Linguistic Emotivity: Centrality of place, the topic–comment dynamic, and an ideology of pathos in Japanese discourse
Senko K. Maynard
John Benjamins Publishing Company
Linguistic Emotivity
Pragmatics & Beyond New Series Editor Andreas H. Jucker Justus Liebig University Giessen, English Department Otto-Behaghel-Strasse 10, D-35394 Giessen, Germany e-mail:
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Volume 97 Linguistic Emotivity: Centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology of pathos in Japanese discourse by Senko K. Maynard
Linguistic Emotivity Centrality of place, the topic–comment dynamic, and an ideology of pathos in Japanese discourse
Senko K. Maynard Rutgers University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
8
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Linguistic emotivity : centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology of pathos in Japanese discourse / Senko K. Maynard. p. cm. (Pragmatics & Beyond, New Series, issn 0922-842X ; v. 97) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Emotive (Linguistics). 2. Grammar, Comparative and general--Topic and comment. 3. Japanese language--Discourse analysis. 4. Language and culture--Japan. 5. Pathos. I. Maynard, Senko K. II. Series. P325.5.E56 L56 2002 401’.41-dc21 isbn 9027251177 (Eur.) / 1588112020 (US) (Hb; alk. paper)
2002021462
© 2002 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
To Michael
Contents
Preface and ackowledgments
xi
Part 1 Preliminaries 1. Introduction 1. Introductory remarks 2. Types of knowledge and Knowledge of Pathos
3 3 10
2. Background 1. Studies on language and emotion 2. Emotion in the Japanese language 3. Emotion and culture 4. Critical assessment: Toward a negotiative theory of linguistic emotivity
21 21 32 40 47
Part 2 Theory 3. The Place of Negotiation theory 1. An overview 2. Sign 3. Function 4. Language as bodily experience 5. Presentation of selves 6. Methodology
53 53 59 63 64 66 70
4. The (re-)turn to place 1. Concept of basho ‘place’ in Nishida’s philosophy 2. Place in Japanese language studies 3. Bamen ‘situated place’ in Tokieda’s theory 4. Place and interaction 5. The concept of place in the Place of Negotiation theory
73 73 76 78 81 82
5. Locating and interpreting emotive meanings 1. The location of meaning and topica 2. Negotiation of emotive meaning in conversation 3. Interpreting textual emotivity
85 85 88 92
viii Contents
4. Interpretation and tacit knowledge 5. Between cognition and emotion 6. Topic–comment, futaku, and the Rhetoric of Pathos 1. The significance of the topic–comment dynamic 2. Rhetorical figure of futaku 3. Rhetoric of Pathos
94 96 101 101 106 111
Part 3 Emotive topics On data for analysis
117
7. Vocatives and topics 1. Introduction 2. Vocatives 3. Topics 4. Where vocatives and topics merge 5. Reflections
123 123 124 137 143 147
8. Emotive nominals 1. Introduction 2. Exclamative nominals 3. Nominals and sentential nominals 4. Emotive nominals and text genres 5. Reflections
149 149 150 155 161 163
9. Quotative topics 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. From quotation to topic presentation 4. Quotative topic as an emotive 5. Utterance-final tte: Assertiveness and hesitation 6. Reflections
165 165 166 168 176 182 189
10. Emotive nan(i) ‘what’ 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. Nan(i) as an anti-sign 4. Nan(i) and emotive meaning 5. Nan(i) and interactional meaning 6. Between interrogativity and exclamativity 7. Reflections
191 191 194 196 203 207 210 212
Contents
Part 4 Emotive comments 11. Da and ja-nai as commentary strategies 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. Stativity and situationality 4. Informational da and emotive da 5. Emotive da and the telling-it-as-is attitude 6. Emotive ja-nai and the telling-it-against-is attitude 7. Reflections
217 217 218 221 226 228 239 245
12. Interrogatives as emotive comments 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. Emotive interrogatives 4. Emotivity of commentary questions 5. Stray interrogative clauses 6. Reflections
247 247 248 251 258 269 274
13. Commenting through stylistic shifts 1. Introduction 2. Da versus Desu/Masu 3. Interactional particles 4. Reflections
277 277 278 292 304
Part 5 Pathos in Japanese discourse 14. Analyzing expressions of pathos in Oda Nobunaga 1. The drama 2. In the cognitive place 3. In the emotive place 4. In the interactional place 5. Visual images and pathos in mass culture
307 307 308 318 326 333
15. Rhetoric of Pathos in Mini-Jihyoo newspaper articles 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. The topic–comment dynamic and text organization 4. Commentary sentences 5. The topic–comment sequencing in headline and text 6. Opening with topic and closing with conclusive comment 7. Sequencing of commentary sentences within danraku 8. Reflections: Textual pathos
337 337 338 341 344 346 347 352 354
ix
x
Contents
16. Playing with pathos 1. Introduction: Emotivity and aspects of self 2. Gendered selves and interactional selves in Long Vacation 3. Stylistic choice and Minami’s gendered selves 4. Stylistic shifts and Sena’s interactional selves 5. Presentation of Minami’s playful self 6. Vocatives and person references 7. Playing with pathos: A friend, a lover, or someone between
357 357 358 360 372 379 386 388
Part 6 Reflections 17. Linguistic emotivity and the culture of pathos 1. The topic–comment dynamic and the centrality of place 2. Linguistic emotivity and realization of the feeling self 3. Concept of place and Japanese discourse studies 4. Significance of place/space in Japanese culture
393 393 395 398 403
18. Language, linguistic theory, and ideology 1. Japanese language studies and linguistic ideologies 2. Ideology of pathos and theoretical possibilities 3. Beyond the boundaries of place
409 409 411 414
Appendix: Information on select data
419
Notes
423
References
435
Data references
460
Author index
465
Subject index
469
Preface and acknowledgments
What does language communicate? What does it express? Or, what do humans do with language? Why do we, by using a system such as language, discover and locate ourselves in relation to others within cultures and societies? Why do we identify ourselves by living and experiencing the language, and how do we think and feel in it? To answer these related questions, I have studied the Japanese language primarily from the perspectives of discourse and conversation analyses. In the process I have strived to consistently analyze real-life Japanese language, part and parcel of contemporary Japanese culture, a dynamic flow that is continuously being produced, consumed, and interpreted. What has become increasingly clear through these studies is the significance of meaning associated with emotion. Issues surrounding language and emotion have often been discussed under the heading of the ‘‘expressive’’ function. Within this broad functional notion, I concentrate on the emotion-related meanings expressed in language, that is, ‘‘linguistic emotivity.’’ Linguistic emotivity refers to human emotions and attitudes specifically expressed by linguistic strategies of emotives. These include the speaker’s attitude toward the speech act, toward the content of what is conveyed, feelings toward partners, emotions associated with interaction, as well as the general mood, feelings, and sentiment the speaker and the partner experience and share in communication. Academically, emotion has been treated sometimes seriously, but often in convenient neglect. And as is widely recognized, the formal linguistics that has dominated linguistics in the latter half of the 20th century has consistently pushed aside and marginalized the emotional aspect of communication. At the same time, the tenet of the postmodern has, for quite some time, questioned the fundamental legitimacy of the rational thinking subject of cogito, and the subject has come to be understood as a speaking, talking, narrating, and feeling self. Given the above, this book opens up a new way of understanding language, i.e., language as sources of the ‘‘feeling self.’’ In this work, I introduce linguistics that focuses on expressivity and explores emotive meaning on the center stage of inquiry. This volume contains the theory, analysis, and interpretation of Japanese emotives, originally explored in Jooi no Gengogaku: ‘‘Ba-kooshooron’’ to Nihongo Hyoogen no Patosu (Kuroshio, 2000). At the end of that book, I expressed my hope to present my work in English so that my ideas will be made available
xii
Preface and acknowledgments
beyond the particularities of Japan. In the current volume, although the basic approach has not changed, I organize the content differently, hoping that my ideas are presented more explicitly. I am adding new chapters and incorporating new observations in other chapters. The work to follow is a culmination of my research during the past several years, and consequently, it is drawn from a number of my earlier publications. Relevant works are mentioned and listed in the references. In particular, Chapter 10, Chapter 11, and Chatper 15 are similar in content to three of my earlier papers; ‘‘Speaking for the unspeakable: Expressive functions of nan(i) in Japanese discourse’’ (Journal of Pragmatics, 32, 1209–39, 2000), ‘‘Grammar, with attitude: On the expressivity of certain da sentences in Japanese’’ (Linguistics, 37, 215–50, 1999), and ‘‘Rhetorical sequencing and the force of topic-comment relationship in Japanese discourse: A case of Mini Jihyoo newspaper articles’’ (Japanese Discourse, 2, 43–64, 1997). The theoretical construct enabling the analysis of linguistic emotivity is what I call the Place of Negotiation theory. The concept of ‘‘place’’ and related notions (e.g., situation, context, frame, script, schema, image schema, and so on) have been explored in various fields such as sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, anthropological linguistics, pragmatics, as well as cognitive linguistics. Following this line of thinking, the Place of Negotiation theory establishes a philosophical rationale for prioritizing place. It requires an appropriate understanding of the sign system, and establishes principles of interpretation based on the interactional negotiation among participants. In terms of methods for analysis, the Place of Negotiation theory draws from practices available primarily in conversation analysis and discourse studies, and secondarily from other related areas including sociolinguistics, pragmatics, rhetoric, and anthropological linguistics. The Place of Negotiation theory enables the analysis of emotives, and forces a paradigmatic shift from the linguistics of logos to the linguistics of pathos. Linguistic meanings are no longer interpreted on the basis of propositional content alone, but rather, the meanings are interactionally negotiated, being indexically linked to the place of communication. The cotexual and contextual information become critical within the theory, rather than some constructs casually mentioned post-theoretically. In my exploration of linguistic emotivity, I have learned much from previous works available both inside and outside of Japan. Many of the scholars are no longer with us, but many others are my contemporaries and friends. Although I do not list them, I would like to express my deep respect to those scholars whose works are cited in this book. In May, 1997 I had the good fortune of meeting Yujiro Nakamura. It was a chance encounter; we both happened to be in the dining area of the Nassau Inn in Princeton, NJ, USA. Until that morning, I knew Professor Nakamura only
Preface and acknowledgments xiii
through his writings. Meeting him in person gave me the courage to seriously construct the kind of linguistics I had only vaguely toiled over for many years. I thank him for his insight, encouragement, and friendship. For many years I have enjoyed knowing respected teachers and supportive colleagues in the field of Japanese linguistics and Japanese studies. My sincere gratitude goes to Noriko Akatsuka, Yoshihiko Ikegami, Chisato Kitagawa, Takie Lebra, Naomi McGloin, Suzuko Nishihara, Matsuo Soga, and Paul Takahara, who have, for so many years, kindly and warmly supported me. Over the past several years, I have had opportunities to share some of my earlier thoughts at various universities and institutes. I would like to express my thanks (in chronological order of my visits) to the National Language Research Institute in Tokyo, University of Tokyo, Harvard University, Princeton University, UCLA, Nagoya University of Foreign Studies, Showa Women’s University, Waseda University, the UCLA Center for Japanese Studies, Aoyama Gakuin University, and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku (Tokyo Women’s Christian University). Portions of this work were funded by the Japan Foundation’s Institutional Support Program for Japanese Studies awarded to Rutgers University (1996– 1998). Some of the research reported in this book was also assisted, in part, by a grant I received from the Social Science Research Council (1999) with funds provided by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission. I express my appreciation to these funding agencies, whose grants facilitated the data collection, analysis, as well as the completion of the manuscript. I also wish to express my gratitude to Rutgers University for granting me a sabbatical leave for the academic year 2001– 2002. Last but not least, I express my warm appreciation to my late parents, Tsutomu and Harue Kumiya of Yamanashi, Japan. It is in their memories that I find a part of my place. SKM Highland Park, NJ, USA Fall, 2001
Part 1
Preliminaries
Chapter 1
Introduction Language, emotivity, and pathos
.
Introductory remarks
. Emotivity and expressivity Traditionally when emotion becomes a research topic in linguistics, it is discussed in relation to the expressive function of language. Expressivity of language, a dimension pervasive in human communication, includes all aspects of selfexpression, whether they are dispositions, general mood and feelings, aroused emotive responses, evaluative attitudes, sense-based judgments, or cultural sentiments, as long as they are linguistically expressed. Emotivity is a specific case of expressivity. Emotivity refers to emotional attitude and response, the feeling of being moved, as well as culture-based feelings and sentiment expressed through the use of linguistic and related signs. An emotive is a device expressing emotivity, and I use the term emotivity distinctly from the term ‘‘emotion(al)’’ which refers to basic and general human emotions such as anger, love, and happiness. Emotives refer to (1) linguistic devices that describe emotions, for example, love and hate, (2) linguistic strategies, such as interjections, that directly enact emotional attitudes, and (3) grammatical and rhetorical means which foreground the emotive meaning, for example, an exclamative sentence structure. I also use emotive to refer to any linguistic sign when its emotive meaning is foregrounded; in this sense all linguistic signs are potentially emotive. Every language possesses an array of lexical terms referring to human emotions. Although the categories and the system of these emotion words may differ across languages and cultures, it is difficult to imagine a language without them. Obviously, emotion words offer much insight for understanding the emotivity and expressivity of language. And in recent years, emotion words and metaphors have become the focus of research among (cognitive) semanticists. Likewise, some obvious cases of grammatical and rhetorical means for emotivity have been studied. In this book, recognizing different types of emotives mentioned above, I focus on devices that have not been fully investigated so far. Rather than analyzing emotion words and metaphors, I examine linguistic signs and strategies on varied
Linguistic Emotivity
levels, i.e., lexicon, syntax, and text, including those signs that have not been traditionally identified as emotives. I take the position that although some linguistic signs and strategies may seem to carry the propositional meaning alone, they always express, in varying degrees, emotive meanings as well. By concentrating on seemingly emotionless signs, a stronger case can be made that emotivity is pervasive in all aspects of language. I identify and analyze a number of emotives in contemporary Japanese discourse to illustrate how rich and critical linguistic emotivity is in language and its use. As I will discuss in the course of this book, emotives are indexical signs (Peirce 1992 [1868]), and can be said to be indexical in multiple ways. First, emotives reveal the speaker’s identity indexically associated with the speaker’s social, cultural, and emotional conditions. Second, emotives are interpreted on the basis of cotextual and contextual information that are indexically linked to the place of communication. Moreover, language as a whole is indexically linked to the culture it embraces (Silverstein 1976). . From logos to pathos Many of the formal approaches to language that have dominated the latter half of the 20th century have concentrated on formal, abstract, and autonomous aspects of syntax and semantics. This preference for identifying language as an isolated (or, isolatable) object of analysis has deep roots in the Cartesian view of knowledge. The concept of autonomous syntax, which excludes all possibilities of explanation and motivation external to itself, successfully limits the analytical universe. Thus, scholars are able to pursue linguistics with the rigor of logos, as long as the proposed rules reach an adequate level of internal consistency and descriptive simplicity. This tradition so convincingly persuades us that we ourselves tend to find mental and psychological security, both peace of mind and heart, in the formalized rule-governed understanding of language. Despite this dominant view of language, language has also long been associated with emotion. Throughout this volume, along with nonformalist and functional approaches to language, I challenge the formalist approach that places undue emphasis on language’s referential (i.e., informational, or propositional) dimension. By resurrecting language’s expressive possibilities, I propose a new way of understanding language as an experience of pathos, as sources of human emotion, and as a way of realizing our emotional feeling selves. Language has been known to possess, at its disposal, the devices expressing human emotions, and this dimension has been traditionally captured by the term pathos. To elucidate the concept of pathos along with two other complementary elements, i.e., logos and ethos, it is necessary to turn to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In the classical sense, logos refers to rational arguments, and ethos, to the presentation of
Introduction
the speaker’s character and personality, especially the reliability of the person. And pathos refers to ‘‘the playing upon the feelings of the audience’’ (Wisse 1989: 5). Critical to the Aristotelian understanding of pathos are the partner’s feelings. Pathos involves the reaction of the message receiver. However, as pointed out by Wisse (1989), there seem to be some contradictions in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, particularly regarding pathos, in the sense of emotional appeal. In Book 1 of Rhetoric, Aristotle seems to deny the validity of pathos in his approach to rhetoric, as reflected in the quotation below. Now those who in these days compose handbooks of rhetoric have spent their efforts on only a small part of this art. For proofs [pisteis] are the only things falling under the scope of art; everything else is merely accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes, which is the most essential part of persuasion, but devote most of their attention to things outside the matter itself: for the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions has nothing to do with the matter, but is directed at the judge only. (Wisse 1989: 17–18)
However, Aristotle does not totally ‘‘deny’’ pathos as an effective means of persuasion; he excludes it from the art of rhetoric, but he advocates it in practice. In fact, in Book 2, Aristotle analyzes fifteen emotions as a means for pathos, i.e, for the arousal of emotions in the audience. The fifteen emotions include anger, mildness, love/friendship, enmity/hate, fear, lack of fear, shame, shamelessness, favor, goodwill, lack of goodwill, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, and lastly, contempt. In other words, Aristotle’s earlier denial of pathos seems to be a ‘‘rhetorical’’ reaction to the then lacking enthymemes; he does not deny, but in fact advocates, pathos. According to Wisse (1989), Aristotle understands emotion (with anger as an example) in the following way. It is necessary to divide the material about each of the emotions under three heads; for instance, when talking about anger, (1) what state of mind makes people inclined to anger, (2) with whom they usually get angry, (3) and on account of what. For if we knew one or two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse anger; and the same applies to the other emotions. (Wisse 1989: 65)
Aristotle’s conceptualization of emotion is situational in that emotion requires a target and a partner to share it with. This point is further elucidated by Cooper (1996) in his explanation of Aristotle’s pathos. Cooper states: Aristotle seems to recognize three central elements as constituting the emotions — they are agitated, affected states of mind, arising from the ways events or conditions strike the one affected, which are at the same time desires for a specific range of reactive behaviors or other changes in the situation as it appears to her or him to be. (Cooper 1996: 251)
Linguistic Emotivity
Significant to the understanding of pathos, then, is that human emotions are not simply experienced internal to the person, but rather, are experienced through interaction with other factors, including how the context influences the person, and how the interacting partner may emotionally react. The social dimension of emotion suggested here, which is in agreement with contemporary views of emotion (e.g., the social constructivist view of emotion), is particularly significant for developing the theory of linguistic emotivity explored in this book. Perhaps a more serious point regarding the concept of pathos is spelled out in Aristotle’s following statement, as given in Wisse (1989): Emotions are all those (feelings) that so change men as to make their judgments different, and that are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and the like, as well as their opposites. (Wisse 1989: 67)
Here, one cannot ignore Aristotle’s words, ‘‘emotions are all those (feelings) that so change men as to make their judgments different.’’ If one’s judgment is changed by one’s feelings, in order to persuade someone, one must take into account the partner’s personality (ethos), and more importantly, how the partner feels (pathos). Since Aristotle takes the position that a person’s judgment is influenced by emotion, his perspective comes close to espousing that the elements of pathos are fundamentally more influential in judgment than the elements of logos. Following the Aristotelian rhetoric, when investigating language, one cannot ignore elements of pathos, for those elements are likely to alter the logos-based semantic content. More fundamentally, is it even possible to separate the semantics of logos and the meanings of pathos in the first place? At minimum, I must conclude that linguistics of strictly formal semantics is not sufficient to account for the full meaning of language. A linguistic theory must embrace not only the proposition-based meaning but also the emotive meaning, the latter of which is the focus of the present volume. Regarding the Aristotelian conceptualization of the relationship between judgment and emotion, Lighton (1996) elaborates further. Aristotle viewed emotion’s ability to alter judgment in terms of two principles, i.e., (1) change of judgment as a consequence of emotion, and (2) change of judgment as a constituent of emotion. And the former comes in the following kinds; (1) ‘‘connivance,’’ (2) ‘‘alteration through favor and disfavor,’’ (3) ‘‘alteration through perception,’’ and (4) ‘‘alteration through pleasure and pain’’ (Lighton 1996: 217). These judgmental changes seem intuitively correct; we have personal experiences such as intentionally ignoring truth, being more lenient toward those we like, severely punishing those from whom we expect more, compromising one’s integrity for the fear of consequent psychological pain, and so on. There is no doubt that our ‘‘rational’’ thinking is influenced, regardless of whether or not we admit it, by our personal and interpersonal emotions.
Introduction
In this book, I use the term pathos similarly to the Arostotelian notion of pathos, with all the possibilities of influencing logos and ethos. Pathos emphasizes interaction-based psychological and emotional aspects, while logos emphasizes the logical and informational aspects of language. Pathos is usually associated with femininity, and logos, with masculinity. The former is often discussed as being evident in Eastern culture, and the latter, as a philosophical foundation of the West. Although logos and pathos seem polar opposites, they are, nonetheless, connected at their foundation. Emotion often requires conceptualization through language which requires aspects of logos, and logical rationality is often influenced by emotion. In reality it is perhaps more accurate to view them as complementary. And this view is the one I hold. Furthermore, differences between logos and pathos are a matter of degree or preference, and they do not constitute a mutual exclusivity. In the course of this book it will be revealed that depending on the purpose of communication, pathos may be chosen over the principles of logos under certain circumstances in certain genres. In this study I also use the term pathos to identify a type of knowledge. Pathos as a theoretical concept encompasses the emotionrelated principles and preferences of a culture, as well as the philosophical position of prioritizing what will be referred to as the Knowledge of Pathos. Although logos and pathos are complementary, it is also true that mainstream linguistics has prioritized logos at the expense of pathos. This logos-centeredness has influenced linguistics at least in two significant ways. First, investigation of language as logos has necessitated the theory of abstract and autonomous language, and consequently, has led to the denial of language as an event enacted by participants in a particular place. Under the influence of logos, propositional meanings are selected as objects of analysis, and the subject–predicate relationship becomes the center of syntactic analysis. Second, data of linguistic analysis are logos-centered, and actual usage of expression remains a non-issue. At the same time, linguists discard emotive aspects of meaning because these aspects are viewed as epiphenomenal, and are unexplainable within formal theories. Formal linguistics is a product of the logos-centered view toward knowledge, and its theories are built on select logos-supporting samples. I am not claiming that formal linguistics is useless. I am saying, however, that if we conceive language from a pathos-centered view, our theoretical conceptualization of linguistics must also change. So, too, must change what constitute relevant data. Consequently, what constitutes an appropriate linguistic research design must be seriously questioned. By shifting our focus to a pathos-centered view, perhaps we are able to reach dimensions of language heretofore not having received full attention, or simply having been pushed aside too long for convenience’s sake. Language conveys more than information. More accurately, under certain circumstances, language prioritizes emotion over information. In the current
Linguistic Emotivity
work, I explore, with as much vigorousness and precision as possible, how emotion is expressed through emotives, and how such emotive meaning is interpreted through a negotiating process. After proposing the Place of Negotiation theory of language, based on this theoretical standpoint, along with methodologies adopted primarily from conversation and discourse analyses, I explore the nature of emotivity and forms of emotives in contemporary Japanese discourse. . Organization of the book Part 1, Preliminaries, presents background in which the current work is presented. Chapter 1 introduces basic concepts, emotivity, expressivity, and pathos, all of which, with slight differences in focus, serve the thread of discourse for this book. Furthermore, to philosophically locate the type of knowledge to be pursued in this work, Chapter 1 provides a brief history of knowledge, with a particular focus on the Knowledge of Pathos. Linguistic emotivity and surrounding topics have become sites of analysis in linguistics and related fields, and tracing this historicity is the aim of Chapter 2. Particularly important in Chapter 2 is the review of traditional Japanese language studies whose fascination of emotivity is symbolized by the expression kokoro no koe ‘voices from the heart’. Closely associated with the issue of emotion is the sociocultural dimension. Chapter 2 reviews ‘‘affect’’ and ‘‘involvement,’’ the two theoretical concepts available in the field, and expands on their potential sociocultural consequences. In the last section of Chapter 2, assessing previous studies, I offer the rationale for my approach. Part 2 introduces, in four separate chapters, the Place of Negotiation theory, on the basis of which I conduct my analysis of linguistic emotivity. I introduce the overall picture of the theory in Chapter 3, along with the explanation on how the concept of selves is realized through negotiation. In Chapter 4 I discuss, in detail, how the concept of place has occupied a center stage in Japanese philosophy and language theories. Chapter 5 turns to a more concrete issue of how emotive meaning is interpreted, negotiated, and approximated. Related principles of interpretation, such as 〈empathetic conformity〉, 〈perspectivized appearance〉, 〈perspective of becoming〉, and 〈emotive focus〉, are discussed as interpretive processes required in the Place of Negotiation theory. Chapter 6 expands the horizon to overall characteristics of contemporary Japanese cultural discourse. I emphasize the significance of the topic–comment dynamic on all levels of the Japanese language, and connect this to the traditional rhetorical figure of futaku. It is for this indirect, round-about way of expressing and negotiating one’s emotion through the rhetoric of futaku that the topic– comment dynamic becomes especially functional. Included in Chapter 6 is the general characterization of the Rhetoric of Pathos, a rhetorical preference I
Introduction
recognize in Japanese discourse. All features analyzed in this book function to realize, in one way or another, the Rhetoric of Pathos. The realization of the topic–comment dynamic is captured by ‘‘emotive topics’’ on one hand, and ‘‘emotive comments’’ on the other. Part 3 discusses four related but different ways Japanese discourse creates emotive topics; (1) vocatives and topic-marking expressions in Chapter 7, (2) exclamative and emotive nominals in Chapter 8, (3) quotative topics in Chapter 9, and (4) emotive nan(i) ‘what’ in Chapter 10. These strategies are chosen as representative means to present topics and topic-like elements with varied shades of emotivity. Vocatives, exclamative/emotive nominals, quotative topics, and emotive nan(i) all appear as nominal elements, and they typically appear in the utterance-initial position where topic is most expected. Their function as a propositional element is minimal; instead they present the target of futaku, potentially rich in linguistic emotivity. Three strategies of emotive comments are discussed in Part 4; (1) the so-called copulative da (and ja-nai), (2) emotive interrogatives, and (3) stylistic shifts. These strategies are chosen because of their potential for expressing linguistic emotivity in the form of a comment. All of these strategies appear toward the end of the utterance, closely associated with a comment. Da (and ja-nai) and interrogatives have been viewed as a part of the predicate, critical to the construction of proposition. If these strategies turn out to function as emotives as well, the case I am making for linguistic emotivity is that much stronger. In addition, stylistic shifts are known to be linked to the speaker’s personal and interactional attitudes, and therefore, significant expressive functions are expected. Despite the commonly held view that da and ja-nai are copulative verbs, in Chapter 11, I argue that these are indexical signs with undeniable emotive implications. Chapter 12 discusses three different kinds of interrogatives that present emotive comments; (1) interrogatives seeking no answers, (2) commentary questions, and (3) stray interrogative clauses. In Chapter 13, based on the analysis of a television drama series and works of fiction, I argue that stylistic shifts indexically signal the speaker’s desire for expressing multiple aspects of emotivity. In this chapter, da versus desu/masu styles as well as use and non-use of interactional particles are discussed in relation to intimacy, power, and identity. Also discussed is emotivity associated with narrative voice in fiction, stylistic shift, and particle use. Part 5 illustrates how linguistic emotivity comes to life in cultural discourse by analyzing it from the perspective of a Rhetoric of Pathos, and within the framework of the Place of Negotiation theory. Chapter 14 discusses linguistic emotivity observed in Oda Nobunaga, a one-episode television drama. The Rhetoric of Pathos in written text is explored in newspaper articles in Chapter 15. And Chapter 16 investigates how linguistic emotivity is associated with the presentation of different aspects of self. Based on examples taken from a television drama
Linguistic Emotivity
series, Long Vacation, I discuss how gendered selves and interactional selves are expressed, negotiated, and legitimatized through emotives. In the final part, in Chapter 17, I reflect on linguistic emotivity and how it relates to the Japanese language’s preferred strategies and how it helps to realize the 〈feeling self 〉. Chapter 17 also broadens the scope and discusses the Japanese culture that embraces the concept of place and the aesthetics of pathos. Chapter 18 questions the significance of the current work in the context of linguistic ideologies. And lastly, I ponder upon how the spacial boundedness inherent in the concept of place can be overcome, especially in light of the potential contribution a researcher is able to make (by constructing a theory through a specific language) toward the knowledge on language in general.
