: John, Mary and X. The situation is similar in the general case. Whenever a statement is not necessarily true while it is verified by every interpretation, we need more
12
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
interpretations, concretely we need an interpretation which would falsify the statement in question. But we need not make do with adding instances of parametric terms: e.g. in the above example the case is that every interpretation verifies ∃x.∃y.P(x,y) although such a statement as ∃x.∃y.loves(x,y) is not necessarily true, and this can be rectified only by postulating an instance of P other than loves. Concluding we cannot make do with constant predicates as instances, we must introduce new kinds of instances of parametric predicates and call them e.g. relations (properties in the unary case). In this way we reach a wholly new notion of interpretation that is no longer substitutional; it is denotational. However, the passage from substitutional to denotational interpretation is not entirely unproblematic. The point is that every substitutional interpretation induces a mapping of schemata on truth values which makes it possible to talk about verification and falsification in connection with an interpretation and thus to make sense of Tarski's thesis; but if we pass from terms to individuals, from predicates to properties and relations, and from expressions to "abstract" objects in general, then the induction does not work any longer. To make it work we need the interpretations of parts of a whole to add up into an interpretation of the whole; furthermore we need the interpretation of statement somehow to yield a truth value (or directly to be a truth value). For an atomic statement (consisting of a predicate and terms), we need the relation interpreting the predicate together with the individuals interpreting the terms to add up into the interpretation of the statement and this interpretation either to have, or to be a truth value. The most straightforward way to achieve this is, of course, to identify n-ary relations with functions from n-tuples of individuals to truth values and to interpret an atomic statement by the value of the application of the interpretation of its predicate to the interpretations of its terms. The concept of substitutional interpretation was based on the assignment of expressions to expressions; only extralogical constants had to be interpreted. Denotational interpretation is in this respect different: interpretation now means mapping of expressions on extralinguistic objects; hence all constants (logical as well as extralogical) have to be interpreted. Now the distinction between logical and extralogical constants may be considered to consist in the fact that a logical constant is always interpreted by one and the same object, whereas an extralogical constant may be interpreted by whatever object of the corresponding domain. However, it appears that this kind of change is necessary independently
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
13
of the passage from substitution to denotation. The point is that the sharp boundary drawn between logical and extralogical constants is in fact untenable. As Etchemendy (1988) points out, there are statements which consist purely of logical constants and which are, nevertheless, intuitively 8 not necessary . The picture saying that there are expressions whose interpretation is completely fixed, and that there are, on the other hand, expressions the interpretation of which is completely free (within the bounds of the corresponding domain), is oversimplified; there are in fact 9 also expressions whose interpretation is partially fixed and partially free . This fact can be naturally accounted for just by considering an interpretation an assignment of values to all expressions, some expressions (the purely logical ones) always being interpreted in the same way, others (the purely extralogical ones) quite freely, and the remaining ones in some partly limited way.
5 PROVISIONAL SUMMARY There are assignments of truth values to statements which are "possible" and others which are "impossible". An assigment of truth values to statements is in this sense "impossible" iff it violates consequence (consequence can, in fact, be considered as delimitation of the space of 10 "possible" truth valuations) . Thus to say that something is necessarily true is to say that it is verified by every "possible" distribution of truth values. This implies that, as we need all and only necessary truths to come out as verified by every interpretation, that the class of distributions of truth values induced by interpretations should coincide with the class of "possible" distributions, that is, that an interpretation should be defined as inducing one of the "possible" distributions. As we no longer require that values of interpretation be expressions, what we have reached is the following "abstract" notion of interpretation: an interpretation is a compositional assignment of objects to parameters leading to a "possible" distribution of truth values among statements. A kind of a by-product of the new, denotational notion of interpretation is the explication of the obejctual notion of instance encountered in the end of Section 3. We have concluded that the substitutional notion of an instance need not be in accordance with our intuition; that there may be
14
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
objectual instances for which no corresponding substitutional instances obtain. Tarski's thesis has now led us to the needed criterion for the demarcation of the space of instances: there are just enough instances to make logical truth coincide with necessary truth. Tarski's proposal, of course, was based on the inverse perspective: Tarski assumed that it is intuitively clear as to what the instances of a given schema are and that the concept of logical truth can thus be considered as a more or less empirical one. Hence the perspective is the one questioned by Wittgenstein (1984, I.8): "Die Logik ist eine Art von Ultra-Physik, die Beschreibung des 'logischen Baus' der Welt, den wir durch eine Art von Ultra-Erfahrung wahrnehmen (mit dem Verstand etwa)." But we deny (together with Wittgenstein, Quine and others) the possibility of inquiring into the world by-passing language, and hence we consider Tarski's perspective doomed. To know what the instances of a schema are is the same thing as to know what is possible and, therefore, what is necessary; and to know what is necessary is the same thing as to know what is necessarily true. Hence knowing instances does not precede knowing necessary truth; and it is thus more appropriate to consider necessary truth constitutive to the space of instances (and interpretations), not vice versa. This means that the notion of interpretation that we have just reached does justice both to the notion of interpretation as dis-abstraction, and to the notion of interpretation as characterization of truth. The general principles governing this notion of interpretation are as follows: such an interpretation is an assignment of objects (the nature of which is irrelevant) to expressions such that it fulfils three principles. First, the value of the interpretation of a whole is to be "computable" from those of its parts; hence the interpretation is to be compositional. (Note that compositionality is a purely technical matter here - it guarantees that interpretation will be something we shall be able reasonably to work with.) Moreover, the simpler the "computation" of the value of 11 interpretation of a whole from those of its parts, the better . Second, among the values assigned to statements there are some distinguished 12 values . Third, the assignment should be as economic as possible, i.e. the 13 fewer interpreting entities, the better .
6 INTERPRETATION AS MEANING ASSIGNMENT Now we can return to the considerations we have started from, to the notion of interpretation as meaning assignment. We have stated that
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
15
meanings are not to be found by a direct empirical investigation of the world, but we have not rejected the plausibility of considering meaning as 14 an object . The way in which meaning must be approached has been formulated in the frequently quoted sentence due to Lewis (1972, p.173): "In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that." This is not to say that we give up the effort of revealing the right nature of meaning; this is the recognition of the fact that there is really nothing to meaning beyond what meaning does. However, if we try to analyze what we are able definitely to say about meaning, we come to the conclusion that the assignment of meanings to expressions must be something very close to interpretation in the sense of the previous section. Thus, meaning, as we handle it intuitively, also 15 seems to be a compositional matter . Besides this, meaning is what can be called verifounded: difference in truth value clearly implies difference 16 in meaning . Third, there seems to be something like Occam's razor, 17 something that pushes the number of meanings as far down as possible . Meaning assignment can thus be identified with that interpretation (in the above sense) of our language which leads to that distribution of truth values among its statements which really obtains. Thus, it seems that the notion of interpretation reached above can do justice even to the notion of interpretation as meaning assignment. It can be proved that a meaning assignment fulfils the above characterization (compositionality, verifoundation plus Occam's razor) if and only if sameness of meaning coincides with intersubstitutivity salva 18 veritate . This result should not be too surprising: the idea that the meaning of an expression is the contribution of the expression to the truth value of the statements in which it occurs is nothing new, it can be traced back to Frege and Wittgenstein (not to speak of Leibniz). What we have arrived at is especially close to the idea of semantics put forward by Davidson (1984): "I suggest that a theory of truth for a language does, in a minimal but important respect, do what we want, that is, give the meanings of all independently meaningful expressions on the basis of an analysis of their structure." This is precisely what semantic interpretation in the sense spoken of here does: it distinguishes between truth and falsity and it propagates this
16
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
distinction "on the basis of an analysis of structure" of complex expressions (i.e. by doing justice to the principle of compositionality plus the principle of Occam's razor) up to their ultimate parts. The meaning of an expression is thus the simplest thing which allows for a compositional characterization of truth. However, should this mean that meaning is a matter of the actual distribution of truth values among statements and that it thus depends on contingent facts? Not at all; at least not for natural language. Every change in semantic interpretation is conditioned by a change of the truth value of a statement; this, however, in no way means that every change of the truth value of a statement would really bring about a change of semantic interpretation. It may well be the case that the only change of truth value that leads to a change of semantic interpretation is a change of the truth value of a necessary statement; and this is indeed the case of natural language. Natural language is inherently intensional; whereas some artificial languages (for example the traditional predicate calculus), for which semantic interpretation does depend on contingent truth, are extensional. This throws quite a peculiar light on extensional languages, but the reason is simple: with respect to these languages it is simply not possible to speak about anything like meaning worth its name. Intensionality is an essential property of natural language; and extensional languages are from this point of view rather "pseudolanguages": they share some essential features with real languages, but not enough to be on a par with them in respect to meaning. Extensional languages can, however, help us in clarifying another problematic semantic concept, namely that of reference. These languages, such as the classical predicate calculus, are results of the formalization of a certain restricted part of our language, of a part which is in a sense distinguishable from the rest of language. It is a kind of language within 19 language , and it is a plausible hypothesis that what we call reference is just semantic interpretation of this extensional core of our language.
7 CONCLUSION We have tried to show that the diverse senses in which the concept of semantic interpretation is used can be brought to one and the same notion. It is the notion of interpretation as an assignment of entities to expressions compositionally characterizing truth. Thus, a semantic interpretation can be seen as a certain kind of account for truth; as an
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
17
account for which Tarski's idea of identification of necessary truth with verification by every interpretation is crucial. It is, however, necessary truth, i.e. the fact that we understand some statements as not capable of being false, that is basic: hence not "a statement is necessarily true because it is verified by every interpretation", but rather "a statement is necessarily true and therefore there cannot be an interpretation which falsifies it". Formal interpretation can be considered a matter of semantics because it accounts for necessary truth, not because it imitates a real denotandum/denotatum relation. Every theory aims at an explication of some facts which are prior to it. To understand such a theory properly, it is essential to distinguish carefully between that which was here from the beginning and that which we built on top of it in our effort to "make sense" of it. The former can only be described (or in a way "systematized"), the latter can be explained (away) by pointing out its role in the pursuit of the description of the former. It is a basic error to try to explicate the former in the same way as the latter. We may explain the fact that expressions have different meanings by pointing out that they make different contributions to truth values of statements in which they occur, but we can hardly explicate the fact that there are statements which are true, or, using the material mode of speaking, that there is anything that is.
NOTES *
Work on this paper has been supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation and by the Research Support Scheme of the Central European University. The author thanks P. Sgall for stimulating discussions and P.Stekeler-Weithofer for valuable critical comments to earlier versions of the manuscript. 1. E.g. Robinson (1965). 2. Slight semantic differences - e.g. different felicity conditions - are likely to be found even between John loves Mary and It is John who loves Mary. Hence whether they really do boil down, as they usually do, to a single formula, depends on the threshold of difference we decide to take as significant. 3. It would be more accurate to call them variable formal expressions, but the term variable is traditionally used in a different sense within logic. Note the essential difference between variables and parameters: variables are tools of quantificational theory which are in fact unessential (it is possible - although a bit cumbersome - to do logic without them; see Quine, 1960 and also Peregrin, 1992a).
18
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
4. The boundary between these two kinds of truth is surely fuzzy (witness Quine's Everything green is extended). Moreover, as Wittgenstein and Quine stressed, it is in fact not an absolute matter, it is rather a matter relative to an adopted conceptual framework. However, despite both of these facts the boundary surely is something quite meaningful. 5. S is a necessary truth iff it is entailed by the empty set; and S is entailed by S1,...,Sn iff (S1->(...(Sn->S)...)) is a necessary truth. 6. The idea, however, can be traced back to Bolzano. See Etchemendy (1990). 7. Note however, that such a notion of an individual is not a product of metaphysical speculation, but rather the outcome of our insistence on Tarski's thesis. Let us avoid the usual misguided idea that by giving an object a name we transform it into that which the name usually denotes. That we call what we have invented individuals is to keep within the boundaries of the usual logical terminology, it is not to attribute hands and feet to these entities! 8. A statement consisting of only logical constants is clearly inevitably accounted for as necessary: there are no alternative ways of interpreting it. However, this is appropriate at most in the case of the pure predicate calculus; it is enough to add = to it in the customary manner, and the picture gets distorted, as there emerge statements which consist purely of logical constants, which are, nevertheless, intuitively contingent. This is the case of ∃x∃y¬(x=y) as discussed by Etchemendy. 9. Etchemendy's example implies that this is in fact the case with quantifiers. A simpler example is that of adding the axiom ∀x(P(x)->Q(x)) to the predicate calculus (for some definite predicate constants P and Q). P and Q are then no longer extralogicals: they are not replaceable by any other predicates. On the other hand, they are also not definite in the sense of &: they can be replaced, but only by some pairs of predicates and not by others. 10. To say that S1,...,Sn entail S is to say that it is impossible that S is false and S1,...,Sn are at the same time all true. See Peregrin (1992b). 11. Thus within the classical predicate calculus the interpretation of an atomic statement is not only uniquely determined by the interpretation of the predicate and the interpretation(s) of the term(s), but it is computable simply as the functional application of the former to the latter. The value assigned to a complex statement can again be computed as the application of the interpretation of the connective (which is the usual truth function) to the interpretations of the substatements. 12. In classical logic there is simply one distinguished and one undistinguished value, the case of modal logic, however, shows that a more general approach is appropriate. 13. If it were not for this third requirement, an identical mapping could be considered as an interpretation; and this is clearly absurd. 14. There are outstanding philosophers that would question this assumption - e.g. Austin or Quine. 15. Compositionality is also what underlies the most influential theories of meaning since Frege. In fact if we accept Frege's conviction that what is primarily meaningful are sentences, then we need the principle of compositionality in order to be at all able to individuate meanings of parts of sentences. It is, however, important to realize that understood this way compositionality is not a thesis to be verified or falsified, that it is rather a postulate which is constitutive to semantics. 16. Cresswell (1982) considers this the most certain principle of semantics. 17. "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity", as Grice (1989, 47) puts it. 18. The problem can be formulated in algebraic terms: if we view language as a many-
INTERPRETING FORMAL LOGIC
19
sorted algebra (in the spirit of Janssen, 1983), then a meaning assignment fulfils the three conditions iff it is a homomorphism with its kernel equal to the maximal congruence for which it holds that no true statement is congruent with a false one. It is easy to see that it is just this congruence which coincides with the relation of intersubstitutivity salva veritate. 19. Its exceptional status manifests itself in the fact that many of the greatest philosophers of language, such as Frege, Wittgenstein, or Church, tried hard to restrict themselves to this very part. We can hardly ascribe to them an inability to see that there are intensional contexts in our language; rather they clearly considered these contexts as is in some sense secondary to the extensional core.
REFERENCES Barwise, J. and Perry, J.: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Cresswell, M.J.: 1973, Logic and Languages, Methuen, London. Cresswell, M.J.: 1982, 'The Autonomy of Semantics', Processes, Beliefs and Questions (ed. by S.Peters and E.Saarinen), Reidel, Dordrecht. Davidson, D.: 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Etchemendy, J.: 1988, 'Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence', Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, pp. 51-79. Etchemendy, J.: 1990, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/London. Frege, G.: 1879, Begriffsschrift, Nebert, Halle. Goodman, N.: 1960, 'The Way the World is', The Review of Metaphysics 14, pp. 48-56. Grice, P.: 1989, Studies in the Ways of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Janssen, T.M.V.: 1983, Foundations and Applications of Montague Grammar, dissertation, Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam. Lewis, D.: 1972, 'General Semantics', Semantics of Natural Language (ed. by D.Davidson and G.Harman), Reidel, Dordrecht. Lukasiewicz, J. and Tarski, A.: 1930, 'Untersuchungen Über den Aussagenkalkül', Comptes Rendus des seances de la Societe des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie 23, pp. 30-50. Peregrin, J.: 1992a, 'The Role of Variables in Logical Formalization of Natural Language', Proceedings of the Eight Amsterdam Colloquium, University of Amsterdam, pp. 463-481. Peregrin, J.: 1992b, 'Meaning, Truth and Models', From the Logical Point of View 2/92, pp. 67-75.
20
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
Quine, W.V.O.: 1960, Variables explained away, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 104, pp. 343-347; reprinted in Quine: Selected Logic Papers, Random House, New York, 1966. Quine, W.V.O.: 1963, From the Logical Point of View, Harper and Row, New York. Quine, W.V.O.: 1969, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York. Robinson, A.: 1965, Introduction to Model Theory and to the Metamathematics of Algebra, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Tarski, A.: 1936, 'Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung', Actes du Congrés International de Philosophie Scientifique 7, pp. 1-11. Wittgenstein, L.: 1984, Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Werkausgabge Band 6), ed. by G.E.M.Anscombe, R.Rhees and G.H.von Wright, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
TOPIC-FOCUS ARTICULATION AS GENERALIZED QUANTIFICATION Jaroslav Peregrin
[In: P. Bosch and R. van der Sandt (eds): Proceedings of “Focus and natural language processing”, 1995, 49-57. Heidelberg: IBM Deutschland; reprinted in: E. Hajičová et al. (eds):Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague, vol 4, Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2002, 263-273]
Abstract Recent results of Partee, Rooth, Krifka and other formal semanticians confirm that topic-focus articulation (TFA) of sentence is relevant for its semantics. The essential import of TFA, which is more apparent in case of a language with relatively free word order such as Czech than in case of English, has been traditionally intensively studied by Czech linguists. In this paper we would like to indicate the possibility of the account for TFA in terms of the theory of generalized quantifiers, drawing on the results of both these groups of theoreticians. The basic intuition which we accept as our point of departure is the intuition of topic as the “semantic subject” and focus as the “semantic predicate”; we point out that the role of topic is to specify the entity the sentence is “about” (thereby triggering a presupposition), while that of the focus is to reveal a characterization of this entity, and usually a characterization that is in some sense exhaustive. Then we show that it may be plausible to consider topic and focus as arguments to an implicit generalized quantifier, which may get overridden by an explicit focalizer.
0. A preliminary remark: symbols in semantics There are two principal ways to employ formal or symbolic means to semantically analyze a sentence (more generally an expression or an utterance). The first of the ways consists in using symbols to picture some aspects of the sentence to emphasize or to point out those aspects of its syntactic structure which we consider relevant loves for its semantics. We may, for example, depict the statement John loves Mary as JOHN MARY to emphasize that John is the agent of the action expressed by loves and Mary its objective; or we may indicate the same by writing [John]Ag loves [Mary]Ob. It is the graphical shape of such a representation that is important: it is just the graphics that does the job of explication. We are free to employ symbols of any kind, the only point is to emphasise the relevant, and to suppress the irrelevant, features of the sentence analyzed. 1
The other way to use formal means is to do logical analysis, and its nature is essentially different. Its primary aim is not to depict features of the sentence’s structure, but rather to point out the proposition which is to explicate the meaning of the sentence (and to point out this proposition means – in effect – to point out the truth conditions of the sentence, or the contribution the sentence brings to truth conditions of suprasentential wholes, i.e. the “context-change potential” of the sentence). We again use symbolic means: we may, for example use the formula LOVES(JOHN,MARY) of the first-order predicate calculus to schematize John loves Mary. However, now it is not the graphical shape of the symbols which is relevant – we know that the formula we have used is equivalent to many other formulas and it would have been the same if we have used any of them – the proposition pointed out would be the same. The basic difference between the two approaches is that the latter works with closed systems of symbols with strictly defined equivalence – in their case, it is not the formula itself that does the explication, but rather the proposition pointed out by it. And it is also only this approach that facilitates semantic analysis in the strict sense (cf. Lewis, 1972).
1. Topic and Focus within the Prague Tradition Contemporary semantic theories are inclined to view focus as something extraordinary, as something which a sentence may, or may not, have, and which becomes semantically relevant only when it gets combined with a focus-sensitive operator. The Praguian approach, on the other hand, considers TFA as the universal basis of semantic structuring of sentence. Let us briefly recapitulate its basic tenets – for a more detailed exposition see Sgall, Hajičová and Panevová (1986) and also Sgall (1995) and Hajičová (1995). The syntactic characterization of sentence underlying this approach works with the concept of dependency. The default order of items depending on a verb (i.e. the order of thematic roles and adverbials) is considered to be fixed for a given language; it is called the systemic ordering. However, this order together with the order of other items not depending directly on the main verb is modified in a concrete utterance, so that the resulting “deep” order is that of the communicative dynamism (CD). The CD order of contextually bound items dependent on the same head is determined by the speaker’s discourse strategy rather than by grammar; on the other hand, the CD of the unbound items dependent on the same head is in accordance with the systemic ordering. An item is less dynamic than its head iff the dependent item is bound. The least dynamic element of the sentence constitutes the topic proper. All the contextually bound items depending on the main verb together with all that depends on them and together with the main verb if this is contextually bound, constitute the topic of the sentence; the rest of the 2
sentence constitutes the focus. Hence the topic/focus classification is exhaustive: every element of the sentence belongs either to the topic or to the focus.
2. Topic & Focus as “Subject” & “Predicate” The basic idea is that the topic-focus articulation has to do with the dynamism of discourse. A linguistic utterance says – in the prototypical case – something new about something old. There is a subject which the sentence is about, and there is a predicate which is ascribed to the subject. The utterer first points out an element of the common ground shared by the participants of the discourse and then reveals something which he proposed to be added to the common ground. If his utterance is successful, then the new item is added and it can become the starting point of a following utterance. In the prototypical case, this semantic notion of subject and predicate coincides with the syntactic notion – the grammatical subject refers to what the sentence is about, and the grammatical predicate expresses what is said about it. However, in general almost any syntactic part of sentence can act as the semantic subject, leaving the rest of the sentence for the role of semantic predicate. Thus, while under normal condition the sentence (1) expresses the ascription of the property of walking to the individual John, its variant (2) (with the stress on John) seems rather to express something like the ascription of the property “being instantiated by John” to the “entity” walking. John walks
(1)
JOHN walks
(2)
An instructive way to see topic and focus is to see them just as “semantic subject” and “semantic predicate”. Topic is that which the sentence is about, by which it gets anchored to the common ground, and focus brings about the very information the sentence was assembled to convey. What does this mean for logical analysis? The straightforward way to analyze (1) is (1’); and it seems that to account for the fact that in (2) the roles of John and Walks get exchanged it is enough to employ the mechanism of lambda-abstraction and to use the well-known Montagovian trick of type-raising. (2) thus seems to be analyzable as (2’). Walk(John)
(1’)
λf.f(John)(Walks)
(2’)
3
However, this idea is misguided, because it disregards the very sense of logical analysis. The point is that (1’) and (2’) are equivalent formulas ((2’) is straightforwardly lambda-reducible to (1’)), and hence (2’) fosters precisely the same analysis as (1’). To analyze something as a “semantic subject” it is not enough to provide a formula in which it corresponds to the subject – because we can always provide another, equivalent formula in which it would correspond to the predicate. This means that if we want to speak about “semantic subject” and “semantic predicate”, we must understand these terms as expressing two different ways of contributing to truth conditions. We cannot simply say that the contribution of the predicate differs from that of the subject in that the truth conditions of the whole sentence result from applying the former to the latter; because we saw it is easy to provide an alternative analysisŘeknu-li někomu například ". The real semantic difference can be seen as stemming from the fact that the subject purports to point out something known. If it fails to do so, the sentence is not false, but rather infelicitous, because it makes the listener wonder what the speaker is talking about. On the other hand, if the subject succeeds in pointing out a known anchor and the predicate fails to be true, the sentence is simply false. In other words, the subject is the matter of presupposing, whereas the predicate is the matter of stating. What kind of logic do we need to account for this?. First, we need a logic that is partial: its formulas can posses not only the values T and F, but can also have no truth value at all (i.e. they can be not only true or false, but also “infelicitous”). Then we can associate define what can be called the “propositional content” of an expression (a propositional content of a statement is the statement itself, that of a term is the proposition claiming the existence of the corresponding individual and that of a predicate is the proposition claiming the non-emptiness of the corresponding class); and we can define “presuppositional” predication as predication posing the presupposition associated with the subject. Let us do it – for the sake of simplicity – on the level of extension (everything can be straightforwardly relativized to possible worlds); thus, ║X║ will denote the extension of X (i.e a truth value if X is a sentence). Definition 1. (“propositional content” of X) │X│ = ║X║ if X is a sentence = ║∃y.y=X║ if X is a term = ║∃y.X(y)║ if X is an unary predicate = T otherwise Definition 2. (“presuppositional” predication) ║P{S}║ = T iff (│S│=T & ║P(S)║=T) = F iff (│S│=T & ║P(S)║=F) = 0 iff │S│=F 4
Only now we can give the analyses of (1) and (2) in spirit of the above considerations – viz (1”) and (2”). Walk{John}
(1”)
λf.f(John){Walk}
(2”)
These two formulas now express different propositions: although there are no circumstances under which one of them would be true and the other false, there are circumstances under which one is false and the other lacks a truth value altogether (if there is no John, then (2”) yields F while (1”) yields 0; if nobody walks then it is the other way round). If we take the sentence John loves Mary, there are formally nine straightforward ways to draw the boundary between topic and focus; they lead to the analyzes (3a) through (3h) (where x, y are variables for individuals, p for properties of individuals, r for binary relations among individuals, f 1 for properties of propositions and g for properties of properties of propositions) . John loves Mary
(3)
λy.love(y,Mary){John}
(3a)
λx.love(John,x){Mary}
(3b)
λp.p(Mary){λy.love(John,y)}
(3c)
λp.p(John){λx.love(x,Mary)}
(3d)
(λf.f){love(John,Mary)}
(3e)
λg.g(love(John,Mary)){λf.f}
(3f)
λr.r(John,Mary){love}
(3g)
λx,y.love(x,y){John,Mary}
(3h)
Out of these, (3e), in which the whole sentence is contained in the topic, appears to be ruled out – a sentence seems to have to bring in something new. All the other ways of TFA are acceptable. Moreover, there are other possibilities to draw the boundary, non-aligned to the boundary of words. Thus, to respond to the statement John loved Mary by stating John LOVES Mary means to make 2 only the present tense grammateme of the verb into the focus . What is important is that in case of sentences with a generic noun phrase the subject-predicate structuring that is yielded by the TFA determines the scope and thus can mean differences not only regarding felicity conditions, but also regarding truth conditions proper, like in case of (4). 5
Every man loves one woman
(4)
λP.P(λx.∃!y.(woman(y)&love(x,y))){λp.∀x.(man(x)→p(x))}
(4a)
λP.P(λy.∀x.(man(x)→love(x,y))){λp.∃!y.(woman(y)&p(y))}
(4b)
λp.∃!y.(woman(y)&p(y)){λy.∀x.(man(x)→love(x,y))}
(4c)
λp.∀x.(man(x)→p(x)){λx.∃!y.(woman(y)&love(x,y))}
(4d)
Besides this, there is another semantically relevant feature of TFA. The focus not only predicates something of the topic; it appears to tend to exhaust all what there is to be predicated about the topic. Uttering (2), we not only state that walking is instantiated by John, but also that John is the only (or at least “the principal”) walker. (2) would be inappropriate in the situation where John would be only one of a plenty of those who walk around. To be able to account for the phenomenon of exhaustiveness, we have to introduce the concept 3 of alternative. We assume that for every entity there is a class of alternatives (of the same type), which count as its alternatives. We can introduce a functor ALT such that if e is an entity of the type t, then ALT(e) is a set of entities of type t (containing e). The trivial version of ALT would be such that ALT(e) would be the set of all the entities of the type t. In fact, it is clear that the nature of ALT is pragmatic – what counts as an alternative to a given item and what not is given by the context; and from this point of view it seems to be reasonable to see ALT as something which gets changed by ongoing utterances. This means that a logic which incorporates an adequate version of ALT would have to be dynamic – changing ALT in the way dynamic logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) changes valuation of discourse markers. Anyway, once we have ALT, we can define the “exhaustive” predication as predication such that the predicate has no alternative which would also hold of the subject, i.e. as follows (where ║X║I means the extension of X under the interpretation I and I[y→Y] denotes the interpretation which is just like I save for the single exception that I(Y)=y. Definition 3. (“exhaustive” predication) ║P!(S)║I =T iff ║P(S)║I =T & ∀p.[p∈ALT(║P║I)&║P(S)║I[p→P]=T→║P║I =p] Combining definitions 2 and 3 we arrive at the concept of “exhaustive presuppositional” predication.
6
Definition 4. (“exhaustive presuppositional” predication) ║P!{S}║I = T iff │S│I = T & ║P(S)║I = T & ∀p.[(p∈ALT(║P║I)&║P(S)║I[p→P] = T)→║P║I = p] = F iff │S│I = T & (║P(S)║I = F v ∃p.[p∈ALT(║P║I)&║P(S)║I[p→P] = T&║P║I ≠ p])) = 0 iff │S│I = F Now we can analyze (3) as (3a’) through (3h’). λy.love(y,Mary)!{John}
(3a’)
λx.love(John,x)!{Mary}
(3b’)
λp.p(Mary)!{λy.love(John,y)}
(3c’)
λp.p(John)!{λx.love(x,Mary)}
(3d’)
(λf.f)!{love(John,Mary)}
(3e’)
λg.g(love(John,Mary))!{λf.f}
(3f’)
λr.r(John,Mary)!{love}
(3g’)
λx,y.love(x,y)!{John,Mary}
(3h’)
(3a’) through (3h’) differ not only in their felicity conditions, but they may also differ in truth conditions (this depends on how we interpret the operator ALT). If both John and Tom love Mary and if Tom counts as an alternative to John, then (3d’) is false, whereas (3c’) may well be true (in the case when Mary is the only person loved by John). However, it seems not to be adequate to take TFA to always amount to this exhaustive version of predication. The extent to which the focus of a given utterance really purports to exhaust all what there is to be said about the topic (relative to context) seems to vary (the heavy stress on focus usually strongly facilitating exhaustiveness), and thus the TFA should be considered to be somewhere in between simple presuppositional and exhaustive presuppositional predication.
3. Introducing the generalized quantifier PRED The linguistic significance of the theory of generalized quantifiers, as elaborated by van Benthem and others, bears on the idea that the truth value of a sentence can be seen as the matter of a pair of 4 sets being in certain relation. This theory seems to be in accordance with certain intuitions regarding topic and focus, namely with the intuition that “topic specifies a class and focus lists the 7
elements of the class”. This is in fact an idea underlying the first attempts of semantic capturing of the Prague notion of topic and focus within the framework of intensional logic (Materna and Sgall, 1980, Materna, Hajičová and Sgall, 1987). This approach is also closely allied to that based on the concept of tripartite structure as proposed by Partee (1995). There is a straightforward way from the analysis by means of strong presuppositional predication given above to the analysis by means of a generalized quantifier. Let us introduce the (type-polymorphic) generalized quantifier PRED in the following way. Let us assume that we have a sentence analyzed as P!{S}; we shall show how to turn this analysis into the new one. We shall distinguish two cases. If P is P = λp.p(T) for some T (i.e. if P is a “type-raised T”), like in case (3c’), then we turn P!{S} into PRED(S,λx.x=T); thus we turn (3c’) into (3c”). PRED(λy.love(John,y),λx.x=Mary)
(3c”)
In the other case (when P is not a λp.p(T), e.g. (3a’)), we turn P!{S} into PRED(λp.p(S),P); thus we turn (3a’) into (3a”). PRED(λp.p(John),λy.love(y,Mary))
(3a”)
However, in this new way we can account also for cases which are not so easily analyzable in the old one. Thus, we can straightforwardly analyze (5) as (5’) and (6) as (6’). John loves MARY, MINIE and HILLARY
(5)
PRED(λx.loves(John,x),λx.(x=Mary∨x=Minie∨x=Hillary) John loves those who BILL loves
(5’) (6)
PRED(λx.loves(John,x),λx.loves(Bill,x))
(6’)
What is the character of the generalized quantifier PRED introduced in this way? It can be characterized by three points. (1) PRED(A,B) implies that all Bs are As, hence B⊆A; which accounts for the intuition that “focus lists only members of the topic-class”. (2) PRED(A,B) presupposes nonempty A (if A is empty, then PRED(A,B) is ‘undefined’); which is the formal counterpart of the intuition that “topic assumes knowledge shared by communicants”. Then there is the most controversial point: (3) PRED(A,B) holds only if B exhausts, or ‘almost exhausts’, A (“focus lists all, or the most important, members of the topic-class”). If we took (3) as stating that PRED(A,B) implies that B⊇A, then PRED would turn out to be very close to ONLY. But it would 8
be probably necessary to distinguish at least two versions of PRED: the basic version defined only by means of (1)+(2), and the exhaustive version, PREDexhaust, defined by (1)+(2)+(3). The idea is that PRED is the default, implicit generalized quantifier which can be overridden by 5 an overt focalizer. Thus, (7) is analyzed as (7’), whereas (8) as (8’). John loves only Mary
(7)
ONLY(λx.loves(John,x),λx.x=Mary)
(7’)
John loves only those who BILL loves
(8)
ONLY(λx.loves(John,x),λx.loves(Bill,x))
(8’)
However, this does not mean that a word like only would automatically assume the place of PRED – in cases with the so called “free focus” the quantifier expressed by the focalizer stays embedded within the topic – viz (9’). JOHN loves only Mary
(9)
PRED(λx.ONLY(λx.loves(y,x),λx.x=Mary),λx.x=John)
(9’)
The problem of focalization can thus be seen as the problem of overriding PRED. In some cases, like (7) and (8), it is overriden, in other cases it is not. Partee (1995) points out, that “adverbial” quantifiers are usually focalizers, whereas “determiner quantifiers” are usually not. Negation can be considered as a principal focalizer – as the primary aim of negation seems to be to deny that “the focus holds of the topic” (see Hajičová, 1995), it can be seen as changing PRED into another, complementary quantifier. And possibly also the relationship between PRED and PREDexhaust can be understood in this way: we might see PREDexhaust as a non-default quantifier which may in some cases (especially in cases with the heavy stress on focus) override the default PRED. However, let us once more stress that if what we are after is semantics proper, i.e. truth conditions, then we must be careful about claims to the effect of presence of quantifiers or other similar items within that which the sentence expresses, means or denotes. Quantifiers are constituents of formulas, and logical formulas are, as we have stressed, only ways to point out propositions. The same propositions can be pointed out in various ways, some of them employing a quantifier, others not. Let us consider the sentence (10). Every man walks
(10)
9
In fact, it is sentences of this kind, which oil the wheels of linguist’s embracing the theory of generalized quantifiers. We have seen that the intuition behind generalized quantifiers in linguistics stems from the fact that the truth of the sentence of the shape Det N V can be computed by comparing the extensions of N and V in the way prescribed by Det. Thus, (10) is true if and only if the extension of man is included in the extension of walk. The TFA-based approach proposed in this paper now might seem to detach the tools of the theory of generalized quantifiers from this powerful intuition. However, this is not exactly true, because the analysis we proposed need not contradict the traditional one. Let us, for the sake of illustration, assume the standard TFA of (10), with every man being in the topic and walks in the focus. If we disregard presupposition and the requirement of exhaustiveness, then our analysis becomes equivalent to the standard one. To see this, let us consider the analysis (10’) of (10) yielded by our approach. It is easy to see that (10’) is – under the given conditions – equivalent to (11), which can be straightforwardly reduced to (12). And if we define the generalized quantifier EVERY in the usual way (i.e. EVERY(A,B) iff ║A║⊆║B║), then (12) is further equivalent to (13). PRED(λp.∀x.man(x)→p(x),λp.p=walk)
(10’)
(p=walk)→(∀x.man(x)→p(x))
(11)
∀x.man(x)→walk(x)
(12)
EVERY(man,walk)
(13)
Thus it does not always make sense to ask whether the semantic analysis of a sentence contains this or that quantifier. What does make sense is to ask whether if we decide to employ a quantifier, its operands coincide with topic and focus (i.e. whether the quantifier can be seen as overriding PRED).
