Leo Strauss: On Plato's Euthyphron

An Untitled Lecture

Plato's Euthyphron

on

Leo Strauss

The

transmit to

not

Euthyphron

tell us

not

us

part of

learn

we shall not

For

piety.

Plato thought

what

Plato's final

important

to us an

mits

Euthyphron is

subject matter of the

Euthyphron does

more

or complete view of piety.

Plato's more

than one reason the

It certainly does Still the work trans

about piety.

Thus, by studying the truth, as Plato saw it, a

analysis of piety.

than part of the

is necessarily also a partial untruth. Yet we can be certain that we shall never find the truth about piety as Plato saw it except after having understood and digested the half-truth that is presented to us not so much in the

truth,

partial

Euthyphron

which

Euthyphron. The half-truth

as through the

the Euthyphron does not common type of

belong

half-truth tells

to the the2

us

common1

to us through

presented

type of half-truth. The

most

The

half-

commonly-accepted opinions.

truth presented through the Euthyphron is not a generally-accepted half-truth. It

is

Since it is

unpopular.

one respect superior

half-truth

isfactory irritating the

to the

popular

if

we are

first forced to be the

said to

if

Secondly, he

or what

lutely

gives us

we should

regarded as and

satisfactory The Euthyphron is

insufficient.

Having

piety is?

supposed

would

phron

Piety

to be

cording to

be

does

two

kinds

of comfort:

activity regardless believe that the result is

moral character

the

is the

complete account of

the end of the

know

not

what

of

the character

important

more

that the

would

and

be

Socrates

what

dialogue,

final

abso

about

be

we are perplexed with

piety is. But does

not everyone

know

but4

in worshipping the ancestral gods, This may be true, but piety is supposed to be But is it truly good? Is worshipping The Euthyphron does not

according It is

a virtue.

ancestral gods ac

give us an answer.

say that the discussion presented in the Euthy answer. But the discussion presented in any Platonic to

the dialogue. The

is the ergon, the the characters do or

other part

University

piety,

consists

part of

unsat

of piety are suggested and all three of them prove to

arrived at

good.

irritating

first, thinking

of

guarantee

way irritating. conversation between Euthyphron

not give us an

part; the

to arrive at the

think. Now it is most

no

more accurate

in the dialogue,

The

order

must

ancestral custom good?

dialogue is only one

a

We do

custom.5

to ancestral

It

in

Three definitions

regard to piety. what

We

satisfying3

most

than the way to the result, Plato's

piety.

half-truth. In

half-truth is in

irritating

think and then receive no other reward than an

Plato

provisional result.

result.

result,

it is irritating. An

we must make some effort.

itself may be of

unpopular

Chicago 1996

discussion,

deeds,6

suffer

the speech, the

the action, what

is

logos, is

happening

in the dialogue. The logos may

6

Interpretation

end

conver may reveal what the speech conceals. The been has between Socrates and Euthyphron takes place after Socrates

in

silence and the action

sation

accused of

impiety. The dialogue

with

abounds

worship the

according to

ancestral gods

ancestral custom?

First,

gives us a two-fold presentation of piety.

a

pious?

Secondly,

Did Socrates

The Euthyphron then

discussion

Socrates'

of what

piety is.

These two

piety.

a presentation of the problem of

this

fact,

to this

references

It forces us, therefore, to wonder, Was Socrates

action.

subjects

belong to two entirely different orders. The question of what piety is is philosophical. The question of whether Socrates was pious seems to belong to seem to

the realm of gossip,

than to that of

rather

sense, it misses the decisive piety in the sense defined is a

degree to

which a

human

Therefore if the

opher.

if he is

is

Yet

philosophy.

For the But the

capable of

while

this is true in a

philosophic question man who

having

all

has

all

is

whether

the virtues to the

the virtues

is the

philos

is pious, piety is a virtue. But Socrates is a Hence, if Socrates is pious, piety is a virtue. And

philosopher

pious, piety is

not

virtue.

being

representative of philosophy.

question of whether

point.

Therefore, by answering

not a virtue.

Socrates

was

we answer

pious,

regarding the essence of piety. Then let from the Euthyphron regarding

the

the philosophic

us see whether we can

gossip

question

learn anything

Socrates'

Socrates is is

accused of

impiety, he is

piety. suspect7

soothsayer, is an expert in piety, innocent. Euthyphron vouches for

who

a

and

of

he is

Socrates'

know

what

piety is. Still if

custom,5

according to ancestral pious, whether Socrates did

was

according to petence,

ancestral

could

be

custom.5

likely

Above all, Euthyphron 's

Therefore, let

us

or

everyone could see whether

did

Euthyphron, in

a good witness as regards

that Euthyphron is not

to pay

But Euthyphron does

not

that piety consists in worshipping the

we assume

ancestral gods rates

piety.

impiety. Now Euthyphron, convinced that Socrates is

not

spite of

the

his

philosophic

decisive fact. But the

much attention

to what

piety is, to say the least, dismiss Euthyphron 's testimony and see own

Soc

worship the ancestral gods incom truth

is

human beings do.

open to

suspicion.

what we ourselves

can observe.

We hear from after

it, he

Socrates'

regarded

consequence of

his

that, both prior to his accusation and know the divine things. Apparently in for knowledge about the divine things, the accuser own mouth

it

as

quest

important

thought that Socrates was an accuser

to

innovator,

naturally thought that he

that is to say, a producer of error. The

himself knew the truth. He

charged Socrates divine things. The charge presup that alleged or real ignorance was but that ignorance not be criminal except if truth about the divine things was easily accessi

in fact

with

ignorance

of the truth about

the

Socrates'

posed could

careless,8

ble to every Athenian citizen. This would indeed be the case if the truth about the divine things were handed down to everyone by ancestral custom. Was Socrates criminally ignorant of the divine things? He seems to grant that he is ignorant of the divine things. But he seems to excuse his ignorance

by

the

Plato's Euthyphron

difficulty

of

criminal.

Now if Socrates

in

the subject matter. His

tradition

what

fact, he

him,

told

as well as everyone

these tales as

not regard

suggests that one ought not to assent to

before

quence

ignorance is involuntary, and therefore not of the divine things, he did not believe

ignorant

was

or ancestral custom

divine things. He did

the

having

it. He

examined

makes

it

ignorant,9

ignorant, radically

really

How then

ancestral gods exist.

he does

bare

about

conse

any

that the ancestral

If Socrates

assertions.

not even

else,

a matter of

assertion of

rather clear

he worship

could

knowledge. As any

reports about the ancestral gods are not more than was

7

know

whether

the

the ancestral gods

according really ignorant, and knew that he was really ignorant, he could not possibly be pious. Of course, he could still go through the motions of worship, he could outwardly conform. But this confor

to ancestral

custom?5

If Socrates

was

longer be pious, for how can a sensible man worship beings whose very existence is doubtful? outward conformity would not have been due to any fear of the gods but only to being ashamed of what would no

mity

Socrates'

human beings Fear

of

bad

might

think of non-conformance, or to the fear of bad reputation.

reputation

believe in the

is fear

of reputation

ancestral gods were thought

for badness. People

to be simply bad men,

did

who

not

men capable

every kind of wickedness, and this stigma attached especially to philoso In the circumstances, Socrates would seem to have been forced to con

of

phers.

form outwardly, if not for his own sake, at any rate for the sake of philosophy. Still, if Socrates conformed outwardly, how could people know that he was not know it from

he

But did Socrates say everything he thought to every human being? He himself feared that he was believed to say everything he knew to every real man out of philanthropy, and himself," to say it not only without receiving pay, but even gladly paying money pious?