.
Types of knowledge and Knowledge of Pathos
Formal approaches to linguistics have dominated the theoretical landscape throughout the latter half of the 20th century. This hegemonic force of formal approaches in linguistics has spread beyond Western academia, and indeed, has profoundly impacted Japanese language studies as well. In this book, I attempt to come to terms with this historicity, and propose a kind of linguistics capable of accounting for the linguistic phenomena so far not fully accounted for. I use the Japanese language as a site for this exploration, but obviously, my interest is not to proclaim the ‘‘uniqueness’’ or the ‘‘particularity’’ of Japaneseness. Rather, the Japanese language serves only as a starting point for a broader rethinking of language, as it provides a means for linguistic theory-building. As an initial step, to locate the present work in context, I must begin by reviewing the type of knowledge I find inadequate for the purpose of fully understanding language, i.e., an ideology of logos. . An ideology of logos The tenet of modern Western science is, in a word, a pursuit of rationality. It is not that all Western scholarship prescribes to it. However, in general, there has been a received understanding that science requires the observer’s objective and rational analysis, and that scientific findings add to the body of coherently accumulating universal knowledge. This Cartesian view of rational (clear and distinct) thinking has tended to push aside humanistic knowledge, e.g., memory, psychological processes, feelings, imagination, emotion, myth, and so on. And as symbolized by the expression, cogito ergo sum, one’s inner thinking leads to the logos, the ultimate ‘‘clear and distinct ideas.’’ As a result, one’s self is understood to be a 〈thinking self〉, un-
Introduction
scathed by the sway of emotion. In humanities, emotion is inevitable, but emotionrelated knowledge has been considered unreliable. Humanistic knowledge, supported by the interpersonal relationship between ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘you’’ as characterized by Buber (1970), was considered less trustworthy. Instead, rational thinking based on observation (i.e., the 〈I–it〉 relationship) was prioritized and praised. Following this line of thought, a human being is divided into mind and body, with prestige given to the former. Mind is capable of creating rational thought, and therefore, the ultimate authority is given to the subject of cogito, the initiator of human thought. But obviously, there is an irony in this thesis of cogito. When Descartes uttered cogito ergo sum, it was realized through a language (although a ‘‘dead’’ language), a specific language with inherent ideology associated with it. Thinking is not totally free nor absolutely clear. This is because thinking must be achieved through a particular, not universal, language, which inherently is shrouded in its ideologized sociocultural mist. In this sense, linguistic theories, from whomever they originate, can not be totally ‘‘free’’ of ideology. Formal linguistics was conceived primarily in English within the English-based universe. Given this, it is not overly presumptuous to assume that the English language (or more cautiously, English, German, and French) influenced the construction of the logos-based theories. Consider that the theory built in English for English is, in turn, legitimatized in English academic discourse. Through this process, a particular view of the universe is reinforced, while other possibilities are precluded. In what follows, I offer an alternative to this hegemony of logos. . Vico’s warning Although, in retrospect, the Cartesian view has dominated modern Western sciences, there is also a tradition in the West to prioritize humanistic knowledge. Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), an Italian philosopher, was placed in the historical time when Cartesian philosophy was beginning to invade the humanities. For fifteen years beginning from 1710, Vico continued to criticize the Cartesian world of the 〈I-it〉 relationship. He doubted the possibility that the essence of humanity is objectifiable, and that it is describable by assembling empirical data alone. Instead, Vico believed that for a human being to truly understand oneself, one must appreciate the meaning of history, that is, one must understand oneself in history. According to Paparella (1993), in Vico’s view ‘‘truth is a dimension of the subject and it is a basic fallacy to think with Descartes that it can be conceived as a property of objects themselves’’ (1993: 31). Therefore, Vico insisted that beyond the three recognized kinds of knowledge, i.e., metaphysics (rational intuition), mathematics (deductive knowledge), and natural science (empirical knowledge), there is a fourth kind of knowledge, that is, self-knowledge. In order to gain self-
Linguistic Emotivity
knowledge, one must not remain a simple passive onlooker. We are participants within our history, and through participation, we understand our existence from the inside. Believing that Cartesian ‘‘clear and distinct ideas’’ constitute the highest form of knowledge, one may engage in introspection. But this does not lead to understanding. For there is no such thing as ‘‘objective’’ history. Thus, we confront the idea of Vico’s hermeneutical circle. When human beings create history, and above all, language, we build internal structures based on our experience. But that experience itself is interpretable only through those interpretive structures. In other words, one’s method of interpretation organizes the world, which in turn nourishes one’s method of interpretation. Thus, the study of history becomes an ongoing reinterpretation of these interpretive structures which human beings have created. But, because one cannot interpret history without language, one’s knowledge is intrinsically tied to that language. Consequently, knowledge gained through re-interpretation is only relative to that language. This position of Vico is summarized by Caponigri (1976) as ‘‘(T)he concrete processes of culture alone provide the context for the idea of man because only in that context are the conditions of total presence realized’’ (1976:310). Now, gaining self-knowledge requires self-experience. But self-experience does not materialize by way of introspection. Self-experience results when a person meets others and shares one’s world with theirs. Thus, by means of empathy toward others, we reach an understanding of history, through which we understand ourselves. Vico believed that we make history, while, at the same time, history makes us. Vico’s hermeneutics is a reminder against the sheer arrogance of the Cartesian mind-set. Objectivists tend to insist that such and such theory is the only valid ‘‘objective’’ view of what constitutes reality, while other views or paradigms are the products of ignorance and, therefore, are of little, if any, intellectual value. This arrogance of the learned still pervades our present-day academies where much production of truth is achieved in specialized, exclusive academic corners. In linguistics, unless one reaches for the ordinary language realized through participation among ordinary people, one’s mere abstract thinking may only add to the Cartesian introspection-based rationality, which may or may not reflect what people do with and in language. Vico’s professed academic discipline was rhetoric, the study of creative aspects of language. For Vico, it is language, rather than ‘‘clear and distinct ideas,’’ that offers the most important source for understanding the relationship between human beings and the world of which we are a part. More significant to the discussion of linguistic emotivity, Vico viewed the relationship between language and meaning as that of interdependence. For Vico, contrary to what Descartes thought, content and form can be distinguished but cannot be separated from one another.
Introduction
For Vico, the principle of complementarity sustains. Just like the relationship between form and meaning, the relationship between language and mind is synergistic. Minds are fashioned by languages just as languages are fashioned by minds. The two are inseparable. Following this line of thinking, it is absurd to think, as Descartes thought, that there are ‘‘clear and distinct ideas’’ standing behind language, and then language strains to express such ideas. Rather, the meaning of language arises with the language that testifies to it. According to Paparella (1993: 67), Vico was ‘‘the first linguist to point out that language is performatory in nature.’’ Paparella emphasizes Vico’s insistence that our relationship to language and history cannot be one of ‘‘using’’ them but rather, one of ‘‘participating’’ in them (1993: 74). Overall, Vico issued a warning against the Cartesian rationality, and being concerned with science’s assumed authority, stated: Since, in our time, the only target of our intellectual endeavors is truth, we devote all our efforts to the investigation of physical phenomena, because their nature seems unambiguous: but we fail to inquire into human nature which, because of the freedom of man’s will, is difficult to determine. A serious drawback arises from the uncontrasted preponderance of our interest in the natural sciences. (Vico 1965 [1709]: 33)
Perhaps I am not the only one to recognize that Vico’s warnings were consistently ignored and often vigorously denied in many of the mainstream formal approaches in linguistics. The analysis and interpretation of language I pursue in this volume are in basic agreement with Vico’s view toward language. I take Vico’s view seriously, especially the following points. First, when constructing a linguistic theory, one needs to take into consideration the hermeneutic self-knowledge. Second, one needs to understand that we participate in history through language which carries within it its culture and history. Third, one must appreciate that language constructs the way we evaluate the very manner in which we understand ourselves. And lastly, the meaning of language comes into being where language and thought meet, and where speaker and partner interact. In this place where language and thought encounter, there must be a 〈feeling self〉 who simultaneously understands the language of logos, and who experiences the personal, interpersonal, and social empathy of pathos. If language and thought are in synergistic relationship supporting and realizing each other, both are fused with logos and pathos. And if such is the case, linguistic theory must also be able to shed light on both logos and pathos. . Knowledge of Pathos The humanistic aspiration Vico held is clearly captured by Nakamura’s term ‘‘Knowledge of Pathos’’ (patosu no chi). Knowledge of Pathos refers to a type of
Linguistic Emotivity
knowledge that Nakamura, a contemporary Japanese philosopher, has developed over the past 25 years, as documented in many of his writings (1975, 1982, 1992, 1993c, 1996). Nakamura sometimes refers to the Knowledge of Pathos as the Knowledge of Dramatic Model (engeki no chi), and the Knowledge of Clinical Model (rinshoo no chi). Here I refer to the idea represented by all three terms simply as the Knowledge of Pathos. In strictly formal linguistics, Cartesian logos had taken root, and has spread in all directions. In the process, rationality has gained ascendency over memory, imagination, emotion, and the human body. More pointedly, rationality has all but obliterated the primacy of locality-based particularities as key to understanding humanity and culture. Nakamura, repeatedly acknowledging the importance of Vico’s humanistic approach, characterizes the Knowledge of Pathos with renewed interest, particularly as a potential heuristic for a host of issues associated with contemporary thought. In Nakamura’s view, Knowledge of Pathos is passive and responsive, while the Cartesian knowledge of logos is active and proactive. As opposed to a mechanized scientific knowledge, the Knowledge of Pathos appreciates the dynamic energy which a place itself exerts on whatever emerges there. We receive our energy from a place, and so does our knowledge. Knowledge, like experience, is born through intimate association and interaction with others and objects located in a place, resultant of which is the appreciation of multiple layers of relationships. In Nakamura’s words: The Knowledge of Pathos is based on three structural principles, i.e., cosmology, symbolism, and performance, in its process of appreciating the meaning of other elements that act upon us such as other persons, worlds, and environments. To put it differently, the Knowledge of Pathos does not understand human beings merely as active existence, i.e., in the abstract. Rather, it starts with the idea that it is a passive-suffering existence receiving the action from others in a semantically rich place. And it refers to the kind of knowledge that understands the self-other relationship as mutual interaction.1 (Nakamura 1996: 306, my translation)
Nakamura’s three principles for the Knowledge of Pathos (cosmology, symbolism, and performance) are polar opposites of three elements basic to the knowledge of logos. Cosmology contrasts with universalism, symbolism with logicality, and performance with objectivism. Nakamura’s pathos is predicated upon cosmological thinking, symbolism, and the significance of bodily action. According to Nakamura (1996), the cosmological way of thinking views place (or space) differently from universalism. In the latter case, place is understood to be monolithic and universal. In the cosmological view, each place possesses an organic order, constructing a meaning-existing territory. In such a place, locality-based particularities and topica (as a location of problematics) become meaningful.
Introduction
Symbolism refers to the principle that linguistic and related signs are understood to realize multiple meanings. The polysemous nature of things is accepted as a norm, and meanings are customarily interpreted from multiple viewpoints, and not from a single, autonomous perspective. Performance refers to more than the body that performs. Nakamura states that ‘‘performance requires, more than anything else, the interaction among the person who acts, the partner who views the actor, as well as partners situated in the same place’’ (1992:135, my translation).2 Nakamura’s three pillars associated with the Knowledge of Pathos are closely associated with Vico’s humanism. I read in Nakamura’s conceptualization of knowledge the following tenet as it relates to language in particular. First, language and place are inherently connected and they always interact. Second, meanings are multiple, that is, polysemy is the norm, and third, linguistic action occurs in interaction, always enacted together with someone else. Although the Knowledge of Pathos may be applied to various disciplines, the points listed above are particularly significant to the kind of linguistics advanced in this book. In my construction of the Place of Negotiation theory, I incorporate Nakamura’s conceptualization of knowledge. Of particular importance, the theory (1) must incorporate the recipient’s passive point of view, (2) must be sensitive to the interactional nature of language, and (3) must perceive the meaning to be multiple. As made evident by Nakamura’s use of the term, the Knowledge of Dramatic Model, Nakamura integrates Burke’s (1969) work on dramatism into the Knowledge of Pathos. In A Grammar of Motives, Burke conceptualizes five terms (i.e., Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose), and based on how these elements interact, he characterizes different types of drama. What interests Nakamura is the thesis Burke develops surrounding the Greek proverb ta pathemata mathemata, i.e., one learns by experience. In a section titled Dialectic of Tragedy, Burke (1969) explains in the following way. Mathemata refers to things learned in general, and the mathematical sciences in particular. A pathema refers variously to a suffering, misfortune, passive condition, situation, and state of mind. But another element is required for tragedy, namely, an action. Thus, Burke’s version of the complete proverb is poiemata, pathemata, mathemata. Poiemata, pathemata, mathemata refers to the motive that the act organizes the opposition, that the ‘‘agent’’ thus ‘‘suffers’’ this opposition, and as the agent learns to take the oppositional motives into account, the agent has ‘‘arrived at a higher order of understanding’’ (Burke 1969: 40–1). If one reaches a deeper understanding by acting on opposition, it implies a dialectic paradox. Burke himself phrases: Grammatically, if a construction is active, it is not passive; and if it is passive, it is not active. But to consider an act in terms of its grounds is to consider it in terms of what it is not, namely, in terms of motives that, in acting upon the active,
Linguistic Emotivity
would make it a passive. We could state the paradox another way by saying that the concept of activation implies a kind of passive-behind-the-passive; for an agent who is ‘‘motivated by his passions’’ would be ‘‘moved by his beingmovedness,’’ or ‘‘acted upon by his state of being acted upon.’’ (Burke 1969: 40, original emphasis)
To understand dramatism, and, more relevantly, to understand human interaction crystalized in drama, one needs to take into account the active-passive relationship itself. This position challenges strictly formal linguistic theories in that they account for the language in abstract, while giving little regard toward the passive recipient side of the interaction. To fully understand that action implies being passivebehind-passive, a Knowledge of Pathos is necessary. Here lies the motivation for Nakamura to incorporate, in his understanding of pathos, Burke’s grammar of dramatic motives. Both Nakamura’s and Burke’s works are reminders that linguistic theories must be able to account for the principle of poiemata, pathemata, mathemata. Effective linguistic theories must not only capture the emotivity within language, but also must be pursued as a part of the Knowledge of Pathos. . Sensus communis I now turn to the philosophical concept of sensus communis that lies at the very foundation of the Knowlege of Pathos. Following the understanding of Vico’s sensus communis, Nakamura, in his series of writings (1975, 1982, 1992, 1993b, 1996), resurrects and renews this concept. The concept of sensus communis, though not developed specifically in relation to a linguistic theory, can be applied to linguistics as well. And as will be explored in the course of this book, sensus communis is of particular significance to the Place of Negotiation theory. Sensus communis offers the philosophical foundation for the Knowledge of Pathos, which in turn legitimatizes the analysis of linguistic emotivity. It also offers insight to psychological and social understanding of language both on the individual and societal levels. As will be explained, in the Place of Negotiation theory, meaning is interpreted through interpersonal negotiation. Meaning is negotiated between speaker and partner, to the extent the potential meaning of linguistic signs allows. To integrate the meaning in the negotiation process, however, some operational motivation is necessary. Sensus communis offers a means and motivation for the integration of various semantic elements inherent in interaction. This motivation operates internal to the person, as it evaluates multiple semantic elements, ranks them, and integrates them. At the same time, sensus communis facilitates the integration of meanings expected in a given society. This sensus communis as intuitive social knowledge makes it possible to integrate and interpret meaning appropriate to the cultural occasion, by selecting, weighing, connecting, and combining multiple factors. Sensus communis may also take the form of social
Introduction
sentiment commonly acknowledged among a group of people sharing the same culture. This aspect of sensus communis enables the interpretation of emotives in socioculturally meaningful ways. To elucidate on the concept of sensus communis, I follow the way Vico understood it, under the guidance of Nakamura’s (1975) further elaboration. Nakamura (1975: 91) summarizes the basic meaning of sensus communis as a process where ‘‘many senses within the body (i.e., what is sensed in the body) by themselves meet each other, are tied together, are arranged in an orderly manner, are clustered together, and are formed into a system’’ (1975: 91, my translation).3 Unlike the case of ‘‘common sense’’ which was eventually censored from philosophy and other academic disciplines, historically, sensus communis has functioned in terms of psychological, physiological, as well as, social factors. For example, according to Nakamura (1975), Aristotle understood sensus communis as the human ability to distinguish the senses, the ability to identify the very process of sensing. Aristotle also identified sensus communis as an operation that human imagination requires when re-enacting the passive side of experience. On the other hand, for Descartes, although he clearly separated thought from sense, and mind from body, sensus communis was something that could bridge the two. Sensus communis is a sense-based intuition, i.e., unreflected judgment, but it also functions to organize and integrate senses, whose process requires rational function. In short, sensus communis is predicated upon the rational. This sense-toconcept process is experienced not only by an individual, but also by a group of people sharing similar cultural values. In this way sensus communis presses forward the patterning of sentiment shared by a group of people. More relevantly to the current study, sensus communis operates as a motivational force for the socioculturally endorsed way of interpreting meaning in the Place of Negotiation theory. Vico, in Naples of the early 18th century, was witnessing Cartesian rationalism challenge the three-hundred-year ascendancy of the humanist rhetoric. Faced with this crisis, Vico found in sensus communis the necessary epistemology. According to Schaeffer (1990), by the 18th century, sensus communis had become the locus of a whole cluster of meanings, including the following; an organizing sense, an unreflective opinion shared by most people, manners or social values of a community, the first principle of reflection, an innate capacity for simple, and even logical reasoning. In the context of this intellectual landscape, Vico advanced his concept of sensus communis. In his 1709 work, Vico emphasizes the importance of sensus communis in the education of the young by saying that ‘‘young people are to be educated in common sense, we should be careful to avoid that the growth of common sense be stifled in them by a habit of advanced speculative criticism’’ (1965 [1709]: 13). In fact for Vico, sensus communis is ‘‘besides being the criterion of practical judgment,’’ ‘‘the guiding standard of eloquence,’’ and he warned us by saying that ‘‘(T)here is a danger that instruction in advanced philosophical
Linguistic Emotivity
criticism may lead to an abnormal growth of abstract intellectualism, and render young people unfit for the practice of eloquence’’ (1965 [1709]: 13). More concretely, given the importance of sensus communis, Vico incorporates it into his rhetoric. Lamenting that the art of ‘‘topics’’ (topoi) has been ignored, Vico advocates it by pointing out that topica allows one to find where arguments are. In other words, one can find the line of reasoning along which the discussion of the subject is to be conducted. Therefore, those who know the loci, i.e., the lines of argument to be used, are able ‘‘to grasp extemporaneously the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case,’’ and ‘‘(I)ndividuals who have not achieved this ability hardly deserve the name of orators’’ (1965 [1709]: 15). Now how exactly does sensus communis work in oral speech? Vico’s answer is the following. Equipped with sensus communis, the person speaks in a language the audience knows, with meanings they share, and with images, rhythms, and emotions that support those meanings. This commonality supported by the sensus communis keeps the individual rooted in the community both culturally and historically. An individual experiences the sensus communis, when language provides him or her the imagination and aesthetic power pertinent to that particular language. It is significant that when Vico thinks of rhetoric, he refers to oral ability. Vico found in the art of oratory the importance of the relationship between speaker and listener. In fact as Schaeffer (1990) wrote, ‘‘(I)n Vico’s account, language begins, not with men speaking, but with men listening. Their first linguistic act is not speech but hermeneutic, the interpretation of the thunder’s meaning’’ (1990:87). This view of linguistic interaction will be shown to be of particular interest to the Place of Negotiation theory. It should be added that Vico’s insistence on the importance of orality was motivated, in part, by the political situation in which Vico found himself. Oral performance dominated the culture of Vico’s Naples, but that culture was under attack from the intellectual forces of the Enlightenment. He was thrown into the controversies over reform of the university and the legal system which suggested the shift of importance from orality to written text. In New Science, his 1725 work, Vico’s idea of sensus communis develops into an epistemological principle that relates language to cultural development. In New Science, sensus communis is not predicated upon an individual; rather, it refers to judgments (including unreflected judgments) shared by community. As Schaeffer (1990) puts it, sensus communis in New Science is ‘‘simply a practical judgment concerning needs and utilities around which a community has formed a consensus’’ (1990: 84). In opposition to the Cartesian desire for reaching truth, Vico’s idea of truth is expressed in his concept of verum-certum. According to Vico, what is verum, true, is that which the human mind can know by itself, because the human mind can construct the truth by itself. But the world out there, what is outside the mind,
Introduction
can only be known as being certain (certum). This is because the mind can only know an object as an object. Thus, physical nature can never be grasped as ‘‘true’’ because its structure and origin lie outside of the human mind. As for the world outside of one’s mind, in Vico’s view, only God, who created nature, can know it truly. Understanding language in use, then, requires the concept of certum. To recognize the differences between certitude and truth is compatible with the interpretation of emotive meanings. Because flexibility is recognized in the concept of certitude, one can construct a theory of meaning accountable for the fluctuating polysemous nature of language. Meanings expressed by language are abundant, multiple, and sometimes even contradictory. Interpretive theories of meaning also follow the concept of certum. It is the certitude reached between speaker and partner, and not the truth, that is key to coming to terms with semantic interpretation. The concept of certitude also allows for the approximation of meaning negotiated between partners. Obviously as in the case of metaphor and metonymy, but in many other linguistic signs as well, literal interpretation is hardly enough for accounting for the totality of meaning. Meaning of language is not monolithic; it is manifold and changing. The meaning exists only to the extent that it is negotiatively interpreted, within the boundaries of potential meanings of linguistic signs, to reach the possible level of approximation. Sensus communis allows multiple interpretations of meaning including logos and pathos; it legitimatizes and is legitimatized by the Knowledge of Pathos. Overall, Vico’s sensus communis offers a humanistic holistic model. In his view, the speaker and partner are placed in a particular place and time, while language keeps them rooted in cultural heritage and in social community. Self, other, and language are placed in balance within this world. Note also that in oral speech, as advocated by Vico, sensus communis simultaneously provides invention, organization, and expressivity required for performance. This process involves the totality of self, of both mind and body. In terms of comprehension as well, the unreflected judgment of sensus communis involves more than decontextualized autonomous logos. It is a judgment involving all senses. Although sensus communis is likely to be criticized by many, I, for one, agree with Schaeffer (1990) who recognizes its significance. Vico reminds us that our civilization is built upon a sensus communis that is essentially oral, communal, and practical, and he challenges us to redraw the cultural history of the West from within its rhetorical tradition rather than from within the traditions of Greek philosophy or Enlightenment rationalism. (1990:160)
The concept of sensus communis offers a foundation for understanding linguistic emotivity. Sensus communis provides psychological motivation for integrating meanings associated with the place of communication, both on individual and social
Linguistic Emotivity
levels. Vico’s prioritization of certitude over truth offers support for the interpretation of meanings based on negotiation. Vico’s oral rhetoric supported by sensus communis also bears testimony to the prioritization of orality to writing. It reminds us that language is an action, an event, rather than an abstract static system. Of particular significance of sensus communis is the recognition of the intuition of the speech community. Language is endorsed by the community and its culture, and this leads to the understanding of emotives as being endorsed in a community according to its cultural heritage. This relationship between sensus communis and culture suggests the hermeneutic potentials, but it also suffers from limitations. For, sensus communis, as a source of cultural identity, is likely to influence the process of the linguistic theory-building itself. I will discuss this issue under the term ‘‘linguistic ideologies’’ in Chapter 18. For now it is perhaps sufficient to mention that, despite expected criticism, the current work is designed to pursue the Knowledge of Pathos, with sensus communis at its foundation, for reaching the certitude of linguistic emotivity.
Chapter 2
Background Emotion, expressive function, and culture
.
Studies on language and emotion
Although historically, dominant linguistic theories have followed an ideology of logos, this historicity has not completely precluded an ideology of pathos. In fact studies addressing emotion and language, and those that touch upon pathos, have been published within linguistics and surrounding areas in the West and elsewhere. This chapter reviews some of these previous studies, with the intention of locating the concept of linguistic emotivity, the Place of Negotiation theory, and the Knowledge of Pathos in a historical perspective. First, I review the relationship between language and emotion as conceived by Rousseau, by scholars of the Prague Linguistic Circle, by Bally in his exploration into linguistic stylistics, and by researchers in pragmatics. I also review studies on metaphor from the cognitive semantics perspective. Although the kind of study I pursue in this book is not in complete theoretical agreement with the cognitive approach, their view of linguistic meaning is something to be noted, and therefore, I briefly touch upon some representative works in and association with cognitive studies. Additionally, the relationship between emotivity and grammaticalization is briefly mentioned. In Section 2.1, I review traditional Japanese studies. More than 200 years ago, Japanese language scholars of the Edo period (1603–1868 ad) approached language in a way radically different from modern Western linguists. In fact, to view language as emotion was rather common among Japanese language scholars, and aspects expressing linguistic pathos have consistently been considered precious and central to Japanese language studies. Through this review, we realize that steps toward the analysis of linguistic emotivity had been taken long ago by some Edo scholars. In addition, in Section 2.2, I briefly review representative works of contemporary Japanese linguistics. Scholars I review in this section, based on insight gained from syntactic and semantic studies of the Japanese language, have challenged linguistics of logos from within. Section 3 expands the horizon to emotion discussed in the cultural context. Included are discussion on sociocultural dimensions of emotion, concepts of ‘‘affect,’’ and ‘‘involvement.’’ Finally in Section 4, a critical assessment of past studies is presented.
Linguistic Emotivity
. Rousseau and the origin of language Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is an important writer on the relationship between emotion and language. In On the Origin of Language (1966), Rousseau argues that language does not derive from people’s primary needs (such as hunger and thirst), but derives from people’s needs motivated by morality and passion. It was love, hatred, pity, and anger that drew the first words from human beings, Rousseau insists. It was the language of human passion, and not the language of instinctive desire, that human beings initially voiced. Rousseau’s example is illustrative. Imagine a situation where someone is in pain. This is fully known. But as one watches this afflicted person, one may not weep. Yet, Rousseau says, ‘‘give him time to tell you what he feels and soon you will burst into tears. It is solely in this way that the scenes of a tragedy produce their effect’’ (1966: 8). As made clear in this statement, emotions are profoundly experienced when they are expressed in and through language. Language is essential for feeling. Naturally, not all linguistic expressions express the speaker’s emotion straightforwardly. This is evident when one considers that linguistic emotivity often involves strategies specifically used to persuade the partner. But, Rousseau was convinced that passion was inherent, and indeed fundamental, to language. He intuitively sensed the significance of emotion in language. Thus, as controversial as Rousseau’s treatise on the origin of language was, well before the development of modern Western linguistics, language was conceived as an emotional experience, rather than as a system of logos. In Rousseau’s view, language of desire is used in social conflict, but language of passion is used for interpersonal empathy, and it encourages the commonality of passion among its people. Language that pursues emotional involvement with others is expressive, figurative, as well as poetic, and it contrasts with the language of logos. Moreover, Rousseau takes the position that the language of logos has derived from the language of passion. This point is emphasized particularly in Chapter 2 of On the Origin of Language when Rousseau states that ‘‘(O)ne does not begin by reasoning, but by feeling’’ (1966: 11). Against another theory of the origin of language (which advocates that human beings invented speech to express their primary needs), he insists that such a view remains untenable. Rousseau viewed the origin of language as being, in essence, emotive expressivity. The ordinary language is a figurative language based on this language of passion, and language of logos has emerged as a result of its expansion. In retrospect, despite the dominance of rationality in academia, language’s emotivity has been recognized within the Western scholarship, one of the most powerful (if not controversial) being the position taken by Rousseau in the 18th century.