4. Conclusion The aim of this paper was to survey the “logic” of topic and focus and to indicate how this “logic” can be done justice to by means of the currently popular formal approaches to semantics. We have claimed that it is the theory of generalized quantifiers, which could provide for a simple and adequate framework to capture TFA. Contemporary semantic theories are inclined to view TFA as something that is relevant only for the scope of focus-sensitive operators. The Praguian approach, on the other hand, considers TFA as the universal basis of semantic structuring of sentence. The approach proposed here can be – I believe – seen as compatible with the approach of Rooth and Krifka – the cases of focus-sensitive 10
operators are considered only special cases of the general pattern. Moreover, the approach can be seen as a step towards an elaboration of Partee’s insight regarding the tripartite structuring of 6 sentence.
References Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M.1991. “Dynamic Predicate Logic”. Linguistics and Philosophy 14: 39-101. Hajičová, E 1984. “On Presupposition and Allegation”. In Contributions to Functional Syntax, Semantics and Language Comprehension, P. Sgall (ed.), 99-122. Amsterdam: Benjamins and Praha: Academia. Hajičová, E. 1995. “Topic, focus and negation”. In Proceedings of Focus and natural language processing, P. Bosch and R. van der Sandt (eds.), Heidelberg: IBM Deutschland. Jakobs, J. 1991. “Focus Ambiguities”. In Journal of Semantics 8: 1-6. Krifka, M. 1991. “A Compositional Semantics for Multiple Focus Constructions”. In Proceedings of SALT I, Cornell Working Papers 11. Krifka, M. (ms). “Focus, Quantification and Dynamic Interpretation”. Manuscript. Lewis, D. 1972. “General Semantics”. In Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.). Dordrecht: Reidel. Materna, P. and Sgall, P. 1980. “Functional Sentence perspective, the Question Test, and Intensional Semantics”. In SMIL 1-2: 141-160. Materna, P., Hajičová, E. and Sgall, P. 1987. “Redundant Answers and Topic-Focus Articulation”. In Linguistics and Philosophy 10: 101-113. Partee, B. 1991. “Topic, Focus and Quantification”. In Proceedings of SALT I. Cornell Working Papers 10. Partee, B. 1995. “Focus, quantification and semantics-pragmatics issues”. In Proceedings of Focus and natural language processing, P. Bosch and R. van der Sandt (eds.). Heidelberg: IBM Deutschland. Peregrin, J. and Sgall, P. 1986. ”An Attempt at a Framework for Semantic Interpretation of Natural Language”. In Theoretical Linguisitcs 13:37-73. Peregrin, J. 1996. “Topic and Focus in a Formal Framework.” In Discourse and Meaning, B. Partee and P. Sgall (eds.), 235-254. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Rooth, M. 1992. “A Theory of Focus Interpretation”. In Natural Language Semantics 1: 75-116.
11
Sgall, P., Hajičová, E. and Panevová, J. 1986. The Meaning of the Sentence in Its Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects. J. L. Mey (ed.). Dordrecht: Reidel and Prague: Academia. Sgall, P. 1995. “Focus and focalizers”. In Proceedings of Focus and natural language processing, P. Bosch and R. van der Sandt (eds.). Heidelberg: IBM Deutschland.
Notes 1
[x F] If S is a sentence with the focus F, then the general way to analyze it would be as λx.S → {F} (where stands for S in which x is substituted for F; x being the variable of the appropriate type). S [x→F]
2
This shows that we need semantic representation fine-grained enough to allow for capturing all possible TFAs; everything that can by itself constitute the focus must obtain its own counterpart within semantic representation. We see that the tense grammateme constitutes such an item. This might seem an obstacle, but is it not rather a test of what are the ultimate constituents of semantic representation? 3
Employed for the first time – at least to my knowledge – by Rooth.
4
And it can thus be seen as a sort of vindication of the Aristotelian, syllogistic approach to logic.
5
We can – in a sense – say hat also negation behaves as a focalizer, because in the typical case it can be seen as replacing PRED by the complementary generalized quantifier NPRED. This is to say that in the typical case it is the TFA that determines the scope of negation – the scope being the focus. See Hajičová (1995) and also Peregrin (1996).
12
Structural Linguistics And Formal Semantics Jaroslav Peregrin [Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague I, Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1995; original pagination]
Introduction The beginning of this century hailed a new paradigm in linguistics, the paradigm brought about by de Saussure's Cours de Linguistique Genérále and subsequently elaborated by Jakobson, Hjelmslev and other linguists. It seemed that the linguistics of this century was destined to be structuralistic. However, half of the century later a brand new paradigm was introduced by Chomsky's Syntactic Structures followed by Montague's formalization of semantics. This new turn has brought linguistics surprisingly close to mathematics and logic, and has facilitated a direct practical exploitation of linguistic theory by computer science. One of the claims of this paper is that the post-Saussurian structuralism, both in linguistics and in philosophy, is partly based on ideas quite alien to de Saussure. The main aim then is to explain the ideas driving the formalistic turn of linguistics and to investigate the problem of the extent to which they can be accommodated within the framework of the Saussurian paradigm. The main thesis advocated is that the point of using formalisms in linguistics is more methodological than substantial and that it can be well accommodated within the conceptual framework posited by de Saussure.
1 De Saussure vs. Structuralism Before beginning to discuss structuralism, let us stress the distinction between the genuine views of Ferdinand de Saussure and the teachings of his various avowed followers, be they linguists or philosophers. In fact, de Saussure's theory, as presented in his Course, is an austere and utterly rational scientific theory articulated with a rigour commonly associated with linguistic theories of the 'post-Chomskian' period, though differing from them by the absence of
-$526/$9 3(5(*5,1
formalisms. Many of the de Saussure's followers tried to turn his approach into something quite different: into a tool of questioning scientific rationalism overemphasizing the "literary" aspect of language. This is true particularly of French philosophers who used the structural insight to fight the analytic approach of their Anglo-American colleagues. It is beyond doubt that French structuralism constitutes one of the most significant philosophical movements of this century; however, its affiliation to de Saussure is an intricate matter. These philosophers have eagerly reassumed the view of language as a self-contained phenomenon to be explained by an appeal to its intrinsic properties; however, they have almost completely ignored other aspects of de Saussure's approach to language, notably his calm scientific rigour.1 Linguists such as Jakobson and Hjelmslev, of course, remained far more faithful to the teaching of their predecessor, but they failed to match his rigour. Thus Hjelmslev's theory, although guided by the promising goal of finding "the system beyond the process" and "the constancy beyond the variability",2 is overloaded with more or less mysterious concepts which he is not willing to make sufficiently precise; and Jakobson, although on the one hand ready for such exquisitely "Saussurian" claims as "if topology is defined as the study of those qualitative properties which are invariant under isomorphic transformations, this is exactly what we did in structural linguistics"3, on the other hand considers theory of language to be akin to literary criticism and claims that "only as a poetry is language essential"4. 2 De Saussure de-mythicized In what sense then was de Saussure himself a structuralist? Structuralism, as developed by de Saussure, consists in viewing abstract linguistic objects (especially meanings, but everything that he calls linguistic reality) as values of elements of the system of the expressions that make up language. Let us explain this in detail5. First, let us notice that to speak about a structure is possible only there where it is possible to speak about parts and wholes. Indeed: structure is the way of organizing parts into a whole. So to base one's theory of language on the concept of structure presupposes viewing language as a part-whole system. Let us stress that the notion of a part-whole structure of language may be far from trivial. Expressions are indeed strings of words and as such they consist of substrings (thus John loves Mary consists of John loves and Mary, or of John and loves Mary, or of John and loves and Mary), but this trivial part-whole structuring is not what linguistics is about. Besides it there is another, nontrivial part-whole structure which can be imposed on the class of expressions of
6758&785$/ /,1*8,67,&6 $1' )250$/ 6(0$17,&6
language and which stems from centuries of investigations by grammarians. According to this notion John loves Mary consists of John and to love Mary, or of John, to love and Mary, where loves is considered to be only a kind of "form" (or a "manifestation") of to love. Let us further notice that to speak about a structure is necessary only there where two different wholes may consist of the same parts. Indeed, structure then is what makes the difference. Otherwise there is no reason for not considering all wholes as having the same structure. We saw that the sentences John loves Mary and Mary loves John can be considered as consisting of the same parts. But these two sentences are different, and hence there must be something which makes them so; and it is this something that is addressed as their structure. The part-whole view of language implies the perceiving of expressions as building-blocks, as constituents of more complex expressions, the ultimate wholes being sentences. (Sentences themselves can thus be viewed both as complete wholes and as blocks used to build more complex wholes.) Any block is suitable for some ways of building some wholes, and not suitable for other ways and other wholes; and the situation may arise in which the usability of two blocks coincides. This is the case when using one of the blocks instead of the other leads always to the result which we consider equivalent to the original one. (If we build houses and equate all houses of the same shape, i.e., differing only in colour, then we thereby equate also all bricks differing only in colour.) This is to say that considering some wholes equivalent engenders our also taking some blocks to have equal values. Hence every equivalence on the class of expressions of language induces an assignment of values to expressions. The concept of equivalence, or, in de Saussure's term, identity, is thus interdependent with the concept of value. This is de Saussure's (1931, p.110) claim that "the notion of identity blends with that of a value and vice versa." Now, roughly speaking, the main claim of de Saussure's is that all the abstract entities associated with expressions can be considered as values and hence as certain "spin-offs" (using the term as used by Quine) of certain equivalences (or oppositions, which are complements of equivalences). 3 Chomsky, Montague and Formal Semantics Chomsky's path-breaking theory occasioned the reconstruction of language as a formal algebraic structure. Chomsky proposed to account for a language via a set
-$526/$9 3(5(*5,1
of formal generative rules, the recursive application of which to a given initial symbol generates all and only syntactically well-formed sentences of the language. The notion of natural language as a bundle of rules is clearly nothing new. In fact, the very idea of grammar is based on this view: to write a grammar of a given language means to articulate rules accounting for well-formedness of that language. Chomsky's novum was that he proposed organizing the rules into a hierarchical system allowing for systematical generation, and basing all this upon setting up of the grammar as a real mathematical structure6. Such a mathematization entailed an exceptional increase of rigour and perspicuity and, moreover, it led to the development of a metatheory, investigating into the formal properties of grammars (e.g. their relative strengths). Chomsky's approach proved to be extremely fruitful in the realm of syntax, and linguists immediately tried to extend it to semantics. They attempted to generate meanings in the same way as Chomsky's theory generated surface structures. However, these attempts, be they presented as semantic markers of Katz and Postal (1964), or as generative semantics due to Lakoff (1971), in general failed to be satisfactory. The reason for this failure was diagnosed by Lewis (1972): it was the failure to account for truth conditions, which is a conditio sine qua non of semantics7. Montague, Lewis and others thefore offered a new way to account formally for semantics based on the results of formal logic. The basic idea was to treat meanings as set-theoretical objects on which expressions are mapped. The first approximation, going back to Gottlob Frege, was to reify the two truth values and to consider the meaning of a sentence to be directly its truth value. However, this approach had the unpleasant consequence that any and every pair of sentences that are either both true, or both false, are synonymous; which proves such an approach to be essentially untenable. The lesson to be learned seemed to be that the meaning of the sentence does not amount to its truth value, but rather to its truth conditions. This obstacle was resolved by introducing the concept of possible world into semantics and this is where Montague enters the scene. (However, it is fair to stress that possible-world semantics was not discovered by Montague; he was neither the first one to use possible worlds as a tool of logical theory - the first to use them systematically were Stig Kanger and Saul Kripke - nor the only one to employ possible-worlds-based logic in an effort to formulate a systematic semantics of natural language; concurrently other theoreticians presented similar theories - at least Tichý's (1971) transparent intensional logic is surely worth mentioning. But Montague is the one who has become the legend.)8 Possible worlds were considered as the entities to which truth is relative; hence to say that the meaning of sentence was its truth conditions became to say that it was a certain function assigning truth values to possible worlds. This turned truth
6758&785$/ /,1*8,67,&6 $1' )250$/ 6(0$17,&6
conditions into entities accommodable within the framework of set theory. The step from truth values to truth values relativized to possible worlds (and in general from extensions to intensions) was a good one, but not good enough. It soon became clear that even to consider every pair of sentences being true in the same possible worlds as synonymous is inadequate. Every truth of mathematics is true in every possible world; but it is surely inadequate to consider all truths of mathematics as synonymous. The solution accepted by the majority of semanticians was to consider meaning of sentence as something structured. According to an old proposal of Carnap (1957), two expressions were taken as really synonymous if they not only shared intensions, but were intensionally isomorphic, i.e. if they consisted of the same number of constituents and if their respective constituents shared intensions; and this idea, revived by Lewis, has served to ground the "hyperintensional" semantics that became prevalent in the eighties. Lewis has proposed to consider meaning as a Chomskian tree whose leaves are occupied by intensions. His proposal has been further elaborated especially by Cresswell (1985). Other proposals to the effect of considering meaning as a structure, were articulated within the framework of situation semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983) and within that of discourse representation theory due to Kamp (1981)9. Tichý (1988) has reached the conclusion that the intension of a complex expression is constructed from the intensions of its components and has proposed to consider not the result of the construction, but rather the construction itself as meaning. The shift from functions to structures hailed a rapproachement between the theories of logically-minded semanticists operating within set theory and those of the more traditionally-minded ones using formalisms more loosely. If we free ourselves from the 'ideologies' of individual schools, we can see that the gap between Kamp's discourse representation structure or Tichý's construction, on the one side, and Chomsky's deep structure or the tectogrammatical representation of Sgall et al. (1986), on the other, need not be crucial10. 4 Language as an Algebra Now what we are claiming is that formal linguistics does not in general bring insights essentially incompatible with the structuralist paradigm; rather, it carries out the "mathematization" of language thereby creating a framework in which the Saussurian point can appear quite intelligible.
-$526/$9 3(5(*5,1
We have stated that de Saussure's approach presupposes the view of language as a part-whole structure, i.e. as a class of items (expressions) some of them consisting of others. Thus we are viewing language as a class of expressions plus a collection of operations which enable more complex expressions to be made out of simpler ones. So, for example, the class of expressions contains the expressions John, to love, Mary and John loves Mary; and among the operations there is one that makes John loves Mary out of John, to love, Mary. Now in order to state this in mathematical terms, let us present a tiny fragment of algebra. We shall restrict ourselves to three definitions, and we are not going to press for exactness; the aim of the whole enterprise is merely to illustrate the role which mathematics can play within a theory of language.
Definition 1. An algebra is an ordered pair A=
, where C is a set, called the carrier of A; and F=j∈J is a family of functions, called the operations of A, each of which maps the Cartesian power of C on C (i.e. each of which is an n-ary function on C). Definition 2. Let A=j∈J> and A'=j∈J> be algebras with the same number of operations. Let G be a function from the carrier of A to that of A'. We shall say that G is a homomorphism from A to A' if G(Fj(x1,...,xn)) = Fj'(G(x1),...,G(xn)) for every x1,...,xn from the domain of Fj and for every j∈J. Definition 3. Let A=j∈J> be an algebra and E an equivalence (i.e. a transitive, symmetric and reflexive binary relation) on the carrier of C. Let us call a subclass of C an E-subclass if each its two elements are equivalent according to E. Let us call an E-subclass of C maximal if it is not included in another E-subclass of C. Let C' be the class of all maximal E-subclasses of C; and for every j∈J let Fj' be the function on C' such that Fj'(y1,...,yn)=y if and only if there exist elements x1,...,xn,x of C such that x1∈y1, ... ,xn∈yn, x∈y and Fj(x1,...,xn)=x. The algebra j∈J> is called the factor-algebra of A according to E and it is denoted by A/E.
Using Definition 1 we can restate our previous consideration more mathematically. The consideration effectively views language as an algebra: the carrier of the algebra contains the expressions John, to love, Mary and John loves Mary; and among the operations of the algebra there is a ternary one, say Fk, such that Fk(John, to love, Mary) = John loves Mary. Chomsky's contribution was not to abolish this view, but rather to
6758&785$/ /,1*8,67,&6 $1' )250$/ 6(0$17,&6
explicate it and to articulate the rules of the algebra of syntax in the rigorous mathematical way. The contribution of the semanticians can then be seen in articulating the semantic aspect of language into another, semantic algebra connected with the first one by the function of meaning assignment. The point is that if Chomsky's theory can be seen as the reconstruction of language as the class of lexical items plus the class of grammatical rules constructing more complex expressions out of simpler ones, then Montague's contribution can be seen in mapping lexical items on certain basic set-theoretical objects and in paralleling the syntactic rules operating on expressions by rules operating on their set-theoretical meanings. Every expression E is thus supposed to be furnished with a set-theoretical meaning ÂEÂ; the simple expressions being assigned their meanings directly, the complex ones via semantic rules. If we - for the sake of simplicity - temporally shelve possible worlds, then we can say that ÂJohn and ÂMary are supposed to be elements of a basic set understood as the universe of discourse, Âto love is considered as a function assigning truth values to pairs of elements of the universe (the sentence holds true for some pairs and is false for other ones), and ÂJohn loves Mary as a truth value (true or false)11. The meanings of simple expressions such as John, to love, and Mary are supposed to be given in a direct way, whereas those of complex ones like John loves Mary are considered to be "computable" out of meanings of its parts. Thus, the value ÂJohn loves Mary is considered to be computable out of ÂJohnÂ, Âto love and ÂMaryÂ; namely as Âto loveÂ(ÂJohnÂ,ÂMaryÂ). In general, the meaning of a complex expression is a function of meanings of its parts. This approach thus sanctions the so called principle of compositionality, which has been considered basic for the theory of meaning since Frege. The set-theoretical meanings of lexical items plus the rules to compute the meanings of complex expressions out of their parts thus yield an algebra with the same number of operations as the algebra of expressions. Meaning assignment then comes out as a mapping M of the algebra of expressions on the algebra of meanings such that to every operation F of the algebra of expressions there corresponds an operation F' of the algebra of meanings such that for every e1,...,en from the domain of F it holds that M(F(e1,...,en))=F'(M(e1),...,M(en))). Hence, referring to the Definition 2, we can say that the meaning assignment is a homomorphism from the algebra of expressions to the algebra of meanings.
-$526/$9 3(5(*5,1
5 Saussure Mathematized With the help of this framework, we find that many points previously difficult to articulate, become surprisingly simple. An example is the way we have just expressed the principle of compositionality: this principle, which has been constantly subject to misunderstandings, now becomes the simple and unequivocal claim of the homomorphic character of meaning- assignment. Everybody who is familiar with the basics of algebra easily understands; a misunderstanding is hardly possible12. We have stressed that de Saussure's claim is that the meaning of an expression is its value resulting from oppositions present in the system of language. We have stressed also that the value is a reification of the way the expression functions as a building-block for building wholes suitable for various purposes, notably true sentences. Translated into our algebraic framework, the algebra of semantics owes its being to certain oppositions present within the system of language, notably to the opposition between truth and falsity, or, which is the same, the equivalence of sameness of truth value. Algebraic theory allows us to clarify how an algebra plus an equivalence between elements of its carrier yields a new algebra: our Definition 3 articulates this in explicating the term factor algebra; it amounts to the "coalescing" of the equivalent elements of the original algebra and to the corresponding adjustment of its operations. This suggests the idea of considering the algebra of meanings as the factor algebra of the algebra of expressions factored according to the equivalence of sameness of truth value. The obvious objection to embracing this conclusion is that it leads to identifying meanings with classes of expressions, which seems to be highly implausible. However, saying that the algebra of meanings can be considered as an algebra of classes of expressions is not to say that meaning be a class of expressions - the point of the structural view is that meaning is not this or that kind of thing, that what there is to meaning is rather only the structure of the algebra of meaning. This is to say, in algebraic terms, that the algebra of meanings is definite only up to isomorphism; the factor algebra of the algebra of expressions must be seen as a mere representative of the whole class of isomorphic algebras, each of which can be considered to represent the algebra of meaning, and none of which can be directly identified with it. In fact, formal semantics can be seen as placing additional, pragmatic requirements on the algebra which is to be considered as the algebra of meanings; it endeavours to select that of the isomorphic algebras which would be the easiest to work with. In particular, it is usual to require that the operations of the algebra of semantics be as simple as possible. Frege proposed that the meaning of a
6758&785$/ /,1*8,67,&6 $1' )250$/ 6(0$17,&6
sentence should be considered as the result of application of the meaning of its predicate to those of its terms. This idea was subsequently generalized to yield the general requirement that the operators of the algebra of meaning should be operators taking as one of its arguments a function and yielding what this function yields when it is applied to the remaining arguments. This means that if F is an nary operator of the algebra of expressions, then there exists an i such that for every n-tuple e1,...,en of expressions from the domain of F it holds that ÂF(e1,...,en)Â=ÂeiÂ(Âe1Â,...,Âei-1Â,Âei+1Â,...,ÂenÂ). The relation of an algebra supplemented by an equivalence to the corresponding factor algebra is thus the prototype of the relationship between the system of language expressions and a system of values which the expressions acquire with respect to some opposition or equivalence. Although the algebraic model, if taken literally, might lead to an oversimplified view of language, it evidently dramatically improves the intelligibility and comprehensibility of the Saussurian point of the value-like character of meanings and other linguistic abstracta. And, this is, in general, the true role of mathematics within a theory of language: it is neither to improve language, nor to give its precise and exhaustive description, but rather to facilitate comprehensibility and intelligibility of language via confronting it with models13. 6 Structuralism Rejoined? De Saussure's structuralistic insights invited generalization: the idea of structuralism is far more sweeping than to restrict itself to linguistic reality. The French structuralists took one direction of generalization: they snesed that natural sciences were threatening to swallow up humanities and they have ended up with philosophy as a kind of literary genre (viz Derrida). But there were other people more fascinated by, than fearful of, the sciences and they instead merged their own structuralist insight with the rigorous scientific thinking. Analytic philosophers, from Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein to Quine and Davidson, were, of course, not influenced directly by de Saussure, but their teachings seem to be in certain aspects more congenial to the spirit of Cours de linguistique générale than the teaching of those who are usually considered as de Saussure's direct followers. And it was analytic philosophy whose advancement is inseparably interlocked with the advancement of formal semantics.
-$526/$9 3(5(*5,1
I do not want to claim that analytic philosophy and formal semantics are necessarily intrinsically structuralist. The views of many analytic philosophers, and of even more formal semanticians, amount to a kind of nomenclatural view of language, which is the direct opposite of structuralism. Many analytic philosophers did not manage to resist the temptation to embrace a form of naive scientism and ended up with a kind of systematic metaphysics (now approached via language and done with the help of mathematics and set theory) which the structuralist insight vanquishes. But a significant number of these thinkers, people such as Wittgenstein, Quine or Davidson, avoided such traps and their approach can be truly called structuralistic. Quine's (1992) recent conclusions about the concept of structure are even more radical than those of his predecessors: instead of urging the reduction of abstract objects to relations, he questions the very idea of an object: "The very notion of object, or of one and many, is indeed as parochially human as the parts of speech; to ask what reality is really like, however, apart from human categories, is self-stultifying. It is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles and meters." (p.9) Hence aphoristically: "Save the structure and you save all." (p.8) The views close to Quine's and especially relevant for what we have been pursuing here are due to Donald Davidson - it is him who has made it clear that formal semantics need not be understood as a naively-metaphysical, nomenclatural matter and who has shown the plausibility of the theory of meaning as derivative to the theory of truth. And it is these views which we try to show to be congenial to the basic insights of de Saussure14. We have stated that the ways of analytic philosophy and structuralism essentially parted. However, their recent offspring - post-analytic philosophy and poststructuralism - are no longer antagonistic and indeed are sometimes surprisingly close. I think that the inseparability of the question about the nature of reality from the question about the nature of the language we use to cope with the reality, as urged in the above quotation by Quine, is in fact the same problem as that which irritates people like Foucault and Derrida. And I think, on the other hand, that the "careful mathematization of language" which is urged by Derrida (1972) is nothing else than the non-nomenclatural, non-metaphysically founded usage of formal logic as pursued by Quine and Davidson15.
6758&785$/ /,1*8,67,&6 $1' )250$/ 6(0$17,&6
7 Conclusion De Saussure's structuralistic view of language is quite compatible with the formal trend of linguistics appearing during the recent decades. In fact formalization and mathematization help to make the structuralist point intelligible. Many theoreticians believe that formal semantics and analytic philosophy is connected with a nomenclatural view of language and hence is incompatible with the structural insight. But this is wrong - formal semantics is in itself neutral, and it is capable of being explicated both in the naive nomenclatural way and in the way congenial to de Saussure's structuralism; and among analytic philosophers we can find outstanding representatives not only of the former, but also of the latter view.
NOTES 1
There are philosophers who evaluate even more harshly the way in which French structuralists handled the heritage of de Saussure. Thus Pavel (1989, p. vii) characterizes their efforts as follows: "They mistook the results of a specialized science for a collection of speculative generalities. They believed that breathtaking metaphysical pronouncements could be inferred from simple-minded descriptive statements." 2
Hjelmslev (1943, p.11).
3
Jakobson (1971, pp. 223-4).
4
See Holenstein (1987, p. 25).
5
For a more detailed expositions of the issues presented in this section see Peregrin (1994b).
6
Chomsky himself, of course, would consider his approach not a mere improvement of methodology, but as an empirical discovery concerning human's innate inner workings; we leave this conviction of his aside, because it is peculiar to his own line of thought and it is not essential to the formalistic turn as such. 7
Lewis claimed that linguistic theories of meaning are mere translations of natural language into another, formal language, namely 'markerese'. However, I think that this caveat, as it stands, is misguided: every explicit semantic theory is clearly a translation of natural language into another language, be it 'markerese', the language of set theory, or whatever. The only way to do explicit semantics is to make statements 's' means m, where m is an expression of a language. 8
For general information about the concept of possible world see Partee (1989); for
-$526/$9 3(5(*5,1
conceptual analysis see Peregrin (1993a). 9
Kamp's framework aims, besides this, at capturing what can be called dynamics of language, especially its anaphoric capacities; and it slowly becomes a paradigm of the semantic theory for the nineties. 10
This point was made quite clear by Davidson (1984, p.30): "Philosophers of a logical bent have tended to start where the theory was and work out towards the complications of natural language. Contemporary linguists, with an aim that cannot easily be seen to be different, start with the ordinary and work toward a general theory. If either party is successful, there must be a meeting." 11
Taking the intensional aspect of language at face value, we have to relativize all of this to possible worlds: the denotations of ÂJohn and ÂMary (if we do not treat them as rigid, i.e. possible-worlds-independent, designators) will be functions from possible worlds to the universe, Âto love a function from possible worlds to pairs of elements of the universe, and ÂJohn loves Mary will be a function from possible worlds to truth values: in some worlds (situations, time-spans etc. the sentence holds true, in other worlds it does not. 12
The objection that such an explication is simple only due to the backlog of the complicated theory of algebra, is not sound - algebra is nothing ad hoc, it is a well established theory whose meaningfullness is independent of whether we do or do not use it within a theory of language. 13
See Peregrin (1993b).
14
For Davidson's way of understanding semantic theory see Davidson (1984); see also Peregrin (1994a). 15
The recent philosophical development of Richard Rorty documents that these two seemingly disparate approaches to philosophy could lead to a unified stance.
REFERENCES Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1983): Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts). Carnap, R. (1928): Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin. Carnap, R. (1957): Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Chomsky, N. (1957): Syntactic Structures, Mouton, The Hague. Cresswell, M. (1985): Structured Meanings, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts). Davidson, D. (1984): Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Derrida, J. (1972): Sémiologie and Grammatologie, Entretien Avec Julia Kristeva; in: Positions, Minuit, Paris. Hjelmslev, L. (1943): Omkring sprogteoriens grundlaeggelse, Coppenhagen. Holenstein, E. (1987): Jakobson's Philosophical Background, in: Language, Poetry and Poetics (ed. by K.Pomorska), de Gruyter, Berlin. Jakobson, R. (1971): Selected Writings II, Mouton, The Hague. Janssen, T.M.V. (1983): Foundations and Applications of Montague Grammar, dissertation, Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam.
6758&785$/ /,1*8,67,&6 $1' )250$/ 6(0$17,&6
Kamp, H. (1981): A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation, Truth, Interpretation and Information (ed. by J.Groenendijk, M.Stokhof and T.M.V.Janssen), Foris, Dordrecht, pp. 1-41. Katz, J. and Postal, P. (1964): An Integrated Theory of Linguistics Descriptions, MIT Press, Cambridge (Masachusetts). Kripke, S. (1963): Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16, pp. 83-94. Lakoff, G. (1971): On Generative Semantics, Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology (ed. by D.D.Steinberg and L.A.Jakobovits), Cambridge. Lewis, D. (1972): General Semantics, Semantics of Natural Language (ed. by D.Davidson and G.Harman), Reidel, Dordrecht. Montague, R. (1974): Formal Philosophy: selected papers of R.Montague (ed. by R.Thomason), Yale University Press, Yale. Partee, B. (1989): Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65 (ed. by S.Allen), de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 93-123. Pavel, T.G. (1989): The Feud of Language, Blackwell, Cambridge (Massachusetts). Peregrin, J. (1993a): Possible Worlds: A Critical Analysis, Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics 59-60, 9-21. Peregrin, J. (1993b): Language and Formalization, Linguistica Pragensia 2/1993, 74-80. Peregrin, J. (1994a): Interpreting Formal Logic, Erkenntnis 40, 1994, 5-20. Peregrin, J. (1994b): Structuralism: Slogan or Concept, Lingua e Stile (to appear). Quine, W.V. (1992): Structure and Nature, The Journal of Philosophy 89, 5-9. Russell, B. (1924): Logical Atomism, in: Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, First Serise, London. Saussure, F. de (1931): Cours de linguistique generale, Payot, Paris. Sgall, P., Hajicová, E., Panevová, J. (1986): The Meaning of the Sentence in its Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects, Academia, Praha. Tichý, P. (1971): An Approach to Intensional Analysis, Nous 5, pp. 273-297. Tichý, P. (1988): The Foundations of Frege's Logic, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York.
TOPIC, FOCUS AND THE LOGIC OF LANGUAGE 1
Jaroslav Peregrin
[appeared in Sprachtheoretische Grundlagen für die Computerlinguistik (Proceedings of the Göttingen Focus Workshop, 17. DGfS, IBM Deuschland, Heidelberg, 1995]
1 Topic as the "point of departure" of an utterance The terms topic and focus are used by many theoreticians, but they often mean different things. In the most usual informal sense, topic is what an utterance is about (as contrasted to comment), and focus is what is emphasized in the utterance (as contrasted to background). Let us consider how this intuition can be sharpened. Let us start with the notion of topic, of "that which an utterance (or a sentence) is about". Consider the sentence John loves Mary. What is it about? Clearly we can say that it is (says something) about John. However, it is hard to deny that it is - also - about Mary. And we can equally well say that it is about John loving Mary, or about John's love for Mary. "What a sentence is about" is thus an extremely vague notion; and to use it unregimented to define the concept of topic is hardly meaningful. However, we can consider another, narrower sense of "being about" - a prototypical utterance of English (or indeed any other language) can be seen as consisting in picking out an item and saying something about it; thus the sentence John walks, in a "neutral" context and with a "neutral" articulation, picks out the person John and states that this person walks. In this sense, the sentence is about John, and not about, say, John's walking. Hence, in this sense, aboutness has to do with the subject-predicate structure; a sentence is "normally" taken to be about its subject. However, it is important to realize that the subject-predicate structuring which is relevant from this semantic - or "informatoric" - viewpoint does not necessarily coincide with the syntactic structuring - what functions as a subject from the semantic viewpoint need not be identical with the syntactic subject. When one says John walks (answering the question What does John do?), he is addressing John and claiming that he is walking; whereas when he says JOHN walks (answering, e.g., the question Who walks?), he is rather addressing walking and is claiming that this activity is carried out by John. We can imagine that the separation of the syntactic from the semantic subject-predicate structure may represent a certain step in the genesis of language; a step by which language has gained another degree of flexibility - but this is of course nothing more than speculation. 1
The paper has been essentially improved thanks to the helpful criticism of Petr Sgall and Barbara Partee.
1
However, if we want to claim meaningfully that semantic subject and syntactic subject need not be one and the same thing, we must be more exact about what a semantic subject is (syntactic subject seems to be defined clearly enough). We have said that semantic subject is that part of the utterance which the utterance is about; but to take this as the desired definition would be begging the question, for we have explicated the concept of aboutness (in the narrower sense) by means of the concept of the semantic subject. To prevent this circle from being vicious we must find a way of defining semantic subject independently of aboutness. A distinctive feature of the semantic subject is displayed by the fact that the failure of an utterance, seen as a communicative act, has different consequences when concerning the subject than when concerning the predicate. The former case of failure means the failure to point out something common to the speaker and the hearer, some shared basis which would anchor the following core of the utterance within the framework of knowledge and awareness shared by the speaker and the hearer; and by consequence generally making the whole utterance not quite intelligible. Thus this kind of failure leads to the utterance being either unintelligible or at least infelicitous. On the other hand, a later failure concerning that part of the utterance which aims at claiming something about the subject results in the utterance being simply false. If I say (as in the well-known example used by Strawson) The exhibition was visited by the king in the context where there is no exhibition to be referred to, my audience will simply fail to grasp what I am talking about and is likely to see my utterance as inappropriate; whereas if there is an exhibition which is understood to be referred to and if there is no king to visit it, the utterance is simply false. Thus what we have called semantic subject is actually a basis, an information-anchoring point of departure for an utterance; whereas that which we have called semantic predicate is the information-conveying core of the utterance. Indeed it is precisely these two concepts - the point of departure and the core of an utterance - which were established as the basic means of analyzing a sentence by Mathesius (see esp. 1939) and his colleagues of the Prague Linguistics Circle (whose precursors were in France and Germany). In the more recent literature (see esp. Sgall et al., 1986), it has been proposed to identify this pair of concepts with the concepts of topic and focus; we have now indicated which considerations can substantiate such an identification in the case of topic.
