Life – Energies, Forces and the Shaping of Life: Vital, Existential: Book 1 (Analecta Husserliana)

LIFE ENERGIES, FORCES AND THE SHAPING OF LIFE: VITAL, EXISTENTIAL BOOK I

A NA L E C TA H U S S E R L I A NA THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH VO L U M E L X X I V

Founder and Editor-in-Chief: A N NA - T E R E S A T Y M I E N I E C K A The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning Hanover, New Hampshire

For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

LIFE ENERGIES, FORCES AND THE SHAPING OF LIFE: VITAL, EXISTENTIAL BOOK I Edited by

A N NA - T E R E S A T Y M I E N I E C K A The World Phenomenology Institute

Published under the auspices of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning A.-T. Tymieniecka, President

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

ISBN 1-4020-0627-6

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

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/ The Theme: Inaugural Lecture: The Life-Force or the Shaping-of-Life?

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SECTION I / Force and Dynamism in Aristotle and Heidegger: Becoming What You Are…To Be H I ROTA K A TAT E M AT S U / Von der Sinnkrise und der Wichtigkeit der Bedeutung für das Menschliche Leben M A R L I E S K RO N E G G E R / Les passions de l’ame et l’ontopoiesie de la vie ⁄ AW PAW E L M I G O N / The Notion of “Humanity” in MIECZYS L Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s Anthropological Thought PAO L A G I AC O M O N I / Georg Simmel Between Goethe and Kant on “Life” and “Force” C AT R I O NA H A N L E Y

3 19 27 41 51

SECTION II / Paleoanthropology from a Phenomenological Point of View. Some Remarks About the Genetic Structures of Human Life J OA N NA S´L Ó S A R S K A / The Function of Autotopoi in the Modification of a Subject’s Activity A RT U RO M A R C H E S I N / The Irreversibility of Natural Processes and the Meaning of the Second Principle of Thermodynamics S U S A N N E L I J M BAC H / The Natural-Scientific and Phenomenological Approaches to Animals DA N I E L ROT H BA RT / On the Dynamical Unity of Instrument and Substance BÉNÉDICTE de VILLERS

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71 83 95 101 117

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SECTION III F R A N C E S C O TOTA RO

/ Life, Power and Measure in Nietzsche’s

Work

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/ Three Models of the Human Dynamic Towards Integrity: Eliade, Jung, Wilber Z O F I A M A J E W S K A / The Dispute between Shestov and Husserl as a Reflection of Approaches to Axiology M I NA S E H D E V / Mass-Media Communication as a Possible Creative Source of New Shapes of Life ⁄ O M A R I A Z OW I S L

145 159 181

SECTION IV / Does Time Move? Dogen and the Art of Understanding the Moment W I L L I A M S . H A N E Y I I / Reductive and Nonreductive Theories of the Self: The Phenomenology of Performance KO I C H I RO M AT S U N O / Evolving Life: Constant Turnover from Inconsistencies to Intensities JA M E S D . S E L L M A N N / A Phenomenology of Proper Timing in Ancient China J I M I . U NA H / African Theory of Forces and the Extended Family Relations: A Deconstruction DW I G H T H O L B RO O K

193 201 215 233 265

SECTION V / Giving Form to Life According to Max Scheler: Part I: Processes of Functionalization and of Work; Part II: Human Perception as a Cooperation of Vital and Spiritual Forces BA R BA R A M A RO S Z Y N´ S K A - J E Z·OW S K A / Worries of a Human Person at the Turn of the Century in the Light of the History of Medicine RO M A NA M A RTO R E L L I V I C O / “Virtutes et Potentiae”: The Medical–Biological Tradition in the Formation of the Philosophical Anthropology of the Thirteenth Century A N NA A L I C H N I E W I C Z / Philosophical Thanatology as a Foundation of Contemporary Medical Ars Moriendi L E S Z E K P Y R A / Nature as the Source of Life DA N I E L A V E R D U C C I

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307 319 329

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SECTION VI / Zur Bedeutung des “Blickes” und des “Antlitzes” bei Georg Simmel und Emmanuel Levinas J . J . V E N T E R / Human Dignity in Weakness –– Gabriel Marcel’s Conception of Human Dignity I R E N E A N G E L A B I A N C H I / From the “Ego” to the “World” for a Community Ethic ANSELM MODEL

339 351 373

APPENDIX

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This volume gathers the first part of the program which was presented by the World Phenomenology Institute at its Third International Congress of Phenomenology/Philosophy and the Sciences of Life, which was held at the Collegium Medicum of the Jagiellonian University, of Krakow, Poland, on September 13–16, 1999. The theme of the congress was: “Forces, Dynamisms, and the Shaping of Life: Vital, Existential, Creative.” It continued our exploration of Phenomenology and the Sciences of Life. We owe our sincere gratitude to Professor Dr. Hab. Aleksander Koj, Rector Magnificus emeritus of the Jagiellonian University for his gracious support of this venture when it was first proposed and to Professor Dr. Hab. Franciszek Ziejka, Rector Magnificus of the Jagiellonian University for his support and hospitality at the time of its realization. To Dean Wl⁄ odzimierz Rydzewski of the Jagiellonian University we likewise owe a debt of gratitude. For the World Phenomenology Institute and myself, its president, the presence at the opening of the congress of the Honorable David Fried, American Ambassador to Poland, together with Mark Toner, American Consul General in Krakow, and their suite, was a special privilege. The faculty, staff, and students of the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University, under the direction of Dr. Justyna Miklaszew offered us substantial help in organizing this magnificent event. In particular we are grateful to colleagues Tadeusz Czarnik, Piotr Mróz, Joanna Handerek from this Institute, but also to Leszek Pyra and Ignacy Fiut from other departments of the University, who together with our valued collaborator Robert Wise, Jr. have carried out the day-to-day progress of the event. Thanks to Zbigniew Zalewski who has obtained for the congress the incomparable setting of the Collegium Medicum for lectures and opening of the congress! We owe them all and each in a particular way warmest thanks for the outstanding success of this event. It should not be forgotten the behind-thescenes painstaking and dedicated efforts of Jeffrey Hurlburt, who on the premises of the Institute in Belmont, Massachusetts, took in hand and orchestrated all the moves of this philosophical play to be performed upon the stage of the Jagiellonian University in the far-off land of Poland.

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To him and to Rosemary Lunardini and Robert Wise, Jr. for their care in editing the presented papers for publication, I owe my heartiest personal thanks. The authors/speakers who flocked to Krakow from all around the world merit a special ovation. A-T.T.

Opening reception; from right to left: our hosts Dr. Hab. Aleksander Koj, Rector Magnificus of the Jagiellonian University, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, . . ., Leszek Pyra, Piotr Mróz, Zbigniew Zalewski, Joanna Handerak, Robert Wise, Eldon Wait, Hirotaka Tatematsu, . . .

The group of the conference participants: First row from left to right: C. Kozma, Agnieszka Nogal, Zofia Majewska, B. Feltz, M. Gol⁄aszewska, A-T. Tymieniecka, Jerzy Swiecimski, Ponti Venter, Jiro Watanabe, W. Haney II. Paola Giacomoni. Second row from left to right: R. Wise, M. Migon, Gerald Nyenhuis, Leszek Pyra, Eldon Wait, Kim Rogers. At the balcony from right to left: T. Czarnik, Marlies Kronegger, Ewa Podvez, Piotr Mróz. At the back: Dariusz Barbaszynski, Zbigniew Zalewski, Bronisl⁄aw Bombala

The “Sukiennice” old Cloth Market in the Old City of Krakow

A N NA - T E R E S A T Y M I E N I E C K A

T H E T H E M E : I NAU G U R A L L E C T U R E : T H E L I F E - F O R C E OR THE SHAPING-OF-LIFE?

Although we apprehend and predicate the status of life by the relatively static form it takes, it is in the energies and play of forces that it takes its shape in the flux of becoming. The great question underlying our inquiry, one which will acquire proper formulation in its course, is that of what are the roles and status of form and force in life’s constructive flux. Are they essentially distinct? Are they separable? Are shape and existential progress two different functions of life? I N T RO D U C T I O N

1. I am raising the issue of the dynamic equipment of life after considerable preparation. In my study of the ontopoietic unfurling of self-individualizing life, preparatory to addressing this question, the emphasis has fallen on the becoming flux of the individualizing beingness-in-progress. I have been concerned with pinpointing and substantiating the initiation and self-direction of this individual course. Decisively, the nature of this course has been envisaged principally in terms of its formative, constructive progress, which implies forces and energies at work: it implies a self-prompting, that is, inner, dynamism. Still, it has been the constructive continuity of life that I have focused on. I am proposing now to envisage the self-individualizing course of each living beingness in the perspective of the dynamisms, energies, and forces intrinsic to it and of those that are intergenerated in the course of its ontopoietic insertion in the life process as well. We, in fact, here stand before an enigmatic state of affairs. The question proposes itself. Form and force appear prima facie to be factors of life most intimately enmeshed with each other. Can we disentangle their respective roles, or are they irremediably fluid? Where does the inquiry into the formal delineation of the deployment of life stop and the inquiry into the force carrying this deployment begin? 2. Since the nature of life consists of a constructive becoming that is constitutive of an individual beingness, that is, its telos, which is caught, as it were, in its ever advancing course, we fasten our attention on the relatively xv A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, xv–xxxiv. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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“stable” — stationary — moments or intervals that manifest strikingly the steps of the constructive accomplishment. To find our bearings within the flux of becoming, which cannot be arrested, we seek to mark the loops of its constructive connectedness, continuity, as it appears to us within our experience; that is, we focus first and foremost on the manifestation of life’s constructive achievements, its objectified, structured facade. However, already at the level of life’s praxis, when the human individual attempts to insert himself into the network of life’s unfolding, he encounters innumerable forces to struggle with or to employ to his/her advantage; energies that lie in wait, to be tapped, dynamisms bursting forth from under the seeming routine of established phenomena. We see, then, that to understand life it is indispensable to envisage it from two perspectives: one may take in its surface phenomenal manifestation in a formal, structural, constitutive fashion, or one may peer into the depths of the energies, forces, dynamisms that carry it relentlessly onward. However, is there along the stream of the constructive becoming a point to be fixed that we may designate the proper one from which to begin our investigation? At such a point the stream of becoming would yield us a cross section revelation, as it were, of all these dynamic arteries of life. But is there a point at which each of a living being’s specific forces and energies encounters the constructive project of individualization and acquires its significant role in it, and thus proceeds from being a neutral available potential to being an engine of life’s progress? This question has to be answered in the negative. At each possible cross section within the constructive stream of the individualization of life, the observable forces and energies that carry it are already significantly engaged in constructive projects of manifestation and we could do no more than describe the status quo of that engagement. A status quo is already there in the course of life’s transformative changes and, what is more, its modalities are already shaped by the constructive projects into which they flow, acquiring specific significance. The modalities of their engagement, being equally in progress, do not stand on their own so as to supply explanation of either the nature of the forces that they are representing or of the ways in which they promote the given constructivity of life. This situation is not propitious for seeking the nature and role of the forces within the project of becoming that delineates itself in life’s continuous transformations. Thus, there comes to light a striking fact: the constructive unfolding and the forces, energies, dynamisms that promote life are not only already inextricably conjoined but, one ventures to surmise, they are also, first, in some mysterious ways “congenital” and, second, each of them implies in some way or other the others, and, third, we cannot discover

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even the existence of these forces apart from their manifestation in reality as producing or exercising some or other effect. Conversely, without considering some assumed forces, dynamisms, or energies concurrent to the deployment of the course of constructive unfolding of reality, this unfolding would, first of all, lack innumerable passages from one segment to another — the constructive discrete continuity would be disrupted — and, secondly, we could analytically-descriptively obtain merely an abstract blueprint of a possible developmental course, one empty of its living substance, its vibrant juices, just a specter of reality’s pulsating existence. It is thus in their distinction with respect to our human intellective (transcendental) approach to the real in which there occurs the objectifying differentiation between the manifest, “visible,” tangible forms and the invisible forces carrying them that we may investigate their factual or apparent distinctness and their amalgamated roles in the establishment of reality, thus reaching the sources as such. It is, then, to the incipient phase of this reality that we have to turn our attention, that is, to the origination of life, where they initially come together in their primal nature. Let me now introduce further inquiry with a summary of my previous studies into the ontopoietic groundwork of life’s manifestation. These studies have already isolated the landscape of its origination. The question of life’s origination in my perspective focuses in fact on three generative matrixes of life. First, comes the generative matrix that I have called the “womb of life.” In the analysis of the generative “incubation” moments (proto-moments) that spring forth and project themselves as the womb of life, we encounter already the main lines of the projected unfolding along which the dynamic “material” in proto-primogenital nature is channeled. Then, in the embodiment and landscaping phase of that progress, we discover the intermediary stage of vitally significant dynamisms that are oriented toward the building of the further means, factors, “organs,” and vital bridges between and among the constructive devices of the originating beingness and its circumambient forces: the constitution of an autonomous beingness amounts to its simultaneously inserting itself into the life network. Organs, as factors of the constructive advance of a self-individualizing beingness, process the forces and energies that they gather while generating new, purposefully oriented energies and deploying forces that insert the self-individualizing entity into the circumambient networks of life. With bodily expansion into the landscape of life, the individualizing beingness acquires a novel platform of vital energies and forces in a new generative matrix, which I have called the matrix of sharing-in-life.

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Thirdly, the establishing of a functional system of organs follows an overall design in which a major intensification of life energies occurs, by which is formed a firmly “substantiated” distributing station of life: its embodiment. At this point we witness already the emergence of an overall “synthesizing” interconnectedness of all the life-involved forces. This interconnectedness is grounded in the primal reactivity/sensibility adumbrated by innumerable purposively orientated functions. This opens a double orientation: the “objective” state of functional procedures and their effect on the “subjective” life interests of the developing individual. This network evolves around a central overseeing and mastering agency that I have called the “living agent.” In other words, we witness the emergence of the prototype of the transcendental subject.

PA RT I 1 . T H E L O G O I C I M P E T U S : F O R C E QUA L I F I E D

a. The Surging of the Ontopoietically Relevant Groundwork On the “other side” of the directly inspectable ontopoietic unfolding of life, it all seems to start by an outburst of force. Yet this is not a neutral, unqualified, brute “physical” force; on the contrary, this primogenital, seemingly preontopoietic force is already endowed with two qualifications that relate it to reactivity (Reizbarkeit) as such, to use the classical term adopted by Brown and used by Schelling in a slightly different context, to sensitivity. It appears, however, to carry with itself from the first a germinal endowment, a set of virtualities to be released in productive deployment. These thus qualified energies and forces constitute a transitional level of prelife, but life-oriented emergence, which on encountering favorable conditions and other energies with germinal logoic elements (moments), enters into an absolutely basic constructive traffic tending toward the formation of “substantial” (hyletic) stuff, the groundwork for entry into the second self-individualizing phase. Indeed, these energies are transmuted in their traffic with other relevant germinal logoic forces into the substantial, which is, however, still undifferentiated and only virtually available. This logoic sphere offers the groundwork for the individualizing origination of differentiated beingness. (Stem cell theory seems to correspond to this insight: the differentiation of the constructive lines of the logos calls for a preparatory stage of a “substantial” [hyletic] nature, while individualizing, that is, the

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constructive origin of life, emerges out of a preparatory “material” phase.) With this we are already at the phase of the origination of life proper, which phase I have called the womb of life. Let us immediately observe a fascinating situation within the various phases of life’s origin: although each phase accomplishes a distinct task, and seems to be self-enclosed, the progress of life runs as a single line through all of them; each is in its very essence not only geared to, but throws feelers out to the incoming phase that continues it. Without this continuation, life would be extinguished. At this pre-initial transitory phase grounding the originary event of the entry of the ontopoietic logos on the scene, we may distinguish, but only abstractly (transcendentally), between the energies that spring forth and their virtual reactivity to the connective logoi to be met. We distinguish also the sensitivities in response to which they may be selectively activated, and last, but not least, the germinal virtualities that allow for transformation and intergeneration. These three virtualities that in-form the initial prelife energies appear indispensable and congenital; none may tend toward the activation of an energy without the other two. It seems impossible to disassociate the energetic release of generative forces from their crystallization and from the intergenerative reactivity geared to particular aspects of encountered conditions, as well as the distinctive germinal content. These appear to pass into one another undissociably. b. Life-Informed Energies and Forces versus Blind Physical Dynamics and Forces We may now deepen the previously developed perspective by examining the radical distinction to be made between life-informed forces and the blind forces of the nonorganic, physical realm. Brute force, such as the force of a falling stone, the attractive force of a magnet, etc., is also exerted out of the inward composition of a body but only in a way that is restricted with respect to particular external factors and having no intrinsic direction or constructive telos within. Here inward composition remains inert and passive, whereas the prelife energies oriented to life are virtual, that is, ready and “lying-in-wait” for release in a form appropriately matched to an orienting environment. On this ontopoietically preparatory ground, we may already distinguish clearly brute forces, energies, and dynamisms of a simply physical nature — that is, those that as they are usually defined perform a “task” when some

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already constituted substances come in contact with them and release an appropriate force that then surges as if automatically, without direction, just proceeding toward a specifically intended aim — and those life energies, dynamisms, and forces that constitute the essential stuff of the ontopoietic life-unfolding, being its essential motor and carrier. The ontopoietic life dynamisms and energies carry with themselves distinct aims-directions; they stem either from the life-oriented logoic material — or even give it life-orientation; they carry selective operational directives and actualize them in their accomplishment. The energies and dynamisms of life promote life’s unfolding progress, and their weakening leads to its regress. The forces that they release carry life’s development. Purely physical dynamisms and energies have here only an auxiliary nature and role, as the dynamisms and forces of life assume the primary function with respect to the becoming of beingness as such. At this point, let us emphasize that the primogenital forces that initiate life’s conditions, like their offspring as well as successors at further phases of life’s deployment, carry within them virtualities primed for diversification. These are indispensable for bringing the intrinsic endowment of reactivity to fruition while entering into transformatory exchange — selectively and not at random — with the available logoi. If we compare the two types of virtualities, one oriented toward diversification, and the other toward the constructivism of life, it appears that this diversification from the moment which carries the others differs only in degree, as specified by the relevant moments that guide the transformatory fusing into a selective range of operations. Both are basically informed by moments relevant to life’s ontopoietic unfolding.

PA RT I I T H E WO M B O F L I F E : T H E F I R S T G E N E R AT I V E M AT R I X 1 . T H E S E N S I T I V E O P E R AT I O NA L F O R C E S I N T H E WO M B O F L I F E

What I call the “womb of life” is the great game of the life-informed forces that come together in their substantialized virtualities in the constructive project of ontopoietic self-individualization. At this phase of encounter, reception, transformation, and constitutive/constructive delineation, the living beingness releases dormant energies, as well as brings about new ones. We may conjecture that life begins with a “first stirring.” The first stirring, a gathering of forces on the substantialized plateau, brings with itself its very

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own impetus, its very own reservoir of dynamism, energies, and forces with which to diversify and synthesize the pregiven with its own transformative virtualities, within a network of life design. The great synthesis of dynamisms within the prelife and organically substantialized forces released by the first stirring with the impetus of life’s incipient moment in the transformatory/ generative contact projects an avenue of mutually involved functions and operations. Thus the gate is opened to constructive life becoming. The release of the prelife, life-oriented forceful logos, one transformed with the cooperation of relevant subsidiary logoi into the sphere of the substantial (stuff, “material”) phase calls for the next stage of constructive diversification. The substantialized logoi (having a modicum of individuality) constitute the differentiating ground for the individualization of living beingness. They muster the forces of universal “nature,” which are already informed by a directional life-relevant malleability. But this directional maleability already throws out feelers toward the essential phase of life’s origination, namely, that in which the logoic constructive progress emerges by means of self-individualized beingness. At this primogenital stage of the womb of life, life’s energies are ready for entering with full force into the ontopoietic building apparatus, onto the selfindividualizing course of living beingness. This entrance into the game of life is pretraced by virtual intergeneration. Now, we pass to the greatest strategic struggle of force in the main phase of life, that which occurs with the entry upon the scene of the great constructive network of the ontopoietic design. This encounter of the prelife differentiating force with its directional ontopoietic shaping outline carries with its impetus its own powerful dynamisms. At the same time, it draws in a constructive way the available energies and forces relevant to its projects. This fateful encounter occurs within the central phase of the origin of life. 2 . T H E E N E R G I E S O F T H E O N TO P O I E T I C I N D I V I D UA L I Z I N G D E S I G N . T H E G R E AT P L AY O F F O R C E S I N T H E U P S U R G E O F T H E S P E C I F I C A L LY O N TO P O I E T I C DY NA M I S M S A N D E N E R G I E S

As stated before, the ontopoietic design for the individualization of beingness enters the scene with its own reservoir of dynamisms, energies, and constructive devices for their implementation in the becoming of the living individual. On its impetus the womb of life turns into a battlefield of competing forces that measure their strength in virtual adaptability to enter

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into the great game crystallizing the ontopoietic devices for beingness. The womb of life is drawn into the phase of life’s individualization. The first stirring of life means, in fact, the entry on the scene of the selforienting powerful dynamisms of the constructive project and design of the self-individualization of living beings. This is the design of constructively informed forces. They will gather, distribute, discriminate, conjoin, bring into intergeneration the available stuff/forces to accomplish a purpose. a. The New Station of Energy in the Embodiment of Life 1. Distantiation It is only in virtue of their virtualities, a new reactivity and selective sensibilities, that the logoic forces may be released in such a way that the individualizing processes may be articulated following the intrinsic demands of the ontopoietic pattern, while observing the limitations imposed by the circumambient conditions that require adaptations, changes of route, transformations of formal aspect, etc. All these occur, however, within the framework of an overall constructive progress. The conjoined efforts of these two sources of energy aim at reinforcing the initial energies by their deployment toward intergeneration. These, however they proceed, establish a new station of energy in their embodiment. It is striking indeed that in the crucial phase of life’s unfolding, in which the constructive progress crosses the threshold of diversification, the constructive unfolding of the living beingness has to acquire an embodiment for its very progress. We may conjecture that it is already at this phase of initiating the life process with a temporal matchup of synergies — with its reservoir of substance being appropriately informed by the logoic impetus — the first, elementary steps of the synergetic process are already oriented toward embodiment in its very performance. Embodying appears, in fact, to be postulated by the nature of ontopoietic becoming. In point of fact, the processes through which the synergetic input of the formative ontopoietic logoi joins the groundwork of substance in the womb of life brings about a uniquely qualitative moment of cross sectioning: a fully substantial distantiation, spatial and temporal. It is the nature of a process to proceed from one constitutive state to another by a “move” that “extends” the “previous” state in the step to the “next” state. Each move simultaneously throws out a “linking” hook to the next move, projecting an “order” of the “spaces” each occupies in relation to the others. Thus, it is the nature of the process that its

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moves expand a spatial ordering that extends to to the “prior,” “successive,” or “concurrent” steps of “temporalization.” Already with the first, incipient move down the ontopoietic route, distantiating is the essential mode of proceeding; it projects the intrinsic regulative axis of spatialization and temporalization of the ontopoietic origination of the becoming of a living being. Distantiation is intrinsic to the entire project as the crucial device of life: the spatio-temporal axis of the selfindividualization of beingness as, first of all, spatial distantiation, constitutes the essential conditions for constructivity — for the unfurling of constructive moves. Spatial distantiation is the condition of becoming as such, the condition for the manifestation of reality as a domain of beingness, of the world, and of the universal sphere of the mind. Temporal distantiation accounts for the successive or simultaneous/concurrent deployment and constructive ordering of the intergenerative forces and processes. In this ordering it is the basis for the purposive and then telic orientation of their unfurling. It is also the basis for the network of sharing-in-life, a new matrix to which we will return. Lastly, but foremost, as we have seen above, spatialization and temporalization are fundamental distributors of all generative forces in their deployment. It is around a spacing-temporalizing axis that the embodiment of life takes place. Embodiment assumes the role of the establishment of the manifestation of reality, its surging from and accompanies the subterranean travail in a “progress” and “expansion.” From the process of distantiation’s initial phase in life’s incipient preparatory sphere, an embodying space is projected, always with reference to the basic diversifying/ontopoietic informing and to the processes such as occur in distantiation. Simultaneously the ontopoietic sequence on entering into play galvanizes innumerable virtual energies and dynamisms relative to the entire constructive network that then enters into the game, in order to bring out into “the open,” into the “light,” the manifestation of the real.

2. The functional organ as a new source of dynamics as well as a synthesis of prior dynamics As pointed out in the Introduction, dynamism and energy mean an intrinsic reservoir of power that comes to the fore only when it converts itself into a force that — and here comes a separation between inert nature and lifesensitized nature — either performs a set “task” or aims intrinsically at a con-

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structive endeavor. At this point let us emphasize that with the emergence of a constructive ontopoietic performance, the vital/poietic forces of the logos of life aim at preparing the channels and frames for the unfurling of the consecutive stages of the ontopoietic constructive process. The crucial task for the logos here is the building of factors/means/organs that can conduct the dynamic series of operations that the performance of the constructive task requires. This is something indeed beyond basic “sensitivity.” It is logoic attunement to the available factors (light, temperature, moisture, etc.). This attunement guides the proper selection of elements and the constructive transformation of logoic energies. From the ontopoietic source there are released the logoic forces that are ordained simultaneously to a specific operation-task at hand, and that, over and above that, are interconnected within the overall functional plan of life for the self-individualizing beingness: the blueprint fits to the circumambient conditions and necessary factors available a virtual sequence to be unfurled in a concrete self-individualizing progress. b. The Constitution of Functional Organs as Stations for Processing as well as Originating New Energies Here we encounter a new strategy of the logos of life in its individualizing project: the building of functional entities that either undertake complete, autonomous building tasks, e.g., organs such as the stomach, the digestive tract, the liver, etc., or serve to channel the life dynamisms (e.g., the circulatory system) and maintain the entire network of life forces in active, balanced condition (the heart). The remarkable aspect of these functional organs of life’s progress is that they become sources of new energies; they generate their own dynamisms and forces, they carry on their own activity as well as sustain each other in harmonious cooperation. These new dynamisms and energies are, of course, partaking of the basic organically significant logoi that constitute the bulwark of the enterprise, but they acquire a special status of vital significance: they are the bearers of life actualizing itself. The dynamisms and energies that they bring about belong to the overall logoic life strategy, are informed by constructive directions and indications of their functional place within the entire system. It is the ontopoietic design that now leads the game; it draws on the prompting forces to fashion a capital individualizing device: the constructing of functional agents that with their constructive directions are essential parts of the embodied individual. In short, the ontopoietic role of the logos of life is

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here played out to the full, but it is in its next strategic move that it reaches its constitutive peak. This strategy brings together all the dynamisms thus far at work into a versatile self-processing individual with mastery. The logos’ very own energies draw on the differentiation of logoic sensibilities that accompany the gradual emergence of functional complexes that we call “bodily organs,” reaching completion in the full manifestation of the living individual. The process proceeds from the “inner,” hidden regions of the poietic travail into the “outer” world of manifested life. These primal sensibilities become adumbrated in further developed embodying organs that assume an “inward”/“outward” orientation comparable to that of the individualizing functioning of the living being itself, in which the physiological processing of externally obtained energies differentiates among them for either appropriate employment for “inward” purposes or “outward rejection.” Among the entire network of forces at work in the concrete implementation of life’s ontopoietic design there stands out the phase of laying down the groundwork for interaction, interchange, and mutual resonance, at which phase are distributed the constructive roles in the grand project of life’s individualizing vehicle. A groundwork upon which to build the overall controlling living agent is of capital significance in the dynamic-energetic traffic of life. As mentioned above, the singularized functional complexes (or organs) generate a reservoir of energies by their actual performance of their tasks. But their very performance endows them with newly generated intrinsic dynamisms and energies that, on the one side, are employed in that performance and, on the other side, constitute together a pool of living dynamism by which to carry the entire project of life onwards. As such they bring about their own significance, which is now relative to this singular project of life. To distinguish this significance from the “organic” pre-individualization significance that life had in its first womb, we will call it life’s “vital” significance. Just how crucial is the role of these specific energies and forces bound primordially to the advanced constructive phase of the ontopoietic progress of living beingness we will see in the new sphere of life’s becoming that then arises and which forms the culminating phase of the living being as agent. Life’s vital significance is traced already by the devices that are released by its first stirring to be deployed in forceful enactment. Its flexible and adjusting virtualities are carried by their ontopoietic sequential, essential “feelings” for entering into cooperative discourse, first, on the plane of substances available to the logos within the womb of life and, second, in

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vitally significant exchanges that the substantial logoi (the building “materials”) make in the implementation of its constructive projects. But these virtualities attain a distinct significance at the stage of the building of functional agencies. It is not only that the most elementary functions call for the building of instruments for the reception and absorption of the available primogenital factors (e.g., light, sound, energy) and for sensory receptivity to heat and cold, texture, scent, etc., but that at a more complex level the very nature of functional, freestanding, vitality requires significant apparatus for the digestion of substances as sustenance for maintenance and development, for the absorption of useful material and the elimination of what goes unused. As a matter of fact, I have brought out already in my cosmological conception of self-individualization, that there is running through the center of the individualizing play of forces a schema of inward/outward directedness that sustains the exchange of energies operated by the self-individualizing beingness and that this exchange system running through all the constitutive spheres of self-individualization is again a source of renewing, constantly replenishing the needed energies and dynamisms. Could we not say that life proceeds in tandem with intrinsic prompting and invigorating entelechial energies, on the one hand, and the operative functional generation of force, on the other?

PA RT I I I T H E E N E R G I E S A N D F O R C E S O F T H E G E N E R AT I V E M AT R I X O F “ S H A R I N G - I N - L I F E .” 1 . T H E “ L I V I N G AG E N T ” A S A N OV E R A L L C O O R D I NATO R O F T H E P L AY O F F O R C E S

As I have been pointing out throughout, already at the sphere of the differentiation of vitally significant functions in the process of embodiment, the entelechial principle of the ontopoietic sequence — a sequence that embraces the virtual constructive unfolding — introduces an ontopoietic network of coherence between the functions through their mutually conjoined roles in the coordinated network. This network coordinates all the operative functions in their cooperation within the overall, flexible project. Let us emphasize that the ontopoietic sequence is essentially a reservoir of energies collected along a directional/constructive path. Its role is in the main to supply basic

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directional forces. Their deployment accomplishes the ordinary operation of the living being itself, secures provisional measures to be taken in case of malfunctioning and maladjustment, and postulates a synthesizing overview of the entire exchange of energies, completing the intergenerative schema. Yet in this exchange schema, there is a particular synthesizing functioning factor — the living agent that emerges at the plateau of higher complexity to which we have just alluded: an integrating and all-embracing network culminating in a central functional agency. This latter emerges and plays its part in response to the gradually unfolding complexity of individualizing beingness. To simplify, it can be said that the living agent originates in the ever onward flow of energies and participates in the play of their constructive poietic forces, first coordinating them as if residing in their progress. Second, it responds to their need for multilateral coordination in this individualizing course. Positioned between the project of the ontopoietic sequence and its complete crystallization in the life process, the living agent gathers a “record” of the entire run of forces. It pays vigilant attention to its progressive steps, and that is what is most significant. The embodying energies that proceed from and pass through each constructive segment amalgamate, expanding in new sensibilities relative to the steps of the constructive progress as they unfold in reactive and purposive differentiations. These new modes of sensibility express the progress of the steps performed in the processes insofar as they achieve their ontopoietic purpose (we see here a distantiation that is alogical to that of the timing and spacing noted above). These sensibilities split, acquiring a double orientation, being “outward” oriented when expressing the purposiveness of the progress itself being accomplished. Thus, next to the original functional reactivity/sensibility, there surges an “outward” sensibility and an “inwardly” directed sensibility of the purposes achieved or foiled, with an inward record being made of functional accomplishment and progress. The coordinating role of the living agent expands in its functioning. We have to distinguish at the outset the primal dynamisms and forces proceeding from the sphere of vital functioning, the “sensibilities” already present in this sphere to light, heat, organic exchange, etc., and the sensibility sensu stricto that so to speak opens the organically functioning beingness-inprogress to the constitutive manifestation of the functioning network in reflective reaction, “image,” and unfolding. These new sensitivities add to the germinal sphere of the constructive phase of individualizing beingness and the organic and vital dynamisms and forces in the sphere of life-constitutive

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deployment. This development transcends the organic and vital. It is a subjacent, subterranean work of nature — a heretofore hidden dimension of nature now become overt, and resplendent. Here in the full light is the manifestation of life’s accomplishment: the individualizing being comes to the center as life’s agent or its “subject,” projecting in overt “acts” of a very special nature, namely, acts that philosophy and phenomenology in particular call “intentional,” that is, acts that place their “objective” at a distance from the act. The agent itself becomes a secondary source of the dynamisms and forces of life, which allows mutual communication among the members of a pack or flock and cooperation in seeking food, shelter, and defense against predators. This inner dimension of sensibility, which works in tandem with the outer, sensory dimension, is a prototype of what with a further development of living beingness we call the “psyche” or the “soul.” It proceeds from a gradual advance in registering purposive needs and their fulfillment, expanding the range of sensibility in pain and pleasure, hunger and satisfaction, drives, appetites, fears, anxieties, all aiming at the unfolding life’s sustenance and advance. Grounded in physiological organic operations, the living agent that emerges thus equipped not only registers but is also capable of surveying concrete progress. Registering all the sensibilities awakened in this progress, reacting to their vital emergencies and needs, the living agent functions also in a “mastering” capacity. 2 . T H E AG E N T A S T H E “ S E L F ”

The distantiation between a feeling and its objective in the agent constitutes for the living agent an “inward space” as his own “inner self” in which he situates himself while considering the entire living progress. This space between the vital move (an “act”) as felt and its “content,” which is like a “reflection” of its concern, gives that content an “objective” character. This inward space has its own status within the functioning of the agent, that is, it cannot be changed at the will of the agent, its inward singularity being shared with the rest of living beings at this stage of their typical unfolding. Here two intimately related points have to be brought out. First, this “window” and inward “spectator” within the functional system of the living agent brings with itself two types of novel dynamisms and forces. First, comes the directly surging special ontopoietic dynamism — which phenomenology denominates “transcendental.” Like a “stream” — to use Husserl’s expression of the “stream of consciousness” — this dynamism

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prompts and maintains the unfolding of this functional modality that transcends the hidden working of nature and “translates” it in a reflective “objectified” manifestation. That is to say, there first comes the surging of an entire stream of “acts” prompted from within by the ontopoietic transcendental dynamisms. Indeed, the “transcendental” act is in itself a novum within the functional system. It is not consumed in its allegiance to the objective of the task it performs within the course of constructive functioning. On the contrary, it is granted a measure of flexible motility dependent on the complexity unfolded by the living agent. Its dynamism is adapted to this level and its confines. So is the hence ensuing communicative skill in sharing-inlife among other living beings. But, secondly, this “inward space” also entails a knot with an inward “timing” of acts, is in fact punctuated by their emergence and passing, as has often been emphasized, and is, as mentioned before, limited as to the extent and variety of its acts by the modality of its type of beingness. The narrow range for acting in which only moments relevant to vital needs are registered — in the simplest forms of living being — is gradually stretched to the unique sphere of life that surges with the most developed type of living beings when there enters on the scene the play of powerful dynamisms and there radiates constructive forces of creativity, what I have termed the “Human Condition.” I have here in mind the overall dynamic interconnectedness of functional roles — the distribution of the innumerable tasks that are being performed; the operative control of the entire schema in its various interdependencies; the flexibility in the mutual adjustments of the dynamic performances — all these being indispensable for a uniform run of individualizing progress. All these roles call for an operative factor attuned to the entire dynamic apparatus as much in its active course as much as in its respective constructive-operative tasks. Such a functional organ we find within the living individual as life’s agent, who, though grounded in the network of operations of the organic sphere, expands through the operations having vital significance, encompassing the entire framework of embodied beingness and rising above it. 3 . T H E L I V I N G AG E N T E X E R C I S I N G M A S T E RY OV E R T H E P RO G R E S S O F T H E S E L F - I N D I V I D UA L I Z I N G P RO C E S S

The living agent that maintains vigilant control over the entire plan of life’s individualizing functioning is, on the one hand, grounded in the

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embodying processes, working through them, and yet, on the other, it distills its own forces in a special reservoir of energies and surges, as it were, above them. In point of fact, in integrating the network of the forces of becoming, the living agent acquires its vital significance in the power of a dynamism flowing from all the integrative moments into the enactment of “mastery” over the entire functional network of individualized life. This mastery stemming from the confluence of organic/vital progress constitutes a unique device of the logos of life as its ontopoietic sequence is implemented and generates for its employment its very own dynamism: self-mastery, a vitally most significant factor of individualized life. Under its aegis there emerges concomitantly the life-promoting sphere we have been preparing to introduce: sharing-in-life among singular individuals. More will be said about this later. It is in virtue of its function of overseeing, recording, and controlling within the unfolding individualizing ontopoietic design of originating beingness, that the living agent accomplishes and guarantees the autonomy of living beingness and actualizes its ontopoietic project of living individuality. This autonomy is not an abstract, ontological, structural phenomenon, but the fruit of the constructive play of living forces that was prepared already in the transitional, primogenital sphere (prelife) and in the ontopoietically informed womb of life. Not only does the living being project, conduct, and enact his individual status within the grand web of life by exerting his own energies and forces, but he establishes and maintains his own center of energies within it as his own self. Let us conclude our consideration of this last phase of the self-individualizing of beingness through progressive embodying by observing that here life’s spacing and timing and distantiating, being manifest in a “substantial” form, resists sensory contact, assuming an “opaque” “appearance.” Thus the living beingness is endowed with a “place” and “frame” on the universal spatio/temporal axis for its life-enactment, a ground for interaction; this resilient selfhood reveals itself in its originary ontopoietic sphere of becoming — hidden from “sight” but sustaining and carrying its progress in becoming with extraordinary ontopoietic transparency. In the play of its germinal, directive, and prompting energies and forces in their fluidity as they work with dependecies and fluctuating conditions, even though embodied, the self-individualizing agent comes into its own as a vehicle of the primeval light.

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4 . T H E C I R C U M A M B I E N T N E T WO R K O F L I F E - E N E R G I E S A N D T H E O R I G I NA RY M AT R I X O F S H A R I N G - I N - L I F E

At this point of our all too schematic inquiry we have brought to the fore all the major sources, constructive arteries and knots of forces, reservoirs of energy in their roles as they actualize the ontopoietic design of self-individualizing beingness. We have now all in place to approach them conjointly and systematize them in the second originary matrix of life. Its full expansion would be the “transcendental matrix,” in which the living agent is informed by the creative virtualities that we have in mind. We will discuss this in the second part of our study. Here, however, our focus will be that matrix’s prototype, which runs through the entire span of life’s evolutive progress from the smallest degree of complexity to the highest in gradual specifications and while constituting the primogenital condition of the individualization of beingness as such: the matrix of sharing-in-life. Indeed, sharing-in-life calls for the developmental prerequisites in which it resides: individuality, autonomy, ability to communicate, and the mastery of the self. I have attempted to demonstrate how these ontological features are carried in the ontopoietic deployment of life by its energies and forces. Recapitulating our previous inquiry, let us state how preceding steps have prepared the appearance of this altogether primary life condition. With analysis of the living agent as registering and acting accordingly, synthesizing the entire condition (state) of the living beingness-in-progress at a “glance” while rising above immersion in it — in a distantiation from the performing system of individualizing progress — and surging above it “on its own” in a new energetic move to attention, surveillance, recognition, issuing signals and signs, we have the prototype of a concrete, significant engine of life’s deployment. In the history of modern philosophy this goes under the name of “transcendental consciousness.” It unfolds gradually with the growth in complexity of the individual and acquires its full extent, vigor, and significance with the emergence of the Human Condition already mentioned. While the sphere of he human condition appears only at the most advanced stages of gradually unfolding life, the schema of the transcendental constitution of life’s progress seems to be in place already from the very incipient phase of the surging of the self-functioning individualization process, that is, from its passage from the womb of life to an autonomous existence. It manifests itself in the foundational spheres of life, namely, in the circumambient networking of interacting.

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At the outset of our investigation we pointed out the crucial ontopoietic device of the individuation of beingness, namely, its inward/outward orientation. It has been also brought forth, first, how the primal sensibilities of “substantial” life-oriented “stuff” were conducive to the primogenital employment and exchange of energies, and then, second, how through the advanced complexities of becoming the inward-outward axis of the exchange of energies promoted the unfolding and growth of the individual beingnessin-progress. Now it is time to pinpoint a third level of the inward/outward oriented exchange and deployment of energies and forces. From the previously established foundational features of the concrete, self-directed and enacted individual life, we move to the circuit of its inward/outward oriented exchanges in the sphere of intersubjective, interindividual communication in sharing life conditions. We observe here a further sphere, one transcending the immediacy of the life-enacting process toward networks of common concern for all individuals. This sphere resides within the newly expanding modality of communication-at-a-distance. This novel distantiating way of communication expands the life relevances and their employment in accord with a discrimination that seeks to determine the fitness of acts within a gigantic life promoting network. In this network the concrete individual beingness is a centralizing focus for the exchange of energies, the amalgamation or diffusion or cancellation of forces. Since at this stage we are dealing with the full manifestion of reality, this gigantic network of interaction and interchange of forces assumes the role of the circumambient sphere of the individual at its center and of the all embracing domain of life, the world. The living self dwells principally within the sphere of its autonomous, individualized circles of energies and forces, but from within the selves of other acting beings and out of their common conditions, it reaches further circles by interactive, communicative exchange of energies and forces in the circumference closer to its very own domain, its own circumambient sphere, and then beyond, extending its reach in the gigantic network of the play of forces. The living individual is this world’s bulwark. Going further beyond, but grounded in the organically/vitally significant exchange of elementary energies, this exchange acquires a special significance in the vitally significant exchange of interindividual existence. This is inscribed within the previously discussed apparatus of existence as a sine qua non. The ontopoietic design seems to carry at its fundamental core

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the complementary nature of singular self-individualization in its participation in a course of life similar to those of other beings in process. Throughout this system of avenues, as flexibly as they might be interpreted in the actual crystallizations of singular lives, there is an intrinsic insufficiency to the singular being with a systematic provision for complementing each being with the existential outline of other singular beingnesses-in-progress. Whether it would be sharing pastures, spoils, grain in the courtyard, the common hunt, this vitally significant thread derives too from the enactment of the set collaboration of procreation, that is, the origination of new individualizing beings. The forces of attraction, of discrimination and attunement, of elementary vital drives that accompany the procreative urge have their own dynamics. This crucial set of functions merits special attention that we cannot pay here. It is with respect to the agent that embodiment of the individualizing process provides not only a crucial meeting place for the logoic forces and their dynamic performance but also a transitory plateau in whose networks the functional segments of the entire individualizing schema are differentiated and integrated and, most significantly, rise above the status of fragmentary, functional segments. The body as a coherent functional system rises to a higher sphere that I call the manifestation of the real. This occurs at the level of selfhood. There too occurs attunement to other beings in a mutual adjustment such that a smooth course is allowed. The respective forces are following their own pre-outlined channels, but in their performance they are measured against each other in the attainment of their respective tasks. Their intrinsic relevance to the ontopoietic sequence in a crystallization determines their roles as well as measures the adequacy of the performances. The circumambient sphere of life carried by this very sharing in life’s proceedings becomes a gigantic arena for energies to play out their diverse tendencies within, for forces to play out their diverse tendencies to intergenerate in powerful reservoirs, from which reservoirs the forces by which the game of life advances (and regresses) are drawn as new turns and aims for accomplishment receive stimulus. It appears that our inquiry into the energies, dynamics, and forces of life in their relation to the shaping logoic moves and directions does not justify any sharp differentiation between those energies and directives. On the contrary, it seems that the logos that they represent is both — that it indivisibly shapes while it prompts and prompts while it shapes. It is in the logoic constructivism’s device of distantiation that there resides the transcendental

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illusion of the relative formal opacity/stability of the real. In the ontopoietic workings of life what is “real” are the energized and directed forces of ontopoiesis. In the ontopoietic becoming it is the logos itself that is revealed in its undissociable fullness. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

SECTION I

The opening session of the conference. From right to left: Wladyslaw Strozewski, Jacek Wozniakowski, A-T. Tymieniecka, Tadeusz Czarnik

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F O R C E A N D DY NA M I S M I N A R I S TOT L E A N D H E I D E G G E R : B E C O M I N G W H AT YO U A R E . . . TO B E

Force and dynamism (actuality and potentiality; energeía and dunámis) together constitute one of the four fundamental “ways” of being described by Aristotle in the Metaphysics; and one of the two “ways,” along with being according to the categories, that constitutes the subject matter of the primary science. Aristotle’s ontology remains the phenomenologist’s touchstone, and indeed this characterization of being has guided the work of Heidegger among others. Comparisons between Aristotle and Heidegger before the Kehre have become more frequent since the publication of Heidegger’s courses of the twenties and thirties. Such studies usually take for granted that there is a modal reversal between the two ontologies. In the standard interpretation, for Heidegger possibility [Möglichkeit] precedes actuality, and Heidegger indeed says this (e.g. SZ: 38\63). For Aristotle, it is said, the reverse is true: and here lies the error.1 In fact, in Aristotle, actuality is contrasted not with possibility [dunatón], but with potentiality [dunámis]: actuality, he says, is prior to potentiality (Meta: 1049b 4ff). In this paper, I examine the modal shift from Aristotle’s actuality to Heidegger’s possibility. There is indeed such a shift, I argue, and it is in fact definitive of the changed ontological project. But to characterize the shift simply as a reversal is inaccurate. For Aristotle, as I discuss in the first section, actuality clearly precedes potentiality, both in the order of knowledge and in the order of being. This is clear on the basis of his conception of science as the study of universal principles and grounds, and, more particularly, in his conception of the science of being qua being as the study of the universal principles and grounds of ousía as universal, actual form. In section two, I explore the distinct meanings of “possibility” and “potentiality” for Aristotle: “potentiality” has a much more restricted use. Just as Aristotle’s notion of physical potentiality and what Heidegger calls possibility are not identical, neither is Aristotle’s notion of potentiality limited to the coming-tobe of form in sensible things. The notion of rational potency corresponds more nearly to what Heidegger means by “potentiality”: In section three, I note that Heidegger does not restrict himself to the use of “possibility”: In fact he uses “potentiality for-” [können-] frequently, 3 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 3–18. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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particularly in the common construction “potentiality-for-being” [Seinkönnen]. Potentiality-for-being refers to the determined ontological structure of Dasein: But this structure itself, as transcendence, is exhibited ontically as the necessity to choose possibilities. Potentiality in Heidegger suggests less what Aristotle means by the (determined) coming into species form of every being, as much as it does the practical movement of each Dasein in appropriating that which is given to it: these are possibilities of being. For both Heidegger and Aristotle, as in Pindar’s famous maxim, human being becomes what it already is (. . . determined by phúsis to become), and in this sense, Heidegger’s potentiality, and Aristotle’s rational potency coincide. However, insofar as the coming to be of Dasein is a free appropriation of possibilities, we can accurately speak of a shift in modal focus between the two philosophers. Aristotle treats human being as a species with little metaphysical attention to the individual. For Heidegger, each Dasein becomes what it is to be; since Heidegger articulates the individual nature of Dasein, the future of each individual as chosen possibility is emphasized. Heidegger’s course of SS 1931, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force (GA33), provides us with an extraordinary interpretation of Aristotle. Published in 1981, this work puts meat on the bones of our prior understanding of the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger in his earlier work; it is especially important for an understanding of modality in Being and Time and gives some indications of Heidegger’s clear re-appropriation of Aristotelian concepts. It is important also, however, to look again at Aristotle’s texts on their own merit. In part one below, I indulge in a long discussion of Aristotle’s metaphysical project, in part because his own words are too often forgotten in the recent comparisons with Heidegger, but primarily because the import of the modal shift Heidegger makes is less obvious if we have not revisited the logical beauty of Aristotle’s enterprise. I . A R I S TOT L E ’ S S C I E N T I F I C M E TA P H Y S I C S A S K N OW L E D G E O F U N I V E R S A L P R I N C I P L E S A N D G RO U N D S : AC T UA L I T Y ( F O R C E ) P R E C E D E S P OT E N T I A L I T Y ( DY NA M I S M )

Aristotle’s Metaphysics treats the science “episte–me–” of being qua being (1003a 20). As such it studies the principles and grounds of things which are (1025b 3). What “science” means here is important in establishing Aristotle’s prioritizing of actuality over potentiality in the realm of ontology.

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In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines episte–me– as a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity and cannot vary [ex anágke–s ára estì tò epistetón] (NE: 1140b 31); it studies eternal things that do not come into existence or perish (NE: 1139b 20ff; 1140b 30). Scientific knowledge then is knowledge of: 1) universals that express formal relations between phenomena; or 2) form as the unchangeable element of sensible things; or 3) God, which is pure form, and thus the principle of rationality, the first principle of the sciences. From the point of view of knowledge acquisition, we know that for Aristotle all knowledge begins with perception of particulars. From here, we build up to knowledge of universals through the process of induction [epago–ge–]. Induction requires the leap to an “intuitive” grasp of the universal, [noûs], and it is thus that we come to know first principles. Episte–me–, on the other hand, designates the outcome of a deduction from first universal principles [archaí], which are themselves known through induction (NE: 1139b 30) and intuition (NE: 1141a 7). Science works with “facts” or propositions, statements that are based on perception of particulars, and it seeks universal true statements that are explanatory of particulars. Episte–me– then is the understanding of universal explanatory grounds, formally revealed through deductive applications of archaí. In short, science uses principles gleaned through an inductive procedure to find universal grounds for particulars. In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle discusses the general conception of science, laying out the characteristics of episte-me- in detail. Each science should have its own object, a particular subject genus, and its own indemonstrable first principles, though all sciences have recourse to common axioms (APo: 77a 27). There is one supreme or primary science that furnishes first principles upon which other sciences are based (though not the first principles specific to each science). This science is the one that Aristotle pursues in the Metaphysics. The Metaphysics is concerned with seeking the most universal grounds and principles of what is. Since the first principles of this science apply to being qua being, and specifically to ousía, they are applicable to any of the more specific subject matters of the other sciences, which study “some portion of being” (Meta: 1003a 25). In the realm of ontological inquiry, episte–me– studies unchanging form. Though particular to an individual sensible thing (this form in this matter), form is also universal (the same form common to many individual things). The science of being treats the form of particulars in its universal, unchanging aspect, on the level of species.

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The capacity to know scientifically, episte–me–, is ultimately expressed through the activity of theoría. The eternal objects of theoretical inquiry are in contrast to the class of things that are the concern of the activities of making and doing [poíe–sis and praxis]; these activities are concerned with things that can also be otherwise [endexómena állos éxein]. The shift in Heidegger to prioritization of possibility over actuality corresponds both to prioritization of the contingent over the necessary, and to the prioritization of praxis over theory as the human way of coming to know. For Aristotle, the objects of the highest form of knowledge — God, the cosmos, form — are necessary, actual, eternal and the object of theoretical knowledge; for Heidegger, the fundament of knowledge — each individual human being — is above all mortal, thus contingent. Furthermore, for Heidegger, each human being is, as we will see, involved in a process of self-actualization through the discovery and exploitation of possibility. Science, episte–me–, treats the universal and the necessary, so that the science of being qua being must treat the universal and necessary aspect of beings; this comes down to the study of actuality, or form. In book Delta and again in Epsilon of the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives a definition of “being” that shows four senses of the term. It means: 1) accidental being [katà sumbebe-kós] as opposed to being in itself [kath’hautó]; 2) being according to the figures of the categories; 3) being in the sense of being true; and 4) being as actual being and potential being (1017a 8–1017b 9; 1026a 33–1026b 2). It emerges that neither accidental being nor being in the sense of being true is the object of the primary science with which the Metaphysics is concerned. As Aristotle clearly specifies in Epsilon (1027b 35): “tò mèn hos sumbebe–kòs kaì tò hos ale–thès òn aphetéon” [we may dismiss the sense of being as accidental and as truth].2 That which is accidental and contingent and admits of no ground can be the subject of no science, whether practical, productive, or theoretical, since “all scientific knowledge is of that which is always or usually so” (1027a 21–2). Science studies the actual, the necessary; the accidental is contingent and merely potential. In the discussion of being as accident in Epsilon, Aristotle says that to be katà sumbebe–kós refers, first of all, to an attribute that is not part of the essence of an ousía — an attribute that is not kath’hautó — and which is therefore particular and not universal.3 Now grounds can be given only for that which occurs necessarily and always in the same way: they must refer to a universal. Accidental attributes, as non-universal, admit of no grounds, and since science is the clarification of grounds, accidents cannot belong to a science. Secondly, a subject can be said to be accidental, if its ground is also

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accidental (1027a 9–10). There is no possible ground of the purely accidental event, for example, of cold weather during the dog days, or of the purely contingent phenomenon such as the whiteness of the cultured person. Only the actual and necessary has scientific grounds. Being in the sense of being true [hos ale–thés] is also eliminated from the study of the primary science. The recognition of something as either true or as false is dependent upon: 1) a connection and division (súnthesis and diaíresis) of concepts in an apophatic statement, and 2) the affirmation or denial of the truth of the resultant prediction. The judgement of the truth or falsity of the predication is itself dependent upon whether or not it mirrors the way that things are in the world. Concerning the mental process of súnthesis and diaíresis, Aristotle writes “falsity and truth are not in things — the good, for example, being true, and the bad false — but in thought” (1027b 26–8). Being as truth, since it occurs and exists only in thought, is not a real quality intrinsic to the being of things, but a judgement concerning the correspondence of a predication to reality.4 The Metaphysics treats being as act and potency, and being according to the figures of the categories as fundamental to the science of being qua being. Being according to the figures of the categories is treated in some detail in Zeta (1028a 10- 1028b 8). “Being” means first the what of a thing [tí esti], and then the quality, quantity, relation, and all the other categories. The “what” or ousía is the primary sense of being, since none of the other categories can be said to be if ousía is not. Thus “it is by reason of ousía that each of [the other categories] is” (1028a 28). Here we see that it is the “what it is”, the unchanging form of the individual ousía that is the prime object of study; the other categories, as contingent, or as merely potential, are secondary. Ousía is the hupokeímenon or substrate; the secondary categories (quality, quantity and the like) can be studied only in relation to the primary category, ousía, since their existence, separate from ousía, is accidental. The particular manifestations of the categories bring out the individual character of an ousía (one, green, now); the formal character of the categories (quantity, quality, time) make it possible to understand an ousía according to its species and genus. Being according to the categories is primarily ousía, the prime focus of the science of being qua being. However, the other categories, as essential attributes of ousía, are necessary to the study of being qua being, insofar as they define ousía on the level of species. The study of ousía is admitted in the primary science precisely because that science studies the universal, the necessary, that which cannot be otherwise; actuality precedes potentiality in the order of knowledge.

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Being as potential and actual [on dynámei kaì energeíai] (which Heidegger treats extensively in various courses, particularly in GA33) is specifically treated in book Theta of the Metaphysics. There (as in Delta 1019b 35–1020a 6) Aristotle describes the primary sense of potency as the principle of change, which is either in the thing that changes, or in some other thing (1046a 10). However, “potentiality and actuality extend beyond the sphere of terms which refer only to motion” (1046a 2). Motion is defined in Kappa as the actualization of the potential as such (1065b 16; also Physics III 201a).5 But it is potency and actuality not as such, but in regard to ousía that is the study of the primary science. In other words, the Metaphysics is concerned with the study of ousía insofar as it is subject to change, and insofar as this change is always directed to some end, which is determined on the level of species. The actuality of a particular ousía, its species form, is the object of the primary science; but Aristotle is interested in this species form in its concrete manifestation in individuals. Since all natural individuals are involved in the process of change, he must also study potentiality. Ultimately, the prime object of the Metaphysics is an immaterial being which, in consequence of its immateriality, is not subject to potency. This supernatural (or to say it in Greek, metaphysical) being, as purely actual, is the ground of change in all natural [material] beings. Potentiality and actuality, force and dynamism, are discussed in book Eta in relation to matter [húle–] and form [eîdos] in an ousía. Matter is potentiality, whereas form is the actualization of matter, or in the case of pure form, pure actuality. Potentiality [dunámis] is a given capacity within beings to be other than they are. Potential being is that which is susceptible to change, whether the source of change is in the thing itself, or comes from something other than itself or from a part of itself. Actualization is the process of bringing the potentiality of a being into entelécheia, that is, bringing a being to fulfillment of its telos through realization of its potential. So basic is the concept of actuality [energeía], writes Aristotle, that it can be understood only inductively and analogously. Actuality is the presence [hupárchein] of a thing, but a presence not in the sense of potentiality (1048a 32–3); it is to potency as waking is to sleeping. Finally, actuality is entelécheia, the end of a process of motion. To be in motion is to be in the process of becoming, of changing from what is merely potential to the actual realization of this potential. Everything moves towards its telos (or in the case of pure form or God, is its telos), and activity is the telos of potency. Aristotle states quite clearly that actuality is prior to potency, prior to any principle of motion or rest (1049b 10–11). It is prior: 1) in definition:

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something is defined in terms of its actuality, not its potentiality. Something is potential because it is possible for it to become actual: 2) in time: there must first be chickens for there to be eggs, (though of course a particular chicken must be an egg before it is a chicken); and 3) in ousía: “Man is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form [eîdos], and the other has not” (1050a 5). Act and potency are grounded in ousía and in that which constitutes ousía (Meta: 1045b 32; 1017a 35–b1). In the Physics, tà phúsei are determined as ousíai that have within themselves a principle of movement and rest (Phy. 192b 13), where movement is the actualization of potentiality. Now individual ousíai within a species are instantiations of one and the same actuality (form); here the fact that actuality is prior to potency assumes enormous significance. Any given individual ousía, since it is in movement, or on the way towards actualization, has an already given telos, or terminus of the movement from potentiality to actuality.6 Actuality preceding potency here means that the development of any individual is always already determined. Actuality is determined as form, and ousía is primarily form (1050b 2; also Eta 1042b 10ff). Matter, on the other hand, is conceived as potential (1042a 28; 1042b 10), and as that which is subject to change. As potency and actuality, the matter and form of a particular sensible ousía are not separable (1045b 17–19). However, it is the form of an ousía that is what ousía actually is [tí esti] — the unchanging essence of ousía [tì tí e-n eînai]. Because Aristotle identifies potency with matter, and actuality with form, and because actuality is prior to potency, an individual sensible ousía as a combination of matter and form must be posterior to ousía as form. Form as actual is prior to any of its individual material instantiations. Individual things come to be and pass away, but the form that an individual instantiates is eternal. The form defines that which a sensible (hylomorphic) ousía is en route to becoming; it thus defines the actuality of ousía. An individual ousía that admits of potential (is material) is the coming to be of a given actual form; and any given individual within a species is the coming to be of one and the same species form. Though they do not all have matter, all classes of ousíai have form. However, since knowledge is acquired on the basis of perception, the inquiry into ousía begins with a discussion of sensible ousía. The inquiry concentrates on the form of sensible ousíai, as that which defines them. The study of ontology, focused on ousía, and beginning with the study of sensible ousía, leads to the determination of nonsensible ousía as its aitía and arche-. Otherwise stated, the study of hylomorphic ousíai leads to the examination of pure form as its ground. The study of actuality and potentiality, approached

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from Aristotle’s aetiological perspective, must include both matter and form, sensible and nonsensible ousíai, and must lead implacably to the study of nonsensible ousía as the ground of sensible ousía. Actuality is the ground of any potentiality.7 I I . A R I S TOT L E : P O S S I B I L I T Y V E R S U S I R R AT I O NA L A N D R AT I O NA L P OT E N C Y

The notion of potentiality is central to Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrine. Every sensible ousía, every material being, is subject to change. But the way that change unfolds is determined by the tí esti, the “what it is” to be a certain thing: the eîdos or form. Matter is thus subject to change in accordance with a predetermined species form. Acorns become oak trees, tadpoles become frogs. However, Aristotle defines possibility [tò dunatòn], in contrast to potency [dunámis], as anything that is possible at some time and in some way.8 Possibility and impossibility, dunatón and adúnaton, are related to nonessential accidental being, [katà sumbebe–kós], that which differentiates individuals within species.9 Possibility then, is that which could be otherwise, that which is not determined to be by species form. It is related to matter, rather than form, and is not considered a subject area of the primary science. In his SS 1931 course, Heidegger discusses why dunatón and adúnaton, which he translates as “powerful” and “powerless”, are excluded from Aristotle’s theme in book Theta. These “senses” of potentiality are related to the assertion [apóphansis] (pp. 50ff). Adúnaton indicates failing in something, not being compatible, or more specifically not conforming with what is said in the assertion (p. 52); while dunatón clearly indicates the opposite. There is or is not possibility, or power, in the thing under discussion to meet what is claimed in the assertion. Something is or is not a such and such. But this compatibility or non-compatibility with what is claimed indicates “a certain kind of being or non-being (of something in unity with something else)” (p. 54; my italics), and not of the thing itself. In Heidegger’s view also then, the meaning of dunatón and adúnaton, though clearly linked to the inquiry into essential being, is secondary to the question of the fundamental nature of the being of a being. In Metaphysics Theta 2, Aristotle distinguishes between rational potencies [dunámeis logoi] and irrational potencies [dunámeis álogoi] (1046a 2ff). Irrational potencies are those that admit of only one result, e.g., something hot must produce heat. This is the physical and metaphysical notion of potency, that everything tends, by nature [phúsis], towards fulfillment of its

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given potency. In the physical world, sensible ousía are finite as particulars, but the universal character of ousía, the species form, is eternal. The physical cosmos is the eternal cycle of movement from potentiality to actuality in sensible things. This eternal movement is grounded formally and finally by a first mover, an eternal being, who is fully actual. Thus, to sum up a large metaphysical notion in few words, actuality precedes potentiality in the physical cosmos.10 The notion of rational potency is perhaps closer to what Heidegger intends by “possibility” in his use of the word in Being and Time and elsewhere, where he writes that possibility precedes actuality. For Aristotle, rational potencies, such as the téchnai (the poietic sciences), admit of contrary results: for example, the science of medicine can produce sickness or health. The actualization of rational potencies is determined by desire (particularly in the case of animals) or by rational choice [órexin eproaíresin], though fulfillment depends on whether the desire or choice is directed towards that for which there is a given capacity (cf: Meta: 1046a 36-b 9; 1047b 31–1048a 15). In the human sphere, desire and choice are also always directed towards some end. Choice is the efficient explanation of action; and the final explanation of choice is desire and reason, themselves directed to some end (NE:1139a 6). There are three fundamental modes of activity [energeíai] in Aristotle’s description of the logos of the psuche–: theoría, poíe-sis and praxis. These correspond to three natural potentialities [dunámeis] of the soul, or dispositions [héxeis]: respectively sophía (which unites episte-me- and noûs), téchne-, and phróne–sis.11 The end of the disposition [héxis or dunámis] of téchne- is poíe–sis, the production of something; the end of the disposition of phróne–sis, is praxis, action itself. The end of the disposition of sophía, on the other hand, is not action, but theoría, universal knowledge. In all these cases, actuality is prior to the principle of change. The three rational héxeis come to be only through being employed; thought and desire are what bring the dispositions to actuality. And human being [ánthrôpos], the originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect (NE: 1139b 5–7). The end of human being is eudaimonía (happiness), the exercise of the dispositions of the soul in conformity with excellence, throughout a complete lifetime (NE: 1098a 12–20). But the highest form of happiness is the exercise of the highest virtue, sophía. Noûs, intuitive comprehension of first principles, is the best activity for human being and the telos of human life (NE: 1177a 13–22).

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Now noûs is directed towards the universal and the eternal, and the eternal is fully actual. Thus even in the sphere of practical behaviour, actuality precedes potentiality in Aristotle. Rational potencies are dependent on rational héxeis, and these are dependent for their fulfillment on a more primordial irrational dunámis: that of the kinetic progression of all things from potentiality to actuality. Human beings, like all sensible beings, progress towards their telos, which is reason.12 Reason is inspired by and directed towards the eternal, pure actuality. Pure actuality is thus the final ground of any human potentiality. For Aristotle, the eternal and fully actual is primary in establishing the meaning of being, and the way that human being understands his or her own being. Eternity is the basis of Aristotle’s ontology and his ethics: Being is eternal. The notion of potency is grounded in an actuality that is always already determined; possibility is the accomplishment of some potency that is accidental to the form of a given ousía. I I I . H E I D E G G E R : T R A N S C E N D E N C E A S P OT E N T I A L I T Y TO C H O O S E P O S S I B I L I T I E S

Between Aristotle and Heidegger, there is a shift from the priority of the eternal to the priority of the finite. This shift, product of the changed ontological project from one grounded in scientific explanation (the search for aitíai) to one focused on phenomenological description, is itself tied to a modal shift in focus from the priority of actuality to the priority of nondetermined possibility. For Heidegger, human being is a living into finite possibility (unto the final, determined possibility of death); this defines, and in this sense “precedes”, human actuality. Whereas kíne–sis in Aristotle applies to beings coming into actuality, and human being achieving its rational telos, in Heidegger, Dasein’s understanding of beings, and thus of being, is kinetic. Kinetic understanding is grounded in the kinesis that is Dasein itself in its finite transcendence. Finite movement, as opposed to infinite presence, defines Heidegger’s ontology. The finite movement of Dasein is that of appropriating possibilities, some of which are always already determined — death in particular. But what is already determined in Dasein is the ontic necessity of choosing possibilities, and this is grounded in Dasein’s ontological structure as potentiality-for-being. Heidegger writes, “as a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible” (SZ: 143\183). But possibility, he continues, is

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an existential, the most primordial way that Dasein is characterized ontologically. Dasein is, ontologically, potentiality-for-being: but the way in which this potentiality is filled is not determined, except insofar as 1) Dasein must choose, and 2) Dasein is finite. The name for the choosing in which Dasein is always engaged is transcendence. “Transcendence, being-in-the-world, is never to be equated and identified with intentionality,” says Heidegger in the summer course of 1928 (GA26: 215\168).13 In the previous summer’s course, on the other hand, he asserts (and discusses at length) that “it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which transcendence consists” (GA24: 89\63).14 How to explain this apparent contradiction? To ask how transcendence relates to the intentional structure of Dasein is to ask whether the choosing of possibilities is itself determined (Is the choosing simply the accomplishment of given potentiality?), or whether Dasein is freedom in choosing (Is Dasein pure possibility?). First of all, Heidegger is careful to distinguish transcendence from any “traditional” notion of intentionality that sets a worldless subject against an object in a noetic relationship. In Heidegger’s sense, intentionality is the very structure of lived experience, a comportmental directing towards, that reveals to Dasein how it stands in relation to the world. Secondly, intentional fulfillment gives for two kinds of truth, which correspond to two kinds of comportment: 1) identification of the intended and the intuited gives for a nonthematized comportmental and fundamental sense of truth as living in the truth. I make possible what I intend by seeing my intention as already fulfilled in my interaction with entities: I am directed towards the subject matter itself (GA20: 69\52).15 This is hermeneutical sense of truth, or the way of understanding being manifest in circumspective concern (poíe–sis). Here, Heidegger’s SS 1931 course on Metaphysics Theta is telling. Heidegger’s discussion of episte–me– poie–tiké in Aristotle (pp. 116ff) quite clearly concludes with a “reversal”. In Heidegger’s view, poíe–sis is in its essence directed towards enantía [oppositeness], (that is, what is produced is a this and not a that), and this is reflected in the logos of episte–me– poie–tiké. “But”, Heidegger says, “then we have arrived at the exact opposite result from Aristotle” (p. 119); for Heidegger’s Aristotle, episte–me– poie–tiké is a logos, and thus is related to enantía. For Heidegger, “it cannot be doubted that our interpretation of the essential constitution of producing is correct” (p. 119). But what has occurred here? Ultimately, Heidegger displaces production from the sphere of the rational, and posits rational reflection on the practical as a kind of post-mortem.

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Thus whereas the primordial sense of truth is practical, the second sense of truth corresponding to a kind of comportment is theoretical. This then is: 2) the structural relationship that is seen to apply between acts of intending and acts of intuition. I direct myself towards the evidence, that is, towards the actual identification, such that truth becomes a character of knowledge (GA20: 70\53). I see the world as conforming to a noetic act of identification of intended and intuited; in other words, I see it theoretically (theoría). The theoretical, clearly prioritized in Aristotle, is here seen as secondary to the more “fundamental” experience of being-in-the-world. Theory becomes a (necessarily distorted) picturing of the basic experience of living. Both practical and theoretical behaviour are intentional; both involve a directing-towards. But both these modes of understanding the world presuppose some prior understanding of being for it to be possible to relate to the world in these modes. “Intentionality is based on transcendence” means that at the root of any intentional relationship is the transcendent comportment of Dasein that makes directing-towards possible at all. “Intentionality is transcendence” means that for Dasein to be in an intentional relationship, interacting with entities in the world, it must already be transcending. Original transcendence, as the primal praxis of Dasein, is what makes possible any relationship to entities whatsoever. In short, “intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes” (GA24: 91\65). Before the intentional relationship (ontic transcendence) can be established, Dasein must be in the world, and as such must have an understanding of being (primal transcendence) (GA26: 194\153). Heidegger writes that “transcendence precedes every possible mode of activity in general, prior to nóe–sis, but also prior to órexis” (GA26: 236\183); it is prior to any noetic intentional relation to the world and prior to any sort of erotic relationship also. It is also prior to any practical or theoretical mode of understanding the world, prior to all behaviour (WG: 34–35). As Heidegger himself points out, “the problem is the common root of both intuition, theoreín, as well as action, praxis” (GA26: 236\184). Transcendence is the key. Transcendence, being-in-the-world as attempting to understand the world in relation to its own possibilities, is the primordial praxis of Dasein that grounds theory and poietic involvement with entities. Thus in Heidegger’s retrieval, Aristotle’s three irreducible potentialities of the soul (héxeis), which become actual only through their exercise, are unified. Theoría is a mode of poíe–sis, and both are grounded in the primordial praxis of transcendence. Because this praxis is that of understanding the

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world in terms of possibility, possibility here precedes actuality; because this praxis is a given determination of Dasein, and, as constitutive of Dasein’s understanding of being, is a self-creative movement, potentiality precedes actuality. Transcendence and the understanding of being that is being-in-the-world, are in fact identical. The world is just the network of meanings that is constituted through Dasein’s relationship to the given. In every movement of understanding, every relationship of involvement, Dasein deals with entities in various ways so that it can be what it is; Dasein is always for its own sake. This does not mean that things are there for us, but that we bring things into relation with ourselves. In understanding entities, we posit something about ourselves; we are primarily concerned with our own becoming. This selfunderstanding, or self-creation, is the root of any understanding of entities. The world is that for the sake of which Dasein exists; but Dasein exists for the sake of itself. Therefore the world is part of the selfhood of Dasein (WG: 84); Dasein is its world (SZ: 364\416). “Transcendere” means to step over, go through, pass over. The world, as the network of meanings revealed to Dasein as it steps over factual entities towards their possibilities (conceived as possibilities of Dasein), is what Dasein steps towards. Dasein, in stepping, is the passage across (GA26: 211\165). Thus Dasein is possibility: its potentiality, that which it is determined to become, is fulfilled only by the free choosing of possibilities. For-the-sake-of refers to the ontological selfhood of Dasein as free to commit to becoming itself (GA 26: 247\191; cf. WG: 96).16 This means leaping over factual and factical beings, being excessive (GA26: 248\192), stepping out beyond the actual into the possible. Potentiality for being is the essence of transcendence, the defining character of Dasein as for-the-sake-of-itself.17 By being for its own sake, Dasein understands the world as potential for its own self to become what it already is. In angst, or in any disposition, by coming to see what it itself is, Dasein construes itself in relation to an already given world. In falling, by bringing entities into the world of its immediate concern, Dasein construes itself in relation to that with which it is now involved. The world then is already presupposed in any intentional relationship, both in the mode of readiness-to-hand (poietic understanding) and presence-at-hand (theoretical understanding); it is that onto which Dasein constantly projects itself in any of the temporal ecstasies. “If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either” (SZ: 365\417; cf. GA24: 422\297). The world must be disclosed before any entity can be encountered: and the world is disclosed through the finite movement of transcendence.

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Heidegger no longer seeks the grounds of why what is, is as it is, a question which in Aristotle leads to the positing of a supreme being who is fully actual. God, the supreme principle of reason in Aristotle, makes meaning as such possible. If there were no first final ground, no ultimate “that for the sake of which”, then there would be a meaningless infinite series of final grounds. God, rationality, is that which guarantees that every human being is en route to becoming what she already is determined to be by form. In the absence of Aristotle’s god, there would be no certainty that form would continue in its eternal constancy, no certainty that baby humans would become rational beings, no meaning. Heidegger, on the other hand asks not what our ultimate meaning is, but rather how it is that we see things as we do, what “meaning” as such means. The grounds for what is as meaningful, are in the groundless ground of Dasein as understanding what is through transcendence, the root of any intentional relationship to the world. God is absent in Heidegger’s ontology, because rationality is not “beyond” Dasein. Meaning is thrust into the hands of the individual Dasein. Because Heidegger thematizes the disclosure structure of Dasein as decisive in the way that being can be said, and because the one who discloses is finite possibility, much of Aristotle is in a sense turned “upside down”. Praxis is primordial over theory, and the finite is primordial over any possible notion of the eternal. And there is a modal shift: for Heidegger, potentiality precedes actuality, and potentiality expresses itself as the free choosing of possibilities. Life is dynamism; the human force is to seize the dynamic impulse.18 Department of Philosophy Loyola College in Maryland N OT E S 1 Such a view is expressed in one form or another in works by, for example: Franco Volpi, Heidegger e Aristotele (Padua: Daphne Editrice, 1984); Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology, trans. Michael Gendre, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991); Richard Kearney, “Heidegger, the Possible and God” in Martin Heidegger Critical Assessments Vol. IV, ed. Christopher Macann, (NY: Routledge, 1992). 2 See Heidegger on this point in GA31, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit; Einleitung in die Philosophie, pp. 77 ff. 3 Helene Weiss, Heidegger’s student, notes in her book Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967) that the translation of sumbebe–kós with “accident” [German “Zufall”] is misleading. The word is con-

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structed from the perfect stem of baínein [to walk, to step, to stand or to be in a place, to come] + sum, and thus literally means “to have come together”, “to have stepped together” and so what goes together (p. 157). Indeed, an “accidental being” cannot stand alone, without being a substrate. 4 This is a more complex issue than I can do justice to here. Ultimately, what is at stake is this: Truth as applied to things means simply that grounds can be given for things (1024b 17). The grounds of judgement revert to the grounds for the things about which a judgement is made; these grounds ultimately concern the universal form of ousíai. 5 Though even here, motion is studied in relation to tà phúsei, that is, ousía that have a principle of motion. 6 All ousíai do not have a principle of movement: the primary aitía, the unmoved mover, does not admit of potency. God, the ousía that is pure act is in no way a coming to be; it is already fully itself. The primary science, which studies the causes and principles of being qua being, studies act and potency in relation to ousía, and it also studies the ousía that is pure act. 7 If space permitted, it would be instructive here to take this analysis further through a reading of Metaphysics Lambda, where pure form (which is pure actuality) is revealed as both the prime ground of potentiality unfolding as it should, and the prime object of human study in the accomplishment of the human telos. 8 Aristotle in book Delta of the Metaphysics defines these notions separately, though he admits of some conflation: see Meta: 1019a 24. 9 Aristotle’s main treatment of being as accident (1026a 33–1027a 30) is complex, as hinted above. He presumes, but does not specify, the distinction developed elsewhere (Epsilon; Delta) between three different kinds of attribute (sumbebe–kóta): 1) essential per se (kath’hautó) attributes; 2) non-essential per se attributes; and 3) accidents that are neither per se nor essential. He does not specifically relate these to possibility, but given the definition of “accident” in Delta (1025a 14ff), it is clear that accident in the latter two senses refers to that which could, but does not necessarily, belong to an individual thing qua itself: in short, possibility. 10 Heidegger’s comments on this section in GA33, particularly with regard to the meaning of logos, are helpful here. See p. 99ff. 11 Cf. NE book VI, 1139bff — chapters that Heidegger cites frequently in courses and published texts. 12 The telos of human being is the good, and the good for human being is happiness, and happiness is the life of contemplation, the exercise of the noetic rational soul. 13 In this 1928 course (The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic: Michael Heim, trans., (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992)), Heidegger cites note xxiii from section 64 of Being and Time that reads in part: “the intentionality of ‘consciousness’ is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein” (SZ: 363\414). Cf. also WG: 28, (The Essence of Reasons: trans., Terence Malick, (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969), where Heidegger again says that intentionality is possible only on the basis of transcendence. Cf: Arion Kelkel: “Immanence de la conscience intentionnelle et transcendence du Dasein”, in Heidegger et l’idée de la phénoménologie, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988). 14 The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstader, (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1988). 15 History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena: trans. Theodore Kisiel, (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992). 16 The for-the-sake-of seems to be a retrieval and ontologization of Aristotle’s hôu héneka (Cf: Franco Volpi 1994: “Being and Time: A ‘Translation’ of the Nichomachean Ethics?” in Reading

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Heidegger from the Start, (Albany: SUNY Press 1994) p.207–209). In Aristotle, praxis is an end in itself, that is, its “for the sake of” is itself. Since Dasein is for the sake of itself, this accrues further evidence to the thesis that transcendence is the praxis that unifies poíe–sis and theoría, determinations borrowed from Aristotle and transformed. 17 “To put it briefly, Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical!” (GA26: 238\185).

Hirotaka Tatematsu and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

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In diesem kurzen Referat möchte ich von der Sinnkrise oder von der geistigen Krise der gegenwärtigen Menschen sprechen. Bekanntlich hielt Husserl im Jahr 1935 in Wien einen Vortrag “Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie”. Vier Jahre vorher in 1931 veröffentlichte Jaspers “Die geistige Situation der Zeit” und schilderte darin die kritische Lage in der Zeit der Massen und der Technologie. Seitdem sind schon etwa 65 Jahre vergangen. Trotzdem scheint die kritische geistige Situation des Menschen vielmehr gröβer geworden zu sein, und zwar nicht nur in Europa, sondern fast in der ganzen Welt. Im Aristotelischen Sinn, “um gut zu leben”, soll jeder von uns selber die echte Bedeutung und das richtige Ziel seines Lebens finden und sich um bessere Zukunft bemühen. Es gibt aber leider in der heutigen Gesellschaft allzuviele entmutigende Hindernisse dagegen. Deshalb könnnen viele Leute kein klares, festes Ziel finden, und sie leiden unter dem Gefühl der Sinnlosigkeit eigenen Lebens, und manchmal sogar an psychischen Krankheiten. Natürlich hat hier das Wort “Leben” keinen physiologischen Sinn, sondern es bedeutet “zwecktätiges, geistige Gebilde leistendes Leben” (Hua. 6, S. 315). Husserl behauptete dann, “daβ die europäische Krisis in einem sich verwirrenden Rationalismus wurzelt” (Ibid. S. 337), und er sagte auch: “Der Untergang des Abendlandes, diese neueste Theorie eines schwachherzigen philosophischen Skeptizismus” (Hua. 27, S. 122). Ja, auch in Japan spielen leider sowohl ein Rationalismus von der Art, die nur wirtschaftlichen Erfolg erzielen will, als auch der skeptische Relativismus zu moralischen Normen und Werten eine herrschende Rolle. Man kann viele Beispiele dafür aufzählen. Besonders in den letzten Jahren kommen unbegreifliche, furchtbare Verbrechen (Mord, Entführung, Raub usw.) häufig vor, und zwar ist manchmal die Jugend deren Täter. Einesolche trostlose Situation müssen wir als einen typischen Ausdruck ansehen für die verlorene Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben und der menschlichen Würde. Als Vorbedingung, um solche geistige Krise zu überwinden, möchte ich von der Wichtigkeit der Bedeutung für das Leben kurz sprechen. Ich habe sehr groβes Interesse an Husserls Konzeption von der Intentionalität als sinngebender Leistung, nämlich an seiner 19 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 19–26. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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“Korrelationsforschung von Bewuβtsein als Erlebnis und darin Bewuβtem als solchem (dem cogitatum)” (Hua. 27, S. 177). In seiner Vorlesung von 1907 “Die Idee der Phänomenologie” (Hua. 2, S. 22) erklärte er folgendes: “Die Korrelation zwischen Erkenntniserlebnis, Bedeutung und Gegenstand ist die Quelle der tiefsten und schwierigsten Probleme”. Diese Erkenntnistheorie kann ihrem Wesen nach auch “die wahre und echte Ontologie” sein (Hua. 1, S. 181), weil sie gleichzeitig auch die ursprüngliche Seinsweise allerartiger Gegenstände für uns aufklärt. Wie Husserl selber anerkannte, ist Philosophie auch “eine universale Wissenschaft von der Welt” (Hua. 27, S. 169). Mit Merleau-Ponty zu sagen: “La philosophie est de rapprendre a` voir le monde”. Durch die Veränderung unserer Einstellung können wir neue Einsichten in die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung gewinnen. Husserl findet seine Hauptaufgaben zuerst in der Entdeckung der konkreten Seinsweise der transzendentalen Subjektivität, nämlich in der Aufklärung ihrer weltkonstituierenden Akte, und zweitens damit korrelativ in der neuen Erhellung der für uns seienden Welt, die als Träger der transzendental konstituierten Sinne vor uns existiert (cf. Hua. 6, S. 275). In seinen “Ideen” (Hua. 3, S. 212) betont Husserl selbst: “Die allergröβten Probleme sind die funktionellen Probleme, bzw. die der Konstitution der Bewuβtseinsgegenständlichkeiten”. Und er fügt sofort dazu: “Bewuβtsein ist eben Bewuβtsein ‘von’ etwas, es ist sein Wesen, ‘Sinn’, sozusagen die Quintessenz von ‘Seele’, ‘Geist’, ‘Vernunft’ in sich zu bergen”. Deswegen hat der Begriff “Sinn” naturgemäβ untrennbare enge Beziehung mit den letzteren drei Begriffen. Was das Wort “Welt” betrifft, gebrauche ich es hier im Sinn der “Umwelt”, obwohl A. Gehlen, H. Plessner et al. die beiden Wörter unterschiedlich gebrauchen. Zum Beispiel behauptet M. Scheler, daβ ein “geistiges” Wesen nicht mehr umweltgebunden, sondern “umweltfrei” und “weltoffen” ist.1 Aber Husserl selbst erläutert in seinen “Ideen” (Hua. 4, S. 218): “Die Welt ist meine Umwelt — d.h. nicht die physikalische Welt, sondern die thematische Welt meines und unseres intentionalen Lebens”. Seine korrelative transzendentale Untersuchung macht es klar, daβ alle umweltlichen Dinge und Ereignisse ebenso konstituierte Sinnträger sind. Vorsichtshalber sage ich, daβ ich hier “Sinn und Bedeutung” synonym gebrauche. Auf Grund des bisher Dargestellten kann ich nun behaupten, daβ wir Menschen nicht in einer bloβ physischen Welt, sondern vielmehr in der sinnhaften Welt als Wertewelt, Güterwelt, praktischer Welt leben. Und wir nehmen jeweilig eigene Stellung zu ihrem Sinn. Ich möchte nun auf die Lehren aus anderen Forschungsgebieten zu sprechen kommen und darin die ähnliche Denkweise wie Husserls Gedanken

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herausfinden. Ein Biologe, der die Bedeutung besonders wichtig nahm, war Jakob von Uexküll. In seinem Buch “Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen” betont er: “Der Frage nach der Bedeutung gebührt bei allen Lebewesen der erste Rang”.2 Nach ihm sind die Bedeutungsbeziehungen die einzig sicheren Wegweiser bei der Erforschung der Umwelten, und jede Umwelt bildet eine in sich geschlossene Einheit, die in all ihren Teilen durch die Bedeutung für das Subjekt beherrscht wird. Ebenso nur durch die Beziehung mit dem Habenden oder Beobachter verwandelt sich auch jeder Gegenstand in den Träger einer Bedeutung, die ihm von einem Subjekt aufgeprägt wird. Nach E. Rothacker ist die Idee einer Umwelt eine Schöpfung von Uexküll, und er behauptet auch , daβ die naiv “gelebte Welt” eine echte Umwelt ist und in strenger Korrelation zum konkreten Menschen steht.3 E. Cassirer, der mit Uexküll engen Kontakt hatte, stellt den Hauptgedanken von Uexküll folgendermaβen dar: “It would be a very naive sort of dogmatism to assume that there exists an absolute reality of things which is the same for all living beings. Reality is not a unique and homogeneous thing; it is immensely diversified, having as many different schemes and patterns as there are different organisms”.4 Wo gibt es dann den Unterschied zwischen der menschlichen Umwelt und der für jede Art verschiedenen Umwelt der Tiere? Die Umwelt des Tieres ist je nach seiner Art durch Vererbung und Instinkt bestimmt und begrenzt. Eben in diesem Punkt ist die menschliche Umwelt völlig anders. Darum behauptete M. Scheler, wie schon erwähnt, daβ die Menschen nicht umweltgebunden, sondern “umweltfrei und weltoffen” sind. Jedenfallls nach der Meinung von Cassirer, der den Menschen als “animal symbolicum” definierte, gehören symbolisches Denken und Verhalten zu den spezifischen Eigenschaften des menschlichen Lebens. Was ist dann der Wesenszug von Symbol gegenüber Signal? Auf diese Frage antwortet Cassirer folgendermaβen. Während ein Signal ein Teil von der physischen Welt ist und eine operative Funktion hat, hat ein Symbol, das zur eigentümlichen Welt des menschlichen Lebens gehört, immer nur auf den menschlichen Geist Bezug, und damit hat es Bedeutung und eine designative Funktion.5 Und zur symbolischen Welt gehören Religion, Kunst, Wissenschaft usw. Von diesem Gedanken beeinfluβt, sagt S. Langer: “Symbol and meaning make man’s world, far more than sensation”, und ferner: “Our primary world of reality is a verbal one”.6 Was die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Geistesleben anlangt, werden in den Schriften von W. von Humboldt viele tiefgründige Einsichten gefunden. Er hebt folgendes hervor: “Der Mensch denkt, fühlt und lebt allein in der Sprache, und muβ erst durch sie gebildet werden.” Und er sagt weiter: “Eine

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groβe Anzahl von Gegenständen werden erst durch die sie bezeichnenden Wörter geschaffen und nur in ihnen ihr Dasein”. Deshalb ist die Sprache “das bildende Organ des Gedankens” und “eine wahre Welt, welche der Geist zwischen sich und die Gegenstände durch die innere Arbeit seiner Kraft setzen muβ”.7 In solchem Sinne kann man sagen, daβ jede Sprache, jede Mundart, eine eigentümliche Weltansicht hat. Auch W. Porzig stellt folgenderweise eine gleiche Ansicht dar: “Die Namen geben die Stellung einer Gemeinschaft zu den Dingen ihrer Umwelt an. . . . die Beziehung der Namen auf die Sachen ist nicht naturgegeben und nicht willkürlich gesetzt, sie ist geistesgeschichtlich bedingt.”8 Zum Beispiel sind die Wörter, wie Berg, Tal, Mulde, Meer, Bucht usw. alle aus der Landschaft herausgehoben, und sie entsprechen gewiβ den Zügen der Wirklichkeit, aber solche Gliederung ist nur unter dem menschlichen Gesichtspunkt möglich, der mit unserem Leben aufs engste zusammenhängt. Ein Bergpaβ kann nur für Menschen “Bergpaβ” sein. Deswegen behauptet Porzig: “Das ist Menschenwerk, das die Natur in menschliche Umwelt verwandelt”.9 Solche innere Kraft des Wortes drückt Stefan George in seinem Gedicht “Das Wort” so eindrucksvoll aus: “Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht”, und ebenso wie dem entsprechend legt Heidegger dar, “daβ im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt. Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch”.10 Was für eine Beziehung besteht dann zwischen Sprache und Erkenntnis? Im allgemeinen liegt die wesentliche Funktion des Erkennens im Auffassen der Bedeutung, die jedes Ding trägt, oder genauer, ihm traditionell gegeben ist. Wenn wir ein Objekt sehen, erkennen wir es als ein Ding, das irgendeine bestimmte Bedeutung hat, und nennen das Ding mit einem treffenden Namen. Natürlich gibt es auch den Fall, daβ man ein Ding zum ersten Mal sieht und nicht weiβ, was das ist. Aber jedenfalls, um das Wort richtig zu gebrauchen und den Namen eines Dinges zu sagen, muβ man, wie Kurt Goldstein wiederholt betonte, die abstrakte, kategoriale Haltung einnehmen.11 Dieser Hinweis ist sehr interessant im Zusammenhang mit der phänomenologischen “Wesenschau”. Beim Sehen nehmen unsere Augen alles Unnötige aus und wollen nur sinnvolle Sachen ansehen. Das sogenannte “selective interest”, das schon W. James wichtig nahm, spielt in jeder Wahrnehmung eine groβe Rolle. Wir können diesen Prozeβ des Sehens “das Suchen nach der Bedeutung” nennen. Über den Wesenszug der Wahrnehmung sind die meisten Forscher gleicher Meinung. Nach der Beschreibung von Cassirer ist die Wahrnehmung “nicht mehr rein passiv, sondern aktiv, nicht mehr rezeptiv, sondern <selektiv>, nicht vereinzelt und vereinzelnd, sondern auf ein Allgemeines gerichtet,” und sie ist zugleich “ein Leben Sinn”.12 Einer

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der kognitiven Psychologen, Ulric Neisser äuβert seine Meinung folgenderweise: “What is seen depends on how the observer allocates his attention,” and “In the normal environment most perceptible objects and events are <meaningful>. . . . These meanings can be, and are, perceived”.13 Daβ wir etwas erfahren und erkennen, ist der Prozeβ, jedem Ding und Geschehen passenden Sinn zu geben, oder meistenfalls, den ihm schon gegebenen Sinn zu begreifen. Was ein Teil unseres Wissens werden kann, das ist nur die Bedeutung der von uns erkannten Sache. Aber wenn wir ein Objekt als soundso erkennen, spielen sowohl unsere Kenntnisse als auch die Theorien, die wir schon in uns haben und an deren Gültigkeit wir glauben, eine entscheidende Rolle. Deshalb werden in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte die sogenanten “scientific Revolutions” oder die Veränderung der Paradigmata ein groβes Thema. Darüber läβt sich hier jedoch nicht diskutieren. Jedenfalls ist es nicht zu leugnen, daβ auch die Welt selbst, die alle Dinge und Begebenheiten umfaβt, ein kolossal groβer Komplex von miteinander zusammenhängenden Bedeutungen ist. Und wir führen unser tägliches Leben in diesem Netzwerk von Bedeutungen. Wenn wir unsre Lebensart und die Seinsweise aller umweltlichen Dinge auf diese Weise verstehen, könnte man dann noch glauben, daβ es doch in unserer Umwelt, bzw. in unserer Lebenswelt “an sich seiende Dinge” gibt, die von unseren Bewuβtseinsakten völlig unabhängig sind? Um ein Wort von Jaspers zu zitieren, sagt er: “Nur was in unser Bewuβtsein tritt, was erlebbar und Gegenstand wird, ist Sein für uns. Was nicht ins Bewuβtsein tritt, auf keine Weise vom wissenden Bewuβtsein getroffen werden kann, ist für uns so gut, als ob es nicht wäre.”14 Auch A. Gehlen äuβert eine ähnliche Meinung: “Wir haben eben die Dinge nicht <selbst>, sondern nur als assimilierte und angeeignete, eingeschmolzen in die Vielfalt unserer Tätigkeiten, . . . Die Dinge sind für uns überhaupt nur insofern da, als sie uns .”15 Auf dem Gebiet der Physik erläuterte W. Heisenberg das physikalische Naturbild folgenderweise: “Auch in der Naturwissenschaft ist der Gegenstand der Forschung nicht mehr die Natur an sich, sondern die der menschlichen Fragestellung ausgesetzte Natur, und insofern begegnet der Mensch auch hier wieder sich selbst.” 16 In diesen Äuβerungen kann man eine gemeinsame Denkweise finden, die mit Husserls Gedanken übereinstimmt. In 1911 bekundete Husserl: “Wenn Erkenntnistheorie die Probleme des Verhältnisses von Bewuβtsein und Sein erforschen will, so kann sie nur Sein als Correlatum von Bewuβtsein vor Augen haben, als bewuβtseinsmäβig : als Wahrgenommenes, Erinnertes, Erwartetes, . . .” (Hua. 25, S. 15). Darum mahnte er uns in “Ideen” (Hua. 3, S. 111f.): “Man darf sich also durch die Rede von der Transzendenz

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des Dinges gegenüber dem Bewuβtsein oder von seinem An-sich-sein nicht täuschen lassen. . . . Niemals ist ein an sich seiender Gegenstand ein solcher, den Bewuβtsein und Bewuβtsins-Ich nichts anginge.” Denn auch alle realen Dinge sind Sinneseinheiten, und sie setzen sinngebendes Bewuβtsein voraus. Aufgrund dieser Einstellung nennt Husserl (Hua. 9, S. 289) das den bewuβtseinsrelativen Seinssinn “des Transzendenten” betreffende Problem “das transzendentale”. Für ihn ist “Transzendenz” nichts anderes als “Transzendenz in der Immanenz”, weil sie auch “bewuβtseinsmäβig intentional Gemeintes” ist. Wie Husserl selber erklärt (Hua. 5, S. 152), ist es die einzige Aufgabe und Leistung des phänomenologischen Idealismus, “den Sinn dieser Welt, genau den Sinn, in welchem sie jedermann als wirklich seiend gilt und mit wirklichem Recht gilt, aufzuklären.” “Die Welt, die für uns ist, ist die in unserem menschlichen Leben Sinn habende und immer neuen Sinn für uns gewinnende, Sinn und Geltung” (Hua. 6, S. 266). Das Wort “Idealismus” gibt manchmal einen schlechten Eindruck, besonders dem Realisten. Aber der phänomenologische Idealismus kann, so glaube ich, den traditionellen Realismus widerspruchslos in sich umfassen. Deshalb behauptet Husserl: “Der phänomenologische Idealismus leugnet nicht die wirkliche Existenz der realen Welt (und zunächst der Natur), als ob er meinte, daβ sie ein Schein wäre . . .” (Hua. 5, S. 152). Er meint vielmehr, daβ es Dinge gibt, die wir nie wahrgenommen haben und nie wahrnehmen werden (cf. Hua. 13, S. 11). Trotz des Primates des sinngebenden Subjekts gegenüber dem Objekt war er sich auch der folgenden Grundtatsache voll bewuβt und sagte: “Das ist auch wahr, daβ der Erkenntnis nach für uns Menschen unser eigenes Sein dem Sein der Welt vorangeht, aber darum nicht der Wirklichkeit des Seins nach” (Hua. 6, S. 266). Nach dem, was ich bisher dargelegt habe, glaube ich, daβ wir im Grund genommen dem Husserlschen Gedanken zustimmen können und die unentbehrliche Wichtigkeit der Bedeutung anerkennen müssen. Aber es taucht hier ein neues schwieriges Problem auf, weil es sehr verschiedene Arten und Schichten der Bedeutungen gibt. Es handelt sich darum, was für eine Bedeutung einem Ding oder einer Begebenheit gegeben wird. Wenn wir einem Gegenständlichen Sinn geben, tun wir es unter verschiedenen Aspekten und Maβstäben: z.B. unter dem praktischen oder theoretischen Aspekt usw. Auβerdem üben darauf auch persönlicher Geschmack und Gefühl ziemlich groβen Einfluβ aus. Besonders in der Zeit, wo der skeptische Relativismus herrschend ist, ist es furchtbar schwer, aus reiner Vernunft und in universaler Selbstverantwortlichkeit allgemeingültige Regeln des sozialen Lebens autonom aufzustellen, obwohl Husserl das verlangt (cf. Hua. 6, S. 272). Er definiert das wahre Sein des Menschen als “Sein auf Telos” (Ibid. S. 15),

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oder als “frei wollendes Subjekt” (Hua. 27, S. 4). Nach ihm ist die Freiheit des Menschen “Vermöglichkeit, seinem individuellen und allgemeinen menschlichen Dasein vernünftigen Sinn zu schaffen” (Hua. 6, S. 11). Es ist sicher auch eine ethische Aufgabe, daβ jeder Mensch mit eigenem Willen und Zweck nach einem besseren Leben strebt und in der Zusammenarbeit mit den Anderen eine bessere Gemeinschaft gestaltet. In der Schaffung einer guten Umwelt wird die menschliche Freiheit zum Ausdruck kommen. Aber leider ist es in der heutigen Gesellschaft eine sehr schwierige Aufgabe. Viele Leute leiden immer noch unter der Zwecklosigkeit ihres Daseins. Und andererseits gibt es auch viele Leute, welche die Idee der Freiheit völlig miβverstehen, und ohne Pflictgefühl nur eigenwillig sich verhalten. Daβ es überall solche unerwünschte Lebensart gibt, wuβte Husserl selbst ganz genau. Deshalb muβte er auch schreiben: “ein Mensch, ein Menschenleben kann nicht vernünftig sein, sondern nur vernünftig werden” (Hua. 27, S. 119). In seiner Abhandlung “Erneuerung als individual-ethisches Problem” (1924) kann man den folgenden Satz lesen: “Zum Wesen des Menschen gehört es ferner, daβ es sich beständig in der Form des Strebens abspielt” (Ibid. S. 25). Am Anfang dieser Abhandlung steht der Satz: “Erneuerung des Menschen — des Einzelmenschen und einer vergemeinschafteten Menschheit — ist das oberste Thema aller Ethik” (Ibid. S. 20). Und am Ende seines Wiener Vortrags von 1935 sagt Husserl: “Europas gröβte Gefahr ist die Müdigkeit” (Hua. 6, S. 348). Die Qualen der geistigen Müdigkeit erfährt aber heute nicht nur Europa, sondern vielleicht die ganze Welt. Gerade in dieser kritischen Zeit müssen wir alle Kräfte anstrengen, um die Menschheit geistig zu erneuern. Das eben ist die Bestimmung des Gelehrten oder Erziehers, besonders in der Gegenwart. Der Engelchor im “Faust” von Goethe: “Wer immer strebend sich bemüht, Den können wir erlösen” — diese Worte sprechen uns immer Mut zu. Nanzan Universität Nagoya, Japan ANMERKUNGEN Die Quellenbelege für die Husserl-zitate sind an den betreffenden Stellen in folgender Abkürzung angegeben. Z.B. Hua. 6, S. 315 = Husserliana Bd. VI, p. 315. 1 Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Bern: Francke Verlag, 7. Auflage, 1966), p. 38. 2 Jakob von Uexküll, Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 1970), p. 119, p. 49 and p. 111.

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3 Erich Rothacker, Probleme der Kulturanthropologie (Bonn: H. Bouvier Verlag, 1948), p. 158 and p. 166. 4 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 23. 5 Ibid., p. 32. 6 Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 3. ed. 1980), p. 28 and p. 126. 7 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie, Werke III (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), p. 77, p. 26, p. 426 and p. 567. 8 Walter Porzig, Das Wunder der Sprache (Bern: Franke Verlag, 5. ed., 1971), p. 49. 9 Ibid., p. 118. 10 Martin Heidegger, “Über den ‘Humanismus’”, in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (Bern: Francke Verlag, 2. ed., 1954), p. 53. 11 Kurt Goldstein, The Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), Chapter 3. 12 Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen Bd. 3 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), p. 271 and p. 235. 13 Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976), p. 39 and pp. 70–71. 14 Karl Jaspers, Von der Wahrheit (München: R. Piper Verlag, 1958), p. 65. 15 Arnold Gehlen, Anthropologische Forschung (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980), p. 34. 16 Werner Heisenberg, Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970), p. 18.

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1. L’éveil de l’esprit En Grèce, le choeur des neuf Muses, filles de Mnémosyne, résumait la culture de l’âme, et l’éducation qui fait les hommes libres, libres à déployer leur esprit. Euterpe et Thalie, Calliope et Clio, Terpsichore et Erato, Uranie et Polymnie, Melpomène, les neuf soeurs étaient tout naturellement associés au trio des Grâces, filles de Vénus. Les disciplines qu’elles symbolisaient avaient pour tâche de libérer l’esprit. Pour Tymieniecka, il n’y a pas de limite, parceque tout est liaison, co-relation, concert, orchestration, interdépendance; elle est à l’écoute du silence qui permet d’entendre l’âme, et cette conversation au-delà de la logique qu’entretiennet les choses avec “the unity with everything-there-is-alive” (“l’unité de tout ce qui vit”) du seul fait de leur coexistence et de leur compénétration en unité. Libérer l’esprit, voilà la vocation de Tymieniecka. Ainsi donc, atteint-elle l’humain et l’universel. Toute oeuvre d’artiste ne vaut que rajeunie et comme enflammée par la lumière naturelle, cette étincelle divine de l’imagination créatrice, car notre nature n’est pas matière opaque et neutre, mais germination de formes vivantes qui souhaitent, pour croître, bénéficier des formes parentes. Nous touchons au problème central, la réhabilitation et l’harmonisation de la vie intérieure. L’harmonie est la clef de voûte de l’équilibre, sans quoi rien ne peut s’accomplir à travers le temps. L’homme et la nature sont vus en relation d’interdépendance et de solidarité. L’harmonie donc doit régir les rapports de co-naissance de l’homme avec le cosmos. Dans ses études telles qu “II grande piano della vita, esigenza delle scienze e della cultura”, Logos and Life — The Three Movements of the Soul, Tymieniecka fonde l’organisation de la vie et celle de notre psychisme non sur l’intelligence, mais sur l’ensemble indissociable de toutes les manifestations que domine l’unité impénétrable de la vie intérieure, la vraie conscience créatrice qui anime les sciences et toute la richesse de notre culture et qui est la plus haute expression de la vie. Ses études approfondissent ses propos sur la vocation de l’homme: le contact perpétuel de l’être humain avec l’éternel. Il s’agit de relier l’homme à tout ce qui a été, et sera, et non pas à une mode d’un jour; d’inspirer le sentiment de l’immense invisible et de l’immense incompréhensible qui nous 27 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 27–39. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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entoure; il s’agit d’exercer notre esprit d’après soi-même, d’après ses propres lois sans béquilles et sans échasses. Elle nous oriente vers le rêve des origines, le rêve qui relie les hommes et cette terre aux valeurs évanouies. La source de la force, de la perfection, de la beauté de ces liens est la lumière qui libère et incite la sève de la vie dans chaque être. La perception spirituelle de la lumière ouvre des dimensions nouvelles: la dimension esthétique, la dimension éthique et finalement cette dimension du sacré qui est la source de tout élan spirituel basé sur l’harmonie du cosmos. L’esprit humain doit être mû par la pulsation, le rythme de l’univers, de la matière qui bat à travers l’homme et son ambiance et touche toutes les formes de la vie. Les lois de la nature sont équilibrantes et tendent à compenser tout excès. Tandis que la civilisation contemporaine est utilitaire et fondée sur les faits (matter of facts) bien isolés et définis, Tymieniecka propose une vision globale, où s’harmonisent la réalité physique et spirituelle, le monde extérieur et le monde intérieur dans des rapports d’harmonie équilibrant l’ensemble par la réconciliation des vues contraires. Nous sommes partie intégrante de l’univers où l’imagination créatrice ajoute par l’acte créateur un apport neuf, vierge à la vie, à la démesure de notre temps. La passion de la vie répond par l’équilibre. 2. Tymieniecka et l’arbre de vie Tymieniecka nous permet ainsi d’échapper à la pression de l’opacité de théories et de systèmes imposée à la culture et civilisation de notre époque. Elle réalise une orchestration spirituelle d’un cosmos vivant en perpétuelle régénérescence. Ce cosmos vivant dans ses enquêtes et dans son expression poétique se compare à l’arbre de vie, en perpétuelle évolution, en ascension vers des valeurs transcendantes, nous mettant en communication avec les trois niveaux du cosmos: le souterrain, par ses racines fouillant les profondeurs où elles s’enfoncent: “the origin of the life-world” — l’acte créateur; la surface de la terre, par son tronc et ses premières branches: toutes les passions élémentaires, “the sap of life” — la sève de la vie; les hauteurs par ses branches supérieures et sa cime, attirées par la lumière du ciel: imaginatio creatrix, la mémoire, la volonté et l’intellect. L’arbre de vie réunit tous les éléments: l’eau circule avec sa sève, la terre s’intègre à son corps par ses racines, l’air nourrit ses feuilles, le feu jaillit de son frottement. L’arbre, selon Tymieniecka, possède un caractère central en étant source de vie: la phénoménologie de la vie selon Tymieniecka embrasse non seulement toutes les sciences sociales,

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mais aussi l’esthétique, la littérature, la musique, la peinture, l’attestation la plus vraie et la plus vivante d’une civilisation. Peinture, sculpture, danse, prose, vers, chant, symphonie, voilà sept cordes tendues côte à côte sur la lyre du philosophe, Tymieniecka qui nous met à l’écoute de l’orchestration du sens esthétique, du sens intellectuel et du sens moral de toute activité créatrice. La littérature et les beaux arts pour Tymieniecka, c’est le choeur des Muses, la correspondance des arts autour de la poésie. Les deux facteurs les plus créateurs de vie sont la lumière et la mer quand elle met en relief: I will . . . investigate two of these onto-poietic factors in the great system of life: the element of light, which is present at the origin of elementary life and omnipresent within it; and the sea, an element which offers us the entire panorama of the human life experience. Both will reveal to us the specific elemental passions of the soul and their proficiencies for creating the specifically human significance of life.1

Tymieniecka explique les grandes oeuvres de la littérature et de la philosophie dans une méditation originaire et fondamentale sur l’expérience de la vie humaine. Laquelle est sa démarche? Comme pour le sculpteur Rodin, elle cherche le caractère de l’homme moderne dans la révélation d’une conscience créatrice. Elle sait pénétrer jusqu’aux couches les plus profondes et les moins conscientes de l’expérience humaine. I I . L E S PA S S I O N S D E L’ A M E . D E S C A RT E S E T T Y M I E N I E C K A : C O M M E N T É QU I L I B R E R L E C O R P S E T I ’ Â M E ?