Background
. The Prague Linguistic Circle Turning to linguistics per se, perhaps linguists most keenly aware of the linguistic emotivity were scholars associated with the Prague Linguistic Circle. Among them are Jakobson (1960) and Bühler (Innis 1982), who introduced poetic and expressive functions of language. Limiting our discussion to the central tenet of the Prague Linguistic Circle, let me start with the view of its founder, Mathesius. The philosophical foundation of the Prague Linguistic Circle is stated in the lecture Mathesius gave in 1929. Significant to our discussion is Mathesius’ emphasis on the functional principle which prioritizes function over form. In his words: Whereas earlier linguistics, which primarily relied on the interpretation of texts, started from ready-made language structures and inquired about their meaning, thus proceeding from form to function, the new linguistics, relying on its experience with present-day language, starts from the needs of expression and inquires what means serve to satisfy these communication needs in the language being studied. It thus proceeds from function to form. (Mathesius 1983 [1929]: 123)
The idea that language responds to needs is significant in that the language user is brought to the fore. Language does not consist of ready-made forms; rather, our linguistic experience involves experiencing language as ‘‘languaging.’’ The motive of the speaker is critical for understanding the form itself. For Mathesius, language is ‘‘something living’’ (1983 [1929]: 122) and underneath the words, lies the speaker or writer whose communicative intentions are expressed in language. In addition, Mathesius reminds us that in most cases ‘‘words are aimed at a hearer or reader’’ (1983 [1929]: 123), advocating the importance of the recipient side of language in communicative interaction. As indicative of the phrase ‘‘needs of expression’’ appearing in the citation above, the Prague School functionalism does not ignore the speaker (or the partner) in its theory-building. This is because language per se does not possess function, but rather, function arises because the language users (or, more accurately, communication participants) have functional needs. This paradigmatic shift, from language-as-form to language-as-function, presupposes a speaker and partner, and their expressive intentions. And in this understanding, linguistic emotivity is naturally understood as a part of the communicative needs. Within this paradigm, the speaker is no longer the thinking subject of cogito, but rather, a person who speaks, talks, participates, interacts, and above all, feels, in communication. Following Mathesius, Trnka (1983 [1948]) advocates the view that language is best understood as ‘‘language experience.’’ Citing Bally’s work which is in basic agreement with the tenet of ‘‘language experience,’’ Trnka laments that Bally concentrated on the emotional aspect of language only. In the Prague School,
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Trnka insists, the concept of language experience has a broader meaning, ‘‘because it includes the experiencing not only of affective but also of intellectual elements of language’’ (1983 [1948]: 226). Trnka (1983 [1948]) continues. For Prague School scholars, it is important to combine both the system of language and the language experience. Because these are mutually related, ‘‘language lacking experience would be no more than an unchanging system of relations with no possibilities of development’’ and, on the other hand, ‘‘without the values of logical order, language would only be equal to an accumulation of unanalyzable phonic utterances’’ (1983 [1948]: 227). Trnka’s position indeed resonates with the theses of the Prague Linguistic Circle presented to the First Congress of Slavists held in Prague in 1929. Under the section titled ‘‘problems of research into languages of different functions, especially Slavic,’’ we find the following statement. Features important for the characterization of language are the intellectuality and the emotionality of language manifestations. Both these features either interpenetrate each other or one of them prevails over the other. (Vachek and Dušková 1983: 88)
As if predicting the formal linguistics that was to prosper in North America in the latter half of the 20th century, Trnka, along with Prague School linguists, insisted on the kind of linguistics that incorporates both logos and pathos. Such a creative desire, however, has not materialized so far, and extensive analyses of broad-based data from the Praguean perspective remain unavailable. As a representative of the contemporary Prague Linguistics Circle, Daneš brings to the fore the issue of language and emotion. Daneš (1987) advocates the interactive approach to emotion expressed in discourse, and states that the study of emotion in communication must include the speaker and the hearer as well as the situation. And at least initially, the researcher must take into account all the various means by which emotions are manifested. Most significantly, Daneš maintains that we must ‘‘abandon the traditional notion of ‘emotional neutrality’ and assume that any utterance and higher discourse unit has an emotional value’’ (1987: 169). Inheriting Trnka’s and the Prague School’s idea of language experience, or more explicitly, the concept of living in one’s language, Daneš points out that emotion is the most typical and natural manifestation of people’s involvement with language. For Daneš, emotion (including feeling and affect) is something constantly experienced. And ‘‘the essential character of human experience is affective involvement with the object being experienced’’ (1994: 256, original emphasis). Daneš emphasizes that we are constantly experiencing affective involvement toward the object of our cognitive intentionality. This is because feelings provide information about the things we are confronted with.
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Following Daneš’ view on language and emotion, I take the position that language and emotion are inseparable. Although one may associate linguistic emotivity directly with intonation and other emphatic features, in reality, language in general is imbued with emotion. Indeed, no expression in language is totally void of emotive meaning. Let me borrow Daneš’ words: Emotion, however, does not constitute a level or layer (. . .), but an aspect — and a substantial and omnipresent one — of the message conveyed by an utterance. It is a specific aspect of the overall linguistic behavior of speech participants, that permeates the whole discourse, which is thus ‘imbued’ with it. And it belongs to the specificity of emotion that it is experiential and ‘interactional’, rather than ‘communicative’. (Daneš 1994: 262)
Because of this understanding of the emotive meaning, Daneš (1987, 1994) opposes attributing emotion to markedness only. If we associate emotion with marked expressions only, then we must conclude that expressions without markedness bear no emotive meaning. And this, Daneš opposes. All expressions are emotive in one way or another. Pointing out that our brain functions as a hybrid mechanism with both digital and analog coding, Daneš (1994: 257) insists that emotion is a matter of degree. Emotion is omnipresent, although in different shades and colors, sometimes spontaneous, and at other times, strategic. Theoretical positions taken by the Prague Linguistic Circle remind us that language is something that responds to the needs of its users, including the emotional need. Language realizes the need of the person who thinks, talks, participates, interacts, and always experiences emotion and feelings. I find in the works of the Prague Linguistic Circle one of the earliest theoretical elucidations concerning linguistic emotivity. Their theoretical position is in agreement with that of the Knowledge of Pathos. As a specific study of linguistic emotivity, I will later examine Volek’s (1987) work, which falls into the Prague School functionalism. . Stylistics One of the disciplines that has contributed to the understanding of the emotive aspect of language is stylistics, or linguistic stylistics. Bally, known as one of the editors of de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, singlehandedly developed this field. Although Bally was a student of de Saussure, his theoretical position was not in total agreement with his teacher, as made evident below. Bally was unsatisfied with the Prague School functionalism which advocated the linguistic sign’s multi-functions. Instead, he proposed dictum and modus, the two levels of functions, the latter of which is his (and my) primary concern. Modus expresses the speaker’s attitude toward dictum, and Bally was drawn to it, as evidenced by Bally’s characterization of modus as l’âme de la phrase.
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Simply put, Bally insisted that language and life are mutually dependent, and both require more than logos. Bally phrases this as ‘‘(I)f language is not a logical creation, it is due to the fact that life, whose expression it represents, does not simply produce pure thoughts’’ (1965 [1925]:15, based on Hübler [1998]:5). Bally continues: Those thoughts which sprout in the fullness of life are never of an essentially intellectual make-up: they are movements accompanied by emotions which sometimes lead me to and sometimes detain me from actions: they are releases or contractions of desires, volitions, vital impulses. Admittedly, it is only through my intellect that I become aware of these multifarious movements, yet it does not represent the essence but is only the vehicle, the stage director, and the mechanic. (Bally 1965 [1925]: 15–16, based on Hübler [1998]: 6)
Accordingly, Bally makes the distinction between mode vécu (the affective mode) and mode pur (the intellectual mode). Mode vécu refers to the performative mode involving the whole person with all his or her senses and feelings, while mode pur refers to the analytic mode of description. In expressing the speaker’s emotional attitude, mode pur offers its description, producing a report of one’s inner sensations, as in I am getting mad. Mode vécu, on the other hand, enacts a live performance of the sensation, as in Damn it! In the mode vécu performance, one senses personal authenticity. Bally treated mode vécu and mode pur as complementary. This is because the emotivity of mode vécu is foregrounded in the context of mode pur, and vice versa. Consequently, it is critical to understand that language provides both means. Bally was also concerned with individual versus social aspects of language. Unlike de Saussure who separated langue and parole, Bally took the position that real-life language involves both langue and parole simultaneously. In communication, one desires to express individual subjective feelings, and yet the communication must be achieved by socially accepted means. Language functions as a sort of go-between, adjusting the two contradicting forces, i.e., one toward individualization, and the other, toward socialization. Bally could not rest easy by analyzing langue only, and conducted textual analysis focusing primarily on various affective functions. For Bally, linguistic stylistics is the discipline concerned with ‘‘the expressive facts of language from the viewpoint of their affective content, in other words, the expression of feelings through language and the action of language on feelings’’ (based on Caffi and Janney 1994b: 333). According to Caffi and Janney (1994b), Bally distinguishes between two types of expressive processes, i.e., direct and indirect. Direct processes involve lexical choices, and indirect processes involve prosodic and syntactic choices that go beyond single words. It is significant that Bally recognizes emotivity in grammar and beyond. In fact, Bally’s stylistics includes different types of dislocation,
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including that of the thematic progression of texts often analyzed in the Prague School functionalism (Functional Sentence Perspective, in particular). . Pragmatics Pragmatics is another area of language studies that has demonstrated interest in the elucidation of linguistic emotivity. No established pragmatics theory for emotivity, however, is available at this point. It is fair to say that linguistic emotivity is yet to be established as the main area of pragmatics research. This is evident in Verschueren’s (1999) overview of pragmatics which lists expressive function along with other functions of language. Emotion is mentioned only in passing, and no substantial discussion is offered. Let me follow Caffi and Janney (1994a, 1994b) for an overview of pragmatics of emotive communication, while paying attention to the problems and themes they suggest for future research. The first issue is theoretical. How is emotive meaning identified? What is the basis for emotivity? If we consider markedness as a feature of emotivity, what happens in the case of unmarked, neutral form (if such a form exists)? Assuming that the recognition of emotive markedness involves certain norms and expected schemata, Caffi and Janney (1994b) list the following anticipatory schema that potentially involves the marking of emotive contrasts. Linguistic anticipatory schemata offer guidelines as to what are normally expected in language behavior. For example, if we assume that a syntactic question requires a rising intonation, a question with a falling intonation represents a divergence, with implications for emotive meaning. Contextual anticipatory schemata refer to expected global and situational assumptions. For example, if parents usually call their children by their first name (e.g., Johny, stop that!), when a parent does not (John James Smith, stop that!), this generates notice. In such a case, some emotional motivations are presumed. Cotextual anticipatory schemata handle cases where there are expectations about types or successions of verbal and/or nonverbal activities that are likely to occur in particular stretches of discourse. For example, against a background of formal speech, informal speech demonstrates a contrast, and therefore an emotive reading is expected. Also to be noted is that emotivity-based contrasts are analogic phenomena, characterized in terms of more or less, and require the appreciation of gradation. Caffi and Janney (1994b: 354) take the position that it is possible to conceive of potential ranges of emotive choices as existing on the more/less scale. In concrete terms, Caffi and Janney (1994b) list a variety of devices that are expected to carry emotive meaning. They include devices of evaluation, proximity, specificity, evidentiality, volitionality, and quantity. Additional fundamental problematics in the pragmatics of emotive interaction involve analytical approaches. For example, one may view emotive communica-
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tion as a process, while another may view it as an interactive achievement. Caffi and Janney (1994b) seem to advocate the latter view. To view emotive communication as an interactional achievement is consistent with theoretical positions advocated by scholars in interactional sociolinguistics, and this has been and is my position as well. Particularly noteworthy is Caffi and Janney’s characterization of the interactional view when they state that this latter view is dialogical, and the ‘‘significance of emotive signals is regarded as a matter of negotiation between the participants’’ (1994b: 358). This language-as-interactional-achievement position takes a dynamic view, in contrast with the language-as-product position which maintains a static view. If a researcher views emotive communication essentially as a product, then he or she observes the product in the 〈I-it〉 relationship. Discourse, text, and interaction are viewed as static product available for analysis. Recall that linguistic stylistics, in principle, assumes this theoretical position, and analyzes written texts exclusively. If a researcher views emotive communication essentially as an interactional achievement, he or she must pay attention to the intersubjective 〈I-you〉 relationship, which necessitates a philosophical position such as the Place of Negotiation theory. Other problematics raised by Caffi and Janney (1994b) regarding pragmatics of emotive communication include the issue of identifying and prioritizing certain units of analysis (e.g., utterance, speech-act, turn, stretch of discourse, text, and so forth) as well as certain loci of analysis (i.e., speaker, addressee, content, discourse management). As pointed out earlier, although these problematics are presented, no overall theoretical solution is offered. In the course of this book, through introduction of the Place of Negotiation theory, and in the process of analyses, I address some of the issues raised by Caffi and Janney (1994a, 1994b). . Cognitive semantics The approach to linguistic emotivity in cognitive linguistics, with special regard to the study on metaphor, is best characterized as a study of mode pur. Among works in cognitive semantics (e.g., Kövecses 1990, 1995; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Kövecses 1987), let me focus on Kövecses (1995) because it includes the discussion of the anger metaphor in Japanese. Kövecses (1995) focuses on the ‘‘hot fluid in a container’’ metaphor of anger, and tests its applicability to Chinese, Japanese, and Hungarian. As for Japanese data and interpretation, he mainly relies on Matsuki’s (1989) analysis of ikari. Citing examples such as Ikari ga karadajuu ni juuman shita ‘My body was filled with anger’, Kare wa ikari o buchimaketa ‘He exposed/expressed/showed his anger’, and Ikari o uchi ni himeru ‘I contained my anger’ (Kövecses 1995:119), Kövecses argues that indeed the ‘‘container’’ metaphor is not only useful for conceptualizing Japanese anger but also it captures a great number of aspects and properties associated with anger.
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For example, the container metaphor allows us to conceptualize intensity (filled with), control (contain), loss of control (could not keep inside), dangerousness (brim with), and its expression (express/show) associated with anger. Kövecses proposes to understand anger in four cultures (English, Chinese, Japanese, and Hungarian) as a process of five stages: cause → anger → attempt at control → loss of control → expression (1995: 132). Cultural differences seem to exist, however, in the kinds of causes and different expression stages. In Japanese, the metaphor also takes on an added characteristic that a (hot) fluid is located primarily in the stomach/bowels area (hara), and this ‘‘hara as container’’ metaphor only marginally implies a pressurized container. The hara metaphor has an elaborate control aspect. For example, an increase in the intensity of anger is indicated by hara rising, the chest (mune) getting filled with anger, and eventually anger reaching the head (atama). Kövecses (1995) also mentions that in the discussion of Japanese ikari, a suggestion is made that the Japanese model (possibly the more traditional kind) gives the angry person more chance to exercise control over anger than the Western model does. All these observations add to our understanding of Japanese emotivity. However, cognitivists’ approach to emotivity aims to understand human cognitive processes by way of descriptive linguistic signs. It does not directly address the theme of this volume, that is, an inquiry into how one expresses and interprets linguistic emotivity. The significance of cognitive semantics to the current work lies in the expansion of the semantic possibility, specifically to the emotive richness of metaphor and metonymy. However, I must point out that their approach to expressivity fails to take into full account the interactionality and the situationality of communication. Language is analyzed as being apart from the partner, and their approach essentially sustains the 〈I-it〉 relationship. And as a result, although different from formal linguistics per se, in many cases language is analyzed as object, giving the impression that their approaches generally fall into the linguistics of logos. Another approach to Japanese emotive vocabulary should be mentioned here. Wierzbicka’s work does not directly fall into cognitive semantics, but, among her works (e.g., 1991, 1997), study on (Japanese) key words, in particular, shows some methodological resemblance to the cognitivist approach. For example, Wierzbicka (1997) uses semantic primitives to account for semantic similarities and differences among cultural key words across languages, including Japanese. One of the key concepts within Japanese culture is amae ‘dependence, indulgence’. Amae, since its inception by Doi (1971), has been known to pose problems in its translation into other languages, into English, in particular. Faced with this notoriously problematic task, Wierzbicka defines amae in the following terms.
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(a) X thinks something like this about someone (Y): I know: (b) when Y thinks about me, Y feels something good (c) Y wants to do good things for me (d) Y can do good things for me (e) when I am with Y nothing bad can happen to me (f) I don’t have to do anything because of this (g) I want to be with Y (h) X feels something good because of this (Wierzbicka 1997: 241) It is true that circular definitions found in ordinary dictionaries fail to truly ‘‘define’’ words. Failing to explicate complex and obscure meanings in terms of simple and self-explanatory ways, too often dictionary definitions are more obscure than the word being defined. As Wierzbicka (1997) advocates, semantic primes can avoid this circularity. However, again, as in the case of cognitive semantics, Wierzbicka’s study is that of mode pur (words describing emotions), and not of mode vécu (direct performatory expression of emotions). Other studies on expressive functions of language associated with cognitive semantics include Drescher (1997), Foolen (1997), Günthner (1997), and Werth (1998). Studies discussing Japanese data are also available, for example, Hasada (1998), McVeigh (1996), and Travis (1998). Approaches mentioned above are encouraging, particularly because they go beyond a proposition-based semantic interpretation, and thus, open up possibilities of interpreting different dimensions of grammatical meanings on a broader spectrum. . Grammaticalization The issue of language and emotion has emerged in the context of another theoretical development in linguistics, that is, in association with the theory of grammaticalization as advanced by Traugott (1982, 1989). The grammaticalization theory attempts to establish a diachronic process that grammatical elements often evolve from lexical sources, and semantically shift from propositional to textual, and then to attitudinal meanings. Linguistic devices become more personal; in theoretical terms, the language change goes through the process of subjectification. The study that substantiates this view, for example, is Hübler’s (1998) study on English expressivity. Hübler (1998) examines six grammatical phenomena in English (possessive dative, ethic dative, expanded form, present perfect, periphrastic do, and the get-passive) through Old, Middle, and Modern English, and concludes that the indexicalness of a single grammatical device could be shown to undergo the grammaticalization process identified by Traugott. Although the unidirectionality of the development cannot account for every case, and therefore, a more
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flexible view is required, Hübler (1998) reports that generally the development from propositional meaning to attitudinal/emotive meaning is recognized. As for the Japanese grammaticalization phenomenon, Onodera’s study (1993) substantiates Traugott’s grammaticalization process. Onodera (1993), based on the analysis of the Japanese language spanning over 1,200 years, explores the pragmatic change that conjunctions (demo and dakedo) and interjections (ne and its variants) underwent. Onodera observes that functional and semantic changes in these forms roughly follow the direction from ideational, to textual, and to more expressive. This confirms Traugott’s (1982, 1989) hypothesis on semantic change, i.e., less to more personal. Onodera (2000) states that demo type connectives (including dakedo, dakara, datte, dewa, and de) underwent both grammaticalization and pragmatization, while na-elements (a group of interjections) underwent pragmatization (independent of grammaticalization). In both cases, contemporary use of these markers has taken on increased varieties of expressive functions. For example, demo as a conjunction functions for (1) point-making, (2) claiming the floor, (3) opening the conversation, and (4) changing the topic/ subtopic. The historical shift toward increased varieties of expressive functions provides support to the argument that linguistic emotivity is an important element for understanding language and its change. The historical shift Onodera (1993, 1995, 2000) observes does not imply that language as a whole is shifting from less to more personal or expressive. In fact, the decline of Japanese kakarimusubi ‘particle/adverb-predicate correspondence’ after the Heian period (794–1192 ad) bears testimony to the fact that emotivity, at least the kind expressed by kakarimusubi, has severely declined. Kakarimusubi which prospered during the Heian period, and gradually declined since the Kamakura period (1192–1333 ad), are practically extinct today. One may interpret this phenomenon as a shift toward the less expressive. Furthermore, the opposite direction of language shift, i.e., from attitudinal to propositional meanings, has been suggested for Japanese. For example, Yamaguchi (1990: 129) points out that Japanese interrogatives have gradually shifted from more emotional to less emotional. Yamaguchi’s position is based on the advancement of certain emotive interrogative particles and the consequent rise of the less emotive question marker ka. Yamaguchi’s point does not directly address the semantic or pragmatic shift of an identical device, but rather, use and disuse of related devices. These observations do not necessarily contradict Onodera’s findings, which are based on the grammaticalization and pragmatization processes of a set category of Japanese words. The above observations only illustrate that emotivity in language undergoes multidirectional changes. Different devices and strategies may fill the void, and those devices themselves may undergo shifts from less personal to more personal. My speculation is that different aspects and levels of language may shift toward different, or even opposing, directions, so that they
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compensate among themselves. Through time, different needs are met in different ways. Although the current study does not address the issue of grammaticalization or pragmatization, its significance to the understanding of emotivity is noted.
.