2 ... and focus as its "core" Having presented some evidence that topic, as the term is usually used today, is comparable to what the fathers of the Prague Linguistic School called the point of departure of an utterance, we would now like to indicate that it is the Prague core of the utterance that can serve as a
2
plausible generalization of the notion of focus. To be sure, focus is often conceived today as something occurring only within some utterances, and which becomes especially relevant in combination with focalizers (i.e. particles like only, even, also etc.). Focus is an emphasized part of the utterance commonly distinguished by way of intonation and stress; it is, as Krifka (ms.) put it, the "intonationally highlighted" part of the utterance. However, the notion stemming from the Prague tradition is different: focus, taken as the core of the utterance, is not some accidental surplus of certain utterances, but an essential constituent of every meaningful and "pointful" utterance; and intonational highlighting can be seen as a mere way of marking focus in cases where the topic-focus articulation cannot be read off the syntax (or sometimes possibly as a means also of marking a strengthened exhaustiveness or contrastiveness claim of the utterance). The plausibility of such a view grows if we do not restrict our attention to English but consider also languages with relatively free word-order like Czech. Such languages allow for organizing the utterance according to the 'functional sentence perspective' - going from the topic, the point of departure, to the focus, the core of the utterance. The topic picks up an entity (in a very broad sense) familiar to the participants of the communicative act (thus presupposing its existence, or, more precisely, its referential availability) and thereby anchors the utterance within the informational pool shared by the communicants (thereby making the utterance intelligible). Focus then says something about the entity thus specified by the topic (usually without presupposing anything) and develops a new theme (extending the common pool). It might seem that topic (what the utterance is about) is something to a large extent independent from focus (conceived as that which the utterance stresses). However, the view advocated here is based on the conviction that all utterances have a "logic" which prevents these two things from being totally independent. The point of an utterance is to get from something known and agreed to something new and informative, and it is the new information that is primarily stressed; so that the topic and the focus emerge as two aspects of a single articulational pattern. This is to say that any "intonational highlighting", characteristic of the focus, makes eo ipso that which is highlighted into that which is the "point" of the utterance, and hence into that which is the core of the utterance.
3 Three perspectives The intuitions discussed so far allow for various forms of explication of the topic-focus articulation; these in turn lend themselves to various kinds of formal articulation. Let us present at least three "metaphors". The three viewpoints lead to three ways of formalization; but these are not intended to represent three different ways of topic-focus structuring - they are simply
3
three ways of presentation of a single ("triune") pattern. (1) Topic is a subject (picking up a piece of information "as an object", thereby triggering an existential presupposition) and focus is a predicate (presenting some further specification of the object). (2) Topic and focus are arguments of an implicit generalized quantifier, or they are - in terms of Partee (1991) - the restrictor and the nuclear scope of a "tripartite structure". In certain cases, the implicit topic-focus-binding quantifier can be overridden by an explicit focalizer, such as always or only, but also by negation (cf. Haji_ová, 1984; 1994). (3) Topic and focus are two phases of an information-conveying act (and they can be pictured as two segments of a dynamically viewed proposition). Topic corresponds to the phase where the information gets anchored to the existing "informational structures", and focus to that where the genuine new information is being added. Therefore, the failure of the act during the topic-phase (i.e. the falsity of presupposition) means the failure of the whole act (which may precipitate a - possibly temporary - breakdown of communication), whereas that during the focus-phase (i.e. the falsity of assertion) engenders the failure to add new information.
4 General Questions of Formalization The three perspectives outlined in the preceding section lead to three different ways in which we can develop a logical formalism to account for the topic and focus. (1) The elaboration of the idea of topic and focus being semantic subject and semantic predicate, respectively, calls for a formalization allowing for the notion of presupposition, i.e. for one based on partial or three-valued logic. (To say that A is a presupposition of B is to say that if B is not true, A cannot be but truth-valueless, which makes a nontrivial sense only if we allow for a nontrivial truth-valuelessness.) The basic subject-predicate nexus has to be analyzed in such a way that subject, in contrast to predicate, triggers a kind of existential presupposition. The subject-predicate pattern of the formal language we use to analyze its natural counterpart thus loses its role as a reflection of the overt, syntactic structure and is intended instead to reflect the topic-focus articulation. This means that we analyze an utterance consisting of the topic T and focus F as a subject-predicate statement F(T) which has a truth value only if any presupposition associated with T is true. The sentence John walks (with the "neutral" intonation) may be thus analyzed as walk{John} (the curly braces indicating non-classical, "presuppositional" predication) with the presupposition ∃x.x=John; whereas the sentence JOHN walks as SS-RKQ ^ZDON` presupposing something like ∃x.walk(x). Moreover, the fact that the focus is usually in a sense exhaustive (JOHN walks is usually understood as not only claiming that walking is carried out by John, but also as indicating that John is the only, or at least the
4
most significant, walker) can be accounted for by a further modification of the apparatus of predication yielding the formula SS-RKQ ^ZDON` - where P!{T}, roughly speaking, presupposes the existence of T, claims that P applies to T and that there is no alternative P' to P that would apply to T. For details see Peregrin (1994 and 1995). (2) From the second viewpoint we see an utterance as essentially consisting of three parts (not all of which have to be overt). Each utterance is seen to consist of a topic (which may be void), a focus, and an operator binding them together (which may be implicit). In the prototypical case the operator can be seen as nothing more than a "higher-level" realization of predication, so that PRED(John,walk) yields walks!{John} and PRED(walk,John) gives SS-RKQ ^ZDON`. (For details see Peregrin, 1994). The operator PRED is in fact nothing else than Jacobs' (1984) operator ASSERT; the place of this operator can be assumed by overt focalizers such as ONLY, but also by negation. (3) If we stick to a dynamic view of language, as articulated by various dynamic semantic theories, we have to see an utterance as something that alters the context, or the information state, in which it is produced. The utterance uses the input information state and works towards an articulation of a message yielding a new, output information state. (This perspective has been suitably formalized by Groenendijk and Stokhof's, 1989a and 1989b, dynamic logic; see also Peregrin & von Heusinger, 1995). Topic and focus now present themselves as two different phases in this process; thus, an utterance consisting of a topic T and a focus F has to be analyzed as T }&! F, where }&! is a new kind of concatenation operator signalling the switch between two modes of evaluation (see Peregrin, 1995). In contrast to the Groenendijko-Stokhofian logic, it is vital here that the logic needed to accommodate such a proposal can distinguish between two kinds of failure of an utterance: between falsity and infelicity: the formula A }&! B is then (1) true w.r.t. an input evaluation f iff there exists an HYDOXDWLRQI VXFKWKDWII !$DQGDQHYDOXDWLRQJVXFKWKDWI J!%LWLV false w.r.t. f iff WKHUH H[LVWV D I VXFK WKDW II !$ EXW WKHUH H[LVWV QR I
VXFK WKDW I I
!% DQG LW LV infelicitousZUWILIIWKHUHH[LVWVQRI VXFKWKDWII !$`
5 A Case Study: Bill Meets the Dallas Clan To illustrate the foreceding of this, let us take the sentence (1) borrowed from Krifka (1991). John only introduced Bill to Sue
(1)
This sentence, devoid of topic-focus articulation, can be schematized as (1') (for simplicity's sake we remain on the level of extensions)
5
(1')
introduce(J,B,S)
Notice that the same sentence (still without any topic-focus articulation) could be equivalently analyzed in many other ways; for (1) is equivalent to many other formulas, and the particular one we employ is a purely technical matter. Thus, instead of (1) we could alternatively use any of, say, (1'a) through (1'c) (where x is a variable ranging over individuals, p a variable ranging over properties of individuals, r a variable ranging over binary relations among individuals, and q a variable ranging over properties of binary relations among individuals): xintroduce(J,x,S)(B) p.p(B)(x.introduce(J,x,S)) q.q(xy.introduce(x,B\ ^UUJ,S)}
(1'a) (1'b) (1'c)
All these formulas are provably equivalent (by lambda-conversion) to (1'), and so they furnish the very same semantic analysis of (1'). Now let us take (1) with Bill stressed, i.e. (2) John introduced BILL to Sue
(2)
Speaking informally, this sentence expresses the claim that the person introduced by John to Sue is Bill, hence it is about the property analyzable as x.introduce(J,x,S) and it claims that this property is instantiated by Bill (and moreover that Bill is in some sense the only significant - in the simplest case the unique - instantiant of the property). To account for this intuition, we cannot simply take (1'b) (for this would in effect be to license no semantic difference between (1) and (2)); we have to make use of the modified predication p.p(B)!{x.introduce(J,x,S)}
(2')
(2'), in contrast to (1'), has a truth value only if there is someone whom we introduced to Sue, and it is true only if Bill is - in the present context - the only "relevant" person we introduced to her. In fact, (2) is compatible also with another topic-focus articulation, with not only Bill, but introduced Bill constituting the focus, which yields the following analysis: q.q(xy.introduce(x,B,y)){r.r(J,S)}
(2'')
6
An alternative way to express (2') and (2'') would be PRED(x.introduce(J,x,S),{B}) PRED(r.r(J,S),{xy.introduce(x,B,y)})
(2'a) (2''a)
These analyses amount to comparing two classes and claiming that the latter exhausts the "significant" part of the former; in case of (2'a) the two classes are the class of persons introduced by John to Sue and the class consisting of Bill, in case of (2''a) the class of all that John does to Sue and the class consisting of introducing Bill. (That these new analyses are equivalent to the old ones is ensured because PRED is defined so that PRED(A,{B}) = SS% ^$` This perspective is plausible if we consider vocalizers, as in the sentence (3) John only introduced BILL to Sue
(3)
In this case we may assume the focalizer to simply assume the place of the implicit general quantifier PRED; the two resulting analyses are ONLY(x.introduce(J,x,S),{B}) ONLY(r.r(J,S),{xy.introduce(x,B,y)})
(3') (3'')
claiming now that the two compared classes coincide. This perspective can be also used to account for what Krifka (ms.) calls "second occurrence focus", like in (4), which can be analyzed as (4') or (4''): John also only introduced Bill to Pamela ALSO(y.ONLY(x.introduce(J,x,y),{B}),{P}) ALSO(y.ONLY(r.r(J,y),{xy.introduce(x,B,y)}),{P})
(4) (4') (4'')
Back to (2) - another way to analyze it, by means of a suitably modified version of dynamic logic, would lead to the analyses introduce(J,d,S) }!& d=B r(J,S ` U [\introduce(x,B,y)
(2'a) (2''a)
7
6 Conclusion In this paper we have tried to bring forward some arguments for the following theses: 1. Topic and focus are two aspects of a single articulational pattern which is basic for every sentence. 2. It is just this pattern that was pointed out by the linguists of the Prague School under such names as the 'topical structuring' ('aktuální _len_ní') or 'functional sentence perspective'. 3. This pattern is relevant semantically, namely in that it triggers an existential presupposition connected with the topic, and that it gives the focus a certain claim of exhaustivity of the significant. 4. The pattern can be viewed from three different perspectives which lead to formalizations in the spirit of three different formal semantic theories (predicate logic, theory of generalized quantifiers, dynamic logic).
References. Groenendijk, J., M.Stokhof. 1989a. "Dynamic Predicate Logic". ITLI Prepublication Series LP89-02, University of Amsterdam. Printed in Linguistics and Philosophy 14.39-101. 1991. -. 1989b. "Dynamic Montague Grammar, a first sketch". ITLI Prepublication Series X-89-04. University of Amsterdam. Haji_ová, E. 1984. "On Presupposition and Allegation". Sgall 1984. 99-122. -. 1994. "Topic, Focus and Negation." Focus & Natural Language Processing (ed. P.Bosch & R.van der Sandt), IBM Deutschland, Heidelberg. Jacobs, J. 1984. "Funktionale Satzperspektive und Illokutionssemantik". Linguistische Berichte 91.25-28. Krifka, M. 1991. "A Compositional Semantics for Multiple Focus Constructions". Proceedings of SALT I. Cornell Working Papers 11. -. Ms.: Focus and/or Context: A Second Look at Second Occurence Expressions. To appear. Mathesius, V. 1939: "O takzvaném aktuálním _len_ní v_tném". Slovo a Slovesnost 5.171-174. Translated as "On Information-bearing Structure of the Sentence". Harvard Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed. by S.Kuno. Harvard: Harvard University 1975.467-480. Partee, B. 1991. "Topic, Focus and Quantification". Proceedings of SALT I. Cornell Working Papers 10. -. 1994. "Focus, Quantification, and Semantic-Pragmatic Issues." Focus & Natural Language Processing (ed. P.Bosch & R.van der Sandt), IBM Deutschland, Heidelberg.
8
Peregrin, J. 1994. "Topic-focus articulation as Generalized Quantification." Focus & Natural Language Processing (ed. P.Bosch & R.van der Sandt), IBM Deutschland, Heidelberg. -. 1995. "Topic and Focus in a formal Framework". To appear in Discourse and Meaning (ed. by B.Partee & P.Sgall). Peregrin, J. and von Heusinger, K. 1995. "Dynamic Semantics with Choice Functions". In: U. Egli & K. von Heusinger (eds.). Choice Functions in Natural Language Semantics, Konstanz: Universität Konstanz, 43-67. Sgall, P. ed. 1984. Contributions to Functional Syntax, Semantics and Language Comprehension. Amsterdam: Bejnamins - Praha: Academia. Sgall, P., E. Haji_ová & J.Panevová. 1986. The Meaning of the Sentence in its Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects. Praha: Academia.
9
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK Jaroslav Peregrin1 [from B.H. Partee and P. Sgall (eds.): Discourse and Meaning: Papers in Honor of Eva HajiþRYi%HQMDPLQV$PVWHUGDP]
1. Introduction The concepts of topic and focus have first begun to figure in linguistics in the middle of the nineteenth century. They have been recognized as interesting and they have received the casual attention of linguists of various proveniences, but they have never moved to the centre of interest. One of the linguistic schools in which the problems of topic and focus have not been considered marginal was the school of Prague structuralists. It was especially Mathesius (1929; 1939) who pointed out the import of this range of problems. Firbas (1957; 1971) then continued the study of the phenomena under the heading of 'functional sentence perspective'; Daneš (1974) studied intonation and word order as a means of articulation of topic-focus structuring. The elaboration of the problem of topic-focus articulation within a formal framework of linguistic description has been carried out by Sgall and his collaborators (especially Sgall et al., 1973, and Sgall et al., 1986). Besides Czech linguists there have also been also various other scholars who have displayed interest in this kind of phenomena (e.g. Kuno, 1972, Dahl, 1974); but the mainstream of the Chomskian movement, which has dominated the linguistic world since the sixties, has left them almost unnoticed. Now the situation seems to be changing: results such as those of Rochemont (1986), von Stechow (1989), Jacobs (1991), Krifka (1991), Partee (1991) or Rooth (1992) indicate that topic-focus articulation (hereafter TFA) is being increasingly recognized as a real challenge. From this viewpoint the results of the long tradition of Czech linguistics might hold a renewed interest. To facilitate discussion about the various approaches to TFA and to related phenomena it may be worthwhile to summarize the possibilities of formal accommodation of TFA as developed in Prague. This is the aim of the present paper - not to offer
236
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
ready-made solutions, but rather to overview the problems and possible leads towards solving them.
2. Basic Concepts of the Prague Approach The framework of the Prague research group of formal linguistics has been presented in detail by Sgall et al. (1986). Let us summarize the main points. The aim of the summarization is to facilitate the understanding of the main concepts independently of the particular framework in terms of which they might be articulated - hence the framework is to some extent oversimplified. 1. The framework, designed to capture grammar, is primarily based on dependency, not on constituency. The meaning of a sentence is considered in the form of a tree, called tectogrammatical representation, which contains no non-terminals and captures the dependential structuring. The items that are considered to depend on the main verb are classified according to their thematic roles (which are, however, more closely related to grammar than the Θ-roles common in American linguistics). 2. Each of the elements of the tectogrammatical structure (corresponding to autosemantic lexical elements of the sentence being represented) is either contextually bound or contextually nonbound. A prototypical example of a contextually bound item is one corresponding to an expression which appears also within the immediately preceding part of the discourse. However, contextually bound elements are not only those which are explicitly used before, they are also elements which are in an indirect way implied by the context, where context means not only verbal co-text, but also the situation of the discourse, including the common cultural background shared by the speaker and the hearer. 3. The default order of items depending on a verb (i.e. the order of thematic roles and adverbials) is considered to be fixed for a given language; it is called the systemic ordering. However, this order together with the order of other items not depending directly on the main verb is modified in a concrete utterance, so that the resulting order of the items of the tectogrammatical structure is that of the communicative dynamism (CD). The CD order of contextually bound items dependent on the same head is determined by the speaker's discourse strategy rather than by grammar; on the other hand, the CD of the unbound items dependent on the same head is in accordance with the systemic ordering. An item is less dynamic than its head iff the
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
237
dependent item is bound. 4. The least dynamic element of the sentence constitutes the topic proper. 5. All the contextually bound items depending on the main verb together with all that depends on them and together with the main verb if this is contextually bound, constitute the topic of the sentence; the rest of the sentence constitutes the focus. Hence the topic/focus classification is exhaustive: every element of the sentence belongs either to the topic or to the focus.
3. Formal means There have been several attempts to account for the Prague notion of TFA in formal frameworks. One group of such attempts has been carried out within the framework of an intensional logic, namely of Tichý's transparent intensional logic (see Tichý, 1980). The basic issues of such kind of formalization have been discussed by Materna and Sgall (1980) and Materna et al. (1987); Vlk (1988) has outlined a procedure for the translation of surface forms into the logical representation. The attempts gave rise to an account of TFA in which the topic is taken roughly to be the specification of a class and the focus is taken as giving a kind of exhaustive listing of the elements of that class. There has also been an attempt to account for TFA in a framework similar to DRT; this attempt is due to Peregrin and Sgall (1986). In this framework, each sentence is associated with a situation-like structure (the "content" of the sentence); the "meaning" of a sentence is then understood as the class of all the embeddings of its "content" into the model. A sentence articulated into a topic and a focus is considered as true if every embedding of the "content" of its topic is meaningfully extensible to an embedding of the "content" of the whole sentence. Meanwhile, other approaches to semantic analysis which appear to be worthwhile from the point of view of capturing TFA have appeared as well. There are three impulses which we consider to be particularly promissing in this context: Rooth's alternative semantics, Groenendijk's and Stokhof's dynamization of logic, and Partee's elaboration of the notion of a tripartite structure.
238
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
4. Topic = Subject & Focus = Predicate? The subject-predicate pattern has been considered as central to language since Antiquity. On the syntactic level this means that a typical sentence consists of a subject (nominal phrase) and a predicate (verbal phrase). On the semantic level it means that the content of a typical sentence can be considered as an assignment of a property to an object. In the typical case the syntactic (grammatical) subject coincides with the semantic (logical) subject, and the syntactic predicate with the semantic one. Most linguists have restricted their attention to the syntactic side of the pattern; philosophers and logicians, who are intrinsically interested in the semantic pattern, have, on the other hand, usually tacitly considered it to coincide with the syntactic one. However, the identification of the syntactic subject-predicate pattern with the semantic one is unwarranted; and those who have really understood the nature of language have avoided it. Thus Frege, who sees the semantic subject-predicate pattern as constitutive of the object-concept opposition, remarks, that it need not be the grammatical subject which acts as the semantic or logical one: "Die Sprache hat Mittel, bald diesen, bald jenen Teil des Gedankens als Subjekt erscheinen zu lassen." (Frege, 1892, p.74). TFA can be considered as just this kind of means. Let us consider a simple sentence (1) and its first-order formalization (1') John walks Walk(John)
(1) (1')
The syntactic subject-predicate pattern of (1) is unequivocal: John is the subject and walks is the predicate. Sgall et al. (1986) suggested that due to the impact of TFA the pattern comes to be modified: if we say (2), then what we express seems to be not the property of walking assigned to the individual John, but rather the property of being John assigned to an anonymous walker. JOHN walks
(2)
One might here evoke the idea that the power of TFA is reminiscent of lambda abstraction: what we do when focusing John resembles what we do when making a predicate, λf.f(John), out of John and then applying it to
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
239
Walks. Hence (2) might seem to be appropriately formalizable by (2'). λf.f(John)(Walks)
(2')
However, this idea, although based on a sound intuition, is not without its drawbacks. The point is that (2') lambda-converges to (1') and that it is hence equivalent to (1'). Thus if we consider a logical formula a mere means of presenting a proposition, then it makes no difference whether we analyze (1) as (1') or as (2'): in both cases we render (1) as expressing the same proposition. This might seem to lead to the conclusion that what has been considered as the articulation of the subject-predicate pattern brought about by TFA is not a semantically relevant matter; and this would mean that it is a matter relevant in no way, since it is surely not relevant syntactically. The syntactic patterning is left unchanged in (2). However, what really makes a sentence into a predication is the fact that one of its parts is "about" the other part. The (semantic) subject is what the sentence is about, predicate is what it says about the subject. What does this "about" mean? Well, it, first and foremost, means that the subject is taken for granted for the whole sentence, its existence is not being disputed. This is to say that the subject is connected with a presupposition. If I say about John that he walks, then the fact that there is no John (i.e. nobody known to the interlocutors under this name) makes the statement meaningless rather than false; in contrast to this, if there is a John, but he does not walk, then the statement is simply false. (Classical Russellian examples with the king of France are probably more perspicuous, but proper names are also subject to presuppositions). Let us write ÂXÂ for the extension of an expression 'X' (hence ÂXÂ will be a truth value if 'X' is a sentence, an individual if 'X' is a term, and a class of individuals if 'X' is an unary predicate)2. Let us with every expression X associate a proposition whose extension we denote by ·X· (to be understood as a presupposition associated with X) in the following way: ·X· = ÂXÂ if X is a sentence = Â∃y.y=XÂ if X is a term = Â∃y.X(y)Â if X is an unary predicate
240
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
Now we can define the semantics of a formula P{S} (to be understood as the "real" predication of P of S) as follows: ÂP{S}Â = T iff ·S·= T & ÂP(S)Â = T = F iff ·S·= T & ÂP(S)Â = F = 0 iff ·S·=F Appropriate formalizations of (1) and (2) now are (1'') and (2''), respectively. Walk{John} λf.f(John){Walk}
(1'') (2'')
If both (1'') and (2'') do have truth values, then these truth values coincide; however, it might be the case that (1'') is false, while (2'') lacks a truth value (in the case when ∃x.Walk(x) is false), as well as vice versa (in the case when ∃x(x=John) is false). Let us consider a complex sentence, (3). If we accept the subjectpredicate pattern articulated by means of {} as a standard pattern of a natural language sentence, then there seem to be the formalizations (3a)(3d), and possibly also the two degenerated cases (3e) and (3f). John loves Mary λy.love(y,Mary){John} λx.love(John,x){Mary} λf.f(Mary){λy.love(John,y)} λf.f(John){λx.love(x,Mary)} λf.f(love(John,Mary)){} {λf.f(love(John,Mary))}
(3) (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e) (3f)
From these, (3f) would seem to be ruled out by the fact that a sentence has to contain some nonpresupposed information; the 'thetic' reading (3e), however, would seem to be, possible3. And it is this 'thetic' reading, as well as the reading (3a) in which the semantic subject-predicate pattern coincides with the syntactic one, which may be considered the preferred reading of (3). (3c) is then the preferred reading of (3') and (3d) of (3''); but (3') may also be read as (3a). The reading of (3'') as (3b) might also ge feasible, although not quite regular.
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK John loves MARY JOHN loves Mary
241 (3') (3'')
5. Quantifier Scope In the case of (1), or of (3), the difference between various TFA's is the difference in presuppositions, and hence can be considered as a matter of felicity conditions rather than of truth conditions in the strict sense. Not so, however, if we take into account sentences with two quantifiers. Let us consider (4): if we adhere to the Montagovian treatment of quantified noun phrases, then the analogues of (3a)-(3d) would be (4a)-(4d). Every man loves a woman λM.M(λx.∃y.(woman(y)&love(x,y))){λQ.∀x.(man(x)→Q(x))} λM.M(λy.∀x.(man(x)→love(x,y))){λQ.∃y.(woman(y)&Q(y))} λQ.∃y.(woman(y)&Q(y)){λy.∀x.(man(x)→love(x,y))} λQ.∀x.(man(x)→Q(x)){λx.∃y.(woman(y)&love(x,y))}
(4) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d)
If we disregard felicity conditions, i.e if we replace {} by simple parentheses, then (4a) would reduce to (4a') and (4b) to (4b'), while (4c) in turn to (4c') and (4d) to (4d'). (4a') then further reduces to (4c') and (4b') to (4d'); but (4c') and (4d') are substantially different, hence different TFA's of (4) lead not only to different felicity conditions, but to quite different propositions. λQ.∃y.(woman(y)&Q(y))(λy.∀x.(man(x)→love(x,y))) λQ.∀x.(man(x)→Q(x))(λx.∃y.(woman(y)&love(x,y))) ∃y.(woman(y)&∀x.(man(x)→love(x,y))) ∀x.(man(x)→∃ ∃y.(woman(y)&love(x,y)))
(4a') (4b') (4c') (4d')
This implies that in this case TFA is not just a matter of felicity conditions, it is something that results in different orders (and hence different scopes) of quantifiers. Hence (4a) and (4b) (or (4c) and (4d)) can have different truth values; and they will have different values in the case when every man will have a loved woman of his own, but there will be no single woman that would be loved by every man.
242
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
6. Focus = Exhaustive Listing? Besides the subject-predicate character of the topic-focus pattern, there is another characteristic feature of the pattern, namely that focus in some sense has the character of exhaustive listing. If we utter (2), then what we say is not only that there is a man who walks, but also that the walking man is the only entity that walks. The only is, of course, not quite determinate: the range of entities with respect to which it is meant may be in various senses determined by the context. If we, following Rooth (1985) and Krifka (ms.), assume that for any expression X there is a class ALT(X) of its alternatives, then we can define the sentence P!(T) (to be understood as the "unique" predication of P of T) by the following prescription: ÂP!(S)Â=T iff ÂP(S)Â=T & ∀P'[P'∈ALT(P)&ÂP'(S)Â=T→ÂPÂ=ÂP'Â] However, it would seem to be more plausible to consider ALT as operating on the level of semantics rather than on that of syntax. If we write ÂXÂI for the extension of X under the interpretation I, and if I[P/p] denotes the interpretation which is like I with the only possible exception that it assigns p to P, then we can write4 ÂP!(S)ÂI=T iff ÂP(S)ÂI=T & ∀p.[p∈ALT(ÂPÂI)&ÂP(S)ÂI[P/p]=T→ÂPÂI=p] In this case ALT is a function mapping elements of the model structure on classes of such elements. It is reasonable to assume that if p is an element of a domain D, then ALT(p)⊆D. In the simplest case we may let ALT(p)=D, i.e. we may let the set of alternatives coincide with the whole domain. In such a case P!(S) says the same as λf.f(S)={P} or ιf.f(S)=P; i.e. it says that P is the only property instantiated by S. For nontrivial choices of ALT, P!(S) says that P is the only one of some restricted classes of properties that are instantiated by S. Let us now forget (for the sake of simplicity) about presuppositions and let us consider (3) from the point of view of exhaustiveness of focus. The four basic readings are
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK λy.love(Mary,y)!(John) λx.love(John,x)!(Mary) λf.f(Mary)!(λy.love(John,y)) λf.f(John)!(λx.love(x,Mary))
243 (3a') (3b') (3c') (3d')
Let us first turn our attention to (3c') and (3d'). (3c') says that the class of all Mary's properties is instantiated by the property of being loved by John, and that none of its alternative is; (3c') says that the class of all John's properties is instantiated by the property of loving Mary, and that none of its alternative is. As any property surely belongs to more than one class of properties, we clearly need a nontrivial notion of an alternative. However, it seems to be clear what should count as such an alternative: any class of all the properties of an individual. If we conceive alternatives in this way, then (3c') says that Mary is the only individual loved by John and (3d') says that John is the only individual that loves Mary. In the case of (3a') and (3b') the need of a nontrivial notion of an alternative is also quite evident (to love Mary is surely in no case the only property of John), but in this case no plausible notion seems to be at hand. The problem is that under the standard treatment of properties, any class including an individual (or any function from possible worlds to classes of individuals such that its value in the actual world includes the individual) is considered a property of the individual; so any individual is sure to instantiate a vast amount of properties. It seems that the trouble is grounded partly in the very nature of properties and partly in the way in which properties are approached within modern logic. (If we, contrary to the usual way, treated properties as primitives and individuals as classes of properties, then the problem might be with (3c') and (3d') rather than with (3a') and (3b').) Hence it seems to be in general more appropriate to consider ALT nontrivial, to add it as a new element of the model structure that can be changed by the ongoing utterances. From such a notion there leads a direct path to both the concept of stock of shared knowledge as discussed by Sgall et al. (1986), and, on the other hand, to the dynamic notion of semantics to be discussed below. 7. Falsity vs. Inappropriateness Combining {} and ! we come to the following definition
244
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
ÂP!{S}ÂI = T iff ·S·I = T & ÂP(S)ÂI=T & ∀p.[p∈ALT(ÂPÂI)&ÂP(S)ÂI[P/p]=T→ÂPÂI=p] = F iff ·S·I=T & (ÂP(S)ÂI=F ∨ ∃p.[p∈ALT(ÂPÂI)&ÂP(S)ÂI[P/p]=T&ÂPÂI≠d]) = 0 iff ·S·I=F This seems to be an adequate expression of the way in which a sentence can be considered as articulated out of the topic and focus: it takes into account both the predicative character of the articulation, and the exhaustive character of the focus. We may distinguish three cases of situations in which P!{S} comes to be false: 1. P!(S) is false, whereas P(S) is not. In this case we may speak about a failure of exhaustiveness. An example of a sentence which would not be true purely due to the failure of exhaustiveness is German is spoken in AUSTRIA. Disregarding TFA the sentence is surely true; however, with the indicated stress and the consequent TFA it is a sentence the utterance of which may cause a serious misguidance (suggesting that Austria is the country, or at least the most representative country in which German is spoken). 2. P{S} is not true, whereas P(S) is. This is the case of failure of presupposition. A case of presupposition failure is the sentence François MITTERAND is the present king of France. Disregarding TFA the sentence would not be true (notice, however, that in that case no presupposition would fail). With the indicated TFA (i.e. with the present king of France in the topic) it is not simply false, it makes the hearer wonder what the speaker is talking about. 3. P(S) is false. In this case we can speak simply about failure of the subject matter. Hence we have three levels of falsity (or, better put in a weaker way, of a breakdown in communication). The extreme, straightforward level is the failure of the subject matter; with respect to the other two levels it is dubious whether it is appropriate to speak about falsity at all. In the case of the falsity of presupposition, the sentence is usually regarded not as false, but rather as lacking a truth value. In the case of the failure of exhaustiveness the falsity is even more subtle.
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
245
8. Negation A positive sentence is usually considered as a means of asserting that its predicate holds about its subject; a negative sentence as that of asserting that this is not the case. If we use the classical predicate calculus, then a positive sentence is understood as P(S), whereas its negative as ¬P(S), as being true just in case P(S) is false. However, we have seen that the semantically relevant subject-predicate patterning of a sentence is a matter far from being this simple. We have seen that TFA makes it possible to make almost any part of a sentence into a semantic subject, and that it is this part which is usually connected with a presupposition. There is a corresponding reading of its negative counterpart for every reading of a positive sentence, hence in the case of (5), the negation of (3), we have the following possibilities5 John does not love Mary ¬ λy.love(y,Mary)!{John} ¬ λx.love(John,x)!{Mary} ¬ λf.f(Mary)!{λy.love(John,y)} ¬ λf.f(John)!{λx.love(x,Mary)} ¬ λf.f(love(John,Mary))!{}
(5) (5a) (5b) (5c) (5d) (5e)
However, these do not exhaust the readings of the negative sentence: there are, moreover, readings in which the negation is "internal", and which should thus be considered as cases of positive predication of a negative predicate. These additional readings are (5f) and (5g). λf.f(Mary)!{λy.¬love(John,y)} λf.f(John)!{λx.¬love(x,Mary)}
(5f) (5g)
Note that the presupposition of (5f) is that there is someone whom John does not love, and that of (5g) is that there is someone who does not love Mary; hence these two readings are really different from all the previous ones. If no stress is on John, then (5b), (5d) and (5g) are ruled out, and thus, leaving the thetic reading (5e) aside, we have three basic readings of (5), namely (5a), (5c) and (5f) (cf. Hajièová, 1984).
246
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
What is beyond discussion is that the negation of a reading of a sentence is true if the reading of the sentence is false due to the fallacy of the subject matter. The cases of the other two fallacies are open to discussion: it seems to be commonly accepted that in the case of presupposition failure the relevant sentence lacks a truth value; hence its negation also lacks a truth value. 9. Dynamic Semantics There is a background, an environment, of an utterance which is determined by the context of the utterance, especially by the utterances immediately preceding it. Any utterance changes this background. If we see the background as a kind of a stack (a stock of shared knowledge, as Sgall et al., 1986, put it), then we can say that an utterance may add new items and in so doing it may concurrently force the less salient items out of the stack. We may see these changes in the environment as a mere side-effect of discourse; it is, however, ever more clear that they should be rather seen as something quite essential. One way to account for this dynamic aspect of language has been formulated within the framework of the dynamic logic due to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1989a; 1989b). This theory identifies the phenomenon of the environment's influencing of individual utterances (and then itself being changed by them) with an assignment of values (discourse referents) to special kind of terms (discourse markers). This engenders an essential perspectival change upon the meaning of a sentence: the meaning is now no longer considered as a truth value or a class of possible worlds, but as a medium of changing environment, hence a function from states of the environment into states of the environment. In this way the semantic account of natural language more nearly approaches that proposed earlier for programming languages - natural language becomes to be envisaged as an implicit command language instead of as a declarative language. Each formula of the dynamic logic is associated with a set of ordered pairs of assignments (of objects to discourse markers); we shall denote the set of pairs of assignments associated by F as [F]. If ∈[F] for a formula F, then this means that the evaluation of F with g as the "input environment" succeeds, and yields g' as the "output environment". If ∈[man(a)] (where a is a discourse marker), then g is an assignment which does not associate a non-man with a (i.e. that g(a) either is a man or it is undefined), and g' is like g with the single possible difference that it
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
247
associates a man with a. ÂFÂ, the truth value of F, can be now considered as T if and only if [F] is nonempty. The rule for dynamic conjunction is as follows: ∈[F&G] iff there is an assignment h such that ∈[F] and ∈[G]. This means that & no longer plays the role of the usual classical connective within dynamic logic, but has become instead an operator of concatenation. The evaluation of a formula F changes the environment E of its evaluation to a new environment E'; the meaning of F is the way in which it changes the environment. If the evaluation of F changes E to E' and that of G changes E' to E'', then the evaluation of F&G changes E to E''. This indicates that F&G need not be the same as G&F: if e.g. F changes E1 to E2 and fails in E3 and if G changes E2 to E4 and E1 to E3, then F&G changes E1 to E3, while G&F fails in E1. This brings about a new kind of sensitivity which may be utilized for capturing the linear order of items in an utterance. However, and here is where TFA may enter the scene, it is not the surface word order that is really relevant, it is rather the "deep" one, the one corresponding to the scale of communicative dynamism (with topic being always less dynamic than focus). The dynamic framework seems to be well suited for the treatment of TFA; it seems that topic and focus can be treated as two ongoing utterances. If we interpret a sentence and fail during the evaluation of the topic, the sentence is meaningless or at least inappropriate; whereas when we succeed in evaluating the topic, but fail during the evaluation of focus, the sentence is simply false6. However, we have so far treated topic and focus as the subject and the predicate of a single sentence; to accommodate our treatment within the dynamic framework we would have to treat them as two sentences uttered subsequently. But this can in principle be done: it is enough to realize that to say that P(S) is true is to say that there exists an assignment of a value to x that satisfies P(x) & x=S. The two new modes of predication we have denoted by {} and !() can now be turned into two new modes of conjunction (or, better, concatenation): the idea is that F}&G (corresponding to G{F}) has a truth value iff F is true, and it is true iff F&G is; F&!G is true iff F&G is true and F&G' is true for no nontrivial alternative G' of G. However, the embodiment of these ideas into the dynamic framework is far from being trivial. The embodiment of }& meets the complication that dynamic logic is essentially two-valued. We may
248
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
introduce }& by the rule below; however, this rule does not establish a real semantics for }&, since it does not specify the value [F}&G] and hence is not applicable recursively. ÂF}&GÂ = T iff [F&G] ≠ ∅ = F iff [F] ≠ ∅ and [F&G] = ∅ = 0 iff [F] = ∅ Far deeper problems concern the embodiment of &!. If we articulate the above mentioned idea, we have ÂF&!GÂ = T iff ÂF&GÂ = T & ∀G'[G'∈ALT(G)&ÂF&G'Â=T→ÂGÂ=ÂG'Â] But if ÂGÂ is, as so far, the truth value of G, then ÂGÂ=ÂG'Â is a condition far too weak to be satisfactory. We may try to substitute [G] for ÂGÂ and so we can write ∈[F&!G] iff ∃k ∈[F&G] & ∀G'[G'∈ALT(G)&∈[F&G']→[G]=[G']] but neither is this what we need; since for any two sentences G, G' containing no discourse markers [G]=[G'] trivially. Moreover, as Krifka(ms.) duly points out, the notion of alternative should depend on the environment of evaluation, so that the rule should look somewhat as follows: ∈[F&!G] iff ∃k ∈[F] & ∈[G] & ∀G'∀h[G'∈ALTk(G)&∈[G]→"G≈G'"] Leaving technical problems aside, we can indicate the way in which (1) should be rendered in the dynamic framework by (1''), while (2) would be rendered by (2''). (a=John) }&! walk(a) walk(a) }&! (a=John)
(1'') (2'')
The first formula is to be true if there is someone who is John, if he walks, and if everyone who is John walks. Hence it is to be true just when walk!(John) is true. The second formula is to be true if there is someone
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
249
who walks, if it is John, and if everyone who walks is John; this means that it is to be true just when λf.f(John)!(walk) is true.