They

could

what

said.

profusely10

if he had any,

provided people would

that what the Athenians really

sion

the

deviationist

real

crime, the

apparent

only listen to him. We

resented was not so much

or

philanthropy,

the impres

his cleverness, or zeal. His

his thought, as his alleged that killed him, was then not so much his

missionary13

character of crime

have12

what

is

called

impiety

as

his

in the charge, his corrupting the

young.

Hitherto, ignorance phron,

we

we

have been

just16

to

end of

given

loathes the these15

at

its face

value what

to the divine things. But if

find that Socrates is in fact

Towards the

having

have taken

with regard

current

look

not altogether

said

in

again

the gods. Earlier in the conversation stories

and

about

fights

the gods

with each

committing

other,

and

regard

into the

ignorant in this

the conversation, he says that all good things

by

dissensions

Socrates we

which

to his

Euthy

respect.

he

has14

he indicates that he

unjust actions or their

that he does not believe that

tales are true. He seems to believe to know that the gods are good and

and, therefore, both the

man and

incapable

would make

of

givers of all good

fighting

him impious, for

things and only of good things

with each other.

But precisely this knowledge he rejected

the current tales about the gods which

8

Interpretation It is

poets.17

merely the invention more important that they

of good painters and not so good

were not much

the

supplied

the ancestral worship. The fact that he did

fights

of

rationale of

not accept

why he But did he profusely Was he guilty of excessive

the gods would

explain

In his not

untrue?

beyond

go

displeased

In

he did

addition

not approach

contrary, the

unbelief

an

Euthyphron

doubt the

current

sionary zeal. To this, one

tales

about

might make

with

the

same

type of

is

upon

him

the

or

his

being feeling

Euthyphron.

with

enlightening him. On the Euthyphron. Without Euthyone could or should

not show a

In the

trace of

second

book

mis

of

the

length.

But, in the first Socrates talks in the Republic and even the

firstly20

He belongs

that

man

of

objection.

theology19

the

kind. He does

tales,

conversation

by

real

the tales with some

Socrates does

following

of the

have heard that

present are a select group.

man.

to every

to these

accepts

the

about

philanthropy?

the intention

gods.

characters with whom

audience which

he

might never

Republic, Socrates develops his place, the

regard

not seek

is forced

conversation

initiative, Euthyphron

phron's

in

these tales. He says that

with

of annoyance.

He did

indicating

say18

Euthyphron he does nothing

conversation with

elements of

impiety. He himself

was accused of

suggests this explanation.

these tales are

important

the current tales

at

great

Euthyphron does

not

belong

to the

to the majority of Athenians who con

demned Socrates to death. And, secondly, in the Republic Socrates does not explicitly mention, as he does in the parallel in the Euthyphron, the fact that the notions of

wrong city

the gods were, as it were, embodied in the official cult of the

Athens. The

of

outspoken criticism of

the Republic

is directed

I draw this

poets who were private men and not against ancestral custom.

Socrates

visional conclusion.

But he might

was

indeed impious in the

against

sense of

the

pro

the charge.

guilty of that excessive philanthropy of which he feared he be thought to be guilty. I have said the conversation with Euthyphron was

not

was

forced

The

reference

upon

Socrates. Socrates'

to

most revealing.

That

Certainly

Socrates did

favorite haunts

at

reference reminds us of

the

not seek

beginning

that of

conversation.

the dialogue

the opening of the Charmides

is

and

the Lysis where Socrates himself describes how gladly he sought those places where

he

could converse with

thyphron. He talks to thought shows

it

by

was

the

young.

him because he

just to do

so.

This

Socrates does

cannot

help it,

conversation was an act of

deed that he is just. Here the deed bears

Euthyphron. Whereas

Socrates'

gladly talk to Eu duty, or because he

not

out of

out the

piety remains, to say the

justice. Socrates

implicit testimony least,21

doubtful,

of

his

But what is justice? According to the Eu justice becomes perfectly thyphron, justice, in the strict sense, seems to be identical with skillfully tend evident.22

ing

human beings.

By

virtue of such skillful

tending, herding, human beings

become better. Whatever may have been the success of Socra skillfully tending Euthyphron, he is certainly trying hard to make Euthy phron better by showing him, who believes to be extremely wise, that he is are

tes'

benefited

or

Plato's Euthyphron

justly, by trying every23

by trying

to

him

make

reasonable, in acting

somewhat

better, Socrates believes

to make people

to act prudently.

For

live among good and hence helpful persons, hence harmful people. But just as a man who tries

sane man would want to

than

rather

Or

stupid.

extremely

9

to appease

among bad and vicious dogs might be bitten

by them, or just as a father who takes away from a child harmful toys might provoke the child's anger, Socrates, in trying to better people, might have provoked their resentment, and thus have to grief. Was it then prudent

come

In

of

him

even to attempt

to better the Athe

Socrates'

difficulty,

rewarding to him and to For in to friends, people, however silly, ultimately talking he was learning, he was studying human nature. Without this study the Platonic dialogues could never have been written. nians?

spite of this

his

and

But let

attempt was

to

even

us come

Socrates'

back to the

impious because he knew,

us.

issue, believed to know,

or

main

the ancestral gods which were underlying

impiety. Socrates

was

that the ancestral reports about

ancestral

custom

are

wrong.

This

knowledge is perfectly compatible with the possibility that Socrates was igno rant in regard to the divine things. He may have had sufficient knowledge of the divine things to know that the

current

tales

about

the gods are untrue, and

therefore that the worship of the ancestral gods according to

is

case, he

is

know

likely

he

wiser

was

than

truly

In that

Socrates,

it

would

be

wonderful

crime of

than a pious wish, a wish that cannot

to a

us now turn

establish

impiety

could

be

which

the

deals

with

justice. Now there

tice,

and wisdom.

place of

with

are

There is

add, is only true if

wisdom.

be

replaced

are

set

seems rather

philosopher,

to

forth

piety,

i.e.,

which

cardinal virtues

with one particular

deals

with

Republic

courage,

which

deals

courage, moderation, jus

Platonic dialogue devoted to wisdom, which, I

Instead

by

with

the Laches

we

piety?