Emotion in the Japanese language
. Traditional Japanese studies: Language as emotion So far we have concentrated on Western theories and views on language and emotion. We now shift our attention to Japanese language studies. Partly because traditional Japanese language studies are mostly available only in Japanese, the significance of their studies has been consistently slighted in linguistics and related fields outside Japan. It is fair to say that serious Japanese language studies started during the Edo period (1603–1868 ad). Edo scholars, however, were not directly interested in constructing a theory of language, nor offering a systematic analysis of the Japanese language structure. Their concerns were more immediate, i.e., how to compose and how to appreciate great waka (a 31-mora poem). In short, they approached language studies from expressive and interpretive perspectives, and not necessarily on the basis of theoretical interest. Two scholars should be mentioned in relation to linguistic emotivity, Nariakira Fujitani (1738–1779) and Akira Suzuki (1764–1837). Fujitani is known for his Kazashi-shoo (1934 [1767]) and Ayui-shoo (1960 [1778]). In the oomune ‘summation’ section of Ayui-shoo, Fujitani divides Japanese words into four basic categories, na, kazashi, yosoi, and ayui, which he defines as the following. 1. na ‘nouns’ identify objects; 2. kazashi ‘pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, exclamations, affixes’ assist other parts of speech; 3. yosoi ‘verbs’ and ‘adjectives’ describe objects; 4. ayui ‘auxiliary verbs, particles, suffixes’ assist other parts of speech. As is widely known, a literal translation of the last three terms reveals Fujitani’s intention to associate his categorization with the linear order of Japanese expressions; kazashi means head decoration (appearing at the beginning), yosoi, clothing (often the middle part of the sentence), and ayui, the footwear (appearing at the end of the sentence). According to Nakada and Takeoka (1960), Fujitani essentially understood language as follows. When viewing language from expressive and interpretive perspectives, the most important aspect is how socially conventionalized words
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and grammar are creatively used by each individual. This is because conventionalized patterns of language restrict individual expressivity. In fact language exists at a precarious balance between this conventionalized restrictive force and individual creative desire. Fujitani identified the abstract level of language as yuu ‘ghost/phantom’ and the actual individually-enacted expressive level as arawashi ‘appearance/manifestation’, and found the relationship between the two critically important. The language realized by an individual involves a number of aspects; (1) speaker’s intention, (2) speaker’s interaction with a partner, (3) situation where the interaction takes place, (4) materials related to expression, and (5) individual particularities. Just as the patterns of classic Noh performances and Kabuki plays thrive on individual creativity by mastering and transcending rigid traditional patterns, language consists of yuu as a convention, and arawashi as creation. Fujitani was keenly aware of the language’s creative possibility, which inevitably expresses personal emotivity. Perhaps I should cite some examples here. On the abstract level, an event may be referred to as Hana ga saku ‘Flowers bloom’, but when it is actually used as a part of an interaction, the expression becomes individualized, situated, and particularlized, resulting in expressions such as A, hana! ‘Oh, flowers’, Saita! ‘Bloomed!’, Saita yo, hana ga ‘In bloom, aren’t they, those flowers’. The variability observed here results from sociolinguistic factors, individual intention and style, as well as genre distinction, and most significantly, in association with different types and intensities of linguistic emotivity. Variability also results from different kinds and degrees of human emotions. These differences are expressed in Japanese by kazashi, yosoi, and ayui, as well as the lexical correspondence within sentence (which Fujitani called uchiai ‘echoing’). With this fundamental view toward language, Fujitani concentrated on the study of kazashi and ayui. Of importance is that Fujitani knew the poetic significance of ayui and kazashi. Given that waka is imbued with deep emotion and sentiment, it seems natural that Fujitani finds ayui and kazashi most critical. Ayuishoo lists 164 particles, auxiliary verbs, and suffixes, which are divided into 50 types. These 50 types are further categorized into five, and then finally into two basic groups. For example, one of the basic groups, ayui that immediately follows nouns, is the zo-family. Within this zo-family, particles so, koso, and koso wa are included. These categories are differentiated not by concrete words but by abstract semantic and emotive meanings. Notably, Fujitani has little to say about the informational meaning the language conveys. Instead, he chose poetics of pathos as his central concern. We witness here that the study of linguistic emotivity had existed in Japan at the early dawn of Japanese language studies. Prominent among emotive devices Fujitani paid attention to is uchiai ‘echoing’. Uchiai refers to the echo effect among different words within a sentence. When
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interpreting waka, a mere understanding of each word is insufficient. One must grasp the larger framework within which one word echoes with another, creating a resonance that reverberates throughout the waka. This echo effect is achieved as a result of two or more corresponding words functioning in combination. Curiously, Fujitani (Nakada and Takeoka 1960) mentions cases where the rules of uchiai are violated. In such cases, there are two recognizable types, i.e., nabikizume and kakusu uchiai. Nabikizume refers to cases where the zo corresponding predicate is absent. When this occurs, the poet ‘‘cast one’s exclamation out there with one’s heart along with it’’ (kokoro o fukumete nagame-sutsuru) (Nakada and Takeoka 1960: 97). In such cases, often, koto yo, koto kana, or mono o (all of these are combinations of nominalization and particle) follow. Fujitani’s above explanation, i.e., cast one’s exclamation out there with one’s heart along with it, is of particular significance to Japanese emotivity, but for now it suffices to say that Fujitani did not ignore the emotivity of language; in fact, he treasured it. To cite Fujitani: As I will explain in each chapter of this book, uchiai is regulated by a particular type of corresponding ayui. However, two additional types of uchiai exist that should be explained separately. First is nabikizume, and the second, kakusu uchiai. Nabikizume refers to the use of pre-nominal forms of adjectives and ayui when they are not accompanied by corresponding particles or other corresponding kazashi and ayui. This happens when one admiringly exclaims with pre-nominal forms (rather than ending the sentence with usual verb endings). Such a case should be interpreted by adding phrases that express exclamation such as ‘‘how . . .’’ ‘‘what a . . .’’ and ‘‘I wish . . .’’ (. . .) Kakusu uchiai occurs when one avoids using corresponding sentence-final particles. In this case the uchiai is suggested by the accompanying original poem or poetry citation, or by the kakekotoba ‘punning phrase’ which hides the corresponding ayui.1 (Nakada and Takeoka 1960:97–8, my translation)
The concept of uchiai is similar to kakarimusubi ‘particle/adverb-predicate correspondence’. Uchiai, however, covers a broader spectrum of phenomena than kakarimusubi. In essence, uchiai is an expression of personal feelings and emotion that cannot be fully explained by a mere compilation of word meanings. Fujitani’s work was further advanced by students of Norinaga Motoori, such as Haruniwa Motoori and Akira Suzuki. And it was Akira Suzuki who immortalized the emotional aspect of the Japanese language by the phrase kokoro no koe ‘voices from the heart’. In his Gengyo Shishuron (1979 [1824]), Suzuki introduces the classification of four word categories; tai no shi ‘nominals,’ arikata no shi ‘adjectivals,’ shiwaza no shi ‘verbals,’ and te-ni-o-ha ‘te-ni-o-ha particles’. Suzuki groups the first three into one large category, i.e., shi ‘referential words,’ and deems te-ni-o-ha to be an opposing category. One may rightfully criticize Suzuki for being overly zealous about the concept of ‘‘voices from the heart.’’ For, Suzuki’s characterization in Gengyo Shishuron
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includes the alleged superiority of the Japanese language, in comparison to languages of other countries (particularly China which has served as the Other to many Edo period scholars). He glorified the Japanese language’s refined features, particularly, the voices from the heart, and one cannot escape from the impression that Suzuki seems to have engaged in celebrating the ‘‘uniqueness’’ of the Japanese language. Suzuki delineates the contrasting characteristics between shi versus te-ni-o-ha as follows: Sanshu no shi ‘three types of referential words’: 1. They have referential function; 2. These are referential words; 3. They refer to objects and thus become referential words; 4. They are like precious beads; 5. They are like containers; 6. They fail to operate (function) without te-ni-o-ha. Te-ni-o-ha: 1. They have no referential function; 2. They represent voice; 3. They are voices from the heart and are attached to shi; 4. They are like strings that connect precious beads; 5. They are like hands that use or operate the containers; 6. Without shi, they have nothing to be attached to. Suzuki (1979 [1824]: 23–4) summarizes that the voices of te-ni-o-ha distinguish and express states of one’s heart, and nominals and other words distinguish objects and describe them. There is no other term in the history of Japanese language studies that proclaims the importance of emotivity as strongly as Suzuki’s ‘‘voices from the heart.’’ This expression implies many things; orality, speakerhood, particularity, linguistic action, situatedness, and above all, expressivity and emotivity. It is true that the phrase ‘‘voices from the heart’’ is metaphorical and somewhat unclear, and, as I point out shortly, has indeed been criticized for this reason (e.g., Yamada 1908). However, together with Fujitani, Suzuki recognizes the importance of language’s emotivity, the emotive voices from the heart. ‘‘Voices from the heart’’ resonates with Bally’s (1965 [1925]) term l’âme de la phrase, with which he captured the essence of modus. Another interesting point found in Gengyo Shishuron is Suzuki’s treatment of the origin of language. Toward the end of Gengyo Shishuron, we find a section titled ‘‘the origin of language or how four types of words were created.’’ He explains as follows. We hear voices in the heart that express human emotion, and
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these voices are the origin of te-ni-o-ha. Te-ni-o-ha is the essential spirit of shi, and by using this shi, people named things, which resulted in the creation of nouns. When nouns were connected like a strand of beads, two types of words were created, and this resulted in adjectives and verbs. If one traces the history of all words, one reaches two kinds of voices, that of te-ni-o-ha and that of nouns. The voice of te-ni-o-ha expresses ‘‘by dividing and presenting the states of one’s heart’’ (waga kokoro no sama o wakachi arawashi), and the voice of nouns expresses ‘‘by dividing and presenting things and events’’ (banbutsu no monogoto o wakachi arawasu) (1979 [1824]: 23–4). Similar to Rousseau, Suzuki thought that at the origin of language were the voices one hears from the heart, that is, the deep feelings (including passion). Similar to Rousseau who found language of passion as the origin of language, Suzuki understood emotional voices of pathos as the source for parts of speech. Indeed, Suzuki found the essence of the Japanese language in the voices from the heart, that is, the Japanese pathos. When discussing language and emotion in Japanese, one cannot ignore Yoshio Yamada (1873–1958), a prominent Japanese language scholar of the Meiji (1868–1912 ad), Taishoo (1912–1926 ad), and Shoowa (1926–1989 ad) periods. His commitment to emotivity is symbolized by the term he introduces, i.e., kantai no ku ‘vocative–emotive phrase’. Yamada states that what he calls bunpoogaku ‘study of grammar’ is ‘‘a study of methods in which one expresses one’s thought and emotion’’ (bunpoogaku wa ningen no shisoo kanjoo o gengo nite arawasu hoohoo no kenkyuu) (1936: 888). Note that he explicitly includes emotion as something that language expresses, and considers emotion as a part of research concern. Interestingly, Yamada was attempting to distinguish linguistics from logic, and specifically states that ‘‘studies of grammar (i.e., linguistics) examines any and every phenonemon as long as it is expressed by language; it includes not only logical operation, but also emotion, desire, and imagination’’ (1936: 890, my translation).2 For Yamada, the thoughts expressed through language include knowledge/information as well as emotion and desire. For example, Hana uruwashi ‘The flower is beautiful’ expresses knowledge/information, Hana uruwashiki kana ‘The flower is indeed beautiful’ expresses emotion, and Hana yo, uruwashikare ‘Oh, the flower, be beautiful!’, the desire. It was this view of language which led Yamada to the recognition of the concept of kantai no ku ‘vocative– emotive phrase’. Yamada divides his linguistics into a theory of words (go) and theory of phrases (ku). Phrases involve combination of elements, and therefore, they represent structural, central, and organizational phenomena. One fragment of thought hangs together by one base point, and this structural point is necessary for every thought. This is what Yamada calls tookaku sayoo ‘(lit.) operation of integrated senses’. The sentence is, according to Yamada, ‘‘the expression, via the linguistic form, of the thought organized through the operation of integrated
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senses’’ (tookaku sayoo ni yorite toogooseraretaru shisoo ga, gengo to yuu keishiki ni yorite hyoogenseraretaru mono) (1936: 902). Yamada adds that, under normal circumstances, sentences possess subject and predicate. The difference between ku ‘phrases’ and bun ‘sentences’ are that ku offers sources for sentences, and bun are those that come into existence bearing the form when ‘‘ku are used (for communication)’’ (ku ga un’yooserarete) (1936: 904). This resonates with the distinction Fujitani (as explained in Nakada and Takeoka [1960]) made between yuu, the abstract language, and arawashi, the actual creative linguistic expression. After following some of the Western typology of ku, Yamada concludes that the Japanese language possesses a type of expression fundamentally different from sentences usually recognized in Western grammars (such as descriptive, interrogative, imperative, and exclamative sentences). This expression is what Yamada calls kantai no ku ‘vocative–emotive phrase’. Yamada (1936) places kantai no ku on the equal level with his juttai no ku ‘descriptive phrase’ and characterizes it as follows. Kantai no ku always builds upon one nominal which becomes a vocative phrase, and it is constructed with that nominal as the core element of thought. Kantai no ku fundamentally and categorically opposes juttai no ku in its character and structure; kantai no ku is a direct presentation of emotion with one-element structure, and accordingly, its form shows characteristics of emotive expression, while juttai no ku is a presentation of rational thought with a two-element structure.3 (Yamada 1936: 936, my translation)
According to Yamada (1936: 947), kantai no ku ‘vocative–emotive phrase’ takes the nominal as central element with pre-nominal phrase/clause. For example, in an expression (1) Uruwashiki hana kana. beautiful flower ip ‘(What) a beautiful flower!’ uruwashiki ‘beautiful’ is the prenominal phrase, and hana ‘flower’ is the core element. Yamada (1936: 947) states that kantai no ku does not take the structure of the subject–predicate, but rather, it represents ‘‘one nominal and calls out for it’’ (ikko no taigen o taishoo toshite kore o yobikakuru ni tomareri). The important point here is that kantai no ku captures the event through its nominal expression, as if the event were summarized within a picture frame, providing a vocative–emotive target. Taking the above mentioned position toward language and emotion, Yamada (1936) remarks on the linguistic theory itself. Yamada (1936) laments that Japanese linguists tend to slight the Japanese language phenomena, and instead, they easily accept Western theories. Kantai no ku ‘vocative–emotive phrase’ does not appear in Western linguistics literature, and following this view, Japanese
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scholars by and large ignored the phenomenon. This only results in an incomplete analysis of the Japanese language. Yamada, in the 1930s sensed the danger of distorting facts about language primarily due to inadequacies of theories. Naturally, emotives are abundant in languages other than Japanese, and as I have already reviewed, Western scholarship has its own scholarly tradition on emotivity. In retrospect, it was simply the case that emotives were often pushed aside from the main stream formal linguistics. As a result, linguists analyzing Western languages have tended to ignore them, which resulted in many of the Japanese language scholars’ lukewarm commitment to the study of linguistic emotivity as well. Yamada (1936) divides kantai no ku ‘vocative–emotive phrase’ into kiboo kantai, i.e., kantai expressing hope/desire, and kandoo kantai, i.e., kantai expressing deeply moved emotion. Kiboo kantai expresses the speaker’s hope, wish, and desire; it takes the core nominal accompanied by particles expressing hope. Kandoo kantai expresses deep and surging emotion; it takes a core nominal or a nominalized clause. Critically, Yamada (1922) warns us that kantai no ku occurs primarily in written Japanese; in spoken Japanese the use of kandoo kantai (vocative–emotive phrase expressing deep and surging emotion) is limited and kiboo kantai (vocative–emotive phrase expressing desire) is not used at all. Yamada consistently advocated the emotional aspect of language, but he was rather critical of the traditional Japanese language studies, works of Fujitani and Suzuki, in particular. In fact, Yamada (1908) criticizes the very term ‘‘voices from the heart’’ for being too metaphorical. In Yamada’s words: Since Suzuki distinguishes te-ni-o-ha from shi by metaphor alone, it is impossible to fully understand its essence. According to the metaphorical definition, it is defined as ‘‘voices from the heart attached to shi.’’ What are voices from the heart? Are they sounds that express thoughts? If so, what words are voices from the heart? It is impossible for me to understand the description, ‘‘voices from the heart attached to shi.’’ It could be that I am simply incapable of understanding a difficult concept, but I think it (Suzuki’s concept of te-ni-o-ha) remains a mere riddle.4 (Yamada 1908: 24, my translation)
. Sense, empathy, perspective, and desirability in Japanese grammar In this section I briefly review some representative works of contemporary Japanese linguistics relevant to the current work. Scholars I review here, based on their insight gained from syntactic and semantic studies of the Japanese language, have challenged linguistics of logos from within. Although their studies do not directly address the language and emotion issue, their theoretical significance should not be ignored. They have encouraged, in broad terms, the directional shift from a linguistics of logos to a linguistics of pathos.
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Kuroda (1973, 1976) sheds light on the relationship between grammar and style, reportive and nonreportive narrative style, in particular. He uses a number of Japanese grammatical phenomena to reveal epistemological differences involved in linguistic and narrative expressions. For example, the Japanese sensation adjective atsui ‘hot’ is used only with first person, and cannot be used with second or third person. For second and third person, the verbal counterpart, i.e., atsugatteiru, is used, instead. This epistemological restriction in Japanese grammar guides Kuroda to offer foundations for the kind of general narrative theory that incorporates the narrator’s sense and performance. The empathy perspective presented by Kuno and Kaburaki (1975) and further theorized in Kuno (1987) also contributes to an understanding of functional syntax beyond Japanese. Empathy, according to Kuno, is ‘‘the speaker’s identification, which may vary in degree, with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence.’’ (1987: 206). By using the consideration of camera angles or points of view in sentence production, Kuno accounts for the marginality of English sentences such as Then John’s brother was hit by him. To make the concept of empathy more explicit, Kuno introduces a degree of empathy that ranges between 0 and 1. According to Kuno, ‘‘(T)he degree of the speaker’s empathy with x, E(x), ranges from 0 to 1, with E(x)=1 signifying his total identification with x, and E(x)=0 signifying a total lack of identification.’’ (1987: 206). Then different levels of empathy hierarchy are proposed, e.g., surface structure empathy hierarchy, and speech act empathy hierarchy, the latter of which states: ‘‘The speaker cannot empathize with someone else more than with himself.’’ (Kuno 1987: 212). In addition, empathy hierarchy principles (word order empathy hierarchy, syntactic prominence principle, the modesty principle, and so on) explain how certain grammatical structures are acceptable or not. Japanese grammatical phenomena Kuno explains through empathy hierarchy include giving verbs (yaru, kureru, and their variants) and the reflexive pronoun jibun. The concept of empathy theorized in his functional approach to syntax has broad application possibilities as shown by Kuno’s extensive analysis of English empathy phenomena. On the intuitive level, empathy is a psychological notion, but Kuno incorporates it in syntactic analysis, thus challenging the formal syntactic approach from within. Expanding the general notion of perspective to clause chaining, Iwasaki (1993) appeals to the concept of ‘‘speaker subjectivity’’ in discourse, and introduces the ‘‘perspective principle’’ which distinguishes two types of speaker subjectivity, S-perspective (speaker describes his own experience) and O-perspective (the speaker describes the other person’s experience). After statistically examining te- and tara- sentence chaining devices appearing in 16 personal narratives, Iwasaki concludes that te is used when the first person continues to be
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the subject in the next clause. Tara is used when the subject changes in the next clause, i.e., tara marks the shift from S- to O-perspective (this also involves change from a higher to a lower degree of information accessibility). Iwasaki (1988, 1993) finds the perspective principle to be relevant for the selection of internal state predicate forms and tense forms. Iwasaki foregrounds the importance of subjectivity in analyzing the relationship between grammar and discourse in Japanese, and goes beyond the linguistics of logos. Perhaps it is a series of Akatsuka’s work on Japanese conditionals that most clearly illustrates a challenge against strictly formal linguistics of logos from a Japanese linguistics perspective. Akatsuka (1983, 1985, 1991, 1997a, 1997b) challenges the traditional Western understanding of conditional sentences by suggesting an alternative way of accounting for conditionals through semanticsand pragmatics-oriented concept of the speaker’s attitude of ‘‘desirability.’’ Akatsuka’s position is that natural language conditionals are an important device for encoding the speaker’s attitude of desirability. For example, Akatsuka’s (1997a) work is a study of conditionals in Genji, while Akatsuka’s (1997b) research examines counterfactual reasoning (i.e., P [desirable], because if not P, not Q [undesirable]) that is co-constructed across speakers. By expanding the target of analyses to classical text and to contemporary conversational interaction, Akatsuka successfully incorporates into linguistics an emotional concept such as desirability. The concept of desirability, an idea that had escaped the attention of previous researchers, provides insight into how people express desirable/undesirable feelings in ordinary life, and it sheds light on the function of conditionals in the way that had not been possible within traditional Western linguistics. Studies briefly mentioned above find their analytical origins in the grammar of Japanese language. Following this line of inspiration and aspiration, in the current work I attempt to straightforwardly explore linguistic emotivity in Japanese discourse.
.
Emotion and culture
When discussing language and emotion, one cannot ignore the related issue of society and culture. Particularly relevant is the question of how language and emotion are related to the notions of universality and relativity. Although the question of whether emotion is universal or relative remains unresolved, scholars at least seem to agree that emotion, like language, possesses both universal and relative features. In this section, I review Solomon’s (1995) contextual behaviorist view, and Nakamura’s (1975) position on society-influenced personal emotion. In addition,
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two American research traditions on language and emotion, i.e., ‘‘affect’’ and ‘‘involvement’’ are discussed. . Sociocultural and personal nature of emotion Obviously, an extreme universalism regarding language and emotion is untenable. Thus, the extent to which culture and society play their roles in the construction of emotion becomes the debatable point. Among many positions on emotion, I find Solomon’s view most reasonable, particularly in light of his cross-cultural comparison of emotion. Solomon (1995: 253) takes the position that ‘‘the distinction between reason and the passion is as suspect and ultimately as misleading as the dichotomy between East and West,’’ and that the most reasonable position should understand emotions as being an experience based on some reasoned judgment. Given that such judgment is dependent on the context, Solomon (1995) refers to this position as the contextual behaviorist view. Faced with the false dichotomy between emotion-as-nature versus emotion-as-nurture, Solomon takes the position that there is little justification for simply assuming that emotions are natural, just as little justification exists for assuming that emotions are nothing but the product of society. He takes the middle road between these two extremes. Solomon (1995) starts his discussion by referring to the social construction theory of emotions. In this view, emotions are locally, culturally, and contextually constituted, and therefore, no supposition is made that emotions are the same the world over. There is some truth to this position. Consider the concept of romantic love. Understanding romantic love requires not only the language but the narrative of romance. Solomon continues: ‘‘My dogs may adore me, but they do not, cannot, alas, love me. No loss to them. Only to me, for only I, not they, know the language and the concept of love’’ (1995: 265). Indeed, most human emotions presuppose participation in society where cultural and contextual values are practiced through human relationships. Although the social constructionist view provides many of the tools we need for understanding how we come to have emotions, its underlying social-contingency-based approach obviates focus on self, consciousness, and accordingly, the particular experience of emotion. Solomon argues that an emotion consists of ways of consciously being in the world, that is, in Solomon’s word, ‘‘judgments’’ (1995: 263). To understand emotion as an experience based on judgment, Solomon proposes the position he calls ‘‘contextual behaviorism.’’ The tenet of contextual behaviorism is that one needs to know, or be sensitive toward, the context, and in particular, the cultural context. ‘‘One has to know the rules, the roles, the folk ways, including the knowledge of when to be (or not to be) solicitous or offended or defensive or affectionate or prideful’’ (1995: 269). Thus,
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according to the contextual behaviorist, one needs to understand the patterns of behavior and the facts of the matter ‘‘in context’’ and needs to appreciate them ‘‘as understood by the participants’’ (1995: 270, original emphasis). The contextual behaviorist view of emotion is considerably weaker than the full-blown social constructionist view, but much richer than the standard behaviorist view. This is because it foregrounds the significance of the cultural context and culturally defined experiences. And since emotions are, Solomon concludes, first of all, experiences, ‘‘emotions are a species of judgment’’ (1995: 275). When Solomon (1995) uses the term ‘‘judgment,’’ he is careful to point out that judgment is not the same as belief, and it is not overly intellectualistic. Emotional judgments are always evoked from a perspective, and are defined, in part, by one’s cultural context, by one’s status and role within that cultural context, and by personal situation. Judgments are not necessarily propositional, although beliefs always are. Solomon explains: To say that emotions are judgments is to say that they are modes of construal, ways of viewing and engaging in the world, including, sometimes, ways of construing the self. Like most judgments (. . .), they are culturally taught, cognitively framed, but implemented by the individual. They are not opposed to but intrinsic to experience. They are not just descriptive but constitutive of the world, our world, as fearsome, offensive, appealing, hopeful, painful, devastating, or devastated. (Solomon 1995: 276, original emphasis)
Following Solomon (1995), I take the position in the middle ground; emotion is both universal and relative, suspended somewhere between the two extremes of ‘‘nature’’ and ‘‘nurture.’’ Debate over the language and emotion raises a related issue, i.e., the individual versus public aspects of human emotion. It is true that emotions are often thought spontaneous, whimsical, shifting, and, most of all, particular to an individual. Emotions may swell in a person instantaneously, briefly, and in a particular way. While there are private, personal, and spontaneous sides to emotion, emotion does not derive entirely from the individual. Nakamura (1975) states that experiencing emotions requires a kind of systematization, that is, it requires the process of logos which is further incorporated into pathos. According to Nakamura, emotion, in its foundation, exists as something that is organized. Emotion, and in broader terms pathos, is passively nurtured within a culture and society, and only when it is organized inside one’s mind, becomes a true feeling. Yet of course, this organization is not achieved on an individual basis alone. Each individual’s emotion undergoes an organizing process shared with other members of the community. Thus the sociocultural coexperience provides the basis of personal emotionality. Nakamura (1975) elaborates on the relationship between an individual’s emotion and the society’s emotion as follows. In a group within which members
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share a strong sense of community, ‘‘behind the aspects of changing and moving emotions, there arises an unchanging and sustaining organization or consistency’’ (kanjoo no henkashi ugoku bubun no haigo ni, kawara-nai jizokutekina chitsujo aruiwa matomari ga ukabi agattekuru) (1975: 159). This unchanging and sustaining organization, which constitutes a kind of sensus communis, nurtures the emotion common among people. Nakamura (1975) continues. In fact, a person belonging to a group does not experience emotion in total freedom; rather, one’s emotion is already directed by the group one belongs to. Even when an individual rebels against such common emotion, and attempts to free oneself from it, the very manner in which the individual rebels reveals that the individual cannot be totally free from the community’s emotion. Nakamura emphasizes: ‘‘Individual’s emotion, however unique to that person, has been nurtured within the common emotion’’ (motomoto kojin no kanjoo wa, donnani dokujisei o motta mono demo, sonoyoona kyoodoo kanjoo no naka de hagukumaretekita mono) (1975: 160). Another related issue comes to mind, that is, the relationship between emotion and conceptualization. When we discuss linguistic emotivity, we understand that emotion is communicated through emotive expressions. As Nakamura states, ‘‘chaotic ideas, passion, a violent emotion and imagination; all of these are formed and organized by being expressed by words’’ (Futeikeina, konranshita chakusoo, joonen, soozooryoku nado wa, gengokasare, hyoogensareru koto ni yotte, katachi o ataerare, totonoerareru) (1975: 33). When we utter words, the process involves much more than a simplistic assignment of words on to ready-made prior-existing feelings. Emotive expressions, in addition to its body- and sensebased experience these expressions arouse, orient themselves toward the process of logos. As long as an individual’s emotion is segmented, organized, and systematized through language, it supports and is supported by logos. Since logos involves the process of segmentation, organization, and systematization of human and social relationships within that community, emotion requires more than intuition. Emotion necessitates a process of conceptualization, and that process itself reinforces and is reinforced by the linguistic and cultural co-experience shared among its group members. . Affect and involvement When discussing language, emotion, and culture, particularly in American academia, two terms, ‘‘affect’’ and ‘‘involvement,’’ have gained significance. Originally, ‘‘affect’’ was considered synonymous with the ‘‘expressive’’ function of language. For example, Lyons (1977) closely connects emotive meaning with expressive function. More specifically, Lyons (1977: 50–1) broke down linguistic functions into three kinds; (1) descriptive (referential, propositional, ideational, or designative), (2) social, and (3) expressive. Lyons notes that the distinction
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between the last two, social and expressive, is far from clear-cut, and often difficult to specify. And he lists emotive, attitudinal, and interpersonal meanings as being associated with both social and expressive functions. The term ‘‘affect,’’ when contrasted with Lyon’s social and expressive functions, reflects a particular theoretical orientation. In general, affect is preferred by anthropologists and anthropological linguists. Recall that semantic research within formal linguistics has concentrated on the descriptive meaning, leaving the expressive meaning virtually unexplored. A study of emotivity and expressive function in general has been brushed aside, neglected, and relegated to something of a residual wasteland. This tendency to overlook pathos as being constitutive of a dynamic ‘‘living’’ language has been largely fueled by the hegemonic Western philosophy of logos, the view that cognition and emotion (i.e., descriptive meaning and expressive meaning) are not only separated but virtually unrelated. As reviewed in Besnier (1990), scholars in anthropology and anthropological linguistics, especially American scholars, have always challenged this assumption, and ‘‘affect’’ became a preferred term symbolizing this theoretical challenge. The work most clearly making the case for linguistic affect is Ochs and Schieffelin (1989). Ochs and Schieffelin (1989), pointing out that linguists have underestimated the extent to which grammatical and discourse structures serve affective ends, propose a guideline for the study of affect. According to Ochs and Schieffelin (1989), ‘‘affect’’ is a broader term than emotion, and it includes ‘‘feelings, moods, dispositions, and attitudes associated with persons and/or situations’’ (1989: 7). First, they review linguistic research on the expression of affect and list four major research orientations. The first is rooted in the Prague School functionalism, particularly Jakobson (1960) and Stankiewicz (1964). The second orientation derives from the intonation studies, such as Halliday’s (1975). Researchers following this orientation study the relationship between pitch and attitudes/feelings. The third research orientation focuses on narrative and other performance genres, and lists Bakhtin (1981) and Burke (1962) as representative works. Added to this category are sociolinguistic approaches to the narrative structure as explored in Labov (1984). Labov (1984) is of special significance because he focuses on linguistic features that index emotional intensity in narrative contexts. The fourth direction of affect research is child language development. Studies under this orientation (including Ochs [1986] and Schieffelin [1986]) indicate that at the earliest stages of language development, children display competence in using affect devices. Second, in analytical terms, Ochs and Schieffelin (1989) concentrate on the conventional displaying of affect through linguistic means. By concentrating on linguistic resources for expressing affect, they propose an array of ‘‘affect features.’’ These features include; pronouns, determiners, tense/aspect, verb voice, case marking, number/gender/animacy marking, other particles/affixes, reduplica-
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tion, intonation, voice quality, sound repetition, sound symbolism, verb variants, graded sets, word order, code-switching, and affective speech acts/activities. These features span over different levels of language, i.e., lexical, phonological, grammatical, and discourse levels. Ochs and Schieffelin (1989) also introduce the concept ‘‘affect keys,’’ those ‘‘linguistic features that intensify or specify affect’’ (1989: 15). They contend that ‘‘(A)ffect keys index that an affective frame or a process of affective intensification is in play’’ (1989: 15). Thus, affect keys may index various emotions such as anger, sarcasm, disappointment, sadness, pleasure, humor, surprise, or coarseness, among others. In short, in their view, affect features, operating as affect keys, provide affective frames for semantic interpretation. These frames function as affective comments, and along with other cues, provide the partners with affectrelated information on which they base subsequent social actions. Overall, they emphasize that affect permeates the entire linguistic system, concluding that ‘‘(A)lmost any aspect of the linguistic system that is variable is a candidate for expressing affect’’ (1989: 22). This resonates with the Prague School view of linguistic expressivity. The concept of affect, particularly as conceived by Ochs and Schieffelin (1989), is in basic agreement with my concept of linguistic emotivity. However, my work goes beyond those features of language customarily considered affective. I argue that all linguistic devices express affect, and such a point can be made most effectively by extending the analysis to devices that have been considered purely or primarily propositional. Studies of affect, largely conducted by anthropologists and anthropological linguists, have examined affect features in unfamiliar communities away from their own native language and culture. Often such studies result in discovery of affect features in the language and culture of the Other. The analysis is conducted primarily from an external point of view, and the more distant the culture being investigated is from their own, the more interest seems to be aroused. Researchers of affect, more often than not, fail to sufficiently acknowledge the scholarly tradition of the community under investigation. It is precisely this perspective that I find problematic. There is something to be desired in the approach that investigates the Other only from theoretical and ideological perspectives of one’s own culture. The concept of affect, however, has much to offer in that it reminds us that language is imbued with emotivity, and one cannot avoid it, even when it may defy available analysis. Another concept associated with linguistic emotivity is that of ‘‘involvement’’ (Chafe 1982; Tannen 1982, 1984, 1985, 1989). Obviously, involvement is a kind of human emotion, which immediately suggests interpersonal and relational dimensions of emotion. Although involvement is considered a folk-psychological notion, it is the linguistically supported concept of ‘‘involvement’’ that needs to be reviewed here in relation to linguistic emotivity. Chafe (1982), having compared
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spoken discourse (informal dinner conversation, formal lectures) and written discourse (letters and published academic papers), reports that the spoken genre is characterized by fragmentation and involvement, whereas the written genre is characterized by integration and detachment. According to Chafe (1982), a speaker’s involvement is manifested by (1) frequent first person reference, (2) frequent reference to a speaker’s own mental processes, (3) use of devices monitoring information flow, (4) use of emphatic particles, (5) use of vagueness expressions and hedges, and (6) frequent use of direct quotation. Similarly, Tannen (1984) characterizes the high-involvement style of New York Jewish Americans by various features related to topic, pacing, narrative strategies, and expressive paralinguistics. For topic presentation, for example, the following features indicate high involvement; participants (1) prefer personal topics, (2) shift topics abruptly, (3) introduce topics without hesitance, (4) maintain persistence (if a new topic is not immediately picked up, it is reintroduced, repeatedly if necessary). Tannen states that these high-involvement devices used by certain speakers can be seen ‘‘as conventionalized ways of establishing rapport by honoring the needs for involvement and for considerateness’’ (1984:30). After reviewing various definitions of involvement, Tannen (1989) states that her sense of involvement is close to Chafe’s, and defines it as ‘‘an internal, even emotional connection individuals feel which binds them to other people as well as to places, things, activities, ideas, memories, and words’’ (1989: 12). Tannen quickly adds, however, that her understanding of involvement is also close to that of Gumperz (1982) in that she also sees involvement not as a given but as an achievement in conversational interaction. Tannen (1989) lists extensive involvement strategies common in conversational and literary discourse. These include; (1) rhythm, (2) patterns based on repetition and variation of phonemes, morphemes, words, collocations of words, and longer sequences of discourse, (3) figures of speech, (4) indirectness, (5) ellipsis, (6) tropes, (7) dialogue, (8) imagery and detail, and (9) narrative. Overall, although linguistic notions of involvement are multiple and flexible, there seems to be an agreement that the meaning of involvement is shifting from psychological orientation toward social practice. This is supported by the observation that increasingly more scholars are giving direct attention to discourse, rhetoric, and stylistics. As Besnier (1994) as well as Caffi and Janney (1994b) point out, however, involvement tends to remain ‘‘a pre-theoretical, intuitive, rather vague, unfocused notion’’ (Caffi and Janney 1994b: 345), and the concept, as is, is not fully effective as a technical and consistent analytical tool. Immediate problems center on issues as to who is directly involved with involvement. Does involvement refer to the speaker’s inner psychological state, or the speaker’s involvement with his or her utterance? Or, does involvement refer to the meanings of linguistic expressions
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and conversational strategies, or does it refer to the rapport that participants feel when their conversational experience is emotionally rewarding? The distinction between detachment and attachment has also become the target of criticism. Hübler (1987) argues that if the concept of involvement is to become analytically useful, it must be regarded as a continuum. We must regard both detachment and attachment as modes of involvement. In Hübler’s words: Either mode can be said to represent the speaker’s involvement equally. (. . .) They just represent different solutions to the methodological question of how to externalize one’s involvement in terms of linguistic behaviour. The mode of attachment represents the mode of ‘living’ one’s involvement. The mode of detachment is a mode of suppressing it, (. . .) the attempt not to appear involved is too obvious not to be communicatively relevant. (Hübler 1987: 373)
Although involvement is not a totally operative theoretical construct, it captures certain aspects of linguistic emotivity. What is needed is a systematic analysis of all linguistic devices and strategies, with an eye toward certain kinds and degrees of involvement. Devices must include all of those functioning on lexical, grammatical, rhetorical, and discourse levels. Examining selected devices simply because they appear to be effective for involvement is insufficient. To understand linguistic emotivity, it becomes necessary to examine broader phenomena across different styles and genres.