10. The Tripartite Structure Partee (1991) has stressed the role of the notion of a tripartite structure as a universal pattern usable also for the analysis of TFA. A sentence of the shape Det NP VP can be considered as a tripartite structure consisting of an operator (determiner), a restrictor (noun phrase) and a nuclear scope (verb phrase). Such a sentence is true (w.r.t. a possible world) if the extension of the restrictor and that of the nuclear scope are in a relation determined by the operator. Partee claims that the tripartite pattern is of greater generality than simply to cover the case of the basic grammatical structure of simple sentences; and she claims that the pattern is also useful for the analysis of the sentence considered not as a grammatical structure, but rather as a structure consisting of a topic and a focus. This is in accordance with what has been claimed above: that topic and focus are "in fact" subject and predicate. Moreover, what has been stated with respect to the exhaustive listing character of the focus means that the determiner that is to be implicitly present is of the kind of only7. The concept of a tripartite structure is closely connected with the theory of generalized quantifiers. If both the restrictor and the nuclear scope can be considered to stand for a class, then the determiner can be considered as a relation between sets or as a function assigning a set of sets to a set. The determiner a can be, for example, considered as a function that to every set s assigns the class S of sets such that s'∈S holds just in case s and s' are not disjoint; A man walks is then true if this relation holds between the extension of man and that of walks. However, the picture that a sentence of the structure Det NP VP is true iff the extension of its NP and that of its VP stand in the relation determined by its Det is plausible provided that we disregard TFA. Let us consider the sentence A MAN walks. Its grammatical structure leads to its analysis as the generalized quantifier a applied to man and walk, which renders the sentence true iff the set of men is not disjoint with the set of walkers. However, the TF-tripartite structure of the sentence leads rather to
250
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
its analysis as an implicit determiner only applied to walks and a man, rendering the sentence true iff the set of walkers is included in a set consisting of a single man. But to treat the combination of topic and focus as a tripartite structure based on the implicit generalized quantifier only we would have to interpret a man as a set, which seems to be implausible. The general picture is that the operator of the "grammatical" tripartite structure somehow moves into the restrictor of the "topic-focus" tripartite structure making place for only. The problem is that while originally we have a determiner (e.g. a) of the type (in an extensionalized Montagovian notation) <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t> applied to two predicates (e.g. man and walk) of the type <e,t>, then we have the determiner only applied to a quantifier of the type <<e,t>,t> (a man) and a predicate (walk); and no plausible type-theoretical treatment seems to be at hand. We would need a man to be of the type <e,t>; but this would mean that we would have to consider a as of the type <<e,t>,<e,t>>. One way to substantiate considering a man as an expression of the type <e,t> is to consider it as having "distributed reference", referring to a class of individuals, not, however, to one definite class, but rather to any element of a class of classes of individuals, namely to any one-element class of men. Such a view engenders a substantial change to the whole semantic framework: expressions come to be considered as having alternative references and a sentence is considered true if there exists at least one reference that renders it true. However, this change in the framework is not totally alien to the spirit of contemporary semantics: it is in fact quite close to the basic idea of DRT. If we consider man as capable of referring to any class of men, then a can be considered as a filter retaining some of these interpretations (the one-element ones) for a man and filtering out the others. That this treatment is universally available for every monotone increasing quantifier follows from the following consideration. If we denote the standard interpretation of Det, a function mapping sets on classes of sets, as ÂDetÂ, then the truth value of the sentence will be ÂDetÂ(ÂNPÂ)(ÂVPÂ). ÂeveryÂ(X) will be {Y |X⊆Y} for every set X; ÂaÂ(X) will be {Y|X∩Y≠∅} for every set X. The quantifier ÂDetÂ(X) is supposed to "live on" X for every Det and S; this means that Y∈ÂDetÂ(X) if and only if Y∩X∈ÂDetÂ(X)8. If we denote the class {Y|∃Z.(Z∈ÂDetÂ(X) & Y=X∩Z)} as ÂDetÂ*(X), then clearly Y∈ÂDetÂ(X) iff Y∩X = ÂDetÂ*(X), i.e. iff ∃Z.(Z∈ ÂDetÂ*(X) & Z=Y∩X). Moreover, if ÂDetÂ(X) is monotone increasing,
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
251
then Y∈ÂDetÂ(X) iff ∃Z.(Z∈ÂDetÂ*(X) & Z⊆Y∩X); hence, as Z∈ÂDetÂ*(X) implies Z⊆X, iff ∃Z.(Z∈ÂDetÂ*(X) & Z⊆Y)9. Let us consider the sentence Every man walks. Let us consider Âman the class of all men and Âwalk the class of all walkers. ÂeveryÂ(X) is the class of all supersets of X; hence ÂeveryÂ*(X) = {Y|∃Z.(Z∈ÂeveryÂ(X) & Y=X∩Z)} = {Y|Y=X} = {X}. This means that the sentence is true iff there is an X∈ÂeveryÂ*(ÂmanÂ) such that X is included in ÂwalkÂ. Hence, as the only member of ÂeveryÂ*(ÂmanÂ) is ÂmanÂ, i.e. the set of all men, the sentence is true if and only if the set of all men is included in the set of all walkers. Similarly for A man walks: ÂaÂ(X) is the class of all the sets not disjoint with X; hence ÂaÂ*(X) = {Y|∃Z.(Z∈ÂaÂ(X) & Y=X∩Z)} = {Y|Y⊆X & Y≠∅}. Thus, the sentence is true iff there is an X∈ÂaÂ*(ÂmanÂ) such that X is included in the set of all walkers; hence, iff there is a nonempty subset of the set of all men that is also a subset of the set of all of walkers. These ideas have been in a somewhat more cumbersome way outlined by Peregrin and Sgall (1986) and also by Peregrin (1987). It has been shown that they can be useful for the purpose of accounting for TFA in a dynamic framework based on the DRT-like ideas (although DRT did not serve as its explicit foundation). Here we can see that they can illuminate the interplay between the "grammatical" tripartite pattern and that which results from TFA considerations.
11. Conclusion The aim of the present paper has not been to develop a definite formal theory of TFA, its aim was rather to overview the different possibilities of the formal description of topic and focus holding the Prague notion of TFA particularly in regard. From the logico-semantic point of view there are three aspects of TFA which are relevant. First, differences in TFA mean differences in the "deep word order" which may result in differences in the scopes of quantifiers. Second, topic is usually connected with a presupposition; hence different TFA's may lead to different felicity conditions (to different classes of possible worlds in which the sentence has a truth value). Third, at least
252
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
under some conditions, TFA purports the exhaustive listing readings with respect to focus, it causes a sentence to behave ina way as if it contained an overt only. We have seen that some of these aspects can be accommodated as fairly straightforward extensions of the predicate calculus; but we have also indicated that dynamic logic might be a more suitable framework. We have, moreover, shown that picturing the TF-articulated sentence as a tripartite structure is fruitful, and we have floated the possibility of merging this view with that of dynamic semantics.
Notes 1
2 3
4
5 6
7 8 9
The author thanks Petr Sgall, Eva Hajièová, Barbara Partee and Mannfred Krifka for their willingness to share their views of the matters addressed here with him. Moreover, the exposition of the Praguian approach to topic-focus articulation presented here would hardly be adequate without the thorough help of Petr Sgall. For the sake of simplicity we shall work with extensions where possible. However, the relativization to possible worlds is obvious. The possibility of the thetic reading of (3) may be disputable due to the proper name in the subject position; in the case of a sentence such as A man loves a woman it would be quite regular. Note that the formal difference between the "syntactic" variant of ALT and the "semantic" one is parallel to the difference between substitutional and objectual quantification. If there are no "nameless" entities, then these notions give the same results. As was found with the thetic reading (3e) itself, its negation (5e) is also not quite regular. This is indeed a simplification: the situation is more complicated due to the existence of presuppositions triggered by (parts of) the focus, e.g. by the object clauses of factive verbs. The situation can be, indeed, more complicated when explicit focalizers other than only are involved. See Barwise and Cooper(1981). ÂDetÂ*(S) is in fact the set of all the sets which Barwise and Cooper(1981) call witness sets for ÂDetÂ(S).
TOPIC AND FOCUS IN A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
253
References Barwise, J., R. Cooper. 1981. "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language". Linguistics and Philosophy 4.159-219. Dahl, O. 1974. Topic and Comment, Contextual Boundness and Focus, Hamburg: Buske. Daneš, F. 1974. "Functional Sentence Perspective and the Organization of Text". Papers on Functional Sentence Perspective ed. F.Daneš, 106-128. Praha: Academia. Frege, G. 1892. "Über Begriff und Gegenstand". Vierteljahrschrift für wissentschaftliche Philosophie 16.192-205. Firbas, J. 1957. "Some Thoughts on the Function of Word-Order in Old English and Modern English". Sborník prací filosofické fakulty brnìnské university A 5.72-100. -. 1971: "On the Concept of Communicative Dynamism in the Theory of Functional Sentence Perspective". Brno Studies in English 7.12-47. Groenendijk, J., M.Stokhof. 1989a. "Dynamic Predicate Logic". ITLI Prepublication Series LP-89-02, University of Amsterdam. Printed in Linguistics and Philosophy 14.39-101. 1991. -. 1989b. "Dynamic Montague Grammar, a fisrt sketch". ITLI Prepublication Series X-89-04. University of Amsterdam. Hajicová, E. 1984. "On Presupposition and Allegation". Sgall 1984. 99-122. Jakobs, J. 1991. "Focus Ambiguities". Journal of Semantics 8.1-6. Krifka, M. 1991. "A Compositional Semantics for Multiple Focus Constructions". Proceedings of SALT I. Cornell Working Papers 11. Krifka, M. ms.: Focus, Quantification and Dynamic Interpretation. To appear. Kuno, S. 1972. "Functional Sentence Perspective". Linguistic Inquiry 3.269-320. Mathesius, B. 1929. "Zur Satzperspektive im modernen Englisch". Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen 155.202210. -. 1939: "O takzvaném aktuálním clenení vetném". Slovo a Slovesnost 5.171174. Translated as "On Information-bearing Structure of the Sentence". Harvard Studies in Syntax and Semantics ed. by S.Kuno. Harvard: Harvard University 1975.467-480.
254
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN
Materna, P., P.Sgall. 1980. "Functional Sentence perspective, the Question Test, and Intensional Semantics". SMIL 1-2.141-160. Materna, P., E. Hajièová & P. Sgall. 1987. "Redundant Answers and TopicFocus Articulation". Linguistics and Philosophy 10.101-113. Partee, B. 1991. "Topic, Focus and Quantification". Proceedings of SALT I. Cornell Working Papers 10. Peregrin, J., P. Sgall. 1986. "An Attempt at a Framework for Semantic Interpretation of Natural Language". Theoretical Linguisitcs 13.37-73. Peregrin, J. 1987. "Quantification and Reference in Natural Language." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetorics (Bialystok) VI.159-185. Rochemont, M.S. 1986. Focus in Generative Grammar. Benjamins: Amsterdam. Rooth, M. 1985. Association with Focus. Ph.D.-dissertation. University of Massachusets: Amherst. Rooth, M. 1992. "A Theory of Focus Interpretation." Natural Language Semantics 1.75-116. von Stechow, A. 1989. Focusing and Backgrounding Operators. Universität Konstanz. Sgall, P., E. Hajicová & E. Benešová. 1973. Topic, Focus and Generative Semantics. Kronberg: Taunus. Sgall, P. ed. 1984. Contributions to Functional Syntax, Semantics and Language Comprehension. Amsterdam: Bejnamins - Praha: Academia. Sgall, P., E. Hajicová & J.Panevová. 1986. The Meaning of the Sentence in its Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects. Praha: Academia. Tichý, P. 1980. "Logic of Temporal Discourse". Linguistics and Philosophy 3.345-369. Vlk, T. 1988. "Towards a Transduction of Underlying Structures into Intensional Logic". Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics 50.35-70.
STRUCTURE AND MEANING Jaroslav Peregrin [Semiotica 113-1/2 (1997); roughly original pagination]
Two Approaches to Language It seems that the theories of language of the present century can be classified into two basic groups. The approaches of the first group perceive language as a mathematical structure and understand any theory of language as a kind of application of mathematics or logic. Their ideological background is furnished by logical positivism and analytical philosophy (esp. by Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein and their followers); and their practical output is Chomskian formal syntax and subsequent formal semantics. The approaches of the other group do not approve of formalization and consider a theory of language closer to psychology than to mathematics. The specific position within this group is occupied by the so-called structuralists (de Saussure, Hjelmslev, Derrida). However, this kind of classification is rather superficial; there is another classification that is really significant, and this classification cuts across standard philosophical schools. What makes the really fundamental difference is the way one views the link of an expression to its meaning. From this vantage point we can distinguish between approaches we shall 1 call semiotic and those we are going to call structural. The approaches we classify as semiotic rest on the assumption that the significance or meaning of an expression does not depend on whether the expression is a part of language or of some other system of signs. Thus, a semiotic approach is characterized by considering language a means of codification of a pre-existing, language-independent world. The scholars who subscribe to this approach see the world as a definite system of objects; and they see expressions as labels which we must stick on these objects if we want to talk about them. This is a naive picture (Quine justly calls it the museum myth); nevertheless a picture that underlies (explicitly or implicitly) many theories of language of the present century. The basic principle of the structural approach to language, on the other hand, consists in the conviction that any significance, or any meaning of an 71
expression comes to it from its being part of the system of language. In contrast to the semiotic notion, this notion of language is based on the reluctance to see language as a kind of nomenclature. The meaning of an expression is, according to it, not a language-independent object casually linked to the expression, rather it is the value of the expression, its position within the system of language or within the language game to be played. However, let us stress that the distinction between the semiotic and the structural view of language is far from coinciding with the distinction between logical positivism and structuralism, or indeed between any two philosophical schools. De Saussure, the father of structuralism, and Wittgenstein, the great dissenter of logical positivism, are personalities representing the structural approach to language most consistently and consequentially (and it is quite surprising how close the opinions of these 2 two otherwise so different scholars in this point are ). The majority of other scholars, including both the avowed followers of de Saussure and those of Wittgenstein, on the other hand, have not succeeded in maintaining this view quite so systematically and consequentially. The aim of the present paper is not only to survey the claims of what we have characterized as the structural approach to language; we would also like to document that such an approach is, contrary to common opinion, that of the most outstanding representatives of analytical philosophy. The main purpose of the paper then is to show how meanings can be considered to materialize out of the oppositions of the system of language.
The Untenability of the Semiotic View Let us begin with neutral, commonly acceptable facts. Language expressions are subject to two kinds of relations: the 'horizontal' relations, relating them to other expressions, and the 'vertical' relations, linking them to their meanings. The terms horizontal and vertical amount to the schematic picture (due, in effect, to de Saussure) of Figure 1. The horizontal and vertical relations are clearly mutually interdependent, and the majority of philosophers would probably agree that they rise and fall, so to say, hand in hand. The main difference
(35(66,21
(35(66,21
(35(66,21
0($1,1*
0($1,1*
0($1,1*
Figure 1: Horizontal and vertical relations 72
between the semiotic and structural approaches to language is the matter of which kind of these relations is granted primacy. The semiotic view is based on the assumption that it is the vertical relations which are primary. (Let us stress that it is just this primacy that makes incompatible the semiotic with the structural view - that expressions are signs in the sense that they simply are significant - that they 'have meanings' - is a truism that would hardly cause a quarrel.) One of the clearest articulations of the semiotic approach was given by Charles Morris: 'The properties of being a sign, a designatum, an interpreter, or an interpretant are relational properties which things take on by participating in the functional process of semiosis. Semiotics, then, is not concerned with the study of a particular kind of object, but with ordinary objects in so far (and only in so far) as they participate in semiosis.' (Morris 1966: 4) If language has any structure, then it owes it to the fact that its expressions are signs (ibid: 17). The structural view, on the other hand, grants primacy to the horizontal relations; it does not grant meanings any existence independent of the system of language. De Saussure pointed out that language cannot be considered as a nomenclature of real-world objects (de Saussure 1931: 65). Whatever it is that is signified, the signification relation arises from the interdependence of expressions within the system of language. It is thus the horizontal relations between expressions which are primary; and the vertical relations associating expressions with their meanings are derivative. De Saussure writes: '...the language has neither ideas, nor sounds, that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system.' (de Saussure 1931: 65). There is little doubt that it is the semiotic view that accords with common sense; moreover, it seems that this view is also (consciously or unconsciously) adopted by many scholars. However, it is hard to imagine that the view could be correct. De Saussure and some of the other structuralists criticised it explicitely; however, and this is often not noticed, very strong arguments against it are offered also by the results of the work of some of the most outstanding analytical philosophers. In fact, since the inception of analytical philosophy by Frege the semiotic view of language has had to suffer one blow after another. Frege (1892) recognized that if we identify the meaning of an expression with the real-world object which it is felt the expression normally stands for (the meaning of the expression Morning star with the planet Venus, for example), then we shall not be always able to recover the meaning of a complex expression from the meanings of its parts. Frege and Wittgenstein also realized that the 73
elements of language that are primarily significant are not words, but 3 rather sentences, and that the discernment of the meanings of parts of a 4 sentence is 'parasitic upon its structure' . Quine (1960) documented that if there were a relation of reference connecting expressions with objects of the world, then there would not be a possibility of determining it; and Davidson (1977) used this result to show that in such a case the whole concept of reference lacks sense. All these results suggest that it is not possible to hold the semiotic view consistently.
Meaning vs. Synonymy Semantics is by definition the matter of the vertical relations linking expressions to their extralinguistic meanings. However, there are also horizontal relations, relations between expressions, which are semantic in nature. These relations amount to similarity and dissimilarity of meaning, their most clear-cut representative being the relation of synonymy. Within the semiotic approach such relations are considered to be mere auxiliaries: saying that two expressions are synonymous is considered to be a mere shortcut for saying that they are linked to the same object. Not so within the structural view. It is sameness-of-meaning and difference-in-meaning that are primary according to this view; meanings are mere reifications of these relations. In the same way as we posit colours by saying that two objects perceived as in a certain sense similar 'share a colour', we posit meanings by saying that two expressions understood as in a certain sense similar 'share a meaning'. Thus, the existence of meaning is considered as grounded in certain equivalences of expressions. However, what is synonymy, if it is not the linkage to the same object? The answer, crucial for the structural approach, is that it is the sameness of position within the system of language, or the sameness of 'usability' within the language game to be played. It is the language itself and the way we use it that is primary; meanings (as well as other linguistic abstracta) are only our means of representing these primary facts, of 'making sense' of them. Wittgenstein (1953: §654): 'Unser Fehler ist dort nach einer Erklärung zu suchen, wo wir die Tatsachen als "Urphänomene" sehen sollten. D.h. wo wir sagen sollten: dieses Sprachspiel wird gespielt.' And further (ibid: §656): 'Sieh auf das Sprachspiel als das Primäre! Und auf die Gefühle, etc. als auf eine Betrachtungsweise, eine Deutung, des Sprachspiels!' When we use language for the purpose of communication, we come to 74
perceive any expression as a tool more or less suitable for our purposes; we come to see it as possessing a certain value. (The task of an expression may - in a particular case - be seen as representing an object, as being a name; in such a case its value may possibly be identified with the object. But this would be quite a special case.) Expressions which are usable to the same effect have equal values, they are equivalent; and synonymy is primarily just this kind of equivalence. It is illuminating to consider the similarities between language and a game such as chess (and it is characteristic that both de Saussure and Wittgenstein, not to speak of Frege, Husserl, Jakobson and others, made use of this comparison quite frequently). What turns a piece of wood into a chess knight, what makes it meaningful within the chess game, is not primarily some link to a material entity ('knighthood'), but rather the rules according to which it is treated. If there is a 'knighthood', then it owes its being to the rules of the chess game. Similarly, what makes an expression meaningful within the system of language is not its link to a pre-existing meaning, but rather the rules of language; and meanings owe their existence to these rules. The semiotic view is based on the assumption that what is primary are the vertical relations, and that the horizontal relations of synonymy or of likeness and difference in meaning are mere auxiliaries which help us speak about those that are vertical. However, the structural approach recognizes that this is not an assumption adequate to the real functioning of language: what is ultimately primary ('Urphänomene') are the similarities and differences between the usability of expressions, and the concept of meaning is our hypostatic means which facilitates speaking about these similarities and differences and making efficient theories from them. The Indeterminacy of Meaning One of the basic characteristics of the structural approach, as contrasted with the semiotic one, is the fact that it leads to the notion of meaning that is in a sense indeterminate or relativistic. If it is the process of semiosis that establishes the link between an expression and its meaning, then there is no room for any kind of indeterminacy: there must be a determinate, pre-existing object that becomes meaning through semiosis. If it is, on the other hand, the position of the expression within the system of language hat establishes its semantics, then any entity the expression may be seen to stand for can be determined only differentially, as opposed to the entities other expressions stand for. 75
Let us imagine that speaker S1 uses the name 'N' for an object A, while his fellow speaker S2 misuses the same name for another object B. How can they find out that they use the name in different ways? If A and B can be unequivocally pointed at, then there is, of course, no problem; but this is usually not the case. However, even if there is no direct pointing at, the resolution seems to be quite simple. S1 can say: 'You call B "N", but "N" is in fact the name of A!' This possibility is nevertheless limited to the case when both speakers are in possession not only of the name 'N', but also of the names 'A' and 'B'. What about the case when they have no alternative names? In such a case S1 cannot, of course, say 'What you call "N" is not N!'; because for S2 what he calls 'N' surely is N. However, if there is something that is true for A, but not for B, then S1 can make use of this fact. If, e.g., A is green, whereas B is blue, then S1 can put forward the statement 'N is green'; S2 will disagree, and S1 and S2 then have to conclude that they use 'N' in different ways (presupposing that neither of them is colour-blind). Thus S2's misuse of 'N' may be discovered as soon as the speakers encounter a sentence containing 'N' and such that it would be true in case 'N' were A and false in case 'N' were B. If there is no such sentence (and if A and B cannot be distinguished by direct ostension), S1 can never find out that S2 is talking about another object. This is the case of Quine's (1960) illustrious example of a rabbit and its undetached part. Another prominent example is that of the meaning of numerals: all of Peano arithmetic does not allow us to distinguish whether a number is the set of equipotent sets (as Frege, in effect, maintained), or the set of all the numbers smaller than itself (as von Neumann proposed), or a primitive object. This means that if A differs from B in a property expressible in the language in question, the confusion of their names can be discovered. On the other hand, if no such difference exists, then there is no possibility of recognizing the confusion, and it is thus altogether problematic to speak about a confusion. To say that 'N' is used to name two different objects makes sense only with the background of a language which has two different names for the two objects. If we can distinguish the two objects by means of what can be said about them, then the different names can possibly be formed as definite descriptions, otherwise not. This is Quine's inscrutability of reference. This precisely is the contrast between the the structural and the semiotic views. If we accepted the semiotic view, then we could not see any problem in determining whether 'N' refers to A or B even if A and B had precisely the same properties; 'N' would simply unequivocally refer to that object which took part in the relevant process of semiosis. Not so within 76
the structural approach: we may differentiate horizontal links only in terms of vertical ones, and where there is no difference on the horizontal level, there cannot be a difference on the vertical one. Any difference between meanings of two expressions must be based on a difference between the functioning of the expressions within language. However, it would be essentially wrong to interpret this structural indeterminacy as implying that we cannot know what the meanings of our expressions are. The right interpretation is rather that meanings are not definite in the sense presupposed by the semiotic view. There is little doubt that natural numbers do exist; at least to the extent to which objects which cannot be touched and tasted can exist. And we consider them unique existing objects although we know that for all we care they can be identified with objects of various kinds. A number is not one of the things it can be reduced to, it is rather what all of these things have in common, it 5 is a number . And what can be said about numbers, can, more generally, be said about meanings: the meaning of an expression is not one or another definite thing conforming to our usage of the expressions within language; at most it may be said to be what all such things have in common. As de Saussure puts it: 'Language is a form and not a substance' (de Saussure 1931: 122). What is basically relevant for meaning is the structure of language.
Structure and Parts & Wholes Structure is the way in which a whole is composed out of its parts; therefore there is no structure (and also no structuralism) where there are no parts and wholes. This indicates that the notion of structure is meaningful only within the context of a part-whole system. Let us, therefore, survey several important facts concerning part-whole relations and part-whole systems. To make the summarization rigorous, we shall need some mathematics, but to make it comprehensible, we shall not go into any mathematical details. A part-whole system can be considered as a set U of items plus a set of certain 'operators' each of which maps an n-tuple of items of U (parts) on an item of U (whole). Hence a part-whole system can be considered as the ordered pair ∈I>where U is a set and each Oi is a (in general n partial) function from the Cartesian power U into U; in other words a part-whole system is a certain (partial) algebra. If e=Oi(e1,...,en) for some e,e1,...,en∈8DQGIRUDQi∈IWKHQZHVD\WKDWHLVFRPSRVHGRXWRIH1,...,en (in the way Oi). L
77
What kind of algebra is a part-whole system? Can any partial algebra be meaningfully considered as a part-whole system? Certainly not - if the operators of an algebra are to be considered as operators of compositions, then they must fulfil certain restrictions. If A= ∈I> is an algebra, let us define the relation PA in such a way that e PAH LIIWKHUHLVDQ i∈I VXFK that e'=Oi(...,e,...). In case A is a part-whole system, PA is the relation of an immediate (proper) part - the relation of a general (proper) part can then be defined as its transitive closure. This means that A can be a part-whole system only if PA fulfils certain conditions - if it is acyclic (its transitive closure is antisymmetric) and if it fulfils some other more intricate 6 conditions, which we are not going to discuss here . Hence we may say that a part-whole system is an algebra A, for which the relation PA has the properties appropriate for the relation of an immediate (proper) part. One basically important thing concerning part-whole systems is that the partwhole structure offers the basis for induction: for a property to be instantiated by all the elements of a part-whole system, it is enough to be instantiated by all the simple elements (those which have no parts) and to be inherited from parts to wholes. Several important concepts are now intrinsically connected with the notion of part-whole system, especially the concepts of substitution, interchangeability and compositionality. Let us outline general definitions 7 of these notions . (1) A substitution of an item ea for an item eb within an item e, denoted by e[ea/eb], is the item that is composed in the same way as e with the single exception that eb is used everywhere instead of ea. The precise inductive definition could run as follows: (basis) if e is simple, then either e is ea and then e[ea/eb]=eb, or e is not ea and then e[ea/eb]=e; and (induction step) if e=Oi(e1,...,en), then either e is ea and then e[ea/eb]=eb, or e is not ea and then e[ea/eb]= Oi(e1[ea/eb],...,en[ea/eb]). The restrictions imposed on algebra to be a part-whole system should guarantee that this definition is correct: that Oi(e1[ea/eb],...,en[ea/eb]) is the same object as Oj(e1'[ea/eb],...,em'[ea/eb]) whenever Oi(e1,...,en) is the same object as Oj(e1',...,em'). (2) If R is a binary relation on U, then ea and eb are said to be interchangeable w.r.t. R iff e[ea/eb] R e for every item e. If R is a binary relation on U, then the minimal relation R' containing R and such that any two elements equivalent according to R' are interchangeable w.r.t. R' is called the interchangeability closure of R. The interchangeability closure of a binary relation is always existent and unique; an interchangeability closure of an equivalence is again an equivalence. (3) A function F on a part-whole system is called compositional iff L
78
there is a general rule how to recover the value of F for the whole from its YDOXHV IRU WKH SDUWV LH LI WKHUH LV IRU HYHU\ i∈I, D IXQFWLRQ )i such that F(Oi(e1,...,en)) = Fi(F(e1),...,F(en)). (This, as well as all the following equations, is to be understood in the extended sense, such as stating that the equated values are either equal or are both undefined.) It can be proven that the function F is compositional if and only if its kernel (i.e. the relation KERF such that e KERF e' iff F(e)=F(e')) contains its own interchangeability closure; therefore the following definition seems to be plausible: a relation is called compositional iff it contains its own interchangeability closure. Thus, a function is compositional if and only if its kernel is. If R is a compositional relation and e1 R e2, then e[e1/e2] R e for every e; hence if F is a compositional function and F(e1)=F(e2) then F(e[e1/e2])= F(e) for every e. Compositional functions and relations occupy a somewhat outstanding position among other functions on a part-whole systems. (If we see partwhole systems simply as algebras, then compositional functions coincide with homomorphisms and compositional relations with congruences.) We shall see later that there may be good reasons for approving only compositional relations and functions; and in such a case we must consider any non-compositional relation or function a mere approximative or incomplete representation of a compositional one. This poses the problem of 'compositionalization', of finding a relation (function) that could be considered a reasonable approximation of a given relation (function). This problem is easily solvable for relations, and not so easily for functions. Every relation can be extended to a compositional relation, the smallest of such relations always being its interchangeability closure. R is clearly compositional if and only if it contains (and consequently is identical with) its own interchangeability closure. A compositionalization of a function is a more problematic matter. In contrast to the case of relation, it is surely not the case that every function could be extended to a compositional function. However, a function can be refined to a compositional function. This means that if F is a function from a part-whole system into a range S, then there exists a function F' with the range S' and a contraction c of S' to S such that c(F'(x)) = F(x). More precisely, if F is a function from a part-whole system P into a set S, then there is a part-whole system P', a compositional function F1 from P to P' and a compositional function F2 from P' into S such that F is the composition of F1 and F2. Thus, a noncompositional function can be decomposed into two compositional functions: but this may require an intermediary system of objects (P'). This indicates that turning an noncompositional into a compositional function may necessitate new kinds 79
of objects.
An Example Let us imagine we have the objects a, b, c, d, e, f such that c is composed out of a and b and d is in the same way composed out of b and a; and that f is composed out of c and e, and g is in the same way composed out of d and e. We can imagine the objects as the geometrical shapes of Figure 2. Hence we have the part-whole system >, where U={a,b,c,d,e,f,g} and O1 and O2 are partial binary function on U such that O1={<,c>,<,d>} and O2={<,f>,<,g>}. d is an immediate part of g, and a is an immediate part of d; hence a is a part of g, but it is not its immediate part. The substitution f[c/d] of d for c in f yields g; the substitution f[d/c] of c for d in f yields f (because d is not a part of f); the substitution f[c/a] of a for c in f yields nothing at all (because O2(a,e) is undefined). Let R be the equivalence on U that yields the two equivalence classes {a,b,c,d,e} and {f,g}. a and b are interchangeable w.r.t. R and so are c and d; but a and c are not interchangeable w.r.t. R, since, e.g., f[c/a] is undefined. This means that a and c are not interchangeable w.r.t. R, although a R c; hence R is not compositional. The interchangeability closure of R is the compositional equivalence R' that yields four equivalence classes: {a,b}, {c,d}, {e} and {f,g}. /HWXVLPDJLQHZHKDYHWKHIXQFWLRQ)WKDWDVVLJQWKHYDOXH.WRa, b, c, d and e and the value ß to f and g. Then F is not compositional. To see
Figure 2: Example of a part-whole system 80
this, let us assume that there is a function O2' such that F(O2(x,y))=O2'(F(x),F(y)) for every x and y of U; then ß = F(f) = F(O2(c,e)) = O2'(F(c),F(e)) = O2 .. 22'(F(a),F(b)) = F(O2(a,b)), but O2(a,b) is undefined. (The noncompositionality of F follows directly also from the noncompositionality of KERF - and this noncompositionality was proved DERYH 7RPDNH)FRPSRVLWLRQDOZHKDYHWRUHILQHLWWRVSOLW.LQWRWKUHH values: a and b will be assigned the first of them, c and d the second, and e WKHWKLUG+HQFHZHPD\KDYHWKHFRPSRVLWLRQDOIXQFWLRQ) WKDWDVVLJQV.1 to a and b.2 to c and d.3 to e and ß to f and g. In terms of F we can distinguish two kinds of objects: if we say x is a(n) y instead of F(x)=y and if we say non-house LQVWHDGRI.DQGhouse instead of ß, then F allows us to articulate statements to the effect that an object of U either is or is not a house. But to make this distinction compositional we need a finer classification of non-houses: we must distinguish among an oblong, a square and a triangle. The abstract objects ('categories') oblong .1), square .2) and triangle .3), which have been employed to 'refine' the object non-house. FDQWKXVEHORRNHGXSRQDVEURXJKWLQWREHLQJE\ the compositionalization of the opposition between houses and nonhouses.