1. La conscience pure Tymieniecka ne construit pas comme Descartes dans Les Passions de l’Ame un univers entièrement métrique de passions ou bien une physique universelle, par un Moi géomètre, égotiste, le développement de la conscience pour les fins de la connaissance. Nous savons que la clarté, cette conscience poussée que Descartes appelle sa Méthode, l’apologie de la raison mathématico-scientifique, en ramenant la nature à une étendue géométrique inerte, soumise à la connaissance scientifique et à la volonté technicienne de l’homme a conquis un empire géométrique et rationnelle sans limites. La méthode cartésienne implique une croyance et une confiance fondamentale en soi-même, conditions nécessaires pour détruire la confiance et la croyance en l’autorité des doctrines transmises:2 Le dilemme de Descartes est clair: pour éviter de parler de conscience inconsciente, Descartes évoque l’âme. Les passions de l’âme sont la réponse

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qu’avance Descartes pour affronter le dilemme d’une vie intellectuelle irréfléchie, sensible, soumise à la mécanique du corps. L’admiration devient selon lui la première de toutes les passions, parcequ’elle marque une rupture inattendue dans l’ordre de la pensée. Les passions rendent compte de l’écart entre une conscience de soi, et une conscience de l’objet. Par contre, à partir de Husserl, la phénoménologie est un idéalisme transcendantal. Les idées directrices pour une phénoménologie de Husserl (1913) sont aussi la matrice de l’existentialisme français, celui de Sartre, évidemment, mais surtout de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty. La conscience pure, la conscience transcendentale, l’être absolu de la conscience, la conscience donatrice originaire, expriment une conscience qui oscille entre plusieurs niveaux. 2. La conscience créatrice La conscience, par contre, est pour Tymieniecka, dans le système espritcorps, inventeur en puissance s’applique à la fois à la réalité créatrice et à l’invention scientifique. Pour elle, “le poète devient le créateur de l’homme et le philosophe le témoin” comme elle le fait voir dans Eros et Logos et dans Logos et Life, The Three Movements of the Soul. C’est par rapport à Tymieniecka que prennent position Gaston Bachelard, Emmanuel Lévinas, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Cornelis van Peursen, Joseph Kockelmans, Benjamin Schwartz, Werner Marx et beaucoup d’autres chercheurs. Dans Phenomenology in the World, Fifty Years after Husserl, Tymieniecka donne un aperçu des interprétations classiques de Husserl, surtout dans l’oeuvre de E. Fink, R. Ingarden, L. Landgrebe et H.-G. Gadamer. La langue de Tymieniecka est une synthèse rythmée de la pensée et du sentiment: c’est définir l’émotion même. Comme toute musique, elle met l’âme au plein du sentiment passionné et elle s’ouvre au monde. Comme les Muses sur le Parnasse, Tymieniecka pourrait dire: Le bonheur d’être philosophe et poète, c’était d’abord celui de communier avec l’univers, avec les choses premières et fondamentales qui sont la mer, la terre, le ciel et le silence. Son contact avec la vie élémentaire a parachevé son outillage intellectuel et sensible, suivant le rythme qu’impose le fleuve continue de la vie. Elle se met à l’écute de la vie élémentaire, dont les frémissements, les mouvements obscurs de l’être sont harmonisés avec le rythme du cosmos. 3. La citoyenne du monde entre littérature et philosophie Entre l’Asie, coeur immense, et l’inépuisable matrice africaine, l’Europe et l’ Amérique du Nord ont la fonction d’un cerveau. De Socrate à Voltaire, l’in-

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telligence ne doutait pas d’elle-même; c’était la foi qui doutait. On se souvient du doute de Pascal. Aujourd’hui l’intelligence commence à douter d’elle-même. Il y a pourtant des sommets de cette Europe bouleversée qui s’éclairent vaguement d’une aube d’Asie et d’Afrique: Romain Rolland avec sa biographie de Gandhi; A. Gide, traducteur de Tagore; Paul Claudel et V. Segalen, profondément inspirés de l’esprit taoïste, Saint-John Perse, poète qui chante les éléments du désert chinois, Marguerite Yourcenar, envoûtée de la philosophie taoïste qui insiste sur l’harmonie entre l’homme et la nature; Le Clézio qui chante les valeurs sacrées des peuples africains, hindous et indiens; mais c’est la grandeur de A.-T. Tymieniecka qui fait preuve des liens et rapports entre tout ce qui vit et anime cet univers. Son infinie compassion pour l’entière création, homme ou animal, végétal ou minéral, et sa rayonnante certitude du caractère sacré de la vie et celle de sa valeur dynamique, nous sauve de l’aride désespoir et du pessimisme nihiliste. Ses méditations se transmuent en une somptueuse célébration de la tolérance et de la bénévolence à l’égard de toute la création, en célébration de l’essentielle fraternité, de réciprocité, de reconnaissance existentielle qui unit tous les êtres. Tymieniecka, donc, à la fois philosophe et poète, s’est placée à un point de vue antérieur à la division cartésienne des savoirs. Elle renoue avec l’esprit d’orchestration et de curiosité la phénoménologie, les sciences sociales, les créations artistiques et littéraires dans ses écrits tels que Logos and Life, Eros et Logos et dans tous les congrès qui réunissent les chercheurs du monde entier dans une vive discussion des relations entre les disciplines si diverses pour établir un noyau d’orchestration et de symbiose. Les traités d’Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka appartiennent à la noblesse lettreé dont l’esprit et la langue s’ouvrent aux lettrés du monde entier, car tous les peuples participent de la même loi naturelle, faisant de tous les hommes des candidats à l’amitié des autres. Elle ne vit dans sa propre activité contagieuse et généreuse que l’épanouissement et l’élargissement mondial de cet élan sublime à l’oeuvre dans toutes les civilisations. C’est là qu’est l’essence de sa noblesse. Le déploiement de l’imagination créatrice fleurit sous tous les climats et son adversaire est le repliement calculateur de l’utilitarisme et du technicisme de la modernité cartésienne. Avec les congrès internationaux de la société internationale de phénoménologie, esthétique et beaux arts, elle fait affronter professeurs aux artistes, elle dissoud les catégories stériles, le décalage entre émotion et raison, entre la participation sensorielle — motrice et l’apprentissage des disciplines sévères de l’esprit. Avec Tymieniecka, la culture rompt, il va de soi, avec les mornes méthodes universitaires faites de rhétorique et d’académisme

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dogmatique et abstrait. Elle cherche le sens de la couleur, du toucher — elle éveille la curiosité, elle éveille la conscience de tout individu qui réálise avec elle que les hommes ne meurent pas seulement de maladie ou d’accident, ils s’entre-tuent aussi, sans scrupules et sans remords et en toute innocence. Quand elle, comme Artaud, parle du théâtre de la cruauté, elle parle de la vie. La vie est un théâtre de la cruauté. Tymieniecka réalise notre cruauté, car on doit tuer pour manger, se battre pour défendre son territoire, résister au prédateur ou fuir. La cruauté a pour compensation le plaisir sadiste de l’aggresseur-vainqueur. Pourtant, inisiste-t-elle, tout homme qui sent, toute civilisation basée sur la sensibilité et non sur le rationnalisme schématique est ouvert aux autres: porteur de santé, d’équilibre, de joie et de rire. I I I . L E S O U R I R E D U P H I L O S O P H E E T L’ O N TO P O I E S I S D E L AV I E D E L’ H O M M E C R É AT E U R

1. Le sourire de l’esprit de Tymieniecka L’âme et la lumière de tout congrès, c’est le sourire de Tymieniecka qui flotte sur le sérieux de la vie. Dans sa présence et sous sa plume, toute désolation se met à sourire. Elle sait convertir nos façons de voir, de sentir, d’envisager les êtres et elle-même en les ramenant à leur source originelle: leur esprit. Elle sait vivre la joie quand le beau saisi dans le sensible délecte son âme. Le sourire de son âme exprime sa noblesse et sa vie spirituelle. Le secret même de sa vie est liaisons, contacts, échanges. Pour elle, toutes choses co-existent, co-naissent dans leur rapport avec l’ensemble. Son intuition saisit le monde dans son entité vivante, dans ses rapports avec l’ensemble. Elle veut surtout être vraie, vivante et dynamique. Elle a tiré des visions enchantées de la réalité vécue, transformée par son imagination créatrice et un monde animé de vie intérieure par son sourire qui reflète ses états d’âme et son esprit. La vie intérieure bouillonne en elle. Sa puissance créatrice vécue et éprouvée se communique à ses lecteurs. C’est la réalité subjective qu’elle porte en elle et qui crée un lien et un équilibre avec la réalité objective autour d’elle. Dans son étude, In Praise of Life, elle s’exclame: To find oneself look into the game of existence in which you are caught. The toss of a dice, the turn of a current, the flowing together and separating of myriads of occasional instants make the turmoil in which the game is played. . . . As significant as your forces might prove in the great challenges of the life-course, do not ever give up to impotence, turn sour in deception, despair; feel in each of your pulsations, the entire universe pulsate. With each breath you suck the sap of

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the spheres; every turn of your neck turns together with suns, planets, galaxies. You taste with each mouthful the germinating substance of plants, animals, birds, and fishes which lived, live, and will be born: their fragrance melts in your mouth each time you salivate. You loose your vision in the infinite horizon of beingness and you inhale waves, the rays and the dust of the spheres. And within all this you still feel the power of bringing it all unto yourself: the power to manipulate-and command- and the infinitely small till it becomes infinitely extended in your imagination on your own battlefield of existence. Man’s battlefield is itself an exultation in his power of experience: rejoicing in his forces, sensibilities, strengths, weaknesses, joy and suffering, pain and delight, losses and gains as they come, in being his own self.3

Voilà qu’elle propose la réhabilation et l’harmonisation de la vie intérieure par son sourire, la clef de voûte de l’équilibre. Elle requiert l’harmonie et est ainsi solidaire de la nature. Elle va plus loin que l’intelligence, car elle accède à un ordre nouveau, celui de l’esprit. Au fond de son oeuvre, c’est l’amour poétique, l’amour qui songe et qui pense, avec ses aspirations et sa couronne de mélancolie. Le lieu s’ouvre sur le cosmos et la condition humaine dans une interdépendance à la fois topologique et anthropologique. En même temps, l’éveil à sa vérité intérieure permet l’équilibre et l’amplification de deux forces: l’une centripète, qui est l’établissement de soi, en refutant l’atrophie et la dévaluation de sa sensibilité par l’intellect, l’autre centrifuge, qui est de tourner toute sensibilité souriante vers la renaissance du monde, la renaissance de la vie. Cet accès à la vie ne s’ouvre qu’à travers la conscience créatrice, propre à l’art. Comme Paul Valéry, dans L’âme et la danse, Tymieniecka révèle l’analogie entre esprit et corps. Le corps est le milieu naturel de l’âme: L’âme s’y retrouve, comme dans ses ébats, au coeur de la vie: charmes, chutes, offrandes, surprises, feintes, mystères de présence et d’absence, d’amour et de haine, d’avidité, sentiments de puissance et d’impuissance, en un mot, ‘tous les hasards du réel’.4

2. L’ontopoiesis de la vie Elle sait évoquer un éveil nouveau et une vie nouvelle dans l’ontopoiesis de la vie. Son esprit, sa volonté, sa mémoire, ses sentiments s’allient pour mobiliser tous les facteurs de la vie intérieure avec ses forces psychiques dont le ton, la couleur, les nuances assimilent leur contenu spirituel de ces synergies créátrices, ce dynamisme de la volonté, ces sentiments et ces pensées dans ce qu’elle appelle l’ontopoiesis de la vie. De cette fusion d’éléments naît un état intérieur très important qui font surgir les facteurs de l’état créateur. Poiésis désigne l’activité créatrice de l’artiste et du poète, un

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collaborateur de la Nature, l’image de Dieu. Sa vision métaphysique de la vie, selon la notion du flux héraclitien, est la poiésis de la vie: “Onto” refers here to the “firstness” of this process with respect to the scale of existential formation. “Before” this schema’s articulations there is no beingness that we may ascertain with the criteria of our minds- which are attuned precisely to this and no other reality. “Onto-” here also means the indispensable and universal character of whatever there could be in the “objective” form proper to human reality, in the sense of the classical metaphysics of “‘onto-” logos, that is, ontology. However, and this is of crucial significance for the understanding of our vision, this indispensable essential factor of all beingness does not concern beingness in its finished, formed, established or stabilized state; it is the intrinsic factor of the constructive process of individual becoming. The individual remains always in the process of becoming. It acquires form and transforms it. “Becoming” is “becoming something that is not yet.” Becoming is a process in its own advance, in qualification. Hence I call it, going back to Aristotle’s Poetics, a “poietic” process: onto-poietic. In brief, the self-individualization of life is an ontopoietic process.5

Et Tymieniecka, qui, sachant connaître ce procès à l’oeuvre chez l’artiste, évoque l’art du danseur comme un exemple de ce qu’elle appelle “the selfindividualization of life” où le danseur réalise le mieux le libre déploiement du corps et de l’esprit par l’éveil de toutes les synergies créatrices: l’art est ainsi le point où les phénomènes de l’âme se traduisent dans ceux du corps, et inversement. Dans le secret de la danse, dans les rapports de l’art et du corps qui l’exerce, les peines du corps s’échangent avec celle de l’âme. . . . la danse s’approprie les fonctions de l’esprit, ses lois, et l’étendue de ses pouvoirs. . . . Esprit et corps se révèlent donc comme des structures analogues. A travers un système qui obéit aux lois physiques, qui se situe dans une espace à trois dimensions, l’âme traduit ses propres dimensions dans celles de l’espace et de la matière: elle s’y retrouve, elle s’y étend, comme une âme s’étend dans son corps. . . . que l’esprit peut se mouvoir dans son intimité avec le corps. Cela, seul l’art nous l’apprend. . . . On dirait alors que le corps, transformé par l’art, devient le lieu où le réel, l’irréel et l’intelligence se peuvent fondre et combiner selon la puissance des Muses”.6

En somme, elle récuse cet imaginaire rétréci, dû à la non-culture de masse qui étouffe l’individu. Pour elle, l’individu n’est pas l’égoïste mais celui qui est conscient qu’il est unique et original. Personne d’autre ne lui ressemble. Elle dit que le héros est en nous et qu’il ne demande qu’à vivre et s’exprimer. Donc elle rejette tous les déterminismes et les systèmes de pensée. Pour Tymieniecka il n’y a pas de héros médiatisés. Le héros s’affronte à l’inconnu dans la solitude pour rien. Ce qu’il fait est gratuit. Tymieniecka, comme Don Quichotte a fait de sa vie un bel élan d’amour, de bénévolence, de magnanimité. Voilà un beau programme de vie. Elle sait affronter les moulins à vent avec un sourire.

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3. Le sens moral et l’homme créateur: Qui sommes-nous? Où allons nous? Comme Cervantes, Saint-Exupéry et les taoistes chinois, Tymieniecka est hantée par le mur invisible qui sépare l’intellectuel de l’homme. Ce mur ou ce gouffre est une obsession dans Moby Dick de Melville et Billy Budd de Conrad, où le narrateur-héros demande aux fraternités de l’action une fusion émotionnelle d’indulgence, de bénévolence et de magnanimité qui s’ opposent à tout vice calculateur et de cruauté animale. Elle nous avertit: “If the petty malice, calculation, and cruelty of man consign him to the very bottom of the scale of life, magnanimity crowns him and lifts him to the summit”.7 La fin de la littérature et des arts, c’est l’homme, et l’homme est en chacun de nous. Partout s’expriment les angoisses et les heurts des êtres séparés, avides et incapables à la fois de se rejoindre. Le drame de la solitude des consciences murées dans leur propre liberté, l’impuissance à entrer en contact avec les autres, c’est ce qui consomme la perte des Orestes d’Eschyle à Sartre ou O’Neill qui tentent vainement par un acte meurtrier de s’intégrer dans le monde des hommes. Par contre, Tymieniecka fait voir à l’exemple des protagonistes de Moby Dick et Billy Budd, que la loi dogmatique et rationnelle morale a fait faillite, car seule la bénévolence et la générosité du coeur, the “subliminal virtualities”, sauront vaincre tout égotisme malicieux. C’est bien l’état que décrivent ces lignes de Tymieniecka: Civilization seems to have, on the one hand, inherited the full consequences of the disaster of the mythical fall of man; on the other hand, it appears in its highest unfolding to also be the ground for the liberation of man’s subliminal virtualities, virtualities which . . . allow him to equilibrate his life situation, even to avoid its pitfalls.8

Au moment où la civilisation tend à devenir ‘mondiale’, seul une prise de conscience sur la crise économique, certes, mais aussi crise psychologique, morale et spirituelle apporte un éveil sur quelle base le présent que nous affrontons parviendra à dégager l’avenir que nous voulons.

I V. L E S E N S E S T H É T I QU E E T L’ I M AG I NAT I O N C R É AT R I C E

1. Tymieniecka entre la phénoménologie, les beaux arts et la littérature Tymieniecka ignore ce triste substitut que les modernistes ont inventé pour couvrir leur stérilité: la théorie. C’est par son intuition et non par système que le spirituel a reconquis ses droits sur l’orchestration ou la symbiose de

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phénoménologie, de la littérature et des beaux- arts: le geste, la couleur, le silence, l’espace. L’artiste, dans sa vision de poètes, se trouve anobli et exalté. Au point où, de la sensation, jaillit l’idée, commence le royaume du mot qui est celui de l’analyse. Le vers conduit au-delà, jusqu’à la musique, lorsque l’idée s’évapore en un sentiment ineffable. Elle met en relief la vocation supérieure de l’homme et les lois naturelles qui régissent l’existence: “c’est-à-dire entre les élans sublimes de l’homme et les conditions naturelles de sa vie, entre l’esprit et les sens, en un mot entre l’homme créateur et l’homme naturel”.9 L’expérience la plus élémentaire nous apprend que la nature humaine, si elle a un fonds universel, se manifeste en réalité par une diversité assez merveilleuse de vocations, de pentes individuelles, de passions, d’idées fixes. La vraie culture, comme l’agriculture est le parachèvement patient de la nature. Le propre de la littérature et des beaux arts, dit en substance Tymieniecka, n’est pas d’évacuer les lieux communs, mais de les approfondir jusqu’à la révélation de leur secret. Ce secret ou “cipher”, le plus difficile de tous à toucher, c’est celui de la nature humaine, commune à tous, mais singulière chez tous. Ce secret est inépuisable, il est à la source de la fertilité littéraire et artiste et de son extrème variété. “Life significance of Literature, the orchestration of phenomenology, aesthetics and the Fine Arts” (la vie: la quête d’un idéal en phénoménologie, esthéthique, littérature et beaux arts) signifie un éveil de la vie avec l’esprit créateur, et comme tel, vainqueur du Temps. Elle sait le secret des arts: le bonheur de reconnaître la nature essentielle au fond des lieux communs. Cultura animi, cest pour elle la croissance de l’âme par l’étude désintéressée. Une certaine gratuité doit entrer jusque dans la trame d’une de nos journées, qu’elle doit aller transfigurer le banal. La culture trouve en elle-même sa propre récompense. Nous partageons avec elle une double prise de position en face de la civilisation rationnelle et objective d’aujourd’hui: d’une part un sentiment de malaise de plus en plus profond devant ses excès, ses menaces de violence et d’autre part le besoin d’y échapper de façons très opposées pour rétablir l’équilibre humain compromis. 2. La crise: la conscience liée à la conception mercantile de la culture L’homme a provoqué son propre déséquilibre: Si les données concrètes et positives, productives et traductibles en chiffres monétaires, si les valeurs numéraires des marchands dans le domaine du matériel et du quantitatif qui

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caractérisent la civilisation scientifique et téchnique s’inscrivent dans notre vie, si nous voulons tout régler par principes et définitions dogmatiques, nous tombons victimes du schématisme rationnel, du rationnalisme logique et simplificateur, borné à organiser rationnellement l’expérience sensorielle du monde. Notre civilisation est donc fondée sur l’administration, muée en bureaucratie qui entend organiser la société selon le profit, le rendement quantitatif par pure logique, en conformité avec un rationnalisme artificiel. L’homme occidental tend donc toutes ses forces et ressorts de sa vie intérieure vers l’efficacité et le rendement: en soumettant soi-même, les autres, son environnement à ses appétits les plus bas. L’échange est source et fondement de la civilisation. Autant profit et rendement sont des intoxications artificielles qui déséquilibrent la vie, plénitude et accomplissement y sont en accord avec la vie. L’homme a provoqué son propre déséquilibre par l’amputation de la vie intérieure en atrophiant et étouffant les fonctions les plus profondes de la vie. 3. Le sens esthétique entre le rationnel et l’irrationnel ou comment récupérer la sensibilité? La vie intérieure, pareille à l’océan réside dans la profondeur où il rétablit sa totalité et son unité. La source de toute vie intérieure est un silence animé, un rapport d’égalité actif entre le monde et l’homme, cette harmonie de rythmes de tout ce qui naît et jaillit en nous, qui est inspiration et intuition. Toute vie surgit d’un centre, puis elle germe du dedans au dehors, telle que les artistes en font preuve soulevant la question: Quel rêve s’exprime dans les oeuvres d’art les plus connus? Rappelons que la vocation la plus profonde de Rembrandt et des peintres baroques est la zone ténébreuse des révélations intérieures, tandisque celle de David néoclassique marque la zone claire des lois logiques. L’Embarquement pour Cythère de Watteau exprime le rêve d’harmonie, de paix, de bonheur et de fuite dans un monde au-dela du visible; la Marseillaise de Rude s’écrie: ‘Aux armes citoyens’. Voilà ce qui est le fruit des excès de la passion révolutionnaire: sa bouche de pierre vocifère à briser le tympan. Si l’oeuvre impressionniste de Renoir ou Monet fixe le spectacle lumineux d’un moment heureux enregistré par les sensations optiques, Le Cri de Munch exprime la montée d’une inquiétude nocturne qui emporte dans le tourbillon d’une vision hagarde et hallucination expressionniste. Dans notre époque qui est celles des ingénieurs et des usiniers, ce qui est utile n’a pas besoin d’être beau et peut être fabriqué à la hâte. Grâce à l’usage des machines, la géométrisation d’éléments fixes et déterminés est réalisée dans

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l’architecture et le paysage qui nous entourent. Le culte du géométrique, du rectiligne, de la ligne droite crée un quadrillage schématique et monotone, car notre intellect réduit tout à l’image des formes spatiales, surtout en cubes. Nous avons passé d’un monde de paix et de bonheur encore connu par les impressionnistes, à un monde d’oppression, dans un univers qui a perdu son assiette ferme. Paul Claudel et Marc Fumaroli à juste titre appellent la peinture l’école du silence. Ils sont à la recherche du sentiment dans les images. Et quand nous défilons devant les chefs-d’oeuvre exposés dans les musées, et qu’environne tout le luxe scientifique et téchnologique dont la modernité est capable, Tymieniecka pose la question: Comment les voir, comment les sentir, comment entrer en conversation avec elles? Les arts doivent tout aux manières de voir, de sentir, de toucher, d’ouïr et de goûter. Les synergies créatrices s’expriment dans des images orchestrées d’ énergie émotive et d’ éclosion intérieure. CONCLUSION

Jean-Louis Barrault, dans Ce que je pense, nous rend visible deux images qui expriment le mieux nos rapports ou liens soit de cruauté ou de sympathie avec autrui: rapports de couvercle ou de corolle. Le couvercle peut à la fois protéger autrui en responsable ou bien le dominer en propriétaire. Figurezvous que ce dernier peut dominer un homard vivant (de la famille des crustacés): jeté dans l’eau bouillante, cet homard évidemment tâche à se sauver en remontant en haut pour se débarrasser du couvercle de la domination. Le deuxième rapport est celui de corolle qui exprime à la fois libération et licence, la liberté de s’épanouir soi- même comme une fleur et embaumer l’ambiance autour de nous ou bien profiter de la licence à faire n’importe quoi. Le péché contre l’harmonie est donc double: a) c’est le désaccord extérieur dans le rapport avec notre environnement; b) c’est le déséquilibre intérieur de nos facultés. Tymieniecka propose comme but de la vie l’épanouissement de l’être, la régénération de l’homme qui éprouve la magie, la plus haute forme de la conscience créatrice dans son for intérieur pour assurer et assumer sa nature complète dans ses sources libres et sensibles. Tymieniecka qui, sachant connaître et rassembler tous les coeurs, saurait révéler à lui-même, en tout enfant qui a un visage de musicien, le naissant Mozart. Comme Saint-Exupéry elle voit en tout homme, Mozart assassiné. Elle s’est interrogée sur les causes profondes de la crise contemporaine, mais elle envisage aussi nos espérances, ainsi qu’en témoigne

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maint titre de son oeuvre, tel que: In Praise of Life; Life: In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations; Life: The Human Quest for an Ideal; Life: Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of Philosophy. Tymieniecka insiste sur les liens qui ne s’acquièrent pas matériellement, tels que le lien de la famille, celui de la foi ou de la langue. Ils sont magiques. Même que rien ne puisse être expliqué, elle insiste à connaître la magie par ce qui est surgissant, jaillissant et bondissant. Il s’agit des forces vivantes et inconscientes, sensibles et affectives qui lient l’homme à la nature et non pas à la machine ou la machine à la nature. L’homme n’est qu’un maillon de la nature. Il n’est donc pas question de conquête de la nature, mais de découverte et de réalisation de l’harmonie homme-nature par le rêve, l’imagination, la contemplation, l’esprit poétique et l’essor vers l’accord, l’équilibre, la justesse et l’harmonie. En réveillant les dons innés et essentiels d’amour et de transcendance, elle insiste sur le repect profond de la vie individuelle nourrie du passé, sur le souffle créateur et le dépassement des forces aggressives en face des autres et en face de la nature par la faculté d’amour, de reconnaissance, et par le respect de la vie qui est latente en chacun de nous, comme équilibre naturel. Michigan State University N OT E S 1

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Logos and Life. Book 3: The Passions of the Soul and the Elements in the Onto-Poiesis of Culture, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), p. 10. 2 Paul Valéry. “Etudes philosophiques” Oeuvres. Ed. Jean Hytier (Paris: Pleïade, 1957), pp. 787–844. 3 “The Praise of Life, A Treatise in the Metaphysics of the Human Condition and of Life”, in Phenomenology Information Bulletin, a Review of Philosophical Ideas and Trends, (Vol. Belmont: World Phenomenology Institute, 1982, p. 96). 4 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Eros et Logos, Esquisse de phénoménologie de l’intériorité créatrice, illustrée par les textes poétiques de Paul Valéry (Louvain, Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1972), p. 112. 5 Life. The Human Quest for an Ideal, Analecta Husserliana XLIX, 25th Anniversary Publication (Book II), ed. Marlies Kronegger and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Kluwer: Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1996, p. 15. 6 Tymieniecka, Eros et Logos, op.cit., p. 110. 7 Tymieniecka, The Passions of the Soul, op.cit., p. 125. 8 Ibid. 9 Tymieniecka, Eros et Logos, op.cit., p. 16.

front: Marlies Kronegger, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka back: Ponti Venter, Jiro Watanabe.

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T H E N OT I O N O F “ H U M A N I T Y ” I N A N NA - T E R E S A T Y M I E N I E C K A’ S A N T H RO P O L O G I C A L T H O U G H T

I N T RO D U C T I O N

Clearly the term “humanity” has not gone out of date in our times. At present, among some philosophers, ethicists, and theologians this notion is essentially tied with the notion of life. Pioneering of work in the philosophy of life and the human creative condition has been carried out for over three decades now by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.1 The aim of my paper is a presentation of Tymieniecka’s probing, of the notion of “the humanity” in her anthropological thought. I would like to show that this philosopher’s approach takes up “the humanity” (the human being) on a “higher” level. Tymieniecka has said that in my early work on the first phase of the phenomenological influence in which phenomenology performed the task of unifying the human sciences by giving them a common foundation in some basic anthropological views and in an ontologically founded methodology, I have disclosed three centers of a common philosophical basis for the foundational field of encounter between the human sciences: first, the assumed structural rationality of all objects of human cognition; this assumption resulting in a variety of methodological approaches called in general “phenomenological.” Second, the anthropological conception shared by Husserl and Heidegger—albeit differently—of the life-world correlative with the conscious existence of the human being. Third, the Jaspersian conception: the encounter with the other human being (essential implicitly also in the genesis of the transcendental life-world).2

Later, the philosopher gave her introduction to phenomenology of life and of the human condition. I think that these represent a new type of philosophy of life in contemporary philosophy in general. I believe that one should place Tymieniecka’s philosophy of life among such philosophers as: W. Dilthey, F. Nietzsche, G. Simmel, H. Bergson, L. Klages, H. Driesch, O. Spengler, José Ortega y Gasset, and Miguel de Unamuno. Then this new type of philosophy of life will be projected along the lines of her conception of man. I . T Y M I E N I E C K A’ S V I E W O F M E T H O D I N P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

The philosopher has said: “the crucial philosophical issue decisive for the path which a theory or a philosophical system takes to explain the human 41 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 41–49. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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universe is that of its means of access to the real.”3 The dialogue which Tymieniecka has carried on with phenomenologists (i.e., E. Husserl, M. Scheler, M. Heidegger, R. Ingarden and others) on the subject of applied phenomenological methods, concerns the connection of the notion of “man” with the notion of “reality.” The philosopher prefers conjectural inference to thematize the elemental spontaneities of life and to investigate the crucial complex of the origin of meaning. “In our investigation it came to light that neither cognition, in any form, nor human behavior, conduct, or action (with all their evidences: intellectual, intuitive, moral, emotive, pragmatic, etc.) may open an access to the essential nature of human knowledge, or to man’s essential status and his role within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, of which he constitutes an inextricable segment.”4 Within phenomenology these experiential perspectives are known: the intentional, eidetic, transcendental, as well as emotive, aesthetic methods. In Tymieniecka’s thought, the spheres of human experience are extended beyond these. The philosopher writes, “Husserl sought vainly to bring nature, body, soul, and spirit under the aegis of transcendental intentionality, Ingarden left us merely ontologically unintegrated ‘regional’ fragments; Maurice MerleauPonty did not succeed in bringing together flesh and the world, flesh and nature, the infinite logos and human destiny.”5 I I . T H E O P E N I N G O F T H E WO R L D - H O R I Z O N B Y C R E AT I V I T Y

I think that Tymieniecka needs in relation to her philosophical reconstruction of the human universe, the so-called Archimedean point “from which everything finds its proper place.” With this “point of view,” the givenness of man within his world is not only of a process-like nature but indicates a specific form of constructivism. For the philosopher, the notion of “constructivism” means: firstly, the development of the human being in his life-course; secondly, that very life is in itself the effect of his self-individualization in existence through inventive self-interpretation in his most intimate life moves; thirdly, man’s evolution as a living being extends life’s possibilities.6 Therefore, Tymieniecka proposes that this Archimedean point from which “the unity of all the possible perspectives on man’s experience can be explained, and the key to the Human Condition be obtained, lies in the creative act of the human being which makes him ‘human’ — the creative act of man where the differentiating factors of the macrocosm of life differentiate.”7

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According to the philosopher, in the Husserlian perspective the limits of intentionality are tied with the origin of the objective order. She instead is asking first after the origin of forms of the human. That is why Tymieniecka assumes a givenness-in-becoming, where all differentiates from virtual powers. The cognitive function of the human being “meets” with all this in the enactment of his life-course.8 First of all, the performance of this enactment entails the so-called principles of cognitive emergence and its nature. In searching for the origin of order, the human being enacts and delineates (in his essential way) the enactment of his life-course. Thus he bestows meaning upon the life-world and his social world. Here the philosopher states that “the life-progress entails the prototype of human action which resides in the creative act of man.”9 In this way, I would like to approach the project of the constructive individualization of the human being. Tymieniecka relates the real individual to his fundamental existential role. Moreover, the philosopher postulates a common network for the existential agent of real being which extends between its entelechy and its telos. She discovers that to be human means to be creative. Tymieniecka underlines the crucial role of the telos which presides over the enactment of the creative function: (1) It allows the human agent to break with his imposed survival-oriented patterns and advance toward the orchestration of Imaginatio Creatrix. Thus it opens up an exit from the closed horizon of Nature (and of the transcendental circle, for that matter) for specifically human freedom. (2) Leaving behind the preestablished regulative principles of the intentional system (subservient to Nature), the creative telos guides the origin of new forms as fruits of human invention. Thus it leads man from natural determination to creative possibility. (3) Finally, the creative vision offers us the much sought system of reference for thematizing the preintentional dimension of human functioning as its “subliminal” resource: it appears as the specific endowment of the real, human individual basic to the human condition.”10

I I I . A P P ROAC H I N G T H E N OT I O N O F “ P H I L O S O P H I C A L A N T H RO P O L O G Y ” A N D T H E N OT I O N O F T H E “PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE”

For the philosopher, man’s creative act is operative in the emergence of the “source-experience.” It establishes a living being as human. In other words, the human condition crystallizes in the self-individualization of the living being. Tymieniecka draws attention to the fact that “neither philosophical anthropologies, focusing upon the human being as if he were the center of the

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universe, nor ontologies, stressing the objective structures, which are the fruit of the most advanced forms of life, can do justice to this urgent call, issuing from the disarray in which human knowledge and man find themselves, for the definitive clarification of the sources of rationality.”11 What is key, I think, is that this the philosopher joins the notion of “philosophical anthropology” to the notion of the “phenomenology of life” in her exposition of the creative act. Moreover, Tymieniecka finds the correspondence of philosophical anthropology and the phenomenology of life in the “central” philosophical focus, namely, in the Human Condition. I V. T H E C R E AT I V E E X P E R I E N C E O F M A N

The philosopher formulates five principles of the metaphysics of life. (1) Life consists in a self-individualizing advance through which all types of rationalities emerge in their respective functional rules; (2) man’s creative act allows a unique and absolutely evident access to the existential constructivity of life; (3) from among the sequences of life’s constructive progress, the phase at which the Human Condition emerges stands out. The unfolding of its unique set of virtualities with the Imaginatio Creatrix at the center marks the turning point in life’s constructivism; from the life-subservient vital rationalities we move to the invention of specifically human avenues of life; (4) the creative orchestration of the individual’s functioning is instrumental in the surging of the source-experience, from which phase the specifically human rationalities originate; (5) the source-experience is the watershed between the vitally relevant rationalities of life and the inventive virtualities of the Human Condition. It is also the locus where all the rationalities which account for the diversification of the cultural forms of humanity within the circumambient conditions of the living system on earth acquire their specific sense.”12

In Tymieniecka’s philosophical vision, the metaphysics of life can be identified with first philosophy. Then, philosophical anthropology as the offspring of this can be identified by the name the metaphysics of life. According to the philosopher, “phenomenological anthropology moved within an anthropomorphic field, whereas the creative phenomenology of life opens all the doors so arbitrarily closed thus far, through which the soul communicates with all the circuits of being and becoming, psychic, vital, organic and inorganic, cosmic circuits, as well as with those circuits generated through the crystallization of the virtualities of the human condition, circuits intellectual, social, cultural, spiritual, religious.”13 In this way, the human soul is revealed by extending itself over all the functioning circuits of man’s self-interpretation-in-existence. In virtue of opening the extended field of the soul, I can investigate all the forces and their molding, specifically, the forces that lead and carry this development. Thus is revealed the subterranean threads which — according to Tymieniecka —

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link the fragments of the genesis of the spiritual act. Here, one should accent the development of moments in their meanings. I believe that the philosopher’s phenomenology of life relies upon the rigor of intuition itself and upon its interpretation as dictated by the concatenations among intuitions, which fall together into the harmony of the vision of the All, the gift of the gods to humanity. That is why Tymieniecka finds ideals which are the backbone and beacons of the specifically human significance of life. They are “the fruit of the cultivation of the main threads of the human significance of life.”14 In fact, “they develop all the concrete lines of the work that the human mind undertakes in its inter-subjective/social interaction, all of which is naturally put to the service of the cultivation of the life of the spirit: human culture.”15 V. TOWA R D S T H E N OT I O N O F “ H U M A N I T Y ”

In accordance with Tymieniecka, I believe that it is the creative experience of man that engenders the capacity of the living being to become human. The creative act accounts for humanness as such. Then “it may progressively penetrate into all the spheres of existence, of life, the reality in which this station is not always openly rooted but out of which it has developed in stages, maintaining permanent ties.”16 The philosopher has said that We encounter, then, two distinct and yet integrated sides of man. There is the subject matter of the empirical/physical sciences, on the one side, and the issues emerging with the universal recognition in the human sciences of the human being as a historical being, on the other side. Ontopoietic self-individualization characterizes both sides, though in different ways according to their specificities.”17

Tymieniecka gives us a definition of the entelechial “ontopoietic design that she sees unfolding here.” This ontopoietic design is neither abstract nor empired. It is an infinitely complex system that maintains its virtual consistency while being embodied in concrete functional links. These links are themselves embodied in concrete virtual moments of response to a variety of promptings, attractions, stimuli.”18 In this way, the ontopoietic prompting force of her phenomenology of life is expressed in the manifestation of essential features and fulfills its main prerogatives. This belongs to metaphysics, to philosophia prima. Thus the entelechial design brings us to the existential profile of the ontopoietic route. Also it personifies the autonomous selfhood of the selfindividualizing being in progress. In other words, the ontopoietic route of the

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living being participitates in its sufficient reason in order to establish its ontic ground. Human individuals ratify themselves by the notion of “human dignity.” This notion serves as the postulate of human rights. Thus, “we have to seek the meaningfulness of human rights in their significance for man’s self-interpretative progress.”19 According to the philosopher, value is not an entity of any type, nor is it a feature of an entity. “It is an abstract complex of meaning constituted within the cognitive process by structurizing the recurrent elements of the respective variants of a valuative moral experience into one coherent core.”20 In other words, “values pertain to the subject, insofar as they express the morally valuative elements of his experiences.”21 The human subject “has” a value in virtue of an especially moral mode of self-interpretative performance.22 For Tymieniecka, virtue is “an actually present ‘state’ of his ‘inner self’ belonging to the moral subject.”23 With the philosopher we may say that this state of the inner self represents a factor of stability in the interpretative progress of existence.24 However, virtue is experienced in the conduct of the Other. In the first place, it is treated as the very motor of moral conduct. In this way, Tymieniecka approaches the detection of virtue as “the latent moral proficiency of the person within man’s system of self-interpretation.”25 One should pay attention to the fact that the philosopher conceives the word “valuable” to mean “a specific side feature of the meaning of value.”26 Thus, “the essential significance of values resides in their ‘worth.’”27 In addition, positive values have a “positive worth,” and negative ones a “negative worth.” In this connection, the moral valuation of the human person is centered in his moral conscience. He constitutes “his” worth. But human dignity is not a value. It is neither a virtue nor worthiness. The philosopher has said that human “dignity manifests itself in the quality of gestures, acts, posture, etc.”28 In turn, human rights do not express a vital or a social significance. They express, rather, “the existential significance of the Human Condition.”29 At this point, the human person may postulate his human rights on account of his self-devised self-interpretive mode of beingness. Thus, his due human rights are related to his human dignity and vice versa. To be sure, the meaningfulness of his existence must be actualized. It is true that Tymieniecka has sought the foundation of morality in the functioning of the Moral Sense: “moral sentiment, valuation, judgment, and action do not originate with the perception of moral values, but in the experience of moral valuation as founding a specifically human phase in man’s self-interpretation.”30

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It is important for my further considerations that the human person originates the consciousness of his unique human dignity. In this context, I may speak of a self-consciousness of “humanity.” Finally, for the philosopher, the humanness of the human individual (implicitly the human person) does not reside in his highest rational self-consciousness, but in his consciousness of the universal life-conditions. Thus the decisive factor in the specifically human significance of life is not the intellect, but the Moral Sense. VI. SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

In Tymieniecka’s anthropological thought, the notion of “man” is differentiated into “the natural man” and “the spiritual man.” This division has its philosophical tradition. I think that the philosopher’s thought on the notion of “humanity” is exactly tied to the formulation of the specifically human significance of life. Indeed, the creative act of the human being makes him “human.” Professor Tymieniecka observes the appearance of the diversified cultural forms of humanity. However, these are related to the circumambient conditions of the living system. I believe that the philosopher prefers so-called metaphysics “from below” to metaphysics “from above.” Firstly, the notion of “rationality” is at stake along with the notion of “naturalism” in her philosophy of life, because a type of the organic/vital rationality is especially accentuated by Tymieniecka. Secondly, the notion of “value,” of “virtue,” of “worthiness” as well as the notion of “human dignity,” of “morality” in general are analysed in her conception of consciousness of the universal lifeconditions. I believe, that in this state of matter these notions do not have objective status but only subjective status. I will say that the so-called, self-interpretation-in-existence or self-interpretative performance spoken of in this philosophy of life bears no guarantee of an advance from the natural man toward the spiritual man. In my comprehension of this question, only within Tymieniecka’s perspective of supernaturalism or transnaturalism is it possible for the natural man to be fully freed to be spiritual. The framework of my paper does not allow taking up an analysis of this fascinating question. I N S U M M A RY

Tymieniecka proposes to conceive of “humanity” within the so-called culture of life. The philosopher unfolds man’s essential status and his role within the

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unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. She brings the notion of “philosophical anthropology” close to the notion of a “metaphysics of life” or of a “phenomenology of life.” The creative experience of man bestows on a living being the proficiency to become “human.” In this connection, ideals are the fruit of the cultivation of the main threads of the human significance of life. Then, the ontopoietic field of Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life opens to the appearance of the essential features of the human being, i.e., of his humanity. Here, human rights are accentuated as bearing the existential significance of the Human Condition. Then, these are related to the human dignity. Values express the morally valuative elements of the experiences of the human individual. Thus the human person may postulate his human rights for realizing his humanity. Then, he originates self-consciousness of his humanity. The Moral Sense is the decisive factor in the specifically human significance of life. In my understanding, Tymieniecka prefers metaphysics “from below.” The notion of “rationality” assumes an organic/vital cast. In my opinion the notions of “value,” of “virtue,” of “worthiness,” of “human dignity,” of “morality” have subjective status. But for the spiritual man all can appear in another perspective within which to understand moral issues, i.e., in the perspective of supernaturalism or transnaturalism. College of Banking Gdansk Technical University of Gdansk N OT E S 1

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life: Book 4 (Dordrecht, 2000). Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition in Communication with the Human Sciences,” in A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.) The Phenomenology of Man and the Human Condition, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 14 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), p. 36. 3 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Logos and Life, Book 1: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 24 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. 3 4 Ibid., p. 4. In raising the conjectural postulate of a telos in the individual’s becoming, “we project the common network of the existential agent of real being which extends between his entelechy and its telos” (ibid, p. 23). 5 Ibid., p. 4. 6 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 7 Ibid., p. 6. 8 Ibid., p. 7. 9 Ibid., p. 7. 10 Ibid., pp. 28–29. 2

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Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “First Principles of the Metaphysics of Life. Charting the Human Condition,” in A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 21 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 7. 12 Ibid., p. 8. 13 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “From the Sacred to the Divine,” in A-T. Tymieniecka, From the Sacred to the Divine, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 43 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 9. 14 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Theme. Passions Soaring toward Ideals: Allegory and the Ideals of Mankind,” in A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Allegory Revisited. Ideals of Mankind, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 41 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994)., p. xv. Also see my paper “The Ideals of Life in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka,” in A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 60 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 137–154. 15 Ibid., p. xv. 16 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Ontopoiesis of Life As a New Philosophical Paradigm,” in Phenomenological Inquiry 22 (October, 1998), p. 37. 17 Ibid., p. 48. 18 Ibid., p. 49. 19 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Moral Sense. A Discourse on The Phenomenological Foundation of the Social World and Ethics,” in A-T. Tymieniecka and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), Foundations of Morality, Human Rights, and the Human Sciences, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 15 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 67–68. 20 Ibid., p. 68. 21 Ibid., p. 69. 22 Ibid., p. 69. 23 Ibid., p. 70. 24 Ibid., p. 70. 25 Ibid., p. 71. 26 Ibid., p. 69. 27 Ibid., p. 69. 28 Ibid., p. 71. 29 Ibid., p. 71. 30 Ibid., p. 68

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GEORG SIMMEL BETWEEN GOETHE AND KANT ON “LIFE” AND “FORCE”

1 . I N T RO D U C T I O N

Georg Simmel, sociologist of the edgy, feverish, metropolitan lifestyle, philosopher of modernity, money, and fragmentation, has a decidedly classical background. Consider him not merely a man of his own times, fruit of late 19th-century culture and sociology, but a man who each day reads Kant’s philosophy and Goethe’s poetic and naturalist works, garnering sustenance for his daily reflection. Apart from the particular style of his learning and the results of his research, the interest in and passion for the “classical” period of late 18th-century German culture plays a decisive role in his philosophy. Simmel dedicated several monographs to Kant and to Goethe, the Berlin lectures on Kant in 1904, the important monograph on Goethe in 1913, as well as comparative studies such as Kant und Goethe in 1906 and numerous articles published in periodicals and newspapers upon various aspects of the culture and social lifestyle of his times, springing from his nonacademic reading of their works. It is widely known how fundamental the legacy of Kant’s philosophy is, in connection with the theoretical aspect of Simmel’s whole philosophical theory, particularly regarding the very idea of a formal sociology, the introduction of typically philosophical categories within sociological reasoning which raise it above simple empirical research. Less known perhaps is the fact that the figure of Goethe himself, together with his works, represents an object of limitless admiration and constant inspiration: The multitude of quotations from Goethe which are found in all of Simmel’s works have only too often been seen as purely evocative and ornamental. On the contrary, if one considers Simmel’s works in their entirety, one cannot fail to see that he makes use of quotations to accentuate his reasoning, to synthesize a paradox, or illustrate an idea. The figure and works of the great poet and naturalist, so diverse and removed from Simmel himself, provide him with an occasion for fundamental problematic intersection, a dynamic melting pot of ideas, producing livelier, more fluent thoughts, but above all giving substance to some of the fundamental aspects of philosophical and sociological reflection. 51 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 51–68. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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There can be no doubt that in both situations we have a case of nonstatic inheritance, something not passively accepted but creatively and originally lived over again. One might perhaps affirm that Simmel is a heretical heir of Goethe and Kant; he makes use of their categories, giving birth to a new and heterodox usage, while at the same time recognizing the value of their vitality and validity, heedless of the age from which they derive. Besides the fundamental concept of form, likewise the ideas of organism and of Wechselwirkung (reciprocal action), which are a direct legacy of Kant and Goethe, play a central role in Simmel’s works, conceived, however, within a philosophical horizon and with totally new theoretical meanings. 2 . G O E T H E : M O R P H O L O G Y A N D C O M PA R AT I V E M E T H O D

Given Simmel’s enormous interest in Goethe’s poetry and naturalist work, as well as in his personality in general, it is safe to say that Simmel recognizes a research method and line of thought, one which had had very little success with the specialists of the time,1 and adopts them as his own. His profound knowledge of the whole of Goethe’s works, both poetic and naturalist, as well as with his letters, induces an extreme yet paradoxical proximity with the “Olympic” poet’s problems, allowing him to travel a road deeply influenced by both Goethe and Kant.2 It is well known that Goethe’s nature studies are concerned with the morphology of living phenomena, animal form, and with the metamorphosis of plants as well as with the visible genesis of colour. Goethe considered himself neither a Naturforscher nor a Naturphilosoph, but a Naturschauer. In fact in Goethe’s opinion, a natural scientist subdivides a phenomenon into simple elements, while a philosopher discovers a secret unity on a metaphysical basis; however, the manner in which Goethe conceives his naturalist work appears to be, on the one hand, firmly connected to the phenomenon, to the visible experience, the manifold and comparative observation, while on the other, concerned with all that which is not manifest as a simple collection of data but rather as form.3 Ever since his earliest research and reflections on organic nature, Goethe’s idea was not so much of a conceptual definition but rather of a direct observation of the variety and richness of natural phenomena, considered on the grounds of comparative methodology. The case of the intermaxillary bone, for instance, is a perfect example: the comparative observation of various animal skulls allowed Goethe to reach a conclusion which went beyond the simple and widely discussed “discovery” of 1784, which

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proclaimed, in a manner open to much criticism, the presence of this bone in human skulls (or at least in the skulls of children and foetuses).4 The possibility of resolutely placing mankind within the animal kingdom, having removed the obstacle which the absence of this small bone — previously considered typically animal — represented, was momentous enough for the period, but was important, above all, for leading the way to a method for Goethe: Indeed the comparative exercise, which he had first come across in Lavater’s study of physiognomy, tends to bring to light certain constant, invariable elements within the infinite variability of nature. By making an orderly observation of the jawbone in the most diverse species of animals, it is possible in fact to see how it changes according to a set rule, how the series of specimens may be essentially considered the transformation of the selfsame form. It is possible to recognize the mutation of shape of the same form, even when it changes radically, as long as this change is observed by degrees within a certain orderly sequence. There is a chasm between the turtle’s jawbone and the elephant’s, says Goethe, but if we place them in the continuing circle of life, it is possible to recognize the same form, which changes, assuming different dimensions and positions while remaining, however, clearly recognizable.5 A form, an invariable, a shape, an idea, a type: The variability of nature is not casual; indeed, it reveals rules and order. Moreover, the comparison reveals that the invariable, or type, should be regarded as a point around which multiple variations radiate and cannot be considered a static model, nor simply a genealogical model or archetype subjected to alterations in time, but is to be seen rather as a sort of point of indifference around which the form and volume of animal bodies oscillate, following a pattern of a compensatory type. Goethe’s research, in this case, is characterized above all by the fundamental idea that all living beings do not necessarily have a fixed (bestimmt) destiny, and the interpretation of their structure and characteristics cannot be based on the finality that they fulfill, but indeed should be examined within its conformation, within its internal completeness, or perfection (innere Vollkommenheit), within its internal logic, one could say, which could be subsequently listed with external, circumstantial conditioning, natural habitat, accustomed movements, and type of nutrition. Goethe clearly sees the necessity, above all, of identifying the rules which explain the internal functionality of a living being, the necessity of identifying whatever it is that creates a significant, organic whole, a nonaccidental product of Nature. In understanding the foundation of its internal equilibrium, one identifies the

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logic which defines the essential traits of the character and aspect of the animal. The influence of habitat is certainly not to be underestimated, as can be observed in the many examples given both in Metamorphose der Pflanzen as well as in numerous articles of the same nature and in notes regarding the influence of light on plant growth, but this is characterized as proceeding from the structural characteristics of the animal. Furthermore, in one of the most important essays regarding this subject: “Erster Entwurf einer allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende Anatomie ausgehend von der Osteologie”, published in 1795,6 as well as in other works, it is possible to find a definite controversy which stems from Spinoza’s theories regarding the final causes: The suitability of the organism in a habitat can be neither the principal criterion, nor the only one, for judging and understanding animal form. The importance which Goethe attributes to the influence of habitat is without doubt considerable, and certainly neither marginal nor secondary, but it cannot be considered separately from the innere Vollkommenheit (internal perfection) of the individual being. The internal logic of each organic natural being has an independence and self-sufficiency of its own. Nevertheless, it never clashes; indeed it is closely connected with the äussere Zweckmässigkeit (external finality), which defines the extent of the suitability of the habitat in which the individual being lives. The influence of the habitat is recognizable in many external elements, as, for example, in the case of the bird, whose lightweight body is suitable for flying, or vice versa, in the case of the fish, whose body is “inflated” by the water in which it lives. However, it is hardly likely that it would be capable of substantially altering its internal logic, as in the case of the seal, whose shape, as Goethe points out, remarkably resembles a fish, but whose internal structure, above all on an osteological level, clearly shows the characteristics of a perfect quadruped. We [. . .] consider each creature as an end unto itself, and since its components lie in a position of the strictest affinity of action and reaction, each one in relation to the next, then each animal must be considered physiologically perfect. No component, regarded from an internal point of view, may be considered worthless, nor, as might be occasionally imagined, produced, so to speak, by force of will of some formative impulse, albeit, some components may externally appear to be superfluous, since they were moulded by the internal connection of the animal nature, regardless of exterior circumstances. If, therefore, we wish to question ourselves, for example, on the Sus babirussa’s canines, we need to investigate their origin and not their purpose. Rather than affirm that a bull has been provided with horns in order to butt and toss, we shall investigate how the bull has those horns with which to butt and toss.7

And shortly beforehand Goethe had declared: This observation proves the rule, according to which, nothing may be added to a part unless being first taken away from some other part, and vice versa. [. . .] The formative impulse

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undoubtedly reigns sovereign here, in this limited but well-structured world. The items among which its expenditure may be divided, are strictly imposed; it is, however, free to establish the quantity to apportion to each one, up to a certain point. If it wishes to bestow more on one item, there is absolutely nothing to stop it; however it will be immediately compelled to subtract something else from some other. Thus Nature may never be in debt, or go bankrupt.8

In Nature as in Art, different forms are present within a certain sphere of possibilities, which is practically infinite, as far as the various combinations are concerned, but which remains within the limits prescribed by the type, limits established according to invariables, to fixed elements of function and position, but capable of occurring in the most divergent patterns in relation to the concrete, external form. “If the creative spectrum (Bildungskreis) of Nature is limited, the form is nonetheless subject to infinite variations, due to the vast number of extraordinarily changeable components.”9 Animal form, or in other words the type to which each different class may be traced, as, for example, mammals, remains fixed and is not subject to variations but appears in an infinity of different ways, provided that the structure frame, or rather the combination of fundamental bones essential to that particular class of animal is respected. In the case of an osteological type, the variations can be of different kinds: The bone structure is constant, affirms Goethe, as far as the position and end-use of each bone is concerned, but inconstant and variable as far as the number, size, and form of the bones is concerned and above all in their ability to increase or decrease in volume. The more a bone or part of the body increases, the less important are the remaining parts. Nature has a prefixed budget, and, therefore, is compelled to recover at one hand what she has already spent at the other. Utilizing the language used so far, one can say that we are dealing here with a sort of action and reaction of Nature which links together the various parts of an animal body in a reciprocal affinity. This is Goethe’s principle of morphology for interpreting animal form: the dominance of one part of the body over another part is what provides an organism with its specific character. The length of a snake’s body, which Goethe describes as infinite, must be considered in relation to its absence of limbs, in which nature “economizes”, thus permitting a longer body; or again, the absence of horns in a predator can be linked to the evolution of an extraordinary set of teeth, necessary to its lifestyle. Consequently, we are facing a sort of equilibrium based on volume, whereby if one part of the body increases in size or mass, therefore becoming a decisive morphological characteristic of that species, another separate part of the body is compelled to decrease in size or mass, and so on.

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Goethe presents an idea of the organism as a dynamic whole, as a sum based on reciprocal affinities between its various parts, according to a morphological rule which is also recognizable in the external physiognomy of each single species. This then is a Wechselwirkung, a compensatory connection between the external parts and volume and shape of a body, insofar as if an organ would adopt larger dimensions, other organs would be subjected to a corresponding reduction. If examined closely, this methodological behavior, this attention of Goethe to form, illustrates a theory that there is in Nature a polarity: even when morphologically interpreted, the idea of a dynamic equilibrium between various anomalous parts of the body, always leads back to the idea of a polarity, which idea is constantly present in Goethe’s works, from his Metamorphose der Pflanzen to his Farbenlehre. We are faced here with an idea of reciprocity, of Wechselwirkung seen as a compensatory connection between various elements, or as a sort of tug of war between opposites, which join up in different patterns, producing visibly different phenomena. In Metamorphose der Pflanzen Goethe spoke of a movement of expansion and contraction of the same model of the leaf in a succession of different organs of the plant, and it is well known how he explicitly uses the idea of polarity to explain the origin of colour: Goethe does not consider colours to be simple segments of white light, but rather, to be visible above all at the exact points where light and shade converge, as shown in the numerous experiments collected in his book Farbenlehre. Thus their explanation is based on a relationship between opposites. Colors are actions of light, actions and passions [. . .]. With a delicate juggling of weights and counterweights Nature oscillates this way and that, rises here or there, above or below, before or after, thus conditioning all existing manifestations within space and time. We perceive these universal movements and determinations in varying ways. Here we capture a simple rejection and attraction, there a light which illumines and disappears, or perhaps a rush of air, a bodily vibration, in the form of acidification or de-acidification — nevertheless constantly joining or separating, producing movement in whatever happens to be present, creating some sort of life.10

The whole of Nature is, for Goethe, permeated by a principle of oscillation around a set point of equilibrium, definable as a sort of breathing organism, in an activity of expansion and contraction, of systole and diastole, of light and darkness. As one can deduce from quotations in which the principle of action and reaction has been discussed in various ways, this idea of an equilibrium originates with Kant, just as Goethe himself affirms in a passage of

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Campagne in Frankreich;11 he draws his principle of polarity from the idea of the relation between two opposite forces of attraction and repulsion, an idea which he applies initially to colour and subsequently to the whole of Nature. Kant, then, is seen as indicating an idea, a method, a line of thought inherent to movement and dynamism. But Kant’s position, though original and rich in potential diverse interpretations, was nonetheless considered to be within the limits of a theoretical paradigm, easily identifiable as that of Newton.

3 . K A N T, S I M M E L A N D T H E DY NA M I C D E F I N I T I O N O F M AT T E R

It is well known that in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft dated 1786, Kant used Newton’s universal principle of gravitation and his introduction of the idea of force into physics to provide a new definition of matter. The forces of attraction and repulsion are defined as “original motor forces” and not as living forces in the sense Leibniz suggested that of productive and self-determining forces: They are thought of as the theoretical basis from which the concept of matter is deducible a priori. However, on the basis of the Newtonian model, they are considered as constant forces acting as a function of distance. The purpose of Kant’s work is to provide an a priori foundation for the laws of physics; in other words, to supply a metaphysics of Nature containing first of all a general notion of matter. In fact, matter cannot be conceived any longer on the basis of notions such as the Cartesian res extensa or the Aristotelian view of matter as a substrate or potential capable of taking a variety of forms. This new notion does away with the distinction between primary, objective, and mathematically cognitive qualities and secondary, subjective qualities, related to the human sensory apparatus. Kant moves from the assumption that the notion of matter cannot be based merely on sensory perceptions if it is really to be a priori and to make natural science apodictically certain. It must be based on the categorical structure described in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, referred to in this work when dealing with the division into four parts, corresponding to the four groups of categories: kinematics, corresponding to quantity; dynamics, corresponding to quality; mechanics, corresponding to relation; and phenomenology, corresponding to modality. Moving from the general idea of movement in space, Kant faces the topic of the impenetrability of bodies from a novel standpoint, i.e., not from that of the mere empirical existence of matter, but from that of the consideration of the action of two moving forces. On the basis of Newton’s model, matter is

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defined as a result of the action of a force of repulsion (Zurückstössungskraft), which allows it to expand in all directions and to fill up space, thus offering resistance to the penetration of other forces, on the one hand, and of the force of attraction (Anziehungskraft), which allows the compression and the mutual drawing near of the components that the former force alone cannot allow, on the other. As Kant points out, if a force of repulsion fills up a space, it would expand to infinity should there be no other moving force acting in the opposite direction, so as to assign a given portion of space a given amount of matter.12 This idea had a great influence on the German cultural world of the time: It was then picked up by Fichte and above all by Schelling, who paved the way for the great period of the Romantic Naturphilosophie, which was mainly based on a posited dialectic of nature’s internal forces, on the annihilation of all traditional material foundations, and on its dynamic, energetic, and spiritual interpretation. This idea of a Wechselwirkung between two opposed forces appeared to many as a new fundamental key for the interpretation of nature. (The two opposed forces were conceived by Kant as constant and fundamental moving forces, acting as functions of distance, in line with Newton’s model; yet, they were interpreted by Naturphilosophen as “living forces”, that is, as being productive, creative, self-moving, dynamic and having an autonomous vital principle.) Even so, Kant certainly did not consider this idea to be as fundamental as his followers did, for he always fought against all forms of hylozoism and all ideas of nature as having an internal vital principle, even in his Kritik der Urteilskraft.13 Simmel tackled this Kantian issue in his dissertation at the University of Berlin in 1881, Das Wesen der Materie nach Kants Physischer Monadologie. It is undoubtedly clear that this is a fundamental element of his thought, for the term and the notion of Wechselwirkung plays a central role not only in Simmel’s philosophical writings, but also in all his greatest sociological works. In Simmel’s view, conceiving nature in terms of a relationship between forces was a fascinating interpretation at the metaphysical level, which he later decided to use to provide a new description of the social phenomena he was determined to analyse. Simmel’s interpretation of Kant’s work once again stresses its dynamic and energetic facet. In fact, Simmel points out that the definition of matter in terms of forces provides not only a foundation for the law of inertia, but also a confirmation of a process of becoming and not of being simply: If matter in general consists of forces, it cannot be considered as passive material, on which other forces can exert their power freely. The product of those forces is not a finite product, but a

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continuous process; it is not a being that can be handled as one wishes, but a becoming, which cannot be superimposed by another becoming: the two becomings can be intertwined and consequently undergo modifications. Forces are not divided into different levels.14

4 . T H E C O N C E P T O F R E C I P RO C A L AC T I O N I N S I M M E L’ S WO R K S

The theoretical consequences of this principle are immense for Simmel’s thought: Reality can be viewed not as a substance, as a static dimension, not as a being that can be described here and now on the basis of its law of constitution, but dynamically, in terms of a network, of a crisscrossing of relationships, as forms of interrelations. This is why we speak of Simmel’s “sociological relationism” what first appears in works such as Über soziale Differenzierung (1890) and returns in Philosophie des Geldes (1900) and in Soziologie (1908). Sociological relationism is directly, though paradoxically, connected to the notion of organism, one of the most important novelties of Romantic Naturphilosophie. In fact, for Simmel, the object of sociology is not society as a whole, as in Spencer’s or Durkheim’s work, nor is it conceptually relevant to consider it as a sum of separate social atoms, i.e., the individuals it is composed of. Therefore, Simmel’s sociology is neither organicistic nor atomistic; it deals instead with the forms of relationship between individuals. It is not concerned with the goals or contents in each individual’s consciousness — this is the object of history, but with the typical forms of the reciprocal action, or interaction, between individuals, defined by Simmel as Wechselwirkung. In Über soziale Differenzierung, Simmel will again and again explain this concept by recourse to the metaphor of the organism, used as a symbol of a unity based On the more powerful action of the parts upon one another, whereas the connection of the inorganic body is weak enough to leave the properties and functions of all other parts unchanged after one of them has been removed.15

In Soziologie (1908), Simmel’s statements become extremely clear and concise: Society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction (Wechselwirkung). This interaction always arises on the basis of certain drives or for the sake of certain purposes. Erotic, religious, or merely associative impulses; and purposes of defense, attack, play, gain, aid, or instruction — these and countless others cause a man to live with other men, to act for them, with them, against them, and thus to correlate his conditions with theirs. In brief, he influences and is influenced by them. The significance of these interactions among men lies in the fact that it is because of them that the individuals, in whom these driving impulses and purposes are

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lodged, form a unity, that is, a society. For unity in the empirical sense of the word is nothing but the interaction of elements. An organic body is a unity because its organs maintain a more intimate exchange of their energies with each other than with any other organism; a state is a unity because its citizens exhibit similar mutual effects. In fact, the whole world could not be called one if each of its parts did not somehow influence every other part, or if at any one point the reciprocity of effects, however indirect may be, were cut off.16

And further along: But when using the term in the second sense, social science indicates that its subject matter is the forces, relations and forms through which a human being becomes sociated. [. . .] There is no such thing as society “as such”; that is, there is no society in the sense that it is the condition for the emergence of all these particular phenomena. For there is no such thing as interaction “as such” — there are only specific kinds of interaction. And it is with their emergence that society too emerges, for they are neither the cause nor the consequence of society, but are, themselves, society.17

Therefore, on the basis of the notions of Wechselwirkung and organism, the idea of a nonorganic society is attained, where substance is replaced by function. The general concept of society disappears and the complex of mutual relationships entailing fragmentation, incompleteness and contingency is analysed. Simmel, unlike Weber,18 does not endeavour to provide a systematic definition of social macrophenomena, but strives to analyse the deepest details of microrelationships: the cynic, the disillusioned, the coquette, the secret, the stranger, the poor, the subordination of minorities, faithfulness, gratitude, decency, the relations between sexes, etc. What he reckons relevant is that each of these social “types” (another Goethian legacy) can be described in terms of relations, i.e., not in absolute terms, but on the basis of the different — often opposed — processes on which mutual relationships are based. The concept of Wechselwirkung described in Simmel’s sociological works has been widely discussed. Many critics have argued that this is the key concept through which the novelty and the extraordinary modernity of Simmel’s stance can be comprehended. Unlike many other sociological theories of the time, it does away with a general view of society. There is no scientific law for the society as a whole.19 What we can know, given the fragmentary character of knowledge, are the different ways in which individuals interact. As David Frisby pointed out, the object of Simmel’s sociology is neither individuals, who are unknowable by virtue of their individual totality, nor society:20 the object of sociology is the complex of forms of interaction, an approach that deeply influenced American sociology.21

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It is the lack of a systematic attitude that characterises all of Simmel’s sociological works, the atomising of sociology’s matter, the tendency towards microsociology and towards the short essay on limited social issues that manifests the importance of the relational element as a fundamental component of the concept of Wechselwirkung during the first stage in the evolution of his thought, within which a major role is played by so-called sociological atomism.22 As has been pointed out by Friedrich Tenbruck while quoting the first chapter of Soziologie (1908),23 Simmel reckons that at this stage there is not an overall Wechselwirkung but only special types. In Simmel’s view, there are merely forms and not one overall form: Society is not a substance in and of itself, but a complex of associations linked together that do not make up an organic unity. With this in mind, many have spoken of a passage from an idea of society as substance to an idea of society as function, where a fundamental role is played by contingency, by the randomness of forms, which do not make up an organic whole, as in Weber’s great systematics, but operate in particular perspectives, in an essentially fragmentary manner. What Simmel investigates is not society as an organic body, nor is it the many different individual viewpoints, as he clearly explains in Soziologie (1908); it is instead the different manners and forms of relationships between individuals, the particular processes through which they interact and influence one another. In this sense, sociological relationism is strictly linked to Simmel’s gnosiological relativism. It is the varied, contingent perspectives, impossible to organise in a systematic order, that count both as primary material for sociological investigation and as cognitive criteria. In both cases, Vervollständigung is but an ultimate aim, it is a perspectival focus ad infinitum where a countless number of viewpoints meet and intertwine in the most unexpected, unusual and even weird manners. As philosopher of modernity, Simmel is attracted by anything that expresses some kind of conflict or that at least gives rise to a difference, a contrast, a boundary, even though running through his thought is an all too evident craving for synthesis, which is given an absolute value in his last work, Lebensanschauung. However, at the same time, contrast and competition are considered by Simmel not merely as negative elements of social life but as phenomena, among many others, that hold society together, for they allow us to vent all those impulses that would otherwise have a destructive effect. For example, the opposition exerted by one element against another connected to it, is not an absolutely negative social factor: it is often the only means that allows us to stay together in spite

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of our unbearable personalities. Were we not capable and were we not to have at least the right to fight against tyranny, whims and tactlessness, we could not stand relationships with human beings whose character annoys us so much, and we would be driven into desperate actions that would undoubtedly kill the relationship.24

The very dimension of modernity sheds light on the fact that the increase in the difference, in the distance between human beings, caused by the variety of relationships, does not mean estrangement, fragmentation and disintegration only. It also entails an increase in relational dimensions, in the incapability of living completely estranged and isolated, and consequently, a paradoxical increase in unity. The ambivalent nature of money is a fundamental instance of this paradox: While money, as a universal means of exchange, separates the individualities of those bound by a social relationship of a monetary kind, it also makes possible the establishment of relationships of many different kinds, as well as moving straightforwardly, though impersonally, from one social level to another. In a money-less economy all this becomes inconceivable and actually impossible. Therefore, at the same time money divides and yet unifies.25 Even the case of the stranger is a good example in clarifying Simmel’s stance: in Simmel’s view, the concept of “stranger” is not an absolute concept, but a relational one.26 We are not strangers by nature, but we become strangers when the relationship that binds us to the group we live in changes. If it ceases to be a stable and “natural” one and instead we choose to live in a group other than our original one, on a spatiotemporal limited dimension, it is possible to seize an element of outsiderness that is, however, tied to a trait of proximity characterising the very idea of “stranger”. And it is the difference between belonging to and being kept at a distance by a given group that affects the way it is perceived. The stranger is essentially a figure of contrast and relationship. Unlike the traveller, who has by definition no ties of stability to a place, who is free from any bonds and obligations towards the community, the stranger belongs to a group located in a given place and having a stable and spatially fixed life and yet has not belonged to the society there from the very start: His belonging to that society is temporally limited, out of necessity or by choice. This means that the notion of the “stranger” is based on a very peculiar combination of proximity and distance: The “stranger” embodies the fact that what is far away lives near and what is near comes from far away. As long as he is considered a “stranger”, his belonging to such community is marked by his place of origin and, therefore, clearly marked by his precarious existence.

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Therefore, the concept of “stranger” is actually an oxymoron: It is near distance or distant nearness.27 For Simmel, the stranger is, however, a figure symbolic of the more general functioning of the advanced industrial society: It combines, through money or through the organisation of metropolitan life, what remains divided in the spatiotemporal dimension and, by means of relationships, preserves that estrangement that can make metropolitan life appear to be inhuman and absolutely impossible to endure. Yet this society also entails the possibility of achieving a certain degree of individual reserve, of being an individual who does not concentrate on one relationship only, but is involved in many, as is typical of people in metropolitan life, which enriches the spiritual life as a whole. The impersonal character of the “mediated” relationships made possible by advanced societies, on the other hand, allows us to avoid the social control typical of more archaic societies and to cultivate a reserve and attention to the individual dimension that more “human”, but less complex and more unilateral, societies do not allow. The concept of organism, which Simmel borrows directly from German classical philosophers, is, therefore, interpreted through new and different lenses. It is therefore possible to analyse it from a standpoint that highlights not merely the elements of unity and solidarity, gathering and closing ranks around a precise and well-identified centre, but also by linking it — and this appears to me theoretically important — to the network of interrelations, of Wechselwirkungen. It does not necessarily involve a centre and a final and definite functional organisation, but manifests instead the reciprocal effects, reaching towards infinity and for which no limits, no self-containment, no order such as marks spatial and conceptual limits can be set. Simmel’s formal sociology entails an idea of organism that does away with its typically associated idea of unity and appears to be linked to an idea of multiple and infinite relationships. However, another context wherein the idea of organism plays a pivotal role, but with a different meaning, is that of Simmel’s reflections on aesthetics. Here the idea of organism retrieves the features of unity and self-containment seemingly lost in Simmel’s sociological analyses. This meaning of organism and Wechselwirkung, one closer to the traditional meaning, will become the prevailing one in the last stage of the evolution of Simmel’s thought. The work of art is described by Simmel as an organic unity, as a “world” — with this word having a precise conceptual value, meaning self-contained and selfsufficient — as something separate having its own internal, completed meaning.

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Simmel’s essay on the “frame” contains a very clear explanation of this issue: The character of objects depends ultimately on their being either a whole or a part. The fact that a self-sufficient, self-contained existence is determined by the law of its own essence only, or that, being a part, it is connected to a whole from which it gathers strength and meaning only, is what distinguishes the soul from any other material element, the free being from any other social being, the moral personality from the personality that, by virtue of the sensuality of desire, depends on the fabric of all given things. This is the basic difference between a work of art and a mere element of nature. As natural existence, every object is merely a point run through by an unceasing flow of energies and matter, whose only meaning comes from its being an element of the entire natural process. The essence of the work of art lies in its being a whole, with no need to be in relation with the outside, and with all the threads of its fabric leading back to its central core.28

This conceptualisation, which seems to retrieve, in a more traditionally self-contained sense, the idea of organism — as happens with the concept of “life” in his last great essay, Lebensanschauung — reflects the original Kantian idea of matter as a point run through by a flow of energies and forces, obviously now interpreted in a vitalistic sense and without the strict Newtonian coordinates, but evoked once again as a theoretical element fundamental in Simmel’s thought. As in this understanding of art, a definition provided in Simmel’s essay on the aesthetic meaning of the “face” links a spiritual activity to an organism: Forming a unity with all the world’s elements can be described as an authentic activity of the spirit: the spirit reduces the co-existence of things in space and time to the unity of an image, of a concept, of a proposition. The more closely related the parts of a connection and the stronger the interaction that turns their foreignness into mutual dependence, the more permeating the spirit in the whole. Therefore, the organism achieves a degree closest to the spirit through the mutual relation between the parts and their involvement in the unity of the living process.29

Also in this case, the mutual dependence of the parts in a work of art explicitly recovers the idea of an organism, considered no longer, in a relationistic sense, as a network of reciprocal exchanges, but as a unity having a centre. Consequently, the concept of Wechselwirkung here has the same characteristics as the Goethian idea of organism, where it is considered as a unity composed of different elements and based on an idea of balance and equilibrium. However, since it is conceived in dynamic terms, it acquires an immaterial appearance and reaches a level close to a spiritual one. After the relativist stage in Simmel’s thought, the idea of reciprocal action, while

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continuing to be central, seems to be turned upside down, so that its meaning now confirms an order and a solidarity in the real world previously not found. Yet, this order and solidarity appear in contexts where the object loses its materiality and becomes spiritual. The desubstantialisation already stressed when dealing with the Simmelian idea of society as a network of relations returns here, but on a higher level, in images of solidarity around a centre achieved on the level of the immaterial, of the spiritual, and in this sense does not contradict but simply modifies the methodological attitude previously adopted. This concept is also important for the definition of the feminine as opposed to the masculine, in which instance the link with the Goethian Ewigweibliche and the Schillerian schöne Seele is absolutely evident: The self-containment that has seeped from women’s cultural role into their inner life, or that, conversely, has emerged out of the latter and has given shape to the former, when in its purest state, grants it some features typical of the work of art, whose essence is a state of selfcontainment, of self-sufficiency never attained by any natural formation.30

In his essay Weibliche Kultur Simmel states: Man comes out of himself, gives free play to his productive strength and in this way acquires a “meaning” outside himself, in a dynamic and ideal form, or in the form of creation or representation; conversely, the essence of woman lies in her imperturbability, in her organic armour enclosing the harmony of her character, in the uniform relationship between the centre and the parts, exactly as in the definition of the Beautiful. To use symbols drawn from metaphysical concepts, woman can be defined as being and man as becoming: this is why he must conquer his meaning in the world of history or in the world of knowledge through an object or through an idea, whereas woman must be beautiful, in the sense of beautiful as “happy in oneself”.31

This brings us back to the similarity with the work of art, which, though being part of the world, appears as something self-contained and complete, as an independent world, whose charm often makes it metaphysically inexpressable. Woman is an immediate and self-contained unity totally unfamiliar with the difficulties of knowledge as a process, as a production, as a tragedy: She has a “less historical nature than man”.32 And here emerges again the importance in this image of the Schillerian-Goethian idea of the beautiful soul which, apart from being extremely fascinating and almost mythical, has a character that might perhaps be considered premodern, a dimension belonging to a world recognised to be vanished but that we still evoke sometimes, when suffering under the unbearable gravity of the laceration of the modern and of the masculine.

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We return here to the central thesis on the paradoxical connection between the “nervous” sensitivity, the relativist attitude, the metaphysical relativism typical of Simmel’s thought, and the great unitary idea of the world, typical of late eighteenth-century classical German culture. As we have tried to demonstrate, the connections are manifold, and often we tend to interpret instead of simply describing; thus, the two eras, seemingly so distant, melt into one another. We reckon that greater importance should be attached to the works read by Simmel as well as to Simmel’s culture, not simply that related to nineteenth-century philosophy and to Kant, which is much too obvious to be neglected, but also, more generally, to classical and Romantic thought as one of the constant and, strangely enough, less investigated facets of Simmel’s thought. It must be recognised perhaps that many fundamental concepts of Simmel’s philosophy have at all stages a “classicist” flavour and that the great sociologist of differentiation, of money and of the metropolis never surrenders completely to fragmentation, for the idea of unity, or the idea of organism, associated with the former, which is obviously used metaphorically but undoubtedly borrowed from the biological sciences, is found throughout Simmel’s thought, thus confirming the typical and so often stressed ambivalence of his philosophy. This ambivalence turns Simmel into the champion of sociology of the modern era while remaining a critic of modernity. He shows more nostalgia than is usually recognised for the solid premodern world that can seemingly be perceived in the background of the complex idea of life, a background perhaps implicit, nondeclared, perhaps not entirely conscious, but definitely close to the more profound and intimate Simmelian sensibility. N OT E S 1

On the scant success of his nature studies see J.W. Goethe, Schicksal der Handschrift, in Werke E. Trunz (ed.), (Munich: Beck, Hamburger Ausgabe, 1982), Vol. 13, pp. 102–105. 2 On the importance of Kant in Simmel’s philosophy see K.C. Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantismus (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1986), and idem, “Il giovane Simmel tra positivismo e neokantismo,” Rassegna Italiana di sociologia 2 (1992), pp. 215–232. 3 On Goethe’s morphological method see D. Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit (Graz, Vienna, Koln: Böhlaus, 1965); M. Kleinschnieder, Goethes Naturstudien (Bonn: Bouvier, 1971); F. Amrine, F. Zucker, A. Wheeler (eds.), Goethe and the Sciences, A Reappraisal (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Tokyo Reidel: 1987); P. Giacomoni, Le forme e il vivente. Morfologia e filosofia della natura in J.W. Goethe (Naples: Guida, 1993); and G. Giorello and A. Grieco (eds), Goethe scienziato (Turin: Einaudi, 1998). 4 See V.H. Bräuning-Oktavio, “Vom Zwischenkieferknochen zur Idee des Typus. Goethe als Naturforscher in den Jahren 1780–1786”, Nova Acta Leopoldina 18 (1956); M. Wenzel, “Der

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gescheiterte Dilettant. Goethe, Sömmerring und das ‘os. intermascillare’ beim Menschen”, in Sömmerring Forschungen,’ Vol. III (Stuttgart, New York: G. Fischer: (1988), F. Moiso, “La scoperta dell’osso intermascellare e la questione del tipo osteologico,” in Goethe scienziato, op. cit. pp. 298–337. 5 J.W. Goethe, “Dem Menschen wie den Tieren ist ein Zwischenknochen der oberen Kinnlade zuzuschreiben”, in Werke, op. cit, Vol. 13, pp. 184–196. 6 J.W. Goethe, Werke, op. cit, Vol. 13, pp. 170–186. 7 Ibidem, Vol. 13, pp. 176–77. 8 Ibidem, Vol. 13, p. 176. 9 Ibidem, Vol. 13, p. 179. 10 Zur Farbenlehre. Didaktischer Teil, Ibidem, Vol. 13, p. 316. 11 Goethe, Werke, op. cit., Vol. 10, p. 314. 12 I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, in Gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1910). Vol. IV, pp. 496 ff. 13 As regards Romantic Naturphilosophie, see: Romanticism and the Sciences, A. Cunningham and N. Jardine (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Romanticism in Science, S. Poggi and M. Bossi (eds.), (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994); AAVV “Scienza, filosofia della natura e romanticismo tedesco,” Annali:sezione germanica. Studi tedeschi (Naples: 1995). 14 G. Simmel, Das Wesen der Materie (Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei, 1881), p. 19. 15 G. Simmel, Gesamtausgabe, O. Rammstedt (ed.), (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), Vol. II, p. 129. 16 G. Simmel, “The Problem of Sociology,” in Georg Simmel 1858–1918. A Collection of Essays, K. Wolff (ed.), (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959), p. 314. 17 Ibidem, pp. 319–320. 18 As regards the relationship between Simmel and Weber and the sociology of that period, see Georg Simmel und die frühen Soziologen, O. Rammstedt (ed.), (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1989). 19 On this issue, see H.J. Dahme, Soziologie als exakte Wissenschaft. Georg Simmel Ansatz und seine Bedeutung in der gegenwärtigen Soziologie (Stuttgart: Enke 1981), pp. 465 ff. Also see F. Tenbruck, “Georg Simmel”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 10 (1958), pp. 603 ff; F. Fellmann, Lebensphilosophie. Elemente einer Theorie der Selbsterfahrung (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1993); A. Dal Lago, Il conflitto della modernità. Il pensiero di Georg Simmel (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994); and finally, my work, P. Giacomoni, Classicità e frammento. Georg Simmel goethiano (Naples: Guida, 1995). 20 See D. Frisby, Georg Simmel (London: Tavistock, 1984), pp. 64 ff. 21 For further information on this issue, see D.N. Levine, E.B. Carter, E.M. Gorman, “Simmel’s Influence on American Sociology,” in H. Böhringer, K. Gründer (eds.), Aesthetik und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende: Georg Simmel (Frankurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1976), pp. 175–228. 22 See H. Böhringer’s essay on this topic, “Spuren von spekulativem Atomismus in Simmels formaler Soziologie,” in Aesthetik und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende: Georg Simmel, op. cit., pp. 105–114; and Dal Lago, Il conflitto della modernità, op. cit., pp. 43–86. 23 See Tenbruck, G. Simmel, op. cit. pp. 604 ff.; on this topic also see K.P. Biesenbach, Subjektivität ohne Substanz (Frankfurt a.M., Bern, New York Lang: 1988). 24 G. Simmel, Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, O.Rammstedt (ed.), (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), p. 262. 25 G. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, in Gesamtausgabe, op. cit., Vol. VI.

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G. Simmel, “Der Fremde,” in Das Individuelle Gesetz, M. Landmann (ed.), (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 63–70. 27 On these topics see B. Nedelmann, “Ambivalence as a Principle of Socialisation,” Rassegna italiana di sociologia 33 (1992), pp. 233–256 and idem., “Georg Simmel. Emotion und Wechselwirkung in intimen Gruppen,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, (Sonderheft, 1983), pp. 179–209. 28 G. Simmel, Philosophie der Kunst, Gertrud Simmel (ed.), (Potsdam: Kiepenheuer 1992), p. 41. 29 Ibidem, p. 43. 30 G. Simmel, “Bruchstücke einer Psychologie der Frau” (1904), in Schriften zur Philosophie und Soziologie der Geschlechter, H.J. Dahme, K.C. Köhnke (eds.), (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 177. 31 Ibidem, p. 169. 32 Ibidem, p. 221.

SECTION II

The organizing group of the congress. From left to right: Robert Wise, Tadeusz Czarnik, Leszek Pyra, A-T. Tymieniecka, Piotr Mroz, Joanna Handerek

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PA L E OA N T H RO P O L O G Y F RO M A P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L P O I N T O F V I E W. S O M E R E M A R K S A B O U T T H E G E N E T I C S T RU C T U R E S O F H U M A N L I F E

There is undoubtedly one question that has always haunted humanity: the question of its origin. In the nineteenth century, this topic entered the field of scientific research. The years 1850–1860 yielded, mainly in France and Germany, a good crop of human fossils, and of remains of extinct animal species as well as stone tools attributable, though they were quite crude, to human activity. All these vestiges were extracted here and there from the depths of the ground. Jacques Boucher de Perthes, a pioneer in this field, thought that the discovered stone tools could only belong to a certain “preCeltic” or “antediluvian antiquity.”1 This was deduced on the basis of their geological situation and their frequent association with the remains of extinct animal species. For the first time in history, scientists were materially confronted with the great antiquity of mankind and its works and then undertook to study that on the basis of scientific principles. Yet, though it was impossible at that time to scientifically date the age of man, we could try to plot his evolution. Lamarck and Darwin, as is wellknown, developed the hypothesis that there are ancestral links between the species. Lamarck can be considered the father of evolutionism with his theory of the gradual and continuous transformation of organisms under the influence of environmental changes. According to his theory, the simplest forms of life appeared first and then progressively changed under the influence of external circumstances. They eventually gave birth to other kinds of living beings and to man himself.2 In his book The Origin of Species, published in 1859, Darwin tried to understand the appearance and the diversification of new species throughout time. And according to him, the mechanism that explains this evolution is “natural selection.”3 Darwin was at first not particularly concerned with the origin of man and focused more on the diversification of the species. Therefore, he had apparently less influence than Lamarck on the first French prehistorians. Within a transformist framework, they attempted to give substance to a certain temporality that preceded history. In the 1870’s Gabriel de Mortillet, for instance, was convinced that transformism was the basic principle explaining nature, including man and his works. According to him, different 71 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 71–82. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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human races succeeded one another. Contemporary humanity is the most accomplished stage of this evolution. The analysis of stone tool “industrial” sites attributed to the end of the Tertiary era led him to consider the artefacts the production of living beings who were intelligent enough to process flint but not intelligent enough to be considered human beings. His idea was to label them the “precursors of man,”4 i.e., anthropopitecus, whom he ranked halfway between the current anthropoid ape and man. Yet, a gap rapidly presented itself given the rarity, or even nonexistence, of remains of this anthropopitecus and the abundance of hewn stones attributed to him. This idea that the original man was preceded by an intermediate creature between ape and man did not have a basis in actual evidence but only in a transformist paradigm. This concept obviously got into trouble, as I am going to shortly show. In 1892, Doctor Eugène Dubois exhumed the remains of a creature that combined ape-like (his skullcap had enormous brow ridges and was of small size) and human characteristics (lack of a sagittal crest at the top of the cranium, the thighbone indicates an upright position). He labeled him “pithecanthropus” and thought he had discovered what Haeckel called the “missing link.” Yet, because very few vestiges were available, doubts were expressed as far as the reliability of this discovery was concerned. Forty years later, some excavations carried out in Chou-kou-tien, in China, proved the fully human nature of that being who had then to be considered as “Homo erectus.” In 1924, Raymond Dart thought he had discovered in Australopithecus africanus (the name he gave of a small child whose cranium was exhumed in Taung, South Africa), the genuine missing link. The skull of that child, in spite of its small volume (500cm3), is more evolved than what we know of with the living or fossilized ape, but at the same time it is far more primitive than any fossilized man. At first welcomed with scepticism by scientists, this discovery was then corroborated by Broom’s discoveries in the 1930s. Australopithecus (the southern ape “of South”) became a candidate for the precursor of man. However, from the 1960s onwards, discoveries of Australopithecus increased. This brought new genuses (Paranthropus, Zinjanthropus, . . .) and new hypotheses on their phylogenesis, on the settling of Australopithecus and on its geographical movements. Yet, this profusion of hypotheses, which mainly aims at finding a solution to the problem of the filiation between the genus Australopithecus and the genus Homo, seemed to indicate a certain perplexity on the part of scientists as far as the origin of man was concerned

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and even the necessity of raising some methodological questions. For instance, we could wonder whether the intermediate stage between man and ape would not finally remain empty. That’s precisely what the French ethnologist and prehistorian André Leroi-Gourhan suggested. In 1964, in his major book, Le geste et le parole, he refused to give that empty space to the Australopithecus. According to him, these were creatures which, in spite of a low volume of his brainpan, stood up and could devise tools. Because of that very characteristic, they were even worthy of the name of man, of being classed the genus Homo. Thus, it would appear that Australopithecus is wrongly named. Leroi-Gourhan would like to substitute the label “Australopithecus” with that of “australanthrope.” “The first designation is an inappropriate term that dates back to a period when these creatures were considered to be sophisticated apes.”5 But they are not to be seen as the result of a phyletic tendency that would have first materialized in some rough simian creatures that then released themselves progressively from animality. “Man is not, as we were used to think, a kind of ape that is constantly improving, the majestic crowning achievement of the paleontological evolution, but something other than an ape.”6 This quotation shows how Leroi-Gourhan considers the problem of the origin of man. Indeed, when he wrote that “we have to show that in the evolution of the vertebrates, the path leading to technical knowledge and language started at the very beginning,”7 he meant that our task is not to determine when it precisely started or when monkeys turned into men. His goal is actually to show that paleontology, throughout its anthropian tradition, has found neither any transitional form between ape and man, nor any evidence showing a gradual shift between the quadruped gait and a more vertical position, or showing any shift between the use of raw materials by animals and the making of tools. Man represents a discontinuous start and was anticipated by no transitional form: “The biological origin of man is necessarily to be found,” he wrote, “beyond the imprecise zone of transitions.”8 It is therefore inevitable to admit that the question of the origin of man has to be raised in terms other than those of the evolutionist tradition. This does not mean that the author denies the existence of a certain evolution or of the temporal succession of various living species. On the contrary, if there is “one certainty, that no convincing demonstration can shake, it is the idea that the world is constantly improving throughout history.”9 However, as far as man is concerned, his evolution can just be seen as a maturation of what is already human, i.e., the maturation of a creature whose upright position is recognized, who correlatively has a short face as well as a free hand while

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moving. “As soon as the upright position is established, even if some adjustments still have to be made in posture, we no longer have an ape, and therefore no half-a-man.”10 Clearly enough, the specificity of human anatomy is undeniable: This anatomy looks mainly like ours but differs from that of other primates. However, this specificity can just be regarded as a differentiation on the basis of a fundamental living community. In the history of life, Leroi-Gourhan wrote, “the position of man is neither a compromise nor a divorce, it does not look any more like a hypertrophied animality than like a negation of the laws of the living world.” 11 The exceptional nature of the anthropian adventure does not mean at all that it stands apart from the morpho-genetic processes at work in the living world. We rather have to admit that the origin of man can just be considered as a form of originality of the human body: “The originality of man lies perhaps less in his biological dissimilarity than in the fact that this creature is human without having lost anything from the continuity of the living world.”12 In this perspective, the question of the origin of man can be related to the genetic investigation of Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed, Leroi-Gourhan’s objective, as I have said, was not to find hypothetical transitions between pithecomorphism and anthropomorphism but to spot an evolutive divergence towards a totally original way of being, that of man. Yet, Leroi-Gourhan tried to show that this mainly technical and symbolical way of being, took root in a particular organisation of capacities, the ability to walk, and a way of touching and exploring the surrounding world. In this way, general body shape can be perceived as the source of meaningful acts and gestures within the world. In Ideen II and in the Krisis, Husserl focused on the transcendental correlation between the world and the subjective and intersubjective life for which the world has a sense and a value. He undertook to go down very deep into human experience, where the world gives itself to a perceiving living being and therefore refers to the flesh, to a “here-perceiving,” which is mobile by definition. And it is precisely in the depths of this subjective-carnal life that he wanted to think about the genesis of the meanings of the world-of-life or about the genesis of the meaning of world experience. This “archaeological”13 process seems to promise that parallels can be drawn between phenomenology and paleoanthropology. I am precisely going to show that Leroi-Gourhan and Husserl have a common point: the fact that they raise decisive methodological questions. First of all, both wondered whether it were possible to have access to ancient human experiences and to meaning development. I would like to deal here

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with the problem of empathy. Secondly, if paleontology commonly reconstructs the body shapes of Australopithecus or of Homo erectus, as well as their surrounding environments, the question is that of determining how it is possible to carry out such a reconstruction. On that very point, LeroiGourhan’s reflections seem to me very close again to Husserl’s thoughts. 1) Finding links between Leroi-Gourhan’s work and Husserl’s phenomenological research is not self-evident. Is it really possible to compare such different disciplines — Husserl’s phenomenology, a transcendental science of consciousness, and Leroi-Gourhan’s paleoanthropology, a natural science among others that fully takes part in the interests of the objective sciences? One piece of evidence that enables us to prove that Husserl did not simply reject the lessons of anthropology is the attention he paid to Lévy-Bruhl’s works. In a letter written on March, 11th, 1935, Husserl described to LévyBruhl “the impassioned interest” with which he had read his book.14 And if he had some reservations about a positive anthropology, the science of the living being in an objective world and of the real existence of humanity, though relative within the world,15 he recognised — and this is the most interesting point of that letter to Lévy-Bruhl — that this science clearly gives birth to the possibility of a mutual understanding, of an empathy that would materialize the goal of an Einfühlung.16 Leroi-Gourhan also dealt in his own way with “empathy.” In an interview of 1982 centered on his job as an ethnologist and prehistorian, he declared his only goal to be to find contacts with the man of the past.17 He had got interested in objects and human artefacts that were produced in the very remote past, and he could on that basis state that “behind those works we had to look for man.”18 But what kind of relationships with paleolithic man does the author want to have, since that man disappeared ten thousand years ago or perhaps millions of years ago? The author explained that “when you find in a grave the remains of a very old man, that’s a memory we want to catch. When you exhume an Australopithecus, you bring to life a memory that would not otherwise have existed, you retrieve someone that did not leave any memory to anybody, you create a kind of memory a posteriori, a sort of ‘retromemory.’”19 Obviously, Leroi-Gourhan is motivated by the idea of recreating, of achieving a certain comprehension of, a certain affinity or Einfühlung with the man of the past, either a close predecessor, like the Neanderthals or a more ancient one like Australopithecus. Here, to deal with the concrete work of the paleoanthropologist, LeroiGourhan was not far from using a concept described by Husserl in a text found in his Nachlass, namely, the concept of “historical empathy.”20 As

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Husserl explained, empathy, in normal time, is an aperceptive transfer that from my flesh “here” constitutes the other in his body “there.” We could, therefore, consider that historical empathy in a prehistorical context refers to the possibility of empathy established a posteriori, a reconstruction being necessary when intrinsic intuition of a body is lacking. Quite remarkably, Husserl himself devised this extension of empathy, and even indicated the possibility of empathy with a dead body, a corpse whose remains are constituted just of bones: “Ideally,” he wrote in Appendix 25 of Die Grund Probleme der Phänomenologie, “the human experiences of one hundred thousand years ago have an intersubjective value, even in relation to us and even if any form of direct relationship with us is missing. But it is, in theory, possible. Yet, an empty possibility is not sufficient; there have to be real possibilities. This needs to be more precisely determined.”21 Husserl suggested here that empathy can be extended until it gives access to a foreign subjectivity of 100,000 years ago, but he also stressed the fact that empathy can be blocked when any perceptible sensory relationships between subjectivities of different periods is lacking. In those conditions, we have to wonder what are the perceptible sensory supports that would enable us to go from an empty possibility to a real possibility of having access to the subjective experience of the past? The material of the prehistorian mainly consists of a huge amount of stones and bones, a small quantity of manufactured articles from bones, works of art, burial places and vestiges of dwelling places. How could those supports awaken that historical empathy or a posteriori memory, as Leroi-Gourhan called it? This is what we have to analyse now. Since the second part of the 19th century, prehistorians have been aware of the existence in western and eastern Europe, of hundreds of caves and dwelling places full of artistic drawings from the late paleolithic era. These works, painted or carved, show scientists the complexity of the “mental universe” of our predecessors, Homo sapiens. They indeed represent “the first forty thousand pages of the history of the arts, of the imagination, of religions and of the human psyche.”22 In other words, they rightfully stand out as the traces of intentional activities of the past. Moreover, the artistic quality of those works is such that it seems natural to assert, as Georges Bataille did in a famous book, that the universe of Lascaux, for instance, awakens “a feeling of evident and burning human presence.”23 This philosopher also said of the artist Lascaux that “inevitably, he looked like us, and obviously he was our fellow man.” As a consequence, it is precisely with this artist that we can, he wrote, “initiate the commu-

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nication of spirits.”24 So the meaningful or symbolic dimension of these wall drawings is so evident that the methodological question of the conditions for possible links between past and present meaningful experiences is immediately solved. Here, we could say that the discovery at the beginning of the century of several burial places of Homo neanderthalis, did not at all awaken with the same intensity that feeling of “evident human presence.” On the contrary, the researchers accepted very slowly the idea that these creatures of the midpaleolithic, though not belonging to the species Homo sapiens sapiens, were human beings that had worries just like ours. In an evolutionist and Darwinian climate, the particular heaviness characteristic of the sturdily built Neanderthal anatomy could only be interpreted as being in contradiction with the degree of abstraction required for concern over death. However, it was recognised that the Neanderthals buried some of their dead companions and also had some aesthetic preoccupations — they gathered strange stones and fossils and also used ochre. The fact that several paleontologists still today have a strong interest in finding the kinship between that extinct species and us25 is perhaps a clue showing there are still persistent difficulties in recognising the intelligence of creatures whose skeletal structures were so primitive.26 It is clear from the vestiges of the Neanderthals that it is possible to have a relationship of comprehension with another species, though it seems more self-evident that we can identify with (sich einfühlen) the painters of Lascaux. However, according to Leroi-Gourhan, this “feeling of evident and burning human presence” that is suggested by prehistoric art could well be misleading. He often prompts researchers to give a meaning to some traces which we would normally simply have to recognize as having an intentional nature. Animism, magic, cannibalism, initiation rites, . . . are various phenomena prehistoric whose incidence is unprovable and whose evocation can only be made by citing a great many ethnographic instances. Yet LeroiGourhan insisted on the fact that these instances would never constitute any evidence: The comparative method, he wrote, “fulfills its role when it learns (for instance) that initiation rites exist in many tribes of today’s world and that prehistory therefore could know them; it cannot go further.”27 In other words, ethnographic comparison does not shed new light on prehistoric man but only shows he manifested human behaviour. Leroi-Gourhan insisted that claiming to be in the presence of traces of human behaviour is not selfevident: We still have to determine, when exhuming the remains of some Australopithecus or Homo erectus, whether we still find “a thinking and

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living man and not just scattered bones.”28 We could reformulate the question: Are the vestiges of the early paleolithic, i.e., bones and hewn stones, the meaningful vestiges of an ancient form of human beings? If so, how can we reconstruct this form? 2) Leroi-Gourhan stated that the postural and locomotor apparatus of the human body has to enable us to define its specificity since the transformations of this apparatus obviously preceded the extension of the cerebral cortex.29 It seems indeed to be clear that becoming a biped triggered off a reorganisation of the forepart of the body (including the poles of the face and the forelimbs). While for the majority of living species, the appropriation of substances necessary to survive, the detection of danger, protection and locomotion all involve the forepart of the body, the human being stands out among the other living species by the fact that the forepart of the body no longer takes part in the locomotor processes. The pecularity of the anthropic form can be defined as follows: “The human foot evolved in the same way as in the other walking mammals whereas his hand evolved strongly towards prehension.”30 This anthropic form is moreover recognisable as early as the first hominoids, since the foot of Australopithecus was already adapted to walking on the ground and his hand was adapted to prehension. The internal evolution of this form can only be understood on the basis of the relations between the hand, the foot, the head and the brain. “Cerebral and body evolution are involved in a sort of dialogue in which they both find an interest.”31 With these kinds of statements, Leroi-Gourhan concluded that the human being was in fact a specifically organised body, thanks to which he could behave in a most original way in his environment. We could even assert that human intentionality or spirituality really appeared thanks to that particular body organisation. The human body does not owe its originality to the addition of reason but essentially to its orientation. Our body, as did that of our remote ancestors, appears right away as adopting a particular position in the world, thanks to a unique posture, the upright position, and to the availability of the arms that this position entails. We might say that this vertical position constitutes a first self-affirmation, one that has to be maintained through much effort and constant vigilance in the face of gravity and the danger of falling.32 If I now refer to Husserl, I would like to point out that in his 1934 text, “The Original Ark of Earth Does Not Move,” he insists on a transcendental correlation between the human body and the Earth, which for him means the ground (Boden) for the body. Husserl described the universe of the Earth, one of an essential contact, of a universal bodily principle from

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which the human body really derives its deportment. We can therefore state as a consequence that this deportment or the upright position already comes with a certain form of intentionality. In this text, Husserl did not intend to reassert the value of pre-Copernican cosmological conceptions but wanted to insist on the terrestrial evidence of the ground, a support that would call for a walking body and that would therefore potentiate all intentional activity and would be the source of the specific possibilities of the self that are considered to be superior, i.e., the possibilities of intelligence and of spirit. When you consider now that paleoanthropology and phenomenology can be used to deal with common problems, the thighbone of an Australopithecus that indicates its upright position, can work as a support for empathy. This thighbone alone constitutes evidence of a body orientation comparable or similar to ours. This is a trace on the basis of which an anticipation of the ancestral intentionality is made possible. Yet this upright position implies a very peculiar relation to the world. Standing up, a man cannot escape from the immediate ascendancy of an Umwelt; he is at a certain distance from the ground and from the “things” that can now be seen as “objects” belonging to a world. In the Appendix 13 of Ding und Raum, Husserl showed that walking always needed a horizon, that it constitutes a surrounding space and that it is a living movement of the spatialization of the subject and object.33 According to him, in the main mobility and kinesthesia constitute the general features of the human being. And if man is in touch with the world thanks mainly to a moving body, this mobility also defines the non-univocal human way of behaving in the world. We could indeed state on the basis of Ideen II that kinesthesia does not just consist in the way man moves on his feet. It refers to a can-do (können) that enables us to define the body as an organism of abilities, ability to move and to adapt oneself in many contexts. Kinesthesia also includes the ability to behave in the world in various ways, to evaluate and to live with one’s fellow men. Yet, according to Leroi-Gourhan, it is precisely that mobile body, which is naturally able to behave and move in a varied way, from which the technical phenomenon could arise. Without any claws or offensive canines, a morphology that remained general and was characterised by mobility enabled man to become a technician, to be in touch with the world through the use of technical objects. We have to bear in mind that specializing evolution, during the anthropogenesis, did not have as a consequence to push human gestures along a one-way stereotyped road, that it could be justified by man’s efficiency at survival.