. Critical assessment: Toward a negotiative theory of linguistic emotivity The brief overview of previous studies on language and emotion discussed in this chapter illustrates that my work on linguistic emotivity is situated in and with certain traditions of linguistics and related fields. Although much has been revealed, much more awaits further investigation. Following, and going beyond, the studies reviewed above, I approach linguistic emotivity in a different way. But, before continuing, an assessment is in order. First, regarding Rousseau’s view on the origin of language, although he emphasizes the language of passion, his conclusions are not empirically supported. Even when one accepts the theory that language is essentially emotive, some convincing linguistic evidence remains to be seen. The Prague Linguistic Circle contributed to the field by firmly establishing the expressive function of language. These scholars’ conviction that emotion is expressed in every possible linguistic means is instructive, indeed. Theoretically as well, their view of language as experience offers insight to the current work. However, their vision of linguistics remains largely just that, a vision, and overall, the data actually analyzed are rather limited. Although the Prague Linguistic Circle insists that emotivity is expressed
Linguistic Emotivity
on all levels of language, I must point out that analyses of actual discourse and texts are rare. Stylistics contributed much by establishing the emotive expression as mode vécu, and by making a case for the social nature of human emotion. However, the analysis has been largely limited to Western literary text, and language as human interaction has remained unexplored. In pragmatics, many theoretical and methodological issues have been put on the table, but neither a comprehensive theory nor an analysis of emotivity has been advanced. Cognitive semantics most frequently analyzes language about emotion, and only limited numbers of studies analyze language as emotion. Thus, the mode vécu of language remains largely untouched. Japanese traditional language studies offer insight to the emotivity of language, but, too often, the theories remain metaphorical, and lack the necessary analytical rigor and actual analysis. More critically, due to Japanese traditional language studies’ concentration on classical literary text, ordinary, everyday Japanese language remains largely unexamined. Contemporary scholars in Japanese linguistics have made considerable progress in the exploration of the expressive function of language. Although some scholars use notions that touch upon psychological and emotional aspects of speaker and partner, emotives in Japanese discourse are yet to be directly and fully explored. And as I already mentioned, concepts such as ‘‘affect’’ and ‘‘involvement,’’ by themselves, do not provide sufficient tools for analysis. It is necessary to follow and incorporate, but to go beyond, these concepts. Given this background, I study linguistic emotivity from the perspective of the Place of Negotiation theory. As I explain in Part 2, I take the position that emotive meanings are negotiated in a place, and are mutually interpreted by participants, to the extent that language allows. Although lexical and grammatical information is critical for interpreting meaning, by establishing a negotiative theory of linguistic emotivity, the current study attempts to understand emotive meaning instantiated by the very interaction in the place of communication. Recall Aristotle when he mentioned three elements involved in pathos. Experience of pathos requires (1) state of mind, (2) the person with whom the emotion is shared, and (3) the target of emotion. And we understand that pathos influences ‘‘rational’’ judgment. Emotion is not autonomous; it requires interaction with others. How one experiences emotion interactionally makes a difference in how one feels it. How one expects others to respond to one’s emotion also makes a difference in how one experiences emotion. If emotion is interactionally realized, the language that enacts it must also be interactionally understood. Recall Rousseau when he illustrated that emotion is experienced through linguistic expression to be shared by others. Given that language is socioculturally based, language that sustains emotion must also be understood within sociocultural dimensions. Emotivity is experienced, felt, interpreted, and negoti-
Background
ated in a sociocultural place, and the society and culture in turn embrace feelings, emotional attitude, and cultural sentiment. Thus, significant to my approach in this book is the understanding that emotion involves both logos and pathos. And, when discussing emotion and emotivity, it is important to consider them from the contextual behaviorist perspective. Like language, emotion and, as a consequence, emotivity are both sociocultural and personal, and both universal and relative. To view language this way, as a human experience filled with emotion (both personally motivated feelings and socially conventionalized sentiment) is compatible with the pursuit of the Knowledge of Pathos. If a researcher believes in the universality of emotion on all levels, he or she is likely to proceed with the investigation by setting up universal categories, and by examining how they fare in different cultures. On the other hand, if a researcher leans toward relativity more than universality, the researcher would start by investigating emotivity in a specific language with the hope of reaching some level of universal understanding. My research design begins with the analysis of Japanese discourse, a particular linguistic phenomenon. This is because I start from a position closer to the relativistic view of language. However, what I pursue should not be regarded as a mere particularity associated with a single language. By starting from a specific language, yet with a hope for reaching universality, one can, I believe, reach deeper understanding of linguistic emotivity. Although my starting point focuses on Japanese, this should not be viewed as a rejection of linguistic emotivity’s universality. Without some assumption for universality, one cannot even begin to contrast the findings across languages. Without some hope for universal knowledge, theory building itself must be considered a futile exercise. That is certainly not my intention. Emotivity cries out everywhere, in word, sentence, text, discourse, and in interaction itself. To understand emotivity, one must investigate a variety of potential emotives in real-life discourse data, and advance the kind of interpretation answerable to the data. As I discuss in Part 2, I find in the concept of place an energy-filled enabling space where such negotiative interpretation of meaning becomes possible.
Part 2
Theory
Chapter 3
The Place of Negotiation theory This chapter presents an overview of the theory of the Place of Negotiation. I introduce three dimensions of place, i.e., 〈cognitive〉, 〈emotive〉, and 〈interactional〉, and six related linguistic functions; (1) recognition of objects, (2) construction of proposition, (3) expression of emotional attitude, (4) communication of attitudes toward others, (5) management of participatory action, and (6) coordination of joint utterances. Five kinds of meanings, i.e., 〈potential〉, 〈informational〉, 〈emotive〉, 〈interactional〉 and 〈negotiative〉 are discussed. In addition, in the latter three sections, I discuss three constitutive concepts of the theory; (1) function, (2) sign, and (3) body, i.e., language as bodily experience. In this chapter I also address the issue of multiple aspects of selves represented through Japanese emotives. Corresponding to the three different places, linguistic expression may foreground 〈thinking self〉, 〈feeling self〉, or 〈interactional self〉. Other aspects of the speaker are also discussed within the framework of the Place of Negotiation theory.
.
An overview
. Three dimensions of place In the Place of Negotiation theory, the meaning is approximately interpreted as a result of negotiation. This place is bounded and defined as a meaning-negotiating space. Upon this space, three different dimensions of place are projected, i.e., cognitive, emotive, and interactional. Different angles, shades, and strengths of these projections define the three spatial dimensions differently. The place where these projections gather together and overlap is the locus of the 〈topica〉, i.e., the 〈negotiative place〉, the place where ultimate semantic negotiation occurs. In other words, participants of communication interpret meanings within this locus of 〈topica〉, and do so in such a way that the 〈topica〉 allows. The dimensions and quality of 〈topica〉, however, constantly change, since the projections differ according to different linguistic strategies. The first of the three projections defines the 〈cognitive place〉, where, lyrically speaking, objects glow in a phenomenological light. Cognitive place enables participants to recognize objects and to construct propositions accordingly. In the 〈cognitive place〉, how the speaker observes, i.e., the speaker’s perspective, assumes significance. Primary concern focuses on how to convey information so as to be
Linguistic Emotivity
comprehended by the partner. The realm of the 〈cognitive place〉 focuses on choice of proposition and determines which lexical items are selected. The second projection defines the 〈emotive place〉, where the speaker comes into focus. Emotive place foregrounds the speaker’s broad emotional attitudes. This is the space primarily concerned with the psychological and emotional aspects of communication. What is relatively important is the speaker who expresses emotional attitude and feelings as he or she incorporates social as well as personal emotions. That is to say, issues in the 〈emotive place〉 include emotional attitudes toward objects and persons, aroused emotional responses, a broad range of one’s general feelings, as well as cultural sentiment. These attitudes and feelings are often expressed through the topic–comment dynamic, self- and other-quotation, rhetorical interrogatives, and so on. The third projection defines the 〈interactional place〉, where the partner comes into sharp focus. Within this 〈interactional place〉, an interactional social atmosphere is created, coordinated, and managed while incorporating personal interests. In the 〈interactional place〉, special attention is paid toward the partners as well as participants of speech events. Here the main concern lies with how speaker, partner, and other participants (if any) express, understand, and manage interpersonal relations among themselves. Such relations are critical for the negotiation of meaning. For example, depending on how turn-taking strategies is enacted, and depending on how co-construction of utterances is achieved, the negotiation of meaning changes, and consequently, the overall interpretation of emotives change. Projections on to places are associated with different types of meaning. These include; (1) 〈potential meaning〉 assigned for each sign, (2) 〈informational meaning〉, (3) 〈emotive meaning〉, and (4) 〈interactional meaning〉, all of which are in the process of instantiating (5) 〈negotiative meaning〉. The 〈potential meaning〉 refers to the conventionalized meaning (de Saussure’s ‘‘signified’’), and it typically appears in a dictionary definition. The 〈potential meaning〉 fails to communicate as it is; it needs to be instantiated in actual interaction. The 〈informational meaning〉, presented in the 〈cognitive place〉, is synonymous with referential meaning and propositional meaning. It primarily describes the [agent-does] proposition with little significance to modality and aspect. The 〈emotive meaning〉, enacted in the 〈emotive place〉, refers to the speaker’s emotional attitudes, aroused emotional responses, and the broad range of general feelings associated with the linguistic expression. The 〈interactional meaning〉, instantiated in the 〈interactional place〉, refers to the socially motivated feelings and attitudes primarily associated with how speaker, partner, and other participants (if any) express, understand, and manage interpersonal relations among themselves. The 〈negotiative meaning〉 is reached through negotiation in the 〈topica〉. It is a result of a combination, competition, and integration of 〈potential meaning〉, 〈informational meaning〉, 〈emotive meaning〉 and 〈interactional meaning〉. In
The Place of Negotiation theory
addition, this negotiation process also brings into focus all relevant cotextual as well as contextual information, and broader cultural and social factors. I must hasten to add that by ‘‘negotiation’’ I mean a back-and-forth interaction of gauging each other’s actions and responses, but only to the extent that the 〈potential meaning〉 of linguistic signs allow. I use the term ‘‘negotiation’’ not in the sense of anything-goes-as-far-as-negotiably-possible, but in the sense of being negotiable to the extent that it does not contradict the speaker’s intention. The speaker’s intention is conveyed through linguistic signs that define 〈potential meaning〉 with their semantic boundary serving as the overall guideline. The speaker’s intention also controls emotive and interactional meanings that help instantiate the 〈negotiative meaning〉. At the same time, the speaker’s intentions and places are in reciprocal relationship; intentions are influenced by places, and intentions also specify places further. Despite well-intended negotiation between speaker and partner, the 〈negotiative meaning〉 may differ between them since the meaning itself constantly fluctuates as it is endorsed, rejected, or revised. And ultimately, the meaning is approximated in the locus of the 〈topica〉. In sum, through the negotiative process, 〈negotiative meaning〉 emerges as a result of an integration of the three places, i.e., in the locus of the 〈topica〉. Depending on which of the three projections dominates, the weight of communication shifts. Certain genres may be dominated by 〈cognitive place〉, resulting in a kind of discourse where information assumes primacy. Legal text, for example, is a case in point. In conversational language, however, emotive and interpersonal dimensions are highly instantiated in emotive and interactional places. This variability applies to linguistic theories as well. Depending on which dimensions of place are being focused, linguistic theories are constructed with informational meanings as a core, or personal emotive meanings or social interactional meanings as primary constituents, and so on. The Place of Negotiation theory allows for the integration of all three places together, in their web of relations under one domain, and offers a conceptual foundation for examining how places interact, and meanings are negotiated in multiple ways. At this point, let us consider the other half of the coin. In a reverse projection, now emanating from the place of 〈topica〉 outward, certain meanings are connected with linguistic signs. With the 〈potential meaning〉 of the sign as a guide, the partner interprets meaning via this reverse projection. In an interaction-inprogress, these two sides constantly interchange, since the speaker and partner alternate roles, while anticipating the next turn-taking from one moment to the next. At the same time, when meanings are negotiated, the speaker and partner intimately engage in an exchange of possible 〈negotiative meaning〉 which may require them to switch roles. That is to say, to understand meaning, a speaker often needs to take the perspective of the partner, to take the perspective of oneself that is presumably understood by the partner, and so on.
Linguistic Emotivity
Within 〈topica〉, the place of negotiation, three elements interact, i.e., 〈speaker〉, 〈object〉, and 〈partner〉, resulting in three levels of interrelationships. Three different aspects of selves are foregrounded in three different places; 〈thinking self 〉 in the 〈cognitive place〉, 〈feeling self 〉 in the 〈emotive place〉, and 〈interactional self 〉 in the 〈interactional place〉. A relation must be realized (1) between the thinking self and object, (2) between the feeling self and the very relation captured in (1), and (3) between the interacting self and those relations captured in (1) and (2). Through combination, competition, and negotiation, certain aspects of selves are foregrounded. Some utterances primarily foreground the 〈thinking self 〉 leading to the 〈informational meaning〉, some utterances primarily foreground the 〈feeling self 〉 with varied types and intensities of the 〈emotive meaning〉, and still others show sensitivity to the 〈interactional self 〉 instantiating certain 〈interactional meaning〉. . Negotiation among meanings The Place of Negotiation theory understands that the meaning of a linguistic sign results in the process starting from potential to negotiative meanings. The 〈potential meaning〉, as it is, fails to communicate; it must become 〈negotiative meaning〉 in a place. We observed in the work of Fujitani (as explained in Nakada and Takeoka [1960]) the distinction between yuu ‘ghost/phantom’ and arawashi ‘appearance/manifestation’. The relationship between 〈potential meaning〉 and 〈negotiative meaning〉 is similar to Fujitani’s conceptualization, but the Place of Negotiation theory emphasizes the very process of human interaction and negotiation. The 〈negotiative meaning〉 encompasses both pathos and logos of language, although my primary interest lies in the former, especially the very process and mechanisms in which 〈emotive meanings〉 come alive. The concept of 〈negotiative meaning〉 refers to the totality of meaning which is actually comprehended by participants including the speaker, the partner, and possibly other participants. When we casually say we understand, we are referring to this meaning achieved through negotiation. As alluded to earlier, in accurate terms, it is possible that the content of the negotiative meaning differs among participants. Yet even where interpretation may vary, of necessity, an overall semantic consensus is assumed. Based on this assumption, meanings are further negotiated, reaching a reasonable level of certitude at each moment. 〈Negotiative meaning〉, frequently polysemous and imaginative, is often interpreted metaphorically and ironically. Its interpretation is dependent on the cotextual and contextual information, and therefore, it is prototypically indexically linked to the actual place of communication. Just as the context transforms from one moment to the next, so does the negotiative (not negotiated) meaning, constantly undergoing changes. Overall, the Place of Negotiation theory enables us
The Place of Negotiation theory
to view the linguistic experience as a negotiative process, involving all aspects of cognition, emotion, and interaction. In this sense, negotiation occurs at multiple levels; it occurs not only among participants, but also among different types of meanings, and among different dimensions of place as well. Furthermore, as will be illustrated in the course of this volume, the negotiation process is manifest in the interaction itself, verbal and otherwise. For example, in addition to linguistic signs exchanged in the interaction, conversation strategies such as speaker turn-taking, and back-channel responses reveal the participants’ negotiative intentions, and consequently, they guide the researcher in understanding the very negotiation process. Also in dramatic and fictional discourse, the narrator’s comments offer clues for characterizing the on-going negotiation. Let me add that linguistic devices and strategies beyond those covered in this book also play important roles in the process of negotiation. For example, nonverbal signs such as prosody, speed, voice quality, facial expression, and gesture all contribute to the negotiation of meaning. The general tone of discourse indicating varied measures of psychological and emotional distance among participants is another factor for negotiation. Although important, these devices are beyond the immediate scope of this book, and therefore, must await future research. (Refer to Maynard 1989, 1993c for a discussion on some of the nonverbal signs in Japanese conversation.) . Sign, function, and the interpretation of meaning In the Place of Negotiation theory, corresponding to the three dimensions of place and three types of negotiation, six related but distinguishable functions are recognized, as summarized in Figure 1.
Dimensions of place
Types of negotiation
Functions
〈cognitive place〉
informational negotiation
〈recognition of objects〉 〈construction of proposition〉
〈emotive place〉
emotive negotiation
〈expression of emotional attitude〉 〈communication of attitudes toward others〉
〈interactional place〉
interactional negotiation
〈management of participatory action〉 〈coordination of joint utterances〉
Figure 1. Types of place, negotiation, and function in the Place of Negotiation theory
Linguistic Emotivity
It should be noted that the six functions are not mutually exclusive. As will become evident in the analysis in subsequent chapters (in Parts 3 and 4), functions should not be considered either-or categories. Functions differ in degrees, and more importantly, they overlap. I should add that the types of negotiation are not entirely mutually exclusive, either. Linguistic interaction is not so clear-cut nor simple as the appearance of this list may imply. I propose these categories for the convenience of analysis, but, it should be kept in mind that it is through the synergistic sum effect of these functions that language comes to mean what it means. Like Fujitani’s echoing, functions emerge not as a mere total sum of functions, but as an integrated, synthesized, overall more-than-sum effect that runs through the entire utterance. Such a view is in line with the Knowledge of Pathos discussed earlier. The force that integrates these multiple dimensions of place and functions of language is the sensus communis operating both on an individual and societal basis. At this point, I should refer to my earlier work on Discourse Modality. Although the concept of Discourse Modality does not contradict the present analysis of linguistic emotivity, it is necessary to point out the relevant shift of focus. In Maynard (1993a), I stated the following. Discourse Modality refers to information that does not or only minimally conveys objective propositional message content. Discourse Modality conveys the speaker’s subjective emotional, mental, or psychological attitude toward the message content, the speech act itself or toward his or her interlocutor in discourse. Discourse Modality operates to define and to foreground certain ways of interpreting the propositional content in discourse; it directly expresses the speaking self ’s personal voice on the basis of which the utterance is intended to be meaningfully interpreted. (Maynard 1993a: 38–9)
Based on this concept, I analyzed a number of what I called Discourse Modality Indicators, i.e., connectives dakara and datte, sentential adverbs yahari/yappari and doose, stylistic shift between da and desu/masu, interactional particles yo and ne, and the [to yuu + noun] structure. Functions of these devices were interpreted in terms of Information Qualification, Speech Act Declaration and Qualification, Participatory Control, and Interactional Appeal. The strategies investigated as Discourse Modality Indicators all function, in varying degrees, as emotives as well. Linguistic emotivity concentrates on the emotional aspect of language more closely than the concept of Discourse Modality. It also focuses more intensely on the negotiative process of meaning under the Place of Negotiation theory. Unlike Discourse Modality, the study on linguistic emotivity includes analyses of seemingly emotionless signs and strategies in broader discourse genres. Also, as a part of the proposed theory, I include interpretive processes, which were lacking in the concept of Discourse Modality. The Place of Negotiation theory, because it
The Place of Negotiation theory
incorporates human interaction in its analysis, offers a philosophical perspective to many of the nonformalist approaches to language studies. The theoretical framework I pursue in this book is an attempt to understand language as a part of the Knowledge of Pathos, and as sources for the realization of the speaker who not only thinks but, more importantly, who also feels. The interpretation of meaning within the framework of the Place of Negotiation theory will be discussed in detail later. In brief, the interpretation process (motivated, in part, by the 〈potential meaning〉 of linguistic sign) is supported by the concept of ‘‘empathetic conformity’’ (kannooteki doochoo) proposed by Ichikawa (1975), a theory of shared perspectives, particularly the ‘‘perspectivized appearance’’ (mie) and ‘‘perspective of becoming’’ (naru shiten) proposed by Miyazaki and Ueno (1985), as well as the concept of ‘‘emotive focus’’ as understood by Carroll (1997, 1998). These theories provide explanation for the psychological processes of sharing the emotive meaning among participants (including mediated cases involving fiction readers and television viewers). The explanation provided by these theories facilitates an understanding of the speaker as a person participating in a speech event. These interpretive models also enable the Place of Negotiation theory to explain how participants negotiate meaning as they take perspectives, interact, experience, and focus on emotivity.
.
Sign
How does the Place of Negotiation theory characterize the nature and function of a linguistic sign? In my view, the Saussurean signifier-signified dichotomy is not sufficient; rather, Peircean understanding of the triadic sign-system that involves multiple processes offers guidance. The relationship between the sign and its meaning is not completely arbitrary, nor is it simply opposition-based as the Saussurean view (de Saussure 1966) advocates. Instead, I view the sign process as a potential system through which the sign user manipulates to create meaning to the extent that conventions endorse and negotiations allow. A linguistic sign may give the impression of being purely informational, but it always holds potential to express emotion. The 〈potential meaning〉 of a sign contains within it the possibility of three different types of meaning, some of which are foregrounded in the negotiative process. In other words, some of the informational, emotive, and interactional meanings are foregrounded which ultimately lead to the 〈negotiative meaning〉. The 〈negotiative meaning〉 is instantiated in the 〈topica〉, after integrating cotexutal and contextual information. Under this view on the interpretive process, the sign-meaning relationship is that of multiple mediation, and therefore, the meaning is not constant, nor is it perfectly matched in a one-to-one relation to a sign.
Linguistic Emotivity
For Peirce (1992 [1868]), sign occupied the center of his philosophical inquiry. In fact, he saw in sign an essence of human existence, as reflected in his statement that ‘‘man is a sign.’’ In his words: (. . .) it is sufficient to say that there is no element whatever of man’s consciousness which has not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; (Peirce 1992 [1868]: 54)
According to Peirce, linguistic sign belongs to the Thirdness, the mediated process. Here I follow Parmentier (1985) who cites Peirce’s following definition of sign as one of the clearest. By a sign I mean anything whatever, real or fiction, which is capable of a sensible form, is applicable to something other than itself, that is already known, and that is capable of being so interpreted in another sign which I call its Interpretant as to communicate something that may not have been previously known about its Object. There is thus a triadic relation between any Sign, an Object, and an Interpretant. (Parmentier 1985: 26)
The sign relation involves three elements, i.e., object, representamen (sign), and interpretant, bound together in a semiotic moment. It is important to note that representamen is in the middle between the object and the interpretant. In other words, a sign (representamen) is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other (cf. the Saussurean dyadic relation). The object of the sign is that which the expressive form stands for or represents. The interpretant is, following Parmentier, ‘‘a resultant mental or active effect produced by the object’s influence on the sign vehicle in some interpreter’’ (1985:26). The relationship among three elements is characterized by opposing vectors of ‘‘determination’’ and ‘‘representation.’’ Determination is the causal process in which qualities of one element are specified or predicated by another. (Color is a determination of object, red is a determination of the color of an object, and scarlet is a determination of the red color of an object.) Representation, working in the opposite direction to determination, refers to ‘‘the act or relation in which one thing stands for something else to the degree that it is taken to be, for certain purposes, that second thing by some subject or interpreting mind’’ (Parmentier 1985:27). The relationship among these three at any moment hangs in a state of constant semiotic expansion. The interpretant acts to determine a further sign, and the sign, in turn, becomes a further interpretant. Thus the interpretant is a mediating representation of the object. The three elements in the sign relation are never stable; they are not permanently object, representamen, and interpretant, but rather, each shifts roles, as additional operations of determination and representation accumulate.
The Place of Negotiation theory
This understanding of sign relations is useful for the Place of Negotiation theory. The meaning of emotives are not only mediated but are negotiated in multiple mediatory processes. The meaning is not instantiated by sign only, which provides only 〈potential meaning〉. Interpretation of a sign involves the mediatory process of interpretant, the process that is predicated upon some interpreter. The representamen and object are related only because the interpretant represents them as related. This mediation rescues the human element in the semiotic process absent in the Saussurean paradigm. Another important point related to the Peircean semiotic view is the triadic designation of signs. Among many triads of sign types proposed by Peirce, for our purpose, the triad of Icon, Index, and Symbol is important. An Icon is a sign which refers to the object merely by virtue of characters of its own. Anything is an Icon of anything, as long as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it. An Index is a sign which refers to the object by virtue of actually being affected by that object. A Symbol is a sign which refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of a law or a convention which enables the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object. A linguistic sign is most frequently considered a symbol, since its foundation rests on the relationship of Peircean Thirdness. Linguistic signs are pure symbols only when they are conceptualized in the abstract system. On the other hand, emotive signs in the Place of Negotiation theory carry with them indexical characteristics. In a broad sense, all linguistic signs are indexical (or more accurately, they all bear characteristics of indexical signs) when they are used in communication. The Peircean view of signs offers guidance to the Place of Negotiation theory by supporting the speaker-involving multiple dimensions of emotive signs. The notion of being indexical is particularly significant in the following sense. First, 〈emotive meaning〉 is indexically linked to the place, including not only physical location but also imagined place, where interaction takes place. This is because the meaning is interpreted on the basis of 〈topica〉 that is defined, in part, by the participatory behavior of those involved. Second, the meaning is indexically linked to the place, especially to the partner’s recognition, acceptance, or rejection of the very meaning. That is to say, 〈potential meaning〉 is not complete, unless endorsed by the partner’s interpretation as a part of 〈negotiative meaning〉. Given the Peircean definition of an index (i.e., a sign which refers to the object by virtue of actually being affected by that object), because 〈emotive meaning〉 is affected by, or more accurately, partly motivated by, the objects in the place, it is fair to characterize it as indexical. And, third, meaning of language is indexically linked to the cultural aspects of which it is a part. In this view, language is an indexical sign of culture by which it is endorsed. Regarding emotive signs, at this point, I should mention Volek’s (1987) work on derived nouns in Russian. Volek’s study is significant to the present discussion, particularly because he combines Praguean functionalism with Peircean semiotics.
Linguistic Emotivity
For Volek (1987), meanings are either ‘‘notional’’ or ‘‘emotive,’’ and emotivity in language is expressed as ‘‘direct’’ emotional experiences, in the following sense. To quote Volek: I understand as emotivity in language certain psycho-physical experiences or attitudes of the speaker (not necessarily evaluative attitudes) which he experiences during the speech and which he expresses in it without transforming them into notional signs. These attitudes, however, also need not be attitudes toward the communicated reality, (. . .) but they must be reflected linguistically in the given communication (message). (Volek 1987: 12, original emphasis)
Volek (1987) takes the position that the meaning of signs is constituted either by notions or by ‘‘direct’’ emotional experiences (not transformed into notions), and therefore, we may distinguish between ‘‘notional’’ and ‘‘emotive’’ meaning as ‘‘two totally separate types of meaning’’ (1987: 25). Emotive expressions contain an emotive ‘‘semantic component’’ for which he coins the term ‘‘excitizer.’’ In his view, this component, which too often has not been included in earlier semantic inquiry, is ‘‘an emotive component of meaning present in a sign in an expressive way (i.e., relating directly or through an associative component to its object-emotion)’’ (1987: 26, original emphasis). Volek continues that one can identify the presence of an emotive component through ‘‘the addressee’s actual excitative response to the emotive sign’’ and through ‘‘his awareness that the meaning of the particular sign cannot be explained fully through notional components’’ (1987: 26). This somewhat default-based characterization of emotive signs may require further clarification. Nonetheless, Volek’s contribution is evident in placing the emotive meaning on the same level with his ‘‘notional’’ meaning. Another point of interest is his typology of signs. Volek proposes the following types of emotive signs. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Exclusively notional sign (table, to run, green), Notional signs with explicit evaluative meaning (good versus bad), Notional signs with emotion as connotation (mother, friend), Notional words denoting or naming emotion (love, hate, lovable), Exclusively emotive component (wow, ouch), Expressive sign (hybrid, complex sign) (Russian diminuitive soba. . .ka, which has the denotational meaning of ‘dog’ yet with an affective emotive meaning). (1987: 27–8)
Volek describes the majority of emotive signs as ‘‘symbolic indices’’ (1987: 219). He does so because, as with indices, these signs express emotivity without representing it through a generalized concept. Yet, these signs also retain an arbitrariness, so they have the character of symbols as well.