Language as a Part-whole System It is clear that language can be seen as a part-whole system; and that it is just this view that underlies the very idea of grammar. To compile a grammar means to explicitly reconstruct the factual phenomenon of language as a part-whole system. A meaning-assignment is then a compositional mapping of the part-whole system of language on a system of denotations. What the structural approach to language claims is that meanings are kind of outgrowths of the oppositions present within the system of language. In algebraic words, that the meaning-assignment is somehow induced by some kind of binary relations on the part-whole system of language. We may say that meanings owe their existence to synonymy, that they are 'reifications' of synonymy; in the sense of Quine's (1992) 'there is no existence without equivalence'. But what we are going to argue for here is a much less trivial thesis: that meanings are 'reifications' of relations much more elementary than that of synonymy, in the paradigmatic case of the opposition between truth and falsity. Sameness of truth values is an equivalence; and it directly reifies into the two truth values. However, if we try to distinguish between truth and falsity compositionally, we may 81
need many more values, and what we argue for is that meanings can be plausibly considered as just these values. To say that sameness of truth values is a compositional relation is to say that language is extensional. The point is that compositionality of the sameness of truth values implies that for every sentences S,S1,S2 the sameness of truth values of S[S1/S2] and S follows from that of S1 and S2; and this is just what can be considered as the general definition of extensionality. However, the profusion of modal and intensional contexts of our language documents that language is in general far from being extensional: to take the most traditional example, Necessary S1 may well differ in truth value from Necessary S2 (i.e. from Necessary S1 [S1/S2]) even in the case when S1 and S2 do not differ. Hence the relation of sameness of truth value of sentences of our language is in general surely not compositional. We have seen what we have to do when we want to make a function compositional: we have to refine its range. This means that if we want to distinguish between truth and falsity compositionally, we do not make do with the two truth values themselves. In order to be able to classify sentences into true and false in a compositional way, we need a much more fine-grained ('auxiliary') classification. If the truth value of Necessary S1 differs from that of Necessary S2, then S1 and S2 must have different values even if these have the same truth value. From the viewpoint of truth, S1 and S2 do not differ when taken as wholes per se, but they differ when taken as parts, as building-blocks. This means that as soon as we take compositionality as a principle, then the value issuing from the differentiation between truth and falsity is a value quite different form the truth value. The sameness of the former implies the sameness of the latter value; but not vice versa. Hence as soon as we take compositionality as a principle (and if we realize the nonextensionality of our language) we cannot account for truth without an elaborate system of values, without meanings.
Infinity and Compositionality We have shown that if we want to treat truth compositionally, we need meanings. What we have not shown so far is why compositionality is crucial. To show this, we must consider the very role of abstract entities for our comprehending our world. There are 'real' objects we perceive, and there are abstract objects we posit. We may posit objects explicitly with the knowledge that they will 82
help us formulate efficient theories of our world, or we may posit them as 8 tools implicit to our very act of comprehending the world . The simplest situation of positing an abstract object is that of grasping a similarity between 'real' objects as something they have in common. However, there are also less trivial ways of positing objects. One of those situations is connected with the way we treat infinity; and it is just this situation that is crucial for our understanding of the nature of meaning. Our view of our world is so infiltrated by contemporary mathematics based on Cantor's set theory that we count infinite sets among the uttermost realities. However, on second thought it is quite clear that there is no infinite set we could really encounter within our 'real' world. Everyone of us can be confronted (at once, but also during the whole span of his life) with at most a finite number of objects. The only aspect of reality that may be felt as amounting to infinity is unlimitedness, the possibility to continue various processes over and over without any limit. In other words, there is no actual infinity, there is at most potential infinity. There is no 'real' infinite set of objects, but there are 'real' devices which make it possible to 'generate' objects without any limitation ('ad infinitum'). We can never encounter the set of all natural numbers; we can at most encounter a rule of the kind of '0 is a number x is a number, then also x' is a number'. The rule in itself is in no way infinite (it is simply a fourteen-word phrase), it is only in a sense felt to insinuate infinity. This nature of infinity has been repeatedly pointed out - probably for the first time by Aristotle, and more recently by several of the most outstanding 9 mathematicians and philosophers of this century - but many theoreticians simply ignore it. However, if there are no real infinite sets beyond those grounded in a finite number of generating rules, then there are also no functions with infinite domains beyond functions defined via finite rules. There is no way of defining a function on an infinite domain, save by giving its values for a finite number of basic elements and then giving a finite number of rules to compute values for new elements from those already computed. We may define function f with its domain equal to the set of all natural numbers by defining f(0) and giving the recipe how to compute f(x') out of f(x), or we may base the definition on a more complicated system of rules generating natural numbers, but it is impossible to define such a function directly, bypassing generating rules altogether. If we understand generating rules as rules of composition of wholes out of parts (which can be in some cases taken literally and in others as an illuminating metaphor), then we can say that there is no 'real' infinite set without a part-whole structure; and that there is no 'real' function on such a 83
set that would not follow the part-whole structure, i.e. which would not be compositional. Thus, reality is restricted to part-whole systems and to 10 functions compositional on part-whole systems. Due to the Cantorian indoctrination we comprehend the world in terms of functions that are not necessarily compositional. This leads to the conviction that any opposition expressed in terms of a classificatory function is a function with merely two values. The opposition between truth and falsity means simply a function that assigns truth to the true statements, and falsity to the false ones. However, we have seen that such an opposition may call for a much wider range if it is to be accomplished compositionally. We have seen, in our oversimplified example, that to distinguish between houses and non-houses compositionally, we cannot make do with two values, that we need a finer system of values. Similarly to distinguish between truth and falsity compositionally we need a much finer system of values than the pair of the two truth values themselves: we need meanings. We might be tempted to say that meanings result from compositionalization of truth. However this statement may be misleading: it seems to suggest that there is a direct, noncompositional characterization of truth which we would compositionalize positing meanings. But there is in fact no such direct characterization. Maybe there is a God who is able to grasp infinity directly and who thus perceives our positing meanings in this way; but for us the compositional way is the only way. Any more direct differentiation is our mythical creature that is licensed by set theory which embraces actual infinity and which can only be talked about, but never really demonstrated. We may well talk about the infinite class of all the expressions of our language, but such talk makes real sense only because we can understand it as a 'shortcut talk' about our ability to form new expressions 'forever', or about the grammar of our language. And we can also well talk about direct, noncompositional assignment of truth values to sentences, but we can make real sense of this talk only in so far as we can understand it as a 'shortcut talk' about (compositional) meaningassignment. There is no possibility of characterizing true statements without specifying the meaning of some basic expressions and specifying how meanings of wholes depend on meanings of their parts. Two Approaches to Language Revisited The concept of meaning is trivially interrelated with that of synonymy: if we have meaning we eo ipso have synonymy ('sameness of meaning'), and if we have synonymy we eo ipso have meaning ('value shared by 84
synonymous expressions'). The semiotic approach tries to offer an independent explication of the concept of meaning: meaning of an expression is a real-world object casually connected with the expression; two expressions are hence synonymous if they are so linked to the same objects. The structural view proceeds the other way round: it tries to reduce the concept of meaning to the concept of synonymy. Synonymy is, according to this approach, sameness of role within the system of language or within a relevant language game, and this in turn is the role of the building-block within the account for certain oppositions, especially for the opposition between truth and falsity. Thus, the meaning of an expression is a value, it is the value that determines the kind of brick the expression is, how it can be utilized within the opposition-based building of language. We have concentrated on meaning; but also other linguistic abstracta can be accounted for in similar terms. Grammatical categories, for example, can be conceived analogously, as a means of differentiating well-formed expressions from mere nonsensical sequences of words. Evidently the differentiation alone would amount to no more than two categories (expressions and non-expressions); if it is, however, accomplished compositionally (i.e. if the category of a complex expression is uniquely determined by the categories of its parts), then what is brought into being are grammatical categories in the usual sense. Thus, compositional differentiation is responsible not only for meanings, but for the whole of what de Saussure calls linguistic reality. That meanings and other linguistic abstracta issue from oppositions does not contradict the fact that the oppositions do not manifest themselves in language as perfectly sharp and clear-cut, that the boundary between, e.g., truth and falsity is notoriously fuzzy. The concept of synonymy, and hence also that of meaning, is based on a intentional simplification: we consider two expressions synonymous if their likeness exceeds such or another boundary. This may lead us to split meaning into 11 various levels corresponding to some natural boundaries , and eventually it may lead us to deny the reasonableness of the treatment of meanings as 12 objects altogether . However, such a simplification necessarily occurs with every abstraction: to speak about expressions being synonymous does not seem to be more far-fetched than to speak about, say, objects having the same colour. Conclusion There is meaning only in so far as there are synonymous expressions. And 85
expressions are synonymous only if they contribute in the same way to truth, i.e. only if they are intersubstitutive salva veritate (or, more generally, if they are intersubstitutive with respect to the usability of language statements in various language games). Hence there is meaning only in so far as there is truth. On the other hand, there is no truth without meaning. In some simple artificial languages there can be truth without meaning; in a universal natural language comprising an infinite number of truths this is, however, not possible. Truth as a property of statements is a compositional property (for there is, strictly speaking, no 'real' noncompositional property), and as a compositional property it rests on meaning. Meaning is the value of an expression with respect to the opposition between truth and falsity; meaning is the product (or, if one prefers, a by-product) of the 13 compositionality of truth . Meaning is in this sense implicit to truth; and we can make it explicit ('explicate it') in that we make a theoretical reconstruction of language as a part-whole system and if we evaluate its 14 expression to make a compositional (recursive) characterization of truth . Philosophers of diverse provenance claim that the hierarchical structure of abstract entities which are the means of our comprehending 15 our world arise from some kind of associations . What has been said here implies that associations, or at least some of them, need not be accounted for as primary phenomena, rather that they may be considered necessary implicit means of our making sense of oppositions, of our understanding oppositions, since understanding is finitistic and hence compositional. We associate synonymous expressions, but we do so because we want to distinguish between true and false sentences and since synonymy represents the only way to accomplish this compositionally. Notes 1. A less ambiguous way to call this approach would be to use the term nomenclatural, employed by Peregrin (forthcoming b), but here we want to stress the roots of this approach, which are connected with understanding language as arising out of a process of semiosis. 2. Cf. Harris (1988). See also Peregrin (forthcoming a). 3. "Nur im Zusammenhang eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas." (Frege 1884: 73). "Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im Zusammenhange des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung" (Wittgenstein 1922: §3.3. Following the usual praxis we quote Qittgenstein by paragraph numbers rather than page numbers.) 4. In Dummett's (1988) term. 5. As Quine puts it: "there is no saying absolutely what the numbers are; there is only arithmetic" (Quine 1969: 45). 6. See, e.g., Simmons (1987).
86
7. It is not usual to address these notions on such a general level; the only algebraic theory that does go into this and that is known to the author is that of Aczel and Lunnon (1991). 8. For detailed analysis of the situation we refer the reader to the writings of W.V.O.Quine, esp. Quine (1992). 9. E.g. Hilbert (1925), Wittgenstein (1964), Lorenzen (1957) or Vopenka (1979). Vopenka also provides an insightful analysis of how we are "held captive" by the Cantorian framework. Cf. also Hailperin (1992). 10. Thus, if we insist on direct reconstruction of reality in terms of infinite sets, then infinite sets in the sense of Brouwer (1920) are much more appropriate than those in the traditional sense. 11. The Fregean split of meaning into Sinn and Bedeutung is well known, but we can go even further. Cf. Peregrin (1992). 12. And this is indeed the conclusion reached by such scholars as Austin, Wittgenstein and Quine. 13. This way of viewing meaning is indeed quite close to that put forward by some analytical philosophers, especially Davidson. Thus. Davidson writes: 'I suggest that a theory of truth for a language does, in a minimal but important respect, do what we want, that is, give the meanings of all independently meaningful expressions on the basis of an analysis of their structure' (Davidson 1984: 55). See also Peregrin (1994). 14. See Peregrin (1992; forthcoming b). 15. Statements to this effect can be found in the writings of Aristotle and Kant as well as in those of the modern philosophers from Husserl (1900/1) and Carnap (1928) on. The paradigmatic picture is the Aristotelian one, as characterized by Cassirer: 'Nothing is presupposed save the existence of things in their inexhaustible multiplicity, and the power of the mind to select from this wealth of particular existences those features that are common to several of them.' (Cassirer 1910: 4)
References Aczel, Peter and Lunnon, Rachel (1991): Universes and Parameters. In Situation Theory and its Applications, vol.2, J.Barwise, J.M.Gawron, G.Plotkin and S.Tutiya (eds.), 3-24. Stanford: Standford University. Brouwer, L .E. J. (1920): Intuitionistische Mengenlehre. Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 28, 203-208. Carnap, Rudolf (1928): Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Berlin: Weltkreis-Verlag. Translated as The Logical Structure of the World, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Cassirer, Ernst (1910): Substanzbegriff und Functionsbegriff, Berlin. Translated as and quotted from Substance and Function, New York: Dover, 1953. Davidson, Donald (1977): Reality Without Reference. Dialectica 31. Reprinted in Davidson (1984). - (1984): Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dummett, Michael (1988): The Origins of Analytical Philosophy I. Lingua e Stile 23, 3-49. Frege, Gottlob (1892): Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
87
philosophische Kritik 100, 25-50. Hailperin, Theodore (1992): Herbrand Semantics, the Potential Infinite, and Ontology-Free Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 13, 69-90. Harris, Roy (1988): Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein, London: Routledge. Hilbert, David (1925): Über das Unendliche. Mathematische Annalen 95. Translated as On the Infinite, in From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book from Mathematical Logic, Jan van Heijenoort (ed.), Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971. Husserl, Edmund (1900/1), Logische Untersuchungen, Halle: Niemeyer. Lorenzen, Paul (1957): Das Aktual-Unendliche in der Mathematik. Philosophia Naturalis 4, 2-11. Reprinted in Lorenzen: Methodisches denken, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988. Morris, Charles W. (1966): Foundations of the Theory of Signs. (=International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Peregrin, Jaroslav (1992): Sprache und ihre Formalisierung. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 40, 237-244. - (1994): Interpreting Formal Logic. Erkenntnis 40, 5-20. - (forthcoming a): Structuralism: Slogan or Concept? Lingua e Stile, to appear. - (forthcoming b): How To Do Worlds with Words, Dordrecht: Kluwer, to appear. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1960): World and Object. Cambridge (mass.): MIT Press. - (1969): Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. - (1992): Pursuit of Truth. Revised edition. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. Saussure, Ferdidand de (1931): Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot. Translated as and quoted from Course in General Linguistics, New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Simons, Peter (1987): Parts. A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vopenka, Petr (1979): Mathematics in the Alternative Set Theory, Leipzig: Teubner. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge. - (1964): Philosophische Bemerkungen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. - (1953): Philosophische Untersuchungen. Oxford: Blackwell.
88
Jaroslav Peregrin LANGUAGE AND ITS MODELS: IS MODEL THEORY A THEORY OF SEMANTICS?
1. Introduction Tarskian model theory is almost universally understood as a formal counterpart of the preformal notion of semantics, of the “linkage between words and things”. The wide-spread opinion is that to account for the semantics of natural language is to furnish its settheoretic interpretation in a suitable model structure; as exemplified by Montague 1974. The thesis advocated in this paper is that model theory cannot be considered as semantics in this straightforward sense. We try to show that model theory is more adequately understood as shining light on considerations concerning the relation of consequence than on those concerning the relation of expressions to extralinguistic objects; and that it makes little sense to use model theory for the purposes of answering such questions as what is meaning? or when is a sentence true?. The organization of the paper is the following: We start by considering various formal reconstructions of natural languages utilizing standard logic. Section 2 points out that the usual way of explicating the semantics of natural language, namely the way of Tarskian modeltheoretic interpretation, is problematic. In Section 3 we propose a more adequate way: to explicate semantics via the delimitation of the space of possible truth-valuations of sentences, especially in terms of the specification of the relation of consequence (indicating that logic, as an account for consequence, is eo ipso a theory of semantics). Section 4 demonstrates that a plausible way to account for the space of possible truth-valuations is to locate a “basis”, i.e. a class of mutually independent sentences each truth-valuation of which uniquely extends to a truth-valuation of the whole language; and it is noted that some of Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1–23. c 1997 Scandinavian University Press.
2
jaroslav peregrin
the most usual traditional logical calculi, notably the first-order predicate calculus, may lack such a basis. In Section 5 we consider another example of a baseless language, namely the modal propositional calculus, and we indicate the general pattern which appears to invoke the idea of a model. Section 6 puts forward the thesis that the idea behind model theory is that of making such baseless languages based. In Section 7 we analyze the concept of quantifier, which appears to be crucial for the fact that predicate calculus is in general baseless; we point out that the seemingly indirect way in which a quantifier alludes to the infinite cannot be replaced by any direct way. In Section 8 we draw the general conclusion regarding the nature of model theory: we conclude that model theory can be understood as concerned with extending baseless languages to based ones; however, that doing model theory usually does not mean presenting such an extension, but rather only to stipulate its existence. Section 9 concludes that model theory should not be considered as a direct presentation of semantics, not only because it connects words with words (rather than words with things), but ultimately because it cannot succeed in explicitly connecting semantically non-transparent (baseless) languages with semantically transparent (based) ones. In Section 10 we point out that the common “ideology” behind model theory is closely connected with the doctrine of logical atomism as pursued at the beginning of this century by Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein. Section 11 then lays out our conclusion that insofar as model theory can be considered a theory of semantics, it is not in force of its being an imitation of the “real” denotandum/denotatum relation, but rather in force of its being an account for consequence. 2. Language and the Ways of its Reconstruction What is language? It is now commonplace to consider language as a bundle of generative and/or transformational rules, as some kind of algebra, as a set-theoretically interpreted logical calculus, etc. Such views need no substantiation as long as we stay within the realm of mathematics: there we are relatively free to define the concepts we use. But, outside of mathematics we must not forget, however banal this may sound, that language is first and foremost something to be found in our world, that it is something factual. This is what is stressed by Wittgenstein (1953, §494): “Der Apparat unserer gew¨ ohnlichen Sprache, unserer Wortsprache, ist vor allem das, was wir ‘Sprache’ nennen; und
language and its models
3
dann anderes nach seiner Analogie oder Vergleichbarkeit mit ihr”.1 It is obviously legitimate, and indeed helpful, to try to reconstruct factual language in terms of a mathematical theory. The attempt may be guided by diverse purposes—we may want to throw light on the workings of some restricted range of expressions (such as logical connectives), to regiment a part of language in a form manageable by computers, etc. What concerns us here is the purpose of explication, i.e. that usage of formal means which aims at fostering our understanding of the phenomenon of language. If some kind of a mathematical structure is to be considered a reconstruction of language relevant in this respect, then it has to share some substantial amount of the characteristic features of the factual language. Which features are considered relevant, and which not, is again partly a matter of viewpoint; but once we are clear about what functions of language we consider relevant we may, in terms of Quine’s (1960, p. 259) classic definition of explication, “devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms of our liking, that fills the functions.” However, there seem to be also certain general principles governing adequate explication, principles that can be articulated independently of a viewpoint. One such principle can be called the principle of persistence of individuation (hereafter PPI ): it states that different explicanda should obtain different explicata and vice versa, that the correspondence between the domain of the pre-theoretic entities that are to be explicated and that of those which are used to explicate them should be one-to-one. If we try to explicate the intuitive concept of ordered pair, then we cannot furnish an explication such that two intuitively different ordered pairs would be explicated by one and the same object, or that one ordered pair would be explicated by two different things. If we try to explicate the concept of language, then we should maintain the one-to-one correspondence between languages in the intuitive sense and the theoretic constructs we employ as their explications.2 One possible way of reconstructing natural language is to reconstruct it as a grammatical system, as a set of basic strings of letters (lexicon) plus a set of rules to combine strings of letters into strings 1 “It is primarily the apparatus of our ordinary language, of our word-language, that we call language; and then other things by analogy or comparability with this.” 2 The factual boundaries between languages are, of course, both fuzzy and ambiguous (in one sense, we can regard, e.g., British and American English as two subspecies of a single language; in another sense we can regard them as two different languages). However, this is not in itself problematic—it is in the nature of explication that it replaces fuzzy lines with crisp ones and sticks to a single sense where ambiguity occurs.
4
jaroslav peregrin
of strings of letters (grammar). This is quite a useful reconstruction employed by syntacticians; however, it is based on the (purposeful) disregard of the semantic aspect, it clearly violates PPI (for two different languages may conceivably share one and the same syntax) and it is thus essentially incapable of being taken as a genuine explication of the concept of language. What makes language into more than a grammatical system is that its expressions are in some sense significant, that they have meaning—the reason two different languages with the same syntax may still be different is that they can differ in meaning, in what their expressions ‘stand for’. So it may seem that to account for the whole of language we need a grammatical system plus an assignment of some kind of entities to expressions. This intuition appears to be done justice to by the notion of language established by Carnap (with support from Morris, Tarski and others), which is nowadays taken almost for granted. According to this commonly accepted doctrine a language consists of (i) a list of basic expressions (words; the lexicon ); (ii) a list of rules which produce more complex expressions out of simpler ones (extending the lexicon into an algebra generated by its words; the syntax ); (iii) an assignment of some basic set-theoretic objects to basic expressions; (iv) an assignment of operations over the set-theoreticals to rules (extending the interpretation of words into the homomorphism of the whole algebra). As Montague claims, this notion of language is so encompassing that it bans any need to make a difference between natural language and formal ones.3 However, it is necessary to realize that to take this kind of reconstruction directly as an explication would still violate PPI ; in this case because there would be more than one explicatum for a single explicandum, for a single language. First, it is quite clear that the grammar of a language can be articulated in various ways. If we take English, then, e.g., John, to love and Mary can be composed into John loves Mary, but we can account for it either by postulating a rule which combines a transitive verb phrase with a noun phrase into an intransitive verb phrase and a rule combining an intransitive verb phrase and a noun phrase into a sentence, or we can have a single rule combining a transitive verb phrase with two noun phrases into a sentence (not to speak about other possibilities). Second, also the semantics of a language can be accounted for by means of various set-theoretic interpretations. We know, for instance, that it makes no substantial difference whether we interpret a predicate by a subclass of the universe, or by the charac3
Montague 1974, pp. 188 and 222.
language and its models
5
teristic function of the subclass; however, a class and its characteristic function are two different things and corresponding interpretations thus make up different objects. Similarly, we know that as far as the usual principles of arithmetic are concerned we may consistently consider a number to be a primitive object, a set of sets of objects (as Frege in effect proposed), or the set of all the smaller numbers (as proposed by von Neumann). This indicates that what makes up a language in the intuitive sense should be considered not as a definite grammatical system plus a definite set-theoretic interpretation, but something ‘more abstract’, something which is shared both by different but equivalent grammatical systems, and different but equivalent set-theoretical interpretations. This is to say that to furnish a real explication of the concept of language we should have to be able to decide when two different grammatical systems are mere alternative ways of capturing the syntax of the same language, and when they concern different languages; and similarly when two set-theoretical interpretations are mere alternative accounts of its semantics and when they differ substantially. In other words, we should have to specify identity criteria, a criterion of identity for grammatical systems and a criterion of identity for interpretations. The situation is relatively straightforward in the case of syntax: two grammatical systems seem to be two different accounts for the same language if and only if they generate the same class of sentences. The class of sentences (or, more basically, the speakers’ ability to tell a well-formed sentence from a mere haphazard string of letters) is what can be considered as genuinely empirically capturable, the grammar is our way of accounting for this class.4 What two grammatical systems relating to one and the same language have in common is the class of sentences; hence we can identify the explication of the syntactical part of language with this set.5 However, the situation is more complicated in respect to interpretation; here no such straightforward criterion is in sight. To volunteer a reconstruction of semantics doing justice to PPI, we need to differentiate interpretations only up to some kind of “semantic equivalence” or 4
Within linguistics a grammar is sometimes considered adequate if it generates the right class of sentences and if it associates the sentences with some kind of “right” inner structures. However, it is problematic on which empirical grounds it could be decided which inner structures are right and which not; it rather seems that the inner structure is a mere by-product of the reconstruction of the class of sentences and that hence the structure is right if and only if it is the product of an adequate reconstruction. This debate, though, is beyond the scope of the present paper (an interested reader is referred to Peregrin 1996b). 5 Cf. Quine 1969, pp. 48–49.
6
jaroslav peregrin
“isomorphism” (or, to use a term coined by Quine, up to some kind of proxy function ). Arithmetic is more than a bare class of sentences; but it is in the same time less than the class plus an assignment of definite objects. Language is a class of sentences plus that part of its interpretation which it shares with all interpretations which are “semantically equivalent” (elementarily equivalent, in terms of current model theory). If we managed to reify the structure which any two so “semantically equivalent” interpretations share, than we have that which must be added to syntax to make up a good explication of language. 3. Meaning and Truth So what must two set-theoretic interpretations share in order to be understood as two representations of the same semantics, rather than as representations of two different semantics? Let us consider arithmetic. It is not relevant whether we consider numbers in von Neumann’s sense and < an inclusion, or numbers in Frege’s sense and < the relation λXY.∀x ∈ X.∃y ∈ Y.x ⊂ y; all that counts is that the interpretation makes the right sentences true: that 1 < 2 comes out true, while 2 < 1 false. This is what Quine (1953, p. 45) seems to have in mind stating: “there is no saying absolutely what the numbers are, there is only arithmetic.” In the same sense it is inessential whether a predicate P is interpreted by a set or by the characteristic function of the set; all that counts is the truth values which result from the combination of P with terms and quantifiers. This suggests that what might be added to grammar to make up a fully-fledged language is something like a specification of truth. The situation is relatively straightforward in the case of arithmetic or any other mathematical language. For such languages truth coincides with eternal, necessary truth; what is actually true is always true. In such a case we can speak about the class of true sentences, or about the truth-valuation (assignment of truth values to sentences). However, in the general case there may be truths which are not necessary, truths which may become false at any moment. There is no definite set of truths, no definite truth-valuation. A sentence such as ‘It is raining’ may be true in the morning, but false in the afternoon. In the general case it is thus not possible to speak about the class of true sentences, or the truth-valuation; we can at most speak either about the class of actually true sentences, (the actual truth-valuation), or about the class of all the possible classes of true sentences (truthvaluations). The enterprise of the account for truth for a general language thus may be thought as split into two distinct enterprises: first,
language and its models
7
the delimitation of the space of all the possible truth-valuations and, second, the specification of the actual truth-valuation. We can call the first of these enterprises, borrowing from Schlick (1932), the pursuit of meaning, while calling the latter the pursuit of truth. The former is a matter for philosophy and logic, the latter one for the sciences.6 A logical account of truth for a general language thus means the delimitation of the space of all the possible truth-valuations of the sentences of the language. For English, such a space would contain truth-valuations which would verify (assign the truth to) ‘Aristotle is human’ and it would also contain those which would verify ‘Aristotle is not human’, but it would contain no truth-valuation which would verify both of these sentences, and it would probably also not contain one which would falsify both of them. However, the delimitation of the space of possible truth-valuations seems to be far from enough to really account for semantics. It seems to be insufficient to know that ‘Aristotle is human’ cannot be true simultaneously with ‘Aristotle is not human’. We have to know when ‘Aristotle is human’ is true; we must know its truth conditions. However, are we really in a position to articulate the truth conditions in a nontrivial way? We can surely say that ‘Aristotle is human’ is true just in case that Aristotle is human. There seem to be many logicians and philosophers who, since Tarski, consider this kind of ‘correspondencetheoretic’ explication of truth conditions satisfactory; but there are also more skeptical theoreticians of language, such as the late Wittgenstein or Quine, who consider this to say nothing nontrivial.7 The statement ‘“Aristotle is human” is true if and only if Aristotle is human’ can never bring us nontrivial information, because it begs the question: to be able to understand it we have to know what it means for Aristotle to be human, and to know this is nothing other than to know when the sentence ‘Aristotle is human’ is true.8 6
Of course it is just this division which was challenged by Quine’s famous attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction. However, as we have stressed before (see footnote 2), a theoretical explication consists, besides others, in positing sharp boundaries where there are in fact none. Thus, although Quine is certainly right that we cannot turn the distinction between the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of meaning into philosophical cash in the way Schlick proposed, we do need such a boundary when building a formal model of language. 7 As Wittgenstein (1977, p. 27) puts it: “Die Grenze der Sprache zeigt sich in der Unm¨ oglichkeit, die Tatsache zu beschreiben, die einem Satz entspricht (seine ¨ Ubersetzung ist), ohne eben den Satz zu wiederholen.” [“The limit of language is shown by it being impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence, without simply repeating the sentence.”] 8 Caveat (due to P.Tich´ y): The statement ‘“Aristotle is human” means that Aristotle is human’ (or ‘“Aristotle is human” is true if and only if Aristotle is
8
jaroslav peregrin
This indicates that the only way theoretically to account for the semantics of a language over and above the demarcation of the space of its possible truth-valuations is to translate it into another language taking the semantics of the other language for granted. This claim may immediately raise suspicion: would it in such a case ever be possible to learn a first language? However, to learn a language and to articulate its semantics explicitly are two essentially different matters: learning a language is an enterprise that is essentially practical and the wordthing (or, better, sentence-circumstances) links which are established during it cannot be directly spelled out within a theory—we may teach someone to use the term ‘dog’ to refer to dogs, but by putting this into words we get the trivial ‘“dog” refers to dogs’. A theory can pair words with words; it is only practice that can literally “pair words with things”. However, do not modern formal theories of semantics aim higher than that: do they not explain the semantics of language in an absolute way (not only relatively to another language)? Do they not provide a direct access to meanings by way of their set-theoretic articulation? Of course not: such claims as that ‘dog’ stands for the class of dogs, or that the sentence ‘Aristotle is mortal’ is true in those possible worlds in which Aristotle is mortal are subject to the same objection as above; namely that to understand them we would have to know what they try to communicate to us in advance. Only if we know what ‘dog’ means can we understand what the class of dogs is; and only if we know when ‘Aristotle is mortal’ is true we can understand which are the worlds in which Aristotle is mortal. This is why Quine (1953, p. 49) suggests that the problem of meaning boils down to the problem of synonymy.9 However, both Quine’s and, especially, Davidson’s (1984) considerations also suggest that meaning can be somehow approached via truth: and it is this idea on which we elaborate here. The decoding of an unknown language involves, as Quine’s and Davidson’s thought experiments with radical translation or interpretation make plausible, finding out which human’) is informative because it is a literal English translation of the German statement ‘“Aristotle is human” bedeutet daß Aristoteles menschlich sei’, which is evidently informative. However, if this were true, then the English translation of the Englisch–Deutsch W¨ orterbuch, containing statements to the effect that ‘dog’ means dog, etc., would have to be as informative as the original. Nevertheless, while the Englisch–Deutsch W¨ orterbuch is surely a bestseller, one could hardly believe that a single copy of the English translation could be sold. 9 Elsewhere Quine puts this point even more vividly (1953, p. 50): “What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in another.”