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In this context, is the tool, extracted by the paleontologist from the depths of the ground, the tangible result of the fact that a man stood up in the world to carry out tasks and projects? This is precisely the idea of Leroi-Gourhan who wrote that “the ultimate evidence [of human presence] is the stone crushed by a hand that therefore becomes human.”34 In other words, if the exhumed tool next to a hand enables the paleonthologist to determine whether we really have a human hand or just some bones, it also constitutes in a way a support for a transfer of meaning saying “I can,” towards the organism that manufactured that tool. Husserl is not far, in my opinion, from examining the modalities of such a reconstructive empathy when showing that the tool presupposes a particularly sensitive perception, a perception, he wrote in Erfahrung und Urteil, “of what can only be perceived by the comprehension of a tool that awakens a certain ‘memory’ of the men that devised it with a precise goal.”35 Therefore, this tool, which is a piece of evidence of a certain “human expression” and which “awakens the memory of the men that devised it,” can be regarded as a support for a posteriori empathy with a body that moved in very remote times and that therefore was a meaningful body. We should notice here that the problem of origins comes back again. Indeed, it seems that Leroi-Gourhan regards the reconstruction of the original man to be the reconstruction of a meaningful form that lived a long time ago. According to him, man, as farback as we can find his trail, is that living form that has meaningful relationships with the world. His vertical posture is already a clue; that is the reason why the bones of Australopithecus do not appear to me as — as Bataille wrote — the “dry forms”36 of a body. The upright position they represent also enabled the creation of hewn stones, and so consequently they do not seem to me to amount to the vestiges of an “unrefined intelligence.”37 Those stones on the contrary allow the reconstruction of an “I can,” of the being who “manufactured that tool with a certain goal.” In clearer terms, those tools and pieces of bones found in proximity constitute the fundamental material for an empathy that brings prehistoric man to life for us. To conclude, I would like to stress that the attention Leroi-Gourhan paid to the bones and to the hewn stones is fundamental. Those tools and those bones already constitute the vestiges of an ancestral intentionality; but above all, nine-tenths of human time went by before our immediate predecessors carved their first mammoth on the walls of a cave, only some twenty or thirty thousand years ago. In other words, the tools and the bones of the Australopithecus make tangible the string of the generations of the major part

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of human history. Leroi-Gourhan precisely pointed out that “there occurred a real change when the intellectual world suddenly received the revelation of this remarkably long chain of human beings that occupied nine-tenths of human time,”38 a change of which we still perhaps have to apprehend the consequences for a phenomenology of history. Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis Brussels N OT E S 1

Cfr. J. Boucher de Perthes, Antiquités celtiques et antédiluviennes. Mémoire sur l’industrie primitive et les arts à leur origine (Paris: 1857). 2 Cfr. J.-B. de Lamarck, Zoologische Philosophie (Leipzig: Kroner, 1909). 3 Ch. Darwin, The Origin of Species, by means of natural Selection or the Preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1968). 4 The title of a contribution to “Association française pour l’Avancement des sciences,” in 1873. 5 A. Leroi-Gourhan, Le geste et la parole, 1 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964), p. 94. All translations ours. 6 Op. cit., p. 166. 7 A. Leroi-Gourhan, Mécanique vivante. Le crâne des vertébrés du poisson à l’homme (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 21; our emphasis. 8 A. Leroi-Gourhan, “Technique et société chez l’animal et chez l’homme”, in Le fil du temps. Ethnologie et préhistoire 1935–1970 (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 111. 9 Leroi-Gourhan, Le geste et la parole, 1, op. cit., p. 41. 10 Ibid., op. cit., p. 34. 11 Leroi-Gourhan, “Technique et société chez l’animal et chez l’homme”, op. cit., p. 121. 12 Ibid., “Technique et société chez l’animal et chez l’homme”, op. cit., p. 110. 13 Cfr. E. Fink, “Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls,” in Revue internationale de philosophie 1: 2, 15/1 (1939), p. 240. 14 E. Husserl, “Lettre à Lucien Lévy-Bruhl,” 11 mars 1935, in Gradhiva, 4 (1988), p. 65. Husserl carefully read his Mentalité primitive published in 1922 and perhaps his Mythologie primitive of 1935. 15 Cfr. ibid., p. 69. 16 Cfr. ibid., p. 66. 17 Cfr. A. Leroi-Gourhan, Les racines du monde. Entretiens avec Claude-Henri Rocquet (Paris: Belfond, 1982), p. 13. 18 Op. cit., p. 215. 19 Op. cit., pp. 15–16. 20 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, I. Kern (ed.), Husserliana XV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 233. 21 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersujektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, I. Kern (ed.), Husserliana XIII (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); trad. franç. par J. English, p. 255. 22 E. Anati, L’art rupestre dans le monde. L’imaginaire de la préhistoire (Paris: LarousseBordas, 1997), p. 12.

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G. Bataille, Lascaux (Paris: Skira, 1959), p. 12. Op. cit., 11. 25 Cfr. Chr. Stringer and C. Gamble, In Search of the Neanderthals. Solving the Puzzle of Human Origins (London: Thames & Hudson, 1993). 26 About the discredit that struck the Neanderthals, cfr. M. Sheets-Johnstone, The primacy of Movement (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: Johns Benjamins Publishing, “Advances in Consciousness Research” Series, 1998). 27 A. Leroi-Gourhan, Préhistoire de l’art occidental (Paris: L. Mazenod, 1965), p. 31. 28 Ibid. 29 Cfr. Leroi-Gourhan, Le geste et la parole, I, op. cit., p. 34. 30 Leroi-Gourhan, “Technique et société chez l’animal et chez l’homme”, op. cit., p. 116. 31 Leroi-Gourhan, Le geste et la parole, 1, op. cit., p. 71. 32 Cfr. E. Straus, “The Upright Posture”, in Phenomenological Psychology (New-York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 137–165. Cfr. R. Bruzina. “Toward a Philosophy of Technology. Reflections on Themes in the Work of E. Straus”, in Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 10 (1976–1977), pp. 78–94. 33 Cfr. E. Husserl, Ding und Raum, Vorlesungen 1907, Husserliana XVI (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 373 ff. 34 Leroi-Gourhan, “Technique et société chez l’animal et chez l’homme,” op. cit., p. 111. 35 E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik (Hamburg: Glaassen & Goverts, 1954), p. 55. 36 Bataille, op. cit., p. 12. 37 Ibid. 38 Leroi-Gouchan,“ Sur la position scientifique de l’ethnologie”, in Le fil du temps, op. cit., p. 85. Our emphasis. 24

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Autotopoi are among a culture’s oldest (and still in use) figures of speech and thought, by which a personal subject describes, as it fancies him, the power, attributes, actions and place of the manifestation of events initiated by him. Autotopoi are present in literary as well as in philosophical and religious texts; they are also explicit in Eastern and Western artistic representation. In literary texts, autotopoi realise the general principle of representing one object through another object, or one subject through another subject or object. In general, this scheme has the simple form of an indicative clause, in which one of the names functions as an attribute of the other, e.g., “those white birds are words,” “a fish is a leaf of rain,” “I was a creeper unfolding all around the forest,” “a hunting dog is a stripe of sadness.” The verb “to be” may be replaced with other verbs, e.g., “awake as a snow, a glade, change into fallow deer’s antler,” and “a song of the most quiet bird changes into mellow cloud.” A verb may be hidden when its attributive function is fulfilled by a name designating the substance that the thing is made of, e.g., “a hind of ruby tears,” “caravels with sails of red butterflies,” “a child of sand.” In the above examples one suggests to the reader to see the identity of the originally indicated imaged entity with another that fulfills the attributive function. In physical reality, white birds and words, a fish and a leaf of rain, a creeper and a human, a song and a mellow cloud, are not identical, nor able to be described by each other. Superposition of two images does not imply, as in a metaphor, the emergence of a completely new image that differs from each one of the component, co-producing elements. Further, this superposition does not imply the emergence in imagination of distinct images of things connected only by similar features indicated by the author, as is characteristic of comparison. The interdependence of superposed images of objects is here based on an identification (imposed by the author) of their content and form, which at the same time means the identity of the semantic fields of the names that are used in image construction. The identity of objects may be represented as a limit of the process implied by an unknown reason, and which leads to object transformation. The identity may also be stated as a sensorially perceived fact of existence of the objects in a form or substance that is improper for them. This effect of designating one thing through another, 83 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 83–93. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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completely different one, may be termed a transformation of the form and essence of the designated object. Substance, shape, action, positioning in time and space, are the features of objects that may undergo such a transformation. In a series of metamorphoses a transformation of the essence of the personal subject takes place when the subject speaks of himself by means of names referring to animate and inanimate nature — e.g., I am a flame, a stone, a lion — and also when the subject describes himself with names having no material reference — e.g., I am an angel, a dryad, an elf. A transformation of the essence of animals, plants and things takes place when names referring to the world of nature are connected with specifically human features, e.g., an apple tree dances, a tree is crying. A transformation of the essence of immaterial entities takes place when empty names are connected with specifically human features, or with ones characteristic of the world of nature. According to the width of the span between the names that belong to the described class of beings, relations between them are more or less direct, easier or harder to detect. Any relation between a human and an animal, or between a human and a plant, is closer than one between, say, a human and a pot. In turn, the relation between a pot and a tree is closer than that between a pot and an animal. The notion of essence, which operates as a basic determinant of metamorphoses, is not only a general notion, but in the actual case of using the scheme of transformation it becomes a particular notion, being characteristic of the individuality of every person and of the essential feature of classes and types of objects that have no distinct and unique essence. Relations of identity and analogy may be accounted as basic structural determinants of the analysed scheme. One of the necessary conditions for construction of the image based on these relations is an initial endowment of objects with an inherent activity that is suggestive to human reaction stimuli coming from the world. This endowment becomes a basis for the indication of a relation of identity between subject and object. A series of transformations and a circle of identifications of a subject with diverse elements of the world may have not only a subjective and individual dimension, it may also refer to many subjects and may be associated with cultural conventions. A case of this kind is referred to by Ramanujan in his analysis of the following poem by Basavanna: The rich will make temples for Shiva What shall I, a poor man, do?

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My legs are pillars, the body the shrine, the head a cupola of gold Listen, O lord of the meeting rivers, things standing shall fall, but the moving ever shall stay.1

According to Ramanujan, the poem refers to the Indian tradition of building temples in the image of the human body. The ritual begins with cultivating the ground and placing in it a pot containing a seed; the temple is said to originate from this seed. This act symbolises the conception and birth of a human. Different parts of a temple are given names according to the parts of a human body: the sides are hands or wings; the top, the head; the shrine — the innermost and the darkest sanctum of the temple — is called the wombhouse. The poem suggests a series of transformations of the temple into a body, and in reverse, the body into a temple; or a circle of identifications — the temple is the body that is the temple.2 In the Song of Milarepa3 this experience has the character of an inner transformation, transfiguration in the elements of water, earth, air, fire, and speech. In all of these spheres there is performed a process of selfprojection into the creature that is best fulfilled in a given element, the strongest one, and the one that bears the attributes of being divine, of liberation and beauty. Earth is presented in a condensed image of icy, snowcapped peaks wrapped in a whirling storm wind, surrounded with lightning and thunder. A show lion wanders in this space.4 Milarepa presents himself as a son of the snow lioness, symbolically immersed in her womb, and being delivered by her — thus performing a regression in order to regain archaic, unconscious content concerning the bond with what is earthly, fierce, predatory, but also sublime, sanctified by the numinous ability to evoke fear and admiration. “I shall not speak of Milarepa, but of me, the royal bird Garuda” — the second mystical transformation is performed inside the bird’s egg, in the nest of the divine bird, emissary of Vishnu. Garuda has a three-eyed human head, eagle’s beak, and claws. He is dualistically connected with snake-like deities, of which he is an enemy, but also a cousin. There is a fight, incessantly going on within Garuda, of bird against snake, of life against death, of good against evil, of right against wrong, of heavenly powers against chthonic forces. Sometimes Garuda is represented as the Lord Descending to Hell, who rips apart the snakes and rules over them. His natural element is air and the “heavenly summits.”5

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“I shall not speak of Milarepa, but of me, the son of the noble fish Yormo. In the belly of my fishy mother I was opening and closing my golden eyes” — in the third self-alteration, in the element of water, Milarepa presents an image of a divine fish that during maturation stretches the shores of the lake, and with no fear in the midst of stormy waves, avoiding uncountable hookstemptations plunged into her habitat, abides alone in her majesty. The element of fire is introduced in the Song through the metaphor of forging iron that no stone is able to shatter. In other Songs as well as in his Autobiography, Milarepa amplifies a theme of fire as inner heat, i.e., inflaming the six inner fires, owing to which a transubstantiation of matter is performed that endues body and psyche with unusual persistence and abilities: “At last, I began to feel that I had obtained the power of transforming myself into any shape [desired], and of flying through the air. By day, I thus felt that I could exercise endless phenomenal powers; by night, in my dreams, I could traverse the universe in every direction unimpededly — from the summit of Mount Meru to its base — and I saw everything clearly [as I went]. Likewise [in my dreams] I could multiply myself into hundreds of personalities, all endued with the same powers as myself. Each of my multiplied forms could traverse space and go to some Buddha Heaven, listen to the Teachings there, and then come back and preach the Dharma to many persons. I could also transform my physical body into a blazing mass of fire, or into an expanse of flowing or calm water. Seeing that I had obtained infinite phenomenal powers [even though it be but in my dreams], I was filled with happiness and encouragement at mine own success. Thenceforth, I persevered in my devotions in a most joyous mood, until, finally, I actually could fly.”6 In the fifth self-transformation, Milarepa calls himself the son of Lama, delivered by the womb of mother-speech, thanks to which he has gained certitude about the very nature of his destiny as an anchorite, a poet, and a spiritual master who is to gain in future the ability of doing good to all creatures, without exception, in all times and spaces, wherever, whenever and by whomever called. The very choice of the cognitive path, and of its direction, in the Song of Milarepa concerns the undertaking of intentional acts of translocating the centre of the psyche into such imaginary-existent creatures that have the ability to intensify and alter a human “I” into a “superior I.” Each transformation is preceded by Milarepa saying: “I shall not speak of Milarepa, but of me, the son of the Snow-Lioness, the son of Garuda, the son of Yormo, the son of Lama.” This refrain is composed of a negation of “ego” and an

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affirmation of “super-ego.” That “ego” of Milarepa is a starting point of the path, which is a natural, chaotic set of sensations, experiences, and successions of identifications with sensory world stimuli, streams of thought and the contents of memory that act randomly, often according to the adaptive requirements of a mind longing for an understanding of one’s own life environment in its dynamics. The calming of the mind begins from the not accidentally chosen patterns and places of projection; Milarepa chooses for himself not the nest of a sparrow, but that of Garuda. Simultaneously, he takes as his dwelling place the caves in the snow-clad summits of Tibet. He feeds himself with nettles, and for many years his only wealth is an old earthen pot for cooking the nettles. Ascetic practice, to which his body, mind, speech, and behaviour (meditation practices) are exposed, underlies a will to transform a human into a person with superhuman faculties — a person, most of all, capable of limitless compassion and able to bestow the good and the right on every being that needs help, regardless of its distance in time, space, form, and substance. The path of his own choice Milarepa treats with trust, with ultimate confidence in its effectiveness, and with conviction about its complete naturalness, what is emphasized in an image of the representation of “super-ego”: Paws of the Snow-Lion sitting on the icy summits are not cold. If the paws were to freeze in perpetual snow, What would be the use of perfecting oneself in Three Powers? Garuda cannot fall down when his wings fly across the skies. If the Great Garuda were to fall down What would be the use of his wings spread wide. The fish fluttering in the water cannot suffocate herself. If the waves were to choke the great fish What would be the use of being delivered in the lake.7

The idea of a total embrace of reality in its polar intensities (oppositions of elements, of emotions, of natural instincts and will, of “ego” and cosmos, of “ego” and deity), which is emphasized in the experience of Milarepa, leads in its effects to a union of the opposites, transfers a person into a radically different, inner reality that henceforth becomes a new centre, a new sign of the cycle of identifications. From the moment of this conversion, an “I” is no longer equal to an “ego” but to the higher self that comprises “ego,” situated in actual space-time, in an actual body, as one of its disposable functions. The figure of autotopoi may be realised by means of a specific inversion of an “I,” one consisting in projection of a human image into any external shape, either real or imaginary. In such an inversion, a projected image of an “I”

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usually surpasses or reduces the human condition due to various desired or isolated (for the reason of negativity) needs and means of activity. In William Blake’s picture “Great Sun at the Eastern Gate,” the figure of Los is shown as an androgynous human being of supernatural form. Los as the “Great Sun” stands in a coat of hair of fire against the background of a golden mandorla.8 A mandorla (also called a vesica) in the European iconographic tradition is a geometric figure in the shape of an ellipsoid or ellipse with two marked centres. The meaning of this figure has been connected with symbolic interpretation of the flowers and fruit of an almond tree (Prunus amydgalus). The space of the mandorla was to represent a “luminous rose of petals” that unfold in the form of a rose flower, and bring forth the almonds as “fruits of light” or “eyes of light.” The two centres of the ellipse symbolise the harmonious accord of opposite qualities: fire and water, heaven and earth, matter and energy. The idea of the union of opposites was linked to the almond tree for the reason that it has male and female flowers in the same inflorescence, which suggests a natural androgyny of the tree. Mandorlas surround figures of Mary and the saints, and also of Christ, thus giving expression to complete subjectification, deification, and the equilibration of all states and qualities, including equilibration of the human psychophysical structure in accord with cosmic manifestations. The space of the mandorla means the ultimate transformation of the body (conversion into light) and the attainment of eternity by the figure in the centre of the mandorla. Unlike the analogous artistic form called the mandala, elaborated in Hindu and Buddhist iconography, the mandorla displays a dynamic whole of contrastive forms and colours distributed along an elongated vertical axis, or pictorial “axis of light.” Usually, this axis follows a course between the central vertical line and the diagonal that rises from the left corner to the right one. Sometimes the “axis of light” overlaps the diagonal, or the central vertical line, or crosses one of them. The choice of the ellipsoid form, instead of a circle characteristic of the mandala, signifies the spurning of the representation of an absolute equilibrium of all components in favour of their relative equilibrium, which establishes itself with reference to the figure occupying the centre. Moreover, in the mandala the contour of the circle defines the line separating the sacred and the profane, harmony and chaos, while the contour of mandorla, sometimes stylised as the figure of a snake, expresses nature in its dynamic relations to the nonsensory, eternal, superconscious, given that the highest energy sign is placed in the central zone.9 In William Blake’s picture, diagonals of the mandorla intersect the diagonals of a plane inside the figure. Two points of intersection lie in the

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central area, whereas two others are located on the left near the contour of the ellipse. The latter points, together with the centre point of the mandorla, form a triangle with the top directed to the right, just below the central horizontal line. Thus, a threefold reality emerges that suggests the threefold “crystal cabinet” from the poem by Blake of that title. The picture’s plane expresses a cosmic reality ruled by laws independent of the subject. The mandorla creates a cosmos subordinated to the will of the “Poetic Spirit.” The triangle hidden in the picture is a sign of the abstract nature of the solar deity. At the same time it is a sign of the union being accomplished between three spheres — Eden, Revival [Resurrection], and Beulah; and, further, it is a symbol of the image itself as the place of the overlapping and intersecting of the three realities. They meet in their common centre and in the points of intersection of the diagonals. Thus they are given the same meaning structure. Hidden in the picture, the figure of a triangle representing Eden, the dwelling place of the Sun, modifies the significance of the very plane of the picture as a form that inevitably contains the fourth sphere of the cosmos, the sphere of Urlo. The composition of the whole picture, viewed from its top to its bottom, becomes asymmetrical and more specified in detail. The shapes in its upper part are comparably larger as well as more heavy and more distinct. Filling the upper part of the picture, as an area of the projection of the transcendent components that establish the laws for the objects situated in the lower part, indicates the thematic intention of Blake — the spiritual world is a realm of authority and full manifestation. The asymmetry of the left and right sides displayed above the central horizontal line, indicates independence from rational factors, a spontaneous order that actualises itself within the spiritual world. The picture under discussion shows the moment in which Los stops himself between his northern abode (the Realm of Eternity, Spiritual Beauty, Friendship, Eden); the earthly paradise Beulah, into which he can incarnate himself; the land of Revival; and the land of Urlo, in which all joy and beauty is lost. Hence the “Great Sun” stopped at the very moment when He and Enitharmon have begotten “a Worm — Human shadow,” named Orc. The child’s coming into being caused Los to never see Eternity again, and he has not been able to step back into his own realm. He has been separated from it by “a curtain of Knowledge.”10 “The Great Sun” then stops between the biblical tree of knowledge of good and evil and the tree of life, and thus becomes an image of the progressive self in relation to the human child generated by Him. Orc is a domain — hidden in both literary and pictorial image — of creative — but unconscious of itself — force, being an impulse

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for Los to self-reproduction within a play of colours, sounds, and feelings. Blake’s Orc is a cyclical figure that undergoes the cycle of birth and death and changes its identity (Adonis, Apollo, Christ). It occurs as a solar deity that bursts into light and conquers the snake by trampling it while dancing.11 At the same time, this figure is a personification of human desires, imagination, and anticipation of hell. Orc’s manifestations replicate its genesis in the womb of Enitharmon: All night within her womb The worm lay till it grew to a serpent, (. . .) With sharp pangs the hissings began To change to a great cry: Many sorrows and dismal throes, Many forms of fish, bird, & beast Brought forth an Infant form Where was a worm before.12

“Great Sun,” as an image of the progressive human self, creates and receives colours, sounds, and forms without their material background. The play of qualities, being the essence of art, is according to Blake a game for a “Human Form Divine.” The game gives expression to an innocent form of human maturity. Innocent, because being performed without any objectification of reality whatsoever. Mature, because implied both by rejected experiences and the conscious decision of autocreation. The poet’s intention, according to H. Bloom, was to transform the sensuality of everyday experience so as to accomplish the union of perception and object created by it, what in effect was to provide the original unity of perception. The image of this unity is Blake’s gigantic figure of a human who contains the cosmos and whose creative-perceptive activity is a continuous re-creation of himself.13 In order to achieve this state one has to abandon the content of corporeal experiences and the awareness of good and evil, the symmetry of golden and black sun. According to Blake, in the night souls recognise God through light (so in terms of contrast) — “God Appears & God is Light/To those poor Souls who dwell in Night”; but at the same time, God “does a Human Form Display/To those who Dwell in Realms of day.”14 God as a human among human beings, in the light of day, as it were indistinguishable, expresses the unity, identity and univocal character of the experience beyond contradictions. An aspiration for the form and the manifestations of being in a world without extreme values is characteristic of Blake’s reconciliation of the dualistic dimension of existence. The poet offers not a coexistence of polar values in their specific

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alternate or simultaneous rhythms, but the creation of a third state that would be the unity of the diverse manifestations of life, the unity being accomplished in a perpetual present. This unity without self-control may divide into representations within four spheres of the universe. Therefore, its essential function and purpose is to perdure at the level of the synthesis of extreme values. This synthesis has to manifest itself in representations which differ from the components that produced it. The basic dimension of existence that realises itself in movement toward unity understood this way is a continuous creative activity in poetry, painting, music, and — emotions. “Emotional creativity” is an emotional subjectification of objects that are identical with acts of perception. Highlighting shapes against background and forming them through the play of sensual qualities is a sign of love-adoration of the light. An attribute of this attitude is not self-cognition, nor any cognition whatsoever of an object, but self-creation in illusory images so that they become the impetus for a love-experience. Creating the figure of Los, Blake interprets his art with reference to the biblical “tree of life” on which “Great Sun” is spread. The tree of life grows, according to Blake, in the human mind, which is nothing other than the “Great Sun” itself. To observe this very fact is the first step toward the “earthly paradise.” Apart from representing and expressing functions, the specific function of an autometaphor is its potential directionality and persuasiveness. This aspect of the pragmatic effectiveness of autometaphors has attracted the attention of the theorists of psychotherapy who developed the epistemological premises of Gestalt psychology.15 The idea of experiential gestalts, expressed and stimulated by appropriate language expressions, is also one of the basic conceptualisations of the present phase of cognitive linguistics’ development. The act of projecting an autometaphor, together with the introjection assumed in it, is based in Gestalt therapy on a conventional formulation called instruction, e.g., “Imagine now that you are a bush of roses. (. . .) What is the bush like? What are its roots, and its stems? What are its leaves and flowers? On what ground does it grow? What can one see from the place where it grows? What is happening around it? (. . .)”. Afterwards, “the participants are invited to share their own picture with the others. The rule is that everyone speaks in the first person (. . .). It is good to begin with the words: ‘I am a bush of roses . . .’ ”.16 The experience ends with an autointerpretation that consists in interpreting the account of a rose bush in terms of a description of the psychological characteristics of a person. In Gestalt therapy, the linguistic representation of an imagined situation is taken into consideration as a substitute of the experience. The type of

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instruction and the technique for conducting the dialogue17 are determined by the assumed purpose, which can be, e.g., the incorporation of verbal structures into the procedures of inner identification and projection, adaptation to reality through reviews of past events, their actualisation and the anticipation of future events, the recognition of concerns and needs, the development of creativity, positive retreat to nonstandard events, the actualisation of release and a joyful attitude in relation to oneself and to other participants in a dialogue. Advocates of both Gestalt therapy and nonlinear language communication hold that the processes of autometaphorisation undertaken by the subject, or more generally the application of symbols and analogies in linguistic representations of the world, have a direct significance not only for the development of self-consciousness, but also for the development of the general cognitive abilities of a human being.18 In a cycle of literary metamorphoses a human being becomes the subject of every world that exists in time and space. A human also becomes the only referential system for the world, the speech of which has hidden meaning only, as in, e.g., the singing of a bird or the sough of trees. Mental migration through metamorphoses of one’s own body and essence, following one’s own image transformed in literature, is an intellectual-emotional experience impossible to gain in material reality, in which all objects and persons remain separate within the limits of the beginning and end of existence. The scheme of transformation of the image of the subject and the object, suggestive and quite simple in reception, may be a determinant of ethical and aesthetic attitudes and may serve to indirectly express issues of an ontological and epistemological character. This is formally the least complicated medium for the conveyance of universal, philosophical ideas. Uniwersytet L⁄ ódzki (see p. 1) L⁄ ódz´, Poland N OT E S 1 A. K. Ramanujan, Speaking of S´iva (Baltimore: Penguin Books: 1973), p. 19; cited in V. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 1974), p. 281]. 2 Turner, op. cit., pp. 280–285. 3 Milarepa, Les cent mille chants, trans. from Tibetan by M.-L. Lamothe (Paris: Fayard, 1989); pp. 21–24. 4 On the cult connection of the snow lion symbol with Milarepa, see The Snow Leopard by Peter Matthiessen (New York: Viking Press, 1978).

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J. Chevalier, and A. Gheerbrant, Dictionnaire des symboles. Mythes, reves, couˆtumes, gestes, formes, figures, couleurs, nombres (Paris: Robert Laffont/Jupiter 1982), p. 473. 6 Tibet’s Great Yogi Milarepa; A Biography from the Tibetan, being the Jetsün-Kahbum or Biographical History of Jetsün-Milarepa, according to the Late Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup English Rendering, edited with Introduction and Annotations by W. Y. Evans-Wentz, Second edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 211–212. 7 Milarepa; Les cent mille chants; op. cit., p. 23. 8 “The Great Sun at the Eastern Gate” [16 × 12,2 cm; pen and water-colour; about 1816] Pierpont Morgan Gallery, New York; see: W. Blake, Descriptions of the Illustrations to Milton’s “L’Allegro” and “Il Penseroso” in Complete Writings, ed. G. Keynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 618. 9 Souzenelle, A. de; Le symbolisme du corps humain. De l’arbre de vie au schema corporel (St. Jean de Braye: Editions Dangles: 1984); pp. 415–420; J. Chevalier, and A. Gheerbrant, op. cit., p. 608. 10 W. Blake, The First Book of Urizen, in Complete Writings, op. cit., pp. 231–233. 11 See H. Bloom, The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic Poetry (Garden City: Doubleday: 1961); p. 8. 12 Blake, The First Book of Urizen, op. cit., p. 232. 13 Bloom, op. cit., p. 17. 14 W. Blake, Auguries of Innocence, in Complete Writings, op. cit., p. 434. 15 J. O. Stevens, Awareness: Exploring, Experimenting, Experiencing (Moab, UT: Real People Press, 1971). 16 Z. Zabrowski, Trening interpersonalny (Wrocl⁄aw: Zakl⁄ad Narodowy im. Ossoli´n skich Wydawnictwo, 1985), p. 120. 17 The form of dialogue based on autometaphors is also present in literary works of mystical character, in which participants in a dialogue establish specific relations between them, relations that shape a degree of reciprocal recognition and interdependencies, particularly the dependencies between God, Who manifests Himself in various forms, and a human being that approaches Him, see, e.g., a poem by Bhartrihari, “Refuge in the Forest,” in The Hermit and the Love-Thief. Sanskrit Poems of Bhartrihari and Bilhana, trans. B. Stoler Miller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) pp. 88–89. 18 In the opinion of G. Lakoff and M. Turner, the authors of the concept of “a field guide to poetic metaphor,” an analysis of poetic figures through the description of schemes for mapping the source domain onto the target domain, provides the basic orientation within the scope of motivation and means of language usage. Lakoff and Turner hold that each metaphoric mapping consists of slots, relations, properties and knowledge in the source domain. The validity of a conceptual schema or a conceptual metaphor lies in its persuasive power as conditioned by the nature of cognitive processes. The principles of those processes (called “the sources of the power of metaphor”) are as follows: “the power to structure,” “the power of options,” “the power of reason,” “the power of evaluation,” and “the power of being there.” The image-schema, comprising at least two equivalent domains as a system, operates as a unit of the series of expressions. See G. Lakoff, and M. Turner, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 63–65.

A RT U RO M A R C H E S I N

T H E I R R E V E R S I B I L I T Y O F NAT U R A L P RO C E S S E S AND THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PRINCIPLE O F T H E R M O DY NA M I C S

From the phenomena of nature described in classical thermodynamics, there follows the conclusion that the macroscopic processes of nature are irreversible. A very effective example of the irreversibility of a macroscopic process is the process of the evaporation of the contents of a small bottle of perfume when the stopper is removed. This is an irreversible process since we will never see the perfume molecules returning spontaneously into the bottle. Once the perfume molecules have been mixed with “air molecules,” the original state is not reproducible. This is very complex and coordinated phenomenon, depending on a great number of degrees of freedom. The irreversibility concept characterizes the physical nature of this process and, specifically, the direction in which it evolves spontaneously in given circumstances, i.e., when the boundary conditions and the initial conditions have been fixed. It sometimes happens that some processes which are carried out spontaneously from a given initial state to a given final state, can, again spontaneously, evolve in the opposite direction. This can happen if the previous final state is assumed to be a new initial state, in which the velocities of change are inverted, i. e., all the derivatives of time change their signs. The new final state is then identical to the initial state of the direct process, where in it too, the direction of all the velocities of change are inverted. When this happens the process is said to be reversible. What both observation and experiment teach us is that, at an elementary level (for example, an atomic level), all processes are reversible in this way. That is, at this level, if a certain process is physically possible, the reverse process is also physically possible then from the kinetic point of view. At a macroscopic level, however, no process enjoys this property of being physically reversible in the sense just explained. The experiment teaches that of two processes that are, from the kinetic point of view, the reverse of each other, only the one which involves an increase of entropy in the system is physically “permitted,” while the other is physically “forbidden.” This is codified into the second principle of thermodynamics. 95 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 95–100. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The second principle of thermodynamics states that every physical system evolves spontaneously towards a macroscopic state characterized by the maximum value of entropy, which is also a state of equilibrium in which the isolated system, once it has been reached, perdures indefinitely. This is a phenomenological principle which enunciates as an assertion of universal validity what has been found to be valid in all the particular systems which have up to now been studied from this point of view. The experimental foundation on which the principle is based is common sense, as the following statement of the second principle of thermodynamics will testify. Rudolf Clausius framed it this way: there exists no thermodynamic transformation whose sole effect is to extract a quantity of heat from a colder reservoir and to deliver it to a hotter reservoir. Thermodynamics is a phenomenological theory of matter. As such, it draws its concepts directly from experiments. Boltzmann’s major contribution to scientific knowledge was his statistical interpretation of the second principle, a model that makes the second principle intuitively obvious. The intuitive explanation that Boltzmann has proposed for this race towards equilibrium is that, among all possible a priori macroscopic states, there is one that is reached in an extraordinarily greater number of microstates. As all microstates are equally possible a priori, the system is found in that state as a rule (that is, nearly always, when the macrostate is observed). In order for this intuitive explanation to have sense, it is necessary that all the possible a priori microstates be effectively accessible so that the system may begin from any one of them. Statistical mechanics is based on a postulate that asserts the equiprobability of all microstates of a given macroscopic system consisting of N equal particles. A microstate is determined by assigning 6 numbers to every particle, there being three spatial coordinates x, y, z and three components of velocity vx, vy, vz. A particular macrostate can follow from an enormous number of different microstates. The probability of finding a given macrostate will be proportional to the number of microstates that constitute it. The most probable state for a system represents the state of equilibrium. If a system is found in a state of nonequilibrium, i.e., in a not very probable state in the sense that the number of microstates that constitute it is by far low, the system will evolve into one that is more probable. Boltzmann, demonstrating a renowned theorem, known as theorem H, explained that, if a macroscopic system in its initial situation does not correspond to a more probable state, it will evolve until it reaches the state of equilibrium.

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In short the task of statistical mechanics is reduced to the explanation of thermodynamics: The statistical interpretation of the second principle of thermodynamics means that macroscopic systems go naturally from a less probable situation towards a more probable one, with the final situations being situations of equilibrium. Thus, irreversibility becomes a question of initial conditions and the isolated macroscopic systems present an irreversibility of fact which is not nomological, that is, owing to a law. With Boltzmann’s theorem H, it seems that a mechanical explanation has been given of the phenomenon of irreversibility and the increase of entropy. This is the aim for which statistical mechanics reaches: to derive all properties of a macroscopic equilibrium system from the laws of molecular dynamics, i.e., to establish a relation between the laws of thermodynamics and molecular laws. But ever since scientists first started to investigate this problem a great challenge has presented itself, the greatest difficulty they face here, namely, that of how to justify on the basis of fundamental laws, valid for molecules (elementary particles) laws which can be reversed with time, the irreversibility of the macroscopic processes which result from the phenomena described by classical thermodynamics. The Boltzmannian particles collide with each other obeying the laws of mechanics. But in studying these collisions even judgements based on a high number of events (the law of large numbers) cannot in any way justify results which break these laws. In fact, the temporal trend of function H, being governed by collision interactions only, can only be a puzzle since it introduces a fracture in the symmetry of time. Therefore, an objective problem remains: It is summed up in the very possibility of supplying a rigorous mathematical test for the tendency towards equilibrium within the framework of the principles of mechanics. In the case of Boltzmann’s theorem H, it happens that the application of probabilistic methods allows the attainment of a lot of results in perfect accord with the results of experiments, but, as Ageno has demonstrated, these results are not obtained when by applying the rigorous method of mechanics to the system (gas). The conclusion is that no reconciliation is possible between the mechanical treatment and the probabilistic treatment of a physical system, for these are based on two contradictory hypotheses. The mechanical approach is based on the hypothesis that, starting from a certain microstate, the system can only pass to another determinate microstate. On the other hand, the probabilistic approach allows the system to have a non-null possibility of passing from one certain microstate to a continuous set of microstates, each different from the other.

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Boltzmann’s theorem H is not valid for a deterministic system that cannot be theorized correctly using statistical methods. The use of statistical methods is only valid for those systems that are centers of stochastic processes. Stochastic processes make all possible a priori microstates effectively accessible, whatever be the initial conditions of the system. Ageno proposes a revised and corrected version of theorem H: ‘As long as the physical system passes from microstate to microstate without ever being presented with any occasion of alternative options, the quantity H remains constant. Therefore, it is as rigorously deterministic a system as that in which the theorems of the conservation of mechanics are valid in molecular collisions. Inversely, H diminishes every time that a violation of the theorems of conservation introduce to the physical system the possibility of alternative options so that a significant number of microstates are accessible.’

Therefore, the probabilistic treatment of the problem obtains partial success in that it gives a perfect reason for the spontaneous evolution of a physical system towards the state of thermodynamic equilibrium, but at the cost of giving up on correctly representing the other fundamental fact which is phenomenologically established regarding the behavior of a physical system such as a gas: the validity of the conservation theorems of mechanics in molecular collisions. Inversely, the mechanical treatment of the problem, essentially constructed on the hypothesis of the validity of the theorems of mechanics in molecular collisions, cannot foresee the race towards the state of thermodynamic equilibrium that characterizes the behavior of every real gas. Until any deductive procedure, be it mechanical or statistical correctly applied, is able to explain the phenomenologically ascertained facts in terms of the behavior of a physical system, we must make the latter into a pragmatic model. As mentioned above, the mechanical approach fails because a stochastic element is not present allowing the system to have access to possible a priori microstates that are forbidden in its initial conditions. The introduction of a stochastic element into the mechanical model that would allow this access without compromising the general validity of the conservation theorems in molecular collisions appears possible here, and probably uniquely so, in order to obtain a good model of a real physical system (such as a gas). In a real system, the interruption of the mandated indefinite succession of microstates by an accidental jump to another microstate (not part of the succession) is allowed by a physical fact. The physical system stipulated by Ageno is that of a real gas enclosed in a box, and the physical state presented is that of the molecular collisions of the gas against the wall of the container.

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Therefore, the correction of the model is such that owing to the effect of the multiple collisions against the wall, in each of which the rigorous validity of the conservation theorems of mechanics for gas is broken, all possible a priori microstates are actually accessible to the gas. In this way the fundamental problem of statistical mechanics is resolved (according to Ageno, but according to Loschimdt, Zermelo and others besides, where Boltzmann had failed when confronted with this problem): that of finding a justification explaining why all macroscopic processes slipping towards entropy are excluded, while on the level of elementary molecules an event and its inverse are always either both allowed or both excluded. Ageno arrives at the following double conclusion: (1) The statistical entropy of a molecular system remains constant until the system evolves passing from microstate to microstate in a mandatory succession that does not have alternatives. It increases at the moment at which more evolutionary options are offered to the system among which it can adopt a different option at every repetition of the evolutionary process. (2) Such ramifications do not exist in a rigorously deterministic molecular system, so that there the entropy remains constant. Given that, ramifications can be created only through events involving interaction with another system, events whose outcome depends on a stochastic element. Thus, any alternatives are always offered to the system after such interaction has been effected, whatever the direction in which the evolutionary (reversible at the elementary level) process was going before the interaction itself. Therefore, here is the source, the origin of macroscopic irreversibility, since, whatever the direction in which the system was evolving at an elementary level, interaction with another system produces in every case an increase of entropy and therefore it produces an approach to the state of equilibrium. It is external perturbations that introduce the causality that is necessary for the system to move towards equilibrium; conversely, if the system were completely isolated from external surroundings, the entropy could only remain constant. Ageno shows that it is not possible to physically realize a system that is truly isolated. The concept of an “isolated system”, i.e., a system which does not exchange with its surroundings either material or energy in any form, is in principle nonexistent in our Universe and is impossible to achieve. By “isolated system”, Ageno no longer means, as is generally meant in scientific literature, an absolutely isolated system, i.e., an absolute absence of any per-

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turbation from the outside. He gives to this expression the meaning of a material system that does not exchange macroscopic flows of material or energy in any form with the outside and is not bombarded by material particles from the outside but keeps itself at a given temperature, at an average constant, exchanging with its surroundings only single quanta of electromagnetic radiation in balance with other bodies kept at that temperature. According to Ageno’s interpretation of the second principle of thermodynamics, it is not possible to realize a system that is completely isolated from its surroundings; hence the residual perturbations are always such as to introduce into the evolution of the system a stochastic element; all the microstates that the laws of probability allow are thus made accessible. As a rule, the microstates of a system are not equally probable a priori: the inner lawfulness of the system, different from system to system depending on the nature and structure of each, establishes which among all possible a priori microstates are effectively accessible proceeding from given initial conditions. The impossibility of completely isolating a system is introduced by that stochastic element through which either the evolution of a system towards the state of macroscopic thermodynamic equilibrium, that with the highest entropy, or the irreversible character of that evolution are justified. In this way the irreversibility of macroscopic processes originates in the temporal reversibility of processes occurring on an elementary level. Therefore, whenever one observes the system undergoing external perturbations, most often, it is in that macrostate which is richest in microstates, precisely the state of thermodynamic equilibrium. Furthermore, the inverse process is improbable, that is, a persistent and increasing distance of a system from the state of thermodynamic equilibrium ends up establishing a well-defined “direction” of time. Even if there is perfect symmetry between the two possible directions in which the orderly series of events proper to the system can go, the direction of the “arrow of time” is automatically fixed in the passage to the macroscopic level. University of Macerata – Italy REFERENCES Ageno, Mario. Le origini della irreversibilità. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992. Bellone, Enrico. I nomi del tempo — La seconda rivoluzione scientifica e il mito della freccia temporale. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1989. Dallaporta, Nicolò. Sguardo sull’attuale cosmologia. Rome: Borla, 1986. Huang, Kerson. Statistical Mechanics. New York: Wiley, 1963. Toraldo di Francia, Giuliano. L’indagine del mondo fisico. Turin: Einaudi, 1976.

S U S A N N E L I J M BAC H

T H E NAT U R A L - S C I E N T I F I C A N D P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L A P P ROAC H E S TO A N I M A L S

I N T RO D U C T I O N 1

This century, the dominant view on animals has been changed. Roughly speaking, animals are no longer seen as mere things, but as living beings who are able to suffer, have pain, or know what is going on and what they do. Since about the seventies, this change in thinking about animals has also permeated the philosophy and science of animals, especially animal ethology, the study of animal behaviour. Some people even speak of a paradigm shift within ethology (Rollin 1989). In my view, however, this paradigm shift has not been profound enough. Animal ethologists have accepted that animal experiences, such as cognition and emotions, can be the subject matter of their research. But, they have not developed a proper concept of animal experiences and an adequate method for studying them.2 Being natural scientists, animal ethologists conceive of animal experiences as unobservable, internal causes of law-like behaviour (rather than as meanings of behaviour). Therefore, they think that animal experiences can be known by the empirical-analytical method of research (rather than by an interpretative method). I will explain my view by first describing the current situation within animal welfare science, which can be seen as an example of this new paradigm within animal ethology. I will show that natural-scientific approaches to animal welfare rely upon implicit interpretations of animals (Part I). Secondly, I will present an interpretative approach to animals. I will do this by presenting the thought of Frederik Buytendijk, a Dutch animal psychologist and member of the “Utrecht School” in Psychology that proposed a phenomenological psychology. Buytendijk’s view on and research into animal bodies and behaviours are very fruitful, I think, for contemporary scientific thinking about animals (Part II). I will propose, finally, a “cogwheel model” for the study of animal experiences. This consists of a meshing of the hermeneutical circle of interpretative research and the empirical circle of natural-scientific research into animal experiences (Part III).

101 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 101–115. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Actually animal welfare science is a multidisciplinary science. Animal welfare is a subject matter of not only animal ethology but also of animal physiology (measurement and explanation of heart rates, adrenaline activation, immune response, and hormone production), neurobiology (on the required structures and processes of the brain and nervous system), evolutionary biology (on the development and biological function of cognition and emotion), and comparative psychology (on the similarities and differences between species as regards cognition and emotion). Within this range of animal welfare sciences, ethology is the dominant discipline. For example, at most animal research institutes, research into animal welfare belongs to the ethology department, although ethologists also use data and theories from the other aforementioned scientific disciplines. Animal experience emerged as the subject-matter of ethology not long after ethology was established as a natural-scientific, biological discipline. In the terms of the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, one can say that, in the middle of this century, animal ethology was in a preparadigmatic phase. Behaviourists, ethologists, animal psychologists and evolutionary biologists explained animal behaviour in different and sometimes incompatible ways as far as the terminology used, methodology and theoretical explanations went. The philosophical-theoretical writings of Niko Tinbergen can be seen as having founded the natural-scientific paradigm of animal ethology. This paradigm stated that animal behaviour must be explained in an empirical and causal-analytic way. Only environmental, physiological, neurophysiological or genetic factors were accepted as causes of animal behaviour. Speaking of unobservable, subjective experiences as causes of animal behaviour was anathema within this paradigm (Tinbergen 1963). At this moment, many ethologists do accept animal experiences as a subject matter of science, but they do not want to give up the naturalscientific character of ethology. Even within physics, unobservable causes of observable phenomena are accepted, they say, so why not within ethology? (Griffin 1976/1981, pp. 115–116). By analogously applying to animal experiences theoretical models used in physics, animal ethologists think they can reconcile, on the one hand, experience as a subject-matter of ethology and, on the other hand, the natural-scientific character of ethology. In the most often used ethological theory of animal welfare, for example, this reconciliation results in a theoretical approach to animal emotions. These emotions are conceived as being elements of causally functioning feedback mechanisms that regulate animal behaviour (see, for example, Broom 1996; Toates 1987; Wiepkema 1987).

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One of the problems within animal welfare science is how to relate the behavioural, physiological and neurobiological data to animal feelings of wellbeing (which justifies a theoretical explanation of these data in terms of emotions). This is done in nonscientific ways. Most animal welfare scientists, especially animal physiologists and neurobiologists, use the argument from analogy. This argument states that in animals, as in humans, particular behaviours and neurological and physiological processes are associated with feelings (see, for example, Dawkins 1990, p. 4; Sandøe and Simonsen 1992, p. 264; Wiepkema 1997, pp. 94–95). Animal welfare scientists sometimes refer to the sympathy we feel with animals (see, for example, Toates 1988, p. 4). They all admit, however, that these arguments do not provide “hard evidence” for the existence of animal feelings (Toates 1988, p. 4). As Sandøe and Simonsen wrote: Animal welfare scientists are confronted with a dilemma. Either their research is scientific but does not give satisfactory answers to questions concerning animal feelings, or it gives satisfactory answers but is not scientific (Sandøe and Simonsen 1992, p. 258). I consider this dilemma to be defined by the question of how to justify the use of interpretative terms, in casu terms that refer to feelings of well-being as the meaning of observed animal behaviours and other bodily phenomena. Within animal ethology in general, the situation is the same: ethologists speak of hunting, foraging, escape behaviour, and so on, which are also interpretations of animal behaviour (see Section III). The following section can be seen as a justification of such use of interpretative terms, though not a natural-scientific justification.

I I . A N I N T E R P R E TAT I V E A P P ROAC H TO A N I M A L S

I conceive of animal experience as the inherent, expressed meaning of animal bodies and behaviour. This concept of animal experience requires an interpretative method for the study of animal bodies and behaviours. Support for this view can be found in the writings of the animal psychologist Frederik Buytendijk. Buytendijk (1887–1974) was a physiologist. Within physiology, he held a special view. Through his whole career, he opposed the monopoly of naturalscientific approaches to physiology, whatever form they took. His criticism of natural-scientific physiological explanations was that they concern only the material aspect of bodily and behavioural phenomena. They neglect their other aspect, namely, that these phenomena are also meaningful expressions. Breathing, for example, is not just a causally explainable, material process, for the manner of breathing is a personal expression as well (see, for example, Buytendijk and Plessner 1935; Buytendijk 1965).

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In 1947, Buytendijk became head of the Psychology Department of the University of Utrecht. The scientists working at that department were called the “Utrecht School” within psychology. This name referred to their special view on human psychology, which corresponded to that of Buytendijk. Their main, common tenet consisted of the rejection of natural-scientific views about the human psyche because these do not do justice to the subjectivity of humans. The psychologists of the “Utrecht School” considered being meaningfully related to the world as the essence of humans as subjects. This essence primarily expresses itself in their bodily and behavioural appearance, they said. Therefore, the methodology of psychology should be oriented to understanding the particular, personal and cultural-historical meanings of these expressions, instead of explaining human physiology and behaviours as being determined solely by causal laws (Linschoten 1953 and 1962; Kouwer and Linschoten 1966). Buytendijk extended this view to animal psychology. Like human bodies and behaviours, animal physiology and behaviours are also not only causally explainable but are also meaningful phenomena, he held. His interpretations of animals in his own or other people’s experiments are demonstrations of such an interpretative view of animals. This is the reason why Buytendijk is called an animal psychologist. However, Buytendijk made a distinction between humans and animals, one which he derived from the philosophy of Helmuth Plessner. In Die Stufen des Organischen un der Mensch (1928),3 Plessner had developed a philosophy about the different ways of being in the world of respectively nonliving things, plants, animals, and humans. Such a philosophy of life is needed, he said, in order to provide the Geisteswissenschaften as developed by Dilthey with a philosophical foundation. These sciences assume a particular status of human being (der Sonderstellung der Mensch), namely, that only humans are culturally and historically changeable beings. A philosophy of life should make understandable the emergence of humans from nonhuman life, and the place of humans within the latter (S, p. 36). Plessner called the typical human way of being “excentric.” This means that humans have two centres in their relationships with the world. On the one hand, they have a bodily centre, their Körperleib, which is both their physical and their experiencing body. On the other hand, they have a reflective “I,” which does not coincide with this bodily centre but is able to reflect upon it (and upon the external and social world) (S, pp. 288–293). Because of this excentric way of being, humans’ relationships to their bodily selves and their external and social world are not given to them.

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Humans have to create these relationships by themselves, i.e. with their reflective “I.” They do this in a personal, cultural and historically changeable way. This typical human way of being is, according to Plessner, the origin of human culture and history (S, pp. 309–321). It is also the ontological foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften as distinguished from the natural sciences (Plessner 1961/1978, pp. 23–24). Speaking of “der Sonderstellung der Mensch” is to immediately raise the question of the distinction between humans and animals. With regard to animals, Plessner spoke of a “closed and centric way of being.” A closed way of being means that relationship with the environment is mediated by a self. In the case of animals, this is a bodily self only. In case of humans, this is, as we saw above, both a bodily self and a reflective “I,” whence humans are also open to the world. Animals do not have a reflective “I.” They do not have two centres. Their bodily centre is the one and only centre of their world. The emergence of human life from non human life can be understood as the coming out of an interior self (Lijmbach 1989, p. 80). In the case of animals, we do speak of the animal self as distinct from the animal body. We can only speak of that self, however, insofar as it is bound to its Leib. Animals themselves do not act as or manifest expression of an “I” distanced from their Leib. The human “I,” on the other hand, is exterior to, because reflecting upon its Leib. This view on the animal self, as distinct from the human self, is at the basis of Buytendijk’s interpretations of animal behaviours. Plessner as well as Buytendijk found partial support for this typical animal way of being in the Umwelt theory of Jacob von Uexküll. This theory is also the link between their view on the animal self and Buytendijk’s interpretation of animals. According to von Uexküll, all living beings live in a speciesspecific Umwelt, which consists of those portions of the environment that they are able to perceive and in which they are able to act. Von Uexküll called the perceived world the “Merkwelt” (the world noticed) and the world in which action occurs the “Wirkungswelt” (the world of action). Together these make up the Umwelt. An activity which von Uexküll called the “subject” or “natural factor” connects the perceptions and actions of organisms into functional circles (von Uexküll 1920). In this theory, Plessner and Buytendijk found support for their view that relationships between animals and their environment are mediated by a self that is bound to the animal’s bodily perceptions and actions (S, pp. 247–248).4 However, both Plessner and Buytendijk criticized von Uexküll for viewing his own Umwelt theory as a natural-scientific, biological theory.

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This implies that the relationships between animal perceptions and actions are causal relationships, and that the Umwelt of animals is to be conceived of in physical terms. Plessner correctly remarked that the biological theory as formulated by von Uexküll cannot be distinguished from comparative biology limited to on physiological exposition, because it only sees animals as physical bodies (S, p. 261). Buytendijk added to this remark that animal perceptions and actions are not separate elements of a causal chain but involve each other. Particular perceptions already involve particular actions, and vice versa. Higher animals especially are actively looking for perceptions and perceive their environment as an Umwelt in which to act. Animals shape and structure their own meaningful Umwelt by means of their perceptions and actions (Buytendijk, 1938 pp. 83–84 and pp. 209–215; 1958/1972, p. 53; 1965, p. 238). With regard to the meaning of animal actions, Buytendijk spoke in terms of a “functioning intentionality” (Buytendijk and Christian 1963, p. 97) or a “vital meaning” (Buytendijk 1938, p. 208; 1948, pp. 31–35; 1965, pp. 78–79). These terms refer to the distinction that Buytendijk, in line with Plessner’s philosophy, made between human and animal expression. Buytendijk agreed with Plessner that the meaning of human expression is of a personal, cultural and historical character because of its mediation by a reflective “I” (Buytendijk 1938, p. 53 and p. 197). In the case of animals, however, the meaning of their expressions cannot become conscious and thematic but is only bodily expressed in the course of functioning. In other words, animals do not give meaning to the world but bear a meaning (Buytendijk 1938, pp. 94–95). According to Buytendijk, understanding this vital meaning of the phenomena of life should be the aim of the life sciences as distinguished from the natural sciences as well as from the Geisteswissenschaften.5 These last sciences are aimed at understanding the personal, cultural and historical meaning of human expressions (Buytendijk 1925). As one can say that Plessner provided the understanding of the human sciences with a philosophical foundation, one can say that Buytendijk — by elaborating Plessner’s view on organisms in general and animals in particular — provided the understanding of the life sciences with a philosophical foundation. Buytendijk applied this view on animals in his own animal experiments and in his interpretations of the experiments of other animal scientists. However, he was not very clear about the method he used. Like the psychologists of the “Utrecht School,” he considered understanding animals to be the matter of a meeting between two subjects (the animals and the

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researcher), in which the researcher’s personal experience with animals is important (see, for example, Buytendijk 1943/1957, p. 91). This leaves the door open to illegitimate anthropomorphism and other incorrect interpretations of animals. In order to prevent this, I think that animal psychology, like any science, should be based on an intersubjectively agreed-upon method. The “cogwheel model” that will be presented in the last section of this paper is a proposal for such a method. First I will give an example of Buytendijk’s interpretation of animals, one which makes the abovementioned view on animals and my methodological conclusions more concrete. A good example of Buytendijk’s interpretations of animals is his view on Köhler’s interpretation of his experiments with chimpanzees. At the beginning of this century, Köhler did research into the intelligence of chimpanzees. In one of his experiments, a chimpanzee had learned to use a box in order to grasp a banana that was hanging too high. Later, the banana was hung higher still and a second box was placed somewhere in the room. The chimpanzee took the second box and did a lot of things with it that appeared to be strange, such as holding it beside the first one under the banana, placing it at a certain angle upon the first one, holding it high above his head, or placing both boxes where the banana had been hanging in the previous experiment (Buytendijk 1958/1972, pp. 136–137). Köhler said that these behaviours were not that strange but are stupid and good mistakes. For example, placing the second box at a certain angle upon the first one was a good mistake: the construction was higher, although less stable. On the other hand, placing both boxes where the banana had been hanging in the first experiment was a stupid mistake. Even intelligent humans make stupid mistakes, he said. Köhler considered both types of mistakes to be expressions of human-like intelligence of chimpanzees. The good mistakes showed that the chimpanzee had insight into the relationship between his own place and the banana and understood the boxes as tools in order to reach the banana (Buytendijk 1920/1932II, p. 173 and p. 223). Buytendijk, however, interpreted these behaviours in a different way (Buytendijk 1920/1932II, pp. 221–224; 1958/1972 pp. 123–141). The chimpanzee’s solution to the first posed problem of getting the banana by means of climbing onto one box seemed to be based on human-like, rational insight, that is, insight into a situation as a task and the deduction of a solution applying concepts and making judgements. Actually it was a solution found through bodily action, Buytendijk held, action which the chimpanzee then repeated in order to solve the second problem posed. As in the first

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experiment, the chimpanzee tried to bring the second box closer to the banana by placing it on top of the first box or by holding it above his head under the banana. If the chimpanzee’s solution was really based on rational insight into the relationships between his own body, the boxes and the banana, then he would have understood that he could not climb onto a box which he held above his head, Buytendijk said. This requires, Plessner would have said, an excentric way of being, that is, the capacity to see one’s own bodily actions from another point of view than that of one’s own bodily centre. The experiments only proved that the chimpanzee was able to perceive the spatial relationships in his environment very precisely, and that he quickly learned to use the boxes in order to get food that is too far away. Buytendijk explained these acquired abilities by seeing in operation the species-specific way of life of chimpanzees. They live in trees and jump from tree to tree to get their food, which explains their capacity for precise spatial perception. In their natural environment they also use sticks or other tools in order to get food that is too far away. This explains the speed of their learning process in using boxes in order to get a banana. This intelligence, however, differs from human, rational insight in that it is bodily acquired and bound, instead of being mediated by perception-independent concepts and judgements. Buytendijk concluded that the actions of the chimpanzee, though sometimes technically perfect, were applications of acquired sensory-motor experience to the problematic situation (Buytendijk 1920/1932II, p. 200). This is what he called “practical intelligence,” which refers to acquired behaviour that is determined by the perception of the structure of meaning of a situation in relation to the available, bodily possibilities (Buytendijk 1958/1972, p. 134). I I I . T H E “ C O G W H E E L M O D E L ” F O R T H E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N OF ANIMALS

On the basis of Buytendijk’s interpretations of Köhler’s, his own and other people’s experimental findings, I have reconstructed a method for an intersubjective interpretation of animal bodies and behaviours. I have done this by discussing four issues that are central for the “Utrecht School” as well as for the hermeneutical sciences (Lijmbach 1998, pp. 114–122). The first issue has already been discussed and concerns the subject matter of interpretation. Understanding animals differs from understanding humans in that the meanings it aims to understand are not reflective, and, therefore, not personal, cultural and historical. This specific subject matter has various methodological consequences.

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The first consequence concerns the context of understanding. Within the hermeneutical sciences, the meaning of human expressions is understood within a personal, cultural and historical context that constitutes this meaning. As we saw above, Buytendijk interpreted the behaviour of the chimpanzee within his species-specific way of life. From a methodological perspective, a speciesspecific way of animal life occupies the same place as the cultural-historical way of human life: They both are contexts of understanding that constitute the meaning of particular expressions of an individual in a particular environment. Ethologists use the concept of the species-specific. However, they use this concept to signify an endowed standard of animal behaviour. They consider genetically-fixed animal behaviour or animal behaviour in the natural environment to be species-specific. Other animal behaviours are called “abnormal” or “unnatural.” At first sight, Buytendijk also seemed to use “species-specificity” in this way: The precise perceptions of the chimpanzee and his use of boxes as tools are just natural because they fit within his species-specific (natural) way of life. However, Buytendijk did more than compare the chimpanzee’s behaviour in the experiments with the behaviour of chimpanzees in their natural environment and conclude that these two are the same. He tried to understand the meaning of the chimpanzee’s behaviour in the experiments by — at the same time — trying to understand the meaning of their behaviour in their natural environment. He tried to bring the assumed meanings of the chimpanzee’s behaviours under laboratory conditions as well as in natural circumstances into coherent correspondence with each other under the heading of a chimpanzee’s specific way of life.6 This particular use of the animal’s species-specific way of life corresponds to what hermeneuticists call the “hermeneutical circle”: a going to and fro between the assumed meaning of particular expressions and the assumed meaning of their context until they fit. The second methodological consequence of the difference in subjectmatter concerns the question of single and double hermeneutics. Within the hermeneutical sciences, “single hermeneutics” refers to the fact that naturalscientific concepts and their founding prescientific meanings are shared by scientists and lay people. “Double hermeneutics” refers to the fact that these concepts and their founding prescientific meanings are also shared by the “objects” themselves. In order to understand the social world properly, social scientists have to base their concepts on the nonscientific meanings acquired by their “objects” of study (Giddens 1976/1993, pp. 163–167). The question is whether the understanding of animals is also a matter of double hermeneutics. I hold that it is not. As explained above, the distinction

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between the meaning of human and animal expressions is that the latter cannot become — for the animals themselves — conscious and thematic but remains bound to their species-specific Leib and Umwelt. In other words, animals do not understand their own meaningful experiences; these simply happen to them. Therefore, it is impossible for them to understand and share the meaning of their expressions as that is understood by us humans. It is also impossible for us humans to understand the meaning of animal experiences as that is experienced by themselves. This would require that we could take away the personal, cultural and historical aspects of our own experiences, so that only their bodily aspects, which we can share with animals, would remain. As Plessner correctly said, then we would be unable to talk about animal experiences (Plessner 1946/1983, p. 59). We can only understand animals applying our own human conceptualization of our own human experiences. Because of the impossibility of a double hermeneutics here, it is perhaps better to speak of a phenomenological interpretation of the appearance of animals as an expression of experiences, rather than of a hermeneutical understanding of animal experiences. Given this last methodological consequence, the interpretation of animals is necessarily anthropomorphistic. Nevertheless, Plessner and Buytendijk’s conception of animals can keep us from illegitimate anthropomorphism, such as ascribing the experience of personality to pets or human-like intelligence to chimpanzees, as Köhler did. A systematic and nonpersonal but intersubjective method for the interpretation of animal bodies and behaviours, as sketched above, can enhance our agreement upon the validity of these interpretations. Besides the interpretation of animals in terms of the hermeneutical circle as explained above, natural-scientific research data and explanations can enhance the intersubjective understanding of these interpretations among scientists. According to the members of the “Utrecht School,” interpretative psychology is enough to understand the meaning of human expressions. All natural-scientific studies into humans abstract from this aspect of meaning of humans, they said. Buytendijk, however, did not exclude all natural science from psychology. An interpretative and a natural scientific approach lead together to a full comprehension of bodily phenomena (see the name for his special view on physiology: “an anthropological physiology” (Buytendijk 1965). Plessner also warned against an illegitimate anthropomorphism found in many statements about animals that are heedless of the physical aspects of their behaviour (S, p. 261). Below I will show how natural-scientific research

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data and explanations can contribute to the interpretation of animals. This will result in a “cogwheel model” for the interpretation of animal bodies and behaviours. I will do this by means of an example from animal welfare research, namely research into the welfare of farm mink (see Lijmbach 1998, pp. 137–146). A few years ago, there was a debate in the Netherlands about the welfare of farm mink. Dutch animal protection organizations considered their care to be poor, and asked for the prohibition of mink farming. The organization of mink farmers however, said there were no problems with regard to the welfare of the mink. The Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries asked a Dutch ethologist to advise him about this difference of opinion. Immediately after the publication of his report, other ethologists contested his conclusion that there are “relatively minor welfare problems, which can largely be solved” (Wiepkema 1994). Most of these ethologists referred to other natural-scientific research data or asked for more experiments in order to demonstrate that the aforementioned conclusion was incorrect. One of the discussed issues shows the relevance of such data for the interpretation of animal behaviour as evidence of good or poor welfare. The discussed issue was whether or not quiet mink enjoy good treatment, assuming that restless mink evidence poor treatment (see below). Many of the aforementioned ethologists said that breeding for quiet mink only takes away a symptom of poor welfare and not their poor welfare itself. One of them said that quiet behaviour might mean apathetic behaviour. An inventory of studies in which various physical criteria of well-being (which in humans are associated with feelings of well-being and in animals are supposed to be associated with such feelings) were applied to quiet and restless mink showed that the quiet mink never scored more negatively than the restless mink. Their reproduction, growth, adrenal activity and abnormal behaviour did not indicate that they got poorer treatment than did restless mink. Also the proposed test for apathy did not indicate that. These natural-scientifically gained findings make it hard to continue to hold that quiet mink are poorly treated, though they do not justify the conclusion that i.e. well-being of the quiet mink is assured. The data simply supports the assumption, based on the argument from analogy, that quiet mink are in a less adverse situation than restless mink. Another issue, however, shows the insufficiency of natural-scientific explanations of supposed emotional animal behaviour. The issue here concerned the aforementioned interpretation of restless behaviour as evidence of distress. Wiepkema considered this behaviour, which farm mink exhibit before feeding time and which does not always stop after feeding, to be

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normal foraging behaviour. Other ethologists, however, considered this behaviour abnormal, stereotypic behaviour and, thus, a reflection of poor conditions. Stereotypic behaviour is the name given behaviour characterized by an invariable form, a high frequency, and no obvious function, for example, pacing in zoo animals. Stereotypies are explained as expressions of distress caused by unsuitable conditions according to the aforementioned system theory of animal emotion. The impossibility or difficulty of performing highly motivated, coping behaviour causes negative emotions, and these cause stereotypic behaviour. However, as one ethologist has correctly said, this explanation is a circular argument: First a particular behaviour is said to be abnormal, stereotypic, behaviour reflective of poor treatment and then unobservable emotions of distress are invoked in order to explain this behaviour. In order to say in a scientifically sound way that a particular behaviour reflects distressing conditions, its causes need to be demonstrated independently of the presence of that particular behaviour, she holds (Mason 1991, p. 1019). This is, however, impossible: Feelings of a poor state of being or condition cannot be observed independently of behaviour or other bodily phenomena. If a neurobiologist looks into an animal’s head, he or she will never see feelings but only nerves and other brain structures. Animal behaviour, and other bodily phenomena can only be identified as expressions of good or poor treatment through interpretation of it. Natural-scientific explanations can only afterwards support or challenge an interpretation. This is what Georgia Mason, who asked for the independent demonstration of the cause of restless behaviour, actually did in her own research. She compared the form of this behaviour with the form of normal hunting behaviour. Because of the similarity of some aspects of their form and the dissimilarity of other aspects, she concluded that restless behaviour of farm mink is an abnormal variant of hunting behaviour (Mason 1993). These two issues from the field of animal welfare science show that both a natural-scientific approach and an interpretative approach are needed, but that neither one of them is sufficient for the interpretation of animal behaviour. Conclusions from the empirical circle and from the hermeneutical circle need to be brought together and compared with each other until they cohere. In the case of the aforementioned issues, this means that the physiological criteria of apathy and the interpretation of quiet behaviour of farm mink as apathetic behaviour need to be considered together. The same holds for conclusions from experiments based on the system-theoretical explanation of animal welfare, preference tests, for example, and interpretatively-gained con-

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clusions. As Buytendijk would have said, each type of conclusion concerns only one aspect of animal behaviour because both aspects cannot be studied simultaneously, but both are aspects of the same meaningful behaviour (Buytendijk 1965, pp. 83–84). Wagenigen Agricultural University The Netherlands N OT E S 1

Author contact: Applied Philosophy Group, Wageningen Agricultural University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands; susanne. [email protected] 2 In this article, I will use the concept of experience in a very broad sense, that is referring to various types of phenomena of animals as subjects, such as cognition, emotions, feelings, or perceptions. 3 “Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch” will henceforth be cited as S, followed by the page number(s). Regarding the edition used, see the reference list at the end of this article. 4 Concerning humans, they did not agree with von Uexküll. Contrary to von Uexküll, Plessner and Buytendijk said that humans do not live in an Umwelt that is species-specific. In humans, the natural unity between body and Umwelt has been broken down because of the emergence of a reflective “I.” Humans have to restore the unity of their Körperleib and Umwelt in an artificial, cultural way (see above). Therefore, Plessner and Buytendijk spoke of the human Welt, instead of the human Umwelt (Buytendijk 1958/1972, pp. 49–53; Plessner 1946/1983 and 1961/1978). 5 The life sciences also cover plants, which bear a vital meaning. With regard to the concept of the self of plants, Buytendijk did agree with Plessner that this self does not mediate between perceptions of and actions in the environment but is solely an aspect of their appearance (Buytendijk 1938, pp. 82–83). Because of this aspect, expressed for example, by the way in which a plant grows, plants also bear a vital meaning, Buytendijk asserted (Buytendijk 1925). However, Buytendijk did not elaborate a way of understanding this vital meaning of plants. I think that this requires separate research into theories about plants, in order to discover terms that do not refer to mere physical aspects of plants. Such terms could help us to imagine and develop a concept of meaning that is specific for plants. 6 This process of going to and fro between an assumed meaning of particular expressions and their species-specific context became more clear in Buytendijk’s interpretations of the behaviour of toads in his own experiments. In order to understand this behaviour, he also tried to understand the meaning of — primarily to him unknown — the behaviour of toads in their natural environment (see Lijmbach 1998, pp. 98–99).

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Buytendijk, F.J.J. (1932). Psychologie der dieren. I and II. Haarlem: De Eerven F. Bohn N.V. [Animal psychology] (original work 1920). Buytendijk, F.J.J. (1938). Grondproblemen van het dierlijk leven. Antwerpen/Brussel/Nijmegen: Standaard Boekhandel/Dekker & van Devegt. [Fundamental problems of animal life]. Buytendijk, F.J.J. (1957). Over de pijn. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Het Spectrum. [Pain] (original work 1943). Buytendijk, F.J.J. (1965). Prolegomena van een antroplogische fysiologie. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Het Spectrum. [Prolegomena to an antropological physiology]. Buytendijk, F.J.J. (1972). Mens en dier. Utrecht/Antwerpen: Het Spectrum [Human and animal] (original work 1958). Buytendijk, F.J.J. & Christian, P. (1963). Kybernetik und Gestaltkreis als Erklärungsprinzipien des Verhaltens. Der Nervernartz 34: 3, 97–104. [Cybernetics and Gestaltkreis as explanatory principles of behaviour]. Dawkins, M.S. (1990). From an animal’s point of view: motivation, fitness, and animal welfare. Behavioral and Brain Science 13, 1–9. Giddens, A. (1993). New Rules of Sociological Method. A positive critique of interpretative sociologies. Cambridge: Polity Press. (original work 1976). Griffin, D.R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness. Evolutionary continuity of mental experiences. New York: The Rockefeller University Press. (original work 1976). Kouwer, B.J. & Linschoten, J. (1966). Inleiding tot de psychologie. Assen/Amsterdam/ Rotterdam: Born. [Introduction to psychology]. Lijmbach, S. (1998). Animal Subjectivity. A study into philosophy and theory of animal experience. Ph. D. thesis, Wageningen Agricultural University. Linschoten, J. (1953). Postscript. In J.H. Van den Bergh and J. Linschoten (eds.), Persoon en wereld. Bijdragen tot een phenomenologische psychologie (pp. 244–253). Utrecht: Erven J. Bijleveld [Person and world. Contributions to a phenomenological psychology]. Linschoten, J. (1962). Fenomenologie en psychologie. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 55, 113–122. [Phenomenology and psychology]. Mason, G.J. (1991). Stereotypies: a critical review. Animal Behaviour 41, 1015–1037. Mason, G.J. (1993b). Age and context affect the stereotypies of caged mink. Behaviour 127: 3–4, 191–229. Plessner, H. (1975). Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. [The stages of organic and human life] (original work 1928). Plessner, H. (1983). Mensch und Tier. In H. Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften, VIII (pp. 52–65). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. [Humans and animals] (original work 1946). Rollin, B.E. (1989). The Unheeded Cry. Animal consciousness, animal pain, and science. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Sandøe, P. & Simonsen, H.B. (1992). Assessing animal welfare: where does science end and philosophy begin? Animal Welfare 1, 257–267. Tinbergen, N. (1963). On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 20, 410–433. Toates, F. (1987). The relevance of models of motivation and learning to animal welfare. In P.R. Wiepkema and P.W.M. van Adrichem (eds.), Biology of Stress in Farm Animals: an integrative approach, pp. 153–186. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff. Toates, F. (1988). Motivation and emotion from a biological perspective. In V. Hamilton (ed.), Cognitive Perspectives on Emotions and Motivation, 3–35. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Von Uexküll, J. (1920). Theoretische Biologie. Berlin: Gebr. Baetel. [Theoretical biology]. Wiepkema, P.R. (1987). Behavioural aspects of stress. In P.R. Wiepkema and P.W.M. van Adrichem (eds.), Biology of Stress in Farm Animals: an integrative approach, pp. 113–133. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Martinus Nijhoff. Wiepkema, P.R. (1994). Advice with regard to Mink Husbandry. Wiepkema, P.R. (1997). The emotional vertebrate. In M. Dol et al. (eds.), Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics. Perspectives from the Netherlands, pp. 93–102. Assen: Van Gorcum.

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When modern instruments are used in laboratory research, dramatic changes occur at the microscopic level. Depending on the particular instrument employed, a specimen absorbs or emits radiation; alternatively, radiation is scattered, refracted or diffracted. In many studies, a researcher then renders a decisive judgment, whether to declare triumphantly that his/her findings reveal something real about a chemical substance or to refrain from such a judgment for fear of having produced an artificial effect. Both judgments presuppose that artificial conditions of the laboratory can be separated from the real effects. Some commentators charge that any pronouncement of success, that independently-existing properties are revealed from experimental studies, masks the inherent artificiality of all experimental techniques. The infiltration of socially-determined practices in laboratory research is so thoroughly contaminating that all declarations of access to Nature’s independent entities convey more about the scientist’s hubris than it does about the objectivity of techniques. But what exactly does it mean to say that experimental effects are real, or that they are artifacts? The real/artifact duality goes to the heart of philosophical debates over the success of laboratory research. If we address this question by exploring techniques of chemical instrumentation, we find that the categories of a laboratory artifact and real effect are not mutually exclusive. One might say that the experimental phenomena of chemical research are both real and artificially produced from laboratory apparatus. But the real/artificial dichotomy is bogus in this context. I recommend a functional orientation to laboratory research. On this view an instrument is characterized by its capacities to convert experimental phenomena to information under specific laboratory conditions. Such capacities are manifested in a specimen’s actions and reactions at the microscopic level: A specimen functions as both a recipient of change and an agent for change based on its dynamical properties. In this respect a specimen is characterized by its (real) capacities which are exploited during (artificially-induced) conditions. Rationalistic philosophers of science, such as Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper, are virtually silent on the philosophical significance of instrumental 117 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 117–133. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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design. The particular character of instrumental techniques has no bearing, presumably, on the pivotal philosophical distinctions between genuine science and pseudo-science, accepted theory and refuted hypothesis, and vertical evidence and mere illusion. But Ian Hacking calls on philosophers to substitute their preoccupation with scientific theories for an exploration of instrumental engineering (1983). We find philosophical insight through engineering, not theorizing. In developing this theme, I argue that the engineering of instruments produces a cognitive vision, which is not a theoretical representation per se, of the anticipated behavior of machines. Certain philosophical treasures concerning the standards for laboratory research can be mined through the work of designers of instruments, revealing how the idealized relationship between experimenter and nature is mediated through instrumental technologies. I . A RT I FAC T S A N D NAT U R A L FAC T S

At the outset, we should avoid some confusion about the apparent duality between artifacts and real effects. The opposite of an artifact is not a real fact, but a natural fact. We find two distinctions at work here: (a) artificial/natural and (b) real/unreal. Immediately below, I explore the artificial/natural duality, and consider questions about reality in a subsequent section. How can we identify whether something is artificial or natural? The answer depends on how it was produced or created. An artifact is a product of human skill, brought into existence through some “non-natural” (read: human) apparatus, action or skill. The work of artisans, pharmacists and metallurgists generate such products through various techniques in which certain material is decomposed and then synthesized. But natural facts are generated presumably without (artificial) interference from human agents. This artificial/natural distinction is frequently attributed to middle-sized objects. We say that sculptures, buildings and computers are artifacts, but mountains, sunlight and tornadoes are not. In this context, I understand Nature as a system of entities (states, forces, powers, etc.) which interact with each other in ways that produce detectable phenomena. Any possible event of Nature can be characterized as a state of the system, which in turn is governed by principles (laws, models and theories) of the physical sciences. So, the order of Nature is revealed by the range of possible phenomena that are defined by the system, as evident in the range of possible phenomena. Should we conclude that all experimental phenomena occurring from the use of modern instruments are mere artifacts and so are not natural? We need

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to ask whether the changes which a specimen undergoes are products of human constructions, or are they “natural” effects of a specimen’s internal action. Can we choose between these two options? The difficulty with adopting the artificial/natural dichotomy in this context is that experimenters have no direct access to the molecules, atoms and subatomic processes which are causally responsible for producing detectable events. Any determination of the artificial (or natural) character of an experimental event requires elaborate analysis of the causal mechanisms at work, an analysis which is not immediately evident from the experimental data. To underscore this point, imagine what a purely transparent instrument would mean for laboratory researchers. We are already familiar with quasitransparent devices, such as scales, rulers and apparatus for measuring distance. Such devices have the obvious virtue of allowing experimenters to separate the (artificial) influences of the instrumental techniques from all (natural facts) states of the material. However, contemporary instruments in chemistry and physics are clearly not transparent: they are designed to produce signals, in the form of experimental events, from the union of energy and specimen. Energy induced from a manufactured source functions as an interfering probe to agitate and disturb a specimen’s dynamics. Again, an experimenter who uses instruments gets no closer to the microworld than microscopic states which are brought into existence from an instrument/ specimen unity. I I . RO B E RT H O O K E ’ S P H I L O S O P H I C A L I N S T RU M E N T S

The idea that scientific instruments are designed as neutral mediators between an objective world and subjective minds is a myth about twentieth-century research. Even the great instruments of the Scientific Revolution cannot sustain the myth of transparency. Natural philosophers of the seventeenth century found a universe without purpose, a world that is neither benevolent nor cruel, neither beautiful nor ugly. The universe was conceived as the product of the Grand Watchmaker: hard, cold, colorless, silent and dead. Man was diminished to a puny, irrelevant spectator of the vast mechanical universe. Such a universe is completely unaffected by man’s actions, achievement and ambitions. In place of man’s divinity in the Cosmos, modern science gave the experimenter-machinist a noble mission, bestowing honor to those who could disclose Nature’s secrets. The discovery of powerful new instruments held great promise for revealing the workings of the Cosmic Machine. In spite of man’s loss of centrality in the Cosmos, man can now

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discover enduring properties of material substance and can gain power to disclose Nature’s secrets. The wonders of the universe can be revealed by using the new machines of natural philosophy, such as a microscope, telescope, air-pump and barometer. These devices were identified as philosophical apparatus, because they gave experimenters access to the truths of the material world.1 The faith in such devices prompted changes in the standards for an objective experiment. The medieval notions of heaven and earth, and up and down in a spiritual order, found no place in modern notion of an experiment. The moderns sought to expunge from experimental research all biasing influences that might arise from human judgment, conception and belief. The philosophical instruments were designed to replicate our God-given sensory capacities. The natural philosophers of the day wrote that such devices augment human sensory capacities and remove some potential biasing aspects. The new instrumental techniques leave their mark on the notion of a scientific object: Only a body’s empirical attributes are worthy of instrumental detection. Some commentators endorse an anthropological orientation to philosophical instruments (Kutschmann 1986). According to this perspective, the techniques employed by scientists for revealing nature’s properties reflect the prevailing conceptions of body, mind and self. Philosophical instruments are developed as material extensions of the human body. Microscopes and telescopes were portrayed as surrogates to the eye, enhancing human vision and avoiding known defects (Kutschmann 1986, p. 107). However, anthropological interpretations of philosophical instruments risk a superficial understanding of instruments. Historians of the Scientific Revolution often exaggerate the role of sensory perception in experimental research. Rather than an observer’s eye, it is the machinist’s eye and hand that provide the best metaphor for instrumentation. Most natural philosophers of the modern era depicted the eye as one of nature’s machines and the reception of the sensory given by a retina was understood mechanistically. A scientific object must be amenable to instrumental techniques, and subject to a mechanic’s skills, for slicing, dissecting or simply putting a specimen under a microscope. Seventeenth-century natural philosophers found great inspiration in the machines of nature. Sensory amplification was understood as the effect of some deeper mechanical interaction with minute bodies. A material body under investigation (specimen) was characterized as a machine of nature, and the optics by which visual images are produced is purely mechanistic. The naked sensory organs themselves were understood as God-

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given machines. Of course, microscopes were designed to enhance sensory capacities. But this is achieved through the mechanical interactions with minute particles, analogous to a machinist’s manipulations of bodies. Natural philosophers designed their new devices to reveal a world of immense power, disclosing otherwise “hidden” processes which were responsible for observable events. To achieve this goal, philosophical instruments had to interact with nature at a level that was not directly observable. Mathematical instruments were passive devices, devoid of any distorting influence on material bodies, and incapable of revealing underlying physical processes that are causally responsible for natural events. Philosophical instruments are designed to interact with nature’s microscopic properties (Hackman 1989, p. 42). In their search for truth, natural philosophers were increasingly drawn to the practical skills associated with instrument-making (Warner 1994, p. 71). The production of telescopes and microscopes in the 1650’s required lensgrinding skills that were familiar to the spectacle-making industry (Price 1957, pp. 632–633). Such skills included metal-working, machining, woodworking, lens-crafting and tube-making. The best natural philosophy can be learned from the shops of machinists who produced telescopes and microscopes. In preparation for his optical experiments using prisms, Newton devised new techniques for producing lenses “free from Bubbles and Veins” with “truly plane” sides (Schaffer 1989, pp. 93–94). As an expert lensworking, Huygens expended considerable time and energy in developing seaclocks, requiring both theoretical insight and practical skills that he hoped would change the art of navigation (Bennett 1986, p. 7). More than ever before, natural philosophers identified their professional status by the technical skills associated with such devices. Wondrous discoveries brought about from such instruments, prompted a large demand, which would be satisfied only by mass production (Price 1957, p. 628). At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Nuremberg and Ausburg were well-known centers for the craft of instrument-making. By the end of the sixteenth century various centers for instrument-making were opened in England, France, Italy, Germany and the Low Countries (Price 1957, pp. 620–622). The simple act of combining lenses, which occurred probably by holding two lenses in one’s hand, quickly revealed advantages to instrument-makers. Such an act would have monumental significance, contributing to the optics of compound microscopes to come (Bradbury 1964, p. 22). Many scholars credit this discovery of compound microscopes to a Dutch spectacle-maker named Jans Janssen along with his son Zacharias (Bradbury 1964, p. 21). The

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first use of lenses for telescopic vision was probably developed also by the Janssens’ work (Charleston and Angus-Butterworth 1957, pp. 230–231). Learning about this Dutch “invention,” Galileo converted this device for studies of planets and stars, leading to great excitement from the discoveries of Saturn’s rings, Jupiter’s satellites, spots on the Sun and mountains on the Moon. Most philosophical apparatus of the Scientific Revolution existed in earlier forms for purposes of natural magic. For example, the earliest known sketch of a telescope is by the natural magician Giambattista Della Porta. Robert Boyle learned of the air pump from reading the work of the natural magician Gaspar Schott. Newton got his prisms at a fair where they were sold as instruments of natural magic. The goal of natural magic was to emulate the wonders of nature, for entertainment or practical benefits, but without exposing the underlying causes of such events (Hankins and Silverman 1995, pp. 4–5). Natural magicians produced wondrous and startling events through trickery from hidden mirrors, for example. The result was a bewildering sensory experience, ostensibly separated from a familiar causal agent. Of course, philosophical instruments of the Scientific Revolution were not truth-concealing, they were truth-revealing. Rather than trying to separate visual experiences from the underlying agents of causation, natural philosophers devised apparatuses to disclose Nature’s productive powers. But how could experimental philosophers persuade critics that the visual images produced by microscopes are products of nature’s properties and not (merely) the instrument’s actions? At stake are more than decisions on the particular scientific apparatus. Underlying disputes over the promises of instruments are debates over the standards of objective empirical inquiry. For designers of philosophers instruments, the standards for a genuine experiment were drawn largely from skills of craftsmen in the mechanical arts. This appeal to the crafts put into practice a mechanics’ philosophy (Bennett 1986). Since a material body was reducible to machines, the methods for understanding nature should be drawn from the practical techniques commonly associated with the mathematical sciences at that time. The artisan was typically not engaged in natural philosophy, not expected to produce new truths about the causal properties of the natural world. The clock-maker worked with wheels and springs, and was not concerned with theories of corpuscular interaction. The designer’s reliance on craftsmen should not be surprising: as energetic participants in the design of microscopes, many natural philosophers found their work increasingly drawn towards the mechanical arts. Man-made machines conform to the same

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principle as the machine of nature, created by God. We find in the craft of experimental machinery certain skills that contributed directly to an experimental philosophy. So the traditional separation between high science (from the theories of philosophers) and low science (from the products of artisans) began to crumble with the new devices of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Bennett 1986, p. 6). Robert Hooke is the first natural philosopher to record systematically experimental discoveries using compound microscopes. His diary shows almost daily visits to cities where instruments were manufactured, as he engaged in lens-crafting activities (Price, p. 630). He designed and used various compound microscopes, as illustrated in Figure 1 (1961, p. 1). His design of microscopes cannot be easily categorized as work in mechanical arts or in natural philosophy. In one of the great works of science literature, Micrographia: or some physiological description of minute bodies made by magnifying glasses with observations and enquiries thereon (Hooke 1961), Hooke provides detailed illustrations of microscopic discoveries. Displaying his talents in the fine arts, Hooke shows the edge of a razor, point of a needle and moss on leather. Insects, such as a louse, gnat and fly, were placed under the microscope; Micrographia includes a 16-inch diagram of an insect (1961, p. 210). The surface of a cork reveals small pores, or cells. This may be the first known use of the term “cell” in biology (Hooke 1961, p. 55). So impressed with discoveries from his microscopes, The Royal Society in 1663 solicited Hooke to display at least one microscopic observation at every meeting (Bradbury 1967, p. 39). Designers of philosophical instruments faced the following daunting task: how to invent machines which interact with a body’s minute particles so that images are made visible to the naked eye. What physical process best serves as a closest analogue to the motion of particles during the use of a microscope? For Hooke the answer is not found in optics, but in the mechanics of sound. Whenever a compound microscope is used, a mechanical system is formed from three kinds of movement at the micro-level: (a) movement of a material body (specimen), (b) action of luminous bodies producing optical effects and (c) movement of the retina of a human eye. Motion of light is caused by an internal periodic vibration of minute bodies, analogous to action of a musical string. A ray is like a string that reaches from a luminous body to the eye. Any visual image is generated from a process that is modeled after the action of a string. For Hooke, the mechanics of strings is universal: The three

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Figure 1

properties that determine a musical tone, which are the string’s length, tension and “bigness” (its thickness), are found in all vibrating particles. These properties are characteristic of the productive capacities of any minute body, so that the universal principles for generating any sensible event are revealed in acoustics (1961, pp. 15–16). Just as the vibrative motion of musical strings will generate an infinite number of possible tones, so too the

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Figure 2

vibrations of all material bodies determine infinite possible sensible attributes. Hooke’s appeal to acoustics as a prototype for instruments reveals a mechanistic philosophy. His designs of compound microscopes were modeled after an instrument-maker’s skills, not the experimenter’s senses.

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The experimenter uses instruments to improve his God-given powers of manipulation with his bare hands. Like the machinist’s use of tools, a compound microscope was designed to manipulate, agitate and probe material bodies. Even in the deepest regions of the microworld, the experimenter reveals nature’s springs, engines and wheels. These ideals both motivate instrumental design and justify an instrument’s use, as an intervention in natural processes. A mechanistic philosophy, attributable to both animate and inanimate objects, is prescribed for the sake of experimental inquiry for a conception of matter. When a compound microscope is properly used, a specimen must be susceptible to the instrument’s interaction at the micro-level. Even human sensory organs are interpreted in this way. An experimenter interprets himself after his image of the world, and interprets his own capacities in “immaterial” terms. For Hooke this meant that the object’s mechanistic properties (definable by the agitation by other bodies and the communication of motion) must be exploited in order for the instrument to function. A materialism is thus advanced from the design of optical devices. I I I . V I S UA L I Z I N G E X P E R I M E N T S T H RO U G H T H E E N G I N E E R I N G O F I N S T RU M E N T S

In his plans for a compound microscope, Hooke showed how such a device works during an experiment. His illustrations and descriptions provide readers with an idealized vision of the machine’s interaction with a specimen at the microscopic level. Designers of twentieth-century instruments engage in a similar kind of idealization. A designer anticipates how instrument, specimen and researcher will behave during an experiment. We often read that thought experiments are confined to the realm of physics.2 But engineers of sophisticated instruments are readily engaged in thought experiments. A thought experiment is a cognitive plan which presumably replicates a range of possible behavior of certain materials. Of course, in devising a thought experiment a designer “lifts” certain known properties from another setting, and exploits them in the service of developing a device. Designers think visually. Visualization provides an engineer with (conceptual) tools for imagining how material will perform under various conditions. A visualization is a “mental picture” which can be tested to determine whether the new product fulfills all of the customer’s needs. A chemical engineer, for example, uses a flow sheet, an electrical engineer uses

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a circuit diagram, and many engineers use block diagrams as tools in a design-plan (Mitcham 1994, Chapter Eight). Although an engineer often works in isolation from others, a solution to a design-problem is eventually communicated to others through a common pictorial language. The designer marshals an array of pictographic inscriptions to depict the functional relationship between components. The drawings, diagrams and figures, which are first general, become progressively detailed and specific. The result is a visual literacy that conveys information to those who can decipher a given code. Obviously, the engineer’s language game rests on conventions to embed information into flat renditions. Consider, for example, simple schemata for an atomic absorption spectrometer (Parsons 1997, p. 262). Absorption spectroscopy is commonly used for identification, structure elucidation and quantification of organic compounds. The material realm includes a radiation source, sample, monochromator, detector, and readout. A beam of electromagnetic radiation is emitted from a source and then passes through a monochromator. The monochromator isolates the radiation from a

Figure 3

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broad band of wavelengths to a continuous selection of narrow band wavelengths. Radiation then impinges on the sample. Depending on the molecular structure of the sample, various wavelengths of radiation are absorbed, reflected, or transmitted. That part of the radiation which passes through the sample is detected and converted to an electrical signal, comprising an event of the phenomenal realm. When using such instruments, the experimenter engages in cunning interventions designed to trick the specimen into revealing its secrets. A specimen is subjected to probing manipulations of its internal state, as Hacking reminds us (1983). The specimen is poked, dissected and disturbed from the bombardment of photons. Instrumentally-induced actions are performed, various effects appear and then quickly disappear, and experimental phenomena are produced. In this way the experimenter uses the apparatus to reveal properties through a quasi-technological mode of making. Science discovers because it invents (Lelas 1993, 440). When modern spectrometers are needed to study microscopic processes, there is no direct access to a pure realm of entities. Because of the spectrometer’s design, an experimenter gets no closer to atoms and molecules than experimental phenomena produced from the unity of specimen and instrument. Trivially, we could call these effects “artificial,” suggesting that the signal and experimental data result from mere human constructions. But this description is quite misleading. The experimental phenomena are engineered from a blend of specimen and instrument, prohibiting purely transparent methods of detection. The designation of an event as artificial should not suggest a contaminated or biased process for generating the event. The familiar opposition between natural entities and artificial components of machines is inappropriate in this context. I recommend that we avoid the categories of artifact and natural fact when describing experimental phenomena. We should use instead a notion of a techno-fact. A techno-fact is a microscopic event which is produced from the union of apparatus and segment of Nature. The transmissions of current through telephone wires are describable as techno-facts, as are the impulses from a telegraph, door bell or radar. Signals generated from many communication technologies are understood as techno-facts at the microscopic level. Similarly, when using an absorption spectrometer, experimenters produce a continuous series of events (techno-facts), ranging from the agitation of a specimen’s internal dynamics to the inscription of marks at the readout devices. Techno-facts are produced from a kind of back-and-forth movement between laboratory and prior experiments. Experimental phenomena come

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into existence by exploiting properties from an outside environment, as if events “in captivity” are produced from “nature in the wild.” Researchers move easily between the laboratory and “the world”, drawing elements from the outside world into the experiment (Gooding, pp. 183–4). In this way researchers are trying to recover certain elements of past experiments. The gap between past (reproducible) experiments and present experiment is bridged, at least hypothetically, in the production of techno-facts. Such techniques of recovery include a process of imitating “Nature” by identifying properties from past experimental studies. Experimenters often try to identify, select and exploit those properties of “Nature” which are causally responsible for the occurrence of experimental phenomena. An engineer searches for worldly properties which can be rendered serviceable for an experiment. Of course, the Nature in question is not like the directly observable atmospheric events of thunderstorms, tornadoes and dirty air that nineteenth-century meteorologists mimicked in their experiments. The entities of the world are not ready-made, as if lying in wait as it were for observation through a transparent instrument. Rather, experimenters can reconstruct objects of nature from the data acquired during laboratory research. What does it mean to say that techno-facts are real? The answer is found in its technologically-mediated mode of reproducibility. Typically, researchers labor under the following assumption: Certain aspects of the experiment are reproducible in other experiments and are not merely contrived effects of the laboratory environment. Reproducibility functions as a hallmark of a real techno-fact. Talk of measuring dials, the sources of radiation, and performance of apparatus is replaced by talk of reproducible phenomena.3 An experimenter will often identify those experimental conditions which can be repeated in order for such attributes to appear in another experiment. To claim that a particular specimen can absorb a certain wavelength of light in one experiment suggests that this can be repeated in another setting. Of course, events themselves are never repeatable with absolute isomorphism, because obviously no two events are identical in all respects. A reproducible experiment suggests something that endures beyond the concreteness of a particular experiment. An event can have its status raised, as it were, from something localized in a specific laboratory setting to a potentially recurring state. The immediacy of the moment is transcended at every turn in the performance of an experiment (Cassirer 1923, Chapter VI). Reproducibility requires that something persists independently of a particular

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experiment, but never in isolation from all instrumental techniques. A new object is shaped by simultaneously importing (reproducing) aspects of older ones. As Bruno Latour writes, a new object emerges from a complex set-up of elements, each of which had been new at some prior time and place. An old object can be isolated from the particular laboratory conditions that shaped them, things with a name that now seem independent of their mode of production (Latour 1987, pp. 91–92). The notion of power is central to an understanding of techno-facts. Nature’s power to generate microscopic states is recovered through the use of experimental technologies. Such technologies are used to “bring something into existence” by mimicking certain known capacities of substance. In agricultural technologies, humans start a process by selecting and planting seeds or breeding couples. This process “liberates” energy stored in molecules or atoms for the production of foodstuffs (Lelas 1993, 434). Such technologies explicitly remove impediments and fulfill material requirements necessary for releasing certain capacities at the molecular or atomic level. An agricultural product exists from chemical reactions which occur from various technologically-induced processes. Nature is revealed by its capacities which, for many segments of the world, are released only under technologically-induced processes. What does it mean for a technology to confer a power to humans? When we say that the automobile gives power to the driver, we mean that this apparatus provides the means in the form of equipment for generating certain states of motion towards the realization of a goal of transportation.4 The three components of power (means, states and goal) can apply to analytical instruments. Through the use of a laboratory instrument, an experimenter acquires a means, in the form of equipment, techniques and environment, for generating certain states, which are the experimental phenomena at the microscopic level, toward the realization of the particular goal. The goal is information about the specimen. So techno-facts arising from instruments are the states of affairs acquired by certain means for information-retrieval. Underlying the production of techno-facts is a positive, but often unstated, commitment to real-world capacities. An instrument’s design typically includes an idealized purification of the environment. A specimen is knowable by its tendencies to permit interference from radiation and to react to certain manipulations, under technologically-induced conditions. Specifically, a specimen is knowable by its capacities to react to certain contact with photons by generating certain events. A specimen is manipulated and in turn contributes to the manipulation of other bodies. One pivotal result

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of the engineering of instrument is that a specimen functions as if it is a machine endowed with certain capacities of motion. A designer treats each specimen as a machine of nature with powers to produce a predictable transfer of forces and motion. When chemical instruments are employed in a laboratory, chemical substance and experimental instrument are united in a complex system of capacities and powers. Modern instrumental techniques do not obediently serve the ruling order of nature, but presuppose certain capacities of substance as a condition for laboratory research. In the laboratory the specimen is never passive; it is reactive, detected by its responses to certain stimuli. Latour writes that reality is defined in the laboratory by a capacity to resist intrusion by external forces (1987, p. 93). But I prefer to say that reality is defined by a capacity to permit intrusion from external forces, and to react in ways that generate detectable effects. A specimen’s properties are knowable by their tendencies to be changed and the capacities to initiate change, that is, to permit interference from the probing action of radiation, and to react to such probes. In this context substance is understood operationally by its dynamical properties which are exploited for the production of signals. Chemical substance is revealed through the techniques designed to generate experimental evidence.5 Once selected for investigation, the specimen is subjected to material preparation in which certain properties are isolated and put on display. In this respect substance is characterized functionally by the properties, capacities and states which are necessary for the performance of the experiment. So, when modern spectrometers are used, the specimen is reduced to its dynamical properties associated with the transformation of energy states. But no global reduction of chemical substance can be sustained, since the characterization of the specimen is highly responsive to techniques of instrumentation. So, an anthropocentric orientation to science is inadequate to explain the production of techno-facts. Techno-facts are produced from the instrumental manipulation of a specimen’s dynamical properties, and such properties are exploited in the design of such instruments. A physicalism is equally deficient. The worlds of techno-facts are not reducible to the (pure) physical properties of matter. There is no ultimate ground to the bruteness of physical properties because the properties of Nature emerge from the technologicallymediated experimental data. If there is an epistemic foundation to the relation between experimenter and specimen, it is found in a blend of instruments that agitate and segments of nature that react. The resulting effects constitute the

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closest that researchers come to the “ultimate ground” of laboratory research. The influence of instrumentation on the techno-facts of the laboratory is inescapable. George Mason University N OT E S 1

The term “philosophical apparatus” was probably introduced during the early years of the seventeenth century (Warner 1990, p. 83). 2 “In chemistry, for example, I can’t find any [thought experiments] at all”, writes James Robert Brown (1991, p. 31). 3 See (Radder, 1996, Chapters 2 and 4) for an exploration of different kinds of reproducibility in science. 4 See (Harré, 1986, Chapter 15) for an illuminating analysis of the concept of power. 5 For Kant the possibility of science requires that matter be defined dynamically as a summation of the forces of attraction and repulsion. Without succumbing to Kant’s a priori categories of the mind, we face the following Kantian task in philosophy of chemistry: What are the metaphysical conditions for the possibility of chemical research? (Rothbart and Scherer, 1997).

REFERENCES Bennett, J.A. 1986. “The Mechanics’ Philosophy and the Mechanical Philosophy,” History of Science XXIV: 1–28. Bradbury, S. 1967. The Evolution of the Microscope. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Brown, J.R. 1991. The Laboratory of the Mind. New York: Routledge. Cassirer, E. 1923. Substance and Function & Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. New York: Dover Publications. Charleston, R.J. and Angus-Butterworth, L.M. 1957. “Glass,” in A History of Technology: Volume III From the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution c1500–c1750. Ed. Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 206–244. Gooding, D. 1990. Experiment and the Making of Meaning. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hackmann, W.D. 1989. “Scientific instruments: models of brass and aids to discovery,” in The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, ed. David Gooding, Trevor Pinch, and Simon Schaffer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 31–66. Hankins, T.L. and Silverman R.J. 1995. Instruments and the Imagination. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Harré, R. 1986. Varieties of Realism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hooke, R. 1961. Micrographia or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries thereupon. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

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Kutschmann, W. 1986. “Scientific Instruments and the senses: towards an anthropological historiography of the natural sciences,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 1: 106–123. Latour, B. 1987. Science in Action. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Lelas, S. 1993. “Science as Technology,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 423–442. Mitcham, C. 1994. Thinking Through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Parsons, M.L. 1997. “Atomic Absorption and Flame Emission Spectrometry,” in Analytical Instrumentation Handbook, 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Ewing. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc. Pp. 257–326. Price, D.J. 1957. “The Manufacture of Scientific Instruments from c1500 to c1700,” in A History of Technology, ed. Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams, Volume III: From the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution, c1500–c1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 620–647. Radder, H. 1996. In and About the World: Philosophical Studies of Science and Technology. Albany, New York: SUNY Press. Rothbart, D. and Scherer, I. 1997. “Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter,” Hyle: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Chemistry 3: 65–80. Schaffer, S. 1989. “Glass works: Newton’s prisms and the uses of experiment,” in The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences, ed. David Gooding, Trevor Pinch, and Simon Schaffer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 67–104. Warner, D. 1990. “What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?” British Journal for the History of Science 23: 83–93. —— 1994. “Terrestrial Magnetism: For the Glory of God and the Benefit of Mankind,” in Instruments, ed. Albert Van Helden and Thomas Hankins. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Pp. 65–84.

SECTION III

F R A N C E S C O TOTA RO

L I F E , P OW E R A N D M E A S U R E I N N I E T Z S C H E ’ S WO R K

1. NIETZSCHE AS A PHILOSOPHER OF MEASURE

In this paper we will try to show the importance of the notion of measure in Nietzsche’s thought. Actually, Nietzsche is famous as a thinker of excess rather than of measure. This excess refers especially to the will to power, in which, as seen in Martin Heidegger’s interpretation, the stress is on the features of dominance and the manipulation of the being reduced to a mere object. Maintaining that in the philosopher of the power a central role will be played by a concept such as that of measure seems, therefore, rather unfounded, at least at a first glance. In the same way the idea of measure seems to oppose also the exuberance of life that Nietzsche wants to free from any underestimation owing to the dualistic Platonic-Christian vision. But at last it is time to note here that to speak of the importance of measure in Nietzsche is the same as to say that in his thought (which is often seen as a wild vitalism) the rules of both thinking and acting have crucial relevance. Without rules it is impossible to find one’s way, both when elaborating one’s thoughts as well as when planning one’s actions. How then does the discourse on measure originate in Nietzsche? It is not the subject of direct thinking. Neither has it been developed a priori. On the contrary, it has its roots exactly in the concrete aspects of life and power. Without measure both life and power would not be in a position to express their creativity. 2. MEASURE AND JUDGEMENT IN LIFE

Let us start from life. It is well known that Nietzsche rejects the traditional point of view as regards the relation between the life dimension and the dimension of the rules necessary to regulate it. In traditional morals, real life is treated as something which is meaningless in itself. The meaning of living depends upon a principle that does not belong to the sphere of experience. Consequently our real life must adjust itself extrinsically to norms, rules and imperatives that set themselves against the sphere of wishes and instincts. This is why Nietzsche maintains that the men of morals say no to life and are therefore unable to accept the positive stimuli the latter contains. Actually the man of traditional morals not only spurns the positivity of life, but he exhibits 137 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 137–143. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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this negative capacity as a value and a virtue. This is the soil that grows the fruits of resentment and envy, i.e., the manifestations of a plebeian soul. On the contrary, we know that Nietzsche attributes to the morals of the aristocratic man the capacity to “say yes” to life and to express positive attitudes and feelings: self-respect, disposition to give, magnanimity, courage and esteeming one’s opponents, in short, all those features that distinguish a “strong” from a “weak” man. Thus the strong man can face all experience displaying a “ludic sense of danger”, opening up to what is new and unknown without being paralysed by the ethical conformism that can be summed up in the words “conventional morality” (Sittlichkeit der Sitte). The task of accepting life in the full requires a rule different from that of traditional morals. In the work Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche formulates this rule as “fidelity to the earth”, which is an imperative that reveals an overall new measure for humanity, both from the theoretical and the practical points of view. It requires the demolition of the dualistic vision of reality and its unjust hierarchies. On the level of knowledge, the self-sufficient position of universal concepts collapses, the abstract exercise of judgement is overcome; even more, and especially, the latter’s claim to deduce from itself or to generate what belongs to life. The Nietzschean criticism regards the whole Western metaphysical tradition that stretches from Socrates to Schopenhauer from this point of view (although on a less superficial and more analytical reading, various evaluations are in evidence, especially as regards the Greek philosophers). This does not mean that Nietzsche, in spite of his invitation not to judge — as expressed, for example, in the work Human, All-Too-Human — declares the activity of judging to be completely over. This would be impossible: On the contrary, however, impure and incomplete and, therefore, illogical, judgement cannot be eliminated from the human horizon. At the core of the activity of judging there certainly lies a paradox, i.e., the paradox of not possessing fixed and complete measures by which to express a global judgement regarding others and the relation of anything to us. However, though lacking a fixed and complete measure, judging is intimately linked to the act of living. In fact, as we recognise in Human AllToo-Human (Aphorism 32: It is necessary, to be unjust) we cannot live without judging in the original and radical meaning of the term, i.e., without “feeling aversions or inclinations.” By expressing in the very act of living, feelings of aversion or inclination, we cannot but judge. The drive towards something or against something is closely associated with the feeling of “wanting what is good and avoiding what is harmful” and, in short, there is in

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man no drive without “some sort of cognitive appreciation of the value of our aim.” Therefore, judging does not disappear at all in Nietzsche, even in the works where his criticism seems to be at its strongest. We acknowledge it has a quality which is far from being abstractly logical and consequently find it firmly rooted in the manifestation of life. In other words, we recognise the illogical nature of judgement and its partiality. This is exactly the reason why we can attribute it to life. In this way, judgement has from the start a practical relevance. If judging and evaluating are guidelines in life, they operate by enabling us to select from its manifold possibilities. They identify the measures by which life traces its own tracks, since life collects everything but is never given in its entirety. The need for a measure is even stronger for individual lives. In fact, if each of us followed his own instincts and wishes, would we not give ourselves up to the impossibility of acting and therefore of living? In order not to suffocate itself, life requires measure and a capacity for self-restriction. 3 . E VA L UAT I N G P OW E R T H RO U G H I N D I V I D UA L M E A S U R E S

This analysis can be better developed by introducing the notion of power. Power is the original force that looks for fulfillment in everyone and in every action. Its increase coincides with happiness. It being the basic structure of every action, it pervades everything. Therefore, at least superficially, it represents the key to describing any way of existing. In fact power is also expressed in the attitudes of traditional morals. Even the resentful man tries to achieve power, and so does the man who looks for sympathy or is devoted to asceticism. Here we meet a great difficulty that we may call an aporia of power. If power coincides with any form of life and gathers in itself all the moments of existence, does not the concept of it end up in a mere acceptance of whatever happens in any way that it happens? All this would turn power into an allinclusive concept that leads to indifference towards the ways and content of its expressions. But if such a semantic levelling was inevitable, how could we expect from a reference to power the capacity to point out which experiences can more effectively achieve it? In short, if all is a realisation of power, nothing truly is. How then, on top of it all, could power clearly signal the way to achieve happiness? How can we escape this aporia? In order to avoid having innumerable differences in power which are indifferent as to their value, we must admit that not all experiences are equally suited to the idea of power.