The Place of Negotiation theory
The kind of signs examined in this volume can also be considered symbolic indices, or more accurately, symbols in use whose meanings bear indexical features. In my view, all signs are indexical in the sense that meanings are ultimately instantiated in relation to the place. When linguistic sign is interpreted through negotiation of participants, it retains the character of an index to varying degrees. As I argue throughout this book, even the signs normally considered nonemotive carry a certain level of emotive meaning. Such emotivity is instantiated, in part, as it is indexically interpreted within the 〈topica〉. Volek’s (1987) work is one of the few studies that approaches emotivity in a way similar to mine. However, I differ from Volek in that, instead of handling the matter as a semantic component, I focus on the negotiative aspect of the 〈emotive meaning〉, and based on the Place of Negotiation theory, I focus on how signs negotiatively come to mean what they mean expressively and emotively. After all, I understand sign to be potentially multifunctional only to foreground certain functions through negotiation. An identical sign, therefore, may function primarily as an informational sign, and at other times, comparatively more as an emotive sign. Characteristics of signs may shift through time as well from informational to more emotive (a case of grammaticalization, for example). Varied functions of a sign are negotiated in the 〈topica〉 on the basis of the cotextually expressed speaker’s intention, contextually significant situated information, and above all, through negotiation of meanings attributed to the three dimensions (informational, emotive, and interactional) of place.
.
Function
The Place of Negotiation theory approaches language by dividing its functions into six types associated with three dimensions of place. Particularly related to emotivity are 〈expression of emotional attitude〉, 〈communication of attitudes toward others〉, 〈management of participatory action〉, and 〈coordination of joint utterances〉. These functions are generally slighted in strictly formal approaches in linguistics. Within the history of linguistics, however, one must refer to Bühler’s work as a significant point in time when emotivity was considered an aspect of linguistic function. In his 1933 work, Bühler discusses four themes, one of which is ‘‘the schema of language functions’’ (Innis 1982:147). In this section, Bühler first characterizes language as an organum connected to three participating parties of communication; (1) things (or, objects and states of affairs), (2) sender, and (3) receiver. The organon model of language views language as an intersubjective instrument by which a sender communicates information related to objects and states of affairs to a receiver. The language-as-organon view emphasizes the social and functional
Linguistic Emotivity
nature of language because language stands as an intermediary between the sender and receiver. Within this theoretical context, Bühler proposes the three functions; (1) appeal (Appell), (2) expression (Ausdruck), and (3) representation (Darstellung). Bühler, in his 1933 work, establishes the contours of the representational function, as opposed to the expressive and appeal functions of language. Representational function refers to language’s capacity to represent and to communicate objects and states of affairs. Then Bühler characterizes the expression and appeal in the following context (in the translation by Innis). (. . .) in the structure of the speech situation a special position is occupied just as much by the sender as the agent of the act of speaking, the sender as the subject of the speech action, as by the receiver as the one spoken to, the receiver as addressee of the speech action. They are not simply a part of what the communication is about, but they are the partners in the exchange, and therefore, in the last analysis, it is possible that the medial sound product indeed exhibits its own specific sign relation to the one and to the other. We call the semantic relation of the sound sign to the performer of the speech deed the expression and the semantic relation of the sound sign to the addressee the appeal. (Innis 1982: 153, original emphasis)
For Bühler, the starting point of language analysis was the concrete speech event, and that involved the ‘‘sender as the subject of the speech action’’ and the ‘‘receiver as the one spoken to, the receiver as addressee of the speech action.’’ It is of critical importance that his expressive and appeal functions are directly linked to the participants of the speech event, sender and receiver of information, respectively. As Koerner (1984) states, ‘‘Bühler made a forceful argument in favour of the semiotically conditioned and sociologically motivated act of human speech’’ (1984: 22). Linguistic function within the Place of Negotiation theory is also identified in association with dimensions of communication, and in close association with the concept of place, in particular. My position does not contradict Bühler’s in that the sender-receiver issue is reflected in functions operating in the 〈emotive place〉 and the 〈interactional place〉. Ultimately, Bühler’s position in viewing language as a human interaction led to the expressive and appeal functions, and this is in line with the Place of Negotiation theory. However, functions in the Place of Negotiation theory are associated not so much with the sender or receiver as the negotiation between them. Functions are closely associated with the three dimensions of place, through which participants are able to identify functions more specifically.
. Language as bodily experience The speaker within the Place of Negotiation theory is a self who engages in the act of speaking in a given place. In the Place of Negotiation theory, a strict division of
The Place of Negotiation theory
mind and body (more specifically, sign and interaction) is not endorsed, and the priority of the former is questioned. This is because the 〈negotiative meaning〉 of language, which includes linguistic emotivity, is achieved through human interaction. Language is not a static concept nor is it an immobile object; language is an event, an activity, and it is predicated upon participation. For the 〈potential meaning〉 to be realized as an on-going 〈negotiative meaning〉, one must envision persons interacting in a place. To put this line of thought into perspective, Merleau-Ponty (1962) offers guidance. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that to describe the phenomenon of speech and the specific act of meaning, one must leave behind the traditional subjectobject dichotomy. He laments that we have become accustomed, through the influence of the Cartesian tradition, to jettison the subject. Indeed, the reflective attitude of cogito has tended to purify the notions of body and mind to an extreme, which has led to its distinct division. A subject is merely what it thinks it is. An object is an object to itself. But, Merleau-Ponty warns that the ‘‘experience of our own body, (. . .) reveals to us an ambiguous mode of existing’’ (1962: 198). In fact we have no way of knowing the human body other than that of living it. Thus, he concludes: I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a ‘natural’ subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one’s own body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the experience of the body or the body in reality. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 198–9)
The self conceived under the Place of Negotiation theory is this person, that is, the body-engaging person. This understanding of person enables the kind of comprehension of emotivity critical in the Place of Negotiation in the following sense. Consider that if language is conceived to be thought, the thinking subject of cogito is incapable of experiencing emotion. Ideas and concepts already exist before someone actually uses the language. (This is a mistake caused by equating the 〈potential meaning〉 with the 〈negotiative meaning〉.) Emotion is excluded from the Cartesian ‘‘clear and distinct ideas,’’ and therefore, nonexistent, and such nonexistent ideas cannot be experienced. Merleau-Ponty reminds us, however, that ‘‘(T)he denomination of objects does not follow upon recognition; it is itself recognition’’ (1962:177), and this is because ‘‘speech, in the speaker, does not translate readymade thought, but accomplishes it’’ (1962:178). So, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the ‘‘word and speech must somehow cease to be a way of designating things or thoughts, and become the presence of that thought in the phenomenal world, and, moreover, not its clothing but its token or its body’’ (1962:182). To conceive language as body leads to the conclusion that language inevitably engages a person
Linguistic Emotivity
in the process of perception. While objective thought is unaware of such subject of perception, in Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) view, ‘‘all knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up by perception’’ (1962:207). Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) position resonates with the view of language advocated in cognitive semantics. For example, Yamanashi (1998) comments that at the foundation of ordinary human language lies the ‘‘sense-based and body-based experience, including sense-based information management, image construction, projection of perspectives, empathy, and shifting of points of view.’’1 (1998: 31, my translation). The cognitivists’ position that knowledge should not be regarded as static, propositional, or sentential is convincing. This is particularly so in light of the empirical studies of categorization and concept development. More fundamentally, Johnson (1991) argues that conceptual structure and reason are grounded in patterns of bodily experience. Structures of our spatial/temporal orientations based on perceptual interaction, for example, provide an imaginative basis for our knowledge of, and reasoning about, more abstract domains. Here the perceiving person is foregrounded, and, therefore, the body-based understanding of the speaker is endorsed. This said, as I alluded to earlier in Chapter 2, in my view, the cognitivists’ conceptualization of the perceiving person (or, what Neisser [1988] identifies as ‘‘ecological self ’’) is still insufficient for understanding what truly transpires in communication.2 The speaker in the place of communication is a bodily person who is not only a facilitator of perception, but more significantly, an experiencer of human emotion and feelings. What cognitive semantics fails to fully account for is a conceptualization of the speaker as someone who talks, interacts, experiences, feels, and negotiates, always in relation with a partner in the place of negotiation. As a final note regarding the view of language as bodily experience within the Place of Negotiation theory, I should mention Tokieda (1941). Tokieda’s theory of language will be discussed in detail later; here I refer to one citation in which his understanding of language as the activity of bodily subject (i.e., Tokieda’s speaking subject) is particularly elucidating. It is possible to think of nature apart from the subject who creates it, but one cannot think of language, no matter when and where, without thinking about the speaking subject who produces it. More strictly speaking, language is the very activity of ‘‘speaking’’ and ‘‘reading.’’3 (Tokieda 1941: 12, my translation)
.
Presentation of selves
Beyond the concept of the speaker as discussed above, it is possible to identify certain aspects of self that become foregrounded in the process of negotiation. As
The Place of Negotiation theory
alluded to earlier, there are three kinds of selves associated with the three places of negotiation. The 〈thinking self 〉 primarily engages in the logical and descriptive cognitive activity which is linguistically realized largely by the propositional construct. This is the aspect of the speaker that is focused in the 〈cognitive place〉. The 〈feeling self 〉 finds its identity in the emotive place where emotive meaning is placed in focus. The speaker is emotionally stirred both personally and interpersonally. The 〈interactional self 〉 is the self that is keenly aware of the partner and acts accordingly, and it is foregrounded in the 〈interactional place〉. Although in reality a speaker is a combination of all three kinds of selves, depending on the strength projecting on to the 〈topica〉, different aspects of selves are highlighted. At this point, perhaps it is necessary to explore a bit further the concept of self/selves in Japan. Let me draw from the philosophy of Watsuji (1937) and Mori (1979) in order to elucidate the relationship between the self and other in Japanese. In his work Watsuji (1937) develops the concept that the social human relationship is that of aidagara ‘betweenness’. The term aida ‘betweenness’ literally means a spacial distance that separates two items. In Fuudo (1935) Watsuji proposes that a person is realized as one who closely interacts with fuudo ‘climate (and mores)’, and this process of interaction and integration serves as the basis of human ontology. A person for Watsuji is a betweenness within the network of social space. Watsuji finds the source of self in interpersonal relationship, and emphasizes that self cannot be defined without sufficiently considering the relationship between the self and others in society, which in fact are definable only in their ‘‘betweenness.’’ In this regard, Watsuji defines the concept of sonzai ‘existence’ as the following. Son’s fundamental meaning is a subjective self-preservation. The fundamental meaning of the word zai is the self ’s existence in some place. (. . .) The place where the self exists is a social place such as lodging, home, village or the society. In other words, the place is (defined by) the human relationship recognized in groups such as family, village, town, and the entire world. Therefore, zai refers to nothing but an existence of self, dwelling in the (human and social) relationship as one circulates through human relationships. (Watsuji 1937: 22–3, my translation)
and therefore, Sonzai is the self ’s comprehension of self placed within human relationships. It is reasonable to say that sonzai is human relatedness realized by human action.4 (Watsuji 1937: 24, my translation)
Mori (1979) takes a step further in characterizing the nature of Japanese ontology and develops the concept of nikoo kankei ‘binary combination’ or ‘binary rapport’ (1979: 66). According to Mori, ‘‘binary combination’’ refers to the following; two
Linguistic Emotivity
persons construct an intimate relationship in the process of life experience, and that relationship itself serves as the ontological basis for each person. In Mori’s words: Essentially, among ‘‘Japanese’’ what opposes ‘‘you’’ is not the ‘‘self,’’ but rather, what opposes ‘‘you’’ is also a ‘‘you’’ from the point of view of ‘‘your you.’’ (. . .) For example, if we consider a parent as ‘‘you,’’ it might seem obvious to consider the child ‘‘self.’’ But this is far from the truth. The child is not the ‘‘self ’’ which has its ontological root in its ‘‘self,’’ but rather, the child experiences self as ‘‘you’’ from the perspective of the parents, who in turn are ‘‘you’’ from the child’s point of view.5 (Mori 1979: 64, my translation)
In Mori’s view, a Japanese experiences self as 〈you〉 from the perspective of someone close, i.e., 〈your you〉. The relationship that enables this intimate reciprocal interdependence is what Mori means by binary combination. This reciprocal intersubjective view toward self among Japanese does not contradict Miller’s (1993) view that Japanese construct ‘‘subjects’’ in a relationship between two subjects (what she calls co-subjectivity). Miller states that in Japan ‘‘subjectivity seems to co-exist routinely with a genuine sense of shared identity’’ (1993:482). Following the views of interaction-based betweenness, 〈your you〉, and co-subjectivity, it is reasonable to understand Japanese self as being defined in interactional relationship within a place. The concept of ‘‘self ’’ endorsed by the Place of Negotiation theory is in basic agreement with the above views. Self is, like linguistic emotivity, negotiated in relation with the partner. The negotiation further foregrounds different aspects of the Japanese selves, i.e., thinking, feeling, and interactional. While linguistic emotivity is closely linked to both thinking and interactional selves, the present work is most concerned with the realization of the 〈feeling self 〉. Recognizing a speaker as a 〈feeling self 〉 is key to understanding how emotives function in Japanese. Regarding the concept of 〈you〉, I discuss further in my analysis in Chapter 13. But for now, two points should be made. First is the concept of the awareness of 〈you〉. When interpersonal relationships are profoundly intimate, the distance between 〈you〉 and 〈your you〉 become increasingly closer. The speaker finds less need to address 〈you〉 as a completely separate and distinct partner. Under this circumstance the speaker does not find 〈you〉 as completely opposed to 〈your you〉. Depending on the 〈you〉-awareness, different expressions are chosen, and different expressions also help define the interpersonal relationship. Second is the issue surrounding different senses of self. Regarding Japanese senses of self, Lebra (1992) suggests that at least three different aspects of self are recognized, i.e., the interactional self, the inner self, and the boundless self. The interactional self involves the awareness between performance by self and sanc-
The Place of Negotiation theory
tions by the audience, as well as the awareness of self as an insider of a group or network, or as a partner to a relationship. Linguistic expressions chosen when presenting an interactional self follow social conventions and expectations most diligently. The inner self is the hidden private self that resides in the kokoro ‘heart, mind, emotion, spirit’, while the boundless self is the ‘‘empty self, non-self, nonthinking, mindless, or nothingness’’ (Lebra 1992: 115). While the interactional self is relative, multiple, and variable in accordance to where and how self stands in relation to others, in the boundless self, ‘‘the relativity is overcome by the mutual embracement of self and other, subject and object’’ (Lebra 1992: 115). Following the understanding of Japanese selves advanced by Lebra (1992), I find it useful to understand speaker’s expressions in association with different aspects of selves. Interactional strategies primarily function to present the sociallybound self, Lebra’s interactional self. Emotive strategies are also predicated upon interaction, and therefore present 〈interactional self 〉, but they involve more. Emotive strategies offer means to present Lebra’s inner self in that they function in two ways to reach 〈you〉. Emotives desire to appeal to the partner, either directly or indirectly. The direct appeal presents the inner self wishing to emotionally appeal to the partner in as direct a manner as possible. The indirect appeal presents the inner self that engages in inner thought, and only indirectly appeals to 〈you〉. The presentation of selves also assumes certain kinds of 〈you〉, i.e., the types of 〈you〉 the speaker addresses. When the interactional aspect of communication is foregrounded, the speaker is highly aware of socially-bound 〈you〉. When emotive aspects become primary, the speaker becomes less sensitive to the socially-bound 〈you〉. The partner whom the inner self tries to reach is 〈you〉, the intimate 〈you〉 who the self strongly feels co-subjective with. The association among different places, functions, and corresponding aspects of selves and 〈you〉 is summarized in Figure 2. Relevant place
Functions
Self being presented
〈you〉 being addressed
〈interactional place〉
indexically signals socially expected speaker identity
socially-bound 〈interactional self 〉
socially-bound 〈you〉
〈emotive place〉
expresses direct emotive appeal expresses indirect emotive appeal
direct 〈you-reaching inner self 〉 indirect 〈youreaching inner self 〉
intimate 〈you〉 intimate 〈you〉
Figure 2. Types of place, function, self, and 〈you〉 in the Place of Negotiation theory
Linguistic Emotivity
Additionally, in the course of this volume, I will discuss further aspects of Japanese selves; (1) subordinate and equal selves as kinds of socially-bound interactional self, (2) gendered selves (such as girlish, boyish, womanly, and manly selves), and (3) the playful self. Gendered selves are special cases of self foregrounded in the emotive and interactional places, and the playful self emerges in the creative dimension of language that always embraces emotivity. These concepts will be discussed in detail in Chapter 16.
. Methodology The Place of Negotiation theory is founded on a range of methodologies available in a broad spectrum of language studies. Most directly associated methodologies come from conversation analysis and discourse analysis. In my earlier work (Maynard 1989, 1993c, 1997a) I have discussed in detail these two research fields. Research methods used in pragmatics and sociolinguistics are also applied in the analysis of linguistic emotivity. I also draw from related fields such as psychology, rhetoric, poetics, and aesthetics in the interpretive process. The fields mentioned above are well recognized within nonformalist approaches to language, and a number of theories have been advanced. Consider, for example, theoretical frameworks available in pragmatics. The Relevance Theory by Sperber and Wilson (1988) is one, and the Theory of the Territory of Information by Kamio (1979, 1990) is another. In textual and discourse studies, traditional frameworks such as the Prague School’s Functional Sentence Perspective, and Hallidayan concept of cohesion are available. Additionally, a text-organizational model such as Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann and Thompson 1988) is known. In conversation analysis, a host of rules and conventions have been proposed, e.g., turn-taking systematics, adjacency pair, preference organization, and so on. However, to date, no theory has been proposed that is able to explain how and to what extent language expresses emotivity. More fundamentally, avoiding the kind of linguistics that alienates the 〈feeling self 〉, the Place of Negotiation theory rescues and brings to the fore the participants of communication who speak and interact, and more than anything else, who feel. The Place of Negotiation theory assumes that linguistic interaction is intersubjective. As Schiffrin (1994) explains, intersubjectivity is associated with the sharing of knowledge or experience. In Schiffrin’s view, intersubjectivity is relevant to communication in two ways, at its inception and at its completion. In order for communication to proceed, partners must share certain basic knowledge. At the same time, one of the main purposes of communication is the sharing of new information. In short, intersubjectivity is assumed in two ways; ‘‘it both allows communication, and is achieved by communication’’ (Schiffrin 1994: 390, original
The Place of Negotiation theory
emphasis). The Place of Negotiation theory takes this assumed intersubjectivity as a theoretical starting point, and provides a philosophical foundation and analytical framework necessary for understanding the process of intersubjective negotiation, negotiation of 〈emotive meanings〉, in particular. From the perspective of discourse analysis, the concept of distributional constraint is useful when identifying the process of negotiation. A researcher can identify the distributional constraints of certain strategies as they occur (and do not occur) in real-life discourse segments on the basis of discourse principles such as cohesion, coherence, as well as topic and other organizational structures. Depending on the discourse behavior of the investigated strategies, a researcher can identify whether or not certain aspects of information or emotivity are more expected and/or foregrounded than others. From the perspective of discourse functionalism, based on use and non-use of certain strategies, the semantic and rhetorical effects can be contrasted. Particularly when the use of a certain strategy violates norms, the speaker’s emotive motivation for doing so is investigated. In this interpretive process, pragmaticsbased cotextual and contextual information provide clues. In certain genres, the narrator’s comment on the character’s feelings provides additional clues for interpreting the 〈emotive meaning〉. In addition, the preference of certain strategies observed across different genres is suggestive of the intended expressive function of those strategies. From the perspective of contrastive discourse analysis (see Maynard 1997a), a contrast may be made between the original and translation texts, and a researcher is able to study what aspect of emotivity is or is not communicated across languages. The contrast often reveals language-internal subtle emotivity difficult to identify otherwise. Conversation analysis offers a variety of means providing immediate contexts for those utterances under investigation. By observing prior and ensuing turn shapes and contents, the reciprocal effect of a particular strategy can be interpreted. Turn-taking rules, adjacency pairs, back-channeling strategies, hesitation, fillers, preference organization, and so on, help define the conversation context in normative and systematic ways. When the expected interaction takes place, the function of the interaction can be interpreted accordingly, and when the expected interaction does not take place, the motivation for such action can be sought.6 Often the motivation involves emotion and feelings, and cotextually and contextually assisted by other visual and verbal clues, a researcher is able to identify the kind of emotivity being negotiated. When investigating linguistic emotivity, a researcher pays special attention to linguistic devices and strategies normally considered to be emotive (e.g., exclamatives, particles, sentence adverbs, and so on). But more importantly, the Place of Negotiation theory assumes that every linguistic sign is emotive, although signs vary in kind and intensity. And therefore, seemingly non-emotive devices
Linguistic Emotivity
and strategies fall within its analytical domain.7 Analyses of these strategies require a close observation of the contexts of their varied occurrences (and non-occurrences). To obtain varied occurrences of linguistic phenomena, data rendered appropriate in the Place of Negotiation theory are taken from real-life sources of contemporary Japanese discourse. In terms of the theory-building, I maintain that construction of a theory based on imaginary data should be avoided at all cost. I take the position that linguistic theory must ultimately be accountable to data, whatever such data demand, and wherever such data lead. The adequacy of a theory must ultimately be tested against data, and for this reason, linguistic analysis must start at the real-life language used by ordinary people in ordinary places. Obviously, no linguist is able to analyze all possible language phenomena. A researcher must select the kind and the extent of data to be analyzed. Consider that the kind of data selected and the kind of theory adopted are interdependently related. Data are not simply given, but rather, they are ‘‘taken’’ from the speech community, based on the researcher’s theoretical mandate. It becomes important, therefore, to keep in mind the limitation of the research result, and recognize the need for further exploration. At the beginning of Part 3, preceding analysis chapters, I offer a detailed explanation on the kind of data selected for the current study of linguistic emotivity. Although the Place of Negotiation theory is a theory for language and linguistic interaction, it can be applied to rhetoric and culture as well. Or, more accurately, the Place of Negotiation theory is a part and parcel of the very linguistic culture which the theory intends to account for. In broader terms as well, the concept of place in the Place of Negotiation theory corresponds with the concept of place endorsed in the culture of which it is a part. The Place of Negotiation theory, therefore, is applicable to the understanding of underlying principles and forces of culture, and I address this issue most directly in Chapter 17. The centrality of place brings to the fore the dimensions of language and culture that heretofore have not been fully investigated. The theoretical standpoint advocated by the Place of Negotiation theory enables us to understand language without discarding pathos, and at the same time it affords us the accumulated knowledge of the linguistics of logos as well. Because of this inclusiveness, the Place of Negotiation theory is expected to be able to provide a necessary tool for analyzing language as emotion.
Chapter 4
The (re-)turn to place
The concept of place is the foundation for the theory of Place of Negotiation. In this chapter, after tracing the history of the concept of place in Japanese philosophy and language studies, I discuss the centrality of its concept. Place, closely associated with the Knowledge of Pathos, provides a philosophical foundation that is polar opposite to the Cartesian subject of cogito. The thinking subject of cogito exists independent of its place. Consequently, language is viewed as an autonomous decontextualized entity. The Knowledge of Pathos takes the opposite view. Place is central to the foundation of self, without which self cannot sustain itself. Place embraces the linguistic performance of the speaker; it includes the grammatical subject and predicate together. Place is central to the Knowledge of Pathos, and it ultimately hosts 〈topica〉, a locus of the 〈negotiative meaning〉. Since 1975, by resurrecting the concept of place in a series of writings, Nakamura (1975, 1987, 1993d, 1993e, 1994, 1996) has urged solutions to social and environmental problems recognized in contemporary society. Nakamura (1996: 291) lists four issues associated with place; (1) place as a source of existence, (2) place as a receptacle, in the form of the human body, (3) place in terms of abstract space, and (4) place as linguistic topos (place). Nakamura develops the thesis that these conceptualizations of place lead to possible solutions for contemporary social and environmental problems. All these issues provide context for, and suggest justification for, the Place of Negotiation theory. To pursue linguistics with the Knowledge of Pathos as its aim, it is necessary to foreground the concept of place. We must (re-)turn to place, and (re-)claim the centrality of its concept.
.
Concept of basho ‘place’ in Nishida’s philosophy
It is in the philosophy of Kitaroo Nishida (1870–1945) that sources for the concept of place of negotiation can be found. For Nishida, the concept of place was formed, in part, as an answer to the problem of knowing, particularly as an answer to the question of how one should philosophically understand consciousness. Nishida (1949a), in his work titled Basho ‘Place/Topos’ discusses his basho no ronri ‘theory of place/topos’ which introduces the place for self reflection. Basho is the true ground of the self, and it is neither the logical subject nor the (Aristotelian)
Linguistic Emotivity
universal predicate. It is a place of ‘‘pure experience’’; it is the concrete ground of immediacy between the logical subject and abstract universal predicate. On the ‘‘logic’’ of the place/topos, Nishida (1949a) states the following. First, a philosophical inquiry should start not from the often assumed dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. Instead, it should start from self awareness which can be realized by ‘‘reflecting on oneself in oneself.’’ For ‘‘self ’’ to be conscious of something is to see oneself cast upon the self ’s own field of consciousness. For Nishida, place is like a mirror on which one reflects oneself. To quote Nishida: This mirror that reflects oneself is not only the place where knowledge takes on its form, but also where emotion and will are formed. When we say ‘‘the content of experience,’’ in many cases we already have intellectualized it, and therefore, it may consist of illogical substance. The experience in a true sense must exist in a total Nothingness; it must exist free from intellectualized knowledge; and it must exist in the place where emotion and will are also reflected. This is why I think all three, i.e., knowledge, emotion, and will, form the phenomenon of consciousness.1 (Nishida 1949a: 213, my translation)
Place is where one experiences and where one’s existence comes into being. But the place itself is not restricted by anything, nor is it itself an existence. And such a place, Nishida called, the ‘‘place of Nothingness’’ (mu no basho). The place of Nothingness is free from restrictions, and therefore, it is a place of endless possibilities. The logic of Nishida’s place/topos unfolds in a hermeneutical calculus of negations until its absolute negativity is reached. At that point, the place enables the experiential immediacy, ‘‘pure experience’’ in Nishida’s term. What is particularly significant to the Place of Negotiation theory is that Nishida saw this place of Nothingness as a locus where intellectualized knowledge, emotion, and will are all embraced together in consciousness. When Nishida states that the place ‘‘is not only the place where knowledge takes on its form, but also where emotion and will are formed,’’ it is reasonable to assume that a sense-based experiential immediacy operates within consciousness. One experiences not only intellectual knowledge but also emotion and will within this place of Nothingness, the place brimming with possibilities. Place, in Nishida’s view, is a field of consciousness, the precise locus of immediacy and self-identity. Regarding the importance of emotion/feelings in particular, Nishida’s view in his Hatarakumono kara Mirumono e ‘From the Acting to the Seeing’ (1949b) is instructive. In this writing, Nishida argues that since the expressive action involves both subjective and objective aspects, feeling is said to exist on more profound level of consciousness than intellectual cognition. It is this ‘‘pure feeling’’ experienced in a concrete immediacy in the place that is most fundamental in human consciousness. This is where one can hear what Nishida refers to as the ‘‘voiceless voice’’ and where one can see the ‘‘formless form.’’