language and its models
9
sentences are true when, and also how the truth of one sentence depends on that of other sentences. We suggest that if we allow ourselves of positing a sharp boundary between possible and impossible truthvaluations (which is, as we indicated, admittedly an oversimplification in respect to natural language, but a helpful one in respect to its theoretical explication), we can see semantic explication of a language as the delimitation of the space of its possible truth-valuations. What we tried to indicate above was that a set-theoretic interpretation can do no better than the delimitation of this space. In other words, our suggestion is that if we want to furnish a formal explication of a language, then a suitable one, not violating PPI, would be (the specification of) a class of sentences plus (the specification of) a space of possible truthvaluations of these sentences. Hence the first thesis of the present paper: A language is most adequately considered as a class of sentences plus a space of their truthvaluations; hence to account for the semantics of a language means to delimit the space of its truth-valuations. 4. Entailment and Bases The space of possible truth-valuations can be considered one side of the coin the other side of which is consequence. Indeed, consequence can be understood as a specification of the boundaries within which it is reasonable to consider alternative distributions of truth values among sentences: to say that the sentences S1, . . . , Sn entail the sentence S is to say that it is impossible for S to be false if S1 , . . . , Sn are true; hence it is to say that a truth-valuation which would assign T to all of S1, . . . , Sn and F to S is unacceptable. Hence any account for consequence is eo ipso an account of the space of possible truth-valuations, and vice versa. This establishes the important link between logic and semantics: to do logic means to work toward an account of consequence, and hence, in view of the conclusion reached in the previous section, towards an account of semantics. Now the most straightforward way to account for consequence and hence for the space of the possible truth-valuations is clearly the axiomatic method. (The axiomatic method aims simply at a list of all the instances of consequence—or, which is, for a “reasonable” language, the same, of necessary truths; it is only because such instances are infinite in number that it is forced to provide, in proxy, merely a potential generator of the list.) We have seen that an axiom can be understood as a statement to the effect of the exclusion of some truth-valuations; hence an exhaustive system of axioms can be understood as a (negative)
10
jaroslav peregrin
demarcation of the class of those truth-valuations which are possible. However, the axiomatic method is not the only possible approach to such a demarcation. There is also another approach, an approach based on the idea of finding a “comprehensible core” of language the truth-valuations of which uniquely determine the truth-valuations of the whole language. To clarify the nature of this alternative approach let us first introduce some auxiliary concepts. We shall say that a sentence S is partially determined by a class C of sentences, if there is a distribution of truth values among the sentences in C which forces S to have a definite truth value. (If C is {S1 , . . . , Sn}, then to say that C partially determines S is to say that there is a necessarily true sentence S1?, . . . , Sn? → S ?, where each X ? is either X or ¬X). We shall say that a sentence S is (totally) determined by a class C of sentences, if every distribution of truth values among the sentences in C forces a definite truth value of S. We call a class of sentences of a language L a quasibasis of L if it totally determines every sentence of L. The definition of the concept of quasibasis says that every truthvaluation of a quasibasis extends uniquely to a truth-valuation of the class of all sentences; hence that the truth-valuation of the whole class is uniquely determined by that of the quasibasis. This means that the study of truth-valuations of the entire language can be reduced to the study of their restrictions to the quasibasis. Every language obviously has some quasibases; this follows from the fact that the whole language itself is its own quasibasis. However, only a nontrivial quasibasis, a quasibasis whose complexity is in some sense remarkably smaller than that of the whole language, can be of interest from the viewpoint of the demarcation of the class of possible truth-valuations. We shall call a sentence S independent of a class C of sentences if S is not partially determined by C. A set of sentences is called independent, if every one of its elements is independent of the other sentences of the set. This means that a set of sentences is independent if all the distributions of truth-values among its elements are possible. We call a quasibasis a basis if it is independent. Although every language has a quasibasis, there is evidently no guarantee that it has a basis. Let us call a language based if it does have a basis; and let us call it baseless if it has none. Notice that a set which is independent can be considered as comprehensible from the viewpoint of truth-valuations: every distribution of truth values among elements is possible. The problem of demarcating the class of its possible truth-valuations is hence in fact—in a sense—solved by finding a basis: there is evidently a one-to-one corre-
language and its models
11
spondence between possible truth-valuations and subsets of the basis; the space of possible truth-valuations can thus be identified with the power set of the basis. So to find a basis is one of the possible ways of solving the problem of the demarcation of the class of possible truth-valuations, and hence of the problem of the pursuit of meaning. Hence: To specify a basis is to specify the space of the possible truth-valuations and hence to account for semantics. It is an alternative way to handle the task which is otherwise handled by the axiomatic method. 5. Model Theory as the Completion of Basis Now it seems that we somehow assume that a language must (or at least should) have a basis. If it has none, then we have the impression that the basis must be only somehow “hidden” and we feel urged to “fix up” the language to make the basis visible. The main claim of the present paper is that it is plausible to see precisely this kind of urge for a fix up as that which is constitutive of model theory. But before we discuss the thesis explicitly, let us consider the existence of bases within the most traditional logical systems. There is evidently a nontrivial quasibasis within the classical propositional calculus: it is constituted by the atomic sentences. The truth value of every sentence is uniquely determined by the truth values of some atomic sentences (it is determined by its atomic subsentences; and this is the reason why the calculus is decidable). Moreover, the truth value of an atomic sentence is independent of those of any other atomic sentences, hence the quasibasis is a basis. The classical propositional calculus thus fulfills our expectations in respect of the existence of basis. The troubles begin when we pass to predicate calculus, i.e. when we introduce the apparatus of quantification. The atomic sentences of the first-order predicate calculus do not in general constitute a basis: the truth value of a sentence such as ∀xP (x) is not totally determined by those of all the atomic sentences. If all the atomic sentences (especially all the sentences P (t) for any term t) are true, then ∀xP (x) may be true as well as false. However, it is not possible to add ∀xP (x) itself to the basis: it is not independent of the class of atomic sentences, because it cannot be true if some of the P (t)’s are false. The point is hence that ∀xP (x) is partially determined by the class of atomic sentences (in particular by those of the form P (t)), but it is not totally determined by it. Now having found out that there is no visible basis within a firstorder theory, one feels somehow urged to say that there is a “latent”
12
jaroslav peregrin
one: to say that the falsity of ∀xP (x) “means” that there exists a “nameless” individual i which does not have the property P . If we embrace this intuition, then in fact we compensate the lack of a name for i by considering the “metaname” ‘i’, and the lack of the (false) sentence “P (i)” by postulating the (false) “metasentence” ‘i has the property P ’. To see what is going on in such a case, imagine the situation where ∀xP (x) is false, but every instance of P (t) is true. The conclusion will be that the universe contains a nameless individual which is not P . This conclusion sounds like an empirical discovery which explains the falsity of ∀xP (x): we have found a certain individual with a certain property which makes the statement false! However, in fact the existence of the individual results from mere reshaping of the information implicit in the falsity of ∀xP (x) and the truth of all the P (t)’s. The conclusion that the universe contains an individual which is not P requires nothing more that the trivial transformation of ¬∀xP (x) into ∃x¬P (x); whereas the conclusion that the individual is nameless is the direct consequence of the fact that no P (t) is true. Thus, it is misguided to say that the existence of such an individual in the universe explains the truth values of the formulas—for it is only another way of stating the truth values (see further Peregrin 1995, Chapter 5). Now if we accomplish such a compensation (of the lack of names by a supply of metanames) systematically in frames of set theory, then what we reach is model theory. If a ∀xP (x) is false although P (t) is true for every term t, then the universe of the model is to contain such an i that i ∈ / ||P || (where ||P || is the denotation of P , a subset of the universe). This nature of model theory is especially manifest if we consider the famous completeness proofs presented by Henkin (1949, 1950). What Henkin in fact showed is that every (“reasonable”) language (or theory) can be conservatively extended to a language with respect to which “there are no nameless objects” (i.e. to a theory which has the property that whenever a ∀xP (x) is false, then there is a t such that P (t) is false).10 What is important is that to understand Henkin’s construction we need not consider interpretations and models at all; it is enough to consider embeddings of language into another 10
Henkin’s procedure incorporates two steps. First, we add names to guarantee that whenever there is a true existentially quantified formula ∃x.F (x), then there is a name t such that F (t) is true. Second, we equate names displaying no difference in behaviour with respect to consequence. (If our system allows for definite descriptions, then we can drop the first step; if it does not include the identity predicate, then we must drop the second one). Then it is possible to assume the one-to-one correspondence between equivalence classes of names and objects and so the relationship between the language and the model may be seen as transparent.
language and its models
13
language. For what Henkin’s proof really says is that every theory can be conservatively embedded into a theory the atomic sentences of which form a basis. If it were guaranteed that every language does have a basis, then Henkin’s proof would lose its import. This indicates that considering a model of a language may be seen as considering an embedding of the language into another, based language. (Notice that only the case discussed above makes the need for a model theory really urgent: if there were a false P (t) for every false ∀xP (x), then there would always be a trivial model constituted by the language itself.) 6. Modal Logic The predicate calculus with its overt quantification is not the only case of a well-established calculus which lacks a basis. Modal propositional logic is another instance. The status of the formula 2S of S5 is similar to that of ∀xP (x) of the classical predicate calculus: it is neither totally determined by, nor quite independent of the class of all the atomic sentences. If S is false, then 2S is forced to be false too, but if S is true, 2S may be true as well as false. Whatever differences one may find between ∀xP (x) of the predicate calculus and 2S of the modal propositional calculus, the modeltheoretic solution is surprisingly similar. If S is true (in the “actual world”) and 2S is not, then this is understood as “meaning” that there is a possible world w, different from the actual world, with respect to which S is false. 2 is thus understood as latently quantifying over possible worlds in the same way in which ∀ quantifies over individuals. While within the classical predicate calculus the basis is restored on the meta-level as the class of all sentences of the form ‘the individual i has the property P ’, within S5 it is restored as the class of all the sentences of the form ‘S is true w.r.t. the world w’. ‘Ideological’ differences aside, S5 is quite analogous to the monadic predicate calculus.11 This indicates that the pattern underlying the ‘pull towards models’ is more general than that of the overt quantification. The relevant pattern is that of the ‘semi-independent quasibasis’: a quasibasis Q with an independent subset B such that B determines the elements of Q\B partially, but not totally. Model theory for such a language then amounts to the embedding of the language into a language in which 11 If we consider other modal calculi, then the situation is technically slightly more involved (the truth value of 2S depends on those of the elements of the basis in a complicated way—requiring a relation of “accessibility”), the principle is, however, the same.
14
jaroslav peregrin
B gets extended to B0 such that B0 is still independent, and totally determines all the elements of Q\B. The new items constituting B0 \B are then naturally felt as being in a way implicit to those of Q\B. 7. Model Theory as Relating Words to Things This is, of course, an unusual way of conceiving model theory. The usual idea is that model theory depicts the relationships between words and things. Expressions of natural languages, the story goes, are expressions because they are somehow conventionally linked to extralinguistic objects, and model theory does the job of convention for formal languages—it guarantees that expressions of these languages are also linked to something extralinguistic, namely to certain sets. Model theory done for a (fragment of) natural language thus appears to be a direct account of its semantics. However, it is naive to take this idea at face value. It would be tantamount to what Quine (1969) calls the museum myth—to the idea that expressions are stuck on objects as labels in a great museum; and this is far from how language really works. As we said above, it is clear that no theory could succeed in directly relating words to things; it can do nothing over and above relating words to other words. It can give meanings of expressions of a language; but only given a “meta”language which is taken as the unquestioned background. (You cannot put a real dog into your theory to show what ‘dog’ means—you inevitably have to employ such or another representation.) And our natural language is the ultimate metalanguage, we cannot step out of it. There is no hope of doing model theory for our natural language, and hence of modeltheoretic answers to philosophical questions about language.12 This is why we stress that model theory should be primarily understood as amounting to extending languages, to making baseless languages based. On the other hand, philosophy is only enlightened common sense (as Popper once remarked), and therefore it would be unwise simply to ignore the intuition which equates model theory with semantics in the pre-theoretic sense: rather, we should seek the rational core of this intuition. Perhaps there might be a way of reconciling the traditional view of model theory (as the words-things question) with the one proposed here (as the words-words question). There are languages, we might say, which are “semantically transparent”, whose relation to the world is straightforward, and model theory can be considered as relating lan12 I discuss this predicament in detail in Peregrin (1995, Chapter 11 and 1996a) but see Hintikka 1988 for a defense of the contrary claim.
language and its models
15
guage to the world because it relates semantically non-transparent languages with semantically transparent ones. Moreover, it seems to be plausible to conclude that for a language to be semantically transparent means to have a basis. Henkin’s proof shows that establishing a basis means having the job of model theory essentially done. So, after all, there is a sense in which relating a baseless language to a based one, embedding the former into the latter, can be understood as establishing the link between words and things, i.e. as doing semantics in the direct sense. Is not model theory, therefore, the “direct” theory of semantics after all? The problem is that what is understood as furnishing model theory for a given language is in fact usually not furnishing a based language into which the language could be conservatively embedded. On the contrary: in the nontrivial cases it is impossible really to furnish a based extension, so model theory is left with merely postulating the existence of such an extension, and it is ultimately this point which precludes taking model theory as a direct theory of semantics. However, to articulate this intelligibly, we must examine more closely the point at which the nature of model theory comes into the open. 8. The Nature of the Quantifier From what has been said it follows that the lack of basis in the predicate calculus is somehow connected with quantification; let us thus analyze the notion of the quantifier. An excellent study of the nature of quantification in formal languages and of its early development has been presented by Goldfarb (1979). Commenting on the views of Bertrand Russell the author writes (p. 354): . . . the incorporation of quantifiers enables us to have principles that deal with infinity . . . . The meaning of our signs is only finitely complex ( . . . ). By the use of signs with such an intelligible meaning, we finite human beings reason about the infinite. But the nature of only finitely complex meaning of the quantifier cannot be given by some explanation from without. No such explanation can have any force. Rather, the meaning of quantification is shown by how we employ the signs, that is, by the logical rules of inference.
Hence for Russell, as for Frege before him, quantification was a means of reasoning about the infinite. It was an indirect means of such reasoning; however, this is not to be understood as claiming that Russell would have entertained the possibility of a reasoning about the infinite that would be direct. On the contrary, the conviction was, as Goldfarb aptly points out, that “the meaning of a quantifier cannot be given from without”.
16
jaroslav peregrin
It was Tarski who took the essential point of departure in this respect. It is not by chance that for the argument Tarski has used to document the insufficiency of the Frego-Hilbertian proof-theoretic approach and to substantiate the need of an alternative, model-theoretic approach, quantification was crucial. In the paper which is usually considered as the point of departure of model theory Tarski (1936) argues that the proof-theoretic approach is not able to account for the fact that the sentences ‘n has the property E’ for every natural n together entail the sentence ‘All natural numbers have the property E’. Let us reproduce the relevant part of Tarski’s paper: Schon vor mehreren Jahren habe ich ein Beispiel, u ¨brigens ein ganz elementares, einer derartigen Theorie gegeben, die folgende Eigent¨ umlichkeit aufweist: unter den Lehrs¨atzen dieser Theorie kommen solche S¨atze vor wie: A0 . 0 besitzt die gegebene Eigenschaft E, A1 . 1 besitzt die gegebene Eigenschaft E, u.s.w., im allgemeinen alle speziellen S¨atze der Form: An . n besitzt die gegebene Eigenschaft E, wobei ‘n’ ein beliebiges Symbol vertritt, das eine nat¨ urliche Zahl in einem bestimmten (z.B. dekadischen) Zahlensystem bezeichnet; dagegen l¨aßt sich der allgemeine Satz A. Jede nat¨ urliche Zahl besitzt die gegebene Eigenschaft E, auf Grund der betrachteten Theorie mit Hilfe der normalen Schlußregeln nicht beweisen. Diese Tatsache spricht, wie mir scheint, f¨ ur sich selbst: sie zeigt, daß der formalisierte Folgerungsbegriff, so wie er von den mathematischen Logikern allgemein verwendet wurde, sich mit dem u ¨ blichen keineswegs deckt. Inhaltlich scheint es doch sicher zu sein, daß der allgemeine Satz A aus der gesammtheit aller speziellen S¨atze A0 , A1 , . . . , An , . . . im u ¨blichen Sinne folgt: falls nur alle diese S¨atze wahr sind, so muß auch der Satz A wahr sind.13
Tarski’s proposal is to improve this via the introduction of his, model-theoretic, notion of consequence. His proposal runs as follows: 13 “Some years ago I gave a quite elementary example of a theory which shows the following peculiarity: among its theorems there occur such sentences as: A0 . 0 possesses the given property P , A1 . 1 possesses the given property P , and, in general, all particular sentences of the form An . n possesses the given property P , where ‘n’ represents any symbol which denotes a natural number in a given (e.g. decimal) number system. On the other hand the universal sentence: A. Every natural number possesses the given property P , cannot be proved on the basis of the theory in question by means of the normal rules of inference. This fact seems to me to speak for itself. It shows that the formalized concept of consequence as it is generally used by mathematical logicians, by no means coincides with the common concept. Yet intuitively it seems certain that the universal sentence A follows in the usual sense from the totality of particular sentences A0 , A1 , . . . , An , . . . . Provided all these sentences are true, the sentence A must also be true.”
language and its models
17
Die Aussage X folgt logisch aus den Aussagen der Klasse K dann und nur dann, wenn jedes Modell der Klasse K zugleich ein Modell der Aussage X ist14 .
Let us analyze Tarski’s argument in detail. What he is urging is in fact the reduction of the truth of the sentence ‘All natural numbers have the property E’ to the truth of the infinite set of sentences containing the sentence ‘n has the property E’ for every natural n. However, what does the truth of such an infinite set really amount to? To say that a definite sentence is true may be considered a kind of paraphrastic way of asserting the sentence itself. To state that the sentence ‘1 has the property E’ is true is to say that 1 has the property E. However, to say that the sentence ‘n has the property E’ is true for every n is no paraphrase: nobody can succeed in asserting an infinite number of sentences directly. Let us suppose we are to put down an instance of consequence. If the instance amounts to the fact that something follows from the truth of the sentence ‘1 has the property E’ (i.e. from the fact that 1 has the property E), we may consider it to follow either from the (“meta”)sentence ‘“1 has the property E” is true’ or from the sentence ‘1 has the property E’. However, if we say that something follows from the fact that the sentence ‘n has the property E’ is true for every n, then there is no alternative: we have no choice but ‘“n has the property E” is true for every n’. We cannot list all the sentences of an infinite set, so the articulation of the truth of all its members inevitably boils down to the truth of such or another “meta”sentence. What Tarski himself in fact says is that it is impossible to account for the fact that the “meta”sentence ‘ “n has the property E” is true for every natural n’ entails the sentence ‘All natural numbers have the property E’. And the employment of the “meta”sentence is no shortcut: there is no way of avoiding it.15 However, what is the real difference between ‘ “n has the property E” is true for every natural n’ and ‘All natural numbers have the property E’ ? To state ‘P (x)’ is true for every x is nothing other than to state P (x) for every x and hence, if we stick to the usual predicate-calculus formalism, to state ∀xP (x); the only substantial difference is that (from the viewpoint of the calculus) the first sentence is a metasentence, whereas the last one is a sentence proper. What makes the difference between ‘P (x)’ is true for every x and ∀xP (x) 14
“The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X.” 15 The whole problem is in fact only a special case of the general problem of the infinite; see Peregrin 1995, Chapter 9.
18
jaroslav peregrin
is that moving from the former to the latter we cross the boundary between that which we take as metalanguage and that which we take as language. However, to say that between two sentences, such as ‘P (x)’ is true for every x and ∀xP (x), there lies a boundary is not an empirical discovery, it is rather something we impose on the language to treat it in a way we want to; the concept of metalanguage is in fact a methodological, not a directly empirical one. It is an outcome of Tarski’s conceptual framework, and we can hardly accept that two things should be different only because we have decided to classify them into different compartments. 9. The Nature of Model Theory So let us return to our considerations concerning the nature of model theory. The point made at the end of the previous section can now be articulated as follows: model theory is (usually) not an embedding of a based language into a baseless “meta”language; it is only about such an embedding. And in fact, where the explicit presentation of the extended language actually is a possibility, i.e. where it suffices to introduce a finite number of new (“meta”)constants, there the situation is trivial. Let us consider the language of arithmetic. Furnishing model theory for this language amounts to introducing the infinity of numbers. But obviously we cannot introduce all the numbers explicitly (by listing them); we can at most stipulate the existence of the domain of all the numbers. Within the original language, there might be a valid sentence ∀xP (x). Model theory is incapable of explicitly furnishing the infinite number of “meta”statements 1 has the property P , 2 has the property P , etc.; it can only cover all these “meta”statements employing the “meta-meta”statement every n of the domain has the property P. Model theory for the predicate calculus can be seen as motivated by a desire to reduce quantificational truth to truth simpliciter of infinitely many instances. However, this cannot be accomplished by model theory; at least not in nontrivial cases. Model theory in these cases is not the embedding of a baseless language into a based “meta”language; but rather the translation of the baseless language into another baseless language, which is purported to be the “meta”language of a based “meta”language of the original language. Thus, far from actually reducing quantificational truth to truth simpliciter it is only stipulating such a reduction. Does all of this mean that model theory is nonsensical or vacuous? Not at all. Model theory amounts to relating two theories—the object
language and its models
19
language theory and a particular theory of sets. Such a relation can be interesting and can give rise to a respectable mathematical discipline; however, it should not be considered as relating expressions of the object language with things. The ultimate reason is not only that it amounts to a relation between two languages and not between a language and reality—we know that no theory could do better. The decisive reason is that it is not capable of relating a baseless language, such as that of a first-order theory, with a language that would be based and hence “semantically transparent”. This is to say that the idea of model theory, however interesting a mathematical discipline it might give birth to, is misguided as soon as it is considered to be capable of directly accounting for semantics of natural language and of explaining such pre-theoretic notions as truth, consequence or quantification. The underlying error consists in the failure to see the real nature of the infinite. A sentence is assumed to allude to infinity if it entails an unlimited number of certain consequences, and this is quite sound; what is not sound is to assume that this allusion to infinity can be made explicit. In that we manipulate our finite signs in a certain way, we do in a sense attain to the infinite; however, such an indirect way is in fact the only way in which we can really attain to it. 10. Logical Atomism Our considerations have been based on the assumption that it somehow belongs to the nature of language, or at least of a “semantically transparent” language, that it has a basis. Where does this feeling come from? The reason seems to be that we take for granted that the world has something as a basis, and that hence the language that faithfully accounts for it must have a basis, too. We usually consider the world as a kind of structure made of some basic building blocks, of what Putnam (1984) aptly calls the Furniture of the Universe. This idea found its most straightforward expression within several influential philosophical doctrines of the present century, namely within Russell’s logical atomism, Carnap’s logical empiricism and the philosophical doctrine of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. All these approaches share the conviction that in the foundation of our language there is an underlying basis of “atomic”, “protocol”, or “elementary” sentences; and they postulate the principal coincidence of the order of language with that of the world and that of our knowledge, so that they see the existence of the basis of atomic statements from which all other statements can be deduced as tantamount to the existence of a basis of atomic facts from which all other facts can be constituted and to the existence of a basis
20
jaroslav peregrin
of atomic pieces of our knowledge (“observations”) from which all our knowledge can be inferred. Logical empiricists even discussed the nature of concrete bases;16 but the fact is that no definite basis has been established for natural language. Nevertheless, if we accept that our world actually is as Russell, Carnap and the early Wittgenstein saw it, then the conclusion seems to be inevitable, that our natural language really is based—for otherwise we would be left with the conclusion that there are some parts of the world we are principally not able to speak about. Being a language—in the genuine sense of the word—thus seems synonymous with being a based language. However, there is no reason to believe that every part of language is necessarily itself a language; similarly we do not believe that every part of, say, an algebra must itself be an algebra. It seems to be the case that certain closure properties are essential for the concept of language, and that besides syntactic closure properties certain semantic or truthvaluational closure properties are also relevant. If this is right, then what looks like a language may sometimes be a mere pseudolanguage: it may be a fragment of a language whose boundaries are not chosen properly. A formal language can be considered as metaphorically “cut out” from its metalanguage; all languages being ultimately “cut out” from natural language, from the “metalanguage of all metalanguages”. Our conviction that there should be a basis within every language indicates that a language in which there is none may be in some sense be faulty, that it has been erroneously gerrymandered. Model theory can then be helpfully considered as an attempt to restore the ‘right’ boundaries, to cut out the language anew without the error, to round off the original language. Hence model theory, viewed from this perspective, can be considered as an attempt at a readjustment of a language cut out in a wrong way, an attempt to realign the language. If this is acceptable, then model-theoretic semantics of natural language may be considered as an attempt to realign natural language; however, out of what could natural language be considered to be improperly cut out? Logical atomism may suggest the idea that it is not our natural language, but the world itself that should be taken as the ultimate metalanguage—but it is hard to see how this idea could be substantiated. Indeed it is highly debatable that the atomistic view of our world is adequate. The linguistic turn taught us to see the structure of the world in terms of the structure of the language we use to cope with 16
From Carnap 1928 on.
language and its models
21
the world, rather than the other way round. Logic shows us that there are many sentences that can be seen as following from other, simpler sentences; and this may be understood to mean that there are many facts that can be seen as constituted out of other, simpler facts. But logic does not guarantee that there is a basis of “atomic” statements from which all other statements would follow—this is a philosophical doctrine; and it is worth considering whether it is really so plausible as it usually seems. Giving up atomism means embracing holism and consequently pluralism (if there is no definite basis, then the decision what to take as basic and what as inferred is ours), and this may seem to be incompatible with the rigor of logic; but scholars like Quine have made it seem plausible that logic may be of a piece with holism.17 11. Conclusion We have tried to indicate that it is preferable to see semantics as primarily a matter of the consequence relation, rather than as a matter of Tarskian assignment of set-theoretic objects. This supports a perspective on logical calculi the reverse of that which is widespread nowadays: the perspective of viewing proof-theory as more basic than model-theory. From this vantage point it is more appropriate to see, for example, incompleteness not as a failure on the part of axiomatics to capture a model-theoretically delimited class of sentences, but rather as a failure on the part of model-theory. That second-order predicate calculus is incomplete does not mean that its axiomatics is unsatisfactory, but rather that its classical model theory is inappropriate, that it is Henkin’s models that are the “right” ones. An orthodox model-theoretician may consider the majority of such considerations irrelevant; what she is after is a mathematical theory and model theory has proven itself to be an interesting mathematical theory. Completeness and incompleteness results are mathematical results which need not invoke any considerations of what is primary or what is appropriate. This is, indeed, true; however, there are not many model-theoreticians consequently orthodox in this sense. The relation between an expression and its model-theoretic interpretation is often understood not as a relation between two abstract entities of a mathematical theory, but rather directly as a relation between an expression and its meaning. Model-theory is increasingly understood as semantics in the intuitive, pre-theoretic sense of the word. While Tarski was— despite some problematical claims—principally aware that it is tricky to see model theory otherwise than in terms of extending languages (or 17
See also Peregrin (In preparation).
22
jaroslav peregrin
mapping languages on their metalanguages), many of his followers, be they mathematicians or theoreticians of language, lack this awareness and mistake model theory for metaphysics. Contrary to Montague’s popular claim that there is no substantial difference between natural and formal languages we are convinced that there is quite a fundamental difference which manifests itself also in connection with model theory: it makes sense to make a model theory of a fragment of natural language or of a formal counterpart of such a fragment (and so to possibly repair its “false alignment”), there is, however, no clear sense in applying model theory to an entire natural language. The idea that model theory is semantics because it deals with assignments of objects to expressions and because semantics is also a matter of objects connected with expressions, is misguided. Model theory can indeed be considered a theory of semantics, but not in force of being an imitation of the ‘real’ denotandum/denotatum relation, but rather in force of being an account for consequence.18 References Carnap, R. 1928. Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Berlin. Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Goldfarb, Warren D. 1979. Logic in the twenties: The nature of the quantifier. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 44, pp. 351–368. Henkin, L. 1949. The completeness of the first-order functional calculus. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 14, pp. 159–166. Henkin, L. 1950. Completeness in the theory of types. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 15, pp. 81–91. Hintikka, J. 1988. On the development of the model-theoretic viewpoint in logical theory. Synth`ese, 77, pp. 1–36. Reprinted in J. Hintikka, Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator (Selected Papers 2), Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997, pp. 104–139. Montague, R. 1974. Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of R. Montague, edited by R. Thomason. Yale University Press, Yale. Peregrin, J. 1994. Interpreting formal logic. Erkenntnis, 40, pp. 5–20. Peregrin, J. 1995. Doing Worlds with Words. Kluwer, Dordrecht. 18 See also Peregrin 1994, where a similar conclusion was reached starting from considerations of another kind, namely from considerations of different meanings of the term semantic interpretation.
language and its models
23
Peregrin, J. 1996a. Logic and the pursuit of meaning. Logic and Linguistic in the Pursuit of Meaning (Studies in Logic and Philosophy—Department of Logic preprints). Available via the author’s homepage: http://www.cuni.cz/∼peregrin. Peregrin, J. 1996b. Linguistics and philosophy. Logic and Linguistic in the Pursuit of Meaning (Studies in Logic and Philosophy – Department of Logic preprints). Available via the author’s homepage: http://www.cuni.cz/∼peregrin. Peregrin, J. In preparation. When meaning goes by the board, what about philosophy? Proceedings of ANALYOMEN 2. Putnam, H. 1984. After Ayer, after empiricism. Partisan Review, 51. Reprinted as ”After empiricism” in Post-analytic Philosophy, edited by J. Rajchmann and C. West, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, pp. 20–30. Quine, W.V.O. 1953. From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Quine, W.V.O. 1960. Word and Object. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Quine, W.V.O. 1969. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press, New York. Schlick, M. 1932. The future of philosophy. College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy, 1, pp. 45–62. ¨ Tarski, A. 1936. Uber den Begriff der logischen Folgerung. Actes du Congr´es International de Philosophique Scientifique, 7, pp. 1–11. Translated as ”On the concept of logical consequence”, in Tarski 1956, pp. 409-420. Tarski, A. 1956. Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Blackwell, Oxford. Translated as Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. Wittgenstein, L. 1977. Vermischte Bemerkungen, edited by G.H. von Wright. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. Translated as Culture and Value, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic
When meaning goes by the board, what about philosophy? Jaroslav Peregrin [from G.Meggle amd J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.): Analyomen 2: Proceedings of the 2nd Conference „Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy“, Vol II: Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1997; original pagination]
1. Philosophy as the Pursuit of Meaning Philosophy is usually considered to be searching out the most general, and hence also the most necessary and the most eternal, truth; its central part, ontology, is often assumed to be fastening upon whatever might be "the form of the world". And because our world is the world as formed by the way we comprehend it and by the way we cope with it by means of our language, it is often assumed that its form must be brought out by the analysis of the interrelations between the meanings of our words and our statements. This is why many philosophers, and analytic philosophers in particular, say that philosophy consists in the analysis of meaning. However, to maintain that philosophy is in this way interlocked with necessary truth and with meaning is no longer a simple matter. Both these concepts are being constantly challenged. Is there, after all, something like necessary truth (pace Quine) to be captured by philosophy? Can we still maintain that there is a meaning (pace not only Quine, but also Austin, Wittgenstein and other sceptics), which can constitute the subject to philosophical analyses? And if these concepts should become endangered species, then what about philosophy?
2. Philosophical Theory? To answer these questions, let us reconsider the question as to what it is that philosophy is searching out. The roots of the way in which contemporary analytical philosophers would generally answer this question can be traced back to the pioneers of the analytic movement, in particular to the Vienesse
Jaroslav Peregrin: When Meaning Goes by the Board, What about Philosophy?
217
logical empiricists. In a programmatic article, Moritz Schlick proposed to distinguish between the pursuit of truth (yielding contingent theses "about the world") and the pursuit of meaning (yielding necessary interconnections between concepts we use); he identified science with the former and philosophy with the latter (Schlick 1932). In this way, the philosophers of the linguistic turn claimed to have found a new definition of philosophy establishing it as a scientifically respectable enterprise and blocking attempts to decry it as what they considered unscientific metaphysical rubbish; and it is in fact this way of thinking which continues to provide the underlay for the intuitions of the majority of analytical philosophers. However, proposals such as Schlick's are tricky. Does the pursuit of meaning mean the same as the pursuit of truth about meaning? It seems that in whichever way we answer this question, we are in trouble. If we do identify the pursuit of meaning with the pursuit of truth about meaning, then philosophy turns out to be identical with a branch of science, namely empirical semantics; and if we reject the identification, then we are left with the conclusion that philosophy is not to yield truths, which seems to be absurd. In the former case we would in fact have no philosophy at all, while in the latter philosophy would be something mysterious and there could surely be no philosophical theory. Logical positivists do not seem to have realized the full significance of this dilemma; they wished to consider philosophy as a theoretical discipline par excellance and so embraced the first answer. Thus Carnap considers meaningful philosophical statements simply as "second-order" contingent truths, as truths about the language in which we formulate the "first-order" truths about the world; philosophy, according to him, is "the logical syntax of the language of science" (Carnap 1934). It would seem to follow from this that philosophy is simply a science, a particular brand of linguistics; but Carnap insists that philosophy, at the very same time, nevertheless constitutes the foundation to science. Carnap's position is thus untenable: we cannot have philosophy both as a theory and, simultaneously, as something fundamental to every theory. Either we must relinguish the theoretical character of philosophy, or we must relinguish its foundational character. This predicament became the central problem for those philosophers of the analytical tradition, most significantly Wittgenstein and Quine, who realized the failure of positivism. These two philosophers chose different ways: Wittgenstein believed that philosophy is in a sense foundational and he realized that in such circumstances it can be neither theoretic, nor systematic; thus he concluded that philosophy must be understood as something as a collection of "therapeutic" hints. Quine, on the
218
Section 4: Philosophy of Language
other hand, wanted to uphold the theoretical status of philosophy and saw that consequently he must relinguish the idea of philosophy as fundamental to science. This led him to his rejecting the very idea of a fundament, of a Cartesian prima philosophia, and to his considering philosophical theory as a bundle of scientific results marked not by being firmer or more fundamental than the rest of science, but by being relevant for questions which are traditionally considered as philosophical. However, there might seem to be a third way, a way which allows us to defend Carnap's stance and to have philosophy both as a theoretical, and a foundational discipline. We may hold that philosophy does yield truths, but truths which are firmer than those yielded by science, because they are analytic. Under this view, philosophy appears to be a special kind of theory which - in force of the firmness of its truths - is fundamental to every other theory. Seen from this viewpoint, philosophy also appears to coincide with logic, which can be seen as a theoretical account of necessary truth. To illuminate the real nature of this proposal, we must consider the nature of necessary truth.
3 The Nature of Necessary Truth It seems to be obvious that some true statements merely happen to be true, whereas others are true necessarily; no matter whether one speaks about truths of fact and truths of reason, real and verbal truths, matters of fact and relations of ideas, analytic and synthetic truths or contingent and necessary truths. Statements true in the former way are usually considered to express some kind of junctions of things and they are thought of as made true by things really being joined in the manner they declare them to be; statements true in the latter way are taken to amount to limitations of the joinability of things (where the limitations can again be seen as certain junctions of objects - in this case as everlasting junctions of some "higher-order" objects in a "third realm"). It is this picture which was challenged by Quine in his celebrated Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Quine 1951). Quine's point is that the boundary between necessary and contingent truth is not an absolute one, that it is rather a more or less pragmatic matter; that we can never verify a single isolated statement, because it is only whole theories, or at least their nontrivial parts, that ever can be really verified. To be necessary thus, according to him, means to be so interwoven with the "web of our beliefs" that we cannot imagine giving it up without doing the whole web a serious harm. A similar picture emerges from the enigmatic writings of the late Wittgenstein: necessity is the matter of the rules of the language game being played, of the theory we employ. Such rules are unsurmountable as long as we
Jaroslav Peregrin: When Meaning Goes by the Board, What about Philosophy?
219
are inside of the game, but they appear deliberate as soon as we move outside of it. Thus, Quine's claim, "any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system" (Quine 1963, 43), can be paralleled by Wittgenstein's (1953, p.69) "it is in a sense arbitrary what is called possible and what is not called possible" (Wittgenstein 1953, 69). Rules are in this clear sense arbitrary; and so are analytic truths as articulations of rules. Hence the arbitrariness of what is necessary, and consequently of what is possible. However, we must be careful not to take this Wittgensteino-Quinean stance in an oversimplified way. To accept a language means to approve some of its sentences as necessarily true. There is no principal need to adopt a particular language (although our native language is in a sense forced upon us and it is just this language which furnished us with our ultimate means of theoretical coping with the world); however, doing theory (in the broadest sense of the word) and engaging oneself in rational argumentation presupposes adoption of a language as an unquestionable basis. Language is a Janus-faced being: its rules, its necessary truths, when seen "from outside", are contingent and deliberate, but when seen "from inside", are necessary and obligatory. To say that something is necessarily true is not to say anything factual, rather it amounts to (as Ayer, 1936, pointed out) declaring one's conformity with a certain language game, one's willingness to accept a certain language. If I say that All humans are mortal is necessarily true, then what I say is that if I encounter an immortal being I am not going to consider it a man. If someone disagrees, then our disagreement cannot be settled by investigation of the world; his disagreement simply means that he is playing a language game different from the one that I am. I can persuade him (for example by showing him some books from which it would follow that my game is the one played by the majority of speakers of English), but I cannot show that he is false in the sense in which I could if, for example, he denied that Bill Clinton is mortal. Thus it is, indeed, in a sense arbitrary which statements are necessarily true - but only if we view language from outside. Accepting the language as our means of communication - and we need a language all the time - we surrender the possibility of querying its necessary truths, on pain of blurring the boundary between consistency and inconsistency and so loosing the firm ground beneath our feet, downgrading language to a bundle of expressive shrieks. However, it is to some extent possible to tamper with necessary truth without breaking down rational communication; and that language is in fact nothing other than an equilibrium between the stability guaranteeing ongoing understanding and the variability making language into something more than a mere set of symbols.
220
Section 4: Philosophy of Language
Our language can be seen as the stage we set up for the world to make its appearance; necessary truth is our setting up the stage, contingent truths are then the way the world appears. Changing language we change the appearance of the world. However, we must beware of taking this scheme-content way of viewing the language absolutely; the decomposition into a scheme and a content should rather be seen as our way of viewing how language works, as our making sense of the working. Hence the necessary/contingent boundary can be seen as the matter of the outside observer's way of viewing the game; and one and the same game may be viewed in different ways drawing the boundary at various places. This is the point of the holistic insight of Wittgenstein and Quine. However, there is more to necessary truth than this. Some necessary truths are constitutive to the actual language game; and the explicit adherence to them makes it possible for the speakers to retain the common ground. To play the game is to take these truths as necessary. The necessary truth of such statements is not the mere matter of the outside observer's conclusion with respect to the way they are handled by the speakers; it is the matter of the speaker's credo, of their making it explicit that they are willing to accept the language game which is being played.