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Among the many ways through which power manifests itself, there are some which suit the idea of power better. It is a question, then, of giving more stress, in reading the Nietzschean discourse, to a need for evaluating the aspects of power. Once again we must introduce a criterion for judgement. This cannot be extrinsic to the actual manifestation of power, however. To subdue power to a power superior to itself would disregard the Nietzschean criticism of the dualistic vision of reality. Power must find in itself the measure of its own evaluation and discover in itself the illustrations of its excellence achieved. But can such a measure be univocally determined? How could we ignore that, according to Nietzsche, “the centre is everywhere” and that consequently we should not speak of constraints given a priori for all of us? The exclusion of a single and absolute measure of power, however, makes the individual search for power possible. Thus there appears the horizon of an individual science of power, capable of calculating its forces and their distribution according to the style of a new wisdom. This is the ground for a morality at a remove from traditional morality. The morality we can find in Nietzsche rejects an absolute measure for acting. In fact, not one measure is given but many. This does not imply, however, that we must renounce giving some sense to acting, falling into a sort of “horrid adventitiousness” and consequently into the nonachievement of any goal. When Nietzsche abandons the great monolithic concepts – such as good/evil, unselfishness/selfishness – he does not open a gaping hole where all reference points are lost. Absolute polarity aggregating the meanings of acting is superseded by a polarity that focuses on the individual, who does not merely have the task of deconstructing the traditional models for acting but must also take on that of searching or inventing more valid courses of action. The individual is asked to develop a responsible creativity. In order to follow this directive the individual will have to marry the pursuit of the arrangements which are most suited to power to more flexible and pliable criteria than those of abstractly moral standards. Measure is, then, the capacity to decline power within life contexts which must be fully acknowledged and fulfilled. 4 . A NA LY S I S O F M E A S U R E I N T H E DAY B R E A K

Nietzsche has supplied us with penetrating and subtle analyses of the search for measure, particularly in the pages of Daybreak. Beyond the high-sounding proclamations advocating the abolition of morals, we meet a

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type of reflexion that does not use solemn tones but which we might call a sort of microconceptualization, i.e., an art of thinking that patiently outlines new equilibriums in the structure of action. When exploring the reasons for acting we must undoubtedly give our utmost attention to the plurality of the forces at play, overcoming the clear-cut oppositions typical of abstract moral thought. Psychological inquiry, the probing of states of mind, is more effective than any classification based on antitheses. Thus, in Aphorism 133 of Daybreak (No longer thinking of oneself), which brings forth the theme of sympathy and criticises Schopenhauer’s position on it, Nietzsche shows how sympathy cannot be opposed in an absolute way to the expression of one’s own personal power. The man who dives into the water after someone who has fallen in before his very eyes, for example, does not do so merely as an abstract application of sympathy wherein his own self is not at all involved. In actuality, Nietzsche admonishes us, compassion for the other is always mixed with the unconscious feeling that the misfortune of the other is also an offence to ourselves and, therefore, it would convict us of our helplessness, or even our cowardice, if we did not offer our help. If, then, the attitude of compassion towards the other always involves the assertion of our power, in the same way that the act of bringing help always gives satisfaction to the one who brings it, it is simply not the case that in order to account for compassion, a clear demarcation between unselfishness and selfishness must be drawn. Compassion is rather a “polyphonic reality” that does not lend itself to exhaustive explanation by only one term. Consequently, evaluation is not so much an exercise framing our actions within rigid or exclusive bounds, which would impoverish their substantial character, but rather an acknowledgement of the richness of the vital aspects constituting them. 5 . AU TO N O M Y A N D R E L AT I O N W I T H T H E OT H E R I N O U R AC T I O N S

However, the conceptual deconstruction Nietzsche has carried out to account for the complexity of human actions comes with precise methodological directions. These concern primarily authenticity and coherence in action. At the beginning of Book Three in Daybreak, in Aphorism 149 (Small acts of anticonformism are necessary), Nietzsche considers the capacity of anticonformism in the actual small acts of life as the way to achieve a measure for acting which is centred on the individual and on the responsible making of his choices and decisions. Anticonformism is not meant to be banal transgression, but emancipation from conventional morals on the basis

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of a discrepancy between public attitudes and personal opinions and, consequently, as respect for “one’s better judgement”. In the conscious correspondence between thinking and doing, the individual’s autonomy and the loyalty towards himself are realised. The principle of the expression of individual power and of its measure does not automatically lead to a negation of the other. Proceeding from our own power we can acknowledge and promote the power of the other. This capacity is the peculiar trait of the aristocratic man, since he does not aim at dominating the other or achieving an impossible union with him but rather at arousing self-love in the other so that the other also realizes an autonomous measure of his own power. In Daybreak, besides the emphasis on what we might call the Nietzschean principle of individuality, the cry “What do I matter” is incessantly repeated, indicating that all are called to realise their own power, participating in a banquet from which all benefit, without needing to name those who give and those who receive. Each person must already be a garden in himself, but while cultivating his own garden, he must always keep the gate open. 6 . A N E T H I C S O F E QU I P OT E N C E

Thus in Nietzsche we can find fruitful elements for an ethical meditation which is concretely related to life. All reference to power, once freed from a suspicion of selfishness, can in fact form the foundation for a new ethics of universal participation in power itself. The means of participating in power are not undifferentiated but are identified by the qualities of each individual. This is why Nietzsche does not allow us to say that each of us can be given the same power, but rather that each of us must be put in a position to pursue and realise his own peculiar power. The ethics, or the code of action that thus comes into being, could be called the ethics of equipotence. It sets a common goal for every one: the excellence of power in striving for what is “the best” (see the conclusion of Aphorism 566 in Daybreak: Living Cheaply). Gravitating towards what is best does not allow us to be satisfied with any particular dimension. At the same time Nietzsche invites us not to cultivate “too much strain” which imposes “something excessive and spasmodic” on even the best actions, thus laying the ground for unremitting frustration with the result that “we always see struggling athletes, exaggerated attitudes and never a winner crowned and happy over his victory” (Daybreak, Aphorism 559: Nothing Excessive). A

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striving for the excellence of power must then find stopovers and goals where it can rest, provided that the aim of a long-distance flight is unchanged, a flight on which we are not alone and on which we can always hope that other wings will go beyond the point we have reached (see Daybreak, Aphorism 575: We, aerial navigators of the spirit). After all, only when it is realised with measure, does power not sweep away the living individuality. Measure is the discriminating criterion, between the authentic “feeling of power” (Machtgefühl) and excessive “lust for power” (Machtgelüst). The former gives fullness to life, the latter devastates it. University of Macerata

M A R I A Z OW I S L⁄ O

T H R E E M O D E L S O F T H E H U M A N DY NA M I C TOWA R D S I N T E G R I T Y: E L I A D E , J U N G , W I L B E R

The problem raised in this essay touches a dynamism of life in the human sphere, since humans — the most complex and marvelous formation of life — are creative subjects who not only experience passively the motions of life that make them act, but who also endeavour consciously to change this life on all its levels: cosmic, social, cultural and personal. Our concern will focus mostly on personal development, although given that each personal activity is not performed in an empty space but in the womb of nature and the complex of culture, we will discuss the cosmic and social effects of human creativity too. To define our subject more precisely we should stress that it is personal development that matters here, and concerns much more inward rather than outward human creativity, although as will become more evident in further analysis, the latter is grounded in the fruits of the former with particularly deep and positive results. But for now we are not interested in inventiveness of homo faber, that inventiveness aimed at technological progress and at overcoming and ruling nature; we would like rather to throw light upon some essential aspects of human self-realisation, or personal entelechia, to use an Aristotelian term, as they are depicted in studies of phenomenology of religion and depth and transpersonal psychology. In these disciplines we choose three representative authors; these have had besides a strong creative hold, both theoretical and practical, upon the humanities and human thought through the last century. I mean the eminent authors Mircea Eliade — a Romanian phenomenologist of religion; Carl Gustav Jung — a Swiss psychiatrist and the originator of depth psychology; and lastly Ken Wilber — an outstanding American master of transpersonal psychology. These three take up inquiry into the human capacity for self-transcendence and show its inextricable connection with the process of self-cognition. This connection enables us to speak of these phenomenological and psychological theories as being hermeneutical. We do so not so much to supply these conceptions with any philosophical horizon — though, in fact, they have much to do with philosophical aims and generalizations — as to accentuate their hermeneutical mode of thinking and approaching human potential. This hermeneutical attitude is founded simply on a conviction we find expressed in 145 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 145–157. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Paul Ricoeur’s “The Symbol: Food for Thought”,1 where he states that knowledge is not given directly but in a veil of profound and enigmatic signs. Man, invited to understand this symbolic realm of meanings and having undertaken the effort of interpretation, simultaneously changes his mind and consequently his existential condition. Eliade, Jung and Wilber emphasize this essential influence of the state of human consciousness upon the condition of man himself and even upon his Lebenswelt, that is, his natural and cultural environment. In addition, each of the three authors uses the term hermeneutics, giving it a specific meaning. Having taken into consideration the symbolic facets of human cognition, one cannot disregard the fact that there are particular kinds of symbols, namely, religious ones, that figure rudimentarily in human existence and show man’s thirst for transcendence. This has prompted Eliade, Jung and Wilber among others to define man as animal symbolicum and homo religiosus. It is well worth mentioning here that accenting the important place of the symbolic and religious facets of human intentionality, as it was originally done by Rudolf Otto and Ernst Cassirer, has in effect brought about the phenomenology of religion that is much closer to hermeneutics simply than to the philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The methodological approach of phenomenology of religion pays respect to the necessity of using the phenomenological epoche, self-criticism, and intersubjective checks. Such a procedure results in suspending all assertive theses on the real existence of all ideal entities, like God, angels and demons. Many a time Eliade emphasized his descriptive, not normative, attitude toward the sacred. The fact is that phenomenology of religion examines the data of religious experience as being subjective, not objective, but it does not go beyond an empirical, namely, psychological, ego toward a transcendental one. It has stopped at the same point as did Descartes when he reserved substantiality for ego cogitans. This methaphysical attitude was then transgressed by Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. We must acknowledge this fundamental distinction between these two methods, the empirical and the transcendental, so that we can understand indeed the great influence of classical psychoanalysis upon phenomenology of religion and hermeneutics, an influence that actually did bypass Husserl’s pure and imperturbable transcendental ego. As it happened, the psychoanalytic intellectual revolution occurred alongside the launching of Husserl’s phenomenology during the beginning of the twentieth century. This revolution drove a deep wedge into man, who then emerged as a beginning whose intentionality is motivated not only by the conscious but also by the unconscious. Man’s familiar conceptual

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ego became merely a fragment of a composite psychic entity. The truth and immediate knowledge of Descartes’ self-consciousness was called in question in the face of masked symptoms. Absolute knowledge is hoped for but is actually a boundary idea, as indeed it was for Hegel. Paul Ricoeur summed up the collapse of the philosophy of consciousness with a declaration that after the Freudian discovery complete and absolute knowledge should not be conceived as an initial a priori but as the upshot of human understanding.2 Self-consciousness is not a fact but a task of hermeneutical reinterpretation. This reinterpretation should reconsider the existential as well as transcendent content of all symbols, among them religious ones. According to Paul Tillich the great function of symbols is to point beyond themselves and to endow reality with mysterious meanings.3 These meanings deeply impress the human mind and imagination, for man believes they speak much about his destiny. Phenomenologists try to explain the essence of these meanings and do so using the method of making multicultural comparisons of myths, cults, folk tales, rituals, the more complex philosophical idea of yoga, alchemy, gnostic thought, and so on. This phenomenological way to universal and ideal structures of religious facts is integrated with hermeneutical efforts to understand the existential backgrounds of human religious images. Such an interpretation will discover some of the dynamic facets, or creative forces that underlie man’s religious and symbolic activity. In phenomenological description the images of the sacred and transcendent point first of all to human inner dynamics prompting toward ontological perfection, a dynamism of self-transcendence that seems to be rudimentary for the human condition. The creative forces of homo religiosus are for the most part oriented by an unconscious and, therefore, supranatural claim, a kind of psychic imperative or telic principle of personal advancement and self-realisation. Supranatural masks of transcendence that surpass all that the ego can consciously identify with are understood here not as signs of outer but as figures of inner, that is, unconscious transcendence. Phenomenology of religion, depth and transpersonal psychology consider transcendent images — be they blessing deities or malicious demons — not as if they were objective and substantial but as certain essential features, or archetypes, of human potential. Each of the three models of human creativity we discuss here shares precisely this general, phenomenological attitude toward the creative dynamism of homo religiosus, though there are several fundamental distinctions between them that make us define each model as a different kind of hermeneutics. Eliade presents a model of personal and cultural maieutics that

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lays special stress on human activity as it reflects mythical paradigms. Jung’s proposal models a depth hermeneutics of psychic drama to attain selfconsciousness through recognition of the symbolic content of the archetypes of the unconscious. Where Eliade’s approach resembles Socrates’ maieutics and Plato’s anamnesis, that of Jung has much to do with Hegel’s phenomenology of Spirit. The third of our authors, Ken Wilber, refers to Hegel as well, and Schelling and Teilhard de Chardin also. His approach we can call a hermeneutics of cosmic and spiritual evolution. Let us examine first Eliade’s understanding of human creativity. In his “Oceanographie” he wrote: “Existence must coincide with [the act of] creation. ‘To be’ must mean a continuous creation, an uninterrupted process of self-transcending, an enrichment of universal life with new and living forms, with new and fertile gestures.”4 Eliade emphasizes that each true act of creation should embrace both personal and cosmic renovation. The foundation of the reciprocity between human and cosmic processes lies in man himself, for he is the most sensitive and responsive life creation, and it is well within his power to be responsible for all other creations. This power and ability is apparent when we take into consideration the great symbols clustered round the alchemic act of transmutation, by which matter and simultaneously the human soul are treated in a deep process of transformation into the so-called lapis philosophorum (a figure of spiritual accomplishment).5 The current of destiny and condition of human existence influence the actual condition of the natural environment of man. “Creativity has a sacred character,” states David Cave. “It repeats a cosmos — human homology. As humans create, so is the world created anew. And conversely, as the world creates, so are humans created for repeatedly new beginnings.”6 Man will succeed in this significant activity provided that the gestures of his efforts imitate the primordial gestures of deities or cultural heroes. The cosmogonic myth plays a meaningful role as a reservoir of exemplary models for each human act of creation in history. In fact the moment of such an imitatio constitutes the abolition of history which in the archaic mode of perception is a domain of profane activity.7 The archaic man yearns for ontological strength, for a divine state of being for himself and his natural environment. “Evidently, for the archaic mentality, reality manifests itself as force, effectiveness, and duration. Hence the outstanding reality is the sacred; for only the sacred is in an absolute fashion, acts effectively, creates things and makes them endure.”8 Obsession with the real and the sacred appears in two forms: as a nostalgia for Paradise (a feeling not strange to modern man too) and as a myth typical of the archaic mentality; the myth of eternal return.

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This return, an object of man’s constant endeavor, oriented by cyclic rhythms of the cosmos, is a story of cosmic recreation recalled on the occasion of rituals or important events like war, hunting, alimentation, and so on, that actually involve the repetition of mythical archetypes. The abolition of profane time and the individual’s projection into primordial mythical time occur owing to a hierophany, which is a dialectical coexistence of the sacred and the profane, a paradox of “drawing Paradise unto the Earth.” Hierophany is inscribed within the world but it can also be generated by the creative behaviour of man. Such behaviour is effective on the condition that it refers to mythical archetypes, which consequently consecrate the world. The Eliadean concept of creativity embraces the Platonic understanding of art as imitating and participating in celestial paradigms. But in opposition to Plato’s view, the mimetic acts of archaic man do not deny human spontaneity and freedom. Inasmuch as they reflect exemplary models these acts cooperate in creating and renewing the world; they are really acts of salvation like those of alchemic operations. Therefore archaic man is much closer to Plato’s demiurge than to Plato’s artist. But this alchemic and archaic aspect of human creativity is only one aspect of the Eliadean understanding of the problem. In fact it would have no worth nowadays unless it dealt with modernity too. It is precisely the Eliadean concept of “creative hermeneutics” that could link the archaic and modern mentalities, that could awake in the modern mind an archaic state of consciousness that has fallen into dangerous oblivion. Modern man is a historical man who trusts in progress in linear time, considers the Kingdom of Heaven as the proper close of history. In so doing, modern man at the same time disregards the Earth and its cosmic crises, placing himself at a distance ultimately. Historical man consciously and willfully makes all sacred paradigms into history and consequently lets himself and the world be overwhelmed by the meaninglessness of profane existence. Activity not mediated by primordial models is exposed to ontological inefficacy, although it yields particular and immediate political and economic solutions. Eliade perceives many modern crises as being founded in the erasure of archaic lore. Hence a task of a new hermeneutics and a new humanisms is to awaken or provide a cultural anamnesis of archaic profound wisdom. “Indeed,” writes David Cave, “giving hermeneutics a creative motivation was a distinctly Eliadean contribution to hermeneutical theory.”9 Creative hermeneutics is a quest for lost sacred senses of life still preserved in myths and religious symbols. These are handed down and extant but are not noticed and acknowledged by modern man, who lives in an age of manifest secularity.

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Hermeneutical creativity should be grounded in a dynamic interaction between the received symbols and religious structures of the world (that is hierophanies), and human consciousness should open out to their meanings. This is stressed by Douglas Allen: Phenomenologically, the religious experience has an initial emphasis upon a kind of passivity and then a creativity emerging from the passivity. True creativity emerges when we can decipher the fundamental givenness that is revealed to us. It emerges from what the particular and historical does with this givenness, how it constitutes or actualizes these inexhaustible possibilities by embodying them in a specific historico-cultural context, by providing them with a particular content and particular values.”10

As Paul Ricoeur writes: “the symbol gives something for thought, something to think about.”11 Thus each hermeneutical act of interpreting the forgotten senses of hierophanies results in a creative transformation of man himself and consequently of his attitude toward the current condition of his world. For Eliade hermeneutical understanding “[. . .] changes man; it is more than instruction, it is also a spiritual technique susceptible of modifying the quality of existence itself . . . A good history of religions book ought to produce in the reader an . . . awakening.”12 Hermeneutical creativity constitutes both a new man aware of his archaic heritage and a new state of culture open to exotic civilizations and their traditional lore. Eliadean hermeneutics is a kind of new maieutics that perceives possible personal and cultural integrity in a great synthesis of what is modern and archaic in man himself and in his culture. In a time dead to hierophanies, such a hermeneutical synthesis seems to be a necessary rescue attempt to revive homo religiosus. This rescue must not be understood as a return to naive faith, as Paul Ricoeur explains; it should be a kind of metareflection. Such a metareflection could not only provide modern minds with some intellectual answers but could also supply modern souls and cultures with an existential therapy. Eliade’s creative hermeneutics emphasizes the necessity of undertaking such a therapy of selfunderstanding, or of rethinking the past within man himself and his different cultural traditions; this is prerequisite for the health of man himself and his environment. Eliadean hermeneutics brings into prominence man’s responsibility for the shape of his natural and cultural environment. Attention to environment is after all the precondition for personal harmony and happiness. In the end we can define Eliadean thought as a creative hermeneutics of personal and cultural integrity. Considering another kind of hermeneutics, that of Carl Gustav Jung, we cannot put away the thought that we are here moving within the same domain of ideas and references. Indeed, both Eliade and Jung were interested in

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ethnology, the history of religions, Oriental philosophy, gnosis, alchemy, mythology and contemporary crises. They both used the term archetype and made it a basic element of their theoretical constructions. They even met together and exchanged their opinions in Ascona during the famous Eranos conferences. Eliade might have learned some Jungian concepts from his Romanian master, the philosopher Lucian Blaga, who was deeply impressed by the depth psychology of Jung. Nevertheless we must note here that Jung’s interests were much more focused on man’s inner and spiritual development than were Eliade’s, which is obvious for psychiatric practice. At the outset we will define Jung’s hermeneutics as a depth hermeneutics of spiritual development. The process of this development, namely, individuation, means for Jung a real opus of attaining personal completeness, the crowning of which is the Self. The Self and individuation stand here for anything but egotism. As Jung maintains: Individuation, therefore, can only mean a process of psychological development that fulfills the individual qualities given: in other words, it is a process by which man becomes the definite, unique being he in fact is. In so doing he does not become “selfish” in the ordinary sense of the word, but merely fulfills the peculiarity of his nature, and this, as we have said, is vastly different from egotism or individualism.13

The peculiarity of individuals as living units lies in universal and therefore collective factors of the conscious and the unconscious. Jung called these archetypes and conceived them as energetic governors and centers of the successive stages of the process of individuation. Individuation seemed for Jung the greatest challenge for human potential, a transcendental claim, or imperative of the psyche to be heard and undertaken by individuals. With this undertaking and response it appears man’s dynamics lead on toward the total, toward accomplishing his personal wholeness. It is worth mentioning here that Jung associates the word “whole” with two other terms: “to make holy” and “to heal.”14 Attaining personal completeness means gaining holiness and healthiness, and such an interconnection of senses shows the gnostic provenance of Jungianism. The aim of individuation is to actualize human entelechia and to become in-dividual, what stands first for its becoming un-divided, and then integral. The Self is such a final integrity, an intended new psychic constellation that joins the conscious and the unconscious, the two spheres of the psyche. This union involves also gaining an absolute insight into the whole realm of the psyche and consequently the fruits of self-master, a rare virtue that has been held in the greatest honour in the ethical tradition going back to Greek antiquity. Here again we can see a gnostic feature of Jungianism — a

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conviction that cognition, wisdom, or gnosis necessarily intervenes in the ontological structure of the human being and has soteriological effects. The Jungian concept of human creative potentials is strictly grounded in a dynamic psychic system of the psyche. It is ruled by the law of enantiodromia (which Jung took from Heraclitus), the principle of maintaining the balance of opposites.15 This law plays a compensatory function and always intervenes when energy is concentrated too much on a certain level of the psyche. When the ego, merely a part of consciousness, thinks of itself as being a center of the whole personality, then the unconscious, having been neglected by such an attitude, calls for the attention and sends symbolic, often obsessive, and always numinous, signals to the upper world of consciousness. There begins a dynamic adventure of dialectical dialogue between consciousness and unconsciousness. The Self, a new centre, a perfect mean between the two is the ideal aim of this dynamic. Fulfilling this intended aim results in a thorough change in the psychic entity, the centre of which moves from the ego to the Self, embracing all content of the psyche. Jung states: If we picture the conscious mind, with the ego as its centre as being opposed to the unconscious, and if we now add to our mental picture the process of assimilating the unconscious, we can think of this assimilation as a kind of approximation of conscious and unconscious, where the centre of the total personality no longer coincides with the ego, but with a point midway between the conscious and the unconscious. This would be the point of new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a virtual centre which, on account of its focal position between consciousness and unconsciousness, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation.16

Jung perceives individuation as an infinite process coursing successively along a spiral path. Becoming homo totus is a hard and dangerous oeuvre of differentiating through consciousness the archetypes of the persona (an external archetype of collective consciousness) and unconscious images. Differentiation means distinguishing the autonomy of archetypes and canceling their numinous activity through integrating their recognized senses with consciousness. Archetypes can manifest both a negative (causing self-alienation or, in other words, inflation) and a positive (as stimulus) influence. As far as it is the persona concerned, its positive role lies in the fulfilling the function of social adaptation and interpersonal communication. Owing to a properly developed persona, a man can become a social being — which is necessary, Jung maintains, in the first period of life. But if the persona be a stiff mask, which always happens when a man clings to a chosen social role, it manifests its negative power of causing alienation. Consequently the social function of a persona that is mimesis, in itself of a great worth, is limited to being a negative submissive mechanism of mimicry. The same menace lurks

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in the background of differentiating the numinous senses of the archetypal images that appear in dreams, fantasies and active imagination. They should be recognized and experienced as being precisely of unconscious origin if man is to avoid their possessive operation (that is the overwhelming spell of archetypal ilinx). The compulsive character of unconscious energy is neutralized by the recognition of and the assimilation of its images into the conscious psyche. Self-realization appears as a way of liberation: Having understood the arcana of one’s psyche, one can manage to master them and invest their energy and lore. Jung finds this to be the essence of the human endowment and of culture itself: “Attainment of consciousness is culture in the broadest sense, and self-knowledge is therefore the heart and essence of this process.”17 We can now observed that Eliade and Jung seem to share the same opinion on the interconnection between the inner development of man and the condition of culture. But in spite of this apparent similarity, we must stress that Jung’s hermeneutics is much more focused on individual, creative potential than is that of Eliade. Eliade seems to have cast a mere and very shy glance at the awesomeness of true inner psychomachia. Thus, his proposal remains first of all a hermeneutics of culture, whereas that of Jung is a hermeneutics of the human depths. Now when we take into consideration the view of Ken Wilber, we can see a still more profound sense of human creative potential one that is not only personal and cultural but also cosmic and methaphysical. Wilber’s great vision of evolution presents a most imposing and elaborated schema of human and cosmic growth and a grand synthesis of all significant achievements within the field of phenomenology of religion, philosophy of evolution and development and depth psychology. Wilber avails himself of Western as well as of Oriental approaches to human consciousness and sketches a dynamic structure of the overall life cycle. This life cycle enfolds not only personal growth from sub- to self-consciousness, or in other words a process of ontogeny from infancy to adulthood (which has been penetrated precisely by Western developmental psychology) but also a further possible development from self- to superconsciousness (which has been revealed by depth psychology and by Oriental and Occidental mystical tradition). The life cycle, or the great Chain of Being, evolves from the unity of the prepersonal pleromatic experience of infancy through the conceptual ego of an adult towards the highest stage in the spectrum of consciousness, that is, the unity of the transpersonal experience of Mind itself. This Mind is transpersonal and, therefore, is, as it were, the methaphysical and cosmic principle of the whole

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growth. Wilber is aware that referring to higher stages of consciousness may be subject to much controversy, among scientists in particular, so he states as follows: “In the meantime, one’s idea of ‘higher-order’ or ‘highly-developed’ remains rather philosophic. Nonetheless, those few gifted souls who have bothered to look at this problem have suggested that the world’s great mystics and sages represent some of the very highest, of all stages of human development. Bergson said exactly that; and so did Toynbee and Tolstoy and James and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and Maslow.”18 The evolution of consciousness reflects a grand spectacle of cosmic development itself. This process is described by Wilber following philosophers such as Teilhard de Chardin, Jan Smuts, Jean Gebser, Arthur Koestler and Sri Aurobindo as a process unfolding hierarchically ever-higher wholes, inclusive, complex and integrated. The utmost integration that embraces all holons, that is psychic and at the same time cosmic unities, takes place at the Level of Mind which is characterized in “The Spectrum of Consciousness” as a pure non-duality, timeless and spaceless Reality, the infinite and eternal Absolute Subjectivity, the Void Mind or Self, Brahman, the Godhead.19 The all-inclusive Mind, the crowning of cosmic and human evolution, is paradoxically the base for a movement down to the lowest layer of the great Chain of Being, for the process of involution. The first impulse of this descent, the primordial Fall into the world of dualism, time and mortality is beyond any intellectual explanation, so that only the metaphorical figure of the eternal play (lila, krida, dolce gioco)20 of the spontaneous activity of Mind persists. While this activity generates the physical and psychic world of universe and humans, it should not be conceived methaphysically as a kind of emanation but rather epistemologically as a make-believe manifestation of Mind’s phenomena. In fact the whole cycle of involution-evolution is a seemingly temporary process: “In our limited and temporal state, we divide this drama into two stages — that of involution and that of evolution — while in reality both phases are one aspect. In highest truth, there is no involution and evolution through time, for whether we realize it or not, the Self remains always above time in the Eternal Moment.”21 Mind’s creative power to generate phenomena is a matter of illusion; nevertheless, its results are so glaring that man clings to them as if they were ontologically real. The run of involution as well as the run of evolution is a two-dimensional process: It brings about both cosmic and psychic transformations. The view of the world depends on the state of consciousness of the seer, the more advanced the human psyche is on the path of spiritual development, the more integrated and inclusive is the state of what is seen.

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Let us take an example. On the Ego Level, which is our common conceptual state of consciousness man identifies exclusively with the ego itself, whereas the body together with the natural environment he believes and experiences as quite severe and separated from himself. We trace here the basic mechanism of dualism and alienation that underlies the path of involution and which is quite opposite to the fundamental principle of integration on the inverse path of evolution and return to primordial unity. This general mechanism of dualism repeats itself throughout the whole run of involution generating gradually lower and lower bands of the spectrum of consciousness. The lower the state of consciousness, the less man is aware of his Supreme Identity with Mind itself. The human conceptual ego that otherwise remains a great, though not ultimate, achievement of evolution22 is nothing but a meagre fragment of potential whole. It believes itself to rule over the body and to be immortal due to its pure ideas, it expects to be beyond time and decay. This severance from the body and exclusive identification with the ego involves also “the exclusive use of the first mode of knowing, the totally dualistic, symbolic, linear, and temporal mode of knowing.”23 Incapable of accepting death, man thus represses life itself, life that is inevitably united with death. Consequently, in the act of severance and fragmentation, man projects all his existential anxiety onto his body, taking at the same time a shelter in the ego’s realm of thought where, according to Wilber, we seem to be trapped down to the present day. The reality produced by the ego is a world that is — as William James states it “full of contrasts, or sharp accents, of abrupt changes, of picturesque light and shade,”24 and it is much more disintegrated and dismembered than the world perceived from the higher bands of the spectrum of consciousness, for instance from the Existential or Transpersonal Levels. All depends on a mode of awareness: much broader and more inclusive or more narrow and exclusive. The world of “centauric man” that is the total psychosomatic being of the Existential Level is much less obscured by divisions than the reality of the Persona, the more narrow part of man, that separates itself not only from the All, and from the psychosomatic unity of organism, but also from the ego and even the non-ego, namely, the Shadow of the unwanted and dark facets of the ego itself. Summing up Wilber’s evolutionary approach to cosmic and personal creativity, we are drawn to several conclusions. First and foremost it may be characterized as a kind of metaphysics of Voidness akin to that of Mahayana Buddhism. The nondual state of Mind, the first impulse of involution and the

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goal of evolution is like the Buddhist Nirvana, or Suchness.25 Wilber himself refers to Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. Secondly, the overall cycle of life embracing the downward as well as upward paths of involution — evolution is not quite a new idea in the Western philosophical tradition. We meet a very similar vision of a circular chain of the reality in Heraclitus’ metaphor of ways down and up or in Plotinus’ description of descending and ascending ways from and back to the absolute “One.” Wilber himself juxtaposes Neoplatonism with Schelling’s idealism of Spirit in order to show the hidden evolutionary intuitions of the Western philosophical tradition.26 Thirdly, Wilber’s conviction that life is dynamic and ever-creative both within humans and the universe, two sides of life that reflect and influence each other, accentuates man’s responsibility for the whole universe and other beings. This task is very close to the Buddhist ideal of the Boddhisattva, he who is “ever striving for the enlightenment of other sentient beings.”27 Having thus presented three models of human creative potential, there remains a last conclusion we must draw to complete our survey. I think the most important idea underlying these three outstanding and in-vogue approaches to profound the human potential for self-transcendence is the idea of self-realisation and self-knowledge as the ultimate condition of any creative transformation whether it proceeds on the cosmic, social, cultural or personal levels of life. Academy of Physical Education Krakow N OT E S 1

Philosophy Today 4: 3 (1960), pp. 196–207. P. Ricoeur, “Le conscient et l’inconscient”, in P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interpretations (Paris: Sewil, 1969), pp. 101–102. 3 P. Tillich, “Theology and Symbolism,” in Religious Symbolism, ed. F.E. Johnson (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1955), pp. 107–116. 4 Cited in Mac Linscott Rickets, Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907–1945 (Boulder: East European Monographs: 1988), p. 588; also in David Cave, Mircea Eliade’s Vision for a New Humanism (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 170. 5 M. Eliade, The Forge and the Crucible (New York, London: Harpen and Rowe, 1969). 6 Cave, op. cit., p. 170. 7 M. Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return or, Cosmos and History (New York: Pantheon, 1965), pp. 27 et passim. 8 Ibidem. p. 11. 9 Cave, op. cit., p.171. 2

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10 D. Allen, Structure and Creativity in Religion. Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade’s Phenomenology and New Directions The Hague, Paris, New York: Mouton Publishers, (1978), p. 188. 11 Ibidem. p. 189. 12 M. Eliade, The Quest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 62. 13 C.G. Jung, “The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious,” in C.G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 174. 14 C.G. Jung, Analytical Psychology; Its Theory and Practice. The Tavistock Lectures (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 136–138. 15 C.G. Jung, Psychological Types or the Psychology of Individuation, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1946), p. 541. 16 Jung, “The Relations . . .”, op. cit., p. 221. 17 C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffe, (London and Glasgow: Collins, Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 356. 18 K. Wilber, The Atman Project. A Transpersonal View of Human Development. Wheaton, III., Madras, London, The Theosophical Publishing House, 1985), p. 3. 19 K. Wilber, The Spectrum of Consciousness, Wheaton, III., Madras, London: (The Theosophical Publishing House, 1985), pp. 106 et passim. 20 Ibidem, p. 153. 21 Ibidem. 22 See also K. Wilber, Up from Eden. A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution, (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1981). 23 Wilber, The Spectrum . . ., op. cit., p. 125. 24 I am quoting after Ken Wilber, ibidem, p. 119. 25 “Suchness alone is real and all the rest are not. By Suchness is meant Reality, which is the Tathagata and called Nirvana” — writes Beatrice Lane Suzuki in her Mahayana Buddhism (London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 48. 26 See: K. Wilber, A Brief History of Everything, (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1996). 27 Suzuki, Mahayana . . ., op. cit., p. 61.

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For a historian of philosophy a divergence of philosophical views is a common phenomenon. Even if he sympathizes with a certain intellectual option, he is aware of the counterarguments questioning it. The issue concerning the potentialities of philosophy, discussed by philosophers throughout the centuries, is manifested strongly nowadays also. The crisis of philosophical thinking is being ascertained. We come across opinions stating that philosophy has not solved a single problem, that it has not achieved convincing results and, what is more, that nobody knows what constitutes its object. It is true that attempts at discussing, in various ways, philosophical problems are carried on. Not everybody has lost hope in the possibility of the continuation and fruitful development of philosophical studies. However, one can also hear opinions that consider this attitude naive, calling it going on a wild goose chase. Some try to prove that the existence of philosophy makes sense, conceiving its tasks to be to awaken anxiety, to deliver man from his intellectual inertness (this also has its ancestors), whereas some only perceive the paradoxes of philosophical thinking and operating with traditional notional oppositions. They also sanction a peculiar type of intellectual game, sometimes approaching the works of philosophers as matter which allows them to carry on their peculiar play with texts. This state of affairs inclines us to ask the following questions again: Might philosophy be only an expression of the perplexity of minds constrained by fanatical beliefs? Would the destiny of every philosopher be to fall into an illusion of one sort or another? What generates such a divergence of philosophical approaches? We shall look for the answer while taking a closer look at two diametrically opposed ways of philosophizing. “A lack of certainty, just the apotheosis of a lack of certainty [. . .] to liberate oneself once for all from the beginnings and ends of all kinds”1 — this statement by Lev Shestov clashes strikingly with Husserl’s desire to make philosophy an absolutely unquestionable science. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Lev Shestov (1866–1938) presented two diametrically different conceptions of philosophy. These two philosophers — who initially did not know anything about each other — were developing their philosophical views at almost the same time. But even 159 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 159–180. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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as Husserl felt dramatically the decline of the foundations of modern science and undertook an attempt to find its ultimate grounding and radical justification (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900–1901) Shestov wanted to destroy all foundations, ridiculed inexorably science’s claims to be looking for certainty, and did not accept any justifications (Apofieoz biespotchviennosti, 1905). Husserl’s heroic efforts, which aimed at constituting scientific philosophy, regardless of all his doubts, stood in sharp contrast to Shestov’s statement that philosophy and science had nothing in common. We have, on one hand, a belief that philosophy has to be a science, capable of grasping the absolute truths, that it should find an unquestionable basis and aim at certain cognitive results in a methodical way. On the other hand, we are confronted with a contempt for science, a denial of the possibility of getting to know the truth, a conscious rejection of all methodicalness accompanied by an enchantment with the uncertain and tenuous. I shall present briefly the approaches of Husserl and Shestov, presenting the reasons expressed by both philosophers at the outset for their conceptions of philosophy and its function. H U S S E R L’ S C O N C E P T O F S E L F - E V I D E N C E

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl attributed a special role to intuition, that is, to what is given in a direct and evident way. His concept of intuition requires a closer look. Its nature has nothing to do with what is generally defined as an ability to sense. It does not mean the freedom of or any dependence on the personal predisposition of the philosopher. It does not rule out philosophical imagination, but at the same time it is bound to the postulate of the ultimate grounding of knowledge. The psychologistic episode led to a dramatic crisis in Husserl’s career. He realized that the psychologistic relativization of the foundations of logic led to the relativization of truth. Later he confessed how terrible that moment was when he did not know what to tell his students for it seemed to him that the whole edifice of knowledge had collapsed: To my own indescribable horror, I convinced myself that if contemporary philosophy has said the last word about the nature of knowledge, then we have no knowledge. Once, when I was giving a lecture at the university, expounding ideas which I had taken over from our contemporaries, I suddenly felt that I had nothing to say, that I was standing before my students with empty hands and an empty soul.2

At that point he decided to make his radical step — he started looking for the truth that was not relativized psychologically and historically, the absolute

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truth. Neither did he want to reconcile himself to a sceptical elimination of philosophical problems, nor approach philosophy as the expression of a philosopher’s personality. His endeavours to make philosophy a science subject to intersubjective verification, independent from individual outlook on life and free from popular and theoretical stereotypes, were yielding newer and newer ideas. Husserl kept changing his views, but he never rejected his conviction regarding the value of philosophical proceedings, he never stopped his struggle with doubts, and he continued his pursuit to discover a certain ground on which it would be possible to realize the idea of a universal science. The path he followed, from Logische Untersuchungen to Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, was marked by eidetic intuition. He performed the validation of cognition through acts of directly looking at things. In Logical Investigations Husserl formulated a significant question concerning “the ideal conditions of the possibility of science or of theory in general.”3 The answer to this question requires some consideration of the conditions of the possibility of truth. The philosopher found the grounds for theoretical cognition in clear insight into the essence of notions and in insight into the a priori reasons for the relationships between propositions. “In perspicuous, theoretical thought we gain insight into the grounds of some state of affairs explained. . . .”4 In this way we can get to the phenomenological origins of primary notions and the relationships between them, as well as establish formal objective categories. The consequence of this approach is univocality, without which it is difficult to continue and develop any research. “We can achieve such an end only by intuitive representation of the essence in adequate Ideation . . . [. . .] But as long as concepts are not distinguished and made clear to ideational intuition, by going back to their essence, further effort is hopeless.”5 Husserl’s concept of intentional consciousness is linked to his belief that an object is transcendent in relation to an act of consciousness (it does not constitute an effective part of it). Andrzej Pól⁄ tawski emphasizes that essentially significant for the conception of cognition presented in Investigations is “the assumption that exactly the same intention can be, on one occasion, empty, ‘unfulfilled,’ and on another intuitive occasion, fulfilled.”6 The experiences of consciousness can be fulfilled in various ways, allowing us to accept that cognition is subjected to gradation. “Assuming gradation leads us to the concept of adequate perception which enables reaching the ultimate, ideal fulfillment, in its very essence impossible to transcend.”7

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Cognition gets defined as the fulfillment of an empty intention in a clear, intuitive insight into an object. It belongs to the essence of cognitive acts that we are conscious of being in contact with an object itself. Such acts are called by Husserl acts of self-evidence. Self-evidence is an experience of truth connected with the self-presentation of an object and the intuitive character of a cognitive act. However, the presence in experience of contents that are assumed emptily and fulfilled clearly can make the experience of selfevidence intensify (along with an intensification of fulfillment) until adequate self-evidence (absolute fulfillment) is achieved. “Self-evidence itself [. . .] is the act of this most perfect synthesis of fulfillment.”8 Consciousness has a complex multilevel structure. Husserl sets what is accessible intuitively to simple acts of consciousness (for example, external perception) against what is given intuitively only in acts superimposed on these simple acts (synthetic acts).9 Looking at an individual object we can fulfill an act the intention of which is to grasp a given quality as species. In the superimposed acts one can abstract not only from what is individual, but also from what is sensory. What is given in the founded act is no longer real, it is ideal. However, if in these founding acts we have to do with content which is clearly fulfilled, and not only with an empty supposition, then we reach this ideality intuitively, directly, in an evident way. These acts are those of categorial clarity. They constitute a phenomenological basis for generalization and formalization, which are the operations used in science, and they enable the building of material and formal ontology. The repeated fulfillment of some sort of experience will allow the identification of an object given in it. In this way, in Husserl’s opinion, a new perspective opens on how to overcome relativity in science. Self-evidence is not only a psychological perception, but it is also the source presentation of an object given in a broadly approached experience. The truth about objects (real, ideal, necessary relationships between objects) has its basis in the experiences of consciousness, and it is possible to repeat these experiences and identify these objects regardless of who fulfills the experiences. Husserl wrote a little later: Nicht von Philosophien sondern von den Sachen und Problemen muβ der Antrieb zur Forschung ausgehen. [. . .] Es bedarf nicht der Forderung, mit eigenen Augen zu sehen, vielmehr: das Gesehene nicht unter den Zwange der Vorurteile wegzudeuten. [. . .] Es liegt aber gerade im Wesen der Philosophie, sofern sie auf die letzten Ursprünge zurückgeht, daβ ihre wissenschaftliche Arbeit sich in Sphären direkter Intuition bewegt. . . .”10

Thus the validation of knowledge means pointing to the experience of intuitive insight into objects. “Aus bloβ gewuβten und nicht geschauten Existenzen deduzieren, das geht nicht.”11

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The next stage in the development of Husserl’s philosophy was the idea of the phenomenological ε′ποχη′ }.12 The philosopher here puts to the side the so-called “thesis of natural inclination” and the compelling power of scientific theories. It also becomes possible to reach a cognitively doubt-free sphere — that of pure consciousness. Hence pure consciousness and its correlates become the object of nonprejudiced description. This does not eliminate eidetic intuition: “Die Analyse ist in jedem Schritt Wesensanalyse und Forschung der in unmittelbarer Intuition zu konstituirenden generellen Sachverhalte. [. . .] Die Phänomenologie verfährt schauend aufklärend, Sinn bestimmend und Sinn unterscheidend.”13 This refers to the elimination of reasoning in favor of understanding, the reduction of reasoning to understanding: “Schauende Erkenntnis ist die Vernunft, die sich vorsetz, den Verstand eben zur Vernunft zu bringen. [. . .] Also möglichst wenig Verstand, aber möglichst reine Intuition (intuitio sine comprehensione), wir werden in der Tat an die Rede der Mystiker erinnert, wenn sie das intellektuelle Schauen, das kein Verstandeswissen sei, beschreiben.”14 Setting pure consciousness against its intentional correlate (the world) is based on the essential difference in the way in which they are given. The experiences of pure consciousness are given in an absolute way (the undoubtedness of immanent perception; here it is not possible that the experience that is given does not exist). In the world a thing is given through appearances, always with a certain horizon of indefiniteness (the doubtfulness of transcendent perception; here the nonexistence of things can be conceived).15 This follows from the essence of a conscious act and the essence of a thing. Husserl introduces his famous principle “das Prinzip aller Prinzipien” (the Principle of all Principles) which emphasizes particularly the role of intuition and the “source presenting evidence.”16 Reaching the essence, which constitutes the object of a phenomenologist’s pursuit, enables “pure perception” in which: “Wesen als Gegenstände originär gegeben sind, ganz so we in der erfahrenden Anschauung individuelle Realitäten.”17 Propositions which are generally considered to be the explanation of facts learned by experience are in reality a result of eidetic cognition: “wir doch in voller Einsicht erkennen, daβ dergleichen Sätze Gegebenheiten eidetischer Intuition zum explikativen Ausdruck bringen.”18 Husserl did not assume the existence of any noncognitive beings. If something exists it has to be given in a kind of experience: “das Eidos Wahrhaft-sein korrelativ gleichwertig ist mit dem Eidos Adäquat-gegeben und Evident-setzbar-sein.”19 Husserl does not hesitate to question popular and scientific evidences if they have not been validated in a clearly presentifying

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intuition. He assumes the distinguishing of a source experience. A predicating approach to something individual does not pretend to be irrevocable. Isolated experiences of this kind are not tantamount to the absolute acknowledgement in a being of that which is given in it by its source. Adequate self-evidence means an insight into its essence; this is an apodictic approach and it is not subject to gradation — it can neither be weakened nor strengthened. Only judgements based on an adequate insight have the value of absolute truth. Hence it becomes obvious why a philosopher reserves for himself the right to maintain a distance with respect to phenomenological descriptions. For not all of them are descriptions based on an adequate approach. One should also remember that what is given is always surrounded by an indefinite horizon of space and time. A phenomenologist has to traverse “a thorny path” as presentifying intuition comprises many variants, but if he remains faithful to it: “. . . es ergeben sich feste Möglichkeiten, das selbst Gesehene anderen zu vermitteln, ihre Deskriptionen nachzuprüfen, die unbemerkten Einmengungen vor leeren Wortmeinungen zur Abhebung zu bringen, Irrtümer, die auch hier, wie in jeder Geltungssphäre möglich sind, durch Nachmessung an der Intuition kenntlich zu machen und auszumerzen.”20 In Ideas I mathematical truths were held to have the status of adequate self-evidence. In Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl maintained his conception of the distinguishing of self-evidence, but he claimed that only the presence of the pure ego can be experienced adequately.21 In order to avoid all theoretical assumptions he resigned from constructing philosophy in a deductive way — he would not use even ego cogito as an apodictic premise. He was aware that this resulted in great difficulties. He even took into account the specter of solipsism.22 However, he would not be content with any easy solutions. In the name of a rigor of a specifically-approached, scientific character he looked for a research procedure of such a kind as would render philosophy possible as knowledge which is ultimately justified, rational, which would analyze various sorts of experiences, and at the same time avoid intellectual constructions which do not find their confirmation in what is given in experience of its sources. It is inherent of the essence of consciousness that it always presumes more than is actually given. A potential horizon of experience is obtained by an intentional analysis. A transcendental analysis of actuality and potentiality is, at the same time, an eidetic analysis. The transcendental reduction and eidetic intuition are the fundamental forms of all the detailed phenomenological methods.23 Ego as eidos is subjected to the operation of variation — in fantasy it creates itself as having different qualifications. The problems of the

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self-constitution of a transcendental ego lead to the questions of the constitution of the surrounding world. The Ego experiences Others and the intersubjective world constituted by the community. Just like the ego, it has a sphere of what is its own, outside of which is what is alien. Hence in the intersubjective world too there exists that which is its own (is of its own culture) and that which alien. Solipsism, according to Husserl, turns out to be just a certain stage in research, one that can be transcended. Transcendental phenomenology covers all philosophical problems. Husserl always approached philosophy as an unfinished task.24 The motive of the philosopher’s intellectual and moral responsibility was strongly manifested in his lectures of 1935. Husserl made a diagnosis of the spiritual disease spreading in Europe. European culture is a scientific culture, and the sources of the European crisis are rooted in science. Therefore, one should study its historical development to understand its genealogy. The thorough study of the origins of the crisis will allow us, at the same time, to undertake some remedial measures, giving us a chance of a radical and successful treatment of it. It is worth mentioning that Husserl employed a new method here. Phenomenology in its classical form (early Husserl, Roman Ingarden) excluded simultaneously researching the essence and the genesis of an object, owing to the danger of the error of making a circulus vitiosus. But in Die Krisis Husserl talks explicite about the intertwining of reflections on the past and the present.25 The genetic order and the eidetic order complement each other simultaneously. There is a discrepancy between the theoretical achievements of the sciences and people’s indifference towards science. When we ask about the aim and meaning of man’s life, science remains silent, because in the name of objectivism scientists have resigned from valuation and normative determinations. Referring to the history of philosophy, Husserl emphasizes that it has not always been like this. He considers the present notion of science to be “rudimentary.” The crisis of science consists in the loss of its “life significance.” Husserl asks: “Können wir uns damit beruhigen, können wir in dieser Welt leben, deren geschichtliches Geschehen nichts anderes ist als eine unaufhörliche Verkettung von illusionären Aufschwüngen und bitteren Enttäuschungen?”26 European culture was founded on the idea of reason and the search for truth. Fulfilling cognitive functions, science also fulfilled axiological functions. The aspiration to truth endowed man’s life with meaning. Loss of trust in reason means a loss of trust in “oneself” and losing oneself in nonsense, for which Husserl cannot give approbation. The philosopher is

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responsible for mankind, and in the name of mundane aims he must not forget about eternal goals. “Wir sind [. . .] in unserem Philosophieren Funktionäre der Menschheit.”27 It is necessary to differentiate philosophy as a historical fact from philosophy as the idea of an unfinished task. Rationalism contains a hidden danger — it can appear in a one-sided form. What is more, one-sidedness is a compulsory route for philosophy for it is the work of limited people. The entanglement of rationalism and naturalism led to man’s dramatic split into a sphere of spirit and a physical sphere. This split can be overcome on the ground of transcendentalism. The phenomenological ε′ποχη′ liberates us from the most hidden inner restraint: We start to approach problematically the thesis of the natural attitude. Thanks to that, we gain the liberty to look at various ways of presenting objects and their essential forms. Three types of attitudes — practical, theoretical and phenomenological — correspond to the three levels of the world’s constitution: the world of everyday life, the objective world and the world as an intentional correlate of transcendental consciousness. Each of these levels of constitution is endowed with a certain general structure; each of them has its specific a priori that can be reached by transcendental phenomenology. The cultural relativizations of everyday life (truths recognized in one cultural circle not necessarily recognized in others) do not determine the relativization of the very structure of this world. In the world of everyday life we remain in the visual sphere. It is possible to build its ontology on the basis of the visual insight.28 But the objective world discussed by modern science, setting up claims to selfevidence, cannot be grasped intuitively in a direct self-presentation (experienced evidence). The objective world is only an indirect theoretical result, another level of constitution superimposed on the world of everyday life. As a matter of fact, it is not any “world in itself,” but the meaning which connects consciousness with the world, assuming a theoretical approach. The a priori of the objective world refers us to the a priori of the world of everyday life, its logic to pre-logical structures. It is only transcendentalism, which abandons the radical opposition between consciousness and the world, that reveals the true meaning of world as an emanation of the constitutive achievements of consciousness. Not fettered by theories, it grasps the essence of the world as a phenomenon, relying on a direct experience. Only on the basis of the clear, visual self-presentation of objects is it possible to finally build valid knowledge about the world. This knowledge constitutes the aim of a philosopher’s life. Transcendentalism provides the answer to the question: “Ist Vernunft und Seiendes zu trennen, wo erkennende Vernunft bestimmt, was Seiendes ist?”29

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In spite of the whole evolution separating Die Krisis from Untersuchungen, the problem of self-evidence and intuitive insight into an object comes back again here. The aspiration to certainty, to grounding knowledge, remains the same, but that outcome is accounted for differently. Emphasis is shifted from purely cognitive justification to practical-moral consequences. In a way this is the opposite of Husserl’s approach as formulated in Untersuchungen, where the theoretical, nomological sciences formed the basis for normative science. Here a motive, which inclines towards undertaking theoretical tasks, is explicated. Phenomenology still aims at transcending relativism, but also at enlightening the puzzling connection between reason and being. The assumption that truths are philosophers’ concepts re-echoes the dramatic situation at the point of departure. That does not incline Husserl, to give up, however: “Wie kann Denken anderes leisten als relative Wahrheiten? [. . .] Ist das [. . .] nicht eine philosophische Erfindung? Aber doch nicht eine Fiktion, nicht eine entbehrliche und bedeutungslose Erfindung, sondern eine solche, welche den Menschen auf eine neue Stufe erhebt. . . .”30 Undertaking the task of building a scientific philosophy, in spite of uncertainty, bestows an aim and meaning on life, releases energy which sets “the highest levels of humanity” in motion. A man’s life has to be connected with self-understanding and responsibility, for a man is a being appointed to life in apodicticity (“Sein in Berufensein zu einem Leben in der Apodiktizität”).31 Hence we are facing a choice: either reason or nonsense, transcendentalism or barbarity. S H E S TOV ’ S BAT T L E W I T H A L L S E L F - E V I D E N C E

Shestov does not approach philosophy as offering certain and absolutelygrounded knowledge, since he is convinced that there is no such knowledge, but as a constant battle with all self-evidence and truths. This philosopher’s words “Do not trust yourself — you will not find the truth”32 define his approach in a concise way. The attack Shestov directed at philosophy follows from its fascination with achieving a scientific character, its search for certainty, even though it finds only illusory foundations and recognizes arbitrary statements as being true. Being enslaved by logic and guided by definite ideas and a concern with consequences, such philosophical reflection cannot reach certain areas of human existence. Science is controlled by logical, methodical thinking, but for that it pays a terrible price — it loses its independence, becomes passively subject to the rules it has imposed upon itself. The only way to regain independence is to approach truths without due ceremony.

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Corresponding to Shestov’s belief that one cannot sacrifice the autonomy of thinking by following obediently the rules of logic is the form of his expression — which is much closer to literature than to the philosophical treatise. His is a reasoning full of aphorisms, metaphors, paradoxes, one that deliberately neglects consistency, simply finding pleasure in discrepancies. A man’s life is full of discrepancies, accidents. Only a philosopher who tries to keep pace with this unexpectedness characteristic of life is capable of grasping something significant in it: “. . . incomplete, unfinished, chaotic meditations without any order, not leading to an aim determined in advance, inconsistent as life itself — are not such closer to our soul than systems, even great systems, the creators of which did not care so much about getting to know reality as about ‘understanding’ it?”33 Shestov accuses philosophers of walking down wide, beaten tracks because that is easier and leads to the erecting of edifices of thought in a way that is free from any conflicts. “A philosopher values only logical thinking or disinterested movement in a chosen direction since then the force of inertia does not get wasted in continuous looking back, searching for roads, the struggle with ‘freedom of will’ and its constant companions — doubts.”34 But the effects achieved in this way are mediocre, truisms gain the status of absolute truths. Certainty concerns only what is generally important. For philosophy shares a totally unjustified belief that life is rational. Even critical philosophy believes in the unchangeability of intellect. All that reduces philosophy to a servant of science. However, all attempts at the rationalization of reality are of no avail: “there is the unknown which in no way can be and should be reduced to the known [. . .] the order, philosophers dream about exists only at school, [. . .] sooner or later the solid ground is cut from under man’s feet. . . .”35 Shestov wants to plow up the beaten tracks that have been followed by philosophers. He wants to walk along virgin tracks, along “the paths over mountain abysses.” A habit of logical thinking kills fantasy. Submission to methods and aiming at foreordained objectives yield the fruit of banal statements, these procedures not being capable of creating anything original. All self-evidence is worthless as none can sow thoughts. The most elevated thoughts emerge unexpectedly and suddenly. One has to reject the belief that working according to a plan will guarantee success. The author of The Apotheosis of Groundlessness points to some examples from the history of culture which prove that many masterpieces were created unexpectedly and some inventions were a total surprise. A chance happening was a determining factor there. The most significant cultural achievements

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drew their inspiration not from firm ground and self-evidence, but from what is unstable and paradoxical. Distinguished personalities had this power, which allowed them to rebel against common opinions and follow their own paths. Their achievements were not hampered by respected patterns and rules. Esteem of the commonly important disturbs the recognition of world and life. A philosopher must not limit himself to the penetration of his chosen spheres of reality employing sanctioned methods. As a matter of fact, it is essential to get to know what nobody knows and even does not sense. And all that becomes possible only through questioning the rules of thinking and the laws governing reality, what is generally recognized as important. These laws and rules constitute “an invigorating dream,” force us into intellectual inertness, and kill our capacity for independent thinking. “The sciences put us to sleep and subjugate us, and ever more perfect thinking transforms us into passive, humble beings, capable only of searching for ‘an order,’ discerning and appreciating only these rules and norms that were established by ‘an order.’ ”36 A philosopher should rather be attracted by lawlessness. He has to believe that “there is nothing one cannot think about.” Only then will he regain his freedom, a prerequisite of creative work. However, this freedom is purchased by its accompanying anxiety and generates the pain of scepticism. Thus a philosopher faces the choice of styles — either methodicalness and imaginary order, which imposes itself upon the world, or unceremonious behaviour vis-à-vis scientific rules and an inevitable sense of chaos. There are the two possible paths that can be followed: logic and self-evidence (with illusion or banality being the outcome) or illogicality and groundlessness (with anxiety, but also with a chance at originality being the outcome). Shestov does not want to impose on anybody either of these paths as being the only one possible, but he demands that the community leave the individual with a free choice between the well-ordered life and one without order. He demands from people that they not subordinate the individual to their norms and not delude him with absolute truths and universal moral dictates. One cannot compel a person who suffers from acrophobia to climb the Alps, but, at the same time, one cannot forbid a person who loves climbing mountains and is used to taking the risk, to do so. Some people walk along familiar routes, looking at the mountaintops from the valleys. Others want to admire the views, which can be seen only from the top. The latter perspective exists, even though it is connected with danger and can be achieved only by some few. Shestov compares the rationalization of reality with a wish to persuade people to think that the mountains can be only appreciated from the valleys and that one cannot go off the beaten track.

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Just like Husserl, Shestov noticed the crisis of European culture, but he pointed to different reasons. According to Shestov, it was brought about by the imperfection of this culture, by unsuccessful attempts to link together what cannot be reconciled — philosophy and religion, reason and belief, the tradition of Athens and that of Jerusalem: “Over the course of many centuries the most outstanding representatives of the human spirit have been rejecting all attempt at placing in opposition Athens and Jerusalem, continuously upholding ‘and,’ persistently suppressing ‘or.’ ”37 Ridere, lugere et detestari has been eliminated in favor of the omnipotent intelligere.38 In the beginning, the source of philosophy was not astonishment but fear of ignorance, apprehension over the fact that some mysteries can exist in the world: “our thinking is looking. . . . It was born from fear. . . . Medusa’s head cannot do anything to the man who walks forward and does not look about — it turns to stones only those who look at it. [. . .] the principle of inertness underlying this looking-about-thinking with its constant fear of the possibility that the unexpected can emerge will never lead us out of this drowsy, almost vegetal state of existence to which we were bound by the history of our spiritual development. . . .”39 The most dangerous consequence of rationalism is general determinism: . . . the idea of necessity could originate and mature only in stones endowed with consciousness. [. . .] And this majority, these stones endowed with consciousness, which do not care about anything but think, speak and act according to the rules of their stone consciousness, created this very environment in which all mankind lives, [. . .] including people who are alive. [. . .] all our ideas connected with captivating truth and captivating goodness were instilled in people by the stones endowed with consciousness who are mixed with them.40

Only irrationalism will allow the overcoming of our crisis, because it opens for us a chance in the form of freedom, along with ignorance, uncertainty, groundlessness. One has to rebel against the usurping omnipotence of reason, which does not tolerate any understatements, any indefiniteness. Authentic philosophy is not satisfied with playing the role of guide to what is known, it does not put you to sleep, it does not support imaginary truths, but destroys and fights. Authentic philosophy does not refrain from risking mistakes, it arouses anxiety and teaches how to live with anxiety. It tries to accustom man to uncertainty and the tragic sense of chaos. Not everybody will give his consent to such an uncertain condition — the instability of cognition, existential fear. That explains why man looks for a firm ground at any price. Whoever wants peace should not, however, deal with philosophy. Philosophy is a domain of these who do not suffer from vertigo (nur für Schwindelfreie). A philosopher has to make everybody aware that there are no

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absolute truths, that the world is full of mysteries, that man can shape his life freely on the condition that he will not impose his views upon others. Thus Shestov defends the individual who has the right not to accept the rules respected by the majority: “If we succeed in keeping daimonion away from Socrates, if we succeed [. . .] in snatching him by force from the hands and power of history, only then will we give him back his freedom, which a living man in the depths of his soul [. . .] treasures and loves more than anything — treasures and loves even when he condemns it aloud as lawlessness, fancy and interest bound.”41 ENCOUNTERS AND DISCUSSIONS

Shestov learned about Husserl at the latest in 1908, that is, several years after his own manifesto The Apotheosis of Groundlessness was published. There followed his ruthless attack on Husserl. They met twenty years later. Shestov’s last work was an article on Husserl, and it finished with the following words: “I consider myself infinitely indebted to Husserl for having forced me, by the power of his impetuous thought, to begin the struggle at the point where no one ‘considers’ hope of victory at all possible. In order to struggle with self-evidence one must stop ‘considering.’ Husserl taught me this, and I rebelled against him, although I regarded him and continue to regard him as a great, a very great, philosopher of the modern period.”42 It is astonishing that these two philosophers representing entirely different ways of thinking could communicate. Shestov wrote about Husserl: “It seemed to me that this was the only person in the world who had the right not to understand my questions. And he is one of the few people who understood them and even more — who heard them.”43 Their first encounter happened at the suggestion of Husserl, who wanted to meet his fiercest antagonist. He reproached Shestov for having petrified his approach: “You have turned me into a stone statue, raised me onto a lofty pedestal, and then with hammerblows you have shattered this statue to bits. But am I really so lapidary?”44 Shestov tried to convince Husserl that philosophy should be a struggle, but the phenomenologist kept denying it persistently: “Nein, Philosophie ist Besinnung.” Each listened to the other’s arguments with particular attention. To Shestov’s utter surprise, Husserl suggested to him that he should get to know Kierkegaard’s philosophy: “How was it that a man whose whole life had been a celebration of reason should have led me to Kierkegaard’s hymn to the absurd?” He came to understand

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this when Husserl wrote to him: “Your ways are not my ways, but I understand and value your problems.”45 Their encounters, during which different reasoning and ways of approaching reality were opposed in dramatic fashion, did not bring about the reconciliation of their approaches. Each of them maintained his views while respecting those represented by his adversary. In Husserl’s as well as in Shestov’s conception of philosophy, there was no room for an eclectic combination of motives and compromises. In spite of their offering different solutions, both philosophers shared the same intellectual fervor, although they manifested in different ways. Husserl believed in the absolute value of scientific knowledge, while Shestov did not share this conviction. That is why Cezary Wodzin´ski writes: “The conflict between the initiator of phenomenology and Shestov takes place [. . .] ‘below’ the traditional epistemological level. It reaches that layer at which the criticism of rationalism does not arrive, it gets reduced to the foundations of all ‘rationality.’ ”46 “Shestov is perfectly aware that rational knowledge is underlined by an utterly arbitrary choice, not sanctioned in any way, an act of belief in the value of knowledge, in the value of cognition.”47 The dispute between Shestov and Husserl is situated on the axiological plane. Their different choice of values leads to alternative conceptions of philosophy. Husserl was prompted to build a philosophy without assumptions by his belief in the absolute value of truth. Trying to explain everything, the founder of phenomenology does not provide us initially with his answer to the question of why we should aspire to truth. Truth cannot be approached as a problem; Husserl is only interested in the prerequisites for the possibility of truth. He assumes tacitly a philosopher’s responsibility and the rationality of his research work. Thus the foundations of phenomenology are based on a spontaneous axiological choice. The drama begins along with the realization of the danger threatening knowledge and the sense of helplessness. The problem emerges of whether we have at our disposal the means to save truth, that being an aim in itself. Losing knowledge, we lose everything we believe in. For Husserl the issue of the absolutely unquestionable grounding of knowledge is not only a theoretical difficulty, but also — and perhaps first of all — a matter of restoring meaning to his own life. When suddenly the illumination came and he could present a criterion of truth — self-evidence — that was not only an intellectual achievement, but a life victory. Therefore, it is no wonder that he defended self-evidence with such determination, pointing to its different variants, trying to define it over and over again.

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Only after many years did it happen that Husserl verbalized what had been tacitly assumed when he stepped onto his phenomenological path: The aspiration towards truth gives meaning to our life. What is more, he added that the aspiration to truth shaped the teleological continuity of history and constituted culture. Only then does a spontaneous choice become sanctioned, but not theoretically. Finally, Husserl realizes the limits of purely cognitive justifications. The emphasis is then shifted from the point of departure to the point of destination. Numerous attempts at finding the ultimate foundations of knowledge come to a climax in the following questions: Can man live in the world deprived of meaning? Is man allowed to accept a human condition that experiences only “illusory flights and bitter disappointments?” Here rationalization is carried out not by means of absolute justifications of the origins of cognition, but by means of pointing to the consequences of the rejection of the aspiration to truth. A vicious circle. Was it worth it, to go through all this torment of doubt only to arrive at the explication of a motive stimulating our own thinking? Is this really a small thing: to achieve self-realization? Would this self-awareness be possible without first striking out in search of the absolute truth? Thus returning to the point of departure is not returning to the same place. It is a return enriched with reflections that came into being while following this path, a return on a different level. The time of philosophizing was not lost time. I believe that it will not be an abuse to define Husserl’s phenomenology as an expression of an ultimately axiological approach. I interpret axiological approaches to be pre-philosophical, spontaneous choice of values which can be subjected to reflection again and even spurned as a result of some further considerations. In Husserl’s case, we deal with a reflective sanctioning of an original choice. What is interesting is that the man who wanted to eliminate from philosophy his personal beliefs, views and create a nonpersonal science, turns out to be a most typical case presenting the connection between philosophy and life. For knowledge, as Husserl understands it, is not an escape from matters of “life importance.” The nerve of phenomenology is not the lack of passion of a pure ego from which “spring all experiences of consciousness,” but the passion of Husserl who is ready to undertake the most breakneck feats in order to save knowledge. Thus Shestov is right when he writes that for Husserl the problem of truth and self-evidence is a matter of “life-and-death.” For Husserl denial of the possibility of coming to know truth is the spiritual death of a philosopher, who can then find no justification for his research work. What is more, he

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then becomes responsible for instilling scepticism, for leaving mankind without any aims and hopes. Shestov was interested in extremes, curiosa. Husserl’s phenomenology was an extreme way of practicing philosophy. Shestov valued Husserl for his courage in formulating the problem so radically that he was not satisfied with any imperfection. From the very beginning, the author of The Apotheosis of Groundlessness emphasized the connection between science and morality. He was convinced, that in order to limit the claims of science to impose truths on people, it was necessary to reject universal morality. This does not mean that Shestov was a nihilist. Destroying the order of values as established by reason, he proposes an alternative one. He admits openly only one thing: It is not possible to justify these values rationally, and hence he does not lay claims as to their grounding. All beliefs are based on faith, although the object of this faith varies. Shestov is attracted by the inconceivable, the incomprehensible, the mysterious. Although Shestov creates himself as a eulogist of chaos, we can find in his philosophy a value to which everything should be subordinated. This is the freedom of the individual. The motif of man’s subjugation by reason and rebellion against science and morality had been discussed by Shestov before he encountered Husserl’s phenomenology. It is true that Shestov holds in contempt logic as an aim in itself, but he is sensitive to argumentation. Being a supporter of uncertainty, groundlessness, chance and extremes, he faces a dilemma. In Husserl’s philosophy he sees passion that is equal to his own, authentic zeal, even though it is directed along a path other than his own. The power of Husserl’s arguments was so great that, as he admitted himself, he almost surrendered to it. In order to refute this argumentation, it was necessary to employ incredible force. Shestov reverses Husserl’s arguments, and he does it with extraordinary polemic spiritedness. When we trust our reason immensely, we become its slaves. Rationalism implies a deterministic vision of the world. The pursuit of truth leads to the loss of freedom. Shestov’s fierce attack on Husserl, in spite of all the respect he felt, was a defense of his independence. To agree with Husserl meant a self-repudiation. To share Husserl’s point of departure, is to be left with nothing to do but to bow one’s head humbly, listening to whatever he has to say. Truth and self-evidence received even more passionate criticism. “Self-evidence is like Medusa’s head: everyone who looks at it is rendered spiritually impotent, turned to stone, paralysed in will, and made to submit to every influence from without.”48 Thus Shestov

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does not criticize Husserl’s argumentation so much as he is frightened by the consequences of adopting his approach. He recalls the already mentioned metaphor of the dream: Phenomenology [. . .] does not know the difference between homo dormiens (a sleeping man) and homo vigilans (a vigiliant man) [. . .] and this ignorance constitutes a source of power and certainty. [. . .] A sleeping man wants, consciously or unconsciously, to perceive in the circumstances of his dreams the only possible circumstances of existence. Therefore, he calls them selfevidence and always defends them; and protects (logic, a theory of cognition: the gifts of reason). When, however, a moment of awakening comes (a thunderclap rolls: revelation), one begins to doubt all self-evidence and joins an unjustified struggle with them, that is, does what a sleeping man seems to consider the highest nonsense — for can anything be more nonsensical than responding to logic with thunderclaps?49

Shestov is ready to do anything to save freedom and faith — he questions reason, accepts nonsense, suffers the pain of uncertainty, consents to the tragedy of his existence. The rejection of reason, although it condemns one to a sense of meaninglessness, does not lead to total absurdity. What reason cannot understand gains meaning through an act of faith. Faith brings hope that the suffering will be compensated for. Hence the depreciation of reason is not entirely irrational, for it becomes justified by the values Shestov approves of, with which reason cannot cope. The real drama began when these two axiological options were confronted with each other. Each of these two approaches discussed separately would really be a monodrama, as they present no internal conflict of comparable values, i.e., values situated within the hierarchy of values more or less on the same level. Making truth or freedom absolute results in other values being treated as complementary or being rejected if they clash with the fundamental value. But then an encounter took place. Each of its participants threw everything onto the scale, but none of them was so fossilized as to not appreciate the arguments of his opponent. Each of them made the other realize that he loses something in maintaining the spotlessness of his approach. However, their axiological perspectives were so different that, in spite of the openness of both philosophers, they could not be reconciled. Husserl was concerned with mankind, for whom a philosopher is responsible, whereas Shestov was concerned with the individual, who has the right to sovereignty. Many a time universal values happen to clash with the values which are essential to an individual. This accounts for these diametrically different solutions as well as the huge intellectual and emotional engagement of both parties.

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The settlement of the dispute over self-evidence would require providing the answers to the following questions: Is philosophy a science? What values are realized by philosophy? What is the place of truth in relation to these values? It is not possible here to offer one impartial answer, absolutely free from an axiological involvement. The history of philosophy proves that philosophy has not always been a science and even that it has not always intended to be a science. I do not think that it would be possible to realize Husserl’s aspiration to build a universal philosophical science, as at the foundations of different ways of philosophizing there lie different choices of values. I believe that even philosophy which maintains that values do not exist and that justified evaluations are not possible, assumes a certain order of values. Man assumes an axiological approach also when he advocates the normlessness of all evaluations. I would not recognize its specific character in the evaluation which is inherent at least implicite in all philosophy. Its specific character rather consists in the possibility of weighing considerations on values and evaluation. Axiology should be acknowledged to be a foundation of philosophy in order to appreciate spontaneous prereflective choices, to realize what axiological assumptions underlie ontological and epistemological conceptions. Philosophy without assumptions does not exist; even a belief that philosophy makes sense is an assumption. The differences in the ways of philosophizing result from different axiological perspectives. Not all conceptions of philosophy have recognized cognitive values to be the most important ones. What is more, cognitive values are not identical with truth — as we become convinced through Shestov’s reasoning. How much poorer philosophical culture would be if we remembered only those who advocated truth. Are we not fascinated by the philosophers with whom we do not agree? Many a time it is they who contribute to the crystallization of our approach to a degree considerably higher than do those with whom we sympathize. What so much attracts to philosophy is its diversity in spite of numerous attempts at universalization. Does not Husserl’s passion in his aspiration to truth fill us with the same admiration as Shestov’s defense of intellectual independence? “The death of philosophy” can be brought about only by agreement and the absence of emotions. As long as reasons clash, thought is kept alive. Shestov makes us fully aware of the danger connected with the realization of the dream shared by so many philosophers — when the chaos of solutions be replaced by the nightmare of consensus. However, it

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is not only irrationalism that conditions diversity. How long can one exploit the motives of uncertainty, anxiety, tragedy, nonsense and still remain original? Would not the ascendency of that outlook present an equally ghastly picture of philosophy? Shestov is right, I believe, when he points to groundlessness as a moment which fertilizes cultural endeavours. However, one has to render justice to Husserl — he did not “prostrate himself” before all self-evidence. One thing is the self-evidence of an initial situation leading to intellectual chaos and another thing is self-evidence as a criterion of truth. Was it not written of Husserl that he questioned the most evident things — the world’s existence, man’s real existence? Philosophers searching for a firm ground frequently avoid the beaten tracks, without escaping from breakneck ideas. With what contempt people say that something like a supposition that we are dreaming, or transcendental reduction could be born “only in philosophers’ heads.” The tyranny of reason Shestov fights against is not so omnipotent if it has allowed so many different philosophical conceptions to come into being. Here the best evidence would be the multiplicity of propositions within the framework of rationalism itself. The passionate defense of irrationalism as a prerequisite of freedom cannot be accepted without reservations. Shestov is cogent, because he leaves an individual with a choice between reason and faith. However, one should ask: Do we gain a real freedom if we submit ourselves to God’s laws, and do we lose it if we become subject to human laws? What is more, a philosopher is also an individual; therefore, he cannot be denied the possibility of choice. And then original ideas in the history of philosophy have occurred not only to irrationalists. I do not consider the gap between rationalism and irrationalism to be as deep as Shestov suggests. It is enough to remember that Husserl was considered an irrationalist and his eidetic intuition was recognized to be almost a mystical source of knowledge. In my opinion, the picture of philosophy is more complicated than Shestov suggests and it cannot be limited to attractive oppositions. One should look rather for a mosaic of approaches — a combination of rational and irrational motives of varying degrees of intensity. A suspicion suggests itself that Shestov, while fighting with logic, became subject to the dichotomy of logical thinking himself. I think that Shestov’s objections to logic do not reach phenomenology. It is difficult to accuse Husserl of considering logic an aim in itself. He excluded deducing theorems from logical rules, just as he rejected inductive generalizations. Indeed, he aimed at eliminating theoretical stereotypes which made

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thinking mechanical. Widening the notion of experience allows the penetration of very different experiences and what is given in them. Both of these philosophers referred to experience, but Shestov put the emphasis on the experience of the incomprehensibility of the world and Husserl on comprehending experience. Shestov was fascinated by the extremes while Husserl carried eidetic analyses of the normal system of experience. Philosophical conceptions frequently provoke ambivalent evaluations. The results of reflection lead to different results depending on whether we remain on a level of immanent critique or whether we ask after the reasons for original approaches. The propositions offered by Husserl and Shestov fascinate when considered from the inside but stir up resistance when the attempt is made to apply external criteria to them. We should remember, however, that then we are not impartial, for we project our own concept of philosophy onto a given approach. What is important for us becomes a filter by which to evaluate a given conception. But it is difficult to demand that the interested philosopher remain neutral when the question is asked: how to philosophize? The most impartial answer can bring about different ways of philosophizing. The power of philosophy inherently has this pluralism. Shestov’s dispute with Husserl proves that authentic philosophy, in spite of different axiological approaches, can find a plane of communication and can rise above personal views to realize an opponent’s motives. It does not conform, it does not aspire to compromise, but achieves more complete selfunderstanding. Then a spontaneous, axiological choice becomes a decision — one made with consciousness of its reasons, consequences and limitations. Marie Curie University Lublin, Poland Translated by Mal⁄gorzata Sady.

N OT E S 1

Lev Shestov, Apoteoza nieoczywistos´ci: próba mys´lenia adogmatycznego [The Apotheosis of Groundlessness], trans. Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter (London: “Kontra”, 1983), p. 8. 2 Quoted after Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher: Edmund Husserl,” trans. George L. Kline in Lev Shestov, Speculation and Revelation, trans. Bernard Martin (Athens, Chicago, London: Ohio University Press, 1982), p. 269. 3 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press, 1970), Vol. I, p. 232. 4 Ibid., p. 236. 5 Ibid., p. 238.

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Andrzej Pól⁄ tawski, “Aletejologia Edmunda Husserla,” Studia Filozoficzne 206–207: 1–2 (1983), p. 90. 7 Ibid. 8 Husserl, Logical Investigations, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 765. 9 Compare ibid. pp. 773–802. 10 Edmund Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, ed. Wilhelm Szilasi (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965), p. 71. 11 Edmund Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesu⋅ ngen, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana II (2nd ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), p. 38. 12 Compare ibid. and Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana III (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 67–69. Cited hereafter as Ideen I. 13 Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie, op. cit., p. 58. 14 Ibid., p. 62. 15 Ideen I, op. cit., pp. 95–98. 16 Ibid., pp. 52–53. 17 Ibid., p. 47. 18 Ibid., p. 46. 19 Ibid., pp. 351–352. 20 Ibid., p. 218. 21 Compare Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie, ed. Elisabeth Ströker (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1977), pp. 23–25. 22 Compare ibid., p. 32. 23 Compare ibid., pp. 70–75. 24 Compare Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, op. cit., pp. 56, 61, 63, 66. 25 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), pp. 71–74. 26 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 27 Ibid., p. 15. 28 Compare ibid., pp. 176–177. 29 Ibid., p. 9. 30 Ibid., p. 270. 31 Ibid., p. 275. 32 Compare Shestov, Apoteoza nieoczywistos´ci, op. cit., pp. 117–118. 33 Ibid., p. 9. 34 Ibid., p. 17. 35 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 36 Lev Shestov, Ateny i Jerozolima [Athens and Jerusalem], trans. Cezary Wodzin´ski (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1993), p. 456. 37 Ibid., p. 63. 38 Compare ibid., p. 73. 39 Ibid., p. 469. 40 Ibid., p. 472. 41 Ibid., p. 473–474. 42 Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher”, op. cit., p. 293.

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Quoted after “Kalendarium z⋅ ycia i twórczos´ci Lwa Szestowa” [Chronology of Lev Shestov’s Life and Work], in Apoteoza nieoczywistos´ci, op. cit., pp. 218–219. 44 Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher,” op. cit., p. 269. 45 Ibid., p. 272. 46 Cezary Wodzin´ski, “Spór o granice racjonalnos´ci, Szestow — Husserl,” Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mys´li Spol⁄ecznej 33 (1988), p. 160. 47 Ibid., p. 162. Compare Cezary Wodzin´ski, Wiedza a zbawienie. Studium mys´li Lwa Szestowa (Warsaw: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, 1991), pp. 89–156. 48 Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher,” op. cit., p. 280. 49 Shestov, Ateny i Jerozolima, op. cit., p. 463. 43

M I NA S E H D E V

M A S S - M E D I A C O M M U N I C AT I O N A S A P O S S I B L E C R E AT I V E S O U R C E O F N E W S H A P E S O F L I F E

The main purpose of this contribution will be to try to point out in which way human communication, and above all mass-media communication, can be regarded as a process and one able to foster the creation of “new shapes of life.” We’ll start from Baudrillard’s thesis on the relation between social communication and the human world of imagery, focusing on other authors’ recent studies, for example, Enzensberger, and keeping also in mind the classical conception of media worked out by McLuhan. Firstly, we have to bear in mind that social communication can be regarded at the same time as the transmission of messages, an organized social activity, a relational experience and an activity of negotiation. But if we conceive it fundamentally as a “system of communication,” then it is characterized “as a creation of the contents of the world of imagery or, if we want, of symbolic or immaterial content addressed to the greatest number of receivers, thanks to the use of instruments with high technological power.”1 In fact we here stand before mass communication, which has now become a part of our daily experience in an indissoluble and inalienable way, with all the positive and negative aspects related to that. The systems of communication, within which television is particularly important, create the world of imagery, able to play a central role in human existence and contribute to organizing it. In fact, social communication, especially if it is considered as mass communication, can be seen first of all as the production of images and of symbolic content. What is fundamental, in this regard, is the concept of the “world of imagery,” which can be defined as the sphere of the creation and use of images, which are then relayed by the power of the communicative system, the recipient of which is mass public. We have to keep in mind that the world of imagery can have a really important social function. An image is just a mental creation, but imagery has a fundamental place in human relations; in this way it can become a means of communication too. With regard to this, we have to point out the importance of the image that everyone retains of himself and projects to other people, which carries us back to the Pirandellian concept of the “mask.” As a matter of fact, it is possible to trace a distinction between one’s own image of himself and that formed in the 181 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 181–189. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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minds of other people, and all that changes depending on contexts, situations, and so on.2 As we have already said, the concept of the world of imagery embraces the sphere of the production and use of images that are then relayed by the power of a system of communication, in which traffic phenomena like suggestibility assume a fundamental role. In this regard, it could be interesting to go back to Freud’s position as expressed in his essay “Psychology of the Masses and Analysis of the I,”3 which emphasizes the role performed by libido in mass dynamics. He identifies the essence of the collective psyche in “love relations”: Eros can in fact be considered as the power which joins together all things in the world. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that in social groups and particularly in the masses, human emotions assume much wider proportions. According to psychoanalysis, the libidinal relation keeps together a mass, composed by individuals who identify one another as they put a common object in the place of their Ideal of the I, both in a vertical direction (each person is linked to the leader in a libidinal way) and in a horizontal direction (that is, the same kind of relation can also be observed between each person and the other members of the mass). The main processes operating in a mass are falling in love and identification; the fundamental phenomenon characterizing a collective psyche is in fact the suppression of the freedom of the individual who acts in a mass. It is possible to suppose the applicability of Freudian analysis of the masses to the field of mass-media communication also,4 a mass can in fact also come into being in a libidinal way in popular relations with a transmission system. We have to remember that, in a system of mass communication, we are in the presence of an uninterrupted mixture of distinction and homogeneity, in other words, of individualization and massification. In any case, our part here is to point out the social function the world of imagery is able to perform in it. The specificity of mass communication consists in the fact that we are confronted here with the absence of a leader. The public here directs its libidinal charge towards a plurality of subjects, that is, towards communication personnel, who have the function of gratifying the recipients of the messages being communicated. The main risks which are involved in this can be found in an excessive homogenization, which clearly tends to limit the individual’s freedom, and in the public’s uncritical identification with the models the media hold up, in which phenomenon we can see a hypnotic component. The subject matter of mass communication and its relationship with the collective world of imagery has recently been dealt with by numerous

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authors; in fact, many different conceptions concerning the nature of media have been worked out in this regard. For example, according to Meyrowitz,5 media can be seen at the same time as “means” which convey a flow of content, as “languages” and finally as “background.” In the first sense, media can be considered above all as vehicles of transmission of ready-made content and messages with possible motives of control over collective opinion. In the second sense, the emphasis is on the grammar of media and particularly on the cultural and ideological elements which favor the choice of certain codes. Finally, when we consider media in the third sense, we confront a conception of the media as contexts which are supplied with particular features that transcend the grammatical and which pertain to their content’s components. For example, in this regard, we can ask ourselves in which way the characteristics of a medium can change the functions and techniques in use by the preexisting media. Each conception of the nature of the media mentioned above has prompted studies, research and analysis of various kinds concerning mass media phenomena and instruments. But we do not forget that communication is also something more complex than the simple communicative act as the transmission of content. It can be considered as a real process of construction of reality, “a symbolic process through which reality is produced, preserved, rebuilt and transformed.”6 According to this different conception of communication, it is not simply the transmission of messages but, on the contrary, the construction of reality, which is more than the “product” of the influence of the media. This is a “process” in which various meanings about the different aspects of daily life and of the social world appear, are compared to one another and related. In this process, media representations, which assume a central role, can be interpreted, discussed, worked out again, by interacting with the systems of representation of reality themselves. About thirty years ago, McLuhan already pointed out the way in which automation had by then reached all the components of the industrial and commercial process, by bringing about true “mass production.” His theories remain fundamental, even if today they are seen as partially surpassed. This is in fact the nature of the mass media, a definition which has to be referred above all to the fact that everybody is simultaneously involved in it.7 On the other hand, we can find a close correlation between massification and the world of imagery, and besides we have to bear in mind that the latter has undergone great transformations. In fact, today, drawing inspiration from one of Yeats’ assertions (which seems perfectly apt to the question of the

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relation between science and the world of imagery), we could say that “the visible world is no longer a reality and the invisible one is no longer a dream.”8 One of the main problems we can ask ourselves in this regard is that of just how is it possible to try to establish a more productive relation between reality and the world of imagery. As a matter of fact, we can often see between them a relationship that is more destructive than constructive. Perhaps, we could even say that nowadays the mass media frequently aim at establishing a dangerous confusion between reality and the world of imagery, which effects a mutual cancellation. Anyway, from the reflections which can be made in this regard, we can deduce that the complex relationship existing between people and the mass media can be at the same time productive and dangerous. Man is in fact being transformed by technology in both positive and negative ways. But even though it will not be at all easy, he can try to look for some solutions here in order not to fall into enslavement by the “machine.” But, until that is possible, it is necessary that man makes use of his freedom and critical ability. In other words, it is necessary to look for some strategies which keep us from being swept away by the mass media and, on the contrary, allow us to use them in a constructive way. In this way it will become possible for imagination and creativity to play an active role in contemporary society. In this way, the imaginary world could regain a specific value and allow, or at least contribute to the creation of new shapes of life, through a different conceptualizing and employment of social communication. As we already mentioned, the mass media manifestly exercise an influence not only upon reality, but also upon fantasy, and so upon the complex human world of imagery. Today reality and imagination can meet; we can in fact observe the presence of a parall relationship, or to put it better, an interpenetration between them. With regard to this, Baudrillard’s theorizing proves to be very interesting. He points out the way in which the mass media have committed the crime of murdering reality, and at the same time that of destroying fantasy, and so the complex human imaginary world.9 He speaks of a true crime, committed above all by television, against both reality and the world of imagery; one cannot forget that today real and virtual often tend to meld, with negative and sometimes truly destructive effects on man’s creative ability. Today the image can no longer imagine reality, because it coincides with it; the mass media have come to end create a real confusion between image and reality. On the contrary, we can affirm that “we live in a world in which the main function of the sign is to let reality disappear and at the same time to

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hide this disappearance.”10 Just as art does this, so do the media. We have now come to live in a world in which everything is information, but in which, finally, nothing can really inform. We have also to remember the fact that to be able to live and to think on everything at the same time lets us be actors in and not only spectators of the performance. After criticizing all illusions, we have only the very illusion of being a critic. “Reality does not disappear into illusion; it is illusion which disappears into total reality,”11 Baudrillard writes. We are here confronted with the process of simulation, in which the “phenomenon,” that is to say the appearance, cancels the “thing in itself” almost completely. On the other hand, we can say that this technique which allows instant communication (thanks to the use of powerful means of spreading of information, like the television, the computer, and other telematic instruments) reduces the individual to a pure mechanism in the “Great System,” as Heidegger tells us. But above all it causes everything to become immaterial and lose its substantiality. In this way reality disappears, because it is completely replaced by its simulation: We are in a universe of “pure virtuality.” Virtual reality as a product of this technique is an extreme phenomenon, one which goes well beyond Heidegger’s technological alienation; in this way, man’s “extensions” become his “expulsions.”12 McLuhan called the mass media real “extensions of the individual,” that is to say, of some of his physical or psychic faculties. All this brings about the birth of an “extended man,” or better put, to an extension of man towards the universe. He also thought that the “electronic galaxy,” in which we are today immersed, is effecting a real “implosion”; in fact it compresses space rather than enlarge it. In this way, it comes to transform the universe into a “global or cosmic village,” which can embrace the whole of humankind. Baudrillard makes McLuhan’s famous assertion, “the medium is the message,” absolute. As the medium is both a means and content, it is the use of a certain instrument which models and changes man, apart from the message it transmits. Baudrillard finally affirms that television disappears into reality and reality, disappears into television. The latter becomes “a miniaturized terminal which actually lies immediately in your head — you are the screen, and television looks at you — it transistorizes all the neurons and rolls up turns like a magnetic ribbon.”13 According to Baudrillard, we are going from a parall relationship between reality and the world of imagery to one of their actual interpenetration, or even a substitution. In fact the imaginary world always appears closely linked to the individual’s daily experience, to his real

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existence: “Now the image can no longer imagine reality, because it coincides with it. It can no longer dream it, as it represents its virtual reality. [. . .] Reality has been expelled by reality itself. Perhaps only technology still gathers the scattered fragments of reality.”14 All this effects a true “perfect crime,” for now things no longer exist and are replaced by their images. Mass–media information and the new technologies that are in continuous development have carried out the simultaneous killing of reality and murder of illusion. But, according to Baudrillard, the crime is not so flawless as it may seem. We have also to remember that, from its beginning, the world has existed through the illusion of the play of appearances; it is therefore a radical illusion, and in order to defeat it, it is necessary to execute the world itself, that is to let it be real and have a precise meaning at any cost. The perfect murder would consist precisely in the unconditioned realization of the world through the actualization of all its data, and so through the actual cloning or destruction of reality. As a matter of fact, if man would decide to have a merely virtual existence, all artificial things would become the setting of the nonexisting subject. But as the crime is not totally perfect, some traces, some signs of imperfection remain. They represent man’s signature in the artificial world, which can also represent a positive element in which we can find a possible resolution. In this regard, we cannot forget the gap between ideal and real claims to the right to exist. For the system of imagery itself allows compensation by means of the gratifications it can offer through recourse to it. These gratifications include the ability to dispose time and space freely, which represents the fundamental advantage the world of imagery offers to its beneficiaries along with opening other important spheres in the individual’s life, such as the linguistic-cognitive sphere and the ethical and political spheres. On the other hand, virtuality implies, as has been already pointed out, the destruction of illusion and alterity. In fact, Baudrillard defines illusion as an absence and a non-identity, by opposing it to virtual reality, in which everything is present and immanent. The actual simulation has destroyed reality, but at the same time we stand before the destruction of all illusions: we assist therefore in an excess of potential intelligence, which pushes man beyond his real possibilities. But paradoxically, all this produced the general illusion that reality was completely destroyed; on the contrary, it has come to its summit: the absence of reality becomes its proliferation. This excess of reality we live in does not leave any space to human creativity by veiling the important role played today by the imaginary world. In fact, a reality which

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potentially lacks nothing can no longer dream a dialectic elevation; in this way we have become subject to a mere, total positivity, and the dream of fighting on is no longer one of alienation but beyond-reality. We are now totally subject to the illusion of the use of technique as an expension of man and of his power; but in this situation of total confusion, illusion is not yet opposed to reality; on the contrary, it becomes “a more subtle reality enveloping the first one in the sign of its disappearance.”16 The paradox today consists in the fact that the absolute rule of human thought is making the world as it has been given to us, if it be possible, a little more unintelligible. In fact, virtual reality marks the loss of the very essence of man, of his relationship with the “Other.” Besides representing the hour of the liquidation of reality, virtuality is also characterized by the killing of the Other, or better of all the forms of alterity: the alterity of death, of the face, of the world, of the individual itself, all of which are cancelled by virtual reality, and of the other which, on the contrary, dissolves in continuous communication. Finally information becomes the site of the perfect crime against reality, and communication the site of that against alterity. What has been suppressed is the element of negativity, which unchains passivity, by determining the liquidation of the other, of the different, that is to say, of all that could allow the production of something new. The contribution we can deduce from the theory of the mass media worked out by Baudrillard in order to better the recent use and fruition of the media can be found above all in the conviction that it is necessary not to pretend to rejoin the opposites here at any cost. If we want to find a resolution to the situation of passivity which marks the world of mass communication today, it is in fact important to maintain some differences which can appear nonproductive. All this could allow the recreation of a new relationship between reality and illusion, by thinking the gap between real and ideal in a constructive way and by giving again a more central role to human creativity and the individual’s freedom. According to Baudrillard, today alterity is “as it were captivity and condemned to the servile destiny of resemblance, but someday alterity will save itself and that time it will achieve a victory.” And let it be noted that Enzensberger’s position towards mass media, which is at the same time critical and engaged, lets us be optimistic as far as the constructive potentialities of these means are concerned. In fact they allow “mass participation in the social and socialized productive process”17 for the first time. In this view it becomes possible to see “a dynamics which goes beyond the pure functioning and reproduction of power and which tends

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to the instauration of a real communicative process.”18 It is above all television which has come today to represent the absence of meaning (in fact he defines it as “medium zero”), which tilts fundamentally towards a dialectic of calculation and away from a logic of meaning. In fact it enlarges the means of communication without taking care as to what is communicated. But its function is not a negative one only: as it allows entry into the linguistic universe and the social world, television can in fact become “a way to enter the world of collective manifestations: We are in front of a phenomenon which projects an image of the world and which lets us get into the world of the image. This is more than a simulacrum; it is a medium which links together subject and world.”19 Still, we have to bear in mind that it is precisely this function that we could define as a “filter,” one constituted by the mass media together in an almost hypnotic process which generally occurs to allow intimate access to the viewer. It is necessary above all to emphasize that the media really could make possible mass participation in the productive social and socialized process. But unfortunately, in their actual form, they tend to prevent communication, rather than to carry it out or to promote it, because they do not allow a successful interaction between the transmitter and the receiver. In this regard, Enzensberger gives us some useful indications of how to address the new means of communication in an active sense. All this is possible firstly if we consider the mass media to be not simple means of communication but socialized means of communication. But what is necessary is above all to end repressive use of the mass media by an emancipating use of it.20 The following initiatives have become very necessary: the broadcasting of decentralized programming instead of a single centralized set of programs; awareness that everyone who receives can also transmit; seeing the mobilization of the masses as a fundamental purpose; envisioning a political process of learning and the collective production of mass communication; hope for the establishment of a social control of the media which comes from a real self-organization more than from owners and a bureaucracy. But perhaps the first imperative is to end the passive conduct of simple consumers by fostering interaction among the participants, which would allow the generation of productive feedback. University of Macerata

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N OT E S 1

Cf. F. Totaro, Immaginario come produzione ideologica di massa ed etica della comunicazione, in Immegime, segno, parole –– Procussi di transformazione, ed. G.N. Ricci (Milan: ˘ 1999), p. 850. Giuffri, 2 Cf. G. Galli Conoscere e conoscersi (Bologna: Clueb, 1991). 3 Cf. S. Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (in Italian), in S. Freud, Opere (Turin: Boringhieri, 1966–80), VI. 4 Cf. Totaro, Immaginario . . ., p. 14. 5 Cf. J. Meyrowitz, “Images of Media,” in Journal of Communication, 43: 3 (1993), pp. 53–66. 6 Cf. J. Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” Communication 1: 2, (1975). 7 M. McLuhan, Gli Strumenti del comunicare, Ital. transl. by C. Capriolo (Turin: Boringhieri, 1966–80), VI. 8 Cf. G. Cesareo, “Rileggere McLuhan: accettare o guidare il cambiamento?”, in McLuhan, Eli strumenti del comunicare, op. cit. 9 J. Baudrillard, Il delitto perfetto (Milan: Cortina, 1996). 10 Ibidem, p. 9. 11 Ibidem, p. 3. 12 Cf. ibidem, p. 41. 13 J. Baudrillard, Della seduzione, Ital. transl. by P. Lalli (Milan: ES, 1995), p. 165. 14 Baudrillard, Il delitto perfetto, op. cit., p. 8. 15 Cf. Totaro, Immaginario . . ., op. cit., p. 18. 16 Baudrillard, Il delitto perfetto, op. cit., p. 91. 17 H.M. Enzensberger, Per non morire di televisione, (Milan: Lupetti & Co., 1990), Presentation by R. Cristin, p. 5. 18 Ibidem. 19 Ibidem, p. 9. 20 Enzensberger, op. cit., pp. 108ff.

SECTION IV

DW I G H T H O L B RO O K

D O E S T I M E M OV E ? D O G E N A N D T H E A RT O F U N D E R S TA N D I N G T H E M O M E N T

In the Western world, at least since the Renaissance, the prevailing view about time has been that it not only moves but moves forward, linearly, in one direction from a hypothesized beginning, such as the Big Bang, to an undetermined end, possibly apocalyptic. And while it is true that the changes we observe in the world, including our own aging, seem to be happening in one direction (nobody is getting younger), it is also true that our tendency to interpret events as progression or as a linear process may not always be caused by the phenomena we are observing but rather by a perceptual bias ingrained in our own directional habit of reading, writing, and analytical thinking.1 Does time move forward? Does it move at all? Is time a changing or moving characteristic of space and matter? From the scientific point of view, things are said to move in time or as time passes. Matter evolves, expands, changes, appears and disappears over millenia. The accepted view is that time started with a cosmic explosion and exists because space and matter exist. Space and matter create the linearity of time, testify to the fact that time had a beginning and has a probable end. Under certain conditions time may slow down, and, theoretically, warp holes may be possible, through which future astronauts could short-circuit to distant galaxies at a fraction of conventional time. Still, the underlying assumption in all of this is that time moves forward, or rather that we move forward in time, no matter how fast or slowly. Recent philosophical debate has centered over what are termed A-time and B-time theories, which are sometimes referred to as the tensed theory and the tenseless theory.2 The A-time hypothesis holds that consciousness is critical to the meaning of time. In other words, we use tenses because they reflect our perspective about present, past and future. Our presence is essential in order to understand what time it is and when things occur in relation to what time it is. One implication of this hypothesis is that, according to Brian Leftow, future events are in no way actual as long as they are still future. Their becoming present changes their ontological status, clothing them in actuality that they had lacked while in the future.3 Hence, time’s passage — i.e., the becoming actual of non-actual future events — is a genuine feature of objective reality. 193 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 193–199. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The B theory, on the other hand, holds that future events are already fully real. Their becoming present does not alter their ontological status. Hence, time’s passage in this view is not a feature of objective reality at all because future events, upon arriving at the present, do not take on an actuality which they did not already have in the future.4 What passage of time amounts to is, instead, the response and interpreting of human perception. And so, according to this view, when we say “time passes,” all we really mean is that our perceptions alter. By implication, all things, all events in time, are equally, tenselessly actual. This does not mean, however, that all events are simultaneous. I am not young and old at the same time. B-time theorists do not claim that the universe exists “all at once,” but simply that all events are co-actual.5 In fact, A-time and B-time theorists use different language to describe what they see as their distinct points of view about time. For the former, there is an objectively real passage from future to present time, and from present to past. The B theorists, on the other hand, steer clear of such expressions as past, present and future, and prefer to use “earlier than,” “simultaneous with,” and “later than” to describe and compare positions in time. For them, tenseness is not mind-independent but instead is a product of the mind, not of time itself. B theorists, in other words, see everything as already laid down. Relations between events are always true, and nothing in the series from earlier to later can change.6 Both these theories about time that we have been discussing are premised on time’s linearity, the fact that it can be measured, that it moves — or is laid out like a series — from one direction to the opposite. While it is true that in the B theory everything is already laid out and is co-actual, there is, nevertheless, a before and after on the time line. Linearity, if not movement along the yardstick of temporal measurement, is thus called for even under the B hypothesis. In contrast to these theories, another approach to the subject of time — one not based on linearity — was expounded long ago by the 13th-century Zen Buddhist monk, Dogen, the founder of the Soto school of Zen Buddhism in Japan. Dogen writes, “Time is not separate from you, and as you are present, time does not go away.”7 The first thing, therefore, to note about Dogen’s teaching is that it is oriented around human consciousness, and in this respect has affinities with the A theory of time. Time implies awareness of the fact that I, the speaker, exist in temporality and specifically in the present time. This point is alluded to by A-time theorist John Lucas, who contends, “It would be

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unintelligible for me to offer a frame of temporal reference within which I could not refer to the date at which I was then speaking. It is part of the concept of time that it is connected to us. . . . The essential egocentricity of time is reflected in the ineliminability of tenses.”8 But for Dogen, time not only is intimately connected to us. It, moreover, neither comes nor goes away. “You may suppose that time is only passing away, and not understand that time never arrives,” he writes.9 “As time is not marked by coming and going, yesterday and today are both in the moment.”10 So now we proceed a step further in his thinking, and this also accords with A-time theory. There is no past or future, no ontological substratum out of which the past and future can be said to exist, except insofar as they are found in the present moment, whose ontological base lacks connection with anything outside of itself. Dogen describes this moment as “not coming or going anywhere and nothing is left out of it.”11 The present moment is never “slipping away.” The immediate presencing of right-now [nikon] is cut off from life and death, before and after. He describes nikon as “an eternity and totality complete in and of itself as a holistic and dynamic situational context.”12 Though complete in itself, the moment — paradoxically — is characterized as well by impermanence [mujo]. While on the one hand every moment is a purposeless and selfless totality, encompassing before and after, past and future, life and death, “it is at the same time cut off from before and after, life and death in that it is absolutely without substratum.”13 That is, there is no enduring self or enduring phenomena. It is not that existence changes or the self changes over time. Rather, the self and phenomena are aspects of impermanence, and impermanence has no measure because it is not relative to anything else which is not impermanent. While it is true that Dogen uses the phrase “every moment” — suggesting a plethora of moments through which we live our lives, it is clear that in his thinking there is no “through which,” no enduring self that holds these discrete moments together. In his philosophy, there is no sequentiality, no substratum that ties the moments together. Quite the contrary, the moment gives definition to the self, to the entities. If there is any foundation for time at all, any ontological base, it is the present moment. But this presencing is characterized by impermanence, and as such it cannot be measured because there is nothing to compare it to. Permanence does not exist. From what Dogen says, we can see that both his perspective on time and the A theory have points of agreement. Both emphasize the centrality of the present and deny the existence of past and future as separate entities. Still, there are some crucial differences. While the A theory denies the ontological

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existence of future and past, it nevertheless holds to a passage of time. Leftow describes time’s passage, under A theory, as a genuine feature of objective reality, the becoming actual of non-actual future events.14 Clifford Williams describes the passage as a shift of presentness from event to event.15 These views, as I see it, necessitate the idea of a process, a flow or directional current, the moving into and out of reality of a series of events along a time line, which in turn provides a source for measurement and quantification. By contrast, Dogen is not talking about a linear concept of time at all but about the totality of the moment complete in itself and cut off from cause and effect, yesterday and tomorrow. There is no yardstick by which to measure such moments, only our own internal estimate. The best way to understand this notion of the moment, it seems to me, is to liken it to one aspect of B theory; namely, the important role this latter theory attaches to human perception in giving us the sense of time. Nothing passes in fact. We create time. We fabricate what appear to be separate realms of past and future. Moments appear to move, to fly by, but it is only in fact our minds that create this illusion. And yet, it may be argued, the content of our shifting attention, the content of this present now, does keep changing. Things and people move, come and go, change position. Surely this is not the result of our own perceptual bias? Surely we are not fabricating what we see? The difficulty here lies in trying to distinguish between what we actually see and the mental act of interpreting the content of what we see.16 Movement is not necessarily out there in front of us. And what appears to be movement to some may not necessarily be interpreted by others as such or as signifying passing time. The phenomena of passage and change may depend, to an extent, on language. One language or interpretation may describe movement as an action, another may see it as an attribute, overall condition, or fixed quality that doesn’t imply a change of presentness at all. Birds flying, waves rolling, a rainy day, the fact that the sun rises or that the light goes out — all this may or may not imply a characteristic rather than a change, or a static or momentary quality rather than a transition from one moment to the next. In fact in this context, the notion of a multiplicity of moments may be an illusion. Just how arbitrary our understanding of momentness may be is brought out in Basho’s famous poem where the state or condition of being now suddenly happens — not that moments change or that time moves but rather that the observer is brought into the present; time is created by the spectator being there as the frog jumps into the pond.