Theages is spurious, because the The have a Platonic dialogue on piety. Is

The dialogue in

which

the four cardinal

clearly is the Republic. In the Republic Socrates piety by wisdom. When speaking of the nature of the

most

replace

i.e.,

with

moderation, and with the

four

no

the Euthyphron. Let

the Euthyphron within the cosmos of the

you assume that the

is devoted to

then wisdom to

be fulfilled.

somewhat more exact analysis of

It belongs therefore together

the Charmides

virtues

if the

the statute books. But from Plato's point of view that message could

first try to

ages

And assuming that know whether

no man could

case one could

Platonic dialogues. The Euthyphron deals virtue.

pious or not.

that24

not express more

us

be

say no more than he ought not for impiety. I personally believe this would have decision. It is just possible that this is the most obvious message of

a wise

Let

to

But he may not have had sufficient knowl to know what true piety positively is. In that

punished

the Euthyphron: that wiped off

order

whether

was pious or not.

to have been

been

not true piety.

divine things in

could not

other men are not

Socrates

custom5

or, if you wish, that to worship the ancestral gods according to

not good

ancestral custom edge of the

ancestral

on the most exalted

level

of

the discussion of morality in the

10

Interpretation

Republic, Socrates does

In

not even mention piety.

there is no Platonic dialogue devoted to

spite or

Yet

wisdom.

because

is

wisdom

a

of

this,

kind

of

the science, and there is a dialogue devoted to science, the Theaetetus. Now

Euthyphron

and the

with particular

Theaetetus

belong

virtues, but also

together,

because they

conversations take place about the same

time,

merely because

not

are

the

after

Socrates'

They belong to the end by Socrates to

the condemnation.

contain explicit references

precisely, to the precisely, to the

He

mother.

skill of skill of

compares

his

his father

his

and

ancestor on

own skill

they deal

contemporaneous:

of

his father

the skill of

his father's

to the skill of his

accusation

the two

and

before

life. Accordingly, they his mother or, more

and

his

mother

or, still

more

to the skill of

side and

his

He denies that his

mother.

the skill

has any kinship with the skill of his ancestor on his father's side, with of Daedalus. The relation of his own skill to the ancestral, to the

paternal,

remains

own skill

doubtful. His

attitude

toward the ancestral or paternal remains

doubtful. The Euthyphron deals with piety and it leaves open the question of what piety is. The Theaetetus deals with science and it culminates therefore in a description of the philosophic life. That description in its turn culminates in the thesis that one must

flight is in

sists

try

to flee from here thither as quickly as possible, but that

assimilation to god as

becoming

just

solemn and central

far

as

it is

possible.

and pious together with

passage,

almost

literally

And that

prudence.25

assimilation con

Here in this

most

central, the question of whether

piety is a virtue is answered in the affirmative. Yet this passage is not alto gether free from ambiguity as would appear from a consideration of the con text. One cannot settle any Platonic question of any consequence by simply quoting Plato. This much about the place of the Euthyphron of the Platonic dialogues. Let us now turn to the

within the cosmos

setting.26

The takes

aged

phron, has

lels

Socrates is

accused

Socrates'

side over against accused

Meletus'27

his

own aged

of

impiety by young Meletus. Euthyphron Euthyphron, the young Euthy

Meletus. But

father

action, the young

man

of

impiety. Euthyphron 's

accusing the aged

action paral

Euthyphron between Socrates and Meletus. What kind of a man is he? What kind of man is he who is the only interlocutor in Plato's only dialogue dealing with piety? Euthyphron is well-disposed towards Socrates and he is a boaster. He is a harmless boaster. There is a connection between his boasting and his harmlessness. What makes him side with Socrates? Socrates has a power of divination, the demonic thing that happened to him. And Euthy phron is a professional diviner. Both Euthyphron and Socrates are different. Both have superior gifts. And superior gifts of the same kind. On account of this superiority they are envied by the many. Euthyphron believes that he and Socrates are in the same boat. Euthyphron is a diviner. He boasts that he has superior knowledge of divine things. Because he has such knowledge he can predict the future in an infallible manner. Yet the people will laugh at him as at occupies a middle position

one.

Plato's Euthyphron

he is

do

They

a madman.

not

to appear

those

appear as madness to

himself

him

regard

as

harmless. But

can

be

being

pious.

only an expert in the divine things, a man like implication he denies the ordinary citizens the possibility By He has a great contempt for the many. He keeps the most

He does

certain that

his knowledge for not

conceal,

driven to

sometimes

at

pious.

marvelous part of wisdom.

best only human wisdom. He speaks of breath. He draws a line between himself and

have

who

the gods in the same

and

human beings. He is

of

They

his superiority that such ridicule does not affect him. He is to be mad. For he knows somehow that the divine is bound to

so certain of

proud

him,

take him seriously.

11

his

reveal

himself, or for however, his claim to

his

wisdom

One does

too.

He

an elite.

his

conceals

Therefore, he is know whether he

wisdom.

not

voluntarily or because it does not find any takers. Being versed in the divine things, he despises the human things; hence he knows next to nothing of human things. He seems to believe that all conflicts are conflicts

conceals

wisdom

principles, about

about

values.

He doesn't

to be aware that most conflicts

seem

presuppose agreement as

to principles, that most conflicts arise from the fact

that different

men regard

the same

himself. He

seems

themselves of

the

the fact that

the limits

within

to believe that

by denying

denying

thing

they

and want

good,

who

are accused

committed of

the

or

In striking the

mother, his brother

contrast

beginning

boat

as

phron

to Socrates who

is

on

his. Socrates suggests, his

conceals

not seem to

be

that Euthyphron is

of

surprised

impiety,

and

act, Euthyphron

about

his

of

attention

superior

as

suggests

wife or

acquittal of

an

to the fact that

is in the

whereas

gift, Socrates is

same

Euthy

difference,

explanation of this

At

persecuted on

and

that

Euthyphron than

than Socrates. After Euthyphron

his feat

which consists

a

doubt in

that he

wishes

about

regard

to the

wisdom of

wiser

the charge of impiety. He

things, in

this

than Socrates.

to become a pupil of

the divine

had proudly own father

in accusing his

to become aware that he is

to know everything

so.

if they are his friends.

even

is safe, whereas Socrates is therefore is in danger. At this point there

Socrates has indicated might seem

should

hesitate to do

impiety

difference between Socrates

more reticent

Socrates

harmless,

and therefore

wisdom and

another

Whereupon Socrates who claims

wisdom

defend instead

would not accuse anyone of anything.

his

account of

thought to broadcast his

told the

moment of

the conversation, Euthyphron believes that he

of

ridiculed

account of

punished

divine things. If this knowledge

sister, his children, his

Socrates. Socrates draws his

Euthyphron

does

or

of a crime

Euthyphron is

crime.28

force him to harm human beings, he will not for a He would not hesitate for a moment to accuse them his father

to have it each for

that criminals ought to be

principle

his knowledge

of

men

as

order

Euthyphron, thus to

bring

particularly that bolts. against

suggests more

Meletus'

he He

would

like to

wishes

use

Euthyphron

lightning

to hide behind Euthyphron's back

He draws Euthyphron's phron

as a

attention

is going to leave the

to the

protector and

fact that

his

well-concealed wisdom.

by teaching

sheltered position which

Socrates

Euthyphron

Euthy

enjoyed hith-

12

Interpretation All this does

erto.

him

make

realize

not make

he is

that

any impression on Euthyphron. All this does not not in the same boat as Socrates, or that a gulf

him from Socrates. He becomes

separates

has indicated his doubt

of the truth of

aware of this gulf

the current tales

this he puts, however unwittingly, Socrates into the

From that

he

still

point on

apparently

ble, i.e.,

as

appoints

his

he knows that Socrates is

regards

Socrates, in

after

Socrates

the gods. For after

category as the many. he.29 Yet in the same boat as

not

same

contradistinction to the many, as

educa-

willing to listen to Euthyphron's wisdom. Socrates, however, dis expectations. Very curiously, Socrates is chiefly interested in less

worthy, less divine and, in

fact,

the definition of piety than in

they demand

of man.