4 Logic and Philosophy after the Fall of the Dogma The recognition of the real character of the necessity/contingency opposition as initiated by Wittgenstein and Quine, constitutes a real challenge to logic logic is to be the pursuit of necessary truth, but does not necessary truth turn out to be something like a mere chimera? However, logic does continue as the summarization of necessary truths - a finite grasp on the infinity of instances of consequences. The difference is only that as necessity turns out to amount not to an ultimate structure of reality, but rather "merely" to the rules of the way we spell out reality, logic turns out to be not the "true canon of the Universe", but rather only the code of our way of theoretizing and our argumentation. Logical truths are necessary not because they reach beyond language into a realm of unchanging and ever-lasting propositions, but because they summarize certain basic relevant patterns of our language on which our overall interaction with the world rests. What in particular is put into doubt is the atomistic view of the world, which has underpinned our understanding of logic for almost the whole century. Logic keeps us yielding cases for the reduction of truth of some statements to the truth of other statements; and these we can continue to view as amounting to the reduction of more complex facts to simpler ones, or to the reduction of some more advanced pieces of our knowledge to other, more
Jaroslav Peregrin: When Meaning Goes by the Board, What about Philosophy?
221
primitive ones. However, it seems no longer feasible simply to assume that there is an absolute, ultimate basis of elementary statements (or of elementary facts, or of elementary pieces of knowledge) to which all other statements (facts, pieces of knowledge) must be reducible. What counts as elementary from one visual angle can count as complex from another; and there is no absolute viewpoint, no God's eye view of the Universe as one closed system (Putnam, 1984, p.27). As Hacking puts it, "logic, depth grammar, structuralism, and the like should postulate points of convergence or condensation, not atoms." (Hacking 1979, 315) Philosophy can still, in a sense, be understood as the pursuit of meaning; but we must not take such a definition as implying that meaning is something absolutely fixed and that the task of philosophy is simply to point it out. We can no longer see necessary truth as something given once and forever by the way our words hook onto the world, and we can no longer claim that the task of philosophy is to discover the true structure of the world beyond all languages and the relationship of words to nodes of this structure. Philosophy is a matter of the critique of the usefulness of the languages we use, it does not result in theories in our common language, but rather at practical hints that are to make us see, to use Austin's popular turn of phrase, how we do things with words, and how else we could do them. We can imagine that viewed "from Nowhere", "by God's eye", the world can be considered as sheer contingency displaying regularity of only the causal kind; linguistic utterances appearing to be merely peculiar kinds of events obeying the all-encompassing web of causes and effects. But insofar as we are no Gods, each of us has to dwell "within a language", to observe the world through its prism and to perceive some of its God's-eye-view-contingencies as necessities. We have to admit that Heidegger (taken, since Carnap, as the prototypical enemy of an analytical philosopher) was right in stressing that language is not a tool, but rather the way of our existence; that it is the House of our Being (Heidegger 1959). Logic and philosophy can be considered as searching out the description of this house established by our language; helping us to figure out its architecture and so to help us feel at home in it.
222
Section 4: Philosophy of Language
5. References Ayer, Alfred J.: Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936. Schlick, M.: The Future of Philosophy. College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy 1 (1932), 45-62. Carnap, R.: On the Character of Philosophic Problems. Philosophy of Science 1 (1934), 5-19. Hacking, Ian: What is Logic? Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 285-319. Heidegger, Martin: Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen 1959. Putnam, Hilary: After Empiricism. In Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. by J.Rajchmann and C.West, New York 1984, 21-30. Quine, Willard Van Orman: Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20-43. Reprinted in Quine (1963). Quine, Willard Van Orman: From the Logical Point of View, New York 1963. Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Philosophische Untersuchungen, Oxford 1953.
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 1 de 18
DYNAMIC SEMANTICS WITH CHOICE FUNCTIONS Jaroslav Peregrin and Klaus von Heusinger1
1 Introduction Over the last two decades, semantic theory has been marked by a continuing shift from a static view of meaning to a dynamic one. The increasing interest in extending semantic analysis from isolated sentences to larger units of discourse has fostered the intensive study of anaphora and coreference, and this has engendered a shift from viewing meaning as truth conditions to viewing it as the potential to change the "informational context". One of the central problems of discourse analysis is the treatment of anaphorical expressions, of discourse pronouns and definite NPs. The traditional solution is to take pronouns as bound variables and to analyze definite NPs by means of the Russellian iota inversum operator; and this solution is usually taken over also by those semantic theories which take the dynamics of language at face value. However, as we try to show, theories falling in with this approach necessarily stop half way in the dynamic enterprise and, therefore, cannot achieve a satisfactory semantical analysis of anaphora. In the present paper we propose to apply the dynamic approach uniformly to all expressions. We give a dynamic treatment not only to meanings of sentences and supersentential units of discourse, but also to those of pronouns and NPs. This is possible by exploring the intuitive idea of salience and by its formalization by means of choice functions. A definite NP the P is taken to refer to the most salient P (to that entity which is yielded by the actual choice function for the set of all P's); discourse pronouns are then considered as equivalent to certain definite NPs. Thus, the mechanism of choice manages to supplant both the apparatus of binding of variables (or discourse markers), on the one hand, and the Russellian analysis of definite NPs, on the other. This enables us to represent all anaphorical expressions uniformly. Salience, however is not a global and static property of a discourse, but rather a local and dynamic one - an indefinite NP can change a given salience by raising a new entity to the most salient one.2 Therefore, a linguistic expression is semantically characterized neither by its truth conditions, nor by its potential to change assignments of individuals to some artificial syntactic objects such as variables or discourse markers, but rather by its salience change potential, which we formalize as its potential to change the actual choice function. In an utterance such as a man walks, the indefinite NP a man is taken to refer to an arbitrarily chosen element of the class of men, and this individual is in the same time taken to update the actual choice function in such a way that it becomes the value of the function for the class of men (i.e. it becomes the most salient man).3 A subsequent anaphorical expression like the man in the man whistles is then interpreted according to this updated choice function - and, therefore, comes to refer to the same individual that was introduced (arbitrarily chosen) by the indefinite NP in the preceding utterance. The pronoun he in he whistles is interpreted in the same way; it refers to the referent that was
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 2 de 18
introduced by the indefinite NP a man. The present theory is worked out as a modification of Groenendijk & Stokhof's (1991) dynamic logic and is hence based on the idea of treating the meaning of a sentence as the relation between its "input" and "output" referential links; it differs from Groenendijk and Stokhof's classical version of dynamic logic in formalizing referential links not by means of assignments of objects to discourse markers, but rather by means of choice functions. This makes it possible to analyze NPs not via quantifiers, but instead simply as terms (already Hintikka 1974); and consequently to dispose of any kind of variables or discourse markers, thus making the structure of semantic representation straightforwardly correspond to that of the analyzed discourse4. Furthermore, atomic formulas are taken to be both internally and externally dynamic. The theory assumes, together with discourse representation theories (cf. Kamp 1981 and Heim 1982), that anaphora and definiteness are two sides of the same familiarity principle; we take definiteness to presuppose not simply the unique existence, but rather the unique referential availability. However, we do not assume that this forces us to represent anaphora by means of binding. We agree with Etype analyses (Evans 1977, Neale 1990, Heim 1990, van Eijck, 1993) that discourse pronouns are definite descriptions, but we do not agree that this kind of definiteness could be explicated in the Russellian way. We prefer to employ an Hilbertian treatment of definite expressions with the epsilon operator, which substitutes the Russellian uniqueness condition by the principle of choice. Since Hilbert's epsilon operator, which we thus engage instead of Russell's iota inversum, expresses a global and static choice function, we have to make this function context dependent (cf. Egli 1991, and Egli & von Heusinger 1995), which we realize by embedding them into the Groenendijko-Stokhofian framework5. The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we discuss the motivation for dynamic semantics as rooted in the shift from sentence semantics to discourse semantics. Connected with this shift we can perceive at least three kinds of important, and mutually interrelated problems: the basic problem of the compositional analysis of an anaphora-laden discourse, the problem of how to account for crossreference - where possible - by linguistic means, and the problem of a uniform representation of anaphorical expressions. We show that dynamic logic, although it solves - besides other - the first of these problems in a very elegant way, does not really tackle the other two. Anaphorical NPs continue to be analyzed via Russellian definite descriptions governed by the problematic uniqueness condition, and the right resolution of anaphorical links is simply presupposed. In section 3 we propose our modification of dynamic logic that would solve the latter two of the mentioned problems. We give the definition of the apparatus and we show how to apply it. Then we hint at various ways of extending the apparatus with the aim to cover further linguistic data; and, of course, we cannot avoid giving our own account of donkey sentences. Finally, we discuss further extensions of our theory to other quantifiers and events. In section 4 we give the conclusion.
2 The dynamic view and its intricacies 2.1 The classical problem The new problems brought about by extending analysis from isolated sentences to larger units of discourse and texts were extensively discussed by Geach (1962). He used classical predicate logic; examining (1) he arrived at the straightforward analysis (1'). A man walks. He whistles ∃x (man(x) & walk(x) & whistle(x))
(1) (1')
It is easy to see that (1') is an adequate analysis of (1); and we should expect the two sentences constituting (1) to be analyzable in such a way that the two analyses would add up to (1'). However,
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 3 de 18
although there is no problem with analyzing (2) as (2'), there is no straightforward way to analyze (3): A man walks He whistles ∃x (man(x) & walk(x)) ???
(2) (3) (2') (3')
This is the most general problem; we can call it the problem of compositionality. Another, affiliated and more specific, problem, concerns the link between the anaphorical pronoun he and its antecedent a man in (1). We cannot analyze (2) and (3) independently, because the argument of man in (2) and that of whistle in (3) are to be bound by the same quantifier. We shall call this the problem of correference. A third problem was mentioned by Evans (1977), who criticized the Geachian way of representing pronouns as bound variables: he showed that this representation is too strong and yields inadequate truth conditions. Evans himself proposed to represent pronouns as definite descriptions which obtain their descriptive material from the antecedent sentence (plus context). However, this analysis raises new problems: the uniqueness condition implied by the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions is still too strong. We will call this problem the problem of definite description. The development of a new family of semantic theories, all of which are based on a dynamic notion of meaning, was stimulated especially by a desire to solve the general problem of compositionality. Some of the most influential among them (esp. Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1991) adhere to the Geachian tradition in representing anaphorical pronouns as bound variables. An alternative view stems from Evans and represents discourse pronouns as definite descriptions (Evans 1977, Slater 1988, Neale 1990, Heim 1990, Chierchia 1992, van der Does 1993). However, such theories fail, or have difficulties, in solving the problem of definite descriptions.
2.2 The way of dynamic logic Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991) offered an elegant solution to the problem of compositionality they introduced a "dynamic version" of the existential quantifier, a version which binds variables even outside what would traditionally be considered as its scope. (The side effect of this move is that variables loose something of their essential character and that they become what Groenendijk & Stokhof call discourse markers.)6 If we denote this version of the existential quantifier as ∃dyn, we can analyze (2) as (2'') and (3) as (3''); the concatenation of these two formulas is then taken to yield (1'') (by way of a suitable dynamic redefinition of &), which can be seen to be - after "dedynamization" - equivalent to (1'). ∃dynd1 (man(d1) &dyn walk(d1)) whistle(d1)
(2'') (3'')
∃dynd1 (man(d1) &dyn walk(d1)) &dyn whistle(d1) (1'') The key to the dynamization of ∃ is that instead of taking the semantic value of a sentence to be a truth value it is taken to be a relation between assignments of values to discourse markers. However, Groenendijk & Stokhof's solution is less satisfactory on closer inspection. Our success in analyzing (2) and (3) was conditioned by the fact that we used the same discourse marker in both formulas - if we used d1 in (2) and d2 in (3), then we would have not been successful. However, if the problem is to give independent analyses of (2) and (3) in such a way that they could be straightforwardly concatenated into the adequate analysis of (1), then Groenendijk and Stokhof's
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 4 de 18
method evidently falls short of solving it - if we analyze (3) independently of (2), then the composition could work only by pure chance. The point is that analyzing (3) we can see no reason for employing d1 rather than, say, d2 - we can see no reason to favour one discourse marker over another. The problem seems to be rooted in the nature of discourse markers - like variables they are not anchored to any overt items of natural language, but unlike variables they are not equivalent whistle(d1) is not a formula equivalent with whistle(d2). In fact, this is only a new reincarnation of the traditional problem of how to get the antecedent of an anaphorical term. The traditional way to handle this is to interlock corefering expressions by means of coindexing - but this clearly does not solve the problem, but only moves it outside of the theory. It is assumed that our formal model starts where coindexing, and hence anaphora resolution, is already done. Groenendijk & Stokhof accepted this common policy; they assume that the choice of right discourse markers is something which is either taken for granted, or at least a job for someone else.
2.3 Definite descriptions Discourse representation theories (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982) reduce definiteness to the principle of familiarity according to which a definite expression refers to a familiar or already introduced discourse referent. In this way, definite and indefinite NPs can both be represented as terms (or as variables). However, such theories usually do not distinguish between different familiar discourse referents, i.e. they do not solve the problem of coreference. Dynamic logic, by contrast, usually keeps - in effect - to the classical representation of indefinite NPs as existential quantifiers and definite NPs as Russellian iota terms. Even the dynamic interpretation of indefinite NPs with nondeterministic programs, as proposed by van Eijck, although in some aspects similar to our employment of choice functions, still cannot escape this Russellian predicament. Van Eijck (1993, p. 240) writes: "[...] in a dynamic setup the interpretation of an indefinite description can be viewed as an act of picking an arbitrary individual, i.e. as an indeterministic action". Therefore, instead of employing the (dynamic) existential quantifier, he uses a dynamic eta term for representing indefinite NPs. The eta operator is not interpreted as a term-creating operator, but rather as dynamic quantifier: "Note that η and ι are program building operators (in fact, dynamic quantifiers) rather than term building operators, as in the logic of Hilbert & Bernays" (van Eijck 1993, p. 245). Furthermore, definite noun phrases are treated according to the Russellian uniqueness condition interpreting definite noun phrases: "It is not difficult to see that this [i.e. the interpretation conditions for ι] results in the Russell treatment for definite descriptions." (ibid.). This indicates that even this modification of dynamic logic does not suceed in applying the dynamic approach in a way such as to dispose of the classical framework which would seem to be responsible for posing the classical problems.
3 Dynamic logic with choice functions 3.1 A sketch of the solution Here we would like to attack the classical problem via a new approach; we propose a modification of dynamic logic which makes do without discourse makers and hence without quantifiers. The idea, taking its cue from the considerations of von Heusinger (1992), is simply to replace assignment of values to discourse markers by Hilbertian choice functions. Roughly speaking, we can say that if we encounter an indefinite noun phrase, then we do not introduce anything like a discourse marker that would be assigned a referent; instead we let the referent be associated with the noun phrase itself via
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 5 de 18
the extension of its predicative part. Formally, we introduce epsilon functions as functions from the power-set of the universe into the universe such that if e is an epsilon function, then e(s) ∈ s for every subset s of the universe.7 An epsilon function is thus a choice function: it chooses "representatives" of subsets of the universe. Semantic values of sentences are then taken to be relations between epsilon functions - this means that we can look at a sentence as something that gets an input epsilon function and yields (indeterministically) an output epsilon function. The basic idea is that an occurrence of an indefinite noun phrase a(n) N obliges the actual epsilon function to choose a representative of the extension of N, and that a subsequent occurrence of the definite noun phrase the N can be taken to refer to this very element. Let us consider (1); i.e. (2) followed by (3). Let us assume that there is an epsilon function e which is input to (2). The evaluation of (2) results in an output epsilon function e' which is just like the input function e save for the single possible difference that there is a representative of the class of men (who walks), i.e. that there is a d ∈ ||man|| such that e'(||man||) = d and d ∈ ||walk||. This function is passed to (3) which can then identify d as the referent for the man. According to this intuitive motivation we make the preliminary assumption that the definite article is formalized as an "epsilon test" whereas the indefinite article is represented as an epsilon update that changes the actual epsilon function.
3.2 The theory Let us assume that we have the non-empty universe U of individuals. An epsilon function (or a choice function) f is a partial function from the power-set of U into U such that f(s)∈s for every s⊆U for which f is defined. This means that the class EPSU of all epsilon functions based on U is defined as follows (where D(f) and R(f) denote the domain and the range of f, respectively)8: DEF1. EPSU = {f | D(f)⊆Pow(U) and R(f)⊆U and f(s)∈s for every s∈D(f)} We further define update functions for epsilon functions, or epsilon updates in short. An epsilon update is a function of three arguments: if it is fed an epsilon-function, an element of the universe and a subset of the universe, it yields a new epsilon function. So formally we define DEF2. UPD = {f | D(f)=EPS×U×Pow(U) and R(f)⊆EPS} The basic epsilon-update, which we shall denote as upd1, is such that if it is applied to an epsilon function e, an individual d and a set s, then it outputs the epsilon function e' which is just like e with the single possible exception that if d∈s, then e'(s)=d. DEF3. upd1 is the element of UPD defined as follows upd1(e,d,s)(s') = d if s'=s and d∈s = e(s') otherwise We shall write e'=es as the shorthand for ∃d.e'=upd1(e,d,s)9. If e2=e1s and e3=e2s', then we shall also write e3=e1s,s'. upd1 can be seen as the first approximation to the explication of an indefinite NP's salience change potential: an indefinite NP a man can be thought of as selecting an arbitrary man and changing the actual epsilon function so that the arbitrarily chosen man becomes the current
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 6 de 18
representative for the class of men. Now we can define a fragmentary language to illustrate how epsilon functions can be used to build dynamic semantics. We do it in three steps, describing the lexicon, the syntax and the semantics. DEF4a. (lexicon) There are the following categories of expressions; the constants of each category (if any) are listed in brackets: 1. sentences 2. terms (constants he, she, it) 3. n-ary predicates for n>0 (constants man, walk, whistles, farmer, boring, woman, thing for n=1; own, beat for n=2) 4. determiners (constants a, the) 5. n-ary logical operators for n=1,2 (the constant ¬ for n=1; &, ∨ for n=2) 6. quantifiers (constants some, every) Note that there are neither variables, nor discourse markers within our language. This is made possible by the fact that we represent indefinite NPs as terms expressing epsilon updates, and that we do not treat anaphorical relations in any way evocative of the binding of predicate logic. DEF4b. (syntax) 1. If P is a unary predicate and D a determiner, then D(P) is a term. 2. if T1,...,Tn are terms and R an n-ary predicate, then R(T1,...,Tn) is a sentence. 3. If S is a sentence and o a unary logical operator, then oS is a sentence. 4. If S1 and S2 are sentences and o a binary logical operator, then S1oS2 is a sentence. 5. If Q is a quantifier and S1, S2 sentences, then Q(S1,S2) is a sentence. DEF4c. (semantics) A model is a pair , where U is a set and || || is a function such that (i) if T is a term, then ||T||∈U; (ii) if R is an n-ary predicate, then ||R||∈Un. If T is a term and e∈EPSU, then we define the value ||T||e in the following way: ||T|| if T is a constant term ||T||e = e(||P||) if T is D(P) for a determiner D and a predicate P We extend the function || || to the categories of terms and sentences so that if E is a term or a sentence, then ||E||⊆EPSxEPS: 1a. ||a(P)|| = {<e,e'>| e'=e||P||} 1b. ||the(P)|| = {<e,e'>| e'=e and e'(||P||) is defined} 1c. ||he|| = ||the(man)|| 1d. ||she|| = ||the(woman)|| 1e. ||it|| = ||the(thing)|| 2. ||P(T1,...,Tn)|| = {<e,e'>| there exist e0,...,en so that e=e0 and e'=en and <e0,e1>∈||T1|| and ... and <en1,en>∈||Tn|| and <||T1||e1,...,||Tn||en>∈||P||} 3. ||¬S|| = {<e,e'>| e=e' and there is no e'' such that <e,e''>∈||S||} 4a. ||S1;S2|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||S1|| and <e'',e'>∈||S2||} 4b. ||S1&S2|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||S1|| and <e'',e'>∈||S2||} (= ||S1;S2||)
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 7 de 18
4c. ||S1∨S2|| = {<e,e'>| e=e' and there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||S1|| or <e,e''>∈||S2||} 5a. ||every(S1,S2)|| = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈||S1||, then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈||S2||} 5b. ||some(S1,S2)|| = {<e,e'>| e=e' and there exist e1 and e2 such that <e,e1>∈||S1||, and <e1,e2>∈||S2||} Let us add some explanations to bring out the insights behind the apparatus. An indefinite NP a P is taken to express an epsilon-update, i.e. its function is taken to be the updating of the actual epsilon function e to a new epsilon function e'. e' then differs from e at most in the representative of the set of P; the NP is taken to refer to this representative. We write e||P|| for an e' resulting from the evaluation of a P with the input e. A definite NP the P is taken to refer to the representative of the set of P's according to the current epsilon function; it is taken to express the trivial epsilon-update.10 Further, it is required that there is at least one P - this expresses the existential presupposition of definite NPs. There is no uniqueness condition - it is replaced by the condition that there exists the representative of the set of P's. A pronoun is defined to be semantically equivalent to the impoverished definite NP expressing merely the corresponding gender.11 The atomic sentence is semantically characterized via its potential to change the current epsilon function e to the updated function e' by way of the subsequent application of the updates expressed by its terms. Thus, e and e' must be connected by a sequence of epsilon functions such that the adjacent pairs of the sequence fall into the respective updates expressed by the terms; and the referents of the terms must fall into the extension of the predicate. Here we differ essentially from usual dynamic logic in that we consider atomic sentences as internally and externally dynamic. The logical operators ¬ and ∨ are static (they act as tests); they are in fact the classical operators only formally dynamized. & is the dynamic conjunction suitable for conjoining subsequent sentences. The actual choice of operators is not important (it would, of course, be possible to employ others); it is not important for our present purpose. Note too that our quantifiers are simply other logical operators. The semantic interpretation for the quantifier every consists in the condition that every epsilon function which is an output of its first argument sentence can serve as an input function for the second argument sentence; thus, our every is in fact Groenendijk & Stokhof's →. every(S1,S2) can
be thought about as corresponding to the classical formula ∀...(S1→S2), where ∀... indicates ∀ unselectively binding all what there is to bind in S1. The condition for some is that there is at least one epsilon function which is an output of its first argument acceptable as an input for the second argument; hence it can be imagined as corresponding to ∃...(S1→S2). (some corresponds to the cardinality reading of English some; that reading of the English word which licenses anaphorical relationships is considered as representable by the operator a). Both the quantifiers are externally static, they act as tests; but they are internally dynamic. This accounts for the fact that a term in the first argument sentence can be the antecedent of an anaphorical expression occurring in the second argument.
3.3 Examples of discourse anaphora In this section we discuss some simple examples illustrating the mechanism of establishing
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 8 de 18
anaphorical links by linguistic means. As already mentioned, we assume that the semantic contribution to finding the adequate antecedent can be described in terms of the salience change potential of expressions.12 This salience change can be thought about as a first formal approximation to the intuitive notion of familiarity that is used in traditional grammars and that was introduced into dynamic frameworks by Heim (1982). We start our analysis with a simple atomic sentence with an indefinite NP. A man walks (4) Walk(a(man)) (4') ||Walk(a(man))|| = {<e,e'>| <e,e'>∈||a(man)|| and ||a(man)||e'∈||walk||} = {<e,e'>| e'=e||man|| and e'(||man||)∈||walk||} Sentence (4) is assigned the formula (4'); this formula is then interpreted according to the definitions given above. As we have noted, a pair of epsilons <e,e'> falls into the update expressed by an atomic sentence iff e and e' are connected by a sequence of epsilons such that the adjacent pairs of the sequence fall into the respective updates expressed by the terms and the referents of the terms fall into the extension of the predicate. Since we have only one term in (4), this reduces to the condition that <e,e'> falls into the update expressed by a(man) and that the referent of a(man) falls into the extension of walk. This yields e'=e||man|| and e'(||man||)∈||walk||. The resulting set of pairs is clearly non-empty just in case ∃d.d∈||man||&d∈||walk|| (i.e. if the intersection of ||man|| and ||walk|| is nonempty); and our formula (4') is thus in this sense equivalent to the classical formula ∃x(man(x) &walk(x)). The man whistles (5) Whistle(the(man)) (5') ||Whistle(the(man))|| = {<e,e'>| <e,e'>∈||the(man)|| & ||the(man)||e'∈||whistle||} = {<e,e'>| e=e' & e'(||man||)∈||whistle||} Sentence (5) with the definite NP the man is represented and interpreted similarly to (4). The only difference is the condition on the epsilon function - the interpretation of the definite NP is static. The only condition is that the referent of the NP, determined by the actual epsilon function, falls within the extension of the predicate. The difference between the definite and the indefinite NP thus lies in the different behaviour with respect to the epsilon function - the indefinite NP updates it, whereas the definite NP acts merely as a test. In both cases, the referent of the NP is yielded by the actual epsilon function. The analysis of the concatenation of (4) and (5) now shows how the referent of the anaphorical NP the man gets identified with that of its antecedent a man. A man walks. The man whistles (6) Walk(a(man)); Whistle(the(man)) (6') ||Walk(a(man)); Whistle(the(man))|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||Walk(a(man))|| and <e'',e'>∈||Whistle(the(man))||} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||man|| and e'(||man||)∈||walk||} and <e'',e'>∈ {<e,e'>| e=e' and e'(||man||)∈||whistle||}} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e||man|| and e''(||man||)∈||walk|| and e''=e' and e'(||man||)∈||whistle||} = {<e,e'>| e'=e||man|| and e'(||man||)∈||walk|| and e'(||man||)∈||whistle||}
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 9 de 18
<e,e'> falls into the update expressed by (6') if and only if there is an epsilon function e'' such that <e,e''> falls into the update expressed by (4') and <e'',e'> falls into the update expressed by (5'). Using the results of the above analyses and eliminating redundancies, we reach the result that <e,e'> falls into the update expressed by (6') iff e' differs from e at most in the representative of the class of men and this representative is a walker and a whistler. This derivation shows the basic mechanism of relating anaphorical expressions to their antecedents; it illustrates how the semantic principle of familiarity can be explicated in terms of the salience change potentials of the expressions involved. The information that a new object is raised to salience can be thought about as passed on by the updated epsilon functions; and since the subsequent definite term is interpreted according to these updated epsilon functions, it comes to refer to the very same object. Let us now turn our attention to sentences about farmers and donkeys. A farmer owns a donkey (7) Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)) (7') ||Own(a(farmer),a(donkey))|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||a(farmer)|| and <e'',e'>∈||a(donkey)|| and <||a(farmer)||e'',||a (donkey)||e'>∈||own||} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e||farmer|| and e'=e''||donkey|| and <e''(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||own||} = {<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||own||} The farmer beats the donkey (8) Beats(the(farmer),the(donkey)) (8') ||Beat(the(farmer),the(donkey))|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||the(farmer)|| and <e'',e'>∈||the(donkey)|| and <||the(farmer) ||e'',||the(donkey)||e'>∈||beat||} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e and e'=e'' and <e''(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} = {<e,e'>| e'=e and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} The atomic sentence (7) contains two indefinite NPs. Since both terms lead to modifications of the actual epsilon function, the eventual output function is modified in respect to its values for both the set of farmer and the set of donkeys. For each of the two sets, a new representative is chosen; the two representatives must be such as to stand in the relation of owning. The sentence (8) does not lead to any updating, since both its terms are definite and act as mere tests. Therefore, its output epsilon function is identical with the input one. Again, the concatenation of the two sentences shows how the epsilon function updated by the first conjunct creates a new context according to which the definite expressions in the second conjunct are interpreted. A farmer owns a donkey. The farmer beats the donkey. (9) Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)); Beat(the(farmer),the(donkey)) (9') ||Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)); Beat(the(farmer),the(donkey))|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||Own(a(farmer),a(donkey))|| and <e'',e'>∈||Beat(the (farmer),the(donkey))||} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||own||} and <e'',e'>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||}} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e''(||farmer||),e''(||donkey||)>∈||own|| and e''=e' and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} =
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 10 de 18
{<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||own|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||beat||} These simple examples show the general principles of linking anaphorical expressions to their antecedents. The indefinite expression changes the informational context so that the subsequent definite expression refers to the object which it has selected. The last example has demonstrated that the epsilon function can carry information about more than one object.
3.4 Improving updates We have seen that classical examples are adequately analyzable by our apparatus introduced so far; however, there are still simple cases which remain outside its scope. We are now going to show that such cases are analyzable by way of various simple enhancements of the apparatus. We saw that we were able to adequately analyze (6); and in force of DEF4c (1c) the same holds for (10) - the point is that the semantics of he is - by definition - the same as that of the man. A man walks. He whistles (10) Walk(a(man)); Whistle(he) (10') ||Walk(a(man));Whistle(he)|| = ||Walk(a(man));Whistle(the man)|| This does not work in case of (11) or (12) - he is not defined to be semantically equivalent to the farmer. A farmer walks. He whistles A farmer owns a donkey. He beats it
(11) (12)
However, this can be improved by replacing our epsilon update upd1 in DEF4c (1a) by a slightly more sophisticated version. We distinguish certain mutually disjoint subsets of U, which we shall call categories, namely M=||man||, W=||woman|| and T=||thing||, and we assume that the occurrence of a P fixes not only the value chosen from ||P||, but also that chosen from the category containing ||P|| (if any). This means that the occurrence of a farmer triggers not only the choice of a representative of the class of farmers, but that it also forces the same individual as the representative of the class of men and thereby as the potential referent for he13. DEF5. Let CAT={M,W,T} be a subset of Pow(U) such that M=||man||, W=||woman|| and T=||thing||. Let Ct be the function from Pow(U) into CAT such that if there is a c∈CAT such that s⊆c, then Ct(s) =c and Ct(s) is undefined otherwise. upd2 is now the element of UPD defined as follows upd2(e,d,s)(s') = d if (s'=s or s'=Ct(s)) and d∈s = e(s') otherwise If we now modify 1a of DEF4c by substituting upd2 for upd1, we can readily handle both (11) and (12). The point is that now not only ||he|| = ||the(man)||, but if e'=e||farmer||, then also e'(||man||) = e'(||farmer||); similarly if e'=e||donkey||, then also e'(||thing||) = e'(||donkey||). Walk(a(farmer)); Whistle(he) ||Walk(a(farmer)); Whistle(he)|| =
(11')
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 11 de 18
{<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||Walk(a(farmer))|| and <e'',e'>∈||Whistle(he))||}= {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer|| and e'(||farmer||)∈||walk||} and <e'',e'>∈ {<e,e'>| e=e' and e'(||man||)∈||whistle||}} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e||farmer|| and e''(||farmer||)∈||walk|| and e''=e' and e'(||farmer||) ∈||whistle||} = {<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer|| and e'(||farmer||)∈||walk|| and e'(||farmer||)∈||whistle||} Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)); Beat(he,it) (12') ||Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)); Beat(he,it)|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||Own(a(farmer),a(donkey))|| and <e'',e'>∈||Beat(he,it)||} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||own||} and <e'',e'>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e and <e'(||man||),e'(||thing||)>∈||beat||}}= {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||own||} and <e'',e'>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||}} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e''(||farmer||),e''(||donkey||)>∈||own|| and e''=e' and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} = {<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||own|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||beat||} We can, of course, go further and let an indefinite noun phrase a P update not only the value chosen from ||P|| and that chosen from the corresponding category, but the values chosen from all supersets of ||P|| whatsoever. This would lead to the following simple epsilon-update. DEF6. upd3 is the element of UPD defined as follows upd3(e,d,s)(s') = d if s⊆s' and d∈s = e(s') otherwise Plugging upd3 instead of upd1 into 1a of Def4c would result into an apparatus which would allow for the right resolution in cases like (12); on the other hand, it might lead to successful resolution also in cases when it is doubtful that such a resolution factually takes place, like in (13). A boxer walks. The sportsman whistles. (12) A woodchuck from Hradec Králové walks. The East-Bohemian groundhog whistles. (13) The right solution seems to be somewhere in between upd2 and upd3 - it seems that in order to crosslink a P and the P' it is not enough that ||P||⊆||P'||, it is in addition required that it is in some sense obvious that ||P||⊆||P'||. However, on the other hand, if the hearer perceives that there is nothing else to be cross-linked with the P' save a P, then (s)he may take it as an information about the fact that ||P||⊆||P'||14. Another kind of problem is posed by proper names. We are as yet unable to account for (14). However, this is easy to repair. Let us add John as a new constant to our category of terms, let us write e'=ed as the shorthand for e'=upd3(e,d,{d}); and let us enrich DEf4c by the new clause 1f: 1f. ||T|| = {<e,e'>| e'=e||T|| if T is John (or any other proper name) This allows us to give the analysis of (14) (note that if e'=e||John||, then e'(||John||) = e'(||man||)): John walks. He whistles
(14)
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 12 de 18
Walk(John); Whistle(he) (14') ||Walk(John); Whistle(he)|| = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈||Walk(John)|| and <e'',e'>∈||Whistle(he))||} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that <e,e''>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||John|| and e'(||John||)∈||walk||} and <e'',e'>∈ {<e,e'>| e=e' and e'(||man||)∈||whistle||}} = {<e,e'>| there is an e'' such that e''=e||John|| and e''(||John||)∈||walk|| and e''=e' and e'(||man||) ∈||whistle||}= {<e,e'>| e'=e||John|| and e'(||John||)∈||walk|| and e'(||man||)∈||whistle||}= {<e,e'>| e'=e||John|| and e'(||John||)∈||walk|| and e'(||John||)∈||whistle||}
3.5 Donkey sentences Donkey sentences serve as a touchstone for every semantic theory since they combine several intricate problems. In what follows, we try to show how we can cope with this kind of sentence within the proposed framework. The main problem is how an indefinite NP embedded in the restrictive clause can furnish the antecedent for a subsequent expression. This is the case of the indefinite NP a donkey in (15). Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it
(15)
Before we analyze this sentence, let us inspect a simpler one to see how the definition of the universal quantifier works.15 Every man who is a farmer is boring (16) every(farmer(a(man)),boring(the(man))) (16') ||every(farmer(a(man)),boring(the(man)))|| = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈||farmer(a(man))||,then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈||boring(the(man))||} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||man|| and e'(||man||)∈||farmer||}, then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e and e'(||man||)∈||boring||}} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if e1=e||man|| and e1(||man||)∈||farmer||}, then there is an e2 such that e2=e1 and e2(||man||)∈||boring||} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if e1=e||man|| and e1(||man||)∈||farmer||}, then e1(||man||)∈||boring||}= {<e,e'>| e=e' and ||man||∩||farmer||⊆||boring||} The analysis of the sentence yields a test that succeeds if every output epsilon function of the first clause can serve as an input to the second clause. One branch of the test can be imagined as, first, picking up a new representative of the set of men such that he is a farmer (the first clause), and, second, testing whether this representative is boring (the second clause); the whole test is successful if all such possible branches are. The testing is independent of an input epsilon function, i.e. either every epsilon function passes it, or none does. The crucial problem of donkey sentences is solved by quantifying over epsilon functions instead of over individuals, which is the result of our disposal of variables and binding. The problem concerns the anaphorical link between the embedded indefinite NP a donkey and the pronoun it - this link cannot be accounted for by the classical means of variable binding, since the pronoun has to be located outside the scope of the quantifier governing the indefinite NP. Since we do not establish
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 13 de 18
anaphorical links in terms of binding, but rather via context information, this problem fades away. The analysis of a sentence such as (15) proceeds straightforwardly. every(Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)),Beat(he,it)) (15') ||every(Own(a(farmer),a(donkey)),Beat(he,it))|| = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈||Own(a(farmer),a(donkey))||, then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈||Beat(he,it)||} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||own||}, then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e and <e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||) >∈||beat||}} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if e1=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e1(||farmer||),e1(||donkey||)>∈||own||}, then there is an e2 such that e2=e1 and <e2(||farmer||),e2(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if e1=e||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e1(||farmer||),e1(||donkey||)>∈||own||}, then <e1(||farmer||),e1(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} Again, the whole expression acts as a test that succeeds if every epsilon function resulting from interpreting the first clause can successfully act as input for the second clause. Since there are two indefinite NPs within the first clause, they both modify the input epsilon function, and so we have to apply the test connected with the second clause to all such functions differing from the basic output of the whole sentence in the representatives of the class of farmers and donkeys which pass the test connected with the first clause. Thus the anaphorical relation is encoded in the context information and in this way it can cross the scope of the indefinite NP.16
3.6 Events Another way to enhance our apparatus is by the introduction of events and event-quantification. A way to do this is to introduce the new category E coinciding with the extension of the new predicate event, and to add the new constants terms then, once, whose semantics is defined as follows: ||then|| = ||the(event)|| ||once|| = ||a(event)|| Then we can analyze (17) as follows: If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. (17) every(Own(once,a(farmer),a(donkey)),Beat(then,he,it)). (17') ||every(Own(once,a(farmer),a(donkey)),Beat(then,he,it))||= {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈||Own(once,a(farmer),a(donkey))||, then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈||Beat(then,he,it)||} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if <e,e1>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e||event||,||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e'(||event||),e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||own||}, then there is an e2 such that <e1,e2>∈{<e,e'>| e'=e and <e'(||event||),e'(||farmer||),e'(||donkey||)>∈||beat||}} = {<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if e1=e||event||,||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e1(||event||),e1(||farmer||),e1 (||donkey||)>∈||own||}, then there is an e2 such that e2=e1 and <e2(||event||),e2(||farmer||),e2(||donkey||) >∈||beat||} =
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 14 de 18
{<e,e'>| e=e' and for every e1, if e1=e||event||,||farmer||,||donkey|| and <e1(||event||),e1(||farmer||),e1 (||donkey||)>∈||own||}, then <e1(||event||),e1(||farmer||),e1(||donkey||)>∈||beat||} The relationship between (15') and (17') now depends on how we treat events, namely which kind of relationship between sets like {<x,y>| farmer(x)&donkey(y)&own(x,y)} and {<x,y,e>| farmer(x) &donkey(y)&event(e)&own(e,x,y)} we stipulate. It seems to be clear that the latter set can be projected on the former and hence that (17') implies (15'); the other direction of inclusion and implication is, however, doubtful - but we do not elaborate on this here.