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Old pond. Frog jump in Water sound.

Taken from an anthology, this translation of the poem — presumably closer to the Chinese — renders the suggested action “a frog jumps in” as an attribute instead — “frog jump in water sound.” Whichever way is correct, the meaning of the poem centers on a personal awakening, a presencing that depends on a witness observing what is before him, on his being there and being now.17 And yet, paradoxically, the fact of the key role of the self and of the self’s perceptions in this minimal experience given in the poem is not intended to imply subjectivity. For Basho, being in that moment creates its own ontology. Existence happens, is born, and likewise the moment occurs and perception occurs. Such a viewpoint may seem to entail an extreme form of idealism that leaves no distinction between perception and hallucination or between factual recording and poetic imagination. Dogen would certainly argue against the blurring of such distinctions and claim that the notion of time elicited in this poem was not subjective at all in the sense of being fabricated by the imagination. In Dogen’s and Basho’s defense, we must remind ourselves of the recognition even in current philosophy of time’s fickle nature. The sense of change and momentness by which we characterize temporality are intimately related to consciousness, at least under the A theory of time. The clock provides us with numbers to measure duration, but what good are these numbers in helping me decide how long or short an event, such as my lifetime, is? How long is three hours? We can substitute other numbers — minutes and seconds — for hours, but that only changes the wording of the question. Or we can make comparisons: Three hours corresponds to a portion of the sun’s movement. But that still leaves the question unanswered. Given a different perspective and a different perception, what we consider three hours, or a lifetime, could conceivably be reduced to an instant, stored like a computer chip the size of a molecule. Not surprisingly, Dogen attaches no length of time to his concept of moment other than to characterize it as impermanent. And of course, even in our use of the term, moment has no fixed length. It is even misleading to think of it as having multiplicity. How can we count moments? Where do we find their fixed boundaries? They are not substances. It would be like counting thoughts. When does one thought end and another begin? The same can be said for the categories future, present and past. Looking out into the empirical world, where do we locate their boundaries? In fact, such boundaries don’t exist except in our minds.

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We must remember that Dogen is not denying a future and a past. He is not denying change. He is only rejecting the view that future and past lie outside the present moment, together with the assumption that change and transition necessarily imply that they do. In Dogen’s cosmology, the future is not coming from anywhere. The present is not going anywhere. And the past has not left the present. Hence, he is postulating not a presentness that exists without any reference to a past or future but rather a presentness in which time does not have a linear meaning and does not flow in either one direction or the other. His is a world in which time is very personal. We may say that certain events constitute a long time, others a short time. These are our own values. Indeed, these are our subjective values. For Dogen time exists because we exist. “The self is time,” as he writes.18 His views, therefore, combine some elements of A and B theories of time but stand apart in his insistence that the essence of time is momentness, which doesn’t stay yet doesn’t move, and can’t be counted. The School of English Adam Mickiewicz University Poznan N OT E S 1 Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan, eds., Explorations in Communication (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 162, 166–7. The scientific, linear view of time is summed up by Stephen Hawking: “There are at least three different arrows of time. First, there is the thermodynamic arrow of time, the direction of time in which disorder and entropy increases. Then, there is the psychological arrow of time. This is the direction in which we feel time passes, the direction in which we remember the past but not the future. Finally, there is the cosmological arrow of time. This is the direction of time in which the universe is expanding rather than contracting.” Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 145. 2 Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 18. Also, Clifford Williams, “The Metaphysics of A- and B- Time,” The Philosophical Quarterly 46 (Jan, 1996), pp. 371–381. 3 Leftow, p. 18. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 L. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith, eds., The New Theory of Time (New Haven: Yale University Press, c. 1994), pp. 19, 158; see also Leftow, above. 7 Kazuaki Tanahashi, ed., Enlightenment Unfolds, the Essential Teachings of Zen Master Dogen (Boston: Shambhala, 1999), p. 71. 8 J.R. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 280 (quoted in Robin Le Poidevin, “Time, Tense and Topology,” The Philosophical Quarterly 46 (no. 185), [Oct. 1996], p. 473).

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Tanahashi, p. 72. Tanahashi, p. 71. 11 Steven Heine, Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen, SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies, K. Inada, ed. (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, c. 1985), p. 128. 12 Ibid. 13 Heine, p. 90. 14 Leftow, p. 18. 15 Williams, p. 380. 16 For an interesting discussion of “collective representation,” see Owen Barfield, Saving the Appearances (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), p. 16 et al. 17 For Suzuki’s interpretation of this poem (which he transcribes with the “s” on the verb), see Carpenter, pp. 36–39. 18 Tanahashi, p. 70. 10

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REDUCTIVE AND NONREDUCTIVE THEORIES OF THE SELF: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE

In his book The Western Canon, Harold Bloom defends the canon against what he calls the School of Resentment, consisting broadly of Marxists, feminists and multiculturalists. This School, he says, has distracted criticism from its true purpose of “enhancing the mind’s dialogue with itself.” “The true use,” he says, “of Shakespeare or of Cervantes, of Homer or of Dante, of Chaucer or of Rabelais, is to augment one’s own growing inner self,” “to enlarge a solitary existence.”518 Bloom, however, does not locate literature’s strength or aesthetic autonomy in its content, morality and ideology, but in the power of its language, ultimately the signifier itself. He repudiates any definition of language based on materiality, thus merging the power of the signifier with the Author as a psychological intention, a “will to figuration.”12 But the signifier is, nevertheless, designated as constituting “aesthetic strength,” which for Bloom resides in “mastery of figurative language . . . exuberance of diction,”29 “linguistic energy.”46 Shakespeare thus demonstrates “a verbal art larger and more definitive than any other.” “Rhetorically,” Bloom says, “Shakespeare has no equal; no more awesome panoply of metaphor exists.”60 Bloom’s impressionistic assessment of the canon in general and Shakespeare in particular has of course come under vehement attack, especially by the School of Resenters, but also by more sympathetic critics who do not reject his views in their entirety. His claim that literature’s aesthetic autonomy and strength reside in the “mastery of figurative language” can be approached not only from a postmodern poststructuralist perspective but also from what I will call a phenomenological decontextualist one. In a collection entitled Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism, Catherine Belsey argues for a poststructuralist or materialist understanding of language as signifying “always and only from the place of the Other.” 133 Similarly in the journal Performing Arts International, C. B. Davis in his essay “Performing Theories of Consciousness” adopts a materialist account of consciousness as developed by Daniel Dennett, arguing that the ontological self, such as that in Shakespeare, is a narrative fiction. In contrast to Davis and Belsey, I will propose that a nonmaterialist or decontextualist definition of language and the self is more effective in 201 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 201–214. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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explaining performance, even in a postmodern play like Sam Shepard’s The Tooth of Crime. Belsey as a poststructuralist argues with Lacan that “Subjectivity, identity, is learnt; it is an effect and not an origin; it depends on the signifier.”133 In everyday life, as she and other poststructuralists argue, we can easily forget that we are subjected by language, that language only appears to be transparent, that instead of being essences given in nature we are socially constructed, and that our desire doesn’t originate from within ourselves. Belsey asserts that if we confront language in its physicality at the limits of mastery where the signifier is opaque, then we encounter the Other, which she defines as “the material of our own identity,”133-34 since our subjectivity is insubstantial except for the materiality of language. “The Other,” moreover, “is the non-full, non-present, non-existent source of meaning and truth, the ungrounded guarantee of the knowledges we seem to possess, and it is constitutive for the subjects we are.”134 “No wonder,” Belsey goes on to say, “the encounter [with the Other of the signifier] is experienced as disturbing, aweinspiring, beyond pleasure, no wonder Bloom [for example] finds it deep, dark and uncanny”.134 Belsey thus defines the limits of language and what we know about the world and ourselves in terms of the signifier, which in its rhetorical play preempts the transcendental signified or universal, definitive meaning, always positioning the subject within a specific context in relation to the world, text or performance. To illustrate this point Belsey, following Freud, Lacan and Derrida, associates the signifier and the subject with mortality. At the moment of death the linguistically constructed subject knows nothing about it, for the subject doesn’t die; what dies is the organism, which is different from the subject as a function or a play of signifiers. But as Belsey notes, in another sense subjectivity does die with the organism, a death linked to the poststructuralist opacity or nontransparency of the signifier. She says that in her view, death is “an example of the uncanny, not its origin. Indeed, it is not death itself which disturbs in fiction, but ghosts and revenants, figures who contradict the meaning of the term.”135 While for Bloom contradiction, paradox, and oxymoron, “the exuberance of diction,” are the “limits of language,” Belsey describes these in terms of the opacity of the signifier. This nontransparency of language replaces or infinitely defers the referent, rendering the subject not only culturally relative but also groundless in its confrontation with the Other. In her assessment of the role of post-theory in literary studies in the postmodern condition, “[n]o other discipline confronts the strangeness of language in a way which enables us to glimpse the corresponding strangeness of the subject to itself.”

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Despite arguments like Belsey’s, however, there are other ways to interpret the limits of language. The English critic Christopher Norris has written extensively in defense of Derrida and deconstruction against the totalizing accusation that they are indifferent to serious philosophical inquiry and promote a postmodernist retreat from emancipatory or progressive thought. In “Deconstruction and the ‘Unfinished Project of Modernity,’ ” Norris argues that Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas represent opposite extremes in praising and condemning Derrida respectively for his perceived overemphasis on the aesthetic on the one hand and for rendering philosophy just another “kind of writing” on the other. As Norris puts it: . . . Derrida doubts very strongly whether any . . . line can be drawn between intra- and extraphilosophical interests, or between (on the one hand) disciplines concerned purely with the pursuit of truth “for its own sake” and (on the other) disciplines that respond to “outside” pressures and incentives. However, he is equally far from thinking that we should just let go of that Kantian distinction and embrace the current postmodern wisdom according to which such talk is another kind of “performative” rhetoric, one that adopts a high moral tone (a fine-sounding language of principle, “disinterest,” and so on) as a cover for its own self-interested motive.42-43

Norris disagrees with Belsey’s version of a post-theory in which the opacity of the signifier precludes any ground or reference outside of language. His position resembles that of the tradition of Sanskrit poetics and Indian literary theory in general, which hold that there are different levels of language corresponding to different levels of consciousness, and that one’s perception of language and meaning changes as the structure of consciousness changes (Chakrabarti 123–28). In Eastern thought there are four levels of language: vaikhari (outward speech) and madhyama (inward speech or thought), which correspond to ordinary waking consciousness and constitute the lower levels of language; and pashyanti (the temporary unity of sound and meaning) and para (the absolute unity of sound and meaning), which correspond to pure consciousness and constitute the higher levels of language (Coward 126–33). Language may be opaque on the lower levels in which a temporal/spatial gap occurs between sound and meaning, but on the higher levels devoid of gaps language becomes transparent, with the unity of name and form experienced on the level of pure consciousness (Charkrabarti 123–27). Even Western thought has begun to recognize that the ground of meaning must be conceived in relation to consciousness (Chalmers 52–55). Norris’s argument that deconstructive theory cannot be totalized as positing the opacity and self-referentiality of language, that it also intimates a ground for meaning and the self beyond cultural relativism, parallels recent developments in the study of consciousness in the social and hard sciences. This burgeoning field attempts to understand first-hand phenomenological

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experience in terms not only of the metaphorical and aesthetic but also the more concrete. Thriving new journals such as the Journal of Consciousness Studies and Consciousness and Cognition explore the hard problem of consciousness, or the relation between the mind and brain, as well as the relation between consciousness and the arts. Their findings suggest an alternative to the postmodernist view of the self and culture. In his editorial introduction to a recent special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies called “Art and the Brain,” Joseph A. Goguen tries with “an appropriate humility and trepidation” to discern “what distinguishes great art from merely good art.”12 Turning from Western philosophy to the East in this attempt, he suggests that we recall the three marks of existence from classical Buddhism: namely “suffering, impermanence, and non-ego.” Suffering we are all too familiar with; even when desires are fulfilled they tend to escalate, so just when the glass is half full the glass gets bigger. Likewise, impermanence touches everything; even the sun will die. Non-ego pertains to the constructed nature of the world and ourselves. Goguen considers the mark of non-ego “to be the abode of the sublime, in the sense of Kant, a kind of profound aesthetic experience that goes beyond beauty, inspiring awe, perhaps even fear”12 — as in Bloom’s experience of linguistic energy. The three marks also inspire in consciousness their opposites: “bliss, permanence and self-existence,” which Goguen associates with medieval art or what is disdainfully called primitive art. For Goguen bliss, permanence and self-existence define the spiritual nature of art, as they do for Margaret Wertheim, who in The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace traces the evolution of space from the spiritual space of Medieval art to the physical space of perspective Renaissance art and back to the spiritual space of the Internet. Goguen finds that bliss, permanence and self-existence, or what Wertheim describes in terms of spiritual space, adds to the greatness of art and is not incompatible with modern science. The philosophical assertions of Buddhism or Hinduism, while not considered objective truths, are “a kind of phenomenological classification of data gathered through meditation experience” (Goguen 12). These philosophies and meditative practices are soteriological, intended to improve human beings. Goguen also points out that the recently discovered delay between perception and consciousness (which by the way would qualify the popular deconstructive claim that all perception is always already an interpretation) was noticed and explained ages ago by Buddhist and other Eastern meditators. They also recognized, as Francisco Varela notes in his studies in neurophenomenology, that “emotional evaluation precedes conscious

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experience” (Goguen 13). The Eastern tradition, moreover, recognizes that the world out there which we construct on the basis of our expectations and values can be altered through meditation in a much more radical sense than that suggested by poststructuralism. Not only are the data or stimuli of perception rearranged according to one’s social context, but as Goguen notes they become “ ‘pure appearance,’ also called mahamudra, which is experience liberated as ‘self symbolic,’ luminous and transparent, without the usual overlays of projection and attachment; in this way all experience can become heightened aesthetic experience.”13 He is talking about a dimension of the self beyond the linguistically constructed subject of postmodernism, one that embodies the three marks of bliss, permanence and self existence. In Indian literary theory, this dimension of the self as pure consciousness corresponds to the unity or transparency of the pashyanti and para levels of language, which through aesthetic experience (rasa) transcends the opacity of the lower levels of language. V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein explore the relation between aesthetic experience and consciousness in their essay “The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of Aesthetic Experience” (JCS 15–51). Although “The Science of Art” is reductive to the extent that it links consciousness to the physiology of the brain, unlike poststructuralism it also seeks universal rules and principles. Ramachandran and Hirstein believe that any theory of art should have three components: a logic of art, an evolutionary rationale, and an understanding of the brain circuitry involved. In addition they propose five other principles for a total of what they call “eight laws of aesthetic experience.” Although Ramachandran and Hirstein have been criticized by peer commentators in both the sciences and humanities for oversimplifying aesthetic experience in their “Science of Art,” they nonetheless offer an alternative to the linguistic determinism and cultural relativism of deconstructive postmodernism. Goguen, Ramachandran and Hirstein are among a growing number of scientists who assert that the phenomenological dimension of great art is of key importance. Although some of their theories on art and consciousness are physiologically reductionist, they acknowledge that no simple metric or quantification such as galvanic skin response or Birkhoff’s aesthetic ratio (Goguen 13) can fully account for aesthetic experience. Let us take one aspect of Ramachandran and Hirstein’s argument, their notion of the essence of art in light of the “peak shift principle.” In describing visual art, they observe that the purpose of art is not to imitate reality but “to enhance, transcend, or indeed even to distort reality.”16 The terms that Ramachandran finds most commonly associated with the experience of art in

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Indian art manuals is rasa, which he translates as “the very essence of.” In the Natyashastra, the definitive classical Indian text on dramaturgy, rasa is defined as aesthetic experience (Tarlekar 56). Ramachandran gives several examples of rasa in Indian art in which the essence of childhood, romantic love and sexual ecstasy are evoked through a strong emotional response. Whereas in the West Picasso discovered nonrepresentational art, which he rendered through grotesquely distorted figures such as a woman’s face seen from the front and side simultaneously, Indian and African art had centuries earlier anticipated multiple perspectives, which as Wertheim suggests is also a feature of medieval art. The rasa or essential flavor of specific emotional modes that underlies most of great Indian art is for Ramachandran related to what he calls the “peak shift principle.” In brief, this principle of science originates from the way animals learn to discriminate between the shape of objects. In the difference between a square and a rectangle, when a rat is rewarded for the rectangle, a grossly elongated or distorted rectangle then becomes even more attractive. Similarly in art, a distorted or amplified feature evokes greater rasa, which is associated with the three marks mentioned by Goguen: bliss, permanence and self-existence. This amplification produces a caricature and leads to Ramachandran and Hirstein’s first aphorism: “All art is caricature.”18 Needless to say, their reduction of art to caricature has been criticized by artists, but their findings suggest that the “super stimulus” or caricature of art and its defamiliarizing effect may be linked to certain genetic structures that have evolved in the human brain. Ramachandran and Hirstein do not try to explain what it is like phenomenologically to have an aesthetic experience induced by caricature; they only suggest a link between that experience and a certain modality of brain functioning — a link between art, brain and experience. The fact that caricature, like Bloom’s linguistic energy, evokes an aesthetic response does not reduce consciousness to the brain. To connect the brain and a particular modality of consciousness is not necessarily reductive, for consciousness in its pure form is always already there. In a nonreductive metaphor of consciousness, the brain is like a radio receiver and consciousness is like a signal it picks up or tunes into which is already present as a field of energy. Be that as it may, Ramachandran makes other observations about caricature reminiscent of recent theories about the relation between tradition and the individual artist. For instance, he says that Often paintings contain homages to earlier artists and this concept of homage fits what we have said about caricature: the later artist makes a caricature of his acknowledged predecessor, but a loving one, rather than the ridiculing practiced by the editorial cartoonist.20

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In his influential book The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom makes a similar assertion. He adopts a psychoanalytic concept to literary history, proposing that each generation of poets struggles against the threat of greatness found in its predecessors, an ongoing enactment of the Oedipus complex. One way the poet achieves greatness is through the “mastery of figurative language,” a kind of caricature of ordinary language that evokes a particular rasa. The logic of peak shift as part of a theory linking art, brain and consciousness may in the end be relevant for art, however seemingly reductive. Ramachandran admits that their eight universal principles of art do not account for everything, like the idiosyncratic or the ineffable, but unlike the tenets of poststructuralism they do not try to reduce the phenomenology of aesthetic experience to the opacity of language. Of all the arts, performance, which combines language, ritual, dance, music and context, may have the greatest power to evoke aesthetic delight (rasa). As mentioned earlier, in “Performing Theories of Consciousness” Davis proposes a reductionist theory of the self in performance that nonetheless defines the self as “mutable, flexible and inclusive.”67 He tries to determine whether the self, in light of the deconstruction of the subject and logocentrism, has any ontological status. While Eastern theories of the self, though not without their differences, emphasize an ultimately decontextual or immaterial definition of consciousness, Davis adopts Daniel Dennett’s (1991) reductionist or materialist definition of the self as the “center of narrative gravity.” For Dennett the self is a “convenient fiction or metaphor for the organizing principle by which the heterogeneous systems of natural, neurological processes comes to be experienced as ‘consciousness’ or the ‘inner I’ ” (63; Davis’s emphasis). Dennett, like the poststructuralists, considers the self a product rather than a source. He rejects the idea of an inner observer of experience, or an “I” of awareness (see Deikman 350–6). Davis in turn argues that the self as a “center of narrative gravity” is like the fictional representation of the self in drama, that is, like a character in representation. This correspondence between dramatic representation and the self as narrative suggests for Davis a link between the structure of consciousness and performance genres and acting methods. That is, the dramatic character, like Dennett’s notion of the self, is not an entity, not the container of awareness, but a “set of biographical events and tendencies” (Dennett 1989, quoted in Davis 64). Davis and Dennett thus believe in the fragmentary, materialist self. This self for Davis is caught in the stresses of postmodern life as represented in the work of postmodern playwrights and directors, like Sam Shepard. Davis finds

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the dramatic self first in the body, and then in other sites like a work of art. The self as body may seem to have the advantage of being dialogic and interactive. But in my opinion, even postmodernist drama points to an immaterial or transcendental self. It is important to remember not only the actor’s physical presence in performance but also the spectator’s response to the symbolic significance of that presence, which is an expression not only of the actor’s body but also of his or her mind and spirit. According to the Natyashastra, the classical Indian treatise on dramaturgy, performance serves as a vehicle for activating one or more of the eight sentiments: the erotic, comic, pathetic, furious, heroic, terrible, odious and marvelous (Tarlekar 56). There is also a ninth sentiment, santa or bliss, which corresponds to Goguen’s three marks of bliss, permanence and self-existence. Performance thus involves a presence which transcends not only the body but also the opacity of language — if we take acting to be a form of language. Though Davis identifies self and body, in performance the latter is not an end in itself but a means to convey temperament or emotional essence (rasa). The body in this way represents the dynamics of the transformations of mind. Performance is a process of mediating the contents of the actor’s consciousness through gestures and language to affect the spectator’s consciousness. In Eastern thought, as is well known, consciousness is identified as sat-chit-ananda, absolute bliss consciousness (Deutsch 9). Aesthetic experience, particularly in drama, moves the spectator’s mind toward this level of consciousness. Although reductionist theories in the sciences and humanities would locate the essence of the self and theater in the body and its context, these theories do not adequately explain the nature of aesthetic delight (rasa). For one thing, all first-person phenomenological experience consists of a unity beyond the differences of theoretical discourse. That is, in performance, the rasa of the bliss of consciousness or santa connects theater/performance-specific contents, mental and sensory stimuli and emotions into a unity accessible only through first-hand experience, not through theoretical discourse — as useful as the latter may be in analyzing the experience after the fact. From the perspective of Eastern thought, the Western mind/body dualism is a misinterpretation of the nature of mind and underlies the reductionist leveling of the mind/body distinction. In a recent exchange between Henry W. Sullivan and Howard Mancing in the journal Cervantes, Sullivan argues that a fictional character, while not a real person, can still be the subject of psychoanalysis, as in a Lacanian analysis of Don Quixote de la Mancha. To support his argument Sullivan

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proposes a distinction between body and “organism,” the latter defined in Lacanian terms as a linguistic and psychological being. We have to recognize that the human biological animal (body) is not the same thing as a human linguistic and psychological being (organism). He thus questions the assumption that the “real person” means exclusively a human biological mammal “who has, or had, a historical existence” (“Analyzable or Unanalyzable” 12). He makes a case for “the virtual psychic reality of personae in literature whose life extends beyond the time of their literary creation into an indefinite future posterity” (“Analyzable” 12). The organism, which he defines through the Lacanian notions of the Imaginary and the Symbolic order, constitutes the essence of fictional personae, serving to “ ‘debiologize’ the human subject.”14 For Sullivan it also serves to undermine the mind/body dualism that cognitive scientists increasingly find untenable. Mancing, however, questions Sullivan’s definition of organism as a concept distinct from body and accuses him of positing “an absolute (Cartesian) mind-body dualism as the cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory” (“Against Dualisms” 158). Rather than accepting the notion of an organism as a culturally constructed virtual psyche, Mancing condemns it as a reaffirmation of Cartesian dualism, espousing instead such concepts in cognitive science as “embodied mind,” the body in the mind, “and the mindbrain.” Quoting Richard Restak, he writes that consciousness is “a very special emergent property of the human brain . . . made possible by a sufficient number of parallel interacting modules.”163 But Sullivan intended to overturn the absoluteness of Cartesian dualism. Organism as a “third term” was meant to provide a “solvent” to binary dualisms by replacing them with the notion of a mind/body distinction. Hence the title of Sullivan’s response to Mancing: “Don Quixote and the ‘Third Term’ as Solvent of Binary Dualisms” (Cervantes). For Sullivan, then, a “mind/body distinction is not the same as a mind/body dualism,” for the “mind is inseparable from the brain, but distinct from it” (“Third Term” 192; Sullivan’s emphasis). But however much Sullivan and Mancing may agree or disagree about their definitions of dualism in the context of Western philosophy and cognitive science, they both differ from the notion of dualism in Eastern thought, which considers both mind and body to be material. In the Indian philosophical tradition of Samkhya-Yoga, the structure of reality consists of twenty-five components in a firm dualism. As Lloyd Pflueger puts it, in Samkhya-Yoga “There are two irreducible, innate, and independent realities in our universe of experience: 1. consciousness itself (purusha); 2. primordial materiality (prakrti).” In these

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copresent and coeternal realities, primordial materiality (prakrti) contains twenty-three components, including intellect (buddhi, mahat), ego (ahamkara), and mind (manas) (Pflueger 48). In this system of thought, the intellect, ego, and mind together with all thought, feeling and perception “are all seen as merely different forms of nonconscious matter” (Pflueger 49). As Pflueger notes, “This is not the garden variety of mind/body dualism encountered in Western philosophy! Here both body and mind are seen as unequivocally material. Even so, Samkhya-Yoga cannot reduce the universe of experience to the nonconscious permutations of matter alone.” The material content of experience related to the intellect, ego and mind are “only half the equation of experience — our experience necessarily involves the element of consciousness.” That is, in addition to the twenty-four material components of experience, there is also purusha, “the principle of consciousness itself.”49 From this perspective, therefore, the Western mind/body dualism is really a monism, for the mind and body comprise the material building blocks of experience as distinct from the witnessing faculty (purusha) that “illuminates” this experience. The Samkhya-Yoga dualism consists of purusha or consciousness itself on the one hand, and on the other hand prakrti or matter, which includes the “psychological faculties: intellect, ego, mind, sense capacities, and action capacities; and subtle elements, gross elements, and material objects” (Pflueger 51). Purusha is contentless pure consciousness “without which even mental processes know nothing” (Pflueger 51; his emphasis). The mistake of the intellect is to identify intellect with consciousness. Even though the intellect seems to know, the knowing or witnessing faculty belongs to consciousness, for intellect is a material linguistic construct while consciousness is beyond language and immaterial. There is no subject/object duality in consciousness, for consciousness is not a knowing as in self-consciousness but a being as in knowingness. As Pflueger states, “Consciousness is eternally free of . . . objects, infinite, immaterial, and awake. The sensations and judgments assembled by the intellect are mere permutations of matter, prakrti, without consciousness of any kind.”55 From the perspective of Samkhya-Yoga, a theory based on direct experience, consciousness is not apprehended by faith or any other mental construction. It is not a material construct like the notion of organism in Sullivan or mind in Mancing and the cognitive scientists. Sullivan’s third term is thus only a synonym for the second term in a nondual or monist materialism: mind-body. By disassociating mind from its (mis)identification with the light of consciousness, which can only occur through the direct

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experience of pure consciousness (purusha), Eastern thought would transform human suffering into freedom from bondage to the material realm. Consciousness is not a linguistic or cultural construct but an innate capacity to experience liberation from “all concepts, all thinking, all words, all feeling, all memory, and all perception” (Pflueger 69–70). This experience can occur though language transcending itself, as though the aesthetic use of pashyanti and para. How would these considerations fit to a contemporary play that represents not the bliss of wholeness but the terror of duality in the postmodern self? In Shepard’s Tooth of Crime, a rock superstar (Hoss) feels challenged by younger stars and their “gypsy movements” as they compete for top-of-thecharts status. Hoss consults his staff, which consists of his manager/girlfriend (Becky), a driver (Cheyenne), a private doctor (Doc), and an astrologer (StarMan), who warns him of the threat of a killer gypsy encroaching on his turf. The gypsy (Crow) confronts Hoss in a new language he doesn’t understand. Hoss begs him to “back the language up, man, I’m too old to follow the flash.” But after a fierce verbal combat, Hoss loses the match despite hiring his own referee to ensure his triumph. To preserve his honor he commits suicide, and Crow takes over in victory. Shepard says that the dialogue of the play surfaced from “a certain sound which [came] from the voice of this character, Hoss . . . and the whole kind of world that he was involved in”; that Crow came “from a yearning toward violence. A totally lethal human with no way or reason for tracing how he got that way. He just appeared. He spit words that became his weapons.” 981 Represented on stage are a pair of archetypes: two warring antagonists from epic history; two gunslingers from the mythic American west; locked in an eternal struggle, with perhaps only one certainty: that youth challenges age, that the old must yield to the new, that the past must reconcile with the present, and the present with the future. At the end of Act I, Hoss tells his manager/girlfriend, “Ya’ know, you’d be O.K., Beckey, it you had a self. So would I. Something to fall back on in a moment of doubt or terror or even surprise.” Hoss seems to sense that his anxiety over the threat of Crow stems from a split in his own psyche, a gap between his mind and something deeper he calls the “self.” In terms of Samkya-Yoga, this self is pure consciousness, the source of thought and creative intelligence. When in contact with this state one experiences the unity of language associated with pashyanti and para. When divorced from it, one can feel unsure. As Hoss says, “I feel so trapped. . . . Everything’s a mystery.”

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Crow, on the other hand, has the self-confidence of someone who, while not directly in touch with the self, at least is not overloaded with preconceptions, inhibitions and other ideological constraints that check his freedom and spontaneity. When in the attempt to peg Crow’s identity, Hoss says, “My sleuth tells me you’re drivin’ a ’58 Impala with a Vet underneath,” Crow retorts only, “Razor, Leathers, very razor.” Hoss is at a loss to interpret an utterance beyond the range of conventional reference. He can’t follow a language whose meaning seems to stem not from an arbitrary, relational system of signs, but from a unity of sound and meaning, sign and suggestive content (rasa) in the speaker’s consciousness. Crow’s idiosyncratic use of language is a metonymic metaphor not only for a postmodern solipsism, but ironically also for the way language is affected by the degree of proximity between mind and consciousness. In their use of language, Hoss is a modernist and Crow a postmodernist. But although Crow’s usage is more opaque, it is Hoss who feels the greater mystery of the self in its absence. When the referee gives the match to Crow, Hoss flies into a rage and shoots him, then surrenders to Crow and begs him to teach him how to become a Gypsy rocker. Crow: “You wanna be like me now?” Hoss: “Not exactly. Just help me into the style. I’ll develop my own image. I’m an original man. A one and only. I just need some help.” Indeed they both need some help. Crow can no more teach Hoss the secret of his creative identity than he can understand it himself. Crow’s challenge to Hoss, as a younger to an established rocker, derives its force not from the socially constructed, intelligible aspect of the self that Hoss might imitate, but rather from the depth of consciousness before it has become socially saturated and crystallized into a cultural artifact. Crow’s success, therefore, stems not from a constructed self or what Dennett calls a “set of biological events and tendencies” or “a center of narrative gravity” (1989). Neither Hoss nor Crow have the slightest idea how to consciously attain this level of pure being, which by definition stands “outside the game” they variously try to enter or exit. Each character moreover tries to become like the other, not on the level of the pure self (purusha) but only on the level of intellect (prakrti). Hoss wants to learn Crow’s gypsy style, and Crow wants to take possession of Hoss’s turf, even though he argues that “The Gypsies float their ground, man. Nobody sets up colors.” The eternal struggle between youth and age as represented in Shepard’s play symbolizes the postmodern struggle to close the gap between mind and consciousness. Representing youth, which being not yet established as the “center of narrative gravity” has an edge over age, Crow may find it easier to elude

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ideological boundaries through his music, but his escape is fleeting and makes no profound impression on him. Hoss purports to admire him: “You know somethin’ Crow? I really like you. I really have respect for you. You know who you are and you don’t give a shit. . . . I just hope you never see yourself from the outside. Just a flash of what you’re really like: A pitiful flash.” Crow: “Like you?” Hoss: “Like me.” Crow: “No chance, Leathers. The image is my survival kit.” Hoss: “Survival. Yeah. You’ll live a long time Crow. A real long time. You’re a master adapter. A visionary adapter.” What Hoss’s ironic repartee suggests is that Crow’s ability to adapt will not guarantee stability, that his gypsy image is no survival kit, that sooner or later he will glimpse his image and realize as did Hoss that one’s image is not identical to one’s self. Perhaps sensing this already, Hoss gives up his attempt to imitate Crow and shoots himself. What then is the aesthetic effect of Hoss’s despair upon the audience? Crow’s postmodern wordplay at first seems to emphasize the opacity of language and the value of the constructed self, forever adapting to the changing beat of time. But in the end The Tooth of Crime suggests that this level of language and self does not comprise the whole story of human existence. Neither Hoss nor Crow have the ultimate answer to their own fulfillment in life. Shepard dramatizes the need to transcend material boundaries, and while he gives no dogmatic recipe for accomplishing this, his play induces a self-questioning that will help prevent our identifying the images of the mind with consciousness itself. Eastern Mediterranean University

REFERENCES Belsey, Catherine. “English Studies in the Postmodern Condition: Towards a Place for the Signifier. Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism. Ed. Martin McQuillan, Graeme Macdonald, Robin Purves and Stephen Thomson. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999. Bloom, Harold. The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages. London: Macmillan, 1995. Chakrabarti, Tarapada. Indian Aesthetics and Science of Language. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1971. Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. Davis, C.B. “Performing Theories of Consciousness.” Performing Arts International 1.4 (1999): 59–72. Deikman, Arthur. “‘I’ = Awareness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3.4 (1996): 350–6. Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained. New York: Little Brown, 1991.

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Dennett, Daniel C. “The Origins of Selves.” Cogito 2 (1989): 163–173. Deutsch, Eliot. Advaita Vedanta. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1969. Goguen, Joseph A. “Art and the Brain: Editorial Introduction.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6.7 (1999): 5–14. Mancing, Howard. “Against Dualisms: A Response to Henry Sullivan.” Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America 19.1 (1999): 158–76. Norris, Christopher. “Deconstruction and the ‘Unfinished Project of Modernity.’” Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism. Eds. M. McQuillan, G. Macdonald, R. Purves and S. Thomson. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999. Pflueger, Lloyd W. “Discriminating the Innate Capacity: Salvation Mysticism of Classical Samkya-Yoga.” The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy. Ed. Robert K.C. Forman. New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. Ramachandran, V.S., ed. The Principal Upanishads. Centenary Edition. Delhi: Oxford UP, 1992. Ramachandran, V.S. and William Hirstein. “The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of Aesthetic Experience.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6.7 (1999): 15–51. Shepard, Sam. “The Tooth of Crime.” Drama and Performance: An Anthology. Eds. Gary Vena and Andrea Nouryeh. New York: HarperCollins College Publisher, 1996. Sullivan, Henry W. “Don Quixote de la Mancha: Analyzable or Unanalyzable?” Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America 18.1 (1998): 4–23. Sullivan, Henry W. “Don Quixote and the ‘Third Term’ as Solvent of Binary Dualisms: A Response to Howard Mancing.” Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America 19.1 (1999): 177–97. Tarlekar, G.H. Studies in the Natyashastra, 2nd Edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1991. Varela, Francisco. “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3.4 (1996): 330–49. Wertheim, Margaret. The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the Internet. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.

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The origin and evolution of life on our Earth poses the intriguing question of how it could be described. If one relies exclusively upon quantitative descriptions as commonly practiced in physics and chemistry, a principal feature of the phenomenon called life, namely, the material manifestation of intentionality, would necessarily be lost. On the other hand, if only qualitative descriptions are attempted, the demonstrated analytical precision of contemporary systemizing in biology would also be sacrificed. Phenomenology of life undertaken in the face of the analytical clarity of the contemporary empirical sciences requires a descriptive device that transforms quantitatively analytical precision into a qualitatively categorical specification of an emergent character. The descriptive scheme that is competent for the phenomenon of life is external description of a variable universal, in contrast to external description of an invariable universal based upon the Cartesian split presuming an invariable object to be described out there. Ever more specific description of a variable universal is attempted through the constant updating of its local descriptions available from the internalist perspective aiming at the global via the interfering local representations. The constant updating of local representations manifesting descriptive capability of the internalist perspective focuses upon a material body experiencing mutually inconsistent representations of the neighboring local bodies, exercising an intensity from within to ameliorate the experienced inconsistencies and then transforming itself into an inconsistency-free representation to others. Internal description upholding external description of a variable universal from within can address the phenomenon of life as an instance of a constant turnover from inconsistencies to intensities and guarantee the operation of intentionality on material grounds. I N T RO D U C T I O N

Despite our persistent descriptive endeavor to address any and all aspects of the issue of life there stands unyielding in all scientific disciplines (Emmeche and Hoffmeyer, 1991), the one deep problem of the limit to which we can describe, beyond which we cannot go. The location of that limit stubbornly 215 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 215–231. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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remains undetermined (Van de Vijver et al. 1998). The malaise surrounding this problem is more than just a philosophical matter. It becomes a serious matter even in the empirical or experimental domain, since the competency of each scientific discipline involves its intrinsic capacity for description and is not merely a matter of the technical means available to aid the discipline. No observational equipment or experimental apparatus can help a discipline unless it has the capacity to allow such technical means to intervene in the first place without destroying the whole descriptive enterprise. Astronomy cannot otherwise be advanced much even if newer highly sophisticated telescopes be developed. This observation will spur us to examine the descriptive scheme each discipline takes for granted from a more encompassing perspective if the issue happens to become broad in its scope while covering many different disciplines, as with the phenomenon of life. One of the standard procedures for practicing any descriptive discipline is to accept the Cartesian split between the external object to be described and the subject who describes it. The present descriptive methodology for providing external description based upon the Cartesian split does indeed remain invincible, because any descriptive author has to stand outside of what is to be described. Otherwise no monologic discourse could be feasible (Matsuno, 1995). As a matter of fact, external description of a definite object out there imposes upon itself such a queer stipulation that the descriptive object has to be universal, at least in the sense that it can be described as an object that remains exactly the same and invariable for any descriptive author, whomever he may be. The significance of this external description of a universal character cannot be overemphasized. This is certainly the case if the descriptive object really remains universal. Nonetheless, the reversal does not necessarily hold (Matsuno, 1998b). Even if external description of whatever object is available, this alone would not guarantee the object’s being universal, a reminder that the descriptive universal might be no more than an artifact of descriptive origin. Once external description of a universal character is lost, the Cartesian methodology would come to meet an almost insurmountable obstacle, especially when it faces the issue of change and evolution associated with the phenomenon of life. If material evolution, including the origin of life and the succeeding biological evolution occurring on Earth, is intended to be an object of external description, what could follow would at its best be external description of a variable universal instead of an invariable universal (Matsuno, 1996c). Although external description of an invariable universal

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can legitimately be relaxed under the standard Cartesian scheme guaranteeing the presence of an invariable object to be described out there, external description of a variable universal cannot be accomplished unless the descriptive framework also changes accordingly. Any description is an attempt to link an object to descriptive fundamentals. If the object remains invariable out there, the corresponding descriptive fundamentals would also have to be irreducibly invariable. Likewise, if the object is variable as with the case of material evolution, the corresponding descriptive fundamentals would have to be irreducibly variable. Reducing a variable universal to invariable descriptive fundamentals or predicates is simply a contradiction in terms. At issue is that of how we can describe dynamic movement in the first place. D E S C R I P T I V E DY NA M I C S

First of all, any dynamic movement is in a process in progress (Köhler, 1993; Matsuno, 1998c; Matsuno and Paton, 1999). Our attempt at describing such a dynamic movement would address the present progressive tense in the present tense (Gendlin, 1995; Matsuno, 1996a; Rosen, 1997). This observation was already explicitly made in Aristotle’s writings. [15] Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g., the removing of fat, or fat-removal, and the [20] bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e., without being already that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g., at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or being cured [25] and have been cured.) (Metaphysics Book IX, Chap. 6, 1048b)

What has been made clear in this thought ventured by Aristotle is that addressing the present progressive tense in the present tense is accomplished through the present perfect tense, because the present progressive is naturally transferred into the present perfect tense with its progression. Crucial at this point is the question of how can the present progressive be related to the present perfect tense and how can such a relationship be addressed in the present tense (Matsuno, 1999). Aristotle suggested a further clue in this regard. [25] For every movement is incomplete — making thin, learning, walking, building [30] these are movements, and incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or being

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moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call actuality, and the former a movement. (Ibid., 1048b)

One decisive point focused on in this observation is that there can be a process equating the present progressive to the present perfect tense as evidenced in Aristotelian actuality, even though that insight has failed to find many followers since his day. If equating the present progressive to the present perfect tense in the present tense is actually validated, such an equation can certainly serve as a universal in a description, no matter what its content may be. The equation can function even as a candidate for a variable universal. Despite having this perspective in mind, Aristotle legitimately recognized that the dichotomy, such that “a thing is moving and has moved, or is building and has built,” does not fulfill the condition for the equality to be established because of the intervention of what he called the end or the final cause. Aristotelian actuality was also unsatisfactory in reality, because it could not incorporate into itself concrete particulars specifying both the present progressive and the present perfect tenses. Equating the present progressive to the present perfect tense in the present tense is an attempt to accommodate concrete particulars in a variable universal at the least, since both the progressive and the perfect tenses are about particular deeds or activities. Surprisingly enough, however, the problem that Aristotle had originally formulated has taken a completely inverted turn or twist over the last several centuries. The inverted attempt to equate the present perfect tense to the present progressive tense has emerged under the banner of GalileanNewtonian-Kantian mechanics. A superficial advantage of employing such a mechanistic doctrine is that the equation of the present perfect to the present progressive tense can remain as an invariable universal while relegating concrete particulars exclusively to initial conditions. Even Darwinian evolution in the biological realm followed suit by viewing natural selection as an invariable universal while letting mutations be concrete particulars (Salthe, 1993; Depew and Weber, 1995). Once the inverted equation of the present perfect to the present progressive tense is sanctioned, the equation can be completely represented descriptively, as following the scheme of external description of an invariable universal. So far, so good, though this is not what we have been looking for. Imperative for the descriptive dynamics that concerns us is a way to relate the present progressive to the present perfect tense in the present tense rather than the other way around, as Aristotle perceived, though in vain.

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What is unique to the equation of the present perfect to the present progressive tense is that the equation itself can be described as an invariable representation because it is no more than an invariable universal embodied in the framework of external description. Representation of a body in dynamic movement, once available, serves as a means of relating the present progressive to the present perfect tense since the representation remains inert in the process even if it may allow in itself an identical transformation. Representation yields this equation has represented = is representing as referring to the inert representation itself. Because of this equality, though the situation is ironic enough, the mechanistic doctrine equating the present perfect to the present progressive tense can again acquire a means for equating the present progressive to the present perfect tense through its representation. This observation, of course, cannot proceed without raising a serious question as to the nature of representation available for the description of dynamics (Pattee, 1977). Representation of a dynamic body, whatever it may be, is a consequence of descriptive endeavor on the part of a descriptive subject and consists of coexisting manifold phenomena. The coexistence of these manifold phenomena at one and the same time is thus based upon a relation of influence or a relation of community or reciprocity, that is, interaction, in short (Matsuno, 1998c). The present insistence on coexistence is, however, undoubtedly subjective, though it is intended to be grounded upon an objective basis. In this regard, a remark Kant made in his Critique of Pure Reason is suggestive. In the mind, all phenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must exist in community (communio) of apprehension or consciousness, and in so far as it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent and connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position in time of each other and thereby constitute the whole. If this subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of some substance must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. (Kant, 1952 [English translation], p. 84).

Interaction as a dynamic community of reciprocal influences underlies the reciprocal sequence of perceptions that can in turn yield the perception of a coexistence of objects and their representation by whomever or whatever. Interaction sets the conditions of things that are coexistent prior to how they are perceived. Before any phenomenon is perceived and experienced as such, the notion of interaction takes it for granted that all phenomena are simulta-

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neously connected to each other in the dynamic community of reciprocal action (Matsuno, 1997a). Newtonian action at a distance as a specific example of Kantian interaction certainly guarantees such a simultaneous global coordination of an invariable universal. Despite its far-reaching significance, however, Kantian interaction as a model for rendering the representation of an invariable universal available does lack its empirical underpinning. Nothing can propagate faster than light. Once we pay due attention to this empirical constraint, it turns out that there are no means by which any subject as a dweller in this empirical world may perceive interaction as an a priori guarantee for the likelihood of the presence of an invariable universal (Matsuno, 1996b, 1997a). Interaction available in the empirical domain cannot serve as a guarantee for precipitating the representation of an invariable universal. To the contrary, it is mandatory to face the issue of how interaction could be described and represented in the first place. Before we seek for an invariable universal that is the community of coexisting objects by means of global interaction on a metaphysical basis, the nature of interaction in the empirical domain has to be descriptively clarified (Riva, 1994; Matsuno and Salthe, 1995). At issue is whether such a descriptive endeavor could be possible at all. One possible clue for this endeavor is in the observation that any material bodies in the empirical world are involved in detecting or experiencing each other through mutual interaction, that is to say, through internal measurement (Matsuno, 1985, 1989; Rössler, 1987). All material bodies, whether big or small, are sentient in their capacity for measuring each other internally. Focusing on internal measurement may suggest a likelihood of describing what empirical interaction is all about. We shall examine here the possibility of internal description of internal measurement. Internal description, as we shall see, is a descriptive attempt without recourse to external description of an invariable universal. I N T E R NA L D E S C R I P T I O N

For the sake of argument, let us consider an extremely simple case such that two bodies A and B are interacting with each other while legitimately keeping in mind that there is no a priori guarantee for simultaneous coordination between A’s action upon B and B’s action upon A (Leydesdorff, 1994; Matsuno, 1996b, 1997a, 1998a). Internal measurement on the part of A implies that A’s experiencing what has been presented by B is subsequently followed by the transforming of the experienced of itself with the con-

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sequence of representing the transformed to B, which then is going to experience the represented from A. A similar line of processes is also occurring on the side of B. Since there is no third party guaranteeing an a priori coordination between the two bodies, the mutual interaction referred to as internal measurement proceeds indefinitely as the repetition of the cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing. Extension of this scheme of internal measurement to cases involving more than two bodies is a straightforward matter. One thus comes to notice that there is some room for representation even in the scheme of internal measurement. Although what is experiencing differs from what has experienced and similarly what is transforming differs from what has transformed, as Aristotle aptly observed, what is representing is identical to what has represented, at least locally as referring to the available local representation, because of its inertness. Of course, this local representation is temporary because it may constantly be updated by repeating the cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing on the part of any one of the participating material bodies (Hoffmeyer, 1996; Taborsky, 1997). The significance of the occurrence of local representation, however, cannot be overemphasized. It is by referring to each local representation that one can envision local or internal description as at all likely, in view of the fact that any description has to be anchored in something stationary or inert. Otherwise, descriptive stability would be lost and no reliable description would be in sight. Compared to external description of an invariable universal upon interaction as a global coordinator, internal description grounds itself upon empirical interaction of a local character, though its constant updating remains inevitable. And it is constant updating of the resulting local representations that in turn provides a means for describing a variable object. In fact, an impetus for initiating each cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing in every material body is the inconsistency to be experienced when facing those local representations presented by neighboring bodies, with the consequence that a body’s representing the transformed carries no inconsistency of its own anymore to the others. Unless there be some prior coordination that eliminates inconsistencies from the whole aggregate of local representations, it is each material body which can constantly transform the experienced inconsistencies into an inconsistencyfree local representation, even though it will along with other bodies subsequently come to meet inconsistencies of a similar nature. Those material bodies that survive in the empirical domain are only those that can constantly

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transform experienced inconsistencies into inconsistency-free representations, however temporarily. Observing these surviving material bodies now suggests to us a new possibility for external description. This is external description of a variable universal. If there is available the global record of the surviving material bodies that have been subject to internal description, it is possible to externalize that record as a universal. The record is necessarily globally consistent, for otherwise there would be no such record. The content of the record can be variable with the progression of internal description being the generator of the record, even as it is approachable externally. Internal description thus yields external description of a variable universal, which exhibits a remarkable contrast to external description of an invariable universal. The phenomenon of life can become describable only when descriptive means that can coping with variable objects are at hand. Internal description grounded upon the material process of internal measurement fulfills this requirement precisely. TA I L O R I N G I N C O N S I S T E N C I E S

The local representation to be met in internal description remains stationary, at least in the interval between its adjacent updatings. One of the descriptive means for referring to such a local representation is a metric (Conrad, 1993; Gunji, 1995), since it does not have the capacity to initiate changes on its own. Once a certain numerical figure is read out from an apparatus measuring whatever object, it will remain unchanged until that reading is further updated. We can encounter an interesting example of this in the empirical, or more specifically, in the biological realm. The biological cell processes the material resource flow whether in a unicellular or multicellular organism (Pattee, 1982). The material flow through a cell is a local representation of that cell. It is also subject to material flow continuity because no biological organisms can create material resources out of nothing. This condition of material flow continuity can give rise to serious inconsistencies among intermittent local representations. Suppose that one cell happens to increase its intake of material resource flow just for the sake of fulfilling the condition of material flow continuity thereby diverting a portion of the similar flow around the adjacent cell. This diversion would then cause a suspension of material flow continuity for the adjacent cell if left unattended. Since no suspension of material flow continuity is allowed for local representation, the adjacent cell

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is forced to update its local representation so as to recover the condition of material flow continuity there (Matsuno, 1989). Inconsistencies among local representations are inevitable in the scheme of internal description, while no inconsistencies are allowed to survive in the globally consistent record approachable by external description. It is not the local representation but the cell itself which can master these inconsistencies. A biological cell as a material body comes to experience inconsistencies in its neighboring local representations in the form of suspensions of material flow continuity. It then transforms by itself the inconsistency-experiencing body into an inconsistency-free body; otherwise the body fails to survive. The inconsistency-free body manifests itself as a representation that is in accord with the condition of material flow continuity. What is unique to the cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing is that both experiencing and transforming cannot be represented as such. Although one cannot represent what the two operations look like in descriptive terms, they are certainly operative. The cell can experience suspension of material flow continuity, which external description cannot address as a matter of principle. The cell is even intentional in activating its own intensity for transforming the experienced inconsistencies into an inconsistency-free representation. Both experiencing inconsistencies among descriptive representations and exerting intensities in the form of exercising an intentionality are unique to internal description. On the other hand, once external description is adopted, which has been the common practice in the empirical sciences, especially in physics, there is no such things as experiencing inconsistencies residing within an established description or exerting an intensity from within. All objects have to be globally consistent with each other from the start just for the sake of the descriptive stipulation. This stipulation of external description is incontestable as an established methodology and remains perfectly legitimate. At the same time, internal description that allows for both inconsistent local representations and intensities to ameliorate them from within also remains legitimate so long as its descriptive character is faithfully maintained. In truth, the relationship between external and internal description is not antagonistic. Internal description is more encompassing, and external description can legitimately be precipitated from internal description if the latter is further constrained by the stipulation excluding inconsistent representations and no intensities from within. In other words, inconsistent local representations and intensities to ameliorate them from within are prior in our empirical world. The phenomenon of life has taken advantage of the circumstances perceived and permitted by internal description.

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Compared to external description of an invariable universal that is necessarily complementary to dynamics, internal description in being capable of precipitating external description of a variable universal comes to furnish our languages with the capacity to enclose dynamics. Physics has traditionally worked hard to eliminate intensive variables that indicate intensities of whatever sort as much as possible. Take, for instance, the electron. Any electron is sentient and susceptive to an electromagnetic field. This sentient capacity is fully appreciated in the established electromagnetic theory of electrons. What the science of electromagnetics has accomplished so far is the reduction of the electron’s intensive capacity for sentience into the extensive quantities called the spatio-temporal displacements of the electron that can be induced when one is subjected to an electromagnetic field. Once the transformation from the intensive capacity for sentience into the extensive quantification of the displacements displayed by the sentient being is completed, there would be no need to explicitly refer to the sentient capacity any further insofar as we are concerned only with its spatio-temporal displacements. If, on the other hand, there is no satisfactory scheme of extensive quantification of this intensive capacity yet in sight, we then have to face the sentient capacity of a material body of whatever sort directly (Ulanowicz, 1997). Although contemporary physics has been quite successful in coming up with extensive quantifications of the intensive capacity inhering in the electron, the issue of whether the carbon chemistry constituting biological organizations could be completely reduced to an extensive quantification in one form or another as in the practice of physics, without a doubt, remains to be seen. Until such a complete scheme of extensive quantification appears possible, if ever, we will have to directly face a material capacity for sentience and avoid any easy shortcut to quantification. Another example of relating an intensity to an extensive variable is temperature. Of course, temperature is about an intensity distinguishing heat from cold or vice versa and cannot be reduced to an extensive variable. Nonetheless, temperature can be related to the mean kinetic energy of a gas molecule if one employs the kinetic theory of ideal gas legitimated in the discipline of statistical mechanics. The kinetic energy of a gas molecule is certainly about an extensive quantity called energy. At this point, the reason why the temperature thus derived cannot be an extensive quantity resides in the particular condition that there must be provided an intensive environment within which to define and measure the mean kinetic energy of a gas molecule. This is required for the gas to establish a thermodynamic

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equilibrium with its surrounding environment. This requirement is literally intensive in what it actually implies. The environment guaranteeing the condition of equilibrium is uniquely individual and cannot be dissected into additive components. It is one thing to seek the condition of thermodynamic equilibrium in order to secure the notion of temperature. But it is quite another to examine the condition under which temperature could be defined and legitimated at all. Temperature presumes, above all, a sentient capacity on the part of anything that can experience heat or cold as such. Unless one intends to contrive an overly articulated artifact to which the participating material bodies may be forced to surrender their capacity to experience temperature, the capacity for sentience of temperature should be ubiquitous in the empirical domain. A similar line of argument also applies to pressure and even to mechanical force among other entities. A principal motivation lying behind the practice in physics of treating intensities or intensive variables simply as derivatives of extensive quantities has been exclusively methodological in its origin. If intensities of whatever kinds are taken to be primary, there should be a dichotomy between an intensity already experienced by one material body and an intensity yet to be experienced by another, even when that intensity originates in and propagates from the same sources. There is no distinction between no intensity being propagated at all and an intensity yet to be experienced on the part of a material body which has not yet experienced that propagating intensity. And such indefiniteness cannot be tolerated in the scheme of external description of a definite universal. Once this descriptive artifact seeking after a definite and invariable universal that is present out there only for the sake of external description is set aside, material bodies in the empirical domain can legitimately resume exercising their capacity to maneuver their intentional intensities. EXAMPLES

The Origin of Life The inconsistencies that any surviving material body experiences when facing the local representations presented by neighboring material bodies come to be mitigated and eliminated by its own intensity from within; otherwise there would be no such body in the first place. What is unique to the functioning of intensities from within is that any intensity to ameliorate those inconsistencies that operates at a slower pace loses opportunities to actualize itself

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in comparison with intensities that operate at a faster pace, since there would then remain no leftover inconsistencies to be eliminated by latecomers. The cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing allows only for an intensity eliminating inconsistencies at the fastest rate among alternatives (Swenson, 1998; Matsuno and Swenson, 1999). Accomplishing the fastest elimination of local inconsistencies thus turns out to be the law for survival in the cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing by any physical body. An actual intensity subject to the stipulation of the fastest elimination of local inconsistencies thus conceived, if legitimate as stated, should have an empirical counterpart to support it, since the underlying material bodies are taken to be the dwellers that survive in the empirical world. This perspective becomes most acute when the issue of the origin of life on our Earth is focused on. Above all, it would become imperative to substantiate that particular occurrence of the fastest elimination of local inconsistencies posited to have facilitated the origin of life (Matsuno, 1997c). Even if living things already have the capacity to eliminate local inconsistencies at the fastest possible rate, the transition from nonliving to living things would have had to have been assisted by the preexisting scheme embodying the then fastest elimination of local inconsistencies. One candidate for the site of this occurrence is the sea-floor near submarine hydrothermal vents in the Archaean ocean (Matsuno, 1997b). Submarine hydrothermal vents are constantly ejecting hot water into much colder surrounding seawater. A small water droplet from such a hot spring comes to fall in temperature rapidly soon after it is ejected into the surrounding cold. The temperature of the water droplet is an intensive variable having about the intensity which the droplet experiences and exerts upon itself. The cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing on the part of the water droplet is now under the influence of the intensity to eliminate local inconsistencies in terms of temperature at the fastest possible rate — that is, to effect the fastest temperature drop in the hot water droplet. The actualization of the fastest temperature drop is intrinsically selective in that that achievement allows only for the kind of droplet that can decrease its temperature at the fastest rate, which also implies that only those material bodies decreasing their temperature fastest could reside inside that droplet among alternatives. We have in fact constructed in a laboratory a flow reactor simulating a submarine hydrothermal system and examined how the generative and selective behavior effecting the fastest temperature drop would develop in a

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hot water droplet ejected from a simulated hydrothermal vent (Imai et al., 1997, 1999). We have then confirmed the synthesis of oligopeptides from monomeric amino acids in the environment simulating submarine hydrothermal vents. Abiotic synthesis of oligopeptides must have been a necessary precursor to the origin of life on our Earth. This experimental demonstration certainly manifests the significance of the presence of an intensity to ameliorate local inconsistencies at the fastest possible rate for the occasioning of the precursors to the phenomenon of life. Muscle Contraction One more example demonstrating the characteristic cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing on the part of surviving material aggregates is an indefinite sustenance of local inconsistencies through their constant updating. Any material body subject to local representations from the neighboring material bodies first comes to experience local inconsistencies among them. The sequence for reaping an inconsistency-free representation out of the preceding experience of inconsistencies and experiencing subsequent inconsistencies among those of the nearby representations of a similar nature repeatedly holds among any of surviving material bodies. A translate of the notion of inconsistency among the local representations into mechanical terms is friction or mechanical distortion. At issue is whether there can be observed any such indefinite sustenance of frictions on the part of surviving material bodies. A case in point is the muscle contraction occurring in any animal body. Muscle contraction involves the sliding movement of an actin filament upon myosin molecules while hydrolyzing ATP (adenosine-triphosphate) molecules. Here many myosin molecules come in contact with an actin filament. Although each myosin molecule coming in contact with the filament generates sliding force while converting the chemical bond energy stored in ATP into mechanical energy, there certainly occurs friction between the adjacent force generators along the filament because of the lack of a prior means to coordinate the generation of force along the entire filament. Fluctuations in the displacement of the filament are associated with the frictions that have to be eliminated. However, what is actually specific to the sliding movement of an actin filament upon myosin molecules while hydrolyzing ATP molecules is that those fluctuations associated with these frictions endure without their being eliminated altogether (Hatori et al., 1996a, b, 1998). There has been an experimental demonstration pointing to

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the indefinite sustenance of frictions constantly pumped up by successive ATP hydrolyses. T H E I N T E R NA L I S T S TA N C E : R E V I S I T E D

Conflicting and inconsistent representations in terms of metrics are foreign to the external description of a definite and invariable universal as practiced in empirical sciences in general and in physics in particular. However, this strict prohibition of inconsistent representations could be somewhat relaxed if one had recourse to the external description of a variable universal. Relevant to this issue is Hegel’s definition of mass or matter as referring to resistiveness in spacetime. A spacetime nebula requires at least its representation if it can be reduced to space and time at all as it should be (Baker, 1993; Matsuno, 1998c). It is mass which occupies a specific location in spacetime when exhibiting a resistiveness to those trying to occupy the same location. Mass must be universal in the sense that it is the fundamental and ubiquitous stuff constituting this empirical world. Despite that, mass as a resistiveness is indefinite in its implication, because resistiveness alone is a negative notion. It is taken to be something negative for any influence coming from the outside. The situation is quite different here from that produced by defining mass in terms of inertia, for inertia can certainly be definite and can be represented as a definite object by referring to its metric aspect. This aspect guarantees mechanics founded upon the notion of mass or point-mass as the supreme prototype of external description of a definite and invariable universal. Exactly on this account, mass defined as resistiveness can potentially be presented as a variable universal. Some positive implications latent in mass as resistiveness will be more closely focused on if one considers the collision of two material bodies. This is just an instance of indicating one resistiveness acting upon another resistiveness (Matsuno, 1997a). Resistiveness to a resistiveness is in fact the negation of a negation. Only when there would appear something positive out of the indefinite sequence of the negation of a negation, could one expect to obtain a representation of what such a mass is all about. Here, we have already committed ourselves to the view that the representation of a mass, if ever possible, should be local, because the scheme of collision that assumes local participants is taken for granted. Furthermore, such a local or internalist perspective has to be consistent with the outcome, otherwise the whole scheme would be broken down. At this point there enters the cycle of experiencing, transforming and representing. If a mass as a negation of a negation establishes a stationary inertness even temporarily, it can certainly serve as a

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local representation. An indispensable characteristic of such a local representation is that of its local space and time structure. Although mass has originally been taken to be a resistiveness in spacetime, its representation was left unspecified. It is the likelihood of local representation which makes it possible to assign a local space and time property to a mass as a resistiveness. A mass as resistiveness reclaims its inertia only through and in between the adjacent updatings of its local representation, which is about the temporarily invariable indefiniteness specific to the negative notion of resistiveness. The indefiniteness is, however, constantly subject to its variable updating. Mass as inertia is merely a local representation of mass as resistiveness. This perspective can be gained only through the internalist stance, which permits none but internal descriptions admitting inevitable inconsistencies among the available local representations. Mass as inertia viewed from the internalist perspective is definitely of descriptive origin, while mass as inertia viewed through the external description of an invariable universal, just as in the practice of physics, is taken to be directly about the nature of a physical object out there. Mass as resistiveness is strictly an internalist notion, while mass as inertia is merely a representation of it destined to be constantly updated. At the same time, internal description of mass as resistiveness is also active in transforming the experienced inconsistent representations into an inconsistency-free representation. This is exactly where an intentionality of material origin enters. This is descriptively approachable only indirectly from the internalist perspective. Intentionality as an attribute of mass as resistiveness, though not directly represented descriptively, is the factor responsible for precipitating its describable representation as mass as inertia. Intentionality is a material factor relating mass as resistiveness to mass as inertia. Mass as resistiveness is, of course, an extremely general and naïve form of matter, one which is accessible in the empirical domain. Even upon such weak and general terms, however, one can envisage the occurrence of intentionality on material grounds. In particular, in view of the fact that the resistiveness to a resistiveness is nothing but the sentient capacity of a material body that is able to experience others, intentionality of material origin is found to underlie the occurrence of sentient beings. The phenomenon of life is seen to take the greatest advantage of intentionality of material origin which is descriptively approachable only through internal description or the internalist perspective. Department of BioEngineering Nagaoka University of Technology

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Aristotle, 1952. Metaphysics in the Works of Aristotle. W.D. Ross, transl. Oxford: Clarendon Press. University Press. Baker, P.L., 1993. “Space, time, space-time and society.” Sociol. Inq. 63, 406–426. Conrad, M., 1993. “The fluctuon model of force, life and computation: a constructive analysis.” Appl. Math. Comp. 56, 203–259. Depew, D.J., and Weber, B.H., 1995. Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Emmeche, C., and Hoffmeyer, J., 1991. “From language to nature — the semiotic metaphor in biology.” Semiotica 84, 1–42. Gendlin, E.T., 1995. “Crossing and dipping: some terms for approaching the interface between natural understanding and logical formulation.” Minds and Machines 5, 547–560. Gunji, Y.-P., 1995. “Global logic resulting from disequilibration process.” BioSystems 35, 33–62. Hatori, K., Honda, H., and Matsuno, K., 1996a. “ATP-Dependent fluctuations of single actin filaments in vitro.” Biophys. Chem. 58, 267–272. Hatori, K., Honda, H., and Matsuno, K., 1996b. “Communicative interaction of myosins along an actin filament in the presence of ATP.” Biophys. Chem. 60, 149–152. Hatori, K., Honda, H., Shimada, K., and Matsuno, K., 1998. “Staggered movement of an actin filament sliding on myosin molecules in the presence of ATP.” Biophys. Chem. 70, 241–245. Hoffmeyer, J., 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Imai, E., Honda, H., Hatori, K., and Matsuno, K., 1997. “Autocatalytic oligopeptide synthesis in a flow reactor simulating submarine hydrothermal vents.” Viva Origino 25, 289–295. Imai, E., Honda, H., Hatori, K., Brack, A., and Matsuno, K., 1999. “Elongation of oligopeptides in a simulated submarine hydrothermal system” Science 283, 831–833. Kant, I. 1952. Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd Edition. J.M.D. Meiklejohn, transl. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc. Köhler, D., 1993. Martin Heidegger: Die Schematisierang des Seinssinnes als Thematik des dritten Ahschnittes von “Sein und Zeit”. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag. Leydesdorff, L. 1994. “Uncertainty and the communication of time.” Syst. Res. 11, 31–51. Matsuno, K., 1985. “How can quantum mechanics of material evolution be possible?: symmetry and symmetry-breaking in protobiological evolution.” BioSystems 17, 179–192. Matsuno, K., 1989. Protobiology: Physical Basis of Biology, Boca Raton: CRC Press. Matsuno, K., 1995. “Use of natural languages in modelling evolutionary processes.” Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of Cybernetics. Namur: International Association of Cybernetics. Pp. 477–472. Matsuno, K., 1996a. “Internalist stance and the physics of information.” BioSystems 38, 111–118. Matsuno, K., 1996b. “Symmetry in synchronous time and information in asynchronous time.” Symmetry: Culture and Science 7, 295–305. Matsuno, K., 1996c. “Boltzmann’s dynamics on the primitive earth about 3.8 billion years ago.” In: Chemical Evolution: Physics of the Origin and Evolution of Life. J. Chela-Flores and F. Raulin (eds.) Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. 231–238. Matsuno, K., 1997a. “Information: Resurrection of the Cartesian physics.” World Futures 49, 235–249. Matsuno, K., 1997b. “A design principle of a flow reactor simulating prebiotic evolution.” Viva Origino 25, 191–204.

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Matsuno, K., 1997c. “Molecular semantics and the origin of life.” BioSystems 42, 129–139. Matsuno, K., 1998a. “Dynamics of time and information in dynamic time.” BioSytems 46, 57–71. Matsuno, K., 1998b. “Competence of natural languages for describing the physical origin of life.” In: Evolutionary Systems: Biological and Epistemological Perspectives on Selection and Self-Organization. G. Van de Vijver, S.N. Salthe, and M. Delpos, (eds.) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. 295–306. Matsuno, K., 1998c. “Space-time framework of internal measurement.” In: Computing Anticipatory Systems, AIP Conference Proceedings 437 (D.M. Dubois, [ed.]). Woodbury, New York: American Institute of Physics. Pp. 101–115. Matsuno, K., 1998d. “Emergent phenomena of time in quantum mechanics.” Acta Polytechnica Sandinavica 91M, 61–70. Matsuno, K., 1999. “The clock and its triadic relationship.” Semiotica, 127, 433–452. Matsuno, K., and Salthe, S.N., 1995. “Global idealism/local materialism.” Biol. Philos. 10, 309–337. Matsuno, K., and Paton, R.C., 1999. “Quantum mechanics in the present progressive mode and its significance in biological information processing.” BioSystems 49, 229–237. Matsuno, K., and Swenson, R., 1999. “Thermodynamics in the present progressive mode and its role in the context of the origin of life.” BioSystems, 51, 53–61. Pattee, H.H., 1977. “Dynamic and linguistic modes of complex systems.” Int. J. Gen. Syst. 3, 259–266. Pattee, H.H., 1982. “Cell psychology: an evolutionary approach to the symbol-matter problem.” Cognit. Brain Theor. 5, 325–341. Riva, M., 1994. “Local/global: literary postmodernism and the scientific rediscovery of time.” Soc. Sci. Info. 4, 649–661. Rosen, S.M., 1997. “Wholeness as the body of paradox.” J. Mind Behav. 18, 391–424. Rössler, O.E., 1987. “Endophysics,” In J.L. Casti, and A. Karlqvist, (eds.), Real Brains, Artificial Minds. New York: North Holland. Pp. 25–46. Salthe, S.N., 1993. Development and Evolution: Complexity and Changes in Biology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford/The MIT Press. Swenson, R., 1998. “Spontaneous order, evolution, and autocatakinetics: the nomological basis for the emergence of meaning.” In G. Van de Vijver, S.N. Salthe, and M. Delpos, (eds.). Evolutionary Systems. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. 155–180. Taborsky, E., 1997. The Textual Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ulanowicz, R.E., 1997. Ecology, The Ascendent Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press. Van de Vijver, G., Salthe, S.N., and Delpos, M. (Eds.), 1998. Evolutionary Systems: Biological and Epistemological Perspectives on Selection and Self-Organization. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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The problem of time (chronos) is well-known in the annals of philosophy and phenomenology.1 A related concern, though less abstract but far more relevant to the form of human life, is the problem of proper timing (kairos).2 This paper seeks to add to the growing interest concerning timing in Asian and comparative philosophy.3 One of the major themes of the Lüshi chunqiu (Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu or The Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Lü) is “proper timing.” The Lüshi chunqiu was completed in 241 B.C.E. (before the common era) at the estate of Lü Buwei (Lü Pu-wei), the prime minister of Qin and tutor to the Qin child King, Zheng. Lüshi chunqiu is one of the few pre-Qin texts that dates itself; the date, though not precise, is given in the xuyi chapter.4 For an ancient work, Lüshi chunqiu is large and divided into three sections: the shierji, balan and lulun. A decade after the completion of the Lüshi chunqiu, King Zheng began the ensuing nine years of fervent warfare that led to his unification of the empire in 221 B.C.E. The Lüshi chunqiu (hereafter abbreviated as LSCQ) played an important role in King Zheng’s education. When a ruler employs proper timing in public and private endeavors, the officials and governing policy will also utilize a timely reform of regulations, promulgate seasonal policy and perform ritual actions in a seasonal manner. If the ruler, officials, and governing policy are flexible enough to respond to situations in a timely and appropriate fashion, then the state will be well ordered in the spirit of harmony rather than a strict “rule of law” or coercive government. This is not to say that there should be no “rule of law” at all, but rather that law and the rule of law would always be subordinate to the aesthetic values of proper timing and appropriate seasonal policy and ritual action. For heuristic purposes, the subject of proper timing can be divided into three dominant arenas: the cosmic, the historical, and the interpersonal. Because LSCQ is a handbook concerning the arts of rulership, the text is especially concerned with how the ruler manages public and private interests exercising both intrinsic timing and the extrinsic appropriation of nature’s seasons. The ruler’s articulation of time develops within three realms. First, there is the environmental realm, where the ruler and the state must integrate 233 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 233–263. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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with the forces of nature — especially heaven and earth, yinyang, the five phases, and the four seasons. Second, there is the historical-political domain, requiring the reform of statutes and regulations. Third, there is the interpersonal sphere, where the ruler must articulate proper timing in meeting and maintaining appropriate relations with the ministers and the events at hand. Because of the complex organic network of interrelatedness which harmonizes LSCQ’s pluralistic and diverse perspectives, it is not necessarily the case that the text is inconsistent. The three realms, cosmic, political, and personal, which require the ruler’s application of proper timing, are fully interpenetrating, forming an organic, foci-field unity in which no one part or aspect has more value or weight than another. That is to say, when the ruler performs an action, it reverberates throughout the court, nation, cultural history, and cosmos. The proper timing of the ruler’s gesture is just as important as the timely reform of law or the performance of seasonal ritual, because the ruler holds that pivotal position and performs those portentous ritual actions which create and maintain time — cosmic, historical, and personal. 1 . C O S M I C A N D S E A S O NA L P RO P E R T I M I N G

When one considers prima facie the notion of acting in a timely fashion by behaving in a certain manner because it is a particular season, one may imagine that this is the most menial form of extrinsic proper timing. One may feel that there is no intrinsic timing in this kind of behavior at all since it does not allow one to act spontaneously and creatively but dictates one’s behavior according to the season. Although there is a certain restraint placed on the potentials of human life by dictating seasonal activities, nevertheless there are certain factors which, when considered from the perspective of mutual interpenetration between people and the environment, require stipulated seasonal policy to direct the masses, generating a well-ordered, agrarian state. Given the diversity of positions and the composite amalgamated character of the LSCQ, it is not surprising that two disparate perspectives on proper timing impact LSCQ’s social and political philosophies. Moreover, the complex content of LSCQ actually makes it difficult to distinguish the strict extrinsic seasonal model of proper timing from the intrinsic appropriation of proper timing in one’s personal conduct, because the two meld together as one in the person of the ruler. That is, it is the ruler’s responsibility as the exemplar of humanity to appropriate the seasonal changes into his own personal and public behavior.

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This full interpenetration of the emperor’s timely ritual actions and the promulgation of edicts in accordance with the seasonal transformations are clearly stated in the twelve “monthly ordinance” chapters opening the 12 subdivisions of the shierji volume of LSCQ which also comprises the Liji’s yueling (Monthly Commands) chapter. For example, in the spring, the emperor must wear green clothes; he is to ride in the green spring chariot; perform rites in the east, i.e. spring, section of the Bright Hall or mingtang temple. The ruler must perform ritual plowing with the ministers and encourage the masses to begin plowing and planting. By performing ritual action and promulgating military and agricultural policy in tempo with the natural environment, the ruler orchestrates both cosmic and social factors. If the ruler does not perform the proper rituals, he is responsible for the imbalance. The mengchunji (The First Month of Spring) chapter warns the emperor: If the summer ordinances are carried out in the early spring (mengchun), then the winds and rains will not be timely; the plants will wither early, and then there will be apprehensiveness in the capital (guo).5

All the monthly chapters conclude with similar warnings of the disasters that follow from performing the rites out of season. This kind of thinking may sound trivial, or even absurd, until one begins to think in an agricultural frame of reference. The central plains of northern China are situated between the 40th and the 35th degrees north latitude, parallel to Iowa and Kansas. With the full seasonal changes, it is crucial that spring planting be completed early enough to allow for maturity of the crop and a full harvest each year. This focus on the seasonal changes led the Han Chinese to develop a sophisticated lunar calendar,6 and an early form of astronomy and astrology which bears some resemblance to the Greek concern, voiced in Plato, to be in accord with the cosmic harmonies. Thus the need to control the environment was and is a major concern. The ritually ordered world of the LSCQ’s shierji, controlled as it is by the court scholar officials, justified the hierarchical structure of the social and political order through this ritual, magical mystique of the ruler both activating and appropriating seasonal weather conditions. a. Cosmic Timing in Agriculture From the modern technological perspective, one may imagine that the agricultural metaphor represents the organic paradigm. One can easily argue, as

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Martin Heidegger has, that man’s dominance of nature in agriculture lies at the root of the technological model. The “rule of law” model fits the agricultural material in LSCQ. In fact, the last four chapters of the lulun (Six Discussions) volume of LSCQ are solely dedicated to Agriculturalist philosophy, technique, instruments, and other technological concerns. Timing is a major concept in these Agriculturalist chapters; the character shi (season/time) appears 45 times in these chapters alone. The final chapter, shenshi (On Examining the Time), makes use of the character shi 23 times. The focus of the chapter is “to obtain the proper time” (deshi) in planting, weeding, and harvesting the best crop; “to obtain the right time” is not a passive affair, one must articulate time in waiting and acting. The chapter describes in some detail the advantages of obtaining the right season and the disadvantages of waiting too long or acting out of time. The conclusion of the shenshi chapter shows that the focus is not merely on grain production, but also the grain grown in accordance with proper timing is good for one’s health and the cultivation of one’s character. In measuring out equal amounts of both types of grain (timely and untimely) for eating, the grain planted in accordance with the right season defends against hunger. Therefore, grain planted in accordance with the right season has a fragrant smell, a sweet taste, and a strong qi (life-power). Eating it for one-hundred days, one’s eyes and ears will perceive clearly; one’s heart-mind and intentions will be enlightened and intelligent; and one’s four limbs will be strong. Bad qi won’t enter, and one’s body will be without disease. The Yellow Emperor said, “The incorrectness (buzheng) of the four seasons is just a matter of correcting the five grains.”7

This passage runs contrary to the daojia hygiene practices, mentioned in the Zhuangzi chapter two, which prohibit eating grain for health and long life. The traditional Agriculturalist perspective advocates grain consumption, and the Agriculturalists lay the foundation for Chinese exoteric dietary practices for maintaining health and for self-cultivation. Thus the rigid seasonal interpretation of proper timing in accord with the seasonal changes is not so mundane and trivial when considered from within the perspective of the organic, focus-field interpenetration of humans and their environment. In ancient China, the state managed agricultural labor and so its policy had to be especially sensitive to the seasons. Without the seasonal administration of labor an agrarian culture could not thrive. Thus the state, as the ruling family, especially the emperor, and the masses are all dependent on the harvest of nourishing crops for their mutual health and well-being. The crucial questions in assessing the various strands of thought in the LSCQ are: Can humans control the natural environment? And if they can, then to what extent? The monthly commands chapters and the shenshi

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chapter are clear in their proposal that humans, especially the ruler, can effect some control over the environment by performing rituals and undertaking timely action in planting, weeding, and harvesting. Other LSCQ chapters, however, strongly imply that humans cannot control the environment. The changgong chapter, from the second lan of LSCQ, in particular appears to present a type of fatalistic thinking. Based on this chapter Kungchuan Hsiao proposed that LSCQ’s account of nature’s role in the dynastic cycle is a variety of fatalism which humans cannot control just like the farmer not being able to control timely rains.8 The changgong chapter describes the plight of the ruler as analogous to that of the adept farmer. It can be illustrated with the example of the good farmer. He may be able to ascertain the most suitable conditions of the soil and apply himself arduously to the plowing and the harrowing, but it is not certain that he will harvest a crop. If one does harvest, however, it begins with such a man. After that it is the chance of encountering timely rains. Encountering timely rains is a matter of heaven and earth [tiandi, the natural world]; it is not something the good farmer can bring about.9

This passage presents a heuristic model to instruct the ruler to make preparations for “harvesting the masses,” and like the good farmer, the good ruler must await the timely transformations of nature to gain benefit. This is not a strong determinism where farmer and nature are totally directed; it is a type of soft fatalism where humans are limited in what they can do. The extrinsic and soft fatalistic thought of the changgong chapter appear to be an extremist position found within the LSCQ anthology. This soft fatalistic naturalism advocates that although humans cannot regulate the seasons and natural changes, nevertheless they can appropriate the natural cycles to their advantage. The guixin (Venerating Trustworthiness) chapter, from the lisilan, proposes such an appropriation of the seasons. It discusses the sishi (the four seasons) and the xinde (the credible bounty, or accretion) of the seasons which can be achieved through human policy.10 The guixin chapter offers an interesting anthropomorphism which describes the regularity of a season as nature’s trustworthiness (xin); agricultural and civil engineering projects can be accomplished because one can trust in the climate and weather conditions. Accommodating and appropriating the natural seasons, humans can accomplish agricultural, social, and political affairs. If trustworthiness (xin) is set up, then even empty insincere words can bring reward. If empty words can bring reward, then all in the six directions will be one’s treasury. Wherever his trustworthiness reaches, he will completely control it. Controlling something but not employing it, this is another’s possession. It is only when one controls and employs something that it is really one’s own. If it is really one’s own, then everything between heaven and earth will be completely

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employed by him. Those rulers who see the point of this discussion their achieving the kingly way will not take long. Those officials who understand this discussion can minister to a true king. If heaven operates without trustworthiness (xin), it could not complete a year. If the earth operates without trustworthiness, the grasses and trees cannot grow large. The power (de) of the spring is wind. If the wind does not blow with trustworthiness, the flowers cannot grow abundantly. If the flowers are not abundant, the fruit cannot be produced. The power of summer is heat. If the heat does not come with trustworthiness, the soil won’t be fertile. If the soil is not fertile, the growing of the plants won’t be essential (qing). The power of autumn is rain. If the rain does not fall with trustworthiness, then the grain won’t grow solid. If the grain does not grow solid, then the five seeds won’t mature. The power of winter is coldness. If the cold does not come with trustworthiness, then the earth won’t be frozen firmly. If the earth is not frozen firmly, then the ice won’t melt (in time). Even with the greatness of heaven and earth, and the transformations of the four seasons, still they cannot complete things without trustworthiness. So how much less can human actions?!11

The guixin chapter implies that humans can trust in and avail themselves of the model of credibility provided in the regularity of the climatic conditions of the seasons. This passage also implies that people can benefit by following the changes of the four seasons. The concluding rhetorical question tells us that humans must emulate the regularity and “honesty” (xin) of nature to accomplish political policy. With the idea that people may acquire benefit from the seasonal changes without actually controlling those changes comes the possibility that such an advantage could only be achieved through a state-run agricultural system. The rendi (Employing the Earth’s Benefits) chapter outlines an agricultural extrinsic approach toward the appropriation of seasonal change. . . . [Farmers should plant according to the] growing and withering of the various grasses . . . According to the five periods of a year (i.e. every 73 days), we should sow living plants when we see life, and we should harvest the dead (i.e. ripe) ones when we see the period of dying. Heaven bestows the seasons, and earth produces wealth without planning with the people. . . . Never [allow] people to lose the proper time [for tilling and ritual], and do not allow them to govern the inferior. Know the tools (i.e. methods) of poverty and wealth. In all of these start off with the season, and stop with the end of the season. This is why even the strength of the old and tender could be completely mobilized. In such cases the effort is “half” while the achievement is “twofold.” One who does not understand affairs, he might start planting before the season has come, or he might wish for the right season when it has already gone, or he might consider it lightly when the right time comes. If the ruler lets his people farm with neglect, then since they were negligent, they reminisce about the right time.12

This passage clearly states that the planning undertaken by the masses plays no role in nature’s seasons and earth’s bounty. Although the people cannot cause the season to change, nevertheless the ruler can order the people to take advantage of the natural changes for agricultural purposes. Despite the soft

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fatalism of the changgong and rendi chapters’ extrinsic approach to appropriating natural seasonal conditions for agricultural benefit, the dominant tendency in the shierji and other passages with a daojia or rujia aesthetic approach advocate that humans, especially the self-integrating ruler, can effectively control the natural environment. The dayue (Magnificent Music) chapter, from the middle summer section, blends daojia and yinyang naturalistic cosmology with a rujia use of music for moral cultivation, and a fajia agenda to strengthen the ruler’s authority. The timely fulfillment of the people’s desires according to the seasonal demands is the focus of the programmatic approach of LSCQ’s eclectic syncretism in the dayue chapter. The dao is the utmost subtlety. It cannot be formed. It cannot be named.13 If compelled to, then call it the Superior One (taiyi). Therefore, the One regulates orders (zhiling). The two comply and obey. The early sage kings put aside the two and took the One as standard. This is why they could know (zhi) the essentials (qing) of the myriad things. Therefore, the one who is able to use the One in administering affairs of state brings enjoyment to the lords (jun) and ministers; he brings harmony to those near and far, pleasure to the masses (lit. dark heads), and unifies the clans and families. The person who is able to use the One in governing himself will avoid calamity; he will complete a long life span, and keep intact his natural relations (tian).14 The person who is able to use the One in ruling his state will cause the depraved and licentious to depart, causing the virtuous ones to arrive, accomplishing the great cultural transformation. The person who is able to use the One in ruling the empire will cause the proper distribution of hot and cold weather, causing the timely operation of wind and rain. He himself will become a sage.15

This passage makes it clear that the ruler of the empire becomes a sage ruler by developing the efficacious abilities to influence the climatic weather conditions. Therefore, despite some of the more objective extrinsic passages in which people are said not to be able to affect the course of nature, a reappearing motif in LSCQ is that of the sage ruler who can bring about appropriate timely weather conditions. b. Daoist Cosmic Timing Although the opening chapters of the shierji integrate a Yang Zhu, and daojia type approach, and the xuyi (Postscript) describes the shierji as expressing the teachings of the Yellow Emperor, nevertheless it is interesting to note that the Laozhuang paradigm is not easily found in the LSCQ. In fact, some of its references to Lao Dan, Zhuangzi, and Liezi do not always accompany the kinds of nature images one expects to find associated with these figures. For example, the story of Liezi practicing archery found both in the shenji (Examining

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Yourself) chapter, in the late autumn section, and in the Liezi itself, is decidedly not daojia.16 On the other hand, many of the passages shared by LSCQ and the works Laozi, Zhuangzi and Liezi describe a daojia type of limited anarchy. However, to the extent that the author’s of LSCQ were concerned with depicting a centralized state ruling the empire, it is not too surprising that the full thrust of Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s philosophy is rarely seen, and the limited anarchy is used as a check against the ruler’s extravagance. One must look carefully through LSCQ’s pastiche of syncretic positions to extract its Laozhuang perspective on cosmic harmony and intrinsic timing. The naturalism of LSCQ is heavily tempered with Huanglao and yinyangwuxing assumptions which more precisely fit both the centralizing government concerns, and the agricultural paradigm, requiring a type of causal, almost mechanical, operation—planting wheat to harvest wheat, spring blossoms arise after the winter frost and before the autumn harvest. One can discern in LSCQ’s contents the emergence of a Laozhuang idea of a spontaneous nature. Zhuangzi’s comment on time, in the dazongshi chapter, captures the daojia intrinsic attitude: He who operates by the natural seasons (tianshi) is not versatile (xian worthy).17 The Laozi chapter eight noted for its natural image of modeling water, highlights some courses of action for ruling naturally: In speaking, be adept at trustworthiness. In social and political attunement, be adept at harmony. In projects, be adept at choosing the capable. In taking action, be adept at choosing the right time.18

The Laozhuang perspective on proper timing holds that time is dependent on one’s integrative actions. Proper timing, for Zhuangzi, is not acting in accord with external affairs, like the Agricultural model of timely planting. Proper timing from the Laozhuang account is dependent on the quality of one’s action to develop cosmic integration. The LSCQ contains some important descriptions and passages concerning Laozi (Lao Dan), Zhuangzi, and Liezi. Some of these stories display how these masters interpreted and practiced proper timing in their own lives. Excerpts from the LSCQ give an interesting description of Lao Dan. They tell us that he had the highest form of impartiality (gong).19 The dangrang (Appropriate Influences) chapter tells us that Kongzi studied with Lao Dan.20 The buer (Not Two) chapter describes Lao Dan as venerating rou (being supple).21 And Lao Dan is described as one of three sages who could hear the

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soundless and perceive the formless.22 The concluding line of the quzhi (Expelling Restrictions) chapter praises Lao Dan for advancing a way beyond restrictions.23 Despite the complexity of LSCQ, the text does contain some unifying themes, one of which is the concern to promote a programmatic approach for achieving and maintaining political success. In this regard, LSCQ’s social and political passages are somewhat wary of the Laozhuang teachings since they usually advance ideas that appear to be impractical, if not antithetical, to managing a multi-ethnic empire. And yet LSCQ’s eclectic syncretism has a place and a time for the intrinsic cosmic timing of the Laozhuang masters. The biji24 (Self Certainty) chapter contains a story from the Zhuangzi’s shanmu (Mountain Tree) chapter concerning Zhuangzi’s understanding on the “utility of the useless,” in which, as we shall see, “timing” plays an important role. When Zhuangzi was traveling in the mountains, he saw a tree that was very beautiful and tall; its branches and leaves were thick and lush.25 A wood-cutter did not take it after having stopped by its side. When asked the reason why, he replied, “There’s no way to use it.” Zhuangzi said, “Because of its uselessness, this tree could fulfill its natural life span.” When Zhuangzi came out of the mountains and arrived in town, he stopped at the home of an old friend. Delighted, the old friend prepared food and wine. He ordered his servant to butcher a goose to prepare dinner. His servant asked, “One of our geese is able to squawk, another cannot; please, tell me which one to butcher?” The host said,26 “You should butcher the one that cannot squawk.” The next day a disciple asked Zhuangzi, “Yesterday that tree in the mountains was able to fulfill its natural life span because it was useless; but the host’s goose was butchered because it was useless. Master, what is your position?” Zhuangzi smiled and said, “My position is between the useful and the useless. Between the useful and the useless appears to be it, but it really isn’t. So one has not yet avoided entanglement in external things. As for dao and de, they are not like this. They are beyond praise and criticism.27 [Availing oneself of the spontaneous way of dao and de,] once a dragon, once a snake, everything transforms according to appropriate proper timing, never willing to hold to one course only. One rising, one falling, take harmony as your standard, and drift and roam in the ancestor of the myriad things. If you can treat things as things and never be treated as a thing by things, then how could you become entangled in anything you do? This is what Shennong and the Yellow Emperor took as their standard. “But the actual state (qing) of the myriad things and the transmitting of moral interpersonal relationships are not like this. Once something is complete, it will fall into ruin; once it attains size, it starts to decline; once something is sharp, it will start to become dull; once a person has achieved a venerated position, others will try to detract from him; once something is straight, it will begin to be twisted; once things are joined, they begin to separate; once love is given, rejection comes. The wise will be plotted against; the unworthy will be duped. How could anything be supposed to be certain?!28 [Alas! remember this my disciples, only one thing can be relied upon the realm of daode!]”29

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This passage contains a number of key concepts and expressions which mark daojia Laozhuang discussions of “timing” within LSCQ. There are two ideas which are integral to the Laozhuang perspective on timing: First, each particular must play its own role in cosmic timing; and second, the timing is integrated throughout the field of interrelated processes such that it extends out of the particular action of the focus into the field and back again.30 This integrative and co-arising manifestation of timing as the creative and spontaneous relation obtaining between field and focus accounts for the indeterminacy and world of flux and transformation typical of the Laozhuang perspective. The passage describes a world of indeterminacy and flux with the expressions: “Once a dragon, once a snake, everything transforms according to appropriate proper timing, never willing to hold to one course only. One rising, one falling, take harmony as your standard . . . ”. The complex changes and flipflop transformations between opposites occur “according to appropriate proper timing,” and this is accomplished pluralisticly “never holding to one course only.” The sage ruler or enlightened ministers operating under the aesthetic paradigm of the Laozhuang teachings would be the kind of people who could enhance both their own personal lives and the social and environmental conditions in and through their personal actions which also allow for the free expression of all other particulars. The LSCQ also contains important references to Liezi who is frequently referred to as Zi Liezi ([our] Master Liezi) — possibly indicating that the stories were recorded by Liezi’s disciples. The buer (Not Two) chapter states that: “Master Liezi venerated xu (vacuity).”31 The guanshi (Observing the Age) chapter discusses the story of master Liezi and his family living in poverty, yet he rejects food presented from the corrupt ruler of Cheng who was later overthrown.32 The LSCQ passage concludes with the following comment: Wasn’t master Liezi’s rejection of what is not right and avoidance of incompliance penetrating? Moreover, when one is suffering the calamities of cold and starvation, and yet one does not take things improperly, this is to foresee transformation. To take action already foreseeing the transformation coming is to be fully penetrative with the reality of one’s character and natural relations.33

Master Liezi serves as a model of one who is able to behave with proper timing because of his self-cultivation and self-control. Liezi is described as a knight of the dao (youdao zhi shi) who has fully realized “the reality of his character and natural relations” (xingming zhi qing), and an integral aspect of his realization is his ability to exercise timing in self-control under adverse conditions.

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The LSCQ also contains daojia descriptions of “cosmic timing” from the ontological perspective of the natural environment. The yuandao (The Cyclic Way) chapter, from the late spring section, opens with the following description of cosmic harmony: Heaven’s way (tiandao) is cyclic fluidity; the earth’s way is square fixedness. The sage kings take them as a standard (fa), whereby they establish the superior and inferior (shangxia).34 How are we to explain that heaven’s way is cyclic? The vital essence and life force (jing qi) [operate in succession];35 one rising (shang), the other falling (xia) — in cyclic revolution, repeatedly in rotation — without halting or pausing anywhere. Hence it is said that heaven’s way is cyclic. How are we to explain that the earth’s way is square? The myriad things are different in kind and shape. All of them have their allotment (fen) and office (zhi).36 They cannot fill each other’s positions.37 Hence it is said that the earth’s way is square (fixed). The ruler holds fast to the cyclic process; the ministers abide by the square fixedness. When the square and the cyclic do not switch, then their state flourishes.38

This passage from the yuandao chapter presents a model of integrative cosmic harmony. Granted it has a Huanglao tone in its prioritizing of superior and inferior; but it generally presents the image of a complex web of interrelated processes. Like the Zhuangzi, it mentions the cyclic process: “One rising, the other falling — in cyclic revolution, repeatedly in rotation — without halting or pausing anywhere.” The passage also maintains that political order can be established by imitating the operations of heaven and earth in court administration and policy. The idea of the human modeling the natural, instead of acknowledging the mutual dependency of both, is again in keeping with the Huanglao and Agriculturalist extrinsic approaches. The yuandao chapter also discusses “cosmic time” in terms of environmental processes, celestial orbits, and geographic cycles of wind and water: Day and night constitute a complete cycle; this is the cyclic way. The moon’s orbit through the twenty-eight mansions (constellations), and Zhen and Jue (the first and last constellations) connecting up; this is the cyclic way. The vital essence (jing)39 operates40 in the four seasons; one rising (shang), the other falling (xia) — each participating in what they meet (yu); this is the cyclic way. Things when stirred, sprout; when sprouting, generate; when generated, grow; when growing, enlarge; when enlarging, mature; when matured, decay; when decayed, diminish; when diminished, it goes into hiding (stored);41 this is the cyclic way. The clouds’ vapor (qi — life forces) moves westward on and on through winter and summer without stopping; the rivers and streams flow out eastward; day and night they do not rest; the source above never drains empty, and the destination below never floods full. The small (streams) becoming large; and the heavy (evaporates) becoming light; this is the cyclic way. The Yellow Emperor said: “The Emperor is without a constant place. To have a constant place is, on the contrary, to have no place.” This is to say that he is not obstructed by any fixed form; this is the cyclic way.42

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This passage represents a highly developed ecological perspective in pre-Qin literature. It reveals an understanding of the celestial, the atmospheric, and the terrestrial; it also presents an understanding of biological growth and decay. But most importantly, the yuandao chapter brings the discussion of the cyclic pattern of cosmic harmony back around to its application in social and political order as a model for the emperor to follow, and it does this in the words of the Yellow Emperor. The chapter contains other interesting ideas like its rujia and Mohist conviction of giving the throne to the most worthy ruler instead of passing it on to one’s descendants which implies that the timely succession of the throne might entail a daojia like abdication. The LSCQ’s descriptions of cosmic proper timing entails at least two predominant themes of extrinsic and intrinsic timing. Again it must be kept in mind that the distinction is drawn for heuristic purposes, because in fact, as we saw above, the extrinsic timely action of according with the proper time is: first, a matter of state policy to ensure that the planting and harvesting occur in the right season; second, that it is the masses or farmers who must be employed properly within the season; and third, the season or time is not entirely objective, but is dependent on the ruler’s performance of ritual action. And so the extrinsic timely action of the farmer must await both the credibility of the season to be what is expected, and the ruler’s auspicious and timely performance of seasonal ritual. The ruler, holding the pivotal position between heaven with its seasons and weather, and earth with its productivity and people, must perform ritual action, in fact any action, in such a way that it be in timely sequence with the extrinsic environment. Simultaneously imperial action must articulate and create an intrinsic timing which generates a whole atmosphere both social and climatic. Not only must the ruler’s ritual action be performed in time with the seasons, but it in return conditions the environment and the masses. The ruler’s ritual action has its own intrinsic timing appropriate to itself, but it also has a cultivating influence on the people and the climate. On the other hand, LSCQ contains descriptions of both Laozhuang and Huanglao intrinsic proper timing, and again the extrinsic and the intrinsic images fade and overlap. The ruler, at least, allows his intentionality and consciousness to meander at ease on the path of spontaneity (ziran); he must live the creative and spontaneous life, if each is to come into its own. The ruler’s creative self transformation opens up the field of experience in which each and every other particular can make its creative contribution to the emergent harmony of both the cosmic environment and the social atmosphere. It is the Huanglao tendency to prioritize and hierarchicalize the world into superior/inferior and ruler/subject which blends the intrinsic

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creativity of the ruler’s actions with the extrinsic model it sets for the rest of the world. The synthetic content of LSCQ finds coherence in its persistent use of proper timing in orchestrating social harmony. There is a strong pragmatic and progressive voice in the programmatic conception of social order found in LSCQ’s treatises which is again indicative of a meld of the ruler articulating historical timing in the reform of statutes and regulations, and that legal reform in turn sets an extrinsic model for the empire to follow. 2 . H I S TO R I C A L P RO P E R T I M I N G

This section explicates a fajia approach to the timely reform of state regulations (bianfa) contained in LSCQ. First, the role of proper timing in successfully managing state affairs is examined. Then, the role of timing in agricultural and military ventures is explicated. Success in agriculture and military matters depends heavily on proper timing. The fajia elements in the LSCQ draw from the agricultural and military models to advance a position on the timely reform of regulations. The second general arena in which the ruler must exercise the use of proper timing is concerned with the timely reform of statutes, regulations, and laws to comply with historical and cultural changes. This type of proper timing is closely related to the “rule of law” paradigm, and it was advocated in its most radical form by the fajia writers in their motto “bu fa xian wang,” or “don’t model the early sage kings.” The Systematizers (fajia, usually rendered Legalists) draw heavily from the practicality of the Militarists (bingjia) and the Agriculturalists (nongjia), and reenforced the idea that farming and warfare are the two main functions of the state. There is a major Agriculturalist concern in the works attributed to Shang Yang and Han Fei. The Hanfeizi describes proper timing in farming as an important government policy: There are four things that enable the enlightened ruler to achieve accomplishments and establish fame; namely, proper timing of the seasons, the hearts of the people, skill and talents, and position of power. Without the proper timing of the seasons, even the Yaos cannot grow a single ear of grain in the winter.43

As in agriculture, timing is of crucial importance in warfare. The LSCQ’s juesheng (What Decides Victory) chapter, from the autumn section, defines military wisdom as appropriation of timing. Military affairs have their roots and trunk. They must be appropriate (yi), wise (zhi), as well as brave (yong) . . . If you are wise, then you will know the transformation of the proper time; if one

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knows the transformations of the proper time, then you understand how to utilize the changes between the weak and strong points, or flourishing and declining, and you would understand the measures (shu) of before and after, far and near, following and leading.44 (Italics added)

This kind of military flexibility in appropriating time in tactics has relevance for the fajia writers and their vehement cry for reform in governing techniques, statutes, and policy. This culminated in their motto “do not model the early sage kings,” because government, like military tactics, must be reformed to meet the needs of contemporary circumstances. Although social and political philosophers of ancient China were generally sensitive to the problem of contemporizing traditional government policy, nevertheless it is in the works of Shang Yang, Han Fei, and some fajia writers’, possibly Li Si’s, contribution to LSCQ which champion a radical reform of policy and regulations to account for historical changes, and accord with contemporary conditions. Underlying this need for timely reform of statutes is a theory of historical transformation (what Hu Shi called a “theory of historical evolution”). The rujia and Mojia philosophers recognized the need to practice proper timing in reforming traditional policy. The rujia methodology is not a simple conservativism of reclaiming the past; even Kongzi acknowledged the importance of remolding the past to suit the present. The Analects makes this point clear when it says: “One who can infer the new by reanimating the past can be considered a teacher.”45 When the Mozi (ch.s 35–37) argues against fatalism, it holds that the acceptance of a belief is based on three criteria, and the third is the applicability of an old belief in the present which implies not blindly accepting the past as one’s model. The process ontology so familiar in pre-Qin philosophy favors the interpretation of change as a constant. However, it is the fajia writers who make the most out of a position on historical transformation. What concerns us here is that the chajin chapter presents historical transformation and the call for reforming regulations (bianfa) in association with proper historical timing. In this context “proper timing or timing” does not refer to one’s self-cultivation per se, nor does it refer to the proper seasonal timing of agriculture or cosmic harmony — it refers to the state making historical changes. The chajin chapter opens with a concern which led Xunzi to advocate “modeling the later sage kings,” namely that the records of the early sage kings are lost or corrupt, and thus the chapter proposes the belief that one must reform regulation in a timely fashion. The chajin chapter opens with the following: Why don’t the rulers take as a standard (fa) the regulations (fa) of the early kings?46 It is not because they are not worthy; rather it is because they cannot be obtained and taken as a standard (fa).

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The regulations (fa) of the early kings have come down from the previous generations. In some cases people might have added to them; others might have deleted things from them. So how could they be obtained and taken as a standard (fa)? And even in cases where they have not tampered with them, still they cannot be obtained and taken as a standard (fa).47

Note that the passage ends with the additional comment that even if the records were preserved, the ancient ways still could not be followed. The reason is made clear a little later in the chapter: How could the regulations of the early kings be obtained and taken as a standard (fa). Even if they were obtainable, still they cannot be taken as a standard (fa). All of the regulations (fa) of the early kings owe their importance to their respective times (shi). Those times, however, have not come down together with the regulations. So even if their regulations (fa) had come down to the present, still they could not be taken as a standard (fa).48

The chajin chapter presents a number of interesting analogies to draw out the significance of historical transformation and the need to reform regulations. One such analogy describes how the scout of an attacking army measured the depth of a river for fording before the water rose, and so when they followed the old mark, they were devastated. Then the passage ends with the following warning: The rulers of the present generation, taking as standard (fa) the regulations (fa) of the early kings, bear a resemblance to this (i.e. crossing a flooded river by an old mark). Their time is already unfit for the regulations of the early kings, but they say: “these are the regulations of the early kings,” and thereby take them as a standard. How would it not be a pity to govern like this?!49

The chapter relates the well-known story of the person from Chu who dropped his sword overboard while fording a river. So he notched the side of the boat where the sword fell in, and after docking he used the notch on the boat to look for the sword in the river! This analogy ends with another warning: To govern one’s state with those ancient standards (gufa) is the same as the above story. The times have moved on, but the old standards have not followed. Won’t it be difficult to govern with them?!50

The chajin chapter clearly advocates a reform of regulations due to the historical transformations which have left the ancient ways outdated. The chapter discusses the significance of changing regulations because of cultural differences.51 It also emphasizes the need to reform law due to historical changes: “Since generations change, and time moves on, it is appropriate to reform regulations.”52 With its main focus of “time having moved on,” and regulations needing reform, the chapter also emphasizes that the proper means of reform-

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ing regulations is to do so “in accordance with the right time” (yinshi).53 The passage runs as follows: Hence, in initiating affairs, one must act according to some standard (fa). In reforming regulations, they should be transformed in accordance with the requirements of the time (yinshi). If one acts as this theory proposes, then he will not have erroneous endeavors. Those who do not dare judge the regulations are the common masses. Those who hold fast to the regulations till their death are the officials. The one who reforms the regulations according to the requirements of the time (yinshi bianfa) is a worthy ruler.54 Thus, there were seventy-one55 sages who ruled the empire. All of their regulations differed. It was not because their missions opposed each other; rather it was due to the different situational factors of the times (shishi).56

Since the fajia writers are heavily influenced by military arts and agriculturalist skills, it is not too surprising that they explicitly call for reforming regulations in accordance with proper timing. In this context, however, the appropriation of proper timing is not a social spiritual integration of one’s behavior within an ethical situation. Rather the fajia writers are concerned with commandeering the historical and cultural transformations in order to institute reform in regulations and government policy to ensure political control. 3 . P RO P E R T I M I N G I N M O R A L A N D I N T E R P E R S O NA L R E L AT I O N S

The third and ethically most interesting type of appropriate timing is that which examines the significance of articulating “proper timing” in one’s personal behavior, especially in regard to one’s interpersonal relations. For many passages in the LSCQ, the cultivation of proper timing in the ruler’s behavior is crucial in effecting social and political order. The emperor’s behavior must not only reflect full integration with cosmic and historical proper timing, but also on a day-to-day and moment-to-moment basis, the emperor must articulate time in and through his personal conduct to ensure safety for his person and the state. The yuhe and shoushi chapters in the second lan of the LSCQ, devote a good deal of attention to this type of proper timing. a. Timely Encounters The yuhe (The Rare Opportunity of Meeting) chapter discusses the significance of individuals, especially rulers and ministers, meeting each other or “meeting” their generation. It addresses how these “encounters” effect the social and political order of a state. The chapter stresses that the

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ruler’s choice of friends and ministers does not merely affect his own person, but that it has ramifications for everybody. As the yuhe chapter states: “And it is not the case that the calamity falls upon oneself only.”57 The focus on meeting others is basically one of proper timing. That is, if one meets up with others at the inappropriate time, then disaster will certainly follow. But meeting others need not be inappropriate. As the opening passage of the chapter purports, proper meeting is in harmony with proper timing: Opportunity (yu), in general, is a matter of fitting (he). If one does not fit (he) with the times (shi),58 one must wait to fit, and only afterward can things be done.59

Proper timing plays an important role when people meet each other, especially a ruler and his ministers. “Waiting to fit” is not necessarily a passive affair of merely aligning one’s behavior in a timely fashion with extrinsic conditions. Given the dynamic, focus-field paradigm of pre-Qin philosophy, “waiting” must be understood as an activity in which time is articulated as well as appropriated. The yuhe chapter demonstrates a special concern about avoiding untimely and inappropriate encounters: If there is the case where friends meet by chance (yu) when it is inappropriate to meet by chance (yu), or if they do not meet by chance (yu) when it is appropriate for them to meet by chance (yu), then there will certainly be destruction.60 These are the reasons why a state falls into disorder and a generation perishes. The bitterness, grief and laborious affairs of the people in the empire are produced from this.61

Here we see that the ruler is warned that inappropriate encounters will lead to destruction of the state and the people’s hardship. Gao You’s commentary to the line “these are the reasons why a state falls into disorder and a generation perishes” is worthy of our attention because he draws out the importance of proper timing in this passage. His commentary reads as follows: The worthy ones consummate the way-of-governing. With just one chance meeting (yu) (with a worthy one), a generation can be enlightened; he can assist with the timely patterning of things and affairs (shiliwu). If he is not encountered by chance (yu), a state cannot be well-ordered which leads to chaos, and the generation cannot distinguish between the worthy and the unworthy which causes them to perish.62

Although there could be a timely meeting of friends, or ruler and minister which could probably pacify the world, nevertheless the yuhe chapter mainly focuses on the destruction of states due to an inappropriate meeting, or a lack of proper encounters between rulers and ministers. The first example used in

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the yuhe chapter concerning Kongzi (K’ung Tzu, or Confucius) sets the theme for the rest of the chapter. Kongzi traveled around the empire, introducing himself to the rulers of that age. He went to Qi and he went to Wei, he met over eighty rulers . . . With all of his traveling, Kongzi just barely got the office of Sike (criminal judge) of Lu. This is why the Son of Heaven is constantly (shi) cut off, and why there is such serious disorder among the feudal lords.63

The royal house of Zhou lost its opportunity by not meeting Kongzi. The writers of the yuhe chapter point out that the ruler must be on guard against inappropriate relationships being formed in the state. If there are numerous inappropriate relationships, some individuals will make a fortune but ruin the state. If there is such disorder, the foolish will have a windfall of luck; if there is such luck, people certainly cannot live up to their responsibilities. If the responsibilities have not been lived up to for a long time, this kind of luck on the contrary becomes a calamity. The greater the luck, the greater too the calamity. And it is not the case that the calamity falls upon oneself alone. Hence, a junzi does not put trust in luck, nor does he act expediently. He takes employment only after carefully examining it in himself. He acts only after he is employed. Who ever is able to listen to advice is a man who understands judgments. But only a few of today’s rulers are able to understand judgments. So how could what they encounter (yu) not be done expediently?64

The authors of the yuhe chapter chide the contemporary rulers who rely on luck to rule their states without paying attention to their articulation of timing by not concentrating on the type of personal relationships they are forming with their ministers, and what the minister’s job performance actually is. The yuhe chapter contains some examples of how confused people mismanage affairs and misunderstand things. For example, the chapter compares understanding debates to understanding music. It proposes that people who do not understand the five tones cannot make proper judgments about music. When they hear the tones played properly, they don’t enjoy it. Contrarily they enjoy wild compositions. The chapter goes on to relate a peculiar divorce story about a newlywed woman who decides to store up some wealth outside her home as insurance against being expelled for not bearing a son. When her inlaws discover what she has been doing, they expel her. But the young lady and her parents never realize exactly what happened. And the author comments: “The destruction of an ancestral altar and the perishing of the empire have similar causes.”65 The yuhe chapter compares the appropriateness of meeting others to developing a deep meaningful relationship, or to finding rare delicacies.