In the

scends to gratify.

He is

trivial subjects.

much more

wondrous stories about what

Socrates

Euthyphron does

which

about

only

for

to have a desire

seems

interested in

the gods did or what a

kind

of

knowledge

very highly, which, however, he conde it dawns upon Euthyphron that he might lose his

not regard sequel

lawsuit which, after all, he would have to win on earth before a human jury, before a jury consisting of the many; but Euthyphron pays too little attention to human things to be

familiarity

with

upset

by

that

human things,

prospect.

and with

the manner in

their low affairs, has convinced Euthyphron that not

many that

his

Socrates'

On the contrary,

strange

which

the

low

Socrates belongs

conduct with

the

only for the time being but altogether, that Socrates is not educable, to listen to Euthyphron's wisdom is due to incapacity to

unwillingness

Socrates, in

understand that wisdom.

Socrates

a

word, is

a worldling.

Somewhat

later,

bringing it home to Euthyphron that he grossly contradicts himself. Although he knows that self-contradiction is a bad thing, and although he

succeeds

appeals to the principle of self-contradiction when

Euthyphron is in he

in

would

no

perplexed

way to have

seem

by

expected

merely proves to him that he cannot or has an awareness of. How indeed which

Euthyphron

can

boast to

arguing

against

others,

the weakness of his own speech. In

fact,

something like it. His self-contradiction say or express to Socrates what he thinks, can one express experiences

someone

who

things? Is one not bound to contradict oneself

has

when

never

trying

like those

of

tasted the divine

to communicate the

incommunicable? Still later, Euthyphron almost openly refuses to tell Socrates the true secrets regarding the divine things, although Socrates urges him to do so.

He

even

suggests

that Socrates must rest satisfied with the simple verities which

the vulgar know sufficiently.

simple verities

thyphron

they

The

regarding these apparently reveals to Eu

ignorance in Socrates. When Socrates

end of

the conversation

quite serious to the extent that as unworthy.

strange remark

concern sacrifices and prayers

an abyss of

shortly before the

Socrates'

he is

not

Euthyphron

asks

to regard him as unworthy, he

convinced that

conversation comes to an end

Euthyphron does

because Euthyphron

regard

is

him

it up as hopeless, and he gives up the conversation as hopeless because he has learned in the course of the conversation that Socrates is a hopeless case. Eu

thyphron is

immune

to

Socrates'

conversational skill.

He

suffers as

gives

little

change

Plato's Euthyphron

during thing

Socrates, just

This is

phron.

For the

all.30

similarity31

ilarity. Euthyphron is

from them to

phron,

it were,

as

We

believes.33

may

accused

try

define that

Socrates

the orthodox

knows34

that he is

regard as pious.

have

clarified

What does he

gives an example

instead

is his third

and

deviates from

by

is, he

piety?

last

answer.

animating36

phron which

throws

a

which

the city

is

will

with what we

become

some

But

what

"the human

beings"

answer to

defective is

second answer

Socra He

answer.

formally

ade

neither the second nor the third

is underlying the formally defective has a direct relation to Euthyphron's

harmony

Only

the

Euthyphron's deed,

with

first

with

answer

his life,

is

a

with

his life. It is therefore the only answer given by Euthy light on that view of piety which is characteristic of him.

the principle

Plato has killed

in

In his first

piety Now only the first answer to his action, to his accusation of his father.

Euthyphron in

Soc

and

which

answer.

speech of

Euthy

the city. Meletus calls

formally

gives a

definition. His

answer expresses that view of

taste,35

goes

Euthyphron's deviation. Euthyphron him

understand

of a

gods

of

orthodox position

that he

different,

in the

the belief

Meletus identifies himself

What the

to what the pious

question as

first

the divine things.

position, between Meletus

with

of the city.

view.

tes'

quate and so

of

middle position.

believing

of not

Meletus identifies himself

what clearer after we self

knowledge

of

occupies a middle

to

Socrates before the tribunal call

kind

Socrates

philosophy, Euthyphron

arts and virtues to

replaces

must now

Meletus

Socrates, Euthyphron

as

the ordinary arts and virtues. But whereas

of

a spurious

Socrates, he in fact

and

rates.

some

way

philosophy by a spurious kind of knowledge of the Although Euthyphron believes to be superior to both Meletus

things.32

divine

Socrates. Just

a caricature of

from the ordinary

goes over

own

Socrates learns in his way something about Euthy In a sense, then, he is really in the same boat as Socrates. which we have mentioned amounts to a fundamental sim as

transcends the dimension

over

Socrates himself. He learns in his

the conversation as

about

13

three birds

of making Euthyphron express his true defective answer. In the first place, he thus characterizes view37

by

piety in a formally Euthyphron as insufficiently trained. Furthermore, he thus lets us see that Eu thyphron never made fully clear to himself the full meaning of his deviation

from the

orthodox or accepted view.

discussion

of

the real issue: no

the circumstances, and no the reader be

be

a

prevented

formally

doing

what

the custom

to the

expression

formally

which

piety

problem of

solution

of that

defective

view

consists

in

answer?

doing

ultimately be

conceived of as expresses

be

be

a real

given

given

in

lest

would

piety which Euthyphron We shall say: piety consists

of

this view with the orthodox what

the ancestral gods according to ancestral

must

piety

can

for himself. What then

we shall contrast

the gods tell us to do. Euthyphron

prevented38

to the problem of piety shall

solution

the gods do. And

view, according to

For to worship

and

solution

from seeking the

adequate

indicates in his first in

And thirdly, he thus

the gods tell us to do. custom5

means,39

since

divinely instituted, to do what view of piety by deed, rather

his

14

Interpretation

than

by

speech.

Yet piety is

Contrary

to ancestral custom, he accuses

to consist in

said40

His deed

ancestral custom.

worshipping the

amounts to a

denial41

his father

of

the

according to

gods

ancestral

impiety.

of

accepted view.