The (re-)turn to place
The centrality of place becomes even clearer when Nishida explains the relationship between a language-based judgment and logic. According to Nishida (1949a), in terms of logic, the field of consciousness functions as a predicate. Given a logical calculus of ‘‘S is P,’’ this means that S (supported by particularity) is defined by P, i.e., generally perceived characteristics of the object. That is, one interprets the proposition ‘‘S is P’’ by applying general characteristics to the particular. For Nishida, the subject is particular, while the predicate is general. The predicate, supported by generally perceived characteristics, is rooted in the place, where one can deeply reflect on oneself. Within this place, Nishida further explores the relationship between consciousness and judgment. To quote Nishida again: If I define consciousness from the perspective of judgment, I must say that it is something that ultimately becomes predicate, and that never becomes subject. The domain of consciousness exists within its predicateness. By objectifying the predicate, it becomes possible to view consciousness from an objective point of view.2 (Nishida 1949a: 213, my translation)
Then, Nishida characterizes what occurs in this place as the following. That which is self-conscious must stand, self-consciously, in a dynamically expressive relation to an absolute other. This entails the biconditional structure of coorigination and co-reflection. Thus I repeat that I disagree altogether with the epistemological position that takes its point of departure from the logic of objects. I hold that thinking takes place within the structure of an interexpressive relation. Judgment itself occurs within the contradictory identity of subject and object. From A, A expresses B in itself, as something expressed by A. That is, taking B as grammatical subject, A predicates of B: alternatively, taking B as object, A predicates of B. But the converse is also true. It can equally be said that A is expressed in B, becomes a perspective of B’s own expression. (Dilworth 1987: 55)
As expressed in the statement above, Nishida moves away from the traditional Western subject-based logic, and arrives at the place of the predicate-based logic. To Nishida, judgment must be approached not from the subject, but from the predicate, and more accurately, within the place where S and P are mutually inclusive and determining. For Nishida, the most important aspect of the self-identifying logic is not the a priori awareness of the subject of cogito but the self placed in the field of consciousness that is given the power of predicating. Instead of building on the logic based on the concept of subject as the center of the universe, Nishida prioritizes the predicate on the basis of which the subject is identified. Nishida continues: Ordinarily one thinks of self as a subjective unification just like those objects possessing various characteristics. However, self is not a subjective unification;
Linguistic Emotivity
rather it must be a predicational unification. It is not one dot, but rather, it must be a circle. It is not an object; rather, it must be a place.3 (Nishida 1949a: 279, my translation)
Place is like a circle, that includes the subject–predicate relationship within itself. Evaluating Nishida’s theory of place, Nakamura (1993d) comments that Nishida indeed ‘‘achieved a Copernican paradigmatic shift from subject-based logic to predicate-based logic,’’ and that Nishida ‘‘understood all existence on the basis of predicateness’’ (1993d: 67, my translation). And most importantly, Nishida ‘‘understood the place of Nothingness, not as a place lacking in something, but as a bottomless fertile world’’ (1993d: 67, my translation).4 Following Nakamura, I find, in the concept of place, the creative potential. By transforming the philosophical concept of place/topos into a theoretical practice, I construct the Place of Negotiation theory. In other words, the Place of Negotiation theory is where Nishida’s theory of place is transformed into a concrete linguistic analytical practice. The theory specifies the inner workings of the place directly associated with language and emotion. Interestingly, as Nakamura (1975, 1987, 1993d, 1993e, 1994, 1996) repeatedly points out, the concept of place resonates with bamen ‘situated place’ in Tokieda’s theory of Gengo Katei-setsu ‘Language-as-Process theory’. In addition, place and related concepts were discussed in many of the traditional Japanese language scholars’ studies. The interest in place in Japanese language theories has sustained, and this fact itself poses an interesting question on the issue of linguistic ideology.
.
Place in Japanese language studies
In traditional Japanese language studies, a series of bamen-ron ‘discussion of scene/situated place’ occurred during the era roughly spanning the 1930s to 1950s. Perhaps the most relevant works from that era are Mio (1948), Sakuma (1940, 1954, 1983 [1936]), and Tokieda (1941).5 Prominent among these scholars was Tokieda, who developed his own theory of language with the concept of bamen ‘situated place’, and who prioritized ji (modal expressions and particles). These two features resonate with Nishida’s philosophy in which the concept of place and the function of predicate were prioritized. Among contemporary Japanese language scholars as well, the tradition of the concept of place persists, for example, in the works of Nagano (1952, 1970, 1986) and Takahashi (1956). Some of the traditional Japanese language research predates the disciplines of sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, and pragmatics, and it is worth reviewing a few critical points. The scholar who introduced the concept of ba ‘place’ into Japanese language studies is Sakuma (1983 [1936]). Influenced by Bühler’s Zeigfeld, Sakuma (1983 [1936]) introduces shiji no ba ‘referential place’, and then in his 1954 work,
The (re-)turn to place
introduces three different places, i.e., hatsugen no ba ‘utterance place’, wadai no ba ‘discourse place’, and kadai no ba ‘topic place’.6 Utterance place is the situation where expressive and vocative functions come alive, and where the speaker and the partner occupy the two polar opposites. Discourse place, which is influenced by Bühler’s Symbolfeld, is where the scene is described, and consequently the place is created as discourse. ‘‘Topic place’’ is Sakuma’s creation and an addition to Bühler’s two-field theory. Sakuma (1940) defines topic place as follows. Now, when one comments about something, first, one needs to create an atmosphere. And it becomes important to specify about what one is going to make a comment, that is to say, in terms of its form, it becomes important to delimit the framework of description. (. . .) It is perhaps appropriate to call the operation of establishing and presenting the territory as the establishment of topic, or teidai. These defined territories, in the psychological process of symbolic expression, establish the ‘‘place’’ that guides each description and judgment. This is what one can call ‘‘topic place.’’ Just as the interpretation of the content in a given situation requires the situated cognition, the description of things located in an imagined place is also understood within this ‘‘topic place,’’ that is established by the presentation of topic in each of the imagined places.7 (Sakuma 1940:210–12, my translation)
The topic place, in a word, facilitates the relationship between topic and comment, with the topic establishing the framework for comment in both concrete and imagined places. As in the Japanese topic sentence marked with wa, topic and comment are connected to each other as if presenting a question and an answer. While insightful, Sakuma’s three-place theory is motivated, in principle, by sentence types, and each place remains separated. Following up on Sakuma, Mio (1948) attempts a sentence typology by introducing the concept of ba ‘place’. Mio starts his explanation by referring to the magnetic field. Although a magnetic field refers to the territory over which the magnetic energy extends (i.e., the territory is defined by the distance the energy controls), the concept of place in language studies differs. The place Mio had in mind is not a place where participants are influenced by certain energy. In Mio’s words: One tends to simplistically think that the speaker is in the center of place, and the place passively receives the effect from the speaker. But this view is contrary to how the place of talk functions. The speaker is the one influenced by place; place is acting and the speaker is receiving. The place influences, and in fact defines, the speaker. Speaker does not merely speak in the place; the speaker is defined by the place.8 (Mio 1948: 21, my translation, original emphasis)
More concretely, Mio explains that this ‘‘place of talk’’ is where the speaking ‘‘I’’ and the listening ‘‘you’’ are located. The speaker finds tsumori ‘intention’ to
Linguistic Emotivity
communicate with the partner, and this tsumori is realized in different ways depending on the place of talk. Thus, in Mio’s view, if one considers language activity as the process of transforming tsumori into actual speech, the place of talk at the moment of interaction is defined as ‘‘the totality of all conditions influencing, in one way or another, the language activity at a specific moment’’ (1948: 26–7, my translation).9 Mio conceptualizes place as a moment-to-moment state of communication, although the content remains largely consistent. Constantly changing and renewing, place influences the speaker’s tsumori, and an utterance, after conforming to the place-based restrictions, appears as the final product. Mio concludes that ‘‘there is no language apart from its place’’ (ba o hanarete gen to yuu mono wa nai) (1948: 28, my translation). Based on this concept of ba, Mio attempts a four-way sentence typology of Japanese; (1) sentence of place (ba no bun), (2) sentence that contains place (ba o fukumu bun), (3) sentence that is directed toward place (ba o shikoosuru bun), and (4) sentence that supplements place (ba o oginaiau bun). These four types are also called (1) genshoobun ‘sentence of immediate description’, (2) handanbun ‘sentence of judgment’, (3) mitenkaibun ‘exclamatory sentence’, and (4) bunsetsubun ‘sentence with topical ellipsis’. Overall, Sakuma (1940, 1983 [1936]) introduced the concept of place in language studies, including the ‘‘topic place.’’ Mio (1948) characterized language in terms of place, and elucidated the energy that place exerts upon sentence types and expressions. Both Sakuma and Mio understood place, not as an independent factor associated with language, but as an essential defining dimension. Their place-centered approaches are in basic agreement with the Place of Negotiation theory.
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Bamen ‘situated place’ in Tokieda’s theory
In contrast to the previous scholars who linked the concept of place to sentence types, Tokieda incorporates the concept of bamen ‘situated place’ as one of the key concepts of his language theory. His Language-as-Process theory (Gengo Kateisetsu), as in the case of Nishida’s theory of place/topos, poses a theoretical challenge to traditional Western thought, the Saussurean view toward language, in particular. Tokieda (1941, 1950) takes the position that language is the very process in which the speaking subject expresses ideas by using linguistic sound. Instead of viewing language as a product (or an object) with its internal structure, Tokieda insists that language is the very ‘‘psychological process’’ (shinteki katei) (1941: 86). Based on the Language-as-Process theory, Tokieda views language as subjective experience, and prioritizes subjectivity over objectivity. For him, objective
The (re-)turn to place
facts result from subjective cognition and recognition. In language, the subjective process is expressed by ji, while the objective facts are represented by shi. Tokieda claims that all Japanese lexical items are grammatically categorized either as shi or ji. According to Tokieda (1941, 1950), shi is an expression which has gone through the objectifying process, representing an objective and conceptualized notion of the referent. Shi includes nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. Ji, on the other hand, is an expression which has not gone through the objectifying process, representing the speaker’s subjective perspective toward the referent. It includes conjunctions, exclamatory expressions, auxiliary verbs, and particles. It was ji that Tokieda found to be critical in language, since it enables self-expression. The concept of place is introduced as one of the three elements necessary for language and language experience. The three elements are; (1) the ‘‘speaking subject’’ (shutai), (2) the ‘‘situated place’’ (bamen) inclusive of the addressee (kikite), and (3) the linguistic material (sozai). In Tokieda’s view the situated place is not only the actual social situation for interaction but also a rather comprehensive (almost psychological and emotional) place where linguistic interaction occurs. In Tokieda’s words: (. . .) as opposed to the notion of basho ‘place/location’ referring only to physical and locative space, bamen ‘situated place’ includes the contents which occupy such location. Thus, although bamen ‘situated place’ is similar to basho ‘place/location’ to the extent that objects and scenery are included, bamen ‘situated place’ includes far more than that. It includes the speaking subject’s attitudes (taido), feelings (kibun) and emotion (kanjoo) directed toward these objects and the scenery.10 (Tokieda 1941: 43, my translation)
For Tokieda the most important element of the situated place is the addressee. The addressee influences the speaker and ‘‘language is always expressed in harmony with that situated place’’ (gengo wa tsuneni sono bamen to no choowa kankei ni oite hyoogenserareru mono) (1941:46). Also important for Tokieda are the speaker’s intentions, attitudes, and emotions. It is through these that the speaking subject understands the addressee and other objects identified in the situated place. Thus, according to Tokieda, ‘‘the situated place is not purely objective nor purely subjective; rather it is the world where subjectivity and objectivity fuse into one’’ (Bamen wa jun kyakutaiteki sekai demo-naku, mata jun shutaitekina shikoosayoo demo-naku, iwaba shukyaku no yuugooshita sekai dearu) (1941:44). The situated place, according to Tokieda (1941), is filled with many other objects and situational factors. Thus, depending on the context of the situation, the same addressee encourages different speech styles from the speaking subject depending on the context of the situation. The important point here is that all elements in the ‘‘situated place’’ must be recognized as such by the speaking subject. Therefore, there is no concept of place unless we acknowledge the
Linguistic Emotivity
speaking subject who defines it. At the same time, since the speaking subject is defined by the situated place, no linguistic action is possible without being located in the situated place. The situated place contextualizes linguistic expression, and in turn linguistic expressions help define the situated place. Tokieda concludes that it is because of this unbreakable chain between human action and the situated place that the concept of situated place becomes critical to the study of language. Tokieda’s inclusion of the attitude and emotion of the speaking subject in the situated place resonates with Nishida’s understanding of place. Nishida’s field of consciousness embraced not only knowledge, but also emotion and will. Tokieda’s words (the situated place is not purely objective nor purely subjective, but rather, it is where subjectivity and objectivity fuse into one) also resonate with Nishida’s philosophy of basho. Most seriously, when Tokieda states that ‘‘the existence of situated place is nothing but the testimony that we are alive’’ (bamen no sonzai to yuu koto wa, iwaba wareware ga ikiteiru to yuu koto ni hokanaranai no dearu) (1941: 45), we witness that for Tokieda the concept of place has served as an ontological basis as well. This quotation from Tokieda reminds me of the statement Nishida made in the first paragraph of his writing on the logic of place: ‘‘Things that exist must exist somewhere; otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish between there is and there is not’’ (Aru mono wa nanika ni oite nakerebanaranu. Shikarazareba aru to yuu koto to nai to yuu koto tono kubetsu ga deki-nai no dearu) (1949a:208). The source of Tokieda’s grammar can be found in Suzuki’s distinction between shi and te-ni-o-ha. Recall that Suzuki (1979 [1824]) stated that the ‘‘voices from the heart’’ are expressed by te-ni-o-ha, which enable the expression of shi. Tokieda, following this tradition, makes a clear case that ji enables the speaker’s self-expression. If language is a process of self-expression, ultimately, ji controls the expression. To understand ji as something enveloping shi echoes with Nishida’s predicatecentered view of logic. Tokieda sees in ji the realization of self-expression that becomes possible in a situated place. Likewise, Nishida sees, in the image of place as a circle, the reflection of self cast upon the self ’s field of consciousness. The prioritization of self-expression and its consequent minimization of the subject-asagent lead to the understanding of language as event, as immediate experience. Nakamura (1987, 1993d), pointing out the commonality between Nishida’s place/topos and Tokieda’s situated place, states that ‘‘(I)n Japanese, the sentences are connected to the narrating self through ji, and further connected to the situation or situated place, where the self is located’’ and ‘‘(T)herefore, language is significantly restricted by place’’ (1987: 84, my translation).11 Nakamura concurs with Tokieda that there is no way of dissociating between language and situation or situated place, and this is linguistically evidenced, that is, language contains in itself ji and ji-related expressivity. Tokieda’s theory on bamen ‘situated place’ predates some of the recent developments of context-dependent theories of language. Tokieda, by denying
The (re-)turn to place
abstract language, by theorizing for the language used in the situated place, and by insisting on the importance of the speaking subject and the addressee, had engaged in the construction of linguistics of pathos. It is worth noting that Tokieda’s insight was available prior to the yet-to-prosper formal linguistics which came into existence in the West. Tokieda’s theory does not stand unchallenged, however. If language is to be understood as linguistic experience, and if it takes place in the situated place, one cannot deny interactional (i.e., negotiative) processes that participants regularly undergo. How do they identify and interact with each other? And, how does the meaning emerge in interaction, in relation to the partner (i.e., Tokieda’s addressee)? Tokieda’s concept of speaking subject retains a sense of autonomy; perhaps even in Tokieda’s mind, the shadow of the subject of cogito was not entirely overcome. Although Tokieda argues for language-as-process, how exactly does the theory account for the interpretation of meaning, especially the mechanism and the process of interpretation? Where is the meaning? Or, how does one come to interpret meaning through varied psychological processes and manipulations, particularly in the process of interaction? What methodological approaches can reveal the interpretation process? Tokieda does not provide adequate answers to these. And lastly, one cannot escape the sense of logos-based thinking regarding his division of shi and ji. Although Tokieda (1941) repeatedly argued against the structuralist view of linguistics, and remained critical of traditional Western linguistic theories, one cannot deny the feeling that perhaps he himself had succumbed to them. That is, following the Western ideology of the clear-cut categorization, he attempted a clear division of items into two mutually exclusive groups, which eventually has led to controversy for years to come. I maintain that the distinction between shi and ji should not be conceived as clear-cut as Tokieda once argued. Rather, words function as ji-like and shi-like expressions for the purpose of varied shades of descriptive and expressive needs. True, some words are more ji-like, and others, more shi-like. But the two categories are not completely distinct; rather, they differ in tendencies. In the Place of Negotiation theory some of the points raised above regarding Tokieda are addressed and some answers are provided. The Place of Negotiation framework enables extensive analyses of real-life data, and it identifies the interpretive processes of meaning more explicitly.
. Place and interaction Discussions on the concept of place in Japanese language studies have declined in large part since the 1960s. The exception, of note, however, is the theoretical contribution made by Nagano (1952, 1970, 1986). Nagano’s thinking is of
Linguistic Emotivity
particular interest to the present discussion because he criticizes and further advances Tokieda’s concept of bamen ‘situated place’. Nagano insists that three elements of a specific speech event, i.e., speaker, addressee, and the material, exist in an objective, physical world. But when these elements are cast in the speaker’s consciousness, they no longer exist in the objective world. The speaker becomes ‘‘self ’’ (jibun); the addressee becomes ‘‘partner’’ (aite); and material becomes ‘‘material in consciousness’’ (ishiki no naka no sozai). The hearer and the partner are not the same; the same addressee/partner is characterized differently depending on the speaker’s consciousness. Nagano’s bamen ‘situated place’ is represented by three different universes; (1) the objective situation, (2) the subjective bamen as understood by the speaker, and (3) the subjective bamen in the hearer’s consciousness. Each speech act is performed through the interaction of five different elements; (1) by someone, (2) to someone, (3) about something, (4) in some context, and (5) as expansion of some discourse. The actual event consists of (1) speaker, (2) hearer, (3) material, (4) environment, and (5) thread of discourse. But when the event is cast in the participants’ consciousness, these elements are understood as (1) self, (2) partner, (3) topic, (4) atmosphere, and (5) plot development. And Nagano calls the tension among these five elements in the event, bamen ‘situated place’. In Nagano’s bamen, these five elements function, not separately, but forming mutually influencing relationships. Nagano understood what Tokieda referred to as objects and situated place to be a fundamentally psychological enterprise, and characterizes it as a subjective understanding. Nagano’s contribution to the theory of place is that it enables the researcher to see how the subjective worlds engage (or do not engage) in the interpretation of meaning. By understanding bamen ‘situated place’ ultimately as a subjective concept, one can face the reality that the speaker and partner may not completely share the specifics of the situated place. Their ways of understanding are approximate, not necessarily identical. This position resonates with Vico’s insistence, that is, perhaps our understanding is only reassured by certitude, and not necessarily by truth. Given that this possibility is acknowledged, Nagano’s understanding of bamen seems to reflect what actually happens in communication more accurately than Tokieda’s bamen. In Nagano’s works, bamen has become more concrete and interaction-based.
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The concept of place in the Place of Negotiation theory
As briefly reviewed above, there has been a long tradition of prioritizing the concept of place in Japanese philosophy and language studies. Nishida’s place, as a source of one’s existence, challenged the Cartesian philosophy and the knowledge of logos. Among traditional Japanese language scholars reviewed, the place-
The (re-)turn to place
centered view of language experience has been the norm, and this is in line with the pursuit of the Knowledge of Pathos. Starting from Sakuma’s concept of place, Mio’s and Tokieda’s theories of place and situated place, all challenge the propositional description of language as logos in the form of [agent-does]. In these models, the speaker emerges as a self who self-expresses through ji, and who participates in the speech event sharing common experiences. Recall that Edo scholars were most concerned with the expressivity of te-ni-oha. They focused on the expressivity of the speaker, i.e., pathos including, and not limited to, emotivity. As we saw earlier in the works of Fujitani and Suzuki, studies on linguistic emotivity had been launched long ago in the tradition of Japanese studies. My task, while incorporating this tradition, is to establish a place-centered theory of language and interaction that enables analysis of contemporary Japanese discourse. The place within the Place of Negotiation theory is a space where participants perform verbal interaction, as they negotiate their interaction and meaning. It incorporates Nishida’s place embracing the subject–predicate relationship within itself, and it also adopts Nakamura’s ‘‘place as a source of existence (foundation of Being)’’ (sonzai konkyo [kitai] toshite no ba) (1993e: 59). This is a place brimming with possibilities and freedom. It defines the 〈topica〉, where the interpretation of meaning is practiced. 〈Topica〉, by converging meanings emerging in three different dimensions of place (i.e., 〈cognitive〉, 〈emotive〉, and 〈interactional〉), facilitates the interpretation of 〈negotiative meaning〉. 〈Topica〉 is a locus for incorporating cotextual and contextual information as well. The interpretation of 〈negotiative meaning〉 is restricted by 〈potential meaning〉 associated with the linguistic signs. It is also restricted by the speaker’s intentions associated with informational, emotive, and interactional meanings. As stated earlier, in the place of the Place of Negotiation theory there are three dimensions of place, each of which consists of three elements, i.e., objects, speaker, and partner. Thus the negotiations are multiple and occur on multiple levels. These elements interact and undergo negotiative processes, constantly changing the content of the 〈topica〉. The place of negotiation is instantiated in actual communication, but it also becomes internalized. The knowledge of actual encounters accumulates as a part of social convention, and contributes to a society’s sensus communis. Perhaps at this point it is useful to provide an example to illustrate the negotiative process of meaning in the 〈topica〉. For the interpretation of (1), the following negotiative processes are necessary. (1) Doose noroma desu yoo . . . da. anyway slow be ip be ‘I’m slow anyway (I’m telling you).’
(Asagiri 1992: 173)
Linguistic Emotivity
The 〈potential meaning〉 for (1) consists of the combination of dictionaryprovided meanings for each lexicon, including noroma ‘slow person’, and desu ‘be’. The 〈informational meaning〉 for (1) refers to the propositional meaning [I’m slow]. The 〈emotive meaning〉 of (1) includes the emotional attitude depicted in ‘anyway’ (a feeling of hopelessness and resignation), the sense of direct emotional appeal (of the 〈you-reaching inner self 〉) signaled by the particle yo, and da that expresses the speaker’s telling-it-as-is assertive attitude. The 〈interactional meaning〉 associated with (1) includes the speaker’s socially sensitive (highawareness) attitude toward the partner reflected in the choice of the desu/masu style. This choice evokes a sense of formal declaration. The use of yo also accentuates the sense of direct speech which foregrounds the narrator as a speaker. All these meanings project on to the 〈topica〉. In addition, for the interpretation of the meaning one must take into consideration the cotext and context of (1). For example, the cotext includes the elongation of yo, which emphatically enhances the emotional appeal, and the pause between yoo and da which prolongs the emotive effect. Contextually, (1) appears in a romance novel in which the narrator, a teenage girl named Konomi, tells a confessional story of how she fell in love with Naoyuki Satoo. (1) is preceded by; ‘When he caught up with me, Satoo breathed deeply, and said ‘‘You are always slow, but only in this situation, you’re fast.’’ Suddenly he says (like) this . . .’ In other words, (1) is a teasingly defiant statement the narrator makes in response to Satoo’s criticism. The meaning of (1) must be negotiated in this interactional context between the character and the narrator enacted in the narrated place. At the same time, the reader must appreciate the said meaning as a confessional statement through which the narrator reveals her inner feelings. In this way, the broad context includes not only the turn-taking situation but also the kind of genre (i.e., romance novel targeted to adolescent girls) the expression represents.12 The 〈topica〉 is the place which makes available all necessary information for the negotiative interpretation, and which facilitates the combination, competition, and integration of meanings. Ultimately, the place within the Place of Negotiation theory is a construct where, in addition to logos, participants interact and negotiate pathos, approximating and arriving at instantiated meanings. In this emotivity-rich place, as the meaning comes alive, the speaker and partner also come alive. As Mio (1948) emphasized, meaning and speaker do not merely appear in the place, but rather, they are defined by the place.
Chapter 5
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
In the preceding chapter, I have maintained that the concept of place has occupied a central position in some of the Japanese philosophical and linguistic studies. But obviously, the concept of place has been advanced in Western scholarly traditions as well. The place, as opposed to the subject of cogito, has been introduced in the history of linguistics-related disciplines, among which the concept of topica in rhetoric is the most significant. In this chapter after touching upon place-related concepts, such as context and frame in sociolinguistics and cognitive semantics, I briefly discuss the rhetorical concept of topica. The place in the Place of Negotiation theory is creative and enabling. But, given such a characterization, how does the negotiation of meaning take place? I stated earlier that the foundation of the negotiation of meaning lies in the sensus communis, but what kind of psychological processes are involved for the negotiation of 〈emotive meaning〉? This chapter provides some answers to these questions. In my answer I draw from available concepts; Ichikawa’s (1975) ‘‘empathetic conformity,’’ Miyazaki and Ueno’s (1985) ‘‘perspectivized appearance’’ as well as ‘‘perspective of becoming,’’ and Carroll’s (1997, 1998) ‘‘emotive focus.’’ These models explain interpretive processes incorporated into the Place of Negotiation theory.