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Hence, it is said that the fitting opportunity (yuhe) is never constant, and giving advice is a matter of occasion too. For example, consider people toward the opposite sex, they all know how to be pleased, yet beauty is not necessarily happened upon (yu). Thus, Muo Mu was obedient to the Yellow Emperor. The Yellow Emperor said, “You never forgot when I encouraged you with virtue; you never failed when I gave you uprightness (zheng). Even though you are ugly, what harm will it be?” Or it is like people toward delicacies, they are all fond of the sweet and the crispy, yet the sweet and the crispy are not always received. King Wen liked to chew calamus (a peppermint). Kongzi took some after hearing this; he ate it and wrinkled his brow. It took three years before he overcame his dislike of it.66

The chapter pursues the topic of developing friendships. It describes a man who had such terrible body odor that his family could not stand to live with him, but after moving to the seaside, the people there were obsessed with his odor. The author goes on to tell the story of Dunxia (or Dunqia) Choumi and the Marquis of Chen. Dunxia was an ugly fellow; he had a forehead pointed like an awl and a broad face with a reddish-brown lacquer color, drooping eyes, nostrils pointing upward, long and twisted eyebrows.67 But the Marquis of Chen befriended him, enjoying his company. When the Marquis fell ill, he sent Dunxia to meet the King of Chu; the King was so insulted at Dunxia’s appearance and inability to speak well that he attacked the state of Chen. Even though the state of Chen was destroyed, the Marquis and Dunxia remained friends. After pointing out that the masses suffer because of inappropriate relationships, the author concludes with the following advice about appointing personnel, and avoiding disaster. In general the roots of appointing personnel are as follows: the most superior ruler does it according to their (the appointees’) intention (zhi);68 the next do it according to their work performance; and the next do it according to their achievement. If the above three cannot be put into practice, the state will certainly be ruined and perish. Various calamities will arrive in large scale, and the ruler (lit. your body) will die in disaster. It is only by luck that a life span can last seventy or ninety years. Even the descendent of a worthy minister or sage ruler can turn around and bring calamity on the masses. This is how he harms himself, but how could he be the only one to suffer?69

It is interesting that the rujia (Confucian) standards of appointment by achievement or merit (gong) is the last. Although the fajia (Legalist) advocate appointment by job performance, the first choice is to appoint according to the potential employee’s intention. If it is difficult to determine the merit of one’s moral achievement, then it will certainly be difficult to determine another’s intentions, that is, unless one has ascertained some deep insight into another’s personality which could only be realized among the most intimate

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of friends. For the yuhe chapter, if the ruler cannot secure intimate relationships with excellent ministers, then he will fall into calamity which inevitably will lead to his death. But the calamity will not only fall upon the ruler; of course, the people will suffer. The general focus of the yuhe chapter is to argue that the ruler must actively engage himself in “making the time” to encounter proper ministers of state. The ruler and minister must build an intimate relationship so that they work together as one person. The ruler must develop deep relationships with his ministers so he can discover their innermost intentions, thereby, securing his life and state. The types of personal relationships the ruler builds will have direct historical consequences. If the ruler creates proper relationships with his ministers by “articulating time” and by awaiting the right time, then he creates a social order and generates a cultural history for the people. b. Priority on Timing The positive expression of proper timing in conducting one’s self-cultivation for the purpose of establishing social and political order is explicitly addressed at length in the shoushi or xushi (Awaiting the Right Time) chapter.70 Although proper timing is a concept shared by the various Warring States philosophers, nevertheless they do not provide us with any extended discussion of the concept of proper timing. So the shoushi chapter is a unique piece of pre-Qin literature entirely devoted to a discussion of proper timing. The shoushi chapter opens with the most significant application of timing in managing government affairs. The sage ruler’s administering state affairs appears to be idle, but in fact is quick; he appears dilatory, but is prompt, and thereby awaits the right time (daishi).71

Gao You’s commentary suggests reading the expression “appears idle” to mean “wuwei,” “non-action,” and “prompt” to mean “to complete merit.” Gao You cites the story of King Wu to illuminate the meaning of the “apparent slowness but timely action of a king.” He tells us: King Wu organized the meeting of eight hundred lords at Mengjin, and all agreed that the tyrant Zhou could be attacked (— the time had come). King Wu said that they did not yet understand the Mandate of Heaven. He went home for two years — which was like delaying. But on the jiazi day he defeated Zhou at Muye. Therefore, it says “await the (right) time.”72

Gao You’s commentary to the above passage helps elucidate the meaning of the subsequent story, described in the shoushi chapter, of King Wu serving the tyrant Zhou while he avails himself of the jiazi day at Muye when he

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finally defeats Zhou. This naturally took a great deal of patience and control on King Wu’s part which imparts his high level of self-cultivation in behaving in a timely fashion for the benefit of the empire. The story of King Wu concludes with the comment that: “The (right) time is indeed not easy to find.”73 The shoushi chapter contains three examples of worthy ministers who practiced self-cultivation and articulated timing in service to a ruler, or who sought revenge by waiting for the right time. First, it mentions Lü Wang fishing and waiting to serve King Wen. Second, the drama of Wu Zixu’s life is related to show how he articulated proper timing in taking years to finally attack Chu to avenge his father.74 Finally, the aesthetic or creative model of articulating the proper time is metaphorized in the story of the Mohist, Tian Riu, who wanted to meet the King of Qin, but could not do so until he was sent there by the King of Chu. This paradox of having “to go to Chu, to arrive at Qin” reflects an aesthetic appropriation of time. The paradox is highlighted with the following comment. Certainly there are situations when one is “far away” when near to it, but near when far away. Time is also like this.75

This approach acknowledges a complete indeterminacy of any given situation, allowing that the timely sagacious act may appear paradoxical, yet it creates and maintains the proper time. The fullest development of this approach to the social and spiritual arrogation of proper timing in self-cultivation and achieving social and political order is found in the Mengzi (Meng Tzu) (II/A/2, & V/B/1), the Zhongyong (Chung Yung) (ch. 25), and commentary appendixes of the Yijing (I ching). The rujia texts prefer to use the binome shizhong, literally, “timely equilibrium.”76 The authors of the shoushi chapter avail themselves of the expression shizhong in their discussion of creating and maintaining intrinsic proper timing in self-cultivation, and in some passages they lapse into the more rigid “rule of law” paradigm of extrinsic timing by interpreting the appropriation of time in a fixed causal order. This may not be readily apparent, but compare the following passage from the shoushi chapter with a related discussion from the Mengzi. First, the LSCQ passage: Even if you have the worth of Kings Tang and Wu, but the times are without tyrants like Jie and Zhou, then one cannot complete the kingly way, or even if the times provide tyrants like Jie and Zhou, but one is not as worthy as Tang and Wu, then again one cannot complete the kingly way. The sage ruler’s perception of the right time is like the inseparability of taking a step and reflecting a shadow.77 Hence, a knight who possesses the dao (youdao zhi shi) who has not yet happened on the proper time will go into retirement or hiding, awaiting the right time. When the time arrives,

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there are those who could be a commoner (lit. plain clothes) who could become the Son of Heaven (e.g. Shun), or there could be a ruler with one-thousand chariots who might come to possess the empire (e.g. Tang and Wu), or a humble person of low rank might become an assistant to one of the three sage Kings (e.g. Lü Wang or Yi Yin), or a commoner (e.g. Yu Ran) might be able to seek revenge against one who possesses ten-thousand chariots (i.e. a powerful ruler). Therefore, it is only timing which a sage ruler values.78 (Italics added).

Although the interpretation of timing in this passage is somewhat rigid, formalistic, and appears to follow an extrinsic model of aligning oneself with an external time, nevertheless one must keep in mind that “awaiting the proper time” is an activity which creates and maintains intrinsic timing also. The above passage, however, appears to follow what Mengzi considers to be the way of Bo Yi, rather than the way of Kongzi. Fung Yu-lan has made note of the fixed rigidity of Bo Yi’s appropriation of proper timing, and Mengzi’s preference for Kongzi’s way of fitting the “exigencies of circumstances.”79 The Mengzi passage runs as follows: “How about Bo Yi and Yi Yin?” “They followed paths different from that of Kongzi. Bo Yi was such that he would only serve the right prince and rule over the right people, took office when order prevailed and relinquished it when there was disorder. Yi Yin was such that he would serve any prince and rule over any people, would take office whether order prevailed or not. Kongzi was such that he would take office, or would remain in a state, would delay his departure or hasten it, all according to circumstances. All three were sages of old. I have not been able to emulate any of them, but it is my hope and wish to follow the example of Kongzi.”80

In comparison then, the shoushi chapter of LSCQ advocates a Bo Yi like withdrawal from a disordered society. It describes a more abstract, generalized and extrinsic notion of proper timing, rather than the intrinsic timely appropriation of circumstances that Mengzi believed Kongzi was sensitive to. The shoushi chapter shares similarities with the rangwang chapter of the Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) which also advocates retirement in bad times. This withdrawal is not passive; it is a return to the roots of order in the immediate context. . . . if they encountered a period of order, they did not run away from public office; but if they encountered an age of disorder, they did not try to hold on to an office at any cost.81

Moreover, this notion of withdrawing in a time of disorder is so basic to the distinctive eclectic thought of pre-Qin China that it is also voiced in the Analects: The Master said, “Make an earnest commitment to the love of learning and abide to the death in service to the efficacious way. Do not enter a state that is in peril; do not stay in a state that is in

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danger. Show yourself when the Way prevails in the empire, but hide yourself when it does not. It is a disgrace to be poor and humble when the Way prevails in the state. Equally, it is a disgrace to be rich and noble when the Way falls into disuse in the state.”82

The idea of withdrawing from a disordered state then, may not be entirely out of step with Kongzi’s use of intrinsic timing. Everyone, but especially the minister, must be able to recognize when one cannot influence a dangerous situation, and then one must withdraw. The above passage from the shoushi chapter also emphasizes the need to correlate one’s self-cultivation with proper timing in opposing a tyrant. This implies that the human person can and does create and maintain time. In places the shoushi chapter is more extrinsic and almost mechanistic in approach. This is not too surprising since many passages in LSCQ appear to have been strongly influenced by the paradigm shift which was replacing the aesthetic model of early rujia and daojia (Daoist) teachings with the less creative, uncompromising “rule of law” type model which culminates in the fajia writers, and in the state of Qin finally uniting the empire — of course, many of LSCQ’s chapters promote that concern for unification under one ruler. LSCQ’s understanding of history and its wuxing (Five Phases) philosophy of dynastic history propose that one can harmonize with the natural cycles of change and establish a new age. The mechanistic understanding of change is sponsored by an agricultural and military approach. The authors of the shoushi chapter also employ the seasonal agricultural metaphor of proper timing, revealing their concern for the less flexible, external and formalistic understanding of time. In fact, the chapter begins to sound like the changgong chapter of LSCQ. When the rivers and land are frozen solid, then Hou Ji would not sow; when Hou Ji sowed he certainly waited for spring. Thus, if a person, although wise, does not happen on the right time, then he achieves nothing. When the leaves are abundant and beautiful, people don’t know the end of it even after picking leaves all day long; when the autumn frost falls, all the forests will wither.83 The ease or difficulty of an affair does not lie in its being important or trivial; rather the task of affairs lies in realizing the right time (zhishi).84 (Italics added).

This passage emphasizes people’s inability to operate if they do not accord with the natural circumstances around them. From an agricultural perspective, it is always good to know one’s limitations. This return to the agricultural model as the root metaphor of proper timing shows that the authors of the shoushi chapter were concerned about a practicable program, gaining success by articulating time. But the overriding concern for precision or exactness in establishing policy and programs borders on the comical in the following example from the

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shoushi chapter, implying that wild animals avail themselves of proper timing, and provide a context for social change. In the difficulties of Zi Yang of Zheng, a mad dog brought on the confusion; in the troubles of Gao and Guo of Qi a stray ox caused the confusion.85 The masses took advantage of these opportunities (yin) to execute Zi Yang, and Gao and Guo. If it coincides with the right time (dang qi shi), even a dog or an ox can take the lead on behalf of humans, how much better to have a human for a leader?86

This passage makes the point that anyone can act in a timely fashion when it comes to attacking a despotic tyrant. The passage challenges the reader to dangshi (coincide with the right time) by leading the masses to attack a tyrant. The shoushi chapter goes on with its animal analogy, and compares the people of a chaotic generation to starving horses or dogs who do not get excited until they see the hay or bones. People of a chaotic generation are quiet because they have not seen a virtuous person. Once they see a virtuous person, their going to him cannot be stopped. That which goes to him is not their bodies, is it their hearts we refer to?!87

Although this may sound mechanistic in that the people of a chaotic generation are driven like starved animals to accept a worthy ruler, we must be aware that this is an analogy concerning the people’s social and spiritual desire to live in peace and safety. And as such it is no overstatement to say that oppressed people would flock to a worthy ruler and a well-ordered society. The shoushi chapter discusses how the states Lu and Wei “met with the opportune time” and gained territory from larger states. That in spite of the smallness of Lu and Wei, both got what they wanted from larger states is because they happened on their opportune times (yu qi shi).88

Above I discussed the significance of proper timing in meeting others and meeting events, and here the text explicitly employs the expression “happening on the opportune time” (yu qi shi). It is this coincidence in meeting with the times which displays the discipline of one’s self-cultivation. To meet with the times is in part something which happens to a person; however, one must be actively prepared and flexible enough to meet the challenges of the event — again the waiting is a positive action which creates the intrinsic quality of time. The chapter concludes with the watchword that in peaceful times one need not worry about rebellion, but affairs need to be conducted according to the times.

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Hence, the worthy ruler’s and eminent knight’s worrying about the common people (qianshou) coincides with a disorderly age. Heaven does not issue (the mandate) twice; the opportune time does not tarry long; and the capable do not perform two tasks simultaneously. Success in tasks coincides with the right time (dangshi).89

It is the sage ruler who can “match the times” (dangshi) and achieve success in the art of rulership. The shoushi chapter’s presentation of shi as proper timing is complex enough in its own right. But as we saw above, it definitely has its own bias toward timing, and this bias is highlighted when compared with the highly creative art of contexualizing, rujia, paradigm of timing in personal conduct. The concern for managing all affairs by creating timely action is very much in keeping with the use of proper timing in the Zhongyong; where chapter 25 describes timing as the key to managing affairs. The authentic one is self actualizing, and the dao is one’s self-realized dao. Being authentic is the beginning and end of affairs (wu lit. things); without authenticity there is nothing. It is for this reason that the consummate person (junzi) venerates authenticity. Being authentic is not only one’s own self actualization, but it is also the means to actualize others (wu). Self actualization is accomplished through appropriate human relations (ren); while actualizing others is completed through moral-wisdom (zhi). This is the virtuous-potency of human character (xing zhi de), and the way (dao) of uniting the inner and the outer. Therefore, proper timing is the fitting way to manage affairs (shi cu [or cuo] zhi yi).90

The Zhongyong passage emphasizes the self actualization which integrates others when consummate people or rulers create time in their management of state affairs. Although this is a representative passage of the rujia paradigm for articulating time, nevertheless it is not a strong example because part of the commentary tradition ignores the role of proper timing and interprets the character shi as an adverb. The Yijing and its commentarial tradition serve as a better basis from which one could explicate the rujia paradigm of proper timing in self-cultivation. The Yijing’s impact on pre-Qin thought is considerable, and its role in the content, but especially the “almanac”-like structure of LSCQ requires elaboration. Timing is central in ancient or modern Chinese divination. From the earliest forms of oracle bone divination, through the development of the yarrow stalk method and the writing of the Yijing, timing is of crucial importance. First, there is the preparation time in which the diviner must prepare materials and himself to make the divination. The divination itself is a highly creative act of articulating time. The hexagram is loaded with various time-related elements, primarily explanation of past and present events, and

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prediction of future ones. Richard Wilhelm maintains that the whole hexagram constitutes a “time”: The situation represented by the hexagram as a whole is called the time. This term comprises several entirely different meanings, according to the character of the various hexagrams.91

He describes four different notions of “time” as: movement — decrease or growth —; action or process; law; and symbolic situation. Finally, it is understood that the person receiving the divination, usually a ruler in antiquity, will take what is learned from the divination and act accordingly, either advancing, altering, or ceasing the current project. In other words, one acts in such a way so as to both articulate an intrinsic time which influences the world, and at the same time, one performs an action which is matched in a timely fashion with extrinsic conditions. The composite makeup of the Yijing provides a model for the interpretation of LSCQ. The understanding of time in the Yijing represents a world view of interdependent multiple processes — particularly processes involving heaven, earth, and humanity as ruler and the masses. For example, hexagram eleven tai (Peace) which shows the trigram kun (The Receptive, female earth) above qian (The Creative, male heavens) represents the harmony of heaven and earth. It constitutes a “time” of peace and prosperity both in nature and society. The xiang (image) gives the following description: Heaven and earth unite: the image of peace. Thus the ruler Divides and completes the course of heaven and earth; He furthers and regulates the gifts of heaven and earth; And so aids the people.

And Wilhelm adds the following comment: Heaven and earth are in contact and combine their influence, producing a time of universal flowering and prosperity. This stream of energy must be regulated by the ruler of men. It is done by a process of division. Thus men divide the uniform flow of time into the seasons, according to the succession of natural phenomena, and mark off infinite space by the points of the compass. In this way nature in its overwhelming profusion of phenomena is bounded and controlled. On the other hand, nature must be furthered in her productiveness. This is done by adjusting the products to the right time and the right place, which increases the natural yield. This controlling and furthering activity of man in his relation to nature is the work on nature that rewards him.92

The above passage and Wilhelm’s comment on it display the Yijing’s position on the interrelationships obtaining between human life and the environment. Note that these passages also show a slightly slanted understanding which is indicative of the Yijing’s perspective that nature, especially heaven, sets the

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pace for earth and humans to follow. The commentaries reveal a bias toward aligning human activity with the natural, creative, powers of qian. This is true even in the commentarial passages which reveal the ability of the consummate person (junzi) to creatively (qian) articulate the accommodation of proper timing (yinshi). In the commentary to the third line of the qian hexagram, the Master, Kongzi, is cited as saying that the consummate person “acts with care in actively and creatively accommodating proper timing (qianqian yin qi shi er ti).”93 Here, the creative and active power of the consummate person is described in terms of the cosmic principle of qian. The tuan commentary to the fourth hexagram meng (Youthful Folly) explains the Judgment’s claim “folly has success” to mean that “one who succeeds hits upon the right timing (shizhong) for his undertaking.”94 Here the creative process of articulating time as shizhong discloses a harmony between both an intrinsic and an extrinsic manifestation of time which promotes undertakings through one’s personal self-cultivation. The Yijing’s position on proper timing, then, is generally in agreement with that of the LSCQ’s. The concept and practical application of proper timing is a predominant image in the LSCQ’s social and political thought. Not only does the text provide a comprehensive discussion of timing, but the very structure and character of LSCQ as a text is arranged by the temporality of appropriating policy according to seasonal, historical, and personal timing. Proper timing grounds the program for social and political order found in the above LSCQ passages by successfully harmonizing various positions, such as the extrinsic “rule of law” paradigm, and the intrinsic, more flexible, aesthetic paradigm, along with the different horizons of proper timing. The LSCQ was defined by its era, and it assisted in perpetuating that culture in a syncretic literary genre and consolidated philosophy which we now think of as distinctly Han or Chinese. It sponsored the unification of prior philosophies, and justified the reform of regulations and the transformation of dynasties while advocating the need for centralized government. The authors of the LSCQ were able to advocate all of this because of their ability to establish a paradigm of harmony under the guidance of proper timing. Certainly our world today is a different kind of place. Or is it? Nations vie for power; philosophers debate about the proper course to be followed or constructed; people speak of a unified world or a global government. Even though these are only superficial similarities, nevertheless we may be able to learn something from the LSCQ, and apply it to our lives today. University of Guam

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1 Robert S. Brumbaugh, Unreality and Time (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). W.H. Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). Charles M. Sherover, The Human Experience of Time: The Development of its Philosophic Meaning (New York: New York University Press, 1975). Douglas K Wood, Men Against Time (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1982). 2 James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric,” in Rhetoric and Praxis, ed. Jean Dietz Moss (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986). John E. Smith, “Time and Qualitative Time,” Review of Metaphysics 40 (September, 1986), and “Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time:’ Chronos and Kairos,” The Monist 53/1 (1969). 3 There is a growing interest in Zen Buddhist timing. Do¯gen, “Sho¯bo¯genzo¯ Uji (Being Time),” trans. N.A. Waddel, Eastern Buddhist, Vol. XII, no. 1 (May, 1979). Claude Larre explicates a Chinese conception of time, see, “The Empirical Apperception of Time and the Conception of History in Chinese Thought,” in Cultures and Time, Introduction by P. Ricoeur (Paris: The UNESCO Press, 1976). Eliot Deutsch develops a creative articulation of time in Creative Being the Crafting of Person and World (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). 4 The Postscript or xuyi chapter tells us that the work was completed “in the eighth year of Qin . . .” There is a debate still unresolved as to what year that would be. Hu Shi (Hu Shih) and others use the year of King Zheng’s enthronement, that is 246 B.C.E. to begin the calculation and propose that “the eighth year” refers to 238 B.C.E. Hu Shi, “Du Lüshi chunqiu” in Hu Shi wencun, Vol. III, ed. Pu Jialin (Taibei: Far Eastern Book Co, 1961). Qian Mu’s argument is more convincing; he uses the year of Lü Buwei’s appointment, that is 249, to begin the calculation. So I follow his date of 241. See Qian Mu, “Lü Buwei zhushukao,” appended to the editor’s preface to Lüshi chunqiu jishi deng wushu, ed. Yang Jialuo (Taibei: Ding Wen Publishing Co., 1977), no page numbers. Qian Mu’s study is briefly discussed by Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, translated by F.W. Mote (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 557, n. 19. And see Michael Carson, and Michael Loewe, “Lü shih ch’un ch’iu,” in Early Chinese Texts A Bibliographical Guide, ed. Michael Loewe, Early China Monograph Series No. 2, The Society for the Study of Early China, and the Institute of East Asian Studies (Berkeley: University of California, 1993). 5 LSCQ, p. 56; cited in Ch. 1, n.77. 6 Michael Loewe, Ways to Paradise, pp. 1–2. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. I, pp. 683ff. 7 LSCQ, pp. 1188–1189. 8 Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, trans. F. Mote (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). p. 568–69. 9 LSCQ, p. 569; cited above, Ch. 3, n 85. 10 John S. Major argues that in some cosmological contexts xing (conventionally rendered as “punishments”) must be interpreted as “recision” and de (conventionally “rewards”) should be “accretion.” See, “The Meaning of Hsing-te,” p. 286. 11 LSCQ, pp. 908–909. 12 LSCQ, pp. 1172, 1173–1174. 13 This passage is a paraphrase of the Laozi, Chapters 1 and 25. 14 Gao You’s commentary suggests reading tian as shen (body, himself), i.e. “he will fulfill himself.”

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LSCQ, pp. 210–211. LSCQ, p. 367. 17 Zhuangzi, 15/6/12. B. Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, translates this passage as “. . . he who looks for the right time is not a worthy man . . .”, p. 78. 18 Laozi, 4/8/2–3. 19 LSCQ, p. 77. 20 LSCQ, p. 119. 21 LSCQ, p. 791. 22 LSCQ, p. 816. 23 LSCQ, p. 503. 24 According to Xu Weiyu’s note, one edition titles this chapter benzhi (Wisdom as Basic), and another renders it as buyu (Not Meeting). 25 This story also appears at the opening of the shanmu (Mountain Tree) chapter of the Zhuangzi 51/20/1–9. 26 Following the Zhuangzi version, I have taken the expression zhigong (“the duke of” or “the gentleman of”) to mean “the host.” 27 Again I follow the Zhuangzi passage. 28 LSCQ, pp. 594–596. 29 This is the conclusion given in the Zhuangzi; the LSCQ passage ends abruptly. 30 Hall and Ames develop the concept of the “field focus” network in Thinking from the Han, pp. 39–77. 31 LSCQ, p. 792. 32 LSCQ, pp. 683–85; and see Zhuangzi, 78/28/31–35; A.C. Graham, The Book of Lieh Tzu, p. 162; and Liu Xiang, Xinxu jinzhu jinyi, ed. Lu Yuanjun, pp. 238–39. The Xinxu version varies the most in that it as interpolated part of LSCQ’s comment into Liezi’s closing words. 33 LSCQ, pp. 685–686. 34 Gao You’s note suggests reading “superior and inferior” (shangxia) as “ruler and minister.” 35 The “vital essence and life force (jing qi)” might be interpreted as one concept, e.g. “the quintessential energy.” A.C. Graham suggested translating this line as: “The quintessential energy once rises and once falls, going round and round, without halting or pausing anywhere.” 36 The line of thought here appears to be that one’s fen (lot in life or one’s externally given and internally acquired designation) gives one zhi (duties or dispositions) which limit one’s realm of action. The fen chapter in the Shizi also links fen and zhi. See Xinyi Shizi duben, p. 48. 37 This line is obscure; literally it says “not able to mutually make” (bu neng xiang wei). Gao You’s note reads it as bu neng xiang jian “not able to mutually unite.” A.C. Graham translates it as: “. . . they are not able to do each other’s job.” 38 LSCQ, pp. 158–159. 39 Gao You’s note interprets “jing” as “the light of the sun and moon,” but both Sun Qiangming and Yang Shuda cite the Shuowen to argue that “jing” means “xing,” “stars,” or “star light.” A.C. Graham suggested translating this as: “The quintessence proceeding through the four seasons . . .” 40 I am tempted to interpret xing (operate) as qi given the above jing qi usage, and the following passage “one up, one down” implies that the operations of both jing and qi are being discussed, not just the operation of jing. 41 “Stored” (cang) is interpreted by Gao You as jian “retire, lay in hiding, store.” The idea is that the seed and root are stored in the earth or granary awaiting their return to the soil. 42 LSCQ, pp. 159–160. 16

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43 Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 254. Note “the Yaos” refers to the sage rulers. 44 LSCQ, p. 330. 45 Lunyu yinde (3/2/14). Ames and Rosemont render this passage: “Reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new — such a person can be considered a teacher.” The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, p. 78. 46 The phrase “. . . cannot follow the standards of the early kings . . .” is a distinctly fajia motto. 47 LSCQ, p. 664. 48 LSCQ, pp. 665–666. 49 LSCQ, pp. 667–668. 50 LSCQ, p. 670. 51 LSCQ, p. 665. 52 LSCQ, p. 668. 53 The concept “yin” (“according with the circumstances or requirements of a situation”) was a major contribution of Shen Dao. See P.M. Thompson, The Shen Tao Fragments. This concept is also used extensively in other chapters of LSCQ. For example, the guiyin (Venerating Being in Accord with Situational Factors) chapter, which precedes the chajin chapter, makes extensive use of the concept yin. 54 The expression “worthy ruler” might seem out of context in a fajia document, but here “worthy” should not be understood in the Confucian or Mohist sense as a “virtuous person,” but rather as a “versatile person.” 55 The commentary says that the number should be seventy-two sage rulers, also see the Hanfeizi. 56 LSCQ, p. 669. The emphasis on proper timing (shi) and situational factors (shi) is a basic concern of both the fajia and bingjia writers. These were especially put into practice by Li Si in abolishing feudalism and burning the books. Hu Shi notes that the last line here is also paraphrased in Li’s memorial on burning the books. See “Du LSCQ,” p. 254. 57 Lüshi chunqiu jishi deng wushu, ed. Yang Jialuo (Taibei: Ding Wen Publishing Co., 1977), p. 586. Hereafter, this book will be cited as LSCQ in the notes. 58 Here I have followed Tao Hungqing’s note which argues against omitting the character shi “time” as Bi Yuan and Chen Changqi suggest. If one prefers to omit “shi,” then the timely element in having a proper encounter is still present in the character “dai” (to wait). 59 LSCQ, p. 584. 60 Following Wang Niansun’s commentary, I have placed the consequent clause after the conjunctive “or” clause. In the text it comes before the “or” clause. 61 LSCQ, pp. 592–593. 62 LSCQ, p. 593. 63 LSCQ, p. 585–86. 64 LSCQ, p. 586. 65 LSCQ, p. 588. 66 LSCQ, pp. 588–590. 67 LSCQ, p. 591. 68 Gao You’s commentary suggests reading “zhi” (intention) as “de” (virtue). 69 LSCQ, p. 593. 70 Xu Weiyu’s commentary cites an old edition which titles this chapter xushi “Depending on Timeliness” which is a more appropriate title given the number of phrases conveying that idea. 71 LSCQ, p. 552.

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LSCQ, p. 552. LSCQ, p. 553. 74 LSCQ, pp. 553–556. 75 LSCQ, p. 556. 76 C.Y. Cheng, “On Timeliness (shih-chung) in the Analects and the I ching: An Inquiry into the Philosophical Relationship Between Confucius and the I ching,” unpublished manuscript prepared for the International Sinological Conference at Academica Sinica, Taibei, August 15–20, 1980. 77 That is, the sage always takes action at the right time. Also compare the story of the fool who dies trying to escape his shadow and foot prints in the Zhuangzi chapter thirty-one. 78 LSCQ, pp. 556–557. This passage resounds the changgong chapter’s wording. 79 Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 371, 372, 391. 80 D.C. Lau, (trans), Mencius (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 79. 81 Concordance to Chuang Tzu, Harvard-Yenching Index Series No. 20 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 80/28/84; and see Burton Watson (trans.), The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 322. 82 Lunyu, in Shisanjing yinde (Taibei: San Min Publishing Co. 1941), 8/13. Modifying the translation in both D.C. Lau (trans), The Analects (Lun Yü) (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 94; and Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (trans.), The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), p. 123. 83 The idea here is that seasonality or time cannot be controlled by humans, but people can avail themselves of it. 84 LSCQ, pp. 557–558. 85 The stories behind these lines tell us that the oppressed people under these tyrants employed the confusion of a mob trying to round up a mad dog and a stray ox to overthrow their rulers. 86 LSCQ, pp. 558–559. 87 LSCQ, p. 559. 88 LSCQ, p. 559. 89 LSCQ, p. 559–560. Here I follow Wang Niansun’s commentary which builds a case that the final character zhi (“this”) is a mistake and should be shi (time). Otherwise the sentence would read: “Completing affairs lies in according with this.” There is a cognate relations between shi and zhi. 90 Zhongyong, in Sishu guangjie, ed. Chen Jizheng (Tainan: Zonghe Publishers, 1981), Ch. 25, p. 46. Most translations render shi as an adverbial, temporal, particle “whenever” or “often” so that the last sentence reads: “Whenever he employs them, actions will be right.” 91 Richard Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes (trans.), The I ching (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 359. 92 Wilhelm and Baynes (trans.), The I ching, p. 49. 93 Yijing yinde, in Shisanjing yinde (Taibei: Sanmin Publishing Co., 1941), 2/1/yan, and 3/1/yan. Wilhelm and Baynes (trans.), p. 381. 94 Yijing yinde, 5/4/tuan; Wilhelm and Baynes (trans.), p. 406. 73

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A F R I C A N T H E O RY O F F O R C E S A N D T H E E X T E N D E D FA M I LY R E L AT I O N S : A D E C O N S T RU C T I O N

T H E T H E O RY O F F O R C E S

In ancient African societies the theory of forces was more or less a common community property. Almost every group marked out by a distinct language, culture, history, mores, socio-psychological experiences and economic realities enunciated one form or other of the theory of forces. A quick survey of a host of literatures, which attempted to present specimens of ancient African worldviews, would reveal that the African metaphysical concept of being is force; that what is in whatever form is endowed with force; that mind and matter have never been apart; that forces interact, intermingle and interpenetrate one another in an egregious sense. A few brief examples will suffice here. A systematic presentation of the ancient African view of the world is contained in several literatures, which adopt Bantu theory of forces as a prototype of African ontology [Unah, 1997–98, 133–139]. In Muntu (1958), for example, Johanez Jahn presents NTU as a universal force which can only occur through its manifestations in four categories of Muntu, Kintu, Hantu and Kuntu. NTU is that force in which everything fuses together, in which “Being and beings coalesce.” It is the point from which creation flows, the focal point of thought and the ultimate rendezvous of contradictions. NTU is the mythical and the imaginary point “at which living and dead, real and imaginary, past and future, speaking and speechless, high and low” [Mbiti, 1967, 4] coexist comfortably. Johanez Jahn’s presentation of Muntu derives from the analysis of Alexis Kagame, a Bantu of Rwanda extraction, who presented the philosophy of his people in his native language, in the vernacular, using the categories of Muntu, Kintu, Hantu and Kuntu, which he takes to be the architectonics of African philosophy. In Kagame’s analysis, all beings, all essences, in whatever form can be neatly packaged in the four categories, which has NTU as its determinative stem. What this means is that nothing can be conceived without the four categories. Whatever is at all must find expression in at least one of the four categories conceived as vital force. Consequently, all forces are related to one another as expressed in the stem NTU which is ever present in each of Muntu, Kintu, Hantu and Kuntu. 265 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 265–276. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Reverend Father Placid Tempels, a white missionary, presented his work on Bantu Philosophy by employing the theory of forces. In his words, the Bantu have no other conception of being other than a philosophy of forces. The life of the Bantu is permeated by the doctrine of forces such that when he engages in a recreation or a pastime or even in idleness he is guided by the conviction that being is force. All things, living or dead, have their vital forces with man at the apex of all created visible forces. No force in the thinking of the Bantu exists all by itself. Every vital force is intertwined with other forces in a hierarchical order, some acting above and others below. In Tempels’s opinion, the Bantu does not believe that the human being can have any real existence outside the hierarchy of forces [Tempels, 1959, 21]. Adebayo Adesanya, a Yoruba writer of South Western Nigeria, appears to have captured the Bantu ontological mood when he writes that “philosophy, theology, politics, social theory, land law, medicine, psychology, birth and burial, all find themselves logically concatenated in a system so tight that to subtract one item from the whole is to paralyze the structure of the whole” [cf. Jahn, 1958, 97]. A similar point is expressed in Kenneth Anyanwu’s meta-epistemological abstractions of ancient African view of the world. In Anyanwu’s view, the African who wants to have knowledge of reality “intuits, reasons, feels, imagines all at the same time” [1981, p. 84]. In trying to have knowledge of the world, the African not only perceives the object of his interest but also imagines a life force interacting with another life force. As he says, the African “sees the colour of the object . . ., feels its beauty, imagines the life force in it, intuitively grasps the interrelationship between the hierarchy of forces” [Ibid.]. There is no individuality and no objectsubject dichotomy in an African world of magical fusion, and great synthesis for a thing is known and understood only in terms of the totality of its relations with other things. The dualisms, which form the bedrock of Western European intellectual traditions, dissolve in the African cultural world of great art and synthesis. Mind and matter, man and nature are “one inseparable continuum of a hierarchical order.” Man becomes real only in “virtue of the way he is situated in the world, the way in which he is the centre of the world. He is man by the way he acts, reacts and is acted upon by events, that is, the way he is interwoven into the multiplicity of events” [Ibid. p. 87]. In the same way, the Kalabari people of South Eastern Nigeria carry on their daily rounds on the assumption that everything, every object, in whatever form or shape is infused with vital force or spirit. In other words,

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whatever is partakes, to a greater or lesser degree, of spirit or vital force. Force is what confers individuality on things. Force, more commonly called “spirit” by Kalabari people, is as real and as concrete as material objects. According to this worldview, every person, plant, animal, anything at all, has its own particular force or spirit, which is in close and constant association with it or which inheres in it. From the Kalabari metaphysical theory that everything is infused with force, Dagogo Idoniboye asserts that the spiritual and the physical interact, intermingle and interpenetrate one another. In Idoniboye’s view, the relationship between a thing and its spirit or vital force is often comparable to the relationship between a canoe and its steersman; for it is spirit or vital force that controls and directs the thing’s behaviour. However, human beings sometimes “appear to be an exception to this rule; for they often struggle for ends that their spirit is set against. But this freedom is illusory; for in the long run, no desire can be fulfilled unless it is a desire backed by the spirit. As for other things in the material world, their behaviour is completely governed by their spirits. It is by the joining of a spirit to a material body that all things are created; and it is by the separation of spirit from body that they are destroyed” [Idoniboye, 1973, 84]. Consequently, spirit is the animating, sustaining, creative life force of the universe. What has thus far emerged from the foregoing survey of literatures on the ancient African view of the world is that the African operates on the basic assumption that there is mutual compatibility among all things; that the universe is a hierarchy of forces interacting with and interpenetrating one another in an inseparable continuum, and that contradictions are synthesized artistically, aesthetically and magically. It is on this metaphysical assumption that reality is a compounded admixture of contradictions conceived as interacting, intermingling and interpenetrating vital forces that underpins the extended family system which in turn reflects on social, economic and political practices in virtually all African societies. The Purist school of thought in African philosophy which valorizes a return to tradition and cultural heritage had drawn from the extended family system to nourish and nurture our social, economic and political relations. But such a nourishment and nurturing have, in modern times, tended to be an exercise in anachronism [Wiredu, 1989, 99]. It is pertinent at this juncture to highlight how the ontology of life forces or vital forces has informed the extended family system and its attendant social relations before focusing the critical searchlight of the phenomenological temper on it, by way of deconstruction.

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The family, comprising parents and children, is the fundament of society. All vital social institutions and practices hinge on the family. But the family in the ancient African context is not the nucleated modern European version comprising one man, one woman with or without a limited number of children. The family, in the African context, is a network of blood relationship and kinship ties extending beyond man, wife or wives, and children to the clan and the entire community. This is so because since the human community is regarded as an aggregate of interacting and interpenetrating life-forces, what affects the individual or his immediate family affects the existential harmony of the whole group. Consequently, if an individual refuses to marry and raise a family after attaining adulthood, his or her refusal becomes a matter of utmost concern to the community. Only in matrimony as concretized in the family does the community grow and find its being. There is no individual existence outside the family of interacting life forces. Refusal to raise a family amounts to refusal to increase the numerical strength of the community, thereby depriving it of vital forces [Unah, 1997–98, 141]. “Marriage is a complex affair with economic, social and religious aspects which often overlap so firmly that they cannot be separated from one another . . . marriage is the focus of existence. It is the point where all the members of a given community meet: the departed, the living and those yet to be born . . . Marriage is a drama in which everyone must participate . . . he who does not participate in it is a curse to the community, he is a rebel and a law-breaker, he is not only abnormal but ‘under-human.’ Failure to get married under normal circumstances means that the person concerned has rejected society and society rejects him in return” [Mbiti, 1967, 133]. Thus, the ontology of life forces has made possible the extended family relations with its inextricable connection between the individual and the clan which continues to hold sway even after the ceasure of life. In fact, death is not the cessation of life but a continuation of it in another realm. Death is simply a transition from life in the material realm to life in the immaterial world. Consequently, the living as well as the “living-dead” are respected members of the social group. What affects the one affects the other and vice versa, since the living and the deceased have equal ontological status in a community of interacting and interpenetrating life forces. From all this, it was convenient for architects of post-colonial African societies to construct a political economy that was either socialistic or capitalistic in outlook. In what follows, we make a brief survey of the political

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economy underpinned by the theory of forces and the extended family relations. We begin with the socialistic expression of the political economy informed by the doctrine of interacting and interpenetrating life forces. SOCIALISTIC EXPRESSIONS

Julius Nyerere was one of the African leaders who gave a socialistic expression to the theory of life forces and the extended family system, to entrench socialism in some post-colonial African societies. “The foundation, and the objective of African socialism,” he says, “is the extended family” [Nyerere, 1968, 11], which emphasizes the brotherhood of man by insisting that all men are blood relations of an ever-extending family. Modern African socialism, in Nyerere’s view, should draw from and build upon its traditional heritage which recognizes “‘society’ as an extension of the basic family unit” [Ibid. p. 12]. But this idea of the social family should extend beyond the tribe and, indeed, the nation and the continent to embrace the whole of mankind. Which is to say that since life forces interact with and interpenetrate one another it is quite possible to extend such interaction beyond the level of the tribe to the global family. At the tribal level, economic life was more or less communalistic. Land was a common property of all members of the social group. And it is through landed property that a family maintained its vital link to its ancestors. Every family had a share of community land from which its immediate members undertook their farming projects. Through community task forces and organized labour public utilities such as roads, markets and town halls were built and maintained. It was mandatory for everyone to take part in community projects. Sanctions or fines were imposed in the event of any member of the social group refusing to participate. Rotational labour force or work teams were organized by age grades to attend to the farm projects of all the members. By this strategy, the weak or lazy members of the clan were protected against penury and want. This way, the communal economic order arising from the extended family relations and its supportive ontology of intermingling life forces guaranteed the survival of the weak and the strong alike. Since what affects one vital force affects the other, in the ancient African setting, wealth, was never acquired by man for the purpose of dominating his fellowmen [Nyerere, p. 6]. If such a thing were allowed, that is, if wealth were not evenly distributed, the vital force of the community would be in jeopardy. There would be a disruption in the flow of life forces. It is to put

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such a development in check that community work teams were evolved to assist one another. And whenever crops were produced from communal land, the proceeds were distributed to all and sundry. Such proceeds “were distributed on the basis of kinship ties. If a man’s crops were destroyed by some sudden calamity, relatives of his own village helped him” [Rodney, 1972, 44]. As interacting life forces, “If you do not make it possible for your neighbour to have nine you will not have ten . . . Seek the good of the community, and you seek your own good. Seek your own good, and you seek your own destruction” [Oguah, 1977, 209]. From all this, it has been alleged, a peculiar brand of socialism which takes account of the spiritual dimension of existence, of humanistic and aesthetic values [different from orthodox socialism] should constitute the basis of social, economic and political practices in modern African societies [Nyerere, pp. 1–12]. This is contrary to the thinking in some quarters that capitalism is the basis of socialism, since you have to accumulate wealth before you could seek to distribute it. In any case, whether that of Nyerere or that of any other African writer, all specimens of socialism presented as accretions of the theory of forces and the extended family system have been shown to be muddle-headed departures from orthodox Marxism. Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Sekou Toure, Tom Mboya, Obafemi Awolowo, among others, have been severely criticized for presenting idiosyncratically wayward versions of socialism in the name of African socialism [Anyanwu, 1981, 236–240]. There are, however, capitalistic expressions to the theory of interacting and interpenetrating life forces and the extended family relations. C A P I TA L I S T I C E X P R E S S I O N S

Proponents of the capitalistic interpretation of the theory of forces and the extended family system have distinguished communism from communalism and asserted that communalistic capitalism was more in temper with the African worldview encapsulated in the theory of forces rather than any attenuated version of socialism. Since emphasis was on production, hard work, magnificent exploits and mutual aid, the theory of forces and the extended family system could only have informed a capitalistic arrangement with a human face, that is, a capitalism without exploitation of the worker, a capitalism that ensured equitable distribution of the excess wealth of the aggressive, the enterprising and prosperous members of the community.

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Although they hide under the canopy of communalism in espousing a philosophy of mutual aid, communal solidarity and shared existence, Kenneth Anyanwu and Kwame Gyekye would appear to have given a capitalistic expression to the theory of forces and the extended family system. They prefer to use the expression “communalism” to characterize a social context of mutual interdependence, productive activities, enterprising economic transactions and equitable distribution of resources that take account of religious sensibilities, humanistic and aesthetic values, and respect for the dignity and freedom of man. They would wish that modern African societies, drawing from the theory of forces, metamorphosed into community societies or communalism(s) rather than socialism(s) or bare-faced capitalism(s). By “communalism,” according to this school of thought, is meant “. . . the doctrine or theory that the community . . . is the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society. This idea places emphasis on activity and the success of the wider society, . . . to the well-being of every individual member of society. Communalism . . . appreciates and espouses values that in African cultures are seen as essential . . . to a human society of which membership is considered natural” [Gyekye, 1996, 36]. Whenever or wherever a human being is born he or she is born into an existing human community. To buttress the point that the community society is man’s natural habitat, “Every normal individual has three levels of existence; as an individual, as a member of a group and as a member of the community. The African culture fuses these three levels together through the belief that all forces are perpetually interacting with one another and interpenetrating each other. There is nothing like a solitary individual in a cultural scheme of reality. The life of the individual is the life of the whole society because what each life force does affects the whole web of social, moral and ontological lives” [Anyanwu, p. 371]. In other words, the communal African can achieve inner peace only when his dreams and aspirations, his enlightened self-interests, are pursued within the context of the well-being and happiness of the whole society. It is at this communal level of understanding that the individual spirit fuses with the community spirit; and the community spirit as a unifying vital force abolishes “all individual and group boundaries” and invests political acts with profound, religious forces [Ibid. pp. 372–373]. In his work, already cited above, Kwame Gyekye makes a study of several African proverbs and wise sayings or maxims which teach a good deal of lessons about communalism, that is, about the imperatives of corporate existence, mutual cooperation, mutual interdependence, mutual assistance

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and reciprocal solidarity [Gyekye, pp. 35–51]. He, like Anyanwu, carefully avoids using the old nametag of socialism or capitalism to characterize his pontifications on communalism. What stands out clear in their works is the need for the cultivation of a deep sense of community, of shared experience, of mutual assistance and of reciprocal solidarity in birth and in death, in suffering and in joy. Their recognition of individual initiative, their emphasis on productivity rather than on sharing, in economic activities, all point to a preference of communalistic capitalism to socialism in whatever guise. Nevertheless, whether in its socialistic or in its communalistico-capitalistic expressions, the theory of forces and the extended family system (which gave birth to them), would appear to have refused to sign a pact with reality in our postmodern era, for reasons not unconnected with anachronism and obsolescence. It is to this failure of an ancient ontology to provide an adequate foundation for social, economic and political practices in modern African societies that we now turn our critical searchlight of phenomenological thinking. P H E N O M E N O L O G Y O F T H E T H E O RY O F F O R C E S

Within the context of the clan (a narrow, homogeneous, human group), it is quite possible for vital forces therein to interact, intermingle and interpenetrate one another in an inseparable continuum of a hierarchical order, some acting above and others below. Social harmony would characterize such a human group, since it is anchored on a common worldview and understanding of being as force. There would be shared values, mutual aid, and reciprocal solidarity. Everyone in such a group would have a common history, common language, common religion; similar culture, similar socio-psychological experiences and economic realities. The problem of the individual would be the problem of the entire community, and vice versa. There would be no avaricious accumulation of capital, since wealth would be shared by all. But because such a community of freely interacting and interpenetrating life forces recognizes and encourages individual initiative and industry, it would be, at best, a primitive capitalism, not socialism. But since land (the essential property) is collectively owned and proceeds from such lands are distributed on the basis of kinship ties, and since there exists a community spirit which propels everyone to put his personal wealth at the service of all, and where society is regarded as an extension of the family unit, it may be possible to construct a primitive socialism.

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Needless to say, a capitalism without an acquisitive propertied class is as inchoate and as impossible to conceive as a socialism without an exploited working class, bitter enough to do eternal damage to owners of capital, by dislocating and dispossessing them and assuming control of all means of production and distribution of goods and services. Consequently, the ontology of life forces would appear to be congenitally incapable of midwifing neither a coherent socialism nor a comprehensive capitalistic arrangement. Besides, a viable theory of social and political action is often vindicated by practice. The point may be more clearly and predispositionlessly articulated when we move away from a clannish village setting to the life world of semi-urban African community and the highly urbanized, modernized and industrialized communities emerging in several African states. In a less homogeneous, suburban community where there is a major language with multiple dialects and different chiefdoms with a variety of local pantheons, how does the theory of interacting and interpenetrating life forces inform social, economic and political behaviour? Do we find the same level of commitment of individuals to community projects in terms of willingness to commit resources — time, money and physical labour — for the well-being of the whole? Experience shows that in a multi-clan community, the individual does not readily transfer the allegiance which he owes to his clan and its head, to a multi-clan community leader. Besides, the sanctions for social misbehaviour, which hold in a given clan, may not hold in another. This accounts for greater social tension and friction in suburban and urban communities. What this shows is that the theory of forces, which may forge social cohesion and harmony in the context of the clan, may not produce the desired result of achieving social harmony in multi-clan communities. Consequently, the individual who finds himself taking a new habitat outside his clan of origin is well advised to subscribe to new norms and values which indeed may be of higher cast since such norms and values seek to cater for the dreams and aspirations of a larger world family. Thus the normative theory of the clan cannot be expanded (as we have been vainly trying to do) to integrate the world family beyond the frontiers of the extended family of the clan. Neither can the theory of interacting and interpenetrating life forces yield a socialism and or a capitalism that can truly guide social, economic and political actions, nor can its by-product — the extended family relations — achieve the monumental task of extending clannish interests beyond itself to a global family.

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The environment of the highly urbanized and rapidly developing communities in modern African states is even less conducive for the informative task of the theory of interpenetrating life forces. All of the clannish sanctions against adultery, for example, have no potency in the urban communities. The once-cherished virtues of chastity and virginity amongst young African brides are of no real consequence nowadays. The cherished values of respect for elders and constituted authority which are still bandied about as values native to Africa have since been eroded by the wantom misbehaviour of the elders themselves in practically every frontier of social relations. How could the youth of nowadays respect constituted authority, which has demonstrated gross irresponsibility in the exercise of authority, especially in the mismanagement of national resources and in the large scale embezzlement of public funds, which have resulted in the social dislocation of the average African youth? Where is the alleged African spirit of unity and artistic integration when every individual African in position of authority “. . . pursues a separate route . . .,” some to Mecca, some to Jerusalem, some to Rome, some to Moscow, yet some to London, and others to Washington, as if to sign a separate pact with anarchy? What do we have at the end of all this jostling? “In the end, we do not have democratic or socialist governments, Islamic or Christian spirits, in Black Africa. We have fanaticism born of insecurity and the loss of the spirit” [Anyanwu, p. 373]. Needless to say, a philosophy which entertains all sorts of contradictions, which insists that reality is compounded in a huge farrago of conundrums, imperils exact thinking and the certainty of action. How, may one ask, does the life force of an Hausa-fulani who speaks a different tongue from the Yoruba or Igbo interact with or, at least, intermingle and interpenetrate that of the latter? What viable social and political arrangement could ever emerge from such interaction and interfusion, if we do not find a common denominator incisively delineated by critical reason, in which the cultural specificity of every distinct group marked out by language, history, economic circumstances and sociopsychological experiences can find expression in multiculturalism? More importantly, how can the theory of intermingling life forces prepare its adherents to come to terms with the technical apparatus, modern telecommunication facilities and computer technology? How can adherents of such an archaic doctrine of forces equip themselves for interaction in an everrapidly expanding global family? Obviously, there is something missing, a path not taken, which the phenomenological searchlight could assist us to uncover.

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A theory of interpenetrating life forces was useful, has served its purpose in the context of the clan and has since outlived its usefulness. One may be permitted to go on a voyage of nostalgia or to paint an idyllic picture of an alleged glorious past. But one may not continue, without absurdity, to blame several decades of inability to evolve a feasible socio-economic and political arrangement after colonial exit on colonial intrusion. The ontology of life forces is not sufficiently critical and rigorous for the purposes of integrating the large African family into the global family. The path not taken is that the existent individual has not been assisted and empowered to rise above clannish, petty, parochial, considerations to climb the lofty mountain of global humanism. Every people at every age has its own characteristic ontology. As the African wakes up in the dawn of the new millennium, an interactive (not intermingling, not interpenetrating) ontology of freely-participating existents contributing freely from their specific cultural standpoints to a common pool of community heritage and seeking consensus therein, is more in consonance with the spirit of the age. It is only when we have entered into the spirit of our age, which we feel, which rattles us, but which we appear to have a reluctance to apprehend, could we begin to thread the path of true egalitarianism. Cultures have borrowed from or interacted with one another without necessarily losing their distinctiveness. Francis Burke calls it “substantive pluralism” in which “. . . the distinctiveness of one’s own culture is reaffirmed through the interaction with the other” (1998, p. 89). Madison calls it “dialogical encounter” between and amongst cultures in which each culture in the dialogical relation comes to greater self-realization (1988, p. 117). Such borrowing or interaction makes for easy and free access of everyone to discourse. The path to thread in the new millennium is the path of multiculturalism in which truth is numerically and quantitatively decidable. The metaphysics of such interaction and multicultural truth determination is neither objectivistic nor relativistic, but intersubjectivistic, that is, through the phenomenological “seeing-consciousness” of the world, of the other. In the interfusing of cultures or multiculturalism that would characterize the new millennium, every distinct culture is allowed to make a profound statement while listening patiently to the equally profound statements of other cultures and resolving differences in superior reasoning that abstracts truth from “dialogical encounter.” This way, no specific culture loses its identity while working in the collective spirit of the age.

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Africa is hereby invited, in the new millennium, to enter into the essence of global humanism by working in the spirit of the age, by going into the world to contribute, not just to borrow. The way to contribute is not to say one thing and do the contrary. Least of all is the way to contribute to a return to archaism, to antiquity or to barbarism. The way to contribute is to vigorously allow our decision as a people to characterize our transactions, and never ever to allow the whims and caprices of a few to determine our collective destiny. University of Lagos REFERENCES Burke, J.F. (1998) “Phenomenology and Multiculturalism: Moving Beyond Assimilation and Utter Diversity Through a Substantive Pluralism” in Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Volume LV, Creative Virtualities in Human Self-Interpretationin-Culture, Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition, Book IV. Ed A.-T. Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Gyekye, K. (1996) African Cultural Values: An Introduction. Philadelphia, Accra: Sankofa Publishing Company. Idoniboye, D.E. (1973) “The Idea of an African Philosophy: The Concept of ‘Spirit’ in African Metaphysics,” Second Order 11: 1. Jahn, J. (1958) Muntu: Umnisse den neoafrikanischen Kultar. Dusseldorf: E. Diedrichs, [English edition: Muntu: an Outline of Neo-African Culture (London: Faberand Faber, 1961)]. Madison, G.B. (1988) The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and Themes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mbiti, J.S. (1967) African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. Nyerere, J. (1968) Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University Press. Oguah, B.E. (1977) “African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study” in African Philosophy: An Introduction. Ed. Richard A. Wright Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. Rodney, W. (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle — L’ouverture Publications. Ruch, E.A. and Anyanwu K.C. (1981) African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Tempels, P. (1959) Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Présence Africaine [La philosophie bantove, in French]. Unah, J.I. (1996) “The Nature of African Metaphysics.” in Metaphysics, Phenomenology and African Philosophy. Ed. J.I. Unah. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Unah, J.I. (1997–98) “Bantu Ontology and its Implications for African Socio-Economic and Political Institutions.” Journal of Oriental and African Studies 9. pp. . . . Wiredu, K. (1989) “On an African Orientation in Philosophy” in Readings in African Philosophy: An Anthology. Ed. S.B. Oluwole. Lagos: Masstech Publishers.

SECTION V

DA N I E L A V E R D U C C I

G I V I N G F O R M TO L I F E AC C O R D I N G TO M A X S C H E L E R

PA RT I : P RO C E S S E S O F F U N C T I O NA L I Z AT I O N A N D O F WO R K

1. The Philosophical Problem of Functions in Scheler Precisely at the heart of his most mature phenomenological work, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, in the section “Fühlen und Gefühle”, dedicated to showing the existence of an “ordre du coeur”, an affective intentionality on the same level as cogitative intentionality, Max Scheler brings up “the class of the intentional affective functions”.1 In doing so he refers to a type of operation for pure feeling which is subsidiary to acts and analogous to that which is found in the intentional movement of representative consciousness.2 However, the use of this term to describe the operative process connected with affective intentionality is not a simple concession on Scheler’s part to the more fashionable studies of the epoch, which used functions in mathematics, logic and the theory of knowledge, psychology and biology.3 Certainly, in the culture of the late 1800s, the functional and procedural dimension bore considerable relevance in various sciences, giving philosophers incentive to apply themselves to it in order to offer a contribution to the understanding of newly apprehended phenomenon. In this way, Scheler demonstrates that functional operativity is enacted not only at the level of biological and psychological or logico-mathematical being, but also and equally in the area of ideal-axiological being. Therefore, every time one has a pure feeling of values, or whenever “we have the feeling of something” independently from the psycho-physical organization of our human species, even in the alogical field, the intentionality of consciousness is expressed, through operations of the “self”, termed “affective functions”. These functions, enacting themselves according to their own automatism, execute in the vital sphere the spiritual acts of pure feeling that the person accomplishes, inasmuch they are “psycho-physically indifferent”, as Scheler says, that is, free from psycho-physical conditioning. The affective intentional functions thus belong in the ambit of that “by means of and because of” which the intentional acts of the spirit can effectively relate themselves with object-entities, reaching them not only on the plane of ideal intentioning but also in reality.4 279 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 279–297. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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At the same time, however, the application of philosophical cognition to the field of affective or non-affective functional relations demonstrates that the operatively self-sufficient universe that a function tends to regulate is not in its turn capable of self-establishment. For example, in the expression “I perceive my I”, Scheler observes, it is clear that the “I” which accomplishes the act of perceiving is on a different level than the “I” which is the object of that perception. In fact, the first “I” in linguistic terms represents someone who is capable of activating a function, the perceptive function, in the ambit of which the second “I” is gathered.5 Thus for each functional relationship which is established, the philosophical question arises of the activating agent, that is, of the originary point from which that way of being active departs. After all, philosophy arises from wonder at that which is the ultimate, that which has nothing beyond itself to go back to cognitively. Philosophy, that is to say, does not issue from the observation of that which one can do, from a field of operativity, but from an astonished gaze upon that which is and could instead not be. In fact, only being, which by its own forces impressed itself on nothing and which as such manifests itself to us, can constitute the authentic principle of everything which is, both in the sense of simple ontological existence and in the other, newer and pregnant sense of life in its ontopoietic character.6 Scheler is well aware of all this. Thus, it is not by chance that in his Philosophische Weltanschauung, a work published a few days before his death, he notes that, starting with Kant’s critique of reason, a revolution occurred in Western metaphysics with the result that “modern metaphysics is no longer cosmology and objective metaphysics, but meta-anthropology and metaphysics of the act”. In fact the idea has taken hold that “the supreme ground of everything which is objectivisable is not itself objectivisable; rather it is only pure fully realized actuality as an attribute of Being, which eternally produces itself”.7 Therefore by now “the entire objective world and its ways of being are not a being-in-itself, but only a repercussion and a ‘section’ of this being-in-itself, compared with the entire spiritual and bodily organization of man. Only moving from the image of the essence of man, which ‘philosophical anthropology’ investigates, it is possible to draw a conclusion — as a backwards prolongation of the acts of his spirit, which originally come from the center of man — about the true attributes of the supreme ground of all things”.8 Therefore if philosophy wants to be itself in the twenty-first century as well, and wants to guide men to participate, by cognition, in the essentiality of all possible things,9 its main task will be to keep awake consciousness of

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the nexus between all the active spheres of the human being, none of which can be repressed or neglected without damage. In particular philosophy will seek to keep open and accessible the road connecting the extensive realm, anthropological and nonanthropological, regulated by functional relations (i.e., psycho-physical being) and the metaphysical dimension of originary being, attainable only by acts of the spirit. In fact it seems that there is no other way that the human being can proceed, if he, as the only entity capable of influencing the course of life consciously, wants to exercise his irreplaceable ontological function of operator of the accomplishment of being to his advantage. 2. The Acts of Pure Feeling and the Intentional Affective Functions In order to examine the intentional dimension of the sentimental sphere and its qualification in a functional sense, Scheler inquires into affective lived experiences of particular complexity. Simple affective states such as “losing one’s temper over something” or “enjoying a beautiful sunset” are not enough. In fact, in these states one is driven in the first place towards the cause of the feeling, gathered thoughtfully and by representation in the empirical events. Only in a second moment does the question arise regarding what gives meaning to the feeling, that is, regarding what makes the beauty of the sunset felt and what configures an empirical object as a source of rage.10 Vice versa, there are lived experiences involving not only an empirical affective state, but also a harkening back to the a priori dimension of feeling, in which an immediate and immanent “feeling something” is given, so that this harkening back does not need representative go-betweens. For example, when “we become sad for not having been able to rejoice in an event, as it deserved to be”,11 it is the very feeling of sadness we experience, which sends us on to a different and better axiological perception: that which characterizes that present affective state is, in fact, a sense of inadequacy vis-à-vis a quality of value, which our empirical feeling was not able to achieve, even though knowing it and being oriented towards it. Thus we are driven towards a level of affective experience in which “the feeling directs itself originally towards a kind of object that is its own, precisely, to values”.12 Here, all extrinsicality in the relationship between feeling and its object is removed, nor is the psychophysical organization of our human species relevant, since this dimension pre-exists our empirical self-reference to it, and it maintains itself even when we abandon it, leaving it in shadow. In fact, Scheler affirms: “This feeling has with its correlative value the same relationship that ‘representation’ has with

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its object, that is, an intentional relationship”. In addition, pure feeling which gathers the value constitutes an event completed in itself, which can find, from the empirical point of view, either “fulfillment” or “non-fulfillment”, without its essential validity being modified.13 Scheler first describes the dynamic of affective intentionality generically as “feeling’s original self-reference, self-orientation towards an object, towards values”,14 but then he soon specifies that it expresses itself in “an instantaneous movement in which something is given to me and ‘comes to manifestation’”.15 In other words, the act of feeling truly draws its determination from that which meets it, since the latter turns out precisely to be the appropriate termination of the movement of the former. Thus every act of intentional feeling qualifies itself as a “goal-determined movement”,16 being induced neither by its spontaneity nor by an extrinsic end. Rather, in pure feeling there is a sort of “entelechy” or inborn inclination to its own end, driving it to fulfill itself in the direction of values: in other words, it manifests that it possesses the nature of a pure “tendency” (Erstreben) and, therefore, that it is totally directed towards its own completion (Ziel).17 In fact, Scheler adds, when we find ourselves in the presence of a behaviour directed toward a value, the qualities-of-value contained in it seem to require, proceeding from itself, corresponding qualities in the responding reactions,18 to the point that, as seen in the case of the lived experience “I am saddened for not having enjoyed an event as it deserved to be”, when close to an affective state, we perceive the inadequacy of our affective reaction as well. In the intentional affective relationship, therefore, there is in force a complete equation between feeling and the felt which in the concrete axiological experience takes place through affective functional processes. In fact, the latter extend the nexus between pure feeling and the quality of value to the psycho-physical level of the individual “I” and of empirical objects. Thus, even in real axiological experience, it happens that, on the one hand, a feeling-movement, emerging from the psycho-physically indifferent level of persons, pinpoints itself in acts which converge totally on the quality of value, while, on the other hand, a value completely pours itself into feeling, causing feeling’s complete actuation. Intentional affective functioning unifies the two poles of the intentional relationship so closely that objective knowledge of feeling and the felt requires of us a deliberate act of reflection.19 Unlike cogitative intentionality, which is pure intuition of essences, the intentional relationship between feeling and value completes an accomplishment of feeling. In this accomplishment of feeling, in external lived experiences as much as in interior lived experiences, we are met only by that

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which has the character of a value (Wertqualität).20 In other words, the act of pure feeling, inasmuch as it is equipped by the affective intentional functioning, rather than proceeding to the intuition of one or other essentiality, gives rise to the axiological adherence of the spirit itself. In this way, feeling enters into contact with values and brings them to manifestation, that is, by becoming one with them before reflection, it overtakes and introduces the distance needful for knowledge: for this reason Scheler holds that affective experience is more original than cogitative experience.21 Thus, the denomination of “affective intentional functions” suits well the psycho-physical operations that connect feeling with values. In fact, in these peculiar dynamics, the two ideal poles of affective intentionality, pure feeling and values — can have results on the psycho-physical level and can concretely express themselves in terms of each other: in the same way in which continuous quantities are effectively represented in space, as delimited along Cartesian axes, by the mathematical functions of axis and ordinate. In the act of feeling a value, the spirit finds its full affective accomplishment in the same way in which the value is entirely grasped by the corresponding pure feeling. Even the very sensory functions of seeing, hearing, etc. draw from that perfect ideal adaptation their model and their measure.22 In the case of the affective functions, therefore, that which is achieved is not an immediate and immanent vision-of-essence, but rather a unification of the movement of the spirit with a quality, that of a value. In pure feeling, the phenomenological experience (“in which is understood only as much as is given and in which nothing is given outside of the understood”)23 comes from an adaptation of the spirit to the felt value, which disposes it, for example, to select knowledge in order to process it into a vision of the world. Scheler affirms that this is seen in analysis of the guiding role of the unities of feeling and of value in the formation of the world view that comes to be expressed in language.24 Unlike Kant’s synthetic functions of the intellect, or categories, Scheler holds that the affective functions in themselves do not open us up to the axiological ideal world: rather, they represent the psycho-physical enactment of a spiritual itinerary which starts out with spontaneous acts of love and hate, “discovers” the axiological horizon, and is thus capable of enlarging or restricting it. This itinerary continues with acts of preference and of deferring which assemble the hierarchic order of values. In fact, the affective intentional functions are a mechanism which is set off in the presence of an already defined axiological context. They are receptive to the a priori axiological dimension, already configured by the “ordo amoris” of each

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person or people: they neither created nor construct values, but simply enter into contact with them in the course of the internal perception, introspection, in a living affective relationship with the world, in the accomplishment of the acts of preference or deferring, of love or of hate, opening for us ethical cognition in its a priori axiological content and proceeding to the axiological formation of the spirit, the source of every authentic praxis.25 3. The Process of Functionalization (= Funktionalizierung) Scheler draws on this functional peculiarity of affective intentionality in Vom Ewigen im Menschen, “Probleme der Religion” therein describing the process of functionalization as that which permits the history of the spirit and of culture. If in fact phenomenological experience culminated in mere ideas and in this exhausted itself, it would risk having no relevance to life, above all, in the face of scientific-technological knowledge which displays a capacity to continually produce useful transformations in the context of daily life. Vice versa, in the pure dimension of feeling, thanks to the type of functional relationship which supports it, the intentional affective movement of the spirit is met by value, not so much as an essence unto itself, but as an end to which the spirit can conform itself in the accomplishment of its own act. In this manner, on an a-rational level, an intentional praxis is determined, the prototypical success of which is in “feeling-the-values”, and its principal result consists in the spirit’s acquisition of a more or less wide variety of adaptations to values. On the other hand, according to Scheler, our spirit possesses neither innate nor congenital ideas: in fact, its being consists of the capacity to acquire knowledge about itself and its surroundings through suitable acts directed towards contingent reality.26 The spirit, therefore, exists as such, in the measure to which it acquires knowledge, that is, it not only scours reality, exercising intentional acts and the connected psycho-physical functional processes, but, through this activity, it enhances its very being-act too. Thus, according to Scheler, a priori knowledge has the character of “receptio”,27 and further the cognitive relationship is ontologically qualified.28 However, Scheler observes, if “our thought and our knowing cannot ‘create’, ‘produce’, ‘form’ anything”, beyond signs and entia ficta, and if, therefore, the “categories” are to be considered a pure Kantian invention, as long as they are understood as synthetic functional laws of the human spirit through which are coined, on a given material without order, the formal objective determinations of being,29 the originality of the spirit and of its a

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priori patrimony would stand next to that of being. The spirit, in fact, gathers from the content of the given an a priori dimension as much as an a posteriori one, capable as it is of distinguishing the determinations of being-so (Sosein), which belong to the pure spheres of the what-thing and of the essence, from the modes of existence (Dasein): in this way the spirit shows that it has with things an authentic and originary relationship of being, establishing a contact which, in and of itself, is not mediated by the sensory organization of our body and which completes a totalizing and unitary intuition of the world. In terms of this intuition, the senses serve as analyzers, introducing differentiations, calibrated according to the degree of biological excitation, that is, according to the possible motor reactions, useful or harmful to the life of the organism which belongs to the spiritual person, as the subject of the intentional perception.30 In conclusion, the spread of the spirit and of its proper sense is indispensable not only for gathering, in the datum itself, the a priori elements from which the objective cognition of qualitative type is developed, but also for acquiring the a posteriori elements that enter into cognition of accidents and quantity.31 However, it remains to be seen how the spirit passes from an “a priori” field to another and “a posteriori” one: precisely to meet this problem Scheler applies the “functionalization” process. There is, in fact, a simple law at work in the operation of the intellect as it is directed towards accidental facts, by which the intellect is able to “determine them”, gather them, distinguish them, intuit them, judge them according to essential nexuses. In this characteristic intellectual behaviour, the essence which the intellect grasps as an object of knowledge (Sache), for example, is transformed in its turn into a form of thought about the object and, analogously, a value, which opens out into an act of love, becomes a form of love in which an unlimited number of objects can be loved. This also happens with that which has been the object of an act of desire, which takes shape as a form of will.32 The cognition of essence in a larger sense, that is, not only in the cogitative realm but also in affective and volitional settings, therefore, gives rise to a “formation” of the spirit, precisely through the application of that dynamics of entelechial finalization which is in force for acts of pure feeling and for the related affective intentional functions oriented towards values. This functionalization process is a spontaneous one of the spirit, and we can recognize it only in the presence of complex lived experiences such as dissatisfaction, deviation from the law and objection to error. In these experiences, in fact, we note a comparative character which signals to us that in our lived experience there is active reference to cognitions of essential

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type, too, that is, to objective and universally valid cognition: thus the latter have entered into our functioning even while not having found themselves explicitly before the eyes of the spirit.33 In functionalizing behaviour the vitality of the spirit is manifested: nourishing itself with cogitative, axiological and volitional “essences”, it acquires and develops the variety of its forms of act, becoming ever more capable of interacting with the other spirits and with extramental reality. Thus, both Spencer and Hegel were wrong when they, departing from opposite, but convergent positions, delineated the evolution of human reason. The former, on the basis of positivistic-sensate cognition theory, favoured the idea of a knowledge which is potentially congenital in the individual, which comes to light in the course of the evolution of the species by means of the organism’s adaptation to the surrounding world. The latter, vice versa, on the groundwork of a rationalistic-constructive theory of reason and of the spirit, represented the development of an idea according to a dialectical law which only takes into consideration the explicitation of that which the idea already has in itself. In both cases, even though for opposite reasons, the same result is arrived at: among the originary dynamics of the spirit no process is identified that is capable of “conforming” reason according to the multiple intuitions of essence that its acts lead to: therefore, there is no true growth at all of the rational spirit itself.34 4. The Work Process as Non-intentional Activity The intentional and functional praxes examined up to this point are not, however, the only types of action identified in Scheler’s analyses, since the human being also acts through work. Thus, intentional praxis has an intrinsic, immediate and immanent relationship with an axiological end; a functional praxis prepares the “fulfillment” or “non-fulfillment” of the noematic pole of that relationship; the work activity, at least, operates through an extrinsic nexus with the end, even though that end determines it. In his Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926), Scheler defines work as psychophysical activity in which a given material is transformed, placing it directly in contrast to cognition, which he considered, vice versa, as spiritual activity directed at ideal participation in things.35 As early as 1899, in his essay Arbeit und Ethik, Scheler had examined the particular structure of work activity compared with other types of theoretical or practical active being, drawing on linguistic observations and using the psycholinguistic method adopted by Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels.

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In particular, Scheler had observed that the German verb “arbeiten”, the linguistic expression for work activity does not take a direct object as do other verbal forms indicating production, such as the transitive verbs “schaffen” and “erschaffen”. This shows that work does not have an intrinsic relationship with the ends or the results which are attained by execution of its process. In effect, from the point of view of pure work activity, it makes no difference whether the work be house building or accounting: if the two actions can be indifferently indicated as work, that means that they possess the same essential structure and that this identity is maintained independently of the empirical ends to which the individual work processes are applied.36 At the same time, continuing the linguistic analysis, Scheler finds that the activity expressed by “arbeiten” is not absolutely intransitive, since the verb is followed by indirect objects of place, introduced by the prepositions “in” or “an”.37 Work seems thus to occupy a “sui generis” position in the practical realm. It indeed lacks an intrinsic relationship with its ends, it is not identical with “praxis”, that is, with moral intentional activity, the end of which is the process itself; even though it is indirectly connected to its ends or results, as indicated by the use of prepositions of place, work can not be assimilated into “poiesis” or productive transitive activity, the end of which is external, according to Aristotle’s famous definitions of that word in his Nicomachian Ethics.38 In Scheler’s analysis, work is thus neither exclusively practical nor totally poietic: rather, its distinguishing feature is its executive nature, inasmuch as it is directed to a material accomplishment and the transformation of the world. Work’s structural specificity causes it to assume, therefore, a middle position between “praxis” and “poiesis”, providing for their ideal dynamics the guarantee of delivering effective results for the transformation of reality. For its part, by its opportune integration of both theoretical and practical intentional activities, work receives that indispensable orientation toward a finality that in and of itself it lacks. 5. Conclusion This brief overview of the principal anthropological acts and processes directed at giving form to life as analysed by Max Scheler has allowed us to demonstrate the close nexus which, according to Scheler, joins the activities of the human being in an articulated unity. In fact, starting with the axiological stream provoked by the spontaneous movement of love, the spirit invests the world with its triple intentionality, affective, cogitative and

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volitional, giving rise, through the functionalization process, to its own formation and at the same time disposing itself as well to shape extramental reality by means of work. University of Macerata Translated by Sheila Beatty.

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“die Klasse der intentionalen Fühlfunktionen”. Cf.: M. Scheler Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, in Gesammelte Werke (henceforth cited as GW) 2 Bern, Munich; Francke Verlag, (1954), p. 264. Further references to Formalismus will be indicated by F. 2 F, p. 87. M. Frings, in his recent monograph on Scheler, The Mind of Max Scheler (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997), (pp. 22–25; 60–63), seems to propose that the acts of pure feeling directed to values and the intentional affective functions are identical. In fact, he thinks that Scheler attributes a merely functional existence to values (“The Functional Existence of Values” is the title of the first section of the first chapter of his book), depriving them of any existence in and of themselves (“The Non-Existence of Values Per Se” is the title of a sub-section). In contrast, we think that a precise differentiation between acts and functions emerges from Formalismus, whereby acts realize themselves in the free dimension of the person while functions develop according to their own automatisms in the ambit of the psycho-physical self (F, p. 387; in addition: pp. 118, 122, 124, 334, where acts and functions are named together, linked with the conjunction, “and”). This distinction seems more suitable than identifying acts and functions, more in accord with the Schelerian idea of the spirit as that whole of “all that presents the essence of act, intentionality and fullness of sense” (F, p. 388), which, even though it lacks power (it is “ohnmächtig”, M. Scheler, “Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos”, in GW 9, Späte Schriften [1976], p. 45), is able to enter into a cognitive relationship with the world of ideal being as much as it is able to direct and guide, inhibiting and loosing, the course of life. (Idem, “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens”, GW 8, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft [1960] p. 40, n. 1). In fact, it is our opinion that the spiritual person’s capacity to contribute to the accomplishment of being pivots precisely on the discovery that acts of pure feeling, which operate exclusively in the ideal sphere, are constituted so as to be assisted by the intentional affective functions, which fulfill and prolong the intentional acts of feeling, until they arrive at their effective realization on the psycho-physical level. 3 In mathematics, Fourier, Dirichlet and Lobatschewski contributed to the generalization of the process of the geometric analysis of the continuous curve. P. G. Dirichlet, in particular, was the first to work on the mathematical notion of function, enabling Cauchy, Riemann and Weierstrasse to better focus on the conceptual gaps still present in the area of the functional analysis of continuity, differentiability, analyticity and integrability. In 1887 A. R. Dedekind offered the first explicit formulation of the current notion of the concept of function, which Schroeder then applied to the theory of relativity in 1895. In the logic of Frege as well, the objective field is divided into the object sector and the functions, which are marked by “lack of integration” (Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit). In his 1922 work, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, the Neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen dealt with the new importance of the concept of function in the mathematical theory of equations. He wrote that it derived from the law introduced by Leibniz on the reciprocal dependence between two variable quantities by which it is possible to produce, among

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the single members or elements, a relationship which accomplishes the function. In 1910 E. Cassirer in his work Substanzbegriff und Funktion-Begriff, while guiding conceptualization to the exercise of the function of order, considers the functional relationship as a producer of concepts. In fact, introducing the nexus of a function into an ambit of variable content always means establishing between the members of the set a constant and general connection which configures them according to the specific form of the concept or symbolic form. In the field of psychology, the two works of William James The Principles of Psychology (1890) and Psychology (1892) launch a fierce attack on the rational psychology of the metaphysical tradition and on the more recent psychological structuralism of Wundt. They were based precisely on a functional consideration of the psyche, one drawn from Spencer and Darwinism. James holds that the soul is not a spiritual absolute entity with its own evolution, but that it derives its current condition from interaction with the environment and adaptation to it. Thus spiritual activity must be considered a function of cerebral activity and in general of the body. In the biological sciences a debate was underway cover priority between form and function. Von Uexkuell, in Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (1921), described the functional circle in animals which connects adductor and effector organs, thus identifying the theoretical structure which was fundamental to enabling biological researchers to reconstruct foreign environments. 4

F, p. 387. “Sage ich dagegen: ‘Ich nehme mein Ich wahr’, so haben die beiden ‘Iche’ wieder verschiedene Sinn”, F, p. 389. 6 Cfr. our “Meraviglia e disincanto nel pensiero di Max Scheler”, in Interpretazione e Meraviglia, Atti del XIV Colloquio sull’Interpretazione — Macerata (Pisa: Giardini Editore, 1994), pp. 53–64. 7 “So ist moderne Metaphysik nicht mehr Kosmologie und Gegenstandsmetaphysik, sondern Metaanthropologie und Aktmetaphysik. Leitende Einsicht ist dabei, dass der oberste Grund alles dessen, was gegenstandsfähig ist, selber nicht gegenstandsfähig ist, sondern nur reine vollziehbare Aktualität als Attribut des ewig sich selbst hervozbringenden Seins”, in M. Scheler, “Philosophische Weltanschauung”, in Späte Schriften, GW 9 (1995), p. 83. The text appeared for the first time in Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten, May 5, 1928, that is a few days before Scheler’s sudden death on May 19. 8 “Alle gegenständliche Welt und ihre Seinsweisen sind nicht ein ‘Sein an sich’, sondern nur ein der gesamten geistigen und leiblichen Organisation des Menschen angemessener Gegenwurf und ‘Ausschnitt’ aus diesem Sein an sich. Erst vom Wesensbilden des Menschen aus, das die ‘philosophische Anthropologie’ erforscht, ist — als Rückverlangerung seiner urtümlich aus dem Zentrum des Menschen quellenden Akte des Geistes — ein Schluss zu ziehen auf die wahren Attribute des obersten Grundes aller Dingen”. Ibid., p. 82. 9 M. Scheler, “Das Wesen der Philosophie und der moralischen Bedingung des philosophischen Erkennens”, in Vom Ewigen im Menschen, GW 5 (1954). In particular on page 68 Scheler defines the act of philosophizing as “liebesbestimmter Aktus der Teilnahme des Kernes endlichen Menschenperson am Wesenhaften aller möglichen Dinge”, again stating a few lines below that “Philosophie Erkenntnis ist”. 10 F, pp. 262–264. 11 F, p. 264. 12 “Das Fühlen geht ursprünglich auf eine eigene Art von Gegenständen, eben die Werte”, p. 264. 13 “‘Fühlen’ is also ein sinnvolles und darum auch der ‘Erfüllung’ und ‘Nichterfüllung’ fähiges Geschehen” (F, p. 263). 5

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“Ein ursprüngliches Sichbeziehen, Sichrichten des Fühlens auf ein Gegeständliches, auf Werte” (F, pp. 262–263). 15 “Eine punktuelle . . . Bewegung, in der mir etwas gegeben wird und ‘zur Erschauung’ kommt” (F, p. 263). 16 “Zielbestimmte Bewegung” (F, p. 263). 17 F, pp. 55–56. 18 “Die in den betreffenden Wertverhalten liegenden Wertqualitäten fordern von sich aus gewisse Qualitäten derartiger emotionaler ‘Antwortreaktionen’ — wie anderseits diese auch in ihnen in gewissem Sinne ‘ihr Ziel erreichen’ ” (F, p. 264). 19 F, p. 264. 20 “Im Vollzug des Fühlens wird uns das Fühlen nicht gegenständlich bewusst: Es tritt uns nur eine Wertqualität von aussen oder innen her ‘entgegen’ ” (F, p. 264). 21 F, p. 83, note 2; in addition, M. Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, GW 7 (1973), p. 41 and p. 68; ‘Das Wesen der Philosophie’, op. cit., p. 81 and ‘Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens’, op. cit., p. 104. 22 F, p. 387; in addition, M. Scheler, ‘Erkenntnis und Arbeit’ (henceforth cited EA), in GW 8, “Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft”, pp. 283–379. 23 F, p. 70. 24 F, p. 265. 25 F, p. 87 and p. 89. 26 M. Scheler, “Probleme der Religion” (from now on: PR), in Vom Ewigen im Menschen, op. cit, p. 195. 27 PR, p. 197. 28 EA, p. 203. 29 PR, p. 195. 30 PR, p. 196. 31 Ibid. 32 PR, p. 198. 33 Ibid. 34 PR, pp. 200–201. 35 EA, “Zusätze”, p. 448. 36 M. Scheler, ‘Arbeit und Ethik’, in GW 1, “Frühe Schriften”, (1971), p. 168. 37 Ibid. 38 Aristotle Nicomachian Ethics, VI, 1140b 6–7, in which he affirms: “In fact, the end of production (poiesis) is other than the production itself, while the end of action (praxis) is not: acting morally well is an end unto itself”.

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PA RT I I : H U M A N P E R C E P T I O N A S A C O O P E R AT I O N O F V I TA L A N D S P I R I T UA L F O R C E S

The philosophical research of Max Scheler was constantly conducted in that area of knowledge that lies between philosophy and the sciences, natural and human, which, in his opinion, to an equal extent represents the origin of both the effectiveness of the sciences and the speculative and metaphysical developments of philosophy. In this regard the themes raised by the titles of the very first of Scheler’s works are significant: Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und den ethischen Prinzipien and Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode.1 It is, however, above all in his sociology that Scheler gave scientific expression to his “realistic” sensibility, demonstrating that if, on the one hand, in the absence of real structural factors ideas do not transform reality, on the other hand, activity and work which are not oriented by ideal factors operate blindly and are thus potentially destructive.2 What was thus of great interest for Scheler were the historical developments which, from the late middle ages, brought work, among all human activities, to the fore, enabling it progressively to encompass the whole anthropological context and give shape to every human achievement as the exclusive outcome of that automatic and effective activity termed work. Particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century, Scheler was able to observe the outcomes of that process which had already become an object of scientific concern for sociological thought, political economics and economic history.3 This had made a deep impact on the understanding that man had of himself, in the end causing, along with Pragmatism, not only a crisis for traditional anthropologies,4 but also the appearance, among anthropological thinking, of a fresh alternative, which Scheler formulated thus: From the essential point of view, is man really homo rationalis or rather is he not homo faber?5 The theoreticians of Pragmatism tended to resolve the question quickly, unanimously preferring the latter hypothesis. Peirce and James sustained that our ideas are confused, and thus ineffective in practice, because of the reduction to pure intellect that they have been subjected to during the course of the development of Western philosophical thought. In their opinion, it is opportune to introduce, on the model of the modern sciences, a practical calibration of thought whereby its sense and meaning are identified solely from the way of acting (die Handlungsweise) that ideas can determine or produce.6 James expounds Peirce’s position, declaring in his famous essay on Pragmatism that, in order to clarify our idea of an object, we must only take into consideration the practical effects that the idea implies. Our cognitive

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attention is thus confined to concentrating on the perceptions that we must expect from the idea of that object and on the reactions to be prepared in consequence. The whole representation of the object, to the extent that it has, in general, a positive meaning, derives for us from the representation of such practical effects, first of all those of a perceptive and immediately reactive type.7 As regards those ideas which make up the processes of reasoning, the crucial question for James is: “If this or that alternative were true, how would the world change respectively?” In the absence of changes in life and action triggered by juxtaposed ideas, it must be concluded that the alternative itself has no sense whatsoever,8 even though it be put forward again verbally and conceptually, and maintained. Scheler observes that the most immediate and obvious result that derives from the application of this first cornerstone of pragmatist gnoseology, whereby ideas consist of the way of acting that they induce, is really an enormous simplification. The bearer of those factors of judgement that Western logico-philosophical tradition had always kept somewhat distinct is now a single indivisible dynamic process. The sense of judgement, the act of judging and the fact upon which the judgement is pronounced are, therefore, involved in a single vital sequence of action, sensation, observation, new action, in which knowing takes place. Each act of knowing is thus not only both theoretical and practical but is also and above all of simultaneous importance from the anthropological-vital and ontological-metaphysical standpoints: In his act of knowing, man, that special being, through the intermediary of his biological structure, acts upon being as such. By exercising cognitive activity, human beings are not limited to obtaining and forming ideas about themselves and about the world, quite apart from an interest in the greater or lesser success of their application in practical life. Rather, it is precisely from the instinctive-vital structure that the propulsions which start up the human cognitive system emerge in a search for their satisfaction. The idea that is generated in this way is, in reality, the program of the activity of satisfaction of the emergent propulsions, and, being closely connected to them, it triggers off the appropriate fulfilling biological mechanisms.9 According to the pragmatists, when he thinks, man vitally interacts with everything that surrounds him, transforming and shaping the indeterminate and chaotic hyle in which he is immersed into cosmos, or into a world endowed at that very time with sense and facts.10 Peirce and James confirmed and reinforced this first nucleus of pragmatist gnoseology endowing it with a new definition of truth: A proposition, whose sense and significance has been confirmed according to recently discovered

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practical criteria is true if the actions which it gives rise to and which it thus represents conform to a purpose or imply the reaching of an intent, the satisfaction of a desire, the fulfillment of an expectation. Scheler observes that the pragmatists even offer a practical conception of truth: For them, what is true is what is useable and opportune11 on the level of life; that is to say; true ideas are those that lead, owing to perceptions and the immediate reactions that they imply for a living human being, to successful interventions within reality. Certain acts of knowing are, therefore, deemed true because they initiate a way of acting which can give shape to the indeterminate, fluctuating, chaotic and insubstantial complex of impressions that surround us and which, like work material (Arbeitsmaterial), is subjected to our “spiritual” activity because this transforms it into useable “facts.” Nor are these “facts” there at the origin of the process. They are produced by an incessant activity of exchange which binds the living human to the vital flow that runs through the whole universe. Facts correspond to that level of living relationship between a human being and the environment whereby the programs of actions which ideas represent can always achieve a better degree of satisfaction of vital needs. Ideas give shape to facts because they are spurred by the questions12 to which the emerging propulsions are applied and which require satisfactory answers. The practical interpretation of truth, taken as the achievement of success in the satisfaction of instincts and needs in the human being, is accompanied, as an inevitable corollary, by a pragmatic reduction of logical principles: Not even these, according to the pragmatists, are innate but are formed out of the impulse of vital necessities and the work that they require; they were then consolidated, in the course of human generations, following repeated successful interventions within reality.13 Although Scheler identified early signs of pragmatist themes in medieval nominalism and then in Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Fichte, Sigwart, Comte, Marx, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, he still believed that the pragmatist combination represented a novelty in the contemporary philosophical panorama. This was a novelty to be taken into serious consideration because it gave an authoritative voice to a series of phenomena which had been hitherto overlooked by overintellectual philosophical thinking, such as those pertaining to the a-rational sphere, both in the area of sentiment and in that of will, activity and action, work.14 Indeed, for Scheler, the nucleus of the truth of which Pragmatism is the bearer should be safeguarded in a special way and thus accompanied by that philosophical reflection which Pragmatism explicitly wanted to renounce.15 The formulation of a philosophy and a metaphysics of perception is thus of particular importance: Only through its go-between can

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the pragmatist conception of this insuppressible relational pivot between theory and practice, ideal world and real world, liberated of its reductive unilaterality and integrated with appropriate founding metaphysical notions, be usefully inserted into the cultural circuit and participate in the promotion of the new era of harmonization which, according to Scheler,16 was imminent. In the first place, Scheler intends to shelter from rejections which are unjustified and deleterious for the development of authentic philosophical knowledge, the central conception of Pragmatism namely that the primary relationship of man and of every organism with the world is not at all theoretical, but practical.17 The living human grasps what surrounds him in conformity with practical reasons related to his biological structure: Thus, in the natural vision of the world the living human favours the thesis of reality over that of being-so (So-sein, i.e., essence); he sees space and time as empty forms; he turns his instinctive attention towards concrete and solid things rather than those which are liquid or gaseous; he gives priority to the mere possibility of perception of a being or an event, if this seems controllable and uniformly recurrent, whilst he puts into second place things that occur that are not uniform or controllable. Certain phenomena that stand in contrast to the findings of physics or geometry depend on the biological economy of the visual function: For example, we see what is close as smaller and what is far away as larger than is determined by the laws of perspective and by taking into account angle of view; or we see that the shape, size and colour of objects are constant and do not vary on the basis of the intensity of stimuli. The following types of behaviour are conditioned in a practical sense: all intelligence in the sphere of the natural vision of the world, the perspective of interests as regards the conceptual meanings of a person or a group, the selection of states of things grasped by judgements, and finally the orientation and impulse of mediated thinking in relation to the practical tasks to be performed, presented to us by instincts and needs.18 Substantially, the principle that in the course of any perception, only what is necessary to enable a living being to react will present itself19 is as true for man as it is true for every other living thing. However, already in the context of the positive science of nature and psychology, the pragmatic motive seems to lose its self-sufficiency: it is in fact true that even this knowledge is pursued for practical ends, or else to supply the fullest satisfaction of the instinctive propulsions of the living being. But developing within this pragmatistic knowledge is a model of a mechanism which can satisfy the needs of a biological being not only that is not present in its immediate and vital relations with what is, and thus perceives it and transforms it, but which also establishes an unequal rela-

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tionship of dominion over what surrounds it. The living human being, different from all others, is endowed with spontaneous movement; he knows and wants to dominate,20 and for this reason he frames, through scientific knowledge, a mechanistic model of nature, wherein everything moves according to certain laws and everything is governable, domitable, avoidable for a being who knows and wants to apply such laws to his own advantage, escaping the natural mechanism.21 So the tracing of human acts of knowing back to mere vital exchange is insufficient, even if one only wants the knowing to be pragmatistically true. For the optimum achievement of this purpose, a distance from biological life needs to be introduced, one which allows the observation of the difference between governable living beings, subjected to mechanistic operations and living beings that govern, because they are capable of spontaneous and nonmechanical movement. Where could the perception of this difference come from, in an exclusively pragmatic universe? This, observes Scheler, is never treated as a theme in pragmatic gnoseology, because of essential description does not lie within the confines of pragmatic knowledge, which is aimed at the manipulation of being, and is surrendered to ontology. Some essential qualities of the human person, who apart from living knows and wants to dominate, must, however, as has been seen, be presupposed; and the philosopher can clarify them, thus obtaining at the same time a foundation for scientific-pragmatic knowledge-of-dominion (Herrschaftswissen) and a movement towards philosophical knowledge-of-formation (Bildungswissen) and towards knowledge of theological salvation (Erlösungswissen).22 Scheler indeed observes that “Knowledge — even pragmatistically oriented knowledge — can succeed in practice only insofar as it is real participation (in being), to the extent, that is, that judgements are formally correct and objectively true — and that anyway knowledge and truth are not the only things determining the success of our actions”,23 which take place in the context of a totality that remains completely beyond these apprehensions. Our natural consciousness already makes us convinced of the fact that the inkpot, for example, which is in front of me in the multiplicity of its objective determinations, will continue to be and to be-so, that my perception neither adds nor takes away anything from this being, that this as an object in its fullness is always richer than any possible perception. It is true that if I “expect” to have the same image again — both as a perception, and in the form of a memory — this could be explained by the fact that its being and being-so has fixed itself within me on the basis of a perception. But how did this being and being-so get into me? This is a question of images, or ideal

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beings, that come to the consciousness through intentional but never causal relations. Scheler is thus led to distinguish three types of stimuli: biological stimuli, referred to elements of the environment, for example, the ring of a bell perceived at a distance; stimuli conceived in physico-chemical terms, which reduce them to mechanico-formal images like airwaves; and finally, at the base of all other stimuli, metaphysical stimuli, there are linked to real forces that contain the reasons and causes of our perceptual, natural and scientific images (environmental as well as mechanico-formal stimulus processes emanate from these). These metaphysical forces act directly and causally on the factors of vital or inanimate or impulsive force that constitute the basic system of various organisms. Each organism then perceives and reacts on the basis of its own measure. The human being, therefore, develops his own perception not only according to merely biological or psycho-physical work parameters, but also in conformity with that ideal-spiritual dimension that pragmatistic gnoseology itself could not avoid recognizing. The perceptual relationship continuously evolves and is enriched for man, to the extent to which, in cultivating a metaphysical attitude and knowledge, he can trace back the stimuli to their real ontological agents and measure them against his own being, in an authentic production of the ideal individual being that we could call ontopoiesis and which really allows man to participate in becoming the foundation of the world, as Scheler wishes.24 For this reason, in his view, Perception is an outcome and an end, not the beginning of psychic-spiritual development. . . . Man draws close to the ideal perception of image than does the animal, the adult more than the youth, man more than woman, the individual more than the shear member of a collectivity, the man who thinks historically and performs the act of knowing in a systematic way more than the man who acts out of a tradition wherein he is ensnared — that is to say he who cannot objectify on the basis of memory that which ensnares him, nor temporally localise it, because he cannot become aware of it within an attitude achieving distance vis-à-vis the past.25

According to Scheler, the wise man identifies himself neither with the pragmatist who gets lost in the contingent reality of the world and does not see the essence of things, nor with the idealist who, in his enthusiasm for the world of ideas, does not feel the resistance of the world. The wise man sees and feels both aspects of reality and does not try to harmonize them precipitously within being itself.26 University of Macerata Translated by Sheila Beatty

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Published respectively in 1899 in Jena, by Vopelius (now in: Gesammelte Werke (GW), Vol. I, Frühe Schriften edited by Maria Scheler and M. Frings, Bern and Munich: Francke Verlag, 1971, pp. 9–161) and in 1900 in Leipzig, by Dürer (now in GW 1, op. cit., pp. 162–197). 2 Cf.: M. Scheler, Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens, GW 8 (1960), p. 21. 3 In one of his first essays “Arbeit und Ethik”, which appeared in 1899 in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 114/2, pp. 161–200 (now in GW 1, op.cit., pp. 161–197), Scheler names Comte with his sociology, the English and Marx with their political economics along with Schmöller as those who dealt with these questions from the point of view of the empirical sciences, without being able to integrate their consideration with those of the philosophers, who, in this very field, had abandoned their task. 4 Cf. the beginning of the work Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (in GW 9 “Späte Schriften”, (1975), pp. 7–73), and for a review on the various types of anthropology Mensch und Geschichte, now in GW 9, pp. 120–144. 5 With this alternative Max Scheler’s work opens, Erkenntnis und Arbeit now in GW 8 “Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft”(1960), p. 193 (henceforth cited as EuA). 6 EuA, p. 212: “Die Handlungsweise ist für uns die ganze Bedeutung dieses Gedankens” and shortly before that Scheler, again recalling Peirce’s declarations, says: “Wir müssen die Handlungsweise bestimmen, die dieser Gedanke hervorzuführen geeignet ist.” 7 EuA, p. 212. Scheler quotes from a translation made in W. Jerusalem Der Pragmatismus (Leipzig: Philos. Soziolog. Bücherei, 1908), Vol. I, p. 29. 8 EuA, p. 214. 9 EuA, p. 200; p. 215. 10 EuA, pp. 215–216. 11 EuA, p. 219: “wird eine Art der Brauchbarkeit und Nutzlichkeit”. 12 EuA, p. 220: “irgendeine Frage vorlegen”. 13 EuA, p. 213. 14 Scheler here seems to reconnect with observations on the rationalistic reduction at work in Western thinking, something he himself stated in Formalismus when dealing with “Fühlen e Gefühle”, or that feeling and sentiment from which so-called “affective perception” springs, another of the novelties introduced by him in the field of reflection on perception. 15 EuA, p. 211. 16 Cf. the concluding sentence of EuA, on p. 382; “Die Zukunft aber besitz eine neue selbständige Erhebung des echt philosophischen und metaphysischen Geist.” See also the enigmatic essay, Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs, published posthumously in: H. Lichtenberger, J. Shotwell, M. Scheler (eds.), Ausgleich als Schicksal und Aufgabe (Berlin: Rothschild Publisher, 1929), (now in “Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs”, GW 9, pp. 145–171). 17 EuA, p. 239. 18 EuA, p. 240. 19 M. Scheler, Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens, GW 3, “Vom Umsturz der Werte” (1972). 20 EuA, pp. 240–241. 21 EuA, p. 241. 22 EuA, pp. 205–208. 23 EuA, p. 206. 24 Cf.: Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs, op.cit. 25 Ibid., p. 315. 26 Ibid., p. 465.

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The medicine we know today developed in the past century when physicians started to examine systematically the structure and functions of the human organism — both when healthy and during an illness. The so-called mechanical model of illness became an essential paradigm of clinical thinking in the period which — using Kuhn’s terminology — we could call a period of normal science. For several years, however, we have been aware that the established paradigm of medicine has been questioned from various points of view. The increase of interest in clinical investigation (the critical clinical school) and in medical ethics has been a response to the uncontrolled introduction of new therapeutic techniques to medical practice. This has been closely connected with the fact that physicians have come to understand not only that clinical practice is an applied natural science, but also that clinical decisions always refer to value judgements. This explains why modern physicians discuss more and more often not only methods of treatment and prognoses, but also the patient’s quality of life.1 Our situation is exceptional also for two other reasons. The first consists in the disappearance of boundaries between cultural spheres. This is quite new — formerly, cultural spheres were rather strictly isolated. The other new phenomenon consists in the very rapid progress of technology stimulated by the development of science. No other example illustrates the speed of development of a branch of science than the history of modern molecular genetics. During as short a period as thirty years we have passed from understanding the structure of DNA to the project of plotting the human genome, whose aim is to create a complete map of the millions of human genes. This whole branch of science has become mature so fast that at present the main debate in this domain concerns not strictly scientific problems but ethical issues. Usually we assume that a science deals with structures while its purpose belongs to the domain of philosophy and religion. The discoveries of the twentieth century — quantum mechanics and molecular biology — obscure this division. A focus on structure still remains a powerful paradigm for science, but the spectacular downfall of strict determinism, accompanying the development of quantum mechanics, has inclined some scientists to enter the area of philosophy. They ask about the possible connection between the 299 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 299–305. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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visible indeterminism of quantum mechanics and the freedom of the human individual. In the new science mathematical description must be based a priori on a distribution of probabilities.2 We must also remember to distinguish science understood as one form of intellectual activity of people in the field of culture, from its application in technology. In the former instance it is not possible to speak of any control, because it concerns conceptions and ideas. In the latter case, social control and adjustment to the requirements of reality are highly advisable. However, confusing of science in the sense of intellectual activity with technology is becoming disturbingly common. Owing to this it is very difficult to formulate any prognosis. As J.M. Boche´nski puts it: “We must not formulate any longterm prognosis. We can and should pose postulates, which are necessary for action. A postulate is not a prognosis, we just assume something in order to be able to act. A long-term prognosis is not possible.”3 We can consider whether a prognosis is possible at all or whether it is only that we cannot pose one. We do not have sufficient experience to be able to formulate prognoses. We have nothing to compare the present situation to, and this is why any extrapolation from today’s status quo is just prophesying and has nothing to do with science. Scientists cannot do it, thus leaving the field for ideologists and the authors of all kinds of myths. Modern science is exceptionally mythical in two senses of this word. One concerns symbols used for the analogical formulation of another thought — in this sense a religion is not possible without a myth. The second sense that shapes our day is absolutely different from the religious one, because here mythic expressions are understood literally. Here, myths are ideals known as being impossible to realize but treated as if they were possible goals. Sociologists claim that such myths have always played an important role in politics and that the situation is the same today. This is the case with issues like the myth of human equality, the myth of perfect democracy, the myth of societies in which human rights are realized, and so-forth. On the other hand, in science, myths are completely useless, and a long-term prognosis regarding issues like the progress of humanity or the dangers issuing from technology is not possible. This can be proved by a logical analysis of any prognosis. A prognosis always appears as a conditional syllogism, the so-called modus ponendo ponens in the following form: if p then q; p is so, therefore q. The first premise is as follows: If the conditions remain as they are, this and this will happen. However, as regards human matters we know very few laws — some are posited in demography, but they are at best highly unreliable. The second

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premise, declaring that conditions will remain as they are, is obviously false. Now are we to make a prognosis, then, in such a situation? In any case, if one wants to say something sensible about the future, about the factors that are supposed to influence a person in the future, this operation is to be called planning rather than making a prognosis. We should also mention the enormous complexity of human nature, which resists any calculations, and the impossibility of foreseeing future inventions. This, however, does not exclude a projection of the probable or possible as a basis for positing possible final effects. Moreover, knowledge of possibilities itself, though it is not enough to allow the framing of a convincing prognosis, is quite sufficient for hermeneutic casuistry, that is as an aid in recognizing the ethical principles applicable in hitherto unknown situations, a needful exercise given the lack of definite opportunities in which they can be applied. We are facing a large number of unknown quantities. The problem of responsibility connected with expanding individual freedom is not a new problem. Nowadays it has only become more intense due to the rapid development of medical science. This problem has already been discussed by several authors. — In his book “Escape from Freedom,”4 Fromm (who is particularly current as regards the situation in our country) emphasized human persons’ subconscious resignation from responsibility in connection with escape into schemes of sado-masochism, destructive activity or conformism. The list can be completed with other dependencies like alcoholism, drug abuse, and TV-mania. — Teilhard de Chardin set the programme of human life in the dimension of the collective construction of noosphere (the sphere of thought hovering above geosphere and biosphere, consisting of the spiritual achievements of past, present and future theorizing), where civilization together with the particular achievements of science and technology are of utmost importance for the unity of mankind. Taking into consideration the increasingly quantitative dimension of and the qualitatively growing complexity of the modern world, homo sapiens is not in an enviable situation. Humans want to understand the world, and, in the situation of the disintegration of science, they have become interested in para-science, all kinds of systematic “esoteric knowledge” and its advocates. This increased interest is manifested in various ways on different cultural levels: from a fortune-teller explaining dreams to a priest-healer, to a guru representing a specific philosophical plane (New Age).