3.7 Further ways of elaboration Even after the enhancements outsketched in this chapter, the framework remains in many respects too simple to allow for a satisfactory analysis of some statements and pieces of discourse. However, this was - at least partly - intentional: we wanted first and foremost to bring out the basic principles of the way we think the idea of the exploitation of salience can be formalized and put to work. Let us now mention - briefly - directions in which the possibility of further elaboration of the framework seems to be obvious. 1. Adding more structure to choice functions. The way we have exploited the concept of salience so far makes it possible for every class to acquire a representative. The real content of the concept of salience is, of course, much richer. This could be accounted for by means of replacing of our simple choice functions by some more complicated ones: we could, for example employ functions which would allow to pick up not merely a single representative, but both a representative and a "vicerepresentative". Or we may utilize functions which for each class would yield a partial ordering of elements of the class. The fine-tuning of the optimal version of such a function would have to draw on the empirical results concerning salience, activation, and the stock of shared knowledge. 2. Going beyond extensions. In some cases, we cannot make do working with extensions, we need something more fine-grained. Thus for example in case when discourse participants do not see coextensionality of two predicates, they may well let their respective predicates license different references. This would call for going beyond extensions - we could allow the representatives to be assigned to intensions or to the predicates themselves. However, before accepting the latter solution, we should have to realize that we would then have to painfully stipulate the relations between predicates which we get for free on the level of extension (such as the relation between farmers and men - we saw that stating the rule that the choice of a new representant of a set forces the representant to represent also some/all supersets of the sets automatically leads to the right resolution of many basic cases). 3. Reintroducing variables. In claiming that we can account for anaphora without making use of the traditional apparatus of variables and binding, we did not claim that this apparatus is of no use whatsoever. There is nothing in our framework which would prevent it from being combinable with the more classical apparatus - we may well enrich it by introducing variables for the sake of coping with, say, relative clauses. This may call for making predicates dynamic, but this need not pose a major problem. 4. Accounting for the topic/focus articulation. Anaphora and crossreference are not satisfactorily analyzable without taking into account their interplay with the topic/focus structure. As argued elsewhere (Peregrin 1994; to appear), the logical formalization of this structure requires that we see linguistic utterances as consisting of two subsequent parts, one differing from the other in that the failure of the interpretation of the first of them (the topic, determining what the utterance is about) results in the whole utterance being meaningless (or at least infelicitous), whereas that of the second
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 15 de 18
(the focus, spelling out something new) results in it being simply false. This interacts with the anaphorical links (the consequences of the failure of referential availability in connection with the definite description differ according to whether the failure concerns the topic or the focus - viz Hajieová's (1993) distinction between presupposition and allegation). Therefore, we would have to somehow render this two-stage process making the difference between an utterance which is infelicitous and that which is false. Here no obvious ways of modification of our framework are in sight; but it is clear how to seek them.
4 Conclusion In this paper we have proposed a modification of Groenendijk and Stokhof's dynamic logic, a modification based on the employment of choice functions. Dynamic logic was developed to give a compositional semantic account of discourse, i.e. primarily to cope with the problem of coreference extending sentence boundaries. However, it did not tackle two important problems - the problem of resolving linguistically detectable anaphorical links and the problem of a uniform representation of anaphoric expressions, i.e. of definite NPs and pronouns. We have tried to show that modifying it in the proposed way can yield a feasible account of both these problems. Both definite and indefinite NPs are represented as proper terms; they are taken to express choice-function-updates and to refer to actually chosen representatives. The definiteness lies in the fact that a definite NP refers to the already established representative, whereas an indefinite NP picks up a new element, which then becomes the new representative. In this way, the anaphorical linkage is encoded in the contextual information, which is passed on by epsilon functions. No preceding coindexing is necessary. Furthermore, the formalism yields a uniform representation of all definite expressions, i.e. of definite NPs and pronouns.
References. Egli, Urs 1991. (In)definite Nominalphrase und Typentheorie. In: U. Egli & K. von Heusinger (eds.). Zwei Aufsätze zur definiten Kennzeichnung. Arbeitspapier 27. Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Universität Konstanz. Egli, Urs & von Heusinger, Klaus 1995. The EpsilonOperator and EType Pronouns. In: U.Egli et al. (eds.). Lexical Knowledge in the Organization of Language. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 121141. (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 114) Evans, Gareth [1977] 1980. Pronouns, Quantifiers and Relative Clauses (I). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 467536. Reprinted in: M. Platts (ed.). Reference, Truth, and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 255317. Geach, Peter [1962] 1968. Reference and Generality. An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories. Emended Edition. Ithaca/N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Pr. Groenendijk, Jeroen & Stokhof, Martin 1991. Dynamic Predicate Logic. Linguistics and Philosophy 14, 39100. Hajieová, Eva 1993. Issues of Sentence Structure and Discourse Patterns, Faculty of Philosophy, Charles University, Prague. Heim, Irene 1982. The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms.
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 16 de 18
Heim, Irene 1990. EType Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora. Linguistics and Philosophy 13, 137177. Hilbert, David & Bernays, Paul [1939] 1970. Grundlagen der Mathematik. Vol. II. 2. ed. Berlin; Heidelberg; New York: Springer. Hintikka, Jaakko 1974. Quantifiers vs. Quantification Theory. Linguistic Inquiry 5, 15377. Kamp, Hans [1981] 1984. A Theory of Truth and Semantic Interpretation. In: J. Groenendijk & T. M. V. Janssen & M. Stokhof (eds.). Truth, Interpretation and Information. Dordrecht: Foris, 141. Neale, Stephen 1990. Descriptions. Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press. (Bradford Book) Peregrin, Jaroslav 1992a. Logical Approach to Discourse Dynamics. Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics 58, 5-10. Peregrin, Jaroslav 1992b. The Role of Variables in the Formalization of Natural Language, Proceedings of the Eight Amsterdam Colloquium. University of Amsterdam, 463-481. Peregrin, Jaroslav 1994. Topic-focus articulation as generalized quantification. In: P.Bosch & R.van der Sandt (eds.). Focus & Natural Language Processing. Heidelberg: IBM Deutschland, 379-387. Peregrin, Jaroslav to appear. Topic and Focus in a Formal Framework. In: B.Partee and P.Sgall (eds.). Meaning and Discourse, Amsterdam: Benjamins. Quine, Willard Van Orman 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press. Quine, Willard Van Orman 1986. Autobiography, in: The Philosophy of W.V.Quine (ed. by E.Hahn & P.A.Schilpp), Open Court, La Salle. Sgall, Petr, Hajieová, Eva & Panevová, Jarmila 1986: The Meaning of the Sentence in its Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects. Amsteradm: Benjamins and Academia: Praha. Slater, B. H. 1986. Etype Pronouns and EpsilonTerms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, 2738. van der Does, Jaap 1993. Dynamics of Sophisticated Laziness. In: J. Groenendijk (ed.). Plurals and Anaphora. Dyana2 Deliv. R.2.2.A Part I. August 1993, 152. van Eijck, Jan 1993. The Dynamics of Description. Journal of Semantics 10, 239267. von Heusinger, Klaus 1992. EpsilonAusdrücke als Semanteme für definite und indefinite Nominalphrasen und anaphorische Pronomen. Dissertation. Konstanz
Footnotes. 1. This paper has resulted from (1) the research project "Semantics of natural language" developed by Peregrin under the support of the research grant 70/94 of the Charles University; (2) the research of choice functions and natural language that were developed by von Heusinger together with U. Egli in the project 645/94 "Interaktion von Wort und Semantik" supported by the German Science Foundation. Further, we should like to express our thanks to the Deutscher Akademische
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 17 de 18
Austauschdienst, who supported us in the exchange program between the Charles University in Prague and the University of Konstanz. (Back to text) 2. See Sgall et al. (1986), esp. §1.35. Choice functions, as we employ them, can plausibly be seen as a way of explicating "the hierarchy of activation of the elements in the stock of knowledge that the speaker assumes to be shared by the hearer" (ibid., p.55). See also Peregrin (1992a).(Back to text) 3. Let us clear away a possible misunderstanding, which often occurs with respect to dynamic semantics. To facilitate readability, we sometimes speak about the meaning of a dynamically interpreted statement as if about a process - but it must be kept in mind that this is nothing more than a metaphor. The sole aim of logical analysis and logical formalization, which is what we pursue in this paper, is the articulation of truth conditions, it is not a description of any processes which might go in speakers' heads or wherever. The shift from truth conditions to a context change potential must not be literally seen as a shift to the description of some mental events underlying discourse utterances - we do not see semantics as a part of psychology. The specificum of dynamic logic is that it realizes that truth conditions of certain larger units of discourse (A man walks. He whistles) cannot be constructed by simply adding up truth conditions of its parts - some of the parts (He whistles) might simply lack their own truth conditions. So in order to arrive at truth conditions of some larger wholes we need more than truth conditions of the basic units, i.e. of sentences, we need what has come to be called context-change potential. However, what we do in specifying this context-change potential cannot be literally understood as describing the raising of an object to salience - we merely say that a sentence containing the NP may be true only if there exists an object which may be thought of as associated with the NP - whichever this object may be. If there are more such objects, then there is no question of the choice of a particular one.(Back to text) 4. This accomplishment is what Quine (1986, p.15) considers "a major step in conceptual analysis". Cf. also Peregrin 1992b.(Back to text) 5. The idea of employing Hilbert's epsilon operator for the purpose of analyzing indefinite NPs in a way analogous to the employment of Russell's iota inversum for the purpose of analyzing definite NPs by means of his iota inversum is of course far from really new. However, this idea is not easy to exploit, as the nature of the epsilon operator differs from that of the iota inversum one (the former clearly does not render the indefinite article as the name of a definite function in a way corresponding to the latter's rendering the definite article as the name of the function mapping singletons on their single elements).(Back to text) 6. In contrast to the theories of Kamp and Heim, Groenendijk and Stokhof tried to retain as much traditional logic as possible; and they managed to show that the dynamics of discourse does not necessarily call for a framework which would eschew the basic principles of traditional logical analysis. See also Peregrin (1992a).(Back to text) 7. Epsilon functions have been extensively studied by Hilbert and Bernays (1939); however, let us keep in mind that Hilbert's motivations, and consequently also his theory of epsilon functions, was quite different from the present one.(Back to text) 8. Some further restrictions might be added; we might for example require that for every epsilon function e, e(A) is undefined, i.e. that the empty class is never assigned a representative. Or we might stipulate that for every epsilon function e and for every element d of the universe, e({d}) = d (i.e. that the singleton of d is always automatically represented by d); this would make our analysis work also in cases where the classical Russellian mechanism for interpreting definite descriptions were required. We do not explore this here -since this paper aims only to bring out the basic principles, not to elaborate details.(Back to text) 9. e' = es thus expresses a relation between two epsilon functions, it says that e' differs from e at most
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
Dynamic Semantic with Choice Functions
Página 18 de 18
in respect to the representative of s.(Back to text) 10. This semantics provides a unified treatment of definite and indefinite NPs. Both determine their referents by using an epsilon function. This similarity of definite and indefinite NPs was pointed out by Egli (1991).(Back to text) 11. This view meets the Etype analysis of discourse pronouns; it could be seen as stemming from Quine (1960, 102f.): "Often the object is so patently intended that even the general term can be omitted. Then, since 'the' (unlike 'this' and 'that') is never substantival, a pro forma substantive is supplied: thus 'the man', 'the woman', 'the king'. These minimum descriptions are abbreviated as 'he', 'she', 'it'. Such a pronoun may be seen thus as a short singular description, while its grammatical antecedent is another singular term referring to the same object (if any) at a time when more particulars are needed for its identification."(Back to text) 12. Obviously there are several other nonlinguistic factors that influence and rule the relation between the antecedent and the corresponding anaphorical expression, but they are not subject to the present considerations.(Back to text) 13. In the English case - in contrast to languages like German or Czech - this is not wholly correct, for a NP like a farmer does not force a subsequent pronoun to be masculine, it may equally well be followed by she. This indicates that the extension of farmer must be taken to comprise both male and female farmers, and consequently it does not fall into any single category; thus no representative of the class of men is established, and the use of he is not licensed. This means that the success of anaphora resolution in this case is conditioned by the accommodation of the presupposition The farmer is male triggered by the second sentence. Again, we do not elaborate on this here but keep with the simple transparent version of the apparatus.(Back to text) 14. It might seem that we need an update changing not only supersets of the class referred to by the predicative part of the indefinite NP, but also its subsets. We may follow the utterance A sportsman walks by The boxer whistles and get the referent of the boxer to be identified by that of a sportsman, although the class of boxers is a subclass of that of sportsmen rather than its superclass. But this anaphora resolution is not "automated" -it is conditioned by the accommodation of a substantial presupposition triggered by the second utterance, namely The sportsman is a boxer; therefore we do not recommend that it should be accounted for in our present terms.(Back to text) 15. Note that as our semantics is such that sentences are assigned the same type of semantic values as terms (namely sets of pairs of epsilon functions), it would be only a trivial matter to extend our quantifiers so as to accept as arguments not only sentences, but also terms. Then (16') could be alternatively stated as every(a(farmer),boring(the farmer)), which corresponds straightforwardly to the natural language Every farmer is boring.(Back to text) 16. This treatment of donkey sentences uses a kind of unselective binding and, therefore, it cannot represent asymmetric readings. As in other theories, additional constraints must be imposed to license asymmetric readings.(Back to text)
file://D:\Documentos\Linguistic%20Philosophy\365.htm
29/7/2004
LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY Jaroslav Peregrin* [Theoretical Linguistics 25, 1998, 245-264] www.cuni.cz/~peregrin
1. How philosophers became linguists Alle Philosophie ist "Sprachkritik". Wittgenstein (1922, §4.0031) During the first half of the present century a number of outstanding philosophers realized that language theory could profitably be viewed as far more than merely a means of studying one among the many human faculties, or merely sharpening the tool we use to philosophize - they realized that there is a sense in which philosophy of language comprises (almost) the whole of philosophy. This was the famous linguistic turn: philosophers came to accept that everything that is is in a sense through language, and that to study what there is is to study what our words mean.1 The enigma of the language-world relationship was brought to the centre of philosophical discussion early in this century by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Austin and others. Their original point was that we cannot take the representing capacities of language at face value, that in order to treat of things - which cannot be done save with the help of words - we must first treat of words and make sure which of them are really capable of treating of things. Thus the philosophers undergoing the linguistic turn slowly gave up asking what is consciousness (matter, evil etc.)? in favour of asking what is the meaning of 'consciousness' ('matter', 'evil' etc.)? This simple turn seemed to have tremendous consequences for philosophy. By replacing the question what is consciousness? by the question what is the meaning of 'consciousness'? we seem to lose nothing (any meaningful answer to the former question seems to be recoverable from an answer to the latter), and yet it seems to take us from the weird realms of mind to the commonplace domain of language, from the troublesome immersing into people's heads to straightforward observing how they use words. It also seems to guard against the "bewitchment of our reason by language" (Wittgenstein) caused by words which are only seemingly meaningful: such questions as what does the word 'ether' stand for? can be answered simply by nothing, whereas the question what is ether? presupposes that there is something as ether (as *I would like to thank people whose comments on earlier versions of the paper have helped me to improve it in an essential way: Hans Kamp, Pavel Materna, Barbara Partee and Petr Sgall. 1 This concerns especially those philosophers who later came to be called analytic (see Rorty, 1967); but not only them - Heidegger, e.g., has accomplished a turn of a very similar kind. 1
that about the nature of which we are asking) and hence that there is something for which the word stands; thus the latter question, in contrast to the former, forces a certain view of the world on us, simply by our acceptance of it as a question. Ayer (1936, p.35), for one, concludes that The propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character - that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Therefore, the proponents of the linguistic turn argue, philosophy can be nothing more and nothing else than a certain kind of analysis of language, "the pursuit of meaning", as Schlick (1932) puts it. Metaphysics is thus aufgehoben - it is exposed as a worthless enterprise stemming from the failure to understand the true role of language; it boils down to expressing one's "life feeling" (Carnap, 1931). Thus, philosophers became linguists.
2. How linguists became philosophers I've puzzled for a long time about what the difference is between certain kinds of philosophy and certain kinds of linguistics and finally decided that the main difference lies in whether you're embarrassed about not knowing about a paper in 'Linguistic Inquiry' or the 'Journal of Philosophy' Bach (1985, p.593) Linguists, of course, have been in pursuit of meaning - in their own way - since the very time linguistics came into being; some of them, the semanticians, being even the specialists. And it was only several decades after the linguistic turn of philosophy that something which could be called the model-theoretic turn of semantics occured: many of the linguists who tried to get hold of meaning in an explicit way have come to appreciate the usefulness of Tarskian logical semantics and model theory. This way of approaching the problem of meaning appeared to be particularly promising to the purposes of philosophy; and, in fact, this turn was to a large extent inspired by the heirs of the linguistic turn (especially by Carnap, 1957). It was this approach which seemed to provide the needed framework for making meanings explicit, by reconstructing them as set-theoretical objects. It apparently augured the reconcilation of the intuition of the platonistic character of meanings with the modern mistrust of any 'ghostly entities' like ideas: we only have to presuppose the existence of the ordinary things and the possibility to group entities together - set theory has taught us that this alone is enough to yield us a platonistic heaven. However, the traditional logic with its extensional semantics was quickly deemed to be insufficient - the range of natural language phenomena which could be directly captured by its means was only had to be found scanty. It was necessary either to develop a more sophisticated logical system, or to find ways how to capture the interesting aspects of natural language in an indirect fashion. The first such new way is inseparably connected with the name of Richard Montague (1974), who was the first to show (or at least the first to persuade a broad audience) 2
that if we accept intensional logic with possible-world semantics, we can account for many nontrivial problems of natural language which are beyond the scope of extensional logic. The key concept was that of possible world - a concept introduced implicitly by Rudolf Carnap (esp. 1957; under the name of state of affairs) and explicitly by Saul Kripke (1963).2 Some philosophers, like Quine and Davidson, rejected intensional logic in favour of the good, old, austere classical first-order logic. Davidson (1967), e.g., tried to show how it is possible to analyze certain nontrivial natural language locutions if we let the first-order quantifiers range over what he called events - thus he rejected logic which would implicitly necessitate possible worlds (as objects in the universe of its metatheory) in favour of logic which would explicitly necessitate events (as objects inside the universe of the logic itself). There were others who rejected the concept of possible world on the grounds of the incomprehensible immensity of such an entity - they proposed to replace it by something smaller and more comprehensible, such as situation (thus Barwise and Perry, 1983). Others urged the necessity of having something like situations, which, however, would be the subject of dynamic development (Kamp's, 1981, discourse representational structures, or the informational states of dynamic predicate logic as expounded by Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1991). And others felt the necessity to work with still other entities of diverse natures, like, e.g., Hintikka's (1978) impossible possible worlds, Heim's (1982) files, Tichý's (1988) constructions, etc. All in all, the activities of linguists-semanticians have come increasingly to resemble those of philosophers-metaphysicians; and some of the semanticians have explicitly spoken about doing metaphysics (see, e.g., Cresswell, 1973), or at least 'natural language metaphysics' (Bach, 1986 but see the motto of this section). Thus, the old monsters of metaphysics, once thrown out through the front door, now strike back through the window; and hence linguists became philosophers. My point in this paper is that this alliance of linguistics and philosophy, or, more precisely, of semantics and metaphysics, is, despite all its apparent fruitfulness, rather tricky; and I would like to indicate some of its dangers. On the general level we can say that it is tricky in that it fosters dangerous vicious circularities: linguists explicate some phenomena by relying on certain philosophical entities or doctrines, whose explanation, however, has in turn come to rest on the linguistic phenomena being explicated. A simple example: linguists sometimes like to explain words like necessary simply by referring to possible worlds, whose real nature they take as something they need not bother very much about, because it is explained by philosophers. However, the (post-linguistic-turn) philosophers would reduce explaining possible worlds to explaining the talk about possible worlds, which is nothing but the linguistic (or logicolinguistic) talk about words like necessary.
3. Two senses of 'semantics' I think that it is of crucial importance to point out immediately that the term semantics is used to cover what are in fact two different enterprises, only one of which is directly relevant for linguistics and philosophy. The term covers themes pertaining to two essentially distinct realms: the realm of language and the realm of the links between language and things in the world. Let 2
See also Peregrin (1993). 3
us call that part of semantics which addresses the issues of the former kind semanticsL, while calling the part addressing those of the latter kind semanticsW. The central theme of semanticsL is meaning, and consequently also analytic truth (for analytic truth is "truth in virtue of meaning"). The central theme of semanticsW is (contingent) truth, and consequently reference (for reference is what is needed to compositionally yield truth). The crucial difference is that semanticsL addresses things which one knows in virtue of knowing language: to know the meaning of, say, the king of France it is enough to know English3, there is no need to know anything about the present state of the world. SemanticsW, on the other hand, addresses things which one knows when she knows language and something about the present state of the world: to know what the phrase the king of France refers to one has to know its meaning plus certain facts about France.4 Roots of many puzzles and problems of modern semantic theory can be traced back to confusions between semanticsL and semanticsW. These confusions begin with the unhappy way in which Frege used the term meaning (Bedeutung) for what we now call reference; this usage had the consequence that the knowledge of language seemed to presuppose and to imply knowledge of many extralinguistic facts (for a detailed analysis see Tichý, 1992). This move instantiated an undesirable ambiguity of the term meaning - we should now rather speak about meaningL, which is, in accordance with common sense, a matter of language alone, and about meaningW which is, in accordance with Frege, a matter of relating words to things5. MeaningW of an expression amounts to some causal or "intentional" link between the expression and an extralinguistic thing (a real thing, a 'content of consciousness' or something like that). MeaningL, on the other hand, is the matter of relations between expressions; hence the meaningL of an expression is best seen as something like materialisation of the place of the expression within the system of language, or of its role within the actual language game.6 Approaches to language may then be classified according to which of these notions of meaning they grant primacy: the "nomenclatural", or representational, ones take the relations between 3
This is not literally true because of the proper name; but this is clearly peculiar to the Russellian example. 4The opposition between meaningL and meaningW is sometimes, especially in the context of Saussurian linguistics, reflected by such distinctions as ‘meaning’ vs. ‘content’, ‘Bedeutung’ vs. ‘Bezeichnung.’ or ‘form of content’ vs. ‘substance of content’. Cf. Sgall et. al. (1986, p. 13). 5
It follows from the considerations of Dummett (1974), that even if we consider that of the Fregean terms which is really closer to the intuitive concept of meaning, namely his Sinn (sense), we are likely to encounter a parallel ambiguity, for Fregean senses have come to be taken to play two incompatible roles: to explicate what a linguistic agent grasps when she grasps words, and to determine the corresponding Bedeutung, i.e. extension. In this way, it appears caught on the horns of the dilemma popularized by Putnam (1975). 6
This is not to say that we must accept an absolute boundary between meaningL and meaningW. As Quine showed, the holistic character of language makes it impossible to distribute the relatively clearcut boundary between semanticsL and semanticsW to individual statements and expressions in any unique way; and this makes the boundary between meaningL and meaningW of an individual linguistic item rather illusory. However, an expression surely can be seen as fulfilling two distinct, however inextricably linked, functions: to cope with the world and to collaborate with its fellow expressions. 4
expressions to be parasitic upon the way words are linked to things; whereas the structural, or inferential, approaches claim that the relations between words and things are, the other way around, grounded in the interrelations of words.7 Anyway, it seems to be quite clear that what is in the province of a linguist or a philosopher of language is meaningL, not meaningW: the project of discovering who is the present king of France, required in order to determine the meaningW of the expression the king of France and hence belonging to the project of semanticsW, is clearly not a part of the semantic theory of English. (As Dummett, 1991, p.151 puts it, "in so far as a knowledge of the semantic value of an expression goes beyond what is required for an understanding of it ... its semantic value is not an ingredient in its meaning, and the specification of it no part of a meaning theory.") Meaning, in the ordinary sense of the word, is a matter of semanticsL - knowing meaning is a part of knowing language, not of knowing facts about the extralinguistic world. This implies that the meaning of an expression is not a thing to be discovered within the extralinguistic world, but rather something as the value of the expression, the materialisation of the role of the expression within the system of language and within the language games that we play. Wittgenstein (1984, §64) writes: "Compare the meaning of a word with the 'function' of a clerk. And 'different meanings' with 'different functions'."
4. What is a 'semantic analysis'? This seems to indicate that it is misguided to see the semantic analysis of language as a matter of pairing words and things; that it is more appropriate to see it as a matter of 'finding the position of the expression within the structure of language'. Let us look how things are in practise; let us inspect what the semanticians do when they analyze language. Doing semantic analysis of an expression usually results in providing a formula, a diagram or another expression. Let consider some examples, chosen more or less at random, of various kinds of formulas and diagrams which one can find in books about semantics - (1) is Montague’s (1974, p. 238) logical analysis of one of the reading of the sentence John seeks a unicorn; (2) is Chomsky’s (1986, s. 76) description of the logical form of the sentence I wonder who gave the book to whom; (3) is Kamp’s (15) discourse representation structure (DRS) corresponding to the sentence Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it; and (4) is the ‘tectogrammatical representation’ of one of the articulations of the sentence The professor of chemistry will come tomorrow as given by Sgall et al. (1986). ! seek’(∧j, P ∨u[unicorn’∗(u)∧ P{∧u}])
(1)
I wonder [whomj , whoi [ei gave the book to ej ]]
(2)
7
See Peregrin (1995a, Chapter 8; and 1997). For a detailed analysis of the representational/inferential dichotomy see Brandom (1994). 5
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ ┌───────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ │ │ │ x v │ │ x v │ │ │ │ . . │ │ . . │ │ │ │ farmer(x) │ │ farmer(x) │ │ │ │ x owns a donkey │ => │ x owns a donkey │ │ │ │ donkey(v) │ │ donkey(v) │ │ │ │ x owns v │ │ x owns v │ │ │ │ │ │ x beats it │ │ │ │ │ │ x beats v │ │ │ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘ │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
comePosterior Dir here
Act
(3)
(4)
Time-when
professor
tomorrow
Obj chemistry
What are we doing in furnishing some such formula or some such diagram? In what sense do we explain the analyzed sentence? In general, providing a diagram may encapsule one of two essentially different enterprises: providing a translation, or providing a description. Providing a translation of the analyzed expression into a language which is taken as understood, or which is in some sense more "semantically transparent", surely means explicating meaning - but, equally of course, only relatively to the uncritical acceptance of the language into which we translate. Providing a description elucidates the meaning to the extent to which it is the description of the meaning, or of that to which we hold the meaning to be reducible, e.g. the use of the expression, or a 'cognitive content' for which the expression is supposed to stand. Restricting ourselves to the two most prominent reducienda of the meaning of an expression, namely the use of the expression and the mental entity ('cognitive content') 'behind' the expression, the following main possibilities seem to emerge as to what a diagram associated with a sentence, or, more generally, with an expression, can amount to: (i) a description of the meaning of the expression (ii) a description of the way the expression is used 6
(iii) a description of a mental entity associated with the expression (iv) a translation of the sentence into another language The first alternative seems to offer the most promising route: what could be a more direct realisation of the task of semantics than displaying expressions alongside with their meanings?8 However, this proposal is rather tricky; for what could count as a description of meaning, which, as we have concluded in the preceding section, is best seen not as a 'real' object, but rather as a value? The most secure way to describe the meaning of an expression is to use the expression itself - to describe the meaning of, say every farmer owns a donkey we best use the description the meaning of 'every farmer owns a donkey' or, possibly, that every farmer owns a donkey. However, using these would lead to trivialities like The meaning of 'Every farmer' is the meaning of 'every farmer' 'Every farmer owns a donkey' means that every farmer owns a donkey We may, of course, also say something less trivial, e.g. 'Every farmer owns a donkey' means that for every x, if x is a farmer, then x owns a donkey; however, what is nontrivial with this is the purported synonymy of 'Every farmer owns a donkey' and 'For every x, if x is a farmer, then x owns a donkey'; i.e. the fact that the latter is - in a certain sense - a faithful translation of the former. Thus it seems that there is no interesting direct describing of the meaning of an expression which would not rest on finding an interesting translation of the expression into another language (or an interesting paraphrase of the expression in the same language); and providing (i) seems to be in this sense parasitic upon providing (iv)9. As Quine (1969, p. 53) puts it, "A question of the form 'What is an F?' can be answered only by recourse to a further term: 'An F is a G.'" It is important to realize that the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to (ii). The most straightforward way to characterize the use of 'Every farmer owns a donkey' is to say something like The sentence 'Every farmer owns a donkey' is (correctly) produced if and only if every farmer owns a donkey (this is, of course, a severe oversimplification, but not one that affects the point made here). And if we use another sentence on the right hand side of the biconditional, then it is the purported synonymy of this sentence with the characterized sentence which is nontrivial. Moreover, despite appearances, the situation does not differ substantially even in the case of (iii). It might seem that in this case we may be able to pick up some relevant 'content of consciousness' independently of any linguistic articulation; however, it is hard to see how we could identify contentful mental entities save by way of language; we cannot describe the mental entity 'beyond' the sentence 'Every farmer owns a donkey' save by saying that it is the thought (or idea, or whatever) that every farmer owns a donkey, or the thought that for every x, if x is a farmer, then x owns a donkey etc. What is worse, even if we could give an independent 8
See Chomsky (1967).
9
For details see Peregrin (1993; 1995a, Chapter 11). 7
characterization of such a mental entity (e.g. by means of some 'mentographic coordinates'), this would not really further our attempts to grip meaning: being told that an expression is associated with such or another lump of a mental stuff can never by itself reveal us what the expression means, for knowing what it means involves knowing how it behaves relatively to other expressions, what follows from it etc.10 There is also no help in recourse to talking of 'neural events' or the like: it is true that these, unlike mental entities, are specifiable independently of the sentences whose usage they may accompany (at least in principle); however they are quite like thoughts in that if they are specified in this way, they cannot really provide us with meanings.11 So it seems that diagrams offered by semantic analysts cannot be taken as descriptions of meanings in a direct sense (in the sense in which a photo is the description of the bearer of a name). This indicates that the only real sense which can be made of formulas and diagrams as exemplified above is in terms of translating the analyzed language into another language. However, does this not suggest that this kind of semantic analysis is circular and consequently futile?
5. The Myth of the Structure One of the common way to avoid this ‘intractability of meaning’ is to move the concept of meaning to the periphery of one’s teaching and to concentrate on the word struture. The enterprise of semantic analysis, it is then claimed, consists in revealing the "semantic structure" of an expression (or of the mental content of an expression). Thus, for many theoreticians of language, meaning has come to coincide with something like the semantic structure; and semantic analysis with pinpointing this structure. This might be understood as accepting the structural approach to language urged above - but usually it is not. The point is whereas what we have urged is an approach which sees meaning of an expression as the possitionof the expression within the network of language, the common way of engaging the concept of structure is based on the picture that an expression is like, say, a mineral: that it can be analyzed and examined with tools akin to microscopes up to the point where we see its structure. This picture essentially obscures the fact that an expression does not have any inherent structure in the sense in which a mineral has - at least no interesting inherent structure. (An expression does have an inherent structure in that it consists of words and letters but this is not the structure held in mind by those who use the term structure to make sense of semantics.) The fact that the structures which linguistic theories ascribe to an expression are not really to be found on the expression itself has forced many linguists to acquire the conviction that what they are studying are - ultimately - not expressions, but rather mental objects which the 10
This is, of course, only an anecdotic hint at the case made against mentalism by Frege, Wittgenstein and others. It is, of course, also only another expression of the fact spelled out earlier in the paper: namely that meaning is not a thing, but rather a value. 11
Hans Kamp has suggested to me that one of the ways to express this is the following: „A theory of the implementation of memory presupposes a theory of understanding of meaning“. 8
expressions stand for. The structure of the expression, the story goes, is the structure of a mental entity behind the expression - be it called an idea, an intention, a cognitive content, or whatever. Thus the situation has arisen where many linguists begin calling themselves 'cognitive scientists'. This semantic mentalism is often complemented with a kind of 'reduction axiom': everything mental is physical, ev