His deed

piety consists in doing what the gods do. Euthyphron's heretical. is Or, to use a more up-to-date term, it is piety This can be easily seen from the following According to the expresses a view that

deviationist.42

view of

considerations.43

orthodox

view, piety

consists

But the

do

sacrificing.

actions of the

The

say exclusively, in praying

not to

and

the gods or the

and sacrifice.

not

gods,

gods are not

formulation

adequate

chiefly,

By imitating pray by doing what the gods do, one will not pray or sacrifice. pious. By imitating the gods, one ceases to be pious. A more gods

is if

pleases the gods

of

men

Euthyphron's

do

view

be that

therefore

would

do,

what the gods

what

therefore that what pleases

and

is something entirely different from the pious. But Euthyphron shrinks from admitting to himself this implication of his view. In his second answer, he

the gods

identifies the that

what

altogether

is pleasing to the

pious with what

he really means is that the pious and different things. It is true Socrates

Socrates'

explicit

immensely

in

doing

what

the human beings agree upon in

Euthyphron's

to do what the gods

position

him. He

ought

is therefore

regard

do,

Yet, if piety? Still

but

to the gods,

Can

merely do

who

gods

what

ogy

they

of

the

which

he

appeals

we

tales, divine that the gods

what can we are

inkling

wise man.

do

what

about the gods

superhuman

disposal in

more the people who

say

beings,

of what

The analogy regard to

is based

the

the

and gods

of the wise gods.

he does than those

Now

people

what

we

should wise

do,

piety is in the direction

or

by issuing

commands.

man, which is our

what would please

view of

say that

the gods tell men to do.

he tells them to do, and who do not do what he does. may then be inclined to think, considering that we understand superhuman beings, that the gods do not rule at all people by

Accordingly,

by

loves

current tales

one accept a position which

therefore be the best clue at our

the wise man

from the

The authority to

we abandon the

be. But the highest human type is the

man will

does he know

the gods, from

to return to orthodoxy.

therefore that the highest human type gives us an might

about

current tales also

rather what

untenable.

can one return to orthodoxy?

on mere tales?

and about

beings believe

he takes to be true. But those

gods which

men ought not

But

shows

the gods do. How

what

the gods do? From what the human

refutes

is pleasing to the gods are this to Euthyphron in a

what

manner than

what

the

him

argument

then the view that piety consists

about

shows

I just indicated, but we shall gradually see that is only the apparently simplified but in fact the telescoped formulation of his implicit argument. Euthyphron holds

different

somewhat

Yet Socrates

gods.

a

the

gods

this

half-hearted

of a

higher

guide to

only analogy leads

attempt to

view.

However

telling be, the

this may

knowledge

us to realize

of

the gods or

that

transcend the orthodox

Euthyphron does occupy

anal of

Euthyphron's view of

piety

a middle position

Plato'

s

between Meletus no choice

The direction Euthyphron's His

boasting

view

Yet he has contradicts

position

is

by

and

superior

the

difficulty

to this

himself

which

have

by Euthy

it is beset. Yet

Euthyphron knows it.

Euthyphron transcends the

to something higher than is

aspired

no right

with

to the orthodox view and

not altogether unfounded.

because he

is indicated

the road and even the end of the road

of

view

is

to Meletus. We

return

15

Socrates.44

forward to

go

half-way

phron's

Socrates. It is impossible to

and

but to

Euthyphron

He really is

observation.45

by

visualized

orthodox

the many.

boaster. Euthyphron

a

saying that what pleases the gods is the pious, and

by

by

meaning that what pleases the gods is not the pious. To solve the contradiction, denying46 one must leave it at simply the identity of what pleases the gods and the pious. One must have the courage of please

the gods except

stands

impiety.

Or,

In

a certain manner.

the gods if

men

by being

more

do

what manner?

things.

impossible to

please

god,

Euthyphron

what

But in

justice is. He

gods

justice,

the idea of justice.

for

imitating

any

Euthyphron had

disagree

this in a

chooses

the

the city under

which

courage

to be impious in

that it is pleasing to

meant

will

gods

He is

justest

doing

god

are

other, if

with each

way.

displease the

by

pleased

they fight

must

know the idea

the many

reason

justice. For the justest

of

most perfectly.

one must

why imitate the idea

Why Imitating not

god.

But if

imitate48

the gods,

of

the

with each

gods

one

god

know

is the

god

knows the idea

of

imitation

of

most perfect

what

for his

must

justice itself? There is

doing

It is

different

the best and justest

what

out of

other.47

to make this choice, he must know justice. He

that imitates the idea of justice there is no

in

sense

the gods do. But the different gods do different and

admits

order

the view that one cannot

have the

pleasing one god one the gods if the different

Zeus, does. He

model.

one must

By

things, if the different other.

impious in the

precisely,

what

even opposite

holding

no reason

the gods do because the

to be superfluous. We must go a step for any gods. If we doubt the current tales about the gods, if we try to think for ourselves, we are led to the conclusion that what general opinion assigns to the gods actually belongs to the ideas. The

gods

do it,

further

ideas

and

and

hence piety,

say there is

replace

the gods.

proves

no need

From here

we

can

understand

and

judge

Meletus'

charge.

Meletus is

right

to this extent. Socrates really does not believe in the

gods of

And he really introduces different beings. But Meletus is wrong in assuming that the different beings which Socrates introduces are gods or de the

city.

In fact they are the ideas. If we want to speak of gods, we would have to say that the different gods which Socrates introduced are the ideas. introduc Meletus erred grossly in speaking of One can also say monic things.

Socrates'

that49

ing

novel things.

ideas,

ing

are prior

For the ideas,

to any

a clue given

gods.

They

being are

prior

the

first

to any beings

which

imitate the

things, the oldest things. Follow

by Euthyphron, Socrates formulates

Meletus'

charge as fol-

Interpretation

16

lows: Socrates is Socrates'

nizes as

been

defense

can

first things

made and as

poetic

in the

the gods,

One

beings. The would

"making."50

are

His

no sense

His

accuser

be forced to say that the first things

one would

alternative

conceive of

suggested

if it

glad

could

the

first things

as

making

Republic.)

or productive

the Euthyphron is so extreme that one

by

be

having

conceived of as

be

is the radically unpoetic view, was a poet. If one were to deny

view

that the gods made the ideas. (Tenth Book of the

and

be very

ideas,

the

in

as can

other things.

making

be forced to

would

of

beings

such

sense of

that the first things are

"inventing"). making gods (the Greek, poiein, be stated as follows. Socrates is the only one who recog

accused

How

evaded.51

it be

can

Let

avoided?

Euthyphron unwittingly left the right way. divined52 that doing what the gods do is superior to Euthyphron had

us

return to the point where

what

the gods tell

realized

or command us

among the gods, and preference. That principle

is

which

something

superior

dermining

therefore the oldest

have to If

having

we accept

sense of

with

gods.53

the ancestral,

In

order

to

recourse

to the

justice, i.e., of

way

ideas,

choosing

without un

point of view of ancestral

with

find

no

the old. The

best

custom,

gods will

out what the oldest god

is,54

we

be do

to any ideas. We simply have to consult the records of the

refer

the current stories as

is Uranos, the

in the

But is there

Indeed there is. From the

piety?

the good is identical

to be the idea of

proved

to the gods.

among the conflicting gods without

god

he

things, opposite things. He was therefore he had to appeal to a principle

choose

of choice or

past.

doing

perplexed when

that the different gods do different

forced to

not

he became

to do. But

grandfather of

doing

what

such

the gods

do,

same

as55

he

possible

learn that the

oldest

being

pious,

way

of

the

only way of being safely pious Uranos did, or to imitate Uranos. But

along Euthyphron's lines, is to do what what did Uranos do? He hurt or damaged his In Greek this is the

we

records,

Zeus. The only

He damaged the

children.

corrupted the young.

young.