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A man of today often seems rebellious in a specific way; this is the way that, in existential philosophy, was called absurd. Modern civilization is justly symbolized by Sisyphus, whose example serves to illustrate the enormity and senselessness of man’s numerous efforts and sufferings. In negating this effort, a human person denies his/her own value — rebels against his/her own fate. Recognising Sisyphus as a happy man is a relatively new phenomenon. Albert Camus wrote: “a fight leading to the top is enough to fill human hearts; we must imagine Sisyphus as a happy man.”5 These words express a minimalist attempt at finding satisfaction in a difficult and unfavourable situation. They seem to show a deep change in values, due to which a modern man has lost sight not only of the old ideal of happiness, but also of the hope that happiness is something stable that can be achieved. This gives rise to anxiety and fear manifested in constant tension and tiredness with life. It would be reasonable to recall here a picture of a prognostic character presented in Alvin Toffler’s work, “Future Shock” (whatever be our opinion about his therapeutic method). In this work Toffler examines consequences that the extraordinary increase of the speed of life connected with the intensive and uncontrolled development of technology brings to an individual and to whole societies. (In Poland we additionally have to deal with changes in value structures, connected with political transformation.) When the speed of change goes beyond the threshold of human adjustment abilities, when relations become more transitory, when the pressure of novelty increases, when both material goods (imposed by advertisements) and the content of culture, norms and models of behaviour become too diversified, the human individual faces the necessity of making more and more choices. In this situation the individual may become paralysed by the speed of change and may manifest the symptoms of “future shock”.6 The symptoms of this civilizational disease include refusal to accept further information, rejection of the necessity of gradually solving difficult life problems. In the future reaction will consist in a psychological crisis connected with confrontation with a panoply of simultaneous changes. There is also occurring: — narrow specialization accompanied by the blocking of new ideas and information in other domains of life; — obsessive attachment to past ways of adjusting to the environment in solving new problems; — searching for a simple, convincing ideology of universal character: McLuhanism, astrology, conspiratorial theories, youth subcultures.

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All these particular tactics aimed at forefending future shock are executed subconsciously. Their efficacy increases when they are transferred to the conscious level. This is often connected with becoming, at least temporally, isolated from other people, from the society undergoing transformation. The utopian aspect of Toffler’s theory is connected with the establishment of socalled associations for the future of society — democratic or even pluralistic informal institutions that would educate individuals unadjusted to change and return them to society. What is worth noticing in Toffler’s vision, is, first of all, his focus on the large number of people maladjusted to life in the post-industrial epoch, and, secondly, his emphasis and his assigning a very high priority to educational and therapeutic activity that involves a concise programme. For numerous reasons we can recognize our day as a turning-point, a kind of edge (the edge of an epoch) between the past of the human world and its future. Humans sometimes manifest an inclination to absolutize the historical role of the epoch in which they live. However, even when we try to think coolly and rationally about it, it is hard for us to avoid the fact that a new quality inheres to contemporary civilization. Taking into consideration the civilizational development of the world as well as the further possibilities and results of this development, one must conclude that we have probably broken through barrier in this development and that life now has a quality hitherto unknown in the world. At present, in the circle of European culture three visions of the human being compete with one another: — the human being as a creature of God, a theological vision; — the human being as a rational creature, the Ancient Greek tradition; — the human as the final stage of the development of life on Earth, the perspective of the modern natural sciences. As Scheler puts it, a man has become a problem for himself. In analysis of the causal background of the present “spiritual situation” and the destruction of the civilization’s “basic vision,” this vision is often understood as some internally consistent set of answers given by a definite epoch to four particularly important questions. The questions concern: — humanity’s place in the cosmos; — the existence of progress; — the importance and usefulness of science; — the range of human possibilities and impossibilities. The postulated harmonization of the new reflections provoked by these matters so important for men given the results of modern science and histori-

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cal experience is undoubtedly an intellectual project of great importance. This, however, does not seem to constitute the greatest difficulty of the task we are facing. An accepted system of values and a hierarchy of goals corresponding to it (though in a liberal society compromise is necessary) would ensure that the particular elements of the new basic vision will constitute a harmonious whole. The problem lies rather in the difficulties of a psychological nature connected with making any vision or paradigm a commonly accepted one.7 In this situation, the creation and dissemination of a new basic vision has a chance of success on the condition that rationalism will be tied to priority being given to unselfish ethics, because only that attitude can justify a sense that action is being taken for the sake of the general public. It would not be sufficient, however, if all physicians accepted unanimously (which is, in fact, impossible in the age of ethical liberalism) some consistent moral code that would govern all questions concerning a physician’s conduct. Such a code would also have to be accepted by patients, which means — by everybody. The ethical problems of medicine are particularly varied, and the development of modern technology continually gives rise to new issues. It is necessary to analyze permanently the system of balance on all its levels, just as is done by a scientist who tests his theory systematically in the light of the newest studies and experiments. Such an attempt at a broad, permanent construction of a compromise in the face of glaringly controversial problems (e.g., euthanasia, the criterion of death, or the problem of medical experiments) is, in my opinion, an expansion of the purely pragmatic perspective. Within this perspective a continual ethical relativization is performed, and all this constitutes a typical system of situation ethics. This creates additional difficulties for physicians bearing their threefold obligation: to do what is best for the patient, to take into account social interests and to respect the patient’s autonomy. In open societies it is impossible — mostly for moral reasons, to say nothing of practical ones — to formulate fixed and universally binding hierarchies of values that would determine priorities in medicine. Trying to formulate them we will always have to contend with moral dilemmas connected with the exercise of choice. Therefore, it is necessary that we become aware of those dilemmas in time and try to resolve them in accord with general human morality (even one built on a very fragile compromise) and the particular obligations issuing from medical ethics founded on a broad, non-naturalistic philosophical conception of man. Jagiellonian University

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N OT E S 1 B. Maroszyn´ska-Jez⋅ owska, “Relacja pacjent — lekarz w okresie paradygmatycznej niestabilnos´ci medycyny” [The Patient — Physician Relation in the Period of Paradigmatic Instability of Medicine], “Sztuka leczenia” [The Art of Healing] 1/98, p. 17–21. 2 See, e.g., I. Prigogine, “Czas, chaos i dwie kultury” [Time, Chaos and Two Cultures] in “Czy nauka jest dobra” [Is Science Good?] (Warsaw: CIS, 1997). 3 J.M. Bochen´ski “Mie˛dzy logika˛ a wiara˛” [Between Logic and Faith] (Warsaw, Noir sur Blanc, 1995), p. 234. 4 E. Fromm, “Ucieczka od wolnos`ci” [Escape from Freedom](Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1993). 5 A. Camus, “Eseje” [Essays], (Warsaw: PIW, 1971), pp. 190–191. 6 A. Toffler, “Szok przyszlos´ci” [Future Shock], (Warsaw: PIW, 1977), pp. 55–67. 7 Apart from the deeply rooted habit of using a maximally simplified picture of the world, the greatest obstacles include emotionalism and the destabilizing attitude expressed in the statement that in our day human matters are changing so fast that most action meant to solve them are bound to be fruitless.

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“ V I R T U T E S E T P OT E N T I A E ” : T H E M E D I C A L - B I O L O G I C A L T R A D I T I O N I N T H E F O R M AT I O N O F T H E P H I L O S O P H I C A L A N T H RO P O L O G Y O F T H E T H I RT E E N T H C E N T U RY

1 . D E F I N I T I O N O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L A N T H RO P O L O G Y * W I T H I N T H E M E D I A E VA L F R A M E WO R K : D U N S S C OT U S A N D T H E T H E O L O G I A N S O F T H E T H I RT E E N T H C E N T U RY

“Two forces dominate the field of the existence and share its dominion: nature and will. Within the kingdom of nature everything is persistence, stability, necessity. In that of the will everything is life, turning, movement, contingency. Therefore these are not really two opposed forces; nor is there here an indomitable antagonism. One of these comes from the other and, notably, while freedom that springs from nature in the unique case of divine existence, these differ in all else.”1 With these words the great French historian of mediaeval thought, Etienne Gilson, in introducing a chapter devoted to Duns Scotus’ conception of the will, highlights the double perspective, philosophical and theological, that emerges as a fundamental aspect of the complex and articulated anthropological investigation of the Franciscan master. The anthropology of Scotus’ school represents the final point of a long reflection on the subject of Man extending through the whole mediaeval period. There are, according to Duns Scotus, two main ways to investigate man, a philosophical way and a theological way. The first one depends on natural experience and leads to a rational anthropology, one elaborated by reason on the presupposition of a fixed and unchangeable human nature that is not modified by historical events. The other is based on the historical character of man and on the freedom of his choices and depends on the revelation that introduces a supernatural anthropology based on historicity and transcendence of human destiny.2 The theological anthropology is considered by Duns Scotus to be effectively more comprehensive of the whole human experience; therefore he does not fail to acknowledge the fundamental contribution that anthropological philosophy is able to give to knowledge of the “nature” of man, the necessary basis of his “will.”3 307 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 307–318. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The origin of the philosophical or “scientific” perspective of the mediaeval anthropology, of which Scotus’s thought represents a mature and significant synthesis, can be traced following the evolution of the idea of “man” in the new naturalistic horizon of the thirteenth century. In the history of mediaeval thought, this century marks the privileged moment when the great Greek-Arab philosophical tradition became thoroughly known and used in the Latin West. This long and fundamental process of doctrinal acquisition involved the main thinkers and “scholars” of that century, from Albert the Great to Giles of Rome, theologians and University masters. None of them backs away from a close confrontation with the new sources of classical knowledge. They are engaged in the rich debate provoked on the possibility of the actual assimilation of this thought, or of its conciliation with Christian learning, or of its partial or complete rejection; manifestly, they contributed to the introduction of new knowledge in every field of mediaeval learning not only within theology and metaphysics, therefore, but also within “natural philosophy.”4 On this subject, in particular, a series of texts extending from Aristotle’s psychological and biological thought (De anima and De animalibus) to the medical texts of Hippocrates, Galen and Avicenna, translated from Greek and Arabic between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, represent the reemerging “scientific” outlook of that century, which enriched with new topics the great issues connected with man, supplementing the religious and theological tradition based on Saint Augustine’s theology and on Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. Starting from the Schoolman theology of the thirteenth century, a new anthropological reflection took shape; it is to be found in a number of works, different in their literary genre and doctrinal content, from which it is possible to extract some thematic kernels, such as those connected to man’s nature and the soul’s structure. The first such topic is the description of both the physical and the spiritual nature of man, formed through the investigation of generation and its principles, that within the theological perspective of the natura lapsa, which while strictly linked to man’s spiritual nature, sees all of nature as corrupted because of Original Sin. Within this context, we must first remember the Dominican theologian Albert the Great (1205–1280), who devotes two works, De animalibus (1256) and Quaestiones de animalibus (1260–1264) to animal and human biological subjects, among which is the topic of generation, which take as their basis Aristotle’s works on animals.

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In the second half of the century the imposing figure was Giles of Rome (1247–1316), a theologian of the religious order of Saint Augustine and a commentator on Aristotle. His high regard for the new philosophia naturalis is documented in the long list of philosophical works written by him, by his commentaries on Aristotle’s work De generatione animalium and De anima, and by what can be considered the first Latin methodical work on the theme of human generation, De formatione corporis humani in utero, written between 1285 and 1295. Much debated is the matter of the place held by another theologian of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan Saint Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (1217–1274) in the field of this new anthropology. The studies made by Francesco Corvino at the beginning of the 1980s present his thought as an authentic Humanism,5 in contrast to the classical interpretation by Etienne Gilson,6 who held a decisively negative opinion on the Franciscan Master’s doctrine, which he saw as an expression of “Mediaeval obscurantism.”7 The theme of the human soul’s structure and its tripartite nature is the privileged place of the confrontation between the medical tradition of Galenic inspiration and the philosophical tradition, founded on Aristotle, characterized by the description of detailed lists of virtues and potentiae. On this subject also another Franciscan theologian, John of Rochelle († 1245), wrote a Summa de anima and a Tractatus in which he analyzed the subject of the soul and its faculties or potencies, considering the new GreekArab sources. These themes on the whole were part of that century’s philosophia naturalis which was still of the competence of the theology masters. Later on, around the end of the thirteenth century, there took place an ideal handing over of medical, naturalistic themes from the theologians to the new scientific intellectual of the mediaeval universities, the “Scholastic Physician.” 2 . A RT I C U L AT I O N O F T H E D E BAT E : V I R T U T E S A N D P OT E N T I A E OF THE SOUL

The anthropological naturalism of the thirteenth century takes its origin from an encounter with the medical, biological literature of the classical past, which is not, however, a homogeneous corpus of knowledge but divided into two traditions, the “philosophical” one essentially based on Aristotle’s biological works and the “medical” one derived from Hippocrates’ and Galen’s texts, for a long time known through the works of the Arab physician Avicenna.

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The entire classical tradition of the life sciences outlined, in the mediaeval era, two different ways of dealing with medical-biological themes, one more theoretical and the other more practical, and a precise hierarchy of knowledge saw the “philosophers” as prevailing over the “physicians.” This peculiar cultural situation was shaped also by the effective quantity of knowledge really available: at the end of the thirteenth century in the West translations from the Greek of nearly all the works by Aristotle were circulating, but only a small part of the authentic thought of Galen was known. Aristotle had created a definition for the human being in general as that which possesses a capacity for movement, considering this in the widest meaning, as a capacity for mutation and development, for assimilation and for reproduction, while the animal in particular is defined by the possession of perception.8 On this basis Aristotle described man as an animated being, that is to say, one gifted with a soul, but one nevertheless articulated according to a hierarchical system of forces, starting from the so-called vegetative soul up to the sensory soul and to the rational soul. In the medical tradition, the anatomical description of Galen’s medicine, based on human and animal dissection, was nearly always more precise than Aristotle’s. Even Galen, in De usu partium described man according to a tripartite scheme, but he expresses in reality three physiological systems named virtutes, each one activated by a specific human organ. The two traditions briefly outlined were meant to provide a physical and naturalistic description of man as a living organism; however, this common aim produced as well evident lexical differences and an important exegetic distance. This interpretive difference present in the source writings taking the naturalistic approach will yield place, at the time of the great University Commentaries of the fourteenth century, to frequent attempts at doctrinal conciliation between medical and philosophical auctoritates.9 Differently, the original phase of diffusion and assimilation of the new scientific knowledge, well documented in the work by John of Rochelle considered here, highlighted consciousness of these distinctions in sense, where terms are used by the physician and the philosopher both and the distinctions of interpretation that correspond to the different epistemological, physical and metaphysical levels, where the respective discourses take place. Anthropological naturalism takes its origin from the encounter between the traditional, theological anthropology with the body of medical, biological knowledge of the old world, out of which encounter there emerged a different description of man that is based on the consideration of the stability and necessity of “nature.”

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This new anthropological horizon is initially documented right in the works of some theologians of that century, among them the Franciscan John of Rochelle, master in theology at Paris in the first half of the 1200s. He is the author of the Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae, written between 1233 and 1239, where the different doctrinal traditions on the theme of the soul and of its faculties or forces are described for the first time in a systematic way, testifying to the growing interest in the new Greek-Arab sources. This work can be rightly considered the initial stage of the new cultural foundation that started to link the study of the soul to natural philosophy, distinguishing it formally from moral philosophy. 3 . T H E T R AC TAT U S O F J O H N O F RO C H E L L E A N D T H E C L A S S I F I C AT I O N O F T H E P OT E N C I E S O F T H E S O U L

Within the history of ideas each deep change is the consequence of new doctrinal acquisitions, of new knowledge that starts to be assimilated and used because an indispensable contribution to the search for the truth has been apprehended. After this initial acknowledgement the exigency becomes concrete, and in authentically mediaeval fashion a clarification is attempted, according to a systematic order, of the complex and varied body of new knowledge. The Tractatus by John of Rochelle illustrates well these two aspects of the cognitive process, the intuition of the potential value of an innovation and the need to achieve an accurate understanding of it. For this reason, he thought it would be of great utility for himself and for his contemporaries if he could provide what could seem at first sight a mere exposition of all the doctrines circulating on the theme of the soul. In reality, this work receives its shape from the author’s intention of simply confronting the traditional thought of Christian theology on the theme of the nature of man with the new Greek-Arab classifications. That is all he essays to do, avoiding any expression of his personal opinions. The Tractatus documents, therefore, the most ancient formulation of the mediaeval doctrines on the soul, which exercise will lead John of Rochelle himself to a more theoretical taking up of the same themes in his following work, the Summa de anima, and draw more elaborated distinctions between the “philosophical” and “theological” realms of Albert the Great and highlight the admirable synthesis of Thomas Aquinas in Questions 79–83 of the Prima pars of the Summa Theologiae. The unambiguous distinction between the two interpretive methods within naturalism, the philosophical and the medical, rightly highlighted by John of

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Rochelle, is still of fundamental importance for further doctrinal evolution and for initiating the great scholastic debate on the potencies of the soul. The theological auctoritates of John are John Damascene and Augustine; the philosophical ones are Aristotle and most of all Avicenna, whose works were the main font of the Greek-Arab naturalism during the Middle Ages. With the reference to their thought, the first part of the Tractatus opens with John listing the main definitions of the soul in general and of the rational human soul, in particular as they were given by tradition and by the new naturalistic texts: 1. anima est substantia vivens, simplex et incorporea/anima est substantia rationalis, intellectualis, spiritualis (John Damascene), (Tractatus I, Ch. I, p. 54; Ch. V, p. 59); 2. anima est omnium similitudo (Augustine), (Tractatus I, Ch. XI, p. 65); 3. anima est actus primus corporis phisici organici potentia vitam habentis (Aristotle), (Tractatus I, Ch. X, p. 64). In a short comment that follows Aristotle’s definition of the “soul,”10 John grasps the harmony and the novelty of that definition in comparison with the traditional definitions. Actus, together with forma and with species, of Aristotle’s vocabulary are different ways of expressing one and the same substance11: forma is the substance of a thing relative to its essence; species is the substance of a thing relative to its intelligibility, that which allows one to distinguish a thing from anything else; actus is the substance of a thing relative to its operations, that through which a thing operates.12 Defining the soul of a natural body as an actus introduces, therefore, the idea of a mover that presides over a series of specific operations of the animated human body. The second part of the Tractatus is entirely devoted to the illustration of this Aristotelian philosophical naturalism’s definition of the “soul” as an actus through the classification of the operations or potencies of the soul, illustration that carefully separates philosophical interpretation from medical interpretation. The classification of the potencies of the soul “secundum philosophos”13 is very extensive and detailed and it starts with the naming of the three forces that form the living being’s soul: the vis vegetabilis, the vis sensibilis and the vis rationalis, where the word vis, a synonym of soul, indicates the action of a natural, autonomous force, independent of will. The vis vegetabilis is the principle of conservation of the nature of a being through generation and nourishment and of its perfection through growth; the vis sensibilis is the principle of sensation and of movement; the vis rationalis is the principle of philosophical intellectual speculation and of free choice. Each of these forces is articulated in specific functions named vires, and

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they comprise all the possible natural operations of a living being. Besides, the three vires describe the progression of animation and delimit different categories of living beings: vis vegetabilis is common to all living beings–plants, animals, man; vis sensibilis characterizes animals and man; vis rationalis is developed only in man. Vis vegetabilis (the vegetative soul) v. nutritiva → virtus unitiva — virtutes attractiva, retentiva, digestiva, expulsiva v. augmentativa v. generativa → virtus seminativa — virtus immutativa — virtus informativa Vis sensibilis (the sensory soul: perception) — virtus apprehensiva modo naturali = fantasia (fantasy) (non regitur ratione) v. cognitiva — virtus apprehensiva modo animali = virtus apprehensiva exterior = 5 senses (regitur ratione) (5 senses) –– sensus communis –– virtus formativa = virtus apprehensiva interior –– virtus cogitativa –– virtus estimativa –– virtus memorativa — modo naturali = virtus pulsativa v. motiva — virtus irascibilis vel concupiscibilis — modo animali — virtus motiva membrorum Vis rationalis (sive virtus intellectiva humana) (the rational soul) The first force, present in every living being, has a manner of action exclusively natural; the third one, specific to man, acts only as guided by rationality and determines intellectual activity properly defined, apart from the material conditions of knowledge. The intermediate force common to men and animals, possesses both ways of acting, instinctive and rational, regarding either involuntary and spatial movement, or the physical process of the formation of sensations. The sum of these forces, developed differently according to the organism in which they act, build up the “soul” of the living being, that is to say, its principle of animation which is ever physically undetermined and quantitatively indefinite.

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The further classification of the forces of the soul contained in the Tractatus is that “secundum medicos”,14 in particular according to Galen, one rightly considered by John to be a possible different interpretation of the functions of the living being, one that proceeds from the same ontological presupposition of the identity of “soul” and actus. John’s medical source is above all the Canon medicinae of Avicenna, a principal representative and conduit of the school of Galen. In this context the tripartite physiological scheme descends a level and becomes concrete, becoming more suitable to explain the main vital functions of the living organism. One does not speak of vires (forces) any longer but of virtutes (faculties), real functional dynamisms and physiological systems causally related to specific body organs and endowed of a material spiritus. The virtus vitalis is the first faculty present in man, from his embryonic state; it guarantees the existence of the vital spirit, that is to say, the principle of life. It has its foundation in the heart and it spreads through all the body through the arteries. It is of two kinds: the virtus vitalis operativa, that is to say, the drumbeat systole and diastole of the heart and of the arteries, the mechanical act in itself; and the virtus vitalis operata, the movement of dilation and constriction caused by sensation, as occurs in the formation of the passions, in rage, in hate, and so forth. The virtus naturalis acts in accord with two goals. On the one side it guarantees the conservation of the individual, providing for the nourishment and growth of the body: understood in that way, it inheres in the liver and is propagated through the veins through all the body. On the other side, it guarantees the conservation of the species through generation: In this instance its base is in the testicles and it spreads through the seminal vessels and in sperm. This faculty is further specified in particular functions divided into two groups according to the mode of their relation. The first comprehends the virtus nutritiva, the virtus augmentativa, the virtus generativa and the virtus informativa. The virtus nutritiva converts nourishment into the nourished; once this transformation takes place, the virtus augmentativa operates the growth of the parts of the body according to the natural proportions for each of these. Both have to consider the age and the conservation of the individual. The virtus generativa involves generation in the general sense, that is to say, the transmission of sperm by which male and female generate; the virtus informativa involves generation in the particular sense, that is to say, the formation of each part of the body: It divides the sperm’s virtues, giving to

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every limb, to the nerves, to the arteries, to the bones and to the muscles, the complexity15 that is peculiar to them. The virtutes generativa and informativa have as their end the conservation of the species, and the four of them act in strict relationship, one to the other. The second grouping is composed of: the virtus attractiva that acts to draw in nourishment; the virtus retentiva that draws and holds the nourishment necessary for the functioning of each single part of the body; the virtus digestiva that converts nourishment into the substance of the body; and the virtus expulsiva that expels whatever superfluous remains from foodstuff. These four distinct virtues each act separately either for the conservation of the individual or for the conservation of the species. The third faculty, the virtus animalis, makes sensation and voluntary movement possible. It is based in the brain and propagates through the nerves. It is divided into two species: the virtus apprehensiva, that is to say, sensation; and the virtus motiva, that is to say, the voluntary motion of the muscles, sinews and nerves. The virtus apprehensiva acts through the exterior of the body through the action of the five senses and interiorly through a further diversification of its action in four parts. There is the common sense that grasps passively all that is understood by the senses; and the fantasy that holds and preserves perceptions even in the absence of the simultaneous action of the senses: both are located in the rear part of the brain. Thirdly, there is the virtus cogitativa or reason, that is, the capacity to distinguish perceptions not derived from the senses (friendship, hate, etc) and the capacity for judgement: it is located in the central part of the brain. Finally, there is the virtus conservativa or memory, that is, the capacity to preserve the perceptions derived from either the senses or from reason. The second kind of the virtus animalis is the virtus motiva, which comprehends the capacity of movement in its proper sense and in its general sense. It is divided as well into three main operations: the virtus motiva imperans et non imperata, that is, the virtus motiva rationali, that is to say, free will or practical intellect; the virtus motiva imperans et imperata that is, the tendency to long for what is useful and to repel what is dangerous; and the virtus motiva imperata, that is, the efficient motion that acts properly on the nerves and muscles either in the form of voluntary, progressive movement (local movement) or as the contracting and extending of limbs. Within the field of medicine, the word “soul” is used to indicate the rational, living being, and the description that follows ties together the material organs and the body’s operation in their respective functionalities.

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Virtus vitalis virtus vitalis operativa virtus vitalis operata Virtus naturalis virtus nutritiva virtus augmentativa virtus attractiva virtus retentiva virtus digestiva virtus expulsiva virtus generativa virtus informativa Virtus animalis virtus apprehensiva — sensus communis — virtus fantasia — virtus cogitativa — virtus conservativa virtus motiva — virtus motiva imperans et non imperata — virtus motiva imperans et imperata — virtus motiva imperata Comparing in detail the philosophical model with the medical one, it is evident that there is no exact correspondence between the respective realms of action and the functions that they take in: virtus vitalis virtus naturalis ↔ vis vegetabilis virtus animalis ↔ vis sensibilis vis rationalis Accordingly there is a deep qualitative difference between the two models. They move in opposite directions. The medical model points towards an evident mechanism while the philosophical model, even if it is sometimes ambiguous, seems to manifest the intuition of the main characteristic of the rational processes, that is to say, their metaphysical dimension. Massive exegetical works undertaken in the middle of the thirteenth century within the Faculties of Art and Medicine at the European universities

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attempted a doctrinal conciliation of the two models. This occurred not only out of a need, typically mediaeval, to by any means forge an agreement between the main auctoritates of knowledge, but also, we may reasonably believe, as was dictated by a consciousness that only a synthesis of the two models was really descriptive of all the complexity, physical and psychic, of human nature. Only in this way, as a matter of fact, could philosophical anthropology present a suitable and opportune completion of theological anthropology. University of Pisa N OT E S *

It is well known that the term “philosophical anthropology” has its cultural matrix in twentieth-century currents of thought. The use of such a definition in a different and definite chronological context, such as that of the thirteenth century, therefore derives the idea from contemporary philosophical studies, such as phenomenological thought, but it perfectly suits the hypothesis of research here developed, related to the outline of a doctrine on man, of medical, biological origins complementary to the traditional theological anthropology of Augustinian school. 1 Etienne Gilson, J. D. Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales (Paris: 1952), p. 574. (The translation is mine). 2 See also Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinatio, Prol., n. 1 (I 1–2). For the editions of the texts to which we refer here and elsewhere, see the bibliography of the sources given at the end of this article. 3 It was dedicated to the theme of the philosophical and theological anthropology of Duns Scotus, a whole section of the 3rd International Congress on Scotus held in Vienna in 1970. On that occasion these communications were presented: Efrem Bettoni, “Duns Scoto denuncia l’insufficienza dell’antropologia filosofica,” in Deus et homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti, Acta III Congressus Scotistici Internationalis, Vindebonae, 28 Sept.–2 Oct. 1970 (Rom: 1972), pp. 245–257; Pietro Scapin, “Capisaldi di un’antropologia scotista,” in ibidem, pp. 269–291; Angelo Marchesi, “Singolarità irripetibile e continua perfettibilità della persona umana, fondata nella volontà libera secondo Duns Scoto,” in ibidem, pp. 371–377. 4 For a concise but complete description of this fundamental cultural process that is at the origin of modern western thought, see also: Luca Bianchi, L’acculturazione filosofica dell’Occidente, in Luca Bianchi, La filosofia nelle Università. Secoli XIII–XIV (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1997), pp. 1–23. 5 Francesco Corvino, Bonaventura da Bagnoregio francescano e pensatore (Bari: Dedalo, 1980). 6 Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure (Paris: Vrin, 1924). 7 To confirm this new interpretation, initial research I have undertaken on the vocabulary of the Commentary on the Sententiae by St Bonaventure revada is the presence, and not sporadic one, of medical and biological matters and terminology, either in the proper sense, that is to say in medical naturalistic contexts, or in a metaphorical sense, in the description of spiritual affections and in the introduction of biological images such as medicus Christus, which are worth being studied more widely in this new anthropological perspective.

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8 See also Aristotle, De anima, I, 2, 403b25; Idem, Parva naturalia, 454b; Idem, De partibus animalium, 665a10 and following. 9 The lexical problems, of exegesis and doctrinal conciliation between philosophi and medici were studied by Jole Agrimi and Chiara Crisciani, Edocere medicos (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992), pp. 226ff. and following. 10 See also Aristotle, De anima, II, 1, 412a20. 11 Ibidem, II, 2, 414a15. 12 Tractatus, I, Ch. X, p. 65, pp. 404–410: “Species, forma et actus idem sunt secundum substantiam, differunt autem secundum rationem. Forma enim dicitur, qua res est et perficitur; species autem, qua res discernitur ab alia et cognoscitur; actus vero, quo res operatur. Forma respicit essentiam et esse, species distinctionem et cognitionem, actus vero operationem; forma igitur ad materiam, species ad intellectum, actus ad operationem.” 13 Ibidem, II, Ch. I–XXVI, pp. 70–103. 14 Ibidem, II, Ch. XXVII–XXXVI, pp. 103–113. 15 The Latin word “complexio” translates the complex idea of physiology and pathology that Galen defines in the prologue to the work De complexionibus. He states that each living being has his own peculiar combination of hot, cold, wet and dry qualities that is suitable to the nature of each and that establishes a right balance that can be identified with the state of health. Consequently, each deviation from or breaking, of it causes pathological situations.

REFERENCES ALBERTUS MAGNUS. De animalibus, ed. H. Stadler, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 15 (1916)–16 (1921). Quaestiones super de animalibus. Ed. E. Filthaut. Opera omnia, XII. Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1955. AVICENNA. Liber Canonis. 3 vols. Venetiis, apud Juntas, 1555–1557. GALENUS. Opera Omnia 20 vols. Ed. C. G. Kühn. Leipzig: Knobloch, 1822–1833, (reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966). De complexionibus, (Galenus Latinus I). Ed. R.J. Durling Berlin: 1976. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS. (Giles of Rome). Super De anima. Venice: 1500, reprinted Frankfurt a. M: Minerva, 1982. Super De generatione et corruptione. Venice: 1505, reprinted Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva 1970. De formatione corporis humani in utero, Arimini: 1626. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS. Ordinatio, in Opera Omnia, Volume I. Vatican City: Typographica Polyglotta Vaticana 1950. IOANNES A RUPELLIS (John of Rochelle). Summa de anima. Ed. T. Domenichelli. Prato: Giachetti, 1882. Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae. Ed. P.M. Quantin. Paris: Vrin, 1964. S. BONAVENTURE DE BAGNOREGIO. Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum, in Opera omnia . . . edita P.P. Collegii S. Bonaventurae . . . ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi). Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Vols. I–IV. Florence: 1882–1889. S. THOMA AQUINATIS. Summa Teologiae, in Opera Omnia, Vol. II. Ed. R. Busa. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1980.

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When dealing with philosophical thanatology as a problem of the ontologization of death, we have to resign ourselves to uncertainty. We are doomed to paradoxes and have to pose the question of whether philosophical thanatology is not an “impossible science.” Philosophical thanatology appears to be an impossible domain as its very subject — death — cannot possibly be caught. It remains elusive in our subjective experience, while in our objective, common experience it is washed away and blurred by the icons of the rituals and ceremonies of dying, leave taking, commemorating and grieving. The social images of death help us to fame it and to soothe its tragic impact, but at the same time they obscure the essence of death and transform this existential event into an aestheticcultural phenomenon. Thus death seems to be the limit of experience and to be impossible to represent. Therefore, what shall we say about it? Death is a borderline event, an existential threshold which separates us from the mystery, a division between being and non-being. Thus we can only depict philosophical thanatology as the ontology of a threshold event. Death is an event which transfers us from the state of being into that of non-being. Nevertheless, according to Plato and other philosophers,1 non-being can be understood in a twofold way. In its first meaning, non-being is conceptualized as a radical erasure of being, the annihilation of existence; nothingness replaces being. In the other meaning, non-being is seen as another being, not “this one,” but “another one.” Thus death is an event which either annihilates being and changes it into nothing or changes “this” being into “that” one. This means that death transforms the ego into a non-ego, which is either nothing, or another ego. Assuming the first possibility means to end the discourse, as it creates an impenetrable darkness of nothingness. Therefore, let us take up the idea of death as an event in which one passes into another ego. We can notice that this is an idea that is prevalent in thanatology. The reason might be the “Cartesian” nature of our consciousness, which is to imply that in our thanatological reflection we have a tendency to 319 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 319–327. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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“slip” another ego into the place of the former ego. We mentally experience our existence as the existence of a cogitating “ego.” In our thanatological reflection this experience is then inverted, and the thanatological “cogitatio” presupposes the existence of a reflective ego that can say “cogito.” Thus “the dead” becomes that “other” who experiences the state of being dead. Death is an event that occurs in time, in its three dimensions: Present, Future and Past.2 “My own death” is a merely future event. I cannot experience it as a present or past one. Already Epicurus observed that something like the throwing of a switch occurs: I am, so death is not, when death is, I am not.3 But when I try to anticipate “my own death,” it appears that I am not able to mentally erase my presence in the world. To imagine the world after “my own death” means to imagine the world without me, to imagine my absence in the world. Nevertheless, it appears that in my image of the world without me, my own presence is included as a presence contemplating my absence in it.4 To consider the idea of “my own death” creates a significant mystification: Our consciousness deceives us, evading the existential import. The falsification is made by slipping in my ego as the subject of the idea of “my own death.” When I am imagining myself as nonexistent, within that object in my imagination (that of a non-existent I myself) there is contained also my ego as a subject that experiences this state of nonexistence. Such mental mystification might be responsible for the fact that in thanatology non-being is rarely conceptualized as an “absolute” non-being, nothingness; rather it is understood as an “other” being. Thus death is seen as a kind of passage and the “non-I” as an “other-me” living in an “other world.” Anticipating “my own death” I approach it using real world concepts, terms and categories. This enables me to domesticate myself intentionally in the beyond, which becomes an “other world.” The phenomenon of “my own death” is, therefore, falsified by the very nature of consciousness. The existential threshold of “my own death” separates me radically from a mystery. I shall end there where it begins, and I do not know into what it transfers me: into non-being as an “other me” or as nothing. As an existential threshold “my own death” remains beyond my scope — its presence and my own presence exclude each other. I cannot experience “my own death” event, thus it remains a “radical mystery.” As “my own death” is a hidden event, we should reject the attempt to build up its ontology. The ontology of death is impossible for it is a radical mystery. Any attempt at overcoming an impenetrable mystery would constitute a false metaphysics.

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Thus there remain “thy death” and “his/her death” as events we can experience in three dimensions — Present, Past and Future. The main source of our thanatological knowledge seems to be “thy death,” which has a very special meaning. We can say that we experience “thy death” as a unique presence-absence phenomenon.5 “Thy” former actual existence is now replaced by an intentional existence bestowed in my memory. “Thou” loseth “thine” identity — which as given in my memory could only be identical, never the same.6 In place of “thou,” I experience emptiness — the “thy death” event becomes an experience of the finiteness of being. “Thy death” is given as a phenomenon of “radical absence,” privatio, nothing.7 In this phenomenon the meaning of death is revealed to be a devastating nothingness. Thus the essence of death is being revealed paradoxically as active nothingness.8 A quite different meaning is carried with in the “his/her death” event. I experience that as an empirical event of a statistical character. It has the significance of a fact, and as such it is subjected to empirical examination and falls under scientific laws: biological, demographic, social and other. It does not engage me existentially — I perceive death in the third person as involving an “empiric self” only. Another meaning of death is revealed when human life is considered as a narrative. In this case death is given as a necessary closure of a life-story — in fact, it is a closure that makes a story, thus it is death that constitutes our life as a narrative. As Kathleen Higgins suggests, our demand for a closure as a fundamental condition of regarding a sequence of events as a narrative is probably not only a contingent requirement made up by Aristotle in his Poetics, but also a basic human tendency in the interpretation of sensory information.9 It is the narrative that makes our life understandable for us; we can even say that it is death that constitutes life as “my life.” The narrative pattern is a meaningful whole which gives events their significances and enables us to understand them and to assign values to them, which is the condition for “my life” having its unity and integrity. In this way, life events create a coherent sequence — my biography — instead of being only a contingent collection of atomic, separate occurrences. Thus we can say that narrative is a condition for a series of events becoming “my life” as something having a reasonable structure. The matter can be even more fundamental. Perhaps it is not only a question of putting events in a sensible order. It seems that a narrative can be considered to be the ontological condition of an event. A narrative not only gives us a pattern for interpretation, which enables us to assign a meaning and a value to a given event so that this event can be situated in “the right place”

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in a life-story. It seems that it would not be possible to experience anything as an event without a narrative pattern — we can argue not only that the narrative bestows meaning and value upon a given event, but also that it makes possible the event’s very being as an event, that thus it is its existential condition. Since, as Alasdair MacIntyre has stated, the human being is “essentially a story-telling animal,”10 it seems that it is the pattern of the narrative which enables me to recognize something as an event of “my life,” to grasp it as “my event.” If this is the case, death is the ontological condition of “my life” as a meaningful integrated sequence of events. The borderline event of death creates a closure that makes a life-story complete, makes it a whole. Furthermore, it appears that this whole is necessary for understanding “my life” experience, since the sense of each event my biography consists of can be revealed only by its reference to the whole. In this respect, Kathleen Higgins has pointed to one more reason for our paradoxical approach to the afterlife that is so characteristic of our attempt at conceptualizing our post mortem status. Considering our lives as narratives, we regard death as “the endpoint that establishes the story’s completion. However, even as we think of our deaths in this way, we are also thinking of ourselves as spectators or auditors of the story.”11 “This mode of double think,”12 means that at the same time, we “want an end to the story,”13 but because it is necessary to make it a story, we envisage a continuation of our existence that enables us to experience this story. Hence Higgins speaks of “the aesthetic paradox of death.”14 I have devoted my consideration thus far to the death event, to the problem of how its meaning is revealed in our experience. Yet there has remained unmentioned a distinction of profound significance, namely, the distinction between death and dying. Some authors, like Epicurus in the past or more recently Canetti (although those two differ significantly in their attitude toward death, since the first promoted an attitude of ataraxia toward it, where the other seethed with hatred of it and railed against it),15 have argued that death is neither worth being a subject of our reflection, nor worth our “respectful recognition.”16 In this approach death is comprehended as something that does not belong to our existence, something external that “attacks from the outside,” an alien evil. Nevertheless, it is rather obvious that dying does not allow us to view it in that way. It is impossible to adopt any approach that denies any significance to dying or its belonging to our existence. Dying beyond doubt is experienced

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as an existential event. Strictly speaking, it appears as a set of events and this sequence of events that dying consists of is experienced as a final part of the life-story. Of course, you can call death nothingness, but it is obvious that you cannot treat dying as nothingness, since it is given as an existential experience, the meaning of which is often revealed to be suffering, both physical and psychic or spiritual. A part of suffering is envisaging death, and in this experience another meaning of death is uncovered. While dealing with the meaning of “my death” as a borderline event, I focused on conceptualizations of the world on “the other side.” In the dying experience the “this side” meaning of death is revealed. Death means the cessation of the life narrative, the deprivation of further events and of previous ones as well, since it also means losing remembrance. Death means one’s leaving close people, animals and places, the impossibility of realizing projects, the deprivation of possibilities. But there is also one more serious meaning of death that is revealed in the dying experience. It is given as “a mirror” standing at the end of “my life” path. It reflects the meaning of “my life,” it is as if it acquired the meaning determined by the sense of “my life.”17 In trying to frame a kind of ars moriendi as a pattern that can make the time of dying optimal for a given person, it seems that ars moriendi can be conceived only as a part of ars vivendi. This final sequence of events is as dependent upon the whole structure of “my life” narrative as every other set of events contained in the life-story. As dying is an integral part of living, the meaning of dying and its value are constituted by the narrative of life. When dealing with the meaning of the death phenomenon we can notice a striking divergence of philosophical and medical traditions. In the beginning Western philosophy (with the exception of Heraclitus and some other Presocratic philosophers)18 adopted the view that the physical death does not belong to human existence. The soul present in a human being was initially understood as a divine element (an Orphic and Pythagorean idea). Socrates was the first to conceive of the soul as the foundation of the individual human personality.19 Plato, Aristotle and successors followed this lead and considered the human soul as an ideal reality that death does not apply to. Thus death was understood as an external fact that concerns only the human body, whereas the human soul — as an immortal being, which was understood as the human person in the exact sense — remained intact. Then a significant shift occurred in the Western philosophical conception of death. Death began to be understood as an event which not only is not

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external to life, but is an integral, ever-present part of life.20 What seems to be very interesting and what Graham Parkes pointed to,21 is that this new stance was adopted under the influence of modern biology. Nietzsche, Simmel and Heidegger were diligent readers of the biological works of their time. Biological researchers of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries stated that death immanently belongs to the nature of at least higher organisms. This idea was confirmed by contemporary biological discoveries. William Clark writes in his Sex and the Origins of Death: The study of death at the level of individual cells has revealed unexpected subtleties and complexities about the nature of death in multicellular creatures like ourselves — for example, the widespread occurrence of suicide among cells in our bodies. Surprisingly, the study of evolutionarily older single-cell organisms suggests that cell aging and death is not an obligatory attribute of life on earth. Obligatory death as a result of senescence — natural aging — may not have come into existence for more than a billion years after life first appeared. This form of programmed death seems to have arisen at about the same time that cells began experimenting with sex in connection with reproduction. It may have been the ultimate loss of innocence.22

Rather surprisingly, while biology has been the inspiration of a shift in the philosophy of death, it has not been able to influence medicine in the same way. Although biology remains a main basic science on which medicine is grounded, as far as death and dying are concerned the latter has adopted an attitude typical of the technological ideology. It is worth noticing that this technological view cannot be met in medical tradition — it is a quite new approach connected with contemporary, primarily technological possibilities. This new medical attitude toward death is characterized by Daniel Callahan as “the idea of a vanished nature, replaced by human art and scientific artifice.”23 It has created a “technological monism,”24 so that death is not seen as a matter of our essence, but has become a matter of our free choice. Since death has come to no longer be regarded as inevitability, it has also lost its meaning as an existential event, becoming only a contingent fact. It has been transferred from the reality of necessity into the realm of artificiality created by technology. Thus death has become something doctor-dependent, which makes the doctor responsible for its occurrence. Since death is declared by contemporary medicine to be its main enemy, not to let it happen has become its main goal. In this way there has been imposed on the doctor the burden of a duty to use all available means to achieve this goal. Denying death as an existential event means to break “the frame” that constitutes “my life” as an integrated, meaningful structure, as a narrative. In the medical realm this can have a devastating influence on the patient’s life story.

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As has been said, it is death that makes life — “my life,” since as its last event, death is its closure, something necessary for making it a narrative. If death is conceptualized as a contingent fact, it becomes something external, not belonging to the life story. When the patient’s biography remains without an endpoint, as something “open,” it loses its integrity and unity. Moreover, the last sequence of its events, i.e., dying, has lost any significance. This often tormenting existential experience becomes nothing, a limbo, lost time. Thus we can say that the twentieth century was a time of the discarding and forgetting of death, which has become medicalized and “wild” (and no longer “tame”). This is a well-known assertion made by many authors, for example Arie`s and Callahan. Death has lost its very meaning and has become a phase of disease, whereas the latter has been ontologized. Death is now regarded as something merely accidental. In the medical realm this means that death is regarded as an avoidable incident, as a treatment failure. The main goal of modern technological medicine is to defeat a disease — by every available means, regardless of any and all costs. According to the hospital ideology, death is the worst thing which can happen. This is the reason why the capacity to overcome life-threatening illnesses is so highly esteemed in Western medicine.25 The technological imperative requires using all available medical technologies, which leads to a situation described by Callahan as technological brinkmanship.26 The hospital realm is dominated by technology-oriented values,27 and all the situations doctors encounter are taken for granted as technological facts. The patient is not regarded as a person, but he or she becomes an object that the doctor has to skillfully handle. The patient’s death has the meaning of a fact, being moreover the worst fact the doctor can encounter. The aim is to avoid the worst — death — while the patient’s personal needs are not taken seriously; in fact, they do not matter. Apart from that, since the treatment of a dying patient inevitably becomes futile at a particular point, the situation is frustrating for the doctor. He or she begins — often unconsciously — to marginalize the dying patient, to skip encounters. However, the needs of the dying person are very special and they can differ substantially from those of other patients. But that the attitude of the doctor makes him or her “impervious” to these. The patient’s death is experienced by the doctor as that of a third person; it engages him or her as an “empiric self” related to the professional role that is determined by the values of technological medicine. Perhaps this is the reason for some of the “increasing amounts of physical torment” of dying patients lately reported.28 If we attempt to create a new medical ars moriendi, we have to oppose the technological management of death. That means that the objective approach

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to the dying patient ought to be replaced by a personal one. It means that the dying patient is not a “he/she” but a “thou.” Furthermore, it means that in the doctor’s experience the death of the patient will gain the meaning of “thy death.” The patient’s death as “thy death” will engage the doctor existentially and become a source of knowledge of the essence of death. Moreover, the patient’s dying will become a meaningful event belonging to the narrative of the doctor’s life too. Only then will the doctor be able to fulfill the very specific tasks of accompanying the dying patient, which are different from diagnostic and therapeutic work. What seems to be most important about regarding the patient’s dying as a meaningful event that is an integral part of the narrative of the patient’s life is that that can help us to resist the temptation to adopt the technological imperative which orders “what can be done ought to be done.”29 This will mean that the doctor will not try to impose on the patient any available treatment promising to postpone death, but that he/she will give priority to the patient’s own ideas on how to accomplish dying in accord with the narrative of the patient’s life. L⁄ odz, Poland N OT E S Plato, The Sophist; Wl⁄adysl⁄aw Stróz⋅ ewski, Dialektyka twórczos´ci (Kraków: PWM, 1983), pp. 37–54. 2 Vladimir Jankélévitch, La mort (Paris: Flammarion, 1966), pp. 5–32. 3 Epicurus, The Letter to Menoeceus. 4 Leszek Kol⁄ akowski, Obecnos´c´ mitu (Wrocl⁄ aw: Wydawnictwo Dolnos´la˛ skie, 1994), pp. 82–83. 5 Louis-Vincent Thomas, Anthropologie de la mort (Paris: Payot, 1975), pp. 223–245. 6 Stróz⋅ ewski, op.cit. 7 Thomas, op. cit. 8 Józef Tischner, S´wiat ludzkiej nadziei (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1974), pp. 274–276. 9 Kathleen Higgins, “Death and the Skeleton,” in: Death and Philosophy, ed. Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 42. 10 Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 201. 11 Higgins, op. cit., p. 41. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 42. 14 Ibid. 15 Reinhard Steiner, “Against Death,” in: Death and Philosophy, ed. J. Malpas and R.C. Solomon (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 16–21. 16 Ibid., p. 17. 1

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Kazimierz Szewczyk, “(Wo)Man and Death in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century,” in: Life — The Human Being Between Life and Death, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and Zbigniew Zalewski, Analecta Husserliana LXIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999), pp. 161–171. 18 Graham Parkes, “Death and Detachment,” in: Death and Philosophy, ed. J. Malpas and R.C. Solomon (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 84. 19 Giovanni Reale, Storia della filosofia antica. I. Dalle origini a socrate, 6th ed. (Milan: Pubblicazioni della Università Cattolica, 1989). 20 Parkes, op. cit., pp. 83–97. 21 Ibid., op. cit., pp. 88–90. 22 William R. Clark, Sex and the Origins of Death (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. xi. 23 Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life: Living with Mortality (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 63. 24 Ibid., p. 67. 25 P.A. Marshall, The SUPPORT Study: Who’s Talking, Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report, 25, 6 (1995), p. S10. 26 Callahan, op. cit., pp. 40–42. 27 George J. Annas, How We Lie, Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report, 25, 6 (1995), p. S12. 28 Ibid., p. S 13. 29 Callahan, op. cit., p. 61.

LESZEK PYRA

NAT U R E A S T H E S O U R C E O F L I F E

T H E C H A N G I N G C O N C E P T O F NAT U R E

When one looks at the history of philosophy one notices immediately how, especially within the so-called philosophy of nature, the concept of nature changes, how it evolves in time, constantly changing its meaning. Let us look at the ancient philosophers first. They were inclined to search for the ultimate ground of all reality, for the so-called “arche” and ultimately found very different things. The categories they thought constituted the deepest reality may roughly be divided into two groups: material and ideal. And so, as is well known, some of them claimed that the essence of reality comprehended four material elements: air, water, earth and fire. The other arche was of an ideal character, e.g., apeiron, numbers; or of a semi-ideal character, e.g., atoms. But alongside these views one can also easily discover others that combine the spiritual and material spheres. This is well seen in the case of Plato’s views, which I call semi-dualistic, using the prefix “semi” because — while the two components of reality, ideas and matter, are not treated on equal terms — the ideal component of reality certainly prevails. According to Plato the material component of reality was in its optimal condition just after it had been built by the Demiurge, the God-like builder of the world, and as time elapsed the condition of the material world slowly but constantly deteriorated. In this sense, I dare say, Plato seems to be the first environmental philosopher in his suggesting that the status of the material world becomes worse and worse with the passing of years. His pupil and successor, Aristotle, continued to propagate the dualistic philosophy of the world. Indeed, his outlook resembles the traditional, classical dualism of modern times much more than do Plato’s views. In medieval philosophy, nature was thought of as the emanation of God; in consequence, when compared with God, it was eventually thought of as being much less important. With a certain amount of oversimplification, perhaps, it may be asserted that medieval philosophy was greatly dependent on ancient philosophy. This is perhaps best seen when one compares the views of Aristotle with the views of St. Thomas Aquinas. In case of the latter, it is strikingly maintained that material reality, when well examined, supplies proofs for the existence of God; such proofs seem to be a necessary component of any systematic philosophy of the Middle Ages. 329 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 329–336. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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In so-called classical dualism, we find nature conceptualized as a mechanism. Also in regard to man, in the field of so-called philosophical anthropology, some attempts were undertaken to present man as some kind of mechanism (however complicated). In the same line of thought, that of Galileo and Descartes, stands the theory of nature propagated by Isaac Newton, at the end of the seventeenth century. During the eighteenth century, in the Age of Englightenment, the Newtonian paradigm prevailed, and all living beings were thought of as mechanisms of some kind. The situation changed in the first half of the twentieth century when ecologists adapted, it seems from classical physics, the theory of the “balance of nature.” And so ecosystems were thought of as having a certain optimal state, to which they were inclined to return if disturbed by external factors such as flood and fire. But if shaken too much, ecosystems were likely to break down, to be rendered unable to come back to a steady-state again. Man’s activities, especially logging, agriculture, mining, when performed on a large scale were able to threaten whole ecosystems and, if uncontrolled, were likely to destroy many of them irreversibly. Then the theory of evolution introduced the new paradigm into thinking on nature, especially in regard to man, presenting man as evolution’s highest achievement on the one hand, but also stressing man’s animality on the other. This theory also suggested that there was no insurmountable discrepancy between man and nature as such, that man was a part of nature (however extraordinary!), participating with other living beings in the odyssey of evolution. The contemporary model of nature appears to be different from the mechanistic Newtonian model because it stresses the importance of two phenomena absent in the mechanistic model, namely, the interdependence of all the components of nature and the reality that nature changes constantly, that it evolves all the time. Therefore, nature is nowadays held to be much better conceptualized by comparing it to a living organism than by seeing it as a mechanism. This is a picture of closely connected parts and processes, sustained by the cooperation, as well as by the competition, that occurs among them. Such a concept has succeeded also in abolishing the sharp dualism between man and nature. What is more, relativity theory and quantum theory have proven that the act of knowing the world cannot be wholly separated from acting upon it. All in all, it is rather easy to accept the suggestion that we should introduce a holistic concept of nature as more adequately reflecting the man-nature relationship. At the end of the ‘80s the opinion circulated that one may speak of “the end of nature” itself, and also of the end of the concept of nature, at least in

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its traditional meaning. According to McKibben: “We live in a postnatural world” and “There is no such thing as natural any more.”1 According to that author, nature has definitely achieved its end. He writes: “Having lost its separateness, it loses its special power. Instead of being a category like God — something beyond our control — it is now a category like the defense budget or the minimum wage, a problem we must work out. This in itself changes its meaning completely . . . .”2 I do not quite agree with McKibben. Although there really seems to be any — or at least scarcely any! — pristine nature left, because anthropogenic activities have changed the world almost globally, there still remain in the world some wild areas in which we should let nature take its course. I believe such areas are adequately described using the following formulation of wilderness: “a wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”3 A B I OT I C A N D B I OT I C NAT U R E

Within nature there appear different levels of organization: abiotic nature — rock, soil, water, air; and biotic nature — plants, animals and last, but certainly not least, men. There is of course at least one great difference between the two spheres, one consisting in this — that the latter is living, whereas the former is not, at least in the traditional meaning of the word “living”. Contrasting the two spheres Holmes Rolston III writes: “An inert rock exists on its own, making no assertions over the environment and not needing it (although it did not come into being on its own).” And then he continues: “But the living organism cannot exist alone. It must claim the environment as a source and sink, from which to abstract the energy and materials and into which to excrete them. It ‘takes advantage’ of its environment.”4 It should be added, however, that we find some similar processes in abiotic nature too, e.g., a crystal is able to reproduce a pattern or, where greater wholes are to be considered, a planetary system is able to maintain its equilibrium. As regards abiotic nature, many unexpected and negative effects of man’s activity, e.g., the greenhouse effect and water pollution, show that man should not treat nature too harshly, especially when his intervention is made on a grand scale through the use of heavy technologies. The heavy technology used, in mining, damming, and logging drives nature beyond the point of

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recovery. From the history of man’s exploitation of nature it appears that within the man-nature relationship a rule of a limited interference should oblige, which means that nature should be treated with care and changed only as slightly as possible under given circumstances. For example, the work of drainage engineers in straightening rivers has contributed to increased flooding by allowing water to run unnaturally fast, keeping it from winding its way freely, something that usually slows it down. There is no doubt that the environmental crisis we have come to glimpse, in the second half of the twentieth century, is multifaceted, which means that numerous interconnections between human actions and the atmosphere, the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, the biosphere are still unknown. One can hear the opinion that the more free nature is, the more wild it is. This opinion seems to be true as regards plants and animals. But it would be nonsensical to speak of the “freedom of a river,” as some theoreticians do5; rivers as such are certainly not alive, although they may be said to be cradles of life. As regards plants it should be noted that one can meet quite often the opinion that man should leave certain areas of wilderness untouched, and that various reasons are given for taking this position. For example, John Passmore claims that such areas can be used by scientists as natural laboratories in which evolutionary processes may take place undisturbed.6 Usually in connection with this the problem of the extinction of species — of both plants and animals — is discussed. It is usually claimed that in such wild areas the endangered species would have a chance to survive, although it must be noted that in natural conditions natural extinction has always taken place, caused by various natural factors, e.g., competition. But it should be called that such natural extinction has usually been very slow and, therefore, rather marginal in comparison with the anthropogenic extinctions that have been caused unintentionally, and sometimes — although hard to believe — even intentionally. Some philosophers, such as Tom Regan, introduce rights theory into the argument, albeit while claiming that it refers to mature mammals first of all. He writes: “Perception, memory, belief, self-consciousness, intention, a sense of the future — these are among the leading attributes of the mental life of normal mammalian animals aged one or more.”7 The author then develops a whole theory of rights, one assuming that animals possess inherent value, and he eventually reaches the following conclusion: “. . . like us, animals have certain basic moral rights.”8 The problem is that rights theory, being a pure product of culture, has no immediate equivalent in nature as such. Its alienation from nature seems even greater when one begins to think on what

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rights, if any, should in fact be granted to animals. Within the sphere of culture, rights are inevitably connected with responsibility, and therefore duties, and it is hardly reasonable to speak of duties in the case of (even higher) animals, for they cannot bear responsibility for anything. What is more, Regan’s theory seems not to take into account the difference between domesticated animals dragged into culture and wild animals remaining outside culture. It seems reasonable to perhaps speak of some rudimentary rights of domesticated animals, because in domesticating them, man took upon himself responsibility for such animals; on the other hand, in case of animals remaining in the wilderness, the only rights we can speak of are the rights — or rather the laws — of nature. In contrast to abiotic nature, the biotic realm consists of entities that seem to be based on a counter-entropic principle and that are some normative entities. According to Holmes Rolston III: “The genetic set is a normative set; it distinguishes between what is and what ought to be . . . the organism is an axiological system, an evaluative system. So it grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists death.”9 As we see, the quotation suggests that there is no unsurmountable discrepancy between “is” and “ought to be,” and therefore George Moore’s dilemma, according to which there is no possibility of a leap from facts to values (norms), is presented with a new solution. T H E E VO L U T I O NA RY H I S TO RY O F M A N

For more than 100,000 years the history of man has been closely connected with the nature surrounding him. The evolution of man has always been based upon his interactions with the natural environment which in turn has determined his cognitive structures and the content of his consciousness. During most of that time man has been unable to change his environment to a great extent, though. But the situation changed drastically after the technological revolution which took place about two hundred years ago. Since then, man has gained the power which enables him to influence nature greatly and to change it, sometimes very drastically. Man always was, on the one hand, a part of nature; on the other, he has become more and more alienated from nature. The notion of “ecology” slowly lost its purely biological character and came to be used to describe man’s varied relations with the environment. Ecological problems, as understood by Passmore,10 began to be the object of the interest of different sciences, including the humanities. For example: medicine took an interest in the problem of pollution; economics, in the problem of conservation; the humanities began to examine the man-nature

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relationship, especially in its ethical dimension. Of course, all this was done within the actual, reigning cultural paradigm and had as its primary aim the defense of man’s different interests — health, welfare, and so forth; in effect, it was meant to guarantee the survival of man on the planet Earth. But sometimes the problem of man’s presence in the world becomes somewhat embarrassing. The theory of evolution shows that over long periods numerous different organisms of flora and fauna have evolved, leading ultimately to the appearance of creatures possessing self-consciousness and intelligence. In the light of that, it seems obvious that all organisms are related to each other to some degree, which is usually reflected in their genetic sets. It seems that in case of man, evolution “invested,” so to speak, in intelligence, which appeared in the Universe for the first time as far as we know! In effect, culture, purely man’s creation, was superimposed on nature. The sphere of culture became for man more natural, I would say, than nature itself. In a sense culture became part of the earthly ecosystem. But within culture man developed something as unique as intelligence, namely, a moral sense that now sounds a note of warning: Stop destroying the biosphere carelessly! It seems that morality appeared rather late in the history of culture, functioning as its instrument for adaptation to life on Earth. Charles Darwin, in The Descent of Man, explains quite well, within the naturalistic paradigm of course, how the mechanisms of natural selection could produce “moral sense” despite his assumption of the ever present “struggle for existence.” According to Darwin, young mammals required a long period of parental care in order to survive. Such care was usually given to them by their mothers. Motherly love together with the parental care of fathers enabled the formation of small families or clans, sharing what Darwin calls “social sentiments” among its particular members. In consequence, claims Darwin, such emotions “will have been increased by natural selection; for those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring.”11 Then the families and clans cooperated in order to successfully exploit the available resources, which usually were scarce. Cooperation prevailed instead of pure competition and rivalry. There appeared a stable tendency to form larger and larger social groups, then tribes and ultimately nations. The feeling of sympathy (altruism) spread on a quite large scale. Following Darwin one can say that in the twentieth century, nations have had a tendency to form still larger communities, e.g., the U.S.A. and the European Union. The category of altruism, under the cover of “human rights,” is spreading throughout the world. I think that Charles Darwin was perhaps right in claiming that

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“altruistic genes” — passed from parents to children — helped to establish the first small human communities, which succeeded. This is probably true in the case of the first representatives of Homo sapiens. But then, I believe the process of the transmission of certain norms from generation to generation has fallen now to the sphere of culture and, as a formal subject matter in education, it has taken an organized and orderly form in schools. In the twentieth century also, because of the environmental degradation of nature which no one questions, man came to the conclusion that he cannot do to nature anything he wants. There now appear some voices questioning man’s superiority in the world, at least the superiority traditionally conceived as dominion and tyranny. The traditional world view implied that we humans could do anything we wanted on the planet, and that which preceded us in the odyssey of evolution, abiotic nature, plants and animals, would accommodate our actions. We humans, under the influence of the theory of evolution and ecology, must realize at last that we are within life, not atop it, and that life as such is a system of interconnections that we do not yet understand well. Briefly stated, these interconnections may be positive, neutral or negative, and humans should promote the positive ties first of all. Some very good advice comes from Aldo Leopold — when one has doubts, one should preserve the health (integrity) of the ecosystem.12 It is this forester with inclinations to philosophy, Aldo Leopold, who is generally thought to be the father of contemporary environmental philosophy. Within this philosophy there are different trends, ranging from the almost traditional views of John Passmore, which may be situated within so-called extensionism, to holistic views, as represented, for example, by J.B. Callicot and Holmes Rolston III, to an almost strictly biocentric vision of nature, assuming that all species of life are equal, as found in the deep ecology of Arne Naess and Bill Devall. All this leads eventually to Albert Schweitzer’s dilemma. We can assume that all life is valuable and as such should be treated with respect, probably in proportion to its complexity and advancement. In the light of ecology, it seems that the traditional views concerning the manenvironment relationship are not enough, because they are too anthropologically oriented. On the other hand, biocentric views seem to go too far when they assume the complete equality of all beings (organisms). Such an assumption is certainly not in accord with common sense and is untenable both for practical and theoretical reasons. What seems to remain is a holistic vision of the man-natural environment relationship, which appears to be both fruitful and realistic as far as any activity of man, on the man-nature borderline, is concerned. But this holistic vision has not been fully elaborated

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yet. It remains in statu nascendi, Nevertheless, the problems it poses are certainly worthy of further elaborate discussion. Jagiellonian University N OT E S 1

Bill McKibben, The End of Nature New York: Random House, 1989, pp. 60, 89. Ibid., p. 210. 3 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 5. 4 Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, p. 99. 5 Mark Sagoff, “On Preserving the Natural Environment,” Yale Law Journal 84 (1974), p. 245. 6 John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature London: Duckworth, 1974, p. 101. 7 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights London and New York: Routledge, 1983, p. 81. 8 Ibid., p. 329. 9 Rolston, op. cit., p. 99. 10 Passmore, op. cit., p. 43. 11 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. New York: Hill, 1904, p. 107. 12 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac New York: Ballantine Books, 1990, p. 261. 2

SECTION VI

ANSELM MODEL

ZUR BEDEUTUNG DES “BLICKES” UND DES “A N T L I T Z E S ” B E I G E O R G S I M M E L U N D E M M A N U E L L E V I NA S

“Von Angesicht zu Angesicht” — diese bedeutungsvolle, absoluten Sinn und Glück verheiβende Formel der Bibel, des Alten und des Neuen Testamentes,1 bildet einen tragenden Hintergrund in Emmanuel Lévinas’ erster Philosophie, der Ethik, die Lévinas besonders in Auseinandersetzungen mit seinem Lehrer Edmund Husserl und mit Martin Heidegger, aber auch mit vielen anderen zeitgenössischen Denkern und führenden geschichtlichen Gestalten der Philosophie wie Kant, Hegel, Leibniz, Descartes, Platon, Plotin und Aristoteles entfaltete. Bei den zahlreichen Namensnennungen in den Werken Emmanuel Lévinas’ (1906–1995) tritt Georg Simmel (1858–1918) in den Hintergrund. Dies ist insofern merkwürdig, als Levinas an der letzten Wirkungsstätte Simmels, an der Universität Straβburg, seine philosophischen Studien begonnen hatte und Simmel im Raum der Freiburger Universität, an der Levinas während seines Studiums 1928/29 entscheidende Impulse des Philosophierens empfangen hatte, in guter Erinnerung (sowohl im Umfeld des Südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus als auch bei der Phänomenologischen Bewegung und bei Martin Heidegger)2 weiterlebte. Darüber hinaus hat Georg Simmel eindrucksvolle, inhaltsreiche Studien zum menschlichen Antlitz und zum menschlichen Blick hinterlassen, dialektische Studien, die sich nicht auf die soziologischen und ästhetischen Aspekte beschränken, sondern auch auf die ethische und ganzheitliche Bedeutung des Antlitzes und des Blickes verweisen. Diese Simmelschen Studien haben in den französischen Sprachraum hineingewirkt.3 Nachfolgend soll ein Vergleich zwischen Simmels und Levinas’ Beschreibungen, Deutungen und Bewertungen des Blickes und des menschlichen Antlitzes begonnen werden, ein Vergleich, der Gemeinsamkeiten wie Differenzen aufzuzeigen und das Denken beider Persönlichkeiten wechselseitig zu erhellen sucht. Wir fragen zunächst nach der Bedeutung des menschlichen Antlitzes und des Blickes im Werk Georg Simmels. Im Vordergrund der Betrachtung steht der einfluβreiche Essay “Exkurs über die Soziologie der Sinne” aus der Soziologie von 1908.4 Simmel untersucht darin die Bedeutung des Blickes 339 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 339–350. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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und des menschlichen Antlitzes unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Vergesellschaftung. Darüber hinaus werden noch zwei weitere, kürzere Aufsätze aus der mittleren Phase des Schaffens Simmels hinzugezogen. Diese beiden Zeitschriftenbeiträge “Die Ästhetische Bedeutung des Gesichts” (1901)5 und “Ästhetik des Porträts” (1903),6 in denen Simmel das menschliche Antlitz im Interessenkreis der Kunst analysiert, zeigen nicht nur das auβerordentliche Interesse Simmels am menschlichen Antlitz in jenen Jahren, sie können auch als Vorarbeiten zum Essay über “die Soziologie der Sinne” gelten und haben darin zum Teil in verdichteter Form Eingang gefunden. Alle drei Essays entstanden zu einer Zeit, da Georg Simmel dem Südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus, der Schule Wilhelm Windelbands (1848–1915) und seines Schülers Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936),7 besonders nahe stand, noch ehe der Einfluβ Henri Bergsons (1859–1941)8 sich (ab 1908) stärker auswirkte. Simmel, der damals die frühere Orientierung an Spencer, Darwin und dem Pragmatismus aufgab, konnte sich durch die Schule des Neukantianismus in der Betonung des “Formalen” bestärkt sehen. Der Südwestdeutsche Neukantianismus, der bewuβt nicht beim “historischen” Kant stehen bleiben wollte, sondern gemäβ des programmatischen Ausspruches Windelbands “Kant verstehen, heiβt über ihn hinausgehen”9 offen blieb für weitere philosophische Richtungen und Ideen, begann sich in dieser Zeit mit dem Erscheinen des Hegel — Bandes Kuno Fischers (1900/1), des Lehrers Wilhelm Windelbands, vermehrt der Hegelschen Philosophie zu öffnen, zugleich blieb auch diese Schule des Neukantianismus nicht unbeeinfluβt durch die ebenfalls in dieser Zeit lebendige Leibniz-Renaissance im europäischen Geistesleben.10 Die beiden Essays, die Georg Simmel 1901 und 1903 veröffentlichte, lassen deutlich den Einfluβ der Ästhetik Hegels, wie sie in Form der von Hotho herausgegebenen Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik damals bekannt war, erkennen. Wir werden hier darauf nicht näher eingehen. Auch Leibnizsche Leitgedanken treten uns dort, etwa in der Formel von “der Einheit in der Vielheit”11 und der Analyse der Mimik unter den Gesichtspunkten von Minima und Maxima12 entgegen. Simmel hebt die maximale Ausdrucksvariation der Mimik im ganzen bei minimaler Formveränderung innerhalb der einzelnen Gesichtszüge heraus.13 Der dritte Essay orientiert sich zusätzlich an Unterscheidungen der Kritik der Urteilskraft, der dritten “Kritik” und dem reifsten Werk Kants, das im Zentrum der Kant-Rezeption des Südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus’ stand.14 Obgleich Simmel in späteren Jahren vorrangig als Philosoph gelten wollte und seine späten Werke überwiegend diesem Gebiet zuzuordnen sind (ein-

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schlieβlich der philosophischen Ästhetik), haben doch weniger seine philosophischen Arbeiten, sondern die soziologischen, insbesondere die Soziologie von 1908 (zweite Auflage 1922) das europäische und amerikanische Geistesleben nachhaltig, zum Teil unterschwellig beeinfluβt. Dem vielseitigen Geist Simmels entsprach es auch in der Soziologie nicht, scharf zwischen soziologischen, ästhetischen und philosophischen Erwägungen zu trennen. Insbesondere hat Simmel in diesem Werk soziologische und ästhetische Betrachtungen eng miteinander verwoben. Den “Exkurs über die Soziologie der Sinne” hat Simmel mit dem “Exkurs über die soziale Begrenzung” und dem “Exkurs über den Fremden” in das Kapitel IX der Soziologie, das den räumlichen Momenten menschlicher Vergesellschaftungen nachgeht und die Überschrift trägt “Der Raum und die räumlichen Ordnungen der Gesellschaft”, eingefügt. In einem ersten Teil dieses Kapitels IX untersucht Simmel fünf Qualitäten oder Bedeutsamkeiten des Raumes für die sozialen Gestaltungen: 1. Die “Ausschlieβlichkeit” des Raumes und die Einzigkeit jedes Raumteiles, 2. die Grenzen des Raumes und die Einrahmung, 3. die Fixierungsmöglichkeit des Rauminhaltes, 4. die sinnliche Nähe oder Distanz zwischen den Personen im Raum, 5. die räumliche Bewegungen der Menschen von Ort zu Ort. Der “Exkurs über die Soziologie der Sinne” ergänzt die Fragestellungen des 4. Problemkreises zur räumlichen Nähe und Distanz, indem er unter den Aspekten von Nähe oder Distanz die Bedeutung der einzelnen Sinne, mit denen die Individuen sich gegenseitig perzipieren, für den Erfolg der Vergesellschaftungsform aufzeigt. Zwar erörtert Simmel entsprechend der Zuordnung des Kapitels die soziologische Bedeutung der Sinne vorzüglich unter dem Aspekt des Raumes, er kommt dabei aber nicht umhin, Aspekte der Zeit15 mit einzubeziehen. Der Blick strukturiert einen Raum. Dies verdeutlicht besonders die künstlerische Gestaltung des Blickes im Porträt.16 Im gegenseitigen Sichanblicken zweier Menschen wird ein Zwischenraum zwischen ihnen erfüllt, wobei Simmel zwei Aspekte trennt. Das “Zwischen” des Zwischenmenschlichen “als eine bloβe funktionelle Gegenseitigkeit” ist zunächst ein Moment, das innerpsychisch, im Inneren der sich anblickenden Personen wirkt, aber es “realisiert” sich auch “als Beanspruchung des zwischen den Menschen bestehenden Raumes.17 Zur Berücksichtigung von Zeitaspekten der Sinnlichkeit nötigen Simmel die Analysen des (unverhüllten) Antlitzes, das im groβen Maβe zum Kennenlernen des Anderen beim gegenseitigen Sichanblicken beiträgt; auch die Unterschiede zwischen Sehen und Hören und das Zusammenspiel der

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Leistungen des Ohres, des Auges und des Mundes mit der Fähigkeit zu Sprechen eröffnen die Zeitperspektive. Obgleich beim Sehen des Gesichtes, seiner Züge und seiner Mimik auch die augenblickliche Verfaβtheit des Angeblickten, seine Stimmungen und Impulsivität mit wahrzunehmen ist, offenbart doch das Gesicht des Anderen weit überwiegend seine dauernden Züge. Es ist darin gewissermaβen das “Nacheinander seines Lebens in einem Zugleich” zu sehen, während durch das Ohr, durch die gehörte gesprochene Sprache überwiegend die zeitliche, augenblickliche Verfaβtheit zuteil wird. Schon das erste Anblicken des Gesichtes, der “anschaulich vollendeten Symbolik der beharrenden Innerlichkeit”, ist ein unmittelbares Ergreifen der Innerlichkeit der Individualität des Andern, ein Gewahren des Andern, das nicht in Begriffliches und in einzelne Züge aufzulösen ist. Kant hatte in der Kritik der Urteilskraft Paragraph 3 innerhalb der Sinneswahrnehmung die begriffliche Unterscheidung von “Gefühl” und “Empfindung” in die Wissenschaftssprache eingeführt, um Missverständnisse zu vermeiden und um eindeutig zwischen der auf das Subjekt und auf sein Lebensgefühl bezogenen und der auf Objekte und deren Erkenntnisse gerichteten sinnlichen Wahrnehmung zu unterscheiden: “Denn im letzteren Falle [‘bei der Empfindung’] wird die Vorstellung auf das Objekt, im ersten [‘beim Gefühl’] aber lediglich auf das Subjekt bezogen, und dient zu gar keinem Erkenntnisse, auch nicht zu demjenigen, wodurch sich das Subjekt selbst erkennt.”18 Simmel beachtet diese Unterscheidung Kants innerhalb der Sinnlichkeit. Er weist bei seiner Untersuchung der Sinnlichkeit Kant gemäβ darauf hin: In das Subjekt hineinwirkend, löst der Sinneseindruck eines Menschen Gefühl von Lust und Unlust in uns aus, von einer Gesteigertheit oder Herabgesetztheit, von Erregung oder Beruhigung durch seinen Anblick oder den Ton seiner Stimme, durch seine bloβe sinnliche Gegenwart in demselben Raume. Dies alles dient nicht zum Erkennen oder Bestimmen des Anderen; nur mir ist wohl oder das Gegenteil, wenn er da ist und ich ihn sehe und höre. Ihn selbst läβt diese Reaktion des Gefühles auf sein sinnliches Bild sozusagen drauβen. Nach der entgegengesetzten Dimension streckt sich die Entwicklung des Sinneseindrucks, sobald er zum Mittel der Erkenntnis des Andern wird: was ich von ihm sehe, höre, fühle, ist jetzt nur die Brücke, über die ich zu ihm als zu meinem Objekte gelange.19

Simmel hebt hervor, daβ bei der Wahrnehmung des Menschen beide Dimensionen der Sinnlichkeit, die nach innen und die nach auβen gerichtete, zumeist miteinander verwoben sind. “Unsere Sinneseindrücke von ihm [‘dem Menschen’] lassen ihren Gefühlswert auf der einen Seite, ihre Verwendung zu einer instinktiven oder gesuchten Kenntnis seiner auf der andern — zusammenwirksam und praktisch eigentlich unentwirrbar zur Grundlage unsrer

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Beziehung zu ihm werden.”20 Diese doppelte Beziehung im Bereich der Sinnlichkeit betrifft auch das Sehen. Simmel hat den Leistungen des Auges einen Vorrang in der Soziologie der Sinne eingeräumt, ihnen eine gröβere Bedeutung vor dem Hören und noch mehr vor dem Riechen und den anderen Sinnesqualitäten beigemessen. Zugleich hat Simmel auch bemerkt, daβ zum Interpretieren des Gesehenen, insbesondere zur Deutung des Gesichtsausdruckes vielfach die Ergänzung durch das Hören vonnöten ist, gerade weil das Hören, wie schon erwähnt, stärker als das Sehen die augenblickliche Verfaβtheit, das zeitliche Moment offenbart. Der Vorrang des Sehens liegt vor allem in der Wechselseitigkeit, in der Möglichkeit der Menschen, sich gegenseitig anzublicken und gegenseitig ihr unverhülltes Antlitz wahrzunehmen. Sich gegenseitig anzublicken bedeutet für Simmel eine einzigartige Situation. Diese Fähigkeit des Menschen ist “vielleicht die unmittelbarste und reinste Wechselbeziehung, die überhaupt besteht.” Gäbe es dieses elementare Phänomen nicht, sähen die gesellschaftlichen Gestaltungen anders aus. Der “ganze Verkehr zwischen den Menschen, ihr Sichverstehen und Sichzurückweisen, ihre Intimität und ihre Kühle, wären in unausrechenbarer Weise geändert, wenn der Blick von Auge in Auge nicht bestünde . . .”.21 Sich gegenseitig anzublicken, in die Augen zu sehen, bedeutet im Unterschied zum bloβen Sehen oder Beobachten des Andern ein wechselseitiges Geben und Nehmen. “In dem Blick, der den Andern in sich aufnimmt, offenbart man sich selbst; mit demselben Akt, in dem das Subjekt sein Objekt zu erkennen sucht, gibt es sich hier dem Objekte preis”.22 Aus der einzigartigen Möglichkeit, gleichzeitig den Andern zu sehen und von ihm gesehen zu werden, folgt, daβ der Mensch für den Andern keineswegs schon ganz da ist, “wenn dieser ihn ansieht, sondern erst, wenn er auch jenen ansieht.”23 Betont Simmel die Wechselseitigkeit bei der Situation des gegenseitigen sich Anblickens von Angesicht zu Angesicht, sieht Levinas zuerst eine Asymmetrie darin. Ohne Simmels subtilen Analysen des Sehens, des Blickes und des Antlitzes in ihrer ganzen Breite und Tiefe weiter nachzugehen, soll nun der Position Levinas’, die bereits hin und wieder (im Anmerkungsteil) vergleichend zur Sprache kam, verstärkte Aufmerksamkeit zukommen. Aus Levinas’ Schriften spricht, daβ ihn das menschliche Antlitz keinesfalls weniger faszinierte als Simmel. Die Erörterungen Levinas’ sprechen jedoch aus einer anderen Atmosphäre heraus, aus dem Geist eines religiösen Glaubens. Levinas vermittelt zwar keine dogmatische Theologie, er läβt aber eine feste Verwurzelung in einem Glauben spüren, der als tragendes

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Fundament seinen philosophischen Erörterungen Sicherheit und Rahmen gibt und seine Rhetorik inspiriert. Anders verhielt es sich bei Simmel. Simmel vermittelte zwar keine irreligiöse Atmosphäre. Auch beim ihm spürte man hinter seiner wissenschaftlichen Attitüde ein religiöses Interesse, aber doch in zurückgehaltener und distanzierterer Weise, besonders auch gegenüber dem mosaischen Glauben seiner Vorfahren. Keineswegs vermitteln seine Schriften einen festen, sicheren Glauben, vielmehr eine suchende Religiösität, die nicht nur nach einer neuen Sprache und Begrifflichkeit ringt (wie bei Levinas), sondern auch seines Inhalts sich nicht mehr sicher weiβ. Simmels Werke erinnern in keiner Weise an das “erbauliche” Schrifttum Sören Kierkegaards,24 jedoch (in analoger Weise) der Groβteil der Arbeiten Levinas”. Levinas hat sein groβes Interesse am menschlichen Gesicht nicht nur quasi beiläufig in Exkursen und kurzen Zeitschriftenartikeln offenbart wie Simmel, sondern seit seiner ersten, die Grundidee und den leitenden Impuls seiner Philosophie eröffnenden kurzen Nachkriegsschrift “Le Temps et l’Autre” (1948), als das Antlitz25 des Andern kontinuierlich ins Zentrum seines Denkens und seiner Darstellungen gehoben.26 Nur weinge Momente aus dem Gesamtwerk Levinas sollen hier kurz erörtert werden. Obgleich Levinas Umfangreiches zum “Gesicht” (visage) ausgeführt hat, besonders in seinem Hauptwerk Totalité et l’Infini (1961), und er das, was er mit “Gesicht” meint, unter zahlreichen Aspekten beleuchtete, bleibt der Charakter von “Gesicht” bei Levinas in der Schwebe. Ist “Gesicht” ein Bild, eine Metapher, ein Symbol, ein Zeichen, ein Begriff, eine Idee? Er selbst ist einer direkten Beantwortung auf eine entsprechende Frage Christoph von Wolzogens27 ausgewichen. Levinas’ “visage” (Gesicht, Antlitz) erfüllt weder voll die Funktionen der “Vernunftidee” Kants noch der “ästhetischen Idee” Kants,28 obwohl im gewissen Umfange Merkmale beider Ideenarten dem Levinasschen Gebrauch von “Visage” zu eigen sind. Als eine vorläufige Zusammenfassung, extrahiert aus dem umfangreichen Schrifttum Levinas’ (sowohl aus den “vorkritischen” als auch aus den “kritischen” Schriften)29 könnte die Grundstruktur und die Grundbedeutung von “Visage” lauten: Visage fungiert zuerst als ein ethischer Appell, der der zwischenmenschlichen Situation des “Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht” entspringt, ein Appell, in dem als Spur das “ganz andere”, Gott, in dialektischer Weise zu erfahren ist als zugleich sich “zeigend” wie entziehend. Diese Grundstruktur von “visage” lieβe sich weiter differenzieren mit einer Fülle von Momenten, die Levinas im Laufe seines Philosophierens und in Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition und mit zeitgenössischem Denken an “visage” band.

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Mit Blick auf Simmel sei auf den Ausgang der Levinasschen “Philosophie des Gesichtes” zurückgegangen. Ähnlich wie Simmel wertet Levinas die Situation “Von Angesicht zu Angesicht” als exzeptionell: “Le Face-à-facè demeure situation ultime”.30 Schon im vorangestellten Plan der Schrift von 1948 (Kapitel I) hält er als Grundargument seiner Kritik an Martin Heidegger und an dessen Entwurf eines “Miteinanderseins” diesem entgegen: “Das ist aber nicht die Beziehung des Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht”.31 Im weiteren Verlauf der Schrift umschreibt er dann diese Situation nahezu mit den identischen Worten Georg Simmels: “. . . diese Situation ist das Verhältnis zu dem anderen [‘autrui’], das Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht mit dem anderen, die Begegnung mit dem Antlitz, das zugleich den anderen gibt und entzieht.”32 Wo liegt die Differenz in der nahezu identischen Umschreibung Levinas’ mit Simmel? Das Verb “entziehen” der voranstehenden Levinasschen Beschreibung scheint mir den grundlegenden Unterschied gegenüber der Analyse des “Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht” durch Simmel anzuzeigen. Simmel sprach nicht von einem zugleich des Gebens und Entziehens, sondern von einem zugleich des Gebens und Nehmens. “Entziehen” verweist meines Erachtens schon in dieser ersten frühen Formulierung des Von-Angesicht-zuAngesicht auf die Dialektik des Sich-zeigens und Sich-entziehens des ganz anderen als “Spur” und “Illéité”. Weitere Differenzen kommen hinzu: Levinas unternimmt die Analysen des Gesichtes (visage) und der Situation des Von-Angesicht-zu Angesicht mit anderen Zielvorgaben als Simmel. Er will keine soziologischen und anthropologischen Einsichten gewinnen und vermitteln, sondern die Dimension des “ganz anderen” in diesem Verhältnis herausheben. Deshalb beharrt er auch darauf, Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht nicht als ein symmetrisches, sondern als asymmetrisches Verhältnis deuten zu können, als eine “Untergebenheit unter das Unangleichbare”33 des anderen. Levinas Denken will Religionsphilosophie sein, wie er später bekennt, aber keine Theologie. Obgleich Levinas das Gesicht unter sehr vielen Aspekten ausführlich erörtert, gibt er uns daher, anders als Simmel, keine detaillierten Analysen der Strukturen und Funktionen des anschaubaren Gesichtes. Gesicht, Antlitz, Visage kennt Levinas weniger in der Bedeutung des Gesehenen und der in in den Zügen niedergeschlagenen Lebensgeschichte, von denen die Züge erzählen, sondern er bemerkt im Gesicht ethische Appelle, zu allererst den Appell: Du wirst nicht töten! Zu den vorangegangenen Aussagen ist einschränkend zu bemerken: Zwar lehnte Levinas die “soziologische” Betrachtungsweise für sein Denken ab,

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das bedeutet aber nicht, daβ Simmels Darlegungen den Levinasschen Kriterien für Soziologie, wo Levinas an zeitgenössische französische, intellektuelle und politische Strömungen dachte, dem ganzen Umfange nach gehorchen. In den Analysen des Antlitzes steht bei Simmel möglicherweise die absolute Dimension angedeutet im Hintergrund. Wenn er darauf hinweist, daβ sich im Gesicht als “Ausdrucksorgan” die “Symbolik der beharrenden Innerlichkeit” äuβere, dann mag Simmel, den der Geist Meister Eckharts tief beeindruckte,34 dabei den Eckhartschen Sinn von Innerlichkeit mit bedacht haben. Antlitz, Blick, Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht, diese Situationen und Phänomene durchdringen den menschlichen Alltag. Mit ihnen verbindet sich ein weites Spektrum an Erfahrungen, Gefühlen und Erkenntnissen. Enthalten diese Situationen und Phänomene nicht auch Anziehung und Abstoβung, Strahlkraft, Freude und Schrecken, Liebe und Haβ, Hoffnung und Enttäuschung? Obwohl diese Gegebenheiten in Fülle oder auch als Entbehrungen das Leben jedes einzelnen betreffen, fehlt doch zumeist ein ausdrückliches und klares Bewuβtsein davon. Georg Simmel und Emmanuel Levinas haben sich von diesen Themen faszinieren lassen und sind deren grundsätzlichen Bedeutungen für den zwischenmenschlichen Bereich nachgegangen. Beide Denker verfolgten dabei unterschiedliche Richtungen: Simmels Augenmerk war primär auf die Bedingungen der Vergesellschaftung gerichtet, Levinas fragte nach den Grundlagen der Ethik und nach Möglichkeiten der Gotteserfahrung. Der zurückliegende Vergleich mit dem Ziele, das Denken Simmels und Levinas’ gegenseitig zu erhellen, scheint mir auch aufzuzeigen, daβ Levinas indirekt oder direkt “Goldstaub” aus dem intelektuellen Nachlass Simmels erwarb. Es scheint mir einer weiteren Aufgabe wert, diesem Sachverhalt näher nachzugehen und auch bei anderen Themen, bei denen sich im ersten Blick eine gewisse Parallelität zwischen Simmel und Levinas zeigt, die Bezüge zwischen beiden Denkern zu vertiefen oder einzuschränken. Nur angedeutet werden konnte die Umgebung, in der der “Goldstaub” Simmels neuen Glanz erhalten haben könnte: der “geistige Schmuck” Levinas’, seine hinterlassenen Werke. Freiburg im Breisgau ANMERKUNGEN 1

Siehe Exodus 33–35, 1. Korinther 13, 12 und 2. Korinther 3, 18; Levinas verweist u.a. auf Exodus 33 in SA, 235.

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VERZEICHNIS DER BENUTZTEN SIGEL: GSW = Georg Simmel, Gesamtausgabe, hrsg. von Otthein Rammstedt; Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main: 1989 — SA =. Emmanuel Lévinas, Die Spur des Anderen, übersetzt, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von W. N. Krewani; Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg und München: 1983; TI = Emmanuel Levinas. Totalité et Infini. ESSAI SUR L’EXTÉRIORIRTÉ; 4. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Haag: 1984; TU = Emmanuel Lévinas, Totalität und Unendlichkeit. Versuch über die Exteriorität, übers. v. W. N. Krewani; Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg und München: 1984. ZA = Emmauel Levinas, Die Zeit und der Andere, übersetzt und mit einem Nachwort versehen von L. Wenzler; Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg: 1984. 2 Heinrich Rickert, der Vorgänger Edmund Husserls in Freiburg und einer der Hauptvertreter des Südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus, war mit Simmel befreundet. Jonas Cohn (1869–1947), erster Habilitant Rickerts, lehrte damals noch als Extraordinarius für Philosophie und Pädagogik an der Universität Freiburg. C. war besonders in seinem ethischen Denken durch Simmel beeinfluβt. Auch seine Theorie der Dialektik (1923, französisch 1994) ist stark von Simmels dialektischem Verfahren inspiriert. C. verfaβte eine der ersten Biographien Simmels (Deutsches Biographisches Jahrbuch. Überleitungsband II 1917–1920, 1928, S. 326–333); am 22.9.28 erschien in der Bad. Schulztg. 66 Cohns Aufsatz “Georg Simmels Lebensphilosophie”. Franz Rosenzweig hatte bei Cohn in Freiburg ein Seminar zu Kant besucht, dies in dankbarer Erinnerung behalten und Cohn später seine Schriften zugesandt. Siehe Rosenzweigs Brief an J. Cohn vom 5.11.1924; Zu Cohn siehe u.a. A. Model, Jonas Cohn, Badische Biographien/Neue Folge Bd. 4, Stuttgart: 1996, S. 49–50. Levinas hat in die Bibliographie seines Artikel “Infini” in “l’Encyclopaedia Universalis,” 1990, t. IX, p. 1121 (Doppelartikel zusammen mit J.T. Desanti) Cohns Geschichte des Unendlichkeitsproblems im abendländischen Denken bis Kant (Leipzig: 1896, französische Übersetzung Histoire de l’infini, Paris: 1994) aufgenommen. Auch Heidegger schätzte Simmel (siehe M. Groβheim, Von Georg Simmel zu Martin Heidegger, Bonn/Berlin: 1991). Husserl stand mit Simmel im Briefverkehr. Als Levinas bei Husserl in Freiburg studierte, entstand die kritische, aber Simmel gegenüber wohlwollend gehaltene Dissertation des HusserlSchülers H. Bohner: “Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der Philosophie Georg Simmels” (1930). Auch lehrte in Freiburg als Extraordinarius der Ethnologe, Kunstwissenschaftler und Philosoph Ernst Grosse (1862–1927), der mit Simmel weite Interessengebiete teilte und den Simmel gelegentlich in Briefen erwähnte. Grosse gilt mit seinen Anfängen der Kunst (1894) als Pionier auf dem Gebiet der Kunstethnologie und hat die Rezeption der alten ostasiatischen Kunst in Europa maβgeblich gefördert. Zu Grosse siehe u.a. A. Model, Ernst Grosse, Badische Biographien/Neue Folge Bd. 5 (im Druck). Die Freiburger Universität hatte 1911 Simmel die Ehrendoktorwürde (Dr. rer. pol. h.c.) verliehen. 3 Simmels Soziologie der Sinne, die von Mamelet ins Französische übersetzt worden war, hat u.a. bei Sartres Analyse des “Blickes” nachgewirkt. Vgl. M. Landmann, Georg Simmel. Konturen seines Denkens, in: H. Böhringer u. K. Gründer, Ästhetik um die Jahrhundertwende. Georg Simmel, Frankfurt am Main: 1976, S. (3–11) 10. 4 GSW 11, S.722–742. Simmel hat in diesem Exkurs den Aufsatz “Die Soziologie der Sinne”, Neue Rundschau, September 1907 aufgenommen (auch in GSW 8). Mit diesem Exkurs greift S. in veränderter Form einen Problemkreis auf, der ihn früh interessierte. Mit der musikethnologischen Arbeit “Psychologisch-ethnographische Studien über die Anfänge der Musik” hatte S. ursprünglich in Berlin promovieren wollen, die Berliner Fakultät hatte jedoch mit der Begründung Helmholtz’, S. habe die Ergebnisse der Physiologie der Sinne ungenügend berücksichtigt und käme daher über Meinungsäuβerungen nicht hinaus, diese Arbeit abgelehnt. (Vgl. dazu K. Ch. Köhnke, Der junge Simmel. Frankfurt am Main: 1996, S. 57).

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GSW 7, S.36–42; zuerst in: Der Lotse, 1.Jg., 2. Bnd. S. 280–284, Hamburg: 1901. GSW 7, S. 321–332; zuerst in: Neue freie Presse, Wien, 22. April 1905. 7 Zu den Biographien Windelbands und Rickerts siehe u.a. meine entsprechenden Beiträge in: Badische Biographien/Neue Folge Bd. 4 hrsg. v. B. Ottnad; Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart: 1996, S. 229–231, 323–325. 8 Das Bekanntwerden Bergsons in Deutschland geht zu einem guten Teil auf Simmel zurück u.a. auch dadurch, daβ Simmel die Übersetzung von Werken Bergsons ins Deutsche anregte. Siehe M. Landmann a.a.O. S.4 f. 9 W. Windelband. Präludien, Vorwort, 1. A. 1883. 10 Zur Leibniz-Rezeption im Südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus siehe u.a. A. Model, Prävalenz des Positiven. Zur Leibniz-Rezeption Jonas Cohns, in: VI. Internationaler LeibnizKongreβ Vorträge I.Teil, hrsg. von der Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft e.V., Hannover: 1994, S. 479–486. Im Zuge dieser Leibniz-Rezeption setzte sich auch im Marxismus mit W. I. Lenins “Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus” (1908) — wohl in Anlehnung an Leibniz’ Spiegel -Metaphorik — “Widerspiegelung” als die Grundmetapher zur Deutung und Erklärung sozialer Wirklichkeit und künstlerischen Schaffens durch, eine bildhafte Umschreibung der Verhältnisse von dialektischer Materie und Bewuβtsein, gesellschaftlichem Sein und Bewuβtsein, die Marx selbst nicht benutzte. 11 Insofern diese Formel im Antlitz vollkommen verwirklicht ist, kann das Antlitz für Simmel als Symbol einer idealen Vergesellschaftung stehen. “Das Ideal menschlichen Zusammenwirkens: daβ die äuβerste Individualisierung der Elemente in eine äuβerste Einheit eingehe, die, aus den Elementen freilich bestehend, dennoch jenseits jedes einzelnen von ihnen und nur in ihrem Zusammenwirken liegt — diese fundamentalste Formel des Lebens hat im Menschantlitz ihre vollendetste Wirklichkeit innerhalb des Anschaulichen gewonnen.” GSW 7, S.37. 12 Die Kriterien von Minima und Maxima bedeuten für Leibniz Maβstäbe einer vollkommenen Ordnung. (Siehe Leibniz, Monadologie 58). 13 GSW 7, S.40 ff. 14 Der Marburger Neukantianismus bevorzugte die Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kants. Simmel soll mit den Die Probleme(n) der Geschichtsphilosophie von 1905 in seinem soziologischen Ansatz eine “kantische Wendung” vollzogen haben. Siehe Otthein Rammstedt, “Editorischer Bericht”, in: Georg Simmel, Soziologie. GSW 11, S. 877–905, 901. 15 Im Rembrandt (Leipzig: 1916), wo S. Probleme des Porträts noch einmal aufgreift und vertieft (auch unter den Gesichtspunkten der Ewigkeit, der Gegenwart, der vergangenen und der künftigen Lebenszeit), beschreibt S. darüber hinaus einen raumlosen Blick tiefer und wesentlicher Menschen, Menschen ohne Flachheit, aus denen eine “immanente Transzendenz” spricht, die einen (endlichen) Gegenstand fixieren und zugleich weiter blicken “gewissermaβen ins Überörtliche, in ein nicht zu begrenzendes Irgendwo, das aber keine räumliche Bedeutung hat” (S. 125 ff). Für Levinas steht bei der Darstellung des Antlitzes die Dimension der Zeit, nicht des Raumes im Vordergrund seines Interesses, da es ihm dabei auf die “Eschatologie”, auf die absolute Zukunft ankommt. Das zeigt er schon mit dem Titel der Schrift von 1948 an “Die Zeit und der Andere”, wobei mit der Zeit die Momente der Befreiung, der Offenheit und der Hoffnung (Befreiung von der Immanenz und Einsamkeit des Subjektes, Öffnung zu dem ganz Anderen, Hoffnung in Form einer unstillbaren Sehnsucht) verbunden sind. Die so verstandene Zeit ist “nicht das Faktum eines isolierten und einsamen Subjektes, sondern das Verhältnis des Subjektes zum anderen” (TU 17), ist das Ereignis einer “Sozialität zu zweit”, insbesondere ein Verhältnis zum Weiblichen, zum Kind. Auch weil Levinas das Gesicht wenig räumlich, sondern zeitlich denkt, fällt es schwer, bei seinen Erörterungen sich ein konkretes Gesicht vorzustellen. 6

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Obgleich Levinas damit eine Fülle an Konnotationen verbindet, wird das “Gesicht” nicht bildhaft, bleibt gewissermaβen auch ein Schema. Das “Gesicht” Levinas’ kann man wegen des Zeitmomentes nicht betrachten (dévisagé), wie Levinas selbst in einem Interview (mit Ch. v. Wolzogen) meinte, aber dennoch wohl — so scheint es mir — erblicken und anblicken. 16 GSW 7, S.41f. 17 GSW 11, S.689 18 Kritik der Urteilskraft. 3. A.; Berlin: 1799, §3, S.9. 19 GSW 11, S. 722. Wenn Levinas auf die Sinnlichkeit bei Kant zu sprechen kommt und Kant kritisiert, dann meint er dessen Ausführungen dazu in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, nicht die späteren, (in der Begrifflichkeit differenzierteren) der Kritik der Urteilskraft. Letztere scheint Levinas weniger intensiv wahrgenommen zu haben. Levinas hat jedoch in TU unter “Antlitz und Sinnlichkeit” danach gefragt, inwiefern “die Epiphanie als Antlitz eine Beziehung” bezeichnet, “die von derjenigen, die unsere ganze sinnliche Erfahrung charakterisiert, verschieden ist” (S. 267). Levinas rehabilitiert in den darauf folgenden ausführlichen Erörterungen der Sinnlichkeit implizit und eher beiläufig und sinngemäβ Kants in der Kritik der Urteilskraft getroffene Unterscheidung von auf das Subjekt bezogenem Gefühl und auf das Objekt gerichteter Empfindung, geht darüber aber noch hinaus, wenn er eine “Transzendentale Phänomenologie” für alle Empfindungsqualitäten fordert. Die Epiphanie als Antlitz unterscheidet sich von der Sinnlichkeit. Die Epiphanie des Antlitzes, der Blick und der Empfang des Antlitzes setzen nicht nur Sehen, sondern auch die Sprache voraus (270). Das Transzendente als Anschauung “der eigentlichen Öffnung des Seins” unterscheidet sich von der Sinnlichkeit, von der Anschauung der Formen und kann “weder in Termini der Betrachtung noch in Termini der Praxis ausgedrückt werden” (277). Die Dimension der Transzendenz erscheint allein in der Beziehung mit dem Anderen und “geleitet uns zu einer Beziehung, die ganz und gar verschieden ist von der Erfahrung im sinnlichen Sinne des Ausdrucks, von der Erfahrung, die relativ und egoistisch ist” (277). Vor allem die erneute, intensive Beschäftigung mit der Phänomenologie der Sinnlichkeit im Zusammenhang mit einer vertieften Lektüre Husserls und dessen Differenzierung der “Intentionalität” in eine “objektivierende” und in eine “transitive” (so sah es Levinas), scheint die “kritische” Periode Levinas’ eingeleitet zu haben. 20 GSW 11, S. 723. 21 Ebenda S. 724 22 Ebenda S. 724 23 Ebenda S. 725 24 Zum höheren Ernst des “Erbaulichen” gegenüber dem vordergründigen Ernst des “Wissenschaftlichen” und zu den entsprechenden Formen an “Strenge” siehe das Vorwort zu Die Krankheit zum Tode S. Kierkegaards. 25 In der deutschen Umgangssprache wird das, aus dem Französischen übernommene Visage (seit der napoleonischen Besatzungszeit?) vor allem gegenüber sozial niedriger stehenden Menschen, etwa beim Militär, zumeist pejorativ gebraucht. Wenn Levinas fast ausschlieβlich visage (“Gesicht”) verwendet, dann hat er, neben anderen Gründen (visage ist Maskulinum und passt besser als die Feminina face und figure zum Maskulinum l’autre), möglicherweise auch den deutschen umgangssprachlichen Gebrauch von Visage im Sinn. Er unterstriche damit schon sprachlich eine Asymmetrie im Verhältnis zum “Anderen” und rehabilitiere die Verunglimpften. Gerade in der Begegnung mit dem Niedrigeren, ja dem Geringsten und Schwachen bekundet sich Hoheit. Taurek weist darauf hin, daβ Levinas das Dreifachangebot des Französischen für Gesicht “figure” und “face” neben “visage” nicht zur Nuancierung benutzt. Siehe B. Taurek, Emmanuel Levinas. 2.A.; Hamburg: 1997, S. 65.

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Im Vorwort der Neuauflage von Le Temps et L’Autre bekräftigte der inzwischen dreiundsiebzigjährige Levinas 1979, daβ er immer noch an dem ursprünglichen (im Alter von vierzig Jahren) verfaβten Entwurf der Schrift festhalte. Levinas beginnt so mit einem Thema, dem Antlitz mit dem Der Stern der Erlösung (1921) Franz Rosenzweigs (1886–1929) schlieβt. Nachdem “Antlitz” und das “Von-Angesicht-zu-Angesicht” als Leitfäden das Werk andeutungsweise durchzogen, enthält der Schluβ des Sterns der Erlösung (“Tor”) eine umfassende symbolische Ausdeutung des Antlitzes Gottes mit den Formen des David-Sternes. Rosenzweig hat Simmel und dessen Denken auch insofern abgelehnt, als er bei Simmel eine Karikatur des “Jüdischen” und Charakterschwächen gesehen hat, die er auch bei sich wahrnahm und zu überwinden strebte. (Siehe die Briefe Rosenzweigs an Martin Buber vom 20.9.1922 und an seine Eltern vom 21.1. und 23.1.1917; vgl. H. Liebeschütz, Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig; Tübingen: 1970, S.141 ff.) In Rosenzweigs Abwertung Simmels mag einer der Gründe liegen, daβ Levinas in seinen Schriften Simmel ausläβt. Obgleich Rosenzweig Simmel ablehnte, dessen Denken zu fernstehend empfand und daher eine Auseinandersetzung mit ihm nicht suchte, scheinen mir doch im Der Stern der Erlösung — geborgen in einer anderen, religiösen Geistigkeit — die Simmelschen Analysen der “Soziologie der Sinnlichkeit” ständig gegenwärtig zu sein. 27 Siehe Emmanuel Levinas, Humanismus des anderen Menschen, übersetzt und mit einer Einleitung versehen von L. Wenzler, Anmerkungen von Th. de Boer, A. Peperzak und L. Wenzler, mit einem Gespräch zwischen Emmanuel Levinas und Ch. von Wolzogen als Anhang “Intention, Ereignis und der Andere”; Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg; 1989, S. 135. 28 Siehe I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft § 57 Anmerkung I, Akademie-Ausgabe Bd. V, S. 341 f. 29 Für Levinas gehört TI noch der vorkritischen Periode an. 30 TI, 53 31 ZA, 18 32 Ebenda, 50 33 Ebenda 10 34 “Seit kurzem beschäftige ich mich wieder mit Meister Eckhart u. bin wieder von der Tiefe u. Freiheit dieses Geistes völlig überwältigt. Deutschland hat weitere und differenziertere Geister hervorgebracht; ob es je einen tieferen, konzentrirteren, wurzelechteren erzeugt hat, ist mir zweifelhaft.” Brief G. Simmels an H. Rickert vom 29.12.1911. Margarete Susman, die sowohl mit Simmel wie mit Rosenzweig befreundet war, scheint eine Nähe Simmels zum Grundanliegen Rosenzweigs anzudeuten, wenn sie in ihren Erinnerungen an Simmel auf eine Aussage Bernhard Groethusens, eines Lieblingsschülers Simmels verweist, die dieser Simmel selbst in den Mund legte, um die Haltung Simmels zum Absoluten zu verdeutlichen: “Ich habe es nicht gesehen, aber es war da.” Für Susman war dieses Wort, “das fast an das 33. Kapitel des zweiten Buches Moses erinnert” (und damit auch an den Schluβ von Rosenzweigs Stern der Erlösung wie an Levinas’ Grundbegriff des “Antlitzes”) entscheidend für das ganze Schaffen Georg Simmels (M. Susman, Erinnerungen an Simmel, in: Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel, hrsg. v. K. Gassen und M. Landmann, Berlin: 1958, S. 279.)