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The location of meaning and topica
It is fair to say that the concept of place is closely associated with a theoretical construct related to ‘‘context’’ in sociolinguistics and pragmatics. For example, a classic example is Hymes’ (1972) S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G (settings, participants, ends, act sequences, keys, instrumentalities, norms, and genres). Added to the list are Malinowski’s (1964) ‘‘context of situation’’ and Gumperz’ (1982, 1992) ‘‘contextualization (cues).’’1 In linguistics and cognitive studies, concepts such as ‘‘frame’’ in frame semantics (Fillmore 1982), ‘‘mental space’’ (Fauconnier 1985), ‘‘image schema’’ (Langacker 1987, 1988), and ‘‘ICM (idealized cognitive models)’’ (Lakoff 1987) are utilized, and traditionally, terms such as ‘‘schema’’ (Rumelhart 1975) and ‘‘scripts’’ (Schank and Abelson 1977) appear in psychology and Artificial Intelligence research. Common among these models is the tenet that the meaning is
Linguistic Emotivity
interpreted in relation to other elements within a larger but defined framework. In all these studies, the concept of place (more accurately, space) has come into play in one way or another. Studies that loosely fall under the rubric of cognitive semantics subscribe to anti-logos approaches, in that they oppose objectivist views of knowledge. As represented by Lakoff ’s (1987) position of ‘‘experiential realism,’’ the significance of bodily experience to thought is recognized. Lakoff ’s statement such as ‘‘the core of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical and social character’’ (1987: xiv) can generally be characterized as anti-Cartesian in nature. For instance, regarding linguistic behavior of categorization, Lakoff (1987) observes that it essentially involves experience and imagination, and it is not simply a matter of manipulation of abstract symbols. Categorization is based on human perception, motor activity, and culture on one hand, and it is also based on metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other. In short, it can be summarized that the process of cogito involves more than Cartesian ‘‘clear and distinct ideas.’’ Thought is imaginative, Lakoff (1987) maintains, and even those concepts not directly grounded in experience employ metaphorical imagery that extends beyond the literal representation of external reality. Although the Place of Negotiation theory does not contradict the cognitive semanticists’ position, as I alluded to earlier, in my view, cognitive linguistics tends to slight some of the critical aspects of communication. It does not directly account for the human factors involved, especially the interactional, dialogical, and negotiative aspects of communication performed in a dynamic place. Instead, in cognitive semantics, the concept of place is static and participants are absent. Instead, the viewer’s position in relation to the surrounding environment is focused. The perspective in this theoretical paradigm is unidirectional; the human being acts on externally existing phenomena and observes objects and interprets environment. Human communication, however, takes place when interacting with partners, and therefore, the perspective in language and communication (and even in cognition because cognition is primarily language-based) must be recognized as being bi- and multi-directional. Consequently, the cognitive semanticists’ concept of place fails to provide a fully convincing methodology for analyzing emotives to be investigated in this work. The theory of language and communication must be designed to account for the intersubjective process of acting and being acted upon, and that process inevitably occurs in a place. One must not ignore the recipient, the passive side of the perception, with a full understanding that the roles of the observer and the observed are mutually supported and are constantly being interchanged. Rhetoric, a classical tradition in Western scholarship, touches upon the concept of place, specifically topica, the art of topics. In Western rhetoric, topica is
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
the place where one finds the problematic as well as the necessary manner of argument. In the most classical sense it is understood as a storehouse for arguments. The information found in an appropriate topica helps the speaker’s inventive efforts; the art of topics facilitates groupings of relevant material, so that necessary material can easily be located when required. In order to understand the historicity of the art of topics, perhaps it is necessary to return to Aristotle. The Aristotelian topics refer to the procedure whereby one may build conclusions from probable statements concerning any problem. The art of topics is considered useful when speaking in public, especially because it may protect the speaker against self-contradiction. This is because the art of topics is concerned with a common place, where one can argue with certain generalities on the basis of evidence bearing upon general subjects. This is rooted in the classical view represented by Aristotelian Organon, particularly in Aristotle’s Topics which contains probable methods of arguing such as hypothetical and verisimilar syllogisms. For Descartes who praised clear and distinct ideas, this line of argument supported by somewhat compromising topica, quickly became the target of contempt. And, in turn, Descartes’ contempt for the humanities and his contempt for synthetic thinking is what Vico opposed. Vico (1965 [1709]) argued that the traditional art of topics is the art of finding the arguments, and those who know the loci of argument are able to grasp the elements of persuasion inherent in any case at any time. And therefore, although the art of topics is forgotten in the education of the young, Vico warned that ‘‘young men should be taught the totality of sciences and arts, and their intellectual powers should be developed to the full; thus they will become familiar with the art of argument, drawn from the ars topica’’ (1965 [1709]: 19). Vico praised the art of topics because it requires identification of the locus of problematics, and it provides information necessary to carry on appropriate argument for eloquence. In modern rhetoric, Perelman (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) discusses the importance of loci. Loci are headings under which arguments can be classified. Reclassifying the Aristotle’s classification of loci communes (i.e., loci relating to accident, species, property, definition, and sameness, all proposed for the purpose of providing premise for dialectical syllogisms), Perelman introduces six types of loci; quantity, quality, order, existence, essence, and person. Particularly important are loci of quantity and loci of quality. Loci of quantity are the rule of majority, that is, an argument is made that one thing is better than the other because the former is observed more frequently. For purely quantitative reasons, a locus of quantity defines a major premise, that which occurs most often, the usual, the normal. Loci of quantity are often used by Classicists. And according to Perelman, Classicists consider superior and as the basis of value ‘‘(T)he universal and eternal, the relational and universally valid, that which is
Linguistic Emotivity
stable, durable, essential, that which concerns the largest number’’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 98). Loci of quality become an issue when the strength of numbers is challenged in argumentation. They are used by reformers or those who revolt against the majority’s position. Loci of quality are often used by the Romanticists, since these loci are considered to bear the character of uniqueness, originality, and newness. Thus, in comparison, the Classicists are sympathetic toward abstract or, at least, universal values, while the Romanticists advocate particular, concrete values. Likewise, while the Classicists maintain the superiority of thought and contemplation, the Romanticists maintain the superiority of effective action. It is important to observe here that the contemporary art of topics, as represented by Perelman’s rhetoric, are in pursuit of the Knowledge of Pathos. Loci of quantity and quality offer a method of argumentation based on the general circumstance and condition tied to the place, the antithesis of the subject of cogito. There are no syllogisms, or the prioritization of clear and distinct ideas, for example. Loci of quantity and quality are largely situation-based, and they are useful for identifying philosophical positions (such as the Classicists and the Romanticists). The concept of topica in the sense of loci does not contradict the current study of linguistic emotivity. As Vico warned, understanding emotive meanings requires the knowledge of topica, loci of problematics and solutions.
.
Negotiation of emotive meaning in conversation
The Western tradition of rhetoric discussed above reinforces the importance of place-based interpretation of meaning. But we still face the question of how one interprets meaning in the 〈topica〉. In this section, first, I discuss conversational interaction and second, I introduce the concept of ‘‘empathetic conformity’’ as an interpretive tool useful for understanding meaning, especially in the 〈interactional place〉. In an on-going conversation, the role of speaker and partner constantly change, as each role is endorsed by the other. The meaning of conversation in this speech event must, therefore, be understood in this interdependent relationship. This is particularly so when the conversation participants engage in sharing emotive and interactional (more than cognitive) aspects of meaning. In a series of studies, I reported on various aspects of the interactional management mutually conducted by conversation participants (Maynard 1986a, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989, 1993c). In Maynard (1989, 1993c) I discussed the concept of self-contextualization as a process of context-sensitive participation. Conversation participants do not behave entirely spontaneously. Their behavior is, in part, a predictable response to the specific conversational context. By perceiving, identifying, and evaluating the
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
overall as well as immediate context of the conversation as they interact, participants in a conversation understand themselves in context. This on-going process of continually defining oneself in relation to one’s 〈interactional place〉 is selfcontextualization. Self-contextualization involves two interacting stages; (1) contextual interpretation, and (2) contextual transformation. The first stage involves the participant’s understanding of actual signs and other structural and interactional knowledge. The second stage requires the participant to process one’s ideas and intentions in such a way as to be appropriate in the on-going 〈interactional place〉 by ‘‘transforming’’ information to conform to the context. Since the situation in conversation changes from one moment to the next, conversation participants must self-contextualize continually, with each change being mutually incorporated in each other’s self-contextualization. Self-contextualization describes the interpretive process that speaker and partner undergo in the 〈interactional place〉 of the Place of Negotiation theory. To illustrate this negotiative process of participation as reflected in conversational interaction, I offer the example of rhythmic interaction. Conversational interaction is characterized by a rhythm often shared by participants, referred to as ‘‘rhythmic ensemble’’ (Scollon 1982). During ordinary casual conversation among speakers sharing a common sociocultural norm, a rhythm is cooperatively established. The established rhythm jointly maintained by speaker and partner affects not only the tempo in which each syllable is pronounced but also how some nonverbal signs are incorporated into the flow of conversation. Regarding Japanese casual conversation I reported (Maynard 1989) that head movement often occurs in pairs, triplets, or even quadruplets. These repetitious head movements contribute to the rhythm by hitting beats of the given tempo of the conversation. The speed of each head movement seems to match the overall speed of conversation. Sometimes, rhythmic synchrony occurs in head movement made by both participants. The occasions of these synchronized head movements are like ‘‘dances’’ the participants perform as a demonstration of mutual cooperation and acknowledgment. They are at the same tempo making the identical movement in synchrony and at the same speed, hitting the given beat even during the turn-transition period. This synchronized rhythmic ensemble helps participants feel comfortable with each other. It helps them make their way through the complex verbal entanglement of face-to-face encounters. On head movement, I noted that ‘‘head movements in Japanese, available to both speakers and listeners, are performed in predictable pragmatic contexts and function in multiple domains; as continuer and transition filler on the listener’s part, and as clause boundary, emphasis, affirmation, turn-end marker, transition period filler, and (pre-)turn claim on the speaker’s part’’ (Maynard 1989: 189). These functions illustrate that head movements, while performing rhythmic ensemble, achieve a coordinated negotiative interaction. Participants must act not
Linguistic Emotivity
only in response to, but more critically, in anticipation of each other’s current and ensuing actions. A question may be raised: How do participants anticipate other’s and self ’s action from each other’s perspective? To participate in conversation and to take part in joint head movement, one must not only interpret the other’s action, but must anticipate it, and perform simultaneously with the partner. Note here that the meaning these simultaneous actions bring to discourse is not cognitive, but primarily emotive and interactional. As evidenced in the awkwardness participants normally find themselves in when taking part in disengaged conversation, the emotive meaning attributed to synchronic actions influences the overall feelings of communication. How, then, do participants experience emotivity in conversational interaction? To understand this experiential and psychological process, Ichikawa’s (1975) concepts of ‘‘empathetic conformity’’ (doochoo) and ‘‘sense-based empathetic conformity’’ (kannooteki doochoo) guide our understanding. By these terms he means that, on the basis of bodily senses, one conforms empathetically, being guided by the meaning of other’s action and expression. Doochoo literally means to be in synchrony with one’s partner, or to become like the partner. In concrete terms, doochoo requires one to first recreate the partner’s action in oneself, and to understand the meaning behind the partner’s action. Next, based on such understanding, one predicts the partner’s next action, and at the same time one prepares for one’s own action. Ichikawa’s (1975) 〈empathetic conformity〉 is a principle of negotiation between two organisms. There are two types; (1)‘‘assimilating empathetic conformity’’ (doogatateki doochoo), and (2) ‘‘complementary empathetic conformity’’ (yakuwariteki doochoo). Two dogs running may run together at the same speed, a case of assimilating empathetic conformity. The dogs may also run by exchanging the leading roles; one may run faster and lead, or one may run slower and follow, yet they playfully interact, always participating in a joint activity. This is an example of complementary empathetic conformity. The negotiation of head movement discussed earlier can be explained from the perspective of empathetic conformity. The joint head movement illustrates how participants engage in assimilating empathetic conformity. And head movements used as a listener response are examples of complementary empathetic conformity. In a broad sense, the 〈empathetic conformity〉 is at work whenever we interpret messages in interaction. Consider that when an actor cries on television, a child viewing it conforms to a similar expression. Or, when watching a boxing match, a viewer imitates the favorite boxer’s movements. In some cases, the viewer engages in activities beyond mere imitation. The viewer empathizes with the boxer, experiences what the boxer experiences, and when the viewer predicts what the boxer will do, he or she conforms to the boxer’s movement. This action involves an anticipated conformity, that is, more than imitating the boxer’s action.
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
In addition, when the assimilating empathetic conformity is internalized, complementary empathetic conformity takes place. The viewer not only conforms to the boxer, but as the viewer engages more deeply in this conforming activity, the viewer follows the opponent’s movement, and from the opponent’s point of view, the viewer anticipates the responding movement of the favorite boxer. When we engage in cooperative human activity, we understand not only our own roles and actions but also those of the partner as we sense the entire situation in perspective. In other words, we understand other’s behavior as a part of the whole, and behave in such a way as to complement the missing part. Such complementary behavior relies on the understanding of the entire event as well as the overall assessment of the place. We participate in conversation and experience others’ verbal actions and interpret symbolic and indexical signs based on 〈empathetic conformity〉. We are able to understand verbal actions and linguistic signs produced by others not only because we understand them by assimilating them into our own, but also because we view the partner’s and our own actions in a complementary relationship. The intimate awareness of each other’s verbal action and 〈empathetic conformity〉 to each other’s behavior help participants to reach appropriate 〈negotiative meaning〉. Obviously we may fail to achieve 〈empathetic conformity〉 and consequently fail to arrive at appropriate 〈negotiative meaning〉. However, on the basis of certitude, we assume we can reach a mutually intended meaning, at least to the extent that we are able to communicate in an ordinary sense. In face-to-face conversation, participants have access to sense-based information, and this also adds to the process of the negotiation of meaning. Resonating with Merleau-Ponty (1962), Ichikawa (1975) emphasizes the importance of bodily senses in the process of interpretation of meaning. In his words: The body that is attracted to words, and the body empathetically conforming to the images provoked by language; such a body cannot be reduced to the sum of a physical-chemical process. The body is the concrete, functionally operating body that acts on and responds to the world.2 (Ichikawa 1975: 192, my translation)
Ichikawa goes further and elaborates on the importance of interaction for understanding human perception. For Ichikawa, a world dissociated from the observer’s perspective does not exist. Whatever human beings perceive, it must be understood as an interaction between the perceiver and the perceived. Again in his words: The world is not an object that exists out there; it is an event generated through our organisms’ negotiation with others. And at the same time, through the event, my organism and the other’s organism are determined. In other words, by the fact that I determine the world, in turn I determine my own self.3 (Ichikawa 1975: 215, my translation)
Linguistic Emotivity
The psychological interpretive process required in the Place of Negotiation theory can be explained by the sense-based 〈empathetic conformity〉. This is particularly the case in face-to-face conversation in which speakers directly participate. 〈Emotive meaning〉 is experienced not only as knowledge but, more importantly, as bodily experience. And for interpreting linguistic emotivity (particularly when the speaker is a participant), sense-based empathetic conformity provides the psychological foundation for instantiating a particular 〈negotiative meaning〉.
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Interpreting textual emotivity
We experience various shades of emotions, such as outrage, compassion, fear, suspense, and so on, when we read a novelistic text. How do we experience such often intense emotions simply by reading words on a page? How does the Place of Negotiation theory account for this mediated event? True, these emotional experiences involve senses and bodily response, but they are not the same as those experienced in a face-to-face encounter. As we saw in Ichikawa’s (1975) work, the sense-based 〈empathetic conformity〉 may be internalized, and therefore, we experience emotion through both direct and mediated means. Our interpretation, however, requires more than 〈empathetic conformity〉, especially in reading. Within the Place of Negotiation framework, the interpretive process, especially of written text (e.g., novels, essays, comics, newspaper articles, and so on), is understood as follows. In essence, the reader, in his or her desire to understand, observes objects and events through the eyes of the narrator and/or character. Novelistic comprehension, for example, requires that the reader share the perspective with a character or characters. In this process the reader attempts to understand, from the internal point of view of the character, the meaning negotiated among characters. This negotiation of meaning requires a locus. More accurately, the interpretation of text requires multiple dimensions of place, not only where characters interact but also where the narrator and characters interact. The Place of Negotiation theory facilitates the construal of these multiple dimensions of place. I just touched upon the shared perspective required for textual comprehension. But the reader does not comprehend text simply by sharing the identifiable perspective of a specific character alone. Comprehension requires a shifting of perspectives not only among different characters but also between the narrator and the character. The shifting of perspectives offers clues for the reader to comprehend the relationships among characters, as well as the relationships the narrator maintains with the various characters. Discussing how perspectives function in human perception and understanding from cognitive psychology, Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) discuss the theory of shiten ‘perspective, point of view’. Two fundamental points are presented. First,
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
the recognition of objects, including sense perception and concept comprehension, becomes possible by temporal and spacial shifts of the perspectives. Second, the recognition of objects is always predicated upon a specific way in which one takes the viewing perspective toward objects. Based on these two principles, Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) explain the process of how one cognitively and emotionally comprehends others, especially in written text. In their words: Comprehension of the other, including when the other is a character in a novel, involves the process where a person transfers his or her perspective to the other. The person tries to generate the other’s feelings and emotions from that person’s internal perspective. In other words, it involves the process where one tries to understand the inner state of the other’s perspective by delegating oneself to share the other’s perspective.4 (Miyazaki and Ueno 1985: 103, my translation)
Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) further divide comprehension into two different processes; (1) comprehension of objects and scenery, and (2) comprehension of psychological states. For the comprehension of the former, the ‘‘perspectivized appearance’’ (mie) becomes important; for the comprehension of the latter, the ‘‘perspective of becoming’’ (naru shiten) plays a role. The 〈perspectivized appearance〉 refers to a specific appearance of objects and scenery as viewed from a determined perspective. When comprehending objects and scenery, readers create an imaginary textual world, and delegate themselves into that world as imagined (surrogate) selves. Readers station themselves in a specific viewing position within that imagined world, and they locate the objects. When the delegated self and the objects are located in perspective of each other, a clear image emerges as a 〈perspectivized appearance〉. By setting up the viewing position, we create a defined perspectivized appearance, and by incorporating relevant information provided by the text, we comprehend the meaning. Miyazaki and Ueno (1985: 144) call this process of understanding mie senkoo hooryaku ‘optical-worldfirst strategy’ (this translation attributed to Ikegami 1996). The perspective plays a more significant role in the comprehension of psychological states, where the ‘‘perspective of becoming’’ (naru shiten) plays a role. To understand how a person feels (regardless of whether that person is someone real or imagined), one needs to guess at the person’s intention, feelings, and emotion, and to experience it oneself. Here Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) insist that one must ‘‘become the other person who possesses intention and feelings/emotions’’ (aru mokuteki nari, shinjoo nari o motta tasha ni ‘‘natte’’ miru to yuu koto) (1985:130). Taking this 〈perspective of becoming〉 requires that the reader delegate the imagined self to the other, and by inhabiting in this person, the reader attempts to generate the psychological state of someone else, as if the reader were that person. In their account of textual comprehension, Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) focus on two types of perspectives, namely, the perspective of ‘‘seeing’’ and of ‘‘becom-
Linguistic Emotivity
ing.’’ In their view, to understand one’s partner in communication, first, one needs to ‘‘see’’ (recognize) an approximate appearance of the world as viewed from the partner, i.e., 〈perspective of seeing〉. Second, one re-creates the world seen by the partner by ‘‘becoming’’ (i.e., taking the identical perspective of) the partner, i.e., 〈perspective of becoming〉. Ultimately, understanding requires one to ‘‘become’’ like the partner. The following example is illustrative. Quoting a Japanese director, Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) mention how one successfully plays Hamlet. However detailed analyses one may obtain about the character of Hamlet, the actor will not be instructed how to act. But if one imagines the situation into which Hamlet is placed, and speculates how Hamlet would perceive that world, one can gain a closer understanding of his character. In other words, by sharing Hamlet’s view toward the world, one ‘‘becomes’’ Hamlet. In order to gain empathetic understanding, one must imaginatively inhabit the very body that experiences thought and emotion in the imagined place. In sum, when reading a novel, the reader sends out, as it were, an imaginary self to travel through the story under the narrator’s guidance. The reader finds oneself placed within the imaginary place, seeing and experiencing the world just as narrators and characters do. Also relevant to the point made here is the art of detached seeing, an approach praised in traditional Japanese performing art. According to Nakamura (1987), the Noh master, Seami, described the art of the Noh drama as the following. To perform masterfully, the Noh actor must be able to see himself from the audience’s perspective, as if borrowing others’ eyes. Although physically one is unable to see one’s back, one must be able to ‘‘see’’ it, because by seeing through detached eyes, one understands one’s own performance. Here, the idea of shared perspectives (or more accurately, being able to see oneself from someone else’s perspective and consequently sharing perspectives) becomes essential. Although the idea of shared perspectives is not limited to the interpretation of Japanese text, the relative importance placed in Japanese aesthetics is supportive of the point made here. It should be noted that in interpreting the written text, 〈empathetic conformity〉 is also at work. The conversational interaction among characters needs to be understood through 〈empathetic conformity〉; it operates as a part of the process to gain access to the 〈perspectivized appearance〉 and to experience the 〈perspective of becoming〉.
. Interpretation and tacit knowledge At this point, a question may be raised as to whether or not interpretive principles discussed above are culture-specific. Although I cite Japanese scholars such as Ichikawa, Miyazaki and Ueno, there is no doubt that these scholars are influenced
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
by Western scholarship, and therefore, these theories are not necessarily specific to Japanese academic discourse. Just as meaning emerges as an intermediary in the negotiative process, much knowledge results from mediation of available knowledge that may be traced to multiple branches of Western and non-Western scholarly traditions. In fact, Ichikawa (1975:113) comments in a footnote that his concept of 〈conformity〉 (doochoo) is an extension of Minkowski’s (1970) ‘‘syntony.’’ According to Minkowski, ‘‘syntony alludes to the principle that allows us to vibrate in unison with the environment’’ (1970:73). Sympathy may be considered a representative of syntony, although it is not the same; sympathy is a manifestation of syntony. Minkowski points out, from the perspectives of existential-phenomenological psychiatry and psychotherapy, that our sense of well-being is linked to the feeling of being like our partners, and to be in tune with each other. Minkowski’s idea that we vibrate in unison with other persons is key to understanding Ichikawa’s 〈empathetic conformity〉. 〈Empathetic conformity〉 provides the psychological motivation for speaker and partner to participate in the intersubjective negotiation of meaning. Likewise, Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) base their theory of perspectives on the concept developed elsewhere, i.e., Polanyi’s (1983) ‘‘tacit knowledge.’’ Polanyi’s tacit dimension of knowledge is key to understanding Miyazaki and Ueno’s optical-world-first interpretive strategy. That is to say, a tacit knowledge provides an answer to the following question: How do we successfully gain 〈perspectivized appearance〉, and more importantly, how does the 〈perspectivized appearance〉 enable us to interpret our partner’s inner feelings and emotions, thus leading to shared perspectives? According to Polanyi (1983), tacit knowing involves two items; (1) first (proximal) term, and (2) second (distal) term. How these two terms of knowing are related to each other offers clues for the optical-world-first strategy. Polanyi (1983) refers to an psychological experiment of ‘‘shock syllables.’’ In this experiment, the subject was presented with a large number of nonsense syllables, and at certain syllables, the subject received an electric shock. The subject showed symptoms of anticipating the shock at the sight of ‘‘shock syllables’’, yet the subject could not identify those syllables. The shock syllables and shock associations form the first (proximal) term of knowing, and the electric shock which followed them form the second (distal) term of knowing. Note here that we know the shock-producing particulars only by relying on our own awareness of them by attending to something else, i.e., the electric shock, and therefore, our knowledge is tacit. In short, ‘‘we know the first term only by relying on our awareness of it for attending to the second’’ (1983: 10). Polanyi continues that ‘‘in an act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending to something else; namely, from the first term to the second term of the tacit relation’’ (1983: 10, original emphasis).
Linguistic Emotivity
It is true that we often sense the distal knowledge more vividly. For example, when we drive a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in a different way. The hammer is not, like the nail, an object of our attention; it is simply an instrument. Although it is the hammer that our hand holds, we do not watch the hammer itself. We watch the nail, while keeping intensely aware of the hammer. In fact, we ‘‘sense’’ the nail going into wood. This sensation is distal, but through this focused distal knowledge, the person understands the feelings of one’s own hands. What one feels is difficult to approach directly, but through distal, and often through more concrete knowledge, one is capable of experiencing the feeling. In other words, one’s proximal knowledge is dependent on the distal knowledge. Miyazaki and Ueno (1985) maintain that their optical-world-first strategy works because of this characteristics of knowledge. The 〈perspectivized appearance〉 functions as distal knowledge, enabling the interpretation of proximal knowledge. More fundamentally, it may be said that human knowledge is mediated by way of distal but often concrete knowledge. The process of interpretation is mediated in that immediate and concrete experiences, although these experiences themselves are not emotions, evoke inner feelings associated with them. Interpretation of feelings is circular, or ricochet-like in that those feelings are recalled by way of something concrete, only to be interpreted in a specific place. In this sense, both Ichikawa’s 〈empathetic conformity〉 and Miyazaki and Ueno’s 〈perspectivized appearance〉/〈perspective of becoming〉 are dependent on the mechanism of tacit knowledge. In sum, the idea that we reach our own inner (and often personal) feelings through something concrete is not limited to Japanese academic discourse. And the interpretive theories incorporated into the Place of Negotiation theory are not necessarily particular to Japan. It should be noted in passing that as I discuss in Chapter 6, the rhetorical figure of futaku, the idea originating in Japanese poetics of waka, resonates with the mechanism of Polanyi’s tacit knowledge. At the same time, I must remind the reader of the culture-based nature of knowledge. Perspective-based understanding and empathy-based conformity incorporated into the Place of Negotiation theory are supported by sensus communis, and in turn, reinforce particular cultural sentiment as a part of the Japanese sensus communis.
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Between cognition and emotion
Now, for the comprehension of visual text, such as movies and television dramas, our visual focus plays a part. We often expect certain sequencing of events, primarily because our cultural knowledge endorses that certain events follow
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
certain others. This expectation often influences how we experience emotion. This is because we integrate cognition and emotion as we incorporate the knowledge of event sequences into psychological and emotional understanding. For comprehension of the visual text, neither Ichikawa’s 〈empathetic conformity〉 nor Miyazaki and Ueno’s 〈perspective of becoming〉 provide sufficient explanation. In addition to these concepts, Carroll’s (1997, 1998) concept of assimilation is necessary. Carroll (1997) launches his argument by criticizing the simulation theory of comprehension. According to Carroll, simulation theory is ‘‘the hypothesis that we predict, understand and interpret others by putting ourselves in their place, that is to say, by adopting their point of view.’’ Ichikawa’s as well as Miyazaki and Ueno’s positions fall under this label in that the participant/reader identifies with a character by going through a mental simulation of the partner’s/character’s situation. The participant/reader imagines the partner’s/character’s situation and then through this imagery he or she is better able to vicariously undergo the partner’s/character’s experience. Carroll (1997) claims that an alternative view is necessary. That is, we respond emotionally to fiction from the outside, as an observer of the situation and not, as simulation theory suggests, as a participant in the situation. For example, when a female character is about to be ambushed, we fear for her. But in this circumstance, we do not imagine ourselves to be her and then experience ‘‘her’’ fear. That is to say, we understand the character’s mental situation as outside observers as we assimilate our perception of the character’s mental state into our overall response, ‘‘as a sort of onlooker’’ (1997: 391). Thus he concludes that ‘‘(R)ather than centrally imagining that we are the character, we adopt the stance of an observer or an onlooker and form an overall emotional response to the situation in which the character finds herself ’’ (1997: 397). Based on this theory of assimilation, regarding interpretation of emotion, Carroll (1998) explains his position in the following way. As background, Carroll criticizes Plato’s view on (mass) art, particularly the view on how emotion functions. According to Carroll, Plato believed that the arts ‘‘undermine the rule of reason, both in the individual and, in consequence, in society’’ (1998: 250). Plato was concerned that drama in particular was inexorably bound to promote emotion over reason. But, Carroll argues, in contemporary psychology, it is more common to understand that reason and emotion are not opposed, and that reason is a constituent of emotion. Consider, Carroll suggests, that unless there is someone or something that you direct your emotion toward, one cannot be said to be in an emotional state. Emotional states are linked to certain sources; you are afraid of war. What links our internal feelings to external objects and events is our cognitive states. Thus, emotion and cognition are not separate, but they interact. In fact, emotional states cognitively organize our perception of the situation. Emotion organizes a situa-
Linguistic Emotivity
tion, in such a way that it foregrounds certain details ‘‘in a special phenomenological glow’’ (1998: 262). Carroll continues. Texts containing scenes that cause emotional reaction are ‘‘criterially prefocused’’ (1998: 264) and criterially prefocused texts give rise, in the right circumstances, to ‘‘emotive focus’’ (1998: 265) in the audience. Emotive focus refers ‘‘both to the way in which the emotional state of the reader, listener, or viewer fixes but also shapes her attention’’ (1998: 265). In Carroll’s (1997, 1998) view, our emotional involvement with the visual text comprises this criterially prefocused scene plus certain concerns or attitudes toward the focused situation. This suggests that narrative structure, especially the sequencing of events, can enlist a viewer about the way a story might develop. Audiences (who share common sociocultural background) show preferences about how a story should evolve. Emotions are aroused when the character follows (or does not follow) the course of the event in the way the audience follows. Carroll (1998) explains that, particularly in mass art, a technique called ‘‘point-of-view editing’’ is used to make use of the ‘‘emotive focus.’’ Point-of-view editing is a widely used technique of the cut in contemporary television. By appealing to common and often observed emotions, the point-of-view technique uses two images; (1) the point/glance shot, and (2) the point/object shot. The point/glance shot involves a character in the act of looking at something, often off screen, with emotional expression. The point/object shot then follows, showing the audience what the character sees. For example, a surprise look on the character’s face is followed by a blood-stained knife thrown on the floor. The juxtaposition of these two shots, through 〈emotive focus〉, arouses expected emotion in the audience. In the situation above, there is no need to describe the character’s emotion, say, by emotive words. Instead, the audience understands the sequencing of events (in the case of the knife and the surprise, a cause-effect relationship) through cognition- and emotion-based knowledge. Note that the simulation theory of text interpretation in its narrow sense is not sufficient to explain this phenomenon. The audience, as an onlooker, must figure out how to make sense of what is focused on by assimilating both information and emotion. From the perspective of the Place of Negotiation theory, then, three complementary approaches are necessary for the interpretation of 〈negotiative meaning〉; (1) sense-based 〈empathetic conformity〉, (2) shared perspectives motivated by the optical-world-first strategy (including 〈perspectivized appearance〉 and 〈perspective of becoming〉), and (3) 〈emotive focus〉. It should be reminded that all these interpretive processes remain under cultural influence. And how they come to operate concretely is dependent on sensus communis. Recall that sensus communis means multiple things; a means connecting body and mind, a bridge connecting thought and sense, or cognition
Locating and interpreting emotive meanings
and emotion, and a force organizing and integrating senses whose process requires a rational process. And above all, the sense-to-concept process is experienced not only by an individual, but also by a group of people. In this