That is to say, precisely

corrupting the young would Socrates be pious. Or the other way the pious Socrates chooses the only pious way, of picking the oldest god

by

around,56

model,

and

god, he is

therefore corrupts the young.

also

heaven. And

be identified

we

know from

Yet Uranos is other

not

Platonic57

only dialogues

as

his

a personal

that virtue

imitating heaven. Meletus on the other hand, who ac cuses the aged Socrates, and more particularly Euthyphron, who tries to destroy his own aged father, imitate Zeus, a relatively young god. They are impious. In can

addition

they

Meletus

and

are

inconsistent, for Zeus did

Euthyphron

respect the old point of

with

view,

who respect

gods, imitates Zeus.

except

not respect

the old gods.

the old gods, but

Socrates

Socrates

seems to

be

Hence

not

does

not

who

pious

from every

that of simple orthodoxy.

One may say that these are jokes. These statements are exposed to few difficulties, one of them being that while Uranos be said to be may the oldest god, he certainly is not the oldest divinity. Certainly mother earth is older than Uranos. And Socrates would probably not admit that a certainly58

quite a

man's virtue

Plato'

s

is incompatible not

his

with

imitating

female

a

own skill a woman's skill?

we cannot avoid

Let

female

god or a

us

therefore

the alternative, either the

ideas

Euthyphron in

being

repeat our

general.

17 Was

whether

question,

the gods. In other words,

or

why is it necessary to assert the primacy of the ideas? The Euthyphron suggests an alternative. Either the highest beings are fighting gods, or else the highest beings in

ideas. If

are

fighting

know. But of

able,

one

Why?

gods.

knowledge,

denies the primacy of the ideas, one arrives at the belief Why do the gods fight? Ultimately, because they do not genuine

knowledge, is

the knowledge

of

the unchange

the necessary, of intelligible necessity, of the ideas. That

knowledge is ideas. There

knowledge,

is

The ideas

prior.

of which

to knowledge of the

are prior

be knowledge if there is no primacy of the ideas. Therefore denies the primacy of the ideas, one denies the possibility of knowledge. If the ideas are not the primary beings, the primary beings or the first things

if

cannot

one

cannot will

be

knowing

fight. In is

whatever

other

beings. Their

be blind.

action must

They

will

words, if the primary beings are the gods, and

good or

just

will

be

good or

just because the

the

love it,

gods

they ideas,

collide, not

and

for

no other reason, for no intrinsic reason. The primary act is not knowledge or understanding but love without knowledge or understanding, i.e., blind desire. But is this alternative not overcome in monotheism? It is impossible to decide

this question on the basis of the "god"

never occurs.

Euthyphron, in

Still the Euthyphron

seems

which

I

believe59

the singular

to suggest that even the oldest

ideas. It is true if there is only one One61 that is in there no god, piety consists in imitating God. difficulty thinking must know that god is good or just or wise, i.e., that God complies with the

god60

be

must

rules62

made

justice. If that

of

rule were subject to

God,

God, if it could be changed by God, it God must be thought to be subject to

by

standard.

necessity, above

conceived of as subject to the

which

He did

not make.

or

dependent

could no

a

necessity,

God,

on

longer an

serve as

or a

intelligible

deny this, if we assume that God is bound by intelligible necessity, He cannot If

we

intelligible necessity, or not strict sense, for knowledge is knowledge

know in the

of

the intelligible and

unalterable necessity. In that case, God's actions would be altogether arbitrary. Nothing would be impossible to Him. For example, He could create other

gods,

and

the many gods,

who of course cannot

If piety is superfluous, if the gods men believe that piety is necessary

and63

men need gods?

The

the third definition of

ing

is

similar

oneself and

interprets it art.

to this

that the

is

question

According

to that

as

to that

doing

which slaves practice

the

follows.

master's

Piety

As such, it necessarily

poses then

that the gods

is

bidding.

an art of

serves a

suggested

are

practitioners

in the discussion

definition, piety

consists

tending

towards their masters,

Piety

is

a a

kind

serving art,

ruling

of

art.

a

of

in tend

the gods

in

of serving.

or architectonic art. of the

fight.

Why do

gods are necessary?

serving,

ruling

would

why then do almost all

the gods. More precisely, piety consists in a kind of

which

ing

answer piety.

have knowledge,

are superfluous,

prostrat

Socrates

ministering

Piety

presup But every art is

18

Interpretation What then does the

productive of something.

using human

its

arts as

ruling

art produce

while

Euthyphron merely answers, the gods

arts?64

ministerial

gods'

many fine things. He refuses to explain to an uninitiated man like Socrates what these many fine things are. And there can be no doubt that the

produce

many fine things which Euthyphron has in mind would not have rates. But Socrates also says in the context that, by answering the gods'

the

what

adequate

of piety.

understanding

immediate

context make

art of the gods. and

of the

products

farming.66

it

Socrates

ruling The

art

examples

he

clear what

are,65

one

Socrates

which men

try

to

reached an

gives

in the

regards as the specific product of

uses as examples of the

The fine things

Soc

question as

have

would

which

satisfied

the

ministering art, generalship

to acquire and produce

by

gener

harvest. Yet generalship and farming alship and farming are victory are not enough for producing victory and good harvest. For these arts cannot guarantee the outcome, and the outcome is what, in these arts, is the only thing and good

that

bad depends

good or

lable

by

art or

depends for the

Whether the

matters.

irrational The

gods.

gods are

upon chance.

knowledge,

man on chance

attempt

knows that he

generalship and of farming be Chance is that which is in no way control

or predictable

gods are meant

particular

art or

knowledge. But too

much

to control the uncontrollable, to control chance. Yet he

It is for this

cannot control chance.

the engine

by

of

to get resigned to the power of chance. Man makes

by

to do for him

which man

art, the

what

he

believes he

the gods in order to be the employer one

the use

outcome of

of

gods,

most architectonic

particularly depends on chance, and its complement. This is the legislative

reason

cannot

that he needs the

do for himself. The

can control chance.

or

of all

He

serves

the lord of gods. Yet there

human arts,

is

whose outcome

which67

the

just,

the noble, and the good,

knowledge is weights,

much

and which are

object of the

mary

more

art.

i.e.,

difficult

absolutely requires gods or piety as The legislative art is concerned with

with objects

than

regarding

which genuine

regarding numbers, measures domain of disagreement. The

therefore the natural

legislative

art

is the just. And it is

as a part of

and pri

justice that

piety is defined in the third and last definition. Piety is justice towards the gods, just as justice in the narrower sense is justice towards men. Justice to wards men

piety,

or

best be men.

have

good.