J.J. VENTER

H U M A N D I G N I T Y I N W E A K N E S S — G A B R I E L M A R C E L’ S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY

BAC K G RO U N D

The concept of a special dignity for humankind has been with us at least as far back as Cicero. It always had two sides: an ontological one, concerned with the place of humankind in the universe, and a social one, focused in the behaviour of a person in relationship with and in comparison to other persons. On both sides the dominant assumption was that human dignity lies in the given rationality and the expression of this in behaviour (cf. Venter, 2000). In gender terms, it was by and large a concept associated with the mature male. Traditionally human rationality had a suprahuman telos: the Idea or the divine, which it was supposed to imitate or to obey. But in Kant “every rational being as such, exists as end in himself,” and that which is an end in itself “has in itself absolute value” and “can be a ground of definite laws” (Kant, 1901: 245). Kant, although not using the term “dignity,” insisted on the implication of not treating a fellow rational being merely as an instrument. The atmosphere of Kant’s view of human dignity is that of absolutised rationality of the autonomous human being. It is common knowledge that Western tradition in the meantime moved away from the axiom that the defining aspect of humanity is rationality — in fact the philosophical and life-view environment is rather more irrationalistic. In the past decades a clear shift in gender relationships has made itself felt, and male-associated concepts are no more representative of the self-image of the human species. And the traditional view of human dignity is biased towards the adult population — neglecting the question of the dignity of human life in the childhood phase. Furthermore, globalisation has created a very intense debate about intercultural contact, which may point to the accentuation of rationality as peculiarly Western. All this puts a question mark behind human dignity as rationality. One now has to ask oneself: What concept of human dignity might be developed in a context where rationality is not necessarily the expression of the peculiarly valuable and defining characteristic of human life?

Gabriel Marcel had the courage to renew the concept of human dignity from an existential point of view. While not outrightly rejecting human 351 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 351–372. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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dignity as rationality, he states that the discourse of rationalism is outdated, and that we have to develop an existential approach to this matter. He situates dignity in interhuman relationships (a second-person philosophy), specifically our relationship to the weak (which finds its supreme expression in confrontation with human finitude). He develops this idea in confrontation with totalitarianism and technocracy. To evaluate his contribution I consider it worthwhile to confront his views with totalitarianism (Mussolini) and technocracy (Skinner). Therefore a brief look at these two viewpoints, as a background for an intensive discussion of Marcel’s viewpoints. MUSSOLINI Fascism wants man to be active and to engage in action with all his energies; it wants him to be manfully aware of the difficulties besetting him and ready to face them. It conceives of life as a struggle in which it behooves a man to win for himself a really worthy place, first of all by fitting himself (physically, morally, intellectually) to become the implement required for winning it. As for the individual, so for the nation, and so for mankind. Hence the high value of culture in all its forms (artistic, religious, scientific) and the outstanding importance of education. Hence also the essential value of work, by which man subjugates nature and creates the human world (economic, political, ethical, intellectual) (Mussolini, 1935: 9; my italics — J. J. V.).

Mussolini’s discourse gives enough reason to think that the whole issue of human dignity is a male-oriented one. It is a question of confronting the difficulties of life like a man. But he goes much further — dignity (in his words, a “worthy place”) is something won by aggressive struggle in all aspects of life, against other human beings and against nature. The programme of Fascism is expressed in one word “fight,” and the meaning of it in one sentence: to “disdain the easy life” (1935: 9,36). In a note explaining how this “worthy place” is won, Mussolini undergirded his programme and political attitude with a view of reality based on struggle and conflict in which he specifically attacks the Christian view of peace and universal brotherhood: Struggle is the origin of all things, for life is full of contrasts: there is love and hatred, white and black, day and night, good and evil; and until these contrasts achieve balance, struggle fatefully remains at the root of human nature. However, it is good for it to be so. Today we can indulge in wars, economic battles, conflicts of ideas, but if a day came to pass when struggle ceased to exist, that day would be tinged with melancholy; it would be a day of ruin, the day of ending. But that day will not come, because history ever discloses new horizons. By attempting to restore calm, peace, tranquillity, one would be fighting the tendencies of the present period of dynamism. One must be prepared for other struggles and for other surprises. Peace will only come when people surrender to a Christian dream of universal brotherhood when they can hold out hands across the ocean and over the mountains. Personally I do not believe very much in these idealisms, but I do not exclude them for I exclude nothing (1935: 36).

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Mussolini seems to have believed in a metaphysic of conflict similar to that of Heraclitus of Ephesus and Callicles of Acharnae. But his metaphysic of struggle is not out of pace with Western militarism, rooted in Machiavelli and Hobbes, and worked out in the competition motive in Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant and others. There is, however, a difference. These latter believed in the maturation of humankind to the level of a final rational order of peace. Mussolini does not give us this secular theory of progress — irrationalism has removed the hope placed in reason. And although he does not exclude a universal peace in a Christian sense, his whole discourse about it borders on ridicule. Any impression that the struggle for a worthy place implies an appreciation for individuality on Mussolini’s side would be totally wrong, however. He had a peculiar ontology in terms of which the individual standing by himself was regarded as transient, self-centred and subject to the natural law of momentary pleasure, whilst Fascism, as a spiritual attitude is the liberating force which opens up the individual for “the higher life, founded on duty, free from the limitations of time and space,” in the context of the state as the permanent, spiritual, universal (i.e., as the reality). This can be attained by the renunciation of own interest and self-sacrifice even unto death, “achieving that purely spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists” (1935: 8). Thus the dignity of the human ultimately consists in laying down one’s life for a mystical community. Struggle is sacrifice of individuality, and although Mussolini explicitly situates the centre of life inside the human being (stating that man must create his own world by the exercise of free will), he means no more than state totalitarianism. The mystical community proves to be the Fascist state, which — in language strongly reminiscent of the organismic views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (cf. Venter, 1996: 184–191; 195–196) — accepts the individual only insofar as his interests coincide with those of the state, being the conscience and the universal will of man as historic entity (1935: 10). The anchoring framework of Mussolini’s views of the value of human life is a holistic one — a conception of the state which is also a conception of life and at the same time an organic conception of the world. Mussolini himself ascribes the exertion of a spiritual influence in the world, which for him is the same as a human will dominating the will of others, to the presupposition of an organismic world-view (1935: 8). It seems then that for Mussolini “human dignity” only has meaning in the context of struggle and willful domination of man and nature in the state as an organic whole, which is the actual life and the really permanent aspect of

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reality. There is no meaning to life outside the living, suprahuman will and conscience which is the state. SKINNER

The philosophy at the basis of B. F. Skinner’s behaviourist psychology remains in the atmosphere of a philosophy of power, although — and it is important to add this — it is a much kinder vision which is rather aimed at solving human problems, such as the population explosion, world famine, disease, nuclear war, and pollution. Skinner finds it natural that we try to solve these problems with the help of what we do best: “We play from strength, and our strength is science and technology” (1982: 11). Success is fairly limited — in fact the increase of human power seems to succeed only in diminishing the prospects of later generations. According to Skinner the difficulty lies in the fact that we limit the technologies we use to biological and physical technology. What we need is a technology of behaviour. We could solve our problems quickly enough if we could adjust the growth of the world’s population as precisely as we adjust the course of a spaceship, or improve agriculture and industry with some of the confidence with which we accelerate high energy particles, or move towards a peaceful world with something like the steady progress with which physics has approached absolute zero . . . But a behavioural technology comparable in power and precision to physical and biological technology is lacking, and those who do not find the very possibility ridiculous are more likely to be frightened by it than reassured. That is how far we are from “understanding human issues” in the sense in which physics and biology understand their fields, and how far we are from preventing the catastrophe toward which the world seems to be inexorably moving (1982: 10–11).

(Skinner was not the first behaviourist to look for an alternative technology of behaviour — we already find it in the linguist Bloomfield, who proposed to control human affairs via lingual behaviour.) The reason why we have remained behind on the level of a technology of behaviour, Skinner says, is that behavioural science still tends to link behaviour to states of mind, feelings, traits of character, human nature. Physics and biology became successful exactly when they stopped with such an approach. The obvious alternative to finding an explanation in the inner man would be to look for one in the environment, but according to Skinner the role of the environment remained obscure. Some crude forms of behaviourism ascribed a push-pull causality to it, whereas in fact it works by selection; just as in evolutionary natural selection, so also we have a strengthening of successful behaviour in the case of individual human beings. As explanations in terms of the environment replace those which refer to inner states, a behaviour technology becomes possible,

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but even this will not solve our problems as long as we adhere to the entrenched prescientific views, as is shown by such ideas as “freedom” and “dignity.” As long as we adhere to them, we cling to the idea of “autonomous man” who is “held responsible for his conduct and given credit for his achievements” (1982: 30), while a scientific analysis, says Skinner, shifts both responsibility and achievement to the environment (1982: 9–30). Freedom, for Skinner, is simply the activity of a living being to free itself from harmful or “aversive” contacts (1982: 31). The struggle for freedom is, therefore, not attributable to a “will to be free.” Whereas physical and biological technologies focus on natural stimuli, the struggle for freedom concentrates on aversive stimuli which are intentionally arranged by other people. The “literature of freedom” has, however, mistakenly defined freedom in terms of autonomy or states of mind — it has, therefore, neglected those techniques of control which do not cause escape or revolt, but do have aversive consequences, and has tended to brand all control as wrong, instead of analysing the different kinds of control, and changing the detrimental ones (1982: 31–46). Any evidence that a person’s behaviour may be attributed to external circumstances seems to threaten his dignity or worth. We are not inclined to give a person credit for achievements which are in fact due to forces over which he has no control. . . . Freedom is an issue raised by the aversive consequences of behaviour, but dignity concerns positive reinforcement. When someone behaves in a way we find reinforcing, we make him more likely to do so again by praising or commending him (1982:48).

Although Skinner often refers to the “literature of dignity,” it is clear from the quote above that he missed an essential point: Especially from the ontological side human dignity has been considered as something inherent in the human being (its status in the totality of reality as a rational being), which of course has to find expression in behaviour. This inherent dignity might be mysterious (as Marcel has it) but it is not simply a question of creditability. It is precisely because of the presupposition of inherent dignity that attention is paid to persons whose way of life does not exactly express dignity, for example as is done in social work (as analysed by Biestek, 1957). For Skinner, however, dignity is a question of credit, and more credit is due for what can be seen as originality and as unrequited action; there is an inverse relation between credit and the conspicuousness of causes of the behaviour (1982: 49–52). Dignified behaviour is behaviour from which (apparently) control is absent, and we try to conceal control in order to avoid losing credit or to claim credit not really due to us (like when a general tries to look dignified in a jeep covering rough terrain). We can also maximize

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credit by exposing ourselves to conditions “which ordinarily generate unworthy behaviour while refraining from acting in unworthy ways” — and this goes together with minimizing of the conspicuousness of the causes of the behaviour (1982: 53–4). This pretence of minimal control and absence of causes which is associated with dignity has a deeper foundation — it is almost a remnant of an occult or divine inspiration: There is something more than good husbandry or the appropriate evaluation of reinforcers in our concern for dignity or worth. We not only praise, commend, approve, or applaud a person, we “admire” him, and the word is close to “marvel at” or “wonder at.” We stand in awe of the inexplicable, and it is therefore not surprising that we are likely to admire behaviour more as we understand it less. And, of course, what we do not understand we attribute to autonomous man (1982: 56).

The literature of dignity, says Skinner, shares with the literature of freedom the struggle against aversive behaviour, in the sense that the removal of a positive reinforcer, such as credit, is aversive and will elicit an appropriate response such as escaping from or attacking and weakening those who produce the aversive behaviour. We must note that dignity (or the loss of it) does not refer to the feelings (of pleasure or resentment respectively) which accompany it, but to the opportunity (or lack of it) to be admired or receive credit (1982: 57–8). When one understands “dignity” from the side of credit and reward, this implies the issue of a just or fair credit or reward (and on the negative side of this, punishment). A large part of the literature of dignity is, therefore, according to Skinner, concerned with justice, in other words with the magnitude of rewards and punishments, whether it concerns legal issues, pricing of merchandise or simply a child’s sense of fairness (1982: 58). In fact he defines the literature of dignity as “concerned with preserving due credit” (1982: 62). There is an important point of conflict between the literature of dignity and that of freedom. Advances in biological and physical technology remove the chances to earn credits — for example medical science may remove the chances to suffer in silence, and fireproof buildings leave no room for brave firemen. According to the literature of freedom, these are advances in freedom, for they contribute to a reduction of aversive features in daily life. In some cases dignity wins over freedom (painless childbirth is not readily accepted), but in most cases freedom wins over dignity (painless dentistry is readily accepted). Behavioural technology has a harder struggle against dignity than biological and physical technology, because it threatens too many “occult” qualities (such as “originality”), without seemingly com-

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pensating for this, like the other technologies (for example, by reducing hard work): There may seem to be no compensating gain when dignity or worth seems to be lessened by a basic scientific analysis, apart from technological applications. It is in the nature of scientific progress that the functions of autonomous man may be taken over one by one as the role of the environment is better understood. A scientific conception seems demeaning because nothing is eventually left for which autonomous man can take credit. And as for admiration in the sense of wonderment, the behaviour we admire is the behaviour we cannot yet explain. Science naturally seeks a fuller explanation of that behaviour; its goal is the destruction of mystery. The defenders of dignity will protest, but in doing so they postpone an achievement for which, in traditional terms, man would receive the greatest credit and for which he would be most admired (1982: 61).

Skinner, as is well known, approaches the human sciences from the perspective of the natural sciences. He assumes, therefore, that human behaviour will be explained (in terms of its reaction to the environment) rather than made understandable in a hermeneutic way. Or as von Hayek would have said: He follows the scientistic approach in the sense that he not only refuses anthropormorphisms in the natural sciences, but even in the human sciences (von Hayek, 1952). Marcel, we hope to indicate below, resisted such scientism and defended the mystery of human dignity. When one does not reduce the concept of human dignity to the credit and admiration given for certain kinds of behaviour, then a concept of dignity, in which the human being can be considered dignified even in weakness, is sustainable, but one will then probably have to deny a final explanation of dignity and accept it as mysterious (as Marcel also does). Skinner’s views have practical consequences. While in his view a person under punishment is less free and dignified than a person not so constrained, and one should expect that the literatures of freedom and dignity would oppose punitive techniques, they have in fact done the opposite, for they believe in a moral struggle which ends in creditable moral behaviour. They reject nonpunitive techniques as leading to “automatic goodness” and not to inner virtues. But according to Skinner it is not our task to encourage moral struggles or to build inner virtues but rather “to make life less punishing and in doing so to release for more reinforcing activities the time and energy consumed in the avoidance of punishment” (1982: 83). But in these words Skinner slips into normative language, and can surely not claim to have remained in the purely “positive” discourse. (In fact, his very striving for a technology of human behaviour is based on a normative point of departure — that it is necessary to solve the “problems” which we are supposed to encounter.)

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Skinner does take account of the objections of defenders of freedom and dignity against his technology of behaviour — the concern of an elite deciding what is good for others. Who will decide and to what end? For Skinner they are simply questions of reinforcers: What has become “good” during the evolutionary history of the species may be used to induce people to behave for the good of others, and one may point to the individual gains which are also involved, such as security, order, health, wealth, or wisdom (1982: 124). The problem is that Skinner neglects the hermeneutic moment in culture (or evolutionary history), for to decide on “the good for others” is a question of interpretation, which reintroduces the question: Who will interpret and according to which principles? At the basis of Skinner’s views we do find a vision of man-in-reality. Skinner recognizes genetic endowment to some extent, but in practice he says very little about it: Experimental science finds the basis of behaviour not in autonomous man but in the environment. The environment is responsible “both for the evolution of the species and for the repertoire acquired by each member.” Since early versions of environmentalism did not yet have the insight that the environment works by selection, they allowed much room for the (supposed) autonomous man. In the Skinnerian version of environmentalism, however, the functions formerly ascribed to autonomous man shift to the environment. This leaves some questions: Is man then “abolished”? Certainly not as a species or as an individual achiever. It is the autonomous inner man who is abolished, and that is a step forward. But does man not then become merely a victim or passive observer of what is happening to him? He is indeed controlled by his environment, but we must remember that it is an environment largely of his own making. The evolution of a culture is a gigantic exercise in self-control. . . . A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities. We have not yet seen what man can make of man (1982: 210).

The expression, “a gigantic exercise in self-control” appears to hide a tension, for the environment includes much more than only the human collective. What Skinner neglects to acknowledge is that he has reduced the individual to a function of the environment. The seductive power of Skinner’s view lies in the expression: “a scientific view of man.” Skinner reduces scientific knowledge to the natural science approach, and then allows into his conception only that which the metaphor of selection will make room for, namely conditioning by the environment. The choice for a purely natural scientific view of humankind cannot be defended on natural scientific grounds — there is no experiment which will show that only an experimental approach to humankind will yield valid knowledge. And it is surely the question whether selection, in the case of

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human beings, does not include interpretation, which will make it difficult if not impossible to maintain a natural scientific approach to the regularities of selective reinforcement. MARCEL

Gabriel Marcel’s views on human dignity are embedded in a metaphysic of the mystery of being, which is focused in transcending everyday life in the direction of being (as the limitless). Marcel’s thought shuttles between this confrontation with the mysterious and the concrete life of man. It was noted in the introduction that the traditional conception of human dignity as rationality was one associated with and oriented to the mature male. In a social context it referred to status and power and all the accompaniments of this. Like Skinner, Marcel departed from this tradition. Skinner limited human dignity to an almost economistic striving for credit, thereby focusing on the activity of gaining dignity. Marcel, however, retains the traditional idea of an inherent dignity of humankind, but he transcends the limitation of it to rationality and the focus on the mature male: It is my profound belief that we cannot succeed in preserving the mysterious principle at the heart of human dignity unless we succeed in making explicit the properly sacral quality to it, a quality which will appear all the more clearly when we consider the human being in his nudity and weakness — the human being as helpless as the child, the old man, or the pauper (1963: 128).

For Marcel it is important to stress this mysterious principle in human dignity, otherwise we may view the (individual) human being in its finitude as unimportant, as does technocratic functionalism (our example is Skinner), as well as totalitarian collectivism (for example, Mussolini). But this confronts us with two aspects of his thought: on the one hand the mystery of being, and concrete life (existence) on the other. Marcel worked in terms of a programmatic intention: “the necessity of restoring to human experience its ontological weight” (1963: 75); that is, the weight of Being or with respect to Being. Ontological weight is an experience, which is not susceptible of logical analysis. The idea of “weight” here refers to something like trustworthiness, something you can count on, like the words of a trusted friend. “Being” is a more difficult idea: it does not refer to something like an object, and it is not reducible to immediate data of experience. Rather we must read it as a verb: Human beings are a species in between Being and Non-Being: It is our calling or responsibility to be. Marcel calls this the plenitude to which we aspire, on condition that aspire is

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here not taken as striving for an ideal, for the plenitude is more like a symphony in which each instrument finds its meaning through the whole without being a fragment (1963: 77). I may meet a person who, by his/her presence, attests to a way of life after which I am groping in the dark. Such a person radiates this like a light, and makes me aspire to be a fellow witness with this person. Ontological weight has existential consequences: The characteristics of this life considered in its increasing dynamism . . . is that this life is inseparable from love. . . . although it is still only a tentative approximation, that what I have called the ontological weight of human experience is the love which it is able to bestow (1963: 79).

Marcel’s clarification of a life of love, which is a life which carries ontological weight, goes in the direction of the mystery of Being. “Mystery” in this context is not synonymous to the confusion created in a detective novel, or to the insoluble problem of nineteenth-century agnosticism; it rather refers to that which cannot be problematized, and we are not to seek for it in the direction of darkness but rather of light. A problem is before me as a whole; a mystery is that in which I am caught up — it encompasses me. All problematizing is in fact done on the basis of that which cannot be problematized. Marcel prefers to replace optical metaphors with auditive ones: He is not a spectator analysing clear and distinct structures, but a listener to the “voices” and “appeals” of the symphony of Being, which for him is a supra-rational unity beyond images, words, and concepts. Two expressions, says Marcel, which encompass an infinity, highlight the mystery of Being: “my life” and the “fundamental situation it presupposes.” Characteristic of this fundamental situation which shapes me into myself, is that it allows for only limited exploration. My situation includes, for example, my ancestors and predecessors on whose shoulders I am standing and with whom I am bonded in love, but they are no more available for questioning (1963: 83–4). Although the ontological mystery lies on the side of light, we should not think of it in terms of that which can become a Cartesian clear and distinct idea. It does not “ideate.” Marcel thinks of it in ways which remind us of Augustine’s theory of illumination and introvert mediation. It does not “ideate” since it is the illuminating source itself, like a source of inspiration. One’s access to it is by recollection, which is a silent, reflexive concentration of thought, the “act by which I recover my being as a unified whole,” by which I “take a stand with respect to my own life and in some way I withdraw from that life,” while yet “in this withdrawal I bear with me what I am and what my life perhaps is not.” It is an act of abandonment of all the powers which one has (therefore, it is also not a know-how); an immersion in

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the source of illumination which is ineffable, and therefore does not allow for any problematizing. In other words it is a holistic stocktaking of my life at the very source of consciousness and memory. Lifting me out of the world of phenomena studied by science and worked upon by technology, recollection opens the way to freedom: Just as “I am not, I have to become,” so also: “I am not free, I have to become free (1963: 87–8). As Augustine said about finding the truth in the inner human being, so Marcel gives a spiritual meaning to recollection: [There is the frustration that the communication between myself and my predecessors has been cut off.] But I shall say . . . that hope, without which there is no life worthy of the name, postulates that this frustration on all sides is not final and that we shall have to find ourselves again and assemble together in the Pleroma which is being; and in the line of our destiny, we have to say at the same time that the Pleroma does not yet exist and that it belongs to all eternity. But I dare say that this return to the source, this recollection, is in a way a very humble anticipation of that Advent which cannot be imagined and toward which we grope our way in all but complete obscurity (1963: 89).

Recollection is an evaluation and censure of the own life — i.e., it has normative implications. Therefore, we have to say that when in our days thought is reduced to a mechanism of adjustment, then the slogan of Pascal that all the dignity of a human being consists in thought cannot be repeated, and recollection ought not be seen as thought in the sense of a mechanism, but rather as a source of thought (1963: 95). In reestablishing contact with the source, recollection emits an illumination, but we must not identify Being with the source itself or the light which it radiates. But recollection gives us the resources for the inner self-exploration in the direction of the plenitude, and protects us from the distractions which alienate us from our true selves and the unity which is at once both before and behind us (1963: 88). Marcel concretises this in terms of a real encounter between two human beings, for example, where one spouse confesses infidelity to another and forgiveness is found — this is a situation of transcendence in which we are liberated from this broken world into true unity. Such an encounter can make a light arise in a soul and this soul may itself become illuminating. This is an interrogation of the self regarding Being and putting oneself in the presence of the mystery of Being (1963: 92). This can be summarised as: “. . . a person capable of communing with himself and so of renewing contact with an invisible and limitless reality thereby reveals himself capable of transcending the spontaneous course of life” (1963: 94). The source of light finally remains in obscurity — “this light bestowed upon me I do not know by whom” (1963: 95) — where the “by whom” ought

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to be read in a suprapersonal (not an impersonal “by what”) sense. And this is linked to the question of human dignity: In stressing, as I have done, the mystery of Being and the positive value of recollection, we may ask whether or not we are in a position to see more clearly the essential nature of what we call human dignity. . . . We could perhaps . . . answer . . . that man’s essential characteristic seems to be his ability to let himself be penetrated by this suprapersonal light, an ability which is evidently linked in some way to what we call human dignity (1963: 94,95–6).

If one stops at this point, it is an oversimplification measured against the standards of existential concreteness which Marcel set for his philosophising. Marcel, striving for a “second person philosophy” (1963: 39ff) saw an obligation to focus on the obstacles encountered by the “will to commune” — that which separates us from Being. In this context Marcel analyses “being” versus “having,” in order to express that which is most intimately subjective (and above analysis), as well as the ambiguity of the “self.” “Having” may refer to that which is external to myself, subject to my power, that which can be uncovered (like when I have an idea which is subject to a change of conviction). It is possible that one’s being is overwhelmed by attachment to what one has. But “having” can also refer to (having) an inner conviction, which can only be attested to — here, having really passes over into being (as we find in saints who are what they believe). Nobody really knows what he believes — his faith he will only know by the manner in which he attests it, for instance, if he attests under pressure, or if it hurts him when he does not attest out of fear. We believe and we do not believe, on the way to a destination which we do not see. The self is ambiguous — it does not encompass the full experience of the subject, but rather that variable part of experience which one particularly wants to protect against subversion in the here and now, and is never without the here-now (situation). It is, therefore, not the same as the Ego — it stands on the side of having, so that, says Marcel, attachment to the self comes down to attachment to a having. In defence of subjectivity, Marcel warns against the temptation of treating the subject as a possession or instrument — for example, when a woman treats her body, which is itself a subject, as a disposable object, she might find that this is not fully in her power (she may fall pregnant). The self was elevated by the Idealists to creative principle par excellence, but this forced them into a dialectic between the transcendental Ego and the empirical self. Marcel does not see the self as the creative principle — it is rather a protective screen, which can paralyse the subject by the picture which the self may think others have of it; or it can divert into egotism, which sees the other only in terms of itself (1963: 98–103). Marcel

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refers in this context to his drama, La chapelle ardente, in which the plight of a person who idolised another person, making him/her substantial part of one’s self, and living only in him/her, is highlighted. He also says that the suffering soul, instead of closing off its own wounds, ought to open up its suffering to others, transforming its suffering into a principle radiating love, hope and charity (1963: 104–7). In his drama, Le dard, Marcel highlighted the issue of betrayal of the individual human being for the sake of fidelity to a collective thing — the class or the ethnic group versus remaining loyal to human beings as human beings, as we find in the selfless service with which a musician transmits the genius of the composer to the audience. In the drama, those whose perspective on the human being is limited to loyalty to one’s own collective and opposition to other collectives, are characterised as lepers and paupers. Marcel, viewing humankind from the side of existential concreteness, objects strongly to any approach to humankind in terms of an abstract schema: . . . what is this poverty which is neither lack of money nor lack of success and which, we are told, is going to spread like leprosy? It might be said, I think, that it is the spirit of abstraction which finds in our own day . . . its most terrifying though not its only incarnation in communism. But this spirit of abstraction cannot be separated from a certain lack of love, and by this I mean the inability to treat a human being as a human being, and for this human being the substituting of a certain idea, a certain abstract designation. . . . But we must hasten to add that any technocracy, even if it belongs to the capitalist system, can be guilty of the same fundamental error. When it goes so far as to consider the individual within the framework of society as a mere unit of production, and to judge his worth only in terms of productivity, it also tends to create communities of lepers, however attractive their outward aspect may be (1963: 122).

The very nucleus of Marcel’s conception of human dignity is given in the rejection of an abstract ideological approach as a lack of love, in the sense of the inability to treat a human being as a human being. Marcel would strongly resist the Mussolini conception of situating the dignity of a human being simply in self-sacrifice to the state. Love, Marcel says elsewhere, is unconditional — it transcends the circumstances under which it originates. He sees a contemporary tendency to reject the unconditional way of being and of belief, concomitant with a belief that the sacred has disappeared (1963: 71ff). It is in this context that Marcel states the “necessity of restoring to human experience its ontological weight,” and as we have seen above, “the ontological weight of human experience is the love which it is able to bestow.” The creative artist, the performing artist, and the admirer of the artwork, all share in the active receptivity — the identity of receiving and giving: giving forth in a selfless way that which has been received. It moves between having and being, from the closed to the open, in a world in which the self recognizes

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itself, exercises itself and touches on the lives of others. Creation is a form of transcendence similar to believing and praying, which has its universality in the comprehension of the message (and not in universal acceptance) and where the admiration takes account of the genius for its own sake, stripped from abstract ideological frames: In either case [that of the believer and of the artist] salvation comes from transcendence, even if, here and there, it takes different aspects; and this transcendency, as we shall see more clearly, is closely related to universality (1963: 125–6).

What Marcel appears to say is that creation and the admiration of the creative is a form of love, and love transcends its circumstances, it breaks out of fatality into freedom. It is the active receptivity of the world of the creative which helps us to formulate a conception of man and human dignity (1963: 128). Marcel wants to go beyond the traditional conception of human dignity, which he summarises in a few sentences: We must admit that in current phraseology what is called the dignity of the human being is described in terms of Kantism . . . I refer to the idea according to which the inalienable value of man lies in the fact that he is a rational being, that stress is placed on his faculty of understanding and comprehending the intelligible order of the world, or rather on his faculty of conforming to maxims that are universally valid (1963: 128).

Marcel does not challenge the legitimacy of this interpretation of human dignity but he stresses that rationalism has lost its vitality and degenerated into formalism. Furthermore, it is associated with a “decorative conception of dignity,” the display of pomp which accompanies power, since it is considered advisable to surround for example the judicial power with appearances which are likely to command respect, and although Marcel does not deny the necessity of enhancing the value of institutions which assume a “sacerdotal” function, he nevertheless warns that this pomp may conceal emptiness and deceit and, therefore, turn against itself and subvert its own authority in the eyes of a critical observer, which may even cause revolt. Reason may thus become a sham and a parody. Moreover, reason has lost the aura which Kant and his followers attributed to it — it has been “secularized” into “a series of technical operations depending on a descriptive science,” and although this reduction does not remove all deserved respect from reason, the language of rationalism, says Marcel, is incapable to convey to the mind of modern man the reality which he describes as “immediate” and “secret” (1963: 129–130). This “immediate and secret” reality is what was earlier indicated as “second person philosophy” — being with the other and speaking to a “thou” rather than about a “him” (1963: 39ff).

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What Marcel has in mind here is the irreducibility of the “face to face” as Levinas has it. Levinas points to the consistency of otherness, which cannot, by a dialectic of the Hegelian type, be reduced to identity. Marcel takes this in the direction ridiculed by Mussolini — the other presents himself not only to be confronted but greeted, as my neighbour, and from “my neighbour” experience brings us to fraternity — a common sonship. The sense of common sonship was implicit in the French revolutionaries’ declaration of liberty, equality, fraternity as the foundation of the rights of humankind, since they were deists who believed that God is the father of all human beings. But since afterwards this deism was questioned, fraternity became no more than “a vague aspiration” or “a dim nostalgic feeling for an era when fraternity was an article of faith” — fraternity has been reduced to behaving as if we are brothers (1963: 130–1). Marcel attempts to show that there exists an opposition between equality and fraternity (in the course of this argument, liberty comes up on the side of fraternity). Equality expresses a demand which is institutionalised in a way which gives more attention to rights than to duties and obligations; it is an egocentric claiming of something — I am your/his/her equal — or even a resentment hidden under a rational or pseudo-rational camouflage, which presents it as irrational not to claim that I am your equal. Marcel questions the argument which deduces equality in all rights from equality in certain rights, and then supposes the equality of all men as basis for this (1963: 131–2). Fraternity, on the contrary, is totally hetero-centric. I recognise you as my brother, and I greet you as such. I can take pride in that in which your are superior to me. . . . if we focus our attention on the act of expansive recognition forming the basis of fraternity, it will be seen as a spontaneous movement exactly the reverse of the claim implied in equality: you are my brother and, because you are my brother, I rejoice not only in anything good which may happen to you but also in acknowledging the ways in which you are superior to me. Why should I feel the need of being your equal? We are brothers through all our dissimilarities, and why should these dissimilarities not imply inequalities in your favor . . . for since we are brothers, it is exactly as if the radiance emanating from your gifts, acts, and works were reflected on me (1963: 132–3).

If we want to recognise human dignity to the full without lapsing into the stereotyped thinking of abstract rationalism, then the condition is that we work from the perspective of fraternity and not from “equalitarianism.” Marcel does not want to imply that only those who believe in God as the Father of all human beings and humankind being dignified as bearing the imago Dei, can recognise human dignity. In fact there are unbelievers,

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militantly involved with the oppressed whoever they are, who have “a poignant experience of the mystery of the human condition” and its tragic side, and show compassion in the strongest sense of the word, in which no feeling of superiority occurs (1963: 133–4). This has a particular significance for our understanding of human dignity: This would amount to saying, then, that dignity must be sought at the antipodes of pretension and rather on the side of weakness (1963: 134).

In a drama, Les Coeurs avides, Marcel represents the contrasts between the affected dignity, pomp, which becomes the very antithesis of dignity, of a dying man, with the dignity, which is inherent “in the condemnation which is the fate of every man from the very fact of his birth.” It may appear as if the finitude of the human being makes his/her acts and very being insignificant — according to Marcel a tendency in the thought of his contemporaries. But this harbours a paradox: For as soon as the insignificance of the individual is declared, then the way is open for all tyrannies. Most remarkable is that there are other options and resistance against the disintegration, based not on the affirmation of the self and its pretences, but rather on the consciousness of the living bond which unites all human beings (1963: 134–5). Mussolini, as we have seen above, contrasts the finitude of the individual with the permanence of the state, and understands the value of the individual only in terms of the coinciding of the individual’s interests with that of the state. The state is the domain of struggle, in which one will may dominate another will. Marcel nowhere refers to Mussolini, but he attacks this kind of collectivism head on: There is a temptation which seems for many men of our time to be almost irresistible: to argue from the fact of man’s mortality that he is negligible as an individual, and to transfer to the collective and to society that regard of which he has been judged positively unworthy. But to reason in this way is to follow a road which leads to tyranny and servitude (1963: 136).

How is it possible to maintain the opposite, that humankind’s finitude is the principle of its essential dignity? Marcel contends that humankind is the only being known to us who knows its own mortality, and in this it transcends the society to which it is being sacrificed, for society is not conscious of its own destiny — if it has one — and cannot therefore also master it. The priority for Marcel remains with the individual. The value of this self-knowledge, however, remains indeterminate, except if we pass beyond the limitations of the ego in a compassion which is also a kind of piety with the mortality of the other (1963: 136–7). Marcel defends life after death against the negativist dogmatism of an outdated scientism, as well as against the officially atheist

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societies on the basis of their own logic, asking why they who do not believe in an afterlife, do not have more respect for life in this world. War and revolutions have the same effect of a devaluation of life, committing the sacrilege of considering individuals as replaceable, which precisely, according to Marcel, they are not — an illegitimate transfer of the trade terminology into a domain where it is most unsuitable (1963: 138–9). Modern self-centeredness does not find any meaning in life after death. Rather than viewing with Sartre the other as a threat to my integrity, they should become part of my experience, and in the same measure I will recognise their irreducible value, and the difficulty of achieving a lasting harmony on this side of the grave, and the necessity of conceiving another mode of existence, leading towards “the real and pleromatic unity where we will be all in all” (1963: 141). A central concept in Marcel’s views on dignity is that of “hope” (which includes the idea that an afterlife is more than wishful thinking). It is always bound up with a situation of captivity where I am both thrown into a situation and engaged by it under external constraint, which makes it impossible for me to experience a plenitude. Hope is the opposite of the defeatist expectation of the worst, but it also excludes the claims of the optimist that everything will work out. Hope includes humility and patience, which is the opposite of passivity — it does not expect the automatic coming to be of an event (1963: 142–3). It carries a personal character: . . . I have or have not hope in the being for whom I bear responsibility, and one may justifiably ask oneself whether “I have hope in thee” is not really the most authentic form of the verb “I hope.” But this does not exhaust the matter: the nature of the test is revealed in its effect on me, in the way it impinges on my being, insofar as it leaves me open to a permanent alteration. So it is that illness, for example, makes me into that deformed being typified as the professional sick person . . . the same processes holding true of captivity or exile. Insofar as I hope, I release myself from an inner determinism comparable to a cramp . . . which engenders despair . . . (1963: 143–4).

Hope is therefore connected with freedom in the sense that it liberates. For myself it breaks down the obsessions which I carry with me as a sickling, or a captive or an exile. And so for the other — but in this case the liberation comes through love for the person in whom I hope (for example, by showing love to a person whose freedom has succumbed to an obsessive fear of death). Sartre’s conception of freedom — condemned to be free — puts freedom in the heart of despair. Marcel wants to bind freedom to hope: the statements, “man is born free” (Rousseau) and “I am free” are both meaningless, for freedom is not an attribute. Rather one has to say that “everybody must make himself into a free man” for “freedom is a conquest, always partial, always

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precarious, always challenged” (1963: 146). Hope on the other hand is not simply aspiration, since it implies patience, vigilance, and a firmness of aim which is not present in aspiration. Marcel finalises the relationship between freedom and hope in a personal formula: To say that the freest man is the one who has the most hope is perhaps above all to indicate that he is the man who has been able to give his existence the richest significance, or stake the most on it. But this is enough to exclude absolutely the pure dilettante, that is the one who, living only for himself, seeks solely such experiences as will awaken in him . . . a feeling of exaltation . . . (1963: 147).

The stakes referred to, Marcel says, can only be conceived of on the level of intersubjectivity, which brings fraternity back into perspective. And thus the relationship between freedom and fraternity finds a personal formula too: . . . the freest man is also the most fraternal. But this formula acquires its full meaning only if we bring to light the implications of the word “fraternal.” The fraternal man is linked to his neighbor, but in such a way that this tie not only does not fetter him, but frees him from himself. Now what I have tried to show is that this freedom is of primary importance, for each one of us tends to become a prisoner of himself, not only in respect of his material interests, his passions, or simply his prejudices, but still more essentially in the predisposition which inclines him to be centered on himself, and to view everything from his own perspective. The fraternal man, on the contrary, is somehow enriched by everything which enriches his brother, in that communion which exists between his brother and himself (1963: 147).

The role of hope and freedom is easily seen here: to love one’s brothers is to have hope in them, that is, to see past those actions which hurt and disappoint, and not to enclose them in what we see as their “nature.” Brotherhood excludes the spirit of abstraction, which is almost always also a spirit of segregation, whether of class or of race. Fraternity refuses all forms of segregation — it is the dynamism of love, rather than the rectifying spirit of equality. Freedom finds expression in fraternity — in the liberation from self-centeredness and empathic sharing in what is good for the brother. There is also a connection between freedom and truth. The rebellions in Poland and Hungary in 1956–7 were directed against the lies of the governments and servile press — the rebels in fact had no specific political alternative in mind for the sake of which they were struggling. It was the will to be acknowledged which drove them. The oppressor removes the selfrespect of the oppressed and transforms him/her into an instrument, which cannot resist the objectives of the oppressor. Self-respect encompasses exactly that obstinacy not to be reduced to the level of an instrument. Most sinister is the obtaining of false confessions — once the consistency between what the tortured is and what he says is broken, and the truth is betrayed,

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such a person can no more be a free man (1963: 150). The representatives of a servile press are slaves in the same way — alienated, “Heimatlos.” “At-home-ness” is a concrete condition of the presence of freedom. The situation of the exile may serve as example — even though he/she is tolerated, he/she is without support systems and has to be careful with what he/she says and does — a tolerated homelessness. The forced transfer of large groups of people is, therefore, a crime against humanity (1963: 150–1). Fraternity (“at-home-ness”) should not be misunderstood, Marcel maintains, as physical proximity. The massification of people in urban areas has nothing in common with brotherhood. Fraternity is a kind of respect and distance is needed for respect (1963: 158). The question comes up, and Marcel states it explicitly, what is to happen to human dignity in the process of the technicalization to which man is delivered. For one thing, he says, we see a trend, in direct conflict with fraternity, not to assume responsibility. Any kind of service is treated as humiliating (as if all service were capitalist exploitation). Although it is necessary to protect the underdog against exploitation, this new tendency is rather founded in the will to pleasure. Furthermore, the technicalization has to bear the blame for an increasing uniformity from which one can no more effectively deviate. Although there is still some creativity in the designing of new tools, the users and consumers are enslaved. Marcel, stressing the responsibility of fraternity in personal freedom and hope, expressed in love, would clash head-on with Skinner’s competitive conception of dignity, according to which dignity is exhausted in acquiring credit for myself. Marcel notes that humankind loses its own dignity in the process of technicalization, on the one hand by becoming a consumer, thus losing its freedom (which is part of creativity), and on the other by reducing its own mental function to a technical function, which then loses out in the human’s evaluation of itself against the precision and effectivity of technology (1963: 160–1). For Marcel it would have been impossible to buy into a Skinnerian environmentalist approach to human behaviour, especially a technically controlled one, for that would reduce human existence to the slave of an abstract collective (this time controlled by a fairly invisible manipulator). Individual existence loses its ontological weight in a Skinnerian perspective. With his great philosophical honesty, Marcel finally drops his own analysis into an embarrassing tension. He admits having oversimplified the problem of human dignity (1963: 161), by leaving the social aspect out of perspective. His view of society tends in the direction of the organismic view:

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Society is not the sum of its individuals but rather Simone Weil’s (and Plato’s) “great beast.” We are integrated into the state as a totality, although it does not seem to inspire the awe which is needed for a philosophy of the state anymore. In spite of counter-tendencies, there is a growing bureaucratisation in technologically-developed countries. Crowding into massive urban centres is threatening the development of the individual — the integrity of the human being as a central value is lost, and this is linked to a loss of dignity (1963: 162). Integrity in its original sense refers to an individual “who is master of himself . . . in perfect possession of himself” without “complacency or selfsufficiency.” In fact, those who pretend self-sufficiency more often than not show traits of escapism (be it into alcohol, drugs, or sheer speed). Integrity excludes such escapism, but under the rule of complete technicalization, escapism is more difficult to avoid and integrity threatened. We are faced with a universal alienation; in fact with an enucleation of the individual human being. We are functionalized, and in such a world “the life of each of us tends to lose its existential weight because circumstances which formerly would have been taken in their intrinsic seriousness now tend to be interpreted in terms of adjustment or maladjustment” (1963: 164) (for example, our impatience with somebody who grieves too deeply about the death of a loved one): What must be stringently insisted upon is that an anthropology with a functionalist commitment has no place for anything in the nature of dignity, and if illusions can be entertained on this point it is solely because language allows for anything, because anything can be expressed. But we should be quick to acknowledge that an anthropology of this order is not implied by Communist regimes alone, but tends to assert itself wherever a technocratic type of thought is affirmed, for such thought tends inevitably to treat the human being exclusively in terms of the return he is likely to yield. And what is this return if not a contribution to a certain world-wide enterprise? (1963: 164)

What Marcel seems to fear is the folly of a world society devoted to the pursuit of the same ends. And then he asks the questions which he surely would have asked of Skinner — the questions about the nature and value of such ends, and who may be the judge of such values (1963: 165). In fact, as if taking account of Skinner, he asks whether the word “value” retains any meaning in such a context (which, in Skinner, it barely can). CRITICAL CONCLUSION

I can certainly identify with Marcel’s attempt to offer some philosophical resistance against the enucleation of the human being by the functionalism

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associated with technocracy. The disempowering of the individual in this context, especially by growing managerialist manipulations devoid of valuebased authority in our own day, is surely a threat to integrity in Marcel’s use of the term, and therefore subtracts from the ontological weight of the human being. But at the same time I believe that we are here also at the weakest point of Marcel’s view of human dignity — the neglect of an analysis of the social relationships in which the human being functions. Marcel seems to suffer from a reactionary approach — he is so concerned about the individual and the threat to individual integrity, that he offers only an analysis of the social dangers, and no real attempt to give any analysis of the possibilities for creative involvement in different interhuman relationships and group contexts. He seems to identify “society” with the state as an organic whole, and though he laments the lack of awe needed for a philosophy of the state, he presents us with no further positive analysis of the meaning of the state and its possible role in the world of his time. In fact, his cryptic reference to the social context in holistic terms harbours the danger of a totalitarian view of the state (as we have seen with Mussolini above; cf., also Venter, 1997: 43ff). In fact, as long as we operate with a vague concept of “society,” we are bound to set “individual” over against “society,” and will then have to decide which of the two has priority: the “social” as in Mussolini and even Skinner, or the individual, as Marcel seems to do. This problem goes much deeper in fact. In Modern times “society” refers to the most powerful social institution, the political one, or the state. (As we are moving into a globalised context, it might come to mean the international economic community.) Once we accept this kind of holism, the largest or the most powerful of social institutions is given the priority of value and importance too (whether in a positive or a negative sense). In fact, the variety of social relationships and their importance for the dignity of the individual is not seen or analysed. A variety of other institutions is not only important, but is as much a part of the life conditions of the individual. Consider, for example, the family and the church. Most established churches are in any case not limited to the boundaries of “society” as the state. The family is a tiny entity, but of real importance in the life of a child — in fact Marcel’s concept of “fraternity” is a family-oriented concept. Marcel’s work would have been much stronger if he had given us an existential insight into fraternity in the state, the football club, etceteras. There is a widespread feeling that brotherhood is a meaningful metaphor: not only has it been used by the churches over two millennia to address fellow

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members, but also by the Free Masons. The French revolutionaries made fraternity one of the three basic values of their republic as Marcel has also duly noted. In Africa “brother” and “sister” is a widespread form of address of one’s equals. Marcel has given a strong existential meaning to this concept, but he does not work out how this can function in the context of institutional relationships. In fact, he seems to avoid this part of the analysis in a state of reactionary fear for formal institutions, while remaining in the tension of the recognition that we do not live outside of them. Potchefstroom University Potchefstroom, South Africa REFERENCES Biestek, F.P. 1957. The Casework Relationship. Chicago: Loyola University Press. von Hayek, F. 1952. The Counter-revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. Kant, I. 1901. The Philosophy of Kant As Contained in Extracts from His Own Writings. Ed. John Watson. Glasgow: Michaelhouse. Marcel, G. 1963. The Existential Background of Human Dignity. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. Mussolini, B. 1935. The Doctrine of Fascism. Rome: Ardita. Skinner, B.F. 1982. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Venter, J.J. 1996. “World-Picture, Individual, Society, “Neohelicon, 23:1, 175–200. Venter, J.J. 1997. “Mechanistic Individualism versus Organistic Totalitarianism,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning, 20:1, 41–60. Venter, J.J. 2000. “Human dignity” as “rationality” — the Development of a Conception, in The Origins of Life: The Origins of the Existential Sharing-in-Life. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Analecta Husserliana LXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. pp. 111–141.

IRENE ANGELA BIANCHI

F RO M T H E “ E G O ” TO T H E “ WO R L D ” F O R A COMMUNITY ETHIC

1 . I N T RO D U C T I O N

Much has been said and written about the “Lebenswelt” and the Ego in Husserl’s thought, as thinkers have delved ever deeper into what seems to be the bottomless well of phenomenology in the search for sources of inspiration for new ideas. It comes as something of a surprise that this thought, even though complex, is a vein which is not as easily exhausted as it may first appear to be and that with the passage of time it seems to become, if anything, ever more topical. The same could also be said of Husserl’s ethics which, though little studied, appear to provide valuable and profound sources of reflection; both because they are intrinsically linked to the very meaning of phenomenology itself and, as we shall see, because they provide the necessary continuity for an investigation into subjectivity and the “world of life.” This is particularly the case in the contemporary historical context where there would seem to be a real need to find a grounding for ethical and moral rethinking in the praxis of the concrete world. Renewed vigour and force can be given to words like tolerance, society and politics in the selfaware thought to be found in phenomenology. Philosophical reflections on problems which are inherent to the individual and on ethical problems are most likely to take place during moments of crisis, such as those experienced by Husserl in the years between the First World War and the ascendency of Nazism, i.e., when the continuity and the solidity of the world of values was being severely undermined. The rules which had seemed obvious and were taken for granted were suddenly called into question and the customary criteria for legitimacy no longer applied, just as the acknowledged principles for deciding what was good and bad were no longer recognised. It is also true that in a social and historical context which is contradictory and confused, as is our own, it appears all the more necessary to try to lay the foundations, or relay the foundations, of an ethical sense if we truly wish to attempt a revision of this primary concept for living in community. The idea of foundation in general, or ethical re-foundation in particular, may have many facets and resist easy solution, but it requires at the very least an attempted investigation. We shall, therefore, try to identify the conditions 373 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 373–386. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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which may make such an investigation possible and, in particular, those which, in my opinion, spring from the profound phenomenological capacity for philosophical self-reflection which is principally represented in the thought of Husserl. From that we shall move on to some reflections on the individual and the community. 2 . T H E P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L “ TA S K ”

We could undoubtedly speak at length about the meaning of phenomenology, but it is principally a search for origins, and is so in a double sense: on the one hand as a systematic questioning about the final foundations of every consciousness, to which we must return, and, on the other hand, as a questioning on the origin of philosophical thought in human history; this is what Husserl meant when he spoke about the crisis of European science, suggesting that phenomenological analysis represented the way to overcome this crisis.1 Phenomenology, always critical of the habits of philosophical thinking which were in vogue at its time, intended to bring phenomena to the forefront, in the sense that it sought to avoid any illegitimate construction and restriction of consciousness, and to offer a critique of the positivistic and psychologistic philosophical theories which enjoyed an undisputedly dominant position at the time. Above all phenomenology attacked the intellectualistic constructions which dominated thought in the first half of the twentieth century and showed how far representative-subjective explanations were from being a genuine search for the foundations of science. Husserl’s fundamental insight understood consciousness as already, from its inception, “present in the things,” overturning the preconceptions held by scientific and philosophical thinkers up to that time of a consciousness that contains images representing objects where the question would be that of the adequacy of the images in relation to the “things themselves.” Phenomenologically, consciousness becomes the “giver of meaning,” while natural reality presents itself as a simple, intentional correlate in relation to the operations of the conscious subject. For phenomenology, therefore, consciousness is insight; if we take the most common case of immediate perception of something, a givenness “in flesh and blood,” it must be understood as a consciousness which, even outside the realm of the merely perceivable, is obtained though an eidetic insight, or a “wirkliche Einsicht.” This simply means the presence of an intuitive givenness and, in consequence, a categorical intuition. We thus come to the famous “vision of essences,” a “Wesensschau,” by which Husserl

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simply intended (forgive the wordplay), a filling up of the intention of filling up (Intention des Meinens), and not, therefore, a repeatedly idealist tension but rather a reaffirming, against any constitutive theory, that, in the words of Gadamer, “[. . .] awareness is intuition.”2 To follow Husserl’s advice, we have to return to the original sources of insight or intuition and the evidence of essences which derive from these; it is only in this way that concepts can become clear and the questions be reframed on the basis of insight and so, in principle, be answered. There are still many radical objections to phenomenology and the phenomenological method. The phenomenologist is also accused of lacking a proper methodological foundation, which is identified in his fleeing, by way of the epoché, from historical and social comparison; he is accused of “bracketing” the world on the one hand, and then returning it reconstituted in accordance with “its” determined method, on the other (needless to say there is no creationist aim in Husserl). All of this clearly does not help phenomenology to escape from the attempts, extremely well organised, to have it either dissolve into Hermeneutics or to tamper with it and relaunch it as a pseudo-existentialism. Certainly it is legitimate to ask where this characteristic “pure voice” of the phenomenologist comes from; how he can appoint himself the “functionary of humankind” in his desire to “tell” the truth about phenomena. Should this too not in the end also give war before the epoché? The phenomenologist names the phenomena, he describes them, he addresses their essences, and yet he first of all declares himself to be a phenomenologist and assumes the phenomenological attitude, thus making himself responsible for his actions both as a philosopher and as a human being.3 We know that Husserl sees philosophers as “functionaries of humankind,” and yet the very use of this term, which could be thought of as having a rather improbable ring to it, brings him back to a dimension of real unity, in-the-situation (in fieri), towards which the course of history tends; this releases the word “humankind” from having a merely ideal value and lends a responsible and pacific unity to the sense of the term.4 Husserl’s concern was with how to become an honest philosopher, i.e., how to make each step in one’s philosophical reasoning a step which treads upon secure ground, is the true source of all Husserlian research and that which leads to the continual revision of his work, its constant reappraisal in attempts to ever more scrupulously examine and justify every investigation. This is at once the limitation and the fascination of phenomenology itself. Without necessarily having to take on the burden of Husserl’s questions, we should nevertheless attempt a phenomenological reflection about the origins

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of our current convictions and their practical consequences. At the outset of any investigation provoked by the need to overcome a crisis, there should be an attempt to thoroughly understand its historical background in order to find a pathway towards a profitable shift in thought, an alteration of stance. It is necessary, therefore, to go to the roots of the crisis to be able to answer the questions intrinsic to the crisis and to open doors, as Husserl himself stresses, to those fundamental facts where the world reveals itself and to the fundamental expressions of life that is aware of itself, i.e., the life of all those which make up our kind.5 For our purposes it is sufficient to acknowledge that the Husserlian theory of transcendental reduction is not something which is just any old product of contemporary theory but is an immanent requirement of the phenomenological method itself, on a deriving from the attempt to coherently constitute a graduated order of experience. Discovering the meanings of transcendental philosophy is not merely an act of ascertaining its given, historically objective reality, but is once again an interpretation, i.e., an effort of comprehension by the subjective individual, not of what he is but of what he wants of himself. It is, in short, the performance of a task, a Beruf, and a projecting into the future as the subjectivity wants it to be in order to realise it; as Husserl writes: “[Transcendentality] is a concept which is reachable through a study of the unitary history of the whole of the modern philosophical epoch; it is the concept of its task, which can only be experienced as such and which acts in it, as the force which propels its development, with the tendency to transform it from vague ‘dynamis’ into ‘energeia.’ ”6 Phenomenological philosophy, properly understood as phenomenologically transcendental investigation, thus also assumes an ethical dimension. This can also be seen in the fact that Husserlian investigation, in its tortuous path, in the ends says that philosophy is not essentially a theoretical way of thinking, a logic of the science of the universal laws of subjectivity, but a way of thinking which is essentially ethical, the exercise (Übung) of the subjectivity in a constant straining to appropriate to itself and keep for itself the ultimate task that gives meaning to the life of the person as a rational being and in turn gives universal meaning to things. 3 . I N T E R S U B J E C T I V E C O N S T I T U T I O N . T H E “ P L AY ” O F OT H E R N E S S

The misunderstanding of the work of phenomenology, also sprang from the continuous revision it was subjected to by Husserl himself; and also owing to the fact that a very large part of his work on the subject went unpublished until not long ago. Now much of this work has appeared in Husserl’s

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collected works, which enable us to have a good overall view of Husserl’s thinking. Another fundamental cause of misunderstandings is the impossibility of learning the phenomenological method using texts alone; Husserl himself tells us that his texts do not give us results which can be learnt but foundations upon which we ourselves can build methods of investigation for the solution of problems by ourselves; in the words of Tilliete: “The struggle with ourselves and for ourselves is what makes a true man real and in particular, in its intellectual form, a true philosopher.”7 Phenomenology in this sense should be seen essentially as firstly a new lifestyle and secondly as a style of investigation. Also in the case of the problem of intersubjectivity, which is constantly pondered in the works of Husserl, the original message has often been misinterpreted. If we only ask to what extent Husserl succeeded in highlighting the solipsism inherent in a typical idealist approach, in the sense of Leibniz’s monadology, we would be falsifying the profounder sense given that solipsism is certainly not what Husserl intended in his project. To see that we need look no further than Cartesian Meditations8 in which, precisely in response to solipsism, he examined the problem of how the transcendence of the Other can be constituted in the immanence of the Ego; this he held to be a necessary step insofar as: “[. . .] constitutive phenomenology had to expand in a subjective direction given that subjectivity is certainly multiple and that objectivity itself connotes this plurality of subjects.”9 Husserl’s notion of subjectivity manifests itself immediately as “life which experiences the world,” i.e., as Leiblichkeit, the organ of perception and centre of orientation within the sphere of the world and no longer as a formal structure. The intentional subject is the concrete historic being, the man (like the philosopher) who lives ingenuously in the givenness of the world. As we set out to follow the essential lines of Husserl’s thought on subjectivity and consequently on intersubjectivity, i.e., the body of analysis aimed at describing the experience of a subjective otherness, we should underline the fact that in carrying out this task we are constantly moving in transcendental territory, as Husserl himself establishes with a certain rigour.10 The Other is given as a phenomenon among the phenomena of the descriptive sphere delineated by the reduction of the Ego cogito. If we are in the merely empirical sphere, within which the Other has always been here-in-front-ofme, we do not have to constitute the Other at all. If we pose for ourselves the problem of the Other’s constitution that is because the empirical assumption of the Other is not yet, in itself, significant for the purpose of intending the Other as a Person. To be current with the last of Husserl’s writings we must

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also stress the presence of a plural subjectivity (Wir Subjektivität) which is always active, which finds in the apodictic evidence of the Other the very trace of its transcendence, just as the evidence of phenomenology is revealed in the solipsistic methodological state of pure consciousness. To name the Other as Persona, is to name him as that which I have “in front of me,” (Pròsopon-ops), as an in-front-of-my-gaze which, though being an open perspective on the world, represents a limit and a hindrance to my own capacity to widen my gaze on the world. Even as the Other looks at me, speaks to me, and expresses a substantial difference from other entities, it closes down a perspective from which to differentiate being. We may reflect on the fact that speaking out of the rhetoric of otherness, accepting its game, at times paradox, recognising the illusory necessity of our point of view, and the compromising represented by the Other who is always sliding into collision with the space of one’s “ownness,” perhaps means giving up the philosophy of Otherness. Accepting, however, the possibility of doubt with regard to philosophy is capacity to not only recognize the Other, but also to “found” constitution, remains methodologically useful in that, it can serve to soldier our conviction that adopting a direct and nonphenomenological naturalistic attitude is not the path to take to arrive at a convincing and suitable way of thinking in relation to the “pratis” of human encounter, which cannot be reduced to only the gesture and the gaze. We must seek to accompany the effort of clarification, a wholly phenomenological effort, with the maneuver of a cultural “dismantling” of preceding ideas, themselves produced by a culture of false tolerance of the diverse, of the will to dominate, of the negation of personal rights to the sole advantage of the economy, viewed only in terms of consumption and the inculcation of a need to produce for production’s sake; for these reasons it is a salutary working practice to not depart from Husserl’s guidance on the effective meaning of Otherness. The transcendental constitution of the Other as such is “founding” for every formation of the being-there of each individual, and hence the objectivity, in a wide sense, of the world as nature and as culture; through it must be gained the universal history of meaning which above all makes the objective world possible for me.11 Philosophical probing of the effective multiplicity of being, and of its interrelationships in addition, can also assist in the quest to understand the sense of being itself. Meditating on how the multiplicity of sense of being in general was already to be found in Aristotle12 prepared the ground for the rediscovery and founding a nonidealistic investigation of phenomena by Husserl. It would

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therefore be phenomenology which would bring to the forefront once again, and with renewed vigour, the concept of multiplicity. Each Ego and all Others, as respective monads, writes Husserl “[. . .] are for themselves as I am for myself.”13 It is not that the We aims at a process of multiplication advancing from the primordial experience of the Ego; instead there occurs a recognition of the historical existence of humanity (Geschichtliche Dasein) or of the sense of community as the relationship which determines the “pairing” or sameness of my being with that of each and every other, a community, therefore, on the basis of which it can be said that I and each of us is, one man among other men.14 The next step which Husserl takes appears in the Crisis and consists of the recognition of humanity’s self-awareness of the objectives which is the playing out itself of humankind in a philosophical and cultural key. 4 . T H E E T H I C A L P RO B L E M

In his ethical studies Husserl strongly criticises ethical subjectivism, considering it to be a sceptical philosophy incapable of grasping the universal a priori of the ought-to-be and limiting itself to the simple fact of human sensitivity to individual pleasure and utility.15 Hedonism, which ends by ascertaining an ineluctable human tendency to pleasure, cannot attain a much more wide-ranging or elevated moral plane. Pleasure is not, nor can it be, a goal for man; rational goals, not determined by simple taste or natural inclinations, are in Enlightenment and Kantian terms “just goals” for Husserl too. We must not, however, see in Husserl’s critiques the end of natural human inclinations, but since man can deny himself pleasure as an end in itself, pleasure to which he is naturally inclined, he acquires a greater propensity to mediate and accept ethico-moral positions.16 Kant, in “Reine Vernuft,” speaks of rational amour propre,17 to indicate the legitimate safeguarding of the individual’s being; Husserl seems to be in agreement with this and well disposed towards the general Kantian moral position; happiness is not a burdensome duty-right which falls only upon ourselves, but we can and we must strive towards conditions in which we can be happy while seeking to unite our own interests with those of the community.18 Such unification must not, however, mislead us, as it is not an associationistic version of ethics which Husserl wishes to offer us; association as a human tendency to create habits, which are useful to the community or society as a whole would in fact of itself induce us to revert to a passive form of morality, and the value of an action would consist only in

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the sedimentation of behavioural canons approved as being useful to society. This would, therefore, undermine the active importance of any value considered in itself. The difficulty in distinguishing what is thought to be good from that which really is good remains the greatest difficulty in the analysis of “good” in Husserl’s work (good in the sense of what is just rather than in that of opposition to evil). We cannot think that a thing, an action, is good because it embodies obedience to a duty, which is a sediment or the “already given or said”; it is inherent to the spirit of phenomenology itself that it distances distance itself from a naturalistic and associationistic attitude precisely because the methodological suspension of the natural attitude comes within, as already stated above, which the meaning of the very operation of the epoché. Along with conducting an eidetic and logical search for the principles of truth and coherence, Husserl can therefore, do no other than seek in what is moral a “value in itself” where ever any particular evaluation can be made with practical reason determining the value’s quality and experience confirming its de facto validity.19 In accord with his analysis, Husserl makes it clear that value is not a property of things (a thing in itself is not a source of value) but that value derives from the transcendental consciousness which is the giver of meaning and which has its intentional reference in the objects which are “already given” or which can be thought by consciousness itself. Value, therefore, belongs not so much to an objective as a subjective ambit, which is not to say that it is arbitrary or cannot be communicated, but that it is, in its universality, never separated from the sphere of transcendental consciousness. 5 . T H E P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L F R E E D O M O F F E E L I N G ; B E YO N D K A N T

One of the problems we have posed ourselves is that of the usefulness of phenomenological investigation for our central questions, i.e., those of the selfdetermination of the individual in an ethical and social context which sees him naturally and always in relation to other subjects. In a society which is ever more oriented towards “mere” productivity, we should reintroduce the fundamental value of feelings and in particular of the feeling of love of the Other (Nächsternlieben), which can assume all its expressive and emotional power and its sensitivity phenomenologically as it is liberated from the strictures of the Kantian consideration of the “maxim of benevolence.” By maintaining the fundamental operation of the epoché, at a good remove from mere natural considerations, Husserl rehabilitates feeling too as being

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constitutive of the moral life.20 The possibility opened by Husserl’s ethics that a rule which derives its form from reason can also acquire in a subject an efficacy involving feeling and inclination, frees us from the Kantian imperative of a duty to obey the law, placing, in any case, the Kantian rule into an experiential context which concretely validates every decision of the will.21 In this a kind of “intellectual sympathy” is established which helps us to live in accord with necessary rational rules without losing what is most human in our being as men. Furthermore, a truly valid triad for current society then presents itself, consisting in the will, rationality and feeling which together actively participate in an endeavor to enhance the person and his acts. Ethics, which aspires to be an integral part of practical philosophy, has at its origins, for Husserl, a logico-formal nexus; but there is, nevertheless, with the appearance of a possible ethic of feeling, an opening out towards a new perspective. With the convergence of pure logic and feeling, a “Gefühl-logik,” we return, albeit by a quite different path, to the “raison du coeur” of Pascal. Husserl’s integration of rational forms with the forms of inner experience (whether of inclination or repulsion) gives judgements a particular emotional and spiritual richness. Finally, in the Crisis, speaking of the task and a possible moral teleology, referring once again to the “kingdom of ends” and to Kant’s rational justice, where the analysed political ideal also makes its appearance in favour of peace as a necessary condition for ethical philosophical work, Husserl unites liberty and the responsibility of self-aware consciousness to permit every effectively valid theoretical initiative. 6. THE CONSTITUTIVENESS OF WILLING

The major difficulty which philosophy before Husserl had to address was a certain difficulty in separating the natural world and the world of consciousness without falling into a monism of the kind we find in Spinoza, or into idealism or total positivism. With the epoché an idealization of the sphere of feeling becomes possible and when it is reconstituted in transcendental analysis the recomprehension of the two spheres on a purer and more rational plane becomes possible. It is, therefore, possible to talk about feeling without falling into emotionalism or the subjectivisation of taste, that is, within an originating structure oriented towards an authentic value.22 Acts of feeling are a modality of being; in these acts should be included various dimensions such as those of love, desire and the will; it is precisely the will, understood as intentional voluntary activity, through which the subject makes its effort to carry something through, and this is a particular focus of and is key in Husserl’s ethical analyses.

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The intention of the will is a projection into the future which, in its “reaching forward” generates a tension which leads to action; it seeks in its “tendency to belief” enactment itself through its creative power; this is not so much the putting of something into effect that satisfies a requirement for its being as a truly creative tension. Here something is not desired because it is not yet, but rather something will be because it is desired.23 A “will of certitudes” appears here accompanied by a strong founding power such that it does not formally depend on a future possibility but, on the contrary, constitutes it; Husserl can, therefore, say that faith in the future springs from the will. The creative process which springs from this unfolds in a continuum of the will that dynamically manifests itself in act. From this also comes a concept of “production” (Handeln), which coincides with the present and which, in its interrelationship with creation and freedom, comes to constitute itself in time in every new “continuum” of the will as present moments overtake each other in the continual mutations of time; the moment which flows into past time is the moment which springs from the actual present by virtue of the creative power which is also present in the will itself, this because the original being of the Ego has its essential character in its being in time. The Ego is thus an “egological-continuous-fluidity” in the now and never a simple “fragment of time.” The Ego is, in itself, “a whole continuity” that is fundamentally different from the external temporal continuum.24 Into this temporal succession, in which phenomenological analysis reveals the teleology and inexhaustibility of the ever operating and never completely operated, there is inserted the will as an original force “unleashed” by a “directional-temporalintentional Ego that is” conscious of never reaching the ultimate target and which, most significantly, also contains within itself a capacity to fall back upon itself insofar as it is a “prior being” (a vor-sein); the flow which bubbles forth is a constant flowing, a “now again”; time is action and that which we are living is our own story. The will thus colours the tension of life with a creativity wholly directed towards the future, so that we thus become life’s authors. 7 . F RO M T H E I N D I V I D UA L TO T H E C O M M U N I T Y

If we wish to understand the original characteristics of modernity, i.e., what is the peculiar nature of modern complex society, we should ask ourselves about causes of and reasons for its various developments and conflicts. These, however, are too wide-ranging and difficult to quantify for us to be able to treat them in this work. We will limit ourselves to briefly observing what

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comes out of Husserl’s analyses, which are already in themselves profound and complex. Husserl’s work does not offer us a systematic treatment of sociology as a positive science. Husserl did not in practice take upon himself the task of offering a description of the phenomenon of social life in accord with the scientific method, but the ideas and the analyses which we find in his work and in his manuscripts show us that he was most certainly interested in this subject. Other philosophers such as Alfred Schütz and René Toulemont would find the essential bases in Husserl’s analyses for a useful phenomenology of the social world.25 We know that phenomenology tends to position itself at the point of view of the subject, the action, and also aims at recognizing the most significant structure of the social world in itself rather than looking to the symbolic structures of society; Husserl’s texts in fact constantly lead us to reflect on the attention he devotes to the life of the world, the community and the family. His analyses of the constitution of the family are exemplary for the purposes of our brief paper. They are primarily investigations of a genetic character aimed at an explanation of the formation of the personality, the individual’s belonging to the privileged social group which is the family, where there are fully spontaneous communicative relationships taking place. The various degrees of the family world (Heimwelt) tend, bit by bit, to extend outward in ever more complex layers and in “steps” which take in ever new horizons. The family is thus an authentic natural community characterized by the communal living which at a later stage is a constituent element defining the wider social system. It is the family, then, for Husserl, which acting in the living present of the life flow, i.e., in the sphere of contemporaneity, and in its generational continuity, enables us to read the historical possibility of a present widening out into future generations. The family context thus presents a world of spontaneous intimacy with others, and with things which are “to hand,” with whom and which we have a relationship of trust and mutually fashioned unity. This model intimate world inevitably has to relate to the stranger (the newcomer, he who comes from the outside) and communicate with him, and so steadily extend its horizons to take in the community, the society and finally the state. The Heimwelt or home world assumes particular characteristics insofar as it is a group formed by a succession of individuals who are not designated beforehand, is open and is subject to a continuous transformation which Husserl understands in the sense of improvement. We have before us, then, a conception of an open society, one which seems to bring Husserl close to the ideas of Bergson; both philosophers devoted

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particular attention to life as a constant state of renewal even, if their way of seeing the logico-moral nexus was substantially different. If Husserl understands the opening of human horizons to be the outcome of moral behaviour led by reason, Bergson believes in uplift connected with the creativity and intuitions in the life impulse, where the moral aspect can be constantly renewed.26 In addition to this, there is the wholly Husserlian concern that the constitution of a family consciousness should not be subject to the imperatives of tunnel-visioned hedonism or utilitarianism; the family is understood to be the basis of an original natural community as opposed to a contractual subordinate and dependent adjunct. The family, nevertheless, tends always to obey a social guidance which sees it as the custodian of a heritage of values, and this naturally tends often to also render it enclosed within its privileges, which encourages a form of individual (or collective) egocentricity which the ethical teachings of Husserl condemned in his critique of blindered utilitarianism. The assertion, which appears in Ideas III, of a possible unity of individual consciousnesses which can be represented as an extended consciousness,27 is a key message of Husserl, one which, as taken up once again in the Crisis, offers us a way of comprehending the world, understood also as that which is closest to us, by way of an opening out toward the Other and which presents itself, therefore, as a “world for everyone” (Welt für alles)28 through the universal language of reason. Thus, we have here a sociology of comprehension through understanding and peace while having at hand all of the intellectual instruments necessary for an original analysis of Husserl’s message. With this awareness we are able to attempt at least a profitable analysis of that message if not hope for its realisation. Despite the lucidity of Husserl’s message in his analysis of the crisis in Europe of science and of mankind in general, it remains a message of faith in humankind and the ethical nature of man as long as this ethicality is willing to open itself up to serious discussion and duly pitch itself in the primary key of personal responsibility. Insofar as philosophy is theory, it not only frees the philosopher but also each and every person who has had a philosophical training; from theoretical independence there follows practical independence.29 Self-consciousness thus constitutes personal being in the community of the life of consciousness so that one, as a personal being, can intimately join in the collective life and not be isolated by it.30 Man thus takes up the often lost task of a “willing-to-be” subject inasmuch as being a man implies teleological being and an “ought-to-be” which must

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not translate itself into an absolute science but rather be a “re-awakening” of each subject to the responsibility which he shares with his “co-subjects” and which spurs him to set out on the path once more (even if his plans should fail) insofar as his designs are moments in a ceaseless movement having man himself as its only protagonist. If in his philosophical reflection he seems to retreat from the world, he does so only to then “take upon himself” once again the freedom of a giver of meaning and actor in the world, putting reason into action. Philosophy is not, therefore, a matter of pure theory beyond practice, but translates into an ethic oriented towards an ultimate responsible self-understanding of what it is to be human.31 University of Verona N OT E S 1

The problem is discussed in detail not so much in The Crisis of European Sciences of 1936 as in the 3rd part of the Crisis published in French by Eugen Fink in 1954. Cfr. Edmund Husserl, La Crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale (Milan: II Saggiatore, 1987). For a historical and theoretical view of the problem see Hans Reiner, Die philosophische Ethik (1964); Italian translation: Etica e teoria (Rome: Armando 1971). 2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Il movimento fenomenologico (Milan: Bompiani: 1990), p. 8. 3 The problem is studied by Husserl in his final years; these difficult works reach us through Eugen Fink and his Sixth Cartesian Meditation, the fruit of many years of research. Cfr. Eugen Fink, VI cartesianische Meditation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). 4 Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie 1923/24. Erste Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), Hua. VII. Also Emilio Baccarini, “Modelli di ragione e modelli di verità”, in E. Husserl. La “crisi delle scienze europee” e la responsabilità storica dell’Europa, ed. M. Signore (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1985), pp 203–210. 5 Edmund Husserl, La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale (Milan: II Saggiatore, 1987). 6 Ibid, par. 72–72. 7 Xavier Tilliette, Breve introduzione alla fenomenologia (Lanciano: Itinerari, 1983) pp. 133 and 136. We also find in Tilliette a quotation from a letter which Husserl wrote to Dorion Cairns in 1930: “Consider that my books do not provide results which are to be formally learnt but foundations upon which autonomous methods of investigation can be built and problems be solved in one’s own.” Ibid., p. 134. 8 Edmund Husserl, Meditazioni cartesiane (Milan: Bompiani, 1994), par. 55–59. 9 Tilliette, op.cit. p. 107. 10 In Logica formale e trageendental, Husserl wrote: “Phenomenology is the science of transcendental subjectivity.” (Bari: Laterza, 1966), p. 12. 11 Husserl, Meditazioni cartesiane, op.cit., p. 124. 12 Aristotle, Metafisica (Milan: Rusconi, 1984), Volume. IV, (1008a–1009b). 13 Husserl, Mediatzioni cartesiane, op.cit., p. 124. 14 Husserl, Mediatzioni cartesiane, op.cit., par. 59.

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Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), par. 4; Hua. XXVIII. 16 Alois Roth, Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen. Dargestellt anhand seiner Vorlesungsmanuskripte (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). 17 Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pratica (Rome, Bari: Laterza, 1984). 18 Roth, op.cit., p. 11. 19 Mario Sancipriano, Edmund Husserl. L’etica sociale (Genoa: Tilgher, 1988), p. 112. Also M. Sancipriano “Les Sources de la vie morale” in Analecta Husserliana Vol. XXXV, pp. 13–43. 20 Edmund Husserl, “Die Gefühlsgrundlage der Moral” in his Vorlesungen über Ethik, op.cit. pp. 384–402. 21 Roth, op.cit. pg. 38. 22 Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik op.cit. p. 48. 23 Husserl, “Zur Phänomenologie des Willes”, in Vorlesungen über Ethik, op.ct. pp. 102–124. 24 G. Brand, Mondo, Io e tempo nei manoscritti inediti di Husserl, ed. Enzo paci (Milan: Bompani, 1960). 25 Alfred Schütz, La fenomenologia del mondo sociale (Bologna: II Mulino, 1960) and René Toulemont, L’Essence de la société selon Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962). 26 Henri Bergson, Le due fonti della morale e della religione (Milan: Comunità, 1973). 27 Edmund Husserl, “La fenomenologia e i fondamenti delle scienze”, in Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia fenomenologica (Turin, Einaudi), Libro III, p. 119. 28 Ibid., p. 217. 29 Husserl, La crisi delle scienze europee, op. cit., p. 5. 30 Ibid., p. 270. 31 Husserl, La crisi, op. cit., Appendici XIII to XVIII (pp. 456–490).

APPENDIX

The Inaugural Address to the Third International Congress of Phenomenology/Philosophy and the Sciences of Life, “Forces, Dynamisms, and the Shaping of Life: Vital, Existential, Creative”, held at the Collegium Medicum of the Jagiellonian University of Krakow, Poland, on September 13–16, 1999, by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka: Magnificence, Mr. Ambassador, Dear Friends and Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the name of the World Phenomenology Institute, I want to express to you my warmest thanks for your being with us on this auspicious occasion. First of all I am greatly moved to be addressing Professor Franciszek Ziejka, who as the Rector Magnificus of the Jagiellonian University represents the centuries of distinguished scholarship carried on in Poland, my native land, and in particular at my alma mater. It seems to be in a far-off past that I was sitting in the tradition-laden rooms of the Institute of Philosophy in the courses of famous scholars like Roman Ingarden, Heinrich, Zawirski, Tatarkiewicz, Swiezawski, Ajdukiewicz. The more than a half century of history that has elapsed since then has witnessed the turmoils and upheavals of Poland as well as my personal explorations of the world, and now I am here returned with the harvest of the seeds of learning and reflection that were planted here in my young mind. And this occasion stirs my emotions even more due to the presence here with us of the Honorable David Fried, Ambassador of the United States, now my adoptive country and the home of the World Phenomenology Institute. It is precisely in the United States that as a beginning scholar and teacher animated by the passionate zeal to spread phenomenology in the world as the means of the revival of our civilization, that I found a hospitable and friendly climate for this lofty endeavor. I have been often asked abroad how it is possible to carry such a private, individual and autonomous scholarly enterprise. It is, indeed, only in the individualistic atmosphere of North America that independent, novel intellectual undertakings may find enthusiasts, understanding, support, etc. and make their way to unfold and blossom.

387 A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana LXXIV, 387–388. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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And that it blossoms we see here in all the spectrum of the world’s colors of mind and inspiration. We greet first our fellow Americans headed by Professor Marlies Kronegger, Vice-Rector of the World Phenomenology Institute, our Italian contingent, which came from various parts of Italy representing our two centers there, in Rome and in Macerata, our dear friends from Russia representing our center in Vladimir, our Latvian group, the French, Spanish, and Mexican Colleagues of the Institute. It is particularly precious to greet our old, old friends from Japan, Professors Hirotaka Tatematsu and Jiro Watanabe. And several other dear friends old and new who came to share with us their ideas. At last I come to the point to sharing my profound joy to see here with us some of my colleagues from the schoolbench: Maria Golaszewska, Jerzy Swiecimski. And tomorrow the opening session will be presided over by Jacek Wozniakowski, whom I remember from the first seminar with Professor Stefan Swiezawski, and Wl⁄ adyol⁄ aw Stroˇv·ewski, a student of our common master, Roman Ingarden. I thank them most joyfully for being with us. Now allow me to present to you the aim, the scope and the work of the World Phenomenology Institute . . . I will conclude on a nostalgic but joyful metaphysical note taken from a poem of our very old colleague and friend, already departed, Jerzy Klinger, who in radical contrast to Heraclitus maintained that “nothing happens,” in the realm of the spirit, that is. A-T.T.

I N D E X O F NA M E S

Adesanya, Adebayo, 266 Ageno, Mario, 97–100 Agrimi, Jole, 318 Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz, 387 Albert the Great, 308, 311 Alichniewicz, Anna, 319 Allen, Douglas, 150, 157 Ames, Roger, 261–3 Anati, Emmanuel, 81 Angus-Butterworth, Lionel, 122, 132 Annas, George, 327 Anyanwu, Kenneth, 266, 270–2, 274, 276 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 311, 318, 329 Archimedes, 42 Arics, 325 Aristotle, 3–14, 16–8, 34, 57, 145, 217–8, 221, 230, 287–90, 308–10, 312, 318, 321, 323, 329, 378, 385 Artaud, Antonin, 31 Aurobindo, Sri, 154 Avicenna, 308–9, 312, 314, 318 Awolowo, Obafemi, 270

Bianchi, Irene Angela, 373 Bianchi, Luca, 317 Biesenbach, Klaus, 67 Biestek, F.P., 355, 372 Bihana, 93 Birkhoff, George, 205 Blaga, Lucian, 151 Blake, William, 88–91, 93 Bloom, Harold, 90, 93, 201–2, 204, 206–7, 213 Bloomfield, Leonard, 354 Bo Yi, 254 Bochenski, Jozef, 300, 305 Böhringer, Hannes, 67 Boltzmann, Ludwig, 96–8 Bombala, Bronislaw, xiii Boucher de Perthes, Jacques, 81 Boyle, Robert, 122 Brack, Andre, 230 Bradbury, Savile, 121, 123, 132 Brand, Gerd, 386 Bräuning-Oktavio, V.H., 66 Broom, 72 Broom, Donald, 102, 113 Brown, James Robert, 132 Brown, xviii Brumbaugh, Robert, 260 Bruzina, Ronald, 82 Burke, Francis, 275–6 Buwei, Lu, 233 Buytendijk, Frederik, 101, 103–110, 113–4

Bachelard, Gaston, 30 Bacon, Francis, 293 Baker, Patrick, 228, 230 Barbaszynski, Dariusz, xiii Barfield, Owen, 199 Barrault, Jean-Louis, 38 Basavanna, 84 Bataille, Georges, 76, 80, 82 Baudrillard, Jean, 181, 184–7, 189 Baynes, Cary, 263 Bellone, Enrico, 100 Belsey, Catherine, 201–3, 213 Bennett, Jim, 121, 123, 132 Bergson, Henri, 41, 154, 383–4, 386 Bettoni, Efrem, 317 Bharitrihari, 93 Bi Yuan, 262

Cairns, Dorion, 385 Callahan, Daniel, 324, 325, 327 Callicles, 353 Callicot, J.B., 335 Camus, Albert, 302, 305 Canetti, Elias, 322 Carey, James, 189 Carnap, Rudolf, 117

389

390

I N D E X O F NA M E S

Carson, Michael, 260 Carter, Ellwood, 67 Cassirer, Ernst, 129, 132, 146, 289 Cauchy, Augustin, 288 Cave, David, 148–9, 156 Cervantes, Miguel de, 35, 201 Cesare, Giulio, 189 Chakrabarti, Tarapada, 203, 213 Chalmers, David, 203, 213 Charleston, Robert, 122, 132 Chaucer, Geoffrey, 201 Chen Changqi, 262 Cheng, Chung-ying, 263 Chevalier, Jacques, 93 Christian, P., 106, 114 Cicero, 351 Clark, William, 324, 327 Claudel, Paul, 31, 38 Clausius, Rudolf, 96 Cohen, Hermann, 288 Comte, Auguste, 293 Confucius, See Kongzi Conrad, Joseph, 35 Conrad, Michael, 222, 230 Copernicus, 79 Corvino, Francesco, 309, 317 Coward, Noel, 203 Crisciani, Chiara, 318 Czarnik, Tadeusz, ix, xiii, 2, 70 Dahme, Heinz-Jürgen, 67 Dal Lago, Alessandro, 67 Dallaporta, Nicolo, 100 Damascene, John, 312 Dante, Aligieri, 201 Dart, Raymond, 72 Darwin, Charles, 71, 77, 81, 218, 289, 334, 336 Davis, Clifton, 201, 207–8, 213 Dawa-Samdup, Kazi, 93 Dawkins, Marian, 103, 114 De Chardin, Teilhard, 148, 154, 301 De Mortillet, Gabriel, 71 De Souzenelle, Annick, 93 De Unamuno, Miguel, 41 De Villers, Benedicte, 71 Dedekind, Richard, 288

Deikman, Arthur, 207, 213 Della Porta, Giambattista, 122 Dennett, Daniel, 201, 207, 213–4 Depew, Daniel, 218, 230 Derrida, Jacques, 30, 202–3 Descartes, Rene, 29–30, 57, 146–7, 209, 215–6, 283, 330, 360 Deutsch, Eliot, 208, 214, 260 Devall, Bill, 335 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 41, 104 Dirichlet, Peter, 288 Dogen, 193–9, 260 Driesch, Hans, 41 Dubois, Eugéne, 72 Durkheim, Emile, 59 Eliade, Mircea, 145–51, 153, 156–7 Emmeche, Claus, 215, 230 Enzensberger, Hans, 181, 187–9 Epicurus, 320, 322, 326 Eschyle, 35 Evans-Wentz, Walter Yeeling, 93 Fellmann, Ferdinand, 67 Feltz, B., xiii Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 58, 293 Fink, Eugen, 30, 81, 385 Flut, Ignacy, ix Fourier, Joseph, 288 Frege, Gottlob, 288 Freud, Sigmund, 14, 181, 189, 202 Fried, David, ix, 387 Frings, Manfred, 288 Frisby, David, 60, 67 Fromm, Erich, 301 Fumaroli, Marc, 38 Fung Yu-lan, 254, 263 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 30, 375, 385 Galen, 308–20, 314, 318 Galilei, Galileo, 122, 218, 330 Galli, Giuseppe, 189 Gamble, Clive, 82 Gandhi, Mahatma, 31 Gao You, 249, 252, 260–2 Gasset, José Ortega y, 41 Gebser, Jean, 154

I N D E X O F NA M E S Gendlin, Eugene, 217, 230 Gheerbrant, Alain, 93 Giacomoni, Paola, xiii, 51, 66–67 Giddens, Anthony, 109, 114 Gide, Andre, 31 Giles of Rome, 308–9, 318 Gilson, Etienne, 307, 309, 317 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 51–7, 60, 64–7 Goguen, Joseph, 204–6, 208, 214 Golaszewska, Maria, xiii, 388 Gooding, David, 129, 132 Gorman, Elanor, 67 Graham, Angus, 261 Griffin, Donald, 102, 114 Gunji, Yukio-Pegio, 222, 230 Gyekye, Kwame, 271–2, 276 Habermas, Jürgen, 203 Hacking, Ian, 118, 128, 132 Hackmann, Willem, 121, 132 Haeckel, Ernst, 72 Hall, David, 261 Han Fei, 245–6 Handerek, Joanna, ix, xi, 70 Haney II, William, xiii, 201 Hankins, Thomas, 122, 132 Hanley, Catriona, 3 Harre, Rom, 132 Hatori, Kuniyuki, 227, 230 Hawking, Stephen, 198 Hegel, Georg, 147–8, 228, 286, 365 Heidegger, Martin, 3–4, 6, 8, 10–4, 16–8, 26, 41–2, 137, 185, 199, 324 Heim, Michael, 17 Heine, Steven, 199 Heinrich, 387 Heraclitus, 152, 156, 323, 353, 388 Higgins, Kathleen, 321–2, 326 Hippocrates, 308–309 Hirstein, William, 205–6, 214 Hobbes, Thomas, 293, 353 Hoffmeyer, Jesper, 215, 221, 230 Holbrook, Dwight, 193 Homer, 201 Honda, Hajime, 230 Hooke, Robet, 119, 123, 125–6, 132

391

Hu Shi, 246, 260, 262 Huang, Kerson, 100 Huangdi, 243–4, 251 Hurlburg, Jeffrey, ix Hurlburt, Jeffrey, ix Husserl, Edmund, xxviii, 30, 41–3, 74–6, 78–81, 146, 159–65, 167, 170–80, 373–86 Huygens, Christiaan, 121 Idoniboye, Dagogo, 267, 276 Imai, Ei-ichi, 227, 230 Ingarden, Roman, 30, 42, 165, 387–8 Jahn, Johanez, 265–6, 276 James, William, 154–5, 289, 291–2 Jankelevitch, Vladimir, 326 Janssen, Jans, 121–2 Janssen, Zacharias, 121–2 Jaspers, Karl, 41 John of Rochelle, 309–12, 314, 318 Jung, Carl, 145–6, 148, 150–3, 157 Kagame, Alexis, 265 Kant, Immanuel, 51–2, 57–8, 64, 66–7, 132–, 203–4, 218–20, 230, 283–4, 288, 293, 351, 353, 364, 372, 379–81, 386 Kelkel, Arion, 17 Kierkegaard, Soren, 171 Kinneavy, James, 260 Klages, Ludwig, 41 Kleinschnieder, Manfred, 66 Klinger, Jerzy, 388 Kockelmans, Joseph, 30 Koestler, Arthur, 154 Köhler, D., 217, 230 Köhler, Wolfgang, 107–8, 110 Köhnke, Klaus, 66 Koj, Aleksander, ix, xi Kongzi, 240, 246, 250–1, 254–5, 259, 262–3 Ko l⁄ akowski, Leszek, 326 Kouwer, B.J., 104, 114 Kozma, C., xiii Kronegger, Marlies, xiii, 27, 40, 388 Kuhn, Dorothea, 66 Kuhn, Thomas, 102, 299

392

I N D E X O F NA M E S

Kung-Chuan Hsiao, 237, 260 Kutschmann, W., 120, 133 Lacan, Jacques, 202, 208–9 Lakoff, George, 93 Lamarck, Jean Baptiste, 71, 81 Landgrebe, Ludwig, 30 Laozi, 239–4, 261 Larre, Claude, 260 Latour, Bruno, 130–1, 133 Lau, D.C., 263 Lavater, Johann, 53 Le Clkezio, Jean-Marie, 31 Le Poidevin, Robin, 198 Leftow, Brian, 193, 196, 198–9 Leibniz, Gottfried, 57, 288, 377 Lelas, Srdjan, 128, 130, 132 Leopold, Aldo, 335–6 Leroi-Gourhan, André, 73–82 Levinas, Emmanuel, 30, 365 Levine, Donald, 67 Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 75 Leydesdorff, Loet, 220, 230 Li Si, 246, 262 Liezi, 239–40, 242, 261 Lijmbach, Susanne, 101, 105, 111, 113–4 Linschoten, J., 104, 114 Liu Xiang, 261 Lobatschewski, Nikolai, 288 Locke, John, 293 Loewe, Michael, 260 Lombard, Peter, 308 Loschmidt, Josef, 99 Lucas, John, 194, 198 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 353 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 322, 326 Madison, Gary, 275–6 Magnus, Albertus, 318 Majewska, Zofia, xiii, 159 Major, John, 260 Malick, Terence, 17 Mancing, Howard, 208–10, 214 Marcel, Gabriel, 351, 355, 357, 359–63, 365–72 Marchesi, Angelo, 317 Marchesin, Arturo, 95

Maroszyn´ ska-Jez· owska, Barbara, 299, 305 Marshall, P.A., 327 Martorelli Vico, Romana, 307 Marx, Karl, 270, 293 Marx, Werner, 30 Maslow, Abraham, 154 Mason, Georgia, 112, 114 Matsuno, Koichiro, 215–7, 219, 220, 223, 226, 228–230–1 Matthiessen, Peter, 92 Mbiti, John, 265, 268, 276 Mboya, Tom, 270 McKibben, Bill, 331, 336 McLuhan, Marshall, 181, 183, 185, 189, 302 Meinong, Aleius, 286 Melville, Herman, 35 Mengzi, 253–4 Merlau-Ponty, Maurice, 42 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 30 Meyrowitz, Joshua, 183, 189 Migon, Mieczyslaw Pawel, xiii, 41 Miklaszew, Jostyna, ix Milarepa, Jetsun, 85–7, 92–3 Mitcham, Carl, 127, 133 Model, Anselm, 339 Moiso, Francesco, 67 Monet, Claude, 37 Moore, George, 333 Mozart, Wolfgang, 38 Mroz, Piotr, ix, xi, xiii, 70 Munch, Edvard, 37 Mussolini, Benito, 352–3, 359, 363, 365–6, 371–2 Naess, Arne, 335 Nash, Roderick, 336 Nedelmann, B. Stoler Netwon-Smith, W.H., 260 Newton, Isaac, 57–8, 64, 121–2, 218, 220, 330 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 41, 137–42, 154, 293, 324 Nkrumah, Kwame, 270 Nogal, Agnieszka, xiii Norris, Christopher, 203, 214

I N D E X O F NA M E S Nyenhuis, Gerald, xiii Nyerere, Julius, 269–70, 276 O’Niell, Eugene, 35 Oguah, Benjamin, 270, 276 Orphus, 323 Otto, Rudolf, 146 Parkes, Graham, 324, 327 Parsons, Michael, 127, 133 Pascal, Blaise, 361, 381 Passmore, John, 332–3, 335–6 Paton, Raymond, 217, 231 Pattee, Howard, 219, 222, 231 Peirce, Charles, 291, 297 Perse, Saint-John, 31 Pflueger, Lloyd, 209–11, 214 Picasso, Pablo, 206 Pindar, 4 Pirandello, Luigi, 181 Plato, 148–9, 235, 319, 323, 326, 329, 370 Plessner, Helmuth, 103–6, 108, 110, 113–4 Pliotinus, 156 Podvez, Ewa, xiii Popper, Karl, 117 Priec, D.J., 121, 123, 133 Prigogine, Ilya, 305 Pyra, Leszek, ix, xi, xiii, 70, 329 Pythagoras, 323 Qian Mu, 260 Rabelais, Francois, 201 Radder, Hans, 132–3 Ramachandran, Vilayanur, 205–7, 214 Ramanujan, A.K., 84–5, 92 Reale, Giovanni, 327 Regan, Tom, 332–3, 336 Reiner, Hans, 385 Rembrandt, Van Rijn, 37 Renoir, Pierre-Auguste, 37 Restak, Richard, 209 Rickets, Mac Linscott, 156 Ricoeur, Paul, 30, 146–7, 150, 156, 260 Riemann, Georg, 288 Riva, Massimo, 220, 231 Rocquet, Claude-Henri, 81

393

Rodin, Auguste, 29 Rodney, Walter, 270, 276 Rogers, Kim, xiii Rolland, Romain, 31 Rollin, Bernard, 101, 114 Rolston III, Holmes, 331, 333, 335–6 Rorty, Richard, 203 Rosemont, Henry, 262–3 Rosen, Steven, 217, 231 Rossler, Otto, 220, 231 Roth, Alois, 386 Rothbart, Daniel, 117, 132–3 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 353, 367 Ruch, E.A., 276 Rude, Francois, 37 Rydzewski, Wlodzimierz, ix Sagoff, Mark, 336 Saint Augustine, 308, 312, 360–1 Saint Bonaventure, 309, 318 Saint-Exupery, Antoine de, 35, 38 Salthe, Stanley, 218, 220, 231 Sancipriano, Mario, 386 Sandoe, P., 103, 114 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 35, 367 Scapin, Pietro, 317 Schaffer, Simon, 121, 133 Scheler, Max, 42, 279–97, 303 Schelling, Friedrich, xviii, 58, 148, 156 Scherer, Irmgard, 132–3 Schiller, Friedrich, 65 Schmoller, Gustav, 297 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 138, 141, 154, 293 Schott, Gasper, 122 Schroeder, Manfred, 288 Schútz, Alfred, 383, 386 Schwartz, Benjamin, 30 Schweitzer, Albert, 335 Scotus, Duns, 307–8, 317–8 Segalen, Victor, 31 Sehdev, Mina, 181 Sellmann, James, 233 Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 270 Shakespeare, William, 201 Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine, 82 Shepard, Sam, 202, 207, 211–2, 214 Sherover, Charles, 260

394

I N D E X O F NA M E S

Shestov, Lev, 159–60, 167–80 Shimada, Kazuhiko, 230 Sigwart, Christoph, 293 Silverman, Robert, 122, 132 Simmel, Georg, 41, 51–2, 57–68, 324 Simmel, Gertrude, 68 Simonsen, H.B., 103, 114 Skinner, B.F., 352, 354–9, 369–72 S´lósarska, Joanna, 83 Smith, Adam, 353 Smith, John E., 260 Smuts, Jan, 154 Socrates, 30, 138, 148, 171, 323 Spencer, Herbert, 59, 286, 288 Spengler, Oscar, 41 Sinoza, Benedict, 54, 381 Steiner, Reinhard, 326 Stevens, John, 93 Straus, Erwin, 82 Stringer, Christopher, 82 Strozewski, Wladyslaw, 2, 326, 388 Sullivan, Henry, 208–10, 214 Sun Qiangming, 261 Suzuki, Beatrice Lane, 157 Suzuki, Daisetz, 199 Swenson, Rod, 226, 231 Swiecimski, Jerzy, xiii, 388 Swiezawski, Stefan, 387 Szewczyk, Kazimierz, 327 Taborsky, Edwina, 221, 231 Tagore, Rabindranath, 31 Taminiaux, Jacques, 16 Tao Hungqing, 262 Tarlekar, Ganesh, 206, 208, 214 Tatarkiewicz, 387 Tatematsu, Hirotaka, xi, 19, 27, 388 Tempels, Placid, 266, 276 Tenbruck, Friedrich, 61, 67 Thomas, Louis-Vincent, 326 Thompson, Paul, 262 Tillich, Paul, 147, 156 Tilliete, Xavier, 377, 385 Tinbergen, Niko, 102, 114 Tischner, Jozef, 326 Toates, Frederick, 102–3, 114 Toffler, Alvin, 302–3, 305

Tolstoy, Leo, 154 Toner, Mark, ix Toraldo Di Francia, Giuliano, 100 Totaro, Francesco, 137, 189 Toulemont, Rene, 383, 386 Toure, Sekou, 270 Toynbee, Arnold, 154 Turner, Mark, 93 Turner, V., 92 Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, xi, xiii, xv, 2, 27–36, 38–9, 40, 41–9, 70, 387 Ulanowicz, Robert, 224, 231 Unah, Jim, 265, 268, 276 Valery, Paul, 31 Van Peursen, Cornelis, 30 Varela, Francisco, 204, 214 Venter, Ponti, xiii, 40 Ventner, J.J., 351, 371, 372 Verducci, Daniela, 279 Volpi, Franco, 16, 17 Voltaire, 30 Von Ehrenfels, Christian, 286 Von Hayek, Friedrich, 357, 372 Von Uexküll, Jakob, 105–6, 113, 115, 289 Wait, Eldon, xi, xiii Wang Niansun, 262–3 Warner, Deborah, 121, 132–3 Watanabe, Jiro, xiii, 40, 388 Watson, Burton, 261, 263 Watteau, Jean-Antoine, 37 Weber, Bruce, 218, 230 Weber, Max, 60–1, 67 Weierstrasse, 288 Weil, Simone, 370 Weiss, Helene, 16 Wenzel, Manfred, 66 Wertheim, Margaret, 204, 206, 214 Wiepkema, P.R., 102–3, 111, 115 Wilber, Ken, 145–6, 148, 153–7 Wilhelm, Richard, 258, 263 Williams, Clifford, 196, 199 Wing-Tsit Chan, 262 Wiredu, Kwasi, 267, 276 Wise, Robert, 70

I N D E X O F NA M E S Wise, Jr., Robet, ix, x, xi, xiii Wodzinski, Cezary, 172, 180 Wood, Douglas, 260 Wozniakowski, Jacek, 2, 388 Wundt, Wilhelm, 289 Xu Weiyu, 261, 262 Xunzi, 246 Yang Shuda, 261

Yeats, William, 183 Yourcenar, Marguerite, 31 Zabrowski, Z., 93 Zalewski, Zbigniew, ix, xi, xiii Zawirski, wLaolyslaw, 387 Zermelo, Ernst, 99 Zhuangzi, 239–4, 254, 261, 263 Ziejka, Franciszek, ix, 387 Zowisl⁄ o, Maria, 145

395

Analecta Husserliana 31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46.

Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense and Its Foundational Significance: Self, Person, Historicity, Community. Phenomenological Praxeology and Psychiatry. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0678-3 Kronegger, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Aesthetics. Approaches to Comparative Literature and Other Arts. Homages to A-T. Tymieniecka. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0738-0 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Ingardeniana III. Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the Fine Arts, and Literature. 1991 Sequel to Volumes 4 and 30 ISBN 0-7923-1014-4 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era. Husserl Research – Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1134-5 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key. Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1146-9 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husserl’s Legacy in Phenomenological Philosophies. New Approaches to Reason, Language, Hermeneutics, the Human Condition. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1178-7 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), New Queries in Aesthetics and Metaphysics. Time, Historicity, Art, Culture, Metaphysics, the Transnatural. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1195-7 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Dialectic of Light and Darkness. The Passions of the Soul in the Onto-Poiesis of Life. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1601-0 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Reason, Life, Culture, Part I. Phenomenology in the Baltics. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-1902-8 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture. Reason, Life, Culture, Part II. Phenomenology in the Adriatic Countries. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2215-0 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Allegory Revisited. Ideals of Mankind. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2312-2 Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.), Allegory Old and New. In Literature, the Fine Arts, Music and Theatre, and Its Continuity in Culture. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2348-3 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): From the Sacred to the Divine. A New Phenomenological Approach. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2690-3 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Elemental Passion for Place in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Passions of the Soul in the Imaginatio Creatrix. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2749-7 Zhai, Z.: The Radical Choice and Moral Theory. Through Communicative Argumentation to Phenomenological Subjectivity. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2891-4 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Logic of the Living Present. Experience, Ordering, Onto-Poiesis of Culture. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2930-9

Analecta Husserliana 47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59.

60.

61. 62.

Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Heaven, Earth, and In-Between in the Harmony of Life. Phenomenology in the Continuing Oriental/Occidental Dialogue. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3373-X Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book I. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3825-1 Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life. The Human Quest for an Ideal. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book II. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3826-X Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of Philosophy. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book III. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4126-0 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Passion for Place. Part II. Between the Vital Spacing and the Creative Horizons of Fulfilment. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4146-5 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field. Book I. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4445-6 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Reincarnating Mind, or the Ontopoietic Outburst in Creative Virtualities. Harmonisations and Attunement in Cognition, the Fine Arts, Literature. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book II. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4461-8 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Ontopoietic Expansion in Human Self-Interpretationin-Existence. The I and the Other in their Creative Spacing of the Societal Circuits of Life. Phenomenology of Life and the Creative Condition. Book III. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4462-6 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Creative Virtualities in Human Self-Interpretation-inCulture. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book IV. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4545-2 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Enjoyment. From Laughter to Delight in Philosophy, Literature, the Fine Arts and Aesthetics. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4677-7 Kronegger M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life. Differentiation and Harmony... Vegetal, Animal, Human. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4887-7 Tymieniecka, A-T. and Matsuba, S. (eds.): Immersing in the Concrete. Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the Japanese Perspective. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5093-6 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life - Scientific Philosophy/Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life. Ontopoiesis of Life and the Human Creative Condition. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5141-X Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life - The Outburst of Life in the Human Sphere. Scientific Philosophy / Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life. Book II. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5142-8 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Aesthetic Discourse of the Arts. Breaking the Barriers. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6006-0 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Creative Mimesis of Emotion. From Sorrow to Elation; Elegiac Virtuosity in Literature. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6007-9

Analecta Husserliana 63.

64.

65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80.

Kronegger, M. (ed).: The Orchestration of The Arts – A Creative Symbiosis of Existential Powers. The Vibrating Interplay of Sound, Color, Image, Gesture, Movement, Rhythm, Fragrance, Word, Touch. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6008-7 Tymieniecka, A-T. and Z. Zalewski (eds.): Life - The Human Being Between Life and Death. A Dialogue Between Medicine and Philosophy, Recurrent Issues and New Approaches. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-5962-3 Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): The Aesthetics of Enchantment in the Fine Arts. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6183-0 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Origins of Life, Volume I: The Primogenital Matrix of Life and Its Context. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6246-2; Set ISBN 0-7923-6446-5 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Origins of Life, Volume II: The Origins of the Existential Sharing-in-Life. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6276-4; Set ISBN 0-7923-6446-5 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): PAIDEIA. Philosophy / Phenomenology of Life Inspiring Education of our Times. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6319-1 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Poetry of Life in Literature. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6408-2 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason. Logos and Life, volume 4. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6731-6; HB 0-7923-6730-8 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Passions of the Earth in Human Existence, Creativity, and Literature. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-6675-1 Tymieniecka, A-T. and E. Agazzi (eds.): Life – Interpretation and the Sense of Illness within the Human Condition. Medicine and Philosophy in a Dialogue. 2001 ISBN Hb 0-7923-6983-1; Pb 0-7923-6984-X Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life – The Play of Life on the Stage of the World in Fine Arts, Stage-Play, and Literature. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-7032-5 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life-Energies, Forces and the Shaping of Life: Vital, Existential. Book I. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0627-6 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay between Philosophy, Literature and Reality. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0070-7 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life – Truth in its Various Perspectives. Cognition, Self-Knowledge, Creativity, Scientific Research, Sharing-in-Life, Economics...... 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0071-5 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Creative Matrix of the Origins. Dynamisms, Forces and the Shaping of Life. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0789-2 to be published. to be published. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology World Wide. Foundations - Expanding dynamics - Life-engagements. A Guide for Research and Study. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0066-9

Kluwer Academic Publishers – Dordrecht / Boston / London