We have already seen that. What is doubtful is the status of gods. It would seem that the need for piety can from the deficiency or the limitation of the justice towards

justice towards the

understood

Now the

most serious

sufficient sanction

supplied must

is

by

piety

be in the

and

deficiency

in the

by

service of

eyes of

of

justice towards

irrational

the gods. But

justice in the

in

men

is that it does

It is this

not

is fulfill this function, piety sense. Justice in the narrower

people.

sanction that

order to

narrower

is primarily law-abidingness, or obedience to the law. Piety therefore must be a part of justice in this sense, that it must be a part of obedience to law. But law is primarily ancestral custom. Therefore piety stands or falls by obedience to ancestral custom. It is here where Socrates agrees with sense

orthodoxy

Plato's Euthyphron

19

the heretic, Euthyphron. Euthyphron disobeys ancestral custom by his own father of impiety. Socrates shows Euthyphron ad hominem accusing that he has no right to disobey ancestral custom. Now no wonder that he ap pears to Euthyphron as one of the people, as a vulgar man. We that may say

over against

both the

Socrates have

orthodox and

this I

common

sense,

whereas

Euthyphron lacks

that a society is possible on both orthodox and By Socratic principles, whereas society is not possible on Euthyphron's principles. For society is not possible if ancestral custom is not regarded as sacred as far as

common sense.

is

mean

It is for this

reason that Plato insisted on the necessity of laws punishing impiety. Liberals like ourselves are tempted to argue against Plato on the basis of Plato's own testimony. Does not Plato show us that in the practice

concerned.

both the many and of Socrates, Euthy being? And is not the ridiculous a harmless deficiency?

eyes of all men of common

phron

Why

is

a ridiculous

then

tolerate Euthyphron? But I hasten back to the dialogue.

not

The Euthyphron is dialogue. The in

procedure

of

sense,

a

very

dialogue. So indeed is every Platonic the Euthyphron consists in this. The normal

paradoxical

specific

a

paradoxy of Platonic dialogue in the type to

that the

interlocutor

view on

the subject

gives under

But the first definition

first

a

definition

which

the Euthyphron belongs is

which expresses

the

most common

discussion

suggested

and then gradually is led to a higher view. in the Euthyphron is in the decisive respect

last definition, which merely formulates the popular view of piety, meaning piety consists in sacrifice and prayer. More generally expressed, whereas the normal procedure in the Platonic dialogues is ascent from the lower superior to the

to the

higher,

the procedure followed in the Euthyphron is descent from the

higher to the lower. One

first place, Euthyphron namely, to orthodoxy an

unusually

tion of the

before the teus

was

could

phron of

suggests

the

most

uncompromising formula

the structure of this dialogue has this

Therefore, truth; B) explanation of the basic error. Shortly dialogue, Socrates compares Euthyphron to Proteus. Pro

exposition of the

wily

into

boars, liquid cannot

to conformity. In the second place, the Euthyphron is

dialogue. It

radical

end of

a

turn

the heretic must

or

paradoxy in two different ways. In the be brought back to where he belongs,

problem of piety.

A)

character:

can explain this

the

sea-god who could all

water,

kinds

of shapes

branching

only with great bearded lions,

difficulty

be

seized.

He

dragons, leopards, huge

trees. Euthyphron resembles Proteus because he

easily be seized, but changes his position all the time. Moreover, resembles Proteus because Proteus is unerring: he can tell all the

the gods. Now Socrates tries to seize

Euthyphron,

Euthy secrets

to force him to tell the

truth. Who tried to seize Proteus in the myth, to force him to tell the truth?

Menelaus. Just Socrates elaus?

as

resembles

Euthyphron imitates

Proteus, Socrates imitates Menelaus.

Menelaus. What does Socrates have in

Menelaus is the husband

of

Helen, just

far.68

as

common with

Men

Socrates is the husband

of

lead very Let us see in what context, or for what reason, Menelaus tried to seize Proteus. (Od. IV / 35 Iff.) Menelaus himself Xanthippe. This does

not

20

Interpretation

says, "At the river

Egypt,

of

back because I did

me

eager as

not make

1

was

to hasten

the

hither,

gods still

held

the offering due. And the gods wish us ever to Menelaus tried to seize Proteus because only

precepts."

be

their

of

mindful

Proteus

could

tell him how he could

get out of

he had

the trouble into which

not make the offering due. Socrates tried to seize Euthy because only Euthyphron could tell him how he could get out of the due. It trouble into which he had come because he did not make the come

because he did

phron

offerings69

this

seems that

state of

in the Phaedo: "We the

reason

should

I

do, but he

said at

truth. That

asked

him

cock,"70

a

last

word

to

Crito

as one might well understand

purely theoretical question, What is

a

that the Euthyphron conveys to us an

beginning irritating half-truth is the

for the

superfluous except

know it?

we

From the

phenomena?

By

piety?

irritating

half-

piety is superfluous and that the gods are Why is it a half-truth? Because we know that

that

many.

indeed the

the gods exist. Not

How do

Asclepius

However this may be, Socrates failed where Menelaus succeeded. is obvious. Socrates did not ask his Proteus what he, Socrates,

passage.

The

things throws some light on

still owe

Socrates'

city of Athens, but the living gods. By demonstration starting from what

gods of the

demonstration.

phenomena of

Plato has indicated the half-true

of

motion,

character of

self-motion,

life,

the soul.

of

the message conveyed through the "soul."

Euthyphron on

the

ideas,

there is no

by

truth

by

using that word, the term the silence about the soul, Plato

and

for the

place

In conclusion, I to

like to say

Banquet,

a

word

about

serious of all subjects.

I

interpretation73

might

have been

remind you of the end of

fulfills

which I take to mean that philosophy

highest function

what

half-

the somewhat jocular character of the argument,

you,72

that is devoted to the most the

the appearance that

Plato probably would have justified this that the ideas are at any rate above the soul.

would

some of

creates

emphasis

gods.

the consideration

offensive

Through the

never

single-handed the

both comedy and tragedy. Both the traditional and current Plato may be said to bring out the tragic element in Plato's

of

of

thought, but they neglect the comic element except where it hits one in the face. Many reasons can be given for this failure. I mention only one. Modern research

cate

in Plato

in Germany, the country

originated

why the element of comedy is of crucial

without comedy.

importance in Plato, I

To indi

read

to

you

few lines from the only Platonist I know of who had an appreciation of this element, Sir Thomas More. I quote: "For to prove that this life is no laughing time, but rather the time of weeping, we find that our Saviour Himself wept twice or thrice, but never find we that He laughed as much as once. I will not a

swear that on the

He

said about

Jesus

laughed twice slight

never

other side.

or

For the

leastwise He left

Plato tells

thrice, but of

at the

us ensample of

with what

bias in favor

philosophy.

did, but

He left

never

laughing75

beginning

of

weeping."

us about

find

we

us no ensample of

If

Socrates,

that he wept

and against

philosophy

weeping as

it. But

we compare what we

More find that "Socrates

as much as

seems to

be

once."7J

A

essential to

the philosophers understood it

Plato'

s

is

fear

the

not

Lord, but

the

of

wonder.

Its

spirit

is

Euthyphron

hope

not

fear

and76

21 and

trembling, but serenity on the basis of resignation. To that serenity, laughing is a little bit more akin than weeping. Whether the Bible is right or philosophy is of course

the only

question which first77

ultimately

But in

matters.

order

to

under

it philosophy as it is. One from the outset through Biblical glasses. Wherever each of us may stand, no respectable purpose is served by trying to prove that we eat the cake and have stand

that question, one

it. Socrates

his

all

used

must

must not see

see

to awaken those who

powers

slumber of

thoughtlessness. We ill follow

for putting

ourselves

(Transcription

to

his

example

if

out of the

think,

can

we use

his authority

sleep.

author)7

by

not checked

NOTES

The

is

following key

notes.

For

a

to

identify

the

sources

used

discussion

of

the sources of the variant readings to be recorded in these

themselves,

see

the

editorial preface.

FT: first typescript ST:

second typescript

AST:

altered second typescript

(ST

as revised

by

handwritten alterations)

eds: editors

1

common"

"common" .

2. "tells 3. 4.

us

"satisfying"

"but"

FT;

7.

"deeds"

9. 10.

AST.

AST.

from ST.

customs" custom"

"careless"

AST.

"suspected"

"criminal"

"profusely"

AST.

ST.

"ignorance"

"ignorant"

FT, ST.

"ancestral

AST;

"deed"

FT, ST; FT, ST; FT; ST; AST;

"suspect"

8.

AST.

or consists of

"gratifying"

absent

5. "ancestral 6.

FT, ST; "most FT, ST; "conveys FT, ST;

the"

FT.

"profusedly"

FT, ST.

11. "himself AST; "itself FT, ST. AST. 12. "We FT, ST; "He had"

have"

"visionary"

FT, ST. AST; AST. FT, ST; "we AST. 15. FT, ST; 16. FT, with handwritten brackets around ST; FT. 17. "not so good ST; "not the good FT. ST, but 18. "profusely eds; "profusedly AST. than Professor Strauss's above the line in FT; "openly AST. 19. FT, ST; AST. 20. "He belongs FT, ST; "He belongs as little to it 21. "to say the FT, ST; crossed out in AST. 13.

"missionary"

14. "he

have"

has"

"such"

"these"

"un."

"unjust"

"just"

poets"

poets"

"professedly"

say"

say"

written

in

a

hand

other

declare"

'"theology"'

"theology"

as"

firstly"

least"

22. At this

point

Professor Strauss's

there

own

is

hand

a paragraph reads

"no

every"

23.

"prudently.

For

break in both FT

and

ST. A

para."

FT, ST; "prudently:

every"

AST.

marginal

note

in ST in

22

Interpretation that"

24. "I personally believe 25. "just and pious together "just

FT, ST.

"Perhaps"

AST. prudent and pious together with

prudence"

with

eds;

"just

FT, ST;

prudent"

and

"setting"

26. 27.

AST.

pious, and also

AST; ST;

"second"

"Meletus"'

28. In AST there is "cf. Diodotus in

reads

"he"

29.

ST;

FT. beside this

a marginal note

which

from FT.

absent

FT, ST; "This is the sum of but crossed ST;

the change that occurs

"singularity"

"similarity''

in Professor Strauss's hand

sentence

Thucydides."

all."

30. "This is 31.

FT, ST.

"Socrates'"

in FT;

out

in

"similarity?"

dialogue."

AST.

the

typed above the

line in

FT. "

32.

knowledge

a shortcut to

by

things"

the divine

of

added at

the end of the sentence

in

AST. believes"

33. "not the

believing in the FT, ST.

gods

in

AST; "not believing

the city

which

the gods which

believes"

city 34.

"notes"

"knows"

"taste"

35.

AST. FT, ST; AST. FT, ST; AST. FT, ST; ST; absent from FT. AST. FT, ST; FT, ST. AST; "means AST. FT, ST; AST. FT, ST; "'case'"

"informing"

"animating"

36.

"view"

37.

"forestalls"

"prevented"

38.

"means,"

39.

40.

that,"

"thought"

"said"

"denial"

41.

42. "Or, to 43.

"rejection"

use a more up-to-date

"considerations"

44. FT but

not

FT, ST;

ST leaves

"observation"

45.

term, it is

"consideration"

an additional space

FT, ST;

"aspiration'

deviationist."

FT, ST;

crossed out

in AST.

AST. between this

paragraph and

the

next.

AST.

denying"

denying"

must leave it at simply eds; "one must leave it as simply FT; "one leave it (at) as simply AST. ST; "one must be willing simply to 47. "By pleasing one god one will displease the FT, ST; "What pleases one god will

46. "one

denying"

deny"

must

other."

displease

another."

AST.

imitate"

48.

"why

49. "One

one must can also

52.

"evaded"

"divined"

53. "The best

say

'making'"

50. "poetic in the

51.

imitate"

AST. FT, ST; "to AST. FT, ST; "To go a step FT, ST; crossed out in AST. further,"

that"

sense of

FT, ST; AST;

"avoided"

"denied"

AST.

FT, ST.

be therefore the

gods will

gods."

FT, ST; "The best

oldest

god will therefore

be

god."

AST

the oldest

54. "In

order

to find out what the oldest god

is"

FT, ST; "In

order to

discover

which was

the

god"

AST.

oldest

55. "In Greek this is the 56. "Or the

57.

as"

same

ST (crossed

"Platonic"

FT, ST; "Or,

way "personal"

ST;

58. "One may say that these believe"

jokes. These statements

eds;

one"

AST. The

They

take

are

certainly"

a stand which

FT, ST; "if I remember AST. FT, ST; "only

One"

61. "God.

is"

FT.

FT, ST. "One may say is"

certainly

AST.

correctly"

AST.

God"

god"

60. "oldest

in AST); "In Greek, the saying AST.

alternatively,"

FT.

are

that these remarks are tinged with levity.

59. "I

out

around,"

other

"god,

One"

FT; "god.

one"

ST; "God. But before

have followed AST in capitalizing

editors

one can

imitate God

"God"

throughout the

remainder of this

paragraph.

62. 63. 64. AST.

"rules"

"and"

FT, ST; FT, ST;

"using

"rule"

AST.

"or"

human

AST.

arts as

its

arts"

ministerial

FT, ST; "using

a

human

art as a ministerial

art"

Plato'

s

65. "the

gods'

products of the

are"

AST; "the

art

ruling

23

Euthyphron gods'

product of the

ruling

are"

arts

FT, ST. 66. In AST there is refers

a marginal note

67.

"therefore"

68. "it 69.

added at this point

sentence

in Professor Strauss's hand

which

added at the end of the sentence

"offerings"

FT;

"offering"

73. "current

due,"

against

76.

77.

"first"

FT, ST;

to some of

FT, ST; "the

interpretations"

current

has been

crossed out

crossed out

in AST. The

passage

began

above

one."

only bias in favor of

FT, ST; FT, ST;

laughing"

laughing"

of

"in"

FT, ST; "Yet

AST. (See

note

a slight

bias in favor

of

comedy

and

74.)

AST.

crossed out

in AST. author)"

78. "(Transcription preface.)

in AST.

AST.

mention

tragedy, in favor "and"

in AST.

you,"

offensive

end of a passage which

the sentence, "I slight

added at this point

offering out in AST.

interpretation"

74. This is the

in AST.

ST.

make the

71. "of FT, ST; crossed 72. "what might have been

75. "A

in AST.

seems"

70. "we forgot to

with

beside this

to Xenophon's Memorabilia 1.1.

not checked

by

FT, ST;

crossed out

in AST. (See the

editorial